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S. HRG. 113–174 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

APRIL 16, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

PETER K. LEVINE, Staff Director 

JOHN A. BONSELL, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

APRIL 16, 2013

Page 

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan ... 5 

(III) 

(1) 

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson, 

Udall, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, King, 

Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Ayotte, Graham, Blunt, and Lee. 

Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff director; 

and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, 

counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority staff 

director; and Thomas W. Goffus, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Bradley S. Watson and Lauren M. 

Gillis. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora and Susie Perez Quinn, assistants 

to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Mara 

Boggs and David LaPorte, assistants to Senator Manchin; Chad 

Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Marta McLellan Ross, 

assistant to Senator Donnelly; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood 

Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to 

Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brad 

Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Craig Abele, assistant to 

Senator Graham; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt; and 

Peter Blair, assistant to Senator Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Before we begin, I 

want to take a moment to reflect on the tragedy in Boston. Thousands of people had gathered there yesterday accepting the physical and mental challenge of running a marathon. The city celebrated its annual Patriots Day holiday in remembrance of Boston’s 

role in our Nation’s founding. 

Whoever was responsible for targeting that celebration, whatever 

their twisted motives, they will fail. America has demonstrated a 

remarkable resilience throughout its history and a firm determinaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tion to bring justice to those who target the innocent. The perpetrators of this attack will feel the full weight of that justice. 

Every member of this committee, this Congress, and all of our 

people mourn the tragic loss of life. Our prayers go out to the victims and their families, and we hope for the swift recovery of those 

who are injured. 

This morning, the committee hears from and welcomes General 

Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Commander of the International 

Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and Commander of U.S. 

Forces, Afghanistan. This is General Dunford’s first appearance before this committee since taking command of U.S. and coalition 

forces in early February. 

General, it can be difficult for us and the American people to get 

the full picture of how things are progressing in Afghanistan as 

negative stories tend to get front-page coverage, while good news 

may not get covered at all. Based on my dozen or so visits to Afghanistan, most recently in January, it strikes me that there are 

real signs of progress. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) training mission has made significant strides in building 

the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to its target level of 352,000 personnel. Afghan forces are already responsible for security in areas 

where 90 percent of Afghans live, and by later this spring, they are 

expected to take the security lead throughout all of Afghanistan 

with coalition forces shifting to a supporting role. 

When Senator Jack Reed and I visited Regional Command East 

in January, we were told that in under 2 years, the ASF had gone 

from conducting less than 30 percent of operations in that region 

totally on their own—that is, without coalition forces present—to 

about 80 percent now. 

Now, there are other signs of progress as well. For instance, 

under the Taliban rule, roughly 800,000 Afghan children were in 

school, and girls were denied an education. Now, more than 8 million students attend Afghan schools, and more than 40 percent of 

them are female. In 2001, Afghanistan had 20,000 teachers, all 

male. Today there are 200,000 teachers, including 60,000 women. 

The number of schools in Afghanistan has grown from 3,400 in 

2001 to more than 16,000 today. More than 18 million Afghans now 

have telephone access compared to about 1 million in 2002. 

Earlier this year, President Obama announced plans for drawing 

down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by February 

2014. This has been interpreted as meaning that the bulk of the 

forthcoming troop reductions will be put off until the end of this 

year. For several reasons, it would be better, in my view, to stick 

to the ‘‘steady pace approach’’ that the President at one point said 

he contemplated for those reductions. It would drive home to Afghans and the Taliban the success of the ASF, whose performance 

our commanders tell us has exceeded expectations. 

Maintaining a steady pace of reductions would also send an important message to President Karzai. The Afghan president’s use 

of anti-coalition rhetoric, while possibly serving some domestic political purpose, shows an insensitivity to the sacrifices made by our 

troops and coalition forces over the last decade, and creates a chill 

on the idea of a long-term partnership. 

3 

It is in everyone’s interest to promptly set the conditions for any 

post-2014 partnership with Afghanistan. NATO defense ministers 

have already begun consideration of the size and mission for a 

post-2014 force in Afghanistan. One factor that will influence that 

decision is the size and capacity of the ASF. In this regard, the recent decision by NATO defense ministers to support maintaining 

the ASF at the current 352,000 level through 2018, rather than reducing the support to a level of 230,000 as previously planned, is 

the right thing to do. It sends an important signal of our continued 

commitment to a safe and secure Afghanistan, and may make it 

feasible for us to have a smaller U.S. and coalition presence after 

2014. 

The greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s security is not the 

Taliban, but the Pakistan base sanctuaries for militant extremists 

launching cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Pakistan has said 

that it supports a stable and secure Afghanistan, but its actions 

belie its words. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship will not be normalized so long as those extremists’ safe havens exist on Pakistani territory. 

Another large challenge to a stable Afghanistan are the continuing shortcomings of the Afghan Government in meeting the 

needs of the Afghan people and its lack of a willingness to fight 

corruption by government officials. 

General, you have already demonstrated that you are carrying on 

the tradition of a highly-distinguished group of U.S. commanders 

in Afghanistan. You are right in that tradition. You are carrying 

it forward brilliantly. We look forward to your helping us understand how far the Afghans and the coalition have come and what 

remains to be done. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I and all of the rest 

up here identify with your comments about the tragedy yesterday 

in Boston. It is very hard to believe that that happened. 

Also, I thank you for commenting about, because very few people 

do it, the successes, the women who are voting, and getting all 

these good things that are happening. We don’t hear that often 

enough. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. As we discussed in my office last week, I have 

been to Afghanistan several times over the past decade, and I am 

greatly concerned that we will repeat the mistakes of Iraq and 

squander the enormous sacrifice of American lives and treasure by 

a precipitous withdrawal of forces at the end of 2014. 

In Iraq, the Obama administration’s decision to abruptly withdraw U.S. troops in 2011 has resulted in the resurgence of al 

Qaeda, increasing sectarian violence, and a growing Iranian influence. The future of Iraq looks increasingly violent. 

In Afghanistan, President Obama is making the same mistake of 

deciding on troop levels based on arbitrary timelines and without 

defining the underlying objectives, strategy, and mission. This is 

backwards. The strategy drives the troop requirements, not the 

other way around. 

4 

In my office last week, General Dunford and I discussed the need 

to have capability to support the Afghanistan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) and counterterrorism efforts in all regions of Afghanistan in an area four times the size of my State of Oklahoma. 

When making decisions about our mission in Afghanistan, the 

President should listen more to his professional military commanders on the front lines and less to the political advisors in the 

West Wing. 

General Mattis told this committee that he recommends approximately 20,000 troops remain in Afghanistan after 2014. That would 

be about 13,600 U.S. troops, about half that many international 

forces. Our commanders tell me the mission should be to continue 

counterterrorism efforts and to train and advise ASF. For those 

missions across Afghanistan, they tell me that 8,000 to 12,000 

troops is an unreasonable target. The fact that this administration 

has floated the idea of zero troops is patently irresponsible. 

A force of only 10,000 will barely be able to protect itself and 

would likely result in ceding the city of Herat to Iranian authorities, which is a scary thought, and the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the 

north to drug traffickers and warlords. On my frequent trips to Afghanistan, I have seen the progress improve professionalization of 

the ANSF. The increased ability of the Afghanistan forces to lead 

security operations gives me hope, but also makes clear that the 

job of training, advising, and assisting is far from complete. 

The number and types of ANSF sustained past 2014 needs to 

match the security conditions on the ground. To be successful, they 

have to be able to maintain both the security and the confidence 

of the Afghan people. 

I look forward to General Dunford’s recommendation on the number of Afghan forces that are needed in the post-2014 environment. 

From my previous discussions with General Allen, General Mattis, 

and General Dunford, it is obvious that the right level is closer to 

the 352,000 than it is to the 230,000, at least through 2018. 

Although I am intently focused on the post-2014 security environment, I am mindful that the 2013 and 2014 fighting seasons are 

critical to setting conditions for success, and I worry that inadequate funding will erode the fighting capability of our troops on 

the front line. The President’s budget proposal last week fails to 

address the unprecedented resource challenges facing our military 

and will hurt the readiness of our military. 

To preserve our foreign combat capabilities in places like Afghanistan and North Korea, the Navy is tying up carrier strike groups 

at the pier. The Air Force is grounding squadrons of combat aircraft, and the Army is cancelling brigade size combat training rotations. The effect of this deteriorating readiness will be felt by the 

fighting forces in 2014, the men and women we send into combat 

in Afghanistan next year. The President must set aside political 

posturing and get serious about working with Congress on the lasting solution to the challenges facing our military. The troops fighting for this Nation deserve nothing less. 

I thank you very much, General Dunford, for all of your activity 

and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

General Dunford, welcome. 

5 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, 

COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN 

General DUNFORD. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking 

Member Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning and represent the men and women of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. Thanks to 

your leadership and support, they are well-trained and wellequipped. Their extraordinary courage and performance reflects 

that support. 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan remains focused on denying safe haven 

in Afghanistan to the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked our Nation 

on September 11, and denying the Taliban, who harbored them, the 

ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. We recognize that our 

national interests in the region are served by a secure and stable 

Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors. 

I appear before you this morning confident in the cardinal direction of the campaign. My confidence is based on the very real 

progress we have made since the surge of forces that began in late 

2009, and that surge allowed us to move the campaign forward. 

The constant pressure we have exerted on the remnants of al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan has disrupted their ability to plan and conduct operations against the West. 

Our coalition Afghan partner operations have pushed the Taliban 

away from the populated areas and prevented them from meeting 

their campaigns objectives in 2012. While they remain resilient, 

they are less of an existential threat to the Afghan Government 

than they were in 2011. Most significantly, our efforts since 2009 

have provided the Afghan forces the time and space necessary to 

grow and assume the lead. 

As the chairman mentioned, today the ANSF has recruited and 

fielded most of its authorized strength of 352,000. They are leading 

approximately 80 percent of all combat operations being conducted, 

and they have the lead security responsibility for territory where 

nearly 90 percent of the population lives. Later this spring, in line 

with the plan outlined at Lisbon and Chicago summits, Afghan 

forces will be in the lead for combat operations across the Nation. 

Today’s hearing truly comes at an inflection point in the Afghan 

campaign, and there are many reasons to be optimistic. That said, 

there are several significant challenges we must overcome to meet 

our objectives. 

Up to this point, it is fair to say we are focused on growing the 

size of the ANSF. We are now focused on improving the quality of 

the ANSF. In the months ahead, we will continue to focus on a 

wide range of issues to include leadership development, ministerial 

capacity, aviation, and the systems, processes, and institutions 

needed to sustain a modern professional force. 

In the coming months, we will also need to address very real political and psychological factors that will affect the outcome of the 

campaign. With regard to political factors, we are at a point in the 

campaign where there is real tension between increasing aspirations of Afghan sovereignty and the reality of operations conducted 

in accordance with the U.N. Security Council mandate, the law of 

armed conflict, and the military technical agreement. Properly 

managing that tension is now a campaign imperative. The psychoVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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logical aspect of the campaign is equally important right now. Psychology will influence the performance of the Afghan forces this 

summer and affect the critical elections of 2014. 

We confront growing uncertainty in Afghanistan and in the region. Many Afghans have told me they no longer fear the Taliban 

as much as they fear what will happen after 2014. One Afghan described it as the Y2K effect. There is a growing sense that December 2014 is a cliff for the Afghan people. That dynamic must be addressed with a credible, compelling narrative of U.S. commitment. 

Absent confidence and the hope for a brighter future, Afghan leaders, the Afghan people, and regional actors will continue to hedge 

and plan for the worst case. The behavior associated with that 

mindset has the very real potential to undermine the campaign. 

In closing, there is a great deal to be optimistic about at this 

point, but we are in the decisive phase of transition. The progress 

we have made to date provides real opportunity, but not inevitability. There will continue to be challenges that will test our will 

and endurance. But in the end, if we define winning as completing 

political and security transition while rendering al Qaeda operationally ineffective. If we define winning as setting the conditions 

for the Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity that will begin 

in 2015, I firmly believe we can win. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this 

morning. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC 

AFGHANISTAN: PROGRESS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND COMMITMENT

WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The conflict in Afghanistan has now shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For 

the past 11 years, the United States and our coalition allies have been leading combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking over, and ISAF is stepping back into 

a supporting role. The progress made by the ISAF-led surge over the past 3 years 

has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in control 

of all Afghanistan’s major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and driven the insurgency away from the population. ISAF’s primary focus is now shifting from directly 

fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

in their efforts to hold and expand these gains. 

The progress made by the ANSF enabled President Obama and President Karzai 

to agree at the January Summit that Milestone 2013—Afghan security lead 

throughout the country—will be announced later this spring. This announcement 

will mark ISAF’s official transition to its supporting role: fully focused on training, 

advising, and assisting the ANSF. In fact, this transition has largely taken place. 

The ANSF are now leading the vast majority of operations countrywide. ISAF casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of ISAF bases have 

been transferred to the ANSF or closed, and construction is complete on the majority of ANSF bases. The United States will redeploy 34,000 troops by February 2014, 

and the ANSF have grown to nearly 352,000 personnel. Afghanistan’s populated 

areas are increasingly secure, and the ANSF have successfully maintained security 

gains in areas that have already been transitioned. Still, the ANSF will continue 

to need training, advising, and key combat support from ISAF, including close air 

support, logistics, and intelligence, through the end of the ISAF combat mission in 

December 2014. 

However, security challenges remain. The insurgency’s sanctuaries in Pakistan, 

limited GIRoA institutional capacity, and endemic corruption remain the greatest 

impediments to long-term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan. ISAF 

will continue to work with GIRoA to address its challenges in order to deliver effective governance to the Afghan people. 

7 

WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE ANSF

The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency. Despite the early recognition that Afghan security would depend on indigenous security forces, building the 

ANSF lagged in the initial years after we forced the Taliban Government from 

power. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal 

of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces—enabled 

by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama—provided the ANSF the space 

to develop combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up. 

GIRoA and ISAF deliberately focused first on ANSF growth (force size), followed by 

the development of enablers and the professionalization of the ranks. This decision 

was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size by 2012, 

would experience some initial shortfalls in equipment, logistics, personnel, and leadership—foreseeable challenges that would be overcome in the 2012–2014 period as 

Afghan knowledge, capacity, and experience increased. 

Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a combined 

ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of over 350,000 personnel who have 

secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan’s population, and are leading 80 percent of 

all conventional operations. These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They are a 

source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people—factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes. 

As of early 2013, most of our coalition partnerships with the ANSF have evolved 

into advise and assist relationships; these relationships are designed to provide tailored support and to continue increasing ANSF confidence and capabilities. Those 

advisory roles are designed to evolve and reduce over time until ANSF units can 

fully stand on their own in a sustainable manner. 

The ANSF continue to improve at a steady pace with marked quality increases 

seen in units capable of conducting independent operations. Over the last year, only 

1 of the 23 Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade headquarters was conducting independent operations. Today the ANA has 1 corps/division headquarters, 5 brigade 

headquarters, and 27 battalions (4 of the 27 are garrison support units) capable of 

operating independently. The growing ANA Special Operations Command 

(ANASOC) has also made strides towards becoming an independent and effective 

force—with the vast majority of ANA Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions, to 

include night operations, being Afghan-led. 

Evidence of the ANSF’s growing capacity to conduct their own increasingly sophisticated operations can be seen in Laghman, Kabul, and Paktika provinces. Here, the 

ANSF have implemented the layered security concept that decreases vulnerabilities 

in any single arm of the force by leveraging the capabilities of the entire ANSF (e.g. 

ALP, ANASOF, ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), 

National Directorate of Security (NDS), etc.), providing security to the Afghan people with minimal assistance from the coalition. This ‘‘web’’ of enduring security 

starts locally, then spreads from the bottom up to the population centers, through 

the rural areas, and out to the borders. 

Layered security consists of all ANSF elements having a defined role within an 

established network, each one responsible for a specific security operation’s focus defined geographically (Border, Village, District, Province), or by other objectives outlined in a security strategy. For example, a layered security operation might consist 

of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) patrolling a population center and its highways, while the ABP provides an outer security layer by controlling border crossings. Simultaneously, the ANA conduct combat patrols and operations based on 

NDS intelligence providing a security layer in between the border and population 

center. Command, control, coordination and intelligence for the entire layered security operation is conducted at the Operational Coordination Center (OCC). The 

OCCs are designed to manage and disseminate information and intelligence 

proactively or in response to an incident, and laterally share information that enables rapid joint action at the provincial level and below. This integrated combination of information sharing, decision support, and the ability to direct operations 

makes it more difficult for criminals or insurgents to succeed. The Afghan ability 

to implement this layered security environment will increase once the Afghan Air 

Force (AAF) becomes fully capable. This ANSF collective effort is an example of how 

Afghans have taken responsibility for their own security and are making marked 

and sustainable progress on the ground. 

In the last year, the coalition has begun transitioning districts and provinces in 

the east and south. There have been setbacks during these operations, as we exVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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pected in any transition as dramatic as the ones described above. But, the Afghans 

are learning from their mistakes and are pressing on to become increasingly independent and effective. This is a part of a larger story of resilience and resolution. 

Throughout last summer and fall, the ANSF fought increasingly on their own, with 

decreasing enabling support from U.S. and coalition forces. In Kandahar’s Zharey 

District, for example, we reduced U.S. troops from 3,500 to 300 last October. Afghan 

soldiers are now patrolling independently and attacks have not increased. We estimate that the number of Taliban fighters have fallen from 900 to 100. In neighboring Panjwai District, local villages have risen up against the Taliban and their 

harsh tactics. When they did, Afghan police quickly reinforced the villagers, enabling them to survive a Taliban counterattack. 

In another branch of the ANSF, the Afghan Air Force’s (AAF) emerging capability 

was recently demonstrated in Regional Command (RC)-East, where winter flight 

missions were successfully conducted to resupply the ANSF at forward operating 

bases in Nuristan Province. In another example, the AAF provided direct support 

to the ABP mission to supply local villages and secure contested territory in RC– 

South. While many challenges remain, the progress across the ANSF has been genuine and is already creating a significant impact on both the physical and psychological aspects of the fight. 

ANSF Challenges and Gaps in 2013 

Having realized the initial goal of growing and equipping the ANSF into an organization that will be capable of assuming the lead security role, we have shifted emphasis to building capacity and fielding more complex and technologically advanced 

capabilities. ANSF progress towards advanced capabilities has been measured. Significant gaps in some ANSF capabilities persist. The ANSF will continue to require 

ISAF support in areas including battle command, intelligence fusion, logistics, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C–IED), surface fires, engineer and explosive ordnance, and aviation. Current ISAF support and 

the subsequent Resolute Support mission (the NATO post-2014 mission) force must 

take a tailored approach to provide train, advise, and assist support focused on very 

specific capabilities to maintain the current ANSF development trajectory. 

The ANSF have made some progress in enablers such as logistics and they are 

increasingly taking responsibility for distribution, maintenance, ammunition management, fuel, and other classes of supply at the national and regional logistics 

nodes and institutions. ANSF intelligence capability has seen improvements. ANA 

Military Intelligence Companies with human intelligence, signals intelligence, and 

counterintelligence sections are currently integrated at the Corps level to support 

several ANSF mission sets. The Afghan Air Force is improving its ability to provide 

air support to the ANSF. These and other capabilities that need further development have been identified for inclusion in the current ISAF and subsequent Resolute Support train, advise, and assist effort. Capabilities that will require continued 

development after 2014 include aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and 

personnel management. While not exhaustive, current capability gaps include: 

• The need for continued assistance with planning, coordination, fire support integration, control of CAS, intelligence, medical evacuation, and command and control, as highlighted by the recent 209th Corps Operations in 

Badakhshan. 

• Intelligence sharing exists, but is not a capability that has been cultivated and standardized across the ANSF. Information sharing between 

the NDS and ANA remains uneven. In an effort to cultivate intelligence 

sharing, the ANSF Operational Coordination Centers are increasingly focused on facilitating intelligence sharing at the regional and provincial levels, where we see some success. However, despite the progress, ANSF commanders tend to rely on what they are most familiar with, such as tacticallevel source operations and intelligence sharing based on personal relationships. 

• The AAF will require increased capability and capacity going into 2015 

due to late equipment fielding, contracting problems, and personnel shortfalls. ISAF currently predicts that this gap will exist through 2016. Coalition advisors will continue working to build sufficient fixed-wing, rotarywing, close-combat attack, and intelligence air platform capabilities. 

• While route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities 

continue to improve throughout the ANA, significant challenges exist for 

generating fully manned, trained, and equipped EOD teams. The majority 

of ANSF casualties come from IEDs. As of February 2013, the ANA has 

only 59 validated EOD teams out of an authorized 230, and the ANP has 

9 

14 validated teams out of an authorized 88. This gap will likely endure 

through 2015 and beyond. 

• ANSF personnel issues, like that of many militaries, are varied and 

range from shortages, literacy, retention, attrition, and desertion. The 

ANSF continue to suffer from noncommissioned officer (NCO) shortages. 

The ANA requires over 10,000 NCOs, while the ANP requires over 5,000. 

In the ANA, the core limitations in NCO generation remain the limited 

number of functionally literate applicants. Just as in many regional armies, 

the professionalization of the ANSF NCO corps has not yet occurred, with 

NCOs being underrepresented across the forces and lacking authorities required to effectively lead troops. 

• Attrition within the ANA also continues to be a significant challenge, creating a burden on recruiting and training structures. The ANA’s sustained 

high attrition rates remain a significant concern and threaten the growth 

and development of a professional, competent, and capable force. Vacancies 

are not always filled quickly or with properly trained personnel, presenting 

challenges for units at the operational level. Furthermore, attrition creates 

a burden on recruiting and training assets, increasing the overall cost of the 

force. The ANA attrition rate continues to exceed the monthly target rate 

of 1.4 percent; for the last year the monthly average was 2.7 percent per 

month. This attrition rate equates to the loss of around 5,000 personnel per 

month or 60,000 per annum. The ANA leadership tracks attrition data and 

the reasons most often cited for leaving the army are issues of leadership, 

family separation, leave, and operational tempo. Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to leadership, Minister of Defense 

Mohammadi formed an Evaluation Commission to assess his commanders, 

and if need be, replace unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps 

levels. 

Mitigation Efforts into 2014 

In most battlefield enabler and functional areas, ANSF capabilities will never 

equal those of the coalition. But parity between coalition and Afghan forces is not 

necessary for the requirements of Afghan security, and is therefore not the right 

measure of Afghan capabilities. In most areas, the ANSF will do things differently 

than the coalition has done them. They will utilize different tools and techniques 

to achieve the same net effect. Indirect fires, for example, can be provided by mortars rather than close air support; CASEVAC can be accomplished by ground rather 

than air; and planning will be accomplished in an Afghan way. In some cases, too, 

the ANSF may simply choose not to do some things that they would have undertaken while partnered with us. But it is a mistake to discount organic Afghan capabilities and techniques because they do not meet Western standards—the ANSF 

have other advantages (local familiarity with the culture and terrain, in-depth understanding of their enemies tactics and techniques, ingenuity, etc.) that they can 

leverage to defeat the security challenges they face. These organic capabilities and 

methods will most often be sufficient to preserve their own confidence and that of 

the Afghan people. Where the ANSF lack sufficient independent capability, we will 

continue to provide security force assistance to close the gaps until such time as the 

Afghans are able to provide their own capacity and capabilities for themselves. 

Although the ANSF are developing solutions to provide needed enabler capabilities, continued support will be required for the foreseeable future. We have developed a tailored plan to accelerate key enablers as a part of transition to help improve the future self-sufficiency of the ANSF to protect the Afghan population, manage violence, and contain the insurgency through sustained layered security operations. We anticipate most of these enablers to be fielded by the end of 2014 with 

capability development continuing through the Resolute Support mission. 

WHERE WE ARE—STATE OF THE INSURGENCY

U.S. and coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the insurgency’s momentum and pushed insurgents out of population centers. By the end of last year’s fighting season, the ANSF and ISAF had deprived 

the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control nodes, and support zones. 

They are now less capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan Government than a year ago. 

Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan 

continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom of action, facilitating the training of fighters, and the planning of operations. 

The Afghan Taliban and all its sub-groups, including the Haqqani Network, remain 

capable of conducting high profile attacks, though counterterrorism pressure has deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
10 

graded this ability. However, the Taliban remain firm in their conviction that 

ISAF’s drawdown and perceived ANSF weakness, especially when supplemented 

with continued external support and with sanctuary in Pakistan that the Taliban 

exploit, will translate into a restoration of their pre-surge military capabilities and 

influence. 

Sustained counterterrorism operations have also eliminated dozens of al Qaeda 

enablers and exerted pressure on al Qaeda personnel, restricting their movement to 

isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. Despite effective counterterrorism pressure on al Qaeda and its Taliban enablers, and on the small number of al Qaeda 

fighters in Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s relationship with local Afghan Taliban remains 

intact. 

CHALLENGES

Establishing a Constructive ANSF-Pakistan Military Relationship 

The security, especially along the border, of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an interdependent issue that requires a cooperative effort between the two countries. 

