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78–817 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–408

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

IN HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

JACK REED, Rhode Island

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

BILL NELSON, Florida

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

JOHN WARNER, Virginia

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

DAVID S. LYLES, Staff Director

LES BROWNLEE, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

OCTOBER 25, 2001

Page

White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army and Interim Department

of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security .......................................... 6

Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .......................... 8

Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander in Chief, United States Space

Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command ............................... 10

Kernan, Gen. William F., USA, Commander in Chief, United States Joint

Forces Command .................................................................................................. 12

(III)

(1)

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in room SR–

222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman)

presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Cleland, Landrieu,

Reed, Akaka, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, Inhofe, Santorum, Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.

Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director.

Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel;

Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis,

professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member;

Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Republican

staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director for the minority; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; William C.

Greenwalt, professional staff member; Gary M. Hall, professional

staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member;

George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional

staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff member; Scott W.

Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Jennifer L. Naccari, and

Nicholas W. West.

Committee members’ assistants present: Craig Bury, assistant to

Senator Byrd; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator

Cleland; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to

Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;

Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K.

Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to

Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton;

Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts;

Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney,

Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to

Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins;

and Derek Mauer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. The committee

meets today to receive testimony on the role of the Department of

Defense in homeland security.

The committee welcomes Thomas White, Secretary of the Army,

who has been designated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as the

Interim Executive Agent for Homeland Security. Welcome also Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, joined by

our two military leaders with direct responsibility for military contributions to homeland security, Gen. William Kernan, Commander

in Chief, Joint Forces Command, which includes the Joint Task

Force-Civil Support that coordinates military assistance to civilian

authorities in the event of a major incident or attack on U.S. soil,

and Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command, Gen. Ralph

Eberhart, who joins us in his capacity as Commander in Chief of

NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command. We

welcome both of you.

On behalf of the entire committee, let me welcome each of you

to the committee for a very important hearing. We had planned to

hold this hearing in the larger central hearing room in the Hart

Senate Office Building, but that building remains closed because of

anthrax contamination, so our very setting today underscores the

new threats facing the United States.

This committee has focused on these threats for several years. In

1998, Senator Warner created with my support the Emerging

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, chaired first by Senator

Roberts and now by Senator Landrieu. At extensive hearings, the

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee has focused on

improving the ability of the Armed Forces to meet nontraditional

threats including nonterrorism and unconventional means of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, based partly on those hearings, a Combatting Terrorism

Initiative to improve the ability of U.S. forces to deter and defend

against terrorism was approved by this committee in the National

Defense Authorization Bill, which we voted to approve prior to the

horrific terrorist attacks of September 11. We had acted in that

way prior to September 11, but the attacks on New York and

Washington have prompted an unprecedented military role in ensuring the security of the United States and the American people.

The extraordinary has become the ordinary. In their State capacity, National Guardsmen stand guard at airports throughout the

Nation. U.S. military aircraft, assisted by NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft, routinely patrol American skies. U.S. warships patrol our shores. These aircraft and warships are prepared to carry

out a once unthinkable mission, if approved by the chain of command: to shoot down hijacked U.S. civilian airliners that threaten

Americans on the ground.

These are extraordinary responses to an extraordinary threat,

and they require a reexamination of the proper role of the U.S.

Armed Forces in helping to ensure the security of the American

people. That reexamination and reorganization has already begun.

On September 30, the Department of Defense released its report on

the Quadrennial Defense Review, which elevated the mission of

homeland defense to the Department’s ‘‘highest priority.’’

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On October 2, the Secretary of Defense designated Army Secretary White as the Interim Department of Defense Executive

Agent for Homeland Security. On October 8, the President designated Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the new Assistant to

the President for Homeland Security. On October 12, the President

designated Secretary White as the Acting Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

The Commander in Chief of NORAD, General Eberhart, now exercises operational control of military aircraft over the United

States, to include their mission of flying combat air patrols over

New York, Washington, and other cities. Under General Kernan,

the Joint Task Force-Civil Support stands ready to coordinate military assistance to civilian authorities in the event of a major incident or attack on U.S. soil.

Overarching all of these efforts is the Posse Comitatus Act of

1878, a criminal statute that prescribes the limited circumstances

under which the United States Armed Forces can be used to enforce the domestic law. That act states: ‘‘Whoever, except in cases

and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution

or act of Congress, wilfully uses any part of the Army or the Air

Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws, shall

be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or

both.’’ It is because this act does not apply to National Guardsmen

in their State status that guardsmen are now being employed at

airports.

This new environment requires careful consideration of some important questions by the committee. Among them are the following:

What exactly is the definition of homeland security, and to what

extent should the Department of Defense be involved in homeland

security?

How does the Department of Defense relate to the Office of the

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge’s new

office?

Is the Department of Defense organized properly to deal with the

many aspects of homeland security? For instance, is there a need

for a new Commander in Chief, or CINC, for homeland security to

coordinate the various military contributions to homeland security?

If so, how would that command interact with NORAD and the

Joint Forces Command? Is it appropriate for a Service Secretary to

be in the chain of command?

Should the Posse Comitatus Act be revised or repealed? If so, do

we want the Armed Forces enforcing the law, as would be required

in an insurrection? What impact would training our Armed Forces

to make arrests, seize property, and preserve evidence have on

their capabilities and readiness to accomplish their warfighting

mission?

Should every State have a weapons of mass destruction civil support team, such as the 32 already authorized and 27 already established, to assist civilian authorities in responding to an incident or

attack on U.S. soil involving weapons of mass destruction?

While there has been a tendency in the past to use the Armed

Forces to support civilian authorities in such events, is that still realistic, given the Armed Forces involvement in a war that is likely

to last for an extended period of time?

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Secretary White, we know that you and your colleagues do not

have all the answers to all those and other questions yet. We are

only 6 weeks removed from the attacks of September 11. We are

19 days into the military campaign against the Al Qaeda terrorist

network and their Taliban protectors. But in times of national

emergency, few questions are as important as the proper role of the

U.S. Armed Forces in defending the Nation and the American people, especially if that mission takes them not only overseas, but to

the skies and to the streets of America itself. We look forward to

hearing the options that you are now considering, or the decisions

that you have already made, to address this new and evolving mission.

Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,

your excellent opening statement embraced much of the text that

I have here, and so I will ask unanimous consent to put mine in

the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made a part of the record.

Senator WARNER. There are several comments I would like to

make. I would like to read two sentences: ‘‘The protection of America itself will assume a high priority in a new century. Once a strategic afterthought, homeland defense has become an urgent duty.’’

That was incorporated in a speech given by President Bush, then

Candidate Bush, at The Citadel University in South Carolina in

September 1999. We are fortunate that our President had the presence of mind and the foresight to look into the future to begin to

prepare America for the exact task that is before us.

Second, our committee, as my distinguished chairman acknowledged, did establish a subcommittee some 3 years ago when I was

privileged to occupy that chair, but it was a joint action by all Senators around this committee. We laid a solid foundation in those

several years, under Senator Roberts and Senator Bingaman, and

other members of that subcommittee. The very teams you referred

to, the civil defense teams, previously known as Rapid Assessment

Initial Detection (RAID) teams, were an outgrowth of the work of

the Department and that subcommittee.

Much has to be done now, and it has been entrusted to you gentlemen and your subordinates. I cannot recall, really in the history

of the United States, and I have been privileged to live longer than

just about everybody in this room, when a greater challenge has

been posed to a man or woman, whether they be President, or an

ordinary citizen, to meet this challenge and keep America strong

and going.

Earlier in this very room, the Subcommittee on Emerging

Threats and Capabilities, under the chairmanship of Senator

Landrieu, held a hearing with the former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn, on the potential threat of smallpox, a disease that

was eradicated when I was a young man. Yesterday the chairman

and I had the privilege of sitting with the President of the United

States, the Vice President, members of his Cabinet, and several

other Members of Congress as we worked with the new Cabinet officer, Governor Ridge, who you referred to.

5

I just mention those things so that those citizens following this

hearing should understand that there are no politics in this battle,

in this war we are waging, whether it is in Afghanistan by the superb leadership of the men and women of the Armed Forces or here

at home. We are all in it together, and we cannot allow our lives

not to go forward because of our children and future generations,

and because so much of the world depends upon the United States

of America to remain strong and free, and to lead in the cause of

freedom.

You are here today to outline your initiatives with regard to following through on the President’s speech given 13 months ago, and

the foundations that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have laid down and charged you with. We wish you well, gentlemen, and generations will look back hopefully grateful to your

contributions and those of your subordinates.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing on

the Defense Department’s role in homeland security. I join you in welcoming our

witnesses today.

We meet today as our Nation remains under attack, and regrettably, will remain

under attack from terrorists who have used unimaginable threats, and as our

Armed Forces are engaged in operations against those responsible for the September

11 attacks. Our thoughts and prayers are with those who have suffered as a result

of these continuing attacks on our Nation, and with the men and women of the

Armed Forces who are in harm’s way, defending our freedom.

I commend our President and members of his administration for the actions they

have taken to respond to the attacks of September 11. It is important to note, however, that President Bush identified homeland security as his highest priority long

before the heinous attacks of September 11. In speeches at The Citadel in September 1999 and at the National Defense University in May 2001, President Bush

called for a primary emphasis on homeland security and the transformation of our

Armed Forces to be able to deter, detect, and defeat the very different threats we

face in the 21st century. I want to highlight a quote from then-Governor Bush’s

Citadel speech of September 23, 1999:

‘‘The protection of America itself will assume a high priority in a new century. Once a strategic afterthought, homeland defense has become an urgent duty.’’

We have experienced a great tragedy in our Nation and a blow to our sense of

security and freedom. We do not know from where the next challenge to our freedom, security and vital national interests will come, but of one thing we can be

sure—it will come, and we must be ready to confront the full spectrum of threats

the enemies of freedom may direct toward our country.

I think it is critically important that we all recognize that we must not focus only

on this most recent terrorist attack. Our review of homeland defense and homeland

security must look at all aspects of our Nation’s vulnerability. Because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world, and the related proliferation of ballistic missile technologies to deliver such weapons, we must include

ballistic missile defense in any concept of homeland security.

These recent attacks on our Nation show, with complete clarity, that our adversaries will use any means they have at their disposal to attack the United States

and indiscriminately kill American citizens. They have now killed thousands with

hijacked airplanes. This form of attack took the world by surprise. How will the terrorists, or any other potential adversaries, strike next? We must be prepared.

I also raise another issue—a controversial issue—and would welcome the thoughts

of our witnesses. On October 11, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld asking that he reexamine the long-standing Posse Comitatus doctrine in light of the September 11

attacks. This doctrine—which prohibits the involvement of the Armed Forces in civilian law enforcement—has served America well since its adoption in 1878. But,

6

in light of recent events and the unique capabilities that the Armed Forces can

bring to emergency situations, is it not time to re-examine this doctrine?

I thank all of our witnesses for your extraordinary service to our Nation, and for

your testimony today. I cannot overstate the importance and urgency of this subject

we will discuss today—a collective effort to understand the role of our defense structure in protecting our homeland, as well as protecting our vital interests around the

world.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have never seen

a Nation more united than we are in the war against terrorism. I

have never seen Congress as united as they are in this war. A huge

burden has been placed on you, gentlemen, and we know you are

up to it, but we are there to support you in every possible way that

we can.

I want to just take 30 seconds for a scheduling note which is important to all of us, because it is so difficult for us to rearrange

schedules.

Tomorrow morning we will meet in S–407 of the Capitol at 9:30

a.m. to receive an update briefing from the Office of the Secretary

of Defense and JCS officials on the ongoing military operations in

Afghanistan. Staff attendance will again be restricted because of

the classification level.

This morning, at the conclusion of our conference meeting with

the House, Chairman Stump and I agreed that we would make

completing our conference our highest priority for next week. Members of the committee therefore can expect full conference meetings

with the House throughout next week, starting on Wednesday

morning. We are going to have a back-to-back conference on

Wednesday, and then we will continue on Thursday, hopefully finish on Thursday, if not Friday, and of course we will get the exact

details of our schedule to the members of this committee as soon

as possible.

Thank you very much.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, does that mean we are not going

to be doing the late Tuesday afternoon meeting we had previously

discussed?

Chairman LEVIN. That is correct.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary White.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE

ARMY AND INTERIM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE

AGENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Secretary WHITE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, distinguished

members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear

before you in my role as Interim Department of Defense Executive

Agent for Homeland Security, along with my colleagues who you

have already recognized: General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; General Eberhart, Commander in Chief, North

American Aerospace Defense Command; and General Kernan,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief opening statement

on behalf of all of us, and then respond to any questions the committee may have, if that is acceptable to you.

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Before I begin, I would like to make one thing very clear. The

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review published last month restores

the defense of the United States as the Department’s primary mission. Put another way, homeland security is the number 1 job for

the United States military, and it has our full attention. I would

like to assure the members of the committee and the American people that we will spare no effort in our endeavor to protect this Nation from aggression.

The attacks of 11 September and since prove beyond doubt that

terrorism is a permanent part of our future. Our traditional response to terrorism at the Department of Defense level has been

to organize around crisis management and consequence management functions, with the former being an activity managed by the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, while the latter is principally accommodated by

the Director of Military Support within the Department of the

Army.

In my view, that construct no longer works. It is far more useful

to view homeland security as an overarching effort that includes

two simultaneous and mutually supporting functions. First is

homeland defense, a DOD-led task involving protection of the

United States in areas where we in the Department of Defense

have unique military capabilities such as air defense. The fighter

aircraft flying combat air patrols over Washington and New York

City under the operational command of General Eberhart are a

prime example of the homeland defense mission.

Second is civil support, where DOD provides assistance to a lead

Federal agency, which can range from the FBI, for domestic

counterterrorism tasks, to Health and Human Services, for biological attacks. Key to this civil support effort is a layered approach,

beginning with local and State first-responders, progressing

through deployment of State-controlled National Guard units, and

then finally to application of Federal assets, including unique DOD

capabilities on an exception basis.

Above all, homeland security demands a comprehensive approach

to accommodate evolving threats and the reality of finite resources.

Properly focusing on this complex mission and providing the coordination necessary for joint and interagency integration requires, in

my opinion, a reorganization of DOD efforts. From my perspective,

there are three fundamental tasks that must be accomplished if we

are to be successful.

First, DOD must consolidate its efforts in homeland defense into

a single staff organization. This will enhance the coordination of

policy planning and resource allocation responsibilities that relate

to homeland security. By focusing our efforts, we can avoid gaps

and duplication in capabilities while dramatically improving the

quality of our planning and responsiveness.

Second, we must develop operational arrangements for the future. Currently, the military responsibilities for homeland security

are assigned to several of the Unified Commanders on an interim

basis, pending revision of the Unified Command Plan, and that, of

course, includes North American Air Defense Command, Aerospace

Defense Command and Air Defense Space Command, and Cyber

and Info, Land and Maritime with Joint Forces Command.

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I will defer operational details to other members of the panel, but

I want to emphasize a key point. As we look to the future, apportionment of forces must be balanced between meeting warfighting

requirements abroad and the need to defend America at home, and

this is a concurrent activity, obviously, from what we are doing

today. This is a threshold event with, in my opinion, profound implications for the military.

As for the last task, we must improve the interagency coordination process to guarantee timely and efficient cooperation among

the many Federal, state, and local organizations that have or share

homeland security responsibilities. I have already met with Governor Ridge, as you have stated, the President’s Special Assistant

for Homeland Security. I have assured him the Department will

fully assist his office in the execution of his mission.

While doing so, DOD will continue to focus on its broad and critical responsibilities: defending our Nation against attacks of war

and terrorism, providing the capacity to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive events of socalled weapons of mass destruction, whether intentional or unintentional, and supporting lead agencies in the event of natural disasters.

The victims of a disastrous event do not necessarily distinguish

between whether the event was a result of actions of non-State terrorists or State actors engaging in a war, or just an unfortunate

accident. What matters to the American people is the knowledge

that our homeland is secure against any and all threats. We in the

Department of Defense stand ready to do our part to meet that

challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this invitation. This concludes my

statement. I look forward to the committee’s questions, along with

my colleagues. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. General Pace.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN,

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members of

the committee. I do deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again today and to have one more opportunity to say

thank you for the very strong, sustained bipartisan support of this

committee for all the men and women in your Armed Forces.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my written statement entered into the record and save the time to answer your

questions.

[The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. PETER PACE, USMC

INTRODUCTION

On behalf of General Myers, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear

before this committee to discuss the important topic of Homeland Security. It is an

honor to be here. I should also thank Congress, and especially the members of this

committee, for your enduring and significant support of America’s Armed Forces.

Your deep commitment to our great men and women in uniform, who today are

waging war against international terrorist organizations, is very much appreciated.

Of course, it was the tragic events of September 11 that led to this hearing. So

let me also add, on behalf of General Myers and the Joint Chiefs, that our hearts

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and prayers go out to the thousands of innocent Americans and other victims who

lost their lives or were injured that day, as well as to their families, friends, and

colleagues.

SEPTEMBER 11

Six weeks ago the terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade

Center shocked the world. Today, we who serve in uniform join with the rest of

America, and with our friends and allies around the world, in a multinational effort

to take down the network of terrorist organizations responsible for these acts. No

one should mistake our unified purpose and strength of our resolve. We did not ask

for this fight, but we will win it. The dastardly act of terrorism against America

will in no way diminish our commitments to our allies, and it will in no way prevent

our military from performing its duties and responsibilities to defend the United

States’ interests around the world.

As President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have frequently noted, this is a new

type of war—one that will require an unprecedented pooling of all elements of our

national power, at all levels of government. It is also a war that will require us to

work in close concert with our friends and allies to maximize our effectiveness.

Our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily,

continue to spend millions of dollars each year on terrorist organizations that target

U.S. citizens, property, and interests. These terrorists are indiscriminate killers who

attack where and when their victims are most vulnerable. They seek to find and

exploit perceived weaknesses, striking at us with what we call ‘‘asymmetric means’’

to achieve their goals. The September 11 attacks were the most recent example of

this strategy. Attacks such as these further reinforce the necessity of improving our

ability to protect our homeland and the American people from future attacks.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Defending the homeland has always been a vital mission for the military. Our traditional national military strategy has been to defend the homeland by engaging

threats beyond our Nation’s shores; however, the September 11 attacks have graphically illustrated the need to do more to meet this threat. We must now focus on improving our levels of security here at home, with appropriate deference to our constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, while simultaneously continuing our strategy of

detecting and defeating threats outside our Nation’s borders.

This new emphasis is reflected in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Report, which states: ‘‘The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.’’ The report also states that ‘‘The U.S. will maintain sufficient

military forces to protect U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical infrastructure . . .’’

Homeland security also involves providing appropriate military assistance to the

responsible civilian authorities to mitigate the consequences of such attacks. So we

divide Homeland Security into two major subsets, Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

The Homeland Defense piece of Homeland Security is about warfighting missions,

with the military clearly in the lead. These missions include the defense of maritime, land, and aero-space approaches to the United States. In the future, this will

include defense against ballistic missiles.

Today, your Armed Forces are conducting many of these missions. For example,

we have over 100 military aircraft involved in fighter Combat Air Patrols (CAP) and

on strip alert for increased air defense; approximately 18,000 National Guard personnel are stationed in airports, port facilities, and other critical infrastructure sites

reassuring our public, deterring future attacks, and providing temporary increased

security capabilities to other lead Federal agencies; and finally, the U.S. Coast

Guard has established over 90 coastal Security Zones on both the east and west

coasts, using 60 cutters and patrol boats.

The Civil Support piece of Homeland Security is where the military provides support to other lead Federal agencies to help manage the consequences of a Weapons

of Mass Destruction (WMD) event, assist in disaster relief efforts, and provide some

counter-terrorism support. The Department of Defense also provides unique capabilities to respond to the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and

high explosive weapons of mass destruction, complementing Federal, state and local

first responder capabilities.

