STICK PUSHER AND ADVERSE WEATHER EVENT TRAINING 

AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE

Final Report and Recommendations

July 6, 2011
SPAW ARC Final Report i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................1

1.0 Methodology...........................................................................................................................................3

2.0 Summary of Recommendations.............................................................................................................4

2.1 Training Enhancements .....................................................................................................................4

2.2 InFO and SAFO Enhancements.........................................................................................................4

2.3 Regulatory Standards.........................................................................................................................4

2.4 Simulator Modeling.............................................................................................................................4

2.5 Simulator Fidelity................................................................................................................................4

2.6 Instructor Training...............................................................................................................................4

2.7 Simulator Instructor Operating Stations .............................................................................................4

2.8 Auto-Pilot Utilization ...........................................................................................................................5

2.9 Competency Based Training..............................................................................................................5

2.10 FSB Process.....................................................................................................................................5

2.11 Upset Prevention and Recovery Training ........................................................................................5

2.12 Adverse Weather Academic Training...............................................................................................5

2.13 Comprehensive Pilot Training ..........................................................................................................5

2.14 Stall and Stick Pusher Training ........................................................................................................5

2.15 Feedback Mechanism ......................................................................................................................5

2.16 Required Simulator Training.............................................................................................................6

3.0 Icing........................................................................................................................................................7

Findings & Conclusions.............................................................................................................................7

Recommendations.....................................................................................................................................8

3.1 Icing Training ..................................................................................................................................8

3.2 InFO and SAFO Process ..............................................................................................................10

3.3 Simulator Fidelity ..........................................................................................................................11

3.4 Comprehensive Pilot Training.......................................................................................................13

3.5 Airman Knowledge Test Requirements ........................................................................................13

3.6 Training Program Content ............................................................................................................14

3.7 Instructor Training.........................................................................................................................14

3.8. Autopilot Utilization ......................................................................................................................15

4.0 Microburst and Windshear Training.....................................................................................................16

Findings & Conclusions...........................................................................................................................16

Recommendations...................................................................................................................................17

4.1 Microburst and Windshear Training..............................................................................................17

4.2 Complex Wind Models..................................................................................................................18

4.3 Adverse Weather Academic Training ...........................................................................................18

4.4 Simulator Fidelity ..........................................................................................................................19
SPAW ARC Final Report ii

4.5 Simulator Instructor Operating Stations........................................................................................19

4.6 Turbulence Requirements ............................................................................................................20

4.7 Non-Survivable Scenarios ............................................................................................................20

4.8 Instructor Training.........................................................................................................................21

4.9 Competency Based Training ........................................................................................................21

4.10 Regulatory Oversight ..................................................................................................................22

5.0 Stall/Stick Pusher/Loss of Control........................................................................................................23

Findings & Conclusions...........................................................................................................................23

Recommendations...................................................................................................................................24

5.1 Stick Pusher Training....................................................................................................................24

5.2 Stall Training.................................................................................................................................25

5.3 FSB Process.................................................................................................................................28

5.4 Simulator Training.........................................................................................................................28

5.5 Stall Training Programs ................................................................................................................29

5.6 Upset Prevention and Recovery Academic Training....................................................................30

5.7 Upset Prevention and Recovery Flight Training...........................................................................30

5.8 Certification Training.....................................................................................................................30

5.9 Simulator Fidelity ..........................................................................................................................31

5.10 Feedback Mechanism.................................................................................................................31

Appendix A—Members, Staff, and SMEs .................................................................................................A–1

Appendix B—Acronyms ............................................................................................................................B–1

Appendix C—Charter............................................................................................................................... C–1

Appendix D—Section 208 of Pub. L. 111–216 ........................................................................................ D–1

Appendix E—Definitions ...........................................................................................................................E–1

Appendix F—Training to Objective and Measurable Standards...............................................................F–1

Recommended/Example Competencies and Proficiency Standards for a Windshear Training Program

...............................................................................................................................................................F–1

Theoretical Knowledge Training ........................................................................................................F–1

Flight Training ....................................................................................................................................F–1

Appendix G—Survey & Data Analysis Results/Industry Practices .......................................................... G–1

Appendix H—Proposed Simulator Standards for Icing, Windshear, Upset, & Stall Training .................. H–1

Introduction........................................................................................................................................... H–1

Summary of Recommended Changes to Current FFS Evaluation Standards..................................... H–1

Attachment A—Proposed Revisions to Current Simulator Standards Tables (14 CFR Part 60)......... H–1

General Requirements...................................................................................................................... H–1

Objective Testing Requirements....................................................................................................... H–6

Functions and Subjective Testing Requirements ........................................................................... H–12

Upset Recognition and Recovery ................................................................................................... H–12

Attachment B—Supplemental Information to Objective Testing Tables ............................................ H–12
SPAW ARC Final Report iii

Stall Maneuver Evaluation .............................................................................................................. H–12

Upset Prevention and Recovery Maneuver Evaluation.................................................................. H–14

Appendix I—Training Objectives from FAA AC 120–50A (Current Guidance).........................................I–1

Ground Training......................................................................................................................................I–1

Simulator Training ..................................................................................................................................I–1

Appendix J—Reference Material .............................................................................................................. J–1
SPAW ARC Final Report 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was created to satisfy the requirements of the Stick Pusher and Adverse Weather 

(SPAW) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) charter and the Airline Safety and Federal 

Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Public Law 111–216 (Pub. L. 111–216) § 208. 

The ARC, composed of a multidisciplinary panel of specialists, studied the issues related to stick 

pusher activations and adverse weather events. 

This report is directed to the attention of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Associate 

Administrator for Aviation Safety and recommends improvements for flightcrew member 

training. To have the greatest impact on safety, the SPAW ARC’s recommendations should be 

incorporated beyond Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 training, with 

particular emphasis on core handling skill development throughout a pilot’s career.

During its deliberations, the SPAW ARC reviewed many previous working group reports from 

the past two decades. The ARC commends previous ARCs and working groups on their

excellent work in this subject. A review of National Transportation Safety Board accident data 

did not reveal any evidence of microburst, windshear, or icing accidents in part 121 operations 

over the last 10 years. The ARC recognizes aviation safety has improved significantly over the 

last two decades, but believes additional improvements should be made. It urges the 

Administrator not to delay implementation of its recommendations. 

The SPAW ARC divided into three subcommittees to complete its tasking: Icing, Microburst 

and Windshear, and Stick Pusher. The full ARC membership reviewed, studied, and debated the 

subcommittees’ work products. All of the recommendations achieved 100 percent consensus,

negating the need for a minority position section. Thus, for the purposes of this report, the 

SPAW ARC and its subcommittees may be considered synonymous.

The current flight simulation training device (FSTD) equipment delivering training provides an 

inadequate level of fidelity and requires updating to support the SPAW ARC’s training 

requirements. Accordingly, the ARC recommends improvements to the technical standards of 

14 CFR part 60 in the areas of icing, microburst and windshear, stall and upset prevention and

recovery.

Each subcommittee identified the lack of instructor standardization. Based on surveys, 

presentations, and the experiences of the SPAW ARC members, it was apparent that while 

standardization may exist among instructors within a training organization, there was limited

instructor standardization among the industry training providers. The ARC believes that 

incorporating this report’s recommendations will provide for better standardization of training 

delivery and improved quality of training.

The ARC recommended methods to increase the familiarity of flightcrew members with, and 

improve their response to, stick pusher activations, and adverse weather events. The ARC 

concluded that it must also address relevant training tasks in the same flight regime as stick 

pusher training and improved icing training. 
SPAW ARC Final Report 2

The SPAW ARC recognized that aircraft ice accumulation can lead to an increased stall speed 

and further develop into an aerodynamic stall or upset. This may occur without the activation of 

the stall-warning or stick pusher system. The ARC reviewed related training requirements and 

standards for FSTD equipment used in the delivery of microburst/windshear, icing, and stick 

pusher training, and concluded it was also necessary to extend its recommendations to stall and 

upset prevention and recovery training. The ARC also determined these simulator deficiencies 

must be addressed before any training can be accomplished beyond the first indication of a stall 

(or stick-pusher activation). The ARC then leveraged previous industry work group efforts to 

make recommendations addressing these deficiencies.

The members of the SPAW ARC wish to thank the Administrator for the opportunity to offer 

recommendations on these important issues confronting the air carrier industry. They remain 

available for further consultations as necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________ _____________________________

Lou Nemeth Philip Adrian

ARC Chairman, ARC Vice-chairman

CAE The Boeing Company
SPAW ARC Final Report 3

1.0 METHODOLOGY

The Stick Pusher and Adverse Weather (SPAW) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)

convened three subcommittees: The Icing Subcommittee, The Microburst and Windshear 

Subcommittee, and The Stick Pusher Subcommittee.

During its 8 months of deliberations, the SPAW ARC used the following processes in each of its 

subcommittees to arrive at its findings and recommendations:

 Conducted extensive research in each subject area, including any previous work 

already completed.

 Reviewed relevant accidents, incidents and other safety data.

 Developed and conducted industry surveys to identify best practices and any deficiencies 

for each subject area.

With the assistance of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the SPAW ARC made 

specific data requests for accident and incident data for the period extending back over the last 

20 years. The FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation (AVP) used the Aviation Safety 

Information Analytical Sharing (ASIAS) database to support the ARC’s requests.

The SPAW ARC made two separate data requests. The first was for non-proprietary data, which 

consisted of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident data, FAA incident data, and 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System 

(ASRS) reports in the subject areas. The search parameters were refined to focus on operations 

in transport category airplanes. The second request was for proprietary data, specifically 

Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data, 

which would have been provided by Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 

air carriers that have an agreement through ASIAS.

AVP was able to fulfill the non-proprietary data request, and the SPAW ARC heavily relied 

upon it in its deliberations and in determining its recommendations. The ARC was required to 

submit a formal request for proprietary to the ASIAS Executive Board, which has FAA and 

industry board members. Though the ARC did not receive a formal notification, it understands 

the ASIAS Executive Board considered its request and determined not to fulfill it. While the 

ARC members believe the data they received supports the recommendations contained in this 

report, data provided by air carrier ASAP and FOQA programs may have identified 

safety concerns that could have led to additional recommendations.
SPAW ARC Final Report 4

2.0 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

This section identifies the SPAW ARC’s recommendations. An in-depth explanation and 

supporting data for each recommendation are found in the appropriate section.

2.1 TRAINING ENHANCEMENTS

The SPAW ARC recommends specific enhancements to training for icing, microburst and 

windshear, and stick-pusher training. See sections 3.1, 3.5, 3.6, 4.1, 4.7, 5.1, and 5.2. 

2.2 INFO AND SAFO ENHANCEMENTS 

The SPAW ARC recommends operators and training providers develop an improved and 

structured system for delivery and dissemination of Information for Operators’ (InFO) and 

Safety Alerts for Operators’ (SAFO). See section 3.2.

2.3 REGULATORY STANDARDS

The SPAW ARC recommends more specific regulatory standards for establishing evaluation of 

microburst and windshear training and a comprehensive training program for icing, including 

knowledge-based training and practical and operational training. See sections 3.1 and 4.10.

2.4 SIMULATOR MODELING 

The SPAW ARC recommends improved simulation modeling to improve training in icing, 

turbulence, and windshear, stall, and upset prevention and recovery. See sections 3.3, 4.2, 4.6, 

and Appendix H.

2.5 SIMULATOR FIDELITY 

The SPAW ARC concluded that in order to implement its recommended training requirements, 

simulator fidelity improvements need to be made for icing, microburst/windshear, and 

stick pusher training. Therefore, the ARC recommends a regulatory change to 14 CFR part 60

and a flight simulation training device (FSTD) directive as defined in § 60.23 to improve 

simulator fidelity. See sections 3.3, 4.4, and 5.9.

2.6 INSTRUCTOR TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends operators provide a method to ensure that instructors are 

prepared to properly train elements included in the specific training program. See sections 3.7,

4.8, and 5.2

2.7 SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR OPERATING STATIONS

The SPAW ARC recommends that all required windshear models must be selectable and clearly 

labeled on the instructor operating station (IOS). See section 4.5
SPAW ARC Final Report 5

2.8 AUTO-PILOT UTILIZATION

The SPAW ARC recommends that the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) give specific 

guidance on use of the autopilot during icing conditions. See section 3.8. 

2.9 COMPETENCY BASED TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends training programs focus on objective and measurable completion 

standards rather than time or content requirements. See section 4.9. 

2.10 FSB PROCESS

The SPAW ARC recommends the Flight Standards Board (FSB) Report identify differences in 

stall handling characteristics between variants of the same type or between types. In the case of a 

common type rating, training shall be accomplished in each identified variant or type being 

operated. See section 5.3.

2.11 UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends both academic and flight training for upset prevention and 

recovery based on the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid (revision 2) or an approved 

equivalent See sections 5.6 and 5.7. 

2.12 ADVERSE WEATHER ACADEMIC TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends the use of theoretical knowledge training for adverse weather and 

specific training topics. See section 4.3. 

2.13 COMPREHENSIVE PILOT TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends that training be improved beyond the scope of part 121 training. 

The ARC concluded that better training is needed throughout the professional pilot’s career. 

See sections 3.4 and 5.8.

2.14 STALL AND STICK PUSHER TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends stall and stick pusher training be conducted during initial, 

transition, recurrent, and upgrade training. See section 5.5. 

2.15 FEEDBACK MECHANISM

The SPAW ARC recommends a feedback mechanism be used in the simulator and outside of it

for briefing and de-briefing pilots on their performance related to upset prevention and recovery. 

See section 5.10. 
SPAW ARC Final Report 6

2.16 REQUIRED SIMULATOR TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends that stall training and stick pusher training (if appropriate) should 

be conducted in a qualified full-flight simulator (FFS) with motion. See section 5.4. 
SPAW ARC Final Report 7

3.0 ICING

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

The SPAW ARC reviewed multiple icing events within a number of sources including the ASRS 

database, NTSB accident reports, and Australian Transport Safety Bureau reports. In addition, 

the ARC reviewed numerous publications related to icing and operations in icing conditions. 

Finally, it conducted a survey of industry practices regarding icing and training related to icing 

operations. Collectively, this information was used to establish the ARC’s conclusions and 

recommendations. 

The SPAW ARC recommends that the FAA take these recommendations and develop 

regulations on flightcrew icing training. For icing conditions, the main recommendation (3.1) is 

to develop a comprehensive training program to ensure appropriate flightcrew member 

knowledge and responses to icing conditions. The ARC also recommends that the FSTD

standards be updated to support such training.

Since the Roselawn1accident in 1994, there has been a considerable amount of research into 

icing, specifically in-flight icing. Icing incidents that are not seen on larger transport category 

aircraft continue to occur on smaller transport category aircraft. The SPAW ARC was instructed

to identify methods to increase familiarity and improve the response of flightcrew members 

while operating in icing conditions.

