Command'Summary'of'Fleet'Admiral'Chester'W.'Nimitz,'USN

Nimitz&“Graybook”&

7&December&1941&–&31&August&1945&

Volume'1'of'8

Running&Estimate&and&Summary&

maintained&by&Captain&James&M.&Steele,&USN,&

CINCPAC&staff&at&Pearl&Harbor,&Hawaii,&

covering&the&period&7&December&1941&to&31&August&1942&

The&following document&is&a&digitized&representation&of&materials&contained&in&Series&I,&

Subseries&A&(original&copies),&of&Coll.&505,&Papers&of&Fleet&Admiral&Chester&W.&Nimitz,&USN,&

maintained&by&the&Archives&Branch of&the&Naval History&and&Heritage&Command,&

Washington,&DC.&&The&Command&Summary,&commonly referred&to&as&the&“Graybook”&

contains the&CINCPAC&(Commander&in&Chief,&United&States&Pacific&Fleet)&staff’s&“running&

estimate&of&the&situation”&and&summary&of command&decisions,&as&well&as key&dispatches&

received&or&originated&by&CINCPAC headquarters.

The&8&volumes&are&paginated&as&follows:

Volume'1 (7&December&1941&to&31&August&1942):&pages&1&^&861

Volume'2 (1&September&1942&to&31&December&1942):&pages&862&–&1262

Volume'3 (1&January&1943&to&30&June&1943):&pages&1263&–&1612

Volume'4 (1&July&1943&to&31&December&1943):&pages&1613&–&1830

Volume'5 (1&January&1944&to&31&December&1944):&pages&1831&–&2485

Volume'6 (1&January&1945&to&1&July&1945):&pages&2486&–&3249

Volume'7 (1&July&1945&to&31&August&1945):&pages&3250&–&3548

Volume'8 (Selected&dispatches concerning&the&period&30&December&1941&–&30&April&1942&

and&pertaining&to&the&Battle&of&Midway):&pages&are¬&sequentially&numbered.&Note:&

Volume&8&contains dispatch copies,&many&of&which&were&poorly&reproduced&at&the&time of&

compilation.&Some&portions&are&illegible.

Digitization of&the&Nimitz&Graybook&was&carried&out&in&2012&as&a&cooperative&effort&between&

the&Naval&War&College&and&the&Naval History&and&Heritage&Command.&Digitization&was&

overseen&by&the&Naval&War&College&Library.&Funding&was&provided&by&the&Naval&War&College&

Foundation,&Newport,&Rhode&Island,&with&donations&received&from&the&Naval&Order&of&the&

United&States&and&several&individual&Foundation&members.

This'PDF'file'contains'a'searchable'text'layer'generated'by OCR'at'the'time'of'

digitization.'The'OCR'text is'“uncorrected”'and'cannot'be'relied'upon'as'an'accurate'

transcript,'but'is'included'for'whatever'search'utility'it'may'provide.'A'future'digital'

edition'may'include'a'complete'and'accurate'transcription.

Any&previously&classified content herein&was reviewed&and&declassified&appropriately&at&the&

Naval&History&and&Heritage&Command&Archives,&in&accordance&with&U.S.&federal&

declassification&authority.&This&document&is&in&the&public&domain.

United'States'Naval'War'College,'Newport,'RI

2013
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ll.SCLASSIFI.ED lAW DOD MEMo OF 5 MAY 1..93.:1,. Jm~. JaiCLASSI.II CA!!OB 0.2 .W.Wll R.EcORLI.i 

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WA.R PLANS 

CINCP AC FILES 

Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE 

SUBJECT'_ S:hd SUMMARY", covering the period 

7 Pecember 1941, to 31 August, 1942. 

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DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD l'Jrl!'O o:r 3 MftY 1972, SUB J • 

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RUYIJIIJG SUI\Iti.l~RY OF SITUA'riON 

Decenber 7 - The war opened with the attack of Japanese aircraft 

on Oahu. ~1hen the first lJapanese aircraft attacked 

Pearl FJ.ar or about 0750 LC'I1 , forces were distributed 

as follows: 

Task Force T1:-.._ree- IJJDIANAPOLIS, 5 DT~1S - at 

Johnston Island. 

Task Force Twelve (composed of uni-cs usually 

part of Task Force Three) - LEXINGTON, 

Crudiv Four less LODISVILLE, 5 DD - about 

500 miles s outheast of liiidvTay, enroute to 

fly off VMSB-231 to Midway. 

Task Force Eight (comprising usual Task Force 

Two less 3 battleships and one desron) - ENTETIPRISE , Crudiv Five less PENSACOLA , 9 DD - returning from transfer of VMF-221 

to ·,"fake - about 200 miles west of Pearl. 

J.1I1UTEAPOLIS and 3 DMS in operating area south 

of Oahu. 

PE1~SACOLA (Ta.sk Group 15.5 ) in south Pacific , 

escorting convoy to Far East. 

LOuiSVILLE (Task Group 15.1) in -south Pacific , returning from Far East vith two Army transports. 

AT I.:ID1

7AY 

1 VPron; 2 SS 

AT 1

YAKE 

1 VMFron; 2 SS 

AT JOhNSTON 

2 PBY-1 of utility squadron 

IN NAVY YARD 

COLORADO at Bremerton; 5 DD, 1 ODD, 

5 SS at Kare Island; 2 CL , 2 CA, 2 SS, 

4 DM at Nyd Pearl Harbor. 

A7. MA.KILA 

BOISE 

Enroute Pearl 

PELIAS; 4 SS 

-1-

1 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

At SAN DIEGO 

SARATOGA, 3 ODD, 6 OSS 

At PEARL HARBOR 

8 BB (PENN in drydock), 2 CL, 2 OCL, 

17 DD, OGLALA, 4 DM, tenders and 

auxiliaries, 5 SS, 69 VP, 18 VMSB, 

32 VJ. (7 of the VP were in the air - 4 at Lahaina, 3 south of Oahu). 

On MAUI 

7 VJ aircra.ft 

This summary will be chiefly concerned with the situation 

as to major forces. The enemy air attack, destroyed or 

immobilized all long range aircraft, with a few exceptions 

which were able to take off within a few hours. The resulting 

aircraft search. was so thin, that no enemy carrier was sighted. 

All battleships had been damaged, at least two irreparable; 

HELENA, PHOEUr.lC and RALEIGH had received hits; and three 

destroyers were wrecked in drydock. Other damage was chiefly 

in auxiliary types. 

Three light cruisers and about 20 destroyer types left 

Pearl Harbor during the raid and shortly after the rai~and 

were ordered to assemble under Comdesbatfor and join Task 

Force Eight • . 

The indications as to enemy position were equally divided 

between north and south of the island. As a result of contacts with enemy aircraft, a despatch was sent to Task Forces 

8, 12 and 3 at 0942 LCT as follows: 

"Search from Pearl very limited account maximum 

twelve VP searching x Some indication enemy 

force northwest Oahu x Addressees operate as) '~; 

directed ComTaskForce 8 to intercept and atta.;g.k. 

enemy x Composition ~nemy force urilmown". , " 

:· L ~ X i""" '1 + o \1 d 1'v-e c· t t d \r1 o .. ~ ·t t.> \ ~ J ~ e~ V"' 1 L<1 e ·· ~ 1 ~r· ' r- r 1 

Then followed on~ the warping net false r~port or two 

carriers southwest of Barbers Point. On intercepting this 

report the MINNEAPOLIS sent a despatch which said tr two" (instead of "no'", as was intended) carriers in sight. 

-2- 2 
RUNNING SUMIYIARY OF SITUATION (Cent 1 d) 

Comtaskfor 8 acted on these last reports and turned eastward. Radio bearings on radio transmissions identified as being the AKAGI were bi-lateral, - both north and south. As a result of mounting indications of a southward position6 Comtaskfor 8 was informed at 1046 LCT that the AKAGI bore 178 • A further step in the unfort,1na te chain of events was that an ENTERPRISE aircraft reported to Comtaskfor 8 that ships to the eastward of him (Drab- ably the DETROIT and ships approaching him from Pearl Harborl were hostile. As a result , a bombing and torpedo flight was put off by Task Force Eight and a light force search and attack was organized for that night . 

The view was held for some time that carriers were both north and south of the island. As a result, Task Force Twelve , soon joined by Comscofor in the INDIANAPOLIS , was directed to operate to intercept the supposed southern group, assuming it was proceed- ing toward Jaluit. A special , distant, VP search, in addition to 

an all-around search, based on the same assumption , was arranged for the morning of the 8th. 

Reports were received of the first air attack on Wake and Guam and of a. bombardment at Midway by light craft. 

December 8. 

No enemy was sighted by the special search to the southwestward and , by the afternoon of the 8th, it appeared from radio intelligence that all of the enemy striking f.orce had been to the northward and had retired northwestward to about 750 miles. Of course they might soon return. 

Before Task Force Twelve left the vicinity of Johnston Island, the situation was confused by a report from a patrol plane that it had sighted and attacked an enemy carrier accompanied by one destroyer. Task Force Twelve had turned toward Pearl Harbor in response to an order to that effect. Althou3h reasonably sure that the contact was in error, this Ta Jk Force turned to search for this carrier and to support Johnston Island. The final explanation was that the patrol plane had bombed ~nd missed, the PORTLAND, which was separa- ted from the remainder of Task Force 12. In the meantime, the 

return of that force toward Pearl Harbor had been consider~bly de- layed. 

Task Force Eight operations made no contacts, and ENTERPRISE with the.units which had been with her on the trip to Wake entered Pearl for fuel. The units which had left Pearl on the 7th operated to the -northward of Oahu under the command of Comdesbatfor. 

SARATOGA left San Diego for Pearl on the 8th. 

-3- 3 
RUNNING SUMI\JARY OF SITUATION (Cant' d) 

Commander.Task Force Eight was strongly of the opinion that 

all carriers should be employed in ferrying air reenforcements to 

Oahu. This view was agreed to with reservations by CinCPac and 

urgent request for aircraft was submitted to Opnav {See 090253). 

December 9. 

Task Force Eight's stay in Pearl Harbor was made as short as 

possible and it departed early on the 9th and took up patrol in 

the area to the northward of Oahu, in combination with Comdesbatfor's 

force. This disposition was considered favorable for action against 

the eneny striking Group should it return for another attack. 

Task Force Twelve continued toward ?earl Harbor, and plans 

were made to send an oiler out to fuel it at sea so that the 

carrier would not be exposed to air attack in Pearl Harbor. In 

this connection, Opnav's despatch 091812, quoted in the following summary, should be noted. 

Communication V'it.h Guam was lost on this date. 

See Opnav despatch 090139 which modified the ryar Plan to 

exclude all offensive tasks except 11 Raid enemy sea communications 

and positions", and to limit defense to territory to east of the 

180th meridian. 

Enemy was reported to have occupied Makin in the Gilberts, and 

landine; at Tarawa. Land offensive was started against Malaya ; bombing against Ca vi te. PRINCE OF ~lVALES and REPULSE were sunk. 

December 10. 

The only change :made in disposition this date was that Task 

Porce Twelve \"Tas ordered to make Westings in order to expedite 

action in case plans , which were belng considered for increased protection of I·J.idway and '.'fake, were adopted. This force was attFmpting 

to fuel but was being delayed on account of rough weather. 

It was beginning to be seen that all carriers could not be 

enployed in transporting aircraft from the Coast. 

Wake had received three bombings, and on this date repulsed 

wha.t appeared to be a landing attack by cruisers, destroyers and 

transports. 

Landings were reported on Luzon. 

At this time the Estimate, dated December lOth, which follows, 

was prepared. The tentative plans which are a part of the Estimate 

are marked with notes as to the action which was taken in regard to 

them. 

-4- 4 
DIRECTIVES AND INFORMATION AFFECTING THE SITUATION 

DEC. GCT 

07 1930 SECNAV TO LNAV 

EXECUTE WPL FORTY SIX AGAINST JAPAN. 

07 2252 OPNAV TO CINCPAC, CINCAF & NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS. 

EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST 

JAPAN. INFORM ARMY. CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH. 

08 0450 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Despite security measures in effect surprise attack by Japanese bombing planes damaged all battleships except Maryland X Moderate damage to Tennessee and Pennsylvania X 

Arizona total wreck West Virginia resting on bottom still 

burning Oklahoma capsized California resting on bottom 

Nevada moderate damage beached x Utah and Oglala capsized X 

Honolulu Helena and Raleigh damaged and unfit for sea X 

Vestal damaged and beached x Curtiss moderate damage X 

Destroyers Shaw Cassin Downes in drydock complete wrecks X 

As result of attack Army airplane losses severe x There 

remain 13 Bl7 nine Bl8 and about 30 pursuit planes X 

Approximately 10 patrol planes remain available Oahu X 

1 Patrol plane squadron at Midway,X Recommend all available Army bombers be sent to Oahu x Fire opened promptly by all ships and a number of enemy aircraft destroyed X 

1 Enemy submarine sunk possibly 2 more x 2 carriers 7 

heavy cruisers 3 squadrons destroyers and all available 

planes searching for enemy X Personnel behavior magnificent in face of furious surprise attack x Personnel 

casualties believed to be heavy in Oklahoma and Arizona. 

08 1700 OPNAV TO CINCLANT 

As soon as possible assemble BatDiv 3, Yorktown and one 

squadron modern destroyers at Norfolk, prepare them 

immediately for transfer to Pacific Fleet. Desire Yorktown have full plane complement plus appropriate spares 

except reduce torpedo planes to 12 and replace the six 

torpedo planes transferred by six dive bombers· X Transfer 

three squadrons patrol bombers to Pacific Fleet immediately X Separate dispatch directs you reinforce Canal 

Zone X You are authorized withdraw all capital ships and 

carriers from Iceland if you desire X 

.. 

5 
DEC. GCT. 

09 0139 

09 0253 

CINCPAC 

TO 

OPNAV 

09 1812 

OPNAV TO CINCPAC, CINCAF 

W~KE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO WPL 46 EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT: 

PAR 3211 (Task Forces) DELETE TEXT SUBPAR C (Guam) AND 

ADD "HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES" X ADD SUBPAR D "NAVAL DEFENSE FORCES, WAKE, WHICH CAN BE REASSIGNED 

TO NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IF DESIREsttx PAR 3212 (Tasks) 

DELETE SUBPARS A (Divert by denial and captures of Marshalls), B (Prepare to capture Marshalls and Carolines), 

D (Support British south of equator between 155° E and 

180°), F (Defend Guam, Category F) X MAKE SUBPAR G (Protect communications) ~N SUBPAR A X ADD NEW SUBPAR BAS ~ 

FOLL01NS "SUPPORT THE ARMY IN THE DEFENSE OF THE HAWAIIA

COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORY OF DEFENSE D X ADD NEW 

SUBPAR DOG AS FOLLOWS: nRAID ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS 

AND POSITIONS" X CHANGE SUBPAR EASY TO READ uDEFEND 

SAMOA, MIDWAY, JOHNSTON AND PALMYRA ISLANDS CATEGORY OF 

DEFENSE Dtt X ADD NEW SUBPAR F AS FOLLOWS "DEFEND WAKE 

CATEGORY OF DEFENSE en X ADD TO SUBPAR H (Protect territory) "EAST OF i80TH :MERIDIANtt AFTER WORDS "PACIFIC 

AREA" AND RELETTER AS SUBPAR G" X ADD TO SUBPAR I (Cover 

Coastal Frontier Forces) "AND THE CANADIAN LOCAL DEFENSE 

FORCESrt AND RELETTER AS SUBPAR H X RELETTER SUBPARS J 

AND K AS SUBPARS I AND J RESPECTIVELY X 

Imperative additional Army bombers and pursuits be sent 

here with utmost dispatch X Propose use high speed carrier 

transportation for pursuits as soon as pursuits available X 

While carrier transporting pursuits base air group here 

to augment island force X A~vise 

OPNAV TO CINCPAC. INFOR TO NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

MY 090139 PLACES COMW~NDER r~WAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FULLY UNDER YOUR CO~~AND FOR ALL PURPOSES X 

YOUR 090253 WAR AND NAVY DPEARTMENTS ARE BENDING EVERY 

EFFORT TO REINFORCE THE PACIFIC FLEET AND THE ARMY 

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, WITH SHIPS, -AIRPLANES, TROOPS, AND 

ANTIAIRCRAFT ~ffiAPONS X YOU WILL BE PROMPTLY INFORMED AS 

TO PLANS X IN VIEW OF.RAID ON VffiST COAST IT IS NECESSARY 

ALSO TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR THAT REGION, ALASKA, 

AND THE CANAL ZONE X 

FOR THIS SAME REASON YOUR COVERING OPERATIONS ASSU~ffi 

ESPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE 

ADEQUATE ESCORTS FOR CONVOYS BETWEEN HAWAII AND WEST COAST X 

MHEN CARRIERS ARE USED FOR TRANSPORTING PLANES TO OAHU 

THEIR OWN COMPLEMENT MAY REINFORCE ARMY AIR DEFENSE OAHU 

BUT SHOULD BE 1'1ELL DISPERSED AMONG DIFFERENT FIELDS AND 

EFFECTIVELY CAMOUB,LAGED X (New par cont' d next page) 6 
I·" 

8ii9iiiii' 

DEC. GCT. 

09 2358 

10 2042 

BECAUSE OF THE GREAT SUCCESS OF THE JAPANESE RAID ON 

THE SEVENTH IT IS EXPECTED TO BE PROMPTLY FOLLOVIJED UP 

BY ADDITIONAL AT~ACKS IN ORDER RENDER FAWAII ill~TENABLE 

AS NAVAL AND AIR BASES, IN WHICH EVENTUALITY IT IS BELIEVED JAPANESE HAVE SUITABLE FORCES FOR INITIAL OCCUPATION OF ISLANDS OTHER THAN OAHU INCLUDING IviiDWAY MAUI 

AND HAWAII X 

UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS QUESTIONABLE THAT 

MIDWAY CAN BE RETAINED BUT IT IS HOPED THAT JOHNSTON 

PALMYRA AND SAMOA MAY BE X 

IN EXPECTATION OF FURTHER AIR RAIDS AND INADEQUACY OF 

DEFENSES OAHU CNO CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT WOUNDED 

VESSELS ABLE TO PROCEED UNDER OWN POWER SHOULD BE SENT 

TO WEST COAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE :viTH DUE REGARD TO 

SAFETY FROM CURRENT RAIDING FORCES AND VERY GREAT IMPORT_ ANCE OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER ATTACKS ON THESE RAIDERS BY YOU X 

UNTIL DEFENSES ARE INCREASED IT IS DOUBTFUL IF PEARL 

SHOULD BE USED AS A BASE FOR ANY EXCEPT PATROL CRAFT 

NAVAL AIRCRAFT SUBMARINES OR FOR SHORT PERIODS VffiEN IT 

IS REASONABLY CERTAIN JAPANESE ATTACKS WILL NOT BE MADE X 

CONSIDER IT SPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT SUB1viARINES AND 

TENDERS NOT SUFFER LOSSES SUGGEST WIDE DISPERSAL THROUGH 

THE VARIOUS LOCHS AND PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE CAMOUFLAGE 

MEASURES X 

SECNA V TO AI.NA V 

PLACE IN EFFECT IMMEDIATELY 11 INSTRUCTIONS GOVEfu\TING MARITIME AND AERIAL WARFARE, MAY 194lu EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY SUPPLEME~TARY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED .FROM TIME TO TIME X 

CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Since appearance enemy in this area all tactical efforts 

with all available forces have been vigorously prosecuted toward locating and destroying enemy forces primarily carriers X Our heavy losses have not seriously depleted 

our fast striking forcesnor reduced morale and determination X Pearl must be used for essential supply and overhaul facilities and must be provided with additional aircraft both Army and Navy m so relief pilots and maintenance personnel .X Pearl chan~s clear X Industrial establishment intact and doing excellent work x Otherwise your 

suggestions being carried out X 

(Among the foregoing are the dire ctives received 

prior to the preparation of the Estimate of 

December lOth which follows;} 

7 
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'uirements and limit tiona on numbers of accompanying light 

forces and aircraft, ho ever, ill be a strong deterrent 

toward· th ir m.ovement as far east as nawa11. The possibility of such movement must not be lost sight of, particularly 

as regards x-battle cruisers. In fact 1 analysis 0f captured 

papers gives some 1nd1oe.t1on .that they :may have accompanied 

the 7 December raid on Oahu. 

16. our own available ships in the Rawa11an area are 

) BB ready about 1)~17 Deoemb r, and COLORADO ready l 

F bruary. 

J CV including SARATOGA arriving 12 December. 

g· OA exclusive of Pl!NSAOOLA enroute Suva to Brisbane, 

LOUISVILLE enorute Samoa to H nolulu, NEW ORLEANS 

and SAN FRAh"CISCO at yard bout to proceed to coast 

tor oompletion of r ·epairs. 

2 OL xolusive of BlliSE in Asiatic and HOl'TOLULU which is 

l OCL 

)8 DD 

4 ODD 

4 DM 

13 Dl~ 

soon to finish repairs. 

tour more complete repairs Mara Island 17 December. 

in 14th Naval Distr1ot. 

3 Coast Guard 

12 PTB 

Various Auxiliaries. 

_,. 12 
........ 

Att.iCk 

10 d.i \ltl bomb r 

0 Ob fl~t-"J ti on 

dtie to r~'l f1 o +.A. .l'tt sd · :t, 

1 ctna t!un(l!ii.y {9 ef&.eh day). 

13 
f~''irst Ma:t~ln.e JU .. r ·cra:ft ·wtng M~.re Ota():1n or~d~rfld bu1~ :.tave · 'ot rep·orted. 

Addltlona.l ttfl0nfOl"*Cen1enta ail'} an(1 otherwise are' to be furn1s:t..ted 

tlte .Avmr but dr£~tatl• are not availa1:tl•• 

20, LOOISTIO BUf'POfttr.. *'fhf) J'apt.tlese could read.il;r supply 

Wake , if it should .fall 1ntc their harJ.d$• v1a tho Marsh~lls . 

Tb&y would :have more dif!'ioulty as to .Midwe.7, but tb• drain 

·would not 'bG a heavy on.e . 

&l, l!ven in peace t:trrs thfJre has been con.t,iderable d1tfi• 

eulty in our me¢ t1ng the logietie requirements of outlying 

b&$81 , It will be much more ~o now., but 1 t l.s po ss l b le .. 

• as. Deftcionc1es in ths available· suppl1t!H1 h&re are 

w.tnifold. No exhaustive disouss.ion of th·ai aspect is 

neeessary. R p<:lated tront; l"¥epreso.ntat1ons in the past have 

only t1oen. partially heeded but 11tronger suw·o~t may n.ow be 

e"peot·ed. AI a glfu:*ing exampl~, all ao em1librre ammun1ti~n 

h~"11 the N ,_A .n. la exllausted , 'It 1s hoped t·o· ~alv·age some 

.rrom dart);Qged ships. Meeting the log:lstic n.eeds of tl:te 

Hawaiian -J:$landa. from the mainland., l1.nd. sttp.plying otar outlying 

b&S-$8 VJtll inrpos$ llea.vy d.erl1and$ on tl:a.is fleet for~ oonvoy. work , 

25, l~};Jt~!dY COUH3ES !~ AQTION 

as. In con.side:ring enemy aou:rse::t of' action it must be 

remembf}red that while Japan has a ireat supal"ior1tr at p:res~:nt 

she has also luany oomnli tment.8, especially in troopa . With o\tt 

more d.ef'i.h! te 1.nform.atlon of how ·thin.g s aottua.lly are 1.n the 

Ft~1r East, it is dif.fleul t to est:Lma te just how ·much O·f he:r 

• 7 - 14 
for o 

t f·otor of s.z or requ 

t d. l,nd~n~ on Oahu 

or n.y . l d :tenc~ao. o 1 t or < ur 

tor 

t ... on& tr!,r ng o c ·, o. 1 n{ll ~ on ny or t+ oth .. r 

. d:J is unli ly. te.n in}!} on oucly ng ial · d ·

1 

ooou. tl n, ~ re unl.i~ ly .xce· .. t for Hale nd 

! ly • '! "'e ooa 1b li ty , ~ 1 ndlng t· mpt 

W.dw y 1 . r: ot to c rd.e • 1 b influcnc d y t. 

r etlt · k4t. tng for .~molition 1 1 t 

J 0 ll1 vOn. p lm:yra nn CJJn ton • 

S4. I 1 ... believ d lliat tl e g a l he in1t1 1 

Oth·~ l ha~~" 

b n to o c 1. t ly. It ~ y till b I b t y t~~ 

10 ard b m a d 

by f t tr1k n~ fOl"C 1 r .ders and "J'\.th. r.t.n 8 • 

25. lYro1~ ·he 3apa.l' e so v1.ev.~potnt; 1 and. t. · t is ths po tnt 

o! t ado t " eo:l 1d -rln··., h r our a of . OT-to ·# lt 

ons ill b. lon . 

t llowir E l.i . ,lJ t 

( ) fi:"td:a l'ly fa t etri in;,;. g:r·oups r c t'r ~·rs, 

orul rs e.nc c.e ttoy ( 0'"hu1 t'lc 'It' y L.d po~ ... ii the 

A_e t· an ' t:· a crogoen 0 iai1 ,J or .f ·lllng ~ i tll th 0 pos 1 n 

d 

15 
(_ } 0 .t.b 

~andln:) a~tomnt • 

( ) Cono -n ~r ted ~rot"PS of submarin(!. (,~n t•oc 1 

t of coJti'~~ m1oat 1on b t e~ Oahu · nd J.t'1 1nl l d 1 . a.rt~.o tl • 

arl .~t lo·c1""te ,. or· • t ly oatt r d 

'bn rlne-. y op& .at on otb r r<>ute • 

(<1) Ra·da on f :rly heavy cal on 'e rl- .a-tOo t 

· o• nm o. io . • .tr y u l~ for this ocoas1on ll ·, bu 

crt aer 1 he 1ly cha t r id r w1l be th r le . 

( ) Cov ring o upportlng groups of heavy force• 

nclu ing b ttle hip t b nti 1.PAt ben 1 or 

p r 1ng ~n ly f roe, out :1 ie th.e r n of our h e bas d. 

a1r·oratt. 

16 
Olni COURSES OF ACTION 

23. rrhe general consideraticna e;u1d1ng our course o£ 

action must b the pu pose of our mission - to retain a secure 

b se for further operations and extension or our control. To 

do this, we must both prevent further raids on Oahu, wllile 

building up its means og defense against ai:rerart. Th:teJ ·latter 

is an Army responsibility,, but we must rw-ther it by insuring 

ar:ri val of reenforeemen ts, p rticule.rly aircraft and AA defense·. 

At the aame time, our r;leployment must~- governed by necessity 

tor covering our terri tory and alli d eommunicat i .ons as well a a 

for the interception and damaging ot enemy raiding forotut. Ir. 

we damage the r iding forces every tinte they enter the ares., 

pr ferably before, but ce:rta1nly after n attack, .the ra!da 

will become smaller and fewer and eventually cease. e can 

then p'r"oject operations of our om from. a seouPe basa. 

24. · "e oan.~ot intercept raids or oontribut to defen e ot 

0 hu from the est Coast, tnerefore we mu$t maint in striking 

.forces in the ar&a, coepting the existing weakness of: Pearl 

Harbor AA d.~.fense~ but overcoming :t t by 1teeping our force at 

sea. Oarrie1?S,- cruisers and d· stroye1.,a must, therefor ~ 

replenish and eat what rela.sat:ton tray can, at .Pea1~1 with 

possibility of periodic return to Ooast as reenforcements are 

reo ived. As security of Pearl is increased it will be 

possible to affor·d furth.er re .. t e.nd upkeep periods there. 

- 10-
25• Sine ntt cks must come from the estward.; nd so 

lo ~ a we hold th Midway, John•tonj Palmyra lin probably from 

th area north of the I!awa1ia.n ch in., they should usually be 

dl posed north nd ~e t or Oahu. In such re~ they not only 

cover Oahu but are in a favorable position tor eupporting t~dw y, 

can be promptly moved toward the Aleuti n8., oll' to interoept a 

foree moving to ard or away !'rom our West C.oa.$t. 

26. Protection of sea comnunieation&J defense of outlying 

bases, particularly ~lake and samoa, nd protection of far flung 

territory reqattres a ride di peXtsa:I of foree·· , Defense of Oahu 

requires concentration sufficient to detect and overoome the 

force sent against 1 t. The two re Luirement are diametrically 

opposed.in thei:r..C.istribution. Our foroes are l1m1ted. e 

must so distribute and dispose them as .to inflict maximum 

damag on the en•:my, whil minimizing our own losses. 

27. Forces baaing on Pe rl not immediately essential for 

eombat . wo?k must be reduced to minimum. ~is is p rtieularly 

true as to battleships, which should be returned to the Coast. 

28. With the above as a prem! e, the following general 

pl n of operations appers feasible and eonsiatent with our 

a stgned task : 

(a) Employ se rching and striking groups of carriers, 

cruisers a.."ld .de troyera, replenishing at Pearl, but primarily 

at ea, in position to intercept and destroy enemy raiding 

force and to afford support to meaaoed bases. The purpos 

.. 11 - 18 
of t.heae groups is to :Pl"oteat our bS.4lfJS· and territory and to 

cover opera·tiona o:f eseo:rt and coastal !t-o-GfU~, 

(b.) 2$1'107 battle.ships with A,/s .groups oompe>ati of 

s'tlitabltt. Dl~s ,. DMSs and DDa., but latter reduott·d to m1n1••t- . 

1n eac.ort between· Oahu and Coadt_. 

(e) Dep"'nd e.n Loo·al Detanst Forces fo~ escort or 

eoaetal oonvoye on our o-. Weet Uoast. 

(dJ Util!e·e striking aroup$ ot: (a) above to s.u.pport 

defense o.f outlyir1e; island. 'b$set. Repleni14h, reenfor.oe .and 

reliftlf'& as p&t'sonnel and material available and .c1reumetanoes 

/ d1c·ta te ~ 

( & ) · Eluploy ttttbma:r:tn,a of'fene1 ve1y in Japanese wa.tert. 

(f) Employ VP primarily ln tearoh and seour1 ty oper~.­

tione. Continue uee ot A1!'14"'f long range be:mbera., and. A)'lfn VI 

. plane• to · as,s14t:• 

(g) Giv$ every a.s-si,s,tanee to A1!11ly and. in&i:lt up~n 

rapid a~gmentatien of their air and ·AA strengtn. 

DBC:tSIOW 

iel, (a) Orgg~ize th~ ta.•k to~ee s, $a,eh cona1!ting or 

one OY 1 2 or ;s OA.., and 6 t .o 9 DD. Operate one (with 5. CA 1f 

prac tieable) irl vicinity or Midway and on& to northward ot 

Ce;hu, the third being ei the:-r enroute or r9pl•n1shing a·t ft~Yarl. 

This d$plO~nt b~St n11tets. the COndi tiona Gf' Sttpk)O!'t!ng d@fentU,1 

of our bases, covering our coasts (1nolu.d1ng Ala.skQ and Oana.d.a), 

- 12 -

·I' 19 
\ 

and affording m ans o£ repl ni hing, reenl~orcing, and reli vlng 

outlying islands by direct and clos. support during progre s 

of a sp cific· oper tionJ as· British now do _r1 th !Jial ta. ; 

(b) rri val of YORI'~OW!I organiz,e . an additional 

similar task foro • 1nt in one ta'sk foree. at each of th 

foregoing stat1.ons, while one is enroute to and from or replen--

ishing at Pearl or in support positi~n, and one to th Coast for 

s ntial ~est of personnel and upk ep of machinery. Se 

typical scheme in ttached table. 

(c) Organize an escort r ·oree between West Coast and 

Hawaii, eonsistit'..g o.r battleship ax.-.d sui table A/S vessels. 

Light era.ft to work from P arl nd from \est Goa t, battleship 

to ork fro 

scheme will b 

st Coast only and make round. trip. The gen,ral 

.,;; 

have convoy leave coast with ,a BB and 4 ... 6 DDs ,. 

or A/S vessels to about 200 - 500 miles off coast when all but 

BB eecort and two DDs return to Ooast.- BBs and 2 DD continue 

~o about 200 miles from Pearl, when convoy is met by additional 

A/S craft, BBs meet coast bound convoy and return to coast. 

2 DD cont nue to Pearl ru1d 2 from there go to coast, other 

escorts return ~earl wh 11 r}eleased bout 500 ·niles out, In 

this connection send battleships to ooast with dentroy r escort 

s soon as ready. 

(a.) Keep shipping to ustrallan theater to minimum 

and adjust sailings to escort. which can be mad a.vail·ble. 

(e) Waln tain ra.aximum submarine pa t:rols in Ja.pa.ne se 

- 13 - 20 
aters, as previously plann d., at aame time continuing those 

at Mld y and ke .• 

(f) Organ12 VP · into an offshore eourity and 

s arching fot'c , cov ring maximum ares and depth • A soon 

pos lble, divide into three gr-ou.p.&, on ou search, on 

stand ... by ·a striking or control zroup and one upkeep nd 

relaxation. Main striking group will be An~y bombers and 

main defense g:x:oup will be _..t\,rmj'" pul' u1 t. v;r plane~ will 

augment sea.roh. 

(g) 1st Marine Air Group when available t augment 

outlying island defenses, or aasi t Army from Oahu as developments dictate . 

(h) Depend on Army and ships 1n port for AA def nee 

ot Pearl. 

As a vital necessity to any plan, land ba d pur~uit 

and bombardment aviation must b built up most rapidly, AA 

defenses, partietdar.ly against dive bombers# is equally 

necessary. Radar, both ship and shore, must be supplied in 

gr-eat quantity. 

_, 14 .. 

21 
Jinpac File No. 

Al6-3/(l6) 

Serial UNITED STATES PAOIFIO FLEET, PEARL HARB -o T. U. 

4.-400 l'XfCem~ :t lG-, ~941 . 

1. Information. 

(a) The campaign for which this is tho plan comprise the op rations h1oh will be undertaken until this Fleet 1 trong enough to conduct strategically offensive operations. 

(b) lotot1vat1ng Cons.1derat1ons. 

The basic Rainbow F1ve Plan has been mod1t'1ed to take 

account or the present reduced trength ot the Pao1f1o Fleet. The only strategically o£fen ive task remaining in Plan is nto raid Japanese p.o1ltiGiAS aW. oomm:unieationsu. 4tbie wtH -~~-~fie -,;t~he \ .eet 1-.s-·reenforeed,unte lJ ·.nrpan· att9m.p-ts t · T'e1r8ta"b11 ~ h 

a AQmmlYJ.jCi\,t on lln&· ·t ·Bout .. or ·'Centra Ameri""Cll.. The remaining ss1gned ta~ce require protection of the terri- tory and communications or tne As oe1ated Po ere in the Pacific Are • (The definition of the P c1fic Area rem ir1.::. the same as in the original Rainbow Five Plan). V AKE is to be defended in eategory ncu, -all other territory in the general HAWAIIAN Area., in category "D". It is con- sidered by the Co~rnander-1h·Chi t that th OAHU g~oup of 1 lands must be made:~~ eeoure :-, at all cost • He expects great quantities of m n andmaterial to augment the pre- sent defending forces, and will prosecute a vigorous ott naive against any threatening forces. The l1n6 ot eoxmnunications to tho We-at Coast is of' course vital. That of SMdOA and beyond to AUSTRALIA must be kept openJ our outlying islands-must be protee-ced and supplied. 

(o) Probable Enemz Action. 

Japanese inttial actions are well known. Because ot the ucc sses obtained we can expect further air :raid on OAHU. Just how soon is problemationlt but the next will. probably occur within t o or three oek or soone~~ Su~­

marines have already appeared in this area, and on the route to the West Coast . suttio1ent numbers will probably 

-l- 22 

'l 
"' - .~ 

16·3/{16) 

Serial Ol20W 

r aeh the Coast to create demands for coastal convoy • 

St·rong urtace raid will probably b made on the same 

route. ~VAKE has .received five air attacks and on this 

date was being subjected to a land1ng attack in whio.h 

our forces had already sunk one oruiser and one destroyer. If th1~ attack tails. a stronger one may be consider 4 a 

certainty • MIDWAY ha a been .'bomb a. red, and was bQrtibed today.. Gen ral Japanese successes may l ad to an ea:rly landing attack against this i.sland, ev n though it may not have been included in the original plan~ 

(d) Own Fore s. 

Our forces available are as follows: 

!!!mediately 

Available 

9 CA 

2 CL 

l OOL 

3 cv 

4 DL 

33 DD 

13 DMS 

4 DM 

16 ss 

2. General Task. 

Eventually A~ ilable 

3 BB repaired in the near future. 

3 BB from Atl nt1a Fle t. 

l BB from PUGE'l' SOUND about February 1st. 

5 BB indefinite. 

2 CA on esco~t duty. 1 OA under overhaul. 

1 CA under r pair (avail ble with thr e 

shafts). 2 OL under r pair, date completion indefinite. 

1 OL 1n far East. 

1 OOL indefinite. 

1 CV :fz-om Atlantic Fleet. 

1 DL under overhaul, MARE ISLAND. 

4 DD under overhaul J..._ MARE ISLAliD. 

9 DD from Atlantic .neet. 

4 DM under overhaul. 

6 SS under overhaul. 

2 SS sound school. 

This Fleet ill. in the Pacific Area, -

(a) Protect the territory and communications o£ the 

A sociated Powers eas.t of Longitude one hundred eighty degrees, 

(b) Assist in the strengthening of the OAHU b• seo 23 
16-3/(16) 

S~rial Ol20W 

(Cont•d) 

(e) ~ever Japanese communications east of Longitude one 

hundred eighty d&greea. 

(d) Defend WAKE may be pr· ctieable. 

(e) Ra1d, With submarines, enemy foretlS and communications 

n ar the Japan e Homeland. 

(. ) TaSk. · 

(jover OAHU, MIDWAY and when practicable, WAKE: destroy· 

1ng or 1n.fl1c ing maximum dam ge on enemy forces which 

come 'vi thin reach, 

Forces. 

Sea (four when YORKTO\'JN joins) st:riking groups each 

composed ot one oart"i.er, at least two heavy Cztuise:re anc\ , six destroyers. .Silbmarines1when available for defensive 

purposes. 

Method of Operation. Maintain two groups at s a: one o£f MID AY; one 

north ot OAHU; two en route to, n route from, or t 

P e.rl, or on \Vest Coast (first 1n..,.port period fo;r groupe 

to be at PEARL HARBOR). See ·tentative sohedu.le, Annex A. 

(b) Task. . 

Escort convoys between West Coast and HAWAII. 

Forces.. 

!ihr e (tour when COLORADO joins) escort groups com• 

posed ot.~ one battleship and two. to six d stroyers. 

Method of Operatiop.. Battleships and eie)lt to ten deetroyers base on 

CoastJ eight to ten dest~oyer base at PEARL HARBOR. 

Four to ix de tttoyers in the e.scort when within 

five hundred miles of a te:rm1nal; destroyers r duced to 

t1o along remainder of route; battleship in the escort 

between Coast e.nd two hundr·ed mile ci cle from PBARL. 

Use SAN PEDRO and 3.t\N DIEGO as w ll as SAN' FRANCISCO .. 

Run convoy about once eek; convoy limited to 

eight to ten ships; unload at both HONOLULU nd PEJ.RL .. 24 
Al6-:)/(l6) 

s rial Ol20W 

Campai~n.Plan (Oi>nttd) Mo.· -its 

{c) Task. - · Escort shipe to and from outlying islands and S~~OA, 

and to point of transfer to Br1t1sh protection a.nd return. 

Forces. , arufsers and destroyer wh n they c~n be spared from 

more urgent duties. 

(d) Ta: k. 

~scort Haw iian 1nter-1sland shipping. 

Forces. 

Destroye·r , other types with anti-subms.r1ne install - tiona, local defense forces. 

(e) Task. 

Support the Army in the defense of the Hawaiian 

Coastal Pront1er. 

Forces. 

Fou~teenth District forces and fleet forces present 

or within, supporting distance of the area. 

(f) Task. 

Destroy enemy oommaroe and raiders in the Pac1rie Ap a. 

I•orcea. 

Forces available and within striking distance. 

(g) ~ 

Taslc. 

Raid enemy forces and communications near Japanese Hon eland. 

Forces. 

:iubmarines in greatest strength practicable. 

(h) Task. · 

Obti"in infol~mation of enemy approaching, or in• the 

Hawaiian Area. Attack enemy under suitable conditions. 

Forces. 

Patrol planes. 

(1) Task. 

Reen.force JOHN8rl,Ol~ ISLAlfD and PALMYRA. 

l~'orces. 

Marine forces; escort by destroyers. 

-4-

25 
le-5/(16)· 

Serial Ol20W 

Camp if Pl~ (Cont•d) No. :R5 

( j) Task. 

Re ntQrce M~IDWAY and WAKE if practicable. 

Forces. 

Iarine forces; escort by .tr1k1ng foree. 

4. Logistic~. 

Base Foree furni ·h neces ary log1st1e support, assisted 

as necessary by District and R val Transportation torces5. Oommander-in-Chief at PEARL HARBOR. 

H. E. KnmEL, 

Admiral, u.s. liavy, Oommander-~n-Cbie£, u.s. Pacific Fle t. 

Annep: 

A - Initial schedule for 

etr1lt1ng forces. 

P. C. GROSL.E!Y, 

l' ... lag Secretary. 

26 
ANNEX .A 

to 

:F!IDWAY: NORTH : PEARL t co ST t SAILS I Rl:IlPUR : 

: :OF QAHUi I T :r:t 2 P~\Rit _t_PEARL I 

* l • t t I I • 

LEXINUTOl-1 t · X ' I = : ' l;)IO 20 I 

• • : I t t • 

SA T·OOA . : : X ' • . DEC l3t DEO 26 I * j • 

• : t t j : ' t I 

IDTTERPRIS • X t I : I I DEO l9t J - -2 .., 1' • 

1 ~ • i' l • : • • J YORKTOWN : ' X : ' I : DEO 25: l I 

• ' : • / ; I l • f LEXINGTOl~ t t : f • : DEC 21:- I 

• : : . I .. . ' I t : • SAF.JtTOGA " X t 1 • i s DEC 31: • • l • ; l : t /, J t • • ENTERP ISE • ' X ; :··. 

• JAN 7 . : t • • ~ : t t # I : YOIUtTO l~ : X * ' /! 1 JAN 131 : • 

·= : I = ' : 

!FJX:INGTO!l • : X t ,)· l • JAN l9J' : • • 

t : : ~~ : :: • I 

I 

i 

I 

I 

f 

i 

1:\ /.·)\ )1'.' 

t· \ 

I 

) 

/ H. E. l{I}1MEL, 

Admiral. u.s •. N vy, 

Co.m.man4,er-1n-Ch1.e.f', u. ,_., Pacific Fleet. • 

27 
L U~S. PACIPIC FLHET, PEARL HARBOR 

Ope·ra tion Plan 1400, 10 Decamber, 1941. 

No. 3·R5 

T SK ORGANIZATION 

(Modified fPom day to day aa availability or ships and 

demands require. See Operations Officer• daily sheet 

. for d t ile). 

(a) Tas! Force Eight - Comairbattor 

gNTERPRISE (F) 

2 - 3 OA 

i to 1 Desron r- J v:\ , 

_// 

/ (b) Task Force Twelve - Comsoofor 

LEXINGTON 

2 - 3 CA (INDIANAPOLIS (F)) 

i to 1 Desron 

l 

.l t' 1. ·-J9 r\ ; 

t·· 

•' I 

/ .. ~.~~. r. ~ ·.~ 

(c) Task Force Three, Task Foroe Sixteen " Cam~ 

(Composition chang d, and designat~on changed on 

arrival PEARL 12/15 December). 

SARATOGA (F) 

2 .. 3 CA 

i to 1 Desron 

(d) Task l~o:roe - Com 

(To be organized after arrival c rrier from East Coast}. 

YORKTOWN 

2 - 3 CA 

i to 1 Dasron -1-

28 
" " ... ' . 

Operation Plan (Cont'd) lo. 3-R5 

(e.) oroe Fifteen, Comba tor 

BB, OAt OL, DD, DMS 

a assigned to eaoort duty from time to time. 

(f) Task Force One - Oamdesbatfor 

(Temporary Fore ) 

1 OCL 

A signed DD 

De troyer tender 

(g) Task Foree Nipe ... Oompatwing Two 

Shore be. ed aircraft 

1rcrart tender 

(h) fa k Foree Seven • Oomsubscotor 

Subm.ar1nes 

Submarine t nder 

(1) Task Porce Six - Combaaetor 

Auxiliaries 

~- -

( j) :Kask Force Po~ - Commander Hawaiiar1 Naval Co a tal hontier 

Local Defense Fore s 

Coast Guard 

DD, DM, DMS~ Auxiliaries 

~d other fleet craft a a signe 

(k) Task Eoroe Pive - Commander Pacific South rn Co stal Frontier 

Oca t l and Local Defense Foro s 29 
Operation Plan (Oont'd) No. a~ .. R5 ' 

(1') 'f'f:Sk Force Ten - Commander Pacific Not>thern Coastal .Frontier ..; 

Coastal and Lgeal Dotens Forces. 

1. Information furniShed in daily and apeelal bulletins. 

2. Th1 tl~at will intercept and destroy enemy forces 

approaching the Hawaiian area, or that come~ or can 

be brought within range by conducting appropriate 

search a e.nd attacking vigorously in order to safeguard 

o n and allied territory and communications. 

3. (a) i!aek t'orce E1$t (~"NTERPRISE). 

(b) Task Force 'l'welve (LEXIltGTON). 

(c) Task Force Sixteen (SARATOGA). 

(d) task Foro& (YORKTOWN). 

(1) These task forces. which constitute the major 

striking .forces, will search their respective 

operating areas for enem.y raiders or other enemy 

forces and in cooperation w1th one another and with 

Array · 1rcratt annihilate those discovered. 

(2) Schedule or expected times and locations ot 

operations 1 as ahown in Annex A to Campaign 

Pl n 2-R5. Spec1t1e directions will be issued as 

necessary tor relieving stations, r servicing , 

visiting ooa t, ate. 

30 
Qperat1on Plan (Cont'4) 

)lo •. ~-~~. . 

(3) For the immediate present in carrying out sub• 

par grap~ one above ~tsk Fore. · Sixteen will continue 

to PEARL for disoharg!ng surplus planes and reserv1o1ng. 

Task Force E1&;1? Will continue sa operations to 

northw rd o:f OAIDJ ~ 

in eoordance with current instructions, ~en interc pt WM. \¥ARD BURROWS and when joined by ships proc•eding fro.m PEARL HARBOR proceed with reenforcements 

to WAKE. Oov r di$oharg of cargo and evacuation or. ' 

laborers, and wound d. !ore complete inst~uctions 

will b issued s par tely. 

(e) Ta ak Force Fifteen (Escort Foree).. P22otect tntiTED 

STATES and ALLIED shipping by escorting with vess,ela 

provided. Maintain clc,se lia1 son w1 th Commanders ot 

Nav 1 Coa tal Frontiers in connection therewith. Conduct 

operations in accordance with current methods, those laid 

. do.wn in Campaign Pl·an 2-rt5 and special instructions that 

may be issued. 

(f) ~ sk Force On ( temporary force}. Assign vessels 

and carry out speci 1 t sks and instructions as ordered. 

(g) Task ·Foree Nine ( P trol planes}. ( 1) Operate p trol 

planes and other shore based aircraft including Army 

bombars made available so a.s to ain the ea:rlieat possible 

information or dvanoing nemy forces. Use patrol planes 

offensively only when other types of our own are not 

31 
1th1n striking d1atanee, or the risk of damage to 

our own planes is small; or hen the importance ot 

1nfl1cting dantage on the objective appe rs to justify 

the risk of reo 1v1ng the dam.ag which may ~esult. 

(2) Coordinate the service of inform tlon with the 

operations ~f other forces, 

(!) At present base all planes available on OABU, but 

be prepared on short notice to transfer units to outlying basea. 

(4) Maintain clQse liaison with A1.!11y Air Porce tor 

all aviation activities particularly as to information,· 

1dontity of aircraft, etc. 

(5) aintain maximum p~aatioable diaper ion of planes 

lhen at baa • 

(h) Task Force Seven (Subma.rinf* ). (l) Conduct unrestrict d 

..a rfare against Axi powers. 

(2) Continue patrol of two submarines eaoh at AKE and 

l!I YAY. 

(3) Establish maxim:um pre.ot1oable 1nit1e.l patrol off 

the Japanese homeland and thereafter maintain it at th.e 

maximum. st:.rength permitted by operating condition. 

Unless ot.herw1se directed give stations the t'ollowing 

priority: YOKOIIAMA 

BUNGO OHANNEL 

KII ORAliNEL 

TSUSIIIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SH:WONOSFJCI 

'l'SUGARU 

-5-

32 
.... 

(4} Intlict maximum damage on enemy forces, 1nelud1ng 

shipping, utilizing mines and torpedo s e.nd f 

ppropria te, gunti.re. 

(5) Report important enemy movements by radio if attack 

mission is not ther by jeopardized. 

{6) Keep unit in po~t w1d.ely dispe~sed. 

(1) 1

fa k ioree Bias (Baa•. Force Vesaels). Oommandel" Ba e 

Poroe continue to p:rovide logi stio nd sal vag erv1e s to 

the fleet and cooper te w1 th Oomtn nder Haw !ian Naval Coastal 

Frontier in providing log1st1o services to outlying base • 

Continue liaison with Castal Frontier Commanders ith 

respect to logistic requirements of the fl&et, loading ot 

vessela, routing and protection of Shipping~ etc. 

(j) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Waval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Asa1st in providing external security for units ot 

th Fleet in the Hawaiian N v l Co etal Frontier, 1n 

cooperation wlth the Ar.my bd units cone rned. 

(2) Task Foree OommandeP eont1nue duties as Ba e 

Def'enee Of.fioer. 

(5) Continue work on outlying subsidiary bas s at 

IIDWAY 1 JOHNSTON, PALM'tRA and WAKE in so far s practicable and circumstances permit. 

(4) Defend tlte foregoing bases.. In close cooper tion 

:lth the Commander-in-Chief and other d sign ted 

oom1tmders provide tor their support, r nforcemant; 

33 
Opera tJ:..Q.n Plan ( Oont 'd) 

lio. 3-R5 

and evacuation of civilians, sick or wounded personnel, 

or others eircumstanc a require. Keep the Commanderin-Chief fully informed in eonneot1on with requirements 

for the foregoing. 

(5} ake the facilities of thoae· b ses available for 

fleet units operating 1n the vicinity and cooperate Wlth ... Commanders o·f t\!Rbile Forces in coordinating the m.ili tary 

activities or those bases. Ann x IV ·ot \iPPac-46 1a 

effective • . 

( 6) Escort inter-island. s 1pp1ng s a.va1la ble fo:rcea. 

and circumstances pe~1t. 

(k) Task li'orce Pive (Pae1f1c Southern 1-Iaval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Task Force Ten (Pao1£1o Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). 

Conduct auah sa rch, patrols and scorts in vicinity Q.f own 

areas ae is practicable with available rox-oes. Keep the 

Commander-in·Ch1ef fully advised of information g 1ned. 

Also, hen c1reumstanoe warPant, oommun1cat uoh 1ntor.mat1on direct to any Fleet fot-ces 1n the v1e1n1ty. 

(x) (l} Ma1nt in all units 1n maximum degr&e or aterial 

re dines • 

(2} Continue such training aetivitie _ s operation and 

other eirou.rn.stancea permit. 

(3) Ma1nta1n intern 1 and external s eurity at all time 

coope~tlng with Commande~s or l~aval Coastal Pront1ers 

while within the limits of tho e frontier • 

(4) This pl n a.t'.fect,.,ve on receipt~ _.,.,_ 

34 
. ' 

4. L g1st1o reple~ishments at PEARL HAP~OR nd on the 

est Coast; and as may be speo1a.lly provided for. 

5.. { ) Communications in ccordance with u.s • .,, Seventy, 

a modified by nnex III 1 WPPae-46. 

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time. 

(c) Cotnmander-in-Chior at Submarine·Base, PEARL HARBOR. 

DISTRIBUTIOU.: 

P. 0. Crosley, J'lag Secretary• 

H. E. KIMMEL, Adlniral, u.s. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, u.s. Pac!fio Fleet. 

35 
CI~ CPAC 

Al1

NI: A 

TO 

-

r~ L 

E;,cort 

17th 

f t 1 A - 'l'ENNT!SS ~E re dy I .tJesron F~:tve 

tJ\RYLA tiD " 13th x~ltJr~SYr~V rJIA n 14th 

cor~onA ;o 1 eb. 

Nt·t ORL ~l~S 

S!• . LOUIS 

~pec1al ~.geor~ \"rroup 

I.~OUI ·: t;·"LLT!: 

PEN~,~ COLA 

HOE£ !X 

P · L - N t 0 a t -

!est Coast PFJ\.llL 

17 D c 

Y'..not - Dee -

. ~ 

·~ 

De 

:~,. Z::JOUIS =··onTEft 

.""es on 3 

1f.a Hout Group 

Des iv 10 (re ch .F. 

3 o.) 

.. ONOL'tJLU ( Reach Pi!AR: 

20 Dec.) 

. '~~IJBOT) 

'!":A#;ER.:>) .... 

D ·• T ) 

Must "-(. ep 

fro l1H l al 

Ef:cort whol 

or MARYLAND and 

PENNSYLVANIA 

36 

0 
Cincpac F11 lo. 

A16-3/(16) 

UNITED STATgs PACIIliC FLEE'!, 

PeARL HARBOR, T. H. 

P12eratlon Pl p 

o. 4-R5 

T: SK OROAHIZATION: 

(a) Ta k Force Fifteen 

t est Co.ast Esoort Group ... R ar Admiral Bagley. 

Batdiv A • ~~NNESSEE 

MARYLA~TD 

PENNSYLVANIA 

(COLORADO) 

fJARL EQeort Group 

One Desron (initial aas1gzllUent 

in Annex A) 

!@ oute . ~seort_ ·Group 

3 BB 

(l BB) 

9 DD 

Combatant ships whieh may be making 

passage- between Ve t Coa t and Hawaii. 

Special Escort Group 

Cruisers nd DD as assigned. 

(b) TasK Force Five • Commander Pao1f1c Southern Coastal Frontier. 

Coastal and local defense forces. 

( o) 'fask Force Four 

Local def n e forces. 

-1 

37 
16-3/(16) 

Serial 

Operation Plan No. 4-H5 

1. Intom.ation. As in 01noPac Oampa1gn :Plan No. 2·R5, 

and informa t1on bulletins to b 1 ued .fro a time to 

time by 'the Commander-1n-Oh1et. CincPao Op ration 

Plan ~o. 3- 5 ass1 ma the task .tor this foree. 

2 . Thia force 111 protect de 1gnated ·United States and 

Allied eh1 ·Jing by escorting. 

:s. (a) Tfsk , oroe kF1tteen. 

\Ye t Coast Escort Group, 

.~EARL Eaeort Grou.a, 

En Route Escort Groue . 

Escort convoys or all Allied Shipping between the 

West Coast or the UNITED STATES and HAW II. Not less 

than .£our de troyers are to be in the escort when 

within five hundred mile of t rminals; not 1 ss than 

two on, the remainder of' the route. West Coast Escort 

Group will base in general on W&st Coast ·and battleships will not approach oltH:la·r than two hundred mile 

to PEARL . l BOR. Pearl Escort Group b s in general 

at '~ARL HARBOR. See Annex. A for initial availabJ.l1t,-. 

En l~ut seo~t Group relieve regular seorta ~h n v v 

practicable. 

SJ2eCi..!l Escort GrouR escort convoys nd h ip bet e n 

38 
Al6~3/(16} 

eri l 

Operation Plan · 

No. 4-R5 

OAHU and_ outlyin islan.ds and .on overseas routes ae 

may be ~ireeted. 

(b) ·~aJ!k oree Fiv augment escorts in co st..al area 

when praetic ble.. Route convoy$ exeept in Hawaiian 

aval Coastal Frontier. ~ Routes are to avoid, 

when possible, known and probable area o.f enemr opera• 

tions. Utilize SAN PEDRO and SAN DIEGO aa well ae 

SP.N. ~HA:trc sco for loading points. Shipping between 

... ·Iorthw at UNITED S'l'Ar.~s ~'"ld HAWAII proceed via SA.1 

FRANCISCO. 

inter-island 

shipping. l'oute convoys in 'Haw 11an Naval Coa. stal 

Frontier to avoid known and probable areas of enemy 

opera.t ons. Utilize b th HONOLULU and Plf!ARI! .for 

berthing and shipping. 

(x) This ~ plan effective on receipt. Spec1al 

ssignments and sohedules 1 ill be in accordance with 

Annex. nd .future special dire ctives. 

4. Logistic support on West Coast and at PlliRL. Util1z 

West Coas'ti su plies wherever pre.ctiee.ble. Combasefor 

Subordina-te Oonma.nd utilize SA!4 )BDHO and SAl'I DI JJGO 

as well as SAr FRArCISC for lo ding points. 

-3-

39 
Al6-;i/(lt3) 

8er1al 

B. E. ltiWM$ 1 

Admiral ~ tr. s. N-. vy, Conms.ande:r•1n ... Ch1ef 1 U.S. Pa·c1t.1c F1 oet ~ 

40 
. , . 

Cincpae l~'ila No ~ 

~16·;3/(16) 

Seri 1 

LEXI};GTON 

INDIANAPOLIS 

CHIC.t GO 

PORTLAND 

TJE.J1tON 1 

(b) TaskGroup 12.7 

TANGIER 

V:m.W. BURRO S 

2 DD 

(c) Ta k Group 12.8 

IGHT · 

2 DD 

(d) Task G;rOUR 12.9 

THORNTOl{ 

UNirr tD STA'rES 11\ CIFIO FLEE'f; 

~ARL HARBOR, T. H. 

Decemb r 10 1 1941. 

l. Garrison at outlying isl ds r quire reenforcement, 

and at ~·Al'CE and. ID1VAY wound d need to b evacuat d. 

i~ part ot the e1v111an workmen l"equire evacuation. 

2. Des1~nnted ~~ps will transport reenforcement to 

outlying island bas.es and v euate per onnel ther -

from as indicated in paragraph three. 

-1- 41 
Al6·3/(16} 

Serial 

COl[FID.f~NTIAL 

Operation Order 

jo. 

· 3. (a) Tas~ Fprce Tw lve on completion ot tuel1ng rend zvous 1 th Taslt Group 121,1. at time and place to be 

d ignated by delpatch by Command r-in•Chief. Thence 

proceed to rende~vous with Wm •• BURROWS at a time and 

place to be d signated by despateh, thenee proceed to 

vicinity of AKE. Cover unloading and loading ot 

TANG :R and wm •• BUFrr{O S a may be found expedient. 

BUR!tO\ S a may b r und expedient w1 thout undue 

exposure of this t.:>ree • . 

\"ilien ships mentioned have completed duties t WAKE 

direct Task g~oup 12.? to return to PEARL.. This taSk 

force then r dezv us with Task Groua 12.8 at time and 

pla.cif to be designated by d patch and procu' ·d. to 

MIDWAY. Cover 1mloading and loading or WRIGHT aa may 

be found expedient without undue exposur of this force. 

Af~er ffiiGHT has completed ditties t MIDV AY d1reet 

f.t'ask Group 12,a to retur11 to PEART.~, and thereafter Task 

Foree Twelve oper te in area to northward ot MIDliAY 

against ny enemy that may appro ch~ 

It enemy cont ct is m d.e during any ot toregoing 

opera tiona take offen.si ve action ag ins t them and gi-ve 

aueh instructions to vessels being eovar:d s yoUl? 

judgment dictate • 

42 
· Al6-3/( 6) 

Serial 

CONFIDEllTIAL 

.9Reration Order 

l't'o . 

(b) Taslc Group l2t? less vV.m.w. BURRO~ S load ueh peronnel and suppl ea for VvAXE as Comtnandant, Fourteenth 

Naval District, direct and depart on twelv ecember 

for d sigaated r nd zvous with Task "more 

Wtn. ~ ·• BURRO S jo1n 'l'ask l?orce Twelve a. t de igns. ted 

rendezvous . .c'it JOHN3TOH', MIDWAY and WAKE tU. · charge 

e rgo and personn l and embark other personnel as 

directed by Commanding Officer of ~espative Air Stations 

giving rr eced&no to wounded. Upon b e1ng released by 

Commander T~sk Force 'lwleve. return to PEARL. 

(c) Task ,Group 12, a load such p~raonnel and suppl1e 

for JOHU 1'01~ and fai .. " Y a.s Commandant, ourteenth Naval · 

District, directs and dep rt on or about twelve 

December tor MID1AY via JOHNSTO!l, thence to designe.t d 

rendezvous with Task Force Twelv~. On arrival .. IDWAY 

discharge c rgo nd personnel and embark other per onnel 

e. a directed by Oonime.nd1ng O!'.ficer Naval J~ir Station 

g1v1ng orecedenee to wounded. Upon being released by 

Commander ~ask ~orce l!Y!elve r .eturn to PEARL 

(d) Taslt Group 12 ~ load suoh per onnel and supplies for 

PAI.rMYRA. s Commandant, Fourteen.th Ne.v l District, directs 

and depart on tw lve December .far PA!JAtYI A. On arrive. 

' discharge cargo and personnel and embark other per onn 1 

as directed by Cmmnanding 0££1e r Na~ 1 Air Station. 

43 
Alo-3/(16) 

ri l 

,qpera tiop 01 d p 

ro. 

Upon completion return to ~RL. 

(x) Upon departing outlyint~ baees report to Commander-in• 

Chi f nd Commandant, Fourteenth aval Di trict, expeoi d 

tim o arr1 val at P ARL. v·ihen four hour w y report 

ex ct time ot expected entrance~ 

4. Co11U11andant, :Fourteenth Navel D.istr1ct, is :reque ted, by 

copy of this order to t ke neces ary st ps s to loading 

the outgoing vessel , and to 1asue necesa ry 1nstru.ctiona 

regarding personnel to be evacuated. 

5. Oomraunica tiona normal •. 

Maintain radio s11ence enroute except for enemy contact 

or uatter or extrem urgency, 

U e Gr enwich Civil Tin1e. 

(Normal) 

H. E. KDmEL, Admiral, u.s. Navy, Commander~1n-Ohisf, u.s. Paoit1c Fl et. 

.. '-

44 
RUNt;ING SUI:IMARY OF' SITUATION (Cont 1 d) 

December 11. 

Task Force Twelve (LEXINGTON Group) continuep its attempts 

to fuel during this day - stil about 230 miles to the southwestward of Oahu. 

Task Porce Ei.:::;ht remained to the northward. 

SA.RATOGA continued en route to Pearl, and MINNEAPOLIS and 

4 DD were sent to form her escort. 

Two submarines started for patrol off the Japanese Homeland; 

one more following on the 12th. 

The Secretary of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor. 

Plans for the reenforcement of Wakt. were still under consideration but not yet crystallized. 

For despatches received on lOth and 11th see attached summary. 

No significant information of the ~nemy was received except 

that his activity in the Gilberts was verified. The landing at 

Tarawa had apparently been for demolition only. 

The LAHAINA was shelled and sunk by a submarine about 700 

miles northeast of Oahu. 

December 12. 

The Secretary of the Havy departed for the 1

Nest Coast. 

Task Force Twelve was still unable to fuel at sea and it 

was decided to brine the LEXINGTO ... - group into Pearl Harbor to 

accomplish this. 

It was intended to use this group in connection with the 

reenforcement of '.Vake, and to have the approaching SARATOGA fly 

off a squadron of Marine fighters which she was transporting , 

and send them to Wake on the LEXINGTON. 

Task Force Eight remained to the northward. 

The SARATOGA was being delayed by the effect of rough weather 

on her escort of three 1200-ton destroyers. 

No imp o rtant despatches were received. 

-5-

45 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

There had been several reports during the preceding few days 

of enemy aircraft on the West Coast. These were never verified. 

Enemy submarines have been operating in Hawaiian Area since 

the 7th, one having sunk the CYNTHIA OLSOJ . miles to the e astward early on that day. Few attacks had been made on combatant 

ships and none had been successful . 

Wak e was continuing to be bombed almost daily . 

December 13. 

Task Force Twelve entered Pearl. It was decided to send it to 

raid Jaluit , (See Operation Order 40-41 of 13 December) changing its 

designation to Task Force Eleven. 

At t he same time it was decided to !orm Task Force Fourteen 

with SARATOGA and send it to cover a reenforcenent of ....;rake. The 

loading of the TANJIER for this purpose was commenced. 

The arrival of the SARATOGA was still further delayed by 

weather. 

Task Force Eight remained north of Oahu. 

I t was besinning to be even more evident that carriers would 

not b e r eadily available for transporting aircraft, and CinCPac's 

13 2101 (following) was sent. Opnav's reply 140237 is also shown. 

Land offensives of the enemy in the Far East were progressing 

unfavorably for us. 

December· 14. 

Task Fo~ce Eleven departe for Jaluit operation, after which 

the SARATOGA entered Pearl. 

Preparations for t~e reenforce~ent of '%1e proceeded and 

Operation Order No. 39-41 for Task Force Fourteen , covering this 

operation was in preparation. fo personnel reenforcements except replacements ·were being sent to Vake, but ammunition , radar 

and many other su·)plies were loaded on the TANGIER, including 

the ground crew and equipment of VMF-221. She was also to take 

off about two-thirds of the 1500 civilian employees from Wake. 

The SARATOGA was to transport the planes of the VMF squadron. 

-6- . . 

46 
RUNNING SUiviWili.RY OF SITUATION ( Cont' d) 

Task Force Eight --on tinued operating to the northward. 

Convoys were bring organized betweFn the West Coast and 

Hawaii, the first westbound being due to sail on the 17th. 

RE)ceived Opnav's 142346 (following) which s1..1.ggested a 

large reenforcewent for Samoa. 

No significant information of the enemy was received, 

except that the Hoegh (Norwegian ship of which no information 

had been received) was sunk 29 miles northeast of Oahu at about 

0300. No submarine or torpedo was sighted. 

December 15. 

Operation Order 39-41 was issued. 

The TANGIER and oiler of Task Force Fourteen sailed - remainder of force delayed until the next day because of the time necessary 

to fuel SARATOGA. 

Task Force Eight was returning to Pearl. 

CinCPac in 152302 reported to Opnav concerninG the Wake 

and Jaluit expeditions. Opnav replied nconcur heartily" (See 

following Opnav 160050). 

Johnston Island was shelled by light surface forces just 

after dark this date, and Kahului, Maui, was shelled by a 

submarine. Wake continued to receive almost daily bombings 

from two-enzine bombers and four-engine seaplanes. 

On this date the Secretary of the Navy announced a considerable percentage of the losses which had been suffered on the 7th - ARIZONA -lost, OKLAHOMA capsized, UTAH, OGLALA, three destroyers 

wrecked, and other ships damaged. 

December 16. 

~emainder of Task Force Fourteen departed, ~nd Task Force 

Eight entered. Task Force Eleven still proceeding toward Jaluit. 

Both Task Force Eleven and .Fourteen planned to fuel at sea before 

beginning active operations. 

LOUISVILLE and her convoy arrived from Australia. 

Some reenforcement of B-17's had been received by this time. 

Three la~ge Matson boats with supplies and reenforcements sailed 

from San Francisco th1s date under escort. 

47 
DEC. GCT. 

10 2033 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Second Marine Defense Battalion leaves Parris Island via 

train about 12-14 December for San Diego your command. 

CNO believes best statione~ Samoa~ however, can be 

stationed in Hawaii. 

10 2209 OPNAV TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS AND 

COAST FRONTIERS 

Desire assist Army aircraft warning service by providing 

suitable small vessels stationed 50 or more miles off 

shore to report approaching enemy aircraft and enemy 

surface craft and submarines. Such vessels to be equipped with radio for transmitting voice or telegraph as 

required for reception by Army warning net ashore. Crews 

to be fur~ished by Navy personnel if available otherwise 

by undoubtedly loyal civilians. Action addressees acquire 

or charter by usual procedure adequate number available 

vessels for this service in addition to those already 

being acquired under 1~L 46 if Naval and Coast Guard 

craft are insufficient in numbers. Naval Coastal Frontier 

Force Commanders will give highest priority to cooperation 

with Army Air F'orce Commanders for this purpose. 

11 1451 SECNAV TO ALNAV 

EXECUTE WPL 46 AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY IN ADDITION TO 

JAPAN NAVAL ATTACHES ADVISE NAVAL AUTHORITIES 

13 2101 CINCPAC TO OPNAV INFO C-OMAIRBATFOR 

!.fuen will carrier be needed ~"lest Coast for transportation 

Army pursuit planes here X_Same question regarding Marine 

A:ircraft ;;ing 1 with composition this wing. 

14 0237 OPNAV TO CINCPAC INFO PACFLT 

Your 132101 Marine Aircraft 1

fing 1 should reach San Diego 

by Friday 19th X Consists of 5 squadrons with approximately 37 

F4F-3's, 23 SB2U-3 1 s, 19 SBD-l's and 11 SBD-4's X 30 Army 

pilots and 69 P-40 airplanes should rea8h San Diego by 

Tuesday 16 Dec X Army planes now in crates X Army authorities have been informed that it might not be possible to accon~odate all their planes available in 1 carrier 

48 
·RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

YORKTOWN and four DD are due about 29 December at San Diego from the Atlantic. 

Estimates of enemy distribution of forces were received 

from Opnav, Com 16 and the British. All were in agreement that 

the main strength of BBs and CVs were unlocated. Their most 

probable location was in the Saipan-Bonin area. 

-8- 49 
DEC. GCT .. 

14 2346 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO MY 091812 CNO ESTI~~TES JAPANESE 

INTENTION ULTIMATELY TO CAPTURE ALL OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC 

ISLANDS. IF THIS VI~M IS CORRECT, THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING 

SAMOA AND PALMYRA IS APPARENT. 

OWING TO THE DISTANCE OF SPJ:tOA FROM HAWAII, THE GARRISON 

OUGHT TO BE IN SUCH STRENGTH AS TO BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT AGAIN3T 

A CONSIDERABLE F.FFORT UNTIL YOU CAN TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE 

ATTACKING FORCES. AT PRESENT THE JAPANESE EFPORT IN THAT 

DIRECTION SEEMS TO BE MINOR AND TO CONSIST OF A F~N 

CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, SUBMARINES, AIRCRAFT AND TROOPS. 

WITH DUE REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN rrHE NORTH PACIFIC, CNO 

PROPOSES FOLLOWING PLAN:- TRANSFER SECOND NlARINE DEFENSE 

BATTALION AND .E:IGHTH IlARINE REGIMENT REINFORCED TO 3700 

MEN TO SAJ.,I[OA i TITH SUPPLIES FOR 3 MONTHS BUILDING UP TO 

6 MONTHS. YORKTOV'lN AND 4 DD WILL LEAVE NORFOLK DECEMBER 

17, PROPOSE TO ATTACH CRUDIV THREE AT PANAMA, PROCEED 

SAN DIEGO TEENCE DIRECT TO SAMOA WITH TROOP CONVOY. 

IT ~NOULD ALSO BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE STATION 1 MARINE VF? 

AND ONE VBS SQUADRON IN SAMOA IF YOU CAN SPARE. THEI\_. 

CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION AND SMALL 

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE. 

ULTI}~TELY CRUDIV 3 WILL RETURN PANAMA. 

ALSO SUGGEST ADDITION OF SMAIL INFANTRY DE'rACHMENT TO 

PALMYRA • REQUEST YOUR EARLY CONSIDERATION AND ADVICE. 

15 2149 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

YOU ARE AUTFORIZED AT YOUR DISCRETION TO REINFORCE WAKE 

AND MIDWAY, TO RESTOCK THEM WITH AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES 

AND TO REMOVE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. 

15 2301 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Wake must be:- One, supplied with ammunition and reinforced 

with fighter planes; 

Two, evacuated or; 

Three, abandon the garrison and defense workers totaling about 1400 men. To unload ammunition and stores and embark a portion of defense workers will take at least· 2 days~ Embarking all personnel for evacuation should be 

accomplished in less than 1 day.. T7i th unfavorable wea. ther 

these times will be indefinltely increased. Ammunition 

50 
DEC. GCT. 

15 2301 that can be supplied will be sufficient for about 1 month 

at present rate of expenditure. Have planned to reinforce 

Wake and evacuate about 700 defense workers and am despatch- ing 1 CV 3 CA and a DD squadron escorting Tangier with 

ammunition and supplies departing today. Also plan a diversiona.l attack on Eastern Marshalls with 1 CV- 3 CA and a 

squadron of destroyers who sailed yesterday. 

16 0050 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

OPERATIONS REPORTED IN YOUR 152302 ARE HEARTILY CONCURRED 

IN. 

16 1900 OPNAV TO CONTINENTAL NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS. INFO: CINCPAC 

CINCLANT 

In Coastal Frontiers of continental United States operate under category of defense Cast instead of Baker. Chief 

of Staff, USA will issue similar orders to Army. 

16 2200 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

AT YOuri CONVENIENCE REQUEST YOUR ESTIMATE AS TO DATE ON 

WHICH AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER FROM YOUR FLEET MAY BE AVAILABLE SAN DIEGO TRANSPORTING ASSEMBLED MARINE AND ARMY 

AIRCRAFT FROM SAN DIFGO TO HAWAIIAN AREA AND NUMBER OF 

HER 0\VN AIRCRAFT TO BE RETAI1~D FOR DEFENSE ENROUTE. 

YOUR 132101.· FOR YOUR INFORJ\ffATION USS KITTYHAVVK AND 

HAMMONDSPORT CONVERTED SEA TRAINS WILL ARRIVE SAN DIEGO 

ABOUT 1 JANUARY TO LOAD ASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT FOR HAWAII 

OR FOR DELIVERY FAR EAST VIA AUSTRALIA IN ACCORDANCE 

FOR ~ECISION TO BE MADE LATER. THESE SHIPS CAN EACH 

CARRY EITHER ABOUT 48 PURSUIT AIRPLANES ASSEMBLED OR 

ABOUT 100 CRATED. 

51 
In reply address 

The District Public Works Officer 

Pearl Harbor, T. H ., 

and refer to No. 

-Al-l/ G53/ND1 4 CR,o. l·.i_.~.:_Ef ( 01377) 

~ , ........ ' 0 

FOURTEENTH 

PUBLIC WORKS 

NAVAL 

OFFICE 

DISTR( 

~ 

\.)"'

~ 

-

Y

A."' \~ 

PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U.S. A. ============:=:----:: 

16 December 1941 --

:.-tJ_ Ol'AliDUH TO: Captain • • C. Davis, Staf~', CIITClAC 

SulJject: Tafuna Airport, Sanoa 

1 . Confirminc; Lt. Comdr. L. J. 7fatson' s statements to you, the 

completior: of the first ru:nway at 1'afuna to 500 ft. by 3000 ft. is not 

.:ossible before 1 March with the equipment now there , and hovr much tine 

after 1 11

.Arc..-· will be required remains to be determined. An esti::n.ate is 

c:;::-pect.ec3. frolL Saiiloa u::_Jcl.,in e_ day or two (in response to our request) . 

2. The estimate will be based on equipnent now on the job 

plus the assmnption that the job may be assured that continuous operation 

will not tJe int errupted because of lack of commercial gc.soline, diesel 

oil and provisions. It is ostiwated that the present gasoline su:pply will 

last only to 1 January and that the diesel oil su_)ply will last until· 

about 1 February, after vinich respective datos the re quirements will be 

25 fifty c;allon drums of gasoline and 15 fifty ::;o.llon drums of diesel cil 

per day. .2rovisio:::_s for Contractors' personLel (about 120 =:Iainlanders 

and 1300 Sa11oans) have "Jeen made available principally throuc;h the :·Taval 

Station. It is presumed that the Governor-Cormnandant is infomin£: the 

1ia~;cy of all provision requirements. 

3 . 'rhe date of "usable completion" o:£' this runv.ray INas ci ven 

as ~ . ..arch 194=2 before the present emert:;ency. This da~ce was predicated U)Oll 

the then scheduled arrival in Sar1oa of certa::..n very important eql.lip-!::!ent 

that is now held U) at San "'t'rancisco Bay ?Oints. 

4. The new tank farm (h~Vo 55,000 bbl. fuel oil tanks, ·bHo 10, 000 

bbl. diesel oil tanks and ·b.nro 2, 500 bbl. gasoline tanks) will be ready to re -

ceive a tanker 2S Decem"}er if the tanker takes vri th it certe.in fittings and 

hoc:oe of vr.1ich Comtrainron 8 has been informed • 

.;3RUlT' 

Officer-in-Charge 

C ontrnct =~oy 4173 

52 
SEC BE~ 

Reference: Opnav 142346 re Samoa. 

1. Proposes 2nd Def. Bn. plus 8th Marine Regiment 

reinforced to 3700 men be sent Samoa. 

2. If 2nd Def. Bn. is full strength, it would have 

about 900 men with: 

6 - 5u or 155 mm. 

12 - 3" 

30 - .50 cal AA mgs. 

30 - .30 cal mgs. 

6 - Searchlights. 

1 - SCR 270 (radar) 

3 - SCR 268 (radar) 

3. The composition of the 8th Regiment reinforced to 

3700 is not s~ted but is assumed to be approximately as follows: 

8th Regiment (Infantry) Artillery Battalion 

Medical 

Service and Transport 

Tank Company 

Special Weapons (AA, AB, AT) 

Signal 

Headquarters 

2.324 

577 

150 

170 

146 

155 

113 

65 

3700 

NOTE: Engineers may be substituted for 

Tanks and/or special weapons. 

4. There is now in Samoa: 

4 - 6" Naval guns. 

·6 - 3" AA naval guns without director. 

12 - .50 cal AA mgs. 

12 .30 cal mgs. 

427 - Personnel. 

500- Native -reserves- authorized but not completely formed 

ri'his has alwa·ys been considered only a defense 

against raids. 

-1-

53 
iiiCiUiHi' 

5. Comdt. Samoa has recommended increased defenses 

and the ROinC based estimates on an assumed defense scheme. 

Major Pefley made a study of the def~es on the ground. I 

have been preparing a study of defense requirements based on a 

Category "C" (minor attack) and Category "D" (may be subjected 

to major attack). All earlier studies were considered and also 

the landing field construction and the increased strategic 

importance of Samoa. My studies indicated need for the following: 

Present Category "Du Increase Required 

Seacoast Defense: 

sn, 6" or 7" 

Antiaircraft: 

3" 

37 mm. AA: 

.50 cal. AA: 

4 8 

6 (Navy 22 

fixed) 

8 

16 (4 Navy) 56 

4 

16 (Army) 

8 (1) 

40 (1) 

NOTE 1: 37 mm. AA fire units (2 guns) may be substituted for 

about 50% of the .50 cal AA fire units and figures 

given adjusted accordingly. 

Beach and Ground Defense Forces: 

6. The need for infantry on this relatively large island 

has always been realized. For a category "ctt defense, one infantry 

battalion was desired. The study in progress had made no estimate 

or the infantry force for a category D defense. However, in view 

of the size of the island, the g reat p ossibility of attack as set 

forth b y Op na v, and the need for its landing field, I am of t he 

54 
S?GRF[JL 

opinion that a reinforced regiment is not too large a mobilized 

defense force for the situation contemplated • 

.... 7. In summary, it may be stated that there is quite 

est- i.w•Q t- c.-d 

close agreement between the forces independently et~~ed 

here as necessary for the defense of Samoa and wr~t Opnav now 

offers. Concurrence with Opnav plan as to sending 2d Defense 

t 5 Battalion and 8th RP.giment to Samoa11 indicated, insofar as 

strength is concerned. This plan must, however, be tested 

for logistics. 

(a) Tonnage for the initial movement will be 

provided by Opnav and is of no concern in this estimate. From 

experience in the Hawaiian area, about 300 tons of fuel, 

gasoline, clothing, food, and automatic supplies is required 

to maintain one defense battalion for one month. ~nunition 

is in addition, but replenishment depends upon expenditures. 

0~ the basis of the foregoing, the average tonnage required 

monthly by the 2d Defense Battalion, the 8th Regiment, and the ..... 

present defense force will be not less than 1800 tons exclusive 

of ammunition. An averag e of 200 tons a month would be re ouired 

~or this. On the basis of maintaining a 6 months supply, but 

never falling below 3 months, one 6000 ton shipment would be 

required every three months by the Marines. 

(b) The support of the Marines, b owever, is not 

the only shipping item for Samoa. There is the naval station, 

naval air station, the maintenance of an adequate level of fuel 

oil, diesel, and gasoline, and food for the natives who, with 55 

3 
increased income, are becoming ever more dependent on imported 

food. Some shipping will have to visit Samoa for maintaining 

the foregoing, if we retain it. There will have to be tankers, 

cargo ships, and refrigerated space used for Samoa, regardless 

of the increased defense force. The .question of escort will 

arise whe:Jhher or not the defenses are increased as contemplated, 

and, therefore, is not particularly involved in the inc~ease. 

·~ In view of all the foregoing, I believe the increased logistic ~ 

demands of the larger defense force are not a controlling 

factor in the decision as to whether they should be sent to 

Samoa. It is a question of capacity of ships used in this 

service, rather than the number of ships, sailings, or escorts. 

For these reasons, if we want to hold Samoa, the shipping and 

escort demands for the increased force may be rejected as a 

con~rolling factor as to the feasibility of Opnav's plan. 

(c) Housing will be a serious problem. The present 

defense forces have liVed in tents for almost a year but will 

shortly move into barracks. The 2d Defense Battalion and the 

8th Regiment will have to live in tents for a considerable time. 

Much clear int; of ground will have to be done to find a sui table 

camp site for the infantry. If arable patches are used, it may 

reduce island food supply. The dispersion of troops of the 

defense battalion to be near their batteries and positions will 

be necessary. There is only 1,000,000 feet of contractor's 

W;ovld b( lumber on the island,---n:o:t sufficient for required tent decks. 

All this could be eventually taken care of, if ships,material 

and time were available. There will b e many dif ficulties in 

56 
· 

housing but they are not insu perable and troops can live 

\ under field conditions for an extended period. 

(d) There is abundant water in Samoa, the chief 

problem being to get it to the place where needed. Suggested 

that about 10,000' of 3" or 4n pipe be talcen along for this 

purpose. 

(e) The terrain is rugged, heavily wooded in 

places, and roads and trails are few and generally poor. 

Motor transportation is limited largely to the south coast. ' 

The emplacement of coast defense batteries is an engineering 

problem of no mean proportions. About 3 - 50 horsepower 

gasoline or diesel double drum hoists, shears, and cables 

for 

\._ 

skidways used in hoisting heavy equipment should be 

provided. 

long time. 

The emplacement of some gun batteries would require a 

(f) The capacity of Pago PRg o harbor is insufficlent to accomr1odate the convoy - at least 4 transports, an oiler 

and 1 or 2 cargo ships and probably an escort of cruisers, 

one carrier and 4 destroyers. Seven cruiser type vessels can 

be acconmodated in the harbor but one must anchor between the 

points at the entrance almost in the open sea where it would 

be subjected ~o torpedo and gunfire attack. 

(g) There is one pier in Page Pago. Unloading 

by one vessel can be done over this pier but simultaneous loading 

would have to be done by ships' boats. With the pier occupied 

by one ve ssel, the land ing of troops and supplies fron other 

vessels cou ld ha rdl y be accomplished over the same pier. The 

-. ~ 57 ' "'"""' / · 
removal of troops and equipment from the harbor area to clear 

it for landing other troops would present a further problem. 

The conclusion as to unloading i~ that it would require an 

extended period during which vessels would be exposed to l 

torpedo attack and require the constant presence and vigilance 

of the escort vessels. 

AIRCRAFT: 

8. Opnav considers it would be highly desirable to 

station 1 VMB,ron and 1 VMSBron in Samoa, if they can be 

spared. A~ present there is only 1 VMSBron available at Pe~l 

and due to go to Midway on 1? Dec. The 1st Marairwing is now 

at San Diego awaiting ~ransfer to Pearl. It consists of 37 VF, 

and 53 VSB. On January 1, 1942 it will have 7 additional VF. 

In my opinion, immediate con~itments for this wing should be 

as follows: Wake: some VF and 1 VSBron; Midway: some VF. 

Johnston and Palmyra should have aircraft but their fields 

are not ready. I~ view of the foeegoing, 18 VF and 18 VSB 

are available for Samoa. 

9. The readiness of the landing field at Samoa, is, 

however, the controlling factor. In this connection, see 

the attached memorandum of the District Public Works Officer. 

March 1st appears to be the earliest date on which land planes 

ca.n be supported in Samoa, and landplanes require no further 

consideration here. It is recommended, however, that 1 squadron 

of VSO seaplanes be sent to Samoa until landplanes can be used. 
Sr'GiUi\iJ 

on 

The possibility as to fuel shows that the capaci}y 

~-~c1. Dec. 28 will be 110,000 bbls fuel oil, 20,000 bbl ~oil, 

10. 

and 5000 bbls gasoline. The tanks should be filled at the 

earliest opportunity. 

11. The chief delay in preparing the landing field is 

equipment that was awaiting shipment from San Francisco in the 

Hawaiian Merchant. No knowledge of this vessel's movements 

are knovm locally, but it has a speed of about 16.5 knots. 

It should proceed Samoa immediately with needed equipment or 

accompany the contemplated convoy, if early use of the landing 

field is to be obtained. 

STRATEGIC FEATURES: 

12. 0 nav estimates it to be Japanese intention ~ 

ultimately to capture all of the South Pacific Islands; that, 

owing to the distance of Samoa from Hawaii tl1e garrison ought 

to be in such strength as to be able to hold out against a 

considerable effort until Cincpac can take action against the 

attacking forces; and that at present the Japanese effort in 

that direction seen1s to be minor and consists of a few cruisers, 

destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. There is complete agreement with the foregoing estimate. ~1e most important questions 

in connection therewith is how much strength Japan can bring 

a gainst Samoa, and when. Our problem is to get sufficient 

forces at Samoa in time to defeat Japanese efforts a gainst it. 

13. The gen eral strategic situation in the Pacific is 

7 --~-----

59 
that Japan is making a major effort in Malaya. Her crying 

need is oil which she hopes to get in Borneo, rather than 

Burma. If Japan is successful in Malaya, it appears that her 

next major effort will be in Borneo. Some time must elapse 

before she can exert this major effort in Borneo with the 

same sea, land, and air forces, because some consolidation 

of gains and reorganization of forces would be necessary in 

Malaya. There is, however, the possibility that Japan already 

has forces available for a major effort in Borneo and that such 

effort may begin before Malaya is completely subdued. The 

Japanese are meticulous planners and organizers and will 

undertake no major effort until they are completely ready. 

14. I~itial success of Japan has been due to surprise, 

efficient execution of a preconceived plan, and unexpected 

damage, at least by us, to allied major sea forces. The 

weakness of the Japanese plan is her widely spread forces which, 

if they are unsuccessful in their first thrust, are without 

.~.. 

reserves to continue the effort. Information, which we have 

no reason to doubt, indicates they contemplated the seizure 

of Wake. The loss of a CL and a DD resulted in withdrawal. 

Success, on the other hand, was easy in the Gilberts. The 

foDegoing analysis applies particularly to the availability 

for landings. The greater flexibility and mobility of naval 

and air forces permits a rapid change in their theater of action. 

15. Although it is believed that Japan will execute 

.,_y< < r ' 

any new Major effort in Borneo or in that area, she is undoubtedly 

~ c; 60 

() 
iiiCRisi 

capable now of exerting minor efforts in other areas. It is 

entirely feasible that she can furnish several thousand troops, 

and transports for one or more of such expeditions. The 

furnishing of adequate air and naval support at great distance 

from present bas&s is not so feasible, as long as the Asiatic 

occupation continues. It is hardly probable that modern 

cruisers, battleships, and large carriers will be risked in 

a minor operation far from present bases, which will require 

their exposure during a period of days while a landing against 

opposition is being made. 

16. The immediate situation in the Samoa area is 

that the Japanese have established air operations from Makin. 

This move appears to have been more for the immediate purpose 1 -r :· 

():..._ v-v-- of covering the southern flank of the Marshalls rather than ~ 

for gaining a takeoff for continued advance to~ard Samoa. ,... ... .... ~ 

_ vidence.yf..~-this ·s the ~cc~pation ._ a~~ s s~~~en~ ,eva~u~t~?n o~ 1 Ol.lt ,J, J-au/(., ~f'""/Y'i-"\~{ '-"If"\,...,_ v-r"'tt~.;t,,A: (.' ..... t ···4' ~ tf"[;K_ c(A....... t;.~..- . ~ 1 .v ~~ .!(lA XaPinar~. H0 wever, from the Marshalls, Jaluit, it is 17!0 miles I 

to Samoa and from Hawaii to Samoa it is 2276 miles. 

17. rf view of the foregoing, it is indicated that 

Japan will not make a major attack a gainst Samoa~ our 

airfield is completed there. Such an attack would be maqe in 

the near future only if forces based on Samoa or if facilities 

there jeopardized Japanese ope .r·a tions in another more important 

area. A bombardment raid is entirely possible at any time but 

infantry can not combat such attack. 

18. O~e f u rther c onsideration should b e mentioned. 

C-i/ 

I' 

"'~ 

61 
The defensive strength of Samoa against landing attack lies 

in surf conditions on the windward (south) side and the 

fact that the rugged terrain and vegetation prevents advance 

froM the north (most favorable for landing) to the vital area, 

except for a fev; preciptous trails. The use of mechanized 

equipment by the attacker after gaining a beachhead is improbable. And, lastly, the Japanese have always avoided 

landing against a defended point, if this was at all possible. 

There is no maneuver space on shore for either attacker or 

defender. The strength of the defender lies in the defiles 

(beaches and trails) which will prevent extension of the front 

and furnish a contientrated target. 

]_9. af the, conclusions of this estimate are accepted, 

it is recommended that the following despatch be sent to Opnav: 

"YOUR 142316 THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OPNAVS ESTIMATE 

RE SAMOA AND THAT REENFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY X LANDING FIELD 

WILL NOT BE USABLE PHIOR TO MARCH FIRST AND THEN ONLY IF VI'rALLY 

ESSENTIAL CONSTH~9jiON EG~UIPMENT SCHEDULED TO DEPART SANFRANCISCO 

. · /vffKCt! ttflr 

IN HAWAIIAN fi.i'I<I'fER ARRIVES WITHOUT I?URTHER DELAY X AIRCRAFT 

CAN BE SPARED ~,OR SAMOA WHEN FIELD IS READY X OONBIDHH Mi\iJi&R 

HARBOR INADEQUATE FOR CONVOY AND ESCORT CON'fEMPIA TED A1TD WILL . EXPOSE AHD DELAY VESSELS X UNLOADING PROTECTION STOHES HOUSING 

:b.,OR COMPTE TE DEF,ENSE BAT ALION AND REINFORCED REGIMgN'r PRESENTS 

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM BUT THIS CAN BE SOLVED X LIMITED AREA 

AVAILABLE F1

0R CAMP AND POSSIBLE CLEARING NECESSARY 

TO ACCOMr·10DATE ENTIRl~ PORCE AT ONE TIME X RECOMMEND SECOND 6 2 

/ C) 
'i:i0Hl3T 

q,'/ 

I 

c£..2 t- ' £;.::. -4 ~.r"'t~ .. .. ~.P" ~ .... "'::!' ... _.,.,~ .. ~ ~ 1.. f!l*' 't. ... ? DEFEN~~ D~TTj\L;tO _COMMA ON~ . BATTALI?lL INPA~·JT ! Y REINFOHCED WITH 

~(}1\'T''· W'tf.lt¥~H:IS!\B~_ SENT SAMOA NOW X REMAI DER ft~INFORCED 

IN~AUTRY REGIMENT SHOULD BE HELD SANDIEGO OR SENT ~IAWAII FOR 

TRANSPOR'rATION SAMOA Vv!f8N LANDING FIELD IS COMPIE TED X CONSIDER 

EXECUTION PLAN RECOMMENDED WILL FUHNISH ADEQUATE IMMEDIATE 

DEF NSE AND ESTABLISillviENT OF DEF' ~NSES BY INCREMENTS WILL 

SIMPLIFY LOCAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT UNDULY INCHEASING ESCORrr 

REQ.UIREMENTS X EXPECT OPNAV TO FURNISH TRANSPORTATION FOR 

INITIAL MOVEMENrr X REINFORCEMENT BOTH JOHNSTON AND PALMYRA 

UNDER CONSIDERATION X ADVISE X 

S ..e.e.. l..-2-0301 of· ece ~h -ev 

ct r ·t 1..i t· ! I y :: t? ~~ t~·, 

/I 63 
SAMOA REENFORCEMENT @ 

I. SITUATION 

1. See attached study by 86 which gives details of 

Samoan reenforcement suggested in Opnav despatch 142346. This 

same despatch contemplates: 

(a) Sending the total of about 4600 men and their 

equipment in one convoy direct from San Diego to Samoa. Three 

months' supplies to accompany; six months' supplies to be 

built up. · 

(b) Composing the escort of the YORKTOWN, 4 DD and 

Crudiv 3 - all reenforcements to this fleet, due at San Diego 

about 29 December. 

(c) CNO endeavoring to provide transportation for 

the troops and equipment. 

(d) Possibly stationing 1 VW& and 1 V~BS Squadron 

at Samoa. 

Since Opnav's despatch H.Q. Marine Corps has organized the above forces (including defense battalions) into the 

2nd Marine Brigade ready to sail in early January (202103). 

2. Although it has not been transmitted to Opnav, our 

tentative decision (see attached study) is: 

(a) To send, initially, only the Second Defense 

Battalion and one battalion of infantry reenfore~d by anti-boat 

weapons. 

(b) To hold remainder of Eighth Regiment at San Diego 

(or Hawaii) until the landing field at Samoa is completed (1 

March or later). 

(c) To transfer one VMFron and one VMSBron to Samoa 

when the airfield is ready. 

3. (a) Second Marine Battalion reported for duty on 20 

December (47 offjcers, 814 men plus 84 men required for Samoa). 

(b) Battalion Col11l:11ancler will inform very shortly 

as to needs for cargo space. 

(c) First Marine Air Win g will be assembled at San 

Die2 o ( 37 VF , 53 VSB), about 21 December. 

- 1 - 84 ··. 
4. (a) Distances involved: 

Distance Days at Days at 

15 kts. 12 kt. 

Samoa - San Diego 4180 11.6 14.5 Pearl - San Diego 2280 6.3 7.9 Pearl - Samoa 2280 6.3 7.9 San Diego-Samoa-Pearl 6460 17.9 22.4 v 

Samoa - Makin Jt.Jc.fO 

Samoa - Jaluit J .. '/It. 

(b) War radii of ships involved: 

15 kts 12 kts 

YORKTOWN 14546 16623 

Crudiv 3 8120 9750 

Desron 2 5850 6550 

Average transport 10000 

(c) Number of cruiser or tmnsport berths at Page 

Page - 6 plus one in harbor entrance. This leaves one buoy for 

four destroyers. ·II'. · ; l !1 s r 'r 

(d) Net defenses - ~. That intended for Rabaul 

has been made available but is sti~l in San Francisco. 

(e) Mine field - Ordered by CNO to be laid in accordance with plan now laid out on chart. Will probably be laid by 

the time reenforcements reach there. Consists of two single 

lines of mines, giving some but very little protection inside 

the harbor and also some in areas outside where depths are 

about 40-45 fathoms. Mines are 100 yards apart. 

5. Other considerations: 

{a) Surface raiding activities of the Japanese 

apparently have so far been by the small cruisers and destroyers 

of the Fourth Fleet. Our OCL's are more than a match for them. 

(b) Only seaplanes can be based at present at Makin. 

6. Transports available. CNO has said that he will 

endeavor to furnish transportation. 86 estimates that four 

transports and 1 or 2 c a rgo ships will be necessary for the 

whole movement. For our initial reenforcement, two transports 

and one cargo ship should be sufficient. (Only one Basefor 

transport, HARRIS, is available and it 'arrives in Hawaii 23 

December). 

-2-

55 
7. Fuel. There is little hope of the fuel storage being ready and filled in time to be of assistance for this expedition. An oiler will therefore be necessary. It should he sent from 

the coast to either precede or accompany the convoy, depending 

on the speeds involved. Such employment of a fleet oiler will 

put even more strain on our fuel replenishment at Pearl. 

8. Discussion. 

Having reduced the size and consequent importance of the first convoy, we would be justified in not sending a 

carrier with the convoy, particularly as the YORKTO~~ is 

needed for ferrying aircraft to Hawaii and for offensive and 

defensive purposes in that area. If two OCL's and 4 destroyers 

are not considered sufficient for the reduced convoy, a heavy cruiser may be sent to join it at some such point as where it 

crosses the longitude of Pearl Harbor. The destroyers should 

not be reduced, as they will be particularly needed because of 

the lacl{ of submarine protection in Pago Pago Harbor. 

Rather than anchor the whole force in Pago Pago harbor 

at one time, it would be better to have the transports go to the 

dock one at a time, where they could unload and the oiler could 

fuel them simultaneously. The destroyers could first fuel at 

sea or in the harbor one at a time, while ~two remain with 

the convoy and one patrols the entrance. 

The cruiser aircraft should main·tain an inner air 

patrol over the entrance. 

Cruisers could be fueled at sea, or one at a time 

in the harbor. 

Covering. If we are going to raid the Marshalls 

in the near future, it would be well to time the raid with 

the approach of this convoy to Samoa. If no raid takes place, 

a covering movement of one of our task forces toward the 

Gilbert area should be made. 

66 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont 'd)_ 

December 17. 

No change in the situation as to major task forces. It 

was decided to send the WRIGHT to supply Midway and to partially evacuate civilians. The PORTER (Comdesron 5) was assigned as 

escort • . 

It was decided t9 send available submarines to observe in 

the Marshalls. 

Submarine patrol at Midway and Wake was reduced to one each. 

A study on the Samoan reenforcement was completed and is appended. 

Vice Admiral Pye relieved Admiral Kimmel of command of the 

Fleet this date. Admiral Nimitz will take command later. 

Enemy submarine activity was very light - still no successful attack on a combatant ship. (Only three attacks have been 

reported during the war) • 

. Radio intelligence connected Crudiv 8 and Cardiv 2 of the 

enemy fleet with Airon 24, of the Fourth (Mandate) Fleet. 

Received Opnav's 170115 giving appreciation of tasks of 

Pacific Fleet (See following). 

December 18. 

Army forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier were placed under the CinCPac this date under the principle of unit of 

command (Opnavs 2355 following). _ 

No change of operations for major Task Forces was initiated. 

COOLIDGE and SCOTT were being loaded with wounded and 

evacuees and will constitute the first convoy from Honolulu 

tomorrow (aside from the local A/S protection which has been 

consistently furnished). 

The enemy announced with considerable accuracy our losses 

on the 7th. 

Land offensives in the Far East continued to advance. 

However, most of our naval forces had cleared the Philippines safely. 

Enemy Cardiv 2 and Crudiv 8 continued to be associated with the Fourth Fleet in communications. Also Cardiv 5 was associated 

in one message with local defense units in the Eastern Marshalls. 

-9-

· .. ' 
RUNNING SUMMARY Oli' SITUATION ( Cont 'd) 

December 19. 

Task Forces Eleven and Seventeen proceeding as before. 

Task Force Eight sailed with orders to support Task Forces 

Eleven and Fourteen in accordance with Op. Order 42-41. WRIGHT 

and PORTER departed for Midway in accordance Op. Order 43-41. 

Received word that facilities at Cavite had been completely demolished. 

CinC in his 191037 {following) replied to Opnav's 170115. 

December 2Q. 

Orders for Task Forces Eleven, Fourteen and Eight were 

changed by CinC 1 s 210157 {See Vice Admiral Pye's Estimate and 

CinCPac 's 2.10147 following). The Substance was that the 

Jaluit raid was called off, Task Force Fourteen's area of 

operations was restricted, and Task Forces Eleven and Eight 

were assigned areas from which to support Task Force Fourteen. 

PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND and TENNESSEE departed for the 

West Coast where repairs are to be completed. 

Wake received a dive bombing attack from carrier planes this date. TRITON was recalled from there due to materiel 

trouble - leaving no submarine on patrol there. 

December 21. 

All forces proceeding as before. The Matson ship convoy arrived Honolulu. 

Wake received another raid from dive bombers as well as 

horizontal bombers. On one occasion previously the daily raid {about noon) was made by 41 two-engined bombers. 

Radio intelligence indicated little of a definite character except that the SORYU appeared to be in the general vicinity of Wake. 

Submarines appeared on the West Coast and sank two ships. 

A recommendation to Opnav was made to effect the Samoan 

reenforcement in two increments and employ the YORKTOvVN for a 

ferry trip to Hawaii (See CinCPac 220301 following) 

-10- 68 
RillJNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

December 22 

Wake's report of a landing attack arrived at 0520 (HST). 

Troops were reported on the island and several ships including 

destroyers and a transport were mentioned. Nothing was heard 

after 0830 (HST). The Commander-in-Chief decided to recall Task 

Force Fourteen which was due to arrive off Wake on the 23rd (HST). The considerations affecting this decision are appended. n~e 

Radio Intelligence report for the day previous linked Crudiv 8 

(2 CA), Cardiv Two (2 CV) and Batdiv 3 (2 BB). During the deliberations as to this move Opnav's despatch 221706 (appended) 

was received. The decision was reported to Opnav in CinCPac's 

222256 (also appmded). 

Task Forces Eleven and Fourteen were ordered to return to 

Pearl)and Task Force Eight to cover the WRIGHT at Midway. 

December 23 

Task Force 14 was ordered to send the TANGIER to Midway to 

land any of her supplies which might be required. Also the 

SARATOGA·will fly off VMF-221 to Midway. 

Opnav in 231546 commented upon CinCPac's 191037 regarding defenses at Hawaii. CinCPac replied in 240507. 

Johnston was shelled by a submarine on the night of 22nd and 

Palmyra this night. 

December 24 

Task forces proceeding as before. WRIGHT and PORTER arrived 

at Midway. 

Plans were made to send supplies and reenforcements to Johnston, 

Palmyra and Christmas Islands (Op. Order 45-41) and Palmyra and 

Christmas groups departed. 

Second convoy from the Coast arrived. 

PENSACOLA at Brisbane was ordered by Opnav to accompany her 

convoy to Torres Strait, then rejoin Fleet. BOISE was being retained 

in the Asiatic Fleet. 

Reports of continued activity of the enemy in the Gilberts was 

received. 

Leave and liberty over Christmas were cancelled. 

Enemy offensives in the Far East were still progressing. 

The Estimate of the Situation which follows was prepared by the War Plans Section. 

-11-
~l!JeJ IL T 

DEC. GCT. 

17 0115 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

CHANGE TASK OF SUB-PARAGRAPH DOG MY 090139 TO READ:-

ttRAID ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND FORCES" - IT BEING 

UNDERsrroOD THE WORD FORCES INCLUDES POSITIONS AND INSTALLATIONS OF ALL CHARACTER~ 

YOUR ESTIMATE OF SITUATION ACCORDS IN GENERAL WITH IDEAS 

OF CNO. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME FEATURES WHICH YOU ARE 

HEREBY REQUESTED CAREFULLY TO RECONSIDER: 

FIRST, KNOX IS NOT YET SATISFIED THAT HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ARE 

SAFE FROM CAPTURE. CNO CONSIDERS IT POSSIBLE FOR JAPANESE 

CARRIERS AGAIN TO DESTROY A LARGE PART OF THE SHORE BASED 

AIRCRAFT AND IF THIS OCCURS A SECOND TIME THEY CANNOT BE REP~ACED EXCEPT AFTER A LONG PERIOD. JAPANESE CARRIER 

STRENGTH IS SUCH THAT YOU CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT LANDINGS 

BY JAPANESE TROOPS ~~'VILL NOT BE MADE ON UNDEFENDED ISLANDS 

OF THE HAWAIIAN GROUP AND SEIZURE OF AIRFIELDS OR DESTRUCTION OF PLANES ARE STILL POSSIBLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE 

ENTIRE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS IS UNDER 

REVIEW BY THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS. CNO HAS RECOMMENDED STATIONING TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT ON ALL THE LARGER ISLANDS 

IN ORDER TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY AIR TO CREATE A LARGER 

BASE AREA .~1ITH MUTUALLY SELF SUPPORTING FORCES; 

SECOND, UNTIL OAHU DEFENSES ARE BUILT UP TO SATISFACTORY 

STATUS PEARL HARBOR SHOULD BE USED BY YOUR VESSELS ONLY 

FOR SHORT PERIODS A:t-;D 1.1\JHEN SUCH USE IS ESSENTIAL. NO 

REGULAR OVERHAULS SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR THE NAVY YARD 

BUT ALL ITS ACTIVITIES DEVOTED TO SUPPLY AND TO EMERGENCY 

REPAIR PURPOSES AND At.TERATIONS T H;l.T CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED 

QUICKLY. UPKEEP PERIODS SHOULD BE SHORTENED AND SHIPS 

KEPT AT SEA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE i~ITHOUT REGARD AT THIS 

TIME TO RELAXATION PERIODS FOR PERSONNEL. EVERY POSSIBLE 

MEANS SHOULD BE DEVISED AND EXECUTED WHICH ;."JILL C ONThiBUTE 

TO SECURITY AGAINST AIRCRAFT OR TORPEDO OR GUN ATTACK OF 

SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND SHORE FACILITIES; 

THIRD, THE l\f~RSHALL ISLAN::) BASES CONSTITUTE A CONTINUOUS 

THREAT TO YOUR FORCES AND SHIPPING TO HAWAII AND THE FAR 

EAST AS WELL AS THREAT TO WAKE AND· MIDWAY. CONSIDER THAT 

THESE JAPANESE BASES SHOULD BE RAIDED AND DESTROYED WHEN 

PRACTICABLE AND ill~DER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES NOT DNLY 

BECAUSE OF TfffiSE TlffiEATS BUT AS SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR WAKE 

AND MIDWAY AND FOR THE GREAT MORAL VALUE WHICH SUCCESSFUL 

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL HAVE FOR THE ARMY, NAVY AND 

PEOPLE OF Ul~ITED STATES AS YOU NOW PLAN. 

70 
DEC. GCT. 

17 0115 CNO RECOGNIZES NEED FOR UTMOST SECRECY BUT DESIRES TO 

(Cont'd) BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS WHEN 

PRACTICABLE; 

FOURTH, WHILE YOUR 'PROPOSED DEPLOYNffiNT IS CONSIDERED 

SOUND, CNO INVITES !. TTENTION TO THE DANGER OF EMPLOYING 

THE SAME TYPE OF DEPLOTivlliNT OR CONDUCTING OPERA~DNS 

ALONG FIXED LINES OVER EXTENDED PERIODS. IN THIS, AS 

IN ALL OTHER OPERATIONS, DECEPTION AND SURPRISE ARE 

ESSENTIAL; 

FIFTH, WHILE TRANS-PACIFIC SHIPPING TO AUSTRALIA AND 

BEYOND M-AY EVENTUALLY BE REDUCED IT '~JILL INCREASE OVER 

THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR 

ARMY AND NAVY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA AND LTTER 

(UPPER OR LOWER?) AUSTRALIA. 

IT ALSO MAY BECOME NECESSARY AT TIMES TO ESCORT SHIPPING 

BETWEEN. WEST COAST AND THE CANAL. 

DESIRE YOUR COMMENT AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION OF· FOREGOING. 

1? 0235 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE HEREBY PLACED TEMPORARILY UNDER 

CINCPAC FOR ESCORT OF YORKTO~JN ULTIMATELY !!+JILL RETURN TO 

PRESEIJT DUTY. CI1~CPAC ISSUE MOVEI'IIENT ORDER FROM CANAL 

ZONE WHERE CARRIER AND 4 DD EXPECTED ARRIVE ABOUT 21 

DECEMBER. COMPAN N C F AND COMPACSOU N C F COOPEfu'"TE 

WITH COLSEPACFOR IN ESCORT AN:.J COVER WITH PATROL PLANES 

AS PRACTICABLE WHILE VESSELS ARE IN RESPECTIVE COASTAL 

ZONES. THIS MOVEMENT MUST BE KEPT AS SECRET AS POSSIBLE. 

17 2355 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

IN SEPARATE DISPATCH TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN 

DEPARTMENT BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND THE CHIEF 

OF STAFF ALL ARMY FORCES IN THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER 

HAVE BEEN PLACED UNDER THE COMHAND OF THE COl\IMANDER IN 

CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC FLEET. OBTAIN FROM COMiviAN:GING GENERAL 

A CERTIFIED COPY OF DISPATCH REFERRED TO WITHOUT PARAPHRASE. 

693 17th WAR DEPARTMENT TO COMDG.GEN. HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

ALL AR~:: Y FORCES I N THE HAWAIIAN COASTL"lL FRONTIER ARE PLACED 

UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE OOlVIMANDER I N CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC 

FLEET, T.TNDER TRE PRI NCIPLE OF JJN I TY OF COMMAND AS PRESCRIBED 

I N CHAPTER TWO , PARAGRA PHS 9 ( b ) ( 2) and ( 10), JOINT ACTION 

OF THE ARTilY AND THE NAVY COMMA NINETEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY 

FI VE S~OP YOU WILL DELIVBR EXACT CO PY OF THI S IIESSAGE TO :'IMJ~NDEH IN CHI EF PACIFI C FL ~ET AND J DVISE V/AR DEPA:lTMENT 

· OF DATE AND IIOUH UUI TY OF COHMAND BECOI·1ES EFPECTIVE X 

STARK AHD 1ATISHA L 71 
DEC. GCT. 

21 0147 OINCPAC TO OPNAV 

In view disclosed weakness of Army defense Hawaiian Islands 

and reduced battleship strength consider maintenance of 

most of present fleet strength essential to insure defense 

of islands. Also in view indicated increased air activity 

Marshalls with assurance one and possibly two carrier groups 

and evidence of extensive offshore lookout and patrol now 

consider surprise attack improbable. I have reluctantly 

abandoned proposed carrier attack on Marshalls. Wake 

bombed by Carrier planes today. Operations relief of Wake 

continue but carrier not to approach closer than two 

hundred miles x Task Force previously assigned attack 

mission being moved to northward in support task force 

enroute vicinity Wake. 

22 1706 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Your 210147 and 152302 general considerations and recent 

developments emphasize that Wake is now and will continue 

to be a liability. You are authorized to evacuate Wake 

with appropriate demolition. Efforts to strengthen and 

hold Midway should continue. King concurs. 

22 2256 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Wake cannot be evacuated. It was under coordinated heavy 

bomber and carrier plane attack at 0210 GCT 22d. It is 

under landing attack today by several cruisers, destroyers 

and transports with possibility covering force in vicinity. 

Last report at 1952 GCT 22d is enemy on island, several 

ships plus transport moving in. Issue in doubt. Gallant 

defense Wake has been of utmost value but hereafter Wake 

is a liability. In view present extensive operations I 

am forced to conclude that risk of one task force to attack 

enemy vicinity of Wake is not justifiable. Have ordered 

retirement of two western task forces. Third task force 

has been ordered to cover Wright now enroute Midway. 

72 
oeEeHEI 

DEC. GCT CINCPAC TO OPNAV, infor Comdt Samoa, CG2JtTrainFor, 

BaseforSubOrdCom, CPSNCF. 

22 0301 Your 142346 CinC in general agreement your estimate 

reference Samoa and tha_t reenforcements are necessary. However, problem complicated by following factors:-

One, landing fi.eld wi~l not be usable prior March and 

then only if vitally essential construction equipment 

now scheduled depart San Francisco in Hawaiian Merchant 

arrives without delay and if operations not interrup~d by lack 

gasoline, diesel oil and provisions; 

Tno, current supply contractor's gasoline exhausted by 

one January and diesel b~ one Frebruary; 

Three, Navy quantities any petroleum products negligible and storage not complete; 

Four, tanker of which fleet critically short required fuel escort and Samoa shore establishement; 

Five, small harbor and lack of A/S protection limits 

size convoy that can be expeditiously handled without 

undue risk and delay; 

Six, protection stores and providing camp site and tent 

floors serious problem. 

In view foregoing recommend increase Samoan garrison by increments first increment to consist of second defense 

battalion and one battalion infantry reenforce with antitank platoon and enginneer company to sail San Diego when 

transportation mentioned your 142346 and one oiler also 

furnished by you is available. Remainder reenforced 

regiment should be held San Diego for later transportation. Local Defense vessels should accompany first increment if 

possible. 

If this plan adopted propose escort first increment Cruddive 3 and 2 DD of YORKTO~m group, leaving YORKTffiVN free 

for other employment. Will require early advice composition of convoy and estimated date of sailing. Sent separately 

To Samoa. Com-11 deliver for info to Comdg. Gen, Second 

Joint Training Force. Com-12 deliver to CombaseforSubCom. 
DEC. GCT. 

23 0145 OPNAV TO MULTIPLE ADDRESS 

~fuile Chief of Naval Operations assumes that events of 

December 7 have caused all naval forces to assume a 

state of readiness against surprise attack it should be 

noted that Japanese and German psychology make Sundays, 

Christmas and other holidays likely dates for attack. 

23 1546 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

REVI~~ OF YOUR 191037 IN CONSULTATION WITH ARMY AIR STAFF 

INDICATES DESIRABILITY RECONSIDERATION PROPOSED ACTION 

RELATIVE OUTLYING FIELDS AND AIRCRAFT STATUS AT NIGHT. 

VALUE OF DISPERSAL OF AIRCRAFT FOR REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY FITS IN WITH CREATION OF LARGER BASE AREA (3 OR 

MORE ISLANDS) WITH MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FOBCES AND 

INDICATES NEED TO RETAIN UTILIZE AND DEFEND OUTLYING 

FIELDS. VALTill OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT NIGHT IN GOOD 

''mATHER WARRNNTS RETENTION OF SOME IN ALERT STATUS 

THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. KING CONCURS. 

24 0507 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

No fields being made unusable that are suitable for 

regular Army Navy use except by temporary removable 

blocking and in some cases preparing to demolish by 

mines. Possible demolition by enemy bombs is being insured against. No demolition charges being placed until field is properly defended against sabotage. One 

squadron Army pursuit on alert during darkness but 

pursuit planes in air from one hour before s~mrise to sunset except when carrier and other important fleet units 

are in port is being reduced to conserve material. 

Add: tional radars have been installed and with more 

experienced personnel the efficiency has· been greatly 

increased. Daily search through 360 degrees by patrol 

planes to 700 miles and Army bombers to 800 miles. 

Your 231546. 

74 
Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

December ~ ~ 13 

,NAKE 

There are nearly 1500 people on ~!lake. 

By completel y destroying or abandoning everything 

on the island, including personal belongings, the personnel could be taken on the Tangier very rapidly. 

She would be crowded to an extreme degree, but I 

beieve it could be done. 

Now as to protecting her. 

She should not go until air protection is available. 

My conclusion then is that if 1

"lake is to be evacuated, 

and I strongly reconwend a g ainst that , then the promptest 

measure is to send 

TANGIER to J oln LF:XINGTON group, and have her and DD 

do the job while LEX planes cover the operation. 

C. H . McMorris. 

NOTE: SARATOGA force was one sent with the TANGIER 

75 
(A) (1) 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

Estimate by Admi r al Pye 

on 20 December. 

There is evidence of increasing air activity in 

Marshalls, both land based and carrier based. 

Intercepted traffic indicates increased activity in 

patrol operations in vicinity of Marshall Islands. 

Indications that s e aplanes are based at Taritari. 

Our positive information re situation in Marshall 

Islands is non-existent. 

(B) From the above it appears that the element of surprise 

in the attack of Task Force 11 will probably be missing in 

which case serious losses might be sustained without compensating damage to enemy. Such a loss would have a seriously 

depressing morale effect on the fleet and country and jeopardize the Hawaiian Islands. 

(C) That long delay in initiating the plan caused by the 

inability of the LEXINGTON to fuel has made it possible for 

the enemy to ~stimate the situation and to increase the defense of the Islands. This in itself is an advantage, as 

it has caused reduction in air strength in other areas. 

(0) Task Force 14 will be at its nearest point about 750 

miles from any enemy air base - such position is not dangerous 

• from air attack. There is a possibility that an enemy force 

may take the offensive against this force if its mission is 

suspected but such chance must be taken any time. 

(E) If Task Force 11 moves to the northward it will be in 

a positions to support Task Force 14. 

(F) Enemy carrier groups full of fuel will be able to 

overtake either of our Task Forces in long run to Pearl. 

We have no support other than Task Force 8. 

76 
eLCtd!l 

Estimate by Admiral Pye as to Action 

re enemy investing Wake - 0700 - December 22, 1941. 

1. Relief of Wake on present expedition now impossible. 

Tangier should be diverted to eastward. 

2. 

remain, 

Relief mission having been abandoned, only two ~ourses 

(a) To attack enemy forces in vicinity of ~ake; or 

(b) Withdraw all forces to eastward. 

3. The time of enemy attacks by carrier planes the last 

two days followed by landing operations today indicates enemy 

has estimated closely the time at which our reliefr expedition 

might arrive, and may if the general location of our carrier 

groups is estimated be waiting in force. 

4. There is a possibility of doing extensive damage to 

the enemy if the presence in the vicinity of our carrier groups is not suspected. 

5. Our naval forces have not yet been e .xposed to action. 

6. The danger to damaged ships at 2000 miles from base 

must not be under-estimated. A loss of a large part of our 

forces would make possible a major operation against the 

Hawaiian Islands. We cannot afford such losses at present. 

7. The decision therefore appears to lle between two 

courses of action -

(a) Direct Task Force 14 to attack enemy forces, 

Task Forces 8 and 14 to become involved only in covering the 

retirement of Task Force 14, or, 

(b) Retiring all forces without any attempt to attack 

enemy concentrated near 1

Nake. 

8. Discussion of course (a):-

There is good reason to believe that if our carrier 

attack is successful, extensive damage may be done to enemy 

forces near Wake. It is not probable, though possible, that 

enemy carrier will be closer than 100 miles from Wake. One 

enemy carrier probably has a definite objective at Wake. One 

or more others may be reserved for any forces seeking to come 

to Wake's relief. The use of our carrier planes will show 

definitely the presence of one carrier in the vicinity. If it 

is pursued the pursuing enemy carriers may be engaged with Task 

Force ll and 8 and cause the enemy serious losses. 

77 
The proposed attack even hy one group may involve 

the loss of the entire group. Such a loss if the enemy can 

be seriously damaged and sene offensive spirit shown by our 

Navy may be worth the sacrifice in view of YORKTOVrn joining 

within t·wo weeks. The ~ARATOGA in Task Force 14 will have the 

use of the Marine planes which were to go to Wake, but these 

are not suited to carrier landings and can be used only in 

an emergency. 

9. OPNAV despatch just received states Wake will continue 

to be a liability and authorizes evacuation. Evacuation is 

impossible; it will eventually be forced to capitulate. The 

real question at issue is, shall we take the chance of the loss 

of a carrier group to attempt to attack the enemy forces in the 

vicinity of Wake. 

10. The exact positions of Task Forces 11 and 8 

are unknown, but since the modification of instructions 

have had adequate time to reach assigned operating areas. 

The distances between Task Forces is thenfore greater than 

had been anticipated for tomorrow. 

Relief or evacuation of Wake now impossible. 

Task Forces 14, 11, and 8 retire to northeastward, 

then to Pearl. Report position when within 600 miles of 

Pearl. 

Relief or evacuation of Wake now impossible. 

Task Force ·14 make one air attack on enemy forces, then retire 

to northeastward. Task Forces 11 and 8 retire to northeastward 

not becoming involved in action in support of Task Force 14 

except under favorable circumstances. 

78 
Estimate of Captain McMorris as to action 

regarding enemy inves~ing Wake 0800 Dec. 22 

1. Wake reported being under eunfire by surface 

forces about 0300 local time today, and that a landing attack 

was indicated. 

Two days aco carrieJ: dive bombers and shore 

based horizontal bombers attacked independently. 

Yesterday they attacked together. 

A dawn landing attack with air support is 

indicated. 

2. Enemy force present is uncertain. Only one 

carrier is known to be Dresent. Others may be. If there be 

additional caPriers they may not partlclpate in the attack 

but be dlsposed to orevent interference with the landing and 

to attack any of our own forces going to relief of Wake. No 

real evidence of this. 

On December 17 a. single message was partially 

decrypted that contained Cardiv 5 (probably) as a joint addressee 

with various Marshall stations believed to be offshore patrols 

and observations stations. 

Numerous other messages of the past few days have 

concerned 4th Fleet - Cardi v ~rwo (HORYU and SIRYU) and Crudi v 

8 (2CA) Horyu and Siryu small CV. 

·- RDF cut Pearl-Samoa-Dutch parbor indicated Crudiv 

8 vicinity Saipan. No direct evidence 'of more than 1 CV in 

vicinity. 

3. Information is too var:ue and limited to draw 

definite conclusions but some indications of most mid-Pacific 

carriers nearing Japan. 

4. In existing clrcu.mstances relief or abandonment 

of iJJake at this tirne assumes secondary importance even thot:J.gh 

there continues to be strong reasons for relieving that place 

at an earl7! date. The point is there is an enemy force 

(possibly weaker) that we can get at. 

-3a- 79 
5. Our ov.rn forces are scattered but convergine;. 

The e:~act situation as to fuel is not kno\Jim 

but there are str.,ong reasons for feeling that the cruisers 

and DD of T.F. 11 and 14 have recently fueled and that the 

CVs of those two forces still have 2/3 or more of their 

capacity. T.F. G has thus far steamed only about 1500 miles. 

Tho carrier of that force is a long rane;e one. The DDs of 

T.P. ·8 are probably the units least vvell off in fuel and they 

can stear1 a long way at hir;h speed. 

6. Relief of Wake nust be delayed or abandoned; the question of evacuation must also await determination 

until the present situation clears. Best way to clear it 

is to get at the enemy. 

7. 

Own Courses of Action 

(a) Withdraw all forces toward Pearl 

without further effort. 

(b) At tack forces threa tenin[; 1 Jake as 

soon as possible with T.~. 14 while 

T.F. 8 and 11 close to supoort. 

(c) Search wide areas with the three T . .?. 

for enemy units t~at mi[ht be covering 

Wake operationo and dela;inr any decision as to final "action until afterwards 

when results of scar•ch are knovm .. 

(d) Concentrate the three T.~. and drive off 

forces threatening Hal~e ( unlo s s it has 

already fallon and surface forces with- drawn). 

8. Course la) - withdrawal. - is unduly cautious. 

It is easily pos~1ible (not to say sor1ewhat probable) tr.~.at the 

enoY~lY fore e is weaker than T. 1.?. 14 alone. It would tend to 

destroy service and nuhlic confidence. 

<J .. 

the ener!'ly. 

and \Vhether 

are at sea. 

Course 

IIe does 

or not 

(b) 

not 

they 

offers the greatest chance of damaging know the location of our task forces 

are concentrated even if he knows they 

-4- 80 
/ 

The enemy cannot have superior forces in all directions. 

We know where part of them are. There may be no others except in 

the general vicinity of Wake. The one carrier known to be there 

is probably the SORYU of 10,000 tons carrying 40 to 50 aircraft. 

T.F. 14 can conduct a limited patrol for her own safety while attacking. The SARATOGA has two squadrons of fighters (including the VMF squadron for .Wake) to guard T.F. 14. Odds 

are strongly in her favor. 

Such an attack might expose T.F. 14 to attack by other enemy forces while SARATOGA's aircraft are operating against 

enemy forces off Wake, or while landing after return. This is 

improbable. 

Such is a possibility, but the enemy would first have 

to search for and locate T.F. 14 and the odds are against rather 

than in fdvor of this. 

Even though the enemy launch such attack its success 

is by no manner of means assured. Japanese attacks on the 

English capital ships in Gulf of Siam were not heavy coordinated 

attacks but successive attacks by relatively small groups. Reports from Far East as well as from Oahu and from Wake indicate the 

enemy aircraft are very vulner·able to fighter attack. 

This course offers great chance of success against 

enemy forces off Wake and added possibility of damaging or destroy~ing the enemy forces piecemeal if they are in the vicinity. Even though the enemy be encountered in superior str~ngth 

the chances of falling back without serious loss are excellent. 

It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon. 

We are in great need of a victory. Success in this 

effort would strengtf(defenses of Oahu tremendously. 

en 

Course(C' This course temporizes and merely postpones the vital decision. In playing for complete safety we 

would stand to lose a golden opportunity through wasted time. 

Courae~\ Necessitates delay. Probably removes the 

advantage of surprise, for it gives the enemy further chance to ~arn as much of you as you do of him. 

It increases the opportunity for him to withdraw 

if inferior or if his objective at Wake is accomplished. 

If he be superior it adds to his chances of damaging all carriers, but such indications as we have indicate no overwhelming superiority and our carrier people are good themselves. 

Decision- adopt course (b). 

-5-

81 
Decision by Admiral Draemel as to action 

regarding enemx investing Wake. 

0700 - 22 December. 

Can the forces at sea, in fact, relieve Wake? 

Even if the Tangier lands everything - the best that can be 

said- is - it affords a temponry relief. Further operations 

must be conducted - a series of them to hold ~ake. If this prove 

impossible Wake eventually must capitulate. Wake was very weak 

prior to this attack. 

Is the condition of Wake after this attack, such - that the 

aid on the Tangier will be - can be landed? We must not overlook 

the fact that this effort of the Japs - may be successful. 

Marine planes must have information before taking off. 

Wake - now - becomes of secondary importance. The important 

issue now --ri- action with Jap forces attacking Wake. 

If Japan is unaware of, or has not deduced that our forces 

at sea; may attempt to relieve Wake - he may have inferiorfforces. 

On the other hand - if he knows or estimates our strength at 

sea - and deduces - their mission as a relief of Wake - he may 

be fully prepared and set for action. If so - his forces are 

undoubtedly - strong - or what he considers strong enough to do 

the job. 

Task Forces 11-14 - Evidently plan to fuel enroute returning - in event of an action - such fueling may not be possible. This 

is a definite weakness. 

In event an engagement with Jap forces is accepted - as 

a.tter:1pting to support Wake - the possibility of the ac~on d~veloping into a major enga8ement can not be overlooked. (We~ 

willing to accept a major engagement - at this distance from our 

base - with an uncertainty in the fuel situation? 

There are no reserves - all our forces are~n the area of 

possible operations. 

The General Situation - dictates caution - extreme caution. 

We must decide - either 

(1) To abandon Wake - or ~2) accept the risk of a major 

engagement. 

-6-

82 
I 

Admiral Pye - 24 December. 

General Plan for Task F'orces. 

1. LEXINGTON group retires 1st. Should take minimum time 

to refuel and proceed to coast, remaining there one week, for 

overhaul, etc. Carry to coas t 9 VF and 29 dive bombers. Obtain 

maximtml number of planes consistent with operating efficiency. 

Number of fighters to be assigned to carriers should be increased 

if it is possible to handle them even if boxed, and additional 

pilots should be carried. 

2. SARATOGA Group enters day after LEXINGTON departs. 

Previous to LEXINGTON departure should operate about 700-800 

miles to southward of Oahu in support of Johnston and Palmyra- ,_,Phristmas line. Should refuel and put to sea with 2 CA and 

5 DD as early as possible. 

3. ENTERPRISE group should if necessary refuel DDs at 

sea and remain in Midway area until SARATOGA leaves - arriving 

Pearl 2 days after SARATOGA sortie. 

4. YORKT01lli should proceed from San Diego to Pearl, as 

soon as possible, bringing as many planes as can be carried and 

retain operating efficiency. She should be scheduled to arrive 

3 days after arrival of ENTERPRISE~ 

-7-

---

83 
B!J 8 JiU~'f' < ---

DEC. GCT. 

693 17th OF THE ARMY ANr THE NAVY, 1935. YOU ~"JILL DELIVER EJ<.ACT 

( Cont 'd)) COPY OP THIS MESSAGE TO COiv1Mh.NDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET 

AND ADVISE WAR DEPAR'ri.iENT OF DATE AND HOUR UNITY OF 

COMMAND BECOMES EPFECTIVE. STARK ANL WlARSF~LL. 

· 18 1915 OPNAV ~0 MULTIPLE ADDRESS 

Movements of Army troops overseas prescribed by paragraph 

3511 WPL 46 have been suspended and will not be undertaken except by special arrangements to be provided for 

by a separate directive for each movement which will be 

issued when the situation demands and circumstances permit. 

18 2010 OPNAV TO NAVAL COASTAL FROrZTIERS. INFO: CINCPAC, CINCLANT 

It is essential that joint operations centers be established 

in all Coastal F'rontiers Sectors and sub-sectors in which 

joint operations are being or likely to be carried on. 

Request funds by despatch if requtred. Immediate action 

directed. A similar directive is being issued by the 

Chief of Staff, u.s. Army. Consult Army authorities. 

19 1037 CIHCPAC TO OPNAV 

After conference with Commanding General regarding points 

Opnav 170115; 

First, Concur Hawaiian Islands not yet safe from capture by 

major operation; 

Second, concur possibility enemy carriers may again raid Oahu 

but question probability of destroying large percentage of 

planes on ground. Commanding General convinced Radar warning net effective. I am not so convinced. Have issued instructions one third interceptor .command be in air from one :··· 

half hour before sunrise until 0800 and from one hour before 

sunset until one half hour after sunset. At other periods 

during daylight one sixth interceptor command be in ·air. 

Planes employed in search take off fifteen minutes before 

sunrise. All other planes manned and ready during the 

morning and evening danger periods. At night planes dispersed one quarter one hours notice three quarters four 

hours notice to permit overhaul. 

Third, concur danger of enemy using outlying army emergency 

landing.fields. These 'are being made unusable. Maui airfield being prepared for instant demolition. 

84 

' . ..t" 
DEC. GCT. 

19 1037 F6urth, concur necessary station troops establish Radar 

(Cont'd) and ·later construct airfield on other islands. 

Fifth, all nets and target rafts now employed guard ships 

and drydock caissons against torpedoes. 

Sixth, concur Pearl should be used by vessels mlnlmum consistent with maintaining operating efficiency. 

Further consideration other points later. 

85 
/ 

U. 8. PACIPIO FLEET ) 

II!Itf!D 2f ~~~ Sl1VA'rl2ft. 

Jle·C·Omb6l" 14., 1941.· ~ 

I • Jif!SSISJ w I t Lt t..:. Oif t .. ~ 't 10 ~. ~. 

8ll14Ml~R!f Q~:. !IlK Sif'O'A~lOJi 

1 . fhe War, ba'Ving be·en opened by Japan's aurp~11e a:t.r 

attaok on P•arl Harbor hal Jtlsted fo.r 17 daye . ttb1t attaolr 

J:teduced our battleship •trength tor the till& being to ·&.lmo•t 

nothing, laid up two light cruisers ·: Bo~ a long periOd and dta• ~ ' 

troyed ~ destroyers. Chl.r ally, Great Jlrlit&in, has lost two 

ot th$ f .iv·e heavy ehips the planned to. station at Slngapore. 

Japa,n'a l .ossea !n b.attleah1ps are unoerta1n. lh• ay 'ha.ve loat 

one but, it ie more probable that one or two ar• damaged and not· 

lunk-. In all, her loss•e have bee.n aompe.Pat1vely small. Th•:r. 

will be enumere.ttJd, as known, in a detailed comparison to·~ 

Rt&¢le later. It is •uft1oie·nt to say here that Iapan ha,a.:. twloe 

as many battleships as •• have available, even oounting our reenroreement (.3 BB) fJ-o:m the Eaet Coast; over twice aa many carriers, 

counting our reenforcement ot on•.. In the oth•r t1J)e$, the compari• 

son 1a not 10 unfavorable 1f we include our Al'!atic Fleet :and 

allies in the W•stern Pae1tic. Also, it ia probable tluat unee~t• 

ta.inty as to Russia • s actions is keeping ·some of the lapaneae 

light forces on guard in the Japan Sta. against attaok by the 

eim.1lar forces Russia 11 tuppoeed. to have at Vladivostok. 

86 
a. !nem:y: Agtiop li A!a:· 

( ) Psc1r1c Area. 

(1) Raid on Oahu on 7 De mber - probable striking force 

lf- «>V IYIDI- a.. 

of,.six c rr!er·s, two/\hea.vy crui&ers; t•o· converted battle 

cru1sera nd one d atroyer quadron. This was pparently 

followed by a retirement, possible ·to the Bonin area • 

. (2) Surface ablp raids on Mi =t ay and Johnston on 7 and 

15 Deeember re.pecttvely, ap-parently by Fou,rth Pleet units. 

(Z) Almost daily air raids on Wake .including two reo6nt 

on a f~om carri r aircraft; one abo ti~e lan !ng attack on 

i'1 wi-J,c,l., 1-1-'le. t:"H '-'"' 1 \~.t"t I CL...J 1.. DO \o\d I ~S. (e!.rf.-t.AA") lu-$t61 ~ 

December 10; and probably ita capture on December 22. In . z DD) ~ A . 

the latter operation, apparently some striking force unita 

~ 

were pre•ent. . d~ q. s~d.-fl oa.. e bos 

(4) Oecupa tion of lakin Island and a demol1 tlon la11ding 1\ 

at Tarawa - also . pparently by Fourth Fleet un1 t • " 

l(5) Air ra1 s again t oc an Isl nd and Nauru•, 

(6) Apparent re nforcement of a1rora.f't 1n the Marshall al'ea, 

and reenroroement of Fourth Fleet possibly witn Orudiv 8 and 

Card.iv 2·. 

(7) and 

b twe·en there and Nissan 

(8) Possible, on one occasion, air reconnaissance of 

samoa. 

(9) Op ration of submarines 1n the Ha aiian area, along 

the route to the West Coast, and on the est Coast. 

(10} Probabl covering operation in the S ipan - Bonin ar a 

with battleship strength (First Fle t). 87 

-2-
. .J 

' . l 

(b) !£ a!.l At!a~ 

(1) L nd1ng in the Philippines, al ya, Hongkong, 

and, ree nt.ly, in North Borneo. 

1 (2) He vy support to the above with r, -both land 

and carrier b sed, either :5 or 4 carriers having bf)en employed 

in the Far Eas·t Area. 

(3} Suppor:t to. the$e landings wlth. the Second (m1riua · 

a.bout 6 CA) Third and Southern E;,~peditionary Fleets,· probably 

reenforced by two battleships, which may l1ave been damaged. 

The above land offensives ar being particularly 

auocessfu.l in Malaya and Hongkong, and apparently the one in 

j J It ~ c p ~ i wi I i J the Philippines is now ge. the ring moment~m. r· ~ 11 ~ -o ~~ I . db ot..>'t" Ce.e.. ~,, +~ S :"\ vu { t \~ P~ ~ t pPt~ e s. o ~ 2 "\ V y · c..~. i ~d' L 

· 'ihere 1s no report whether oil wells and fac1.li ti s. 

in North Borneo were demolished prior to oapturea. Own Action to date: - -- (a) Pacific Are • 

{l) Reenforcement and improvement of the defenses ot Oahu 

and nearby large islands. 

(2) Oovering the l•wa11an area and outlying islands by 

the employment of o rr1er groups containing a single carr1 r. 

three CA and a destroyer squadron. 

(3) Escorting important shipa in convoys 'b&tween West 

Coast and Oahu, - ith the all ava1lable cruisers nd destroy r 

not otherwise employed. 

(4) Intensive A/S operations. air nd surtaoe in the vicinity of Oahu. (No submarine damage to combat nt ships to date) .• 

-3- 88 

I 
ll .?a. y 1 rcraft. Same aircraft 

to ta.l"'e th often v if ob j o t1 ve 1 · ound. 

(6) R plen1shment nd reenforoem nt of outlying islands (did 

notre eh Wake befor e pture). 

(7) Repair and r turn of battleships to est Co st. ( ivtV't ~ . b ~ ~ ~ [ 

( 8 ) mployment of submarines te defend We:lre (GQw wi~lidft.wtr) 

~ idw y, and for offensive operstions .o~f 'apaneae R~me~~~ . 

k nd in Marsh 11 a { efferts~. ve euemai""ineJJ..~· a::t--en-route-~ ; ' 

(9) A planned air raid on J•luit which \1 

as abandoned when 

th t k force was in the area east ~rd of ·the Marshall • 

(b) Far East Area. ---

(1) Resistance wher&~er practic ble and r tirement ot 

eurtace forces to the Soer·baya area. 

(2) ir attacks with patrol planes, probably damaging one 

battleship. (Patrol nlanes have retired to ll.E.I. also). 

(3) Offensive and defens. v ation by ubmarines, remain• 

ing bas d at Manila as long s practicable. 

(4} In ooordanc with present direotivea from CNO to 

SinOAF will provid tor ev ntual ret1:rem.ent to Nortbw st Aus,tral1a 

nd th pushing of all poss1bl rm.y reenforcements into Luzon. 

In the meantime the u.s. foro s at J va h ve undert ken to hold 

the 1Jalay Barr•1er e st and north of Lombok Stra1 t. 

-4-

89 
5) l,'lytoll, The Duteh · ve made t nto.tiv gre m nt to 

VV' '-sT- hold the M lay P&rr ier ~ 'of Lolllbok Strait. Their a1 rcratt 

nd ubmarines h ve been attack1n~ Japanese tr n ports and 

oruis r , and some r sults ·have been ala1med. 

cruisers are presumably at Singapore. 

(6) ~ritiaq. It ia not clear hat the Brit1sh Navy is 

doing, and wb ther the thre.e other h avy un1 ta o:r the five 

originally planned will be brought to Singapore. Admiral 

Phillips, the CinC 1 Easter·n Fleet was lost .in the nrince of 

Wales, $hortly' afte;r le and CinCAf had conferred an'd came to 

some agreement as to coordinated action. The British have 

bad a tendency to use their ships for escorting in the Indian 

Ocean rather than for such a .task s "hold the Malay Barrier." 

( 7) A'U@tr lia,a !iew Z$&1'ID.S.· Thea,e tlim forces re oeou-

. pied ··"7hol-ly in commerce protection in the vtc1nity of Austr-alia. 

One bombing a. ttaek has be E'.'n mad on 1\npingnmar1ng1. 

~OruroLATI~ .OF· MISSION. 

Th ffeotiv ~ar Plan (Rainbow Five) as revised, aaa1gned 

the following task to the Pacific Fleet in the Pa.c.1f1o Areas 

(1) Protect sea oommunioations of the Associated Power • 

(2) Support the Army 1n the defense of the H wa11an 

Coastal FI'ont1er, Cate ~s ory D. ( Mo ';) 

(3) Destroy Ax1a aea. oommun1oat1ons. 

-5-

90 
(4) Be. d en my a coxmmm1c t ion and fore . • 

{ 5) Der · nd. San oa, tid ay , Johns ton, P lmp-a in 

Cat gory D. 

{ 6) Pro teet the terx·i tory of the As oe!a t•d ~ower a 

east of 1aoo. 

{7) Cover the opera tiona of ti.~.e Naval Ooastal Frontier 

fore and the Oa~dian Naval Local Defense Forces. , 

In (4) "forces" is to be taken a.s including. positione, 

inst~llations, etc. 

Otbcr co.rnmunic tions from t.:te CNO lnd.io te conoern over 

the safety of the Oahu ba$e, and the belief that additional 

attacks ~1.11 be made to r.;~nde::r 1 t untenable. In one despatch 

tl"JS v .e ls l.eld that the r e tcntlon of ) ldwa,.r is dov.btful . 

The holding of Se ... 'Tloa, Palmyra an.i Johnston and of t. e lu.rge 

1 lands of the group, 1 s s.tre a s&d. The use of Pearl Harbor 

unt il the. defenses have been increased is dlscourased. Escorts between Haw 11 and the Co st · re to be provided, end 

eff ctive counter att aka ag lnst raiders are to be made. 

The Miasion .ls formulated as follows: 

" ile protecting the territory ~n4 sea eomrnunioa.t1ot1s 

of the Aeeoc1ated Powers east of 180° and raiding enemy 

comm~~ication nd forces, to reenforoe and defend the 

Oahu and outlying basesjin ord r to ret in, and mak• 

~ '1 T-~ e . fleet base for further operation&. ·~ · 

sty. 0 "'' tt "'' v ~ t t It · 1 t1 J \ I; 

It ' { A ~V 

-6-

91 
II • AYmX OP O,PP2SIJG S'l'IPGfR 

l. Jt!SAAOJP1e F otore. 

J; n muat have oeess to raw mater! 11 and mark ta in order 

to aurv1 v • Th• supply of her •xpanding pcsd,e•eiona •1+1 b n evet1noreas1ng problem. 

We muet upply our r 1n1ng outlying po•• eeio~. Ou%' 

aeoeaa to the atrategie t r1ala or the .E.I. and lala,.. 1 moat 

important. 8uppl1ee must go to the Ph1lipp1nes in tbe Far Ba1t 

ae long as they remain 1n ou~ ban4 • OVer U~ our economlc poa1· 

t1on ia muoh better than .:ta.pan/. . 

a. Ptxchglos1o f:!ctort• 

(a) orale - Th morale of the .Japan •• t1ght1ng tore •• 

tluahed with 1n1t1&1 aucoeaa, ahould b high. 

(b) Our morale has rece lved a g:r. at blow, but 1 t has gx-ea t 

capacity :for come b ck". That ·or the country is probably of the 

same calibr but qu~•t1on1ng e . ·•re undoubt dly ~1ng t\umed on 

the Paeitic Fleet. 

(c) Tr ining. From xperienc o tar bad with th$ ene y • 

hie performance ha been good. H1 submarine h v. not di•t1ngu1ahed themselves, but the meehanloal exoellenee nd reeolution 

of hia f'17e:r have been prov d beyond doubt particul rly in 

ae~1 l torpedo t ehn1qu • His pl nning ba al o pp ared to b 

very good. 

we, how ver, should be ble to demonatr t superiority 1n 

mo t d p r nt when we actually make eontaet. 

92 
s. Re£at1ve Po 1t1ons. 

ith the loss ot Guam and ake our most expo ed poattion 

18 Samoa. 

The following diatano a· re pertinentc 

DISTANgE 

BASE PEARL TRUK JALUIT AKE 

SA OA 2276 t600 1710 

PALJ.t!RA 960 2780 1700 

JOHNSTON 720 2334 1384 

MIDWAY 1150 2155 1529 1080 

I 

4. lnfg£m!~~OD• 

The Japaneee continue to have manr advantage• ov r ue 

when 1t comes to. information already obtained and to meant or 

obtaining it in tbe vicinity of baae • Secret agent radios 

may &till be in existence on Oahu. 

-8-

93 
5. Armed Foroes (Oorrected to 13 January) 

(a) Na.vy • 

.9]! ENEMY 

PACFLT ASIAFLT BRITISH N.E.I. ~ TOTAL AGAINST PACFLT 

4 3?. 0 BB 8 a 

3{1) BB(~ 2? 

4 1? ... cv 10 or 11 6 

1 cv(2) 

12 1 3 """ OA 18 9 

2 1 5 2 CL 9 8 

2 ct<2) 3 

l 1 7 2 OOL 8 

l DCL( 2 ) l 

50 6 '7 DD 80 35 

1 DD(2) 

17 13 4 (ODD~ 46 6 

(DMS . 

- ODD(2) 3 · 

17 21 12 ss 42? 17 

4 6 3 038 SS(2) 33? 

- ss small ? {minus 5) 

Notes: 

(1) Includes C0LORADO, under overhaul; excludes, EVADA, 

CALIFOR IA, WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHON!A and ARIZONA • 

(2) Damaged. 

(3) Japanese ships reported sunk have been subtracted 

from the total. Those shown damaged are in accordance 

-9-

94 
(b)~· 

) 

with reports received. No attempt has been made to 

estirnat l.osses of enemy s\l.bmarines. He baa 

admitted the loss of 5 m1dg t submarines. 

At Vladivostok Ruas1a is reported to have 16 

destroyers or v r1ous 1z e and 93 aubmarlnea. 

The disposition or enemy forces, ao tar as we 

know Xul 1 ':J haa been given 1n the "Si tua t1ontt. 

Th number of troopa ava1lable to the enemy for ope·rationa 

in the Central Pacific i difficult to estimate. In spite of 

hia involvement with China,. and his guard ag !nst Russia, he 

~IU~~~had s.uff1a1ent available to exeoute e1multaneoua 

attacks aga1nat the Philippines, l&J& and Hongkong, and 1e 

sending some against British Born~o. ore impressive, - these 

wer& tnob1le foro·es in transports. It 1 s believ·ed the. t the two 

largest offensives, Luzon and laya ill absorb practically 

a.ll of hia mobil foraes until these attacks have been pushed 

to a succ ssful conclu ion. There were apparently sufficient 

such forces in the u~ndates to act successfully ag inst the 

Gilberts and Wake, 

(c) Air Forces .. 

XI! No complete stlmate of air toroes will be attempt d 

here but the follo ing det 1ls are r corded. 

(l} Japanese carrier· · aver ge less oapaci ty than do ours. 

·10- 95 
(2) Ateorart in the Marsh lls at the outbreak of war 

were variously estimated from 150 by the Fleet Intelligenc 

Section down to 29 by the British Intelligence. One indication of the number present as that ake w s bombed by 2? 

. twin•llOtored planes on Deo•mber 7th and a tew daye later one 

ot the almoat daily attacks contained 41. As many as eight 

tour-motored eea planes att eked on anothtr o~cas1on. On 

Decemb r 9th a eeaplane unit and tender moved into Makin. 

(3) The l•pa.nose hflve several a a plane garr1era. These 

and the 1nterlock1~ eha1na or baaeo give grea~ mob-ility to 

their air torcea. A few submarines may b f1tt d with aircraft. 

(4) While the above air et1vity was going on, the var1ou• 

land offensives in the Fa~ Eaet app ared to have adequate air 

aupport, and Oavite, .1n particular, wa• severely bombed. 

(d) Material. 

No interior material wa$ noted in the planes hot down on 

the seventh. However, they were not armoured and were not 

tast. One outstanding~ materiel .feature is the 

Japanese aerial torpedo wh1oh takes its depth so ·quickly that 

it oan b~ dropp d in shallower ater and elosor to the target 

than ean ours, at present. 

-11- 96 
(e) •t•• 

J pan e b sea in the l(a.ndatea and other island a.re, 

in gen ral, admirably placed for mutual suppo:Pt, nd to ;form 

aueoeasive lin of r si tano ga1nst any advanc of ours. 

They also h lp to extend the range or h1a ortenaive operation&, 

particularly tho or submarin an aircr ft. Ju t how well 

dev loped any of them are· for aurtace Jhi'ps is uncertain. 

Truk probably baa conoid r ble tac111t1es, and also Port Lloyd. 

It is doubtful it any of the ·rahalle are t1tted, say, to 

tuel i~e bl• foroe, but many of th m ott r anoho~ag s where 

fueling could readily be conducted trom oil rs. 

In Pearl Harbor we have a flttet base good 1n many respeota, 

but it is the only one 1n a larg ar a. Thisia a great dia• 

advantage - all our eggs are in one basket; enemy submarines 

can concentrate; and the gen r l effec on our operation 11 

ae though each foro had a string tied to 1t, the other end 

ot which 1a sur to b secured at P arl Harbor. Our outlying 

baa a are well aituated aa outpoata, but are weak, and cannot 

aupport surfac craft. Samoa is exc ll n ly placed !or our 

southwest oommun1oe.t1on lines. It, howe'Ver, is f r trom 

Pe rl Harbor and th r hall nd Gilberts somewhat rlank 

the rout6 to it.· 

97 
(,t) Lsslsttga. 

A 1.train will undoubtedly be plaeed. upon J pan to keep 

np the tar flung s.yst·om o.f positions she baa reentoraed and 

exps.ndtu:t. 0£ her needs, av.1at1on gasoline will px-cbably 

be th•·moet er1tita1. 

OUr logistic problem ts. d1ffl.cul t eb1efl7 becaua• of 

the laQk ot bottoma, &uhaar1ne airuttnga have a1read.7 atarted 

.and .-.aorta will b• di.tt1oul t to turn11h. 

Drydook• l'aaJr be a bottlen$-Ck· for us, but they will b• 

the eame for the enemy, pe.rt1e·ularly .1r he eJr;.J,lOHB himael.t 

in the Ea. .• t.ern Pao1f1c. 

98 
1. 1ea1on. 

(a) Jl pants broad mis ion 1Gb 11 ved to hav been, at the 

beg1nn1ng or the war: 

'tTO DESTROY THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PO ER OF 'lBB 

ASSOCIATED POWERS nt THE WBSTgft}l PAOIPIC IN OnDER 

TO ES?ABLISB JAPAJJESB HEGEMONY OVER THAT AREA." 

~at how tar tb1 ma7 have been extended by h1s initial 

su.cce a again t our Fleet 1a problematical. 'l'here bas been . . :I t)V f 

much talk ot ruling the · torld among certain e£ tiM · enem7A but 

there are eo many things ~ef must accompl1ah betore lt;b.e.; 

oan oona14er working up to a major effort, even ou"ttBtde "Ot 'Y1 

M,~ I 

the ~ Pacitic, that auah a broad extension ot his 

m1as1on 1a d1aoard d fro. consideration. 

!b tor.mulation ot the Mission as given 1 cons1dere4 

li ~ t{-r:l tr i t + ~ 

aound.. The onemy ·na. al:read7 attacked most or th.• territory A 

or tho Associated Powere north ot tho Jial 7 Barrier, and 1t 

is considered tbat the islands comprising this Barrier are 

vit· 1 to him. 

The question at preaent 1s1 w1ll he lUlde:rtake to extend 

control to the Mid Paci.f1o? To do ao ot course, he must 

oapturo Oahu. 

(b) The eons1dorat1one Which may lead h1m. to such an eff·ort 

are: 

(l) He may desire such control in order to be ablo to 

l ,aunch an ort ,ns1ve against the United .States in th 

Eastern Pae1t1c. 

99 
(S) U. may desire to deny Oahu to us so that we lltlrelr 

cannot interfere with his e~t&nsion and oonsol1.dat1on 

in the Far East. 

The latter is considered to be his most likely motS>· 

v:ation,. It ie in line with h1a attack on December ftth, -

a preventive measure. 

(c) The oons1d.era tiona against auob an a ttaok a!'·e. that: 

(1) Be will aubjoot hie naval at:-ength to attrition 

losses which would plae• them in an unfavorable situation 

tor carrying out• against inoroaaing aeuoc1ated foroee, 

the :remainder of the program he may have laid out. 

(2) Be. may have~ and probablY" has. another commitment 

. 1n mind. - t.he conquest of Auatra11a. Thia 1s. considered. 

probable beeauaet 

(1) lte undoubtedly 1s anxious to incorporate 1t in 

h1a Btap1re bee~uae of 1 ts :-oaouroee, 1te apace £or 

colonization and because its bases would there 

be denied to the Aaaoc1ated Po1f8ra as f"oot-hol4a 

to ~enew pressure on Japan 1n the Par East. 

(11) Such advance eould probablT bo undertaken at 

no great cost in the way ot loaaea to his Fleet. 

~111) it is a natul"*al extension from the a7Btem of 

bases he will have 1f successfUl 1n capturing the 

Malay Barrier. 

(3) Because ot: present oomm11menta he may not be- able 

to prepare for uob an a t tack i n time . ~1· t1 el ant 

enters very strongl y int o t he ai tua tion for~ jJn be a us · J 

100 
(1) .He must at leaat a'Ul"ldse that reentordementa 

such as Batd1v Three, the Yorktown, and possibly 

tho North Carolina and Waan1ngton, will be brought 

to the Pac1.f1c. 

(11) More ot our battleahipe w1ll be repaired in 

a r w monthe. 

(111) The longer he delays, the stronger Bawai1 

can be made. 

(1v) We alre 47 have a trflM!lendous war ettort program 

which 1a only beg1nn1.ng 1:o produoe. 

(v) 1'he events in Ruee1a may presage the beginning 

ot a fold-up tor Germany. Ir euoh should be the 

case Great Britain and the United States wo,uld 

eventually be tree to turn tull strength upon Ja~an. 

(4) He may not be able to unde~take the 1"espons1b111ty 

or support and supply ot Bawa11. 

Prom the foregoing 1t appears that th6 enemy m1es1on 

alread7 quoted is the most probable one, and that tho 

moat pl'Obable change 1n 1 t would be that ould 1eek 

extena1on of contlYol to the Mid Pac1f1o 1n order to df)ny 

1t to ua. 

-16-

101 
2. Cour§fHJ of ~ot1on. 

The following four courses re set down as being 

evident from the enemy's present actions and as being necese..ary 

,to complete the execution or his probable mission. 

0-1 - To o pture and consolidate the Philippines, 

Malays., and the Dutch East Indies,. including the Malay Farrier. 

/ 

0·2 - To oapture and consolidate Australia - New 

Zealand. 

0-3.- To prevent 1nte~f~renoe with operations in 

the Far East by the Aseooiated Powere, 

0~4 • To hold the status quo with China and Russia 

whtle completing 0-.1 and 0-2. 

His co1:trae to accomplish his next most probable 

mission is: 

0-5 - 'Po oa.p'ture 1 and deny to us, Oahu and 1 ta 

outlying positions. 

In oarrying out 0•1, f) ... s and o ... a, 1t 1a visualized 

that he will: 

G·l - Capture,. by landing operations and land 

offensives, ·bases or sites suitable for aircraft to support 

naval and land foroea, and for naval forces to cont;rol the sea 

areas and support further land offensives. 

0.2 .... Mop-up remaining tarritory by eup)orted land 

operations. 

C•3 - Employ naval and air units in the W stern 

Pacific to render support as indicated above and to vover the 

-1?-

102 
operations in that area. 

&-4 - Employ naval and air units otherwise to: 

(a) Protect the homeland and outlying islands 

1.n coordination w1 th land tor·oes; 

(b) Protect lines or commun1oat1on in the Western 

Pacific and to outlying positions in tr"e m1d-Pao1f1c J 

{c) Divert our forces and 1nrl1ot damage by raids 

on our oommun1oat1ons, forces, and positions. includ• 

1ng demolition raids; 

inferior 

(d) Cut off and destroy/forces as opportunity 

off era. 

&.-5 - Capture Samoa and British outlying positions 

in the South Paoifio. 

This course is considered probable.because it 

will assiet in his oa.mpa1gn against Australia and will fao111tate 

attacks on our lines of communication and, because, due to the 

exposed position and present weak defenses, 1t can be aocompliohed 

without great loss to the enemy. 

Less probable: 

-6 - Capture Oahu and other main islands of the 

Hawaiian Group. 

This is aonsidered less probable because of 

our de.duoed enemy mission, l1ut the adoption of t h1s course by 

the enemy must, of oourse be guarded ags.inst. 

-18- 103 
3. Ql>erations. 

To oarry _cut the courses of aotion enumerated above b ' -~ l ~ • J ,. ', · ;j. V' "' C' ~ 1 0 f-{- '_ £r\ (1 l \f E:. S. 

it 1s visualized that!\ the en my ill: / 

(a) Occupy an air base or bases in the Ellice Islands. 

(b) Mak• supported landing attack against Samoa as 

soon as he oan muster sufficient troops and transports. 

(c) Continue submarine raids on our forces and 

oommun1cat1ona and an ooc $1onal submarine shelling of our 

outlying islands. 

(d) Continue submarine observations of our movements. 

and, if it continues praotioable, the employment of secret 

a~ents to obtain and transmit information. 

/(e) Employ aruisere and aonverted merchantmen for 

raids on our lines of communication in the South Pacific, and 

cruisers against our Hawaii - outlying base communications. 

Less probable, employ cruisors. and perhaps raids•in-roroe, 

against our Ha.wa11-Ma1nland oornmunioations .. 

(f) Make surface bombardment and air raids against 

out outlying basees. Less likely but still to be guarded against 

are air raids against Oahu, West Ooa.st ports, and the Canal. 

(g) Make landing attacks for demolition against our 

outlying bases and stations, including the Aleutian Islands. 

(b) Conduct sweeps in fo·roe through the areas in the 

mid•Pacif1o in which inferior forces of ours may be operating. 

-19- 104 
.. ...... 

(1) Less probable, make landing attacks for capture 

on outlying bases of the Hawaiian area, outlying islands of the 

main group, and Oahu {It ia not believed outlying bases will be 

attacked for capture exoept as part of the operations for the 

capture of Oahu). 

(j} Establish air patrols and surfaoe warning nets 

of~ ~apanese territory. It is believed that the enemy is 

particularly apprehensive against a carrier raid against the 

Homeland. 

(k} Repel attaok$ against territory with aircraft 

striking groups, submarines and other torpedo carft, and with 

land defenses. 

(1) Cover territory and communications against 

attack, and l•,ar East operations against interferonc~ w1 th main 

fleet units. 

... 20~ 

\ 

l 

{ 

j \l 

'\ 

h 

~ 

I 

1 

\ l 

\ 

1 05 
4. An estimate as to enem.y act1.on in the mid-Pacific 

in the itnrrtadiate future is as follo s: 

(a) Continue raids and harassment with submarines. 

(b) Attac~ comw1n1cations to Australia .ith cruisers, 

aux1,lie.ry cruisers and long range patrol planes •· 

(c) Seize an air base in the Ellice Islands. 

{d) Make a stronp~ car·rlor ra.1d (not le ~· s than two 

CV) against one of our OiJ.tl:rlne bases - priority as follows: 

Midway, Palmyra, Johnston. 

(e) Make a cruiser bombardment, and perhaps a 

demolition raid against Canton. 

(f) Land for demolition purposes at outlying 

Aleutian positions. 

(g) If it can be organized before our reen.for eement, 

send an expedition to oapture.Samoa, and probably ter, Suva . 

(h) Fmploy remaining forees to protect own territory, 

comntUnicatlons and .Far Eastern operations. 

5 . Possible but not considered probable at thi.s time are: 

(a} Cruiser ratds e.r_e.inst communica tlons to th~ 

v.Tes t Coast. 

(b) Sweeps ln force including fast battleships a-long 

the West Coast co:mrnunico. ti nn l:tne. 

(c) C rrier raid a gainst Oahu. 

{d) Cs,rrier raid a gainst Pacific Northwest. 

- 20i- -

1 06 
III. OWN COURSES 

1. The mission is repeated: 

t~rWhile pro tee ting the . terri.tory and gea. communi cat! one 

of the Assoo1Qted Powers east of 180° and raiding enemy communications and .forces 1 to reenforce arid ·defend Oahu and outlying 

bases: in order to retain, and make secure, a fleet base for 

further operations when the fleet is strong enl")ugh to talte the 

., 

strategic offensive t 

2. This mission is the eu1de for our actions until our 

fleet base is considered strong enougb to defend itself, and our 

Fleet 1' strong enough to undertake distant opera.t ions. It is 

a strategically defensive mission but we nntst bear in mind that 

;when highly mobile forces are t handJ a paasi ve defense is by 

no means indicated. 

2. Courses. of Action • 

. Some courses of act.!.on s.r, evident and are alre dy 

being carried out. Under the broad course of action -

B-1. Strengthen the defenses of the Oahu base to 

the maximum practlca.ble extent/- e have the following supporting 

courses: 

b-1. Incre.a.se the Army defenses of Oahu in pursu1 t 

aircraft, bombers, AA artillery, troops, heavy artillery, radar 

equipment, to the maximum extent praottcable. 

b-2. Increase the naval local defense fore s to 

provide sufficient anti -aub!"·a.rino patrols, surface air-warning 

-21- 107 
litCili\ll 

net, mine defense, harbor patrols. etc. 

b-3. Improve passive defense by means of nets 

and obstrnctions; bomb or splinter proof construction; 

dlspersalJ cA..mouflage; better operating centers and communications~ 

b-4. Inct"~ase to the limit that can be supported 

troops, arms, radar, ammunition and other supplies at outlying 

bases. 

Other evident courses f~llow: 

B-2. Cover the Oahu base and the West Coast by 

the operations of task foroes· at sea. 

ucover' is a broad tel'm and its application 

in this case will be discussed later. 

B-3. Cover the outlying bases by tbe operations 

of task .forces at sea and, in come caaes,·v,ith submarines. 

~ This also requires lscussio:n. It is apparent 

that Samoa, for 1natanoe, could be covered in this way only 

occasionally; the Aleutians rarely ever. 

B-4. Protect see. communications by escorting., 

patrolltng , r outing, covering nd by destroying enemy raiders • 

. This course of ctlon llla.s already been taken and 

its execution is shaping up s.s follows: 

b-5 . Provide anti-submarine and anti-surface 

r 1der esc or t between Ba ali and the West Coast f or i mportant 

shi ppi ng ; d i ve rse r outing fo r ot,d ~ary frei ghters, wi th local 

A/S escor ·t near termina l s . Provide covel ~ t he ope r ati on 

-22-

108 
I • 

O·f task t ·oro·e. in tht? m1d-Pao1f1·o. 

b•6• Provide ant,1-submar1n• escort !lnd cover 

between Itawa1i and outlying isl nda. 

b•'7. Provide a.nt1•!'81der eacort tor extremely 

tmportant shipplng along the moat expoaed portion of the route 

to the New zealand - Australia area: diverse and roundabout 

rout1ns for other traft1o .• 

For tbat part of the rtt1aa1on hicb requires re.1ds 

on enemy sea communications and. forces, it is evident th•t a 

large perc•ntage ot our submarlne.s should be so employed, hence\ 

B-5~ Raid enemy sea. communications and tor·oes with 

aubmax-1nea. 

It is other raids with surfao and air forces whian 

require oar•tul consideration. 

?lo. bav• roroe e.vaila*'le • oa:t?r1ers and oruisers -

well sui ted for thla work - ·· ar."ld a judicious choice of 

objectivoa and timing will do muoh to make our defenseive effective and ah,ould help to in1prov$ our relative atrensth, We cannot afford to aeoept loss·eo on a ah1p ro.r ship ba.s1s, but will 

h ve to talce some rtska in order to strike the enemy a blow 

trom time to time. The morale ot tbe . .lleet and of the nation 

demanda it, and. tt ls only in this we.y that we can keep some 

of the enemy diverted t .o the de.fensi v• lns tead of parmi tting 

hlm to ta1ce offensive ma9.&ures a gainst us ;at will. Aside .from 

l" ids Ol'l posi·tiOtlS W'O Should a{n· k SWeeps in foroe (not leas \. 

-as109 
than two carrier groups) in areas he1')e 1nfer!. or nemy forces 

and supply ships a:re likely to be • As o:ur battleships become 

nvatle.blo they oan be advanced ss supporting r'.strong point '* 

on whioh the f•st groups oould retire. 

Eaoh operation must be me tttclously plann d in '\.. 

accord no with the oond1 tions existing, and roroes va1ja ble 

at the t1 • The gener 1 courses aret 

B-6. Raid outlying en&P'Y baa.ea with carrier - !'wavy 

cruiser groups. 

•B-7. Sweep xpoeed enem7 ar a1.and commun1cat1ona 

1th atrong, f-ast forces. 

b-8. Support raiding ar~d swe.eping operations 

from intermediate advanced. positions with battle hips. 

110 
·OFFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT ' ' 

QF CARRIElt GROUP . TASK FORCE ·~ ~). . . ~ 

I. SITUATION ( JP L , 'Z-s; 19 4--i) 

. 1. Foret•• · 

The three principal task fo:roes at sea are nearing the end 

of their .fuel and are now { sohedulJ to return . to P·earl to remain 

as indicated below: 

T .F • 11 

T.F. 14 

T.F. 8 

OomR. 

LEXINGTON 

OHICAG'O 

PORTLAND 

·INDIANAPOLIS 

.DESRON 1 · 

nos as. 

CoG• Dat~ 

Viae Ad. Brown 27-29 

SARATOGA R.Ad. Fletche~ ·. 29~31 

ASTORIA 

MINNEAPOLIS 

SAN FRANCISCO 

DESRON 4 .NBOllES 

.ENTERPIRSE Vice Ad. Halsey 31-? NORTHAMP1fON 

SALT LAKE.OITY 

CIIESTER 

DESRON 6 .. 

2.. Previqga ~l2mtnt 

Iaak For.ce lJ. left Pearl on 14 December w1 th orders to 

conduct bombing raid on J'alui t on 22 Deoember {f. lOt). on 20 

December ita orders were changed to render support to Task 

·Foree 14 :from position to the eastward of t~ake, On .22 Decem• 

ber, befor it had taken up this position, it was recalled to 

Pearl. 

111 
I 

Task .Foroe 14 departed Pearl on 16 December with orders 

to reenforce and supply Wake with men and materials carried 

in the TANGIER1 beginning ,33 December. on 22 December, after 

+V.e- ,y-.eJ~,-fd lt?n/;J:i' fiJ lh,Jte Wlaim -was.r-tiH'!'iLl:•,. Llte unum,., this to:roe was recalled. 

~ask Fore~ 6 departed Pearl 19 December with orders to 

supp.ort the other two task forces from a position to the west .... 

ward of Johnston Island. On 22 Deeember 1 t was ordered to 

cover the reenforcement ot Wake by Task Force 17 (WRIGHT1 

PORTER), an operation ending 26 December. 

~. Motivating Oons1dera tlions. 

The effective war plan requires protection of our territory and Gea communications, but also raiding of enemy sea 

communications and forces. Recent directives from. ONO have 

expre.ssed concern over the inadequacy or the present defenses 

of the Oahu base, but have alao pointed out the necessity tor 

vigorous raiding of the enemy's outlying positions. 

The ·defenses or Oahu have been considerably improved since 

7 December; det"ense organ1$at1on has been ironed out; and air 

searches are extending to 700--800 miles. Task torces are not 

so greatly needed to assist in a close defense. 

Aaidf1 from any directive received, 1t is most apparent 

that to buoy morale and to create some diversion of the en$my, 

e.n of'.fens1ve blow must be struck, ... and SJoon. 

4. Objective .• 

The outlying island objectives- for an air :raid present 

themselves as follows' 

112 
(a) Wak~ - captured from us on 22 December. 

(b) Eniwotok - westernmost island in northern chain; 

probably considerable development; an important link in 

the air route through the Marshalls; probable base ot 

aircraft wh1oh raided Wake almost daily. 

(e) Rongelap ~ in northern eha1n; another possible base 

or the aircraft wh1oh raided Wake, but any considerable 

development if there, has been a well-guarded seoret. 

(d) WotJe - Maloe.lap - on northeast corner of the Karshalls; 

considerable development reported~ 

(e) Majuro - Arno - in eastern chain of Marshalls; com• 

paratively good base sites, but not much development 

reported. 

(f) Mille - southeast corner or the Marshalls; little 

development reported but 1t includes a base detachment 

and, in an enemy despatch of about ll December, a Mille · 

detachment was referred to. 

(g) Jalu1t - in western chain of islands; is seat of 

government ot the Marshalls; the center or defenses and 

apparently the most developed. 

(h) Makin - northernmost Gilbert lalandJ was captured by 

the Japanese on 10 December; is being developed as an air 

be.se; had prese.nt recently a portion or Airon 24, probably 

a tender and some four-motored sea planes. 

(1) Tarawa " Abaians - Gilbert Islands south of Makin; 

have been attacked by the enemy, but it is doubtful if 

they are being developed now. 

-3-

113 
Some or the considerations which lead to a choice or 

objeotivest 

(1) Due to our present reduce.d forces, chance ot 

damage to our carrier should be kept as small as 1' 

compatible with the inflicting ot an appreciable 

amount or damage on the en4my. We can•t artord to 

trade Ship for Ship much leas Ship for some minor 

shore installations. T.hia consideration eliminates 

Eniwetok, Rongelap and Jaluit for the present. It 

points to Makin ~re defenses are not oJJgan1zed and 

which can be approached with little risk ot detection 

and bombing from the stronger islands. Wotje-Jlaloelap, 

Haj.uro-Arno, and Mille, being 1n the eastern chain can 

also be approached under favorable conditions, but 

.Wotje-Maloelap are probably fairly well guarded. 

(2) Damage inflicted should be worth the risk and the 

wear and tear of the .operation. This is a difficult 

problem. It is improbable to get something for nothing, 

and valuable objectives are usually well defended. 

/Z'-11> ~ (3) Not MS\tPQ1ng the status of our personnel now in 

Japanese hands on Wake, bombing that island would not do. 

{4) The operation might be considered 1n its relation 

to other of our operations and problems. ONO oonsiders 

that the action of the Japanese in the Gilberts indicates 

a threat .to.-Jampa!J ~concur in the idea that the 

t rt;,6f4ol//"' IJ I.s OY (irj sv- V~t enemy must ~\eve designs on that plaoeA A large reenforcement to Samoa will probably be en route in early 

-4- 114 
January. An operation against Makin would have a 

covering effect, and the wiping out ~ho present 

development might set back any plane the enemy m1ght 

have against Samoa. Mak1n is therefore selected as 

an objective. As the development there will probably 

not warrant the employment of a complete oarr1e~ group, 

1e there any other objective which could be struck 

1 simultaneously. Kille suggests itself at once. It 

probably has little development, but it is an outpoet 

for Jaluit, and cleaning it out would assist a later 

operation against that place. A simultaneous air raid 

against Makin and Mille is therefore decided upon. At 

Makin)as there is s British settlement, the bombing 

objectives must be very oare#ully selected!' 

s. All three of the task forces have been operating almost 

continuously for a considerable period - order in length of 

operating period 8, 11, 14. For any raid against the en~my 

islands, fuel will be a consideration, and the ENTERPRISE has 

about twice the rad1ua or the LEXINGTON class, However, waiting for tha ENTERPRISE would dela-y the operation considerably, 

and this carrier has had the longest cont1nuoua operation. 

Therefore we chose the first force to return - 11 with the 

LEXINGTON. 

( A-s o 

V\ Di' b ." ·t: t d < C : (! -

1

1 s. ~1 D w d v · ··t o· h , _ 

(;. 2 0 j ~: I i1 I) Ci I'")') 

d v f c~ tt ; 

e lr1 Jro t/l e 

-6-
RUNNING SUW~ARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

December 25 

No change in orders £or task £orces. VMF-221 landed at 

Midway. 

December 26 

No change £or task £orcas. WRIGHT departed Midway and 

TANGIER arrived there. 

Johnston group departed from Pearl. 

No significant enemy information received except reports 

of minor activity in the Gilberts. 

Opnav put decision as to Samoan reenforcement up to CinCPac, 

but advised sending full reenforcement and carrier escort. 

December 27 

Task Force 14 entered. 

In accordance with decision to reduce the strength of the 

main task forces, one cruiser and three DD were detached and 

assigned to escort duty under Combasefor (Task Force 15). Decision 

was made to employ Task Force Eleven in covering the Hawaiian area 

instead of raiding the Eastern Marshalls or Gilberts. The deciding 

factor was that we cannot at this time af£ord to subject our £orces 

to losses from shore based air and superior carrier strength/particularly while 2000 miles £rom base. (See Op. Order 46-41). 

Opnav directed more detailed reports as to operations of 

task forces, and particularly of the considerations that led to the 

abandonment of the tasks in connec~on Jaluit and Wake. (Opnav 

271808 and 271810 L ,-s .,. p f. p " (/' 'l/ i . ~ 1-f () rv r· 1'1 '1. z,.~' ~i I;. 

December 28 

No change for task £orces. 

Rescue of survivors developed that s.s. PRUSA was torpedoed 

on 18 December, and s.s. MANINI on 17 December - both south o£ the 

Hawaiian group. 

Decision was made to send the full reenforcement to Samoa 

(CinCPac 281631). The YORKTOVffi group will escort it as Task Force 17. 

CinCAF is moving from Manila to Sourabaya, pr obably by 

submarine. 

-12- 116 
RUNNING SID~MARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

December 29 

Task Force Fourteen entered Pearl this date. Other two major task forces (Eight and Eleven) patrolling in general Hawaiian area. 

The battleships arrived at West Coast ports - PENNSYLVANIA at San Francisco; MARYLAND and TENNESSEE at Puget Sound. 

A raider report near West Coast was received but the identity of this ship was never established. 

Radio Intelligence offered nothing significant. Enemy carriers 

are linked in some way with Homeland air stations - possibly receiving relief air groups. 

Opnav in 291431 pointed out threat against. Samoa and Suva constituted by the enemy activities in the Gilberts. Directed consideration of this in planning "covering or diversion operations" in con- nection with the Samoan reenforcement. 

December 30 

-0 CHICAGO, in Task Force Eleven, was recalled ~ that Rear Admiral 

Newton might turn over command Cruisers, Scouting Force to Rear Admiral Fletcher. It has been decided to send the latter officer to San Diego to embark in the YORKTOWN and take command of Task Force Seventeen. 

All task force commanders of carrier groups are to be embarked in the carriers and arrangements are being made for a rear admiral to command the cruisers of each of these forces. 

YORKTOWN group arrived at San Diego. 

No significant infon~ation of the enemy was received. 

Admiral King took command of the u.s. Fleet from Washington and sent his appreciation of the principle tasks for the Pacific 

Fleet in his 301740. His plans for exercising command are given in 

301701. 

December 31 

Op. Order No. 48-41 was issued to Task Force Seventeen. 

Rear Admiral Fletcher flew to San Diego to take command of 

this force. The LOUISVILLE and ST. LOUIS were assigned to this force 

instead RICHMOND and TRENTON (Southeast Pacific Force). 

Task Force Fourteen sailed to cover the Midway area in accordance with Op. Order 47-41. Rear Admiral Leary was placed in con~nd. 

Task Force Eight entered Pearl. 117 

-13-
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

December 31 (Cont'd) 

Received orders from Cominch to transfer one patrol squadron to CinCAF. Eighteen VP reenforcements have now arrived in 

this area and the last six are awaiting good weather. 

The maintenance of a daily all-around search to 700 miles 

from Oahu has not been found possible with the long range aircraft 

available, and certain sectors to the eastward each day are searched to only 200-300 miles. 

As result of RDF bearings of 5 enemy ships passing through Johnston Island, Comtaskfor 11 was ordered to give special coverage to that place. 

Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Fleet this date. 

Cominch (Commander-in-Chief, u.s. Fleet) informed CinCAF 

concerning the tasks of the Asiatic Fleet (Cominch 312300). 

January 1 

Tasks forces operating as before. It was decided that Task 

Force Eight would operate in the IIawaiian.Area for a few days beginning January 3rd and would then return to prepare for an opera- tion in coordination with Task Force Seventeen. 

Enemy submarines in the Hawaiian Area had apparently withdrawn to greater distances from Oahu, vnth several along the routes 

to the outlying islands. 

s.s. ]~LAMA, 600 miles south of Tahiti was stopped apparent- ly by an aircraft from a raider. 

January 2 

No developments as to own forces. War Plans Section's 

Estimate of the Situation as to employment of main task forces 

in January is appended. Offensive employment for Task Forces 11 

and 8 during their next period at sea was recommended. 

No significant radio intelligence of the enemy was received. 

No association of carriers with the Mandate Fleet had been noted 

for some time. 

Cominch in 021718 urged serious consideration of offensive 

action against the Gilberts, particularly in connection with the 

Samoan reenforcement. 

-14- 118 
o@il!!Cit£1 

DEC. GCT 

27 1808 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

INFORMATION RECEIVED AS TO YOUR OPERATIONS HAS BEEN 

INADEQ.UATE FOR ESSENTIAL COT-fJ:PREHENSION OF YOUR CURRENT 

ACTIVITIES. REPORT DAILY: 

(A) MAJOR TA3KS WHICH ARE ACTIVE. 

(B) CORRESPONDilJG TASK FORCES AND GROUPS. 

(C) APPROXIMATE LOCATION TEEREOF. 

(D) APPROPRIATE COMl'!iENT AS TO PROGRESS OF THE 

SEVERAL ACTIVE TASKS. 

28 0545 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

ON 27 December organization and operations Pacific Fleet 

your 27 1808: 

(A) Task Force Eleven. Lexington with grounded main rotor 

3 CA 9 DD in Pearl refueling after return Jaluit area (see 

my 28 0417). This force less 1 CA and 3 DD departs 29 

December to cover Johnston-Palmyra line. LEXINGTON can now 

make 30 knots. On return about 4 January repairs must be 

undertaken Pearl if practicable otherwise CV must return 

mainland for rotor repairs. 

(B) Task Force Fourteen. Saratoga with 3 CA, 9 DD , 1 AO 

retiring from Wake (see my 280417) to refuel 29-31 December 

thence proceed Midway area. 

(C) Task Force Eight. Enterprise with same support force 

as Fourteen completing covering reenforcement Midway by 12 

VI'.1F additional arnnuni tion and radar is returning Pearl enter 

31 Dec. depart 3 Jan., probable use covering Oahu or own 

advance bases against enemy raids. 

(D) Task Force Nine. Patwings covering daily 700 mile 

circle aro~L~d 6ahu assisted by Army Bl7s. Two planes 

each at Johnston, Palmyra, plus striking force at Oahu. 

(E) Task Force Seven. Submarines. One Midway, one 

Wake. Two enroute Marshalls, three in Orange waters. 

(F) Task Porce Fifteen. Escort force of ?cruisers plus 

10 DD on r.1ainland and trans-Pacific escort duty plus 

covering reenforcements to Johnston-Palmyra and Xmas. 

(G) Task Force Sixteen. Three BB and DD escort returning 

mainland ya rd overhaul. 

(H) Available ~and DM under Commander Hawaiian Naval 

Coastal Fr·ontier· for local escort a~d anti-submarine pa lrfS 
Si!Qfii1T DEc. GCT 

28 0545 

(CONT'D) 

27 1810 

28 0417 

to insure channe l kept open . 

(I) No forces in contact with enemy except several 

attacks by planes and destroyers against suspected 

submarines. 

OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

ESSENTIAL FOR UNDEHSTANDING RE~UIRED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY 

THAT YOU FURNISH WIE WITH FURTHER INFORMATION AS TO CONS!DERATIONS WHICH GOVERNED RETIREMENT OF TWO WESTERN TASK FORCES 

AS REPORTED IN YOUR T~tJENTY TWO T~NENTY FIFTY SIX 

O!NCPAC TO OPNAV 

Considerations changed situation due to: 

(A)(l) Enemy landing at Wake made relief or evacuation 

impossible. 

(2) Navy Department's expressed opinions (A) Wake a liability; 

(B) Concern for holding Midway; 

(C) Belief Hawaiian Islands not secure which 

was concurred in by e.G; (D) Opinion raid on Pearl may soon be repeated; (E) Concern over route to Australia. 

(3) Radio intelligence indicating probability two 

carrier groups and a fast battleship division in 

Mandate area. 

(4) The probability that a definitely organized landing expedition at Wake would have strong supporting forces. 

(B) Question then became should TF 14 be directed to 

attack enemy forces at Wake? If TF 14 became involved 

should Task Force 11 be ordered to support? My conclusion 

was that if action developed against any but unimportant naval forces at Wake it would be on enemy' s te r•ms in 

range of shore-based bombers with our forces 2000 miles 

from nearest base with inadequate fuel for more than 

2 days high speed, with probable loss of any damaged 

ships, and might involve~ two task forces 

(C) I had been strongest advocate of offensive action for 

relief of Wake but with Wake under landing attack I 

became convinced that the general situation took 

precedence and required conservation of our forces. 

With extrefle regret I ordered a retirement Opnav 271810. 

120 
DEC. GCT 

8 1631 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Your 26 1908 I plan to transport entire reenforcement less 

aviation in Ma tson Line ships escorting with force mentioned 

your 142346. One Fleet AO will accompany expedtion. In 

addition commercial AK with essential contractor's material 

may proceed with or independent this convoy. Covering or 

diversion operations under consideration will be determined 

upon later. Recommend you make the three Matson ships 

available San Diego by 3 January. 

29 1431 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Alnav 

166 

STRONG INDICATIONS JAPANESE BASING MAKIN ISL IN NORTH 

GILBERTS THUS DEVELOPING THREAT TOWARDS FIJI AND SAMOA AND 

SO TO COlviMUNICATIONS VVITH A US'I'RALIA. INCLUDE THIS FACTOR 

IN YOUR CONSIDERATION OF "COVERING OR DIVERSION OPERATIONS" 

OF YOun 281631 KING CONCURS. 

ALNAV 

FUNCTIONS OF COMr.'fANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET ( COMINCH): 

(1) Evaluation of information and intelligence. 

{2) Preparation and execution of plans for current war 

operations. 

(3) Operational duties. 

(4) Essential communications for war operations. 

(5) Training. (Opnav prepares War Plans from long-range 

point of view). 

0 1701 COMINCH TO PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES 

ALNAV 166 CURRENT· OPERATING PLANS ALLOCATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS 

CONTINUE IN EFPECT liTNLESS AUD UNTIL DULY MODIFIED AS TO ALL 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AFFECTING FLEETS NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

AND ARMY COVIlv~ANDS X ADDRESS TO IVJE ALL OPERATING DESPATCHES AND 

CORRESPONDENCE BUT CONTINUE TO ADDRESS OPNAV ON ALL OTHER 

IVIATTERS. IT IS MY INTENTION THAT COMMAND SHALL BE EXERCISED 

B Y THE ISSUE OF GENERAL OPERATING PLANS AND OR DIRECTIVES 

AND THAT PERTINENT DISCRETION l'-~ D RESPONSIBILITY SHALL BE 

B VESTED IN APPROPRIATE PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES IN CHAIN OF 

COMMAND. CARRY ON. OPNAV INPORMED. 

·- 00 1740 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

CONSIDER TASKS ASSIGNED YOU SU:MivlARIZE INTO TWO PRIMARY TASKS 

I N ORDER OF PRIOHITY FI RST COVERI NG AND HOLDI NG LINE EAWAII 

MIDWAY AND MAINTAINING I TS COivTIVIUNICATIONS WITH WEST COAST 

SECOND AND ONLY IN SMALL DEGREE LESS IMPORTANT MA I NTENANCE 

OF COMf1IUNICATION r1ffiST COAST AUSTRALIA CHIEFLY BY COVERING 

SECURI NG AND HOLDING LINE I:IA~!VA II SAMOA WHICH SHOULD BE EXr~PEN D TO I NCI,UDE FIJI AT rARLIEST PRACT I CABLE DATE SEE 121 

OPNAV 291431 I N THIS CONNECTI ON. 
DEC. GCT 

0 1940 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

TRANSFER FROM HAWAIIAN AREA TO CINC ASIATIC FOR DUTY ONE 

12 PLANE PATROL SQUADRON READY FOR SERVICE X DESIGNATION OF 

SQUADRON CHOICE OF ROUTE LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS AT DISCRETION 

CINCPAC X THIS MOVEMENT MUST BE EXPEDITED. 

31 2300 COMINCH TO CINCAF, INFO CINCPAC 

JAN meT 

THE GENEB.AL STRATEGIC POLICY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EASTERN 

THEATER VJHICH HAS BEEF AGREED UPON BY THE US AND BRITISH CHIEFS 

OF STAFF IS AS FOLLOYS: 

(A) TO HOLD THE WiliLAY BARRIER (DEFINED AS THE LINE ri~ALAY PENINSULA SUWlATRA JAVA AND NORTH AUSTilALIA) AS THE BASIC DEFENSIVE 

POSITION IN THAT THEATER AND TO OPERATE SEA LAND AND AIR FORCES 

IN AS GREAT DEPTH AS POSSIBLE FORWARD OF THE. BARRIER IN ORDER 

TO OPPOSE ANY JAPANESE SOUTIDVARD ADVANCE. 

(B) TO HOLD BURW~ AND AUSTRALIA AS ESSENTIAL SUPPORTING 

POSITIONS FOR THE THEATER AND BURWlA~AS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUPPORT 

OF CHINA AND TO THE DEFENSE OF INDIA. 

(C) TO REESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE DUTCH EAST 

INDIES WITH LUZON AND TO SUPPORT T1TE PHILIPPINES GARRISONS 

(D) TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE THEATER 

IN DISPOSING OF THE REINFORCE1ffiNTS ARRIVING IN THAT THEATER 

YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE POLICY AND CONSIDER THE 

:NEED OF THE THEATER AS A WHOLE X TO THIS END CLOSE COOPERATION 

AMONG THE BRITISH DUTCH AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS IS 

ESSENTIAL AND YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONCERT MEASURES 

ACCORDINGLY BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF FAR EAST WILL INFORM 

THE DUTCH AND REQUEST THEIR COOPERATION. 

02 1718 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

URGE YOUR THOROUGH CONSIDERAT TON OF EXPEDITION OF RAID IN 

CHARACTER AGAINST ENEMY BASES IN GILBERT ISLANDS PROBABLY 

MAKIN AND OR IN ELLtCE AND PHOENIX GHOUPS EITHER AS SEPARATE 

OPERATION OR PREFERABLY COORDINATED WITH SAMOA REINFORCEMENT 

EXPEDITION IN ORDER TO FIRST COVER LATTER SECOND CHECK 

INCREASING ENEI\1Y THREAT TO SAI\10A DASH FIJI AREA T HMD UNDERTAKE 

SOME AG~RESSIVE ACTION FOR EFFECT ON GENERAL HORALE . 

02 2235 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

OPERATIOlJS PROPOSED YOUR 021718 CONTEMPLATED AND UNDER 

consideration. 122 
January 2., 1942. 

'EMPLOYMENT OF CARRIER TASK FORCES IN JANUARY~ 

·I. SI'f'UA TIOM 

1. The general situation has been given 1n .the Estimate 

prepared December 24 and corrected as of December 28. A 

general comparison ot forces is included in the same Estimate. 

'• 

2. The pertinent ~eatures of the situation £ao1ng us 

are as follows: 

(a) Enemy Situation. 

From the beet intelligence. that we have, it appears 

that: -

(1) The Far East offensives are oocupy1n practically 

all of the amphibious forces of the enemy plus 3 or 4 

car~1ers ,. 2 BB 's, about 13 cru1 sers, about one-third of 

his destroyers, some submarines and many auxiliary types. 

How long these farces will be needed 1n the lt1

ar East is 

problematical but it is believed that the end o£ January 

will see them still thel'e. 

(2) Since the raid on the 7th, all Firat Fleet units 

and carriers have appa~ently remained west of the · 

Eastern Marshalls. 

(3) Carrier air groups are being refitted or 

exchanged. 

-l123 
SECRET 

(4) There are about fifteen submarines at sea 

from the Hawaiian area to the Wea.t Coast. 

(5) The enemy is consolidating an a1r base at 

Makin and is extending his air e.ct1v1t1es to New Guinea 

and, at one t1me, to the Ell1oe sl~nda. He has bombed 

Ooean Island several t1maa and Nauru at least onoe. 

(6) There are increasing indications or converted 

raiders and. tenders being at large. 

Known enemy action since the raid on Oahu has 

been -

(7) T.he sustained bombing and capture of Wake - with 

at least one carrier supporting. 

(8} Surface ship Shelling ot Midway and Johnston, 

nnd submarine shelling or Johnston, Palmyra, and outlying main is.landa ot Hawaiian group. 

(9) Sinking or three cargo ships in this general 

area and three or four on the West Coast. 

(b) Own Situation. 

(l) BattleShips - P¥mNSYLVANIA ready in mid-January, 

MARYLAND about 20 January, TENNESSEE about 5 February 1 

COLORADO 1 February_ Batdiv Three probably by the end 

of the month. Thus no battleship will be ava1lable 

dur1ng·greater part of this month. 

124 
iiCi1iiS!' 

(2) Oarrier Task Forces. 

T.F. 11 - LEXINGTON Brown. 

INDIANAPOLIS 

One DL, 5 DD 

CRIOAOO (at Pearl 

today) 

T.P. 14 - SARATOGA • Leary. AS'fORIA 

M!NltEA.POLIS 

One DL, 5 DD 

Location 

Departed P.B. 29 Dec 

covering Johnston~ 

Palmyra line; return1ng 3 January. 

Departed· P.R. 31 Dee 

covering Midway areaJ 

returning lS Jan. 

T. F. 8 - ENTERPRISE - ltal.sey. In Pearl. 

NORTHAMPTON 

SALTLAKECITY 

CHESTER 

Desron Six 

T.F. 8 Will ~robably be reduced by one. CA and ~ DD 

before departing on 5 January. It will probably remain 

at sea in the vicinity of oahu from 3-7 January. 

T.F. 17 - YORRTOWN - Fletcher. 

LOU.ISVILLE 

ST LOUIS 

Four DD 

At or en route San 

Diego. Departing S.D. 

for ~oa about 6 

January ·escorting 

3 AP, 1 AK, 1 AE, 1 AO, 

Should arrive 20 Jan. 

Some covering operat~ 

has been tentatively planned. 

Other Pac1f1c Force are engaged in escort, and local 

nnt1-.subms.rine operations; ·submarin-es - t on defensive 

I d~ W K 

patrol, 3 to tha Marshalls, 3 off Japan; patrol planes I' 

engaged 1n .patrols from Oahu. 

Same units must soon receive upkeep and others 

engage in some training. 

Our Asiatic Naval Forces have retired to the Malay 

Barrier and are preparing to move to Darwin if neoessary.1. 2 5 

-3-
SECRET 

(3) From the directives issued to the Pac1f1o Fleet, 

the mission is taken to be: 

nTo SAFEGUARD ·OUR TERRITORY 

AND COMMUNICATION LINES". 

'!'his has been stressed by the Commander-in-Chief, ( ~~ u 

U.S. Fleet (who took command yee~erda~) giving first 

priority to M1dway-Hawa11 and Hawaii-Mainland lines, 

and only slightly less to Hawaii-Samoa, extending to 

Suva as soon as practicable. 

CNO and the Secretary of the Navy have been 

concerned over the safety ot the Oahu base, and only in 

one despatch did CNO point out the need for offensive 

operations to prevent enemy use or Marshall bases and 

to benefit national and service morale. 

In connection with our tentative plan for cover-

' · fr t • o {>>f: r (i ·t~ ovt . r f>'il~~ ' • t ~· ~·t# 

ing the Samoan reenforcement, CNO ~ pointed out the ~ 

act1v1ties of the enemy 1n the Gilberts. Cominch oon-

"'(r ¥" t"~' ~' .i', •' ' ',. ' .{ ~~ fl~.>tf1 r 

curred in this suggestion~ on 2 Januar7l urged its . ~ -~d 

adoption. 

J ') r .. t..~ J 
II. ENEMY INTENTIONS 

3. In other estimates the enemy's 1ntent1one in 

general order or priority have been deduced as follows: 

(a.) The prose.eution of the offensives in the Far East 

until all of Malaysia, Philippines and N.E.I. have 

been captured. In this will probably be included 

Rangoon. 

(b) Consolidation o.f this territory. 

(e) Advance upon Australia .. 

\Vh1le these are going on: 

(d) Continued submarine raids on our forces and communications, minor attacks against outlying islands 

and Alaska. 

(e) Cruiser raids aga1n$t the routes to Australia, 

and possibly to the Mainland. 

(f) Capture Samoa. 

(g) Capture Canton. 

(1) Capture Suva. 

(j) Attack w1th strong forces)including carrier~for 

demolition Johnston, Palmyra, Midway. 

(k) Sweeps 1n force along our communications to outlying islands; along our route to Mainland. 

(1) Carrier raids on West Coast. 

1\4 i' t. ~'~ \! >' 

(m) Attacks £or capture of'~. Palmyra; main 

Ha aiian Islands; Oahu. 

.s.,. 127 
8!8R!IIe 

III. OiVN COURSES OF ACT!OB 

4. During the next month it may be assumed that ther• 

will be no release of the forces now engaged 1n escort duty, 

or of those oper.at1ng in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 

In other words we are committed to thit esoort1ng and patro11ng. 

5. The program ror the submarines and patrol planes for 

the next month may be considered fairly well settled. The 

only change that might be made is for some submarine protection 

of Samoa, 

6. It is also aaaumed that during January there will 

be' no renewal or navy yard overhauls and extended uplteep, or 

diversion of .forces to a strictly training ,program during 

January. 

7. As Task Force l? 1s committed to the Samoan expedi~ 

tion, our problem reduces to the employment of tho units now 

comprising Task Forces Eight, Eleven, and Fourteen. The wa:y 

the employment of these task forces has been shaped up so far, 

it appears that we are committed to covering to the westward W~ "Y\ 

T.F. 14 until the 13th and that thG.t force \Vill not ba available· for another operation until about the l7th. T.F. 11 will 

be available about' .. the 7th. T.F. 8 the llth. Thus Oahu will 

be covered until the 17th and Midway until about the lOth. 

-6- 128 
8i6Riit 

e. The following courses of action sug~est themselves: 

(a) To covor Oahu closely,. 

(b) To cover Midway. 

(c) To cover Johnston and Palmyra. I 

(d) To cover Canton and Samoa. 

(e) To operate carrier groups in above covering operations: (1) separately; (2) w1tb.1n ready supporting 

distances of each other; (3) in combination. 

(f) To attack enemy communications with: (l) cruisers; 

{2) one carrier group; (3) two or more carrier Broups 

separately, or in combination. 

(g) To attack enemy positions with one or mo1 .. e carrier 

groups. For objectives, it is considered that the only 

ones at all practicable at this time are Wake, the 

Marshalls and the Gilberts. 

9. The considerations favoring the adoption of oovering 

operations alone aret 

(a) Oahu may require more than 1ts own defenses in case 

of attack. 

(b) The outlying islands undoubtedly do require more than 

their own de.fenses to defeat even a moderate scale attack. 

(c) Such operatlons should keep own available forces 

undamaged until an enemy attack comes (ignoring possibility 

of damage by submarines). They would ther~fore be intact 

for a close-in defense of the territory being covered. 
&iiiiiiil 

(d) Limiting our covering operations to the islands of 

the Hawaiian system would preserve the forces for the 

defense of Oahu, which is paramount. 

(e) Considerable trainine could be accomplished while 

covering is in progress. 

10. Considerations leading to adoption of offensive courses: 

(a) Damage to the enemy, disproportionate 1X practicable. 

At the shore objectives sufficient facilities might be 

destroyed to prevent, or at least hinde~ the use of these 

bases by the enemy. 

(b) Tendency to divert enemy forces for defense. lie 

might try to cover his territory with forces whioh he 

would intend to be stronger than our attacking forces. 

(c) Boost to morale of the flaet. 

(d) Boost to morale of the nation. 

(e) In general, the advantages which go with the 

initiative. 

11. One ot the . ba.sic questions facing us is: 

Is the close cover of Oahu necessary at this time? 

Taking in combination the present state of its 

defenses and our deductions as to enemy in'Centions the 

answer is "non. 

12. or outlying positiona) which is in most need of cover? 

Samoa, Cant-on, Midway, Palmyra and Johnston in that 

order. 130 

-8-
Ot course, while covering Midway and Johnston we 

would be furnishing some cover to Oahu, and w:pile on a.ttaok 

missions to the westward oerta1n cover ~it d be afforded. 

Samoa will require much less coverage after the 

reenforcement arrives and is organized, but until this has 

been accomplished (about the end of January) Samoa 1s a special 

case, and we are pract1ca~ly oor.1m1tted to cove~ing in that 

ares. or conducting a d1ver$iye operation. 

13. The questions now aPe' 

(a) Shall the operation coordinated with the samoan 

reenforcement be a. covering or an offensive operation? 

If offensive, where strike and when? T.F. 8 seems to 

be the choice for this opera_tion. 

{b) Shall T.F. 11 (ready on 7th): -

(l) Cover in the Hawaiian ·area? 

(2) Cover in the Samoan area in conjunction with T.F.8? 

(5} Conduct an offensive operation? 

If (3) when? whe~e? 

(o) Shall T.F. 14 (ready on 17th) continue to cover in ; 

the Hawaiian area or conduct an offensive operation? 

If the latter, where? 

-9-

131 
14. T.F. 8t 

(e.) In view of the strong considerations for an offensive 

move, viZ: 

(l·) Diversion of enemy from offensive moves or 

~dvanceSJ 

(2) Damage - particularly ot means which facilitate 

enemy advances; 

(3) Morale. 