Even before the horrific events of September 11, we had been exploring organizational improvements to support Homeland Security. For example, on 1 October

1999, we established Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS), an organization that

is now fully operational under the command of General William Kernan, ComVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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mander in Chief, United States Joint Forces Command. This standing JTF currently

has a major role in the development of training and doctrine associated with providing support to civilian first-responders for a WMD event. JTF-CS also provides expertise and command and control to those DOD assets deployed in support of civil

authorities.

Additionally, on 1 November 1998 we created another standing task force to defend the Defense Information Infrastructure against cyber-aggression. Our Task

Force-Computer Network Operations currently operates under the command of General Ralph Eberhart, Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command.

In the wake of the attack, we have placed an even greater emphasis on these missions while continuing to examine other steps to more effectively respond to emerging threats. We are also in the process of carefully reviewing our Unified Command

Plan (UCP). Currently a number of Combatant Commanders are assigned different

roles within our homeland defense mission. Consequently, we are looking at ways

of eliminating any seams that may exist between the various organizations and

agencies involved in the Homeland Security efforts. We will be reviewing the UCP

with an eye toward developing a seamless command and control of all DOD assets—

active, reserve, guard, and civilians—required to execute our Homeland Security responsibilities.

This past July, we established a new Homeland Security Division within the

Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff. This new division will serve

as the focal point for the development and coordination of the military strategy and

policy aspects of Homeland Security. Additionally, we recently established a General

Officer Steering Committee to facilitate the coordination of Homeland Security

issues.

Of course Homeland Security is not a DOD-only effort. An effective Homeland Security posture requires that multiple Federal departments, agencies, state and local

governments, and the military all work together as a team. Therefore, anything we

do within DOD must be synchronized as part of a comprehensive interagency effort.

DOD is currently represented in key interagency-working groups, identifying and

responding to emerging homeland security requirements.

Indeed, an overall Homeland Security strategy of preventing and deterring future

attacks, while simultaneously protecting the American people and our critical infrastructure, demands improved communication and sharing of information across the

government. It also demands a laser-like focus and unity of effort, and this is where

Governor Ridge and his team at the Office of Homeland Security will play such a

critical role.

CONCLUSION

The Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and I recognize that much work remains to be

done. Together, with Secretary White, DOD’s new Executive Agent for Homeland

Security, we will get the job done. For inspiration we need look no further than the

mountain of rubble in New York City or the gaping hole in the Pentagon where so

many from our DOD family were suddenly taken from us. We will continue to focus

our attention on efforts to protect our homeland, our people, and our national interests.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. General Eberhart, do

you have a comment?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND/

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General EBERHART. Sir, in the interest of time, I will submit my

statement for the record also, and I add my thanks to those of the

Vice Chairman for your continued support over the years, and more

so for your support in the upcoming weeks and months as we challenge this task ahead of us.

[The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF

Senator Levin, Senator Warner and members of the committee: Though the circumstances that led to this hearing are tragic, it is an honor to appear before you

to represent the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace Defense

11

Command (NORAD). Our hearts and prayers go out to those great American heroes

who lost their lives or were injured on September 11, 2001, as well as their families

and friends.

Our combined U.S. and Canadian response to the unprecedented terrorist attacks

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was a tribute to the professionalism

of our people. We are proud to be part of the national security team now focused

on defeating terrorism.

MISSIONS

For 43 years NORAD adapted to the changing threats—transitioning from an initial ‘‘air’’ defense orientation to a broader aerospace dimension—one that provides

surveillance and warning of ballistic missile attacks and space events. The unprecedented attacks on 11 September 2001 were a reminder to our Nation of the need

to detect, validate and warn of hostile aircraft or missile attack against North America. Proper attack assessment ensures the U.S. National Command Authorities and

the Prime Minister of Canada can take appropriate action in response to an attack.

Clearly, our ability to provide surveillance and control of U.S. and Canadian airspace remains vital and constitutes a critical component to the defense of North

America.

NORAD’s mission now has clearly expanded to protect North America against a

domestic airborne threat. Prior to 11 September 2001, our air defense posture was

aligned to counter the perceived external threats to North America air sovereignty.

Within this context, our aerospace control and air defense missions have traditionally been oriented to detect and identify all aircraft entering North American airspace, and if necessary, intercept potentially threatening inbound air traffic. These

threats were generally considered as hostile aircraft carrying bombs or cruise missiles. Based on the recent events, we are now also focused on threats originating

within domestic airspace such as hijacked aircraft. While we have adjusted to provide a rapid response to domestic air threats, we continue to execute our previously

assigned missions.

NORAD’S RESPONSE

On 11 September 2001, we quickly transitioned to an interoperable, joint and

interagency force consisting of active and National Guard units, U.S. and Canadian

military aircraft and U.S. Navy ships. Additionally, we have positioned portable air

control radars to more rapidly respond to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requests for assistance. We are also working together with FAA representatives to access FAA radar data and now maintain a continuous communications loop.

With the approval of the President and the Secretary of Defense, we now have

streamlined the Rules of Engagement for hostile acts over domestic airspace to ensure the safety of our citizens and critical infrastructure. We have increased our

alert posture from 20 fighter aircraft standing alert to more than 100 U.S. and Canadian aircraft. These aircraft and aircrews now support the continuous combat air

patrols over Washington, DC, and New York, as well as random patrols over other

metropolitan areas and key infrastructure. They remain on a high state of alert at

26 air bases across the country.

As a result of this heightened posture, our air defense activity has increased significantly. Last year, we scrambled fighter aircraft 7 times (including exercises)

from 10 September–10 October 2000. During the same period this year, we scrambled 41 times, and we diverted 48 fighter patrols from ongoing combat air patrols

to assess tracks of interest, for a total of 89 events. Likewise, all of our units supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE have experienced a significant increase in

NORAD-related flying sorties. Normally, our units fly 4–6 sorties a month in support of the NORAD air defense mission. Since 11 September 2001, several of our

units such as the one at Otis ANGB in Massachusetts have flown in excess of 100

sorties in the last month (approximately one-third of Otis’ entire yearly flying program).

CHALLENGES

From a resource perspective, we must address our manpower shortfalls at the

units charged with conducting our aerospace warning and control missions. The administration’s call-up of Reserve and National Guard forces was the right solution.

In the near term, we need to ensure we allocate these forces to meet our greatest

needs in the field. For the longer term, the execution of our National Military Strategy will hinge on our ability to attract and retain high quality, motivated servicemen and women and civilian employees. As always, our tremendous warfighting capability depends on our people. If we take care of them, they will take care of our

12

mission. Without them, even our most effective weapon systems are of little value.

Congress’ initiatives to improve military and civilian pay, health care and housing

for our professionals in uniform are a step in the right direction. We are very grateful for your continued support in these areas. However, we still have work to do.

CONCLUSION

NORAD remains committed to protect our homeland in the face of this national

tragedy. We believe we will be key to fighting and winning this new war on terrorism against a faceless, cowardly enemy. To do this, we need to provide the right

people and equipment to get the job done and we once again appreciate Congress’

continued support. We are heartened by the ongoing efforts to improve security at

our airports. Our hope is that this increased vigilance will deter foul play on the

ground and eliminate the need to commit fighters in the air. We should be the last

course of action, implemented only after all other protective measures have been

tried.

We stand with you and the rest of the Nation to meet every challenge and ensure

freedom prevails. I am honored to appear before you and look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. General Kernan.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM F. KERNAN, USA, COMMANDER

IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

General KERNAN. Sir, I would just like to echo the thanks of all

of our military for this committee and all of Congress’ staunch support, and in the interest of brevity I would like to submit my written statement for the record.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Kernan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. WILLIAM F. KERNAN, USA

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this panel on this most fundamental of military responsibilities,

defense of our homeland. For the purposes of this testimony, Homeland Security

comprises Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

With over one million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines—some 80 percent of

the Nation’s general-purpose forces—U.S. Joint Forces Command stands ready to

defend our homeland and provide trained and ready forces to combat terrorism

worldwide. As the supported Command for the land and maritime defense and civil

support aspects of Homeland Security, U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible

for defense against land and maritime aggression targeted at our territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as directly supporting the

lead Federal agency in the management of the consequences of such aggression and

other domestic civil support. These responsibilities are complementary to Federal,

state and local responsibilities and capabilities.

Additionally, we are pressing forward with our other mission areas of joint force

training, integration, and experimentation with the overall objective to transform

our Armed Forces to meet the unique challenges of the post-Cold War environment.

The 11 September 2001 attacks have put our Nation and our command on a wartime footing. This is a two-front war—at home and abroad. We are moving aggressively forward with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army as the Department’s Executive Agent, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other

combatant commanders, and our National, state, and local governments to improve

our collective ability to defend our homeland. Likewise, our deployed forces are actively defending the Nation through their offensive actions overseas. Make no mistake, the status quo is not an option, and we are developing solutions to combat

terrorism both at home and abroad.

OUR RESPONSE TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACK

Within minutes of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center (WTC),

our Joint Operations Center, which operates 24 hours per day, began notifying U.S.

Joint Forces Command’s senior leadership and coordinating with the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon as well as our component commanders (Atlantic Fleet, Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, and Army Forces ComVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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mand). Next, the command’s operations director activated the Crisis Action Team

and began assembling key decision makers and planners from throughout the command to respond as needed. This action began prior to the impact of the second aircraft into the WTC, which ultimately confirmed our suspicion that this was an act

of terrorism. Actions taken were focused in two directions: the possible need for

DOD resources to augment first responders, and the need to raise the threat condition and force protection levels to ensure the safety of military personnel and facilities in the United States.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks, U.S. Joint Forces Command rapidly responded to the air, maritime, and land force requirements for Operation Noble

Eagle. Atlantic Fleet ships and Air Combat Command tactical aircraft were deployed in support of North American Aerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) mission and responsibilities. Aegis-equipped ships were used to enhance the NORAD

early warning radar system, two aircraft carriers were dispatched to provide seaborne combat air patrol, and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit was placed on

alert. The Joint Task Force-Civil Support was also marshaled and an assessment

team dispatched to New York City to evaluate whether military resources were

needed in the consequence management efforts and to coordinate support with the

designated lead Federal agency. Within 6 hours of the attack, Federal authorities

made their first request for DOD assistance, a request that was passed to U.S. Joint

Forces Command by the Department of the Army’s Director of Military Support

(DOMS) for quick action. Also, our Service components postured forces to protect our

critical military infrastructure. Concurrent with these domestic support efforts,

trained and ready joint forces deployed, and continue to deploy, as part of Operation

Enduring Freedom, to support the fight against terrorism abroad.

Support to civil authorities has been narrowly focused due in great part to the

nature of the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon and the extent of New

York City’s robust response capability. However, it is clear that other localities

might not have such robust and sustained capabilities in the face of a similar catastrophe. Clearly, we must be ready to provide responsive military support if required

while striving for deterrence and prevention of future threats. There are numerous

measures required to realize this posture, both at the military and interagency level.

In concert with ongoing operations and support, we initiated a comprehensive

Homeland Security planning process working hand-in-hand with the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and my fellow combatant commanders. This

planning effort additionally included extensive coordination and synchronization

with the Services, our components, and relevant government agencies, including the

National Guard Bureau.

As part of this effort, we organized and activated a 90-person Homeland Security

Directorate from within the command, with a two-star Army general in charge, to

oversee planning, organization and execution of our responsibilities towards Homeland Defense and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. Leveraging the insights

and concepts gained from our joint training and experimentation work, we are employing emerging concepts to organize, train and operate this new organization as

a highly functional command and control headquarters to conduct Homeland Security.

These efforts have borne fruit as we take on responsibility for the land and maritime defense of our Nation. We are postured to execute our responsibilities in support of the National Homeland Security effort in accordance with the Secretary of

Defense’s direction. We are continuing to adapt ourselves for a sustained effort and

to respond rapidly in support of civil authorities.

In addition to the innovative organizational and operational approaches mentioned above, we are conducting parallel planning with the Joint Staff and our components to develop a Homeland Security Campaign plan. We have established liaison with the appropriate military, defense and select Federal agencies and we are

prepared to work in concert with them to execute the Homeland Security mission.

We have been in close coordination with the applicable unified commands, particularly with Adm. Denny Blair at U.S. Pacific Command and Gen. Ed Eberhart

at NORAD, to outline and discuss campaign plans for Homeland Defense. These efforts will continue, coordinating with Service components and other commands to

refine details of a campaign plan and prepare necessary orders as additional guidance is received.

Finally, we are ready to provide command, control, and assessment capabilities

in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or enhanced high explosive

incidents using Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS), Regional Task Forces East

and West, the Marine Chemical Biological Immediate Response Force, Weapons of

Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD–CST), and other forces as necessary.

This will be discussed in greater detail later in this statement.

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SUPPORTING HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. Joint Forces Command is currently working in support of DOD leadership

to dynamically refocus national responsibilities for homeland defense and security.

The goal is to coordinate all national security elements to ensure the best possible

predictive capability and proactive response.

With this planning and command and control capability as a foundation, our components are protecting our critical military infrastructure. Likewise, after a careful

review of applicable contingency plans and functional plans with our components,

U.S. Joint Forces Command is ready to execute and support the national campaign

to protect our country.

As the command responsible for the land and maritime defense of the continental

United States, we work closely with many Federal organizations to achieve unity

of effort. Our key partners include the U.S. Coast Guard and the law enforcement

community. In developing our ties to law enforcement, there has been much innovative and path breaking work since 11 September to share critical information while

still safeguarding the liberties of American citizens. We have more work to do to

achieve full intelligence fusion and gain a true measure of accurate, actionable, predictive analysis. That will enable all of us, in support of and led by law enforcement,

to transition from today’s posture of deter and respond to a more proactive stance

of effective prevention.

In the area of military assistance to civil authorities, we are an active member

of the Federal response community, and coordinate with and support the various

Federal response organizations, most notably the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA). These are long-standing ties and feature well-practiced procedures

previously used in support of Federal efforts to deal with the effects of wildfires,

floods, and storms. Our partnerships in the area of military assistance are solid and

well-understood.

In light of these responsibilities, here is U.S. Joint Forces Command’s posture for

providing responsive support to the Nation:

We have designated selected active duty ground forces as rapid reaction forces

and placed them on increased readiness. These Army and Marine forces are stationed at bases that provide regional coverage throughout the continental United

States. Our intent is to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense a flexible

and responsive capability in the event of unexpected incidents. We have also designated necessary air transport from the Air Force’s active, Guard, and Reserve C–

130 fleet to enable these reaction forces to rapidly respond when requested to support local, state, or Federal emergencies. We have exercised and trained these

forces, and prepositioned aircraft at the Reaction Force departure airfields where

they are ready to load now.

In our role as the joint force provider, U.S. Joint Forces Command is providing

forces as tasked to support military operations overseas in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

We are prepared to provide naval forces in support of Coast Guard operations in

ports and adjacent waters.

We provide active and Reserve component tactical aircraft to NORAD and, in

partnership with Pacific Command, will provide maritime assets, if needed, to defend our coasts.

We are also identifying additional support forces, such as chemical and biological

detection and defense units, many of which reside in the Reserve component, which

might require mobilization to maintain the appropriate capabilities.

We have worked closely with local, state, and Federal authorities to be ready. I

have met personally with Lieutenant General Russ Davis, Chief of the National

Guard Bureau and Admiral Jim Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to discuss how best to integrate National Guard, Coast Guard, and Active and Reserve

Forces to secure our homeland. They have sent liaison officers to U.S. Joint Forces

Command, who are integrated into our planning and operations, and our respective

staffs are working closely to ensure a seamless response to any event.

JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT

U.S. Joint Forces Command also has the responsibility to provide military assistance to civil authorities. Along with traditional assistance to local, state, and Federal agencies in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances—which we have

planned and organized for previously—we are also charged with providing Consequence Management support.

Consequence Management is a critical task and for that purpose we had previously formed and trained a standing joint task force headquarters called Joint

Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS). Joint Task Force-Civil Support is a command

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and control headquarters ready to respond today to support the lead Federal agency

in the event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Let me outline the genesis of Joint Task Force-Civil Support and clarify what it

is and what it is not. The 1999 Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned U.S. Joint

Forces Command the responsibility for planning and executing military assistance

to civil authorities for consequence management of weapons of mass destruction

within the continental U.S. The 1999 UCP also tasked U.S. Joint Forces Command

with responsibility for consequence management response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE) for the 48 contiguous states

and the District of Columbia. U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command

were given responsibility for CBRNE consequence management within their respective areas of responsibility; U.S. Joint Forces Command provides support to them

as necessary for their Consequence Management missions. Joint Task Force-Civil

Support was activated in 1999, and following a rigorous training and validation

process, JTF–CS achieved full mission capability in April 2000. It is currently authorized 36 personnel with a requested growth to 103 by 2003. In light of current

conditions, and in order to maintain a continuous 24-hour response, I have authorized through assignment and augmentation the expansion of the headquarters to

164 personnel.

Joint Task Force-Civil Support has the mission to command and control all DOD

assets deployed to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear

and high yield explosives-incident, in order to save lives, prevent injury and provide

temporary critical life support. I want to emphasize that JTF–CS is not a lead agency nor does it provide a first response capability. Joint Task Force-Civil Support’s

mission is to provide command and control of military forces in support of the designated lead Federal agency, for example, Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA). Joint Task Force-Civil Support’s primary functions also include consequence management support to national special security events such as the State

of the Union address last February.

As envisioned, JTF–CS was designed to be a command and control headquarters

without assigned forces, organic communications, or dedicated transportation. Required forces, communications and transportation assets are allocated as the mission dictates. We are taking steps to allocate forces to habitually train and work

with JTF–CS. It has the normal staff organizations you would expect, with the addition of an interagency coordination element, comprising seven personnel to include

a U.S. Coast Guardsman, that is the conduit for working with Federal agencies.

This coordination element interfaces regularly with FEMA headquarters and FEMA

regions as well as the Department of Health and Human Services.

Joint Task Force-Civil Support has developed detailed force requirements for a variety of likely consequence management contingencies. These requirements include

communications and transportation units, as well as service support, engineers,

medical, aviation and specialty units like the National Guard Civil Support Teams

(CST). The Service components are working through sourcing for these contingency

packages to facilitate joint training and exercises to maximize proficiency. With

forces allocated based on the mission, the headquarters is ready for employment,

but needs more depth. It is a ‘‘one of a kind’’ organization. With that in mind, we

are assessing its current structure and whether a second JTF–CS organization is

required.

To further unity of effort between the varieties of forces that may potentially be

involved in providing support to a CBRNE incident, JTF–CS has directly coordinated with a wide array of Federal, state, local, and military organizations to conduct training and planning.

As you can see, U.S. Joint Forces Command has aggressively moved forward since

we received the military assistance to civil authority mission as outlined in the 1999

UCP.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS

Another critical asset in Homeland Security are the National Guard WMD–CSTs.

These teams immediately deploy to the incident site to (1) assess a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological event in support of the local incident commander (2) advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions and (3) facilitate

requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and Federal assets to

help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. The

WMD–CSTs are National Guard assets that are manned by their respective states,

and trained and equipped by the National Guard Bureau. We currently are funded

for 32 WMD–CSTs, of which ten have been certified by the Secretary of Defense (in

Washington, Colorado, New York, Texas, Massachusetts, Missouri, California, IlliVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
16

nois, Pennsylvania, and Georgia). Seventeen are in various levels of training and

equipping (not yet ready for certification); five still need to be activated. We eventually expect to have a certified WMD–CST in each U.S. State and in all U.S. territories.

Joint Forces Command is tasked only with training and readiness oversight of the

WMD–CSTs and does not assume that responsibility until a WMD–CST receives

Secretary of Defense certification. We are working closely with the National Guard

Bureau and the states where those teams reside to standardize their training, tactics, techniques and procedures.