Regarding icing, the SPAW ARC—

 Conducted extensive research to identify what work has already been completed in the 

area of icing.

 Accomplished a review of icing events within a variety of databases including various 

icing related incidents and accidents.

 Performed a survey of pilots and air carriers to identify best practices and deficiencies.

 Hosted subject matter experts (SME) from the NTSB, FAA, NASA, and industry to get 

their perspective on what has been done, what needs to be done, what is working, and 

what is not working.

Based on that input, the SPAW ARC developed recommendations aimed at increasing the 

familiarity and improving the response of flightcrew members in icing conditions.

It is evident that considerable research and studies exist in the areas of aircraft icing and 

operations in icing conditions. The FAA has taken steps to improve safety for aircraft operations 

through changes to regulation, airworthiness directives, and operator guidance using InFOs,

 

1 An American Eagle GIE Avions de Transport Régional (ATR) 72, Flight 4184, flew into unknown icing 

conditions on October 31, 1994. The plane was en route from Indianapolis International Airport, Indiana to 

O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois when it crashed, killing all on board. The full report is 

available at http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx, and the report number is DCA95MA001.
SPAW ARC Final Report 8

bulletins, and other such means. However, this has not resulted in complete industry adoption or 

the use of all available publications. The ARC believes that to ensure adoption of best practices, 

implementation requires regulation. 

The ARC identified some challenges faced by industry and regulators. These include, but are 

not limited to—

 The range of aircraft types used and their associated performance, technologies 

and systems;

 Lack of uniformly trained pilots upon entering part 121 operations;

 Geographic differences in operational requirements; and

 Lack of uniform application of regulatory standards and oversight.

By reviewing recent efforts to improve safety during operations, the SPAW ARC noted that 

while much information is available to the industry and individual flightcrew members, there is

no consistent method to ensure this information is properly disseminated to and used 

appropriately by stakeholders.

The ARC concludes that—

 The industry, as a whole, lacks consistency in interpretation of current regulations. 

 Tracking of previous recommendations, such as InFOs and SAFOs, is insufficient..

 Some simulators may lack the fidelity to accurately portray the aerodynamic effects of 

ice accumulation.

 The issue of icing training and awareness exists prior to entering part 121 operations and 

should be part of the training curriculum through the entire career of a professional pilot.

 There is a lack of uniformly trained pilots entering part 121 operations.

 There is a lack of uniform application of regulatory standards and oversight.

 In some of the accidents/incidents analyzed, the flightcrew’s actions deviated from 

company procedure and training.

 Effective training can be conducted through a variety of methods, including 

scenario-based training, threat and error management, and modular training.

 The method of delivery should be based on the operator’s procedures and should be 

evaluated based on its effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

3.1 ICING TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends that operations in icing must be initially trained to include no less 

than the following matrix, where applicable to type of aircraft and operation. Where an element 

is not applicable, mitigating tactics are required, i.e., operator must satisfy principal operations 

inspectors (POI) regarding the exclusion of the element from the training requirement.
SPAW ARC Final Report 9

Table 3.1. Icing Training Elements.

Knowledge 

Based 

Training

Flight Training 

(Simulator or 

Aircraft)

Operational Experience 

(Demonstration or 

Discussion )

a. General icing and meteorological information

Aerodynamic Effects X

Meteorological Reports X X X

Performance Effects X

Types of Icing X

Super-Cooled Large Drops X

Definitions of Icing Levels X

* Operational Limitations X

b. Ground De-Icing

De-Icing Fluid Types and Effects X X X

Use of Hold Over Charts X X X

Ground Operations on Contaminated

Ground Surfaces X X

Identification of Aircraft Contamination 

Before Flight X X

c. Type-Specific Operations

Aerodynamic Effects of Icing X X

Use of aircraft ice equipment X X X

Failure of ice equipment X X

Use of Autopilot X X

Performance and Handling Effects of 

Ice Accumulation X X X

Severe Icing Conditions

Recognition X X

Procedures X

Operational Considerations (e.g., speed) X X X

d. Company Operations and Procedures

Company Policies (standard operating procedures) X X X

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)/Aircraft 

Operating Manual (AOM)

X

Pilot Monitoring Requirement X X X

* The flightcrew should have a full understanding of the operational limitations as documented in the AFM, AOM, and 

Quick Reference Handbook
SPAW ARC Final Report 10

The knowledge-based training elements should be tested through an operator or training 

provider’s own testing method to ensure the training is effective. It is not necessary to test 

every element or every aspect of each element, and the primary purpose of the test is to 

establish that the training was effective. These recommendations are intended to supplement 

existing regulation, i.e., these requirements are additional guidance and do not replace 

existing requirements.

Rationale

The SPAW ARC conducted an industry survey to determine the content and methods of training 

on operations in icing conditions. As the current regulations provide little guidance to operators 

and POIs on the elements that should be covered in this training, the response showed significant 

differences in the content of training programs. The ARC does not intend to prescribe the 

methods of training delivery, but believes it is imperative to provide guidance to the operators, 

training providers, and POIs as to critical content for training. This matrix is designed as a 

checklist to assist in this. This conclusion was also supported through the review of a smaller 

sampling of specific part 121 training programs by ARC members. It is the opinion of the ARC

that consistency through the industry will improve safety standards and this or a similar matrix 

should be included in regulation.

3.2 INFO AND SAFO PROCESS2

The SPAW ARC recommends that the Administrator and all operators/training providers 

develop a system to ensure that stakeholders receive, distribute, evaluate for adoption, and report 

back to the Administrator the disposition of all InFOs and SAFOs. A mechanism should be 

created for the Administrator to share this information with POIs. However, the FAA must 

ensure that the purpose of the SAFO and InFO remains as an information dissemination tool only

for the FAA and does not translate to a regulatory mechanism.

Rationale

The SPAW ARC makes this recommendation because past InFO guidance, SAFO information,

and other guidance on this subject was not incorporated into current training plans.

The Administrator uses InFOs and SAFOs as a means to rapidly transmit information that may 

have importance to operators and training providers before it is incorporated into other 

documents (such as an advisory circular (AC)) or until it becomes an actual rule. It is important 

to note that not all of the information contained in an InFO or SAFO may be applicable to all 

operators and training providers. Results of interviews and discussions with industry 

representatives reveal that there is no formal system to verify that operators and training 

providers have evaluated the relevance of the information contained in these documents.

The SPAW ARC makes this recommendation to help improve the safety of operations across the 

industry by ensuring that critical safety information is available, reviewed, and incorporated 

when applicable, by all operators and training providers, in a timely fashion.

 

2

This recommendation applies to Stall, Stick Pusher, Icing, and Microburst/Windshear
SPAW ARC Final Report 11

3.3 SIMULATOR FIDELITY 

The SPAW ARC recommends improving the fidelity of simulating the aerodynamic effects of 

aircraft icing conditions in FSTDs used in flightcrew member training. Specific aircraft data 

should be used when available; lacking that, other sources of engineering data may be used. It 

should be noted that there are limitations to simulation and not every possible situation can be 

demonstrated. Simulator improvements should include the following considerations:

1. Flight test data should be made available for simulator modeling.

2. Effects that represent the actual flight dynamics and performance changes should be 

simulated to increase the awareness of ice accretion.

a. Aerodynamic effects on lift, drag, and moment in simulation through means other 

than weight. 

b. The effects of icing on control feel, airframe buffeting (if applicable), and control 

effectiveness should be simulated.

c. There should be the potential to have the aircraft stall before the stall 

warning systems activate.

3. Ice protection equipment failures should be simulated.

4. The effect of ice due to engine ingestion should be simulated.

Please refer to appendix H for technical requirements pertaining to the above.

Rationale

The SPAW ARC makes this recommendation based on industry and survey feedback about

unrealistic training events and improving flightcrew recognition.

The SPAW ARC acknowledged that icing conditions were generally not a problem for 

large transport category aircraft. The ARC researched accidents and incidents involving 

icing conditions that involved fixed-wing transport category aircraft. It was evident through the 

various surveys and testimony that there was general concern from the operators and users about

the fidelity of icing simulation models in FSTD equipment. The method to simulate the effects 

of icing varied, were based on improper simulation through changes in weight, and were not 

subject to adequate testing through the qualification process.

A key concern from the simulator manufacturing representatives was the lack of appropriate 

OEM data to properly model the aerodynamic effects related to the formation of ice and the 

resulting effects on the airplane performance. 

In its review, the SPAW ARC recognized that icing effects should not be treated as a constant for 

every aircraft type. Certain aircraft types are more susceptible to the formation of ice. Therefore 

it is necessary for simulation models to include specific characteristics applicable to the 

simulated aircraft type.

For example, in the Roselawn accident due to the icing encounter and subsequent loss of control

(LOC), ATR used data available from incidents and their numerical simulation to study the 
SPAW ARC Final Report 12

airplane performance and identify any abnormal aerodynamic characteristics. It concluded that 

in each incident there were significant drag increases, and in some cases this was accompanied 

by a significant decrease in lift coefficient; the drag increases were primarily attributed to the 

propeller ice accretions at the lower revolutions per minute settings used during the subject 

flight. It is evident that such factors are not captured in the aerodynamic mathematical models 

used in aircraft simulators. 

One of the factors leading to a LOC resulting from the effects of icing is the increased stall speed 

or reduced critical angle of attack (AOA) at which the aircraft will stall. There is evidence 

indicating that in many cases, current simulation of icing aerodynamics effects is through an 

increase of the weight, which may be disproportionately changed to provide the general 

characteristics. After review, the SPAW ARC concluded this method is inappropriate. The most 

significant effect of icing on the wing surface is its influence on the smooth flow of air over the 

surface, causing the airflow to separate from the wing at a lower AOA than normal and creating

a reduction in the lift that is normally developed by a wing at a given AOA and airspeed. The

maximum lift that can be developed and the AOA at which it will be developed is significantly 

reduced and the stall buffet and stall will be encountered at higher than normal airspeeds. The

systems to protect the aircraft from entering a stall are considered effective for most 

transport-category aircraft and are designed to activate at a predefined AOA. It is evident that, in 

icing conditions, these may not activate prior to the stall, or may activate with a reduced safety 

margin, and not allow the flightcrew reaction time to avoid a stall condition. This condition is 

observed in numerous incident and accident reports, such as in 20063 when a SAAB-Scania AB 

aircraft during an en-route climb over Santa Maria, CA suddenly entered icing conditions. The 

wing dropped, the autopilot disconnected, and the clacker immediately sounded.

The SPAW ARC is confident that, based on the system design, this is a critical situation that may 

also be masked by the autopilot and could result in an LOC condition. Accordingly, the ARC

finds it important that flightcrews are appropriately trained on this phenomenon in a simulator 

training scenario that emphasizes that in icing conditions the stall protection system may not 

activate and the stall margins may be significantly reduced. The ARC also notes that the ice 

contamination of the wing has a significant detrimental effect on the aircraft’s total drag, which 

is comprised of parasitic drag and induced drag. Similarly, the pitching moment characteristics 

are also affected by the ice contamination. For example, on a swept wing, the progression of 

flow separation is affected and the pitch down characteristics may be different from a stall event 

with an uncontaminated wing. It is therefore important that these effects of icing on lift, drag, 

and pitching moment are properly modeled to ensure the appropriate airplane characteristics are 

present for flightcrew member training.

 

3 On January 2, 2006, a Saab-Scania AB SF340B+, N390AE, operated by American Eagle Airlines,

Flight 3008 encountered icing conditions during the en route climb over Santa Monica, California. The 

airplane was at 11,700 feet mean sea level (MSL) when it departed controlled flight, and descended to an 

altitude of about 6,500 feet MSL. The pilots recovered control of the airplane, and continued to their 

scheduled destination. The NTSB report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx,

and the report number is LAX06IA076.
SPAW ARC Final Report 13

The systems to protect the aircraft from in-flight icing are built into the aircraft and go through a 

rigorous certification process. Flightcrews are trained to use them and make appropriate 

judgments about when to exit icing conditions. While these systems are considered to be 

effective for most aircraft, it is necessary for flightcrew members to be trained to recognize the 

failure of such systems and to manage the ensuing conditions. 

3.4 COMPREHENSIVE PILOT TRAINING4

The ARC concluded that it is important to look beyond part 121 training into pilot certification 

training to ensure enhanced skills, comprehension, and knowledge. To assist in consistent 

flightcrew member training and response in icing conditions, operational issues such as icing

training should be part of the training curriculum throughout the entire career of a 

professional pilot.

Rationale

Based on research into accidents and incidents involving icing conditions, it is the opinion of the 

SPAW ARC that a pilot operating an aircraft in part 121 operations is using the total of all of the 

skills learned and used to that point. Icing is a condition that may be encountered in a variety of

aircraft operations so it is critical to have training in this area during all phases of a pilot’s

aviation career. The ARC believes—

 Encountering icing conditions without proper preparation and training in any form of 

operations is dangerous.

 If the importance of operations in icing conditions is not introduced early in the pilot’s 

career, the experience will not be gained for future part 121 operations.

 Numerous NTSB reports of accidents that are not under part 121 regulations have cited 

icing as a contributing factor to the accident.

It is the opinion of the ARC that these recommendations should be applied beyond

part 121 operations.

3.5 AIRMAN KNOWLEDGE TEST REQUIREMENTS5

The SPAW ARC recommends the Airman Knowledge Test requirements be changed to require 

the applicant to meet a minimum passing grade in each of the subject areas to verify the 

applicant has the desired/satisfactory level of knowledge in all of the areas covered in the test.

 

4

This recommendation applies to Stall, Stick Pusher, Icing, and Microburst/Windshear.

5

This recommendation applies to Stall, Stick Pusher, Icing, and Microburst/Windshear.
SPAW ARC Final Report 14

Rationale

The current Airman Knowledge Test requires the student to have a minimum passing grade 

based on the average of the overall test; the applicant can potentially obtain a passing grade 

without correctly answering a single question in one of the subject areas. For example, the 

applicant could pass the test without answering any question correctly on meteorology. 

Additionally, it is good practice for an employer to validate the knowledge of a pilot in each of 

the written test subject areas during initial training.

3.6 TRAINING PROGRAM CONTENT

The SPAW ARC recommends that POIs inspect training program content and ensure it is 

comprehensive with regard to the operations and that the training conducted is applicable to the 

operation. Additionally, the ARC recommends that a mechanism be developed to allow POIs to 

collect and share information concerning approved training programs.

Rationale

The ARC’s recommendations are based on evidence that information and procedures taken out 

of context can be detrimental.