I ~e defensive covering of tho Bamoan expedition 

is not considered sufficient. 'l'he CinC, U.S. Fleet is 

evidently in full agreement with this view. 

{b) The Gilberts and any other extensions of Japanese __ 

bases in the same dir·ection, are considered to be the 

best objectives, because: 

(1) Such extension toward 

0 \J Y 

oommun1cat1on linea 

and territory should be repulsed. 

{2) The force attacking them is in a good· covering 

·~ position for Bamoa and T.F. lf. 

(3) The Japanese can hardly have had time to install 

strong defenses 1n the Gilberts. Cominoh concurs that 

the Gilbert bases are ravorable objectives. 

15. When? If it is too far ahead of the arrival of - T.F. 17 at Samoa, T.F. 8 might have to retire and the enemy 

would have time to make good some of his losses, and investigate as to what is going on. 

-10-

1.32 
ii1QfU1! 

If we ~ndeavor to have the attack on the· day or 

the arrival of T.F. i7, we may have tnissed an enemy expedition 

which 'ould be arriving at Samoa at about the same time. 

I£ the attack on the Gilberts were timed to be 

about three days ahead of the arrival of T.F. 11~ the above 

objectives would be met and --T.F. 8might encounter the enemy 

expedition. I£ "sorttt oond1t1ons were .found at enemy bases, 

r~peated attacks ffould be made - the long,er. the better .for our 

;!· 

p\h'poses. \ 

'• 

16. - .T.F. ;fJi! (ready on ?th). orrenaive; moves bJ task . 

forces against communica tior:1s are not considered :r;r aptica.ble 

at t~his tlme. The enemy's. communications are all protected by 

his outlying positions. T.F. lt will be covering the Midway 

area until the lOth and 1s tied to '.the Oahu area from about 

13th to 18th. ·The alternatives for T.F. 11 are considered to be: 

(a) Cover the Midway area; 

(b) Cover the southwestern ar~a; 

(c) Attack on Wake; 

(d) Attack on northeaste~n Marshalls; 

(e) Attack on southeastern Marshalls. 

17. Perhaps more enemy 1nrorma tion will be rece1 ved in 

the next few days to guide us (via aubmartnes, B-17 or enemy 

activity). Failing this, the best course for T.F. ll .is believed 

to be an air raid on Wotje-Maloelap. This has the following 

advantages: 

-11-
(a') Starts our o.ffensive moves earlier, 

(b) Approach to these islands is not flanked by 

any ener1y pos1 tions, and they are not believed too 

strong tor such an attack; 

(c) It will divert the enemy 1n connection w1th our 

later operations in the southwest. 

(d) The force will be furnishing some measure or 

cover to Johnston and Palmyra. 

(e) T.F's 11 and e will ·be within mutual support 

dttring part of the operation. 

lU. This a.ttackeould take place about the 13th or 14th. 

T,F. a, by leaving on the lOth should be able to attack the 

Gilberta on the 17th. 

19. T.F. 14 after departing Pearl on the 17th should be 

held in a central supporting position. T.F. ll 1Duld return 

to the Oahu area about the 20th.; T .. F. 8 about the 25th. After 

they return, more effective upkeep, and a.ome $ystem for 

trainingJshould be initiated. 

ao. Summary. 

{a) T.F. 11 depart 7th and attack Wotje~Maloelap on 

13th or 14th. Return to arrive Pearl a bout 20th. 

{b) T.F. 8 depart lOth. Attack Gilberts on the 17th 

if practicable (delay i.f departure of T.F. 17 is delayed) • 

Return to P.efrrl about 25th. 

134 

--12-
.&ianrm 

(a) 'l'.F. 14 continue present covering oper·ation, and 

on departure from Poarl about l7th oover from a central 

position to the westward. 

January 24. 

Final decisions by CinCPac as to the employment of 

the carrier task forces was as follows: 

Task Force Eleven sailed on,7 January to cover the 

Johnston - Midway line; returnPd on 16th; sa i led again on 19th 

to cover Christmas - Palmyra line ; was on 21 January ordered to 

attack Wake ; then, when NECEES was sunk, was ordered to r eturn 

to Pearl. 

Task Force Fourteen carrier, ·sARATOGA was hit by one 

torpedo; returned on 13th; out of action for several months. 

Task Force Eight sailed on 11th to cover Samoa ; then 

to make an attack on the Marshall - Gilberts after the unloading 

was completedrt 

Task Force Seventeen was to make an attack in conjunction with Task Force Eight. 

Final order was to depart Samoa for this attack just as 

soon as troops were ,Jise:m.barked. This will make the .attacks 

(Jaluit, Mille, Makin) about January 31 . 

-13-

135 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION {Cont'd) 

January 3 

Task Force 8 departed and Task Force 11 entered Pearl. AA 

and surface target practice was arranged for Task Force 8 on its 

first two days at sea - a resumption of this type of training. Besides covering Oahu, Task Force 8 was to assist in protection of a 

very slow convoy of 17 ships which was approaching from the Coast. 

Complying with directive of the War Department, the Arm 

was trying out the route for heavy bombers to Australia. 

First division of Patron 22 departed for the Asiatic Fl~t 

This Fleet had largely assembled at Port Darwin. • 

One Army B-17 reported on a reconnaissance of Wake made on 

the 2nd. Little activity was seen except two seaplanes and three 

small craft. This was substantiated by photographs and the report of the POMPANO. This submarine was ordered from Wake to the 

Marshalls, leaving none at Wake. The need for information of the 

Marshalls motivated this change. 

January 4 

Task Forces operating as before. 

GRAYLING departed to make the fifth submarine in the 

Marshall-Gilberts. 

In 050547 CinCPao pointed out Cominch the danger of detaching air units when we need as many as 288 VP for maintenance of 

effective search. 

What information of the enemy could be obtained indicated 

that reenforcements were moving to support the land offensives. 

However, Rabaul aerodromes were bombed this date. 

The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was informed by the War Department that he would be in command of a 

pursuit squadron, arriving Fiji the end of January, which would 

operate under strategic direction of New Zealand. It is not clear 

what relationship this force would have to the CinCPac in his exercise of unity of connnand. 

January 5. 

Task Force Eleven is in Pearl; to depart the 7th. ~ask 

Force Fourteen is patrolling Midway area until 13th; Task ~orce 

Eight covering to the northward of Oahu, to enter the 7th. 

Cominch in 051747 in connection with detachment of VP's, assured that paramount importance of the Hawaiian Area was realized~ 

and inquired whether Midway was sufficiently strong to be held 1,j 5 

against a strong attack. See Cincpacs reply, 070245 • . 

-15-
RUNNING SUMMARY OF' SITUATION {Cont'd) 

January 5 {Cant 'd)' 

In 052154 (rollowing) Cominch informed of the agreement concerning the Far East between Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the U.S. 

January 6 

Task Forces assigned as before. Task Force 17 sailed from San Diego for Samoa, date of arrival, 20th. 

The large, slow convoy (DETROIT) had been joined by the PORTLAND and two DD from Pearl. 

War Department info~ted Commanding General that the u.s. participation in the construction of the air field at Noumea is his responsibility. Australia should defend New Caledonia, but 

u.s. may have to contribute. 

Deliberation continued as to character of the operation to be conducted by Task Force Eight in connection with the Samoan reenforcement. 

January 7 

Madn ta~s f~ces operating as planned. Task Force One was established, c~~posed or BBs, HELENA and 5 DD. 

PENSACOLA departed Brisbane for Pearl. 

Cominch informed of expedition from East Coast to Borabora (see 070015 following). The status of the. army garrison was not defined. Same despatch informed of Army reenforcements to Australia, Canton, Christmas and Hawaii. 

· No significant information of enemy was received except a trend toward reenforcement of the land offensives in Philippines, Malaya, and Borneo. 

January 8 

All battleships at Puget Sound were given a completion date of February 5; PENNSYLVANIA January 22. 

It was decided that the operation of Task B,orce Eight would be to cover Samoa from a northward position. See Vice Admiral Pye's estimate a9pended, and Op. Order 3-42. 

Offensive operations are planned for Task Forces Eight and Seventeen after the unloading at Samoa is completed. See Op. Plan 

4-42. 

-16-

137 
RUNNING Sill~IARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January~ (Cont'd) 

Received Cominch's 081856 asking date of Samoan reenforce- ment. Replied with 090445 giving outline of plans. 

SWAN departed for Pago Pago to act as tender for VOS planes being sent there via Taskfor 17. 

First report from a submarine indicated little activity at Rongelap and Binini, and considerable at Kwajalein. ~ 

Report of attacks on 6th and 7th against Rabaul aerodrome 

was received. 

Organization of Asiatic Fleet was .received. A report indi- cated very few u.s. aircraft had escapted from the Philippines. 

r Australia is sending some cruiser strength toward Suva. 

-17- 138 
~· GCT 

05 0547 

8!88iUii 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH - INFO OPNAV, CO}dGEN HAWNDET(MAIL) 

Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theater even though temporary for other 

projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft 

carrier and other fo1~s of attack x Retention of 

Oahu is by no means assured with present available 

forces x Navy patrol wings should be increased to 

144 planes composed of both seaplane and landplane 

types for maintenance effective search x Carrier 

squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full 

allowance of spares to insure maximum effective seaborne striking force x To maintain even pres·ent 

da.ily search imposes greater load on material and 

personnel than can be much longer continued x See 

my 041001 x See Co.mdg General Hawaiian Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which 

CinCPac strongly concurs x 

139 
_fi1J!Oi18f 

JAN GCT. 

05 1747 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

WITHDRAWALS OF PATROL PLANES OM YOUR THEATER ARE NOT 

· CONTEI~I PLATED OTHER THAN ONE SQUADRON TO FAR EAST ALREADY 

ENROUTE X YOUR 050547 X trEASURES NOW IN HAND (1st) TO 

INCREASE YOUR PATROL PLAHE STRENGTH (BUT AT LEAST TOKEN FORCES 

MUST BE CONTINUED ALONG WEST COAST WHILE EAST COAST IS 

CURRENTLY DENUDED) (2) FOR KEEPING CARRIER SQUADRONS AT 

STRENGTH AND TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENT SQUADRONS,; BE ASSURED 

THAT PARAM01JNT I~~I PORTANCE OF HA"vVAIIAN AREA IS REALIZED X 

DO YOU CONSIDER MID1'7AY NO'JV ADEQUATELY STRONG TO BE HELD 

AGAINST STRONG , TTACK X 

05 2154 COMINCH TO CINCAF 

Following is brief of draft agreement between Australia, 

Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States known as ABDA 

Powers. Will inform you when ratified. ABDA Area established 

to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in the 

general region Burma, Malaya, Netherlands;.. East Indies and 

the Philippines. The boundaries are similar to those defined 

for the Far East Area but including Torres Strait and North 

coast of Australia from Cape York to N0 rthwest Cape. Supreme 

Command set up under one commander of all land and sea and air 

forces of the ABDA governments which are in the ABDA area 0r 

located in Australian territory when such forces allotted 

for service in or in support of the ABDA area. Basic strategic concept for the conduct of war is not only in the 

inmedia te future to maintain as many ke; positions as possible but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity~ 

The first essential is to gain gensral air superiority at 

the earliest moment through employment of concentrated air 

power* General strategic employment of concentrated air 

pblicy is that stated in my 312300. Supreme Command will 

coordinate strategic op erations all armed forces assign 

strategic missions and objectives and where desirable arrange 

for formation of Task Forces for the execution of specific 

operations a ppointing any officer irrespective of seniority 

or nationality to command such task forces. Supreme Command 

will have n o responsibility in respect to internal administration of f orces. He will make no alte ration in the basi c 

tac t ical or gafuization of su ch forc es and each national component of a t ask force will n or ma lly operate under its o\m 

c ommander and not be subdivided into small units for attachment to other na tional components exc ept in case s of urgent 

necessi t y. Commanders of a l l land and air forces will be 

i nforme d b y r espective governments that fr om a date to be 

n otif ied a l l orders and instructions issuea by t he supreme 

c ommander will be considered as emanating f r om.t h~ i~ respective 

gover nments .. Staf f of supreme commander will l nC.Lude 14 O 
JAN. GCT 

2154 

(C¢)NTD) 

015 

07 0245 

officers of each of the ABDA powers. The supreme hPadquarters 

initially in Java. ~avell will be supreme commander, Brett 

deputy, Hart CinC all naval forc es ABDA area. Obt~in 

full text of agreement from ,,IIJg_ ve ll. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

NAVY 7viLL ESTABLISH A FUEL DEPOT CAPACITY 200,000 GDBLS 

FUEL OIL 50,000 BBLS DIESEL 50,000 GALLONS GASOLINE IN 

BORABORA SOCIETY ISLANDS CODE NAME BOBCAT, REPEAT BOBCAT 

V'JITH EXPEDITION SAILING FROM EAST COAST LATTER PART OF 

JANUARY X NAVY WILL NLAN FUEL DEPOT RADIO STATION SEAPLANES 

NETS AND HARBOR FACILITIES 6 VOS WITH FACII.ITIES FOR 12 VPB 

X ARMY GARRISON AB01JT 3,880 ~~ILL MAN/NAVY rztt GUNS AND AA 

EIGHT 

1 

l 

EQUIVALENT OF MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION AND PROVIDE MOBILE 

DEFENSE X PROPOSE ESCORT REPEAT ESCORT T.~liTH SEPACFOR TO 

REMAIN DESTINATION UNTIL FIXED DEFENSES INSTALLED AND ARE 

OPERATlNG X COMPANCF INFORM COMSEPACFOR ON ARRIVAL FROM SAN 

DIEGO AND CilJCPAC ON DEPARTURE CONVOY FHOM CANAL ZONE Z ARMY . PLANS SENDING LA3T OF JANUARY FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO AUSTRALIA 

CODE rAME XRAY 15 KNOT CONVOY WITH 11,000 TROOPS AND ABOUT 

SAME TI1~ GARRISON 1,400 MEN TO CANTON AND 1,900 TO CHRISTMA~ 

X APPROVED ARMY PLANS TOTAL REENFORCEI11ENTS HAvYAII CODE NAME 

COPPER ~ILL BE ABOUT 30,000 MEN POSSIBLY 50,000 IN ADDITION 

TO THOSE N0\7 ENROUTE X Iv'lOVEMENT TO XRAY CANTON CHRISTlvlAS WILL \ 

INCREASE ~~~OUR ESCORT LOAD AND RETARD r.IOVEMENT TO COPPER SO 

THAT ONLY 1500 ADDITIONAL WILL GO IN JANUARY 20,000 IN 

FEBRUARY REMAINDER VIARCH X REQUEST C011MENT AND STATEMENT AS 

TO WHEN YOU CAN PROVIDE ESCORTS X 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

YOUR 051747 Personnel and equipment Midway given my serial 

0128W of 1 January. 14 VMF and 17 VMS now based there. My 

serial 102W of 3 January ordered 2 Cor;;panie s infantry 

transferred from 2d Marine Division at San Diego to Midway. 

They will not be there before end this month. 1 submarine 

on patrol there. 1 Major Task Force operates intermittently 

that vicinity. Addition of 2 patrol plane squadrons 1 or ~o~I 

fighter squadrons and small surface units for local defense ~ould ~reatly strengthen the defensive capabi~ities of Midway 

and should be provided at earliest opportunity but under 

existing circumstances such forces are not available to 

Cincpac for assign~ent. Consider Midway as now held can 

repel moderate attack and with additions mentioned above 

will be able to withsrand any except major attack. 

141 
JAN. GCT 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

8 1856 'V1IAT IS E3TI T,f!ATED DATE OF REINPORCEMENT EXPEDITION MENTIONED 

l.IY 021718 YOUR o22235'Z 

09 0445 ~INCPAC TO COMINCH 

YOUH 081856 Date, arrival reenforcement Samoa 20 January. 

Taskfor 8 departing Pearl 11 January to operate in coordination 

with Task Force 17to cover arrival and unloading x Upon 

completion plan both forces make simultaneous air attacks 

Gilberts and Eastern Marshalls. Estimate date these attacks 

first vTeek of February. Offensive opera tio:as deferred until 

after establishment Samoan Reenforcements in order to more 

positively insure success that expedition and to avoid serious 

situation that would arise if one carrier were damaged 2,000 

mi'les from base while operating without other carrier support. 

142' 
iiiCiFf 

ApDITIONAI, CONSIDERATIONS t SAMOA REENi~EMEN'l'1 OP~T ON 

~~ '7 ~~ dlttl~ kJl?7-

What means or interfering with Samoa Expedition are available to enemy? 

(l) Seaplane bombers. 

(2} Land based bombers. 

(3) Submarines. 

(4) Combination ot cru1ser-oarr1er task group. 

General Considerations. 

Enem1 must be assumed to know of the comp·os1 tion and date · 

of depar-ture o:t SAMOA reenforcement expedition, bj' means ot 

agents communicating via Mexico. For such an expedition the:re 

could bo asgttmed only four probable destinations -

(a) Midway, (b) Hawaiian Islands, (c) Samoa, (d) Fiji Islands. 

If the enemy information service is as err1o1ent in the 

Un1 ted States as it is in Ha.wa1.1an Isl.anda, the lal"ge amount 

of contractor's materials destined for SAMOA will be known to 

be in tha AK, and that the true destination may be assumed to 

be known to the enemy. 

The assumption, that t e e emy will be advised of the OO!npo si tion- of the force, 1 ts ~)'j- departure 1 and destination will 

be known to the enemy, is not only reasonable but should be considered a~ n fact and our plans ~~ould be made on that assumption. 

The enemy will have at least two weeks in which to organize 

and move forces to attack the SAMOA detachment. Vie know that 

there were at least 41 land bombers which made an attack on Wake, 

probably from Eniwetok or Ronge.lap. To the best or our knowledge 

there are in the Marshalls a compara.tively few long rang sea 

planes. There were and may still be two carrier groups, several 

CA'a and possibly a fast battleship division in the Mandate area. 

Jaluit appears to be the center or enemy submarine activity and 

1n all probability bas both seaplane and landplane operating 

raeilities. The number of submarines actually available at 

Jaluit is unknown but with the number known to be operating in 

Hawaiian waters and in waters between Hawaii and the West Coast, 

the probable number of submarines available in Jaluit, ie not 

large. 

In the Marshall Islands on the eastern fringe Wotje is 

probably the best developed. Rec,ont information indio tea 

enemy ac ti vi ty at M111, the sou theJ?nmO s t 1 sland. 14 3 

-1 ... 
In' the Gilbert Islands (B1 .. i tish) information indicates 

the possible establishment of an enemy seaplane base nt Makin, and the demolition by landing forces of the radio station and 

other .facilities at Tarawa. Of the other Gilbert Islands 

although most or them are sparsely inhabited none seem to offer 

good sites for seaplane operating bases. 

Crtlc/ U(!Jrlll.:'"ofdtt C/1 c 

or the Ellice lsJ,.ands Funafut1.tt i-s- apparently sui table a 

seaplane bas~ ~Hi an extensiv atoll with a lnrge lagoon, into which there are two entrances for ships probably 18' ~ 20' 

draft., This lagoon has bean used by seaplanes. fl'hia island 

is the moat suitable for development by the enemy for a seaplane base. Enemy planes have been reported flying over this island 

at vnrioua times but as yet it 1s presumed that no attack by the 

enemy has been made as pres'Unlably con:nnunlca.tion between .Funs.f'ut1 

and tho Australian Government still is intact; and no r~port of 

any attack has been made. 

Consideration of ~ttack on Samoan Detachment by seaplane bombers. 

At present e.ny known seaplane operating base in use by 

enemy seaplanes is outside or effective range from samoa. Even 

IUnaruti is over 700 miles from Samoa. 

A row long range seaplane bombers were seen over Wake, but 

the numbor was too small to cause m.uoh concern. The total 

number o:f this type oi: plane possessed by the Japanese Navy is 

not believed to be larg , and to date there are no indications 

ot the development of a base rrom which mtch type could be ef£ect1ve in the area. of Ss.moa. 

Conclusion: An effective attack against the Samoan exp - d1t1on by seaplane bombers does not appear to constitute a 

serious threat. 

Consideration of Attack on Samoan Detachment by landbased 

bombers. 

Landbased bombers to a number of more than 40 appeared over 

Wake on aeveral occasions. The bases from which they operat d 

are not definitely known, but ar•e presumed to be Eniwetok, Range- lap# and possibly Wotje. The radius of action or these planes is over 500 miles with bombs., and possibly a:1 much as 700 miles. 

It must always be kept in mind that if a ravorable target is 

presented we may expect these planes to fly to at least 900 miles 

in a suicide attack. 

So far na is known there exist no land fields for the oper- ation of landbaaed planes south or east of Jaluit, which island 

is about 1700 miles fr'om Pago Pa.go. 

-2- 144 
!!@Ri'l 

Conclusion: Until further fields tor the operation of 

landbased planes are known to exist, interference with the 

Samoan Detachment by landbasad bombers does no·t appear to constitute a serious menace as long as Canton remains in our hands. 

Consideration of Attack bz submarines on Samoan Detach:rnent. 

Assuming as we should do, that the enemy w.Lll make a 

correct decision as to the deetination of the Samoan Detachment 

submarines from Jalu1t could arrive in the vtcinity of Pago Pago before the arrival of our detachment. 

Tho number of. ships in this detachment which are required 

to enter port is not less than five. The YORKTOWN may have to 

enter to unload the seaplanes she is carrying. The only net 

protection is an anti-torpedo net~ The harbour is deep and a . 

submarine could pass the net when submerged. Two-man submarines 

would be effective if they could be brought to the vicinity. 

There are two single lines or mines off the entrance. 

Such minef1elds are not very effective and in ta.ot may complicate the operation of destroyers against submarines. These 

fields have been placed and there is no possibility of changing 

or removing them. 

If as we must l!relieve the ~nemy is anticipating extending his operations to Samoan and P1 1 Islands, the maximum possible interference with the Samoan Expedition must be anticipated by 

us. A coneentration of onamy submarines in the v1oin1ty· or 

Pago Pago would consti·tute a serious menace both to ships at 

sea and in port. Whether or not the enemy Will so emplo:r them 

1s probably merely a question of their availability and the 

precedence assigned to this operation as compared to operations in the vicinity or Pearl and on our West Coast. 

Conclusion: Under the c1rcn1r.:ustances we should aesume 

that enemy subrnarines will be made available for such operation against the Samoan Detachment and should plan accordingly. 

v Consideration of a combination Carr1er-Oruiser enemy Task ~oroe to inter?ero with Samoan ExEedit1o~. · 

There was ample radio intelligence indicating the presen~e 

in tha Mandate Area as late as 20 December, or 2 carrier divi• 

siena, 1 hoa.vy cruiser division, and possibly 1 fast battleship division. The indication of the locations of these units has 

not been so definite recently. ..ibey .may or may not have 

returned to their home bases. 

145 
We should assume, ho ever, that the general composition of our Task Forces are known to tho enemy, and it is reasonable 

to suppose that within the Mandate Ar.ea there exists an enemy Task Force of superior strength to any one of ours. 

It is not believed that Jalu1t is capable or handling such 

a forco, but Truk may be. Truk is about 2600 miles from Samoa. 

Such a force operating trom T~tk would of necessity require fuel 

at sea, but we have evidence of the enemy being efficient 1n 

such operations. 

Conclusion: We must consider that the f~rmation of a Task 

Force superior in strength to our normal Task A.'orce organization, with instructions to intercept and destroy our Samoan DetachMant 

1 s a probab111 ty which can not be ove.rlooked. 

Su.nunarizing the conclusions reached above:· 

An attack upon our ~oan Detachment by • 

(a) Long range seaplanes 1s improbable; 

(b) Long range landbaaed bombers is improbable so long as 

Canton remains in our hands, and Suva in the hands of 

our Allies. 

(c) A concentration of submarines in the vicinity of Pago Pago is probable. 

(d) An enemy Taak Force or carriers and surface ships of 

a strength superior to one of our nol"'mal Task Fo.rce 

organizations ~s probabl6. 

To counter these enemy measur~s -

(a) Ve must provide a.dequate anti-submarine defense in the 

immediate vicinity of Pago Pago during the approach, unloading and departure or the ships of Task Force 17. 

·(b) Increase the protection of Task orce 17 by an additional Task Force, support Task rorce l? by an additional Task Force within striking distance; or attempt by attacking enemy positions in the Gilberts by our 

second Task Force to divert enemy efforts away from the 

Samoan Expedition. 

Anti-submarine defense. 

The anti-submarine defense of Task Foree 17 consists of 4 

destroyers and air patrols .from a carrier a.nd 2 cruisers. In 

the open se this anti-submarine defense during daylight is 

146 
probably adequate but in port, or while entering or sortieing 

such de.f ense appears 1nadequa te.. ·r t is a.l so ina.dtHtua te at 

night to prevent enemy submarines entering the bay and passing 

under the anti ... torpedo net. 

This f'orce will be in port .from 6 - a days and four 

destroyers is 1nadequ.ato to maintain the required night patrol for such a long period. 

Conclusions t Task Force 17 should be a.ugraentad by 4 

destroyer's. The destr.oyers of Task Force 8 should not be 

depleted in ord&l' to furnish these ships, unleas four destroyers 

can be made available from no other aouroe. 

~Anti-carriet;-eruiser _ gerense .. 

Task Force 17 will consist of • LOUISVILLE, ST LOUIS, 

YORKTOWN and 4 destroyers and on the last day at sea and while 

in port, of 4 additional destroyers from Pearl. 

Task Force a will consist of - NORTHAMPTO~f., SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTl~R, ENTERPRISE and 9 destroyers (or 5 destroyers in case 

4 must be sent from th1s force to Task Force 1'7). 

It is possible but not probable that any enemy cruisercarrier task force will be much 1f any, superior to this combined force. 

These tlvo forces can effect a junction the day before 

Task Force 17 arrive a.t Fago Pago if desirable; or, 

Task Force 8 could attack Mili and Makin as a diversion 

at any tim.e from 2 days before to several days after the arrival 

of Task Force 17; or, 

·Task lt"orce 8 cquld operate within supporting distance find 

in advance of Task liorce 17 during its approach, and to the 

westward of Pago Pago during the unloading • 

.Q.ons1derat1on of a diversion attack on ~~111 and Makin. 

The conclusion has been reached that the Samoan Detachment 

is not threatened seriously by long range seaplane bombers or 

by landbased bombers so long as Canton is in ou~ hands, but 

tr...at it is threatened by submarines and a carrier .. oruisar task 

force. 

A diversion attack s.a such, could be of assistance to the 

Samoan Expedition only in case it caused enemy submarines or 

' the enemy carrier-cruissr task force to be diverted fram Samoap 

-5-

147 
Such a diversion attack certainly would divert no enemy submarine from Samoa. 

That it would divert an enemy carrier-cruiser task group is very doubtful. In the first place 1t is doubtful if such 

enemy task force would be sufficiently close to consider that 

there was a possibility of overtaking our task toroe; and in 

the second place if the enemy has information of the Samoan 

Expedition wh.ich we should assume that he haa, he would at once 

place the at tack on Mili and Makin in the cls. ss of a diversion. 

Should such a.n attack result in any loss and fail as a 

diversion 1t would have been a costly experiment. 

Even if such attack were made early and no loss sustained 

the situation in relation to the Samoan Detachment would remain 

unchanged. If this attack were made about the time of or after 

the arrival of Task Force 17, the distance separating our two 

task forces would be so great that for several daya they could 

afford each other no mutual supnort. 

~1is course of action offers no advantages except the 

possibility of damage to Mill and Ms.k1n at the possible sacrifice of Samoa. After the Samoan Expedition is landed and the 

ships are clear, ijttack and reconnaissance by rfask ii'orce 8 

and Task Force/l~ea auxiliaries will be practicable should the 

situation then warrant. 

Consideration of joining our two task forces the day before 

a.rr i val at Se.moa. 

The two task forces so .1o1ned probably will be equal or 

superior to any enemy carrier-cruiser attack group 1 but i"f not, it will have to fight it out. There s.re several advantages in 

having these two task forces concentrated. 

{1) reduces air activity for anti-submarine patrol and 

for fighting plane patrol; 

(2) concentrates a large number of destroyers for antisubmarine defense; 

(3) has all ships within tactical control in case an 

enemy force is located and an action or oha e ensues. 

(4) permits more e.ffective cooperation of air attack 

activities. 

There ara 1 howe,rer, several disadvantages:-

(1) a chance sighting of this force unknown to it, by a 

submarine or plane, night permit the nemy to launch l~ 

a daylight attack findin ., both carriers togeth r nd - t 8 

subject to the same attack~ 

-e .. 
(2) limit the area that ean be searched to the r dius trom 

one position although it increases the arc which can be 

e rob d. 

(3) deereaaes tltxib111ty for maneuvering. 

~ Conclusion on this eourae of action is reaerv·ed.. 

Oonsid ~atign of oUerating our two task.forcts within t ct1oal air aupport but not in 'he same formation, 

If T sk Porce 8 operates 200 .. 300 miles in advance of Task Force 

17 d~ring dar befo~• arrival, and to westward of ~am.Oa during the 

p riod ot unloading tb rea covered by plane- of the two carriers 

will be much greater than if they operate together and aonsequentlr giv~ a gr ter cba.noe of locating the enemy •. It 11 recognized that 

this requires mor £lyipg with consequent wear and t ar but due to 

importance of this expedition g tting shore this disadvantage should 

be aooept d. 

There 1 the 1\lr·ther diss.dva.nt.age that if either of our Task 

Forces 1s enoounte~ed alone, it may be weaker than the enemy Task 

oro J and under oerta1n conditione might not be able- to assist by 

air support in time. And further, the operation of two carriers 

in the immediate vicinity or Pago Pago 1ncre ses the chance or 

loss of one by submarine att ek. · 

9ono~siona t The advantages and disadvantage ot operating 

our Taekoroes together or separated by 200-300 miles a·re just about the ame, but I should be ,inclined to favor operating them 

separately but within t ctical air support. 

Additional measures. 

Canton Island 690 m1lea north of Tutuila has t present a 

land air field 5000 tee·t long and suitable for B-17 operation. It can also acoomm~date VP planes. 

Dur,.n. tho Samoan relief expedltion a :rorc of' 6 VPta and 6 

B-17•s operating from Oanton I land might be of gr at valu as a 

scouting nd attack group. 

If C nton is 3t111 in our hands on 19 January a force of 6 

VP'e and 6 B·lrl'a should arrive at Oanton Island that d y, 
OPERATIONS AFTER RlniNFQROEME~TT . OFI SAMOA IS COMPLETED 

Task Force 8 and 17 should .fuel from tankers just pr vioul to 

arriv 1 of TasJe Foree 17 in Samoan are (within 500 tnilee of deat1-

nation), and uga.1n during latter stages of unloading period. They should be prepared for additional operations. 

A question immediately arises in regard to the ·prooedure in 

refereno to the transports and auxiliaries. Tbeae hips will be 

light on their return trip and can make g.ood spe~d. It is robable 

that ther will be many evacuees from Samoa_ on"&t least one of the 

tqon l ne v saela. 

er it not for these 6vaoueea 1 t would proba.bly be d4UJirable 

to p rm1 t aoh tl'ansport and auxili.e.ry to proceed 1ndep.ende:ntly 1· 

but to permit vessel loaded with women and ohi ~dren t-o proceed •ltbout escort is a different matter. It aa has be~~ recommended, 

4 d troy rs re sent from the Hawaiian are-a in. addition. to Task 

Foree 8 nd 17 - it appears desirable for t 1 ast 2 of thes to 

return to the West Ooaat with the ship car~yingthe.·evaoueea, ~nd 

1f th1 is done it appe rs desirable for· the three Matson line sh:!pe 

to proo ed in company. The distanc·e to San Diego 1s 4200 milee an.d 

destroyers .can not make thfs ~1stanoe at high speed without refuel- . ing. This situation may be · met by 2 de a troyera 1 aving Samoa day 

or two b fore the convoy mal ins aontaet itn the late tanker from 

th coa t, ~ fueling and reli&ving the 2 destroyers th n with the 

convoy, th l tter 2 proo ding to ?earl, refueling from the tanker 

if n oesa ry. 

The AK_a,nd Ao should proceed independently. 

RECONNAISSANCE. 

Our 1nfo.rmat1on in r lation to the islands of the Union, Ellice, Gilbert and Marshall groups is not adequate. Th Phoenix Zalande 

have been r connoitered and the decision reached that Canton 1e the 

moat sui tabl . · ight for an air base. 

The Army h s. con truot d a base at Oanton suit bl~ ~Jo tar as 

lanc11ng opera t·T ons are oonoerned, for the la:r est landpl~4Ut and 

seaplan$s. It 1 poorly defended and there is no channel for · 

ships h no 11 gear must b landed by barges. Ther is no natural 

ater supply. D1st1l~rs r neoee ary. At pres nt the garrison is 78 men of an engineer oompany. Certain minor reenfo~oement 1• 

underway. There nre t present no planes at Canton, and no radar 

or RDF. This island is an impor·tant li.nk in the line of air oommun1-

c tions ith Suva and the F r :8ast. 

Tha reo nt flight of a B-17 from Mid ay to Wake nd back for 

purposes of reaormaiasnnce indicates that Canton had a radar for 

homing planes, it might be possible for a B-1 to r•connoiter 

-a1 [- 0 .. J 
1

!!akin nd 1~ 111 .from Canton. Tl:"ie appearance of a B-l '7 ever t1 ther of the places would cause the enemy to make additional efforts 

o£ 

ge."nst 

Canton 

Canton. · This possibility ln tbe present undefended stat~ 

should be recogniz d as a disadvantage to the conduct of 

r conna1ssanc· from that :lsla.nd at present . 

UNJ;ON GROUP 

So tar as our information indicates there a~e no islands or 

however, 

thi group sui table for exten 1 ve u.se,,. s S.1r 'b ses. It is noted, · th t any of .tl1.E1rJ might be us·ed as emerg nay seaplane landing areas. There may be enemy observers and radio stations on th se 1 land but so far there is be~ieved .to be no other a<;t,1vity. It 1 qu st1on ble that ~econne.1.sanoe of thes.e isl:S.nds would pro- dua ny information of value but if VP pl nea alre ;sent to Canton during this operation they might be directed to rebonnoiter these . 

1 1 nds befor returning to P rl. 

ELLICE ISLANDS. o- 11c/ al- AlttK(,I f'/i !II V~ 

~lr own VP planes. last year landed at Funafut1A Th VP tender entered the lagoon and anchored there . This island has poss1b1l1tiee ror development a..s· a e pl ne base and probably will: be ooeupied and 

have 

u ed by the enemy in the future . At present, although en my planes 

Allied 

been reported flying over the islands, i't is saum d to be in 

no 

hands as no report of hostile aottv!ty ha be received. It report of nemy activity in th1e area ia received etor Jan. ·e7, it appears that air reoonnaissanoe would add little to our present information. 

etl 

If however, enemy activity is reported 1t wjll oon- tute e. defini t threat. to Samoa and Fiji Islands and . should be 

d an ttack .objeotive of Task Force 8· or 17 . 

GILB RT ISL.A.UDS 

Reported enemy otivity in the Gillbertt to de.te, hal been' limited to t..,.e probable occupation of llakin as a •eaplano operating base, nd demolition landing at Tar wa. Enemy planes ve been 1ghted over Ocean I land tbout 400 miles to the stward. , 

Our information of th1 group 1 not very good but. Tarawa aeema to have the gre t at po. ·s1bil1ties for development. k1n ppea·ra· to b . th next moat suit ble e. d possibly 1 ts location malreq 1 t the 

1 mo. t d i r b.le to the enemy. 

It appears d$Sir ble . t! at eaoh ,of thea island should be 

air 

reconnoitered and any enemy ahipping, plane , or fu l tanks or other b s~ facilities, be attack d. They constitute a definite step in the direction toward S moa and Suva and must be interfered ith as much as possible. 

151 
-. 

It must be recognized that the Gilbert Islands are British possessions and that indiscriminate bot!lbing can not be dono. Planes and ship of belligerent character, however, are legitimate objects of attaCk even though such an attack would damage allied areas. 

Tarawa and Makin should be reconnoitered and any enem:y planes, Ship , or aviation fac1l1t1es destroyed . 

MARSHALL ISLANDS 

7 Ther·e. can be no question that the enemy has strong ir base $ in the Y~rsh 11 Island • It is improbable that th re are landplane bases south of ·J lu1t. It is probabl;e that there is · oom.parative- ly strong •eaplane base at 16111 though 1 ts de.velopm.e:nt appea·rs to have tarted only recently. An attack on ili proba.bly could be countered only by ea.planes and by la.ndplanes from J'alu1 t . which would have to fly t l t 400 mil s in order to attaek the carri r ( ssumdng that they did not t ke off previous to our planes arriving in th• vicinity or 111) . 

It is most d sirable that the Pacific Fleet take some offen- sive aation but •n ttaok by ~hip based aircraft g 1nst shore- based aircraft bases exo pt when the element of surprise is present, partake of tho nature of an attack on shore fortifloationa with long range guna and m y r s l.l t in serious lease .• 

The ·Commander-in- Chief has suggested such an attack aa ha-,r- ing a possible bearing· on the Samoan reenforcement expedition. Suoh an a tta.ck previous .to the Sarnoan expedition's completion of landing opera tlons appears to me to be un:sound as conc'!,uded· above . This nttack if. made should be made upon the return trip or Task Fore a from Samoa to Pearl. It should be made ' if at all, only ith a complete understand~ng of the risk 1nvol ved in a ttao1

,1ng with a C·rr1cr ithin 500 miles of a possible land-b sed bomber group t J luit. 

General Di eus.s1on of Attack Procedure. . · 

Sllould 1 t be d oided to.~· e. tta.ck Mili, and Makin and Taraw , th most dv ntag oua procedure ·would be to attack Mili with one carrif-'r group and Makin and Taraw_ with the other carrier group, the · ttaelts to be conducted simultaneously and Mili being tt eked by the c rrie:r having the strongest cruiser and destroyer protec- tion. 

Attacl'.; points. on a bear ne .from Mlli ~nd Makin of 120° ill place the oe.rrier groups abo :tt 190 m1lee p.art t the time of launching. The c rrier to attack Makin would be pproximately equally distant from Tarawa. A retirement of the northern c rrier on course 1100 ould give the greatest dietance from J luit nd. almost the. maximum .from Mil!. 15 2 

-10-
tf planes were launched in time to attack about 15 minutes before S\mriae 1am1ahing V~~" ould be ·completed. about 1 · hour 45 minutes before sunrise - at thi period the moon will rise about and ther will be no moonlight during the operation. The carriere ahould be consulted as to the feasibility of thi plan~. 

If this plan be practicable the carrier would run in about 10 hour at 25 knota before launching - she would be 3.bou:t 450 miles from .M111 nd 575 mile from Jaluit at sunset the night befor.e. Should the carrier unb knownst to her be diaaovered during daylight th day before the attack her po.ition would be 

s ·r1ou • Sp c1al observation for pla:p,es and mall boat ahould be mad during auen period. 

After th attacks the Task Groups should re~1re 1th1n supporting dist~noe · of each other until olea,r of ·shqr -baaed aircraft, nd then proceed toward Pearl. 

if (/'LL (-( t-} . ·:zf> 7 ef', 1 t <)'-cf 

-l/1 c. 'J.t-fL ~, ·t, .,., ecz . .r1...rt -c r. -~ , 

I ~ft u (.,1(( tu, 4u r((( t, . 

( t 

J 

153 
• 

RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January 9 

Task Forces as before. 

Australian Naval Board reported estimate that enemy was 

concentrating in Carolinas and Marshalls and would move against Fiji. Asked as to what we are doing (See ACNB 091206). It was 

thought, for security purposes that full information of the Samoan 

operation should not be sent at tl1is time (CinCPac 100605 was the 

reply). 

January 10 

Task Forces as before. 

Opnav informed of list of 21 tankers which were being chartered 

for the Pacific Fleet. Two of these are for gasoline;. one more will 

be required. 

In response to an order from Cominch, the TROUT is being prepared to carry 3" AA ammunition to Corregidor, departing 12th. 

, Cominch provided for systematizing the dissemination of 

enemy information. CinCPac is directing Com-14 to collect and disseminate to all concerned, including task forces and Australian 

Naval Board. 

Opnav reopened question of balloon barrage for Pearl Harbor. 

Cominch directed that Samoan mine-laying facilities be used for 

laying 300 mines at Suva. arriving about January 29th. 

A complete report of aerial reconnaissance of Truk was received 

from Australia. Twenty-four ships, mostly DD's and no capital ships 

were reported. 

January 11 

Task Force E:l.ght departed for planned operations. 

NEW MEXICO and 1~ISSISSIPPI departed from Canal Zone for West 

Coast. 

Cominch reported New Zealand authorities willing to have defenses installed in British Samoa in connection defense Tutuila. As 

only air field site would take months to prepare, it is not the present intention to install any defenses on these islands. 

Naval Station, Samoa was shelled by a submarine at about 0230 

Samoan time. 

-18- 154 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January 11 (Cont'd) 

Nuku Nona in Union Group reported sighting a single en- gine plane at 0130 (GCT) the lOth. Afterwards it was reported as seaplane. 

Enemy planes reported reconnoitering Bismarch Archipelago and Solomon Islands. 

January 12 

Tasl{ Forces proceeding as before, but SARATOGA received a torpedo hit at 1915 last night - about 350 miles southwest of Oahu. 

Australian - Suva convoy left San Francisco, convoyed by PHOENIX. 

RAMAPO left San Francisco for Borabora to act as fueling depot. 

Naval Attache Melbourne reports concentration of transports in eastern Marshall Islands. Our submarines were ordered to report on their observations. 

January 13 

Task Force Fourteen entered Pearl and SARATOGA was prepared to docl{ in the new drydock. 

It was decided to send 6 VP and 6 B-17 to operate between Canton and Suva to cover the Samoan operations. See Op. Plan 6-42. 

SUMNER departed for Borabora to survey and mark the harbor. 

Submarines reported on Marsl~lls - considerable activity at Kwajalein and Wotje but not anywhere else observed including Jaluit 9 Eniwetok and Maloelap were not examined. 

January 14 

Task forces proceeding as before except Task Force Eleven was ordered back to fuel. 

Two DD were ~ent to support Canton during VP-B-17 operations. 

Australia reports: large movement in Marshalls, probably in- cluding 2 CV; runway at Rabaul demolished on 11th; enemy observation of Gilbert and Ellice Islands continue; and strange plane was seen in New Hebrides. 

155 -19-
Rill~NING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont 'd) 

January 15 

SARATOGA entered drydock. 

Main task forces as before. 

POLLACK returning from YOKOHAMA patrol reports sinking three merchantmen. 

A sunrraary of the demands on Pacific Fleet for escorting 

was sent to Cominch with request for more destroyers. 

January 16 

Task Force Eleven entered Pearl. Decision was made to 

reenforce it with units from Task Force Fourteen and send it 

on 19 January to a supporting position off Christmas Island. 

PROCYON departed San Francisco with further supplies for 

Samoa, and HAMMONDSPORT (AKV) departed for Australia. 

Brigadier General Larsen, U.S.M.C., Commanding the troops 

for Samoa, was appointed Military Governor of American Samoa by 

the President. Present Governor, Captain Wild, to continue to 

execute.duties as subordinate of Brigadier General Larsen. 

Admiral Hart assumed command of the Allied Naval Forces in 

ABDA Area (see 052154 preceding). Address "ABD Afloat Batavia". 

Admiral lfurt's position is subordinate to General Wavell the 

Supreme Commander in the ABDA area. 

CotnPacSoNavCoastFront is having considerable difficulty in 

supplying escorts for coastal convoys. The results on the distribution of pe.troleum products are particularly serious. Desdiv 50 

is being relieved by other sound-equipped craft and will perform 

escort duty for the Coast Frontiers. 

January 17 

All active operations are, as before, in connection with 

the Samoan reenforcement. The B-17's, less one damaged at Palmyra, 

arrived at Canton to join the VP's which arrived the day before. 

They reported sighting 3 submarines within 100 miles of Canton. 

The SARATOGA damage develops as being rather severe, and 

she will be given final repairs and probably some alteration on 

the West Coast. 

There are 7 crui sers and 15 destroyers now assigned to 

escort duty. 

156 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION {Cont'd) 

January 17 {Cont'd) 

Due to the manner in which supplies to Oahu have been 

handled to date, CinCPac recommended better coordination {180401 

to Opnav, following). 

Efforts are continuing to solve the questions of supplies, 

transportation and escort of supplies, and defenses of the outlying islands. Pressure is being placed on Com-14 to better 

coordinate these matters and to line up the Army authorities in 

connection with Canton and Christmas which are being developed 

by them. The Army authorities are using Inter-Island ships 

chartered by them in this supply and are showing their inexperience in these matters. 

Australia and New Zealand Boards were informed of the 

operations in connection with the Samoan reenforcement ut 

the reenfor-cement itself was not mentioned.( t1 () I) .? ... 

Januarx 18 

No important developments this date. 

Patrol plane sighted a submarine south of Canton. 

Received more information from Cominch concerning Borabora 

(Cominch 182110). A reenforcement to Noumea is included. 

Radio intelligence for several days has indicated a concentration in the Truk area. 

Je.nuarv 19 

T~sk Force Eleven, reenforced, departed for Christmas area. 

Cominch in 191815 {following) gave further information on 

plans for the South Pacific, and suggested air base at Funafuti 

and permanent force in Samoa - Fiji area. 

Heavy raid including carrier aircraft was received by 

Rabau1 {2 CV indicated.) 

.![anuary 20 

Relief for two destroyers at Canton departed escorting Army 

supply ship. 

Found that Army had misinformed conc erning gasoline at Canton, and that supply was very low.. Decided t o continue operations 

of aircraft a few days - then review situation. 

157 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January 20 (Cont'd) 

Consideration was being given to the operations of the 

escort required from Borabora to Australia the middle of February. 

Cominch in 202lf>O (following) directed a speed-up in the 

offensive operations of Task Forces Eight and Seventeen and 

suggested a raid on Wake in addition. 

In 210309 (following) CinCPac pointed out pertinent lo- gistic information to Cominch and asked for certain other similar information concerning Australia and South Pacific. 

DOLPHIN reported after an inspection of Jaluit, a suspicious lack of activity. Three large auxiliaries, possibly total of six, were sighted on two different days. 

GUDGEON reported no naval activity of Bunge Channel; sank one freighter. 

Task Force Seventeen was supposed to reach Samoa today. / 

No report was received except an arrival report for two aircraft which indicated that the convoy might have been delayed one day. 

January 21. 

Consideration and discussion continued concerning the 

operations proposed by Cominch. There was general concurrence 

that speeding up the attacks on the Gilbert-Marshall area was 

desirable. Some doubt was expressed as to the advisability of 

making Vlake an additional objective for another task force. 

This would create a period thereafter when all three of the 

task forces would be unavailable for distant operations. The 

morale factor as to Wake and the indicated desires of Cominch 

led to the decision to divert Task Force E~ven to make the 

suggested attack on Wake. The NECHES will be sent to join it 

about 600 miles west of Johnston and two of its extra destroyers will be returned to Pearl for escort duty. Cincpac 212217 

Task Force Eight and Seventeen were ordered to leave 

Samoa as soon as all troops are disembarked, and to carry out 

the planned attacks. One cruiser and three destroyers will be 

left at Pago Pago, and these ¥dll later be used as part of the 

escort of the convoy from Borabora to Australia. Cincpac 2200f>5 

The IDAHO and two DD from the Atlantic departed Balboa 

for San Francisco. 

158 
RUNNING SUMMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January 21 (Cont'd) 

It was decided to employ the MISSISSIPPI and NEW MEXICO 

(due at San Francisco tomorrow) immediately as escorts of Hawaiibound convoys thus releasing cruisers for the southwestern convoys. 

Heavy air a ttaclcs in the vicinity of Rabaul continued; 

a group of nine ships were sighted approaching that port; and 

Japanese landings took place at ~ussau Island and Rapsu, New 

Ireland. At least two carriers were indicated in that area. 

Enemy submarines have apparently been clear of the 

Hawaiian area for three days, and from the Eastern Pacific for 

much longe1.,. 

Received directive from Cominch regarding exchange of 

information with the British (Cominch 201730). 

Januarz.._?_g 

Operations going .forward as previously decided. No direct 

report was received as to unloading at Samoa, but it was apparently progressing. 

Our submarine patrols are being extended by sending one to 

Truk·and one to Saipan, reducing accordingly the number in the 

Marshalls. 

Lt-Comdr. Beasley, Intelligence Officer of the New Zealand 

Naval Board arrived for conference. An appreciation as to the 

general situation, and of the situation at Suva, were delivered 

by him and are attached herein. 

The Warspite left Puget Sound for Sydney. 

A report was received giving clear indication that Rabaul 

had been captured. 

There are further indications that there are two enemy carriers operating off New Ireland and the Solomons. 

NZUB reports that the enemy reconnoiters, with large seaplanes based on Makin, daily in the Gilberts and about every third 

day in the Ellice Islands. 

159 
~ ~~· 11-, A) 

1 -;:;t ~i '{,a. ""--. __.., 

~~L=~~=~~~~W~.J?.J~~~~ .... 'l·*· -...!.,.,2-

·~ u.~ 

1 

. li _,, { ' [:.:.:> ... .,..e..~ ... - ,..;.; 

1"'7 

. . P;tjt Z,~v1t1Ga tbe beet egutpr;ed ~;.ncl :pr;otsote.rl 4eeJ! watetbt r'ba to~~tl\c! \lith air (~aoi~t!tioe on ·tbQ tOt:tt~ be oon. tl' · u.s. -. 

n lulu aoo Pt.'n~ on. the · M ~1mi1 'Uld !~f: W SE~~ Mit -~ . t . · Ua 

tt .. Mal Dat-~io~ Gn ·tb.e otbot~. Tltere ~l11S o·tllell pot: ~Ltble h~o"tl.rB 

al t'1h aa Paso P~go, .1!·\l,li$, f:% 1~~ but h1f' ,rsf;,ag;t~1 .and er•'~tdeal 

o. · l'ilY -~1oal l~ll< SI)fUj they oo~ un.-ra.v )ttt•4lblU vltb Fi;ti. 

I . • Qec put tJll ttl£ Jfij::.t. ~lnl.d be · t·· ·~tttl ~rtt;lMG tbe 

eneuw t·o~ the · f'o11oY~1,na t"'eaaa1li11• · 

(a) ~1 ~t'i, .itiah, tatol, u.s. a11ppillt'' tt .. a w 

· im;po·.tant in .. et~1ml ~.t·~tt .,.-ue.llin£ hMe. . 

(b) au < tlO ~~ ~e1nt~ol~ 1n8 ~~ute betlvoen u. 

1.1_ · rrie4-"• 

mos vn1uab'lo· Gtel:tnmcetl base for a ~tu»e attaCk 

on :t>te r .c.oaland ~P posalb:l$ .t\w~Ua. ¥~4) 

(G he 1o · o . 131. w:,ultt t\ e · ~ retitle . · be · ·l'Weta 'I 

ot A· 11ed eotloB ~nst Japan.cf;JO buoe.tl in t.he liar hall s. 

''*

·· fte $~lnble J\111$4 flt:nnil te»oes in tl\e ~ea · ue beavi~ comJttted ln tb.o l?XJO'tt~ t1on. f ~a. ·and. the so !F't1n:ss ot' er.n:~fll\Uol 

tr p · - en1e ta. Tb.J.o ..J v l (l).e a nsil!eroble .~1~001 cl1! l~~. A . tr Kl.l"Jl~ f\1~0 oi· ne ~h ~aev I.Utd two , a~ G-ineb cruie -r 

lG eVf.Ula'ble undtlr J~ u.e .• J\ •. S. :ln tho ~-s~a--lti..41~1o~t Mr,;cesblf J\x. . ~11!-all atr a-.eoon..nats.lL noe ,tl\(j, St1'1lting :Co· ~ .as .. .ava lo.blo at ft;J· 

a ·· ; Rab. Ul. l . a em u.1r0m; ' t ~'ijt vt:tl· t be -r·. t i:f:Jtt U. b . . t 1yi · 

~ort~~oees tmt 1 rull\-J.urr®tW, a:t'"e~ ·\fbieb "' ~ t"fJ.il'tf~~GftBn. a oan. 

be .t~otoo, bu.t aot·ning 18 'e'~ kn~ ae to \Yb.et~ ti:~;v \dU be, · 

:t. $t!ood. i'he Jnmano ··to aN . tht1t~t:~o1•e at ll' ,;.·t I'oosent to ot'u\OontPd 

ve1:1vi1e mtna r una m, val .. Ul)~ri· l~t t:/' tlll .t 131, tmleeB thiQ • nt 

o: be l.n ··an ~rrled 1f1 th ~ eort~Jined _.:J .. ur.~n ana, u.s. r' :val ~, o .. ce 

and (J£U.~}'10~b:Otl:M Bi~l"tlf:t. 

6. - 'The ~irhe~b :tut$ ''i"' tbi) if npua~~ E"J: c~mbl"M"'f:l :r~· l.oet it~ :>t0cm~,. 

,)ut a r.tll "lbet~ o:e h.navlr urut:s J~ ~ 'iJ't,:. Jub1 ettl~ te.nuute4 :t~~t.!• 

:r ... <trJ.l o~Oflt3 tn. ""' ~. j. * t_>i ~;1 1-:!. to · "':~h., .... i Jbt. a o ··11S ·· t 

150 ........... 
l:t I.ri4k1 .. ~ C11>tti@r.n.~ 

i4 lJ ~J~'~··.)y(f ~ t,.t ~rx~lk on 10/i 

9 ~~'*ua · ~11~1 1os 

i ~j; oapk~ tl~i~ . ~t ~~l( )n 10/1 

~ . ·&1 l1 :a."Je ''':n ~'~r:1:te~ 30 l~Wtl iJ1'I1 tts in the 

7. • t 

· 1~ ptl':'tion of tb.e ~~1~:1 4h Oh:lna cJe ~ Wfi:tO bore · 13/'12. tt 

u,. ki~v• ta b~ a ~nl)t~:t!:\$ bt-•e and. bas ~'ulen.tly b·eeo ~ 

operot~>"n.g 011: 11n ..• / nee. · 

A1~~t nt 3alu1~t ~{') .!!trobabl • 

\i I 

'J1ho naln at. bas. in tbe h'ta!'t~hnll, pt"~obt'llb.t.F .,$tlu 

l"l. J.~boat, .• ~>tbev at~rat)<t al---e • 

9- ? ' ' 6 :f'l.gll ~ 

f1gbt~b _,Of'S 

The 'Yokol • . 8M t~~toGe -~oat squmtro,.. ~1tlt~1t to b .a · w t~e · a; p : •• o. ,~~n.et\ flying b.~ot rave been. ~ol:t$\1 ~1fl:r;tf3:t 4rl118 o~l? the (lill'e~, P~SUf~l7 ;ft~~'m Wf1tja. 

JlfiA&a wli~ •• ui&illit!m 

troor ewuh!p& ~¥Jit pl)t:'h .. 31b~ a ¥JGapt&ne a~t~ier \ft8le ~po•te« 

· at wri(llltl t1mea. ~~ ·tte~ ind.:1ca1rlaas tlu1t soaplaae 1l . · e b~1ns _tt.e~l~ bn. ··"'two~ b a a,p;t!llb~tiJl.e .It 97, we 

preaf»\t at l~lk'a a 1w1. . At 1 · ~.- a tu~tt1e• 66 tli~t. ~e eat:ttna'kd 1ft the ~ated 

Islt~ftt'ts ba-a.e • 

8 4 ·ns._i · .. l.no4 :tla_ 1_~ n~, ) we,llo 1 · ted at ~m n 

8 lt- 9 HeaTJ' !;Jmba~: . ) 10/1, n Sit 081 i"i·;rbte . 

a... ( > IIDl 

c~lie~ J· 

cruieer~ ~ 

u A ~Ji~'f,Jl~ Ill'~,, - old 6tJt 

c!rtllaa:J? •. 

• l:'~J~tlftf1 ~o~V,,l~ ~rf011:i .rl~ton 

,~ s nnw tt~t e 6/1. 

,...... 161 
fb) 

flaak Po~e ~ ls ~e.t1ittloct to bo o~~at.:·1:tS 

f'f~l !Irino1Ula e1nd Cf)ll. is to o~ t3 ~t~&:~u:t c~~"it:tttta ' 

e. or '9 fJ1

$ oro!se~ 

. Apa;vt t*· ~~ de-s . ··~ ]!· · ... ~ W'¥i. mlb~ .... :illefl tbe f* · - int.na ~t f'(;)etiV:':~ hea'\1:1 t'tni £l \'lt't tb~ u .. s. · . n1;.,.,o Fle- t bnve b en w~t tbd~''n ~ t~ tho u. •. t~ • 

. . · ~~~. a1 .. ~ft Qt;tr~ieJ- ~•roJ1.mtc~ van mi. •• e~ser 

ft.Lt)UisV1l.la1

' t~ rt Bt •. LoUlt~" 044 4 dO·S~lY..,.fi ~: 

f.'a~ll1;'b.ia.~ a Oflnvoy •o ~) il~a~$0 <itte ail1 ()tt 22/1. 

•>¥' ' 

a: ., 

g... As ~ga~ :rtJ ·ttt.e rlftptane~e t a.w. two nte.i'ft. o· ·us oo :r oot1on • 

(a) !lo de.QU 1 · use to u 

(b) 'fo take 1t ·~t-1» ~ttt~R~olvee •. 

~~ l"*Otfft.J~ ( ) tb4,s Off!.:at\ l)r·l1 oa»rielt. out. ~ the 1'*o1lot ;:·.ng rt.tetln.a:•· . 

,.;-

_·· ·? 

( i) l.rlte.n.si ve PI.ill:i~ 

Bubnt "ln .a ttaak"-

(1U) ~"~9st0ss:~l'; l& ~f' m~~ batJee :t~or ~n-ee h l)tl and o:ll:'<t~~a.c~ trtblah ~'~at\ ~- J'·13i u:nte~ltl'ble ~otf' ·ot,. . ah.l:l)l!lns a11it u:\~··· 

.As regttVdf5 (tl) ·~{116 flt,ttllJ tmw.l90 a. ~jox ~1aval antt 

$1:t\ and M11itt~XW ~1? ~14t1(~• 

•... , 

152 
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tl"t.r:)artf;u$e ltill~ tG., $l) tt\fl,, 1't ea•• %1i tle t~t> a$ 1\n~ l~ ·t t~~ wil:1 .. so \11 oui~ to a•1se t l\9 is,l ~. It l~ fl100 Jr al..t. o-d ut t.hat {)u;, 

o tlll'titl OO~i~l.:ta,~ s ·to· ~~:uu.~ against (b) ~ .tul.{1 fu s.o ut :,It tlooll;r ~;uat.~ t~~ 1ft$t (a • ~. t =i~ o t.~l .fo).?a Btllndtd tllt\t tile Jtitpart.ese \trJ.11 

· p bablY t• to · o t1;):\ l 1l~ herlt.*~Jl vet~. 

t1.• ~lG ~oal• i ' at1J t0~ ~ t\e t\G rmw.h a& one t11Vl:J1on 

' ·· ~ Bl.lpportotl b;g' .. lll~· ait<trtu~t 0· ~t.ere Sad, the)~ M ·Vi/ tu\Va.. tmltte. Jr 

t ' ~ .. ~ In J~~ae 

. . .. ~ nbtle 

c. 

o.

nvctJ.l 

r,:,. . of: ru

t1'()Ulli 

.t . U: oo 

ttt~v.e . .tl fuel~ .li 

OtfJV~ 

. .ns . · .. .ba&O:ti 1500 .tn· miles . !1e El

fl~ l. o.o a'altnt . a. lant\8 . · . ~ ~ \ bel.'OI'e ~iwl a~ t~ ooene ?~ O.l)e·m'tio:oo. De t~yeps end othcl' l ~ small c;; · ' ll ·· be «~1 ~ tml?f u !tit o.1 .. ~. t 1el Gtlltl 'frtlultt luted to \lo • 

, \. refill. el. ~ ~ .. · ·· · ., . ;>()~ .. .nt1. :m .. J .. t .n.;:M.· .Gh¢·1 . te. r. It .. tilOI'et"*o~ a~ Ole@ f1\ 

/

1 9r-·- ·tnat tl Jt,;paneet't .roulc.! 11e d • 11ea:r'b7 edtvartoed bQae ·ro. 

vrl '\; ,. re.ru ll1!ll'( ~u:u:· t"'ll&r r<~e utl'i tle·At&_., 'f • ....-:: 

t .... Tb . t".tl'at. neo·eesi t::t is t:bll~f.d:- re to btai an at~vanaed 

___ kee,. l ther • 

( ) th ., tJ1ktfib~lftS' 1~ ott t~•M•n 

fb) ooe ... ' the lll.l'lee l~l.~d f~l\P ~ JMtgttb~,~p,!;ns 

SX'•i\JP 

As reg~ (e) Vanua L•w ie~ it1 ~ boll'lb·1n di&tf~ of -r.tti Low ~ ·ttt• ~:a.~t mov~ l'fUGt tlleR)rt>~ .be ~'l . tlte . a.et'o~ at.!iaJ'ldl. ~nco t~o is t)nl.y one un,!aJ~ aoro~mo theN ~Nfllldl) an4 1n vt~w .:. the h~".r.lr ~z« a ttl,~~ \Met· O!>uld b 1no4f) tram . :L ., 1r ei t<)!'~t. etll"t,~.e~e-; it. to ®t th ~.U~t that this ~9)ttld · aeat 

rooch CU.f»tieul.t'!· trnltt .. ~~~1 J\.:\. 6ete.noo end Gdequata ghte~ 

e·t'l:t~tb oor1 be provi · od Q.t ~~allfli. 

As t.te.gr~ (b) tbs fo.Uowi,QJI 1 ~ntls ~ 110·&t?J!b1et• 

-~ llOC) lalunt · o. o.nchorat& ! · ~ , u . Bll:tce I .1aaa. »• aa<Jhorase 

· .._r:.oU£s I.alW ·· . e,.. tmebQl'a.ae. ,ol' 1!. ...... . ' . . ' . 

~ ... All tneoe tslanda Wtlu1d however. 1:uvo1..-e oo 1 etano .o 

ot :! ~ SO , 'lee botwoea th~~l ttrKl tbe t'Gt41n t> ;jfl~Ct1~ ., t ) 1~~131. 

~\UUtf·uu L't eta: btm.t~l ~lee t·~ . la •t4te ~!.* fit1e ract. thot it 1e only ole. aet!'J. ucJ. a n. etl#J'ho~o;g'it · it 1a oo;,~ le oi ' euq , :t VetneDt, fU1l i,s b'OOd 1 g 11 at bflse, t :.~ wh1o. : ·. os· · 1 

\: 

J.:~cantJa. 

Mtct .;,aoafU.llN 

.\lm.d7'UU u~· ·t:l 

is 

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tl)e~<?~o•fJ} 

tbe u. e. t.u:ttl\t 

,a uer~ 

::t"t.1tl.es 

moe' t~" 

likol;t 

U'laiJ?' 

GS 

~ 

J.lagra~ 

(.:) oc~ ve. 

(a · ~:~•~· ~~- sbt it':t::Jr J.1!131 l~J!Jm tl1'.e Mt~~sb :.lUs!--v ! Melt 

01.1t ffnnd!. roti ~_j;~ ~ ~ OfZS't;iltbl1Eth .tUt ad~.· t10ctt bas-e ~ ortl vh.1 ch t o at $i~. k V1. ti I~evu, 

~ ..... . 

153 
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'1 . • ( · ,) W'"ttt\la. hM iai tbo ·~4VM~8<0 . ·t Sl~~is~, ;,Q'h \tl;,~~~ 

Pi~·~ t c.MitOC'i~mblc . :~.&! to ~~mi.0'£~ 1-i~M ·tbl~· tene4 b7 th lJ.-t . 

}ao· f · ~~-·, 1) and Britt ~l Oroi~P t1)qW.~.dron 1?: -. · • 

·('I) · .uld. ~ ~fet~ but ~rf;»'tlld t~l''le tt:~ ~ -_ f»> au4 

mttltt tn; .. · ·.1·_· :! ' ··••• cle~ 'Wh:\.oh d . :t 11ve u time t t, ~so 

a &O'Wlti&l'W:Sitt'OM-t 

(e) ·obtdas -·lm a~& tho rrtwlft ob;)(tet'• ot .Pi;& 

la 1.\t'Oll:trra· .Uld ai1t.~· eoo~1~f!1~6 ~.~~e$ ln ·thft M~ tta . H~•:t .. 

. ~c. v -, ( ) 1& tb.m-ra· · · oa•d~.. · :. !ZJSt l)J}ll')ba r.lfl •J'Ol'~• o:t a tl& 

( ) 

8$'- o._·· .:1- · m, -;Jeo·ti.v• w··)ult alRI t c -~ bo to 

& ._, the tt.,, of . tb~ h,a»bt:~U»' ~!ltl ~l11 : ~o1l.ltlea 

a·t atta ~ ·a• txt V4 'ltli*! to~114 • . aatd2g be .ob1 . V(t)t\ . ·IJI. a•iJ-c•a bg al11 •• ~8~ 0~ ~·. ~ ,. ·i .. llQ t- l)f'O·b&J blu & u.d·tane·tJUG 

ttl the t1mtt Ed.!' $'''to -... tt!\ t~ ~-~~--

( A~~tb&~' O(tn·· atto•td~)n 1 . taw neeess1t¥ J?op -ilYMOe4 ,...... , . . baaGctJ• It la !rile to a . · _: ''bat tJtq • . j 111 \~r:r,)~ (~. ~ J ~. 't,/'~.' a. ..... tl~ s.e~ ell ' ' ~" ~ad ,.,.. .~ew 

I A_~·'" iii~ 4 .{1 . ~ y (~.. · .. · tr~-17 ~~-· . t·O: tb.e· mai:b &ttaot~ ·$e-.. & li !~r~\.,G>'v"\.. i "if' '-···'11~1/' i)' ~- tf eot.to ' 

16•• ( ) to ~f»ta;\1 t _'btl l~BG OOftee!_\~ft\tiM bef9S9 

i.t, 1Ge. ·- . the l8t16b8l1 · C .. !~. ~- :\··· fie -~ .. ' .•. ., 

(b) II· 1ft~ ~.,.pt: tile _,c4!1t18n • ~~~•te. 

(C) Ye eQfU) n ·te oa 4~1- ~~s a.t Pi;Ji.a 

(A) to Oti1~ fJU a --i~~t · :o; , fll'l t' 

·11.- A. ~.- (e) ~ · · ltfteit .,tate o:t ·the i.s. J~a•Ulc nee,,. -atUl . . . o:t .,. oW~A ~~" Jhi#ce.s 'l'~'~ %Vittt'lle ~- ~ oi ... ~1as ~ ebi,a Wi tilltt ~~· t~ff sh~· 

b •$4 Qi;rc · .. · ~~ e~tUJ to. ~l!e _ _· hl,~l ·(t_ .•aft ~~nwoue_ ·~M!»o,le • Uo11ti~GVOI' . t 1J.1. be intt)$'i &1!1-tl ( .:t. ~btmt ~ · aoS the 

seib1:11tv of· ~1, sa w sso~u ~irl:t$·the~ th& e ,..o.n i. 

" rr tlt t r~ t~.t:tsm~ea. · · 

· ~ r~r-:a1'(~s ('b); 'Ike Na~•~e axp;;41 t!O.n rt£1 bo. al't•~~ if:t rlliW.• h~tltfl! n:~1 a- ~mtdti ~~tbl$ t41i!!t&1~b~•• Gi~ . " 'ldll b.f! t~O$t d.if.Ti .t 1)& \Jl)t~lift tt~'f'IU ~" ~'M;; 4"1 '».\·vt~e tit . -~t~eton •1tl ·tbj t) ..r•inl. a!' ··. t~ ~. l1f a» _& _, ·. · twJ ... .-)l.abl ~nttt ·teal j ft1tr a1:tt b~ eo«. ~a ~r' llllll• fbia .o. . t~he, ~t0rc, tle"JJ · -: t .ntn,s i~l1~- l:t:l.~~nc~. &~C t · .sl· .. ,,,. · ti. ' dS?&;e~. · Otlc~~~•fUl ~ · ••~pti.tJn ro·ca«, h*:m~'\1'fJl", ·· -'t l e.e --·· .... .... - ,. · ee~i.oo 'bW~ trd:~e.~a att:an1~ ·Qft 1113·1. 

~ A.~a. ~ ( tJ) ., !t , .! .. o .f~~ r't .. th~'~ t~h• : '.~l .. .,~1 . tl~ . ttl' o:~~tt1t1 ri ;~t ~ j~ .. w111 l) tt mtt1t vnln~~~lhle :;~~H~e;·-· 11\ tto:r- tb · 

ii ~- ~t .1 .,-m.n.g J:•oe.. ~rO!\!f ;...., 

( .1) Itri ex ~~tJ, t ~)tlt i . U 1n "'. 11'1 b~ kno ~ 

( U.) ~b' tl~lf'~~~) Ot1f~~~ wil.t ~~ u~a clt~ t~~;~rul~. 

~.. ... 164 
(lv) 

~- e~tJ.'i.tl~">n .till b-~ .r; t, its. ~~l'l.ill 

dit:rt~·l!lO . f:t?~~ml 1 ·te T1iU3;6. 

we 'IJ~_,etU,;l b~lV$ ~t~no #JUIIP~'rt 0-1 ctUP ~\v.n eba~e 

1t1t:U~ a.t.ro~~:rt. 

/1/J 1£". A' ~1~tt..-~ ( ) {#W" b·fi~S \V1ll be a1QDe a.t hclii. 't'vtJ> r.r"v rr /-

~ At~ rtlti~ (d), it ·1~ :t~~lt thtsrt r~ cm$~in&.tion o:t (b) (c) t"'·"'!"'l' Ai.~' ... ~-.1(1'1; nt t-e tleQ·f¢ ~--ss~b111tr ()!.~ l~:tte\,1~~ llel~., Gft ·~bo en__,. 1 :mover:.- f9!f (. ) t·. oo-op .. ~ation tJf the i1. tl. ,aciteio Fle 1\ lm4 ~*vtioola·r~tu the U.cl. 81oomtt tJaftitl•u ifl ea"Jentiel. ~o a:t-"ti)Cll ~Jl!10 . ~ e~~ ti?n e~ll)"*ht4 b~ a p('ltf'o»i'\!Jl. aat•2.&l' t~;,»«e v btlst. r.ttur own 1'1~ val. Fa~ · ·a ~o Ul'lell;t\)?OX tea ru~crat.~t ls to ~vUJtt d s.WJte• ti'4&8!l t:he r}&~'~ ttoa t :t"' tbft ~1 t1il:n ~ s so. a.oeUftttGlY 1

ltn...,\m ·tl'.tat .1 t . Cfitn b -u tt"'" e]~ 4 by v..t~~ . l " 't'tl adeQ,Utfte tim J:~ \Y1 tb4J.~\1l 

bc.,:ra· vl1eht. u · ~r t~ha o1~ ~ , e 8\loh ~till at · tl<lH ultl be llig~ p ®lfm&tittl\1 aa4 kfl~u• · ~mb!~ne attt:tek o .. rucb. a 

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71 ' ... 

U) 

(111) 

(:tv) 

( } 

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tl'Q;VS..-

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t

1

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·1-••••• 
-

s 

) 

.185 
r 

'/ 
APPRECIATION OF THE PACIFIC SITUATION AS AT 15th JANUARY 2 1942. 

GENERAL . REMARKS 

The underlying strategy of the war in the Pacific is quite simple, namelyg to defeat the J ·apanese at sea. Once we can cut the Japanese sea communications and regain command of the Western Pacific, our victory is ce~tain• 

. 2.~ Unfortunately, the Japanese have a ~enty years start on us. ince the Washingt·on Conf'erence in 1922, when for political reasons the British Empire and the United .States of America guaranteed not to develop bases in the. 11 status quo" area of the Pacific, Japan was f-· gsured of command of the sea in her own waters and, generally - bpeakirt~., the north-western part of the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese have made full use of the advantag~s conferred by this Treaty. The following successive moves have all consolidated and extended the 

area over which they have complete controlt~ 

(a) 

{b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

the formation of naval and air bases in Formosa and the Pescadores:;_ 

the seizure of Manchuria; 

·the Chinese· "incident" and formation of' flirthe!i naval and air bases on the Chinat ·coast: 

the development of bases in the mandated islands; 

the seizure of French Indo China and yet f~her naval and air bases. 

They have also learnt the importance of shore-based air forces and have retained thosewhich will operate over the sea under naval control. The first three weeks of the war have again strengthened and extended the area over which they have complete control. 

3.- It will be no easy task to reduce their commanding position. It can only be achieved by defeating them at sea, which demands strong ir forces as well as naval forces. and by economic pressuree 

OBJECT 

4.- our object, therefore, is to regain command of the sea in the Western Pacific. 

INTELLIG~ 

Since the war broke out, the situation has altered radically disadvantage, thanks mainly to the following circumstances:-

(a) the cripp1ing of the u.s. Pacific Fleet; 

(b) the sinking of the "PRINCE OF WALES" ' and "REPULSE" and consequent delay in forming the British Eastern Fleet; 

{c) the realisation that the J.apanese know how 

to exploit the advantages of sea power and of modern tactics by sea, land and air. 

-2-. 0 '•. 0 

167 
I 

-2-

.. J. S. Pacific Fleet. 

6.- The Pacific Fleet has lost 2 battleships sunk, and 3 badly damaged and out of action for some months at least. T-hree 6" 

cruisers are also damaged. 

This leaves the following ships capable of conducting operations in the Pacific:-

4 

4 battleships, . aircraft carriers (including U. s.,s, "YORKTOWN" 

11 

4 

36 

17 

which has just arrived from the Atlantic), 

8" · cruisers ( including 4 temporarily detached), 6" cruisers (including 3 temporarily detached)~ 

destroyers~ · 

subma.rine s. 

In addition, we know that 3 battleships and 9 destroyers are 

joining the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic about the end of January. 

7.- The battleships and two of the 8" cruisers have retired 

to the Western Pacific Coast of America~ leaving only 3 aircraft 

carriers and seven 8" cruisers with attendant destroyers, in .the 

Honolulu Area. The reason for the move of the battleships and 

cruisers is not yet knowno 

8.- In a recent telegramf Ivfrs Winston C.hurchill said that the 

naval situation in the Pacific should be restored in a month's time. 

The meaning of this remark was not specified, but it can only refer 

to the reformation of the UcS. Pacific Fleet. 

B~itish Eastern Fleet. 

9.- The premature movement to Singapore of the "PRINCE OF WALES" 

and "REPULSE", with only 4 destroyers as escort, was obviously dictated by political strategy and has been a disastrous failuree 

The intentions of Admiral Phillips were to collect as many cruisers 

and destroyers as he could from British, Dutch and American forces in 

the Eastern Theatre. He had reached full agreement with the 

C:ommander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet (Admiral Hart) 

on the following dispositionse · 

A . cruiser striking force, consisting .of the 3 American cruisers 

rom the Asiatic Fleet and possibly one or two British ones, commanded by an American Admiral, was to be based in the Sourabaya- Darwin area, to deal with enemy forces detected by aircraft and 

submarines patrols to the Northward~ The battle fleet, with its 

cruisers and destroyers, was to be based on Singapore and would be 

responsible for preventing a Southward move of Japanese forces along the ~ava-Sumatra lineo It was intended that 2 Dutch cruisers, ·together with one from New Zealand and one or two from the East Indies~ should be attached to the battle fleet. In addition, 6 

Dutc destroyers and at least 4 American destroyers would join the 

4 me ern destroyers which came out with the "PRINCE OF WALES", · and n 

.1 -do zen olfr ~~S H class des troy e-ra -from- B-ingapo-r an Hong- Kong~ 

t ~~der to form a very heterogeneous screen for the battle fleet. 

3 date of arrival of the L~ "H' '· class battleships was not knowno 

10o- The present intention is to reform a strong Eastern Fleet 

be based on Singapore ~ rr Singapore is not availableJ other 

ses have been, or are being, pr epared in the Indian Ocean and in 

Lstralian waters ~ It is obviously a question of monthe before 

is Fleet can become effective~ 

-3-•ooo ~ 

168 
-3-

11.- In the meantime, every effort will be made to hold Singa- pore; and land and air reinforcements are being sent as quickly as possible. As the ~apanese have almost complete command of the air 

now over Malaya, their arrival is problematical unless strong air 

escorts arc made available • 

.£apanese Methods of Warfare. 

12.- ~he opening J.apanese moves have shown how successfully the ~apancse have adapted themselves to the lessons of World War II. 

No doubt this is largely due to their German advisers. Examples of this arc given in the following paragraphs. · 

13 •. - Their use of their command of the sea has certainly been astcrly. They have not hesitated to move large land and air forces over the seas which thoy cornmnnd, in spite of probable opposition fl,om our own naval and air forces. Their success shows. that the risks they took were really not 1rery great. 

14.- Their combined operations have been very well organised and uniformly successful. They must have suffered considerable losses, but in every case they have succeeaed in getting large masses of 

troops and equipment ashore at the place and time they had selected. 

In Malaya this was attaihed 1Im infiltration tactics. Although they were repulsed on certain beaches~ they got ashore at others and immediately threw in large masses of troops where they had obtained 

a footing. 

15.- Similarly, in their operations ashore they have certainly adopted the very latest methods of .land warfare. Their personal equipment is l~ght but efficient ~ Tq.ey ~ave landed tanks and 

mechanised transport. They have inflatable rubber boats for ~rossing creeks and rivers. They are evidently past masters of 

infiltration tactics~ and so f~" in Malaya we have not succeeded in holding them. 

16.- Finally, their very successful torpedo attack with shore- ~ based aircraft on our two unfortunate heavy ships shows a degree of . organisation which we have only achieved in our carrier-borne ~ torpedo aircraft squadrons. We can certainly assume that their naval efficiency is as good as ours, even though perhaps we hope it is not. 

Forces Avai~able. 

~nem.v 

17.- The Jiapanese have at least 9 battleships available, assuming that 2 have been damaged by American aircraft. ~hey also have 10 -ircraft-carriers» 12 8" cruisers, 23 611 cruisers and large numbers 

of small craft. f.~ 17 

18,- The whereabouts of their main fleet is not known; but wi.rcles traffic indicates a strong concentration, including at leas+. 4 aircraft-carriers~ in the Marshall and Carolines area. 

· )n1arines nre operating of'f' the Hawaiian Islands and the West Coast the U.S.Ac ~he Japanese have also seized an advanced base for ~ [L thern advance at B ar· ri in the Gilbert group, but reports on 14\;L_ 

uary show that fly~ng oats onl,Y are operating f'rom here at present •. 

Allied - P?-cif'ic ~Q. 

' 9s- The disposition of the IT.S& Fleet is given in paragraphs 6 

l 7 above. A .force consisting of 3 carriers and 8 8" cruisers (one which is on passage to the Pacific coaf?t) known as Task Force 3 is ,ught to be operating near Honolulu~ 

-4-. t'·.-. 

159 
-4-

20.- ~he only British ~orces in the Pacific are those in Australia and New Zealand~ consisting of 2 au cruisers, 3 modern 611 

and 1 old 6" cruisers .. 

Allied - Darwin-Sourabaya Area 

I , 

21.- The American Task Force 5 (consisting of au cruisers, 2 Elt cruisers and 13 destroyers) and 25 submarines, are retiring to this area. It is also intended to base one Australian 6" cruiser here ("HOBART"'). 

- Wes·t Java Sea 

22.- Dutch forces are operating in this area, consisting of 1 modem 6" cruiser, 2 old 6" cruisersg 1 modern flotilla leader, 6 destroyers and 5 submarines~ 

- Singapore Area 

23.- Two of the three old 611 cruisers based here recently were at Batavia on 6th January with 0. in c.~ E •. F. The third is in the Sourabaya areao Subsequent allocation of these cruisers is unknown. 7 destroyers are at Singapore together with 2 u.s. and 4 Dutch Submarines 

- Indian Ocean 

24.- British forces consisting of one "Ru class battleship, ? 811 cruisers, 2 modern 6" cruisers, and 7 old 6" cruisers and one aircraft carrier are widely dispersed for trade protection. 

DEDUCTION 

25.- At the present time the enemy has superior forces in all 

respects. The Allied forces have the additional disadvantage of being widely dispersed in the defence of trade. In addition• in thaw areas occupied by the enemy there arc strong shore-based naval air forces. 

He can therefore launch attacks in any direction in which he ~ishes to move. So far, he has only done so over seas under his full control, i.e,, towards the Philippines and Malaya. Expeditions further afield are attemded by greater risks; but at the present t:lme the risks are not very groat until the u.s. Pacific Fleet is 

· eformed. 

26.- The only possible brake on his further expansion is his ' 

prcoecupa tion with his present connni tments •. 

Tne inference is that he could move against the Dutch East Indj or i ~he direction of the Tasman at any time he likes. As soon as ..... "' ....., oc u-pi d the Ehili;pp_j,.nc_§ the ~o bi.~i .. :t¥ of at.:ta-ck wil..l be enselY increased. 

~~.! JAP ~!iESE MOVE 

~- Tho following are possible alternatives:-

(a) Attack on Allied trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans by submarine and surface forces. The submarines have a lready started this attack, but have 

not yet appeared in Australian and New Zealand 

waterso The ir arriva l there is only a matter of time, Surface attack by raiders, and possibly surfac e warshi ps, may be expected at any time. 

Larger forc es will need an advanced base to become 

eff ective. 

-5-••••• 170 
{b) 

(c) 

-s-. 

A ttaclc on the Netherlands East Indies, in order to obtain oil and other tropical products, and to 

obtain control over the passages into the Indian Ocean~ This attack will certainly be made if and when Singapore has fallen, and probably 

sooner .. 

Seizure of advanced bases for attack on trade, and eventually for invasion of Australia and/or New Zealando 

28.- Of the above moves, {a) and (b) are certain to take place. (cJ may possibly be delayed until he has completed his earlier co~itments, but we have been warned by both the Unitod Kingdom and American Chiefs of staff that a Southward move mny take place ·at any timeo · 

ALLI .. ED COUNTER MFASURES 

29o- The first and most important is the refor,mation of the United Sttates Pacific Fleet,. At the present time we are completely in the dark about thiso The whole situation regarding intelli e~c~ , 

v 

j}:

(?_ 

;J; AmJJ 

J1 ic:/an . 

movo!Jlents 

;; ,...(,.'\. 

~~ .tlJ.e Paci:fic is highly unsatisfactory. A.A ~ , 

30.- The next most important is the re:formation of the British Eastern Fleet. During the last few days the Admiralty have been making preparations, including requests to Australia to prepare certain ports as bases. The present intention is that the British Eastern Fleet should operate quite independently of the u.s. Pacific Fleet. Both Australia and New Zealand have protested strongly gainst this, pointing out tha unity of cornznan.d, ,if not p combined lleet, is essential.4 ,1< .l . r ~_,AJ vt ~ . ,. r. ~ _, "-e/ / . . . , 

31.- In the meantime, we must make use of what few forces we have available. It is generally agreed that, in face of the scale of probable attack, as many cruisers ae possible must remain concentrated. This is the reason for forming a cruiser striking force (Task Force 5) in the Sava Sea, and the Anzac Squadron in the Tasman. 

32.- It is also essential to keep trade moving in spite of risk or losses. The main protection will be given bY, wide dispersion, d by keeping Pacific shipping us far south as possible in order to ake advantage of. bad weather and low visibility. Important troop and supply convoys must be escorted by the strongest force availableo 

.§l..TUATION IN THE SQUTH WEST PACIFIC 

33.- The strong concentration of naval forces in the Marshall Islands, and the seizure of tho advanced seaplane basa at Butaritari arc ndicatio e t~at ~ho Qnemy is contemplating a southward move • ...,_ --;· .• l"' "'1~, ,., 

34.- The most likely objective is the Fiji Group. This would not o., =J.y cut b~ r oip.forc1ng route across the Pnc~fic, pu~ _ ____,.!_._ ~ . -ai so gi ve him a g ood ito. val advancoa oas a 1i va. , v .- J:JOGb•v•.y. 

one of tho other· anchorages in the Group, and 2 aerodromes. 

5.- The next most at:braotive bait is New Caledonia, where he wil l. ain good harbours and resources, aerodromes and valuable minerals ch he cannot get elsewhere. It is quite possible that he will 

ack both. 

IJ -6·-• .•••• 

I 

171 
• 

-6-

36.- Now Zealand itsclr is a possible ulterior objective. The Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government (General Sir 

Guy Williams) suggested in September,. 1941, that invasion could not take place until Singapore had fallon, the British and American fleetE1 

had been defeated, and the Japanese had captured an advanced base. Although none of these contingencies has yet occurred, it must be admitted that Singapore is in danger of capture, the two fleets have suffered serious reverses and Fiji is threatened with attack. 

37.- Although actual invasion can still be ruled out at the 

present time, nuisance raids nrc quite possible. Now Zealand is still sending appreciable numbers of men overseas for the Navy and ~ir Force. Reinforcements for the Middle East are not urgently needed nt the moment and have been temporarily suspended, mainly owing to lack of escorts ~ A successful nuisance raid would have considerable psychological effect and might well result in complete suspension of oll troop movements overseas. 

Qountcr Measures for these Movos. 

38.- Tho present forces in Fiji are insufficient for an attack, which may be mndc by u Division, accompanied by 4 aircraft-carriers~ 

Now Zealand has reinforced Fiji~ whore thoro are now two Brigade groups and certain other troops, organised as a D·ivision. The United states of America also realises the importance of Fiji and is sending equipment, aircraft and air personnel, and possibly land forces. ~be reinforcements contemplated would have u good chance of holding tho island of Viti Levu. · 

39•- The situation in Now Caledonia, which is an Australian ~ommitment, is not too good. The F~cnch forces, though considcrableJ 

arc not reliable. So far; the AustDalians have only beon able 

to send a small force of their own. · 

40,- The main defence for those islands is naturally by naval forces. ~he Anza~ Squadron is obviously not strong enough to 

prevent such ~n attack, though if well handled it should be able to interfere seriously with it. Its main weakness is the absence of carrier-borne aircrart. 

41.- The British position in the South West Pacific must there- fore depend on the reformation of the United States Pacific Fleet, his has boon prossed for in personal telegrams from tho Primo Minister, New Zealand, to Mr. Winston Churchill in Washington. 

42.- In view of tho potential threat to Now zealand itself, the Government has decided to take certain anti-invasion measures, 'ncluding mobilisation of the Territorial Army, which needs at least three months' training before it can be considered qfficiont. The Military Adviser apprecio. ted that the most likely point.s for invasion are the North Auckland Peninsula, probably through the 

Bay of Islands, and tho Marlborough Sounds; in that order. Guns 

are peing mounted and mobile forces disposed for the defence of 

hn1~e .wo areas. ~· ~~-- .... --_,..,...,.._.......,~-..--......... -~ 

3 _ Civil emergency schemes to deal wi -h damage caused by · 

~b;rdment or air raids arc also bei~g a~colerated in the principal 

nso The E.P .• S. and blackout orgnnJ.satJ.ons arc already well 

ancodo 

COMMAND 

~ _ The washington conversations between Mr. Winston Churchill 

t President Roosevelt have resulted in an agreement for unified d ~nd of sea, land and air forces in the ADBA area. This comman 

172 
• 

-7-

is to be under a British General, who will be known as the Supreme Commander, and he will have an American General as his deputy. An American Admiral will conmmnd the naval forces in this area, under the Supreme Corrununder. 

45.- No attempt has been made for a unified command of' the nava}. forces, i.e., of' the United States Pacific Fleet, tho British Eastern Float and other naval forces in the areao This has been pointed out by both Australia and New zealand, in urgent telegrams to Mr. Winston Churchill~ Australia has put forward proposals for a combined fleet. New Zealand has prossed for unified command over the two fleets, possibly by an American Admiral working in close co-operation with tho Supreme Commander(J46.- ( i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

(v) 

(vi) 

(~t) 

(viii)' 

(ix) 

CONCLUSIONS 

Japan must first be defeated at sea. 

This demands unified direction of British and United States forces and the formation of a balanced fleet strong enough to defeat the Japanese. 

Until such a fleet is formed, the Allied position is precarious and depends on holding our bases~ 

particularly Singapore. 

In the South West Pacific the British position depends primarily on the u.s. Pacific Fleet. 

A japanese attack on Fiji and/or New Caledonia 

may be expected at any time. 

our naval forces in this urea are inferior to tho possible scale of attack. They can only be used effectively if they are concentrated. 

Invasion of New zealand is improbable at the moment, but tho possibility will become greater if the J-apanese hnve further successes. 

Attack on trade by surface and submarino raiders must be expectede This is best met by wide dispersion of shipping and the strongest po ~4l-- 1 . ..,. 

protection of troop convoys. 

The next few months will be most critical. 
8!!'!CitM 

JAN GCT 

09 1206 

10 0605 

I 

ACNB TO CINCPAC AND NZNB 

Australia and NZ intelligence confirmed concentration 

naval forces and auxiliaries in Caroline Island and 

Marshalls x It is considered that an attack on islands 

which form parts of USA bombers reenforcing route across 

Pacific may be impending x New Zealand considers Fiji the most probable objective x The establishment of Japs in this area besides cutting the ferry route will also 

seriously threaten the shipping routes x Such an opera- tion by Japs will give an opportunity for counter issue 

by USA and British naval ·forces x Our forces available 

in this area consist HMAS AUSTRALIA, HMAS PERTH, HMS 

ACHILLES and HMNZS LEANDER X Request if no objection be 

informed of searches completed re this matter so that 

we may cooperate in any action you propose to take • 

CINCPAC TO ACNE 

Your 1206Z/9 under advisement x Exact information of 

enemy forces in Marshalls limited except observed at 

Kwajalein four large auxiliaries anchored and landplanes both bombers and fighters present x Other commitments 

preclude operations suggested in imraediate future but 

possible later x Request be kept advised of any new 

development. 

174 
JAN GCT 

10 2250 COMINCH TO COMPSNCF 

COORDINATION AND DISSEMINATION OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES AT 

SEA WIT.~L BE HANDLED IN ATLANTIC AREA DIRECTLY BY COMINCH X 

IN PACIFIC AREA BY COM 14 X AS AT PRESENT UNTIL NOON GOT 

JAN 20 AND THEREAFTER COM PSNCF ADDRESSING C01·.'IINCH 

APPROPRIATE US COMDRS IN PACIFIC NOIC ESQUIMALT liEW 

ZEAIJ'l.ND NAVY BOARD WELLINGTON NSHQ OTTAWA BNLO SAN 

FRANCISCO AND CINC EASTERN FLEET X PARA INFO ADDRESSEES 

INCLUDE COM PSNCF IN REPORTS OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN 

PACIFIC 

12 2310 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, COM 14, ALL NAVAL COASTAL 

10 2251 

11 1921 

FRONTIER 001\Th'fANDERS, COM PSNCF, CINCAF, COM 12 

CANCEL ~IT 102250 CINCPAC 120435 CINCPAC MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISSUING PACIFIC BULLETIN INCLUDING IN ADDRESS 

BRITISH C01~~NDS SPECIFIED IN MY REFERENCE DISPATCH 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

IN COMPLIANCE WITH REQUEST NEW ZEALAND GOVT 300 MARK 6 

MINES COMPLETE Ll~VING SAN FRANCISCO FOR SUVA ABOUT 12 

JAN X ARRANGE FOR PLANTING THEM THERE PREFERABLY WITH 

PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT SAMOA AFTER 

PLANTING MINES NOW .ENROUTE LATTER PLACE X UPON COMPLETION PLANTING RETURN SAMOA X 

CINCUS TO CINCPAC 

NEW ZEALAND CONSENTS AMERICAN FORCES MAKE INSTAI.~LATIONS 

ON BRITISH SAMOA AND TAKE SUCH OTHER MEASURES THERE AS 

MAY CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF AMERICAN SAMOA X NEW ZEALAND 

AUTHORITIES APIA WILLFULLY COOPERATE X NECESSARY ACTION 

ACCORDANCE YOUR JUDGEMENT IN AGREEMENT WITH THEM X 

"17 S 
JAN. GCT 

16 0615 - CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

hecommendations urdis 070015 x Current and foreseen 

requirements are: 

(1) Samoan expedition convoy 1005 escort Task Force 17. 

(2) Bobcat expedition latter part January escort SouthEast Pacific Force. 

(3) Xray first contingent convoy 2013 escort PHOENIX. 

(4) Xray second contingent late January. Honolulu now 

enroute east with convoy 4036 tentatively asstgned. 

(5) Canton Christmas late January. PORTLAND leaves Pearl 

east bound 16 January. Available at San Francisco 29 

January. 

(6) NoUmea project reference War Department message number 880 of 5 January. Assume can be handled in Xray 

convoys 

(7) Copper reenforcements transports not assigned but 

assumed generally in 14 knot class. Between 40 and 50 

slow cargo ships and tankers per month continuing indefinitely. Escort by battleships and destroyers necessary between mainland and within 500 miles Copper both directions. 

Inside 500 miles escort by destroyers based Copper with air 

ooverage. 

(8) Believe continuing supply of outlying bases and pro- tection of inter-island shipping can generally be handled 

by Coastal Frontier Forces as now reenforced by Minrons 

1 and 2 at the rate of 1 convoy to each base per month. 

However Minrons 1 and 2 must be relieved by subchasers and 

patrol craft at earliest practicable date to make minecraft 

available for their primary employment. Due short cruising radius intend retain DETROIT this area to support these 

movements as necessary after battleships are available 

for ocean escort. 

(9) Barring -effects enemy action requirements outlined above 

can be met at times indicated. ·For continuing requirements 

on Bobcat-Xray line 4 light cruisers can handle 1 convoy 

per month in each direction. ST LOUIS and HELENA will be 

added this run completion Samoan expedition and Navy Yard 

repairs respectively. Any other cruiser requirements will 

necessitate removing some heavies from rlajor task forces. 

17 6 
JAN. GOT. 

16 0615 - (CONT'D) 

For continuing requirements of Copper can handle approximately 5 convoys per month. West Coast shipments for Christmas and 

Canton can be cut out of these convoys at Ocean meeting point . by local escorts. Urgent need exists for additional destroyers. Under program described above not more than 2 destroyers 

can be assigned to each battleship escort unit and the light cruisers will have none from Pacific Coastal Frontier until junction with Far East Forces. Urgently recommend transfer 

at least 1 and preferably 2 Desrons to this Fleet. 

Particularly desire remaining leaders of Desron 9. 

177 
JAN GCT 

18 0401 

18 2110 

19 1815 

CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Control, allocation and loading of shipping in Pacific 

requires coordination in order make most effective use 

available shipping and escorts x Essential provide for 

needs Army Navy and Civilians and that coordinated schedules be established earliest practicable date x Control by centralized NTS agency in Pacsoncf as contemplated by joint agreements and war plans believed essential X All 

shipping in Pacific including supply of personnel and 

material Xray, Bobcat, Samoa, Suva, Xmas, Canton, Noumea 

must be included x Reinforcements and developments above 

places plus Hawaiian Dept must be predicated on availability shipping and escort to support them X Impossible Cincpac make long range plans either escort or other operations until comprehensive picture shipping requirements known X 

Opnav deliver Cominch also for action X 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

BOBCAT CONVOY BC 100 OF 6 SHIPS WITH 4,500 T~OOPS AND 

XRAY CONVOY BT 200 OF 8 TRANSPORTS WITH 20,000 TROOPS 

A.RRIVE CANAL ZONE ABOUT 28 JANUARY THENCE AFTER FUELING 

WILL PROCEED IN COMPANY TO BOBCAT ESCORTED BY SOUTHEAST 

PACFOR COMPOSED OF 2 CL 2 DD ETA 16 FEBRUARY SPEED OF 

ADVANCE 14 X SE PACF,OR REMAIN BOBCAT UNTIL BOBCAT CONVOY 

READY RETURN VIA CJ~NAL BY WHICH TIME HALF FIXED DEFENSES 

AND VOS OPERATIONS SHOULD BE READY X TRANSPORT BARRY OF 

BT 200 WILL REQUIRE FUEL BOBCAT X CINCPAC PROVIDE ESCORT 

FOR BT 200 SPEED 16 FROM BOBCAT TO BRISBANE ADJUSTING 

FLEET PLANS IF NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ADE~UATE PROTECTION 

FOR THIS HIGHLY IMPORTANT EXPEDITION X PARA CINCPAC 

150615 ITEM TWO SEE ABOVE X ITEM 5 CONVOY WILL CONSIST 

TWO SHIPS FOR CHRISTMAS ISLAND TWO FOR CANTON READY SAN 

FRANCISCO 29 JANUARY X ITEM SIX NOIDdEA INCLUDED IN BT 

200 X ITEM NINE FURTHER TRANSFERS DESTROYERS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT THERE ARE SERIOUS SHORTAGES EVERYWHERE X 

OTHER ITEMS NO COMMENT X 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

~~ 182110 GIVES STATUS OF BOBCAT EXPEDITION X REENFORCEMENT OF SAMOA BY US AND OF FIJI BY NEW ZEALAND NOW IN 

HAND X \NE NOW CONTEMPLATE OCCUPATION OF FUNAFU'".ri IN 

ELIJICE ISLANDS AS OUTPOST FOR SAMOA AND FIJI AND AS 

LINKAGE POST TOYlARDS SOLOMON ISLANDS PARA GOREGOING 

FACTORS COMBINE TO MAKE ADVISABLE EARLY CONSIDERATION 

OF KEEPING SUITABLE AND AVAILABLE FORCE CONSTANTLY IN 

AREA ~MBRACING CANTON FUNAFUTI SAMOA FIJI BOBCAT X 

178 
JAN. GCT. 

20 1730 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CIDTCLANT, CINCAF 

HAVE AGREED WITH BRITISH THAT Il~FOR ATION CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL 

FOR OTHERS TO KNOW, INCLUDING I:t\TENDED MOVEMENTS WHEN APPROPRIATE, 

}1J,.Y, SUBJECT TO WHATEVER CONTROL CO}.~MANDERS IN CHIEF MAY CHOOSE 

TO EXERCISE, BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF APPROXIMATELY 

EQUIVALENT ECHELONS OPERATING IN ADJACENT AREAS X ON NO ACCOUNT 

IS THIS TO I NCLUDE ANY MATTER THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS AN 

ORDER X T".d.ATEVER ARRANGEMENTS MAY RE :~ULT FROM THIS AGREEMENT 

THE KEY I[JEA IS TO USE THAT COMTi-UNICATION NETWORK WHICH 1

.VILL 

RESULT IN ~UICKEST EXCr~NGE OF ESSENTIAL NFOR~~TION BETvVEEN 

THOSE iNHO NEED TO KNOW. 

20 2150 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PARA 3AB1 OF YOUR OPPLA:N 4-42 ~:liLL NOT BE SO INTERPRETED AS TO 

DELAY DEPARTURE OF TASK FORCE EIGHT BEYOND Til','iE ESSENTIAL FOR 

FUELING AS ADVANCE OF TASK FORCES TO NORTH\'VEST t;VILL AFFORD 

ADEQUA11

E COVER AND TIME F'ACTOR APPEARS PARAMOUNT. 

GIVE CONSIDERATION TO PRACTICABILITY OF RAIDING WAR.~ WITH 

ADDITIONAL TASK FORCE TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER ATTACKS ON 

GILBERTS OR IvlARSHALLS AT .~HICH TIME ENEMY ENDF.AVORS TO 

OPPOSE HALSEY CAN BE EXPEC~PED TO HAVE REDUCED COVERAGE ON 

WAKE, A!,;D WHEN ALSO INDICATIONS OF LARGE NAVAL MOVEl\IENT FROM 

MANDATES TO'VARD SOUTHWEST MAY FURTHEH HAVE REDUCED WAKE 

SUPPORT. 

21 0309 CINCPAC TO CIDMINCH 

Your 182210 and 1918~5 every operation including escort duties 

in areas indicated must be predicated bn availability fuel for 

combatant and noncombatant ships. Following information significant total naval and co~~ercial fuel oil stocks in thousands of 

tons 12 January Brisbane 21, Sydney 8, Melbourne 8. The foregoing remaining after reductions since 22 Dec. of 10, 7, and 1B 

respectively. At Port Moresby none, no exact information as to 

current·situation Suva and Noumea. Par. 

Request information as to probable future availability and plans 

for maintaining supply at Bobcat, Samoa and places mentioned 

above. Diversion tankers available to fleet or in prospect to 

supply Australia n:o New Zealand will jeopardize supply of Pearl 

Harbor. 

In order make definite logistic estimates and provisions for 

fuel at Bobcat up to and incl1.Jd1.ng depai·ture BT 2oo for Xray and 

BClOO for Canal request estimate total fuel requirements. Both 

convoys at Bobcat. Data available here for estimating needs 

179 
liiKCBERJ 

JAN. GCT 

21 0309 both escorts. Assume BT 200 and escort can obtain fuel at 

(Cont'd) Xray. In view recent difficulties docking Republic at 

Brisbane and lack knowledge composition convoy invite 

attention to controlling depths that harbor. 

21 2217 CINCPAC TO TASK FORCE COML~NDERS 

Task Force 11 for action. Cancel my OpOrder 7-42. Direct 

BAGLEY, MUGFORD and JARVIS return to Pearl. NECHES will 

depart on 22nd to join you at rendezvous Mike. Task Force 

11 conduct air raid on ,.Vake followed by bombardment if 

practicable. Proceed to meet NECHES at Point Mike lat 20 

North longitude 179-50 West at 2000 GCT January 27. nlel 

at discretion and conduct raid after which return toward 

Pearl. Latest information objective will be furnished as 

received. Delivered for info to Comcardiv 1 Domdesbatfor 

and NECHES. 

22 0055 CINCPAC TO TASK FORCE COMIMNDERS 

Essential execution my Operation Plan 4-42 be expedited. Duration of close coverage Samoan unloading reduced accordingly. As soon as troops disembarked carry out plan except detach 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers to cover remainder unloading and to await further orders designating this detachment Task 

Group 13.4. Direct its conrr~ander report to Cincpac via 

Samoa the composition this command 

Raiding objectives extended to include Ralik Chain at 

discretion CTF B. Latest information Marshalls will be 

furnished as becomes available. 

23 1940 COMINCH TO CINCAF, CINCPAC 

DEVELOPE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF MARINES AND NAVAL UNITS 

OF "COMMAND0 11 TYPE FOR USE IN CONNECTION WITH EXPEDITIONS OF 

RAID CHARACTER FOE DEMOLIT'ION AND OTHER DESTRUCTION OF SHORE 

INSTALLATIONS IN ENEMY HELD ISLANDS AND BASES X EM·PLOYMENT 

OF SOME SMALL UNITS Eiv~BARKED IN SUB1v1ARINES APPEAR PRACTICABLE 

BY USE OF RUBBER BOATS~ 

180 
:iCAiiW 

JAN. GCT 

2004 - CPSNCF TO CINCPAC 

Urdis 210910 Item five convoy will probably be organized in two sections proceeding in company from San Francisco. 

1st section 6 - 17 knot vessels, 2d section 8 - 14 knot 

ships. Composition may be changed by allocations from 

Admiral Land's board to be available here today. Irres~ 

pective of composition large convoy will be ready to sail 

on or about Jan. 30. Escort recommended 1 cruiser with 

3 or 4 destroyers reinforced when nearing point of separa- tion of sections. Timely decision escorts 2018 and 2019 

essential. 

2 0121 - CPSNCF TO COMINCH 

Cominch 182210 was interpreted to mean that convoy BT 200 

would take the place of movement of 11,000 Army to Xray from 

San Francisco late January mentioned in his 070015. This 

inference apparently convirmed by your 202358 which requested Honolulu previously earmarked for Xray trip as escort for 

convoy 2018. Urdis 212004 now indicates this interpretation incorrect and that you are sailing the 11,000 Army for Xray as 

well as contingents for Christmas and Canton since you state 

there will be 14 ships in item 5 convoy whereas Cominch 

specified only 2 ships each for Canton Christmas. Expedite reply giving sufficient detailed information to clarify whole 

situation. 

23 0350 - CPSNCF TO CINCPAC 

Your 220121 status present information in connection formation 

convoys in Clipper mail but owing weather Clipper delivery not 

made. This information will clarify situation as to present and future movements of convoys. Hereaft.er each day this 

report will be forwarded by Clipper. Large troop and freight movement by Army to Xray and Copper is in formative stage. Approximately 14 ships will be ready to sail around Jan. 30. 

This convoy will include 2 ships to Xmas Island and 1 or 2 

to Canton Island, remainder to Xray. Above independent and 

separate from Panama Canal movements or convoys scheduled 

for 23 Jan and 25 Jan. Further information as ·soon as 

obtained. 

181 
JAN. GOT. 

21 0331 

23 0329 

CINCPAC rro CINCAF, INFO CIDMINCH 

WPL-46 Appensix L Section 516 A2 and B4. Desire you 

release to me area north of latitude 26 in order provide submarines with entrance East China Sea. Would 

it aid you to release to me area east of Long. 132 ! ast 

and North of Equator. 

CINCAF TO CINCPAC, INFO COUINGH 

Afirm to your 210331 as regards the extension south 

to latitude 2 6. N0 t now advisable release to you 

westward to longitude 132 east. 

J 8,2 
RUNNING SIDKMARY OF SITUATION (Cont'd) 

January 23 

The NEC1ffiS was sunk at 0319 (local). She was proceeding 

to her rendezvous with Task Force 11 and was 135 miles west of 

Oahu. The night was extremely dark. She had no escort with her 

due to the non-availability of DD's but was meeting the JARVIS 

from Task Force 11 at 0800. 

As no other tanker was available except the NEOSHO which 

was duo at Pearl on the 26th, CinCPac decided that the factor of 

safety for the Wake expedition was too small, and ordered Task 

Force 11 to return to Pearl to be fueled and held in readiness 

for eventualities. 

RDF positions placed three enemy SS in the imn1ediate 

vicinity of Midway. As no other Sub except the NECHES attacker 

was heard or seen in the Eastern Pacific, this indicated a 

particular interest by the enemy in Midway. 

Ca.mtaskfor 17 reported that all troops were disembarked 

at Samoa and recommended that the Task ForceL/s depart Samoa on 

25th, GCT. 

The GRIDLEY and FANNING of Task Force ~~~&n collided 

and damaged both bows. After emergency repairs at Pago Pago they 

will return to Pearl. 

Task Force 8 gave his plan of attack. F-Day is 25th. 

Attack will be made on 31st on Jaluit, Ivlili and Makin. VP's and 

B-17's discontinue shuttle to Suva on 27th and make search to 

westward on the 28th. 

Subs in the Marshalls were ordered to reconnoiter Maloelap 

and Uterik, then retire to northward during the raid of Task 

Force 8 and 17. The CACiffiLOT had been ordered away from Midway 

to proceed westward but developed engine trouble. All submarines 

are now going to be employed for offensive patrols. 

Due to presence of the enemy at Rabaul, CinCAF advises 

that all merchant ships entering the ABDA Area should be convoyed 

and that Torres Strait be u ed only under special arrangement. 

Cominch directed the trai~ing of Commando units for surreptitious landings on enemy coasts. ( .r c_-, :· i 1 v'! c h -:z 3 I q 4 o) 

Ill It was learned that there would be a large convoy of 

troops for Australia from the West Coast about January 29th as 

well as the 20,000 which were coming from the East Coast, and 

proceedinG via Borabora. 

183 
January 24 -

-

Operations of Task Forces Eizht and Seventeen 

progressing as nlanned. Eight starts to the northwest 

tomorrov; Seventeen will follow 150 miles astern. No 

further information as to unloading at Samoa. 

Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade, estimates 

that a 2500 foot runvJay could be made ready in one month. 

Requested aircraft an soon as possible. 

Another B-17 dropped out at Suva so that Suva-Canton 

Flight yesterday was by only two planes. 

Task Force 11 will enter Pearl tomorrow . I t will 

be fueled and 1-::.eld in reserve for the present. 

Cominch (in 24 1740 a t tach ed ) inforrr~d of the proposal 

t o constitute the Anzac Naval Area in which an allied 

naFal force would operate under a U. S . flag officer. 

Vic e Admiral Pye was suggested for the command and wilJ 

probably accept. The reply is under study. 

Report was received of a British launch from Apia 

beinc fired upon by a n aircraft which answered the description of a ~.s . observation plane. 

Enemy offensives are advancing in the Far East and 

in the Hew Britain Area. At least two carriers are 

operatine; ln the latter. Ts.rakan and northern Celebes have 

been in eneny hands for several days and Amboina has been 

bombed several times. 1 convoy advancing south through 

Tviakassar Strait~ w~ .. s roughly used by Dutch aircraft 

yesterday and~ U.S. destroyers last nie;ht. The DD's 

escaped with egligible damage. However, the S-36 is a 

total loss through grounding and the BOISE damaged her 

bottom in Sapeh Strait. 

A submarine was sighted off Midway, and one south 

of Oahu. 

Cincaf released the area between 26° and 30° so 

that Pacific Fleet submarines can operate in the North 

China Sea (Cincpac 210331 and Cincaf 230329). 

184 
SEOJ.iU!T 

JAN. GCT 

23 2350 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

FOLLOWING FROM OPNAV n CINCPAC 219309. AS INDICATED OPNAV 

102250 IT WAS ASSU1ffiD WITH TOTAL 19 LARGE AND 2 SMALL CHARTERED 

TANKERS THE NEEDS OF PEARL AND BOBCAT MIGHT BE MET X FURTHER 

ASSffi~PTION TlffiT REQUIREMENTS LATTER WOTlliD BE REPLENISHED BY 

DIVERSION SOME OF CHARTERED TANKERS AS YOU DIRECTED X SAMOA 

NOT ESTIAIATED IN FOREGOING NOR AUSTRALASIA FOR WHICH FOLLOWING 

INFO FURNISHED X ANTICIPATING SITUATION LIKELY DEVELOP THAT 

AREA BRITISH THROUGH SPENAVO SUGGESTED ABOUT 20 DECEMBER THEIR 

READINESS .~ EET OUR REQUIREMENTS FAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

WITH TANKER TONNAGE THEIR CONTROL AND REQUESTED ESTIW~TES OF 

FUEL TO BE LAID DO,,TI{ X ACCORDINGLY ADVISE THEM CINCAF WOULD 

NEED AT DARWIN IN THOUSANDS OF TONS MONTHLY 28 BUNKER 6 

DIESEL and 1 ·AVGAS X ALSO REQUESTED FOR PROSPECTIVE CONVOY3 X 

EITHER BRISBA1'"E OR SYDNEY FOLLOW NO AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS OF 

TONS JANUARY 10 X FEBRUARY 13 X MARCH 16 X APRI L 20 X THERE 

SHOULD THEHEFORE BE FUEL AT THESE POINTS DURING PERIODS 

MENTIONED OV'E_R AND ABOVE NORMAL NEEDS AUSTRALASIA X INTE11TI KEEP 

LONDON ADVISED OF REQUIRE~ffiNTS AS CHANGING X EXCLUSIVE OF 

ESCORTS ESTIMATES FOR CONVOYS BC100 AND BT200 AT BOBCAT ARE 

X FUEL OIL 5,100 TONS X DIESEL 460 TONS X BOTH GROUPS SHOULD 

RESTRICT WITHDRAWALS FROM RAIVlAPO TO MINIMUM X ARMY ACQUAINTED 

DISADVANTAGES UNLOADING BRISBANE BUT PREPARED ACCEPT DELAYS 

INCIDENT BARGING FROM OUTER ANCHORAGE 

24 1740 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, INFO CINCAF 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE ABOUT TO RECOMMEND THAT ANZAC 

NAVAL AREA BE ESTABLISHED ALONG FOLLOWING GENERAL LI1~ X (1) 

WITH BOUNDARIES BEGINNING AT MERIDIAN 141 DEGREES EAST ALONG 

EQUATOR TO MERIDIAN 170 DEGREES EAST THENCE SOUTH EAS'rERLY TO 

PARALLEL 20 DEGREES SOUTH MERIDIAN 175 DEGREES \FIEST THENCE DUE 

SOUTH ALSO FROM POINT OF BEGCHJNING SOUTH ALONG MERIDIAN 141 

DEGREES EAST TO SOUTH COAST OF NE.V GUINEA THENCE EAST1.VARD 

ALONG THAT COAST TO MERIDIAN 143 DEGREES EAST THENCE DUE 

SOUTH IN SEA AREAS ONLY X (2) SAID AREA ~"TILL BE UNDER US 

DIRECTION t.~TITH US FLAG OFFICER IN COhHftA~;D AND t.VILL BE EITHER 

DIRECTLY IDJDER cor.~INCH OR ELSE UNDER CINCPAC WHO :MAY NOT 

Cl-IAI GE ALLOCATION OF SHIPS TIIERETO X (3) TENTATIVE INITIAL 

ALLOCATION OF SHIPS BRITISH 1 CARRIER U S A'.r LEAST l HEAVY 

OR LIGHT CRUISER POSSIBLY ONE DESDIV NEW ZEALAND 2 LIGHT 

CRUISERS AUSTP..ALIA APPROXIMATELY T\''/0 THIRDS OF SEAGOING SHIPS 

(REMAINDER TO ABDA COMMAND) X (4) TASKS: ONE, COVER EJ~.ST 

AND NORTHEAST APPROACHES TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: TWO, 

ESCORT AJY!D COVER CONVOYS IN ANZAC AREA: THREE, SUPPORT DEFENSE 

OF ISLANDS IN SAID AR.EA PARTICULARLY KEY POINTS ALSO ATTACK 

ADJACENT ENEMY KEY POINTS: FOUR, CORRELATE OPERATIONS WITH 

FORCES IN ABDA AREA AliD iJ1JITH PACIFIC FLEET X ( 5) REQUEST 

COMMENT PARTICULARLY AS TO PARA ( 2) ABOVE X ( 6) CINCPAC 

NOMINATE FLAG OFFICER FOR THIS COMMAND FOR '!VIIICH COMINCH 

WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE OFFICER NUMBER 20 IF ACCEPTABLE TO 

YOU AND TO HIM 185 
January 25 

Task Forces Eight and Seventeen departed from Samoan 

area to the northwest. 

1.~a tsonia departed Samoa for the Coast. 

Task Force Eleven entered Pearl. Plan is still to 

hold this force in reserve, at the same time accomplishing 

minor upkeep and inter-change of carrier fighter aircraft. 

Triton and Tuna departed for patrol areas of(Japan. 

Asiatic Forces continued to clash with the enemy in 

Makassar Strait, Sturgeon reporting that she sank a CA or CV. 

The activity of·the enemy along the New IrelandSolomon front leads to one estimate that he will soon extend 

his bases to Noumea to cut the bomber route and operate 

against the communication line to Australia. If he advances 

on Port Moresby, as he probably will, he will control Torres 

Strait. 

Further reports by our submarines gave the followint;: 

Shore installations, anti-sub patrols and one large 

steamer at Maloelap. Two seaplanes at Wotje. Nothing 

at Uterik. 

January 26 

Task Forces 8 and 17 still maintaining schedule, will 

fuel on 28th; attack on 31st. Still being afforded partial 

cover by the operations of the VP B-17 unit, which will make 

its last search to westward on 28th and then return Pearl. 

Monterey departed Samoa. 

T,ask Force 11 will be held for eventualities in connection with the attacks of the other two forces. 

Plans have been made for the escorts which must accompany Australian reenforcement convoys mentioned in earlier 

despatches - one from West Coast and one from East Coast via 

Borabora. See Op. Orders 8-42 and 9-42. 

The earljer three-ship convoy is about south of Suva 

today. One ship is going to Suva and the other two are now 

being directed to Melbo ") rne with t e idea that one wilJ eventually proceect to the NEI. A request that the Phoenix proceed 

beyond Melbourne was denied because of our shortage of cruisers • 18 5 
Janua!"y 29. Task Forces =~ight and Seventeen v\lere apparently 

proceeding as planned. 

Deli erations continued as to the employment of 

Task ii1orce :Sleven but decision was withheld until after conference 1ith the Task Force CommanderAlthough the l'TISSISSIPPI is now escortine; a 

convoy, that duty for the n~;J MEXICO has been cancelled for the 

present. This employment for the battleships requires extra 

destroyers which are not available at present. _ 

none of the three cargo ships have left Samoa 

yet. The unloading is being cuarded by the SAl PRAIJCISCO and 

three destroyers. 

The 1")eenforcement (pur· suit sqnadron) for Suva 

aJ.rrived in the President MONROE. r.rhis force has been placed 

under the Commandinc General HaVIaiian Department but its tactical 

direction is by the Hew Zealand comrnand. 

RAMAPO arrived Borabora, and a report on that 

place was Peceived fron the SUMN~H. 

In 291430 Coninch informed that S.S . QUEEN 

ELIZABETH ·would fuel at Nuku Hiva and asked if destroyer would 

be available to cover this. Tieply was made in ne~ative. 

A patrol plane inspection of Baker and Howland 

found that they hac~each been raided by the enemy. This probabl"r occurred about ~fanuary when a garbled radio report was 

received but not tr~ced. Any of the weather observers remaining 

will be taken off by the HELJ in the next few days. 

Cominch was informed that the 1-~rmy wished to send 

A.A. amnunition and medical su~'Jlies to Manila via a subr1arine 

and that one is available. He replied in the necative because 

of the in2dequate number of subr:1arines for combatant work. 

The Australians have made several raids on Rabaul 

where a consider~ble concentration of shippinG continues. ~nemy 

is now usinr; Ka t/tong as a base. 

Air raids alone the coast of Hew Guinea continue. 

187 
January 30. 

The operations of Task Forces Eight and Eleven are 

proceeding as planned, but Vice Admiral Halsey reported in his 

302000 that unless fuel on his return trip was assured, his 

attack could not extend for more than one day. This led to 

the decision to send Task ./orce Eleven with the 1TEOSH0 tomorrow 

to a rendezvous with Task Force Eight (see 6peration Order No. 

10-42). After this duty is completed, this task force is to 

cover Canton. That place is to be reenforced about 12 February 

as provided in Op. Order No. 8-42. 

Inforr1ation of this nover'lent was sent out in 310137. 

Considerable concern over the fuel situation was felt, and 

KASKASKIA enroute Sar'loa to San Pedro was ordered to proceed to 

Pearl. 

Pour out six B-17's and five out six VP's of Task 

Group 8.9 returned from the Canton-Suva search they had been 

conductinc. 

Cominch' s 292110 provided fo1· our contribution to the 

Anzac .b,orce. Admiral Leary and staff will proceed by plane to 

Wellineton on the 1st; CHIC ·Go and Pl~TIEIE3 will depart for that 

place on the 2:t;ld; and the LAUSON will proceed from SAr,roA on the 

same date. See Operation Order No. 11-42. 

Cominch in 292220 (a al'c - secret file) info~ed that 

decision had. been made to establish an outpost at Funafuti and 

asked again for corrrment on the necessity for basing a force of' 

considerable strength in the Suva-Samoa-Canton-Bobcat area. 

CincPac replied vri th despatch 30-A which follo·ws. Nukufetau 

was recommended in place of Funafuti. 

Received orders to transfer the PH06JIX to the 

Asiatic Fleet vice the damaged BOISE. 

Thr•ee APD' s are be inc trans:' erred from the Atlantic 

to this command. 

The IDADO and 2 .DD arrived San Prancisco. 

188 
January 31 .. 

Attacks by Task Forces 8 and 17 were successfullJ 

carried out today except that heavy rain decreased the effectiveness of that agqinst Jaluit .. 

Results: 

Dy rr. F. 17 Uakin - 1 auxiliary badly damaged, two 

seaplanes destroyed. 

By T.P. 8 ~----

Jaluit - 1 out of two auxiliaries badly 

damaced; no aircraft present. 

Mili - Nothins present. 

(Seven of our airdraft lost). 

T.F. 17 retiring for fuel. 

Kwajalein - many auxiliaries and aircraft 

destroyed, some shore installations attacked. 

Wotje Many auxiliaries destroyed, 

shore installations bombed and 

bombarded~ 

Maloelap - Installations bombed and 

bombarded. 

(Six of our aircraft lost, CHESTZR hit by 

bomb amidships, ENTERPRISE some damage 

from near misses.. CliEST~R can still make 

thirty knots). 

T .. F. 8 retiring toward Pearl in urgent need 

of fuel. T.F. 11 will meet him north of 

Johnston Island. T.F. 11 depaPted this 

morning. 

HELM received attack at Baker Island from large seaplane -

~{-c(t~~e~ n9 ,.~flmf,~~~-qt('t probably damaged plane. Co~ plc1e..d evc\t-vt :->~ 

I\1\..SKASKIA vras told to resume voyage because PLJ TTE was 

nearing Pearl A Standard Oil tanker was being prepared for fuelin2 at sea. 

Cominch in 311606 directed that CinCPac control routing 

of Convoys 2030 and BT200, and also cover them with a carrier 

group operatlng in the South Pacific east of 1000. Convoy 2030 

sailed from S .. F .. today for Ca.nton, Chnistmas and Xray .. 

The enemy continues to advance in his offegsive. He is f~( installed at Balikpapan and in southeast Celebe!J. , e has reache~ BS 
January 26 (Cont'd) 

The loadin8 of all the convoys mentioned has been 

directed b~T antr.._ ori ties on the continent. ~'le have only the 

following information: 

S.F. - Australia 12 , 000 troops 

East Coast - Australia 20,900 troops 

East Coast - Borabora 3,500 troops 

S.F. - Canton 1 , 600 troops 

S.F . - Christnas 2,100 troops 

President l:1onroe to Suva 660 troops - pursuit 

squadron and air warning company. 

Coolidr;e and Hariposa to 

Australia - NEI - Unknown 

Enemy air attacks and observation a l ong the Solomons, 

New Guinea and the line west of New Guinea continue. 

An enemy submarine shelled Midway at dark last night. 

No danage ashore; possibility of a hit on the suhmarine. 

The radio intelligence and other indications m a d to 

the belief that there could har dly be much strength in the 

Marshalls. 

In his 251630 Cominch directed that no further withdrawals be made from the First Marine Air Wing. This will make 

it difficult to supply the aircraft which Cincpac has been directed to furnish, and which are an urgent need, at Samoa. 

Preparations of plans for a balloon barrage in certain 

sectors of Pearl Harbor are going forward. Previous objection 

was a result chiefly of the danger of such an installation to 

our own aircraft based in the Parl Harbor area. This objection is now being met by careful choice of locations and by placing balloons in sectors which offer the least hazard to our own 

operations. 

January 27 - In view of the growing conviction that most of 

the Japanese strength is engaged in the southwest, full consideration was given to expanding the offensive operations of Task 

Forces 8 and 17. Vice-Admiral Halsey's plan included attacks 

on Makin, Mili and Jaluit. Since he prepared this plan the 

submarine reports on Maloelap and Wotje and intelligence of 

enemy operations in the Raba.ul area have been received. During dellverations as to what form the directive to Vice Admiral 

Halsey should take a despatch along the s e.me lines from Cominch 

(271945) was received. As a result Cincpac's 280311 (following) 

was sent to Comtaskfor 8. 

T.F . 11 was permitt ed to disable machinery until Jan. 3~· 90 
January 27 (Cont'd) 

A dispatch (262007} was received from Cominch with 

regard to the possibility of dispensing with escorts for 

ships .between here and the West Coast, and adopting diversive 

routing in place thereof. This matter is under consideration. 

Cominch in 261721 directed that one large cruiser and 

two DD be prepared for the i-Anzac area. 

In regard to that area Cincpac nominated Vice Admiral 

Pye as the Connnander and made certain other reconnnendations 

at contained in 270103. For political reasons, etc., it was 

thought that the Anzac force should operate directly under 

Cominch though for strpctly naval reasons a status under 

the Commander-in-ChiefAiis considered to have been better. 

Vice Admiral Pye has been acting as adviser to Cincpac 

since A~ral Nimitz relieved him. It will have been noted that 

several of his estimates of the situation are contained herein. 

It has been decided to recommend that the Battle Force 

and Scouting Force grouping be abandoned and that the administration organization be composed of types directly under the 

Commander-in-Chief. 

A task organization and broad tasks are being formulated 

to be issued in the form of a general plan, and also more 

specific plans which will include the Army forces placed under 

Cincpac on the principle of unity of command. 

Enemy activity continued in the Solomon area, chiefly 

air raids and air observation, but Rabaul and Kavieng appear 

to be definitely captured, as well as a few of the unprotected 

small islands in the vicinity. 

Submarines are again making their presence knovrn in 

the Oahu area and again one shelled Midway at dark. However, 

during yesterday forenoon the GUDGEON returning from Japan 

sank a submarine of the I-68 class on the surface 200 miles 

west of Midway. 
JtN. GCT 

25 1630 - COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMAIRSCOFOR 

IT IS DESIRED THAT NO FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF AIR.CRAPI' 

FROM FIRST MARTI[E AIR WING BE MADE WITHOUT SPECIFIC 

AUTHORITY FROM ME X INTENTION IS TO MAINTAIN THESE 

SQUADRONS IN COMPLETE STATE READINESS AS COMBAT LOSS 

REPLACEMENTS FOR CARRIERS IF REQUIRED UNTIL SUCH TIME 

AS NAVAL S~UADRONS ARE READY FOR THIS PURPOSE. 

26 17.2 1 - COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PREPARE TO ALLOCATE TO ANZAC AREA ONE HEAVY OR ONE NEW 

LIGHT CRUISER FITTED AS FLAGSHIP ALSO AT LEAST TWO 

MODERN DESTROYERS PARA PRESSURE IS INCREASING FOR 

ALLOCATION MORE SHIPS TO ABDA COMMAND. 

26 2007 - CGMINCH To ·crNCPAC 

DESIRE RECO~mNDATION AS TO PRACTICABILITY AND SECURITY 

OF DESPATCHING CARGO VESSEL REGARDLESS OF SPEED INDEPENDENTLY BY DIVERSIFIED ROUTING BETWEEN WEST COAST PORTS AND 

HAWAIIAN AREA X AIR AND SURFACE COVERAGE TO BE FOR AT 

LEAST 200 MILES FROM PORTS OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION. 

27 0103 - CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

OFFICER NUMBER 20 NOMINATED IN PRESENT RANK OF VICE 

ADMIRAL X APPOINTMENT ACCEPTABLE TO HIM X REFERENCE PARA 

2 COMINCH 241740 X BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF ANZAC SHIPS 

COMMA LOCATION OF AREA AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RECOMMEND AREA COMMANDER OPERATE UNDER COMINCH DIRECT X 

AREA ASSIGNMENT SHOULD lfflT BE CONSIDERED AS RESTRICTING / 

OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCES WITHIN SUCH LIMITS AFTER DUE 

NOTICE X RECOMMEND LIMITING POINT IN LAT 20 DEGREES SOUTH '" 

BE LONGITUDE 172 WEST IN ORDER TO INCREASE DISTANCE TO 

LIMITING LINE FROM SUVA AND TONGATABU X PROSPECTIVE AREA 

COntlilllNDER REQUESTS OFFICER NUMBER 45 BE ASSIGNED TO HIS 

FORCE IN WHICH CINCPAC CONCURS X BECAUSE OF HAVING GREATER 

STAFF ACCOMMODATIONS AND RADAR RECOMMEND ONE CA BE 

INCLUDED IN US CONTRIBUTION 

182 
JAN. GCT 

~71945 : - COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

ASSUME YOU ARE AWARE OF SERIOUS ENEMY THREAT TO COMlVIUNI..;.. CATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA CREATED BY CURRENT ENEMY OCCUPATION OF POINTS ESPECIALLY RABAUL IN BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO AND HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT 'V'/HILE IT IS INADVISABLE TO DIVERT · PART OF HALSEY EXPEDITION IN THAT DIRECTION IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT PLANNED ATTACK IN MARSHALLS BE DRIVEN HOME 

28 0311 - CINCPAC TO TF COMMANDERS , 

FOR ACTION COMTASKFOR 8 X ESTIMATE ENEMY FORCES ~~RSHALLS I 

HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OPERA- IJAJ /JJ TIONS TO SOUTHWESTWARD X NOW I.S OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY ?J~ ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS GILBERTS MARSI~LS AND IT \ IS ESSENTIAL THAT ATTACKS BE DRIVEN HOME X EXPLOIT THIS 1(· / SITUATION BY EXPANDING OPERATIONS UTILIZING BOTH TASK FORCES IN SUCH REPEATED AIR ATTACKS AND SHIP BOMBARDMENTS ,. AS DEVELOPMENTS AND LOGISTICS MAKE FEASIBLE X IF PRACTICABLE EXTEND OFFENSIVE ACTION BEYOND 1 DAY 

183 
January 28. 

fuel today. 

Task l:i1

orce s Eight and Seventeen scheduled to 

Deliberations as to er.1ployment of Task Porce Eleven 

were in progress. Desp8tCll 270956 had been received from Australia 

indicating much anxiety as to enemy occupation of Houmea. The 

only infornation previously received as to a reenforcement at that 

place was contained in Cominch's 182110 (January) and earlier 

reference from the Vlar Department to the Commanding General 

Hawaiian Department which said that Artstralia was being urged to 

reenforce that place but. that the U. ~). might have to undertake it. 

Vice admiral Pye urges that one of Vice Afuniral 

Halsey's carrier groups be sent to Suva after the presently 

planned attack on the :Marshalls and that Taslr ?orce ~leven be 

sent to a position west of Samoa; these two forces to oppose 

further extension of the enemy to Noumea. The view of the vVar 1 .Plans Section is: that this nove is too eccentric for our primar} 

task of pPotectinc Hawaii and the Mainland; that it would be coh.-

siderably vveaker than the force the enemy is enploying in the. t · 

area; and that the logistic situation or our forces would be most 

precarious. The Uar Plans Section inclines to the view that a 

t:ollow-up in the Marshalls or a raid on Hake would be the best 

employment for Task Perce Eleven in order to further destroy 

facilities in that area and to divert some enemy forces from 

·, 

his offense. No decision was nade today. It will probably be 

decided after Vice Admiral Halsey's attack has been completed. 

l'n enemy S'..lbmarine torpedoed the small Army transport R.T. I•,RANK this morning between Haul and 3awaii. An intensive search resulted in some cood sound contacts and good indication that the submarine had been sunk. 

Our· subMarine observation of Taongi revealed no 

development although radio intelligence has t:or a long time 

placed a radio station there. 

In 272333 Coninch informed that Vice Adniral Pye 

would not cor:rraand the Anzac Force. 

Cincpac in 282117 urged reconsideration of the foregoing and noninated Rear Ad.mir>al Leary to be assisted by Hear 

Admiral Smith. 

In his 290047 Cincpac recommended to Cominch that 

all ships between the West Coast and Hawaii continue to be convoyed. 

.1 84 
January 31 (Continue d ) 

Johore Strait in ~alaya ~ He may have landed at Salamoa, New 

Guinea and he is believed to be reconnoitering the Hew Hebrides .. 

Hade detail e d despatch report to Cominch as to composition and employment of task forces . 

195 
AN. GCT 

27 0956 CANBERRA (ACNE?) ·TO CINCPAC 

The occupation of Rabaul increases threat to Port Moresby 

and New Caledonia. (2) Port Moresby has garrison of 5,500 

and requests for submarines to add to its defenses has been 

made. Its capture would close Torres Straits. (3) New 

Caledonia is practically undefended and its capture would 

give Japan a base from which she could cut the sea and air 

ferry route between United States and Australia besides 

providing access chrome and nickel. (4) It is understood 

that U.S. troops are now enroute Australia from u.s. East 

Coast to form a garrison for defense of New Caledonia and 

will arrive in Australia in about 21 days when transports 

have to be restowed. Time factor suggests Japan, with 

so rich a prize in view consitutes acting 1st, in which 

case the only immediate defense is a strong naval cconcentration in this area (5) On assumption u.s. Flag Officer 

will now assume command in Anzac area and that one 8" 

and 2 6" British cruisers will be available to join him, 

request plans be be concerted so that a sufficiently strong 

force may be concentrated in this area to deal with force 

similar to that employed in capture of Rabaul. It is 

believed that approximately 1 carrier was used in this 

operation, escort being 2 8" - 2 6" cruisers and 2 

aircraft carriers. 

196 
iiOPEm 

JAN. GCT 

27 2333 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

YOUR 270103 REGRET THAT OFFICER PROPOSAL CONTAINED 

11ri 241740 NOT APPROVED LOCALLY AND REQUEST NOMINAJ:E 

ONE OR MORE OTHERS X ANZAC AREA TO BE INITIALLY 

DIRECTED UNDER COMINCH X CHANGES IN ANZAC BOill·JDARIES 

NOT PRACTICABLE AT PRESENT AS PROPOSAL V:lOULD PUHTHER 

DELAY ACTION 1~;1IICH IS ALREADY OVERDUE 

28 211?' CINCPAC TO COMI NCH 

Urgently request reconsideration your 272333 X Considered most capable and suitable officer available X 

If reconsidera t5.on not acceptable recommend officer 

whose signal number is 45 to be assisted by officer 

whose signal number is 205 

29 0047 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Consider most econonical air coverage and surface escort can be provided in convoys composed of ships of 

equal speed but that careful coordinated control under 

one responsible cow1and essential - mydis 180401 Compacsoncf 191804 urdis 262007 X Routing ships independently will complicate rather than simplify air 'and 

surface coverage X wnile at present no Japanese 

raiders or submarines believed to be east of longitude 

150 West - this situation subject to sudden change X 

idith between 20 and 40 slow freighters at sea enemy 

action would probably result in excessive losses x 

Navy auxiliaries and new cargo ships capable 15 knots 

or better ·considered reasonably safe unescorted but 

these ships able to travel with 14 knot transpoi,ts 

which must be escorted regardless X Naval auxiliaries 

add materially to gun power of such convoys and obtain 

in return some antisubmarine protection X Reconnnend 

against sailing slow ships unescorted and further consideration my dis referenced above. 

29 1430 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

29 

My 261800 about February 15 SS Queen Elizabeth passage 

Auckland to San l~'rancisco will fuel from British 

Bishopdale at Nuku Hiva Marquesas x Do your present 

plans make practicable assignment one DD to investigate and select best fueling site February 13 or 14th 

and cover ships involved during fueling X If reply 

negative Comsepacfor arrange one Dog Love with 

Baker Tare . 200 carry out above assignment. 

2200 COHilJCH TO CINCPJC 

AIDAC (FETLOCK and t"oh~it.i.. Force) 197 
~ 

~LJ ~·~ / . ~] 

CinCl>ac File No, 

Al6-3/{16) UNITED STATES PACIFIO FIEET, 

u.s.s. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship. Serial Vi --- CARE FLEET POST OFFICE, 

PEARL HARBOR, T. H. 1 

8ii8ii:Di I _, _, 1942. 

O;eeration Plan 

· No. RS-1 

TASK ORGANIZATION 

(a) Covering .Force (Task Force One), Rear Admiral Anderson. 

All battleships Cruisers as assigned Destroyers as assigned. 

(b) Striking Forces. (Task Force numbers as assigned in orders 

for specific operations) 

Carriers, cruisers and destroyers Qrganized into task 

forces sui table for the specific task or tasks assigned •. ,

(e) Submarine F·oroe ( 'rask Force Seven),. Rear Admiral Withers. 

Submarines, Pacific Fleet; 

(d) Patrol Plane Force (Task Force Nine), Rear Admiral Bellinger. 

Patwings ONE and ~wo. 

(e) Escort Force (Task Force F'-fteen), Rear Admiral Calhoun. 

Forces exclusive of Task Force One assigned. 

(f) Base Force (Task Force Six), Rear Admiral Calhoun. 

Trainron TWO, FOUR, SIX, and EIGHT. 

Base Fore& Subordinate Command, San Francisco. 

(g) Marine Force, ·Major General Vogel. 

{h) 

Marines assigned to Paciric Fleet. 

Hawaiian Naval Coagtal Frontier (Task ~orce Four) Rear 

Admiral Bloch 

Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 

Fleet Forces which may be assigned • 

( 1) Naval Station Samoa (Task Force F1V@) 1 Brigadier General Larsen. 

Local Defense Forces, Samoa. 

Fleet f orces which may be assigned. 

-1-

1.98 
iiSRilEIJ 

Operation Plan 

No. R5-JL 

1. Information. 

1 (a.) This plan is 1saued under u. s. Ps.c1f1o Fleet 

Campaign Plan 2-R5 to promulgate a task organization of the 

Pacific lt"leet and to assign general tasks to the task forces. 

More detailed tasks will be assigned in the orders or plana 

for specific operations. The Pacific Northern and Pacific 

Southern ·Naval Coastal :e•rontiers are not included in the Task 

Organization at this time as there are no tasks to be assigned 

to them other than those assigned by the Chief of Naval Operationa. 

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and Naval Stat1on 1 

SAliOA are made task forces of tho Pacific Fleet by the effective Basic Navy War Plan (V~L~46) 1 as revised. 

(b) Information of the enemy is in Fleet Intelligence Bulletins and in the daily broadcasts by Commandant, FOURTEENTH 

NAVAL DISTRICT. 

2. This fleet will: 

(a) Raid enemy communications ~nd forces. 

(b) Protect the territory of the Aaeoc1ated Powers 

east of Longitude 180° by covering, by deatro7'D& 

·. (\~ ~~1~ 

enemy forces, and by cont~iR-g tb..rough offensive 

opera tiona. 

(c) Escort shipping, and cover and patrol lines of 

comm.unica tion as circums.ta.nce·s require. 

-2-

.1 9 9 
iiliitill 

Operation Plan 

No. ftp;-1 

3. (a) Covering Fpr~~~ (Task Force One) 

(l) Cover operations of other fol'Ces as may be 

directed. 

(2) Escort, with appropriate strength, convoys 

between the West Coast and the five hundred mile circle 

from Oahu. 

{3) Base at San Francisco at present. 

(4) Conduct intensive training as conditions permit. 

(b) ~triki~g Forces 

(l) Raid enemy communication$, positions and forces 

as directed in specific plans and orders. 

(2) Cover own territory, forces, and communications 

as directed in specific orders and as can be accomplished 

incidental to other operations. 

(3) Base at Pearl Harbor. 

{o) Submarine ,orce (~ask Force Seven} 

(1) Raid enemy eommunications and forces off Japan 

·and in the Japa,ne se Mandates 1 in accordance with specific 

dirf.lct1ves e.a issued. 

(2) Observe enemy areas as may be specifically 

directed, and aa may be accomplished incidental to 

off'ensive taslc. 

fl.j 

(3) l(!ainta.in defonsive patrols as may be orderp. 

(4) Base Pearl Iiarbor., Utilize facilities of MIDWAY 20 0 

as may be expedient. -3-
Jperatlgn Plan No. R5-l 

{d) Pa tl~ol, Plane Force (Task Force Nine} 

(l) Conduct aerial patrols from Oahu 1n conjunction 

with the Army as specifically ordere4. 

(2) Vfllen directed, operate aircraft from advance bases 

to support operations of other forces; and to increase 

general security or the Oahu Base, and of the bases concernad. 

(3) Assist Task Foree Four with transportation ot 

supplies to the outlying islands. 

(e) Escort Force (TaSk Force Fitteen) 

(1) Escort convoys to the An2!ac Area and the southwestern 

bases as circumstances require and the force• available permit. 

{2} Make forces available to Task Force One as directed. 

(3) Assist in escorting convoys to MIDWAY, JOHNSTON) 

PALUYRA • CAtrTON', CHRIS ..l}iAS a.nd other outlying baa·es. 

(f) Base F•orce {Task Force Six) 

(1) Provide logistic service to the Fleet, maintaining 

:for this purpose close liaison tln .. ough tha Base Force Subordinate Command with Commander Pacific Southern Coastal 

Frontier and with the Naval Transportation Service. 

(2} Assist Task Force Four as may be practicable with 

transportation of supplies to the outlying islands. 

{3) Prepare, by- training and by liaison vt th the agencies 

supplying material, to establish a.clva.:nce bases. 

( 4) Train tranaworts for amphibious expedi tiona 

in conjunction with Second Marine Division• 

-4-

201 
MJI&l 4 

Oeeration Ord,er lto. R5 ... 1 · 

<g) ;second Marine Division. 

(1) Ol:"ganize t\nd train for landing operations, including 

those of the "Commando" type. 

w0b{, (2) Cooperate and aas1.st Army units in training for 

"-

landing operations as may be required by apecif'io directives. 

(3) Be prepared to move advance units to base on 

OAHU, or at advanced bases. 

(h) lmwa11an Naval Coastal Frontier (Task Force Four) 

(l) Oarry out tasks ass:iene·d in C1n0Pac Fleet's 

Campaign Plan 2-.R5. 

(1) Naval Station Samoa (Task Force Five). 

(1) Defend American SAMOA, 

(2) When assigned forces permit, assist 1m the 

prt'tection ot Allied m.a:r1 tin1e connnunioa tiona in the · 

vicinity of SAMOA. 

(3) Assist in t he protection and supply of Fleet 

units present, 

(x) {1) This plan effective on receipt~ 

4. Logistics. General logistic support vtill be supplied by the 

Base Force~ as prescribed in paragraph 3(t). 

(a) Communica t1ons. In accordance with PAO-SEVmT'l'Y, 

· 8. Connnander-in-Chief, U. s. Pacific Fleet v:ill disseminate information as to his location. 

C. w. NIMITZ 

Admiral u.s Navv Oommantier-l.n-UnJ.et, 

U.s. Pa.o1t1o Fl ee·t. 

20 2 
SiiOnrm --·- JAN. GCT COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

20 2ll0 PARA APITIM X FOTI OFFICER VJHOSE SIGNAL NlJliiBER IS 45 

, (P~DM LEARY) YOU WILL BE ASSIGNED BY SEPARATE SECNAV 

DESPATCH TO COIJ.ri-.IAND QUOTE ANZAC PORCE UNQUOTE CONCERNI NG ~7HICH .riE~RE IS G IVEH I-IEREWITH FULL TEST OF 

DESPATCH AGREED TO BY ALL GOVERNill:SNTS CONCERNED QUOTE 

TliE COHBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMEND TIIE IMMEDil-~TE 

ESTABLISID1ENT OF THE QUOTE AHZAC AREA UNQUOTE AND OF 

THE OR ESPONDilT~QUOTE ANZAC Ii'ORCE UN ~UOTE PARA ONE 

BOUNDARIES COLON BEGINNING AT LONGITUDE .l41 DEG EAST 

AT ~IE EQUATOR E l'VARD AI.JONG THE EQUATOR TO LONGITUDE 

170 DEG EAST THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY TO POINT IN LATITUDE 

20 DEG SOU~H LONGI'rUDE 175 DEG WEST THEHCE DUE SOUTH; 

FROM POINT OF BEGINNING SOUTH ALONG MERIDIAN 141 DEGREES 

EAST TO.SOUTH COAST OF NEW GUINEA THENCE EASTWARD ALONG 

SAID COAST TO }1E~DIAN 143 DEGREES EAST THENCE DUE SOUTH 

Ill SEA AREAS ONLY X PARA 2 X ANZAC FORCE TO BE UNDER 

STRATEGIC DIRECT N OF THE UNITED STATES EXERCISED BY 

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U S FLEET THROUGH ONE OR MORE U S 

FL/iG OFFICERS ASSISTED BY ONE OR I'TORE FLAG OFFICERS 

NAMED BY AUSTRALIA AND SLANT OR NEYv ZEALAND X PARA 3 X 

ALL PRACTICABLE USE VJILL BE HADE OF lTAVAL SUPPLY 

COMHUHICA~ION AND REPAIR FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA AND 

UEW ZEALAND X PARA 4 X INITil .. L ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS TO 

AUZAC FORCES BRITISH 1 CAHRIER UlJITED STATES ONE IillA VY 

OR ONE LIGHT CRUISER AND T:~''/0 DESTROYERS NEW ZEALAND TViO 

LIGHT CRUISERS OIJE AUXILIARY CRUISER AUSTRALIA TWO 

HEAVY CRUISERS ONE LIGII ~ CRUIS:ER THREE AUXILIARY CRUISERS 

TWO DESTROYERS TWO ANTISUBMARINE PATROL VESSELS SIX 600 

TON . AUTISUBT.IARIHE VES3:2LS PAR:SN REMAINDER OF AUSTRALIA 

SEAGOI1TG PORGES NAHELY Trvo LIGHT CHUISERS TWO DESTROYERS 

THREE SLOOPS TO BE ASSIGUED rro ABDA COUMAND PAREN PERIOD 

ALL OTHER li.usr:PRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND NAVAL UNITS TO 

. REVIA!H AT DISPO SAL OF rrHEIR RESP ECTIVE GO\TERNMENTS lilOR 

LOCAL DE !JNSE X THE DI SPOSAL OP ADDITIONS TO DOMINION 

NAVAL }, ORCES rJI LL BE DECIDED BY AGREEL1 E~TT AT THE 

APPROPRIATE TIME. 

29 2335 SUMNER TO CINCPAC 

30 

200 foot 9 fath om channe l devel oped and buoye d X Not 

difficult improving by bl ast ing X Seapl anes can land 

and takeoff in main harbor X Be l ieve I/Iotu Mute I sl and 

could be developed for land plane base X East of 

Tah ihi f or seaplane base X Old chart of inner harbor 

nearly correct X no water supply above native needs X 

Could be developed X Ready to receive ships X Ramapo 

arrived today A M 

2000 COr:ITASK1i'OTI EIGHT TO CIHCPAC 

Unless assured o.f fuel neetinc, me on return route to Pearl 

anticipate necessity Task li1orce 8 withdrawal after 1 day 

203 
sii!lG I L ... " 

JAN.. GCT 

31 0138 CINCPAC TO TASK FORCE COMMANDERS 

This message to Comtaskforce 8 for action X TaskPorce 

11 with only available tanker lJEOSHO departing Pearl 

2030 GCT Janu~ry 31 for point 100 miles south Task 

Force 8 Fox plus 8 day rendezvous Comtaskforce 8 

221825 X Vii thdraw after first day at Halseys discretion 

31 1340 YOUR 302139 SEA FROUTIER IS NEW TERM FOR NAVAL COASTAL 

FHOHTIER WHICH IS GEHERAL CHARACTER OF ORGAniZATION IN 

THAT COMANZAC SHOULD SET UP TO INCLUDE PROTECTION OF 

COASTWISE SHIPPING. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Your 292220 Compatwing Two serial 0425 of 11 July furnished Hydrograpl1er contains report reconnaissance 

Ellice Islands last June whi.Ch indicates Nukufetau is 

somewhat better seaplane operating area than Funafuti X 

Chart study shows former more easily defended X Unless 

landing field is to be built su~gest occupying that 

place instead of Funafuti X Request information contemplated developments whether Army or Marine personnel and estimated date X Para X Primary mission mobile fleet 

force mentioned your 191815 not entirely clear X At 

present and in foreseeable future considerable number 

cruisers and destroyers engaged covering or escort 

duties Canton Christmas Bobcat Samoa Piii Anzac area X 

A mobile str:Lking or covering force to ~enain constantly in the area superimposed on prospective escort obliga- tions seens likely to result in principal employment of 

fleet being defense distant cor~nunication lines and relatively we~k shore positions X This would result in 

considera ,)le expf ndi ture of resources v1i th no cor:Ui1ensura te 

return X Presence of a covering force in that large area 

would not reljeve necessity for cruiser escorts to cuard 

transports or other important ships against single raiders X 

Recommend aga:tnst proposal as guiding directive X 

CinCPac proposes operate Task Porces that area from time 

to tiMe as situation or enemy intelligence may indicate X 

If still considered advisable to make perManent assiP.:nn.en t that area 1 o s s of one CA two DD to anzac fore e change of Phoenix for Boise attendant logistic difficulties and 

weakening of operations elsewhere sur;~est two cruisers 

and four DD which would be available to CinCPac for escort 

as circuns tance s t•equired .. 

204 
BECR&'fl 

JAN. GCT 

31 1606 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PLOT OF. PROBABLE TRACKS OF CONVOYS BAKER TARE 200 BAI~ER 

CAST 100 AND 2030 INDICATES HJ~A VY C ONCENTFL~'~ION OF 

VALUABLE ST-!IPPING TJILL BI! SOUTH OF ~qUATOR AND WEST OF 

LONGirrU.rJE 150 WEST PEOM ABOUT rr TO 25 FEBHUARY X SUGGES~C 

YOU CnVER THE LIOVEI!E~NTS OP THESE COIJVOYS USING AIRCRAFT 

::LH GENERAI ACCORDA1JCE WITH YOUR OPPLA1T 6-42 BETVvEEN 

HAVlAII AND 1JE~v CALEDONIA X SUPPORT TEIS AIR PATROL BY 

QIT2 OF YOUR STRIKIIJG GHOUPS EAST OF LOITGITUDE 180 X 

I ·,7ILL ARRANGE POR COVER AND SUPPORT BY ANZAC HAVAL 

AND AIR ~· 0RCES REHAINDER OF VOYAGE X CINCPAC CONTROL 

RUUTIIJG O~? CONVO:!S 2030 BEY01TD XMAS AND BAKER TARE 200 

BEYOlTD BOBCAT TO TA1Cj]; ADVAHTAGE OP COVEH XX WHJ~T 

ESCORT 'v'liT_L YOU PR01

!IDE r,1

0R BAK~R TAHE 200 BEYOND 

BOBCAT 

205 
ebruary 1. 

Task Forces Ei~ht an Seventeen continued their 

retirenent. 

Task ~orce Eie1t approachine Task 2orce Eleven. Tho 

nunbor of pa tro1 planes a. t Jo_,_mston Island was increased to six 

to assist in coverinc these forces. Later, Vice hd~iral Halsey Peported that his force had sufficient fuel to reach Pearl. 

Apparently CII1~2/EI~R and two DD are separated from EHT~~RPRISE and 

must conduct fuelinc: of the DD. Admiral Halsey also reported that the eneny operates two-ene::ined bombers 600 miles from Taroa 

Island, I.Ialoelap. 

The avy Department announced the news of the attack, 

and a boost in norale all around is evident. 

The employnent for Task Force Eleven r1ust now be 

decided upon. TI~ directive from Cominch to operate a currier 

[roup in tl1e South Pacific bears very heavily upon the situation. 

_

1 Convoy BT-200 dep:t rted from the Canal Zone today. Task ~orce Thirteen (Op.Ord. 9-42) will take it over near Gobca 

where the BiRqY (AP) nust refuel. 

The TAUTOG, whic~ is about 300 miles ahead of Task Fore~ Eight, reported two biplanes. rrhe se are thought to be 

from submarines. 

Rear Admiral Leary departed by plane for 1;iellincton. 

He will assune the rank of Vice ldmiral upon arrival uckland, 

an_ take command of the Anzac Porco • 

.b,irst reenforceraents for il.ustralia ( COOLIDGT~, MARIPOSA) arrived .1elbourne. The COOLIDGE may be sent on to Java. 

CinCi~F re-oorted that condition of BOISZ makes it 

necessary to send her to Colo:r1bo for two nonths repairs. Pacific 

Fleet has now detache two CLs leaving three; one CA leaving 

eleven; and two DD, lea vine 49. Three of De sdi v r>O are now 

assiened to the '.lest Coast Coastal Prontiers leavine; division 

corrrr1ander in t .1e Rl:. ':i:HBURHE to operate the sound school, to which 

has been as:::;ignod several patrol types which vrork with two 

S-type submarines. 

Suva reported bearinGs of ener1y forces to the southeo. s tr1ard movinc eastward. 'l11De se were fixe bv our r-adio lntcllic~nce to he northwest of ~)uva, west of the Gilberts. 

Radio 8orr1:nunica -cion v1i th Salamoa ,-,as established a _pin, but air attacks by Japs in that aroa continue. 

206 
February 1 (Cont'd) 

Replied to Cominch 292220 that ir still considered 

advisable to make permanent assignment of a force to the 

Samoan area, two cruisers and four DD should be the maximum 

and should be available for escort in that area (Aidac file 

010407). In same message recommended that Nukufetau be substituted for Funafuti because it has a clearer lagoon and can 

be more easily defended. Only disadvantage is that it has 

not as much space for land aircraft. 

February 2. 

Task ~orces Eight and Seventeen continued toward Pearl; Task Force Eight will enter on the 5th, and Seventeen on the 

6th. Both have been at sea for extremely long periods and need 

rest and upkeep. The hazard of having three carriers in port together for several days will be accepted. The SARATOGA will 

be ready to leave for the Coast for permanent repairs about the 

lOth. 

Task Force Eleven turned south to carry out the remainder or its orders (10-42) to cover Canton. Plans are in 

the making to employ this force in carrying out Com1nch 311606 

(covering convoys). 

GRIDLEY and FANNING (damaged) started from Pago Pago for Pearl. 

Six submarines are enroute to stations in the west 

including one in the East China Sea. 

In the Asiatic, Sourabaya and other points in ~ava 

were attacked by carrier planes. Other enemy pressure continued in the southwest. He bombed Tulagi and New Guinea including Moresby. British attacked shipping at Rabaul with 

4 VP. 

February 3. 

Task Forces at sea proceeding as before. 

The Bobcat convoy departed Panama, due to arrive 

February 18. 

Supply of outlying islands is continuing, - RAIL, WASMUTH and SS HAWAII returned from Johnston; TANEY and BARBARA 

OLSEN are at Canton; GREBE and Y0-43 are return/from Palmyra. 

ing 

207 
Februarz 3 (Continued) 

Comineh in 031600 (Aidac) informed that Funafuti 

would be selected as the outpost for Samoa and that the 

Samoan Force of 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers would be kept 

continuously in the area. 

The MOFFETT of the BT-200 escort will guard fueling 

of the SS QUEEN ELIZABETH at Nukuhi va. 

Radio intelligence indicated that an extensive operation, "MA" covering period 5-10 February will be undertaken by 

the enemy - probably attacks all along the Malay Barrier - New 

Guinea line. 

Amboina is being attacked. Air raids continue on 

Java, but Malacoa is still in Dutch hands. 

Nine U.S. B-17's attacked enemy ships at Balikpapan. 

Results indeterminate. 

February 4. 

No change for Task Forces. 

Op. Order 11-42 was issued to Task Force 11. It 

provides for that force to cover Convoys 2030, BT-200 and 

BC-100 and reenforces it with PLATTE, being sent to Samoa, 

and CURTISS and six VP being sent to Suva. 

The escort of 2030 is Task Force Twelve (Op. Order 

8-42) and that of BT-200 west of Bobcat is Task Force Thirteen 

(Op. Order 9-42). 

CASE and O'BRIEN collided off the Farallones in fog. 

They returned to San Francisco but complete damage report has 

not been received. 

All enemy forces are fairly well accounted for in the 

southwest by radio intelligence, except seven BB and Cardiv 

Four. 

Enemy ships were reported off Efate. 

208 
F.e bruary 5 • 

Task Force Eight entered. Damage to CHESTER was by 

a small instantaneous bomb; that to ENTERPRISE was from fragments. A most successful raid was indicated - destroyed about 

fifteen ships including cruiser, tenders, gunboats, two submarines, a 17,000 ton merchantman, and 35 planes for sure. 

Well developed airfields were found at Taroa and Roi Islands 

and much damage to shore installations was inflicted.· Five of 

our fighters engaged fifteen enemy fighters and shot down three 

with no losses. Our chief loss was at Roi where fighters got 

4 YSB. The raid was apparently a complete surprise to the enemy. 

ENTERPRISE remained in sight of Wotje for five hours - was 

attacked by seven twin engined bombers. 

Because of number of carriers in port and the Emperor's 

birthday, overnight leave and liberty was cancelled until further 

orders. 

CURTISS, PLATTE, WORDEN of Task Force 11; PORTER of 

Task Force 12; PENSACOLA and 4 DD of Task Force 13; departed. 

Asiatic Fleet was redes-ignated u.s. Naval Forces Southwest Pacific, Vice Admiral Glassford in command. Admiral Hart 

in command of Combined N~val Forces ABDA area (Secnav 042030). 

Received from Cominch a request for vie.ws as to whether 

the PacFlt should relieve the pressure of the enemy in the southwest by reenforcing the ABDA and/or Anzac area or by aggressive 

operations in the Pacific Area, including use of battleships 

{051555 Aidac). 

Enemy action in Far East continues. Submarine activity 

in the Eastern Pacific is nil. 

February 6. 

Task Force 17 entered. Little to add to previous report. llo air opposition encountered except two flying boats. 

No air at Jaluit. Weather caused loss of six out of the eight 

planes lost. 

Cominch informed that CONCORD is in SEPac Force and 

not in PacFlt. 

Received attached despatches 061513 and 062352 from 

Cominch estimating that enemy would soon strike all along the 

Southwest line including Noumea and the New Hebrides. They 

also might well raid Midway, Oahu, West Coast and Canal Zone. 

Sends Task Force 11 to Anzac Area (established this date) and 

reenforces with two cruisers and six destroyers from Task 

Forces 12 and 13. 

209 
February 6 (continued) 

Despatch orders were issued making these changes. HONOLULU and two DD will combine convoys 2030 and BT-200 at 

Bobcat. 

Secnav despatch 061445 (attached) changed "Naval 

Coastal Frontiers" to "Sea Front1ersu. 

Enemy showed no signs of turning aside from his southwest objectives. 

Februarz;. 

ComTaskForce 11 gave .his plans in 070615. He will 

operate in the area between. Fiji and New Caledonia. Cornanzac 

reports that he is leaving for Melbourne Feb 10. He diverted 

the CHICAGO and PERKINS into Suva where it will join the Anzac 

Squadron. 

Six VP left for Suva in accordance with original orders 

except that they will make no search from Canton. 

Replied to Cominch 051555, 061513 and osgas2 in CinCPac 

080239 (Aidac). Pointed out that there were insufficient forces 

to conduct .any offensive operations except hit and run raids 

which probably would not release pressure in southwest. Battleships would not fit in such operations and there are insufficient 

light forces to raid, and also screen them. Contemplate that one 

task force will next cover in the Samoan area and one will be 

held in reserve. It was decided not to conduct f~~ther raids at 

this time because the probable results do not balance the prob- able risks. 

In response to a request from c.o., Bobcat for a tug, the TERN ·is being sent there. 

~ Governor Samoa reports airfield will be ready on March 

1 for fighters on May 5 for bombers. It is not yet evident how 

this aircraft will be provided. 

A large convoy is making up in San Francisco £or 

Australia. Many of the AK's will be sent alone on dispersed 

routes. 

Com1nch in 071940 informs that Marine units being removed from Iceland will be sent to the Pacific Fleet. He 

speaks of the need for amphibious troops here being obvious. 

Ten S-class submarines are being sent to the Far East. 

210 
February 7 (continued) 

Activity in the Bismarck area appears reduced. The 

enemy main attack forces are in the Molucca Area. Singapore continues to be hammered, and artillery is working against the Bataan Peninsula. 

February 8. 

Shifts in forces are proceeding as directed for the 

"offensive" in the New Caledonia Area. 

Through a dispatch from the War Department to the 

Commanding General,. Hawaiian Department, it was learned that 

Caminch desired 12 B-17's sent to support Task Force 11. 

Arrangements are being made to send them and a plan of opera- tions is being drawn up. The TANGIER will be sent to Fiji to 

carry neeessary personnel and material there. 

Comanzac gave further directions for the concentration 

of the Anzac Squadron off Fiji. 

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, informed 

the ABDA Command that plans for the following ferrying of aircraft was planned in February and March: 

22 B-17 

114 B-26 (must be set up and trained 

in Hawaii) 

8 B-25 

Except for more bombing of Java the offense in that 

area does not seem to be getting underway. 

A submarine bombarded Midway with 3 shells tonight, then escaped. 

February 9. 

Task Force 11 and reenforcements proceeding as previ- ously ordered. 

During the afternoon, Cominch 092245 (A1dac) was 

received. Disagrees throughout with CinCPac 089239. Briefly, it informs that present emplo-yment of battleships is unsatisfactory and points out that attempts to relieve pressure in 

the southwest must be continued by offensive operations in 

the Mid-Pacific, mentioning Wake and the northern Marshalls. 

This makes the situation particularly difficult, as through orders of Cominch in 061513 and 062352, Task Force 11, extra 

light forces, and tankers are being tied up in the Suva Area. 

Full deliberations were held but no satisfactory solution of 

the problem could be reached. Further conference with 211 
February 9 (continued) 

Vice Admiral Halsey will be held tomorrow. The War Plans 

Section Briefed Estimate is quite pertinent and is bound 

herewith. 

In response to a request of CinCPac, Vice Admiral 

Pye, was ordered to Washington for conference with Cominch, 

and lett by clipper today. 

The SARATOGA left for Puget Sound today for permanent repairs and major alterations. 

The activity in the New Guinea area is still slack. 

The offensive against Java is holding off, but pressure against Singapore and Bataan is severe. The Japs have landed on Singapore Island. 

February 10 -

.No change made today in plan of operations. Further 

discussion was held as to employment of Task Forces Eight and 

Seventeen and the battleships, but final dec~sion was ndreached. ~ 

As pointed out in the briefed estimate, it is very difficult ~ 

to select an objective within reach of the Fleet (extended by 

oiling at sea) which would result in any considerable diversion 

of enemy force from the southwest. One proposal was to send 

Task Force Eight to make a sweep with Task ·Force Eleven as far 

as Rabaul, while 11olding Task Force Seventeen in reserve or 

having him attack Wake. Task Force Eight would of course be 

operating outside of the Pacific Area which is the responsibility of the Pacific Fleet. 

Another proposal was to raid Tokyo. This would be 

precarious due to bad weather for fueling. 

Comanzac has established himself at Melbourne. He 

is forming an Anzac Squadron under Rear Admiral Grace (R.N.) 

composed of 2 CA, 2 CL and 2 DD. This will cooperate with 

Task Force Eleven between Fiji and New Caledonia. 

Task Unit 11.1.2 (6 VP) arrived Suva. 

An enemy sub bombarded Midway a gain this evening. 

Two rounds, no damage; was attacked by two aircraft. 

Events are moving fast at Singapore and slowly in 

the Solomons area. Off Java and Timor strong preparations by 

the enemy are still i ndicated. 

212 
February 10 (continued) 

The Australians air attacked Gasmata, New Britain, which has just been occupied by the enemy. Only slight damage claimed. 

February 11 

Decision was reached to employ Task Forces Eight and 

Seventeen combined into one Task Force to make a coordinated 

raid on Wake and Eniwetok or other objective such as Marcus if 

Eniwetok develops as undesirable. It is feared that this will 

not divert much strength from the southwest but it is as strong 

an aggressive operation as can be undertaken at this time. 

The combined Task Force is designated as tlnnteen. 

Vice Admiral Halsey will depart on 13 February with 

Task Group 13.1 and Rear Admiral Fletcher on 15 February with 

Task Group 15.2. Each will hold target practice enroute. 

Cominch was informed in 120459 (Aidac). 

Patrol Squadron 91 will reenforce the Pacific Fleet 

on March 1. 

Singapore is being over-run and will probably fall 

in a day or two. 

Some enemy activity in New Guinea continues and the 

R.A.A.F. bombed ships at Gasmata again. 

CHICAGO and PERKINS of Anzac Force arrived Suva. 

Admiral Hart has given up his position in command 

of the ABDA due to ill health. The Dutch Vice Admiral Helfrich 

relieves him. 

213 
February 12. 

Prior to issue of Operation Order 15-42 to Vice Admiral 

Halsey, deference was paid to possibl~· superstitious persons by 

changing the task force number to Sixteen. Then, in order to 

make sure connections between Admiral Fletcher's force and the 

QUADALUPE which must accompany him, and is not scheduled to 

arrive at Pearl until the fifteenth, the dates of departure of 

Task Groups 16.1 and 16.2 were changed to 14 February and 16 

February respectively. 

A report was received from the CACHALOT which indicated 

little activity at Wake and none visible at Eniwetok. This is 

considered rather puzzling in regard to the latter for radio 

intelligence before the war indicated the probability of an air 

field, and the air attacks on Wake were believed to have been 

launched from there or Rongelap, which also showed no activity 

during an earlier submarine reconnaissance. Eniwetok appears to 

be even less of an OPTIMUM objective for attack than had been 

believed before. 

The NEVADA was refloated today. She will be placed in 

drydock in the near future. 

Com1nch in 122200 (Aidac) directed that Admiral Leary 

who had expected to establish a command center at Melbourne, to 

rejoin his flagship, and conduct an offensive operation with 

the Anzac Force and T.F. 11 against the enemy in the SolomonsBismarck area. CinCPac was directed to furnish logistic support 

for the whole operation including ammunition. Three large 

tankers had already been assigned; the British have two at Suva; 

TANGIER and CURTISS have bombs and air torpedoes. Other forms 

of ammunition must be sent. 

Task Force Eleven's VP's (6) started search to westward 

from Suva, but sighted nothing. 

Singapore island is still holding out. No more enemy 

landings were made yesterday at any point. 

One submarine was reported by a B-17 northeast of Canton. 

This may mean difficulty for the PORTER in protecting the President TAYLOR while she is unloading. 

February 13. 

Plans for Task Force 16 are still in effect. All movements of escorts, and reenforcements for Task Force 11 are 

proceeding accordi ng to schedule. Task Groups 12.1 and 12.5 

(HONOLULU and 2 DD) arrived at Bobcat wi th Convoy 2030. PENSACOLA 

and 2 .DD ar iv ~Pa go Pago, fuelrlfrom PLATTE and departed t o join 

Task 1torce 11 . PORTER and PRES . TAYLOR arrived Canton ; MORRIS 

EtLET and PRES. JOHNSTON arrived Chri stma s t he tenth. Twelve 

B- 17's are at Nandi . 214 
February 13 (Continued) 

In connection with Cominch 1222DO (Aidac) Com T.F. 11 

in 140022 (Aidac) recommended to ComAnzac that the two forces 

conduct a sweep to bomb Rabaul. ComAnzac's receipt of Cominch 

122200 was much delayed because it was sent in a code which 

ComAnzac did not have available in Melbourne. When he received the ' despatch by means of a reencoding by CinCPac, he 

replied in 140336-140344 (attached) in which he asked for reconsideration as to embarking in his flagship in order that he 

would have access to the intelligence and communication channels 

of the ACNB. He also in 140538 asked Task ~~orce 11 to comply with Cominch 122200. In the meantime the Anzac Squadron, under 

Rear Admiral Grace departed to cover the Noumea-Suva line after 

he had conferred with the staff aviator of Task Force 11. 

Army B-24's will start reenforcing Oahu at a rate of 

four per week. 

Singapore stil~ holds out. No other land offensives 

have started, but Dutch are apparently giving up Malacca. 

Some enemy forces are reported at both Rabaul and 

Gasmata and enemy VP's were reported 90 miles southeast of 

Rossel islands on 12th. 

February 14. 

Task Group 16.1 departed as scheduled. 

No reports have been received from HONOLULU with convoys 2030 and BT-200 so it is presumed they left on schedule from 

Bobcat. BT-200 now goes to Melbourne. There, some of it will 

be reloaded and taken to Noumea. Final destination of 2030 is 

not yet determined. 

The PRESIDENT TAYLOR at Canton went aground, probably due to losing her anchor which slipped off the anchorage shelf. 

The PORTER is with her; TANEY and SEMINOLE are being sent to her 

assistance. Disembarkation has been extremely slow due to the 

necessity for remaining outside the lagoon and the scarcity o£ 

shallow draft ·equipment for unloading. The defense of Canton 

which is being garrisoned by the Army (TAYLOR'S loading was 

entirely directed on the mainland) is going to be most difficult. 

With the departure of the carrier of Task Group 16.1, the special alert was relaxed on Oahu. 

THRESHER returning from Saipan said that she had sighted six freighters and sunk one. 

Cominch informed that a training carrier would arrive 

in the Pacific the latter part of April. 

21 5 
February 14 (Continued) 

Comanzac accepted the proposal of Com T.F. ll's 140022 

(Aidac)(raid on Rabaul) and enlarged upon it in his 1502,44 ~attached). 

The Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) the Australian 

squadron, Rear Admiral Grace, reported logistic arrangements and other matters to Com T.F. 11 in his 142112 (attached). 

Enemy rorces in the New Britain-Solomons area were 

1 CV, 3 cruisers and 11 AP at Rabaul and a small force at 

Gasmata. Tulagi was lightly bombed. 

Singapore still holds out. 

February 15. 

About noon received despatch 151830 (Aidac) from 

Cominch, which indicated that occasional raids in the Mandates 

are considered sufficient, and that forces should be disposed 

more to meet suspected threats of enemy forces. Suggested sending either Halsey or Fletcher to the Canton Area. As a 

result Rear Admiral Fletcher will go to this area, his Task 

Force redesignated Seventeen (See CinCPac 160301 with operation ~ orders). Vice Admiral Halsey's Force remains Sixteen; objective changed to Wake because of lack of activity reported at Eniwetok. 

Received Wake aerial photographs taken by an Army B-17 

yesterday. No great activity is shown. No ships or aircraft 

visible. This was confirmed by a report from the NARWHAL. This 

planned raid will be chiefly of morale value. 

Cominch apparently accedes to Comanzac remaining ashore 

and in 141835 (Aidac) directed Vice Admiral Brown (T.F.-11) to 

take charge of offensive operations in the Bismarck-Solomons 

Area. Brown in his l~ ~~ (Aidac) gives his plan for raiding Rabaul on Feb 21st (local) Feb 20th here. 

The PRESIDENT TAYLOR is firmly aground. Diverting the TANGIER to assist her was considered but was discarded 

because of her unsuitability, and the urgency of her war mission 

to support the B-17 bombers in the Anzac Area. Lt-Comdr. Curtiss 

(U.S.N.R.F. and salvage expert) is being flown down. J 

The CURTISS, PLATTE and WORDEN remained one or two 

days extra at Samoa because of a garble in their orders. They finally proceeded to Suva today. The CURTISS must get to 

Noumea to tend the six VP which Brown is shifting there from Suva. 

Admiral Brown has made the TANGIER available to Suva 

to transport Army personnel to Townsville where the B-17's will 

base during the Rabaul operation. In CinCPac 160329 (Aidac) 

21 6 
February 15 (Continued) 

Admiral Brown was informed that we want the CURTISS returned 

for a ferry trip to th~ mainland as soon as possible. 

The troop convoy which arrived today reported a midnight 

submarine a tta.ck on Friday night which was unsucce.ssful. Otherwise the route between here and the mainland has been quiet for 

several weeks. 

SARATOGA arrived Puget Sound. 

Singapore fell today and Palembang is being attacked. 

February 16 

Task Force Seventeen sailed as scheduled. Task Force ~ 

Sixteen enroute Wake • 

. Task Force Eleven proceeding toward Rabaul to bomb it 

on the 20th (our date). Intelligence continues to locate several 

ships in the harbor there and the Hosho in that vicinity. The 

Australian Squadron is in support of Task Force 11. 

The KINGFISHER is being sent from Samoa to lay the 300 

mines recently landed by the Monroe at Suva. 

The TROUT has commenced her return voyage from East 

China Sea, and reports sinking a 5,000 ton freighter. This is 

the submarine which carried AA ammunition to Corregidor. She 

is now loaded \dth gold and securities from Manila. 

Cominch in 161635 (attached) informed that serious 

consideration must be given to establishing an intermediate base 

at Suva and a main base at Auckland. 

The supply of ammunition to the forces in the Anzac 

Area is still being studied. No ship is readily available. 

The enemy operations in Sumatra have been ~ediately 

successful, but the Dutch apparently burned the oil facilities 

before capture. 

February 17 

Task Forces proceeding as planned. 

It was decided to employ the DOBBIN to carry ammunition 

to the Anzac Area. 

Due to a collapse in the marine railway, the PLUNGER fell 

on its side. No serious damage resulted. 

217 
February 17 (Continued) 

GRAMPUS reported that there is small activity at Wotje 

but a considerable number of ships at Kwajalein. 

I 

President Taylor is apparently not badly damaged but will 

require 3,000 tons lightening. The Japara is already enroute with 

more material for Canton from San Francisco. Undue congestion there 

may result. 

Cominch informed that Convoy 2030 (now combined with 

BT-2J 0) must go to Brisbane. BT-200 is going to Mel bourne. Convoy 

2033 composed of 7 ships left San Francisco for Australia on the 

12th and a fast convoy of three troopships will leave on the 18th. 

Consideration is being given to Cominch's despatch about 

Auckland and Suva. It is evident that CinCPac has no means with 

which to establish a base. It is also not clear whether the 

strength of the fleet is to be employed to defend Anzac or Hawaii. 

A despatch from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 

urging immediate sending of reenforcements already requested was 

given full cf\ncurrence by CinCPac. ('lh is \V d s. ..(, Vl ~· H 1 ~.t<: i:<\ •· 1 i1 '- \~\'H 1 ci '1 J 

t s. c::l.-'t"t' ~ c.. "" e...d J ' . Enemy concentrations are making up against Timor and 

Batavia. A considerable convoy has just moved from Australia to 

Koepang in Timor. 

February 18. 

Task Forces proceeding as planned. 

TANGIER, carrying supporting material and personnel for 

the B-17's of Task Force 11 arrived and departed Samoa for Suva. 

CURTISS, tender for VP's of Task Force 11 left Suva presumably for 

Noumea, where VP's will operate and search to the northward. 

The Australian Squadron is supporting Task lilorce 11 from 

the rear and is guarding the PLA T'1.1

E. KASKASKIA is enroute Suva 

and will arrive about the 27th • . Other logistic support is planned - DOBBIN with ammunition; chartered tanker Schofield to unload into 

tanks at Pago Pago. 

Convoy BC-100, SEPULGA and TEHN presumably arrived at 

Bobcat today. 

NEVADA entered drydock successfully today. 

The Australian estimate locates 12 fighters, 12 torpedo 

bombers, 24 heavy bombers and eight vessels at Rabaul. These 

forces are very evidently on the increase. Task Force ll's D-day 

is the 20th. 

218 
.01 0407 

03 1600 

04 2030 

05 1555 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

AIDAC 

Reply to A1dac 292220 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

AIDAC 

FETLOCK WILL BE ESmABLISHED 

SECNAV TO ALNAV 

042030 

FOLLOWING NEW NAVAL COMMANDS ESTABLISHED X FORCES 

FORMERLY CONSTITUTING AS.IA TIC FLEET ARE NOW KNOWN 

AS QUOTE US NAVAL FORCES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC UNQUOTE X 

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD COMMANDS THIS FORCE X ADMIRAL 

HART IS COMMAND!~~ COMBINED NAVAL FORCES ABDA AREA X 

COMBINED NAVAL FORCES AUSTRALIA DASH NEW ZEALAND 

AREA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH VICE ADMIRAL LEARY 

U S NAVY IN COMA~ND TITLE CO~~ANDER ANZAC FORCES 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

AIDAC 

REENFORC'EMENT AND AGRESSIVE ACTION 

219 
FED. GC'J:l 

06 1445 SECNAV TO ALL 1JAVAL CO.i\.STAL FRONTIER COI•1DRS. , ALL NAVAL 

DISTRICT COMDrrs., CINCPAC, CilTCLl\.HT 

1513 

Executlve order nl.Jmber 8981 nf Decenber 18 , 1041 reading in part quote The Corm:1ander in Chief United States Fleet 

shall have suprene command of the operEL tinr: forces of the 

Naval Coastal I11 rontier Connnands un.quote Is interpreted and supplemented as hereinafter set forth para Designation 1Taval Coastal Frontier is hereby changed to Sea Frontier 

and lTaval Coastal Force is chanced to Sea Frontier Force 

Para Names of former naval Coastal Frontiers changed to sea 

Frontiers as follows Colon North ttlantic to Eastern X 

;~outhern to Gulf X Caribbean to Caribbean X J3anama to 

Panama X Hawaiian to Hawalian X Pacific ITorthern to Northwest 

X Pacific Southern to Western Para A Sea Frontier to 

Commander Paron Formerly Ha val Coastal lllrontier Comr:tander paron commands two .forces /l.firm Sea Frontier Force 

comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated by Corninch 

Baker Local Defense Porces cor1prising E3hips and airc r aft 

duly allocated to the Cornponent Naval Distt·icts by Chief 

IJaval Operations para As Commander of a Sea Frontier Force 

the Cor'illlande;r of a Sea Frontier is under Co:rainch and in 

turn may have under hin as Task Porce Commanders the 

Commandants of component Naval Districts x· 1\.s Commander 

of the Local Defense Forces he ls under the Chief Naval 

Operations and in turn shall have under him as Task 

Force Commanders the Cormnandants of the eomponent naval 

Distriets Para Pertinent existing regulations orders 

and plans are modified ac~ordingly 

COMil'JCH TO CINCPAC COHTA.SKFOR 11 COMANZAC CPNCF CPSHCF CPNNCF 

GIVE THIS DJ~3PA.TCH IUU::DIAT:GLY TO ADDEES IIT P~RSOIT X TfffiRE 

AHI: D:SFINITE SIGHS O.F A WIDESPREAD AiiD COORDINATED JAPANESE O::_ll~j1ElJSIVE IU ABDA AHD AITZAC AREAS i;fi~rHIN HEXT IilEVJ DAYS WIIICH 1AY VJELL BE ACCOMPANIED BY STTIONG RAIDS i1GAITJST HIDWi1.Y OAHU !!~Vl_..,rn=BRIDES NE AUSTRALIA AND POSSIBLY VlEST COAST OR CANAL X 

L:u\.P; _ _,DITE DISPOSrTIONS AIJD OPERArl1 IOITS O~ll YOU~ PORGES TO 

SEIZE T:IIS OPPORTUNITY :·,OR MAKIIJG DLTACHED EIJEI-.TY ~l 'J:IURES 

COSTLY ~?OTI HIM X COIJTASI:POR 11 PACPLT COTJTIUUE TOWARD 

AI'JZAC AREA li1

0R COOPER~l.TION ;,7ITH COI.TJ~HZAC Ii,OH X IIJ ~~,OHM 

ATIHY AHD AUSTR.:l.LIANS X HOJTS TO FOLLOH 

22 0 
GiJOQJaT 

FEB. GCT 

OG 2352 COriilJCH TO C IIJCPAC CO~ IAUZli.C FORCES 

':"I",U/\ TI0 1'J IIJ TT0:1 rr:ITIRU AlJZAC AREA l1EQUIR~S PHOIIPT ACTIOiJ 1-J 1 .t'.. .t . ""<r ~smrr'T .~mE PIT,T1Y TO C;IECK T.:IJ:=:HY ADVAlTCl: AITD OCCUPii.~ION A ~~ .L- u~1 1 -~ l~.A -

GARHISON JJTD srrnOIJG SHORE BAS~ AIR 1

;7ILL BE ESrrABLISHED 

Ri~BAUL IJEXT P:3Vl DAYS AIJD TJIC1J :DlJEHY S':L'HIKIIJG lilOTICE OF 

AT LEA3T 2 CJ;.RRI~RS SEVERii.L CRUISERS DESTROYERS POSSIBLY Bl~rrTIE S:ITIPS AI~D AI·,1PTIII3IOUS TROOPS '"!ILL BECOME 

AVAILABL::~ TO STRIKE 1JL'.J CAL'SDO JIA 1~7 IillBTIIDES OR OTTG~R 

P03II'ION0 ON OUR LilT:~ OF COIHIU1JICATI01JS :ex COT.IA~TZAC 

FO~C~ COJJC27TIJ:'RATION liAVAL PORCES :!IJI - HI:'.·/ CALEDOHIA 

AR:.=A ALSO PRESS iilJD ARRAlTGE ~OH ~ULL COOP~RATIOIT 

l~UsrrRi~.LIAN AIR ?ORCE IIJCLUDIIJG 1 GROUP US ARl',JY PURSUIT 

REC ~HTLY ALLOCATED XX CIITCPAC ARRAITGE lilOR AHD :JIRECT 

TASI: 1?0RCE 11 AUG~ r=~HJ:ED BY SA1T FRJ~ECISCO 2 D::J AND ALIJ 

· PRACTICABLE lTAVY PATROL .AJLJ ARLfY BOEDER PLAIT~S FROB 

IIJ~:aAII TO ~OCEED AS: one ~ ':20 AHZAC l;.R:SA AlTD COOPEHJ~ TE 

':JIT~I COTili.lTZAC · ~j!O RCE ffiJD~R DIRECTIOH OF LATTER X 

EXPEDITE PEESACnLA AlTD 2 DD JOINING UP BUT DO NOT 

DELAY OPERA':2IOH AHAI11

I1TG THEIR .H.RRIVh.L X THIS ACTIOn 

COITSIDERED GOOD PHOTECTIOIT COlJVOYS 2030 AND BAKER TARE 

200 v!HICII s=TOULD BE COHBI1T~D :TEAR BORA BORA THEUCE 

PROCEED AUS':;HALIA UHDER REDUCED SSCORT HONOLULU JUJD 

1 DD SUGGESTED XX CITTCPAC P:tOVIDE TIIES:2 PORGES VIITH 

ALL POSSIBLE IF. .. ?O~I IATION 0~ ElT::r.IY 

07 0615 COHTASKFOH 11 TO CINCPAC 

After fueline present intention originator proceed on 

seven 2ebruary fron position 150 r1iles east Hypo to 

position about 800 Miles bearing 320 fran Tare arriving 

020 0 GCT February 13 neosho in conpany :~ ~'Jill oDera te 

in 300 niles nquare \'rhose cen ter .is latter position 

until about 15 Peb when necessary refuel with all 

remainin~ fuel in tanker in order reach Afirrn X This 

based o~ 15 knots x Request you inform Comanzac X Arrny x ~ustr~l1ans an~ dire~t San Francisco join in position 

.)20 -:-;-~t1l1~ s be rl~C b 'ro ~i h t nin e frn;J. Easy at 0000 Zed 

11 Leb A Conp1y1ng Cor11nch OG1Gl3 

221 
--

FEB GCT 

07 1940 

08 0239 

/ . 

09 22:45 

12 0459 

12 2200 

COMcrNCH TO CINCPAC 

MARINE UNITS NOW BEING BROUGHT OUT OF ICELAND WILL 

BE ASSIGNED YOUR AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AS WILL 3 APD'S 

AND CORRESPONDING TROOPS XX OBVIOUSLY YOU HAVE URGENT 

NEED FOR AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATIONS NOW IN SIGHT THEREFORE URGE THAT YOU REQUIRE 

ALL POSSIBLE TRAINING ESPECIALLY SHIP TO SHORE OF 

ALL MARINE AND ARMY TROOPS COMPRISING YOUR AMPHIBIOUS 

FORCE EVEN THOUGH SUCH TRAINING HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT 

PIECEMEAL WITH SUCH AP' S AS YOU CAN MAKE AVAILABLE X 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Aidac 

Reply to Cominch 051555, 061513, 062352. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Aidac 

CONTINUOUS EFFORT TO DAMAGE ENEMY SHIPS AND BASES 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Aidac 

Reply to Cominch 092245. Proposed operations. 

COMINCH TO COMANZAC 

Aidac 

Return to flagship and conduct offensive in SolomonBismarcks. 

222 
~ QQ.! 

14 0022: 

14 0336 

14 0338 

T.F. 11 to COMANZAC 

Aidac 

Recommends Rabaul raid. 

COMANZAC to COMINCH 

Part l of my 0344Z 14th. Your 122200 total ships available my command one Australian 8 inch cruiser, 

2: New Zealand 6 inch cruisers, USS CHICAGO, and 2: 

u.s. destroyers. Rear Admiral Commanding Australian Squa~ron is in command and is cooperating with Brown. 

By leaving Melbourne I will cut myself off from all 

direct contact with RAAF and the very complete communications, intelligence and operational facilities 

of navy organization here which I cannot duplicate. I have to work everything through naval boards of 2 

dominions and it is my considered judgement that 

command of Anzac Force can best be exercised from 

here. By embarking in my flagship I frequently must 

break radio silence for proper and efficient execution 

of numJ'brous tasks assigned me. 

COMANZAC to COMINCH 

Part 2 of my 0344Z/14 x After several conferences with 

both Australian and New Zealand naval boards, US Army General, and US Naval Attache Melbourne there is gen- eral agreement that US ordered commander must base 

ashore to coordinate many activities and problems constantly arising this area x I had arranged to 

utilize my aviation operations drafting officers and 

intelligence staff jointly with those of Vice Admiral 

Royle, Chief of Australian Naval Staff and work in 

same building with the Chief of Air Staff who also 

uses same intelligence and communication facilities x 

All these advantages will be denied me by trying to 

operate from cruiser x No immediate addition to my force in sight and as my task includes responsibility for protection shipping I will be unable to have any information on which to base decision as how best to 

employ the very few vessels available. 

223 
~ GCT 

14 0340 

14 0344 

14 0538 

COMANZAC to COMINCH 

Pa rt 3 of my 0344Z 14th x Refer your 1222000 in order 

conduct offensive operations we must accumulate additional aircraft in northeast Australia see my 0758Z 

13th x I can only arrange for this and for shifting 

location of few heavy bombers now in Suva by remaining 

here x All United States aircraft available in Australia 

are being sent NEf or Darwin and RAAF is inadequate for 

present assignments x I request to be informed what 

additional aircraft will be sent me besides the 12 

B-17's now enroute Suva x Present operations were initiated to afford protection to convoy proceeding Xray 

as per your 062353 x I now understand you authorize 

operations as far to westward as Brown and I deem 

possible x In order carry out your instructions I con- . aider it essential to operate from location where 

maximum communications and information are available 

to me in order that I may keep Brown fully informed x 

Part 4 follows x 

COMANZAC to COMINCH 

Part 4 and final of my 0344Z)14 x I repeat that my 

considered judgement with which VAdm Royle and 

Commodore Parry completely agree is that operational 

command can only be exercised from Melbourne where 

complete facilities for communications and intelligence exist x I request reconsideration x Can depart 

Sydney 19th Feb on an armed merchant cruiser HMNZS 

Monowai which vessel now enroute here with all my 

codes staff equipment and personnel this will permit 

me to join Chicago at Suva about 25th Feb at which 

time must detach 2 six inch cruisers to escort 

important convoy to Xray leaving me only 2 cruisers 

and 2 destroyers with Australian Flag Officer second 

in command x Request reply in this system 

COMANZAC TO COMTASKFORCE 11 

Please comply Cominch 122200 

224 
FEB 

- 14 1835 

14 2112 

15 0244 

COMINCH to CINCPAC and COMANZAC for COM T.F. 11 

Aidac 

Vice Admiral Brown take charge of operations in 

northern Anzac area. 

FOC AUSTRALIAN SQD to COMTASKFOR 11 

Your 0247/14 not to NOC Fiji number 140033 not receivedx P~ra x 25000 tons fuel now at Suva x Naval 

tanker FALKEFJELL with 10,400 tons due Suva today 15th 

and tanker British Colony due !8th or 19th Feb to replenish Suva tanks to capacity 7250 tons x Para x 3 x 

FALKEFJELL fitted for fueling warships at sea but 

loaded speed only 9 knots. Para 4 x Assuming ships to 

be fueled to stowage capacity, and allowing for (a) cruising speed 20 knots, (b) steam for full speed at 

30 minutes notice, (c) 12 hours at full speed, (d) 10% effective fuel remaining, (e) destroyers are completed with fuel from a" cruisers after 70 hours 

steaming at 20 knots, then maximum operational endurance is 2750 miles x This distance is endurance of 6 11 

cruisers which would not be refueled at sea from 8" 

cruis era x Para 5 x At 2 .. 300/14 February Squadron will 

be short of fuel to the equivalentof 400 miles at 20 

knots x Para 6 x Should you wish to make NEOSHO or 

PLATTE available to fuel Anzac squadron at sea, FALKEFJELL is available to replenish them as directed 

by you x Para 7 x I suggest it would be advantageous for me to meet you at sea and come on board LEXINGTON 

for discussion x I now intend to be in position 18 Deg 20 min south 173 Deg 00 min east at 0001/16 Feb and 

will continue towards Point Peach at 15 knots until 

0500/16 when course of Anzac Squadron will be reversed x 

COMANZAC to COMTASKFOR 11 

(1) Concur in Rabaul operation outlined your 0022.Z/14 x 

(2) Send all B-17 bombers to Townsville for operation under 

and with all available Australian Air Forces for coordination attacks x Australian Air Force will conduct 

daily search of Rabaul dash Port Moresby dash Tulagi 

area which will require all Australian Catalinas x 

(3)My (word apparently left out) indicates that PBY's 

should not be utilized for daylight attacks in view 

of fighter opposition but operations have been conducted 

successfully at night x Necessary your PBY's base Noumea 

and take over reconnaissance Noumea dash Tulagi area 

now being conducted by Australian Catalinas or search 

as you desire x 

( Cont 'd next page) 2 2 5 
15 0244 

15 1830 

16 0329 

16 1635 

(Continued) 

(4) Use Anzac Squadron as you desire x 

(5) Australian Air Force will coordinate attack of all available planes from continent on date and at hour 

set by you x 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

Aidac 

CHANGE IN .PLAN FOR FLETCHER. 

- CINCPAC to T.F. ll 

Aidac 

Instructions for AV's x 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

SERIOUS CONSIDERAT!ON MUST BE GIVEN AT ONCE TO THE 

PREPAHATION <F' SUVA AS AN ADVANCE OR INTERMEDIATE 

OPERATING BASE AND OF AUCKLAND AS A MAIN OFERATING 

BASE IN SOUTH B\ CIFIC BOTH BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC 

CONSIDERATION FR EMISED ON PROBABLE PRESSURE OF 

EVENTS. 

226 
REGRET 

BRIEFED ESTI:II.ATE OF THE SITUATION @ 

5 February, 1942. 

1. The Japanese are being successful in all of their 

advances from Malaya to New Ireland. Singapore will probably 

fall very shortly - reenforcements, even if underway, could 

not be of the types and in the quantities to save it. The 

Ba.tan Peninsula will probably hold out for some time, but 

reenforcement for it is most unlikely. Enemy air raids, 

1nclnding carrier planes, have started against Java, and 

enemy bases are being established at Bs.likpapan and Kendarl 

to which Amboina will soon be added. .Java, Florea 'and Timor 

are very evident objectives for future landing attack. The 

enemy is operating from Rabaul, and Kavieng and has reeonnoitered and air raided extensively 1n eastern New Guinea and the 

Solomon Islands. tie has also observed the New Hebrides frequently. His flrst·a1r raids against Port Moresby have just 

been made. Radio intelligence indicates much activity at the 

Pelew Base and some at Truk. A large attack force has been 

organized in a plan de signa ted n~t.A u. 

This is believed to be against Java, and also 

against New Guinea and possibly ·New Caledonia, for the British 

report eleven transports or auxiliaries at Rabaul, wh1ch might 

indic.ate further landing attacks are impending in that area.. 

Moresby and Noumea would be tempting obje ct1ves. 

-1-

I~ 

I 

'I vI 

227 

f 
&OHM 

2. The disposition of the enemy's important naval forces 

is believed 

BB's 

to be somewhat as follows: 

2 

2 

6 

damaged 

operating as support for carriers. 

or 7 in a covering force ope r·ating between 

the Homeland and the Pelews, probably spending 

a considerable time at anchor to save fuel. 

Truk or Ulithi may be used as a fueling point 

occasionally.-

Cardiv One - south of Truk, engaged in the attacks 

on and near Rabaul . 

Card1v 2 - probably making the attacks on Java. 

Cardiv 3 - RYUJO off Malaya; 

HOSHO enroute Truk from Yokosuka. 

Cardiv 4 - unlocated. 

Cardiv 5 - Shokaku near Truk, ZUIKAKA near 

homeland. 

Even the Fourth Fleet cruisers and destroyers have 

apparently not been in the Marshalls for some time, but have 

been based on Truk and working a gainst the Solomon Area. 

Actual observation of the Ea stern Marshalls discovered only 

one cn1 iser. 

3. Our own operation in the Marshalls has apparently 

diverted some air forces from other points, but little else. 

The Australians are continuing to conduct weak bombing attacks 

-2- 228 
8f83PFW 

against enemy shipping at Rabaul 1 and a few remaining air 

forces in Java are inflicting some damage on enemy transports 

and light foroes in that area, but little impedance has resulted 

to the enemy's progress. Asiatic submarines have obtained 

unexpectedly small results. Our Asiatic destroyers made one 

successful night attack but the surfaoe forces available at 

Java can eas.ily be overpowered by the forces Japan has available. 

4. Except for the recent raid, our fleet has been 

engaged 1n covering territories and communications with carriers 

(or which three are now available) and light forces. We have 

four BB available at San Francisco now, and can have two available in four days and one on the 21st. The Anzac Force is being formed but is weak and the time of arrival of its one 

carrier 1e uncertain. 

5. Any hope that the enemy may be extending himself beyorj.d his means of supply seems to be· in vain. He gets along 

with simple equipment, min~mum food, and is also living off 

the land to a large extent. Aircraft and aviation gasoline are 

critical supplies but he is still delivering them where they 

do him the most good. 

6, From the foregoing it 1s apparent that we must 

examine exhaustively how the Pacific Fleet can best contribute 

to the retardation and eventual stopping of the enemy advance. 

-3-

229 
I 

. 8J89jiji15Jl 

MISSION 

7. In line with our own conclusion Cominch has asked 

for comment in regard to the methods of relieving pressure in 

the Southwest Pacific. He advances the idea that th1a may be 

done by reinforcing the Anzac and/or ABDA forces, or by vigorous offensive action in the Pac1fio Fleet Area including the 

employment of battleships. He points out that suoh vigorous 

action would incidentally reduce the necessity for esoorta in 

Eastern 

the/Pao1f1o. 

Our mission is taken to be: 

"To so employ the u.s. Pac1f1o Fleet as to beat 

relieve the enemy's pressure against ABDA and 

Anzac forces and territory .in the Southwest 

Pacific." 

ENEMY COURSES 

s. The enemy's action for the past month and a half 

has verified the estimate made on 24 December that he would 

prosecute and consolidate his offens.ives in the Far East to 

and including Australia before he would make a strong move in 

the Mid-Pacific. He has not made even minor raids, except by 

submarines, in our area and has removed some forces from the 

Marshalls. It 1s therefore again stated that his course of' 

action continues to be: 

To employ all the forces that oan be made available 

to capture and consolidate all land areas in the Far East. 

-4-
3118fll!I 

In so doing he will continue to employ his naval forces 

to support the land attacks and air attacks, and to cover the 

attack forces and their communications. It is probable that 

his battleship strength plus one or two or the carriers which 

are unlocated are employed tn the covering task. 

OWN COURSES 

9. The succ·ess or any course that we adopt depends 

somewhat on how the enemy reacts to it. Predictions as to 

psyoholo f~ ical reactions, particularly of the Japanese, are 

difficult. Any ra1ds against the enemy's territory and communications max cause him to divert some of his forces from the 

southwest. 'Ihey would not be sure to do so unless they were 

sustained enough to inflict appreciable damage on installations, 

forces or shipping which is directly supporting his present 

offensives. For instance, he probably will not divert forces 

to fully replace his losses in t he Marshalls, arguing that 

even if we capture some of them, we could not,for some time 

to come, bring sustained e.ffort against his present operations. 

Thus if we adopt the propose1 vigorous action we must make it 

against objectives which will hurt, a.nd make it as sustained as 

possible. Our decision as to adopting this course depends very 

much upon its feasibility. Fuel and bases and relative strengths 

are the considerations. Before examining these further, a comparison between the two proposed courses will be made: 

- 5- 231 
ADVANTAGES 

Reenforcement of Anzac and/ 

or ABDA. 

{1) Some though limited bases 

are near the areas of active 

operations. 

(2) More chance of coming to 

grips with important enemy 

forces. 

(3) Possibility of finding 

roop convoys enroute, or 

forces i n the midst of a 

landing attack. 

(4) Covers our line of 

communication to Australia 

where it ia most in danger. 

