U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

86–076 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–69] 

2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE 

U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 

REVIEW COMMISSION 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 20, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, November 20, 2013, 2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission ...................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, November 20, 2013 ............................................................................. 41 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2013 

2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC AND 

SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Bartholomew, Carolyn, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission .................................................................................................. 8 

Reinsch, Hon. William A., Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission .................................................................................................. 3 

Shea, Hon. Dennis C., Vice Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission ............................................................................................. 5 

Wortzel, Dr. Larry M., Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission ............................................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartholomew, Carolyn ...................................................................................... 111 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 45 

Reinsch, Hon. William A. ................................................................................. 48 

Shea, Hon. Dennis C. ....................................................................................... 78 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 46 

Wortzel, Dr. Larry M. ...................................................................................... 89 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.–CHINA 

ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 20, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I would like 

to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the 2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. This hearing is part of a larger oversight effort focus on the 

Asia-Pacific rebalance led by Mr. Forbes and Ms. Hanabusa, who 

are providing strong bipartisan leadership on this important topic. 

We have met with the U.S. Pacific Command officials and last 

week heard from key ambassadors representing allied and partner 

nations. However, we cannot consider the rebalance without examining China. 

The Commission has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of 

Chinese military capabilities, economic developments, and political 

and foreign policy objectives. Their annual report, which was released earlier this morning, is a superb resource for Congress and 

the public. While we continue to warn about our military’s readiness and the dangerous effects of budget cuts and sequestration, 

China’s military spending continues to rise and its new leadership 

seeks to increase combat readiness. Its current pace of military 

modernization shows that Beijing is developing the ability to 

project power and influence further abroad. I look forward to hearing the Commission’s assessment of the key military and foreign 

policy developments made by China in the past year and the implications for our own policies and posture in the region. China can 

play a constructive role in the region and the world, but for those 

of us focused on security issues, recent trends in their anti-access 

and area denial capabilities and cyber espionage campaigns in particular give us cause for concern. 

The committee is pleased to welcome the Commission, which is 

represented today by the Honorable William Reinsch—did I get 

that close? 

Mr. REINSCH. Well done, Mr. Chairman, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Chairman of the U.S. Economic and 

Security Review Commission; the Honorable Dennis Shea, vice 
2 

chairman of the Commission; Ms. Carolyn Bartholomew, commissioner; and Dr. Larry Wortzel, commissioner. I appreciate all of the 

work that they and their staff have done, and I look forward to 

hearing their testimony. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, welcome the report 

and appreciate the commissioners being here to present it today. 

I think it is very important that we on this committee keep up to 

date on developments in China, both in terms of their foreign policy aims and also, most importantly, their military buildup. I think 

it is something obviously we need to be aware of, but I also agree 

with the chairman’s comments that there is no reason that we 

should have China as an enemy. We should certainly look for ways 

to work together. I think we have an increasing number of common 

interests in terms of peace and stability certainly in Asia but globally. China has become more and more involved economically 

throughout the world, and I think the most important thing is they 

actually step up and start assuming that role. 

Most recently with the typhoon in the Philippines, we have seen 

once again that they are not there yet. Right in their backyard, second largest economy in the world, and they really have done nothing to be helpful; whereas the U.S. from all the way across the Pacific has in large numbers proven once again that we are the one 

indispensable nation in terms of helping people in times of crisis. 

I very much would like to have help in that regard. I think the 

world would be better served if a nation like China were to step 

up and begin to take those sorts of greater responsibilities, and I 

think we need to look for ways to build that partnership and that 

relationship, ways we can work together. We already, we do some 

joint military exercises, and I certainly think the world over the 

course of the next five decades will be a much, much better place 

if China and the U.S. found more places to be partners and avoided 

any sort of conflict. And I think that is distinctly possible, but we 

have to be aware of what is going on. 

This report and the work that you all have done is part of that 

effort, and I look forward to your presenting it and to our questions 

as we grow in our understanding of China’s role in the world. 

Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reinsch. 

Mr. REINSCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. All of your testimonies, without objection, will be entered in the record in their entirety, and now if 

you could go ahead. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM A. REINSCH, CHAIRMAN, U.S.– 

CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

Mr. REINSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, members of 

the committee. As noted, I am Bill Reinsch, I am the chairman during this year’s hearing and report cycle. I am going to provide an 

overview of our annual report, and Vice Chairman Dennis Shea 

was going to address China’s maritime disputes and cross-strait 

military issues. Commissioner Larry Wortzel will discuss China’s 

military modernization, U.S.-China security relations and China’s 

cyber activities, and Commissioner Carolyn Bartholomew will address China’s foreign policy and Middle East issues. 

The most significant development over the past year in the bilateral relationship has been the change in China’s leadership. Xi 

Jinping took over as president and party general secretary and Li 

Keqiang as premier and party secretary of the State Council. China’s leadership change has raised expectations that the government will implement the economic reforms that Beijing has long 

acknowledged are necessary. 

Many of those changes have been advocated as well by the Commission, by the Congress, and by the administration. Most recently 

the new leadership in Beijing provided unusual level of detail of its 

intended reforms. Among them were promises to raise taxes on 

state-owned companies, provide Chinese depositors with insurance 

against loss of principal and to open state-controlled sectors of the 

economy to competition. 

China’s economic growth has slowed to a pace of 7.66 percent so 

far this year. China’s new leadership has pledged to at least maintain that rate by shifting China’s industrial policy away from its 

dependence on exports and massive debt-financed infrastructure 

projects to an economy more dependent on domestic consumption. 

This would be a welcome change, one that the United States has 

been urging for some time and one that would greatly benefit Chinese citizens. 

Developments in the national security sphere have not been so 

benign. Under its new political leadership, China’s actions in the 

East and South China Seas continue to increase tensions in the region. It is becoming clear that China does not intend to resolve its 

maritime disputes through multilateral negotiations or the application of international laws and adjudicative processes but prefers to 

use its growing power in support of coercive tactics to pressure its 

neighbors to concede China’s claims. 

Meanwhile, China continued to develop and field advanced military platforms and weapons systems. China’s comprehensive military modernization is altering the balance of power in Asia, challenging decades of U.S. military preeminence in the region. During 

China’s leadership transition, President Xi also was appointed Central Military Commission [CMC] chairman. The commission, China’s highest military decisionmaking body, ensures Communist 

Party control of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army], sets military 

policy and strategy, interprets party guidance for the military, and 

oversees the daily operations of the massive PLA bureaucracy. 

President Xi is the key link between the party and the military 

and embodies civilian control of the PLA at the highest level. Since 

his promotion to CMC chairman, President Xi has moved quickly 
4 

to highlight broad military policy themes. These themes include the 

importance of a strong military to fulfill Xi’s China Dream goals, 

increasing China’s combat readiness, and reducing corruption in 

the PLA. Because of historic ties to the PLA, President Xi is well 

positioned to take on this wide-reaching and potentially contentious 

agenda during his tenure and may be more active than his predecessor in managing China’s military policy. President Xi has recently begun to enhance civilian control over the PLA by creating 

an agency that in some respects will be analogous to our National 

Security Council. 

It is important to note that policy changes in China sometimes 

require years of effort by the leadership to create a consensus for 

action once the general policy has been agreed to. Typically, central 

government pronouncements filter down to agency levels and provincial and local bodies for implementation, overseen by the ubiquitous party officials. The recently concluded third plenum provides 

a window into that process. For example, the new leadership apparently takes seriously the goal of moderating the nation’s growing inequality between rich and poor, urban and rural, and coastal 

and interior regions. One step in the right direction is the proposed 

extension of land rights to China’s farmers, who currently face seizure of their collectively owned land by local government authorities. 

Now comes the hard part for China’s leadership, which is implementation of these proposed reforms. Reforming the economy by 

empowering consumers is one necessary step in a process that will 

require many changes. Some of those changes were topics of the 

Commission’s hearing. For example, China’s state-owned enterprises must be weaned from their long dependence on the stateowned financial system. China’s banks must be allowed to compete 

for depositors by offering market rate interest payments and reasonable credit terms to China’s entrepreneurs and consumers. China’s government should also open its closed financial services industry to foreign investors. 

At the same time, China needs to meet Western standards of auditing in order to list Chinese companies on U.S. stock exchanges. 

The Commission also examined China’s interest in investing in the 

United States. While such investment is small relative to America’s 

other major trading partners, China’s acquisition of U.S. companies 

is growing exponentially. With $3.66 trillion in foreign currency reserves, China has the potential to become a major investor in U.S. 

companies and real estate. This past year, China made its largest 

purchase to date of an American company, Smithfield Foods, for 

$7.1 billion U.S. dollars. 

The Commission also considered the strong evidence that the 

Chinese Government is directing and executing a large scale cyber 

espionage campaign against the United States. China to date has 

compromised a range of U.S. networks, including those in the Department of Defense, defense contractors, and private enterprises. 

These activities are designed to achieve a number of China’s broad 

security, political, and economic objectives, such as gathering intelligence, providing Chinese firms with an advantage over their competitors worldwide, advancing long-term research and development 

objectives, and gaining information that could enable future mili-
5 

tary operations. My colleagues will discuss this issue in greater 

depth as well as China’s military modernization efforts, and China’s activities in the East and South China Seas. Thank you all for 

your interest in our work. When my colleagues have concluded, we 

would be happy to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reinsch can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS C. SHEA, VICE CHAIRMAN, U.S.– 

CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

Mr. SHEA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify 

today. As Chairman Reinsch stated, I will be focusing on China’s 

maritime disputes and the cross-strait relationship. I have submitted written testimony to the committee, and this is a very 

abridged version of what that written testimony says. 

This year, commissioners held public hearings and met with the 

leaders of the Armed Forces and political bodies in Japan and Taiwan to sharpen our understanding of the East China Sea dispute 

and the current state of the cross-strait relationship. Those conversations served as the basis of two sections in this year’s report, 

one on China’s maritime disputes and one on Taiwan. China’s 

strategy in the East and South China Seas involves delaying the 

resolution of its maritime disputes while strengthening its maritime and air forces to better assert its claims. By using its military 

and maritime law enforcement forces to react to perceived challenges to its sovereignty, China seeks to change the status quo of 

its maritime disputes in its own favor. China applied this approach 

in the South China Sea effectively and with some success in the 

East China Sea in the past year. As Beijing has escalated rhetoric 

surrounding the dispute, it also has sharply increased air and maritime activity near the contested Senkaku Islands. 

Our report also identifies popular nationalism, economic development, and China’s sense of sovereignty as key drivers underlying 

China’s maritime disputes, suggesting the complex and intractable 

nature of these issues. These factors, combined with China’s inconsistent adherence to internationally accepted norms of air and maritime operations, contribute to an environment in the East and 

South China Seas that is both politically and operationally tense. 

Turning to Taiwan, China and Taiwan enjoyed generally positive 

relations this year, characterized by growing economic ties and relatively amicable political relations. Despite these positive trends, 

China’s cross-strait policy remains focused on pursuing balance. 

The CHAIRMAN. We don’t know what that is. Until we find out, 

please continue. 

Mr. SHEA. Okay. I apologize if I said anything offensive to anyone. 

Well, turning to Taiwan, China and Taiwan enjoyed generally 

positive relations this year, characterized by growing economic ties 

and relatively amicable political relations. Despite these positive 

trends, China’s cross-strait policy remains focused on pursuing a 

balance of economic, political, and military power that heavily favors China with the eventual goal of eventually unifying with Taiwan. China is more prepared than in the past to conduct several 
6 

different military campaigns against Taiwan, including a partial 

naval blockade and a limited air and missile campaign. In my view, 

a strong U.S. military presence in the western Pacific and the deterrent and stability effect it provides is critical to preserving peace 

in the region. 

At the top of the Commission’s list of recommendations this year 

is a recommendation that Congress fund the U.S. Navy shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the 

Asia-Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance home ports to 60 

percent in the region by 2020. I think my colleague, Commissioner 

Wortzel, will get into this, but China is undergoing an incredible 

naval modernization effort, and by 2020, they may have the largest 

fleet of modern submarines and surface combatants in the western 

Pacific. 

Other recommendations focus on the need for the United States 

to help our partners and allies improve maritime domain awareness in the East and South China Seas and the need to deepen 

strategic trust between the United States and China. In environments as potentially explosive as the East and South China Seas, 

strategic trust provides the foundation to reduce the potential of 

miscalculation at sea. To further develop the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, we recommend Congress urge Cabinet-level officials to visit 

Taiwan in order to promote commercial, technological, and peopleto-people exchanges. We further recommend Congress direct the 

administration to permit official travel to Taiwan for senior Defense and State Department officials. 

Finally, I would like to highlight a recommendation to Congress 

to direct the administration to transmit an unclassified report on 

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Taiwan’s diminishing ability to maintain a credible deterrent capability could incentivize China to pressure Taiwan toward political talks or to use military force to 

achieve political objectives. The report we recommend would not 

only provide accountability on the progress of planned sales, it 

would also, I believe, support U.S. strategic interests in the Taiwan 

Strait. 

Again, members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shea can be found in the Appendix on page 78.] 

STATEMENT OF DR. LARRY M. WORTZEL, COMMISSIONER, 

U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

Dr. WORTZEL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members 

of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today, and what I am going to do is present some of the Commission’s findings on China’s military modernization, U.S.-China security relations, and cyber activities from this 2013 report to Congress. 

The extensive modernization of the People’s Liberation Army enables the PLA to conduct operations farther from China’s coast and 

makes the PLA more formidable in all of the dimensions of war— 

air, space, land, sea, and the electromagnetic spectrum, which includes cyber. 
7 

Major elements of PLA modernization are really designed to restrict U.S. freedom of action throughout the western Pacific. China 

already has 65 submarines that can employ intercontinental ballistic missiles, torpedoes, mines, or anti-ship cruise missiles. The 

PLA Navy’s surface combatant force has modernized, and its 77 

major surface combatants are networked and capable of conducting 

multiple missions, and they are supported by a growing combat logistics force that can sustain them at sea. The PLA Air Force is 

getting new bomber aircraft that will carry long-range land-attack 

cruise missiles, and China is also developing new stealth fighters. 

While China’s military is growing, our own is shrinking. China’s 

firing of a rocket into nearly geosynchronous Earth orbit in 2013 

probably tested the vehicle component of a new high-altitude antisatellite capability, and that would threaten our GPS [Global Positioning System] satellites and our SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared 

System] infrared missile launch detection satellite. 

Bilateral military-to-military relations deepened and expanded in 

2013 between China and the U.S. To date, there have been eight 

rounds of Track 1.5 U.S.-China strategic dialogue that address critical issues, like nuclear strategic stability. I see this as one of the 

most productive dialogues that takes place with China. Still, I 

think military contacts with China require constant congressional 

oversight. 

For China’s military, cyberspace is an important component in 

national power, and it is a critical element of its strategic competition with the United States. The Chinese Government is directing 

and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign that poses a 

major threat to U.S. industry, critical infrastructure, military operations, personnel, equipment, and readiness. 

Looking at some of the Commission’s recommendations, it looks 

like the Department of Defense is already taking some action to 

make at least information technology in the supply chain more secure. They just passed a new—they will pass a new directive. On 

November 18th, they finally took some action, but we need further 

work on supply chain security. 

The Commission recommends a careful examination of the Federal use of cloud computing platforms and services with attention 

to where the data storage and computing services are located. If 

they are located in the Third Department of the People’s Liberation 

Army, it may present a little bit of a security risk. It is clear that 

naming the perpetrators in China in an attempt to shame the Chinese Government will not deter cyber espionage. Mitigating these 

problems will require a well-coordinated approach across the government and with industry. 

The Commission recommends Congress clarify the actions that 

U.S. companies may take regarding tracking intellectual property 

and amend the Economic Espionage Act to permit a private right 

of action when trade secrets are stolen. 

My personal view is the President already has some powerful authority to sanction Chinese people and companies through the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act. If the magnitude of 

Chinese espionage is causing the amount of damage to the U.S. 

economy that the NSA [National Security Agency] Director tells us 

is the case, then the President ought to exercise that authority. 
8 

In closing, I would like to address the U.S. rebalance to Asia. The 

Navy aims to increase its presence in Asia to 60 ships and 60 percent of home ports by 2020. However, Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Greenert, has recently warned that budget constraints 

would delay or prevent the Navy from achieving those objectives in 

a rebalance. So you can have 60 percent of something out there, 

but by 2020, China’s navy and air force will outnumber and almost 

match the technical capabilities of our own forces in the Asia and 

Pacific. A shrunken military may be insufficient to deter China or 

to reassure our friends and allies in the region. I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today, and I am happy to respond to any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wortzel can be found in the Appendix on page 89.] 

STATEMENT OF CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, COMMISSIONER, 

U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, I join my colleagues in thanking you for the opportunity to 

testify today. I would like to start by expressing my condolences on 

the recent loss of former Chairman Skelton. His leadership, like 

yours, has supported our troops and protected our national interests in the great tradition of this distinguished committee. 

Like my colleagues, I have submitted my written statement for 

the record. Today I will be discussing China’s foreign policy, particularly in regard to the Middle East and North Africa, which I 

will refer to today collectively as MENA, and also India and North 

Korea, all of which we examined in our 2013 annual report. 

As China’s global interests expand, Beijing is becoming increasingly assertive and active in its foreign affairs. This trend is apparent in MENA where China’s ever-growing demand for energy imports has driven Beijing to pursue greater political and security engagement. Beijing’s emergent influence in MENA has at times competed with or challenged U.S. strategic interests, particularly in 

Syria and Iran. As in other parts of the world, it remains to be 

seen whether China’s stated interests in regional stability and 

peace will make a lasting positive impact in MENA. Given the 

United States deep security interests in the region, China’s developing role there presents geostrategic opportunities and challenges 

for U.S. diplomats, policymakers, and Armed Forces. 

In the past decade China’s trade and economic ties with MENA 

have grown substantially, driven primarily by China’s demand for 

energy. Over half of China’s crude oil imports are from MENA, and 

China’s dependence on the region will only continue to grow in the 

coming decades. Given this trend, the Commission expects China 

will increasingly augment its already robust economic ties in the 

region with stronger political and security engagement in an effort 

to protect and enhance its energy security interests. 

Historically, China has avoided directly opposing U.S. power in 

the region, content to free ride on the U.S. security presence there. 

In recent years, however, Beijing appears increasingly willing to 

take positions on important regional issues that directly oppose or 

undermine U.S. interests and objectives. This is clearly the case 
9 

with Syria. Despite its emphasis on neutrality and peaceful resolution in public statements, China repeatedly has used its veto power 

to prevent the U.N. from singling out, blaming, or imposing sanctions on the Syrian Government. 