The Administrator is required to review the contents of any approved training program. This 

review should be conducted to validate that the training program conforms with all 

regulatory requirements and is appropriate to the information contained in the approved 

Operations Specifications. 

Results of accident/incident reviews have shown that material in approved training programs 

may not be appropriate for all operators. For example, training material for part 121 turbo-prop 

operators may not apply to a part 121 turbo-jet operator, even if a single operator maintains a 

mixed fleet type, such as turbo-prop and turbo-jet.

The additional mechanisms for POI information sharing are to help ensure application and 

standardization of safety-critical information across the industry.

3.7 INSTRUCTOR TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends that the operators provide a method of ensuring that instructors 

are prepared to properly train elements included in the training program. This should include 

knowledge of any limitation that exists with the equipment used in the delivery of this training.

Rationale

It is the opinion of the SPAW ARC that the industry should be mandated to incorporate training 

for all instructors responsible for delivering training in FFS to ensure that the potential for

negative training as a result of operating outside the verified limits of a FSTD is avoided. The 

ARC makes this recommendation based on evidence gathered from incident reports that FFSes

are not consistently operated within the prescribed limits of their operational specifications. 

Maneuvering within the operational parameters and constraints derived through either OEM 
SPAW ARC Final Report 15

flight test data or engineering data, which are verified by SMEs, is essential. Although 

simulators may be aerodynamically modeled outside of these operational limits, without proper 

verification with OEM data, there is no guarantee that the flight training device will accurately

simulate the actual aircraft for which it is modeled and thus, it cannot be relied upon to 

realistically simulate undocumented flight conditions. 

3.8. AUTOPILOT UTILIZATION

The SPAW ARC recommends that the OEMs give specific guidance on use of the autopilot 

during icing conditions. If additional requirements are identified by the Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO) for the use of autopilot during these conditions, this should be evaluated by the 

Aircraft Evaluation Groups (AEG) and included in the FSB report. The AEG should evaluate 

flightcrew workload and awareness of the aircraft state.

Rationale

Incidents and accidents demonstrate that automated flight control systems may mask the actual 

aircraft trim state and consequent changes in performance and handling qualities. If such 

conditions go unnoticed, the aircraft state may deteriorate, resulting in LOC and possibly a stall. 

By design, an autopilot system will generate commands to adjust for unusual conditions until the 

commands reach full authority or cannot be sustained. This may result in autopilot disconnect, 

when control must be assumed by the pilot. Accordingly, the SPAW ARC believes that 

autopilot design should be reviewed with consideration for the potential of trimming to an 

undesirable aircraft state, to ensure that such characteristics are addressed in pilot training in 

specific types.

There are three elements related to the automated systems that should be a focus in any practical 

or theoretical training related to this subject:

1. An understanding of the operation of the automation and specific conditions that may 

result in an undesired/unexpected response;

2. An understanding of the indications and cues related to the system, in particular in 

situations where there is potential for the undesired or unexpected behavior; and

3. A proper flightcrew response in situations where the condition of the aircraft under 

automated control may lead to an undesired/unexpected behavior.

Anomalous behavior of the autoflight system is generally confined to unusual circumstances, 

such as when an aircraft is accreting ice on the lifting surfaces. In such circumstances it is 

especially important to monitor aircraft status with a focus on the autoflight systems that may 

reach trim limits and ultimately disconnect, with the potential for aircraft upset. Accordingly, 

the SPAW ARC urges the OEM, FAA ACO, and the FSB/AEG to give emphasis to assessments 

of autoflight systems and conditions that might cause the system to trim toward an upset.
SPAW ARC Final Report 16

4.0 MICROBURST AND WINDSHEAR TRAINING

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Since the introduction of the Windshear Training Aid6in the late 1980s, microburst and 

windshear events (both incidents and accidents) have decreased significantly. The 

recommendations in this report must therefore be seen as a combination of current 

―best-practices‖ and issues that may not be properly described in current regulations and ACs.

With regard to microbursts and windshears, the SPAW ARC—

 Conducted extensive research to identify what work had already been completed.

 Performed a review of microburst and windshear events within a variety of databases and 

the provided incident and accident reports.

 Surveyed operators, pilots, training providers, and universities offering flight training to 

identify best practices and deficiencies in microburst and windshear training.

The SPAW ARC members agreed on the main issues that could either be improved upon, 

should be required in new regulatory guidance or advisory material, or have not been properly 

addressed. Those issues are discussed in this section.

The specific issues addressed are validated by findings from the provided incident and accident 

reports, survey responses from stakeholders, the experiences of subcommittee participants, and 

testimony from SMEs.

Safety impact has been the main reason for the recommendations, but care has been taken that 

these proposals do not pose significant monetary investments or add to already demanding 

simulator profiles. Rather, the SPAW ARC recommendations focus on the quality and 

standardization of current practices, tightening of simulator specifications and requirements, and 

additions to theoretical knowledge training. This theoretical training can be accomplished

through classroom training, Web-based/distance learning, or any other suitable training method.

Recency requirements have been added as part of the recommendation.

The basis of safe operation in and around areas of windshear and microburst can be divided into

different segments. These are—

 Knowledge/Awareness,

 Prevention,

 Recognition, and

 Recovery (Skill).

 

6 Windshear Training Aid, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 1987.
SPAW ARC Final Report 17

RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 MICROBURST AND WINDSHEAR TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends including microburst and windshear training in the following 

air carrier training programs:

 New-hire training,

 Type rating/transition training,

 Recurrent training with specified intervals,*

 Requalification training, and

 Upgrade training.

*The intervals for training on adverse weather during recurrent training recommended by this 

subcommittee are—

 For theoretical knowledge training, at least every other training event.

 For flight training, at least every recurrent training cycle.

Rationale

The SPAW ARC members’ experiences and industry feedback show that the knowledge and 

experience level of new-hire pilots varies widely on many subjects. Windshear and microburst is 

no exception. In order for an operator to ensure that all new-hire pilots have the minimum level 

of knowledge and skill required for company type-specific training, operators should define and 

identify what they consider to be the minimum acceptable level of microburst and windshear 

knowledge required prior to entering any category of training. Each operator should then ensure 

that all new-hire pilots have the required minimum knowledge and skills to enter their next 

training course, or provide refresher training to ensure that pilots meet the minimum standards. 

Maintaining safe operations requires pilots to build and retain skills and knowledge in microburst 

and windshear avoidance, recognition, and recovery regardless of operation, airplane type, role, 

or position. In order to build and maintain these skills, pilots need to be exposed on a periodic 

basis to microburst and windshear training. Since the results may be catastrophic if a pilot fails 

to avoid, recognize, or properly recover from a microburst or windshear event, the SPAW ARC 

members believe a pilot should be exposed to microburst and windshear training on a recurring 

basis during their career. 

Air carriers and training centers should include both academic and maneuvers training (both 

takeoff and landing) on a periodic cycle as part of their required recurrent training cycles. Pilots 

shall accomplish microburst and windshear training during recurrent training on each type of 

aircraft for which they are qualified at least once every recurrent training cycle. The intent is that 

some part of microburst and windshear training is covered during every training event.
SPAW ARC Final Report 18

During part 121 training, aircraft type, areas of operations, and operator-specific issues need to 

be addressed. Also, part 121 training must validate the skills and knowledge of a pilot in these

issues. Training initial skills and retaining skills and knowledge should remain part of training 

during the career of a pilot.

4.2 COMPLEX WIND MODELS

The current part 60 requirements require four wind profiles in takeoff and landing 

configurations. The SPAW ARC recommends two additional complex windshear models, which 

include vertical wind (shear) components, to be available to the instructor. These profiles are 

considered to provide experience in a more complex windshear encounter. They must be 

available in the takeoff and landing configurations and must consist of independent variable 

winds in multiple simultaneous components. The Windshear Training Aid provides two such 

example complex windshear models that can satisfy this requirement. Any proposed alternate 

wind models used to meet this requirement must be properly supported and referenced in the 

master quality test guide (QTG). After inclusion of the two additional complex models, these 

models should be included in training programs.

Rationale

The four required profiles, which allow for the training of procedures, only include horizontal 

windshear components. The complex scenarios include vertical downdraft, are representative of 

microbursts, and provide for a more challenging encounter.

4.3 ADVERSE WEATHER ACADEMIC TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends that theoretical knowledge training for adverse weather should 

include at least, but not be limited to, the following items:

 Windshear;

 Microburst;

 En-route/high altitude weather phenomena;

 Convective activity;

 Weather events that exceed the capability of the airplane; and

 Events that do not necessarily exceed the threshold for microburst and windshear 

alerting, such as gusting crosswinds, turbulence, or virga.

Rationale

Information contained in the Windshear Training Aid and other FAA-approved training material 

should be used to ensure pilots have a more complete understanding of the phenomena causing 

adverse weather, and provide an added capability to recognize and avoid adverse weather, 

including microbursts and windshears.
SPAW ARC Final Report 19

4.4 SIMULATOR FIDELITY

The SPAW ARC recommends that improvements be made to simulator standards that will

improve FSTD capabilities to support the microburst and windshear training requirements as 

recommended herein. For these changes to become mandatory, the ARC recommends the 

publication of an FSTD Directive as defined in § 60.23. For more information, see appendix H.

Rationale

Training recommendations made in this report to improve microburst and windshear training will 

require updates to the FSTD technical standards as defined in part 60. These technical standards 

were developed by a technical working group comprised of a broad range of SMEs on simulator 

development and evaluation, including members of the FAA’s National Simulator Program 

(NSP) and simulator manufacturer engineers.

The FAA should incorporate these changes to part 60, through due process, and make these 

requirements applicable to all new FFS equipment based on an effective date that is coordinated 

with the effective date of new training requirements as defined in the body of this report. 

Furthermore, since the training requirements recommended in the body of this report will likely 

be conducted in FSTDs evaluated and qualified under grandfathered simulator standards, the 

recommended simulator standards detailed in Appendix H should be published through an 

FSTD Directive as defined in § 60.23. Note that the publication of an FSTD directive addresses 

safety of flight issues and is applicable to each qualified FSTD, regardless of its original 

qualification standard. It is the intent of the SPAW ARC that any retroactive simulator 

requirements as defined in attachment A of appendix H and published as an FSTD Directive 

should be addressed as additional qualification requirements (see § 60.16) that are applicable 

only to those simulators being used to conduct training tasks as defined in this report.

4.5 SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR OPERATING STATIONS

To improve microburst and windshear training, the SPAW ARC recommends that all required 

windshear models be selectable and clearly labeled on the IOS. Additionally, all IOS selectable 

windshear models must employ a method, such as a simulator preset, to ensure that the FSTD is 

properly configured for use in training. In order to achieve the training objectives in accordance 

with the Simulator Windshear Model Implementation Guide, this method must address variables 

such as windshear intensity; aircraft configurations, including weights and flap settings; and 

ambient conditions, to ensure that the proper windshear recognition cues are present. The FAA 

NSP manager (NSPM) shall insure these profiles are evaluated at initial and recurring 

qualifications. Please refer to appendix H for further guidance.
SPAW ARC Final Report 20

Rationale

Current requirements for windshear profiles do not require a standardized approach for the 

labeling of the available profiles on the IOS; as a result, there is variation in the implementation 

and use of the windshear profiles between simulators and between instructors’ use of them on the 

same simulator. Furthermore, the instructors lack the necessary information to determine how to 

configure the profile to ensure the windshear recognition cues will occur as desired and that the 

profile will provide the expected levels of severity. Requiring the pertinent parameters to be 

preset, together with information/guidance for the instructor on the nature of the profile and its 

purpose should ensure a consistent use of the installed profiles.

4.6 TURBULENCE REQUIREMENTS

The SPAW ARC recommends minimum turbulence requirements be included in the 

windshear profiles.

Rationale

Most windshear events include levels of noticeable turbulence. Feedback from simulator 

manufacturers and training providers revealed that wide variations exist between simulators in 

how they handle turbulence in windshear profiles. Some simulators have turbulence 

automatically programmed into windshear profiles while others do not. Some simulators allow 

the instructors to select a turbulence setting when they select a windshear profile, while others 

do not. There is no industry standard or regulatory guidance on this, and it is not part of the 

simulator qualification standards. The result is that there is no standardization in microburst and 

windshear training among instructors. Without adding this realistic effect, the situation and 

recovery maneuver can be seen as benign, resulting in negative training. By requiring a specific 

turbulence setting to be programmed in each windshear profile that cannot be changed, the use of 

realistic turbulence will be standardized in microburst and windshear training, helping avoid 

negative training.

4.7 NON-SURVIVABLE SCENARIOS

The SPAW ARC recommends that a non-survivable scenario should not be required or approved 

by the Administrator as part of a windshear training program.

Rationale

The current industry philosophy is that positive training should be reinforced and non-survivable 

training events should not be used. Simulators currently have the requirement to demonstrate a

non-survivable windshear scenario, and this scenario is used for microburst and windshear 

training. Requiring a non-survivable event can not only result in negative training, it can create a 

sense of helplessness when encountering an actual windshear.
SPAW ARC Final Report 21

4.8 INSTRUCTOR TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends that all instructors responsible for delivering training on 

adverse weather, including microbursts and windshears, have the knowledge and teaching skills 

to properly deliver this specialized training. Specifically, the ARC recommends—

 Instructors receive instruction on adverse weather and the Windshear Training Aid, 

including microbursts and windshears. This training will include specific parameters for 

different windshear modules available in the simulator and how to effectively teach and 

assess students using these windshear modules. 

 Instructors are trained and evaluated on effectively briefing and debriefing windshear 

training events to insure the key elements in the Windshear Training Aid are covered.

 Instructors should be trained and assessed on the delivery of microburst and windshear 

training. This shall be done on a recurring basis, when profiles change, or when there is a 

change in recovery or avoidance procedures.

Rationale

Feedback from training providers and pilots show that instructors do not always have the 

required background knowledge of adverse weather. Additionally, instructors are not always 

aware of the proper use of the available microburst and windshear scenarios. The lack of 

instructor knowledge has resulted in some improper use of microburst and windshear profiles, 

different training standards, and improper or negative training.

The instructor must have knowledge of the Windshear Training Aid, which sets the industry 

standard for microburst and windshear training, and the scenarios for use within the microburst 

and windshear training program. Instructor training should focus on the practical application of 

these principals and the evaluation of a pilot’s performance of proper avoidance and recovery 

techniques for microbursts and windshears. The standardization of briefing and debriefing is

critical to ensuring the required standards are met.

4.9 COMPETENCY BASED TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends that objective and measurable completion standards are set 

(competency based rulemaking), rather than time or content requirements. Appendix F provides 

examples of recommended competencies and proficiency standards for windshear training. The 

ARC further recommends that checking should not be a requirement for windshear and 

microburst training.