Aggressive Action in Paoifio Area. 

(1) lias covering effect for our territory and important lines of 

oommunioation. 

(2) Base, though dista~t from vital 

enemy areas, is complete and well 

protected. 

(3) Concentrated forces can be used 

.in areas which the enemy may be 

guarding lightly due to the commitments .or his offensives. 

(4) Nearer the u.s. Mainland which 

must furnish much of the logistic 

support to any area of operations 

in the Pacific Basin. 

DI'SADVA 1~AGES 

{1) Bases are most inadequate, (l) Either seizing of a fuelinr base, 

particularly for carriers. 

Those in t he ABDA area, except 

Darwin, are already under 

heavy air attack. 

or fueling at sea, mus t be undertaken in order to reach vital enemy 

area a. 

{2) Di sperses. our forces to (2) Without a nearby base, the 

o:f a 

suoh an ext ent, t hat 1f we pro- ao ti on cannot be/ sustained na. ture. 

vide a reenforcement which would We have no troops ready to seize an 

be strong enough to meet the 

f orce s already used in that 

advanced base. 

232 
iEiRili' 

area, we would denude the 

Pacific Area. 

(3) Although action may be 

slightly more sustained than 

the operations which could be 

undertaken in the Pacific Area, 

they have the disadvantages of 

frontal attack as opposed to a 

flank attack against communioa-

(3) Except by containing or 

diverting, does not provide protection to the Australian route 

tiona. 

(4) Even including the shore fuel 

storages, the logistic situation 

is precari ous,.and will suffer 

from making in haste such a. tremendous shift of base. 

·where it is most threatened. 

/0. The bas1o question is one the answer of whioh 1e out 

ot: our hands: 

(1) Are we going to gamble all upon securing Australia 

a:s a base of future operations a gainst the enemy, and leave our 

Pacific Area open to attack, or 

(2) Are w~ going to protect our own vital territory and 

communications while doing what we can in bold operations against 

the enemy's flank? 

It is believed that the second course of action 1s 

pref'erable if we decide that we ~ e.xecute the bold operations 

aga inst objectives which, if damaged, would really hamper the 

2') l ~..J \..t 
SECRET. 

Japanese effort to the southward. 

Possible ob j ectives and the feasibility of att acking 

them will therefore be examined. 

11. Objectives - Japane·se Homeland 

Truk 

Saipan 

Bon ins 

Eastern Marshalls - Wake 

En1wetok - Ponape 

None or the above objectives aan be operated against 

safely without fueling at sea, and against none can really 

sustained pressure be maintained. Eaoh is considered separately 

as follows: 

Homeland - Advantages 

(l) No outposts guarding east coast. 

(2) Strong psychological effect - Earticularly in u.s. 

(3) Some damage to enemy war effort. 

(4) Best intelligence to date indicates that, it 

our available battleships were at hand, we would 

not encounter forces which were superior. 

Disadvantases 

(1) Weather along route is almost universally unfavorable for fueling. Employing an Aleutian harbor might 

-8-

2-34 
SRi Rill 

help, but weather i s also bad there and some units 

would still have to be fueled at sea. 

(2) Due to dispersion and multiplicity of objectives, 

it would be d1ff1cult .to cause large and effective 

military damage. 

(3) Psychological effect on Japanese may be overrated due to their regimentation and control or · 

public information. This would be particularly 

true if the damage created was less than they have 

pictured in their apprehension over our carriers. 

(4) Because we could not make repeated attacks, the 

Japanese high com=and might refuse to divert any 

forces from their present offensives. (This of course 

might apply to any of the listed objectives). 

(5) Though enemy air forces might not be great in 

number, the multiplicity of fields-in the vicinity 

would make it impossible to immobilize a large 

percentage of them by surprise attack on the ground. 

(6) Distance involved would require about 40% more 

f'uoling than a raid on the Marshalls. 

-9-

235 
Truk - Advantage$ 

(l) It is an important advanced based which is being 

used extensively in the attacks in the New Guinea 

area. Australian reconnaissance baa shown many ships 

1n the anchorage, congested airfields, a floating dry 

dock and considerable building. A strong attack 

against this concentrated objective, particularly 

found 

if 1tjmany ships, either naval or supply and transport 

types, would definitely interfere with the Ja~nese 

advance - both by the destruction or logistic support 

to his advance farces and by the necessary replacement 

and probable increase in the defending forces against 

another attack. 

(2) There are directions or approach clear of outposts. 

(3) Weather should give reasonable chance of successful 

fueling .. 

is a chanc e that our battleship group, if 

employed in the operation might encounter important 

enemy forces in inferior numbers. 

f!h t Disadvantages 

<Jt . ' (l) Tho northeast approaches, while fairly olea.r, ~ 

%~ be covered by aircraft .from Wake, Eniwetok, Marcus and it 

Iiall Islands. Thus the hazard of discovery during 

approach is considerable. For the same reason there 

is good chance of being intercepted by land-baaed 

bombers. 

23 5 

-10-
8B8ft8T 

(2} The distance involved requires about 50% more 

fueling than a raid on the Marshalls. 

( 3) The defenses ar•e probably stronger than ·the 

Marshalls and include larger guns to oppose bombardment. 

Bonin-Saipan - Advantages 

(1) Being nearer the Homeland than the other island 

objeeti.vea there would be more psychological effect. 

Saipan is an important administrative center. 

{2) Approach is free from outposta except Marcus. 

(3) Air opposit1on at Port Lloyd should not be very 

strong. Saipan is believed to be a well equipped 

staging point but would not necessarily have large 

number of aircraft present, 

Disadvantages 

(1) These bases will probably offer little shipping 

and few facilities which, if damaged, would appreci~ 

ably hamper the enemy• a present war effort. Port 

Lloyd is a small harbor and Saipan has one only for 

small craf't. 

(2) Bad weather is probable off Port Lloyd but 

better than in the Homeland area. 

(3) The di.stanoe is practically as great a$ to the 

Homeland. 

-11- 237 
&iiORJAI 

Marshalls-Wake - Advantages 

(1) Closest to Hawaii. 

(2) Weather favorable for fueling. 

(3) Less danger from shore defenses, particularly 

where we attacked last. 

(4) Wake has some psychological advantages in 

connection with u.s. sentiment. 

Disadvantages 

(l) orrer ~ast chance or diverting fo~ces from the 

southwest. 

"'a o (2) May offerAsuitabla objectives to damage - no 

important mobile roroea liable to be found there. 

iniwetok-Ponapo - Advantages 

~~ (1) Being deeper in tho enemy territory than the 

, ·/f.; Eastern Marshalls, an attack against them might 

retract mora enemy forces. 

(2) Eniwetok has only Wake as an outpost to the northward. 

(3) Weather favorable for fueling. 

(4) Distance less than Truk-Homeland line. 

I 

Riea.dvantases 

(1) No good 1nfo~~tion as to activities at these 

places. (This may rectified at Eniwetok by expected 

submarine report). 

(2) Little shipping would be found at Ponape as no 

good harbor exists. 238 

(3) Advance and retirement would be roundabout to avoid 

Marshalls. -12-
iii8ft!LI 

De c... i · 1 0 t1. . 

12. (a) The weather is believed to J;r eclude a raid on // 

~he , Hop1eland in wi~per ·/ (' 4ti , , 1 .tr 

, (b) The lack of probable objectives at present in 

the Eastern Marshalls, Eniwetok and Ponape and ' the\daok or 

drawing power prevents them from being the best choice. 

(o) It is considered that, if we can employ four or 

more battleships as a support force, a raid should be made on 

Truk; if battleships are not used a raid should be made on 

Port Lloyd or Saipan or both. 

(NOTE: Having been ordered to send a considerable force to the 

Anzac Area, there are not enough light forces remaining to 

permit employment of battleships. Therefore our second choice, 

if we mako another raid, is forced upon us, ~ namely 11To raid 

the Bon1n-Sa1pan Area with two carriers"). 

239 

-13-
February 19 

Task Force Eleven when it was spotted at 1137 (local) by two four-engined scouts 400 miles east of Rabaul decided to 

turn back for fuel because surprise would be absent the next day and tlw fuel situation would preclude any delay. These two planes ~~re shot down but five hours later the force was attacked by aboutl\.~s:'vy bombers, of which 12 to 20 were shot down without damage to our ships. Commander Task Force 11 is continuing his retirement for fuel (see despatches 200237 and 20075~ attached). Comanzac in his 200734 stated that attack on H.abaul should be made soon to prevent enemy attack on Port Moresby. The number of ships sighted by reconnaissance at Rabaul was 18. 

It was decided to include the BRIDGE in the logistic support for the southern forces, and to escort the three ships (SCHOFIELD, DOBBIN are the other two) with two light minelayers which can lay mines at Samoa. 

The TAYLOR is still fast aground, and weather unfavorable. the SONOMA has been despatched to assist. 

Received by despatch from the MILvVAUKEE which had left Bobcat on the 16th, that Convoy BT-200 was turned over to Task Force 12 (HONOLULU, 2 DD) on schedule on the 14th. MILWAUKEE and MOFFETT are Atlantic Fleet forces returning thereto. One CL and one DL of the SE Pacific Force will return iwnediately to pick up a new convoy, and the others will remain at Bobcat until the defenses, which were supposed to arrive yesterday, are established. 

The SUMNER in a separate despatch reports preparation and 

survey of the harbor well underway, and that large ships negotiate the channel readily. 

Bad news comes from Port Darwin. Two air raids totalling ninety-five planes did much damage including sinking the PEARY and six cargo ships. These were part of the convoy which was going to Koepang, but had turned back after an air attack at 

sea. Most disturbing, 10 P-40's were shot out of the air and only 5 

enemy planes were shot down. 

ComSouWestPac Force reports a battle off Bali in which U.S. destroyers and Dutch cruisers attacked a landing expedition. Results indeterminate but cruiser ,JAVA badly damaged. 

Radio Intelligence was checked by the GRAYLING which sighted the HOSHO off Truk. 

2t1 0 
February 20. 

There is no further news of Task Force 11. Radio 

Intelligence indicates that the enemy was stirred up by the 

contacts and is probably conducting urgent operations in connection with the location and interception of this force. RDF indicates that the Hosho, formerly thought to be near New Britain, 

is northwest of Ponape. 

The Tangier will remain at Suva until further orders. 

She, however, moved to Nandi on the same island. 

Other Task Forces proceeding as planned, though date 

of Vice Admiral Halsey's attack is not known -Feb. 22nd, 

Hawaiian date, is a reasonable guess. 

Operation Order No. 16-42 was issued to Task Force 

19, the logistic force, due to depart for Samoa tomorrow. 

In Cominch 201830 the transfer of the Hornet, Vincennes, 

Nashville, one modern DD division and one large tanker to Pacific 

Fleet was directed. They will leave the East Coast about March 1. 

In Cominch 201940 (attached) he directed the forming of 

an amphibious force under a flag officer. 

All signs point to continued concentration of the 

enemy on the job at hand, namely the conquest of the Malay Barrier 

(now Java, as he is on Sumatra, Bali and Timor). The great 

question is whether he will continue after Australia and New 

Zealand or will he first consolidate the N.E.I. It is the 

estimate of the War Plans section that he will soon try to 

capture Port Darwin and Port Moresby at least. 

February 21 

Still no news from the task forces, but there was intercepted a despatch from Comanzac to Comtaskfor 11 informing him 

that Army and Australian planes from Australia would attack Rabaul · on Feb. 23rd, local. 

The departure of Task Force 19 was delayed until tomorrow. 

A large evacuation convoy including the Lurline and the 

Aquitania left this afternoon. 

24 .L 
Februarv 21 (Cont'd) 

No information was received of the salvage operations 

on the Taylor. The ~rter can remain three days more and the 

Taney seven. The former was ordered to proceed to Palmyra when 

necessary and await orders. 

Plans are being made to send about 20,000 troops from 

the Mainland to the other large islands of the Hawaiian Group, - about 17,000 arriving in one convoy early in March. It will be 

noted from the Commanding General's despatch of the 19th that he 

has again requested a second division for these islands. 

Other messages concerning bases in the south Pacific were 

received, Comanzac's 210430, 210435, and 210516 and Cominch's 

,: , 211600 (all appended). In this connection a personal letter from 

CNO was recently received asking if the Hawaiian Islands were 

strongly enough protected by the Army and district forces to permit the Fleet to be "footfree." The CinC's reply was in the negative and the general's despatch was referred to. Reference was also 

made to the frequent requests by the Commandant for adequate forces. 

A discussion was held as to what was probably making up in regard to the employment of large fleet forces in the AustralianNew Zealand Area. The consensus of opinion seemed to be that such 

employment was basically unsound because of the difficulties of 

supply and repair (no drydock for carrier or battleship) and 

because of the resulting exposure of U.S. territo~y to attack. 

However, that area is the one in which our forces will meet 

advancing enemy forces, and we may be forced to make the move 

due to political or ttdesperation strategical" considerations. 

Radio Intelligence continued to indicate an alerted 

Nake-Mandate-Rabaul area, but no indications of any change in 

distribution of surface forces. 

Apparently the Dutch and u.s. forces inflicted considerable damage on the enemy landing force at Bali, but did not prevent 

a landing in considerable force . .. 

February 22 

Still no news of the progress of the three active Task 

Forces. Task Force Eleven presumably finished fueling today. Task Force Sixteen should have attacked Wake today. Task Force 

Seventeen is presumably in his area WSW of Canton. 

Army and Australian bombers presum.ably raided Rabaul 

today but reports of result have not yet been received. 

242 
February 22 (Continued) 

Task Force Nineteen (logistic support) got away for 

Suva today. 

The situation at Canton remains bad. ~~e weather has 

been such that neither salvage nor unloadine of the President 

Taylor has been proceeded with. The Japara will arrive there 

in a few days. Extra barges are being sent down but they will 

not arrive for about two weeks. 

Cominch in 22-2200 directed that Tonga tabu (code name 

"Bleacher") be prepared as an intermediate operating base suitable for sheltering a carrier. The Sumner is being ordered there 

from Bobcat to conduct a survey and make other preparations within her capabilities. Coninch based this selection on the 

premise that Suva cannot be developed as such a base. 

Another directive from Cominch was received, concerning the offensive employment of subnarines (221729 attached). This 

directive is already being complied with in that all patrol stations now occupied are in the Western Pacific - including Truk, Saipan and Port Lloyd. The Trout, enroute here, sank a small 

patrol vessel north of the Bonins. 

The enemy has definitely landed on Timor and Bali, but not yet on Java. 

Radio intelligence indicated that twenty-five heavy bombers were moving from either the Pelews or Truk to Rabaul. 

Commandant 14th Naval District has recommended to 

Secnav the deportation of all Japanese males under 50 who are 

aliens or who have been educated or trained in Japan. 

February 2!3._ 

Comtaskfor 11 in 232214 (Aidac) reported that, due 

to the impossibility of effecting surprise, he would withhold 

attack on Rabaul until he has another carrier to assist him. 

In 232146 and 232156 he reported further on the encounter with ~nemy aircraft on the 19th. Our VF's and VSB's shot down 16 or 

17 out of the 18 Jap planes which attacked, and their bombing was 

ineffectual. Apparently Task Force 11 has not been able to fuel 

from the PLATTE as yet. 

243 
. February 23 1Cont'd) 

Enemy urgent radio activity began at Wake at 0730 ~ake time) and continued all day. This indicates an attack by 

Task Force Sixteen but nothing has been heard from that force. 

The enemy was apparently ordering submarines to intercept and 

RDF showed one or two in the vicinity of Wake. 

The unloading of the President Johnson at Christmas 

was completed today and it, with MORRIS and ELLET, is enroute 

Honolulu. 

Received word that the fuel situation on the east 

coast of Australia is critical and also the supply of aviation 

gasoline at Suva. TLe latter can be remedied from some of our 

supply ships in the area. The former sltuation is difficult of 

solution, . It was visualized in Cincpac's 21 0309 of January. 

Opnav (231417), contrary to recommendation by Cincpac, 

directed that a flag officer under supervision of Combasefor 

be charged with the maintenance of battleship carriers and 

cruisers. Cincpac's recommendation was to permit the shorebased administrative offices of Type Commanders to continue 

the function. 

No great changes were noted in the activities of 

the enemy. Apparently allied successes off Bali are holding 

up the attack on Java. There were several despatches which 

indicated some interception and possible decrypting of our 

call system. 

February 24 

Still no word from Task Force Sixteen though the enemy 

at Wake continues sending an occasional urgent message, and a 

concentration of submarines was making up in that area. Task 

Force Seventeen also unheard, and, due to bad weather is 

probably having trouble in refueling at sea. 

Two despatches (232158 and 232208) were received from 

ComTaskFor 11 on the subject of logistics. These were replied 

to by Cincpac in 250125 and 250427. Also two despatches were 

received from Comanzac on the subject of the Rabaul attack. 

(250100 and 250430 attached). Cincpac, in his 251209 (Aidac) 

to Cominch, acceded to the idea that it was desirable to have 

Task Force 17 join Task Force 11 for an att ack on Rabaul. 

Included were recommendations (1) that the command relationships 

be clarified and (2) that, due to logistic difficulties, at least 

one force should retire from the area after the attack. The air 

attack by Army bombers, etc., on the 22d was somewhat abortive 

244 
SECRET 

February 24 (Cont'd) 

due to weather. Two reached objectives - results unknown, and 

one landed in a swamp. 

The Japara arrived for unloading at Canton. The weather 

is still bad and the Taylor is still unloaded. Either one or 

both of her eneines is damaged so that she will probably require towing after she is refloated. The Robin was sent with one 

large and three small lighters which will -assist with future 

unloading. 

Five more commercial tankers have been made available 

to this Fleet and four more are promised for March. 

No new moves by the enemy are evident, and our small 

forces in Java continue to hammer at enemy convoys. Moresby received a rather heavy raid. 

An enemy submarine bombarded the California coast 

yesterday and there were two air alarms in the Los Angeles area 

dueing the night. 

February 25 

No news from any of the three major task forces except that a despatch (260458) from Vice Admiral Brown (T.F.ll) info~med 

that he does not now consider an attack on Rabaul, even with two carrier~advisable. Also no reply was made by Cominch to the 

proposal by Comanzac for a two-carrier attack. 

Received suggestion from Cominch as to possible use of 

Puget Sound and Gulf of California as training areas (261530). 

The TANGIER will go to Vila (Efate) to tend the six 

patrol planes which are operating with Task Force 11. 

A decoded enemy report indicated that a special air 

search may have been conducted for Vice Admiral Halsey's force 

on the 23rd {the day he is assumed to have attacked). 

Convoy plans are being made for the movement of the 27th 

Army Division to the outlying large islands of the Hawaiian Group. Also for further movement-s of U.S. troops to Australia. The plans for the garrisoning of New Caledonia have been received recently. Troops (eventually totalling 20,000) of the BT-200 convoy will 

return there from Melbourne departing about March 15th. 

Further enemy traffic regarding our call system mentioned 

papers captured at AA (almost surely Wake). 

245 
SECRET 

February 25 {Cont'd) 

A large enemy convoy has been spotted north of Java 

and Comsouwest Pacific has ordered five cruisers and nine 

destroyers to attack it until destroyed. 

A Japanese message to Berlin mentioned that Japan 

will be unable to sustain losses at the present rate. 

February 26 

. Still no news from Task Force , 16. and Task J.' orce 17 is 

still quiet. Also nothing was received during the day from 

Task Force 11. 

A long despatch (261630) came from Cominch. This did 

not materially clarify the command relationships in the northern 

Anazac area and contains no assurance that an attack against 

Rabaul will be made. The great difficulties in connection with 

the operations in that area are logistics and the lack of bases. 

It appears that the LEXINGTON cannot enter any harbor except Sidney. The fuel situation has been discussed before. It is 

precarious indeed. The NEOSHO will depart for that area again 

on Saturday; and the KASKASKIA is arriving Suva today. Task 

Force Nineteen (logistic Group) will arrive Samoa on 3 March. 

Deliberations as to what Cincpac must do, and how, 

will be held tomorrow. 

Vice Admiral Pye returned from Washington today. The 

chief and most disturbing rep~rt was that no over-all plan has 

been adopted. We don't know how "all-out" our help is .to be 

to Australia. 

No new enemy moves were reported yesterday. 'I'he Burma. 

Road has been cut and Rangoon is about to fall. Incidentally 

the PHOENIX is escorting from Freemantle a convoy for Rangoon 

which will probably be diverted to Colombo. ,. The l30ISE is 

undergoing repairs at the latter place. 

Of interest is a directive to Comsowestfor from Cominch 

tr.o have one submarine always available to General McArthur and 

to send munitions by subs on this duty. 

245 
February 21 

The only despatch received from the task forces today was 

Comtaskfor ll's 270542 which stated nec~ssity for provisions prior 15 March and that Sydney was the only harbor that the carrier 

(LEXINGTON) could enter. 

Comanzac in 270845 assured Cominch that Anzac Force was 

not being controlled by the ACNB. 

The deli~erations, as to Cincpac's action as a result of 

Cominch 261630 were completed, and despatches 280417 and 280559 

were sent out. In general they provide for TF 17 joining TF 11 

as soon as possible so that an attack on Rabaul could be made. 

In any case TF-11 is to depart for Pearl about the middle of the 

month, obtaining provisions from the BRIDGE at Page Page as 

necessary. 

The CURTISS reported that Vila (Efate) was dangerous for the operation of patrol planes (262100) and Comanzac therefore 

ordered (272355) the TANGIER to proceed to Noumea and the patrol planes of Task Force 11 continue operations from there. This is 

of interest because Vice Admiral Pye learned in Washington that 

Vila is intended by Cominch to be the first outlying base established 

in that area instead of Funafuti. Both of the foregoing messages 

were relayed to Cominch. 

Arrangements have been made to have the HONOLULU and 

JARVIS escort the reenforcement from Melbourne to N6umea, where it 

is expected to arrive about 13 March. 

The Australians continue to bomb Rabaul at night with one 

or two PBY, - apparently with good results. Our B-17's, only nine 

operative, are being held for possible coordination with Task Force 11. 

A report recently came from Noumea that the Free French 

High Commissioner there was indignant becaus·e he had not been informed 

of the establishment of the Bobcat base. A check did not verify this 

and showed that General deGaulle had consented to this project. 

Things at Canton are going very slowly due to heavy swells. 

A tropical storm is making up south of Canton, moving southwest. 

This may hinder TF-~t considerably. . 

No report was received as to the attack on the convoy in 

the Java Sea. 

The signs of a major Japanese effort toward India are on 

the increase. 

247 
February 28. 

Task Force 17 presmnably proceeding to join Task Force 

11. The latter force reports emptying the PLATTE on the 24th 

(Hawaiian Date) and recommends two small tankers be used instead 

of one large one. Still no word from Task Force 16 though Tokyo has reported the attack as occurring last Monday (Hawaiian time); admits minor damage and loss of one patrol boat; claims damage to heavy cruiser and three destroyers. 

In 280511 provided for escort of Noumea reenforcement. 

The sea is still rough at Canton and the TAYLOR has 

surfered more damage. Effort to pull her off will be made on 

the 2nd. 

Cominch in 282121 suggested to Comanzac that,as lone 

as Vila was found unsuitable for patrol planes, Havannah Harbor 

at the ·same island (Efate) be tested. 

Co:r.tinch also, in 282035, requested comment as t ·o distribution of submarines in the Pacific. 

rfue name of the Base li'orce has been changed to Service 

Force. 

Consideration of the base detachment designed for 

Tongatabu is continuing. The ANTARES and RIGBL with an AF a.nd 

a.n AO would be suitable. 

The RAMAPO left Borabora several days ago. ComsoueasPac 

Force reported unloading going slowly there (010247) - six weeks 

before half the guns will be installed. 

The attack asainst Java has started with three landings. A heavy attack was made against Port Moresby yesterday in which 

three PBY's were destroyed. 

Another (or the same) submarine showed up off San 

Francisco. There have been no contacts in the Hawaiian Area 

for about a week. 

248 
FEB GCT 

19 2345 GEN EMMONS . TO ~DJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 

The Fall of Singapore and the employment of considerable 

part of the Pacific Fleet in Anzac and perhaps other distant areas requires new estimate of Pacific situation based 

on following factors: 

First, Japanese know great value of Pearl Harbor as base 

of our defensive and offensive operations in Pacific. 

Second, they know present strengths of Army, Navy and 

Air units on Oahu and outlying islands. 

Third, they know these islands are to be reinforced. 

Fourth, Japanese are opportunists and their operations 

have proved they are capable of carefully ~ighing our 

situation here and making sound plans for the capture of 

Oahu. 

Fifth, it will soon be within their capabilities to launch 

attack on these islands and still carry on their campaign 

in the southwest Pacific. 

Sixth, they would first seize one or more of the outlying 

islands of this group as base for operations against Oahu. 

Seventh, with land based aviation on such island as Hawaii 

or Kauai facilities of Pearl Harbor could be demolished 

and security of Oahu meanaced. 

It is realized that War Department knows our situation and 

is taking steps to strengthen our defenses. However, 

decisions made in December to limit reinforcements for 

outlying islands to one square division, and to limit air 

forces to two bombardment groups plus one bombardment squadron 

and three pursuit groups should now be reviewed in light of 

current situation. In considering our needs it should be 

remembered that this department combines theater of operations 

with communication zone and has a special anti-sabotage 

problem in Honolulu and outlying islands. Again recommend 

2 reinforced square divisions for outlying islands, air 

strength as recommended in my radio 1273 December 20, 

full T/0 strength for units on Oahu and one armored 

regiment requested in my radio 16q7 January 13 or 2 medium 

tank battalions in lieu thereof. Reinforcements and fillers 

for Hawaii should now have top priority on transport in 

Pacific. 

249 
FEB GCT 

19 2345 

20 0237 

20 0734 

20 0753 

2) 1830 

20 1940 

CONTINUED 

Only by thus adequB.tely guarding the naval and air 

bases in Hawaii can the security of the Pacific Coast 

and the sea and air routes therefrom be guaranteed. Irrespective of what happens in the Far East the Hawaiian 

Islands should be made genuinely impregnable. Cincpac has seen this radio and fully concurs. 

COMTASKFOR 11 to CINCPAC 

Shot down 2 4-engine enemy scouts 400 miles east Rabaul. 

Believe harbor of Rabaul wi 11 be clear of shipping by morning and general m r alerted x In view acute fuel 

shortage which permits no delay in original schedule 

will not attack 21 Feb., but will withdraw to refuel in 

readiness for further offensive action. Will reconnoiter 

Solomons enroute and attack enemy found there. Recommend 

cancel scheduled attack by Army and Australian bombers. 

Cincpac transmit to Comanzac. 

C01~NZAC to COMTASKFOR 11 

Attack scheduled by shore based bombers cancelled. Your 

200237. In view of threat to Port Moresby consider 

attack should be rescheduled as soon as fuel situation 

permits. 

COMTASKFOR 11 to CHICAGO, CINCPAC 

Have been heavily attacked by approximately 30 heavy bombers. No damage to ships this force. About 12 to 20 ene~y planes destroyed. Own plane losses slight. Am 

returning to rendezvous with Platte arriving there 1200 

:b,ebruq ry 22nd. Cincpac transmit to Commander Australian 

Force and Comanzac. 

COMINCH to CINCLANT 

Make ready group for transfer to Pacific leaving from 

East Coast about 1 March consisting of Hornet, Vincennes, 

Nashvi lle, one modern Desdiv, one tanker of Cimarron 

class. 

COMINCH to CINCLANT, crdcPAC 

EACH FLEET SHALL INCLUDE AN AMPHIBI OUS FORCE WITH FLAG 

OFFICER AS FORCE COMMANDER TO COMPH I SE THREE GROUPS 

NAMELY FIRST COVERI NG FORCES AS ASS IGNED SECOND TRANSPORT X 

COMBAT AND OTHER UNDEH NAVAL OPFICER THIHD AMPHIBI OUS 

CORPS UNDER GENI~HAL OFFI CER PR EF'ERABLY MARINE 25 0 
FEB GCT 

21 0430 COMAN ZAC TO COMINCH 

Part one of two. Immediately upon my arrival requested steps be taken develop Suva Nandi area as operating base. 

Your 1635/16. Drag survey channel and ·four mile square anchorage Nandi Roads has been arranged with New Zealand 

Naval Board. ~1va Harbor difficult for very large vessels. 

Increased fuel and cold storage facilities have been requested but great difficulty obtaining material. New 

Zealand Naval Board also been requested increase protec- tion. This will require _installation submarine indicator 

loops and nets Nandi and Suva material for which not 

available Australia or New ·Zealand and additional mines 

required even after Kingfisher lays 300 mines now on 

hand. End first part. 

21 0435 COMANZAC TO COMINCH 

Part. 2. Additional landplane facilities and more anti~ 

aircraft protection for fields also necessary. Both 

places vulnerable submarine attack at present from 

examination of facilities available Auckland (small dry dock and limited shop facilities) and of area available 

for possible expansion thereof also considering maximum 

depth water available I consider Sydney Harbor only really suitable location ~r main fleet operating base 

this area. 

251 
FEB GCT 

21 0516Z. C01~NZAC TO NZNB 

1 1600 

2 1729 

22 2200 

Request every effort be made to develop Suva Nandi area 

as operating base for Pacific Fleet as well as Anzac Force. 

Refer my 0742Z/16. Steps should be taken to increase pro- tection of anchorage by installation indicator loop nets 

and additional mines. Increased fuel tanks and cold storage should be· make earliest practicable date. Airforce 

and anti-aircraft protection-· should be increased as soon 

as practicable. Please keep Comanzac informed of steps taken along these lines. 

COMINCH TO COMANZAC 

Your 210435 indicates misunderstanding of intent of my 161635 which may have been inadequately expressed but 

Auckland will be main operating base in south Pacific 

because of paramount strategical considerations which 

take precedence over major overhaul and drydock facilities. 

OPH1\'1 'I'O COM INCH To C IN C. PAC 

IT IS MY BELIEF THAT ENEMY SHIPPING IS ONE OF THE MOST 

VULNERABLE FUNCTIONS INVOLVED IN CONTINUANCE OF HIS 

OPERi\TIONS AND rrHAT EVERY SUBMARINE THAT CAN BE SPARED 

FROM INDISPENSIBLE OPE-Hi·~TIONS IN MANDATES SHOULD BE S~NT TO ATTACK ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN WESTERN 

PACIFIC WHERE THEY LEAVE JAPAN AT FOCAL OR OTHER FAVORABlE 

POINTS ENROUTE SOUTIDVARD, OR ELSEWHERE AS YOUR AVAILABLE 

INFORMATION MA~S ADVISABLE. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC COMANZAC 

REFERENCE INTEIDABDIATE OPERATING BASE MENTIONED IN MY 

161635 X CONSIDER SAMOA AND SUVA INADEQUATE FOR PURPOSE 

PROPOSE DEVELOP TONGATABU TO WHICH CINCPAC REQUESTED SE~D SUMNER FOR SURVEYAND ESTABLISH AIDS TO NAVIGATION 

ALSO IMPROVEMENT OF CHANNEL PREFERABLY EGE,RIA COMANZACFOR 

ENLIST ALL PRACTICABLE AID FROM NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 

LOO.KING TO MAKING TONGA TABU $ECURE PRIOR TO AND AF'rER 

ARRIVAL US NAVAL AID.1Y AIR UNITS C_INCPAC MAKE READY 

APPRO_flllA_TE eE cFO.RQE DE'rACHM~N:T .1 INCLUDING ALL PRACTI- _Qh.L SECUR.IJ'Y MEAS:URES) TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL OPERATING 

SERVICES - FUEI, PROVISIONS · STORES REPAIRS - FOR FORCES 

WHICH WILL BE WpRK ING CONTINUOUSLY IN AREA NORTH NORTHVVEST 

AND \iVEST OF "BLEACHER" WHICH IS CODE NAME AND SHORT TITLE 

POR TONGA TABU. , . 

252 
FEB GCT 

23 2146 COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

23 2156 

23 2214 

My 200753 revised and final count shows force attacked 

February 2o by 18 heavy bombers in two groups of nine 

each. One other group at time thought to be enemy turned 

out to be own planes returning from search. First attack 

occurred at 1~50 LCT when force was on southwesterly 

course 346 ·miles bearing 071 degrees from Rabaul. Second 

attack one half hour later. 16 .enemy planes known to 

have been destroyed and possibly a 17th. 2 planes 

previously damaged by fighters finally brought down by 

short range antiaircraft fire. Remainder brought down 

by repeated attacks by fighters and scout bombers. Lieut 

Edward H. O'Hare chiefly responsible for destruction 

of 6 planes. Own losses 2 VtF and one pilot Ensign John 

Woodrow Wilson USNR. Inform other interested commands. 

Part 2.· follows. 

COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMANZAC, CINCPAC 

Carrier target of both attacks. Bombing wild in first 

attack due to intense fighter attack which early damaged 

leader's plane. Only three planes this group reached 

approximate release point. Radical maneuver by carrier 

contributed to large error. Leader plane after damage 

appeared to attempt crash landing carrier deck but was 

shot down by antiaircraft fire from carrier one hundred 

yards from ship. Second attack five planes reached 

release point. Salvo landed astern carrier on port 

quarter nearest 100 feet some fragments landing on ship. 

Both groups circled formation and made final approach 

up wind from astern in tight vee formation. Release 

point at about 11 to 12000 feet altitude~ Planes 

camouflaged mottled green and gray color type 97. 

Anti-aircraft fire inaccurate in fuse range probably 

due to change of altitude during first part of final 

approach. This is part 2 of Comtaskfor 11 dispatch 

232146. 

COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMANZAC 

Aidac 

Need for support by another carrier. 

253 
FEB GCT 

2.3 2158 

23 2208 

25 0100 

25 0430 

25 0125 

COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC 

Expect to empty KASKASKIA about 2 March. Request information whether KASKASKIA can refill Suva for 

Taskfor 11 or whether another tanker same c~pacity 

will be provided in Suva area by 8 March. In view 

increased force will require thereafter 80,000 bbls. 

every six days. Plan return PLATTE to Pearl after 

fueling this force about 25 F~bruary. 

COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC 

Further extended operations this area will require early delivery following replacements. Planes in crates 

for carrier and cruisers as early as practicable three 

F4F-3 for replacements and three for spares, total six. 

One SBD-3 for replacements and six for spares. One SOC-2 

for replacement. Ammunition 4000 rounds each 5 inch 25 

and 5 inch 38. 500 catapult charges. 20,000 1.1. Total 

500000 50 caliber AP and tracer. 200 depth charges. 8 

inch replacements for possible future expenditures~ 

Informat:i.on requested from BuOrd whether carrier 8 inch 

suitable for use heavy cruiser guns by reduction weight of charge. 

COMAN&A.CFOR TO CDTCPAC 

In view latest intelligence suggest consideration be 

given early attack Rabaul area by Task Forces 11 and 

17. 

COMANZAC TO CINCPAC 

Corour Brown's remarks regarding further attacks Rabaul 

outlined in his 232214. See my 250100. Latest information indicates u.s. Army expedition New Caledonia probably ready proceed about 15 March with possibility some units 

anticipate that date slightly. Anzac Squadron will be 

required escort that movement. Cincpac pass this to 

Cominch and Comtaskfor 11. 

CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 11 

Ammunition shipped in DOBBIN for you, Army and Anzac 

Force. 5 inch 138 4,000 AA common. 1,000 comMon. 5 inch 

/25 3100 AA. 3"/50 200 AA. Catapult charges 450 full 

load 50 no load. 1.1 50,000. Caliber 50 450,000. Caliber 30 200,000. 20 MM 40,000. Depth charges 300 

pound with arbors 50. 600 poun4 100. Bombs 1000 pound 100, 500 pound 500, 100 pound 500. Incendiary 200. 

Mk. 17 depth bombs 50. Miscellaneous details included 

with above. Also shipped in CHICAGO 600 pound depth charges 48. 300 pound 24 plus capacity load in own 254 
FEB' GCT' ----

25 0125 (Cont'd) 

calibers. DOBBIN should arrive Samoa 4 March. ·Aircraft 

replacements and conversion LEXINGTON 8 inch will be 

covered in separate despatches. 

25 0427 CINCPAC TO TASKFOR COMMANDERS, COMANZAC 

Comtaskforce 11 232158 consider fuel requirements indicated are excessive and greatly beyond previous reports. Comanzac expected supply fuel his squadron. 

Leary advise Brown and Cincpac feasibility refilling 

KASKASKIA Suva after Task Force 11 fueling on 2 March. 

NEOSHO expected return Suva about 8 March__,local date. 

25 1209 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Aidac 

Recommendations concerning employment two task forces 

against Rabaul. 

26 0458 COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC 

Comanzac 250100 my 232214 not intended to recommend 

two carrier attack on Rabaul. I do not recommend it 

under present condttions. 

26 1530 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

CONTINUOUS USE OF CHEASAPEAKE BAY AS SECURE TRAINING AREA 

PROMPTS SUGGESTION THAT PUGET SOUND AND AREA NORTHWARD BE 

USED FOR SIMILAR PURPOSE PARA USE OF GULF OF MEXICO FOR 

SHAKEDOWN OF LARGE SHIPS ALSO SUGGESTS SIMILAR USE OF GULF 

OF CALIFORNIA AS AFFORDING CORRESPONDING DEGREE 0~, SECURITY. 

26 1630 COMINCH TO CTF 11, ~ COMANZAC. INFO CINCPAC 

FOLLOWING DECISION ON COMMAND AND ~.1Y GENERAL COMMENTS ON CTF 

11 232214 CON'iAFZACFOR 250100 AND 250900 CINCPAC 250847 -· ,A.ND 

251209 X 

(A) VlliiLE LEARY RElV!A INS ON SHORE SENIOR PACFLT OFFICER AFLOAT 

IN ANZAC HEREAFTER EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OP PACFLT FORCES 

AND ANZAC FORCES ASSIGNED TO COMMON TASKS BUT LEARY COORDINATE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS OF US AND AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCES 

BASED AUSTRALIA AND MORESBY X CANNOT APPROVE WITHHOLDING 

ANZAC FORCE FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS MERELY TO FORM A RESERVE 

X THIS IDEA IS PASSIVE AND APPEARS LIKELY TO BE PREMISED 

ON AFIRM CAST NEGAT BAKER VIEWS 

(B) AGREE Th'"E CURHENT PRACTICE OF USING A SINGLE CARRIER IN 

AN IMPORTANT OPFENSIVE TASK WifJ:'HOUT SUITABLE COVERAGE BY SHORE 

BASED .AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES 

PEHMI'r X EITHER TF-11 OR 17 PREFERABLY BOTH SHOt1LD REMAIN 

255 
FEB GCT ---

26 1630 (CONT'D) 

ANZAC UNTIL NE,,V CALEDONIA IS GARRISONED BUT THIS DEPENDS ON 

LOGISTICS AND MUST BE DECIDED BY CINCPAC X ADVISE 

(C) OPERATIONS IN FOH\.1\TARD AREAS SUCH AS "OFFENSIVE SWEEPStt 

ARE SELDOM JUSTIFIED IN THE ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS OF ENEMY 

PRESENCE SINCE SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DISCLOSE OWN PRESENCE 

AND INTENTION AND ELIMINATE ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE 

(D) ,OUR CURRENT TASKS ARE Nar MERELY PROTECTIVE BUT ALSO 

OFFENSIVE WHERE PRACTICABLE AS BEST WAY TO PROTECT IS BY 

REDUCINC;t ENEMY OFFENSIVE POWER THROUGH DESTRUCTION OF HIS 

MOBILE FORCES PARTICULARLY CARRIERS CRUISERS LOADED TRANSPORTS 

AND LONG RANGE BOMBERS X WHILE ENEMY SHORE POSITIONS MAY BE 

LOOKED ON AS LOCATIONS WHERE ENEMY NAVAL FORCES MAY BE STRUCK, 

RAIDS WHICH MERELY PUT AIR FIELDS AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS OUT 

OF COMMISSION TEMPORARILY MAY NOT IN THEMSELVES BE PARTICULARLY 

PROFITABLE X 

{E) NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY IN BISMARCK SOLOMONS AREA 

CAN PROBABLY BE BETTER COVERED BY RECONNAISSANCE BY PATROL 

PLANES AND BOMBERS BASED NORTHEAST AUSTRALIA USING MORESBY -FOR REFUELING X RECOMMEND LEARY MAKE EFFORT TO HAVE US ARMY 

FIGHTERS SENT TO MORESBY TO PROTECT THIS VERY IMPORTANT AIR 

FIELD 

(F) WILL TRANSMIT IN SEPARATE DESPATCH MY ANALYSIS PRESENT 

ENEMY SITUATION AND INTENTION ANZAC 

CTG 11.1 to COMANZAC, CINCPAC CTF 11 CTF9 

262100 Survey by squadr.on commander disclose~ operation PBY's from 

Vila impracticable. RAAF has already seriously damaged similar 

types attempting to operate there. Limited area in harbor requires takeoff in Meli Bay which has heavy swells due to 

shoaling. Consider operation from Noumea with cooperation 

RAAF to northward ~till assure effective search. Flight 41 

has been operating away from base since February 7 on basis 

3 ,,veeks of such employment. Spares aboard Curtiss·" dlnsufficient 

to make necessary repairs and replacements particularly engine 

and spark plugs for prot~acted operations. Continuance of 

flight operations after this week most doubtful unless spark 

plugs already requested are received. 

270542· COMTASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC 

It ·will be absolvtely necessary reprovision repeat reprovision 

this force not later than 15 March. Unless it is intended we 

return Pearl it will be necessary proceed Sydney after refueling 

from Kaskaskia about 5 March. No other harbor this area for 

carrier. 

255 
~ SECRET 

FEB GCT ----

27 0845 COIVIANZAC TO COMINCH 

Your 261630 regarding comment Afirm Anzac Forces are operating actively with Brown except when necessary to withdraw certain units for important escort duties. Decisions are made and operations ordered without any reference to ACNB. US and Australian shore based aircraft operate from northeast Australia refueling at Moresby or Horn Island and our patrol planes operate from Noumea or Vila to afford coverage of entire area Moresby to Efate. 

US Army preparing pursuit squadrons for service and will provide protection NE coast soon as possible. 12 planes now available Townsville Horn Island and next squadron goes Darwin. 

27 2355 C01~NZAC TO CURTISS, TANGIER 

My 250935x Cancel 1.operations from Vila. Tangier proceed Noumea and relieve Curtiss. Continue daily air patrols from Noumea with 3 planes to 700 miles on median line 342 degrees from Noumea. Curtiss when relieved by Tangier proceed Suva and carry out previous orders. 

28 0417 CINCPAC TO TF COMMANDERS 

Ta§lt Force 17 join Comtaskfor ll ~_ now assumed to be in area westward of New Hebrides. To minimize necessity for use radio rendezvous tentatively set three hundred miles north of Noumea at 0100 GCT 6 March subject to change by Brown or 

Fletcher's inability to meet. 

28 0559 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

INterpret your 261630 Afirm that SOPA PacFlt in Anzac Area 

operates directly under Cominch. Fletcher beine ordered join Brown. Location and fuel statu~both uncertain but estimate they can join and both fuel to c acity from accompanying tankers 

west of New Hebrides by local sf March unless currently pre- dicted unfavorable weather interferes. 

If offensive action is then initiated promptly toward New Britain can supply tankers Noumea and Suva .to replenish after withdrawal. Can thereafter furnish logistic support one task fore~ except for aircraft or large quantities ammunition. Brown undertay continuously since 31 January should be with- drawn after Fletcher arrives unless he remain for an offensive operation and in any case must leave by mid-March taking sufficient provisions in Tutuila from Bridge to reach Pearl 

Estimate New Caledonia garrison will not arrive Noumea prior 13J Marett. Advise. 2 57 
FEB GUT ---

28 0511 CINCPAC TO COMANZAC --- ---- ---- Urdis 270640 X Orders for Task Groups 12.1 and 12.2 in r.1ydis 252315 hereby cancelled. Direct HONOLULU ITARVIS as Task Group 12.1 escort army convoy departing Xray seven March for Noumea. Completion this duty proceed Pearl via Samoa for ·fuel. Direct NEW ORLEANS pue r~ Brisbane four March and MUGFORD as Task Group 12.2 

depart Brisbane in time arrive Bobcat by 22 March report there to Comsepacfor escort convoy Baker Tare two hundred one from Bobcat to junction with escort fron Anzac Force thence to Pago Pago for orders. CO NEW ORLEANS desie;nated Comtaskfor 12 effective five March. Units stopping Samoa report time of departure route and speed to Pearl via shore radio. 

28 2025 COMINCH TO CINCPAC~ COMANZAC, COMSWPACFOR 

EXPRESS "l'OUR VIEWS AS TO MOST PROFITAB11~ DISPOSITION OF SUBMARINES AND THEIR TENDERS NOW IN PACIFIC I-i,LJt~T 

AND FAH EAST PLUS TEN SAIL CLASS AND TVJO TENDERS NOW ENRourrE. 

- "28 2121 COMINCR rro COMANZAC, infer CINCPAC 

CONCERNING COMTASKGROUP 11.1 262100 SUGGEST POSSIBILITIES OF HAVANNAII HARBOR POR PATROL PLAUE OPERATIONS BE INVESTIGATED. 

28 2120 COMINCH TO COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG 

REPORT RELATIVE PRACTICABILITY ESTABLISHING AIRFIELD SEAPLANE BASE AND GARRISOU ON UPOLU OR SAVAII X INTENTION DEVELOP 1 ISLAIJD ONLY X SAVAII PREFERRED TACrriCALLY 

258 
RUNN I NG SUMMARY OF 11

HE SI TUArCION --~----

March 1 

Task Force 11 (LEXINGTON, 4 CA, 9 DD under Vice Admiral 

Brown) is presumably in t h e area north of Noumea, with an 

Anzac Force of 2 CA's, 2 CL's and 2 DD's operating in coordination with it. The KASKASKIA arrived in Suva on the 17th, the NEOSHO is enroute tlmt place and the TIPPECANOE and SS 

GULFWAX leave today for that area. Arriving at SaMoa tomorrow 

are the DOBBIN, BRIDGE and SS SCOJ:!,IELD. The last named will 

proceed to Suva after it deposits 20,000 bbls. of fuel at Samoa. 

Task Force 17 (YORKTOWN, 2 CA, 6 DD under Rear Admiral 

Fletcher) is proceeding from the Canton area to join Task Force 

11 300 miles north of Noumea at 0000 Z on 6 March. The 

GUADALUPE is in company with this Force. 

rraslc Force 16 (ENTERPRISE, 2 CA, 7 DD under Vice Admiral 

Halsey) raided Wake on 23 February (Hawaiian date) and may be 

about to attack Marcus. The SABINE is attached to this force. 

No report from any of these forces was received today. 

The Commanding General, Se.cond M:arine Brigade at Samoa 

replied to Cominch's 282120 in his 021037 which chooses 

Upolu Island as the outpost of rrutuila. 

Enemy radio vras intercepted which showed that some of 

our aviators had been made prisoners at Wake, and that they had told a good many truths about Pearl Harbor. 

Other intercepts indica ted that the Marshalls are bet ng reinforced and that a shift of seventeen planes was being made 

from one ba Je in the Marshalls to another until certain 

uoffensive 11 operations are completed. 

Enemy Cardiv Five has been so suspiciously .:1 ctive on the 

radio in the Bonin-Haneland A-rea that radio deception is 

indicated. 

Tho enemy offensive a gainst Java continues, three beach 

heads having been established. 

258 
SECRET 

March 2. 

Task Forces were silent a gain today. 

Cominch in 021615 (Aidac) directed that Comtaskfor 11 use 

his combined forces to make an attack in the New Britaln - Solomon Area about March lOth. Task Force 11 would then 

return to Pearl if directed by Cincpac. 

To obtain full -use of fuel available Cincpac sent 

despatches 030935 and 031007 (filed with orders). 

The situation at Canton was unreported today. An attempt 

to float the TAYLOR was supposed -to have been made. 

The CACHALOT returning from Truk had only one attack with 

indeterminate results to report. The lack of success of 

submarines in general has been quite disappointing. 

No particular change in enemy activities were indicated 

in any way today. Attack on Java continues and light air 

activity in the Solomons - New Guinea area continues. 

There have been no further intercepts mentioning an 

offensive, and Cardiv Five appears to be really in home waters. 

March 3. 

Still no reports from the active task forces. The Noumea 

area is having hurricane weather which may interfere seriously 

with refueling. 

A report rece i ved via the Army said the TAYLOR was still 

pounding and had flooded some of the engine and fire room spaces. Indications are that she will be a total loss. 

Cominch in 031505 directed that the service detachment required by his 22220q plus appropriate troops and aircraft be 

sent to Bleacher ·( Iongatabu). These are to "fill in" to m9.ke 

it an intermediate operating base until the expedition for 

its establishment can be sent from the West Coast. 

It appeared from the Sailing Directions that this harbor 

could not be entered by a carrier or a loaded tanker. As the SUM1~R had just reported her arrival, she was asked in Cincpac 

040201 as to the capabilities of the channels, and replied favorably in 040530 (attached). 

250 
March 3 (Cont'd) 

It is the opinion of the War Plans Section that Nandi 

offers the best site for a carrier anchorage in the area, 

as: it is believed to require only some sweeping; it has a 

large airfield; and there are considerable defenses, with a 

pursuit squadron already installed. 

A despatch to this effect may be sent to Cominch but, 

in the meantime, the Army is being asked for troops and planes, 

a Marine defense battalion is being assembled; and several 

auxiliaries to form the service detachment are being readied. 

Cincpac replied in 040337 as to disposition of submarines. 

The MARYLAND, COLORADO and TENNESSEE arrived San Francisco 

today. 

The TROUT (carrying Manila bullion, etc) returned from 

patrol. 

Cominch in 031525 told Comsouwespacfor in what way to 

carry on. 

A detailed report of surviving American forces in the 

Asiatic was received (031335 attached). Apparently the 

Marblehead, Pecos and LANGLEY have been sunk. Fate of Houston 

uncertain. It will be noted nearly all forces are retiring to 

Fremantle. 

Cominch in 031630 asked Com~seafrontier as to suitability 

of Kodiak for surface forces. In 030730 the NAS Dutch Harbor 

told of a rough patrol of the S-18. 

Radio intelligence indicates some kind of an offensive 

against the Hawaiian area, possibly tomorrow, employing large 

seaplanes and submarines based in the Marshalls. An alert 

was sent to all forces. 

The enemy's Java offensive was not over-running the Dutch. 

However, fighter planes raided Derby and Broome in northeast Australia, Moresby received another raid, and the concentration at Rabaul is increasing. 

Submarines were reported off the Galapagos by the 

Moffett, and off the coast of Lower California by the 

Naval Attache in Mexico. 

251 
March 4. 

Task Forces 11 and 17 were unheard today. Bad weather 

still persists in Nour.1ea area. 

Co~inch in 042227 called attention to a possible enemy 

offensive in which the Hawaiian area would be an objective. 

The alert sent out yesterday was justified~ for one or 

two large enemy planes raided Oahu last night. They were picked 

up by the Kauai radar and were tracked in from the northwest and 

out.to the southwest showing up for about three hours except 

when they were oveJ• this island. The night was moonlit but 

there was a low ceiling witl1 some rain here. The four pursuits 

put in the air were ineffective, and gun fire was not opened because the searchlights could not pick up the enemy. Four bombs 

were dropped at 0215 local and landed above Honolulu without 

damage. Five patrol planes took off with torpedoes to search 

for a supporting ship. The present estimate is that the plane 

was fueled by a submarine at some such anchorage as French 

Frigate Shoal. An AVD was sent to watch that atoll. 

Due to warning by Cominch and other information it was 

decided to inform Comtaskfor 16 and tell him that the CUYA~~~ 

could be sent to fuel his force (CinCPo.c os- o"'~ I ). 

Vice Admiral Halsey has not yet informed CinCPac of what 

he has been doins. However, an English broadcast from Tokyo 

reported a raid by 30 planes against the Marianas. 

Consiberable deliberation has been held as to the 

establislment of Bleacher. CinCPac's 050509 and 050553 were 

sent to Cominch on this subject. In general, further enlightenment as to ulti~ate plans for Bleacher was requested and the 

higher priority of Nandi Roads as a carrier anchorage was recommended. The Army here was unable to furnish a garrison for 

Bleacher, and the aircraft supply is practically nil. A marine 

defense battalion is being prepared although transfer of its 

weapons will leave quite a hole in the defenses of Pearl Harbor. 

The CRESCENT CITI (AP) and CASTOR (AKS) are bein8 prepared to 

transport the troops and equipment. The SOLACE may be sent. 

rrhe RIGEL and ANTARES are not immediately ready. 

Cominch in 041725 requested comment as to the proper 

subdivision of the Pacific Areas in which the U.S. will be responsible for the operations. 

Cor1taskfor One commented in his 050215 as to possible 

cruise to the Gulf of Lower California to train battleships. 

Com-13 in his 050127 replied to Cominch's question as 

to Kodiak. 

262 
March 4 (con tlnued). 

The enemy is continuing to concentrate on Java and is 

succeeding. New raids were made against both Moresby and Darwin. 

At least two submarines continue to operate between here 

and Midway. Other small raids may be received here from large 

seaplanes, but radio intelligence gives no indication that carriers have started this way yet. 

March 5. 

As a result of announcement by Tokyo and one urgent message 

sent out by I·Iarcus, it anpears that Task Force Sixteen attacked the 

latter place on \Jednesday, 1Iarch 3 (Hawaiian date). This was nine 

days after the probable date of the attack on \flake. Vice Admiral 

Halsey replied to Cincpac's 050251 by setting a rendezvous for the 

CUYAMA 720 miles west of Oahu at 1800Z March 8. He informed that his 

force was undamaged but gave no other information. Due to an 

·increasing number of submarines in the French Frigate-Midway area 

and south thereof, the rendezvous is not very well placed. 

No news from Task Forces 11 and 17 but TANGIER has reported 

hu:rricane weather for the last two days, which cloes not augur well 

for an operation which will not wait. Lsicle from the fuel situation 

the concentration at Rabaul is becoming greater and is probably about 

to move. As regards fuel, the S.S. SCOFIELD completed discharge of 

sone of her cargo at Sanaa and is on her way to Suva. 

No enemy aircraft reached Oahu last night though at least one 

submarine is indicated still near French Frigate Shoal. Radio 

intelll~ence still indicates a close tie-up between submarines in 

this area and aircraft in tho eastern Marshalls. However there are 

no indications of an irnminent carrier attack here. 

The latest report fron the TAYLOR at Canton is that it may 

not be fatally damarsed, but three vveeks vrill be required to prepare 

her for refloatinr;, and then she must be towed to a dry-dock for 

major re~airs. The JAPARA unloading is going extremely slowly, but 

the RdBIN delivered barges there today. 

No reply has been received from Cominch in ree;ard to further 

plans as to Bleacher. Plans to send defense battalion and as much 

equipment as po s sible is proceeding. 

The enemy is spreadine; successfully on Java. Batavia fell 

tonight. 

263 
March 6. 

In view of the continued concentration of submarines 

near the desir.;nated rend.ezvous for the CUYJMA and Task B

1

orce 16, 

that force \Vas told to return to Pearl for fuel, and CUYAWIA 

was recalled. Still no a~plifying re~orts from the Task 

Force Commander, but eneny announcements make the raid on 

Marcus a certainty. 

Task Forces 11 and 17 were unheard again today. The 

center of the hurricane passed Nour~ea with nec;ligible damage 

to our forces, and patrol plane search was made from· there 

yesterday. Some r1ovement has already taken place from nabaul, 

as reconnaissance shows fewer ships there. 

ComTaskfor ONE in his 060103 told of plans for training 

battleships. 

Plans concerning Bleacher are still underway. The 

SUMnER repoPted that housing there was available for 5000 

troops and that more huts could be built. Still no anplification as to that base received from Coninch, except for 

841403 which shifted attention fror1 the northwest to the 

northern channel. This was replied to in 060225. 

The radio activity between submarines west of here and 

aircr•aft in the Marshalls continues, but no further activity 

either here or at French Fri~ate Shoal has been noted. A 

patrol plane as well as the AVD observed the latter place. 

A reply (070451) was sent to Cominch in regard to his 

suggested subdivision of the Pacific Area. Comanzac ~ 

ComSouviTestPe:cfor replied in 060507. ~ ~~*~· 

Eneny successes continue in Java. One carrier was 

reported in the Indian Ocean. In New Guinea, his air activity 

indicates further landings. 

March 7 

Task Force 16 still silent and returning Pearl . 

Task Force 17 has presumably joined Task Force 

Eleven. From the latter an Aidac (080013) was received 

giving his plans for his attack against New Britain bases 

on the lOth (9th Hawaiian date). Apparently close figuring 

on fuel, and bad weather, have not prevented plans from 

going through. As Japanese landings at Salamoa, Lae and 

other points in New Guinea have beennnde, this attack is a 

little late for maximum effectiveness. 

Another aidac was received from Cominch (071820) 

directine that Task.Force Eleven, before departing from the 

Anzac Area, should fill up Task Force Seventeen with spares 

and stores e 26 4 
March 7 (Cont' d ) 

Th e SUMNER i n 072345 re p orted further encourag ing 

n ews as to Bleacher. Th e load ing of the Crescent City and 

Castor is underwa y and the Solace will probably accompany 

them. The expedition will be slightly delayed due to the 

shortage of escorts and the 14th has been tentatively set 

as the sailing date. 

A false alarm as to aircraft and bombarding 

submarines occurred this morning. The radar plot of the aircraft was quite convin c:tng , but there does not seem to have 

been much justification for the report that five submarines 

were bombarding the west coast of Oahu. Radio intelligence 

and the continued presence of submarines n ear French Frigate 

indicate that other raids by large seaplanes may be attempted. 

A carrier raid does not appear to be imminent. 

In 080135 the Commanding General, 2d Marine 

Brig ade at Samoa reported further upon his misg ivings as to 

Western Samoa being undefended. He is receiving 1200 troops 

which he may use to garrison Upolu Island. 

The enemy continues his success in Java, and, as 

already mentioned, he landed in some strength in New Guinea. 

Task Porce 16 was si[hted today GOO mlles to the 

west southwestward. It should arrive Pearl on the l Ot h . 

Task Porces 11 and 17 combined should be a pproachi ng New Britain and were apparently not discovered today. 

Efate re~o!'ted that possibly a carrier and two 

other vessels passed there at about 2100 last night (I~waiian 

time) heading northeastward. 

The convoy for IJo1. nea "~Na s scheduled to deDart 

from Australia yesterday, escorted by two cruisers and two 

destroyers, all U. S. 

ComSouifvcstPac 's reply 090912 was received to 

Conlnch's des,atch su ~ests operating area subdivision 

The enemy situation continues much the same. 

265 
March 9 

No indication of the operations of Task Forces 11 and 

17 plus Anzac Force was received until about 1600 when a 

contact report v1as made by the enerty Gunboat Division EIGHT 

in the Rabaul area. Also no report of the results of the 

raid by the B-l7s on the n ortheast coast of ~ew Guinea 

(Comanzac 091300) was received. 

The VPs at Noumea and . the . Bri tish planes at Suva made 

a sp ecial search foran enemy carrier in that general area 

. without result. Suva had been alerted by what was thought 

to be a carrier plane last night. 

Task Force 16 will enter tomorrow. 

Unloading at Bobcat is go ing very slowly, and one-half 

of the 7tr guns will not be emplaced for about a month more. 

Opnav t 'herefore ordered the remainine; sh ips of the Southeast 

Pacific Force to return to t h eir station. Their departure 

was reported in ComSePacfor 100254. 

Opnav in 081905 provided for the garrisoning of EFATE 

by two companies of the Noumea detacruaent. 

rrokyo was again interested in Hawaiian weather so a 

warning a gainst seaplane attacks was disseminated. 

Dutch resistance in ,Java has collapsed and Rangoon 

has fallen. Enemy submarines and probably one carrier are 

working in the Indian Ocean. Air attacks on Moresby continue, but it is still usable. 

TRITON in 100915 reported sinking four ships durine 

her patrol in the East China Sea. 

In 091630 Cominch requested comment as to advisability 

of doing away with Battle Force and Scouting Force as task 

organization. 

March 10 

Task Force 16 entered. The results of its attacks are 

c .ontained in Cincpac's 110321, attached. Little permanent 

damage was done, but the enemy was harassed with very small 

loss to us except wear and tear. 

The results of Vice Admiral Brown's activities are not 

yet apparent, though enemy contact reports in the Rabaul 

area continued today . The raid of tbeB-17's scheduled for 

yesterday was still unreported. The enemy landings on the 

northeast coast of New Guinea were continuing. 

26 6 
March 10 ( -Cont'd) 

Due to s spell of good weather at Canton some progress 

has been made in unloading the Taylor and the Japara. The 

latter should be completed about the 15th and the former may 

be ready for a pull shortly after that date. 

Plans for the Bleacher expedition are continuing. It 

was decided today to add the CUYA1~ to provide transportation 

for excess vehicles and to deposit some more oil in the area. 

The SU!vfNER reported delay due to bad weather, in marking 

the channel, but that the anchorage is ready. 

The supply of the Anzac Area is going according to 

schedule. The Scofield has delivered her oil to· the 

KASKASKIA and is returning to the West Coast. The BRIDGE 

and DOBBIN are at Suva. The NEOSHO is enroute to Suva and 

the Gulfwax has almost reached Samoa. The GUADALUPE delivered her remnant of fuel at Suva and after depositing some 

gasoline on the north shore of Viti Levu will return to 

Pearl. The PLATTE is receiving a much needed week's overhaul. The SABINE, which has been with Task Force Sixteen, 

will be held as the 11 ready11 tanker. · 

The code name of Efate is apparently "Roses" and 

Opnav sent the attached query (101828) in regard to its 

characteristics. Opnav also asked about barges at Bleacher, 

probably in connection with the expedition it is making up 

in connection with the ~rmanent garrisoning of that place. 

The situation at Noumea is indicated by the TANGIER's 

despatches 100605·and 102350 attached. The convoy from 

Australia es expected to arrive there day after tomorrow. 

There were no new noves of the enemy apparent today. 

His present intentions appear to be against both Australia 

and India. 

March 11 

Flnally heard from Vice Admiral Brown - his report 

102201 is attached. He did not approach New Britain at all, 

but went to a position south of NEW GUINEA and sent aircraft 

across the peninsula to LAE and SALAMOA where they found a 

considerable number of targets. Even with the damage inflicted, it is doubtful if the enemy will be greatly retarded. 

A despatch 120335 was sent to ComTaskfor 11 to comply 

with Cominch's order to fill up TaskFor 17, and to direct 

the latter force to continue operations in the ANZAC area. 

Another despatch 120259 w&s sent to inform Cominch of 

the BLEACHER plans. 

257 
March 11 (Continued) 

The SUMNER reported in 120235 that the main channel 

is ready at BLEJ:1.CHER. Some doubt as to SUMNER's optimistic 

reply regarding fresh water there was raised by SUVA. 

COMANZAC in 110432 answered Opnav's query as to 

"Roses u· (EFATE). 

Received 111620 (AIDAC) from Cominch which warned as 

to possible attacks in this area. 

HORNET, NASHVILLE, VINCENNES, CIMARRON, DesDiv 22 

have reported for duty. 

A very significant change in ene~y disposition has 

been indicated. The Scteening Force (BBs, CAs, DDs plus 

some carriers) is apparently assembling in the BONIN area 

and Cardiv FIVE received urgent orders which apparently 

turned at least one of its carriers back from on a passage 

to STARING BAY. This looks suspiciously like an offensive 

move because it is difficult to believe that our operations 

have made the enemy so fearful of an attack against his 

Homeland. 

March 12 

·No word from Task Forces 11 and 17 today. Comanzac 

reported that five B-17s attacked LAE and SALAMOA and 

shipping off those places on the day after the attack by 

Vice Admiral Brown's forces. They did $orne damage to 

these places and reported several enemy surface units were 

still present. In fact some of these sounded suspiciously 

like the same units that the carrier aircraft thought they 

had sunk. 

Nothing was received from Cominch today. 

Three despatches (130307, 130339, 130545) were sent 

in order to provide ComTaskfor 17 and the auxiliaries in 

the South PACIFIC with full information as to their 

directives. In this connection Comanzac sent his 130025. 

To Cominch was sent another request (122129) for Army 

heavy bombers. 'I1

his was particularly timely due to the 

warnin8 recently received from Cominch. 

Preparations are being ma.de to form another Task Force 

with the HORNET as the carrier. 

1

1

here still continued indications tha t the enemy is 

forming a strong concentration in the BONIN area. Cardiv 

FI VE is still involved and may be moving eastward. 

258 
March 12 (Continued) 

The enemy also evinces strong interest in the Bay of 

A considerable number oi' his ships were reported to 

have been recently at Buka passage. 

Com-14 sent his 130121 to Cominch in regard to information bulletins based on radio intelligence. 

March 13. 

No report received today from Task Forces 11 and 17. 

They should be about to commence fueling. 

Task Force 16 is still at Pearl and will probably remain 

until the 20th or 21st. The ships of this Task Force are receivinrs much needed upkeep and are being brought up-to-date on 

the various projects for irr1provement of fighting efficiency. The 

seneral question of upkeep is givin£ some concern. T.?.-11 has 

been at sea for 1~ months and T.F.-17 will probably be longer. 

Cominch in 131535 told ComT.F.-17 to carry on in the 

Anzac Area. 

Operation Plan No. 17-42 was issued t &> ask £G& c13 . cL1 the Bleacher expedition. In 132037 and 132100 pd lndicate~'~ that the permanent carrison might arrive just about the time 

Task Force 13 has gotten established, and that the Marine Defense 

Battalion in T.F. 13 (No.4) would have to move on to another 

base. This is a most undesirable situation. 

Another despatch concerning water at Bleacher was received from the Sill1NER (122305). Also further information as 

to Roses (~fate) was furnished by the TANGIER (140t330) e This 

ship and· six patrol planes are beinf left in the Anzac area for 

the time being. The planes are just now being relieved by six 

fresh units. The B-17's which were sent in connection with 

rr. P. -11 operations will continue to operate fror1 Townsville 

under ComAnzac. Only five out o:f' the or•i£_\inal twelve figured 

in the last attack. 

CinCPac today signed Hawaiian D"efense Plan No. 1-42. 

This assigns defensive tasks to the Army and the Sea frontiei', 

and to Fleet Porces present in the Iawaiian Sea l''rontier. It 

supplants the old joint plan which has been in effect for the 

Army and the Sea Frontier and is issued under the principle of 

unity of cor:L.""land. It has been under considera -cion fo:r many 

weeks in an endeavor to solve some of the knotty problems as to 

its forr1 and substance. 

Sent 130339 to ComTaskFor 17 givine him information as 

to facilities at his disposal. 

269 
March 13 (Continued) 

Cominch ln 121250 suggested a reor5anization of the Sea 

Frontier Command. CinCPac recommended agalnst this in 140353 

as did also Com 14 in 132358. 

Further radio intelligence indicates that the enemy is 

really alarmed as to an attack near his Homeland, and that the . 

powerful force that he is assembling is at present for defensive purposes. However, the alerted state of the forces in the 

Hawaiian Area has not been relaxed. 

March 14 

No reports were received from Task Forces 11 or 17 today. 

Task Force 13 is delayed by loading difficulties until 

tomorrow. 

Received 131430 from Cominch, as to reorganization of Task 

Force 16. This dispatch is not entirely understood and 142155 

was sent in reply. 

Received another question in Cominch 131955 as to doing 

away v1i th Scouting Force and Battle Force as task forces. 

In 131305 Cominch continues his emphasis upon the Amphibious Force. However many demands on the transports are still 

being made to send garrisons to Pacific bases. The training 

of the troops was of course greatly retarded by the detachment 

of the Iceland garrison last year, and the moving of 5,000 men 

to Samoa in January. 

A fals~ air alarm this morning was the result of failure 

to identify friendly planes to the s Ol.l thward. A garbled report 

of a carrier was also made by an Army plane. 

Canton was not heard from today though a launching attempt 

was supposed to be made on the TAYLOR yesterday. 

The enemy Screening Force is still screening in the BoninMarcus Area. The remainder of his re-deployment is not clear, 

though some units are undoubtedly going to the Indian Ocean and 

some are reinforcing the Marshalls and Rabaul. 

March 15 

Received 160821 (Aidac) from Vice Admiral Brown giving his 

views as to how the enemy can be held in the New Guinea, northeastern Australia area - he considers enemy too strong on land 

to permit a raid against his bases - particularly Rabaul. 

270 
:March 15 (Continued) 

In Cominch 141825 the duty of promulgating enemy intelligence bulletins was assi gned to CinCPac. It is intended 

that the Com 14 unit will continue to supply the data for 

these bulletins. 

In 150137 CinCPac replied to Opnav's inquiries about mines 

at Bleacher. 

Admiral Brown also in his 151520 and 151525 gave further 

details of the attack of his and the Army aircraft on the lOth, 

indicating that the damage inflicted really was great. 

Comdesron 5 (PORTER) reported that he is enroute to Pearl 

with the JAPARA and that the refloating attempt on the TAYLOR 

was unsuccessful. This matter is being studied further by the 

salvage personnel now at Canton. 

. The destroyer watch on French Frigate Shoal is being continued. 

In response to orders issued by Comsubpac on the 13th, 

three submarines are taking up patrol stations northwest of 

the Bonins to attack any of the enemy concentration believed 

to be forming there. One sub is being sent into the Anzac 

area to patrol near Rabaul. 

The enemy continues to search intensively north of Marcus, 

but Cardiv Five is now slated to carry planes from Yokosuka to 

Staring ~y. A considerable enemy concentration has continued 

to use Kessa Harbor (Buka Channel), northwest Solomons. Bombing 

of Moresby continues and Horn Island (Torres Strait) has 

received its first air attack. 

March 16 

Task Force 17 was heard from in his 132141 in which he 

endeavored to arrange for the train vessels at Samoa to move 

to Noumea or Suva. In 160217 Cincpac ordered that these ships 

be moved from Samoa only in emergency. 

Further word from Cominch was received as to the conference concerning Task Force 16's employment (162043). Orders 

for this force will therefore have to wait for the results of 

the conference. 

In 170545 replied to Opnav's 151526 concerning water at 

Bleacher. 

The small force sent from Noumea to Efate is due to 

arrive today. 

271 
March 1 6 (Con't) 

The spec ial a lert placed in effect on Oahu on March 

3 was relaxed today. 

High Conrr.1issioner Sayre of the Philippines passed 

through by plane enroute to the u.s. 

Cominch in 161642 rected transfer of 4 DD and 5 OSS 

from Southwest pacfor to Anzac Force. Also the GRIFFIN and 

5 OSS are now enroute from Panama to the Anzac Area. 

No offensive move of the enemy has been detected as 

being actually underway but the indications are that he 

will move a gainst northern Australia and India and possibly 

New Caledonia. Our garrison is now ashore at the last place 

but unloading has not been completed. 

The enemy also is apparently continuing to activate 

his screening and mainland defense forces. The YiliGA is 

definitely enroute to Yokosuka, perhaps with some torpedo 

damage. Our sub~arines may g et a shot at her. 

Uarc h 17. 

No nevvs of any task force was received today. 

Recent re">Jorts from submarines have been quite discouragin~ as they have not sighted much traffi c off Port 

Lloyd, Bungo Channel, or even the eastern part of t he East 

China Sea . No indication of the result of our submari nes 

concentrating northwest of the Bonins has been noted. They 

should, however, be at pre sent in the path of the YJ-1.GA vvhich 

is lmo\rn to be en route to Yokosuka. 

Several more or less administrative matters are being 

forced upon the Commander-in-Chief because of unsatisf a c t ory 

conditions. The fuel supply of Hawaii is one , a nd i n f a c t 

t he Eeneral supply and shipping are in the same conditi on . 

No action was taken on CinCPac dispatch 180401 of January 

and no real naval transportation service, as was visua l ized 

by the War Plan, has ever been created. There is therefore 

no coordinating or directinr agency on the West Coast to 

systematize the shipnents. 

The allocation of spa c e for evacuees has just b een 

put in the hands of the CinGPqc by Opnav. 

27 2 
March 17 (Cont'd) 

In reply to a ques-clon fron Co:r1inch concernine; the 

airc~aft slated for Bleacher, 172029 was sent. Contained 

therein is the irr-1pliecl sn~re st::~on that, as lone as the f. rr1y 

carrison will arrive there so0n, it would be better not to 

send the ~arine aircraft. Also in 170545, Cincpac replied 

to Opnav's question about well-dig~in~ equiprnen~ in Task ~orce 

rrhir teen. 

Sone of the troops for Hawaii, !1aui and Kauai arrived 

on the l~th in the Lurline and Aquitan~a. ~here has been no 

great increase in aircra there recently- about 30 D-17's 

and about 183 pnrnuits constitute the Army's air force. L. 

few D-24's have started through to 1.ustralia and the first 

B-26 's, v1hich are beinr: set up here have bor;un to fly to the 

same destination. 

The si tun tion at 1Jounea is indica ted by 'Tfl.ngd.er' s 

170145. 

T~10 press announced General VIcArthur' s presence in 

Australia, and that he vvould be in suprene corJY'land there. 

In connection wlth this Coninch's 171640 was received telling 

of pros?ective area alignnents. 

Thore were no new developments in enemy activities 

today. 

273 
MAR GCT ----

01 0247 ANY OR ALL US MEN OF WAR TO CINCPAC 

To Cincpac for info who is requested pass to Cominch 

for action and also to Comanzac and Opnav for info. 

President Tyler will depart 28 Feb for Papeete for 

water than to San Prancisco via route 30 miles west of 

normal Great Circle Lane. Other vessels unloading slowly. Ostrom estimates 6 weeks before one-half of 

7 11 guns will be installed. rrransports and store ships will require water. Request convoy vessels returning from Anzac ports deliver 1000 tons if practicable. Deemed undesirable send vessels to Papeete for water 

except in emergency. 

02 1037 CG 2MARBRIG SAMOA TO COMU:NCH 

Ref Urdis 282120. Opolu is onl-yr practicable choice for 

establishment airfield seaplane base and garrison. Tactical advantage in location of Island of Savaii recognized but it offers no natural advantages for immediate 

developments. Estimate Savaii would involve enormous . / 

const:huction project requiring many months for development v 

port, roads, field and seaplane runways. Estimate runway 

on Opolu adjoining existing seaplane runway could be 

prepared in 30 days after arrival personnel and equipment. Foregoing based on recent staff reconnaissance and study of both islands. 

02 1615 COMINCH TO COMTASKFOR 11 

03 1335 

Aidac 

Combined offensive about 10 March. 

COMSOUWESPAC TO COMINCH 

Following ships Fremantle. Holland, Snapper, Sturgeon, Sculpin, George B. Henry, Island Mail. 7 submarines 

operating Java Sea and approaches 2 south of Java, Permit· 

enroute disposition General McArthur, remainder enroute 

Fremantle. Houston and Perth sailed Batavia March 1 

probably in action Sunda Strait no information since sailing. Pope with badly damaged Exeter anp. Encounter bound Sunda 

Strait from Surabaya. Last heard from Java Sea being shadowed by plane. Remainder Desron 29 enroute Fremantle. 

Lt. Clark and 4 men ordered to aestroy Stewart Make best 

way to Tjilatjap. Action and present whereabouts unknown. 

274 
,/ 

MAR GCT 

03 1335 (CONTINUED) 

Childs in Exmouth Gulf, Preston, Heron minus one propeller 

blade, Lark, lthipporwill, Tulsa, Ashville, Isabel, Lanakai 

enroute Fremantle. Andam sailed 1 March counsel general 

Foote rin board, destination unknown. Mount Vernon nearing Fremantle. Phoenix and Otus enroute. 7 hospital cases 

Houston and Marblehead in charge Lt. Comdr. Waskel, MCR, USN, 

remain Tjtlatjap. Whipple has 200 Langley and Pecos 

survivors no information remaining 500 or so. 

03 1505 COMINCH TO CIKCPAC 

03 1525 

SEND SERVICE FORCE DETACHMENT 1IT 222200 TO BLEACHER AUGMENTED 

BY SUITABLE DETACHMENT OF TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT FOR LOCAL DEFENSE PENDING ARRIVAL DEFENSE FORCE NOW BEING MADE UP FOR ../ 

DEPARTURE FROM WEST COAST WHEN SHIPPING IS AVAILABLE PARA 

OPNAV HAS IN HAND ROUTING OF SHIP SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS 

DIRECT TO BDEACHER. 

COMINCH TO CO SO~NESPATCFOR 

CONTINUE ACTIVE SUBMARIKE OPERATIONS IN ABDA AREA PARA 

ATTACK ENEMY VESSELS WITHIN AREA AND EXITING FROM I?A:SSES' 

COMMA OPPOSE ENE!viY ADVANCE TOWARDS AUSTRALIA AND MAINTAIN 

ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS VlliTH PHILIPPINES PARA MAKE USE 

OF AIR AUGMENTED BY OWN ARMY AIR AND AUSTRALIAN AIR AS 

ARRANGED FOR Jly CONlANZAC FOR SUPPORT OF SUBNf.ARINE OPERATIONS AN 

ATrrACK ON ENEMY AIR BASES PARA REPORT BY REr:L,URN DESPATCH 

WHAT SURFACE FORCES REMAIN INCLUDING A.UXILARIES AND WHICH OF 

THEM YOU FEEL YOU CAN ACTIVELY EMPLOY AGAINST THE ENEMY WHILE 

.CONTINUING TO OPERATE IN THE ABDA AHEA PARA MAKE SIMILAR 

REPORT AS TO AUSTRALIAN NAVAL UNITS ALLOCATED TO ABDA AREA. 

03 16360 COMINCH TO COMNWSEAFRON 

TO ,,\THAT EXTENT DOES KODIAK ENTER INTO YOUR PLANS AS AN 

OPERATING BASE FOR SURFACE FORCES AS YffiLL AS AIRCRAFT AND 

SUBMARINES PARA REVIEW ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES AND DEFENSES 

OF KODIAK ON FOREGOING PREMISE 

04 0201 CINCPAC TO SUMNER 

Earliest possible information desired as to feasibility 

use Nukualofa anchorage by CV. What is estimated time / 

for determining suitability Lahi Passage by deferring 

work Egeria Channel. Is Narrows considered difficult 

to ne gotiate by heavy 6ruis e rs and larger ships. 

275 
MAR GCT 

04 0337 

040530 

Your 282035 believe there should be retained in Souwestpacfor maximum number submarines which can be supported within reasonable range of the NEI and lines which Japan may develop in Bay of Bengal area. Additional tender should be assigned if required. Of submarines which cannot be maintained by the Souwestpacfor all Sail class should be assigned to 

Anzac Area and large type with appropriate tenders shifted 

to Pearl which is considered satisfactory as base for patrols in the Western Pacific. Pearl based units sbould take over Pelews and other Asiatic areas when Comsouwestpac is ready ~ 

to release them also Solomon-Rabaul Area. 10 S-type enroute should be assigned Anzac less Solomon-Rabaul area with tender or tenders as necessary. Comsubpac considers 

1500 miles their maximum practicable operating range. Present sound school and assignment to Dutch Harbor with appropriate rotation should be continued. 

SUMNER TO CINCPAC 

Nukualofa now available as anchorage. Narrows not difficult for types specified. Slow low powered ships use during slack 

water. Experienced local pilot available. Lahi Passage ~ considered safe but will be dragged and marked in four days. 

04 1725 COMINCH to COHANZAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, CINCPAC. 

YOUR VIEWS REQUESTED ON CONVENIENCE AND ADVISABILITY -OF 

DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL AREAS IN PACIFIC WHICH IS ABOUT TO BECOMB WHOLLY UNIT SAIL (US) SPHERE OF HESPONSIBILITY. 

CONSIDER AFIRM CONTINUATION OF ABDA AREA MODIFIED TO EX- CLUDE MALAYA AND SUMATRA WITH NORTHERN BOUNDARY 20 DEGREES NORTHEAST BOUNDARY 130 DEGREES EAST TO EQUATOR THENCE AS NOW, BAKER ANZAC AREA TO INCLUDE AUSTRALIA EXCEPT ABDA AREA 

OTHER1

NISE AS NOW BUT WITH EAST BOUNDARY RUNNING SOUTHEAST 

PROH EQUATOR AT 160 DEGREES EAST TO POINT 30 DEGREES SOUTH 

175 DEGH.EES \!'lEST THENC1~ SOUTH CAST SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 

SOUTH OF EQUATOR AND EAST TO 110 DEGREES WEST DOG CEN'rRAL P~CIFIC AREA NORTH OF EQUATOR AND EAST OF ABDA AREA TO 42 DEGREES EASY NORTH PACIFIC AREA NOHTH OJ? 42 DEGREES 

FOX SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AREA AS NOW. 

OPERATIONS IN AREAS APIRM BAKER POX INITIALLY TO BE UNDER COMINCH, THOSE IN CAST DOG EASY UNDER CINCPAC. 

MAIN OPERATION AND SUPPLY BASES X AREA AFIRM TO BE DETERMINED X BAKER AUCKLAND X CAST TONGATABU X DOG PEARL HARBOR 

EASY KODIAK X FOX PANAMA. 

276 
MAR GCT ----

04 2227 

050127 

05 0215 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

SHOW IMT/lEDIA'rELY TO CINCPAC IN PERSON X COPEKS FROM 

COM 14 AND COM 16 AND OTHER RADIO INTELLIGENCE SINCE 

ABOUT FEBRUARY 15 INDICATE ENEMY PLANS RAID \JITH CARDIV 5 PLUS NITTA MARU AND LARGE SEAPLANES AGAINST US 

POSITIOlJS AND FORCES PROBABLY OAHU POSSIBLY PALMYRA 

JOHNSTON MIDWAY X IN SPITE OF SUGGESTIONS OF ngCEPTION COMINCH ANALYSIS HAS HERETOPORE TENTATIVELY PLACED DATE 

OF RAID ABOUT MARCH 11 TO 13 X HOWEVER THE IMPLICATIONS 

II:l COM 14 040919 AND COM 16 041228 THAT THE ATTACK WILL 

OCCUR MARCH 5TH EITHER TOKYO OR OAHU DATE HAVE SOME 

FOUNDATION AND CANNOT BE IGNOHED. 

C.OMNOWESSEAFRON to COMINCH 

See Com 13 endorsement on district report to shore 

station development board 18 October last recommending 

drydock for Kodiak for ships up to 3,000 tons ur 031630 

consider Kodiak should be used as base of operations 

for at least squadron of destroyers and no less than 6 

submarines in addition to 48 patrol planes and 72 land 

planes latter on emergency basis x In view current shortage in all of preceding cate~ories current plans are 

predicated on employing Kodiak as principal base of 

operations of force available in Alaska. Comalsec has 

shore administrative headquarters ~here at present x No 

net or mine defenses so far provided but Army garrison 

of about 6,000 considered adequate defense against surface raiders x Protection against air attack is inadequate due to lack of fighting planes x Army endeavoring 

remedy this condition has 13 Bl7's and 25 P40's at· present. 

COMBATSHIPS to CINCPAC 

Puget Sound and area to northward lacks protective nets 

and compares unfavorably with Chesepeake Bay in security 

and in· expanse of clear water and percentage of good 

visibility for training purposes but has some value for 

limited elementary training particularly for shakine 

down after protracted visit navy yard provided for security reasons this use is sporadic and irregular x 

Consider desirable net Port Townsand anchorage x Enemy 

submarines have visited Gulf of Mexico but apparently 

not Gulf of California x Relative security for training 

in such an area must be sought in not too frequent nor 

regulall use x Believe strongly in plenty of cruising 

for battleships adequately screened but consider desirable they customarily be behind nets x Do not recor.rrnend 

nore than 4 battleships cruise with 5 destroyer screen x 

Believe su g~ ested 3 weeks cruise practicable. 

277 
MAR GCT ----

05 0509 

05 0553 

CINnPAC to COMINCH 

Part 1 of 2 parts x Your 222200 and 031R05 Marine Defense 

Battalion preparing depart x Marine fightin~ planes Ewa 

can be used Bleacher instead of Johnston and Palmyra but 

if Army will ultimately man station recommend use pursuit 

planes from Hawaii replacing with others from mainland x 

Essential necessities for acconm1odation planes will be 

provided· prior to their arrival x l/' 

If more than protected anchorage con0emplated base should 

have at least minimun accommodations for carrier group 

also storage facilities for fuel oil gasoline ammunition 

stores and preferably some repair and other facilities x 

Consider these should be provided x Does your concept include such development and to what extent x It will 

materially assist if your ideas could be communicated 

to me more fully x Second part to follow. 

CINCPAC to COMINCH 

2nd and last part x Para x Shore installations and personnel should be provided by department meaning of quote 

Opnav has in hand routing of ships supplies of all kinds 

direct to Bleacher unquote not clear x 

Size force supported by base and service detaclli~ent 

definitely limited by supplies that can regularly be 

received from mainland which in turn depends upon availability adequate shipping x In view exposure anchorage 

propose use it to minimum extent until defenses including 

aircraft are established x Fourteen service ships consisting of 1 AF 7 AO 1 ADR 2 DM 1 AM and 2 AV already in area 

and others being prepared x 

ComanHac 210430 and 0742Z/16 February indicate availability 

Nandi Roads by middle April x Believe date could be considerablv advanced if SUMNER sent there from Bleacher to 

assist s~eeping x Recently advised additional air fields J 

being constructed Viti Levu that will soon permit use by 

carrier group x Other facilities and defenses including 

presence Army pursuit squadron and mining preparations 

point to certain advantages that place which while closer 

to bases far enemy bombers is also closer to probable 

operating areas x Believe protected base can be developed 

earlier there than at Bleacher x 

Request your reactions as to Nandi Roads also as to use 

Army pursuit planes from Oahu at Bleacher and information 

as to whether or not Department will provide shore installations and shore personnel including those for construction both places. 

278 
MAR GCT ----

04 1453 

05 0251 

06 0103 

06 0225 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMANZAC 

My 222200 your 230403 February. Request SUMNER give 

priority to Lahi Passase for deep draft ships reporting 

by despatch preliminary estimates of suitability estimated time required to check survey and install navigation aids. Anchorage area off Nukualofa should be 

surveyed to provide for 4 deep 4 medium and 8 light 

draft vessels initially and then extended for twice this 

nuMber of ships. 

CINCPAC TO ALL TASK PORCE COM:rvTANDERS 

For Task Force 16. Following extracts from C6minch: 

nrntelligence indicates enemy plans raid with carriers 

and large seaplanes against U.S. positions and forces 

probably Oahu possibly Palmyra, Johnston, Midway. In 

spite of suggestions of deception Cominch has heretofore 

tentatively placed date of raid about 11 to 13 March. 

Implications that attack will occur at an earlier date · 

cannot be ignoredn. Troop movements are enroute Hawaiian 

Area ETA 11 to 14 March. Desire Task Force 16 be prepared for counter action. If you require fuel will send 

CUYAMA to rendezvous to be designated by you. CUYAMA 

speed 12 with 40,000 barrels now on four hours notice. 

COMBATSHIPS 'J.10 CINCPAC INFO COMBATFOR 

Propose following schedule of training and firing at 

sea for battleships screened by 3 destroyers now assigned 

Task Force ONE. March 9-14 Batdiv 3 provided one additional destroyer which has been requested from ComWes~ 

SeaFron is available. Otherwise Batdiv 3 less NEW r,IEXICO. 

March 19-23 Batdiv 2. March 27-31 Batdiv 4. Consider 

above time at sea inadequate but maximum which can be 

provided until additional destroyers are available. 

Propose continue similar operations to limit of available 

destroyers. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Your 041453 on 3 March in response my inquiry SUlviNER 

preliminary report estimates Lahi Passage safe. Time 

to drag and mark 4 days. Narrows feasible at slack j 

water. Action being initiated regarding serious water 

problem indicated Naval Officer in Charge Fiji despatch 

03452/5 to NZ Air Liaison Officer here. Assume diplomatic arran,sements with NZ and Tonga governments made. 

279 
MAR GCT 

06 0507 

07 0451 

COMANZAC TO COUINCH INPO CINCPAC, COMUSNAVFORSWPAC, OPNAV 

Regarding areas proposed urdis 051725 consider: (a) ABDA 

area should be extended southv1ard to include western coast 

of Australia and southwestern coast to Longitude 118 

degrees east. r.rhis will place Fremantle in ABDA area as 

operating ~)ase. (b) Eastern boundary ANZAC area should 

be changed to read "Running southeast from Equator at 160 

degrees east to point 18 degrees south 176 degrees west 

thence south". This wi.ll keep Fiji in ANZAC area as 

Fiji tied very tightly with New Zealand. Believe that 

for strategic econoQic and political reasons Fiji should 

not be outside ANZAC area. Fiji is ~arrisoned by and 

is main outlying base for New Zealand. (c) Strongly 

recommend desisnation of Sydney as additional operating 

and as main repair base. 

CINCPAC TO COHINCH 

Consider operational areas should be analogous to sea 

frontiers with unity command all forces assigned thereto. 

Cominch 041725. The Commanders should support but not 

C01"1mand other Fleet forces operating in their area. 

Size force required for effective results in attacking ./ 

enemy positions or meeting enemy attack as well as 

complicated lo~istic problems clearly indicated forces 

must not be dispersed unduly by definite assignment to 

areas. Proposed areas satisfactory except AFIRM should 

includ~ all western Australia. Hecommend BAKER CAST 

DOG under Cincpac to facilitate operations. Others 

under Cominch. 

280 
M.AR GCT 

07 1820 FROM 

--~--~~~~----------

AIDAC 

FILL TASK FORCE SEVID~TEm~ WITH STORES ANDSPARES 

07 2345 FROM SUMNER TO CINCPAC 

Plenty of drinking water available. Local jetty will 

take vessels to 5,000 gross tons. Reef to (either 

we s.tward or eastward) of town dry in places a. t low 

tide. Top of reef level enough for vehicles. Edge of 

reef steep in deep water facilitating landing by boats, 

pontoons and tank lighter. One deep water channel through reef to shore wide enough for tank lighters. First class 

road along waterfront and to large grass surfaced landing vi 

field and various other places on the island. No cranes 

available. Sumner originator of this. Colonel in command 

of island forces starting immediately on causeways for use 

in landing when reef is awash. Also other arrangements . for reception of troops. Has 700 men available for work 

as necessary. Ready to receive troops and equipment at 

any time. 

08 0013 FROM TASK FORCE 11 TO COMANZAC 

Aidac originated 052300. 

Plans for attack. 

08 0135 CG 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC 

Personal visit to Western Samoa yesterday convinces me 

defenseless condition rich island simply waiting seizure 

by enemy. Without our superiority at sea and in the atr 

this area present status and Sava.ii imperils security this base. Whole group Samoan Islands forms tactical 

entity. Administrator has instructions to give us whatever we want on those islands. Rumor current that / 

negotiations underway for release mandate these islands 

to the United States and it appears reaction would be 

favorable in official circles. Upolu and Savaii feasible 

for occupation by enemy but only Upolu capable of hasty development as base. Enemy occupation and development Upolu could prevent our primary employment Tutuila Base 

without even his seizure of Tutulla. Enemy occupation Upolu would require major operation to dislodge him. 

281 
:MAR GCT 

09 0912 COMSOWESPAC to COMINCH 

Your 041725 for operational purposes including basing proposed area satisfactory. 

08 1905 OPNAV to COMTASKGROUP 12.1 

On joining with deliver th~ following from General 

Marshall to Commanding General POPPY quote dispatch 

to EFATE at earliest possible date a detachment consisting of 1 heavy weapons company, one rifle company, and necessary services with 60 days supplies ~ 

and 10 units of fire. This is a temporary measure 

pending the establishment of permanent garrison. 

This force·will remain under your command. A representative of Comanzac Force will meet you at Noumea. 

Acknowledge unquote Comanzac deliver to Brett. 

09 1300 COMANZACFOR to C01W:PASKFOR 17, 11, CHICAGO 

8 B-17s leaving HORN ISLAND about 0900 local time 

lOth will attack enemy forces SALANAUA IAE area about 

1200 local time lOth priority of targets {1) aircraft 

carrier or seaplane tender {2) transports (3) warships. 

09 1630 COMINCH to CINCPAC INFO OPNAV BUNAV 

YOUR 030323 FEB APPROVED BY MY 041920 OF FEB MENTIONS 

QUOTE REORGANIZATION WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED NEAR 

FUTURE UNQUOTE AND NOT YET RECEIVED PARA VlHAT ARE 

YOUR VI~JS ABOUT DISCONTINUANCE OF BATTLE FORCE AND 

SCOUTING FORCE AS PERN~NENT TASK FORCES ESPECIALLY 

SINCE BUNAV STATES NO REASON WHY FLAG AND OTHER 

OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE ORDE.:RED AS COMMANDER TASK FORCE 1 

OR TASK GROUP OR TASK UNIT 

10 0254 COMSEPACFOR to COMINCH 

Originator ComSepacfor in TRENTON plus SAMPSON departed 

Bobcat for Canal Zone by direct route 1600 9th. Desire w~il be held at Balboa.~ SEPULGA now SOPA Bobcat. 

Request interested activities including Army be notified 

route radio radio traffic via that vessel. Request 

mail for all vessels BC 200 be forwarded to and held 

San Francisco. 

10 0915 TRITON to COMTASKFOR 7 

Cleared area 2 March. 3 freighters and 1 cargo passenger vessel torpedoed. Some rerouting traffic. May 

pass around north of SAISHUTO. Area patrolled by large 

seaplanes. No men-of-war sighted. 

282 
SECRET 

MAR GCT ----

10 0605 TANGIER TO CINCPAC 

NeBotiations with high commissioner progressing satis~ 

factorily. He strongly desires to command all military 

forces. Have informed him such is and will be my task. 

AJr eady Commander Australian Force here cooperating splendidly under me. Anticipate no further troubles re question / 

of command. 12 officers of Poppy force arrived yesterday 

by plane. Contrary to War Department information Emmons 

representative here has been and is doing superior work. 

He should not repeat not be removed. This from General 

Patch for transmission to War Department. 

ll.O 1828 OPNAV TO COMANZACFOR 

Request information if any following facilities available 

at Roses housing in nipa shacks or otherwise weight 

handling docks lighterage fresh water fuel or gas 

storage. · 

10 2350 TANGIER TO CINCPAC 

Deliver to General R.W. Crawford, War Plans Division, 

War De:r;::a rtment, Washington, D.C. War Department 

instructions not inform high commissioner our defense 

plans for Poppy have been strictly complied. with by me. / 

However yesterday Australian Naval Liaison here (to 

Crawford from Patch) informed me he had disclosed date, 

strength and all other data to high commissioner in 

accordance with orders from his superior navy authority 

in Australia. This latter fact I have confirmed. Otherwise preparatory reconnaissances proceeding satisfactorily. 

This from General Patch. 

11 0321 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Halsey in this morning. Well executed attacks against 

Wake 24th Marcus 4th local dates found no shipping and 

few aircraft present. At Wake three large seaplanes one 

patrol boat all destroyed four prisoners taken from 

latter. Shore installations including landing field 

damaged by 37 five hundred pound bombs, 182 one hundreds, 

heavy strafing and by bo~bardment Northampton, Salt Lake 

City, Balch ~nd Maury. Our loss one VSB crew apparently 

captured. At Marcus two dive bomber squadrons attacked 

dawn. No enemy alrcraft present. Field is only partially 

developed but usable. Considerable buildings including pier on 

283 
SECRE'T 

MAR GCT ----

11 0321 (CONT'D). 

south side. Damage difficult to determine as heavy 

type machine gun fire was accurate. 32 five hundreds 

and 64 one hundreds dropped on buildlngs, tanks, AA 

guns and runway. One VSB shot down but crew seen in 

rubber boat ten miles from island. 

Unless eriemy action prevents will keep force sixteen 

at Pearl at least ten days to accomplish necessary 

upkeep and urgent alterations to increase combat effectiveness. 

No report from Brown but enemy radio indicates contacts 

beginning 0030Z on tenth. TRITON returning from area 

north of' Formosa reports sinking three freighters and 

one passenger cargo ship. , Midway reports contact with 

enemy planes at 2340Z tenth. .t11Urther details when 

received. -

10 0221 C01flASKFOR 11 TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC COMANZAC 

On forenoon 10 r~rch 105 planes launched from 2 carriers 

in Gulf of Papua from point 125 miles from Salamoa and 

carried out surprise attack on enemy forces that port and 

Lae. No enemy air opposition encountered except 1 scout 

type seaplane and antiaircraft batteries from shore and 

ships. Following damage inflicted 3 transports at Lae 

2 sunk 1 about 15000 tons with many men aboard other 

beached. 2cruisers, 2 destroyers 1 auxiliary believed 

to be minelayer in Lae-Salamoa Roads damaged as follows: 

One cruiser hit by 6 500 pound bombs and 1 100 bomb left 

burning. , O±her cruiser hit by one 1000 pound bomb blew 

up probably sunk. One destroyer _hit by 500 pound bomb 

stern blown off and sunk. Other destroyer hit by 100 pound 

bombs afire and stopped. Minelayer left burning. At 

Salamoa 2 transports about 10000 tons at anchor. 1 sunk 

other left burning. 1 scout t~;rpe seaplane shot down by - fighter. 1 LEXINGTON ~cout bomber pilot Ensign Joseph 

Philip Johnson USNR and James Wuford Jewell ARM 3rd 

service number 287 39 74 USN shot down by direct hit AA 

fire near shore at Lae. Survival uncertain. No other 

casualties this force. No enemy planes sighted by our 

ships. US Army bombers followed our attack results unknown. Air field hangars and WSWMI houses believed unserviceable mostly from previous bombing. Greatly appreciate excellent reconnaissance information obtained 

by Royal Australian fliers under difficult and hazardous 

conditions • . Combined task forces withdrawing to fuel 

rendezvous. Taskfor 11 proceedl ng PEATIL after fueling 

about lGth unless other wise directed. 2 8 4 
SECRET 

NIAR GCT ----

11 0432 COMANZAC to OPNAV INFO CINCPAC, TANGIER, SUMNER 

Your 101828. Facilities ROSES: (a) Estimate housing 

accommodation for 2000 men available wooden construction 

buildings and about 1000 in Nipa shacks. (b) Jetties 

suitable ships boats only 2 length 240' width 8' and 

4 length 100' depth water alongside 6 to 8 feet. (c) 

Lighterage nil. (d) Very limited drinking water supply 

catchwater only. Drinking and boiler water for local / 

steamers at Port Havannah from small stream using ships 

boats. No water barge. (e) Small supply Diesel oil 

for Inter-island steamer and AvGas approx 45000 gallons 

90 octane and 1500 gallons aero oil available 3rd March 

for RAAF use. All in drums •. No tank storage. (f) 

TANGIER being requested obtain more detailed information. 

11 1620 COMINCH to CINCPAC INFO COS, US ARMY 

AIDAC 

120235 

Full scale effort against HAWAII-MIDWAY may be indicated. 

Implement Unity of Command and ensure readiness. 

SUlrnER to CINCPAC 

Lahi Passage ready for use large ships. Your 052321. ~ 

Buoyed drag s ed to 40 feet and cleareq of coral heads. 

Proceeding with survey Egerial Channel : 

12 0335 CINCPAC to CTF 11, CTF 17 INFO COMINCH 

120259 

Task Force 11 comply Cominch 1718eo except direct 

PENSACOLA join Fletcher. Taskforce 17 continue operations 

ANZAC area. Well Done. 

CINCPAC to COMINCH INFO OPNAV 

Your 031505 Fourth Defense Battalion and advance detachment of personnel from Marine Fighting Squadron Ewa 

expected depart PEARL ~bout 14th. Initial movement to 

BLEACHER will be CRESCENT CITY, CASTOR, CUYAW~, SOLACE 

and 2 DD. All except SOLACE returning after disc.harge. . Expect plant mines carried in CASTOR by DMs now in SAMOA. 

As no reply received my 050509 and 050533 equipment and • 

ground personnel Marine Fighting Squadron being sent to 

prepare for receiving planes to follow when transportation available here about 1 April. Please advise as to 

diploma. tic arrangements with TONGA and NEVJ' ZEALAND 

governments. 

285 
SECRET 

MAR GCT ----

12 1~350 

12 2010 

12 2305 

COMINCH to QINCPAC ~ COMTi'01illTGEN 

IN CONNECTION WirrH PHOSPECTIVE CHANGES IN DISTRICT AND 

NAVY YARD COMMANDS WH.l'LT JU1.1s YOUR. VIBVvS ABOUT SUBSTITUTING TEHM NAVA1~ BASE POR NAVY YARD TO INCLUDE ADJACENT 

ACTIVIrriJi~S OF BAS}~ CHARACTER AND TO El/IPLOY TERM NAVAL 

DOCKYARD TO INCLUDB INDU8TRIAL ESTABLISHMENT AND 

ACTIVITIES SERVING OR orrH ~HVJISE DIRECTLY RELATED THERETO PARA IN HAWAII A LINE OFPICER WOULD HAVE TRIPLE 

PUNCTIONS AS TO S3AFHONTII£H DISTHIC'r AND NAVAL BASE 

YvHILE AN ENGINEERING DUTY ONLY OFPICBH WOULD COMMAND 

NAVAL DOCKYARD~ 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

REF"B~R MY 161635 AND 222200 X PLAN DISPA'rCH PROM EAST 

COAST ABOUT 6 APRIL NAVAL X ARMY AND AIR UNITS AND 

SERVICES FOR BLEACHER X PERSONNEL ABOUT 6000 ARMY X 

500 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALION X 500 NAVAL LOCAL 

DEFENSE UNIT X POHCE MENrriONED YOUR 120259 WILL BE USED 

FIJI-AUSTRALIAN AHEA AT A PLACE ~CO BE DgSIGNATED LArrER 

APTER BEING RELigVED AT BLEACifgn BY ARMY. 

SUMNii;R TO CINCPAC . 

Local colonel in command made careful survey water. 

Your 122149. Sumner replying. Reports present wells 

and storage adequate for number troops specified. 

Additional machinery and tanks will __ add to convenience / 

by locating wells where desired. Storage tank and 

cisterns generally used in tolJvn. :Mostly open wells 

located at various other places of the island. Water 

reported good. 

286 
SECRET 

MAR GCT ----

12 2129 FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH IN-FO COMGENHAWDET 

Maximum number Army heavy bombers available daily here 

for striking force is 18. This due to limited total 

number and essential demands maintenance and repair. / 

Your 111620. Request every effort expedite air increases 

previously recommended for this area particularly heavy 

bombers. 

13 0025 COMANZAC to CTF-17, CHICAGO INFO COMINCH CINCPAC TANGIER 

13 0121 

Anzac squadron under Focas will operate as desired by 

Fletcher in connection further operations against enemy. 

Army bomber and RAAF cooperation will be arranged by me 

as may be requested. PBY patrol and search continues 

but is subject to modification as desired. Comanzac 

will continue daily intelligence. CHICAGO pass this 

(by visual) to Focas for action. 

COM 14 to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

With reference to Dally Bulletins of Japanese activity 

and after consultation Cincpac submit following for 

consideration by Cominch (a) in order prevent possible 

leakage information obtained by CI and consequent loss 

of source of this information delete from all bulletins 

direct references this type of information. (b) avoid 

repeating information previously issued by Mid Pacific 

Units. This will obviate possibility of apparent contradiction of locations enemy units due to time lag 

between issuance various bulletins. (c) in order preserve general security reduce number of addressees to 

those actually concerned. 

1 

/ 

13 0307 CINCPAC to CTF-11, 17 INFO TIPPECANOE, COMSERFORPAC ETC. 

On completion fueling both Task Forces around sixteen ·March assume Task Force 17 full and Task Force 11 sufficient fuel for r e turn PEARL. Further a ssume KASKASKIA 

NEOSHO practically empty and TIPPECANOE at SUVA with 

65,000 barrels. 

Based on above TIPPECANOE remain to serve Pletcher. 

PLATTE expected arrive SUVA same purpose around 26 March. 

Y-:..A SKA SKIA and NEOSHO return PEARL as direct·ed by Brown 

discharging remnants to SUVA if s pace ava i lable and 

remnants large enough to warrant it. Advise if foregoing not feasi ble or satisfactory. 

287 
MAR GCT ----

13 0339 CINCPAC to COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CCMit;CH,COMANZAC 

CinCPac 120335 your operations directly under Cominch. 

In absence other orders be guided by principles given 

Cominch 261630 and 021615. BRIDGE with food and DOBBIN 

with some ammunition replacements of all kinds and minor 

repair facilities are in Pago Pago available for your 

logistic support. SOLACE departing Pearl 14th for Samoa. 

You are at. thorized · to order any one of those ships else- / 

where in emergency to supply your forces keeping CinCPac 

informed. Fuel supply covered in separate despatch. 

Service Force detachment with defense battalion and mines 

arrives Tongatabu code name Bleacher about 26th to establish advance base. Lahi Passage has been swept to 40 

feet and buoyed by SUMNER. Anchorage available off 

Nukualofa. 

13 0545 CINCPAC to BRIDGE, DOBBIN, SOLACE 

ComTaskForce 17 has been authorized to order any of 

addressees to proceed as services for his forces may 

require. 

13 1305 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CINCLANT INFO CG AMPHIBF'OR PAC & LANT 

Effort will be made to keep 1 full division combat loaded 

transports available each coast for training which must 

be expedited even though piecemeal. Para. vf 

Demands for shipping may necessitate that transport 

training division include ships under overhaul. 

13 1535 COMINCH to COMANZAC, COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CINCPAC 

CINC;t>AC 130339 EXPEDITE READINESS TASKFOR 17 AND ANZAC 

SQUADRON TO CONTINUE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ENEMY 

ACTIVITIES NE'i11J GUINEA AREA AND EASTWARD PREMI SED ON 

IN:b'ORMATIOH SUPPLIED BY CINCPAC AND COMANZAC FORCE 

YIITH LATTER ARRA1·JGING FOR AIR COOPERATION WHICH WAS SO 

EFPECTIVE ON MARCH lOTH PARA ENEMY ACTIVITIES AGAINST 

PORT MORESBY AND/OR TO SECTJRE BASE SITES IN SOLOMON 

ISLA1~DS ARE INDICATED AS OBJECTrVES BUT YOU AHE FREE 

TO STRIKE AS YOU SEE FIT TO CRIPPLE AND DESTROY E~;EMY 

FORCES. 

13 2037 OPNAV to CINCPAC 

/ 

Your 130339 request information number mines type cable 

plummets and antenna being sent Bleacher in order correlate mining projects. 600 contact mines being pre- ~ pared for shipment to B~acher and 270 to Roses repeat 

Hoses fro;m Yorktown and T."lest Coast early l'~.pril. 

288 
MAR GCT ----· 

13 1430 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

YOUR 122059 LATEST DEVELOPIVLENTS INDICATE ADVISABILITY 

OF ATTACHING BASIC SHIPS NAMED TO YOUR TASK FORCE 16 

DULY STREAMLINED BUT TO INCLUDE SISTER SHIP PARA STAND 

BY TO SEND CO~~ANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN TO WEST COAST 

FOR CONFERENCE ABOUT TITvTE BASIC SHIP ARH.IVES THERE 

13 1955 COMINCH' J:'O CINCPAC 

YOUR 030323 FEBRUARY WAS APPROVED BY rEY 041920 FEBRUARY 

PARA NOW WISH YOUR VIEWS AS TO CONTINUATION OF: TERMS 

uBATTLE FORCE AND SCOUTING FORCE" AS PERMANENT TASK 

FORCES X NOTE THAT THESE TER:ltiS ARE NOT IN USE IN 

ATLANTIC PARA BUNAV STATES THAT OFFICERS CAN BE 

/ 

ORDERED TO SEA DUTY AS " COMMANDER TASK FORCE TASK 

GROUP OR TASK UNITtt WITHOUT NUMERICAL DESIGNATION 

14 2155 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Task Force 16 ready to depart about 21st. Your 131430. r Task Force 18 due arrive San Diego about same date. 

Task Force 17 should leave Anzac Area about 5 April 

for return Pearl. Proposed conference would require 

delay depart 16 or assignment of relief task force 

commander. 

15 1520 COMTASKFOR 11 to COMINCH INFO C01~NZAC CINCPAC CTF-17. 

This my 102201 and Comanzac 120155 during Navy attack 

Salamaua-Lae area additional ships were sighted 25 miles 

off coast and attacked by part of YORKTOVVN planes which 

arrived in area one half hour after LEXINGTON planes. 

An o.fficer flown to Townsville with despatches following 

day was informed by Major Carmichael USA that Army 

bombers attacked ships at sea and not ships in ports of 

either Salamaua or Lae already sinking or badly damaged 

by Navy. It is therefore probable that total damage 

inflicted on 10 March by combined United States-Australian 

forces is: By Navy 1 CA MOGAMI class sunk 1 CA KINUGASA 

class sunk 1 CL NATORO or TENRYU class badly damaged and 

believed sunk. 1 DD probably sunk 2 badly damaged 

possibly sunk. 5 APs or AKs all either sunk or completely 

destroyed by fire and beached. 1 AM burning and probably 

sunk. 1 AV seriously damaged. 2 PG damaged 1 burning 

possibly sunk. 

289 
SECRET 

MAR GCT ----

13 2100 

13 2358 

14 0353 

14 0530 

OPNAV to CINCPAC info COMANZAC 

Our mining plans assume same ships will lay mines in 

succession at Fantan Bleacher and Roses using some 

assembly personnel nov1 enroute Fantan. Advise whether · 

correct or what additional mine facilities desired. 

COM-14 to COMINCH info CINCPAC 

Believe current designations and organization simple 

effective and well understood your 121250. Line Flag 

Officer for Comdt Navy Yard of great value on account 

military and professional qualifications as he has 

important military duties relating security navy yard 

and adjacent land areas as well as being charged security waters Pearl together with entrance sortie 

berthing piloting and supply tugs to fleet. In addition he affords trained line relief for District Comdt 

in case sickness or casualty. Doubt exists as to 

whether change title would not cause loss statutory 

and fiscal authority now possessed by Comdts Navy Yard. 

Recommend no change. 

CINCPAC to COMINCH info COM-14 

Recommend against changes Naval District dash Navy Yard 

setup offered for comment your 121250. New setup does 

not offer advantages that would outweigh confusion that 

r.1ight result from changes in organization at a time 

when utmost stability is required. Concur in Com-14 

despatch 132358. 

TANGIBR to COHANZAC, CINCPAC 

/ 

Your 030500 suitable for flight operations, . it is believed, u.r1der all wind directions. The greatest 

difficulty will be experienced finding suitable plane 

and tender moorings since deep water comes abruptly 

up to coral reef skirting haT·bor. Chart depth of 

water is below figures furnished by French authorities / 

here. Before basing at Havanna submarine protection 

across two passages should be provided. Above result 

of roncom landing and air reconnaissance information 

contalned your 1104:32 checks except that there is 

possibilities few lighters at Roses though not seen 

in harbor today. Pass to Comanzac for action. 

280 
Ml-\R GCT ----

13 2141 COTVITASKFOR 17 to COlV.LANZAC INFO CINCPAC 

141825 

Necessary .BRIDGE DOBBIN SOLACE base closer to probable 

scene of operations this Task Force. In view my lack 

of knowledge harbor conditions and necessity radio " ' 

silence request Comanzac take charge those ships and 

order them to Noumea or Suva preferable the former. 

BRIDGE especially required for early provisioning. 

BRIDGE should leave 10 days provisions at Samoa for San 

Francisco and Bagley. 

C01\1INCH to CINCPAC, COM 14 INFO VARIOUS COMMANDS 

Com 14 130121 recommendation: 

{A) Approved. 

(B) Cominch and Com 14 discontinue bulletins. CinCPac 

issue daily bulletin. 

(C) Addressees as per present Com 14 bulletin plus 

SPENAVO. Continue distribution RI and COPEKS as 

at present. 

15 0137 CINCPAC TO COMINCH, OPNAV 

Opnav 132037 sending to Bleacher 480 mark 6 mines completely assembled and adjusted for depth. Following 

data give in order number mines depth casing feet depth 

antennae float feet limitations depth water \fathoms 

Afirm 80. 45. 10. 10-157, Baker 80. 45. 10. 10-74, Cast 

20.25. 10. 6-57, Dog 175. 25. 7. 6-57, Easy 125. 22. 7. 

5-57. 

Tentative mining· plan supplied Commander Task Force 13 

subject to mbdification after arrival Bleacher a~out 26th 

and conferring with local authorities and Sumner now 

surveying there. ·vi 

Opnav 132100. Kingfisher now laying fields Suva understand additional mines being sent there from mainland. 

Gamble and Ramsay planting mines Samoa estimated complete 

27 r.1arch. 1v1ines arrived those places missing essential 

parts which have been supplied from Pearl. Plan use 

Gamble., Ramsay at Bleacher. No information regarding 

Roses. 

Buned 132041 assume orders for base hospital 3 issued 

by Opnav or Comir.1ch. Request location Strawstack 

estimated time arrival and 3-ny other pertinent information. 

Insofar as possible recommend Cincpac be kept fully 

advised as to plans for south sea bases with advance 

lnforma tion wher·e prac tlcable in order to pr·ov:Lde more 

effective planning cooperation and coordination here. 291 
15 J2525 COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMINCH INFO CO!IIANZAC 

Numerous small craft and landing boats attempting rescue 

of personnel froN AP beached and sunk. 2 seaplanes Lae 

definitely shot down in flames other seen falling out 

of control. Antiaircraft guns on beach at Lae and on 

cruisers strafed and silenced. By Arrny and Australian 

forces: 1 near miss on cruis r. 1 near Tiiss on large 

destroyer. 1 direct hit on each of 2 APs. 1 AP ~rrounded by 6 bombs and left burning. 1 near miss on 

each of 2 other AP seen to have caused dama~e. 1 near 

miss on 1 other AP. All bombs used by Army and Australian forces were e i. ther of 500 or 600 pound type. Total 

104 carrier planes 12_o i sh Hudsons and 8 Army bombers 

participated in attack. Report of Navy damages is result 

of careful check and analysis of reports submitted by 

LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN squadrons commanders and pilots 

and from interpretation of photographs made during engagement. 

15 .1526 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

If well boring outfits are enroute Bleacher in CRESCENT 

CITY or other vessel request wells be drilled to accommodate about 7000 Army, Navy permanent garrison due Bleacher/ 

in May. Will any distillation and purification units be 

required? Reference Sumner to Cincpac 122305. 

16 0217 CINCPAC TO CTF 17, COMANZAC 

CTF 17 132141 do not desire ships mentioned base in as 

advanced places as Noumea and Suva. They may be ordered ~ 

there for services in accordance my 130339 on completion 

of which they should be promptly returned Samoa. Contemplate use Bleacher when advanced base established 

there. 

16 0821 COMTASKFOR 11 TO COMI NCH INF O CINCPAC, COif1..~ NZAC 

Aidac 

Recommendation as to future operations in north Anzac 

Area. 

1 6 1642 COMI NCH TO COMSWPACFOR, COHSUBRON 5 

COMSWPACFOR TRANSFER 4 DD 5 OSS AT ONCE TO COMANZAC FORCE 

FOH DUTY . HAVE AS ACCOlVIPANY OS3 LAND SPARES AND STORES j 

AS DI RECThD BY COMANZA CF OR THEN RETURN NORivlAL STATION. 

ON DEPARTURE BOBCAT COMSUBRON 5 I N GHIFFIN SUBDIV 53 

REPORT COMANZAC FOR DUtl1

Y. 

282 
MAR GOT ----

16 2043 COMI NCH TO CINCPAC 

MY REPRESENrrArriVE PROCEEDING PEARL 'M OST RAPID IviEANS 

FOR CONFERENCE WI TH YOU AND COMTASKFOR 16. SHOULD 

ARRIVE 20TH THIS REFERS TO SUBJECT NIT 131430 YOUR 

142155 AND TAKES PLACE OF CONFERENCE PREVIOUSLY 

PROPOSED 

17 0241 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Your 141828. Cincpac no'IN controlli!l8 evacuation 

allocations and g iving consideration to civilian needs. 

Allocations are based on prio~ities and proportioned 

to numbers various categ ories to be evacuated as agreed 

to in conference with representatives ComGen Hawaiian 

Dept. 

17 0$45 CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

No well boring equipment in CRESCENT CITY. SUMNER 

reports water situation satisfactory. Your 151526 

in view comments SUivlNEH 122305 and considering varia- / 

tion in Bleacher rainfall recommend permanent garrison 

provide well boring outfits and purification units 

and for emergency use distillation equipment. 

17 01 45 TANGIER to CINCPAC 

General Patch to General Mar shall War Dept Wa shing ton 

DC. Situa t i on as follows c o lon except f or u n loading 

de t ail s comma all t roops ashore and di spersed. s 

p r esen t ship supplies ashore. Linited unloa d ing 

facilites and equipment slows time of d e bar ka tion of 

supplies and equipr1ent. 85;b motor equipment ye t to 

arT"'ive. Ground reconnaissance shows terrain and r oad 

net exceptionally severe comma hence addi tiona l quarter / 

ton 4 by 4 vehicles urgently needed here. Requisition . 

for thorn follows. Force directed to be dispatched t o 

Efa te by your rladio have sailed under escort comma 

General Rose in command. My previous request f or 3000 

additional 30 caliber rifles and attendant amn1uni t ion 

to organize comma train and have available a fo r ce o.f 

3000 additional native troops unanswered . Emphasize 

tho importan.ce of this request semicolon request con-

.fil'ma tion or denial. Destroying air field at Koumac 

because ade~1ate defense thereof would cause excessive 

troop disp ersion. Have received written agreenent from 

high cor:1r1issionor here to exercise cornr.1and over a llied 

force s in Poppy . ~ron Gene ral Patch. 

29 3 
MAR GCT ----

17 1640 COMINCH to COMANZAC, COMSOvVESPAC, info CINCPAC 

POR INFORMATION ONLY. IT IS LIKELY THl~T SOUTITNEST PACIB,IC 

AREA UNDER· UNITED STATES CO NTROL WILL SOON BE SET UP ro 

INCLUDE AUSTRALIA THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES LESS SUMATRA 

PLUS PHILIPPINES NEW GUINEA BISMARCKS AN ) SOLOr,IONS. IN 

SUCH CASE NP VAL PORCES \/ILL DE UNITED IN ONE COMMAND PROBABLY UNLBH LEARY COHPRISING AUSTRALIAN NAV'! AND CURHENT 

UNITED SOUTIThVEST PACIFIC FORCE. ALL AIR FORCES OTHER Tf~N 

NAVAL WILL PROBABLY ALSO BE COMBINED UNDER A SINGLE SUBORDINATE COHMAND. OVERALL COMMAND WILL BE SIHILAR TO THAT 

OF ABDA AREA PROBABLY UNDER UNITED STATES ARMY OR AIR CORPS 

OFFICER. SOUrrH PACililiC AREA ALSO CONTEMPLATED rro INCLUDE 

ALL EAST OF ABOVE SOUTFNEST PACIFIC AREA AND UNDER UNITED 

STATES NAVY. 

17 2029 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

YOUR 161847 MY 120259 ADVANCE DETACHMENT OF 1 OFPICER 151 \ 

MEN WITH 1 J2F DUE BLEACHER IN CRESCENT CITY 27 MARCH TO 

PREPARE POR RECEIVING PLA!',JES. EXPECT SEND 21 F2A AND 1 

J2F FROM HERE i:VHEN TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE ABOUT 1 APHIL. . I 

IN VIEW LIMITED ·uNLOADING FACILITIES BLEACHER AND DISTANCE 

FIELD ~ROM PORT PROBABLE PLANES MUST BE LANDED AND REASSEMBLED SUVA AND FLOWN TO BLEACHER. TRANSPORTATION AND / 

READINESS FOH SERVICE WILL BE EXPEDITED AS MUCH AS THE 

VARIOUS COMPLICATED FACTORS PERMIT BUT IT NOVl APPEARS IMPROBABLE THAT HEADINESS VJILL BE APPRECIABLE BElilORE ARRIVAL 

FORCE 1r!F~NTIONED YOUR 122010. IF ASSIGNMENT THESE PLANES 

ELSEWH1~RE IN SOUTH SEAS CONrl,EMPLATED FURTHER COMPLICATIONS 

AND DELAYS IN MOVING FROM BLEACHER WILL BE ENTAILED. IF 

ANY CANCELLATION ASSIGNMENT THIS S(lUADHON IS UNDER CONSIDERATION REQ1JEST EARLY ADVIC~ IN ORDEH IT MAY BE SENT 

PALMYRA WHERE srrArriOUING OF PLANES URGENTLY DESIHED. 

294 
March 10., ..; 

There was s till no word from Task Forces 11 and 17. 

Some indication is expected from ComTF-17 as to his intentions. 

TF-11 is returning to Pearl but date of arrival is unknown. 

TF-13 is en route Tongatabu (Bleacher) expected to 

arrive on the 27th. Orders (182055) were issued to the GAMBLE 

and RAMSAY to proceed to Bleacher on the 27th to lay Mines. 

TF-18 (HORNErr Group) is expected to arrive Sun Diego 

on the 20th. 

The refloating attempt on the TAYLOR was unsuccessful 

and prospects are most unfavorable. 

Received 182350 from Com.Gen 2nd Marine Brigade 

concerning Western Samoa. 

The enemy seems to be occupied in reorganizing, 

thoueh he continues to bomb Moresby and is advancing on that 

pl3.ce throur;h the junp:le of the Papuan peninsula. 

Tulagi was also bombed by fi four-engined bombers. 

The Army comMander at Canton reported five ships proceedine; by Canton. The MAHAN was unable to verify this report. 

Also Christmas Island sighted a mysterious single engined plane. 

March 19. 

No information from Task Forces at sea but froM report 

of KASKA SKI!~, it is estimated TF-11 will arrive here I',larch 25th. 

Sent 191929 to Cominch concerning Marine shore bettery 

at Bleacher. 

Com-12 sent 190?10 to Opnav askin0 for infor::-·1a tion on 

the new South Pacific bases. 

A squadron of patrol planes will be sent to Australia, 

to be replaced by one from the West Coast. Efforts are being 

made to provide ~remantle with air defenses. (Coninch 191920). 

Info:::"r1ation v1as received that ~~ear Admiral 'ls Rockwell 

and Purnell would serve under Vice l~d.111iral Leary and Vice 

Admiral Glassford would go to other duty. Admiral Hart arrived 

on the East Coast a few days ago. The MAHBLEH ~AD was badly 

danaged and is at Columb¢.)1. with the BOIS8. The HOUS~ON has 

been ~iven up for lost. 

285 
March 19 (Continued) 

The enemy bor:1bed Beru (Gilberts) yesterday. Indications continue to point to a move against India - other moves 

not yet defined. 

Received from Cominch 191905 concerning possible use 

of battleships to relieve pressure in the Indian Ocean. 

Captain Duncan, the aviation officer of Cominch's 

Staff, arrived for conference. 

March 20. 

Task forces proceeding as before. 

Received Cominch's 191400, 191401, 191402 in which 

plans were ~ade known for bases at Tongatabu, Efate and a 

Samoan system of bases. These expeditions from East and West 

Coc.st_s will total 13 transports and 15 cargo ships. The Samoan 

group will continue to be Marine-garrisoned; the others, Army. 

It will be seen that this requires Task Force 13 to be diverted 

to Efate (Roses). (CinCPac 210533). Also mining at Bleacher 

vvill be delayed. 

Some convoys continue to go to Australia there being 

one en route from San Francisco and one from the East Coast. 

There are also large numbers of cargo ships proceeding singly 

by circuitous routes. The items in the press emphasize the 

help that is being given to Australia. General McArthur has 

announced that we will launch an offensive from Australia and 

relieve the Philippines. 

Our B-17's from Townsville continue to bomb the enemy 

at his New Guinea and New Britain bases, though only four have 

been used recently. 

Sent 210111 to Samoa in regard to initial movements 

to Western Samoa. Heceived Cominch's 192055 concerning local 

defense forces for Samoa - apparently to be supplied from 

HawSeali"'ront. 

Comanzac's 202256 indicates some of the questions 

the Department is now asking about Roses. 

The enemy still maintains the Screeninft Force in the 

Homeland-Bonins Area, and a good many units are returning to 

home yards for refits. In general he seems to be reorganizing 

and Making plans for his next moves. 

296 
March 21 

Task F'orce 11 still returnintj . The Sl"N PRANCISCO and 

one destroyer found it necessary to stop at Pa go Pago for 

provisions fron the BRIDGE. 

Task Force 17 has not yet informed of his intentions. 

Task Force 16 is being held ln port until the HORNET 

gets out to the Hawaiian area. 

The reports of the UARWHAL and TUTJA with about two 

ships apiece (East China Sea and Bungo Channel respectively) 

are more encouraging than was at first thought. 

A conference was held by the Admiral as to the possible 

use of the battleships to divert forces from the Indian Ocean. 

It was decided that we would be forced to hold them on the 

West Coast for almost another month. They are operating at 

sea, including tar~et practice, as much as the size of their 

destroyer escort permits. They have only 3 DD now but will 

soon have five. 

No considerable change in the enemy dispositions has 

been noted. Some movement of units to the Homeland continues. 

The mutual air attQcks between enemy and allied forces in the 

New Guinea area continues. 

The Vichy :radio has been broadcasting apparently Axis 

inspired reports that large expeditionary forces(Jap) were 

enroute Western Australia and Fiji. 

March 22. 

Task Forces as before. VINCENNES is heine r;iven a 

short availability at Mare Island to correct her most glaring 

deficiencies. 

The salvag e units 11ave been ordered back from Canton. 

rurther attempts to float the President Taylor Vvill be discussed 

after their return. 

Allied aircraft had considerable success in destroying 

297 
March 22 (Cont'd) 

enemy aircraft at Lae. This was the first indication that 

fighters have been stationed at Moresby. There arc 15. 

Also received information that there is a squadron of fighters 

at Fremantle. Koepang was reconnoitred and attacked by the 

Australians. 

March 23. 

Task Porces as before except received report that Task 

Force 11 will arrive the 26th instead of the 25th; also received ComTaskFor's 210833 as to his intentions. He does not 

intend to attack any enemy base. 

Captain Duncan left by air for Washington today. He 

carried a Mailgram (232130 - not attached) to Corninch concerninc; future plans. Cincpac 240147 was sent on the sane subject. 

In 231255 Cominch ar:ain pointed out to Comanzac that 

Bleacher and Anckland are the bases having priority. 

Received 210502 from CHICAGO concerning lack of underwater defenses at Nour1ea. 

SOLACE arrived at Pa[So Pap;o. He reports sighting a 

submarine just north of there ~1rin~ the night. The R.D.F. 

has indicated a submarine in that vicinity for some time. 

SOLACE is observing Geneva Convention concerning hospital 

ships. 

The Cofl1Tllander-in-Chief held a conference to discuss 

an :Cstima te of the Situation by Rear Aci-r:1iral Theobald. The 

gist of this was that the Japs would probably not tackle 

either Australia or India - therefore the present is a likely 

time for an attack against Hawaii. rrherefore he recommends 

holdin~ strong forces within a day and a half of Oahu until 

the enemy comr•1i ts hinsolf. The concEraus of opinion at the 

conference was that there is increased chance of such attack 

but it is not irrrninent. Itis not practicable at this time 

to ope:r·ate strone:: forces as h e cur.:ccsts. 

Received Cor1d£3. General 2d Marine Brigade's 232026 and 

232039 ~i ving terms of agreement re~arding Wostorn Samoa. 

rrhe third part of th:!..s aereenont (2~)2051) \Jas a lso received. 

2.98 
liarch 23 (Cont'd) 

A patrol plane has been surveying the Society and 

Cook Group with a vie\v to huilding other Army air fields. 

Ilutllal air attacks continue in area along North Australia. One eneMy attack went to Katherine, lf)O miles 

inland of Darvvin on the one land route which leads to that 

place fron the south. 

March 24. 

Jo chango in operations of task forces today. 

A letter giving the proposed ta.sl: organization of the 

Fleet was sent to Cominch via Capt. Duncan. By this, the 

Scoutin~ Force and Battle ~orce are done a~ay with. Vice 

Admiral Brown ·will comnand the Anphibious -'-' orce; Vice l~dmiral 

Pye the Coveri:-1r Porce ( BB' s and accompany ships of other types) .. 

The CALIPOI1l~IA was floated to clay. rrhe IJEVADt is out of 

docl-: and is ex~ected to be ready to proceed to the '1'Vest Coast 

about Anril 18th. 

Received 240300 from NZNB relative to features of Roses. 

The LEXINGTON has a stripped turbine, but the present idea is that she will have to run on it for awhile. Hoyrever 

T.?.-11 will be given ebout two weeks in port if practicable. 

~he state of the dcfensos of Canton is ~ivinG concern. 

rrhe expedition \•vas planned in \/ashington, and the personnel 

establishing themselves there are inexperienced in any such work. 

It has been entirely an Amy project, but CinCPac is responsible and tho place is of great strate~ic value to us. Investiration o~ neans to inprove tho situation is underway. 

No new moves by the enemy were evident today, although he has or is about to occupy the Anclanan Islands in eastern Bay 

of Ben[jal. 

March 25. 

No change in operations of task forces. 

Received training schedule for BE's of Task Force One. 

Due to small number of destroyers available, the divisions are 

operating at sea from .San Francisco one at a time. 

The situation as to aircraft in the Hawaiian area is 

attached herewith. 299 
March 25 (Cont'd) 

Plans are complete to mine French Frigate Shoal and 

mine-laying will commence about the 29th. 

Received from Opnav 251410 regarding mining at Efate and 

251650 regarding fuel requirements for the April convoys to 

the South Pacific and Australia. 

The situation known of the enemy remains the same. A 

flurry by our submarines in the Bonins area was apparently caused for the enemy Screening Force and related forces. A 

definite submarine contact was reported between Brisbane 

and Noumea. 

300 
\Jincpac File No. UNI1'ED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN -CHIEF 

1 :..f~v· ;, .1be-r• 

( 3· 17) 

f~. nfornl ' · ir n 

00 ~~ ~·uro (lo) i. fl ll, rine f' • 

~ """ ~COJt :5·:>:nt' .,rs .. ~qu iro~ (18) ·au ,r] t:Jqua .. ro, 

301 
tjincpac File No. UNI':I'ED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN -CHIEF 

------------

c 

l 0/ t: 

, 

"' 

V ( ~er(~o} 

:r ( (~= al 

h. · o! · t:f 

OpeJ.,.Gti n. 

·: ~ ~- nn 

Oo;pt. ·"oCorn i "' 

--. . -- - ----- ------

302 
~.larch ~36. 

Task Force 11 entered today.. On the whole, they had 

stood the 54 da~rs at sea very well. Tl1e fuelinp- at sea was 

acco~plished repeatedly but it takes up a large nercentaBe of 

tine and puts the force involved in a very vulnerable status. 

r.rhere is not a great deal to add to Vice Adrniral Broun's despa tch reJJorts which have been included earlier in this su .. rnmary. 

The tvo carriers and the four cruisers went into the Gulf of 

Papua on the lOth and flew aircraft across the mountains duri~~ 

the fo.vorable part of the day. ~L he L;~xi~JGT0lJ and YOHKrrovvn air 

groups attacked separate groups of ships, and including the 

B-17 attac}c which followed, a total of 23 ships sunk or damaced 

are claimed. Durin[ the advance of the carriers, four C!'uisers, 

includin8 the ~nzac squadron, conducted air patrols southeast 

of lJew Guinea to guard against surprise from that clirectio~. 

ComTF-ll's directive was to a~tack the enemy in New 

Britain and the Solomons, but he apparently decided that better 

targe t s offered and more effective attacks could be nade where 

he ;ent . A 

TF-11 will remain in port about two weeks for upkeep, 

alterations and repairs. The turrets are beinc renoved from 

the LEXINGTnN in accordance with ap~roved alteration. 

The G~I~FIN and 6 S-boats have arrived Bobcat en route 

nzac Area. llso convoy BT-201 (From East Coast) has just 

pessed Bobcat en route Australia. 

Written directives for the Movements to Bleacher, Roses 

and the Str aw bases have been received. ~he despatch description 

of these plans has already been included in this su:mr:1ary. 

Hdqrs. U.S.ILC .. 252030 directs that arrangements be 

made to r•ecei ve the 3rd Marine Brigade on Upolu ( Strawha t). 

Received Co~inch 261655 concerning offshore boundaries 

of sea frontiers. 

No new moves on the part of the enemy are evident. 

March 27. 

Task forces are employed as before. Task Force 17 

i s presumably at the farthest west point of his sweep in the 

Coral Sea. 

Received 272000 (Aidac) from Cominch in reply to 

Cincpac 232130 concerning future operations. 

Sent 280215 in reply to 272000 which referred to 

overhaul for Fletcher's force. 

303 
iliOMr 

March 27 (Cont'd) 

Received Cominch 271340 concerning employment of 

SUMNER at Nandi. 

The enemy, from his radio traffic, is undergoing a 

period of quiet, but some kind of offensive is expected to 

start on March 30th. 

March 28 

Task forces operating as before, except Task Force 16 

completed target practice yesterday and today. 

Received 281645 (Aidac) from Cominch concerning special mission for submarine. The DRUM has been designated in Cincpac 290159 (Aidac) to perform this duty. 

Plans have been made to send the WRIGHT to Freema.ntle 

to carry personnel and gear for patrol squadron 21 which is 

enroute F'reemantle. WRIGHT will stop at Samoa, Suva, Noumea 

and Melbourne enroute Freemantle. 

Four DMs left for French Frigate to lay the mine field 

at French Frigate Shoal to deny it to enemy ships, especially submarines • 

Received intelligence report from Comanzac which reported 30 transports at Rabaul. In response to an inquiry this was 

explained to be 30 ships total, including 17 merchant type. 

At the same time this report was received, 281635 was 

received from Cominch asking for the situation with respect to 

Task Force 17 and the enemy. 

Received from Comanzac 290230 regarding state of survey 

at Nandi, and 280731 concerning the use of some of the Bleacher 

mines at Nandi. 

No other enemy movements or concentrations were noted. 

March 29 

Task Force 17 is the only major task force at sea. A 

report from Comanzac s ta. ted that our air pa tr·ol had sigh ted 

Task Force 17 only 280 miles southeast of Rabaul. This w~s surprising as it was so far within the air search range of enemy bases. However, enemy forces had also been sighted south of 

Bougainville and it appeared that Task Force 17 was in excellent 

304 
aii18RET 

March 29 (Continued) 

position to strike them. 

Six B-17s are scheduled to strike Rabaul today. 

Vice Admiral Halsey flew to the Coast to make arrangements with Task Force 18 (HORNET) for future operations. 

The supply of the outlying islands of this Sea Frontier 

occupies the full time services of several ships. The .CURTISS 

with escort is at Midway; the BLUE SONOCO, O.OLSEN and THORNTON 

have just supplied Palmyra. 

Cominch in 291440 directed Vice Admiral Leary to take 

command of the Southwest Pacific forces. This merges them, to 

all intents and purposes, with the Anzac forces. 

In 291015 from Air Department, Wellington, a report was 

received as to progress in New Caledonia. 

The enemy' is apparently still preparing for ._ his drives. 

The Malay-to-the-westward move is the most evident, but a large 

concentration of ships is at Rabaul. 

March 30 

Comtaskfor 17 in 292346 gave his real position which 

was much to the southward of that reported yesterday. In 

response to the above message, Cominch sent 301930 to Comtaskfor 17 questioning any apparent retirement from the enemy. 

Further reports of enemy detachments at or near Euka and 

Bougainville Islands were received, and Shortland Harbor was 

bombarded and probably occupied late this afternoon • . ~e r~~ 

~ r B-17s did not bomb Rabaul on account of clouds, but 

dropped their loads on Lae. 

By 3~0243 Cincpac organized the Amphibious Force with 

Vice Admiral Brown in command. He is leaving Pearl 3 April to 

conduct training at San Diego. 

Cincpac sent 302231 asking for information as to the 

agency which will provide for supply of outlying bases once 

they are established; and 310047 making recommendation that · 

the Wallis Island development be reduced. 

In regard to the employment of SUMNER at Nandi as 

suggested by Com.inch, if the full deve l opment of Wallis is 

persisted in, there will be much more profitable use for her 

there. The SUMNER has reported she will complete survey of 

Bleacher about 6 April. 305 
iii ilNiii' g 

March 30 (Continued) 

The mine fields at Samoa are completed. Cincpac sent 

292359 to Comindi v 2· in regard to laying the Bleacher mines at 

Roses and Fiji. 

Asked SEPULGA in 302325 when fuel tanks at Bobcat 

would be ready. 

Cincpac was informed of a special task of blockade 

running which has been assigned to the Army. 

Indications of enemy advances continue. Besides the 

westward and eastward moves already mentioned an expansion 

along the New Guinea North Coast is indicated. 

March 31 

t~ 

_ Comtaskfor 17 explained his plans to Cominch 29 2346. 

After he provisions and fuels at Noumea he will pro~ed to the northwe~tward a gain to oppose enemy advances. In 311455 Cominch 

informe·d T.F. 17 that he should use Bleacher during replenishment 

after present operations. 

In 010033 Cincpac amplified his previous message concerning the Amphibious Force ·by giving the composition of the 

Amphibious Corps. 

A merchant ship is being prepared for a special mission 

by placing Navy officers and crew on board. 

Taskfor 16 is again carrying on target practice. 

The BOISE, c9mpleting repairs in a few days, will return 

to the Pacific Fleet. 

Received 312125 from Cominch in regard to plans for the 

raider battalion to be stationed on Upolu. In 010557 ComGen 

Second Marine Brigade reported arrival of the first contingent 

of the garrison for that island. 

degree 

supply 

In 301940 Cominch requested the British to reduce 

of dissemination ?oncerni~g shipping. 

o I P(, , • I'' f 

Opnav in 301345 told of inability of Australia to 

oil. This was no surprise. 

the 

Although there were again several reports of enemy ships 

in the vicinity of, and south of, Bougainville, nothing definite 

has developed in that area, nor have the first steps of the 

other enemy advances been reported. 

306 
March 31 (continued) 

The bombing of Moresby continues but the fields there 

are still operable. 

In 010435 the RICHMOND reported upon the development of 

Bobcat. This report and letter from SE Pacific indicate that 

unloading troubles were added to by poor loading. 

April 1. 

Task Force 17 presumably, completed provisioning at Noumea 

today and is proceeding to the northwest again. Its tanker, the 

PLATTE, has been given a point to the northward to which it is to 

return each day. Small enemy forces are being reported around 

Bougainville Island and T.F.-17 may find some worthwhile objectives. It is not certain whether Shortland Harbor (South of Bougainville) has been occupied. 

Comtaskfor 13 (CRESCENT CITY) reported a surprising speed in unloading at Roses, and in preparing a field for fighters and 

dive bombers (Comanzac 011359). As a result 020411 was sent to 

provide for the future movement of the units of that force. 

Received311830 from SecNav ·providing for the reorganiza- tion of the Pacific Fleet. Also from Cominch 010910 learned that 

the ATLANTA and probably all of Crudiv 11 would reenforce this 

Fleet. 

Received011040 from SUMNER describing facilities at 

Bleacher for a carrier group. 

At a conference with salvage officer it was decided to 

organize an expedition to renew attempts to float the TAYLOR 

at Canton. 

No particularly significant moves were made by the enemy today, but he continues to reenforce Rabaul with aircraft. Submarines remain clear of the Central and Eastern Pacific and some 

have been noted changing base to the Sea of Japan. This and other 

recent moves of forces in the same direction may mean something in connection with Russia. 

April 2. 

Task Force 18 departed from the West Coast today. Vice 

Admiral Halsey is still held up on the coast by weather. The 

plans for the employment of Task Force Sixteen are awaiting completion until his return. 

In 011600 Cominch replied to Admiral Layton concerning 

exchange of information. 

307 
April 2 (Continued) 

At an informal conference held by the Conmander-in-Chief 

today the future employment of Task Po~ce 11 was discussed • 

.. 1 though 1 t had been planned to :b..a ve this force operate with 

Task Force One, chiefly in trainin~ exercises, it now ap,ears 

that it would be Moro profitable for it to join Task Force 

Seventeen to oppose the enemy in his advance in the Hew GuineaSolomon .area. Contrary to previous decision the L~X~HGTON is 

h a vinc; her t:;ur1)ine repaired until about the 15th. "'"he chief 

mo t ive. in having the battleships (Task Force One) put to sea for 

a considerable period is to exert a diverting or holding effect 

on enemy forces 1vhich night otherwise support the offensive in 

the Indian Pocean. 

Rear Admiral Bloch was detached as Comhawseafront. 

The HRIGI-rr and TUCKER departed today in accordance with 

CinCPac 290241 (not attached). 'l,he KtSKASKIA was added to this 

expedition to provide for fuel needs in the Anzac or Solonon Area. 

The chief cargo of the WRIGHT is material for the patrol plane 

squadron vhich has just been transferred to Fremantle but she is 

also carrying miscellaneous itens to other bases. 

There was received from Cominch 311840 which reversed 

the previous interpretation of Secnav that CinCPac is the "rlilitary 

Commander" required to coordinate intelligence activities in 

Hawaii. In reply 020247 was sent. 

The expedition for the salvase of the ~AYLOR uas ordered 

by CinCPac 030125. 

'rhe POLLACE which na trolled in the East China Sea reports 

sinkine.; one frei~h-cer. rrh~ "bae;" by subnarines continues to be 

sMall but is causin~ the enemy concern and is diverting his 

forces for escorts. 

No new trends were noted in eneny action. There is 

still douht as vJhether ho has occup:.ed 3hortlancl Harbor, but a 

reliable r0port was received that about 500 troops had landed at 

BuK2 PasDace ·v1here there is a small airfield .. 

1.~-pril 3 .. 

~eceived Contaskfor lry plan for lis next operation 

020250 (Aidac)G Comtaskfor 17 has also issued orders for the 

Service Force clotachm.e:nt to meet him at Bl.eacher on 1 May .. 

Vice Admiral IIal sey has not yet returned, so that plans 

are still heing held up .. 

3 08 
MAR GCT -·- --- 18 2055 

18 2350 

19 0710 

CINCPAC to SAMOA 

Deliver following to CO RAMSAY qpote on 27 March RAHSAY 

GAMBLE desi£:;nated TG 13.9 proceed Tongatabu report CTF 

13 and lay nine fields as directed by him. Information~ 

as in my OpPlan 17-42 in mail via SOLACE. Report expected date completion mining when determined Unquote. 

Any unfinished mining Samoa will be completed later. 

COMGEN 2D MARBRIG to CINCPAC 

The following radio to Admor Apia from his government 

has been furnished the military governor of officer 

messinger Quote Americans can have full and free use 

of all land and other facilities for all war purposes 

and every possible assistance. Cannot answer in detail your inquiry regarding tenure of land but suggest 

Governor be informed matter will be dealt with as soon 

as possible and that in meantime he should proceed on 

the understanding that any question that may arise 

now or after the war will be dealt with on agreement 

and on the principle that our object is to meet American 

wishes in every respect. A senior military officer from 

New Zealand will arrive in Apia by air at a very early 

date for discussions with American authorities. Prime / 

Minister Unquote. A message received from Admor staues 

he Col Hunt New Zealand military representative is 

arriving Api~ today or tomorrow and on his arrival will 

advise military governor when he will be available for 

discussion. Admor has been advised that we will send 

a plane to escourt Colonel Hunt Pago Pago at such time 

as he may be ready. It is apparent that Colonel Hunt 

is prepared to discuss details of American garrison 

and air installations in Western Samoa. Request instructions as to how far the military governor is 

authorized to go in such discussions. 

COM-12 to OPNAV info CINCPAC, etc. 

Definite informatioti required for intelligent planning 

to assemble cargo assign loading berths and make loading plans for the proposed Roses B1'13achers Straw movements. Information should include rates vessels in- ~ 

valved troops whether Army Navy or Marines with number 

and where and when they will arrive complete data 

re carding cargo where and how it will be delivered. 

With amounts weights cubic and heavy lifts. 

309 
MAR GCT 

18 2355 COMINCH to ---- INFO CINCPAC 

Following is Admiralty message 294A passed by Cominch 

to you for info: The following arrangements of cor.~~and 

in area covered by ~ast Indies station are promulgated 

for information and necessary action: 

(a) The Eastern Fleet consists of all His Majesty's 

Ships and vessels at present of the East Indies station 

(except local defense vessels) and of such additions as 

may be made by Admiralty from time to time. 

(b) The Eastern Fleet is commanded and administered by 

CinC Eastern Fleet who fs also responsible for the 

conduct of naval strategy in area covered by East Indies 

station and for the provision of naval forces for all 

operations. on the station, including convoy escort other 

than those provided out of local defence forces. 

(c) CinC East Indies remains in command of East Indies 

station and is responsible for all routine duty on the 

station. The cor':lnand and administration of all local 

defence forces and shore establishments, including Fleet 

Base (except those situated in Australia which remain 

under Australian Commonwealth Naval Board, Melbourne) 

and for the routine of convoys and shipping. 

(d) Cine East Indies is also deputy Cine of Eastern 

Pleet and will act for t~e Eastern Fleet when latter 

proceeds aflo~t so long as CinC Eastern Fleet's headquarters are in Ceylon. 

(e) The responsible naval advice to and cooperation with 

a·overnment of India and other adjncent authorities rests 

with CinC East Indies and Deputy CinC Eastern Fleet who 

is responsible for referrin ·any matter of a major 

strategic_nature to CinC Eastern Fleet. 

(f) The headquarters of Cine East Indies will remain 

ashore at Colombo as at present. The CinC Eastern Fleet 

will be provided vvi th shore accommodation for himself 

and his Staff at Colombo in order that he may be either 

as:.1ore or afloat as circPms-cances require. 

(g) Signals and correspondence dealing with matter which 

falls within province of CinC East Indies as defined 

above should be addressed CinC East Indies with copy to 

CinC Easter'n Fleet.. Signals and correspondence dealing 

with matter in province of CinC Eastern Fleet should be 

addressed Cine Eastern Fleet with copy to CinC East 

Indies as Deputy to Cine ~astern Fleet. 

310 
MAR GCT 

19 1400 

19 1401 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

MY 122010 IN ADDITION TO FORCES POR BL:!!AClfgH I PLAN TO 

SEND FROM SAN FRANCISCO ABOUT 12 APRIL NAVAL AND ARLtY 

UNITS AND S~RVICES TO ROSES. MARINE CORPS REENP011CEMENTS FOR STRAW WILL BE LOADED IN TRANSPORTS TO ACCOMPANY WITH BLEACHER AND ROSES CONVOYS \HIICH \''/ILL BE 

ROUTED TO VICINITY OF BOBCAT AND THEN PROCEED GENERALLY 

IN COMPANY TO DESTINATIONS. ARRANGE F'OR PROTECTION 

li1ROM SAN Fl1ANCISCO TO BOBCAT AND THENCE TO DESTINATIONS 

REQu.bSTING COM ANZAC FOR SUPPORT. COI,1SOUTHEAST PACFOR 

WILL BE DIHECTED BY ME TO PROVIDE ESCnRTS FROM PANAMA / 

TO BOBCAT. ESTiloiA'::ED rriME 0F ARRIVAL BOBCAT 29 APHIL. 

BLEACHER CONVOY HILL CONSIST OF 5 THANSPORTS AND 7 

CARGO VESSELS ROSES CONVOY 3 TRANSPORTS AND 3 CARGO 

VESSELS STRAW CONVOY LOADING NORFOLK 3 TRANSPonrrs AND 

4 CARGO VESSELS LOADING SAIJ DIEGO 2 TRAHSPORTS AND 1 

CARGO VESSEL. ARRANGE I-~,OR REFUELING TRAN~3PORTS AND 

CARGO VESSELS AT BOBCAT AND BLEACH~H. PART 2 FOLLOWS. 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

PART 2 OF MY 191400. ROSES PLRSDNHEL CONSISTS OF ABOUT 

5,000 ARMY BUT OOES NCT REPr~AT H011 INCLUDE AA OR COMPLETE COASrr DEFENSE UNITS ALSO INCLUDES 500 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BAr~TALIOlJ AND 500 NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE AND 

HOSPITAL UNITS. BA.St~D ON INE'O Ll\. TELY RECEIVED REGARDING 

NEW 'ZEALAND DEFENSES IN PLACE AT BLEACHEE AND BECAUSE OF 

EXPOSED POSITION OF ROSES \JH~~RE 450 ARMY TROOPS ARE DUE 

TO LAND 18 MARCH FROM POPPY I DESIRE YOU S}~ND 4TH DEFENSE BATTALION AND ADVANCE DETACHMENTS OP PEHSONTJEL 

FROM MARINE FIGirriNG sqUADHON IN rrASI-:FORCE 13 TO ROSES. 

MARINE FIGHTING SQUADHON PLANES AND HEUAINDER 0~, PEH- / 

SONNEL TO BE DISPATCHED BY YOU TO ARRIVl~ ROSES AS SOON 

AS POSSIBLE AFTER FIELD COMPLETgD. MARINE DEFENSE 

BAT'rALION AND VP SQUADRON MUST REMAIN ROSES UNTIL RELIEVED LATER BY ARMY. ARRANG S LOCAL CONI:MAND RELATIONS 

ROSES WITH GEIFj~RAL PA':PCH ASSIGNING UNITY OP COHMAND 

LOCALLY TO SENIOR TROOP COMMANDEH PRESENT. NEW ZEALAND 

KNOWS OF IFTENDED MOVEHEN'r TO BLEACHER. NECESSARY 

DIPLOI.1A TIC ARHANG ':::;MTI:NTS ROSES HILL BE MADE HERE. DIRECTIVES l:t,OR BL::1/1CHER ROSES AND STRAW ~10VEMENTS BEING 

FORWARDED BY COURIEH. PAR'r 3 NOT TO COL1ANZAC FOLLOHS. 

311 
MAR GCT 

19 1402 

19 1920 

19 1929 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

THIS IS PART 3 0? HY 191400. PARTS 1 AND 2 ARE NOT TO 

INPO ADDRESSEES. SAMOA CODE NATviE STRAW REENJ?OR C.2!MENTS 

WILL ARRIVE ABOUT 2 MAY CONSIST AJ30UT 6000 MARINES OF 

1ST DIVISION 19 VO-VJ AND 1450 NAVY INCLUDING NAVAL 

CONSTRUCTION BA':lTALION. PLAN TO DEVELOP AHEA AS FOLLOWS. 

TTYrUILA CODE NAME STRA\JVSTACK PH~~SENT DEPr~NSES PLUS FORCE 

HEADQUAnrrERS BASE lJEPORT RAIDElt BliTTALION BARRAGE 

BALLOON SQUADRON MOBILE BASg HOSPITAL. UPOLU CODE NAME 

STRAWIIA T BRIGADE IlEA DQFARTJ:RS RE !-t~NFORCED RJ3G IMENT LESS 

BATTALION BAA GUNS 8 1,55MM TWO THIRDS MG GROUP AIRFIBLD 

SEAPLANE BASE. SAVAI CODE NAME STRAWMAN INJ?ANTRY COM- I 

PANY POH OBS"SRVATION. WALLIS ISLAHD CODE NAME STRAWBOARD REENFORCED BATTALION 8 AA GUNS 8 155 HIM TWO THIRDS 

MG GROUP AIRFIELD SEAPLANE BASE. H.t5FERENCE COMGEN 2ND 

MARBRIG 130045 CINCPAC ISSUE T)IRJ;CTIVE RELAr.riVE ADVANCE 

PHOTECTIC~N h.ND PHEPARATIONS UPOLU. DELAY RECON1JAISSA1JCE 

PREPARATIONS '.!ALLIS UNTIL JUST PRIOH AHRIVAL GARRISON 

AS IT MAY BE ri'Hi\.T FORCIBLE OCCUPATION MAYBE INVOLVED. 

COHINCH to GINCPAC 

IN ORDER M"8:2T INSOFAR AS PRACTICABLE REQUIREMENTS 

COHSOWESPAC 140310 WITHOUfJ.1 HEDUCING PATHOL PLANE 

STRENGTH HA"iAIIAN AR~A rrRANS~~R TO PEARL ONE SC~UADRON 

FROT-/r PAT ~/ING 4 AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AJ:i'rrEH AHRIVAL 

THESE PEPLACEM2Nrrs TRANSF~R TO COMSOW~SPAC FOR OPERArriON/ 

IN WESTE~1N AUSTRALIA OIJE SQUA "'JRON OF 12 PATROL PLANES 

FR()J1 11

J\SY::F0'1CE 9. Al1RANGS WITH COMSOHESPJ\.C FOR SUPPLY 

OF ONLY SUCH EQUIPMEHT AND p·~HSONNEL AS IS IH~C-~SSARY. 

REDISTRIBUTION Oiil PLAlJ~S AND PERSOUNEL AUTHORIZ.SD AT 

YOUR DISCREf]_,ION TO EPYECTUATE ABOV~. OPNAV AND BLREAUS 

INFORMED. 

CINCPAC to COMINCII 

Your 122010 urge six 1.55 H~.l I-1 tractor drawn high speed 

mounts with amr1uni tion be provided li1

ourth Defense 

Battalion for use after relief Bleacher. Present five ~ 

inch guns and arununition this battalion to remain in 

defense Bleach. Approval will speed permanent defense 

Bleacher and increase suitability lilourth Defense Battalion for mobile use with offensive forces. 

312 
MAR GCT 

19 2055 

20 2256 

21 0111 

21 0833 

COHINCII to CINCPAC info CQMGEN 2ND IvU~RBRIG, SAJ,~ OA 

Following Higgins boats were shipped to SAI.10A.. Four 

picket boats serial numbers C5934, 5935, 5936, 5940, and two converted landinc boats nUMbers C3618 end 3622 

total six Higgins type intended foi' antisubmarine use. 

Equipment included depth charge racks installed radio 

and portable hydrophone sets furnished . Navsta Tutuil a 

130644. Four additional landin:S boats serial nur:1bers 

C3564, 3568, 3573 and 3591 were also shipped by local 

authorities. Assignnent of tuna boats and l ocal def ense 

vessels may be made by Cincpac from those assigned HawSeaFron. 

COMANZAC to --- I1'JFO CINCPAC 

Following contents Comanza c 1 438Z/ 10 passed to 

Australian Naval Liaison Officer OBJO REP a t Vil a 

for action and NZNB for info. Please pass foll owing 

message t o Com.mandine Officer U.S. Army Detachmen t at 

J 

Vila. Quote requi~e three dispersed landing plane / 

fields. Inform what areas are suitable and give a:;_)proxima te e stirr1a te amount earth movenent required to grade. Report on available water suppl y from 

existing source and prospect supp l y new we lls and f rom 

streaM within five miles of Vila. Requiremen t s are 

for about 6, 000 men. Unquote above message was 

received froM \lashington. 

CINCPAC t'o COMGEN 2ND 1'/IARBHIG INFO COI.1INCH,ETC. 

Refer Hdqrs USNC 132123. General plan contained 

Cominch 191402. UR 130045. "B.:!stabll sh advance 

protection at Upolu and Savaii. .Authorized employ / GARF IEJ_~D for initial movement with least practicable 

delay. Prerare in every possible way for arrival of 

l)Ormanent defenses and facillties Upolu and Savaii . 

UR 182350 in discussions with Col Hnnt authorized to 

discuss our plan for defense of SaMoan group and to 

arrange for land, services, assistance required by military necessity. 

COMTASKFOR 17 TO COMANZAC 

Your 200733 This force will fuel from TIPPECANOE 22-23 

March north of New Caledonia. Then proceed west into 

Coral Sea to approximately Long. 153 East . If favorable. opportunity can be found to attack enemy ~urface concentra- _) tions will give you mas much advance information as possi- ble. Necessary to return vicinity of Noumea by April 1st 

for provisioning. Your 190015 Please keep me informed. 

313 
MAR GCT 

CINCPAC to CTP-13, . CO 4TH MAR DEli' BATT 

Make following changes to my operation plan number 

17-42. Add new paragraph lJ: On 18th I'.1arch US Army 

advance detachment composed one heavy weapons company 

one infantry company services commanded by BriGen Rose 

60 days supplies 10 units fire landed at EFATE, New 

Hebrides code name ROSES. Due exposed position this 

detachment Cominch has directed Cincpac to divert 

Marine 4th Defense Battalion and advance detachraents 

personnel from Marine F'ighting Squadron now embarked 

in Taskfor 13 to ROSES. Planes and remainder personnel 

fighting squadron to follow as soon as possible after 

airfield is completed. Defense battalion and fighter 

squadron to remain ROSES until later relieved by Army. 

Under General Patch at Noumea local unity of command 

vested in Senior Troop Commander present. Necessary 

diplomatic arrangements regarding ROSES being made in 

Washington. Cancel paragraph 2. New mission derived 

from information above. Cancel subparagraphs 3 afirm 2 

to 5 inclusive substitute operate with US Army in 

defense of ROSES until relieved. In paragraph 3 baker 1 

change destination to ROSES. Add completion discharge / 

marines and equipment at ROSES proceed BLEACHER and 

discharge material destined for that base. M:oclify 

paragraph 3 Xray proceed ROSES via route points Maine 

11-45 South 171-00 West and Vermont 17-00 South 175-00 

East to arrive FILA HARBOR 1900Z/28 March if practicable. 

If delayed advise Gen. Patch via TANGIER. Use direct 

route from ROSES to BLEACHER advising SillviNER and Comdt. 

SAMOA expected time arrival. CHESCENT CI r.I'Y depart 

BLEACHER in advance of CASTOR if return to west coast 

will thereby be expedited. CTF 13 deliver copy to 

CO 4th Marine Defense Battalion for action. TANGIER 

deliver copy to Gen. Patch. Comanzac requested to 

cover movement Taskforce 13 from point Vermont to 

HOSES and during discharging. Comdt. SAMOA direct 

minelayers to BLEACI~~R on receipt dat~ Taskfor 13 

arrival there. 

314 
Mar. GCT 

21 0147 

21. 0502 

23 1255 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

In view special character of some of the considerations 

involved reply to your 191905 is being transmitted by 

your representative leaving Pearl today Monday. 

CHICAGO TO COMANZAC 

Further observation Noumea on relatively clear dark nights 

no moonlight leads conclusion port and Great Roads peculiarly susceptible to submarine attack surface awash or 

submerged. Precipitous shore line contour and profile stand out clearly against dark background and depth of 

water close to shore offers simple problem of navigation 

and attack to determined submarine commander of average 

ability. Military value of ships present which may be ~eter.mined by air reconnaissance would justify loss any 

reasonable number of submarines. Penetration barrier 

reef possible with relative impunity several passes. 

Attack could be delivered later after charting and close ~ 

observation. On clear moonlight or partial moonlight 

night problem everi simpler for submarines handled with 

average skill. Suggest ultimate protection should be 

positive with anti-submarine net at frequently used 

passes such as Bulari with effective mine labyrinths 

at all other passes and torpedo and light indicator 

nets across port and Great Road entrances. Such means 

nece s·sary for security and to reduce tension which might 

othervtise exist through baseless alarms. This is a 

continuation of my 160132. In meantime anti-submarine 

patrol air and surface desirable at Bulari and at Port and 

Great Roads entrances day and night. Danger submarine 

attack progressively increases. 

COMINCH TO COMANZAC 

HAVE JUST SEEN ACNB DISPATCH TO BAD WASHINGTON FROM WHICH 

IT APPEARS THAT YOU DO NOT YET APPRECIATE THAT BLEACHER 

AND AUCKLAND HAVE BEEN SET BY ME AS PRINCIPAL OPERATING 

BASES IN SOUTH PACIFIC 

TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO CURB REQUESTS WHICH CANNOT HAVE 

PRIORITY UNTIL BLEACHER AND AUCKLAND HAVE BEEN TAKEN CARE 

I OF 

315 
23 2026 

23 2039 

COMGEN 2ND A~RBRIG TO CINCPAC 

Cancel my 220750. This part one of three parts. Originator ~om.Gen. 2nd MarBrig. Following summary agreement signed by 

Brig. Gen. Larsen in capacity Military Governor and Lieutenant 

Colonel' F L Hunt representing the New Zealand Government 

signed 20 March becomes operative immediately and subject 

to ratification by the Governments of United Stabs and New 

Zealand: 

United States have full and free use of the areas and facilities required now or for future development for the period 

of the war. And such further periods as may be required 

by the connnander of the American forces in Samoa to clear 

up the situation. 

Tactical dispositions will be considered of primary importance and will be given highest priority in any arrangements 

to be concluded. 

The full and free use of existing facilities will be granted j to the United States authori.ties including ports. Land 

area to be selected by the Commander United States Force in 

Samoa. Roads. Communications. Seaplane base, eto. In 

event future development created either by United States 

authorities or British use of such facilities may be granted 

to either nation at the discretion of the commander of such 

military installation. · 

Samoan Group shall be considered tactical entity and 

in consideration of the garrisoning or occupation of Western Samoa by United States forces the latter islands 

(Western Samoa) shall be under the same military status 

as American Samoa. 

Under principle unity of command Governor American Samoa 

shall exercise same authority in Western Samoa. Part 2 

follows. · 

COM GEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC 

This is part 2 of 3 parts. The functions of civil govern- j ment in Jestern Samoa shall continue exercise through the 

administrator of Western Samoa but in any and all matters ~ffeeting the military situation or forces or the security 

316 
.Mar. ,GCT 

3 2039 (CONT'D) 

23 2051 

) 

of the islands the orders and actions of the civil 

government insofar as they affect Western Samoa shall be 

subject to the approval of the Military Governor. Authority over the civil population will be exercised through 

the civil administration and authority over the military 

forces will be exercised by the military commander. Local 

detachment New Zealand troops will act as patrols and 

military police in relation to civilians in insuring 

security of Western Samoa in cooperation with United 

States forces and may be assigned missions in general 

scheme of defense also guard duty government property 

and in charge of internment camps. Camps. Airfields 

and similar areas placed at the disposal of u.s. forces 

shall pass to the exclusive jurisdiction of such u.s. ~ forces. All discipline over members of u.s. forces or 

u.s. Nationals employed defense projects remain hands 

appropriate u.s. authorities. Arrests, trial, punishment Samoan civilians carried out per local law by 

ordinary civil agencies. New Zealand Government 

agrees to provide u.s. forces with necessary land and 

water areas and their unrestricted use free of all 

incumbrances, taxes, or other expenses during the 

period of this agreement. Such land to be cleared 

of civilian or other occupants and their activities. 

QQMGEN 2ND Jv1P1.RBRIG to CINCPAC 

Part 3. New Zealand Governr:1.ent ae;ree s to grant United 

States forces necessary harbor and other facilities without port or other governr1.ent charges or taxes on any requirements of or for United States forces during period 

of the occupation. Area under consideration at present J 

estimated 5,000 acres including water front along buoyed 

neaplane runway at Sa tapuala and inland mJ.fficient neet 

require:r:1ents size shape location determined by survey United 

States authorities. This includes seaplane runway and such 

other area required for occupation training and defense of 

~:estern Samoa. Colonel Hunt clirec ted to not · discuss financial considerations. His directive stated such matters 

will be dealt with by tho IJew Zealand government direct 

\lith the United States authorities if they ariso. End of 

agreement. Copies of agreement being mailed Cincpac. Opnav. 

Ibrcorps. In view of inseparable destiny all islands Samoan 

Group and the intimate relationship these islands to our 

security in South Pacific reconm1end consideration United 

States assumption :nandate Hestern Sar1.oa. My opinion this 

can bo accomplished now. End of throe parts317 
MAR. GCT -- -- 24 0300 (VIA NZNB) CG US ARlfY DI~T VILA to CO~IANZAC info C INC PAC 

Following has been received by NZNB. "J?ollowing for 

Comanzac repeated Cincpac. New Zealand and Consular agent 

Noumea froM Cor.1r1andine; Officer US Arny Detachment Vila. 

Begin. 3 desirable landinc stretch sitos available within 

a radius of 5 niles Vila. Grading and clearing no serious 

probl em with equipment. no existinG water supply Vila. 

Rain water storaf!e in tanks no wells in area. Local inhabitants advise water to be found at 40 feet~ No equipment~ 

available for quick survey. 3 GOOd streams within area 

considered adequate supply. In sane part of this area 

exanined and selected for separate aerodromes, large 

areodrone by Colonel Sverdrup US and valued by Lieutenant 

Melbourne of Australian Airboard. P&rt 2 follows. 

25 1410 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Your 220141 Suggest leaving 100 Bleacher mines roses. 80 

with 940 foot and 20 with 340 foot cables to close Havannah 

Harbor and South Bay. Remaining 380 Bleacher mines to ~ 

Fan Tan if practicable for field between Lovuka and Malalo 

Lailai recommended Comanzac. Reconunendation establishing 

Bleacher reserve my 201900 withdreawn. 

25 1650 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

260400 

Your 242345 to Cominch. 

of barrels as follows. 

second diesel. 

Fuel requirements in thousands 

First figure each group fuel oil, 

Bleacher 

Straw 

Roses 

18 and 8.5 

16 and 6.5 

10 and 0 

Total all three movements 44 and 15. 

NAVOBS WELLING TO CINCPAC 

This is part two of my 240300. All after large aerodrome 

by Colonel Scerdrup US, and Flight Lt. Livingstone (note 

cor rection) of Australian Air Board. Flight Lt. Sand, ~F, now stationed here inspected area today and considers 

area suitable for all types. End of message. DNI Melbourne 

pass to Comanzac DNI Wellington pass to Cincpac NLO Noumea 

pass to Consular Agent Noumea. 

318 
MAR GCT - ---

25 2030 

26 1655 

27 1340 

27 2000 

HDQS USMC WASH to C0!,1DGEN 2nd _MARBRIG info CINCPAC 

Mydis 212115 request you make all arrangements practicable for arrival and installation of Third Brigade at 

Strawhat. Prom examination map cast george 3rd Brigade 

estimates that bulk of ~upplies and about 1000 personnel 

including most of defense battalion and construc tion 

company will eventually be located in vicinity proposed / 

aviation fie l ds' near Toloa Point. He tenta t i ve l y proposes to have remaining personnel operate with Toloa 

Point as main base and Apia as secondary base. Pendi ng 

movement to airfield site suppli e s vd 11 have to be s t ored 

near Apia preferably in west ern part of vil lage. Sto r age 

requirements approximately the same as for 2nd Br igade . 

Comments and suggestions as r e sult of rec onnaissanc e on 

ground requested . 

COMINCH to COMFRONTihRS info CINCPAC, e tc. 

RECOr.IMEND TO ME OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES SI£A FRON r~ERS FOR 

PURPOSE OF FIXING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROUTI NG OF SHI PP I NG 

TO IMPLEMENT BHITISH DASH USA MERCHANT SHIP ROUTING 

AGREEMENT. OFPSHORE BOUNDARIES US ATLANTI C COAST AS 

ESr:J:ABLISHED BY CINCLANT SECRET SERIAL 00266 NOVEMBER 

81941 ARE BEING USED AT PRESENT BUT NO INPORMATION HAS 

BEEN RECEIVED REGARDING ESTABLISID~~~NT SIMILAR BOUNDARIES 

ON PACili,IC COAST. INCLUDE HAWAIIAN SEA FRONTIEH ALSO 

BOTH CANADIAN COASTS AS TO OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND BOUNDARY B"BTWEEN US AND CANADIAN ZONES IN THE R~CONIJI:T ENDATIONS 

Vv!.IICH VJILI"" BE FURTHER REFERRED BY COHINCH TO FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENTS AS NECESSARY. BOUNDARIJi!S RECOMMENDED WILL 

NOT LIMIT OPERATING AHEi~S SEA_,HON FORCES BUT WILL BE 

USED CONNJ5CTION HESPONSIBILII'Y F10R DIV~RSION FOR SHIPPING. 

OPNAV INFORMED. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

COMPLETION SUMNER AT BLEACHER DIRECT HER PROCEED NANDI 

IF SERVICES CAN EXPEDITE SWEEPING NANDI ROADS X THERE- ~ 

AFTER SHIP AVAILABLE TO YOU X COMINCH WILL NOT ACT 

REFERENCE·.:NAVOBS WELLINGTON 250345 BUT IS OF OPINION 

INVESTIGATION UNNECESSARY. · 

COMINCH to CINCPAC 

Aidac 

Comment on future operations. 

319 
MAR GOT 

27 2245 CTF 12 TO SUMNER 

280215 

NEW ORLEANS and MUGFORD expect arrive Bleacher rorenoon 

April 2nd and will depart same day for Samoa. Cincpac 

pass to Comanzac for and Navsta Samoa for info. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Your 272000 as units ror setting up initial defenses 

Bleacher were diverted to Roses and since New Zealand 

defenses former place are negligible no service units 

except SUMNER have been sent there. TIPPECANOE and j PLATTE now operating under Fletcher's orders. BRIDGE 

due Noumea 1 April to provision his force. SOLACE 

and DOBBIN being held Samoa. Cincpac will arrange to 

assemble aforementioned units to service Task Force 17 

at Bleacher or Auckland as soon as you advise which place 

will be used and when. 

28 0731 COMANZAC to CINCPAC INFO OPNAV,KINGFISHER 

Suggest KINGFISHER use remaining 380 BLEACHER mines to 

complete mining Nandi waters as follows: Opnav 251410. 

Three rows 80 yards between mines on line 020 degrees from j northeast tip Malololailai to reef; also 085 degrees from 

reef to Kandauu Island. Total distance about four miles. 

Above lines recommended by KINGFISHER reference Opnav 

201900. KINGFISHER reports use two additional minelayers 

desirable to expedite completion of operation. 

28 1635 COMINCH to COMANZAC INFO CINCPAC 

COMTASKFOR 17 DISPATCH 210833 REPORT CURRENT SITUATION 

AS YOU KNOW IT 

28 1645 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Aidac 

Special mission for submarine. 

29 0159 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

Aidac 

Reply to 281645. 

32 0 
MAR GCT 

29 0230 

'29 1015 

29 1440 

COMANZAC to CINCPAC INFO COMINGH, ALSNOB WELLINGTON 

Following from officer commanding survey party Nandi: 

"Preliminary survey Nandi and sweeping completed except 

final sweep. No navigational dangers other than immediate vicinity Curacoa Rock not yet examined. Consider anchorage suitable any type ship. Anticipate com- / 

plete ·Nandi survey 31st March. Preliminary work commenced extension survey to Lautoka proposed by NZNB 

requiring additional 7 days". Reference Cominch 271340 

urgently recommend SUMNER proceed Nandi to expedite 

establishment necessary beacons, ne.vigational marks, 

and check survey. 

AIR DEPT WELLINGTON to NZALO HONOLULU 

For NZALO HONOLULU from Air Department Wellington. 

X3892 A473 20/3 From CAS. You are probably aware that 

General Tinker was unable to make his intended inspection in New Caledonia. Group Captain Hewlett whom 

the General met in Fiji left Noumea 27 March and reports 

as follows: American Army and works units arrived 

about 12 March with full equipment and are attempting 

to straighten out general civil disorganization. Worst 

features are civil administration and chaotic communi- ·/ 

cations internal and external. RAAF wireless station 

is the only W/T link ln working order and is hampered 

by routing through Townsville. Departure signals from 

ferry aircraft are frequently unrecognizable and are 

seldom if ever received until after the aircraft arrive. 

First aircraft tested 27/3. Tontouta runways serviceable. Plaine Des Gaies progress reported good. 

Americans at Tontouta eagerly awaiting arrival of 

General Tinker as they require much assistance from him 

and his Staff. Reports end. You should enquire whether 

this report would be of value to General Tinker. 

COMINCH TO COMSOWESPACFOR, COMANZAC INFO CINCPAC · 

.IN ORDER TO FACILITATE IMPENDING CHANGES INDICATED IN 

MY 171640 VICE ADMIRAL LEARY HEREBY DIRECTED ASSUME 

COMMAND NAVAL FORCES SOUTirNEST PACIFIC AS ADDITIONAL 

DUTY PARA APPROPRJATE ORDERS TO LEARY WILL BE ISSUED 

BY BUNAV AS WILL ORDERS DETACHING GLASSFORD TO US AND 

TO PURNELL AND ROCKWELL TO REPORT TO LEARY PARA UPON 

ASSUMING DUAL COM~~ND LEARY PLACE HIMSELF AND BOTH 

FORCES AT DISPOSAL OF GENERAL W~CARTHUR FOR COORDINATION 

OF EFFORT PENDING FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPREME COMWAND IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA 

321 
MAR GCT ---

29 2346 

29 2359 

30 1930 

30 2231 

30 2325 

COMTASKFOR 17 to COMANZAC INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC, ETC. 

Comanzac 291325 at 0340 GCT March 29 Taskfor 17 in 

La.t 16 South Long 157 East enroute Noumea. to arrive 

April 1st for provisions. Request verirication report. 

If force reported is enemy heading south I will proceed at once to operate until further orders vicinity 

Lat 15 South Long 160 East. 

CINCPAC to NAVSTA TUTUILA INFO COMINCH, OPNAV, COMANZAC, ETC. 

Deliver to Comindiv 2. CASTOR with Taskforce 13 at Efate 

code name Roses has 480 completely assembled mines 

originally destined Tongatabu code name Bleacher. Opnav 

has proposed 80 mines be left Roses for mining Havannah 

Harbor and South Bay and remainder brought Fiji for 

planting additional fields there. Comindiv 2 with GAMBLE 

and RAMSAY taking any Army stores for Fiji now in DOBBIN 

proceed Suva. After conferring with KINGFISHER and local 

authorities Suva proceed to Roses. After arrival and 

consultation with Commanding General recommend to .Comanzac 

info Cincpac Opnav and Cominch as to mining there. As 

Comanzac directs either plant the fields or stow mines / 

until suitable time for planting. Completion duty Roses 

load mines from CASTOR, return Fiji and plant fields there 

as agreed upon. Make arrangements with Commander Task 

Force 13 for obtaining remainder mines either through 

repeated trips your command to Roses or CASTOR stopping 

Fiji to deliver them. Your mining operations Anzac Area 

subject to orders Comanzac. Keep him and Cincpac informed 

of plans and progress. Use shore radio stations maximum 

practicable extent for communications. 

COMINCH to COMTASKFOR 17 INFO CINCPAC, COMANZAC. 

YOUR 292346 NOT UNDERSTOOD IF 'rT MEANS YOU ARE RETIRING 

FROM ENEMY VICINITY IN ORDER TO PROVISION 

CINCPAC to COMINCH, OPNAV 

Reques.t information as to what agency will plan for and 

provide shipping supplies material and personnel for v' 

Navy and Marine units at Bobcat, Straw, Bleacher, Roses, 

etc., after the initial movement. 

CINCPAC to SEPULGA 

What is best estimate first availability shore fuel oil 

tanks sufficient take your remaining fuel second completion shore installations. Include other information 

deemed pertinent. 

32 2 
MAR QQ.! 

31 0047 

30 1345 

CINCPAC to OPNAV, COMINCH 

Cominch 191402 and his serial 00191 also Comdt. MarCorps serial 003A7842 have you any Hydrographic information 

besides that on H.o. Chart 2019 and in H.O. 166 on 

Strawboard. Careful consideration of available information causes grave doubts as to practicability operatlons proposed. Use of passes and and waters there by 

any of vessels mentioned in references has great 

probability of resulting in disaster. Small vessels J 

for ferrying material from Strawstack are not available 

and such method is impracticable for much of the heavy 

equipment involved. Suggest consideration be given to 

sending only special weapons company to and not developing that island, at least until other Straw developments are 

completed. 

\Vhat diplomatic arrang~ments have been made or are in 

prospect. Is your 191402 to be interpreted that initial 

reconnaissance will have authority to make any necessary 

local arrangements and be prepared to use such force as 

may be required to obtain agreements. 

OPNAV TO ALUSNA MELBOURNE 

Alusna Melbourne deliver to ACNB and NZNB for info. 

British authorities advise their inability meet United 

States fuel requirements Australia after May 1. Accordingly have arranged with WSA to allocate sufficient tonnage 

meet our needs over and above those Comanzac which already 

programmed with McKay and Catawba. Estimate about 11 

tankers required. First 2 nominated are E.J. Henry and P~n American due arrive Sydney about 30 April and 2 May 

respectively with full loads Navy grade special fuel oil 

totalling 30,000 tons. Remaining ships should arrive 

various dates thr.oughout May. Initial cargoes each tankerj being obtained Gulf of Aruba. Thereafter will load San 

Pedro. u.s. deliveries are on basis of requirements 

cargo ships and transports to arrive Austnalia monthly . plus units Sowespacfor. Important Opnav know where cargoes 

should be discharged best m.e~ available storage space and prospective offtakes. Further desirable route tankers 

to exact ports of delivery prior leaving Canal or California in order minimize diversion orders enroute. Desire 

you consult necessary authorities and advise Opnav 

destination ports as appropriate. Under plan outlined 

supplies laid down monthly will approximate 67,000 tons 

fuel oil and 12,000 diesel. Although requirements 

Sowespacfor are also included therein it is not contemplated tankers will discharge at ports other than east 

coast including Melbourne. In other words it is hoped 

British can continue meet needs that force in view 

delivery equivalent fuel eastern Australia by United Stat3~·3 
~ GCT 

30 1940 COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON 

Please convey to First Sea Lord in person my growing 

concern over volume and variety of information concerning ships and shipping now being exchanged not only in 

Atlantic but in Pacific. 

Some of it appears only to be of general information 

nature but superfluous curiosity on part of plotters. Much of it seems based on an attempt to identify ships / 

and ship's officers by their exact location rather than 

by effective recognition signals. Much of it facilitates 

essential cooperation. All of it tends to overload 

communication channels. 

I request his cooperation to restrict volume and variety of information exchanged first by limiting it to those 

who need to know, second by improving recognition signals, third mutual confidence that affairs are being conducted 

in manner as effective as means in hand allow. 

31 1455 COMINCH TO CTF 17. 

Upon completion current operations proceed Bleacher 

there replenish fuel and supplies and otherwise make · 

ready for further operations to northwestward as the 

situation in the area where you are now operating requires constant activity of a task force like yours; 

to keep the enemy occupied. · 

Requirements for use of other task forces like yours make it necessary to continue your active operations south of Equator until your force can be relieved. 

31 2125 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

APR GOT ---

THINK IT ADVISABLE THAT YOU HAVE COLONEL CARLSON 

COMMANDER RAIDER BATTALION VISIT HAWAII FOR CONFERENCE 

REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF THAT BATTALION IN COMMANDO 

TYPE OPERATIONS 

01 0033 CINCPAC TO PACFLT, C.G. AMPHCORPAC 

My 100041 February and 310243 March. Former Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet consisting 2nd W~rDiv and 3rd Ar.my Div less air and other units on detached duty becomes 

Amphibious Corps Pacific Fleet zero hours Zed 15 April. 

324 
!fl! GCT 

01 0435 SOPA BOBCAT (RICHMOND) TO CINCPAC 

Your 302325 following information from Naval Station 

"Construction not started on fuel depot. 1st question 

estimate July 1. 2nd question rough estimate November 

1. 2 gun emplacements about June 1. Temporary facilities 

for operation VS 2Dl4 installed 0 shore facilities installed 

for operation VPB. Naval Radio Station completed ... 

If desired empty SEPULGA RAMAPO can take 9600 barrels / 

fuel no diesel. HAMUL (ready to depart April 3) can take 

4800 barrels. MERCURY (ready to depart about April 10) 

can take 3000 barrels. Both vessels have sufficient 

fuel on board now to reach destination. Suggest transfer 

avgas to Naval Station and lubricating oil to RAMAPO. 

No storage for 3000 barrels diesel and 1400 barrels 

bunker remaining in SEPULGA. 

01 0557 COMGEN SECOND BRIGADE TO CINCPAC 

#-_FtR 

Advance party arrived Strawhat 24 March and main body j completed disembarkation 1700 30 March. Total force 

550 officers and men. GARFIELD returned here today. 

31 1830 S'CCNAV to ALNi\ V 

This is AJnav sixty-two. al lowing chan es in orcanization of Pacific ?leet are effective as of 1 0 April. 

Battle ?orce and Scoutin~ Force a r e · abolished. Fleet 

'l_lype Commands estab lished a re battle ships, carriers, 

cruisers and d e s troy ers.. Other fleet t~ pc cornnands now 

in existence namely Se r vice force, Amphibious force, 

Submarines and Patrol Wing s are ·to be continued as such . 

Units heretofore comprising battle and scouting forces 

are thereby assigned to ap )ropriate fleet t ype corrrn.ands 

for administrative purposes. Orders to officers being 

issued incident to this reorcanization will not involve 

Aj~ any chang es in rank of flac of ficers. 

3l 1 8 40 CO~.T INCH to CINC PAC 

·· 1 t i:LITLRY COiviHAND.IR T~ lo n PU POS:~ } OP I"tFrEl·~NAL SI::CURITY 

AND LOCAL IN':_lT~LL IG:SN E C0VIi~RJ GE YOUH 2 5014.5 IS EH I- U.~TED 

TO Pi 1. N TH:!~ Ani·r£ 0l.1L11- NDl~R . YOUH HJ ', LIJi N DElJll'.JNSE PI.J~N 

1-12 COI'.U.I.t._I;D:LR IIt:.dAII Alr DEP!l.~tTT·'IE}Pr SII0l:L D i BE COOHDIHATIHG P GEITCY ~' 0R IIT11

L:LLIGE1JCE CC VEI'AGE viiTHIN SCOPE ELI~1 ITLT IOIJ AGHEEI·/I·:TTT FL::VISED P ~D U14RY 9 .. AH1'.TY CHI E 11 OP 3TA_._l}:l, 

I NPORMED . 

325 
APR GCT 

01 0910 

01 1040 

01 1600 

03 0125 

COMINCH to CINCLLN1J.1 infor CINCP.l C etc. 

DIR~~;CT hTLANrrt .. PttOCS~:D CJ.HAL ZOUE AND UPON 4 RRIVAL 11EPORT CINCPAC :?OR DV':2Y IN N~VJ CRUDIV 11. ATLAlJTA AVAILABLE ESCORT DUTY ENH01JfrE PANAMA. 

SUMNER to CINCPAC 

Large grass·surfaced air field in good condition 14 

· rniles frora Nukualofa available for use. Local commander j arranging housing at airfield for 250 Tien or more if 

necessary in IJipa shacks. If notified will have food available for 21 or 48 hours. Little shop facilities. Transportation between dock and field will be available. 

COMINCH to ALUSNOB COLOMBO info CINCPAC etc. 

ADVI8E ADMIR.AL LAYTOIJ THAT EXCH!~IJGE OF INJ?ORTIATION OF THE 

SCOPE INDICAs:'BD IU YOUR 311605 30 HAHCH IS UNNECESSARY AND 

UNDI..SI:-iliBLB FOR FOLLOWING rtEASONS (A) INDIAN OCEAN AND 

P tCIFIC THEATl~RS RE ENTIRELY SEPARA'rE STRATEGIC ENTITIES. 

GRAND STRATEGY OF ANY ACTIOH INVOLVING COHBIN~~D OP.:~H11TIONS 

OF NAV L FORCE~) IN BOTH THEATHERS CAN BE COOHDINATED OULY 

BY COI~BINED CHIEFS OF STAi~ .t:1 OR BY COI.1INCH AND ADEIRALTY 

WliO WILL THEN ISSUE APPROPHIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMANDERS 

CONCERNED. CODES ~JOINTLY HJLD BY SUBOHDilTATE COUNANDERS J LISTED IN SIGHTED DESPATCJ1 UNSUITABLE 70:1 SUCH USE. (B) 

PENDING FINAL gsrrABLISffi·1 ~NT OP SUPREME COMMl NDBR IN 

SOUTHVITEST PACIFIC ARCA CINC EASTERN FLT~,·~T AND COMSOUWESPACFOR SHOULD EXCJD·\UGE SUCH INPOBIIll. ~ION AS 11

HEY DE~~M 

NECESSARY TO THf1 C01JDUC'J.'1 OF OPERATIONS IN THEIR ADJACENT 

AREA ISSUING I·.TEANS i~LR~~ADY 1 VAILADLE. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS 

PREMATURE (C) DETAILED PLANS ORGANIZb.TIONS OR REPORTS 

OF l/[INOR OPI~RATIONS IN ONE THEATER ON A LESSER SCALE THAN 

THOSE OF, PARA (A) N::S~D NO~ PS KNOVJ~J BY COBHANDER 0"? OTHER 

THEATER AS TH}.;""'Y DO NOT AFPECrr THIS OPERATION. ADMIHALTY 

AT rrHEI11 R1~0,lr·:ST ALREADY JNFORMED OP GENll:RAL NATURE OF 

PRESENT AIJD PROSPECrriVE OPERArriONS OF NAVaL PORCES IN 

PACIFIC TllEATER. THIS IS SECRET. 

CINCPAC to COMSERFORPAC 

Take charge of and conduct salvage operations Pres. Taylor at Canton.. CTF 4 and 1 s1J.ip Task Group 4.5 or TANEY .., 

available to accompany expedition. Inform Cincpac of plans and keop him advised of progress of salvage work~ 

326 
APR GCT ----

01 1359 COMANZAC TO CINCPAC 

Following received from Vila. Action Cincpac infer 

Comanzac, Tangier, Focas, Comindiv 2. Crescent City 

· and Cuyama expected to complete unloading 3 April Castor 5 April. Request instructions originator Comtaskfor 13. Comtaskgroup 13.1 estimates landing field will be ready for use of fighters and dive 

bombers by 12 April. Do not recommend landing of ~ 

mines Roses due lack of handling facilities on shore. 

If not urgently required Bleacher recommend 5 buoys be left by Cuyama for marking shoals this harbor. 

This is my 010456. Tangier pass to Gen. Patch 

unquote. Cuyama pass all above to Comtaskfor 13. 

02 0247 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Cominch 311840 is at variance with interpretation term military commander in Secnav 252030 in reply to Cincpac 0145 same date. Acting on the earlier 

decision the duty of coordinating intelligence 

coverage has been delegated to army commander in 

letter, your copy of which is in the mail. 

03 0411 CINCPAC TO COMTAS~OR 13. 

Retention 5 buoys at Roses approved urdis 010456. 

Mydis 010323 modified as follows. Completion unloading Cuyama at Roses transfer to her material in Castor and 

Crescent City intended for Bleacher. Direct Cuyama proceed with one destroyer escort to Noumea there 

deliver all remaining avgas to Tangier and fuel that 

vessel to capacity. Thence proceed to Tutuila complete discharge of liquid cargo to shore tanks. Completion proceed to San Pedro and there await orders. Destroyer in company escort Cuyama until clear of Samoan waters 

then return to Tutuila to await orders. 

Direct Crescent City, Castor when discharged Roses 

proceed with remaining destroyer to Suva. Castor deliver mines to Mindiv 2 utilizing shore storage if ovm 

departure can thereby be expedited. Completion proceed to west coast Crescent City to San Diego Castor to San 

Francisco. Destroyer in company e scort clear of Samoa 

area then return to Tutuila to await orders. 

Gamble, Ramsay lay Fiji mines then take 100 mines 

to Roses and lay or stow them as directed by Comanzac 

in accordance with directive in mydis 292359. 

327 
--

APR GCT 

03 1905 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART 1 COMINCH 031905 X 4 PARTS IN ALL X 

PARA ONE BY AGREEMENT AMONG GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA NEW 

ZEALAND UNITED KINGDOM NETHERLANDS AND UNITED STATES THE 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COMPRISING NORTH CENTRAL AND SOUTH 

PACIFIC AREAS HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED WITH BOUNDARIES AS 

LATER DEFINED HEREIN 

PARA TWO BY DIRECTION OF THE PRES'IDENT WITH CONCURRENCE 

OF ABOVE GOVERNMENTS YOU HARE HEREBY DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER 

IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND OF ALL ARMED FORCES 

1

NHICH THE. GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE ASSIGNED OR MAY ASSIGN TO 

THIS AREA 

PARA THREE YOU WILL APPOINT A COMMANDER OF SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 

WHO ACTING UNDER YOUR AUTHORITY AND GENERAL DIRECTION WILL 

EXERCISE COMMAND OF COMBINED ARMED FORCES WHICH MAY AT ANY 

TIT~ BE -ASSIGNED THAT AREA X YOU WILL EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND 

OF COMBINED ARMED FORCES IN NORTH AND CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA 

PARA FROUR IN CONSONANCE WITH BASIC STF.ATEGIC POLICY OF 

GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED YOUR ASSIGNED TASKS ARE AFIRM HOLD 

ISLAND POSITIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

AREA NECESSARY FOR SECURITY OF LINE OF COMMillfiCATIONS BETWEEN 

THESE REmiONS AND FOR SUPPORTING NAVAL AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS 

OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPANESE BAKER SUPPORT OPERATIONS OF FORCES 

IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA CAST CONTAIN JAPANESE FORCES WITHIN 

PACIFIC THEATER DOG SUPPORT THE DEFENSE OF -THE CONTINENT OF 

NORTH AMERICA EASY PROTECT ESSENTIAL SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS 

FOX PREPARE FOR EXECUTION OF ~~JOR AMPHIBIOUS OFFENSIVES 

AGAINST POSITIONS HELD BY JAPAN INITIALLY TO BE LAUNCHED 

FROM SOUTH PACIFIC AND SOUTFNEST PACIFIC AREA XX MORE FOLLOWS 

03 2123 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

PART 2 COMINCH 031905 PARA 5 YOU WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE 

FOR INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF RESPECTIVE FORCE UNDER YOUR 

COMMAND X YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DIRTCT AND COORDINATE CREATION 

AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITIES AND BROAD 

ALLOCATION OF WAR W~TERIAL PARA 

PARA 6 AUTHORIZED TO CONTROL ISSUE OF ALL COMMUNIQUES CONCERNING FORCES UNDER YOUR CONlli~ND 

PARA 7 WHEN TASK FORCES OF YOUR COM:IVIAND OPERATE OUTSIDE 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COOPERATION WITH FORCES IN AREA IN WHICH 

OPERATING WILL BE EFFECTED BY JOINT OR COMBINED CHIEFS OF 

STAFF AS APPROPRIATE 

328 
03 2123 (Cont'd) 

PARA 8 COMNANDERS OF ALL ARMED FORCES WITHIN YOUR AREA 

WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS 

THAT FROM A DATE TO BE NOTIFIED ALL ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS 

ISSUED BY YOU IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS DIRECTIVE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY SUCH CO~W~NDERS AS EMANATING FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE 

GOVERNMENTS 

PARA 9 YOUR STAFF WILL INCLUDE OFFICERS ASSIGNED BY GOVERNMENTS 

CONCERNED BASED UPON REQUESTS MADE DIRECTLY TO NATIONAL 

COMMANDERS OF VARIOUS FORCES IN YOUR AREA 

PARA 10 GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WILL EXERCISE DIRECTION OF 

OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AS FOLLOWS AFIRM COMBINED 

CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL EXERCISE GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER 

GRAND STRATEGIC POLICY AND OVER SUCH RELATED FACTORS AS 

ARE NECESSARY FOR PROPER IMPLEMENTATION INCLUDING ALLOCATION 

OF FORCES AND WAR MATERIAL BAKER JOINT US 

03 2017 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART 3 COMINCH 031905 X CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL EXERCISE 

JURISDICTION OVER ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO OPERATIONAL 

STRATEGY X COMINCH WILL ACT AS EXECUTIVE AGENCY FOR THEM X 

ALL INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU WILL BE ISSUED BY OR THROUGH COMINCH 

CAST N~N ZEALAND CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LAND 

DEFENSE OF NEW ZEALAND SUBJECT TO SUCH STRATEGIC DECISIONS 

AFFECTING THIS RESPONSIBILITY AS YOU IMY MAKE FOR THE CONDUCT 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREA X BOUNDARIES X 

BETWEEN INDIAN THEATER AND PACIFIC THEATER X FROM CAPE KAMI 

LUIENOW PENINSULA AROUND COAST OF TONKIN GULF INDO CHINA 

THAILAND AND MALAYA TO SINGAPORE Th~NCE SOUTH TO NORTH COAST 

OF SUMATRA AROUND EAST COAST SUMATRA (LEAVING SUNDA STRAIT 

TO EASTWARD OF LINE) TO POINT ON COAST OF SUMATRA AT LONGITUDE 

104 EAST THENCE SOUTH TO LATITt~E 08 SOUTH THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY 

TOWARD ONSLOW TO LONGITUDE 110 EAST THENCE SOUTH X PACIFIC 

THEATER EXTENDS EASTWARD OF THIS LINE TO CONTINENTS OF NORTH 

AND SOUTH AMERICA X OF SOUTWNEST PACIFIC AREA X WESTERLY 

BOUNDARY IS THAT OF PACIFIC THEATER X NORTH AND EAST AS FOLLOWS .X 

FROM CAPE KAMI SOUTH TO LATITUDE 20 NORTH THENCE EAST TO 130 

EAST LONGITUDE THENCE SOUTH TO EQUATOR ALONG EQUATOR TO 

LONGITUDE 165 EAST THENCE SOUTH TO LATITUDE 10 SOUTH THEN SOUTh~STERLY TO LATITUDE 17 SOUTH LONGITUDE 160 EiST THENCE 

SOUTH X OF SOUTHEAST PACIFIC AREA X FROM MEXICO-GUATEMALA WESTERN 

BOU}TDARY TO LATITUDE 11 NORTH LONGITUDE 110 WEST THENCE SOVTH 

X OF PACIFIC OCEAN AREA X HUNK 4 COMING UP 

329 
--

03 1922 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART 4 THIS AREA INCLUDES ALL OF PACIFIC THEATER NOT 

INCLUDED IN SOUTHWEST AI\TD SOUTHEAST .. PACIFIC AREAS SUBDIVIDED 

INTO (A) NORTH PACIFIC AREA NORTH OF LATITUDE 42 NORTH (B) 

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA BETWEEN EQUATOR AND LATITUDE 42 NORTH 

(C) SOUTH PACIFIC AREA SOUTH OF EQUATOR X PARA 

APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVE SENT TO GENERAL MAC ARTHUR AS 

SUPREME C01~1ANDER SOUTEVIEST PACIFIC AREA ASSIGNS HIM 

TASKS AS FOLLOWS (A) HOLD THE KEY MILITARY REGIONS OF 

AUSTRALIA AS BASES FOR FUTURE OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST 

JAPAN AND IN ORDER TO CHECK JAPANESE CONQUEST IN THIS 

AREA (B) CHECK ENEMY ADVANCE TOWARD AUSTRALIA AND ITS 

ESSENTIAL LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS BY DESTRUCTION OF 

ENEMY COMBATANT TROOP AND SUPPLY SHIPS AIRCRAFT AND BASES 

IN EASTERN MALAYSIA AND NEW GUINEA BISMARCK SOLOMON ISLANDS 

REGION (C) EXERT ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ENEMY BY DESTRUCTION 

OF SHIPPING TRANSPORTING MATERIALS TO JAPAN (D) MAINTAIN 

OUR POSITION IN PHILIPPINES (E) PROTECT COW~UNICATIONS 

WITHIN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND ITS CLOSE APPROACHES 

(F) ROUTE SHIPPING IN THAT AREA (G) SUPPORT OPERATIONS 

OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND INDIAN 

THEATER (H) PREPARE TO TAKE OFFENSIVE X COPIES OF 

BOTH DIRECTIVES BY AIR MAIL X PARA 4 ABOVE SHALL BE 

CONSIDERED SUPPLEMENTARY TO BASIC DIRECTIVE IN MY 

301740 DECEMBER. 

04 0650 COMTASKFOR 17 TO COMANZAC 

My 0!2250 Attack delayed until I have definite location 

enemy. Remaining vicinity 15 south 160 East. 

04 1310 / coMINCH TO COMSOWESPAC, COMANZAC 

My 291440 March and my 031905. Vice Admiral Leary report 

to G.eneral MacArthur with foro.es under his command. 