In recent weeks, Beijing has slightly reoriented its policy to appear less supportive of Assad and more supportive of mainstream 

efforts to facilitate peace in Syria. For instance, China has made 

occasional efforts to reach out to the Syrian opposition, has called 

for talks between the regime and the opposition in Geneva, and has 

supported efforts to eliminate chemical weapons from the country. 

These recent efforts notwithstanding, China’s fundamental position 

on the conflict does not seem to have changed. 

Another problematic element of China’s MENA engagement is 

Beijing’s continued ties with and support for Iran. As elsewhere in 

the region, energy interests are a primary driver of the SinoIranian relationship, although I would note that there has been a 

relationship that has been a millennium going between the two 

countries. China is Iran’s top crude oil customer and sources about 

8 percent of its crude oil imports from Iran. Although China seeks 

to prevent its ties with Iran from becoming a flash point in U.S.- 

China relations, China has not halted its energy trade with Iran, 

despite U.S. sanctions. Instead, Beijing maximizes its economic leverage over Tehran to secure advantageous oil trade deals, then 

seeks exemptions from or exploits loopholes in the sanctions to ensure steady access to energy. 

Concerns persist about the role of China in proliferation of weapons to Iran. In the past, China sold tactical ballistic and anti-ship 

cruise missiles to Iran. China may continue to provide support to 

Iran’s advanced conventional weapons programs. Since 2009, the 

U.S. has sanctioned six Chinese entities for missile or weapons proliferation to Iran. Moreover, while Beijing insists it has not provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear program since 1997, open source 

reporting suggests that Chinese assistance and components have 

continued to augment Iran’s nuclear programs. 

China’s growing assertiveness was on display in its relationship 

with India this year as well. Sino-Indian tensions flared in April 

when New Delhi claimed that 30 to 50 Chinese soldiers crossed the 

China-India border about 12 miles beyond the line of actual control, the effective border between the two countries, and stayed 

there for 3 weeks. While Beijing and New Delhi resolved the border 

impasse in May after a series of talks, the potential for periodic 

low-level confrontations between border patrols to escalate likely 

will persist. 

Turning finally to China’s relations with North Korea, Beijing for 

decades has provided Pyongyang with economic and political support, shielding its neighbor from harsh punishment by the international community for its destabilizing rhetoric and activities. 

While Beijing appeared increasingly dissatisfied with Pyongyang 

after a series of North Korean provocations in the past year, the 

Commission assesses Beijing is not likely to significantly alter its 

support for the country. 

In conclusion, the impact of China gradually taking on a more 

assertive global role will be significant. Beijing may become more 

willing to use its increasing political and economic clout to wield 
10 

its influence. This trend has significant implications for the U.S., 

particularly if China’s foreign policies undermine or challenge 

America’s. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. Like my colleagues, I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bartholomew can be found in the 

Appendix on page 111.] 

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. Thank you all for your testimony. We 

appreciate you volunteering to do this effort. You do a wonderful 

job and produce a good report. It is my understanding that you also 

have with you several members of your staff who contribute so 

much on this today. 

And Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would just ask them to stand 

up, any members that are here, so we can thank them for the good 

work that they do if you have anybody with you today. 

Mr. REINSCH. Go ahead, everybody. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. FORBES. Well, we want to thank you all for the good work 

that you guys do on that. 

And I just have a quick question for you. As we look at the capabilities, your report makes clear the enormous increase in capabilities that China is having. This weekend I was with a former member of the current administration who had been with the Pentagon 

and made an interesting observation that it didn’t matter what the 

intentions of China might be, the capabilities are what we had to 

plan for, but having given that assumption, you guys are looking 

at this in a very careful way. Could you give us just your assessment of what you think the Chinese intentions are? We see these 

capabilities, and there is a huge dispute as to what their intentions 

are, but as we see this beginning to take shape more and more, I 

would just ask you to look in your crystal ball and give us your 

best assessment of what you think the intentions of all this military buildup is, and I will let you decide who wants to respond. 

Mr. REINSCH. You may find we don’t all agree on that. 

Mr. FORBES. No, no that is what this is about. So we appreciate 

that. 

Mr. REINSCH. Dennis, go ahead. 

Mr. SHEA. I will just very briefly—there are probably multiple, 

multiple intentions, but one of the intentions that particularly concerns me is they are trying to deny access to the western Pacific 

by U.S. forces and to extend military power out to the second island chain, which is about 1,800 nautical miles from the Chinese 

coast, and be able to operate freely in that area and basically remove the United States as the predominant military force in that 

region of the world. 

Mr. FORBES. Any other thoughts? 

Mr. REINSCH. Larry or Carolyn? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Larry, you can go. 

Dr. WORTZEL. I think their goals are at two levels. I think in the 

western Pacific, that 1,800-mile range to prevent the United States 

from intervening in any contingencies is a very serious range, and 

it is a range that is roughly equal to the combat radius of carrier 

aircraft and the range of a Tomahawk cruise missile. They want 
11 

to keep us far enough out that we can’t get near their coast or their 

interior. 

But the greater charge that the previous Communist Party 

Chairman gave—Hu Jintao gave to the Chinese military, which Xi 

Jinping reinforced, is the ability to go out beyond that western Pacific and have a military capable of defending China’s interests, 

global interests. Now, they look at about 2050 before that comes 

about, but they are worried about sea lines of communication into 

the Indian Ocean. They are worried about their oil supplies. And 

they recognize that, yes, they have been free riders, as Ms. Bartholomew said, but they are not comfortable with that. 

Mr. REINSCH. My background is in trade and economics, so I 

defer to Larry and the others on particularly the short-term military issues. 

I guess I would say that I think in the medium term, their policy 

goal is to expand the range of influence in the region, particularly 

over that part of Asia to the south of them that has over thousands 

of years of history that they have historically tried to influence, 

and I think they want to, you know, recapture the historic relationship they have had with those parties. I don’t think they intend to 

do that in a military way particularly. I think it is a combination 

of exercising a variety of means of influence, but that includes 

some fairly aggressive tactics in the South China Sea, as we have 

seen. 

I think one of the dilemmas they face, and Larry alluded to it, 

is whether they can successfully or whether they even want to 

make a transition from a regional power to a global power. They 

have been very tentative in looking outside their region. I thought 

their participation—and their participation is limited but still helpful—in the Somali anti-piracy effort, for example, is a very important step, it was a very important step for them. Their contribution 

to U.N. peacekeeping forces has been, I think, a significant contribution. Their efforts to reach out beyond their comfort zone, if 

you will, so far have been careful, cautious, and largely constructive. We do have situations obviously where their policies, Middle 

East being one that Carolyn talked about, have bumped up against 

ours in part because we have different interests, and those are 

areas where we are simply going to, I think, continue to have different interests for the long term. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. All right. 

Mr. SHEA. Clean up. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, I will do clean-up. You will see, we 

have 12 of us on this Commission, and we have a wide range of 

views, and you guys know what it is like marking something up. 

When we go through our report, it ends up for the most part being 

a consensus document, which means sitting in the room, hammering it out paragraph by paragraph, line by line, and sometimes 

word by word. So thank you for the opportunity. I think you will 

see that there are probably some differences in some of our views. 

I think just from sort of a bigger picture that I think that China 

is ultimately interested in retaking what it sees as a historic position in the world. I do think that it is necessarily going to be taking 

on a bigger global role, partly because of its search for resources, 

which it needs in order to build its economy the way that it wants 
12 

to. I think that that will potentially and frankly inevitably end up 

challenging U.S. power in a lot of ways, sometimes intentionally, 

but sometimes it is just we will be playing in the same space. 

I know people like to give the Chinese Government credit for 

their work on counter-piracy. I guess I always need to say that 

they are there protecting their own interests, and we see the world 

fundamentally differently, which is that the U.S. sees that it has 

a global responsibility and it isn’t just our interests that we are advancing. 

And the final thing that I really would like to note is that I am 

particularly concerned about what I see as China exporting a 

model of economic growth with authoritarian government, and we 

see that is certainly of interest in Africa, both in North Africa and 

in the rest of Africa and other places; people who have a tendency 

toward authoritarian orientation and see opportunities for doing 

economic growth in trade deals with China, I think is going to be 

a real challenge for us. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you all, and the chairman and the 

ranking member both had commitments that they had to step out 

for, but we are ably represented by Congressman Davis, and I 

would like to recognize her for any questions that she might have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

I might just follow up on your question. Just if you could maybe 

characterize in some ways the differences on the committee and 

perhaps kind of the range of where people were coming in and 

what you think that was based on because we really appreciate the 

fact that you are here and the fact that there certainly are some 

differences. There are differences, of course, as you know, on this 

committee, and if you could give us a little more depth about that, 

that would be helpful. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. We probably all have different views on that, 

too. 

Mr. REINSCH. Well, let me begin on that one. I think one of the 

advantages of the Commission is that the members bring to it different background and expertise. I said mine is primarily in international economic policy and trade, although I served in the Clinton administration as Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration and dealt with export controls and technology transfer. 

Others bring different experience. Larry is known to many of 

you, his long experience in the military. That has meant in effect 

the Commission approaches the issues differently based largely on 

the differences of background. 

A number of members of the Commission over the years, and I 

have served on it from its inception, have been primarily concerned 

with the military challenge that China poses for us in multiple 

areas, and our work there has shifted over time from, you know, 

nuclear power to naval power, satellites, cybersecurity, whatever. 

I think a number of the other commissioners, many of them on 

the Democratic side, frankly, have focused more on China’s economic challenge and the challenge it presents to our industrial 

base, not only our defense industrial base but our manufacturing 

base, and our overall trade relationship to China. 
13 

The mandate that Congress gave us when we began was to study 

both, and we have tried very hard each year to, you know, balance 

our hearings and activities so that we focus on both. I think it is 

fair to say that all of us, and you can all disagree with me if you 

want, but I think all of us see that China poses a lot of challenges 

for us. I use the word advisedly. In our first year, in our first report, the biggest debate we had was over whether to use the word 

‘‘threat’’ or not, and I was one of those that preferred not to use 

the word ‘‘threat,’’ but I think ‘‘challenge’’ is an appropriate word. 

China presents challenges all over the map, largely because of its 

size, and as Carolyn said, there are areas where we are going to 

bump up against each other or not deliberately but because we are 

both large powers that share space. So I think we try to navigate 

our way through that and try to identify hopefully in advance those 

areas where we would recommend Congress take a closer look at. 

Mr. SHEA. Yeah, I think we are divided into two teams, security 

and economics, and my assessment is that there is general close to 

unanimity on the security side, and there is less unanimity on the 

economic side. 

One issue that the Commission has sort of advanced is examining the investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises into the 

United States, which at this point is relatively modest. I think 

most of us think there should be a heightened level of examination 

and concern about this. There are a minority of commissioners who 

will say, well, it is just like Japanese investment in the 1980s, but 

I think some of us, including myself, say, well, these state-owned 

enterprises are organs of the Chinese Communist Party. The leaders are appointed by the Organization Department of the Chinese 

Communist Party, the large ones. They, China is engaged in a 

massive economic espionage campaign against the United States. 

That didn’t happen in the 1980s, I don’t believe, by Japan. And 

China is building up a military that is designed to restrict U.S. access to the western Pacific. So—and it is all part of the larger Chinese enterprise. So we are called the Economic and Security Review Commission for a reason, because the two areas are closely 

linked. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, it is a good and interesting question, 

and for those of you who don’t know of us, I mean, as I said, there 

are 12 of us, 3 each appointed by the House and Senate Democratic 

and Republican leadership, so we come with different orientations 

and with different levels of expertise. 

I think in the 10 years that I have served on the Commission, 

I see that a number of people have sort of a strong economic orientation and some sense that economic strength is critically important to our national security and our national strength, and others 

have had a more what I would call traditional military and security 

orientation. But I do think that over the 10 years that I have 

served on the Commission, that we are seeing more alignment in 

places, and that was in some ways what we were established to do. 

I would say out of fondness with my colleague Dr. Wortzel, the 

first time I saw him really interested and then concerned about the 

economic issues is when we—manufacturing, when we looked at 

the defense industrial base and what was the ability of our manufacturing sector to be able to create components for the warfighter 
14 

if we needed it, as things were being outsourced more and more, 

and what was the future of our tool and die industry, so there are 

places that we have really crossed over in terms of looking at the 

issues and bringing our own orientations but recognizing that there 

are a lot of challenges that we can all work together on. 

Dr. WORTZEL. I came on to this Commission with a very strong 

orientation toward espionage, military developments, and looking 

very hard at Chinese long-term intentions, as their military literature defined it, and probably for the first year resisted almost 

attending a hearing that had anything to do with economics. But 

I was educated. 

And I have to say that if I had to pick out a single area where 

you might find tension and debate, it is over the orientation of the 

United States as a free trade and open trading nation and the challenge that is posed by dealing with an authoritarian state composed almost entirely of state-owned industries, populated with 

people who have to follow the dictates of a long-term plan by the 

Communist Party and how you—our tensions tend to be over how 

you maintain a free and open trading system with proper national 

security controls for exports and still meet the challenge of this 

controlled economy that has so many substitutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Davis. 

Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, thank you for your 

work on this issue. The—just a quick brief look at your report 

shows at first blush a particularly juggernaut of China across all 

these spectrums. Could you also talk to us or did your Commission 

look at where is China’s Achilles heels to be able to fulfill all of 

these grand schemes? You know, they have got a particular, almost 

visceral fear of internal unrest. They have got demographic issues, 

a one child policy. They have got a tremendous imbalance in marriage age females versus males and an economy that has got to 

grow faster than ours in order to soak up all the new interests. 

Could your Commission talk to us a little about those aspects of 

can China actually deliver on all of their grand schemes? 

Mr. REINSCH. Yes, I think that you have provided a very good 

list, and these are issues that we have looked at over the years. 

They have an enormous number of problems. They have a demographic problem, as you noticed, as you noted. In past years, we 

have spent a lot of time on their environmental problems, which 

actually is one area where cooperation between us and them can 

be useful, both in terms of technology sharing and because of the 

environmental benefits. If they clean up their air and water, that 

is good for everybody, beginning with their people, but it is also 

good for our people, because their air blows over in this direction, 

and people who represent the West Coast are familiar with that 

problem. 

They know it is a problem, and they are under significant domestic internal pressure to deal with it. It is visible every day, and if 

you go there, you will experience that. 
15 

My own interest has been in their enormous economic problems. 

Right now, in the wake of the financial crisis, you know, virtually 

every country has economic problems. I, frankly, would much rather be us than them under the current circumstances. Their steps 

to—they are moving in the right direction economically, but they 

have, I think, a long way to go. They are taking baby steps, and 

they have the central dilemma of, how do you liberalize economically without opening the door to pressures for political liberalization, which is the central conundrum of how they are trying to 

operate? 

This regime—I am sorry, this administration if, I mean, President Xi and Premier Li, if anything, have given early indications 

of being tougher politically even than their predecessors and more 

resistant to political change and trying to address demands for political reform by fighting corruption. Unfortunately, in my view, 

corruption is kind of an integral part of the way the regime operates. They can’t effectively deal with corruption without undermining the party’s control, and that is their central dilemma. And 

they have to face the problem of trying to deal with that in that 

context. They have to deal with the fact that anything they do to 

liberalize the economy is inevitably going to create political pressures that are going to complicate their life. That, to me, is the biggest problem they have got. 

Mr. SHEA. I think, Congressman, you and Chairman Reinsch 

have put together a nice list of the problems that China faces. 

The one additional vulnerability or two additional vulnerabilities 

I would see are the debt. We don’t know how much debt is in the 

system. They had a huge stimulus program. They rely on local governments to finance infrastructure projects, so there is a huge 

amount of debt floating around in the system, and it is very 

opaque. We just don’t have a good handle on how much outstanding debt there is. 

There is also, they don’t have a strong culture of breakthrough 

innovation. They are very good at incremental innovation. We had 

a hearing last year on this subject, and they are very good at going 

on the manufacturing floor and trying stuff out in the marketplace, 

bringing it back, fixing it, but very much incremental. They don’t 

necessarily have a culture yet of people challenging conventional 

wisdom, breakthrough thinking. 

Dr. WORTZEL. I would like to address some of the things that we 

have had in previous annual reports that I think meet your question. Among them, the inability to master the metallurgy for jet 

turbine fan engines and marine engines, naval engines. They just 

can’t do it. 

The attempts with difficulties in addressing air and water pollution that we have looked at in China, you know, there are real 

ways we could help them there. 

Dennis mentioned the problems in innovation, and then, finally, 

the weaknesses in their military and developing a cadre of personnel that are able to maintain a networked, I think I can use the 

acronym in this committee, C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] system that they know they need. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 
16 

And the ranking member has been a strong leader in this area, 

and he has returned, so the chair would recognize him for any 

questions he may have. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you mentioned in your opening remarks a lot of the different areas where China has, you know, conflicts over the islands 

and, you know, differences with, you know, border disputes. What 

do you think are the most likely to cause problems in those areas? 

What is the greatest challenge, the country they are most likely to 

come into conflict with, and how might we go about trying to resolve some of those border disputes? What role should we play? 

What role should others play? Because that seems to be the area 

that, you know, is most causing China to be more belligerent as 

they, you know, advance territorial claims, you know, basically because they want the mineral rights, and they think they are the 

biggest kid on the block so they can go ahead and force their way 

in. What is the best way to defuse that? 

Mr. SHEA. I think the best way is to have a strong U.S. military 

presence there. If Japan weren’t operating under a security umbrella with the United States, I wonder what would be happening 

now. So I think the best way to preserve peace in the area is to 

have a strong, strong naval, U.S. naval presence. 

One thing that is very concerning is the possibility of something 

happening, an incident happening at sea that is unintentional. You 

probably, the committee has probably heard about the incident earlier this year, the two incidents involving the PLA Navy locking 

target, radar targeting on a Japanese vessel, naval vessel, and a 

Japanese helicopter. The Japanese showed tremendous restraint in 

not reacting to that. It seems as if—my impression is that that was 

more of a tactical decision made by the local PLA, the commander 

of the PLA Navy vessel, as opposed to some sort of great strategic 

decision. I think the PLA Navy is getting a little more sophisticated and aware of norms, maritime norms, but something like 

that could really—is really a problem. 

I have asked some Japanese interlocutors, do you have a phone 

where you call, can someone in the Japanese military call someone 

in the Chinese military directly and say, we have this situation at 

sea? We don’t want this thing to blow out of control, and there is 

no mechanism for that type of consultation or communication. So 

I believe transparency, communication, strong U.S. military presence. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, I would join in that. I think internally 

one of the biggest flash points they have is Xinjiang and how that 

is handled and what ultimately happens, but as I look at China 

and the region, I am concerned about I guess what I would call incremental expansionism, which is that their moves in the South 

and East China Seas to sort of, they have these historic claims, but 

it is sort of they keep moving forward a little bit and not ever coming back quite as far as they had done before. 