Rationale

Time-based training does not guarantee a successful or safe outcome. To satisfy a minimum 

standard requirement, setting objective-based completion standards guarantee that an outcome is 

the same or similar, regardless of the method of training or time spent in training. Training 

outcomes are more important than time-based requirements. There is a global initiative to 

transition from prescriptive training requirements to a competency-based model.
SPAW ARC Final Report 22

4.10 REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

By not including competency based objectives in FAA AC 120–50A, Guidelines for Operational 

Approval of Windshear Training Programs (See appendix I), any windshear/microburst program 

is subjectively judged by a POI. To eliminate subjectivity, the SPAW ARC recommends

improvement of the approval process for training programs by including not only the operators’ 

POI, but by providing oversight from the certificate management office/region, implementation 

of a safety management system (SMS), and have the FAA Flight Standards Service (AFS–200)

interaction for quality assurance.

Rationale

Currently, there are large variations in content, quality, and methods among approved training 

programs, which may affect safety. To effectively address the underlying issues, there needs to 

be an exchange of information between POIs to provide an industry-wide uniform application 

through sharing industry best practices. This approach will provide a system in which

improvements in operational safety will be made through controlled training programs, while 

oversight, harmonization, and standardization are improved. This approach still allows 

reasonable flexibility for industry. SMS concepts are required and accepted in industry. The 

SMS concept provides feedback and quality assurance, and leads to process and safety 

improvements. Even though SMS is not required, it would be recommended for implementation.
SPAW ARC Final Report 23

5.0 STALL/STICK PUSHER/LOSS OF CONTROL

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Part 121 air carriers are required to provide flightcrew members with ground training and 

flight training to recognize and recover from stalls in several conditions. A primary objective 

should be to provide training to maximize the likelihood that pilots will respond correctly and 

consistently to unexpected stall warnings, stalls, and/or stick pusher activations. The 

SPAW ARC recommends that training providers present realistic stall scenarios to ensure 

recognition and recovery of an impending stall in order to avoid an actual upset. Training should 

address specific aircraft behavior at low speeds and approaching stalls. Prevention training 

should be included to train pilots to recognize conditions that could increase the likelihood of a 

stall occurring as well as recognize undesirable aircraft states that could result in a stall. The 

ARC recommends that training providers present unexpected situations that surprise pilots as 

they would be during an inadvertent event. The ARC maintains that the ability to recognize the 

earliest indications of an impending stall is a critical skill in preventing stalls and consequent 

upsets. The ARC recommends scenario-based training to observe flightcrew behavior in 

situations with threats of impending stall. 

Stall recovery procedures prescribed by the OEM provide the proper flightcrew response to 

recover from any condition between first indication of a stall and aerodynamic stall (exceeding

CLMax). Any pilot encountering a stall indication is to assume an actual stall has occurred or 

is imminent. Pilots should be trained to treat an approach-to-stall warning as an aerodynamic 

stall and immediately execute the recommended stall recovery at the first indication of an 

impending stall. Time should not be spent trying to determine if it is an approach-to-stall or 

aerodynamic stall.

The SPAW ARC discourages mandating precise parameters for evaluating pilot performance in 

stall, stick pusher, and upset prevention and recovery maneuvers. If pilots are concerned about 

meeting such constraints, they are distracted from the total picture of recovering to safe flight. 

The total performance—including decision making—embraces the valid criteria for judging the 

pilot skills essential for safe operations.

With regard to stick pushers, no training requirement exists beyond the generic mandate of 

training on all aircraft systems. The letter of the law has been met by discussing the stick pusher 

in academic training, although some operators have included some training in simulators. When 

there has been simulator training, a variety of approaches have been used, ranging from preflight 

checks to overriding improper stick pusher activation. Some of the deficiencies the SPAW ARC 

discovered from surveys included—

 Not all training providers address stick pusher in simulator training.

 Among operators that train on the stick pusher, there is no consistency in the training.

 There are insufficient regulatory requirements (14 CFR) and guidance (FAA Order 8900, 

Flight Standards Information Management System).
SPAW ARC Final Report 24

The SPAW ARC conducted an informal survey of operators and training centers offering 

part 121 flight training in stick pusher equipped aircraft. The results are in appendix G. Queries 

were also made to manufacturers regarding improper pusher activations. The manufacturers 

reported no occurrences of any improper pusher activations.

No evidence was found that any stick pusher system installed in transport category airplanes has 

a history of improper activation. Therefore, the ARC has determined that there is no value in 

training for such an event; such training may have a negative effect on pilot response to an actual

pusher activation. 

Despite the fact that pilots receive academic training to allow the pusher to function, the few 

training organizations that regularly train pilots in stick pusher activation during stall training 

find that the initial (natural) pilot response is to resist the pusher. Evidence from surveys shows 

that only a few training organizations have added stick pusher training to their syllabi, and they 

have completion standards for the pilots. The training objectives of the air carriers responding—

barring one—are nebulous in that they do not describe the objective of training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 STICK PUSHER TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends mandating stick pusher training in equipped airplanes. Although 

the ARC does not recommend checking pilot response to the pusher, the training should have 

specific completion standards. Operators should have completion standards appropriate to 

pusher-activation training during stall. The training completion standards shall include recovery 

to desired flight path. Federal regulations should require the training and the Administrator 

should provide guidance for training standards for pusher-equipped aircraft. Stick-pusher 

training should be included in the following curricula:

 Initial training,

 Recurrent—not less than once in 3 years,

 Transition,

 Differences, and

 Upgrade.

Rationale

Since overwhelming evidence indicates that pilots’ initial physical reaction to the stick pusher is 

to resist it, training providers should ensure that the training continues until the completion 

standard of permitting the pusher to reduce AOA is accomplished by each pilot. Notable 

accidents include—
SPAW ARC Final Report 25

 In 1994, an Atlantic Coast Airlines7J–41 stalled on final approach after the autopilot 

disconnected. The pilot resisted the stick pusher. The result was fatal.

 In 2004, a Pinnacle Airlines8 CRJ stalled at high altitude, and the pilot resisted the initial 

stick push, resulting in the engines failing and fatal injuries.

 In 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc.9 Q–400 stalled on final approach after the autopilot 

disconnected. The pilot resisted the stick pusher. The result was fatal.

5.2 STALL TRAINING 

The SPAW ARC recommends that training programs for stall training include the following:

Stall Training Element

KnowledgeBased 

Training

Flight Training 

(Simulator or 

Aircraft)

Operational 

Experience Focus 

Elements7

General Aerodynamic Characteristics

General Aerodynamic Principles X

Control Effectiveness at High AOA X

High AOA Reduction in Stability X

Effects of High Altitude and MACH Number X

Characteristics of Power ON and Power OFF Stalls X

Stall with Sideslip Present X

Type Specific Aerodynamic Characteristics X

Effects of Weight and Center of Gravity X

Stall Training1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Energy Management X X X

Avoidance and Prevention X X X

Recognition X X X

Stall Recovery X X

 

7 On January 7, 1994, a Jetstream J4101, N304UE, operated by Atlantic Coast Airlines doing business as

United Express 6291, stalled on final approach after the autopilot disconnected. The pilot resisted the 

stick pusher and crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of the runway. The NTSB report is available at 

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx and the report number is DCA94MA027.

8 On October 14, 2004, a Bombardier CL–600–2B19, N8396A, operated by Pinnacle Airlines doing 

business as Northwest Airlink, crashed into a residential area about 2.5 miles south of Jefferson City 

Memorial Airport, Jefferson City, Missouri. During the flight, both engines flamed out after the pilot

induced an aerodynamic stall at high altitude and resisted the initial stick push. The engines failed to 

restart. The NTSB report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx and the report 

number is DCA05MA003.

9 On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc, Bombardier DHC–8–400, N200WQ, operating as 

Continental Connection Flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International 

Airport, Buffalo, New York. The Q–400 stalled on final approach after the autopilot disconnected. The 

pilot resisted the stick pusher and crashed into a residence. The NTSB report is available at 

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx and the report number is DCA09MA027.
SPAW ARC Final Report 26

Stall Training Element

KnowledgeBased 

Training

Flight Training 

(Simulator or 

Aircraft)

Operational 

Experience Focus 

Elements7

Surprise Effect

8 X X

Handling Characteristics (Type Specific) X X

Slow Flight Characteristics X X

Stick Pusher (Equipped Aircraft)2 X X

Stall Maneuvers: Training and Evaluation1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Clean Configuration Stall at Low Altitude6 X

Clean Configuration Stall at High Altitude6 X

Departure/Approach Stalls with Partial Flaps X

Landing Configuration Stall X

Company Operations and Procedures

Crew Resource Management Integration with 

Stall Training

X X X

Instructor Training X X

Notes:

1. Stall training beyond the first indication of a stall in the simulator will not be conducted 

until all of the following conditions are met:

a. The simulator modeling and fidelity are such that the simulator of the specific 

airplane is representative in this flight regime.

b. Simulator enhancements in the low speed regime are incorporated in order to 

represent the changes in flying characteristics that typically occur approaching the 

critical AOA and include the following enhancements:

i. Reduction in pitch, roll, and yaw stability,

ii. Reduction in aircraft response to control inputs,

iii. Improved motion response for better g-cueing,

iv. Stall buffet to cover broader range of flight conditions (if appropriate for the 

airplane),

v. Feedback of model aerodynamic fidelity and pilot control inputs to the 

instructor station, and

vi. Type or model specific characteristics or behavior approaching or exceeding 

critical AOA (CL Max) .

c. Simulators used for aerodynamic stall training must obtain additional qualification in 

accordance with § 60.16. See appendix H.
SPAW ARC Final Report 27

2. For pusher-equipped aircraft, stall training will be conducted to pusher activation and 

through recovery. Pusher equipped aircraft according to certification requirements, are 

deemed to have stalled at pusher activation. Pilots should always be trained to recover 

from an impending stall at the first indication of a stall; however, demonstration of the 

stick pusher activation should also be included in stall training.

3. Stall training should be conducted in a full-flight simulator with motion. If an airplane is 

used for stall training, stall training must be limited to approach-to-stall training only. 

Stall training to aerodynamic stall must not be performed in a transport category airplane. 

4. All stall training and evaluation should be conducted using realistic scenarios that 

replicate operational conditions and representative altitudes. Stall training must be 

accomplished with the autopilot engaged and disengaged.

5. For the purpose of this training matrix, stall training must be done within the aircraft

certification envelope as defined in 14 CFR part 25 or 23. Note: The stall may be 

defined as the stick-pusher system activation. Emphasis in training must be on the 

recognition and recovery, not the entry into the condition.

6. Stall training in a clean configuration should be conducted both at altitudes close to the 

service ceiling and at low operational altitudes to familiarize pilots with the difference in 

aircraft performance at these altitudes.

7. These items need discussion during operating experience, and are not meant as training 

items that need to be performed on the actual airplane.

8. Presenting pilots with a surprise event in the simulator and training to respond to 

such events.

Rationale

In 2010, an industry Stall/Stick-pusher Working Group was organized to address concerns with 

LOC accidents due to stalls. The recommendations in the matrix are based on industry feedback 

that indicated discrepancies among operators for standards in stall training and checking in 

knowledge and practical flight training. The matrix represents industry best practice and defines 

the elements required for part 121 air carriers to provide flightcrew members with ground 

training and flight training to recognize and avoid a stall of an aircraft or, if not avoided, to 

recover from the stall. 

A paper published by the technical subgroup of the FAA/Industry Stall/Stick-pusher Working 

Group, including members of the FAA’s NSP and simulator manufacturer engineers, concluded 

that simulators for transport category aircraft as of 2010 are accurate, validated, and can be used 

for training to the first indications of a stall, which includes up to the stall warning (stick shaker) 

and stick pusher (if installed). However, stick pusher force must be validated to ensure that it is 

representative of the airplane. It is not currently required to be checked. 

Due to current simulator limitations, stall training beyond the first indication of a stall should not 

be conducted because the simulator’s lateral/directional characteristics may not be representative 

of the aircraft (in most cases they are not validated) and the pilots/instructors cannot always 

determine where the stall occurs. Negative training may result if the simulator is not 
SPAW ARC Final Report 28

representative of the airplane. A technical subgroup of the FAA/Industry Stall/Stick-pusher 

Working Group, including members of the FAA’s NSP and simulator manufacturer engineers, 

further recommended today’s simulators not be used to train between stick pusher and 

aerodynamic stall (exceeding CL Max) unless further testing and validation in this flight regime 

are performed for the specific simulator and approved by the FAA (see note 1 of the stall matrix 

and appendix H).

5.3 FSB PROCESS10

The SPAW ARC recommends a review of the current procedures and standards established for 

developing OEM-recommended and AEG/FSB-validated training programs for safety systems 

that will be included in the FSB report. Standards should also be established for a continuous 

process improvement feedback loop of the FSB report, including changes an OEM may 

recommend to established training programs after operating experience is gained from 

in-service aircraft.

Rationale

The SPAW ARC, based on expert testimony and through deliberations, concluded that the 

current FSB review process and the resulting FSB report has the potential to omit the assessment 

of training requirements for safety critical systems when they have not been identified by the 

aircraft OEM. Furthermore, where safety-critical systems are assessed, they may not receive the 

required level of scrutiny to assure the desired level of safety through training. The ARC 

observed that—

 Incorporation of new systems does not always receive proper attention in the FSB report.

 No quality-assurance process for FAA reviews and approvals exists.

5.4 SIMULATOR TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends stall and stick-pusher training (if appropriate) should be 

conducted in a qualified FFS with motion. If the airplane is used for stall training when a

qualified simulator is not available for the aircraft type, this training must be limited to recovery 

at the first indication of stall.

Rationale

Industry experience shows modern FFSes with motion allow stall training and evaluation in a 

safe environment without subjecting the pilots and instructors to the associated hazards of 

in-flight training. Most stall training is currently done in a qualified FFS with motion. 

 

10 This recommendation applies to Stall, Stick Pusher, Icing, and Microburst/Windshear.
SPAW ARC Final Report 29

There are specific cases where stall training is conducted in the airplane because no qualified 

FFS exists. This inflight stall training has proven to be safe in airplanes because adequate safety 

margins are maintained during the stall training. Conducting stall training to the aerodynamic 

stall in the airplane increases risk and could lead to an LOC situation. Therefore, the stall 

training must not be conducted in the actual aircraft beyond first indication of a stall in transport 

category aircraft.

5.5 STALL TRAINING PROGRAMS

The SPAW ARC recommends that each air carrier should include stall and stick pusher training 

conducted for pilots during—

 Initial new-hire training.

 Transition training (including requalification training) to include stall and 

stick pusher training on the specific stall characteristics and recovery techniques 

for the specific airplane.

 Upgrade training.