Arrange with MacArthur an appropriate designation and 

corresponding short title for naval forces in southwest} 

Pacific Area and for detachments thereof. 

New Zealand naval forces now in Anzac Force will be 

directed to join South Pacific Force at an early repeat 

early date. Opnav) Chief of Staff Army and Australian 

New Zealand Naval Delegation informed. 

330 
04 1850 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

NOMINATE FLAG OFFICER NOT NECESSARILY NOW UNDER YOUR CO~mAND 

AS COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND TO COM~~ND "SOUTH PACIFIC 

NAVAL FORCE" X SEE MY 031905 X 

ASIDE FROM CERTAIN MINOR NAVAL AND AIR UNITS IT IS NOT MY 

INTENTION TO HAVE PACIFIC FLEET UNITS PERMANENTLY ASSIG1mD 

TO SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE BUT OF·COURSE UNITS DULY ASSIGNED 

TO YOU WILL PASS TO OPERATIONAL COMMA1m OF COMMANDER 

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE WHILE IN THAT AREA. 

05 1849 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Pye nominated command South Pacific Naval Force, Ghormley to relieve Pye. Alternative nomination Ghormley to 

command South Pacific Naval Force. Your 041850. 

331 
ft~ril 3 (Continued) 

The Navy c'~-1arte~ec-:. ship T:r orAS ~"?_il · ::sorT left today. 

Vice Admiral Brown and Staff left for San · ieGo to take 

comrJ.and of 11

ask For'ce Three, the 1-mphibious .lorce. Hear 1 dniral 

~ .. itch is now in c·ornmand of Task 1•1

orce 11. 

Orders were · s sued to keep the TJ~IIBOR cle&.r of the area 

south of ~ubaul in vrhich she might contact Task 1

110rce Seventeen" 

The loss of tankers on the East Coast is making itself 

f el t in t 11a t the reenforcement of the P2~cific Fleet by four 

tankers has ~een held up. 

~eceived a chan~e in decision as to intellieence. Secna v 

reversed hi3 interpretation to agree 1ith Co~inch s that the Army 

Corn.mander is the 11 Mili tary Cor1r.1ander 11 responsible for coordinatinr; 

intelli~ence activities. 

Jo new trends or action by the eneray toda-:_r. 

April 4. 

Operations are proceeding as previously reported. Orders 

.for Task ·Force ·16 are still being held up awaiting Vice Admiral 

Halsey. 

Received a most importantjiirective from Cominch contained 

in 031905, 031922, 032017 and 032123. This informed of the agreement with our allies as to delineation of areas, and command relationships. It also restates the tasks of the Armed Forces in the 

Pacific . OceanArea, under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and fn 

the Southwest Pacific Area under General W~cArthur. A special / 

commander .for the South Pacific Area is required (Cominch 041850) 

and Vice Admiral Pye has been nominated (Cincnac 051849). 

... "" 

The new delineation places New Zealand, Noumea and Fiji 

under Cincpac. However, the area of active operations (New GuineaSolomons) is in the Southwest Pacific Area, so that some command 

relationships will need to be clarified. 

Vice Admiral Pye assumed command of Task Force One today, 

and Rear Admiral Bagley has reported tomke over the Hawaiian Sea 

Frontier. Rear Admiral Furl6ng continues as Commandant of the 

Navy Yard. 

In 041310 Cominch ordered Vice Admiral Leary to report 

to General MacArthur, and stated that the New Zealand Naval 

forces would be assigned to the South Pacific Force. 

The condition of readiness against aircraft attack of 

ships at Pearl Harbor has been relaxed to Conditi on II from! 

hour before sunrise to 0930; Condition IV from 0930 t o sunset; 

Condition III from sunset to i hour before sunrise. The improvement in the defenses and in the warning system is considered to 

332 
permit this change. The Aquitanla on the 3d brought more 

troops for the outlying islands - the total in the Coastal 

Frontier is now about 80,000. As additional planes report the 

increased number will be utilized at first to accomplish more 

training. 

The Grenadier returned and reported sinking a 7000 ton 

tanker and a 5000 ton cargo ship south of Truk. 

No new enemy moves were noted today. Preparation in 

the Indian Ocean, and strengthening of Rabaul and the Marshalls 

continues. 

April 5. 

In 040650 Comtaskfor 17 reported that he would not 

proceed into the Solomon Area until he had ~ore definite information as to suitable objectives. 

One B-17 attacked the Rabaul airdrome and six B-26 

(first appearance) bombed the shipping in that harbor with fair 

success. 

The unloading at Roses has been completed and the ships 

are proceeding as directed in 030411 already referred to. 

The Gudgeon reports sinking one large passenger-freighter and a 5000 ton freighter south of Tsushima. 

A small set-back in the salvage of the California was 

received today when a gasoline explosion stopped the pumps so 

that she settled again. 

Enemy trends remain the same. It seems fairly well 

established that small landings have been made at Kessa, Buka 

Passage, Falsi (Shortland) and Kieta. 
April 6. 

The Army reported a submarine off Christmas Island - doubtful, as not confirmed any source. 

The DRm~ left for a patrol to westward. I I 

The directive from Cominch received on the 4th was 

slightly modified. In the modification, reference was made to 

Annex 1 (defining areas); and the "Pacific Theatre is designated 

art area of Unfted States strategic responsibility." This modification merely states nyou are designated as CinC of the Pacific 

Ocean Area" - leaving out "By direction of the President with 

the concurrence of above governments.tt 

A shore radio station has been established at Roses. 

Cominch ordered Comanzac to start the setup for an 

intelligence group for the South Pacific Force. This will 

deal initially with the islands in the area 0°-20° s, 150° E -

170° w. . 

Cincpac expressed to the Fleet his satisfaction on the 

endurance, ability, etc., of the Fleet and called attention to 

the fine work of Task Force 11 which has been ~t sea 75 out of ~ 85 days. 

Major General C.F.B. Price reported as prospective C.G. 

Samoa Islands. 

Compatwing 2 is to establish a liaison officer group 

at Noumea. 

Task Force 16 was ordered to prepare to sail on the 7th - but was delayed and placed on 2 hour notice. 

Cominch ordered Cincpac to relieve the New Zealand 

detachment at Fanning with U.S. Army troops. 

B-25's bombed Gasmata aerdrome and 2 Hudsons bombed 

14 flyine boats at Koepang. Size of attacks and results minor. 

Moresby again bombed - no casualties. Darwin raided on 

5th by 7 heavy bombers - damage slight. Japs are managing to 

destroy considerable allied avgas at Darwin~ 

There is increasing evidence that at present the Japs 

(1) are c~~~to a seaborne offensive in the Bay of Bengal 

area, (2)Are~nrorcing air l~he New Guinea and Mandate area, 

(3) expect to defend theirl\.eastern flank mainly by air for the 

present. 

Increased activity vicinity of Cebu is indicated. 

The Jap occupation of Faisi is confirmed. 334 
APR GCT 

04 1450 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

FANNING ISLAND NOW GARRISONED BY NEW ZEALAND DETACHMENT 

GUARDING CABLE STATION IS SO FAR REMOVED FROM HOMELAND 

THAT REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE FOR REPLACEMENT OF GARRISON 

BY U.S. 

DETACHMENT THERE NO'.IIl COMPRISES FIVE OFFICERS 108 MEN 2 

HEAVY MACHINE GUNS 8 1\'fACHINE GUNS 1 3" MORTAR 250 GRENADES 

145,000 ROUNDS SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 1 6tt GUN WITH 150 

ROUNDS. 

TAKE IMMEDIATE AND APPROPRIATE STEPS REPLACE GARRISON 

PREFERABLY WITH U.S. ARMY TROOPS LINKED WITH CHRISTMAS 

ISLAND 

MUNITIONS EQUIPMENT THAT WE CAN USE l~JVILL BE LEFT 

ALSO ARRANGE FOR TRANSFER OF GARRISON-TO HOwffiLAND IN 

DUE COURSE X OPNAV AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED. 

06 1315 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

HERE IS A MESSAGE FROM COMINCH ACTION CINCPAC INFO CO~MNZACFOR COMSO~NESTPACFOR COM 16 X CHANGE FIRST 2 

PJiRAGRAPHS OF DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC 

OCEAN AREA MYSER 00254 OF APRIL 3RD TO READ, "PARA 1 

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE ~OVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA N@N 

ZEALAND THE UNITED KINGDOM THE NETHERLANDS AND THE 

UNITED STATES THE PACIFIC THFATER (SEE ANNEX 1) IS 

DESIGNATED AN AREA OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY PARA 2 THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA COMPRISING THE 

NORTH CENTRAL AND SOUTH PACIFIC AREAS HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED AS 

DEFINED IN ANNEX 1 X YOU ARE DESIGNATED AS THE COMMANDER 

IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREA AND OF ALL A~MED FORCES ~~-·~ ... WHICH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE ASSIGNED OR MAY 

ASSIGN TO THIS AREA 11 X MAKE SIMILAR CHANGE IN MACARTHURS· 

DIRECTIVE X CORRECTED COPIES BY MAIL. 

06 2140 COMINCH TO COMANZAC 

Request following intelligence action in anticipation 

establishment base for Southern Pacific Force in New 

Zealand or in islands generally to riorthward (A) Form j nucleus intelligence group for contemplated intelligence 

center at above base using available personnel including 

intelligence personnel evacuated from NEI and those recently 

sent out after providing for needs Australian area (B) 

Obtain list of individuals a vail able in Australia and 

Polynesia having local knowledge islands between Equator 

and 20 south and 150 east to 1'70 west (C) as initial 335 
APR GCT 

06 2140 (Cont'd) 

task direct ba se intelligence group to collect all 

available data concerning above islands supplementing where practicable by consulting individuals cited. 

Request advice regarding constitution intelligence 

group. 

336 
iUJORiJ'i 

April 7. 

The SIDdNER completed a survey of Tongatabu. 

Shore Radio was established at Efate. 

The ARGONNE and BREESE departed for Canton to salvage the PRES. TAYLOR. The NAVAJO will follow about the 15th to tow 

the TAYLOR to Pearl. Estimate the salvage job will be completed April 20 and ETA Pearl May 4th. 

TF-16 is on 2 hours' notice. Vice Admiral Halsey returned to Pearl from West Coast. 

2 own SS are on western patrol stations; 3 own SS enroute 

west; 3 SS enroute Pearl from west; 13 SS at Pearl; 1 SS enroute 

Pearl from west coast; 3 SS at NYMI. 

Minor air attacks continue at Koepang, Lae, and Gasmata. 

Port Moresby and Darwin under minor air attack from Japs. 

Enemy trends remain the same. 

Unidentified submarines were sighted (1) Lat 9-42 s, 

Long 176-18 W, (2) Lat 58-11 N, Long 1~1.-48 w. 

There may be 5 Jap BB's in the Bay of Bengal area. 

April 8. 

TF-16 departed at noon. 

The first report of our Pacific Fleet submarines using gunfire against enemy was received today when the POLLAdK re• 

turned from a China Sea patrol. She shelled (ineffectively) 

one freighter, sank one sampan with her deck gun, and sank one 

sampan with .50 cal. MG. Comsubs Pacific has directed more of 

this kind of work be done. The work accomplished by our submarines to date is not too impressive. 

Cominch (072135) gives CinCPac the task of directing the occupation and development of Island Bases in southern part 

of area. This despatch refers particularly to the Straw pro- ject, and says that Strawboard will be developed as a land-plane 

and seaplane base. ClnCPac will send a light force (125 men I> 

to Strawboard in the next few days. 

The e.G. 2nd Marine Brigade in his 080223 gives preliminary plans for the reception of forces at.- Straw. 

3.37 
April 8 (cont'd). 

The convoys with reinforcements to Bleacher and Straw 

will sail from the East Coast April 9 and West Coast April 12. 

TF-1 reports readiness for sea the afternoon of April 10. 

All of the above points to more than passive defense. 

The Japs are landing at Lorengau (Manus Is). There 

seems to be a good target at Rabaul, but the attack by our B-26 1 s 

today only got a near miss on one AP and destroyed 8 VB on the 

ground. Minor air attacks by both sides continued. The major ~~ operations of th~ Japs are in the Bengal Bay area. 

338 
'BEG REI ---

APR GCT 

08 0245 COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG rro CINCPAC 

THIS IS PART 3 OF 3 PARTS X ESTIMATED SCOPE AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE DEFENSE X STRAWSTACK: PREVENT RAIDS MINOR LANDINGS AND 

PREVENT OR DELAY ENEMY USE OF AIRFIELD OR HARBOR X STRAWHAT: 

PREVENT RAIDS MINOR LANDINGS AIRFIELD AND EARBOR AND PREVENT 

OR DELAY UNRESTRICTED DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAND AS BASE OF OPERATIONS X STRAWM.AN: OBSERVATION PROTECTION WARNING INSTALLATIONS 

AND FUEL CACHE EMERGENCY SEAPLANE OPERATIONS X STRAWBOARD: ,/ BLOCK ALL BUT MAJOR LANDING EXTEND WARNING :NET TO YfEST 

PROJECT AIRFIELD AND SEAPLANE BASE X .STRAW: 1ttJARNING NET STRA~;\T GROUP ORGANIZED ONE SYSTEM CENTRALIZED AT STRAWHAT X 

ALL AIR DETACHMENTS AND LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCES ORGANIZED 

FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT. 

339 
MAR GCT --

07 2135 COMINCH TO CINCPAC IN}~ COMGENAMPHIBCORPSpac 

YOUR 310047 EARLY DEVELOPMENT STRAWBOARD DESIRED AS 

LANDPLANE SEAPLANE BASE X METHOD OF OCCUPATION AND 

DEVELOPMENT ARE LEFT TO YOUR DISCRETION REFER PARAGRAPH 

3H MY SERIAL 00190 X OPNAV 041939 TO COM 14 MAKES LUMBER 

SCHOONERS OLIVER OLSEN AND EL CAPITAN AVAILABLE AS YOU 

DESIRE X YOU ALRF.ADY HAVE USS KAULA AND SS TY.Ih~ X 

ABOUT 7 DAYS PRIOR YOUR FIRST LANDING NOTIFY CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS WHO WILL THEN MAKE ARRANGEME~TS RELATIVE 

AGREEMENT FREE FRENCH AUTHORITIES X YOUR INITIAL LANDING 

PARTY SHOULD MAKE NECESSARY LOCAL .ARRANGEMENTS AND BE ~ PREPARED TO EMPLOY NECESSARY FORCE X NO ADDITIONAL 

HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE EXCEPT BRITISH 

PUBLICATION PORTS AND HARBORS WHICH STATES ANCHORAGE 

SHOULD BE CHECKED BEFORE USING BY LARGE SHIPS X ASSUME 

YOU HAVE 1941 EDITION HO CHART 2019 X COMGEN AMPHIBCORPS 

PAC DELIVER COPY TO MAJ GEN PRICE 

08 0223 COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC 

PART 1 OF 3 X REFERENCE CINCPAC SERIAL 054W PART 1 X 

PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR RECEPTION FORCES STRAW X PREPARATIONS 

FOR RECEPTION AND PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF STRAWSTACK, STRAWHAT 

AND STRAWNIAN FOR SQDN VS 1-Dl4 TO COVER SHIP MOVEMENTS TO 

STRAWHAT AND STRAWBOARD X IF LOADING PLAN PERMITS PROPOSE 

DESPATCH KIT CARSON DIRECT TO APIA ON ARRIVAL STRAW X 

AREA COVERED BY AIR X DETACH 1 dd to BTRAWSTACK fron STRA,~l 

CONVOY ON 28 APRIL TO COVER KIT CARSON AT STRAWHAT X UNLOAD 

AP HAVING STRAWSTACK TROOPS ON ARRIVAL CONVOY 28 APRIL X j AIR RECONNAISSANCE STRAWBOARD 1 MAY. 

08 0235 COMGEN 2ND MARBRIG TO CINCPAC 

PART 2 OF 3 X ON • MAY EMBARK ADVANCE PARTY ON THE DD 

AND DEPART SAME DAY FOR STRAWBOARD X AIR COVERAGE X LOAD 

EMPTY AP AT STRAlNSTACK Vt!ITH 8TH DEFE:t-TSE BATr:lALION PERSONNEL 

AND MATERIEL X ON ARRIVAL EAST COAST CONTINGENT STRAW AREA 

SHIPS TO PROCEED TO PORTS EMBARKED PERSONNEL ARE TO GARRISON ~NITHIN CAPACITY UNLOADING FACILITIES AND COMMENCE UNLOADING 

X DD LANDS ADVANCE PARTY ON STRAWBOARD AT DAYLIGHT 2 1/IAY X 

AP 1

NITH INFANTRY GARRISON FOR STRAWBOARD DEPARTS STRAWSTACK 

1 OR 2 MAY X KIT CARSON AND AP WITH 8TH DEFENSE BATTALION 

TO PROCEED TO STRWWBOARD DIRECTED BY COM GEN AREA X FOREGOING 

PLAN BASED ON DIREC1:1

IVE DELAYING RECONNAISSANCE OR ADVANCE 

PARTY UNTIL IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING MAIN LANDING X HOi:tJEVER IF 

DIRECTE."D AND TRANSPORTATION MADE AVAILABlE AM PREPARING TO 

SEND ADVANCE PARTY OF 125 LIGHTLY ARMED PLUS COMMUNICATION 

AND ENGINEER PEHSONNEL ON DD OH APD FROM FOHCES NOW HERE j DESTINED FOR STHAWBOARD X PART 3 FOLLOiNS 

340 
April 9 

The CALIFORNIA was placed in drydock. 

The press reports the fall of Bataan defenders, but 

Corregidor still holds. Thus any relief to that area from 

here cannot be undertaken. f.h .... ,, d1.· · i,o· ...... ~?\ ~ ,. ., ~ 

Vice Admiral Glassford is enroute Pearl from Sydney by 

air. 

Scattered submarine contacts in the Pacific Ocean area 

are not con1irmed by any source. 

Rabaul was bombed again by the Army/RAAF. Considerable 

opposition met with but we had no losses. The enemy lost 8 

VB, 1 VF, others damaged, and large fires started. 

The main Jap effort today is in the Indian area. They got 

two Red cruisers by air attack. 

Signs point to an offensive in the New Guinea area the 

latter. part of the month. 

April 10 

Orders were issued for TF 1 and 11 to conduct training 

to westward of Palmyra Christmas line ending about May 4, men 

BBs will enter Pearl 

~1e Greyback returned from a patrol in Empire waters - results one 7,000 Maru sunk, one 250 ton subchaser sunk, one 

4,000 ton freighter bit. 

The type organization for the Pacific Fleet was placed 

in effect today. 

There was· a long conference today during which the Admiral 

made several decisions, a long dispatch was sent to Cominch setting 

forth the position of the Cin6 Pac and requesting further 

amplification and clarification of Cominch 4 part directive dated 

April 3rd. When a reply is received Cine Pac should be able to set up 

his organization requirements and comply with- the directive. It 

should be noted that the directive of April 3rd raised many 

points of doubt here. Without comple~ backgromld it is almost 

impossible to understand the detailsA uch a broad directive. 

It was further confused when Cominch said,on the 3rd,you will 

appoint a Commander of the South Pacific Area 11 and on the 4th" 

nominate" such a Commander. ~ 

34 1 
April 10 {continued) 

The directive was sent on the 3rd. It was still not clear 

today. Could time have been saved (1) by a full explaination from Cominch by airmail (2) sending a representative to Pearl 

from Washington wl1o could have answered questions (3) the two 

Admirals meet in San Francisco. 

Comanzac estimates that the offensive in Eastern New Guinea will start about April 21. 

There is evidence that the air reinforcements to the Mandates and the New Guinea areas continue and that the air 

defense (offense ?) arrangements for the Jap Eastern flank 

will be completed soon - may~e in 10 days. 

The Japs are operating five, and possibly six CVs in 

the Bengal Area. They are having good success as the British have lost at least two cruisers and one carrier and have suffered ·; bombings in the Ceylon Area. The departure of the KAGA from 

the homeland may be an indication of an offense in the Solomon 

Area. This would give them at least two carriers for their 

venture 

Minor bombings continue in the Anzac Area. 

342 
i jj Q ii B Wt 

April 11 

The Pacific Ocean Area was quiet except for submarine 

contacts at Christmas. 

Small allied bombing raids by air were made on Lae, Vunakanau, Lukunai, Rabaul, and Falsi. These raids undoubtedly 

cause the enemy dar.1age and slow down his offense. 

April 12 

Except for submarines seen by the Army off Christmas, the Pacific Ocean Area was without contacts. 

The PLUNGER was refloated and needs about one month 

repair at Pearl. 

This is now the period of placing our forces in 

position and readiness for offense. Without opposition, this should now proceed rapidly. 

B-26s attacked a carrier at Rabaul and report a 

hit on the stern and a close miss. She was able to leave 

the harbor at high speed. There was also an air attack on 

an Orange AO at Lae. 

34 3 
iliiGiiiiil 

April 13. 

Operations scheduled are proceeding as ordered. 

Task Force 2 completed target practice off OAHU. This is 

substantially Task Force 11 less LEXINGTON. 

There has been no indication that Task Force 17, operating 

in the Coral Sea, has had any enemy contacts for some time. 

The SUMNER reports good entrances to BLEACHER via Lahi 

Passage and the Narrows. She can now go to Nandi until May 1st 

if desired. She has done a fine job to date and now needs more 

gear (can be sent via RIGEL) to continue surveys. 

Convoys for South Pacific reinforcements to STRAW, BLEACHER 

and ROSES should be underway from u.s. East and West Coasts. Arrangements are underway to escort and cover these landings. 

An observation detachment of one marine officer, seven 

marines, and four Navy, provided with one 3u/23 gun and radio was 

set up on East Island French Frigate Shoals. 

The heavy bombing and shelling of Corregidor continues. ~ Ammunition will probably be the deciding factor there. 

~~ United Nations made aerial attack Lae - results very small. 

Both sides conducted aerial reconnaissance in Southwest Pacific Area. 

April 14. 

Vice Admiral Glassford gave an informal talk to several 

Flag Officers and some of CinCPac Staff on the campaign in the 

Far East and pointed out several lessons, (1) the Japs are not 

invincible, (2) there were allied command difficulties, (3) ~ack of our air made Jap task much easier, (4) the performance 

of Army Air in Manila shows that there must be improvements - and 

present USA pilots lack training and experience in Australia. 

Task Force 17 (CinCPac 142027) was ordered to BLEACHER 

for replenishment and to depart from there the 27th for further 

operations toward the Coral Sea. 

Cominch directed (141225) that, as operations permit, 

the Southwest Pacific be reinforced with one squadron of 1600 

ton DDs, trading 1200 ton DDs for them. 

The RIGEL will leave Pearl the 20th to take a relief 

detachment to FANNING Island, and will transport the Anzac force 

from there to Auckland. Enroute she will drop off some survey 

gear for the SUMNER. At Auckland she will b e a vailable for t he 

base development there under Captain Bowman. 
m GCT 

14 0910 NAVAL ATTACHE AUSTRALIA TO OPNAV, CINCPAC 

Authorities here estimate that Japanese shipping losses 

are such that they are now able only to support one / aggressive move at a time; t~ with further extending and losses they soon can only hold end defend. In my opinion this is erroneous and does noc properly evaluate 

the small tonnage required to supply their inactive troops. 

14 1225 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOWESPACFOR 

AS OPERATIONS PERMIT BUILD UP DESTROYER STRENGTH SOUTH 

WEST PACIFIC FORCE TO EQUIVALENT 1 SQUADRON OF 1,600 

TON DDs in EXCHANGE FOR 1, 200 TON DDs. 

14 1416 QQMlNCH TO CINCPAC info NAVOBS WELLINGTON, COMSOWESPACFOR 

PENDING ARRIVAL GHORMLEY TO ASSID~ COMMAND OF SOUTH 

PACIFIC AREA CINCPAC WILL EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OF 

NAVAL FORCES THERE BUT EXISTING COMJvT~ND ARRANGEMENTS / 

OF SOUTH PACIFIC BASES WILL CONTINUE WITH COMINCH 

COORDINATING UNTIL GHORMLEY ESTABLISHES HEADQUARTERS AUCKLAND AT WHICH TIME THE FULL COMMAND SYSTEM OF PARA 3 

MY 031905 WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE. INFO ADESS INFORM 

APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AND ARRANGE FOR NEW ZEALAND SHIPS 

HITHERTO ALLOCATED TO FORMER ANZAC FORCE TO COME UNDER 

CONTROL OF CINCPAC IMMEDIATELY. 

14 1417 COMINCH TO CINCPAC info COMSOV!_ESPACFOR 1 MACARTHUR, CoS .I USA 

I APPROVE PARAS 3(b) AND (c) YOUR 110535 IN FORCE 

TEMPORARILY ENTERING SOPAC AREA MAY BE UNDER DIRECT CONTROL 

OF CINCPAC WHEN YOU SO PRESCRIBE. YOU THROUGH GHORMU.."'Y AFTER 

HE ARRIVES WI-LL EXERCISE COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL 01', 

PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TEMPORARILY ENTERDiG SOWESPAC AREA / 

AND WILL ARRANGE COORDINATING MEASURES WITH MAC ARTHUR. 

THIS APPLIES NOW TO TASK FORCE 17. YOUR PARAGRAPH 5 

APPROVED. WILL ADVISE AS TO ARRANGEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS AFTER GHORMLEY ARRIVES HERE. SEE MY 141416 IN CONNECTION 

HEREWITH 

14 1600 V COMINCH to · ·CINCPAC info COMSOWESPACFOR 

PRESENT INTENTION MAINTAIN ABOU'I' 20 FLEET SUBMAR1 NES WITH 

APPROPRIATE TENDERS IN SOUTHWESPAC~ 0R. IN CONNECTION 

WITH EXCHANGE OF SUBMARINES NOW IN PROGRESS CINCPAC IS TO 

DECIDE VVHETHER TO SEND BACK SUBMARINES AFTER OVERHAUL OR 

TO SUBSTITUTE LATER TYPES. ARRANGE WITH INFO ADEE FOR 

DISTRIBUTION OF SPARES AND EXCHANGE OF TENDERS IF AND WHEN 

NECESSARY. 

345 
~Q9T 

14 2027 CINCPAC to TASK FORCE 17 info COMINCH, COMSOWESPACFOR 

Cominch has placed you under operational command CinCPac 

effective immediately. Proceed to BLEACHER for replenishment, upkeep, preparing for further operations Coral Sea. ~ Depart BLEACHER 27th. Dispose KASKASKIA, TIPPECANOE as 

desired keeping me informed. I will order DOBBIN, SOLACE 

to BLEACHER immediately. Information BLEACHER separately. Comsouwespac pass to MacArthur·. 

34 6 
fii1EGi4ilff 

APR GCT 

03 1351 

04 0650 

10 0505 

11 0641 

12 1405 

OPNAV TO CIIJCLANT_.t_ CINCPAC 

My serial 09 of Jan. Change assignment Desron 12 from Lantfl~ to Pacflt. 

COMTASKFOR 17 TO COI!TANZAC 

~]:y 012250 Attack delayed until I have definite location 

enemy. Remaining vicinity 15 S 160 E. 

CINCPAC TO ?ACFLT AKD VARIOUS OTHERS 

Effective 10 April PacFlt administrative organization as 

follows. Units listed PacFlt conf. notice 7CN-42. Batships PacFlt Anderson all BBsx CruPacFlt Fletcher Crudivs 3 4 5 6 

9 11 x CarPacFlt Halsey Cardivs 1 2 includes HORNET alll 

embarked aircraft Photo unit training group and service units x 

DesPacFlt Theobald Desrons 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 Desdiv 22 Detroit 

Raleigh and tendrs x BubsPacF1t Withers Subrons 4 6 8 10 

Subase Pearl x Patwings ~acFlt McCain Patwings 1 2 4 8 

Transition Training Squadron x Serfor PacFlt Calhoun 

Serena 2 4 6 8 Minron 1 in Seron 6 x Amphibious Force PacFlt 

Rrovm .x Marine defense forces x Type commanders duties as 

before except as provided in my 270159 of February. 

COMANZAC TO VARIOUS 

TABAR ISLAND REPORTS LARGE NUMBER AIRCRAFT COURSE SOUTH SOUTHWEST 2115Z lOth .(ZONE ZERO) AND 15 MINUTES LATER THREE MORE 

WENT SOUTH X ON 8TH APRIL TWO ENEMY CRUISEHS ONE DESTROYER 

ANCHORED LORENGAU FROM WHICH THREE SMALL SEAPLANES MADE FORENOON RECONNAISSANCE DROPING SOME BOMBS ALONG COAST X THESE 

VESSELS NO LONGER THERE X RELIABLY REPORTED JAPANESE 

ESTABLISHING BASE FOR SMALL SUBMARINES SOUTH WARANZOI RIVER 

POSIT 4-31 SOUTH 52-21 EAST X SMALL VESSEL REPORTED LAE 

YESTERDAY \'flJAS ATTACKED THIS MORNING BY OUR AIRCRAFT X 

CATALINAS CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE FROM TULAGI TODAY ORDERED 

ATTACK SHIPPING FAIST ISLAND HARBOR X INDICATIONS NINE ~)MALL 

ORANGE VESSELS ASSIGNED RABAUL, ONE NEN CF EXPECTED TRUK, 

POSSIBILITY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY ENEMY IN EASTERN NEW 

GUINEA AREA COMMENCING ABOUT 21 APRIL. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

REFER COMINCH 072135 AND CINCPAC 090215 INFORMATION JUST 

RECEIVED STATES THAT FHEE FRENCH MOTOR ESCORT VESSEL CHEVRUIL / 

WILL DEPART FROM SYDNF.Y SHORTLY AFTER 15TH APRIL TO BRING / 

STRAWBOARD UNDER FREE BRENCH CONTROL X IN VIEW US AGREEMENTS 

NOT TO MOLEST VICHY FHENCH TERRITORY IT IS DE3IHED THAT YOU 

POSTPONE YOUR RECONNAISSANCE UNTIL LATER INFOHNf.ATION INSlJRES 

THAT STRAWBOAHD IS IN FACT FREE FRENCH._ 

347 
iEii6iHtiiT 

--

APR GCT 

13 0610 SUMT~ER TO CINCPAC 

A PROSPECTIVE CHANNEI.J SHOWING MINIMUM 40 FOOT SOUNDING HAS 

BEEN l\!ARKED OUT FROM READ OF LAHI PASSAGE TO EAST AND BUOYS 

PLANTED AT IMPORTANT POINTS X SHOULD BE USED IN EMERGENCY 

ONLY X SUMNER HAS MADE SEVERAL 'JPBIPS ACROSS THIS AREA WITH SOUND 

BOATS X EACH rrRIP REVEALED SURPRISING SHOALS OFTEN 40 FOOT 

SHOALS IN 40 FATHOM AREAS ALSO 30 FOOT JUST OUTSIDE BEST 

PASSAGE DISCOVERED X POSSIBLE MANY SHALLOWER SPOTS UNDISCOVERED 

X PROPER SURVEY THIS AREA lffiS NEVER BEEN CONDUCTED X CONSIDER IT 

VERY DANGEROUS F

1

0R LARGE SHIPS X IF ALSO DESIRED THE CHANNEL 

MARKED BY SUMNER COULD BE DRAGGED LATER BY MINESVJEEPERS OR 

OTHER SMALL CRAFT X THIS WORK CONSIDERED IMPRACTICABLE FOR ./ . SUMNER BOATS BECAUSE OF WEATHER AND AREA THAT SHOULD BE 

COVERED TO MAKE THIS CHARNEL SAFE X AT PRESENT NOT EASY TO 

FIX POSITION THIS AREA X WOULD BE DANGEROUS IN THICK VlfEATIIER 

X TO J~KE PROPER CHANNEL A REGULAR HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY WOULD 

NEED TO BE CONDUCTED ANDLLARGE MARKER BUILT ON NEAREST ISLANDS 

FOR FIXING POSITION X ALSO A LARGE AMOUNT OF SOUNDING AND 

DRAGGING X ESTIMATE 1 MONTH X SEE NOTE AT TOP OF HO CHART 

2013 X DIAGRAM OF PROSPECTIVE CHANNEL PLACED IN SOPA FILE X 

GOOD ENTRANCES NOW AT LAHI EGERIA AND THE NARROWS X BELIEVE 

PRESENT RELUCTANCE TO USE NARR01.VS WILL SOON BE OVERCOME. 

15 0150 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

RF.PORTED PRESENCE ENEMY SUBMARINES AND TENDER RABAUL 

INDICATES PROBABLE COMJ\1ENCEIVIENrr ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH PACIFIC 

AREA X CAN MORE DESTROYERS BE MADE AVAILABLE PACFLT FOR 

PROBABLE ANTI SUB1~RINE OPERATIONS THAT AREA 

34 8 
APR GCT ----

15 2130 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Under consideration a joint supply service for South 

Pacific area except Canton for purpose effecting the 

supply of U.S. Army and Navy forces. Headquarters at 

Auckland. Subsistence stores less a few items can be 

supplied from Australia and New Zealand for both Army ~ 

and Navy there and in outlying bases south of Equator. 

Opnav 072013. After consultation commanding general 

Hawaiian Area request you indicate in broad terms 

your recommendations on the overall problem to include 

necessary joint procurement and joint use of shipping 

and storage facilities and composition joint staff. 

16 1236 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Negative your 150105 except for vessels mentioned in 

my 031351 

( 0 ~ V'\ o.. "~ ·o ~ , ~ s \ ) · f\tt 'i ~ e ..,. ~ ~ \ o ~ I) f J ~ '*' . C h a. ~c... 

~~\~qlt\.~ ves 'fl)"' '1- t"'o""" Lo..~Jtr ~ fa.e t' t. 

. . 349 
April 14 (Continued). 

f 

Our Naval Attache in Australia does not agree with the 

Australian estimate (140910) that Jap shipping losses are such 

that now they are only able to support one aggressive move at 

a time and with further losses they soon can only hold and defend. 

The S-34 and S-35 departed for operations in the Kurile 

Island Area. 

The NAVAJO departed to tow the PRESIDENT TAYLOR to Pearl. 

Bureau of Navigation wants a survey of Staff officers 

with view to reducing the 13% of iiac strength now so employed. 

In his 141416 Cominch further clarifies his ideas of 

command relations in South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas. 

Nandi mine fields are now almost complete. This work 

is being done by Mindiv 2. 

Cominch in his 141600 states his plan to keep 20 fleet 

submarines and necessary tenders in the Southwest Pacific Area. 

There were no important actions in the Southwest Pacific , but Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean seem to be proceeding 

well. 

There is indication of some sort of reinforcements to 

the Mandates and Rabaul. While the Japs would like to take the 

offensive it seems more likely that they will hold in those 

areas for the time bcing at least because of lack of means. 

April 15. 

The mine fields at Nandi Roads have been laid with 862 mines. 

The SUMNER will check up on doubtful navigation points there. 

The question of Seniority in the Southwest Pacific has 

come up. The British Rear Admiral is senior to our recent Task 

Force commanders. CinCPac desires that the command of our task 

forces which con.tain a carrier remain with our officers regardless 

of seniority. 

The DOBBIN and SOLACE will be available to serve Task Force 

17 at BLEACHER. He also has good fuel oil arrangements. Unless 

the Japs start up sooner than expected now he should have a good 

rest. \ I 

Captain M. C. BOWMAN will leave for Auckland Friday to 

start work on a base for SoPacArea at that point. 

350 
6 ii 0 R 12 i 

April 1~ (Continued) 

In view of increasing enemy activity in South Pacific 

area Cine Pac (150105) has asked Cominch about DD reinforcement. This was not granted by Cominch (161236). 

Task Forces 1 and 11 will operate in possible enemy submarine waters for the balance of this month. 

Opnav (152130) is considering a plan to supply the 

outlying bases in the South Pacific Area and has asked Cincpac for recommendations on a Joint Staff. This Joint Logistic Service will take into account the supplies that can be obtained 

in New Zealand and Australia. 

A channel 37' deep and 600' wide is considered by the New Zealand Board for Auckland to be completed about 

August 15, 1942. 

The SAN DIEGO will join the Pacific Fleet about nfuy 6th. 

A sub attacked the s.s. Firethorn in Lat. 45-30 S 

and 174-10 N. This indicates reconnaissance around New 

Zealand. 

Two Jap CV are expected at Truk April 28th. There 

is more submarine and air activity in Mandates. An offensive 

in the SW Pacific is shaping up. 

Minor bombings and operations continue in the SV'J 

Pacific, although the Japs are not- doing so much. This would 'indicate that recent air losses for them have hurt. 

The press reports that our VB bombed Manila. 

~ril 1fi 

Opnav (152130) states that there is under consideration a 

joint supply setup for the South Pacific Area (less Canton) with 

headquarters at Auckland. He requests Cincpa.c recommend on the 

logistic problem south of the equator. 

Opnav (151859) describes a merchant ship routing arrangement for all oceans giving limits, responsibilities, and means 

of coordination. 

Comanzac (150500) informs us that the drydock at Sydney v1ill be ready for CV in the 'tmrnecliate future. 

351 
April 1( (continued) 

Cominch (162220) to Comsowespac says that it is 

essential that our task forces with CV operating in MacArthur's 

area be commanded by our officers with CV experience regardless 

of rank, and points out that Cincpac has power to ensure our 

seniority (This would keep Halsey there -undesirable). 

Cincpac (170405) to Cominch again requests action on 

assignment of code names for bases. All commands seem. to think 

up new names now. 

Cincpac (162217) will send Desron 4 to the s.w. Pacific 

in accordance with a directive from Cominch. 1200 ton DD 

from that area will relieve Desron 4 here. It will also involve 

a shift of tenders. 

Task Force 17 will arrive at Bleacher April 20. This 

will afford a good test of facilities there including the air 

field. While it is considerably east of Noumea, it seems safe 

from all enemy action now except submarines. If CV are to use 

this very much, aveas must be sent there. 

There is some delay in the reinforcement convoys for 

the SoPac bases. 

Admiral Nimitz pointed out the necessity for our action 

at Ocean and Nauru Islands. These are rich sources of phosphate 

which Japan needs to fertilize her crops. Japs have already looked 

these islands over. 

One Jap sub was sighted near New Zealand (SE) and there 

are indications of one 200 miles SW of Midway and another near 

Oahu. A move of Jap subs lnto the Central Pacific is expected. 

There are strong indications of an Orange offensive in 

.the SW Pacific around the end of the month. Th~ Japs are 

expected to use as many as four CV with suitable cruiser and 

destroyer escort and land based air from the Rabaul area. ~e 

are planninG opposition. No BB are expected in this. 

Air activities in the S. ~. Pacific seems limited to 

reconnaissance. 

Th ere was no news today of i wportance from the Bengal 

area.. 

35?. 
8 !I e It E I 

g] .Q.Q! 

15 1546 (Continued) 

LONG 080-01 WEST ENTERING MARITIME CONTROL ARE LAT 08-00 

NORTH LONG 079-30 1J'VEST THENCE NORTH TO STATION SHIP ABEAM 

TABOGUILLA LIGHT FOR ID~TRANCE INSTRUCTIONS SUBPARA (C) VESSELS APPROACHING CANAL ZONE FROM SOUTH AMERICA NEW 

ZEALAND AUSTRALIA KEEP TO SOUTHWARD AND EASTWARD OF LINE 

FROM POINT LAT 02-00 NORTH LONG 093-00 WEST TO LAT 04-50 / 

NORTH LONG 080-00 WEST THENCE THROUGH LAT 07-20 NORTH v 

LONG 078-47 WEST TO LAT 08-00 NORTH LONG 079-30 WEST 

THENCE NORTH TO STATION SHIP ABEAM TABOGUILLA LIGHT FOR 

ENTRANCE INSTRUCTIONS X PARA 3 BUNKER REQUIREMENTS OF 

VESSELS ROUTED TO WELLINGTON AT TIME OF ISSUING ROUTE 

INSTRUCTIONS X AMCON ANTOFAGASTA DELIVER TO MISTER GILBERT 

16 1315 OPNAV TO VARIOUS 

MERCA~TILE PACIFIC COASTAL ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS {MPORI) HEREBY PROMULGATED PRINTED COPIES TO BE MAILED SECTION 1 

PARAGRAPH 1 subpara A VESSELS IN CONVOY OR ' INDEPENDENT 

BETWEEN ALASKA AND UNIT SAIL WEST COAST NORTHBOUND 

DIVERSIFIED 00 URSES TO NORTH AND EAST MEDIAN LINE USUALLY 

TRAVELED COURSES (2) SOUTHBOUND TO SOUTHWARD AND WESTWARD / 

OF MEDIAN LINE USUAL COURSES SUBPARA (B) MAXIMtnd USE MADE 

OF INSIDE PASSAGE TO ALASKA PARAGRAPH 2 SUBEARA A {1) 

BETWEEN PUGET SOUND ·AND SAN DIEGO INDEPENDENTS AND VESSELS 

IN CONVOY SHALL BE ROUTED ON DIVERSIFIED COURSES NORTHBOUND 

EAST\VARD OF MEDIAN LINE 25 MILES OFF PRINCIPAL AIDS TO 

NAVIGATION (2) SOUTHBOUND TO WESTWARD OF ABOVE LINE 

SUBPARA (B) SMALL CRAFT ROUTED CLOSE IN SHORE PARAGRAPH 3 

SUBPARAGRAPH A VESSELS PLYING BETWEEN US AND CANAL ZONE 

ROUTED DIVERSIFIED COURSES USUAL TRAVELLED ROUTES 100 MILES 

OFF SHORE SUBPARA B SMALL VESSELS MAY BE OOUTED CLOSE IN 

SHORE X PARAGRAPH 4 WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA USUAL 

STEAMER TRACKS SECTION 2 PARAGRAPH 1 ENTRANCE TO PANAMA 

MARITIME CONTROL AREA SAME AS MPRI SECTION OF SUB PARAGRAPH 

2 X THIS DISPATCH TRANSMITTED TO ALL OFFICES INTERESTED X 

(UNDERLINED POHTION GARBLED) 

17 0503 COMINDIV 2 to CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

Comindiv 2 replying 020411 and 162149 April will reply. Plan to finish Fiji fields 538 additional mines by time ~ 

MONTGOMERY arrives about 3 May. Understand General Rose 

primarily concerned with mine protection against tank 

barge approach to ROSES especially SAVANNAH HARBOR. Since 

preliminary work must be completed on mines prior to 

loading have prepared subject to change 100 ROSES mines 

including 50 with 24 foot depth and 18 foot antennas to 

be layed at high water slack in designated areas as desired 

giving float submergence 4 to 8 feet in SAVANNAH HARBOR. 

'15 ,j '· 3 
S E G 14 B T 

--

APR GCT 

15 1546 OPNAV to VARIOUS. 

MERCANTILE PACilt1 IC ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS (MPRl) HEREBY 

PROMULGATED PRINTED COPIES TO r.,OLLOW IN MAIL X SECTION 1 

PARA 1 GENERAL REMARKS X PARA 2 SUBPARA ·(A) CONVOYS 

BETWEEN US WEST COAST AND HAWAIIAN ISLANDS DIVERSIFIED 

COURSES WESTBOUND NORTHWARD AND EASTBOUND SOUTHWARD OF 

THE GREAT CIRCLE COURSES SUBPARA (B) VALUABLE CONVOYS 

ROUTED BY SP~CIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUBPARA (C) SLOW CONVOYS 

ROUTED TO WOUTHWARD WHEN WEATHI~R CONDITIONS MAKE 

DESIRABLE SUBPARA (D) INDEPENDIDlTLY ROUTED SHIPS CLEAR 

OF CONVOYS BUT CONFORMING IN GENERAL X PARA 3 INDEPENDENTS 

AND CONVOYS FROM US WEST COAST TO SAMOA X FIJI AND SOCIETY 

ISLANDS ON DIVERSIFIED COURSES TO EASTWARD OF CHRISTMAS 

ISLAND USING AS A BASE COURSE GREAT CIRCLE SAN FRANCISCO 

TO A POINT BETWEEN TOMGA AND COOK ISLANDS X PARA 4 

INDEPENDENTS AND CONVOYS TO EASTERN AUSTRALIAN PORTS 

NORTH OF LATITUDE OF AUCKLAND ROUTED AS IN PARA 3 FOLLOWING IN GENERAL THE GREAT CIRCLE COURSE SOUTHWARD OF 

SAMOA AND FIJI DIRECT TO DESTINATION X PARA 5 SHIPPING / 

US WEST COAST FOR AUCKLAND GREAT CIRCLE THROUGH TUAMOTU 

ARCHIPELAGO THENCE DIRECT TO DESTINATION X PARA 6 SHIPPING FOR VlELLINGTON OR PORTS IN SOUTHERN AND WESTERN 

AUSTRALIA DIVERSIFIED COURSES THROUGH TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO 

THENCE SOUTH OF CHATHAM ISLAND TO WELLINGTON OR SOUTH OF 

CHATHAM ISLAND AND SOUTH OF NEW ZEALAND TO DESTINATION X 

PARA 7 SHIPPING FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS BOUND SOUTH OR 

SOUTHWEST PASS WELL TO EASTWARD OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND AND 

FOLLOW TRACKS INDICATED IN PARA 41 5 1 AND 6 X PARA 8 

SUBPARA (A) SHIPPING BE~VEEN CANAL ZONE WEST COAST OF 

SOUTH AMERICA AND PACIFIC ISLANDS INCLUDING AUSTRALIA 

{1) TO AUSTRALIA AND ISLANDS IN SOUTH PACIB,IC GREAT 

CIRCLE COURSE BETWEEN TUAMOTU ARCHIPELAGO AND PITCAIRN 

ISLAND THENCE DIRECT TO AUCKLAND AND PORTS NOR~HERN 

AUSTRALIA OR IF BOU1iD WELLINGTON SOUTH OF CHATHAM OR FOR 

PORTS SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA SOUTH OF CHATHAM ISLAND AND 

NEW ZEALAND TO DESTINATION {2) FROM AUSTRALIA AND ISLANDS 

IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC GREAT CIRCLE SOUTH OF PITCAIRN ISLAND 

{3) FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS OUTWARD BOUND VESSELS TO THE 

SOUTHWARD AND WESTBOUND DEEP TO THE NORTHWARD OF THE 

GREAT CIRCLE COURSES X SUBPARA (B) VESSELS SHALL GIVE 

GALAPAGOS AND COCOS ISLAND A WIDE BERTH XX SECTION 2 

PARA 1 SUBPARA (A) DIVERSION IN PACIFIC AREA SHALL BE 

INITIATED BY AUTHORITY EXERCISING STRATEGIC CONTROL OF 

AREA IN WHICH SHIPPING MAY BE X SUBPARA (B) LOCAL 

DIVERSIONS SHALL BE MADE AS NECESSARY BY COMMANDERS OF 

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN EACH CASE DIVERTING AUTHORlTY 

FOR GENERAL AREA IS TO BE INFORMED X PARA 2 SUBPARA {A) VESSELS SHALL ENTER PANAMA MARITIME CONTROL AREA DURING 

DAYLIGHT AND AHRIVE AT BALBOA BEB,ORE DARK SUBPARA (B) VESSELS APPROACHING CANAL ZONE FROM HAWAII AND WEST PASS 

TlffiOUGH LAT 06-55 NORTH LONG 082-00 WEST TO LAT 06-55 NORTH 

~ r- ,; ,,) 4 
r . 

SiOH:BI 

APR GCT 

15 0500 

15 1859 

COMANZAC to CTF-17 info CINCPAC 

Following is Comanzac 0150 GCT 14th action focas sent 

you for info. Sydney dock available about 22 April. 

J D EDWARDS and HMAS ADELAIDE with convoy expected arrive Noumea forenoon 19 Aprilx When ready J D 

EDWARDS ADELAIDE and AUSTRALIA proceed Sydney in ~ company. LAMSON and LEANDER should remain Noumea 

until required depart for rendezvous with convoy. 

ACHILLES will be sent from Sydney direct to rendezvous. HOBART will complete refit about 22 April. Refit of AUSTRALIA estimated require 10 days. Unless 

situation requires it shift of flag to HOBART will 

not be made. 

OPNAV to CINCPAC etc. 

BRITISH UNITED STATES ROUTING AGREEMENT Short Title 

BUSRA. Was recently concluded. Its principal provisions are (including modifications incident to agreement Southwest Pacific command). 

(1) United States will control (sail and route) all 

merchant shipping in Western Atlantic (line of demarcation of Western Atlantic area has been promulgated 

to authorities concerned} and Pacific Areas (including southwest Pacific) issuing route from port of 

departure to 1st port of arrival in British strategic 

area when latter involved. ~ 

(2) British will control shipping in British home 

waters. Eastern section north and south Atlantic. 

Mediterraniam and Indian area issuing route from port 

departure to 1st port arrival in United States strategic area when latter involved • 

. (3) Opnav issuing single comprehensive mercantile 

Pacific routing instructions (short title MPRI) for 

whole Pacific Ocean, Admiralty, NSHQ Ottawa, ACNB and 

NZNB may suggest amendments to Opnav. 

(4) Admiralty will continue to issue mercantile 

Atlantic routing instructions (short title MARI). 

Opnav and NSHQ Ottawa may suggest amendments to 

Admiralty. 

355 
\ 

8!J8Rt3T 

APR GCT 

15 1859 (CONTINUED) 

(5) Opnav issuing mercantile Atlantic Coastal and 

Pacific Coastal routing instructions (short titles 

MACRI and MPCRI) covering routing within sea frontiers. 

(6) Control of shipping in Canada, Australia, New 

Zealand, and other British territory in United States 

strategic areas will be exercised by United States 

using as their agents the personnel of existing British 

naval control service organization. 

(7) British routing officers in United States strategic 

areas to be accommodated in same or adjacent buildings 

as United States routing officers vice - versa in 

British areas. Closest collaboration between British 

and U S routing officers essential. 

(8) In areas under United States strategic control 

where British Officers available, routing instructions 

will be delivered to British masters through British 

routing offipers (BRO) and vice versa. 

(9) Arrangements for ~outing of convoys will remain as 

at present. 

(10) Diversions of ships or convoys by authority exer- ~ cising strategic control of area in which vessel located 

at time of diversion. Other authority may suggest 

diversions. Time and date at which estimated ship or 

convoy passing from one area strategic control to other 

to be included in "Route Signal''. Such time and da. te 

called CHIP responsibility passing from originating 

authority to other authority at this time and date 

irrespective whether ship or convoy in precise position 

estimated or not. 

(11) To prevent both U S and British authorities duplicating merchant ship movement reports (U S 11MERCO" 

British "VESCA" Messages) and route signals. It is 

intended that gradually in U S strategic areas other 

than British territory, only MERCO and US route signals 

{dispatches) will be sent action Opnav and Seafrons 

through which route passes. Admiralty and British 

staff officers {Intelligence) in area of departure. 

Similarly in British strategic controlled areas and 

British territory in U S controlled area only vessels 

and British route signals will be sent action Admiralty 

and British staff officers (Intelligence) in area of 

port of departure, Opnav and Seafrons through which 

route passes. 

356 
NCHEfi 

APR GCT 

15 1859 

( 

15 2130 

(CONTINUED) . 

(12) British naval shore code being issued by Admiralty 

to Opnav and U S Seafrons. 

(13) U S Master Control Cipher has been issued to admiralty and British intelligence centers at Ottawa, Kingston, Jamaica and Montevideo. 

(14) Joint British American code (MERSIGs :. Volume 11) and 

appropriate receding tables is supplied to various categories of shipping. Will be used for communication with 

ships at sea. (Reference Opnav 081235 April). 

(15) Opnav will send dispatch to addressees signalling effective date of BUSHA which presently anticipated about 1st June. 

(16) Copies of BUSHA being sent to all addressees. 

(17) Detailed instructions covering method of reporting 

movements and route signals contained in "General Instructions for Routing Officers (Short Title GIRO)" being mailed to addressees responsible for such reports. If GIRO unreceived by effective date BUSRA addressees 

shall, pending its receipt, use same method of reporting presently used by British except Opnav and Seafrons 

involved shall be included as action addressees of all 

ship movement and route signal dispatches. 

OPNAV to CINCPAC 

Under consideration a joint supply service for South 

Pacific Area except Canton for purpose effecting the 

/ 

supply of U 8 Army and Navy forces, headquarters at 

Auckland. Subsistence stores less a few items can be 

supplied from Australia and New Zeland for both Army j ' and Navy there and in outlying bases south of Equator. Opnav 072013, after consultation Bommanding General 

Hawaiian Area request you indicate in broad terms your recommendations of the overall problem to include 

necessary joint procurement and joint use of shipping and storage facilities and composition joint staff. 

357 
iJiORili 

APR GCT 

16 2217 

16 2220 

CINCPAC to COMANZAC 

Propose to comply Cominch 141225 by transferring Desron 4 to Southwest Pacfor in exchange for PERKINS 

FLUSSER and 1200 tanners. SELFRIDGE MUGFORD BAGLEY 

arrive Bleacher with convoy about 7 May can be relieved there by 4 stackers as soon as shore defense 

is able to assume antiaircraft defense of convoy. HENLEY HELM will be ordered to Roses with convoy arriving there about 3 May and can be ordered to report to you as soon as two 4 pipers are started for 

Pearl. BLUE JARVIS RALPH TALBOTT are temporarily on 

mainland escort run with availability at Mare Island 

for Radar installation. Can start them south from 

here about 3rd week in May in exchange for PERKINS FLUSSER 

and remaining 1200 ton ships. Ships of Desron 4 all 

have double beam sound gear aOmm guns and depth charge throwers. All except HENLEY HELM will have SC Radar 

and these two have preliminary work completed requir- ing only instruments which will be forwarded when 

available and can be installed in about 5 days with 

repair ship or equivalent help. Request all Radar 

equipment received by you for 1200 tanners but not 

installed be sent to Pearl with them. Also propose exchange DOBBIN for BU.CKHAWK account spare part situation your comment on this requested. 

COMINCH to COMSOWESPACFOR info CINCPAC. 

TAKE UP FOLLOWING WITH ACNB AND ADVISE X WHILE I 

ACCEPT GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT COMMAND SHOULD BE EXERCISED BX SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT WHEN US AND AUSTHALIAN 

NAVAL FORCES COOPERATE TACTICALLY THIS CANNOT DEROGATE 

THE HIGHER PRINCIPLE THAT COMINCH AND CINCPAC ALWAYS 

RETAIN THE POWER TO APPOINT AS TASK FORCE COMMANDER 

ANY OFFICER UNDER TJffiiR COMMAND REGARDLESS OF RANK. 

IN PARTICULAR CMA OPERATIONS OF PACIFIC FLEET CARRIER 

UNITS IN SOPAC AND SOPAC AREAS HAVE BEEN PREDICATED . TO UNDERSTANDING THAT CO~lli~NDER THEREOF COMMANDS 'THE 

COMBINED FORCE WHEN AUSTRALIAN VESSELS COOPERATE 

TACTICALLY CMA REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK OF OFFICERS 

CONCERNED. IN VIEW NECESSITY THAT OFFICER EXPERIENCED 

IN CARRIER OPERATIONS BE IN CONTROL MAY I ASK THAT 

YOU CONFIRM THIS UNDERSTANDING WITH REFERENCE TO 

FUTURE COMBINED ACTIVITIES. DELIVER TO MACARTHUR. 

358 
APR GCT 

17 0405 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

Complete list of code names bases twice requested 

promised by Opnav despatch 122037 March but not 

received. Have obtained at least partial list prepared by Comdg General Hawdept from war department 

directives but desire confirmation and assurance 

that full information has been received. Believe 

too many commands are unrelatedly employing code 

names and that confusion with serious effects might 

result. after receipt of complete and authentic list 

will control this within my command but believe 

broader coordination is necess~ry. Emmons list contains no name for Johnston Island or Auckland. rlequest verification of indications Fulcrum is name 

for latter. 

359 
S F G R F ?? 

17 0503 (Continued) 

Recommend South Bay field alternate 24 and 45 foot .depths having floats 6 to 10 foot submergence. Subject 

to confirmation preliminary estimate includes 2 line / 

fields (A) across INDIE LITTE entrance (B) halfway 

across HILLIARD CHANNEL from northward (C) across 

South Bay. Water depths indicate need for 40 anchors 

with 400 feet cable and 60 with 900 feet. Absence 

handling facilities ROSES makes desirable conduct of 

mining operations upon arrival and approval fields. 

17 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

CONTINUOUS STUDY AND CONSIDERATION OF ENEMY COMMITMENTS . IN PACIFIC THEATER CONFIRMS THB~ VIEW OF Tim JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF EXPRESSED IN PARA 4B OF DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME 

COMMANDER OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND EMPHASIZES THE 

ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF MAKING ENEMY SHIPS AND 

SHIPPING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF SURFACE AIR AND 

SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN ORDER TO HAMSTRING HIS CAPACITY 

TO SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS. PARA. 

NOTE THAT SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND SHIPPING IN / 

ENEMY WATERS IN WESTERN PART OF CENTRAL PACIFIC HAVE 

FORCED THE USE OF CONVOYS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND SOUTHWARD. PARA. 

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING 

TRAVERSING SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL ALSO SERVE TO HELP 

BRITISH SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATER. PARA. 

LEARY SHOW THIS DESPATCH TO MACARTIIDR. CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INPORMED. 

350 
APR GCT 

19 2151 (Continued) 

office within San Francisco service force sub command for 

this purpose but utilizing existing agencies procurement 

and storage. Joint s .faff there to coordinate requirements 

and shipping handling all stores until Auckland established 

and functioning. ~ 

Desirable supply all bases be as automatic as possible 

and that after requirements are determined ships be permanently allocated this service. Status White Poppy not clear. 

Present supply a responsibility of Australia. 

If the above recommended organization is adopted the 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, should be 

relieved of responsibility for supply South ·Pacific bases. 

361 
8ii0 llLT 

APR GCT ----

17 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC, C01~1SOWESPJ~C 

CONTINUOUS STUDY AND CONSIDERATION QF ENEMY COMMITMENTS 

IN .PACIFIC THEATRE CONFIRMS THE VI~v"J OF THE JOINT CHIEFS 

OF STAFF EXPRESSED IN PARA 4B OF DIRECTIVE TO 3UPREME 

COMMANDER OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA AND EMPHASJZES THE 

ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF MAKING E[\TE~tTY SHIPS AND 

SHIPPING THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF SURFACE AIR AND SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN ORDER TO HAMSTRING HIS CAPACITY TO / 

SUPPORT HIS OPERATIONS PARA , NOTE THAT SUBMARINE ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND SHIPPING IN 

ENEMY WATERS IN WESTERN PART OF CENTRAL PACIFIC HAVE 

FORCED THE USE OF CONVOYS BETWEEN HOMELAND AND SOUTHWARD 

PARA 

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPS AND SHIPPING 

TRAVERSING SOUTH CHINA SEA WILL ALSO SERVE TO HELP 

BRITISH SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATRE PARA 

LEARY SHOnf THIS .DESPATCH TO MACARTHUR XX CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORWJ.ED. 

18 0135 COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC 

ACNB confirms your understanding regarding exercise of 

command of combined units when PACFLT carrier units ~ 

operate SWPAC Area. Suitable directive being promulgated RAN by ACNB. This refers to COMINCH 162220. 

ACNB has this. 

18 1915 CINCPAC to TASK FORCE COMMANDERS. 

RECENT INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCE ON ORANGE CARRIERS 

STATES X A X ORGANIZATION X CARDIV 1 AKAGA 1 AND KAGA X 

CARDIV 2 HIRYU PLUS SORYU X CARDIV 3 RYOJO ONLY X CARDIV 5 

SHOKAKU AND ZUIKAKU X B X PLANE COMPLEMENTS X FIGHTERS X 

EACH 18 PLUS 3 SPARES EXCEPT RYUJO HAS 12 PLANES AND 4 X 

DIVE BOMBERS SAME AS FIGHTERS X TORPEDO BOMBERS X 18 PLUS 

3 SPARES PER SHIP EXCEPT KAKA CARRIERS 27 AND 6 AND RYULO 

HAS SWABO. 

19 2151 CINCPAC TO OPNAV. 

Joint supply service South Pacific Area deemed practicable 

and necessary your 152130. Joint office staffed with personnel Army Navy W~rine should be established Auckland 

and assigned responslbility under Ghormley supply outlying 

islands with' such stores as can be obtained that region 

including joint purchase storage and use of shipping. ~ 

Accordance your 072103 overall planning and coordination 

logistics Pacific Ocean Area being assigned Service Force 

hence logical above proposed joint office be a section of 

Service F'or e Sub Command to be established Auckland 0) 

Supply material and stores South Pacific Area from coast 

also requires coordination • • Recommend similar joint 352 
i!8iHiiT 

APR .GCT ---

20 2050 IIDQ USMC WASH to COM-14 info CINCPAC 

Urser 00146 dated 22 March tanks in limited numbers 

can be furnished for outlying bases after divisions 

have been equipped. 5 amphibian tractors for interisland use at PALMYRA will be provided. on request. 

8 mortars 81 ·mm wlll be furnished. Sufficient ammunition being shipped to brin8 .30 caliber to 10 ~ units of fire, .50 caliber AP to 7! units of fire 

and 37mm AA HE to 10 units of fire. Additional 

needed for 10 units all types will be shipped as 

available. Com-14 inform CG Marforces 14th ND. 

Cominch informed. 

20 2110 OPNAV to NAVATT WELLINGTON info CINCPAC, COMANZAC 

ALUSNA Wellington 150015. Inquiries by New Zealand 

Military Attache regarding port facilities were made / 

at r.equest of Joint Army Navy Committee now making study of Logistic problem Pacific Area. Space requirements are for use by both services. 

353 
! !I 8 It L T 

April 17. 

The press reports that we have bombed TOKYO, YOKOHAMA, KOBE and NAGOYA. As only nine planes are reported shot down, 9 nine other probably reached the bombing objectives. No dope yet from Halsey. I 

Cominch in his 171750 to Comanzac and Cincpac confirms and emphasizes that the best way to damage Japan at present is 

to give first consideration to attacks on her shipping. We have 

apparently expended a lot of bombs on air fields and buildings when the target should have been ships. 

Opnav (151546) has issued ship routing instructions for 

the Pacific. No change is noted in our present set up. 

Captain Bovmtan left for Auckland in connection with 

the establishment of a base there. The RIGEL will follow on 

the 20th. 

..; 

Comindiv 2 (170503) tells of his plans for the com-· 

pletion of the mine field now underway at Nandi, and of his 

plan to mine ROSES. 

Minor air actions and reconnaissance continues in the 

Southwest Pacific area. There are indications that our raids 

on Koepang are doing damage and that the Japs desire to move 

from there. Also the Japs desire early air raids on Darwin. 

Our estimate for the Jap offensive in the New Guinea 

area still is that it will start around the end of the month. 

They will use CVs with usual flotilla. We are trying to get a 

force together to oppose. Task Force 17 will be ready; Task 

Forces 11 and 16 are otherwise committed. 

The I~SUGA MARU which we recently hit on the stern at 

Rabaul will go to YOKOSUKA for repairs and should be ready for 

service on the 23rd. 

Relations with Vichy France are becoming more strained. 

Com-14 has warned against damage here by miseuided Frenchmen. 

~ 

354 
April 18 

.The raid on TOKYO and vicinity has caused the Japs to 

search with their air,surface>and submarine units., This 

search maY possibly delay the SW Pac offensive as the 

RYUKAKU probably is at sea searching~as are air units from 

the KAGA. It should be noted that (lJ this raid ties up impot'tant :~ forces for a long time ( 2) The military damage is small (3) the risk of loosing a CV is great (4) 

Bombing of shore objectives in this manner does not 

altogether agree with Cominch strategy (his 171750 :referred 

to yesterday). The raid does have, however, great public approval. As one result of this raid we see the good work 

being done by our radio intelligence. 

NAS Midway seems to think that there is some life on 

Pearl and Hermes reef. Some Japs could have landed there from 

a submarine rec~ntly. 

We are having trouble with the fuel tanks in the 

Yorktown VFs. 

The Smnner will complete the survey at Nandi on 

April 27th. 

Cominch is sending the approv~ code names to arrive 

here about the 25th. Maybe this will clean up and settle 

that matter. 

Leary says in his (180135) that CinC Pac view that 

our officers command task forces containing a .CV regardless of rank is concurred in by the ACNB. 

The airfield at TONGATABU is in fine shape and will 

probably be of value to TF 17 for the next few days. ~ey 

arrive• there tomorrow after a long stay at sea. 

We are taking steps to oppose the expected mo'te of 

Orange in the SW Pacifi.c. Our date of commencement of the 

offensive is the end of the month, while Cominch thinks 

it will be the first week in Ma~. Taking into account the 

possible delay due to air search ~(above CincPac 

and Cominch are in agreement as to the time. CincPac 

will probably be unable to send enough forces to be sure 

of stopping the expected Jap offensive. ----

Com 14 wants 1,000 marines to guard the waterfronts in his 

district. This would be of some help to the not too good Hawaiian Defense set up. 

Rabaul was attack by two planes. There 

misses on 2APs. 10 AP and one cruiser were 

They are the tar~et - not the airfields. 

The Jap base at KOEPANG may be moved. 

was l hit and 2 

in the harbor. <V' 

v 

38 5 
April 18 (Continued) 

~ril 19 

ThreA ships of Batdiv 3 are returning to Japan, 

Cincpac (181915) describes the loading of Orange CVs. 

A squadron of Orange CBs is enroute Wake today. 

Cincpac in his 192151 recommends a logistic plan for the South Pacific Islands. 

There was no news about the Tokyo raids except in 

the press. 

A possible submarine contact was reported by the 

Army at Christmas. 

The PREBLE reports that there is no sign of life 

at Pearl and Hermes Reef. The report of life there by a 

plane was investigated. 

Rabaul was again attacked by our planes with small 

results. 8 ships were reported in that harbor. 

Vice Admiral Brown is on leave until May 1st. 

April 20. 

The problem of providing ways and means to deal with 

the expected Japanese offensive in the Southwest Pacific was 

discussed informally by Admiral Nimitz. 

There is still no word from Admiral Halsey. 

The landing field at ROSES is now ready for VFs. In 

his 202050 to Com-14 the Major General Commandant said that a 

limited number of tanks can be supplied to outlying bases. 

The first priority for the tanks is offensive units but the 

Major General Commandant infers that he agrees that tanks are 

necessary for defense battalions on our outlying coral atolls. 

The TANGIER indicates that, after due notice, and providing 

modest supplies, we can operate PBY-5As {amphibians) at NOID{mA. 

The PREBLE reports recent signs of life at KURE ISI~ND. 

This seems to indicate a visit by the Japs within the past two 

months. 

In his 202110 Opnav states that a Joint Army and Navy 

committee is now studying the Pacific logistics. So are we. 

356 
April 20 (Continued) 

Cominch now wants tankers speeded up on the Hawaii - West Coast run. This is being done to some extent. 

,..., I 

The Army bombed the FLYING FISH. They do considerable 

damage to our SS and something definite must be done to stop it. 

The first job for the LAFFE..Y is the NEVADA escort to 

Bremerton. 

Minor bombings continue on SALAMOA. These recent attacks by our forces may be slowing up the Jap effort in this 

area. More Jap troops are being landed at BOUGAINVILLE. 

Indications for the next Jap offensive in the Southwest Pacific continue. Our date for the commencement is tentatively May 3rd. ~~ 

387 
8! s n:n,"' 

21 1549 BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA ARB PLANNING 

TO SEND TO NOUMEA MATERIAL :B,OR UNDERWATER DEFENSE 

AND I¥PROV1~MJ~NT OF FACILITIES ON SHORE X THESE 

PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE TiffiU THE ACUB X IN VIEW OF 

THE TECHNICAL SKILL REQUIRED THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 

WOULD PREFEH THAT THE INSTALLATIONS BE MADE UNDER 

THE SUPERVISION OF THE ACNB POR WHICH PURPOSB THJ~ / 

LATTER ARE PREPARI~D TO SEND AN OFFICER IN CHARGE 

AND STAFF rro NOUMF.J\ X SUBSEQUENTLY THIS PERSONNEL 

MIGI!'r EXERCISE CONTROL OF' THE HJ\.RBBR UNDER AN 

AUSTRALIAN PORT CAPTAIN BUT AFTER AN INTERVIEW 

WITH ADMIRAL AUBOYNEAU :OOUBTFUL IJ? THE FR}"i;NCH 

WOULD AGRh"E X YOUR RECOMMENDATION IS REQUESTED 

X ARMY CHIE ~ OF STAFF CONCURRS X CHICAGO DELIVER 

to comgen us forces new caledonia. 

.3GB 
GCT APR 

24 0430 

24 0825 

(Continued) 

flying boat inspected aerodrome. Allied air oper- ations 24 April fortresses marauders and B-25's attack 

Lae aerodrome and installations. B-l?'s attack ship- ping near Rabaul. Usual searches west Horn Island 

northwest Tulagi and south Salamaua latest photos Lae 

show 23 fighters dispersed off runway 3 others prob- ably unserviceable near hanger. 4 bombers. 6 blast 

pits westernside. 3 dispersal areas east of northwest end runway. 

COMANZAC to OPNAV info CINCPAC 

Allied cruisers and destroyers ·in Task Force 44 must 

be conversant with U.S. Signal and Tactical Instructions in order to operate with Pac Fleet Task Forces. 

To this end am supplying Australia, Canberra, Hobart 

with General Signal Book, Tactical Instructions, 

Fleet Doctrine, Call Books. To communicate effici- J"' 

ently they should also have effective contact code 

air code and other crypto channels Pacific. Request authority issue class 4 allowance including ECM to 

above 3 ships. Sufficient cipher machines available 

ex sail boats. Will furnish liaison officers as required. 

369 
8ii8ll8T 

--

GCT APR 

23 1725Z NZNB to CINCPAC 

Army desires transport approximately 2000 personnel 

New Zealand to Fiji in May. In addition to hired 

transport propose utilize HMNZS MONOWAI and HMS 

ASCANIA as escort and to assist in transfer personnel. 

HMNZS MONOWAI 12th to 16th May ID~S ASCANIA 12th to 

28th May. 

24 0400 _ COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC, etc. 

24 0430 

This is the first of 2 parts. Scheduled attack vessels southeast New Hanover unsuccessful due bad 

weather which also obscured Kavieng but 2 objects 

possibly ships s~~hbed in strai~s there. Nil enemy 

air activity Cape Gloucester. B-26's bombed 3 transports Talili Bay (South Watom Island) obtained near 

misses. Confirms ttse this anchorage for dispersal 

shipping. 3 other marauders dropped incendiaries on 

wharf installations northwest side Simpson Harbor 

starting fires. Encountered little AA fire except 

machine guns from shore and ships in harbor. Marauders machine gunned motor transport and personnel. 

Saw in this harbor 2 l~rge 5 medium transports of 

which one at new wharf. Reconnaissance Duke York 

revealed no aerodrome nor VP there but small freighter 

and yacht southeast thereof. Encountered AA fire 

from VLU Island. Submarine on surface ST. GEORGE 

Channel 9 miles southeast Cape Gaz~lle. 3 AP tonnage 

about 5,000 sighted underway in Ataliklikun Bay. 

Total shipping observed Rabaul area 23 April 16 vessels. No AA construction nor other activity seen 

Watom Island. End of part one. 

COMSOWESPACFOR to CINCPAC, eto. 

Part 2. Possible ship or submarine which fired on 

our aircraft was sighted yesterday afternoon 90 miles 

northwest Port Moresby from whence planes sent to 

attack. Latter town raided 11 hours local time by 

8 type 99 bombers escorted by 7 type 0 fighters not 

intercepted by Kittyhawks but antiaircraft kept planes 

up. 8 bombs dropped from 21,000 feet hit center run- ~ay making 300 yards the reof temporarily unserviceable. 

3 enemy VF machine gunned ground installations without 

serious effect. Vicinity Cape Melville (Northeast 

coast Au stralia) 3 unidentified schooners sighted yesterday. Enemy officers 19 April arrived Salamaua in 

37 0 
~. '.l'here are "'lany indication ·c::tat the anomy will launch 

an often· 1ve in the N',:.; (: liNEA - .11:7\\V HRI~'AIU - sn .lH Oll IST..A;1 ~A5 

arett eomeneing about }~117 3, 194$. The probl r1. harQ eonsidored 

is how to dea~ with that of'tens1ve. insofar as tho Comm.underin-Ch1cf, 1· o1f1c Oee n Areaa is concerned_ th1le continuing 

to ca.rr:r out the tasks a a 1t;nec.1 b 1t not directly r~·~l ted to thls 

proble 

The S1 tufl. t1on 

~. The D.S51gnod ta.al"'s or tho Comrnt nd r-in-Chiof' • Pacit1c co n 11 reas aro: 

( ) Uold 1slnnd poai tiona b ttnlon lJ,.JITL) ~~'T i>·fl1:s and Southest Pnpific Jirea nooesenry f'or socuri t:y o.i~ the line of uownun1-

cnt1ons between these regions tmd for supporting naval, air .:u1d 

amohibioua ·onare.tlona ai;uinat Japanose. 

(b) 5Up?.JOrt optn~ut1ona of .f('):v-cas 1n South,•est , c1f1c rea. 

(c) Contain Japanese forces 1th1n ncific Tht~a tre. 

(d) nupport tho defensle oi" the oont1nont ol" .l~. R'I'H A I.E IC.i • 

{c) l)rotoc.t essential so a nd air eomr~utlica. tiono. 

{1') Proptt.ro for exectu;ion of jor anphibious offensives 

a:. a1nat po 1 tiona held by ,Japan 1n1 ti.e.ll y to b launchod frora 

South P ·c1t"1c nd l"outhwest l~no1.tic it.raa. 

:3. 7hauo are supplam.entary to thf; !'"ollo ~lns::~ basic 

directive! 

_e.sks asa.ignod you atmwtnrize into t 7o prir.mry ta ks 

1n ordor of priority" 

lit,.st, coverinG find hol·iin :

1 line ~J;\\IAII - l!IDVAY 

nnc1 :1aintnining ita eq :lr ur1ications ~tith host Goa at; 

!l$Ocon<1,. and only in small degroo leas ir1portf.t.nt, nnintcnc~ncf;) of corru:-run1c~ t1on \h)nt Cov. nt - .t.n:3'::.'RttLIJ 

chiefly by Cf.)V t""in~ , sactu··int; and holdinr line 

i~. d II - f:'u\UOJt. ~hlch shOl>,l d be c,.,xtt~ndod to lt..al ude 

?IJI at earliest prncticrble ( i tc. 

I - l 

371 
. ·• 

• The t · sks ass1cned to t ht} Supl .. emo r:.mlandtu~, !louthv1est 

.P c1£1c \r a. bioh boa.r an the I'roblorn un.der f1'CUdy arc: 

( ) Hol d t 'l ey m1l:i tnry r e gions of 1dJS'~ltAL!A as bases 

for .futur. o.f.fensiv no tion n ., inst J .\ An· and in orrler to chock 

np n ·3e conquest in th1o oa. 

(h) Ch· ok enarnJ advance to~J'd AUSr:1R \LIA nd ·its e tvent1al 

l1nos of' conmuniontions by d ntruct1on ot enemy cot1batant, troop, and · ·pp ly hi,.., , aircrnrt and bas s in l~A rr~ .~l N l LAY!l!A and f;t 

u .. r I Sl,AHCK - sr-·Lonot I !}U !~>d r gion. 

(o) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 

(d) - - - - - - - - - - - •• ~ - - - - - -

( ) Protect cot.1munie t1ons ~ · h:l.n Southweat P c1f1o Ale 

nd 1tn clo ppro ohos. 

(l'') -- -- - --- - -- -- - --- - - --- - - -- - (g) Suppol,.t operu ion of · tr1 ndly forcos in P o1f1c c cean 

Area and Indian 'l'h.ea tre. 

(h) Prepare to tnl::e orr naive. 

h tollo in.; cle n tch from t~ e Oot1r.1Qnr~ r-1n-L111ef, 

U. S . lf'l l t, to Cotttrl ndnr-1n-Ch1ef, U.S. 0 cit1c Pl e e t, and 

Commander o J.1orco must be considered wl th the second t k 

set forth aoove t 

I CKS .H SHIPS J tD Dl :c~P I!IO I I 

:n-~l;IT' , A Ttl .. ~~ ... tr ~i iit~r~'i;Rji >r\H'I' o.i:- (, •• N'I'H .~ p,~ CI ••IG Hl.\H~ 

.i;l rtt:ED L't. : 'J:;R c.? COUV0Y3 :~ rr .. ··l;r;r IIOJ..l ~LI\1 D A1lD ~( UTH\:-'111.. 

~ru~~ 

:~U3Ut .. : I Nn op ,:;~v ~'Iol:S f:JJA '~ '.r i-~tn~.Y' Slli?. ~ 1\UV SHI PPI NG 

rrn •.V:i;~·atdH1 i10U'l'H CHI :f1A SEA \n:LrJ ~~o SI.:!\VC ~ 0 In~ P 

r;r ~r s:~ ."-I I .~. u ._'T'IOH :r.~-! !H;JIJ\N ',CEAN J~H'T; 'l'J:1 P 31\. 

L'\ARY S1 iO ·~· r. :r ~ DE;,pl~ frtCH .~·~ ( 

OPEtU\':~:(>.t~ h . .l>fD CL:r·~ .. '

1 0 1 

j_, 

37 2 
5. P'rom th.esa tasks 1 t will be seen th t tho .. o i1ich 

imm di t ly pply ar : 

Chock snem. !vance towarc.1 J\U!:Yl"fti\.LIJ nd its essential linou or C<Yt.nnuniot tions by doetru ttion of onemy combatant, 

troop, nd su·pnl7f ship , 1:rcr.nrt · nd bnsoa 1n 'RhSTEIUi l4AIJYr'IA 

nd ~tt ~ OUIUFJ\ ... BISMAncrr • SOLOMO i I~3l J ~fDS region. 

Ooe .n Area# 

Su . . ort opcr tionn of .t.C roe in Southweat Pae1t1c Aro • 

6. It 1s interred that the Commancicr-1n•Cllief, u.s. t.1J.o t, 

1nte~ld. to employ la:rgo P o1f1c lf'l.oot foi--oca in the solution ot 

thia problom. 

I - 3 373 
l. ( ) The Japanese are nuehod w'1tl1 vietory. 'l"he1r morale 

1a hi ~h. As long a th course of thoir op.er -ciono p:roceode 

e.ecordlnr~ to lan their morale nd ef.ric1oncy 1ll rom.a1n high. But hen they are l"'o:reed to improvise becauae of major a tb elta 

a lO\fer1ng of eff1c1onc:r and r.1or le can b expected. The im.-

pr esion 1a g ined that th y have de.f1n1t ly been held up 1n 

the ;:- .. ST2!!ftN U ~ GUINEA rea by t4l! ·1oase 1nfl1cted by Vice 

Admiral Brown t s Force and b;r tho per at stont bombing from 

AUSTRALIA nd POF T MO!-U~SDY. 

(b) The1r 2laru11n6, tratning, and experience 1a excellent and ·must notbe underestimated. rl!ho attack on PE.ii . .RL l .. AHBOR 

was a wo:r~,:mrmlilro job 1n every reepect. That opor tion ItW.y bo 

taken as an exar:tple ot what they can o in tt e y o.~. planning nd ex oution or th plans. 'flr.lng, the objective. ·tho surprise, drivins homo the att ck - all show that \VO oan expect oxcell(1nt work. Their . rmy has shown ab111 ty and th · will to l'oaoh objoo- t1 a even 1n £aoe o conoider bl o position. They CAn travel 

over v ry :>ad terrain. 'rho1r .food supnly 1s var1 s1mple - a t w 

handefull o~ rice plus what tho country can offer seerla to keep them going in £1gh·t1ng trim. !n lnntl1ng. they aro perf ctly ill n~ to coopt large losaea 1rom enemy f1re and dr wn1ngs, and 

t;hey do reach objoct1ves in spite or losses. '"Vh1le tho genoral terrain in t area under study 1s not the best fo:r ampb1biou · 

operation , thoy have alroa.dy aNply demonstrated e;re t ability in oqu ll¥ bad places. 

(o) It has been determined tbnt, g~nerally speaking, their airplanes hn vo [)rea tor rang than Oltll"S• In p rt1cul r • 

by tho us o belly tanks thoir fighters have a radius of s<n.te• 

thing over 500 r.dloa. Thoy also 'ru;.ve, t irly effective seaplane fighters. 

(d) rrhoir aerial torpedoos are oxo ll·ont, and tho t .. c~1que 

ot t;beir uoa has been very good. 'Ibere 1a ev1denoe that their 

aerial torpedo as run very aceura toly, take depth quiekl y .rte:r 

a very short run, and tl'm.t they ,may a er1f1co ran ... ~·o .for oi(!ht oi explos1v • -

(e) Th.oy have a .lplJ demonsi;re. to the cxcollonce of tho1r 

ai.r po or fl g: .inst surf ce ah1pa whon t! oao t.Hl.t·face ships 1 v 

· ina equate e.1r protection. 

(:f) On the oth.or h nd, o·ur t1.en B.l... . .just t s hruvo, and 

thotJe to f"JB.VO boan pr~ope:rly trained nre believed to be uotte.t• 

than their oppo 1 te ~rnpano tlO number. ~ur Hn vy undor fire in 

II ... l 374 
( 

(.r) continued. 

tl1is war, ospooially in air com.\)S.t haft loft 11 ttlo to bo dos1rod. 

Our J\rtty is u.ntrlod except nt ~A TA N', whcx'e the ;~round troopa 

re ma ~n1f.1t}ont. But thoro, nd in the ltll~IJ.,YSIA campalr;n, Am'f 

air sbowecl lack ot: proper training n-'1 eoord1nati,on. Our exeruis· or unityof command is prob$-bly interior to that ot· the 

Japanese bee use or our laelt of' ex.por1t1'nce in this respect. 

(g) Our au mnrinos nu their personnel hs.vo 1nd1c ted consideruhle superi r1ty. 

(h) In g n~~r 1 due to tl superiority of our personnel in ro ourc t'ul.n s nd 1n1t1at1ve, and ot tho undoubted super- iority or much or our equ1pment wo should bo ablo to ceeut 

odda ir1 battle 1f neoessacy. 

2. c 

· (a) Jfzdrosra2b:r, Toposraphz. The lt}ail1tl8 U1rectione kre dequate ror ord1nar'1 navivst1on and for a general description ot the Thoat~o. Certain o1nta desorv emphasis: 

(1) Navigation in· the area 1s difficult due to 

inaccurate charts, rather strong currents, r..um:y atoll • stoala ·nd rea.rs.. However, prudent nav1r;ator· can bo expeoted to take our sh1pa any place military oper - ti onn det-1And. 

(2) vig!i·l tion of£ the southe t coast of NJY uun!t J 

ls particul rly di,ft1oult duo to inaccurate ch rts- matly 

1alC~.ruis, al10 ls, and reers, and the r ct the.t the lead 

seldom g1 ves w rninf:t of danger. Near the aoa~ t tho wa te~ 

1s often thiek d mudd!T• 

(3) 'l'he islands ro very thinly popul r.;ad and the 

culti v tlon t:b.f):,.a atforlda poor eup~)ort tor troops. A 

high and very r 1gp;ed motmtain range extends through. the length of the island of Ul-;\\1 BHI :.t.n, with the 

highest peak·. 7540 £not. In ii:~; lu~ r.Jtl. D tno 'tnountain 

are up to 6000 teet. But there, between Mt. ~"'0! OMUI' 

(4265 £ et) and tho northea .. t tip of* the island, t h .:. o 

aro. t~m d1p w1 th a ,.,nximurn elevnt1on of' eoo toet. i J.e 

Ln ,fOtl ~~. L;\1-tDS lao present t ho oha.ructer1at1<~S of the 

thors in that ·thoro is t l1e usual claain of nount in 

fo • tll: r.toet part ooverod w1 th dcrute :rorost an( rank undergro~r;rth. I~tlndin s woul :i pree(tnt no t;roat dif'£1oul t .... 1o in the ren us t .hc;re ,;, re many- h.s rbors an l beaches. 

37 

II- 2 
(b) The ~ eather. A chart of conrii tions for tho month of 

May is attaehod as Annex "A"., tlota that there are apt to be 

hurric nes making up in the SAMOANJ .F'IJI, and CO?lAL SEA areas. 

In the SOLOMONS - NEW BRI'l'AIN - NI~W GUINHA area flying w1ll be 

tricky vvith much .ra1n..c'm.t:ltclouds. The pilot ehart gives average conditions • . This;~ "eo be studied 1n connection with particular operations • . Our pilots recently reported that the 

passe in the mountains vu~re clear or clouds only 1n the morning hours. 

(o) Daylight will be tron &tbout 0530 to 1830 1n Latitude 

150 South on May 7th, while there will bo a full moon on both 

May lst and June la.t. 

(d) The following di~tancea are ot interest: 

PnARL to SAMOA . 

PEARL to TONGATABU 

P RL to SUVA 

PIURL to NO'Ul.W..A P~~L to MORESBY 

TONGATADU to !lOU l!!A 

'rolTGATABU to SUVA 

r.t'ONGJ' .. ':rABU to MID CORAL SEA 

SUVA to RABAUL 

TRUK to RABAUL ( wa tar) 

YOKOSUXA to HABAUL 

MBA UL to tAE ( w ter ) 

RABAUL to LAE {air) dORESBY to LAE (air) MORESBY to LAE (water} MORESBY to HABAUL (air) 

MORESBY to RA.BAUI., (water) 

3. I~PORMiTION 

_ 2276 m1lee 

2700 tt 

2"150 " 

.3400 tt 

4410 u 

990 n 

430 " 

1700 " 

1836 ft 

795 • 

olao " 

420 u 

350 It 

150 ft 

1080 tt 

440 u 

950 " 

( ) While we get very good communication 1ntelligenco,a weakness 

1s our lack of organization to obtain and evaluate combat 

1ntell1Bence to best advantage. Such an organization is being 

et up. We are able to obtain rather good CI and RI information, and our radar 1s improving. Our codes. are thought aeo.ure. 

But a national weakness 1s tr~t through gossip, oarelesoneas, 

etc., we do not deny information to the enen1y that 1s of v-alue 

to him. Included are ·ship movements, building program, press 

releases, some ruture plans, and land military installations 

ot: all kinds. 

(b) Duo to his systematic col lee tion of 1nfol''r.tl.a t1on 1n 

the past and to the almost certain existence o!' spioa and 

sympathizers, we must assume that the enerny is well informed 

of the present overall strength ot .. our armed forces, the details 

of our major bases, and the general location of our Navy. 375 
(c) Our own ccmrnunlcation racilitiea re 

a.r - tho c of th enerny 1 as far as we can jurl::.e. 

4 • l!..,rl my; Forces , 

eellent. So 

(a) Ultimate J panesc strength in the op ration cannot 

b accura t ly · s tiJ':nG. ted at th1. s ti.nH~. Annex "B" shows 1nf'orrnat1on dat d pr1l 22, 1942, on force which might t k part. 

{b). The total n v 1 .forc(-!a• lncluC.ing a!r, w 1ch we may be expected to op ose in the are are estimated on April 22, 

1942, to be: 

CV - Fi v , namely 1 ZUIKAK.U, SHOKAKU,. RYID"' XU, 

K A SUGA MAfiU 1 1

\AGA. { l¢ote: · There are tndiee tiona 

that th Comm.ander let Air Fle t in AKJlGI may 

p rt1o1p te). 

BDn - t l ast nne . (rlotet This is not ol .a.r yet. 

2 DBs re used on the 1nlt1al nttack on HABAUL 

nd. at l nat 2 BBs. w~"re used in recent opera- tions in the BEI~GAL rea) • 

CA - At lea t five, nan~elyt 2 - 7500J 3 - 10,000. 

CL - t least four. 

DD - t least twelv , exolustve of plan guards. (Uott: 4 more DD indicated as poso ble). 

<'S ... Indf)fint te, but up to twelve for NAlDAIJ. .. E5 - '·~~'.f BRITAIN rea. 

VB - Sl (heavy}; V ·, • 80; Vi! -20J VO -26. 

{.r-1ot : Th · folloN1na addi t1ono.l · :r est 1mted to b. in the NfAHSHAL.LS: VB • 54 (heavy) 

vr1 

• 54; VP • 28; VO • 26). 

(c) Th . only thinr;; known about troop 11th t ther re 

transports 1n th R PJ1UL Area . It rnus t be asumed tho. t troops nd 

tr neports are vall ble. in Sl~flclent fore, for m jor attack 

no that other camp 1gns hilV, been successfully completed. 

5. · Bas.ea. 

MBAUL - f his bas a good harbox~ ··wb.ere considerable numb r of 

6f1Jpe can anchor. · It is defended by AA, al thoue;h :t•ecent :re-pC>rts do not show conai tcntl-y heo.v·y nor accurate Aft .fir-t~. .!.lher r · 

t o lsn ln ~ fi lds - ono nE)nr tho hat"bor·, and .one 9 miles a~ "&tj • 

Loth are avni:t\ble _to vn. I an~ ~.rs, shops, and ~torr-~hous s a . . "· no1.m to be us d there· by the Jn::pano.se for• t."'li l:.t .~ary operu c..~ns. 3 7 7 . . ' 
RADAUL (continued) 

h vc no intorr:1a.tion on eonatul bnttel .. iea. U 'U"Oi lithts 

have been obaorved. 1'I'he pproH.cheu may he m1nod .and netted 

but sueh inforr·1 tion 18 lacking. 

el."' re a1r bases near ru~ru ur. t !UW1ltAUAU (Vr and 

V· ) , !J .. C'tJUAI (Vs~ and poas1bl7 V 3}, Sl ~P.Sl$N UAHE!1R (VP anchorage) • and 

ER!tVrt.~. At tho lnttor. pla,oe tho enemy is t 1ought to ba C<>n• 

utruet1ng di pGr l i1~oue. 

fi1l~\UL lao has a we tbe~ station. 

Th1 s 1 eeapl ne harbor us d tor ro1'uel1ng VPs. 

at o~ t.-1 town there is a.n &il•field :1th hangar · 

for VBs and VPa. There in some AJ protection. Nothini 

ab>ut !nos or net • 

tJ~E - n ndv no . position :.or VB and VF air operation • 

anall ah1pa b ve boen ohaorve.d 1n the · rbor. Thia is closely aasoc1at d and s1m1lar 1n u ·ntl defense to SAJ',.,.AMAU/1 ·no rby. loth pl e s a undor the .. _Y: BHI~ Ilf 1~1r Cor:ml&n • 

Oa&tATA - 1.'his ia . inly n emorgonoy seaplane anchoraee. 

'Niere 1s a small l nd"'nn ·~1eld . Only VP l1ave boen obaervod 

ther Our plane h ve r · oeivod heavy i'li.A f1r•e fl'\Ott th.ia pla.co. 

seaplane anohorai~e wld n SP.Jall lartd• 

\1 f) bean no ted. 

An raorg ney s plane anchorage. !fo .ru.e111t1es or 

aecomoodat1ons ashore. Rad1o to 11\.PAUL. B·t.een 300 and noo 

troop havo been landed tlu~t~e this r.ztonth ~ Vl' havo beou observed .a.troll1ng the harbor. 

rrhe enemy has also occupied _,. ;-SSA, J.?A!SI, BUKA 

Pll3SJ'ln;;, nd Kir:.~~A. Very small 1 nd1ng rtolds exist a~ the 

1 at t o. 

G. wn Forces. 

Tho s1 tuation wit l. !" ape.ct to own oro.es 1s set 

fo1•th as well as 1t can be predicted for· the period l-15 I< y. 

(a ) .]ltt ttl shl p s. 

'l'ho ltH!.at.1on of .. tl e ae.von battleahii.Hl will der>end 

upon tho d -oision as to their next tn<Jva. mhe Catnmttnda:t•-lnChlof • TJ. ~.3. ? c1f'1c~ ;?l.eet, hus already d oided tc> 1 CO!:lrttond 

tha. t t.d..e.r rettl.Pn to tl1e CoN-st. Het'-aons: 

(l) ... ~copt in ttu~ Southwos·t Pneil'ic tllcl--e t.tp[>eu:rs 

to bo little c1 n~o of finding uultuhle ot .jectivas t'or tho emplo~ont ()·f" th it' power. 3 7 8 

II - G 
(2) In the Southwont Pacif'ic thore are no sui t&.blo 

ba ·t.)S y t ready for b ttlo~hi~a, and float logistic . ej .. l1t1es &n"e 1nsuffic1~,nt to :rup;->ort thmn and adu1-

t1oP 1 l rg for c n 1n tl:v{ t r·ea. 

(3) To furnish au1tt..tblo air and surtaoe ac.Peening 

to th . battl ships would take ;Ct)rces which cnn be util- ized aa carr1or striking groups for h1ah thoro re 

cert in to be suitable ob,ect1vos. 

( ))) perat1ng es.rrior gx~u o atl.d battleship in 

coordination roduoes t':le freedom of action of the forntor. 

(5) The only su1tablo basu, J_; AH!.~ J ~RBfHt, 1-a unduly congested nd ausoent1ble to air attack, ,partioularl:r wh n r pr1s l .tor the TOKYO ttnck may be expected. 

(6) Tb.c fuel supply 1s onl rtow beginning to be held 

l vol 1thout ·ny drain by the b~ttltshipa . 

Task Fore en containing the buttl ships will be in 

the area to aat-ws.rd of' ClrR"!f/l'f,fAS about 23 April. 'il1o screen 

tor the battleships 1 composed of only 5 deetroyern. t.r tho 

reco:mmcndud decision is mado t :tis orce will !"'Oturn to San 

Franci co. 

(b) Carrier Task · oroos. 

(l) 'i'ask I~'orco Seventeen t B!..,tCACl r. ~ until 26th, 

our dato. Can be at ron<lezvoua northwest ot lfOlJMF.i.t\ . 

1 J!ay our date. This force l ~rt ~i,UL 16 l!1

ebrunr.,- nd 

sb..ol lc not rer.win etivo nrueh longer without .ro£1 t 

here . 

(2) Taslc 1·orco ~"!even now an rou-ctl to ooru .. L S.F'· 

should roach ronaozvo~a on 30 Apr11. 

(3) Taslt Force -."1xteo.n (2 CV) shoulu arrive ~: RL 

ahout 26th. Should be able to leaVf) on 50th, roaching 

santo rendezvous 13-15 !,lay our da:r;a . Ttl :nattor or the 

r.. JRHET•<:) planes ia unce1--ta1n. 

{c) Esaorta. 

All ot the rertW.1n1ng s-urf,; t1 torc$a o.ra n.ssiened to 

escort du.ty and ttt-fJ cons1dt~r.od to lle th~ m1n1lntll't.i thnt antic1-

pa. ted oond:l tiona roqu1 re • e'\i~en vti th tho cover i1h1oh will be 

a ... omeii h:; forces operatlne !n tho Southweot. 

IJ - a 379 
(l) IIO! OLULU 11.11 be at SAi:oJ wtth oonvoy begirming 

20 April. 

(2) IH: •I r~ A?' LIS arrives fJlfl~;Y w1 -ch convoy about 

'.l ~ '1• 

{3) ACffiLLI,:S and }t:,\~lD ~R anrl $ dootroy rs will be with 'HS convoy arr1v1n-: there about :5 May. 

( 4) HICLl'. Ol1D and DL -11 be w1 th DL:~ACJI R convoy 

arriving about 8 hay. 

Most or tll destroyer involved in tho.so escorts will . be in tl c pr-oooaa or boin: .. turned ()\T 1 .. to the South OSlJ Pac1£1c Fo1~co . 

"the OOI3E will be t E! ... D! URl'IE on 23 Atn--11 . lter oon- 1t1on 1 somu hat doubtt:ul and mho has little close-in M 

d r ns and he ha beon orderod to ~.Arc:: !ST~ND but 1a availablo for n e&stbound convoy. 

Th, .. r ill bo a ven fleet oiler av 1 able. I11 a 

soparo.te study, Annox '"Gn, it has buen determined thllt tho 

maximum roroe h1ch t hea can k"'J p fueled 1n the C' HA ,. s~ 

until bout Jtul lst la the equivalent or ab~>ut tour oarx-1er 

>roup,. 'fh1a could be .furthor extended by t te u.sa of chartered . tankora pro llidod there 1 a n( . troublo \Vi th thoil~ cr ~s. fl 

oilors av ilable $re: 

lll~OSH( ~ Y.AS .. U SKIA, LA. ~rc , C'UYA U~ and _rlj:tp.t-;C l (r :. 

at f>!5

(H:lont. CI~!A~ nf u , 8111lifH~ return with Vice ' dn1ral Ualsoy. y~ rA 1 ··~ av 11 bl 2-3 ,, 1• 

.,rhe S.tlDilLi. i o sl tod ~or o\rerhuul beginning 15 £!ay. 

The lJADH .~ will completo overha.ul on 13 :a:l• St~ IGA and 

fiAl1A PO re aorv1cin6 at. OHABOHil. 

(e) 5ubt:nl.r1n s. 

Uost of o·ur aubr.to r irlos ure eithor on J1fc.. tt•ol ofT the Japan.:~oc hocteland or tu""o on route f!:Oing or retur tins . ri'he 

re , 1n1ng un ta a e schedul ed to' move to southv, oat A'J!;T!tt. L. 

via va1··1ous putrols, including one on t .tU ·rnUI\-hJ\.>A1J!J line. The arr1v ·l at tho.t lino enn be xpedited by oancelling or 

cutting short the patro s in 1e J:!i H!~~lA.Ll'.n. Tho subnurin s 

which mi t~ht he thus avalla.hl e f.n~o: 

I I ... 'l 

380 
Name 

-

OAR 20 1inril 

TAU'.rno 24 Aor1l GRA~PUS 20 April 

(Can be xpedit&d by about 0 days). 

J, rri ve south 

of TRUK 

']he GRl~ENLIH!l left for a 'l}utrol at TRUK on 20 pril. th P'JLL ·CK and SILr:.nt.>!DES w11l be ava1lablo on 30 .Ap:t"il; the 

"AU'I'ILUS on 15 l!ay. 

It would probably not be doa1rubla to ple.co p11trols aouth or l; :'1Al1L bocnuse of interference with tho aubr:1 rtnes of 

the South est P c1tic ·~oree which will bo roady to take over 

tllis area on l y .. 

(r) Aircnrt 

Only thoue aircraft wl'ttc.h o.an fly to tho ar-ea neod 

b considered in this p~oblem~ They ret 

(1) 90 VPB, HR 

Amph1b1an goar) • 

11an Area (including SO •111 th 

6 VPB at liO UMJ~ • 

{2) 29 U-l7•a at OAHU .. certainly not enough to 

nrov1de a rea onably stro triking force in d renee 

or the Hawaiian Area. 

(g) sea. 

{1) earl Hnrbor ta the only nmin b ne doveloped anc y, ttaiiio. · , 

(2) Auoklan<l la earmarked as a nain base but baa received i:1ttle development yet. 

(3·) Szd9J!:;f hna many or the attribute of' a main 

h se w1tn ita harbor and docl: faoilit1es. It also G under- con truction the only drydock in the area which 

l11ll take oapit 1 sh.1p {e:XJlOctod to be eo!aplot~d vorJ short~ly)., !t;t however, hAs little in thew y of d _.fenaea. 

(4) .Tonsatabu. I,esignrtt'4:ld as intermod1ute o crating b by ~ffie dommander-1n-Chlef", u. . il1.oet~ F i:r · noho:r-

.rtge; negl1 g1 bl e dot:' ,6ns.o s a tl yet • U. 3.. garri son arr1 0 s 

s.hout 8 :!ay, but prov1 a :ton of fighting airctt£ltt 1 s indefinite. 

II- 8 . 381 
(5). P1.J1. t 1 ndi l:.o1n:~ davelopacl as n spaciou nohora~e; gO<)d nattural J)-l"'Otectlon a{sai.nst submarines; 

u.r' • .ri ·1hter !.rera.f'·t. Uew ?.ualand <lo.fense m .. dioe~e. 

Suv fa.nehora o Bmtl.ll .for eal"'r1el". 

(a) !,.o ~a,. ltl 11?' na turt1.lly- :pro tee ttJd nchorage. 1ather advanood toward the en<Jttly. v.s~ det"'ons&s being in talled. !A).r?o a1r.f1eld; u.s. t1p-)ltere. 

(~) Tutu1 a. Small nava* t tion1 vor limited t~r or; fa1r do en e • 

( ·) Sorabor. Fueling ba e. too far removed rro 

aotlv tlieatro l'or cons1dorat1on in thi est1~te. 

v 

(9) C,anton, Chria~tnta,a ... ,Pa).:rn'l!1l avail bla as staging 

o nta ror a! eratt. 

(ll) TJ1la~1. V·Gr-"J adv~ced eaplano ba o. Auatraltana 

are till ua ns 1 t in sp1 te ·ot" an occaa1onal bottb1ng. 

(12) Uoreab.z. •flle probable enemy obJective is 

.fairly tlove1'op d bas$. Southwest Pacific 1rora£t are 

still basing thoro and ~re tle ones car~J1ng out almost 

1ly reeonnaiasa.nco an<l bombing aga1nat the enemy. place of 001lrae reeu1vaa frC:fquent bombinga. 

(h) ~!Ref11.ti~l¥'~'l 'l,ro.op·s. 

B&coe ary air bases 

anrt tho stag1nf5 of B-£6 'a 

(1) Seeond ."\a! .. dor Bnttal1on ttlll be ~a dy to movo 

to, lH.AJtL for t1nal six · eoks t~ 1n1ng on l Uay. 

( 1 ) h"'ir t taitler Battalioll il.l rrive SAH0.1 at 

end o£ Ap:r.il. tate of train1ne· unkno n. 

(3) Ampl'.J.bious Corps tr ln1nt~ will not be co p.let d 

until 3~1mer, but five b.attali ne have completed trnin1:nt~ 11th t:-anGpor-cs. 

{ 1) :f.:rS.n.SpQr•t ~ ,an<~ T~>t[!Odi ticUU\1~1 /iilrS. 

{l) h;i,tr)\t ? in var~oua ·iegroae or ,-\e dine as are ~ o:Jignod. T ro Alta _ll be a~:;igned. 

Il - t> 

382 
(2) 3 PD are sa1e-J1ed. t.tthey are b 1ng fi tte 1 

with aound gear clw1ng tho month 01... M 7 but re avail• 

abl on 12 hours notice. :i'btly u:r-e ~.ricisnt to 

carry onl:f three companies o·ut of tour i.n on ra1d r 

battalion. 

The nemy 1a ppar ntly .able to .eurn1sh logistic aupport tor hi:J adv nee. How f .l' ~l.e can still go !n tb1 

rea eo cannot be determined, but, lth th &cl-tipp1ng losses 

he a suft r&d, th limit y ell b near. 

Studies or. our o fuol situation for propoaed operation . 111 be np ended to this t!.atiMtc. 

II ,... 10 383 
I 1 .l J : .. ;!a 

( 

1. Fairly ccur te kno~ledge 

of direction of enemy 

2. 

dv no • 

Pr ent probab111ty or 

bl:ing bl to d t1ot 

chan,. in en ,ny d ploymenJ;. 

Fn my 

1. Supct'io~ CV nd po ai.bly B ~ 

trength. 

2. Prob bly tronger shore b ed 

irforee 1n the di put d ar • 

3. B11 my advance ba. e, /AFJ.r\UT.,~, 3. 

1 1 tl: 1n r g of our 

.:-:.utticlent and ne soned m h1b ... ioua troopa and trans orts .• 

4. 

... };G.sed ircr rt., 

unportin our nav 1 

s S.n the South 0 aci fl c 

otent1ally etrongcr than en~t'IY base '"within ran~:'& of the d1aput d e.t*e • 

4. Training nnd expericno amphibious ~rare. 

in 

5. Strongth of' MORESBY, thouc~h 5. A1r bas a though artJ.ally uncertain, :tnolud a bor - d · voloped re in e sy r n~ .. bas ·.d airoraft. of "!ORT::SBY. 

6. L rg r &nd px·ol; bly t1ore 

e ""f1cie:nt carrier· ir 

5 rou .. 

'7. t:or ft1c1 .nt submarine 

·per onn l. 

€. . Mor r . ourc.efUl and 

skillful personnel. 

9. 1n ; ~ ne r l mor c or-tple te 

and. rrec ti ve ma. t ,rial . 

II-11 . 

e. Better air-orart rmtte f:POL1 

home b . a s. 

0. I"f.fic1 nt er-1 l torpedoe • 

9 • Ac t .i \'e fiDI~ sya t m • 

10. Initiative duo to superior 

11. 

12 

str ,.nr:;th, pr~rtieularly 1n aircraft 

nd amohibio·. foro • 

;.;e . r ., 1,.. to nl.G in base " ? rt1 ~u.la:r.l y if THUK is on c ns derod . 1.nua 

easier log1. t:to and othor 

problems • . r·or(::e ~1...."1d bas s flank ou!~ 11n 

of" CO!llm m C tl.on to P~. -\ t-r., 

r.L CJOrt nnd ~"'· t Go· t. 

384 
, r 

r; R 8 n r i: 

0\m 

l. Pl"ooent w•al{nfUUJ ot South 

Pao1t1o bases. 

2. !.;~Onf:~ li.nea Of ¢()tr.;mU:rd.·C&t1·cn, distantly flanl.z.$d l:Jy ~ne~~ 

positions, thus need ror tH)COl'~tSw 

s. ' 01ff1oul t1eo or !naugttl' ting 

new oommand aot-up_, 

. ,· 

Tenuoua 1-ogistio t1 tua~1on 

and. u.aual nee~:aa1 ty for 

f'u lins at sea. · 

Untrained armr; p!lota ai~ 

general •re&kn as o:r f'orae 1 

in ATJSTRl"I~. 

II•l2 

l. I 

Gen~l•lly oxtend~d ttta te 

of. to.roe.s and newl·y c~nqu&red terr1to~. 

D1£t1nul"ty ot repla:o!ns ahip.s and othttr steel 

produ-cts. 

Disadvanta.gtn.t ot attempting 

·to e•ts.bl1ah new bastHt 1n ·range of enttmy land. baaed 

·. ai~ .• · · ' , 

t)if'fioult and Ufid· veloped ter-rain c)t ea.atern l!I~W 

GUI!ITJt. 

Unt•vo·rabl6 QlOUd and. Wf'Athe:r 

con<li t1on.a • . 

a. · Probable neceea1 ty for 

proceeding r~undabout the Pt~Jl''lAU PFlintst~..A: • 

? • Inherent we:akntaa of 

a.mf).ti.Lbiouo $·Xpe4lt1ona • 

385 

I . 
1. It 1~ 11~£1cult tu v1st l1zo just hat randl.os 

1d s of' conquest the ene . y r .. 1 hnv· , but, in apt to o£ our 

reeogn1 tion of the problom. po ed by l 1 . 1nfl1cn ted concentration in the t ~w f<ftiTAIN Aretl,. · o should con ider ome of the 

oth r d mand which 10 or- e1rcu tancea may pl ce upon his 

oro s. 

2. To ensure holding whnt ~1e 1 a a~ .1nat our 1ncroa 1ng 

strength, or arha '$1mpl7 to inere ae nis holdines, he may. '· . ( ) Con inue tt ck. on IlU)L\. ' 

{ ) Att pt to conquer all of AUf~ ru LIA. 

(c) Try both (a} and (b) at oncn. 

(d) Captur only nough or both to tao111tu.te hi 

ho d on the N. 16. I. and 4-A!..Jl.YA. 

(o) 

"0.. 

(t) 

3. The expected a tt ck on <~'0~{ ··!.;)! t :r:light bo · par't of 

ny of the hove xcopt 2 ( ) and (f). 'Inlcsa t·o hua deo1ded 

on 2 (a) or (li) the onl:r d mands w dch t)uld provont h!.t1 f'rott 

plao1n!; noarly all ot his to-rcoa 1n th RA1.A ~L area ould be 

for: 

( ) A poa iblo 1multan ous drivo ga1nst tho 

Dar- 1n Area. 

{b) Usoort.a ' C: inat £'ur aubmarinos a d other I 1d ra. 

(c) Protective f ol"Ces beliovad necessary a gain t 

our ra1d 3. 

( d ) Striking i""t")rces n. :.~ nat ou:r 1

1{oi-Pno .fio po 1 t1on:s 

(part1<. .. ulavly aa rnvenf:o 1a an incentiva). T~ s '"'cfvcl! -~ a~ 

(e:) ( ll.lbl'l1t.ir•11cs J.n otlr r ra.l.de1 .. 8 t:lg 1nst our liries 

of co:t!.~I.loa t1ons. · ~ 

386 

I I .I - l 
4. All 1nd1o tiona oint to a CitS3ation of the B Y 

of n:~ ·fOAL ot'f nsivo nc a cone ntrat1on at r:t"RUK nd soutL• 

rd theroof. 1\lothing appear · to bf) r.taking up towt rd l!AWA.II 

yet. ~th&r d mana . do not appear to he very strong. sow 

may find a fore 1n the ~}outhwest oven la~ger than tl t 

11 ted in ~eotion II. '.i'he situnt.;..on ust continue to ~ ~'I 

watched. and studied very clneel;;r. A mov to the !louthwi:a:t 

is 1nd1eatod. · Will 1t be only to·r ·(\flES• , o~ JA(; hSBY and 

tne tOM J5 t th1 t1m or will direct advanc to U011lt1~A · 

or StJ A h ttemptec..1.? Pa t parforuance indicates that the · 

ener. v r.ruoh _p:re.fo,. to make his movea under protection or 

land-b ed s.11~oraft, - wi·th f1 ~hxor lf praot1cable. ~orotor , thouf;h the other po·~s1b111t1cs cannot be discarded, it 

1 . olieved th roe·ogn1t1on ot our 1rnrn.od1ate robl.em aa 

bein. an attack for th capture or MOiU~SBY s cox-root. ' . 

!II • 2 

387 
IV .. OVU COURSI::S OF ACT!Otl 

1. Thou~h th enemy till ha th 1n1t1ativ , can 

1"'0P to detect changes in thla deployment and may be able to 

· c t in time • u; no'' have the rae t of the. approaching concen• trn..tlon { trr: ~· DRI'lAI:r. A most vi dent cours . 1 : 

( · ) '!'o o .. lP<lS the enemy dvanc i.n th 11IFX! BRI'!'A IN 

re t th full strength ·Of the Pac1r1c Pleet. 

2. ~rllat prevents ua from do1n:-, this? 

( ) Our tas1< to nroteet terrl tor:; nnd convnun:t.ca ion , 

p rtlcul rly the HA·JAII - n·: ........ COAST combination. 

(b) Th· osaibility of div rt1ng so:nc of tl cone ntr t .1on by o. fens1 ~e opera tiona &f~&.ins t enemy co~1nic tlon nd t rr1tory. 

( o) Lo~11st1c dlftloul ties. 

(d) Dlff1culr:y 1n ooreening and supporting battlehips in that area3. '.e hnv lready made an early dec! ion to try to 

r turn the battle hips to the We at Coast for th rca one 

pr v1ously gl v n •. 

4. D n er from ubmarine nd other ra.1dera, part,.oul rly to troop and e'l cuation ships, plaaes definite demands on cru1 era nd d tro~cra. T' se are 1 a.dy asign·d :for t!l month of May nd nr consid,red to be reduced to a minimum. 

5. IIAWA!! is by no moans con 1der,d impr gnable , p rt1cularl;r wl th only a9 Arrey hP-avy boMbers available. As this weakness 

ean b comp naated for to somf'l extent by an eff1c1ent ttearch_ th 

VPBa are also n eoss rzr. ·However, :1. t 1a eon$1der that t nu bcr 

nt '"iOtJEA 06\n be raised to tv:olve. 

c. Shall "U:? -r ep fol~ the 1A :VAIT.AN d .. renae ~ .. thf~r or both 

of t: e t 0 carrier t;roups ~,rh1oh are not now comm.1 ttcd to tho .Jouth- ~{1 st~ Corta.ln1y not fpr pas at ve- defense . A raid to the ·;eatwe.l"d, ho ~ever, would help with the defense and continue th· contatnlng eff ot of oul"" previ. ous ra!dn. However_. iVi th ktl.o Jn incr'e · sed a. ir 

strenp-th in cnomy outly!nr; bases it would be takin·, too large 

a cl..x no to ~mploy <)nly one carrier in this V"&.Y. Pr n ,nt 

IV-1 

388 
lndic tton or the South st oonoentrat1on ma!e it p·o ar that 

e t'f'ltst upp,ort tb forces torn there with at ler;.st one carrier. 

p t•ticul rly Task Force 17 ~ll .. ould be brought ba.ck soon. 

D tailed stud1E a att ehod i'n Annex ttcrr • how that we can keep 

e1ther t o or fouz" ea.rri r groups 1n the Southwest during :-:iay. /tel~ . o , d c 1 sl on 1 made to pr pare ~aa.lr Foro 16 1 th 1 t 

t o o rl•it'"·l:--s to l ve for the Southwest as oon aa it can be ~Ot r.ady. l:. r port han just be6n recelv~d th t lt "ill enter PEARL on 25 April. :tf 1t is Bent down, vt· will find it expedient to omplo)' two wo-cn.rr1er Task :Poroes as reliefs but vre ·must void r1g1<11ty in our cisposittons. 

7. All ubr.:.arine., sho\~.ld be continued to b ' ed offens1 vely 

on t .. c .o ~ luorat!ve n trol st.atlon , but, among the.rJe th 

RAEAUI, nrea hottld b rell ~)atrolled . As Comsouwoapacror intends 

to a , hl · t bmttrines into the. t lnm ed1 , te area, Ifill <: p 

one or t o on the aroa boundary orth or HAMUL . This oan be don by mploytng t~t # subms.rinas now ln th p oc s. of trans- £ rr1ng to ~outh e t AU~TRALIA. 

8. CHUISt ~. ID~Jt3. Th netny linea of commun:lc t1on are 

too 11 p trolled for us to ~1sk a ax•uiaer to r id them, )Ut 

tl~ l1in·r ground cast of Kf'-.MCi1A'l'KA offer good hunttng. The 

proJ. ot o~"' s nding a erul er u th r about l ~t· y is r ta1n d. 

h could lso create radio deception o·n th .·ay. 

9. 

this <'>rc 

b 

should 

389 
1. · .. oo.t s the :n my• s moat )rob ble cours 1s an nrly 

ntt C·: on r:o .. .. j~~Y , a. 1otv1led study of 1t hs.a b· .. n made nd 1 

att oh. "1 a. a r. nnex upn. It ill be een tht' t aftr·r th ener.ry 

moves tr nsports south of the ·tsl ncl barrter off the PAlro.AN 

n .~ ;nt~ ~:uA the b .st opportunit'"' will exist for our task force 

to · inflict aer1ous darn :.-se on ~1m. 'Hovtev .r, great skill must 

L di3pla7 a in coordinating the operations of our taal forces, nd fford1n6 mutual prot ction arnon3 t~c carriers. Inf rmatlort from 1r scout .ng by hor ri-ba cd plano a r.ru.at be made 

ava1ls.bl at the rl e!~t possible moment. 

2. · rlor to or 1n oonjunctlon with the att ok on ,101iL3BY 

tb follo · ng must b . }Uarded ag 1n t: 

I 

(a) Capture of' TULA ri 1 0-IZO nd other b ~ e 1. tP-s in th 

SOLOl 01' s . 

(b) Carrier raids on TO ·I. VILLE , HORl~ IS!.~AND, NOt1l4 _; 

and SUVA . 

(c) Interf r nc w1th landing our reenforc 

J:"='AT .. , trONGATABU· n · . ..,AMOt . 

(d) tt ek on our ta.k foro byt 

( l) -.hore-b od all,Crsf't. 

(C) Carrier--baaed airor ft. 

(3) r~ubtMrinos. 

s. necapi tulatton o! our cleolcion : 

nts at 

( ) l old ';.'aQk fot•ee l'"! and ll in th. Southwest during 

tb.e f:!.~nt pe..t•t of .:.ay .. 

(b) ·Prepar '1: . sk Porce 1€ to pr-oo .e;d promptly to th t 

rea, ov .rl p 1 th and probably r l!ev tllos foro • 

(c) Inor s 

(d) Obta1n nu:1ximum saistanco fron'l Sou ,hw st Pacific 

F'oree , 

( ) Continue scor·t1nG as now planned for ~" y • . 

(f) Plan to send c:ruisAr to r id Bt~R ~;z; ::,:;A f1sh1 ~ 

e:rounds to de art about 1 ~ay. 

v - 1 390 
(g) Continue offensive stl' tn~lrine patrols .and tnor-tnars& 

length of th.Ofie on ~rR1JK.-fu\P~UL line . 

(h) netttrn Task f»<roroe ton& to arr1 ve: SAlt l~AUUJ:s co ·about 

·a tbA1 • 

•' . 

v- 2 391 
CARDIV TWO 1 SORYU 

HlRl"U 

CARPIV T~ ... EE 

HYt1JO 

l'tJKAKU 

Sohe ul 

CARDIV . OUE 

A!\AGI 

KAGA 

ll April - i!.e.y of F.engal Area. 

15 .pril - De rta S1ngapor • 

18 April - Arrives E ko. 

I 

• 

20 April • :tcnrout Trlll! £or duty 1. th 4th tl .et. 28 April - ( bout) L ave Tnlit for New Britain 

r • 

9 April ... {until) beli ved to have been op r -

ting in BAY of . :NGAL . 

22 April - Sohedul d to arrtv in E PIRE . {will end ahore-b a equipment v1a 

DD to SHORE (AIR) BAS~: and after 1 t 

rrlval, fly plan a ther )( Navy Yard 

availability-?) 

toe t1on unknown - autpect d to be 

near hom water • 

g pr1l- FAY of BE~GAL . 

13 Aprtl - Depart a 5:) INOAPO . nrou te KTJRE . 22 April ... ~aheduled x~r ve i .. URF .• 

(has outatand1ng ·i.vork to bo ·done -

may rec ive rYD ava1lab111ty) . 3 April - On 1 t r .. "at to o rry 20 typ 0 VF 

for u e ot CJ I'l)OS : P. ir and 1st Air 

Corns - (hence to •. R~! · TJLS?) 

3 1: pril ... In T tUK e.r .. a probably in comp ny 11th 

KA1. !G.t\l~A MARU • 

6 A ril ..... l:;nroute FMPIRE. 

15 l ,ril- In YOKOSUKA. 

(20 April - RYU r U scheduled to leave E,~,~PU1"" 

- (26 l~ pril ... Sch duled to 'lf.lai.tcf Tf UK . 

10 .l!pril- Left YOKOSUKA nnd pparently a si rned 

offensive tQak in se rch. 

20 April • r nrout T \ t . 

26-28 April - Depart TRUI" for( .arshall Area 1 

(Nett 1J.r1 tain I r a ( 7) 

• 

21 April- I.nrout, 1' ~P :tnF from &1\Y of 1-.. r o 1, ('l) 

in doek SAS:LEO .. indicated included 1n 

POH'l' :MOR "SHY off en 1 v • 

392 

-1-, 
.Cont 1 d.....!. 

9 Anr11 - PABAUT ... - SA! AU AR A. 

13 i -pril - J;nrout ~· u IR "' via Tf:UK nd SAIPAt~ 20 April- ... ched1led arrive ~OKOSUKA (for stores, planes, etc •• (?)}. 

25 April - Sch dul~d depart YOKOSUF'.A (apparently 

had no p rt in arch for BLtn: on lOth 

and 19th} Prob 'bly on misalon to ~UK 

and HA J:A UL 'l . 

·nrout RABAUL from PALAO. 

20 /4-pril ... At RAHA1JI~ • 

... BAY of J3 ~NG L ARF~ • 

- Enroute ElPIRE • ... Scheduled to arr1v SASFBO. 

ITU 2 (Probably bB) 

21 Ap.r11 • Indicated nroute .1ANDATES and then 

to ~lEV~ BRITAIN area (could thi btt 

HARUlrA?) 

CRUDIV PIV !. .:JACHI) 

10 April 15 April 

21 pr1l 

25 April 

... D . i_ art d S SEBO. 

In YO rn UI;A area. - F.nr·out TRtJK. 

.. l\rr1 ve TRtr.t'C. 

Dr .aD!V 34 (of DESHOd FIVl ) 

15 April ith CO HINED 

ClUDIV 6 and 19 

CRbuiV li'OtJR. 

SUBBON EIGHT 

21 ril - l t r to 

8 April .. In HI:~~ BP ITA IN area. 

l7 .pri.l - AT AGO t YOr\ oStTKA 1 th 2 DESDIVS • 

19 April - CinO SECOND in '!1

A. 0 active in search 

oper tions f'or rJUE - YOKOSU ar a. 

l Apr 1 • In(1oat1on of movement from s. of 

KYUSHU r.a. 

15 April - COMSUBPOR ~nroute AA N!>ArfF.S (JALUIT(l 

T UK?) 

21 April• 'T' t~nde r 'believed in SUBFON :EIGHT l th 

;::>uB· in company indicated 9:!~ near TRUK. 

21 An:ril ... n~.~F indicates r1 val COtiiSlJ .,FOR t 

"liT 'X bout · 23 April. 

393 
45 .i. ~ •.J l t - 1 

BO ~I31 R GI.OUP (Command r TAINAN AIR) 

45 Long range pl n (VB) 

Base RZ (L F.) and RRt~ (VUllAKANAU) 

2nd B01Brn GROUP (Comm nder FOURTH IR CORPS) 

36 • Type 97 VB (Land) 

fa ae RZ ( LAE) and fiRE ( VUl~AKAtiA U) 

prd 

s KAWA MARU ----- K.A!'JA MARU ------· 

c Ol'!'tt!'lQ.nd r l'E\': J:,~ 1: I· ,I I ~ A I t sk r or 

Observation Planes ••••••• 13 of __ Typo 

13 of_Tyn 

OEliZAJ.~IR nrout~ RABAUL • 

probably part.or 4th AIR 

CORP11? cr R .lnfot•cements. 

MARSl · LLS AIR Oo.M~- ND 

13a.ees at OI ; AKE 

(has s :nt 10 type 97 Vf$ 

7 type 0 VF _ typ 1 v· · 

or VP 

A !R COHPS) Eaa 

3rd BOMBER GROUP {Command r 14th AIR Q.fiOUP} 

12-4 Type 97 Patrol Pl nee 

?(9-3 ? T;pe o ? ?} ? 

MAHU 

MAJZU --

t ]~\:!.OJ !c 

• .UiKil 

394 
) 

" tiltf;X ucn rro C!rCP;' .C OPLRA't'ION 1

•. 

. -~";';'} '1\'!'"-T .;;;..:.;-;;:..;.:;...;;. ;..;..:;....._;;;;.::;,.;.;;.;;..;...~...;;.,;..;.;.........,~ ............ ..,..,._.. ...... 

.,\.~I'' ~ .... ..... 

l. ( ) 1:as ~ Porae ll lreft )E'ARL 15 April. Will ar~1 v 

r nd zvou l ti t\tde 11•45 South, l,on~~i tud 

170-37 ~le t on 25th. 

(b) Task Poroe 17 will arrive DLZ2ACHEH 19-20 April, 

h :tng cot1.l . ted ru -11np- to e ps.oi ty rom PLA'l'Th 

on 14 ,.~ p1rt11. 

( c} KA ~ ·~A ~>KIA 11 fuo l '.~.ask ~ o:roe 17 BLl ACHER prior 

to dcp rture ror rend zvou h Ta k Fore ll on 

25 April. 

(t'i) ?!EOSHO a n rr1 ve 1\!.;~~.~\Cl IU on 27 April. 

( ) TIPPrCA.t\0 ~- is t NOUMl~'rl • 

(£} Lo din,~ of 

YJ.SK t. i<!J 

rE~ .suo 

r a follo 1 

- 112 1 000 Fu 1, 300,000 v Oas. - 102,000 Fuel , 2,000 liieaol, = 150,000 v Gas. - 65,ooo ru 1. 

(g) Task ·ore 17,. patrol steaming (around 15 Kt ) usee 

about 5 1 500 bbl /day. 

{h) Task Fore 11, 

d Y• . 

trol steaming, uo s bout f), 900 

2. c n srr1 1 !"'.L.' ~otr-:. , 1' sk l~oro 17 111 r q lr bout 

30 ,ooo b rrels, whJ.ch 1 t cv111 take from .. c t .KASKIA . I . ·. tina_tc 'K . SR'.A ·_nriA t:!..ll hav pr( viounly fUeled t·:HIO IT 

nnd TUC.J~ :t' H to amout'.t of bout 7*000 barrels, le ving 

75,000 barrels in .. ~) K ~KIA hen h. dcnarts BL J\CH~H. 

S. On 25 11-pril, n t rendezvous, r;:· s~~ Fo~oe 11 ~111 h v 

used about 5'3 ,000 b~- rr ,ls. On oomnl t1on :fuel1n6, tl·is 

will le v round 16,000 'barr ~ls 1n \A.rJ~'A' KIA . 

4. F :leotln~.~, this l~emnant 1n 1\ASf.J SKIA, trLre 11 b 

avail ble 1n the t~ea, in '\~I:os.no ( "'t1 h 17), 102,000 

barrels, nd in r:I:Pi?F';Ar: :, ( t Nol·! .. 1lA) as,ooo b't-Jl I 

tot 1 Of' 167 ,(;00 barr•els, r.:1

\:l( C0!1'.tbined ne-eds OJ. tb J 

~:o task foro;a 1re a~ound 11,400 r day. Tlma allo"-

ing for tha two d ys previa\ s ste .. min~~ hy 'r s'Y ,l.::lorc 

ll (23th to 2?th) ·' th(:,· r~ wi 11 b( f't,el for about lv d y~ 9 S 

-1-
/ 

41\ .... L L .; .. ¥ 

.Cont 'g. 

fr.om 27 Ap.~~11 ,. or until 10 · tay. On th1a d te, both 

T S" Pore s should oe full and. both tonlers empty. Eo '!ever, w · h.ave to hav 101 000 barr, ls at no.~ES 

b tw(~en 3 nd 10 !<.ay, b1eh TIPPECANOtt or HE~XlHO 

v,ill hav to furnish, mal<ing this dat round 9. !.iay,. 

5. If' an att c · tak bcfor 9 ·!ay nd the uaual 

high s ed 1 u d, an dd t1onal 33 1 000 barr 1 will 

h ve to be u ed, thu mov ng hlle date of both foro a 

boing full nd tanker mpty to 6 U£y. 

6. Joth !a k Foro s ~111 ant addition l tuel by about 

13 May 1:f an ttaek 1a mad or by 16 r~ay 1f not. 

ill a:rri v L around 2"1 April. Ct~A! 111 arriv PEA L around 27 April. 

s. SKIA ill arrive n • L around 4 5 May~ · 

i\ NA'~l~ will arr1 vc PF~ L around 4•5 May. . 

a. Pl.A'l TF.: can arrive fuel ng area, northvr st of t:10UMEJ\, 

about 13 Lay, lo v·inr;; h re on ;;.,oth of pr11. OUYt .. Y~ 

o n rr v fuel r; r a a:round 16 \Viy, l aving 1 rc ame 

t1rn ~. ';rhey o n -:"o in comp ny ho ever 1f accept th 

r duct1on 1n p ed for PL/ TTh and have both of them &J•rive 

on 16th. Th. · two t nk rs ill o rry both Tas; .t>.,oro s 

unt1l 23 tray, wh n both ~r sk I·'oraea r~ll b full o.nd 

both tanl!ers .mpty • Tas1r Forces then 111 ant additional 

tucl around tl .o 30th. 

9. t ,nnwhile, TIPlt:Ci' "OE and U ?JJSHO 111. be returning .. ~A ~rJ, havinr· l"•ft r ~ &.l,ound "'/ or 10 ~.~ay, depend1n 

on w.hethGr Ol" not tt.aok wa mnde. 7!PlEGl\.1·0E stop 1 

by Rr;sr~s to fuel convoy there, It ·would be adv ntageous 

to <nnpty ~I~ /l:,C.t,l-rOE first nd start her to ? ~~ f\L e rl~, 

as she make only 10 knots, but ~hi dvanta.ge is prob- ably out"f ei,:l.. d by ad van tag ·s of more .xp d1 tiou fuel• 

ing with two t nkers and rr edom rpf .ction to keep the 

t o foroes s, para t d. k su.ming tho taruters lea 10 5~ y., 

l\.OSHO ill r t'i ve PI!:AhL 23 :\a y, TIP >~Ct tiOF ... 29 Hay. 

Ne1 ther o.t. th m can r turn by 30 M '1, heno KJ s~~ :.>.KIA 

and KAX:lA':rfA will have tt.' b£~ used, 

10. A te1nt t1 vc plan, sub i(~Ct to oha.ru:e ns 1.nformat1.on on 

actual opet""9.t1on· nd consumpt.ion or fuel com s 1n, is 

as follovts: 

385 
12. 

Cont 1 d. 

(a} J5f"OSHO nd ~rr·~P C/~~~OT~ t d1 posal of Comtask:ror 17 to 1aeet noeda both :ro:roea as d1l'eoted by him, e:}(cept 1n.form Comtas .. ror 1'1 that 0 ,ooo ba:r~rels fuel oil "' will 1 ve to b r erved in T1PPl.CA7IOI: or i

1EOSHO for d 1' very to convoy at R03F"S r:r1val 10 ~:ay . 

~. h ·v to aalt R ~F.S about when they need 

or can tak this oil, s fir t ship unloaded 

mtA be th on that nc d oil to t" t ome. Th se two ves ls wtll take· care of nettds ~ontil a or ·9 May, de ending on h ther n attack has t k~n plaoe or not. 

(b) Have PLAfPT.. nd nrrA d:eps.:rt PEAHL around l t.ay to arrive ar a round 16 or 17 ~. ay. If an t t ck baa taken plac · , PI.A 1' ·F;t can 

b ent on alon and get th r around 13th. The t o ve$ ls will take oar o!' ne ds until p roxi t ly 23 Y; wh n th s two tankfr ·111 be .mpty, with bo h Ta k ·Forooa ·rull. Task roreea will nt to rctu 1 around 30 ~ ay. 

{c) ~ !:A InA and t' NA~'n:r ill 'be ready to s 1 from PKttL round th lOth and can r aoh 

area by 26th. They o n stand-by ther until 

n d d. Th r w ll t ke ear of need until around 7 Jun ·., tank r b in·~ empty nd Task Poro s full on that dat • "~or tu.l will v to arrive by 14-15 June. j 

(d) liBOSIIO alone/ can arrtv . by about lo Jun , but TIPP.bC \t!IOF' oan ot. s TI ,.pr;CAl:Olr · 111 

hav be n ~ ay ainoe l March 1 it would be b · .st to send .fu l to StJVA by charter oiler nd ke p E NA'~"t I in area, filling from fi)tJVA 

tank a or o ornm ro · l tank r at that plao • V' might A:()ep 'u1S ~U\. there doing th 

th ng. ~1s c n be or.ked out b ttor s.s 

more 1!\tormat1on on y vonvoy com in. 

A ouppl mont ry report ~111 be subMitt d on po ib- 111 tie for su porting T s1t: Foro 16 in a.dd1t1on in 

area. 

I 

I 
·· -. 

PAl.t: !I 

( ) l 1{ Porce Sixteen 111 le ve ai"Ound 1 1¥.ay "''!d 

rr1ve n area around 15 t~ "1• Thla 1s b on 

12rt knots advn.nce;" h c.h. 111 require about 

15 knots teaming, allowing tor flight operation • 

(b) SAHIN1~ AND C IUIAH \Cl~t wlll aeco:npany tore • 

(o) Force 1ill r quire nbout 7,600 bbla/day. 

{d) SAI:-INE nd CI Ut.Pro.~ can oarry 105 1 000 bbl• eaol. 

2. It Task Foree 16 leaves here l ~•y, by 15 y, 1t 

111 need approxi tely 1141 000 b rrels or oil. Part 

of this may have been taken out enroute, but net 

r ·ult 111 beth sam. This will le v-e 96,000 barr la 

in two tan"er , hich will b~ eX.ldusted by about 20 lay. 

On that d te 1 ,!oroe wlll · b .full and t nk .rs empty. Th y 

c n stay in re bout 4 y mor h n th -y 1111 mvo to 

re turni o.rri vir.lG l'!.:AH.L 1 tn 20r of fu l rema 1n1ng bout 5-16 Sun • 

s.· If 1t is nee acy to k p the e '.!' l\: Por-oea in the 

area lonl'; r than thts per·lod, 1 t 1Z 111 be neoesaary 

to d1v rt eomm·- rc1al tanl~ r from t .e -J est Coa t 

to :JTJVA. The cornbi nod needs of th rou .. Ta k Foro .a 

o.r.1ount to 5t"/01 000 barrels month, if they ate m ll 

30 day •• 'l'b. ~ tantcer {5 ;, ~· OSHOt 2 CUY ~ and l 

'l: PLCA!·JOE) i'lor1d .. ng from ): anL~ oan compl te a round 

tr .. p to area, fuol and turn. each 45 days, carrying 

a total or 670,000 barrels. or about 450,000 b rr 1 

e. month. ~'f''·1ia lea.v 1201000 barr ls a month to b 

supplied .rrom commercial tankers, which 1a 2 tan\: r 

a rnonth. E~t, s1nce theae tan1,eru can not .fuel se _ they can only ~ot as! eder ·, nooes it tin r·ta n!ng 

one large nd one small taru er 1n ar t ll 1me , thus reducing the tota.l t ha.t can b oarriod by our own 

tankf.J:VS to S50 ,000 pe·r month €lnd rec ulring an addi t1o~al 

100,000 barr ·ls to be dive rted to ~~UV in chart~red 

tank ra, ivin~ a total of 220,000 barrel to b 

u.rrnl1 d by th .. nt. 

-1- 3 98 
.. cgnte'd.· · 

; . 

• Tb errect or diver ion or charter d t nt·ers to suvA 

ll ot cour• , · low down the~ rut ()f tsul)ply ~o t:n.Ar! by ttl! 1ttcr&a&$d dieto.noe and 1 "!f•ov r t :lme 

w 1t1ng d1 ohar.ge ;o tlle Fl.cet tank 1•a d1reoCl7 

or tns · e • ak ... oreita" Th$.a. td.ll. v tho e·tf · ct or 

1 sing one trip p r month tw 3 tartk·e 1 <> reduo1ng tb 

of upply t PF:A. .. L bf ome. o,ooo rrel • . a. b 

the pre• nt t .. er e 1 <1 nd , the pre ;1t 30 day tum aroun · I e 1cve ou uppl7 to 4; • Rr.~ can at n4 

thi reduot1on and !'till k ·O.P ,abHaat or exp.nditurea. 

8. 1elp1ne th1s a1uat1ou ta faot. that the~· 1a no . e tb111 1 or rol"ce ·teaming 30 d&J8 a onth 

continuo • 

s. t'Y'h provi81on h1p to ko p oroea aupp11 d 

th food ~ can uae A!i'l' RES to au';)t)l7 gen ral tore• a..~d epee l qutpment y be aont an ank re. 

7. £ . above do no'' allow tor a1 nk1nga. 

a. ..r tbe n ope~ ~ from PF , PFA \L PP17 can't 

atan4 1t. 

399 I 
1. .;.-hoa t!le. 

!..s 11 ttlo known to us and accur te 1n-

:orn:w.tion c nno out 1ned to th1a oat1mate. The outhonstern .eninsul· of z.t:w UINF~'\ 1 s r ng or high mountains 

runn1n8 t~lt"ough its long aXis. Blgh~st elevation 1a 13,255 bu~ tho olov t1on d exact location or the lower a ddles nd 

sues can not be determ1ned. It is oerta1n tl ·t thoro aro 

no good. roads ex.c · p... 1n the nonr v1c1n1 ty of larger towns. 

The Je.ps·bave proved, how ver, that no terra.ln ao far baa boon 

blc to at p their dvtl nco. It nppaars warranted, ho · vor., to 

conclude that ny overland advance a.inat !orcsby o n bo de 

only by troo- without heavy ma'ter1al, such e.a arti ler:r~c 

tanka and trucks. 

(b) The a .. ) ~eh to H< t ;~BY by wator from J>" !:iAtJL 1a 

lmoat 1 11 000 milo s unle u a l:mssac;e 1o r,tade olose to tho 

eastom t1o or NEW OUII :J • Th1 s course would reduao tho distanc o o.bout 700 :; 11 a but would bo most dangerous, i.f not 

1tlpraot1cabl , 1'or larg fot~c · oi~ tnnsports. 

(o) In ddition to landlll{' tr1ps t LAE and SALA .! ~A. 

there ro about 1~ 1 nd!nL irounds, prob bly usabl in good 

"'e ther nd emort;ency onl,-, on t.1o north aid · o:f th · t~ounta1n 

rang 1th1n short distance of tht) nort.h coast. 

2. lteatl or l . o been tr a se.par tely d r no e t 

be r1ne; on th! e timat;o xoept for. possible inland advanco 

by w ter courses. The Jap wore tl.ootied. out of uho fARlt!IAlf 

~ x~.r m valley and the sama ean happen in other vnllay • Clouds 

over the r ount ins will 1m. ode ir operations over thom. 

s. (a) Tho soa d1s·tanoe from HJHJAUL to HO!U~blfl has been 

ntontion d. Cl"i tic l air ia tu.nces trom OR:: say, i g loring to-u,r equirtld by ,1ounta1ns, are : 

llO mile 

l G3 n 

2(31) tr 

430 " 222 n 

970 f 

g4 u 

300 u 

GOO . ., 

-1 .... 

4 00 
(b) Enemy air otrength on shorfl 1n tho liABAUL ar a 

( 1nelud1ng OA31 ra, LA!b _, and SALAAOA) 'has a.lready been e,3t1mted. B about 2!)0 planes. Th6 exact number of ahoro-b,,aed .lanes Will depend upon hoW nan~ J ff C U mkA8 av 11 ble from 

other comtdtments. nd the losse int11cted by ua prior to the 

bagin.n.ing ot th ownpa1gn. lJ:hore 1s 1ndicat1on that tho J'aps 

arc decrena1ns $quadron atrcnt;th and ~ree but She can easily ake ~50 pl no v 1 a'bl for a movu against · iTC ~HBS Y. She ha.a 

o far not b gun 1th 1n utticiont forco ru1 wo can not afford 

to undt.lrestimate her now. 

(c) Cardiv 5 and !lYUr·ru will increase air strength by about 150 planes. C:arcl1v Two is also mon.tionod 1n connection 

w1 th tho prosant concentrntion but 1 t is unliKely that all S 

carr1 r 1nvolvod ould be u ad 1n the rna1n t.hrust unle 1t 

er stalled. Tltos CV y be hold to provide spcody re nto ee.m nt r needed. 

(d) J'ap ne e Gurtacc foroea to be expoetod havo been 

covered in the main e .. t1mato. 

4. Own Shore T~fensea. 

• e exact stre r;t 1 t &OH.iSDY 1a not known but 1 on t~rch 10, 1 42, th.ero were '7 1000 ground troops and nbout t,aoo HAAl<~ orsonnol. It is 1nd1catGd tha't thiu , ill b~ or baa been, lnorea· ed to one division o,_ .1\merie n tl'oop • !,lanea otually present are not known but moat r cent lnfornatlon, p~1or to 

M rch 30th, pl ced the ~ollowing u.s. aircraft 1n AUSt'mAr.,IA. 

In Cor.tnia oct ion 

Pursuit 

VB {henv,r) 

VB (medium) 

VB (l1,sht) 

172 

14 

s 

35 

185. 

lS 

12 - In ad<li t1on .. ,5 P•40 ho.vo been deli vercd to i~U.Yl 1tALI11. ; l tl'louc;h 

the majori t7 ot th!s air Stl'enr;th can b oono ntre:t('d 1n 1~orin.~­

ern J\U .. TF..Jl.LL\~ pursu1 t for the oloao . dG ·~enso or MOH~~ ~BY Inust 

base or ~ fuel there. 

5. lli10r1y Land l1oreos. - · KVI1lablc· 

gnenly · grou.nd t"orcas/fol"' the attnck are not kno v.n, but from po.at oxporienco ·t& mus,t assu..'Uc that 1n1tiully they will bo auffic1ont to accortpliah tho mibsion, 11' no in'ter--

ference intervenes. If -th.o Amor 'c :n r!.1v1sion 1 as not yot .:rrived ts.t; I!<. lt,:D.Sf, it ls <;sti~a.tod the L!;round .Corcos rec,uir .. d . oul :1 be &l;otlt .}l0 1 000 &nd will rcquir-o a t' OUt 20 mediUt1 v:r--anspor)t ~ to nove ther:t. 

401 
( 

~ 

OJJHLI 

6. t.os1stiCJ!• 

'lhls will be mora a1rr..plo for J p n aa to n1r and 

:urt ce rorct1& oec~ use of near-ne o of catablishod baae:s. As to "jround tl'toopa. it n ovorland taove.mont 1s attempted, supply will be ·11ff1cul t, although Japanese are a<iopt a:t l1vinc off the land nd on rations ot l!ttle bulk. Tha def ndere o£ 4~ :1B3B"! nust b eon idor d aeli'•co:;;tta1ntJd ,for bulk auppl1os during the op rnt1on, oxecpt th t SOrl! it01:1s m· y be .tlown 1 .. 

7. S1.lf'!!!ri , ot St~tt1~th. 

Aaaociat f;\ 

Prot ct!on by tor:r.1n and long d1stane r quired by sea. Vulnor- · 

a t 1ty ot c rri rs if Jap n us s 

them to support tt. ok. VulncrIn1t!at1v • Proximity of several landing t1elda 

for shoro-bnsed air. SUperor air tt'&rongth·. r .. ong b1li ty or Jap embarked troopu. ran e fighters. 

o. Eneptz coursos of l\~~~op. 

(a) Tho Ji panestt have consistently rollowe<l a set procedure £or attack of -enemy held b~atu.t. A br1ef stattmont ot th1G pl .. ocodur La in order and will show what abe will try to do at OH f~ SBY. J tl erttploying a joint t · ak tore val, !r, and lnvrul, organization has h en on tt~o b sis ot th siz of the landine; toroe. l')or a d1 vlu1on of 15,000 men and b ttalion or pa at~oops the rollowtns rw• been ·used: 

VF 

Vl' 

(hoavy) 

_..,... 

Air 

3 - 4 ·aqu ctrons 

2 - :5 BctU0.("')401l · 

2 ;quuo.ron 

Total 75 - 100 

40-00 40- flO 

Aggregate -· 115 - 180 

NEt.V~l l·'e:rce 

cv 2 

CA - CL 6 

JS 2 'OOijt 4 DT.~ lO - 14 J'P 12 20 . 402 

To t ll 32 - 46 

- 3-
., SM8Jl1J! 

A}f ltx:. un•• 'Cont '41 

For a brigade o£ ttbout 5,000 troops the following ha been uscdt 

Shore-based 

VB (he vy) 

VF 

VP 

Carrier-borne 

CV 

CA - CL 

ss 

nn 

AP 

Air 

-

2 - 3 aqu drona 

l - 2 squadt-ons 

2 squadrons 

~otal 45 - 60 · 

40 I 40 

Aggregate - 85 -100 

}laval Force 

1 

3 - 4 

1 - 2 

s - a 

8 -10 

Total 19 - 26 

(Mote• Strength of escort has va~1ed with expected requirements). 

(b) The t'orce est1mat~d tor MOIUC!1BY attack is 20,000 

troops and, although mere t\rithtletical computation 1grtorea varying details of the imm·;diat oporut1on, it is highly valuabl as a yardstick. For 20,000 mon the following might be 

used: 

Shor -basecl 

cv 

VB (heavy) .. iF 

VP 

CA - GL 

DD 

AP 

Air 

-

5 - 7 squadrons 3 - 5 squadrons 4 squadrons 

~'otal 120 ... 160 

ao - 120 eo - 120 

Aggregate - 200 - 280 

!ftt val For·c..! 

3 

7 - 8 

3 - 6 

12 or more 

20 - S2 Total vesse.ls 4B - '73 

-4· 

403 
A~ I !!X "!111 .~ C~nt 'd) 

The greatcs.t probab111 ty of c.han#;e 1n the torcgoing tht~ eecort vessels but, 1hen uo ro ombel:" thnt ono convoy voaaola approached JAVA, the above 1~1gu:.t"ea ard fa.r trom tlc. 

(e) -:t'ho t otlos for and1ngs 1 ve b en: 

(l J ! .. lutual at.tpport1ns fore. move within 

boundar1e 400 miloa apar-t. 

{2) Initial r.tovomonte are in .t"ollotdng orders 

1. Jtcconnftiaanco by !13. 

11 lteconnatssanca and l1m1t•d day attacks by VP. 

111. ~bing, somet1moa uneacortod, by T-90 hoavy bombr..~rs froM closest land ba eu. 

Dfttq&e to run f8, destruction or installa- tion and obtaining meteorological 1ntot't1~it1on are 

1n1t1al object1vus. 

(3) For ·th destruction or enemy a1rorart. a heavy 1r attack supported b:y land-or c rr1er .... ba d 

VF tolloYa. 

(4) Ju t prior to the coord1nated ttack ot all 

forcoa, a tit l homb . ng by 50 to l50 planos 1 mo. de 

to deatroy eo~un!on.tlons~ coastal battor1~a, ant1 

t.. oa ons. l'he _ ctual landing follows. ·l'h,e total aort1es prior to a landing 1H ft~>m 150 to 300. 

(5) I:>ouble Pl"'Otoct1on is :Curn1shed oonvoy · on 

tho day prior to attack, navtel:T, 1:roet pro;tection by nlanes from lttnd st t1on.G vtith1n rang-e and indirect pro tion by attacks on 1r bas s from w llch 

enemy pl,mes could o.perato agu1nut th& convoy. Ship" bnsod and shore-buaod planes eooperato in this pro- tection., 

(6) A1rpl · nes 1 controlled. by .t~ d!o from l ding units, protect motor landtng craft from whioh troops land about dawn. MOtlt of' tha ttir f()roe · 1 held 

X'()ady t-o nttaok en(nn:r bttooe \fithin re.ngo. 

404 
(7) Procedure a.f ter tho 1n1 ti 1 landing lm 

be n quit ~ Ult1form follo t 

1. Soaplanes or 11p-b sod plane 

au oort l nd rorces durin~ ~1e 

first day. Paratro pa or other 

oapturc field to b · used by VF. 

11. soon ne posaiblo~ vr supvort the 

troopo. B7 t 2nd or 5r oay t7P -vr~ do thi.s from a captured field 

or .from cv. 

(?) 1th1n 2 o tho Japa h. vo bcco e w ll 

at bl1 -d and tn-;gan1zed for de·tonao o~ or further 

of ensivo rrom1 the a 1a d b ·se. 

It 1a hel1eve<i that the .foregoing prcood: :ro, ¥41th. v ri t1on.a requ1z;ed ·by hydrographic and topography, contains 

the broad tr-amework or a Japanuoo os.ttp ign ror tho c ptur or ~- -fl:.~ 1~~ ; ... • Ov rland ad vane trom BUt:~ to ~ Of-.ESI}Y 1s air c11atance 

\'out mil a but actual distance over the •.:round cuoh r;roater. Ponet a.tion tor a short d1 ttdlCO tt1ght be rnlule 1n an..all boate 

to - pn d the dvan{ but ·t•lo hole oport t1on ould be t1t· o conuming. It ould h ve the advantt:u o ot not exposing J~P an 

ur.f ce cro. t to at tnck tor aeveral da1s <hlt-ing tho pproaeh to 

t ·w lan( 1ng. It would hav·e good n1r cover during the dis ~abtlrkat1on 1thout unduly oAponine cv. Juring th& s o advance 

aero s tb pon1nsul , ho ever, tl'oop oul,· be subject to continual air ~ tratf'ing. '1: rgote wot ld b small but nulll .. lll.V 

only r1flca. probnb 1 tov own protection. It :lf"wor-o poaa1ble to adv nc 1n atre f"th 4oroaa the p .ninsuln, th1 wo·uld be tha 

most prob blo courtl or ction r r Jap n but topographical information compels tho rejection or this eou1~so. U overland 

movon nt 1o possible, disc !lbtu•ka.tion ill be t\one du~in~ darkness on tho north coast. Stren 1ou · o :torts. would b ade to 

destro:r or neutraliz the !i JifE~"BY airfield, by bonbitlr; or by 

using p t--atroopo. At the OU(l 1 ho\-rovcr, the Ji panose m.ight have 

t nother BATAIH~ on her banda \1'1tll 1nsur1·1c1ant 1tnmo<11at 

trenr th to oonelud 1t aucccserully. 

(d) The rrtcult probable eourlle o"' action a1nnt 

'0Rt!' '011h[H~Y la uO • ke a lv.n inr~ attaok on the south co . ot 

near thnt pl 0. c and to proce ed o orland aga i nst 1t. Tl e 

dctaila or t lda courao or acti on mlg lt b as rollo : 

( l) i. re11m1nary r ~oonna ttsa.nc . nd bombing , which 13 no v tal"inp- place. .rn t hi ca ~i are 

not necoasi:t.ry because ot the proxlt1ity o:t."' landing fiel <).s . 1~1e f ront of a bout ~o ) r:111eu on wh1ch 

405 
. ( _ 

the Jape pr·ov1de ai.t" coverage 

1r from RAUAUL, trA ~$ ~h Tl , and fA. 1 i ~ wi h landplanes and by nea:olane 1 nclucling ooaplan flght rtJ, frol'!l KB • /C , fi'J IS!, d JLA.GI ( 1:f last is capture ) • 

C rriors .trot. retired oa1t1ons can cover holes in 

th air sor en. Unt1l" tho Japanese debouch into 

the coRAL SEA, they can be re ohed only b1 long 

rang bombers '\V1tbout VF support. At tho timo ot 

ntering tho oonll r..~ 51SA I tho Jap(lne ( would be 1400 

11 o £l"'t1 IJl., 980 .rrom. ~rnlJM}::A 1 llbout 900 mil s 

fro BY 1. , bout 450 , 1le tror: tl" HLnt:1Y, and 660 

· l s fro ~ \:t ~VII# .JI~. · t th1 s point al. so tbey ould b about 460 n1l.es :rrom tho1t• no reat eho:re 

b ed 1 ndp· an fighters but the.y would ut1ll be 

w1th1.n ZOO mil · or pott ble aeaplan VF bas • 

Th1 would be their mo t oritle 1 noint insor r 

sllor ·h sed air support 1s eon ernad. i~l o, at 

this poir t would bo t e po a1bility of proceeding 

ae;M1nst NOTft4BA or T lNSVILL ~ 1nst d o£ going to 

r,,o?~ n~JY . I tho oporat1on is tJ..gainet MOl"E .. ~BY ae ia 

aaumod horein, thia''po1nt would be pasaed during darknons. aaum1ng 15 knota for th 1r convo:r thia 

point would be pa.&sed b~)ut t:t1d.n1ght o.r 30 hour 

botor-e the ltulltL"\g.. With 12 latata p ad thin point uld bo ro ohed about aa""kneaa in oruor to ua& .two 

da.rl per1ot1a in the l'lto t cr1t1cal art or the 

ap. ronch nd to ko landing abou davr11ght. During the approach~ on ~i t ~::~ Y, V... .from LAE and 

SAf~OA c n ~aver during dayli~~t and cv aircraft, 

rrou ~et1red poa1t1on~ can aes1st 1.n thi oovo:r .ee 

or they c)an attack A'V~~THAL!Al't .a1rtial<ls titb1n 

range. Dombor e · cor to by VJ~'t 1" ro)IA !AI~ and SAtAllOA 

can attttek the t10tiESBY field lUld those 1n ATJ:.,Tt'ULIA 

wit lin t:tange. The move ent of this torce can be 

eovorud b7 land-baaod a1rcrart aceor ing to th 

usual Jap pattern pr v1(>ual:r outlined. eva must be 

oxpoaod to shoro-based .a1r but n ed not b subject d 

to bombers e corted by J'1gh.ters unless the Jape decide to coma w1 thin 1•ange. 'l'he · dv nee ot~ t 

convoy olin b~: eovered by sur•fuce ves els and by .submarines to p:t•even t in torf'erenoe by O\tl"" Wt'-'tac 

onrt. 

(2) Dur·1ne all tho l ~at two dayrJ oi· tho ·dvance, they would try to '1 J1ko the GPcSBY · il"f1el<1 unt nable for ow~ a1rcrai*'t. The nutwtl landing of troops 

oan o-e covel"' l d by both ah<Jl:'O .nnd oarrltJ:r be.ued lanes. 

4 06 
(e) i'lltJ COilClUaion from the fot going is that th 

ttae .. on A'' 01 r:S by pp-roacbln ~ by s a trot"J R UL 1 feasible. It s elan nts or ~ euch bad w ther ovor the li~~ OU Bll . ounta1n , aubjeot1n , P to da'1l1ght attack by 

hore-b od 1r, su""r ce ·d aubaurrac forces: and by oxpoa- ing CV to hore-b aod . . ir ttttack.. However, Jnpan&se advances 

have boon boldly zoeut d in the past and tho .foregoing cl1adv nt ges rould not s , op theL1. Only bold and ek1lltul action 

n our oort o xtr · 1 bad(!W ather would p1 .. event tbe Jape 

rts ·ching .. 0 ,.Ht>BY w .... th tb •e ter pA.rt ot their :t:orces. 

(t) It our 1 nd strength at UOHESLY 1a as stated 

heroin, 20,000 J>PA,tr•:sg could p obably overcome thern. It 1s 

firmly b lieved, ho· ever, that 1£ thu enemy starts with only 20,000 men, ggr me1ve attack can e use such 'ho vy lo~usos in 

• t t th ovontu 1 attack will fail. 

4 07 

-o-
0 

April 21. 

April 22. 

Coninch in his (211649) describes his plan for 

improvement of shore facilities and underwater 

defenses at NOillv!EA. 

The preparations for the expected Japanese 

offensive in the Southwest Pacific continue. 

In the mean time minor air activity is senewhat the same pattern as it has been for most of 

this month. 

C\ ~a,{ u.,.C 

An estimate was prepared concerning the employment 

of the Pacific Fleet to assist tR dealing with the expected 

Japanese offensive in the SW Pacific. Intellizencc indicates 

that preparations are in full swing. 

Several submarine reports are being received from the 

South Central Pacific Area. ~bile these may be true, they are 

considerably discounted. The Army at Christmas even reported 

Jap airpl~nes n~ar there (birds?). 

Opnav to Cincpac (222000) says the ~ining project at 

Suva will be completed May 2d. 

The 2nd Raider Battalion will arrive at Pearl the 

middle of May. V"le may have a job for them one of these days. 

The NEVADA left for Bremerton. Thus ends local 

. salvage Dt'\ ~~· 6hip. 

B-17's bombed a dock at Habaul. 7 large AP were 

in the harbor. Results of high level bombing are disappointing. 

Mail to the ~outh Pacific is not very satisfactory. 

Other things not g oing any too well are torpedo supply and 

the Radar program. 

The SEARAVEN was damaged at sea by a fire on board. 

The BOISE is going to San Francisco for a refit. 

She has been in the far east since the war started. 

408 
• 

April 23. 

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department received an 

alert from General Marshall - period 25-30 April. This does not 

agree with our estimate. No air attack on the 14th District, or 

for that matter in the Pacific Ocean Areas, seems indicated this 

month. It would be better for Cincpac to initiate alerts in his 

areas, but at present (until the new command set-up is made 

fully effective) General Emmons probably feels that he must warn 

his people. We are, of course, taking large steps to counter 

Jap moves - especially an alert ordered for the 25th. 

When Admirals King and Nimitz conclude present conversations it will probably be possible to formulate and pass along broad operational directives to the task forces. 

Comanzac (240825) directs that Allied cruisers and 

destroyers be conversant with u.s. Signals and Tactical Instructions. It is, of course, necessary that we understand each other. 

Is th1.s another thing to be studied and acted on here? 

The intensive search for BLUE Forces off Japan has 

stopped. Task Force 16 enters Pearl the 25th. 

Minor bombings and reconnaissance of each other's 

positions continue in the S.W. Pacific. No large amphibious fo~e has been spotted in the Rabaul area yet. 

April 24. 

There was a possible submarine contact off Pearl entrance. 

While all these Central Pacific sub reports cannot well . be true, i~ is very possible that there are enemy submarines in the 

Hawaiian area and to the south of that area. If they are in 

those areas they (1) are for observation only or (2) they are 

not efficient. 

Qominch in his 242025 warned the Pamfic armed forces 

to be on watch for Jap offensive, particularly as the emperor's blrthday is the 29th. 'Our estimate of Jap moves still holds - probable time, May 3; probable place, s.w. Pacific area. 

An intelligence center will be set up at Auckland. The 

intelligence set up is beginning to get better attention. 

Cincpac 250245 gives plans for mining operations at Roses 

and Bleacher. 

There has been a delay of nine days in the Wallis project which may be embarrassing. · A/ 

\ 

4 09 
(' 

iiiOiiili' 

· April 24 (Continued) 

Opnav (221724) is going to ship material such as A/T 

protection, mooring buoys, etc., to Auckland, Suva, Nandi and 

Noumea. The general defense and supply for our advanced bases 

will undoubtedly improve when Admiral Ghormley takes charge. 

Captain Bowman took over at Auckland today. 

Cincpac (250357) makes some of the old Anzac surface 

force and 12 VP available to Task Force 17. 

The general s.w. Pacific situation remains the same. 

April 25 

Task Force 16 (CVs - ENTERPRISE and HOIDlET} returned 

from their eastern Pacific operation. All went well with the 

job. As noted by our subs, sampans seem to be acting as lookouts as much as 1000 miles out from the coast. 

Doubtful submarine contacts continue to be reported 

in the Hawaiian Area. 

In his 231900 (and 00600) Cominch gives the AP's 

for the Pacific Fleet. 

The New Zealand Naval Board has reported that Tombako, 

Nandi is entirely suitable as a fleet anchorage. 

In a letter to Bunav, the Cincpac estimates that his 

staff will have to be somewhat increased but that other staffs 

will probably be reduced as a result of reorganization in the , Fleet. 

The 4th Derense Battalion at Roses has 14% down with 

malaria. That is a serious thing just at this time when Army 

reinforcements are coming and when an attack may come within 

a .few days. 

General MacArthur has given his directive to counter 

the Jap offensive. (Aidac). 

Cincpac 260325 gives the fuel set-up for Task Forces 

11, 17. 

Darwin received a fairly heavy air attack. Other 

operations in the s.w. Paciric continue to follow the same 

pattern that has been used for the past few weeks. 

~ 

410 
APR GCT 

22: 1724 OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

Projected developement baes includes shipment following Lend Lease Material~. To Auckland,; 10 Mooring buoys, 3 Acoustic sweeping gear, 1 mile A/T net, 5 individual ship protection A/T nets, Tank farm 561,000 barrels, 8 picket boats, 1 buoy boat, To SUVA indicator net 900 yds A/T net, 700 yards loop, 8 sonobuoys, 2 contol units, 1 Buoyboat. To NANDI loop 2 and thre e quarters miles, indicator net, 10 sonobuoys, 5 individual ship protection A/T nets, 6 picket boats, 2 contol huts, tank farm 80,500 barrels, 1 buoy boat. Signal equipment to NOUMEA 2 loops, 10 sonobuoys, 2 control huts, 1600 yards A/T net, 9 picket boats, 1 buoyboat. Shipping by partial shipment as ~ 

material becomes available estimated date of completion early June. Following personnel for supervision installation and initial operations will be sent. To AUCKLAND 3 officers .4 men; to SUVA 3 officers 7 men; to NANDI 4 officers 18 men; to NOUMF~ 3 officers 7 men. Will B 

send fou~ net tenders for assignment Comsoupac. 

24 0825 COMANZAC TO OPNAV 

Allied cruisers and destroyers in Task Force 44 must be conversant with u.s. Signal and Tactical Instructions in order to operate with Pacific Fleet Task Forces. To this end am supplying Australia, Canberra, Hobart with General~

Signal Book, Tactical Instructions, Fleet Doctrine, Call · Books. To comr1unica te r; eff~ciently they should also have effective contact code, air code, and other crypto channels Pacific. Request authority issue Class· 4 allowance including ECM to above three ships. Sufficient cipher machines available ex-S boats. Will furnish liaison off- icers as required. 

24 2025 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMNOWESSEAFROM, COMNESSEAFROM, COMPANSEAFRON, COMSOEASTPACFOR, COMll. 

'-

Attention invited to the fact that the birthady of the Emperor of Japan is april 29. It may be that this date or the l~tter part of April mi~ht be selected by Japan for executing against Allied Forces important Offensive 

measures including coordinated sabotage. Opnav Army and USMC informed. 

411 
I 

APR GCT ---

25 0245 . CINCPAC TO OPNAV 

Urdis 222000 Request mine assembly personnel and material 

be assigned CominDiv 2 now at Fantan 2. Will be used by CincPac to lay minefields Roses and Bleacher and for ~ 

future mining projects. Opnav please pass to NuNav. 

25 0357 CINCPAC TO COMTASY~OR 17 

Following SouWesPacFor Forces available to you. Chicago Perkins at Nournea, HMAS Australia, Hobart and two DD which 

depart Sydney for Noumea soon. Inform ComSouWesPacFor where 

and when they are to report to you and other initial 

instructions. Also your desires as to air cooperation vi 

and suggestions as to separation of operations your forces and tijose of S-Boats about to operate in New Guinea 

Solomons, Bismark @rea. 

Intend increase VP with Tangier to twelve about 3 May. This 

tender and plane group hereby placed under your orders to 

assist you in operations Coral Sea. 

At Efate beginning about 3 May will be the Leander, Achilles plus 2 ODDs under Cincpac and the Flusser, Helm and 

Henley under ComSouWesPacFor protecting convoy arriving that 

date. 

412 
APR GCT ---

23 1900 

26· 0327 

( 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT 

Uy 00600 of April 11 ,,Assignment of Vessels and Aircraftn 

modified as follows: Amphibious Force Pacif~~. TansDiv 

2 Harris, Cresent City, President Adams, James Ohara, 

Alhena, Almaack, Betelgeuse. TransDiv 4 Zeilin, President 

Hayes, President Jackson, Frederick Funston, Procyon, 

Alcyone. TransDiv 6 Henry T.Allen, J. Franklin Bell, 

Arthur Middle ton, Algora s, Titania. TransDi v 8 Neville , Heywood, George F. Elliot, Fuller, Formalhaut, Bellatrix. 

TransDiv 10 McCawley, Barnett, Hunter Liggett, American 

Legion, Libra. TransDl vl2 Calhoun, Gregory, Littler; / 

McKean. Amphibious Force Atlantic. TransDiv 1 Thomas 

Stone, Tho~as Jefferson, Harry Lee, Arcturus. TransDiv 3 

William Biddle, Leonard Wood, Jos T. Dickman, Oberon. 

TransDiv 5 Joseph Hewes, John Penn, Edward Rutledge, 

Electra. TransDiv 7 Samuel Chase, George Clymer, Charles 

Carroll, Alchiba. TransDiv 11 Stringham, Manley. 

Any of about ships now on teMporary duty under NTS will when ;> releasetl·~· be .:"' Ordered by Opnav to report for duty 

in accordance with about assignment. · 

ComSoEastPacFor and CTF 12 inform ships concerned in their 

respective present movements. Opnav informed. 

CINCPAC TO CTF 17 

Logistics arrangements for Task force 11 and 17. Assumptions ~~SKASKIA fuels Task Force 11 and starts return 

to Pearl by 27 April and NEOSHO emptied by.Task Force 17 

and starts return to Pearl by 10 May. I will sail tankers 

from here to arrive vicinity Noumea as follows: PLATTE 

12 May, CUYA~iA and KANAWHA 17 May, KASKASKIA 23 May, 

and NEOSHO 3 June. Present intention is to maintain 

CUYAUA, KANAWHA in Noumea Area and use KASI\ASKIA, Nl~OSHO, 

PLATTE as feeders thus taking advantage high speed of latt 

group to transport oil ~nd minimize their standby time 

in the operations theatre. Separate despatch covers / 

TIPPECANOE which will be filled from other sousses and 

kept in Noumea area as emergency reserve. Intend fill 

Samoa from chartered tankers about 15 May. WHITNh"'Y, AJ..~DEBARAN, LASSEN will arrive Bleavher about 25May with 

repair facilities, provisions and about 3,000 tons 

replacement ammunition. ANTARES will supply general stores 

date later. This further assumes that ComSwPacFor will 

supply those units of his fotce which operate under his 

command. Not definite but possible that Task Force 17 

will depart for Pearl about 15 May. 

41 3 
iil!BR!!!I 

APR QQ! 

26 2000 COMTASKFOR 17 to COMSOUWESPACFOR info CINCPAC 

27 0515 

27 0653 

28 0925 

To separate operations as directed CinCPac 250357 

Comtaskfor 17 originator will operate area Afir.m 

east of Longitude 155 between NEW GUINEA - LOUISIADE 

ARCHIPELAGO line and Latitude 20. Request Comsowespacfor action adee keep me informed location own 

submarines, especially in neutral zone between Afirm 

and Baker which I may have to cross without warning. 

COMSOUWESPACFOR to CINCPAC 

Exchanging Desron accordance URDIS -230345 will send 

WHIPPLE, EDWARDS to ROSES to relieve HELM HENLEY 

about 5 May. Comdesdiv 57 with FORD, A~EN and one 

destroyer from Desdiv 58 depart Xray on escort duty 

arriving BLEACHER about 15 May as relief for SELFRIDGE 

MUGFORD BA.GLEY. Comdesdiv 58 with 2 DDs depart SYDNEY 

about 24 Kay for PEARL via SAMOA to relieve JARVIS 

PATTERSON. BLACK HAWK and remaining DD depart SYDNEY 

about 26 May when relieved by DOBBIN. PERKINS FLUSSER 

exchange for BLUE and RALPH TALBOT in NOUMEA area on 

date to be designated by you. All hands informed. 

COMSOUWESPACFOR to COMTASKFOR 17 

This is Comtaskfor 42's 261446. Passed to you for 

info: s 47 departed BRISBANE 22 April direct to 

vicinity RAPAUL arriving 1 May thence ~~pund NEW 

HANOVER and NEW IRELAND departing 11 May. 844 

departed 24 April direct to ST GEORGES channel arriving 2 May departing 14 May. S 42 departed 26 April 

direct to Cape NARUM arriving 3 May departing 15 May. 

S 38 departes 28 April direct to vicinity HURON Gulf 

DAMPIER Strait arriving 7 May departing 17 May. 

Advance to 12 south 216 miles daily north of 12 south 

100 miles daily. 

COMTASKFOR 17 to CINCPAC 

Task Organization contemplated by originator CTF 17. 

Task Group 17.5 Air YORKTOWN LEXINGTON, Destroyers 

Rear Admiral Fitch. 17.2 Attack Group MINNEAPOLIS 

NEW ORLEANS ASTORIA CHESTER PORTLAND Destroyers j 

Rear Admiral Kinkaid. 17.3 Support Group AUSTRALIA 

CHICAGO HOBART Destroyers Rear Admiral Crace. 17.9 

Search Group TANGIER 12 VP Captain Sprague. Am considering advisability transferring my flag temporarily 

to CHESTER or INDIANAPOLIS if latter joins. 

414 
April 26. 

The TAMBOR reports sinking a medium tanker on April 15th and small freighter on March 23d, missed a freighter on 

the 30th possibly due to too deep torpedo setting. Unsuccessfully attacked a tanker the 6th, was depth charged by aircraft on the 12th. Score - 2 sunk, 2 missed. This is a 

disappointing score for a submarine in an area supposed to be 

quite active. She did, however, send in good information for 

future submarine operations in the Rabaul area. 

Task Force 6 will be formed the 28th consisting of 

Service Force vessels. 

An unidentified DD and AP were r~orted by Army in 

Lat ll-15S, Long 176-47 W. This is probably not enemy. There were, however, a number of unexplained sightings in 

the South Pacific today. 

The TAUTOG reported sinking an enemy submarine 550 

miles southwest of Oahu. Many submarine officers have long felt that a fine way to clear an area of enemy subs is to 

use our subs to hunt for and destroy them. This theory is 

not by any means proven by tl1e recent success of the GRAMPUS 

and the TAUTOG but bears watching. 

' . The Commander Southwest Pacific set up his plans for 

deployment of his forces to counter the expected Japanese offensive in the New Britain area (Aidac). His search starts 

tomorrow. Task Forces 17 and 11 will join up under Rear 

Admiral Fletcher on May 1st east of the New Hebrides. 

The air bombings by the Japs on Darwin, Moresby and 

other places in the New Britain area are increasing. 

The Japanese are taking interest in Alaskan cl~rts. 

415 
SiFGiili 

April 27. 

An important directive from Cominch was received 

today (Aidac) relating to the employment of TF-1 and 16. 

Decision will be made tomorrow when Admiral Nimitz returns. 

A Possible submarine contact was made 480 miles northeast of OAHU by a search plane. 

The tempo of air operations has been stepped up in 

the S.W. Pacific. Darwin was heavily bonbed. 

It now seens fairly clear that the enemy will use 

3 to 4 CV and usual cruisers and destroyers in the expected 

offensive. Initially we oppose with two CV task forces. 

April 28. 

Admiral Nimitz returned and the followinG general 

plan was adopted. TF-16 (2 CV, 4 CA, 1 DL, 7 DD, 2 AO) Vice 

Admiral Halsey cornnanding will depart for the CORAL SEA area I 

on the 30th. TF-1 will return to the West Coast. Depending 

on developments TP-17 will leave the CORAL SEA area for PEARL 

about May 15 and TF-11 to follow-about June 1st. They will 

reconnoiter soing and coming, doing what damage they can to 

the enemy and his installations. The above will be covered 

in Operation Plan 23-42. 

There is a plan underway to send the NASINILLE to the 

BERil-lG SEA to destroy Japanese fisheries. 

Col. Lyman, USA, is apparently interferring with the 

New Zealand plans for NANDI airfield. We should not have to 

have these things cone up. This is aggravated because it 

was referred to the Army at Oahu. 

Maj.Gen. C.F.B. Price, USMC, assumed conuna.nd at 

Samoan A:rea. 

'I'he Emperors birthday passed without much more than 

minor bombings in the S.W. Pacific. There are some good 

indications that our bombings are hurting the Japs. They 

may even be changing the direction of there effort to the 

east now instead ·or south from RADAUL. This may only be 

wishful thinking. At any :rate there are more bombings and 

reconnaissance in the GILBgRT Area. 

A subnarine was sighted in Lat 21 S, Long 176-30 E. 

41.5 
EF37 

I 

~EGRET 

From: 

To: 

Subject: 

1. 

17 

16 

April 28, 1942 

Cruiser attack on Japanese Siberian Fisheries. 

Information. 

Japanese fishermen leave their base at Hakodate 

for the fishing grounds off Siberia in the middle of April for 

crabs, and the middle of June for salmon. Thus, some crab 

fishermen should be there now while the salmon fishermen will 

not arrive until the latter part of June. 

The importance of these fisheries to Japan is pointed 

out in the reference enclosed in Cominch serial 00210~ March 20, I "1_ 

1942. In that serial Cominch permits Cincpac to take any desired 

' :J 1' \ b action. C .......... <!. \eve. ""V'..~~ t!vvle."""-·"•,JI ,.( ·t~ 1')- t..~ b\.o-IA--tL ..-u. tlrv. t fiL 

I" ~ ' V t'\t \ \' "'' I L v I 

Two S-boats are now operating in the southern part 

of the area, one to the east and one to the west of the Kuriles. l? ~ Of- ~ ? . 1\ ~ . 

Comaubpac has recommended that a submarine "investigate 

the main areas of operation of the Japanese mother ships." 

If a cruiser were also sent to the area the plan 

would be for the submarine to operate in the Sea of Okhotsh and 

the cruiser off the east coast of Kamchatka. 

The NASHVILLE is available now, although it is a bit 

~ . early for maximum enemy fishing activity. (A heavy CL is a suitable 

surface type for this operation). 

f\fc:.\1 

-1-

417 
2. It is proposed to send the NASHVILLE (an~e 

dest.royer ;--r-N irected) to operate against the fisheries outside 

the 3-mile zone. While the "Instructions for the Navy of the 

United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare••, May 1941, 

must apply insofar as Russia is concerned, we are directed to 

commence unrestricted submarine and aerial·warfare against Japan. 

This means that the enemy character of these fishing vessels must 

be determined. They are known to be armed, frequently officered 

by Japanese naval reservists, and escorted by naval vessels. Thus, 

they lose innocent character. It would defeat the purpose if 

these enemy vessels were to be sent in for adjudication. The 

Commanding Officer, NASHVILLE should sink the vessels, once 

their identity is established, as a military necessity. He 

should only make sure that he does not .sink Russian vessels. 

~ft ~ie ~~•eP ease, J[t will be best to explain an accident 

later than to let a good Jap target escape. 

3. NASHVILLE - alone 

(a) Pearl to Kamchatca 

to Dutch Harbor 

to Pearl 

Days cruising 

(b) Pearl to Kamchatka 

to Dutch Harbor 

to Midway 

to Pearl 

- 2-

Miles 

2762 

1200 

2046 

6008 

12 

2762 

1200 

1653 

1149 

6765 

Gallons 

162000 

71000 

122000 

268,000 

162000 

71000 

97000¢ 

68000 

418 
Days cruising 

(c) Pearl to Midway 

Miles 

12 

1149 

to Kamchatka 1800 

to Dutch Harbor 1200 

to Pearl 2046 

Days cruising 

(d) Pearl to Midw~y 

to Kamchatka and 

6195 

15 

1149 

return 3600 

to Pearl 1149 

5898 

Days cruising 

Gallons 

268,000 

68,000 

10,600 

71,000 

122,000 

323,000 

68,000 

213,000 

68,000 

287,000 

Note: If a DD goes along (d) would be cut to about 

5 days. 

(e) Pearl to Dutch Harbor 2046 

to Kamchatka 1200 

to Dutch Harbor 1200 

to Pearl 2046 

6492 

122,000 

71,000 

71,000 

122,000 

Note: This, of course gives the maximum time in 

Siberian waters, i.e., 17 days. And if a 

destroyer escort is deemed necessary, it is 

the best way to do the job. It does withdraw 

244~000 gallons (5800 /- bbls) from the 45,000 

bbls. capacity supply there (7000 bbls on 

Mar. 31, 1942). 

-3- 419 
4. Figures given in paragraph 3 above are relative. 

They are based on 15 knot steaming, - subtracting 14% for war 

conditions, and always having 20% fuel remaining on board. 

Based on these figures (e) seems the route to follow. It has 

the added probability of minimum enemy interference. 

5. I think that the circumstances permit sending the 

NASHVILLE without a DD. If she steams at 15 knots advance, 

suitable zigzag, she is reasonably safe. ~ DD is not 

assurance that she will be safe from S/M. A DD does, of 

course, give additional air security. 

help roll up the enemy fishing line. 

'3 (c) 

-4-

Also, the DD could 

420 
April 29. 

The Tangier reports the landing field at Roses to be 

satisfactory for VF. This is good if true)as VMF 212 

is soon enroute and NOUMEA is already crowded. . 

The prelimenaries to the New Britain area are underway, 

but there is no change in the general picture there 

today. 

The following areordered to the new SOPAC area: 

Commander - Vice Admiral Ghormley. 

Chief-of-Staff - Capt. Callahan. 

Operations - Comdr. T.H. Roper. 

Supply- Capt. H. D. Nuber (SC). 

Comair SoPacFor - Re~r Admiral McCain. 

The Na~hville will be ordered to carry out a raid on 

the Japanese Fisheries east of Ka~chat'a leaving 

here about May 3rd. She will go via Midway and 

probably return via Dutch Harbor. 

April 30. 

The reinforcements for BLEACHER, STRAW, and ROSES are 

about to arrive at their destinations and TF 17 is in a 

position to cover the last part of the movement. The 

auxiliaries of the Marine Amphibious Force in NZ will 

arrive there June 6th. 

Cominch 301800 contemplates assigning the CURTISSas 

flagship of Admiral ~~87· However, she is under 

overhaul for the next month but the WRIGHT (now in 

Austrailia) is offered by CincPac. 

Normal condition of readiness was resumned in the 

Hawaiian Area, the Emperor of Japads birthday having 

passed without incident. According to our dope this 

alert was premature, and so proved. 

ComGen 2nd Marine Brigade in his 291915 reports progress 

on aviation facilities at STRAW. 

Task Force 16 departed for the CORAL SEA Area. When he 

arrives in the general vicinity of the critical area he 

will have four CV task forces at his disposal. 

One of our submarines will reconnoiter MAKIN on May 6th. 

a Maru visited there today, evidently bringing suppl,es. 

421 
s N o n ~ w 

April 30. (ConT'd) 

The general condition of our intelligence set up is 

not the best. We get excellent RI and CI, but we are 

not yet employing all means which can be placed at the 

disposal of the Cine Pac. 

The SUMNER arrived at PAGO PAGOwhere she will get replacemen~of her gear. 

A RDF is being constructed at WAKE. 

The move of the Japs ·in the SOWPAC is underway but, 

aside from stepping up air offensives by both sides, 

nothing impressive has happened yet. 

The activities of the ORANGE SECOND FLEET are unkown. 

CinCPac in his 292343 re~ests arrangements for 

Strawboard be expedited. 

422 
8 18 0 R H i 

GCT 29 1915 

GCT 30 1800 

GCT 29 234~ 

! · 

ComGen 2nd Mar Brig to CincPac of April '42 

This from Commanding General Second Marine 

Brigade. Seaplane ramp capable of accomodating Catalinas, will be completed 30 April at ~ Satapuala Upolu. vs ·1 now using as auxiliary base. Started clearing landing field there. 

Cominch to CincPac of April '42. 

Contemplate immediate assignment of CURTISS to 

South Pacific Force as flagship Comairsopac. Your comment requested. 

Cincpac to Cominch 

Free Fr~nch ship CHEVRUID at Noumea considerably delayed your 121405. Troops for Strawboard 

already at Strawstack. Request arrangements be expedited and advise. 

423 

_/ 
--

MAY GCT 

01 1927 (CONT'D) 

Cominch will 

_(A) transmit to Opnav fleet and frontier commanders 

notices of arrivals and departures .from and to areas 

outside of the u.s. strategical control 

(B) Transmit pertinent information to appropriate foreign authorities. Opnav will 

(A) Issue corresponding routing instructions to outgoing ships to first port or position as opportunities within area of British strategical control information 

Cominch Fleet all HM ships, sea frontier commanders 

appropriate foreign authorities. 

{B) Make diversions for both incoming and outgoing vessels while within area under .United States stragetic control 

(C) Issue an -approximate date. 

Sea Frontier Commanders will arrange for provision of 

coverage and/or escort as for comparable u.s. ships. 

424 
!!!!fib! 

APR GCT 

30 1916 COMINCH to VARIOUS SEA FRONTIER & DEFENSE COMMANDERS 

The Chief of Staff of the Army and CinC US Fleet have 

agreed on the following plan under which unity' of command 

will be exercisea as to defense commands, coastal frontiers, and sea frontiers of the Atlanbic Gulf and Pacific Coasts: 

(A) The Chief of Staff and CinC may jointly declare the 

existence in sea frontier and defense commands of either 

a ttstate of non invasiontt or a ' "state of fleet opposed invasion" or a "state of Army opposed invasion". 

(B) When a state of non invasion is declared unity of 

command will be exercised in accordance with the joint despatch of the Chief of Staff and CinC of March 25th 

(C) When a state of fleet opposed invasion is declared 

unity of command is vested in the Navy, as regards 'fleet 

forces and sea frontier forces, excluding naval local 

defense forces, with sea frontier forces continuing in 

status of unity of command for operations over the sea against 

enemy sea borne activity as under a state of non invasion; unity of command is vested in the Army over all naval local 

defense forces and over all Army forces, except air units 

allocated by defense commanders to sea frontiers for opera- tions over the sea. 

(D) When a state of Army opposed invasion is declared, unity of command is vested in the Army over all Army forces, Sea Frontier Forces, and naval local defense forces 

(E) Unity· .of command in all cases will be exercised in 

accordance with par. 10 of Joint Action of Army-Navy 1935. 

Existing instructions and agreements in c onflio·t with the 

above are cancelled. 

In accordance with the above plan, a "state of noninvasion" is hereby declared. 

30 2110 SUMNER TO CINCPAC 

Reference 142142 of Comindiv 2 and Comanzacfor 180310 x 

This is first of two parts from Sumner. Following confidential notice to mariners suggsted: Chart HO 2857. Nandi 

waters Viti Levu. To avoid minefields remain east of Boundary line drawn from NE edge of Casco Bay four. point ~lye miles 

246 degrees then 8.9 miles to Vatu Mbulo r~peat Va·tu Mbulo 

Island on 209 x From that island 4.3 miles 169 degrees ~ thence on 205 degrees for 3.3 miles to NE corner of Navula 

Reef. Center of channel one half mile wide deagged to 

41 foot depth extends from 100 fathom curve on 076 and 

3/4 degrees 1.2 miles to a point bearing 113.5 degrees 4 · 25 
APR GCT 

30 ~110 

MAY GCT --

CONTD 

distance one half mile from Navula Reef Light then on 017 

degrees for 5 and 1/3 miles and from there 040 degrees for 

9 and 1/3 miles to anchorage area overlapping swept channel shown in chart. Part two next. 

01 1736 COMINCH TO VARIOUS SEA FRONTIER AND DEFENSE CO~ThffiNDS 

Pending the reaching of agreements as to the.'c terms under 

which unity of command will be exercised as to defense 

commands coastal- frontiers and sea frontiers and as an 

integral part thereof unity of command as set forth in 

para nine baker paren two paren and para ten of Joint 

Action of Army and Navy 1935 is hereby vested in sea 

frontier commanders over all naval foras duly allocated 

thereto and over all Army air units allocated by defense 

commanders for operations over the sea for the protection of shipping and for antisubmarine and other operations against enemy seaborne activities para 

Defense command~rs will allocate Army Air Units in full 

time basis. but may rotate them as not less than two week 

periods as requisite for essential training. 

01 1828 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

2 days prior arrival convoy Bleacher inform through u.s. 

SOPA the British consul GR Armstrong and Commanding Officer 

New Zealand Garrison of prospective arrival. Direct Brig. General Lockwo.od, Commanding US Army troops Bleacher to 

Assume command that his arrival of all local defense forces ~ 

under principle of unity of command. Request New Zealand ·chiefs of staff to direct CO New Zealand garrison Bleacher 

to operate under Lockwood under principle of unity of 

command pending decision by them of disposition of New 

Zealand and local native forces. After arrival convoy Bleacher inform GOC Fiji General Meade command relations 

est.ablished by you at Bleacher. 

/ 01 1927 COMINCH, OPNAV TO VARIOUS 

Cancel my 3820 of the 25th February and my 3119 3oth March. 

Following procedure crucial to arrivals and departures 19 

naval vessels of British or other United Bations. 

426 
ziii0Ri1T a 

MAY GCT ----

01 1939 OPNAV TO ~~ 

Reference your report April 1st subject logistic policy fuel oil. For establishing reserve pool of fuel oil in Chile for Navy and issue to commercial ships when no other supply available Latin American supply committ~e recom- mends following. Make application locally to Villiamson Balbeur Co. Agents for International Petroleum Co, stating that Navy desires 10,000 tons maintained at all times for its own use. Based on experience with issues 

port or ports where foregoing to be stored left your discretion but suggest ~onsideration 1/2 in .each Antofagasta and Valparaiso. Any expense involved should be covered by request to Busanda for special . allotment. If practicable fuel oil of Talara origin desire'd because of approximation to Navy special grade. If not best attainable commercial fuel is acceptable. Advise action taken. 

02 1515 COMINCH TO U.S. FLEET 

Unwarranted despatches for the promiscuous exchange information and unevaluated reports of own and enemy operati.ons by other than established communication / channels and command echelons cause confusion, jeopardize security and delay transmission of high precedence traffic. The previously expressed principle of information for only those who need to know is hereby emphasized and repeated. 

02 2055 COMINGH TO TUTUILA 

It is against policy of government to occupy Vichy French Territory. Your 292343. Suggest you inquire from Com- / Gen. Noumea as to schedule Of CHEVREUIL. Oral discussion with Admiral Auboyneau now arrived London indicated DeGaulle government definitely intends ·take over STRAWBOARD and will then welcome occupation by US Naval St~ion Samoa pass to ComGen Samoa. • 

427 
:zii!8 RO!I 

MAY GCT 

01 1939 

02 2055 

OPNAV to --- INFO CINCPAC, COMSERFOR, ETC. 

Reference your report April 1st subject Logistic 

Policy Fuel oil. For establishing reserve pool of 

fuel oil in CHILE for Navy and issue to commercial 

ships when no other supply available Latin American 

Supply Committee recommends following: Make application locally to Williamson Balbeur Company, Agents 

for International Petroleum Co., stating that Navy 

desires 10,000 tons maintained at all times for its 

own use. Based on experience with issues port or 

ports where foregoing to be stored left your discretion but suggest consideration ! in each ANTOFAGASTA 

and VALPARAISO. Any expense involved should be 

covered by request to BuS&A for special allotment. 

If practicable fuel oil of TALARA origin desired 

because of approximation to Navy special grade. If 

not best attainable commercial fuel is acceptable. 

Advise action taken. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO NAVSTA, TUTUILA 

IT IS AGAINST POLICY OF GOVERNMENT TO OCCUPY VICHY 

FRENCH TERRITORY. YOUR 292343. SUGGEST YOU INQUIRE 

FROM COMGEN NOUMEA AS TO SCHEDULE OF CHEVREUIL. 

ORAL DISCUSSION WITH ADMIRAL AUBOYNEAU NOW ARRIVED 

LONDON INDICATES DE GAULLE GOVERNMENT DEFINITELY 

INTENDS TAKE OVER STRAWBOARD AND WILL THEN WELCOME 

OCCUPATION BY US. NAVAL STATION SAMOA PASS TO 

COMGEN SAMOA • 

/ 

. 02 2056 COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOWESPAC, NAVOBS WELLINGTON 

DUE TO DELAY ARRIVAL GHORMLEY IN SOPAC AND DESIEABILITY 

ALL FORCES THAT AREA BE BROUGHT UNDER UNIFIED CONTROL 

IN VIEW PRESENT SITUATION DESIRE CINCPAC ASSUME COMMAND OVER ALL LAND SEA AND AIR FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN 

AREAS LESS THOSE FOR LAND DEFENSE NEW ZEALAND AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE IN ACCORDANCE PROVISIONS MY 

031905 OF APRIL AND SECNAV LETTER OF 20 APRIL NOW IN 

PROCESS OF DELIVERY. AFTER GHORMLEY ESTABLISHED 

HEADQUARTERS SEPARATE SOPAC COMMAND CAN BE SET UP. / 

ADVISE COMINCH IN ADVANCE DATE AND HOUR YOU PROPOSE 

ASSUME COMN~ND IN ORDER THAT ARMY AND GOVERNMENTS 

CONCERNED CAN BE NOTIFIED. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY 

MATTERS PERTAINING TO U.S.A. FORCES IN SOP.A.C WILL BE 

ADMINISTERED AS DIRECTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT. 

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY MATTERS PERTAINING TO U.S. 

NAVAL FORCES SOPAC WILL BE AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC. 

MY 141416 OF APRIL MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY. CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF ARMY INFORMED. 

428 
MAY GOT --

02 2056 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Due to delay arrival Ghormley in SoPac and desirability all rorces that area be brought under uniried control in 

view present situation desire Cincpac assume command over 

all land, sea and air rorces, Pacific Ocean Areas less 

those for land defense New Zealand at earliest practicable date in accordance provisions my 031905 of April and 

Secnav letter of 20 April now in process of delivery. After Ghormley establishes headquarters separate SoPac 

command can be set up. Advance Cominch in advance date ~ 

and hour you propose ass.1me command in order that Army 

and governments concerned can be notified. Administrative 

and supply matters pertaining to USA forces in SoPac will 

be administered as directed by the War Department. Administrative and supply matters pertaining to U.S. 

Naval Forces SoPac will be as directed by Cincpac. My 141416 of April modified accordingly. Chief of Staff 

Army informed. 

02 2211 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Consider it imperative that AA guns at Midway be 

increased to 24 with all possible speed your 290337 

Army advises that Emmons can give you 8 complete less 

height finder by 14th. Also 4 more without firecontrol 

equipment which has been requisitioned. Ex SARATOGA 

altimeters now at Pearl may temporarily fill lack of 

height finders. Twin 20 MM on 40 MM Army mounts shipped San Francisco to Pearl as follows 9 on May 7 and 11 on 

May 10. 

04 0930 4TH DEF. BTN. TO COMINCH, CINCPAC 

This from u.s. Naval Unit, Roses. Existing facilities 

Roses adequate for Catalinas. 

429 
GCT MAY 

01 2318 

03 0130 

04 0351 

04 0630 

04 1505 

COMINDIV 2 TO DOBBIN INPO CINCPAC 

Considerin? our mining mission to protect vessels in 

Bleacher Harbor i'rom snbr.1arines and surface craft 

offensive action problematical if satisfactory solution can be submitted if Egeria ·channel, the Narrows 

and especially Lahi Passa~e are all left open.' ~wo 

former may be protected by nets and shore batteriesExtensive mine pl"otection Lahi with its reported cross / 

currents may endanger own forces. Engineering investigation Bleacher may show a number of essential dredging :0rojects exist. Provided the Narrows can be made 

safe for use by deep draft vessels can close Lahi thereafter by mining. Request your decision as to whether 

dredging operations should be requested. 

COMINDIV 2 TO CINCPAC. 

General Reade accepted mine cases Cincpac 270031. 

Completely equipped detail departed Suva on Bridge 

for Bleacher afternoon May 2nd. Roses mining detail 

with equipment departed Suva in l!Tontgomery and Ramsay / 

1400 May 3rd to arrive Roses 0900 May 5th. All times 

local. Preparation mines being undertaken simultaneously at Bleacher and Roses. 

AREA HDQ AHPHIBFORPAC TO c;rnCPAC. 

In addition to Ifurris combat loaded for Strawboard 

now at Strawstack ready for embarkation on Zellin 

troop and about 1000 tons cargo for strawboard. / 

Estimate 4 days work loading with local facilities. 

Appears undesirable start loading with present uncertainty. Request 4 days notice of decision to 

execute strawboard operation. 

TANGil~R TO CIHCPAC. 

FREE FRENCH SHIP CiillVRIBUL WAITING TO LEAVE WI'rH EITHER 

GOVERNOR SAUTOr.r OR ADJ'.1IRAL DARIBNLIEU PENDING OUTCOME / 

CRISIS. PRESENT INDICA 'eiONS ARg ADI'IIIHAL WILL LEAVE 

BUT NEITHER DATE OR DESTINA'riON HAS BE~N SET. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC. 

LONE WOLF PLAN. FOLLOWING SHIPS READY SAIL CANAL ZONE 

POR WELLINGTOn tJgGAT ZED ON APPHOXIMATE DA'rES IlJDICA'rED 

TO BB ROUTED INDE;Fr;NDEN'rLY VIA SOUTH~~RN ROUTE. EL:EC'rHA / 

CARRYING CARGO MAY 17. DELBRAZIL CARHYING CAHGO MAY 19. 

~JL\KEFIHLD CARRYING TROOPS MAY 26.. COHPASEAFRON PROVIDE 

ESCORT :i'OR WAK!£PIELD ONLY OF ONE DJSTROY·~H PANAMA TO 

PRUDENT LIMIT 0:11 ENDURANCE. 
GCrr MAY 

04 1819 

04 2010 

04 2315 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLAHT, ETC. 

FROJ,,l COS' U S 1~ RJ,TY AND COHr.1ANDER IN CHIEF US FLEE11 • 

ACTION TO SUPRr-:!ME COMUANDEH SOUTH NEST PACIPIC i .. HEA. 

COMMANDERS VESrrED 'ilis:'H UNITY OP COlfil,tAND VIILL NOT 

PERMA1TEHTLY ~TIANSFER UNITS OF SERVICE TO 'VJHICH HE 

DOhS 1TOT BEL01JG PROM ASSIGNED STAS:IONS OR SUBDIVISIONS 

OF HIS COMMAND WITHOUT AUTHORITY FHOU ·~'JAR OR UAVY 

DEPARTJ./E~NT AS INDICATED. THIS WILL HOT BE INTER- ./. 

PRE'rBD TO RESTRICT IN ANY WAY THE AUTHORITY OF SUCH 

COMMANDER TO MAKE TEMPORARY MOVEMJi~NTS OP MOBILE FORCES 

0~, EITHER SERVICE REQUIRgD IN EXECUTICN OF OPERATIONS 

TO MEET A SPECIAL SITUAri'ION UNQUOTE LEARY PASS TO 

MACARTHUR. VAN HOOK PASS TO ANDREVJS • ALL ADDRESSEES 

DELIVER TO ARHY AND NAVY cor~.1AHDERS AS NECESSARY. 

OPNAV TO COMSOWESTYACFOH INFO CINCPAC 

Changes to Cast Sail Prep 819 Afirm approved your 

271620. For reasons expressed by 012030 do not issue 

Pacific Fleet Publications to your units. Pacific 

Fleet Forces based at New Zealand and New Caledonia 

should be issued Asiatic aircraft code. Contact code ../ 

and authenticator. Destruction Cast Sail Prep 688 

and associated publications authorized by Opnav 211705 

March. Comdr South Pacific Force will hold class 6 

allowance of Asiatic publications in addition to his 

T·egular class 6 allo·wance of Pacific publications. 

AREA HDQ. AMPHIB PAC TO CINCPAC. 

Air field Strawstack now has capacity for squadron 

present and enroute plus one additional squadron. ~ 

Concentration of ships this area now building up 

makes additional air protection urgent. All possible 

speed to provide additional squadron recommended. 

431 
1 May 

Cominch 011736 {and see his 191~0) issued a directive 

as to unity of command with reference to Defense Commands, Coastal, and Sea Frontiers. 

Opnav 012030 considers it undesirable to risk Pacific Fleet publications in the Southwest Pacific. 

Cominch 1927/01 concerns procedure in reporting and rout- ing ships. 

Cominch 011828 indicates the desired command set-up at 

Bleacher. 

The SUMNER continues to do a fine job. In his 302110 

he gives the naviation information on Nandi. 

The preliminaries of the Japanese offensive in the 

Southwest Pacific are underway. There are indications that the 

main first objective is Port Moresby. The Solomons are to be attacked also. To keep our forces from interfering the Japanese plan to raid such·places as Cooktown, Townesville, and Horn Island in Australia, and may raid as far east as Roses, Noumea, Fiji, and Samoa. 

While there is no good information as to moves in the 

Central and North Pacific at this time, all positions as far 

east as Pearl Harbor and Dutch Harbor may possibly be recipients of a raid. However, it appears that the general known location of Japanese forces today preclude anything which threaten our 

positions or general security. In fact, there are reasons to 

believe that a small raid on Oahu, for example, might benefit 

our ultimate position more than it would Japan. For example, today we have a B-17 striking force of only 16 planes available. As long as we get no threats we are not apt to get more planes. 

Our DD position in the Pacific Areas, always bad, will 

now commence to get worse as we send new boats to the Southwest Pacific in exchange for China Station 4-pipers. These ODD must have 

an overhaul and modernization as soon as the Pacific Fleet receives 

them. 

Our lack of CA, CL, DD for the SARATOGA {our May 25 from 

Bremerton) is a real problem. Our BBs are trying to get in some 

sea time with 5 DDs. 

Evacuation was started from Tulagi today. 

43 2 I \. ' 
May 2. 

'Admiral Nini tz made an inspection of the defenses of 

MIDWAY today. Admiral I~ing has expressed his concern about 

this island, \thich in the opinion of Cincpac, is now able to 

vvithstand a moderate attack. Cominch 022211 directs that the 

A. A. defense at MIDV/AY oe strengthened. 

Opnav 011939 states plans for the supply of outlyin~ 

bases. 