The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has ebbed and flowed over time, but both 

nations acknowledge that stability in Afghanistan impacts Pakistan and vice versa. 

The unresolved border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a historical 

source of friction between the two countries. Actions by both sides exacerbated this 

friction and contributed significantly to the loss of trust necessary for a meaningful 

relationship between each country’s military forces. Last fall, as a step toward improving this relationship, ISAF led the development of a Tripartite Border Standard 

Operating Procedure. This document is designed to improve cross border coordination between ISAF, the ANSF, and the Pakistan military. ISAF continues to work 

to improve the cooperation, participation and commitment of the Afghans and Pakistanis. 

Recently the ANSF established a more robust Tripartite Joint Operations Center 

in Kabul, providing general officers on both sides with direct access to their respective Ministries. Ongoing Border Flag Meetings continue to address border issues 

and are key to develop and improve cross-border relations. While we see some initial 

progress, serious challenges remain. Our goal remains to develop the trust necessary between the two countries so that they will eventually be able to maintain 

a constructive bilateral military-to-military relationship. 

Insider Threat 

One tactic the insurgents use to sow distrust and attack our resolve is infiltration 

in friendly forces for the purposes of attacking from the inside, sometimes described 

as ‘‘Green on Blue’’ or ‘‘Green on Green’’ attacks. We recognize the insider attacks 

are a threat to Afghan and coalition forces and take this issue very seriously. ISAF 

is a learning, adaptive organization, and we have devoted a tremendous amount of 

time and energy to better understand this threat. Together, ISAF and the Afghan 

Government have undertaken numerous measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks, including improved vetting and screening, counterintelligence, and cultural 

awareness. We are constantly refining our approach. 

Our actions are based upon the three pillars: Force Protection, Situational Awareness, and Counter-Intelligence (CI). Our Force Protection (FP) efforts include the assignment of a dedicated FP Officer to provide a daily risk assessment and adjust 

FPO measures as appropriate. We have also instituted guidance to employ Guardian 

Angels to prevent insider attacks or reduce the effects of these attacks. We have 

brought in outside support to provide Insider Threat Situational Awareness Training with mobile training teams. These teams provide a sophisticated understanding 

of Human Behavior Pattern Recognition Analysis, helping to identify predictive indicators of potential insider attacks. Our final pillar encompasses the expansion of our 

CI teams for both the coalition and Afghan National Army; we have accomplished 

this by employing additional resources from Allied Command Counter-Intelligence, 

while the Afghans have transferred CI personnel from the Ministry of Interior and 

National Directorate of Security over to the Afghan National Army. 

Civilian Casualties 

The protection of the Afghan population remains a top ISAF priority, and avoidance of civilian casualties is one of ISAF’s highest priorities. We have taken significant actions over the past year to minimize these tragic events. As a result, ISAFcaused civilian casualties have been reduced by almost half in comparing 2011 to 

2012. These casualties are, rightly, a concern to the people and the President of Afghanistan. We are working with the GIRoA to further reduce ISAF-caused civilian 

casualties and maintain the trust and support of the Afghan Government and the 

Afghan people. 

11 

ISAF continues to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to ensure accurate 

and timely reporting of civilian casualties. Supporting security transition is the 

transfer of responsibility for civilian casualties avoidance and mitigation measures, 

procedures, and capabilities to the ANSF. In order to support effective protection of 

the Afghan population, in December the Ministry of Defense hosted its first Population Protection Conference to discuss and address these issues. 

Lessons Learned 

Detention Facility in Parwan 

The transfer of the Detention Facility in Parwan to the Afghan Government reaffirmed Afghan sovereignty, while preserving our force protection requirements. 

Now known as the Afghan National Detention Facility-Parwan, the facility represents an emerging sense of sovereignty for the Afghan people, allowing them to 

assume responsibility for the detention and prosecution of detainees under the authority of the Afghan constitution. During the transfer ceremony, GIRoA officials 

highlighted their responsibilities for detention operations in accordance with the Afghan rule of law, due process, and international standards for the humane treatment of detainees. While the day represented a transfer of authority, there is still 

work in progress to transition the management functions of the facility. We still 

have an appropriate presence at the facility in support of Afghan forces. We will 

continue to train, advise, and assist the Detentions Operations Command, the Afghan Review Board process, and the Justice Center at Parwan as Afghanistan’s capability to operate independently fully develops. 

We did not arrive at this juncture overnight; the original Memorandum of Understanding was signed on March 9, 2012, and it took a year of continued work at the 

facility to build sufficient Afghan capacity and capabilities to finalize the transfer 

of authority—that work continues as we mark another milestone in the transition 

of this mission. The Agreement that determined the final requirements for the 

transfer reaffirms our mutual commitment to the lawful and humane treatment of 

detainees, while ensuring proper protection of Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. 

This transfer improved our strategic partnership with Afghanistan, sets the stage 

for increased cooperation in the broader transition framework, and fulfilled the 

pledges made by President Obama and President Karzai during their joint statement in January. 

ISSUES

Elections in 2014 

A peaceful and successful transition of the Afghan Presidency in 2014 will be a 

crucial step toward a confident, secure, and stable way ahead in Afghanistan. Elections must be seen to be inclusive, free, and fair to the Afghan people. A successful 

political transition is also a precondition for the continued flow of resources as described in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Donor confidence and sustained flow of pledged funding are critical for continued progress in a stable Afghanistan. ISAF will support the ANSF as they provide security for the elections process. 

Force Posture 

As the Campaign transitions in the coming 20 months to the Resolute Support 

train, advise, and assist mission in support of the ANSF, we will also be redeploying 

U.S. forces to reach our 34K force structure by February 2014 and retrograde equipment. Following that, we will further redeploy forces to a level yet to be determined 

by the end of 2014. Although challenged by geography, weather, and occasional disruptions in the land routes, we can complete retrograde and redeployment of U.S. 

Forces from Afghanistan. We have sufficient transportation capacity to meet redeployment and retrograde requirements. The combined capabilities of the MultiModal (M/M) network, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and the Pakistan 

ground lines of communication (PAK GLOCs) provide redundant capabilities to meet 

our requirements. 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) redeployment and retrograde operations 

began in 2012 with the recovery of surge forces. From January 2012 through March 

2013, USFOR–A reduced force levels by 28 percent, reduced U.S. bases by 70 percent, reduced rolling stock equipment by 45 percent, and reduced non-rolling stock 

equipment and supplies by 26 percent. We are confident in our ability to successfully continue redeployment and retrograde operations through 2014 as we transition to the post-2014 mission. 

12 

Contractor Drawdown 

In concert with our mission requirements and overall retrograde and base closure/ 

transfer, we are responsibly drawing down the contractor footprint, both in terms 

of personnel and equipment. In August 2012, we stood up the Operational Contract 

Support Drawdown Cell, and tasked them with this specific mission, giving particular emphasis to applying lessons learned from Iraq. With this cell in place, we 

put our primary focus on the largest contracts in theater and are currently executing a plan that will yield a reduction in contractor personnel by approximately 

25,000 (∼25 percent) by the end of calendar year 2013. A combination of base closure 

and a further descoping of contract requirements will allow us to continue to reduce 

contractor footprint through calendar year 2014. We are also putting great emphasis 

on responsible disposition of contractor-managed government-owned equipment in 

theater. To make this happen, we are collaborating closely with Defense Logistics 

Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, and other key stakeholders to ensure we have a fiscally responsible and logistically feasible plan for materiel reduction of this equipment. Over the next 21 months, this approach will result in a responsible contractor reduction that appropriately balances mission risk with our 

need for retrograde, base closure/transfer, and materiel reduction. 

During this transition, commanders will move to more expeditionary standards 

and balance quality of life, safety, fiscal stewardship, and mission. For example, we 

will reduce our in-theater food stock by changing the meal cycle to two Meals 

Ready-to-Eat and two hot meals, we will reduce the use of non-tactical vehicles on 

our bases, and we will begin to descope the services provided to our soldiers and 

civilians such as contract laundry. We will continue to provide wireless internet 

services as long as possible which is important to the morale of our force and provides a vital link to their families. 

STEWARDSHIP OF RESOURCES REMAINS A KEY TASK

Afghan Security Force Funds 

A critical tool in our efforts to support the development of the ANSF has been 

the use of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which provides the resources required to train, sustain, and equip a force of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and 

police as well as 30,000 Afghan local police. A combination of ongoing Department 

of Defense reviews, Department of Defense reprogramming, and congressional reallocation reduced the original fiscal year 2012 request from $12.8 billion to $9.2 billion. ASFF received $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2013 against a request of $5.7 billion. 

This reduction will result in the delay in deploying some needed enabling capabilities. The fiscal year 2013 budget shifted emphasis from building, equipping, and 

training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. It will include some key enabler builds as well as equipping and infrastructure requirements for the Afghan 

Air Forces and Special Operations Forces as they continue to build their capabilities. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains important; although it will reduce as our forces reduce. Working collaboratively with the Special 

Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction and the Army Audit Agency, we have 

made significant improvements in policy and execution that provided significant return on investment. In fiscal year 2012, ISAF was able to reduce CERP projects in 

both number and scale due to improving security conditions and a decreasing requirement for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Even so, the right-sizing of 

this critical enabling program continued to emphasize small-scale, high-impact 

projects that delivered immediate assistance to the local population with 96 percent 

of the projects executed in fiscal year 2012 valued at less than $100,000 each and 

90 percent under $10,000 each. CERP remains a critical tool for our commanders 

on the ground. 

Military Construction 

Despite a dynamic and evolving operational environment, ISAF and USFOR–A remain firmly committed to efficiently managing congressionally appropriated Military 

Construction (MILCON) funds to support our warfighters. By establishing a deliberate process to review, validate, and adapt this multi-billion dollar investment, the 

command ensured effective resource stewardship while providing the quality facilities needed by our troops. As a result, since 2011, we have recommended and received approval for the cancellation/descope of over 100 MILCON projects with an 

estimated cost avoidance/savings of nearly $1.3 billion. 

13 

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund 

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) is a Department of Defense funding source 

that uses 2-year funds for the execution of critical infrastructure projects in the 

power, water, transportation, and rule-of-law sectors. The projects are carefully selected, assessed, and coordinated with GIRoA, the U.S. Department of State, and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that they are both sustainable and congruent with Afghanistan’s future infrastructure priorities. AIF projects 

are critical to locking in stability gains and providing a foundation for internal economic growth that is less reliant on external aid. Nearly all AIF funds (99 percent) 

are spent in the east, south, and southwest areas of Afghanistan where they provide 

positive counter-insurgency effects in support of the ANSF and encourage long-term 

security and stability. In addition, 2-year funds enable USFOR–A to execute large, 

complex projects that were not possible with CERP. Most importantly, the AIF program serves as an effective counter to the insurgent narrative of abandonment. 

WHAT WINNING LOOKS LIKE

Despite the remaining challenges, we can win in Afghanistan. The key elements 

of our success include: 

• The transition of security responsibility to a confident, self-reliant and 

sustainable ANSF capable of protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan Government. 

• An operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of a safe haven from which 

to plan and conduct operations outside the area. 

• An acceptable political transition, defined by inclusive, free, fair elections 

and Afghan Government adherence to the Mutual Accountability Framework. 

• A constructive ANSF-Pakistan military relationship. 

We will have reached the end state of our combat operations when security conditions are set for the Afghan people to exploit a Decade of Opportunity. All of this 

is achievable—but it is not inevitable. Winning in Afghanistan will require us to remain focused on why we are there and firmly committed to achieving our objectives. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. We will follow 

the 8-minute rule this morning. 

General, I made reference to the media characterization of events 

in Afghanistan. Recent news reports have described a number of 

high profile Taliban attacks that suggest a declining security situation in Afghanistan. A Taliban attack and a hostage standoff in 

Farah Province was said to ‘‘highlight the crumbling security situation’’ and the ‘‘deteriorating security situation’’ in that western 

province. 

A Taliban assault on a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan 

was said to be a ‘‘serious blow’’ to one of the Afghan army’s most 

elite units. The tragic death of a U.S. civilian advisor and five other 

Americans in an attack in southern Afghanistan was said to highlight the ‘‘escalating violence’’ associated with the Taliban’s attempt to regain momentum. 

Could you tell us whether in your view those articles, those characterizations, taken together provide an accurate impression of the 

security situation in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, in the aggregate, those incidents remind us that we are still at war, and there is still violence 

in Afghanistan. Having said that, it is important to note that 80 

percent of the violence currently occurs where 20 percent of the 

population lives. By and large, the population in Afghanistan has 

been free from violence. The Talibani enemy have been pushed 

away from the populated areas. 

Each of those incidents that you referred to was a separate incident. In Farah, as an example, we know that the enemy at this 

point is relying on high profile attacks, improvised explosive deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
14 

vices (IED), and assassination attempts in order to achieve their effect because they are unable to influence the population in the way 

that they were a short time ago. 

The issue at the remote outpost that you referred to was frankly 

a breakdown in leadership. It had nothing to do with the capabilities of the ASF in the aggregate. In fact, what I was impressed 

with was that the Afghan leadership took immediate action against 

the leadership that were responsible for that particular incident. So 

what we see is increasingly ASF and the leadership in the ASF 

being held accountable when they fail to properly perform their duties. In this case, that is exactly what happened. 

With regard to the tragic loss of life of our young Department of 

State (DOS) employee, that also indicates what the enemy is intent 

to do in order to erode our will. But in general terms, Mr. Chairman, what I would tell you is that that does not reflect the level 

of violence across the country at this time. The level of violence has 

significantly reduced over the past 2 years. As I mentioned, the 

surge had the desired effect, and, most importantly, not only has 

the violence been reduced in the populated areas, but that security 

is currently being provided by ASF largely and not coalition forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. General, do you support maintaining the ASF at the higher level of 352,000 through 2018 rather 

than reducing those forces to 230,000? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I do support extending the 

352,000. That decision has not been made and it is conditional on 

Afghan negotiations related to the bilateral security agreement 

(BSA) and our enduring presence in Afghanistan, but I would support that. It mitigates risk during the period of a transition. It 

mitigates risk during a period of what we project to be economic 

downturn. I think it provides that demonstrated commitment that 

you referred to in your opening remarks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. General, do you support the President’s decision to draw down 34,000 of the 66,000 U.S. troops from 

Afghanistan by February 2014? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, I do support it. What is critical about the drawdown this year is that it allows us to stay engaged at the battalion or Kandak level with the ASF during their 

first summer in the lead. We have the flexibility to conduct the 

drawdown to allow us to stay engaged with our train, advise, and 

assist mission at the appropriate level this summer. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was an article, General, in yesterday’s 

New York Times about the threats that are faced by many Afghans 

that spent the last 11 years, or part of the last 11 years, helping 

us in Afghanistan by interpreting so that we could proceed more 

effectively in Afghanistan. These interpreters are supposed to be 

protected by a visa program, which I remember very vividly that 

Senator Kennedy and many of us worked very hard to achieve. 

Can you personally take whatever steps you are able to take to 

make sure that those visas are provided as contemplated by law? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, we owe a tremendous debt of 

gratitude to the interpreters that have supported us over the last 

11 years. It is fair to say we could not have accomplished the mission without them, so I would fully support that. 

15 

What we are doing now on the ground is ensuring that their applications make it through the process, at least through the U.S. 

embassy, and come back here to Washington, DC. We are personally tracking those on an individual basis, in many cases, to ensure 

that those interpreters who most deserve to come to our country 

can do that. But I absolutely would support that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you take whatever steps you can with 

DOS, beyond what you have already done, to tell them that it is 

really important to our security, and to what our security demands 

have been, that those visas be forthcoming? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will also be writing a letter to the DOS relative to that matter. 

In terms of our relations with President Karzai, did we recently 

work out an agreement with President Karzai in a province where 

he said that our Special Operations Forces (SOF) would have to 

leave within 2 weeks? Did we get that straightened out so that, in 

fact, we worked out an acceptable agreement, a mutual agreement? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, we did. That was the Wardak 

Province. In February, President Karzai had directed that all U.S. 

Special Forces be removed from the province. That was as a result 

of allegations that proved to be unsubstantiated. 

At the time President Karzai gave us that direction, I let the 

President know that that would be unacceptable both from a force 

protection perspective and from our ability to accomplish our objectives. He afforded us the opportunity to work with the Minister of 

Defense and Minister of Interior and come up with a transition 

plan for the Wardak Province. Since that time, we have removed 

U.S. Special Forces from one district inside of that province. There 

are nine districts in the province. We removed SOF from one of 

those districts, and we replaced them with effective ASF. 

So in honesty, Mr. Chairman, what I told President Karzai when 

that was over, frankly that turned out to be a model for transition. 

We had broad guidance from President Karzai. We were able to 

work with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior to transition. It is exactly what is happening across the rest of the country. We are in the process of transitioning from provinces, and so 

this particular incident worked out. From my perspective, we have 

an effective solution. 

Chairman LEVIN. I might just note that President Karzai made 

a statement, and it got huge publicity. But when the resolution was 

achieved by you and the Afghans, it got very little publicity. I am 

afraid that is too typical of what the media situation is here. 

My final question is on Pakistan. You met with General Kayani, 

the chief of the Pakistan army staff, also with Afghan military 

leaders, I believe. It was a trilateral meeting. Can you tell us what 

your assessment is of Pakistan’s current role as to whether they 

have in any way changed their behavior in terms of ending the safe 

havens that exist in Pakistan that have been used to attack our 

forces, Afghan forces? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, at this point I could only tell 

you that the rhetoric from Pakistan has changed. General Kayani 

has pledged cooperation. We have seen at the tactical level increased levels of cooperation since the fall. We did sign a trilateral, 

16 

tripartite border agreement between Afghanistan and the coalition 

and Pakistan in November. We have conducted an exchange of officers. I have a Pakistani liaison, flag officer, in my headquarters. 

We have several Pakistanis in our headquarters to deconflict border issues. 

We have seen increased cooperation on the ground lines of communication as we have tried to move our equipment back and forth 

through Pakistan. General Kayani has pledged that we will meet 

with him on a monthly basis individually, and we also will have 

routine meetings at the trilateral level with Afghan leadership, as 

well as General Kayani. 

So the rhetoric and the degree of our engagement has increased. 

We are still obviously concerned with the results, and I think there 

is still some time to see before we can make a judgment on that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you give us an update by the end of 

May as to whether that rhetoric has been followed by any change 

in action? Could you give us that—just send us a report by the end 

of May? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. Just so you 

know, President Karzai and I think it is significant. I proposed and 

he approved 2 weeks ago to have General Kayani and the senior 

leadership from Pakistan come to Kabul and attend a meeting 

hosted by us with the minister of defense from Afghanistan and the 

chief of the general staff from Afghanistan. This is a significant 

step forward. I will be able to report on that in May. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Our regular engagement with the Pakistani military leadership on a number of 

bilateral and trilateral issues (involving Afghan leaders) continues, and we have 

achieved some positive effects through those engagements. Most notably, our efforts 

to bring senior Afghan and Pakistani military officers together to discuss issues related to the contested border between the two countries have reduced tensions. In 

early May, a series of tri-lateral meetings prevented what may have become a more 

significant distraction—not only for the campaign in Afghanistan but for Pakistani 

security forces during that country’s historic election of a new civilian government. 

However, as yet, we have not witnessed a demonstrable shift in Pakistani willingness to address the persistent challenge of insurgent safe havens. This is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the domestic security requirements related to Pakistan’s presidential elections and the military’s focus on limiting violence and guaranteeing the population’s right to participate in the democratic process. With a new 

government forming and preparing to take power, we will remain closely engaged 

with our Pakistani counterparts, encouraging them to follow through on their commitment to address threats to our mutual security. That said, there is a growing 

realization within the military leadership that insurgents and terrorists pose an increasing problem that destabilizes Pakistan. However currently, Pakistani efforts 

are focused only on the direct threat posed by Terik-e-Taliban. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I told you in my office, General Dunford, it is hard for me to 

believe that it has been 10 years since we started our active training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The reason I am particularly sensitive to that is that this began with the Oklahoma 45th 

Infantry Brigade, their first duty over there, and I spent quite a 

bit of time there at that time. That is what kicked it off. 

Then later on with the Kabul Military Training Center, that is 

so incredibly impressive. It is almost like you are looking at Fort 

Sill, and the resources they have and who has taken that over. On 

17 

any given day, there might be 10,000 ANA trainees crawling 

through the mud and busting down doors. That facility is now 

20,000 acres, I think. 

My concern is that, with the changes that we are talking about 

in this hearing today, is that going to negatively impact this real 

success? I think the chairman here talked about the great successes that we have had over there, and I agree with that. But one 

of the successes is in that training capability, and that particular 

center, you have spent a lot of time there, I am sure. Is that going 

to suffer at all with the changes that we are looking at now? 

General DUNFORD. Sir, what is important, and I think you are 

alluding to the post-2014 presence, what is important I think when 

we look at post-2014 are a couple of factors. One is geography. I 

believe we need to be in the four corners of the country. Much of 

the training takes place at regional training centers, and it is important after 2014 that we continue to be at those regional training 

centers with an effective advise and assist effort. 

The other is the level at which we advise and assist the Afghan 

forces. This summer as we go into the Afghan first summer in the 

lead, they will be advised and assisted at the selected battalion 

level, lieutenant colonel level, the Kandak level. As we get to the 

fall, we will lift off to the brigade level, and post-2014, current 

planning would be either at the brigade or the corps level, and that 

decision has not been made yet. 

But in any event, we recognize that what you pointed out is critical, and that is we maintain a robust train, advise, and assist effort at the training center level. We would expect that to be at the 

institutional training center level in Kabul, as well as those four 

corners of Afghanistan at the regional training center. So from my 

perspective, what is really important is as we look at our enduring 

presence, it would be sufficient to address that particular function 

that you referred to. 

Senator INHOFE. I have heard about some of the changes that 

perhaps we are going to make, maybe go into a regional level. But 

that facility is so impressive, I just want to make sure we are going 

to continue it at the level it is now. The number of people that are 

going through to sustain numbers that we talked about in this area 

so far, it is going to be necessary to do that. I am sure that you 

are equally impressed with the successes we have had at that 

Kabul military training center. 

With the elections coming up, it is their constitution that causes 

Karzai to have to drop out, and we know there are many areas of 

the world where they have a constitutional prohibition that would 

require people to stop. Yousemeni comes to mind in Uganda. Has 

there been any talk at all of any kind of an effort on his behalf to 

be able to remain there? I understand there is not, but I just wanted to get that into the record. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there has not been any public discussion about that. In fact, in several meetings that I have attended, 

both one-on-one or with the Ambassador, with President Karzai, 

with Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on each occasion, President Karzai has expressed his intent to stand down in April 2014. 

I also attended his address to parliament, somewhat equivalent to 

18 

our State of the Union, a month ago where he announced to the 

parliament that he also intended to step down on the April 5, 2014. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. Is there any talk about who 

might succeed him? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is a tremendous amount of political activity ongoing on in Afghanistan right now, but it would 

be difficult for me to select a favorite at this point. 

Senator INHOFE. There is a history that when rogues are on their 

way out, they clean up their act. Have you seen a more positive 

Karzai than we have seen in the past? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, over the past 2 months, we have 

worked through very difficult issues, President Karzai and I, and 

we have come in each case to an effective solution. So the relationship I have had on the ground over the last 2 months has been cooperative. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand that when this takes place, when 

the change takes place, that our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activity is going to be dramatically reduced. I 

would ask you, first of all, is that really necessary, or do we have 

the resources to sustain it, and should we do that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, my perspective is I will need a sustained ISR effort post-2014. In fact, there is not a direct relationship between the numbers of forces on the ground and the ISR effort in that we cannot reduce ISR commensurate with the forces. 

In fact, at the time that we reduce forces, ISR actually becomes as 

important or more important. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, that was our thinking. We have talked 

about this in the past because they have had several things in the 

media that would reduce proportionally. You make a very good 

point that that actually could be better to increase the presence of 

ISR capability. 

I think you have talked about, the chairman asked the question, 

and you answered the question about the 352,000 versus the 

230,000. I agree with you. Is your feeling agreed with by General 

Mattis and by your other counterparts? 

General DUNFORD. It is, Senator, but I think collectively we also 

agree that our support for 352,000 for any additional enabling support for the Afghans and our sustainability for the ASF post-2014 

ought to be conditional. It ought to be conditional based on Afghan 

behavior, and so that is part of our calculus. But we believe that 

our interests will be best served by extending the 352,000 through 

2018. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, General, for your service. I want to associate myself with the 

chairman’s remarks about the Boston Marathon. It is particularly 

poignant because it is not just a Boston tradition. It is a New England tradition, and so many Rhode Islanders participate. Obviously, our sympathy goes out to the victims and also our respect 

for the first responders and everyone who helped out. I know you 

have connections, too. Your father is a retired Boston police officer. 

So thank you for that service, too. 