LEVERAGING JOINT TRANSFORMATION

As our President stated, this is a war ‘‘unlike any other.’’ It demands fresh approaches and new thinking. We are and have been working on just such innovative

joint operational concepts.

With our redesignation as U.S. Joint Forces Command on 1 October 1999, we assumed the responsibility to lead the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces to

achieve dominance across the width, depth, and breadth of any battlespace. That

means that whether in peace, conflict, or war, anywhere on the spectrum of operations, we will fight and defeat any adversary. Our command is focused on achieving that objective, and the events of the last month, both at home and abroad, have

shown that we must accelerate those efforts. We need today’s forces to get to the

objective area quicker, dominate the situation, and win decisively. Comprised of

highly trained, competent units and leaders, those forces need to operate with agility, versatility, precision and lethality.

Combating terrorism, protecting the homeland, and transformation are inextricably linked. We are working today with Enduring Freedom’s joint warfighters to rapidly operationalize the innovative ideas we have been working on through our joint

concept development and experimentation program. The war on terrorism cannot be

won with legacy means alone. Development of advanced techniques, tools, and organizations for these challenges require new thinking and aggressive experimentation

to develop alternatives for the future joint force.

For more than a year, U.S. Joint Forces Command has been working on proposals

for transformation that can directly address the operational requirements we face

today. Our most recent experiment on advanced concepts, Unified Vision 2001 last

May, envisioned a set of conditions similar to those we face today. The intellectual

foundation for dealing with these new conditions should put us in the position of

being able to more rapidly operationalize our best concepts.

Converting these concepts into operational capabilities is now our challenge. As

we task organize our command for its role in winning this war, we are also integrating many of our new ideas into our organization and operations. Our execution of

the Homeland Security mission, and the fight against terrorism abroad, will be built

around the doctrinal, organizational, and technical findings that come from our

transformational efforts.

Our efforts to date have set the conditions for unified transformation activities to

take place across the Services and the Joint Force. Our concept development and

experimentation efforts over the past 2 years have established the common joint

context for service concept development, have facilitated collaborative concept development across the Services, and have synchronized the joint and service experimentation programs.

Further, I think that these insights are compelling and have immediate application. As I mentioned earlier, we leveraged these concepts to guide our efforts to

stand up our Homeland Security Directorate and guide development of our Homeland Security Campaign Plan. But in all of this, we have to remember the basics.

War remains close, personal, and brutal. There is no silver bullet that can change

that. There have been revolutions in how we fight . . . gunpowder, nuclear weapons, and computers. But in the end, it still comes down to our willingness and capability to decisively defeat our enemy. It’s never safe, easy, or risk-free. The enemy

sees to that. Today while I talk to you, there are people flying, sailing, and standing

in harm’s way, under enemy guns, at night, and far from America. Our national

will, combined with their spirit and tenacious commitment, will define our success.

I look forward to working with you to give our troops what they need.

In closing Mr. Chairman, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of U.S. Joint

Forces Command are ready to defend our homeland and are deploying to fight terrorism abroad. We are acting now, and ready to do more. Each day, we improve our

capabilities, refine our plans and increase our Homeland Security capabilities while

providing trained, ready, and—over time—fundamentally transformed forces for

combat operations against terrorism.

17

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. We will follow the usual

procedure here. We will have an early bird rule with a 6-minute

round.

Secretary White, can you describe what your authority is as the

DOD Executive Agent for Homeland Security? For instance, does it

extend to authority over the combatant commanders, or the forces

assigned to them?

Secretary WHITE. Senator, my authority as Executive Agent is to

act on behalf of the Secretary to organize and get moving the whole

business of homeland security. I do not see myself as having any

operational authority or being a part of the chain of command. I

will make recommendations to the Secretary, and he will exercise

his authority.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it clearly established that you are not in the

chain of command?

Secretary WHITE. The Secretary is the chain of command along

with the President, and I, as his Executive Agent, make recommendations to him, but I do not exercise command authority.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, would you describe

what you understand your relationship with Governor Ridge and

his office is going to be? How would, for instance, good faith disagreements be resolved between the two agencies? I know in your

opening testimony you said you intend to fully assist him, but

there will be differences from time to time, and the question is,

when they are not resolved, who wins? Who prevails? I know truth

and justice will win, but who will prevail?

Secretary WHITE. Well, you know as well as I, the charter that

Governor Ridge has for homeland security is directly from the

President. We have had excellent initial meetings with Governor

Ridge. We have detailed a senior officer of the Department who has

extensive experience in homeland security to serve on his staff. If

there are differences of opinion between the Department and Governor Ridge, I would presume that they would be resolved, like any

disputes in the executive branch, either at the principal’s level or

at the Cabinet level, or ultimately with the President himself.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your position

on the suggestion that the Posse Comitatus Act needs to be revised?

Secretary WHITE. I think, Senator, that at this stage our general

view is that the act is fine the way it sits. It has a longstanding

tradition of not using Federal forces in a law enforcement role that

I think serves the Nation well.

The General Counsel of the Department, in response to your

communication, is studying it in more detail to see if there are revisions that need to be made to certain aspects of it, either for flexibility or to deal with the new situation, but in general this longstanding tradition is one that we would like to see prevail. There

may, of course, be necessary minor revisions.

Chairman LEVIN. As part of that consideration, are you looking

at what the impact of training and using our Armed Forces to enforce the law would have on their warfighting capabilities, their

readiness? Is that all being considered as a part of this review, or

is it just a legal issue?

18

Secretary WHITE. It is principally a legal review of the law

against the current situation. The broader issue that you raise gets

to the whole fundamental question of having a common force pool

of active and Reserve components that have longstanding primary

missions in support of the combatant commanders in chief, but that

also have important homeland security responsibilities either on a

State or a Federal basis. Obviously with the current events these

challenges are on us concurrently.

As we sit here today, the 29th Division from the Virginia Guard

is deployed in Bosnia, and consequently the elements that are in

Bosnia are not available to the Governor of Virginia for title 32

purposes for homeland security, so as my colleagues and I go about

our business of the operational planning for homeland security, one

of the issues that has to be dealt with is force apportionment, and

how much time will be focused on homeland security, and how

much time will be focused on normal warfighting activities.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Eberhart, there has been some confusion about the sequence of events on September 11 that maybe you can clear up for

us.

The time line we have been given is that at 8:55 on September

11, American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east, away from its

intended course, and at 9:10 Flight 77 was detected by the FAA

radar over West Virginia, heading east. That was after the two

planes had struck the World Trade Center Towers.

Then 15 minutes later, at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD that

Flight 77 was headed towards Washington. Was that the first notification NORAD or the DOD had that Flight 77 was probably being

hijacked, and if it was, do you know why it took 15 minutes for the

FAA to notify NORAD?

General EBERHART. Sir, there is one minor difference. I show it

as 9:24 that we were notified, and that was the first notification

we received. I do not know, sir, why it took that amount of time

for the FAA. You will have to ask the FAA.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know if that was the first notification

to the DOD?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir, that is the first documented notification we have.

Chairman LEVIN. Either NORAD or any other component of the

DOD?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. I have a number of other questions relative to

that issue which should be clarified, and I am going to ask you

those questions for the record to clear that up. It seems to me we

all should have a very precise timetable and the precise indication

of why other agencies or entities were not notified by FAA, if they

were not.

Perhaps you could make that inquiry for us, or we will ask the

FAA directly, if you prefer. We would also ask what notification

was given to the buildings in Washington once it was clear that

this plane was headed towards Washington, but we will save those

for the record.

Senator Warner.

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Senator WARNER. I would have thought all of you in this chamber would have gone back and rehearsed these things, figured out

what happened, what went wrong, so that we ensure it will not

happen again. If there was that significant a delay and you cannot

tell us why, how do we leave with an assurance that you and your

subordinates have taken steps so that it will not happen again?

General EBERHART. Sir, I assure you we have, and we practice

this daily now. It now takes about 1 minute from the time that

FAA sees some sort of discrepancy on their radar scope, or detects

a discrepancy in terms of their communication, before they notify

NORAD, and so that certainly has been fixed.

I think at that time the FAA was still thinking that if they saw

a problem, it was a problem that was a result of a mechanical failure, or some sort of crew deviation. They were not thinking hijacking. Today, the first thing they think is hijacking, and we respond

accordingly.

Senator WARNER. So working with the FAA, NORAD had not rehearsed the possibilities of an aircraft being seized for some terrorist activity?

General EBERHART. Sir, the FAA is charged with the primary responsibility in terms of hijacking in the United States of America.

We are charged with assisting the FAA once they ask for our assistance. The last hijacking of a commercial aircraft in the United

States of America was 1991, so although we practiced this day in

and day out, the FAA sees on their scopes scores of problems that

are a result of mechanical problems, switch errors, pilot errors, et

cetera, and that is what they think when they see this.

Although we have exercised this, we have practiced it, in all the

hijackings I am aware of, where we have plenty of time to react,

we got on the wing, and we followed this airplane to where it landed, and then the negotiations started. We were not thinking a missile, an airborne missile that was going to be used as a target, a

manned missile, if you will. In most cases when we practiced this,

regrettably we practiced it, the origin of the flight was overseas,

and we did not have the time-distance problems that we had on

that morning. We had plenty of time to react, we were notified that

for sure there was a hijacking, and we were notified that they were

holding a gun to the pilot’s head and telling him to fly toward New

York City or Washington, DC.

So that is how we had practiced this, sir. I certainly wish we had

practiced it differently, but I really think that for sure in the first

two instances of 11 September, and probably in the third, time and

distance would not have allowed us to get an airplane to the right

place at the right time.

Senator WARNER. Let me just ask the following. You are now the

commanding officer in charge of the Combat Aircraft Patrol (CAP)

missions being flown over our various communities, which so far as

I know have functioned exceedingly well and serve, I think, as a

strong deterrent. It is being performed by Guard and regular aviators, am I not correct?

General EBERHART. That is correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. Are the missions for the Guard any different

than for the regular aviators?

General EBERHART. No, sir.

20

Senator WARNER. They fly the same?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. If an aircraft begins to deviate and such security measures as are on board fail, whether it is an armed guard

and so forth, then your aircraft is instructed, with certain procedures, to fire and take that plane down. That is basically what happens.

General EBERHART. When given the proper authority, yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Here is my problem, and it is one of the reasons that I raise this posse comitatus situation. I have done some

independent research on this matter. The Air Guard person is up

there within the law of posse comitatus. It is a criminal penalty,

as our chairman stated. By what authority is the regular performing duty that the Air Guard is doing so we get around the posse

comitatus?

General EBERHART. Sir, I believe in this case it is not a law enforcement action. I believe it is a national defense action.

Senator WARNER. Well, you say that. It could be a bunch of

drunks on the plane who have caused it—I mean, there are scenarios by which it could not be terrorism. That is one of the reasons I have raised this issue. I have been criticized roundly for

bringing this up, first in a question to the Secretary of Defense,

who acknowledged at that time in the hearing that he felt it ought

to be reviewed.

It is a subject of considerable debate in the National Journal,

and I do not mind taking criticism, but I really think somebody

ought to look at this very carefully, because what that aircraft is

doing is supplementing what the armed guard is doing on the

plane. If that measure fails, then and only then will that aircraft

perform its really awesome mission. I just think we had better look

at this posse comitatus.

We also have to look at it because we could have situations

where enormous numbers of our citizens could be put in harm’s

way by some disaster, and the military folks who remain nearby

could come in and help the police establish some law and order, if

only to protect the citizens in some way against further harm. So

I am glad somebody is taking a look at the situation of posse comitatus.

I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, the document has served us very

well, but there comes a time when we have to reexamine the old

laws of the 1800s. Given the challenge that we are faced with

today, I would take a look, and have your lawyers take a look at

that situation, because in Europe I am told by the Department of

the Air Force that they are referred to as air police. Have you ever

heard that term in Europe applied?

Secretary WHITE. No, sir.

Senator WARNER. Take a look at it. Have you or General

Eberhart?

General EBERHART. No, sir, I have not.

Senator WARNER. You ought to have a chat with a couple of the

other two-stars around the hall. We ought to clarify that.

To you, General Pace, the Secretary of Defense, in consulting

with Senator Levin and myself and members of the House, talked

about proposals by which to either modify a current CINCs responVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
21

sibility and/or maybe even the creation of another CINC to deal

with the homeland defense, and also the possible need for an additional, say, Deputy Secretary of Defense to be the counterpart for

Governor Ridge and such other individuals within the Department

of Defense and other agencies and departments will begin to form

the structure to deal with these important challenges of homeland

defense. To what extent can you elaborate on that for us?

General PACE. Senator, thanks. The Unified Command Plan is a

plan that breaks down the individual authorities of the individual

commanders and, as you also know, it is the Chairman’s responsibility to recommend to the Secretary of Defense changes to those.

As we speak, the individual service chiefs and the combatant

commanders are proposing changes to the Unified Command Plan.

They will be in to the Chairman by the end of October. The Chairman will quickly synthesize all of those and go forward to the Secretary with his recommendations for the changes. One of the key

elements in there is the requirement for a CINC specifically designated for homeland defense.

If I may go back to your previous question, sir, just to elaborate

on the airmen who are flying right now. Because the authority to

shoot down that airplane must come from either the President or

the Secretary of Defense, and because the President has emergency

powers to use his Armed Forces in that capacity, the particular

pilot who is ordered to take that action would not be, in my judgment, subject to criminal prosecution.

Senator WARNER. There is this exception in there, and I think

you raise a very important aspect of it. By virtue of the President

ratifying the subordinate commander’s recommendation that the

shootdown occur, he then would be operating under that exception

of posse comitatus?

General PACE. Yes, sir, and we should certainly take a look at

that, sir, but we do not have your service members today in any

jeopardy.

Senator WARNER. But, I mentioned it could be a bunch that is

intoxicated. It could be a mentally deranged person on the plane.

There are other hypotheses, regrettably, that jeopardize the safety

of aircraft from time to time which are apart from terrorism.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Senator Cleland.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much.

I would like to pursue this question of posse comitatus. I am not

a lawyer, but I really agree with Senator Warner, that I think the

events of September 11 have given us a new demarcation here in

our reaction as a defense team, or as a defense system, and I will

say that I think it was proper in 1947 for the U.S. War Department

to then be called the Defense Department. Since 1947 we have all

been in the defense business. The defense of what? The defense of

NATO, certainly. The defense of Bosnia, the defense of South

Korea, certainly, but ultimately the defense of our homeland.

So I think the number 1 lead agency for the defense of America

is the Defense Department. That is where we put our money, our

time, and our energy. We ask young Americans to risk their lives

in harm’s way in America and all over the globe for that purpose,

so that is where I am coming from.

22

Regarding posse comitatus, to me the date 1878 says it all. In my

understanding, that is when President Grant asked Sherman’s

troops to leave Georgia and said, don’t come back. I mean, that was

the era where we had for 10 years Federal occupation of a number

of States in America. There was great resentment of that, so I

think the posse comitatus law that you could not in effect nationalize the American Armed Forces and have them go somewhere and

occupy somebody, I think that was a direct reaction to that particular era.

The point is, when it came to the war on drugs, in 1980 we

amended the posse comitatus law to allow the American military

to do what, to defend our homeland, and American blood has been

shed on American soil by a foreign foe on September 11, and now

we are under attack by germ warfare. I do not think we need much

more evidence to understand that we are not dealing with a crime.

If this were a crime we would put the FBI Sherlock Holmes detectives on it, and we would nail Timothy McVeigh and execute him.

This is war, and so I am not quite comfortable with the FBI leading the war against terrorism and being the lead agency when we

have the entire Department of Defense out there taking second

seat. I think we have to figure out a new posse comitatus amendment that allows the Department of Defense to step forward and

defend America.

It is interesting that when the commander in chief was faced

with that on September 11 he said, not only yes, but definitely yes,

put your aircraft in the air, General Eberhart, without batting an

eye. So in reality, that posse comitatus went out the window real

quick. The commander in chief said so, and he had a right to say

so, and he did the right thing, and so I do not think we are in a

crime scene here. I think we are in a war.

If we are in a war, then I think the Department of Defense ought

to be the lead dog here. If we work from that premise, then everybody else can follow in, or follow along and be part of a homeland

defense team, but I have been looking for a leader in this thing.

We just got a briefing here from Senator Nunn, who sat in that

chair, Mr. Secretary, just a few hours ago. He played the President

in a Dark Winter exercise, a germ warfare attack against the

United States, and what did he find? He said, ‘‘I found myself getting very impatient with bureaucracy.’’ In other words, he found

that the agencies were not coordinating, were not cooperating with

one another, and that is where we are today.

So I think we are in search of defining exactly what we want to

do as a Nation here. If we want to defend ourselves, especially our

homeland, the lead agency ought to be the Department of Defense.

I think there should be maybe a CINC for the homeland area, to

work closely with the homeland guard, or the homeland czar, or

whatever, but I am beginning to see that we need somebody to step

up to the plate, and I think that is the Department of Defense.

Now, I know it was not popular to be involved in counterterrorism and so forth, and the American military wanted to be engaged elsewhere, but up until September 11 counterterrorism was

buried over there in the Justice Department and the FBI somewhere. Now we realize it is homeland defense. It is what we are

23

in the business of, survival, and so I just thought I would throw

that out.

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you one question. The President mobilized the Air Force within a matter of hours to defend our Nation

and said, we are in a war against terrorism. The Coast Guard, in

a war, comes under the Department of Defense. Have you thought

about asking for the authority, since the President says we are in

a war, to put the Coast Guard in the Department of Defense now?

Secretary WHITE. On a permanent basis, not in a national emergency, but——

Senator CLELAND. I would settle for a national emergency basis.

Secretary WHITE. That is a good question, and there has been

thought on that, obviously. If you look at the events of 11 September, the Navy and the Coast Guard have worked very closely for

maritime and coastal defense, as they have for a long time, and the

Commandant of the Coast Guard regularly attends coordination

meetings in the tank with the other leaders of the military, so

there is close coordination, albeit at this point no direct chain of

command authority.

Senator CLELAND. Because the Coast Guard currently is under

the Secretary of Transportation, and in so-called peacetime it is

quite adequate, but this is not peacetime. This is war, and we have

been made painfully aware of that, and I would just suggest that

you look at that as one step towards DOD becoming more engaged

in the war on terrorism.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cleland.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator WARNER. Senator Inhofe, would you yield just to suggest

to our witnesses in reference to the remarks made by our colleague,

there is a very good piece written by Paul Stevens, called ‘‘U.S.

Armed Forces Homeland Defense, the Legal Framework.’’ I would

urge that those who have not had a chance to refer to it, it covers

some of the points that our distinguished colleague just reviewed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INHOFE. General Eberhart, quite a few questions have

been asked about the length of time it has taken us to respond to

certain requests, and I am naturally concerned. We have the 5073

fielding that is involved in all of this out in Oklahoma.

Have you ever just sat down and in a very brief way described

what the decisionmaking matrix is for this process of having to

make a shootdown?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. First, we are cued by the FAA. Now

that cueing is a lot easier. We are actually up on a hotline, a chat

line with the FAA all the time, so as soon as the FAA realizes

there is a problem, we realize there is a problem simultaneously.

We have taken what we call air battle managers and put them in

the FAA sector, so they are present for duty and are there to coordinate and facilitate. You are familiar with air battle managers

from the Airborne Warning Control Systems (AWACS). They are at

Tinker Air Force Base.

We also have increased FAA presence at our regions and our sectors. The most important thing is cueing, so that we know there

24

is a problem. Cueing allows us to work the time-distance problem

I alluded to earlier.

Second, we have continuous CAPs over Washington, DC, and

New York City, which obviously allow us to respond very quickly

in those locations of the northeast seaboard.

We also run random CAPs throughout the United States of

America over population centers and key infrastructure. Our goal

there is to be unpredictable, and to have would-be terrorists know

that we might be there, so your chances of success are not very

good.