Cominch 022056 is direct~~to assu~e comoand when ready 

and h~s put in effect the directive for the Pac ific Ocean Areas. 

There is a delay at Wallis (Cominch 022055) . 

The GATO cert ainly got hits on a vessel in the Marsha l ls. 

I t is hoped that she sank the KASUGA MARU. The Marshalls may 

be go o d hunting grounds. 

The offensive in t he Southwest Pacific is in the prel iminary stages. Bombings have been stepped up . Submarines are 

probably on station but enemy surface units appea r s t i ll enroute. 

The PRBSIDEHT TAYLOR was abandon ed at .CANTON. The salva ge effort was worthwhile for experience and to i ndicate to 

ship owners that the Navy will attempt salvage of their vessels. 

The S-35 returned from the KURILES because of mur.1ps. 

Off ParaM.ushiru Island a Jap sub fired at them - but probabl y ~~ 

not wi t h magnetic torpedoes. 

May 3. 

The GATO probably did not sink the KASUGA. Also, OI~NGE possession of magnetic torpedoes reported by the S-35, requires further confirmation. 

Submarines are again reported by the Army. This time 

one was reported in Lat 11-36 s, Long 178 w. The report is 

doubted. 

4th Defense Battalion (040930) reports that Catalinas 

can be operated satisfactorily at ROSES. 

Admiral Ghormley arrives at San Francisco May 5th. 

Rear Admiral McCain will be here tomorrow. 

Com1nch 021515 states policy regarding information of 

own and enemy forces. 

Operations in the Southwe st Pacific are still in the 

preliminary staees noted ye ste r day. 

433 
!my 3 (continued) 

There is now fairly good evidence that there will be 

2 BB and a total of 6 CV employed in the SWPacific campaign. 

Against that we have 4 CV, 11 CA, 4 CL, 22 DD. We do not know 

what General MacArthur has to oppose the enemy. It is probably 

that the enemy bomber and fighter strength have been considerably 

reduced by our own planes in bombings during the past few weeks. 

It is possible that losses have exceeded replacements. 

Admiral Nimitz returned from a two-day personal inspection 

of Nridway. 

Mal 4 

The probable line-up in the New Guinea-New Britain area 

for the offensive now underway is - OWN ENEMY 

SWPac :There ; • • • • • There • . . • . Force: now :Enroute: Total T:y]~e . • Total • Enroute • now • • 

~q) _ • • • . . . . • • . • 

: 2 2 4 . • cv • 7 • 3 • 3 • • . • • . • • • • ~ • • 

Q.-1 2 . . 6 . • 4 • 11 • CA. • 6 2 • 4 • • . . • . : : : . • 

('f) 2 2 4 CL 2-3 2-3 . • 

: 

: . : BB . • 2-4 2 1-2 . • 

: : • • 

2 12 8 22 DD 20-30 20-30: 

: . • 

4 2 6 ODD : : . • . • . : tl PO ( ~/) ~ : . . . . • 

) 4 ~ XCL 8-12 8-12: 

l ?uchl~ : XPG . 

. 

. ·- PC 12-16 12-16: . . u . " ss . . . 18-24 18-24: 

The TANGIER 040630 says that the Free French ship 

CHEVRIEUL is still waiting to leave Noumea. 

Area Headquarters, Samoa, 040351 states that four days' 

notice will be required to execute the Strawboard operation. ~l/. 

43Ll 
May 4 (continued) 

Cominch 041505 initiates a Lone Wolf Plan. 

Cominch 041819. Transfer of units m st nave OK of the \ 

Army or Navy Department. ~~ D ~~ 1 

Opnav 042010. Pacific Fleet publications will not be 

issued to vessels of the Southwest Pacific. 

Area HQ Samoa 042315 says that the airfield at Strawstack 

is now OK for the squadrons present and enroute and requests that 

the arrival there of additional squadrons recommended b2 expedited. 

Cominron 2 012318 and 030130 gives ideas on and progress of the mining projects for Bleacher and Roses. 

The big news of the day is the report of Task Force 17 1 s 

action in the Tulagi area. As a result of his attack he sent in 

the following score: 

Own Result Eneml 

0 Positively sunk 2 DD, 4 AT, 1 AK . • 

0 Beached & sunk 1 CL 

0 Badly damaged 1 CL, ·1 AV, 1 AK, 1 AP 

: 

1 VT Lost 5 Seaplanes 

2 VF . • 1 4-engine VP 

The Moresby striking force seems to be composed of Cardiv 

5 and Crudiv 5 and the time of attack on Moresby set for May 7th 

(local). 

. Surface units of the enemy are enroute in the Rabaul area •• ~ 

The presence of at least 1 CV of the KAGA type and 1 BB of the ~ 

HARUNA type in the area seems confirmed. 

435 
MAY GOT 

1 2205 COMINDIV 2 TO COMSOWESTPACFOR, CINCPAC 

Fiji minefields complete with 1436 mines May lat. Nandi 

fields accordance mydis 142142 April. Other single line 

fields across inshore of passages unless otherwise stated 

with number mines as follows Rovondrau Bay passages west 

21 middle 32 east 27. Lauthala Harbor passes within 

Nukumbutau 10 within Nukulau 10 x Ovauau fields south / 

Moturiki Channel 16 west Motuiki Channel 22 Ovalau line ~ 

65 Naingaini Passage 29 Line to Moon Reef 123. North 

Viti Levu Passages within Nananu Ira 5 Malake 10 

Nukurauvuha 12 Natombu Nurauivi 10 within Manava 10 

Savusavu Bay Passages po~nt 42 Nyavu 20 within Kumbalau 

17. North Vanua Levu Passages Sausau 21 Kia 14 within 

and across inside Mali 58. Recommended routes inside 

reefs unobstructed. Marked charts provided NOCF. 

04 0249 AREA HDQS AMPHFORPAC TO CINCPAC 

Cordially received by administration StPawhat complete cooperation extended nevertheless undivided control o£ 

island by US highly desirable and strongly endorse previous suggestion this be obtained by diplomatic means if possible.~ 

Island adapted practically unlimited development as air 

base. If major.development planned better harbor 

facilities important consideration. From air bay on 

north coast about 4 miles from NE point of island appears 

offer favorable anchorage suggest SUMNER survey. 

04 1615 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

TRANSDIVS EIGHT AND TEN NOW AT BLEACHER AND STRAW MOVEMENTS 

ARE DESIGNATED IN LONE WOLF PLAN FOR TRAINING SOPAC AMPH 

FORCE IN WELLINGTON AREA X TWO OF THESE TRANSPORTS ARE . DESIRED AT SAN FRANCISCO IN TIME TO LOAD .ABOUT 12 JUNE 

FOR SECOND ECHELON OF LONE WOLF MOVEMENT X NEVILLE AND / ' 

BARNETT ARE NA~ffiD IN PLAN BUT MAY BE REPLACED IF YOU SO 

DESIRE X TRANSPORTS SELECTED SHOULD LEAVE ALL PRACTICABLE 

LANDING BOATS AND TANK LIGHTERS IN SOPAC AS SPARES FOR 

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING X REPLACE1ffi~T BO~ms WILL BE MADE 

AVAILABLE AT SAN FRANCISCO X ADVISE WHICH TRANSPORTS YOU 

RECOMMEND FOR RETURN ALSO APPROXIMATE N1JMBER OF REPLACEMENT LANDING CRAFT REQUIRED FOR THESE TRANSPORTS. 

436 
/-

i!JOR!!If& a ;LJ l! I/ f I 

~ Q.9.! 

09 0543 

09 1939 

10 1835 

11 2241 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT both now in BLEACHER movement hereby designated for 2nd Echelon LO~m WOLF movement latter ship vice NEVILLE named in plan. Infer 

.from Cominch 041615,>'that other ships of Transdivs eight 

and ten are to be ordered direct to SPOONER from present 

missions at STRAW and BLEACHER. Cominch requested to 

confirm. If confirmed Comtransdiv 10 is directed to 

bave·all practicable landing boats and tank lighters 

transferred ·from BARNETT and ELLIOT to other ships 

present at BLEACHER for transportation to SPOONER and 

in addition to leave at BLEACHER such landing craft as 

can be picked up by ships from STRAW enroute to SPOONER 

advising Cominch direct inform Cincpac of number of 

replacements each type which will be required at SAN 

FRANCISCO. Remainder is for action ComWestSeaFront: 

BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT expected to be ready to 

depart BLEACHER about. 17 May. Furnish by despatch 

direct to them info Cominch Cincpac routings from 

BLEACHER· to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel. 

CINCPAC TO COMTRANSDIV 10 

I 

Designate third transport. Cominch 082131. Myd1s 

090534 hereby modified to include ship designated. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

YOUR 090543 AND 091931 CONFIRMED. ALSO SEE MY SERIAL 

00322. 3 vessels DESIGNATED FOR SEOOND ECHELON LONE 

WOLF REMAIN UNDER NTS FOR THAT OP.ERATION ON COMPLETION 

OF MIICH PROVISIONS OF NEXT SENTENCE APPLY. OTHER 

VESSELS OF TRANSDIVS 8 AND 10 NOW IS SOUTH PACililiC WHEN 

UNLOADED REPORT CINCPAC FOR DUTY CONNECTION TRAINING 

AT SPOONER. WHEN UNLOADJ;~D SHIPS OF TRANSDIVS 2, 4 AND 

6 NOW IN SOUTH PACIFIC LESS ARTHUR MIDDLETON ALSO REPORT CINCPAC TO PROCEED AS YOU MAY DIHECT. MIDDLETON PROCEED SAN FRANCISCO UNDER NTS REPORTING ON ARRIVAL TO 

COM 12 FOR CONVERSION. 

CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT, COMHAWSEAFRON, BASES & PACFLT. 

The fact that Japanese have not used gas against United 

State.s Forces is not to be taken as a criterion that 

gas will not be used in future. It is directed that a 

survey of' gas defense measures be made to ensure that 

we are prepared to minimize effects of surprise gas 

attacks. 

437 
,, 

I 

• • a n F m 

destined 

CINCPAC TO COMTRANSDIVS 8 & 10 

Completion present tasks in STRAW and BLEACHER convoys Transd1vs 8 & 10 proceed as follows: (a) MCCAWLEY 

FULLER depart STRAWSTACK about 14 May proceed via 

direct route to WELLINGTON NEW ZEALAND (code name LONGBOW). (b) AMERICAN rEGION NEVILLE depart about 16 May 

HUNTER LIGGETT about 30 May from BLEACHER proceed direct LONGBOW. (c) FOMALHAUT BELLATRIX when unloaded 

date indefinite depart STRAWSTACK proceed LONGBOW via 

BLEACHER. Units under (a) to (c) inclusive after 

arrival LONGBOW report to Vice Admiral Ghormley for 

duty in Amphibfor SouPac. (d) ~VOOD GEORGE F. ELLIOT 

BARNETT continue duty under 'NTS when unloaded proceed independently to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel 

on routings being furnished by ComWesSeaFront estimated 

departure dates HE~VOOD from STRAWSTACK 14 May ELLIOT 

from BLEACHER same day BARNETT from BLEACimR 16 May. ComTaskfor 17 has been authorized to modify ·.orders of 

either ELLIOT or BAR1mTT to carry excess personnel to 

PEARL enroute SAN FRANCISCO if required. All three 

SAN FRANCISCO ships are to arrive there by 12 June 

at latest. Ships destined West Coast are to fuel only sufficient to reach SAN PEDRO with prudent reserve. 

Ships/LONGBOW are to fuel sufficient to reach that 

port with reserve equal to 3,000 miles normal steaming. Provisions available LONGBOW. ComTransdiv 10 arriage transfer HEYWOOD landing craft to ships proceeding from STRAWSTACK to LONGBOW and advise ComTransdiv 8 

additional craft which can be left at BLEACHER to be 

picked up by FOMALHAUT and BELLATRIX. NavAtt WELLINGTON 

pass to NZNB and BOWMAN. ComTransdiv 10 pass to 

Commander Defense Force SAMOAN AREA. Comtransdiv 8 

pass to ComGen BLEACHER all for info. 
MAY GCT 

~ 0245 AREA HQ AMPFORPAC TO CINCPAC 

Your 031931 recommend all reports sightings Apia _be made 

to CO US forces there only. Latter will take necessary 

action and report Area HQ. Enemy sightings will be 

reported Cincpac. 

05 0411 CINCPAC TO AREA HQ AMPHFORPAC 

SUMNER IS made available ror survey work selected by you ~ 

provided,·.it will not prevent her immediate employment 

Strawboard project when authorized. 

5 0437 CINCPAC TO NAVSTA TUTUILA 

Recommendation urdis 040249 re undivided control passed 

to Cominch as were previous information and suggestion 

ur o80135 and 232051 March. This raises political ~ 

question beyond cognizance of Cincpac. Consider authority vested in you by unity of command and agreement 

with local authorities gives you undivid.ed military control. 

~5 0555 COMGENHAWDEPT TO CINCPAC 

Repeat to Tangier .for Patch (via USN channels) from General 

MacArthur: Suggest Tangier be directed pass Cincpac and 

Comsowespac intelligence reports to General Patch for his 

information and immediate staff only. Not to b~ passed to 

local government officials. In this way General Patch 

will be kept fully informed situation SWPA via secure 

communication channels and duplication will be avoided. 

In an emergency this headquarters will pass high priority 

information direct. 

05 1315 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CINCLANT, COMSOWESTPACFOR, ALL SEAFRONT COMS 

FOR ALL JOINT OPERATIONS IN EVERY THEATER OF OPERATIONS THE 

JOINT PLANNERS ARE DIRECTED TO EFFECT TI1~Y CONSIDERATION 

OF COMMUNICATIONS ON ALL OPERATIONAL PLANNING INCLUDING A 

DEFINITE ASSIGNEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING THE 

NECESSARY COMMUNICATIONS FOR EACH OPERATION AND FOR EACH 

PEASE OF EACH OPERATION 

439 
81'!8RMc 

05 2201 CINCPAC TO AHQ WELLINGTON 

A60 4/5 your A577 2/5 General Tinker is replying to C.A.S. 

signal direct. Understand the reply confirms in the main 

Tinker's agreement with C.A.S. in Fiji. Contrary instructions to those made in Fiji by C.A.S. and Tinker were forwarded by asparate agencies who were dealing with Fiui 

works policy without reference to each other. Tinker has 

detailed Major Fleming to coordinate policy here with Army / 

engineers. Fleming visited Fiji after Tinker's departure and apparentlC dictated memorandum on works policy which 

was given to olonel Seltzer and Captain Ende and which 

detailed priority. Fleming states memorandum is in effect 

General Tinker .and C.A.S. agreement. Fleming states matter 

was discussed by him with B7C Roberts. 

05 0135 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

~ After inspection Midway plan send there 12 3 inch AA 8 37 

mm AA and 12 twin 20 mm on 40 mm mounts. 12 Army AA referred 

urdis 022211 are same gauns previously allocated and about 

to be delivered Third Defense Battalion. No other AA Army 

guns availaae this area. Plan send guns Midway with key personnel from AA and special weapons groups, Third Defense 

Battalion, who are only trained personnel immediately available. Fillers are to be recruits. In order. 

accomplish foregoing and yet maintain combat value and 

readiness Third Defense Battalion urgently request by 

Fagtrans sixteen officers 455 enlisted marines and as 

soon as practicable 12 AA guns preferably 90 mm. 

440 
111@£0 HE£ ftl'Y tr ,.,.,,/ I 

May GCT 

~ 06 1435 COMINCH TO COMUSNAVFORCES EUROPE 

You are directed to call on General deGaulle inform him 

the Free French plan for the seizure of Wallis Island by the Chevrueil is greatly delayed or possibly disrupted by the apparent controversy in New Caledonia between Admiral 

D'Argenlieu and Governor Sautot. Chevreuil now at Noumea. 

It is most urgent for military reasons that Wallis be ~ 

adequately defended against Japanese. u.s. Navy is now 

ready to provide that defense as soon as Free French 

occupy the island but for political reasons does not 

wish to seize it so long as it remains under the Vichy 

government. Urge General deGaulle (A) to issue such 

instructions as will result in the earliest possible occupation of Wallis Island by the Free French government (B) Advise me as soon as accomplished (C) Authorize me 

to proceed with establishing defenses there with u.s. 

naval forces. 

06 2104 OPNAV TO DOBBIN 

Dobbin deliver to Cast George Bleacher. Ra~po to 

Bobcat: Borts on islands Manila Bay have capitulated. Enemy in northern Lu~on made fifteen mile advance to 

Bagabog; their forces ret~eated to Tuguegarao when 

attacked by our forces while attempting crossing of 

Cagayan River. General strike in New Caledonia following~ arrests by High Commissioner of administrative council 

members and governor. Successful air raids on Lae and 

Rabaul. Fighting on border of China and Burma. One 

brigade estimated arrived Rangoon enemy reinformcements 

since 30th. 70 enemy planes observed in successful heavy bombing of Rangoon Mingaladon a.lrdrome. Kroner. 

07 1045 TANGIER TO CTF 9 

In view recent submarine activity. off New Caledonia 

request authority to hold 3 planes flight ~5 and use as 

anti submarine patrol to limit of extended engine time. 

Recommend 6 more platrol planes be assigned Tangier immediately for anti submarine patrol. These in 

addition to 12 now used in maintaining search directed 

Comtaskfor 17's 262010 Ap~il. 

/ 

441 
8 E 9 Pi ii 51i1 

May 5 

In his 050245 the Area Comrnander SAl.IOA gives his plan 

in which he will be the clearing house for information on enemy 

contacts in his area and action thereon. In his 040249 he suggests the desirability of undivided control of islands and of 

the potentiality of add~ing to SAMOAN area airfields. In his 

050437 CinCPac states his views regarding unity of command at 

SAMOA. 

Cominch 041615 will use two transports now at BLEACHER 

or STRAW in a Lone Holf Plan. They are desired at SAN FRANCISCO 

June 12th to join the SoPac amphibious training project to be 

started at WELLINGTON. 

CinCPac 050411 makes the SUMHI~R available for a short 

time to Commanding General SAMOA. 

The mine field at FIJI has been completed - Comindiv 2 

012205. CinCPac 052201 summarizes air field work at FIJI. 

Cominch 051315 is a directive for comMunications in joint 

operations. This does not assure complete satisfaction. 

The Commanding General llii.WAI I AN ( 050555) wants General 

Patch at NOUMEA to get all Navy intelligence available to the 

TANGigR stationed there with the understanding that this will 

not go to the local government. 

CinCPac 060133 gives his plan to reinforce MIDWAY. This 

important outpost has been given considerable thought. ~ 

May 6 

Admirals Fletcher and Fitch should be in position riow to 

attack important objectives in the Louisaide Islands area. 

The NEOSHO and SIMS were apparently sunk by dive bombers 

in the Coral Sea. The loss of a fast new tanker makes the 

fuel supply to forces in that area more difficult than ever. 

And the loss of a DD, when we are already very short of that 

type in the Pacific, is a hard blow indeed. The score for the 

week is still in our favor. 

The SS CHLOE was sunk and the SS JOHN ADAMS was set 

afire and abandoned in the New Caledonia area. This was 

submarine action which makes counter measures there necessary. A DD patrol and anti-SS air patrol has been started. 

Admiral Ghormley's staff will leave San Franc:1.sco May 8th. The Admiral should be at Pearl to confer with Admiral 

Nimitz the latter part of this week. 
8 E 8 iR E T 

May 6 (Continued) 

Opnav 062104 relaying a message tells of a general strike in New Caledonia. 

The Free French slowness in taking over Wallis 

continues to be embarrassing. For political reasons Cominch 

(061435) has put the matter up to General deGalle. 

Jamming of our radio transmissions by the Japanese in 

the s.w. Pacific was handled by shifting to alternative wave 

lengths. 

There is the suggestion that the Japs can recover our 

ECM from the HOUSTON. She probably sank in diveable waters. 

A plan for immediate shift to secure codes must be in hand 

as we can expect Japan to break our codes eventually. 

The TANGIER (071045) wants more VPs. She will probably 

get them. 

While the Japanese offensive continues as expected in 

the SW Pacific, it is noted that they have sufficient forces 

in the Central Pacific Area now available to raid in the Central 

and North Pacific Areas. 

:May 7 

This was a red-letter day for our forces operating in 

the Coral Sea area . As a result of the exchanges between 

carriers in the past 36 hours· we have sunk the RYUKAKU and 

badly damaged the SIIOKAKU, while they have badly damaged the 

LEXINGTOIJ and slir;htly damaged the YORJ:TOWN. There has been 

no news of the light forces but enr;agements are probable. At 

the end of the daylic;ht period the YOHKTOWN and LEXINGTON were 

retiring to the south. The LEXINGTON wilJ/transfer planes to 

make up YORKTOWN losses and proceed to Pearl. AdrniraJ Fletcher 

faces the prospect or .. e,pponinc; two carriers tomorrow with only 

the YOHKTO\VN. Admira Halsey can hardly arrive on the scene 

before the 11th. The situation is generally favorable . 

The ITEOSHO is reported still afloat but a total loss. 

In his 070121 (Opnav) the Army does not propose to 

send 6" guns requested by Bobcat for the defense of Makatea 

as there seems no prosr ect of Japan explo\tinc that place, 

while we have command of adjacent sea areas. 

443 
snonr'm • 

May 7 (Continued) 

Cominch 071240 gives his views on command in the Pacific 

Ocean areas with particular reference to Sanoa. 

Cominch (071405) and ACNB have agreed on the development of harbor facilities at Nournea. 

1£3 VPs will be the total stationed at lrournea. 

Gor.1Naval Forces Europe 071536 gives GeneJ>al DeGaulle's 

1 ~ 

directive for Free French occupation of Wallis. '\.iJ444 
:@ 2 6 It l!il I 

MAY GCT ---

07 1536 COU U.S. NAVFORCES EUROPE TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC 

General assures me that the only de sire of the Free French 

forces is complete cooperation with American and United 

Nations forces Your 061435. He is today directing 

Dargenlieu to proceed immediately with seizure and to 

infom you through the Senior U.S. Officer of anticip:1 ted 

date and detailed plans. The General is also ordering 

Dargenlieu to report to you the actual time of seizure 

and to request the United States Porces to defend the 

island imme dia tel y after Fl""e e Prench seizure. He de sires 

to issue specific instructions as to whom Dargenlieu 

should report in order to insure corr1plete collaboration. 

Request you inform me on this point. DeGaulle had been 

under the impression contact sho11ld be with MacArthur but ~· 

I informed him MacArthur not responsible in this area. 

Lack of codes between Prench High Cornr.J.issioner NOUMEA and 

Free French Delegation VvASEING110N led De Gaulle to ask by 

what means High Commissioner NOll/lEA could notify American 

Navy of date agreed upon and conditions of op~ration. 

DeGaulle proposed in first place that his communication 

be passed to American Navy by American Consul NOUMEA. 

I rejected this proposal and suggested that High·Commissioner shou1d communicate through Senior American 

Officer on spot. I stressed necessity for secrecy 

surprise and· speed and with this DeGaulle declared himself in complete aGreement. 

445 
iii OHIJii 

:r~~IAY GCT ----

07 0121 

07 1240 

07 1405 

OPNAV TO THENTON 

Deliver to ComGen BOBCAT for action: 6 inch guns, heavy 

machine cuns and long range patrol bombers are not available at this time for assignment to BOBCAT for denial of 

1ffiK~TEA to enemy. It is believed here that enemy could 

not expo:r")t phosphates from MAKATEA unless they had control of the entire area. In the absence of this enemy 

control and in order to carry out the directive outlined ~~ 

in letter of March 16 consideration should be given to 

reconnaissance missions of at least biweekly frequency 

usins Navy observation scout planes now at your disposal. 

Further consideration should be given to the establishment of a radio contact on MAK!-1-TEA to warn of any enemy 

actions. Report action taken. Marshall. From War Dept. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

RE~:~EENCE PA HAGRAPH 8 AGRE!~l\'rENT RE WESTJ~RN SA1'1IOA ADVISE 

LOCAI..J NL-nN ZEALAND AUTHORITIES THAT I.1ILITAHY GOVERUOR 

AMEHICAN SAJ'iOA ~11\VING B~l~~H SUPERSEDED BY SENIOR TROOP 

COlU.TANDER SATIOAH GROUP AS I!!LITARY C0HBANDER OF AREA .,tl 

AUTHORITY DEPINED THZRbi1J WILL BE EXERCISED BY LArrTER OR 

MILITARY COHWANDER ON THE SPOT DESIGNATgD BY HIM. YOUR 

050437. SEE ALSO PARTS 2 AND 8 OF THE DIRECrriVE TO CINC 

PACOCEAN AREAS ·~viiiCH GIVB YOU AUTHORITY TO APPOINT SUBORDINATE COBMAHDERS AlTD TO ASSIGN TO THEM SUCH FORCES AS 

YOU DESIHE. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

COMINCH AND ACNB HI!.VE AGHEED TO DEVELOPMENT OP NAVAL 

UNDERWATER DEFENSES AND NAVAL FACILI11 IES ON SHOHE OF 

NCUMEA HARBOR. INFORMATIOH AS TO UATBHIAL PERSONNEL AUD 

PACILITIES TO BE F1.7RNISHED AlTD COHDITIONS ATS:ACHED TO THEIR 

ASSIGHrJENT IS BJ~ING FORWARDED BY AIR T11AIL . A CAPTAIN OR 

COMMANDER WILL BE :!JIHECTED BY BUJ'JAV TO PROCEED TO NOUMEA ,./' 

AND REPORrr TO PATCH. PERTINENT IN}i,OTIMATION AS TO ORDERS 

TO BE ISSUED THIS OF~iliCEH IS ALSO INCLUDED IN AIR ~.1.1\IL 

LETTER. IT IS DESIRED TF..AT DEVELOPN~NT OF NOUidEA Hjl.RBOR 

PROCEED UNDER US SUPERVISION AS HAPIDLY AS MATERIAL CAN BE 

MADE AVAILABLE.. IT WILL BE "TECESSARY FOR PACIPIC FLEET 

rro ASSIST IN DEVELOPHENT OF BXTE1JT OP MAKING AVAILABLE A 

VESSEL SUITABLE ,OR lJErr LAYING. ' 

446 
diMORIIis 

MAY GCT --

08 2105 CINCPAC TO CG DEFOR SAMOAN GRP INFO COMINCH 2 ETC. 

Deliver following to Civil Governor Western SAMOA from 

CinC Pacific Ocean Areas: Military Governor American 

SAMOA has been superseded by Senior Troop Commander 

(Major General CFB Price) as Military Commander of 

SAMOAN AREA. In regard to agreement Re Western SAMOA 

between Military Governor American SAMOA and New Zealand 

Authorities authority defined therein for Military Governor American ~~OA will hereafter be exercised by ~ 

the Military Commander of SAMOAN AREA or by such 

Military Commander on the spot as may be designated by the Military Commander SAMOAN AREA. ALUSNA Wellington deliver to appropriate New Zealand authorities for 

information. 

09 0543 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

09 0555 

BARNETT and GEORGE :F . ELLIOT both now in BLEACHER movement hereby designated for 2nd Echelon LONE WOLF' move-. ment latter ship vice NEVILLE named in plan. Infer 

from Cominch 041615 that other ships of Transdivs EIGHT 

and TEN are to be ordered direct to SPOONER from present missions at STRAW and BLEACHER. Cominch requested to 

confirm. If confirmed ComTransdiv 10 is directed to 

have all practicable landing boats and tank lighters transferred from BARNETT and ELLIOT to other ships · 

present at BLEACHER for transportation to SPOONER and ~, in addition to leave at BLEACHER such landing craft as· 

can be picked up by ships from STRAW enroute to SPOONER 

advising Caminch direct inform CinCPac of number of 

replacements each type which will be required at SAN 

FRANCISCO. Re.mainder is for action ComWestSeaFront: 

BARNETT and GEORGE F ELLIOT expected to be ready to 

depart BLEACHER about 17 May. Furnish by despatch direct to them info Cominch CinCPac routings from 

BLEACHER to SAN FRANCISCO via SAN PEDRO for fuel. 

COMSOUWESPACFOR TO COMTASKFOR 17 

Have been in telephonic touch with your representative. Air force informed immediately regarding enemy position 

at 2100 GCT 8th and will send all available planes to 

attack. Fuel available BRISBAlm and SYDNEY from shore 

tanks additional to that at NOUMEA. 

447 
BEeJI&._ 

--

MAY GOT 

09 1841 CO~lliAVFORCES EUROPE TO COMINCH 

Part 1 of two parts. I have communicated to General deGaulle substance of your despatch and outline of instructions 

to be sent to General Patch xx Facts as reported by General 

Patch and interpretation given by him to political background of recent developments do not coincide with reports received 

by General DeGaulle from Noumea including message received 

today from Chief of Staff of Admiral D'Argenlieu. Free 

French Officers are of the opinion that civil disorders began only after arrival American forces. Difficulties due to 

special character of population local intrigue and political agitation perhaps indirectly encouraged by American civilian ~ 

action or American failure to act to support authority High Commissioner D'Argenlieu. General DeGaulle informed he he 

had no information.about arrest of Sautot who in obedience 

to orders is returning to London to report to national 

committee and who left Noumea May 5 on Chevruil for Auckland. 

As no report has been received from Admiral d'Argenlieu Free 

French National Committee cannot agree to any permant 

repeat permanent measures until reports are available and 

whole situation examined. 

Part 2 of 091841 x With reference to 4 measures you propose: General DeGaulle agrees that martial law be declared as a 

temporary measure provided first that declaration should 

refer to necessity of this act as a military defense measure 

secondly that mention be made of fact that this action is 

taken in agreement with General DeGaulle as Chairman Free 

French Committee. DeGaulle states d'Argenleu proposed to 

Patch some time ago declaration of ma~tial law to maintain 

order. General Patch as the military authority responsible for defence of New Caledonia has General Degaulle's opinion .full power to act under martial law including authority to 

provide for civil administration without assuming title of 

Governor. Believe this is crucial point. Degaulle agrees that military protection of security of Admiral d'Argenlieu should be assured on condition that his freedom of communication by code or cypher with General DeGaulle and with 

Commander South Pacific should be guaranteed. Very highly qualified civil servant now in Elrica already appointed to 

act as civil governor of New Caledonia and ordered to proceed immediately· to Noumea to exercise this function. General 

DeGaulle objects emphatically to consitution new civil 

government by American military authorities. He must prote,st 

against such action if taken as a violation of French 

sovereignty. Pending reports from Admiral d'Argenlieu. General DeGaullefts not prepared to consider his final 

disposition. General DeGaulle urgently requests complete 

censhorship be established in New Caledonia over all QUtgoing 

448 
8J!J8Pt1Jf 

May GCT 

09 1841 (Continued) 

(Part 2) 

reports of civil disturbances to avoid exploitation such 

reports by Vichy and Axis propagandists. Full report ~ 

will be sent by mail. General DeGaulle agrees to maintain 

close touch with me pending clarification of situation. 

449 
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ghormley (Aidac despatches) 

MAY GOT -----

08 2028 Part 4t 

Part rour of Co~nch 082046. Does the international 

political situation per.mit delegating to me authority 

to place Dargen11eu and his m1ss1on in protective custody as these disorders grow into an 1nuned1ate and 

dangerous m1l1 tary threat he.t-e Patch I? MAARSHALL 

UNQUOTE paragraph I desire you call on General DeGaulle 

and state that X deply value his splendid cooperation 

as reported your 011536. All communications between 

Prenoh authorities NEW CALEDONIA and u.s. Navy should 

be through General Patoh. 

'!'hen inform him of the contents of' General Patoh·ta 

reports and state that allied military interests do 

not permit continuation of the intolerable pol1C1oal conditions 1n NEW CALEDONIA. 

08 2046 Part 5: 1 

Part tive and final of Caminch 082046: Therefore I 

propose with General DeGaullee concurrence to direct 

General Patch to declare martial(law omitted) in 

NEW CALEDONIA, to a.ssume the m111tary governorship, 

to plaoe Admiral 1Alrgenl1eu under pl'otect1ve ·custody, and to form a civil government under a Free French 

c1 tizen o'ther than Dargenl1eu or Sau tot who will be 

generally acceptable to the French population. Martial 

law will be revoked as soon as conditions permit, 

I request Degaulles concurrence be confirmed to HEW 

CALEDONIA new civil government and the appointment or 

a new High Commissioner for French territory in Pacific 

Oc$an. 

D1apos1tion of De.rgenl1eu will be subject of future 

negotiation. 

For your information on May 8th General Marshall re~ 

questod Brit! sh to taka up 'Uhis matter with DeGaulle 

but has agreed tht t hereafter .Navy vtill have cognizance of the Free French m111tary matters in Pacific Ocean 

Areas. 

450 
Memorandum for Viae Admiral Ghorm1ey (Aidac despatches) --...... ,_ ·- .......... - ... -..... -...... -........... -..... -.. -... - MAY GOT --

08 2010 ( COMI!lCH TO OOMN'AVFORCES EUROPE Cont 1 d.) 

The high commissioner has requested tho use ot my military foroes to assist on the maintenance ot order. Beyond the point nooesoary to pvotect United States propert7 I have refus•d to intervene. It 1s my belief that the events have 1ndurod th.e prestige of and local confidence in the Free French movement. 

Part 2: 

Th!a is Com1neh 082046. This action of Dargenlieu was devious and surreptious and unknown to me. Any impli- cation of American sup>or.t therot is unjustified. I do not bel1ove that such action could have been accom- plished had not American t~oope been present~ From a military standpoint this may have injured the con- . fidence of New Caledonians in Americans and will impair seriously the utility of their ,m111 tia as part of my torceaR. May 7th "Further reference political situation here incarceration or Exgovernor Sautot and prominent citizens plus the deceptive moans employed bas eo in- creased temper of populati'on against Dargeriltou and his mission that open violence is now more imminent ! from military standpoint resulting disorders can be highly favorable to enemy. P~rt three follows. 

Pa~t 3: . The strike continues. I believe that domonatrat1ona vill eontinue and grow in intensity until source of troubl~ is retnoved by some m.eana. The source ot trouble is Dargonliou and his mission. I believe Dargenl1ou instigated the a~rests previously reported at moat inopportune time. Vlhile professing an understanding of 

my neutral attitude h e seeks and expects me to use American troops aga i nst the common people of UEW CALEDONIA to protect him in his mission. It I use our troops to 

suppress this incipient roballion asa·inat the preaent Hfgh Commissioner and h1e mission I will lose the military support of the local militia and the entire population which is important to u.s. militarily. The recent actions of Dargenliau especially in view of the present military situation now cause me t o be distrustful of his motives. Th is i s t•urther accentuated by the fact 

that potential fifth columni sts appear to be prominent 4 51 against hi a now ad vi sora. 

(amongst)? 
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ghormley (A1dao dospe.tchea) 

MAY GCT --

09 0117 CINCPAO TO COMTASKFOR 1'7 jtNPO OTF 16, ETC. 

Desire you retire w1 th YORKTOWN, LEXINGTOU 1 ASTORIA, PORTLAND, CHESTER, ANDEllSON, HAMJlAll 1 VlALXEt ·RUSSEL, 

MORRIS to West Coast if practicable otherw1se PEARL. 

Have other forces now under you join Halsey when you 

can release them. K7 080~51 modified accordingly. lly 022155 KANAWHA or CUYAMA or both '1111 be sent to 

BLEACHER it you desire to fuel there. SAMOA not 

available. 

09 020'1 CIUCPAC TO COMINCI! 

\V1thdrawa1 directed My 09011'1 based on folloWing,: (a) Damage to both carriers and heavy loss of planes has 

reduced their effectiveness to the point where combat with undamaged carriers and shore based aircraft would 

result in almost certain loaa both carriers. (b) It 

is doubtful if either could return to contested area 

prior to Halseya arrival. (c) ·Consider it undesirable 

to undertake extensive repairs PEARL. (d) LEXINGTON requires adequate excort. Excorts have be.en on 

strenuous duty for almost throe months and most require work which oan best be accomplished on coast. 

08 2010 COMINCH TO COMNAVFORCES EUROPE INFO CINCPAC 

This ia ·part one of Com1nch 082046. Five-parts in all. 

Following desps.tch received by Chiof ot s~r trom 

General Patch who commands all military forces NEW 

OALEIXH-liA May 6th tt'lhe following change in the loeal 

political situation is reported reference your radio 

to W3VI CALEDONIA April 5. Governor Sautot and tour leading NEW CALEDONIA citizens have been arrested by High Cotm:liaaionar Admiral Dargenlieu and confined 

aboard the Free French Gunboat CHEVREUIL last night about 7:30 p.m. Early today the CHEVRBUIL departed far an unnanouncod destination. In protest Darge·nlieus action a general strike has been called with public demonstrations and the population is highly incensed. 

4.5~ 
Memorandum for Vice Admiral Ohonnley (A1dac despatches) 

- - - ------ ---- - ---- - - " -- - - -- -- ~ - } ~Y. OCT -.-....-

02 0641 Task orce S1xteen should arrive your area about twelve May. Request include now in your intelligence bulletins. Task Force One returning to Coast. 

02 1430 COKXNCB TO O!NCPAC, COM.SOUWESPAO 

051:515 

My 192032 April must not be construed as eliminating the posa1b111 ty tha. t enemy rnay attack I!A 'J\II - MIDWAY line or launch attacks against our lin.eu of oommW'l1-

cat1on via GILBERT-EI .. tiOE·SA~ OA line. 

COUINCH '1'0 COUSWPACPOR IllFO CINCPAC 

Admiralty request discouragement or reported Japanese salaage operations of HMS PrtillCE Ail 'lAI"ES or HMS Rl!~PULSE in position 03-40 North 104~30 East by submarine attack 

on salvage ve.ssela. 

Also say to General MacArthur that I w1ah to empbaaiae importance of submarine a ttaeks on enemy ships and shipping proceeding to and tram DURMA via SINGAPORE 

as indicated in Ky 1'71750 April. 

08 0204 COMTASKFOR 17 TO C IliCJlAO IllFO qoMSOWEPAC 1 COl4INCH 

LEXINGTON two tol'Pedo hits posslbly more port side. Num.ber 4 flreroom flooded. Number 2 and 6 boiler rooms leaking but under control. YORKTOWN 2 botnb hits many noar misses. ax1nllnn speed. 26 knots. Plane losses believed heavr. One enemy carrier received two one · 

thou and pound bomb hits two torpedo hits. Other enemy 

cnXTier undamaged. Enemy had super1or1ty 1n !lum,ber fighters. 

08 1830 COW\MPeyORl'AC TO C0b1I,TCH IHJ.i'Q CINCPAC, COMS'ilESP,ACFOR 

Present situation Southwest Pacific impels e again to invite attention many I!OKIITLY trained ana experienced PREP BAKER YOKE crows if equipped ~1 th long range bombers \..J could provide important 1ncroe.so in our of.1"'tens1 vo strongth. in that area. Or1glnintor OomJ~nlph bforPac. Pdmira.l McCain ost1nmtes less than one woek t~equired for trainirwr and sea experience these pilo t s invaltw.ble pre bent !.F'0 3 

opportunity to destroy enemy 

_,_ shipping and 1nen of war. 
i1!10R1SI 

MAY GC'r -~--

WD 3669 

,/,. ;, / .J 

"' '7 I 

WD WASH TO COMGENHAWDEPT 

This morning Navy reports plane tenders under Cincpac's control leaving San Francisco May 11th with inspection 

party for your area or southward thereof. Suggest you 

contact Cincpac for authority to join in such parts of 

trip as are feasible under present plans. Navy asked 

you to notify us if arrangements difficulties arise. 

Keep us advised of changes in proposed itinerary, and 

location on various dates. Attention invited to recent 

New Caledonia meassages regarding political relations to 

mill tary situation - MARSHALL. 

12 0245 NAS DUTCH HARBOR TO COMALASKAN SECTOR 

Serious doubt exists in minds submarine commanders that 

Russian merchantmen in operating in and near Japanese waters 

between Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok display any neutral 

identification to differentiate them from Hapanese vessels 

possibility exists such lack of identif'i.cation is requirement of Japan request information effective submarine operations vicinity enemy waters require attack on all unidentified 

vessels. 

11 2150 CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY COMINCH TO "!~' ~'VJ re: .. . ) l~~r~ 1 t\.J 

From Chief of Staff US Army and Comdr in Chief US Fleet 

Action Supreme Comdr Southwest Pacific x Cincpac X· Cinclant x 

Comg. Dgen Panama Canal Deptmt x Comsoupac xComsouwespacfor x 

Comdr. NavFor Europe x Comdg. Generals Western, Eastern, Central and Southern Defense Coramands, Comdrs all sea frontiers 

x Opnav x Man Hook Pass to Andrews x Leary deliver Macarthur x 

Western and Eastern Sea Frontiens and Commandant 8th NavDist 

deliver respective defense commands x Opnav deliver Comdr 

Central Defense Command xx Boundary lines of Ocean areas, 

Sea Frontiers, and National Areas of strategic responsibility 

are designed to give a general .definition to usual fields of 

operations x They are not designed to restrict or prevent 

r·responsible commanders from extending operations outside 

their assigned areas when such action will assist or support fre'iendly forces, when it is necessary to accomplish the task 

in hand, or when it will promote the common cause. Comdrs 

of adjacent areas should keep each other informed as to 

operations in the vicinity and make direct arrangements for 

support and cooperation 

454 
~YGCT 

12 0255 CINCPAC TO CO~VESSEAFRONT 

Understand Fantan movement in 2076 contemplates that only 

2 ships make there initially and that completion involves 

shuttling remainder between there and Fulcrum x Appreciate 

New Zealand troops must be returned Homeland x para x 

Army here considers Fantan Harbor can acconwodate all ships 

x Air coverage is available there x para x Recommend all 

Fantan movement in 2076 go there direct and further that 

ships not required for evacuation be used on homeward trip 

to carry large amount native cargo now understood accumulated 

that port x Requirement for escorts will be materially reduced 

by this procedure. 

2 0731 CINCPAC TO COMTRANSDIV 8, 10 

Completion present tasks in Straw and Bleacher convoys 

Transdivs 8 and 10 proceed as follows x Afirm x McCawley, 

Fuller depart Strawstack about 14 May proceed via direct 

route-to Wellington New Zealand paren code name Longbow 

repeat Longbow paren x Baker x American Legion, Neville 

depart about 16 May Hunter Liggett about 30 May from Bleacher 

proceed direct Longbow x Cast x Fomalhaut Bellatric when 

unloaded date indefinite depart Straswstack proceed Longbow x 

via Bleacher. Units under Afirm to Cast inclusive after 

arrival Longbow report to V.A. Ghormley for duty in Amphibfor 

SouPac x Dog x Heywood, George Fox Elliot, Babnett continue 

duty under NTS when unloaded proceed independently to San 

Francisco via San Pedro f~ fuel on routings being furnished 

by Comwesseafront estimated departure dates Heywood from · 

Strawstack 1~ May Elliot from Bleacher same day Barnett 

from Bleacher 16 May x Comtaskfor 17 has been authorized to 

modify orders of either Elliot or Barnett to carry excess 

pers-onnel to Pearl enroute San Francisco if required x All 

three San Francisco ships are to arrive there by 12 June 

at latest x Ships destined West Coast are to fuel only 

sufficient to reach San Pedro with prudent reserve x ships destine 

Longbow are to fuel sufficient to reach that port with reserve 

equal to 3,000 miles normal steaming x Provisions available 

Lorgbow x Comtransdiv 10 arrange transfer. Heywood landing 

craft to ships proceeding from Strawstack to Longbow and 

advise Comtransdiv 8 additional craft which can be left at 

Bleacher to be picked up by Fomalhaut and Bellatrix x NavAtt 

Wellington pass to NZNB and BOWMAN X Comtransdiv 10 pass to 

Commander Defense Force Samoan Area x Comtransdiv 8 pass to 

ComGen Bleacher all for info 

455 
19!161&1 

MAY GCT ----

12 12-4:5 

,-; I~.:· l ~lt-ifl' I . / I ' r 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Prior to operation in Pacific consider essential 2 

squadrons Wasp SB2U airplanes be replaced by SBD x 

Also desirable replace TBD wlth TBF x if accomplished 

at San Diego half of present VSB personnel plus VTB 

personnel can be sent overland to receive planes familiarize and join Wasp on arrival x If accomplished Norfolk it will be necessary to bring 30 TBD east by time Wasp arrives x Latter course obviates necessity visiting San Diego x Comment. 

12 0900 CO VMF 212 TO SNAP MAG 21 PH, CTF-9 

Visited Roses today will require at least 20 days more 

construction for satisfactory temporary operations. Navy engineers just arrived to complete field.· Fourth Defense 

270 Radar operation. My 270 serial 106 not yet installed. 

6 men assigned will keep in touch with progress. Will 

carry on best possible at Noumea mean time x Little, Martin, 

Ross deserve plenty credit x Little sending requisition x 

Men and equipment arrived and unloaded Roses today. 

12 1329 OPNAV TO COMSOWESPACFOR 

Inquiry from Admiralty states belief that US tankers being used maintain naval stocks Suva now and will continue do so 

in future. Noting that E. J. Henry was employed recently that connection has committment been made to replenish stocks 

as necessary with Navy almocated tankers assigned to 

Australia, New Zealand program. Suggest desirability this 

procedure if not already in effect. 

12 1951 CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 1, SARATOGA 

s~~atoga hereby assigned ~emporarily to TF 1 is scheduled 

conduct trials Puget Sound 25-27 May then proceed San_Diego for training x Comtaskfor one direct four DD join Saratoga Puget Sound by 25 May provide escort and plane guard services 

during trials voyage to San Diego and training until relieved 

about 5 June by other destroyers to be designated by me 

later x Assign Task Group number x Battleship operations 

may be limited as required by this diversion of your DDs. 

456 
Iv1AY GCT 

13 0305 CINCPAC TO VARIOUS 

Night attacks on Oahu and/or outlying islands by 4 engined seaplanes may occur on or after 16 May. In 

oreer to make atta,ck on Oahu it is believed fueling from submarine or shore cache must be accomplished x Appropriate alert against night attack including following measures will be taken. From 16 May until further notice. Comtaskfor 9 base 2 patrol planes at Midway. Midway observe islands and reefs within 400 miles of that place particularly in the late afternoon. Daily search plane in appropriate sector scrutinize all islands passed in the northwest chain. Army patrol French Frigate Shoal area with bombers in late afternoon and attack enemy units sighted. Comcarpac (ADM) base 6 marine fighter barking sands and provide for fighters direction from Kauai radar.s by Lt Comdr Griffin and two assistants using transmitters provided by navy. Cincpac communication officer will assist in arrange- ments. Comcarpac clear details as necessary with Com- mander Interceptor command. Para. Cincpac has augmente.d present mine and observations defenses French Frigate Sh~oal as follows. Special submarine patrol copy of whose orders is herewith furnished addressees and who must not be attacked. PREBLE patrolling vicinity clear of own submarine patrol. Observation post specially alerted 

457 
aft£6£LI1rf 

MAY GCT --

13 2043 

13 2323 

CINCPAC TO CTF-17 INFO COMINCH, CTF-1 

Direct Fitch and starr proceed on transport from 

BLEACHER to West Coast and join SARATOGA there as 

Commander new Task Force 11 to be formed on SARATOGA. 

COMINCH TO HELM (ROSES) 

Following despatch from Chief of Staff, Army, for 

delivery to Commanding General, ROSES Task Force: 

Can heavy or medium bomber squadron operate from 

your air base for extensive operations for limited 

period (Marshall to Chamberlain) query. Report actual stockage of following: Airplane ammunition 

by caliber, number of bombs by size, amount of 

aviation gasoline available. Immediate reply requested. 

458 
,_ 

fiJiiOAiiW 

~ QQ.! . ~/lr. ,'f 1'/ 

14 1527 COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COS US ARMY 

AS AGREED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE PRINCIPLES 

OF JOINT COMINCH AND CHIEF OF STAFF USA 251745 MARCH AND 

191630 APRIL FORWARDED MY SERIAL 0733 MAY 1, ARE EXTENDED 

TO THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL AND SEA FRONTIERS AND A STATE OF 

FLEET OPPOSED INVASION IS DECLARED NOW IN EFFECT. 

YOU ARE DIRECTED AS FOLLOWS: ESTABLISH A SEPARATE DEFENSE 

SECTOR EMBODYING THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER AS 

DELINEATED IN YOUR HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PLANE ONE AND ·JOINT 

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN. ORGANIZE A 

DEFENSIVE TASK FORCE COMPRISING ALL AR1ffY AND NAVY FORCES 

SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED BY CINCPAC FOR LOCAL DEFENSE OF 

THE SECTOR AND DESIGNATE THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN 

DEPARTMENT AS THE TASKFORCE COMMANDER HAWAIIAN DEFENSE 

SECTOR. FORM SEA FRONTIER TASK FORCES AS APPROPRIATE. 

MAKE SUITABLE CHANGES YOUR HAWAIIAN DEFENCE PLAN ONE TO 

EFFECT THE FOREGOING. 

THE ABOVE CHANGES DO NOT EFFECT THE HIGHER UWITY OF 

COMMAND HELD BY CINCPAC OVER ALL ARMED FORCES PACIFIC 

OCEAN AREA SPECIFIED IN COMINGH SECRET 031905 APRIL. 

INFORM COMGEN HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT. YOUR SERIAL 042W 

MARCH 13. 

14 1842 OPNAV TO CINCPAC INFO COM-12 

Underwater defense material and personnel for installation including nets leaving SAN FRANCISCO on SS HENRY 

KNOX about 22 May for FANTAN and FULCRUM same for WHITE. 

POPPY and ROSES probably several days later ship unknown. Installation nets FANTAN 2 considered urgent 

as protection Army transports commencing about 10 June. 

Request CinCPac render all practicable assistance. 

Reported that CATALPA (YN-5) EBONY (YN-10) expected ready in time to proceed with HENRY KNOX. Your 120155 

CHESTNUT availability would appear too late for purposes 

at FANTAN 2. 

~ 14 1905 COMGENHAWDEPT TO -~- INFO CINCPAC 

Following from Arnold for your information. WD plans 

to establish squadron of 8 B-17s and squadron of 13 

B-26 at NEW CALHDONIA and duplicate strength at FIJI. 

EFATE to be used as advanced air base and TONGATABU 

to be available if necessary. Movement to be completed 

by May 25th. Adequate stocks of fuel bombs and annnunition to be established at all four bases. Special attention to dispersion and camouflage signed E~Th10NS. 

45 9 
8i12PFT / ' /1/ 

MAY QQ.! 

14 1950 PALMYRA TO CINCPAC 

From Ghormley: Please inform BOBCAT and BLEACHER 

regret unable visit them this time hope to do so 

later time. Your 140541. Am proceeding CANTON tqday 

Thursday and SUVA 15th. Please inform SUVA. Contemplate having: Elpeck and Lt.Comdr. Funk visit STRAWSTACK Friday to confer with ComdGen regarding pos- sibility using STRAWBOARD contingent temporarily defense NANDI aerdrome pending arrival Army that place. 

Please notify Price. 

14 2100 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

THr'S IS COMINCH 142140 PART ONE OF FOUR COMING: 

ANSWERING QUERY FROM MARSHALL . REGARDING COOPERATION OF 

FORCES MAY 1ST TO 12TH THIS IS PARAPHRASE MACARTHURS 

REPLY OPERATION PLAN OF AIR FORCE IN CORAL SEA AREA 

REQUIRED EXTENSIVE RECO~lliAISSANCE GENERAL AREA SOLOMONS 

SOUTHEASTWARD FROM NEw IRELAND TO BOUNDARY BETWEEN AREAS: 

SAME DIRECTION FROM BUNA AREA A PATROL ALONG NEW GUINEA 

AND LOUISIADE NORTH COAST TO LTI~IT OF RANGE THEN WESTWARD 

SOUTH OF THESE ISLANDS TO MORESBY, CORAL SEA WEST OF 

TULAGI, OFF TOVffiSVILLE ISLE ZONE EXTENDING 500 MILES: IN 

AREA MORESBY RABAUL MADANG THURSDAY ISLAND A FLANK 

RECONNAISSANCE PATROL: ACROSS MOUTH GULF CARPENTERIA 

AND OFF DARWIN NORMAL PATROLS. ASSEMBLED IN NORTH EAST 

AUSTRALIA MAXIMUM AIR STRIKING FORCE FOR USE AGAINST 

NAVAL UNITS. PURSUIT AFIRM CAST AND AFIRM AFIRM (AA) 

DEFENSES ALERTED. PRIOR THESE STEPS ATTACKED ENEMY AIR 

FACILITIES AND SHIPPING SUCCESSFULLY. COORDINATED 

RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS WITH NAVY AND FURNISHED DETAILED 

INFORMATION TO COMTASKFOR. ALSO INFORMED HIM THROUGH 

LEARY WOULD GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT WITH LAND BASED AIR AND 

ARRANGE COMSOPACFOR FOR AIR RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL AREA 

NOUMEA AND NEW HEBRIDES NORTH AND NORTHWESTWARD TO AREA 

BOUNDARY. PART TWO FOLLOWS. 

14 2109 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART TWO: PARAGRAPH CONSIDER COORDINATION WITH TASK 

FORCE WAS ATTAINED. DUE TO DISTANCES REQUIRED OF ATTACKING 

AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD TO USE ONE BOMB BAY TANK, UNSUITABILITY . OF HYPO AFffiM ATTACKS AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS AND WEATHER 

IN NORTHERN PART OF AREA OPERATIONAL RESULTS WERE ONLY 

FAIR. ALL CLASSES BOMBARDMENT NOW IN AUSTRALIA FORCED 

OPERATE HIGH ALTITUDES FOR PROTECTION FROM AA FIRE AND 

PURSUIT. INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION ON THIS METHOD BOMBING 

ONLY PARTIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST SHIPS UNDERWAY AND NOT 

ECONOMIC FROM STANDPOINT OF EQUIPMENT. URGENTLY NEED 

(SEE NEXT PAGE) 45.0 
~ GCT 

14 2109 (COMINCH TO CINCPAC Cont'd.) 

DIVE BOMBERS AND TORPEDO PLANES WITH ADEQUATE RANGE, 

PERFORMANCE AND DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT FOR USE WITHOUT 

PURSUIT PROTECTION AGAINST SURFACE CRAFT. ATTENTION 

CALLED TO RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON EFFECTIVE RANGE OF 

OPERATING AIR FORCE BECAUSE MORESBY DUE LIMITED 

DEVELOPMENT WILL ACGOMODATE ONLY Fh"'W BOMBARDMh~TS 

PART THREE WILL COME. 

14 2118 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART THREE: AS NAVAL TASK 1'1

0RCE COMMANDER IS RESPONSI~LE 

ONLY FOR IMMEDIATE TACTICAL EXECUTION THERE IS SOME 

DANGER IN COORDINATING OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE BECAUSE 

SUCH MOVEMENTS MUST BE ORIENTED WITH REGARD TO THE PAST 

AND FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN CARRIED OUT IN THE AFFECTED 

AREA IN ORDER TO EXERCISE A SUCCESSFUL INFLUENCE. 

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF EFFORT BETWEEN NAVAL AND AIR . FORCES IS DIFFICULT·. BUT WHEN LAND FORCES ARE INVOLVED 

THE OPERATIONS MUST BE PLANNED AND EXECUTED BY THE AREA 

COMMANDER ON WHOSE AREA OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE X NARRATIVE 

OF AIR MISSIONS BY DATES FOLLOWS SECOND 8 B-26 ATTACK 

RABAUL 6 B-17 FAIL REACH SAME OBJECTIVE LATER DUE WEATHER. 

THIRD 2 B-17 ATTAClC RABAUL. FOURTH 9 B-17 FAILED ACCOUNT 

WEATHER REACH RABAUL BUT SIX ATTACKED LAE REPEAT LAE AS 

DID 3 OF NINE P-39. 6 B-26 ATTACK BUNAKUNAN. FIFTH 

ON ALERT ALL BAKER SEVENTh"'EN AND B-26 • SIXTH 2 OF 3 

B-17 REACH AND ATTACK TARGET AT BUKA PASSAGE 3 MORE ATTACK 

WOODLARK ISLAND PART 4 FOLLOWS 

14 2140 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

PART 4 AND FINAL: 7TH 10 B-17 ATTACK NEAR DEBOYNE. 

8TH 8 B-17 ATTACK CONVOY BUT SIX B-26 FAILED LOCATE IT 

AND ATTACK KITOBA. 9TH WEATHER ffiEVENTED ONE B-17 

REACH RABAUL BUT ATTACKED PLANES DEBOYNE. 6 B-26 FAILED 

SAME MISSION BUT 3 ATTACKED TORLESSE ISLAND. 5 MEDIUM 

AND 9 HEAVY FAILED DUE DARKNESS TO ATTACK CARRIERS EAST 

TOWNSVILLE. TENTH 7 B-25 FAILED REACH SHIPPING LAE AND 

FINCH BUT 4 ATTACKED DEBOYNE ALSO ONE B-26 ON AIRCRAFT 

THERE. ELEVENTH 9 B-17 UNABLE LOCATE CARRIER ATTACKED 

SHIPPING AT KESSA. 3 B-26 FAILED REACH RABAUL ACCOUNT 

WEATHER ATTACK DEBOYNE. 12TH WEATHER REQUIRED CANCEL 

MISSION 3 B-17 4 B-26 BUT CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE WITH 

B-25 HUDSONS CATALINAS AND SOME B-17. 

451 
/ 

8 E tJ It E I 

MAY GOT ----

14 1247 . OPNAV TO CINCPAC 

15 1910 

16 0447 

Information requested your probable requirements for 

offensive influence mines and where depot facilities 

with special personnel should be located. Mines now 

available are Mark 12 for submarines, Mark 12 mod 1 

parachute type for torpedo planes and mark 13 for 

bombing planes. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Transmit to Patch for Action. Ascertain from D'Argenlieu when he will have Chevreuil carry out Free French occupa- tion of Wallis. Impress on him urgency of early action in 

this matter. Chief of Staff Army informed. 

CINCPAC TO ALUSNA WELLINGTON 

Request New Zealand Chiefs of Staff to direct Commanding Officer New Zealand Air Forces, Fiji, to report to the 

GOO Fiji under the principle of unity of command. Am 

directing the commanding officer, u.s. air forces that 

place to conform. 

462 
ltl I I 

10 2347 CIUCPAC TO COMINCH 

LOSS OF LEXINGTON REPRESENTS ONE FIFTH OUR CARRIER STRENG~H IN PACIFIC X JPA LOSS ONE LARGE CARRIER WITH TEMPORARY SEHIOUS 'DAMAGE TO ANOTHER LARGE CAHRIER APPROXII.'fATES ONE FIFTH ENEMY CARRIER STRENGTH X AT 

PRESENT STAGE OP OUR CARRIER BUILDING PROGRAM WE CAN 

NOT AFFORD TO SWAP LOSSES WITH THIS RATIO X JAP 

SUCCESSES TO DATE DUE PRIMARILY TO DECISIVE AIH. SUPERIORITY AND POSSESSION OF MANY MUTUALLY SUPPORT- ING AIR BASES X OUR AIRCHAFT STAGING POINTS 'BETWEEN ~~ST COAST A1ID XRAY TOO WIDELY SEPARATED TO BE 

MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TO SAME DEGREE AND EACH IS 

VULNERABLE TO DETERMINED MAJOR ATTACK DUE TO LACK SUFFICIENT AIR STRENGTH X EACH STAGING POINT MAY 

BE CONSIDERED AS A FIXED CARRIER WHICH CANNOT BE 

SUNK BUT WHICH CAN BE CAPTURED OR RENDERED VALUELESS X 

EACH POINT MUST BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT AIR STRENGTH TO 

FORCE ENEMY ACCEPT LARGE RISKS IN CAPTURE ATTEMPTS 

WHILE IN MEANTIME WE BUILD UP OUR GENEHAL AIR 

STRENGTH X IMPORTANCE PACIFIC AREA TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES RESURVEY OF DISTRIBUTION OF 

AMERICAN PLANE OUTPUT ,NITH LARGER ALLOCATION PLANES 

TO PACIFIC AREAS X PARTICULARLY NEEDED ARE CARRIER 

TYPE PLANES ~NITH MAXIMUM MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS X ALSO NEEDED ARE LONG RANGE NAVAL LANDPLANE BOMBEHS TO AFFORD RELATIVELY SAFE AND EFFICIENT PATROLLING AND SCOUTING IN THE FACE OF THE ENE~IT AND TO PROVIDE 

STRONG STRIKING FORCE X 

11 2100 C01~ASKFOR 11 TO CINCPAC 

I C01JCUR WITH FLETCHERS 110216 EXCEPT BELIEVE ENEMY CARRIER AIRCRAFT DO SEARCH X ADD FOLLOWING X HOWEVER HIGH COORDINATION EXISTS BETWEEN ENEMY SHORE AND CARRIER AIR- CRAFT IN CONTRAST TO OUR PRESENT SITUATION X BELIEVE 

ENEMY SHORE PLANES AND CARRIERS ARE RADAR EQUIPPED X 

ENEMY NOW USING ME 109 FIGHTERS FROM CARRIERS AS V'JELL AS ZEROS X THE PORMER APPEAR TO HAVE ARMOR AND PROTECTED TANKS X ENEMY FIGHTERS AND TORPEDO PLANES GREATLY OUT- PERFORM OUR PRESENT CARRIER TYPES X OUR AA FIRE IS STILL RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE BUT IS SUPERIOR TO JAPS X COMBAT PATROL MUST PATROL AT 20,000 FEET IF' SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTION IS TO BE ~fADE. 

463 
12 1950 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

COMINCH 121950 PART 2 FINAL SAME ADEES XX ARMY HAS BEEN REQUESTED BUELD UP BASE PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN POPPY ROSES FANTAN BLEACHER PARA I CONSIDER YOU SHOULD TRANSFER AIRCRAFT SERVICE UNITS TO POPPY AND FANTAN ADEQUATE FOTI OPERATING1 CARRIER GROUP PLUS ADDITIONAL VPI3 AT EACH PIA CE X SUGGEST IM!v:EDIATE USE OF YORKTOWN AND LEXINGTON PLANES AND AVIArriON SEHVICING PERSONNEL THAT CAN BE SPARED AS ~NELL AS ORGANIZED SERVICE UNITS IDJDERSTOOD NOW AT PEARL PARA AVIATION FUEL SITUATION OBSCURE CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS ARMY AND NAVY BOMBS IN AREA BUT NO TORPEDOES OR FACILITIES X ARMY BOMBS MAY REQUIRE ADAPTEHS X THIS MATTER CONSIDERED MOST URGENT DESIRE EARLY ADVICE YOUR ARRANGEMENTS X 

14 0517 CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT 

COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FROM CINCPAC X FOLLOWING IS DISPATCH 132140 FROM COMINCH TO CINCPAC X QUOTE X ------ ------- X UNQUOTE X THIS FOR YOUR INFOR~M­ TION X CINCPAC SUGIJ:ESTS ALL EQUIPMENT. OF AA REGIMENT BE SENT X DESIRE INFORMATION ASSISTANCE REqUIRED ESPECIALLY GROUND CREWS AND PILOTS AT EARLIEST DATE X 

14 0541 CINCPAC TO PAL~rrRA 

FOR VICE ADMIRAL GHORMLEY X HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARMY BOMBERS ARE BEING DIVERTED TO SUVA AND CALEDONIA X A NUMBER OF THESE PLANES MAY BE MANI\TED BY NAVY PILOTS X DESIRE GET THESE UNITS READY FOR OPERATIONS EARLIEST DATE X IMPERATIVE COMAIRSOPAC ESTABLISH COMMAND ALL SHORE BASED AIR FORCES SOPAC GET EFATE IN OPERATING CONDITION AND SET UP ADEQUATE AIR RAID ,:JARNING SYSTEM TIIROUGH01JT ISLANDS THAT ARE UNDER CONTROL INCORPORATING IN IT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND COAST WATCHING PERSONNEL X EXPEDITE X OMIT BOBCAT AND BLEACHER PRESENT ITI~ffiRARY X 

14 0747 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

MY 140639 THIRD SENTENCE CHANGE TO READ ALL PAR'J.lS REFER- ENCE NUMBER 140639 X FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH X PARA TWO X CHANGE TO READ CONSIDER THAT THE PRIMARY TASKS 

454 
14 0639 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

PART ONE OF FIVE PARTS ALL HEFERENCE 140639 XX FROM OWN 

ESTIMATE WHICH AGREES IN GENERAL WITH OPNAV 121920 ENEMY 

PLANS APPEAR TO BE X AFIRM X DELAY MORESBY OFFENSIVE 

UNTIL MORE STRENGTH IS ASSEMBLED HOLDING TRANSPORTS IN 

GENERAL RABAUL AREA X BAKER X PROCEED WITH THE OCCUPATION 

OF NAURU AND OCEAN ISLANDS X CAST X POSSIBLY EXTEND 

OPERATIONS REFERRED TO IN BAKER ABOVE TO THE EASTWARD 

PRIMARILY WITH CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS X DOG X ATTACK 

OAHU NEAR FUTURE WITH LONG RANGE SEA PLANES X EASY X 

ASSEMBLE LARGE STRIKING FORCE WHICH FROM ITS COMPOSITION 

AND LOADING WITH ATTACK GAS APPEARS PREPARATION FOR 

ATTACK ON POPULOUS AREA DASH PROBABLY OAHU POSSIBLY WEST 

COAST X PARA TWO X I CONSIDER THAT THE PRINARY TASKS I 

AM ASSIGNED CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS BY X AFIRM MAKING OAIID IMPREGNABLE X BAKER 

PLACING SUFFICIENT STRENGTH UPON EACH BASE OF THE CHAIN 

TO INFLICT CONSIDERABLE LOSSES UPON ATTACKING ENEMY AND 

AT LEAST DELAY HIM X CAST I'tAINTAINING OUR STRIKING 

FORCES IN A STATE OF W~XIMUM MOBILITY TO ACT AGAINST 

ADVANCING ENEMY FORCES OH TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS X 

THIS IS PART TWO OF MY 140639 XX PARA THREE X FULLY 

CONCUR THAT SHORE BASES SHOULD BE REINFORCED BY VPB 

AND 1lB X I AM STRONGLY CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT THIS 

SHOULD NOT BE DONE BY REDUCTION OF EITHER HAWAIIAN OR 

AUSTRALIAN AIR COMPONENTS X I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE 

MOST DESIREABLE IF THE MOBILITY OF AIRCRAFT COULD BE 

UTILIZED TO REINFORCE ~NY OF OUR BASES BY MOVEMENT OF 

AIRCRAFT FROM OTHER BASES WHICH APPEAR TO BE LESS 

THREATENED X CONSIDER HOWEVER THAT DISTANCE AND TIME 

AS VI!ELL AS TECHNICAL FACTOES MAKE IT A FALLACY 'TO COUNT 

ON SUCH REENFORCEMENT AFTER ACUTE lffiED ARISES X IN THE 

PRESENT SITUATION \VE ARE FAR FROM READY TO EVEN CONSIDER 

SUCH A METHOD IN THAT BOTH OAHU AND AUSTRALIA HAVE NOT 

BEEN BROUGHT TO REASONABLE AIR STRENGTH AND THE OTHER 

BASES ARE NOT READY TO RECEIVE 'l1HE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT X 

THE LATTER IS MORE THAT A LACK OF SERVICE UNITS X·THE 

FIELDS ARE NOT YET PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF RECEIVING AND 

AFFORDING PHOTECTION TO ANY NUMBER OF TEMPORARILY BASED . AIRCRAFT X ROSES FOR INSTANCE IS NOT YET READY FOR ITS 

SQUADRON OF FIGHTERS X I NOTE THAT ARMY HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PUSH THE WORK OF PREPARING AIR FIELDS IN 

THIS RESPEQT AND I SHALL DO EVERYTHING IN MY POWER TO ~.AP DITE THIS AT ALL BASES X 

46 5 
14 0741 NOW COMES PART THREE OF MY FIVE PART DISPATCH XX PARA 

FOUR X AS REGARDS OPERATION CARRIER GROUPS FROM SCUTH 

PACIFIC SHORE BASES WHEN LATTER HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED 

CONSIDER THIS EXCELLENT EMPLOYMENT FOR CARRIER REPLACEMENT GROUPS X INTEND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION INCLUDING 

BASING OF CARRIER AIRCRAFT SERVICE UNITS AS RAPIDLY AS 

CARRIER REPLACEMENT GROUPS BECOME AVAILABLE AND MINIMUM 

ESSENTIAL SHORB FACILITIES ARE PROVIDED X CONSIDEH IT 

INADVISEABLE TO UNDERTAKE IMNffiDIATE USE OF YORKTffi~ 

LEXINGTON PLANES AND AVIATION PERSONNEL IN THIS CONNECTION X TOTAL REJvlAINING YORKTOWN LEXINGTON PLANES 

CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN ONE FULL GROUP X I INTEND RETURN 

YORKTffiVN TO PEARL AND USE THESE PLANES WITH YORKTOWN 

AIR PERSONNEL FOR BRINGING YORKTO'~'IN AIR GROUP UP TO 

STRENGTH X THIS GROUP WILL BE USEFUL PENDING YORKTOWN 

REPAIRS FOR ASSISTING STILL INADEQUATE DEFENSE OF OAHU 

AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR YORKTOWN AS SOON AS HER REPAIRS 

ARE FINISHED X ALL LEXINGTON PERSONNEL NOW SLATED FOR 

DIRECT RETURN VlEST COAST F,ROM BLEACHER X BELIEVE THIS 

PLAN SHOULD BE FOLLOWED X RECOMMEND LEXINGTON CREW AND 

AIR GROUP PERSONNEL BE USED FOR COMMISSIONING ESSEX X RECOMIV~END THOSE NOT IMJVIEDIATELY NEEDED FOR THIS PURPOSE 

BE RETAINED WITHIN THE NAVAL AERONAUTIC ORGANIZATION 

AND TRANSFERRED ESSEX PRIOR HER COMMISSIONING X 

14 0829 PART FOUR STARTS HERE MY 140639 XX PARA FIVE X EIGHTEEN 

PATROL PLANES FROM PEARL NOW BASED WITH TANGIER AT 

POPPY X INTEND FURTHER DISTRIBUTION PATROL PLANES SOUTH 

PACIFIC AREA AS RAPIDLY AS NUr;~rBERS HERE !\!TAKE THIS PRACTICABLE X PARA SIX X THE ONLY SOLUTION PROMISING ADEQUATE 

SECURITY IS IMMEDIATE PROVISION ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT BOTH 

ARMY AND NAVY IN NUMBERS AND TYPES PREVIOUSLY HECOMMENDED 

FOR HAWAIIAN AREA TOGETHER WITH AIRCRAFT FOR ISLAND BASES 

IN ADDITION TO THESE INCREASE X IN CONNECTION FOREGOING THI~HE ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN TRAINED PATROL PLANE CREWS 

PATRON 61 AND 62 NOVV AT ALAMEDA WHICH COULD WITHIN FR"t'V 

DAYS TAKE OVER AND BRING TO PACIFIC AREA ARMY LANDPLANE 

BOMBERS X ACCORDING TO ANNEX EASY OP WPL DASH 46 DASH PC 

CANTON SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AN ARMY PURSUIT SQUADRON X 

UNDERSTAND THIS ASSIGN1VIENr:L1 CANCELLED BY WAR DEPT X 

RECOMMEND PLAN OR MODIFICATION USING BOTH PURUSIT AND 

ATTACK BE ADHERED TO X PARA SEVEN X AGREE HALSEY SHOULD 

REN.tAIN OUTSIDE OF RANGE OF SHORE BASED FIGHTEHS TORPEDO 

BOMBERS AND DIVE BOMBEHS EXCEPT UNDER CONDITIONS MENTIONED IN YOUR 121945 AND HALSEY IS BEING SO INSTRUCTED X 

IF HE ADVANCES NORTIDNARD IN PRESENT AREA PAREN NmV 

HEBRIDES PAREN IT APPEARS IMPROBABLE HE CAN KEEP OUT 

OF RANGE OF LONG RANGE SEA PLANES X WHILE ONLY MINOR 

THREAT IN THEiy!SELVES r:L1HE KNOWLEDGE OF HALSEYS POSITION 

WOULD REDUCE BUT PERHAPS NOT PREVENT HIS PROSPECTS OF 

OBTAINING MARKED SUCCESS IF ENEMY MOVES TO NAURU AND 

465 
14 0829 

14 0853 

13 2140 

(CONTINUED) 

OCEAN X HALSEY HAS AMPLE LATITUDE X H01

NEVEH IN VI~"W OF 

CARRIER SI'l1

UATION WHICH WILL EXIST UNTIL SARATOGA AND 

WASP ARE AVAILABLE COMMA POSSIBLE Bs"'NEMY ST~NGTH UNDER 

PARA ONE AFIRM AND POSSIBLE THREAT UNDER PARA ONE EASY 

BELIEVE INSTRUCTIONS YOUR 272058 OF APRIL TO FMINTAIN 

A FORCE EQUIVALENT TO TASK FORCE SIXTEEN IN SOUTH 

PACIFIC AREA SHOULD BE REVIEWED SO THAT 1iiE MAY BE RETAil\ffiD OR MOVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INFOHMATION RECEIVED X 

NOW YOU HAVE PART FIVE AND FINAL OF MY 140639 XX PARA 

EIGHT X YOUR REFERENCE TO CONSERVING CARRIERS IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN THA'r THEY SHOULD NOT BE RISKED AGAINST 

SUPERIOR FOHCES IN DEFENSE OF BASES WHICH CAN DEFEND 

THEMSELVES X IN THIS I CONCUR X PARA NINE X WOULD 

APPRECIATE YOUR OPINION AS TO EXTENT WE SHOULD OPPOSE 

NEXT AND ALMOST CERTAIN ATTACK ON MORESBY X THIS HAS 

IMPORTANT BEARING UPON EMPLOYMENT HALSEY AND A'rTACK WILL 

INFLUENCE MACARTHUR AND HIS EMPLOYMENT OF PLANES X PARA 

TEN X IN ADDITION TO MEASUHES ALREADY MENTIONED I PLAN X 

AFIRM X TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS AGAINST EXPECTED SEAPLANE ATTACK THIS AREA X BAKER X FIRST IF ENE~IT DRIVE TO 

SOUTHEAST IS NOT INDICATED GIVE CONSIDERATION TO MOVING 

HALSEY TO CENTRAL PACIB,IC SECOND MOVE SARATOGA TO THIS 

AREA AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE X TIME AND DISTANCES INVOLVED REQUIRE A DEFINITE DECISION IN THE NEAR FUTURE X 

THE END X 

COMINCH TO CINCPAO 

FOR YOUR ADVANCE INFORMATION RE ARMY TENTATIVE PLANS 

MY 121950 X ARI\ifY PLANES NOW ENROUTE AUSTRALIA WILL BE 

DIVEHTED REPEAT DIVERTED .AS FOLLOVIJS 8 HEAVY 13 MEDIUM 

BOMBERS TO SUVA AND LIKE NUMBERS TO CALEDONIA X ONE 

REGIMENT ANTIAIRCRAFT NOW OAHU WILL BE SENT SUVA AND 

REPLACED BY REGIMENT FROM ,NEST COAST WHICH IN TURN WILL 

BE REPLACED BY REGIMENT FROM EAST COAST X GENERAL EMt~ONS 

WILL BE DIRECTED PROVIDE: ARMY AIR HEADQUARTERS AND NECESSARY GROUND PERSONNEL FOR ARMY SQUADRONS X AFFORD EVERY 

POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE BY NAVY INCLUDING AID BY GROUND CREWS 

AND RELIEF PILOTS FROM LEXINGTON AND YORKTOWN AS AVAILABLE X AIM IS TO GET THESE UNITS INTO POSITION BY IVIAY -- 25TH OR AS SOON AFTERWARD AS POSSIBLE PARA CONSIDERED 

IMPERATIVE THAT A'r EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE COMAIRSOPAC 

ESTABLISH COMMAND ALL SHOREBASED AIH FORCES SOPAC, GET EPATE 

IN OPERATING CONDITION, AND SET UP ADEQUATE AIR RAID WARNING 

SYS'rEM THROUGHOUT ISLANDS THAT AHE UNDER CONTHOL INCORPORATING IN IT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND COAST VATCHING . PERSONNEL X OBTAIN DETAILS ARMY PLAN .FROM EMMONS X CHIEP 

OF STAFF USA INFORMED X 

4G7 
15 2130 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

11 1245 

(15 0825) 

16 0200 

THIS IS PART ONE OP TWO PARTS XX IN GENERAL AGREE YOUR 

140639 VIJITH THESE COMMENTS: COM 14 142138 AND INDICATED 

DATES DEPARTURE STRONG ENEMY UNITS FROMEMPIRE WATERS 

LAST WEEK MAY CREATES THE PHESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE 

STARTING FROM TRUK 15 TO 20 JUNE AND LASTING MORE THAN 

ONE MONTH X WITH THIS LENGTH OF TIME AND PHOFABLE NAVAL 

SUPPORTING FORCE OF 4BB 5 TO 7 CV 6 CA 4 CL NUMEROUS 

DD PLUS STRONG SHORE BASED AIR IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT 

NOT ONLY MOHESBY BUT ALSO EITHER NORTHEAST AUSTRALIA 

OR NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI ~~y BE OBJECTIVES ' X SINCE MAY 

12 THERE IS AN APPARENT SHIFT IN PART OF PLAN VlliEREBY 

·EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FOR CAPTURE MIDWAY MAY LEAVY GUAM 

SAIPAN ABOUT 24 MAY SUPPORTED BY AT LEAST CARDIV 3 X 

THIS MAY BE FOR ELIMINATING MIDWAY AS SUB REFUELING 

BASE AND ALSO TO DIVERT OUR FORCES AWAY FROM SOPAC X 

ALASKA IS ASSOCIATED BUT NOT CLEAR TO VillAT EXTENT X 

HOWLAND AND BAKER MAY BE OBJECTIVES PRESENT OPERATION 

INSTEAD OF NAURU AND OCEAN X WAR DEPT APPROVED NOT S~NDING PURSUIT PLANES TO CANTON ON GENERAL EMMONS RECOM~ffiNDATION X I AGREE PURSUIT SHOULD BE THERE BUT 

THEY MUST COME FROM l~WAII GARRISON PARA TODAYS REPORTS 

FROM SOPAC BASES GIVE MORE FAVORABLE VIEW THAN YOUR 

DESPATCH AS TO FF~SIBILITY OF SHORE BASED AIR OPERATIONS XX 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

WHILE NOT FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING 

OPERATIONS LAST WEEK I FEEL I MUST EXPRESS MY FEELING 

THAT DESTROYERS MIGHT HAVE BEEN USED IN NIGHT ATTACKS 

ON ENEMY ESPECIALLY SINCE JUNCTION OF TASK FORCES 11 

AND 17 MADE A LARGE NUMBER O:b, DESTROYERS AVAILABLE X 

COMTASKFORCE 17 TO CINCPAC 

YOUR 150825 X TASK FORCE 17 WAS ORGANIZED WITH AN ATTACK 

GROUP OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING NIGHT AND DAY ATTACKS ON ENEMY SURFACE CRAFT AND A 

SUPPORT GROUP OF CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS TO PROTECT 

CARRIERS OR ATTACK SLmFACE CRAFT X ON THE MORNING OF 7 

MAY THE SUPPORT GROUP 3 CRUISERS AND :i DESTROYERS WERE 

DIRECTED TO DESTROY TRANSPORTS REPORTED MOVING THROUGH 

JOMARD PASS TOWARD MORESBY X AFTER THE ATTACK OF SHIPS · 

OFF HISIMA ISLAND THE ONLY SURRACE SHIPS KNOWN TO BE IN 

RANGE OF A SUHFACE FORCE ATTACK WERE THOSE WHICH THE 

SUPPORT GROUP HAD BEEN ORDERED TO DESTROY X WHEN TASK 

FORCE 17 WAS ATTACKED BY CARRIER PLANES AT SUNSET ON 

MAY 7TH IT WAS REALIZED THAT CARRIER GROUPS WERE IN THE 

VICINITY BUT THEIR LOCATION WAS INDEFINI'l1E X AT 'rHAT TIME 

5 CRUISERS AND 7 DESTROYERS WERE ~TITH MY CARRIERS AN.D IT 

WAS NOT CONSIDERED THAT THE ATTACK GROUP WAS LARGE ENOUGH 

468 
16 0200 (CONTINUED) 

TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL SEARCH AND ATTACK WHEN THE DIRECTION 

OF ENEMY WAS UNKNOWN X AFTER THE CARHIER AIH ACTION ON 

MAY 8TH SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO SENDING THE 

ATTACK GROUP IN FOR SURFACE ATTACK THAT NIGHT BUT THE PLAN 

WAS REJECTED FOH THE FOLLOWING REASONS X IT WAS REPORTED 

THAT ONE OF THE ENEMY CARRIERS WAS UNDAWlAGED AND THE LEXINGTON REPORTED THAT RADIO INFORWillTION INDICATED THAT A 

3RD CARRIER HAD JOINED THE ENE!~ X THE ATTACK GROUP WOULD 

THEREFORE HAVE HAD TO SEARCH FOR AN ENEMY VffiOSE LOCATION 

WAS KNOWN ONLY GENERALLY TO BE 135 MILES TO THE NORTHWARD 

IN THE AFTERNOON X IF STARTED IMMEDIATELY THE ELEMENT OF 

SURPRISE WOULD BE LOST WHILE APPROACHING IN DAYLIGHT 

SUBJECT TO ENEMY AIR ATTACK X BOTH OF MY CARRIERS WERE 

DAMAGED X OPERATING PLANES WERE GREATLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS X 

AND THE PRESENCE OF THE ATTACK GROUP WAS NEEDED FOR CARRIER 

DEFENSE X DESTROYERS VffiRE REDUCED TO ABOUT 50% FUEL PRECLUDING HIGH SPEED OPERATIONS FOR ANY EXTENSIVE TIME X 

AFTER THE SINKING OF THE LEXINGTON AT NIGHTFALL SURFACE 

SHIPS WERE CROWDED WITH SURVIVORS UP TO 300% OF COMPLEMENT IN SOME CASES GREATLY REDUCING THEIR MILITARY 

EFFICIENCY X ACTING ON ~IT BEST JUDGMENT ON THE SPOT NO 

OPPORTUNITY COULD BE FOUND TO USE DESTROYERS IN NIGHT 

ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY EXCEPT THE ATTACK BY THE SUPPORT 

GROUP WHICH I ORDERED X 

16 0307 CINCPAC TO CTF 16 INFO COMINCH ETC 

17 0537 

BELIEVE ENEMY ATTACK OCF.AN AND NAURU INDEFINITELY POSTPONED X DESIRE YOU PROCEED TO HAWAIIAN AREA X AM ORDERING 

PLATTE AND CIMMARRON MONAGHAN AND HUGHES DEPART FROM 

NOUMEA ABOUT 2100 GCT 16TH AND PROCEED TOWARD POINT 

ACORN UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECT~D BY YOU X ATLANTA BEING 

DIRECTED TO SAME POINT TO AWAIT YOUH ORDERS X DESIRE 

MEREDITH RE:WlAIN WITH TANGIER FOR PRESENT AND THAT SALT 

LAKE CITY REE'NFOHCE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCE UNTIL FURTHER 

ORDERS X AM DIVERTING KASKASKIA AND RAINIER TO BLEACHER 

FOR TIME BEING X TANGIER HAND TO VICE ADM GHORMLEY X 

CINCPAC TO COMSOUVIJESPACFOR INFO COMINCH TANGIER 

FOR SUPREME COMDR X COMINCH HAS DIRECTED THAT ANY FUillURE 

PLANS FOR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH AND SOUTFNEST PACIFIC BE 

CONCERTED WITH YOURS X PLAN FOH IMMEDIATE FUTURE HEQUIRES 

RETURN OF HALSEY TO HAWAIIAN AHEA WHERE I EXPECT STRONG 

ATTACK X HAVE DETACHED FROM HALSEY SALT LAKE CITY AND 

MEREDITH WHICH WITH TANGIER WILL BE DIRECTED TO REPORT 

TO LEARY X THESE WITH GRACES SQUADRON ARE STRONGER THAN 

NAVAL FORCES ENEMY IS APPARENTLY LEAVING IN THE N~N 

BRITAIN DASH SOLOMON AREA FOR THE PRESENT X ARMY IS 

PLACING EIGHT HEAVY AND THIRTEEN LIGHT BOMBERS FROM 

THIS AREA ON EACH POPPY AND FANTAN X I AM SUPPLYING 

469 
17 0537 

17 0508 

(CONTINUED) 

TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO PERSONNEL TO SAME PLACES PLUS 

AIR SERVICE DETACHMENT BLEACHER X PHF:PARATION OF BASES TO HECEIVE TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENTS IS BEING RUSHED X PTIIOR TO NEXT EXPLOYMENT CARRIER TASK FORCES IN YOUR AREA WILL SUBMIT GIST OF PLAN FOR YOUR COMMENT AND REQUEST INFORMATION AS TO YOUR PLANS FOR SOffiVESPAC 

FORCES X FROM PRESENT KNOV'JLEDGE BELIEVE FLETCHERS 

OPERATIONS WERE REWiliRKABLY \~LL TIMED AND EXECUTED AT 

rrHE LOCATION WHERE THE ENEMY WAS MOST VULNERABLE AND HE LITTLE SUBJECT TO ATTACK BY ENEMY SHORE BASED AIR X I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION FURNISHED BY YOUR FORCES TO PLETCHER DURING THOSE ACTIV- ITIES X THE IMPROVEMENT TO BE SOUGHT V!HEN SIZE OF YOUR FORCES PERMITS IS CLOSER AIR COVER BY SHORE BASED AIR PARTICULARLY FIGHTER PROTECTION FOR SURFACE FORCES UNDERTAKING SUCH TASKS AS WERE ASSIGNED TO ADMIRAL GRACE X PARA X PLEASE INFORM ME WHAT AIR REENFORCEMENT COULD IN EMEHGENCY BE STAGED FROM AUSTRALIA TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC TO HEENFORCE POPPY ROSES FANTAN STRAW BLEACHER OR ANY OF THEM WHICH IF THE ESTIMATE OF COMINCH IS 

CORRECT MAY BE ATTACKED ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JUNE X ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HAW CONCERT CAN BE BEST ATTAINED ll'lOULD BE APPRECIATED X TANGIER DELIVER TO VICE ADMIRAL 

GHORMLEY X 

COMSO~rffiSPACFOR TO CINCPAC 

FLETCHERS 152126 UNDER OPERATING CONDITIONS CORAL SEA BELIEVE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT FOR COORDINATION SHORE BASED AIRSEARCH WITH ATTACKS BY FORCES AFLOAT THE BESrr POSSIBLE X IMPROVEMENT POSSIBLE BY MORE FREQUENT EXCHANGE OF INFORT~IATION REGARDING MOVEiviENTS POSI'riONS 

INTENTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND SUGGEST INFORhfATION BEING DESPATCHED BY PLANE OR DESTROYER TO NEAREST SHORE B.t\SE FOR 'l'R..A.lJSMISSION X LIMITED RADIUS AND INSUFFICIENT 

Nill·.iBERS SHORE RASED AIHCRAFT AND LACK OF ADVANCED AIR 

BASES AVAILABLE FOR RECONNAISSANCE PRECLUDES CONTINUOUS OBSERVATION OF MOVEMENTS OF o~\TN TASK FORCES X CLOSEST LIAISON MAINTAINED HERE ~}IJITII HEADQUARTERS SHOREBASED AIR BY USING COMMON OPERATION ROOM AND ALL INFOHlVLA.TION IS HETRANSMITTED TO INTERESTED COMMANDS AT ONCE X 

470 
16 0325 

15 2126 

CINCPAC TO COWIINCH 

PRESENT INDICATIONS THAT THERE MAY ~JELL BE THREE SEPARATE 

AND POSSIBLY SIMULTANEOUS ENEMY OFFENSIVES X ONE INVOLVING CRUISERS AND CARRIERS AGAINST THE ALEUI'IANS PROBABLY 

DUTCH HARBOR X SECOND AGAINST PORT MORESBY INVOLVING 

PRESENT FORCES THAT AREA PROBABLY REENFORCED X THIRD 

AGAINST MIDWAY OAHU LINE PROBABLY INVOLVING INITIALLY A 

MAJOR LANDING ATTACK AGAINST MIDWAY FOR WHICH IT IS BELIEVED THE ENE1ITS ~~IN STRIKING FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED X 

THE TIME THESE OFFENSIVES WILL BE DELIVERED IS NOT CLEAR 

BUT BELIEVE SIGHTING HALSEY IN SOUTH YESTERDAY CAUSED 

POSTPONE:NIENT OCEAN AND NAURU OPERATIONS AND WILL EXPEDITE 

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL OPERATIONS X MY ORDERS TO HALSEY 

160307 BASED ON FACT THIRD OFFENSIVE IS AGAINST THE l10ST 

VITAL AREA AND THE MOBILE FORCES AVAILABLE TO USE ARE 

INSUFFICIENT TO EFFECTIVELY OPPOSE ALL THREE OFFENSIVES X 

SHALL ENDEAVOR MOVE OUT BATTLESHIPS AND SARATOGA AS 

SUPPORT AS SOON AS LIGHT FORCES AND ESCOHT CAN BE MADE 

AVAILABLE X THIS ACTION COMINCH FROM CINCPAC X 

COMTASKFOR 17 TO CINCPAC 

DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED T~ITH 

THE FACT THAT COMSOWESTPACFOR HAS KEPT ME FULLY INFORMED 

OF THE RESULTS OF HIS SHORE BASED AIR SEARCHES, AND ON 

THE FEW OCCASIONS WHEN RADIO SILENCE HAS PERMITTED A 

REQUEST FOR SHORE BASED AIR CORPERATION IT HAS BEEN 

EXTENDED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND FULLY X HOWEVER UNDER THE 

PRESENT SETUP DUE TO THE NECESSITY OF RADIO SILENCE IN 

THE CORAL SEA ARF.A CO~rSOWESPACFOR CANNOT BE KEPT INFORMED 

OF THE POSITION X FlffiL SITUATION X OR INTENTIONS OF THE 

TASK FORCE COTVIMANDEH X IT SHOlJLD APPEAR MORE LOGICAL FOR 

THE OFFICER CONTROLLING SHORE BASED AIR SEARCHES TO ADVISE 

THE MOVEMENT X FUELING X AND ATTACKS OF FORCES AFLOAT IN 

THE AREA X FOR THIS PURPOSE IT WOULD APPEAR ADVISFABLE 

TO HAVE AN AIR COMN.ANDER OF SUITABLE RANK AND HIS STAFF X 

HE COULD TliEN COOTIDINATE TRACKING AND STRIKING FORCES AND 

SHORE BASED AIR SUPPORT X THE ATrrACKS 1v1ABE BY MY TASK 

FORCE HAVE BEEN BASED UPON RADIO INFORMATION RECEIVED 

FROM LFARY BUT RADIO SILENCE HAS PRECLUDED BY INB,ORMING 

IN ADVANCE AND EXCEPT FOR SCHEDULED A1rTACKS ON SHORE 

BASES THERE COULD BE NO CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN SHORE 

BASED AIR AND FORCES AFLOAT DURING THOSE ATTACKS X 

FITCH AND SMITH IN GENERAL CONCUR BUT THI3 SUBJECT IS 

TOO COMPLICATED FOR COMPLETE DISCUSSION IN THE LIMITS 

OF THIS DISPATCH ORIGINATED BY COMTASFOR 17 ACTION CINCPAC 

INFORMATION COMTASKFOR 16 COMSOWESPACFOR X 

471 
8 I! 0 R 1J I 

May 8 

Edstressing news from the Coral Sea and action thereon 

by CinCPac is in the Aidac file for today. It also contains 

the NEW CALEDONIA sltuation. 

The Japs have landed at TUGALI and attacked MAKAMBO and 

GAVUTU. 

There is good indication that the attack on Port Moresby has been postponed and that the direction or the Southwest 

Pacific offense will shift to eastward. The SHOKAKU seems enroute to TRUK for repairs and thus may soon be a fine target 

for our submarines. 

On the 4th the TAMBOR reconnoitered MAKIN Island. Results negative. 

Carrier plane replacements are on their way from East 

Coast via Alameda. 

CinCPac 090543 deals with LONE WOLF movement to NEW 

ZEALAND. 

ComSoWesPac 090555 indicated that shore based planes from 

AUSTRALIA will be ordered to attack in the CORAL SEA area. 

They have not accomplished anything except scouting in that area 

so far. 

There is evidence of enemy mining near NmV CALEDONIA. 

The STRAW section of the East Coast convoy arrived at 

STRAWSTACK. 

Task Force ONE is now at West Coast base. 

The command set up at SAMOA under Major General Price is 

shown in CinCPac 082105. 

The NEOSHO l~s not yet been found. 

472 
8H01iiili 

May 9. 

The Commander-in-Chief discussed fully with members 

of the Staff as to whether the orders for the YORKTOWN to 

retire from the area should be in any way modified. If she 

stayed for at least one operation with Vice Admiral Halsey, 

she would add one carrier, apparently not badly damaged, 

and with about two-thirds of a complement of planes. It 

was decided to adhere to yesterday's decision for the following reasons: 

(1) The enemy has postponed the Moresby operation 

and retired close to his shore based aircraft. He has remaining in the area one regular and one converted CV. 

(2) Any car.rier which is not 100% effective operates 

at a grave disadvantage in the duels which usually result when 

forces containing carriers oppose each other. Inflicting sorne 

damage on your opponent is not compensation for being sunk 

yourself. Besides damage and plane losses, the YORKTOWN has 

the wear and tear of three months at sea. 

(3) The general situation with respect to carriers 

is such that we must husband our present carrier strength for 

future operations, some of which must be in areas now completely uncovered. 

(4) The probable crowding by the LEXINGTON survivors 

adoo to the decrease in effectiveness. 

Present trouble in New Caledonia indicates the immediate necessity for the declaration of martial law. General 

Patch, there, has been communicating with e.G. Hawaii and the 

War Department. As the matter has been dumped in the lap of 

Cincpac, General Patch has been directed to communicate with 

Cincpac. In a long message from Comdr. Naval Forces, Europe 

to Cominch (091841, 2 parts) the results of his conference with 

General deGaulle is set forth in detail. The gist being that 

General deGaulle approves martial law to cope with immediate 

military situation but, until he has all the facts from his own 

people, he will not con~it himself to permanent action. General 

DeGaulle seems to feel that the trouble all started because the 

Americans refused to support the Free French High Commissioner 

to New Caledonia. As yet Cincpac has no directive to give Patch. 

Mining has commenced at Efate. The unloading of the 

garrison, which is underway,, will take until mid June. The 

unloading of the Straw garrison, less, Wallis, should be 

completed about May 12. Vice Admiral Ghormley will probably 

visit these bases, including Bobcat, by air starting next week.\; 

Bleacher garrison is also unloading. 

47 3 
£i?822£! 

May 9 (Continued) 

Opna.v ·says that they cannot now di~m transports to 

Pearl to evacuate citizens. 

About May 15th the HAMMONDSPORT should leave Alameda 

with the following replacement planes: 21 TBF-1; 36 F4F-4; 

75 officers; 400 men. 

Fletcher, in his (Aidac), tells of his plans to 

return to Pearl via Bleacher for fuel. The Cincpac has 

recommended that Rear Admiral :b,letcher be promoted to Vice 

Admiral and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. The .WALKE, of his force, has gone to Brisbane for reduction gear 

repairs. Rear Admiral Crace, R.N., has been directed to report 

with his force to Task Force 16. 

Apparently the Japs have postponed their attack on 

Moresby but have by no means given it up. They are getting 

reinforcements and will probably try again when they feel 

strong enough. In the meantime, they are indicated to try an 

occupation of Ocean and Nauru Islands. The occupation force 

will come from Jaluit and the covering force, consisting of 

a l one-carrier task force will o~erate to the south of these 

islands. Task Force 16 has been informed of this. 

It is indicated that the Japs will try a seaplane 

bombing raid on Oahu between May 15 and 20. They would 

possibly refuel their seaplane from a submarine at French 

Frigate Shoals. Counter measures are underway. 

The NEOSHO was still afloat today but -has not been 

sighted yet by the MONOGHAN who was. sent to the rescue. 

The performance of the Australian land based striking 

force in the past few days has been very disappointing. They 

can only report "near misses." They have, however, done good 

scouting. 

We may have lost one VP of the TANGIER group yesterday. 

The VP reported being attacked by an enemy 4-engine seaplane. 

The route home of the drumaged Orange carrier is fairly 

well known. There is a chance for four of our submarines to 

take a crack at her before she reaches her repair yard. ~~ 

47 4 
May 10. 

The HENLEY picked up 123 survivors from the NEOSHO and 

SIMS. Others are believed adrift on a raft in the general vicinity and the search continues. 

~ The CHEVREUIL arrived at AUCKLAND. While all despatches concerning the friction between the u.s. Army and the French, and between the two French factions at New Caledonia must be 

read to fully understand what happened, the result is shown in 

Aidac 110055. (Note l V\ K paper is Aidac). 

Unloading at Bleacher should be co~pleted the 1st week 

in June. 

CTF-16 sent VMF 212 to POPPY because the landing field 

at ROSES is now unsatisfactory. That field must be put in 

satisfactory state as soon as possible because there is already 

some crowding of facilities at POPPY. 

The SAN DIEGO arrives at San Diego May 16 and should be 

ready for Fleet work by tTune 1st. 

The WASP will be withdrawn from the vicinity of Gibraltar 

and sent to the Pacific Fleet. 

The ATLANTA left to join TF-16. 

The NASHVILLE arrives at Pearl tomorrow for repairs. The length of time for these repairs is tentatively 5 days but 

examination here may indicate a longer period. Thus her opera- tions of Kamchatka cannot begin before the end of the month. 

Six S-type submarines will be sent from the Atlantic to 

operate in Alaska. 

The extent of the damage (reported by the YORKTOWN in an 

Aidac) is not well enough known here to estimate time of repairs. A further report is requested. Apparently Fitch and Sherman 

were saved. 

ComsouwestPac 110305 gives the present disposition of 

his forces. 

The SUMNEH 110315 reports progress on survey work. 

Cominch (Aidac) feels that destroyers should have been 

able to get in a night attack in the Coral Sea battle. Ftag 

~ntapy repo~s leads one to. agve~ At any rate, Fletchers promo~ion and citation recommended by CinCPac is being held 

up by Cominch until further details of the duel are known. 

47 5 
May 10 (continued) 

A recapulation of present enemy strength in SWPac from 

ComsowestPac is: 

~ New Britain New Guinea 

VF 21 17 

VB 16 29 

VP 14 29 

Seaplanes 4 2 

This does not include reinforcements now en route from 

the Marshalls. 

Shore watchers state following enemy losses in the TULAGI 

area (the price for TULAGI ?): 

Sunk - 2 CL, 3 DD, 1 AP(20,000-t), 2 AP (8-10,000-t) Damage - 1 CA 

Today Vice Admiral Halsey is fueling in the vicinity of 

EFATE. Tomorrow he will be joined by the CAs of TF-11 and will th~rt operate t o the northward. 

The indications continue that TF-16 may have a chance to 

meet up with an enemy covering force south of Ocean Island. 

. ;~ ,. ATLAN'TA ltt}\. ro .to'"" TF-• ~ . 1"' +he S4\N\e 

qy-.,up ~;~ he.,.,·, tho ~AINIER who wil\ bt A~~~+··"', 

AW\~Vn,t. o~ d.-erof. ~\I\ ~ So Pit~, u\ & t•"-\' '1 ~ il I ~"'e.ke ~. 

475 
8 a·a It z,.. 

6 Y/ 9 3 9 Cominch 101835 and CinCPac 090543 and 091931 and 120731 

give information on transports for the Lone Wolf plan. LONGBOW 

i s the code name. for WELLINGTON. ..._ 

CinCPac 112241 direct's that a survey be made to prevent surprise and .to minimize effects of gas attacks. We have good indication that the Axis will use gas soon both in Russia and 

by Jap Navy. 

The UPOLU garrison is now established ashore. 

Marine personnel for augmenting defenses at MI~NAY will 

be ready at SAN DIEGO on May 31st. 

1 Barrage Balloon Squadron and one defense battalion 

will leave u.s. in June for defense of AUCKLAND. They will be 

relieved by the New Zealanders as soon as possible. 

Th~ search for the NEOSHO and SIMS survivors will end 

today. 

The search for the NASHVILLE plane, lost last week, bas/( be en negative. 

The NASHVILLE is in for a new propeller and rudder repairs. The time for these repairs is not yet knoWl, but as soon as 

ready she will go on her KAMCHATKA operation. A prize crew will 

be put on board and she will be ordered to take prizes if pos- sible. We could use crab trawlers here to supply outlying bases. 

The bombing of MORESBY continues. While the MORESBY campaign is delayed the occupation force is centering at RABAUL. 

Same of this force plus some from JALUIT may be used to occupy NAURU and OCEAN Islands. 

Task Force 16.3 (Rear Admiral Crace) will operate under 

V.A. Halsey between SYDNEY and PORT MORESBY for the present. 

It is indicated that Task Force 16 may operate to the 

Northeast of the SOLOMONS. 

477 

•. 
May 12. 

Vice Admiral Ghormley and his staff completed their 

conferences with Cincpac and his staff and will start tomorrow 

on an air trip to visit SoPac bases. All matters discussed 

were settled as far as nown now. The future will undoubtedly bring forth matters not touched on. \~en Vice Admiral Ghormley takes over Cincpac will handle all matters pertaining to that 

area through ComSoPac. The new command will be ready to function 

after the inspection and the setting up of communications. 

Cincpac 120255 to Cominch deals with troops at Fantan. 

Cincpac 120731 to Cominch tells of plans for transports 

now in South Pacific Area. 

Task Force 16 proposes to operate to the eastward of 

Vanikoro Island (s.E. Solomons). 

The Army in Rdo Wash 3669 proposes an inspection of 

Pacific Island bases. 

N.A.S. Dutch Harbor 120245 feels that Russian vessels 

operating out of Vladivostock are deliberately not flying neutral 

colors at behest of Japs. ComffiVSeaFrontier directs that vessels 

presumed enemy be destroyed by his subs or other forces, and 

Cominch approves. 

Cincpac 121951 gives plans for SARATOGA. This CV 

is urgently needed now. 

Cominch 121245 (Aidac) is a very important proposal for disposition of forces in the Pacific. We certainly have 

inadequate forces now available. But what we do have seem to 

be best disposed to accomplish tasks assigned. In general, we 

must make our Pacific positions dangerous to attack, secure, provide for adequate striking forces, harrass the enemy. All 

this means more air, surface and subsurface strength than are 

now available to Cincpac. 

Cominch 112150 gives policy on operations crossing boundaries of areas. 

The WASP will be assigned to Pacific Fleet in the near 

future. She is now at Gibraltar. 

It will take 20 days to get the airfield at Roses 

satisfactory for VF. C.G. Roses 12-0900. 

47 8 
r 

/ 

May 12 (Cont'd) 

r 

Comtaskfor 9 (122358) gives the proposed operations 

of the force under Rear Admiral Crace, R.N. 

Opnav 121329 states fuel plans for Suva. 

Cincpac 1'30305 gives plans for countering an enemy 

air raid on Oahu s cheduled 16-2'0 May. 

It is interesting to note that yesterday not a single 

DL or DD of the Pacific Fleet was in any port. 

Orange plans now seem to be (1) Attack Moresby when 

reinforced (2) occupy Ocean and Nauru starting May 18 (local) 

(3) Commence an operation May 21 with a force of about 3 BB, 

2-4 CV, and usual light forces. The objective may be Oahu. 

479 
t!'1! 1 2 E ± 

May 13. 

Cominch shows increasing concern over immediate strength- ening South Pacific bases (Aidac). CinCPac recommendations and 

plans are shown in the answer (Aidac). Evidently Cominch believes 

the enemy will strike at POPPY and ROSES after May 25th. 

Cominch desires a report on past shore based air coopera- tion in CORAL SEA. This was almost completely lacking during the CV duel. 

One AA regiment is being sent from HAWAII to NANDI at 

once. 

V}ID-25 goes from SAN DIEGO to SAMOA June 12th. 

The Army has directed that complete facilities for 70 

planes be provided at FANTAN. 

ComSV~ac suggests that the TANGIER and planes be moved 

from NOUMEA to ROSES to give better coverage in the SOLOMONS area. 

Cominch repeats Army query 132323 and 132222 about suitability now of airfields and equipment for immediate reinforcements. It may be stated that not even VFs can now operate at 

ROSES. 

CinCPac 132043. Admiral Fitch and staff proceed directly to West Coast to form Task Force 11 in SARATOGA. 

There are no new enemy developments. 

May 14. 

Admiral Halsey was sighted in a position probably 500 

miles Southeast of TULAGI. The shadower who sighted was evidently not driven off at once. This sighting may (1_) reduce 

his chances to surprise the OCEAN and NAURU occupation force 

and {2) speed up Jap central pacific offensive plans. 

It is planned to operate 70 planes at FANTAN. These 

will be Army. 

PALMYRA 141950 gives change in Vice Admiral Ghormley's air base inspection schedule. 

ComGenimwDept 141905 gives air reinforcement plans for 

South Pacific bases. 

The SARATOGA will be ready at SAN DIEGO June 5th. 

/(_/ 

~ 

480 
-ezcHET 

May 14 (Continued ) . 

The seaplane bonbing of OAHU has evidently been delayed 

two days. 

Opnav 141842 gives shipment for underwater defenses at 

South Pacific bases. 

Cominch 141527 directs 14th Naval District reorganization under ".lt,leet opposed" unity of command. 

Cominch 142100 gives the data on the efforts of shore 

based Austrailian mr to support recent naval action in the 

CORAL SEA. Army efforts were of little help beyond scouting. This lack of mutual support is discouraging. Maybe Rear Admiral 

McCain can help. 

There are several significant indications of future 

enemy action. During this present lull he may be preparing to: 

(1) Attack the MIDWAY- OAIDJ line in force about the 

first week in June. 

(2) At the same time as (1), attack the ALEUTIAN chain 

and ALASKA. 

(3) Occupy NAURU and OCEAN about the 17th of May. 

(4) Reinforce his NEVI BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA force to 

strike to the Southeast at any time between May 25th and June 15th. 

The NASHVILLE is delayed one day to load 8 - 37mm guns and personnel for MIDWAY. 

481 
May 15. 

On April 23 we told Cominch we intended to bring to Pearl 

the 3 APDs assigned to the Pacific. Task Force 3 desires them 

at San Diego for training and anti-submarine work. Because these 

vessels can be used offensively by raider forces in the near 

future it was decided to refuse their use at San Diego and bring them to Pearl. 

The courses of action open to Blue and Orange were reviewed 

by Admiral Nimitz in conference today. Decisions made and the 

reasons therefor are shovm in Cincpac Aidacs 16 0307 and 16 0325. 

Cincpac 16 0447 arranges for unity of command at Fiji. This places the New Zealand general in command until our army division arrives there. 

The YORKTOWN damage can be repaired at Pearl, but no 

time estimate is made. 

Opnav 141247 has mines available for SoPac defenses. 

Cominch 151910 desires to known when Admiral D'Argenlieu will occupy Wallis. The idea is that Free France will occupy the island, then call for U.S. help. We have the troops waiting at Straw. The actions of the French in the South Pacific leave 

much to be desired. 

Our submarine concentration at Truk has been unproductive. The sub at Ocean Island can now move to her assiened task now 

that the occupation campaign there has been cancelled by the Japs. 

In a 2-part Aidac Cominch comments on the line of action 

Cincpac is now following. The Aidacs must be read for complete understanding and are attached. 

Comtaskfor 17 did not make a night torpedo attack in 

his recent Coral Sea battle because (a) need of DDs to screen 

carriers (b) uncertainty of enemy position (c) fuel restrictions. 

May 1§. 

Unless the enemy is using radio deception on a grand scale, 

we have a fairly good idea of his intentions. Of most interest 

is his preparation for an offensive in the Central or North Pacific. 

It seems quite possible that Orange will attack Midway and raid 

Oahu the first part of June. Present air weakness in the Hawaiian 

Sea Frontier makes it mandatory to employ a strong striking force 

in the area_ The striking force can be assisted by a BB covering force. BBs will be moved out from the coast if the problem of 

protecting light forces can be solved. The views of Cominch and 4~/ 

Cincpac are shovm ln the Aidacs attached. 

482 
May 16 (Cent 'd) 

A draft of Hawaiian Defense Plan No. 2-42 was made up and circulated among the staff. This is designed to make the 

proper set-up for "Fleet opposed invasion." 

The positions of our submarines in the Central Pacific was 

discussed and it was decided to leave the concentration at Truk 

as it is for several more days. 

Admiral Halsey's immediate intentions are not known but 

it is expected that he will try to get back to Pearl without 

being seen again~ He should arrive at Pearl about the 27th. 

The seaplane bombing raid on Oahu will probably not occur 

in the next few days, and might be delayed until the full moon 

at the end of the month. 

May 17. 

In the attached Aidac, Cominch substantially agrees with the 

estimate of CinCPac of present enemy intention. He does not indicate a desire to bring out BBs from the Coast but desires available forces employed in attrition attacks. Steps were taken to 

organize a force for the defense of ALASKA and to expedite the 

return of Task Forces 16 and 17. 

Marine reinforcements are being sent to MI:8WAY via the 

KITTYHAWK. 

Admiral Ghormley will arrive in AUCKLAND May 20th. He has 

been delayed in SUVA talking D'Argenlieu into the idea of ta.king WALLIS. Patch's 180617 gives D'Argenlieu's ideas on this. 

llv~M.b.., 

~ The HELM picked up f~~r ;zyrfi vors from the NEOSHO. The great that had abandoned sh~p~ie~lof thirst. It will be interesting and useful to determine tl) why men left the ship prematurely (2) why the search was so ineffective. 

The Subs at TRUK have not produced results yet. That concentration should have been able to do more. 

Cominch wants the movement of 6 S-boats to ALASKA from the 

Atlantic expedited. 

The Commanding General, Marines, HAWAII, will inspect MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, and PALMYRA next week. 

KODIAK will receive mines sometime in July. 

483 Indications of Jap bombing in the GILBERTs were received 

otherwise there wa.s no chane;e in the picture not referred to above. ·· 
zxil!8RET 

--

MAY GCT 

18 0617 GEN PATCH TO CINCPAC 

PATCH TO CINCPAC FURTHER REFERENCE YOUR RADIO COMINCH 

151910 ADMIRAL DWARGENLIEUS REPLY RECEIVED X HIS LETTER 

STATES CHEVREUIL CANNOT CARRY MORE THAN 10 PERSONS PLUS A CREW 

OF 70 HENCE CANNorr CARRY AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FOR FREE 

FRENCH OCCUPATION OF WALLIS X HIS LETTER STATES BRITISH 

AUTHORITIES SUVA HAD CHOSEN A SOLUTION OF LIMITING ACTION 

TO DESTRUCTION OF RADIO STATION THERE X LETTER FURTHER 

STATES THAT CHEVREUIL COULD SAIL FROM NOUMEA BY THE END 

OF THIS \~K TO EXECUTE THIS MISSION X WE HAVE EVIDENCE 

CHEVREUIL COULD CARRY FORCE OF 50 MEN PLUS CREW 

484 
~I! i ~ ii T a 

MAY GCT --

19 0117 

19 0839 

18 1120 

19 1759 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFOR COMSOPAC 

Pending investigation and study potentialities Auckland and Island Bases South Pacific Area desire hold 

abeyance specific assignment Lion and Cub bases. Your 

162250. Probable specific units less than full base 

may be needed augment facilities now in or being established in area. Information on requirements will 

be forwarded as determined. 

CINCPAC TO COMSWPACFOR, CO BLEACHER GOC FIJI CO BOBCAT 

CO ROSES·CG DEF FORCES SAMOAN GR CO POPPY. 

Rear Admiral J. s. MCCAIN USN will under direction of Cine 

pac assume command of aircraft of the South Pacific area 

at 0700 GCT May 20. Command entails operational control 

including training and indoctrination. Abbreviated 

title ComAirSouPac. Initially will be embarked in USS 

TANGIER at Noumea. Base commanders addressed please acknowledge for their air untis to CincPac who will pass 

to ComAirSouPac. ComSouWe·stPacFor 1 s l"eque sted to 

place Tangier the Aircraft she· is tending and Meredith 

under command ComAirSouPac. Alusna Wellington infor.m 

New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and Vice Admiral Ghormley. 

C01~IRSOPAC TO CINCPAC 

In connection indoctination crews Army planes being diverted to POPPY and FANTAN vour 140647 utilization 

as many LEXINGTON Torpron pil~ts in addition personnel indicated your 172045 considered of utmost value in 

effective early readiness. Army VB units involved. 

Urge assignment as many as practicable. 

COMGEN ROSES TO ---- INFO COMSOWESPACFOR, CINCFAC 

Re~mmend occupation ESPIRITU SANTO NH which possesses excellent harbor, seaplane base, and airfield sites in 

2nd channel areas. If authorized shall send small 

force including reconnai ssance detachments, infant·ry, engineers, to initiate work on airfields with native 

labor such move also will require authority to divert 

PAUL JONES 3 days with destroyer escort both available 

VILA. Believe separate Task Force for permanent occupation should be sent promptly, with air components 

to follow as soon as base is ready. To insure 

retention of ROSES, further recommend immediate 

reinforcement by two additional regiments infantry and two batteries 155~~ guns. Enemy reconnaissance 

recently observed ove r ESPIRITU SANTO and MALEKULA. 

485 
8 !J 0 Pl i1 'iQu 

MAY GOT ----

19 2200 

20 0113 

20 0359 

COMINCH TO COMNAVUNIT ROSES INFO CINCPAC, ETC. 

Your 162036. 6 inch guns furnished in order to provide 

meditm fixed defenses after Marine Defense Battalion 

including harbor defenses battery of 5 inch guns has 

been relieved by Army. Present concept is that either 

the 6 inch battery or 5 inch battery would be manned 

by Marine Defense Battalion but if ComGen ROSES requires 

that both batteries be manned then this s·hould be done 

by personnel now available ROSES. The manning of fixed 

defenses in any of the island positions is not an 

assigned task of Navy Bluejacket personnel and it is 

not desired to change this policy. Army will provide 

additional personnel to man 6 inch guns but no definite 

date can be stated at this time. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH ·INFO CG DEFFORCES SAMOAN GROUP 

Patch's reports in his 180617 and in ComGenHawDept 

180700 show S:TRAWBOARD situation still most unsa-tisfactory and apparently efforts of Ghormley did not 

avail. Five ships now waiting STRAW. One since 

28 April. Recommend our actionrot be further delayed. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

In preparing this reply to query of combined Chiefs of 

Staff in your 131412 MacArthur's reply in your 142100 

has been noted. Comtaskfor seventeen's 152126 and 

ComSouWesPacfor's 170508 and 190345 which are being 

passed to you for information have also been considered. 

CinCPac's coordinating action prior to CORAL SEA battle 

comprised (a) assignment to Comtaskfor 17 task 11Assist 

in checking further advance by enemy in NEW GUINEA - SOLOMON area by seizing favorable opportunities to 

destroy ships shipping and aircraft". (b) Request to 

ComSouWesPacfor to continue dissemination of information 

and to inform of the operations of his forces which 

would support Fleet task forces. (c) Order to Fletcher 

to inform Leary when and where surface forces placed 

under his command should report and also his desires as 

to air cooperation. · 

As a result of information furnished Fletcher was able 

to deliver his highly successful attack against ships 

at TULAGI and to later time the battle with enemy 

carriers whtch tur ned back the MORESBY occupation force. 

(continued on next page) 

486 
Nl.AY GCT ----

20 0359 CINCPAC TO COMINCH (Continued) 

Just how much the action of .shore based striking groups 

against ships and bases assisted Fletcher is indeterminate 

but it and the previous sustained effort undoubtedly 

accumulated considerable effect. However the General 

ineffectiveness of high altitude bombing against mobile 

targets and the doubtful results from light bombing of 

shore establishments are evident and I concur in the 

recommendations of MacArthur concerning dive bombers 

and torpedo planes. I urge most stronely the addition 

of fighters which can furnish cover to surface forces at 

considerable distances at sea. The enemy has a most 

decided advantage over us in the possession of these 

types and in having them operated by the Navy so that 

best coordination with the surface Navy results. 

From the reports previously mentioned it will be seen 

that remarkably good results obtained but improvement 

should be sought by the Fleet Task Force Commander 

furnishing the Commander of the land based air all 

possible prelimin~y information as to his intentions 

communication plan, etc,. and later during radio 

silence sending if practicable further information by 

aircraft or destroyer as to his probable movements 

fuel situation and needs for air cover. Ships and 

aircraft of Pacific Fleet will be issued Asiatic Waters 

Air Code and contact pad to provide a common method 

of communication so that contact and other information 

reports can be exchanged immediately without necessity 

plain language. The shore commander should assign 

attack missions designed to render the greatest possible 

assistance to the Fleet Task Force when it is engaged 

and particularly should be ready to supply fighter 

prot'ection when it is practicable. The last measure 

is one that both the Japs and the Germans make effective but which Allied surface forces are reported 

never to have received in the ABDA~ea. Much must be 

done to bring about coordination in this respect. 

487 
MAY GCT 

20 2122 

21 0137 

21 9531 

COMGEN SAMOAN GROUP TO COMSOWESPAC INFO CINCPAC 

In event collapse STRAWBOARD negotiations recommend 

employment STRAWBOARD force to strengthen HAT and MAN 

and engineers to speed up air base on HAT. 

CIKCPAC TO COMINCH 

Necessary bring YORKTOWN Pearl for fuel. Your 182030. 

If operations feasible contenplate using YORKTOWN as 

support for Halsey. If not feasible contemplate sending to Puget. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Have directed Commanding.General Hawaiian Department 

to .defer further transfer of ~lanes to the South. 

Your 192340. Commanding General states he has received 

no instructions from War Department. Request you have 

War Department confirm. 

488 
17 2101 

17 2221 

18 0635 

17 2220 

CINCPAC TO CG SAMOAN 'DEFFORGE 

Action ComGen SAMOAN DefForce x info Com1nch from 

CinCPac x Desire your opinion on readiness Fi~st 

Raider Battalion for operations against advanced and 

semi-isolated enemy bases x Immediate purpose of 

attack for time being would be destruction of shore . facilities rather than permanent occupation X Desire 

recommendations and what you require ror specific operations you ·maz ru,tve considered in your estimate 

of current situation x TANGIER pass to Vice Adniral 

Ghormley for info. 

COMINCH TO COMVIESSE.AFRONT, COMNORWESSEAFRONT 

There are strong indications that between about 50 

May and 10 June enemy will attack MIDWAY - PlAWAII 

line and will raid or even attempt to capture UNALASKA x CinCPac has been directed to create north 

Pacific Force xx Para 2 x Commander Northwest Sea ·Frontier place himself and all his Sea Frontier 

forces-at disposal of CinCPac Y~ para x Commander 

Western Sea Frontier pl11ce all his sea frontier 

forces at disposal of CinCPac including sound school 

destroyers and submarine,s _ x CinCPac may be expected 

to order concentration of North -Pacific Force initially 

at KODIAK and/or COLD BAY in which direction you should 

move your surface .forces as soon as they can be made 

ready while air fo~ces proceed to ALEUTIAN area xx 

Para 3 x Move shipping out of ALEUTIAN area before 

May 30th x Observe utmost secrecy and enforce rigorous radio discipline x Greenslade pass to Dewitt x Parker 

pass to Buckner x Arrange full coordination Ar.my in 

ALASKA War Department c.oncurs. 

CINCPAC TO C01lWESSEAFRONT1 COMNORWESSEAFRONT 

What forces to reach ALASKAN area by thirty May can 

you provide in cotl,j:pliance with Cominch 172221 x 

\Vhat additional forces by ten June. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Differences in estimate due to earlier receipt by you of DI x Your 170407 Para ONE I have somewhat revised 

my estimate and now generally agree with you except I , believ e nemy attempt to capture MIDWAY and IDiALASKA 

will occur about May 30th (note the double holiday) 

or shortly {therea:fter while ' enemy Sou~h Pacific 

campaign will be started middle or latter parlt of June 

and will be strong attempt to capture MORESBY plus Northeast AUSTRALIA or NIDV CALEDONIA and FIJIS x 

(continued on next page) 

489 
17 2220 

17 0407 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC (Continued) 

Para T¥10 Estimate that MIDWAY attack may possibly be preceded by shipborne air raid on OAHU and that 

enemy intention includes effort to trap and destroy 

a substantial portion of the Pacific Fleet ~ Para 3 

My estimate of enemy strength will be: MIDWAY attack 

force 4 fast BBs in Batdiv 3, Crudivs 4 and 8, Cardivs 

· 1 and 2 possibly plus ZUIKAKU at least two desrons and 

a Landing Force x UNALASKA attack force Crudiv 7, Cardiv 3 (RYUOJO and HOSHO), at least 2 desdivs plus troops x Consider it possible that "AOB" is BEAVER 

INLET and that landing is planned there x Para Some 

indications that remainder first fleet may take up a 

supporting position to westward of MIDWAY x Para four 

I consider that our appropriate strategy is to make 

strong concentration HAWAIIAN Area and in view of last 

clause of para two chiefly to employ strong attrition 

tactics and not repeat not allow our forces to accept such decisive action as-would be likely to incur heavy losses in our carriers and Cruisers x Para five Create 

for the defense of ALASKA the North Pacific Force comprising Northwest Sea Frontier forces and commands 

plus such Western Sea Frontier forces as you elect to 

include sound school destroyers and submarines plus such fleet units as you can make available all 

preferably to be concentrated initially at KODIAK and/· 

or COLD BAY. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Your 152130 and 152136 crossed my 160307 x Considerable 

difference in estimates based probably on the same 

data is noted x Latest information here does not confirm 

future enemy concentration at TRUK x Believe he may well try to capture vi•al HAWAIIAN Area at this time 

before reinforcements afforded by our war production 

can be received x Will watch situation close+y and 

return Halsey to Southwest if innninent concentration 

that direction is indicated x Further details indicate 

YORKTOWN damage within capacity PEARL to repair in 

reasonably short time x Therefore have retained YORKTOWN air personnel and planes in YORKTOWN for readiness 

active carrier operations when ship repairs are completed x 

With respect to torpedo personnel and torpedoes for 

FANTAN and POPPY see my 160905 x Army medium bombers are 

built to carry torpedoes x Will take appropriate action 

as soon as situation clarifies with respect to number of 

torpedoes and their status as regards strengthening for 

high speed drops x Will push readiness of bases and 

endeavor exploit all means of their mutual reenforcement x 

Must reiterate however that we should not count on such 

reenforcement arriving i n time x Action for concert with 

SouWesPac under s.tudy and made sub.1ect of communicati<490 with MacArthur today x TAN~IER deliver to VAd Ghormley. 
17 1927 . CINCPAC TO COMTASKJ:t,OR 16 

18 2154 

It is not intended that you shall attack enemy island 

bases while returning this area x Consider it important t~t you not be sighted by the enemy. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Situation your ~72220 x .Island reenforcements your 132140 x Request scheru1le of arrival all Army aircraft 

expected to arrive OAIIU during remainder of May and 

June. 

491. 
MAY 

17 0555 

18 1135 

18 1145 

18 1255 

18 2030 

COMSOUPAC TO CINCPAC 

From Ghormley x Your 140647 request information numbers 

location and ratlngs Lexington and Yorktown personnel and transportation contemplated x McCain will be ready 

assume command Air South Pacific 0700 GCT 20 May temporarily based on TANGIER at WHITE POPPY if available. 

As I will not have assumed comnand request you inform 

forces South Pacific area. 

SAMOA TO N.t.ARCORPS INFO CINCPAC 

Early employment 1st Raider Bn demands men to bring organization to strength be sent this area first 

opportunity x Either Rear Echelon at Quantico or equal number selected volunteers with basic special raider 

training 81 mm mortar personnel not essential x Assumed 

plan for automatic training and forwarding future replacenent now in operation. 

COMGEN SAMOAN AREA TO CINCPAC INFO TANGIER 

Comgen Samoan Area fires that at CinCPac x Raider Bn 

ready for any operation desired x Your 172101 x If 

special type ships employed some special training preparation desireable x TANGIER give to Adm Ghormley. 

COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON INFO COMSOWESPACFOR CINCPAC 

Refer to this as Cominch 181255 action Spenavo London 

info Comsowespacfor CinCPac xx· Request you say to first 

Sea Lord in person that indicated imminence of enemy attacks on Midway and Alaska perhaps Hawaii has required withdrawal of carrier-cruiser groups from South Pacific 

para Comsowespacfor has cruisers and destroyers but no 

carrier wherewith to work against enemy activities in 

Coral Sea para will Admiralty entertain request for 

carrier from Eastern Fleet to join up with Leary temporarily, if so move had best be made at once para as 

alternative suggest consideration of coordinated eastern 

fleet and British shore based air raids on Rangoon or 

Andaman Islands and line of communication between Rangoon and Singapore. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Give consideration repair Yorktown at Puget in order 

to avoid exposure to attack to save shipment of material 

to Pearl to refresh personnel and possibly saving in 

overall time to prepare for service. 

492 
MAY 

18 2012 

18 2235 

19 0345 

COMVIIESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH COMNORWESSEAFRON 

Aidac 30 May your 180635 surface Desdiv 83 less 

LAWRENCE 4 DD Desdiv 70 less KILTY 3 DD RATHBURNE x 

At SanFran 19 May ready x 4 Sail Sail depart SanDiego 20 May x KILTY depart SanFran 26 May aircraft my 180742 LAWRENCE a.t NYMI available about 6 June x 

Suggest 3 DD including KILTY LA~HENCE remain Westseafr.ont anti submarine duty x Consider inadvisable strip Frontier all aircraft. 

COMNORWESSEAFHON TO CINCPAC INFO COM'vVESSEAFRON 

All my sea frontier forces herewith at your disposal Cominch 172221 4 destroyers now in Alaskan waters plus 2 submarines CHARLESTON WILLIAMSON CASCO OHI.OLE 14 YPS 

15 Coast Guard vessels x Will augment these by 4 YP 

and 4 AMCS by 30 May x Will also send 3 additional 

destroyers if info addressee can take over coastal 

escort duty x Also ONONDAGA x SPICA VEGA BRAZOS are 

plying between Alaska and Seattle together with U S 

GRANT and ST MIHIEL which operate for Army x Air forces already reported x Look for 2 additional submarines from SanDiego by 10 June. 

COMSOWEPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH 

Appreciate your assigning additional ships to this 

area replying your 170537 x I have recommended that the forces of the Eastern Fleet be brought to bean 

upon the situation either operating from this area 

as a base or by creating diversion in Eastern Indian 

Ocean x In any event I will assist your action to 

extent possible by direct support or through diversion x Number planes here inadequate for direct reinforcement of Soupac Area x Consider your forces in recent action 

were handled with marked skill and fought with admirable 

courage and tenacity x Am most anxious to perfect airnaval cooperation x Suggest detail liaison officer from here aboard flagship task force when operating this 

area. x A preknowledge of movements and communications plan is also necessary to enable us monitor frequencies used your scout planes x Call upon me freely x You can 

count upon my most complete and active cooperation. Signed MacArthur. 

48 3 
MAY 

19 0244 

19 1605 

19 1600 

COMliVESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC 

From LtGen Dewitt Comdg WDS and Fourth Anmy x Present 

strength and location combat airplanes in Alaska as 

follows: P-36 Elmendorf 4, Kodj_ak 3 and Ladd 6; P-40 

Elmendorf 23 and Kodiak 20; B-18 Elmendorf 4, Juneau 

one and Kodiak quartet; B-26 anchorage 12; LB-30 

Kodiak duet and anchorage unit; B-17 Kodiak single. Additional airplanes for Alaska: P-40 enroute 6 and 3 

by June first, B-26 enroute 4 and 11 by June first. 

14 RCAF pursuit airplanes Annette Island. Hequest being made for added pursuit squadron Umnak will 

advise you when further informed. 

TANGIER TO CINCPAC 

Make my 196000 read as follows x Your Government both 

with regard to rallying the Wallis Islands to Free 

Franc·e and with regard to their procection by American 

forces comma x from there on no change x 

SOMSOUPAC(GHORMLEY) TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH 

Conferred Dargenlieu today x your 172051 x Results 

satisfactory x Following in two parts is translation 

Dargenlieu letter confir.tra tion to me and my reply x 

Begin translation x Following our conversation this 

morning in the course of which I received some very interesting information on the political and military .views of your ~qvernment both with regard to rallying the Wallis Islands to Free France and with regard to 

their protection by American forces, I have studied 

the question with the greatest care. I have the honor 

to inform you that I intend to send the French sloop CHEVREUIL with an occupying force Saturday, May 23, 

at dawn. Its arrival is expected on Thursday, the 

28th, towards noon. As soon as the rallying of Wallis 

Islands to Free France will be accomplished, the 

American authorities at Samoa and you, yourself, will 

be informed to that effect. It is understood that, without any delay, the hmerican forces will debark 

and will assure the defense of the Wallis Islands 

against a possible enemy attack. The civil administration will be carried out by a resident designated by Me,. Moreover, I am counting on the fact that at 

the :moment when the CHEVREUIL arrives in the vicinity of the . Wallis Islands, aerial patrols will keep guard 

over the islands in order to prevent any possible surprise by the enemy. These arrangements have been 

made in the shortest possible delay, a fact which I am 

sure you will appreciate in order to meet the desire 

of your government, which is in full accord with the 

494 
T;IAY 

19 1600 

19 1630 

20 0143 

(CONTINUED) 

directives of the French National committee. I would 

appreciate your being so good as to confirm the fact 

that you are in accord and beg you to accept, Admiral, 

the assurances of my highest consideration signed Dargenlieu. Part two follows. 

TANGIER(GHORMELY) TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH 

Second part x My reply ur hereby acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 May 1942, in which you confirm 

our conversation relative to the occunation and defense 

of Wallis Islands. I note that you will send the 

French sloop CHEVREUIL with an occupying force which 

will depart from Noumea at dawn Saturday May 23rd 1942, 

and that this force will arrive and occupy Wallis 

Island about noon on Thursday May 28, 1942. Such 

military measures by air or otherwise as may be expe- dient at the time will be taken to guard against possible surprise attack by the enemy during occupa- tion by your forces. I understand that the American 

authorities at Samoa and myself will be informed 

promptly when the Wallis Islands have rallied to Free 

France in order that the American ~orces will without 

delay debark and assure the defense of Wallis Islands 

against possible enemy attack. I further confirm that 

the civil administration will be carried out by resident designated by the high commissioner for France 

in the Pacific. Allow me to express my appreciation of 

your very prompt and energetic action in this ma.tter.u 

From Ghormley xx In view of the fact I have not taken 

command request you inform Price and issue directive 

to him xx Force sent to T.'\Jallis must be prepared to 

assist in feeding the Population of approximately 5000 

as food is believed to be very scarce. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO COMNORWESSEAFRON COMALASEC 

Composition North Pacific Force now planned with approx- imate dates arrival Alaskan waters ST LOUIS NASHVILLE 

CASE REID 30th LOUISVILLE HONOIJULU 3rd INDIANAPOLIS 

GRIDLEY MC CALL J?IFTH X EIGHT old DD six SS CHARLESTON 

and patrol craft fron sea frontier forces about 30th x 

Think advisable leave 24 PBY as minimum for whole West 

Coast therefore only 11 available Alaska. De Witt 

reports totall05 Army aircraft but none at Cold Bay 

or Unmak x Comalasec inf~ms these two army fields 

ready x Majority of arrny air must be based there in 

order to take part in defense of probable eneMy objec- tive and assist surface force X Please take steps to 

495 
NAY 

20 0143 

18 2145 

18 2141 

/ 

19 2330 

19 2340 

(CONTINUED) 

accomplish this and army air reenforcements if practicable x Inforr.1 Army that surface force will be almost completely dependent on them for air 

cover and that if enemy is in estimated strength our surface force is strong enough only to seize opportunities made possible by air action or as may be fortuitously presented x Under my strategic com- mand Theobald in ST LOUIS will command surface force. With what Army coL~ander will he deal and what will be the command relationship x 

CINCPAC TO MIDWAY 

For CACHALOT your previous orders cancelled x Believe 

enemy will attack Midway using planes launched from 

a position fifty miles northwest of Midway. Patrol that area until further orders. Avoid detection. Midway acknowledge delivery. 

CINCINC TO COMINCH INFO COMNORii'IJESSEAFRON 

Please obtain for me information numbers types location Army aircraft expected to be in Alaska Aleutian Area remainder of May and in June x Your 172220 X 

COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC 

Price informed Peck 4 days required for loading transports a.t Straw x I estimate 1 day required for transit strawstack to Strawboard x My 191600 x 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Part 1 of Cominch 192340 x 3 parts x Your 182154 and 182141 para 1 War Department has been requested to improve existing defenses Hawaii as rapidly as pos- sible including retention Hawaiian area for time being of forces destined for other areas also to issue appro- priate instructions for deployment army forces Alaskan 

area to meet prospective situation para 2 present schedule arrivals aircraft Hawaii week beginning 19 May 23 B-17-E's of which 11 are part of group originally set up for south pacific by 25 May 26 B-26's these latter will require about 1 day after arrival to re- place ordnance and other naterial removed during ferry flieht and shipped out by other air transportation x 

49h 
e 1!l 0 M L i 

AIDAC 

. MAY GCT 

19 2358 Prom COMINC]l TO CINCPAC 

PART 3 OF COMINCH 192340 XX DISPOSITIONS AS lilOLLOWS 

HEAVY BOMB AND 1 PURSUIT SQUADRON KODIAK, MBDIUl\1 BOMB AND REMAINING PURSUIT ANCHORAGE PARA 4 FIELD AT UMNAK Hf.S AT LEAST ONE MEr.PALLIC 6500 FOOT RUNV"iAY, 29000 GALLONS GASOLINE NO'IJV WITH MORE ENROUTE X STATUS OF BOMBS BN ROUTE Dtm ARHIVE MAY 1000 .LB 441 1 500 LB 1500, 300 LB 

2000, 100 LB 2500, 20,000 ROUNDS CAL 50 X PIELD AT , COLD BAY IS USABLE AND REPORTED TO I~VE LARGE AMOUNT OF GASQLINE AND HAS BOMBS 1000 LB 340 1 500 LB 10~0 1 300 LB 12001 100 LB 1500 

497 
MAY 

19 2235 

19 2245 

19 2246 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC · 

Part two Cominch 192340 x They have torpedo racks 

but pilots require torpedo training para 3 Alaska 

now h~s 1 B-19-E, 3 LB-30's with ASV, 15 B-26s, 9 B-18, 47 P-40s, 11 P-36s. Arriving about 21May 4 B-26s and 6 P-40s. Subsequently a schedule of 

repl acement of B-26s may result in temporary absence 

from ALASKA of 4 planes a. t any one time· between now 

and 30 July. 

COMNAVEU TO COMINCH 

Part 1 of 2 partsxx Following is Admiralty's ·reply 

to your 181255 "(A) We have seen enough of Japanese tactics to realise that it is their policy to operate several carriers in company, and henc.e to send one ~' 

of the 3 carriers of the Eastern Fleet to the Southwest 

Pacific Area would only result in our forces being weak 

both in the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific 

Areas.x We do not, therefore, consider that it would 

be justifiable to make such a detachment (B) We realize 

the necessity for the movements of the Brltish FoTces 

in the Iddian Ocean and the US Forces in the Pacific 

being coordinated, and we appreciate the action taken 

by the US Fleet in April in an endeavor to relieve the 

Japanese pressure on the Indian Ocean x (C) \Vhilst 

ehere is doubt that the Japanese would welcome an 

attempt by our surface forces to break th;rough the IviALAY~ DARWIN l~ne so as to bring our forces within 

reach of their shore based air forces, we cannot 

believe that they would credit us with being so foolish 

as to do so (D) Hence, we do not consider that the 

knowledge that our surface forces were approaching the ~/JALAYA DARWIN line would have any effect on the 

movements of Japanese naval forces ~Neither would an 

air attack on the ANDAMANS or ports in JAVA or SUl~TRA xx 

Part 2 follows with para (E). 

COMNAVEU TO ·COMINCH 

Part 2 of 192246 x (E) Interference with the SINGAPORERANGOON line of communications as not considered prac- tical at the present stage as to be effective it would 

necessitate our surface forces being maintained within .striking distance of Japanese shore based aircraft for 

a considerable time .. x At the moment the Eastern Fleet 

is at KILINKINI with. 2 of the carrie :rs making good defects after the MADAGASCAR operations, and in a few 

days we are being forced to practically demobilise the 

Eastern Fleet by sending two thirds of its destroyers to the 1EDITERRANEAN to assist in g etting a. convoy on 

whi ch the sec·uri ty of MALTA depends through to that 

place x · 

(cmtinued on next page) 498 
J 

19 2246 

20 0151 

COMNAVEU TO COMINCH (Continued) 

(G) CinC East Fleet is b,eing asked whether he will have 

sufficient screening destroyers to proceed with part of his fleet to CO~OMBO where its arrival might become kno~n to the Japanese x If you consider such a movement 

would serve any useful purpo~e it will, if practicable, be made at the earliest possible moment.x (H) Our 

intelligence points to a concentration of the Japanese fleet in the- TRUK area in the latter part of June, but 

gives no intlication of an attack on either ALASKA, MIDWAY or HAWAII x Obviously however you would not have 

redisposed your forces without good reason, and it would be helpful if we could know on what you base your appreciation. 

CINCPAC TO COMNORWESSEAFRONT 

Present plan to utilize only your forces 'now in ALASKAN 

waters and total of eleven VPB x Request names DDs. 

20 0537 COMNORWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC 

20 0236 

20 0650 

Your 200151 DDs Comdesdiv in GILMER DENT BROOKS KANE 

COMSffiVESPACFOR TO COMTASKGROUP ' l6.9 

Suggest for your early consideration night raid on 

TULAGI by ,planes based ROSES x Targets indicated 

ComSoWesPac daily intelligence reports held by TANGIER x Si~ilar operations for about 28 May now being planned here by RAAF planes to be temporarily based ROSES x 

Nieht attacks by submarines also being planned x ·r will 

keep you fully informed and .request you reciprocate. 

COM-14 TO NAS MIDWAY 

Japan's Navy Day will be 27 1my 26 t~y our time x It 

is expected that MIDWAY will be attacked sometime after 

25 May, possibly around 30 May when the moon is full x 

Attacks may be expected by planes from as many as 4 

carriers supported by cruisers·, destroyers, and possibly battleships x More information will follow x Your force 

being. reenforced by CinCPa.c and by squadron of PT boats 

from here. PT boats should a.:rrive early morning 25 May x 

4 YPs should arrive early morning 26 May x 1 PY, a 

patrol yacht, should arrive about 26 May :x Utilize the 

PT boats .as striking force at discretion and PY plus YPs 

for patrol d~ty as desired x Disperse foodstuff, par- ticularly cases, widely in areas where material can _be 

covered with sand x Store water in containers and disperse 

(contin~ed on next page) 
20 0650 COM-14 TO NAS MIDWAY (Continued) 

as much as possible x Amnunition should be dispersed 

a.s much as possible, ke eping a.ccessi ble x The Commanderin-Chief on his re cent visit to MIDWAY was very much 

impressed vnth the fine spirit of the personnel and has 

extreme c onfidence in their ability to hold the Island x 

Both he and I charge you to give them hell. 

20 1315 COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Arrange CHEVREUIL destroy Radio ~ALLIS as suggested 

your 190121 x You will consider this an occupation by 

Free French and land United States troops immediately 

thereafter .x TANGIER pass to VAdm Ghormley x Acknowledge. 

20 0943 GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC 

ComGen ROSES 191759 ComGen POPPY G-45 xx In my opinion 

relatively small force can deny ESPI~ITU SANTO ISLAND 

to Japs advance if not in force x Opinion based on reported 

Jap methods in occup'ation TULAGI x Importance of ESPIRITU 

SANTO to US cannot be over accentuated x As soon as 

practicable this position should be reenforced preparatory 

to our entering the second phase x If Japs occupy this 

island defense of lines of communications and positions 

ROSES and POPPY made most difficult x Reconmend approval 

Patch plan detailed arrangements to be perfected by Patch 

and Chamberlain. 

20 2045 CINCPAC TO COMGENDEFFOR, SAMOAN GROUP 

Vice Admiral Ghormley's 191600 191630 and 191605 and 

COMINCH 201315 being passed to you x Perfec:t and ca rry 

out plans for the occupation of STRAWBOARD observing 

meticulously the procedure agre ed to by Ghormley and 

D'Argenlieu x RIGEL pa ss to Ghormley. 

sao 
I 

I 

U. S. ., \,~V L COlVIMUNICATION SERVICE 

COlVIl\1ANDER-IN-CHIEF 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET INCO~. lNG 

181 7@1 

C T HAVE TOTAI.J OF 23 PATROL AMPHIBIANS IN ALASKA r3y 30 l'.'IAY PROVIDED 

1. {ON 43 FROIVI HfESTERN SEA FROYTIER TAKES OVER PATROL OF NORTIITrESTERN 

SECTOR X ALSO 9 VSO'S X SURFACE FORCES LATER DISPATCH 

DATE CRYPTO-GROUP CBO SERIAL NO. 

OR!GJ X AT OR ACTION IX F ORMATI ON 

COM NTv SEA FRC N CINCPAC COUINCH 

C01TNESSEAFRON 

501 

I I 

00 CofS ACS FSec OPERATIONS I'J10Ltl WAR f•'{"(f FSO FRO F'IO PRO ACO FMO '1od I Gun A vin Aero 

-\dm 01 02 05 PLANS 20 21 22 25 27 30 50 "!" 95 91l 

I I 

SUBJECT FILE 7 
May 18. 

A conference wa s held by the Admiral to discuss the 

measures to be taken t o counter the expected Jap offensive 

in the Hawaiian Area and in Alaska. It is generally believed 

that a serious attempt will be made to capture Midway and 

naid Oahu. The date for this is indefinite but the Admiral 

wants everything possible done by the 25th of May. This might 

be about a week early. In general it was tentatively decided 

to - (1) reinforce Midway with part of a raider battalion, 

above reenforcements of marines already underway; (2) station 

about 4 subs off Midway; (3) use Midway to stage army VB to 

within reach of enemy CV; (4) search with about 12 PBY; {5} 

employ task force 16 plus the Yorktown group if ready in the cr~tical area; (6) move out BBs with the Saratoga; (7) form 

a North Pacific Force and send it to Alaskan waters; (8) 

expedite navy yard repairs. 

Doubtful submarine contacts continue in the Central 

Pacific Area. Today a small seaplane was sighted which could 

have come from an enemy submarine. 

Conditions are not yet settled at Efate. The landing 

field is not ready for VFs and men are required to man six 

6" guns and some short range weapons. 

The Hawaiian Islands were placed on a special alert 

because of the possibility of a seaplane bombing attack. 

The NEVADA will be repaired about October 1. 

CinCPac l~Rtl7 suggests that Lion and Cub units now 

about ready wllljOe assigned definite destination until further 

study in Southern Pacific is completed. 

CinCPac 190839 Rear Admiral McCain becomes Comairsopac. 

Fletcher will arrive Pearl about May 28th. 

Colonel Clements USMC, who got out of Corrigedor April 

lOth gave a gloomy talk on how we lost the Philippines. 

Aside from small scale air activity the Southwest 

Pacific seems quiet. 

502 
May 19. 

Cominch 192200 deals with the manning of 611 guns at Efate. 

CinCPac 200359 suggests necessity for and means to obtain 

coordination between ships and shore based air. 

Com.Gen. ROSES 191759 recommends occupation of ESPIRITU 

SANTO. This is concurred in by prospective ComSQWPac. The 

C.G. also desires at least two more infantry regiments. The 

desire for more troops seems general as e.G. STRAW also wants 

more. The logistic item must be considered before all men 

requested are sent. Comairsopac (191120) wants more civilian 

personnel. 

CinCPac 200113 urges Cominch action at STRAWBOARD. See 

aidac in this connection which directs action to be taken. 

There is malaria at ROSES. Also at that place the field 

for VF will be ready June 20, while use of VBs is indefinite. 

An estimate of the present situation is being prepared. CinCPac is busy today takine; counter measures to oppose the 

Japanese American campaign. Specific developments are shown 

in the aidacs for the day. 

503 
8 pjJ s n FJ T 

May 20. 

The formation and despatch of the North Pacific Force 

(Task Force EIGHT) under Rear Admiral Theobald got underway.(O~A~ ~ The vessels of the force present will depart Pearl May 23rd, ~~-~) 

and proceed to an Alaskan rendezvous via. MIDWAY. The main 

reinforcement of MIDWAY, consisting of AA batteries, and ground 

personnel, and two companies of a Raider Battalion go to MIDWAY 

with Admiral Theobald. 

Admiral Ghormley arrived in AUCKLAND. 

CinCPac 210531 requests that the Army direct that no more 

planes be flown from here to AUSTRALIA for the present. Technically, he does not control these planes. 

CinCPac 210137 gives plans for the YORKTOWN. 

Rear Admiral Byrd and party leave here soon on the 

MACKINAC to inspect South Pacific bases. 

Conwanding General, SAMOA 202122 must feel that the 

French won't let us have WALLIS ISLAND and suggests a diversion 

for troops earmarked for that place. 

504 
Cincpac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN -CHIEF 

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505 
May 26, 1942 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 

ATTACK ON HAWAIIAN AND ALASKAN BASES 

PART I - MISSION 

The Problem 

1. There are indications that the enemy will make a 

strong simultaneous effort, commencing after May 26, 1942, to -

(a) Capture MIDWAY for possible subsequent operations 

against ~~ arid 

(b) Capture an advanced position in the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. 

The problem here considered is how to deal with that 

enemy effort, while continuing to carry out tasks assigned but 

not directly related to this problem. 

The Situation 

2. The basic task of the Commander-in-Chief, u.s. Pacific 

Fleet, which applies is: 

ttcovering and holding the line HAWAII-MIDWAY and 

maintaining tis communications with West Coast". 

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, is 

assigned, among others, the following supplementary tasks: 

"(a) Hold island positions between the United States 

and Southwest Pacific Area necessary for security of 

the line of communications between these regions and 

for supporting naval, air, and amphibious operations 

against Japanese." 

fl(d) Support defense of the continent of Norl(America." 

"(e) Protect essential sea and air communications." 

I-1-

506 
3. The following is quoted from a message from COMINCH: 

"I consider that our appropriate strategy is to make strong 

concentration HAWAIIAN AREA and ---- to employ strong attrition tactics and not allow our forces to accept such 

decisive action as would be likely to incur heavy losses 

in our carriers and cruisers. 

'"Create for the defense of ALASKA the North Pacific Force 

comprising northwest ~frontier forces plus such western 

sea frontier forces as you elect to include sound school 

destroyers and submarines plus such Fleet units as you 

can make available all preferably to be concentrated 

initially at KODIAK and/or COLD BAY." 

4. The Commander-in-Chief, u.s. Pacific Fleet will 

employ the major part of his forces to repel these attacks~ 

He will expect full cooperation from Army forces stationed 

in ALASKA. 

.I-2- 507 
PART II - SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS 

1. (a) The Japanese have just experienced a setback in 

the NEW BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA Area. In spite of this, their 

morale is high. 

(b) It is to be expected that the planning for this 

campaign will be excellent and the preparations complete. 

They are indicated having a rehearsal for parts of the campaign. 

(c) Their planes, are generally speaking, of greater 

range than ours. Their fighters out-perform ours. 

(d) The,rhave amply demonstrated their ability to use 

their carrier air with great ability. We can no longer underestimate their naval air efficiency. 

(e) On the other hand, our men a!,e just as brave, and 

those who have been properly tr3ined are believed to be better 

than their opposite Jap nmnber. Our Army is untried except 

in Bataan. The Army air has not demonstrated that it has the 

ability to coordinate with surface forces, and they are not 

very successful in hitting mobile targets with their high 

altitude bombers. 

(f) Our submarines have demonstrated considerable 

superiority. Division tactics have not been tried out 

against the enemy. 

II- l·N 508 
2. Character of the Theater. 

(a) Hydrographx, topography. The Hawaiian Sea Frontier 

presents no problem. Ships up to the size of CAs can enter and 

berth at MIDWAY, but must exercise extreme caution. 

In the ALASY~N Sector navigation is difficult because of fog. Charts are only fairly accurate. Harbors are 

generally poor from the viev~oint of the fair weather sailor. 

The best anchorage for a Fleet is at COLD HARBOR, ubt it has 

no resources. The islands are rugged and very thinly populated 

and will not support troops. 

(b) The Weather. The normal trades are expected in the 

Hawaiian Islands Area, while in the Aleutians south of the 

chain overcast weather with fog and occasional rain will be an 

average condition. North of the Aleutian chain there will be 

a somewhat higher percentage of good flying weather. 

(c) Daylight will be from about 0341 to 2014 in Latitude 

250N on June 1st. In Latitude 50°N it will be from about 0023 

to 2342. 

There will be a full moon on June lst. 

(d) The following distances are pertinent: 

PEARL to MIDWAY 1149 mi. 

PEARL to SAN DIEGO 2200 mi. 

PEARL to DUTCH HARBOR 2046 mi. 

MIDWAY to SAIPAN 2300 mi. 

MIDWAY to DUTCH HARBOR 1653 mi. 

DUrraH HARBOR to COLD BAY 200 mi. 

DUTCH HARBOR to KODIAK 600 mi. 

II-2 sog 
2. (Continued) 

SAIPAN 

SA I PAN 

WOTJE 

to TOKYO 

to TRUK 

to PEARL 

3. Information. 

1343 mi. 

570 mi. 

1986 mi. 

(a) Our sole source of information for this problem 

is RI and cr. The enemy may be deceiving us. 

{b) We may expect the enemy to have had full information prior to December 7, 1941. Since that time he has not 

had such good opportunities. Nevertheless he spotted the return 

of Task Force 16 in April due to our radio carelessness. 

{c) Communication facilities are considered equal, 

with the exception of our ECM. 

4. Enemy Forces. 

(a) Ultimate Japanese strength which will be employed 

in each sector cannot be accurately deterrained at this time. 

In the Hawaiian sector he may employ: 

Cominch estimate CinCPac estimate 

Fast BBs 4 BBs 2-4 

Crudivs 4 and 8 ? CVs 4 

Cardivs 1 & 2 plus 1 5 CAs 8-9 

At least 2 Desrons ? DDs 15-20 

A landing force ? ss 2: surbrons 

A landing force. 

II-3 .. 510 
4. (Continued) 

In the Alaskan Sector he may employ: 

Cardiv. Three (RYUJO and 1 XCV) 

NACHI (Flag CinC 5th Fleet) 

One section of Crudiv 4 

One old cruiser of TAIAA type 

Desron ONE, less 1 Desdiv, and Desdiv ~VO 

Subron ONE 

2 cv 

1 CA 

2 CA 

1 OCL 

16 DD 

8-10 ss 

This ~orce will escort and cover auxiliary types 

consisting o~ transports, landing boat carriers, cargo vessels, and tankers. 

(b) Shore based air can only be employed by some 

re~ueling method such as fueling seaplanes from submarines 

and/or tankers, and using CVs to act as staging points. 

5. Bases. 

The nearest bases are too ~ar distant for consideration. He will be well over 2000 miles from any good base support. 

6. Own Forces. 

(a) Battleships. 

We have seven battleships on the Pacific Coast. 

All of them can be moved westward, but because of entire lack 

or air support and inadequacy o~ screening vessels they will 

be kept where they are at the present. They could hardly be 

secure at Pearl during the period of this estimate because 

of the strong probability of an air raid. 

II-4 - 511 
6. (Continued) 

(b) Carrier Task Forces. 

(1) Task Force SIXTEEN should arrive in the 

OAHU area about May 26th. Departing OAHU 28 May it .can arrive 

orf MIDWAY, ·fueled, about 1 June. 

(2) Task Force SEVENTEEN will arrive Pearl about 

May 28th. The YORKTOvVN is damaged and must receive plane replacements. It is possible that she can be placed in service 

four days arter arrival Pearl. If she cannot be given adequate temporary repairs in that· time she will be sent to 

BREMERTON at once. 

(3) The SARATOGA will be ready at San Diego 

June 5th. She could arrive in the critical ·area of the Central 

Pacific only if the Japs are considerably later than now expected. 

(4) The WASP will not arrive in time to be considered. 

(5) The LONG ISLAND is not suitable as a Carrier 

Task Force nucleus for present operations but might be used 

after June 15th. 

(c) North Pacific Force. 

This rorce is being formed at the direction of 

the Commander-in-Chief, u.s. Fleet. It comprises all of the 

forces which can reach Alaskan waters during the first week in 

June. 

II-5- 512 
6. (c) (Continued) 

As Task Force EIGHT, this will eventually comprise: 

2 CA, 3 CL, 12 DD, PG, 1 AVP, 1 AM, 14 YP, 4 AMC, 15 CG, 6 SS, 

20 PBY-5A, 9 VSO and all Army aircraft that can be made available. 

The major part of this task force can rendezvous at 

COLD BAY or KODIAK about June 5th. 

Being opposed to a force containing carriers, it 

must depend very heavily on land based air. 

(d) Escorts. 

All of the remaining surface forces are assigned 

to escort duty. 

(e) Submarines. 

At daylight May 26th submarines will be disposed 

off MIDWAY as follows: 

1 - 50 miles NW of MIDWAY. 

1 - 50 miles NNW of MIDWAY. 

3 - in the arc 215-315 from MIDWAY distant 175 

miles. 

Eight more submarines will be ready at Pearl 

between May 24 - 30 to take up offensive patrol in the MIDWAY -

OAHU Area. 

Other submarines of the Pacific Fleet not under 

overhaul are on patrol in enemy waters. 

(f) Oilers. 

(1) The COMET with ten days oil for Task Force 

EIGHT is being sent to KODIAK for orders. The SABINE is available for that force also. 

II-·6 ~· 51 3 
6. (f) (Continued) 

(2) Other oilers will be used as necessary in 

the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. 

(g) Aircraft. 

NUMBER ~ 

50 Heavy bombers 

(B-17) 

26 Medium bombers 

(B-26) 

17 Medium bombers 

(B-18} 

180 Pursuit 

(P-39, P-40) 

7 Attack (A-20) 

96 Patrol 

43 Fighters 

29 Scout Bombers 

ARMY 

REMARKS 

30 of these are already here. The remaining 20 are due within the next few 

days, to stay here until further orders. 

Due within next few days, to remain 

here until further orders. 

These are obsolescent. 

Does not include 18 planes at NOUMEA. 

Does InClude 16 at or enroute MIDWAY. 

Total actually based OAHU and KAUAI: 80. 

11 more due within a few weeks. 

SARATOGA Squadron (22} and Marines (21). 

27 more in reserve as CV replacements. 

SARATOGA Squadron (18) and ·Marines (11). 

16 more in reserve as CV replacements. 

13 Torpedo planes SARATOGA Squadron. 3 more in reserve 

as CV replacements. 

15 VO/VS 

12 V J (large) 

26 V J ( small) 

II·-7 

SJ.4 
6. (Continued) 

(h) Bases. 

{1) Pearl Harbor is being cleared of shipping 

as far as possible. 

(2) Midway can be used as a staging point for 

Army bombers. 

(3) Alaskan bases are shown in Annex "At' to Task 

Force EIGHT Operation Plan No. 28-42. 

(i} i. Defense troops at: 

OAHU (Army) 64,843 total 

MIDWAY (Marines) Officers Men 

Defense Battalion 71 1828 

2 Raider Companies 9 270 

ii. ALASKA (Army) troops 23,518 total 

iii. ~: The above does not include air personnel .at MIDWAY who are sufficient to 

handle the 16 PBY (Navy) and the 54 Marine 

planes, but do include some air personnel 

in ALASKA. 

7. Logistics •. 

The enemy will have a difficult logistic problem. 

Because of this the time spent by their combatant types east 

of 180° will be strictly limited. Should they establish themselves in Alaska or Hawaii their logistic supply will be an 

immediate objective of the Pacific Fleet forces. 

II-8 - 515 
7. (Continued) 

Own logistic supply will mainly be from Pearl. Small 

Navy tankers and supply ships now assigned to Alaska cannot be 

diverted to supply Task Force EIGHT. 

8. Summary of Strength and Weakness Factors. 

Strength 

Own 

1. Fairly good idea of enemy 

intentions. 

2. Present ability to detect 

changes in enemy intentions. 

3. Fairly strong shore based 

air. 

4. Strength inherent in defense of strong positions. 

5. Reinforcement of MIDWAY. 

6. Submarines available in 

probable area. 

7. A strong base at PEARL. 

8. Adequate logistics. 

Weakness 

Own 

- 1. We are forced to employ 

attrition. 

2. The YORKTOWN may have to 

go to Bremerton at once. 

II-9 ~ 

Enemy 

1. Superior CV and BB strength. 

2. Sufficient and seasoned 

amphibious troops and transports. 

3. Training and experience in 

amphibious warfare. 

4. Possible carrier VB, superiority. 

5. Larger range of CV aircraft. 

6. Efficient air weapons. 

7. Initiative due to superior 

strength. 

Enemy 

1. Operation projected at long 

distance from own bases. 

2. Must establish new bases. 

3. Difficult logistic problem. 

516 
8. {Continued) 

Weakness {Cont'd) 

Own 

- 3. We have no adequate air or 

submarine protection for 

our BBs. 

4. Army air is of uncertain 

value. 

5. Our submarines have not 

operated as a division 

against the enemy. 

6. Coordination with the Army 

in Alaska will be difficult. 

II--loEnem::i 

4. Inability to adapt themselves to forced change 

of plan. 

5. Striking forces will be 

hampered by train. 

517 
PART III - ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION 

1. The enemy knows our building program - and that in 

time - our forces will be sufficiently strong to take the 

offensive. He further knows our defenses are inadequate now -

but gradually being strengthened. Hence, from the time factor 

alone, such operation should be conducted at the earliest possible time. While he is "extended", he is able to assemble a 

considerable force - as most of the occupied territory is unable to make any real effort. He knows that AUSTRALIA is being heavily reinforced from the United States and would undoubtedly desire to cut that supply line. But he may also 

consider MIDWAY to be just another WAKE and ALASKA undefended. 

Regardless of our ideas of his strategic possibilities, the 

purpose here is to discuss immediate possibilities. 

2~ To hamstring our efforts to build up facilities for 

the offensive we conclude that he will: 

(a) Attempt to capture MIDWAY. 

(b) Raid OAHU. 

(c) Attempt to secure an advance position in the 

ALEUTIAN Islands. 

3. It is believed that his forces will depart for the 

ALEUTIANS from a point in no~thern Japan on May 25 or 26; and 

that the Hawaiian forces will depart from the SAIPAN Area a 

bit later. If these beliefs are accepted our opposing forces 

should be in initial posittons in the ALASKAN Sector by June 

1st and in the MIDWAY - OAHU Sector June 3rd. 

III--1 ~ .518 
PART IV - OWN COURSES OF ACTION 

1. We have decided: 

(a) To .retain the battleships on the West Coast. 

(b) To employ Task Force SIXTEEN to the northeast 

of MIDWAY initially as soon as possible. 

(c) To employ Task Force EIGHT in the ALEUTIANS. 

(d) To initially employ a submarine screen of 6 

fleet submarines off MIDWAY. 

(e) To employ Task Force SEVENTEEN in the MIDWAY -

OAHU Area if temporary repairs can be made at Pearl. Otherwise 

the YORKTOWN will be sent to Bremerton. 

(f) To expedite the arrival of the SARATOGA in the 

HAWAIIAN Area. 

(g) To reinforce the submarine screen with .6 fleet 

submarines at Pearl as soon as possible. 

(h) To reinforce MIDWAY with PBYs, AA, and a small 

Raider Group. 

(1) To alert forces in the HAWAIIAN Area. 

(j) To clear Pearl Harbor of ships as much as is 

possible. 

(k) To hold Army bombers enroute to AUSTRALIA at 

OAifU during the present emergency. 

(1) To use MIDWAY to stage Army bombers to enemy 

carriers. 

IV-1 

519 
2. Danger from submarines and other raiders along the 

Pacific lines of communications requires the continued use of' 

convoys and escorts. 

3. Not only our directive from Commander-in-Chief, u.s. 

Fleet, but also common sense dictates that we cannot now afford to slug it out with the probably superior approaching 

Japanese forces. We must endeavor to reduce his forces by 

attrition - submarine attacks, air bombing, attack on isolated 

units. The principle of calculated chance is indicated, as set 

forth in a letter of instructions to Task Force EIGHT. If attrition is successful the enemy must accept the failure of his 

venture or risk battle on disadvantageous terms for him. 

4. There is the suggestion that the enemy will attempt 

to trap our surface .forces. Our air umbrella will assist in 

preventing that. 

5. vVhile the difficulty of placing our submarines within reach of the enemy is extremely great, and dependent to a 

large extent on chance, the risk to them is no more than normal and we only do it at the expense of ultimate reduction in 

offensive patrol in close to the enemy homeland. The placing 

of submarine leaving Pearl May 28-30 will depend somewhat on 

the RI and CI information. 

IV- 2 

520 
PART V - DISPOSITIONS AND FUTURE DECISIONS 

1. More information of the enemy is expected. On present 

information t he following , not indicated in Part IV, is planned: 

(a) All submarines available in the Hawaiian Area 

will be placed on a scouting line to the westward of Midway. 

They are assigned patrol sectors until contact. On contact 

they will close in for attack without regard to the assigned 

sectors. 

(b) The SARATOGA will be the carrier of a new task 

force which will be assigned to the Striking Forces operating 

in the critical area. 

(c) Key personnel under orders to other stations will 

be retained in present duties until further orders. 

(d) Leave and liberty for officers and men will be 

cancelled until further orders. 

(e) Extreme care will be used to prevent the enemy 

from gaining inforwation of own deployment by radio or otherwise. 

(f) The Amphibious Foree at San Diego will be put on 

48 hours notice in order that it may load and retake any positions captured by the enemy. 

(g) Part of a marine Raider Battalion will be retained 

at Pearl for use in eventualities. 

2. The disposition of the YORKTOWN should be determined 

by May 28th. 

3. An Operation Plan for MI DWAY Area will be issued to 

all concerned prior to the departure of major forces. 

V- 1 521 
MAY GCT 

21 0200 

21 0456 

21 0900 

COMALASKA SECTOR TO COMNOVI/ESSEAFRON INFO CIHCPAC 

Essential that Army and Navy commands in Alaska have 

complete information as early as possible on total 

prospective aircraft reinforcements both services so 

as to plan and coordinate initial dispositions and 

operations. 

CG STRAW TO COMSOUPAC INFO CINCPAC 

Cincpac 202045. Outline plan follows. First Echelon 

SUMNER SWAN with advance part 20 officers 200 enlisted 

plus one plane. Make rapid reconnaissance harbor and 

beach facilities. Seaplane operating area include 

photo reconnaissance report to Strawstack estimated 

time 2 days. Second Echelon ZEILIN HARRIS KIT CARSON 

followed by TURKEY and barge heavy engineering equipment. Disembark fuel garrison combat equipment sup- plies. Estimated time troops 4 days dash afirm king 8 to 10 days. Third echelon FORMALHAUT possibly MANOERAN with heavy cargo. When unloading facilities 

available estimated week to ten days after arrival 

second Echelon. Times estimates subject modification 

with full knowledge local conditions present plans did 

not anticipate call upon this force for food for popu- lation. Force has normal 90 day supply that could be 

drawn upon in emergency but recormnend subsistence 

population organized separate project with independent line supply. Re·quest information of established rate 

of exchange French franc versus American dollar in 

islands. 

COMAIRSOUPAC TO CINCPAC 

Following air reinforcements recommended by respective air commanders in indicated South Pacific Areas as 

being requisite to adequate defense thereof: Straw - 1 fightron 1 medium bombron and 6 OS2U planes. Fantan - 3 fightrons 4 heavy bombrons 3 medium bombrons 2 dive 

bombrons and 1 patron. Poppy - 1 fightron 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron and 1 dive bombron. Roses - 1 heavy bonbron 1 medium bombron and 1 dive bombron. 

Concur in these recommendations when fields and facilities for maintenance available (some months hence) 

except recommend additional fightron at Roses and 1 

less heavy bornbron at Fantan. Concentration at Fantan 

considered desirable in view central location and 

potential facilities. As result my inspection recommend and request following air reinforcements as soon 

j 

522 
MAY GCT 

21 0900 

21 2209 

22 0300 

22 0311 

(Continued) 

as planes and personnel can be made available: Straw - augment existing 3 VF 6 SSD-3 and 6 OS2U planes. Fantan - 9 VF to bring fightron to strength 1 heavy bombron 1 medium bombron 1 dive bombron and 6 VP 

planes. · Poppy - 1 fightron 1 heavy bombron 1 medium 

bombron and 1 dive bombron. Roses - 1 fightron. Reinforcements expected your 140647 inclusive in 

recommended increases. Basis of strength in planes considered as fightron and dive bombrons 25, bombrons 

and patrons 12. Urge reinforcement VF be type P-38 

if obtainable. Info adees requested keep me advised 

of completion proposed fields and maintenance facilities. Cincpac pass for info to ComGen Straw ComGen 

Roses and Alusnob Suva for GOC Fantan. To ComGen by hand Poppy. 

COMNOWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC 

Request to pass to Theobald. Comairtask Group Alaska so~etimes referred to as Comairalsec is Comnander 

Perry commanding officer air station Kodiak who functions under Comairtaskfor Northwestseafron Commander 

Gehres who commands Patwing 4. Perry experienced flyer with broad Alaskan background will have 12 patrol amphibians including 1 recent replacement to cover 

Kodiak and westward through Aleutians. Parker Comalsec maintains headquarters ashore at Airsta Kodiak 

with close liaison with Buckner at Fort Richardson. 

Latter on inspection tour through Aleutians now hurry- ing back to anchorage. 2nd part from Comnorwesseafron 

follows. 

GHORMLEY to COMGEN STHAW INFO CINCPAC 

Cincpac is in cottmand Pacific Theatre including South 

Pacific Area until such time as I have taken comrtand. 

Your 210456 is hereby referred to him for action. 

Attention invited to fact that I have promised Free 

French that our forces will occupy island as soon as 

it is declared Free Frencl1. Ref Cincpac 202045. 

COMGEN SAMOAN GROUP TO CINCPAC 

Unidentified freighter sighted lat 14-10 south long 173-30 west at 1830 GCT 21 May. Course 200. 

523 
MAY GCT 

22 0335 

22 0716 

COMSOUWESPACFOR TO CINCPAC 

Search NEOSHO SIMS survivors abandoned. Aircraft will 

continue search during routine patrols and reconnaissance flights. HENLEY picked up one hundred twenty three men including 25 hospital cases then sank NEOSHO 

with two torpedoes. Commanding Officer NEOSHO stated 

additional large number men left ship in rafts immediately after engagement on 12 May one man from SIMS died 

aboard HENLEY and 13 May one man from NEOSHO died. 

16 May HELM rescued 4 more NEOSIID men lat 15-2~ long 154-56 one man later died on board. Other 3 men stated 

they only ones left alive out of 68 who abandoned ship in 4 life rafts at. time of engagement and remained 

together throughout. No information yet as to fate 

of missing men. Later on 16 May in lat 15-16 long 155-07 HELM sighted enpty NEOSHO whaleboat and two 

life jackets no men. All survivors able travel being returned via WRIGHT. Cor.1plete list survivors will be 

forwarded airmail. 

COMGENHAWDEPT TO CHIEF OF STAFF WASH INB1

0 CINCPAC 

Following msg sent to Chief of Staff Army Washn DC 

and is for Cincpacs information stop status report of units reference your 3839 20th stop 3 B-17's of the 

first provisional bombardment squadron have arrived 

here stop 5 of second provisional squadron already 

at PCPPY no information received here on remainder of 

these aircraft stop 50 men being trained in torpedo maintenance and operation at 14th Naval District stop 

navy has assisted in preparing a tactical and technical 

torpedo training program that will be given B-26 com·- bat crews upon arrival. 

524 
w@EORii 

MAY GOT ----

212142 

22 2041 

22 2115 

22 2230 

T 

a 

HQ USMC TO COMGENDEFOR SAMOAN GROUP 

Your dispatch 200125 see paragraph 20 my serial 

003A7842 of 20 March. Subject approval CinCPac 

this HQ has no objection to increasing garrison of 

STRAWBOARD by 1 battery 3 inch 4 guns 37mm and 8 guns 50 caliber from 2nd defBn with additional personnel 

per T-0 when that place occupied. 420 men for 8th 

Marines and 350 men for DefB.ns proceedlng via WHARTON 

in May. Urdis 190210 assignment additional personnel 

as labor troops impracticable due to other commitments. 

Detachment about 600 will be sent in June for attachment to 3rd Brig for training pending ultimate assign- ment to a Reinforced Regiment relieving 7th Marines. 

CINCPAC TO TANGIER 

For Admiral D'Argenlieu: I desire to express my appreciation of your excellent plan for the rallying of WALLIS ISLAND to the Free French and I have directed the Commanding General at SAMOA to carry out 

the procedure agreed upon by you and Vice Admiral 

Ghormley. As a final arrangement it is requested that you direct the CHEVREUIL to meet the advanced 

Allied echelon of three ships 35 miles south of WALLIS 

at 2000 Greenwich time on 27 May. This advance echelon 

will follow CHEVREUIL into the lagoon at an interval 

of one hour for submarine protection but will not land 

troops until requested by your representative. It 

would be appreciated if such request were made promptly. I request that you confirm the foregoing arrangement to me by radio. Admiral Nimitz. 

(C;INCPAC TO MACARTHUR 

Period ,extending 8-14 May. Maximum 11 and 12 ~~y. 

Ciphered retransmissions by Japs to own forces were 

from fifteen minutes to one bour after original Allied 

transmission CinCPac replaying to ComsoWestPac's 221042. 

It is also noted that the Allied plain language contact 

reports and press releases are frequently very similar 

to encrypted despatches sent to this command • 

• COMSOPACFOR TO CINCPAC 

ComGen STRAW 220354 in my opinion in order carry out 

spirit of mission of force ppoceeding WALLIS and in 

view French ternpe rment disposition it is better not to 

ma!-<:e actual rende zvou:-; with CHEVREUIL. Any change in 

arrangemen ts now mlghtnjeopardize wh~le project. Ghormley originator. wAMOA pass to ComGen STRAW. 

TANGIER give , to Cor1AirSoPac. 52 5 
~ iJ o R E T 

MAY GCT 

23 0333 

21 1805 

23 2311 

24 0330 

CINCPAC TO COMGEN POPPY, COMGEN ROSES 

Plan of General Patch for occupation ESPIRITU SANTO 

approved with following reservation. Army not prepared to, furnish additional troops from u.s. therefore airfield not to be constructed until adequate 

defense is assured. 

Minor preparation as seaplane base is desirable. 

Diversion PAUL JONES and escort authorized. Details 

by arrangement with General Chamberlain. 

C01v1AMPHORPAC TO CINCPAC 

Cominch 201455 All tactical squadrons Marine Wing 2 

are at or under orders Islands Pacific for defense 

duty. Marine Wing 1 in training status except subject to defense duty on call Army Interceptor Command and Western Sea Frontier. Defense duty reduced 

training about 25%. Impossible to train progressively 

with Pacific Amphibious Force due to lack airplanes 

and continuous absorption untrained aviation and 

ground personnel. Recommend defense duties Marine Air 

Wings Western Sea Frontier be subject to my approval 

and that wings be assigned adequate aircraft. Definite 

written reconwendations now in preparation will .be 

forwarded promptly. Recommend you release 3 groups 

2nd Marine Aircraft ~ing for transfer to Amphibious 

Force on Mainland and request early decision. 

USNLQ NOUMEA TO CINCPAC 

·Admiral D'Argenli'eu's Chief of Staff states that 

CHEVREUIL is under radio silence but following message ·transr:.titted this morning Sunday over both Allied 

and French circuits: Quote You must intercep t the 

Allied Advanced Echelon of 3 ships 35 miles south of 

WALLIS ISLAND at 2000 GCT on the 27th of May 1942. 

The 3 ships will follow the CHEVREUIL into the lagoon 

at an interval of 1 hour for submarine protection but 

will not land troops until requested by you. end:i. 

unquote. 

COMGEN DEFFORCE rr UTTIIILA TO COMA I HSOPAC 

Your 210900. Will report progress construction of 

fields and request items in Part 2C Cominch secret 

00190 dash 17 March 1942 as a ccomodatlons b ecome available~ ~u oting my 07 0115 t o CinCPac. Requireme n ts pr e s ent an d p ros pective opera t i ons make more 

effecti ve sc ou ting pa trolling urgent need. 

(continued on next page) 526 
1\ftAY GOT ----

24 0330 (Continued) 

24 0620 

Recommend one squadron VBP for this area earliest 

possible. Can operate STRAvrrlAT. Six additional VSO 

for STRA\IIJBOARD or preferably J2F5 should be available 

earliest possible after initiation that operation 

end quote. 

GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH 

Going to Wellington tonight for few days Callaghan remains FULCRUM. I will recommend to Chiefs of Staff 

that New Zealand forces now in FANTAN remain there on 

account their familiarity with country and their 

services there are required in addition to our Army division now earmarked for that assignment. Also 

that New Zealand officers now serving with native 

forces remain there. 

527 
iiifllri!SB 

MAY GCT 

23 2300 COMAIRSOUPAC BY TANGIER rro CINCPAC 

Your 211950 x Request delivery of material as follows: 

Fantan 24 torpedoes from west coast plus warheads and 

tractor field equipment with compressor x Poppy 12 

torpedoes from west coast and 12 from east coast plus warheads and tractor field equipment with compressor x 

Event foretjoing .' i:rnpracticable because of required routing 

request entire ship~ent be consigned Fulcrum in lieu 

Xray for further distribution this force. Consider 

above will fulfill immediate needs of 2 squadrons medium bombers presently allocated this area. 

24 0543 COMSOWESPAC rr,o CINCPAC 

First part xx Connection forthcoming operations sug~est 

use of radio deception create impression that task force 

New Hebrides Coral Sea Area may contribute in some extent 

by (A) delaying or postponing any New Guinea invasion x 

(B) Diverting units from Midway force to this area x or 

(C) Causing enemy under estimate forces available you xx 

Analysis radio traffic 28 April to 5 May connected opera- tions this area indicates Cincpac originated 7 messages x 

Units at sea 5 X Systems used GEPAJ GUPID JITAJ BYPAJ GALUG X 

Some messages from forces at sea sent direct by radio others 

apparently flown to shore radio stations or tenders for 

transmission x Messages originated by me depended upon 

enemy sightings and intelligence info xx Suggest following plan x Near future ship at sea New Caledonia area transmit 

dummy message in Galug on taskfor commanders freq addressed 

you and me x Two days later Tangier transmit similar 

message (This is last half) messr:J. ge v:ith time group about 

6 hours old in JITAJ to you and me info several calls to 

simulate tanker arrangements and message being flown in 

to Tangier x Two days later Message similar above two but 

in GALUG from Tangier simulating exchange of plans between 

task force comdrs x No dummy messages necessary from you 

as legitimate traffic to task forces will probably suffice 

However recommend including me as addressee stiatable number x 

I will continue intelligence messa[es to task force comdrs 

your fleet volume and freqs depending upon actual information x On certain messages will increase the precedence to 

simulate info that a striking force in this vicinity would 

require for attack x Dummy traffic to use one or more 

call signs Para 16 call sigh book.xx Believe above plan might accomplish desired purpose with very little 

addition traffic on radio circuits x 

S28 
WIAY GCT ----

25 0045 COMGEN SAMOAN GROUP TO CINCPAC 

urdis 232117 x Present strength and armament 2nd Defense 

Battalion reinforced pursuiant urgent recommendations 

ComGen Strawstack in which item concur x Increasing 

importance Stack port base and airfield make reduction 

in strength not warranted x mission Strawboard indicates 

demand great strength anti-aircraft defense x 1v1ore weapons 

and weapons of greater effectivene~s required procurement 

90mm batteries 20mm or 40mm guns urgently recommended x 

No part of addi~ional 10 officers 225 men required to 

increase defense battalion Strawboard to Table D-155A 

can be taken from any source within this area unless 

assurance most expeditious replacement x Suggestion in 

Marcor.ps 212142 therefore not feasible x Question labor 

troops not urgent at this time x 

25 1240 COMINCH TO COMSOPAC 

This dispatch for Admiral Ghormley x Recommendations your 

240620 with respect to New Zealand troops remaining Fiji 

not repeat not in line with expressed views of United 

States Chiefs of Staff who would have to find and transport another U.S. division to New Zealand to keep their 

commitments. 

529 
--

MAY GCT 

25 0215 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

HAVE GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION TO EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESHIPS IN PRESENT SITUATION X YOUR 241540 X S01vffi LIGHT 

FORCES AND SARATOGA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AS SCREEN B«JAM CONVINCED THAT LATTER'S STRIKING POWER IS }ffiCESSARY \VITH O'l1

HER CARRIERS AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO 

PROTECTION OF BE'S X SARATOGA WILL BE MOVED OUT AS SOON 

AS POSSIBLE X BATTLESHIPS WILL .BE HELD IN RESERVE ON \~ST COAST UNTIL OBJECTIVES FOR THEIR STRIKING POVffiR 

ARE MORE DEFINITE X MY 230051 APRIL X WHEN EMPLOYED 

WILL ENDF~ VOH TO FORM SUPPORTING CARRIER'S AIR GROUP 

CIIIEFLY OF VF X SUFFICIENT THIS TYPE AIRCRAFT NO'r NOW 

AVAILABLE TO ME 

530 
May GG~ 

25 2031 , 

26 0045 

26 0140 

26 0550 

CG SAMOA TO CINCPAC 

Defense force Strawhat and man established ashore all unloading completed 22 May. 

CINCPAC' TO MARCORP HDQ INPO COMINCH 

Urdis 212142 and CG Samoa 250045 x Cincpac has always felt that AA protection contemplated Strawhat and Strawboard was inadequate but compelled general shortage of armament and personnel. Overall situation will 

not be improved by strengthening Board at expense of Stack. Recommend AA armament Board be increased as 

soon as available equipment permits to strength in 

CG Samoa 200125 and then similar increase be made hat. 

CG SAMOAN TO CINCPAC 

VM0-151 has reported and is established and operating on field at Strawstack in part of Marine airgroup 13. 

COMAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC 

16 Marine fighters will occupy roses by Friday 29 May. ~emaining three delayed by leaking fuel tanks. Two weeks after delivery of 6000 feet length 150 feet width marston mat landing strip will be ready for heavy bombers. Equal amount of matting required for taxi lanes to dispersal points. Request rush delivery of marston mat which has been ordered by Sverdrup. 

531 
~ L 6 It .w 1£' 

r.1.AY GCT 

26 1305 

26 2005 

27 1245 

28 0308 

From COUINCH TO CINCPAC 

Consider your 0331Z/26 to ComFarEast Fleet and your 260345 to other may be cause for trouble with 

sources of information. 

FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Does comment contained urdis 261305 apply to info 

contained in dispatches mentioned or relative general character info disseminated in compliance your 122310 

of January amended by your 141825of March. If comment 

applies to second category above suggest Cincpac issue 

bulletins to activities Pacific Theatre including SouthWestPac, Cominch issuing to others for better 

control and security. 

FROM COMINCH TO _COMSOWESTPACFOR, INiilO CINCPAC 

Review of .your 260746 and similar earlier despatches confirms impression that ships spend more tine in 

AEtralian ports than at sea. Para. 

Vfuatever may be restrictions imposed by Australia you should see to it that our ovm ships seize every opportunity even make opportunities to engage the 

enemy. 

2ROM COUSOWESTPAC TO COMINCH, CINCPAC. 

No opportunity conduct aegresive operations against 

enerry has been nor will be missed. Urdis 271245, Australians authorized impose no restrictions 

operations which arc fully under control. Present 

unkeep period authorized to make necessary repairs incident 90 days continual operations, to install 

radars, 20 mm guns and other vital military equipment. 

53 2 
From: CINCPAC Originator 16 

To : (Action) ~~ t~S ··,J I D,, y 

A1ot4c...- Release ~1 

Show to 11 ~5 -·-I 

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To (Info) Classification Precedence : 

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531 

SEMT 
J' ."'f. ' I ' ,., ,. 'f I t I' ~ ~ ,, ~ 

U. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SER. E 

CLASSIFIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET INCOMING 

itCitCT A IDAC 281C)21 / 3958 QR ~._~E N I 

HEA'I / Ro~;,l~ARD~ .. Er·~ T GROUPS '3Y 7H[ 2t 1D A I R FO~-:CE td·.;:r, D I S P ATC~Eij TO 

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DATE 29 MAy 42 CRYPTO-GROUP UNKN QVJN CBO 8 

ORIGINATOR ACTION INFORMATION 

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War Plans 
u. 

CLASSIFIED 

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SER~- E 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET INCOMING 

----------------------------------------------------------------------, 

DATE 

l\lDf\.~ ROUTINE 

P L /~ N T 0 P A T R 0 l.. 2 4 ;'1 /\ Y / r; F 0 L :___ 0 W S X f\ L I N E S E 1\ R C H U 8 I N G 6 P L AN E S 

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THIS TO BE ltiCREASED AS PLANE ! VAJL AB lL ITY INCREASES AND 

.~.Dl) IT I ON!\L I NFOR~.1f\.T f ON RECEIVED 

AIDAC AfDAC 

CRYPTO-GROUP CBO / 4 .1.. P;f ,. ... t . J ) ~ 

ORIGINATOR ACTION INFORMATION 

NAS 1lD WA Y C I ~JCP .AC CO H 14 

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OPERATIONS 

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COMl\fANDER-IN -CHIEF 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET INCOMING 

SECHE I AIDAC 291311 AIDAC PRIORITY 

F0 0M GHOR~LEY X NZRB INFORMS ME AS FOLLOWS COMMANDING OFFICER OF 

JAPA~JESE tET/\CIP..~ENTS HAS BEEt~ ORIJERED TO TAKE SPEC! P.L L,~NDI NG P/\RTY 

TO CAPTURE MIDWAY ISLA ND X PARTY IS TO ARRIVE 1900 JUNE 6TH X COMMENT 

X EXPEDIT ION STARTED FROM SAIPAN X COMPOSITION OF ESCORT FORCES UNKNOWN~BUT FOLLOWING UNITS COULJ BE AVAILABLE 488 12CAS 4CV 3 SEAPLANE CARR IERS 2CL AND LARGE NUMBER DESTROYERS X OPNAV INFORMED XX 

A~OVE COMES FROM SECRET SOURCES. 

NOTE: THIS WAS BROADCAST. ON THE ~PM FOX SCHEDULE./CWO 

DATE 

I > 1 

ORIGINATOR 

GHORMLEY 

291311 

CRYPTO-GROUP 

ACTION 

CBO 

INFORMATION 

COMSWP ACFOR 

COMAIRSOUPACFOR 

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536 
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u. NAVAL COMMUNICATION. SER'~- E ·. . ~ .. 

CLASSIFIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF INCOMING . U. S. PACIFIC FLE~T 

AI DAC 240845 ROUT!rJE 

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AI DAC A IDAC A I·DAC 

DATE 24 MAY 42 CRYPTO-GROUP 1 ') 5 S CBO B 

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ORIGINATOR ACTION INFORMATION 

I 

NAS ~.11 BWAY COMPA TWING 2 C I iJCP AG I 24~~845 537 

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.\dm It 01 0~ 05 ll'i PLANS 20 22 25 17 80 50 75 to 85 16 

I K X ( ' X ·~ I/ I \ 

Admiral 

) 
May 21 

Cominch 211700 fAidac) prospectively gives Alaska 

state of fleet opposed invasion until and if invasion in 

force of Kodiak or continental Alaska becomes imninent. Army 

and Navy air to be under General Butler.'( Co111_rnand relationship 

between remainder Army Alaska force and Task Force 8 to be 

by mutual cooperatlon. Op-Plan 28-42 will be changed accordingly. y. C.C."".l~ v.,.,J.-t' er~e. 

Cominch 211930 (Aidac) gives new estimate for attack 

on Midway and the Aleutians. Th:ts agrees generally with our 

dope previously written up (estimate of May 21). 

ComNorWesSeaFrontier 212209 and ComAlaska Sector 

210200 deal with current defense measures. 

C.T.G. 12.2 220311 gives the situation on reinforcements for Suva area. 

C.G. HawDept 220716 ives the VB setup for Poppy. 

The NEOSHO search is officially over. The story is 

told in ComSWPac 220335. 

Canton reports that a fighter approached the island. 

If true it must have come from a ship. The TANGIER VPs 

spotted and attacked a submarine in Lat. 14-04 s, 162-30 E. 

Cominch wants the Army to learn to drop torpedoes 

from B-26s. The Navy has something to learn on that. 

Ghormley 220300 and Straw 210456 deal with the occupation of Strawboard. The French still have not acted. 

CoMAirSoPac has looked over his new command and says 

what he v1ants to Make it t:!..ck in his 210900. 

The enemy situation is shown in the attached esti111ate 

so is our o't.vn. - v 

v 

538 
SFGailT 

Cincpac 222041 g ives plan for occupation of Wallis on 

May 27th. However, Admiral Ghormley's 222230 says that no 

rendezvous should be kept. In the meantime the CHEVREUIL 

1eft Noumea for Wallis today to destroy the radio station. 

That act will be considered Free French occupation and a 

signal for our marines to land. 

The Japs are using our careless communications in 

Southwest Pacific to their advantag e (Cincpac 222115). 

Cincpac 230333. approves the occupation of Espiritu Santo 

with reservations. 

Marine Headquarter's 212142 approves increasing garrison 

of Strawboard. 

Hollandia was occupied by the enemy May 6th. There is 

very little activity in Southwest Pacific now. 

Enemy plans for Hawaiian and Aleutian attacks are 

completed, and, unless we are badly .informed should take 

place about June 1st. 

Hear Admiral Theobald (CTF8) left for Kodiak to confer 

with the Army and Navy there on the operations of his force. 

He arrives there May 27th. The NASHVILLE was diverted from 

her fishing expedition to join Task Force 8. 

.53 9 
May 23. 

The CG at Straw {240330) talks about reinforcement 

theT·e. 

Admiral Ghormley is going to Australia for a few 

days. In his 240620 he recommends that the New Zealand troops remain at Fantan in addition to the 37th Army Division which 

is earmarked for th~t place. 

The Tangier 232311 gives the plan of the Free French 

CHEVREUIL. It is what Cincpac recomnended two days ago. 

(-1119-C ) rv1arines 211805 gives views on defense duty marine 1 

air vs training. 

The British High Commissioner for Pacific Islands 

strenuously objects to our Army taking over British resident 

radios at Canton and Christmas. This set-up is under consideration along with the general communication problem in the 

SoPac Islands. 

YP-277 was blo~m up by one of our mines at French 

Firgate Shoal. Two survivors were picked up by a DD there. 

The following are to be added to PacFleet {See Aidac); 

1 BB, 1 CV, 1 CL, 4 DD. 

ComAlaska Sector {Aidac attached) recommends that 

not less than 54 torpedo planes or dive bombers supported by equaJ;humber of pursuit be made available Alaska in addition to 

present force. He also urges the Army in Alaska to move maximum possible bonbers and pursuit from Kodiak and Anchorage westward. This seems a very good idea. 

The plane search from Midway to NW to 600 miles will 

start tomorrow. At that station an error in placing demolition 

charges destroyed considerable avgas. Cincpac will send replaceMent gasoline there immediately, in drums. 

The enemy is indicated leaving SAIPAN on the 26th 

for Midv1ay. Thus, the attack can hardly take place in Hawaii 

before June 2nd. In the meantime the Army feels unnecessarily alerted now. They should only be alert for seaplane bombing 

now - not attack in force~ 

540 
May 24 

Preparations for the defense of Midway and the Aleutians f ~ 

continue. There were no new developments. ftL Lv r:J- -' 

The performance of our YPs is not good. They ev~dently 

need nore seagoing training. One (YP277) was blown u~by a mine f 

at French Frigate Shoals. He may not have been properly notified of this field but the fact remains that the operation was P'f' 5 

at fault someplace. Others ran out of fuel and must be towed. 

In this connection Cominch directs that all craft capable of 

operating in the open sea be assigned the Sea ' Frontier,rather than the Coastal Frontier. 

In ans·wer to a Cominch query Cincpac 250215 agaln states 

his decision not to use BBs until they can be protected. The 

SARATOGA, as centre of Task Force 11 under Rear Admiral Fitch, will be ready to leave San Diego June 5th and will be moved 

westward. 

Comairsopac gives his immediate torpedo needs in his 

232300. 

Corninch 251240 does not approve keeping New Zealand 

troops in Fiji mentioned yesterday. 

C.G. Marines 250045 discusses Straw reinforcements. 

Comsouwespac 240541 gives what looks like a very good radio decption plan. Might well be used now. 

There is good reason to believe that Orange is using 

our plane-shore radio traffic to deduce our deployment. This also has the possible result of drying up our information sources. 

54 1 
May 25 

The RICITh~OND and shore batteries opened up on 

an unidentified plane at Bleacher. Later it was found to be 

a new Zealand photog raphic plane on unauthorized flight. The 

proper identification of friendly planes in time to safely 

withhold fire is one requiring constant attention. 

C.G. Straw 252031 says unloading completed at 

Strawhat and Strawman on May 22d. Note that reinforcements 

at Straw have been requested and that Cincpac 260045 considers 

AA nt Strawhat and Strawboard as projected to be inadequate. 

Comairsopac 260550 gives further news on Roses air. 

CG Samoa 260140 does the same for Strawstack. 

Preparations for the attack continue in Cominch Aidac. 

He gives several suggestions which were complied with. There is 

nothing to indicate a change of enemy plans - including estimated 

timing. 

Task Force 16 returns to Pearl tomorrow. 

C .G. Hawaiian Department seems v.rorried about defense 

of Oahu and pointed out to Cincpac the necessity of a proper ~~ 

estimate of enemy intentions. 

542 
~ 13 0 Pl ii T 

MAY 26th. 

Cominch 261305 and CincPac 262005 reveal the 

delicacy of the dissemination of intelligence. On the 

one hand the effort is to prevent drying up information 

sources, while on the other hand tho effort is to give information to those who can use it in time. It is a 

matter of great importance. 

VPs are sea1~hing from J~a.oo. MIDWAY. As a 

frieMdly sub saw what was thought to be a searchlight 600 miles west of MIDWAY, two VPs were sent to investigate. It does not seem probable that this was enemy in strength approaching MID~AY. 

The set up for an Intelligence Center at PEARL for 

the Pacific Ocean Areas was sent to Washington today. Generally speaking our present intelligence is mainly the decoding of 40% of the messages copied, and only 60% 

of possible messages are copied. 

Cominch 271245 told the SouWestPac to get going. Too many ships iri port too LONG. 

--( 5t~'e>\wb~r\vJ) 

The French occupied WALLIS 26th local. 

It is estimated that BLEACHER " will be ready in 

all respects ~une 21st. 

Task Force 16 entered Pearl. Admiral Halsey has some 1 ~-

kind of skin trouble and was sent to the hospital. vr 

MAY 27th. 

Both TF 16 and 17 are in port. The damage to the 

YORKTOiJIIN 1 s not enough to prevent operations on the evening of the 29th. She will be drydocked to patch oil leaks. Her 

replacement planes wi.ll ·come from the SARATOGA group here. 

As these forces have been at sea for a long time, liberty 

was granted (no liberty for others from 1830/26 until 

further orders). Because of the urgent necessity to get out 

on station T.F. 16 will leave tomorrow at 1100 and T.F. 17 

about the 30th. 

There was a general discussion of the MIDWAY problem conducted by the Admiral. General Emmons and General 

Hichardson (from War Dept., and. intimate of General Itlarshall) 

were present, as so wa s :Rc'a.r AUm.iral Spruance, who will be 

54 3 
MAY 27th. (Cent 'd) 

C. T .F. 16 until Vice Admiral Halsey returns to the job from · 

the sick list. While nothing new was brought out, all 

hands expressed views and were given a very clear 

explaination of the problem by Admiral Uimitz. General Emmons 

said that he hasn't anTNhere near enough planes to defend 

Oahu. Trmt is, of course, nothing new. 

The business of being on the stratigic defensive 

is very hard on personnel and material - especially when 

means are so limited. For example, T.F. 16 went all the 

way to ROSES to assist in the ~/ ~UINEA affair, came 

rushing back to head off the MIDWAY attack, and soon will 

probably have to hurry to the CORAL SEA area again. It is 

3500 miles from PEARL to the CORAL sea. There are several 

remedies but they all involve more combatant ships of 

CV and DD type in the Pacific. 

T.F. 8 will rendezvous initially at KODIAK instead 

of COLD BAY. 

C.T.F. 1 again wants to reduce the fuel load in BE's. 

But it will be reduced by burning before he can steam from 

the West Coast to probable action areas. 

The ComAmphForce wants submarine protection. He 

probably does not know the general situation when he 

denands the APD's, 40DD's, 3 weeks training - all after 

telling him that a part of his force mustbe ready to move for 

combat in 48 hours. While no one wants to see his transports sunk by enemy subs off San Diego it is hard to believe 

that the submarine threat is as great as C.T.F. 3 believes. 

Timidness wont win this war, neither will foolish recklessness. 

ConSoWestPac 280308 explains why so many of his 

ships are 'in, port. He does not propose to be at sea. just to 

be at sea. The Jap planes in his area are only estimated at J J 

153 total and the surface forces S're : small and inactive. 

0

A submarine was attacked by a TANGIER plane in 

Lat 17 52'S, 164° 08' E. 

There i s more evidence that' own magnetic exploders 

on the torpedoes do not f unc tion 1.00;:&. In fact the tropedo picture is not the best. vw~ 

54 4 
8 N 3 P .. ~ i 

MAY 27th (Cont'd) 

It seems probable that ORANGE is now changing his 

codes. If true our Communication Intelligence will suffer 

for sometime. This may be important 9,n getting into our 

defensive positions referred to above. mf course it may turn out 

that the Japs are pulling our leg and usins deception on a 

grand scale. 

Operation Plan No.29-42, for the MIDWAY defense 

was issued. 

54 5 
JtJ£CitE£U 

MAY GCT --

28 0315 

29 0339 

29 0238 

GHORMLhY TO CINCPAC, COM-12, RIGEL 

Army contingent headed by Colonel Boyers has arrived 

LONGBOW -and is proceeding FULCRUM to establish "Port 

of Embarkation". Hope to get this coordinated with 

establishment of Naval Base that place. Boyers also 

has orders purchase ships which may be available and 

supplies etcetera. I have received no previous infernation of Army intentions in this regard which might result in Navy and Army working to rsoss purposes 

even bidding against each other for facilities and 

shipping. Strongly recommend all such questions be 

coordinated in Washington and that I be kept advised 

fully in order to effect efficient cooperation here. 

Have not yet received information other than of vague verbal nature in regard to "Joint Purchasing Commission". Ghormley originator. 

TANGIER TO CINCPAC, COMSOPAC (FROM GEN. PATCH) 

Originator is Patch. Reference letter from CinCUS 

to CinCPac FF/A-1Al6-l n~ber 00353 May 7th 1942 para- graph 2 and inclosure (B) thereof. Am informed 5 

French Naval Officers scheduled to arrive NEW ZEALAND 

are being directed to proceed promptly to NOUMEA. 

Believe D'Argenlieu intends using them to con~and job of Port Captain. This will rock boat considerably. 