19 

You talked about in your opening comments what success might 

look at in winning. Can you elaborate on that? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Senator. For the last few years, many 

people have shied away from the using the word ‘‘win.’’ I personally 

have used that word since arriving in Afghanistan. My predecessor 

uses that word. I frankly think that when we are talking to 18-, 

19-, 20-, 21-year-old soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we 

ought to talk in those terms. 

From my perspective, winning is achievable, and I described it 

briefly in my opening remarks. First of all, the transition to an 

ASF lead in affecting security transition in 2014 is an important 

component of winning. I think we have a plan that is in place to 

do that, and I think we can see through 2014 where the Afghans 

can successfully assume responsibility for security after 2014, given 

the projection we make about the security environment post-2014. 

Another critical component of our winning would be supporting 

the political process that would lead to inclusive, fair, and free elections in 2014. Again, I think that is very achievable, and of course, 

remembering why we went there in the first place, an important 

component of our winning is to ensure that we deny sanctuary to 

al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and we contribute to regional stability 

where we have national interests. 

Those three components are important. There are subcomponents 

to include our posturing to force and setting our counterterrorism 

posture post-2014, continuing to sustain the ASF post-2014. But if 

we do those three things—effect security transition, affect political 

transition, and deny al Qaeda sanctuary—I believe at the end of 

2014, as we transition missions, as we change authorities, we can 

look at the families and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

that have served over the last 11 years, and say we won because 

we provided then the Afghans the opportunity to seize the decade 

of opportunity that starts in 2015. It very much at that point is up 

to the Afghans to seize the opportunity that we provided them. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. Let us focus on the ANSF and a 

comment that the chairman made. Often their successes are not as 

visible as their lapses and you are on the ground. The chairman 

and I were on the ground in January. We were impressed. Recently 

we have heard of commando operations in Anbar Province, which 

is 203rd Corps successfully operating, and Paktika Province. 

It seems to me that the first measure is obviously protecting population centers, but then exerting control over the entire country. 

Can you give us your assessment right now of the capacity and capability, and maybe even some successes that have not been noted 

by the press? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. Like many members of the 

committee, I have had many visits to Afghanistan over the years. 

I can remember one visit in particular in 2008 in the Helmand 

Province. At that time, the ratio of Afghans to coalition partners, 

more properly, coalition to Afghans, was we had 10 U.S. marines 

to every 1 Afghan that was in the Helmand Province, as recently 

as 2008. 

The ratio today, of course, across the country is there are 3 Afghans for every 1 member of the coalition that is serving right now, 

and we have talked about the statistics, the percentage of operVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
20 

ations they conduct, the percentage of population they secure. Most 

impressive is they are actually conducting independent combined 

arms operations at the brigade and the corps level. That is with a 

minimal amount of advise and assist by coalition forces. 

I’ll be honest with you, Senator. Even as someone who is generally a glass-half-full individual, I could not have foreseen that in 

2008. I think the progress that we have made since 2009 is nothing 

short of profound in terms of where they are on a day-to-day basis. 

What is really important to note is that when we go to Milestone 

2013 this summer, and we talked about the transition, we are 

going to have inside of formations of 600 or 700 Afghans. We are 

going to have 16 or 17 members of the coalition in an advise and 

assist role. We will have thousands of Afghans providing security 

in each of the provinces—each of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. 

We will have some few hundred members of the coalition providing 

advise and assist at that level, and then by exception, combat support, largely coastal air support, some planning, and some logistics 

capability. 

So when we talk about what the Afghans are doing right now 

and when we talk about the security environment, although we formally go to transition at Milestone 2013 later this spring and summer, early summer, in fact, on the ground today we are at that 

point already where the Afghans have taken the lead. They are 

providing security for the Afghanistan people, and every day they 

improve a little bit. 

Again, I would caveat by saying that this progress we have made 

from 2009 until today is largely quantity. They are out there. They 

are in a fight. At the battalion level and the brigade level, they are 

certainly very effective. But in order to sustain those gains, we still 

have challenges to ensure that at the institutional level, the logistics that we have to have—planning, programming, budgeting— 

those kinds of tasks are still the work that remains. But all that 

addresses the quality of the force, the quantity of the force, and 

their ability to take the fight to the enemy on a day-to-day basis 

is real, and it is on the ground today. 

Senator REED. As the fighting season, which is critical this year, 

is underway already because of the weather conditions, the ANSF 

are planning very aggressive operations going forward this summer? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, they have conducted the planning for 

operations this summer. This has been an Afghan-led process. I attended what they called the campaign synchronization conference 

about 6 or 7 weeks ago. I attended as a guest with the senior leadership from the coalition. It was led by the National Security Advisor, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Interior. They outlined 

their plan—Afghan plan—for the summer of 2013. Each one of the 

corps commanders and brigade commanders stepped up and briefed 

their plan. Over the course of 8 or 9 hours, they integrated their 

planning effort for the summer of 2013. So what we are seeing 

right now is very much an Afghan-led, Afghan-executed security 

plan for the summer of 2013. 

Senator REED. Just a final question. The Afghan local police 

(ALP) have been a component. In fact, as we visited in January, 

touted by our military commanders on the ground as a real turning 

21 

point because it combines not just the military, but also a village, 

a local connection, a governmental capacity connection. Can you 

comment on the future of the ALP? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that has been a very successful program for the reasons you alluded to. Number one, the individuals 

in the ALP are closely vetted in conjunction with local leadership. 

Number two, it is part of the ANSF architecture the ALP work directly for district police. 

In terms of clear, hold, and build, and counterinsurgency, it has 

proven to be the most effective hold force. Frankly, my assessment 

is less relevant than the assessment of the Taliban. We know from 

our intelligence that the most feared organization out there right 

now is ALP because the Taliban realize they cannot make inroads 

where we have effective local police in place. Again, it is that relationship between local leadership, the local people, and the ALP 

that has made this so effective. 

We learned a lot over the last several years about properly vetting, and we put those proper vetting procedures in place. We have 

learned a lot over the years about proper chain of command and 

ensuring that there is oversight both from a logistics and a command and control perspective. They are fully plugged into, again, 

the Minister of Interior. More importantly, we are implementing 

what we call layered security in each one of the provinces. The 

ALP are inextricably linked to the overall concept of layered security in each one of the provinces. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you for your 

service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome back, General. 

First of all, in your written statement, you have ‘‘what winning 

looks like,’’ and you have four bullet points. One of them says, ‘‘an 

operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of its safe haven from 

which to plan and conduct operations outside the area.’’ Have you 

seen any change there? 

General DUNFORD. Over the years I have, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. They do not have a safe haven anymore in 

Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. They have a safe haven inside of Afghanistan. 

In some areas, we are disrupting them, but they have a sanctuary 

in Pakistan. 

Senator MCCAIN. So have you seen any progress there, the safe 

haven they have in Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. The progress I have seen inside of Afghanistan first, Senator, has been that our—— 

Senator MCCAIN. My question is Pakistan. 

General DUNFORD. They have not been able to conduct effective 

operations, nor plan effective operations from Pakistan, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. They do not have a safe haven in Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. They are still physically there, Senator. They 

are not able to plan and conduct operations from there at this 

point. 

22 

Senator MCCAIN. That is very interesting news. Today in a press 

clip it says, ‘‘Production of Opium by Afghans is Up Again.’’ According to the Nation’s top counter narcotics official, Afghanistan is already the world’s largest producer of opium, and last year accounted for 75 percent of the world’s opium supply. Is that of concern to you, General? 

General DUNFORD. It is of concern, Senator. It is a destabilizing 

effect. It breeds a criminal element, and it also supports the 

Taliban. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thought one of our objectives back in 2001 

was to eliminate opium as a crop of interest, a crop that would be 

so very important when now apparently, according to this news report, it might provide 75 to 90 percent of the world’s supply. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in that area, our success has not 

been satisfactory. 

Senator MCCAIN. As we watch the situation unravel in Iraq because of our failure, among other things, but primarily because of 

our failure to leave a residual force there, we continue to hear 

mixed reports about the size of the force that would be left behind. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, recently testified 

that a combined U.S.-NATO post-2014 force between 8,000 and 

12,000 would be ‘‘a reasonable target.’’ General Mattis, former 

Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) testified before 

this committee, reflecting the opinion of your predecessor was to 

keep 13,600 troops in Afghanistan, with several thousand additional NATO forces on top of that. What is your view, General? 

What is your number? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am not going to give you a number. 

I am going to give you a range. My best military advice at this 

point is that we leave it as a range of numbers, and here are the 

reasons. Number one, I think we need to see how the Afghans do 

in their first summer in the lead, and make an assessment in November 2013. The other variables that need to be considered are 

how effective political transition is in 2014, and then the strategic 

landscape within which we expect to be operating post-2014, which 

addresses the strength of the enemy to include the Taliban, al 

Qaeda, as well as the cooperation of regional actors. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you have no number to tell this committee 

right now? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I have not provided my number to 

the President yet. We are still in the process of crafting our best 

military advice. But my strongest military advice is not to pin 

down a number right now because the number is—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you not understand, General, that one of 

the reasons why we are having so much difficulty in some areas 

is because the Afghans do not know what our commitment is? They 

saw what happened in Iraq where we had a commitment. Do you 

not know that they want to know sooner or later what the American commitment is post-2014? Do you not understand how critical 

that is to them, because that is what they all tell me? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do. I think the most important 

physical manifestation of our commitment is the signing of the 

BSA with a range of numbers and the level of commitment that we 

will provide post-2014. I have spoken to my Afghan counterparts. 

23 

I do not believe a specific number is anywhere near as important 

as an assured commitment in the context of the BSA, and knowing 

that we will provide the level of advise and assist in the 

counterterrorism effort necessary for post-2014. 

Senator MCCAIN. I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in your 

testimony, General, because they see what happened in Iraq. They 

see us withdrawing every place in the world. They see what is happening in Syria. They see a lack of commitment to the United 

States in Libya, for example, post-Gadhafi, and they know which 

way the wind is blowing. 

For you to tell this committee that we will make that decision 

later on, they are making accommodation for United States departure right now. That is one of the reasons why we are seeing a lot 

of the difficulties that we are seeing. I strongly urge you to do what 

General Mattis said, and that is to give us an estimate of what 

the—General Mattis was not concerned—did not voice all the concerns that you just—and caveats that you just articulated. We 

know that the Afghans want to know what the size of our commitment is and what the size of the army that we will support is critical for their planning in the future. 

So I strongly urge you to come up with a number to tell this committee and the American people. We have a responsibility as well. 

For you to say, we are just going to see how things turn out, it will 

determine the size of the post-2014 force, I believe is a tragic and 

terrible mistake for which we may pay a very heavy price. 

I have no further questions. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, can I comment on that? 

Senator MCCAIN. Sure. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, to be clear, I did not say to leave it 

completely vague. We are today advising and assisting at the battalion level. We are going to lift off to the brigade level here this 

fall. The number of post-2014 is inextricably linked to the level 

that we believe we need to provide advise and assist post-2014—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You are going to have to wait until 2014 to determine that? 

General DUNFORD. We do not, Senator. What I suggested was 

that this is the Afghan’s first summer in the lead. I believe this 

summer will be the bellwether for Afghan performance and in 2014 

and beyond. 

Senator MCCAIN. General, Senator Graham and I, we talk to the 

Afghans all the time. They are not sure of what the U.S. commitment will be, and many of them are making various accommodations for a repeat of what happened in Iraq. That is why we got 

a specific number from General Mattis, but we somehow cannot get 

that from you. It is very disappointing. 

I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Udall is not here. 

Senator Donnelly. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, in regards to the BSA, how does that stand, and what 

are the expectations on that? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the negotiations for the BSA are ongoing. The next meeting between the Afghans and the United 

24 

States is in the month of May. I think we are down to several 

issues that have to be addressed inside the negotiations. 

My sense is that the Afghanistan people as a whole want the 

BSA, so I am optimistic that we will get it signed at some point. 

But there are some difficult issues that are being negotiated at this 

time. 

Senator DONNELLY. Is there an understanding on the Afghan 

side that if we do not conclude a Status of Forces Agreement 

(SOFA), it is very difficult to leave our men and women there? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, it is absolutely clear to the Afghans 

that we will not leave our men and women there without appropriate SOFA in the context of the BSA. 

Senator DONNELLY. What kind of timing are you looking at to 

conclude that? 

General DUNFORD. Initially, that was identified as being signed 

not later than November 2013. From my perspective, as soon as we 

can sign it, it would be helpful. It would address what Senator 

McCain spoke about a minute ago and something that we are dealing with, which is an environment of uncertainty. I believe that the 

commitment that would be manifest in that BSA would be helpful 

in addressing uncertainty. 

Senator DONNELLY. How much control does Pakistan have over 

the Afghan Taliban? 

General DUNFORD. I do not believe the Pakistanis have control 

over the Afghan Taliban. I do think that the Afghan Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network, has sanctuary inside of Pakistan, 

and they get support from individuals in Pakistan. But I do not believe anybody controls them. 

Senator DONNELLY. Do you think the Inter-Services Intelligence 

(ISI) is working with them? 

General DUNFORD. There have been intelligence reports that link 

the ISI particularly to the Haqqani network. 

Senator DONNELLY. What control does the Pakistan army have 

over the ISI, in your opinion? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not know. I do not know. I think 

they nominally, of course, work for General Kayani. General 

Kayani is a former Director of the ISI. My sense is that anything 

the ISI does is known by General Kayani, but I cannot confirm 

that. 

Senator DONNELLY. Where do you see the primary source for the 

Afghan Taliban of the financial resources they receive, the military 

resources they receive? Where do you see that coming from? 

General DUNFORD. A percentage of it comes from the drug trade, 

some probably 35 or 40 percent comes from the drug trade. Some 

money comes from taxes, illicit taxes that they get from Afghan 

people, and some money comes from external support from outside 

the region. 

Senator DONNELLY. Now, when you look at the places that they 

go in Pakistan, the frontier areas, do you believe Pakistan, number 

one, has control over those areas; and, number two, can get control 

over those areas if they do not? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, Pakistan does not have control over 

those areas right now. They have had over 15,000 killed or wounded in operations in that area over the past decade. They have had 

25 

hundreds killed or wounded just in the past several weeks as they 

have tried to gain control of regions in the Khyber agency against 

the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or the Pakistan Taliban. So I think 

that is a clear indication that they cannot control their border area, 

and they cannot control the Taliban that are operating freely inside 

of that border area. 

Senator DONNELLY. What do you see as a role for the Taliban, 

if any, in a future Afghan Government? As we transition out, as 

discussions are taking place, how do you envision that future Afghan Government? Obviously there are elections coming up, but 

how are we looking at the transition for the Afghan Government 

as we move forward? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, DOS has the lead now on working 

on a reconciliation process and trying to bring together the Afghan 

Government as well as the Taliban. I do not have any insight today 

that would lead me to believe that the Taliban will be part of the 

political process in 2014. 

At some point, this war will have to be resolved through political 

means. There will have to be some political accommodations made. 

But I do not have any indication to believe that that will be in the 

near term. 

Senator DONNELLY. As we look at the Afghan citizens, and obviously there are different parts of the country that react in a different way based on where they are located. But when the different 

provinces and the provincial leaders are making their decisions, 

and the people in the towns are making their decisions, looking at 

post-2014, what do you think are the most important things they 

are looking for from the current Afghan Government, from the 

army, to provide them with some certainty that come the next 

night, the Taliban are not going to come back and cause havoc and 

turn their world upside down? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in addition to being secure and not 

having those illicit taxes collected, and not having the kind of oppression associated with the Taliban in the 1990s, one of the major 

concerns that young Afghans have today is jobs. Sixty percent of 

the population is 25-years-old or less, and so in addition to security 

and a stable environment and free from the oppression of the 

Taliban, they are also very concerned about the economy post-2014 

and their ability to seek proper employment. 

The good news the chairman has outlined is that we have 8 million that are in school today. The issue is that we raised expectations, and those expectations will have to be met with an economy 

that will support adequate jobs. 

Senator DONNELLY. As we look towards the end of 2014, is there 

a detailed transition plan with DOS and with the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) for many of the projects that 

have been begun, many that are on the books? Where do those 

projects go as we look forward? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is a very detailed transition 

process. We established a headquarters just to oversee transition. 

We are completely interlinked with USAID and the DOS, as well 

as other international organizations. Not only do we have a broad 

transition plan for every task and we have knocked that list down 

from some thousands to a handful of tasks now that still remain 

26 

to be worked out in terms of the detailed transition plan, but every 

project that is out there right now will have a detailed transition 

plan as well. 

Senator DONNELLY. You mentioned before about security zones in 

the country, areas that are safer than others. As you look forward 

to the next year and then to 2014, what are the things that you 

are most concerned about that could go wrong? 

General DUNFORD. We are going to transition the final tranche 

of areas over to the Afghans here this summer. That final tranche 

is on the eastern part of the country along the borders. That is 

where the most virulent strains of the insurgency are. That is 

where the most difficult challenges from a security perspective are. 

So as we deal with tranche five, that will be difficult. 

My major concern is making sure that by the fall of 2013, we 

have created the perception in Afghanistan that supports the political process that will begin in earnest. We will have candidates announcing for elections in 2014, here this fall in 2013. We have 

talked about inclusive, free, and fair elections, so ensuring that we 

provide security in the areas of what are now some 7,000 polling 

stations is a primary focus that we have in conjunction with our 

Afghan counterparts. 

Senator DONNELLY. That whole eastern region as you look forward to that, are there metrics that you look at and you go, ‘‘we 

have accomplished this by now, we have accomplished this by now, 

we are at this point.’’ Do you have a game-plan of by the end of 

2013, here is where we hope to be in those provinces? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. We are in the process of what 

we call a geographical and functional gap analysis. As I alluded to 

earlier, we want to affect a concept known as layered security in 

each one of the provinces. Layered security is successful when you 

have everything from the ALP, to the Afghan uniform police, to the 

border police, and the ANA working together, coordinated by an 

operational coordination center and independent with advisors. So 

our metrics are very much based on the performance of the ANSF 

and their ability, with limited support, to provide security in each 

of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. But as we have been discussing, the most difficult provinces will be those in the east. 

Senator DONNELLY. General, thank you for your service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would 

like to express my sympathy for those who were lost in Boston. If 

it were to turn out to be that it was a terrorist al Qaeda connected 

operation, I think two things are important for us to remember. 

One is that perfect security is not possible. The United States is 

a great Nation. It is vulnerable, and we will always be vulnerable 

to some attacks. But the offensive approach in which we go after 

those who are organized and dedicated to attacking us is the right 

approach. It does reduce the amount of attacks that can occur, in 

my opinion. 

General Dunford, I think you are what winning looks like, and 

your statement is a conclusion to this effort in Afghanistan that I 

can support. I think it is a reasonable and legitimate definition of 

success. 

27 

I am concerned, along with Senator McCain’s comments, that 

success cannot be just removing our troops. After our men and 

women have given so much, this Nation has sacrificed treasure, 

and we have lost some of our finest in this combat. To not finish 

strong, to not end this effort in a way that gives us maximum opportunity for this kind of success would be a deep and great failure 

of our country. 

Do you feel a commitment to those who have served, who committed themselves to this effort, and want to see a successful conclusion occur? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I feel an absolute commitment to the 

men and women who have sacrificed over the past 11 years and to 

the families of the fallen. That, frankly, is my motivation for performing my duties on a day-to-day basis. 

Senator SESSIONS. You have told us you believe successful conclusion is possible. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely believe that the things 

I outlined in my statement and that I referred to a minute ago in 

terms of what winning looks like are absolutely achievable. 

Senator SESSIONS. This is an important observation, but I am 

concerned, and I will follow up a little bit on what Senator 

McCain—the question he raised. I am looking at an April 2nd 

Bloomberg article. It goes on in some depth about our group of 

former U.S. officials who visited there, and they say that President 

Obama—I will quote the first sentence: ‘‘President Obama’s failure 

to spell out his plans in Afghanistan is adding to the risk that 

some Afghans will start negotiating deals with the Taliban, according to former U.S. officials who visited the country,’’ one of those 

being former Under Secretary of Defense, Miche`le Flournoy, who 

all of us know, was President Obama’s appointee there. 

Do you think that is a risk that is occurring? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely agree that today we are 

dealing with uncertainty that must be addressed, and that uncertainty has to be addressed by a clear commitment from the United 

States. What I was attempting to do earlier was allude to the fact 

that it is about more than a specific number. Our commitment 

post-2014 and support for the ASF, it is support for the political 

process, and it is advising and assisting in the counterterrorism effort. So it is an entire package that transcends the importance of 

any one number. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. I respect that. This is a quote from 

former Under Secretary of Defense Miche`le Flournoy: ‘‘In Afghanistan right now, there is a huge amount of anxiety about the scale 

and nature of U.S. commitment long term.’’ Do you think there are 

actions that we can take to eliminate that huge amount of anxiety, 

and would that not help us be successful? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely believe there are things 

we can do, and I absolutely believe that the environment within 

which the Afghans will assume the lead this year, it is critical that 

we shape that environment with this idea of commitment. 

I mentioned the BSA a minute ago. From my perspective, signing 

the BSA, of course that takes both the Afghans and the United 

States to agree on the modalities. But signing that will be a clear 

manifestation of our commitment post-2014. I do think that continVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
28 

ued emphasis on the resources and the commitment we provide 

from an advise and assist in a counterterrorism perspective post2014 is important. It cannot be one day we make a message and 

then allow it to go some months before we say it again. 

I think a constant drumbeat of our commitment post-2014 is necessary to overcome the uncertainty that is very real and very counterproductive inside of Afghanistan right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. This article notes that there is a historical 

paranoia in Afghanistan, the result of the previous abandonment 

of Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to take over. Do you think 

that is an accurate assessment, that there is a sense of uncertainty 

and paranoia among the people? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I see evidence of that. I mentioned 

the age of Afghans. Even those Afghans who were not alive in 1992 

talk about the beginnings of civil war in the 1990s and a desire not 

to return back to those days. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy went on to say that spelling out U.S. intentions, including how many troops will stay, would 

‘‘reduce counterproductive hedging behavior on the part of various 

parties in Afghanistan and in the broader region.’’ Do you think 

that is a valuable observation? 

General DUNFORD. I think providing a specific range of numbers 

right now with a demonstrated commitment at the level that we 

provide support would be helpful. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you aware that one White House advisor 

has said no troops may remain in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I read that in the newspaper. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would that create uncertainty in Afghanistan 

if that were thought to be a reasonable, or a potential policy of the 

United States? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, having no forces and no presence 

post-2014, in my mind, would undermine our campaign success. 

Senator SESSIONS. In this article, I just found it to be a pretty 

good summary of some of the difficult choices we are wrestling with 

and you are having to deal with. You are not the commander in 

chief. Ultimately, President Obama, the Commander in Chief, will 

decide how many troops are there. You will make a recommendation up through the chain, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. One of the things that was troubling to me is 

our Commander in Chief, President Obama, has been there 5 

years, and we have troops on the ground in harm’s way right this 

minute. This is what Mr. Michael O’Hanlon, the defense analyst at 

Brookings, said in this article, April 2, one of the most consistent 

observers of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq of anybody in 

America. From the beginning, he has been observing, commenting, 

and writing about it, and this is the liberal Brookings Institution. 

He says the absence of a clear message from Obama about the 

continuing U.S. presence in Afghanistan may be an indication—excuse me. He is not saying this. This is what the writer said: ‘‘ ‘The 

absence of a clear message may be an indication that the President 

has not made up his mind,’ said Michael O’Hanlon, defense analyst 

at Brookings. ‘Obviously Obama was of two minds about keeping 

29 

U.S. troops in Iraq after the war ended there,’ O’Hanlon said. ‘He 

may have similar ambivalence in Afghanistan.’ ’’ 

So if the President is ambivalent about the future—I will not ask 

you to respond to that. I would just say if the President is ambivalent about the future, what will happen in Afghanistan? I will observe I think without a doubt it makes your job more difficult and 

makes success more difficult. We have to get our act together. I 

think we have to have a clear message. 

I appreciate your firm view that success is possible. I think that 

should be the goal, and the goal should not be to meet some political vision of troop levels unconnected to the reality in Afghanistan. 

Thank you for your service. We appreciate it, and all the men 

and women that serve with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join 

in thanking you for your service over many years in the position 

you have now and many others, and the men and women who perform so courageously under your command. I want to thank you 

particularly for your very helpful and informative testimony here 

today, which is encouraging in many respects, but also sobering. 

I find it sobering in two respects particularly. First of all, your 

reference to the continuing threat from IEDs, a problem that has 

bedeviled and perplexed and stymied our efforts in Afghanistan as 

well as Iraq over the years. I want to ask in particular whether you 

view there having been any progress in the Pakistani’s action 

against the flow of fertilizer and other bombmaking materials from 

their country into Afghanistan? Apparently the casualties and 

deaths and from IEDs are still the biggest single source of the 

threat in Afghanistan to life and limb there, both to our forces and 

to the ANA and ANSF. So I wonder if you could comment on 

whether the Pakistanis have been more cooperative and helpful? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can, and this is another area where 

we have seen a lot of rhetoric exchanged over the last couple of 

months. We are now meeting with the Pakistanis specifically on 

the IED threat. They also recognize the threat of IEDs inside of 

Pakistan, which I think has heightened their concern. 