Then finally, we have improved the communication lines between

the pilot to the sector, the regional controllers, and to me. We have

exercised this almost daily to make sure that once we see this problem, once we get in a position where we can take action, all of that

information is relayed up to the National Command Authorities,

and we get the authority to take the action that they deem is appropriate. Hopefully, that is the action we have recommended to

them.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, General. That is very specific, and

I do appreciate that. Talking about the CAPs program, the role of

the Guard, there has been some discussion on the changing of

equipment. For example, I understand the F–15 would perhaps

perform those duties better than the F–16. A lot of the changes in

this program since 11 September are going to cost money. Are

these in the QDR, or are you working on that now? First of all, do

you think there will be a substantial increase because of the

changes in emphasis and equipment?

General EBERHART. Sir, I think there are changes that are appropriate. There are modernization programs that are appropriate. We

are reviewing those as we speak. Some of those programs were included in the Department’s request for the supplemental. First and

foremost I think we need to focus on our command and control systems. As a matter of fact, our command and control systems are

1970s and 1980s technology in NORAD. They really have not kept

pace over the years, and so we need to bring them into the 21st

century.

There are other things like additional radios for the F–15s, VHF

radios, which you are very familiar with, and fighter data links.

Right now, we are awaiting the benefit analysis for these missions,

and they are part of the supplemental that came in, and will be

part of the 2003 request.

Senator INHOFE. You are working on that now?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir, we sure are.

Senator INHOFE. General Pace or anyone else, I came in kind of

disagreeing with some of the things Senator Cleland said, but he

made a very persuasive argument in terms of the use of our military. Historically, I have always opposed the use for one specific

reason we have not talked about here today, and that is that we

are currently in a crisis in terms of our deployments, in terms of

our force strength, and I know everyone gets tired of hearing us

talk about it, but nevertheless it is true that we are about one-half

of where we were back in 1991 and we have deployments in places

like Bosnia or Kosovo, where many of us do not believe we should

have been deployed.

25

Nonetheless, if you are going to have an expanded role for the

military into these areas, I contend that you do not have to change

the act to do that. There is recently a study released on October

12, that is this year, by the Center for Strategic Studies here in

Washington, DC, and it says neither the Posse Comitatus Act nor,

apparently, any other statute purports to deny, limit, or condition

the President’s use of the Armed Forces in response to a catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States.

I guess what I am saying is I think it is going to happen anyway

regardless of what we do with that act. My concern is that it affects

readiness. I spent 5 years chairing that subcommittee, and I have

been concerned about deterioration because of the force strength,

modernization, and our deployments. How is this going to negatively impact it, and what can we do about that?

General PACE. Senator, as we do with all allocations of resources,

allocations especially of service members, part of the process that

delivers to the Secretary of Defense a recommendation to send

troops to Bosnia or to allocate troops to a particular section of this

country will include the impact on readiness for the next most likely deployment of those forces, so when it goes forward to him it

tells him, we need X number of troops to do this particular mission.

If you send them on this mission, then we will need X number of

months to get them back, retrained and ready to go for their most

likely combat mission, so that kind of readiness equation is part of

the process that tees up the decision for the Secretary.

Senator INHOFE. I understand that and appreciate that, but that

is on a specific mission or deployment. Right now, we are dealing

with unknowns. We are establishing a policy whereby we may be

using military in some areas where we had not used them in the

past, and I would just caution all of us to keep that in mind, that

somehow the cost of that is going to have to be transmitted to us

and we will have to act on it.

Unfortunately, it may be too late, and so we need to prepare as

much in advance, if anything new is going to be imposed upon our

military than they are already in their overloaded commission performing today.

Secretary WHITE. I suppose airport security is a classic example.

We have today 6,000 guardsmen that are deployed in 430 airports

across the country, augmenting security forces. That is all under

State control, but that comes out of the same force pot that we

send to Bosnia and we have Federal authority for, and that is the

real challenge that we have to deal with here.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Carnahan.

Senator CARNAHAN. Secretary White, I would like to follow up on

a question the chairman asked earlier and ask you to elaborate on

what steps are being made to coordinate your activities with the

new Office of Homeland Security headed by Governor Ridge.

Secretary WHITE. Senator, I have met with Governor Ridge and

laid out for him in some detail how the Department operates in

support of homeland security, both the civil support side and the

defense side. We have assigned a senior officer and other staff to

his office. The former Commander of the Joint Task Force for Civil

26

Support from Joint Forces Command, who has extensive experience

in homeland security, will be a part of Governor Ridge’s office, and

I look forward to detailed coordination with him as we go forward.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you.

General Kernan, there are currently 27 National Guard Weapons

of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) in existence. Ten of these teams have been certified to assist in detecting

the presence of chemical or biological agents. What are the roles of

civil support teams in the event of a chemical or biological attack,

and how else could these teams be of assistance as civilian first responders in the event of such attacks?

General KERNAN. Senator, the civil support teams come under

State title 32 responsibilities to the Governor. They are the first responders. They possess 14 different specialties. They are commanded by a National Guard Lieutenant Colonel. They have a mobile analytical lab and a mobile communications suite.

What they do is, they arrive at the incident site, they assess,

they analyze, they validate, and they facilitate the military support

that may be required to a catastrophic incident in a State. They

initially work for the State Governor. If additional military support

is required for a weapons of mass destruction incident, or high

yield explosive event in the United States, they would then facilitate the military support coming to help save lives, prevent suffering, and reestablish critical infrastructure and facilities.

Secretary WHITE. May I add that of the 10 that we have, since

11 September every one of them has been employed for a variety

of tasks by the Governors, to include early on the team in New

York under the control of Governor Pataki, so we have found them

already to be enormously useful, and we are accelerating the training and certification of the additional teams.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you.

General Eberhart, you are responsible for overseeing the security

of America’s skies. Would you describe the new procedures that are

in place to respond to hijacking of commercial aircraft, and if there

are additional resources you feel are needed in intelligence or command and control to further support this mission?

General EBERHART. Yes, ma’am. In terms of the new procedures

in effect, we have increased connectivity with the FAA, so in fact,

as I said earlier, we are on a chat line with them 24 hours a day,

365 days a year, so when they see a problem we simultaneously see

that problem.

Second, up until this time we were looking out. We were looking

external to the United States of America for the foreign threat, and

aerospace warning, aerospace control were our missions. It was redefined on 11 September, because now aerospace warning and

aerospace control means the unthinkable. It means looking inside

the United States for this terrorist threat that developed at that

time, and so now we are employing additional radars.

These radars come in the form of Coast Guard airplanes, Navy

airplanes, and additional AWACS, to include NATO AWACS. Five

NATO AWACS are a part of our team now and are temporarily deployed to Tinker Air Force Base. We are also moving ground radars

throughout the United States to fill areas where we did not have

good internal coverage in terms of the military. We are also linking

27

some of the FAA radars into our command and control sectors in

our region and NORAD command posts to make sure we are seeing

again what the FAA is seeing so we are able to increase our situational awareness and decrease greatly the reaction time to work

the time and distance problem.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Eberhart, I am very interested in NORAD, and so I am

particularly interested in how NORAD might interact with our various agencies, particularly the FAA. I appreciate the question that

was asked by Senator Carnahan, but I am going to ask for a little

more detail. On September 11, my understanding is we had aircraft at least up in the air when the second plane hit the Twin

Towers, is that correct?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir.

Senator ALLARD. So what I am interested in knowing is, what

was the process there, and then how was that followed up with the

other aircraft that you identified that were coming or heading towards Washington, and how you responded, and how was the FAA

interacting with NORAD in that whole situation, starting with that

first plane you deployed heading toward New York City?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. The first flight I think was American Flight 11. The FAA, once they notified us, we issued a scramble order almost simultaneously to the first crash, that flight of two

out of Otis Air Force Base, out of Cape Cod——

Senator ALLARD. Let me understand this. So right at the time

the first aircraft was hitting the Twin Towers, you are being notified by the FAA that you had another plane headed towards the

towers?

General EBERHART. They notified us of the first hijacking just

about the time that airplane was hitting the tower, and at that

time we issued a scramble order to the two F–15s out of Otis Air

Force Base. We continued to send those airplanes toward New

York City, because initially, as we worked with the FAA, we were

not sure if that was the hijacked airplane.

I hate to admit it, but I was sitting there hoping that someone

had made a mistake, there had been an accident, that this was not

a hijacked airplane, because there was confusion. We were told it

was a light commuter airplane. It did not look like that was caused

by a light commuter airplane, and so we were still trying to sort

it out. We are moving the two F–15s, and we were continuing to

move them. They were flying toward New York City. In fact, they

were 8 minutes away from New York City when the second crash

occured. We did not turn them around. We did not send them back.

Senator ALLARD. They had not made a sighting of that airplane?

General EBERHART. Again, the issue is time and distance. Once

we told them to get airborne, it took them only 6 minutes. Talk

about the professionalism and training of these individuals. Tragically, there was just too much distance between Otis and New

York City to get there in time.

Senator ALLARD. Now, did the FAA notify you that you had a

second hijacked plane somewhere up there?

28

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. During that time, we were notified.

We will provide the exact time line for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator ALLARD. I am not interested in the exact time line as

much as I am how the FAA reacted with NORAD during this time

period.

Then you had the other two planes, and then the FAA continued

to notify NORAD that you had two other potential hijackings, these

headed for Washington, is that correct?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. We were working the initial hijacking of the one, I think it was Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon. We launched the airplanes out of Langley Air Force Base as

soon as the FAA notified us about a hijacking. At that time it took

those airplanes, two F–16s again, 6 minutes to get airborne. They

were approximately 13 minutes away from Washington, DC, when

the tragic crash occurred.

Now, the last flight was a little bit different. I think it was

United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. At that time we were

trying to decide initially if that flight was going to continue west,

and if there was some other target for that flight, was it Chicago,

was it St. Louis, and what might we do to launch an aircraft to

intercept it.

Senator ALLARD. So the FAA knew before it deviated its flight

pattern that it was hijacked?

General EBERHART. What they really knew was, it was headed

west, Sir. It dropped off their radar screen, and then they reacquired it. At that time it became obvious to us, we thought it was

probably headed for Washington, DC, but maybe New York City.

29

We elected at that time to keep the airplanes that were doing the

Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC, and New York City right

where they were in case there was another airplane coming. Then

our intent was to go out and meet that aircraft and destroy it if

we needed to, if it entered either Washington, DC, or New York

City air space.

Senator ALLARD. My understanding is that NORAD has made

some effort to get direct access to FAA radar data in the past. You

have not had access to that? What is the status of that?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. Again, in the past we have had access to what we call the Joint Surveillance System, which is that

system which rings the United States. It looks for the foreign

threat. It looks for someone coming into our air space that is not

authorized.

We have not been charged, we have not been concerned with any

aircraft that originate inside of our air space because we believed

that, in fact, is an authorized aircraft on a flight plan and is authorized to be in the United States of America, so we have been

looking out. We have had access to the Joint Surveillance System,

but we have not taken all of the radars internal to the United

States and imported those into our command and control centers.

Back in the 1950s, we actually owned and controlled all of those

radars in the United States Air Force, and since 1958, when we

stood up the FAA, we have been moving those radars to the FAA.

We have helped pay for them and purchase them, and we have actually moved manpower on the order of about 200 people over the

years to the FAA to operate these radars, but we were looking out,

and we used the radars that the FAA uses to look out. We both

use those radars.

But now, to answer your question, we have figured out a way to

take these internal radars and net them into our command and

control centers.

Senator ALLARD. Well, I just want to thank you and your people

for a tremendous effort, in light of totally unexpected circumstances, and I, for one, appreciate the readiness that was displayed. I think that when you think about getting that plane and

taking off in 6 minutes, there had to be a lot of hustle there, and

I recognize that, and we are searching for better ways in which we

can even do a better job while recognizing that you did a superb

job at the time. So I want to thank you and your people, General,

for that.

I see my time has expired.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Allard.

Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate

your convening this hearing. This has been a day of very impactful

and instructive testimony. I want to thank our witnesses here, too.

This morning we had a subcommittee hearing chaired by Senator

Landrieu, and with the involvement of the Ranking Member, Senator Roberts. There was mind-blowing testimony about the threats

under the category of bioterrorism. I discovered then, others have

known it before, about possible threats in the area of agricultural

terrorism, chemical terrorism.

30

Now, this afternoon, we are reviewing the acts of civilian airplane hijacking, turning them into, as you said, manned missiles.

In between we had a Top Secret briefing from the Director of the

FBI and the Director of the CIA. Since those were Top Secret, all

I can say is that there were areas discussed there that, again, to

a new Senator are revealing and mind-boggling.

So I guess I want to say, following up on what Senator Allard

said, the magnitude and the enormity and the complexity and the

multidimensional nature of what we are now calling homeland defense, or homeland security, are staggering.

It is one thing to come in with perfect hindsight, and I am not

saying we should not do so to learn the lessons for the future, but

we talk about a Dark Winter simulation. We have been in a Dark

Fall in reality, and we are still in the midst of one right now with

the anthrax situation, which is changing on a daily if not hourly

basis, and may have other unfoldings that have already taken effect that we are just not aware of yet.

So I think we have to take all of this both with respect and appreciation for all you are doing. While looking for those areas

where we can improve, because we always can improve. But we always say we are preparing for the last war. What constitutes

homeland defense we have learned through a $359 million defense

budget, and then we are in the midst of a legitimate debate about

how much more, according to the national missile defense development, and lo and behold we have some very astute and very determined, to the point of self-sacrifice, enemies who are looking for exactly what it is we are not focused on or we are not prepared for,

and that is where they are going to strike next, at what we are not

prepared for.

We do not want to scare the American people. On the other

hand, no one is complacent any more. How do we cope with all of

this, and how do we do so without spending more money? I guess

I go back to that, because we just passed a tax cut. We thought

that was the right thing. People thought that was the right thing

to do. With all respect, we thought we had a surplus, but now we

find we have a diminishing surplus and we have these greater

needs.

We are told this morning our public health system is seriously

inadequate to address those potential threats and those real

threats now. How do we gear ourselves up across the board for all

of this, much less coordinate it?

Secretary WHITE. Well, I think, Senator, we are geared up. We

have a great deal of work to do. For example, the key to homeland

security to me is the competence and capabilities of the first responders. There are 11 million first responders in this country—

State police, emergency medical technicians, local hazardous material teams—and the question is, if you look at the threats that you

are talking about, what are the gaps in the capabilities, and then

how do we fill those gaps on either an interim basis with assets

of the Department of Defense, Reserve component or active, and

then on a long term basis how do we build the confidence of the

first responders to fill in those gaps?

We cannot take all the resources of the Department, because our

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currency to this effort between what we do in the homeland and

what we are doing in CENTCOM or other regions of the world that

all address the same set of forces.

I do not think there is any way, with the increased operational

tempo that we are currently facing, like the air cap that General

Eberhart is directing, that you are going to be able to do this in

the same resource ceilings we were talking about before 11 September, because the operational tempo is just significantly escalated,

and that is our national challenge, as to how to come to grips with

that.

Senator DAYTON. Do any of the others want to add to that?

General KERNAN. Sir, I would just echo what Secretary White

said. We have some tremendous capability right now, and we have

refocused it, everybody is energized, and we are looking to get the

synergy that we need. Fusing efforts in the interagency arena, and

a fusion of both domestic and international intelligence and information, and the ability to do the collaborative planning, is going to

allow us to better predict what the threat is, and allow us to be

much more proactive. We will have to look at reducing those seams

and gaps that you talked about.

We are assessing what command relationships make the best

sense. I think we need to look at the authorities that Guard, Reserve, and Active components have, and who can work for whom,

and under what conditions can you maximize the flexibility within

the State.

The key is the responsiveness of the first responders, as Secretary White said. The more prepared we are for them to be employed and engaged to deter, I think the better we are going to be

able to protect our citizens.

General PACE. Senator, I would simply add that part of a good

defense is a good offense, and we have a tremendous country. It is

an open society. We want to keep it an open society. There are

many parts of it to defend. A good way to defend it is to keep the

other guy off-balance by attacking him where he lives.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Hutchinson.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had

several members make reference to the very excellent hearing that

the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee under Chairwoman Landrieu conducted this morning. It was a pretty chilling

presentation, at least in my mind, what we heard, and in that presentation Senator Nunn made the comment that smallpox was—he

expressed it as being that which was the least likely to be used,

but the most catastrophic if used as a threat to our population,

then he went on to say that the Health and Human Services was

moving very aggressively to find multiple sources of smallpox vaccine.

Later in the hearing, the question was posed to the entire panel,

if smallpox is the least likely weapon to be used, what is the most

likely, and the answer was anthrax. Perhaps on a wider scale, a

more sophisticated scale, but anthrax was the most likely bioterrorist threat that we faced.

32

Hearing that, the question rose in my mind, and the question

that I posed to the panel was, well, if the least likely is smallpox,

and we are seeking multiple sources of access, multiple sources for

smallpox vaccine, and the greatest threat, at least the greatest in

the sense of likelihood of being used is anthrax, what is the logic

behind us having one source for anthrax vaccine? What is the

logic?

Dr. O’Toole responded immediately by saying, it is not logical,

nor is it defensible. I think she is exactly right, and it is a concern

that I have had for a long time. My first question is, can the vaccine that is produced at the BioPort facility in Michigan, the anthrax vaccine, presumably, hopefully that it will be approved quickly by the FDA and that we can see production begin again.

How can the civilian population access that? Will it be only for

force protection? We are talking about homeland security. What

kind of prospects are there that the production of anthrax vaccine

could be available for protection of the general population should

that be needed?

Secretary WHITE. Well, the anthrax vaccine, Senator, with a single source, was in a single source because the only people we felt

necessary to protect with the vaccine were those people in the Department of Defense who would have an immediate concern with

anthrax.

Senator HUTCHINSON. Which obviously was a misguided strategy,

since we do not have a vaccine for our troops today going into the

arena of harm’s way.

Secretary WHITE. Yes, given the events since 11 September, but

I would say two things. I was in Houston last Friday, and met with

the emergency health services people, and the doctor there said, if

you are really worried about a biothreat to this country, get your

flu shot this year, because 30,000 people a year die of the flu in

this country.

The Health and Human Services under Secretary Thompson is

going to move anthrax vaccines and the business and production of

it to a national program.

Senator HUTCHINSON. If I might interrupt you, Secretary White,

my understanding is, it is 36 months before any commercial firm

will be able to produce anthrax vaccine, so even if they move very

aggressively, for 36 months there is no protection, unless there is

some means of accessing the DOD production.

Secretary WHITE. The principal treatment for anthrax today is

antibiotics, and that depends upon early detection, but the strain

that started here is 100 percent treatable with antibiotics.

Senator HUTCHINSON. I do not mean to be argumentative, but I

have been told there are strains of anthrax that are resistant to

antibiotics. Is that accurate?

Secretary WHITE. I am not an expert, so I do not think I should

offer an opinion. I think the point is, we need something far greater

than the BioPort single source. I know that Secretary Thompson,

in working with the FDA, is pushing to number 1, certify BioPort’s

production; and number 2, expand those that are in the business

as rapidly as he can.

33

Senator HUTCHINSON. Mr. Secretary, are there pathogens beyond

anthrax and smallpox that our troops, our forces face as potential

risk, potential dangers in the future?

Secretary WHITE. I would say yes.

Senator HUTCHINSON. The Surgeon General of the United States

has endorsed the idea of a GOCO, a Government-owned, contractor-operated facility because there are pathogens out there that will

never be commercially feasible. Will the Department of Defense,

working in conjunction with HHS, and working in conjunction with

the Surgeon General, move expeditiously toward a GOCO?

Secretary WHITE. Absolutely. If the GOCO is the right way to

produce it, with all the experts, then we would obviously support

that. We are heavily involved in the research on this, at Frederick,

at Fort Dietrich. We have a leading research laboratory there on

biological terrorism threats, and we will be an active part of the

solution.