 Recurrent training providing refresher training of academic and maneuvers training 

spread out over two years to include basic stall aerodynamics, slow flight, stall 

recognition and recovery maneuvers, and effective aeronautical decision making to avoid 

stall events. The intent is to ensure some basic elements of stall training are covered 

during each training event. Maneuvers training, including stick-pusher demonstration, 

should be conducted in a qualified simulator. At least once each three years a scenariobased training stall exercise should be accomplished in the simulator as a flightcrew stall 

event. Scenario-based exercises should be accomplished during recurrent training 

without briefing the pilots that the event will occur.

 Recurrent training on each type of aircraft with distinctly different stall characteristics at 

least once every 24 months, in the event that a pilot is qualified on more than one aircraft.

Rationale

Industry feedback shows that some part 121 stall training programs make improper assumptions 

of new-hire pilots’ aerodynamic knowledge, and stall recognition and recovery skills for large 

transport aircraft. Therefore part 121 air carriers shall include stall training in their initial 

new-hire training program to ensure that all new-hire pilots meet the required level of 

aerodynamic knowledge as well as stall avoidance, recognition, and recovery skills.

Pilots need to be trained on the specific stall characteristics for the type aircraft they are flying. 

Stall training should be conducted on a recurring basis during the career of a pilot at an 

air carrier. Air carriers and training centers should include both academic and maneuvers 

training as part of their required stall/stick-pusher recurrent training cycles. 
SPAW ARC Final Report 30

5.6 UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY ACADEMIC TRAINING

The SPAW ARC recommends an academic training program based on the Airplane 

Upset Recovery Training Aid revision 2 or an approved equivalent, be mandated for all 

commercial pilots.

Rationale

This satisfies the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010,

Public Law 111–216 (Pub. L 111–216) § 208 mandate to utilize the existing aviation training 

infrastructure and ensures appropriate qualifications for those that deliver training. It ensures 

that the existing aviation-training infrastructure is used appropriately to eliminate incorrect 

information and negative training. The term ―commercial pilots‖ encompasses more than 

part 121.

5.7 UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY FLIGHT TRAINING

Upset prevention and recovery simulator and academic training shall be conducted for pilots 

operating under 14 CFR part 91 subpart K and 14 CFR parts 121, 125, and 135. This training 

shall be delivered by instructors specifically trained and evaluated in upset prevention and 

recovery training (UPRT). The FAA should develop an AC articulating how to implement a 

UPRT program based on the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid revision 2, an approved 

equivalent, or other FAA-approved guidance.

Rationale

LOC in flight is the leading cause of fatalities in the world-wide commercial jet fleet. It has been 

determined that appropriate training is lacking because there is no regulatory requirement and the 

current industry guidance (Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid) is either poorly understood or 

not used.

Due to limitations in simulations, this area of instruction requires specialized knowledge and 

skill to avoid negative training. 

5.8 CERTIFICATION TRAINING

Aircraft training relevant to upset prevention and recovery training shall be mandated for 

Commercial Pilots License and Multi-Crew Pilot License (MPL) pilots during certification 

training. This will require UPRT-qualified flight instructors.

Rationale

The new-hire demographics have changed to include far fewer pilots with a military background 

who have had all-attitude training. The target group for this training is commercial pilots. There 

is insufficient infrastructure to expect today’s pilot population to undergo basic in-flight UPRT. 

This area of instruction requires instructors with specialized knowledge and skills. The need for 

this training will be enduring; recognition and recovery skills should be a core-competency for 

commercial pilots. Aircraft training relevant to UPRT is best done early in the pilot’s flying 
SPAW ARC Final Report 31

career so the relevant knowledge and skills can be developed over time. The International Civil 

Aviation Organization has recognized the importance of UPRT in aircraft prior to flying large 

transport category aircraft by including UPRT in the basic phase of the MPL training.

5.9 SIMULATOR FIDELITY 

The SPAW ARC recommends part 60 should be amended with a requirement (see appendix H) 

for an improved mathematical model of aircraft responses in a stall, as well as improved motion 

and stall buffet cueing. For previously qualified simulators, such requirements shall be through 

an FSTD directive. The ARC further recommends simulators used in UPRT should include 

proper simulation of the following, as appropriate:

 The effects of the proper and improper use of flight controls and thrust,

 Reduction of stability,

 Reduction of control effectiveness,

 The improvement of control effectiveness with the reduction in AOA,

 Wing drop (if required), and

 Entry into secondary stalls .

Rationale

Specifications are training-objective driven. Current mathematical models are inadequate for 

teaching recoveries from fully developed stalls. The SPAW ARC concludes that improvements 

are required for both the dynamics and the cueing in these regimes. Over the past 25 years,

training of aerodynamic stall and upset prevention and recovery in simulators have not been 

required. The applicable FSTD regulatory standards have therefore not been required to be 

amended to allow for this training. In light of the recommendations to include aerodynamic stall 

and UPRT herein, it is the opinion of this ARC that a set of minimum objective and subjective 

testing standards for simulators needs to be defined to support the intended training tasks in both 

stall and UPRT. Appendix H to this document contains a set of recommended changes to 

part 60, including improved simulator evaluation standards for both stall and UPRT tasks.

5.10 FEEDBACK MECHANISM

The SPAWARC recommends feedback mechanisms for use in the simulator and outside the 

simulator for briefing and debriefing pilots on their performance as it relates to upset prevention 

and recovery. These feedback mechanisms should include pilot inputs during recovery from an 

upset as well as information from both the validated simulation envelope and the aircraft 

operating envelope as determined by the data provider, to include at least control forces, 

angle-of-attack, g-load, and sideslip excursions. During UPRT, maneuver excursions beyond the 

validated simulator envelope require training intervention and explanation. See attachment B to 

appendix H. 
SPAW ARC Final Report 32

Rationale

Industry feedback from instructors indicates that they do not always have the proper tools to 

provide adequate feedback to pilots on their responses to upset prevention and recovery or show 

how the flightcrew’s responses relate to the aircraft operating envelope. This often results in 

negative or incomplete training. Proper feedback of pilot performance is crucial during training, 

especially when an instructor needs to be able to relate pilot responses to upset prevention and

recovery to the actual aircraft operating envelope. 

If part of the training is done outside of the validated envelope, there is a risk that the aircraft will 

not respond as simulated, which could result in negative training. When exceeding the accepted 

simulator model envelope or the known aircraft load factor envelope, the instructor should be 

able to inform the pilot that he or she is exceeding those limits and should have improved tools to 

correct flightcrew behaviors, thus mitigating negative training. 

In addition, simulator time is normally constrained and the instructors do not have enough time 

to completely debrief the flightcrew on their performance while in the simulator. These 

feedback tool(s) need to be available both inside the simulator for immediate feedback to correct 

flightcrew behavior and outside the simulator during the debrief, where longer discussions can 

take place between the instructor and students in a more relaxed and less time 

constrained environment.

For recommendations 5.6 through 5.10, the following conditions apply:

 UPRT shall follow a phased implementation plan. This plan, created in conjunction with 

industry, shall be put in place to eliminate the risk of negative training.

 Completion of an integrated course of UPRT shall result in pilot training record.
SPAW ARC Final Report A–1

APPENDIX A—MEMBERS, STAFF, AND SMES

SPAW ARC CHAIRMAN

Mr. Lou Nemeth, CAE, Chief Safety Officer

SPAW ARC VICE CHAIRMAN

Mr. Philip Adrian, The Boeing Company, 

737 Chief Technical Pilot, Chief Pilot 

Regulatory Affairs

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,

INTERNATIONAL (ALPA)

Capt. David McKenney

Mr. Chad Balentine

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF 

AMERICA, INC.

Mr. Paul Railsback 

Mr. David Ward

ATR

Mr. Jerome Bonetto

Mr. Dominique Falque

THE BOEING COMPANY

Mr. Chuck Allison

BOMBARDIER AEROSPACE

Mr. Allan Dunville

Mr. Scott Black

CAE

Mr. Itash Samani

Mr. Gary Morrison

THE COALITION OF AIR LINE PILOTS 

ASSOCIATIONS

Mr. Noam Morgenstern 

Mr. Charles Cox

EMBRAER NORTH AMERICA

Mr. Gilson Russo

Mr. John Sevalho 

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION

Mr. Jim Burin

Mr. Bill Voss

FLIGHTSAFETY INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Suren Meras 

Ms. Susan McHaffie

REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION

Mr. Paul Kolisch

Mr. Paul Preidecker 
SPAW ARC Final Report A–2

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

Dr. Sunjoo Advani, 

International Committee for Aviation 

Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE)

Mr. Mike Belcher, Calspan Corporation

Mr. Tom Bond, FAA

Mr. Randy Brooks, Upset Prevention and 

Recovery Training Association (UPRTA)

Mr. Bryan Burks, ALPA 

Mr. Dan Campbell, Airbus SAS

Mr. Dennis Crider, NTSB

Mr. John Foster, NASA

Mr. Joe Jacobsen, FAA

Mr. Dan Litman, FlightSafety International 

Mr. Pete Neff, FAA

Mr. Jerry Ostronic, FAA

Mr. Paul Pellicano, FAA

Mr. Paul Ransbury, UPRTA

Mr. Tom Ratvasky, NASA

Mr. Don Weins, Horizon Airlines

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Robert Burke, Designated 

Federal Official 

Ms. Barbara Adams, 

Air Transportation Division

Ms. Catherine Burnett, Management and 

Program Analyst, 

Air Transportation Division

Mr. Larry McDonald, 

National Simulator Program

Ms. Sara Mikolop, Attorney, Office of the 

Chief Council Regulations Division

Dr. Jeff Schroeder, Chief Scientist and 

Technical Advisor

PAI CONSULTING

Mr. Scott Harper

Mr. Ryan Gibson

Mr. Davis Chung
SPAW ARC Final Report B–1

APPENDIX B—ACRONYMS

14 CFR Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations

AC Advisory Circular

ACO Aircraft Certification Office

AEG Aircraft Evaluation Groups

AFM Airplane Flight Manual

AOA Angle of Attack 

AOM Aircraft Operating Manual

ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee

ASAP Aviation Safety Action Plan

ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analytical Sharing

ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 

AVP Office of Accident Investigation

CCA Computer Controlled Aircraft

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FFS Full-flight simulators

FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance

FSB Flight Standards Board

FSTD Flight Simulation Training Device

ICATEE International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes

InFO Information for Operators

IOS Instructor Operating SystemStation

LOC Loss of Control

MPL Multi-Crew Pilot License

MSL Mean Sea Level

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NSP National Simulator Program

NSPM National Simulator Program Manager

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer

POI Principal Operations Inspector

Pub. L. 111–216 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, 

Public Law 111–216

QTG Quality Test Guide
SPAW ARC Final Report B–2

SAFO Safety Alert for Operators 

SME Subject Matter Expert 

SMS Safety Management System

SPAW Stick Pusher and Adverse Weather

TEM Threat and Error Management

UPRT Upset Prevention and Recovery Training

UPRTA Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Association
SPAW ARC Final Report C–1

APPENDIX C—CHARTER
SPAW ARC Final Report C–2
SPAW ARC Final Report C–3
SPAW ARC Final Report D–1

APPENDIX D—SECTION 208 OF PUB. L. 111–216
SPAW ARC Final Report E–1

APPENDIX E—DEFINITIONS

Term Definition

Adverse Weather

For the purpose of this report, the term adverse weather is not limited to icing, 

microburst, and windshear. The ARC deliberations and recommendations went 

beyond the narrow scope and included broader weather conditions.

Aerodynamic Stall (VS) When the wing’s critical angle of attack is exceeded and lift is reduced substantially 

due to airflow separation over the upper surface of the wing.

Approach to Stall Flight conditions bordered by stall warning and aerodynamic stall.

First Indication of a Stall The initial aural, tactile, or visual sign of an impending stall, which can be either 

natural or synthetically induced.

Flight Simulation Training 

Device (FSTD)

A full flight simulator (FFS) or a flight-training device (FTD), which is in 

compliance with the standards for FSTD qualification as described in part 60.

Integrated Training Course

In an integrated training course the licenses and ratings are provided through a single 

course. The integrated course is done with a constant and intensive assessment 

accomplished in a shorter duration than a modular course.

Landing Configuration Starts at initial configuration change for commencing an approach until executing a 

landing, go-around, or missed approach.

Lift Curve

A depiction of an aircraft’s lift coefficient versus angle of attack. Typical lift curves 

show lift increasing proportionally with angle of attack until lift decreases due to 

airflow separation.

Maneuver-Based Training Training that focuses on a single event or maneuver in isolation.

Microburst A concentrated, powerful downdraft associated with convective weather.

Modular Training Course

In a modular training course, the licenses and ratings are obtained in different phases 

and may be by different providers. The modular course is normally longer than the 

integrated course.

Scenario-Based Training

Training that incorporates maneuvers with possible real-world experiences to 

facilitate training of critical thinking, flight management skills, and cultivate 

practical flying skills in an operational environment.

Secondary Stall A premature increase in angle of attack during stall recovery that results in 

another stall.

Stall Event Anytime the aircraft develops indications of an approach to stall or 

aerodynamic stall.

Stall Warning

A natural or synthetic indication provided when approaching a stall that may include 

one or more of following indications:

 Buffeting (some aircraft will buffet more than others),

 Reduced roll stability and aileron effectiveness,

 Low airspeed visual or aural indications,

 Reduced elevator (pitch) authority,

 Inability to maintain altitude or arrest rate of descent,

 An aural or visual cue, or

 Stick shaker activation (if installed).
SPAW ARC Final Report E–2

Term Definition

Startle 

An unexpected event that causes an emotion such as when a pilot engages autopilot 

in vertical speed mode at high altitude, gets distracted while airplane runs out of 

thrust, loses speed and stalls.

Surprise An event that causes a reflex, such as a pilot wincing and blinking after 

windshield cracks.

Takeoff Configuration

Defined as normal configuration for takeoff, go-around, or missed approach until all 

flaps/slats and gear are fully stowed. Retractable landing gear may be extended 

or retracted.

Threat and Error 

Management (TEM)

An overarching safety concept regarding aviation operations and human 

performance. There are three basic components in the TEM framework: threats, 

errors and undesired (aircraft) states. The framework proposes that threats and 

errors are part of everyday aviation operations that must be managed by the aviation 

professionals, since both threats and errors carry the potential to generate undesired 

aircraft states.

Training Provider Defined as anyone who is providing flight/simulator training to pilots flying under 

parts 91K, 121, 125, and 135.

Uncoordinated Flight Flight, especially during turns, in which the horizontal and vertical forces acting on 

the aircraft are out of balance resulting in a slip or a skid.

Undesired Aircraft State A position, condition, or attitude of an aircraft that reduces or eliminates 

safety margins.