The Joint IED Defeat Office has had some success in working 

with manufacturers in Pakistan to perhaps change the composition 

of the chemicals inside of the fertilizer that would make it less explosive, less likely to be used in IEDs. We have some increased cooperation at the border, but, Senator, I am not satisfied with the 

output of all those activities yet. We still see a large amount of ammonium nitrate moving back and forth from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and sadly that provides the materials for the preponderance 

of the IEDs that we are dealing with. 

Largely, by the way, at this point, the effects of IEDs are being 

felt by the ASF even more than our forces today. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. My impression over the years from my 

first visit, and I have been three times and asked these questions 

every time I visited, is that there have been more words than action from the Pakistanis, and the continuing rhetoric, as you refer 

to it, over the years has produced less action than there should be. 

30 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is fair to say there is less 

action than there should be, less action than there needs to be. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me then go to the second sobering 

part of your testimony, which refers to the attrition rates in the 

ANA, what you refer to as a significant challenge, quoting you. Is 

this problem solvable? Is the ANA going to be able to recruit and 

train the forces that it needs to contain and repel and conquer the 

Taliban? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe there is room to make a significant improvement in this attrition issue. I mentioned earlier 

that we had focused on growing the quantity of force over the last 

several years. The vetting process that is in place today is much 

better than the vetting process that we had in place a couple of 

years ago. 

The other thing that gives me room for hope is there is a direct 

correlation between the attrition in the ANSF and leadership. 

Where we have seen effective Afghan leaders, we see low levels of 

attrition. Even though some of the factors are beyond leadership 

that have to be addressed, there is a direct correlation between 

leadership and attrition. 

The minister of defense has recently directed a study be done of 

all lieutenant colonels and above in the ASF. They have completed 

that study and 30 general officers were recommended for relief 

from their duties; 55 additional general officers we recommended 

for retirement, that they hit retirement age. 

Minister Mohammadi, the minister of defense, decentralized decisionmaking for personnel for captains and below, so we see some 

decentralization taking place to enhance accountability of leadership. These are the steps that I believe have to be taken. I am 

mindful of the challenges we have in the U.S. military when I came 

in as a platoon commander in the 1970s, and we had significant 

attrition in the U.S. Marine Corps at that time, and we had significant attrition in the U.S. Army. A big part of that was a function 

of leadership, and as leaders were held accountable and held to 

standard, we addressed that attrition problem. 

I think a similar process can take place and is taking place in 

the ASF, but it is not something that will happen overnight. This 

idea of leadership development is a 2-, 3-, 5-year process, but we 

are moving in the right direction. The thing that I find most encouraging is that Afghan leadership are being held accountable 

today by the Afghan chain of command. When they fail to perform, 

they are being removed from their duties. When they fail to perform, they are being dismissed. I think that is a positive sign. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That effort will really depend on the credibility and confidence and the integrity of the Afghan Government, 

will it not, in part, to assure that kind of leadership? 

General DUNFORD. Over time, effective political transition is absolutely critical to security. They are inextricably linked, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me then go to the question of corruption in the Afghan Government, which affects the United States as 

well. I am very concerned with the contracts involving taxpayers’ 

dollars of the United States that may go to companies that, in effect, benefit our enemy. Senator Ayotte and I have helped to spearVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
31 

head efforts to improve that contracting law that will enable more 

effective prosecution of those kinds of corrupt contracts. 

Do you have any observations about whether there have been improvements generally in corruption within the Afghan Government, 

and specifically relating to U.S. contracts for goods and services? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the National Defense Authorization 

Act in 2012 that allowed us to cease contracting with the enemy 

was extraordinarily helpful in that we had decisionmaking authority decentralized where if you had an indication that a contractor 

or a subcontractor was associated with the enemy, we could immediately stop that contract. 

I read the recent Inspector General of Afghanistan’s report making some recommendations how to take that legislation further. 

Conceptually, I absolutely support that. It would expand that beyond the Department of Defense (DOD) so that other U.S. Government agencies can also have the same authorities that we have 

been given as a result of that very helpful legislation, and also to 

address a different level of contracts. In the past, there had been 

over $100,000, and this would bring it to a level below that. 

So I do think we have had some improvement in that particular 

area as a result of that legislation. I think to continue to move in 

that same direction would be very helpful, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. One last question, and I have 

a lot more questions, but my time is about to expire. The chairman 

asked you, I believe, about the Afghan interpreters that were the 

subject of a recent piece in the New York Times. I am very concerned about providing the kinds of visas that are necessary often 

for the survival of these interpreters. I have talked to a number of 

our marines coming back, and they are concerned as well with the 

kind of service that these interpreters and others have provided 

that may endanger them, in fact, very severely so, their lives. 

Do you have any observations about what we can do to improve 

that process? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think raising the visibility is very 

important, and I would put a personal face on it. One of the individuals that is waiting for a visa, one of the individuals who has 

applied to come back to the United States for many years, was the 

interpreter that was with Sergeant Dakota Meyer the day he received the Congressional Medal of Honor. There is an individual 

who was part of that fight, fully supportive of the advisors who 

that day their lives were lost, or in the case of Sergeant Meyer, certainly threatened. There are many interpreters like those who have 

fought alongside of us, who have supported the mission. As I mentioned before, our success could not have been possible without 

them. 

I think having visibility and recognition of their contribution, 

and facilitating their coming to our country through the bureaucratic process would be very helpful. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, General. Thank you for your 

service, and thank you to the men and women who are under your 

command. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Graham. 

32 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, General. I thank you and your 

staff for doing a very good job, an exceptional job, in difficult circumstances. 

I would like to revisit an exchange you had with Senator McCain 

about the al Qaeda presence in the tribal regions. You said al 

Qaeda is still present on the Pakistan side of the border, but they 

are—how did you term it, ‘‘not as effective?’’ What did you say? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what I was trying to get at was I believe our operations, and of course, those not being conducted by 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, but it seems to me that there are operations being conducted in Pakistan that are disrupting al Qaeda in 

Pakistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that having SOFs on the Afghan side of the border has been helpful? 

General DUNFORD. It has been extraordinarily helpful, and we 

have had a disrupting effect on al Qaeda as a result of our SOFs 

in Afghanistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. How many SOFs do we have in Afghanistan 

today? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can give you that number, but I 

would prefer not to give it to you here. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. But it is thousands I would suggest. 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. One of the reasons that we have contained al Qaeda is that we have other agencies in the fight, but we 

have a lot of intelligence capability in that part of the country. Is 

that correct? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We have the ability to strike in that 

part of the country as well. I guess my point is that when you look 

at a post-2014 force, it would be a very unwise move to take that 

infrastructure down. Do you agree with that? 

General DUNFORD. I do agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. So I want my colleagues to understand the infrastructure in place that diminishes al Qaeda’s effectiveness along 

the tribal regions inside of Pakistan is the direct result of infrastructure that we have in Afghanistan, as well as other agencies’ 

capabilities. 

When you talk about winning, what would losing look like? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think losing would look like Afghanistan devolving, Afghanistan returning to chaos, Afghanistan 

being a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the people of Afghanistan once 

again being subjected to the oppression of the Taliban in the 1990s, 

a sanctuary from which security and stability in Pakistan can be 

threatened. All those would be components of losing. 

Senator GRAHAM. The ability of al Qaeda to regenerate would be 

greater under a losing scenario, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. I do not think there is any question about 

that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. If we were seen as losing in Afghanistan, it 

would be hard to convince the Iranians to change their behavior? 

General DUNFORD. I think a credible outcome in Afghanistan certainly will influence those who would do harm. 

33 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, when it comes to future hands to 

be played or cards to be played, the follow-on force, let us say for 

a moment there were no troops in 2014. We decided to pull out 

completely like we did in Iraq. What would your evaluation of the 

outcome be under that scenario? 

General DUNFORD. I think if we did not have a presence post2014 and we did not provide security assistance to the ANSF post2014, it would be a question of time before they would devolve. 

Senator GRAHAM. So we would eventually lose all we have 

gained? 

General DUNFORD. I believe that Afghanistan would be at great 

risk of instability if we would leave before 2014. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think that would be true if we had 

2,000 troops left? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we would not be able to accomplish 

both of our missions. We have two missions. One is to deal with 

the terrorist threat, the other is to deal with security and stability, 

and to prevent the Taliban from coming back. It would be difficult 

to accomplish those missions at a force level of 2,000. 

Senator GRAHAM. One of the goals of this BSA is to solidify the 

relationship between the United States and Afghanistan for at 

least a 10-year period. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. People are evaluating what bets to make as I 

speak in Afghanistan and the region. The sooner that we can make 

this announcement in a bold way, the better off. Do you agree with 

that? 

General DUNFORD. I do agree with that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, Senator Levin and I have been on the 

same sheet of music for a very long time about the size of the Afghan army. It is 352,000. As I understand, it costs us about $6.5 

billion a year to maintain that force. Does that sound about right? 

General DUNFORD. It is going to be $4.1 billion for the program 

of record. Increasing the program of record and sustaining past 

352,000 is somewhere between $5 and $6 billion. So that is the aggregate cost of the force. Only a small part of that is what is the 

cost of the program of record to 352,000 through 2018. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So what percentage do we pay? 

General DUNFORD. Of the $4.1 billion program of record, our coalition partners pay $1.3 billion, the Afghans have pledged $500 million, and we pay the difference. 

Senator GRAHAM. The difference between 352,000 and, say, 

230,000, is how much? 

General DUNFORD. In any given year, it is somewhere between 

$400 and $600 million a year, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. The difference in capability, would you say, is 

significant between 352,000 and 230,000? 

General DUNFORD. I think both from a capability and a psychology perspective, it would be significant. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it would be a wise investment 

for American taxpayers to continue to invest in the ANSF at 

352,000? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

34 

Senator GRAHAM. The more they have, the less they need us, is 

that correct? The more capable they are? 

General DUNFORD. I absolutely think there is a relationship between our post-2014 presence and the capabilities and capacities of 

the Afghans. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to detention, we have just 

entered into a new agreement with the Afghan Government. Could 

you give us a 1-minute overview of that agreement? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we transferred authority for detention operations to the Afghans in March 2013. What that means is 

that now there will be a criminal process that affects detainees. We 

have an agreement to keep the enduring security threats that are 

in detention at this particular time, and future enduring security 

threats, and we also are partnered at the facility, the detention facility at Parwan, to ensure that we continue to have humane treatment, and that we have visibility of detainees post the transfer. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say that we do not have a disposition planned for the third country nationals we hold at Parwan? 

General DUNFORD. We still have custody and control of third 

country nationals, Senator, and I do not know what the plan is 

right now post-2014. It is part of a process that is ongoing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Some of these are definitely transnational terrorism—terrorists who have been in the fight for quite a while. 

General DUNFORD. They are, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have drones helped the operations in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Significantly, Senator. That is one of the ways 

that we put pressure on al Qaeda, as an example, but they are effective across all of our operations. 

Senator GRAHAM. Under the Rules of War, if you see an al Qaeda 

operative out in the open walking down the road and we get a good 

signature on this person, do we have to wait until they take up 

arms to fire, or can we shoot when we see them? 

General DUNFORD. If they are designated, we do not have to wait 

until they take up arms, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Which makes common sense. Do you agree 

with that? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, as to the future of Afghanistan, you have 

Pakistan as a potential threat because of the safe havens. You have 

al Qaeda, the Taliban, and you have Afghan governance. The Government of Afghanistan in many ways is one of the enemies we are 

fighting here. 

You indicated that the military will get better over time as leadership evolves and people are held more accountable. Do you believe that the corruption we see today in Afghanistan among different ministries and throughout the country can get better over 

time as these young people we have been mentoring take over in 

the future? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe it can get better, but the 

operative part of your phrase is ‘‘over time.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. We are talking about a 10- or 15-year window 

in that regard. 

35 

General DUNFORD. We are talking a significant period of time. I 

think we are talking about this population now that is 25 years or 

less assuming positions of increased responsibility in the future. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it is a good investment on our 

part to stay partnered with these young people? 

General DUNFORD. I think it is a critical investment, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. General, thank you very much. It seems to me 

that what we are facing in Afghanistan, and particularly what the 

Afghanistan Government faces after 2014, amounts to a guerilla 

war. The doctrine of guerilla war, as I remember Mao Tse-Tung, 

was that the guerilla has to swim in the sea of the people or something to that effect. 

How do the people of Afghanistan feel about this conflict? Can 

the Taliban and al Qaeda find a warm, hospitable sea to swim in, 

or are the people loyal to the government and what we have tried 

to accomplish? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there is no question in my mind that 

the Afghan people do not want to return to the oppression of the 

Taliban that was there in the 1990s. We have survey after survey 

that indicates that the Taliban are increasingly unpopular amongst 

the Afghan people. That has not yet made a direct correlation to 

support for the Afghan Government. So while they are absolutely 

opposed to the Taliban returning to power and they are absolutely 

opposed to what the Taliban stands for, they do not yet have the 

full confidence in the Government of Afghanistan to provide it full 

support. 

Senator KING. That might apply here. The people of America are 

not too crazy about Congress either. It is a different subject. 

You were involved in Iraq, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator KING. What lessons do you take from Iraq, and particularly from the unwinding of our involvement in Iraq, that can be 

applied to this circumstance that we are now facing, ending our involvement in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think one of the most important 

lessons from Iraq is that we waited too late to work through the 

details of a BSA. In any event, we were unable to conclude the successful BSA. 

We have started that process much earlier. That is why I have 

highlighted the BSA this morning. I think we have had a discussion about it. I think the key lesson learned is to ensure that we 

have a smooth transition post-2014, that we provide the Afghan 

people with our sense of commitment post-2014. We should view 

2014 today, December 2014, as nothing more than a change in the 

mandate, in a change in the authorities, but a continuity of commitment post-2014. If we are able to do that, I think we will have 

internalized the most important lesson from our Iraq experience. 

Senator KING. So you think that essentially 2014 should be a 

seamless transition to a competent and sufficient Afghan force to 

essentially take over what we have been doing. 

36 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. What January 2015 ought to 

look like is we have completed political transition. We have completed security transition. But we are still there decisively in an 

advise and assist in a counterterrorism role under different authorities and now at the exact request of the Afghan people in the 

context of a BSA. 

What will be different is we will not be under a United Nations 

(U.N.) mandate. We will not be under the law of armed conflict. We 

will not be under the military technical agreement. But we will 

still be there and be able to provide the requisite support both politically and from a security perspective. 

Senator KING. You mentioned that the Afghan force is anticipated to be somewhere around 350,000. What are the estimates of 

the size of the Taliban or al Qaeda or the aggregate enemy group, 

if you will? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is a question that frankly we 

ask all the time, and we do not know. There are some estimates 

that talk about 20,000 to 30,000 Taliban. But I think because you 

have such various levels of Taliban, those that are actually ideologically committed, Taliban senior leadership in Quetta is certainly different than day-to-day people who might fight on the 

ground that it is very difficult to capture a number when you talk 

about the Taliban. 

Senator KING. I would suggest, therefore, given the small number, that the view of the people at large, as we discussed at the beginning, is going to be critical as to whether or not they can really 

gain any power in the situation. They are going to have to have the 

support of the public, would you not agree? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, what gives me optimism and the reason why I am optimistic about the campaign is it is all about the 

ASF’s ability to provide security to the population, and every day 

we are improving in that particular area. That reduces the freedom 

of movement. That reduces the ability for the Taliban to influence 

the population. 

I honestly believe—there used to be an expression that the 

Taliban have the time and we have the watches. I do not believe 

that is any longer the case. I think the Taliban are going to wake 

up at some point and they are going to realize this is not their father’s ANSF, and they are going to be unable to influence the population in the way that they have done in the past. 

Senator KING. Let me change the subject for a minute. What is 

the situation on green on blue attacks? Has that declined? Do you 

feel that is under control? Does that indicate significant infiltration 

of the ASF? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, that is one of the most insidious 

risks to the force, and in 2012, we had a significant challenge with 

insider attacks. As a result, we significantly improved our training. 

We added counterintelligence capability both in the coalition as 

well as inside the Afghan forces. We revised our tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, and we have a much more routine and effective 

dialogue with our Afghan partners to mitigate the risk of the insider attacks. 

I will not for a second be complacent. Indications are that we 

have made some progress just based on numbers. We have had 3 

37 

in 2013; during that same period of time, we had 20 last year in 

2012. But of the issues that keep me awake at night and the ones 

that I want to stay focused on, the insider threat is absolutely one 

of those. 

It erodes trust between our coalition and our Afghan partners, 

and, more importantly, it erodes the will of the American people. 

I recognize that. 

Senator KING. What is your analysis of the leadership of the Afghan force? That is important. The quality and character of the 

leadership is a crucial element to any enterprise success. You know 

these people, I presume, personally. Do you have confidence that 

these are strong and effective leaders? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would characterize the Afghan 

leadership as improving. There are a number of leaders, and we 

are fortunate right now that both the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior have fallen into this category. There are a number 

of leaders who have vision, that have commitment, that have 

strong leadership, and are taking appropriate action. 

It is going to take time before we have the depth of leadership 

that we need to have across the forces, the consistency, the continuity of leadership. Where we see good leadership we see good 

units. Where we see deficient leadership, we have some challenges. 

That is one of our areas, again, as we focus on quality over the 

next couple of years, leadership development is really important, 

not only officers, but noncommissioned officers (NCO). 

As an example, we are currently short 10,000 NCOs in the Army 

and about 6,000 in the police. Addressing that deficiency and developing those leaders is a key part of what we need to do over the 

next couple of years to make sure that our progress is sustained. 

Senator KING. Are we going to maintain after 2014 any role at 

all in training—in leadership and that kind of professional development, if you will? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Senator. That really is probably 

the primary focus of our post-2014 contribution will be advising 

and assisting in the institutions where we grow NCOs, where we 

grow officers, and where we develop integrated combined arms capability. Among the more important tasks we have post-2014 is 

leadership development. That is the same for our coalition partners 

who will also contribute. 

Senator KING. General, thank you very much for your service, 

and particularly for your service in this very difficult and important period. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Lee. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, for 

joining us and for the service you provide to our country. 

If the United States and Afghanistan reach an agreement to 

keep a U.S. troop presence in that country beyond 2014, what are 

some of the tangible goals that the United States would be looking 

for to achieve in that country? Is there a certain security metric, 

a certain measurable level of security we are hoping to reach? In 

other words, going along with that, what would it take for you to 

38 

be comfortable in saying that we would no longer at some point 

need a troop presence in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the focus post-2014 is all about growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. Some of the remaining challenges, they started at the ministerial level. So Minister of 

Defense and Minister of Interior, they cannot manage a budget 

right now. As an example, last year the minister of defense only 

executed a very small percentage of the budget they actually had. 

It was not due to corruption, it was due to bureaucratic inefficiency. So growing the capabilities and capacities of the ministry 

are very important to be able to sustain our efforts. 

By the same token, there are logistics issues, so having a logistics infrastructure in place, taking a sure distribution of supplies 

and parts all the way down to the lowest tactical level is an area 

that needs to continue to be worked on. I spoke about a minute 

ago, leadership development is also important. 

So when I start to look at what we need to do past 2014, to be 

clear, our effort will not be to provide security inside of Afghanistan. Our effort will be to advise the ASF so that what we have 

done over the past several years is actually sustainable, and we 

will be able to measure that sustainability over time and gradually 

reduce our presence. 

Senator LEE. You have the metrics in place to do that? 

General DUNFORD. We do have the metrics in place, Senator, 

that both address where we have to be for proficiency at the ministerial level, as well as we have 14 functional areas that we evaluate in our tactical units that allow us to determine where they are 

and what support they may need to improve to take it to the next 

level. 

Senator LEE. DOD is currently spending about $10 billion more 

conducting the war effort in Afghanistan this year than was estimated would be necessary. From what we understand, in order to 

make up for this underestimation, DOD will, of course, have to pull 

from other funds from its base budget, which is, of course, difficult 

because of the cuts we are facing as a result of sequestration and 

the other long-term spending limits imposed by the Budget Control 

Act of 2011. 

I understand the problems with trying to budget and plan for a 

war a year in advance and how unforeseen costs can arise. At the 

same time, a $10 billion miscalculation is a little bit alarming, especially just given all the other pressures that we face in DOD. 

So, General, can you explain to us how that underestimation occurred? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I am not aware that we inside of 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan underestimated by $10 billion our requirements for this year. I can assure you that we have gone back and 

looked at every dollar that we are spending to make sure we are 

spending it to good effect. We have significantly reduced, in fact, 

particularly in the area of military construction, significantly reduced the money that we are spending in Afghanistan. 

I will go back and take a look at where that projection came from 

and why we are in the position we are in right now. But that is 

not something I was aware of. 

39 

Senator LEE. Okay, we can follow up with that with you after 

this hearing. So let me talk about Pakistan for a minute because 

it is impossible to cover the gamut of issues that we face in Afghanistan without also discussing the influence of Pakistan and Pakistan’s behavior. 

We have spent billions of dollars in Pakistan since September 

11th, 2001, for security and for economic assistance. But Pakistan, 

some would say, can at times seem to be more of an obstacle than 

a partner in the progress of the region, from closing the borders to 

NATO supplies, to the ties of the ISI to extremist groups, to the 

lack of cooperation in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and to the 

imprisonment of Dr. Afridi for his assistance to the United States. 

What is your personal assessment, General, of the relationship 

between the United States and Pakistan, and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan moving forward? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, in the first place, I think we would 

agree that we have vital national interests in Pakistan in the sense 

that the nexus between extremism and nuclear weapons would be 

catastrophic. 

I personally have watched how we have dealt with Pakistan over 

the years. In the 1990s, we decided to isolate Pakistan as a result 

of the Pressler amendment, and then we stopped conducting military-to-military engagements. I now see the adverse effect of that 

policy that took place for over a decade because my generation of 

leaders does not have personal relationships with our Pakistani 

counterparts to work through some of these issues. 

So I think there has to be balance. I think it is in our interest 

to have a strategic partnership with Pakistan, and we need to manage the relationship with the end in sight, which is that professional and deep strategic partnership over time, which of course 

today is something that needs work. 

With regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, my objective before 

transition in 2014 is to ensure that we have a constructive military-to-military relationship, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It 

will absolutely be at the tactical level, but I think it can be a foundation for a deeper relationship over time. The relationship will 

take much effort. 

I am optimistic because, as I mentioned earlier, General Kayani 

and his leaders, as well as Afghan leaders, will meet with me later 

this month. We do have a number of exchanges going on right now. 

Senator LEE. So looking forward then to a post-2014 environment, do you believe these multibillion payments to Pakistan ought 

to continue regardless of whether, or to what extent, there is a continued American presence or a continued NATO troop presence in 

Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe we need to maintain a very 

constructive, effective relationship with Pakistan. We need to recognize the very real threat that Pakistan has inside of its own borders. From my perspective, we ought to do whatever it takes to ensure our vital national interests in that particular part of the world 

are protected. 

Senator LEE. Okay. One of the things that I am always looking 

to in that kind of aid is whether or not it does serve the military 

purpose. You are saying we need to do whatever it takes to conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
40 

tinue that relationship. Are you saying that payments of that size 

and of that nature are what is going to be required in the long run? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe it is in our best interest to 

continue to develop the Pakistani army and to ensure that they can 

effectively deal with security within their borders. I would not tell 

you that every single program that we have in place right now is 

one we ought to sustain in the future. That is not something I pay 

particular attention to right now in my current duties, but I am absolutely adamant that we ought to maintain a close relationship 

with Pakistan and help them to develop the resources to be able 

to provide security. 

Senator LEE. Your fear would be that if we were to cut all of that 

off abruptly, that we could end up in the same kind of dynamic 

that you are describing where the military-to-military relationships 

do not exist. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe that Pakistan has a very 

real threat inside their borders right now, and I do not believe that 

they can deal with that particular threat without external support. 

Senator LEE. Okay. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, General. Thank you, of course, for being here and for your incredible 

sacrifice and service to our country. 

Let me move right to the Afghan general elections in 2014. When 

we met, we agreed that it would be difficult to overstate the importance of those elections. In your assessment, what needs to happen 

between now and April 2014 to ensure that the elections are not 

only free and fair, but recognized to be free and fair by the Afghan 

public? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the first precondition for successful 

elections is obviously the security environment. So as I mentioned 

earlier, summer of 2013, from my perspective, is very important. 

We need to emerge from the summer of 2013 with security in those 

areas, particularly those areas that are important to the elections. 

We need to emerge from the summer of 2013 with the perception 

of security so that people want to participate in the elections. 

I think one of the things that will determine whether they are 

viewed as free and fair is if they are inclusive. I imagine there are 

7,000 polling stations, and we need to make sure that there is security such that people have access to those polling stations in April. 

So from a security perspective, that is very important. 

The Minister of Interior has the lead on security. We are decisively engaged, and my intent is to provide whatever support the 

ANSF need us to provide to make sure the elections are successful 

in 2014. 