Senator HUTCHINSON. One of the suggestions Senator Nunn

made was the hiring of Russian scientists, and it was a very constructive idea. My question is, after this amount of time, is it too

late for those Russian scientists that worked in biological warfare,

created a lot of the weapons that are unfortunately out there, for

us to endorse that kind of a policy, where we try to take some of

those that may be a potential threat and utilize them and their expertise in trying to fight these biological threats to our country?

Secretary WHITE. Well, that is a good question. We have an enormous research capability in this area already, both in the Army

and the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, and those two facilities work very closely together. I know on the Army side, and I am

sure in Atlanta, they are looking to recruit talent in these highly

specific areas, but as we sit on the ground today we think we have

the finest technical base in the world to deal with these things.

Senator HUTCHINSON. I do not think it is necessarily a reflection

on our lack of talent, but trying to get that talent out of the potential of working for our enemies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hutchinson.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Pace, since September 11, many operations have been

increased, and there is no question that there has been a burden

on the present Active Forces that we have, and so I am concerned

about the structure and training and personnel.

Do you believe, General Pace, that increased operations—for example, increased air patrols over the United States’ cities and the

use of National Guard personnel at airports, do you think that they

are likely to be maintained for a long period of time?

General PACE. Senator, I am not sure what the definition of a

long period of time is, but certainly it must be maintained until

other forces are available. If it turns out to be a pure police function and a police force can be built to take over that function, then

naturally we would turn it over. I do not know who else in the

United States could possibly do that, the CAP that General

Eberhart’s people are doing, but I would like to take the opportunity to tell you how fortunate we all are to have such a robust

34

capability in our National Guard and in our Reserves, and those

folks are critical.

Senator AKAKA. I am glad to hear that, but let me ask you this,

then. Do we have adequate force structure, training, and personnel

to sustain these operations on the long-term basis?

General PACE. Sir, it depends upon how many other things we

embark on. Quite honestly, we may not have enough active force

structure. It all depends on the coalition. There have been about

40 countries so far who have offered to assist us in many ways,

some of them financial, others up to going into combat with us, so

there are opportunities for our country to partner with our friends

around the world to be able to share some of this burden, but as

we go down this road, which is still very uncertain, we may very

well need to change our force structure.

Senator AKAKA. General Pace, what, if any, is the impact of your

Department’s current activities regarding homeland defense on our

readiness for other missions?

General PACE. Sir, short term we have not had a major impact

from the allocation of resources to homeland defense. One area,

however, is in the area of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), early warning aircraft. In fact, that aircraft has

been in such demand that our NATO friends have sent five of their

AWACS type aircraft here to assist General Eberhart in his mission, so there are specific low density, high demand assets, primarily intelligence and air warning type assets that are in short

supply and are being used more rapidly now than they were before.

Senator AKAKA. General Kernan, would you have a comment on

that?

General KERNAN. Yes, sir. Unquestionably there are some significant training and readiness implications due to the crisis we find

ourselves in today. A lot of it has to do with the force protection

condition levels, for instance, that we maintain to protect our military installations. Increasing our force protection condition Charlie,

will commit tens of thousands of our troops to just protecting our

installations.

As General Pace said, right now it has not had any readiness impact. A lot of what we are being asked to do in the way of homeland defense are collateral tasks to our primary warfighting missions, but obviously operations tempo has increased. We still rely

heavily on the Guard and Reserve, so the force structure issue is

one that needs to be very carefully studied.

Senator AKAKA. General Eberhart, you said in your testimony

that NORAD forces are also focused on threats coming from within

our own air space. Are these duties in addition to the prior focus

on threats originally coming from external forces, and if so, how

are you preparing to do both?

General EBERHART. Yes, sir. They are in addition to the aerospace warning, and aerospace control focus we had in looking externally. We are preparing and training to do this through the

means we have talked about earlier in terms of additional radars

in the interior of the United States, different netting and

connectivity between the FAA and other agencies and NORAD, and

close cooperation with Pacific Command and with Joint Forces

Command.

35

In fact, on occasion we have had operational control or tactical

control of Navy ships or Navy airplanes to work these kinds of

problems, so we are looking at any and all ways as we fight this

war on terrorism to use the resources available and use them as

smartly as we possibly can.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Eberhart, a question that I would ask, and I think this

has been stated before, but by what authority was it that your pilots had the authority to shoot down an aircraft? Where was that

given, and what, legally, do you have to have before you can do

that?

General EBERHART. Sir, the authority was from the National

Command Authorities. We never asked for that authority, and we

never gave the pilot that authority because we did not see that situation. We did not see the necessity to do that, but the authority

was from the National Command Authorities.

Again, we have thought our way through this in exercises, and

worked with our lawyers, and have decided over time that if we

were convinced that the people on board that aircraft were going

to die regardless, and if we allow that airplane to continue on, others are going to die, too, and we believe that that is persuasive—

that is difficult. I cannot imagine a pilot living with that the rest

of his life, but we have talked to all of them. They all say they are

prepared to do this if they have to, and we know they are all hoping to God they never have to do it.

Senator SESSIONS. But has there been an agreed-upon person or

command authority that would approve that, or is it up to the

pilot?

General EBERHART. No, sir, it is well above the pilot. The National Command Authorities do not wish us to discuss that in open

testimony.

Senator SESSIONS. But you have clarified in your own mind that

there is no doubt as to how that should be handled?

General EBERHART. There is no doubt in the minds of our pilots

and all of our intermediate commanders, right on up to the National Command Authorities.

Senator SESSIONS. A question about posse comitatus and the involvement of the defense forces in homeland defense is a very troublesome issue. We had hearings several years ago under NunnLugar and the Department of Defense willingly decided that they

would want to give up that responsibility of training local police

that was given them, and we agreed to that, and the Department

of Justice assumed that responsibility.

It seems to me that that is the right thing. Secretary White, we

went through that before, that we want our military constantly

ready at a moment’s notice to do what it is committed and trained

to do, and if we put too many domestic civilian training demands

on them. But it does undermine your core function, does it not, in

addition to the legal and historical reasons for minimizing military

involvement in domestic law enforcement?

36

Secretary WHITE. Yes, Senator, it does, but at the same time, if

we in the Quadrennial Defense Review have said that homeland

security and homeland defense is the most important thing we do,

it becomes a matter of balance.

If we have deficiencies in first responders, and in coordination

with Governor Ridge, we have to figure out a way to fill in those

gaps between the States and local communities to provide the necessary defense, then we are going to have to make decisions about

how to apportion resources and allocate them, because somebody

has to do it.

For example, we have biological and chemical units in our structure because we face those threats on the battlefield, not because

there might be a biological attack in New York City. As we review

this whole business of homeland security, we are going to have to

revisit those questions of the appropriateness of the force structure

to a balanced capability between what we do in homeland security

and our traditional focus internationally on the threats that face us

and make some decisions about priorities.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is exactly right. I guess my concern would be that we do not somehow look on the Department of

Defense but on the base force within the community, but it would

be a response force called on in an emergency. We need to know,

I think, for example, that we have certain chemical and biological

teams that do not need to be duplicated elsewhere if yours are

available to be called on. Is that what Mr. Ridge is going to be

working to do, to decide what the needs are and what the gaps are

and what the duplications are, and try to develop a comprehensive

program that will best cover our Nation?

Secretary WHITE. I think that is precisely the challenge, and to

me the cornerstone is to begin by looking at the 11 million first responders in this country, in State and local organizations. The

question is, what are the gaps, and how do we fill in the gaps, and

what do we add to them? Until we can add it, what do we do in

the interim? That to me is the essence of Governor Ridge’s challenge to sort out, and we aim to help him do that.

Senator SESSIONS. I know we have a first responder training center in Alabama for civil domestic preparedness, and surely anybody

who saw what happened in New York knows it was the police and

fire fighters that are first there. Now, the Guard or the Active Duty

Force could be called on to supplement, and would be, but traditionally it is going to be—I mean, every time it will be, in the inferno—the people who are right on the scene to begin with.

General Eberhart, I know General Pace has wrestled with this,

and maybe I should ask him about it. In the Southern Command,

the drug effort and the law enforcement part of that and the military mission is important. As a United States Attorney on the Gulf

Coast for 12 years, I was aware that we were vulnerable to flights

from South and Central America coming into the country pretty

much undetected. Now, we are trying to protect our major cities.

I will ask you, General Eberhart, do you think that we need any

increased effort to maintain security over our southern border?

General EBERHART. Sir, we are doing a radar coverage analysis

as we speak, to include looking at aerostats. We have used them

there for years. We are going to draw them down, but before we

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do that, we are going to make sure there is no value added with

this new mission of homeland defense and looking to the interior.

We are doing that analysis to see what is value added, and that

should be available soon.

Senator SESSIONS. I would add, the aerostats have not proven to

be spectacularly successful in the drug effort, but maybe they will

be in the effort for homeland defense.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, if I could,

submit for the record a fairly lengthy opening statement that

would support many of the issues raised by Senator Cleland. I

want to associate myself with remarks he made, and this statement goes into a lot more detail about that.

[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

All government officials in this room, from Chairman Levin to Secretary White,

to General Pace, to our professional and personal staffs, take an oath of office. That

oath states, ‘‘We shall protect and defend the Constitution of the United States from

all enemies—foreign and domestic.’’ At this time, our Nation and our constitution

require protection from enemies both foreign and domestic. The hijackings on September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks were infiltrated from within our borders. For the first time since the War of 1812, our United States have been attacked. Like then, our military should provide defenses to the Nation during this

current time of war.

As the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,

I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this hearing. As one of 100 Senators and as one of millions of citizens, I am grateful we are exploring the role of

the Department of Defense in homeland security. This morning, I chaired a subcommittee hearing to investigate our Nation’s preparedness in response to a hypothetical smallpox outbreak. Quite frankly, the exercise, known as Dark Winter,

which was conducted under the direction of this committee’s former chairman, Sam

Nunn, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), was quite sobering. Neither our Federal nor local officials, responding to the smallpox outbreak,

worked effectively to curb and ameliorate the disaster. Moreover, in this exercise,

the government had to resort to martial law to restore any semblance of order.

Politicians, generals, and think tanks have long hypothesized over a possible terrorist threat to the United States of America. As of September 11, the days of

hypothesizing are over. The United States faces, and will continue to face, real

threats from biological, chemical, radiological, and possibly even nuclear weapons,

that could devastate our critical infrastructure, our economy, our public health system, and cause massive casualties.

Because our politicians, generals, and think tanks have been contemplating the

possibility of an attack, our level of preparedness for such attacks has improved

slightly in recent years. While I know that our emergency responders and public

health officials have worked hard in response to the September 11 attacks and the

anthrax scares, those events have also shown that we are still under-prepared. Our

enemies are well aware that our citizens are scared, and that our government has

yet to remedy the public’s fear. Our enemies are not going to give us a time out

or a reprieve to wait for the U.S. government, local governments, and public health

officials to tighten up critical infrastructure, expand our vaccine programs, implement bio-chem detection units, and otherwise improve our capabilities to respond

to the next public emergency. They do not play by the rules.

Regrettably, I think our Department of Defense is beholden to an old notion of

traditions and rules that hamper the Department’s ability to emerge as the leader

it needs to be in Homeland Defense. For generations, the Department has thought

that wars would be fought on other continents, and not on our soil. Under the doctrine of Posse Comitatus, which dates back to the Revolutionary War, the U.S. was

not to maintain standing armies for any constabular purposes within the United

States. Our soldiers were not to engage in domestic defense or activities generally

associated with law enforcement. The F.B.I., local police forces, and the National

Guard were created to undertake domestic defense. I recognize the spirit from which

38

Posse Comitatus grew, and I am a strong proponent of federalism. However, our 50

States have been attacked, and we will only further endanger our citizenry if the

Department of Defense is withheld from taking action when American soil is under

attack. Posse Comitatus does not forbid the use of troops to quell riots and civil disturbances, and it should not pose a barrier when our Nation is under attack from

its enemies. Notions that the Department of Defense cannot actively participate in

Homeland Defense are antiquated, and they jeopardize our democracy.

The Department of Defense has long prepared its uniformed men and women for

the dangers of a non-conventional attack stemming from the use of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). These men and women best know how to respond to the dangers that presently face the United States at home. Moreover, the Department of

Defense has dedicated teams of scientists to create a wide array of counter-measures

and defenses to a WMD attack. Furthermore, they have created state-of-the-art

WMD detection units for troops in the field that our Federal and local officials certainly need to protect the Nation. Our military has also been better trained to respond to the likelihood of a WMD attack than our civilian officials. We cannot afford

to have the best department suited for response, evaluation, containment, civilian

security, and defense on the sidelines because of its reluctance or beliefs in old theories of states’ rights that should not apply when America is under attack.

Currently, over 40 Federal agencies and countless state and local agencies have

responded to the September 11 attacks and the anthrax scares. Again, those brave

men and women who have responded are to be lauded. However, there have been

dents in the armor, as evidenced by the deaths of the postal workers in Washington,

DC. What the American people are looking for is a solidifying force to restore confidence, and I believe that DOD can best provide that stability and confidence. I am

hopeful the Department of Defense is willing to undergo a paradigm shift and take

an active role, if not a primary role, in homeland defense. We must not forget, after

all, that the Pentagon was one of the sites attacked on September 11.

The Quadrennial Defense Review, which was released on September 30, 2001,

does not provide the framework it should as to how our military will deal with the

asymmetrical type of war that will dominate the beginning of the 21st century. The

tragedies of September 11 are mentioned by the QDR as part of DOD’s military

planning, but DOD merely papers over the problems posed by September 11.

At least the QDR states, ‘‘Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of

strategy.’’ The QDR recognizes that the real chance of another domestic attack has

increased dramatically since September 11, 2001, and states ‘‘. . . the defense

strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States and its

land. . .’’

Nevertheless, the QDR raises concerns that the Department of Defense will not

commit itself to an active role in homeland defense. I recognize the Office of Homeland Security should oversee and coordinate a national strategy to safeguard the

United States against terrorist attacks and respond to them. Again, however, DOD

should not be so willing to cede over its expertise in crisis management and response, and by doing so, only take merely a supplemental role in Homeland Defense.

The QDR makes clear that local police and fire officials should continue to serve

as the first responders to future attacks, and that the DOD does not wish to give

such a duty to the military. However, it seems evident that the military possesses

both the human and the scientific assets to best assess the aftermath of an attack,

restore calm, and provide further protection to the area affected in the case of secondary attacks by an enemy.

I am hopeful that, today, we can alleviate much of DOD’s misgivings about any

active participation in Homeland Defense. Of course, DOD will have to change its

force structure and organization to fight the new type of war that so affects our Nation. Frankly, I am encouraged by the possibility of such changes because it will signal an end to planning and organizing based on the obsolete notions of the Cold

War. Furthermore, it is not my intention for military to undertake this task without

the means to do so.

Congress must and will provide DOD the funds to meet the demands of the war

we currently face at home. There is a war to fight on the home front, and Congress

will ensure that our military is funded to fight that fight. DOD’s role in Homeland

Defense will not be an unfunded mandate. We need our Nation’s best and brightest

at this urgent time, and our men and women in uniform are the best and the brightest.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I am thankful you scheduled this hearing today, and

I hope we all understand that our military is crucial to Homeland Defense.

Senator LANDRIEU. Just a comment, and then I have three questions, if I could. One, it was said here on the record by one of the

39

panelists, and I thank you all for the excellent work that you are

doing, but we talked about being careful about expanding the role

of DOD in light of this sort of domestic and homeland security. I

know there are resource issues and all sorts of things we have to

address, and they are legitimate, but I want to get back, Mr. Secretary, to what you said, and to try to affirm that it is the original

role of the Department of Defense, the principal role, the central

role, the entire reason of being that the Department of Defense

would protect the life and liberty and well-being of the people on

the homeland, as well as people who have to temporarily travel off

the homeland to go for whatever carries them away, business or

commerce or other endeavors.

But the central role of the Department of Defense is protection,

and I think we are in a significant historic paradigm shift. I think

one of the roles of this hearing is to help us focus on that new paradigm, and I for one am very happy to see in the Quadrennial Defense Review the words reemphasized about the primary role of the

Department of Defense in protecting the homeland.

We have had 6,000 innocent people killed. This is not a crime,

this is an attack. This is not a crime scene. This is a battleground.

6,000 men, women, and children, innocent people have been murdered and killed by the hands of our enemies, using different weapons.

It is an asymmetrical attack, and I think the faster we get clear

about that, the better we will be able as a Government to respond

appropriately and quickly to prevent the further loss of life and

prevent the further deterioration of individuals’ well-being, and

prevent the economic downturn for this Nation that would have a

dramatic effect not only on us but everybody in the world, and to

support what the President says about the urgency of that.

Now, I want to just refer us to something that is not new, because it was written in 350 B.C. by Sun Tzu. He said, ‘‘know your

enemy, know yourself, and you can fight 100 battles without disaster.’’ I thank the chairman for calling this hearing, because it is not

only about knowing our enemy, who he or she is, or where he or

she is, or what it is, a State or a terrorist cell, and where they

might be and what their motivations are, but a very important

thing about what we are doing today is knowing ourselves. Who

are we? What have we become? What are our departments, and

what are our capabilities, and how are we organized?

So along those lines, I just need to ask you, Secretary White, if

I could, one of the ongoing difficulties I believe we face in this new

era of symmetrical warfare which we are in, and getting fully engaged, precisely when are we under attack and when are we precisely at war?

We have developed a system for what we call low intensity conflict. These actions are characterized by interventions around the

world to defend democracy during the Cold War. They are fairly

well-defined. We reached a hazy compromise under the War Powers Act, by no means perfect, but it was the best option that we

had to reflect a changed world.

After the Cold War, we switched gears to peacekeeping, and then

the Pentagon has developed methodologies for what it calls operations other than war, meaning peacekeeping and humanitarian

40

interventions. We are all familiar with this. It has worked pretty

well, because through the course of the Cold War it was developed.

There are expected protocols that have been established, here and

through the international community, but I think we find ourselves

in this new war without a paradigm similar to the ones that we

are familiar with. The Pentagon does not seem to know how to

treat non-State actors. It does not seem to know what its proactive

role is in defending the continental U.S. That is what we are debating.

My question is, can you describe for me a scenario in which a

non-State actor would take actions within the United States and

which you would anticipate would put the Pentagon on a war footing? Let me be clear. Could you describe for me a scenario in which

a non-State actor would take actions within the United States and

which you anticipate would put the Pentagon on a war footing?

Secretary WHITE. Senator, I think we are on a war footing right

now. I think we have just observed a war-like act. As the President

clearly said, we are at war with international terrorism. If you look

at what we are doing inside the Department, we are on a wartime

footing right now. We had 174 people killed in our building, and

so we thoroughly understand that we are at war, and the gentlemen on my right or left I think understand that, and we are prosecuting that war both domestically and internationally to the full

measure of our ability.

Domestically, as we have said earlier in the hearing, the Quadrennial Defense Review cites our traditional role to protect the

homeland as the number one responsibility we have in the Department. I absolutely agree with your comments on that. We are at

war right now, both domestically and internationally, and I think

we have the resolve and will and support of the American people

in that activity, and we are going to prosecute it until it has finished.

Senator LANDRIEU. I want to agree with you and say I support

that most strongly, and I am also one of the Members of the Senate

that will try to provide the resources necessary to do that, because

there is a leadership role that must be assumed, and the question

about who assumes that leadership role I think is central to being

able to wage an effective and appropriate battle for what we are

experiencing right now. There are many issues that have to be resolved, but I think the people of the United States would welcome

the military’s leadership role, respecting the other roles that all the

other Government agencies have to play when we are in fact in a

new kind of war, an asymmetrical battle. We are attacked in different forms.