Windshear Any rapid change in wind velocity , either direction or speed.
SPAW ARC Final Report F–1

APPENDIX F—TRAINING TO OBJECTIVE AND 

MEASURABLE STANDARDS

Windshear training programs should be competency based. Pilots must demonstrate proficiency 

in each competency to satisfactorily complete the training. Proficiency standards must be clearly 

outlined for each competency.

RECOMMENDED/EXAMPLE COMPETENCIES AND PROFICIENCY STANDARDS 

FOR A WINDSHEAR TRAINING PROGRAM

THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE TRAINING

1. Microburst/Windshear Theory—

 Identifies conditions that produce microbursts and windshear.

 Lists indicators of the presence of microbursts and windshear.

2. Microburst/Windshear Accidents—

 Describes major accidents caused by microburst and windshear.

 Shows knowledge of the existence of microbursts that exceed the performance 

capability of any airplane.

3. Microburst/Windshear Avoidance—

 Identifies avoidance as the primary means of handling microburst and windshear.

4. Microburst/Windshear Escape—

 Lists the steps of the windshear escape procedure.

 Identifies the goal of the windshear escape procedure.

FLIGHT TRAINING

1. Microburst/Windshear Escape—

 Identifies the presence of windshear.

 Initiates windshear escape maneuver promptly.

 Follows windshear guidance according to OEM or company procedures (if available).

 Coordinates flightcrew activities to respond the windshear.

 Maintains flight path and accepts abnormal airspeed and pitch attitude.

 Reports the windshear encounter to ATC.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–1

APPENDIX G—SURVEY & DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS/INDUSTRY PRACTICES

Table G–1. Stick Pusher (SP) Company Survey.

Company

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP 

Demo

SP 

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how 

training is accomplished

A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes —

measured

Demonstration

B No No No No No No No Not in BAE syllabus

C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA Ensure pilot allows pusher 

to lower AoA

Table G–2. Stick Pusher Airline Survey.

Airline

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP 

Demo

SP 

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training 

is accomplished

#1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Unknown

#2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

#3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Hold from shaker to initial 

pusher activation —

experience only

#4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Unknown

#5 Yes No No FAA considered activation of 

SP "negative training."
SPAW ARC Final Report G–2

Airline

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP 

Demo

SP 

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training 

is accomplished

#6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

SME and 

NSP force 

verification

Training complete when 

pilot response is to release 

back pressure

#7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Flightcrews to get hands-on 

with the proper recovery 

technique, and reset 

muscle memory.

Table G–3. SPAW ARC 208 Stick Pusher Demo/Training Data.

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

ATR 

42/72/500 Yes Yes No Simulator Yes Yes No No No

Stick pusher demonstration 

conducted during approach to 

stall series. Only one demo is 

required. As the airspeed 

decreases and when the stick 

pusher activates, the pilot will 

perform the recovery. Maneuver 

graded with a T.

Challenger 

CL300 Yes Yes No Simulator Yes Yes No No No

Stick pusher demonstration 

conducted during departure, 

approach, and at a high altitude 

over the course of training. 

Bombardier flight test pilot 

provided subjective verification 

of pusher activation during 

simulator certification process.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–3

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Challenger 

Cl600 

Series

Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Stick Pusher forces measured and 

subjectively verified by the SME. 

Exercise in the simulator is 

trained to not oppose SP forces 

but is not graded.

CRJ200 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No No

Training is given in both the clean 

and landing configuration. 

Exercise in the simulator stresses 

not to oppose the stick pusher, 

and execute a stall recovery once 

the pusher ceases. The event is 

trained, but not graded.

CRJ700 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No No

Training is given in both the clean 

and landing configuration. 

Exercise in the simulator stresses 

not to oppose the stick pusher, 

and execute a stall recovery once 

the pusher ceases. The event is 

trained, but not graded.

CRJ900 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No No

Training is given in both the clean 

and landing configuration. 

Exercise in the simulator stresses 

not to oppose the stick pusher, 

and execute a stall recovery once 

the pusher ceases. The event is 

trained, but not graded.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–4

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Dash 8 

Q300 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Stick Pusher forcesare measured 

(+4 lbs) and subjectively verified 

by the Bombardier chief flight 

test engineer. Exercise in the 

simulator is trained to not oppose 

SP force but is not graded. No 

malfunction training is provided.

Dash 8 

Q400 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Stick Pusher forces are measured 

(+4 lbs) and subjectively verified 

by the Bombardier chief flight 

test engineer. Exercise in the 

simulator is trained to not oppose 

SP force but is not graded. No 

malfunction training is provided.

Embraer

120 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No No

Stick pusher force is per the 

original measured values obtained 

during simulator certification. 

Stick pusher pressures are verified 

by the SME for accuracy in feel. 

The manufacturer does not have a 

stick pusher demonstration. We 

accomplish the demonstration in 

accordance with standard 

FlightSafety recommended 

practices.

Embraer

135/145/

Legacy

Yes Yes No Simulator Yes Yes No No No

Stick pusher forces are measured 

during the initial certification of 

the simulator. The pusher is only 

demonstrated not trained, but it is 

graded.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–5

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Global 

Express Bd700Yes Yes No Simulator Yes Yes No No No

Stick pusher is subjectively 

verified by the Bombardier test 

pilot who originally certified the 

aircraft. Demonstration is 

conducted in the simulator at low 

and high altitudes.

Gulfstream 

(G1159) 

II/III

Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No Yes Yes

Demonstration is accomplished 

only after proficiency is achieved 

for normal stall recovery. At 

simulated minimum en route 

altitude on visual approach, stall 

is taken to pusher and the pilot 

recovers to go around. Additional 

training options are available 

through use of windshear 

recovery that often result in a 

pusher or use of pusher 

malfunction, which allows 

recovery from real-world 

scenarios at any altitude. Push 

force is verified subjectively by 

Gulfstream test pilots during 

recent recurrent.

Gulfstream 

G200

Gulfstream 

G-IV
SPAW ARC Final Report G–6

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Gulfstream 

G450/550 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

Subjective force measurement. 

Activation is verified by the 

cockpit avionics AOA indication 

and the graphic pitch limit 

indicator.

Gulfstream 

G-IV/300/

400

Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

Brief then simulator 

Demonstration. Demonstration is 

no lower than 600ft minimum 

decent altitude. Push force is 

verified by the OEM test pilot.

Gulfstream 

G-V

Hawker 750 No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

The demonstration is conducted 

in one of two methods. One is 

during a mid-altitude holding 

pattern, the other is on approach 

fully configured. Both are done 

as a demonstration and is not 

graded 1–4.

Hawker 

800XP No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

The demonstration is conducted 

in one of two methods. One is 

during a mid-altitude holding 

pattern, the other is on approach 

fully configured. Both are done 

as a demonstration and is not 

graded 1-4.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–7

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Hawker 

850XP No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

The demonstration is conducted 

in one of two methods. One is 

during a mid-altitude holding 

pattern, the other is on approach 

fully configured. Both are done 

as a demonstration and is not 

graded 1-4.

Hawker 

900XP No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

The demonstration is conducted 

in one of two methods. One is 

during a mid-altitude holding 

pattern, the other is on approach 

fully configured. Both are done 

as a demonstration and is not 

graded 1-4.

Hawker 

4000 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No No Yes

Pusher force was measured during 

simulator flight data collection 

and has been confirmed by 

Hawker Beechcraft Flight Test 

pilots. A stick pusher 

demonstration is conducted by 

having a pilot hold a landing 

configuration stall to the pusher 

and recovering.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–8

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Jetstar II Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes No No

Stick pusher is per the original 

simulation certification for 

accuracy and force. The stick 

pusher feel is verified by the 

program SME. The value given 

in the AFM is approximately 

100 lbs pull force exerted by the 

stick pusher. The stick pusher 

demonstration is from the Jetstar 

AFM and is delivered per the 

manufacturer’s recommendations 

and procedures. 

(AFM chapter 2–46).

Jetstream

31/32 

Series

No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No Yes No

Some verification of SP force. 

Training is given in either the 

clean or landing configuration. 

Exercise in the simulator stresses 

not to oppose the stick pusher, 

and to execute a stall recovery 

once the pusher ceases. the event 

is trained, but not graded.

Learjet 20 

Series Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes Yes No

SME verification of SP force. 

The SP demo is demonstrated as a 

separate maneuver as part of the 

stall series. SP & stick/shaker 

inadvertent activation is given as 

two separate emergency 

malfunctions during the review of 

all flight control malfunctions and 

they are graded.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–9

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Learjet 

35/36 

Series

Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes Yes No

SME verification of SP force. SP 

demo is demonstrated as a 

separate maneuver as part of the 

stall series. SP & stick/shaker 

inadvertent activation is given as 

two separate emergency 

malfunctions during the review of 

all flight control malfunctions and 

they are graded.

Learjet 55 Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes Yes No

SME verification of SP force. SP 

demo is demonstrated as a 

separate maneuver as part of the 

stall series. SP & stick/shaker 

inadvertent activation is given as 

two separate emergency 

malfunctions during the review of 

all flight control malfunctions and 

they are graded.

Metro 

23/C-26B Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Stick Pusher forces subjectively 

verified by three program SMEs 

each have several thousand hours 

of Metro time. SP malfunction is 

trained in the simulator using the 

manufacturer's checklist 

procedure. SP exercise in the 

simulator is trained to full stall 

and to not oppose SP force. The 

exercise is not graded.
SPAW ARC Final Report G–10

Aircraft 

Type

SP Ground 

Training/

Briefing

SP

Demo

SP

Training

Training 

Aids Used

Initial 

Training

Recurrent 

Training

Differences 

Training

SP 

Malfunction 

Training

SP Force 

Verification

Comments on how training is 

accomplished

Premier 

I/IA Yes Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No Yes No

OEM production test pilot 

confirmed today (Jan 6, 2011) our 

stick pusher tends to correct the 

AOA too quickly. The aircraft 

does it slower and smoother. 

Also, the pusher releases too soon 

after activation and will 

sometimes enter a secondary 

push. Need to reevaluate the stick 

pusher data for the simulator.

SAAB 2000

SAAB 340 

A/B No Yes Yes Simulator Yes Yes No Yes No

Some verification of SP force. 

Training is given in either the 

clean or landing configuration. 

Exercise in the simulator stresses 

not to oppose the stick pusher, 

and to execute a stall recovery 

once the pusher ceases. The 

event is trained, but not graded.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–1

APPENDIX H—PROPOSED SIMULATOR STANDARDS FOR 

ICING, WINDSHEAR, UPSET, & STALL TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides recommendations regarding the updates to the FSTD technical standards 

as defined in part 60 to support training recommendations made in the body of this report. These 

standards were initially developed by the industry technical working group ICATEE. It was 

comprised of a broad range of SMEs on simulator development and evaluation. 

The SPAW ARC recommends that the FAA incorporate these changes to part 60, through due 

process, and make these requirements applicable to all new FFS equipment based on an effective 

date that is coordinated with the effective date of new training requirements as defined in the 

body of this report. Furthermore, since the training requirements recommended in the body of 

this report will likely be conducted in FSTDs previously qualified either under part 60 or an 

earlier standard, the recommended simulator standards detailed in this appendix should be 

published through an FSTD directive as defined in § 60.23. Note that the publication of an 

FSTD directive addresses safety of flight issues and is applicable to each qualified FSTD, 

regardless of its original qualification standard. It is the intent of the ARC that any retroactive 

simulator requirements as defined in this appendix and published as an FSTD directive should be 

addressed as additional qualification requirements (see § 60.16) that are applicable only to those 

simulators being used to conduct training tasks as defined in the body of this report.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO CURRENT FFS EVALUATION 

STANDARDS

This appendix is in two sections. Each section provides a summary of significant new 

requirements that are proposed in the attached tables together with supporting information.

 Attachment A defines recommended changes to current simulator standards tables to 

support the required training tasks from the SPAW ARC recommendations.

 Attachment B provides supporting information and requirements that are intended to be 

appended to existing regulatory guidance material. 

ATTACHMENT A—PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CURRENT SIMULATOR 

STANDARDS TABLES (14 CFR PART 60)

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Windshear Recognition and Recovery 

The existing requirements for windshear recognition and recovery are amended to address the 

following improvements as recommended by the SPAW ARC:

1. In addition to the four windshear profiles that are currently required, two additional 

complex windshear models will be required to enable demonstration of the complexity of 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–2

a real world microburst event. The Windshear Training Aid provides two examples of 

such complex models that may be used to satisfy this requirement.

2. All required windshear profiles must be selectable from the IOS and must use a method 

to ensure the simulator is properly configured to ensure the proper windshear recognition 

cues are presented as tuned and qualified.

3. Realistic levels of turbulence associated with each required windshear profile must be

programed into the profile.

Table H–1. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A1A–Minimum Simulator 

Requirements, Entry No. 2.e.

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Simulator 

Levels < Information >

Entry 

No. General Simulator Requirements A B C D Notes

2.e.

(amend)

If the aircraft being simulated is one of the aircraft listed in 

§ 121.358, Low-altitude windshear system equipment 

requirements, the simulator must employ windshear models 

that provide training for recognition of windshear 

phenomena and the execution of recovery procedures. 

Models must be available to the instructor/evaluator for the 

following critical phases of flight:

(1) Prior to takeoff rotation.

(2) At liftoff.

(3) During initial climb.

(4) On final approach, below 500 ft AGL.

The QTG must reference the FAA Windshear Training Aid 

or present alternate airplane related data, including the 

implementation method(s) used. If the alternate method is 

selected, wind models from the Royal Aerospace

Establishment, the Joint Airport Weather Studies Project 

and other recognized sources may be implemented, but 

must be supported and properly referenced in the QTG. 

Only those simulators meeting these requirements may be 

used to satisfy the training requirements of part 121 

pertaining to a certificate holder’s approved low-altitude 

windshear flight training program as described in 

§ 121.409.

The addition of realistic levels of turbulence associated with 

each required windshear profile must be available and

selectable to the instructor.

In addition to the four basic windshear models required for 

qualification, at least two additional complex windshear 

models must be available to the instructor that represent the 

complexity of actual windshear encounters. These models 

must be available in the takeoff and landing configurations 

and must consist of independent variable winds in multiple 

simultaneous components. The Windshear Training Aid 

provides two such example ―complex‖ windshear models 

X X If desired, Level A and B 

simulators may qualify 

for windshear training by 

meeting these standards; 

see Attachment 5 of this 

appendix. Windshear 

models may consist of 

independent variable 

winds in multiple 

simultaneous components. 

The FAA Windshear 

Training Aid presents one 

acceptable means of 

compliance with 

simulator wind model 

requirements.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–3

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Simulator 

Levels < Information >

Entry 

No. General Simulator Requirements A B C D Notes

that may be used to satisfy this requirement. Any proposed 

alternate wind models used to meet this requirement must 

be properly supported and referenced in the Master QTG.