Senator UDALL. Let me move to the ALP. We talked about their 

important role, and you talked about how the Taliban sees that 

program. If my memory is right, you said that the ALP is one of 

the most significant issues that the Taliban will have to address in 

order to be successful. Do you still hold that view? To what extent 

does the ALP need to be funded and manned at high levels? Is the 

ALP a sustainable initiative as we draw down our coalition troops? 

41 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I absolutely continue to believe that 

the ALP is critical to our success. It is an important component in 

that layered security concept I spoke to earlier. For all the reasons 

I spoke about, I have confidence in their ability. 

We have about 21,000 what they call guardians or member of the 

ALP today. There is planned growth for 30,000. The Minister of Interior has requested to grow that figure to 45,000. What I have 

asked my staff to do is review that in June or July this year to ensure that we do not look at the ALP other than in the full context 

of ASF and the effect that we are trying to achieve post-2014. 

But I am a big believer in the ALP initiative. I believe it is one 

of the critical components of security post-2014. I believe it is sustainable, and it has Afghan ownership right now. In many cases, 

it is the Afghans who are identifying the areas where they want 

ALP to be established. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, I do not think you could overstate or I could 

overstate the utility of local ownership in the sense that these police forces work for us, not for the coalition, not for anybody else, 

but for the local communities. 

Let me move to the heavy responsibility you have, and that is 

that you are simultaneously preparing for this year’s fighting season and you are planning for troop reductions over the next 20 

months. In your opening statement, you mentioned a range of capabilities and units that the ASF currently lack. 

In that light, would you recommend that aviation assets, DOD 

support, and other capabilities be provided by our military after 

2014? On a related note, will the U.S. Government civilian agencies 

be able to sustain their current levels of personnel and assistance 

without having a robust NATO military network in place? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are certain capability gaps, 

and you highlighted the most important ones, and I would say the 

most important one would be close air support (CAS). So I would 

recommend where appropriate that we would provide CAS to the 

Afghans post-2014. We have seen several times recently where the 

absence of that kind of CAS created difficulties for Afghan forces, 

and we will not have addressed the capabilities of the Afghanistan 

air forces until 2015 or 2016. That is the program of record as it 

currently exists. So there will be a gap between 2014 in the full 

operational capability of the Afghan air force. When that gap exists, where it is important to sustain our success, I would recommend that we provide that support. 

With regard to the civilian agencies, earlier I mentioned that I 

believe we should be in the four corners of Afghanistan post-2014. 

One of the reasons why I believe that is not only to provide the 

right level of advise and assist to our Afghan counterparts, but also 

to support the U.S. Government interagency. Ambassador 

Cunningham in Kabul and I have complete integration in terms of 

planning for post-2014. I understand what his requirements are 

from an embassy perspective, and they are part of our planning for 

post-2014. 

Senator UDALL. I will not ask you to answer this question, but 

I think it is incumbent on all of us to think about the president’s, 

as in President Karzai’s, behaviors and comments at times about 

air support, about our SOFs and the like. We should consider what 

42 

his reaction will be to the continuation of CAS moving forward. I 

just make that comment. 

Let me turn to sequestration, if I might. What are your concerns? 

To what extent will sequestration have a negative effect on the 

mission and the readiness of the troops that will rotate into that 

theater between now and 2014, and perhaps beyond? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, you hit it exactly right. From my 

perspective, I have been told that sequestration will not affect the 

resources that we have available to our men and women on the 

ground inside of Afghanistan, and I believe that. My greatest concerns is that it will impact the readiness of those units who are at 

home station preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. 

I think one of the great success stories over the last 10 years has 

been the quality training and equipping that we provided to our 

young men and women in uniform. Training today, there is no comparison to what training was earlier in my career. That is as a result of the support of Congress. That is as a result of leadership 

learning lessons over the last 10 years, and I think it is very important that we sustain that same high level of training in the 

coming years because we will still have people in harm’s way. 

Senator UDALL. Let me move back to the Taliban and the threats 

that they present, but also the opportunity for the Afghan Government and for us. I think we share a concern that the Taliban could 

become viewed by the public as the best arbitrator in dispute resolutions. If the national government or even provincial officials are 

viewed as corrupt, then Afghans could be tempted to turn to the 

Taliban and their courts to resolve their problems. Then if you add 

into that the sense that the Afghan Government is a predatory 

actor that takes private land unfairly or without compensation, 

that provides the Taliban power and influence potentially. 

Is it reasonable to expect that these types of practices which are 

counterproductive can be halted? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe it is not so much halting 

them as providing an alternative which would cause them to be irrelevant. I do believe that dispute resolution is a core function of 

subnational governance in Afghanistan, and it is one of the critical 

areas. The rule of law in general is one of the critical areas that 

the Afghans have to improve in order for our success to be sustainable in the future. There is no question about it. 

Senator UDALL. General, again, thank you for your service. 

Thanks for making the long trip here from theater. I look forward 

to working with you as we move forward at this crucial point in 

time in our involvement in Afghanistan. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Your mic. 

Senator BLUNT. Almost turned it on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

and thank you, General, for spending time with us today. 

I want to follow up first on Senator Graham’s comments on the 

detention of somebody we capture, a third country national. My imVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
43 

pression is that there is really no plan as to what to do with them 

in the future. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we do not have a decision on what 

to do with them in the future. In fact, next week we have a team 

led by the Office of Secretary of Defense to come over and to work 

through this issue. This issue is not a new issue. It has been 

worked. 

Senator BLUNT. Right. 

General DUNFORD. I just do not have the decision about the disposition of those detainees as we approach 2014. 

Senator BLUNT. What would be the risk of not agreeing to a plan 

for those detainees? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, these are people that absolutely have 

to be kept behind bars, so we need a plan to detain these individuals, in most cases, on an enduring basis. 

Senator BLUNT. Is it our view that the Afghans would not be the 

best people to be in charge of these detainees? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not know if that is a viable alternative right now. First of all, I do not know what the Afghan 

desire would be for those third country nationals or the legal 

framework within which the Afghans would be able to keep them. 

The Afghans have moved to an evidence-based process now for 

detention operations. We, of course, use the Law of Armed Conflict 

framework. I am not sure that the Afghan process would allow us 

to keep those third country nationals detained beyond 2014. That 

is something we would have to take a very close look at. 

Senator BLUNT. Okay, thank you. On the force, you mentioned 

about 350,000 Afghan forces. This would not be the police forces, 

but the other forces? 

General DUNFORD. No, Senator, that is the aggregate of both the 

police and the army, less the ALP. So the 352,000 would be all the 

Afghan uniformed police, all the Afghan army, the border police, 

and then over and above that 352,000 right now is the ALP, which 

are approved for a level of 30,000. 

Senator BLUNT. How big a problem does attrition continue to be? 

General DUNFORD. Attrition in the Afghan army is a significant 

challenge. We have nearly 30 percent attrition. In the police, it is 

much better. It is at or above the goal of 15 to 16 percent. The local 

police is very low and so the army is the area where attrition is 

of greatest concern. 

Senator BLUNT. Is it highest as you get closer to fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have not seen a direct correlation 

between the fighting season and the attrition. We have seen a direct correlation between leadership and attrition. 

Senator BLUNT. What size force as you contemplate us leaving— 

I guess I want two questions here. First, what size force do we 

have to leave to get people and equipment out successfully? Then 

second, what size force should we hope that the Afghans can maintain and sustain? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, with regard to our equipment, there 

are really three aspects of closing down in Afghanistan. One is the 

retrograde of equipment that would come back here to the United 

States to reset our Services. The others are base closure and material reduction. 

44 

The equipment that is needed to reset our forces, we will get that 

equipment out by the end of 2014. We still in all likelihood will be 

closing out bases and reducing materials, that is, returning the 

ground to the way we found it, post-2014, and so we will need some 

element to be able to do that. Currently, the size of that element 

is 2,500 soldiers that help us with that. I expect we will need some 

similar organization post-2014. That is called from CENTCOM. It 

is a logistics unit that actually works in CENTCOM. 

With regard to the Afghans, I think we now are looking at that 

352,000 force being sustained through 2018 as being the best recommendation. 

Senator BLUNT. What level of help will the Afghans need from 

outside to sustain a force that big? 

General DUNFORD. In accordance with the Chicago Conference, 

Senator, through 2018, the vast majority of the money necessary 

to sustain that force is going to come from the United States and 

international partners. 

Senator BLUNT. The vast majority of that money will come from 

outside? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, of about $5 billion to sustain that 

force, the Afghans will pay approximately $500 million. So the preponderance of the resources necessary to sustain Afghan forces 

post-2014 would come from the international community and the 

United States. 

Senator BLUNT. On removing our people from Afghanistan, at 

what point do you leave—at what point do the people that are 

there face real danger, and how many people do we need to leave 

there to safely get everything—the other people out? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, there are a couple of things. One is 

that we will make that decision based on the security environment, 

based on the capabilities and capacities of the Afghans, who will 

provide the security environment within which we draw down. But 

as General Dempsey says, we are never going to ask 10 soldiers to 

do more than 10 soldiers’ worth of work. We will very much shrink 

the perimeter, figuratively speaking, in Afghanistan in a way that 

keeps protection first and foremost. 

Senator BLUNT. One other question on facilities that we have 

there. You mentioned returning the situation back to the way it 

was before the facility was built. Do we have any kind of process 

we go through with the Afghans to decide if they would like things 

left there that otherwise are just of no value? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. We have a very detailed plan 

for Afghan infrastructure to sustain Afghan forces post-2014. Some 

of that infrastructure is being transitioned from coalition forces to 

Afghans, but all the infrastructure that is over and above their 

ability to sustain over time. We have a very detailed plan that 

links the infrastructure that the Afghans will maintain post-2014 

with the resources we project will be available to sustain that infrastructure. We want to make sure there is a balance between the 

projected resources for sustainment and the numbers of facilities 

that the Afghans keep. So those facilities that cannot be sustained 

post-2014 are the ones I talked about that we would reduce back 

to the way we found it. 

45 

Senator BLUNT. Do we go beyond just the military use of those 

facilities to hospital, school, some other use? Do we have a checklist 

like that or not? 

General DUNFORD. We do, Senator. In fact, that is led by the Afghan Government, the Minister of Finance. So if local governments 

want to have infrastructure, they submit a request up to the Minister of Finance. The Afghan Government is responsible for determining the sustainability of that, and then the Minister of Finance 

would come to us with a request for a specific piece of infrastructure to be maintained. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, General. You have had a tough assignment, and it looks like to me it is not going to get a lot easier. 

I wish you well with it, you and those people you work with. Thank 

you for what you do for us. 

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Good morning, General Dunford. Thank you for 

appearing before us today. I want to ask about a couple of items 

starting with budgetary questions, and there have been a number 

already about sequester. I did a tour of Langley Air Force Base in 

Virginia a couple of weeks back, and we talked about this issue of 

the warfighter being protected in sequester. But I was surprised to 

find that many of the military personnel that maintain the F–22s 

are not defined as warfighters. So some of the sequester and budgetary issues are affecting their ability to maintain aircraft, and 

that is one of the factors that then leads to the step down of readiness of some of the F–22 units. 

As you are—with 60,000 folks under your command in Afghanistan, while the warfighters may be protected, how does the sequester and some of the other budgetary challenges impinge upon your 

mission? In particular, I think about things about the retrograding 

of equipment. Is that something that is viewed as a core 

warfighting mission, or is that a part of the mission that is subject 

to some of these budgetary reductions? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, all the functions that we are performing inside of Afghanistan to include retrograde are considered 

warfighting functions. So I have been assured by the Secretary of 

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there 

will not be an adverse impact in those areas. But I think you highlighted a really important point, and that is units that are at home 

station, and I know from my previous assignment as the Assistant 

Commandant of the Marine Corps, it is very difficult to say we will 

properly resource those units that are next to deploy and not support those who are not next to deploy. It is not that clean. 

So as we start to see degradation of readiness at home station, 

there is absolutely no doubt that that degradation of readiness in 

home station will affect both units that are next to deploy as well 

as those not slated currently for deployment. 

Senator KAINE. On the retrograding question, and there may 

have been a question asked about this before I came over from the 

Senate floor. But just talk about the current status of the relationship with Pakistan as it affects retrograding of equipment out of 

Afghanistan. 

46 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we just completed about 2 months of 

proofs of principle to move equipment from Afghanistan into Pakistan and through the Port of Karachi, as well as to move the backlogged equipment that has been there for almost a year from Pakistan into Afghanistan. In fact, we are largely clear of the backlog 

that was in Pakistan, moving it into Afghanistan. 

We also have successfully completed those proofs of principle, 

and so we now will be looking over the next 45 to 60 days to actually maximize the movement across the ground lines of communication into Pakistan. 

So at this point, it is moving in the right direction after a very 

long period of time where those ground lines of communication 

were not available. We are in a good place. 

Senator KAINE. General, you had a good colloquy with Senator 

Lee that I was watching about Pakistan, about the importance of 

the relationship. I think many members of the committee and 

many Senators look at certain actions that the Pakistani Government with a lot of concern, the imprisonment of Dr. Afridi and others. At the same time, we also understand that Pakistan has lost 

as many people in the fight against terrorism, and al Qaeda, and 

the Taliban, and other elements as any of our allies. 

You alluded to, but did not go too deeply into, the question of the 

nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. From a security standpoint, is not one 

of the main issues that the United States needs to worry about is 

an unstable Pakistan that could potentially jeopardize the security 

of the nuclear arsenal there. That is one of the reasons that we 

need to be so diligent in not distancing ourselves from Pakistan, 

but continuing to work to the greatest degree we can as partners 

for the ultimate security of that nuclear arsenal. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I believe we have common cause 

with the Pakistanis in that regard. I think they increasingly recognize the threat of extremism. We certainly have been dealing with 

that for some years. So, to the extent that I think we have at least 

an effective relationship in dealing with that extremist threat over 

the next couple of years, I think Pakistan’s increased appreciation 

of the threat will be helpful in that regard. 

Senator KAINE. General, you talked with Senator Graham a little 

bit about drones and the use of drones, and I would like to expand 

and go deeper into that question. There is a strong military rationale, and we have been able to use drones in a way that have provided us significant advantage in the military mission. Yet we also, 

as a body, as a military, as a Congress, weigh the effect of the 

drone program on the civilian populations in both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

Talk to us a little bit about the current state of affairs in Afghanistan in terms of how our drone program affects the civilian population’s acceptance of our mission and whether it leads to additional violence against our troops. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we employ unmanned vehicles in Afghanistan. We have the same standard for proportionality and discrimination with those as we do with manned vehicles. So mitigation of civilian casualties is no different whether there is a pilot in 

the cockpit or not. 

47 

Before we would employ force in Afghanistan, we ensure that we 

have positive identification of target. We identify individuals with 

hostile intent, and we do a very clear assessment of the collateral 

damage that might be associated with a particular strike. 

I am actually quite proud of our forces over the last 18 months 

in terms of all that we have done to mitigate the risk of civilian 

casualties. But I do not think there is a direct relationship between 

a method, a tool—which is what an unmanned vehicle is—and collateral damage or civilian casualties. I think it is the employment 

of that tool which is most important, and I think we are employing 

those tools in a way that mitigates the risk of civilian casualties. 

Senator KAINE. General, even beyond civilian casualties, because 

I have a high degree of confidence that you are deploying the tool 

in that way to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties. 

How about the civilian perception, the attitudes that the drone program brings about? Even if we are doing it perfectly, if it creates 

a great deal of controversy within the civilian community, that can 

make our challenge more difficult down the road. What is your perception of the Afghan civilian population’s understanding of the 

program as we implement it? 

General DUNFORD. Inside of Afghanistan, Senator, I have not detected any concern by the average civilians over those vehicles. I 

think that is in large part because of the way we employ them. I 

would tell you that the Taliban are very concerned about those vehicles, and they talk about them all the time. 

Senator KAINE. Let me move to another issue about the presidential elections. I think our presence post-2014 is designed to address two conflicting issues: first, that we are not an occupying 

force; but second, we are not going to abandon Afghanistan. Trying 

to meet both of those goals is challenging. 

What do you think our recent announcements and policy in this 

country about post-2014 troop levels, what effect are they likely to 

have on the outcome of the 2014 presidential elections? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, you are exactly right. The message 

of occupier and abandonment, while seemingly inconsistent, exists 

in the same space. I am optimistic that we can address this as we 

set the condition for the elections in 2014 in a couple of ways. One 

is the message of us as an occupier is actually not going to resonate 

as the Afghans assume the lead in 2013. What the Afghan people 

will see on a day-to-day basis is ASF providing security. So the 

message that the Taliban have had of us an occupier, or the Afghans being a tool of occupiers, I do not believe will resonate in 

2013 as the Afghans take the lead. 

With regard to the message of abandonment, the BSA is a commitment post-2014 is a component. But what really is necessary is 

that the United States and the international community convey a 

credible, consistent, and comprehensive message of commitment 

post-2014. Together with that commitment and the Afghans in the 

lead, I think both the message of us an occupier and the message 

of us abandoning the Afghan people gets undermined. 

I think what you are alluding to is really important in that it is 

the information environment that will in large part determine the 

success of the elections in 2014. The messaging that we are talking 

about here is very important. A strong narrative of commitment 

48 

and a strong narrative of Afghans’ credible, to the fore, in the lead 

for providing security, I believe is a critical component to success 

of the elections in 2014. 

Senator KAINE. General Dunford, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, 

thank you very much for your service and for taking on this very 

challenging job at such a critical time. 

I want to go back to further discussion about the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan because I agree with your view of 

it. That is critical. Whatever we can do to help smooth that relationship and really foster it is very important. 

Now, President Karzai has repeatedly accused Islamabad of trying to undermine the peace process between Afghanistan and the 

Taliban. Does Karzai’s accusation have any substance to it? Can 

you update us on whether or not there is actually a reconciliation 

process underway? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I do not know if there is any credibility to President Karzai’s statement about Pakistan undermining 

the peace process with the Taliban. The DOS, of course, is working 

very hard. The President has identified political reconciliation as 

one of his priorities; that is, President Obama. So, I know the DOS 

is working very hard to do that. 

There is an office being opened in Doha. I think we are waiting 

now for the Taliban to meet their end of the bargain in terms of 

moving the process ahead. But that is not a process that I am 

deeply engaged in on a routine basis. From my perspective, my job 

is to set the conditions that would facilitate reconciliation; that is, 

the conditions on the ground. 

But with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan and President 

Karzai’s comments, I think they merely highlight the very deep 

mistrust that currently exists and has historically existed between 

Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think what we have to do is, in our 

efforts to bring, especially in a military-to-military perspective, is 

if we can bring that relationship together in a constructive way and 

establish a foundation of trust, I think just like our Nation when 

we do military-to-military engagements, that can be the foundation 

of something deeper, some strategic partnership that would obviously take years to develop. 

But I believe that that military-to-military bilateral relationship 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be one of our objectives. It is—and I did not mention it earlier; I should have—one of 

the components I believe is critical to winning is affecting a constructive bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan 

so that tactical issues along the border area do not actually have 

an adverse strategic impact. 

Senator SHAHEEN. One of the areas of tension, as you point out, 

has been that border. When I was there in 2011, we saw that very 

directly. One of the things that you talk about in your testimony 

is the effort to improve that cross border coordination with the tripartite border standard operating procedure, I think you called it. 

Can you talk about whether that has actually improved as the 

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49 

2014 when obviously those border issues will continue because 

there is a basic disagreement about where the border—who controls what along the border. 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can. We did sign that agreement 

back in the fall, and as a result now, we have an exchange of information. In the event of cross border firing and so forth, that is very 

helpful. 

I can give you a recent example. About 3 weeks ago, the Pakistanis began to do some construction on a border post that is in the 

border region. So it is disputed as to where exactly that border post 

is, whether it is in Afghan territory or Pakistani territory. 

Initially, the Pakistanis brought forces up to the border point because of tensions. The Afghans indicated that they were not going 

to stand for that border post being approved, and their forces were 

given the authority to use force in the event that was necessary. 

We used the tripartite process called border flags process to bring 

together senior Afghan leadership, senior Pakistan leadership, and 

coalition forces. We did that as recently as yesterday, again with 

the border flags meeting, that attempts to de-escalate the situation. 

In this particular case, the issue is still out there. It is not permanently resolved, but over the last 3 weeks we have been able to 

de-escalate and manage the crisis as a result of this tripartite 

agreement. 

What is most important is that we eventually migrate that to a 

bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I actually think it is not only possible, it is happening right now, and 

I think both the leadership on the Pakistani side as well as the Afghan side recognize that tactical issues must be addressed at a tactical level and not allowed to bleed over into the strategic relationship. Even President Karzai has acknowledged that to me, and he 

is very supportive of a military-to-military relationship in order to 

address these disputes. 

So, Senator, I think that while cautiously optimistic, I am optimistic that we are moving in the right direction. 

Senator SHAHEEN. That is encouraging. You have talked a fair 

amount this morning about what our presence might look like post2014. Can you talk about the commitment of our NATO partners 

after 2014, and how robust that might be, and whether there is 

agreement about what that presence should look like? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I attended the defense ministerial in 

Brussels in February, and at that time, the collective defense ministers agreed that they would contribute between 8,000 to 12,000 

forces for post-2014. They gave that guidance for general planning 

to take place. 

I think it is fair to say that our coalition partners are very much 

looking to see what the U.S. contribution will be post-2014 before 

making a commitment. Also in many cases, our coalition partners 

will need U.S. enabling support before they are able to commit. By 

enabling support, in most cases I mean specifically casualty evacuation, medical evacuation, post-2014, which they cannot provide, 

but would need that to be in place in order for them to be committed post-2014. 

50 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is there anything that we should be doing in 

the lead up to 2014 to provide those assurances to folks so that everybody is in agreement on what happens? 

General DUNFORD. I do, Senator. I know that the President is deliberating now, but as he makes a decision about the basic framework—he already committed to President Karzai as recently as 

January that we would be there in some significant way post-2014. 

But as President Obama makes his specific decision, then I think 

it is going to be incumbent upon all of us at all levels to engage 

our coalition partners to ensure that we build the same effective coalition post-2014 that we have had over the past several years. 

I think it is a huge success story the way we brought NATO together to accomplish the mission inside of Afghanistan. I think it 

is important that we maintain that same level of commitment for 

the alliance post-2014. 

So I think in terms of sequencing, once the President makes his 

decision and certainly discusses that with his counterparts in the 

coalition, I think we will then start to see the coalition partners 

make their own decisions. But their ability to generate the political 

will to contribute post-2014 and do the budgetary planning necessary for post-2014 in large part rests with the U.S. decision and 

what our presence will be post-2014. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. My time is up, but I 

should say, just offer my condolences. As a Boston native, I am 

sure you share the concern that we all felt yesterday looking at 

what happened at the Boston Marathon. So hopefully you did not 

have any family members who were affected. 

General DUNFORD. No. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Hi, General. 

General DUNFORD. Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much for being here today and for 

your service to our country. We appreciate very much your leadership. 

I wanted to ask, first of all, about the transfer of the detainees 

into Afghan control for the Parwan detention facility, and how is 

that going. Can you also tell me if we capture, for example, a target, in particular, a foreign national or a high value target, even 

who is an Afghan, that may have intelligence that is helpful to preventing future attacks. How do you we handle that situation in 

light of the detention transfer? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I can talk to you about the transfer. 

One of the last things I did before I left Afghanistan, and it was 

about 10 days after the transfer, I walked down to Parwan, spent 

about 4 hours on the ground with the leadership down there, and 

walked through each and every function that is being performed inside the facility to ensure that the partnership arrangement that 

we had with the Afghans protected our interests. I am satisfied 

right now that it does in the sense that we still have good control 

over the detainees, we have visibility, and we are in a position to 

ensure that there is humane treatment taking place inside of the 

facility. 

51 

With regard to future targets, a couple of things. One is we have 

a commitment by Afghanistan that they will not only keep in detention the enduring security threats that we have identified in the 

past, but any future enduring security threats would also be detained. 

I would prefer to talk about the intelligence piece in a closed 

forum. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. 

General DUNFORD. But I would tell you in this forum that I am 

satisfied that we will have appropriate access and intelligence 

sharing with the Afghans. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General. I appreciate that, and we 

can follow up in a more appropriate forum on the intelligence gathering. 

You said that the enduring security threats, those that are detainees obviously that would continue to represent a threat, you 

are satisfied that the Afghans will maintain control of those individuals. So I think you and I both would want to avoid a Daqduq 

type situation. So, can you assure us that, how this agreement is 

with the Afghans, and to your satisfaction, that we will not have 

that kind of situation? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have a commitment from President Karzai to President Obama that those individuals will be detained. What I have said to the Chairman and what I have said 

to the chain of command is that were Afghanistan not to meet their 

commitment, we would have real operational and policy issues to 

address at that particular time. I think it would change in some 

way the fundamental nature of our operations, and certainly 

change the nature of support that we might provide to Afghanistan 

in the future. 