And it is affecting the Philippines, as you mentioned, Mr. Smith, 

you know, the terrible tragedy that happened in the Philippines 

and what kind of role, but it is affecting Vietnam and Indonesia 

and Japan, and I think I certainly agree with my colleague that 

having a U.S., a strong U.S. presence in the region I think to rebal-
17 

ance both militarily and economically and diplomatically, it is going 

to be really important to try to defuse some of these things. 

Mr. SMITH. One other question along these lines if I could, and 

China, the neighbors around China, one of the concerns is that as 

we, you know, go through some of the budget struggles that we 

have had and speculation about sequestration and all that, you 

know, the neighbors, they are going to recalculate basically that, 

you know, well, China is the only person, but it just seems to me 

that it is unlikely because the relationship with China is difficult, 

but how do you see that playing out? What are Vietnam, Philippines, how are they going to deal with the fact that we may not 

have as big a presence as we would like? I mean, I think we are 

going to have a presence, but how do you see that rebalancing? 

And I am sorry, Dr. Wortzel, you were going to dive in there, so 

I will let you. 

Dr. WORTZEL. That is all right. I will start with that, sir. It 

seems to me that part of it depends on whether the surrounding 

nations are traditional U.S. alliance partners, so that extended deterrence and the confidence in U.S. extended deterrence is extremely important in the region. I think that Secretary Clinton and 

Panetta and Gates’ remarks on the importance of resolving maritime disputes peacefully and that U.S. does have an interest there 

are extremely important, and the explanation and the situation 

with the Senkakus in Japan is very different than the situation 

with the Philippines and Scarborough Shoal, but your question on 

what is the most explosive, potentially explosive problem, in my 

view, is not the land borders, that could, you could have scuffles; 

the most potentially explosive or volatile problem is the positions 

that China takes on the range of activities that can be conducted 

in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and its own exclusive economic zone because that is where you get things like the EP–3 incident. That is where you get the painting of Japanese ships with 

fire control radar. That is where you get the Invincible and Bowditch incidents, and those things can really spiral out of control. 

Mr. REINSCH. If I could add, I think that in terms of how others 

are going to respond, in the short run, Chinese behavior, which I 

would characterize as aggressive in the region, if anything, is driving them closer to us, and you have seen that. 

Mr. SMITH. That would have been my logical conclusion as well, 

yeah. 

Mr. REINSCH. I think that eventually the Chinese are going to 

figure that out and will probably respond with more sophisticated 

tactics, but in the short run, it has helped us. There is at the same 

time and always has been in the region this lingering fear that the 

Americans are going to leave, and it is one of these things that no 

matter how many times every administration of the last six or 

seven has said we are not leaving, there is always still this undercurrent of fear that we might. I think it is incumbent on every administration, regardless of party, to continue to reassert our interests in the region and continue to take concrete steps to demonstrate our interest in the region. 

Frankly, from my point of view, the most useful thing the United 

States can do in the short run is to conclude the TPP [Trans-Pacific 

Partnership] negotiations, and Congress can approve the TPP. 
18 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. REINSCH. A little lobbying here, and we can demonstrate to 

the region that we have an ongoing long-term trade and investment, which is important, and as well as military commitment to 

the region. 

Beyond that, I think you are going to see different countries reacting in different ways. The Vietnamese, who historically have 

had an adversarial relationship with China, haven’t changed, and 

I think are focusing first on a search for more friends anywhere 

they can find them, including us, and will be looking at their own 

military buildup. The Philippines, for obvious reasons, which is 

having a terrible crisis they have to deal with in the extreme short 

run, I think is going to be doing the same thing. 

The countries farther south I think are—it is a little bit more 

complicated. Indonesia is facing an election and probably a change 

of administration. It is hard to predict what is going to happen 

there. But the picture will be different in each case. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I think that pretty thoroughly answers my 

question. I will yield back, give some others a chance. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Smith. The Chair now recognizes 

the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Wittman, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman, members of 

the Commission, thank you so much for joining us today. I want 

to begin with Dr. Wortzel, and ask you a question about the readiness posture both of China and of the United States. As you know, 

President Xi has said that he is emphasizing the readiness of Chinese military forces. I want to know, in that perspective, how does 

China view the current situation in the United States with sequestration, the current military readiness challenges that we have? 

And where does that put China from the standpoint of their strategic thinking about the United States, not just in the Asia-Pacific, 

but how they are interacting across the globe? 

Dr. WORTZEL. Well, they see us, their military thinkers and writers and political leaders, see us in a slow decline, and struggling 

to meet the obligations that we have cut out for ourselves. And 

they look at, you know, some things that might be effective operational tactics like air-sea battle and think that we may not be 

quite capable of doing those things with the proper number of 

forces. 

At the same time, I think they recognize that we really do have 

probably the best, most used, and most practiced military at operations in the world, and they don’t have that. They have a lot of 

great operational doctrine, in part, modeled on ours. They have exercised it several times in what we would call unified commands, 

supported across the Armed Forces in an integrated way, but they 

have never really used it. And they are not practiced at using it. 

And I think that is going to take them quite some time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. I want to pose a question to the entire 

panel. Looking at the recent natural disaster there in the Philippines, looking at the U.S. response, which I think we are all very 

proud of, and we understand what we can do in that region of the 

world, and then looking at the Chinese response, what does that 
19 

do for our relationships in the region, not just with the Philippines, 

but how other nations look at us? And what does it say about the 

Chinese limited response? And what does it say about Chinese capacity? Is it an issue of a lack of will to do this? Is it an issue of 

a lack of capacity? Where does that stand? And again, how is that 

viewed within that particular region? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah. Well, I think, as you said, Mr. 

Wittman, that we can all be really proud of the way that our 

Armed Forces respond, both in the Philippines, I would say going 

back to the tsunami in Indonesia, and also the Tohoku earthquake 

in Japan. I think that that buys us an enormous amount of good 

will. It is not the reason that we do it, but it is one of the benefits 

that we do it. And I found it particularly interesting, as Mr. Smith 

mentioned, that China’s first response on the Philippines was really pathetic. I mean, it is the only way to describe it. And I think 

that there was enough international concern and outcry that they 

have stepped up some. But, you know, people remember who is 

there and helping them. It is like constituent service in some ways, 

people remember who has helped them. 

So, you know, I know that one of the sort of shared military exercises is disaster response that is happening. I don’t think that it 

is simply going to be the mechanics and the logistics of disaster response. I think that the Chinese are going to need to change their 

entire orientation in terms of what is their responsibility in the region when it comes to crises. But I am, like you, very proud of our 

armed services and the way that they always respond to these 

things. 

Mr. REINSCH. If I could add to that, I was struck on the financial 

relief side that a single American company, Philip Morris International, has contributed more to the Philippines than the Chinese, 

all of China has, which I think says something. One of the things, 

when I used to teach this issue years ago, one of the texts I used 

talked about the key element of hegemonic leadership globally is 

the willingness essentially to take one for the team, to take on, to 

bear costs in the interests of maintaining the system and helping 

everybody else. It is what the United States did after World War 

II, for example, to rebuild the system. And the costs were not that 

great at the time, but the rewards—not the direct rewards, but the 

rewards for the people of Europe were enormous. 

The Chinese continue to demonstrate over and over and over 

again that they haven’t learned that lesson. Their responses tend 

to be tactical. They are mad at the Philippines for reasons that we 

all know. So their response is to demonstrate their irritation. Unless they grow beyond that, their capacity for leadership, either regionally or globally, is going to be limited. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Bordallo, the ranking member of the Readiness 

Subcommittee, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

thank all of our witnesses for being here today to give us further 

information. My first question is in regards to how China views our 

selective hardening and dispersal plans. As your report has discussed over the past year, China has enhanced its anti-access/area 

denial [A2/AD] capabilities with certain stand-off weapons systems. 
20 

So part of countering that A2/AD threat is selective hardening and 

dispersal of Air Force facilities in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. How important would you say are these actions to 

countering the A2/AD threat? And what message does this send 

China? How does this change their calculations? 

Dr. WORTZEL. I think that we absolutely need to harden and disperse. And it is critical to the survival of our military assets. But 

I think what it will do is force the Chinese to improve their ability 

to mass weapons on a target, to use intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance to identify hardened targets, and to improve their 

ability for precision strikes on those targets. So hardening is one 

part of what we need to do. It seems to me that the second part 

are ballistic missile and cruise missile defenses. That the real answer, in my opinion, to massed warheads, whether they are coming 

from ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, is you really have to move 

forward on directed energy, whether it is ship-based or land-based 

or air-based laser and things like that. So we really don’t have adequate—in my opinion, adequate responses to what they can mass 

in terms of cruise missile and artillery fires. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I have another question. It is also for 

any of the witnesses. There has been a lot of discussion about the 

outcomes from the third plenum session of the 18th Congress in 

Beijing. There has been a lot of focus on the development of the national security council-like entity, although we wait for the details 

of how this organization is going to be structured, as well as the 

announcement that China was easing its one child policy and closing their detention centers. 

Now, I know it is only a few days since the session concluded, 

but I am wondering what all these actions in total paint. Tell us. 

Can you comment on their actions? Is it serious concern among the 

political elites about growing internal instability in China? And is 

there a way of trying to more effectively coordinate government, 

but also defuse political hot button items? 

Mr. REINSCH. Let me begin, if I may, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

Mr. REINSCH. First, just to note, these events all happened after 

our report, so obviously, they are not covered in the report. We did 

produce a detailed memorandum on the plenum document and the 

document that appeared last Friday as well. We have circulated it 

to members of the committee, I believe. If we haven’t, we are going 

to. And it is also on our Web site. So I would encourage you to have 

your staff to take a look at that for greater detail. The initial document was disappointing, partly because it was at 40,000 feet, and 

managed to say several different things in different directions simultaneously. 

I think that we would probably say—and we haven’t had a 

chance to discuss it collectively—but I think that our view would 

be that the document they provided on Friday has a number of 

promising elements to it. The biggest question always, as I mentioned in my opening statement, is whether they will actually be 

able to implement these things. You know, the old slogan that 

mountains are high and the emperor is far away is as true now as 

it was 5,000 years ago. These things often don’t happen at the local 

level. 
21 

And in terms of, you know, public unrest, as you mentioned, 

some things that will be very popular, like expanding land use 

rights for farmers, for example, to prevent arbitrary seizures, and 

dealing with the hukou system, the urban and residential permit 

system in some modest ways, whether those are implemented or 

not really is going to be up to local authorities, and not the national authority. And we simply have to wait and see what happens. 

The sign from the document is entirely a positive one. In some 

larger areas, I think their steps forward are modest. Even assuming they are implemented, they will be modest. I think the debate 

amongst economists is going to be whether they are heading for a 

hard landing or a soft landing. That the course they have embarked upon is untenable for the long term economically. But 

whether they are going to be able to sort of skate through it or suffer a more serious setback is I think an issue that economists are 

going to be debating. I think I will stop there. 

Mr. SHEA. Ms. Bordallo, you asked about the creation of a national security committee. One thing of interest in that is it also 

covers domestic security. And you asked the question are they concerned about internal instability? And the clear answer is yes. 

Now, we also have a memo on this, which we can share, share with 

you as well, prepared by our very crack staff. But some have speculated that the positioning of internal security as a responsibility of 

this national security committee is an effort to reduce the power of 

something called the politics and law leading small group—they do 

everything by small groups in the Politburo—which has overseen 

the police, judicial system, and civilian intelligence operations within China. 

And there is an individual, Zhou Yongkang, who used to run 

that, a former member of the standing committee of the Politburo, 

whose colleagues are being investigated in PetroChina and other 

areas. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much. My time is up. And 

the chairman is nodding at me. I would like to hear more. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. And as you guys know, you work very 

closely with Congressman Bordallo, so I am sure that you can give 

her that additional information. Dr. Heck is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. Recognizing that we are in the Armed Services Committee, 

I am going to take advantage, I want to take advantage of having 

you before me and go on a topic that is not related to the military. 

And that has do with the importance of gaming to Macau. As you 

may guess, I represent southern Nevada. 

Mr. REINSCH. That is not unexpected. 

Dr. HECK. So with 87.5 percent of total government revenue coming from gaming from Macau, allowing them to accumulate the 

third largest budget surplus as a percentage of GDP [gross domestic product], and surpassing Las Vegas as the world’s largest gambling market, I wonder what you think the greatest implications 

are for Macau on the U.S. gaming industry. 

Mr. REINSCH. This is an issue that we have studied for the first 

time in the Commission’s history. We had not addressed Macau for 
22 

the previous 12 cycles. So this was new for us. And as you know 

from the statistics you cited, it is impossible to study Macau without studying gaming, since it is such a significant part of what goes 

on there. We had testimony from your regulators, from Federal 

Treasury authorities and regulatory authorities, and also from experts. We also ended up meeting with representatives of two of the 

American casinos that operate in Macau at great length. And they 

provided us with a lot of information about the procedures that 

they follow in the Macau casinos to insulate themselves, in an attempt to insulate themselves from some of the problems that our 

report identifies. I think the report speaks for itself on this. We felt 

that the way that Macau is regulated, the way it is structured, and 

the way it works, it interacts with Chinese law in both the prohibitions on gambling in the rest of China, except for lotteries, but at 

the same time, the prohibition on collecting gambling debts in the 

rest of China, promotes a culture that contributes to organized 

crime and money laundering because of capital controls on moving 

money from the mainland to, well, anywhere, but in this case, 

Macau. 

There is an extended record on this subject dating back to congressional investigations 20 years ago before the Senate Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations that looked at various aspects of 

this issue that has suggested that money laundering and organized 

crime are significant problems. There was, on the international 

front, the issue, the case a few years ago of Banco Delta Asia, 

which had ties to North Korea, and there were questions then 

about flow of funds into and out of North Korea that would enable 

them to do some of the things that our government has been objecting to for a long time. 

We concluded that this was an issue that needed more work. And 

the essence of our investigation—I am sorry, the essence of our recommendations to the Congress is that this is something that needs 

to be looked into in more detail by the authorities that have basically more expertise and more assets than we do. 

Dr. HECK. Were you able to come to any conclusions or ideas of 

what this would mean? What Macau’s success would potentially 

mean to the U.S. gaming industry? 

Mr. REINSCH. I wouldn’t say that—we did not come to a conclusion with respect to the—specifically with respect to the activities 

of the American casinos there. We didn’t encounter any evidence 

that suggested that they were complicit in illegal activities. We 

concluded, and they, I think, would acknowledge, that it is a very 

difficult situation doing business there because of everything I just 

described. I think that beyond that, I think we were not in a position to go farther. But Carolyn may want to say something more 

about it. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah. It was—I think we come into this with 

a lot of different viewpoints on this Commission. And I think, Dr. 

Heck, that, you know, when you look at the percentage of revenues 

that the three U.S. companies who are involved in gaming in 

Macau are getting from Macau, it does raise some questions. We 

did not deal with those questions specifically. But you know, what, 

60 percent or 70 percent of the revenues of some of these companies is now coming from Macau gaming. I came away from the 
23 

hearing that we had and the additional information concerned 

about the ability of regulators to get access to the kind of information that they need to ensure that the U.S. gaming companies that 

are working in Macau are not being adversely affected by the organized crime that we know permeates the industry generally. But I 

think Nevada needs to be thinking about this and looking at this 

effort. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield 

back. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Heck. We 

proceed now to Congressman Austin Scott of Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ma’am, gentlemen, thank 

you for being here today. And I was glad to hear you speak of our 

friend Taiwan, and making sure that they know that we are going 

to continue to be their friend. I had the opportunity to visit there 

a year or so ago with some of my staff and discuss different issues 

with regard to trade relations for agriculture as well as militaryrelated issues. My question gets back to kind of that whole region 

with regard to China. They have a lot of borders with other countries, countries that we have been involved in, countries that we 

are involved in because of terrorism. Those terrorists don’t seem to 

want any type of trade with any outside country. So my question 

gets back to, if we look at Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda, the other 

terrorist groups that operate in that region, China essentially 

stayed out of those conflicts that we were engaged in. But now, as 

they try to expand trade into those other countries, are they starting to become more aware of—that might not be the right term. 

What approach are they taking to terrorism? And are they starting 

to see increases in threats from Al Qaeda and others to them? 

Mr. REINSCH. We have looked at this in the past. We didn’t 

spend a lot of time on it this year, Mr. Scott. Let me defer to Carolyn in a minute. I think what I would say is that they are acutely 

aware of it, because they have a problem in Xinjiang in western 

China, a problem primarily with the Uighurs, which are of the 

Muslim culture. So the Chinese are very sensitive to it. And again, 

as always with China, for reasons of self-interest, not a larger interest. And their concern about terrorism elsewhere is spillover primarily, and people either moving into China, moving into Xinjiang 

and causing the same troubles that they are causing somewhere 

else, or providing some aid and comfort flowing back and forth 

across borders. That has let them in some limited circumstances to 

be cooperative and share some of our concerns with fighting these 

efforts in other parts of the world, again, because they see a direct 

relationship to them. 

They have also begun to, at least in one notable case, move into 

Afghanistan with a significant investment, economic investment, a 

mine that they are building. I don’t have a lot of current information on how that is going, and whether it has been subject to terrorist attack, or whether it has become a volatile political issue. 

Somebody else might want to comment on that. So, you know, they 

are sensitive, but they are sensitive, again, for very specific internal reasons. 
24 

Mr. SHEA. I will just make two observations. China is the largest 

foreign investor in Iraq’s oil fields today. I don’t know if the committee knows that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Say that again. 

Mr. SHEA. China is the largest foreign investor in Iraq’s oil fields. 

This is outlined on page 301. We have some information about 

that. Secondly, China, this is an issue we looked at a couple of 

years ago, owns—Chinese entities, state-owned enterprise owns the 

largest copper mine in Afghanistan. And it is called the Aynak 

mine. I have not kept up to date as to whether it is up and running 

or—I think it is the single largest investment in natural resources 

in Afghanistan’s history. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if I may, before he answers, and that is one of 

the issues that I have a hard time with as a member of the Armed 

Services Committee, just before you answer please, ma’am, because 

we are sending our men and women over there to provide security 

when it is China that is receiving the economic benefits and the industrial relations in that country. Quite honestly, they should be 

paying the cost, not the United States taxpayer and the U.S. soldier. Ma’am. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Mr. Scott, I think that is a very important 

point that you made, which is that our young men and women died 

in Afghanistan and in Iraq. 