Instructor Operating Station (IOS): All required windshear 

models must be selectable and clearly labeled on the IOS. 

Additionally, all IOS selectable windshear models must 

employ a method, such as a simulator preset, to ensure that 

the FFS is properly configured for use in training. This 

method must address variables such as windshear intensity, 

aircraft configurations (weights, flap settings, etc.), and 

ambient conditions to ensure that the proper windshear 

recognition cues and training objectives are present as 

originally qualified.

Engine and Airframe Icing

The SPAW ARC recommends improvements to simulation modeling regarding the aerodynamic 

effects of icing conditions on the aircraft, in particular emphasizes that the aerodynamic effects 

modeling should not be based on weight changes. Specific aircraft data should be used where 

available, however empirical data should be used if flight test data is not available. 

The SPAW ARC also recommends simulation of the effects of engine ice ingestion. In addition, 

the ARC recommends that adequate simulation of failures to ice protection equipment be 

included to allow for the training of failures in these systems and the ensuing impact to the 

performance of the aircraft.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–4

Table H–2. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A1A–Minimum Simulator 

Requirements, Entry No. 2.j.

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Simulator 

Levels < Information >

Entry No. General Simulator Requirements A B C D Notes

2. j.

(amend)

Modeling that includes the effects of icing, where 

appropriate, on the airframe, aerodynamics, and the 

engine(s). Icing models should simulate the aerodynamic 

degradation effects of ice accretion on the airplane lifting 

surfaces including loss of lift, decrease in stall angle of 

attack, change in pitching moment, decrease in control 

effectiveness, and changes in control forces in addition to 

any overall increase in drag. Engine icing models should 

include the degradation effects and cues of ice accretion 

including vibration changes, power changes, and ice 

ingestion where appropriate.

Aircraft OEM data or other acceptable analytical methods 

must be utilized to develop ice accretion models that are 

representative of the simulated aircraft’s performance 

degradation in a typical in-flight icing encounter or other 

icing encounter as required for training flightcrews due to 

accident/incident history for a particular aircraft type. Ice 

accretion models should be developed using historical 

accident/incident data where appropriate and available. 

Statement of compliance (SOC) and tests required. See 

objective testing requirements.

In addition, the SOC shall include the effects of icing 

following failures of ice protection equipment as 

applicable to the aircraft type. The ice protection system 

for aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and airframe,

including instrumentation systems such as pitot static 

sources should be considered. 

X X A statement of 

compliance should be 

provided describing the 

effects that provide 

training in the specific 

skills required for 

recognition of icing 

phenomena and execution 

of recovery; the effects 

resulting from a failure of 

an installed protection 

system should also be 

addressed through the 

SOC. 

The SOC should include 

verification that these 

effects have been tested.

Icing effects simulation 

models are only required 

for those airplanes 

authorized for operations 

in icing conditions. Icing 

simulation models should 

be developed to provide 

training in the specific 

skills required for 

recognition of ice 

accumulation and 

execution of the required 

response.

Upset Recognition and Recovery

1. New requirements are proposed for the qualification of upset prevention and recovery 

maneuvers that are based upon the principles as described in the Airplane Upset 

Recovery Training Aid.

2. These requirements address the following elements with respect to aircraft UPRT:

a. To verify that the FFS response can remain within the range of validated data or 

wind tunnel/analytical data during the execution of a UPRT task.

b. To provide the instructor/evaluator with a minimum set of feedback tools to properly 

evaluate the student’s performance during a UPRT task. This feedback tool should 

provide the instructor/evaluator with information that can be used to critique and/or 

debrief the student. It should provide the information necessary to determine whether 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–5

or not a repeat or additional training is warranted, should the observed recovery take 

the simulator outside of the validated envelope.

Table H–3. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A1A–Minimum Simulator 

Requirements, Entry No. 2.m.

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Simulator 

Levels < Information >

Entry No. General Simulator Requirements A B C D Notes

2. m.

(append)

Upset Recognition and Recovery. 

Aerodynamics Evaluation: The simulator must be capable 

of performing upset recognition and recovery tasks as 

defined on the simulator’s statement of qualification

(SOQ). The simulator must be evaluated for each specific 

upset prevention and recovery maneuver for the purpose of 

determining that the combination of AOA and sideslip 

does not exceed the range of validated data or 

wind tunnel/analytical data during a typical recovery 

maneuver as defined in the sponsor’s training program. 

The following minimum set of upset prevention and 

recovery maneuvers must be available to the 

instructor/evaluator. Other upset prevention and recovery 

scenarios as developed by the FFS sponsor must be 

evaluated in the same manner.

1. A nose-high, wings level aircraft upset.

2. A nose-low, wings level aircraft upset.

3. A high bank angle aircraft upset.

Instructor Operating System (IOS): Selectable airplane 

upsets must provide guidance to the instructor concerning 

the method utilized to drive the FFS into an upset 

condition including any malfunction or degradation in the 

FFS’ functionality required to initiate the upset. The 

intentional degradation of simulator functionality to drive 

an airplane upset is generally not acceptable unless used 

purely as a tool for repositioning with the pilot out of the 

loop. The simulator must also have a mechanism in place 

to notify the instructor/evaluator when the simulator’s 

validated envelope and aircraft operational limits have 

been exceeded during an upset prevention and recovery 

training task. A statement of compliance (SOC) is 

required that defines the source data used to construct the 

flight test and wind tunnel/analytical envelope. This SOC 

must verify that each upset prevention and recovery 

maneuver as defined on the FFS’ SOQ has been evaluated 

using the methods described in this section.

X X X X This section applies to the 

qualification of airplane 

upset maneuvers that 

exceed one or more of the

altitudes described in the 

Airplane Upset Recovery 

Training Aid, Revision 2. 

The IOS display (or 

equivalent method of 

instructor feedback) 

should contain features 

that clearly indicate to the 

instructor/evaluator when 

the simulator has 

exceeded its flight test 

validated and wind 

tunnel/analytical envelope 

(typically displayed as an 

alpha/beta crossplot). 

Additional capabilities 

should include 

instructor/evaluator 

feedback on aircraft 

operational limitations 

(V-n diagram) and control 

displacements, control 

forces, etc.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–6

OBJECTIVE TESTING REQUIREMENTS

Stick Pusher Force Calibration

1. Objective test requirement is added to validate the stick/column control transient forces because of stick-pusher 

system activation.

2. The validation test may be performed as part of an existing stall characteristics test. 

3. The test definition allows for the ground testing of this system for validation data to be collected through stimulation of the 

stall protection system to produce a stick pusher response. 

Table H–4. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A2A–Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Objective Tests Entry No. 2.a.10

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Information

Test

Tolerance Flight 

Conditions Test Details

Simulator Level

Notes

Entry No. Title A B C D

2.a.10

(append)

Stick Pusher 

System 

Force 

Calibration

±10% or ±5 lb 

(2.2 daN)) 

Stick/Column 

force

Ground or Flight Test is intended to validate the stick/column 

transient forces as a result of a stick pusher 

system activation to prevent an 

aerodynamic stall. 

This test may be conducted in an on-ground 

condition through stimulation of the stall 

protection system in a manner that 

generates a stick pusher response that is 

representative of an in-flight condition.

X X X X Aircraft manufacturer 

design data may be 

utilized as validation 

data as determined 

acceptable by the 

NSPM.

Test requirements

may be met through 

column force 

validation testing in 

conjunction with the 

stall characteristics 

test (2.c.8).

Stall Characteristics

1. Additional flight conditions to the objective testing requirements for FFS qualification: These additional flight conditions 

broaden the scope of objective testing beyond the current requirements, which are limited to idle power, wings-level, and 1-g 

stall entry conditions.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–7

a. Cruise (high altitude11) stall.

b. Cruise (low altitude12) stall.

c. Accelerated stall.

d. At least two other flap settings to be demonstrated, to include second segment climb and approach or landing.

2. Modified tolerances are proposed to tighten standards on relevant aerodynamic parameters in the ―approach to stall‖ region 

(to provide aircraft-specific recognition cues) while gradually relaxing the tolerances as the stall develops, to support an 

engineering-based methodology for stall model development.

a. Approach to stall (prior to the activation of the stall warning system or stall buffet onset):

i. ±2.0pitch angle

ii. ±2.0angle of attack

iii. ±2 bank angle

iv. ±2sideslip angle

b. Stall warning to stall break:

i. ±2.0pitch angle

ii. ±2.0angle of attack

iii. Correct trend and magnitude for lateral/directional body rates

a. Stall break through recovery

i. The SOC describes the aerodynamic modeling methods, validation, and checkout of the stall characteristics of the FFS. 

The minimum model features are defined and must be addressed in the aerodynamic model where applicable to the 

simulated aircraft.

ii. The SOC verifies that the FFS has been evaluated by an SME pilot with knowledge of the stall characteristics of the 

aircraft and provides an acceptable level of fidelity to accomplish the training tasks.

 

11 These tests should be performed as close to the service ceiling as available data permit.

12 These tests should be performed under 10,000 ft altitude.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–8

3. Proposed new tolerances to better validate flight control inputs in an objective manner.

a. Correct trend and magnitude tolerances applied to all flight control inputs throughout the maneuver.

4. Additional SOC for aircraft equipped with Stick Pusher System. 

a. The SOC verifies that the stick pusher system has been modeled, programmed, and validated using the aircraft 

manufacturer’s design data or another acceptable data source. The SOC must address, at a minimum, stick pusher 

activation and cancellation logic, as well as control displacement and forces that result from the stick pusher activation.

Table H–5. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A2A–Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Objective Tests Entry No. 2.c.8

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Information

Test

Tolerance Flight 

Conditions Test Details

Simulator Level

Notes

Entry No. Title A B C D

2.c.8

(amend)

Stall 

Characteristics

±3 kt airspeed 

for initial 

buffet, stall 

warning, and 

stall speeds.

Control inputs 

must be plotted 

and 

demonstrate 

correct trend 

and magnitude.

Approach to 

Stall:

±2.0pitch 

angle

±2.0angle of 

attack

±2.0 bank 

angle

±2.0sideslip 

angle

Second 

Segment Climb, 

Cruise (High 

Altitude) and 

Cruise (Low 

Altitude) 

Approach or 

Landing

The following stall entry methods must be 

demonstrated in at least one of the three 

required flight conditions:

 Stall entry at wings level (1 g)

 Stall entry in turning flight of at least 

15° to 30° bank angle (accelerated 

stall)

The required cruise condition must be 

conducted in a flaps-up (clean) 

configuration. The second segment climb 

and approach/landing conditions must be 

conducted at different flap settings.

Record the stall warning signal and initial 

buffet, if applicable. Time history data 

must be recorded for the full stall and 

recovery through normal flight. The stall 

warning signal must occur in the proper 

relation to buffet/stall. FFSes of airplanes 

exhibiting a sudden pitch attitude change or 

―g break‖ must demonstrate this 

characteristic. FFSes of airplanes 

exhibiting a roll off and/or loss of roll 

X X X X Due to the inherently 

unstable and 

non-repeatable 

behavior of the stall 

maneuver, 

parameters from the 

stall break and 

recovery will only be 

subject to correct 

trend and magnitude 

tolerances for the 

purpose of continuing 

qualification 

evaluations.

Alternate methods, 

such as wind tunnel 

methods, engineering 

simulations, or other 

generally accepted 

analytical methods 

may be utilized to 

develop enhanced 

representative stall 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–9

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Information

Test

Tolerance Flight 

Conditions Test Details

Simulator Level

Notes

Entry No. Title A B C D

Stall warning 

up to stall:

±2.0pitch 

angle

±2.0angle of 

attack

Correct trend 

and magnitude 

for 

lateral/direction

al body rates.

Stall Break and 

Recovery:

SOC Required 

(see Attachment 

B)

control authority must demonstrate this 

characteristic.

―Approach to Stall‖ tolerances apply up to 

the activation of the stall warning system or 

aerodynamic stall buffet, whichever occurs 

first. ―Stall warning up to stall‖ tolerances 

apply from the activation of the stall 

warning system or aerodynamic stall buffet, 

whichever occurs first, to just prior to the 

stall break. ―Stall Break and Recovery‖ 

applies from just prior to the stall break 

(pitch break, g-break, stick pusher 

activation, or other indication of a 

full/aerodynamic stall) through recovery to 

normal flight.

For stick pusher equipped aircraft, a 

Statement of Compliance (SOC) is required 

verifying that the stick pusher system has 

been modeled, programmed, and validated 

using the aircraft manufacturer’s design 

data or other acceptable data source. The 

SOC must address, at a minimum, stick 

pusher activation and cancellation logic as 

well as system dynamics, control 

displacement and forces as a result of the 

stick pusher activation.

An SOC is required that describes the 

aerodynamic modeling methods, validation, 

and checkout of the stall characteristics of 

the FFS. The SOC must also include 

verification that the FFS has been evaluated 

by an SME pilot with acceptable supporting 

documentation of the stall characteristics of 

the aircraft being simulated. See attachment 

models.

For the purpose of 

these tests, high 

altitude is an altitude 

close to the 

operational ceiling of 

the aircraft.. Low 

altitude is below 

10,000 ft.

Non-flight test 

tolerances as defined 

in Attachment 2, 

Paragraph 11(a) are 

not applicable at 

airspeeds below the 

activation of the stall 

warning system.

Tests may be 

conducted at a center 

of gravity typically 

required for airplane 

certification stall 

testing.

When it is 

demonstrated that 

engineering or 

flight test data is not 

available, the use of 

AFM data 

accompanied with 

SME evaluation may 

be permissible as 

agreed upon by the 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–10

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Information

Test

Tolerance Flight 

Conditions Test Details

Simulator Level

Notes

Entry No. Title A B C D

B for detailed requirements.

Computer Controlled Aircraft (CCA): 

Test in normal and non-normal control 

states. For CCA aircraft with stall envelope 

protection systems, tests are required in the 

non-normal control state only if acceptable 

AOA envelope protection tests are provided 

(see Table A2A, section 2.h.).

NSPM. The SME 

must have relevant 

experience to 

perform such 

assessments.

Engine and Airframe Icing Effects—Aerodynamic Stall Demonstration

1. The intent of the test is to objectively demonstrate the expected icing effects as described in the SOC required in the general 

requirements in Table A1A, Section 2.j. 

2. Flight test validation data are not required. The test enables a comparison between a baseline test (with uncontaminated lifting 

surfaces) as compared to a similar test with ice contamination.