So what I am saying now is that we have an agreement with Afghanistan to keep those enduring security threats detained. Were 

they to violate that commitment, I am satisfied that that would be 

a significant change in our relationship, a significant change in the 

nature of operations, and we would have to deal with that at the 

time. 

Senator AYOTTE. Okay. Thank you, General. I wanted to follow 

up on the questions that Senator Blumenthal asked you about, and 

I appreciated your testimony. Senator Brown and I were original 

sponsors of the No Contracting With the Enemy provisions, and 

Senator Blumenthal and I had the opportunity to travel to Afghanistan in January together. As a result of that, we have introduced 

legislation called Never Contracting With the Enemy—to try to fill 

in some of the gaps to improve—we made significant progress with 

the No Contracting With the Enemy, but to fill in some of the gaps, 

including to drop the contract level from $100,000 to $20,000 as 

you had mentioned earlier. 

But it is not just the DOD that is contracting. What other agencies are contracting in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. USAID, Senator. I think that, as you are describing the new legislation, it will be critical that not only DOD 

that has contracts, but the DOS, and, specific, USAID, which has 

a significant role in contracting in Afghanistan. They would have 

52 

the same authorities that we do; that is, do not contract with the 

enemy. 

Senator AYOTTE. From your perspective, have we already been 

able to save taxpayers’ dollars with the No Contracting With the 

Enemy provisions? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, we have been able to save taxpayers’ 

dollars, but, more importantly, we have been able to prevent those 

dollars from being in the hands of the enemy who would do us 

harm. 

Senator AYOTTE. With our legislation that Senator Blumenthal 

raised to you, is this something you would endorse that we hopefully would get passed this year? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I would. I think anything that would 

keep resources out of the hands of the enemy would be a positive 

step. So far the legislation has been very effective both with subcontractors and contractors, and expanding that to include nonDOD organizations makes a lot of sense. 

Senator AYOTTE. Great, thank you. Major General Longo was 

very helpful to us in helping us put together this legislation, so we 

are grateful certainly for his support as well. So thank you for that. 

I wanted to ask you about the follow-on for us in 2014 and beyond. With each area of Afghanistan, thinking about the follow-on 

recommendations that you will make to the President, how important is it that we have a presence in all four regions of Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, I think it is very important that we 

be in all four regions. From my perspective, it starts with, I think, 

the lowest level at which we should advise and assist post-2014 is 

at the Afghanistan corps level. They have six corps level headquarters, and they are in the four corners of the country. 

I also think being in the four corners of the country will help us 

to better support the DOS mission. As I mentioned earlier, I am 

completely integrated with Ambassador Cunningham in terms of 

planning for U.S. presence post-2014. So I believe being in the four 

corners is going to be necessary for us to ensure that the gains that 

we have made with the Afghan forces are sustainable post-2014. 

Senator AYOTTE. When we look at Iran and their role in Afghanistan, thinking particularly post-2014, what area of the country are 

you most worried about with respect to Iran in terms of having a 

presence? 

General DUNFORD. It is in the west, Senator. It is in the Herat 

region, and we certainly see today evidence of malign Iranian influence. We certainly see today great effort made by Iran to control 

what goes on inside of Afghanistan. 

I am happy to report that many of the resources have not fallen 

on fertile ground. They have tried to do things that they have been 

unsuccessful in doing. But they absolutely have great interest and 

influence in the western part of the country. 

Senator AYOTTE. If we were not to have a presence or a sufficient 

presence in the western part of the country looking at our post2014 posture, along with our NATO allies, what type of influence 

do you think Iran would have, and what do you think that they 

would do with that? 

53 

General DUNFORD. I think it is fair to say that they would have 

influence in the western part of the country. I think it is also fair 

to say if past is prologue, that that influence would be malign and 

could be destabilizing for Afghanistan. 

Senator AYOTTE. How is it going in terms of negotiating the 

BSA? 

General DUNFORD. Senator, the next meeting of the BSA is May. 

The last thing I did before I left was I met with Ambassador 

Hakimi, the Afghan Ambassador to the United States. He is the 

primary negotiator for Afghanistan. All I can say is that at least 

on the Afghan side, his sense was that things were moving in the 

right direction. He was positive that we would be able to sign the 

BSA. President Karzai has said the same thing to me. 

There are two or three difficult issues that we are working 

through right now. They are non-negotiable from a U.S. perspective. So I think the team is working very hard to address that right 

now. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, General. I appreciate 

your leadership and all of those that serve underneath you. You do 

an excellent job. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thanks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 

I just have a few additional questions, General. One is the use 

of the term ‘‘safe haven’’ and ‘‘sanctuary.’’ I have always used them 

interchangeably, and obviously you do not. At least I think that became obvious in some of your early conversation this morning. Can 

you explain to us the difference in your vocabulary between the 

two? Who has what where? 

General DUNFORD. I can, Mr. Chairman. We use the term ‘‘safe 

haven’’ in an area from which we cannot get at the enemy or in 

an area within which the enemy has freedom of movement. Inside 

of Afghanistan, we use the term ‘‘safe haven.’’ ‘‘Sanctuary,’’ we use 

that with regard to Pakistan. 

So when we talk about enemy safe havens, just so we are clear, 

inside the force. When we talk about enemy safe havens, we are 

talking about areas that are geographically within Afghanistan, 

and then obviously sanctuaries being those areas outside of Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think there is some confusion about those 

terms. I will just talk about my mind. I will not talk about others, 

but I am confident that colleagues also have used the terms interchangeably, and that that may have led to some of the comments 

this morning. I am guessing on that because you said that—I believe you said that—I thought you were referring to the Taliban 

not having a sanctuary in Pakistan, but I think you would agree 

that the Taliban does have a sanctuary inside Pakistan. The Afghans—excuse me—the Afghan Taliban. Would you agree? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. In the exchange 

earlier, I thought we were talking about al Qaeda. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, and you may have been. I may have 

misheard it, but I think there was some real uncertainty, at least 

my staff also felt—I am not talking about your comments necessarily, but in the exchange, that there was some uncertainty as 

54 

to what was being referred to in Afghanistan because it is clear 

that there is a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban inside of Pakistan. 

Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt. There is 

also the Pakistani Taliban moving, in some cases, freely in the 

eastern part of Afghanistan and back into Pakistan. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think probably in the future, it 

would be wise for you to pin that down when talking to Members 

of Congress because I have heard it repeatedly used interchangeably. Again, I will just point to myself, not to others. I am not saying it is a mistake one way or the other, but it is used interchangeably by many colleagues, I believe, and it surely is myself. So I am 

going to try to be more accurate in the future, particularly when 

I am talking to one of our military leaders. But I think in the common ordinary sense of the word out in the public, that there has 

not been that distinction which has been made, and you should be 

aware of that if I am accurate, okay? 

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Second, I want to ask you about the time 

table for the decision as to the number of troops that would be 

there after 2014. I think that most of us, maybe all of us, agree 

that we need to have a credible commitment, the earlier the better. 

That is important, for the uncertainty that does exist in Afghanistan to be removed both in the eyes of the people, the government, 

that clearly want an ongoing presence that is credible. It is also important for the Taliban to understand there will be an ongoing, 

credible commitment from the United States. 

As to the specific number of that, you have not made a—numerically what that commitment would amount to in terms of troops, 

you have not made your recommendation yet, and you have indicated today that there are a number of factors which can affect 

your judgment as to what that proper number or range would be. 

So far, am I right? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, the one issue, however, that, and 

you have spoken on this and I want to be real clear on, is that in 

your mind in making your recommendation, that it is essential that 

there be a BSA that protects whatever number of troops we have 

that are there, for instance. Another is on the sovereignty issue. 

We are very careful about protecting our troops that are in a foreign country so that they are not, if it is not appropriate, subject 

to the judicial arm of other countries if we do not think that it is 

appropriate for that to be the case, and under what circumstances 

will an American soldier or marine or whatever, be subject to foreign jurisdiction. We are very protective of our troops. Is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. Mr. Chairman, that is absolutely correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is set out in a BSA. It is supposed to be 

set forth, is that right? 

General DUNFORD. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman. In other 

countries, of course, it is the SOFA, and that really is a subset of 

the BSA. 

55 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Whatever commitment that is made, 

in your judgment, should be conditional upon a working out of a 

BSA. Is that fair to say? 

General DUNFORD. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Any authority that 

we have to operate post-2014 would be within the framework of a 

BSA. As the U.N. mandate expires in December 2014, and the military technical agreement expires in 2014, our presence post-2014 

would be based on the BSA that we make with the Afghan Government. 

Chairman LEVIN. Not only would it be dependent on that authority, but my point is that whatever number we have could only be 

committed if we have a BSA. We need a BSA before troops are actually left there after 2014, is that correct? 

General DUNFORD. That is exactly right. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that whatever number, whether it is 8,000, 

10,000, 12,000, 6,000, or 14,000, whatever the number is, is our 

share of the total number of troops there. That would only be accomplished if, in fact, there is a BSA between our two countries. 

General DUNFORD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Again, we all thank you very much for 

your service. You have really done a superb job there following a 

superb number of commanders that have preceded you. You are 

carrying out a very impressive tradition, and we commend you for 

it. We thank you for it and those who work with you. 

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

2013 FIGHTING SEASON

1. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, this fighting season will have the Afghans 

in the lead for security operations with support from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). What are your strategic military objectives for the 2013 fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. This will be the first fighting season with the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) in the lead across Afghanistan. In many parts of Afghanistan, the ANSF have been responsible for their own security for some time. Our objective is simple—we want the ANSF to be successful. We will help the ANSF 

achieve success by being a good supporting partner as they take charge of security 

at the national level. This will improve ANSF confidence in their own ability to 

stand against the insurgency and terrorism. This in turn will improve the confidence of the Afghan people in their government to deliver security across Afghanistan. Improved security delivered by the ANSF will set the conditions for successful 

Afghan presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of presidential power in Afghanistan for the first time in history. This will allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to transition from combat operations to a mission focused on 

train, advise, and assist of the ANSF. 

2. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how does the 2013 fighting season set the 

conditions for success in 2014 and beyond? 

General DUNFORD. By the conclusion of fighting season 2013, the ANSF will have 

had their first full fighting season in the lead for security. The significance of a successful fighting season means a confident ANSF, one in which the people of Afghanistan can be proud. When the ANSF succeed in fighting season 2013, the people, the 

candidates, and most importantly, the political parties will feel secure about the 

elections process for 2014. The 2013 fighting season refines the narrative about the 

Taliban—they are losing and are progressively marginalized in their influence. An 

Afghan process owned by Afghans and delivered by the Taliban has been their strategic focus. Instead, the Afghans will have taken ownership of their own security 

and political process without them (unless they turn to reconciliation). The election, 

56 

the security institutions, and a government acceptable to the Afghan people all help 

set conditions for a sustainable Afghan future: each are related to successes during 

this fighting season. 

3. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in the draw down to 34,000 U.S. forces by 

February 2014, what will be the size of the international forces? 

General DUNFORD. By February 2014, total requirements for ISAF forces will total 

52,000 troops. Of that, 18,000 troop requirements have been identified for sourcing 

by the 49 other troop-contributing nations. Sourcing of these requirements will occur 

in June at the NATO Force Generation Conference and that will determine the final 

number of troops pledged against the campaign. 

4. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, do you sense that our international partners 

are heading for the exits and how do you manage that issue? 

General DUNFORD. I can emphatically state that our international partners are 

not heading for the exits. Much like the United States, they are managing force reductions in accordance with the decreased troop requirements as the ISAF campaign 

progresses and the capabilities of the ANSF increase. I actively engage with our 

international partners in conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 

the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in a synchronized engagement plan to ensure that we send a common message about our current and future requirements 

to heads of state, ambassadors, and senior defense officials from all 50 nations in 

the coalition. The coalition remains solid in their commitment to the obligations of 

this mission. 

2014 FIGHTING SEASON AND ELECTIONS

5. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, two major challenges for 2014 will be supporting the Afghan presidential elections in April 2014 and drawing down to the appropriate force size by the end of 2014. The smooth transition of power is critical 

to the democratic, peaceful, and secure future of Afghanistan. Will 34,000 U.S. 

troops and a commensurate number of allied and partner forces, in support of the 

ANSF, be enough to provide security for the Afghan elections in April 2014? 

General DUNFORD. Based on our current estimates and plans, ISAF will require 

approximately 52,000 troops to support the ANSF in providing security throughout 

Afghanistan for the 2014 national elections. The 34,000 troops that the United 

States has provided and 18,000 troops that we have requested that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe provide from the troop contributing nations is sufficient to complete this mission. 

6. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the critical military tasks after the 

April elections for the remainder of 2014 for your forces? 

General DUNFORD. Assuming that the Afghan presidential elections go as 

planned, in April 2014, and the political transition is successful, then our critical 

tasks will remain supporting and enabling the ANSF to neutralize the threats. Our 

Special Operations Forces will continue to partner with their ANSF counterparts 

and we will continue to advise the security ministries at the corps and brigade levels. The decisive point of our post-election train, advise, and assist mission will remain at the brigade level. Other critical tasks will include a theater reserve and 

quick reaction force for our forces, the civil authorities we enable, and the international community. 

POST-2014

7. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what missions do you believe we should be 

performing in post-2014 Afghanistan to preserve the investment of American lives 

and treasure we have invested over the last decade? 

General DUNFORD. We will conduct three missions in the post-2014 environment: 

train, advise, and assist at the brigade level and above; counterterrorism; and support to civil authority. We will be conducting the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan for a few more years. In extremis support to civil authority will remain 

a part of planning in Afghanistan. 

8. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what is your professional opinion on whether it would be better to train at the brigade or the corps level post-2014? 

General DUNFORD. Optimally, I believe that post-2014 we need to maintain a robust train, advise, and assist presence with all of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

57 

corps and regional police commands. The decisive point for train, advise, and assist 

to the ANSF is at the brigade level. We are exploring options for how best to configure the NATO and U.S. force to best support the ANSF. We fully expect the Afghan security institution leadership (Ministries of Defense and Interior) are contemplating Afghan military command and control constructs and may reorganize based 

on their own lessons learned from the upcoming fighting season. In addition, we will 

require the ability to reach out and conduct regular train, advise, and assist visits 

to the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to monitor the effective 

use of the international donor community’s continued investment in the ANSF. 

9. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, if you had to make a recommendation at 

this point in time, would your recommendation be to train at the brigade or at the 

corps level? 

General DUNFORD. The Afghans are making significant progress as they are 

poised to take the lead for security during this fighting season. The Afghan units 

engaged in the fight today are at varying levels of performance and have tailored 

Security Force Assistance teams from the coalition from the corps down to the tactical level. Some Afghans units are conducting successful un-partnered operations. 

The performance of the Afghans during this fighting season will drive us to refine 

our partnering model for the 2014 elections period and the 2014 fighting season. 

The Afghans are also expected to reorganize their command and control structures 

in both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Those variables will drive how we partner with the Afghans in the post-2014 Resolute Support 

Mission. 

10. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in your testimony, you said that your recommendation of required post-2014 troop levels would depend in a large part on the 

performance of the Afghan forces in the 2014 fighting season. What are the key dimensions of their performance that you will use to determine the appropriate post2014 force size? 

General DUNFORD. At the end of the fighting season in 2013, the most important 

performance measure is the ability of the ANSF to be responsible for their own security at the national level. Specific areas I will look at this year will be proficiency 

of ANSF leadership and unit training. I am also interested in the progress of developing command and control, logistics, and combined arms capabilities. 

11. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, why is it important, from a security and 

military perspective, for the United States to stay engaged post-2014 in all four regions of Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Our efforts post-2014 will be regionally-based and focused on 

the Afghan corps throughout the country. This will maintain the momentum 

achieved by ISAF, align us with the Afghans security and military force lay down, 

and build upon current coalition and coalition/Afghan relationships. The post-2014 

military mission will conduct training, advising, and assisting with a focus at the 

Afghan national and institutional level at the corps level. This will support the development of a sustainable level of skills and capabilities which will enable the 

ANSF at corps level to deal effectively with residual insurgent threats. 

12. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, is it your sense that the Afghan Government would object to 20,000 or more U.S. and international troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2014 for training and assisting and counterterrorism? 

General DUNFORD. No, although, I do believe that 20,000 is the top end of what 

the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) would probably find 

acceptable in Afghanistan. 

13. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the risks if the residual U.S. force 

size in Afghanistan is too low? 

General DUNFORD. The post-2014 mission, under NATO authorities is predicated 

on a role without combat. This portion of the mission is focused on continued train, 

advise, and assist of the fielded Afghan forces and training institutions for both the 

ANA and ANP. Additionally, a portion of the force will also be dedicated to improving capacity in the Afghan security institutions and the civilian oversight of the 

military. These two NATO missions will be balanced by a coalition of the willing, 

under U.S. leadership, focused on counterterrorism against transnational terrorists. 

It is important to note, that a sufficient force must be dedicated against the train, 

advise, and assist mission to ensure the ANSF deliver long-term security to Afghanistan, while the coalition of the willing with our Afghan partners ensure that 

transnational terrorists do not take advantage of the mission shift to try and reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
58 

establish their safe havens in Afghanistan. A too-small force will not allow a balanced effort between these interlinked missions. 

14. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the primary lessons learned from 

the drawdown in Iraq that you are attempting to apply in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. There are a number of lessons learned from Iraq that U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and the International Security Forces Afghanistan 

are applying now and will be over the course of the next 20 months with regards 

to retrograde activities. One of the primary lessons learned that I would like to 

highlight from the drawdown in Iraq is the need for a Single Logistics Command 

and Control (C2) system in theater. This lesson was applied in Afghanistan since 

the spring of last year and has been critical to the Combined Joint Operations Area 

(CJOA) and theater sustainment and retrograde processes. This concept basically 

placed the pre-2012 logistics command structure under the 1st Theater Sustainment 

Command (TSC). 

The TSC has been able to bring strategic partners into the CJOA as a single point 

of contact linking them at the operational level. This did not happen in the Iraq 

drawdown causing inefficiencies. This also enabled U.S. Army Central Command to 

start to execute certain Army Forces tasks such as Class VII equipment management and asset visibility. With the proper enablers, the TSC can smooth out CJOA 

processes. 

Single Logistics C2 must be integrated into corps operations, unlike Iraq, or we 

will lose the opportunity to ‘‘operationalize’’ both sustainment and retrograde. This 

is happening now and represents some improvements from our Iraq experiences. 

The lesson lies in our ability to codify the proper command and support relationship 

in order to ensure sustainment and retrograde are nested with the operational plan/ 

execution. 

DRUG TRAFFICKING

15. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, the United Nations says opium poppy cultivation will increase for a third year in a row and is heading for a record high and 

provides 75 percent of the global crop. What do you think will be the effect of the 

drawdown of both U.S. troops and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) presence in Afghanistan on the drug trade in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. The reduction of U.S. troops and DEA presence in Afghanistan 

will limit the ability to support certain Afghan-led counterdrug operations, especially in remote areas heavily influenced by the Taliban. However, DEA’s enduring 

mentoring and training mission, combined with continued international training, 

advice, and assistance from NATO after the ISAF mission, will ensure Afghan 

counterdrug forces have the ability to continue to operate in many areas of the country. As the recent arrest, conviction, and 20-year jail sentence by Afghan authorities 

of U.S. kingpin Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai demonstrates, Afghan capability to locate and 

arrest dangerous narcotics traffickers has advanced significantly. Sustained 

mentorship and support to Afghanistan law enforcement will be necessary to prevent insurgents and criminal elements from evading law enforcement, threatening 

the population, and potentially allowing sanctuary for transnational terrorist 

groups. 

16. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, will the Taliban receive a boost in funding 

from increased drug trafficking? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. The Taliban profits from all aspects of the narcotics trade, 

but a key source of drug revenue for the insurgency is taxes levied on illegal opium 

poppy cultivation. While there are no official estimates yet for the size of the 2013 

crop, there are indicators that this year’s poppy crop could be among the largest of 

the last decade. A larger opium crop will also generate more revenue for the insurgency from Taliban extortion of drug movement, processing, and trafficking networks. Furthermore, they have become more deeply involved in all aspects of narcotics trafficking and where they own the cycle from processing to export, as the recent kingpin designation of senior Taliban commander Naim Barich demonstrated. 

PAKISTAN

17. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, as you have indicated, the stability of Afghanistan affects the stability of Pakistan and vice versa. What aspects of the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan are the most critical and what are the 

59 

indicators that would tell you the relationship is heading in the right direction 

versus wrong direction? 

General DUNFORD. Pakistan and Afghanistan’s ability to engage consistently and 

constructively—both diplomatically and militarily—is critical to overcoming their 

mutual deep-seated mistrust and improving their relationship. An irritant in this 

relationship is the countries’ shared porous border and hostilities that arise when 

each nation attempts to protect sovereign territory—which is not clearly defined. 

ISAF has been working to mitigate this irritant in the relationship by facilitating 

engagement between the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s militaries, institutionalizing 

communications processes, and brokering a framework to manage military border 

incidents. Improvements in these areas would indicate the relationship is maturing; 

however, the countries are not yet independently able to manage cross-border disputes. Although progress is slow and fragile, Pakistan and Afghanistan have also 

held a number of bilateral and multilateral engagements which indicate the relationship is heading in the right direction, but there is more work to do. Of note is 

Afghan Minister of Defense Mohammadi’s February visit to Pakistan and a series 

of trilateral sessions hosted by United Kingdom Prime Minister Cameron which included President Karzai, Prime Minister Ashraf, and representatives from both Afghan and Pakistani political and security establishments. 

18. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the best roles or tasks for the 

United States to assist in the improvement of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship? 

General DUNFORD. I do not assess there will be a deep, strategic partnership between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but I am encouraged by the degree of coordination 

and cooperation that’s taken place at the military-to-military level, that improves 

in fits and starts. We would like to take the fundamental relationship we’re building 

in a trilateral fashion between the militaries, and use it as the underpinnings for 

a solid bilateral relationship between the Afghans and the Pakistanis by the end 

of 2014. We’ll continue to mature this effort over the next 20 months, with the understanding that there is distrust over such things as the border, but significant 

areas of potential agreement in other parts of their relationship such as training. 

The United States has significant influence with both nations and can continue to 

provide positive opportunities for each nation to deepen its trust of the other. 

19. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, if Afghanistan is stable and security steadily improves, will that send more or less extremist/terrorist elements into Pakistan? 

General DUNFORD. Even a stable and secure Afghanistan will have difficulty preventing terrorist and extremist elements from operating in some rural, rugged areas 

near the Pakistan border without continued counterterrorism pressure. Improvements in stability and security in Afghanistan would make it more difficult for these 

groups to operate and could force some extremists and terrorists to move to Pakistan. 

20. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, in your professional military opinion, has 

our security assistance to Pakistan been effective at helping Pakistan and in reducing the flow of extremists and instability from Pakistan to Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. U.S. security assistance programs are an important tool in 

building strong partnerships and equipping states with military capabilities to address their security requirements. Internal threats from extremism, coupled with a 

nuclear arsenal, make Pakistan a state wherein we have vital national interest. 

In my opinion, our security assistance programs help us build a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. U.S. security assistance programs assist the Government of Pakistan in coping with extremism within their own borders and enhance security and stability. However, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for executing security assistance programs in Pakistan and can best assess 

the effectiveness of these programs. 

21. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what changes to our security assistance to 

Pakistan would improve regional stability? 

General DUNFORD. Security assistance programs are critical in helping us build 

a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan and providing capabilities to enhance security and stability. CENTCOM is responsible for executing security assistance programs in Pakistan and can best assess what specific capabilities might improve regional stability. 

60 

POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

22. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, you have indicated that many Afghans fear 

uncertainty about the future support of the United States and the international 

community more than they fear the Taliban. What specific U.S. actions or elements 

of U.S. policy do you consider most important to reducing the uncertainty which 

contributes to potential instability and the hedging of actors both within Afghanistan and in the region? 

General DUNFORD. A clear and unambiguous commitment of U.S. and international support beyond 2014, such as a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) or a 

NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), would help reduce uncertainty and 

hedging by actors within Afghanistan and the region. There is anecdotal information now that Afghans, certainly the Afghan elite, are preparing for an uncertain 

future making plans to depart Afghanistan prior to the end of 2014. Afghanistan 

has a societal memory of the post-Soviet war period, when the international community turned their attention away from the country, and they fear a relapse to the 

fighting that defined that period. 

We do not believe we can fully mitigate Afghan and regional hedging behavior, 

as it is rooted into the culture of a society that has seen over 35 years of warfare. 

However, international assurances—especially binding pledges or transparent announcements of post-2014 intentions—should help to mitigate hedging behavior. 

23. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, sustainment of infrastructure programs 

and projects in Afghanistan is one of the key variables Congress will need to decide 

upon going forward. Which of the infrastructure programs and projects do you consider most important to sustain, and why? 