Do you desire me at this time to inform D' Argenlieu 

a u.s. Naval contingent is intended to exercise this 

function. Cite G-65-5. 

/)r f ~" . ,--} ,:·f ·~ 1/, i r 

Enroute CinCPac. STRAWBOARD 1st Echelon according plan. CHEVREUIL came from harbor to rendezvous sig- nalled quote Island Free French protectorate since 

2230Z/26 May unquote led way into harbor SUMNER SWAN 

following. Escort now STACK. SUMNER reports "situation 

on smre good. Free French took over without opposition and control Government and Radio. At OlOOZ/28 Marines 

engaged in landing to be completed before dark. Survey presents no difficulties". 2nd Echelon loaded embarked 

standing by. Will proceed upon receipt report of 

reconnaissance condition a~horages beaches and unloading facilities. SAMOAN Area Gen originator. TANGIER hand to ComAirSoPac. 

545 
liiAY GCT 

30 0151 

30 0523 

FROLT CINCPAC TO COMGENHAWDEPT, COMPA'rWING 2 

My confidential serial 0334 of 31 January and my 

secret serial Oll4W of 27 May. For rapid and 

effective ·coordination of effort during current 

emergency authority of comoander naval base air 

defense shall be understood to include the ordering 

of aircraft of army bomber comnand on missions that 

incl1Jde landing at or basing on Midway. .Such aircraft 

while based on Niidway are under the command of the 

commanding offjcer that place. It is desired that 

attack on Wake by long range bombers refueling at 

Midway be undertaken as soon as possible. 

FROM CNBAD TO CINCPAC 

Your 300151 ComGen 7th air force now advises long 

range bombers have insufficient range to make attack 

on Wake from Midway. 

547 
MAY GCT ----

31 2245 From ComGenHawDept to WD CSA Wash. 

Aircraft status Reurad 3995/29: B-17s, temporarily assigned 15 permanently assigned 41. B-26s temporarily assigned 6, none permanently. Following permanently assiened 18 B-lB's, 7 A-20's, 135 P-40's, 2a P-39's 

and 28 P-36's. In combat readiness 48 B-17's, 16 B-£8's, 6 A-20's, 4 B-26's, 120 P-40's, 21 P-29's, and 27 P-36's. 

Of this nymber 15 B-17's and 4 B-26's are at Midway and additional B-17 will be dispatched there tonight. There are 5 B-17's for Australia attached here; 7 B-17's of the lst Provisional Squadron have arrived 

here. 3 B-17's of the 2nd Provisional Squa(~on are here 

and 5 are in Poppy. Other items no change. 

548 
-iniHiiT 

t 

JUNE GCT 

01 0058 

01 

01 2131 

01 2135 

SUPREM:E COT;IMANDER SOWESPAC AREA TO CINCPAC 

It is felt that the phrasing of para.6b your Directive 05920 CoM So vlfe sPa cFor may cause him to undertake direct coordination with force of SoWesPac area with ComSouWesPacFor instead of CinC of the Area. Although utilization of naval communication channels is advisable all dispatches pertaining to the co- ordination of any elements of my co~nand should be addressed 1

to CinC SouWesPac Area which is my official designation thus avoiding confusion and possible embarrassment Do Admiral Leary who is governed by orders issued this general headquarters. signed MacArthur. 

CINCPAC TO NAS MIDWAY 

My 312323 was intended to provide for return of B-17's only in n~bers considered by you necessary to relieve congestion. Remainder should be kept available and used for striking as long as situation warrants. They should remain at least until enemy is located and if possible attacks delivered. Bear in mind that situation with respect enemy plans may be changing. Will advise you any available information. Interested parties informed. 

CIHCPAC TO COMSOPAC 

Your 010907 for present all communiques will be issued by me or by higher authority. Presume SeQ'nav will contirn1e address credentials Pacific Ocean Areas correspondents to CincPac. Transmit to me names correspondents your area who desire credentials all correspondents accredited by.Secnav must further be accredited by me. 

CINCPAC TO COMSOVffiSPAC~,OR. 

For Con~ander in Chief SouWesPac Area. I understand 

your 010058 to refer to my serial 090W to Vice Admiral Ghonnleye I am taking steps to insure that it is well understood that despatches pertaining to co- ordination of your forces are addl"e s sed to you. Vfhen the task nov1 at hand is completed I shall take pleasure i n c.oncerting with you sone operations which will curb and eventually drive back our enemy. Nimitz 

548 
JUNE GCT ---

02 2319 

04 0245 

CinCPac Oper Plan 29-42 of 27May information paragraph sub baker 6 and 8: Enemy MIDWAY occupation force includes two special pioneer battalions to restore and service air field for immediate use by Orange planes. Jap carriers ·and seaplane tenders carrying land planes earmarked l\1IDWAY Base. Heavy bombers and patrol pla.nes ready to be flown in from WAKE. Ground crews munitions 

su ')plies and base equipment embarked with occupation force. Spearhead of landing force indicated as Jap Marines plus special Army unit. Principal objective indicated as Eastern Island. 

They are even bringing guns captured on WAKE to defend 

our islands. Confident you have the stuff to smear 

their plays. -rva tch for razzle dazzle. MIDWAY has 

this by cable. 

From Cincpac to Cominch 

Days developments to present time apparently summarize 

as follows: This morning there was an enemy reconnaissance of DUTGH HARBOR a1 d vicinity. Believe report of 

carrier there was erroneous and our search has not 

located northern attack force. At MIDWAY a group of 

ships probably combatant first sighted 700 miles West 

may be escort group heading toward a rendezvous with the 

occupation force vessels sighted closer in. Believe 

the striking .force has not yet been located. 9 B-17s 

are enroute to attack the supposed escort group and 6 

more are moving from here to MIDWAY. There is not 

enough yet in picture at either place to confirm or 

deny my previous estimates or to warrant ch~ge in 

:i.nitial deployments. 

03 2225 FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

If New Zea].and Air units are not to be wi thdravm from F:liji 

my 011051 recommend that there be ordered that base a US 

Army Air officer of sufficient rank to ensure that untiyt· 

of Air command is exercised by US. Failing that recommend 

that agreement be reached with the New Zealand authorities 

that US having preponderance of air forces its air commander 

should exercise unity of command regardless of relative 

rank. Your 162220 of April regarding cormnand o.f combined 

surface .forces in the southwest pacific is a precedent. 

550 
JUNE GCT 

04 0910 

04 0241 

04 0245 

Fror1 COMGENHAWDEPT r:po WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF 

Changes in status: Following airplanes arrived 3rd June: 

2 Bl7s, 3 Bl7s expected tonicht and 3 LB30s assigned, and 4 B26s of the 69th squadron aslo expected tonight 

to be attached. 52 Bl7s, 4 B26s, 14 BlBs, 6 A20s, 79 P40s, 17 P39s, 21 P36s, 7 0-47s are in commission. Under 

erection none. (Reu!~ad 3995/29th) No combat or other 

losses. 7 Bl7s included above were dispatched to 

Ht dwa y this date. Emmons. 

FROM CINCPAC TO C014, INFO COMSERFORPAC, COMGENHAWDEPT, COMING H. 

Designate two patrol yachts (ex-tuna boats) best suited 

for distant service. ~men ready send them to ROSES via 

BRUSH STRAWSTACK FANTAN T\''10. Upon arrival Roses they are 

to report to Comsopacfor by despatch and to Comgen ·Roses 

for duty. Available capacity loading enroute. Remaining eir,ht vessels of this class received from West Coast 

are hereby assigned to Com 14 for duty for the present. Advise names of vessels each assignment. 

FROM CINCPAC TO COMINCH, INPO COMGEIJHAWDEPT COMHAWSEAFRON 

COMWESTSEAPRON, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, ALL rrF COMDHS, 

CO MIDWAY 

Days development to present time apparently sur1marized 

as follov1s. rrhis morning there was an enemy reconnaissance 

of Dutch Harbor and vicinity. Believe report of carrier 

there was erroneous and our search has not located 

northen attack force. At Midway a group of ships probably combatant first sighted 700 miles ~.J est may be escort 

group heading toward a rendezvous with the occupation force vessels sighted closer in. Believe the striking force has not yet been located. 9 Bl7s are enroute to 

attack the supposed escort group and 6 more are moving from here to I\lidway. There is not enough yet in picture 

at either place to confirm or deny my previous estimates 

or to warrant chance in initial deplo~nents. 

551 
sil L Oft£± 

05 1225 From Cincpac to Cominch and others concerned. 

June 4 summary to 0600 GCT 5th. Para~ MIDWAY 

attack. The 2 main forces approaching MIDWAY were. 

First. Bearine 260 Distant about 500 miles at dawn 

composed of 2 or 3 BBs cruisers possibly a carrier 

and au~liaries totalling 20 to 23 ships plus aDD 

screen. One or two BB and two transports of this 

force damaged yesterday. Second. Bearing 320 distant 

about 200 miles at dawn composed of about 4 CV 2 BB 

4 CA 6 DD. MIDWAY and carrier task forces concentrated 

all attacks on this second force. Results 3 CV burning 

1 CV hit by 3 submarine torpedoes comma 1 or 2 BB and 

other ships damaged. In morning air raids MIDWAY suffered very heavy air losses but no serious damage to 

station. In afternoon Task Forces 16 and 17 had heavy 

air losses and the YORKTOWN received at least 3 bomb 

hits and is stopped 150 miles north of MIDWAY. Para. 

Reports are incomplete at present but r\elieve enemy will 

if he can muster sufr'icient air continue duel with our 

2 remaining carriers in order to proceed with landing 

attack on MIDWAY. It is certain that he has at least 

one carrier able to operate aircraft. ~life are executing 

night attacks with appropirate types. SAf~TOGA will 

arrive PEARL early on 6th and will be despatched as soon 

as fueled. Para. In ALASKA sector. Enemy large CV 

with small CV 2 or 3 CA and DDs was maneuvering about 

250 miles southwest DUTCH HARBOR during day. Attacked 

DUTCH HARBOR at 0600 GCT. Para. Navy Commanders 

deliver to appropriate Army Commanders. 

552 
June GCT 

05 1215 From Vice Admiral Ghormley to Cincpac, VfliiTNEY, Comgen BLEACHER, Cominch. 

On April 28 Mr. Fraser the NEW ZEALAND Prime Minister 

sent the following message to the NEW ZEALAND Minister in 

WASHINGTON quote Please take up US question American 

troops assuming complete responsibility for defense of 

TONGA including relief of own artillery unit and NZ 

personnel with TONGA defense force all of which we advocate. There will be minor difficulties to be overcome with regard to defense force which consists local 

troops with Cadre NZ officers and NCOS and has British 

weapons. Complete relief on this base will therefore 

take time unquote. NEW ZEALAND military command has 

received no re~ly to this cable and is desirous of having the present unsatisfactory conditions from an administrative ~oint of view especially for maintenance 

and sunply clearly defined. See the Commander in Chief 

US Fleet despatch 011825 of May 194.2. The Commanding General at BLEACHER by copy is requested submit recommendations to Cincpac with copy to me. WHITNEY hand 

this message to Comgen BLEACHER. Action Cincpac From 

VAdm Ghormley. 

06 0530 From Ghormley to Cincpac Info WHITNEY 

WHITNEY pass to Comgen BLEACHER for Info. Relative 

my 051215 following recommendations received from IOC 

NZ military forces 

"(1) NZ personnel except those with TONGA defense force 

be withdrawn (2) 2 four inch guns with ammunition and 

stores remain manned by US (3) 2 18 pound guns ammunition stores withdrawn to NZ (Your) TONGA defense force 

be equipped with US weapons and supplied and commanded 

by US Commander, present weapons shipped to FIJI for 

Jrd Battalion FIJI defense force" 

553 
June 

06 

06 

GCT 

0831 

0915 

From Cincpac to Cominch, Opnav, and others concerned. 

June 5 summary to o6oo GCT 6th. MIDWAY attack. No 

Air Raid on MIDWAY since yesterday morning. Enemy attack forces approached during night and sub fired 

light bombardment but by daylight all forces sighted 

were heading Westward. Northwestern Force 2 BE -probably 

damaged two CV showing damage 3 CA 5 to 10 DD making slow speed. MIDWAY striking groups bombing these CV 

today and tomorrow and Task Force Sixteen pursuing. 

Western Force 3 CA two damaged 2 CL 6 AP. MIDWAY 

aircraft further damaged 1 CA this force. Para. Sinking two carriers yesterday verified one having received 

three torpedo hits from NAUTILUS. No enemy aircraft 

evident today and all his forces believed withdrawing. End of Part 1. 

From Cincpac to Cominch, Opnav, and others concerned. 

This is last part of Cincpac 060831. Pass as in Part 

1. Yesterday MIDWAY Marine fighters and bombers Army 

Bl7s and B26s and Navy PBYs and TBFs were magnificent. 

None caught on ground. Marine aircraft and B26 losses 

50 percent. PBY heavy. Bl7 none. TBF 5 out of 6. All 

took heavy toll of enemy who apparently attacked with 

4 carrier groups and some 2 engined bombers. Consider 

previous over water search operations from OAHU added 

greatly to efficiency of MIDWAY search and striking 

groups. AA fired downed 15 enemy aircraft. Para. 

ALASKA. Air raids on DUTCH HARBOR and UMNAK last night 

and today were light either as diversions or because of 

weat.her. A few of our aircraft have bombed enemy carrier and 2 torpedo hits are re~orted on enemy heavy cruiser. No occupation force sighted. Scouting by 

Navy PBYs outstanding. Navy commanders deliver to 

appropriate Army commanders. Comsowespac to C'inc Sowespac 

and ACNB. Comsopac to NZNB 

·o6 0401 Cincpac to Comsowespac Info Comserfor & Comsopac 

Have been informed a number of small Dutch tankers 

escaped from I}IDIES and are now in South West Pacific. 

Such tankers ideal for servicing outlying islands. 

Vessels capacity around 15-20,000 barrels. Draft 

15 feet or less speed 12 or better most desirable. 

Request you make preliminary inquiries as to availability such vessels and whether they can be spared. Preferable they be able handle cargoes part gas and 

part oil. Should be self sustaining for voyage at 

least 4000 miles. Inform Ghormley and me. 

554 
JUN GCT 

07 0500 

07 0757 

07 0803 

07 0829 

\. 

GHORMLEY TO CINCPAC INPO COMINCH 

It is necessary that unity of command FIJI be maintained at al~ times especially during difficult period 

of relief. lherefore recommend one that all u.s. 

organizations arriving FIJI be directed report Major 

General Mead GOC FIJI Defense Force under principle 

of unity of command. Two that Mead retain command N'l1

CB 

paragraph 25 Cominch serial 00380 is operative. Three 

that paragraph 25 be not made operative until practically all of U.S. troops have arrived in FIJI. Ghormley originator. J;lso recommend no N.Z. troops other 

than casuals be transported from FIJI in first shuttle 

trip of COOLIDGE from FIJI to AUCY.:Ll\.UD 

HQ STRAW AREA TO CINCPAC 

Gen. Price left STRAWBOARD 1300 and arrive STRAWJ~T 

1600 June 5 returned STRAWBOARD Jjne 6. Operation 

STRAWBOARD considerably aheact schedule all troops and 

combat equipment ashore. Temporary defense established 

2 AKs and barge unloading heavy gear inside lagoon. 

CIHCPAC TO CO:WINCH, ETC. 

The forces which attempted to · attack MIDWAY have retired some to the ~kstward others probably to the 

Northwest where they ho.ve entered an area of low visibility. There remained within bombing range before 

dark one group of one BB and five DD which Task Force 

16 was attacking and one group of 2 or 3 CA and 2 DD 

to the iNest being attacked by long range bombers from 

MIDWAY. Results 00' these attacks not yet reported. 

The retirement Pay be temporary. All forces must be 

alert and prepared for further enemy action. South of 

ALEUTIANS a force of 1 CV 3 CA 8 DD v1as again sighted. 

Navy commanders deliver to appropriate Army commanders. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

The results of actions with the previously reported 

enemy forces West of MID1

11fAY not yet received. Force 

sighted last night containing 2 damaged CV was not 

picked up and ao carrier aircraft wore sighted today. 

Believe good possibility 1 CV may have been abandoned 

and sunk by accompanying ships gunfire last night. 

SARATOGA group win. leave tonight for MIDWAY area to 

deliver plane reinforcements to Task Force 16 and then 

act as circumstances indicate. ~lill act against 

ALEUTIAN attack force if situation continues favorable 5.5 5 

in MIDWAY area. No news from the ALEUTIAlJS other than 

as reported to you by NAS KODIAK and CQ~,INOWESEAFRON today. 
8 

8 E 6 .H L*T 

JUN GCT ----

08 OJ 51 CINCPAC TO COlvliNCH 

No enemy surface forces sighted in the MIDWAY area today. 

Believe he ,iscontinuing his withdrawal and am chasing 

with submarine from MIDWAY area and attempting to intercept with others returning from patrol. As reported 

in his 070756 which was sent to you Spruance is proceed- ing East for fuel after which I plan to send his force 

North. Other reinforcements for Theobald. as separately 

reported. The BB reported gutted and abandoned by Commander Task Force 16 is shown by photograph to be MOGAMI 

class cruiser. A number of submarines are believed in 

the OAffiJ MIDWAY area. SARATOGA group with extra planes 

left this morninP:: to meet Spruance. Para. Besides 

reported transport last night there were 2 contacts with 

enemy aircraft renorted in the ALEUTIAN area. 

08 0931 CINCPAC to COMINCH and others concerned. 

Enemy group which Task Force 16 bombed yesterday suffered considerable damage and 1 1v10GAMI was reported gutted 

and abandoned in Lat. 28-55 North Long 173-08 East. There 

appears to have been no BB in this group. Contact with 

surface forces lo·st during hight and no aircraft sighted 

today except by submarines within distant air search of 

WAKE and 1 cruiser scout plane bearing 264 distance 545 

from MIDWAY at 1830Z. Submarines active throughout 

MIDWAY-OAHU area and believed to be concentrating in appreaches to PEARL HARBOR. Enemy contacts in ALEUTIANS 

1 transport and 2 groups of aircraft. Navy commanders 

deliver to appropriate Army commanders. 

08 0429 CINCPAC to CTF 8, 16, 17 and others concerned. 

Task forces sixteen and seventeen rendezvous in position 

86 Q,uincy 50 at 19 hours GCT 10 June. SARATOGA fly aircraft bombs and personnel to Et~ERPRISE and HORNET as 

directed by CTF16 to bring these two carriers to best 

practicable strength bearing in mind that SARATOGA will 

return to PEARL for replenishment and that ENTERPRISE 

arresting gear is not suitable for TBF planes. Radio 

silence is to be maintained in connection with plane 

transfer necessary instructions being transferred by 

plane or destroyer. Mydis 070121. SARATOGA also 

transfer to CTF 16 all copies of TF 8 orders and information concerning ALASKA recently furnished at PEARL. 

TF 16 Rear Admiral ~p ruance HORNET ENTERPRISE NORTH&~PTON 

PENSACOLA VINCENNES MINNEAPOLIS NEW ORLEANS ATLANTA BALCH 

ELJ_,ET CONYNGHAM PHEI-'PS DEWEY WORDEN AYVNIN MONAGHAN KASKASKIA 

(less destroyer escorting PLATTE if listed above) proceed 

to pass through ryoint Blow Lat. 48-00 North Long 172-00 

West at 0400 GCT 13 June at which time Taskfor 16 .will SSsS 
.SECRET 

JUN GCT ---

08 0429 CINCPAC to CTF 8, 16, 17 and others concerned. (Cont'd) 

under the command of CTF 8 Rear Admiral Theobald who may join at Blow if he desires. Until assigned another task 

by CTF 8 the task of TF 16 is to seek out and destroy 

enemy force$ in the ALEUTIAN area and exploit any favorable opnortunity to damage the enemy enroute. After TF 16 

passes under command of CTF 8 the task of both forces is 

"destroy or drive out enemy forces in the ALEUTIAN-ALASKAN 

Area". TF 17 Rear Admiral Fletcher SARATOGA ASTORIA 

PORTLAND SANDIEGO MORRIS RUSSEL lVIUSTIN ANDERSON LAFFEY 

MAHAN SMITH PRESTON after comuletion of plane transfers 

return to PEARL. When TF 16 finishes fueling from CIMARRON GUADALUPE CTF 16 send them to PEARL with BLUE RALPH 

TALBOT and ·HUGHES as escort. 

4157/7 MARSHALL C.of S., USA to COMGENHAWDEPT Info CINCPAC. 

To meet immediate emergency full strength Army pursuit SQUadron or equivalent authorized to be temporarily based 

a·v MID.WAY until relieved by Navy or Marine units. 

(Reference: Cincpac's request transmitted your radio 614 

June 7) CINCPAC should be responsible for shipment, ~upply 

and return of unit when relieved. Acknowledge and advise 

of action to be taken. Cominch will be notified. · 

08 0731 COMSOUWESPAC to CINCPAC. 

1st of 3 from MacArthur. For your information I have this 

date transmitted the following telegram for consideration 

by the joint Chiefs of Staff quote enemy defeats in Coral 

Sea and in central Pacific with heavy Naval losses, par- ticularly in carriers, has brought a bout a·_ new situation 

which should be exploited at the earliest possible date 

through offensive action stop the 1st objective should be 

the NEW BRITAIN-N@N IRELAND area against which I would 

move immediately if the means were available 

08 0733 I have 3 divisions (32nd and 41st American and 7th 

Australian) which can be used in the support of a landing force but which cannot be emuloved in initial attack due 

to lack of specialized equi~ment and of specialized training. I have an excellent Naval comnonent but which must 

have integral air element for such an operation step it 

is reconimended that 1 division trained and comnletely equipped for amphibious operations and a task force 

including 2 carriers be made available to ~e at the 

earliest.date - End part 2. 

08 0735 Last and 3rd part. With such a force I could retake that 

important area, forcing the enemy back 700 miles to his 

base at TRUK with manifold strategic advantages both 

defensive and offensive with further potential exploitation 

557 
@ '-1 c It E 1 

JUN GCT --

08 0735 COMSOUWESTPAC TO CINCPAC (Continued). 

Last and 3rd part. (Cont'd). 

immediately possible. Speed is vital and it is not pos- sible for us to act quickly enough if I must build equipment and train my divisions in its use. You have informed 

me that there is on the West Coast a force of 40,000 trained 

in amphibious operations. I cannot urge too strongly that 

the time has arrived to employ these troops, or a portion of these troops, in conjunction with the forces available 

to me in the initiation of offensive operation in the 

Southwest Pacific area unquote. Enf of 3 part dispatch. 

07 2145 CINCPAC to COMPATWING #. Info to: NOWESTSEAFRON, CTF 8, COMALSEC. 

The Battle of MIDWAY has not lessened my close following of 

your splendid efforts. Your tireless persistence your 

courage and the bulldog grip you have kept on the enemy in 

snow rain and fog have aroused my admiration. You have 

kept the slant eyes from their objective so far. Hold on 

and your chance to smash them may be next. You will have 

help as soon as situation here permits. 

08 2135 CINCPAC to CTF 1, Info to: COMINCH. 

FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR DAYS OPERATE IN SQ.UARE ABOUT 300 

MILE8 EACH SIDE SOUTHEAST CORNER LATITUDE 37-30 NORTH 

LONGITUDE 142-30 vVEST "PASSING THROUGH D"F:SIGNATED POIJ\lT 

AT 0300Z/13 JUNE X NO SHIPPING Kl\JONl'J TO BE IN ASSIGNED 

AREA X ·viTHIN FOUR DAYS WILL SIGNI\.L ROUTE FOR CROSSING 

TRAFl?IC LANEP TO SOUTHWARD. 

08 2022 HDQTRS MARCORPS to CG MvffiHIBCOR, M~HFORPAC & others concerned. 

Cominch serial 00464 dated 6 June directs transfer 22nd 

Marines reinforced less advance echelon about 20 July ·to 

S.ANIOA for garrison duty in relief 7th Marines reinforced 

which will revert to lst 1IarDiv v·rhen released by ComGen 

SAMOA after limited period _of adjustment . Ships to be 

designated will be available for loading about 10 July at SAN DIEGO. Expedite oreanization and training. Personnel not procurable other sources will be taken from 

2nd Division less 2nd Marines. Approximately one hundred 

graduates current ROC will arrive about 21 June. Expedite June nominations for field promotions which may be submitted 

by despatch. Further instructions will be issued· covering assignment of about 40 excess officers of appropriate rank 

new in S.PJv10A to 22nd Marines on its arrival. Initial allowances equipment and supplies 90 days and ten units of fire. 

5.58 
JUN GCT ---

08 2022 to CG fu11JTI?H I BCO R ATV1PHFORPAC & others concerned. 

Make available equipment on hand less that in hands 2nd 

Marines and ,less one half initial allowances for remaining organized units also ammunition less 2nd Marine requirements and 2 units of fire for remaining organized units. 

Submit requisitions for remaining deficiencies in 22nd 

Marines to normal sources of supply except weapons ammunition fuel and lubricants which should be submitted 

this headquarters. Pass to A F P F Com 11 and MarBase. 

Cominch Vice Chief Naval Operations BuNied BuOrd informed. 

08 1935 COMINCH to CINCPAC CINCI.JANT COMSOVVESPACFOR. COMSOPAC. 

Survey in progress as to numbers and disposition of salvage and other seagoing tugs with view to making available to 

Task Forces one or more such craft whenever action is 

imnending. Para. Adopt and apply this principle. 

08 2050 COMINCH to CINCPAC. 

Contents of your 311221 May were 1JUblished almost verbatim 

in several newspapers yesterday. Article originated with corres~ondent Stanley Jo~nson embarked in BARNETT until 

June 2nd. While your despatch was addressed Task Force 

Commanders it was sent in channel available to nearly all 

ships which emphasizes need of care in using channels para Cominch investigating on BARNETT and at San Diego. 

08 1930 COMINCH to CINCPAC. 

Highest quarters would reJOlce in salvage of enemy combatant vessel for morale and publicity purposes. 

08 2113 CINCPAC to All TF COMDRS Info to COMINCH. 

There are good indications that Ora;nge submarines have 

been ordered to search for and attack our forces returning 

to PEARL. RDF plots show Jap submarines on bearings and 

distances from MIDWAY. One. One hundred and thirty five 

degrees one· hundred and five miles. One. One hundred and 

twenty four degrees three hundred fifty miles. One. 

Ei ghty one de grees two hundred ninety five miles. Presence 

of more submarines between MIDWAY and OAffiJ suspected. 

559 
JUNE GCT ----

08 2133 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Weather permitting four long range B-24's were 

scheduled to depart Midway last night to bomb 

Wake. Confirmation this mission not yet received. 
JUN GCT 

08 2243 CINCPAC to GOC FIJI, Info COMINCH, ADM. GHOffi~LEY, 

NAV. OBSERVER SUVA, FOR GEN. BEIGHTLER, COMGENHAWDEPT. 

My 160327 established you in supreme command all allied 

forces FIJI .under principle unity of command. Assume 

that principle now in effect for all land sea and air 

forces assigned defense FIJI. In order unity of command 

be maintained during period of relief NZ forces desire 

you retain supreme command until Cincpac directs CG US 

Army Force FIJI to assume supreme command accordance 

Cominch 00380. Desire NZ troops leaving FIJI in first 

shuttle trip COOLIDGE be held minimum preferably casuals. 

Nav Observer SUVA pass to Commanding Officer or CG US 

Army forces on arrival. 

08 2029 CINCPAC to COMINCH. 

Your 071954 and 071530. Though my 070829 contemplated employment of SARATOGA in Northern Area decision arrived at 

in my 080429 was made because hazard to one carrier would 

be unduly high and because SARATOGA air group requires more 

training. Continued strenuous emnloyment for the two 

carriers involved must therefore be accepted.- SARATOGA 

will furnish planes as needed to Task Force 16 and will 

then return to PEARL to re~lenish and ferry aircraft to 

MIDWAY and then comnlete training. Fitch will command 

SARATOGA Task Force. Fletcher will be given a rest and 

probably take WASP group. Through oversight believe move 

of battleships out of SANFRANCISCO on 5th was not reported 

to you. They are 1000 miles West of that place today and 

will be at sea available for eventualities until their 

return via SANPEDO on 19th. LONG ISLAND is with them in 

accordance my 020157. On her return she will be used for 

training carrier groups unless and until required to assist 

KITTYHAWK and H.AlVINfONDSPORT in aircraft transport. Additional 

AVG's assigned will undoubtedly be very useful but increasing employment of BB's in advanced areas depends upon increased strength in regular carriers fi ghting aircraft 

and destroyers. 

09 1135 CINCPAC to COMINCH. 

Three planes my 082133 returned MIDWAY. Had arrived 

vicinity of target too late to attack before daylight made security impossi ble. Fourth B-24 with General Tinker 

aboard feared lost about 40 minutes after takeoff. Special 

searches today and tomorrow. 

561 
JUN GCT 

10 0545 

- 1/l/ t tt/'1 

COMSOPAC TO OPNAV COMINCH INFO CINCPAC 

Joint purchasing board now set up for immediate 

operation at Longbow which considered best location. 

Ghormley sends this. Pending arrival navy and 

marine members board will function under Westbrook 

army member in collaboration with Navy Supply Officer. 

Cominch pass to ComGen SOS for info. 

582 
~iiOFFm.. 

JUN GCT ---

11 0336 

11 0401 

11 0501 

11 0537 

11 0921 

COMSUBSOWESPAC TO Vb .. RIOUS 

Submarine TAUTOG arrived tqday. Outstandingly successful 

results .follow: One submarine off JOHNSTON Island 

April 26. 10,000 ton AK May 16. Item-one class and 

Item -28 submarines May 17. These 3 south of THUK. 

10,000 ton AK 1~y 22 at Lat. 06 North Long. 159-28 East. 

5,000 ton AK May 25 at Lat. 0407 North Long. 143-32 East. 

Total 3 subs 3 Marus. 

COI'lPATWING 4 TO CINCPAC CONriNCH CTF 8, 16 

Catalina reports unidentified ships in KISKA Harbor 

110320 GCT. All here told. 

CINCPAC TO GHOHiviLEY 

Urdis 100515. 37th Army Division not repeat not assigned 

1-JEW ZEALAND for land defense. Until departure for FIJI 

should be in same status as Marines in para. IX LONEWOLF 

PLAN. In emergency or event attack 37th Division in 

NEW ZEALAND may be used as Task Force under GOG NZ 

military forces under principle unity of CO@nand. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

VADM Ghormley dispatch zero five one two one five. George Option Cast Nb"VV 6EALAND Military Forces and Ghormley recommend: (1) New Zealand personnel except those with 

TONGA defense force be withdrawn (2) Two four inch guns with ammunition and stores remain manned by US ( 3) 'rwo 

eighteen pound guns ammunition stores withdrawn to New 

Zealand (4) TONGA Defense F,orce be equipped with Unit Sail 

weapons and supplied and commanded by Unit Sail commander, 

present weapons shipped to FIJI for third battalion FIJI 

Defense l''orce. ComGen BLEACHER desires retain status quo. View Urdis zero one one eight two eight and logistics involved I concur and approve Ghormley's recormnenuations. 

Hequest steps be taken Army equip BLEACHEH. native defense 

force vvi th Unit Sail weapons and ammunition 3.nd provide future sup ply that force. rrvHITNEY pass to ComGen BLEACHER 

for info CinCPac originator. 

NAS KODIAK TO CTF-8 INFO Vh.RIOUS 

Sumr1ary from ComAlsec and CPW-4 fro l'l1 last report to 

110800 GCT nil enemy contacts in SEWARD area. Four enemy ships found KISKA by Catalina 110320. Army bombers 

ordered out. Ca talina will keep under observation bomb 

at day liaht and check ATTU first chance. Reinforcements 

arrived fo11r to Sard Point four to Dutch Harbor one damaged l anding . 1

1

o tal eff ective Catalina s 20. Under repair 1CQ:-1) Searching max sectors south tonight first priority KISK.AJ. 3 · '-

Local i1.rmy Jrnow s a 11 • 
a B o n z r 

MAY 28th . 

The subject of cooordination of activities, Army- Navy at AUCKLAND comes up in Vice Admial Ghormley's 280315. No great difficulty is expected. 

The 8inC has cor~ended TF 11, 16, 17 for recent 

excellent work. 

C.G. Samoa 290238 reports STHAWBOARD occupied by U.S. Forces. This ends a long wait and increases confidence in Free French. On the other hand Free French are 

trying to send in own people to run the Port of NOUMEA 

(Tangier 290339) (Espirito Santos has been occupied by our forces) 

The underwater damage of the YORKTO\"ffi is slight and she will leave with TF 17 at 0700~V/30. This gives 

us a much better chance to be successful at MIDWAY the first 

week in June. Also, the Army will have a total .of around 

60 B-17 at Oahu-Midway in the next few days. 

CTF 1 282150 - very dangerous and wholly unnecessary. 

The TANGIER search may now be more extensive than 

necessary and is hard ·on personnel and material. But 

Admiral McCain is the man on the spot to take corrective 

action. 

A 11 front" is approaching MIDWAY from the west 

thus making the weather unfavorable for Blue. 

Conversations between the CincPac and TF Commanders. ~ 

on MIDWAY plans continue. No chanee in the plan has been v ~ ,.. accepted. 

MAY 29th 

A submarine was reported 450 miles 282° from Midway and another 300 miles 220° from the same place. RDF gives and enemy submarine approximate 660 miles North of OAHU. 

As expected the eneny is beginning to try to find out if 

the coast is clear. 

The SUMNER will soon make additional STRAn surveys. ~ At STRAWROARD the unloading is as difficult as it was 

expected to be, and there is good evidence that the loading of the ships for the SO PAC base reinforcements was poor - adding to difficulties. 

The GRENADIER got 1 AP and 1 AF on recent Jap patrol. 

564 
/ \ 

MAY 29th (cont 'd) 

Decendants of Japanese in U. s. Army at HAWAII are 

being shipped to the Mainland for duty. There still 

remains 14,000 plus employed by Army or defense on vital 

work in the islands. 

Admiral Fletcher leaves tomorrow and the SARATOGA arriv~ here is to be expedited. The day is primarily 

concerned with perfecting the MIDWAY defenses. 

In another AIDAC Cominch gives his ideas of enemy 

forces and plans. 

KISKA and ATTU might be enemy Aleutian objective, 

the former for a seaplane operating base. 

MAY 30 

In his despatch (300151) Cincpac desired an attack 

on WAKE by Army B-17s. This was proposed and adopted as 

a measure to neutralize ORANGE air now at that place which 

could be flown to Midway after occupation and to knock it 

out as a staging point. Our air people think also that 

there is 'a real threat that lone range aircraft from WAKE 

might make a preliminary attack on MIDWAY. This may be 

true but it is doubted by the Plans Section. It was understood that this would not affect the readiness of the striking air on June 1. It was stated that the Army was all for 

this and that they only wanted permission to go. Their 

answer (300523) indicates a change of heart when the proposition was agreed to by Admiral Nimitz , because of the supposed 

threat from WAKE. 

Our patrol planes from Midway ran into two Jap 

twin-motored VB from WAKE. One of our men was slightly 

wounded. As own search was to 700 miles it was realized 

that there might be contact with the WAKE search. This 

contact was not recorded by C.I. 

Cincpac wants to know if the NE\V ZEALAND air will 

also be taken from FANTAN when their troops go. It might 

be easier to have USA air after our troops arrive there. 

Cominch is showing interest in the possibilities of 

a seaplane ramp at ROSES. At present vve have only the 

TANGIER planes nearby. 1

1 

/ 

565 
May 30 (Cont'd) 

The Japs are continuing aerial observation 

of tte Gilbert, Ellice Groups and of Ocean and Nauru. 

Our plans for the defense of Midway are going 

along. The ~ARATOGA will come out at 20 knots as soon 

as possible, thus making another CV task force available 

here by around June 8th. It was proposed to lay some 

metal airfield planking at Midway for VBs. But time is 

too short now although the material is in Honolulu. 

The Army is getting more VBs at Oahu. 

In~ Aidac~Admiral Theobald gives the initial 

deployment of his North Pacific Force and sets a 

rendezvous south of Kodiak for June 3d. 

The two companies of' American troops that 

occupied Espiritu Santo Island, New Hebrides, did so 

without incident on May 28th. 

The CUTTLEFISH on patrol at a possible Orange 

rendezvous (Lat.27° N, 170° E) sighted three enemy 

planes. It is hoped that she was not observed. 

SG6 
a u o n w m 

MAY 31st --- The MIDWAY area was quiet. Nothing was reported by the search from MIDWAY or JOHNSTON. Nothin8 was heard from the T~sk Forces there nor was anything expected. 

B-17s which just arrived at MIDWAY went out 700 miles west to try to sight an attack ORANGE at his supposed .rendezvous. Results negative. 

In his Aidac COMINCH is worried about T.F. 8. Apparently he thinks proper use is not beine made of shore base air. To begin with, shore based air in ALASY~ is limited, and in the ALEUTIANS almost non-existant. Furthe~ore, 

as noted befor e we cannot expect nuch from Army air against mobile targets. 

C.G. Hawaiian Department 2245/31 gives a summary of his air strength. 

In the past three days there has been an exchange of Aidacs on the employment of Haider battalions now available at STRAW, CinCpacs idea is that they could be very successful at TULAGI now, for example. : ·Gen MacArthur thinks the idea not sound as we cannot now hold the place attacked nor support communications. This, of course, is . not how the Raiders would be employed. C:bKQ. ~< ar;rees _~.,.,..~ that now· is a good time to hit such a place but says - that the raider battalion is not strong enough and proposes diverting other troops. Thus, neither seem to understand CinCpacs proposition. 

557 
!! iii 2 £ F T 

tTune 1st. 

One of our patrol planes searchine; from MIDWAY 

was attacked by a twin engine land plane. Two slightly 

wounded. 

The SAWlTOGA, SAN DIEGO, and 4 DD should arrive 

at PEARL about June 5th. 

CinCPac 012135 and General MacArttrur's 010058 

refer to cooperation between areas. 

CincPac 012217 deals with employment of VB at 

MIDWAY. It may be that we now have more there than can 

be handled. 

Submarines made an attack in SYDNh"Y lJAHBOTI but only 

sank a ferry boat. The war in the South Pacific has 

slowed dovm considerably. Our attempt to use a Raider 

battalion at TULAGI has been frowned on by General 

MacArthur. He sees a regiment intrenched there with a 

division at RABAUL. It is possible that he wont let this 

take place for personal reasons? In any event it is too 

bad as the Japs are now very weak and extended in that 

vicinity. A few weeks from now may be too late as they 

seem to plan to recommence their offensive. 

ABEIVIAMA in the GILBETITS received two bomb~ ~ 

yesterday. 

CinC Pac 012131 gives policy on communiques · 

from the Pacific Ocean Areas. He will issue any t lmt 

go out, but does not expect to issue any at the present. 

In an Aidac from Rear Admiral Theobqld he explains 

his conception of the ALEUTIAN stra tegy. CincPac, in an 

Aidac, generally concurs and expesses confidence in 

Admiral Theobqld. 

1 

There was a small flurry toward evening when a total 

blackout was ordered by Com-14 in anticipation of a 

raid. While possible, this was probably premature. Everything points to an attack on MIDWAY within the next 48 

hours. The attack on the ALEUTIANS may start the same time. 

Our del'~4¥ment is complete. ./ L/ 

v 

558 
June 2. 

There are increasing indications of impending attack 

on Aleutians and :MIDWAY. Messages were sent to forces and 

stations calling for careful and prompt contact reports. CinCPac 

022319 gives the ~robable line-up of the Orange occupation force. 

It was suggested to Task Force 16 and 17 that a position further 

to the Vlest might be advantageous. Own submarines off lv1IDWAY· 

were given definite patrol points, the plan for them remaining 

as generally indicated in Operation Plan 29-42. 

There has been excessive use of gasoline at MIDWAY. Since 

almost 400,000 gallons were accidentally destroyed last week the 

ability of CinCPac to keep enough AvGas at MIDWAY has caused 

concern. 

There may have been an enemy submarine in UNALASKA BAY 

yesterday. It is probable that there are quite a few enemy 

submarines in the Central and North Pacific Areas on scouting 

and reconnaissance. 

PBYs are again shown to be of little value when searching 

areas where there may be opposition. They are very vulnerable 

and slow. CinCPac urges a better type for this duty and suggests 

to Cominch that Army medium bombers operated by Navy would do. 

The present plan is to send the SARATOGA and escort to 

join Tasl':: Force 17 from Pearl on the 6th. The CHESTER could 

hardly make this as she could probably not leave SAN DIEGO 

before the 3rd. 

The Japs have reconnoitered SUVA. 

June 3. 

The day is 0enerally summarized in CincPac 040245. Later 

indications are that DUTCH HARBOH had some kind of an attack but 

nothing serious. The force approaching MIDli/AY has grown to 20-23 

ships screened by DDs. B-17s attack getting 3 hits and about 

3 near misses. Attack was not concentrated and probably 600 lb. 

bombs were used. As the day ends 4PBYs loaded with torpedoes are 

enroute from MIDWAY for a niP:ht attack. The CV attack on MIDWAY 

is scheduled for tomorrow at~dawn. Our RI and CI is proving 

exceptionally fine. 

Admiral Draemel goes to the Amphibious Force relieving 

Admiral Brown who goes to Com 1. Captain Delaney goes to the 

NEW ORLEANS. Rear Admiral Spruance relieves Admiral Draemel. 
June 3. (Cont'd) 

C . G. HAV'l 040910 gi ves Army air streng th today. hy u,_<, .. I •· ;r 

Cincpac 032225 recommends an air comnand at FIJI if NEW ZEALAND air stays there. A 

The 3rd echelon departs STRA'NSTACK for STRAWBOARD the 

4th. 

Cincpac 040247 Gives the disposition of the tuna boats recently made available to him. 

The avgas situation at 1\IIDiHAY is satisfactory for the next 6-7 days as they have 543000 gals. now on hand. Receipt of more depends on what happens. 

The whole course of the war in the Pacific may hinr._~ e on the developments of the next two or three days. , ~;'(,,/ 

570 
E iii 0 n 1M T 

June 4th 

CinC Pac 051225 generally records the start of 

w}mt may be the greatest sea battle since Jutland. Its 

outcome, if as unfavorable to the .Taps as seems indica ted, 

will virtually end their expansion. We lost a large 

percentage of highly trained pilots who will be difficult 

to replace. 

The remainder Task Force 1 will get lmderway from 

San Francisco and entire force take a position about 

1,000 miles west of San Francisco. This move was not 

ordered by CinC Pac. 

It will not now be announced that our forces are 

at WALLIS. 

The FUL'rON is enroute to pick up YORKTOWN survivors. 

Salvage forces are also enroute. 

rfuere seems trouble in ALASYill be tween the Army and 

Navy over employment of A~y air. .. .. 

June 5th 

As the day progressed mounting danage reports 

indicated a major defeat of the Japanese approaching 

Midway. It is summarized in Cincpac 060831 and 061915. 

Admiral Nimitz i4sued a conservative communique. 

Cincpac 060401 suggests we obtain several small 

Dutch tankers v1hich escaped from the N.h.I. 

Vice Admiral Ghormeley's 051215 and 060530 make 

recommendations regarding military forces at Tonga. 

The enemy was quiet in other areas today. 

\J.Y' 

The SARATOGA group will not arrive until tomorrovJ. The present plan is to have them join Task Force 

17. 

There is considerable to be done as a result of 

the Widway battle, but the most urgent is to rescue aviators 

and planes adrift in the wake of the battle. 

571 
June 6. 

This was a greAt day for the American Navy. It is 

summarized in Cincoac 070803, 070829. 

In his 070500 Vice Admiral Ghormley reco~mends that 

General Meade be retained in command at Fiji until U.S. Army have taken over. 

The e.G. Straw 070757 indicates that unloading at 

Strawboard is com~lete. This is a very ~ood job as unloading there was bound to be very difficult. 

The SARATOGA groun arrived and commenced fueling. They leave in the morning to rendezvous with TF-17. Developments will be waited upon before decidin~ where to send the 

group. Admiral Fitch, the Task Force Co~mander, will be here 

about the 8th in the CHESTER. As Alaska does not seem to be 

doing so well, it may be decided to send her there to help ~ 

TF-8. r 

June 7. 

In the Alaska sector the Army inadvertently fired on 

a Soviet ship. 

The day in the Central and l orthern Pacific 'reas is 

summarized in CinC~ac 080351 and 080931. The decision regarding the employment of the SARATOGA group is in CinCPac 

080429. 

The Cormnanding General STRAW describes the political 

and economic c onditions at WALLIS where he ha.s just <nmpJ eted 

a persrnal inspection. In general, the island people we lcome 

the arrival of U.S. troops and can be expected to cooperate. 

Possibly because they see a source of food and clothes which 

they have not been able to get for over 1~ years, our 1\Iarines 

are quite welcome. 

General Marshall (4157/7) authorizes·Army pursuit for 

MIDWAY as a temporary emergen cy measure. 

The following are Army planes in commission in the Hawaiian department today: B-17 61; B-26 23; B-25 1; LB-30 5; 

B-18 10; A-20 6; P-40 100; P-39 14; P-36 22; 0-47 7. 

In his 080731 (Com.SWPac) Gene ral MacArthur recommends 

an offensive now in the NEVIl BRITAin area , but needs our amphibious force that is not quite ready. He would a lso need 2 CV 

groups. 

CoMinch concurs in CinCPac 072145 . 

572 
June 7 ( C mtinued) 

Admiral Ghormely sees need of an additional mobile 

base hospital at FULCRUM. 

18 PBY and 12 B-17 are being retained at MilJWAY for 

the present. 

Admiral Nimitz has received many congratulations from 

all over the world for his. victory at MIDWAY. 

Cominch has ordered more planes for the PacFleet pool. 

Our people at Chunking seem to be fairly sure of 

indications pointing to a Jap offensive into Siberia. There 

have been CI indications of this in the past week or ~o. 

Submarines continue active off the East Coast of 

Australia. Otherwise that area is quiet. 

June 8 • 

Task Force One will operate for 4 days as shown in 

Cincpac 08 2135. The 11.mphibious Force was released from 48 

hours notice for a regiment to depart and placed on orders to 

leave after a reasonable time from notification. Normal 

liberty in Oahu ends this evening when condition 2 goes into 

effect. 

There is no news of contacts from any task force 

commanders. It seems very possible that all enemy forces 

except submarines have withdrawn from the Midway and .i1leutian 

areas. Submarines nay be tryine; to get into attack positions 

off Pearl. But because we cannot be sure that .the enemy is 

not reforming for a new attack no chances are being taken. 

On June 1st L1exico declared war on the Axis powers 

as of I.1o.y 22d. U.S .A. declared vrar on Houmania, Hungary 

and Bulgaria, as of June 5th. 

In the near future tt is expected that the Free 

French vessels in the South Pacific will operate under Vice 

hd:miral Ghormley. 

Uarine Headquarters 082022 giv(s plan for relief of 

7th Marines at Samoa by the 22nd Marines. 

As Captain ~.L. Ainsworth is ordered addi tional duty 

to command DesFlots 1 and 2 Pacific, Cominch suggests Flotilla 

co:mrr1anders be abolished. That would facilitate thjs administrative coMmand set-up. 

573 
ru"~ il ( C.c.n' t.) 

Cominch 081935 directs salvage tugs be sent along 

with +ask forces when there is tmpen•ling action. 

Cominch 08 2050. Apparentlft some leak of enemy 

dispositions for ''American campaign 1 got into the nev1spapers. 

Cominch 081930 suggests we salvage a Jap ship. The 

only one possible was the CA reported eutted and abandoned. 

However, a submarine in the area found evidence that the 

ship had sunk. 

C:i.ncpac 082113 gives a submarine warning in the 

Hawaiian Area. 

Cincpac 082243 gives the command set-up for Fiji. 

Cincpac 082029 explains the employment of the 

SARATOGA. 

Cincpac 091135. General Tinker was probably lost · 

in a flight to Wake. 

June 9. 

The area where the CA was supposed to be gutted and 

abandoned was again searched by the TROUT and search planes 

from Midway . The TROUT picked up two prisoners who had been 

floating around in the wreckage. It would have been ·fine to 

bring in such a ship to boost public morale, but wreckage 

may help. 

CinCPac congratulated all major con~anders involved 

in the Battle of Midway. 

On May 4th the GAR sallie one 6000-ton AK in the Marshalls 

and on May 17 sank a 1500-ton ship thought to be a u~lu ship 

off Truk. 

Comsopac 100545 discusses a joint purchase board at 

Longbow. 

There have been no indications of Jap landings in the 

Aleutians although the possibility existsw The enemy force 

there is unreported and may be withdrawing. If nothing is 

heard of them by toMorrow the plan is to bring TF-16 back to 

Pearl. Cominch is rather noncommittal in a message giving 

his estimate of oneny plans. He gives three courses which 

the ener1y :r:1ay adopt. The problem is to guess which. For 
8 I!l 8 H E I 

JUN GCT 

11 0929 CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

Compatwing 4 110510. TI during last few days indicates 

formation of strong screening force by enemy in Northern 

area which is believed to be based upon his estimate that 

we will react strongly to his occupation of ATTU and KISKA. 

I consider that his drive for MORESBY and/or other 

Southern bases which is also well indicated by TI and past 

DI is a greater threat ~o our interests. I therefore 

propose to return Task .b'orce 16 and the Fleet units of 

Task Force 8 to Pearl in preparation for future operations 

and will employ only submarines and shore based air 

against the enemy in the KISKA Area for the time being. 

Will return West Coast units to ComAlSec. Request your 

comment. 

11 1645 COMINCH to CINCPAC 

Agree in general with your 110929 especially as regards preparation TF 16 for future operations and for use of 

submarines and air against KISKA para two suggest part of TF 8 join up with TF 1 for operations and training approximately on line DUTCH HARBOR PEARL pending further 

developments. 

CINCPAC to CTF 8: 

11 2209 Have good reason to believe present activities of enemy in KISKA and ATTU are covered by Cardiv 3 and reenforcements from MIDWAY force which may include undamaged ships of Batdiv 3 and Crudiv 8 X Taskforce 16 is returning PEARL to prepare for future operations. Taskfor 8 

operate in vicinity of Point BLOW fueled and ready to 

seize opportunities which may develop. 

10 2340 CG BLEACHER TO CINCPAC 

Reference dispatch 051215 of June 1942 from VAdm Ghormley 

Cornr.1anding General Bleacher has assumed responsibility 

and command of all forces includin8 local defense force. 

No change in artillery matters should be made. Recommend New Zealand command retain administrative and supply responsibilities for local defense force also that 

New Zealand personnel be not repeat not relieved. No 

serious difficulties in supply and administration are 

being encountered. American occupation of this island 

may not be of long duration but local defense forces 

must be so organized that they can continue to function 

and to be supplied. from NeYl Zealand after American forces 

lli~ve left. Therefore no extra weapons available for 

local forces and but limited supplies. Signed Lockwood. 

575 
~?GP 'r' 'i 

JUN GCT 

11 0840 

12 0216 

12 0401 

4TH DEF BN TO CINCPAC 

In the absence of General Clmmberlin have assumed 

tactical command Roses urad 120059 May. Reference 

section 162 1 revised statutes has 4th Def Bn been 

detached for service with unit sail army. 

CHORMLEY TO CINCPA.Q 

Following from Comsowestpac passed on to Cincpac quote 

account institution coastal convoys east coast. To 

combat present Jap submarine menace ACNE has urgent need for all available AMS vessels. Consequently I 

propose authorize withdrawal WILCANNIA and MIDURA now 

operating from Vfui te Poppy. ACNE has by hand unquote. Ghormley originator. If Cincpac agrees to withdrawal 

rcconmend arrangement ror replacement fron other source 

earliest practicable date to fill urgent need pending installation contemplated A/S defenses. 

NAS KODIAK TO COMDR FLIGHT 11 INFO CI1JCPAC 

Patrol Wing 4 delivering as per orders at 120120 three 

Catalinas dropped bombs on Kiska Harbor enemy as follows 

on CA 3 on transport one one destroyers one on gun boat 

one. Results not yet reported. One Catalina bombed 

DD and CL westside Kiska Island course west reports damage doubtful. Catalina P-43P sunk repeat sunk Jap sub Lat 51-00 Long 177-10 at 111800 GCT sub caught on 

surface course east true speed 20. Refueled and 

rearmed Catalinas enroute to bomb the Jap CA lat 52 

long 177-05 West at 110225 GCT. Sand Point unit and 

tender moving to Atka to keep hammering. Shore based 

Nakajuna fighters operating from Attu. L0 cal Army reads this. Own losses unreported at present. Four 

new Ca.talinas received today. 

57 6 
JUN GCT 

13 1200 

12 1?45 

Continued 

Umnak field reported scouted by 4 t.Tap VO.. Atka Harbor 

scouted by twin flat at 130520. Nil carriers sighted. 

Very few CV type planes. Progression of RDF cuts in 

Herring Sea indicate force moving south. •Weather preuicted excellent along and north Aleutian chain Saturday. Conclusion Japs hit Atka Saturday. Big boats 

start bombing our bases. Possible carrier attack from 

north. Tender and planes failing back to Nicolski and 

Chernofski tonight. Gillis directed evacuate Atka 

people. Scorch earth. Patrol sectors 10 to 13 inclusive overnight. Search north for CV early daylight. 

About 40 effectives available. All precincts not 

reported. From Thursday morning to Friday evening 

Catalina shuttle express Kiska and return took all 

Gillis gas and bombs. Splendid organization of LtCom 

Norman Garton Comdg and continuous unremitting toil 

by crew made the schedule possible. Comalsec and 

local Arm.y have this from Compatwing four. 

COMNOWESEAFRON TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC 

This from General Dewitt deliver to Chief of Staff 

Army. Basis for constant request for both air and 

ground reinforcements for Alaska is conviction that 

Glenn, Mears, Randall, Morrow and Kodiak can be held 

if air and sround reinforcements repeatedly requested 

are provided and that successful defense of Dutch 

Harbor is dependent upon retention of Gleen and Randall. 

Kodiak cannot be successfully defended if posts to the 

westward fall. Protection of navy section bases Kodiak 

and Dutch Harbor essential in defense of Alaska. Comnowesseafron concurs entirely and emphatically with 

above sta tement.s. Again reqt1.est 4 bombardment squadrons 2 equipped with B24S and 2 equipped with B-1? 

airplanes 1 trained infantry regim.ent one AA regiment 

and one composite AA Batallion be made lmmedlately 

available for d~fense of Aleutian area. SendinG irom 

here as early as shipping permits one AA regiment each 

to Gleen and Randall and infantry battalion to Gleen 

together v1i th 2 batteries field artillery 75 mrn to 

Gleen and one to Randal. Buckner movine rapidly as 

possible one battalion infantry available to him to 

increas~ garrison Randall. Navy advises today Japs 

on Kiska and Attu with fleet force in addition north 

of Tanaga Island. B-17s unable to reach Kiska which 

can be reached by B24s. Bl?s can operate against 

fleet force north of Tana e a. 

577 
JIDJ GCT 

12 1720 

12 2345 

13 1200 

NAS KODIAK ~ro COMTASKPOR e3 

11

his fron Butler Com 11th Air B'orce. Following 

paraphrase fron Ft Glenn 5 B-l?s back from Kiska 

at 120955 report Jap antiaircraft btrys definitely 

landed and cruiser based, landing from cruiser continued during raid, tent city seen, 1 enemy plane 

ran when attacked, no zero fighters or seaplanes 

.seen, Eareckson counted 14 vessels in harbor and 2 

entering at full steam. One pilot believed he saw 

geometrical design of destroyers headed southeast. 

2 cruisers believed heavily hit. IJo losses no damage 

unquote. 

Com Fl 811 TO Com Fl 20 

Plan for toni8ht completion daylight attacks Batron 

43 planes nov1 Atka base Gillis Hulbert rest resume 

attacks daylight tomorrow. 5 torpedo planes Patron 

43 now enroute attack enemy heavy cruisers or carriers at dusk return base Atka. Gillis direct Dutch 

Harbor, Cold Bay Units patrols 41 and 42 return each 

individually arriving by 0500 GCT if possible. Last 

4 planes Patrol 43 now Cold Bay remain that base 

prepare attack tomorro7!. Patrol 43 maintain 1 plane 

contact with enemy Kiska forces during darkness. 

Dutch Group. Covering sectors 10 to 13 inclusive 

tonight. 

NAS KODIAK TO CTF 8 

Supplement to my 122235 new enemy contacts made since. 

1 CL 1 DD moored semisipochnoi repeat Semisopochnoi 

Island excellent forward site for ack ack protection 

to Kiska. Attacks not previously reported 122100 

Catalina 2 bombs on cruiser lat 52 north long 178° 

45' west. Cruiser plane attempted to prevent and 

beaten by PBY. Bomb results uncertain. 121845 2 

bombs from pilot Johnston 1000 feet on DD. Same from 

Mr Greene from 1500 on CL both at Kiska results not 

observ0d. Ireene chased by 4 engined PB. Also caught 

some shrapnel. 130210 Catalina 4 heavies on massed 

ships Kiska. Results not observed dicked for clouds. 

120215 Ensign Dahl torpedoed CA near Kiska, good hit. 

122343 3 Catalinas led bv LtCom Doc Jones tleiiv.e~ed 

12 500 to Jap Kiska fleei. Did not wait count results 

but straffed set afire 1 4 engine PB. At 130521 the 

bi~ party. 6 Catalinas placed 16 500 in the middle. 

At least 1 tremendous explosion. Plenty fires still 

blazing. New casulties since last report none except 

many bullet and shrapnel holes and 1 PBY5A nov,r a 

land plane bottom not water proof~ All foregoing 

reports from navis:ators no army attacks included. 

578 
JUN GCT 

130113 

13 0333 

CINCPAC TO CO 4th DEF BN 

Urdis 110840 negative. Unity of command gives you 

responsibility and authority to coordinate operations 

orGanize task forces assign missions and designate 

objectives but not to control Army administration 

and discipline nor to issue instructions beyond those 

necessary for effective coordination. 

COI/TSOPAC TO CINCPAC 

Based on )rospective advanced base activity deriving 

from WPL 46 PC and on recent increasing necessity for 

land based aircraft I believe a large scale program 

for construction of advanced bases and of numerous 

mutually supporting island airfields will be essential. 

Although shortage of shipping may retard base development I believe local planning for South Pacific construction should be vigorously prosecuted and that 

every effort should be nade to secure maximum accomplishTIBnt on current SoPac projects by coordination of 

personnel materials and eqvipment now ava.ilable on 

area or scheduled for early arrival. To assist in 

accomplishing both objectives and to plan and direct 

an increasing number of SPOONER projects to support 

operations SouPac Area request assignment at earliest 

possible date of 12 civil engineer officers additional 

to Bupers 059516. I also request 1 construction battalion for SPOONER to establish an advanced based 

headquarters including a receiving station for construction personnel and a storage depot for materials 

and equipment. RecomMendations retarding advanced 

base construction will be made after conference with 

Admirals I1cCain and Byrd. 

579 
aiil 2 lit iii T 

JUN GCT 

11 1922 

14 0145 

COI.:INCH TO CINCPAC 

EARLY CONSIDEHATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ASSIGNMENT 

SERVICE. TYPE l.IRCHAFT TO REPLACEiv1ENT CARHIER SC.(.UADRONS 

EXIS':PING AND TO BE PORMED. THIS TO PHOVIDE ':eRAINED 

REPLLCET,:TENTS FOR CARRIERS NOW IN SERVICE AND TO START 

BUILDING UP SQUADRONS FOH CARRIERS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION. IHTEl~~, IOU TO ESTABLISH AT AN EARLY DATE O:;?FICE 

OF COM?"ANDER CARRIER REPLt\.CEr~NT S·,tUADRONS PACIFIC 

:FLAG OFFICER ON WE3T COAST PROBABLY 1 LA.MEDA DUTIES 'rO 

ORGANIZE FIT OUT I ND 1'HJ;\.IN REPLACEMENT CARRIER SCiUADRONS. C OT.IMENT. 

COMPATWING 4 rro COMFLT 11 

Operations by Patwing 4 reported since My 131200. 

Catalina pilot Sorenson bombed KISKA sunk several 

4-en~ined PBs in water and completely demolished 

adjacent radio or aerological station. Pilot Jackobson then dropped 600 pounder between 3 PBs remaining 

on water and one on adjacent·beach. Hesults not observed but easy to assume. Japs clearing burning 

Southeast cape of island possibly for landing field. 

Catalina number 2 pilot Hildebrand returned this mo:r:'ning 

unable drop bombs in KISKA at 122300 driven off 3 times 

by zero fighters. Got away O.K. Last report eneMy 

force at KISKA 4 cruisers 1 transport North of Head 

4 transports 3 CL several DD South side. Catalinas 

44 to 51 inclusive Lt.Cdr. D. Jones out of ATKA for 

DUTCH via KISYill at 131525. 4 Ca talinas numbers 4 7 

15 35 ATKA to DUTCH via KISKA at 131605. Results of 

night searches Southern sectors negative. Off on 

North day searching fo3 at 231415. GILLIS·destroyed 

ATKA departed for DUTCH with school teacher and wife 

at 131516. Natives skipped ~1en first Jap plane 

sighted. RULBEHT rounded up evacuated 26 men 17 women 

18 kids. Estimate 25 left. Casualties since last · 

report 3 Catalinas abandoned destroyed AT~~ due unrepairable combat damage 12 Junea 1 Catalina crashed 

taking off KODIAK 131720 BuAero 04490 belly had uncJo r 

torpedo loaded wing. .rrorpedo dropped ran missed 3PICA 

SAN MIIIIEL exploded between docksa No damage. Personnel two previously reported killed over KISKA area 

LANSING William Hatey AMMlc no data available. KEITH 

Ellis J. Jr. seaman second class unmarried next of kin 

and beneficiaries mother and father Mr. Mrsw E.E.J. 

KEITH 112 Lihbood Sargme Houston rrexas request notify 

above and l1~is s Margare t Porter 2509 Rene vert St. Houston 

Texas; insurance Seabo~rd Life Houston 2800 Na t ional 

3ervice 2000 National Mutual Houston 500 one wounded 

(see next page) 580 
8 FJ o il n T 

JUN GCT ----

14 0145 (Continued) 

14 0457 

14 OG16 

is MOHTENSEN Minton R. ACRM next of kin wife Josephine 

1Jancy H<?HTENSEN 4077 Dwight St., San Diego request 

notify above and Mrs. Easy R. lA:ortensen 452 Garfield 

Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah. Enroute to DUTCH on GILLIS. 

Killed in take off crash Ens. Robert D. Jones, Jr., AVN 

USNR. Beneficiary wife Mrs. Hobert H. Jones 2260 Alameda 

Ave., Alameda, Calif., one son two years. Requested 

notify also mother Mrs. Roberta H. Jones 909 South Oak 

3t., Ablington, Texas Veterans Insuranc~ 10,000. Lt (jg ) 

Charles II. Holt; USN and crew of slx slightly injured 

shaken. GILLIS ETA Durrcn 2100 13 June. HULBERT at 

~liCOLSKI ~"TILLIAIVISON at GHEROFSKI. Cominch pass to 

Bureaus. 

CNBAD '11

0 CINCPAC 

There are approximately 18 B-26 airplanes in this area 

vrhich have withdrawn from availability to the Naval 

Base Air Defense in preparation for ferrying to points 

further Southwest. Commander Naval Base Air Defense is 

assisting in torpedo training of the B-26 crews. B-26 

aircraft are considered of greatly more value as torpedo 

planes than as bombers. In view of' the urgent need for 

long range torpedo planes in the Hawaiian Area it is 

recownended that representations be made for 18 B-26 

aircraft to remmn in th~s area. 

GHOHMLEY TO COJ.1 INCH 

Fully understand concur and will carry out principles 

enunciated your 171750 April with all forces assigned 

or vihich may be availab~e this area. Cominch 111530. 

To strike e:rierYly shippins it is necessary to have surface or subsurface combatant forces, which at present 

we lack, or land or s eaplane bases within practicable 

strikinG ranse of hostile concent~ations shipping lanes 

or focal po·ints. Eefer your 220523 May postponing construction airfield ESPiti.ITU 0ANTO. First echelon Nrarine 

AMphibious Force arrive LCNGBOW today. Its offensive 

power should not be reduced by assienment to defensive 

roles such as protection of advanced airfields except 

when ur£ently needed. Lesire initiate advance through 

New HEBHIDES SANTA CRUX and ELLICE Islands as soon as 

prospect of reinforcement is more favorable. 1he 

specific ans'wer to yo·ur question is no enemy ship~Jing 

in 3outh Pacific ,rea or within effective striking 

distance available forces. 

581 
JUN 14 

15 0415 NAV ATT WELLING to CINCDAC, CO~NESSEAFRON 

YOUR 140215 X PRESEJ\TT ALI.OCATION FULCRUM 3 M/SA/S WITH 

1 M/SA/A AND 1 M/S ARRIVING SHORTLY X LONGBOW 2 M/SA/S 

1 M/S X FANTAN 3 M/SA/S LYTTELTON 1 M/S REYtAINDER 

REFITTING AND ON PASSAGE FROM UNIT KING X IN VIEW 

PRESENT SUBNL~RINE THREAT IT IS FELT THOSE BASED SPOONER 

SHOULD REMAIN BUT IF 3 BASED FANTAN 1 COULD BE SENT WHITE 

POPPY IF YOU SO DESIRE WHICH WOULD IJEAVE SMALL COVER 

FOR MANY SHIPPING MOVEiv.IENTS IN FANTAN AREA 

15 1300 CCMINCIT to COM US FOR EUROPE info COMSO\illSPACFOR, CINCPAC 

COMSOPACFOR 

In addition to assignment of LEOPARD and TRIONPIIANT to 

ConSpPac request arrangement be completed with Free French 

authorities for assignment converted cruise1~ CAP DE PALMES 

and escort vessel CHEVREUIL to Commander South Pacific 

Cooperating under principle unity of comr1and. Present 

arrangements as to pay subsistance of crews and maintenance 

of vessels to continue. 

15 1300 COMINCH to CINCAPC, Info CARPAC MATERIAL OFF AT SAU DIEGO, 

COHCARPACFLT. 

Contenplate following disposition LEXIHGTOH YORKTOWN 

squadrons (A) LEXINGTON retain squadrons in commisslon 

with same designations for present detach up to 50 percent 

person~el for other duty build up with new personnel as 

replacement carrier group 11 West Coast (B) YORKTOWN 

retain squadrons in conrr.1ission utilize personnel as 

required fill up HORHET r~NTERPRISE build up with new 

personnel as replacement group 12 Hawaii. Comment. 

15 2201 CINCPAC to COUINCH info COMCARPAC (ADMIN) COMADCARTRANG GROUP 

AT SATJ DIEGO. 

Fully concur in all respects your 111922 except believe consideration sh~uld be given to better aircraft training and AV§ 

operating conditions San Diego Area. Y/ar expermence particularly recent has demonstrated necessity for trained carrier 

replacenent groups. New aircraft deliveries and new flight 

schell graduates to date have done little more than balance 

operational and battle losses of active carrier planes and 

pilots. Realize this condition has been unavoidable and is 

now improving. Iv1eanvlhile .it has been and v1ill remain essenttial to keep active carrier groups fully equipped and manned 

and to have have here in Hawalian Area for immediate 

us~ reasonable pool of planes and pilots. Plan to build 

this pool into replacement croup as soon as practicable and 

582 
SECltLfb 

JUNE '42 

15 2201 

16 0131 

(Cont(d) 

distribute other replacement groups as they are formed in accordance demands of situation. Present status active carrier 

groups is not good, General tendency operational fatigue 

due long continued intensive operations at sra and heavy 

battle attrition without relief that replacement gr6ups 

will provide when available. Will return to mainland for 

assignment to new squadrons to extent that they can now 

be spared pilots who are most exhausted particularly those 

of YOHKTOWN and ENTERPRISE groups. . 

CINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET, Info ComSouWestPacFor,ComAirSoPac, Oom~nch, ComSoPac, Com 11 12 13 14 15. 

Strikinc Forces Pacific fleet hereby reorganized as follows. 

TaskE)or 11 Rear Admiral Pitch in SARATOGA cruisers Rear 

Admiral Kinkaid in MINNEAPOLIS NEVv OHLEANS ASTORIA DESRON 

1 less FARRAGUT. TASKFOR 16 Rear Admiral Fletcher in ENTJi~HPRISE cruisers Rear Admiral Smith in LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, CHHSTgR, ATLANTA COMDESRClN 6 in BALCH BENHAM ELIET 

l.1A URY GRIDLEY MCCALL GWIN I'..fONSSEN. TASKFOR 17 Rear Admiral 

Mitscher in IIORHET cruisers Rear Admiral Good in NORTHAMPTON, 

SALT LAKB CITY, PENSACOLA, SAN DIEGO, COMDESRON 2 in 

MORRIS RUSSELL ANDgRSON MUSTIN MAliAN PRESTON SMITH. 

TASKFOR 18 Rear Admiral Noyes in WASP cruisers Rear Admiral 

Scott in QUINCY VIllCENNES SAN FRANCISCO SAN JUAN DesDiv 15 

and 23 less WOODWORTH plus PARRNHOLT. This reorganization 

effective for ships now at ~earl at 0930 GCT 16 June and for 

units now in TaskFor 18 upon arrival San Diego. Other units 

listed are to complete currently assigned tasks before 

reporting to reorganized foroes. Orders to temporary TaskFor 

11 in my 130329, 131925, 140445 and my Opord 31-42 are 

not modified by this despatch. Approved upkeeps and overhaul 

remain unchanged. Units not listed herein continue 

present assignments. 

583 
~EGI&i 

JUN GCT ---

18 0247 GINCPAC to COMINCH. 

17 0323 

My 170241 Task Forces 16 . and 17 have been nlaced on 48 

hours notice for rest reorganization and training with 

particular reference to new personnel. While these 

forces could be used in emergency this period of readjustment is very seriously needed and every day of 

training for the next 10 days and not to exceed two weeks 

will pay great dividends later. Will employ DD escort 

your 162230 to UNIMAK PASS and main body ·Task Force 8 

to NO},'JE. Pacific Ocean Areas continue quiet. 

CINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET, COMSOPAC, Info: COMINCH, 

COMAIRSOPAC, COMSWPAC, COMSEPAC. 

Following Pacific Fleet units are hereby transferred to 

South Pacific Force effective OOOOZ/19 June and will 

acknowledge this despatch to Comsopacfor at first op- portunity consistent with operational radio restrictions. 

At POPPY CURTISS McFARLAND and attached patrol planes MACKINAC. AT Bobcat TERN. At Bleacher NHIT~mY, SOLACE. 

At Straw or enroute thereto SW~~ TURKEY CAMANGA YP 240 289 

and 292. Enroute to Roses YP 239 and 346. At Fulcrum 

RIGEL. At Longbow Transdiv 8 less HEYNOOD GEORGE F 

ELLIOTT Transdiv Ten Less BARNETT LIBRA. Para. Following units now in South Pacific Area will not pass to 

command of Comsopacfor but will rejoin the Pacific Fleet 

when so ordered by Cincpac upon completion of presently assigned tasks. At Poppy TANGIER MEREDITH. At Bobcat · 

SEPULGA. At Bleacher RAINIER KANAWHA BARKER and Comindi v 2 in MOJ\1TGO:NIERY RAMSAY. At Straw 0 'BRIEN WALKE 

KINGFISHER SUMNETI. At Fantan TUCKER CUMMINGS. At 

FULCRUM SAN FRANCISCO FARRAGUT. Para. ACHILLES LEANDER 

report to Comsopac upon completion of nresent assigned 

tasks. 

584 
££61&! 

JUN GCT ----

17 2033 

18 2017 

CINCPAC TO CCMINCH 

Your 111245 May has been under continuous consideration 

which has been intensified by your 151310. All carrier 

task force commanders have studied and commented on 

problem presented. My conclusions based on experience. to date follow: Modern naval warfare will continue to 

present tactical situations favorable to night destroyer attacks which must and will be exploited by our respon- sible cor~anders at the scene of action. Advent of 

carrier borne aircraft in fast mo\ring carrier task forces 

has greatly curtailed such attack opportunities and has 

made such attacks prohibitive unless destroyers are pre- sent in numbers considerably in excess of defensive screen 

requirements. To date such escess over minimum require- ments has not been available. In addition screening plane guarding and prompt development night radar contacts requires destroyers in constant attendance carriers. 

Greater distances and faster moving forces reduce ability dest~oyers to rejoin their carriers at succeeding daylight which situation is entirely unacceptable unless reasonably 

sure of immunity from enemy submarine and air attack or 

unless destroyers in excess of minimum defensive require-· ments are available. Fuel situation for destroyers is 

usually precarious even without high speed at night. Necessity for guarding the ever present and important tankers further reduces number available. Be assured 

that the question you raise is constantly in my mind and 

also in the minds of my Task Force Commanders who can be 

counted upon to exploit favorable opportunities. The 

destruction of enemy carriers which has already taken 

place and the availability to us of more carriers and 

destroyers which is expected from the building program should give added impetus to our aggressive operations of the future. 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

ComGen HawDept secret file 6663 of 16 May request support this effort to improve air component at CHRISTMAS ISLA1TD 

and to provide aircraft at CANTON ISLAND which now has 

none. This matter is important and urgent. Earliest · 

possible favorable action is necessary. 

585 
swz a It n P 

JUN GCT 

22 0455 

23 0427 

COl.ITASKFOR 8 TO CINCPAC 

Present plan of operation includes continuance of 

patrol plane scouting operations against enemy's 

advance in ALEUTIAN-ALASKA PENINSULA Area with Army 

air striking force disposed to attack located eneny 

forces that area. Contemplate use of submarines for 

observation ATTU and KISKA and to attack important 

enemy units as opportunities offer there and in middle 

ALEUTIAN area. Vfuen submarine reinforcements arrive 

will use new type vessels in the advanced stations and 

use old type on stations closer to UMNAK-DUTCH HARBOR 

approaches. Contemplate dispatching detachment of 

4 PBYs to N01ffi to scout against enemy advance on that 

place. Will utilize Army bombardment and pursuit restricted by orders from Washington to operation in FAIRBANKS - NOI\ffi area as striking force against enemy advancing on 

latter place. ,.¥ill escort and cover movement of individual Army transports.between SEWARD and NOME and 

reenforce escort as possible for ,~ST COAST-DUTCH HARBOR 

Naval transport movement giving such surface and air 

coverage as prior obligation to Army S~NARD-NOME movement permits. Will use main body for surface coverage 

as practicable and to exploit any opportunity for 

attrition attacks on detached enemy units. 

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, info COMINCH, OPlU~V 

Your 130333 Opnav 202035. In view present uncertainty place 

of Lion installation shipment Lion material to SPOONER 

appears in advisable. Referring Cub believe shipment 

material for construction advance air fields and bases 

merits consideration but to reduce denands on shippinG and 

rehandlying such r1aterio.l should be kept to minimum required 

and placed in storage in port advance as close as reasonable 

safety now permits to sites where material may be expected 

to be used. SPOONER appears unnecessarily di~tant. Su~gest 

r:lHITE POPPY. -{e quest your c onnen t. 

585 
JillJ GCT 

23 2230 

24 0315 

C011SOUPACFOR TO CINCP.L\C 

Flrst shuttle trip PRESIDElFr COOLIOOE froM FULCRUM 

to FANTAH CoMinch serial 00380 of May 13 leaves 

FULCRUM 25 June. t'Iy 240620 and 260415 Uay Cominch 

021545 June.. I reiterate my concern over with-. 

drawal New Zealand forces from Fantan. Situation 

as presented in Cor.1airsopac 220430 indicates necessity strengthening forw~rd positions instead of 

retrograde movement at this time. In any case it 

is essential that Nevr Zealand troops remain I-ilANTAN 

until 37th U S Division thoroughly experienced. 

CINCPAC TO COMAIRSOPAC IHPO COUSOPl.C 

Have under consideration use of NOID~EA Harbor as 

rest and replenishment anchorage for carrier task 

forces. Desire you make preliminary reconnaissance 

HOUMEA Harbor and submit recor::rrnendation as to probable best area for protected anchorage. Have in 

mind utilizing SUMNER for detailed survey of recommended area. Desire also general survey facilities 

for basing ashore at POPPY at least 2 carrier aircraft groups while carriers are in port. Survey 

should cover present facilities and what in addition 

is needed for both carrier aircraft service units 

and flight crews of aircraft groups. Submit similar 

air facility survey as early as practicable for 1 

carrier aircraft ~roup each at BL~~ACHER and FAHTAN. 

587 
JUN GCT 

27 0302 

26 0105 

MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC 

v/ill collect data and for,·;ard at earliest possible date reference your 260317. In this connection I 

have just inforMed the war department that there 

are numerous signs of increased enemy activity in 

the Bismarck-Solomons area involving the development of airfields and ground installations ~1ile 

shipping activity considerably exceeds the requirements for normal supply. This may presage aggressive action but deer.1 it more probable consolidation for 

defense. In either case the situa0ion here is chaneing and I have requested the .shipment of additional 

airplanes to meet the eneny development. 

COMAIRSOUPAC to CINCPAC 

In view transfer to Xray by Army of B-17s assigned this area affected yesterday. Your 250221. 18 VP 

planes considered minimum requirement POPPY. Believe 

div:i.sion this number between FANTAN and POPPY undesirable except to cover some special dtuation. 

FANTAN requires 12 VP as soon as available. In addition have equipment present Singa~ore Squadron there 

with 6-9 Catalinas from lend lease planes understood 

currently in production. Effective POPPY 15 PBY-5S. 

1 more aground HAVAID~M1 Harbor probably requiring lengthy hull repair. 

588 
! 

JUN GCT 

27 0733 COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC (Part 1) 

27 0735 

Cincpac 242221 and 260317 available target information 

SOLOMONS 1=iiSMARK ARCHIPELAGO forward my airmail 20 

June register number 1059. 3 additional sets latest 

tareet maps plans interpretation sheets and photos being forwarded about 3 July for following localities TULGAI and vicinity FAISI BUYili NA1Vf_.ATANAI :FENI KAVIENG Rt'\.BAUL 

VUNAKANAU GASMATA LAE GREENWICH. Netatives photos TULGAI will be forwarded but target information above 

mentioned contain full interpretations. Nil activity observed recent photos KIETA KESSA NISSEL FENI. RAAF 

publications 32A and ASD 203 forwarded airmets 15 and 23 

May register numbers 0693and 0667 contain further information aerodromes and possible patrol plane operating 

area. 

COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC (Part 2) 

Estimate Japanese land based air strength 25 June 

Place Fighters Bombers VP's Observation Total ~Sea & Land T~y]~es) 

BISMARCK 

ARCHIPELAGO 24 44 11 23 102 

NEW GUI"NEA 33 Nil Nil Nil 33 SOLOMONS 0 Nil 4 4 8 

TD/rOR 12 6 Nil Nil 18 

BALI 21 Nil Nil 4 25 

AMBO INA 12 9 4 Nil 25 

CELEBES 54 45 12 18 129 

Copies Airmets plus enclosures also forwarded Comsoapc. 

588 
June 9th Cont'd 

enemy 

example, if v1e decide that the hext/move will be in the 

Southwest Pacific we cannot afford to have our striking forces 

in the Aleutians. As the matter stands at the end of the day 

it seems a good guess that the enemy Midway force is withdrawing toward the west, some to the Mandate s for fuel and repairs, 

and that the Aleutians force is unreported. There seems no 

doubt that the enemy is using radio deception to confuse ·our 

RDF. 

Midget submarines similar to the two captured at Oahu 

last December were used last week to attack Sydney. They 

probably transported there by large submarines. 

June lOth. 

NAS KODIAK 110921 gives the ALASI~ summary while 

110929 gives plans for the future. 

PATWING FOUR 110401 reports enemy activity at KISKA. 

BLEACHER needs considerable time and equipment to fix up 

the air field. 

Ci.nCPac 110537 gives his views on the TONGA Defense Force, 

and his 110501 gives status of 37th Army Division. 

Cominch has asked when Vice Admiral Ghormley would take 

connand. It is assumed that he will take over the South Pacific 

Area just as soon as his communications are established and his 

other comnand arrangements completed. 

The TAUTOG 110336 again describes his remarkable success 

at TRUK. (ComSubSoWesPac 110336) 

June 11th. 

Cominch 111645 agrees with the plan for future operations 

outlined in Cincpac 110929. CTF 8 will operate as indicated in 

Cincpac 112209. This change of employment from 110929 was made 

because of indications enemy was moving to the eastward in the 

ALEUTIANS. There has been no definite indication of a CV in that 

area for several days. TF' l6 returns to PEARL, to refit and prepare for action either North or South deoending on developements. 

TF 1 continues to operate in present advanced position as long as 

possible without a tanker, This to provide support or a retirement point for TF 8 if necessary. 

NAS KODIAK 120401 tells of bombing results at KISY~. The 

Landing there is definite, and a landing at ATTU is suspected. 

Cincpac urges that all practicable steps be taken to 

expedite the completion of CVs now buildine. 

580 
June ll (Continued) 

The NORTH CAROLI NA and WASP groups have left PANAMA 

enroute to the SAN DIEC~ - SAN PEDRO area. The NORTH CAROLINA will join TF l while the WASP becomes the CV of TF 18. 

Vice Admiral Ghormley 120216 recommends the use of the 

WILCANNIA and MIDURA. 

C.G. BLEACHER 102340 and the 4th Defense Battalion 

110840 give respective command set-ups. 

The designation "Flotillas" in Atlantic and Pacific 

destroyer organizations has been abolished. 

Mining at EFATE was completed today. 

The SILVERSIDES returning from patrol of HONSIID reports sinking 1 SS, 3 AK, 1 AO. 

Cominch again tells the Army air in the SW PAC that 

their best targets are enemy ships. Lately their reports indicate that they have preferred runways and shore installa- __ ,~ 

tions while the har~ors seem well filled with ships. ~ "· 

June 12. 

The action in the Aleutians is developing as Kis ka as 

shown by NAS Kodiak 121720, 12235 and 131200. Landing a t 

At tu is possible also . While no one has actually seen CVs in 

the area the past few days, their presence is c onsidered 

likely . Comnorwesseafront 121745 gives defense needs for 

Al aska. The messa£~es from that area sent by Compa twing 4 

have caused CinCPac to be concerned about that officers 

ability to handle the situation. But Compatwing 4 seems to 

have the complete confidence of Comalaska Sector. Our own 

submarine was bombed today, again showing how difficult it 

is to avoid t?is kind of a mistake. 

Comsopac 130333 r commends on B.n advance base construction program. 

CinCPac 130113 defines Unity of Command limitations 

for marines at Efate pendine arrival of a relief for General 

Chamberlain who was detached leaving Col. Fasset, USHC, SOP. 

The Japanes search from .7ake toward l\1 idway continues. 

That area is quiet. 

As the threat to Oahu seems very small norMal alert 

' v1as resumed. 

591 
s H o n 11 T 

June 13th 

In the Aleutians our efforts are mainly to bomb 

the Japanese at Kiska and to search for the suspected CV; 

Zero fighters were encountered at Kiska. Compatwing 4 

140145 summarizes the situation. 

· Admirals Fletcher and Spruance arrived at Pearl. 

The Central and South Pacific Areas are quiet. 

CNBAD 140457 presents the need of B-26's carry- ing torpedoes. 

Ghormley 140616 says that he will need more forces 

and positions to be able to strike at enemy shipping. 

Cominch 111922 plans a CV replacement and training 

set-up . This, under a flag officer, would train pilots and ,.....(...,_.. ... crews for CVs building also. ~ 

June 14th 

Task Force One has been directed to return to the 

West Coast. 

There were surprisingly few developments in Alaska - probably due to bad weather. The enemy continues to keep 

a large number of ships in Kiska for his landing there, but 

his carrier forces have not yet been located. Comtaskfor 8 

continues to operate his main body in the vicinity of Lat. 

48° N, 172° W, as previously directed by Cincpac. Both Army and Navy air continue to attack Jap forces at Kiska but an 

accurate account of results has not been received. The 

surface and air search for other enemy forces continues. 

Cincpac has ordered that planes on the ferry route 

make reconnaissance of HoVJland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands. 

NavAtt Wellington 150415 is a plan for redistribution 

of New Zealand patrol vess els in the South Pacific. 

As he did after the Coral Sea battle, Cominch again feels that CAs and DDs should have been used in night attacks ~ 

during the Battle of Midway. y-
JLGii£'1: 

June 14th (Cont'd) 

The Free French DD Leopard will soon be assigned 

to Comdr. South Pacific Area. 

A prisoner brought in by the TROUT from the Midway 

area confirms the belief that two cruisers of the Mogami class 

in the "western force" were sunk. 

Outside of the Aleutians, the Pacific Ocean areas 

were quiet. 

June 15th. 

In the Aleutians it appears that the weather has prevented 

much activity during the past' 24 hours. A flight of Bl7's 

which operated over Kiska was unable to bomb effectively due 

to weather. They report at least 16 vessels in the harbor. 

C6minch 151300 gives proposed use of the crews of the 

Lexington and Yorktovm. FI'OT.l that message it is inferred that 

the new CVs are ahead of the building schedule. 

J 

Cominch 1513 , r;ives his ideas on employment of Free 

French units in South Pacific. 

Notification to those concerned was made that Vice 

Admiral Ghormley will take command of the South Pacific Area 

on June 19th. At that time the Service Squadron South Pacific 

will be formed. 

The Sara toga group will transport Army P40 's to Iv1idway 

for duty. The CV task forces at Pearl are placed on 24 hours 

sai1ine; notice. CincPac 160131 gives the new conmand set up for 

the carrier task forces. 

CincPac 152201 gives views on carrier pilots and training. 

MacArthur is startin~ amphibious training. 

area is quiet. 

Otherwise his 

~i...' ...... 

59.') •., ,) 
June 16. 

Task Forces 16 and 17 are utilizing the present period 

at Pearl Harbor to rest, refit, and replenish depleted and exhausted personnel and ships. They are ready to sail on 24 hours 

notice but the rest period will be extended as long as circumstances permit. "fuen enemy moves become more clear a decision 

will be made regarding their next employment. The SARATOGA 

group, with Adniral Nimitz and Army guests embarked, spent the 

day training at sea off Pearl. The group will depart for the 

vicinity of MIDWAY tomorrow to ferry Army P-40s for duty at 

MIDWAY, and to train enroute. 

The main body of Task Force 8 continues -to operate in the 

vicinity of Lat 48 N, Long 172 W, in an effort to seize favorable 

opportunity for strong attrition tactics. The other units are 

scouting and attacking as weather permits. 

Task Force 1 is enroute San Francisco via San Pedro. No 

further moves for this force are now planned. Thus, they will 

operate from San Francisco for training while being prepared to 

cover other operations. 

The WASP - NORTH CAROLINA group arrive in the San Pedro - San Diego area the 19th. The NORTH CAROLINA will then join Task 

Force 1, and the VvASP will be the center of the new task force 

under Rear Admiral Noyes. 

Other surface units are engaged in escort. 

The submarines are starting the offensive patrol in Japanese waters again. In the next few days six boats will be on 

station. A number are at Pearl for rest, refit and replenishment. 

While the force the enemy is now employing in the ALEUTIANS 

is not definitely known, there is no good reason to believe that 

it has been substantially reinforced recently. There is the 

nrobability that the enemy is now ~orking to base shore-based air 

and seaplanes at KISKA. The weather has been so bad in that area 

recently that definite news of his activities could not be obtained. 

Cominch sees the formation of a strong enemy northern force to 

protect the Eastern flank in case of an attack on Russia, and that 

he may move to occupy the St. Lawrence I~ands and possibly Nome. 

In the Central Pacific there is definite indications that 

no moves will be made in the forseeable future against the MIDWAY ... 0Ah"1J line. 

the 

very 

There continue to be indications that a resumption of 

Moresby caMpaign is a definite possibility; but not in the 

near future. 

\_;~ 

· 

5.94 
Si0ilii1ili 

June 16 (Continued) 

An attack on Russia in the next few days has been repeatedly predicted by several sources including Cominch. 

Our activities in the South Pacific are confined to 

the multitudinous and complex uroblem of building up our bases 

and arranging for their logistic support. 

In the Southwest Pacific activity was limited to the 

exchange of minor air attacks and search operations which have 

been underway for a long time. 

June 17 

In view of the fact that Task Forces 16 and 17 are 

badly in need of rest, refit and reorganization, their notice 

was extended to 48 hours. (Cincpacl80247) 

There is no further word from Task Force 8. As the 

Army is sending three transports with reinforcements for Nome 

from Seward via Unimak Pass, Comtaskfor 8 was directed to 

escort the move to Unimak with DDs, and from there to destination with his main body. It is considered that strong escort 

in the Bering Sea is necessary. 

In anticipation of the formation of SoPac forces, Cincpac ordered certain vessels to that command in his 170323. 

There is no new enemy information or activities. 

595 
! !I 8 n !l ± 

June 18. 

Task Forces at PEARL are continuing the rest and training 

period. As the SAl1ATOGA group could save a round trip to MIDVIJAY 

by waiting for Uarine replacement dive bombers to go there, she 

is being held over until about the 2Z~d to embark these in addition to the Army VF. The WASP group at SAlJ DIEGO will also 

have a short period of training there. 

Task Force EIGHT is still silent, but the weather has 

cleared at KISKA to permit one Army bombing expedition. That 

group reports a direct hit on a transport and says that a photo 

shows no cruisers at KISKA. The whole situation in the ALEUTIANS 

remains vague. 

In the Hawaiian Sea Frontier command relations have been 

under study for several days. Cominch desires the Fleet Opposed 

Invasion plan adopted here but CinCPac will probably point out 

difficulties of applying the Fleet Opposed Invasion formula to 

the Hawaiian Area. 

CinCPac 172033 gives .views on night attacks in carrier 

duels. Lack of DDs is an insurmountable obstacle to date. 

CinCPac also suggests the possibility of the use of B-25 

(or similar) from CVs for attack and then return to a field 

ashore. 

CinCPac 182017 again urges that planes be placed on CANTON 

· ISLAl'ID for defense. 

In the South Pacific the day was devoted to administrative 

matters of building bases and providing for their logistic support. 

In the Southwest Pacific the routine aerial war continued. 

5.96 
June 19 

Tas~ Force 18 has arrived on the West Coast and will be 

ready for sea the 25th. Task Force 11 will depart for MIDWAY 

on the 22nd to deliver 25 Army VF and 18 Marine VSB and will 

return here the 29th. The other forces except Task Force 8 are 

engaged in normal activities. Task Porce 8 is operating in the 

ALEUTIANS to try to stop Jap penetration there, mainly by air 

and submarine attack on the KISKA landing. To date results have 

been wholly ineffective and the Japs are presumably strengthening 

their occupied position(s). No CV has yet been located. 

At MIDVlAY one of our PBYs and one of our B-17s on.patrol 

failed to identify each other and exchanged a few shots. No 

great damage was done and the incident is not further explained. 

The FULTON will base at MIDWAY in the near future to 

service submarines,. thus advancing their operations nearer to 

enemy waters. 

llso, operatine; from MIDWAY the BALLARD picked up 18 Japs 

in a boat who said they came from a CV sunk in the battle of r.~IDVvAY. 

Just off TATOOSH an enemy submarine sank a British merchant 

vessel. This is the second instance of definite sub activity in 

the Northeast Pacific in the past few days. 

In the South Pacific ~evelopMents were routine. One flight 

of Eudsons will be sent from NKN ZEALAND to POPPY soon and a 

squadron later. The South Pacific Amphibious Force will arrive 

in IJEW ZEALAND early in August •. The SUMNER will survey MULIFAUNA 

UPOLU as her next job. 

OCEAN ISLAND was observed today by enemy air. 

In general, the Areas were quiet. 

co - ,) .j 7 0 
June 20. 

There have been no changes in the employment of the major task forces. Task Forces 16 and 17 at PEARL refitting and resting; Task Force 11 at PEARL preparing for the trip to MIDWAY; Task Force 18 at SAN PEDRO - SAN DIEGO training; Task 

Forces 1 and 3 on VIlest Coast tralning. Thus, only Task Force 8 is active against the enemy. Rear Admiral Theobald will oper- ate that force from ashore and Rear Admiral W. W. Smith will command the Main Body. It is thus again shown that a Commander embarked afloat can only run as many ships as he is in visual 

contact with. 

Apparently ComTaskFor 8 did not comply at once with Cominch directive to place the ALASKA Air under the Army under the Fleet Opposed Invasion formula. Again it is shown (as in 

H..!\1

.VAII) that it is hard to set up a fixed rule of command that will fit all conditions, and locations. 

Consideration is being given to taking the offensive in the Southwest Pacific. Becau'""e of the Coral Sea and MIDWAY battles, the time ma:r be here now to at least retake the enemy positions in the NEVJ BRITAIN - NEW GUINEA area. It is interest- ing to note that this question is aired over the radio and in the press today - origin General :MacArthur. 

I.IIDWAY :)risoners are giving some interesting information 

on Jap Navy compositions. An accurate estimate of Coral Sea and I,~I~WAY enemy losses may soon be possible. 

The Pacific Ocean Areas continue quiet. Weather ap- parently prevents air action in the I:ISKA area. 

The movements of reinforceMents to NOME from the SEWARD 

area has been delayed. 

598 
SSE Q iR 1i T 

June 21. 

There is no change in the employment of own forces, and 

no new information of the enemy except that a submarine shelled 

a lighthouse on Vancouver Island. 

HOWLAND, BAKER, and JARVIS 'Nere reconnoitered by air 

(the latter by a landing party). No signs of the enemy were 

found. This is routine reconnaissance for planes enroute to 

and from the South Pacific. 

Cominch does not remember ordering the SALT LAKE CITY to 

the Southwest Pacific. She was ordered there by CinCPac for 

temporary duty and will join the first Task Force sent to operate in the Coral Sea Area. 

There is no news from the ALEUTIANS but Admiral Theobald 

has put ·the air there under General Butler as was ordered in 

CinCPac Operation Plan 28-42 and has sent in his general plan in 

220455. 

June 

The plans section is dra~vinr; up an operation plan for 

the early employment of the carrier task forces. Hhile ideas 

are nebulous at present because of lack of good information 

from ALASKA, the ceneral plan is to sail two CV's task forces 

to the CORAL SEA area about 3rd July. There they would be in 

a position to contend further Jap advances in the Southwest 

Pacific, and might be in a position to cover and support amphibious operations, such as the recapture of TULAGI. About August 

24th two other CV task forces would arrive in the Southwest to 

relieve, but there would be an overlap of about four days durinG 

which it may be possible to stage a major offensive. Aduiral 

Nimitz would retain strategic control of such a plan even though 

it is outside his area. 

There is nothing significant from the ALEUTIANS. There 

is a possibility that the S-27 has been lost and that the codes 

she carried are captured. This is just a guess, but is being 

checked up on. 

CinC Pac 230427 gives his vi~ws on the Lions and Cubs 

now ready to be moved. 

There is no sir;nificant information of the enemy. 

589 
JUN GCT 

10 1235 

10 0046 

10 0045 

COMINCII TO CINCPAC 

This to be handled ~Ni th the utmost secrecy.. Urge 

prompt and thorough consideration of establishing 

at French Frigate Shoal staging fuel station for 

fighter planes to Midway. Par 2 nature would be 

that of fixed carrie!") headed into prevailing north- ea~terly w1nd constructed preferably with overhang and, slant or cantilever extensions from grounded hulk or base structure supported by piling. Par 3 

hav Cora 14 engineers expedite consideration of this 

proposal which can be built chiefly of wood. 

COMINCH TO COMNAVFOREU INFO CINCP.A.C 

This messaee to be handled with the greatest secrecy. Please say to First Sea Lord in person that recent 

success against enemy in Midviay Area proports the 

renewal of the proposal that the Eastern Fleet undertake active steps against the enemy this time because 

of his reduced strength. Par 2 opportunity appears 

at hand tG coordinate activities of Eastern Fleet 

with MacArthursforces to northwest of Australia as 

against Timor or alternatively against enemy bases 

in Andaman and Uicobar Islands and the communications 

which they shield. Par 3 1st course should serve to 

divert much of remaining enemy sea forces from strong action in New Guinea area which is now his likely 

next move and thus enable us not only to deal with · 

such a thrust but to mount an operation designed to 

weaken his hold on Solomons and Bismarcks. Par 4 

such a correlated effort might well develop into 

getting pincers on him applied in the areas west and 

east of New Guinea. Par 5 Leary pass to MacArthur. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

This message to be handled with greatest secrecy. Further evidence appears to support my 071530. 

Estimate 2 northern carriers and ZUIKAKU will 

rendezvous with Combined Fleet and retreating Midway force about 10 June.. Par 2 estimate future 

enemy moves in order of probability first covering the return of crippled units Empire and of undamaged 

transports to Mandate Area closely followed by second 

assembly of available forces to move against south 

or southwest Pacific bofore our s·ea forces can be 

shifted there. Second renewed attack on Midway. Third renewed atta~k on Aleutians. Par 3 reque~t your comr1cnts as r.1ovement of oul"' carrier groups northward 

after rendezvous at 1900 June 10 now appears questj_on~ 

able. 600 
~TUlJ GCT 

10 1957 

16 0132 

16 2230 

23 1255 

I 

CINCPAC TO COMINCH. 

Handle this message with greatest secrecy. Agree in 

general with estimate enemy intentions your 100045. 

Am taking measures to investigate possibility enemy occupation Aleutian points. Holding Task Force lG 

in present area until situation is clearer. 

COJ.':IlJCII TO CINCPAC. 

This is to be handled with the utmost secrecy. There 

are a number of indications that current Japanese operations are in preparation for an attack against Russia. Included a~ong these persistence in remaining at Kiska and establishment of' strong air forces 

in Paramushira and the probable formation of a strong northern force. Occupation of Uome and the adjacent airfields also St. Lawrence Island May W~ ll be a part of this plan (2) Army reinforcements of Xlaska contenpla te reinforcement of Pome VIi th troops and automatic weapons moved in by air (3) Suggest you consider 

preparation of a divtsion of modern submarines for 

employment in the Aleutian Bering Sea Area in the 

event that a concentration of Japanese forces there 

appear to be confirmed* 

C0!1TINCH TO CINCPAC. 

irmy plans to send about 1500 troops to rome from 

Anchorage Seward Area in 2 or 3 .M.rmy transports or 

chartered vessels leaving about 21 June. Make pro- vision for escort as necessary. Comalsec pass to 

Buckner. (To be handled with utmost secrecy)* 

COMINCH TO S01,~SO.VESP!.C. INFO CilTCPAC. 

IIanQ.le this ~~~i th the greatest of secrecy. British 

can be expected to agree to cooperation of detachment eastern fleet including at least 2 carriers for 

operations directed toward s~izure and occupation of 

'l:'imor or other sui table l;lace provided detachment can 

be used in c;onjunction with land base air in northwest 

Australia including air umbrella. Para this project 

to be tined with seizure and occnpatlon of Tulagi by 

South Pacific Force which is to include U S Task Force 

containlng at least two carriers also to be employed in conjunction with land based air in north~-tQ..; .t-' 

• Aun tralia ·and in Hew Oaledonlan ancl ~ew Hebr.:_cles .. Paru. Bt•i tish have been given target date August 1st .. 

6 01 
*8.wdh£1• 

JUN GCT 

23 1415 

23 1902 

24 2303 

24 2396 

CO~.CINCII TO CIHCPAC .. 

Second Marine Regiment Amphibious Force Pacific· 

should be kept in readiness for a quick movement 

to the South Pacific. Decision on this will be 

made in the early# future. Cincpac inform ComGen 

AmphCorPac. 

COMAMPHIBCORPAC TO COMINCH IHFO CINCPAC. 

Your 231415 2nd Regiment, reenforc~d embarked in 

CRE3CENT CITY, PRESIDENT HAYES, PTIESIDENT ADAMS, 

PRESTJENT JACKSON ·and A:ti-tENA will be ready to sail 

by 1900 GCT June 24th on 24 hours notice. Captain 

Kiland in CRESCENT CITY acting DivCom.. Comgen 

Ar1phibCorPac has this info .. 

COMINCII TO CINCPliC. 

Following to be handled with utmost secrecy. 

Refer to this as Cominch 24230C part one of two. 

For the execution of offensive operations indica·ted 

in Cominch 231255 repeat 231255 the following 

arrangenents are contemplated para (1) seizure and 

initial occupation of Tulagi and adjacent islands 

to be acc.omplished by .rrask I_.,orce set up by Cinc}?ac. 

Forces to be nade available for this purpose to 

include at least 2 carriers with accompanying cruisel';S and destroyers, South Pacific Amphibious· ~orce 

consisting of first division less seventh Regiment 

plus second Regiment, 8 APS 3 AKS, 4 APS and 1 AK 

of Pacamphfor, 4 APDS in Pacific and 2 APDS now 

enroute Pacific, 2 converted lumber schooners, 2 

marine fighters and 2 marine dive bomber squadrons in· 

addition to VMO 251 now enroute South Pacific, land 

based air South Pacific area, patrol planes as designated by CinCPac, (Release of army aircraft now in 

1Iav1aii and slated for South and Southwest Pacific 

will be taken up here with .~rmy), land based air 

Austr·alia and Moresby, surface force and submarine 

task e;roups from Southwest Pacific Force.. Part 2 

and final coming. 

COr.:INCII TO CINCPAC 

Part 2 and final of Cominch 242306~ Para (2) Marine 

air squadrons to be fitted out with aircraft available to you. They will require transportation to 

South Pacific by carriers and/or seatrain, as arranged · by your. Henention WASP in San Diego area for carrier 

6 02 
Jill! GCT 

24 2306 

25 1840 

(Continued) 

qualifications prior to movement and possibly for 

transportation one squ~dron is suggested Para (3) 

Permanent occupation of seized islands in Southwest 

Pacific area will px·obably be accomplished by troops from Australia under the direction of the Commander 

Sou we s tpac a, rea. Trans porta ti on foP these forces by 

Amphibious L'orce AP'S AND AK'S may be necessary. Discussion with Army undePwav here as to whether 

additional Army troops will be sent from United Jtates, 

and as to other questions this paragraph para (4) A 

di:recti ve by the ·Joint Chiefs of Starr for the executions of this operation ·will be issued. This de~atch 

sent for your immediate informa ti'on in regard preparation plans, marine squadrons and .,!ASP movement. Leary 

pasn this despatch to llacArthur and make sure he has 

seen referenced dispatch. Chief of Staff Army informed 

by .hand. 

CQL=INCH 'TO CIHCPAC. 

Your 241943 both task forcesthould be made and kept ready for Jeparture at 12 0.ours notice but may be 

kept in hand until circumstances require departure pending developments connected with operations planned 

to begin about ;~ugust lst., Handle this with the 

utmost secrecy. 

,, 

6 03 
JUN GCT 

COMSOPACFOR to CINCPAC 

26 0015 Due to inexperienced radio and coding personnel 

your 230017 has just reached me* Cominch 24"2306 and 

231255 reached me last ·night. I assume that the 

two messages from Cominch modify your suggested 

operations but of course the .three do link up except 

as to date of execution. Am I correct in this assumption? You realize, of course, that my radio 

intelligence unit has not arrived. Hope you wil1 

speed them up as I have not succeeded in doing so. 

27 0251 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC. 

28 0607 

27 2341 

Handle with utmost secrecy. As ·operations your 

242306 should be followed by quickest possible construction landing fields recommend ship$ Vice CNO 

202035 carry material for this puroose including 

four .Army type landing mats 5000 by 150. Most desirable that construction battalion with own housing 

accompany shipment. If this approved my 260019 to 

Vice CNO modified accordingly. Advi$e. 

COMSOPACFOR to CINCPAC. 

Handle as-most secret. Most desirable 2nd Marines. 

Cominch 271415. Be reinforced and combat unit 

loaded ready on arrival in this area for employment 

in landing operations as a reinforced regimental 

combat team. 

CINCPAC to CO~J.[Al\JfDHIBlPORPAC, Info COMINCH, C01dSOPAC 1 and COMSOWESTPAC. 

Exercise utmost secrecy in handling. Plan move 

Third Marine Defense Batbalion from Pearl to Soupac 

area combat loaded. Transportation required approximately 1000 men 250,000 cuoic feet (6,500 tons). 

Designate 1 transport .fully equipped. for combat . loading and if required by amount cargo -indicated 

above one cargo ship. Unless othervvise directed 4 

designated ship or ships are to proceed to Pearl in 

convoy 2098 sailing from·West Coast 7 July. 

28 2013 COMM/[?liiBFORPAG to CINCPAC, Info: COMINCH. 

Leary and Ghormley are info adees.. Pass to them. 

Your 2723hl. 

604 
8!18JfQT 

JULY GCT 

02 2314 COMSOPACFOR to COT,/Lf\.I RPOPAC FOR, Info C INC PAC. 

Handle this as most secret. Deliver this message 

to Comgen ROSES by airfor his action from Comsopac. Proceed with construction bomber strin at BUTTON 

using part of your construction battalion, light equipment and local transport available to you .. Report Drogress weekly . Acknowledge. 

02 2100 COMINCH to C INCPAC, Info CO T\'lS '~l PAC:B,OR, C0!1SOPAC. 

Handle this with utmost secrecv. This is part one 

of three parts. The United St~tes Chiefs of Staff 

have agreed upon this joint directive for offensive 

pperations in the Southwest Pacific Area. Leary pass 

to MacArthur. Quote para 1 objective. Offensive 

operations will be conducted with the ultimate objective of seizure and occupation of the NEW BRITAII'JNEW IRELAND-NEW GUINEA Area~ Para 2. Purpose. To 

deny the area to Japan. Para 3 Tasks Afirm Task One 

seizure and occupation of SAHrA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI 

and adjacent positions. Baker. Task 2 seizure and 

occupation of the remain.der of the SOLOMON Islands, .· of Lt\E, SALAMAUA, and Northeast Coast of NEW GUII\frGA. 

Cast. Task 3 seizure and occupation of HA'lAUL and 

· adjacent positions in the I.JJ~TN GUINEA-NEVv IRSLA1~D area. 

02 2145 Part two of Cominch 022100. Para 4. General instruc-- tions. Afirm. The comnosition of the forces to be 

used, the timing of the tasks, and the passage of command will be determined by the u.s. Chiefs of Staff. Baker. For nlanning nurposes a target date for task 

one is t entati vel;r set as Ausust first 191+2. Cast. 

Direct command of the tactical operations of the runphib- ious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout t he conduct of all three tasks. Dog. The withdrawa l of the Naval attached units of the U. S . 

Fleet may be ordered by the IJ. s . Ch iefs of Staff upon the completion of any particular phase of the operation in the event that (l) cond:L tions deve lop which unduly jeopardize the a ircra ft car r i e rs, (2) an emergency arises in other Panific areas whic h dictates such withdr awal. Easy . The e ast ern and west er n boundaries of 

the southvv-est Paci f ic area and of t he south Pac i f ic area 

re spectively will, a.s of Augu st firs t 1942, be longit ude 159 dep;r ees east f rom t he equator southward para 5. 

Forces. Afirm. Gro·und a i r and Naval Force s now under 

command of t he Suureme Commander Sout hwest Pac i f ic Ar e a. 

Baker. At l east two aircraft carriers with a ccompanyi ng 

(continued on next phge) 605 
,....- ' 

JULY GCT 

02 2llr 5 COMINCH to C I NCPAC, Info COMPOWESPACFOE, co:MSOPAC. 

(Continued) 

02 2150 

03 225lr 

cruisers and destroyers, and the South Pacific .Amphi bious Force, with necessary transport divisions. Cast. 

Marine air squadrons and available land based air support in South Pacific Area. Dog. Army occupational forces now in the South Pacific Area to be utilized 

to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions; 

troops from AUSTPALIA to provide other garrisons required. 

Part 3 Cominch 022100. Para 6. Command. Afirm. 

Task 1 seizure and occ-upation of. S.ANTA CRUZ Islands 

TULAGI and adjacent positions ( 1) 'I'ask force comrnander 

to be designated by Cincpac (2) necessary naval reinforcements and land.based air sunnort will be attached 

by the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific .Area who 

will also provide __ j:or interception of enemy air and 

naval activities--westward of the operating area. Baker • . 

Task 2 seizure and occupatlon of the remaincler of the 

c::oLOJVI.AJ'l Islands and of LAE SAIJAJYI.r'\..UA and Northeast Coast 

of tffiW GUINEA. The task forces .engated in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area. Cast. Task 3 seizure 

and' occupation of RARAUL and adjacent 0ositions in the 

J\TF.Vv GUIN1!:A-T\fETV ID·'~I.J\ND Area. The task forces engaged 

in this operation will be under the direction of the 

Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area unouote. 

Assume you will make Ghormley Task Force C·ommander at 

least for task one which he should command in person in 

the operating area. He should also go to ViELBOUHNE for 

conference with General MacArthur as to all 3 tasks. 

Chief of Staff Army informed. 

COMINCH to COr.1SOPAC, C INCPAC, ~nfo COMSQ',-' rESPAC. 

The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff direct that 

there be set up in the South Pacific Area a Conmllinding General Army Forces, under the Corrilllander South Pacific 

Area (a naval officer) para 2. The functions of the 

Commanding General are: (1) To coordinate and supervise 

the administration, logistics and training of all Army ground and air troops within the area. (2) To assist · 

the Com1nander of the South Pacific Area in the prepara- tion and execution of plans which involve the use of 

Army forc'es para 3 Nimitz pass to Emmons. Leary pass 

to MacArthur. Ghormley pass to all Army coramanders in 

South Pacific Area. Army Chlef of Staff informedil 

6 06 
@TJ3ifiilil'i 

JULY GCT 

03 ·2255 

04 1632 

COMI :t{CH to C INCPAC, E~ PAC, Info COMSO:E)AC. 

Handle this despatch with the utmost secrecy. The . Chief bf Staff Army directs that there be created 

2 nobile air forces in the Pacific Theater, each 

comprising at lea.st, 1 heavy bombardment group, to 

be available to support operations anywhere in the 

Pacific Theater, as may be directed by the United 

States Chiefs of Staff. These mobile air forces will 

comprise: · ( 1) A Hawaiian mobile air force, from 

units duly assigned to the Hawaiian Department, which will 

normally base and operate in Hawaii: An Australian 

mo bile air force, ·from units duly assigned to the Southwest _Pacific Area, which will normally base and operate in AUSTRALIA. Para 2. Nimitz pass to. Enunons. Leary 

:pass to MacArthur. Ghormley pass to subordinate Army Commanders South Pacific Area. Chief of Staff Army informed. 

COMINCH to CINCPAC. 

Your 230205. As result of agreement by c6mbined Chief s 

of Staff direct Comsopac to cooperate in so far as ·uracticable in the suuuly and evacuation of inhabitants 

OCEA1J and ~~JRU Islands using such island schooners as 

may be avai.+able. NEW ZEALAJ\ID government being notified 

through diolomatic channels. Handle with utmost secrecy . 

05 0325 COMAIRPOPAC to COMPOPAC, Info Cl:I_\JCPAC , CDMGE-NROSES. 

\ 

Made personal inspection several good field sites 

:ESPIRITU SANTO. Your 022314. R'equire services 

Joseph Lykes upo~ completion her unloading ROSES , estimated date 7 July, to transport construction 

equipment and personnel SANTO. Can start immediately thereafter. 5000 feet Marston matting 150 feet wid-e 

required. Very secret. 

607 
43£61&? 

JULY GCT 

04 1045 COMSOPAC to ALL .l\RMY COMDRS SOPAC AREA,lnfo NIMITZ, 

EN!1VIONS , LEARY, MACARTHUR. 

All Army Com.J~anders South Pacific Area. Utmost secrecy. First message is Comlnch 032254. The Joint United States 

Chiefs of Staff direct that there be kept up in the South 

Pacific Area a Commanding General Land Forces f 11nde~ the 

Com_rn.ander South Pacific Area (a naval officer) Para 2 • . The functions of the Commanding General are: 1. To coordinate and supervise the administration, logistics and. 

training of Army ground and a1r troops within the area. _2. To assist the Commander of the South Pacific Area 

in the preparation and execution of plans which involve 

the use of Army Forces. 2ndmessage is Corninch 032255. 

The Chief of Staff Army dire cts that .there be created 2 

mobile air groups in the Pa&ific Theater, each comprising 

at least -one heavy bombardment group, to be available 

to support operations anywhere in the Pacific ,Theater as 

may be directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

These mobile air forces vvill compr.ise: (1) A Hawaiian 

mobile air force, from units duly assigned to the Hawaiian 

Department, which. will normally base and operate in Hawaii; 

an Australian mobile air force, from units duly assigned 

to the Southwest Pacific Area, which will normally base 

and operate in Australia. Nimitz, Emmons, Leary and 

MacArthur have this. 

05 0510 COMSOPAC to CTF 18, CTF 11, Info CINCPAC. 

Handle this with utmost secrecy . From point negat 25 

Taskfor 18 continue southwesterly to point hypo 66 I 

estimate you will reach by 0400 GCT 17th allowing for 

fueling delay. From point hypo 66 proceed toward point 

george 86 near which unless othervvise directed detach 

transport with escort to WHITE POPPY to await orders. 

Expect you will refuel combined Task Forces 11 and 18 

enroute to or vicinity point George 86.. Near this point opportunity will be afforded for conference with Comairsopac and Comamphibforsopac as to operational details if 

required.. Avoid sight or plane contact from islands. 

6 08 
\....,.~;. 

ei!HOMJ.i 

JULY GCT 

05 1845 

06 0130 

06 2229 

07 0125 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Handle this with utmost secrecy •. · Employment of fighters 

at Dutch on basis outlined your 031929 from forces available to you including units formed for ships to be commissioned near future satisfactory to Cominch. Next 

AVG available for Pacific is .C0PAHEE due for delivery 15 July should b.e opera tions.l in all respects prior to 

1 September. -

CINC SOWESPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO. CINCPAC 

Handle with utmost secrecy. Action Comsoupac from CinC 

Sowespac. 5 cruisers (AUSTRALIA, CANBERRA, CHICAGO, SALT LAKE CITY, HOBART) and only nine de.stroyers (Desron 4) available here one August. PERKINS, .FLUSSER being returned CinCPac after BLUE and·RALPH TALBOT report. Comsowespacfor will direct officers proceed Longbow for 

conference with you 15 July. Also will have Sour Sail 

type subs available one August if desired. Advise. 

CINCPAC TO COMTASKFOR 11 INFO COMINCH etc. 

Maximum secrecy enjoined. Comsopac 050510 modify mydis 300015. Taskforce Eleven depart Pearl 7 July. Complete gunnery practices including shore bombardment afternoon 8 July vicinity Cape Kalae Hawaii. 

Thence proceed by approximately direct route to rendexvous with Task _Force 18 at Point Hypo 26 at 200Z/18 

July. By separate despatch KANAWHA is being directed 

from Bleacher to meed ·and fuel Task Force 18 on 16 July. Leary inform MacArthur. Direct operational control 

Task Forces 11 and 18 still passes to Ghormely at 

2000Z/1U July. 

CINC~AC TO COMSOPAC 

To be treated with utmost secrecy. Turner after consultatien with Fletcher and my staff suggests following major features for forthcoming operations Sopac. Turner expects arrive Fulcrum 11 July. Afirm reenforcement Santo and construction of landing fields to be 

carried out as soon as practicable two Marston landing 

mats departing Pearl in Oliver Wendell Holmes 6 July 

one mat for Santo construction equipment and personnel from Roses one mat for later use Guadalcanal construction equipment and personnel to be obtained from West 

Coast or Bleacher as decided later. Baker occupation and defense of Ndeni. Divert Transdiv 2 to Bleacher 

6 09 

' \ 
QiJORIIT 

-J1.TLY GCT 

07 1::0125 (Continued) 

08 1012 

send rorward· one DD with ground and air reconnaissance 

party to arrive Ndeni about 25 July to decide on sites 

for air and seaplane base and location defense force. 

Transdiv 2 depart Bleacher in ·time arrive Ndeni on · 

dog minus two day 2nd Marine Regiment assigned as 

garrison. On arrival from east coast 5th Marine Defense Battalion less ·one third antiaircraft elements 

reenforce Ndeni ga_rrison. Aircraft base and naval 

local defense personnel and material will be supplied 

later from us. ~ capture Tulagi, Gavutu, Florida 

and Guadalcanal Islands on Dog Day approximately one 

August. Forces first )~rine Division less 7th Regiment plust First Raider Battalion, Third Marine Defense 

Battalion one third ·of AA elements 5th Defene Pe.ttalion 

3rd Balloon Barrage Squadron and 6 planes VMO 251. 

Transdivs 8, 10, 10. Task Forces 11, 16, 18 Anzac 

Squadron possibly also TF 16. Considered essential 

to hold rehearsals landing attack employing 1st Mardiv 

less 7th Regiment plus first Raider Battalion Task 

Forces 11 and 17 Australian Squadron and 5 DMS to be 

assigned. Estimate about six -days starting 23 July 

required for 2 complete rehearsals 2nd one to include 

firing by ships aircraft and troops. Because of central position yet more retired from enemy observation 

and apparen~ly better landing beaches re~ommend Fijis 

as site for rehearsals and departure point for expeditionary force.. Dog these operations will be covered 

and supported by air from Australia and by VPB and Arn~ air Sopac as previously indicated. Suggest 

scouting-from Ndeni by 12 VPB beginning about Dog 

minus two and from east coast Malaita by similar 

number beginning on Dog Day. 

COMSOWESPACFOR TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSOPACFOR 

Handle with utmost secrecy. This for action, Chief of 

Staff and Cominch fr,om MacArthur and Ghormley. Information to Leary and Nimitz. This is the first of 

seven parts. Pursuant to the directive of the joint 

Chiefs of Staff contained in Cominch 022100 a conference has been held between General MacArthur and 

Vice Admiral Ghormley with regard to the execution of 

the offensive operation as therein directed. The plan 

of the operation .in broa:Cl outline is as indicated 

below. Many detail-s of execution and the timing of'· 

the phases may be modified materially after conference 

with the Amphibious Force and Carrier Force Commanders 

who have not yet arrived. Para Task One orthodox 

610 
JULY GCT 

08 1012 (Continued) 

landing attack by the Amphibious -Force in the Tulagi Guadalcanal area stop the Southwest Pacific Force to 

support the operation by interdicting air and naval 

activities west of the operation area and by the 

participation of its na~al elements Para tasks two and 

three are based upon two major oncepts: Subpa"ra A 

the progressive movement forward - of air echelons in 

order to provide sufficient fighter and bomber coverage for surface elements Subpara B the iso~ation of Rabaul 

prior to its final assault. End of Part ' one. 

08 1014 Following i's part two of seven parts. In execution of 

this concept Tasks Two and Three have been divided into 

five phases in which ~he timing may be modified to com~ 

pensate for variation in the scheduled development of 

airfields and the availability of shipping phase 1: 

The capture of Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea ·and the 

a:irfield at Gasmata on New Britain. Prior to the 

initiation of this phase it is necessary ··to continue 

development in the P0 rt Moresby area and to provide airfields at .Milne Bay at the Southeastern tip of New 

Guinea and at Buna on the North Coast of' New Guinea 

Northeast of Port Moresby in order to provide fighter 

coverage for the surface vessels carrying the attacking forces to Lae. Phase Two: The occupation of Cape Gloucester and Talahea on New Britain and of Madang 

08 1015 

, on New Guinea, airdromes of those points to be put in ~peration with the least practicable delay. Phase 3: 

The capture of Loresgau on the west end of Buka Island 

in the Solomons stop phase four: The capture of Kavieng 

stop Phase five: The capture of Rabaul. End of part two. 

Look out for part three. Adequate ground troops are 

available for the operation although but one division 

is trained and equipped for landing attack and it is 

probable that losses normal to this type of operation will prevent its employment throughout. Adequate ship- ping 1 s laclcing for the transport of the inf'a.ntry divisions. Task one as nowr laid down requires the 

presence of AP'S, AK'S and supporting ships in the Tul.ag1 .4;rea from 36 hours to 4 day~, where they will 

be outside the range of any supporting air base and 

exposed to continued hostile air surface and submarine 

attack stop The· air force not~V in sight for the southwest 

Pacific Area is not adequate to interdict hostile air 

or naval operations against the Tulagi Area Stop the 

carrier task groups will be themselves exposed to attack 

by land based air while unprotected by our land based 

aviation and it is extremely doubtful that they will be 

able to render fighter support -to the transport area, 

expecially should hostile naval forces approach. End 

of part three. 611 
lililCDiiQi 

JULY GCT 

08 1017 

08 1018 

08 1020 

08 1021 

Part 4. Surprise is now improbable due to the depth of 

the existing hostile reconna.issanc·e. The successful 

execution of the phases of Tasks 2 and 3 will depend 

upon our ability to maintain air superiority. This is 

doubtful at the present time due to the numbers of 

reserve planes available and to the fact that the 

fighters are now operating under a distinct handicap because of their limitations as to altitude and range. 

It is anticipated that this condition will be progres- sively ameliorated as regards altitude as replacements arrive with equipment permitting of efficient operation 

a.t twenty to twenty five thousand feet. Part 4 ends. 

Part 5. During the last 3 weeks there has been a 

change in the enemy situation in the objective area 

which has been indicated in the operations reports submitted to the war department. The enemy has been 

and is making a major effort in the development of ~irfields at Kavieng Rabaul Lae Salamaua Kuka arid 

Guadalcanal which will greatly facilitate the operation of its air elements throughout the area Stop it appears 

at the present time he is installing the heavy equipment for an air base on Guadalcanal recent reconnaissance 

having shown 4 cruisers, 6 to 8 destroyers, 4 transports, 

8 motor torpedo boats and numerous landing barges. 5 

landing jetties have been constructed and ground installations have been initiated. Antiaricraft fire was 

encountered there by reconnaissance planes for the 

first time on July 7th. More· to come. 

Part 6. It .is the opinion of the two commanders CMA 

arrived at independently and confirmed after discussion 

CMA that the initiation of this operation at this time 

without a reasonable assurance of adequate air coverage during each phase would be attendant with the gravest risk as has been thoroughly demonstrated by the Japanese 

reverses on the. Coral Sea and at Midway. This is part 

six. The operation CMA one ini tia,ted CMA should be 

pushed through rapidly to its final conclusion CMA 

because a partial attack leaving Rabaul in the hands 

of the enemy enabling him to support by land based 

avaition the heavy concentrations that could be effected 

fron the Trul<: area would expose the initial attacking 

elements to the danger of destruction by overwhelming 

force. End of part six. 

Last of 7 parts. It is our considered opinion that in 

view of the recently developed strength of the hostile 

positions CMA of the shortage of airfields and airplanes for the continued maintenance of strong air support throughout the .operation and of the lack of sufficient 

612 
eiil Q itiii' 

r--- JULY GCT 

08 1021 (Continued) 

shipping that would make possible the continued mover-; ment of troops and supplies CMA that the succe-ssful 

accomplishment of the operation is open to the gravest doubts Para It is recommended that this operation be 

deferred pending the further development of forces in 

the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas and in 

the interim we proceed with an infiltration process through the New Hebrides and the Santa Cruz Island 

groups CMA in conjunction with accelerated· air field 

construction in New Guinea, with a view ,to the develop- ment of bases for the support of the operation when it 

is deemed that adequate means are available for the 

execution of all 3 tasks in 1 continuous movement. 

Signed MacArthur and Ghormley. 

09 0339 CINCPAC TO CTF 8 INFO COMINCH 

09 0633 

Handle with utmost secrecy. General situation and 

prospective operations other theaters which will require all our large carriers made advisable strong diversional attacks on Kiska and or Attu during July and August. Continuous pressure ~s desirable. No 

enemy carriers or other heavy units believed to be close 

enough Aleutians to give prompt support against hit and 

run bombardment attacks by our cruisers and destroyers coordinated if weather permits with our Army Navy air 

activities. Weather unfavorable to our air partici-pation is probably unfavorable to -enemy air activity but may not 

prevent surface bombardments which appear practicable with low cloud ceiling. Enemy shore installations will 

be good bbjectives even if no combatant ships or shipping 

are present. Comment ancr indicate ammunition replenish- ments required near future. Frequent aerial reconnaissance and photography important and necessary. 

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH 

Handle with utmost secrecy. This is brief my serial 

0151W now in airmail to you. You are hereby designated Task Force Commander for Task One Cominch 3 part 022100. 

You will exercise strategic command in person in the 

operating area which is interpreted initially to be the 

New Caledonia New Hebrides area. Para. Following Pac Fle~t forces in additon those already under your command 

are assigned to you for Task One; Task Force 11 Vice 

Admiral Fletclier 1 CV 3 CA 1 DL 6 DD 4 APD. Task Force 

16 Read Admiral Kinkaid 1 CV 1 BB 2 CA 1 CL 1 DL 6 DD. 

Tas1{ Force 18 Rear Admi al Noyes 1 CV 3 CA 1 GL 8 DD. 

:Marine Forces 2nd Marines reenforced 3rd Defense Bn ~~SB 231 and 232 VMF 223 and 224 VMO 251. 5 AP 5 AK 

513 
\ ...J 

ef!len:ru 

.JULY GCT 

09 0633 (Continued) 

4 AO 1 AE 1 AG 5 DMS 1 AT Salvage. Para. Commander 

Southwest Pacific will have available the AUSTRALIA 

CANBERRA CHICAGO HOBART plus Desron 4. You are 

authorized to apply directly to Supreme Commander 

Southwest Pacific Area for additional forces required. Para. With forces under your command you will commencing about August 1 seize and occupy Santa Crux Islands Tulagi and adjacent positions in order deny that ar.ea to Japan. Para. Logistic support for this operation will be pro- vided by Cincpac. The following arrangements have been m~de. Two fleet tankers Cimarrqn and Plat~e will accompany Task Force 11. KASKASKIA will proceed to ~outh Pacific 

from Pearl about July 20. Y~NAWHA will fuel Task Force 18 

then to Noumea. Chartered tankers with total 225,000 bbls 

fuel oil will arrive Noumea July 22 and again with same 

amount on August 2, It is expected that about 225,000 bbls fuel oil per CV Task Force per month will be made 

available to you in New Caledonia area. Requirements for diesel fuel avgas and stores for Pacfleet Task Forces 

will be met as requested by you. Para. Communications 

will be generally in accordance Pac 70 modified as 

directed by you. Para. Cincpac will remain Subbase 

Pearl and mJY from time to time issue further instructions in connection this operation. I have full confidence in your ability to carry this operation to successful conclusion. 

10 0145 COMALSEC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH 

10 0235 

This is CTF 8 reply to Cincpac 090339 Cincpac pass for 

information to Cominch. Have no comment additional to . that contained in my 302100. My first objective will 

be ships and my second enemy installations at Kiska. 

Latter mainly in valley the trend of which requires that 

bombardment fire be delivered from southward over hills 

to westward of south head in water of minable depth. Fire from eastward on ships in harbor would also be from 

mineable waters. Request four fast mine sweepers. Day of attack may be delayed by necessity of delaying final 

approach to await report of suitable visibility .for 

accurate navigation fix required for indicrect fire. 

Request ammunition replenishment as follows 8 inch 1100 

rounds 6 inch 3600 rounds 5 inch 3000 rounds. Will command with flag in INDIAN~ OLIS Smith in ·NASHVILLE. 

CINCPAC TO COMAIRSOPAC INFO COMSOPAC 

Most secret. Present indications 1 group 26 B-l?'s 

arrive Fantan Poppy aeea during July. So that logistic plans can be made what division of these planes will 

you make between -Fantan and Poppy. Expedite reply. 

514 
8i80PE9Jse 

JULY GCT 

10 0546 COMSOPAC TO SOMSWPACFOR INFO CINCPAC 

10 1143 

10 2118 

11 2000 

Handle as most secret. Do not intend employ your submarines with this force for task one. Your 091717. 

Pass to CinC Sowespac area. Request you employ them 

in furtherance interdiction task assigned you during Task One. 

COMAIRSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC 

~6 B-17's Poppy. Your 100235. And 10 ;Fantan as a 

desirable divison consonant with tactical division 

FO group. 

COMINCH TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC 

Para 4 addressees are directed to itemize to joint Chiefs of Staff specific additional forces not now 

prospectively available but absolutely essential to 

the execution of Task 1. Para 5 while recognizing that 

other demands to meet the world situation may prevent the assembly of forces and equipment in the southwest P~cific for immediate execution of Tasks 2 and 3 it is 

desired that local efforts in preparation for these 

tasks be vigorously pushed, including detailed opera- tional planning para 6 participation in operations by British eastern fleet in northwest Australian area has 

been definitely 'postponed. Nimitz pass to Emmons and 

Leary pass to MacArthur. Comsopacfor advise lf you hold higher crypto systems than this. Chief of Staff 

Army informed. 

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC 

Considering present known disposition hostile forces 

consider means now prospectively available Sopac sufficient for accomplishment Task One provided Sowespac Area be furnished sufficient means for interdiction 

hostile aircraft activities based on New Britian-New 

Guinea Northern Solomons area. Refer Comsoweslpa.cfor 081012 which in part quote the air force now in sight for the Southwest Pacific Area is not adequate to 

interdict hostile air or naval operations against the 

Tulagi area unquote. In this connection I wish to 

emphasize that the basic problem of this operation is 

the protection of surface ships against land based 

aircraft attack during the approach the landing attack 

and the unloading. By copy this despatch MacArthur 

is requested to answer that part of your inquiry relative to the additional means necessary to effect 

the required interdiction. 

6.15 
July (GCT) 

10 2100 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CIHCPAC. COMf5 0WESPAC. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Part l of ·2) fully appreciate the disadvantage of undertaking Task One before adequate forces and equipment can be made available for the continuance without interruption of Tasks Two and Three. 

This refers to your 081012 para two they feel however 

that it is necessary to stop without delay the enemys southward advance that would be effected by his firm establishment at TULAGI. They recognize that enemy airfields at GUADALCANAL will seriously hamper if not prevent our establishment SANTA CRUZ and ESPIRITU SANTO. 

With these and other considerations in mind they do not 

desire to countermand operations already underway for the 

execution of Task One. Para. three. Cincpac has already made preparation to provide additional shipborne aircraft 

and additional surface forces ·for Task One. Army has set 

up at Hawaii available for South Pacific area one heavy bombardment group of 35 planes. Army also plans to increase rate of flow of renlacement aircraft and will take 

all followup measures possiJle in support of the seizure 

and firm occupation of the Tulagi area. 

10 211S Part 2 of above. To be decoded by addressees only. Part 

2 of my 102100. Para 4. Addressees are directed to 

itemize to Joint Chiefs of Staff specific additional forces 

not now prospectively available but absolutely essential to 

the execution of Task 1. Para. 5. While recognizing that 

other demands to meet the world situation may prevent the 

assembly of forces and equipment in the Southwest Pacific 

for immediate execution of Tasks 2 and 3 it is desired that 

local efforts in preparation for these tasks be vigorously pushed, including detailed operational planning. Para. 6. 

Participation in operations by British Eastern Fleet in 

northwest Australian area has been definitely postponed. Nimitz pass to Emmons and Leary pass to MacArthur. Comsopacfor advise if you hold higher crypto systems than 

this. Chief of Staff Army informed. 

616 
cfi?F CiliJT 

JULY (GOT) 

11 0045 COMSOPAC to Cincpao, Comsowestpao, Info MacArthur. 

Most secret action to Cinopac, Comsowestpac. Latter 

to·: hand to MacArthur. While afloat near future will be 

compelled lean heavily on intelligence reports from you 

as my intell1gence unit will be divided. Reauest 

every effort be made keep me fully aware all -items 

that will sustain steady flow vital information. Reports 

should be sent to both tactical and administrative headquarters. 

11 1800 EMMONS to WDCSA Info CINCPAC, 

Cincpao directs transfer of 26 B-17 airplanes from 

HAWAII (16 to POPPY, 10 to FANTAN) with all necessary equipment and ground personnel stop to report to . Comsopao for duty upon arrival at destination. Advance 

personnel leaving today and movement to be completed 

by 28th July. HDGCS this force will be gone at least 

2 months and may not return. This reduces bomber strength in HAWAII to about 50 percent of authorized strength. 

Cincpac concurs in urgent request for early replacement 

in HAWAII of these airplanes, combat crews, ground personnel and equipment as follows: HQ, and HQ Sqdn (hvy) 

9 officers. 5 warrant officers, 128 men; 3 Bomb Sqdns (Hvy) 111 officers, 3 warrant officers, 687xmen; detachment ordnance company aviation 4 officers, 122 men; atchd 

medical 4 officers 24 men, detachment material Sqdn 20 men. 

All above units with complete . T/BA equipment. Cincpac 

also requests frequent diversionary air attacks on BERRY 

and that a full squadron of bombers using alternate crews 

to permit maximum use of equipment be employed for the 

purpose as soon as they can be obtained. LB-30 or B-24 

are suitable type airplanes. 3 LB-30's on hand.<For this 

mission request at least 6 additional LB-30's or B-24 

airplanes with 12 combat crews to arrive here not later 

than July 21st. This message held in highest seoret 

classification. 

12 0105 CINCPAC to CO~~IRSOPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC. 

Cominoh 102100 B-17s will be increased to 35. Plan send 

about 1000 men Army ground crews 1500 tons freight no 

bombs or fuel in PRESIDENT TYLER leaving PEARL about 

22 July. ARGONNE has about 100 man 50 tons freight same 

purpose. Advise destinations you desire for airoPaft 

ground crews freight. Do you expect operate any these 

Bl7s from ESPIRITU SANTO and from AUSTRALIA staging at 

MORESBY? 

617 
JULY (GCT) 

13 0621 GENERAL PATCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC. 

Because of possible projected . operation from this area 

question of complete censorship over Free Freench Government arises. I cannot guarantee either the loyalty or 

judgment of their operators.· · Consequently it becomes a 

military necessity for me to completely control their radio 

station. This will deny Free. communication from the French 

authorities here including Admiral Dargenlieu with General 

DeGaulle and all other French possessions. Such action 

may violate an international agreement. If I am authorized 

to take such action 2 alternatives are open to Free French 

authorities, first, completely close their station for the 

desired period or periods, during which time they could 

use either·the British system or ours, and second, turn 

over their code to us and we will transmit such messages 

as they desire which have no military value to the enemy. Recommend authority to impose this be secured from Washington or such authority as may be empowered to give it. 

Comairsoupac concurs. 

13 0021 COMAIRSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPACFOR. 

Treat as most secret. On the assumption 4 squadrons involved your 120105 reauest 1 to FANTAN 1, 2 to POPPY and 

1 to ROSES with proportionate distribution of stores and 

personnel. Request analysis of equipment and stores in 

order make specific changes in allocation. if desirable 

also analysis of officer personnel included. Desire 

operate Koumac ROSES, and BUTTON when ready. Consider 

operation from MORESBY not advantageous initial stages. Urgently request 16 these planes at POPPY immediately. Sufficient ground service available for limited period. 

13 0414 C01~0PAC to CINCPAc· Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, MACARTHUR. 

Cominch 022100 in part quote Army occupational forces now 

in the South Pacific Area to be utilized to garrison TULAGI and adjacent island positions unquote. In addition 

to Marine defense battalion units now planned estimate 

minimum required garrison as reinforced regiment. Such 

Army force lacking and available only in FANTJL~ and POPPY. 

Most inadvisable weaken either place until possibility of 

hostile counter offensive definitely past. Furthermore 

at present plan to later garrison SANTA CRUZ from present 

POPPY garrison relieving Second Marines for other duty. Cominch 012100 in part quote Army also plans to increase 

rate of flow replaoement aircraft and will take all follow 

up measures possi ble in support of the seizure and a fir.m 

oc·cupation of the TULAGI area unquote. Does this mean 

618 
BEG!&! 

JULY (GCT) 

13 0414 (Continued) 

garrison troops for SANTA CRUZ dash TULAGI dash GUADALCANAL question. If not request I be given authority to 

:take matter up, at the proper time, with NEW ZEALAND 

authorities with view securing suitable garrison force from 

NrN ZEALAND. Leary pass to MacArthur. 

14 0510 CTF 18 to CINCPAC. 

Station in heading pass to Cincpac for action. Utmost 

secrecy. This from Comtaskforce 18. WASP casualty to 

starboard high pressure turbine evidenced by loud scraping noise even at lowest speeds. Impossible deter.mine conditions without lifting casing which is being done making 

good maximum of 15 knots with port engine. It found necessary _ lift rotor for repairs propose send WASP into 

BLEACHER as we pass where estimate 4 days work. by ships force assisted by WHITNEY. This based on assumption 

Fletcher can meet my convoy earlier than now planned. Air 

coverage by WASP now entirely dependent upon favorable 

wind conditions. Weather follows. 5.5682511. 

\,. 15 0137 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COM:SOUPAC. 

Handle as most secret. Comsoupac 130414 should be considered in connection my 130211. Request comment whether 

Army quote follow up measures unquote includes providing 

troops from u.s. to garrison SANTA CRUZ dash TULAGI dash 

GUADALCANAL areas. I consider AA recommended my 130211 is 

minimum essential :from u.s. and additional two reinforced 

regiments desirable. In any event desire authorize Ghormley subject your ' approval to lay ground work now with NEW 

ZEALAND authorities for sending their forces northward to -garrison bases when threat to N ZEALAND is lessened. 

14 2226 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY. 

Ar.my does not intend to provide garrison troops from 

United States for S~~TA CRUZ, TULAGI, GUADALCANAL. Their 

interpretation quote to take all follow up measures possible in support of the seizure and firm occupation of 

the TULAGI area unquote is release of Army occupational 

forces in rear positions of South Pac,if'ic area tor garrisons in forward positions. This in reply to your 130414. 

As regards use of NEW ZEALAND troops am of opinion pro~osal 

would reopen FIJI discussion. If you believe you can 

handle without upsetting arrangements made you are author619 
W8I1il'ia 

JULY {GCT) 

14 2226 (Continued) 

ized to take up at the proper time the use of ~v ZEALAND 

troops for garrison forces in advanced position. Army is dispatching from u.s. com)at units previously authorized 

as follows: For FIJI 20 July 1 FA Batt 1 CA Batt 1 Inf Rgt less 1 Bn, for NFN CALEDONIA ~0 July 1 Cav Rgt less 

animals plus air corps fillers and minor miscellaneous 

troops each place. 

16 0612 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC and others concerned. 

This despatch must be handled with utmost secrecy. 

Comsopac originator. Action is to Cinopao Info to Cominch, 

Comsowespacfor (pass to MacArthur), Comamphibforsopac, Comtaskfor 11, 16, 18. If you are not an addressee break 

no further. Cincpac 090633. On acco~nt delay arrival 

transports LONGBOW and delays due to weather in unloading 

and reloading August 7th local date tentatively set as 

Dog Day. Rehearsal exercises in FANTAN area now scheduled 

commencing 27 July local date. Comamphibforsopac has 

for info. 

15 2015 OINCPAC to COM l4 Info CG MARFORCES 14 ND, ZEILIN, BETELGUESE. 

Handle as most secret. Refer mydis 010159. Direct 3d DefBn 

combat load equipment and personnel fof distant service in 

ZEILIN and BETELGUESE as soon as practicable after arrival. 

Expedite loading on 24 hour basis and advise prospective completion. 

17 0602 COMSOPAC TO TFll, 16, 18, 44, C011AIRSOPAC, COMA}WHIBFORSOPAC 

Part 1 

/-

Handle as most secret. SoPac Operation Plan 1-42 bein~ 

distributed 1 briefed as follows: Task Organization (A) Task Force ol (Expeditionary Force) Vice Admiral Fletcher 

composed of combined Task Forces 11, 16, 18, 41 and 62 

(AmPhibForSoPac} (B) Task Force 63 Rear Admiral McCain 

composed of land based aircraft and patrol planes of SoPac 

area. Paragraph 1: CinCSoWesPao Area will interdict · 

westward of operating area. Air Scouting by SoWesPac forces 

as arranged with Comtaskfor 63. Own submarines in vicinity 

RABAUL and TRUK. 

620 
\. 

JULY (GCT) 

17 0615 CONillOPAC to TF 11, 16, 18, 44. COMAIRSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOPA{ 

Part 2 

17 0625 

- Utmost Secret. Paragraph 2. This force will seize occupy defend successively TULAGI area and SANTA CRUZ. Operation in 3 phases: Phase one: Rehearsal or TULAGI attack in 

FIJI area beginning a bout 27 July. Phase two: Seizur.e 

TULAGI area on DOG Day. Phase 3: Seizure NDENI. 

Paragraph 3: (A) Task Force 61 - Phase 1 conduct rehearsals 

Phase 2 - Capture occupy TULAGI area and adjoining portion 

GUADALCANAL. Construct landina field. Defend until 

relieved. Phase 3 - Occupy and defend NDENI. Construct 

landing field. Paragraph 3: {B) Task Force 63 - Phase 1 -

Continue scouting. Phase 2 - Cover approach to and 

operations in TULAGI area by scouting. Execute air attacks. 

Render airc.raft support on call. Initiate patrol plane 

scouting from NDENI by DOG minus 2 Day and from MALAITA 

on DOG Day. 

CO!ASOPAC to TF 11, 16, 18, 44. COMAIRSOPAC, CO ~HIBFORSOPA( 

Part 3 _ Utmost secret. ComTaskFor 6J arrange with Supreme Commander 

SoWesPao Area relative coordination aircraft scouting. 

Paragraph 3 xray - Conference will be arranged by SoPao 

between interested commanders this force on coordination 

air activities. DOG Day tentatively August 7 will be 

promulgated by despatch. Bombing by our units of all 

submarines interdicted west of Longitude 155 East. 

Paragraph 4 - Logistic arrangements promulgated in 

written plan. Paragraph 5 - Use zone zero time. Maintain 

radio silence during phase one. Communications according 

to PAC-70. ComSoPac initially at FULCRUM moves to 

ARGONNE at WHITE POPPY about dog minus 5 day. LEARY pass 

to MacArthur. 

18 055$ COMSOPAC to COMTASKFOR 11 info COMINCH, CINCPAC, ETC. 

To be handled with' utmost secrecy. After passing South 

of Latitude 20 degrees operate in general area within 

radius of 250 miles from Point HYPO 26. At first 

favorable opportunity contact Noyes and Kinkaid and 

assume command of Task Forces 11, 16 and 18 and inform 

me of prospective movements via shore based radio. I 

will inform you later of projected movements Task Forces 

44 and 62 and arra.ngements for their rendezvous with you. 

621 
-t' 

j 

SFQftilrpr 

JULY (GOT) 

18 00.35 COMSOPAC to PATCH,. CO 1ST RAIDER BN, COMAIRSOPAC, El'C. 

Handle this as most _seoret. Sent by ComSoPac for action 

to ComAirSoPac. ComTransDiv 12 ComAirSoPac pass to 

Patch and to c.o. lst Raider Battalion. CinCPac ,and 

ComAmphibforSoPac are info addressees. Modify my 1504.39: 

'l'ransDiv 12 embark striking element 1st Raider Battalion 

on readiness to sail by 2000 GCT 23 July on orders to be 

issued later. 

16 0400 COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMJ;NCH, ETC. 

Handle as utmost secret. PICADOR plan reoeived·mail today. 

CinCPac 150251. Intend to employ 7th Marines my 140245 

only in case of necessity. Uncertainty hostile reaction 

to pending operation dictates wisdom preparing most 

available effective force in my area for possible emergency 

use. Will release fram standby orders as soon as situation 

permits. 

18 2106 COMINCH TO COMALSEC info CINCPAC, COMTASKFOR 8, ETC. 

18 2230 

Army has under consideration recommendation by General 

Dewitt to establish land based airfield on TANAGA Island 

in immediate future. In this connection desire your 

comment. Also desire information as to contemplated. operations of Task Force 8 in WesteTn ALEUTIANS. 

COMTASKFOR 18 to COMSOPAC info CINCPAC, CTF 11, 16. 

Handle with utmost secrecy. Arrived BLEACHER last night 

except 3 destroyers still outside but in touch. This 

morning winds gale force maximum at 1800 GCT 67 knots 

from East Southeast barometer 2971 now moderated but am 

still standing by. No damage my force or other ships 

present except latter lost several small boats. No report 

yet from ashore. Carrier prior entry completed removal 

first 2 rows damaged impulse 'blading. Rotor has been 

lifted and replaced plant being reassembled. Plan to 

fuel transports as soon as tankers arrive. Here are 

weather numbers 4 6 6 8 3 4 5 1 4 

19 1034 COMSOWESPACFOR to COMSOPAC info CINGPAC, C'TF 61,62,63. 

The following plan of air operation will be executed in 

support Task 1 Macarthur to Ghormley. Prior to DOG minus 

5 existing 48 hour aerial surveillance will continue over 

r area PORT MORESBY-LORENGAU-KAVIENG-BUKA-ONGTONG dAVA- ~ ~JLAGI-SAMUMAI stop Thereafter all aircraft operations 

(continued on next page) 

622 
J :--" 

JULY (GCT) 

19 1034 COMSOWESPACFOR TO COMSOPAC (Continued) 

of the Southwest Pacific Area will be prohibited eastward 

of 158 degrees 15 minutes East Longitude between the 

Equator and 15- degrees South Latitude unless missions 

are requested by you. Starting DOG minus 5 following 

support will be given: DOG minus 5 to DOG plus 4 daily 

reconnaissances areaPORT MORESBY-MADANG-KAVIENG-ONGTONG 

JAVA-POINT PRASLIN (NORTHlNEST OF YSABEL ISLAND)-EASTERNMOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND-TAGULA ISLAND, aviation 

will be prepared to -strike hostile naval targets 

discovered in this area within 550 mile range PORT MORESBY 

during same period, morning DOG Day to DOG plus four days 

interdict hostile air operations in area RABAUL-KAVIENG 

and deny hostile refueling operations from BUKA island 

if used; DOG to DOG plus four days shorter range aviation 

to attack LAE and SALAMAUA periodically to prevent 

reenforcement to RABAUL from that area. Will advise if 

current development MILNE BAY permits of extended range 

bomber operations. All available aviation in this area 

subject to actual limitations of range will operate in 

your support on request to CinCSoWesPac. Your comment 

or concurrence requested. Naval support will be given 

as previously arranged. Suggest you send courier to my 

headquarters BRISBANE with detailed plan of operations 

to arrive by .DOG minus 5. Further details relative 

communication plan will follow. 

20 0100 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH 

Handle as most secret. Antiaircraft units at BORABORA 

and TONGATABU barely sufficient for partial protection 

against raids. Cominch 172026 CinCPac 182217. Consider 

it most inadvisable weaken them now. Intend employing 

marine defense battalions in seized areas until new 

Army units arrive for this purpose or until tm need 

for antiaircraft protection present bases definitely 

lessens. 

20 0130 COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC to CTF 11 info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC 

or 2 secret parts this is the first and not to be 

deciphered except by adees. Fram ComAmphibforSoPac to 

ComTaskfor 11 info ComSoPac and ComAirSoPac. Plan 

sortie 8 hours Mike (minus 12) 22 July arrive rendezvous 

with Transdiv 12 CinCPao grid posit HYPO 2057 time 14 

hours Mike 26 July. Paragraph. 

(continued on next page) 

623 
wM8MI 

JULY (GCTl 

20 0130 COMA!~HIBFORSOPAC to CTF 11 {Continued) 

Recommend Taskfors 11 and 18 and Transdiv 2 rendezvous 

this force s~~e place and time in order permit con~ 

terence and distribution plans for rehearsals proposed 

to begin 28 July North and West Coasts KORO Island. 

20 0135 SAME AS ABOVE {Part 2) 

Stop deciphering unless an adee. Second part of two 

secrets to ComTaskfor 11 info ComSoPac and ComAirSoPac 

from ComAmphibForSoPao. Following task organization 

proposed for attack force AFIRM Transport group XRAY 

10 Afirm Prep 6 Atirm King BAKER Transport group YOKE 

3 Afirm Prep 4 Afirm Prep Dog CAST Fire Support group 

LOVE 3 Cast Afirm 4 Dog Dog 6 Victor Option Sail 

seaplanes DOG 1 SAN dUAN 4 Dog Dog EASY Mine Sweeper 

group 5 Dog-uike Sail ~ Air Support group 1 Victor 

Fox 3 Victor Sail Baker squadrons with l additional 

squadron each type first 2 hours of DOG Day GEORGE 

Screening group 3 Cast Afirm 8 Dog Dog 2 Victor Fox 

squadrons 8 Victor Option Sail seaplanes HYPO Landing 

Force troops plus 10 Victor Option S&al seaplanes. 

Paragraph. 

It would be understood approximately half of avmlable 

aircraft would be in transport area continuously during 

daylight. Paragraph. 

Recommend one aircraft control group from carriers be 

transferred to McCawley for voice direction of air 

support group and 1 similar group be sent flagship 

screen to direct fighter cover. Paragraph. 

Consider most desirable all vessels of attack force 

be Unit Sail ships. paragraph. 

ComSoPac has directed strict radio silence be preserved 

during rehearsals. Paragraph. 

As soon as you can answer by radio request decision on 

foregoing, names or vessels assigned and names of group 

commanders not in this command. 

19 2310 COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC to CURTISS info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC 

Especially secret is this from ComAmphibForSoPac info 

ComSoPao ComAirSoPac pass by hand for action to Com 

Transdiv 12. Your 172307 ComSoPac 1S0510 embark assault 

echelon first Raider Bn. ready in all resnects for day 

or night landing in rubber boats against strong opposition. 

Rendezvous with this force which is escorted by Task Force 

44 at CinCPao grid position HYPO 2058 time 14 hours Mike 

26 July. Expect rehearse at KORO Island beginning 28th. 

Have remainder Battalion ready to embark on short notice 

if ship becomes available. Guard 2562 primary 369 

secondary frequency enroute rendezvous. 524 
JlJLY ( G_CT) 

23 1025 C.T.P. 8 TO CI:NCPAC INPO COIIINCH 

Persistent dense fog has continued and is predicted for 

v;hole area including objective to- last until Jp.ly 2'7th 

makes that day first probable bonbarchnent clay.. Hill move 

east to fuel and return to approach area to use first 

satisfactory Qay for operation. ~ Cincpac deliver to Cominch 

for in~::'o .. 

28 0329 CIHCPAC ~0 COHIHCII 

Doi se departed ·rroarl today to raid oneny sampan patrol line 

reported 5 to 800 niles east of H01H3HU to ere ate impression 

BLtn:: strikinr; force onroute Empire Wa tors. Hope for contact .about 7.')0 miles due east TOKYO ofl :n~ugust ... :t5ttl local date. 

Cruiaer w:.11 retire toward Pearl at high .speed 10 hours after 

first contact. Para.. - · 

ITo \7ord yet fron. Theobald. Pacific ocean area Lonerally 

quiet. 

19 0'737 COI/fA:RSOPAC r_::o COHSOUPliC!·1

0El IIT?O C Il'TCPAC 

During forth coninc operations intend placinG CURTISS in 

.Segond channel at BUTTCH. ':2o afford all practicable AS 

protection re quest consideration be given t9 mining such 

entrances as may be considered practicable. Lxpect this harbor to assur:1e increasing importance as natters progress, ~~his 

1 s no st secret .. 

Handle as most secret. Cor:1sopac sends action to ComTaskPorces 

11,16,18, 44, ComAmphibForSoPac, Comi· ... irSoJ>ac ana_ for info to 

Coninch, CincPac, and ComS\lesPacJ;"lor. Hodify ComBoPac 

operation plan 1-40-2 para 3B phase 2 to read as follows n 

"Cover the approach' ~o, and the operation \lithin, the 

~ULAGI-GUJ~DllLCA.3AL area by search. Execute air attacks on 

enemy objectives as arranged with cm~1ander expeditionary 

force. Render ai1")craft support on call. Initiate patrol 

plane scoutinr; from NDENI about gog :r.1inus 1 day and from 

east coast MALAI'l1

A about dog plus 1 day". I.Iake corresponding change in ComSoPa-c 1?0602. Leary pass to Mac Arthur. 

625 
0 !@ '- LJia 

JULY ( GC~) 

21 0802 CTP 18 to COJ;ISOPJ~C info CINCPAC, CTP g. 

Maintain hi~1t secrecy~ For 'info to Con~askFor 11 and Cincpac 

(doli ver-y by 1TPI.I} Action to Cor1SoPac fron CTF 18. 

Sa ti sfac tory traial underw_ay completed by Vi'fASP rna kin[' turns 

for 27 knots.. 1~stina te maxinum actual speed at present 

displacement in water about 70 degrees same as before casualt~ 

namely 25 knots but with decreased reliability. Reconmend 

available replacement blading be sent PEJ~RL and all three 

rows impulse blading replaced first available opportunity 

after emploJ.-rr;lent{ now started. 'rhe se nur.1bers. 53803417. 

are vve s ther. 

21 0820 GTP 11 70 COHSOP!~.C info GTP 16 '-~ 62,44, COI·.'IAIRSOPAC. 

Untr1ost secrecy. ~.Jill assemble task forces 11, .16,18, & 62 

at 14 hours mike (minus 12) 26 ~Tu1y at CINCPAC GHID po.si t 

2057. ~Jill hold conference in SAHATOGA at earliest 

opportunity after rendezvous. From TasForce 11. After 

rendezvous shall prococ<d to vicinity :fiAJrrAN for phase one. 

Consi.der it hir;hly important confer with HcCAIN and your 

representative earlist practicable date. 

21 1106 OOJ!LTASKPO~{ 18 TO COHSOPAC info CINCPAC, CONTAS:KJ?Oll 11, 16, 

COMAEPHIBFOHSOPAC. 

23 0250 

HiP:h secrecy. ~."!ASP rern:til~s successful. Task I~,orce 18 ready 

:for sea. Transports fueled. Hout r.1arching troops ashore 

-as p:rac ticable for acclimatization.. Your Opplan l-L12 recei vee 

delivered Fletcher by air holding for Kinkaid. No copies for transports or narines. :i,urnishing Creso.nt City 1 copy 

with authority to reproduce. Scott will conduct gun pr-actice 

tomorrow for my crui snrs and destroyers against ba1-~ren island 

simulating Naval gunfire support of landing with air spot. 

I will fly aboard local thursday forenoon for conference with 

l'lotcher. Hy understanding that references to task force 18 

no longer include transpnrts .. 

COMSOPAC ~0 GOMS01/~SPAC info CTF 61,62,63, CinOPac. 

Handle as most secret. CorhSoWe sPac pass to HacArthur,. 

Unless addressed do not decode beyond here, So pac plans 

for air search follow: Ber;inning clog minus 2 day SoPac 

search disposed as to isolate Coral Sea east of Long 158 from 

enemy interference without detection and to cover to.rgot a.rea 

to nortlnvard cas far as range of aircraft po:rr:d ts' this 

coverage increasing in extent as scouts move to successive 

advance bases0 Suggest SoWestPac alrpraft beginnlng dog minus 2 day cover approaches to Coral Sea and target area 

by search west of 158 east Lon&:.. to mo.ximu.rn extent nurtbeg 26 

and range of available scouts permit.. }?op increased 

effectiveness SoPac scouted area will overlap an average of 

1~~0 mlles ~lost of frat Long .. Copie;_r of our final air search ~ 
itii GiPN; iJ T a 

23 0250 COI,1~~PAO to COHSCYvlESPL.C info CTP 6J, 62 ,_63-L CincPac ( Cont 'd) 

plan will be i'orwa:rded latter. Subject to above we concur 

your plan as ,·ontained CouSoYles?ac 192034. 

27 2211 COHSOPAC to CTF 61, Info cons·.JPACPOH, CIUCPACJ. CTF G3 1 62, 

l'.IA CAR f_llHUif. 

Tv1ost secret. J:'his from ComSoPac. There are j.udications that 

oneny \I:i!ll ,connence some operations on 29th Jul~r from New 

Britain area. Request you consideration early termination 

phase one a.nd c or1.r.1ence phase Two my opora tion ·plan 1-42. 

Ad vi ·se. · Leary pass to IIacApthui". 

20 0201 CTF 61 to COUSOPAC I1'0R info CTP 6?, 63, CINOAPC. 

This is most secret. Comsopac 272.~11. Irrespective of value 

exercise of phase one this force v1ill be short estimated more 

tmh 50,000 barrels fuel after emptying PLATrr & CIMAHRON on 

31 ~.Tuly. I consider it imperative that ships depart area 

Pi-\.NTAH fully fueled and that they be topped off enroute from 

KASKA3KIA and CiliL.4.RRON. CTF 62 cor1ment to ComSoPacFor and 

originator CTP 61. 

28 0539 COMAIRSOPAC TO' CINCPAC 

C IHCPAC rro COI1G~NIIA.HDEPT. 

Treat as most secret. Cincpac pass to ComGen HavlDept. Reques:b 10 radio compartment gasoline tanks be shipped by air 

at earliest possible date to 11th bombardment group POPPY. 

Accomplishment of 1st phase -of mission hinr;es on delivery 

by LF~-30 or B-24. Everest to Harr1on. 

28 1440 COMAIRSOPAC TO CIHCPAC info COHSOPAC. 

28 1830 

- . !Jiost secret. As utility field at BIJTT.ON for B-17 prior D day 

cot1ing operations sti~l in doubt and as :bange those planes 

with out radio cor1p~rtment tanks insufficient ,for bor1bing 

operationsfron ROSES and POPPY request urc;ency matter 

contained my 280530 bo recommended to ConGen IIawDept. 

COUITJCH T0 COHSOPii.C info GINCPAC, COI.!SOv"JESPAC. 

It is r:1o st ir1~ortant that attacks your 170602 and 201300 be 

not delayed peyond August 7th and that this date be anticipated if possible in order that enemy ElHY not be given time 

to perfect installations now und er construction in obj~ctive 

areas for use ~gainst us~ 

627 
IEJBRMf• 

JULY (GCT) 

29 0041 COI!IAIR80PAC ?0 COTr1SOPAC, info CINCPAC, COUGEN HA.'/DEPT. 

I.Iost Secret" Larr,o scale bombing operations ap;ainst TULil...GI 

- GUl\.DALCAlJAL planned fen-. ~'51st in confere.nce in SAHATOGA 

must await arrival and instillation acldi tional r;as tank in 

10 Bl7's or completion BUTTOH field. Will attack as planned 

that date wlth as nany these planes now so equipped - about 

9. CinCpac pass to ComGen HawDept. 

29 0857 CTP 61 to CJ:F G·3 info COI.ISOPAC, CTF 62, . 18. 

Ufrnost secret. Your opora tion plan 1-42. Assume on dog minue 

1 day planes sear~ching sectors 3 and 5. will arr·ive outer 

limit search at sunset searchin~ return leg by radar. Note 

that ener:1y strfuking group could approa.ch undected to launch 

air attacl: sunrise dog day by be~ng to Northwest of sector 5 

and north of sector 3 rr t sunset dor; minus 2 day dog minus 1 

day. On dog day sufiGest planes searching sectors 2 and 4 be 

abrerut ~ULAGI by sunrise. 

29 2335 COT1SOPAC TO COl'IINC~I, iJ1fo I'U~Ci~RTEUH, CilJCPAC, CQHSViPACiilOR. 

This to be handloa. most secret. Comsopac s:e.nds. Leary pass 

to EacArthur for info. Your 201830 every effort has been nade 

and :. s being nado to cor1.ply for reasons you have indica ted. 

See replies fron Fletcher and Turner to my 272211 which were 

passed to you. 

30 0820 CTP 63 r:;o CTF 61 info CTF 18,62, COIIBOP.AC. 

30 lGOl 

From ConTaskFor 63. If weather forecast fndicates favorable 

navisation conditions will comply your 290857 as regard~ 

sectors 3 and 5 dot; minus o·ne. Othervvise daylight search will 

be nacle . On diG~ day will 00r1ply regarding sectors 2 and 4. 

COMSOUESPAC~ilOR. 

r.i.1his dispa tr~h must be handled vvi th utmost sec1-.ecy. If you 

are not an addressee break no further. The British gastorn 

·~leet will create an aversion in Bny or Bengal Code name S~B 

in accord follouine plan. All tines Greenwich mean tiTie. 

T~1ree con?Joys w.t th local escort will sail at 0400 Auc;u::i"t 1st 

:tn diroc tion i .. TJ:JAITAITS. Porco V fron '/IZAGAPATAT.t. ~Jiorce 

1,1 from l'TlL):U""S.. Yorco T fr·om T .. 1IHCOI.1J LL h Convoys will 

reverse course at 1700 Aucust 1st and return to port before 

sunset Aur:ust 2d. A covePinr~ force l .. f:.rm co:mp.osi tion 

probably fast I BB or 2 CV's~- cruisers and Destroyers \!ill .: 

sall fron ·coLOIIBO 0400 July 31 to cover the eastwards forces 

T and VI durinr:; August 1 and 2.. Hix·ele :Js diversion code 

narrtc 3PLRKS na·7be cnrr-ied out to si:rnula te breakdovm in force 

!'ike followed ~y CINCPAC cancelli~~ operation. Porco 

.1.firm v1ill act as circ"l.lMstances dictate probably arrivinc: 

COLOliBO fl. Vf:tJJS t 4. Leary pas :3 to Ji·1acAr~hur. 6 2 8 
~ GCT CINCPAC TO COMINCH 

30 0235 {Recent photo reconnaissance Makin Gilbert Islands does 

not disclose definite enemy activity. Nevertheless 

plan to raid that island with marine raiders from submarines about August 17 to destroy possible fuel stores 

and installations. Para. No further word from Theobald 

not already reported. 

29 1920 COMTASKFOR 8 TO CINCPAC 

Based on prediction of good visibility there in late 

afternoon decided to ap~roaoh Kiska 127th. At 30 

miles from objective 2 hours before dark was oom- pell~d by thick fog to turn back despite prior encouraging weather indications. On second 90 degree 

turn LAMBERTON apparently turned prematurely rammed 

CHANDLER. MONAGHAN on own initiative left station to 

investigate collision rammed LONG. No vessel is 

dangerously damaged but all need repair. 3 minesweepers reported able to continue operations. MONAGHAN · [ 

damage to bow limitsthat vessel to 20 knots. Damaged 

vessels sent to Dutch Harbor. Further report 

on them later. 1 sweeper available. Delay have 

caused disruption of air support plan due inability 

to issue necessary orders. Have operated in fog for 

10 days. Few and widely ~aced contacts with own 

planes during rare periods of slightly improved visibility have permitted only small ~ercentage of required orders. In view of these factors and prediction of 

further protract period of adverse weather must withdraw to reestablish plans. With necessary modifications 

to operation plan greatly gravated by visibility in 

this area am now convinced that officer directing operations involving widely separated forces must control 

from base where essential coordinating orders may be 

issued. Accordingly am returning flag ashore Kodiak. 

Will advise further plans at earliest possible time. 

Cincpac pass to Cominch. 

31 2145 CINCPAC TO CTF8 

Utmost secret. Appreciate difficulties engendered by weather but consider important that your superior 

surface power be employed if feasible. As indications 

continue enemy surface and air forces in northern area 

are weak believe bold operations would be successful. 

Exploration of all means of utilizing weather to our 

advantage is indicated. Doubt if indirect . bombardment 

would ever be particularly effective. Due danger their 

own forces under difficult navigational conditions 

question enemy employment mines. Suggest for consideration direct bombardment Kiska or radar sweep with 

cruisers along communication lines Kiska and Attu 

toward homeland or both. Ghormley's D-Day is 7th and 6 2 8 

diversionary effect your operations will be important. 
SiiGPii'i 

JULY (GCT~ 

31 2145 CINCPAC to COMTASKFOR 8 info COMINCH 

_Utmost secret._ App~ecia.te · difflcul ties engendered by weather but consider important that your superior surface power be employed if feasible. As indications 

contip.1._1e enemy surf-ace and air fot·ces iin northern area 

are weak belte.ve bold ·operations would he successful. 

Exploration of all means of utilizing weather to our 

advantage is indicated. D-oubt if indirect bombardment 

would ever be particularl~ effective. Due . danger their 

· own .:forces under dffficuJ,.'t naviga tiona.l conditions 

question enemy employment mines. Suggest for consideration direct bombardment KISKA or Rada~ sweep with 

cruisers along communicatiGn lines KISKA and ATTU toward 

homeland or both • . Ghormley• s D-Day is~ 7th and diversionary effect you~ operations will be fmpor·tant. 

AUGUST {GCT) 

01 0301 COMTASKFOR 

Consider adherence to KISKA bombardmen~ best · possi bl.e 

employment of this force. This is Part 1, 2 more parts 

to follow. For purpbse set forth in your 312145 GomTaskForce 8 sends -to CinCPac and Cominch as stated. 

Raiding line~ of connnunication used only intermittently and in dense f.og easy to attempt but practically sure 

of "barren results. No more assu~ed chance of fog free ~ttack on ATTU than on KISl'\:A with less chance of efficient 

weatoer prediction due to lack ·of observation of wes.ther 

to westward. 

01 0523 Thi-s is the second part of my 010301 from Col!lTaskFor s. 

Believe KISKA only important enemy position in area at 

present . Topography of island restricts bombardment to 

2 areas one to South other to East. Believe my plan bombarding from South by ·far the best. Bombardment from: 

Eastward requires a direct fire on main ca-mp West of 

North head and on main ship anchorages also hidden by North head. Only 2 secondary targets .North Head and new 

camp in Southern end of 'harbor can be bombarded by direc·t 

fire from Eastward. . Enemy shipJ¥ing to KISKA. observed 

rounding SEGULA Island indicating possibility of waters ,,between KISKA and MCARTHUR REEF p.ow mined against our 

submar-ines action however our submarine report there are 

no mines near approaches to KISK..l\... Bombardment from South 

b-est from all angles and believe bombardment plan wi11 

, produce decid-edly ~f ective res1.1l te. , Gqnsi.df3:n possibility 

of mine s in tnis area less l ikely., ' Ititend increasing 

bombardment range of heavy crui.sers ar.e outside hundred fathom curve most of b ombardment. Will use available 6 J O swee~ ahead of light cruisers in middl,e land, 
sncr•ru 

KUG UST ~ ( (JCT } 

01 0333 T COMTASKFOH 8 to CtNCPAC info ,coMiNCR 

Part 3 of ComTa.skFor 8 010301 

Utmost secr€t. ·Am modifying air _support plan to insure 

excellent wea. ther service and to- assure daily repetion of operations until main body reports bombardment com- plete d~ Section three 1 and last b:( Comtaskforce Eight's 010301. New plan is believed to meet most of difficulties so far en-countered.. E.x:gerience indicates not · 

enemy actlon out weather and delay caused thereby and 

lack of coordinating control were main obstac'les. Fog persists about eighty percent of time in objective area. 

during .July and August. Last clear day was-July 20. 

Fog. in approaches lifts over land so that harbor is at 

times clear when visibility o;ff shore is quarter mile 

or less. Will expedite next ef.font -t ·o maximum possible. J Expect to initiate move within 48 hours, 

02 0237 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

Most gecret. Assume carrier grouH your 011550 refers' 

to carrier task force. Until sttuatibn in Southwest and 

· enemy intentions particularly hi-s carrier fleet are 

clearer I feel unab~e to commit the additional force to 

the ALEUTIANS. In addition am reluctant to operate a 

Cast Victor in such bad weather area for any purpose. My 290525 June and 230327 July. AVG COPAHEE will be 

assigned Task Force 8 as soon as she reports ready for 

\ duty. 

02 .0240\ COMSOPAC to CTF 61 inf'o CIN'cPAct · CTF 62, CTF 63 

Most secret. Under information you plan to withdraw 

carrier support TULAGI a:rea prior to Dog plus 3 Bay. Necessity exists of providing continuous fighter coverage for area. ·Following plan pronosed for your considera ti o:Q: 

(a) Carriers prior to withdrawal leave 2 fighter squadrons~ GUADALCANAL ·(assuming field is ready}. . 

(b) Providing belly tanks fit fighter planes at ROSES, 

carriers fly tanks to ROSES abou~ Dog plus 4 Day then 

ROSES planes fly to GUADALCANAL -Dog plus 6 Day. 

(c) LO~IG ISLAND from position 200 miles South GUADALCANAL 

fly fi-ghter plane-s to GUADALC.(!lNAL and receive ·carrier 

planes for subseque·rl.t .return t -o carriers~ · 

Above p-la.n operative only on contingency no hostile carriers destined near this area. Should hostile carriers 

be detected subsequent to landing your fighters ·these 

fighters would be immedla tely re~eased to you fl' 

-.~ 

' ' 631,: 

\ 
_) 

01 235:5- CTN'CPAC ,~ to CTF 8 

-- _lf6st sec_:ret -. If" ·weather -continues _unsuitable- :for your 

planned operation take advantage ,tfiis -condition to make 

sweeps :to Southwestward ATW - KISKA with ona ~r two _ your cruisers m,ost efficient in ,Radar op~ration~ ~4. !II 

02 2220 COMSOPA~ -- o CTF 61, -62,63,16, 18, ~- In:f'G> COMINCR, ClNCPAC etc; 

Most secret. August 7th local Q.ate hereby de$ignated as 

Dog day under Comsop!lc Operation-Plan. 1-42. Leary pass 

to MacArthur. 
. ~ 

a8il0iliii' . 

AUGUST - , ' 

05· OOQ3 COMINCH to 

The Joint Chiefs of Sta_ff ha've approved the following operation f-or which.the coae~: name . is FIREPLAOE: '\ 

1.- Occupy TANAGA Isla_nd and construct airfield thereon 

in order to deny at.;'ea :tu Japan and to support own offen- sive opera ti oils. · · · 

2. · Task- 1 ... Seizure and occupation; Ta~k 2 - Construction of' airfield and· de~ensive works;_ " I -

3. Grnund force l Bn Inf Refnf 2· Btrys AA AW including 50 20mm Oerlikons 1, -Btry AA 3 inch 1 Brty AA searchlight 1 Btry il-55mm guns 1 Btr~ 75mm guns 2 Radars SGR 270 with 

crews 800 and 7th Engr R.n le~s 1 Co ~nd service detach~ 

ments approx total 3200.. Air f'orce such air units as 

may be directed by Comtaskfor 8 from units in ALASKA now 

under his contpol plus heavy bombardment squadron pre- viously restricted to NOThffi. Naval linits as directed by GomTaskFor ·s. 

4. Unity of Command vested in ComTaskFor 8 for · Tasl-- 1. 

Upon completion Task 1 and when agreed upon by Army and 

Navy t-ask commanders command of Army ground force will 

pass to senior Army coinmande_r for completion , of Task 2. 

Naval Task ~ ForGe Conrrnander will remain in command of wa. ter 

borne units and combined air units as heretofore. Direct 

communication between Army and Navy commanders concerned 

is authorized. . ' 5. Time of occupation to be determined by Joint Chiefs 

of staff premised on earliest availability of shipping and naval support forces now in Task Force 8 which latter 

cannot be augmented until certain current commitments 

elsewhere have - been met .. CihCPac provide 1 combat loading transport for initial landing thence to be returned 

to previous duty West Coast.. This transport to proceed San Francisco immediately report . to Connnander Weste1-.n 

Defense· command for loading, ,who will arrange f .or escort 

and rotating to KODIAK vr:i th ComWestSeaFron: Commander 

Western Defense Command will ari1

a.nge shipping for remaind-;-

er_ of Army unitB ~nvolved. 

6. :fithdrawa.l of' Naval units may be ·ordered by Joint 

Chiefs of Staff upon completion of Task ~ if conditions 

warrant. 

7. Preparation for execution of;., FIREPLACE will be -commehced upon receipt this dispatch. ComTaskFor' 6 ~e port 

to Comineh when forces have been assembled in KOD!AK 

DUTCH HARBOR area with recommends. ti on as to date of oc .... ~pation. Buchner pass to DeWitt • . ~tmost secrecy cfor 

this dispatch. -

633 
AUGUST (GCT) 

05 0105 8 info 

Recommendation of ,General DeTVi tt to Cominch and Chie r 

of Staff was entirely unila teraj: _. ComTaskFor 8 will 

Comme:ilt to CinCPac in another despatch.- . Gene :ral 's · 

despatch follows: · 

To Chief of Staff, U ~S. Army and Cominch,- U.s. Navy • . GG ADO and ComAlSec in ful~ joint agreement on following -: 

:~ 'fANA6A. offers .dec:tde.a.ly best airfiel·d facilities and 

Pield can be constructed and in shorten 'time after landing than at ADAK. Disadvantages of establishing field 

on TANAGA lie in' fac"t that· its harbor ·racili ties are, such that landing -and later supply maybe delayed as a 

result of bad weather or hostile submarines. The sooner 

the attack on KISI<:li is made the easier and less costly it will be. There is divergence of opinion on following: ComAlSec is of opinion that if field is to be built on 

TANAGA the initial delays from probable bad weather and 

enemy a.c.tion may be suer~ as t,o prevent entirely accomplish- ment of. .operations. CG VIDD considers, since time is ~ressihg , it is preferable to risk possible delay due to 

weather·nnd enemy action at TANAGA and -secure better field 

than to be certain of delay due to cons.truction dif.f'icul ties and s~cure less sa tisfact6ry field at ADAK. Com- _ TaskFor 8 feels if operation is directed he will require in addition to ·present force 1 CA 2 CVs 1 DD squadron and 

two squadrons Navy dive bombers ·to operate from UMNAK 

ini tia.lly and _from TANAGA,. at earliest possible date and ·. 

considers TANAGA BAY difficult to protect from hostile 

submarlne actlon. I consider operation should be initiated .at earliest possible date.__ Major items of egu.ipment not available to CG ADC essential: for o!)eration: 1 transport equipped for ship to ·shore movement either 

BELL or ALLEN and 1 squadron heavy bombardment. Recommend 

TANAGA site · b·e selected and urgen tly, request . eoxpeditious reply TOYP liere giving me .freedom of action to proceed with plans while I have opportunity to confer with Buckner .and ComTaskFo_r 8 _ ·signed DeWitt CG WDC. ComT_askFor 8 

sends to CinCPac for info. 

. ' 
(.GCT) 

05 0520 C011TASKjfOR 8 info :COMINCH, CINCPAO 

Part l of -3 •• ComTaskFor 8 serids,. Attended conferences 

with Generals Det'Vi tt "B.tld Bu6kn·er epncern.ing adP,.i tional 

western .air bases. .DeWitt arr.!:vea with mind a·pparently fully made up on move and all d~tai1s~ Buckner same. I 

oppose · creation of -intermediate bases and prefer neutralization or KISKA at this ti;me for reason set forth below. 

Comparing 2 base sites consider Army estimates of time to 

unload men stores _heavy machiner:y at TANAGA too" sanguine. Weather and submarine menace in 'o:pen harbor w~re entirely discounted. Information recently gained b~ ComAlSec per- sonal survey of TANAGA and ADAK disre~arded. _His estimate 

of difficulties at r_rANAGA and better harbor facilities at 

ADAK .did not sway DeWitt's decision. In preliminary conferences with Buckner voiced my conception of Naval objectiot?-s but merely informed DeYfi tt that I opposed plan for reasons of basic Naval strategy: involved adding that 

these conside.rations were however concern of high Naval . conrrnand and that I of course intended complete report to 

you. My thought was that large ·scale Naval commitments 

in two widely separa te·d areas violates fundamental prin- ciples Naval strategy. Such concurrent operations are 

only warranted by preponderant Nav-al strength. Stations 

addressed deliver all three parts. 

Considert that minimum reinforcements to Task Fonce 8 for 

necessary long cont~nuing support of proposed project are 

2 carriers one heavy cruiser one destroyer squadron 2 Navy dive bomoing squadrons~ Suggest~d that with these forces 

surprise operation to capture KISKA could be supported. Such ~ction followed by neutralization as enemy base and 

wi thdrawa1 is better_ ope.ration .. · Army preferred intermedi,a'te -base as firs-t mo:ve I offer for your con~iderat ion 

that ste_p -by step operations follow Dardanelles pattern., As campaign progresses this mo-ve must augment Naval com-: 

mi tmertts in this area. In la·ter conversation stated this to 

DeWitt .who agreed and further replied that he realized 

large t:leet action could -easily eventuate. I gathered that such eventualities .in the Pacific Naval Campaign appa~ently had no det·e,rrent effeet upor1: his· do:esire .. to -- prosecute his plans f'or the TANA'GK' base irr,espect'i ve of 

whether or not this fitted your pl'ans or those of Ad.~iral 

King~ At any time when inrrnedia t .e Naval support is 

inadequate TANAGA can become a second WAKE. 

63-5 
AUGUST (GOT) 

05 0625 COMTASKFOR 

(part of) .. . (050520) Part 3 of 3/ With total lack of Nav:al base facilitie.s 

in nearoy area day by day maintenance of this support for 

· protra.c ted period not possible. · .Defense plans based 

largely e.fficiency of" land based air support in this area 

considered doomed to failure. Prospective Army ~ANAGA 

forces believeQ. inadequate to delay strong enemy attack 

long enough tq permit timely arrival of· a naval force two ·days distant at inception " cf a-ttack. Regret length .but 

thought you would desire full exposition of my opinions particularly since your last directive requires diversion 

of enemy forces to the ALEUTIAN area which action would be 

strategically inconsistent with Naval operations designed initially to ·deny enemy ac~ion against the advance to and 

creation of a base in that area. · 

05 1237 CON~LSEO to COMNffiVESSEAFRON 

COM 13 to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COIViWESSE..4..FRON 

Conference was completed Anchorage yester¢la.y 'with Theobald: 

attending following investigation directed by Cominch 252000 

ffuly •· Hewett has submitted report. While I agree with ·Buckner that- TANAGA offers site for better and more readily built field than at ADAK believe he is much too optimistic · 

regarding effects of weather. Harbor is open to prevalling fall storms and experienced observers declare it untenable 

under those conditions. Not only will unloading operations stop but loss ·of lighters upon which Army is placing main 

relianc-e is probable. In my opinion ¢iifficul ties are underestimated and consequently means contemplated are considerable less than· necessary t o make the, plan sound. 

636 
_05 07,0 

-Treat with 1.1tmost _secrecy. When ~eady a_bout August S 

proceed with PECCAVI 9peration myser Ol66W. MAK!N 

de-signat-ed p:rimary objective. ,. ~l;so· re.connoit·er anQ. 

tnflict ·damage on '' ene~y at LI~'fl5~ ¥A:K+N, APkiANG, . MAlXA.l\1:, as oondit~o:ns " per;mit •. - Inte3Imi~tion ,own and 

_enemy forces will . ·be furnished &e~a~ately • . 

Handle as· most secret . .. One of ~o parts.- ·Gen-eral Harmon 

following a personal- inspection ()f . FANTAN, -POPPY, ·RoSES 

and IDT!J!QN makes 'th,e following recommendations (in wh'iah 

I emphati eally co noun) ·as representing t ,he minimum Army reinforcements necess_ary to prov!de a·dequate garrisons for present bases, to conduct operations inc,ident to 

succeeding Tasks 2 and j and subse.quent thereto·,- and to 

relie-ve amphibious 1J:nits in seized area.s: {a) Immediate 

dispatch to POPPY qf 3 fighter S<Iiladrons equipped with 

P-38 -airplanes for use in the GUAD~LCANAL and SANTA CRUZ areas. 

These airplanes can make·· fiight :ero}.ll POPPY ;b'.o - :SUTTON to 

GUADA~CANAL or SANTA: CRUZ. ~b) Initiate immediate re- . plaoemen~ of attrition Of B-17s ,. ifi the 11th g:7;oup. {c) ·. 

Dispatch as early .as prac~-1 oabl·e __ o:tte bombing squadron m~di~ 

to EOPPY for use -in the GUADALCANAL area. (d) Prompt d~s..:. 

patch of .. replacement fighter and medium bomber ·airplanes 

to POPPY and FANTAN and dispatch -a _s .. early aos - raq-ti~ able 

of one ftgh ter squadron to ·BUTT.ON, one to .. ROSES ana one · . · 

additional to POPPY. -(e) Dispa,t _ah .as early as pra.ctioabl.e". 

one bomber squadron. B-:b? to POPPY and one SqU:adron B-l?s 

to FANTAN ror permanent. station. ·_ E.nd ·'of part orie. 

05 0750 Part two. · 

- • . :· l 

· ( Cont inue d ., on . e:x:t ~ p·age) .. _ !l .,_,~ ( 
'SELMI 

AUGUST ( GCT) 

05 0730 COMSOPAG to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGENSOPAC.. 

05 0750 Part two- (Continued). 

1 battery 4th to POPPY one regiment infantry, one .regiment 

coast artillery antiaircraft 5th no decision has been 

made . as to availability of NEW ZEALAND troops. Availability 

would obviate need 6~ ·corresponding U. s. Forces. Written 

recommendations follow. Comgensopac has by hand. Comgensopac is also sen~ing the above recommendations direct to the 

Chief of Staff Army. 

05 2213 CINCPAC to CTF 8, 

Utmost secrecy. Report details recent inspection TANAGA. 

Unless landing was made and inspection party included 

technical assistants desire such a survey conducted at 

once and results reported to me earliest practicable date. 

05 2205 CINCPAC to CTF 8 info COMINCH. 

Utmost secrecy. Assume your 050520 sent qefore receipt 

Cominch 050003. Carry out plan contained Cominch 050003 

assembling necessary forces KODIAK pr_ior to ·arrival transport ordered in my 050955. 

06 2035 CINCPAC to 00~ l:SOPAC, Info COMINCH, CTF 17 ,18.61. 

It is my present intention to sail Task Force 17 plus 

GUADULUPE from PEARL about 17 August to relieve Task Force 

lS plus PLATTE on station. Unless otherwise requested by 

you will route 17 to cross equator in longitude 174-00 West 

command passing to you at that point. 

07 1030 CTG 61.2 to CO,.ifiSOPAC, CTF 61, and info addressees. 

Situation ·summary 'WATCHTOWER. Most secret. From CTF 61.2. - Approach a complete surprise 18 enemy seaplanes destroyed 

on water one small schooner. No enemy ships present. In 

both areas opened shore bombardment 1910 GCT 6th with ships an~ planes light gun opposition soon silenced. Landings began FLORIDA area 2040 initial opposition light GUADALCANAL 

2210 no opposition. Para. At 0220 GCT 7th about 25 enemy tj~e 97 bombers pass~d overhead dropped several bombs no 

damage proceeded toward carriers 2 ·shot down 2 damage~. 

About 10 enemy type 99 dive bombers madel 250 pound h~t on 

:MUGFORD 0400 considerable damage after deck house 2 guns 

two engines on 15 missing 5 dead 9 seriously inj~red. 2 

enemy planes shot down. Para. Situation at 0900: GUADALC~~AL all troops ashore esti~ated occupy on ,west line 

(Conti~ued on next page) 538 
ii13lilil1f 

AUGUST ( GCT) 

07 1030 ~C~T-G--~~~~~~~~C~T~F~6~l~,~a~n~d~i~nf~o~a~d~d~r~e~s~s~e~e~s~* 

(Continued) 

TENARE River and on east security line about longitude 

160-06 in neither place in contact with enemy. On FLORIDA 

side I1ALAVO occupied no opposition. TULAGI occupied except east e~d fight continues GAVUTU captured heavy casualties TAI~M~BOGO still in hands of enemy attack underway. 

Para. Tomorrow request maximum fighter cover 2 VSB 

squadrons continuously in area. Request scouting against 

approach enemy surface forces from westward para. Early 

morning 8th expect send out SANTA CRUZ occupation rorce 

less PRES .JACKSON, WILSON, plus McCAWLEY, FULLER, HEYWOOD, 

TREVER, MUGFORD, some other APs later in day. Tonight 2 

DMs searching for fighters shot down near RUSSEL ISLAND. 

One WASP dive bomber shot down by zero fighter according to 

pilot wounded gunner lost. · 

08 OJJO CTG 61.2 to COMSOPAC, CTF 61. 

Squadron Xray attacked 0100 GCT 8th by about 40 type 

99 twin engine torpedo nlanes and 8 high altitude bombers. 

JARVIS hit in forward part of ship by torpedo disabled am 

towing into shallow water. ELLIOTT on fire amidships from 

bomb hit. Not known yet whether ship can be saved. At 

least 12 enemy planes shot down probably more by ships and fighte~s. 

5 08 1951 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPACFOR. 

09 0315 

Utmost secrecy. Assuming successful completion present 

operations recommend pending initiation Task 2 that Task 

1 be extended to permit Ghormley to extend control as 

practicable northwest along the SOLOMONS to increase 

security of TULAGI area. 

FLETCHER to COMSOPAC. 

FLETCHER sending to GHORMLEY 8 Following summary of messages delivered from TURNER. Qllote at 081645 surface ' 

attack on screen coordinated with use aircraft flares. 

CHICAGO hit torpedo, CANBERRA on fire. At 2100 GCT. 

Heavy actions continue to westward. More of our ships in 

trouble. Submarines in area. At 2152 GCT. QUINCY sunk 

by torpedoes and gunfire. Air attack enroute. At 2325 GCT. 

VINCENNES sunk by gunrire and torpedoes. 0245 casualties 

heavy. At 2358. ASTORIA has fire in wardroom destroyer 

ordered to pump and ALCHIBA to tow through LTTNGA channel 

to ROSES as chance to save her. Movements requires protection which I am unable to provide. Unquote. Direct 

TURNER to make reports direct to you info to me. 

639 
~ AUGUST { GCT) 

09 0508 CTF 62 to CTF 61, COMSOPAC, COMSWESPAC. 

Following departed GUADALCANAL 0400 GOT 9th for NOUMEA 

via LERGO channel and north of SAN CRISTOBAL. Captain 

Reifsmider in command 5 APs, 5 AKs. CHICAGO, 4 DD, 5 

DMs speed about 12. JARVIS enroute alone to ROSES expect 

to provide escort. 

09 0725 CTF 62 to COMAIRSOPAC, COMSOPAC, CTF 61. 

Expect depart 0730 Zed {Zone Zero) 9th GUADALCANAL for 

NOUMEA !ffiNGO channel and north of SA}T CRISTOBAL speed about 

12 with seven APS, one .AK, SAN JUAN, AUSTRALIA, HOBART, 

four APDs 10 DDs. Turner in McCAWLEY with this detachment. 

09 0750 COMSOPAC to CTF 61,62,63, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPACFOR. 

Comtaskfor 62 direct withdrawal naval surface forces to ~~ITE POPPY. If 2nd marines still present direct them to 

land and reinforce CACTUS. If landing of 2nd marines has begun 

at APRICOT direct it to continue as ulanned. If 2nd Marines 

have departed CACTUS andlanding at APRICOT not repeat not 

commenced divert 2nd marines to BUTTON to. land and reinforce 

garrison there. Insure delivery this directive by despatch 

to appropriate task group commander. Comtaskfor 63 direct withdraw~l patrol planes and servicing tender from ~uun~SIKE 

estuary. Likewise withdraw from APRICOT if 2nd Marines do 

not land there. Comtaskfor 61 cover movement as practicable 

without interference with fueling. Leary hand MacArthur. 

Comsopac sends action Comtaskfors 61, 62, 63. For info to 

Cincpac!1 Cominch. Comgensopac has by hand. 

CO!vJAWESPACFOR. 

09 0950 COMSOPAC, TF 62, Info Comgen 1st mardiv. 

Comsopac sends. Believe enemy landing forces proceeding 

CACTUS. 

09 1000 CO~ffiOPAC, to all. US NAV SHIPS SOPAC AREA, info NAV ATT WELLINGTON 

~nis is from Comsopac. Following instructions were sent in 

another system to TF corns: CTF 62 direct withdrawal naval 

surface forces to WHITE POPPY. If second marines still present 

direct them to land and reinforce CACTUS. If landing of · 

second marines has begun at APRICOT direct it to continue as 

planned. If second Marines have departed CACTUS and landing 

at APRICOT not r~peat not commenced divert second Marines to 

BUTTON to land and reinforce garrison there. Insure delivery 

{Continued on next page) 

64 0 
-this dir ti ve b¥ despatch to " appropri+ate _TG- commander~ ._ . CTF 63 · dir~ct withdrawal pa~rol l> ~~n. es and serv:icing· tender - .from MARMASIKE Estuar51~ Likewise · withdraw fr-om APRICOT . ~ .. 

"" i:t Seo on~. Marines ·db not land th·er.e. · "CTF 61 cov~r movements' -. 'as :Qrac ~ioa.ble witiiout interf ere:n~e!< with. fuelfng ~ · Unit ' -. ·- _ commanders of detached -units take Qharge and carry out _ the above in the absence of. other instructi-ons. 

09 · 1212 COMSOPAC to CTF 63. 

From Oomsopac. My 090~50. Withdraw BREESE and "ALDRICff with 

McFARLAND .• · 

Most secret. Carriers short oi' fuel proceeding to fueling 

rendezvous. Have been unable get situation -reports :fa:-om 

TURNER d~reot. FLETCH.ER informs me " .. tun receiving de spatches . 

from TUJ::>J.TEH describing heav,y losses in eruisers ~_ in engage- ., __ ment which continues t _o westward" • . Also in ga:vbled message_: -

CHICAGo: hit torpedo, cM;rBERRA on tire, more of our ships in trouble~ ·submarines (question) in area, QUINCY ~unk: by 

torpedo, air attack enroute". Para. Am withdrawing other _ naval surface forces- and patrol planes unti.t such time as I 

have shore based airc"I"aft in such strength tl;l.at ·I can protect my~ lines of communication t .o CACTUS and su.p_ply CACTUS" M 

rtith suffi,oient aviataon for effective defense • . )leque.st 

immediate_ air reenfor-cement espeGially long . rah-ge fighters and 

heavy bombers. - · 

09 1230 COI ISOPAO ~ to- CTF 63 t Info CTF 61, CINC.PAO, TF- 62-. , 

Vessels Task Force 62 withdrawing· in several, groups and ! possib1Y: ""0Ue or two sing le: ships. Inteng. p~(.)G~e d "north of 

SAN GR'[S~OBAL t .o ;NHTTE POPPY except :~ three or f.our ships to .- .. ROSES. · ·Oarrier grou:ps- proceeding to fuel in ~ rendezvous 

to west , o-r line BUTTON-ROSES<} .Modify; searches to provide 

maximum, possible cove.r e.ge for _task :: roroe '62 units. Comsopa·o, s~nds ~ · · · · 

·i'. ' 

., _; Utmost f;H~crec . Conisopa·e 'OSjO.S)O ~ > One . arine~· ~ . s~u~d . ·, 

18. planes· proceed.ing _80PAC 15 Aug:ust· supplements s1m1la~ 

s quadro:rL arriving vi i~ity SANTA CRUZ Island _13.: Augus~ ,,111 •. 

LONG I SLAND . Est i mate" one CV r epJ::a·oement qu~dron ready o_:ne , Sept. · No- :t:U:rther a ir ·support a -v·ai_i a ble from _Bawaiia,n area · 

-Which UO".l Opera ting wi,tli minimum 'U}argin ?,!? rating 09mple,- .·. , ~ ' r, .. ,, • 'il ' . . , 

laohti,nuea. "on ri e~t . 
v 

(Continued) ' 

ments and -no reserve rbr -~ losses •. -- un,:til his -~ posftion; imprO·VBS'' 

recom..lD.end Ghormley be---authorized "' ~e_tain his area Arniy heavy ··· 

and, medil.Uil_ bombers ~owi< enro"Qte ~c~ and that"_ additional 

· suppoTt -be furnish~d _from- SO IE!~TB Mobile .A,.fr~ ;.- Force ·and _ u 

fighters -as!>\ practicable-. "·. · · -

09 _2219 CINCPAC t ·o COMINCH. 

U~most secrecy. Request informati on status my :086155" 

In compliance with dir-e.cti ve _given ·Tneobald when -your 

05D003 was received he is having an in~peotien party .. landed T~AQA by submar:tne. I de-$1_.;-re to can.cel this i:t 

location of base is to be changed. 

10 0340_ COMSOPAC (A) to COMSOPAC. 

Handle with utmost secrecy. New Z~aland Army is pl~nning to - provide reenforced division as requested by you total strength 

approximately 20,000 men. Despatch o·f forc·e is subject 'to _approval of New Zealand_ -government. -Prime Minister reserves - his decision until a:rt.-er personal cQ:nsultati-on with Admiral 

Q-hoJ?m.ley. For planning purposes following reque-s_t-ed at early 

date: P:nfority forward displacement o:r New Zealand units; - names o~ -APs and AKs tb be made avail~ble; date o~ availability vesse_ls at LONGBOW. Only 16 AA ·guns, on wheels avail- _ -

able (additional 32 on improvised mountings ultimately to be - ,provided)". Will this number suffice for 1st echelon. ,"' Im- ~ provised -mountings _fo-r 6- inch coas~ guns are being con~ 

structed.- .. Will any l~5 mill1meter -guns w-ith maa:-ine units be ·~ 

made available until New Zealand. is able to supply coast 

def'ense 'guns and mounti-ngs. ;plans he.re contemplate Unit.ed - Statces Forces CACTUS-RfN@BOLT area--will provide equipment 

for movlng New Zealand equipment from ship to s'hore. Foroe 

oan_ qe avtj~ lable _beginning -25 Augu~t. -· Prime Min,ister states_ tt imme-d;j/ate dec1sio:q. -no_t n-eoes·s·a;ry::;)l:e ·will plan -on leaving " 

FULCRUM --:u;:- August v ia_ Coronado but ·if·-· early· deoi sion desired . wfl~ try-J anticipate this dat~ via Tasman. He has been- ihfo:rm·ed 

ear.ly decision is urgent. · New Zealand Army mak:tng prepare-_ ations ±n advance of ap.proval. ' 

.This is- m9st _ secret.· l?elieve~ eneiay 1a.11 _ ex ecnitn~ .. lan,:E! ing .. ,, , . attac]$: against_ our troops in -CAGTUS· area~ llequeost you, con- oentrat~ your ·subma.ri·nes in :that .az:ea. , Requ~st continue aerial 

reconnaissance as in your 260955 J"uiy .,, Action MacArthur. I 
August (GOT) 

10 1830 C01vfiNCH to CINCLANT·,. Info Commands -concerned. "" 

This is eJCtra secret. Direct SOUTH DAKOTA escorted by 

minimum 3 destroyers proceed earliest practicable date P.~~~ [A. - Upon arriv~l PkW~ A SOUTH DAKOTA report Cincpac 

:for duty Batdi v 6. Hold DUNGAN LANDSDOVITNE IARD}JER Canal 

Zone - :e~r onwar.d esco-rt- as directed by Oincpac •- Intend 

that SOTJTH DAKOTA shall augment Ghormley. -

Treat as most secret. _ Desire full information as , pract-ica.ble of your nlans as they develop. As -reaction 

of enemy appears strong toward tJ:ie south and negligible toward ;your area comme-nt as to destrability rotating your 

force in~ small units to Bremerton for upkeep. 

10 1418 ADMIF..A~TY to Cincpac. 

Hush most secret. Following is (Cincpac from Admir:alty). 

A repetition of F.O.I/0 Ceylon 0301Z/10 addressed Admiralty from FO.IC Ceylon pass following to Cincpac from Cine E.F. 

begins hush. Recent diversion carried out by Force A in 

Bay or Bengal appears to have been successful as Japanese ' 

have sent fighter float planes to Sabang, additional 

bomber squadron to Sabang and surface ship movements are 

reported in Ivialay area. 2. I have to return to Kilindini 

for operation in that area but have arranged wireless 

diversion to give impression that force as sti:)..l operating in this area until 18th August. 3. ·'Ne wish you .. all -success 

in your present operatipn. 0259Z/10 ends. 0301Z/10 ends. 

10 1840 COMINCH to C!NCPAC. · 

War Department has directed Comg-ensopac to exp.edite 

through South Pa.ciffo Area movement of airplanes destined for Au_stralia unless by their diversion- they can 

be more effecti ve·ly' used in South Pacific Area. This 

message is- unusually' secret. · -_ ': .. 

09 2040 CTF 8 to .CINCPAC. 