I know I am out of time, but just as the planes were turned into

missiles, we have now been attacked through the mail. The next

attack could come, as Senator Sessions or Senator Roberts said,

through the crop-duster. The next attack could come from some

other place, and if we are relying on the 11 million first responders

who are hard-working, underpaid, not getting paid for overtime,

not trained the way the military department is, I think we may be

relying on something that was not necessarily intended for the new

paradigm we are facing, not to say they have not been fantastic

and terrific.

41

So I will save my other questions. My time is up, but I just think

that the role of the military, I think I want to support you in that

central mission for the military.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Landrieu.

Senator Santorum.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I just want to maybe shift a little focus to some

of the concerns that I have. When I think of Army, I think of Army

beginning with R, and that is the word resources, and I have had

big questions for a long time about the Army and its resources.

Now you are here in front of us saying we have a new mission,

a new responsibility, all these things I have to do now, and I keep

coming back to the Army that is underfunded with the plan of 331⁄3

capitalized, modernized units, and I am just wondering how this

new mission is going to be a drag on resources. I believe it is absolutely essential for the Army to begin and finish the process of

something this committee has advocated for quite sometime, which

is the transformation of the Army.

I understand and I support the designation of the Army as the

leader of this homeland defense with respect to the military, but

I have to tell you, I have some huge concerns, and I would like you

to tell me how you are going to take what is already an underfunded Army to do an additional mission and still get to transformation.

Secretary WHITE. I think it is clear, just like the other services,

there will be additional resources required for the additional op

tempo that we find ourselves in.

I was making cases all summer long in the Quadrennial Defense

Review that, given the operational tempo of the Army at that point,

with deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo and other places around

the world, that we were hard-pressed, from a structure and resources point of view.

If you just take the Guard side of it, we now have 6,000 soldiers

in airports across the country dealing with that challenge, so I

think clearly, depending upon the duration of this activity, as the

Vice Chairman has said, there are significant resources and structural implications to this level of operational tempo that we are addressing both in the 2002 budget and the 2003 one that we are putting together as we speak.

We must, however, sustain the transformation that the Chief of

Staff laid out 2 years ago, and that you have supported in this committee, the transformation that makes us more agile, more strategically mobile than we have been in the past. In my opinion, it is

tailor-made for the security environment we find in post 11 September, and so we have to sustain that transformation effort while

we keep up with this increased operational tempo.

Senator SANTORUM. I agree with you. My question, maybe, is

more specific, and that is, what challenges do you face not just with

the increased operational tempo, but the resources that operational

tempo demands, and still have the resources to invest in the transformation, and what is the impact? Well, just give me that. Can

you tell me how you believe you can allocate those resources?

Secretary WHITE. Before 11 September, the allocation was very

clear. The allocation was to fully fund people, fully fund readiness

42

of the structure as it existed then, and to support transformation

both in the interim brigades and in the objective force due with the

legacy force, and bandaging together our infrastructure and our installations, and those were the trades we made to make it work.

Post 11 September, in our budget submits you have seen we have

asked for more money for force projection, we have asked for more

money for our intelligence resources, and the operational tempo

that we are at will require more O&M money. We have made those

requests, and we are, of course, in discussion with you right now

as you go into conference.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Santorum.

Mr. Secretary, you have testified today about the current plan for

reorganization with respect to homeland defense. I understand that

plan was developed at the highest echelons, and came down

through the Pentagon. Could you give your personal views, based

upon your extensive experience as a professional officer, as a business executive, as a thoughtful commentator? Is this reorganizational plan effective? Does it go too far? Does it go far enough?

Secretary WHITE. Do you mean in terms of what we are doing

in the Department of Defense?

Senator REED. Or perhaps overall. Just your impressions would

be very valuable, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary WHITE. My personal opinion is, number 1, as I said

earlier, we need a focus at DOD level, most likely with a dedicated

Under Secretary, and we need to collect all the bits and pieces from

SOLIC and Policy and Health Affairs that have to do with homeland security, and we need to pull that all in one spot. The Secretary, I have made recommendations to him, and he is considering

precisely how he wants to do that. I think that is number 1.

Step number 2 is the operational planning that the joint commands are doing before we get the Unified Command Plan out so

we can clearly define what our homeland security requirements are

and figure out the apportioning of forces. Details are associated

with that, and that is a big task, and ultimately it will mean

changes to the Unified Command Plan, as the Vice Chairman has

discussed.

The third and perhaps the greatest step is the interagency aspects of this, which Governor Ridge will drive, and that gets down

to practice, practice, practice, against the realistic threats we find

ourselves fighting post 11 September. There are parts of this that

we do very well, because we frequently exercise chemical spills and

hazmat things that you find in the normal course, but we have an

enormous challenge facing us in these new threats, and we have

to train up on the interagency side, and I am confident, having spoken with Governor Ridge, that he will drive that process, and those

are the things I think we need to do.

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. In fact, you have

predicted my next question. The impression I have is that we have

lots of good plans at every level, we have units that have been designed to implement some of these plans, but I am not quite sure

we know what we have out there, because we have not exercised

vigorously. We have not done the kind of command post exercise

43

and operational exercises that will show, as you have said before,

the gaps.

Do you have now a vigorous schedule of exercises? I should also

add that this has to extend not just through DOD, through Federal

agencies. This has to go down to local police departments, local fire

departments, the environmental managers in agencies and States.

Are you thinking about those kinds of exercises, and do you have

the resources to do them, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary WHITE. We have to, and I think everyone recognizes

that, and everyone recognizes the key role the Governors will play

in this, and State and local responders. In 23 of our States the Adjutant General of the State is also the emergency services coordinator for the Governor. We will get to that, and we will train to do

that, because we do not have any choice. We have to have the operational capability that will be developed by that exercise, and as

a former military officer, you understand what I am talking about.

If you do not train it and do not exercise it, you do not have the

capability.

Senator REED. I could not concur more, and I do not want to belabor this point, but is the money there for these exercises? Are you

actively planning? Will the schedule coordinate all the way down

to the emergency management office in the State, and to the local

fire departments and police departments?

Secretary WHITE. I do not think the planning is laid out in adequate detail at this point. I know that is a focus that Governor

Ridge and his appointment brings to the Government, and we will

actively support him.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. One final point before

recognizing Senator Warner for a second round.

We recognize we are up against a very adroit adversary. They

have struck us through our aviation system. One would assume

that they would try to find an open door and knock on it, or just

come through, which leads me to the issue I think could potentially

be very vulnerable, and that is our maritime security, which the

Department of Defense and Department of Transportation must

play a key role in.

Could you, Mr. Secretary, and your colleagues, comment on maritime security in terms of your efforts at coordination and organization in general?

General PACE. Senator, if I could go at it in an unclassified way,

and then perhaps in another forum address it more specifically, but

for example, some ships that were scheduled to deploy overseas

have not been deployed, to be able to stay here. Some that were

overseas are being brought home. The cooperation between the

Navy and the Coast Guard is tremendous, and they are working

collectively in our major ports, on our coastlines to provide the best

security they can with assets they have, and so from the maritime

perspective I think the Navy and the Coast Guard are working

very closely, and are reallocating resources to focus more on homeland.

Senator REED. Is this also a issue of the Unified Command, who

is in charge with respect to Coast Guard, Navy, and civil authorities?

44

General PACE. Unified Command Plan has a primary objective.

The work that is going on now for changes has as a primary objective identifying a CINC responsible for homeland defense.

Senator REED. Thank you, General Pace, and if I may take this

opportunity, there was some discussion earlier about the posse

comitatus counterdrug efforts, and General Pace, you have a

unique perspective, being a former USSOUTHCOM Commander.

The understanding I have is that our participation in these operations supporting Colombia and other initiatives, that our legislation provides the Secretary of Defense the authority and the direction to ensure that members of the Army and Navy do not participate in law enforcement activities, so that there is not an active

regulatory stricture against those law enforcement activities where

DOD personnel are doing military things. Is that fair, or could you

comment on that?

General PACE. Sir, let me try, and you can tell me if I miss the

mark.

The statute does for routine daily activities prohibit your military

from acting as a police force. There are also, however, emergency

measures that the President can invoke which allows us to do the

things we have been doing since 11 September.

Senator REED. But again, and I think my question was slightly

tortured, with respect to your operations in Colombia and elsewhere, you are performing a strictly military role. The regulations

and the guidance you are giving the troops did not invite them to

get involved in criminal justice activities.

General PACE. That is correct, sir.

Senator REED. If there is no objection, at this point I would request to have the prepared statement of Senator Thurmond inserted into the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing on the Department

of Defense’s role in homeland defense. Although the Nation is focused on the ongoing attacks against the terrorists groups in Afghanistan, we must prepare and posture our forces and government agencies for the defense of the U.S. homeland. This

struggle, like the President’s declared war against terrorism, will be long in duration and one that will test the perseverance of our people and democracy.

Mr. Chairman, threats against our Nation are not new, however the events of the

past month are serious challenges to our citizens and economy. Never before have

our people been faced with the threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.

Nor has our economy faced the threat of an attack on the critical computer networks

that tie together the domestic and international business community. We have to

prepare to meet these threats and, more importantly, the potential aftermath of

such attacks.

Mr. Chairman, our panel of distinguished witnesses will have a critical role, but

not the predominate role, in determining how we prepare the Nation for homeland

defense. Governor Ridge has the challenge of effectively bringing together the efforts

of all government agencies at the federal, state and local level. We must ensure that

he has the authority and support in this vital effort to ensure the Nation is prepared. The Department of Defense’s role should be supportive so it can focus on the

traditional and non-traditional threats emanating from outside the United States.

Although it is critical that we focus on the homeland defense, I have always advocated that the best defense is a good offense. In that regard, we must ensure that

our military forces are in the highest state of readiness, are forward deployed, and

have the capability to detect and strike the threat at its point of origin. I hope we

45

will keep that focus in mind as we consider the role of the Department in homeland

security.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Secretary White, you referred to our distinguished acting chairman as a former military officer. He went to

West Point, and we are very proud to have him on this committee.

He certainly handles things very well. But I am just curious, who

was senior at West Point, the Secretary or yourself?

Senator REED. The Secretary was senior, quite senior.

Senator WARNER. Secretary White and General Pace, we have

had a lot of discussion here on posse comitatus, but there are some

related statutes which I am informed by our staff have directives

which inhibit such things as the sharing of intelligence between

law enforcement and local military organizations, and maybe we

had better take a look at that. I think what we did on the floor

today, the Senate terrorism bill has gone part-way in alleviating

that. I come back to our President, who has handled this thing

with tremendous courage and I think with foresight and brilliance,

who said we are all in this together, and we have to look at things

that have been in place for so long, like posse comitatus, and

maybe there are good reasons for the military to have intelligence

that you do not want to share with law enforcement at one time

in our history, but I think after this hearing you have heard an expression of a lot of our colleagues that we had better look at it.

I am glad you touched on the maritime security issue, the port

security, which of course is with the Coast Guard, but we need to

coordinate with the Coast Guard if we are bringing heavy tankers

in. Our Nation is so dependent on overseas petroleum, and if one

of those tankers were blown up by a terrorist in a port it would

have devastating effects. I would hope that would be examined

also.

Now, as we all fully understand, Secretary White and General

Pace, our overseas combatant commanders—we refer to them as

CINCs—establish uniform standards within their geographic areas

for force protection and threat warning conditions. Who is responsible for establishing such standards and issuing such appropriate

warning information to our bases within the United States, and we

have obviously Air Force bases, naval bases, and Army bases, and

it seems to me that should have a uniform examination. Now, you

can take that for the record, but does anybody have anything for

the moment on that?

General PACE. Yes, sir. The Service Chiefs are the ones who set

the force protection standards at the bases and the stations in the

continental United States.

Senator WARNER. With all due respect, is the Chief of Staff of the

Army looking at the same level of force protection for a base that

is right next to the Norfolk Naval Base, and the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for that?

General PACE. They are, sir, and in fact that was a discussion

item in this week’s tank session with all of the Joint Chiefs. We

do collectively look at that to make sure we are on the same level,

but your question for the record is what should we do in the future.

[The information referred to follows:]

46

Currently, the Secretaries of Military Departments, through Service Chiefs, set

force protection standards at bases and the stations in the continental United States

(as set out in DODD 20001.12 and DODI 2000.16). In the future, this responsibility

may go to a new ‘‘Homeland Security CINC’’ or fall in line with a national homeland

security threat system, if one is developed. Any proposal on changing the current

system will need to be properly vetted throughout the Department of Defense before

implementation.

Senator WARNER. Lastly, we are all moving out as quickly as we

can to solve these problems, and I think we had better take a look,

Mr. Secretary, at the procurement regulations which this committee, over the 23 years I have been here, worked on many reforms.

We have achieved, I think, some improvement, but right now if

there is a small firm out here or a collection of individuals that is

making a product and you need that product tomorrow morning, I

would hate to see you encumbered with a long procurement process

of bidding and the lowest bidding, best and final, and review the

bids.

We do not have time for all of that, and I indicated yesterday in

our discussion with the President that I think we ought to look at

a statute which reposes a wide margin of discretion in the Secretary of Defense and, indeed, the Secretaries of other departments

and agencies, and Governor Ridge acknowledged he is going to look

at this also, whereby for a period, let us say 2 years, and we would

sunset it after 2 years, but if the Department of the Army wants

to get out here and buy a product, go to it, and let us get that product and bring it in and utilize it in this war on terrorism.

We have had a good hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you

and all members of the committee.

Senator REED. Let me inquire, Senator Akaka, Senator Sessions,

do you have additional questions?

Senator SESSIONS. I would just like to make an observation. Having served as a United States Attorney during the early days of the

drug wars, I saw the incredible difficulty of getting every agency

that has a role to play in drugs working together in a harmonious

way. I can understand the difficulties you are facing. The only

thing I was concerned about was the suggestion, perhaps—and I do

not think it was meant to be that way—that somehow the Department of Defense now might be involved and be responsible for investigating mail, or is going to be responsible for security at airports permanently, or going to have to take over for the Coast

Guard and now guard the ports of America.

We have this tremendous investment over the years in all of

these agencies which have a good deal of expertise and equipment.

They are trained specifically, the FBI is, to investigate cases. I

know every local police officer and the things in their community

does things that the Department of Defense does not have the ability to do, so what we have to do is figure out how to draw on the

resources of the Department of Defense and make sure that they

are readily available on call when needed, create an orderly process

here in some way, and the problem, the challenge is a tremendous

one, and it falls on Mr. Ridge primarily.

I do not favor a major change in the roles we have, frankly. I just

do not favor that. Yes, a murderer is a threat to the homeland,

drug dealers are threats to the homeland, but I do not think we

want to turn all of that over to the Department of Defense now,

47

at a time when you are trying to transform and be prepared to

fight wars around the world, so however we do that, Mr. Chairman,

is going to be difficult, but a comprehensive plan is needed, and

this committee is doing the right thing in having hearings on it.

I just would say that we ought to recognize every additional duty

given to the Department of Defense—the 6,000 National Guardsmen that have been deployed, called up, and have to be trained

and paid for that purpose—does drain your budget. It drains your

readiness from other missions you are trying to do.

I will submit some more questions for the record.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. If there

are no further questions, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you, gentlemen.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

WMD–CSTS

1. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan and Secretary White, to date we have authorized 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs), but only

10 have been certified ready to conduct their mission by the Secretary of Defense.

At the same time, their capabilities are limited to WMD detection. They do not conduct clean-up. Instead, they reach back to other units who do so. Some proposals

have recently surfaced to create new teams. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps and other

services are expanding their response capabilities to include more clean-up and

management. What is the correct way forward—should we create more teams or

should we focus on improving the capabilities of the armed services across the

board?

General KERNAN. Managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction

incident is a complex task that will most likely demand a broad range of capabilities, exceeding those of any one unit. The capabilities of our state and local first

responders remain the most important investment we can make. Supporting military capabilities should be unique or complementary in order to provide depth. The

detection and assessment capabilities of the WMD–CSTs are critical to determining

the scope of the problem and the type of follow on support needed for a particular

incident. These teams immediately deploy to the incident site to assess an incident,

advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions and facilitate requests for

assistance to expedite the arrival of follow-on personnel and assets to help save

lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage.

When demands exceed local and state capabilities, Federal assets can be employed. Requirements for additional Federal assets are broad in scope, likely exceeding the capabilities of any single organization and therefore will include a variety

of military capabilities that are established principally to support warfighting

abroad. Organizations with military unique capabilities should be limited in light

of the 11 million first responders and the 600 local and state hazardous materials

teams in the United States. The WMD–CSTs are one such capability. The various

proposals for establishing a WMD–CST in each U.S. state and U.S. territory are

worthy of consideration.

Secretary WHITE. Careful analytical analysis during several Department reviews

have concluded that the current 32 congressionally authorized WMD–CSTs adequately support our national requirement. The teams are federally funded and

equipped to provide state Governors ready access to fully trained military response

assets to use in preparing for and responding to WMD incidents as part of their

state emergency management response capability. The CSTs are not considered to

be part of the first responder community. Rather, they are designed to arrive within

12 hours after being requested by local authorities. The Department’s placement of

32 teams ensures that a WMD incident anywhere within the U.S. can be supported

within that response standard. Thus, establishing more than 32 teams would require substantial fiscal investment with little benefit, in terms of increased population coverage or expected response time.

As you pointed out, the role of the CSTs is limited. There are many consequence

management functions required in responding to a domestic WMD disaster. Most

of these are performed by non-DOD entities. Local first responders do the most critical, time-sensitive functions. It is the Department’s position that improving the

48

training, equipping and manning of our first responder community is in the best interest of the American people.

2. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan, about a month ago, the GAO issued a report

on combating terrorism that was mandated by last year’s National Defense Authorization Act. The report asserted that the WMD–CSTs ‘‘continue to experience problems with readiness, doctrine and roles, and deployment that undermine their usefulness in an actual terrorist incident.’’

What is your command doing to bring all of the teams up to a high, uniform

standard of readiness?

General KERNAN. The WMD–CSTs are National Guard assets that are manned

by their respective states, and trained and equipped by the National Guard Bureau.

Joint Forces Command provides training and readiness oversight of the WMD–

CSTs. We assume that responsibility once a WMD–CST receives Secretary of Defense certification. Training and readiness oversight includes guidance to the National Guard, comment on their programs, and coordination and review of readiness

and mobilization plans. Therefore, under our training and readiness oversight responsibilities, we are working closely with the National Guard Bureau and the

states where those teams reside to standardize their training, tactics, techniques

and procedures. Joint Task Force-Civil Support serves as our Command’s executive

agent in this critical effort. I would add that in recent visits to Fifth U.S. Army in

San Antonio, Texas, and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, I had the opportunity to review the Army’s training program that ensures that all WMD–CSTs receive standardized, high quality training. In fact, collectively both First and Fifth Army headquarters conduct a validation exercise for each WMD–CST prior to Secretary of Defense certification. The high standards and consistency of this program are impressive.

NORAD–FAA

3. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, as I mentioned in the hearing, in order to

get a complete account from you, I am resubmitting this question and adding some

related questions regarding the sequence of events on September 11 relating to the

aircraft that crashed into the Pentagon. According to the timeline I have seen:

At 8:55 a.m. on September 11, American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east

over Ohio, away from its intended course.

At 9:10 a.m., Flight 77 was detected by FAA radar over West Virginia, heading

east. This is after the two planes had struck the World Trade Center towers.

At 9:25 a.m., the FAA notified NORAD that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington, DC.

General Eberhart, is this the first notification that NORAD and DOD had that

Flight 77 was probably being hijacked?

General EBERHART. At 0924 EDT, NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector

(NEADS) received the first notification that American Airlines Flight 77 was possibly being hijacked. This was the first documented notification received by the Department of Defense.

4. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, given what had happened in New York City,

do you know why it took the FAA 15 minutes to notify NORAD that Flight 77 had

probably been hijacked and was headed toward Washington, DC?