3. Icing effects should include, but are not limited to, the following effects as applicable to the simulated airplane type:

 Decrease in stall angle of attack;

 Increase in stall warning (e.g. stick shaker) speed;

 Changes in pitching moment;

 Increase in drag; and

 Change in stall buffet characteristics and onset.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–11

Table H–6. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A2A–Full Flight Simulator (FFS) Objective Tests Entry No. 2.i

<<< QPS Requirements >>> Information

Test

Tolerance Flight 

Conditions Test Details

Simulator Level Notes

Entry No. Title A B C D

2.i.

(append)

Engine and 

Airframe 

Icing Effects 

Demonstration 

(Aerodynamic 

Stall)

Takeoff, 

Approach, or 

Landing

Time history of a full stall and initiation of 

the recovery. Tests are intended to 

demonstrate representative aerodynamic 

effects caused by in-flight ice accretion. 

Flight test validation data is not required.

Two tests are required to demonstrate 

engine and airframe icing effects. One test 

will demonstrate the FFS’ baseline 

performance and the other test will 

demonstrate the aerodynamic effects of 

ice accretion relative to the baseline test.

The tests must utilize the icing model(s) as 

described in the required SOC in Table 

A1A, Section 2.j. Tests must include a 

rationale that describes the icing effects 

being demonstrated. Icing effects must 

include, but are not limited to, the following 

effects as applicable to the particular 

airplane:

 Decrease in stall AOA

 Increase in stall warning (e.g. stick 

shaker) speed

 Changes in pitching moment

 Increase in drag

 Change in stall buffet characteristics 

and onset.

X X Tests will be 

evaluated for 

representative effects 

on relevant 

aerodynamic 

parameters such as 

AOA, control inputs, 

and thrust/power 

settings.

Plotted parameters 

must include:

 Altitude

 Airspeed

 Normal 

acceleration

 Engine power

 Angle of attack

 Pitch attitude

 Bank angle

 Flight control 

inputs

 Stall warning 

and stall buffet 

onset 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–12

FUNCTIONS AND SUBJECTIVE TESTING REQUIREMENTS

High AOA Maneuvers

The current functions and subjective testing requirement have been modified to specifically 

require evaluation of the stall warning and stick pusher activation (if applicable) in conjunction 

with aircraft automation such as autopilot and auto-throttle.

UPSET RECOGNITION AND RECOVERY

Additional functions and a subjective testing requirement were added to require evaluation of the 

required upset prevention and recovery tasks as described above in the General Requirements 

section.

Table H–7. Proposed Revisions to 14 CFR Part 60 Table A3A–Functions and Subjective

Tests Entry Nos. 6.a and 6.i

<<< QPS Requirements >>>

Entry No. Operations Tasks

Simulator Level

A B C D

Tasks in this table are subject to evaluation if appropriate for the airplane simulated as indicated in the SOQ 

configuration list or the level of simulator qualification involved. Items not installed or not functional on the 

simulator and therefore, not appearing on the SOQ configuration list are not required to be listed as exceptions on 

the SOQ.

6. Maneuvers

6.a.

(amend)

High AOA, approaches to stalls, stall warning, buffet, g-break/pitch break, 

and stick pusher response (take-off, cruise, approach, and landing 

configuration). Airplane automation (such as autopilot and autothrottle) 

responses to stall warning, stall, and stick pusher.

X X X X

6.i.

(append)

Upset recognition and recovery maneuvers within the FFS’ validated 

envelope as defined on the SOQ.

X X X X

ATTACHMENT B—SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO OBJECTIVE 

TESTING TABLES:

STALL MANEUVER EVALUATION

1. Fidelity Requirements: The objective testing requirements as defined for the stall 

maneuver are intended to validate:

a. Aircraft type specific recognition cues of the first indication of the stall (stall warning 

system and/or aerodynamic stall buffet);

b. Aircraft type specific recognition cues of an impending aerodynamic stall;

c. Recognition cues and handling qualities from the stall break through recovery are 

sufficiently representative of the airplane being simulated to allow successful 

completion of the prescribed stall entry and recovery training tasks.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–13

For the purposes of stall maneuver evaluation, the term ―representative‖ is defined as a 

level of fidelity that is type specific to the simulated aircraft to the extent that the training 

objectives can be satisfactorily accomplished.

2. Statements of Compliance: Traditionally, flight-test-collected data have been the 

preferred data source for FFS objective evaluation required for qualification. It is 

recognized, however, that strict time-history-based evaluations against flight-test data 

may not adequately validate the aerodynamic model in an unstable flight regime, such as 

a stalled flight, particularly in cases where significant deviations are seen in the aircraft’s 

stability and control. As a result, the SOC-based approach for evaluating the 

aerodynamic model at AOAs approaching the stall was implemented to allow the

aerodynamic modeler and data provider to develop enhanced representative stall models 

that are based upon generally accepted engineering and scientific principles. Some 

examples are—

 Stall models developed using aircraft OEM engineering simulation.

 Wind tunnel or well established analytical methods to extend stall modeling 

sufficiently to achieve a representative full stall and recovery.

As described in the objective testing section, stall qualification requires statements of 

compliance detailing the following information:

a. Aerodynamic Modeling: The SOC must identify the sources of data used to develop 

the aerodynamic model. Of particular interest is a mapping of test points in the form 

of an alpha/beta envelope plot for a minimum of flaps up and flaps down. The 

envelopes are defined in the Upset Prevention and Recovery Maneuver Evaluation 

section of this attachment, and examples can be found in appendix 3–D of the 

Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2. For the flight-test data, a list of 

the types of maneuvers used to define the aerodynamic model for AOA ranges greater 

than the first indication of stall are to be provided according to flap setting. 

At a minimum, the following stall model features must be incorporated into the 

aerodynamic model as appropriate, and addressed in the SOC where applicable by 

aircraft type:

i. Degradation in static/dynamic lateral-directional stability,

ii. Degradation in control response (pitch, roll, yaw),

iii. Roll-off requiring significant control deflection to counter,

iv. Changes in pitch stability,

v. Mach effects, or

vi. Stall buffet.

An overview of the methodology used to address these features must be provided.

b. Subjective Assessment: The FFS must be evaluated by an SME pilot with 

knowledge of the general stall characteristics of the simulated aircraft and the cues 

necessary to adequately accomplish the required training objectives. This evaluation 
SPAW ARC Final Report H–14

must use available supporting documentation and/or guidance material that describes 

the aircraft’s general behavior in stalled flight and recovery. Documentation may 

include aircraft certification data/procedures, aircraft OEM documentation, 

AFM documentation, and other acceptable source documentation. Particular 

emphasis should be placed upon recognition cues of an impending aerodynamic stall, 

such as the stall buffet or lateral/directional instability; stall break (e.g. g-break, 

pitch break, roll off departure); response of aircraft automation (e.g. autopilot and 

auto-throttles); and the necessary control input required to execute an 

immediate recovery.

c. Stick Pusher System Modeling: For aircraft equipped with a stick pusher system, 

the required statement of compliance must verify that the stick pusher system/stall 

protection system has been modeled, programmed, and validated using the aircraft 

manufacturer’s design data or other acceptable data source. At a minimum, the 

following characteristics must be addressed in the SOC:

i. Stick pusher activation logic;

ii. Stick pusher system dynamics, control displacement, and forces; and

iii. Stick pusher cancellation logic.

UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY MANEUVER EVALUATION

1. Basic Requirements: The basic elements for the qualification of upset prevention and

recovery training maneuvers are—

a. To verify that the FFS can be expected to remain within its designed validation 

envelope during the execution of available upset prevention and recovery training 

tasks.

b. To provide the instructor/evaluator with a minimum set of feedback tools to properly 

evaluate the student’s performance in accomplishing an upset prevention and

recovery training task.

2. Flight Envelopes—

For the purposes of this document, the term ―flight envelope‖ refers to the entire domain 

in which the FFS is capable of being flown. This envelope can be further divided into 

three subdivisions, for example (see appendix 3–D of the Airplane Upset Recovery 

Training Aid)—

 Flight Test Validated: This is the region of the flight envelope that has been 

validated with flight-test data, typically by comparing the performance of the FFS 

against the flight-test data through tests incorporated in the QTG and other flight-test 

data used to further extend the model beyond the minimum requirements. Within this 

region, there is high confidence that the simulator responds similarly to the aircraft. 

Note that this region is not strictly limited to what has been tested in the QTG; as long 

as the aerodynamic math model has been conformed to the flight test results, that 

portion of the math model can be considered to be within the Flight Test 

Validated region.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–15

 Wind Tunnel and/or Analytical: This is the region of the flight envelope for which 

the FFS has not been compared to flight test data, but for which there has been wind 

tunnel testing and/or the use of other reliable predictive methods (typically by the 

aircraft manufacturer) to define the aerodynamic model. Within this region, there is 

moderate confidence that the simulator will respond similarly to the aircraft.

 Extrapolated: This is the region extrapolated beyond the flight test validated and 

wind tunnel/analytical regions. The extrapolation may be a linear extrapolation, a 

holding of the last value before the extrapolation began, or some other set of values. 

When extrapolation extends into the non-linear range of the airplane aerodynamics 

there is less confidence that simulator will respond similarly to the aircraft 

3. Instructor Feedback Mechanism: For the instructor/evaluator to provide feedback to 

the student during UPRT maneuver training, additional information must be accessible 

that indicates the relative fidelity of the simulation, magnitude of student control inputs, 

and aircraft operational limits that could potentially affect the successful completion of 

the maneuver(s). At a minimum, the following must be available to the 

instructor/evaluator:

a. Simulator Validation Envelope: The FFS must employ a method to record the FFS’ 

expected level of fidelity with respect to the designed validation envelope. This must 

be displayed as an ―alpha/beta‖ crossplot on the IOS or other alternate method to 

clearly convey the simulator’s fidelity level used during the maneuver. This 

information should be available to the instructor during the simulator session and 

after the simulator session for use during debriefing. 

b. Flight Control Inputs: The FFS must employ a method for the instructor/evaluator 

to assess the student’s flight control input used to execute the upset prevention and

recovery maneuver. Parameters that may not be easily assessed visually from the 

instructor station, such as rudder pedal displacement and control forces, should be 

included in this feedback mechanism.

c. Aircraft Operational Limits: The FFS must employ a method to provide the 

instructor/evaluator with information concerning the aircraft limitations (such as 

normal load factor and airspeed limits found on a V-n diagram) that may affect the 

successful completion of the maneuver.

This information should be available to the instructor during the simulator session and 

after the simulator session for use during debriefing. An example FFS alpha/beta 

envelope plot and IOS feedback mechanism are in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Note: These diagrams represent an example of a typical IOS display, however the 

operator should use their judgment to ensure all pertinent controls and flight parameters 

are available so as to ensure the instructor can properly brief the upset recognition and 

recovery trainings tasks.
SPAW ARC Final Report H–16

Figure 1. Example FFS Alpha/Beta Envelope Plot.

Figure 2. Example IOS Instructor URT Feedback Display.

1
SPAW ARC Final Report I–1

APPENDIX I—TRAINING OBJECTIVES FROM 

FAA AC 120–50A (CURRENT GUIDANCE)

GROUND TRAINING

1. General Training Objectives—

a. Reduce windshear related accidents and incidents through 

flightcrew member education.

b. Stress the importance of windshear avoidance to flightcrews.

2. Specific Training Objectives. Provide pilots with the knowledge needed to—

a. Identify the actual or potential presence of windshear from a variety of information 

sources and cues.

b. Adhere to a policy of avoiding encounters with windshear whenever possible.

c. Adhere to a policy that when executing a missed approach or go-around in weather 

conditions conducive to windshear, the missed approach or go-around is conducted in 

an aggressive manner and the flightcrew is ready to accomplish windshear escape 

procedures should an ensuing windshear be encountered.

d. Use operating procedures and techniques designed to enhance the possibility of 

surviving an inadvertent encounter with windshear during takeoff, approach, 

or landing.

e. Identify unique stall characteristics and windshear recovery techniques that are 

specific to the aircraft type. Special attention should be given to topics such as 

low airspeed lateral control characteristics, loss of climb capability, unique windshear 

characteristics, and windshear flight guidance system limitations.

SIMULATOR TRAINING

1. Flight Simulator Training Objectives. The training objectives of the simulator-training

program will be to provide pilots with the necessary experience and skills to—

a. Recognize onset of a severe windshear encounter using available 

flight instrumentation.

b. Coordinate cockpit activities to improve the pilot's ability to recognize and take the 

appropriate actions to recover from an inadvertent windshear encounter.

c. Make proper use of pitch, power, and airplane configuration to recover from an 

inadvertent windshear encounter.
SPAW ARC Final Report J–1

APPENDIX J—REFERENCE MATERIAL

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VH-OLM, Eildon Weir, Victoria.

Bragg, M. (1998). An Interdisciplinary Approach to Inflight Aircraft Icing Safety.

Bragg, M. (2002). Envelope Protection and Atmospheric Distrurbances in Icing Encounters.

Bragg, M. and Broern, A. (2003). Effect of Airfoil Geometry on Performance with Simulated Intercycle Ice 

Accretion.

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and Analysis.

Crider, D. (2011). Airframe Icing- What Every Pilot Should Know [PowerPoint].

Federal Aviation Administration. (1996). Advisory Circular 91-51A – Effect of Icing on Aircraft Control and 

Airplane Deice and Anti-ice Systems.

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Training and Checking.

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Airplane Deice and Anti-ice Systems.

Federal Aviation Administration. (1997). FAA Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2007). Advisory Circular 91-74A – Pilot Guide: Flight In Icing Conditions.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2007). FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 3- General Technical Administration; 

Chapter 19- Training Programs and Airman Qualifications; Section 5- Flightcrew Aircraft Ground 

Training Curriculum Segments.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2009). Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM): Part 121 Activation of 

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certification Requirements in Supercooled Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal Icing 

Conditions. Docket FAA-2010-0636

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Overview. 
SPAW ARC Final Report J–2

Green, S. (2006). A Study of U.S. Inflight Icing Accident and Incidents, 1978 to 2002.

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Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New 

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Ratvasky, T., Barnhart, B., and Lee, S. (2008). Current Methods for Modeling and Simulating Icing Effects 

on Aircraft Performance, Stability, and Control.

Rosenkrans, W. (2010). High Marks Overall. AeroSafety World, Volume 5(9), 12-17.

The article discusses the GAO Report on Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations.

Seifert, H. and Richert, F. (1997) Aerodynamics of Iced Airfoils and their Influence on Loads and Power 

Production.

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Statistics to Detect Icing Induced Upsets.

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Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority. (2008). Large Aircraft Ground De-Icing.

Transportation Safety Board of Canada. (1997). Loss of Control on Go-around, Air Canada Canadair CL600-2B19, C-FSKI, Fredericton Airport, New Brunswick.

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FAA Address Challenges Related to Winter Weather Operations (GAO-10-678).

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Aircraft Icing and Winter Operations (GAO-10-441T).