Mr. SCOTT. Still are. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. And the Chinese are getting economic benefit out of both of those. So I think that is an important issue, an 

issue of concern. I just wanted to go back and revisit on the issue 

of terrorism, I think it is important to recognize that in China, 

where the people of China are so repressed, the Chinese Government has a tendency to indicate—to characterize any uprising or 

any attempt to try to challenge them, they sometimes call it terrorism. And so it becomes complicated in terms of understanding 

and looking at it. 

And then also, and I don’t know, Larry, whether this was actually ever really documented, but particularly in the 1990s, there 

was some sense that the Chinese might have been providing missile technology and some nuclear technology and things to Pakistan 

in this kind of a, we will help you, but you make sure that you 

keep your problems outside of Xinjiang Province. This kind of, I 

doubt it was ever actually stated that way, but some sense of some 

of their dealings in parts of the world where some of these problems are kind of a, almost a quid pro quo. I don’t know that there 

was actually any ever documentation of that, but I think that there 

was some concern among analysts. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am out of time, so if you speak, be very brief. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Their concern is pan-Turkic and Uighur separatism. And they will permit literally anything to go on inside a 

country, regardless of who else it threatens, and assist any country 

with weapons, as long as they think they are getting a quid pro 

quo in controlling what they see as pan-Turkic and Uighur separatism. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you for those answers. Thank you for the work 

you are doing and for being here. 
25 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Scott. We now proceed to Congresswoman Tammy Duckworth of Illinois. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question, I am 

not sure which of you would be the right person to answer, has to 

do with China’s cybersecurity, their cyber attacks and how—I 

would like a greater discussion on the Chinese Government’s role 

in cyber theft and espionage using Chinese companies or on behalf 

of Chinese companies. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I was just going to say we are lucky we have 

one of the country’s experts on that issue sitting right here at the 

table, Dr. Wortzel. 

Dr. WORTZEL. I think the three things that have really helped 

document that this, for the most part, is a centrally directed effort, 

are the two reports by the Northrop Grumman Corporation for our 

Commission, and the Mandiant report that went as far as to identify an organization of the Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army that does this. 

So it is an extensive effort. It involves the electronic warfare and 

countermeasures department of People’s Liberation Army that 

cracks into computer systems, takes control of them, documents important nodes, and then they turn it over to the Third Department, 

the equivalent of our National Security Agency, which extracts information and can replace information, so that a large part of it is 

government directed. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And is that information then turned over to 

their corporate entities? Cybertheft? 

Dr. WORTZEL. Absolutely. It goes right to corporate entities. It is 

used to short-step research and development, it is used to supplement research and development, particularly in areas that they are 

unable to do themselves. And it supports directly their own comprehensive strategic industries that they want to develop. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What about the opposite flow of information? 

That is, I have Huawei in my district. One of their North American 

locations is actually in my district. I have real concerns, especially 

with them and ZTE and the reports that have been generated 

about how they are actually turning over information from their 

work with U.S. entities as telecommunications corporate networks 

back to the Chinese Government. Do you still that that is still existing, that the information is actually flowing from their corporate 

entities back to—— 

Dr. WORTZEL. When the Director of National Intelligence sees 

that as a problem, the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command 

sees that as a huge problem, our Commission sees that as a problem, and despite all the denials, that the genesis of some of these 

companies out of the People’s Liberation Army says to me that 

there is very close cooperation. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I know the DOD [Department of Defense] is 

still putting into place rules concerning country of origin for some 

of the components that are being used, not just in U.S. munitions 

purchases, but also for telecommunications and the like. Is there 

anything else that we here on this side on the dais should be thinking about that would help further protect our national security in 

terms of, you know, I am thinking about procurements. Because 

this is not just us dealing with the Chinese Government, this is ac-
26 

tually with their corporate entities that are providing services and 

goods to U.S. companies. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Well, first of all, given the structure of power in 

China and the penetration of the Chinese Communist Party into 

literally all industries, I don’t think you can separate any industry 

in China from the government. I think the Department of Defense 

is beginning to recognize that there are problems, particularly in 

information technology supply chains. And they are really fighting 

internally over the Federal Acquisition Regulations on what they 

can do to provide security. The State Department had the same 

problem. So I think the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 

in what was it, section 806? 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. 806. 

Dr. WORTZEL. 806. They are just beginning to act on that. So I 

don’t think you can let them off the hook on that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Are there other departments? I am sorry, Mr. 

Shea. 

Mr. SHEA. I was just going to recommend a book to you—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 

Mr. SHEA [continuing]. By James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi, 

and William Hannas called Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization. And it is a comprehensive examination. It is footnote 15 in one of our chapters. 

But it is a comprehensive examination of how the Chinese use 

technology theft and transfer it, they have mechanisms and organizations and structures to transfer that information to their commercial enterprises. 

Mr. REINSCH. And you ask what you guys could do about it. We 

have a recommendation simply that you encourage the Pentagon to 

move faster on the 806 issue. What is happening is directionally 

correct, but it is very slow. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I am out of time. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Duckworth. And we 

now proceed to Congressman Rich Nugent of Florida. 

Mr. NUGENT. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do appreciate 

the candor of this panel. While I heard, you know, the terminology 

challenges versus threat, but when you look at the spectrum of 

what is going on with China, particularly as it relates to our allies 

in the China Sea area, what we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq 

and how the Chinese have moved in behind us, even though it was 

our sons’ and daughters’ blood and our treasure that went there to 

pacify or correct issues going on, I wonder, I mean—and then you 

hear about the cyber threat that we face from China. And it is not 

just—I mean. 

And I think you have articulated very well that the government 

and its industries are one and the same. But it goes even further 

than that in regards to the cyber threat as it relates to our national 

security, particularly as it relates to our military. And I would really like to hear about the relationship between China’s cyber attack 

capability and their military advancements over the years, particularly as it seems to be that what they are developing specifically 

counters some of our abilities. And I think it has become more of 

a threat than it is necessarily a challenge. And I appreciate the 
27 

wordsmansmith of it. But if any of you would like to talk to that 

issue. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Well, first of all, I think you have to look at the 

way they think about us. When they analyze their security environment and the general trends, which is what they call it, they see 

us as the main threat. That is their writing. And Russia and India 

and Japan are secondary threats. So they have got to deal with the 

main threat. And they see us as heavily dependent on space and 

cyber over really extended distances of lines of communication. 

Now, for us, we tend to put these things into little cones. You 

know, we have got a Cyber Command and a Space Command. 

Hopefully, they are working together at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. But the Chinese have adopted an approach that 

was very close to what the Soviets used in radio electronic combat. 

So across all the military services, and across all the domains of 

war they have integrated the use of counterspace, their own space 

systems, cyber penetration, and precision fires. They practice it 

several times a year. And they are still struggling with making it 

more effective. But it is a comprehensive approach that is designed 

to attack what they see as our greatest weaknesses and our dependence on all of these command and control and surveillance 

systems. 

Mr. NUGENT. And it would seem that Mr. Scott hit on an issue 

that is near and dear to my heart, having had sons both in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. It seems that, you know, we could force an effort—and the Chinese, you have to give them credit, they are pretty sharp actors to come in behind us, and then on an economic 

viewpoint, and I think it has been well discussed by this committee, is that they do things, obviously, that are in the best interests of China and could care less about anything else. So how do 

we counteract that? I mean, how do we counteract the ability, 

when we go in, let’s say, just in Afghanistan while we are still 

there, what do we do? 

Dr. WORTZEL. I think, first of all, they were there before us. They 

didn’t care about the Taliban. 

Mr. NUGENT. Right. And I think they can operate, obviously. 

Dr. WORTZEL. They are happy to operate in these environments. 

And they won’t take a necessary security interest—I mean, the one 

thing you could do that would get them involved is stop protecting 

their areas. They start losing people, they start losing equipment, 

they have people captured, and what they are developing already 

as a force insertion capacity for hostage rescue, they will have to 

put into effect. And then they will have their own little problem. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I would just add that I think that our diplomacy needs to be perhaps more, I will use the word ‘‘vigorous’’ in 

ensuring that American companies have access to some of these opportunities too. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, I am out of time. And I want to thank this 

panel and the committee for holding this briefing. It is very important to all of us to hear what you have to say. Thank you very 

much. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Sheriff Nugent. And we now proceed to 

Congressman Joaquin Castro of Texas. 
28 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. And thank each of you for 

coming and joining us this morning, and for your testimony. Sometimes when you are this low in seniority, a lot of the great questions have already been asked. Plus, I was late to the hearing. So 

if you have already been asked this question, I apologize. But I am 

reading through the executive summary on this report, and on page 

10, it describes the U.S.—I am sorry, on page 4 first, it describes 

the U.S.-China trade deficit over the years. And as you can tell, it 

went up markedly in the 13 years, or actually the 12 years between 

2000 and 2012, from about, it looks like about $90 billion to over 

$300 billion. And during that time our economy has been up and 

down, we have had a Republican and a Democratic President, and 

actually a Democrat and then a Republican and then a Democrat. 

So how do you all account for that incredible growth? 

Mr. REINSCH. Well, I think in the first instance, the single 

event—well, there were two events, I suppose you could say, that 

triggered it. First was the decision by the Chinese some years earlier to embark on their own program domestically of economic liberalization and growth. This was the 1978 decision by Deng Xiaoping 

and others to essentially change policy and to abandon a lot of the 

Maoist policies, and to put China on a different course. 

It took a long time for that to evolve and develop and turn them 

into an economic unit that was capable of exporting to the extent 

they are now. But that is where that began. The other seminal 

event, if you will, was when they joined the WTO [World Trade Organization] in 2001. That created a network of, first of all, lower 

tariffs of our exports going there, but also, you know, their exports 

coming here were reduced. 

Mr. CASTRO. And I would point out what is a little bit confounding is that on page 10 it shows, for example, that our agricultural exports have actually increased at the same time. So it seems 

as though we have been sending more stuff over there, and yet that 

trade deficit just keeps getting bigger. 

Mr. REINSCH. Yes. And actually, they are, I think—we export 

more to them now I think than anybody else, except maybe Canada. But their imports to the United States have been growing 

faster than our exports to China. So the deficit continues to get 

worse. There are two bright spots. The main one, our agriculture, 

although if you look at the rest of our report, we have—we think 

we could be doing a lot better in agriculture. They focus their purchases largely on soybeans, commodity animal feeds, and not in 

some other areas. They continue to create market access barriers 

for our meat, for example, beef, pork, and poultry. There are significant issues there. We also do fairly well in services, but also encounter significant obstacles at their end to the use of U.S. 

services. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Mr. Castro, this is one of the issues on which 

I think some of the members of this Commission might not necessarily agree on sort of causes and effects. From my perspective, 

the Chinese Government certainly did not open their markets the 

way that those who in the U.S. Government promoted China’s accession to the WTO was supposed to happen. And so when you look 

at the numbers, and if you go back to 1989 we had a minuscule 

trade deficit with China, and it grew over the course of the 1990s, 
29 

but it took off exponentially after China’s accession to the WTO. 

And so there was this promise that was made that this was supposed to be opening up new opportunities for American goods and 

services, and it just hasn’t turned out that way. And it is a huge 

problem for our economy. 

Mr. REINSCH. And as she said, we don’t all agree with that analysis. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. And then I would ask you this as a general 

question because it is one that I have been thinking about. China’s 

economy is still markedly smaller than ours, right? You have a lot 

of folks there that live in poverty. You don’t have the same middle 

class that we have. But in your best estimation, in about 45 seconds, what—if they stay on the same course, how long would it 

take China to catch up with the United States? 

Mr. SHEA. I will just say that they can’t stay on the same course. 

This investment-led, export-led economy, I think, is ultimately 

unsustainable. And the challenge for China is to move their economy more towards a consumer-oriented one. 

Mr. REINSCH. If they do everything right, which is what Dennis 

just said, I agree with him, how long will it take until they reached 

the level of per capita income—and I say per capita, because that 

is the important distinguishing feature here—where we are now, I 

would say probably 20, 25 years. But then we will have gone beyond that by that time. 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. Thank you all. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Just note that a growing problem they have 

with inequity. So per capita income is important, but who is getting 

the benefit out of the growth is going to be really important, too. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Castro. And following the 

roster, I now recognize myself. And I want to thank each of you for 

your extraordinary work on the Commission report. It is of particular interest to me. I grew up with a great appreciation of the 

Chinese people. My dad served in the Flying Tigers during World 

War II. And so all my life, I heard how industrious and how hardworking the people of China are. And then I appreciate, I have 

been to Taipei to see the remarkable recognition of the Flying Tigers, and appreciation by the Chinese people of the service of the 

American military. 

I had the opportunity to serve on a delegation with Congressman 

Curt Weldon to Beijing. We were at the presidential compound 

with President Jiang Zemin, where as I was introduced, he yawned 

when I was introduced as a Member of Congress, but he stopped 

the meeting when it was announced Joe is a son of a Flying Tiger. 

And so then he announced the American military is revered in 

China, which was then front page of China Daily the next day. 

And then I have seen as recently as last month I was at the Chinese embassy for the recognition of the new museum which is 

being built at the site of the Flying Tigers operations cave in 

China. Again, recognition of affection and appreciation. So I am 

really hopeful long term indeed that we can have a positive relationship. 

With that in mind, too, I have also had the opportunity, with 

Congressman Jeff Miller of Florida, to visit Pyongyang. We saw the 
30 

enigma of this country, the bizarre circumstance. What is the relationship, each of you, to North Korea at this time of the People’s 

Republic? 

Dr. WORTZEL. Well, to start, they do have a peace and friendship 

treaty that, at least People’s Liberation Army officers have said 

still contains a secret protocol to provide for security support. So 

it is very close. And as frustrated as they may be with some of the 

behaviors there, they are still doing what they can to prop up 

North Korea with fuel and food. Although the government says it 

won’t sell weapons, they tend to treat their government-owned industries, state-owned enterprises that may be engaged in weapons 

trade as separate entities that they can’t control. So I think it is 

a frustrated relationship. It is certainly not one where they can 

control what North Korea does. But they won’t let it collapse. 

Mr. SHEA. I would say, as Larry, Dr. Wortzel mentioned, their 

key objective is stability. They won’t let the regime collapse. Why 

do they want stability? They want it because they don’t want a refugee problem around the border. They don’t want thousands of 

North Koreans coming into the country through the border. They 

don’t want a U.S. ally, potential U.S. ally on their border. That 

could be the case if the current regime fell. And I think there is 

some business interests that—resource development in North 

Korea, particularly at the provincial level in the provinces near 

North Korea, they have significant business interests in North 

Korea that affect—those interests may affect Chinese policymaking. 

Mr. WILSON. And as we go to another country, it just struck me 

that the relationship China has developed with South Korea has 

been so mutually beneficial. I can’t even think of trying to compare 

how South Korean investments, the jobs created, the economic opportunity, and then the bottomless pit that they are in in North 

Korea. I also had the opportunity last year, with Congresswoman 

Bordallo, to visit Vietnam. It is extraordinary to see the relationship of the people of Vietnam to the people of the United States. 

And a great concern about China. So what is the relationship between China and Vietnam? 

Mr. REINSCH. We were there in 2009, I guess, and I was struck 

that 2 weeks before we got there, they had, after 30 years of negotiation, settled the land border with China. They had fought a war 

with the Chinese in 1979 over that question. It took them 30 years 

to settle the border. There is a long, multi-thousand-year adversarial relationship between the two parties, and a great deal of suspicion in Hanoi about Chinese intentions. And I don’t see that 

changing any time soon. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah. We haven’t talked at all today about 

some of the challenges certainly that Vietnam is facing because of 

China. Things like water. The Mekong River serves as a rice basket. And as the Chinese dams upriver, it is having an impact on 

all of the countries downstream. So there is that. There is the 

issues in the maritime arena that the Vietnamese are dealing with. 

We had, as my chairman said, you know, we had a very interesting 

visit when we were there. I think that the Vietnamese were particularly pleased to see people from the United States coming over 

and talking to them about these issues. And I remember asking 
31 

one of the generals there, you know, I understand that you want 

diplomacy to solve these problems. But what are you going to happen if diplomacy fails? And he looked and he smiled very politely 

and he said to me, well, as you well know, we know how to fight 

and win. I took that away as something. 

I mean, I think we would all hope that there aren’t any conflicts 

that take place on this. But that is going to really require the Chinese Government, too, to make some concessions and be concerned 

about what its neighbors downstream are thinking. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you all. And again, who would ever 

imagine a positive relationship between the people of Vietnam and 

the United States. Really, I saw a deep friendship in my role to 

work with MIA–POW [Missing in Action-Prisoner of War] issues. 

We now proceed to Congressman Mark Veasey of Texas. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you 

about just the Chinese culture overall as it relates to cyberspace 

and some of the things in the past that they are known for, like 

imitation and what have you. Has the culture in China changed 

enough to where they know that a lot of the more serious cyberspace issues are very serious? The reason why I ask that question 

is that I recall a story that I read many, many years ago about an 

American executive from Detroit that happened to be in China, and 

they saw a car that looked just like, I believe it was a Jeep Cherokee. And he said, hey, that—at first the guy was like, hey, that 

looks like our car. He was excited. Then when he got closer, he noticed that the emblem was slightly different. And the guy explained 

to him who was on the tour with him that, no, that he should see 

that as—you know, imitation is the highest form of flattery, that 

he should be impressed by that. 

I mean, do the Chinese seriously understand that a lot of the 

hacking and the cyberspace issues that have been going on, that 

is really like serious business? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. You know, there are some people who believe that Chinese intellectual property protection will happen as 

the Chinese become more inventive and have things to protect, 

though there is this whole thing that is going on about patent filing. I think you have to look at the economics of this. And I just 

wanted to go back to something that Ms. Duckworth asked. The IP 

[intellectual property] Commission report assesses that the damage 

to the U.S. economy annually from intellectual property theft is 

$300 billion a year. Now, that is from all places. But they also assess that about 50 to 80 percent of that is coming from China. That 

is a loss to us of $150 to $200 billion a year. And it has been the 

way that—one of the ways that the Chinese Government has built 

their economy. 

I wish I could say that things are getting better. But they have 

been able to bypass all sorts of R&D [research and development] 

costs. So why would they stop doing this when they get this economic benefit, which is a huge cost to our own companies? We 

might have some differences here. 

Mr. REINSCH. Well, no, I would put myself in the category of this 

is a situation that is get getting better, but it is getting better very, 

very slowly and unacceptably slowly. One large American company 

at one point reported that—they were in the software business— 
32 

the rate of piracy of their product had fallen from 94 percent to 88 

percent. Now, I don’t construe that as a victory. On the other hand, 

it is directionally correct. I think the more interesting piece of data, 

and I think that it is not—I think it is more than what some people 

believe, I think it is really axiomatic that countries get interested 

in protecting IP when they have some of their own to protect, because then they have constituencies within their own country demanding that their own government take steps. 

