1

Filed 11/26/13 P. v. Sanchez CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY EDWARD SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

E056919

(Super.Ct.No. SWF1202970)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Albert J. Wojcik, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Ronald A. 

Jakob, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Anthony Edward Sanchez is serving four years in prison after pleading 

guilty to inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his children. He challenges the trial 
2

court’s order that he “have peaceful contact with [his children] only for the safe exchange 

of children for visitation as stated in a family, juvenile, or probate court order issued after 

the date that this order is signed, as an exception to any no-contact or stay-away order.” 

This order was made at the suggestion of defense counsel to alter the standard language 

in a form CR-160 domestic violence criminal protective order. As discussed below, 

although neither the court nor the parties were aware that the Family Court had already 

issued a civil restraining order protecting defendant’s children and their mother, there is 

no need for a remand. This is because the criminal protective order, although it refers to 

future orders rather than existing orders, accurately reflects the trial court’s intent to leave 

any contact and visitation decisions up to the Family Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

On July 4, 2012, defendant inflicted a corporal injury resulting in a traumatic 

condition on the mother of his two children.1

On July 31, 2012, the People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with 

inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition in violation of Penal Code, 

section 273.5, subdivision (a).2 The People also alleged that defendant had four prison 

priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

 

1

 These are all the facts available in the record on appeal. Defendant pled guilty 

before a preliminary hearing and waived preparation of a probation report. There is no 

police report in the record.

2

 All section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

After defendant was arraigned on the complaint, the superior court issued a 

domestic violence criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2. The court ordered 

defendant to have no contact with the victim or with his two children. The order stated 

that any more-restrictive protective order issued in Family Law or by the Juvenile Court 

would take precedence.

On August 10, 2012, defendant plead guilty to the corporal injury charge in 

exchange for dismissal of the prison priors. Defendant waived the probation report and 

requested immediate sentencing. The court sentenced defendant to the four-year sentence 

to which the parties had agreed.

Also at this August 10, 2012 hearing, the court terminated its prior criminal 

protective order and proposed to sign a post-conviction domestic violence criminal 

protective order pursuant to section 273.5, subdivision (i).3 The parties and the court 

entered into a lively discussion as to the terms of the new protective order. Defense 

counsel asked that defendant be allowed contact with his two children and argued that 

section 273.5, subdivision (i) applies only to the actual victims of the crime, which here 

did not include defendant’s children. The People asked that the children be included in 

 

3

 “Upon conviction under subdivision (a), the sentencing court shall also consider 

issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim, which may 

be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature 

that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before 

the court, the probability of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her 

immediate family. This protective order may be issued by the court whether the 

defendant is sentenced to state prison, county jail, or if imposition of sentence is 

suspended and the defendant is placed on probation.” (§ 273.5, subd. (i).)
4

the new protective order because they had been included in the previous order. The 

People argued that one of the children was present during the crime and that the victim 

had asked that child to call for help. Defense counsel suggested that the standard form 

for criminal protective orders in domestic violence cases, the CR-160, included boxes to 

check that allowed for communication to occur where there was a family law visitation 

order. Defense counsel proposed the trial court check box number 144 and that any 

visitation would have to be by separate family law order. The People again asked that the 

two children be included in the protective order. After this discussion the court proposed

the following to the parties: that only the children’s mother be listed in the order as a 

protected person, and that box 14 be checked but modified to include the children’s 

names in place of the phrase “the protected persons named above.” Neither party 

objected, and the hearing ended. 

It appears that neither the parties nor the trial court were aware that the Family 

Court in Hemet had on July 26, 2012, in case number HED017919, issued a five-year 

civil restraining order after hearing. The Family Court used Judicial Council form DV130 to grant the children’s mother sole legal and physical custody, name the children and 

their mother as protected persons whom defendant could not contact, and order no 

visitation between defendant and his children until the parties attended child custody 

 

4

 Box 14 on the form reads as follows: “may have peaceful contact with the 

protected persons named above only for the safe exchange of children for visitation as 

stated in a Family, Juvenile, or Probate court order issued after the date this order is 

signed, as an exception to the “no-contact” or “stay-away” provision in paragraphs 10, 

11, or 12 of this order.”
5

reconciliation counseling. This Court hereby takes judicial notice of this order, pursuant 

to defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice filed with this Court on January 14, 2013.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION 

Defendant asks this court to remand to the trial court with instructions to revise the 

criminal protective order to allow defendant to have ongoing contact with his children 

while he is incarcerated. He bases this request on three legal arguments, which we will 

address in turn. 

First, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it fashioned this 

criminal protective order because it inadvertently re-imposed the restriction on contact 

between defendant and his children that the court had sought to eliminate. Our reading of 

the sentencing hearing transcript shows that the trial court did not intend to eliminate 

restrictions on contact between defendant and his children. To the contrary, the trial 

court was quite clear that it intended for the family law courts to determine what contact 

was to be allowed. It set forth its intent behind checking box 14 and amending its 

language as follows: “And then it goes on to state this will be pursuant to, in this 

situation, any family court order issued after this date. [¶] So my guess is there will have 

to be some family court proceeding, and that they would have to decide through 

proceedings in front of them what, if any, visitation should be, and he has to comply with 

that. So that’s what I’ll do.” It is apparent to us that, had the court been aware of the 

prior civil protective order, it would have checked box number 13, which allows contact 

according to existing “Family, Juvenile, or Probate court” orders, rather than box number 
6

14, which is identical except that it refers to such orders “issued after the date this order is 

signed.”

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it accomplished what it 

sought to accomplish—to allow the Family Court to decide whether defendant could have 

contact with his children. 

Second, defendant contends a remand to correct the criminal protective order to 

conform with the trial court’s intent to allow contact between defendant and his children 

would be consistent with public policy. This argument is moot because we have already 

determined that the trial court intended to leave this decision to the Family Court.

Third, defendant argues remand is necessary to correct the conflict between the 

criminal protective order and the prior civil restraining order, which is still in effect. As 

the People point out, the criminal protective order is actually less restrictive than the prior 

civil restraining order because it does not list the children as protected persons and it 

permits future peaceful contact for visitation purposes if so ordered by another court.

Thus, there is no need for a remand.
7

DISPOSITION 

The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

J.

MILLER

J.