General EBERHART. My understanding is that the FAA lost radar contact with

American Airlines Flight 77 and momentarily regained contact at 0850. The FAA

also began to receive calls from outside agencies with reports of a possible downed

aircraft. Additionally, the loss of radio contact with the aircraft added to the confusion. In light of this, I believe the FAA was faced with conflicting information which

hindered them from making an accurate assessment of the actual location of the aircraft.

5. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, at 9:37 a.m., 27 minutes after Flight 77 was

detected by FAA radar heading east over West Virginia and while the whole Nation

was watching the devastation in New York City, it crashed into the Pentagon. What

level of the DOD had the knowledge that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington

at the time it crashed into the Pentagon?

General EBERHART. The FAA notified the NEADS that American Airlines Flight

77 was headed towards Washington, DC. NEADS then passed this information to

NORAD’s Air Warning Center and Command Center in Cheyenne Mountain and to

the Continental U.S. NORAD Region’s Regional Air Operations Center. At 0925, the

49

NMCC convened a Significant Event Conference and during that conference, at

0933, NORAD reported one more aircraft en route to Washington, DC.

6. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, was there ever any consideration given, between the time the aircraft was detected heading toward Washington and the time

of the crash, to evacuating the Pentagon?

General EBERHART. The FAA notified the NEADS of the possible hijacking at

0924 EDT and F–16s from Langley AFB were airborne at 0930 EDT. At 0925 EDT,

the FAA notified NEADS that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington, DC. At

that time, there was no way for the FAA or NORAD to determine what target within the Washington, DC area the terrorists on Flight 77 intended to strike. Because

of this, NORAD did not consider issuing an evacuation notice to the Pentagon.

7. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, to your knowledge who else did the FAA notify aside from NORAD?

General EBERHART. After the FAA determined that American Airlines Flight 77

had been hijacked, they convened a hijack conference, which included representatives from the FBI, DEA, and CIA.

8. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, what, if any, existing interagency plans were

activated?

General EBERHART. Prior to the attacks on 11 September, the FAA and NORAD

established a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure accomplishment of the air

defense mission. The assigned responsibilities and working relationships were fully

executed during the timeframe mentioned above.

9. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, who within DOD should NORAD notify in

the event of a future attack of this nature?

General EBERHART. Since the attacks on 11 September, NORAD has made major

changes regarding how we respond to an air threat. We have established a new conference called the Domestic Threat Conference which is used to alert and inform

command centers, senior authorities, and other agencies of a domestic event having

the potential to threaten the United States, U.S. Forces, or national security and

critical infrastructure protection interests. [DELETED] The Domestic Threat Conference provides the ability to quickly pass time critical information needed to react

to a threat against North America.

10. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, during the hearing you testified to the

timeline of notifications from FAA to NORAD, and at one point stated ‘‘we were told

that it was a light commuter plane’’ that hit the first World Trade Center tower.

Who told NORAD that it was a light commuter plane?

General EBERHART. On the morning of 11 September, NORAD rapidly received a

vast amount of information concerning the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. During this timeframe, we received conflicting reports on which aircraft were

involved in the attacks and which aircraft were hijacked. As we were responding

to the first hijacking, CNN reported that a commuter plane had hit the World Trade

Center. NORAD soon learned that the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade

Center was in fact the hijacked commercial airliner.

11. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, relating to Flight 77 and Flight 93, what

buildings or offices did NORAD consider notifying once you learned that Flights 77

and 93 had been hijacked?

General EBERHART. The FAA informed NORAD that American Airlines Flight 77

was headed toward Washington, DC, but neither NORAD nor the FAA had any information on the terrorists’ intended target. Concerning United Airlines Flight 93,

NORAD did receive word that aircraft had a possible bomb on board; however, our

records did not indicate the direction the flight was headed. Therefore, we did not

consider notifying any offices or buildings.

12. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, to your knowledge did the FAA notify the

Pentagon that Flight 93 was hijacked?

General EBERHART. The data/log entries received by NORAD from the FAA do not

show a time or entry indicating the FAA specifically notified the Pentagon that

United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked.

13. Senator LEVIN. General Eberhart, did NORAD notify the National Military

Command Center that Flight 93 was hijacked?

50

General EBERHART. NORAD did not notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC) that United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked. In the event of a hijack,

it is the FAA’s responsibility to convene a ‘‘hijack conference,’’ which includes the

FBI, DEA, CIA, and the NMCC. Due to the rapidly evolving situation on 11 September, the FAA also made direct contact with NORAD’s NEADS.

14. Senator LEVIN. Secretary White (reassigned to General Eberhart), what improvements have been made since September 11 to communications among NORAD,

the FAA and the National Military Command Center?

General EBERHART. Since the attacks on 11 September, NORAD has created three

new conferences to improve communications between NORAD, the Federal Aviation

Administration, and the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

The first new conference is the Noble Eagle Conference. This is a NORAD/FAA

conference that allows for rapid investigation of air events which do not require the

National Command Authority’s (NCA) notification. This conference is convened to

gather information on emergent air events that are unusual in nature, but do not

present a threat to North America. [DELETED]

The second conference now used by [DELETED] is the Domestic Event Conference. CINCNORAD uses the Domestic Event Conference to characterize and assess domestic warning indications for potential threat to North America and to inform agencies within the Department of Defense as well as other Federal agencies.

Based upon the situation, the NMCC Deputy Director of Operations or

CINCNORAD may recommend upgrading the conference to a Domestic Threat Conference.

The Domestic Threat Conference is the third new conference used in the event

of an air threat to North America. This conference also links [DELETED], and it

is used to alert and inform command centers, senior authorities, and other agencies

of a domestic event having the potential to threaten the United States, U.S. forces,

or national security and critical infrastructure protection interests. The Domestic

Threat Conference provides the ability to quickly pass time critical information

needed to react to a threat to North America.

Along with the newly established conferences, NORAD has sent military representatives to the FAA’s Air Route Traffic Control Centers and the FAA has sent

additional representatives to HQ NORAD and to CONR.

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

15. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan, in the aftermath of September 11 you have

augmented the staff you have dedicated to homeland security, I understand as a

stop-gap measure until the Secretary of Defense decides where he wants this mission to be permanently housed. In addition, the Joint Task Force-Civil Support, also

under your command, has doubled its size to 160 people who are enhancing planning and sustaining the current 24-hour homeland security operations. Could this

constitute the nucleus of a homeland security staff, if JFCOM inherited the mission?

General KERNAN. Our new 90-person homeland security directorate could serve as

the nucleus of a homeland security staff. It was structured to be an interim Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. Led by a two-star Army general, this directorate

is charged with planning, organization and execution of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s responsibilities for land and maritime homeland defense and military support to civil authorities. JTF–CS continues to fulfill its charter as a deployable command and control headquarters ready to respond today to support the lead Federal

agency for consequence management in the event of an attack by weapons of mass

destruction. The increase in manning to 164 personnel was initiated prior to 11 September and we are accelerating it. Achieved through assignment and augmentation,

this increased manning ensures that JTF–CS can maintain a continuous 24-hour response. Furthermore, to enhance unity of effort, I have recently placed JTF–CS and

JTF–6, our counterdrug task force, under the control of my Homeland Security Director.

16. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan, do you think Joint Forces Command should

take on the homeland security mission?

General KERNAN. U.S. Joint Forces Command is fulfilling its recently assigned responsibilities for land and maritime defense and military assistance to civil authorities. The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and responsibilities of the

individual combatant commanders. In light of the 11 September attacks, the Service

Chiefs and combatant commanders are proposing changes to the Unified Command

Plan and the Chairman, under his Title 10 responsibilities, will recommend changes

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to those authorities to the Secretary of Defense. Joint Forces Command is ready

now to assume this mission if assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

17. Senator LEVIN. Secretary White, President Bush has appointed several individuals to oversee or coordinate some aspect of homeland security. This list of individuals includes: Governor Ridge, as head of the Office of Homeland Security; an

NSC counterterrorism coordinator, General Wayne Downing; an NSC

Cyberterrorism coordinator, Mr. Dick Clarke.

As DOD’s interim executive agent, how are you working with these various individuals?

Secretary WHITE. I have close and daily personal contact with Governor Ridge,

General Downing, and Mr. Clarke on homeland security matters. There is a strong

relationship developing between my staff and the staffs of the Office of Homeland

Security and the National Security Council. The daily meetings and communications

will continue to forge solid relationships so that we may work together to effectively

address the many homeland security issues the country is facing.

18. Senator LEVIN. Secretary White, how are you ensuring that the Homeland Security Office, the interagency and agency coordinators, and the Department are not

working at cross-purposes?

Secretary WHITE. The Department of Defense fully participates in Governor

Ridge’s daily Homeland Security Council principal, deputy, or policy coordination

committee meetings. Representatives from other agencies also attend these meetings. This ensures that the agencies are not at cross-purposes with each other or

with Governor Ridge’s office, but are working together towards a focused, common

purpose.

19. Senator LEVIN. Secretary White, in addition, how are those of you charged

with defending U.S. territory against terrorist attacks coordinating with the officials

in the NSC and State Department who are focused on global terrorist threats to the

U.S.?

Secretary WHITE. Homeland defense is an integral part of Homeland Security.

DOD’s homeland defense activities and operations are coordinated with both the Office of Homeland Security and the National Security Council, and are often a topic

of discussion in meetings chaired by these organizations. The State Department is

represented at these meetings to provide a linkage to the global threat from terrorism.

JFCOM HOMELAND SECURITY CAMPAIGN PLAN

20. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan, in your testimony you mention that your

command is developing a Homeland Security campaign plan using ‘‘innovative organizational and operational approaches’’ and that you are coordinating with other

military, defense and Federal agencies. What innovative approaches are you using?

General KERNAN. In organizing our 90-person Homeland Security Directorate

from within the command, we leveraged insights and concepts gained from our joint

training and experimentation work. Specifically, our standing joint task force headquarters initiative, associated collaborative tools, and training initiatives provided

the framework for developing this organization into a highly functional command

and control headquarters to conduct Homeland Security. Our campaign development

and coordination with other agencies is guided by both sound operational experience

and joint experimentation insights derived from work on the Operational Net Assessment and Effects-Based Operations concepts.

21. Senator LEVIN. General Kernan, how will your campaign plan relate to the

existing DOD plans—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s CONPLAN 0300–

00 and the DOD Directives on Military Support to Civil Authorities—as well as

interagency plans, given the fact that homeland security involves all agencies, as

well as local, state, and Federal governments?

General KERNAN. Our campaign planning effort is nested within or informed by

all of these existing plans and directives. We are working in concert with the appropriate agencies through the Joint Staff. Ultimately, the Joint Forces Command plan

will complement a National Homeland Security strategy and plan.

52

NATIONAL GUARD

22. Senator LEVIN. General Pace, the National Guard is presently functioning in

a variety of ways with regard to homeland security in both its State and Federal

status. Are you satisfied that procedures are in place to ensure that the use of the

National Guard for homeland security does not interfere with their potential use as

envisioned in the CINCs’ warfighting plans?

General PACE. The Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau have been and will

continue to track this issue. Currently, there are 555,000 National Guard and Reserves in the force with 30,000 volunteers supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE.

This commitment does not have a major effect on our ability to execute current war

plans. If further National Guard and Reserve Forces were called up for Homeland

Security missions, or multiple warfighting plans were activated, we would certainly

reassess the impact of assigning those forces to our war plans.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD

23. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, the Hart-Rudman Report, page XIV, states:

‘‘We urge in particular that the National Guard be given homeland security as a

primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself ordains.’’

Major General Allen Tackett, the National Guard Adjutant General for West Virginia, and other Adjutants General believe that homeland security should be one of

the missions of the National Guard, but not the only mission. The Guard should still

maintain its warfighting missions. Do you agree with the Hart-Rudman recommendation that homeland security should be a primary mission of the National

Guard?

Secretary WHITE. Historically, the National Guard has been dual missioned for

both its Federal warfighting role and its domestic response, state role. Many of the

Guard’s capabilities, including medical, command and control, and communications,

are a direct result of preparations to perform their warfighting mission. Given the

recent heightened interest in having the military execute domestic security missions, the National Guard is being relied upon to perform its domestic response role.

The National Guard does play a primary role as a military force provider for disaster response within the United States. However, there are several reasons why

homeland security is not considered to be their primary mission. First, as reservists,

National Guardsmen are not available to perform domestic missions for extended

periods of time. They are optimized to be recalled in the event of a major war or

to perform short duration consequence management missions following a domestic

disaster. Overall, most homeland security missions are likely to involve many longterm tasks that are unsuited to be performed by the National Guard.

Likewise, many homeland security missions within the United States can be best

performed by other Federal, state, and local elements.

24. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, what changes in force structure and additional resources would the National Guard Bureau require in order to fulfill the

broader mission of homeland security?

Secretary WHITE. There are still a lot of issues to be worked out in defining the

missions that make up homeland security, assessing current capabilities, and assigning responsibilities. It is not yet clear how much of the overall national mission

will fall under the purview of DOD, let alone the National Guard. Some temporary

tasks currently being performed by DOD, such as airport security by the National

Guard, will revert to another Federal agency for the long term.

We anticipate that more changes will be required in resources than in force structure. The Department is still developing what those exact changes will be. The extent of changes required will depend on the exact number and types of missions assigned to the National Guard. Assuming that the Guard’s role will be focused on

crisis management response, few force structure changes will be required, as forces

can be tailored to meet special missions and circumstances.

25. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, what statutory changes might be required for

the National Guard to conduct ongoing homeland security operations and also take

on broader support to law enforcement and first responders?

Secretary WHITE. The National Guard may undertake homeland security missions

in a State active duty status. In such a status, the National Guard is under the control of the State governor and is funded with State funds. All missions undertaken

by the State National Guard in this status must comply with State law. Our counVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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try’s traditional reliance on the National Guard is valued and the Federal strictures

of our Constitution prescribe a combination of national and State structures to address national and State needs. Under our Federalist form of government there are

many missions in the Homeland Security area that can and should be done by the

States.

The National Guard may undertake homeland security missions in a State active

duty status. However, for those missions that are national in scope, such a State

active duty status has a number of disadvantages: each State will perform the mission in a different way depending on State law; the funding levels for each State

National Guard will be different; and the Federal Government has little say over

how the mission is accomplished.

A second status that is often considered for performing such homeland security

missions is duty pursuant to Title 32, United States Code. Title 32 sets forth the

authority under which National Guard personnel are trained to perform their

warfighting mission and provides that such personnel remain under the control of

the State governor but are supported with Federal appropriations. Although title 32

also authorizes the National Guard to undertake some specific missions that do not

constitute training (such as counterdrug support or support to disadvantaged children), such missions are specifically authorized by statute. We believe that the use

of National Guard personnel under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) to undertake homeland security missions such as critical infrastructure protection and national border security,

which constitute neither training nor a defense mission, is extremely problematic

legally.

It should be noted that National Guard members performing airport security duties are now serving under title 32 under a unique set of facts: airport security prior

to September 11 was the responsibility of State and local governments; the President requested State assistance; the National Guard personnel performing the airport security mission obtain valuable training (preparation for peacekeeping); and

Congress provided emergency funds to support State and local preparedness for

mitigating and responding to the September 11 attacks and for increasing transportation security. These factors are not readily apparent for most routine homeland

security missions and the use of the National Guard in a title 32 duty status to perform such homeland security duties is not appropriate.

If it makes sense to perform homeland security duties with the National Guard

in a title 32 status, it is possible to amend title 32 to permit the use of the National

Guard similar to the way the National Guard is now employed to undertake

counterdrug duties under 32 U.S.C. § 112. Such an amendment could provide for

members of the National Guard in a full-time National Guard duty status to undertake specified homeland security missions as delineated by statute. National Guard

personnel performing such duties would be under the control of the State governor

but the costs of the National Guard program would be borne by the Federal Government.

26. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, it is clear that the Guard has, and will continue to have, an important role in responding to a wide range of civil disturbances,

from natural disasters to terrorist acts. These missions can be essential to our national security. The National Guard counterdrug program is a useful model for Federal support of the state missions of the National Guard.

Will you support using defense dollars to increase the readiness of the National

Guard for homeland security training and exercises?

Secretary WHITE. Yes. This is not different from current practices, since we keep

our National Guard forces trained and ready for various types of employment; to

include many missions that can be considered to be homeland security-like missions.

National Guard WMD–CSTs have participated in inter-agency response exercises,

such as TOPOFF. Since DOD is not normally the lead Federal agency in responding

to domestic disasters, it does not take the lead in conducting domestic exercises. The

Department will continue to support other lead Federal agencies in the conduct of

such domestic exercises.

27. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, do you believe that the type of homeland security threats we will face in the future require the use of the specialized skills that

National Guard Special Forces units can provide, including knowledge of unconventional warfare, specialized skills in urban and rural environments, and medical

knowledge to support first responders?

Secretary WHITE. The National Guard does have impressive Special Forces units,

which will continue to prove valuable in the future. However, legal restrictions on

the use of military forces within the United States apply to almost all of the tasks

54

applicable to these types of forces. Rest assured, that where they can be used most

effectively, National Guard Special Forces units will be used.

28. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, do you concur with the recommendation to the

Senate Armed Services Committee from General Peter Pace, Commander of the U.S.

Southern Command, that the illicit drugs flooding America should be considered a

weapon of mass destruction? Should counterdrug efforts be included as a part of

homeland security?

Secretary WHITE. The Department of Defense’s role in counterdrug efforts is one

of civil support. Additionally, we support U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies’

interdiction of illicit drugs before they reach the shores of the United States. Within

that construct, the Department of Defense is the lead U.S. agency for detecting and

monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs. The new Office of Homeland

Security focuses on the terrorist threat to our National security. The structure of

DOD’s Homeland Security program is under review, and it remains unclear whether

the counterdrug mission will be included in that program.

29. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, I have long supported the creation of an integrated homeland security training site at Camp Dawson, West Virginia, which includes the recently constructed Regional Training Center, and would include a

planned Virtual Medical Campus located at West Virginia University. Combined,

these institutions would provide the necessary education, training, and certification

capabilities to prepare America’s emergency first responders, including the medical

community, for an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction or similar event.

Camp Dawson incorporates the Integrated Special Operations Training Facility

(ISOTF), a world-class training facility that would make Camp Dawson America’s

premiere training facility for emergency first responders. According to a National

Guard Bureau feasibility study, dated March 2001, the ISOTF is a unique facility

that will encompass special training complexes unlike any other in the world today.

Some of the specific areas that will be able to be taught at the ISOTF include:

Asymmetrical Warfare;

Counterterrorism (CT);

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD);

Law Enforcement Special Operations (SWAT);

Civil Disturbance Operations;

Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Basic and Specialized MOUT);

Special Forces and Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC);

Hazardous Material (HAZ–MAT) Response and Handling;

Fire Fighting;

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Response;

High and Low Level Rescue;

Disaster Preparedness;

Aerial Delivery Operations (Personnel and Equipment);

Cyber Terrorism;

Information Warfare;

Electronic Warfare;

Maritime Terrorist Training;

Emergency Services for Federal, State, and Local agencies; and

Live fire capability.

Please review the National Guard Bureau feasibility study on Camp Dawson and

provide comments on how you believe the capabilities at Camp Dawson can be better integrated into our Nation’s homeland security efforts.

Secretary WHITE. The feasibility study summarizes both the current and planned

training facilities at Camp Dawson, and notes that it provides ‘‘an excellent opportunity for military and non-military institutional training.’’ The number and variety

of facilities at Camp Dawson position it well for use in homeland security training,

which involves a wide variety of situations.

Camp Dawson will be considered along with other military, Federal, and local

training sites in a coordinated strategy incorporating national requirements and capabilities.

30. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, I understand that certain military technologies such as those that identify chemical and biological agents are much more

accurate than their commercial off-the-shelf identification counterparts used by civilian HAZ–MAT organizations. An integrated National Guard and first responder

training facility would allow for the education, training, and certification of emergency and first responders using the latest dual use military and civilian techVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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nologies to fight terrorism and counterdrug operations. Camp Dawson has the potential to be such an integrated facility.