General DUNFORD. The Department of Defense (DOD) through the use of Afghani- stan Infrastructure Program (AIP) fund has been able to secure $400 million for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012, and $325 million in fiscal year 2013, 2-year 

funds, by demonstrating the link between Department of State (DOS) investments 

with that of the GIRoA’s priorities. Those national priorities include infrastructure 

needs such as power, water, and transportation. USFOR–A and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development engage with the GIRoA at the local, provincial, and ministerial levels to synchronize project planning and execution with GIRoA priorities 

and assessment for sustainment as the leading indicators. The funding allocated by 

Congress promotes economic growth and agricultural yields, while connecting Afghans to services, civil society, and improved governance at all levels. 

24. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, based on your interaction with the Afghanistan Government and conditions on the ground, which of the most important Afghan 

ministries are most capable and which require the most improvement to secure the 

peaceful future of Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. The peaceful future of Afghanistan will rely on what the Afghan people want. The security conditions achieved in 2013 and an effective political 

transition in 2014 will allow Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity. The focus 

of the post-2014 mission is all about growing capabilities and capacities of the Afghans. As I have said before, some of the remaining challenges we will have to deal 

with start at the ministerial level. There is no metric to determine ‘‘the most important’’ Afghan ministries. All 17 ministries of the Afghan Government are important 

for the Afghan people, whether it is the MOD, the MOI, the Ministry of Commerce 

and Industry, or the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, to name a few—they are all important to their nation’s success. It is my view today that there are various levels 

of improvements needed across the board to secure the peaceful future of Afghanistan. We have the metrics in place that both address where we have to be for proficiency at the ministerial level, as well as 14 functional areas that we evaluate in 

our tactical units that allow us to determine where they are and what support they 

may need to improve to take it to the next level. 

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) employs the same capability milestone ratings to assess ministerial development. Additionally, NTM–A assesses 

ANSF institutional progress towards autonomous operations for ANSF training institutions, regional military hospitals, and logistics nodes. Both ministerial and institutional development is rated against the following capability milestones: 

• 1A: Autonomous Operations 

• 1B: Coalition Oversight 

• 2A: Reduced Coalition Advising 

• 2B: Regular Coalition Advising 

• 3: Coalition Partnering 

• 4: Initial Capability 

61 

25. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what are the key elements you recommend 

should be a part of U.S. policy and policy implementation to fight the problem of 

corruption within the Afghan Government? 

General DUNFORD. Holding the GIRoA to the terms of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework is the key to ensuring the political will to fight corruption in Afghanistan. If you ask most people who are tracking the issue in Afghanistan how 

to curb high-level corruption, they will tell you: ‘‘by the International Community 

better controlling its own purse strings.’’ Donor countries must withhold funding to 

institutions and ministries that make little or no progress in fighting corruption. 

The Afghan system of having to pay for official positions seems to be a driving factor 

fueling corruption in the security forces. We recommend a systematic approach by 

donor nations to address the system of impunity and interference with the judicial 

system within GIRoA. 

26. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, what should the U.S. role be in the Afghan 

reconciliation process? 

General DUNFORD. The DOS has lead for reconciliation policies. From my perspective, the United States, through ISAF, needs to set the conditions on the ground 

that would facilitate the dialogue between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. 

27. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how has Congress been the most helpful 

to your efforts as a military commander in Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Congress has been extremely helpful in a number of ways. 

First, thanks to Congress’ leadership and support, the men and women of U.S. 

forces serving in Afghanistan today are well-trained and well-equipped. It is important that the fiscal commitments that permit such a premier fighting force are sustained in the future. 

Second, Congress’ funding of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) has been 

instrumental in building and equipping the ANSF. As a result of your support, the 

ANSF will shortly assume responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan. ASFF 

will continue to be vitally important to the ANSF in sustaining the very force we 

just helped build and to secure those gains for which we have paid so dearly. 

Third, Congress’ passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 was effective in halting contracts to entities and individuals supporting 

an insurgency or opposing coalition forces. 

TRANSPORT MISCALCULATIONS

28. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news briefing on the 

defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in answer to a question that 

costs in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion higher this year than what we anticipated. This is very troubling in any environment, but especially under the constraints that DOD is currently under. Can you verify if this is correct, and can you 

give a detailed account for such a massive underestimation? 

General DUNFORD. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets are put together 1 to 2 years before execution; 

a difficult task given the uncertainties that exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013 

OCO budget request, DOD estimated that many of the operating costs would decline 

proportionately with the reduction of troops. What we are seeing in actual execution 

is that many of these costs will not decline until bases are closed. In addition, DOD 

did not forecast the closure of the Pakistan ground lines of communication for such 

an extended period of time, so higher transportation costs arose from using more 

expensive means and routes. DOD also did not have a good estimate of the total 

equipment retrograde requirement. In late fiscal year 2012, CENTCOM stood up a 

Material Retrograde Element to manage the retrograde efforts and can now provide 

a better estimate of the retrograde requirement. 

ARTICLE 60 MODIFICATIONS

29. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, we trust you to make decisions that may 

result in the loss of life in order to protect the Nation and accomplish the mission. 

Every day, commanders must make decisions to correct underperformers with training or education, and, when necessary, to discipline troops or possibly relieve commanders. Ultimately, our Nation charges them, and you, with the responsibility to 

establish cohesive, mission-ready combat units. While we trust you with our sons’ 

and daughters’ lives, the proposed modifications to Article 60 of the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice (UCMJ) seem to suggest that we do not trust your discretion 

62 

when it comes to the UCMJ offenses. Do you, as a commander, consider the UCMJ 

as it is currently structured, to be a viable tool to help you maintain and enhance 

the cohesiveness and fighting capabilities of your combat units? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. I believe the UCMJ, as currently structured, is important 

for commanders to maintain and enhance cohesiveness and fighting capabilities, 

and to maintain good order and discipline. 

30. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, have you seen any evidence that commanders are abusing their discretion as the convening authority to adjust sentencing? 

General DUNFORD. No. In my experience, commanders exercise their judicial responsibilities under the UCMJ very carefully and with deliberation for the interests 

of all personnel involved, including victims of offenses. 

31. Senator INHOFE. General Dunford, how would the proposed changes to the 

UCMJ impact your effectiveness as a commander? 

General DUNFORD. I will continue to exercise my responsibilities as a Convening 

Authority as authorized under the UCMJ, with due consideration for all personnel 

involved. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

GREEN ON BLUE ATTACKS

32. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, over the span of the Afghan conflict there 

have been many instances of attacks by Afghan forces on U.S. and coalition personnel. A January 2013 Foreign Policy article noted that 52 coalition soldiers died 

as a result of 37 green on blue attacks in 2012. Despite improvements in the overall 

quality and capabilities of the ANA’s personnel that you noted in your testimony, 

the data indicates that green on blue attacks escalated last year. As we continue 

to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan Government, I am concerned 

that we may not fully understand the motivations and allegiances of our ANA counterparts. Are you seeing a similar trend developing this year with regard to green 

on blue attacks? 

General DUNFORD. Because no single definitive countermeasure can prevent insider attacks, ISAF and the ANSF introduced a program of countermeasures, which 

applied collectively, are reducing the threat posed by insider attacks. These measures include strengthening the vetting processes for new recruits and those returning from extended leave; increasing the number and training for counterintelligence 

agents; and enhancing force protection for ISAF troops operating in small units or 

in remote areas. 

Additionally, I am encouraged by the joint, integrated ISAF–ANSF approach and 

level of the Afghan Government’s commitment to reducing this mutual threat. For 

example, ISAF and ANSF established the three-star-led Insider Threat Action 

Group, which they co-chair, as well as the Joint Casualty Assessment Team, that 

investigates every incident in order to identify lessons and required actions for the 

future. 

33. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, how many such attacks have occurred thus 

far in 2013? 

General DUNFORD. From January 1 to April 16, 2013, there have been four green 

on blue attacks. 

34. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, do you believe that the screening program 

for prospective Afghan military and police forces is sufficient? 

General DUNFORD. The Afghans have established sound procedures for vetting 

ANSF personnel. The challenge is the quality of compliance with those standards 

and working through the high volume of personnel. The Afghan Government has 

significantly increased the number of counterintelligence personnel in the ANSF, in 

order to ensure that they have sufficient personnel with the appropriate training to 

ensure compliance with those standards. The Afghans understand that this is a 

threat both to us and to our relationship with them. This also affects the will of 

the coalition at the strategic level and erodes the trust between our forces. The coalition has also significantly increased the number of counterintelligence resources 

being provided in Afghanistan and developed additional measures to mitigate 

threats against our personnel. 

63 

35. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, are there additional capabilities that need 

to be made available to change the trend? 

General DUNFORD. First and foremost, the insider threat is a force protection 

issue. ISAF has taken a comprehensive approach to the insider threat, both at home 

station in terms of enhanced training and additional measures that take place once 

forces are deployed to Afghanistan. There has also been a significant increase in the 

number of counterintelligence resources provided in Afghanistan, both on the part 

of the coalition as well as within the ANSF. This is starting to bear fruit as over 

400 ANSF members have been arrested as a result of this increased scrutiny, and 

additional investigations continue. This critical issue is far from being solved, but 

progress is being made. 

AFGHAN ARMORED VEHICLES

36. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, the Army intends to sign a sole source contract for 135 additional Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) for Afghan Security 

Forces. The cost under this contract is estimated at $1.0 to $1.5 million per vehicle. 

With respect to our current fiscal challenges, the sole-source procurement of new vehicles appears less cost-effective than the upgrade and transfer of hundreds of existing Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that are already in Afghanistan. Have you considered the upgrade and transfer of the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans? 

General DUNFORD. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was made in fiscal 

year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP variants did not meet 

the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) operational requirements relating to an enclosed turret with day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional requirement of 135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and implemented. The justification to sole-source the additional 135 MSFVs was based on 

the following factors: 

- Maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training burdens. 

- Preventing an unacceptable program delay which would severely and 

negatively impact the ANSF’s ability to maintain security and achieve dominant combat capability prior to the transition on December 31, 2014. 

- Reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a competitive 

solicitation. The estimated costs associated with competitive procurement 

would have exceeded $125 million and would not have been recovered 

through competition. 

37. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, will you provide written justification for 

the sole-source contract for the MFSVs? 

General DUNFORD. See attached Justification and Approval (J&A). 

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SAAL-PS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFice OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

103 ARMY PENTAGON 

WASHINGTON DC 20110-0103 

FEB 1 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR HEAD OF CONTRACTING ACTIVITY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

TACOM LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND (AMSTA-CG), 6501 EAST 11 MILE 

ROAD, WARREN, MI 48397 

SUBJECT: Justification and Approval (J&A) for Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (Control 

Number: 2013-018) 

1. I have approved the enclosed J&A and I am returning it for your implementation . 

. 2. Relain the original copy of this memorandum in the contract file. 

Enel 

CF: 

SAAL-ZP (w/encl) 

CCTA (w/encl) 

CCTA-HTA-C (w/encl) 

~v. Heidi Sh~ (fSenior Procurement Executive 
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416ful2.eps

CMO control No; 20.1aJ01"S 

Mobile Strike Fo~~ 

Justification Review Documentfor ot~erthan Full & Open COmpetition 

Program/Equipment Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) for-the Afgh8i'i1.$tari 

Nationa! Security Forces (ANSF) 

Authorit)': 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1) as implemented by FAR 6.3D2-1(al~)(i~~& 

'Only One Responsible Source and No other Supplies orSeO(ices Will S •. 

Agency Requirements" • 

Amount: '$114 Million 

Prepared by: 

Typed Name: John Karczewski DSN: 786-545.1 

Title: Procurement Analyst Date: 20 December 2012 

E-mail: john.p.karczewski.civ@mail.mil 

Contracting Officer: 

Typed Name: Craig A. Goepper DSN: 766-3898 

Date Reviewed: 

E-Mail: craig.a.goepper.ciy@mall.mil~ r:;..£J I:? 

Technical Repr.esenlative: 

Typed Name: William M. Boruff 

Colonel, US Army 

Trtle: Project Manager . 

Transportation Systems (P) 

Requirements Representative: 

DSN: 786-4319 

Date Reviewed: /- J~ 201'} 

Typed Name: Richard W. Dennis DSN: 318-237-92~ . 

Brigadier General, UK Army. th:tLW ~ 

Trtle: DeOM-Anny' Date Reviewed: . --V'~II'V~ 
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CMO ContmI No: 2013-018 

Mobile Strike Force \Ietdd8s 

Justification Review Document for Other than Fun & Open CompeIIIian 

ReViews: I have R:tviewed this justification and find it adequate to auppottmber 

than full and open competition. 

Product Director, Non-Standard Vehicles 

Typed Name: TRACY MITCHELL SN: 786-8884 

Acting) 

va Officer, Combat Support & Combat Se.w. Support 

Typed Name: KEVIN M. FAHEY DSN: 786-5106 

Signature;)~ 4 ~~/I:fi1;Jlj 

, Legal Counsel 

Typed Name: AMANDA VOGLER DSN: 786-5792 

Signature: liS&-co l.b. I~ 

DSN: 786-0006 

Signature: DaIe:&f'3. 

PrlncJpal AssIstant R ponsible for Contracting (PARe) 

Typed Nam~ ~~K I DSN: 786-7025 

Signature.~~ Date: \'~~\~ 

Alternate Competition Advocate 

S DSN: 786-0582 

\c:==~ 

DateF\ ~ 't:. 

Head of the Contracting Activity (HeA) 

Typed Name: MICHAEL J. TERRY DSN: 786-5131 

Major General, US Anny 

CommandJng 

Sjgnalure:~.........L.-/ ~ate: 114. .. ,201! 

2 
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CMO Control No: 2013-018 

Mobile Strike- Fotl::e Vehicles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FUll AND OPEN COMPETITION 

1. ContraCting Agency: Army Contracting Command - Warren (ACC-WRN) is-the 

contracting activity for this action. 

2. Description of Action: Approval is being requested to award a new,. Firm FGced 

Price (FFP) standalone contract for the procurement of 135 Mobile Strike Farce 

Vehicles (MSFVs) to support the Afghanistan National Security Forces (AN$F). The 

proposed contract will be awarded on a sole source basis to Textron Marine & L.antl 

Systems (TMLS), New Orleans, Louisiana, and will be funded with FY12 ~RisfaFl 

Security Forces Funds (ASFF). The estimated dollar value of this action is $114M. 

3. DescrlpUon of Supplies: This requirement is for 135 MSFVs. The MSfV is a 41€4 

annored tactical vehicle which provides Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MMP). 

level 1.0 protection to the crew compartment, a weapons statian, and an ammunition 

storage area. The primary mission of the MSFV is to support planned. operations, such 

as area and convoy security, assaults resulting from actionable intelligence, route 

recon, and Special Forces missions. The MSFV also provides the ANSF vlrth a deterrence force and quick reaction capability to defend against sudden enemy attacks. 

The MSFV fleet is composed of three armored vehicle variants on a Ci:Jr'hnion platfdrrn. 

They include: 

• MSFV with 40/50 Enclosed Turret (Model Number 156001) 

• MSFVwith Objective Gunner Protection Kit (OGPK) (Model Number 155001) 

• MSFV Ambulance (Model Number 159001) 

The ANSF requires 135 vehicles consisting of 60 MSFVs with Enclosed Turret, 68 

MSFVs with OGPK, and 7 MSFV Ambulances. The ANSF requires vehiclee'ihat: 

1. have enhanced sUNivability capabilities 

2. are easy to operate and maintain 

3. provide for target acquisition while driving 

4. have standardization among variants which aHows for low su$tainment cos.ts 

5. have capabilities required in the vehicle platform for cross-a:iuntry mobility on the 

rugged and mountainous terrain of Afghanistan . 

6. move rapidly for increased operaUonal mobility 

AddItionally, the ANSF requires the OGPK and the 40/50 Enclosed Turreted vafjant 

have ten-passenger occupancy and the 40/50 Enclosed Turret have day/night sight 

capability. 

The MSFV is capable of maneuvering through rugged and mountaifl<lus terrain and 

through the narrow roads and pathways of Afghan_n. The MSFVs ate capable of 

surviving traffic aCCidents, improvised explosive device detonations. direct fire and 

3 
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CMO Control No: 2013-018 

Mobile Strike Force Vehicles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 

rock~t propene~ grenade attacks. It provides the ANSf with rapid mcbilHy, quick 

reactIOn capability, and increased combat power to fight against the Ta~ throughout 

the Area of Responsibility. 

The MSFV variants required by the ANSF are not included in US Army inventory. The 

US Army procures the M 1117 and M1200 Armored Security Vehicle. (A$J} variantsfrom TMLS. Compared to US Army ASV variants, the MSFV wria.nIB an! ~ 24 

inches in length and approximately eight inches in inside height and have beet! te&t$d to 

MRAP level 1.0 protection. The US Army does not procure an ambulam;e variarit from 

TMLS. 

4. Authority Cited: The statutory authority permitting other than full and open 

~ompetition for this effort is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c}(1), pursuant to FAR 6.302~1(~)(2)(i~(B), 

Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Service!> WilI.Satisfy AQenc:y 

Requirements: 

5. Reasons for Authority Cited! 

Memorandum of Request (MOR) 12-E1A-207 was received from 1he Combined S~rity 

Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) on 25 June 2012 for this requirement. 

The MOR requests, by manufacturer part number, 135 additional MSFVs be,pl'QCIJn!dlo 

support the ANSF. The requirement is for the same vehicles previouslY SUpPlied '8I'Id 

cites commonality, familiarity, and an existing MSFV logistics support netwol'kasreasons for requesting these specific vehicles. 

a. Fleet Commonality: Fleet commonality Increases operational fIexibllityand rad..u~ 

the procurement, logistical, and training burdens. Introducing a new sy9tem. woulQ 

require the ANSF to logistically support another whicie platform which would be V$Y 

burdensome on the fragile ANSF logistical infrastructure. Further, intel'CperatfilitY . 

between TMLS vehicles and Ihose of another manufacturer would beexbemelY difflE:Ult 

and costly to attain. Fielding different vehicle configurations would reql,lirethe ANSF to 

maintain additional training packages, spare part inventories, and special tolm;. The 

ANSF has been trained to operate and repair multiple vehicles in a shQrt 1iineftame 

based on the universal platform and common characteristics of 1I1e MS.FV variants and 

their components. Using a new manufacturer's vehicle would require. the ANSF to 90 

through additional training for a new system and retain multiple training ~ and 

vehicle system manuals, which could result in confusion amongst the opelldoll5 'Gi'Id 

procedural and operational mistakes In the field. Thus, not only is tl'\erathe P-Ole.rrtr.llfor 

damage to the vehicle, there is a likelihood of danger to the ANSF soIdieis.Jf1hey.ate 

not completely familiar with operation and maintenance of the vehicles. IUhe ANSF 

cannot maintain and sustain Its fleet of MSFVs, Coar~ion forces Will nQt ml*!ttbe 2014 

drawdown deadline. Therefore, commonality, standardization, and nOltt1a1ization of the 

4 
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CMO Control No: 2013·018 

Mobile Strike Force Venicles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 

MSFV 

requirements·. 

variants provide for an economical and safe solution for ANSF ~ 

b. Current Conditions; The drawdown and eventual withdrawal of Coalition fOrces from 

Afghanistan is predicated on the ANSF having the capability to provide f« its· own . 

Internal security and protect itself as a sovereian nation. Until the ANSF can 

demonstrate it possesses dominant combat capability over Talibarrforces, the coalition 

cannot place the responsibility of national securtty In the hands Of the Afahan Army. 

Coantion forces Intend to begin gradually withdrawing prior to D.Bce:mbei 2014,. With the 

final turnover of security operations by the end of December 2014. Currently. coalition 

forces provide the overwhelming majority of security to the ANSF through fQrce, 

projection and through the conduct of offensive operational missions. If the ANSF II.. not 

prepared to undertake security missions as the number of Coalition troops gradually 

dea-eases, a heavy burden will be placed on the remaining troops. Thlf E!dd"TIiornlI 

operational burden coupled with the unavailabnity of combat power (manpOWer and 

eqUipment) once provided by the withdrawing forces may lead to addltiO~ aoarrtion 

casualties (over 1,200 US seNice members have died in Afghariistel'lslnce2010). A 

reduced troop and equipment presence also equates to a decreased I'l'8pabUity for 

Coalition troops to provide internal security as they spread thin to eov'EIt aU misSians. 

This means Coarrtion troops will be more susceptible to "green OtT blue"· attatks Which 

have become increasingly frequent (up from two in 2007 to 37 In 2012). 

c. Unacceptable Delay: H the MSFV requirement is competed, thtn would be 

unacceptable program delays, which would severely negatively impact the ANSf's 

ablllty to maintain national security in Afghanistan and achieve dominant CCimbat 

capability over Tallban forces by 31 December 2014. In addltlori, this would Oltiirlately 

set back the timenna for the strategiC withdrawal of CoafJtion forces fmi1:l Afgh$nistatL 

. A competitive Technical Data Package (TOP) is not available forfhis·procurernent 

because TMLS owns the TOP for the vehicle configurations and has i'efused ·to sell this 

to the U.S. Government on multiple occasions. Therefore, in order·la.awald tcany 

manufacturer other than TMLS, the Government would have to de~lop·a QOinpe!iUve 

performance specification. Based on historical data captured undarPl8)liol./s complex 

vehicle system procurements such as the Stryker and M1117 A.BV. the,iSovemment 

estimates developing a competitive specification for each of the thtee vatiant& woutrJ 

take approximately six months (two months per variant). Once the requirement W8$ 

ready for competition, the Govemment estimates developing a competitjVe filcq\.l~lon 

plan and making a competitive best value award would take apprOXimately eiQlit 

months. to Include soliciting the requirement, evaluating offers, and seleClinl'fthe 

successful company. Once award is made. the new contractor would be l"eq\;Iired to 

manufacture the three variants and undergo performance, reliabiOty •. and live f1retestlhg, 

which would lake an additional six months. Once the vehicle variants ha,~ ~IIY 

passed testing, the new contractor would be required to provide ~ining to ANSF 

operators and maintainers, whiCh would take an additional 1 B months. Therefore, 

5 
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CMO Control No: 201~18 

Mobile strike Forte vehiCles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 

competing this requirement would take at least three years from start tc finish. ThuG. even if the competitive process commenced Immediately, vehicles couki not be fielded 

and effectively utDized until 2016, well beyond the Coalition's 2014 draWdovm deadliJle'. 

d. Duplication of Cost Issuing a competitive soHcitation would result in a sub$tantial 

duplication of cost which is not expected 10. be recovered through compB.tltkXl. Prior 10 

awarding Contract W56HZV-11-C-0114 on 21 January 2011 for the irlilial quantity of 

MSFVs and associated support, the Government determined, based on previous 

procurements of similar complexity, the cosls associated with a oompati!ive 

procurement would exceed $125M and would not be recovered through com~on. 

Any potential nEIW contractor w.ould be required to design, manufal:turi:l. produl$e, test. 

and train the ANSF on the vehicles before a single vehicle ceufd be fielded I!lntl utilized. 

e. TMLS is the only known source with the knowledge and expei1ise tp fulliD this 

requirement without adl(ersely impacting cost, schedule. and continuity of1tte:exisling 

ANSF fleet. TMLS is the MSFV Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) as wetl as the 

configuration manager of the variants required by the ANSF ahd hassupplied these 

vehicles and the associated support for prior ANSF requirements. Further, iMLS has 

already undergone and passed all requisite testing, including pe~C!iI, reliabilitY.. 

and live fire testing and is in current production of the MSFVs to support the·ANSF so 

there is no start up lime required to begin producing this requirement M()f'EIOIISr. TMLS 

has already developed and implemented operator and rnaintaineftrllining programs. 

Therefore, not only is the ANSF familiar with the operation and maintenance of tile 

TMLS MSFV based on this training. but no additional time would be requirec!. 10 develop 

(lr implement new (lperator and maintainer training procedures. Award to TMLS 

provides the unique advantage of commonality of parts among the variants and allOWS 

for uniform training and economies of scale received through a oommon parts Supply. 

Finally. TMLS has experienced and knowledgeable personnel immediately on hand tp 

continue to successfully produce these vehicles In a timely and cost effed!ve· inanrfer as 

well as effectively and efficiently provide training to the ANSF. 

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition: No known contractors are attempting to become 

viable sources for this requirement at this time. While other manufaCtUAml proauee 

simBar vehicle systems. oone meet all the ANSF requirem8l11s. Market i'8se$"ch 

{detailed in Section 8 below} supports TMLS is the only prectical SQurce With 'the 

requisite system knowledge, experience, and proprietary design to meet"1beANSF 

requirements. In addition, TMLS is the only source which has proven capabUities of 

meeling the needs of the AN SF, has the required logistical s~pport .in ATgttan~n,and 

can meet the required delivery schedule. At the subcontracting level, TMLS Will ~ 

required to competitively place purchase orders and contracts to meJdmlzecompetitio.n 

of components and parts. FAR 52.244-5 entitled "Competition In 5ubccintraCling" wIH be 

incorporated into the resulting contract to maximize competilion in suboontf8cting 

efforts. The contract will also include FAR Clause 52.219-9 entitled, ·Small Bu$ines$ 

6 
71 


416ful8.eps

CMO Control No: 2018-018 

Mobile Strike Fotce Vehicles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITfON 

Subcontracting Plan,' for promotion and utilization of small business conoems in 

subcontracting opportunities. During negotiations, positive subconinn:ting goals. llliill.be 

sought for aU socio-economiclsmall business categories. No actions, ofher lhan those 

outlined above, have been taken to obtain competition for this requirement. 