Prelim.:i:nary Army estimates on operation FIREPLACE. Phase 

l initial landing and: occupation troops 2863 tonnag·e 12429. 

Phase. 2" Reinforcements -troops 5250 tonnage ) ·0500. Phase 

3. Additional equipment · housing ", tonJiage 10000 'i . Phase 4. 

Monthly maintainence tonnage 908_4. Army :plan calls for 

moving heavy -equipment from Chernofski to destination by · 

barge sp_eed of advance about 5 knots. Survey of island and 

harbor i ·S being· ma.ae by 2 Naval aviators, 1 Marine officer 

and 1- Civil Engineer embarked on FINBACK arriving there 

about 10 .f\ug. Your 052213. 

r 

. 
10 

I·· 

~dle With ult r~' s"e ecy = ' . Estimate' 0~4NG:E. streng~:ti _ ~~sl!larcR: Sol~mons 1 ;, C:O.oka~ 4 Aoba· ,2 T,e:nryu .l Yubari . 6 ,Kam:t,kaz_e I+ M~nekaze, 4i; :RO Suhs:. S -I subs ~:-,1 Ctittose· 2 t 'o ·-, 

- l(amfga~ 4 PT 4 PC 2 tl1 16 SO -L.t AM -6· to 8 Ji:P 4 to 6 AK • . -,- --Enro~te ~rom Malaya. -2 ~ogamf 4 Shlgure-- 1 K~:migawt;J.. }Enrqute "from !3MP~'xe .8 A'Sashio 1 to 2 1\amiga.wa. Have no hint of 

damage to e~emy surface craft -· except his . ahnou.noement 2 

·.- damaged GA.. He.avy atr reenfor .. aem,ents -have- arrived or ape "-

enroute =Rabaul btit. enemy air lasses_ in recent engagements ~. 

wer.e -very _ h.eavy. -No Jndicatinn any CV has y_et left -emp.:i:re. · ~ 

P~ra. :Your 1-01006.. ~ost ~ important to ,- successful acoomp- . 

. l~shnlent. Task- 1 that landing . be pr·ev·ent'ed. Assume you will ·'J.lSe carr::te: task 'forces as praot.icable on opposit,ion :thereto. Most ~mportant that airc~aft of Sowespac detect and 

report movement in time and that when our carriers are in 

range ot· e·nemy aircrat:t their _bases be- bombed in such a -· 

manner as to effect maximum damage -during such period. 

C±N8'PAC to C Oli!INGH 

Intercepts from Gh<rrmley :tndic ate :--

0 (a) ·BUPTON to be strong 

p"oirit for' relnfo.rc.ement RINGBOLT CAcrrus and occupation . ,APRICPT. (b} 2nd: N.ar1nes did not land APRICOT. (c) Opera- . tional losses PBYs appear co_nsiClera.b1e.-. (d) Fletcher's CV 

Task Forc.es ·probably commenced fueling yesterday. (e) As 

9rang e .expected to land re:i:nforeemen ts· CACT,:US G:hormley requests ~~cArthur's subs that area. (f) Radio contact ,esta-blished by ComSoPac w.i tb Vandergrift but no report yet. 

Para.-. · · · 

Bombardment at KISKA was hampered by fog during _approach 

and low ceiling during f..iring *'hich preyented spotti;ng or _ observation df damag e.. Own loss 1 plane onlw_ damage· to 

'ships w~s minor due to own .gu~fire. Para. ' ~ .y • :;,~ ~-

";eo 

:Plan to sail VESTAL So'?ac August 15th to assist in -salvage 

. ·ana r ep.a'irs • " ~- ", - "., ~' 

CTF; 

· Thi·s -/is to be handled as most s e c Pe t. c. ·F ollowing is firs.t 

-·s;ttu-? t i on ·.~rep ort J~ i veJ:J;, :rr.e ,by - ~gri ft . t imed 1012 02. _We 

hold -TULAGI · J"AVUTU lVTAKAMBG '11

AN:AMBOG O and ha:ve 5.,000 .men 

tha. t area whi_ch s taken only a f'·t _e r b1 t ,te r fi ghting due . 

- r e s-trict-ed a.re.as _-.',. Ou::& ~ ca s;ual.tfe s there " es:t!i ma. t:e:d ., about ·· . . ·450 .- Jap . ca sual tfe s 00~ ;f unn~ng over '" ,o o. ~ 'Also <hold . . JCUKQON t 'o . KOLI Pa.:tnt GUADALCAUAL dfgging :tn to d efend 

beaches. ·· Have few , tool's ·and ri.o• ba:rbed wi r _e .. . rollin g 

to mo~ J.lP garrison ·300 tr oo.ps -~ and, ~,000 . J?ioneers . wh9. with-

~ ~re'' · ~o busb-·, Have d:ts~p~ed o:f nu.nibe.r. , ·and ns. · s.uf .. t:e d .· , a few casual ti.es. Airf~e.-Id ready figh·ters _ a.nd di tre bomb ers • 

844 
' . 

. AUGUST ( GC'l1 ) 

11 0206 to CTF' 61 info All Cams SoPac, CINCPAC 

Handle as most secret ~ G:hormley sending· Ftetcher a'ction" 

Leary pass to MacArthur. Harmon will have by hand. In 

addi-tion t_a the eont!nu:tng primary task of' destroying carriers encountered the present tasks of carrier tas1r forces 

are: (a). Cover BUTTON WHITE POPPY line of con;Jmunications (b) Support CACTUS RINGBOLT garrison by destroying ships · 

of hostile attack force (c) _ Cover movement of our aviation 

ground crews ground equipment and ·aviation su,.pplies into 

CACTUS area. I hope we can give you about -24 hours warning ·of hostile landing attack force moving against CACTUS, and 

I estimate most probable point of hostile landing in West 

end of CACTUS. Will keep you informed of. plans under Task ( c ) · above • · · · 

· 11 0226 COMSOPAC to CINCPAG info COMINCH, ETG. 

11 0650 

'' In order conserve carriers and their aircraft and other 

vital surface craft, request transport planes, maintained 

at 2 squadron level, for transportation personnel and 

material to CACTUS area. ComSoPac to CinCPac actiorr and 

to Oominch, ComSoWestPacfor, OomGenSoPac, Comtaskfor 61·, 

62 and 63 information. Leary pass ~ to MacArthur. 

CTF 62 to COMAMPHIBFORSQPAC info COMSOPAC ' 

Position here secure but feel that considerat~ons not 

previously apparent should be pres en ted. l~ovem.en t of sup- plies and preparations of defenses. progresslng slowly due 

to shortage of equipment -and ·material. Preparing to defend 

nine thousand yards beach. Is now obvious that ,a form of 

perimeter defense is required, since hostile detachments ~ade into jungle befbre patrols. Have mopped up a few and 

suffered some casualties. Equipment and supplies captured indi.cate· Jap meant this to be a major b.ase c"''and may attempt to retake it. Information desired as to prospective employ- ment of Second Marines. We must have reconnaissance of 

sea and air approaches. · Situation requires an additional 

infantry regiment on GUADCANAL to defend against a major att~ck.Va.ndegrift to Turner. Rupertus has takep objectives · 

after tough ·going reports- he is digging in. He needs means 

to go after hostile detachments on FLORIDA. , Action ComAmphibforSoPac i~fo ComSo~a.c. 

. . ' ~ 

64 5 
. '· t\,. 

BEOI£1!.11 ~· 

AUGUST (.GCT) · 

ll -2.030 ' GINCPAC 

) ~ 

Your 062035 seems tome to unduly expose Hawaiian area 

because relief on station will involve absenc-e of 

earrier group for some I? to l5 ~aj~~ Para~ 

Therefore request you explore pr~;c ticra.bility o_:E: rotation 

of . ca.r..rier Task Groups -so that a:t -all' times at least one · 

such gr.oup 'Will be within say I200 miles of PEARL except when extraordinary circumstance·s _: warrant otherwise. 

11 2209 CINCPAC: to COMSOPAC -~~j.nfo GOMINCH, CINC SOVJESPAC 

Treat as ultra sec.ret. Close association CinC 2nd and ~· CfnC lat ~ir Fleet wi'th CinC 4th and 8 Fle~t and 11th. 

11 2220 

12 0216 

Air B+.e.et suggests probability of formation of ~trong 

striki-ng force for employment in .BISiviARK-SOLOMONS in 

near future. Preliminary organization seems iio be First 

Air Fl'eet ·task force: -HIYEI., KIRISHIMA, SHOKAKU, ZU1KAKU, RXUJO~· HO.SHO, T8NE, CHih.'lJMA, KUMANO plus another cruiser. 

2nd Fleet task force; H.A.RUNA, KONGO, MYOKO, HAGURO, MAYA, 

TAKA.O, one XA V 2 desdi vs. Need .for logistic arrangement~ · 

plus necessity assemble destroyer screen from present e:s:-

cart missions indica-te movement surface reinfbrcements 

will not materialize for seven - ten days. Para. 

Every means available must be empl0yed to strengthen our 

position in RINGBOLT CACTUS area prior to arrival above 

force in area. Cover must be f11nnished by carrier aircraft as ~ong as necessary and carriers while' wLthin 

range enemy .air bases should be given maximum protection by action of shore based air against these bases. 

COMSOPAC to CINCPAO info COMINCH 

Delayed reports from 'rurner state CHICAGO torpedoed in 

stem can make 12 knots; PATTERSON,· MUGFORD, RALPH TALBOT 

Q.amaged- by gunfire; AST.ORIA blew up and sank; E~LIOTT 

"stranded still burning.. · "' 

C.OMSOPAC to CTF 63, OOMTRANSDIV 12 info ·arNCPA-C, ETC. 

Handle - as most secre''t. Early establishment air a f CACTUS . imperative. Load all APDs present_ and arriving with AvGas· 

AvLub, bombs·, ammunit·:to,n., aviation· ground pe:rsonnel ahd 

mater:tal available· and despatch ·earliest poasible . via LUNGA 

CHANNEL to arrive OAOi1US lat~ afternoon unloaa during nigb,t and depart early followihg m6rnin{;S return BU~TON ... Furnish 

air coverage. Aviation ground personnel will be replaced BUTTON from William 1

Nard Burrows.. Aviation will be flown 

CACTUS from LONG ISLAND. Leary -pass to "MacArthur. , 

648 
AUGUSr.l} ( GCT) 

12 0220 GREENIJAN to CTF 62 info COIViCRU.!:!£ 

From Greenman: RecomrJend immediate removal all inflammable material vicinity well deck and hangar including 

planes from cruisers ASTORIA typ.e.. Fires started this 

area ydtb.in first five minutes -or -action drove engineer- ing personnel from after engineroom and after fireroom 

resulting in immed_iate loss of fifty percent of power and 

intense heat and smoke made all after fire control and 

ship control stations untenable. Observations- and statements of survivors indicate same situation developed in 

o"t e_r two cruisers pre seen t. 

12 0316 COMSOPAC to COMS9WESPACFOR info CTF 61, -62,63, CINCPAC 

Retired position our carriers wbile awaiting enemy attack 

with relation distance HABAUL to enemy objectives makes 

necessary they receive information enemy naval surface 

movements earliest moment. I am unable reliably to intercept reconnaissance pilots reports therefore request they be transmitted to me on Task Force Cams circuit as soon 

as received by you. Leary pass to MacArthur. 

12 1056 COMS-OPAO to MAOARTUUR info CINCPAC, CTF 61, 63. 

Most secret. Large assemblage vessels RABA'(JL as reported in ComSoWesPacfor 120335 may indicate initiation expected 

movement against CACTUS - RINGBOLT area. If air striking 

ePoups as outlined your 191034 July are still available . attacks on such groups vessels would be of inestimable 

benefit in fu.rtb.erance our joint _operations. 

12 1750 COUTITGH to CINCPACIn view Japanese concentrations that appear to be directed 

towa1")d RABAUL you should consider -advancing 3 to 5 battle- ~hips of Task Force ~ to BLEACHER. Desire your comment. 

Parai · 

Am directing JUNEAU to join SOUTH DAKOTA. SOUTE DAKOTA's 

ETA _PANAMA l9 August. 

12 2047 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

PBY5A landed on field at CACTUS yesterday. Field excellent 

condition 3600 feet long now. and_ will complete additional 

900 feet in 3 days. Ca.ptain G.reenman in preliminary repor,t 

recommends immediate removal all inf1a.ma.ble material including planes vicinity well deck and hangar f.rom ASTORIA type~ Survivors indicate serious fires there all 3 ships 

early part of action. LUNGA-KUKUM area bombed by three 

enemy planes. Target area otherwise quiet., . - Ghormley ha.~ 4 7 

requested M:acLJ~I'thur to employ air ·striking group against ~ar$~ number 9f ships reported at RABAUL. P~tr~,. iivill reexamin 

J-P.f'.Lamrnable s1tuation on cruisers but do not :tntend to remove their nlanes .. 
MOHEP 

.. '· . Al!GUST (GCT) 

12 2337 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

Utmost Sec1"\e~.. Following comments your 112030 and 121750 

are based upon present estimate enemy intentions which may 

be further clarified before our next moves.. Enemw strength 

appears to be destined for NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMON area 

therefore consider improbab]e serious attack against MIDWAY 

and even less against OAHU. A raid in force is of higher 

probability but opposing it with one carrier task force 

would be ineffectual and might well result in loss of 

carrier without compensating damage to enemy. Para.. 

Unable provide logistic support in SoPac area for battleships task force 1 with ships now available and doubt BB 

usefulness unless we can operate them in close support 

CACTUS area.. Consider we can best oppose enemy that area 

with shore based air, carriers a.nd fast forces including 

new battleships. Therefore while developments next few 

days ~ay change my opinion I believe that maximum carrier 

strength will be needed in South and that this can be obtained best by an overlapping relief of Carrier Task Forces 

on that station. Para. 

Am bringing Task Porce 1 into Pearl Harbor ·for possible 

use against landing attack this area.. For reasons above 

I will not send any of the slow battleships South unless 

so directed by you. Para. 

For reasons ~iven in my 310215 and because additional 

planes being dispatched SoPac ~rom HAWAII I aga~n urge the 

air reenforcements requested in that dispatch. 

Handle as most secret~ ComAirSoPac originates. Radio 

Tulagi deliver to ComGen CACTUS for action . Four APDs 

Transdiv 12 will depart ESPIRITU SANTO daylight tomorrow 

morning Friday 14th proceeding direct route LUNGA harbor 

speed of advance 18 knots. Expect arrive • •••••. •. .... 

13 1248 COMSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC 

If you have any expert Radar personnel send 1 or 2 to . CACTUS on APDs repeat APDs tomorrow good Jap set there 

intact with plans needs expert to figqre out how to work 

it. 

648 
.3iWil0T 

.r'\ AUGUST ( GCT) . 

13 1418 ·coMIHCt-I, ALL SOPAC 

!""'\ · This .message 1'Vas · hand~d ,me by "' Turner tonight. ·CTF 62 dispatch 090230. Prey:J..ously: vecei VE;d by OomSoPac.FoT ' other address~~ is hereby ~eenc phered for yqu~ information:; As of. 9 houl~s -8th s'i tuation as i'uilows: CTG 61.2 

to ComSoPae CTF 61 info to CTG 62 ;,.4 and 6, Co:mA:ir SoPac, CinCPac, C.ominch, ComSoWesPac _ latten pass to MacArthur 

NPlll pass my 080330 to s.ame address para. 

Progress r-etarded today by beach .. congesti.on stubborn enemy resistance north side one enemy .a.ir attack and one f'alse alarm. Desi~e . e~press appreciation for warhings by coast watcher Bougainville. Para. 

ELLIOTTS fire caused by torpedo plane diving on boa:rd .fire got out of control removed personnel and had ship tor- pedoed but she grounded on shoal and is stili burning. JARVIS anchored not taking. water engines and bailers okeh hull bottom open from frame 50 to 55 deck damaged can make 4 to 7 knots ovm power will try to get her to ROSES start- ing tonight 14 enlisted mfussing 7. wounded para.. 

Continuing dischaTge of cargo tonight plan temporary re- tirement from area tomorrow see separate dispatch~ para. 

Shore GUADALCANAL KUKOOM and airfield occupied. Enemy troops and construction workers scattered considerable -stores equipment captured.. No advance yet to East. Con- dition airfields reported separately. Para. · · 

FLORIDA area Marin&s hold TULAGI GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO except for occasional snipers • . Assault on MAKAMBO planned for 2300 GCT on 9th. Severe &hemy resistance after initial landing required use all 3 battalions of 2nd Regiment. This will delay APRICOT operations. Reconunen;a. use there .of 7th Regiment. In view further operations CTF 62 remains on MCCAWLEY. 

13 ~135 CINCPAC to COMINCH 

Most secret. I . presume feasibility of Southwest Paci~ic 

l &nd .f or ces expelling Jap~nese from Northeast NEW GUINEA 

is being fully .. examined. This would tremendously improve 

our position . with respect t o RABA1JL and its accomplishment should be assisted by enemy' s preoccupation with RINGBOLT ' t.:trea. 

. ... 

' 649 
15 --o746 

:Handle ~s .most secret. Four- APbs aue CACTUS -toElay-. It 

is planned to send ilil ALHENA FONMALHAUT witli fooGl, ammunition as- soon "after loading as " possible and FULLER 

ZEJLI!{ with antiaircraft and b,arrage balloon units soon 

as practicable. Hostile submarines and aircraft operat- _ing CACTUS area fre~ ly. ~nemy surface vessels ·m.ay be 

expe-cted for purpose of blockading. CqmAirSoPa.c comment 

on following_ propqsa=ls (to be inttiated earl~est possible - date-): ·· (a) Maintain daily -antisubmarine pa.trol VPB plane~-­

armed depthbombs in CACTUS area as many hours daylight as 

pos-sJ ble until air forces ashore are prepared assume this 

duty. Fuel available KUKOOM field. (b) Bomber ' patrol 

sent O:aiiy into vicinity CACTUS RINGBOLT on offensive -

sweep _against surface vessel~. .Due consider.a.tion to pe 

given -your primary -task. · 

inf-o _ C OMS 01

JIJES P A. C z 

Haridle. a ·s ·most secret. ~ ComSoPac sends to Gominch, CinCPa.c 

acti-on. -Leary pass to MacArt!+uP. - Situation 16 August. 

11_,000. Marines hold._ ~ortn coas O:l!ADALCANAL to depth 5 

miles·- from KOLA Point to ,., Point ORU:K including .a-irfield, . enga.geq.·-q,onstructing perl:me~e-r defense impro v;~g airfield . . ,s:nd patr-olling ai t . guerillas · a few . daily: casual tie~. 

T'otS;I c-a ual t:le's i7o date pr obably ex,cee-d CLLFN hundred. · 

Som:e .Afirm .f\firm lan riled ·out·no coast defense .. 6,000 ltlB. nEfs hold TULAG-I GAVUTU TANAMBOO O MBANGAr MOKAMBI and 

spots ·on·· adj acent ,!~;LOR IDA coast line . Mt¥rines have only 

app roximatel y 5 units of fire and 3 .da-ys rati-ons du e to .. ear ly ;;o rced withdr awal o.f APs _ arl;d .AKs. · Wi_ th inadegua.:l{e _. eq pnr~ nt E;t t t empti

74ng i,mprove jfield GUJ-\DA1C.A,NJ\L .. on whi ' ~ 

fi ght ere" cart novr~· rc dj Jhnerny .'a.i nora.£t and s-:q. bmS:~ines . 

threaten ·all shi pplng-:rn t h e area . , ent~ 4- AP12s i.rito area · 

l a s t nU.ght with AvGa s AvLub avia:tion spa'r e ·parts and some .. 

ground _crews . No v~t rd as -t o success or f"a.ilure of this 

action"~ · . . 

on next page) 
--' 

' ' ~ 

AUGUST (GC'[') 

l~-~'- 1951 COMINCH :.t ·o CI A~ ; C0~1S OPAO, COM~ PAC, CIJ\TC COMSOWESPAC-

~i. 

Treat _ with utm-ost sec~ecy this mes~age from . Joint Chiefs 

of Staff to Commander Southwest 17a c ific Area arid to Com~ . ' mandar· Sou'th Pacific.. Para. 1.~ .Information ~ecefved from . . - Oin:Q S~VP:A indie &tes,"' that plans and p~eparations for opera-:: .. tions- in ·the NE\~T GU!NEA area have· i:>rogressed to sue.h a pqfnt 

that, based upon the successful rirogress of T8:sk One, it 

should be ·practicable· .to mount immed:iately that part of 

Task 2 :t-nvolving t'h;e seizure and ·occupation of -LA.E, SALAMAlJA 

and the Northeast Cbast of NEW GTJ §[£-TEA~ ·A mes-sage from 

Cincpae urges such -actton. Early €:Xecution of such an ope:r:~­

tion wou ld . appear to b~ especially · desirabl~; :- Para 2. 

Execution of that part of Task 2 Cominch 022IOO_ July involving. the Seizure and·_·occupation of LAE, SA:Il:AlVfAUA and the 

Northeast coast of NEN GUIT\f.Efo. should be push~ d: Para 3. 

With this end in v1ew desir~ : A. · G_hormleys estimate of 

time required for ,consolidating "Q osi tions seize-a and occupied in Task One, including ulans of relieving -Marines 

for· further offensive- operations.. B. Ant.icipated progress 

of measu~es plannecf "t:l_j Ma.cArtnur_ before 'Ghonnley is ready_ c 

to provide forces Por joint action Task 2. c.- ;,From Mac- ·Arthu:v and Ghormley ..recommendation o.f forces to be used 

for this limi te·d Ta sk 2 ~ D-. Estimated targe-e· date upon 

which above joint a _ction could ·be- launched. 'E . Date when 

direction of Task Forces involv~d in_ this operation should _ 

pass to Comsowest-pac Area. 

' . ... 

f 

_} 
16 1156 

·, 

Plan to' _fly in VMF anGl VMSB plane$ from LBNG, :ESLANP 

18tl]. C?r l9th~ More· experiencedfi~nter pilots. will be ·put on board ~ONG ISLA~D to replace those nov1 on board. 

So-me .f.::igh ~er p~a:ne s -w.ill sti11-:J:.aclt exper;ienee9- pilots,-

and tnese will not b~ flown· to GUADALCANALil : 1 AK now · 

loadlng""lJOUMEA nq~ one,. loading EJ?PIRITU .SAl{J]·o w'-:th such ~ 

ra tion;s .. and ammunit~on _ e.s- can be unloaded ,in ,2A haters. 

These- _"v'Vi1l be sent GUADALCANAL with DD e,scort ·:-soonest · 

po~sible. "'Yill also c-arry nucleus ground crews of Army 

P-400 planes which ·plan to base GUADALCAl~AL. " 3: Carrier 

Task Forces at sea. to. cover movement of suppli~s into 

GUADALCANAL, to attac1c ships o!" :t:tosttle l _anding attack 

force," and,· to meet· nostile force comprising· 4 BB -4; CV . 

8 C~ ·· I XAV . a:nd 2 d~sd:Lvs which we are i ·nfo:nmf9d"' by CinCPe.c 

112.209 may attack betwe.en 19 anGI 21 August: "' End Part 1.- · 

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH, CINCPAC info COMSOiNESPAC 

Part 2. Regard~ess of time of part l this message my _ 

1156. ·Forces under -ConlAirSoPac engaged in search sea 

ana land areas Sou'thea.st SOLOMONS. and sea to East thereof . 

to limit of range from ESPIRITU SANTO, and covering movement supi?,lies to GUADALCANAL. 1800 2nd Marines (ren1ainder 

in TULAGI) have reinforced ESPIRITU SANTO where we are 

pushing impPovement a•irfield using half Cub _1 and construction personnel ~ Other ha1f Gub 1 held ,pending 

_clari:fica tion of si tua tion. Rega:rd ne.xt ·f-ew days as 

hignly crLtica.l and rp.ight be dangerous if ca.rriecrs expend 

fighters planes in support of: GUADALCANAL ge.rri:s.on and DD oare ex.p _ended escorting and screening under enemy shore .~· 

based aircraft; As of August 8th figh_ter planes on board 

carriers had already been reduced from 99 to 78 planes , 

with no repla.cement·s available this area. Once we succeed 

in getting criticallJ" needed supplies into GUADALCANAL 

area- and basing planes there sltuation will be definitely improved~ However this action· forces us to strip . NEW · CALEBQN~A of -fighter protection.~ . Sh~ps .o.f Alli:Rhibious 

For·c-e '" enroute vYE:IJLINGT·oN to embark 5th. Battalion and 3r<i 

Bs:rr-a:ge Balloon squ~dron and others will arrive STRAW 

about -25th to embark 7th Marines.. Until air coverage _can, , 

be I given in the restricted \Vaters between GUADALCANAL and 

TUL.AGI against enenty shore based aircraft and a:n.tisub 

protecticin can ~e given at ent~ances the protection of 

any sh±p entering , fD:a t ~rea l,s ·_a nt~j or oper~tion. ,, Bl ock~~e· 

runn:tng .wi_l _l rentalL an exc.,e:S stve l9~Hl o!'. Sh~pping .• .. A . ~: 

determrne'a enemy carrier attack against. our ·carr::ters ·while - . planes? p.f latter ari~ ·· protecting ships_ in CACTUS · area. might' . 

. spell disaster.. Under present conditions our carrier 

groups are the principle defense oT this area and. of our 

lines of co:mmunication from U ... s ... to Australi$. and New 

Zea.lan'd. JARVIS not yet located. - '\· • ... 
17 0230 

Most secre t.. · FIREPLAO~ Rr~j ~c t unsumpqr:te d: b~ . 9- ~rrier a?trcra£t makes "' UM.NAK ba-Sed, ±foh~ rang~·-.. fight-ers best 

an swe~ to ])roblem o£' air coverage. My air aonnnander "' ~ - -_ ' "'-- -- .. ~-

un~ble supply _'a:uequate air po~erage que lack f.ighte:r~ · -, 

snifficient_· endurance_,; Request ~ep:r·esent ations be- maa;e, - Chief _·:A-5. r -G'orps immedta:-tely furp.-ish .one_ squadron fighters ·. , t'~pe · apa.nle_ pnoceed ou hunare ~ ·miLes 'f;_Fom -~base ·and:, then 

actively ·p.a.trol at least fo"tJr' hours. Local advices suggest P9S sibili t_y comx~~s_;i on"~B-29 if !pO figb,teJ~ . type· 

specif-ica. ions s.ta'ted ;;- available. _ -

Greate,st · secrecy, :'While .realizing that- T have only ~ 

part of the~ general picture . befa-re me I .feel I must . 1n'\ese~t my view that our situation in the Southwest i ·sby no means sufficiently secure _so that we can spare ,.. the ships mentioned· your 152.014 •. - Not only as means of 

tra.nsporta tion "but of training urgen tl.Y needed a.mphibi_ous 

troops. ls the Third k.rrny Bivision ~va:i:lable to ;me flor . 

employment in the Pacific Ocean rArea:s. If not I recommend that it be made so . 

- Handle _as most s.e-cret. ComSoPacc sends t6 Oominch, 

CinCPa.c action. Leary pas~ to MacArthur. It is my 

considered opinion that until positions now h,eld have 

been firmly established and the South Pacific area has 

been reinforced by air and troops. as r ·ha;ve recommended, 

and as. reconJ!nended by ComGenSoPac, no · further advance 

except by minor infilt~ation can be ma~e withput d~n~er-

. ously wealtening our· entire posi ti·on • . Lacking reinforcements there is alsoa reasonable doubt whether the position:$ no_1v occupie-d _plus :N19ENI _- :repeat :NDENI (wll;t.·oh wid.l . be occupied as soon < as prac ti ca.1Jle ) -could be held , ·· · 

"" especially sh~~ld tpe carrier task g:roUl}S be w1 thdrawn. ; 
BEGIW!P 

AUGUST (GCT) 

17 2047 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info: CTF 61,6),62 COMSWPACFOR~ 

Treat as ultra secret. Intelligence at hand indicates 

ORANGE decision reoccupy GUADALCA:t~AL and TULAGI bases. 

Force under Comcrudiv 6 probably consisting three A03AS 

with DD screen to attack BLUE surface vessels in above 

areas. Crudiv 6 departed KAVIENG 14 hours inter (minus 9) 

16th. 3 transports carrying Jap Marines in convoy destroyers and JINTSU nlus possibly 2 Tenryus proceeding 

TRUK to GT~ADALCANAL area. Another escorted convoy carrying Army shock troops originally destined MIDV·TAY last June de~arted TRT~ 9 hours inter (minus 9) 17th destined CACTUS 

may r ·endezvous with first group vicinity Greenwich Island 

18th. Above movements indicated to have a covering force 

probably heavy cruise!'s possibly 2 Hagu:ros one OR ~wo 

Atagos nlus destroyers. Reconnaissance of SOJ..JOMONS areas 

to be conducted by 4 sea,lanes of KIYOKAWA N~RU based on 

GIZO Island. Attack day can be as early as 20 August but 

but actual date not indicated. 

18 0215 CINCPAC to OOHSOPAG Info CTF 61, 17, COMINCH , COMSWPAC. I 

Your 162111 negative. Desire TF 18 return PEARL earliest 

date consistent with military situation existing on arrival TF 17. This necessary effect repairs WASP arrange 

future reliefs carrier task forces your area and meet 

logistic problem. Such reassignments of ships between 

Taskforces as required by damage and need for repairs 

authorized. Use ulanes uilots and material TF 1'8 to make 

good losses. Pre~ent intention return LONG IS.LAND to SAN 

DIEGO as soon as her present operations with 1v1arine Aircraft are completed. Advise date. 

18 1420 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CTF 8, COMWESTSEAFRON, Info COMALSEC, 

COMNviSEAFRO N. 

This message is from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Cincpao, 

CTF 8 and Comdg. Gen. Western Defense Co:m:rnan·d. Greenslade 

pass to DeWitt. 'rheobald pass to Buckner. Extra Secret. 

Pa.ra one. In view of extremely adverse uhloading conditions TANAGA as set forth by Comtaskfor 8 in all despatches 

and further emphasized following recent reconnaissance, 

plan to modify directive for FIR~PLACE operation in Cominch 

050003 by substituting ADAK Island for TAI~AGA Island. 

Para two. In the event that the development of ADAK is 'considered lmnractica ')le by Gener·al DeWitt plan ,to cancel 

operation. Para three. Further comment and recommendation after consultation are desired from adees. 

654 
i!IOM!Ills 

~ AUGUST (GCT} 

18 0646 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESTPACFOR, MacARTHUH, Info COMi l!CH, CINCPAC, 

~ CTF 61,62,63. 

Handle as most s~cret. Refer Cincpac 172047 request you {a) Station available SS ' S CACTUS ar'ea vicinitY. SAVO Island earliest 

possible, notifying Sopac Task Forces assigned operating area 

and time arrival therein. (b) Intensify reconnaissance paying particular attention surface forces moving from RABAUL-GREEN- 1tV ICH toward Southern SO,..JOMONS . (c) Destrov vessels located 

with p~rticular attention carriers and transnorts. (d) Reconnoiter GIZO and destroy forces located. (e) Stand by for call. 

18 0916 COr~ OPAC to IJTF 61,62, 63,44 Info MacARTHUR, COMI NCH, CINCPAC, . COMJNCH, CINCPAC, CTF 11,16,18, QG SOPAC. 

Hand1e as most secret. Sopac OuOrder 2-42. Task Organization. {a). Taskfor 61 Adm Fletcher combined Taskforces 11 16 18 44 less detached units. (b). Taskfor 62 RAdm Turn€r Amphibforso-

-pac. Tasl{ for 63 RAd lv'IcCain' land based aircraft and patrol planes of Sopac area. Para. one. For enemy information see 

Cincpac 172047. No nositive info as to nresence of carriers with- hostile force however such presence '· considered highly probable. Cincsowespac area has been reQuested to station sub- . marines vicinity SAVO Island, intensify reconnaissance pay- ing particular attention surface forces moving from RABAULGREEl-rnTICH toward Southern SOJ..JOMONS, destroy vessels located with 

particular attention carriers and transuo~ts, reconnoiter GIZO and destroy forces located, and standby for call. Para two. I 

This force will defend the CACTUS-RINGBOLT area by destroying hostile attack forces. Para three A. Taskfor 61 destroy hostile vessels prior to tfieir arrival in and while in the CACTUSRING30LT area. Taskfor 44 join Taskfor 61 soonest possible with cruisers AUSTRALIA, HOBART and PHOENIX (delayed) and 3 

destroyers. Para three B. Taskfor 62 defend seized areas 

with Marine expeditionary force. Expedite movement food and ffilli~unition into CACTUS RINGBOLT area. 

19 0323 CTF 62 to COMAIRSOPAC. 

Agree that use of small vessels to carry material and perso"nnel 

CACTUS is an emergency measure only. vour 180043 see my 162136. The i mmediate need there now is food which must not be delayed . plan i s to use two _ or three AP ' s and AK 's for which convoy to 

be unloaded in 12 to 30 hours. Lat er to transnoTt material via 

one thousand ton lighters and tugs a lready re 1uested para. As 

soon as practicable pronase CTF 62 Com CUB 1 Com Sixth Construc- tion Batta lion your represent ative and staf f members fly CACTUS 

make form plan f or a ll later construction and movements personnel and mater i a l. Heavy lifts can not ·be handled CACTUP until 

sectional l ight ers fir mer pi er s and shore crane s are ava ilable_. 

555 
I 

AUGUST (GCT) 

19 2320 COMSQPAC_. to COM':rASKFOR 61: 62 2 63, !nfQ CINCPAC, COMINCH, 

MACARTHUR 

Handle as most secret. From present estimate expect 

hostile a.t·tack in force on Cactus Ringbolt 'between 20 

and 23 August.. Early detection and prompt report to 

all our task forces vital·in order that our striking f0rces may attack in time • 

. 20 0041 C1:NCPAC to COMSOPAC info CTF 6:L.§2, 63 SOMSO~liESPAC 

20 0220 

Increased destroyer divisions now associated Bismarck 

Solomons Jananese Tvianda te areas colon Desdi v 27 of 

Desron 1 plus Comdesrons 2 and 4 paren accompanying units not apparent paren indicated Truk area show 

interest in 4th fleet Marshall area. Desdivs 15, 2 

and another unidentified of Desron 3 recently at Davao 

now escort~ng convoy army troops plus shore air units 

plus 2 CA under Comcrudi v 7 to Truk dash Rabaul area.· 

One unit of undetermined size ex Desron 5 will renort 

to CinC 8 B,leet for duty soon.. Desdi v 4 and 17 ex 

plane guard squadron are now in Bismarck Solomons. 

Above units in most cases may be half or incomplete 

divisions. Some units engaged in escort duty round 

trip anticipated but total represents sizeable increase 

previous dog dog strength paren Desron 6 plus Desdiv · 34 

paren. Sum total esti~ated 30 - 35 DD. Orange previous boasted quote superior night torpedo technique unquote 

May be up for test. Above is ultra secret from Cincpac. 

COMSOPAC to CQMINCH infor CINCPAC 

Especially secret your 181422 screening group as whole 

commanded by Rear Admiral Crutchely Hoyal Navy with 

Australia group in south area. At 2055 L (-11) in 

obedience to signal he left formation and proceeded 

to transport area for conference with 'J:lurner on board 

McCawley conference lasted until 0115 L (-11). Crutchley 

report states "at 2055 I ordered Chicago (BODE) to take 

charge of Australia group and ordered Australia to close 

transports of Squadron X*'. Riefkohl in c11arge Vincennes 

group in north area.. Ralph Talbot Lieut Comdr. William 

Callahan radar patrol north area. Blue Li.eut Comdr H N 

Williams radar. patrol south area is not available but 

in preliminary report makes report of aircraft rad.ar contact but no surface vessels. Callahan states maintained 

radar sweeps to seaward with no contacts.. Comma.ncllng officers cruisers consulted state radar inef~ective due 

"land locked radar conditionu~ Comment: I.t is possible 

Jap attack force afirm approached from such direction 

as to minimize land locked effect on their radar baker 

employed RDF from 3a vo Island c on1bined with info from . 55 6 that station re mo·vements our detachment cast or Japs have more efficient radar than ours. Will cormnent further . regarding radar when more information available .. 
~-

SECHL'k 

AUGUST (GCT) 

20 0230 

20 0310 

COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC -

Most secret. Cominch 181422 paragraphs 116 and 117 

Crutch1ey report herewith quoted for the bearing they have on subject quote 116: It was most disappointing that RALPH TALBOIJ:1 and BLUE failed to detect the enemy with radar.. Thei-r p~trol beats had been arranged clear 

of the land to give warning and avoid interference to 

radar and with an effective contact range of ~nly 12,000 

yards they should. have detected an approaching force. 

This failure could be explained by the enemy, having detected them from the air, making a circuit to the 

westward and approaching close to the land cape fsperance. 

117: the results of the ni~ht action are disappointing 

too, but one must remember that the enemy had very much 

in his favour. He knew that everything he met was bound 

to be an enemy.. The ai rcraft flares, which were excellently placed, had probably silhouetted our forces .for 

him. The enemy would have been on tip toe whereas our 

personnel had undergone the strain of 48 hours in the 

combat area closed up'at action stations most of the 

time, had fought three enemy air attacks and has· sufferred the strain of false alarm@ It must be admitted 

too that the enemy displayed a very high standard of 

night fighting and were probably more effi c i ent and 

more practised at it than were our forces which were 

assembled together for the first time to carry out this 

operation. 'Qnquote.. · 

COMAIRSOPAC to CTF-62 infer COMSOPAC 

Premise your 190323 relative immediate urgency, food to 

watchtower realized and concurred in. However should 

not obscure fact that security supply that area of whatever nature dependent largely on local air coverage and 

fighter support. This cannot reasonably be expected to 

continue in any effectiveness longer than few days after 

arrival planes \Vi thout aviation .supplies. F~cili ties 

and personne.l now in W ·w BURROWS of which only immediately necessary portion provided via McFARLAND. Bombs 

and avgas in quantity also reqrtired and available in 

Morinda and Kopara which essentials now being all· transferred to latter vessel held in readiness to go. Uree 

tb.a t "vV W BURROWS be routed Cactus to arrive on comple- tion unloading ALHENA and FORMALHAUT closely followed 

by KOPARAw Believe no cargo in those vessels which can 

not be unloaded Cactus via. t~nk or artillery lighter 

understood available. 

657 
\ 

AUGUST (GCT) 

21 11.56 COMSOPAC info COMI NCII CINCPAC COMSWOESPAC O'.FF 61., 62,63 

25 2241 

MACARTHUR 

Handle as most secret" From Comsopac info Cominch 

Cincpac Comtaskfors 61,62,63.. Leary pass to MacArthur .. Operations 21st. Incomplete reports from Guada.lcanal 

indicate enemy forces unknown .streng th well equipped 

machine guns mortars landed during night from · two · vessels type unidentified. Vessels withdrew before dawn .. Enemy attacked our positions along Tenaru River, fled 

eastward from our bombers.. Six APDs unload food GUADALChNAL - TULAGI tonight. 21st. Two DDs protect Lunga 

Roads same time. Under protection three DDs _and air 

coverage by carrier task forces AK ALHENA arrives Ringbolt tomorrowmorning with food ammunition. 

Cincpac to COMINCH, Info: COMSOPAC, COMGE~JHAV!DEPT. 

Utmost secret. Refer Comsouac 250)30. Development of 

situation in Sopac area requires earliest practicable action 

in accordance Comsopac 050730, 050750, Cincpac 062205 of 

August and Cincpac -310215 July. We have made good start 

in our offensive. We have suffered moderate losses and 

damage which can be accepted if replacements already 

requested are immediately sent. ~ets not let this offensive die on the vine. Urgency ·of situation is such 

that im.rnediate replacements should be sent here to replace 

corresponding equipment from Hawaiian area which can be 

sent Sopac. Under above conditions repeat above conditions following planes essential to defense of Hawaiian 

area are ready to move on short notice. 22 Army Bl7-E 

12 Navy PBY5A all with combat crews. Additionally ready 

50 Army fighter pilots less aircraft. Emmons has copy. 

to 

25 1326 GHORMLEY/Info: GO:MINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61 62 63 17 MacARTHUR, 

COMSOiNESPAC. 

Handle as most secret. Operations 25th. Preliminary 

reports indicate enemy fo;rces yesterday and today consisted 

at- least 4 groups. 1 consisting. 1 BB some cruisers attacked 

by our carrier air groups some hits. 1 group consisting 

2· large CV' s, 4 CA' s 6 CL' s 8 DD' s discovered too late for 

attack. Planes this group believed those which attacked · 

our carriers resulting some damage NTERPRI ~. 1 group 

consisting Ii.YUJO 1 CA 2 DD attacked by our B-17's and 

S.t'illATOGA air group, set on fire and belteved badly damaged 

by latter. Group including BB at 1100 L (-11) today appeared to be retiring to northwest at Lat 04-18 Long 162-

40. During last ni ght ENTERPRI SE and SARATOqA their task 

forces· retired to southward to fuel~ WASP ordered to support q.uADALCANAL. Some "F!:NTERPRi gE "() lanes to GUADALC.ANAL. 

( Cont i·nued on next page) 658 
diifH1l3T 

AUGUST ( GCT) 

25 1356 _ (Continued) 

During last night enem~r DD' s estimated at 7 shelled posi- tions GUADALCJ1.J\TAL. Strafed by 3 SB's but no bomb hits. 1 

en~my force . consisting unknown number AJ>' s escorted by 

cruisers and DD's approached GUADALCANAL from north this 

morning was hit by planes from GUADALCA1TAL at 0835 L (-11). 

1 large AP hit left burning. 1 CA reported hit burning fiercely. Later same force was sighted retiring t eo north • 

.AP had been abandoned. GUADALCANAL had air raid 0623Z 

(GCT) \i§th no report of results. 

24 2325 CT:B, 6 to CTF 61 Info GOMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC. 

This is most secret from Comtaskforce 16. ENTERPRISE sustained three medium bomq hits three near misses. Following 

out of commission. Number two and three elevators. First 

two wires and first barrier. After half gasoline mains. One 

firemain riser. One damage control riser. Degaussing gear. Starboard steering engine~ After director. Group three AA 

guns. Group four ~munition supply. Following damage. Flight deck along starboard side number three elevator and at port after corner lifted two feet. After fifty feet hangar deck 

lifted two feet entire width. One·large storeroom at waterline aft open to sea and flooded but bulkheads holding. Prevents maneuvering at high speed. Only small amount of 

rudder being used. Outer plating sprung and slowly leaking port side at stern. Heavy general damage to storerooms 

shops living spaces decks and bulkheads between fxames 157 

and 179. Planes on board in commission six VF 21 VSB 3 VT. 

11 VSB at CACTUS. Gould operate about 50 planes in emergency. About eighty dead one hundred wounded. Missing undetermined. 

Large quantity provisions destroyed. Exact extent underwater 

damage not determined. Fueling at this time not recommended. 

Propelling machinery not damaged. CTF 61 to COMSOPAC, Info CINCP.AC, COMAIRSOPAC CTF 16, 18. 

25 06461 Am directing 1tl'-TTERI)RISE proceed on course between ROSES and 

·wHITE POF?PY in order fly plane to ROSES with message and ~ 

await further orders from you. Comtaskfor 16 242325 self 

explanatory. Recommend Taskforce 18 remain in area until 

situation clears and Taskrorce 17 joins as soon as practica- ble on completion fueling tonight local 25th will proceed to . join Taskforce 18. Due incompleteness of last contact reports 

was unable to fix with any degree accuracy position of enemy carriers. Convinced R~JJO very badly damaged and 2 cruisers 

torpedoed and 1 battleship hit by 1000 pound bomb. Estimate 

enemy lost more than 50 planes to carrier groups and antiaircraft fire. Our plane losses 7. On 25th dropped 500 

uound bomb on submarine number 425 while diving direct hit 

abaft conning tower believed sunk lat 12-30 ·south Long 164-15 

East. Also strafed another number 417 same position damaged 

slightly. Still another dived same day lat 12-58 South 

' 659 

(Continued on next page) 
AUGUST (GCT) 

25 0646 (Continued) (:f!l.lom CTF 61). 

long. 163-36 East. 2 destroyers dropped many depth charges 

possibly damaged. Sighted 2. more submarines 24 lat 8-30 south 

long 162 east. No attacks made. Have kept 18 fighters 6 TBF 

of ENTERPRISE group with personnel to strengthen SAPJ\.TOGA 

group. Now have 1-i t t le more than com')lete group on board.., 

Will have to provision in 10 days. On morning 24th shot down 

2 twin engine bombers being used as search planes and 1 4-engine serial 43. Your attention invited my 241014 concerning 

11 SBD and 7 TBF on ENTERPRISE group at CACTUS. In case surface forces are sent from .this Taskforce for other operations 

they should com~ under your direct command as radio silence 

precludes proper command by me. Taskforce 44 plus ~~~LT LAKE 

CITY available. Kinkaid recommends proceed 1NHITE POPPY. 

25 2205 CINCPAC to COMINCH, info COMSOPAC. 

Handle with utmost secrecy. Believe enemy may be capable of 

now attacking F.A.J\TTAN or STRl\.'J but consider such a move . improbable because. Afirm. It would leave our strong forces of 

which he is cognizant on his flank. Baker. He is likely to 

consider our carriers more important and prior objectives. 

Cast. Recent battle damage and most difficult logistic problem 

decrease feasibility of such a :oroj_ect. My estimate difficulty 

his logistics confirmed by our o'VIm experiences to date. No 

enemy tankers have been sighted in area of operations o~ to 

eastward. 

26 1812 COM~SOPAC to CTF 16 Info CTF 61 .62 63 17 18 COT1I NCH C INCPAC. 

Most secret. Your 260639 received. Location hostile forces 

not definitely l<nown. Ass1une you have received 6incpacs 

260239. Proceed BLEACHER v;ith units now in company passing 

south of FAI'-JTAN and if you have not already transferred planes 

and -personnel to other carriers for adjustment land at H.~mr 

those planes not required for· defense ~RL later. Land necessary- personnel als-o at NANDI via destroyer. Upon arrival 

BLEACHER make detaile d survey of damage and report via shore 

radlo special materials needed to expedite reconditioning at 

Navy Yard. My 260750 modified accordingly. 

660 
a8!QQ:FMT 

AUGUST (GCT) 

ll_l320 COMI NCH to CJ!NCPAC COM80PAC Info CONIAI RC5AFT SOPAC, COMS\"lPAC. 

Para. Comsopac inform MacArthur. Harmon. This is part 1 

Cominch 271320 total 3 parts handle with great est secrecy. Comsopac 250330 para following info from War. Dept para War 

Dept will authori:z.e movement from Hawaii of any aircraft · considered by Cincpac as necessarx to suooess of present opera- tion.. Emmons )eing so advised by VJ'ar Dept Para Ghormley and Harmon already fully authorized shift aircraft in South , Pacific as deemed exp edient by them :para Harmon was authorized 

on 9 August to divert any aircraft enroute Australia and use them as situation demanded in that area Para Any urgent request for air reenforcement should be made by Comsopac direct 

to CinC Southwestpacific area who ~Qll make every effort toward immediate comvliance ara Recommend advise Comsopac that it is impossible to attempt send from US any Army Air reinforcement for this action additional to that indicated in parts 2 

and ~ which are to follow. 

27 1322' Part 2 of above. 

Following are reenforcements for Central and South Pacific 

Areas (This part 2 my 271320) A 1 group of 35 B24 in US being prepared for-movement 10 Sept. B Crated fighters not ac- · 

companied by pilots nor crews are now enroute by ships as follows. JANE CT-IRISTIANSEN departed US 11 August with 10 for 

C.Al\JTON. CAllJIARES sailed US 13 August with 2 for TONGA. TNM 

'NHIP.?LE with 28 for :NECAL1 and PO~~~"O A wj_th 16 for :b,IJI left 

US 18 August. PETER SYLVE2T"SR saileo US 20 August with 3 f*or 

HAWAII and 7 for ClffiiSTM:.l\.S. 8 more for CANTON were shipped about 11 August and 12 more for HAWAII were shipped about 22 

August past replacement pilots for 20 single engined ti~hters 

left by air :from Vvest Coast 26 August destination NEvV" CALEDONIA. Para. Pilots in excess of above still under cQnsidera- - tion War Dept this ends part 2 more follows. 

27 1324 Part 3 of above. 

Continuing long mes~a e my 271320 this is par.t 3 which lists reenforcements for bouthwest Pacific Area.. A on 24 August following with full combat crews were enroute HA~Vl:..II to 

AUSTRALIA, 13 Bl?,, 11 B25' s , 6 DC3 transports. B Crated 

fighters, not with crews, are now enroute in ships as follows: 

!tJI T.JLI.AlVi ELLERY due arr ive WELLI~1GTON 23 August with 33. 

BENJAMIN GOODHUE due BRI SBJ\NE 23 August with 9* J ASON LGE 

due · Wellington 21 August with 9.. PAYNE ':/I NGATE departed United States 27 July ' with 2. John Steele due WELLINGTON 

25 August with nine. J OSEPH LANE with 17 due rNELLINGTON 

September 3. J OHJ:1

J Bl\KER ASffE wi th 14 and ELI HU YALE with 3 6 

due WELLINGTON September 10* C Foll owing being prepared in 

Uni ted Stattes: 18 heavy bombers. 22 mediurn bombers * 44 

fi ghters . 13 transp orts. Para . 3 part message ends . hief~ 

of Staff Ar my informed . 

661 
r"'\ AUGUST ( GCT) 

27 1026 COMSOPAC to OTF 61 62 6) In~o COJV[I NCH , COiviGENSQPAC 1 CI NCPAC, CTF 17, eTG 2.9, ao ~4RT3UR. 

Handle as- most secret. Based on present situation the following concept of operations is given for your guidance. Until the hostile strength and intentions are determined we 

must employ to the utmost our. limits land based aircraft 

strength, '-'lfhile improving the CAC'I'US ~INGBOLT position. VI/hat 

we wish to achieve is the combination (no matter where 

the enemy may strike} of our shore based aircraft and our 

carrier aircraft against the follovving targets in order of 

priority: Carriers, transports, battleships, cruisers, destroyers. Therefore the carrier task forces should for the 

present operate generally south of latitude 10 degrees south 

unless a promising target is located within strikinR distance, 

meanwhile covering the movements c of su~:rpli es and r 'einforcements into the CACTUS area. Shore and tender based planes should continue as extended and intensive search as operating linitations permit. If and ¥men reinforcements arrive the 

present limited search operations on the FANTAN STR.4.:W front 

should be amnlified. 

27 0350 COl-190PAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIR2·0PAC, COMINCH. 

-Cominch most secret 2.51235 estaolishes clearly the need for an 

additional patrol ulane souadron at FANTAN and one at STRAW. 

This in addition to reenforcements previously requested. Patrol 

planes originally based on FAN~~J have had to be moved to BUTTON 

to replace losses and planes worn out in present activities. 

Scouting to north of FANTAN dash ST&~W now woefully inadequate. Coma~rsopac has this in another system. Also require one 

patrol wing headquarters each FANTAN ONE and VH-IIT1"!! POPPY. 

I 

27 1416 COLLSOPAC to Mac.A . .L-qTHUR , CINCPAC, COMI NCH, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 61, 

62, 63, 17, CTG 2.9. 

Operations 27th. Handle as most secret. Own surface forces 

no contact with enemy today . Several reports own patrol planes show enemy force of 1 BB 6 CA 1 CL 6 DD on various courses 

throughout today in vicinity lat 02-20 south long 161-45 east • . 

No report enemy activity CACTU8- RI NGBOLT. 

28 1805 CTF 16 to C0litTSOPAC info CINCPAC COMI NCII COMCARPAC CTIP 17,18, 

l, 61, 62, 63, COMSERFORPAC. 

Keep this secret. Originate by CTF 16 Action 6op1sopac inf? 

C'r:B,, s 61. 62 63 17 18 1 Cincpac Com-serforpac· Comcarpac Com1nch. 

TF16 proceeding BL1f.AC1fifR accordance your 261812. ENTEHPRISE 

does not need temporary_ repairs to ·r each PEAHL as stated my 262137 evidently lost. Ready to ·proceed after fueling. To 

delay departure unt i l arrival SAN JUAN and ;N I T.SON will delay 

(Continue d on next page 562 
r. 

ALO±t£1 

AUGUST (GCT) 

28 1805 CTF 16. (Continued) 

ultimate readiness for action of ENTERPRISE. Request per- mission take about 23,000 bbls from HS RHEEM arriving BI.JEACHE.R 

31 August. Have sent 14 SBD and 3 TBF to ROSES. No additional 

personnel. Remaining on board 6 VF and 6 SBD. This dispatch with ships report special materials needed being sent BLEACHER 

by plane in advance of arr ival. 

28 1026 \I L~Y to CTF 61, 62, COMI NCH, CTF 2. 9, COMSOYVESPAC, CINCPAC. 

Handle as mos~ secret. No sig hting 28th of enemy surface 

vessels our forces engaged in air reconnaissance to limit of 

range, movement of aviation supplies food and rurununition to 

GUADALCANAL - TULAGI, protection this movement by task forces. 

From Ghormley. Leary pass to MacArthur. 9 P-400's arrived 

GUADALCA.NAL 1140 love (minus 11) 27th. Amuhibious force 

plans to destroy Jap outposts nearby islands during period 1 - 3 September. Operations for 28th. 

29 2340 D['F<86bo CINGPAC. 

Most secret. CTF 8 reply to Cincpac 28000?. , My Op Plan 10- 42 

mailed 22nd. Plan in general conforms to similar operation for original objective outlined in my 132214. This covers 

operations of 1st phase FIREPL~C E project with August 30 as 

Dog day. Covering force of 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser plus 3 destroyers, escort and transport torce consists of 3 trans- ports escorted by 2 CL's and 7 destroyers, tug and lighter 

group screened by J destroyers, TEAL, 2- Canadian Corvettes 

now proceeding. Landing commences about 0700 W (:plus 10). Will support subsidiarJ landing ~AGA and ATKA. Intermediate 

phases of FIREPLACE troop and cargo movements obligate all 

forces for continuous coverage and escort until end of October. 

Estimate that final consolidation FIREPLACE positions wi 11 

not be accomplished until end of year at earliest. Renuired 

naval sunport later phases can not now be predicted. Motor 

torpedo boats will arrive FI REPLACE about 6 September. When 

defensive situation warrants intend MTB attack on KI SF..A and 

submarines and air will resume full offensive. When field 

bomb ers is ready at ].,IREPLACE consideration must be given to 

surface ship overhaul and upkeep af ter 5 months then of intensive operation here imme diately following .many months 

similar operations to southward. ST. LOUI P boilers LOUISVILLE 

guns urgent but all shi ps need attention which operations to 

date have largely prevented. 

553 
8§!18!&1 

AUGUST (GO T) 

30 1010 FORR~S L to SECNAV, CQMINCH , SECY GATES , Info CINCPAC. 

Handle most s'ecret not to be decoded by other than addressees beyond this uoint. From Undersecnav to Secnav Asst 

Secy Gates and Cominch for action transmitted by Comsopac. Quote in my j udgement steady flow aircraft replacement 

especially fighters for CAC TUS imperative if position is to be 

held. Have narticular reference to' planes sufficient eeiling intercept high altitude bombers. Best for this purpose is 

P-38. Gomgensopac has asked for 2 squadrons this type and I · 

hope his request will be granted. Sending similar message Lovett Forrestal. ~ 

29 1113 C014SOPAC to Info C:(:NCPAC, COMINCR , COM80WE8PAC, CTF 61 62 63 

CTG' 2. 9, 1JiacA.."1THUR. 

Operations 29th. :f?:andle as most secret. At GUAD.f\LC.Al'JAL 

evening 28th 2 SBD's sighted and attacked 3 large DD's 1 small 

DD bearing 355 cours e 180 distance 70 miles from GUADALCM~AL. 

Hit 1 small DD. 1800 L (-11) 28th 11 SBD's attacked same 

target then 15 miles north S Island. 2 large DD's hit. 

1 blew up sank. Other hit amidship burning fiercely when 

last seen. Small DD previously hit was low in water trailing oil smoking. DD' s had considera 1

)le gear on deck. 1 plane 

failed return. 

29 1442 COMSOPAC to CTF 61 info CINCPAC, CTF 62, 17, 18, 63. 

Handle as most secret. Retire 1 carrier task force to VffiiTE 

POPPY to arrive forenoon ~V ednesday 2 September for fuel and , provisions. Proceed by route to East of PO~PY passing well 

clear of EFATE and ~r i thin 50 miles of :MAHE I PLAND to avoid 

possible interference by units enroute POPPY-BUTTON. Commander 

of entering groun fly 1 plane to 3UTTON or ROSES ·when practica- ble to inform me composition entering group. Arrangements for entry and logistics by separate dispatch~ Will start 2 

fleet tankers on Manday. to Tasl\:forces remaining on station 

after loading on them provisions as .Practicable. Rendezvous 

for f ueling to be desi gnated later. 

28 2355 CTF 16 to CTF 61 i nfo COMSO?AC, C01v.f.A.I RPOPAC , COMC.AHPAC Ad.m,, 

From CTF 16 this i s a retransmission my 260239 which apparently 

was lost. Additional information. Launched all fl ya)le pl anes 

pri or to attack of 35 bombers (approximately ). Ga soline system drained and C02 bl a nket around t anks an d in pi ping . Ap- proximately 25 tons of 'paint removed since leaving PEARL. 

Damage due to fires would have been much more extensive had 

t his not been done. Total bag V:B, 6 in this act i on 29 enemy u l ane's . ENTEHPHISE a ircraft losses 3 VJ!' 2 VSB 3 VTB of wh ich 2 

VJ.~ and 2 VTB believed lost in action remainder l anded in water 

our of gas . All personnel recovered 1 VF 2 VSB 1 VTB . Pilot 

(Continued on next page ) 664 
8!SIOMT 

AUGUsrr ( GC T) 

28 2355 CTF 16. (Continued. 

losses 2 VG 2 VTB. Free gunner losses 4. Planes now on ·board in commission 6 VF 20 VSB 5 VTH. Your 250656 7 TBF 

directed to land CACTUS returned to land on ENTEH.PRISE and 

SAHATOGA that night. Cincpac 231917 following transferred 

to ROSES8 Photographic F4F-7. Radio transmitter and 

receiver coils for TBF planes. Also pay accounts for all 

ErJTERPRIS.E: personnel remaining on SARATOGA and at .CACTUS. 

-31 0242 COI\1SOPAC, to CTF 16 17 18 63 Info CINCPAC , _COMIN"CH CTF 62. 

From Comsopacfor to CTF 16 17 18 63 for Action Info Cominch 

Cincpac CTF 62, Item assmne the following: Afirm. That 

Task force 18 is retiring toward VffiiTE POPPY for provisions. Baker. That TF 11 is retiTing southeastward with SARATOGA 

at reduced speed. Cast. That CTF 17 has instructions to 

contact oilers at grid posit George 6093 designated (Grid position is 165-00 east 14-15 south) my 300542 for fueling morning 2 Sept ember. On basis of the above assumptions the 

following directives are fssued. subjected to modification by TF commanders as required by circmnstances·at variance with 

assumptions. Afirm. SAR~TOGA groun proceed to BLEACHER by 

route passing approximately 100 miles east of BUTTON and 

ROSES and south of FANTAN. Baker. Comairsopac arrange all 

possible air coverage by land based planes along route. Cast . TF 18 cover retirement of S.fut:tATOGA until south of lat 20 

degrees then proceed 11lHITE POPPY in accordance Y·.rith previous instructions advising me as soon as practicafule composition 

entering group and eta. Dog NAVA~JO with LA ~FEY vvill be dir- ected proceed to point 100 miles due east of second channel E~PIRI~J S~~TO ETA that point 100 L(-11) 1 September thence 

on course 330 speed of advance 13 until joining SARATOGA. 

'Easy. CI~vJl1ARRON and GUAJJALUPE with escorts will be directed 

to nroceed to noint 50 miles due east of ROSES thence course 

about 350 to new fueling rendezvous for 'I'F 17 in position lat 13-15 south long 168-35 east to arrive that position about 8 hours L(-11) 2 September. CTF 61 contact and retain 

one oiler for use with SltRP:..TJOGA group if desired. 

665 
,_ I SL STiili' 

~ August (GCT) 

2$ 1240 COMi i"IJCH to CINCPAC , COJ:~.S01)AC , Info COM~.Q:ffE8PACFOH . 

Following greatest secrecy from ~J acArthur to War ·Dept is 

q_uoted for info and com11.ent. Indications that enemy is 

pre-oaring atta ck against 1\rs·,; ~U IN'3:B. . Evidence is accumulating that he contemnlates a stroke here under cover of ~·oi...~O HO N ·Islands operations. LJ:y position exir)osed due to 

absence of Southwest Pacific Naval Forces w&ich are operat- ing under South Pacific Area co:rrrmand. Enemy cornpletely controls sea approaches to E~J GUINJTIA and when adverse 

weather hampers our air activities he can have transDorts 

directly into MII.NE Bay. Unless I- am afforded naval support roy situation will ir'lPlediately become critical if 

strong infJltration continues or if a major movement eventuates c 

I have been moving the maximtun number of troops I can 

transport and supply with my shipping resources into NEVI/ 

GUil\1EA as rapidly as possible. In order to secure my 

position I suggest that the added mission of covering the 

MIL}ffi Bay area be given to GHOID~LEY. 

29 0310 COMSOPAC to COMINCH * CINCPAC, info MACARTH1.ffi, CG SOPAC , COlv1S-vvPAC 

Most secret. Reference Cominch 281240. I am now 'forced to 

retire my carrier task forces in succession to reprovision. 

My remaining strength is needed to cover the movement of 

supnlies and personnel into CACTUS necessary to strengthen that position. -~'\!hen the· 7th Marines are embarked and if the 

situation then permits I intend to seize NDENI , the occupa- tion of which -and the esta ')lishment of an airfield thereon 

will greatly strengthen my position. This operation will 

reauire the close support of the ' carrier task forces . The 

increasing ·of our strength at OACTU9, and the inauguration of 

pressure up the S1LOMONS when I have the means , together with the carrier task forces in being on the flank of any hostile attack on AUS!TRALIA is a greater contribution to 

MacARTIDJRS assistance than any sacrifice move at this time of 

carriers to the Iv~ ILN"E Bay area. Until the strength of the 

hostile main effort is determined- and it has been: committed 

to a definite line of action I sh )uld keep my carrier task 

forces centrally located prepared to operate anyvvhere on the 

front S.AMOA L!'-D!~ Bay. rrhis means that for the present hostile 

infiltration tactics and the initial shock of a hostile main 

effort · may have t ·o be borne b3r ground troo-ps and land based 

aviation. Land based aviation attack a gainst J apanese infiltration moves should extract a c onst ant toll of transports and escorting combatant ships which the Japanese cannot lpng sustain. Should Japanese repeat Japanese qarrier 

supported main forces move to attack, our land based aviation 

should be a:)le to equ a l ize the opposing carrier strength. In 

short it is hoped t hat t he resolut e us e of ·our def.ensi ve 

positions and land based a viati on may create a favora ble situa- tion where in I can decisively employ the carr ier task for ces, whether on my extended front or t o the we stvvard.. It is hoped that my fr eedom of action will not be circumsc ribed be ' 

restrict ive tasks or missions . 6.6 6 
t!ECILJJ ~ AUGUST (GCT) 

r 27 0~11 COM:ATI180PAC to Oi SOPAC I nfo Com.gens opac. 

' . 

30 2123 

Your 230424. Any augrrtentation of air units this theater RNZAF 

or .A.meriean heartily concur red in. Proposal to transfer aircraft from 6 Ame r ican s quadrons to RNZAF squadrons with resultant withdrawal of American units thereby deprived of aircraft unsound. No enonomy of aircraft results. Continuation 

of American squadr ons already experienced in specialized op~rations this theater as well as attrition replacement of bagicacp trained American combat crews Jelieved essential to success. 

Coordination o:e Army Na,vy air units procedure suf-ficiently difficult. That of foreign units would present an impossible situation. Previous recommenqations relative equipment 

Rl\TZ.A_F units made on a basis or better distribution lend lease 

material allocated Great Britain such that South Pacific would 

share therein and actual, aid potential reinforcement by l~N 

ZEALAND units be available. Unless aviation S¥pply situation 

radically changes for better all combat aircraft this area 

required for combat not training8 Unqualifiedly opposed to 

proposal which is not only swapping horses but swapping streams. .._C-p "- C......:--

c~ to COJVISOPAC info COMINCH, COMSVlPACFOR. 

.3 D I '-/ J.S" 

Utmost secrecy. Cominch ~Ql~ as soon as your oprations in progress permit turn over to operational control Comsowespacfor necessary vessels to nrovide support MI~m Bay opera- tions.. Advise. Leary pass to T/IacA:rthur. 

31 0845 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC. 

I 

Enemy sightings have indicated possible employment of screening force in area to 4 degrees south of equator between 159 

and 163 east. Ultra secret from Comsopac. Suggest for your consideration the possibility of employing SS's protitably that general area within next week or ten days. 

31 1046 GHORMI..JEY to CINCPAG, COMINCH, CTF 61 62 63. 

Operations 31st. Handl e as most secret. In air engagement 1145 

L{-11) 13 enemy lost 5 zeros to P-400's and 3 zeros to F4F's. 

Our loss.es 4 ·p-l'-00' s 3 pilot s missing. 19 F4 . and 12 SBD' s arrived GUADALCANAL from BUTTON 1440 L(~ll) 305h. 18 bombers attacked our ships at .KU:®v! at 1500 L( -11) 30th. CALHJUN sunk 

by estimated 3 h its after part of ship from 1500 feet. 45 

enlisted unaccounted for. Some may be at GU.A.DALCAN'AL. Evening patrol from· GUADALC.ilNAL sighted 2 cruisers and destroyers 20 

miles nor th -RUSSELL Lft~TD S course 090 at 1745 L(-11} 30th. No 

report f rom 5 SED' s which went after them. Little ·dropped depth chartes on SS at 1630 1,( -11) . 30th., el~eved sunk . ,~,SARJ.\­

TOGA reports being torpedoed Lat 10-25 South Long 16~-26 liA~st. · 

No further report from her. Have s ent NAVAJO to ass1st.. Leary 

pas s to MacAr thur. 

657 
I -.. ; 

8BOI1iiT 

AUGUST (GCT) 

.31 0930 CTF 61 to COM80PAC info CINCPll .. C COMAI RSOPAC CTF 17 18. 

This is part 1 of 2 parts of CTF 61 msg 310930. Your 

310242 SARATOGA 0700 ~~tr ( -12) Posit Tuesday Lat 12 43 South 

Long 167 13 East. Proceeding 14 knots under own power. 

At present NAVAJO not required but will. interce.pt and have 

her standby. Ships now in company SARATOGA MI NNESPOLIS 

NE1N ORLEiiNS ArrLANTA PHELPS MA.CilONOUGH li'AICZt.i\.GUT ~1 RDEI:J DE·t!EY 

GRAYSON. MONSSEN r emained behind to .. attack submarine. Hequest she be infonned my movements. AUSTRALIA HOBART 

~~ LF ID E with J\l"OYES . NOHTH CAROLINA PHOENIX PATTERSON BAGLEY with MURRl-i.Y. Your assumptions A B and c absolutely correct. Request you desi gnate rendezvous September 2nd for 

this force and tanker with our mail. Sent 20 VSB and 9 VTB to 

)UTTON 3 more VTB flying in Tuesday morning. Have 36 VF on 

board. Will await your instructions on where and how many t o 

fly off. Have enough provisions to last until lOth on re- duced rations. Recommend 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers accompany SARATOGA. End of part 1.· 

31 0931 Part 2 of above. 

This is the 2nd and last part CTF 61 msg 310930. Subsequent examinations SAilATOGA indicate all 4 shafts in good order. 

Proceeding at 14 nots on units A and c. Coflrylete bushing and switching assembly on unit B burned. Other 3 assemblies 

damaged by a rcing A and require thorough _ examination and 

test nrior departure Sopac area . Number 15 fireroom and 14 

outboard tanks arid voids flooded •• Number 13 fireroom leak- ing but under control. Flushing pump and torpedo compressor 

room (Compartment C-601E) and storeroom D-305A also partially flooded but under control. 

568 
c!Pl 6 23 

Admiral J:ini tz returned from an inspection of Palnyra and i:rYlr.ledia tely approved Cor1taskfor 8' s c;cneral plan !.oted on 

the 22d. He also agrees ,ith CoMtas~fol : that, dus to sending 

troops to rome b"' air, t 1 cre is no need for his rain body to 

escort the reinforcement supply ships except two D~ for each 

AP. 

The 2cl Regiment, reenforced, of the Amphibious Corps will be ready to sail on the 24th on 24 hours' notice. This 

is in response to Cominch directive that it should be ready to 

nove quickly to the South Pacific. A decision on its move will 

be made sLortly. There is now under consideration a plan by which a detachment of the Pastern fleet including at least 2 

CV would seize and occupy Timor or other suitable place at the 

same time a 'C.S. task force with at least 2 CV would operate 

to seize and occupy Tulagi. The target date is August lst. 

Except for Taskfor 8 in Alaska and Taskfor 11 enroute 

1idway, own forces are ln port restin[, training, and refitting. 

Cincpac 240315 indicates the desire to use Noumea for 

CV task forces. The SUI.INEH will probably have to survey the S.E. 

area inside the reef as her next job. She can be released from 

v1ork in the Straw area any time. 

Consopac 232230 still does not like the idea of withdrav!int.; 1;ev: ~cal and troops from Fan tan. 

J:herG is no further news of the enemy. His major forces are believed to be operatin£:; north of Latitude 35°. A 

guess is that there is an occupation force at Kiska anu 1ttu 

covered by a fo1'lce opera tine to tJ._e n .E. of the Kuriles. 

June 24. 

A preliminary scheme for carryinc out the idea noted 

yesterday for TULAGI operation was received from Cominch and 

is attached. In that a directive for this operation will be 

sent later from CoMinch the close examin~t:on of the development of the selected course is deferred. It would appeal that there 

will be difticulty in (1) getting the marine souadrons carrier 

trained, (2) gettin8 a field where they can operate. The troops seer:1 adequate. Because of air difficulty it May not be possible 

to meet the August 1st date. 

SA? moG.c 

ALASYJ\." 

0\"m forces continue to rest anc~ t ain, except the 

eroup which arrives at BID·.~!AY tonorro ~~, and TF-8 in 

TherE ls no news from the l~tter. 

569 
June 24 (Cont'd) 

The S-27 t;rounded at AMCHITKA I~)LAND Aleutians and 

is probably a total loss. 

A new set-up for TF co~nanders was placed in effect. 

Rear Admiral Ki aid will act as commBnder of TF-17 until the 

return of Vice Admiral Halsey. 

The GENERAL GORGAS has reported that she was attacked 

three tiMes by a sub in the Eastern Alaska Bay. It has been 

known for several weeks that Jap subs are operating in Alask~n 

waters. There is nothinG new from the enemy. 

Our forces continue rest, training, and preparation 

for further operations. ~F-8 in Alaska is still quiet. 

The problem of the. proposed offensive in the SOLOMOrSBISMA:2CK area continues to receive careful consia.ei'a tion and 

study. While no decision can be reached until Cominct. sends 

CinCPac a directive, active preparations for the operations 

are under·way. Cominch has dirE,c ted that two CV :_roups be made 

and kept ready on 12 hours notice. (Utmost Secret 251840 

attached) • The 2nd r.Iarine Hegimen t is on 24 hours noti e;e. 

There seems no urgency in sending out the task forces except 

for the desirability of having more stren[th immediately 

available in the south than is thEre now. 

An arny f .... ic:ht of three 13-24s too~ off from OAHU this 

mornine; for T.iiu.way. They will fuel there anJ then go to 

boMb i7AEE. The present schedule calls for their arrival at 

the targE:t about dusk tomorrow. 

~here is stll~ no real evidence of enemy intentions. 

He is 1cnoun to be in Kis{a and Attu. His su marines are 

act:vc in the ~E Pacific. TLcre are indications that the 

Rabaul Area iG beinc reinforced. 

The mininr.: at BLf:!1.C:IEH has beer: conpleted. CinCPac 

reco:mmended that d. CUB be sent to FULCRUI.I. 

The Intelli~ence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas was 

establinhed today at PParl. Com-14 will administer the 

Center, but CinCPac will retain op6rational control. 

570 
i;E 0 It E? 

June 26th .• 

Discussions continued concernine plans for the 

offensive in the SOLOT:ION - BISiv1ARK AREA. Our forces 

except TP 11 and 8 continue rest, training, and refiting. r.r11.e SARATOGA group has delivered the Army and 

Marine Planes at MI:-JVJAY. There is no further word of 

importance from the J\LEUTIANS. 

In his 270302 General liicArthur c;i ves informa t i on 

on his comMand, and ComAirSoPac 260105 gives his views 

of air requirements for his command. 

The Air s earch for survivors at HIDVIAY has ended 

and ?BY ' s so employed will be returned to pgARL. 

There is no si gnificant information of t he enemy. ~ ~ 

June 27th. 

In a most secret message to Cominch (aitachea) Cincpac gave his plans for the employment of .the Amphibious 

regiment and Marine air and air in Sopac. While the offensive in the SVJPac is still under discussion all combat 

task forces, except TF8, are training, resting)and refitting 

as before. There is no significant news from the ALEUTIANS. 

An Army flight of three LB30s bombed WAKE by moonlight. Good results are reported. 

One CUB is to be moved to ~JLCRUM during July. 

Comairsopac says that three bomber landing fields could be 

built a_t ES"P I RITO SAT\TTO. 

TF8 now has 32 VP conducting search operations. Because of operational losses he wants 18 more now. He also 

has need for one 4 engine seanlane. The 8-34 was damaged 

by depth charge s and bottoming and must go to a Navy Yard 

for repairs. Since the 8-27 cannot be salvaged she will 

be destroyed. 

News of the enemy i ndicates not hing very important. 

In his 270735 Com ffiVPac gives an estimate of enemy ground 

strength in the SOl.OMONS - BISJ\1ARK area. \...-cc_ 

57-
iii!Jllili 

June 28 

As a result of delibera tions extending over several 

days Cincpac 290409 and 290525 were sent. 

There have been no change in own forces during the 

day. TF 8 continues to remain silent, except to say that he 

plans to employ submarines in extreme NVv Pacific and in the 

western Bering Sea. 

It is now planned to increase the SoPac PBYs to a 

total of thirty. 

There is nothing new from the enemy. 

June 2<J th. 

J~dmiral Nimitz and Captain LTcCormick lef t today for 

a conference on the west coast with Admiral King . Va r ious 

phases of current and pro j ected operations will be discussed. 

It has been decided to send TF 11 , 1 8 and the 

2nd Marine11, to the South Pacific ne;ct week . They wi ll 

r ende zvous on the equatoT and then pass to Admiral Ghormleyf or operational control. Rear Admiral Fletcher will be in 

tactical cot~nand. 

As a result of Coninch despatch attached, t h e 

whole ma t ter 'of the ALEUTIAN situation is again under r e view. 

Briefly t he situation toda:r is that the Army is not now 

prepared to move in and sarrison KISKA as they would need 

strone; intermediate points between there and DUTCH HAHBOH. . Occupation under present circumstances would, in CoMinch opinion , 

create an opportunity for enemy attrition which we now have. TP 8 

in his 300215 says that he needs reinforcerrJ.ents to proceed 

successfully. In view of Cominch despatch no CVs or raiders 

will be sant to TF B. 

Comairsoupac 280830 deals with UOUMEA as a possible 

CV anchorae;e. The Sumner leaves SAMOA on the 1st for HOUJTEA 

to further investigate the harbor. 

It now seems definite that a vvi thdra wal of enemy 

surface forces from the North Pacific Area is underway. IJ.1he extent 

of the r1ove is not yet knovm. It seems pl"obable that considerable 

reinforcements are enroute to the SOUTH PACI:B,IC. 

The plans section has an estimate undernay for an V 

offcnsi ve in the BISf,TARK - SOLOMONS AE-~A. LackinG Cominch ft' 

:Jirective any such estimate nust be rather indefinite. 

572 
S.iv lL'~ 

June 30. 

Admiral :Jir1i tiz t s plane c1·ashed on landing at Alameda . ~e 1 d~iral was slightly injured~ 

T:1.e attached ~ .~ Jespatches, Ci11CPac 272341, 

3021'1,..., 010159, Comge1 S'::!?.A~;V .2D2015, Comsopac 300600 are ~oted 

as indica tine; ~~-.elimin::....T'Y marine ~)lans for the offensive. 

CinCPac 290409, 302359 and Comalaska 300215 and Cominch 

291810 give the present Alaskan situation. In absence of AdMiral :~initz, the Chief of Staff foelG that no action is apl)ro- priate here and that it is a matter for conversations between 

Adnira_s .;iNitz and ::ing. 

Rear Admiral r1etcher has assur.1ed conman:l cf TF-11 and 

that force will proceed to the South Pacific, as prevlousl~ 

11entioned, on Jul~ 5th. TF-lG and 17 will continue training 

at Pearl for the present. 

In his 302010 Cornnander Amphibious 1'orce Pacific says that the I~arines novr ucsired for enployr1ent ln the Southwest 

Pacific require $ training ana rehersal before ready for the 

offensive. They will not have time for that f they are to be 

ready August 1st . 

The project to place a landing mat on Tern Island, 

French Frigate Shoal, has been approved by Cominch and the 

time estjrr1ate is roughly three months. Th:s project will 

pernit VF to fly to Midway. 

Johnston Island can now be used for VF and the initial ~lanes are now desired. 

Ener1y su"bm rlnes continue to be reported in the ,rorth 

and Centr·al Areas but have •lone no dar1aee . On the other hand, 

v1e have indications that Japan has resorted to much larger 

em:_:)lO'J'Y'1ent of convoys as a j:·osul t of our sub activities. 

rrhere is no chance in eneMy disposl tions worth notine. 

573 
JUN GCT 

30 0215 COt~LASEC TO CINCPAC, COM 14 

This is CTF 8 estimate on answer to Cincpac 290409. 

Air operations to date have shovm that landi~:.; opera- tions at Kiska and Attu both are beyond effective air 

S1.J::_)port fro1ll any oxi sting air fie1d.. The number of 

days required to effect seizure and de3troy enemy 

insta1lations or to capture and consolidate position 

Asho is permanent occupation decided upon cannot be 

foreseen. For either type of operation ships should 

x-·em.ain in close support until operations ashore are 

fully cor~leted. Enemy surface forces including carriers :may arrive to dispute se[~_ control before withdrawal of our force is desirable. ,,"li thout ovm carl'"'iers 

our surface forces fron the beginning will be devoid 

of defensive fighter support and nrust suffer serious 

damage fron enemy air forces in Attu-Miska area plus 

enemy air for·ces available frora Paramushiro and carriers. Without carrier support damage and losses to 

ships and troops will probably nore than negative any gain that can be envisaged from destruction of enemy shore establishMents. ~vi th strong carrier support 

temporary seizure of Kiska and Attu to destroy enemy forces installations and supplies considered feasible 

and desirable. In view of mutual air support afforded 

each other by two enemy bases they should be attacked 

simultaneously which consideration requires further 

increase in strength of supporting forces. Continued 

occupation by us appears highly undesirable at this 

time. Required logistic suoport 'Nould create very vulnerable 11ne of communication. Loss·of supply ships 

and obligation of large naval force two protect the 

line would be inevitable. Believe Japs can be made to 

see that continued occupation by them is too costly. Offensive operation gives us full initiative in timing of attacks. Carrier planes can operate if on the spot 

takine advantage of even short brea~s in the local 

weather. Patrol planes operatinG froM tender at Adak 

could sive scouting covera~e. Enemy may be counted on 

to :ru.sh carriers to sup::~ort surface force action. 

Strongly recor.r.r:1end attacks on buo islands be r.1ade 

sir:1ultaneously and be unclertalren onl:r when stron carrier and .. cavy cruiser support is a vilable. 

574 
JU17 GCT ---~-

20 0830 

29 1810 

COTI.A.If~30P!iC TO Cir;CPAC I~JPO COt:SoP; C 

An supplomentins 1~1y letter to you. Uy 270655. In 

light ny conversation with Ghormley. 2 carriers can 

be berthed Groat Hoads lJoumea which is best protected 

anchora ___ o. 7/i th r1ost if not all sui)portj ne light 

forces. 1 carrier eroup can be based Plaines Des· 

Gaiaes Field and 2nd group at ICornnac Field both on 

west coast POPPY former about 100 miles and latter 

200 miles northwest Noumea. Latter affords no dispersal. Is exposed and unprotected by AA ~uns and 

boasts poor communications but is serviceable. Ho 

housing or messing facilities exist for flight crews 

or service units. Either prefabricated pousing rrust 

be provided including galley and mess equipment no 

complete advance base equipment sirdlar to that for 

VP squadrons brcught. Tontouia Field being r eV'{orked 

and not in commission until about 1 September. 

COI~IECI: TO CI~ JCPAC IHFO CTF-8 

Operations in South Pacific expected to require the 

use of 6 AP0S and raider battalion. This in answer 

to your 290409. Para 2, in general, permanent establishments in Kiska, Amchitka and Attu must be preceded 

by preliminary establishments in Atka and Adak. Army 

is not now prepared to ]rovide forces an~ equipment, 

in particular aircraft, for projecting establish:ments 

this far west in the Aleutians. Further we are not 

pl')opa:!:"'cd at this tirlG to GUJ?port such projected 

establiswents. Our occupation of the western lleutians 

would inevitably bring about strons counter neasures 

b ... ~ tho Jananese tl1is YJould nrobabl"\T necessltate the 

s~pport o~ our Fleet forces. includinG carriers in a 

strength that would not fit in ·with 0 outh Pacific 

operation. Para 3, consider one raider battalion, 

even supported by additional troops on cruisers, probably insufficient for this proposed operations. Para 4, 

occupation of Kiska by either side presents opportunities to other side for profitable attrition tactics. 

If improvenent of conditions now warrants the projection of landing forces to Kis{a even more would raids 

appear to be in order. Para 5, surface force opErations in i:rnr.1ediate vicinity of Kiska harbor may now 

call for use· of fast nine sweepers. Para G, request 

advice of specific operations contEmplated. 

675 
8TIOM'il 

JUN 1942 

29 0409 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CTF 8 

Believe more aggressive action your 281635 practicable in near future with means now available for those to 

be supplied in accordance proposals to follow and 

also because indications today that enemy carrier 

strength is in or near OMINATO and other strength units are estimated to be retired between OMINATO and 

PARMKUSHIRO x Para X Our modern submarines are just beginning to arrive X I expect to reenforce patrol plane strength from Replpatronspac X Request you 

urge army to add to their long range air which can 

be brought to bear X Para X On assumption that Army is prepared to take over KISKA and ATTU after they 

are recaptured and will occupy and construct airfield 

on .l\MDRITKA I propose send the Second Raider Battalion 

to act as assault troops and propose add thier four 

APDs and VINCEN~ms to Theobalds Force. 

29 0525 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CTF 8 

Part 2 of dispatch 290409 from Cincpa~, These ships would be withdra~~ from Southern Expedition and latter 

would be relieved in Taskfor 18 by SALT LAKE CITY. If 

Raider Battalion considered insufficient for landing there will be room in cruisers and destroyers for Army · 

troops for landing after raiders have obtained beach 

head. Para. Believe that weather conditions make 

inadvisable risk carriers or LONG ISLAND that area and 

latter urgently needed for training carrier pilots. Consider shore based air though unsuitable for close 

support of landing can supply on selected days sufficient for success of expedition provided no carrier 

opposition encountered. Para. Experience with PTs 

convinces that due to frailty short range and poor habitability they are unsuitable for suggested use. 

Para. Request your comments. 

676 
SiiSilET 

Jill~ GCT 

30 2010 

30 2359 

CTF 3 TO CINCPAC. 

Your 000015 2nd I.1arine Regiment reenforced is combat 

loaded but is not repeat not prepared for offensive 

operations without rehearsal of specific operation conteMplated in locality approximating conditions 

expected to be encountered~ 

CINCPAC TO CTF 8 INFO COJ'.:INCH. 

Your 30215 in view Corninch 291810 carriers and raider 

battalion will not be sent you. Request surr.unary your 

contenplated operations. Do these require use DMS. 

Can make four available if 'urgently needed. 

677 
02 0150 COHTASEFOR 8 of July'42 

This from ComTaskFor 8 in answer to Cincpac 302359. 

Present plans of operation continues scouting against enemy advance in ALEUTIAN-ALASKA PENINSULA and ar;ainst HOME with 

army air strikin8 force disposed to attack located enemies 

in both areas. Continues bombing attacks on KISY~. 

Subaarine plan stations 1 in PARAIIHJSHIRU-KURILE AREA :b on 

PARAMUSHTRU - ArrTU line 2 at ATTU, 2 at KISKA others in 

mid-Aleutians with 4 old submarines in UMNAK, DUr.i:CH HARBOR ARF~. All ordered to scout and take strong offensive action. 

Destroyers convoy and air provide close in coverage for army 

transports to NCH,TE. Destroyers escort other transports and 

auxilliaries. Main body to exploit any opportunity for 

attrition attacks on detached enemy units. No enemy surface 

fo1")ce s located out side KISKA-ATTU AREA since tTune 12th. 

Now appears probable thatair action in first week of 

caMpaign and results of MID1

NAY VICTORY plus our western 

air striking concentration has discourar,ed for the present 

enemy advance east of KISKA. If campaie;n to date has 

restricted enemy to seizure of 2 barren islands the nearest 

57G miles from UMNAK submit that ALASKAN CAHPAIGN to 

date has successfully executed plan contained your Oplan 28-42 in defending against enemy advance on vital postions in 1\.LEUTIAN-AL.A.SKAN AREA. Major test of the situation here 

will come when Japanese next know that our main forces in 

:IAWAIIAN AREA are too :far removed to flank their advance 

throue;h ADAK and ATKA on UMNAK DUTCH HARBOR COLD BAY AREA. 

bnemy position in the occupation at KISiili can be rendered 

unprofitable when ever carriers and troops can be made 

available here for commando attack. Believe present operatine; plans require all that my forces are capable of 

accomplishing. Do not need dog mike sai.ls at this time. 

To date enemy has not mined waters used by our forces 

28 4584 GENERAL I'!IARSH.L\.LL of June' 42 

Cominch file Al6-3(0017?) dated 12 March, 1942 Joint Basic 

Plan for occupation and defense of Bl:~AClffiR, contains pro- visions vhereby Navy Department provides necessary personnel, material and equipnent necessary :for construction land plane baseBleacher. Commanding General reports arrival constructi 

personnel representing Department Engineer Hawaii. Also 

reports department Engineer has certain Army construction 

equipment now at San Pranci sco earmarked for BL::ACHER and 

requests that it be shipped. He also recornnends that 

construction this field be joint task under supervision Hawaiian Department .i~nginoer. It is desired that you in 

cooperation with CincPac deterrnine single Agency responsible for supply of personnel, Material and equipment for this 

entire project and notify War Department of your joint 

a~reement. This nece ssary in order to eliminate confusion 

and duplication of effert. Connanding General BLEACHERS 7 B 

beinc :furnished paraphrase copy this rado. Cominch A 

concurs in above. Pass this radio Cincpac. 
~ E a n il r 

JUL GCT 

02 1928 

02 2025 

CINCPAC '11

0 COUSOPAC (Continued) 

FLORIDA Island. (g) Negatives and 10 contact prints 

of Stereo pairs all landing beaches FLORIDA TULAGI 

and GAV'UTU Islands. (h) Written report by Intelligence 

Officers attached lst MarDiv of visual air reconnaissance by them of FLORIDA and TULAGI supplemented by all 

possible local information they can obtain from Australian 

and New Zealand authorities. 

2. Request also you endeavor assemble lONGBOW by 15 July 

several ship !.>ilots familiar VJi th waters around FLORIDA 

Island and several guides familiar with terrain and 

trails on FLORIDA and TUJ-1AGI suggest contact Burns Philip 

CoJ1pany and Lever Pacific Ltd. as poss-ible sources .. 

VICE OPJU V TO C OM-8, C 01,1-12 

CinCPac 260019 requests priority transfer 1 construction 

battalion of C U B Humber 1 to duty base FULCRUT~I1. Com-8 

effect transfer 6th Construction Bati-a1ion consisting of 

1'7 officers 1071 men to Com-12 who will ari'ange FFT. 

Com-12 notify Com-8 date ancl place embarkation. 

579 

,_ 
~·-- -~ 

.t3ii0Rl!IT 

JUL GCT 

02 0031 

02 0453 

02 1331 

02 1928 

COl.~GEN SAI~:OA TO C OL:AIRSOPh.C 

STru\WBOARD now ready for 1 six plane VS squadron , completely equipped and self sustaining. Should bring 

tents cots bedding and field equipment· until better 

facilities constructed. Can mess initially with 

naval administrative unit. Because of many calls for 

utility service should have at least 2 preferably 4 

J2F5 additional. Increased derr1ands STHAVvHAT and nan 

and considerations essential training make duties 

squadron VSD-14 as at present necessitating division 

of squadron unreasonably onerous. Fulltime service 

of 12 plane squadron at HAT also considered essential. 

Copy to CO STRAWP.OARD by mail. 

ALUSNA WELLirGTON TC' COMSOPAC ( COI"SOP.AC TO CINCPAC) 

CinCPac 230305 passed to General Horley who notified 

NZ Govt. Prime ninister replies he passed info to 

High Comnissioner for ·"Jestern Pacific who has jurisdiction over FA:;urNG Island. Only connection 1JEW 

ZE!1Li1

.JJD had with FANI'"IlJG VJas through small defense 

force put there no\'! relieved by U.S. 

VICE OP1TAV. TO COT!ITASEFOR 8 VIA COT:ALSEC 

Anglo Soviet recognition system provides signals your 

290048 and 300005. Status distribution to Russian 

forces has been requested. Has hSRS been distributed 

your forces. See my 091240 June Basegram. 

CII;CPAC TO C01 30PAC 

CinCPac (Admin) pass by hand to CTF-11. On reconwendation Rear Admiral Turner desire following be obtained 

for delivery to him at IONGBO~ by about 15 July. (a) 

Charts and sailing directinns showing FLORIDA-TULAGIGUA.DALCAl'AL and UDENI Islands and approaches with 

information obtained from Australian authorities which 

is not shovm in U.S. p1 .. blica.tions. (b) Topographical 

map:J of sane. (c) Information as to airfields and 

pos sl ble sites for air fie lcJ. s. (d) Eest information on 

strength, dlspositions and defensive installations of 

Jap Ground, air and Haval forces in SCLOI;:ONS particularly 

FLC)!liT.1i. and ':CTJL \GI. (e) l~ ega ti ves and 10 contact prints 

of overlappinB reconnaissance strips of FLORIDA and 

rrULJ. .. GI Islands scale 1 to 20,000. (f) Flat obliques to 

larc;est possible scale of nortL 8.nd south coasts of 

580 
JUL GCT ----

02 0334 

02 22320 

COT.ISOPA.CFOR TO OPNAV I1TFO CI17CPAC 

Comsopac Comseronsopac C 0 first port embarkation 

FULCRUT,: in conplete accord on policy for logistic 

naintenanco South Pacific Area. Recoro~end Opnav 

and SOS Army promulgate fol1owing directive to all 

forces South Pacific Area quote Consopac will assume 

responsibility for logistic support all U S Forces 

in Sopac area as quickly as shipping becomes available to neet requirements. Upon notification that 

Comsopac has assumed logistic responsibility FULCRID,I 

will undertal<:e automatic supply all fresh and frozen 

provisions for all bases no requisitions required. 

Dry provisions all bases ] oss STRAul submit data port 

of embarkation San Francisco for automatic supply. 

STRAVl same data to Comserforsubcon San Francisco. 

Comserforpac will be source supply for all bases for 

fuel and naval ammunition. Army aMmunition. Army 

amraunitlon fro~ San Francisco. All bases furnish 

respective sources of supply maximum information for 

automatic supply. For clothing all bases submit 

data annointed a~encies San Francisco for automatic 

supply:~ Com-12 pass to Comgen San Francisco. 

COl'.~SOPAC TO CNO INFO CIIJCPAC 

This is part 2 of my 020334. General stores Army 

and Navy submit data to appropriate San Francisco 

supply points for automatic supply. Furnish Comsopac copy all requirements on all sources of supply. 

ComMunication difficulties prevent genPral use itemized requisitions. ~evelop automatic supply maximum 

possible decree. Utilize itemized requests only 

\·rhen essential to correct deficiencies automatic 

supply. Shipments from San Francisco to move direct 

to bases Wiramp,rt transshipment whenever possible. 

When direct delivery impossible F'ULCRUivi will designate transshipment point. Unquote.. Com-12 pass 

to Com~en San Francisco. 

'-' (unc.:orline probabl-;] means 11 v•Ji thoutu) 

681 
JUL GCT 

03 0202 

04 1901 

04 2144 

COUDG GEU BLEACHER TO CINCPAC 

Fr'on Comdcen Bleacher HR ?xl 3rd Cincpac.. Comairsopac for infor~ation. SOD runTiays usable dry 

weather available as follows 1~1-SE 4273 feet. ~ith 

coral extension to 5000 feet by .ug 30 Yrutfo five 

two three hundred. HE-SW 3600 feet with coral extension to 5000 feet by October 15th. r-S 3600 feet 

no extension or improvement contemplated. Dispersal 

area for carrier group ready by Aug 15. Very limited 

repair gassing and arMing facilities available by 

personnel and equipnGnt station pursuit squadron. 

Linited space in 40 by 100 foot shop can be made available for equipment aircraft service units by hug 30. 

Ir1provi sed housing and s tor inc faci li ties can be made 

available for 250 officers and men for temporary 

period. Plan contemplated construction native huts 

for housing 350 officers and men of arrr1y bombardment 

£?;roup. This can be increased to provit"-e for housinB 

of carrier aircraft service units if assigned here. 

Bedding and mess equipment not available. Lockwood. 

(Note: Underlined group garbled). 

COl:INCI: TO C IrCP/1.C. 

British prepared to accept following proposals communications Canton and Christmas Islands (Afirm) close cor.rr:J.ercial circuits provided th&. t sui table 

facilities available under-control Cincpac period 

(Baker) A1J. thori ze British censorship British Offical 

Traffic and Transmission via U S circuits in British 

codes and cyphers on assurance security such cyphers. British advise cyphers used for transMission of this 

traffic i'J secure and that official r10ssa~es v1ill be 

originated by administration officers fully aware of 

necessi tJ for exercisinc; stric;t vigilance. Com.rnent. 

Thi3 from Cincpac to Comsopac for action and Cincpac 

adm for info pass to Ghormley. Your 2CJ0830 June 

desire you proceed imnec1iately construction airfield 

at Espiritu Santo utilizin~ personnel and Material 

from Roocs.. Landinc; mat will be sent frort Copper. This project has highest priority. Desire field 

ready for oprratlon heavy bombers not later than 

July 28. :Jesir·e you reinforce Espiritu Santo with 

one ArMy heavy weapons com~any and one third A~ gun 

and nachine e;un [roup of Fourth Defense Battalion 

frort Efate usinc; first available transportation~ 

682 
SF6ii]j]T 

JULY 5 

06 0110 CTF 8 to CINCPAC 

Request you make representation to Washington to prevent 

Russian ships stopDing by Pribilofs due to difficulty in 

determining friendly or enemy character. Station ashore 

at St. Paul always reports enemy transport approaching 

thereby to date causing needless alarms. We should know 

that vessels approaching are enemy. Comtaskfor 8 originator. Comalsec by hand. 

05 0620 COMSOPAC·to CINCPAC 

In connection with possible future advances by Amphibious 

Forces this area careful study has been made of the problem 

of logistic support for such forces. Because of the nonavailability of suitable vessel of medium size for this 

duty and the extreme vuinerability of larger ships in 

advance areas, above study discloses the need for (in 

addition to reefer type Tuna boats requested for servicing bases my 290345 June} additional 15 Tuna boats 300 

tons refer capacity each for supplying Amphibious Forces 

in advanced areas lacking refrigerated storage. Request 

information of non refrigerated cargo capacity these 

boats in order prepare estimates additional vessels required to support above Amphibious Forces. Also require 

at least 50 raider transport tj~e boats accordance para 

4 King Annex George of William Prep Love 46-Prep Cast, 

would be of inestimable value for prosecution offensive 

island warfare. 

68 3 
JUL GC11 

04 2205 

05 0043 

r,1ARSHALL TO CG HA\.11J1.J DEPT 

With further reference to joint directives on subject of Army com.1'f!and South Pacific and Pacific Mobile Air 

Force which was dispatched to you through navy communications and will reach you throu;:~h CinCPac to 

prevent c·onpromising codes period, Major General 

r.Iillard F IIa!."mon has been de Si8na ted as Commander 

Army Forces South Pacific and will depart shortly 

to assume cor:L."1and under Ghormley in that area. You 

will desic;nate one heavy bonbardment group of the 

7th Air Force as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force . This group will be administered, supplied, and 

trained as a part of the 7th Ai:r Force. While based 

in Hav;aii, it vrill be available to you under CinCPac 

for operation without reference to the War Department, but vvill not be moved. out of Central Pacific 

area except on orders of the Joint United States 

Chiefs of 3taff. War Department does not repeat 

not contemplate augmentation your bonber strength 

over that currently authorized. The latter is in 

reply your 1229-2. 

MARSHALL TO CG HAWN DEPT 

Priority 4700 4th June 27 radio number 119 acknowledced.. Birch, Holly, and Lampoon are your responsibility. Assumption of command of South Pacific Area 

by Admiral Ghormley of June 19 relieved Fantan and 

Bobcat from your command. Directive to Ghormely (See 1

ND Radio Humber 3593-l;1ay 6 )' stated "matters of 

administration and supplJ7· pertaining to U S Army forces in South Pacific will be handled as War Department directsu previous instrl..Jctions to Poppy 

and Bleacher making them responsible directly to 

t,"Jar Departnent in matters of adr1inistration remain 

unchanged. Letter of instructions to General Beight- ler advised him that upon assumption of corrrrnand all r1atte~o pertaining to Sl.J.pply and adninistration 

Fan tan 'Woulcl be handled directly ·with the t:var Department. Letter of Conmanding General San Francisco 

port of embarl:a tion June 27, copy which has been 

nailed you relieved you from responsib1.11.ty for sup- plyin! Bobcat and charged CG SFPE with responsibility therefor. War Departnent letter June 25 AG 400 copy of which is being sent you by airmail sets forth 

supply plan for U S Army Forces in South Pacific 

area except Bobcat but does not charge you with any 

responsibility in connection therewith. 

684 
JUL GCT 

05 0043 MARSHALL TO CG HA',7N DErrr (Continued) 

Paragraph Tag has charged you with providing machine 

record service for Bobcat and Fantan.. This is due 

to the available capacity of machine record facilities 

in the Hawaiian Department and lack of such facilities 

at Bobcat and Fantan* Effort. is being made to remedy 

this situation and you will be advised when you are 

relieved from this responsibility. 

Paragraph ~.'Jar Department radio number 3686-Ivlay 11th 

dispatched to you from Connnanding General Army Air 

Forces approved alternate South Pacific ferry route 

and advised you that 3 Nillion dollars was being 

allotted for construction staginc fields. These 

instructions did not make clear that an air field 

was being constructed by navy at Bleacher for Task 

Force there. Since one of the staging fields on 

alternate ferry route was also to be at Bleacher, 

sone confusion apparently resulted as to responsibility 

for construction this air base. In order to eliminate 

confusion and du;_Jlication of effort, War Department 

radioed you on June 26 to confer w:i. th CinCPac and 

determine the single acency responsible for supply 

of personnel, naterial, and equipment for this entire 

air base project and notify War Department of your 

joint agreement. Subject of such agreement, you will 

continue to be charged with the construction of air 

fields on alternate South Pacific ferry route. Defense · forces for Ostler and Lineout a~e under study. 

What is status of construction of airfields these 2 

bases as well as Norfolk Island query Marshall 

685 
JUL GCT 

08 0740 C Ol.I?ASKFOR 8 T 0 Tt~.SKFOR 8 

Army reports positive identification at KISEA Harbor 

1 battleship or heavy cruiser at least 4 destroyers 

2 light cruisero 2 tankers or transports and 3 fast 

seaplanes (2 monoplanes and l biplane). 

586 
S:HOHiT 

JUL GCT 

10 ]250 COMINCH TO CIUCPAC 

The Joint US Chiefs of Staff direct the followin~. 

Subpara afirrn. It is a function of commanders ~ 

exercising unity of' comr.1E.tnd to cool'dina te reports 

concernin2; combat 6pora t ions of O"Nn or• enemy forces~ 

Subpara BakE;r. Or•ic;::..,na tor will make all such re-· 

ports to the corzn:J.andcr, exercisinG uni t~r of comrnand 

for coordina tl.on" co:n..1c~1t ... r'~Len a ~)roprla te ctr1d p~r>om}t 

I'etransrnis .;.ion as indi 2:d tGd belo.7: 3ubpara baker 1. 

·v~1.en the officer exercising unity of cor.nnand is a 

mcnber of the service otLt:r than ths.t of the originator of the report the report after application of 

the principles stated a1ove will be retransmitted to 

the head of the service of the originator that is 

the Chief of 0 taff US Ar1:1y-: or the ·commander in Chief 

·us Fleet. Subpara baker 2. If the originator is a 

member of the same service as the officGr exercising 

unity of command the reports will be trea tee;. as required by the practice of that service. Subpara 

cast.. Originators of reports whether in Army or 

Navy service vvho are not under the jurisdiction of 

the conJ'1ander exercising unity of command in own 

sphere of activity concerned will by the most direct 

r1eans available render reports of ovm or enemy 

operations to tr1e commander responsible for taking 

action .. 

687 
B@Jf] g ifiEi 

July 11 

12 0419 CINCP.AG to COMI NCH, Info: C0~~1S OPAC, CG STlli\W, CG SOBCAT, 

CG HltW DEPT II 

Q,uestion of control civil radio stations and exercise 

censorshi n has arisen at STRA':fSOARD and '30BCAT and 

may arise at other Free French Islands garrisoned by US trooP.S• Varying local conditions and requirements prohibit ~nunciating broad policy applicable 

to all islands" Consider imperative fOr military security to have authority to exercise control French 

civil radio stations and exercise necessary censorship at my discreti0n. It is noted urser 00254 of 

April Third does not include Free French as having agreed to my authority in Pacific Ocean Areas. Request you obtain necessa~r agreement from General 

DeGaulle stressing no desire to interfere with communication between him and his followers and re~uesting he announce my authority to the High Commissioner 

and his chief local representative at each island. Am 

prepared to handle French official communications over 

our circuits except in Society groups. At this time 

believe it advisable to suppress civil radio stations 

BOBCAT and STRA'NBOARD. Vlill defer reply your 041901 

until receipt reply this message. 

588 
l. 

July ;, 1942 

l. Cominoh gave the background for his serial 00581 of 2 July pointing 

out amongst other things: 

(a) After accomplishment of Tasks 1, 2, and 3, the plan 

will be to proceed to Truk-Guam-Saipan. 

(b) That he ( Comineh) had rejected the conception that the 

line between South Pacific area. and Southwest Pacifie 

area was a. "ChinGse wall. n 

(e) As to paragraph 4a of tho reference that MacArthur is 

thereby prevented from ma.ld.ng unre sonable demands on 

Cincpac. 

(d) That paragraph 4d of the reference is perhaps superfluous 

but serves to clarity. 

(e) That paragraphs 5 and 6 of the reference arc not wholly 

eatisfactor.y but, again, that paragraph 4a ~~vas necessary 

leeway. 

2. Cincpac stated that he had already directed Adrui.rals Ghormley and 'l'urner 

to proceed to Melbourne ae soon as may be to diseuse tho entire operation 

with General MacArthur. 

3. Cominch discussed Bolero pointing out that this shift of front from 

/ U.K. to Ellrope was stronely backed by the President and tho Arn13 which 

accounts for difficulties in obtaining adequate forces for tho Paeifie 

campaign. 

4. As to _mobile air forces, Cincpac emphasized the need for adequate 

ground facilities, nucleuses and fiehtera at ach staging point and 

advlsed that Oencre.l Elnmons had recently set up two groups or 2l planes 

lJ 26) for Fiji and Now Caledoni • 

v / 

authority for a Vioe Admiralty for Fletcher in adva.nco of .formal notifioa.-

tion. 

58 q .J \..J 
6. Comineh and Chief of BuPer-s will process Cincpa.e ts letter ot 24 June 

as to appointment of Task Force Commanders (regardless of senio·rity). 

7. Cinepa.c stated that Taalt Forcee 11 and 18 which are to give initial 

support to coming operations will be joined by Task Force 16 departing 

Pearl about mid July. 

s. Cinopac advised that another la.ruiing .field was being constructed at 

Jddway (Sand Island) using a. mat• whieh is already in the locality. 

9. Cominch repeated that he wanted SOllie means for tighter staging at / 

French Frigate. 

10. Admiral Turner recommended consideration of a diversion towards 

Alaska (or in any other appropriate direction) about lO days betore 

commencement of the Tulagi operation. 

11, Admiral Turner catatOd that with respect to Lione and Cubs, he had 

taken the liberty of advising the logistic people at San Francisco that 

such units required for the organization operations should take preoedenoe 

over units being assembled for Roses and other localities. 

12. Admiral Turner stated his view that. with respect, to captured islands• 

wo should set a target period ot one week for the establishment of an air 

field. 

lJ. Cincpac stated that he had been nursing the idea or knocking out 

)Jakin. 

1.4. It was decided that both raider battallons should be available for the 

Tulagi operation-. 

NOTE: At this point Admi.ra.l Turner withdrew. 

15. Oominch and Cincpac discussed val;"'ioue phases of the Alaskan· operations, 

are in accord that undue seriousness does not attach to tha present situation unless Kodiak is threatened and agreed to reserve judl)Illont as to the 

command fox• a short ti.m.c pending further developments. 

I • · ~ to 11laska1 Cominch mentioned that. last Thursday t there had been an 

indicat·on that Russians in Washington were prepared to undertake staff 

conversations with respect to projection of operations into Siberia. 

59 0 
17. Persormel. 

(a) Cinepac advised that; 

1. M1 tsehers' assignment is okeh. 

2. Murray is to be s onior Navy .Member of a Joint Board to 

pass on aiJ'I fields in the Hawaiian area. 

3. Gunther be given consideration for promotion. 

4. lf Halsey does not return, Fitoh should be tho Senior 

Air Flag Officer, PacFlt. 

(b) Cominch eta ted that Seligman and others involved in the 

affair were in •teaerow." 

(c) It was decided that·ae a general proposition, PhibFor 

Commanders would be Rear Admirals and that the advancement of such a Co.mma:nder to Vice Admiral 'WOUld be dotermined not only as the result or aecompllshment, but also 

depending on whether ho is a. Task Force Commander directly under a Fleet Commander. 

(d) Tho possible availability Qt Admiral Hoover for errployment 

in the aeronautic organization ·was discussed. 

18. Cincpac stated that there had been procured in Oahu a small house for 

the accommodation of Senior Oi'tieers who needed rest and that consideration L.r". 

was being given to the establishment of a. rest, camp on Y.aui. 

19. Vice Admiral P3e entered for tho pnrpos o of discussing employment of 

battleships. 

20. Com1nch stated his general agreement with the views expressed in a 

paper as to the employment of battleships prepared by Admiral Pye. 

21. It tas decidod. that: 

North Carolina should join Task Force 16. 

cc·nt.· n s udy should c given to the maintenance of a tDiv 

in\south Pacific. 

(c) In tho interoets of c~ntinued development of tactics for large 

forces (the necessity of whieh was pointed out by Admiral Pye) 

5 91 
when such BatDiv was established. in the. South Pae1!1o and 

rotation became neccssar,y relief would bo accomplished at 

about a mid point between Pearl and tho South Pacific 

station hich would thus permit of periodie exercises tor 

tho whole of Taek Foree 1. 

(d) An additional BatDi v Commander will be ordered to Task Jt~oree 1. 

22. SecNa.v was reque$t·ed by despateh to withhold release as to the award ot 

a tlS to Cincpac until 10 July. 

23. Oincpa.c pointed to th~ n•ed tor a survey looking to the oe\abllshm.ent 

ot medical storehouses 1n the south Pacific area. 

24. Cinopa.c advised that Sumner will nrvey the large area behind r.eefe 

at the southern o.nd of New caledonia which appears to hold possiblli ties 

U a large and SSQUt'O neet anchorage • 

2;. Admiral Jacobs advised that BuPers was giving constant coneideration 

to the p:roblem of maintilnanee of submarine captains and have arrived at 

these tentative conclusions: 

(a) A Subtttar'ino Oapta.in could be expeeted to hold up for three or four 

rul.l patrols .(total time o£ about ono year) before he should be 

given a prolonged blow. 

(b) The 30 odd small submarines in LantFlt afford a pool for promotion 

or captains of these ships into large submarines. 

26. Comineh pointed out that Sea. Frontier Corrananders Vl'ere a.vaUablc to 

Cinepac as Task FOree Commanders. 

tJOTE: Comineh will go into the details of directives bearing on this 

subject and will elarit,y it necessar,r. 

27 • Cominch stated that V'Ja.shington would be sent to Pacific about August V "" 

1st - whon so. Dakota should be ready. 

Cb~eK on · ned PncFlt n ~ Co nch on ~0 J~. 

Ch~.ck also on replacement ot 19 kno,t tanke~ bJ 17 knot t .. 

28. Cominoh ta.ted his view that oil storage should be placed in To aTabu tor a full due before permanent storage was placed in other islands in 

that a.rea. 
-5-

"'§.!!!!! 

29 • Cinopac rea.!fimed his view that all restrictions should be removed 

as to plane allocations to the end that each service should have available 

those types which it can n10st effectively onplo1• 

30. C..et. copy of Churchill's speech of 2 July. 

31, Cinopae outlined his view that a.e a contingent operation while Task 

Forces were in the vicinity ot Pearl without specific taske it would be 

desirable to have carriers take B-2$'s to about. 6oO miles from Wake, 

thore to be launched, bomb Wake and rotum MidWay. 

32. Cinepae advised that Bellineer wae to make an inspection of all Pacific 

air bases and 'M:>uld afterwards come to Washington for conversations with 

Cominch. 

33 • Cincpac stated his objections to the JAN Grid. Cominch pointed out 

that in the interests or obtaining a common grid we had Bditied our 

grid nomenclature to conform to those of the Army grid and that, as a 

result, he ani General Marshall had prescribed the JAN g~id ft>r use in 

all operations • 

Cincpac wi th<b:-ew his objections. 

NOTE• Check to determine that modification has ~eon made to General Signal 

Book - and issued. 

34. Cincpac stated t.hat there were about 101000 person.e of Japanese ~raotion 

in the islands who are eligible for the dr-oft which Viar Department intends 

not. to call. Their being called will take a lot of "dangerous characters" 

out of the islands. Hie view is that so long as they are limited to ·units 

ot a battalion and used on fronts outside or Pacific area• they will 

render good service • 

.3.5. Cincpac expressed his satistaQtion with tho manner in which the 

militar.y government in the islands is working out and urged that. after the 

'lar, · t shoul e tinue. ~ ' 

36. Cincpao advise ha a trial was to be given to a modifiaation of 

eubl'Dlllrine ·Operations in the Pacific whereby Fulton will be based at dway 

and submarines will, after one patrol, retum to Midway for upkeep and 

593 
rest. of ten days to two weeks, will then mke another patrol and then 

return to Pearl. Duration of patrols may be slightly reduced over tho 

present 5o-60 days. 

37. Cincpac stated that there wa.s a plan on foot to repatriate aliens from 

the islands to Japan via the vrest Coast. He stated that he now considers 

very little infor.mation gets out of the islands excepting perhaps by mail 

to the West Coast and then to tht} F)n.pire by radio !rom South America a.M. 

registered hie objection to the method ot repatriation contemplated, on 

the grounds that mUitar·;r security 'fbUld thus be jeopardized. 

694 
Sillll 

....................... ._ July -5, 1942 

OOHVERSAtiONS BETWEEN COMINCH AND OINCPAO 6 JULY 1942. 

1. Cinopao qu.eetioned whether Bagley would be made a Vi~• Adairal 

• 

•• a Sea Prontier Oo der. Oominch pointed out that the ciroumstanoea 

in th& Hawaiian Frontier ditt r materially from thoee in other large 

frontiers wher · the Commander ha one or more flag ottioert under hia 

comman4. 

2. OOJtlinoh raiaed the queation at to how Admiral Dunn'• organisation 

•• workin out and Oinopa.o expr••••4 hit aatitft.otion with the preaent aet-up. 

s. Cinopac atated that with the preaeAt expertne11 ot the Salvage 

Unit at Pearl, he uo longer te•l• it neo••••r, to keep a dook available tor 

wounded ahipa in&hlUoh •• any ahip that oan be gotten into Pearl ou be kept 

atloat or t .. porarily grounded pending availability ot a dock. 

4. Oinopac now requiraa 'that every ahip in the Fleet haTe a Jalvage 

organisation made up from all d partment1. 

5. Oinopao oonaldera that the Pearl Harbor Salvage Unit ahould be 

kept intact tor the duration. 

e. The Publio Relations altuation in PaoPlt 11 aatietaotor,y to 

Oinopac. I~ thia oonneotion. Cominoh outlined the Preaident•a policy that 

one repre1entat1va or a n .. • aervioe and no othera ahould b allowed to go 

out in !aak Forcea. 

7. C1ncpao queetioned whether seaplane tighter• were to be made 

available. 

8. Ooudnoh atated that the probl a:t Ocean and Haru haa been 

pl oed in the lap ot the N..., Zeale..nd )j ~ 

are 

10. It wae m ntioned that th•r•jeight to nine thou and Australian 

troo~, at Port Moreaby. 

I 

I 

-1- S9 S 
.. 

!. ! a ! ! ! July 5, 1942 

11. Oinopao expreeaed a detire tor heavi~r wa.r-heada ·at the 

earlieat poaaible date • 

. 12. In diaouaaion aa to the uae of radio deoeption. Cinopao 

expr••••4 the vi" that it na very JnUCh ot a double-edged awordJ that 

the Japa have tried it & n~ber ot timea and have always been deteoted 

in 1 ta ptaotioe. · 

13. In oonnect1on lfi th the above. paragraph nwa".red. twelve • 

Oinopac repeated an observation that be bad JDAde during the April oon-

••raa.tiona to the etfect that the Jap r&c:lio d1reot1on·tinding 1)"8t• 1a 

exoelleut ud that it 1•··only n•ceaaary tor our toroe1 to open up and they 

are detected. By oa.parilon, he oonaidera that we are deo1d•dlyweak. 

OOlllinoh expr••••d the view that our RDP work 1n the Atlantio •• rapidly 

illlproving and that perhaps the weight ot thia experience lldght well be 

aade available in the Paoitio. 

14. Durin the Midway action our pe9ple at Midway got morning 

~d afternoon Honolulu papera. 

6.96 
-0' 

Jun 291 1942 

l J 

UOZEl KQB .:&:&m,g~B 1l! gB6R FQR Si.W!J£i;~JQ~ !iJU S«il~kfl& 

ADWI 4 ~i!UrXt 

1. -~ .sn4 ,{(IU!i:·i1. Eaa~t&o fAitaatla. 

t ok · on M!DWAY and WE~S!EftN ALEUTIANS prob blf had 

part of the original Japanese .ob3ect1ve prep at1on t ·or 

t aoka n EASTERli SIBElllA. asn, wbUe not wry tenable 

1n inter month t would (an4 will) · erve a1 a base tor Jap. 

ane e patroll1ng the l80th. r141an, north and south, ould . support further op rations to cut ALASKA ott from SIBERIA, and 

would, 1n conjunction 1th patrols from Ml:J>\fAY (it eapturetl) 

and asoblc force 1n the NORtH PACIFIC, serve to oover the 

ppro ohe to JAPIJt 1tealt. 

fbeae Japanese operations acunat ~all LEU'TIAliS 

.. liD. 'AY wer a:tven 4de4 1ne ntive b7 the TOKYO raid. 

------------------------------- In vtew ot general situation 1n this at-ea, continuance 

ot t o carriers .in the NORT~ PACIFIC 11 indicated. 

It de\telopmen s d distribution of Japanese forces 

1ndicat , a atmultaneous wid spread ra14 against Japan· e 

patrols extendin along the 160th. Meridi,an and asainst Jap. 

ane e t1ahing in the KAMCHATKA Are should promls profitabl 

result • • Should probably be made by ell. p:r ad out destroy :rs, supported to the· ea1twaret b)' carrier te.ak forces 

2. &111~10 QQDmtl&tiRnl.. • (It und rt k · n) • To 

obtain from s1an tactual data a t t o111t1 in F.AS!-. 

ERN SIBERIA on which to base· est1m tea · s to t e amount t 

g h. 

re • 

587 
.t . 

• 

~r ion SOUTH PACIFI hav 1 g 11 

cover 1 ~ exchange ot desp tabes covering the ~ "' 

t1~ ·l ! tor ott nd• oper t1o in thi a. 

, ,: 1

; . . t proce a or ttl UPt in aahin ton, 

two ,/

1 

~ ott1c r to con ern the lVl 1 solely with 

tu Uf ,/plana in t PACIFIC in. genaralt and tn the Satmi 

tore: 

/ 

e<t ~o 

tiTJ · !' P 0 IC in partie , tn order that the 

teri can plann 4, produced. • nd d 11 v r 

ituations exp o1 oppo tun! 1e a they {r , actually 'I prospeotively wUl u-1ae in ·he tuturtt. It 

WOUld 11 that least on otticer on rour Statt be 

I , Ci 11 dutie • If this 1 done, t e two 

roup o be kept in contlnuous touch by mail ooca 

ional pe aonal conta t 1 so that the d1tt1cultiee presented 

by the ~.ooo mil s s paratin PEARL trom ASHillG oan 

ov rc in tb be t r posaibl • ... 

A oa 1n point 1n regard to pr p ·ion tor future 

op r t1ona 1a that ot ott: nst m1n1n (at th preeent t e 

tor t t t er, s U as in the tu ure) arried out ,-

t, oludtn p trol pl • by 

order that proper pl n tor pr duatlon ot 

t1on and towage, o. 1 can be oarr1 4 out 

4. 

b 1ne , in 

ne , d1str1 

1' B:r1t1 h lu ant to do ch mo than to 

eont1nu th1 1 ge force relatt Gly idle in th INDIA!"' 

• o not carry f:l!1J pl , no 1v t torp do 

pl e obso ate. lot ,Quitabl ·or operation 1nst 

Jsp n se carrie nor ror ope ationa 

o j tiv- ~ 

- 2-

intJp 10 ' land 

598 
f1 

order t tt them, bav en sivinc co 1d atio 

1ne avi .,ion. 

In ie · t t 

o fit the B 

that on a b. t ed in co j 1otion · 1 

weal~ a ot th• e carr! r , it l dit• 

1 h E~ ter Fleet nto r t bl o • 

e,r ., on ainst the J an• • 

Tl · · d be coxmnander 

Chi r 1ted s 

taft, u.s. 

Fl t h e o l..., .... liool\ ..... 

ot 1rec 1 

t ( ) 

o e 

ports i.ll 

It 11 t ction or ~tdera exero1acon din t e ort co. cor 

o! o o and n oroes. h 

f'orwaraed thro tgh th oo under es 

c1 :ln un t of c an , ·for coo di t1on1 oomment 

J..l4,j .. ""Qbl ' 

by t it 

.a t • I initi t 

tl th t to 1ch th of. 

t1oer rc :tng un1 ty of c·ommand l'olo gs the eport 

forw rded mad to th e d or t t 

s rvic .. Ch! or Starr, u I. 

n r 1 Clie. I tntti te b ~ 1c. they 

w 11 b 1 andled as reQ.1li ed by t . e pr otie of th t 

ervi • 

'' b) omm iar r :f1<! or 1 et--

c , e ot ttn th 3 r1 t n of th Od 

.n!ler ex r ising unity ot eomrnm d in a. h r of' 

3 

699 
18 xp c d that th1 d art directive will be 

p o g t 1n th ne tuture and will re edy the cond1 

tiona resard1ag this matter recently reported bT the Co~ 

der 1n Chi t, u.s. Pac1f1o Fleet, relative to KIDWAY 

p r tiona. 

6 .QQIIl.\DiAAikl.\1 ~~ tAl .§QlWJ fAgtlUla 

The organization ot communications 1n the SOT.rrH 

PACIFIC and the t bl1 hment of Joint command. posts are 

rece1v1ns ~he con 1d ration ot the .. ar and Navy Departments •. 

A Joint committee 1 working on this matter and their 1tud7 

po 1bly will be turnished to the Co and r in Chief t 

Pacitie Fleet, an Commander, South Pac1t1o rea. 

It is understood that a ander CUrt (Statt ot 

01ncpac) 1 making a study ot ·the ~;tuat1on s it exist by 

visiting the poe1t1ona 1n t OUTB PACIFIC Area. 

Any r~commendat1on that Comman<l$r 1n Ch1et, Paoit1o 

Fl t, may wish to tor rd as a r ult ot c ande.r Curts• 

tudy 111 be ot value to the joint oomm1tt e, 

7. 

BOLERO ha to do w1th o ement or troop o E GLAND 

for cross chann 1 amphibiou operation next ye r, or gl:tty tha h e o r t o 

• 

700 

- 4 
0 (- • 

The e ployment ot hipping and of productiv. capa• 

city to meet programs 1n l'egard to special landing craft, 

and ot training. personnel to ~ these landing cratt 1 all 

have Double A Prior ty, 

It 1s anticipated that some or the pecial landing 

cratt uch as th 318• tank oarrylng ship and the 1';• 

persona l carrying ship or boat wUl prove very usetul 1n 

our future PACIFIC phib1ous op rations. 

8. AD\1~A~rqrars P.txt;Lmamtot • 

e ant1c1pat that by tbe time our .new .carriers are 

com1ng along the d velopment ot ant1•a1ror ft weapons, 

including director , guns, ne types of atamu.nitlon, Will 

be such a to permit us to project our perat1on into 

the areas ot enemy land•·ba ed a.ir W1 th 1 •• hazard than 

exists at the pr a nt time. It this is th• case, we· Will, 

in the future, h ve greater flexibility 1n el ct1ng points 

or attack against the widespread Ja. anese po 1t1ons. 

9. ptgbltl g( llcOtt Ytlll.l• 

10. NinA PomJ:>u:ft tg: Eatrell!ns §t& J.ID!•· 

11, ProJaJ.tm Qt LIDd-la1'14 J}Qlll1Dtla Tgt;ea; 

f~ADt•• &nd l~&b~§tl (gr Ugg QQ I§liQd »ases, 

l2 • MOlt I!J.3M&P& Wl tb! Hll o( BNI£9 PIQIPSiOD • 

To b tho~oughly work d out in connection 1th .our 

strat g1cal and tactical oper~tion • 

-' .. 70 
J 

13~ ~&au rcz:a, UQU:XQ, 

Our plan to bUild Up a well organized and trained 

Amphibious Porce, PACIFIC, while buUd::tng one 1n the 

SOUTH PACIFIC, are constantly being 1nterter d with by tb 

necessity of eating 1mm d1ate demand • The thot\ght has 

be n, of course, to b prepared to c ry out amphibious 

torce operatioll tn either ar a, both area s1multaneously, 

or concentrating rapt ly CENTRAL or SOUTH, - probably SOUTH. 

The b d p rt of the problem has been the development 

ot rine phibious aircraft quadrons. Pres nt planria 

to concentrate on the organization of Iarin Air Wing One 

with a v1 to b~1ng1ng it up to at least halt strength tn 

the early tuture. 

There have been man7 discussions with the Aray regarding t:heir p rt1cipat1on in future aaph1b1ou tra1n1ns 

and in aJll)hibiou organ1~at1ons. The Ar!IY does not w18h 

to b und r the in and not "'ery much under the Navy. -

Though they were perteetly willing te accept unity ot com- , 

mand offered by the · vy for the BOLERO op rations •. 

14. Al•~snment Q% ,,liD. Ql?ltt!trs tA Arm At~PI:at:t 

Jlu4 tQr ratr91l.1ns .IQQ !llgonnasssangt &n Qsu~ra~en•t&on, Jitb 

Qla: iYttiSAe ~g. tQ§ s, 

15. ll.\' QgJMUmd · tbt fitYlb Po;~t1;. I~gluding 

A:ml Qanf!tll in tbft §snttb , fag.!t'*g • 

) ' 

7 02 

- 6 -
.· 

/ 

CQ ·.ANDER I1~ CLtil • u.s. p ClFIC FLW 

1. ~c~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..-

lOJlS 0 AI40tts. ·,~ Tbis.~s giving us quite a problem to1solve, inas ch 

s e must keep our fe ,; existin ~arriers ready for operations at all times against enemy carriers, as well as earry. 

1n on othe ,aslts - th the Fleet. 

On~ y ould b to devote t1e 

lt1 ion. 

!he cond thought is the use or British carrier_ • 

At th present t1m the British h v uite a number of carr1era which cannot be usefully employ d because they have 

no di bomber tor th m and no mod rn torpedo eratt. !he 

question ot ustn. one or o British carriers in Eastern 

Aus.tr lian aters for our J!arine aircraft (involving the 

use also o! some fli ht deck ore :vs) has been taken 't p with 

the ·ritish and tb y are lookin into it. They, the Britilht 

admit that these oar iers are not no pa 1ng t!1eir way. 

2. 

703 
July 1st. 

Except for Task Force 8 the Fleet in the Pa cific 

is resting, training and preparing for fur ther op e rations. 

Task Force 8 ~o SO gives his sumnary of current operations, This message was sent along t o Admi ral Nimitz. 

General Marshall ' s 4584 of t h e 28 t h rega rding t h e 

j o i nt construction of an airfied seems t o p r e s ent no 

special problem. 'ilc have asked Com So Pac for comment 

and on its receip t wi ll t ake n ece ssa r y steps to settle 

t he ma tter. 

The r e a r e no sicnificant chang e s in t h e enemy 

di spo si t ions. 

J"uly 2nd. 

Attached directive for the offensive was received by Cominch and those commanders concerned will 

talk it over tomorrow. Our present plans are not changed, 

except that Marine Defense Battalions we suggest are 

not included. 

There is no new information of own Task Forces. 

Vice CNO 022025 gives :plan for a construction 

battalion at FU CRlTh . 

TONTOUTA field at WHITE POPPY is now O.K. for 

one carrier group, if used with caution. Rebuilding is 

underway. 

e.G. STRAW 020031 says field at IDARD is now 

ready for up to six ve. He also gives needs and recommendations regarding air for the STRAW area. 

Vice CNO 021331 states that the Anglo Soviet 

recognition signals provide means to work Russian vessels. However, as Opnav does not know whether or not 

Soviet ships have these signals on board, nor where 

sig nals are effective the net result is as stated in 

our despat ch on the subject to CTF 8 this week. In the 

meantime Russian ships will be routed from Siberia thru 

the e~ing Sea and to U. S .A. via Dutch Harbor, and all 

forei gn vessels operat ing South of t he Al eutians west of 

Dutch can be presumed enemy. 

7 04 
a@!!IGI& I 

July 2nd. (Cont'd) 

ALUSNA 020453 states that the only interest New 

Zealand had in Fanning Island was their troops there. 

Cincpac 021928 gives requirements for Rear Admiral 

Turner in connection with the attack on Tu1agi. We 

are continuing to assemble material for use by the 

operating forces in that effort. 

The following were sighted by a weather plane: 

At Kiska, three cruisers, 3 VP, one unidentified vessel; 

at McDonald Cove Agattu, 3 AP, 5 DD; at Massacre Bay, 

Attu, 1 cruiser. B-l?s have been ordered to attack. 

The NAUTILUS returning from patrol off Honshu 

reports that all merchantmen sighted are )eing escorted 

by cruisers or destroyers. She sank one DD and. one 1500 

ton PC, and fired at and may have hit one DD, one 17000 

ton AP, one 10000 ton AO. 

A sub was reported in Lat. 20-08 S, 163-04 E. 

There is nothing new regarding enemy deplo~~ents. 

July 3rcl . 

Cominch 041632 (pink) directs that Comsopac 

cooperate in the evacuation of Ocean ana Nauru Islands. 

There is no answer to CinCPac uery regarding who is to 

be evacuated and where they are to go. 

CinCPac 040057 (pink) delays the departure of 

TF-11 until after the 6th of July. Rear Admira l Turner 

will be here by then to discuss the forthcoming offensive. 

Cor1inch 032255 (pjnl:) cstabli:Jhcs 2 mobile air• 

forces. This does not seen to ad~ to the total planes 

available in the Pacific Gcean Areas$ 

Cominch 032254 (pinl:) provides for an Army 

r:;eneral under Cor.1sopac. We hc:.ve not yet recei vcd 

Comsopac viev1s on this. 

CoMsopac 020~04 oi320 civos t1e locistic set up 

for his area . It is alons tl~ general ~lan su[~ested 

by CinCPac ln conf~rence with Vice Admiral Ghornely 

~,·Then he vr s hC:::.re ln Hay .. 

TP-16 and 1? a1·e to undertake tr·a_ining off Pearl 

for tl1e ne:xt 10 days or so.. They will practice ton= ~'L/ 

bardment of s11.ore objectives. 

705 
SECHE'l 

TF-8 surface vessels are inactive but thiS planes 

a ttac_ced eneny vessels at Kiska and ;ear Islands. Results 

ape uncertain~ 

The OGLALA was placed in drydock - thus clearing 10-10 docl~ :'or the first tiMe. since she was sunK there on 

:Jec. 7, 1941. 

There are no significant reports of the enemy. 

July 4th 

T:- ere i nc chanse in t 1e Car·rier Task Forces at Pearl; all three are on 12 hours notice. ~ask force 18 is 

enroute outY Pacific. ~ask Force 8 submarines are active and 

report hitting t.1ree 0Ds at ATTU e1nd one DD ·at AGGATU. 

C o:r1inch 041901 deals -vvi th rs.di o at Ch.liT CH and CHTIISTrl1.S. 

A B-J 7 reconnaissance of :nc··rLAI;D and BAKER Islands 

,roduced necative results. 

CinCPac 043144 directs irr~ediate construction of a landing field at I;SPIRIS":F .JA:~T 0 for 1.1 se :!.n the c or1:r1tng offensive. The cons true tion bat tall on vrill COMe from ROSES and the mat will leave P&RL on the 6th. 

C .G. BLEA.CI:ER 030202 su:mnarizes the air situation 

at that :->lace. 

r:lhere is now ::;ome evidence of mines at KISK.A. 

cauoe 01.'"' t:~ts 4 :JLS ar-e beinc; helcl at PEARL to send north. 

:o to SOPAC but a total of six are requested. 

BeThree 

There is no further infornation of r.J&.jor changes in J apanese deploynents. 

7 05 
s F 9 £? E T 

July 5~ -

Rear .... dmiral Turner arrived and an all day conference 

wa.s immediately started to diseuss the rru"Li~GI operation. The 

in;:,ediate job is to r~et a landing field in 09cration at ESPIRITU 

S~i~~TO.. Admi2al 1\n•ner" s plans, wbich have the general a 1

)proval 

o:' H.d:r1irs.ls ).Jimi tz and King, 8.l"'e to ( 1) rehearse the landing 

between July 25 and 30 in the South Pacific ( 2) ore rate la nJba3ed p~_anes fror1 ESPIHITU SAW:PO by July 28 (3) use the 1st 

B.aider :'atta1ion anJ the 3rd Defense Battalion plus the 1st 

1~rine Division, less the 7th aeslment, plus the 2nd Regiment -

the lattol~ to occupy Ir:JEHI on A-2 day. (4) the present rather 

nebulous iclea is that :..t ~~'ill ~)e a dav::i ·ht assault ~Ji th cruiser 

.:.tnd DD shore l:Jomba1'd111en t (.:::~) CVs clos~ in wj_ 11 provide fi0htex· 

c overR::;e for APs (about 3 da-ys) ancl will dive bomb defended 

pos1t~ons Lefore the landlng~ Task Force 11 will leave Pearl 

July 7th. Decision on other Carrier '.rask t:<,orces was not reached. 

However, the nr~~E CA~OTll~ is enroute to Pear,@ 

Task .2o:r·c.e 8 conttinues o.s before, i .. e (t, dependence on 

.Jubmarine 3 anC_ air to stop the Japs in the .M.I EU'riAHS.. The 

fleet s·ubs ( Gl10'rlLER and TRITON, so far) are doing a fine j ol~. 

Cont::as::z:Por 8 OGOllO indicates some trouble wi tl:1 Hus sian 

merch&..ntmen.. Jin.;Pac has r·equested. Opnav to keep the force$ in 

~\L!~.SF..A fully iLfOl'"'ue<l of ?t.us sian movements. 

C or'1SoPac 000G~O ~c rll.tr s ts. ~-c, d i ti orl.al 8:1all boat tonnage. 

His request ',.111 ~1e sPl.diec_ an:~. ~-K •.vi~l e given ever-J conside""'~ t ion. ........ , £ p: ct~l o._rl to meet L.i s nf. eels 1 s far from comfJlE tion, CinCPac is unable to clo norJS s t t.Lic time than ·urge 

Opnav tr) f'lnd ·Ha·ys BlYl mt?ans to r.1cet the Eeeds of a very difficuJ. t loglstic prch1er:: for tt'i3 offt,•lSi Ve;; rJ.1he needs itVill be 

met one \J8.y or ar otrcr 'Ul·- ca1.not be alloil'.r€d to stop the offensive .. 

TI1cro is ~l~ probability that units of Crudivs 6 &nd 18 

and. ~Jne De sron _ .. re ln thr· s:'ULAGI - GUADi-.LCANAL C:Lrea and tl"H:-t t 

an airflel d i. 8 bein, ~ con J true ted on tlie north sh~:re of the 

la tt_er island. ..\11 ~ Orane:e CVs r-~.re north of .the ec;_ua tor. The 

·Tcr~i~KU seer:1s tG he 1 cpairecl and at sE-a tr£!.1ning a new air 

~rou:r. ~2here i.J no cvj_dence of E1..r y change in em:1loyment of (___/ 

Jap un:!. ts in t:1e n:L..E"C"TL~IT - I~u~ LF area.. w 

707 
ui'FGR?ir 

Con~er·on~.'"' 3 ~J·on tinucc1 c oncerr.:..:::1~ t}l:; TrT ... J I o'Jc r•c. tl_ on. 

It ·:;-r: <J c ecir1od to -JL :1 Tasl~ ?orce 11 tor,1oProw. 1 dmlral I~lr~ti tz 

l'Otur>ned ctl1 l ~--:;encro. }_~r approvecl !repara tio:ns. 

~ask ~orce 8 operations ~re co~f:net to air and submarines. ITo nor.e attacl':s are recoPdcd ut the G:{Of.'!LER v1as 

lar1a~e l :~ depth chc -rces to the extent thP t s:1e r1u8 t c;o to a 

navy yar 1. J.,_ ~Jlane re_i)orts no ships in KIS:K:l~ .~.arbor·, ll.t thB. t 

2 destroyers weY'e observed in South ~>ass s.r:J 2 destroyers at 

Little Kis '"a. 

I n Ge n eral :ars:1all' s 04220'3 ancl 050043 the directive 

for the Eo'.Jile 1 ir Pox·ce and t.__._c Army General for the South 

Pacific is si ven. rrhe latter relieves C . :J .. Hawaii for resr~onsibility in the South Pacific. 

There seems to 1e consi erab e enemy activity on the 

:~orth Coast of GU .. :JALCAr:AL. Observed in t 1e vicinity yesterday , ~ 

were 2 larce AK, 1 cruiser an~ 1 destroyers. ~ 

July 7 . 

mask Force 11 sailed ~or ~ rendezvous with TaskForce 18 . 

" ... fter neet5 n~~ , t -:ese forc(::S under the co1 nan'-: cf "''flee lldrriral 

~letcLer uill ]roceed to ti1e ~outh Pacific an~ report to Vice 

Auniro..l Ghornle"J .. for Task 01:E of the of::'ensive (TULAG I O::_:)eraticn ) 

nas1-:: .L---.orce lG f'~ 1::. ""Jroceed South _,_acific o.1 out the 1) th Ol"' lGth . 

:Jecision laS not oeen r-enchecl on the emplo-yr.1ent of Taslr Force 7, 

nncl th3.t force ~ .. n'1 ~asl: Force 16 o·"tinues trainin~ in th€ Oii. :u area . 

Tas~- Force 8 surface 1 3U"!Jnarine, and air elements continue 

scoutlnc anC 'ltrai tine for favorable opportunities. ri e FINBACK 

attacked 2 ~.Js and px·obably sank one of them on the 6th south of 

:,.ISI:A Islancl. CorTaskFor 8 080740 sr~runarizes ener1:r sighting at I:ISIC. •• 

Lhe arran,:f "ents for locistics for t tf.' forthcominc; ca~pai· n 

in tho 3cvth ")c_r,if·c nrc uncler,"T&y. -~xcept for· enour.:h t11_na oats to 

comp y 1:th t" e request of CoJ:-~Sr..,P[~C tLore will be 110 difficulty in 

keeplnr; four cv task forces Sl.Jlj' lied wi. th fuel' J;i.VGas, Giese]' - nr1 

stores durin__:: the r1ontb of n:_:ust~ 

~here continues evidence tl-o.t the CY1emy i..) landi11~~ troops 

anc. Viorl(men on the north coast of GUil.:U;i.ICn.4.._.I. to cnns-'.:ruct a 

lanc~in0 field. It ap~Jc&r8 po ,si .lc t L ... they will undertake the 

occunatinn of :~Au"'I .. U and. OCEi~._~ lal£-1.n.1s tn the ne&.r future. BatDiv 

seer1; to te }leader"' 1 or liO:rs:n: f~,on: tne ~_r:cini ty of the YlJRILCS. 

708 
I , 

J 

J 

i~FQMJ 

ESTIMATE 

An Offensive for the Capture and 

Occupation of TULAGI and Vicinity. 

July 6, 1942. 
SECTIOlJ I 

1 . Sum~arv of tho Situation. 

As a result of the battles in the Coral Sea and off 

~~ IDWAY Japan has suffered heavy and disproportionate naval 

losses . The losses are considerea sufficient to permit us to 

take the offensive in the SouthVTest Pacific Area. 

At present the only 8r~eny ac ti vi ty in the Pacific 

Ocean Areas that threatens the accoJJIJlishment of tasks assie:ned 

to t1.e Conmander-ln-Chief , U.S . Pacific Fleet, is the occupation of positions in the ~!!estern ALEUTIA:~s . 

2 • r::he fol lOVlil1!3 r~irecti Ve has been recej_ Jed fron the 

Co"11."n.B.ndoi·- tn-Chie.f, Un: tc u States Fleet : 

s;he United 3ts.tos Chiefs of 3taff have a~~reed upon 

the follow:ne jo~nt directive for offGnsive oper~ tions in 

the Southwest Pacific Area. 

Ob.-j ec ti ve: Offensive opcrs. ti one vii 1 be conducted 

with the u_._tirnate objective of seizure and occupation of 

Purpose: To donJ t.Le area to Japan. 

(a ) TFsk 1: Seizure and occupation of 'JA::T.A CRUZ 

Is=._ands , ~1JLr1.GI and adjacent positions. 

(b) Tas: ~ 2: Seizure an~ occp_:;a t1 on of the remain·1ur 

of the SOT 0 "0; Islr,nc s, of LAE, 8.t- L I:t~ UA, and 

, ) r>, Seizure o.n" .ccup[ttior:. of ~ .:AUL and 

aC:jacent poG: tions in the l4E7 GUI!JF.t ~ KE'7 

I REL. LID area . 

-1 71. 0 
General Ins t:!-.,, ~ t: ons: 

-:;..) The com_osition of the forces to be used, 

the t-tr.1l1e of t~no tas~s, and the passage of 

connand will be determined by the u.s. Chiefs 

of Staff .. 

(b) For plan..11in~ ~)ul~poses a tareet date for task 

one is tentatively set as ~u~ust 1, 1942. 

(c) ....~:Y'ect com.r1and of the ta~tical opero.tions of 

the a 1 _ _:-yh: o · ous forces Hi 11 :r·er.1e.:.~t Vifi th the 

Nav&l Task Force Com..nrander throu~hout the con-

<luct f all thr•ee tasks. 

(d) The v1i thdrawal of the ... naval attached units of 

the U.S. Fleet n~y be ordered by the u.s. 

Chiefs of Staff u_::>on the complot:on of any 

1 articular phase of tl1e operation in the event 

that; (1) conditions devGlop which unduly 

jeopardize the aircraft carriers, (2) an emereency arises in other Pacific areas which 

dictates such withdrawal. 

(e) The Eastern aLd Western boundaries of the Southvrest Pacific area and of the South Pacific ar·ea 

respectively wiJl, as of Au~ust 1, 1942, be 

Long1 tude 1~)90 E. fro :1 thf'' equator Sol1thwar L . 

I-2 7 .11 
Forces: 

(~) Grmn1:, alr and ncval orces nov under the 

co~-:1and of the Supre:r:re Com~"'lander Southv:est 

Pacific .. 1·ea ~ 

0) At least two aircraft carriers with accompanyin~ crulsers and destroyers, and the South 

Pacific Amphibious Force, with necessary 

trans~ort div~slons . 

(c) I.:arine air squadrons and available lanu uased 

air support in South Pacific Area. 

(d) Arr1y occupational forces now in the South 

Pacific Area to be utilized to garrison 

:'ULAGI and adjacent island positions; troops 

from AU3TI1ALIA to prov~_de ot .. er garrisons 

required,. 

ComnanJ.: 

(a) Task 1 seizure u.nC. occupation of SA:JTA CRUZ 

Islands, Tu~AGI and au·acent osit~ons. 

( l) ~ask Force Con1.-rnandEn"' to be de signa ted by 

Corun:S~.nder-in-Chief, l.S. Pacific Pleet. 

(~) :Tecessary nava_ rei_nforcements and land 

based air su,port will be attached by the 

Suprene Conrr:1ant 0r- Soutrnvest Pacifie Area 

who will ~lso provlde for interce~tion of 

enemy air and naval activities of the 

operatin0 a 'ea. 

I-3 

712 
i'ii3?Fw 

(b) Task 2 seizure and occupation of the remainder 

of the ,SOLOMAN Islands and of LAE, SALA1VTAUA and 

.Northeast coast of tmw GUINEA. The task forces 

engaged in this operation will be under the 

direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area. 

(c) Task 3 seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA - NEW IRELAND 

area. The task forces engaged in this operation 

will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area. 

SURVEY OF lvJEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED 

3. General Factors. 

(a) The above constitutes most of the 2nd stage 

of the Pacific Campaign. Remaining in that stage are strong 

attrition attacks on enemy positions in the CAROLINE and 

MARSHALL ISLANDS. The sooner we accomplish the Second Stage, 

the sooner the war, and its terrific drain on our national 

resources, will be brought to successful conclusion. This 

point is stressed here because there is too often the tendency 

of the military profession to wait until everything is 

absolutely perfect before any operation can co1nmence. Conditions will never be perfect, and we cannot afford to miss 

any chance while waiting for perfection. 

r-....4 713 
JiPPSJiit!Pf 

(b) The Japanese have recently been up against 

their first real opposition and have taken a bad beating. In 

their present extended and disorganized condition they are 

less apt to be ready to meet us than they will after only a 

short period of consolidation of their remaining strength. 

(c) Enemy morale must have suffered in the past two 

months. Ours can be considered excellent. 

(d) Our amphibious training is incomplete; and, of 

importance, those troops who have received training are untried. 

We have yet to get the full measure of coordination between the 

Army and Navy, particularly to obtain full benefit from Army 

air forces. 

In any island to island advance we will be most 

dependent on the strength and effectiveness of th~ Army aircraft unless the Na~J can obtain landplane types. 

Our troops are brave and willing but their performance has yet to be tested in battle. On the other hand, 

the enemy is known to be skillful and experienced. Their cooperation between all branches of the Service seems excellent. 

(e) While we have had good success in the past making educated guesses as to enemy intentions, there are already 

indications that our sources of j nforma tion are drying up. So 

far as we know our communications are secure. 

I-5 

714 
4. Factors more directly applicable to armed forces. 

(a) Vessels, including aircraft: 

OWN On July 6, 1942, there will be available: 

At PEARL - Task Force ELEVEN - 1 CV, 3 CA, 2 DL, 6 DD. 

Task Force SIXTEEN - 1 CV, 1 CA, 1 CL, 1 DL, 

6 DD. 

Task Force SEVENTEEN - l CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 

6 DD. 

Enroute to South Pacific -

Task Force EIGHTEEN - 1 CV, 3 CA, l CL, 8 DD. 

On WEST COAST -

Task Force ONE - 8 BB, 1 CL, 7 DD. 

Note: Fleet oilers will be assigned to Task Forces. 

ANIPHIBIOUS TROOPS -

Offensively trained 

1st Marine Division less 7th Marines 

available :NEW ZEALAND July 24th 

2nd Marines (SAN DIEGO) ready now 

14,000 troops 

5,000 

Total - 19,0_00 

Prospective offensively trained 

3rd Army Division (requires training 

and some weapons) 

2nd Marine Division (requires 

training and equipment) 

7th Marines (when relieved about 

1 September) 

15,000 

10,000 

4,000 

Total - 29,000 

I-6 

n 

715 
Defensively trained only 

5th Defense Battalion and 3rd Barrage Balloon 

Squadron due for transfer to NEW ZEALAND 

about 1 July. Available 1 August. 

3rd Defense Battalion ready PEARL July 15. 

In SOUTH PACIFIC -

CRUISERS 

ACHILLES) Upon release from Pacific Fleet·. LEANDER ) ASCANIA 

MONAWAI 

DESTROYERS 

LE TRIOMPHANT 

LEOPARD 

GUNBOAT 

CHEVREUIL 

SERVICE UNITS 

AIR 

SOLACE 

RIGEL 

ANTARES 

WHITNEY 

TERN 

Sll'l.A.N 

T1ffiKEY 

COMANGA 

7 YPS 

Small craft not listed 

12 YM:S enroute 

BALLARD 

CURTISS 

McFARLAND 

MACKINAC 

30 PBYs 

I-7 716 
iiiiOI1TIT 

4. (a) (Continued) 

AM:PHIBIOUS FORCE 

Transdiv Eight 

NEVILLE 

HETNOOD (enroute) G.V. ELLIOTT (enroute) FULLER 

FOMALI:L4.UT ( enroute) 

BELLATRIX 

Transdiv Ten 

MCCAWLEY 

BARNETT ( enroute) 

HUNTER LIGGETT 

.PJViERIC.AN LEGION 

LIBRA (enroute 7/l) 

In SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 

Task Force 42 - Rear Admiral Rockwell 

(Based Brisbane) GRIFFIN 

TULSA 

Subdiv 201 

S-37 

S-38 

S-39 

S-40 

S-41 

Subdiv 51 

S-lr2 

S-43 

S-44 

S-45 

S-46 

S-47 

Task Force 44 - Rear Admiral Crutchley (RN) 

AUSTRALIA 

CANBERRl\. 

HOBART 

CHICAGO 

4 destroyers of Desron 4 

Task Force 50 - Vice Admiral Leary 

Desron 4 less 4 DD 

ADELAIDE 

STUART. 

ARUNTA 

TROI\1P 

WESTRALIA 

KAUIMBLA 

MANOORA 

GOLDSTAR 

I-8 717 
iiJBM'i 

4. (a) (Continued) 

Task Force 50 (Continued) 

50.6 Service Group - Captain Paddock 

DOBBIN 

A & 0 Unit 

Aircraft Torp. Unit 

Aircraft Service Unit 

Task Force 51 - Rear Admiral Lockwood 

(Based Fremantle) 

PHOENIX 

VOYAGER 

LANAKAI 

ISABEL 

LARK 

'NHIPPO ORWILL 

TRINITY 

VICTORIA 

HOLL...A.ND 

PELIAS (enroute) 

Subdiv 21 

SAllvlON 

SEAL 

SARGO 

SAURY 

SPEARFISH 

SKIPJACK 

Subd.iv 202 

SEADRAGON 

SEALION 

SEARAVEN 

SEAWOLF 

Subdiv 61 

TAMBOR 

TAUTOG 

Subdi v 22 · 

SN.f1J?PER 

STINGRAY 

STURGEON 

SCULPIN 

SAILFISH 

SWORDFISH 

Subdiv 203 

PERCH 

PICKEREL 

PORPOISE 

THRESHER (enroute) 

GAR 

GRJ~MPUS 

GHAYBACK 

I-9 

718 
i~8MT 

4. (a) (Continued) 

ENEMY - Estimated air strength in the area under review: 

Patrol Float 

VF VB Planes Planes vo 

New Britain) 

New 25 33 12 10 23 Ireland)-

New Guinea 39 10 0 0 0 

Solomons 0 0 4 4' 8 

Available outside area for quick reenforcement 

area under study: 

Marshalls (inc .36 24 24 36 0 

Gilberts) Truk-Ponape 36 18 12 18 0 

Estimate of probable seaborne strength 

(On 15 July under present known conditions) 

4 CA 

) CL 

12 DD 

4 XPG(XCL) 

4 X.AM 

8 PC 

12 ss 

2 AV 

3-4 XAV 

4 (plus?) 

6-8 AP 

3-4 AK 

- Crudiv 6 (4-A05A) - Crudiv 18 (1 KASHI11A - 2 TATSUTA) - Desron 6, reinforced - Gunboar division 8 - Minesweep division 16 - SC divs 51-53 - Subron 7 (reenforced) - NOTORO, K.AMOI - Air tenders (FUJIKAWA M.ARU, etc) 

MTB · - Motor torpedo squadron attached 

Base Force R.ABAUL - 8th Base Force (reenforced) - 8th Base Force (reenforced) 

Total 

103 

49 

16 

of 

120 

84 

8th 

Also, the following could be in the SN Pacific by 

August 1st: 

3 cv 

2 XCV 

2 BB 

Cardiv 4; 

RYU.JO 

JUNYO 

ZUIHO 

Batdiv 3 

H.ARUNA 

KIRISHIMA 

Crudiv 4; 

6 CA ATAGO 

TAKAO 

Cardiv 5 

ZUIKAKU 

SHOKAKU (believed that repairs now 

completed) 

Crudiv 8 

TONE 

CHIKUMA 

I-10 

Desron 10 

NAGARA 

12 DD 

719 
4. (a) (Continued) 

Crudiv 5 

3 CL MYOKO 

36 DD (Inc. HAGURO 

plane guards) 

Desron 

2 AV SEND AI 

12 DD 

Sub ron 

12 ss 

l± 

8 

Desron 2 

JUITSU 

12 DD 

Airon 7 

CIIITOSE 

CHIYODA 

12 ss 

2-3 XAV Miscellaneous Air-tenders 

aux. Seaplane tenders. 

(b) Troops 

The following maximum troop strength is estimated 

in the area under consideration as of June 25, 1942: 

12,000 

200 

NEW BRITAIN 

NEW IRELAND 

ENANG ISLAND 50 ~ffiNUS ISLAND 400 

LAE (New Guinea) 800 

(Vicinity RABAUL and adjacent small islands) 

(KAVIENG and patrols at Cape St. George) 

(Southeast ~~ l~OVER) 

SALAM:.AU A " 2 0 0 

TULAGI 1400 

SOHANA ISLAND 600 

KIETA (Bougain- 500 

ville) 

BUIN-VAISI 100 

(LORENGAU) 

(Probably split into small patrols from 

FINSC.HAVEN to BUNA) 

(Split in several nearby islands. Main 

strength and headquarters on GAVUTU) 

(SOLOMONS - Buka Passage) 

Note: The troops at RABAUL are believed to be Army and 

the remainder either Marines or Naval Landing 

Forces. At LORENGAU the garrison is definitely 

Marines. 

I-ll 

720 
(c) Personnel 

We have two experienced Carrier Task Force Commanders, plus one who has not yet had battle flag command, and 

one who has commanded cruisers in battle. 

Pilots with experience are spread very thin; 

and those recently in battle are shaken. All other personnel 

is adequate in experience and numbers. 

As noted before, our personnel is beginning to 

show fatigue from recent strenuous duty. 

The enemy has probably lost a number of experienced 

older officers including some of Flag rank, and must have lost 

a good percentage of their experienced pilots, and a large 

number of enlisted. men. 

{d) Material 

There are some indications that our bombs are 

not as effective as they should be. 

Our torpedoes are not as effective as the .enemy's. 

No serious machinery derangements have been experienced by our ships which prevents satisfactory mobility. 

We are beginning to find that our airplanes are 

not as advertized, always "the best in the world". Fo~ example, 

except for armor protection the zero fighter is better than anything we have; our PBYs are extremely vulnerable; our B-17s do 

not have the radius under war conditions that they were thought 

to have. 

The enemy material is generally good to excellent. 

I-12 721 
i2111JRET 

(e) Logistics 

All our fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, 

food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, and general 

supplies must be transported to the area. While fuel may be 

a difficult problem if a large force steams at higher speeds 

than 15 knots more than a few days during the operations, it 

can be handled. 

There is no indication yet that the enemy is 

unable to support himself in this respect. 

One Construction Battalion can be made available. 

Troop replacements can be made by shifting less 

trained men to the more inactive positions to relieve fully 

trained troops for garrison duty in the active positions. Sufficient troops are available for the operation if used to maximum advantage. It is not believed that the Army in the SOUTH 

PACIFIC can arrive at TULAGI on the first target date to take 

over defense. Marine defense battalions can be ready, and later 

relieved by the Army. 

Ample Jap troop replacements are considered 

available if the operation is prolonged. 

Facilities 

In the process of construction we have major 

advanced bases at BLEACHER and FULCRUM. Anchorages are available for a large force at BI~ACHER and PEARL. Anchorages for 

one Task Force and a smaller are available at POPPY, FANTAN, 

I-13 72 2 
1iEffiQjFe 

STRAW, BOBCAT and FULCRUM. Reports now indicate that two CV 

Task Forces can be accommodated at WHITE POPPY. One CV air group 

can be landed ·at· the airfield but must use cautlon as the field 

is under repair. 

There is no drydock for a CV south of PEARL. CA 

and smaller can be docked in AUSTRALIA and NKfl ZEALAND. 

Tender repairs can be made available at any 

sheltered anchorage. Large repair can be accomplished at SYDNEY, 

but this will be hampered by lack of blueprints and spare parts. 

Moderate shore repair facilities are available at FULCRUM. 

One hospital ship is at BLEACiffiR and one mobile 

unit can be made available in N~v ZEALAND. 

Recreation is almost non-existent in the South 

Pacific except in N@N ZEALAND. 

There is no indication that lack of facilities have 

hampered enemy operations. Large repairs can be undertaken at 

TRUK. A floating drydock which may be able to dock a CA is there. 

5. Details of own and enemy positions. 

Information regarding own bases in the SOUTH 

PACIFIC is appended marked "A". 

Information on enemy positions is appended marked 

"B". 

6. Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength. 

Strength Factors 

I-14 

72 3 
6. (Continued) 

Own 

1. Enemy bases at RABAUL, LAE, 

SALAMAUA and TULAGI are 

within range of our shorebased aircraft. 

2. Our bases supporting the 

operation are adequate except no air bases to eastward or southward are in 

range. 

J. Ability to provide adequate 

logistics. 

4. Almost unlimited potential 

strength. 

Enemy 

1. Excellent and experienced 

troops. 

2. Good air coverage of the 

area. 

3. Long 'range scouting. 

4. Superior VF. 

5. Better and shorter air 

route from home bases. 

6. Efficient aerial torpedoes. 

Weakness factors 

Own Enemy 

1. Difficult problem of neutral- 1. General extended state of 

izing enemy shore based air forces. 

so our carriers can approach 2. At present difficulty in 

the TULAGI area. replacing ships and steel 

2. Present weakness of SOUTH products. 

PACIFIC bases. 3. Recent losses resulting in 

3. Long lines of communications. new fleet readjustments. 

I-15 

724 
rzygpgw 

6. (Continued) 

Weakness Factors (Continued) 

Ovm Enemz 

4. Difficult logistic problem. 

5. Untried amphibious troops. 

6. High percentage of inexperienced pilots. 

?. Difficult coordination with 

Army (land-based aircraft). 

8. Must establish new bases. 

I-16 

4. Probably lowered morale. 

72 5 
1 . Analvsis of the Objective. 

':'he declsion has been made to proceed at an early 

date wltl1 t·e start of the Second Stage of the Pacific Campaign. It now remains to investigate how and when ~ 

It is considered that the capture of bases in, and 

expelling the enemy from the SOLOMOI. S = S:t~IATICK AH ~-1I ilG O -

ADTvJIH.AI}J.lY ISLANDS are and will: 

(a ) Reduce the threat of AUSTRAL IAN invasion to 

almost the vanishing point. 

(b ) :{educe the threa. t to our co1.TIL1unica tions to 

AU3TL~LIA and to our South Pacific bases. 

(c ) Pernit us to initiate strong attrition against 

enemy forces and 90si tions in the CAROLil~E S and IHARSIIP .. LLS. 

(d ) Constitute a springboard for further extension 

of control .. 

That objective will further the general plan of the 

2 o Survey of Courses of Action. 

The r1e thods by which we can drive the enemy out of 

the area and occupy it for our o'·'n purposes seem to be, broadly, 

tvro .. 

FI~13T ~ to advance step by step to tJ.e Northwest 

from our !JOsi tions in HOUMEA, I::FA~E and ESPIRITU SANTO .. 

II-1 

726 
EEEPiiC 

to simultaneous_y hlt o.ll enemy posit*ons, 

neutralizing tnose whlch interfere, and occurying those 

selected .. 

3. At the outset it 1;1ust .e assumed that whichever the 

method to be adopted we cannot count on Allied troops, at least 

in the ear_y stages. This wlll be an amphibious operatlon for 

which only Pacifir· Fleet troops are trained.. Genf.ral IIacArthur 

has just advised that he is comnencing ~}reparations to train 

forces under .lim for am_9hib" ous warar-e. Until his troops are 

thus trained, and unt:l operational coopera Llon is vTell developed, there is definite danger in attempting to use 'ustralian 

troo?s, IncludinG ~.s. troops in Australia, or rew Zealand 

troops, for the initial ssaulte ut those troops may well 

be considered as a source of supply for garrinons vhen adv9.nce 

positions are captured. Later trainine; may permit their use 

for assault. In any plan, the a:r support which General t~cArthur can give from AUSTHALIA and fror11 PORT I.Io-qE3BY is essential to the success of the o~eration. If adequate air from 

I101{E3BY is not available 1e will be unable to neutralize enemy 

air at a vrry critical tlr.1e. The naval forces assir;ned to the 

SoutL'.rest Pacific rn.ust also be fully em.:~loyed n ti:1is operation .. 

I~1. the first 11r:..- t' 10cl the en tire ::> t ength of the eff"'ort 

lS proc;ressi vely co11cent1~a ted on sinr:le positions, while tn the 

second tLere is conGlderetbJ e d.:. spc r'si on. T':1e neny he s been 

II-2 

7,..,. , 

.C I 
quite successful i1 the Jtep by step operation. The general 

idea is well understood and re'uircs no explanation here. The 

simultaneous assault and attaclc may be a very difficult opt:ra 

tion becuase until v:e can neutralize eneny air in the area 

there seems no sure ~aJ of naking aoproaches undetected~ We 

are t~'2.us su j ec ted to repeat ..,d air a -c tack fro:~ 0 1.ore -bs.sed 

air durin:3 at least the Llaylicht ~;el"iod. .. 

As v1as amply de . .tonstrated at :rli.Y:lAY, ~ln attacker 

w11.o has not neutralized s .. 1or·e-based air in advance is at a 

great disadvantage. He can expect early discovery well outside his ovm carrier launchinG point. After discovery he has 

the c:Z1oice of wading on in in hope of c;etting local air superiority before he is sunk; or of retirin[;. 

Surprise in this operRtion is always a possibility, 

but the chances seem reraote when possibil:i.ties of enemy search 

are considered. There is the possibility, however, that enemy 

air in the area can be sufficiently neutralized to permit a 

striking force to r~et \Jithin att9.Ck ranrre unuetected. This 

invol vos the large use of air f1•or1 PO~T r:O~tESDY. 

1

:vhntE.ver the method, Hhen HJe are committ0d to the 

offensive and £",11 th'1t the offensive lmplics , we r'lust eypect 

c..-.nd. to able to r~ fford. clispropo1 tlona te los .:Jed in t;aininc our 

objective. If we aro not prepared to lose sl1ips and men :ret, 

then the time is not ripe . 

728 
REG ,.,...,n 

t seems reasonable to suppose that by the first of 

Il.u~~ust we \Till ha7e the necessary tra:.ned troops. But, judgins from the past, and fro~ known plans to fieht this war as 

a ~lole, the planes suceestcd above as necessary are not in 

sis.1t , Take ~BAUL alone - Ie s. auld be able to send at least 

~G ~-17 or D-24 over each air fiel in t~9t vicinity two or 

throe time in the 3 ~ 'f1ours before brine;ing out carriers within 

reach . 

Between nov'.' and the first of iiUt:;ust much r1ay hap:pen , 

but for this discus.sion we will adhere to an assump tion .hat 

the c:eneral picture remains the same. That is, that the v1ar 

will so along without any major chan:_;;es - such as an all-out 

attack on ALASKA , or tlJ.e entrance of RUSSIA into the war 

against Japan, or the defeat of RUSSIA by Hitler, or the complete loss of the I.IE.Jri'ERRA TEA1J by ~Rir:::; IIT, or the collapse 

of C.c1I1JA. 

II-4 729 
~HI EFT 

SECTION III 

CAPhBILITIES OP THE ElTEMY 

1. Despite losses in the Coral Sea, Iii::r7AY, and seemi::.'l.t:;ly over-extended dis 11o,sitions, the enemy is well capable 

of exerting very 0reat p:;."essure at almost any point he decides . 

Thus , he is dangerous - and may be a bit reckless .. The evil 

of under-e .stima ting an enemy was recently shown at WBHUK ( if 

the press in correct) . 

2 . Summary of the Enemy's Situation .. 

(a ) .. s of the date of this estimate the enemy seems 

to have three thines ~n nind primarily invol ving his Na vy: 

(1 ) Operations in the Northwest Pacific , 

possibly, but not probably , including an attack on 

TIU33IA . 

(2) Extension of hi~ holdings in the South-

·west Pacific to eliminate L~ORESBY and ,_:;et near enough 

to stril~e at least at our il3~J.~·~LIA1: comnunications.,. 

(3) Keep his HetJte.rn flank secure 7lhile he 

consolidates his great and newly acquired possessions $ 

(b) His now depleted carrier divisions are operating 

north of the eque.tor ~ He has boen reinforcing both his air 

and troops in the Southwest Pacific.. Some needed unlts are 

under repair .. 

(c) If by his FI::JWAY campaie;n, he expected to gain 

a fPee hand in both the Eorthwest and the Southwest Pacific, 

that plan failed. Ee must now make other plans on a reduced 

f)CblO o III-1 

7]0 
Oil O'Pi'rl 4 

u.. The effect den:i.reu b7 the Eneny .. 

(a) T~1.o nature and extent of the next enemy moves 

are uncertain.. Therefore it may be profitable to briefly r·eviev1 

the past ancl remark on v1ha t seem to be trends. On December 7, 

1941, the Ja.ps ef'fectively stopped us at the I,1I:JWAY- OAHU line. 

We have only ventured past that line in the Central Pacific 

(genprally the 180th I.~eridian) V'li th submarine and air raids. 

Those raids have been only moderately effective. We were unable 

to divert him from his occupation of I.IALAYSIA and the PHILIPPII~ES. 

His irst hurt came in the Cor·al Sea when he was forced to turn 

ack. He then conceived his grandiose sche~o of dig~ing in on 

the J,:I:JW.~. Y - OAHU line and in the ALEU~,IAIJS at the sar1e timP .. 

Te1·y fortuna tel:,.,. for ::s 'J!C v!erf, aLlE. to net,:e 9. c::ood "educated 

.3ue G s ll and W€ ro rcaJ.~.,. at ~~I"'JV. Y.. In the ALEVT IANS not r1uch ras 

tryinc to set a trap.. So f'" 1' v1e L.a\ie been .s.l;le to keep the 

holes ::;lugsecl .. 

# ~ ) 

1,) Viewer 1r~oadl:,"', Japan now has under her co:ntrol 

alnost 0vsr~. na tul"al resource nec:,ded for not onl·s her war, .ut 

to sup.._JOl")t L~el' as a first rate power with undisputer hegemony 

in the Orient. She wou.ld :)::.~oba1Jly like nothing better than to 

sit uac~ and consolidate her gains .. In fact a peac~ wltich would 

c;ive er all places now occlJplefJ woulc ·Lc just right .. But she 

sees the dan~cr of AlliEd interrPrence and see·s no way of comr1e1l.::..n3 security dc8ircd v;ithout a bit more extension .. She 

731 III-~ 
also has a ~act v;i th :Ii tler which s:1e cannot afford to ~reak . 

:n 1 ,r· :)rc~sent posit.:.on her only .salvation lies ir~ a H::t1er 

vic tory - or at least a European ~ tstler:1n te - and ,.vl ile the 

· lssue is .:.n d01.1bt she r1ust better her position.. 3he knows 

the United States is preparine; to nake a major effort in the 

European Theatre . And as long o.s V:!O continue to make our major 

effort in Europe she fe8ls that her chance is sood to improve 

her Pacific position . 

(c) Eneny capabilities. 

The enemy has the strength availablE; to: 

(1 ) Continue the ALEt"TIAF offensive to include 

an a tter1pt to occupy the ALEUTI AFS and possibly the 

:'J.Li .. SEAr r.1a inland . 

( 2 ) .n. ttn.cl: the 0 .. rru - I:IL7JAY line in force . 

( ~ l-1. t tac::.: our ail· f rry routes from OA11U to 

the Sou tl1v1e s t Pacific . 

( ·l ) Continue her narch fror.1 the IlALA 17L area 

to the South . 

( 5 ) At tack SIDF:HitJ. .. 

(e) L~akE, ¬her attempt in the Ir!dian Ocean 

lj_lheatrrs. 

(d) Suitability, FeAsibility and. cceptability ~ 

Course ( 1) . This ls not considered suitable nor feasible. 

It is belir->ved th:J t the enemy may a tter1pt to ~_,atn security for 

course (~.)by occu)y:tn_: only enough po;:3itions to orE-ven+- our 

732 
use of star~ins points from ALASKl\ .. to SIBEEIL... If this is corre c t, the oc cup a ti on of ATTU and EISKA in the ALEU:e IAKS and of 

a position in the ST. LAWREr~CE ISLAlJDS - NOlvffi area would suffice .. 

With our present deployment such a course seems feasible, suitable and acceptable. 

Course (2) .. lTow that the enemy has made one disastrous attempt in this dir~ction it seems probable that further attempts -

at least in the foreseeable future - will not be considered 

acceptable. 

Courses (3) Both are su1table but (4) seems to be the most 

and ( 4) .. 

logical as it ~obld, if successful, do most 

darna ,e to our plans. 1

Vi th the enemy in 1JOUI~~EA, .for example, 

he could be a Great nuisance. 

Course (3). Yvas ncntloned above.. Such action may be part 

of the Axis grand strategy but there are indications at present 

that Japan is unvd~lling. T:1.e naval forces involved would be 

minor. 

Course ( 6). This again may be part of the Axis strategy for 

the purpose of supporting land operations to gain a stronger 

hold in IlTDI_ and to elininate the British threat to MALAY 

If course (6) is adopted he mu8t remain on the 

defensive in the Pacific. Conversely he cannot be on the offensi ve in the Paciflc and in the Indian Ocean at the sa:rne time(; 

733 

III-4 
(e) 1.etained courses are (1) and( ... ) . If he 

chooses between these cJurses, the latter is favor6d as the 

one he will ado:pt . He may attempt bot Lut it is believed 

that his remaining carrier strength is insuffi c ient f or 

rea sonabl e ch~nce of success . 

IIl-.5 

734 
uELECTIOl~ 

1 . As our eene1·al co'I.J.rse of action has been selected 

there no~ remains only an examination of the details which will 

permit a decision as to the method. 

2. Because the airplanes necessary to neutralize shorebased air throughout the area are not now in sic;ht, an attempt 

to make sinul taneous landinzs and capture the vrhole area in a 

na tter of 1

·1ours proba 1 y can't be made . It is considered to 

be a fine nethod Tihich was only recretfully given up after most 

careful consideration. 

3 . The ~dopted Course of Action. 

is previously stated we are cor:1I!litted to step by 

step method. In view of this a·general ~lan for the capture 

of TULAGI ancl its occupation to hold that point is to be discusseo.. After the TULAGI Area is made usable for operations 

by land-based planes, it is unders tooc that He '"i 11 proceed 

with ta sl:: rf2 • 

AIJ Ol""TLIITE OF A PLAN FOR TH}: CA?TT:r-~E OF TULJ\.G I 

4: . (a) In the folJoviin~, 11 Au Day ls tho cay that troops 

Y'lill lan.' at T'CU GI, now tentatively set as Au2_:ust 1, 1942 .. 

(b) ~he following are ao~umed to be completely 

ready en A-5 Day: 

IV-1 73 5 
(1) Task Porces 11 and 18 in the NOUJ.IEA Area .. 

(2) FIRST I.:e.rine Division ninus the 7th Regiment ::>lus the 2d Pegiment (reenforced) in transports 

within 1200 rnile s of TULAGI. 

(3) 1st Marine Raider Battalion embarked in 

6 APD in the HEiJ1J HEBRIDES - lJEiiV CALEDOIJIA area .. 

(4) 30 VPB tender based in the 1TE'N HEBRIDES -

TIEW CALE~ONIA area prepared to scout the approach to 

the SOLOLOITS. 

(5) Australian sround, naval, and air forces 

ready. 

(6) Australian surface ships in the Coral Sea 

area. 

(7) Two defense battal.lons in the ~eneral area. 

(B) Three DMS; 1 AH; 1 AT (Salvage) in the 

NOUMEA Area. 

(9) One SS with raiders embarked within 500 

miles of T"GLAGI. 

(c) As there are probably not nore than 1000 troops 

at T1JLJ .. GI it is believ0d necessary to employ only one Raider 

Da ttalion to secure a beachhead e.nd one regiment (2nd) for the 

landine. iTo 3hore bombardment by ships is conter1pla ted .. A.n 

e .s tima te of the landir1e; operation is appended marked "cu .. 

IV-2 73 6 
G .. Broad schr r

1 v e for the P1e.n. 

Event 

-J (1) ':!:ask Forces 11, lC and troops underway ao necsssary 

to r ach Lat 18° S, 168° E at 11 hours local -3 Day ~ 

(Z) 3carch the 1JW sectors fror1 thE. POPPY - r{03ES bases 

to di cc ovc:r ener1y Cl'"'aft . 

(3) Conuence ,:arracsing raid on TUL&GI with 3 VPB . 

(4 ) Coril.mence har-rassintr raid on RA.L. UL and BUEJ~ airdromes ui th B-17 or B-24 fron IIOHESEY . 

(5) Southwest Pacific submarines on stat.:.on in the 

HABAt"L "rea. 

( 6 ) ustralian surface forces connnence operations in 

the l~ortheast Coral Sea to locate and destroy inferior enemy forces. 

:;oTE: This is not considered an essential operation 

)ased. on present information of eneny forces. This 

force can be called on as escort of APs thus permittine mask Forco5 11 and 18 to cover only. 

(7) ~efcnse battalions embarked. 

-4 (1) Contlnue sGnrch and harrassins raids. 

(2) Cover inc anc: 1ancln~ forcos onrov te r nc"lez rous . 

IV-3 737 
5Wf'

0

Bli:r 

Dax 

-3 ( 1) 

Eve:r1t 

Rendezvous just south of -~FAT:C. Lat 18° s, 

-

Long 1 o "8° E ro 1 d t r-.-.. j' ~uc e excop v~s. Commence o.prJroach. 

(2) Co~J.tinue s arc:~. and harrassinr_; raids. 

(3) Subnarlne ratders destroy seaplanes in TULAGI harbor. 

-2 (1) Continue approach. CV task forces ln coverins 

position. APs maintain speed of advance 12 kts. 

APDs speed up to arrive TULAGI just before dawn. 

( 2) Knock out VB lanG.ing fie leis at RAB LL and BU'.fili. 

(3) Continue search. 

(4) Fuel DDs as necessary. 

-1 (1) Concentrate heavy £ir pouncing of landing strips 

l:::nocl-::ed out to p1·evE n t rer1airs. 

(2) Cont.tnuo air seared. 

(1) APDs land raiders just b6fore dawn. 

( 2) :Jl.1S sweep appros che s. 

(3) CVs continue coverin oper&tions ane Jrovide 

IF protectlon as close to APs as possible. 

(4) J~t about 1000 local corrrnence lancllng from APs. 

(5) Continue seCtrch .. 

IV-4 

738 
u A tr Da ~r ( Con t ' cl ) 

Day 

A /1 

(:) Continue air Dounding of 1an~ing str~~s to 

prevent re_Jairs. 

(7) Nhen 1andine conplctsd APs withdraw . 

(8) I~:ove up one J~V~ to Ticinity 3-UADALCAHAL . 

(1 ) Continue search . 

(2 ) Continue B- 17 ·attack on airdromes . 

) Land ~efensc b~ttalion. 

( 4 )C ornneDce unloadin~ --.lear anG. preparation f or 

buildin~ an airfield. 

(1 ) Eclieve lnnclins force w=:_th defense battalion . 

As_ sovn as ~ossi l e 

( 1) I.~ove in J.=arine e.ir vr sn l8ndins ship is ready . 

(2) Ie1ieve Larine defense battalion by Army 

gar1·ison. Suc£cst colored troops . 

(3) Conmencc task l.lo . 2 .. 

IV-0 739 
OESltJi:L:: 

1). It is as0umed that tl1e Cl task :'orccs .1.:11 'lave --..:-~___;:;,..::..::....;;;.__..:....=:.~ 

been ln the HC"CT.:EA area for sevc1•a 1. -lay.s. :Jur in~ that time the 

task force c:o .. mnanders wi 11 have LacJ. an opportun·· tJ to discuss 

the plan for the ca~Jture of TULAG-I as adopted by Conrr11ander, South 

Pacific Force. By day A.-5 all c·omman-.l pl·cparo_ tluns v1ill have 

een compl0ted, includin~ the co~~nication set-up8 As the APs 

have not room enou.e;h at ""'Ot1'T..J!. they must leave .fror1 othE'~x· bases 

for ~en ~ezvous with C1.Is. Thee , not participatinc in task til 

uill rena in l.n po:r·t .. 

.~.: -S event (~). ~he ~r::. ... na1 y )Jr:;1Sf-- of the PBY search is to preirent o1.n, ot ... ·iJ:in: ~orccs fron beinG Jul--~l'inecl :r b.ll enemy carrier 

crou"J. ~Vo cnn ..... .ave a va:i la ble four se&plan6 tendo ·:-J - the C1JRTI3S , 

J .. CKI ... ~J~..C, :cFlL L:.l D and : .. LL ~-D. ~he latter two can only pro-

"Jicle search fuel for 12 :!lane, a f'or G scarche c.. The Ml-iCKTi.;l C 

can fu 1 12 planes for 4 .st-archea .. .t).C t .. 1e <'t:arch can·.,.ot be 

effective from :;c-cniEA ',hr; tenders 1ust b · .~.-ut in advance positions. ldvnnce positions which seem favorable are at BELEP 

ISL::,.:r.), 1Torth ~JE:l CAL1::..Do::·~IA; :~ V.n1 :TPH 1:11 :\BOJ, El;~ATE: the Southeast Coast of E3-IRITu :-" ';rno; anl 1JDE1~I. At fl1')st, it v1ould 

seeM desirable to use ~-:AVA~~l· J.H =:n:~BOH and B:::LI~P. Later :~:JE~~I 

is to be cons ide red. Because of gas li1.1i ta -cions of the tender::;, 

C Of.10 VI il •obabl' Lave to be put as'J.ore in clr·urns. lso, crews 

:may l.~.avc to liv ashore. T.._e ClYHTir~-.:> can r;o to F.?A~E :rtt,1. 

se.f __, Ly. 

74 0 

• 
A-5 event (3). It W'l 1 :tll S88m fc:1s.:.~) .... e to now cunL'~'Ience a daily 

harrassins o:' posit:or1s in ':_1~/..-i-I ar·ca .. r:::'hi.s s.l3o ro.s the 

definite reconnaissance purpose. Three PBY .Lr-om f~~vArn;A.H 

A-5 Event ( 4). The VB at airfiE-lds at ? :LA UI1 and :CUY are a 

cle.finite t~1."':"'eat to ar_; ships within GOO mllcs., ,Vhile present 

OR~ZJE strength of long ~an3e planes will hardl· pernit long 

ran~e sea "Y>C.u. and a ttac · at tb.n .. t ra'"li us, th8 threat is a real 

one and nust be neutralized if J08Si ~0. It cetu worse as the 

CVs ~et in closer.. The start of thi. effort ii!ould Je v1i th 

abo1,_t 50 ::..oo- emolition bombs landed on dispersal areas, 

s:1ould e landed on the ::::ame type tare,;et. Later ·nfornation 

:r:1ay sLow bF tter tarcr::ts. ?hotos ':Joul also ttS ta£en on these 

flic;hts. VB from AU3..~.!lt..LI , via Lo;nL"':BY, would be employed 

B.nc. the attacks nust be pressed hor.1e. In all these attacks 

the B-l7s sL.ould 1.;omb from 75 to 100 feet altitude. 

r: 1.'. 4- (~) -o r.:..ven., . .J .• It will be assumed that only the S-boats &re 

available. T~ese will Je ~l~ced - in ST. GEOI 1 3 CI~l~EL -

,,.:"1e boat; the reil1.U nclcr· on c line 1;1~ of };~-; IHEL1\TD between 

r ... le 0~ jcct of this is to elevlate operat_:.ons 

74 1 

IV-7 
B!Mo=--rw 

A-5 Event (7) 4 As noted before, it is not believed that there 

is any chance of the Army be in~ J'eady on the targc t date to 

nove into the r:21ILAGI area. The landinG forces have no vveapons 

for AA Qefense and are vulnerable to air attack~ The defense 

battalion muJt provide alP1ost ir.rrnecliate defense of both the 

seaplane area and tlJ.e landinc; field area.. L balloon barrage 

for the latter is provided during the construction stage. 

A-4 Event (1). The se8.rch and harrassing oper' tions continue 

as before. Veather may reduce this from that herein planned .. 

A- 4 Event (2)@ ~he CVs take up coverinz positio? as the situation demands .. The speed of advance is assumed to be 12 knots 

for the transports. 

A-3 Event (1). The rendezvous just south of EFATE is out of 

any enemy aircraft ranr;e except carrier borne. Fueling can 

be undertaken if needed -vvi th impunity, except that sub attack 

is always a possibility . This is probably too far from the 

objective to fuel DDs. 

A-3 Event (2). As on previous days. 

A-3 Event (3). This is an operation which v1e have never tried 

before. The submarine would gradually work its vay into the 

immediate vicinity of the seaplanes noored at TULAGI.. During 

darkness the ~·aiders vroulcl get clo:-:e enough to the seaplanes 

IV-8 742 
in boats and from the deck of the sub to produce a simultaneous 

large volur.1e of fire on the enemy seaplanes.. 'While the deck 

[3Un may also be used, the main reliance would be placed on 

large volnr.1e small caliber fire8 The operation requires much 

study and io only noted here as a :!:"eminder, If successful, 

the approach to TULAGI by the troops may be a cor1plete surprise .. 

A-2 Event ( 1 )_. No further re:marl,::s. 

A-2 Event (2). This operation is of great iuportance and the 

success of the venture hinges, to large extent on its effectiveness. Her•e v1e must have pilots v1ho will lay 1000-lb bombs 

right on the runways.. 2000-lb bombs are fine for this but the 

probability of hitting is such that the double number of 1000-lb 

is best . It will probably do no good to try this from the 

cuntomary 25,000 feet release point. In Europe it has been 

shown that 100 foot altitude of release is safer than very 

high altitu~e. If this operation is a success, the task is 

a cinch . If not, we may lose a carrier. 

A-2 Events (3) and (4). The search is the sane, and DDs are 

noV'! fuelecl before bein£; in land-based air bombinp; ran,c;e. 

A=l Lvent (1~. The object here is to prevent repair. Every 

effort must be made to make repeated low level flights ove:r. ... 

these fields to be su1,..,e that they remain out of co1~1ni ssion i. 

IV-9 743 

c n a l JJ i 

July Oth 

Task Force 11 and 18 are enroute to the South 

Pacific. Task Force 16 is training off P:t~ARL and preparing 

to depart about for the 3outh Pacific on the lGt_h. Task 

Porce 0 continues as noted yesterday. Task F1

orce 17 is 

training at P2IRL. 

Preparations have been nade to sond about 225,000 

barrels fuel oil per CV task force per month to NJ'."J CALEDOHIA 

AREA. 

rrUTUILA air fiJJecl is not yet ready for Arny VB. 

They desire use of that fi~d in energency only. 

There is considerable malaria at HOSES. Sickness 

there at this tine could have an important bearing on the 

planned operations. 

Vice Adniral Ghormley has returned to PULCRUI.1 

fror:1 his conference with General Hcl-~.rthur. 

The t_!ap ac ti vi ties at GUJU)JlLCANAL continue. 

On the other end of the line own submarines are very busy. 

The F1

I1TBACK is credited with sinking a DD. In as Much as the 

Japs do not seem to have r.1uch strene;th at KISKA, CIJ'JCPAC 

(pink) was sent to Cor 1:mander Task Force 0 to urge action 

there by his surface forces. 
BEvftEi' 

:811r ill.[ a conferenc( conductsd by i~(iui:r-:.J:::_ l~ir1i tz, a:t1C:. 

a~tenc,ecl )Y t1 c ·=:.G. J~·.val~ar ::Je~,ftrtr'1ePt 'ln,.:: CorrunandGr .... awalian 

Sea. :;!ror..ti ~ -r) ·tl1e ~>ropose'l tus: s ·· n the SoutL. anG. Suuthwest 

... acific ·n..-rE cliscussecl c.t 1en:2:t 1. It vas clecided to imr'lediately 

send. 2G : -17s to t:1e Fantan-Poppy a1•r-a, the transportation of 

.r.:;r-ouncl :;erson ... v;.el be in~ orovicled lJy the Eavy .. 

r::::'F-11 an(~ ~G will cross the cq_uA tor tonorrovr, anc_ vJhen 

theJ cro:Js thoy vril1 re_ ort to Comnander So·uth Pacific for duty 

in connc~ti.o:c-t v1itL ~as1z One of the of:'er...sivo. TP-lG and 17 artS 

trainin~ in tl1c =~awal.ian <...J~ea. T~1c latter v:ill .>e retained ~n 

or near ?earl ~c~din: ~evclopments. 

s;F-C in his 10~14~ ( pinJ.~) re~)lic to CinCPac 09033£ C>ink) 

~enr.I .. al] ~T acceptin,j the idea of a bo barclmcnt of ships and 

s ~. ore faclli ties at E.:.s1ra. The 4 ~Tv"S ""'EJ~uc ·)ted rrill 1 r:, sent 

to liL :Iis 1 0Y patrol vrill move to !1. tka to ~i ve better sea1·ch. 

ai rfie lc: e. t is now r·eady for heavy bombers. 

The airfield at Jolmston i.J novv 300C ft "by 300 feet . 

Two subs v1ere sish ted, one b. t 0;:; -20 E, 134-30 1

7 and 

the other near Paeo Pa~o. 

T~e THRBSiffiR at '"Jotj e beliP.ves · that she sank 1 ;. .. T and 

1 AO. p, ... bqbly 1.",::..-t.le on the bottom she was located by a magl'"~f tic swL• ~~, an.d was tjJ'applecl. for. Depth charr;es landing close 

aboa-rd dicl sor'1e cla.r-1ace ana sle :nay 1avr, to return to Pearl for 

repair. 

r::l:ere lS nothin[~ s5_::;nificsnt in eneny do:1loym.E.nt. 

July 10. 

Tasl: Forces 11 and 13 re _;o1•tcd to 2011sopac toda~r for 

Ta<J'"" One of the offen'"3i ve in the s·"I Pacific. TP-lG is out 

shoot i·1c, anrl ·!!ill probably ~o south the lSth.. TF-17 is being 

J:.rept ln the Pearl a..~."'ea for evr ntua.li "':;ies.. TP-8 i.n 1is 100145 

(:lie'" o 1tlines his plan to bombard ICislra ancl vicinl t:r v;i th 

r is sur:·ace J">orces. Thls is in 1·es~Jonse to a bit of rrt:;in~ 

~ uy Gln "'" en (0~'"'~0'7'7() . ~ ) 1 ac 'J ov~· p .nK .. 

CinCPac 1Ul1JC.9 (pink) dirE" cts the t1·ans! rr 0f ~o fl-1'7s 

frorr'l. :ra\·ra.i i to tl:.P .?CP?Y~F pr~'Al; h.rca foT' 1JSe in Ta:.>'~ One .. 

C '"i!'l0~ 102100 (:~ :;art pl ,~ ,:;' 7 0S t .G ViC'!~> of th!J 

::Jon,:_~i.ne 1 ::_;,,_. t .J o, St, ·"..~. en t~1e ':!Ol:::!..n,__; of:'E;J.si vr-J, in ~e:)l.,r to 

t:lc c .1 t • !"C... tr: Of Jhorrr1le ._'" ar.:.cl l =~.C \ .: .. ti:lU '• 'rhe 2:; ~ t iS that \"!6 

:til_ __}., r u: ~ :::109' vr5 t, r~·o.8:!.C Cne. 

745 
. ·• 

l]jjfffiiii 

July 10 (Continued) .. 

The S-27 ~&s been Jestroyed in the Aleutians. 

vlete deotruct1.on ,:ras not °CCO.""lishod. 

, 

v 01.1-

The A. ·::Iol:"ITE left !'or t 1e South Pacific to act ~s 

.£'l9.~3ship for Vice Adr:1iral Ghorn1 ley durtn~ the fortncomin~~ 

offensive .. Sone Army perso-rtnel, ammunitjon, c~.ncl cruipment 

for :;3-17s j_n the POPPY-F-....J1:AI; rea V!8!1t for,vo.r in the A:?.GOHJE .. 

Cor1inch 101250 describes the method of contact re.,_;orts 

in joint operatio~s by the offtccr cxercisln~ unity of com~nd . 

It is just ~oss:b e that a SV is ope atin~ ~n the 

F.: l;TJ~lT - POPPY - rea . Enor"(T 1and )lanes there ,:Jere re porteu today , 

but the rc:)o:;."t is apt to bs erroneous ,. There arf, ini ttal s i gns 

of _arc;e ene 1

-n:r o~e1·a t"i ons bont to build up in t he s·~ Pecifi0. 

rrheDC o~;ert~ tlon3 C:ll1 har( ' .-J ta' C place for tV/ 0 or t:!:-,~.ree WSPkS ~~/ 

c .. t ~r1.o es.rl.:_e ~1 t. 

July 11 rr-ov;Je-J c,l-'lc $o,..Jv.le~ ~ct S. I)~ 1 

/ Comsopac 112000 (pink) believes that he has enough forces ~cr~pt for interdiction hostile aircraft activities in 

the RA3AUL Area. In his 110045 h~ says that he has insufficient 

intelligence facilities and must lean heavily on Cincpac and 

Comsowespac during forthcoming operations. 

There is being started a lan to exercise TF1 and 17 

together, winding up with a bombar&nent of the south tip of the 

Island of IIAVvAII. Corirmanders involved will work up a plan for 

this. The main idea is to boost BB morale. 

TF 16 has been training in the Hawaii area for support 

of amphibious operations. 

I~ ltv TF 8 is quiet. Amateur" Arm.y radio deception in the 

Alaskan area recently brought censure from Opnav. 

Cincpac 120419 refers the matter of release of Free 

French radio in the South Pacifi6 to Cominch. 

There is great need for tuna type vessels in the entire 

Pacific. The 14th District has been ro bbed of four to send south. 

This situation will not improve until f a ll. At that time about 

50 small ships will be ready. 

There is nothing new about the J aps . The SVORDFISH reports that in June the J a ps were not engaged in sa lva ~e of the 

PRI TJCE OF \TALES and REN01

.·vN. 
JUL GCT 

12 1489 EMMONS TO CHIEF ARiv:Y AIR FORCE 

Proposed operations of Hawaiian Mobile Air Force of 

one heavy bombardment group will require augmented air transport facilities. Request one long range 

transport squadron be assigned Hawaii with C-54 type aircraft or equivalent. 

747 
iiiiJNET 

JULY 12 

13 0211 CINCPAC to GOM~NCH,: .. Info cor,1SOPA C. 

13 0035Z 

Prospective needs antiaircraft artillery units in 

South Pacific advanced positions within range enemy shore based air far exceed present available units. 

Antiaircraft group 4th Defense Battalion is now 

being divided between ROSES and BUTTOJ\f resulting in 

inadequate protection both ~laces. Present plans provide for dividing antiaircraft groups Jrd and 5th Defense Battalions to provide protection 3 places. This 

basically unsound and will result in reducing effectiveness of all elements of divided units. Survey of Anny antiaircraft units now in Soupac Area shows them inadequate for present bases and therefore not available 

for relieving Marine AA units at new bases. To pro- vide adequate AA defense at new bases within range 

enemy shore based air and to provide mobile defense to 

support further offensive movements of which our attack elements are capable recommend expediting readiness 

of lOth and 12th Defense Battalions and i~mediate transfer of J Army antiaircraft regiments to Soupac Area. 

MARSHALL TO COMGENHAWDEPT 

4849-12th Movement directed by Cincpacs reurad 1463-11 

was authorized by paragraph 3 of Joint Chiefs of Staffs 

directive July 10 to be passed to you by Nimitx. You 

were informed in War Department radio 4695 July 4 that 

replacement group designated as Hawaiian Mobile Air 

Force was not contemplated. Your request for replacement of units ordered to South Pacific by Cincpac is 

therefore not considered. Additional LB 30's orB-24's 

as requested by you for proposed attacks on Berry can 

not be made available in time. LB 30 with avs equipment now on West Coast enroute to you. Additional 

planes of this type not immediately available. 

748 
AEGILEI 

JULY 

15 0237 OINCPAC to PACIFIC FLEET. 

Amphibious Force South Pacific hereby established 

effective zero hours GCT 16 July. Composition 

Transdivs 8, 10, 1st Mardiv less 7th plus 2nd 

Regiment. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner commands. In addition following units are temporarily 

assigned duty with Am11hi bforsopac Transdi v 12 

CRESCEN"f CITY, PRESIDENT HAYES, PRE9·IDENT ADAMS, 

PRESIDENT JACKSON, ZEILIN, ALHENA, ALCIIIBA, 

BETELGUESE, lst Marine Raider.Battalion, 5th 

Marine Defense ~attalion, Jrd Marine Barrage 

Balloon Squad~on. 

14 1445 CONIINCH to CINCPAC. 

Although not stated in my letter serial 00254 of 

3 April Free French have concurred in your desi~nation as CinC Pacific Ocean Area and recognize this 

as sphere of United States strategic responsibility. 

Your 120419 DeGaulle being advised that you are 

proceeding with suppression of civil radio stations. 

16 0705 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMGENB..AWDEPT. 

Refer Urdis 041901. At conference with me today 

prospective British High Commissioner for Western 

Pacific who will exercise administrative control 

of Canton and Christmas agreed to following. 

Military security is paramount consideration. 

Close- British radio circuits and use facilities under 

control Cincpac. Our personnel to encode outgoing 

messages for which British codes and cyphers will 

be made available to us. Incoming messages will be 

delivered without decoding. 

749 
OIJOFWI 

JULY 

17 2209 COMSOPAC to Cil\TCPAC Info OPNAV, COMAIRSOPAC, CO~/IIHCH. 

In regard Cominch 1211516 Fox NR 68 Comsopac sends. 

Following is summary airmailed via Cincpac aviation 

strength, facilities and potentialities Auckland 

Area. Have been advised NZ Government ready and willing to organize train and reequip RNZAF to meet our 

requirements. Estimate available personnel sufficient 

to man, operate and maintain 20 combat squadrons during 1943 if required equipment can be made available. Reeommend Affirn1 aviation for LION Base for AUCKULWD Baker 

sub depot for Army aircraft at NA}JDI be not delayed Cast 

If NANDI ·sub depot is out combine Army facilities with 

T ... ION at AUCKLAND Dog Equip RNZAF as soon as aircraft 

available for duty outside Iv1Z area Easy Equip RNZA.F 

Singapore Squadron at SUVA ·with 9 Catalinas. Existing airfields AUCKLAND Area can accoflmodate carrier SQUadrons 

in addition to existing squadrons as follows: 4 fighter, 4 bomber, 2 torpedo, but no facilities available. for additional personnel maintenance or overhaul. Require skilled mechanics machinery and technical personnel. This for info in advance receipt my letter. Further 

info gives existing organized combat squadrons as 4 Hudson 

and 2 Vincent general reconniassance 4 Kittyhawks fighter 2 Vincent and 1 Hind Army cooperative. Of these 1 Hudson 

and 1 Vincent AC nlus 3 Singaryore boats in FIJIS. 1 additional Hudson formin~ for HOTTiiiJ~A. 

17 224 7 C. G. STRA.W l to·. C®l'·ff.SOPAC Info C I~CPAC. 

Radio AUCKLAND to Comsopac NWM info Cincpac. STRAW 

Force Comdr. My 162038 and antecedents same subject 3 additional messages filed this date. Originator holds 

11 1st dated 6 July. This matter becoming quite acute 

Governor thru nonreply his dispatches suspects same not 

for-v,rarded and has stated CO STRAW.BOAR.D he intends resign as he obviously is not trusted by American authorities. His messages filed this date probably resigna- tion. Originator should and desires visit STRA'NBOARD 

but waiting solution this matter to a~oid embarrassment. 

Cincpac 160435 noted. Since application provision transfer outr:oinp: to our code involves additional delay suggest 

not apply this case. If authorized transmit NOill\lliA 

direct in French code can feed gradu~lly beginning with 

first filed which A-ppears desirable solution. Meanwhile 

communication to MATTEI from his own superior explaining situation desirable to reestablish cordial relations. 

750 
?iGliilT 

Julx 

18 0723 CTF 8 to TASKFORCE 8, Info CI HCPAC , COMI NCH ., 

Reconnaissance KI SKA Harbor today reveals one 

cruiser 3 DD' s 1 large AI) 2 4-engined patrol planes. 2 or 3 landing boats. Ove rcast. Old camp enlarged. lJew camp south of bay ·and west of South Head. B-24's 

made unprofita ble attacks on vessels. Opposed by 5 single float planes. Moderate to heavy antiaircraft from north and south head and cruiser at and 

above twenty thousand feet. Large buildings seen 

on North Head. Photos obtained. 1 B-17 shot down. 

17 2026 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COl·orSOPAC. 

In connection your 130211 Army antiaircraft cannot 

be made available from United States in time and 

suggest antiaircraft re~iments at BORA BORA and 

TONGATABU be used. Army will furnish one replace- ment antiaircraft regiment as soon as can be assembled 

in United States and ·shipping provided. Renlacement 

additional antiaircraft regiments reoue sted probably 

can not be made due to Drior A~ny commitments. Chief 

of Staff Army informed. 

751 
' • 

Oi18Il£! 