One of the interesting things that has happened there is that 

there has been a kind of an explosion of intellectual property litigation in China. I think 95 percent of the cases are between Chinese 

parties suing each other, or one suing another for exactly the thing 

you are talking about. But it is all about Chinese IP, it is not— 

you know, it is not Ford suing—I mean, there is some of those, too. 

But to me, this is a good sign, because it has forced the Chinese 

Government, one, to improve their court system and to develop. It 

is still not an independent rule of law system, but at least they are 

developing now an infrastructure that is able to take these cases 

and decide them in decent periods of time. And they are developing 

an infrastructure, and they are developing—they are responding to 

a demand that is domestic for better practices here. It is going to 

take a long time. 

Two years ago we did a road trip from Nanjing to Shanghai and 

stopped along the way at Suzhou and Changzhou and met with 

American companies there, and asked every single one of them do 

you have an IP problem? And everyone but one said yes. The one 

that said no said, well, of course we don’t. You know, we are number four in the marketplace. They are all stealing from number 

one, which was a German company. What intrigued me about that, 

though, was a couple of them said we have solved our problems 

simply by getting our lawyers to send cease and desist letters to 

the offending Chinese party. I thought that was extraordinary. 

That was only a couple of cases. But, you know, baby steps is something I said earlier. This is moving in the right direction. It is 

going to take 20 years, you know, before it reaches an acceptable 

level. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I want to add one thing, though, which is 

that, again, my chairman is talking about big companies that 

might be able to take this 85 percent hit on intellectual property. 

But our innovative, small and medium enterprises in this country 

whose IP is being stolen can’t survive that kind of theft. They can’t 

afford the lawyers who can do this. They can’t survive it. So it is 

huge opportunity costs for our economy that this kind of theft continues. And the slowness might work for some companies, but I am 

afraid that we are going to have a lot of companies that will go 

belly up because they can’t deal with the slowness in terms of the 

protections. 

Mr. VEASEY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question? 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE [presiding]. Without objection. 

Mr. VEASEY. There was a recent acquisition of a large American 

pork producer by a Chinese company. And of course whenever a 

Chinese company acquires something, obviously, they are in business with the Chinese Government in some sort or fashion. What 

sort of concerns, you know, looking long term at deals like this, and 
33 

obviously in order to keep the economy going strong worldwide, you 

know, we need to be able to do business with the Chinese and 

other countries that may not necessarily share all of our same business, I guess, morays as it relates to, you know, cybersecurity and 

what have you. But, you know, when you talk about an American 

pork producer and you are talking about a company that is going 

to have to be interacting with the USDA [United States Department of Agriculture] and other Federal agencies, you know, what 

sort of security concerns, you know, might that sort of a deal, you 

know, have for the American public? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I think that this is another issue where we 

are going to have some differences on here. But I would just note, 

Congressman, that our colleague, Congressman Slane, who is sitting in the audience, testified on the Senate side expressing concerns about what this acquisition might be. Of course, it has since 

gone through. But we will ask our staff to get you a copy of his testimony. We have food security concerns, food safety concerns. And 

I have been interested to see that since that acquisition has happened, that particular company is doing a lot of advertising on TV, 

that I don’t recall seeing, all about their good products. But we 

have a number—some of us have a number of concerns about it. 

Mr. REINSCH. I would just say this is probably an issue that has 

divided the Commission more than most issues. There were different views on that specific transaction, which I think Carolyn has 

addressed, and I won’t say anything more about that. And Dan has 

addressed it in his own testimony, which we can get you. I think 

there is also a debate amongst commissioners on the larger issue 

of how to deal with this issue. 

It happens to be the same debate that Congress has had on several previous occasions. And that is what are the authority to prohibit an acquisition? Should we base solely on national security, or 

whether it should also be based on what might be called economic 

security, or cost-benefit, or whatever the Canadians, for example, 

use what they refer to as a net economic benefit test in going to 

a similar process to ours. 

Congress has considered that question twice in 1987 and then 

again in 2007 and, on both occasions, decided not to go down that 

road, and so we have a statute that is a national security statute 

only and permits the President to block a transaction based on national security. 

In this particular case, CFIUS [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States], the group that oversees this, which is 

an interagency committee, concluded that there was not a national 

security issue with respect to pork. People don’t—not everybody 

agrees with that, but that was the conclusion they came to. It 

wouldn’t surprise me if at some future point Congress takes this 

issue up again and debates it again. 

I would just say the politics of it are complicated because at one 

level these acquisitions do raise all the issues that you mentioned. 

Another issue with these acquisitions particularly, or a green field 

investment particularly, creates jobs and brings new economic activity, so you often find that whereas, you know, military officials 

and national security officials in Washington have one view, you 

know, the Governor of Alabama or the Governor of Texas may have 
34 

a very different view about the economic advantage that an acquisition might bring. 

Mr. SHEA. Just to add to that, there is another issue that, frankly, we are divided on the Commission is the issue that is raised by 

the Smithfield purchases. It is the issue of reciprocity. It is unlikely 

that an American company could turn around and buy a porkproducing company in China. 

Mr. VEASEY. That is correct. 

Mr. SHEA. And there are multiple markets, multiple sectors in 

the Chinese economy that are essentially off limit for foreign investment, including U.S. investment, so the Smithfield purchase 

also raises the issue of reciprocity. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, thank all of you for being here, and I wanted to kind of 

direct this question, if I could, Mr. Reinsch, to you. 

Obviously, a lot of us concerned about China building such a robust naval offensive capability at a time when we are facing a 

readiness crisis in our own country and to respond, and of course, 

they are, I think, probably looking at our rapidly downgrading force 

capabilities across the spectrum of our military. Can you talk a little bit about the JL–2 as well as the first anti-ship ballistic missile, 

the Dong-Feng or the DF–21, and how the Commission assesses 

our missile defense apparatus as postured to respond to these missiles in the defense of our homeland and our allies abroad? 

Mr. REINSCH. I really can’t, Mr. Franks, but Mr. Shea can and 

Mr. Wortzel can. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, we will talk to—— 

Mr. REINSCH. I would prefer to have them speak for us. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. 

Dr. WORTZEL. It has been a painful program for them, Mr. 

Franks. They have spent decades blowing out the bottom of test 

submarines trying to perfect a submarine-launched ballistic missile 

that they couldn’t get to pop out of the water, and although they 

have worked at it for a very long time, it looks like finally they 

may be nearing operational capability in one ballistic missile submarine, and if that becomes operational, then I would expect two 

or three more. That will allow them to target the United States 

with some 16 more ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], but 

it also complicates our problem of locating a submarine. 

Now, we think they will operate it in bastion as the Soviets did 

and the Russians do, and that is perhaps not as great a problem 

because if it operates in bastion, it is still launching over an area 

that we are protecting with ballistic missile defenses; but they 

don’t have to operate it in bastion. If they move it into the deep 

South Pacific, which they explored with hydrographic ships and undersea mapping ships in the late 1970s and 1980s, it complicates 

our ability to find it, and it literally flanks any ballistic missile defenses and radar systems that we have. So if you are worried about 

a couple of launches out of northeast China or North Korea across 
35 

kind of a polar route to the United States, we are probably in good 

shape. If they have three of them out there, you are in real trouble. 

Mr. FRANKS. I understand, and I assume blowing out the bottom 

of the submarines they classify as a negative result most of the 

time. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Only reselling. 

Mr. FRANKS. Quickly, I am going to try to get two other quick 

questions in if I can. Can you just elaborate in general on what 

progress China has made in developing and testing EMP [electromagnetic pulse] weapons or enhanced nuclear weapons for purposes of EMP? 

Dr. WORTZEL. They have worked on it. They have also worked on 

tactical neutron enhanced radiation warheads. We know that they 

have worked on electrical generating EMP as well. 

Mr. FRANKS. EMI [electromagnetic interference]. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Right. I think they are aware of what the footprint 

of an EMP blast inside their own second island chain would probably do to cripple themselves, so it is something they have looked 

at, and they are capable of doing it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I hope we keep an eye on that. 

Last question. The Burmese Government and military has, you 

know, obviously a very ingrained relationship with China, and we 

also know that democratic civil society within Burma is sort of 

upset about that with how much support that China has given to 

the Burmese Government’s oppressive military. What do you think 

the future of the Chinese-Burmese bilateral relationship is? How 

do you think that the Chinese will deal with their setback in influence in Burma, and how do they adjust to that, and what is our 

role? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Well, that is a big question, and it is actually not a topic that we have looked at in the past couple years and 

certainly since the change has happened. I think some—I guess I 

would say about Burma that the question about a distinction between what the people of Burma are thinking and what the Government of Burma is thinking and doing remains to be—it is unfolding, shall we say it that way? And I think another interesting 

dynamic I am just going to throw into the mix on Burma is the 

India-Burma relationship, and how does India-Burma-China end 

up working out? I don’t really have any observations to make yet, 

but it is something that perhaps we should look at over the course 

of the year. 

Mr. FRANKS. I hope you will because I can tell you the Burmese 

people and the Burmese military have a widely disparate view. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

You know, if you are a freshman and you sit in these committee 

hearings long enough, sometimes they give you the gavel, and so 

I have the gavel, and I have a question I would like to follow up 

on. 

Mr. Joaquin Castro asked a very insightful question, and he and 

I are on opposite sides of the aisle. Our political philosophies are 

very different, but he does have some very good insights. And he 
36 

asked about the trade deficit. And from my perspective, when you 

see a trade deficit the size that we have, usually what would happen, as long as we have, you know, floating currencies, their currency should strengthen as we are demanding more and more of 

their goods. That means their currency would strengthen relative 

to ours, and that would enable our exports to increase while their 

exports decreased. And what we have seen is that while their exports have increased and increased and increased, we haven’t seen 

their currency strengthen the way we would expect relative to ours. 

I was wondering if the panel could share with me their thoughts 

on why that has occurred. 

Mr. REINSCH. This has also been a subject of some debate in the 

Commission. We addressed this in our report. We have addressed 

it in our report I think the last 5 years, and I apologize, Mr. Chairman, my statement actually had a sentence or two on it which I 

skipped in the interest of time, but if you go back to the full statement, it references the Chinese currency manipulation. 

The RMB [renminbi] does not float freely, and so its rate is effectively set by the Chinese Government. I think most economists out 

there have concluded that over a long period of time, the Chinese 

have set the rate at levels that allow them to achieve the results 

that you have described as far as trade is concerned. Over the last 

5 or 6 years, they have allowed the RMB to appreciate; it has appreciated significantly. I think there has always been a debate 

amongst economies over the extent to which it has been undervalued. Five years ago, the argument was between people who said 

zero and people who said upwards of 40 percent. I think now the 

argument is more between—there is always some people who say 

zero—but the argument is more between 10 and 20 percent, so 

there clearly has been progress made. And I think it is shown in 

the extent to which our exports have increased. At the same time, 

their exports to us have increased faster, so this does not show up 

in the bilateral trade data. 

This is an issue that the last two administrations, meaning the 

Bush administration and the Obama administration, have pressed 

the Chinese on very, very hard, never with as much success as we 

would like. They continue to press. As you well know, it is an issue 

that Members of Congress have raised on both sides of the aisle 

frequently via letter and occasionally via amendment and bill. I 

have no doubt it is not going to go away. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, I will just add, and this is interesting 

since the chairman and I come from the same party, but we have 

some disagreements on this issue, among other economic issues 

that, you know, I think that to call what this administration and 

the previous administration and the administration before that 

have accomplished as progress is really just not acceptable. 

And, you know, I think that it would be, this is my views, it 

would be an important step for the U.S. Treasury to actually acknowledge that the Chinese Government is manipulating its currency rather than giving it the pass that it has consistently done, 

including most recently in September. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. To follow up on that, when you talk about the 

manipulation of the Chinese yuan, what capacity would they have 

to manipulate the U.S. dollar based on how many Treasury securi-
37 

ties they own of ours and how many dollars they own of ours? Do 

they have a capacity there at all? 

Mr. REINSCH. Well, it is—yes, I mean, if they dump them, but 

they would be the biggest loser if they did that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if they were to dump U.S. dollars, then 

they would lose exports, or they wouldn’t have the strength of the 

dollar for their own export economy. 

Mr. REINSCH. The value of their holding, their dollar-denominated holdings would go down dramatically. 

Mr. SHEA. We had a hearing, sir, a couple of years ago I believe, 

where we brought in some experts who shared their views as to 

whether, you know, China was America’s banker and they had us 

over a barrel, and I think the most, the overwhelming majority of 

the experts said no, as Bill explained, that, you know, it is sort of— 

China would hurt itself if it took a drastic action dumping its 

dollar-based reserves. My understanding is China owns about 10 

percent, I may be wrong, but about 10 percent of U.S. Treasurys. 

The staff will correct me if I am wrong. 

Dr. WORTZEL. Some years ago, we actually had a hearing and 

went up to the financial industry in New York and asked some of 

these questions, and I can’t remember the percentages, but my colleagues have given you the arguments on why it really doesn’t pay 

to dump your U.S. securities, but the other assessment by the financial industry is if it did, it might cause an increase of a couple 

of percent in interest rates in the U.S., but the whole market is so 

big, the whole securities market is so big that it is really not a fatal 

problem. 

And I guess the other thought I would leave you with is that you 

have many people that say you can’t go to war against your banker. Well, we are their banker. They are not our banker. And if you 

go to war, all your assets are immediately seized. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So when we experienced—I don’t know if you 

would call it dumping, but they had a massive sale of U.S. Treasury securities I think back in 2007 or 2008, can you guys share 

what—how that reflected on our currency and on our markets? 

Dr. WORTZEL. I don’t think you could then because we had our 

own financial crisis at about the same time and the banking crisis, 

so I think it would be—I think what they did was a reaction to 

that, and it would be very difficult to separate their action from the 

bigger domestic banking crisis, and that is from a guy that don’t 

know much about it. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Right, exactly. He is doing an excellent job 

talking about economics in this hearing. But another point I just 

want to make is they have us over a barrel if we think that they 

have us over a barrel, and again, I have been concerned over the 

years that there might be people within the U.S. Government who 

are afraid to take certain actions on perhaps other issues in the 

U.S.-China relationship because they are concerned about the impact of, you know, dot, dot, dot, and so it becomes a negotiation tactic rather than necessarily the reality. And I always find myself 

even saying in a context like this what—if they dumped it, where 

are they going to put their money? I don’t think they are going to 

be buying euros. I mean, it is—— 
38 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I have one final follow-up on this, and that is 

when you think about the risk of China selling U.S. Treasury 

bonds or making an effort to potentially weaken the U.S. dollar, 

when you think about this risk, the follow-up is usually, they 

would never do that because it would hurt their own export market, and their export market is the backbone of their economy. But 

what we have seen in the last probably 7 or 8 years, and I would 

like to hear if you guys agree with this, they have really diversified 

their exports across the world such that they don’t rely so much on 

us for their export economy anymore. Can you follow up on that? 

Mr. SHEA. Well, I think their biggest market is the European 

Union, and I think we come in second place, so we are still a very 

substantial market for Chinese exports. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. The power of the American consumer still, 

I mean, I think that 2008, the financial crisis of 2008 really demonstrated both to the United States and to China how intertwined 

our economies are and that it has always been ironic to me that 

as the Chinese have built their economy on exports, they have been 

having an adverse impact on the very sector of our economies 

where the workers would be consuming Chinese goods, but it 

doesn’t seem that that has had as much of a difference. 

But they are, indeed, diversifying their exports all over the 

world. In Africa, for example, you know, they are displacing African 

markets and African workers, and there is some growing concern 

in countries in Africa about what is happening to their own indigenous businesses as cheap Chinese goods are flying into—going into 

Africa. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One final line of questioning, and this is regarding—I am a Navy pilot. I flew combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

spent a lot of time in the Persian Gulf. Given the position that we 

are in with the sequester right now, our presence in the Gulf and 

around the world is lacking, and that is unfortunate. My concern 

is that if we are not securing shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf 

or in other market sectors around the world, there is a void, and 

of course, the Middle Eastern countries that export oil and rely on 

that for their economies, they are going to find a replacement for 

our security. And in order to hedge their bets, they will export oil 

to whoever wants to provide that security. Is there a risk that because we are not there and we have left a void, that China might 

fill that void, and might that explain why China is now investing 

so heavily in the Middle East and why the Middle Eastern countries are now exporting oil so heavily to China? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Well, first, I think that lots of countries 

around the world are hedging in their own ways. Certainly for the 

Middle Eastern countries, especially also as the United States talks 

about energy independence, they need to be thinking, they are 

thinking about where are there going to be reliable purchasers of 

oil who are also not going to be pressuring them on things like 

democratic reforms and human rights, so it is that issue that I 

mentioned earlier about economic growth with authoritarian government that goes hand in hand, but there are complications and 

there are risks for China involved in this, so Saudi Arabia has far 

greater oil production than Iran, and yet China has a really close 

relationship with Iran, and how it manages that balance of main-
39 

taining relationships or expanding relationships with countries 

that have their own challenges, their own problems, their own battles I will use the word, is going to be a really interesting dynamic. 

I mean, it is a Middle Eastern quagmire so that as the countries 

themselves are interested in engaging more with China and selling 

more to China, the Chinese Government very well might get pulled 

more into some of the difficult dynamics that we are trying to deal 

with in the Middle East. 

Mr. REINSCH. This is a new—if I could just add, getting pulled 

into this has been a new and kind of unsettling experience for 

them. They have encountered occasional difficulties in Africa. I 

think what really set them back was the need to conduct a massive 

evacuation from Libya during the revolution. They suddenly had 

35,000 people that they needed to get out of the country, and they 

weren’t—we are prepared for that kind of situation. We know what 

to do, we have a Navy. We have capabilities of dealing with it. 

They weren’t. They ultimately did it, but I think it was a wakeup call for them that if you are going to be involved in this region 

in any capacity, you need to have a whole level of commitment and 

activity beyond anything that they have experienced and beyond 

anything that is comfortable for them. This is going to be a difficult 

transition for them to do the kinds of things you are talking about. 

Dr. WORTZEL. The scenario you suggest that the United States 

couldn’t or wouldn’t creates a lot of other competitions, that suddenly Japan has to rethink, which has a very capable navy, has to 

rethink how far it lets it go out to protect sea lines of communication. They would probably be a natural—India is developing a navy 

that, you know, it hopes can do those kind of things. Japan and 

India and Vietnam and India look to each other for that sort of 

stuff. So—and there is no love between the Indians, the Japanese, 

and the Chinese, so it does create the potential for competitions, 

but none of those nations, except possibly Japan if it chose politically to do so, is capable of undertaking those missions at this time 

or for a good 5 to 10 years. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Any other thoughts before we adjourn? 