7. Actions to Increase Competition: The TOP has not and cannot be·purt:ha~ bV 

the Government. The latest request to purchase the mp from TMLS was. made via 

email on 13 August 2012. TMLS responded to this request in an email dated 14August 

2012 stating it would not sell the TOP to the Govemment. To protE!!;! the il1f\ei1!&l.¢1he 

Government and to promote competition at the subcontract level, appl~bre TechniOlll 

Oata clauses, as required by DFARS 227.71, wiD be incorporated illtotheoontract. 

There are no plans for future procurement of this system. 

8, Market Research: Mer receiving correspondence from CSTG-A in Maroh 201 Z 

outlining this as a p.otential requirement, Product Director Allied Tac.tical VehiCleit-(PdD 

A TV) conducted market research for this requirement during the period of Mamh 

through June 2012, when the MOR was received. This assessment included internet 

searches, review of teChnical publications/catalogs, and review of atbef inUustry 

literature available online. The research Indicated the limiting factors for pbta;illng 

competition for this procurement were the enclosed turret with day/nifjht slOht. 10 

passenger occupancy and enhi,mced survivability protection requirerneT$,.aS wEIll as 

the commonality among the required variants. Market research revelliliid nl) Qther 

source capable of meeting aU of these requirements. Ultimately, results from tfIe PdQ 

ATV market assessment concluded the MSFV produced by TMLS Is the only vehicle 

system capable of meeting all of the requirements of the ANSF. 

9. Interested Sources: To date, one other source has written to express il'ltere&t in the 

MSFV reqUirements. In a letter dated 11 May 2011, Oshkosh Defenu.:proposee the 

MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) platform as an alternate to the MSFV ~ by 

TMLS. The proposed vehicle was subsequently evaluated by the ProduQt "Manager 

Armored Security Vehicle (PM ASV) engineering team. This evaluatiOn detenirined the 

M-ATV does not meet the enclosed turret (MSFV Model 156001) or 10 passenger 

occupancy (MSFV Model 155001) requirements, which are critical perfomiance 

requirements. Although Oshkosh indicated the M-A TV piatformcoukl be rmX(i'tied to 

possibly meet the ANSF requirements, it had not yet designed, manufactured or tested 

this hypothetical vehicle. Therefore, PM ASV determined additional tiIt1EI ari~ c;:osts 

required to modify and test an M-ATV variant which does not yet exist would cause the 

program to incur duplicative costs and unacceptable delays, resulting in c;>ur falUra' to. 

meet the ANSF fielding schedule and ultimately delay the Coalitil:ln withdrawal eIfQrt. 

This requirement wlll be synopsized and posted on Fed BizOpps we"bs1fe In~cOO$OO! 

with FAR 5.201. Should additional sources respond to the synopsis, their prepasals 

and/or capabDity statements will be evaluated by the requiring ~-

7 
72 


416ful9.eps

CMO COnlrOl No: 2013-018 

Mobile strike 'Force Vehicles 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPEnnoN 

10. Other Factors: 

a. Procurement History: Contract W56HZV-11-C-0114 was awarded to TMLS'as an 

Undefinitized Contractual Action (UCA) on 21 January 2011 and deffnitked on a JURe 

2012, in the total amount of $79.7M, to procure 18 test vehicles, associated ~ 

support, and test support packages. This award also included refurilisifrrrentof s&Ven 

test vehicles, 41 production vehicles, field and sustainment tools, and ~PO. A 

J&A citing FAR 6.302-2, "Unusual and Compelling Urgency· was appwveQ for this 

action by the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARe) on 15 December 

2010. 

On 26 May 2011, the contract was moarfied (POOO04) to include a UCA for 240 

production vehicles and options for 200 additional vehicles, training, Fi~ S$lVice 

Representative (FSR) support, field and sustainment tools, training akls, translation of 

manuals, and spare parts. All vehicle options have been exeroiqd,under't/1isl!ction. A 

J&A citing FAR 6,302-1, ·Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or 

Services WiD Satisfy Agency Requirements· was approved for this 8€;iKm by ,the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technelagy (A$A(ALl)J 

on 15 April 2011. On 26 July 2012, Work Directive 001, originally ISSUed under 

Modification P00004, was modified (P00025) to Include one year of on-1J:!e..jOb 

maintenance training for the ANSF. This effort provides practical hal1ds.-on tl'ai'l1ifl(ffor 

the ANSF, reinforcing the classroom based training and In identIfYing, v~lfda1Ingend 

sourcing components organic to the MSFVs. This UCA was defii'litiZed,on 28 

September 2012 in the total amount of $452M. 

b. Acquisition data availability: The US Government does not own the TDP'forthe 

MSFV. TMLS declined to sell the TOP to the Govemment on several occasiOns. 

c, Subcontracting Competition: TMLS will be required to competitively /ill~ pu~e 

orders and contracts to maximize competition of components and parts. TML~ ~trenlly 

has an approved subcontracting plan under existing contracts with ACC~WRrt 

however, because this is a new effort, a new subcontracting plan wUl be l'eqilireQ. The 

contract will include FAR Clause 52.244-5 entitled, "Competition In Subcontfaoting,' 

which requires the contractor to select subcontractors on a com~ basis-lo'1Jte 

maximum practical extent The contract will also include FAR Clause 52.219-9 ei1titIed, 

·Small Business Subcontracting Plan," for promotion and utilization of $maU busines& 

concerns in subcontracting opportunities. During negotiations, ~ subcoi'ltl$tlng' 

goals wiil be sought for ail socio·economiclsmall business categol'ies. 

a 
73 


416ful10.eps

. 'CMO Oqoi1Jli.~.;J~[~1P. 

Mobile Sirike F;oree.· VelilclliS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPErmOM 

11. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting dabl under~~ 

which are. included In the justification are accurate and complete· to !fHI.beSt .. ~. ·Of fmt.. ... 

knowledge and beuef. '. .~/ /. ..:... .. 

Name: William M. Boruff Signature ~ .#~.. . .. Colonel, ·US Army i 

Title: Project Manager Date Reviewed; );J~ Zo~ . Transportation Systems 

12. Requirement Certification: I oertify that the supporting data under'my !!Ogfl~ 

wk~:I_~ .. ~~~~uddbe:lilef'.'" J~' "" ~.'!" ..... ,,'!'1 

Name~ Richard W. Dennis' , Signature: ~ . ." .__ .~. '. 

Title: Brigadier~neral, US ~ .t?sfe ReVie ~ AM. . DCOM - Army . . 

13. Fair and Reasonable CCHlt Determination: I hereby .:tetennloe thatlhe9ntrd~ 

·cost to the Government for this contract aelion will be faiT and reasonable. The 

Contractor's proposal will be reviewed using cost ana/ysls teohn!~wid. OCAAtu;Klit 

recommendalions to discern whether the costs proposed are curtant and Justifiable. 

The final negollated agreement shall give full consideration to aU oorm.clI:I$.! 

requirements,lncluding delIvery schedule, to support a determimttioo offairand 

reasonable prices for this effort. A certificate of cu rrent cost and pdcirig !fa!.!! Is: 

required. . . 

Name: Cr~ig A. Goepper 

Tille: Contracllng Officer 

Signature: .~ (l.~~ ... 

Date Reviewed: ~ .r-~I.3 

14. Contracting OffIcer Certification:' I certify that this "Ju.stlficat\on Is 'a~~ and 

complete to the best of my knowledge and belief. () . .IA 

Name: 

Title: Contracting 

Craig A. Goepper 

Officer 

Signature: 

Date Reviewed: 

&-~ ~ ~ 

t5{or3 

9 
74 


416ful11.eps

CMO Control Number. 2013-018 

APPROVAL 

Ba!!ed on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of 135 Mobile 

Strike Force Vehicles from the Textron Marine & Land Systems, an operating unit of the 

Textron Systems corporation on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant 

to the authority of TItle 10 United States Code Section 2304(c)(1) as implemented in 

. Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1 (a)(2){ii)(B), "Only One Responsible Source and 

No Other Supplies or Services will Satisfy Agency Requirements." The approval of this 

procurement is subject to availability of funds, and provided that the services and 

property herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition. The total 

estimated value of this action is $114 million. 

FEB 12m3 Oate: _____ _ signature:· __ 

'-'/_/1/ 

~--''-'----:-:--:-:=-=-''=--1r=- ~ __ Heidi Shyu 

Senior Procurement Executive 

10 
75 

38. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, has ISAF or CENTCOM conducted a cost 

analysis that provides a side-by-side comparison of executing the sole-source contract for the MSFVs against upgrading and transferring the in-country MRAP vehicles to the Afghans? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. The initial decision to procure 488 MSFVs was made in 

fiscal year 2010 after market research determined that the MRAP variants did not 

meet the CSTC–A’s operational requirements relating to an enclosed turret with 

day/night sight. In June 2012, an additional requirement of 135 MSFVs to outfit additional units was validated and implemented. The justification to sole-source the 

additional 135 MSFVs was based on the following: 

- maintaining fleet commonality to increase operational flexibility and reduce procurement, logistical, and training burdens. 

- preventing an unacceptable program delay which would severely and 

negatively impacted the ANSF’s ability to maintain security and achieve 

dominant combat capability prior to the transition on December 31, 2014. 

- reducing substantive duplicate costs incurred by issuing a competitive 

solicitation. The estimated costs associated with competitive procurement 

would have exceeded $125 million and would not have been recovered 

through competition. 

Additional rationale considered: 

- The MSFV is distinguished by armored protection around both the occupants and the major automotive platform as opposed to the occupant-centric 

tactical vehicle protection provided to MRAPs, where the engine and transmission are more vulnerable to small arms and other attacks. 

- The chosen way-ahead leverages the only known source (Textron Marine 

and Land Systems) with the knowledge and expertise to fulfill the requirement without adversely impacting the cost, schedule, and continuity of the 

existing ANSF fleet. 

STATUS OF DR. SHAKEEL AFRIDI

39. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, there is no doubt that our operations 

against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations rely upon assistance from foreign 

nationals who are willing to risk their lives to help us. It is widely understood that 

Dr. Shakeel Afridi played an important role in helping the United States determine 

the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden. His bravery was rewarded by a 33-year jail 

sentence for treason. I am concerned that our failure to secure the release of Dr. 

Afridi will be seen by others as an indication that the risk of aiding the United 

States is too great, no matter how important the target. Can you provide me a status update on Dr. Afridi? If your office is unable to, would you request that your 

colleagues in CENTCOM provide me with this update? 

General DUNFORD. The DOS is responsible for handling and working the details 

of Dr. Afridi’s situation and can better update you on his status. 

40. Senator WICKER. General Dunford, are you aware of ongoing efforts by the 

United States to secure his freedom? 

General DUNFORD. The DOS is responsible for handling and working the details 

of Dr. Afridi’s situation and can better update you on his status. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

SERGEANT BOWE BERGDAHL

41. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, Sergeant Bergdahl was captured by the 

Taliban on June 30, 2009, in Paktika province. Can you provide an update on Sergeant Bergdahl’s situation, as well as your efforts to find him and bring him home? 

General DUNFORD. I can assure you that finding and rescuing Sergeant Bergdahl 

remains a top priority. The military effort to bring Sergeant Bergdahl home is as 

strong as it has ever been and there are many people, within DOD and throughout 

the U.S. Government, who are committed to this goal. This effort will not cease 

until it is successful and he is safely brought back to the United States and reunited 

with his family. 

76 

FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN

42. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, if we rush to the exits or provide an insufficient force after 2014, what would failure in Afghanistan potentially look like? 

General DUNFORD. A drawdown that is too hasty would pose risks to the viability 

of the Afghan Government. We would expect a resurgence in insurgent influence. 

Diminished access to resources would exacerbate tendencies to aggregate wealth, 

leading to intense competition and a probable return to factional fighting (renewed 

civil war) as powerbrokers—including insurgent commanders—sought to secure 

their positions and interests. The conflict between these groups would likely be protracted, as regional players would become entangled in providing calibrated support 

to groups deemed favorable to the interests of those regional actors. Government 

and powerbroker groups have already amassed the degree of resources required to 

extend a conflict for resources. We would likely see a refugee outpouring similar to 

the early 1980s, if renewed civil war hindered Afghans’ abilities to provide for their 

families. An increase in ungoverned spaces would allow hostile non-state actors the 

freedom to train and operate in Afghanistan. 

43. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, if we fail in Afghanistan, what could be 

the impact on U.S. national security interests? 

General DUNFORD. We came to Afghanistan as a result of September 11 to ensure 

that the Taliban did not harbor al Qaeda and al Qaeda didn’t have the space within 

which they could plan and conduct further operations against Western interests. We 

also wanted to preclude a resurgence of Taliban rule, which provided the opportunity to al Qaeda to operate from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Those objectives are 

unchanged and continue to retain international support as evidenced by the 50-nation coalition created over the last decade. 

Failure in Afghanistan would provide an opportunity for al Qaeda and other extremist groups to reestablish safe havens from which to plan and conduct 

transnational terrorist acts. Furthermore, failure in Afghanistan would have detrimental effects on the stability of Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons that is 

already battling a significant terrorist problem. 

AFGHAN FIGHTING SEASON

44. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, do you have the forces and resources you 

need for this fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. Yes, I have all the forces and resources that I require to support the ANSF as they take the security lead for the 2013 fighting season. ISAF 

will have approximately 97,000 troops during the upcoming fighting season. The 

troop requirements for this fighting season reflect a bottom-up developed plan that 

reflects the troop requirements as seen by subordinate commanders in support of 

the overall ISAF campaign plan and the subordinate commands’ seasonal orders 

framework. This plan was presented to and approved by Joint Forces CommandBrunssum and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. 

45. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, do you anticipate having to drawdown U.S. 

forces during the fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. Our current planning does include significant troop reductions 

during the fighting season as we transition from the 68,000 to 34,000 U.S. forces 

in Afghanistan. In order to reduce turbulence, we will execute as many troop reductions as possible during already planned troop rotation periods. This is accomplished 

by not replacing troops as they reach the scheduled end of their deployments. Some 

of these troop rotations will occur during the fighting season. 

46. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, do you believe you have the discretion to 

wait until after the fighting season concludes? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. Based upon the guidance I have received from my chain 

of command, I believe I have the flexibility to manage the transition from the 68,000 

force to the 34,000 force as I deem best supports the mission as long as I accomplish 

this transition by the February 12, 2014, date directed by the President in his State 

of the Union address. 

47. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what would be the dangers to our mission, 

and to our troops, if the plan was changed and you were forced to withdraw a significant number of troops during this fighting season? 

General DUNFORD. An accelerated reduction of troops during the fighting season 

would jeopardize our ability to provide the support that our ANSF partners require 

77 

as they transition into the lead for national security for the first time during this 

campaign. This would also challenge our ability to maintain coalition cohesion as 

many of our international partners count on valuable enabler support that we provide, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, route clearance, and medical 

evacuation. 

An accelerated withdrawal would also increase our vulnerabilities to attack as it 

would challenge my ability to balance the flow of troop withdrawal with maintaining 

the capabilities required to secure our base camps and our lines of communication 

at a time when the enemy is at his strongest. Most importantly, though, would be 

the erosion in confidence within the ANSF, the GIRoA, the Afghan people, and within our coalition. This fighting season will be critical to establishing confidence in a 

positive future in Afghanistan. 

48. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, if at any point this year or next year you 

feel that the pace of the drawdown is endangering our troops or the mission outcome, will you provide that professional military judgment not only to your chain 

of command, but also to this committee? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. 

49. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how are your subordinate leaders going to 

manage the competing demands of conducting the mission while preparing to withdraw? 

General DUNFORD. We have done a great deal of planning to examine the methodology for our redeployment. This is not necessarily new, as we did reduce our force 

level from the height of the surge in 2012. As the ANSF take the lead for security 

across Afghanistan in the summer of 2013 and effectively counter the insurgency, 

the nature of our mission will change to a supporting role. We will still be supporting the ANSF this year in great enough numbers to ensure their success, but 

our mission demands will lessen and enable us to redeploy forces, balancing risk to 

mission and risk to force. 

AFGHAN ELECTIONS

50. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, compared to previous elections, to what extent will U.S. and NATO forces be able to offer point and/or area security during 

key electoral processes—particularly on Election Day and during an extended election results aggregation period lasting several weeks? 

General DUNFORD. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, 

fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right 

security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to support the ANSF 

as they set the environment within which the elections take place. The ANSF are 

planning to provide layered security with a unity of effort during the elections period, integrating Afghan Local Police, Afghan Uniformed Police, ANA, and Afghan 

Special Forces. Confidence from a successful 2013 fighting season will set the conditions for successful presidential elections. ISAF’s role will be to support the ANSF 

and to be prepared to provide in extremis support to the international community, 

if required. 

51. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, in the previous election, women candidates 

and candidates representing ethnic minorities had their election activities severely 

curtailed due to physical security concerns. What actions and support can the international forces offer in this regard? 

General DUNFORD. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, 

fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right 

security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such 

as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place. 

52. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what about for other candidates, voters, 

and poll workers in insecure areas? 

General DUNFORD. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which free, 

fair, and legitimate elections can take place. To have participatory elections, effecVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Feb 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\86712.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
78 

tive elections, elections that are accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have the right 

security environment to do that. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such 

as logistics and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within which legitimate elections can take place. 

53. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, some elements within the Afghan Security 

Forces contributed to electoral fraud and malpractice problems in 2009 and 2010. 

To a certain extent this was due to insufficient training on their roles and responsibilities during the electoral process, generally, and on Election Day, in particular. 

What is the U.S. military planning that will ensure the ANA, ANP, and Afghan 

Local Police are better prepared in 2014? 

General DUNFORD. We have focused over the last few years on growing the quantity of the Afghan forces. Now that we have the quantity and the structure in place, 

we are focused on improving the quality of the force. When I look out at the security 

environment right now and the relative strength of the Taliban and the relative 

strength of the ANSF, I know they will be able to provide adequate security for the 

elections in 2014 with our support. Additionally, the Afghans have started the planning process to support the elections much earlier than in previous elections, nearly 

14 months ahead, giving the ANSF more time to adequately prepare. The ISAF has 

also developed a supporting plan to ensure that ISAF is better prepared to support 

the ANSF in its security role for the 2014 elections. Credible ANSF stewardship is 

crucial to the successful completion of elections; their preparation will include training on proper procedures, actions, roles, and responsibilities in support of Afghanistan’s free, fair, and legitimate elections. 

54. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, additionally, a significant amount of electoral fraud in 2010 was committed during counting and tabulation of results. The 

Independent Electoral Commission is currently contemplating moving the count 

from 6,000 polling centers to large provincial count centers. This means there would 

be large stationary targets counting ballots for weeks. Would international security 

forces and Afghan Security Forces be able to secure such vulnerable temporary compounds for such a length of time? 

General DUNFORD. Yes. We are going to do whatever we need to do to support 

the Afghan security forces in establishing an operational environment within which 

free, fair, and legitimate elections can take place; this includes ensuring Afghan security forces will be capable of securing large temporary count centers during the 

election period. To have participatory elections, effective elections, elections that are 

accepted as legitimate, we’re going to have to have a secure environment. Our focus 

as a coalition is to provide support to the ANSF so they may ensure a secure environment within which the elections take place. 

55. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, if there is a provincial count—what training would the military be able to provide, specifically on ballot security from polling 

station to counting centers? 

General DUNFORD. Our focus as a coalition is to provide support, such as logistics 

and air support, if required, to the ANSF to ensure a secure environment within 

which legitimate elections can take place. The ANSF will provide the necessary security along lines of communication between polling stations and counting centers 

and are capable of conducting route security training to meet these requirements. 

U.S. COMMITMENT

56. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, do some Afghans fear that the United 

States may abandon Afghanistan? 

General DUNFORD. Abandonment is a key theme of the Taliban narrative. We do 

not believe wide segments of the Afghan population view the ISAF drawdown as 

abandonment. Afghans are uncertain about their future and that of Afghanistan. 

Perceptions of ISAF ‘‘abandonment’’ would likely derive from two primary anxieties: 

(1) deteriorating security conditions and increase of local violence as ISAF reduces 

its footprint; and (2) Afghanistan’s economic viability post-2014. We believe Afghans 

delink the ISAF drawdown and the provision of security: according to the Afghan 

National Quarterly Assessment Report, 80 percent of Afghans believe the government is the primary provider of security in Afghanistan. However, we believe Afghans are concerned about their future, and likely link fears of a precipitous drop 

in post-2014 international economic assistance with anxieties over ‘‘abandonment.’’ 

79 

57. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, what are the implications of those sentiments? 

General DUNFORD. Although we believe the majority of Afghans harbor concerns 

about the post-2014 environment, potentially negative outcomes likely to trigger 

hedging behavior are too remote for most Afghans to pursue hedging measures now. 

At this juncture, non-elites are likely preserving their options, and their current 

hedging posture is best described as minimal or preliminary. Elite Afghans have 

greater access to information and resources with which to hedge. Accordingly, we 

have observed examples of elites hedging, but for most of the population, we assess 

conditions have not yet reached a point where Afghans feel they need to firmly commit to hedging strategies. 

58. Senator AYOTTE. General Dunford, how can we best convey an enduring U.S. 

commitment to the Afghan people? 

General DUNFORD. Political reconciliation and elections remain our strategic priorities. We can support both processes and significantly change the dynamic for the 

2013 fighting season with an expeditious signing of the U.S.-Afghan BSA and NATO 

SOFA. The BSA and NATO SOFA will form the cornerstone of our narrative. 

Timely completion of these international agreements, properly integrated with our 

transition to train, advise, and assist, will undermine the Taliban’s messages of 

abandonment and characterization of the coalition forces as occupiers. Today, a clear 

demonstration of our will, endurance, and commitment is required to advance the 

campaign. A reinvigorated and credible narrative in conjunction with Milestone 

2013 will positively influence the strategic landscape both within Afghanistan and 

throughout the region. A consistent and clear coalition-Afghan narrative will set favorable conditions for the political process and enhance prospects of success for Afghans in their first fighting season in the lead. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

AFGHANISTAN BUDGET UNDERESTIMATION

59. Senator LEE. General Dunford, at the April 10, 2013, news briefing on the defense budget, Under Secretary Robert Hale stated in answer to a question that costs 

in Afghanistan were $7 to $10 billion higher this year than what we anticipated. 

This is very troubling in any environment, but especially under the constraints that 

DOD is currently under. Can you verify if this is correct and give a detailed account 

for such a massive underestimation? 

General DUNFORD. The $7 to $10 billion shortfall range is correct. OCO budgets 

are put together 1 to 2 years before execution; a difficult task given the uncertainties that exist in war. In the fiscal year 2013 OCO budget request, DOD estimated 

that many of the operating costs would decline proportionately with the reduction 

of troops. What we are seeing in actual execution is that many of these costs will 

not decline until bases are closed. In addition, DOD did not forecast the closure of 

the Pakistan ground lines of communication for such an extended period of time, 

so higher transportation costs arose from using more expensive means and routes. 

DOD also did not have a good estimate of the total equipment retrograde requirement. In late fiscal year 2012, CENTCOM stood up a Material Retrograde Element 

to manage the retrograde efforts and can now provide a better estimate of the retrograde requirement. 

60. Senator LEE. General Dunford, as the United States and Afghanistan negotiate for a troops presence in the country, can we continue to expect similar miscalculations in the future as referenced in the question above? 

General DUNFORD. I believe that as our force footprint is reduced and we enter 

into a more stable train, advise, and assist relationship with Afghanistan after 2014, 

budget fluctuations will become more predictable and less distinct in magnitude. I 

would also like to note that USFOR–A is committed to being a good steward of our 

citizens’ tax dollars. Within USFOR–A, for example, we have self-identified over $9 

billion in cost savings and cost avoidance during fiscal years 2012 and 2013. 

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION

61. Senator LEE. General Dunford, a U.N. report in February stated that Afghanistan lost $3.9 billion in 2012 due to public sector corruption. That’s twice the domestic revenue of the entire Afghan Government. The high level of corruption in Afghanistan poses a great problem for ISAF and the future of Afghanistan. What is 

80 

your assessment of the level of corruption at all levels of government in Afghanistan 

and the anti-corruption efforts of the Afghan Government? 

General DUNFORD. I am convinced that corruption represents a strategic risk to 

Afghanistan and contributes to negative perceptions of the government by the Afghan people and donor nations. The climate of impunity, as well as a lack of control 

mechanisms, must be addressed in the coming years in order for the GIRoA to succeed and endure. 

While conditions vary significantly by ministry or agency, I assess that there is 

corruption at differing levels of the Afghan Government. That said, certain GIRoA 

ministries are performing better than others. The February 2013 Transparency 

International Report assessed levels of corruption within the Afghan MOD as lower 

than in other ministries and better than in many other emerging nations. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