Please comment on the value of disseminating dual use military technologies and

training to civilian emergency and first responders through facilities such as Camp

Dawson.

Secretary WHITE. Senator Byrd, we agree with you that some military technologies could be very beneficial to civilian emergency and first responders. Demonstration of these technologies in integrated military-civilian training and other

venues is both a wise and valuable approach. As such, we can assure that as we,

in conjunction with Governor Ridge’s Office of Homeland Security and other Federal

and State agencies, develop and implement training strategies and facilities, we will

endeavor to capitalize on efficiencies and synergies that may be gained by using facilities such as Camp Dawson.

HOMELAND SECURITY AND BIOMETRICS

31. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, in your new role as the Interim Department

of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security, you have assumed the responsibility for bringing together the resources of the Department of Defense to coordinate with and assist the Director of the President’s Office of Homeland Security,

former Governor Tom Ridge, and other Federal, state, and local agencies. You are

also the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Biometrics, a responsibility assumed by the Secretary of the Army last year.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of September 30, 2001, lists biometrics

as one of five priority ‘‘emerging technologies’’ of which the Department of Defense

‘‘will vigorously pursue the development and exploitation.’’

What role in homeland security do you see for the Department of Defense Biometrics Program, especially the Interim Biometrics Fusion Center located in Bridgeport, West Virginia, within the Department of Defense and within the Executive

Branch? What responsibilities will you be assigning the Biometrics Program in this

new mission?

Secretary WHITE. In light of the events of September 11, the Biometrics Management Office refocused its singular direction from information assurance biometrics

efforts to an expanded role including the use of biometrics applications for physical

security.

• This expanded approach will support greater knowledge to the services

for force protection and anti-terrorism efforts.

• The Biometrics Management Office and the interim DOD Biometrics Fusion Center will further support homeland security by maintaining a web

site to assist DOD on biometrics issues. The restricted access section of the

DOD web site will contain test and evaluation reports, biometrics product

data, and lessons learned.

Considering heightened interest in biometrics devices and applications since September 11, we plan to use the Biometrics Fusion Center to analyze more commercial

off-the-shelf (COTS) biometrics products. It is our intent for the Biometric Fusion

Center located in Bridgeport, West Virginia, to become a Center of Excellence that

can be utilized not just by DOD assets but can provide leadership, technical expertise, and capability to National Homeland Defense efforts at large.

I have tasked the Army CIO to supervise the biometrics initiative. The DOD Biometrics Office will assist the CIO to carry out this responsibility. I further directed

the DOD Biometrics Office to expand its singular direction from information assurance biometrics efforts to the use of biometrics for physical security. Additionally,

I have tasked the DOD Biometrics Office to accelerate the full integration of biometrics into the DOD Common Access Card, which is used across DOD for network

access, facilities access, and personal identification.

32. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, what relationships exist or are being developed by the Department of Defense Biometrics Program to assist the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and other Federal, state, and local

agencies to improve security at airports and national points of entry, and to assist

in their law enforcement efforts?

Secretary WHITE. I have tasked the Director, DOD Biometrics to meet regularly

with senior officials at the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, and Department of Justice to discuss common interests. Most recently, on October 18, he visited the FBI facility in Clarksburg, West

Virginia and recently met with security officials in the Federal Aviation AdministraVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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tion. These events focused on identifying opportunities to incorporate biometrics

technologies to enhance security at airports, national points of entry, and other key

points of interest for Homeland Security. The DOD Biometrics Management Office

continues to foster these relationships to leverage lessons learned and exchange

technical information.

33. Senator BYRD. Secretary White, biometrics offers the promise of increased

physical security, computer and communications systems security, and information

and identity assurance for military and key civilian facilities, such as airports and

national points of entry. The largest biometrics repository in the world is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fingerprint center in Clarksburg, West Virginia,

and nearby is the Department of Defense Interim Biometrics Fusion Center. The

FBI uses its computerized fingerprint repository to provide identity assurance for

law enforcement personnel across the Nation and overseas. What plans do you have

to establish a centralized repository for Department of Defense biometrics data?

Secretary WHITE. We have developed conceptual models for three databases including: Knowledgebase, Test and Evaluation, and Operations.

• The Biometrics Knowledgebase will serve as the DOD’s source of information about biometric security, technology, products, test and evaluation results, and lessons learned.

• The Biometrics Test and Evaluation Database will serve as a stand-alone

database for use by the DOD Biometrics Fusion Center for test and evaluation activities such as validating COTS and government off-the-shelf

(GOTS) biometrics technologies, products, and applications.

• The Biometrics Operations Database (Gold Standard). A study is awaiting contract award to define the capabilities and functions of the database.

The current plan is for the centralized repository to be located at the Biometrics

Fusion Center in Bridgeport, WV, and to have the Knowledgebase and Test and

Evaluation databases initial operation capable by March 2002. The study for the

concept of the Operations database is targeted to begin in March 2002. Following

review of the study, we will construct milestones for implementation.

Bottom Line.

• We are working closely with the FBI Criminal Justice Information Systems Division. The Biometrics Fusion Center is located in Bridgeport, WV.

The FBI activity is located in the adjacent city, Clarksburg, WV.

• We are working with the West Virginia National Guard Home Land Security Facility, located at Camp Dawson, West Virginia.

• West Virginia University, College of Engineering and Mineral Resources,

Department of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering is collaborating with DOD Biometrics Office to develop the Information Assurance and

Biometrics Graduate Certificate Program, and Concepts in Biometric Systems and Information Assurance Program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

ACQUISITION REFORM

34. Senator WARNER. Secretary White, a central goal of acquisition reform has

been to leverage the commercial marketplace and attract ‘‘non-traditional’’ commercial contractors to meet an increasing proportion of DOD’s needs. By overcoming the

barriers to these companies’ participation in Federal contracts, DOD can tap into

their expertise and gain innovative new solutions to address the challenges that

confront our Nation. Despite the efforts of both the legislative and executive

branches over the last decade, many commercial contractors still express frustration

with the constraints of governmental contracting rules and regulations.

In this time of crisis, and particularly with respect to how the biotechnology and

the information technology industries can help our government wage its current battle against terrorism, do you see a need for additional acquisition reform legislation?

If so, what specific legislative measures do you believe are needed?

Secretary WHITE. Section 836 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act provides legislative authority that will help in the current battle against

terrorism. Specifically, it provides that any procurement of biotechnology property

or services needed to defend against terrorism or biological attack will be considered

a commercial item, which facilitates its purchase under our regulations. It also increases the micropurchase threshold and simplified acquisition threshold for procurements needed to combat terrorism. Finally, paragraph (b) of section 836 reVerDate 11-SEP-98 15:22 Apr 22, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 78817.090 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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quires the Department to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of

the Senate and the House of Representatives containing the Secretary’s recommendations for additional emergency procurement authority necessary to support

operations to combat terrorism. The Department is in the process of identifying such

additional legislative authority and will include them in the report.

35–38. Senator WARNER. [DELETED].

Secretary WHITE. [DELETED].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

39. Senator THURMOND. Secretary White, last year Secretary Cohen said that

when he first proposed the formation of a ‘‘commander in chief for homeland defense’’ the idea was controversial. ‘‘Immediately there were questions being raised

as to whether or not this would intrude upon constitutional prohibitions of getting

our military involved in domestic affairs.’’ I understand the Department is again

considering establishing a CINC for Homeland Defense. How do you address the

constitutional question on getting our military involved in domestic affairs?

Secretary WHITE. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA/18 U.S.C. § 1385) and DOD Directive 5525.5, which as a matter of Department of Defense policy extends the restrictions of the PCA to the Navy and the Marine Corps, have for many years ensured that the Armed Forces of the United States only engage in the direct enforcement of domestic criminal laws under circumstances that are clearly authorized by

laws of the United States or the Constitution. The Department of Defense historically has been reluctant to accept law enforcement missions. There are a number

of reasons for this reluctance:

(1) a longstanding distaste on the part of the citizenry for the use of the military

as a police force;

(2) a lack of formal training on the part of most servicemembers to engage in domestic police activities involving functions such as arrest, execution of warrants,

searches and seizures, and the protection and preservation of evidence;

(3) an unwillingness within the military to permit servicemembers to undertake

extensive law enforcement training because such training may well interfere with

a servicemember’s ability to train for our warfighting mission; and

(4) a significant concern that the addition of a law enforcement mission to the

many high demands already shouldered by the Armed Forces in defending the country will degenerate or destroy their ability to accomplish their primary mission.

Over the years, section 1385 has been interpreted to preclude the use of the Army

or the Air Force to execute the criminal laws of the Nation regardless of whether

the military was employed as a posse comitatus or simply undertook law enforcement missions as part of its military duties. Notwithstanding the Department’s reluctance to use the Armed Forces to engage in domestic law enforcement missions,

the Department has on rare occasions provided such support to civil law enforcement agencies in emergency situations (e.g., support during riots and insurrections).

The President has inherent constitutional authority, and longstanding statutory authorities (e.g., chapter 15 of title 10), to direct the use of the Armed Forces domestically in support of the national security interests of the Nation. In addition, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Congress provided express statutory authority to the President under Senate Joint Resolution 23

(S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)) to use military force to prevent further

such attacks. Accordingly, although I understand that a review of the PCA is ongoing within DOD, I do not believe that the PCA and the Department’s implementing directives pose an obstacle to the Department when the President determines

that the Armed Forces must be employed to protect the national security interests

of the United States.

ASD HOMELAND DEFENSE

40. Senator THURMOND. Secretary White, a recommendation of the United States

Commission on National Security for the 21st century was that a new office of assistant secretary of defense for homeland security be created to oversee the various

Department of Defense activities. Does the Department agree and plan to create

this new position?

Secretary WHITE. The Secretary of Defense requested that Congress consider a

new Under Secretary of Defense position for homeland security. In that context, the

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Secretary asked that I carefully consider how we might reorganize within the Department of Defense to oversee homeland security activities; this review is ongoing.

IMPACT ON MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES

41. Senator THURMOND. Secretary White, critics of DOD’s involvement in responding to incidents of domestic terrorism argue that extensive military involvement in

domestic matters will distract the DOD from its core missions and may make the

DOD more like domestic civilian institutions. Consequently, the critics argue that

this domestic involvement will degrade military professionalism. What are your

views on this issue?

Secretary WHITE. The Department of Defense carefully analyzes all requests for

support to civil authorities and other Federal agencies prior to the commitment of

resources. These requests are analyzed based on four criteria: scope, duration, appropriateness (i.e., mission profile), and exit strategy. Those requests that satisfy

this analysis are then weighed against other obligations and should not detract from

DOD’s ability to execute its core missions.

With regard to military professionalism, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines

pride themselves in their professionalism and their commitment to service. Performance expectations for domestic support missions are no different than they are for

any other mission and servicemen and women will execute their duties with pride

and professionalism.

USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

42. Senator THURMOND. Secretary White, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 382, Emergency

Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction and 18

U.S.C. Section 831, Prohibited Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials, authorize

the Secretary of Defense to use of military personnel, equipment, and technical assistance in non-hostile emergency situations that pose a serious threat to the United

States and its interest. Are you aware of any discussions between the Secretary of

Defense and the Attorney General that would create a foundation for the rapid enactment of these statutes?

Secretary WHITE. The Department of Defense and the Department of Justice have

already established detailed protocols and procedures for these cases and have exercised them extensively.

WMD PROLIFERATION

43. Senator THURMOND. Secretary White, current United States Anti-Terrorism

Policy states that the highest priority shall be given to preventing the acquisition

of a WMD capability by terrorist groups. Do you believe the Comprehensive Threat

Reduction programs and related DOE non-proliferation programs are effective tools

for preventing the acquisition of WMD materials from the former Soviet Union?

Secretary WHITE. The CTR program is one element of a more extensive program

designed to keep WMD from being acquired by rogue states and terrorist groups.

Our efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorist groups from acquiring WMD must

include:

• Enhancing our ability and willingness to interdict shipments of nuclear

weapons related material to countries supporting terrorists;

• Assisting foreign government in their efforts to control exports or transshipments of material from or through their territory, and efforts to interdict WMD-related shipments;

• Increasing efforts through diplomatic and military channels to enhance

U.S. nonproliferation objectives; and

• Focusing the efforts of assistance programs such as the CTR program on

those areas where we can obtain the highest return.

We continue to work to make the Department of Defense CTR program and DOE

nonproliferation programs as effective as possible in assisting the FSU to prevent

the proliferation of WMD materials in the face of efforts by terrorists, organized

crime and rogue states to acquire these materials. The two departments are working

with the states of the FSU to consolidate and secure or destroy nuclear, biological,

and chemical agents.

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HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION

44. Senator THURMOND. General Pace, last month’s report on the QDR states: ‘‘It

is clear the U.S. forces, including the United States Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations for performing these missions (homeland).’’ How is the Department addressing these issues?

General PACE. There will be a number of future changes that will have a direct

effect on how our forces prepare, train and execute Homeland Security missions. In

the near term, the Secretary of Defense has designated JFCOM and NORAD as the

two primary CINCs responsible for Homeland Security. Long-term solutions will be

incorporated into ongoing revisions to the UCP. All UCP revisions are approved by

the President.

MILITARY HEALTH CARE SUPPORT

45. Senator THURMOND. General Pace, in February of this year the head of the

Joint Task Force for Civil Support, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, agreed with the

views being expressed that the National Guard and the Reserves could provide medical support in case of an attack, but he had some reservations. Specifically, he

pointed out that the Army medical community ‘‘has been downsized by as much as

40 percent,’’ and ‘‘what remains is not organized for domestic support. It is designed

for combat operations.’’ What is the state of military healthcare concerning a largescale response to terrorist attacks?

General PACE. The DOD brings to the table significant assets that can be called

upon in a national crisis. These assets include specialized medical platforms that

can be used to provide surveillance, detection, and field laboratory capabilities in

support of operations in a WMD environment. However, the DOD lacks the capability to provide direct medical treatment and healthcare support for large-scale populations requiring a response to terrorist attacks employing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE) agents.

The military healthcare system is neither equipped, task-organized, nor staffed to

function in a role of primacy for these types of events either in the homeland defense scenario, or to support geographic Combatant Commanders in operations overseas. Successful mitigation of a WMD event will be predicated on interagency coordination and cooperation. The DOD healthcare system will only be part of the

wider ‘‘system’’ of assets that must be brought to bear in support of our national

consequence management efforts.

ROLE IN MONITORING

46. Senator THURMOND. General Pace, recently the Los Angeles Times ran a story

that detailed some difficulties the Department faces regarding intelligence sharing.

Specifically, the article noted that if the National Security Agency were monitoring

the cell phone calls of a terrorist suspect, surveillance would be required to be

stopped the moment the suspect reached U.S. soil. The Senate passed the Uniting

and Strengthening America Act by a vote 96–1 that gives new tools to law enforcement to combat terrorism. Will the DOD benefit or, more specifically, be able to utilize the provisions articulated in this bill to provide asset and intelligence sharing

with Federal law enforcement?

General PACE. Yes, the Uniting and Strengthening America Act allows the DOD

to receive more and better information on terrorism from U.S. law enforcement. For

example, the provision to allow grand jury information to be shared among Federal

officials, to include intelligence officers, is a strength that will improve DOD’s ability

to fight the global war on terrorism.

NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT

47. Senator THURMOND. General Kernan, according to the U.S. Commission on

National Security for the 21st century, the National Guard and associated Guard

Response Teams are ‘‘vital to creating an effective national response ability’’ for

Homeland Defense. As such, the report recommends that the National Guard ‘‘plan

for rapid interstate support and reinforcement,’’ and ‘‘develop an overseas capability

for international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.’’ Unfortunately, I have

been informed by National Guard officials that there is no current mobilization plan

to bring regional teams from other states to the site of multiple attacks. There is

no plan to respond to multiple attacks within a large single urban area and due

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to the high operational tempo of the Air Force, ‘‘there is no military airlift support

available for domestic mission training scenarios.’’ Is this accurate?

General KERNAN. U.S. Joint Forces Command and our Army and Air Force components are working with our assigned units, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the

National Guard Bureau to improve responsiveness and coordination and formalize

the process. In this regard, I have met with Lt. Gen. Russ Davis, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, on a number of occasions and with several state Adjutant

Generals. One result of these meetings is a combined Joint Forces Command-National Guard Bureau initiated general officer steering committee, comprising all involved active, National Guard, and Reserve organizations, to further develop the collective way ahead.

Airlift issues are the responsibility of U.S. Transportation Command. I would note

that U.S. Transportation Command’s support of our Homeland Security Ready Reaction Force exercises has been superb. In coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, C–130 aircraft have been allocated on a regional basis and placed on high

alert to rapidly transport those Ready Reaction Forces throughout the United

States.

MORTUARY SUPPORT

48. Senator THURMOND. General Kernan, the head of the Joint Task Force for

Civil Support, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, addressed a major problem that he

feels is a significant gap in the current organizational make-up of the national response plan—dealing with the grim problem of the victims. He stated that the Civil

Support Teams ‘‘could not cope with collecting and burying possibly hundreds, if not

thousands of dead bodies,’’ not to mention the ‘‘host of legal and religious issues’’

involved in dealing with these victims and he warns that ‘‘there is currently only

one mortuary affairs company on active duty and one in Reserve.’’ What steps is

the Department taking to address this shortfall?

General KERNAN. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams are National Guard assets that are manned by their respective states, and trained and

equipped by the National Guard Bureau. These teams immediately deploy to the incident site to assess an incident, advise civilian responders regarding appropriate

actions, and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of follow-on personnel and assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property

damage.

The primary responsibility for collecting and disposition of bodies rests with the

state and local coroner. If requested, military assistance to civil authorities could

include mortuary affairs. Joint Forces Command has combatant command over

three mortuary affairs units, the 54th Mortuary Affairs Company in the Active component and the 311th and 246th companies in the Reserve component. Both the

54th and 311th have supported post 11 September recovery operations at the Pentagon. Assets from the 246th augmented the 311th and the 246th is in the process

of being re-manned. These units exist to support combat operations, but may be employed when a request for assistance is received from the lead Federal agency and

approved by the Department of Defense. For example, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the 54th effectively assisted the medical examiner, the responsible local agency, in processing remains. In wartime, a fully manned mortuary affairs company can process up to 400 remains per day, though actual capacity will

vary based on the situation. It is important to remember that there are many private, local, and state first responders who will do the bulk of this difficult but necessary work. We have certainly seen that in New York City since 11 September.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

DONOVAN TRANSPORTABLE DETONATION CHAMBER

49. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary White, in your positions as Secretary of the Army

and Interim Department of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security, have

you considered the need for technology such as the Donovan Transportable Detonation Chamber (DTDC)?

Secretary WHITE. As the Interim Department of Defense Executive Agent for

Homeland Security, I am continually looking for tools to respond to situations involving threats to homeland security. I am especially interested in technology developed in the private sector for it portends a great benefit to the U.S. taxpayer. Over

the past several months, I have received a considerable amount of information on

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the Donovan Transportable Detonation Chamber and share your interest in pursuing its potential here in the United States.

50. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary White, I have been told the DTDC is a promising

tool to meet the need for explosive and chemical bomb destruction devices. I understand that this technology is awaiting Army validation. I request that you have the

DTDC reviewed and its validation decision be made as soon as is possible. Once the

review has been made have your staff report its findings to my office.

Secretary WHITE. The DTDC has been approved for the destruction of conventional munitions and other high-explosive devices. Additionally, the U.S. Army is

providing technical assistance to the Royal Military Academy of Belgium in support

of their efforts to evaluate the potential of the Donovan Chamber for destroying recovered chemical munitions. We are awaiting the results of the Phase I and Phase

II tests in Belgium to determine if we should move forward here in the United

States. Once our review has been completed, I will have my staff report their findings to your office.

[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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