Is there anybody else that would like to ask a question? No? 

All right. 

Well, I would like to thank the witnesses so much for your testimony, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 20, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 20, 2013 

(45) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on "2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission" 

November 20, 2013 

I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the 2013 Report to Congress of 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. This hearing is part of a 

larger oversight effort focus on the Asia-Pacific rebalance led by Mr. Forbes and Ms. 

Hanabusa-who are providing strong bipartisan leadership on this important topic. 

We've met with U.S. Pacific Command officials and last week heard from key 

ambassadors representing allied and partner nations. However, we cannot consider the 

rebalance without examining China. 

The Commission has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of Chinese military 

capabilities, economic developments, and political and foreign policy objectives. Their 

annual report-which was released earlier this morning-is a superb resource for 

Congress and the public. 

While we continue to warn about our military's readiness, and the dangerous effects of 

budget cuts and sequestration, China's military spending continues to rise and its new 

leadership seeks to increase combat readiness. Its current pace of military modernization 

shows that Beijing is developing the ability to project power and influence further abroad. 

I look forward to hearing the Commission's assessment of the key military and foreign 

policy developments made by China in the past year and the implications for our own 

policies and posture in the region. 

China can playa constructive role in the region and the world, but for those of us focused 

on security issues, recent trends-in their anti-access and area denial capabilities, and 

cyber espionage campaigns, in particular-give us cause for concern. 

I appreciate all the work they and their staff has done, and I look forward to hearing 

their testimony. 
46 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on "2013 Report to Congress ofthe U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission" 

November 20, 2013 

I would like to welcome our witnesses and to thank them for being here with us this 

morning. I look forward to hearing their views on the important topic of our economic 

and security relationship with China. 

For more than a decade, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has 

reviewed the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic 

relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The 

commission's annual reports to Congress are valuable resources for assessing China's 

dynamic rise. 

While some observers have expressed alarm over China's military modernization effotis, 

r do not believe that an adversarial relationship with China is inevitable. We must 

carefully monitor and evaluate Chinese military developments, but it is my hope that the 

United States and China will be able to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship that 

promotes growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The United States 

can help China to become a more open and cooperative participant in the international 

commtmity. The United States should work with China, in close coordination with our 

many allies and partners in the region, to: provide and maintain collective security; 

peaceably address concerns and mitigate disputes; further shared interests and objectives; 

and perpetuate healthy multilateral exchange. 

The United States will continue to lead in the Asia-Pacific and to offer assurances 

through its strong forward presence in the region, but we should also welcome China's 

cooperation on matters of communal interest. For instance, I hope that China will exert 

its unique influence on the North Korean regime, in concert with the efforts of other 

concerned states, to facilitate denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Transnational 

threats, such as violent extremism and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and 

weapons also continue to menace the region, while disease, malnourishment, 

environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster persist. China could be 
47 

instrumental in helping the international community to combat these common 

difficulties. The more we can do to defuse tensions through cooperative efforts, the more 

we can help to realize the immense potential for growth and prosperity throughout the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and to expanding the dialogue on China. 

would especially appreciate our witnesses' views on how the United States might 

enhance its relationship with China as it proceeds to rebalance its presence in the AsiaPacific region. 
48 

"U.S.-China Economic and Secnrity Review Commission 2013 Report to Congress" 

Testimony of the Honorable William A. Reinsch 

Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Secnrity Review Commission 

before the 

Armed Services Committee, U.S. Honse of Representatives 

Hearing on "2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Secnrity Review Commission" 

November 20, 2013 

INTRODUCTION 

While 2013 has been a year of leadership change for China, it is too early to say that the initial 

economic policy pronouncements will lead to quick refornls. Less heralded but longstanding and 

continuing improvements in China's military eapabilities, however, could bave a major impact on the 

region. 

The Chinese leadership accomplished a peaceful turnover during the past year, complicated by 

factional political maneuvering. The handoff for the new five-year term took place with both ceremony 

and caution. In the absence of immediate policy changes from the newcomers, the government in Beijing 

coasted on the momentum from the previous decade. While China's economy slowed from a 30-year 

double-digit sprint to a more sustainable pace of 7.66 percent growth, Beijing's new economic 

policymakcrs appear to be clinging to the old formula of exports and infrastructure projects and a strong 

state-controlled sector to boost employment and maintain the regime's political control. 

The Chinese renminbi continued to appreciate against the dollar but remains undervalued. The 

rise in the Chinese currency did not jeopardize China's expanding trade surplus with the United States nor 

its growing foreign exchange reserves, which hit $3.66 trillion at the end of September. China's new 

leaders, President and Party General Secretary Xi J inping and Premier and Party Secretary of the State 

Council Li Keqiang. reaffirmed the government's long promised goal of shifting the economy to one 

more driven by domestic consumption. However, the major market based tools and reforms that China 

could use to empower Chinese workers and consumers remain unused: opening China's financial services 

sector to foreign investment; shrinking the size and number of state-owned enterprises; and expanding 

opportunities for private investment and savings beyond low interest-bearing deposits in state-owned 

banks or risky speculation in the volatile real estate market. Such moves by China would help reduce the 

growing trade imbalance with the United States and boost employment in America. 

Also troublesome were the press reports in April 2013 of an official but secret party-approved 

directive known as "Document No.9" that seeks to enhance party authority. Widely attributed to 

President Xi, the memo lists seven perils to be avoided, among them "Western constitutional 

democracy," "universal values" of human rights, press freedom and independence from the government, 

pro-market "neo liberalism," an independent judiciary, and "nihilist" criticisms of the Chinese 

Communist Party. 

U.S. companies investing in China reported the same problem areas as the year before. In a 

survey of the top ten problems experienced by the foreign affiliates of U.S. companies, the majority were 

of the Chinese government's making. U.S. companies cited competition with Chinese government-owned 
49 

companies, onerous licensing procedures, lax intellectual property protections, discriminatory laws and 

standards, and restrictions on foreign investment. 

After announcing with some fanfare a free trade zone in Shanghai, Bcijing diluted its potential 

impact by exempting segments of 18 different sectors, such as construction, finance, and manufacturing, 

from foreign investment and imposing a variety of other restrictions, highlighting continued disputes 

within the government over the pace and direction of economic reform. Beijing's leadership also reacted 

haltingly to the emerging problems in China's lightly regulated shadow banking system, particularly the 

buildup of unsecured, olf-balance sheet loans. The system has proliferated because China's state-owned 

banking system still heavily favors government-run enterprises over the efforts of Chinese entrepreneurs 

and small- and medium-sized business owners. Without fundamental banking reforn1 and expanded credit 

to private industry and consumers, China's goal of economic diversification will remain stuck in low gear. 

One positive development in bilateral trade has been agriculture, the only sector in which the 

United States enjoys a substantial trade surplus with China. U.S. food producers stand to benefit from 

China's growing demand for consumer foods, especially meat products. But at present, China 

concentrates its imports on lower value-added bulk commodities while exporting consumer foods to the 

United States that pose significant safety risks. 

Under its new political leadership, China's actions in the East and South China Seas continued to 

increase tensions in the region. It is becoming clear China does not intend to resolve its maritime disputes 

through multilateral negotiations or the application of international laws and adjudicative processes but 

prefers to use its growing power in support of coercive tactics that pressure its neighbors to concede 

China's claims. 

Since the Commission's 2012 Report, strong evidence has emerged that the Chinese government 

is directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the United States. China to date 

has compromised a range of U.S. networks, including those of the Department of Defense and private 

enterprises. These activities are designed to achieve a number of China's broad security, political, and 

economic objectives, such as gathering intelligence, providing Chinese finns with an advantage over their 

competitors worldwide, advancing long-term research and development objectives, and gaining 

information that could enable future military operations. 

Meanwhile, China continued to develop and field advanced military platfonns and weapon 

systems. China's comprehensive military modernization is altering the balance of power in the Asia 

Pacific, challenging decades of U.S. military preeminence in the region. 

China in 2013 expanded and diversified its arsenal of weapon systems capable of placing U.S. 

ships, aircraft, and bases in the Western Pacific at risk. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) also 

continued to pursue cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace capabilities that will enable Beijing to 

degrade or disrupt the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance that are essential to U.S. military power projection on behalf of its interests in the region. 

As these capabilities mature, the costs and risks to the United States of intervention in a potential regional 

contlict involving China will increase. 

Furthermore, the PLA enhanced its regional power projection capabilities, improving Beijing's 

ability to use force against Taiwan, Japan, and rival claimants in the South China Sea. This could increase 

China's willingness to respond militarily to a perceived provocation or to consider preemptive attacks in a 

crisis involving Taiwan or China's maritime sovereignty claims. Many of these scenarios could require 

the U.S. military to protect U.S. regional allies and partners as well as to maintain open and secure access 

to the air and maritime commons in the Western Pacific. 
50 

Most Asian countries welcomed the U.S. rebalance to Asia when it was announced by the Obama 

Administration in 2011. However, there is growing concern among U.S. allies and partners that the 

Department of Defense will be unable to follow through on its commitment to thc rcbalance due to 

declining defense budgets and continuing secllrity challenges elsewhere. 

The Commission's Report addresses these and other issues in dcpth as it continues to monitor the 

cvolving economic and security relationship between our two countries. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (USCC 2013 Report to Congress) 

Chapter I: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship 

Trade and Economics Year in Review 

China's economy grew at a 7.66 perccnt annualized rate in the first three quarters of 2013, 

continuing a three-year trend of decelerating output. This marked a significant decline from the three 

decades of growth in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s averaging 10 percent annually. Demand for China's 

exports stalled, and the domestic economy adjusted to a drop in government spending on massive 

infrastructure projects~undermining the two main pillars of China's economic surge over thc previous 

decade. 

China underwent a leadership change with a new president and premier and several new members 

of the Politburo and Standing Committee. No prominent political or economic refonners were elevated to 

the Politburo Standing Committee, China's highest decision-making body, though the backgrounds of 

Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli suggest that they might be open to further economic refonn. There is 

unccrtainty over the prospects for economic reform as a result of contradictory statements and actions by 

the new leadership. While there are signs that President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang are preparing 

a package of reforms to be unveiled at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, expected 

to take place in November 2013, President Xi has also been reaffirming the role of the state in the 

economy and introducing Maoist-style ideological campaigns aimed at stamping out political 

liberalization. In recent months, the government has introduced some important initiatives aimed at 

addressing some of the country's growing inequalities of wealth and opportunity. One initiative has been 

a focus on urbanization. The hope is that urbanization will become the next gro\Vih engine, initiating a 

new wave of investment, adding to the consumer class, and creating a surge in demand for housing and 

intl'astructure. The urbanization drive may also boost Chinese efforts to make more land available for 

agriculture and improve fanning efficiency. 

Growing demand from China has supported exporters in certain sectors of the U.S. economy, 

such as aerospace, the auto industry, and agricultural products. However, the U.S. trade deficit with China 

continues to widen. In Jnly 2013, the monthly deficit exceeded $30 billion for the first time. Moreover, 

the Chinese government policies driving economic growth have resulted in what the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) calls a "pattern of growth [that] has become too reliant on investment and an 

unsustainable surge in credit, resulting in rising domestic vulnerabilities." The most important~ and 

most challenging~element of domestic rebalancing is increasing household consumption as a share of 

gross domestic product (GDP), which has declined as a share of China's GDP for decades while the share 

of fixed-asset investment has grown. 

China continues to intervene in foreign exchange markets to keep its cun'ency undervalued. Such 

interventions, combined with China's subsidies to exporting industries, have helped China accumulate the 

world's largest foreign currency reserves~$3.66 trillion by the end of September 2013. While 
51 

maintaining a preference for government securities, China continues to diversify its foreign exchange 

assets. China's nonfinancial outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) for the first half of 2013 totaled 

$45.6 billion, up 29 percent from the prior year. China rapidly accumulated foreign currency in 2013, but 

the pace of currency inflows varied during the course of thc year. [n the first quarter, currency inflows 

surged, followed by outflows in the second quarter as the country's banks encountered a liquidity crisis. 

These movements caused volatility in China's external accounts that carried over into the domestic 

financial sector. 

Trends in Chinese Investment in the United States 

China has amassed the world's largest trove of dollar-denominated asscts. Although the trne 

composition of China's foreign exchange reserves, valued at $3.66 trillion. is a state secret, outside 

observers estimate that about 70 percent is in dollars. In recent years. China has become less risk averse 

and more willing to invest directly in U.S. land, factories, and businesses. This trend appears to be 

accelerating. In June 2013, China announced its largest purchase of a U.S. asset to date: a $7.1 billion 

acquisition ofYirginia-based Smithfield Foods, Inc. Given China's large holdings of U.S. dollars, China 

has a huge potential for FDI, particularly if China should substitute or abandon portfolio investment for 

direct investment. 

The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2016) called for a three-pronged approach for increasing China's 

investment abroad. First, Chinese manufacturing companies should invest overseas in order to establish 

international networks and globally recognized brands. Second, Chinese companies should invest in 

research and development outside of China. Lastly, the plan set goals for shifting acquisitions toward 

sectors that promote a high-tech economy. This policy focused on investment goals in which domestic 

state-owned or state-controlled firms were already intended to be dominant by policy. These sectors 

included energy, machinery, construction, and infonnation technology. The Chinese government wields 

many tools to drive these goals. including requiring permission for overseas investments by Chinese firms. 

Despite China's large holdings of portfolio investment, China's FDI is still relatively modest. 

According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. in 2012, the United States attracted $174.7 billion of 

global FD!, of which only $219 million came from China. OtIicial estimates of Chinese FDI in the United 

States are too low, because they do not account for flows of FDI though Hong Kong and other offshore 

financial centers, among other things. Chinese FD! in the United States has emphasized services, energy, 

and technology and is notable for its focus on brand acquisition. 

State-owned enterprises (SOBs) have dominated Chinese FOl in the United States. making 

investments that follow the industrial policies of the Chinese government. Chinese SOEs receive 

substantial benefits from the central and provincial governments that are not available to their foreign 

competitors, including preferential policies and low cost of capital. Furthermore, SOBs investing in the 

United States may engage in particular predatory or anticompetitive behavior that U.S. trade remedies 

cannot address. 

Trade-related aspects of foreign investments often intersect with national security concerns. For 

example, foreign intelligence collection efforts and espionage that target U.S. technology, intellectual 

property, trade secrets, and other proprietary information can be concealed under the pretext of foreign 

investment in cleared government contractors. The United States has a limited screening process for 

determining the potential national security threat from a specific foreign investment. The Committee on 

Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagency committee that reviews certain 

mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of U.S. businesses by foreign persons, corporations, or govel11ments 

for national security risks. China presents new challenges for CFIUS, because investment by SOEs can 

blur the line between national security and economic security. The possibility of government intent or 
52 

coordinated strategy behind Chinese investments raises national security concerns. For example, Chinese 

companies' attempts to acquire technology track closely the government's plan to move up the valueadded chain. There is also an inherent tension among state and federal agencies in the United States 

regarding FDr from China. The federal government tcnds to be concerned with maintaining national 

security and protecting a rules-based, nondiscriminatory investment regime. The state governments are 

more concerned with local economic benefits, such as an expanded tax base and increased local 

employment, rather than national strategic issues, especially as job growth has stagnated. 

Governance and Accountability in China's Financial System 

China's 12th Five-Year Plan calls for less dependence on exports and statc-Ihnded infrastructure 

projects and more domestic consumption to support China's economy. A shift from government-led to 

private-led growth requires that Chinese families and private sector businesses have sufficient access to 

credit and capital. Bank lending, the traditional source of credit for entrepreneurs and startups in most 

countries, is largely inaccessible to Chinese individuals and small- to medium-sized entcrpriscs (SMEs), 

because China's financial system is dominated by large, state-owned banks that mainly service 

government-directed projects. 

Banks hold a unique position in China and are even more important to the national economy than 

banks in Europe or North America, where alternate sources of financing are available. China's financial 

sector is dominated by five massive, state-owned commercial banks that account collectively for about 50 

percent of all deposits and loans. Additionally, three policy banks were established in 1994 to take over 

government-directed spending functions like financing of major development projects. China's policy 

banks are funded primarily by selling bonds to the big commercial banks, and all are ultimately backstopped by the Chinese government. The incestuous relationship between the government; the large, 

state-owned policy banks; and their state-owned commercial cousins provides borrowers a considerable 

benefit; attifieially low interest rates. The banks' depositors, meanwhile, are paid very low rates, 

sometimes below the rate of inflation, to help hold down the rates charged to borrowers. Thus, thc stateowned corporate sector receives a subsidy fi'om the bank's depositors (Chinese households) in the form of 

low interest rates. 

A "shadow banking system" ofunofticial credit has sprung up to fill the gaps left by the big 

banks' lending practices. China's shadow banking system can broadly be defined as lending that falls 

outside of the official banking system. It can involve both traditional and nontraditional institutions and is 

best understood not in terms of the institutions engaged in the system but in terms of the activities that 

they undertake. Because shadow banking activity occurs outside oHormal banking channels, it does not 

appear on bank balance sheets and is far less transparent than otlicial lending activity. Chinese demand 

for shadow banking is largely driven by the growth of China's private sector, a sector with limited access 

to official bank credit; and the Chinese government's tolerance of shadow banking in recent years has 

been tied to the reality that the private sector is the increasingly dominant source of the nation's 

employment. 

Demand for credit has led Chinese companies to seek capital overseas even as its shadow banking 

system has expanded. In the late 1990s, Chinese companies began raising capital on major international 

stock exchanges. This trend has been driven by large Chinese companies, many state owned, that have 

sought to broaden their shareholder base, increase the liquidity of their shares, and enhance the visibility 

of their brand names. U.S. stock markets are among the most popular global exchange destinations for 

Chinese firms. 

Initially, U.S. investors purchased stock in U.S.-listed Chinese companies in hopes of profiting 

from China's rapid growth rate. However, investors in U.S.-listed Chinese companies have increasingly 
53 

found that insufficient corporate governance standards make these companies high-risk investments. 

Many havc becn implicated in frauds and accounting scandals, and U.S. regulators have deregistered 

about 50 Chinese companies in the past two years following fraud probes. During recent probes, the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has sought audit work papers from Chinese branches of 

multinational accounting firms that service U.S.- listed Chinese companies, a common request during 

fraud investigations. To date, the firms have refused to produce these documents, arguing that doing so 

would put them in violation of Chinese state secrets laws and subject them to criminal liability in China. 