JULY GCT 

18 0226 COMINCH TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC 

Munitions assignment board Washington has prepared list of deficiencies of critical items New Zealand 

ground forces. United States and New Zealand representatives in England are placing this before 

London munitions board which should take care initial 

equipment for New Zealand forces. Since it is desirable that requisitions for all items of any category of finished military equipment and munitions be submitted to one place it is recommended that further 

assignments for New Zealand forces be handled as 

follows: (a) Initially send to London requisitions for all munitions except for air forces and motor 

vehicles for ground forces which will be submitted 

to Washington (b) Munitions for US forces will be 

provided by US in normal manner (c) All requisitions 

to London or Washington to be approved by you or your authorized representatives, and allocations of sup- plies so furnished to be made by you or above desig- nated subordinates (d) In obtaining concurrence of 

New Zealand authorities for proposed procedure, inform them that this is method :fE~x~~0~B!XBriXIS1X.1!1tBMJ:B; 

in operations for requisitioning supplies for Australia. 

Chief of Staff Army informed. 

752 
JULY GCT 

18 1825 

19 0249 

19 0515 

COMTASKFOR 8 TO CINCPAC, COMINCH 

Cumulative reports from aircraft over Kiska indicate 

ships present 1 BB 2 CA 3 DD 1 AO 1 large 2 small AK. 

Increased antiaircraft plus boldness fighters makes 

tough opposition. Fighters release apparently harmless balls fire and smoke. Seems certain enemy constructing landing strip approximate location recommended H 0 187. Photos will be forwarded when delivered to originator. 

COMALSEC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC. 

From Comtaskforce 8. This is my answer to your 

182106 to Comalsec. Contemplated operations in 

accordance with Cincpac 090339 is bombardment of 

Kiska about July 22 by cruise1..,s and destroyers of 

Taskforce 8. Recommend decision on future operations await the results of present move. Commitment 

for bases as far west in Aleutians as Tanaga will 

involve naval support for supply line that will 

appromate twice the naval strength now stationed 

in this area plus carrier for continued aerial support. 

COMSDEAC TO CG POPPY BOBCAT STRAW INFO CINCPAC 

The present situation is such that for reasons of 

military security it has become necessary for radi0 

communications in this area to be placed under my 

direct control. At zero hours GCT July 21st you will 

therefore suppress all civil radio stations and exercise censorship over all outgoing civil messages at 

all Free French Island garrisoned by U S troops. Inform Free French authorities General DeGaulle has 

recognized entire Pacific Area as sphere of United 

States strategic responsibility. He has been advised 

of this suppression of radio. You will transmit French 

official messages in their codes after encoding by our 

personnel. It is therefore necessary Free French make 

their codes available for transmissions. Incoming 

messages will not be decoded by United States personnel 

but will be delivered as received. French commercial 

messages may be handled if deemed expedient in individual cases but they shall only be handled if military load allows. No charges are to be made for any service. 

Messages now being held may be forwarded to destinations prior to application above policy. Desire the 

above policy be put into effect in such manner that 

if possible cooperation of Free French officials and 

cordial relations with them may be preserved. 

753 
SFGRFHL 

JUL GCT 

19 1751 

20 0715 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Instructions are being issued by the War Department to the appropriate Army commanders directing the 

immediate discontinuance of radio deception and 

interference by Army radio stations in ALASKA during the continuance of the present status of command in 

ALASKA, i.e., 11FLEET-OPPOSED INVASIONn. These instructions will permit the use of Army radio facilities in ALASKA for this purpose only upon request of 

the Naval Officer exercising unity of command in 

ALASKA. 

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC 

The procedure relative to the handling of New Zemand 

military requisitions recommended in Cominch 182026 ~ill require a considerable addition to my Staff and 

would be a most probable source of friction with the 

New Zealand authorities where excellent cooperation 

now exists. This opinion based on unofficial discussions with New Zealand Army and civilian authorities. 

The situation here is different than in Australia as 

I am not in command of the land defenses of New Zealand. 

Reasonableness of requisitions submitted can be judged 

as well in London or Washington as here unless it is 

expected I, although not in command, investigate New 

Zealand defense plans and conditions of New Zealand 

equipment and supplies. To allocate here supplies furnished on New Zealand requisitions would be an 

especially excellent source of friction. I have given careful consideration to this subject since my arrival 

and earnestly recommend that final decision be held in 

abeyance pending the arrival in Washington of Colonel 

WESTBROOK of the Joint Purchasing Board who has been 

sent from here to discuss this and in view of the above 

and other subjects with War and Navy Departments. Pending further instructions from you I am not submitting the proposed plan to the New Zealand authorities. 

754 
isECAb!t 

JUL GCT ---

20 2215 COMTASKFOR 1 to CINCPAC info COMAMPHIBFORPAC 

It was originally intended to hold bombardment with 

Amphibious Force at SAN CLEMENTE resulting in exercise 

in most important phase of fire support and troop 

landing and better analysis due to accessability of 

area. Your 120337 changed site but after conference 

with Commander Voegeli repeat Voegeli recommend bombardment exercise be shifted to SAN CLEMENTE. Limited 

ammunition prevents both. 

21 0721 COMALSEC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNORVffiSEAFRON 

Summary by ComAlSec for Cominch, Cincpac Comnorwestseafron. 

2 light cruisers vicinity KISKA Sunday with pair of 

destroyers patrolling entrance no batteries observed 

Orient point. Says Wing 4. Monday GILLIS found ADAK 

untenable and under close observation. Was attacked 

repeatedly by trio of 4 engine bombers whose work was 

excellent and patterns good. Undamaged. 2 near misses. 

Retired towards NAZAN Bay trailed by 4 engined bomber. 

Entire area well scouted~ 

21 1019 COMALSEC to COMINCH, info CINCPAC, CTF 8, ETC. 

Based on reasonably complete information on KULUK Bay 

and meager information on TANAGA recommend former as 

having definitely better harbor and probably better 

site for landing field. Cominch 202205. Minimum 

additional naval support considered necessary 2 carriers 

6 CL 12 DD 8 SS and motor torpedo boats plus necessary 

train and supply. DUTCH pass to ComPatWing 4 who is 

requested to comment if personnel knowledge these 

localities available. 

755 
iiiSI&i 

JULY {GOT) 

21 1531 COMINCH to COMNAVEUROPE Info ·crNCPAC, COMSOPAC. 

My 141440 and 181324 Cincpao has directed Comsopac 

suppress and civil radio stations at discretion and to 

exercise censorship at all Free French Islands gar- risoned by u. s. troops and to directly control Free 

French Govt stations in NEW CALEDONIA, BORA BORA, and 

WALLIS. In exercising this control official French 

radio communications will be transmitted for them in 

their codes. Outgoing messages will be encoded by 

our personnel to whom necessary codes must be made 

available. Incoming messages will be delivered as 

received without decoding. French commercial traffic 

will be handled as military load permits. No charge will be made for any service. This is policy which 

British have agreed to in FIJI, CANTON and CiffiiSTMAS. 

It appears to be in accord with DeGaulles wishes as 

given in your 171418. It is imperative that Dargenlieu be instructed accordingly without delay. 

21 1536 COMINCH to Cincpac, Comsopac for Info. 

Refer to this as Comnaveu 171418 passed by Cominch to 

you for info. Urdis 141440 communicated to General De 

Gaulle who reauests further information as to measures 

already taken -or paanned for control of radio communications in South Pacific. French National Committee inquire (first) whether their agreement is sought for the closing of civil radio stations (2) What stations are to be 

closed. No information is available here concerning any commercial radio stations in NEW CALEDONIA or the WALLIS 

ISLANDS. French state TONGATABJ is in British territory. They report existence of two official French Government 

stations in NOill~A, one in WALLIS. All were taken over 

before end of 1940 and have since been operated by militarized personnel. Only messages passed by military censorship are accepted. If Commander in Chief Pacific 

has closed, or proposes to close, French official stations at NOUMEA the National Committee can not agree. They would consent to closing French station WALLIS. 

But they insist shutting down French official stations 

in NEW CALEDONIA is no more necessary or appropriate than 

closing of British or Dominion official stations in NEW 

ZEALAND or AUSTRALIA. French Committee willing to accept stricter censorship or direct control of NE'N CALEDONIA 

stations by u.s. Military Authorities. They would wish 

Admiral Dargenlieu to be consulted. They are requesting additional information from him. 

756 
8\BJFt!H 

· JULY GCT 

21 1140 

22 1503 

22 1504 

PATCH TO COMSOPAC 

Patch to Ghormley following transmitted at request of 

Admiral Dargenlieu nr thank you for your answer. Here 

is the telegram of General DeGaulle which he asks me 

to communicate to you as well as to General Patch ui 

order you to keep under your control the radio stations 

of territories placed under your autl1ority. Only an 

order from me could liberate you from this obligation. Radio stations of Noumea are to be occupied militarily. Conversations are presently taking place between the 

national committee and the American Government on this 

subjectu consequently the traffic of our stations which 

have all been militarized and controlled since 8 months 

will continue until further orders signed Dargenlies" regardless last sentence Dargenlieus dispatch quoted above, all French radio traffic now closed including military. This is temp~ary solution only. French 

will not surrender their code without fighting. Unless 

otherwise directed --_. by you I will impose American 

censorsl1ip over all radio traffic leaving Poppy except French Governmental radios certified by Dargenlieu in 

writing as such and as containing no information of 

value to the enemy. I am satisfied this will attain 

desired censorship. In order to avoid possilbe open combat with French and to maintain friendly relation, recommend you indicate approval my proposed compromise in your reply to Dargelieu. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

In view recent commissioning of naval submarine base 

at Midway, plan establish Midway as naval operating base with senior line officer in command • . Comment. 

COMINCH TO CINCPAC 

Commandant Marcorps proposes to establish under Cincpac 

a command designated Quote Marine Aircraft Wings Pacific 

Unquote consisting of 1st Marine Aircraft Wind 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing 4th Base Defense Air Wing plus a service group charged with distribution personnel and material. General officer commanding to have headquarters with Cincpac and to be charged with following duties 

(2) Organization, administration and distribution per- sonnel and supplies within the 3 wings. (b) Recommendations to Cincpac covering plans for employment and distribution of 1mrine aircraft units Pacific. (c) Command 

of all marine aviation units above except those assigned specifi c task organizations. Commanding General 1st 

Marine Aircraft Wing and Commanding General 2nd Marine 

Aircraft Wing concur. Please comment. 7 57 
iiiiM .. 

JULY (GCT) 

22 0048 COMSOPAC (Via Comairsopac) to PATCH, Info Oominch,Cincpac. 

This is for action Patch from Comsopac. Comairsopao deliver. · RDO Washington deliver to Cominch and Honolulu 

deliver to Cinopac for info. Your 211140. Situation 

relative your closing military radios not understood. See 

last sentence Cincpao 160435. My 190515 authorized you 

suppress civil radio stations and exercise censorship 

over all outgoing civil messages. Please explain situation in full. Pending further clarification of situation 

I approve transmitting Dargenlieus official messages. 

We must accept such in good faith. It is not intended that 

Free French official governmenta:-1 :-: mes~ages over Free French 

authentic military radios be censored. 

21 1450 COMSOPAC to CINOPAC, Info COMAMPHIB:B~OR SOPAC. 

Plan to send Army antiaircraft regiment Cominch 182118 

directly into objective area upon arrival this area. This 

regiment could probably arrive in objective area as soon 

as could units from BOBCAT using shipping which will be ~ 

available to me. This plan avoids de·pleting BOBCAT and · 

BLEACHER of any of their present inadequate antiaircraft 

and avoids confusion and delay incident to the exchange of units at those bases. 

22 1856 NAVFOREUROPE to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC. 

Urdis 211531 communicated to DeGaulle. In very friendly discussion he expressed full understanding of necessity for unified control of all communications in strategic South Pacific Area and agrees to American control of radio 

stations accordance system outlined in instructions to 

Commander South Pacific. General DeGaulles agreement is 

subject to three conditions. First, he proposes only one 

modification insisting that messages between him and 

Dargenlieu shall be known only to them and sent in their 

personal private code to which no other French Commanders 

have access. Such messages if handled . by American operated stations shall be transmitted without delay. He will approve of any technicalities or operating procedure which 

guarantees such secrecy between him and Dargenlieu. Second, 

representatives of French authorities will be designated to 

participate in censorship of all French messages. Third, 

General DeGaulle understands that the measures proposed are 

subject to adjustment if changing conditions warrant. 

Cominch agrees to these conditions. DeGaulle is sending instructions to Dargenlieu in accordance foregoing. He 

expresses hope that u.s. Military authorities in NEW 

CALEDONIA will reach agreement. 

758 
J1JLY (GOT) 

23 2315 COMSOPAC to BUPERS, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMAMPHIBFOR, SOPAC 

I am informed by Comamphibforsopac that transports under his command are deficient in officer and enlisted personnel. This will be worse after forthcoming opera- tions. Only one set boat crews which will delay unload- ing. Transport duty involving amphibious operations considered excellent training for young officers. 100 

to 150 could be usefully employed and trained in 6 to 9 months. Sopac area is critically short of Naval per- sonnel. I again urge establishment of personnel pool this area to man essential Naval activities and for replacements. 

24 1405 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC. 

~ 

Your 220603 acceptance of strategic direction does not necessarily include obligation of assuming responsibility for provisioning equipping or supplying with arms. Fixed defense of territory wherever located other than territory in which United States bases are established· is funda- mentally duty of the nation which has sovereignty over such territory. Specifically as regards TAHITI Free French 

Forces there have not in so far as known been organized into a task group and made available by Free .French to a 

u.s. Commander for task assignment. United States has 

not assumed responsibility of provisioning equipping or furnishing with arms of Free French Forces in TAHITI. Ap- parently negatized authorities for purposes of their own previously assumed this obligation. Reasons for a change are not apparent. Provisions of lend lease have been extended to Free French. Requisitions have been received for clothing and a small amount of equipment for Free French Forces in TAHITI. These requisitions have been disapproved on grounds that strongly held U, S, positions eover defense of TAHITI and adjoining islands, and payments for small amount of clothing and equipment is within means of local Free French Government. If for military reasons 

you desire a modification on aforesaid policy request your recommendations. 

25 0309 Cincpac to COMINCH, Info COMAIRWINGS 1 & 2, COMDT USMC. 

Recommend approval Marcorps proposals urdis 221504 subject following. Propose incorporate Marine Aircraft Wings Pac- ific in quote Air Pacific Fleet unquote recommended my conf serial 02077 of July 14. General officer commanding Marair- wingspac would probably have headqua.rters this area and deal with Cincpac through type commander air Pacific Fleet. 

759 
lEFT 

24 1405 

24 1801 

(Is also 

ComAlSec 

212225) 

COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC 

Your 220603, acceptance of strategic direction does not 

necessarily include obligation of assuming responsibility 

for provisioning, equipping or supplying with arms. 

Fixed defense of territory wherever located other than 

territory in which United States bases are established is 

fundamentally duty of the nation which has sovereignty 

over such territory. Specifically as regards TAHITI Free 

French forces there have not insofar as known been organized into a Task Group and made available by Free 

French to a U.S. commander for task assignment. United 

States has not assumed responsibility of provisioning' 

equipping or furnishing with arms of Free French forces 

in TAHITI. Apparently negatized authorities for purposes 

of their own previously assumed this obligation. Reasons 

for a change are not apparent. Provisions of Lend-Lease 

have been extended to Free French. Requisitions have 

been received for clothing and a small amount of equipment for Free French forces in TAHITI. These requisitions have been disapproved on grounds that strongly held 

u.s. positions cover defense of TAHITI and adjoining 

islands, and payments for small amount _of clothing and 

equipment is within means of local Free French Government. 

If for military reasons you desire a modification on 

aforesaid policy request your recommendation. 

COMINCH info CINCPAC 

Agree absolutely with Foster report . and recommendations 

DUTCH HARBOR. Vice Opnav 2nd Endorsement of lOB of 11 

July. Urge immediate action most important points without awaiting letters on details as follows: 

(a) Need immediately all or part of fighter squadron for 

which runways approach suitable. 

(b) Require at once 1 additional squadron KINGFISHERS 

present convoy coverage totally inadequate. 

(c) For immediate needs require 2 PC boats for patrol in 

AKATAN and UNIMAK PASS, 4 YP boats for Harbor Patrol and 

same number for carrying men and supplies to section bases. 

(d) Approval and funds for breakwater between AMAKNAK and 

HOG Islands. 

(e) Expedite Motor Torpedo Boats understood to be enroute. 

(f) Provide within 3 months additional SeaBee battalion 

as most effective means of expediting construction. 

(g) Provide as rapidly as possible 1 Lieutenant Commander, 

5 Lieutenants, 16 Junior Lieutenants or Ensigns, 4 Supply 

Officers including 1 Lieutenant Commander or Lieutenant, 

(Cont'd on next page) 760 
JUL GCT 

24 1801 

(is also 

ComAlSec 

212225) 

25 2000 

26 0248 

COMINCH info CINCPAC (Continued) 

1 Captain and 2 Lieutenants MarCorps. Enlisted personnel 

now aboard is barely sufficient for present needs Air 

Station without provision for Submarine ·Base or Section 

Base. For latter need following men by branches: 

Seamen - 347; Artificer:- 107; Engineer - 108; Special - 50j 

Commissary - 23; Messmen - 20. New allowance Artificer 

which includes foregoing being requested.· 

COMINCH to COMALSEC 1 CO~~STSEAFRONT info CINCPAC, ETC. 

From the Joint Chiefs at Staff to Commanding Genera~, 

Western Defense Command and ComAlSec. You are directed 

to ·make joint investigation as early as practicable of 

TANAGA and ADAK Islands with a view to establishment of 

Army Air Station in that area. Investigation will give 

primary consideration to suitability and strategic location of air field but will give careful consideration to 

suitability of harbors in regard to protection against 

hostile attack and weather. 

Joint report by despatch is desired. Report should include the major items of equipment not now available in 

the ALASKAN Area but absolutely required for establishment of proposed base. 

Joint issuance of a directive for establishment of base 

is contemplated after receipt of report. This directive 

for reconnaissance is issued to ComAlSec in view of 

temporary absence of ComTaskFor 8. Reeves pass to 

Buchner. Greenslade pass to DeWitt. 

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC 

Have received rn:ar Department letter OPD384SPA (7-77-42) · of 

10 Julv instructions for Major General Harmon designated ComGen~U.S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area. Harmon has not 

yet arrived. Paragraph 2(a) of above reference says in part 

Harmon responsible "training of all US Army ground and air 

troops within the a.reau. Paragraph 2(b) directs Harmon to 

make recommendations to the War Department in regard to the 

defenses of this area which is a responsibility of ComSoPac 

to CinCPac and by paragraph lO(b) Enclosure (B) to SecNav 

secret letter (SC)A/16-3(28) of 20 April '42 subject United 

Nations Operations in Pacific Theater, Cominch is executive 

agent for Joint Chiefs of Staff. See paragraph 5 your 

letter instructions to me serial 090W of 14 May and your 

190839 of May. Harmon's orders from War Department and the 

above reference regarding training and command Army Air Units 

this area at variance. In order that I may effectually 

command the forces assigned to me Unity of Command is necessary and clarification of responsibility for training ai}6 1 

units is essential. Advise. ComSoPac sends this. 
3 lS 6 It E I 

ff.UL GCT ---

26 2127 

26 1201 

27 0510 

25 1728 

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC 

Partial clarification requested urdis 260248 contained 

my 230039 which apparently you have not yet received. 

In order to keep you and me informed official recommendations affecting defenses your area suggest you handle at first meeting with Harmon matter recommendations directed by War Dept. Believe Harmon now at FANTAN. 

COMGENSOPAC to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, 

Pursuant letter of instructions from Commander in Chief 

dated July 12 I have this date assumed command u.s. Ar.my Forces South Pacific Area except for administration and 

supply for which responsibility will be assumed later 

date. Propose to confer with Callahan and McCain Tuesday in SUVA and proceed NOUMEA Wednesday establishing pro- visional command post that place. Kind personal regards. 

COMSOPAC to CTF 6), COMGENS ALL ISLAND BASES SOPAC, etc. 

Major General Harmon having reported this area as ComGen 

SoPac is responsible for training all units all Anmy ground and Air troops SoPac Area. Rear Admiral McCain 

as Comairsopac is responsible under Comsopac direct 

direction for operational control all shore and tender 

based aircraft South Pacific Area and for training and 

indoctrination Naval Aircraft SoPac Force. All addressees 

in SoPac Area please acknowledge. 

OPNAV to CINCPAC. 

Russia has reauested and Opnav concurs in establishment 

direct radio contact between Russian Navy controlled radio 

VLADIVOSTOK and Cincpac. Suggest initiate daily schedules 

between VLADIVOSTOK and Radio HONOLULU at 1300 and 0100 

GCT HONOLULU using 7760 and 14920 KC respectively. Messages initially to be in crypto channels held by Taecker 

in office AmCon VLADIVOSTOK and Alusna MOSCOW (CSP 1405, 

1406) use secret or confidential in first portion of 

text if applicable. Advise 

762 
ii10Ni1i' 

JULY (GCT) 

31 0215 

30 2351 

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info CGHD, 

(Continued) 

enforcement South Pacific or even to constitute 

reasonable defense Hawaiian Area when bulk of striking power of Fleet is South. Request Army send Hawaii 

minimum of two heavy bombardment groups of 35 planes 

each at earliest possible date to provide reserve for 

Soupac operations which must not fail or reach stalemate stage. 

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, 

Your 262215 all components of LION except for defense 

forces desired for SPOONER projects. After approval 

of shipment of LION 1 assembly of materials will take 

some time as LION was stripped to form CUBS 1 and 13 and 

will probably be stripped and other urgent demands until 

orders for shipment to SPOONER are issued. Combase for 

CUBS. 231908 indicated that CUB 1 was stripped of barges 

and lighters so that unloading of CUB 1 materials must 

be handled by Comamphibsopac equipment. Therefore consider it extremely imnortant that LION materials be 

authorized for SPOONER at once both to a~oid further 

diversions and to get materials in area where they are 

needed. Furthermore reouests for LION and CUB materials 

should not be ~ostponed until materials are needed as 

it requires from 3 to 6 months to secure delivery. CUB 

1 was reouested by me on 28th on file in Washington and 

and shipment three months later is incom~lete in essential 

items. Request for construction battalions not modified 

as 1st battalion# was requested with 1st shipment of 

materials. Furthermore construction detachments in Sopac area were too small for the jobs and numbers of effectives have been greatly reduced by exhaustion and 

malaria. 

76 3 
JULY GCT 

29 0800 

30 2125 

29 2345 

31 0113 

31 0215 

COlJIDGEN ROSES TO COMAIRSOPAC 

Bomber landed satisfactorily at BUTTONS. No repeat 

no marston mat required there. Have directed DALE 

and SS HOLMES depart BUTTONS for ROSES and will 

unload all mat here. BUTTONS impracticable as 

transshipment port. 

CTF 8 to TF 8 Info Cincpac, etc. 

PRESENr OPERATIONS MY OPPLAN NUMBER 8-42 DEFERRED. 

Resume normal operations pending reorganization of 

forces and necessary modification of plan. 

COMSERFORPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSERON 8. 

Directive mentioned Opnav 261639 not received. 

Request reconsideration Opnav 271539 establishing 

area petroleum officers as refers to Hawaiian Area 

and South Pacific for following reasons: (a) Highly 

satisfactory operation of existing arrangements with 

Army for joint needs in Hawaiian Area. (b) Unified 

control for supply of South Pacific Bases was established by Opnav secret serial 053812 of 15 July. 

Believe provisions Opnav despatch 261639 and 271539 

should apply only to such areas as Australia and pos- sibly New Zealand where several sources of supply 

must be reconciled with demands and available storage 

facilities. 

CINCPAC to OPNAV, Info COMSOWESPAC, etc, 

Request reconsideration in effectuating your 271539. 

Needs Hawaiian Area now served by arrangement satisfactory to both services. Supply of South Pacific 

Island Bases already covered by Opnav Secret Serial 

053812 of 15 July which places sole responsibility 

on Navy. Believe provisions urdis 261639 particularly applicable Australia and possibly New Zealand but 

prefer delay in establishing area petroleum officer 

latter place until further study made of necessity 

therefor. 

CINCPAC to COMINGH, Info CGHD. 

Myser Ol64W urser 00675. Numbers Army aircraft 

Pacific Ocean Area such that there is no reserve for 

situation expected to exist after completion of 

Task One in South Pacific. Available bombers at 

Oahu too low in numbers and shy sufficient trained 

flight crews to be considered as reservoir for re754 
iN onna 

AUG GCT ----

01 0233 CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO COMSUBPAC, SOMSWPAC, ETC. 

Your 291315. Pending outcome of operations now started 

by Ghormley no change is recommended in present plan to 

operate twenty fleet submarines from West Australia. 

Developments may require consideration of sn advance 

base in Rabaul area. 

Because of repair facilities Pearl now best suited main 

submarine base for entire Pacific with advance positions 

as situation demands. 

More submarine hours in major focal points of Jap 

communications can be achieved from Pearl using Midway 

than from Southwestern Australia. 

02 '0141 CINCPAC TO VICE OPNAV INFO COMSOPAC, COM-12, ETC. 

Until later advised request no definite arrangements be 

made load and ship Lion 1 and Cubs 2 and 3. This in 

reference my 220349 your 251953 and Com-12 280632. 

Cub 13 not involved this recommendation and should go 

forward as planned. 

75 5 
eEtJMi' 

AUGUST (GCT) 

20 0830 CTG 7.15 to COMSUBPAC. 

This is novel. Primary objective raided result. Radio 

station, Avgas, 1 single float seaplane and 1 four 

engined VP destroyed. Submarine ·indirect gunfire sunk 

3500 ton AP and 1 PG and damaged enemy reseFve area on 

shore. Heavy enemy air action encountered during day- light which attacked Jap troops and installations almost exclusively including secondary objective which we 

did not raid. Jap dead known 83, prisoners none. Own 

dead lst Lieut. G. P. Holton, 13 men. Wounded 2 officers 16 men. Missing approximately 20 men. Cleared 

area 2400 18th local date. 

756 
Si1SRET 

20 1407 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, & Info Commands Concerned. 

Following is summary of battle damage vessels Taskfor 44. 

A - General Description. B - Temporary repairs made. C - Proposed final repairs. Para. MUGFORD (A) 100 pound 

bomb hits high order detonation on impact top after deckhouse frame 145-6 number 3 gun shelter and surrounding 

structure wrecked. Structural strength not impaired. Number 3 5" gun jammed both train elevation completely useless all hydraulic motors piping beyond repair FC 

instruments circuits demolished. All other armament 

undamaged. Capable making full power 20% fuel tank 

capacity contaminated. Longest leg 3500 miles at 15 

knots steering engine gear operable. (B) Damaged gun and 

mount re~laced by similar good gun removed from RALPH 

TALBOT and secured for sea. All holes weather deck 

blanked. (C) Recommend despatch in company CHICAGO 

STUART to Sydney for complete reconditioning. Para. 

RALPH TALBOT (A) Shell hit starboard shear frame 142 shell 

hit forecastle deck junction deckhouse side frame 54 

starboard direct shell hit each number 4 5" gun slide and 

1 torpedo tube mount shell hit after bulkhead quartermaster storeroom superdeck frame 68 gun 4 completely out 

guns 1, 2, 3 no automatic elevation train order torpedo 

tube mounts 1 3 jettisoned correct list. All FC and IC 

out of commission also both Radars and starboard torp 

director. Diesel generator completely submerged power cables outside machinery spaces cut degaussing cables 

submerged and damaged no sound gear or fathometer no 

power to bridge chart house gutted by fire. Capable 

making full uower longest leg 4,000 miles at 15 knots 

steering engine gear Okay emergency radio working can 

drop depth charges. (B) All holes side and deck patched number 3 5" gun and mount exchanged for 1 removed IDGFORD. 

(C) Recommend despatch to PEARL or West Coast via PEARL 

in company for complete reconditioning. Para. CHICAGO 

(A) Torpedo hit on stem which sheared extensive structural 

damage forward shell. Compartments A 50402 and all forward flooded to water line. Keel deflected down from 

about frame 10 forward maximum 3 feet 9 inches below base 

line. Chain locker wrecked anchor windlassis out of line. 

Forecastle deck knuckled 2 cross lines forward windlass. 

Speed reduced to 12 knots on arrival. Gasoline can not 

be removed from starboard gasoline tank due broken stem cut 

out valve 4,000 gallons. All damage ~orward frame 15. * 

'(3B) A 402 dwwatered slow leak repairs bulkhead 10 showed 

between 2nd deck and 2nd nlatform both chain cables removed 1 bow anchor rigged -over stern with wire cable 

for emergency use. St ru ct ural bre akwater installed forward 

(Continued on next pa ge) 

767 
@!IQRiJT 

20 1407 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, & Info Comds Concerned. 

{Continued) 

of chain pipes to protect bulkhead 10 all loose shell removed. (C) Recommend despatch to Sydney in company MUGFORD, STUART to drydock with view determine whether 

practicafule rebuild bow sent port or install temporary 

bow prior departure Pearl. Projection keel below base 

line has not been removed. Vessel capa9le making maximum 

14 knots smo.oth sea. PATTERSON damage minor all urgent work completed and vessel returned active duty. All above 

discussed with Comtaskfor 42 who concurs. ~GFORD, RALPH 

TALBOT now ready proceed. CHICAGO ready August 22 local. 

768 
a '] 9 n "IJ, .. rp 

July l~~th. 

The FULTON arrived at J:IDVvAY to tend submarines 

operating in Japanese waters. Tho p~osent plan~t call for the 

subs to p;o to PEATIL~fe"\.rd"ry other war patrol. A 

CinCpac 130211 requests considerably more antiaircraft protection for ovm Pacific bases. 

The principle developments of the day have to do 

with ComSoPac propara tions for the forthcor:1ing offensive. 

In his 130414 (Pir~:) he is concerned with Garrison troops 

and sur:Ge sts that lJEH ZEALAND be prodded to prov~~.ide the 

TULAG I AREA requirements in part. IIi s 120835 (Pd~ncerns command 

arranr;or.1ents. He desires the ARGONl:1~ to go to PULCRUM, a nd 

pick up his staff, then to NOtnviEA. It would possibly be 

sinpler and quicker for the A~GOlJNE to r;o to NOUBEA end report 

as Adm:tr~al Ghormleys flagship. This way hl s staff would have 

time to meet her before the active operations commence. 1 

a CO't'I:F09 'Hill be B~§~Q ots.d ;t;g, J-..i:m-@;y o<€),ic~~. His 120332 ( ?,1\1.() 

concerns with 1\vGas in drums for advance operations. Plenty I 

of this vrill be available to hin, but distrubition may be 

a proble:m.. 

The delicate question of Free Prench Hadio came up 

again in General'Patch's 130621 ·(Pink). The general problem 

has already been presented to Admiral King so this message was sent· 

along, emplmsizinG the need for naval control of Free French 

and other foreien radio stations in the Pacific Ocean Areas. 

Comairsopac 130021 e;ives distribution of the four 

arr1y B-17 squadrons as 1 to FULCTIUB, 2 to POPPY, and 1 to 

ROSES and hints at more advance positions when facilities are 

ready. 

In his 130035 General l.larshall tells General Emnons 

~illt no plane roplacenent for the 35 sent south will be considered. This probably not tho final word, and planes may be 

expected if a good noed can be shovm. 

Task Force 8 renains quiet pending the arrival of 

4 DHs \7hich will perr1it activo operations at KISKA and ATJ:U. 

rrhe rcinforconents of air and troops continue in 

the Hl!i.BAUL ARnf!l.. A r;oocl sized project for a landing field at 

GUA 1JALCAliJl.L ~lTS well underway... ~ ..-c_.. 

75 .9 
July 13. 

The WASP has developed engine trouble and her speed is 

reduced to 15 knots. Her Task Force commander plans to send her 

to BLEACHER for repairs which are estimated to take 4 days. It 

may be necessary to relieve Task Force 18 with Task Force 17. The 

latter force is preparing to operate with Task Force 1. There is 

nothing new from Task Force 8. 

Plans are underway to turn the search operations from OAHU 

over to the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier. 

General Emmons in his 1489/12 has requested one long range 

transport squadron for use by the Mobile Air Force. 

'* 

Cominch received a letter originating by the Army which 

indicates that there are good air base sites on ESPIRITU SANTO. 

We also got that information from ComAirSoPac several days ago. 

It is hoped to have an airfield in operation on that island by 

July 28th. 

There continue to be reports of occasional enemy cruisers, 

destroyers and MARUs in and near KISKA. The Army bombed a cruiser 

there yesterday but did not observe results. 

The 8th Fleet and 8th Base Force have been set up to 

operate primarily in the RAEAUL area. Enemy reinforcements there 

continue. 

July 14. 

TF 11 and 18 are in the South Pacific. Comsopac will 

make modifications in their rendezvous, - the change being necessary due to a casualty to the 1

1ifASP . TF16 wi 11 depart for the 

South Pacific tomorrow to supDort the Task One. TF 17 remains 

ready for any duty in the Pearl area. TFl continues training on 

the Coast. It is now expected that the T-sNl'TESSEE can be made 

available f or about six months modernization conwencing Sept. lst. · 

TF 8 continues quiet. 

Cincpac 150237 establishes the SoPac Amphi)ious Force. 

Jo inch 1~2226 (pink) states that no troops from the US 

will be sent to garrison the TULAGI area. Also that NZ authorities 

may be approached on the question of the use of their troops in 

the TULAGI area provided this does not reopen the FIJI question. 

The question of the French and British radio stations 

in the Pacific theatre is still un in the air. See Cominch 141445 . Cincpac desires that we take over their codes and code their messages for trAnsmission over our systems. Such a propositi on is 

-"(/ 

770 
&ChEf 

July 1~ . ( Cont inued ) 

be ing sent t o Cominch for approval . 

Th e McFARLAND probably sank a Jap sub just s outh of 

NOUl\'IEA . 

No important enemy changes are rec orded f o r today . 

July 15th. 

Task Force 16 departed for the South Pacific to be under 

Vice Ad'Yl'liral Ghormley for Task Ono of the offensive , thus beinG 

in addition to TF 11 and 18 •. Task Force 17 continuos and is 

traininG at PLARL. 

T.F. 0 activities are linited to search and to air and 

submarine attacks in t ao AL~ur_rr! NS. Admiral Theoba ld is waiting 

for DMS before makinr; an at tack with surface vessels on ICISYJ\.. 

Due to delays ComSoPac reports that he has noved the t arret 

date for the offensive along to Aueust ?, 1942. His 160612 (Pink ). 

CinC Pac 1G0705 cives instructions for operation of fore~cn 

radio stat:ons in tho Pacific Ocean Areas. 

The TAFUlJA airport, ~U'::UILA, vli11 be ready Augu st 1st. 

It seer1s indica ted that Jap subs may have received orders 

to take offensive action rather than just observe. The movement 

of several combatant units from the ALEUTIJ'd~S is under·way, and 

several Jap froir:htors are enrouto to that area, 

The Japs are evidently quite busy strencthi ng thei r 

SOLOI10Ir ISLAND positions. ~lork is underway on the airfield 

at GUADALC.\NAL, as noted before. Also, there is sone sort of a 

landinG on 3/ .. UTJ~. ISAB1:..L ISLL.IrD. 

July 16th. 

In his 170602 pink ComSoPac briefs his operation order 

for Task ONE. 

Task Force 18 will be in BLEACHER tomorrow and soon thereafter we should know the status of the WASP. Task Force 11 is 

east of SUVA enroute to the NEN CALEDONIA - NEW HEBRIDES area. 

There is nothing new from Task Force 8. Task Forces 1 and 17 

are preparing for a joint exercise. 

Major General Beightler will take command at FIJI on 

18 July. 
8EOREI r 

July 16th (Continued) 

There is some doubt as to the location of Jap CVs 

that were thought to be in the vicinity of the KURILES. None 

are indicated south of the equator, but the JUNYO may be transporting planes to the MARSHALLS. 

It is indicated that there is considerable shortage of Jap shipping bottoms in the INDO CHINA area. 

July 17th 

During his informal morning conference Admiral Nimi tz 

remarked on the possibility of the Japs making an attack on MID1NAY or JO ~ITJS TON or CAHTO.N while we have our main carrier strength in the South Pacific. That they might go further in their North 

Pacific campaign was considered possible but not so probable as 

the Centra l Pacific Area. Tv'v ith the sending of 35 B-17s south, 

our shortage of shore based air in the Hawaiian area becomes 

acute. In short, we are most vulnerable now with three fourths 

of our strength in the South. What we need, of course, is more 

carriers and attendant flotilla. Six CV striking groups could 

well be employed. Except for the RA.NGER (which is not too good) 

no additional CVs seem possible before next spring. Of course, the Japs may have no stomach for bringing CVs within our shore 

based air range . These generalities indicate grave concern caused 

by present shortages in the Hawaiian area. 

T:B' 17 was placed on 24 hours notice. If the WASP can be 

repaired at BI.EACHER in the next six or eipht days (the ship gave 

a preliminary estimate of 4 days) it will n6t be necessary to 

relieve TF 18 immediately. 

In his 180035 (pink) Comsopac changed the date for the 

raider battalion readiness from July 20 to July 23. In his 

172209 he indicates that lJilots for 20 squadrons R1\JZAF can be 

ready in the spring if we supply everything to them except their 

pay. 

e .G. STRAW 172247 comp l ains of the Free French radio set 

up at RA'~lOATID . 

Coninch has establishe d a new set up for Patrons. To 

relieve the squadron personnel of adm inistr tion and maintenance 

geographical wing commands are set up and patrons are no longer 

assigned to any particular wing . 

CTF 8 180723 gives his report on KI Sr:A. One cruiser, 

3 DD, 1 AI? and plane s are reported in that harbor. A Russian 

772 
July 17th (Continued) 

ship was shelled by a Jap submarine S:P~ of DUTCH HARBOR . The 

s .s . ARGATA was sunk by a sub in that general vicinity on the 

15th. 

The WASHINGTON and about 3 DD will leave the Atlantic 

for the Pacific Fleet late in August. 

Cominch 172026 indicates tha t little AA for South Pacific 

bases can be expected from Anny sources. 

B-l?s are leaving from HA ,r rAII at the rate of one sq_uadron 

a day for SoPac. Four squadrons are to leave. 

There is nothing new of enemy deployments. 

July 18. 

TF-8 in his 181825 reports sighting 1 BB, 2 CA, 3 DD, 

1 AO, 3 AK in Kiska harbor. Believe that the BB report is in 

error. In his 190249 he expects to shell Kiska about the 22nd. 

He also mentions the need of more forces to protect shipping 

from subs (which have been active the past week southeast of 

Dutch Harbor). Cominch 182106 (pink) requests comment on an 

army proposal for an airfield at TANAGA Island. CTF-8 sees 

logistic difficulties in sue~ a plan which would require substantial addition to his force including a carrier. 

TF-18 arrived in Bleacher yesterday in a gale. Admiral 

Noyes reports that the repairs to the starboard HP turbine of 

the WASP are almost completed. 

Comsopac 190515 implements Cincpac instructions regarding foreign radio stations in his area. If commercial traffic 

cannot be handled over , navy circuits consideration can be 

given to reopening commercial stations under military control. 

Cominch 180226 dea·ls with sup.ply of munitions to New 

Ze-aland forces. 

There is little new of the enemy. Again Admiral Nimitz 

tried to deduce enemy intentions. He feels that it is of 

greatest importance to push the work of the landing mat on 

Sand Island Midway-so that that place can be made stronger. 

It is at Midway where the Japs can do the most damage to our 

Pacific war effort now. Also, the need for RDF coverage in 

the South Pacific was discussed. 

The Japs are going right ahead with their project of 

strengthening positions in the SOLOMONS. v~ 

773 
Cincpac File No. 

Al6-3/(16) 

From: 

To: 

Subject: 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 

17 July 1942. 

Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. 

Supply of reinforcements to continue campaign in South Pacific. 

1 . Reque sts made by the Conwander South Pacific Force 

f or a dditional troops and by the Commanding General, Hawa iian 

Department for additional aircraft to be used in prosecuting Ta sk One in the campaign in the South Pacific have not been .ap- proved by the Navy and War Departments. 

2. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, be -

lieves that the forces being made a'vailable to the Commander 

South Pacific Force are sufficient in strengtr1 to permit Ta sk 

One of the campaign to be undertaken with reasonable expecta- tions for its successful accomplishment. 

3 . The military situation which will exist after the 

successful accomplislunent of Task One of this campaign will, 

however, be radically different from the one that has existed 

in the Pacific since the fall of the Netherlands East Indies 

into Japanese hands. 

4 . Our forces, both land and air, will be in poten- tially close fighting contact with the enemy. The enemy will 

probably be in a position to move amphibious forces under cover 

of his shore-based aircraft for the recovery of the positions taken from him by our first step. The situation which has 

existed at Port Moresby is not analagous, because of the pro- tection afforded Moresby by the mountain range beyond it and 

by its nearness to Australia. 

5. It is unsafe to assume that the enemy will not exert 

every effort to recover the positions we may take from him. T~is will result in losses to us of troops and aircraft and prob- ably of supporting ships. Unless these losses of troops and 

aircraft are made good by a steady flow of rep~acements from the 

- 1 -

774 
. Cincpac File No. 

Al6-3/(16) 

Subject: 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 

17 July 1942 

Supply of reinforcements to continue campaign in South Pacific. 

United States, not only will we be unable to proceed with Tasks 

Two and Three of this campaign, but we may be unabl~ even to 

hold what we have taken. 

' 

6. ·The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that, if not already done, immediate steps be taken to 

provide an adequate flow of troops and aircraft to the South 

Pacific area. This flow may be expected to be necessary indefi- nitely while seizure and consolidation of new positions are 

being underta~en. 

7. Transoission of this doci.1ment via U.S. registered air mail is authorized. 

Copy to: 

C.G. HawDept. 

ComSoPac. 

ComAirSoPac. 

C • W. 'NIMITZ · 

77 5 

- 2 -
3 E 8 2 E T 

July 19. 

Admiral Nimitz left Pearl to inspect JOHNSTON Island 

and will return on the 20th. 

Task Force 18 at BLEACHER is riding out a storm which 

caused only minor damage. The WASP seems o.k. and will have 

a full power trial at the earliest opportunity. 

!ask Force 8 is preparing for the bombardment of KISKA 

about the 22d. The GRUNION operating off KISI~ reports sinking 

3 DD there on the 15th. Also affecting the ALASKAN situation 

is Cominch 191751 which will stop Army attempts at radio deception and jamming. 

ComSoPac 200715 gives his recommendations regarding 

procedure in handling munitions fer New Zealand. 

Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific 200130 pink 

blocks out the forces he expects to use in Task One. 

ComSoPac 200100 pink gives objections to taking AA 

away from BOBCAT and BLEACHER. References (pink) are attached. 

ComSoWesPac 191034 pink gives a suggested plan for air 

operations from :MORESBY and AUSTRALIA during the forthcoming 

offensive. 

The recent formation of the 8th Fleet in the RABAUL area 

can be taken to indicate that the Japs intend to make the 

SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA area much stronger. It is now a race to 

see whether or not we can kick them out in time, and with 

present forces. 

The ZUIKAKU seems headed for SINGAPORE, possible for 

docking, but also possibly indicating a resumption of the offensive in the South Pacific. 

July 20 

The tasl: forces in the South Pacific are proQ.eeding to 

rendezvous for the corrting offensive. T:I! ill is in D~:.::ACHEH .. 

Adr1iral Nimitz returned fron his inspection of JOIHTSON ISLAND . 

Cr:2~~ 0 is presunably enrouteto his bor1barcJm.ont of KISKA, in the 

IlTDIAIJAPC LIS. ComAla slcan Sec tor 210721 ci ve s a summary of the 

situation. Also his 211019 rcc;arding advance air sities in the AL~~urri d S ho visualizes the necessity for the omplo:rmen t of two 

carriers plus attendant flotilla, 

77 5 
B N &P Pa 

July_ 20 Cont'd. 

CTF 1, 202215 gives his plan for a practice bombardment. 

He will eventually exercise off 1-Iavvaii with TP 17, -unless 

other needs for those forces appear. 

The AcJm:Lral again emphasized the need for makinr; HIDWAY strong 

as soon as possible. He views another attack in force there .-as > ': 

aecidedly ·possible. He also believes that B-l7's can be usefully 

employed against the enemy 4 motored seaplanes who are now 

operating to the eastward of KISKA. 

~ trip for the BOISE to raid the Jap patrol line about 

800 miles east of HONSHU will be coordinated with a bombing of 

~.'JAI\:E,- as a diversion just before 'tDtr day in tho TULAGI AREA. 

s:'he Japs continue to reinforce their positions in the South 

West Pacific and seem to be making good progress on the landing / 

strip at GUADALCANAL. 1 ·"" 

\)r' 

777 
BEG It£! 

JULY 21. 

The WASP made a successful full power trial and now 

TF-18 is ready to proceed westward. Comsopac is arranging conferences with representatives of the various task force 

and group· commanders regarding both the training operation and the actual operation. 

CTF-1 plan for an exercise with TF-17 in the Hawaiian 

Area has been approved. TF-1 will leave the coast August 1st. 

TF-8 continues silent as expected while approaching Kiska. 

Cominch 211531 approves inferentially CinCPac action 

on Free French radio. His 211536 goes further into detail. 

Comsopac 220048 says that the Free French military radio 

stations will not be censored. Thus, the matter is not yet entirely cleared up. 

The 3rd defense battalion and army ground crews and 

gear (for the B-17s being sent south) left Pearl today. 

Comsopac 211450 is planning on using the Army AA regi- ment coming from the West Coast in forward positions as soon 

as they arrive. Apparently he will not move up any AA units 

from Bobcat and Bleacher. 

Admiral Nimitz desires that the Army use B-17s freely when opposed by zero fighters. None were damaged in 18 contacts at Midway while 10 Zeros were shot down and 2 damaged. This is fine indication of the capability of the B-17s. They probably can be used to shoot up the Jap 4-engine seaplanes in the Aleutians. 

Except for the intensified reinforcements and replace- ments of Japs in the SW Pacific, no significant enemy moves 

were noted. Subs near Oahu are possible. Reconnaissance of 

Howland and Baker today was negative. 

The British system of assessing damage to enemy subs 

will be used by U.S. Navy. 

778 
0 H 3 p F T 

July 22. 

Task Forces 16 and 18 are in vicinity BLEACHER and will rendezvous with Task Force 11 south of FIJI on the 25th. Task 

Forces 1, 3 and 17 continue training. 

Task Force 8 was supposed to bombard KISKA today but no 

direct report of what happened there has been received. There 

was a dense fog in the morning at KISKA which cleared somewhat 

towards evening. 

General Patch's 211140 tells of more Free French radio 

trouble. Apparently the French will not make their codes 

available to us for censorship purposes. 

Cominch 221503 proposes setting up a Nav~ Operating Base 

at MIDWAY; and his 221504 proposes to set up a W~rine Airc~aft 

Wing under CinCPac. 

The Japs are again trying to set up commercial relations with Chile and Argentina. They have had some small success 

running the blockade to France and are willing to try it in 

the Southeast Pacific. Yesterday they landed in small force 

at BUNA and GONA, New Guinea. This is only considered further 

consolidation of their position in the Southwest Pacific. 

Our offensive in the TULAGI area is still in the planning stage. The present target date is August 7. Rehearsals start 

at KORO Island, Fiji, July 28th. CinCPac has given ComSoPac 

authority to redistribute troops at SoPac bases. Probably 

some units will be moved up from the more distant bases to 

seized positions. 'Y 

July 23. 

There is no change in any of our own Task Forces. Apparent- ly Task Force 8 is operating in poor visibility in the vicinity of KISKA waiting for an opportunity to shoot up the place. 

Preparations for the TULAGI operation continue. There is 

a possibility that the landing strip at ESPIRITU SANTO will be 

ready for bombers August 5th. 

Commander Naval Forces EUROPE 221856 gives General DeGaulle's 

agreement to our censorship of Free French radio. A prime con- sideration is that DeGaulle insists that he be able to communicate privately with Admiral d'Argenlieu. 

The airfield at FALEOLO, Samoa, is now ready for VF. 

779 
ol@!iJ BEET 

July 23 (Continued) 

ComSoPac 232315 points out the need for more officers and 

men in transports. And he a ga:tn renews his request for a per- sonnel pool in order to quickly fill vacancies. 

The Jap landing at GONA is not on a very large scale. Possibly 1000 troops were landed. That number is wholly inadequate to go overland for an attack on MORESBY. 

In the ALEUTIANS the Japs are gradually strengthening their 

positions but show no desire to go further East. 

Major General Harmon, U.S.A., who is to be the Senior Army 

man in the South Pacific, passed through Pearl today. 

July 24. 

The CV task forces in the South Pacific are heading for 

a rendezvous south of Fiji. TF-17 continues training and standing by at Pearl. TF-8 main body has encountered heavy fog and 

has moved along his bombardment day to the 27th when he hopes for clear weather. Admiral Nimitz directed that 4 MTBs be sent 

from here for such use as may be possible in the Aleutians. 

Cominch 241405 states that CinCPac does not have the 

responsibility for clothing and supplying munitions to Free 

French Forces in the South Pacific. 

Also in the South Pacific the censorship problem regarding Free French radio has apparently been settled to the 

satisfaction of all hands along the lines ordered by Cominch, and previously noted. 

CinCPac 250309 recommends approval of the formation of 

Marine Air Wings in the Pacific. 

The problem of supply of Canton came up in the Admiral's 

informal conference. The Admiral desires to use Midway as a 

yard stick for channel depths. Also, concern was expressed 

over what Jap CVs are likely to do in the next three or four 

weeks. It seems improbable that they will be used against Vladivostok. 

The Dutch ship TJINEGARA was torpedoed south of Poppy. There ha been other enemy sub activities in the South Pacific 

during the past 10 days but their subs are generally ineffective. 

There is nothing significant in Jap deployment today. 

780 
6 E 6 It IS I 

July 25. 

Task Forces in the South Pacific are preparing for the 

coming offensive. A rehearsal in the FIJI area is scheduled 

for the 28th. Task Force 8 is still in a dense fog which 

Admiral Theobald thinks may clear sufficiently for him to bombard KISKA on the 27th. 

Cominch 252000 directs Army and Navy in ALASKA to investigate and report on the establishment of an airfield at 

TANAGA or ADAK. The latter, at Andrew Lagoon, seems preferable. Also in his 241801 Cominch agrees with the Foster report (Secret file May 1942) regarding deficiencies at DUTCH HARBOR and indicates immediate steps to correct most important deficiencies. 

ComSoPac 260248 comments on General Harmon's duties in 

connection with training of Army Air and Defense dispositions. CinCPac despatch of yesterday, 262127, answered this. 

The FLYING FISH returning from patrol off HONSIID reported sirucing 1 DD, MINIKAZE class, and hitting 1 5,000 ton ta~~er with 2 torpedoes. 

There is nothing new of enemy deployment. 

J"u1y 26. 

There has been no change in the employment of own task 

forces. TF 11, 16, & 18 are in the South Pacific to support the 

TULAGI operation. TF 17 remains ready at PEARL. TF 8 is waiting for good weather, expected tomorrow, to bombard KISKA. 

Comgensopac 261201. General Harmon took over command; and Comsopac 270510 relieves Admiral McCain of Army air training and puts this under General Harmon. 

The Russians seem to need our help. Opnav 251728 indicates closer trade relations. The press reports of the Russian - German war indicate that the Gennan all out drive bet·ween MOSCOW 

and the Black Sea is meeting with very considerable success. The 

outcome of that campaign is bound to have profound effect on the 

War. 

Admiral Ghormley wants a "LION" moved to FULCRUM:. As the 

ultimate destination is not yet determined, and cannot be ·until 

781 
.jjl£ 6 It !J' 

July 26, (Continued) 

the conalusion of the current offensive, Cincpac is not yet ready to permit its movement to the South Pacific for storage, 

Vice Admiral Halsey cannot return here before the middle 

of September. Thus the Admiral will recommend Rear Admiral Fitch 

be promoted to Vice Admiral and ordered as ComCarPac - eventually "Air Pacific", Murray will relieve Fitch as CTF 17, 

The CUTTLEFISH made contact with an enemy submarine off 

LAYSAN Island, The SILVERSIDES reported the Jap sampan patrol at 

500 miles east of Japan in Lat. 33-30 N, 

There were no significant moves of the enemy reported, 

During the month Admiral Nimitz has continued his conferences with General Emmons to ensure close cooperation between 

the Army and Navy. At these conferences there were also present usually the Army Chief of Staff and the Senior Army Air Conwander 

and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Conferences 

held this month were on July 9, 13, 18 and 23. At the last conference General Harmon, who was passing through HONOLULU enroute 

to assume command of Army forces in the South Pacific, was also A~ . 

present, ~ ~ 

July 27, 

Task forces are employed as shown yesterday. TF 8 still 

has not good enough weather for the planned bombardment, The 

clearing weather predicted only produced a 2 mile visibility, 

The BOISE departed to raid the enemy sampan patrol line 

reported 500 to 800 miles east of HONSHU, in order to create the 

impression that a striking force is enroute JAPAN. This diversion 

effort is set for August 4, PEARL date, 

There are now at least two enemy subs thought approaching OAHU, These could be the harbingers of another raid on PEARL, but are probably only on routine reconnaissance. In any event, Admiral Nimitz feels that another raid in force is possible and 

urges the early completion of the landing strip at SAND ISLAND, MIDWAY, and the VF staging field at TERN Island, French Frigate 

Shoals. 

As the Japs have mentioned some move to take place on 

"Y Day" and stated that this is July 29th, Vice Admiral Ghormley suggests omitting the rehersals for Task One in his 272211 (pink). 

-v 

782 
July 27, (Continued) 

General Meade, who was recently in command of NZ troops 

at FIJI, has evidently been lost in a plane about 10 miles from 

TONGA, 

There has been a carrier reorganization by the enemy, It is now indicated. that the CVs are completing training in 

Empire waters, The Japs continue to consolidate their positions in eastern NEW GUINEA and are apparently constructing two airplane fields on the North coast of GUADALCANAL, , 

July 28. 

No definite word has been received from Admiral Ghormley regarding anticipating his target date of August 7 for Task One. 

Bearing on this, however, is ComAirSoPac 281440 pink and 290041. 

In a despatch from ComGen ROSES 290800, the field at BUTTON is 

now ready so ComSoPac may decide to bomb TULAGI and GUADALCANAL 

on the 31st. Cominch 281830 pink states that the target date 

must not be delayed beyond August 7 and should be anticipated. 

There is no further word of the bombardment of KISKA. 

Evidently the weather is not good enough to execute Admiral 

Theobald's plan. Planes observed a cruiser there and bombed 

shore activities today. 

JOHNSTON Island is now co.ns ide red satisfactory for B-17 s, 

while WALLIS will be ready for the smaller types aircraft on 

August 15th. 

There is now good evidence that Jap cruisers have Radar. 

The Japs are going right ahead with the~ strengthening of their 

positions in GUADALCANAL and Eastern NEW GUINEA. In the latter 

place they are penetrating inland. At GUADALCANAL three air 

fields are now reported under construction. 

There is no news of changes in the deployment of major 

Japanese units. ~ 

7 83 
AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS 

MONTH OF AUGUST - 1942. 

1. Preliminarz 

This is not a tor.mal Estimate of the Situation in that much. data. usually included in the e atabli shril.ont of the basis fo'r solution o:f ,a problem ia omitted. Also, own Courses of Action and the Decision (Leading to planned action) is beyond the scope of -ch1s paper. W1.1.at 1s aour;ht here is a- complete examination of Enemy Oapabilit1ea insorar as the Paof1o Theatre is concerned. 

2. The Situation 

(a) ~nemz. As a result of the Coral Sea action and the Battle of Midway, Japan lost five carriers and had one damaged. They also had losses involving cruisers and destroyers. Some damage was inflicted on other units, including at least one battleship. 

.. Shortly a£ter the Battle of Midway, the Japanese carrior strength concentrated in Empire ~f'aters, the last W11te 

coming frorn the Aleutains about the middle of July. During the latter part of July it is estimated that the carriers wore reorganized and refitted~ On August lst it is believed that six CV and two XCV are available for employment. It is not to be expected that these carriers are as weli trained or equipped as those encountered at Midway, nor can their screen be as complete. However, as there is danger in undereat1mat1ne ti1eir 

presen._t capabilities, it 1111 be a.ssumod h e reinafter that they are ( in all respects ready :for any task. 

There has b en no rocont oha.ng in Japan's battle- ship strength which e.f'.fecta this study. Tan battleships are 

a va1lab1

le. 

1 

vVh11e little information is at hand regarding Ja.panode amphibious troops, largo nu.mbors who are well trained and quipped are believed available. It is known 

that Japan's shipping ia already overtaxed and probably unable to undortako an !;"t d di tional major transportation and logistic problf;m. 

-1-

784 
(b) Ovn. Because of the emplo1ment ot t~ carrie~ 

task forces 1n the South Pacific only ono carrier task force 

is avail ble on August 1st 1n the Central Pacific. Cone ntration of our carriers at Pearl from the South P oitic ould 

take about twelve days. To movo them to the Aleut 1ns would 

involve about eight days more. Thus, ~o meet an advance or 

an enemy r !ding or occupation tore 1n the Central Pac1£1c w 

rould require ov&r two weeks notice; and the North Pacific 

over three weeks notice. 

Our battleship strength 1n the Pacific i still 

inferior to the enemy. TF-l 111 operate near Uaw 11an Ar a 

during part of August~ but 1s not ready for battle b~cause of 

lack or adoquate creen and air coverage. 

Air strength in the w 11 n Area 1 inadequate 

to rep l a determined raid. ·Lid ay 1 ~ being str ngthenod 

by the add1 tion of a landing strip on Sand Island. When that 

strip is completed, the entire pre en~ heavy bombing streneth 

1n tha islands can operate from J 1d y. At present fighters 

oan be brought into Midway by ship. ~le fighter taging project to iidway via Fr nch Frigate Shoals will not be corn .. pleted before October. 

A cruiser taak fore plu fairly good a1r stren th 

is oper ting 1n the Aleut ins. So £ar it has been 1neffoot1v , mainly becaus of b d weather and lack of air cover go 1n 

advance rea a. Th effo·rt there is 11m1 ted to ttri t1on1 using submar1n a and long r nge bombing. ~ Erraotiven as of long 

range bombardment of Japanese held position in Klska and 

Attu l1a not yet been demonstrated. 

Our submarine off"ensi a 1n Jap ters is no at low 

ebb because of the employment o£ submarines t Truk and in th 

leutta. s. This condition will continue during August. 

nackgpound. 

( } ~erely s a reminder, oert 1n points of J pan&se ambitions and trends are sot down in the briefest sort or 

w y. As far back a th a ·rly n1not1es the Jap ere not 

at1s.f1ed with their lot nd determined to do something about 

it. To raise living standards ~nd to caro for their popul t1on 

presaur , they decided (t) to becom an 1ndu trial nation~ and 

(2) o.xpand. For the f1rat they noedad ready ace s to ro. 

mater1 ls. !!"'or the socond they needed lan< sui table to Japanas • 

Their progres in att 1n1ng thes .oals h ve be n .teady, if 

-2-

78 5 
slo : but thoy have consistently stuck to the mnin id as. now that t1ey have overrun the vast stretches of Mal u,sia need only to consolidate their gains to accomplish hegemony in the Orient. This boing the case, it vtould seem reasonable that their one nd only desire at present 1s to prevent outside interfer.ence until their exploitation or capturedreg1ons baa nado them im- pregnable in what they call their sphere o£ influence. Their ttack on Pearl Harbor is further evidence that they desire 

above all to prevent our interference with Asiat1c,operat1ons. The t rgots picked indica tecl only n do sire to immobilize our Fleet. 

(b) ~ith the above in mind it seems logical to consider Japanese courses of a.ctionas limited .for the present to making secure their extensive gains, rather than considering -possible expansion not closely related thereto. 

Threats to Japan. 

Interference w1th Japanese pl ns can come from the following: 

( 1) China.. The Sino ... Jap war has been dragging along since 1937. Vnllle Japan dominates the r1chest part of Ch~1na, 

there is no proof yot that this military gesture ha paid commercial dividends. IIDwever, they cannot afford to lose that war and might be well satis.fied w1.th a strong and con- trolled puppet government and existing boundaries. As long as the China venture continues Japan must continue to pour in men and materials which they would probably rather use else here. 

(2} Ensland. (1nclud1nB India.) Today England is only a minor threat mainly because of her preoccup tion 

w1 th Germany. Her Far Eastern Fleet is not now able to pene- trate the J,alay barrier. nor can her Pleat be of much use in the Bay of Bengal. Burma is su£:r1e1ently occupied by Japan to prevent an overland threat to the I~do-China rice. Ind1 is , hardly pro-British. \1hile British sea power ia always a danger to Japan, There is nothing to indicate even a mild threat to Japan dur1ng August. 

(3) Australia. At present Australia caru1ot take th~ of'fensive. Tha.nka to tho United States there is the derinite probability that Australia will b come the jump orr 

point for an of.fensive destined to defeat Japan.. To mal~a this possible the supply lines to Australia. must be leapt open to the United Nations. Of immed1a.to 1ntorast is the Australian air activity 1n tho SW Pacific. This is, so far, decid dly of minor proportions but onoup-)1 to c use Jo.pan sone trouble and delay in consoli t1ng her po itions in the New Guinea, N'e~ Britain-Solomon Area.. 

785 
A_B0It1I 

1 / ( 4} United .State.$. Lacking troops and bottema tor 

··~·· n. o~f6ns1?o·/ ~hru ti1e iiandates. (.· evf.u···1 .. ·it we ha.d tlw :t"6quired · .. ea combatant ava1lable) there 1s little w& oan do now 

& cept in .the South Pacific. Of course 1 Japan may not h.!lOW 

th~s. Sh~ knows that we have ~n eno~ous building program, and that potentially (and eventua.lly) we can muster tho re• 

quisite strength to move thru tbe C6nt1•al Pae1.f1e and gradually ·gain and maintain control o:r the sea. areas vital to J'apan. H&:r 

1·uea may be that be for~ wet a,.-e ready tor such a m.ove, Jiip&.n will be strong enough so that the game will not be worth the 

candle• In the meantime 6ur greatest threat 1s the supplies., equipment, and men v1e are sending to the Southwest. .sxcept for submarines, Pearl is too far away .for U$6 as an offensive 

ju;nmp off point, and we are too weak to gain nea.rer positions north o:r the e·quator • 

. ( 5) ~ussia. Ha·re the . da.ngar lie$ in the prold..a1ty of air in tho Vl.adi vo·stok region to industrial Japan. Japan C·an 

hardly feel secure v.rhile this thre.at exists.. . Certainly she Will 

not provoke wa~ tmtil ~he thinks tha-t Russia 1s beaten by 

Germany, and until that beating takes shape 1n the removal of Russian aircraft from Sibf)ria to the German front. 

Broad Courses ot Action. 

Based on tha idea e-xpressed above, i•a• that Japan must no\v prevent interferenet) with her exploitation 1n the 

Orient, the tollowing are he:r broad cours-es of action: 

(l) Step up mil1 tar,- opel"a tiona in China. . \Vi th view 

to .obtaining a sat1sfacto:ry stalemate in the Sino-Jap War. 

Any inereaao in ttuoh m.111 tary opera t1on$ vtill be 

primarily e.n Arnry project. nut it would hav·e effect on other 

fronts because 1 t would involve ru:rther demands on he;r national 

strength. Ifow that Japan has $ftoot1vely st·opped nearly all 

occidental :raeinforcem.ents she is 1n a bottor position to offer 

China a compromise peaoe. flle nUlfn~•s of .Oh1nese may woll be 

glad to end the struggle. The leaders may become disaouraged 1!' th$y. continue to receive promises, but little real au.pport. Especially it the war continues favo:r-able to the Axis, and i.f 

Japan can administer some s-ort of a. major local defeat on the 

Chinese., and if Oriental intrigue o-.n be reasonably successful, them is t.he possibility of auff1c1ont Japanese withdrawal trom 

Chinato be acceptable to the Chinese·•· 

As this is :not expect·ed during August it will not be considered as hearing on the 3.:nunad1ate p:roblmn .. 

787 
(2) A m jor errort to continua tho o£rensive 1n the Indian Ocean. 

It ·Japan could no occupy Ceylon tho1r strategic po it1on would be considerably enhanced as they would be in a 

po s1 t1on to bet tar dominate the Bay of Bengal. and the approache a 

of Sing pore. Oft-hand, 1 t , ould seem logic l that no such step would be taken unless Japan felt suro of the socurity or· her 

eastern flank. And this is especially so now when the Far Eastern Fl et s ems to have no id of any ction which will caue Japan trouble. On the other hand there is the bright prospect or w1n- n1n, Ind1n over to the Ax1 s a1do. 'l'he ef'for·t ould not be an 

attempt to conquer India, but to .make a aho o:f strength to die·• cr-edit the British, and to bring th military, economic, and political fronts more nearly 1nto alignment 1n that arefl. I£ Ceylon ere captured, the stranglehold on India would be complete. 

(-3) Operations to: fir t, gain a foothold in Australia and; second, to extend their positions within tr1k1ng distanc of the U.S. • Australi $Upply line. 

Jap positions in He Guinea ill never be entirely s ou~e s long as Port Moresby is strongly held and can continue 

a an ir base. It 1e as umed that the Austral! ns for tho present will continue their sporadic and nuisance- alue bombing • If the Japanes capture Port oreaby they will eont1nu to be 1th1n bo.mb1ng r nge or Au tral1an air fields. Such a condition could continue a long time ithout serious injury to either side. With the elimination o£ the Port Moresby nuisanc , though, ~ pane positions in th Solomons nd their cap b111ty to dvance to Noumoa would be considerably $nhanaed. 

It does not seem re sonabl that Japan will, in th foreeeeabl f'utu.r , make a serious at-cempt on th Australian 

a inland. 

Becaua. or their many good position nd rela- t1 ecurity north o Timor Sea, the J panese are well placed tor oper tions 1n northwestern Australia. That rea 1 fa·rly well 1 olated from the populous east rn Australia by the gr at 

streto tos of ast land. In ord r to better s cure Timor, and Java by d nying Au tralia jump of points such a r in and Broome, and to reduc the aubmar1n men ce fro stern Australia, J pan may very possibly plan l ndings in fore in that rog1on. Such a move could conceivably tak pl ce in Augu t. 

On t he othor hand, many sit,?fla point to ard their desire to occupy Po1-.t oresby and to expand do through th t Hebr1d s and to r C ledon1a. clor the occupation of Port Moresby the must go overland unless they ar 11 1ng to ake noth rand stronl"er a tt mpt vi t he Cor l Se • I ·by 

788 
re go1n · overland they muat us many more troops than ba 

be n r port d in N Guin up to now. A po 1bl indio tion 

that auch is intended is tho 1nfovm t1on or larg rm.y forces 

p:rob bly enrout • U th y 1,e thinking of a. sea borne att mpt th y ould probably nt to be stronger than they re in ltay. And 1.f the se borne attack is eonton pl ted we could rea onably 

exp ct it to take place only after ~1rf1elds are oompl t d in 

S.E. l'lew Guine and at Qua.ds.loanal. 1'hat done, they could oper- ate t ir carriers under an air umbrella to the S.E. nd s.~. 

The;r may be content to defer the Port Moresby proj ct for a whil and go head into the Santa Cruz Isl nde 

and . New Hebrides. This sort or an oper tion would seem to call 

tor eons1d rable carrier streneth, but not a oomp ratively larg number of troops. Ir 1t w~re dono step by step (and it prob .. bly would have to be as landing fields cannot be captured but 

must b built) the operation could hardly be more than at rted 

during August. 

(4) Raids on our line from Midway to Su a. 

Those re always poss1bl and well within 

Japan' capab1l1t1ee. Good jumping ott places are available 

to them in the Marshalls. Such oper tions South ot Hawaii 

would not have to be in force, and would be hit and run in 

order to delay our efforts. It does not seem probable at th 

moment that Japan could seriously try to occupy and hold ny position e st of the l80th r1d1an 1n the South P cific. In 

the Hawaiian Area the most damage th y could do would be t 

Pearl Harbor. Another ucoea:Jful surprise raid t e rl 1s 

lwaya possibility. 

(5) Se1zur and occupation o£ the Ba 11 n Islands. 

Whil there 1s good re son ror ~ p n to !!B£ 

to do this, he~ v ilabl str ngth for the operation 1a not in · 

sight •. It 1s truo that she can bring to bear a force l rge enough to cover the necessary troop movement if moat ot ~ur 

strength is elsewhere. But there just does not seem suff cient 

tonnage V; 11 ble to her to transport and suppot~t any such eff'ort. It 1s true th t if she could arrive at a time h n our 

task forces are absent and hen the Hawa11an 1r fore is weak, Japan could probably g in a toothold on outlying islands. After 

gaining such foothold she could ea ily los the r in tryin to dig in. It would of£er tho finest sort of attrition possi- bili ti to us. W have only to rattember ths. t · could f'1nd no 

ray to upport Guam and W ke. In fact they were considered by 

many aa a liability. i' 

789 
B 8 8 R 18 Ia 

The seizure and ocaupa tlon or ltidway was 

undoubtedly a plan of the Jap nese in early Jlme. What the1~ 

ultimate objective was in that campaign is not known. If 

they 1ero aatisf1ed m rely to occupy 1t to deny 1t to us they would thEn')eby, (l) restrict our westward air a&arehJ {2) deny M1d7ay to us, as a fuel topping o£f place; (3) eliminate our 

chance of bombing Wake with preeant planes. Maybe this, plus undoubted ve.lue to them for the same purpose to the ea.ard, is considered enough t9 cause them to mak anothor attempt. But again, th y ould have an almost impossible situation. Holding Pearl, we could undoubtedly make their logistic probl~ 

impossible. And they could not defend the place against 1nev1tabl racapture. We conclude~ then, that the Japs will not 

attempt to occupy Midway except as part of a campaign to cap- ture a1l of the Hawaiian Islands. 

(6) A £urther advance to the Eastward in the 

Aleutians. 

Itere it all depends on the estimate or why they went there in the first place. It they went th re to 

eau e a d1v rs1on they hav succeeded in immobilizing a cruiser task foroe, and no further effort is immediately necessary. If they want a base to operate from to protect northern fiSher- ies they may need only to ~trangthen pre$ent positions. If they want to interrupt a possible air ferry route to Siberia via the Aleutians they need go no further. But if they want 

t.o cause ua ser1ous worry 1n that region they must movf) con- siderably more to the ea.st. As this is ·not a good OV operating 

area 1t ~ould seem that the chances or larg . so le CV covering forces operating against shore baaed a1r now known present are small. Nevertheless, such a course is possible. 

(7) An attaok on Rus ia. 

'l'h1 depends so muoh on Eu:rop$an operations 

now. underw y that it serves no useful purpose to guess. Sut- .fice to say that CVs could be employed. 

1 ~ t ~ t;f' 

• 

790 
§E£2ii!! 

e. 

(a} \1e are no .l.ong•r reading the enemy mail _and 

today (August 1) we must dap~nd almost entirely on trarfic analysis to deduce enemy deplo;Jment.- There 1s a cha.nae that. 

during August, we will improve in this respect .• 

(b) \fe ha.ve only the fl1ms1ost sort 01.,. a sur~ace 

picket line to warft_us ot host1.le approach,. and must rely on air lll86\l'Gh and radar. 

(o) As there ape so mahy poaa1bil.!t1es open to 

J&pan there does not aeem to be any pro.f1t in making wild 

guesses as to their next move . From -. purely stra..tegio point of vi&w the only move during August Which seems likely la expansion in the direction of the New Bobr1des. 

7.91 
July 29th 

In his 292~35 (Pinl:) ConSoPac indicates his desi re t o 

anticipate his target elate of :.ucust 7th. The so0ne r he can 

launch his · att a ck the easier the job should be, as the Jr .. ps 

are nal:inc strong and ap,arcntly ra,id progress in stren8theninc 

their positions .. 

Task ~florce 3 is still unable to bombard EifJKA. ~' UPti1e r 

scoutins there indicates DY.)s and auxiliary typos in the hal.,bor. 

A ~'J err cor1r1~u1d n}J"aval Air Porces Pacific 11 has been se t up .. 

Hdniral :!!itch will be tllo first Cor1nancler . 

J\. recent p~1oto reco'lnaissance of IIAJ~IIJ :ISLAlJD ( GILB.'H':PS ) 

fails to shorr. suspected enemy air or o t:1er ac ti vi ty there . 

lJevorthel o ss ITarine Raiders vJill be landed there by subnarine s 

about J~.uc;nst 17th to clostroy possible fuel , stores, and other 

installations. If ho resistance is net it is still a r;o o d 

traininc exercise i n a new kind of warfar e for us. 

Admiral 1Jir:1i tz is anxious to get the Connander., Hawai i an 

Sea Frontier started on conducting t h o da i ly routine search 

fror1 0ATIU. 

L:!!~~arentl~r the CinC 8th Jap Fleet hD s taken o v er c onmand 

in the RABAUL AR:~A , Hhere defense is bein0 speeded up . 

There are no c:1anGe s in loco. tion of me.. jo:r Jap units. \,:' 

July 30th. 

1-'-1Y''t Because of two collisions in dense fog involving two 

DHS and two DD, and because weather has made bombardment in 

accordance with his plan impossible Theobald has retired to 

Kodiak. (His 30212~His future plans are not known. Admiral 

Nimitz favors sending him some encouragement and a suggestion that a sweep along the Jap communications line to the westward 

of Attu may be profitable. 

Admiral Ghormley has not yet set his day for the Tulagi operation but it is assumed that it will not be later than 

August 7th. 

Serfor 292345 recommends on present petrolaum supply system for Pac Fleet; and CinCPac 310113 desires to maintain 

status quo for logistics for present, with the possible exception of New Zealand. 

792 
SfGPEa? 

July 30th (Cont'd) 

Despite the desire of the C.G. at Fiji to retain some 

New Zealand troops there, Comsopac has directed that they return to their homes as planned. 

CinCPac ~6:2:?5f recommends an army air reserve of 70 

planes be sent Hawaii now for possible use in the Pacific. 

The present number is wholly inadequate. 

Comsopac 302351 desires that the Lion now assumed 

ready for shipment be sent to him now. 

The Japanese seem to be stepping up their air reinforcements to the Rabaul Area. In their operations in Eastern 

New Guinea they managed to destroy five of seven Army dive 

bombers which attacked their landings. So far as is known, there is no change in the location of their major units. Most ~-G/ 

of their Navy seems to be in empire waters. 

July 31. 

In his 010301 piru{ ComTaskFor 8 answered CincPac 312145(P~\ concerning KISKA operations. Since the 22d, when Admiral Theobald-/ 

arrived for his bombardment, the weather has been bad. There has 

never been the needed surface visibility. Finally, the double 

collision referred to yesterday made a retirement and ~edification 

of plan necessary. Now, ComTaskFor 8 wants to go ahead with his 

bombardment in spite of little hope of success. Admiral Nimitz 

feels that a radar sweep to the westward might be profitable. 

There is nothing to remark about other task forces. 

CinCPac 010233 recommends no change in the pattern of 

Pacific submarine operations pending the outcome of Admiral 

Ghormley's pre sent operations which are to start on the 7th. 

Army photo reconnaissance planes at ~AKE were attacked 

by 11 zeron fighters. 

The Japs have decided that they can see no profit in 

making war on Russia now as ha s been requested by Germany. 

Apparently the Japs are taking air from the Marshall's 

to strengthen their positions in the Southwest Pacific. In 

that area enemy activity is being stepped up a bit. w-~ 

783 
#i8:B8RI51' .. 

AUG GCT 

03 0427 

04 .2355 

05 ' 0601 

CINCPAC TO OPNAV INFO SOMSOWESPAC 

In reply last part your 011939 invite attention my 

312231 not to all addees. As indicated therein 

arrangements have been made for supplying fuel to 

U.S. forces based New Zealand with tankers now 

assigned CinCPac. Question of taking on civil and 

military fuel requirements that dominion is one of 

policy and availability of British tonnage on which 

no opinions are expressed. 

CTF 8 to CINCPAC 

My OPlan 9-42 essentially same as my 8-42 with same 

bombardment objective. New plan deletes offensive 

tasks of patrol planes until Baker plus two day. 

Plane and submarine action altered to produce more 

effective assistance to main body with minimum dislocation of effort due to delays. Have ordered alternate operation two cruisers in event of delay in 

separate letter of instructions. 

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info VOpnav, Comsopac(Adm) Serforsubcom. 

My 220349 Comsopac has now requested LION 1 complete 

for SPOONER pro~ ects. Also total 6 construction battalions for SPOONER -and 2 OAKS for Sopac. Recommend 

approval OAKS and su·ch construction battalions as can 

be provided. Former to take precedence over CUBS 2 

and 3. Am opposed to storage any LION components 

SPOONER and unless there are projects of which I am 

unaware believe many components LION unneeded there. 

Request your co ~ent and dispatch or airmail outline 

of approved projects for SPOONER. Your 161635 Feb. 

794 
Q!!IORNT 

AUG GCT 

06 2235 

06 2240 

C01~MPHORSOPAC to COMSOPAC 

This message consists of three parts. Following recommended. Cub 1 and 7th Construction Battalion 

be definitely routed to Cactus and Cub 13 to Apricot. 11th Construction to Apricot instead of Straw see 

Cincpac 310915 July. Cominch 081856 July one aviation 

engineer battalion to Straw vice construction battalion. One barrage balloon squadron to Apricot. 2nd 

Division Headquarters and 8th Marines to Longbow. 

Cominch 031230 August. September 30 defense battalion 

to White Poppy for temporary use prepared for immediate 

withdrawal for offensive. One construction battalion 

to White Poppy for employment but as reserve for offensive. One construction battalion to Fantan for same 

purpose. 

October 30 Headquarters Amphcorpsopac and 6th Marines 

to Longbow. Defense battalion to Fantan for temporary 

use prepared for immediate withdrawal for offensive. 

Aviation engineer battalion to White Poppy ready to 

accompany offensive. Division troops 2nd Division to 

Longbow. End part one. 

Part two. 

November 30 division troops 2nd division to Longbow. 1 barrage balloon squadron to Cactus 1 to Button. 

Guns of foregoing defense battalions not repeat not 

to be employed if 5 inch. 

7th Marines reinforced on relief by 22nd Marines embark 

combat loaded in Transdiv 2 and conduct amphibious training in Bleacher if not immediately required in 

forward area. 

Marine aircraft group 23 plus one half VMO 251 to 

Cactus as soon as possible. Other half VMO 251 to 

be retained at White Poppy and trained and employed 

as observation aircraft ready for next offensive. 

Of next 2 marine aircraft groups 1 to Apricot and 1 

to be held at White Poppy in reserve for offensive 

both groups to be given carrier training. 

All shore based VF airplanes Navy and Marine to be 

equipped with droppable fuel tanks with 200 percent 

spare tanks. Finish part 2. 

79 5 
SilO~RW.. 

AUG GCT ----

06 2246 COMAMPHORSOPAC to COMSOPAC (062235)(Cont'd) 

Commence part 3. Further recommended that following be established and trained as soon as possible in 

Straw. (a) Two additional raider battalions {b) One 

additional parachute battalion {c) Replacement and 

reserve cadre adequate for replacements for two 

marine divisions on continuously active serive. 

Parachute battalion of first Marine Division should 

first be brought to full strength. This is the end 

of the three and last part. 

796 
S E C R E T 

AUG GCT 

07 1443 CofS, U.S.A. to COMGENHAWDEPT info CINCPAC 

5368-7th. Improper application of Joint Chiefs of 

Staff directive concerning procedure to follow in 

reporting combat operations and intelligence in your command indicated by report of recent operation of 

B-17 against Jap fighters at WAKE. Action took place July 31 but War Department not notified until late 

August 4th. Para. 

Clarification OURAD 4945 of 17 Jul¥ indicating proper procedure follows (pass to CinCPac). Para. 

1st, the report should be addressed to Chief of Staff 

not to CinCPac. Para. 

2ndly, the report should be sent through CinCPac for 

comment if he deems comment necessary. However, he 

has no authority to alter your original report. Para. 

3rdly, the report should be transmitted promptly by CinCPac direct to Chief of Staff, not to Cominch. Para. 

Cominch concurs in this interpretation. 

797 
.as ~ o n E ± 

AUG GCT 

09 0553 COlVITASKGROUP 8.6 TO COMTASKFOR 8 

My 080741. · First attemp t to b ombard made at 1745, approach being made by Radar and sounding. Launched spotting planes at 1750. At 1755 ran into thick fog that 

persisted inside hundred fathom mark and forced turn 

away. Spotting plane cruising at 1500 feet eave excellent information of shipping in KISKA and visibility 

conditions. Although under attack by float fighter and 

antiaircraft and hit repeatedly plane maintained station. 

Second approach by Radar and soundings at 1945. About 

5 minutes before executing Roger fog lifted and permitted 

navigational fix but ceiling too low to permit plane spot 

or observation of damage. Firing groups adjusted positions and opened up. First salvos mistaken by Japs for 

bombs and replied to by antiaircraft barrage. Battery on 

South Head firing fixed projectiles, possibly 6 inch, at· 

destroyers silenced by NASHVILLE estimated range 9,000 

yards. 

09 0540 Part 2 of above. 

Fire of shore battery showed excellent control possibly 

by spotting plane. li

1

our-engine seaplane bombers (2) 

yellow, avoided heavy ships. Observed one unload entire 

rack of bombs at ELLIOT, missed astern. Fl·oa t plane 

fighters very accurate with cannot, damaged SOC at 500 

yards through fog patch, strafed destroyers one believed 

shot down. Huge white chemica l flare possibly for artillery ranging dropped over INDIANAPOLIS. Plane report of 

KISKA harbor before firing included one very large auxiliary several smaller ships at least 4 subs at least one 

CL and 2 DD. After firing observation one large fire, 

tanker leaving harbor, shore battery silenced, many hit's 

in target area. Only c a usual ties one plane and crew missing, one pilot wounded in foot by shrapnel, numerous 

hits on plane. No damage to ships other than minor due 

to own gunfire. Piring CA not completed due to forced 

turn about from reported periscope. Ammunition expended 

8 inch 631, 6 inch 3534, 5 inch 2620, small amounts 1.1 

20 millimeter and machine gun. Shadowed until dark but 

not attacked by four engine seaplane. No contact our Baker 

plus one flights. 

788 
SFGPRT • 

AUG Q.Q! 

12 1620 

13 1258 

COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC, CTF 8, CINCLANT 

Vfuile it is deemed mandatory that communications 

essential to the conduct of operations actually in 

progress against the enemy shall have the first 

priority, that part of operating organizations concerned 

with constant assembly, evaluation and summary of 

operating information must include arrangements whereby 

pertinent information as to state of affairs can be 

sent to you and to me as opportunity offers, or can be 

made, without undue interference with the conduct of 

such active operations. 

COMTASKFOR 62 to COMSOPAC, CTF-61, info VARIOUS 

Delayed in transmission due to circuit congestion and 

radio silence is this situation summary as well as 

yesterday's and also report on GUADALCANAL air base. 

First Detachment this force departed GUADALCANAL through 

LENGO Channel late afternoon local 9th w.tth part of 

transports escorted by wounded vessels and minesweepers. 

Final Detachment formed off TULAGI after dark and passed 

out same route. No contact with enemy since night action 

previous·night except DDs dropped depth charges on 3 

reported sound contacts vicinity CinCPac Grid LOVE 536063 

about 0200 GCT lOth. Location JARVIS not known request 

ComAirSoPac cover as possible and inform me if sighted. 

It seems probable enemy unaware our losses recommend no 

publicity. Some evidence has appeared that enemy also 

suffered in the night action. Nothing further as to 

developments on shore. Para. 

At 2300 GCT lOth plan to unite both detachments near 

Grid GEORGE 913634 thence course 157 at 13.5 knots 

toward POPPY, and to detach Transdivs 2 and 12 to arrive 

BUTTON morning of 12th local preparatory further operations. ComTransdiv 12 will deport available troops for 

reenforcement garrison on arrival. Para. 

Plan arrive BULAPT Pass about 0200 GCT 13th request ComSoPac make necessary pilot and berthing arrangements. 

This is final summary for present~ 

7 8.9 
/ 

tiiJJ '!!, 8 ii iii Ta 

GCT 

i3 2214 COMALSEC of August '42 

14 

CTF 8 sends in reply ·to CinCpac 102205. Tentative plan. covering force 2 heavy 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers to 

westward of advance. Lighters and tugs with heavy freight screened by 4 destroyers departing CHERNOFSKI dog minus 

4 day land in FIREPLACE BAY weather permitting. Speed about 5 knots. Continuous anti submarine patrol by destroyers during unloading. Three transports escorted by 

2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers pass UNALASKA dog minus 

2 days land troops food essential light supplies in own 

boats eastern side commencing evening twighlight dog minus 

1 day. Allawhtwoxhsitrth and clear of chain. Vfuen troops and essential immediate equipment landed transports screened 

by 3 destroyers retire to northward to await availability of lighters for dischar e heavy eq1Jipment when two light cruisers 1 destroyer join covering force. ¥otor torpedo boats held initially in vicinity of FIREPLACE to attack enemy forces threatening FIREPLACE. At desirable time in operation will use for low visibility attack on KISKA HARBOR. Submarines observing and attacking ATTU KISKA AREAS and for 

observation and attack in north and south approaches FIREPLACE. PBY's with tenders based NAZAN for protective scouting of approaches FIREPLACE and provide close screens 

to forces as practicable. Army P-38's defensive screen 

NAZAN and maximum concentration bombers at UwffiAK for 

offensive operation at KISKA and against enemy surface 

forces threatening FIREPLACE. Waters east FIREPlACE totally unsurveyed. Prior operation intend submarine fathometer 

survey with sounding of beach approaches from small boat. 

Submarine sounding WESTERN BAY accomplished 11th. 

Above subject to modification after conference 

with troop commander now awaiting return 3 officers survey 

party due bapk from FIREPLACE next 48 hours. 

0131 CTF 8 of August'42. 

From Rear Admiral Smith Quote CinCPac 130003. Heavy ship bombardment by direct fire from between LITTLE KISKA and 

SOUTH HEAD not practicable. ,rater shallow poorly charted 

and perhaps mined. Firing area so limited as to require ships to slow or stop. Could hit main camp only by indirect 

fire over north head. NORTH HEAD heavily hit 7 Aug. Further risk of cruisers in a repeat bombardment KISKA not 

justified unless coordinated with landing attack to capture and hold island. Reporb on 7 Aug. bombardment in mail. 

Attack in low visibility. Ships in harbor by motor torpedo boats supported by destroyers practicable and hi hly 

recommended. Unquote. CTF 8 concurs and sends this. r·.1y 

010301 stated that NORrrn HEAD and camp at southwest end of bt~ 

._ harbor only direct f1.re targets from eastward. PBY pilot 

800 
.. s E s n !9 '" 

GCT 

14 0131 (CONTINUED) 

after observation from 2000 feet reports all north 

head area heavily hit bombardment 7th. Early repeitition 

of identical operation which depends for success largely 

on surprise believed an ubsound war operation. 

14 0646 COHSOPAC to VICE OPNAV, Info Various Conunands. 

Recent events emphasize absolute necessity have facilities 

for rapid unloading CUB materials at advanced bases. These 

islands have nothing in line unloading equipment and 

therefore nothing can be provided at destination. This 

problem does not refer to that of unloading during initial 

landing force attack operations where items small and 

can be men handled but refers to subsequent operations 

where many heavy items equipment have to be handled. Each 

base where a CUB to be landed should have standard pontoon 

wharves and barges as follows: 2 wharves· and 4 bridge 

sections, 3 barges 100 tons, 3 barges 50 tons. Each barge 

to have outboard motor. Each wharf to have 5-ton derrick. 

For rapid establishment weight handling facilities ashore 

require either tractor and 2-wheeled gooseneck crane which 

can be carried on deck of vessel or must tow a flat deck 

barge from nearest advance base carrying crawler crane 

and tractors on deck. These would walk ashore from beached 

barge. Recommend first method with duDlicate tractors and 

cranes on 2 ships in case one damaged although second 

method permits earlier use heavy equipment and worked 

efficiently at island bases before war. For immediate 

needs urgently request 3 com~lete sets pontoon units as 

described above. 1 set to be used BUTTON second at CACTUS 

third for next advanced Jase. Any units enroute for CUBS 

1 and 13 may be considered as partial fulfillment requirements. In addition to foregoing facilities for unloading large ships the availability of 1000-ton covered 

barges similar those used between PEARL and outlying 

islands would permit transportation food anmunition to an 

advanced base in combat area without risking large vessel. 

Tug NAVAJO type made 12 knots with such a barge good weather. Could tow barge to destination leave at beach and 

return immediately without remaining in danger area. Maximum draft barge 9 feet but average draft loaded usual 

type materials 6 feet. Therefore torpedoes generally pass 

under. Recommend 4 be sent earliest practicable with 4 

more later. 9 believed now available at PEARL but more 

should be built. Again desire emphasize importance all 

essential items for initial establishment of Airbase be 

sent in first convoy even if ships have to wait at loading port for certain items. Less risk and delay thereby 

than have ships spend many days unloading with primitiv~n 

facilities in combat area. d .... 1 
4 0!MSPERJ 

AUGUST (GCT) 

15 0720 CTFS to CINCPAC. 

From additional information obtained by recent survey party 

indicating good possibility of uncharted rocks and shoals, 

consider it inadvisable and too hazardous to make survey and 

take soundings eastern Bays of FIREPLACE by submarine. My 

132214 will therefore be modified accordingly. Will use 

TEAL or similar Arv1 to take soundings and make as complete 

survey as practicable in period remaining prior to landing of initial garrison. 

14 2358 COMALSEC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMGEN ALASKA DEFENSE, etc. 

Following is the concensus of opinions of recent action against KISI(A. Targets covered: Shots main camp 2 thousand 286-6 

inch, 1 thousand 101-5 inch 38, results large fire. South 

camp 690-6 inch shots no observation results. North head 

180-8 inch, 1020-5 inch 38 shots heavy smoke and dust. South 

head 60-6 inch, 40-5 inch shots: Jap surface and AA batteries silenced. Harbor area 451-8 inch shots. Ship first 

reported as tanker now identified as destroyer - TOMOZURU 

Class - seen leaving harbor on fire disappeared later, possibly sunk. Large auxiliary beached on south shore of harbor with decks awash. Prior to bombardment 10 auxiliaries, 

4 submarines, 1 large destroyer or small cruiser force one 

4 engine patrol plane, were reported in the ha·rbor with 1 

destroyer and patrol boat patrolling off the entrance. During firing observing planes reported 8 inch fire in Aarbor 

as very accurate. Every reason to believe from analysis 

ranges and deflections used that light cruiser and destroyer 

fire on main camp was eqq.ally effective. Afterwards no 

reports from submarines of any ships leaving harbor. On day 

following bomboardment only ships reuorted were 2 auxiliaries, 1 destroyer, 2 or 3 patrol boats in vicinity of South 

Pass with possible 2 destroyers in harbor. Both auxiliaries 

were hit by 2-500 pound bombs and possibly 1-1000 pound. Observation from 2000 feet upon August 8th reported North Head 

area very heavily hit all over. Flying at this height was no 

anti aircraft fire from North Head which was most heavily armed area. Good possibility that excepting the ships bombed 

the following day, other ships in harbor during bombardment 

were sunk. Comtaskfor 8 has summaried this. 1 SOC INDIANAPOLIS plane not recovered probably shot down. Other SOC 

planes hit by seaplane fighters. 1 INDIANAPOLIS plane receiving 157 holes. 1 ST. LOUIS pilot foot injury from shrapnel. 

No casualties to ships. ELLIOT struck by fragments from 

bomb or projectiles with few small minor holes. No Army Air 

Force planes bombed target area on bombardment day or day following. Visibility since has be en poor preventing other than 

sketchy photographs. Appears now that any photographs will 

be too late to give any positive evidence of total damage. 

Cominch pass to Chief Staff Army. 

802 
..a ISIO@I JIC!J I 

AUGUST (GCT) 

15 0340 CTF 8 to CINCPAC. 

This is first part of a two part message from Comtaskfor 8. 

Deliver to Cincpac. Survey required your 052213 completed by experienced board. Summary of report follows terrain 

excellent for creation air field and land transportation. TANAGA Bay Truncated Funnel in whiah seas pile up during weather from south southwest to northwest. Even with light northwesterly wind of 10 knots heavy swell was running in 

TANAGA Bay when inspected. Logs and other debris thrown 70 

to 100 feet beyond high tide mark. It is reasonable to assume that beached lighters under these conditions will be 

permanently stranded. Lighters should be towed to eastern 

side of island if approaching westerly gale can be predicted in sufficient time and all shipping will have to leave 

TANAGA bay. Task of landing supplies and equipment has 

been gravely underestimated and uossibility of losing a 

considerable part of the equipment is strong. Completion 

summary. And end part one. 

15 0357 Second part Comtaskfor 8 150340 to Cincpac. My 050520, 050556, 050625, 092040. Phase two is three times as comprehensive as 

phase one. Will cover fall and early winter. Period of worst 

weather in area. Refer page 11 and 201 HO 187. Waters to eastward of island totally unsurveyed with one long projecting reef and many rocks. See page 373 Coast Pilot Volume Two. 

There is no wharf. Navigation on eastern side dangerous as 

nothing but very sketchy survey possible. From conference 

deduce Army estimate problems transportation and unloading largely derived from experience at Umnak where cargoes transferred to lighters in land locked CHARNOFSKI and short haul 

to lee shore Umnak made on calm water days. Enemy opposition aside operation disregards fundamental considerations of 

navigational dangers, weather and seamanship. See Overesch 

report cargo handling in open sea by Army at Canton and 

Christmas. If not complete failure for these reasons length of time to completion phase two gives enemy every chance. 

Unanimous opinion of all local senior naval officers entirely disregarded in favor of local Army opinion in planning opera- tion for which seamanship and navigational dangers are govern- ing factors. Consider ADAK KEY nosition in middle ALEUTIANS. 

Occupation during fall presents none of foregoing seamanship and navigational problems. Army plans for fixed positions 

to westward of Umnak Dutch Harbor area must include plans for 

development of Adak as advanced naval base. End part 2. 

803 
# O:iOiiESClaas 

AUG. GCT 

16 0545 C.G. CACTUS TO COMSOPAC 

Party referred to your serial 130623 arrived ready to function. Tulagi reports all well and mopping up com- pleted at Halavo Port, Purvis and Bungana Island. No 

slant eyes encountered. Large dump avgas at Halavo. Natives that area friendly and delivering some prisoners. Situation Guadalcanal no change. Consolidation of area continuing. Patroling being conducted by Marines and Natives. Awaiting air support for opera- tions against outlying detachments. Mopping up of 

distant detachments will require APD's. Next vessel · 

arriving should take off prisoners. Request reconnaissance plane passing drop message giving info ob--" tained. Request 2000 silver Australian shillings for intelligence. 

804 
dL BE Cl&'-

AUGUST (GCT) 

17 0925 CTF 62 to CO SQPAC, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc. 

Situation reuort Guadalcanal Tulagi sector. August 

11-16. Guadalcanal bombed by 3 Orange bombers high 

altitude on 12th and 14th 6 on 15th no damage 1 plane 

damaged AA fire. SS fired into position on 13th and 

14th. No damage. 1 SS reported hit by 75 on half 

track. Tulagi situation excellent. Mopping up completed Halavo point Port Purvis Bungana Island. Patrolling and mopping continued Guadalcanal. Some Marine 

casualties. 50 enemy killed or captured 13th. Enemy 

planes dropped food ammunition by parachute. 15th 

Marines captured four of 6 loads seen dropped. Ground 

crews for aircraft arrived 16th. 

805 
AUG. GC'T 

18 2340 COM\VESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC 

Following paraphrased radio sent by me (General Dewitt Originator) to Commander Task Force 8 furnished for your information begin paraphrase CG 

ADC has been instructed to confer with you reference directive Joint Chiefs of Staff for further 

recommendations and comments fireplace stop development Adak not considered impracticable but as stated 

to you during conference in Alaska location of airfield Adak involved too long construction period and 

when accomplished is too distant from Kiska for pro- tection and for neutralization and reduction Kiska 

stop except for possible difficulty in accomplishment task one, seizure and occupation, Tanaga meets all 

requirements stop this unexpected turn of events is 

deeply disappointing since decisions made and pre- parations for fireplace far advanced stop troops have 

been selected and equipped for fireplace mission and 

arrive Kodiak today stop if operation limited to 

occupation Adak my concern that possible reaction by 

enemy will be occupation of Tanaga -or neutralization 

that place by construction of field on Amchitka with 

resulting local enemy air superiority during long period of time required for construction of Adak airfield stop If enemy accomplished this it will be 

difficult to ascribe sound reasons for the Adak 

occupation stop this attitude in fact would be untenable from military standpoint as a solution to the 

control of the Aleutians stop respect your views as 

to adverse unloading conditions Tanaga but feel such 

difficulties must be expected in operations of this 

character is war and overcome stop if you still feel 

unwilling to accept responsibility for naval support fireplace operation request you and General Buckner 

consider landing eastern Tanaga as last resort and 

with purpose of taking at least positive action towards 

consolidation our positions in Aleutians with expecta- tion of ultimate control stop I can not repeat not 

conscientiously consent to abandonment fireplace end 

paraphrase stop above my views this subject and 

presented to you in compliance with directi ve joint Chiefs of Staff August 18th stop Hope you concur. 

806 
AUG. GCT 

202248 

21 1120 

COMWESTSEAFRON TO CINCPAC 

Following paraphrased radio sent to Joint Chiefs of 

Staff 20 August furnished for your information. No 

re~ly received to my dispatches August 18th to Cincpac 

and Comtaskfor 8 but parajhrased message received sent 

by Comtaskfor 8 for Cominch. You agree to modification 

of directive for fireplace operation through substitution Adak Island for Tanaga Island because of necessity 

for speed in development of airfields in support of 

offensive operation towards ultimate objective since 

Comtaskfor 8 has agreed to support Adak operation. Do 

not consider and never have considered airfield construction on Adak impracticable. Initial landing force 

now at Kodiak ready to move. Hecommend Adak occupation 

earliest 9ossible date. Enemy reaction to Adak operation may be occupation of Tanaga or neutralization of 

that place by construction of field on Amchitka. This 

will result in enemy local air superiority during longer 

period required for construction of Adak field over that 

required for Tanaga field. Considering this possibility 

recommend issuance joint directive assigning mission to 

navy of furnishinG constant protection for project until 

Adak field can be used by planes and also mission of 

preventing enemy action aimed at occupation and establishment of airfields east of Kiska. Suggestion of 

Comtaskfor 8 for development fighter strip Atak not 

considered feasible as part this operation due to 

necessity for dispersion available construction means 

both men and material and requirement of additional 

garrison for protection. Commandinr; General Alaska 

defense command agrees signed Dewitt. 

FLETCII!:~R TO COMSOPAC 

Sighted submarine in lat 10-30 S, long 162-30 E, August 

20th. Dived before being bombed. Shot down 1 enemy 

float type patrol ~lane on 20th and 21st. Believe this 

force sighted from time to time. Does your intelligence 

confirm this. Communicntj ons most unsatisfactory ovvn 

ships and enemy ships in Cactus area received very late. 

Referring Comgen Cactus 202013 consider it inadvisable 

to send cruisers and desttoyers into Cactus nightly. 

Must retire on 24th for fuel and redistribution of provisions. 

807 
AUG. GCT 

22 0910 COMSOPAC TO CTF 61 

Indica t i ons ,oint strone ly to enemy attack in force 

on Cactus area 2 3-26 Au gust. From available intellie ence b elieve follo wing enemy forces now within radius 

of a bout 600 miles from Kavieng . 1 possibly 2 other 

BB, 10 CA, 5 CL, 10 or 11 Desdiv, 8 or 9 Subd.ivs incouding South Pacific. An undetermined n~~ber PT and 

other small craft add itional to those previously known 

island based and sea pl a nes Nevv Britain and sou·th east 

probably increasing steadily over current estimate of 

GO fighters and 80 to 100 bombers all types. Land 

forces include 1 division available Rabaul. 1 from 

11ruk and a force enroute from Davao. Presence of 

carriers possible but not confirmed. Only evidence 

sighting you is Cincpac 140159. Realize comr1unications 

not sa ti sfac tory. r1Iaking every effort to im )rove. 

I mp ortant fueling be conducted soonest possible and 

if practicable one carrier task force at a time retiring for that purpose. Your 211120. This from Comsopac 

to Comtaskfor 61 info Comtasl~ors 62, 63 and Cincpac. 

Am sendinr; Plat-ce and Cimarron from Roses daylight 

tomorrow Sunday accor dance by 220911. 

808 
cr-III!!RF!!!CP!!F!!Tiii-

-~ 

) 

AUGUST (GOT) 

2.4 2305 CINCPAC to COMINCH. 

F1etchers 241014 Ghormleys 241102 McCains 241333 all passed to you give best information I now have of carrier actions and plans for today. Intercepts indicate two carrier 

groups generally northeast of MALAITA and last night within 150 miles that place. RYUJO in western group damaged and reported burning fiercely. SHOK~KU and ZUI~KU in eastern 

group. Photos show no hits attack on RYUJO with 500 lb bombs. CACTUS reports bombing attack yesterday afternoon which was intercepted by our fighters there enemy losses 5 twin engine type 97 bombers 5 single engine bombers be- lieved CV based Mitsubishi 11 land zeros against own loss 3 F4F. During night 7 DDs shelled CACTUS. P&ra. Believe M.AI{IN reoccupied. 

~4 1333 Comairsopac to Comsopac Info CTF 61, 62. 

F~om pilots report of B-17s 4 hits made on large enemy CV with 500 pound bombs position lat. 06-35 Long 161-00 at 0625 GCT. Believe this CV to be one reported dead in water 

at 0713 GCT by 23Pll. 2nd Group B-17's attacked small car- rier position latitude 06-02 longitude 162-45 at 0710 GCT believe 1 300 pound bomb hit. 

24 1102 COMSOPAC to CTF 17, Info CTF 61,62,63, CINCPAC. 

Our carriers attacked by enemy carrier planes about 0540 GCT 24 August in approximate position latitude 09 degrees south longitude 163-15 east. 1 enemy carrier reported latitude 0550 south longitude 161-25 east at 0300 GCT August 24. Fuel your Task Force as soon as possible. Send GUADULUPE to WHITE POPPY with DD escort to refill. 

Be prepared for offensive operations to westward of grid posit previously designated. Further orders will be is- sued. 

24 1014 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC I.nfo CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COI\1AIRSOPAC, CTF 18. 

Attacked by carrier group at 1712. ENTERPRISE received 2 bomb hits aft. Fire under control. Some underwater damage. Proceeding to southward toward fueling rendezvous. Cancel 

request for tug ENTERPRISE steering under control. SARA- TOGA group attacked RYUJO extent damage unknown left burning badly. ENTERPRISE attack group proceeded CACTUS no informa- tion results of that group. Other attack groups attacked cruisers and a battleship some hits made. 2 large carriers 4 CA's 6 CL 8 DD lat 05-45 long 162-10 east course 120 speed 25 at 1530. Not located in time for attack. Task Forces 11 and 16 must fuel tomorrow. Taskforce 18 fueled today will stand toward CACTUS to support that place in accordance opera- tion order. ENTERPRISE planes at CACTUS remain there unt~0 9 further orders. 
Ri13ilili 

AUGUST (GCT) 

26 0307 FOWillLAUT to CTF 61, Info Comsopac, Com Transports Sopac. 

Discharged to CACTUS about 1500 tons or 3/4 cargo on board 

including 95 percent that taken at VfliiTE POPPY. Major items 

not left ammunition of 20 millimeter and larger sizes also 

barbed wire and miscellaneous gear. Estimated total now on 

hand 600 tons. Torpedo from submarine barely missed ship few minutes before clearing unloading area. Considered not 

advisable attempt tow BLUE due her location near SAVO Island 

at 21 hours L (-11) 23rd reported locations with movements 

enemy forces and recommendation Div Comdr. UnaJle get 300 

prisoners prior departure today all casualties intended for 

us except 6 picked up patrol plane which delivered BUTTON 

where HENLEY WlANLEY STRINGHAM: and FOW.t.ALATTTJT arrived 800 L 

(-11) 26th. Fuel a board 238000 gallons good 13000 miles at 

14 knots provisions available 19 days crew plus 180 passengers. Personnel with me: Marines 4 officers 149 enlisted 

in special detail. 4 officers for WHITE POPPY. Navy medical 

unit 1 officer 6 men also 28 men evacuated as not suitable 

duty CACTUS. Patients 1 officer 13 ratings. A deceased 

Marine. 

26 1930 CTF 61 to Comsopac, Info Cincpac, Comairsopac, CTF 16,17,18. 

Am sending repeat of my twenty five zero blank blank baank 

which apparently went astray. Noyes rejoined 26th and reported destruction three patrol planes on 25th. REKATA Bay searched and empty. No enemy sighted by searches 26th. My posit 0800 27th Lat 10-40 South Long 163-45 East operating that vicinity until contact TF 17. From CTF 61 Action Comsopac Info Cincpac, Comairsopac, CTF's 16, 17 and 18. After 

further study believe bulk of attack group of SHOKAJJJ and ZUIY~ lost in attack on ENTERPRISE. RYUJO hit. One 

torpedo and 4 bombs 1000 lbs by SARATOGA group at 0440 GCT 

24th. 

26 1336 COMSOPAC to CINGPAC, Info CTF 62, 63. 

Enemy submarines in RINGBOLT-CACTUP. area are a threat to 

ships unloading supnlies. Urgently require PC boats based 

at RING130LT equipped with listening device for continuous 

as patrol and defense that area. The same need exists at 

BUTTON Vlhich is staging pm!hnt for supplies to CACTUS. Request 12 boats of the 110 foot t ype or similar be sent at 

earliest moment. 6 to be stationed at BUTTON and 6 at 

RT1

\TG130LT. Thi s with knowled.c: e your 310121 (Tuly as need is 

most urgent. 

81 0 
;goMT 

AUGUST (GCT) 

27 0226 COMSOPAC to CINCP_'\C, Info COMINCH, CTF 61,62, 63, Comgensopac. 

Snecial attention invited Corngen 1st MarDiv 25735. Comsopac sends Cincpac action Cominch, Comtaskfor 61, 62, 63 info. Com~ensopac by hand. In addition to aircraft reinforcement 

required this area as requested by Comsopac, Comairsopac and 

Comgensopac. Regular renlacement pr·ogram must be initiated 

immediately as one of the essentials necessary in order that 

present positions may ·be maintained and pre-parations made for 

a further advance. Reference despatch is only definite information on front line attrition rate so far available. By 

copy of this despatch Comairsopac is reouested inform addressees and originator next information available on attrition rate PBY's, Bl7's and other types not covered by 

reference. 

26 2120 CTF 8 to Cincpac, Info Comseron 6. 

My 260203 in order complete mining project FIRE?LACE estimate total 1000 additional Mark 6 Mod 3 mines will be 

required for secondary project. Priority for areas as follows. Bay of Waterfalls one standard leg. Bay of Islands 

and Skagak Bay 1 standard leg whose southern extremity shall 

be north of Cascade Rock to permit ready access to both 

channels into expedition harbor with entrance landfall on 

Eddy Island. Three Armbay 1 standard leg. Beyer Bay one 

half standard leg. Landrum concurs entire mining plan FIR~PLACE. 

811 
s 5 9 B E R 

AUG GCT 

25 0955 

26 1336 

27 0211 

CG lst Mardiv to COiv:SOPAC info CTF 61, 62, 63 

CinCPac T'd to Cominch 

DDs shelled position at 2400. Casualties 2 killed 

3 vrounded. No material damage. 3 SBD contacted at 

0210 L (minus 11) my 242057. 2 SBD went out at 0245 

L (minus 11) no contact. 3 SBD went out at 0245 no 

contact. 3 SBD went out 0300 scored 1 hit on destroyer. 

Ensign ,~lliam E. Brown of ENTERPRISE failed to return. 

Large oil patches seen in area of contact after daybreak. 

At 0357 2 sFall planes bombed and strafed position. At 

1150 21 twin engine 97 bombers ·dropped over 40 bombs on 

position from 27,000 feet. 4 killed 5 wounded no material damage. My 242335 and 242230 additionally. 1 transport b:Lt on or near miss under stern ,Ni th 1000 pound 

bomb and 2 25 type seaplanes shot down. At 1400 3 scout 

bombers flight 300 ENTERPRISE and 6 scout bombers VIv1SB 

232 scouted 70 miles to north of floats marking contact. 

Large oil patches seen but no vessels. Destroyer already leaving oily trail bombed off North Coast SAN 

CRISTOBAL Island. No hits but all bombs fell close. 

Patrols to each flank of position developed no contact. 

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info CTF 62, 63. 

Enemy submarines in RING BOLT .- CACTUS area are a threat 

to ships unloading supplies. Urgently require PC boats 

based at RINGBOLT equipped with listening device for 

continuous A/S patrol and defense that area. The same 

need exists at BUTTON which is staging point for supplies 

to CACTUS. Request 12 boats of the 110 foot type or 

similar be sent at earliest moment. 6 to be stationed 

at BUTTON and 6 at RINGBOLT. This with knowledge your 

310121 July as need is most urgent. 

IfARSHALL to CG HAWDEPT info CINCPAC 

5718 Status air reinforcements South Pacific follows 

REUPJiDS 2468-23rd and 2504 of 25th: lst, MacArthur 

instructed provide all possible support ComSoPac. 2nd, 

Ghormley has authority to shift aircraft assigned South 

Pacific at will. 3rd, Harmon authorized August 9 to 

tenporarily divert bonbardment airplanes and crews enroute SUl/IP:~.C providing he can use rn.ore effectively in 

South Pacific. 4th, N.jmitz has vlar department approval 

for movement any aircraft and crews including fi~hter 

pilots your air force considered necessary to success 

of SOLOMON operation. 5th, 19th bomb group under orders 

for COPPER about September lOth. Para. 

Further Army reinforcement heavy bomber aircraft Pacific 

theater in support of present action impossible. 15 Bl7s 

requested not available. Para. 

Cominch has been notified of above summary. 

812 
--§£cnz g-. 

AUG GCT ----

27 0226 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH, CTF 61,62,63, CGSOPAC 

Special attention invited ComGen 1st Mardiv 250735. 

ComSoPac sends CinCPac action Cominch Comtaskfor 61, 62, 

63 info. ComGenSoPac by hand. In addition to aircraft 

reinforcement required this area as requested by ComSoPac 

ComAirSoPac and ComGenSoPac. Regular renlacement program 

must be initiated immediately as one of the essentials 

necessary in order that present positions may be Maintained 

and preparations made for a further advance. Reference 

despatch is only definite information on front line attrition rate so far available. By copy this despatch 

ComAirSoPac is requested infonnaddressees and originator 

next information available on attrition rate PBYs B-17s 

and other types not covered by reference. 

813 
s E o a s i 

AUG GCT ----

29 1240 

29 1304 

30 2032 

COMINCH to CIJ\CPAC, CO~/ISOPAC info VARIOUS 

Army 43rd Infantry Division Reinforced with 1 Regiment 

antiaircraft l Battalion 155 millimeter l Regiment 

Engineers combat l Company Engineers maintenance 

1 company ordnance (awnunition) miscellaneous services 

including hospitalization total about 21,000 sailing 

from "Vest Coast for SoPac latter half September and 

early October. Troops and equipment wlll be dispatched 

as ships and escorts available. This is part 1 of 2 

parts. Troops not necessarily in same ship as own 

equipment therefore a place for equipping and organizing 

necessary at destination. 

SAME 

Part 2 of 291240. ComSoPac advise destination selected. 

Largest ships COOLIDGE and MOUNT VERNON. This movement 

will not interfere with departure Marines Cominch des~ 

patch 021230 Au~ust or with ACORNS l and 2 early Sept. 

ACORNS 3 to 8 delayed until shipping available probably 

November also no other personnel transport available 

until then. Prompt return of shipping particularly 

transports important. 

COMTASKFOR 8 to CINCPAC info COMSERRON 6 

Objections raised by your mining experts precludes 

defensive mining of own waters or advanced bases and 

does not accord with m1ning recently completed here at 

KODIAK or world war German and British practice. According to mining officer here German and British are 

using same defehsi ve mining technique in this war. VJ'hile 

submarines can dive under knowledge of presence of mine 

field has deterrent effect. Recognize will not stop MTB. 

During next four months there will always be transports 

and cargo ships discharging at FIREPLACE which is wide 

open to Northward for quick raid by surface forces.. In 

addition several navigable straits must be kept under 

continuous destroyer observation unless mined. A field 

effective for 3 months would be of great value. Use of 

ASUKSAK Pass will route own shipping. Five miles from 

nearest line of mines with excellent navigation fix for 

approach. ~ip due to current may lower efficiency but 

would have to be accpeted. Currents not greater than at 

KODIAK. 

814 
SeE 0 P E T 

SEPT GCT -----

01 0105 COMTASKFOR 8 to CINCPAC, CTF-7 (Td to Cominch) 

In view of the high ly successful action of the modern 

submarines in the Alaskan Area coupled vvi th the fact 

that this type of ship offers the only solution for 

continuous observation during prevalent low visibility 

of the KISKA - ATTU areas request early replacement of 

the FINBACK and GRUNION. In this connection attention 

is invited to CinCPac 180145 of June. 

815 
4@ tg 8 It E I 

August 1 

Admiral Ghormley will announce August 7th, local date, 

as DOG Day unless Admiral Fletcher cannot meet that date. Also, - in his 020240 (pink) he suggests a method for VF coverage at 

TULAGI beginning D + 3 Day. 

The Army proposes to build an advance airdrome near 

ADAK but will only do so if there is a CV sent to protect them. 

CinCPac 020237 (pink) says that he is unable to comply at this 

time. 

Task Force 8 has been directed to make a cruiser sweep along Jap communications west of ATTU (CinCPac pink). 

CinCPac 020141 holds up the Lion shipment to Ghormley for the time being. 

The LAFFEY grounded at SUVA and damaged one propeller. This sort of thing emphasizes the need of spare propellers, tail 

shafts and other spare parts in the South Pacific. Also, it 

indicates the need of a floating drydock, possibly at BLF~CHER. 

It is evident that the Germans need rubber and other 

supplies from Jap conquered territory. 

There is considerable strengthening of Jap air in the 

Southwest Pacific but no indications yet of the employment of 

carriers in that area. 

The Army B-17 which went to WAKE for photos was attacked 

by six fighters. Four were shot down, of which three were "zeros" 

and one resembled a Heinkel 112. 

August 2. 

Admiral Ghormley has set August 7th, local date, for 

Dog Day of the TULAGI operation. 

No further word has been received from TF-8. It is 

expected that a cruiser bombardment of KISKA will be undertaken 

about August 4th. On that date the BOISE should commence the 

raid on the Jap sampan patrol east of HONSHU. 

CinCPac (030427) will undertake the supply of fuel to 

the military forces at NEW ZEALAND, but expresses no opinion 

as to civil supply. 

816 
uEdit!:§l 

August 2 (Continued) 

There is evidence of fuel trouble in the South Pacific. 

The trouble seems in distribution rather than a lack of fuel. 

The photo reconnaissance pictures of WAKE taken July 31st 

reveal continued strengthening of that island by the Japs. At 

all occupied places the Japs seem to be working very hard to make 

their positions secure. 

There is still no indication that Jap CVs have left 

Empir-e waters. 

August 3 

During his morning informal conference Admiral Nimitz 

brought up the following points: 

(a) He desires that continued effort be made to commend the 

Army for good work done, and to be meticulous in recommending medals and giving them official credit when due. 

(b) B-17s .are very good against zero fighters and should be 

brought in contact every time conditions favor. 

(c) The subject of use of our subs in the Japan Sea was discussed; objections raised; no decision reached or necessary at 

this time. 

(d) The employment of air strength in the Hawaiian area was 

mentioned. 

(e) It was decid~d that two planes, instead of one, should 

be used for long distance photo reconnaissance. 

Task Force 1 is enroute to the Hawaiian Area for exercises 

with Task Force 17. Task Forces 11, 16, 18 are participating in 

the TULAGI operation under ComSoPac. Task Force 8 is preparing for further operations in the ALEUTIANS; cruisers to again attempt 

a bombardment of KISiffi about August 7, and conduct a raider sweep to the westward. The Y~NE at ATTU was bombed by three 4-engine seaplanes with no damage. 

The TUCKER, entering 2d channel at ESPIRITU SANTO, hit 

one of the mines that had just been laid (presumably) by Mindiv 2 

and is a complete loss. Such salvage as is possib~ will be undertaken by the NAVAJO. 

The BISHOPDALE (XAO) hit a mine when leaving NOUMEA via 

Bulari Channel but apparently suf fered little damage. 

There is still no indicati nn that the Jap CVs or BBs are 

underway from home waters. Signs, however, point to coming ·operations either in the Southwest P.acific or Indian Sea. 

NAURU and OCEAN Islands are looked over daily now by Jap planes. This may be the forerunner of occupation there. 

81.7 
SEO±Zll 

4 AUGUST 

The combined chiefs of staff have decided to seize, occu~y, and build an Army airfield on TANAGA Island in the 

ALEUTIANS (Cominch 050003 pink). The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Comalsec seem to agree that TANAGA is better than ADAK and General DeWitt is anxious to go ahead with the pro- ject (CTF 8 050105 pink). CTF 8 050520 (pink) strenuously objects to the entire proposal. Two CVs are requested to cover the opera- tion but are not now available. Comalaska Sector 051237 (pink) gives his opinion of the difficulties which will confront this ex- pedition. 

CTF 8 042355 gives his modified KISKA bombardment plan. 

P-38s near ATKA shot down two Jap 4 engine seaplanes, leaving only two of these known to be at KISKA. 

TF 11, 16 and 18 are engaged in the TULAGI operation. 

TF 1 is enroute the HAWAIIAN area for training with TF 17. 

Cincpac 050601 recommends on LIONS, OAKS, and construction battalions for the South Pacific. 

Satisfactory arrangements have been made for censorship of British radio stations at CA1~0N, CHRIS~~s, and FANNING. 

There is still no word from the ESSO LITTLE ROCK. That 

tanker is now overdue at NOUMEA three days. 

The Japs continue to strengthen their defenses in the 

SW Pacific and are showing interest in the Bay of Bengal. So far, however, there has been no known move of major units from Empire Waters. 

5 August 

There is no change in the major task forces in the past 24 hours. Operations mentioned yesterday continue. 

The BOISE operation is still unre orted either by the 

Japs or by that ship. 

In his 050750 (pink) Comsopac concurs in the recommendations of General Harmon for increased defenses of South Pacific 

bases. 

Evidently the ESSO LITTLE ROCK arrive~afely in SUVA, having been diverted there by SoPac authorities. 

81.8 
5 AUGUST (Continued) 

An AV or CV was sighted just NE of NEW IRELAND. It is 

probably a Jap plane transport bringing air reinforcement to the 

RABAUL area. 

No change was noted in the deployment of major enemy units. 

6 August 

The offensive against TULAGI and adjacent islands started 

this morning as planned. Fragmentary reports from both own and 

enemy sources indicate that the . landing was preceded by bombardment and that it was a complete surprise to the Japs. ComSoPac 

did not report during the day. 

No word has been received yet from the BOISE. 

Task Force B's action at KISKA is expected tomorrow - weather permitting. 

The GREENQNG on patrol off TRUK reports sinking 24,000 

tons, including · the BRAZIL MARU. 

The CUMI'y1INGS definitely claims to have sunk a Jap sub 

at Meli Bay, .EFATE. 

ComAmphibForSoPac 062235 recommends on disposition of 

Cubs and Construction Battalions, and troops in the South Pacific. 

The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific now does 

not want to evacuate OCEAN and NAURU Islands. CinCPac will ask 

General MacArthur to release two ex-DD banana boats to supply these islands. The Japs surely intended some action there soon, but Admiral Ghormley's offensive may again cause them to postpone the project. 

The Japs were not sufficiently perturbed today to order 

any major units for the defense of the SOLOMONS Area. Submarines 

and air already there were ordered to attack. There were no 

changes noted in the deployment of major Jap units. AY-~ 

819 
ncltE± a 

August 7. 

The TULAGI operation summary is found in ComTaskGroup 

61.2 071030 ( p ink) and 080330 (pink). Evidently the operation 

is proceeding satisfactorily. As the landings may permit further extensions in the SOLOMONS to the Northwest which would 

increase security in the TULAGI area, CinCPac sent 081955 to 

·Cominch. Admiral Fletcher's carriers are being withdrawn for 

fuel. Also they are vulnerable to shore based air in the combat area where they have been providing CV coverage. 

Toward evening TaskForce 8 main body bombarded KISI~ 

and withdrew. No results are yet known to CinCPac. Only minor 

damage was sustained by our force. 

There has been no word from the BOISE, but no fear for 

her safety has been felt. 

Our search plane from MIDWAY drove off a Jap Mitsubishi, 

four-engine type 97 plane 520 miles Southwest of MID1NAY. 

orev ~~s 071553 to CG HawDept, General Marshall complains 

about ~t reports. The Army here did not make proper report 

via CinCPac. 

MARAMASIKt- has been mined by our forces - probably to 

p rotect a seaplane tender. 

The Japs are thought to be operating a seaplane tender 

at REKATA BAY, St. Isabel Island. This, if true, is too near 

TULAGI for comfort and we will attack them 11 in such a manner as 

to ensure destructionn of the AV. 

Our PT s for ALASKA will arrive SAN FRANCISCO August 10. 

Even though the bombardment of KISKA is over, Admiral Nimitz 

decided to replace two DMS that were damag ed in a collision in 

the ALEUTIANS last week. 

There has been a large increase in Jap radio activity 

due mainly to our South Pacific offensive and our diversion at 

KISKA. The Japs are even a pprehensive of our photo reconnaissance of WAKE. So far, however, the y are not ·thought to have 

started major forces toward the active areas - relying on shore 

based air and submarines to repel attacks. 

82 0 
§kdi&ft 

AUGUST 8 

The fragmentary account of the days operations at TULAGI 

is in Comsubpac 090830 pink, 091212 pink, 091230 pink, 091000 

pink, 090950 pink, 090750 pink; CTF 62 090725 pink, 090508 pink; 

Fletcher 090315 pink. While there is not enough information 

available to Cincpac to reconstruct accurately the last three 

days events, it is evident that serious losses were incurred. 

Admiral Ghormley has ade.quate surface forces remaining but insufficient air. 

There is no further news from the ALEUTIANS. 

The BOISE completed her job of raiding the sampan patrol 

line east of HONSHU and is returning to PEARL. 

The PERKINS damaged a propeller in the South Pacific 

and will be docked in NFN ZEALAND. The MORRIS and MUSTIN of 

TF 17 collided about midnight enroute exercises with TF 1 in 

the Hawaiian area. Although the damage to these DDs was apparently slight, it further depletes our DD strength at a time when 

they cannot be spared without embarrassment. 

A recent report indicates that, of the GILBERT Islands, 

the tTaps only now occupy MAKIN and nTL~ JlAKIN. The ARGONAUT, 

NAUTILUS , and marine raiders will lY,J raidY those two places. 

Aside from heavy air movement to the RABAUL area there 

is no indication of moves of major Jap units. 

Augu s t 9. 

In reply to Vice Admiral Ghormley ' s request f or air 

replacements and further air strength CinCPac 0 91957 (pink ) 

was sent. The s t rictly limited air available to CinCPa c will 

not be able to sati sfy ComSoPac needs . 

ComSoPac 101006 (pink) indicates that reinforcements 

of the enemy are expe ~ted at GUADALCANAL. Such a successful 

move on the part of the enemy would seriously je opardize our 

chances of acconplishing Task one. In the meantime, the 2nd 

1furines have not landed at NDENI, nor is any present intention 

of so doing indicated. Radio contact v1ith landing forces has 

been established but the situation is far from clear. ESPIRITU 

SANTO ha s been selected as the present strong point (CinCPac 

102059 .( pink). 

In his 100340 (pink) ComSoPac outlines the planned 

reinforcement of Admira l Ghormley's forces by New Zealand troops. 

821 
Aug ust 9 (Continued) 

Admiral Smith describes the bombardment of KISKA in his 

090553. Fog hindered the approach and low ceiling prevented 

spotting the indi rect fire and ob servation of damage. 

Cominch states that for what appear to be several good 

reasons the Army will establish an airfield at TANAGA, Aleutians. 

Admiral Nimitz a g rees vvi th the plan. 

Task Forces 1 and 17 are engaged in exercises off the 

Southern end of the Island of HAWAII. 

Both the WASHINGT ON and SOUTH DAKOTA are enroute to the 

Pacific. CinCPac has not a s sig ned either yet. 

It is very evident that the Japs are going to make a 

determined effort to defend their Southwest Pacific positions. 

'Vlhile the CVs have not been started South yet there is some 

indication that at least some of them may start soon. In the 

meantime air strength in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES has been 

sent to the RABAUL Area, and Jap subs are concentrating to hit 

our forces in the SOLOiviONS. 

August 10. 

The good news of the day is contained in Comsopac 

102230 pink which indicates landing at TULAGI area is successful. 

General Vandegrifts position at GUADALC~NAL is generally satisfactory as shown by CTF 62 110650. Fletcher will complete fueling 

tomorrow afternoon and will then operate as shown by Comsopac 110206. As a landing of Jap reinforcements on the west end of GUADALC~~rAL is expected by Admiral Ghormley, and as further Jap 

surface air and troop reinforcements can be expected in the area 

soon, it is evident that the eupply of the occupation forces is 

of utmost urgency. Admiral Ghormley has reouested transport planes in his 110226 pink. The surface forces must now risk 

enemy air attacks in the delivery of supplies to the Marines. 

Our S-boats have managed to sink one maru at RABAUL. 

It is known that they are not very efficient but will continue 

that viainity for the present. The long range bombers of the 

SW Pacific Forces have not yet been able to deny to the enemy 

almost complete freedom in the use of his airfields at RABAUL 

and BUKA. 

The BOISE arrived at PEARL. No enemy patrol sampans were 

sighted. She lost two search planes, and as radio was freely 

used in the attempted recovery, the BOISE withdrew. The planes 

landed on the water at sunset and may have been picked up by 

the Japs. 

822 
August 10. (Continued) 

There is nothing new from the ALEUTIANS. 

The strong probability exists that the JAPS are forming a typical BB, CV striking force for employment in the 

BISMARK- SOLOMONS area under the CinC 2nd Fleet. A rough guess is that such a force could arrive in that area bout August 24th. 

August 11. 

The action of the surface screening forces northwest 

of GUADALCANAL on the 8th are summarized in CTF-62 090715 pink. Comsopac 112220 pink gives summary further losses. CinCPac 112209~ves estimate of enemy intentions and suggests what 

now must be done. 

{v---(_../ 

Our carriers are still in a retired position presumably awaiting necessity for covering reinforcements to the TULAGI area. 

The captain of the ASTORIA, which blew up shortly after 

action, describes the great fire hazard because of planes on 

this type cruiser (Greenman 120220 pink). 

Cominch 112030 pink feels that TF-17 should not relieve 

TF-18 on station as it ~p~s unduely exposes the Hawaiian 

Islands. In his 121750Tlle suggests sending some old BBs from 

TF-1 to the South Pacific. CinCPac will probably not desire 

to do that. 

Transport divisions 2 and 12 have arrived at ESPIRITO 

SANTO to reinforce the garrison there. 

Comsopac 120216 piruc gives his ~n to send aviation 

supplies to GUADALCANAL. In his 121056tfo MacArthur he requests action against the large number of Jap ships reported 

at RABAUL. 

A PBY5A landed at the Jap made field at GUADALCANAL. 

In three days B-17s may be able to use it. 

As the picture in the South Pacific is not yet completely understood here, Admiral Ghormley has been requested 

to furnish a brief narrative as soon as possible. 

The SOUTH DAKOTA is due at the Canal Zone August 19th 

enroute CinCPac. Juv1 e v. -to fo f f()w 

There is nothing new from the North Pacific. 

The enemy continues to strengthen his air in the South 

Pacific. 40 ships including 8 cruisers are reported sighted 

at f~BAUL. A strong striking force may leave Japan for the SW ~ 

Pacific in the near future. 

82 3 
£J il 0 ¥1! 2 I 

August 12. 

The consolidation of captured positions in the Southwest 

Pacific continues. 4 APDs will be sent to CACTUS with AvGas, lub 

oil, amrnunition and air ground personnel, to arrive the 15th, 

local date. Presumably the troops that landed are in urgent need 

of food. 

ComTaskfor 62 131258 and 101220 (pink) give a summary of 

his moves since the 9th. 

The Southwest Pacific Air are stepping up air operations 

at RABAUL and claim hitting four ships in that harbor. 

The Second Marines, less three battalions, landed at 

ESPIRITU SAN)TO to reinforce that place. C<a>~S()p~c )' ~ct e ~e\"~ 11-,\~ 

Cominch 121620 states his needs for information on current operations. Communication difficulties in the South Pacific 

makes up~to-the-minute news hard to get. 

It has been decided to bring Task Force 1 to PEARL, arriving the 14th. CinCPac 122337 (pink) gives his views on the 

employment of BBs at this time. 

There is no significant information from the North 

Pacific. 

Indications continue that a Jap striking force composed 

of BBs and CVs will soon depart for operations in the NEW BRITAIN -

SOLOiviONS - NEW GUINEA Area. t.v---~~"'" 

August 13th 

ComSoPac eleven part 131456:' (pink) is ~ ;r;grra ti ve of the 

first part of the Tt~AGI operation. The excellent~J6r~t.h~~Jap 

ships in night attack is of special interest. Cu ~ent operations 

in the TULAGI area continue to be consolidation of captured 

positions. 

CTF 8, 140131 recommends a~ainst further bombardment 

of KISYili. ComAlaskia Sector (132214) gives plan for covering 

the Army move to TANAGA ISLAND. · No date for the commencement 

of this operation has been given yet. 

The GRENADIER reports having hit a tanker off TRUK with 

two torpedoes. For some time we have had five fleet subs off 

TRUK and six in the. KISKA area. As a result only five of our 

submarines are on patrol off JAPAN today. To hit the shipping at 

KAVIENG, two of our submarines have been moved to that place from 

TRUK. 

824 
August 13th (Cont'd) 

·(,. TF ONE will enter PEARL tomorrow morning and TF 17 

1'() the .follo,;-:f}fg1 dey. For the present TF ONE will be kept at PEARL 

to be· in a position to oppose an enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN 

AREA. 

The marine pilots being sent to the South Pacific are 

reported insufficiently trained, and six weeks training time in 

the area is requested. Opinion here is that no squadron is ever 

sufficiently trained and that those enroute are as well trained 

as can be expected under the circumstances. In any event they 

are well enough trained to go to work down south. 

The Japs found one of the BOISE planes and seem quite apprehensive lest a BLUE striking force be enroute JAPAN. They have hurridly loaded three CVs to bolster up their defensive 

line. At present at least two CVs seem about ready for onerations 

and a move to the South West Pacific is quite possible. 

August 14. 

Task Forces One and Seventeen arrived at PEARL from 

Joint Exercises in the Hawaiian Area. Task Force 1 will probably remain at Pearl about a month. Task Force 17 is scheduled to 

leave Pearl the 17th to relieve Task Force 18 on station in the 

South Pacific. . (.t)v\..;\ l U ~ t\ i~ t .)Yv (., 

Tiuring the day ComSoPac eleven part 131400 (pink)~came 

in giving the report of the TULAGI operation (as noted yesterday). ComSoPac 150746 (pink) and ComAirSoPac 130623, 140803 (pink) gives plans to provide food and reinforcements to the Marines in the 

TULAGI - GUADALCANAL area. 

The JARVIS has not been located and an air search of 

her probable position was ordered. The ship is badly damaged and 

trying to reach NOUMEA. 

ComSoPac requests fleet subs in the GUADALCANAL area, but CinCPac replied that none are now available. 

Because of the many news items now originating in 

Australia and New Zealand and which give the Japs information 

they would not otherwise obtain, CinCPac has requested that 

Cominch and ComSoPac dry up the news sources. 

Air reconnaissance of the New Georgia Islands including GIZO does not disclose enemy activities. 

8.25 
qj E 6 It E I 

Au~u?t 14 (Continued) 

ComSoPac 140646 gives needs to unload Cub material. 

So far in this war little thought has been evidenced in providing 

for unloading ships at their destinations where harbor facilities 

are nonexistent. 

ComTaskFor 8 150340, 150357 and 150720 gives the report 

of his survey of TANAGA. He does not approve the Army plan for 

an airfield there because of the seamanship difficulties in unloading and transporting material to the airfield site. 

J'i- 'J.-3~~ 

In his ~40646 ComTaskFor 8 gives the results of his 

recent bombardment of KISKA. No doubt some damage to the enemy 

was caused but bad weather makes a photo check impossible. 

There continues to be considerable evidence that a Jap 

striking force is about to move from the Empire to the South 

Pacific. Possibly the CinC 3d Fleet will be in command. Hovrever, 

it seems reasonably sure that the movement has not yet started. 

As the Japs put in a new cipher last night, our hopes 

o~ reading their important traffic in the near future is remote. 

They are giving careful study to communication security. This 

may be due to so many U.S. Press stories about our reading their 

mail. 

The SOUTH DAKOTA and 3 DD will transit the PANA1~ 

CANAL about Aueust 19th enroute duty in South Pacific. The 

VASHINGTON and 3 DD will follow about 10 days later. 

August 15. 

The South Pacific Forces continue to consolidate 

their positions in the TULAGI area. 

are probably smaller than estimated. 

from Cactus gives following losses -

navy 1; enlisted, marine 89, navy 2; 

navy 1; enlisted, marine 64. 

Losses of those landing 

For example, an intercept 

Killed: 6ffice~ marine 7, 

missing office~ marine 4, 

C.G. Cactus 160545 gives general situation in the 

TULAGI area. 

Jap submarines are active in the SOLOMONS and at 

least one floating contact mine was sighted in the NEW HEBHIDIES 

area. 

TF-1 and 17 are in PEARL ~or recreation, fuel, supplies, and minor repair. 

There is no news of importance from the ALEUTIANS. 

826 
SECft£ 14 

At~st 15 (Continued) 

The SOUTH DAKOTA returned to Philadelphia for 

turbine repairs. 

Cominch rS\Gl St pink suggests that now is the time 

to recapture the N.E. Coast of NEW GUINEA and ·desires comment 

from Vice Admiral Ghormley and General IviacArthur. 

The transports of the Amphibious Force are to be 

moved to the east coast after August 18th. 

There is still no word fr.om the JARVIS. Air search 

was ne gative. 

A possibility exists that the CinC 2nd Fleet with a 

striking force is enroute to the S.W. Pacific. 

827 
SECRET 

16 AUGUST 

The consolidation of ~ositions captured in the TJLAGI 

area continues. Comsopac 161146 pink and 161156 pink reviews 

the present situation. Comsopac 170230 pink states that no 

further advance is possible until he is able to secure firmly his present position and requires reinforcements. 

The LONG ISLA}ID will fly off planes for GUADALCANAL 

August 20th. 

Apparently the Marine raiders landed at JJAKIN as planned. Jap radio reported their arrival. p~) 

Cincpac 17014l~points out that he does not desire to 

send the Amphibious Force transports to the East Coast. 

CTF 8 170015 pink requests fighter planes to give air 

coverage for the establishment of an Army airfield at TANAGA in 

the ALEUTIANS. 

The Japs continue to show signs of making a large effort 

to recapture GUADALC.ANAL and to hold their :tfEN GUINEA - BISMARK - SOLOMONS positions. If a force without carriers is to attack 

GUADALCAJ'JAL it could. reach that place around August 20. But 

if CVs are to be used they cannot attack before the 25th - if 

todays estimate that all Orange CVs are still in home waters. 

It seems indicated that the Japs are interested in GIZO Island, NE'N GEORGIA Group. 

17 August. 

./ 

CinCPac 172047 (Pink) gives information of enemy in the \ 

TULAGI area. The despatch is referred to in ComSoPac 180646 ~\ 

(pink) requesting more action from General MCArthur; and 180916(~) which briefs his Opnrd #2-42. The APD's which had been sent to 

GU.ADALCANAL with gas, stores, and air personnel arrived and 

departed safely. Plans are now underway to supply needed food 

to the landing troops. Apparently the process of digging in 

continues in a satisfactory manner and all serious opposition by enemy troops stationed there has ended. CTF 62, 170925 

summarizes the situation at GUADALCANAL. 

~ (P~ CinCPac 180215 gives directives for the relief of TF 18 

by TF 17. The later left PEARL for the South Pacific Today. 

J ~p~l Cominch 181420 plans to change the site of the proposed Army landing field from TANAGA to ADAK because adverse landing facilities at TANAGA. TF 8 seems to be marking time. 

828 
17 August (Cont'd) 

It is not at all certain that the Jap CV's are still in home ~Naters. They may be using a bit of Radio deception. It is certain however that the Jap will soon make a determined effort to ~ecapture'GUADALCL~AL. There are no indications of 

·enemy moves toward the North or Central Pacific Areas. 

18 August 

Admiral Ghormley's 190710 generally summarizes the TULAGI operation. There is no major change in the situation there yet but all indications point to an all out Jap effort 

to retake the captured positions. 

Because of the difficulties of landing equipment for 

an airfield at TANAGA the Chiefs of Staff naw contemplate chang- ing the site to ADAK - but only if the Army considers ADAK feasible. If they do not consider it feasible the project may be cancelled. See ComWesSeaFron 182340. 

The GRUNNION which was last heard on patrol in the nor-thern approach to KISKA on July 30th may be lost. 

MAIANA in the Gilberts was reconnoitered by a Jap plane yesterday. Apparently the enemy is sending a relief force to lv1AKIN. 

There are still no definite indications that the Jap CVs have left home wat~rs. But strong indications of 30-40 DDs destined to the BISLIARK area are noted. 

19 August 

Further light is shed on the night action off SAVO Island in Comsopacs 200220 pink and 200230 pink. Our losses were heavy and there is still no explanation of why. The enemy seems to have suffered little or no damage. 

The food situation there has not yet been cleared up. In fact since the initial landing not much of anything has been done by o~r Task Forces. And the air under General MacArthur has been of little help except for reconnaissance. 

The LONG ISLAND flew in the Marine fighters and bombers 

as planned. 

The target which a B-17 reported hitting on the stern with 

one bomb yesterday now is reported as being a destroyer. DDs have been intermittently shelling our shore positions and small boat 

82 9 
19 August (Continued) 

patrols for the past two days. Enemy cruiser type seaplanes based on SAVO Island also have been attacking our small~oat 

patrols. 

Comsopac 192320 pink is preparing for an attack in the GUADALCk~AL - TULAGI area between 20 and 23 August. 

The Marine Raiders evidently found stiffer opposition 

at MAKIN than expected. Nevertheless the ARGONAUT 200830 indicates that they did a fine job. 

S c\\"'1 Dl C' D 

TheA-transports of the Amphibious Force have been ordered 

to the east coast departing at once. 

TF 1 continues at PEARL. During the next 30 days 

groups of that force will exercise at sea off OAHU. 

No news was received from TF 8. 

Cincpac 200041 pink gives an estimate of enemy moves 

toward the SN Pacific. There is still no indication that Jap CVs have left home waters. ~(_./ 

20 August. 

Consopac 211156 pink gives the general situation of 

the TULAGI operation. It is noted that the enemy ships which 

landed troops east of the Tenaru river, GUADALCANAL, got 

away before daylight and were not attacked by our forces. 

The air strength at GUADALCANAL will be reinforced 

by 5 army fighters tomorrow. ESPIRITO SANTO is receiving 

vital supplies from NOUMEA via B-17s. 

Only the APDs and the ALHENA (AK) are now scheduled 

to bring logistic supplies to the TULAGI area. The FORMALHANT 

was temporarily turned back as the C.G. there said that because 

of the landing mentioned above he could only handle one large 

ship at a time. 

Comsopac 201407 gives the battle damage to the vessels of TF-44 and means to be taken for repair. 

CTF-62 190323~d Comairsopac 200310~1 with the 

logistic problem at TULAGI. Apparently the food problem will 

be met before anyone g oes hung ry. 

Subron 9 will g o to IRELAND. This takes two new 

submarines from Subron 10, thus further reducing the already 

sMall number of modern submarines available to CinCPac. 

830 
OEOPt:MT 

20 A~ust (Continued) 

15 B-24s are to be sent to HAWAII starting next 

month. Even this small number will help the rather critical 

air shortag e in the HA1

NAIIAN Area. 

There is nothing new of note in the North and 

Central Areas. 

Indic a tions of enemy moves to reinforce the RABAUL 

area and to prepare for an attack on our recently captured positions continue. However, although three CVs have not 

been definitely located since the 16th, there is no good 

reason to believe that they have sailed from home waters. 

The MACKINAC was almost hit by one of our S~D at 

NDEHI. No serious damaged was reported. 

21 Aur;ust 

ComSoPac 221056 (pink) reports on days operation. The 

annihilation of the 700 a ttackine: troops is good news indeed. 

'1d.miral Ghormley feels the need of motor torpedo boats and 

has asked the SVJ Pacific area for any that can be s pared. 

This need ma y nave been sho n by the dama ge done to the BLUE. 

Pletchers 211120 states t hat he r.1ust v,rithdraw to fuel 

on t,-1e 24th. There is plenty of fuel in the vicinity of his 

force. 

ComSoPac 220910 gives his estimate of enemy forces 

novr approaching the l'J1:!; 1

1'1 SRITi .. IN AR A. 

HONSHU 

18000 

The 1-!ARWHAL arrived at :·AI DVIAY from patrol off north 

AKD reports having sank 4 K and 3 sampans totalling 

tons. 

Cominch 211830 directs e rr::? 8 to commence the move tc , 

construct an army a irfield a t A"JAT: lnsteadof 'I'ANAGA as oriB; inally pla,nn ed. 

on ·Lrest rn S. oa rontier 202248 gives General De Witts co~mon s on ~l cing ~ an airfie ld on ADAK as compared to S: ~l;AGA . 

I t noYJ s o ems most p robable t '1a t t wo strik ing f orces 

a rc ·at TRVI\: enrou te to t he SCLOI';TC NS AR:SA and t ha t t he suspected 

a ll ou t a t temp t to rec ap t u re positions in t he TU l~G I AR:J:A sta rting 

a s earl y a s Au E::ust 25 t h , Honolul u da te. 

831 
!S !l 6 It E ,_ 

August 22. 

The consolidation of positions in the TULAGI area 

continues with Fletcher's striking forces standing by to prevent Jap reinforcements. A comparatively large number of enemy 

cruisers, destroyers, transports, and freighters have been 

sighted recently in the RABAUL area. This constitutes a threat 

to our r~rines, but also offers a fine target for Fletcher if 

they ever come within his reach. A force of 1 CL 2 DD and 4 AKs 

was thought heading toward GUADALCANAL. Attack planes took off, 

but as the force turned a·way, no contact was made·. The BLUE was 

ordered scuttled as she could not be towed. 

The S-44 of the South~~~~ Pacific force sank a Jap 

cruiser off NEV IRELAND on the ~. Heretofore these S-boats 

have not been very successful in the RABAUL area. 

A B-17 landed at GUADALCANAL. 

Admiral Fl·e tcher will fuel his forces on the 25th. 

In the North Pacific the day for co:rmnencing the operation to build an airfield at ADAK has been set as August 30th. 

It is now indicated that enemy striking forces previously mentioned as heading toward the Southwest Pacific are 

in the TRU1C area. This being the case, they cannot arrive in ~ ~ 

the TULAGI area before the 27th or 28th, local date. 

August 23rd. 

The arrival of onemy carriers in the SOLCMON AREA 

occured yostorc_ay. The CVs were a bit ahead o.f radio intellig enue 

scl1.edule as t!'la t source of information olaced them in . TR.UK AREA . 

CinCPac 242305 with references mentioned attached g ive as 

clear a picture of the action as was available at the end of the day. 

Rear Adr.1iral Theobald reports that the Army has 

insufficient equipment to install an airfield at ADAK and ATKA 

simultaneously - as su g~es te d by Cominch. The North Pacific 

continues quiet. 

2xcept from t~e about si~htings noted there is little 

known of major Japanese deployrn.ent. Everything continues to point 

to an all out attempt to recapture our positions in the TUUGIGUADALCANAL ~.. ";{li.A . 

832 
Aup;ust 24. 

AdMiral Ghormley's 251326 (pink) gives a surnnary of the 

day's operations. The forces to the North and East of MALAITA 

Island have retired to the Northward. There is a force still 

l1eading South in the TROBRIAND Island area. Cominch now believes 

that the enemy will strike at either the FIJI's or SAiv1 0A. CinCPac 

has nothine to indicate such a move. The Japs have landed a small 

force on GIZO Island in the NEW GEORGIA group, and are operating . 

seaplanes from REKATA on SANTA ISABEL Island. The ENTERPRISE r,e,ca-VQ{ 

three bomb hits and some near misses but the vessel is under con~ 

trol and reports being able to operate as many as 50 planes in an 

emergency. A report of survivors from ships present at the TULAGI 

area landing shows a relatively large number of killed, wounded 

and missing. Generally, about 60% were saved from the cruisers 

which were sunk. 

It is now reported that both NAURU and OCEAN Islands 

were shelled by cruisers ' on the 22nd. 

Task Force 1 is preparing for exercises in the Hawaiian 

area. 

While the logistic supply to the active areas involves 

a great amount of administrative traffic, there is no worry over 

food &nd fuel here. On the other hand, the supply of airplanes 

to HAWAII and to the South Pacific is inadequate for urgent ne~ds 

and no proper movement of replacements and reinforcements is in 

sight. 

Three Jap CVs and most of their BBs are S'till indicated 

in home waters. The movement of the CVs is of importance to 

CinCPac now, but the chances of learning very much definite about 

this seem only fair. 

v 

, ~ 

83:3 
Auu:ust 25. 

No further c ontact was nade with the enemy forces except 

that a search nlane which was s h ot dovm reported a CV well to the 

Horth o.f yesterday's position. That CV may have been the RYUJO. 

GUADALCAJJAL had an air raid. Our planes shot down 7 VB 

and 5 nzerosn with a loss of only 1 VF. Only minor damage and 

casualties were reported. 

CinCPac 260239, ComSoPac 260342, ConTaskFor 16 260639 

and ComSoPac 260750 (all pink) refer to the withdrawal of the 

ENTERPRISE due to her bomb damage. It is expected that she will 

be repaired at PEARL. 

CinCPac 252241 (pink) urges Cominch to provide the reinforcements requested by Admiral Ghormley so that the offensive 

can continue to1Ae. successful conclusion of Task ONE. 

In answer to Cominch message in which he expressed his 

"growing convictionn that the enemy are now massing to attack 

SAMOA or FIJI, CinCPac (252205) pink) replied that he does not 

agree with that idea. 

The enemy made a landing at MILNE BAY, New Guinea. B-17s 

attacked the convoy but did not prevent the landing or the withdrawal of the convoy after the landing. General MacArthur has a 

division of Australian troops in that area but there is no report 

showing that they opposed the landing. 

ComTaskFor 8 proposes to mine at KULUK BAY, ADAK, as a 

defensive measure and requests four light mine layers. The ·se will 

be sent from PEARL. 

There is still no definite word of the departure of Jap 

Cardiv 2 from home waters. As t h ey are known to be about ready 

to go, the possibility of an undetected departure exists. 

Admiral Nirr1itz informed General Emmons and Admiral Bagley 

of the g eneral situation in conference today.· Present also were 

Vice Admirals Pye and Calhoun. Thls supplemented the usual 

Thursday luncheon conferences which General Emmons always attends. 

~~ 

834 
RilORNT 

August 26. 

A delayed message froM Fletcher (250646 pink) gives 

his plans for the next couple of days, and his actions and 

recommendations. 

Consopac 261812 pink directs TF-16, as modified, to 

proceed to Bleacher. There a detailed examination of damage 

to the ENTERPRISE will be made and urgent repairs accomplished 

.with the assistance of theVESTAL and divers from the SEMINOLE. 

Some ENTERPRISE planes will land at NANDI the 28th local, and 

the modified TF-16 (ENTERPRISE, PORTLAND, 3 DD) will arrive 

Bleacher about the 30th local 

Comsopac 2714161

~ gives a summary of the day. The 

carriers seem outside our search and may be fueling. The force 

sighted at about the northern limit of our search planes does 

not seem to have any immediate objective. 

Comsopac 270350 pink used Cominch's idea of a Jap 

move t~;ard Fiji or Samoa to plea for more planes at those 

places~ His request for a patrol wing headquarters at both 

Fantan and White Poppy will be met by Cincpac. 

In his 271026 pink Comsopac gives his concept of 

present operations. The last sentence does not indicate much 

hope of reinforcements. 

The FOR~ffiLHAUT 260307 is an exanpl e of the difficulties 

of unloading at places where facilities do not exist. Present 

AKs are built to unload at docks. The shortage of even elementary lighterage facilities results in being unable to unload any 

more than very limited cargo. There must be ·decided improvement 

in this situation. When more small vessels are available there 

will be an improvement. At present the logistic supply of captured positions is critical. 

CTF-61 261930 gives a report of his current operations. 

Coms ~~ pac 261336 requests PCs to patrol unloading 

waters in the TULAGI area against submarines which are known 

to be present and which are a definite threat. Three small 

patrol boats are enroute from Poppy but they have no listening 

gear. One NZPC now at Suva has been requested. 5 New Zealand 

PCs which recently passed thru Pearl enroute south seem well 

equipped for this duty but are coal burners. 

Comsopac 270226 a g ain urges that his air forces be 

reinforced. 

835 
RJ?S?i'i a 

Au()ust 26 (Continued) 

CTR-8 262120 gives his ~eneral plan to mine the 

approaches to ADAK. This defensive mining is open to question. 

!t any rate it cannot be done now as o~ly four light minelayers 

carrying approximately 360 mines are immediately availa]lle. 

While Admiral Theobald is engaged in covering the operation to 

build an airfield at ADAK there is· a possibility that he may 

also be able to take some offensive action. Admiral Nimitz 

desires to urge him to some sort of offensive operations even 

if it is only sending the MTBs, which just arrived at the 

Aleutians, to attack vessels that may be at KISI0~. He will be 

asked what plans he has for the next few weeks. 

There are continued indications that the Japs intend 

to make a very strong effort in the Southwest Pacific. It is 

possible that BBs and CVs have recently left home waters for 

that area. If these indications are correct, the danger to 

our Midway-Oahu line is non-existant for the present, Also, 

there is little danger of much addition to their combatant 

strength in the Aleutians. 

Press reports of the Russian situation are very gloomy. 

It looks like STALINGRAD must fall shortly. The press also 

talks a lot about a second front in Europe. N0 thing definite 

is known here about projected operations in Europe. However, 

our difficulty in obtaining men and munitions for the Pacific L>-~ 

can be traced to very large movements to Europe. 

August 27 

The South Pacific was fairly quiet. Our Task Forces, 

less r.1odified Task Force 16, are operating Southeast of GUADlLCANAL 

covering the logistic move to that area. No contact with enemy 

carriers was made. A ~roup of four en en y DDs were at tacked by the 

Guadalcanal air north of MALAITA and one DD was probably sunk and 

two others daMaged. 

Aside from minor air reconnaissance by both our own 

planes and those of the enemy, the JLEUTIANS area was quiet. 

In response to h.drli r al Ghormley's request fer PCs, 

three will leave from PrJ. RL for the South tomorrow. This cuts 

dovvn the already small number in this area. 

Indications that the enemy is going ahead with his 

preparations for an all out attempt to oust us from the TULAGI 

area continue. No new moves of r'laj or units from the Empire are 

known with any de gree of certainty. 

83S 
August 28. 

Ghormley's 281026 summarizes the TULAGI operation. 

As his carrier groups are now busily engaged in covering. 

that operation he cannot comply with NiacArthur's request for tiP• 

.f.e.s.e reinforcements in the Eastern NE'l GUINEA Area. (ComSoPac 

290310 and Cominch 281240). CinCPac generally concurs in the 

position taken by ComSoPac. 

The ENTERPRISE has furnished the Service Force a list of 

material needs so that her repair can be expedited. ComTaskFor 

16 281805 indicates that there was no real need for the ENTERPRISE 

to go to BLEACBER. 

Air replacements for the South Pacific are now able to 

keep planes at present levels, but the future is not clear. Marshall's 270211 says that after the 19th Bombardment Group consisting of 35 B-2's arrives at Hawaii about September lOth that 

no more can be sent. ComAirSoPac 290607 gives an estimate of his 

air replacement needs. 

As there are several small enemy detachments with radios 

in the TULAGI area ComTaskFor 62 will attempt to clean them out 

between September 1st and 3rd. Three APDs will provide transportation. 

TaskForce 61 is short of both food and fuel and one CV 

&Sroup at a time wi 11 retire to NOUMEA to replen\t sh. The supply 

of the troops ashore is being accomplished in spite of great difficulty. 

CinCPac 290125 comments on the mining plans of ComTaskFor 

8. Because of several objections the mining of ADAK as planned 

is not considered a good thing to do. 

There is still no definite word that additional carriers 

have left Jap home waters. The possibility that they departed 

undetected continues. The enemy striking forces in the SOLOMONS 

area have not been seen in the past two days and are possibly 

just outside our air search getting ready to battle again. 

There are indications that OCEAN ISLAND has been occupied 

by the Japs. 

A report indicates that tpe Japs are operating landplanes 

in the ALEUTIANS. If this report is correct they must have constructed some sort of a landing field in the KISKA - ATTU Area. 

837 
s x s n B I ~~~ '2-~ 

CTF 16 282355 pink gives details of the ENTERPRISE 

engagement on the 24th. The ENTERPRISE VF-6 did a very fine 

job in knocking do'l:vn 29 at tacking enemy planes with s mall loss. 

As indicated yesterday ComSoPac will retire one carrier task force at a time to NOUMEA for food and fuel. (His 

291442 pink). He summarizes yesterdays operations in his 

291113 pink. Most of this information was received separately 

from intercepts. 

Cominch has suggested that Ghormley release Leary's 

units to cover IviacArthur' s cornmunica tions to MILNE BAY. 

CinCPac will indicate his approval of this in principle to 

ComSoPac. 

The Undersecretary of the Navy has added his voice 

to the pleas for more air strength in the SOLOMONS. We have 

indications that the Army is going to try to send a good 

number of fighters to the Pacific for distribution to Admiral 

Nimitz. 

Cominch 291240 states that the 43rd infantry reinforced 

is to be sent to the South Pacific leaving the u.s. about the 

middle of September. 

During a bor1bing raid at GUADALCANAL the CALHOUN was 

hit and sunk. While the W. '~'IIJ. BURRUNS was trying to unload 

at TULAGI she grounded heavily. 

Complete repair to the CHICAGO cannot be made handily 

in Austrailia so ComSWPac suggests that she be sent to Mare 

Island. It is now estimated that repairs and certain desired 

modernization items will require three months. 

There is still no definite word as to whether or not 

OCEAN Island has been occupied. 

Admiral Nimitz had Lt. GehE'ral Emmons and Rear Admiral 

Bagley in for a conference to acquaint them V'Ii th the situation. 

It was decided to send 25 fighter pilots to the South Pacific 

from those available in the Hawaiian Department. 

CTF-8 292340 pink g ives his plans for the operation to 

construct an airfield at ADAK. He estimates that h~ will be 

active in covering the movement from now to October and that 

completion of the ~ject cannot be expected before the first 

of the year. In the meantime his surface units ·will require 

repair. 

Nothing si :2;nif icant was heard today of enemy moves. 

rr he striking forces now south of t he e qua tor are thought to 

b e somor;l a ce northea st of t h e SOLOLTONS . 

838 
3 .._, 6 it J:'; fb 

Aug;ust 30. 

Th§"' situation in the South Paclfic is sumrnari zed in 

Admiral Ghofley's 311046 (pink). The extent of damage done to 

the SARATOGA is not known. She will proceed to BLEACHER for 

emergency repairs. The NAVAJO has been ordered to meet up with 

the SARATOGA to render such assistance as is practicable. 

{fiNk) ComSoPac 310242~gives his plans for the next few days 

operation of the Carrier Task Forces. Incidentally, this messa8e indicates that Admiral Ghormley is having a hard time finding out what his forces are doing. 

ComAirSoPac 270411 (pink) com_ments on the employment of 

New Zealand Air. He also desires a Patwing under him at ILE NOU, 

which is being done. 

,tit< 

CinCPac 302123Pand ComSoPac 302240 (pink) dire cts the 

return of the Southwest Pacific cruisers and destroyers to 

Admira l Leary. 

b.dmiral Ghormley:(310845 pink) suggests the employment 

of submarines to operate against an enemy screening force thought 

to be northeast of the SOLOI\.iON'S. The few submarines available 

would have a hard time locating a good target in such a large 

area. 

Cominch 271320 (3 part pink) gives the Army plan for 

reinforcements to the Pacific. This was mentioned yesterday but 

only the second part of Ghe despatch was received then. 

Difficulties in unloading ships at the advance positions 

in the South Pacific continue. ,

1

This makes tl;.e prompt turnaround 

of the AKs impossible. 

There was h a rd luck in the ALEUTIA~S also. The CASCO 

was hit by a torpedo in NAZAN BAY and had to be beached. Off 

AT::LIA Island the •iJILLIAI~;ISON was accidentally damag ed by own 

seaplane depth bombs. ComTaskFor 8 302032 gives his views on 

the mining at ADAK . He still wants to mine there and CinCPac 

still doubts the wisdom of the plan. Captain Hull v1ill be sent 

North from here to investigate and report. The first wave of the 

supplies and equipnent to bui ld an airfield at ADAK has arrived 

at that pla ce • 

There is nothin23 new to record of enenw moves .. 

839 
--

AUGUST 31 

Cominch 011315 pink is u~~~e to understand how the 

recent DD bombardments and landing;\ could. approach GUADALCAN.AL 

unmolested. 

Comsopac 01030 5 pink and Comairsopac 310402 gives -tH-ci.'r · 

ideas on the imuortance of GUADALCANAL to the Pacific War and the 

necessity of holding the nlace, - for which air strength is absolutely essential. 

CTF 61 310930 pink gives disposition of the Task Forces. 

And Comsopac 011256 summarizes the days operations in that area. 

TF 8 010105 desires that two fl eet submarines now in the 

ALEUTIANS be replaced. Not only will Cincpac be unable to replace those submarines, but will also have to withdraw one more 

in the near future. It is now expected that only three fleet subs 

plus 8- boats will be available in the AIJEUTIANS. Better targets 

are presented to Fleet subs in other areas. 

It now appears that ·the CASCO is being towed to DUTCH 

HARBOR. 

The best guess now is that Cardiv 2 is still training in 

home waters. Only -two ships of Batdiv 2 are indicated in the 

RABAUL area. It seems probable that the Japs have occupied both 

OCEAN and NAURU Islands. 

At MILNE Bay the ,Japs may have been forced to retire to 

their ships by Australian ground troops. 

840 
I ,Jn 

TC!~I::f1>1re 

2-LA Qj CROI)II/ '7 

~(;) W v~ ~Iron~ 

Subject: 

1. 

INTELLIGENCE CENTER 

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

July 24, 1942. 

Japanese Naval Operat~ons; Estimate of. 

GENERAL 

(a) There has been no mention~:. of Midway in the 

radio traffic since the middle of June. Kiska and vicinity 

have been repeatedly mentioned as has Dutch Harbor, the 

latter place in connection with Radio Intelligence reports. 

No other American areas have been mentioned. Various areas 

in the Solomons have been very prominent including Guadalcanal 

and a place name designation believed to be Buna or possibly 

Gona. There have been many new place name designators assigned, including Woodla.;pk Island, Daussy Island and several new 

unidentified Australian places. The assigning of place name 

designators has in the past been invariably followed by naval 

operations either surface or air in those localities. 

(b) There has been no significant connection noted 

between any of the major forces with Malaya or the Indian 

Ocean, or with any American areas. There have been several 

messages or fragments of messages connecting the Second 

Fleet and First Air Fleet with both Palao and the Solomons. 

There is still a close connection between the Second Fleet 

and the Fourth Fleet. 

(c) The CinC First Fleet recently issued a radio 

operanion order to a group of destroyers but this probably 

ordered them to detached duty, either to convoy or to relieve 

the destroyers now in Malaya. It will be recalled that CinC 

First u· ,. Fleet also has the task of screening the homeland 

and whenever units of the fleet return home for recreation, 

repairs, etc., they come under his command and upon their 

· departure are ordered to return to their regular or special 

duties. 

(d) The Acting CinC First Air Fleet or Chief of Staff 

First Air Fleet was at Palao recently, apparently for 

inspections and conferences with local officials. The carriers 

are still in the vicinity of Japan. 

2. CONCLUSIONS 

Based on Radio Intelligence and fragments of messages 

the most probable operations of th~ Japanese Fleets in the 

immediate future are as follows: 

(a) Further consolidation of gains in the Aleutians, 

and further ad vance s to the ea-stward unless offensive 

action is taken by us . 

-1-

0 (l 1 0 1" _L 
July 24, 1942. 

Subject: Japanese Naval Operations; Estimate of. 

~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 

=lJ;l\<-AI<J ~w 

~uit.& w £_ ~;~- l"!¢. 

fl-... I a-'>~ ~1.{2-, 

Forces involved will not exceed 1 CA, maximum of 

1 DesRon with leader, and one SubRon (operating in 

entire AYeutian area) plus aircraft and tenders, supply 

ships, etc. 

(b) Further consolidation of gains in Solomons and 

eastern New Guinea with immediate objective as Port 

Moresby. In view of the new place name designators 

in the Louisiade Archipelago and Australian areas it 

is evident that the Japanese are planning further 

operations to the south and west. This office does 

not believe that, at least in the immediate funnre, 

any large striking force will be involved. Any 

offensive operations by the Allied Nations in this 

area should be expedited. 

Forces Involved - CruDiv Six, CruDiv Eighteen, 

DesRon Six, Gunboat Division Eight, maximum of one 

SubRon (operating to southward) plus the normal shore 

based aircraft groups, Army forces, and supply vessels. 

(c) Strong indications of offensive action from Java 

and Timor areas have been recently noted. The objectives 

are not clear but the sudden increase of the Third Fleet 

activity plus presence in Palao of Chief of Staff First 

Air Fleet is significant. 

Forces Involved - Probahly no more . than normal 

Third Fleet augmented by CruDiv Five. 

(d) Persistent indications of a movement toward 

Singapore and Indian Ocean lead to the conclusion that 

a large increase in convoys may be expected there. 

Forces Involved- ZUIKAKU, two CA's, and present 

Malay Force of destroyers, submarines, etc. 

3. It will be noted that no mention is made above 

of the 6 atDivs and CarDivs. At present the CarDivs which are 

the key to the situation are in the Empire. The direction of 

movement of these carriers will indicate the next operations. 

If the carriers move to Palao, fakao area the next operation 

will be to the south and west. If the carriers move toward 

Saipan the direction of operations will be toward the east 

and south. It is hoped and· expected that information will 

become available to forecast the movement in sufficient time. 

Apparently plans h ave not progressed to the poin t where the 

flee t is preparing to move as yet. In other words, the forthcoming operations of the Japanese Fleet h ave not progressed 

-2-
saonai 

July 24, 1942. 

Subject: Japanese Naval Ope rations; Estimate of. 

to the point where they are discussed in messages between 

fleet commands and units, nor to the point where the scope 

or area is indicated to Rad io Intelligence. It is, of 

course, possible that no operations other than those 

mentioned in Paragraph 2 are planned for the i~mediate 

future. 
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

------ ~ ___ /t;J_ _____ , 194~ 

MEMORANDUM 

From: Commander-in-Chief _ J ..... ~ ~ ~ 

To: 1~- ~~ . 

~/ ~ ~~ 

t!Z4<-~~~~ 

;d. ~ ~ 1'/>Vt_ ~ ~ 

ft ~~1 av-) 

~,/_c._ 

~ fiC- /11 

/ M/L. 

84 4 
o() 

1. Preliminary 

Tll.is is not a formal !.stimate of the Sjtuation in 

th9-t Yl1uch data usually included in the establi[3hrnent of the 

basis for solution of' a p:roblem is omitted. Also, ovvn Courses 

of Action and the Decision (Leading to planner_ action) is 

beyo:1J the scope of -chis paper.. '.,Jhat is soucht here is a 

comp~ete examination of 3nem_y_.Q_a_pabilj_ ties insofar as the Pacfic 

T~e~tre is concerned. \ 

\ 2. The Situation 

(a) ~nem1. ~s a result of the Coral Sea action and 

the Battle oi' I'Iidv;ay, Japan lost five carr•iers and had one dane.red. 

They also hacl losses involvinc cruisers and destroyers. Some 

d2mace was inflicted on other units, including at least one 

battleship. 

Shortly a.fter tl-1e 1Jpttle of liid\Iay, the Japanese 

f:-'lvJ (snwL) carrier stren~th concentrated in 1

Z:1pire .Ja ters, the last units ~ 0 (old-'ll'4 ~cominr: from t~e Aleutains about t 11e middle of tTuly. Durine 

tl1.e latter part of July it is estimated t"i1at the carriers -vvere 

reorganized and refitted.. On J~ugus t 1st it is believed that 

six CV and t ro ':.CV are available for enployr1ont. It is not to 

be expected that these carriers are as vlell trained or ecuipped 

as t1 o se encountered at I.~idway, nor can their screen be as 

conplete. T-Iowever, as the!"'e is dan1fer in unclerestir.1atinc; their 

present capabilities, it ~:rill be assumed hereinafter t.aat they are · 

i~ all respects re~dy for any task. 

There has been no recent chan[~e in Japan's battles~l.ip stren(rth which effects this study. ':::'3n battleships are 

available. 

While little info!"'r1a tion is at hanc1

. recardinc 

J·apaneHo amp1libious tr•oops, lar~~o nuubers ·who are well 

trained and equipped are believed available. It is known 

t~~t Japan's shi,~in[ is already overtaxed and probably unable 

to undertal::o an additional najor transportation and lor;istic 

oroblen .. 

-1- 845 
,. 

.J?GPriMl 

(b) Own. Because of the employment of three carrier 

task forces in the South Pacific only one carrier task force · 

is available on Au~ust lst in the Central Pacific. Concentration of our carriers at Pearl from the South Pacific vrould 

take about twelve days. To r.1ove them to the Aleutains would 

involve about ei~ht days more . -Thus, to meet an advance of 

an enemy raiding or occupation force in the Central Pacific we 

would require over two vreeks notice; and the North Pacific 

over three weeks notice. 

Our battleship strength in the Pacific is still 

inferior to the enemy. TF-1 will operate near Hawaiian Area 

durine part of August, but is not ready for battle because of 

lack of adequate screen and air covera~e. 

Air strength in the Hawaiian Area is inadequate 

to repel a determined raid. Midway is being strengthened 

by the addition of a landing strip on Sand Island. When that 

strip is completed, the entire present heavy bombing strength 

in the islands can operate from Bidway. At present fighters 

can be brought into 1iidway by ship. The fighter staging 

project to Mid1.vay via French Prigate Shoals will not be completed before October. 

A cruiser task force plus fairly good air strength 

is operating in the Aleutains. So far it has been ineffective, 

mainly because of bad weather and lack of air coverage in 

advance areas. The effort there is limited to attrition, using 

submarines and long range bombing. ·;~ffectiveness of long 

range bombardment of Japanese held positions in Kiska and 

Attu has not yet been demonstrated. 

\ 

Our submarine offonsi ve in Jap waters j_ s now at low 

ebb because of the employment of subr:1arines at Truk and in the 

Aleutians. rrhis condition Hill continue durine: August. 

3. Background. 

(a) Merely as a reminder, certain points of Japanese 

ambitions and trends are set down in the briefest sort of a 

way. As far back as the early nineties the Japs '\Jirere not 

satisfied with their lot and determined to do something about 

it. To raise living standards and to care for their population 

pressure, they decided (1) to become an industrial nation, and 

(2) expand. ~or the first they needed ready access to raw 

materials. For the second they needed land suitable to Japanese. 

Their pro3ress in attaining these eoals ha~ been steady, if 

-2 .... 

848 
43!99~L T 

~ slow; but they have consistently stuck to the ,main ~d~s. liow 

that they have overrun 0he vast stretches of lialays1a need only 

to consolidate their gains to accomplish her-;enony in the Orient. 

rrhi s being the case, it ''lould seem reasonable that thei1, one 

and only desire at present is to prevent outside interference 

until their exploitation of capturffiregions has made them inpree;nable in what thoy call their sphere of influence. Their 

attack on Pearl Barbor is further evidence that they desire 

above all to prevent our interference with Asiatic operations. 

The tar~ets picked indicated only a desire to imnoblize our 

Pleet. 

(b) 'dith the above in mind it seems logical to 

consider Japanese courses of action as limited for the present 

to making secure their extensive gains, rather than considering 

possible expansion not closely related thereto. 

4. J:hreats to Japan. 

Interference with Japanese plans can cone from 

the following: 

(1) China. The Sino-Jap war has been dracging along 

since 1937. Hhile Japan dominates the richest part of China, 

thereis no proof yet that this military gesture has paid 

commercial dividends. However, they cannot afford to lose 

that war and might be well satisfied with a stronG and controlled puppet e:;overrunent and existing bounde.rie s. As long 

as the China venture continues Japan must continue to pour 

in men and materials which they would probably rather use 

elsewhere. 

(2) Enc;land. (includ.inr; India.) Today -~ngland 

is only a ninor throat nainly because of her preoccupation 

vJi th Germany. Her Far ~astern Fleet is not now able to penetrate the 11alay barrier. Nor can her Pleet be of much use 

in the Day of Bengal.. Burma is sufficiently occupied by Japan 

to prevent an overland threat to the Indo-China rice. India is 

hardly pro-British. ,Jhile British sea power is always a dancer 

to Japan, rfnere is nothinG "to indicate even a mild threat to 

Japan durin~ Auf3ust. 

(3) £ustralia. it present Australia cannot take 

the offensive. ~han~:s to the United States there is the 

deflni te probab1li ty that Austral:!. a vvill become the jump off 

point for an offensive de stinecl to defeat ,Japan. To rr1ake this 

possible the supply lines to Australia must ue kept open to the 

United ITations. Of inmediato interest is the .hustralian air activity 

in tho :.:r.v Pacific. r--L1

his is, so far, decidec:ly of minor proportions 

but onourh to cavse Japan some trouble and delay in consolidatin,: 

her po s.:. tions in tho JTew Guinea, IJe-v~r ri tain-Solo:mon 11rea. 

-3-

0 A -7 

U'-i-1 
\'i e Kv>ow J ll-f'ln . will 6-lta.ct tfumu., 

~~~ tf R~S.SI~ 

\nif~c.S ho-stle. 

atltl)n. 

(4) United States. Lacking troops and bottoms for 

an oi~f en si ve thru the l.ianda te s (even if v;e had the required 

types combatant available) there is little we can do now 

except in the South Pacific. Of course, Japan may not know 

this. She knows tlJ.a t we have an enormous building pror;ram, and that potentially (and eventually) we can muster the requisite strength to move thru the Central Pacific and gradually 

gain-and maintain control of the sea areas vital to Japan . Her 

'idea may be t 1 1a t before we are ready for suc~l a move, Japan 

idill be strong enouch so tJ:1a t the r;ame will not be worth the 

candle. In the r1eantime OUl" greatest threat is the supplies, equipnent, and Men He are sendine to the Southwest. Except for submarines, ?earl is too far away for use as an offensive 

jum:; off point, and we are too "~"Neal: to gain nearer positions north of the equator. 

( 5) Russia . Here the dan~er lies in the proximity of 

air in t 1J.e Vladivostok region to industrial Japan. Japan can harc~_ly fool secure ,-,rhile this threat exists. Certainly she will 

not provoke Vlar until she thinks that Ruc-Jsia is beaten by 

Gernan:r, and until that beatinG takes shape in the removal of 

Russian aircraft fron Siberia to the German front. 

5. Broad Courses of Action. 

Based on the idea expressed above, i.e. that Japan r1ust novf prevent interference \vi th her exploitation in the 

Orient, the followinG are her broad courses of action: 

(1) Step up military operations in China with view 

to obtaininG a sati8factory stalemate in the Sino-Jap \fur . 

tny increase in such mil~tary operations will be 

primarily an hrny project. nut it would have e,fect on other 

fronts because it would involve further demands on her national 

strenzth. 1Torv that Japan 1as effectively sto_p::_)ecl nearly all 

occidental reinforcements she is in a better position to offer 

China a compronise peace . The masses of Chinese may well be 

clad to end the strugcle . The leaders May be~ome discouracecl 

if the~r con t:i_nue to receive pror1i se s, but little real sup:1ort . ~J specially if the vrar continues f,q_vorf3ble to tho J~xis, and if 

Japan can admini stnr son.e so rt of a major local clefea t on the C'~inese, and if (lriental intr,igue can be reasonably successful, t,1ere is tl1o possibilit:I of sufficient Japanese vrithdrawal from 

Chinato be acceptable to the Chinese . 

s this is not expected dur·in~ Aucust it wlll not 

be considex"ed as beapin~ on the innr1ediate problem .. 

- 4- 848 
s 'T s a ..., m 

(2) A major effort to continuo the offensive in 

the Indian (cean. 

If Japan could now occupy Ceylon their stratee.;ic 

position ~~:ft~t~~~:iderably enhanced as they would be in a position t mip~te the Bay of Bengal and the approaches 

of Singapor~ Off-hand, it would seem logical that no such step 

would be taken unless Ja:9an felt sure of the security of her• 

eastern flanl: . And this is especially so now when the ~ar Eastern 

::!leet seems to hs.ve no idea of an:r action which will cause Japan 

trouble. On the other lland there is the bright prospect oi' winnint"~ India over to the Axis side . The effort would not be an 

attempt to conquer India, but to make a show of strength to discredit the British, and to bring the military, economic, and 

political fronts more nearly into alignment in that area. If 

Ceylon vvere captured, the stranglehold on India would be complete. 

(3) fperations to: first , gain a foothold in 

Australia and; second, to extend their positions within striking 

distance of the U.S. - Australia supply line. 

Jap positions in New Guinea will never be entirely 

secure as long as Port Moresby is stron~ly held and can continue 

as an air base. It is assur;1ed that the Jl.ustralians for the present 

will continue their sporadic and nuisance-value bombings. If the 

Japanese capture Port Horesby they will continue to be within 

bonbing range of lustralian air fields. Such a condition could 

continue a long time without serious injury to either side. 

With the elimination of the Port Moresby nuisance, though, Japans 

~ositions in the Solomons and their capability to advance· to 

Noumea would be considerably enhanced. 

It does not seem reasonable that Japan will, in 

the foreseeable future, make a serious attempt on the Australian 

mainland . 

Because of their nany good positions and relati vo security north of Tir1or Sea, the Japanese are well placed 

for operations in northwestern Australia . ~ehat area is fairly 

well isolated fron the populous eastern lustralia by the great 

stretches of wasteland .. In order to better secure Timor, and 

Java by denyinc, Australia junp off points such as Darwin and 

Broome, and to reduce the submarine menace from \!estern 

Australia, Ja9an may very possibly plan landings in force in 

that rer:ion .. Such 'a move could conceivably take place in August. 

On the other lmnd, many signs point toward 

their desire to occupy Port Tloresby and to expand down through 

the lTew Hebrides and to T>iew Caledonia. For the occupation of 

Port Eoresby they nuot co overland unless they are willing to 

make another and stronger atterwt via the Coral Sea . If they 

-5- 849 
• o " a 12 L r 

are going overland they must use :many more troops than have 

been reported in New Guinea up to now. A possible indication 

that such is intended is _the information of large array forces 

probably enroute. If they are thinkinr; of a sea borne attempt 

they would :probably want to be stronger than they were in May. 

And if the sea borne attack is cont~plated we could reasonably 

expect it to take place only after airfields are cor.1pleted in 

S .1~. Hew Guinea and at Guadalcanal. That done, they could operate their carriers under an air umbrella to the S.E. and S.W. 

They may be content to defer the Port Moresby 

project for a while and go ahead into the Santa Cruz Islands 

and Nev.f Hebrides. This sort of an operation would seem to call 

for considerable carrier stren~th, but not a comparatively large 

number of troops. If it -rrere done step by step (and it probably would have to be as landing fields cannot be captured but 

must be built) the operation could hardly be more than started 

during Aut::ust. 

(4) Raids on our line from Llidway to Suva . 

These are always possible and well within 

Japan's capabilities. Good jumpin~ off places are available 

to them in the Harshalls. Such operations South of Hawaii 

would not have to be in force, and would be hit and run in 

order to delay our efforts. It does not seen probable at the 

moment that Japan could seriously try to occupy and hold any 

positions east of the 180th meridian in the South Pacific . In 

the Ha1w1aiian Area the most damace they could do would be at 

Pearl Harbor. Another successful surprise raid at Pearl is 

alvyays a P9~sibili ty_~ ~7 Ova ~ p-, /;--~-~-·J.-Q&- -::/--~ ea.,~..,,( t /<?.< (j_ 

(h{v i ,.-( {A. ( 

(5) Seizure and occupation o:f the Hawaiian Islands. 

Vfuile there is sood reason for Japan to want 

to do this, her available strength fo:r the operation is not in 

sight. It is true that she can bring to bear a force large 

enough to cover the necessary t~oop movement if most of our 

stren2:th is elsewhere. But there just does not seem sufficient 

tonnace available to her to trans;Jort and support any such effort. It is true that if she could arrive at a time when our 

task forces are absent and w'l;.en the Hawaiian air force is weak, 

Japan could probably gain a foothold on outlyin~ islands. fter 

gaining such a foothold she could easily lose the war in trying 

to dig in. It would of~er the finest sort of attrition possibilities to us. We have only to remember that we could find no 

way to support Guam and vlake. In fact they were considered by 

many as a liability. 

-6- 850 
a TI o Jt TJ ... 

The seizure and occupation of Midway was 

undoubtedly a plan of the Japanese in early June. What their 

ultimate objective was in that campaign is not known. If 

they were satisfied merely to occupy it to deny it to us they 

would thereb~r, (1) restrict our westward air search; (2) deny 

:r,Iidway to us as a fuel topping off place; ( 3) eliminate our 

chance of b ombing Wake '\vith present planes. I.1ay:be this, "9lus 

undoubted value to them for the same purpose to the eastward, 

is considered enough to cause them to make another attempt. 

But again, they would have an almost impossible situation. 

Holding Pearl, we could undoubtedly make their logistic problem 

impossible. And they could not defend the place against inevitable recapture. We conclude, then, that the Japs will not 

attempt to occupy Midway except as part of a campaign to capture all of the Hawaiian Islands. 

{6) A further advance to the Eastward in the 

Aleutians. 

Here it all depends on ~ e s+.i i meets m why 

they went there in the first place. If they went there to 

6!1../:>dJ&f;. cause a diversion they have succeeded in immobilizing a crui- lnterc~~ 1n a.rJ ser task force, and no further effort is immediately necessary. ( -·· I,SC.mte er A · If they want a base to operate fror.1 to protect northern fisher11 :r~,Y~ .}ies they may need only to strengthen present positions. If co (lol-~ 0+ {Q t, t t . t . b 1 • • 4Avct111 (~ ~- ne:r wan o :Ln -errupt a possl e a1r ferry route to Siber1a 

um>ohJatl"'n via the Aleutians they need ~o no further. But if they want 

c-.:rru-KISI<A . to cause us serious worry in that recion they r:1ust move considerably more to the east. As this is not a good CV operating 

S: ea it would seem tbat the chances of large scale CV covering 

i~ forces operating against shore based air now known presen~ are 

srrtall. Nevertheless, such a course is possible. 

(7) An attack on Russia . 

JAI'A.tJ w1\l 1\Qt-' 

oJ. ~ i<M.m~ 

w-.1-t~S I a:-t)'t.Y 

This depends so much on ~ropean operations 

now underway that it serves no useful purpose to guess.. Suffice to say that rJvs could be employed. 

ri>•'((.t ,\-o t p{)Stt~~-t.. 

l)t~~\~C. tr-thcm dtr•J.J 

~QIIl.)r .J ~"'"· 

J W t4Wcv CV$ w&vS 8 ~ Lope.v-da. ~t.-..~f-· Pet"vo~losk~ 

l«:>~t~ stc-ie. - a. tv. j 

~,u. t \ vlo 

( t 

-7-

851 
6. 

(a) We are no longer reading the enemy mail and 

today ~ugust 1) we must depend almost entirely on traffic 

analysis to deduce enemy deplo:yment . 'rhere is a chance that, 

during August, we will improve in this respect~ 

(b) \Je h0ve only the flimsiest sort or a surface 

picket line to warn us of hostile approach, and r1.ust rely on 

air search and radar. 

(c) As there are so mahy possibilities open to 

IW .Jk Sapan there does not seem to be any profit in making wild 

~~ ~ guesses as to their next Move. From a purely strategic point 

+k- ~~h,:u;l~, of view the only move during August which seens likely is ~wtc:tc~~~~ v<qt\ ~ ex.panslon in the direction of the Uew Hebrides. 

s.c.co~"J t'll ~'rots 

~ ~~t<:: PtA-1\iofJ.&~ ( 

. ~ 0\J<t>ll'l~ (,.,J.~ 0-S.It~f'.r.~ b) ~ e-, \ ( 

Wrel~~- -' 

r' '\ 

-8- 852 
ESTill rrE 011 JAPAl>L.:.,SE LAHD _,,OHC2S -==--

Jew Britain ( Rabaul a nd Vicinity) - - - - - - - -

1c~iralty Islands (Loren au) --- -------

New Ireland (less Kavieng patrol) - - - -

Hew Guinea: 

Salamaua - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Lae - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gbna - Buna - Kokoda - - - - - - - - - - - - Dutch 1Tev1 Guinea (8 detachments) - - - - - -

Solomons: 

Buka - - - - - - - -

Kieta - - - - - - - - -

Faisi - Buin - - - - - -

Nalai ta - - - - - -

Rekata (Santa Isabel) - - - -

Tulagi - Gavutu - ~lorida - - -

Guadalcanal - Lunga - Kukum 

15,000 

400 

200 

1 , 100 

400 

800 

4,000 

800 

600 

500 

100 

200 

500 

1,600 

3,000 

\ '&. C D O 

'3 ao 

~ I\ v o J 

plUS 5oo 

natives 

6 o c 

S"oo 

-?-

t b oc:. 

rrotal 26,100 plus 400 

natives. 

Tiecent reenforcements in area have come via Truk . Army 

in Davao appears to be showing interest this area . Present 

forces appear to be committed where now located, except 

Rabaul. Scattered land forces are incapable mutual support. 

I e stina te maximum t hat could be assembled as a striking 

force in area without adandoning present positions is about 

5,000, provi ded slnpping and assault equipnent is available . 

These could be taken from Rabaul. Reenforcements from outside area are sub ·ect only to availa ble shipping and escort 

forces but could probably not reach area in less than 20 

days. 

85.3 
1. Present Defense ~orces . 

~fate - - - - - ~~ spiri tu Santo 

Piji - - - - -

6936 

610 

- - 17673 

Hew Caledonia - - - - - - - 23000 

Tongatabu - - - - - - - - 8501 

Tutuila - - - -

Upolu - - - - - - - - - - -

Savaii - - - - - -

\Vallis - - - - - - -

Bora bora 

10730 

4260 

189 

2426 

4978 ----

Total 

2. Mobile Defense orce s: 

3d Harine Defense Battalion 

5th l'larine Defense Da ttallon 

3d Barrage Balloon Squadron 

Total 

3 . Hobile Attack Forces: 

1st Harine Division(less7th) 

2d liarine S ( est) T(eenforced 

1st Marine ~aider Battalion 

Total 

982 

1165 

228 

13403 

4736 

900 

4. Present Porces South Pacific Area 

79,303 

2,375 

19,039 

100,717 

5. Prospective increases by Cctober ~.st (Picador & Opium): 

1 Army AA ~eciment - - - - - -

7th 1.1arines (reenforced) - - -

8th l1ar ines (reenforced) - - -

2 BarraBe Balloon Squadrons 

1st iv. ~ngineer Battalion 

1 Pioneer Com~any - - - - - -

Total 

-1-

1800 

4300 ( Approx. ) 

4300 ( rt ) 

454 

677 

203 

11,734 

854 
6. Contemplated Garrisons: (fn>~ 1.. til'\ cl .!) 

Ndeni - - - - - - - - - - - ~rulagi - FoPida - -

Guadalcanal - - - - - -

Total 

5124 

4541 

1762 

11,427 

7. Remaining for offensive or defensive action (less 

combat losses) after operations contemplated in 

Phase 1-9987 (2 plus 3 less 6 but not including 5) 

Present contemplated distribution will have to 

extend to Malaita and Santa Isabel Island. This 

will probably be accomplished by using AA regiments and defense forces now in present bases 

plus the Army AA regiment in prospect. 

-2-

855 
OEBRI I 

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY IN'l1ENT IONS 

September l, 1942. 

l. Preliminary. 

This is a continuation of the Estimate of enemy 

capabilities for the month of August.. Much cor: tained in that 

e s t i mate ·wi 11 not be repeated . Events to J e p t ember 1 s t , 19 4 2 , 

are reflected herein. 

2 . Brief of Events during Aupust, 1942. 

South Paci fie" The offensive in the SOLOMOl~S 

started on August 7th. All enemy positions in the 1TULAGI area 

were captured. About 15,000 Ma rines were landed. An airfield 

at GUb.D.-.. LCAl~AL was captured and air search advanced to NDEHI 

and ESPIRITU 3ANTO . Since that time our forces have been consolidating nositions under the ) rotection of carrier task forces and shore based air. As was to be expected, repercussions 

were immediate . On the 9th an enemy cruiser and destroyer force 

sank four of our screening cruisers and damaged one cruiser and 

two destroyers off SAVO Island. One good sized enemy landing 

attempt was annihilated on GUADALC NAL. Our positions in the 

area have been bombed frequently, and minor landings continued 

to the end of the month. The bombing raiders have been attacked 

very successfully by our air forces at GUADALCANAL causing the 

enemy considerable losses. A large number of submarines continue to attack our line of communications to the TULAGI area . 

On the 24th (local) four larg e groups of enemy ships vvere discovered north and \vest of I'IALAITA approaching the T1JLA.GI area. 

One group contained 2 CVs; another contained 1 CV; another was 

thou.ght composed of 1 BI3, 4 crvisers and several destroyers; 

and the fourth was probably made up of 2 or 3 APs escorted by 

cruisers and destroyers. Our carriers and shore based air engaged in an air duel with these enemy vessels. As a result the 

enemy sustained damase to her carriers and other vessels, the 

extent of which is obscure, ancl returned to the northward . 'I'he 

Japs lost a large number of carrier based planes in the duel. 

The El~TEHPHISE received bomb hits which will keep her out of 

action for a long time. On the 30th the SARAr:roGA was torpedoed 

and seriously damaged by a Jap submarine - reducing our carriers 

available in the Pacific to two. 

Gil bert Islands. On Augus t 17 (local) a }~arine 

Raider group r:1ade a very successful landing on l

1

,J\.KIN Island from 

submarines. ,-~11ile stiffer opposition was encountered than was 

expected, the rald stirred up the enemy considerably and was 

well worth while e 

-1- 855 
ESTilVLA TE OF ENEMY I ETENTIONS ( Cont 'd) 

Central Pacific. The BOISE was sent toward Japan 

to attack an enemy sampan po. trol .line estimated to be 500 to 

BOO miles east of HONSHU. No patrol v essels were sighted, but 

due to an error in n a vi g ation the BOISE lost two search planes . 

One of these planes was found four days l a ter by the Japs and 

a p parently created the impression that a BLUE striking force vras 

enroute Ja.pan. At any rate, the en emy hurriedly sent out a force 

built around 3 CVs to investigate. 

North Pacific. On August 7th the main body of Task 

Force 8 bombarded KISY-.A. 'rhe firing was indirect and low ceiling prevented spotting or observation of results. No enemy reaction has been noted following this attempted diversion. It 

has been decided to build an Army airfield on ADAK Island. Task 

Force 8 will cover this opera~ion which began on August 30th. 

The CASCO · vras torpedoed by a Jap sub at NAZAN Bay and severely 

damaged . 

3 . The Situation. 

(a) Enemy. Our offensive in the TULAGI area has 

produced severe repercussions in Japan and all signs point to 

an early and major effort on their part to recapture the positions we have taken. Indications are that a large portion of 

enemy air and surface units t h roughout the entire Pacific Theatre 

are being concentrated in the South Pacific. The estimate of 

streng th of these forces c r1ang es from day to day and is not included herein, but is available on short notice. Strong striking 

forces consisting of at least 3 CVs (one may be badly damaged), 

1-2 BBs, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and g ood sized shore 

based air are operating in the South Pacific. Additional carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers now may be enroute 

to that area. Troons are beinr: transferred to the l~ BAUL area 

from as far VJest as_,_the .I. nd PHILIPPINES. The enemy has 

made a new landin~ at MIL1'JE BAY which now seems unsuccessful. · 

His efforts in NE"N GU I NEA have been small since the Coral Sea 

Battle. The enemy occupied OCEAN , Nl:~. UHU, and vJ ~ Islands 

du ring the last part of Au gust. 

(b) OvJn. Tvro carrier task forces are now op e rating 

in the South .Paci fic. The ENTERPRISE and SARArroGA 1.•rill either 

be repaired at PEA.RL or on t he 1

'Je s t Coast. They cannot b e in 

service in the area during Se p temb e r. 

- 2 -

857 
s:rs a ... t!S!IIt 

ESTirliATE OF I;;NEMY INS.

1

ENTIONS ( Cont 'c~l 

(b) Own (Continued). 

The posltions in the lJ:1ULAGI-GUADALCANAL area are 

being improved gradually. The supply of food and ammunition to 

the forces ashore is proceeding under great difficulties. Unloading facilities are primitive in the extrer.1e. While enroute 

and unloading, our ships are constantly vulnerable to enemy submarines, shore based air, destroY.ers, cruisers, motor torpedo 

boats. The enemy striking forces and submarines threaten the 

line of supply from the South. There is a great shortage of 

shore based aircraft in the area. Army types are particularly 

desired. 

Two new BBs, the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA plus 

1 CL and 6 DDs are now enroute to the South Pacific. They are 

expected to arrive in the active area about September 5th and 

15th. 

As there has been no improvement in the Army air 

situation in the Hawaiian Area, the extreme vulnerability of 

the MIDvVAY-PiliWAII line continues. It must be assumed that for 

the next 30 days a raid on that line could not be prevented . 

One group of B-24s are scheduled to arrive at HAWAII about September lOth and the Army has advised that no more heavy planes 

are to be expected in September. To reduce the possibilities 

of a successful enemy landing, Task Force 1 is being kept at 

PEP:.RL. . 

Task Force 8 continues to operate in the ALEUTIANS. 

The net result to .date has been the immobilization of tb.e surface forces. Our Fleet submarines there have probably sunk at 

least six enemy DDs. 7/e have lost one submarine and a number 

of airplanes. 

Our submarine offensive in Jap waters continues to 

be at a low ebb because of withdrawals to ALASKA and to TRUK 

and KAVIENG. 

Our convoy operations continue to be satisfactory 

as no losses have resulted. The escorts employed are urgently 

needed elsewhere. 

4. Threats to Japan. 

( 1) China. No addltional remarks. 

(2) En rr land. No a dditional remarks. 

-3-

858 -
E3TII.1A1'I~ OF I~Nl:'..I Y I1JTENTIONS ( Cont 'd) 

(3) ~\ustralia. The air sttacks in the Southwest 

Pacific continue to be of a r:1inor character. No substantial 

increase in the threat from Australia during the month is 

noted. However, as tir:1e ~oes on the forces in Australia should 

become considerably better trained and equipped. As long as 

our submarines continue to base on both the west and east 

coasts Japan will be uneasy about them. 

(4) United States. The present offensive in the Southwest Pacific is the only active threat. ·It is now too early to 

say whether or not this threat will become critical. The long 

pull threat of the United States continues. 

(5) Russia. Because of the deterioration of Russia's 

position on her western front the threat to Japan is remote. 

The potential danger of hostile Hussian action against Japan 

still exists. 

5. Broa~ Courses of Action. 

At this time it seems almost a certainty that there will be an all out offensive to recapture lost positions in the 

SOL0110N3 and, if all goes well, to extend positions toward J\1]~·~1. 

CALEDONIA. 

But as we can never be sure, the following must be 

considered within Japanese capabilities: 

(a) Another a ttern.pt to ca_pture MID1

VAY. 

This is not considered possible as lon~ as the 

Japs are ensaged in a major effort in the South Pacific. But 

Japan can now break off in the south and muster a large force 

off I:1TD7/AY before we can brine; in sufficient forces to prevent 

a landing. If the enemy arrives off ~IL VAY ln force ) unde tee ted , kiDffiY would probably fall. 

(b) t further extension of effort in the ALEUTIANS. 

This is considered possible but not probable. It 

seems more p~obable that her effort there will be to supply 

present positions for the winter. 

(c) An at tack on TVe stern AUSTRALIA. 

This r->ossiblli ty would cause us ser5_ous embarrassment and night do lar.c;e da:r1a ge to our J:'ULJ G I venture by the 

drainln~ off our surface and air to repel such an attack. It 

rrust not be discounted and should be re ~arded as a diversion 

attempt. 

-4- 858 1 
i!!l..uv .t~.J.., f 

ES'l,IMATE OP LNEMY IN'TEN~riONS (Cont'_gj_ 

(d) Raids on our positjons from MIDWAY to NOUMEA . 

These ·would be to cause diversion and must be 

considered quite possible. They wou ld be in connection with a 

main effort in the SOLOMONS. 

(e) An offensive toward INDIA. 

This would require a strategic defensive attitude 

in the Pacific. Possible, but improbable. 

(f) An attack on RUSSIA . 

Mainly an army effort and would not greatly effect current estimated intentions in the Pacific. 

6. I.Iost probable enemy intention. ~. 

As stated above the most probable enemy intention as 

of September 1, 1942, is to recapture the SOLOMONS and extend 

further to the South. rrhe capture of eastern NEW GUINEA, including Pt. MORESBY, is considered a part of the plan. His 

effort :rr1ay be visualized as follo·ws: 

1st, preceeding and during an all out attack in the 

GUADALCANAL-TUU4G I area the enemy :rr1ay be expected to (in that 

area): 

(a) Continue his submarine reconnaissance in that 

area and along our lines of communications, and attack prime 

targets. 

(b) Continue air attacks on our ships and positions 

us·ing shore based air. 

(c) Occasionally shell our shore positions. 

(d) Attack our transports and freighters with 

cruisers, destroyers, and motor torpedo boats bothday and 

night; especially while unloading. 

(e) r~1ake minor repeated landings·. 

2nd, during a·major attack in the GUADALCANA.L-TULAGI 

area to: 

(a) Raid our positions in the NEW HEBRIDIES. 

-5- 860 
AJSGflb'jl: 

ESTIMATE OF ENELtY I NrrENTI ONS ( Cont 'd) 

6 •. (continued) 

The purpose of this would be to break up our 

lines of supply and destroy advanced airfields, airplanes, 

and supplies qf all kinds. 

(b) Occupy NDENI. 

This would be to deny it to us, give them an 

advanced position for further moves south, and protect recaptured positions. 

7. There are listed below possible diversion attempts 

which might preceed the major attack or be tined with. the attack. 

As these are considered not probable they are not discussed 

further. 

(a) A raid in force on FIJI or SAl11 0A. 

(b) A. light raid on OAHU. 

(c) A lif;ht raid on our air staging positions 

south of OAHU. 

(d) A raid on }hl DWAY or JOHNSTON. 

8. Except for events since August 24th, this estimate 

was completed that day. Since then cap t ured documents and 

events have shown the estimate to be substantially correct. 

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