In December 2012, the SEC charged five firms with breaking U.S. securities laws by refusing to turn over 

the requested audit work papers. 

In May 2013, the United States and China announced a deal for limited information-sharing 

bctween their regulatory agencies when there are questions regarding audits of U.S. listed Chinese 

companies. In July, Chinese regulators agreed to turn over certain requested documents of some listed 

Chinese companies to assist the SEC in ongoing investigations. No agreement has yet been reached that 

would grant more general direct access to documents for U.S. regulators conducting investigations or 

inspcctions. Although it is considered a last resort option, if an agrecment is not rcached, the SEC and the 

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board could choose to ban Chinese accounting finns and 

Chinese branches of multinational accounting firms from auditing U.S.-listcd Chinese companies, which 

could in turn lead to these companies being delisted from U.S. exchanges. 

China's Agriculture Policy. Food Regulation, and the US.-China Agriculture Trade 

China's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001 was a watershed event for U.S. 

agriculture. China is now the primary export market for U.S. agriculture products. While the United 

States ran a $315 billion trade deficit in goods with China in 2012, it achieved a $21 billion surplus in 

agriculture. Since tiJll implementation of the WTO acccssion in 2005, China's agriculture imports from 

tbe United States bave risen by an average of $2.5 billion eacb year, exceeding the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture's (USDA) initial estimate of$2 billion. China must feed a tifth ofthe world's population with 

less tban a tentb of its arable land and potable water. As China transfonns into an urban society with a 

growing middle class, per capita food consumption is rising and, with it, the demand for bigher-protein 

diets-a demand that U.S. fanners are well positioned to till. 

There remain serious problems within the U.S. China bilateral agriculture trade relationship, 

however. Many in the U.S. agriculture industry lobbied Congress in 2000 to grant China permanent 

normal trade relations, because tbey expected Cbina to become a major purcbaser of U.S. food products 

once it joined the WTO. But farm belt advocates have been disappointed that China has concentrated its 

purchases on bulk commodities, sucb as soybeans used as animal feed for China's outsized livestock 

industry. China's agriculture policy favors domestic production, even when it is unsustainable and 

nonessential to food security. In trade, China has used nontariff barriers to restrict imports of higher 

value-added products from the United States, including excessive subsidies; govemment control over 

import quotas; discriminatory taxes; and sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions that are not based on 

proper scientific analysis. These measures have contributed to an imbalanced food trade that has been 

particularly damaging to U.S. meat producers, who enjoy a comparative advantage over China in terms of 

resources, quality, and efticiency. 

China's agribnsinesses have pursued outbound investment in several countries and sectors in 

recent years. In the United States, this trend came into focus in June 2013, when Shuanghui lnternational 

Holdings Limited, a subsidiary of Shuanghui Group, proposed to acquire the U.S. pork producer 

Smitbfield Foods, Inc. As the largest U.S. pork producer, Smithfield is a strategic node in the U.S. food 

industry. 
54 

China's WTO accession was primarily envisaged as an opportunity for U.S. expOlters. But U.S. 

consumer food imports from China have surged as well. part of a greater reliance on imported food by 

U.S. consumers. The bulk of U.S. food imports from China consists of farm raised fish and fruits and 

vegetables. China also supplies ingredients for U.S.-processed foods, as well as organic foods that are 

USDA-approved through third-party certifiers. For the United States, these imports from China present 

significant food safety risks. Over the past decade, China's major trade partners have repeatedly banned 

its food shipments on the basis of food safety. Current regulation of food entering the United States from 

China is insufficient. For one, the Chinese government's own food safety regulation is inadequate. The 

Chinese government in 2009 introduced a comprehensive Food Safety Law to establish a modern 

framework for food safety regulation and in 2013 created a China Food and Drug Administration to 

consolidate regulatory authority. However, it is uncertain whether these and other reforms will improve 

oversight of China's large and fragmented food industry. 

In the absence of effective regulation by the Chinese government, U.S. consumers depend on U.S. 

food safety inspectors to provide protection against the importation of unsafe food products. The Food 

and Drug Administration (FDA), which is in charge of inspecting all nonmeat imports, is making 

substantial efforts to dedicate more staff and funding to China, to modernize its regulatory system, and to 

propose useful policies, such as foreign supplier verification. And yet, there are numerous problems with 

U.S. food regulation. The FDA still inspects only a fraction of the food that enters through U.S. borders. 

The agency has also found it difficult to increase on-the-ground inspections on thc Mainland, in part 

because Chinese authorities have delayed visas for FDA inspectors and restricted access to food 

production sites. 

Conclusions 

Trade and Economics Year in Review 

• China underwent a once-a-decade leadership change with a new president and premier and 

several new members of the Politburo and Standing Committee. The leadership indicated that 

China's overall economic policy goal-to transition from an export and investment-led growth 

model to a greater reliance on domestic consumption, remained the same. In reality, this change 

proved difficult to implement by a new government concerned about a slowing economy, real 

estate speculation, stagnating wages, and unemployment. The incoming government issued 

statements supporting a large and powerful state-owned sector in the economy, disappointing 

advocates of a larger private sector. 

• The new Chinese leadership introduced initiatives aimed at reducing inequality. cracking down 

on corruption, and promoting urbanization. There are significant impediments to the 

government's ability to implement these reforms. For example, corruption is endemic at all levels 

of government, while local governments oppose urbanization due to fear that they will be 

overwhelmed by a flood of new migrants. China's progress in external rebalancing following the 

financial crisis was only temporary and largely driven by a weak global demand that reduced the 

relative size ofChina's export sector. Trade data for 2012-13 show that Chinese exports are again 

growing at a higher rate than imp011s, signaling a continued reliance on exports to fuel economic 

growth and a reversal in reducing China's massive trade surplus. As a result of failcd measures to 

rebalance its economy, China has continued to expand its alrcady record foreign currency 

reserves, reaching $3.66 trillion by the end of September 2013. 

• China's trade surplus with the United States in goods in 2012 was $315 billion, a record. For the 

first seven months of 2013, China's trade surplus with the United States was $178 billion, also a 
55 

record. China continues to manipulate the value of its currency, the RMB, to achieve a 

competitive advantage with the United States. China also continues to follow mercantilist policies 

to foster a trade surplus with the United States. 

China has had little success transitioning toward a consumption- led growth model and reducing 

its reliance on massive infrastructure pr(ljects to boost economic growth. Consequently, China's 

high investment levels have led to overcapacity in multiple industries, including steelmaking, 

shipbuilding, and solar panel manufacturing. A slowdown in urban household disposable income 

growth and an increase in the household savings rate have cut into consumer purchasing power 

and contributed to a decline in total retail sales growth. 

• Chinese officials have played down the significance of lower growth, saying the slowdown is 

partly due to economic rebalancing. However, the government continues to stimulate the 

economy through a variety of small steps. For example, the State Council, China's cabinet, 

instituted a temporary tax cut (scraping all value-added and operating taxes) for more than 6 

million small- and medium-sized enterprises; reduced approval procedures and administrative 

costs for exporting companies; and provided more investment in railway construction in China's 

central and western regions. In a similar vein, securities regulators and the central bank issued 

record amounts of investment approvals to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors program. 

• Due to its restrictive monetary policy, China's central bank has accumulated the world's largest 

foreign exchange reserves. The bulk of these reserves are invested in U.S. Treasury securities, so 

that Chinese ownership accounts for nearly one-quarter of foreign-owned U.S Treasuries. In 

addition, China's two largest sovereign wealth funds, China Investment Corporation and SAFE 

Investment Company, have expanded their equity and real estate investments in the United States. 

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has concluded 13 trade agreements, the latest with Iceland 

and Switzerland this year-the lirst signed with European governments. China is in the process of 

negotiating six additional trade agreements, which include the ASEAN-led Regional 

Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an initiative to link ASEAN member states and 

preferential trade agreement partners to fonn the world's largest trading bloc. The Regional 

Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which excludes the United States, is competing with the 

U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, which excludes China. Formal negotiations of the Regional 

Comprehensive Economic Partnership began in May 2013 and are scheduled to conclude by the 

end of2015. 

China's attempts to keep the value of the RMB artificially low while strictly limiting the flow of 

RMB from the country, coupled with its efforts to control a large state banking sector, led to a 

banking crisis. The collapse in liquidity threatened economic growth in China and demonstrated 

the difficulty of conducting a monetary policy so at odds with its trading partners and 

international norms. 

• The fifth round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic dialogue was held on July 10-11,2013, 

in Washington, DC. There were no significant achievements in the stratcgic track. On the 

economic front, the most relevant announcements were (1) resumption of bilateral investment 

treaty talks; (2) the launch of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone; and (3) new measures to liberalize 

China's financial sector. In the multilateral arena, the United States successfully challenged 

China's improper imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties at the WTO. 
56 

China continues to take incremental steps toward RMB internationalization, but the goal of 

making the RMB a major international currency remains out of reach as the government 

continues to maintain strict controls on cross-border capital f10ws. 

Beijing's efforts to refon11 the financial system continue to be hampered by risky off-balancesheet lending by banks and nonbank financial institutions. Beijing has undertaken efforts to curb 

these risky lending practices, removing the floor on lending rates and imposing a short-term 

credit crunch in a clumsy effort to send a strong signal to the financial sector. However, there is 

little evidence so far that these efforts have succeeded. The ceiling on rates paid to depositors 

remains low, and some risky lending actually increased during the credit crunch. 

Trends in Chinese Investment in the United States 

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDT) in the United States continues to grow, though from a 

very low base. According to official U.S. statistics, in 2012 the United States attracted $174.7 

billion of global FDT, of which $219 million came from China. An estimate by country of 

ultimate beneficiary owner, whieh better tracks actual investors, put stock of Chinese FDT in the 

United States at $9.5 billion at the end of 2011. For the same year, China's Ministry of 

Commerce put the flows of Chinese FDT to the United States at $1.8 billion, with stock of FDT 

estimated at around $9 billion. 

Official statistics underestimate the true volume of Chinese investment, because they do not 

account tor flows of FDl through Hong Kong and other offshore financial centers, which are 

likely transit points for Chinese money on the way to the real investment destination. Official data 

are also provided after a significant delay, which hinders analysis. 

To date, state-owned enterprises (SOBs) have dominated Chinese FDl in the United States 

measured by the value of deals, though private companies lead by the number of deals. One 

reason is that the biggest investments so far have heen made in the oil and energy fields. which 

are dominated by Chinese state-owned giants. 

• Chinese investors have primarily targeted those sectors where China lacks know-how and 

technology, particularly in the Strategic and Emerging Industries identified in the 12th Five-Year 

Plan. Energy and services (in particular real estate and financial services) have received the most 

investment. High-end manufacturing is another important destination for China's investments, 

particularly when measured in tenus of the number rather than the value of deals. 

• Due to the considerable government ownership of the Chinese economy, provision by Chinese 

companies of critical infrastructure to U.S. government or acqnisition by Chinese companies of 

U.S. firms with sensitive technology or intellectual property could be han11ful to U.S. national 

interests. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFlUS) investigates the 

national security implications of mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors of U.S. assets. 

Investigations by CFIUS and other national security review and mitigation mechanisms may be 

hampered by limited resources or limited statutory authority. 

Investments made by Chinese state-owned or -controlled companies can also pose economic 

security threats. The Chinese government provides signi1icant financial and logistical support. 

This puts U.S. firms, which receive no such support, at a competitive disadvantage. When 

Chinese SOEs invest abroad, they do not necessarily seek protit and may instead pursue 

government goals such as resource acquisition or technology transfer. 
57 

Chinese investments in the United States are subject to the same set of rules and regulations as 

investment from other foreign countries in the areas of foreign corrupt practices, export 

administration, sanctions, and antitrust. If Chinese firms run afoul of these rules, they will be 

subject to legal sanction. But gaps exist in the U.S. government's ability to address the 

competitive challenges posed by SOEs. 

• In areas where there are no national security considerations, and when the investment is driven by 

economic rather than strategic rationale, Chinese FDI can benefit the U.S. economy through 

creation of jobs and other positive spillovers. 

Governance and Accountability in China's Financial System 

The Chinese economy weathered the first few years of the global economic downturn by 

doubling down on its time-tested strategy of funneling capital into domestic development projects. 

But five years on, global demand for Chinese exports remains too weak to sustain thc country's 

factories, much less new ones, and the merits of massive in frastructure projects have more than 

run their course. The policy decisions that kept the Chinese economy chugging over the last few 

years have also sped it closer to a reckoning that economists have long forecast would eventually 

be necessary. If a rebalancing of the U.S.-China economic relationship is to be achieved, China 

must reform its financial systcm to support newer, nonstate sources of economic growth, which 

will require that China's banks better service its private sector. 

• As long as China's official, regulated channels of credit do not possess the flexibility to meet the 

needs of the Chinese economy's main job creators, China will be at risk of depressed economic 

growth, which in turn may limit the growth of U.S. exports to China and the prosperity of U.S. 

investments in China, slowing economic recovery here at home. The shadow banking system that 

Beijing has allowed to step into this credit gap is insufficiently regulated and, if left unchecked, 

will pose an increasingly serious threat to Chinese and global economic stability. 

The opacity of Chinese corporate governance and accountability policies, as well as conflicts with 

U.S. securities laws and regulations, hurts investor confidence in Chinese companies trading on 

U.S. exchanges. The current situation threatens U.S. investors with unforeseeable and 

unmanageable losses and may lead to a broad deli sting of Chinese companies. China's lack of 

sophisticated banking, corporate governance, and auditing policies and practices also hinders 

much-needed growth and opportunity for the very U.S. financial services firms that could help 

China to restructure its system if they were allowed greater access to the Chinese market. 

Insufficient transparency and accountability in China's financial sector put U.S. firms at risk of 

violating laws in both China and the United States; pose unreasonable hazards for U.S. investors 

with shares in Chinese companies; and render some U.S. laws and regulations unenforceable. 

Without greater regulatory transparency and assurance of China's regulatory, oversight and 

enforcement capabilities, Chinese firn1s also risk cmiailment or cven revocation of access to the 

U.S. market. 

China's Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation. and the US.-China Agriculture Trade 

• For the past three years, China has been the largest export market for U.S. agricultural goods. 

However, trade is far from free, and enormous opportunities are being withheld. China's 
58 

WTO accession has not been as productive to the United States as initially expected. In contrast 

to U.S. agricultural exports to the rest of the world, most U.S. exports to China are bulk 

commodities, particularly raw soybeans that supply China's outsized livestock sector. Conversely, 

processed commodities, meat products, consumer foods, and other higher value-added products 

have not kept pace with the overall growth in bilateral trade. 

• Since the 1980s, China has developed into the world's largest agricultural economy, producing a 

fifth of the world's grains, a quarter of its meat, and half of its vegetables. But demand in China is 

beginning to outstrip supply. As more people move to cities and earn higher incomes, China's 

population is demanding safer food and a more diverse, protein-rich diet at an affordable cost. 

The United States is well-positioned to meet that demand. U.S. farmers enjoy a comparative 

advantage in resources, productivity, and quality, particularly in meat production. 

China's agriculture policy favors domestic production over imports. China maintains ambitious 

self-sufficiency targets that are unsustainable and unjustifiable in terms of food security. This 

policy is now being challenged by the decline in China's farm labor surplus, deteriorating land 

and resource endowments, and iragmented producer and land use systems. A related problem is 

that efforts to modernize agriculture conflict with rural welfare aims. Millions of rural migrants 

continue to rely on farmland and smallholder agriculture for insurance in the absence of a 

functioning welfare state. 

China has failed to fully perform its obligations under the WTO. It has erected a series of 

nontariff barriers that include state trading; excessive domestic subsidies and stockpiling of 

commodities; discriminatory taxes; uncalled-for antidumping duties; and slow approvals of 

biotechnology applications for U.S. crops. Damaging to U.S. interests as well are sanitary and 

phytosanitary restrictions, especially BSE-based bans on beef and zero tolerance for raetopamine 

in pork. Although China has significantly lowered its tariff's and increased its agricultural imports 

since accession, numerous trade restrictions remain in place. 

• U.S. companies, universities, and government agencies are helping China to improve the quantity 

and quality of its food output. In a sign of deepening bilateral ties, the United States and China 

signed the tirst U.S.-China Plan of Strategic Cooperation in Agriculture (2012-2017) in February 

2012, and in March of that year the largest-ever U.S. agricultural trade mission visited China. 

However, U.S. companies operating in China are hamstrung by regulatory uncertainty, restricted 

market access, and weak intellectual property enforcement. 

China is fostering globally competitive agribusinesses, in the process becoming an active acquirer 

of agricultural assets overseas. In June 2013, China's largest pork producer, Shuanghui, proposed 

a $7.1 billion acquisition of Smithfield, the leading pork producer in the United States. While the 

deal has been approved by CFIUS and Smithfield's shareholders, it raises critical issues regarding 

net economic benefits, intellectual property, reciprocal market access, and the treatment of quasiprivate Chinese companies that maintain links to the Chinese government. 

China accounts for a large share of the fruits, vegetables, fish, and processed foods that 

Americans consume, but the United States has little assurance that the food imports coming into 

the United States from China are safe. China's own food safety regulation is still ineffective, in 

spite of recent efforts to consolidate agencies and improve legislation. U.S. consumers rely on 

U.S. food safety inspectors to do their jobs, but U.S. regulation is also fragmented and 

underfunded. U.S. regulators have increased their presence within China but have struggled to 

obtain work visas and to gain access to food production facilities. Although the United States 
59 

does not permit raw meat imports from China, the USDA has granted equivalence status to 

Chinese poultry processors, which will permit them to process poultry raised in the United States 

and Canada and ship it to the United States. 

Chapter 2: China's Impact on U.S. Secnrity Interests 

Military and Security Year in Review 

China's late 2012 leadership transitIOn brought the largest turnover to the Central Military 

Commission (CMC) in a decade. Xi Jinping assumed the position of both CMC chairman and Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) general secretary at the CCP's 18th Party Congress on November 15, 2012. 

President Xi then completed his accession as China's senior leader by becoming the People's Republic of 

China (PRC) president on March 14, 2013. Although President Xi was widely expected to eventually 

assume all three of China's top leadership posts, many observers were surprised by the speed of his 

elevation to CMC chairman. Mr. Hu broke with the pattern established by his two predecessors, who 

retained the CMC chainnanship for two years after finishing their terms as CCP general secretary. 

Since becoming CMC chairman, President Xi has used public speeches and visits to People's 

Liberation Army (PLA) units to reaffirm China's long-term military modernization goals; emphasize the 

importance of a strong military to the fulfillment of the "China Dream," his new political slogan and 

party campaign; and signal his intent to focus on increasing combat readiness and reducing corruption in 

the PLA. 

In November 2012, President Xi introduced the "China Dream" concept, which envisions the 

"great renewal of the Chinese nation" and the advancement of an international system in which China's 

successful rise provides an attractive alternate political model to Western ones. Achieving the dream 

means building a "moderately prosperous society" by 2021 and a "modern socialist society that is strong, 

democratic, cultured, and harmonious" by 2049. Although President Xi emphasizes that "peaceful 

development" and a stable regional environment are essential to create the conditions for this vision, he 

linked its fulfillment to a strong military in a December 2012 speech while aboard a PLA Navy destroyer. 

In June 2013, official PLA media explained, "To the armed forces, the China dream is the strong-army 

dream, the China dream leads the strong-army dream, and the strong-army dream supports the China 

dream." 

During his first reported visit to a PLA base as CMC chairman in December 2012, President Xi 

called for the PLA to increase "combat readiness" through "realistic training." Combat readiness has 

been a central theme of subsequent speeches to the military by President Xi and now features prominently 

in official PLA statements and documents. For example, official PLA media in January 2013 said the 

military needs to prevent and overcome the "harmful" practice of training "for show." Furthermore, 

describing the PLA's 2013 training priorities, a PLA official said: "The 'scent of gunpowder' in the 

'fighting' will be stronger. The entire military will make 'training like real war' ... the main theme of the 

entire year's training, powerfully strengthening training of mission topics, ensuring that as soon as there is 

a situation, the military will be able to go forward and fight to victory." 

In a meeting shortly after becoming the CMC chairman, President Xi urged senior PLA officers 

"to take a firm stand against corruption" and to maintain a "strict work style" and "iron discipline." 

Since then, reducing corruption and waste in the PLA has been one of President Xi's most consistent 

messages in his public speeches to the military. In addition to rhetoric, President Xi has announced 

stronger anticorruption regulations for the PLA, inclnding restrictions on military personnel holding 

banquets, drinking excessive amonnts of alcohol, and using luxury hotels. 
60 

In March 2013, China announced its official defense budget for 2013 rose 10.7 percent to 

720.168 billion RMB (approximately $117.39 billion), signaling the new leadership's support for the 

PLA's ongoing modernization efforts. This figure represents 5.3 percent of total government outlays and 

approximately 1.3 percent of estimated GOP. China's ofticial annual defense budget now has increased 

for 22 consecutive years and more than doubled since 2006. The Institute of International Strategic 

Studies assesses China's actual defense spending is 40 to 50 percent higher than the official figure. The 

U.S. Department of Defense (000) estimated China's actual defense spending in2012 fell between $135 

and $215 billion, which was approximately 20 to 90 percent higher than China's announced defense 

budget. 

In April 2013, China released the latest version of its biennial defense white paper. This is the 

first defense white paper published since President Xi became CMC chairman. Although Chinese military 

leaders likely began to draft the document before President Xi assumed the position, official Chinese 

prcss suggests it contains strategic priorities specific to him. Official Chinese media hailed the 2012 

defense white paper as a milestone in transparency, citing the "declassification" of military information. 

However, most of this was widely-known information that Beijing had never officially acknowledged. 

Furthern10re, as in previous iterations, the 2012 defense white paper offers no substantive information on 

important defense issues. 

Since commissioning its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September 2012, the PLA Navy has 

continued to develop a fixed-wing carrier aviation capability for air defense and offensive strike missions. 

China plans to follow the Liaoning with at least two indigenously built carriers. The first likely will enter 

service by 2020 and the second by 2025. China's Julang-2 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM) is expected to reach initial operations capability by late 2013. The JL-2, when mated with the 

PLA Navy's JIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), will give China its first credible seabased nuclear deterrent. The SLBN/SSBN weapon system will be able to target the continental United 

States from China's littoral waters. 

The PLA Navy continues to steadily increase its inventory of modern submarines and surface 

combatants. China is known to be building seven classes of ships simultaneously but may be constructing 

additional classes. China also recently began developing its first sea-based land attack capability. Modem 

submarines and surface combatants equipped with land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) will enhance 

Beijing's flexibility for attacking land targets throughout the Western Pacific, including U.S. facilities in 

Guam. 

China also continues to pursue new space and counterspace capabilities. In May 2013, China 

fired a missile into nearly geosynchronous Earth orbit, marking the highest known suborbital launch since 

the U.S. Gravity Probe A in 1976 and China's highest known suborbital launch to date. Although Beijing 

claims the launch was part of a high-altitude scientific experiment, available data suggest it was intended 

to test at least the launch vehicle component ofa new high-altitude antisatellite (ASAT) capability. Tfthe 

launch is part of China's ASAT program, Beijing's attempt to disguise it as a scientific experiment would 

demonstrate a lack of transparency about its objectives and activities in space. Furthermore, such a test 

would signal China's intent to develop an ASAT capability to target satellites in an altitude range that 

includes U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and many U.S. military and intelligence satellites. 

Throughout 2013, China also made significant advances in its manned space and regional satellite 

navigation programs. The PLA's extensive role in China's civilian space programs suggests these 

activities support the development of PLA space, counterspace, and conventional capabilities in addition 

to serving China's overall development strategy. 
61 

In late January 2013, China conducted the first test flight of its indigenously developed cargo 

transport aircraft, the Yun-20 (Y-20). China previously was unable to build heavy transports, so it has 

relied on a handful of Russian aircraft for strategic airlift since the 1990s. Once large-scale deliveries of 

the new plane begin, the Y -20 aircraft will be able to support a variety of domestic and international 

military operations. The Y-20 will enhance the PLA's ability to respond to internal security crises and 

border contingencies, support international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, and 

project power in a regional conflict. 

In June 2013, the PLA Air Force began to receive new Hongzha-6K (H-GK) bomber aircraft. The 

H-6K has an extended range and can carry China's new long-range LACM. The bomber/LACM weapon 

system provides the PLA Air Force with the ability to conduct conventional strikes against regional 

targets throughout the Western Pacific, including U.S. facilities in Guam. Although the H-6K airframe 

could be modified to carry a nuclear-tipped air-launched LACM, and China's LACMs likely have the 

ability to carry a nuclear warhead, there is no evidence to confirm China is deploying nuclear warheads 

on any of its air-launched LACMs. 

In July 2013, the PLA began to deploy peacekeepers to the United Nations (UN) 

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The PLA contingent includes 

what Beijing calls a "security force" ti'om a PLA group army. This marks the tirst time Beijing has 

deployed infantry to support a peacekeeping operation since it began participating in UN missions in 

1990. China previously had limited the PLA's participation in peacekeeping operations to noncombat 

troops. 

China's Cyber Activities 

In 2013, strong evidence emerged that the Chinese government is directing and executing a largescale cyber espionage campaign against the United States. Mandiant, a private U.S. cybersecurity tirm, 

issued a report that provides evidence that the PLA since 2006 has penetrated the networks of at least 141 

organizations, including companies, international organizations, and foreign governments. These 

organizations are either located or have headquarters in 15 countries and represent 20 sectors, from 

information technology to tinancial services. Of the organizations penetrated, 81 percent were either 

located in the United States or had U.S.-based headquarters. 

The Mandiant report was followed by DoD's first direct accusation that the Chinese government 

and military are conducting cyber espionage against U.S. networks. DoD's 2013 annual report to 

Congress on China's military stated: "In 2012, numerous computer systems around the world, including 

those owned by the U.S. government, continued to be targeted for intmsions, S0111e of which appear to be 

attributable directly to the Chinese government and military." Previously, DoD had stopped short of 

attributing cyber espionage to the Chinese government or military, instead merely acknowledging cyber 

espionage "originated" in China. 

There are no indications the public exposure of Chinese cyber espionage in technical detail 

throughout 2013 has led China to change its attitude toward the use of cyber espionage to steal 

intellectual property and proprietary infOlmation. It is clear naming and attempting to shame will not be 

sufficient to deter entities in China from engaging in cyber espionage against U.S. companies. Mitigating 

the problem will require a multifaceted approach. Many potential actions to address the problem are being 

discussed by Congress, the Obama Administration, and outside experts. These actions include linking 

economic cyber espionage to trade restrictions, prohibiting Chinese firms using stolen U.S. intellectual 

property from accessing U.S. banks, and banning U.S. travel for Chinese organizations that are involved 

with cyber espionage. To date, Washington has not implemented a comprehensive framework for 

addressing China's ongoing cyber espionage. 
62 

China's Maritime Disputes 

Although sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas are not new, China's growing 

diplomatic, economic, and military clout is improving China's ability to assert its interests. It is 

increasingly clear that China does not intend to resolve the disputes through multilateral negotiations or 

the application of international laws and adjudicative processes but instead will use its growing power in 

support of coercive tactics that pressure its neighbors to concede to China's claims. Viewing a public 

defense of its maritime claims as central to political legitimacy, leaders in Beijing exploit deep-seated 

popular nationalism to support foreign policy aims in the East and South China Seas. China also views 

sovereignty over the East and South China Seas as critical to its national security, territorial integrity, and 

economic development. China has been more asseliive since the publication of the Commission's 2012 

Report, offering counterclaim ants the choice of either facing the brunt of Chinese power as a result of 

challenging Chinese claims or benefitting from economic and political rewards for moderating their 

positions or evcn acquiescing to China's claims. Chinese official statements and usc of maritime law 

enforcement rather than military forces suggest Beijing prefers to avoid direct military conflict over its 

maritime disputes and rely on the shift in the balance of regional power in its favor to resolve its maritime 

disputes in the long term. 

The East China Sea dispute involves China, Japan, and Taiwan. The dispute can bc divided into 

two distinct issues: territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Dao in China, 

and Diaoyutai in Taiwan), and demarcation of maritime zones that have implications for natural resource 

rights. Given the historical animosity between China and Japan and the strong nationalist sentiment on 

both sides regarding the sovereignty of the islands, the Senkaku Islands dispute is especially intense. The 

Japanese government's September 2012 purchase of three of the islands from a private Japanese owner 

angered China, sparking an escalation in tensions between China and Japan. PLA Navy and Chinese 

maritime law enforcement activity near the Senkaku Islands, previously irregular and sporadic, increased 

to a robust and near-persistent presence following Japan's purchase of the islands. Tensions continucd to 

simmer throughout 2013 as both sides enhanced their naval and maritime law enforcement presence in the 

disputed waters to assert their claims. 

The South China Sea dispute involves China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 

Brunei. Beijing denotes its claim on its South China Sea maps using a nine-dash line, with an additional 

dash off the coast of Taiwan to demonstrate its sovereignty over Taiwan. China's diplomatic preference 

on the South China Sea is to "divide and conquer" by negotiating the issue on a bilateral basis rather 

than under the auspices of multilateral forums such as ASEAN. 

In addition to boosting its presence in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has taken a number 

of steps since mid-2012 to address shortcomings in its coordination of maritime policy to betler align 

China's maritime activity with national policy. In an effort to streamline its maritime policy-making 

bureaucracies to manage its maritime disputes more effectively, China created a high-level policy 

advisory group on maritime security issues in mid-20 12 and consolidated multiple maritime law 

enforcement agencies into a single China Coast Guard in mid-2013. Beijing discourages and seeks to 

prevent the diplomatic involvement ofthe United States in the East and South China Seas because Beijing 

considers these disputes bilateral issues between China and each claimant. However, U.S. treaty 

commitments and forward-deployed military presence bind the United States to the region in ways that 

link its secnrity interests to the peaceful resolution of China's maritime disputes. Despite a generally 

improving military-to-military relationship, mutual mistrust about one another's long-term intentions 

continues to pervade the overall security relationship. This strategic backdrop poses challenges for the 

operational environment at sea, especially as the maritime operating areas of the two conntries 

increasingly overlap. 
63 

Conclusions 

Military and Security Year in Review 

PLA modernization is altering the security balance in the Asia Pacific, challenging decades of 

U,S, military preeminence in the region, 

The PLA Navy is in the midst of an impressive modernization program, China's acquisition of 

naval platforms, weapons, and systems has emphasized qualitative improvements, not 

quantitative growth, and is centered on improving its ability to strike opposing ships at sea and 

operate at greater distances from the Chinese mainland, Today, the PLA Navy is able to conduct 

high-intensity operations in China's immediate periphery as well as low-intensity operations 

bcyond thc region, Trends in China's defense spcnding, research and development, and 

shipbuilding suggest the PLA Navy will continue to modernize. By 2020, China could have 

approximately 60 submarines that able are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental 

ballistic missiles or antiship cruise missiles and approximately 75 surface combatants that are 

able to conduct multiple missions or that have been extensively upgraded since 1992. 

The PLA is rapidly expanding and diversifying its ability to strike U.S. bases, ships, and aircraft 

throughout the Asia Pacific region including those that it previously could not reach, such as U.S. 

military facilities on Guam. 

The PLA's expanding involvement in real world missions allows it to field-test equipment and 

obtain hands-on experience in areas such as addressing unconventional threats in harsh and 

potentially hostile environments, satisfying expeditionary logistics requirements, and integrating 

into multilateral operations. 

The PLA is improving its day-to-day readiness levels and conducting longer-range and more 

frequent, robust, and realistic training. As these reforms continue, the PLA will become more 

proficient and confident operating its advanced platforms and weapon systems and better able to 

rapidly respond to regional contingencies. 

• The PLA Navy's growing presence in foreign EEZs contradicts its longstanding policy on 

military activities in its own EEZ. Rather than resolvc the inconsistency bctween its actions and 

policy, Beijing likely will continue to assert its authority to regulate U.S. military activities in its 

EEZ. 

China's Cyber Activities 

The Chinese government is directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign 

against the United States and to date has successfully targeted the networks of U.S. government 

and private organizations, including those of DoD and private firms. These activities are designed 

to achieve a number of broad economic and strategic objectives, such as gathering intelligence, 

providing Chinese finns with an advantage over their competitors worldwide, advancing longterm research and development objectives, and gaining information that could enable future 

military operations. 

China has not reduced its cyber intrusions against the United States despite recent puhlic 

exposure of Chinese cyber espionage in technical detail. This suggests Beijing has decided to 

continue its cyber campaign against the United States. 
64 

Developments in cloud computing in China may present cybersecurity risks for U.S. users and 

providers of cloud computing services. The relationship between China's Ministry of State 

Security and the Chongqing Special Cloud Computing Zone represents a potential espionage 

thrcat to foreign companies that might use cloud computing serviccs provided from the zone or 

base operations there. In addition, the plan to link 21 Viane!'s data centers in China and 

Microsoft's data centers in other countries suggests the Chinese government one day may be able 

to access data centers outside China through Chinese data centers. 

There is an urgent need for Washington to take action to prompt Beijing to change its approach to 

cyberspace and deter future Chinese cyber theft. Actions and policies under discussion include 

the following: passing new legislation or modifying existing legislation; changing the cost-benefit 

calculus of Chinese cyber actors and China's leaders through sanctions and cOlmterintelligence 

tactics; undel1aking multilateral measures; appointing a Cabinet-level official to oversee an 

interagency process regarding the protection of intellectual property; and enhancing cooperation 

between the U.S. government and the private sector. These would be more effective if used in 

combination, as they probably would lead Beijing to make only temporary or minor changes to its 

cyber espionage activities if used in isolation. 

China's Maritime Disputes 

China relies on a coercive and persistent maritime law enforcement and naval presence to gain 

control of disputed territory in the East and South China Seas. A consolidated maritime 

policymaking bureaucracy and streamlined maritime law enforcement fleets could increase 

Beijing's confidence in its capability for coercion in the ongoing maritime disputes. 

Two key drivers shape China's approach to its maritime disputes: First, China encourages ardent 

popular nationalism, which it exploits to support its foreign policy aims in the East and South 

China Seas. Second, China views sovereignty over claims in the East and South China Seas as 

central to its national security, territorial integrity, and economic development. 

• China uses legal and administrative measures to assert de jure governance over its disputed 

maritime regions; it deploys maritime law enforcement and naval vessels to its claimed waters to 

demonstrate and lay the groundwork for de facto governance. 

Beijing's tendency to demonstrate resolve in its maritime disputes; its large and complicated 

political, foreign affairs, and military bureaucracy; and its inconsistent adherence to 

internationally accepted norms of air and maritime operations may contribute to operational 

miscalculations in the East and South China Seas. Unyielding positions on sovereignty and 

nationalist sentiment surrounding these maritime disputes increase the risk of escalation from a 

miscalculation at sea to a political crisis. 

Chapter 3: China and the World 

China and the Middle East and North Africa 

China employs a multifaceted foreign policy approach to the Middle East and North Africa 

(MENA). It is characterized by growing economic (and particularly energy) ties; the pursuit of friendly 

relations with all countries (as well as the Palestinian territories) in the region; the protection of domestic 

stability and control in China; and the promotion of regional stability in support of China's own domestic 
65 

economic, political, and security priorities. China has in recent years faced challenges in the region, 

particularly in responding to political upheaval and regime changes during and after the Arab Spring. 

China also has taken positions in support of regimes in Syria and Iran that put it at odds with the United 

States and other regional and international communities. 

China is expanding and deepening its trade and invcstment ties with countries in the rcgion. 

Betwcen 2003 and 2012, China-MENA annual trade increased more than twelvefold, from $20.8 billion 

to $262.1 billion. In 2009, China overtook the United States to become the world's largest exporter to the 

region. China's energy demand is the primary driver of these economic ties. MENA accounts for more 

than 50 percent of China's crude oil imports; these imports are projected to grow in the corning decades. 

China's leaders view the country's growing reliance on MENA oil imports as a strategic vulnerability. 

This sense of vulnerability appears to drive Beijing's efforts to enhance the security of its imports by 

strengthening its relations with the region's largest oil producers, patiicularly Sandi Arabia and Iran, but 

also Iraq, Oman, and others. 

China seeks to develop and maintain friendly tics with all MENA countries without being drawn 

into the region's conflicts and power struggles. As such, China has more or less successfully maintained 

positivc relationships with the major powers in the region, simultaneously strcngthening ties with regional 

rivals like Israel and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Israelis and Palestinians. Beijing's approach 

generally has been well-received in the rcgion, where China enjoys mainly positive views among Icaders 

and the public. 

China also seeks to leverage its relations in MENA in support of its own domestic security, 

particularly in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, home to matlY of China's ethnic Turkic Muslims. 

Episodic ethnic and political unrest in Xinjiang has in the past attracted support from overseas Muslim 

groups in MENA. Beijing fears thesc overseas groups could encourage or exacerbate what it refers to as 

"separatist insurgencies" in Xinjiang. To mitigate this perceived risk, China solicits support from 

countries in the region for its policies to suppress "separatist" activities in Xinjiatlg. 

In addition, China has taken steps to promote stability within MENA. Offers of support for the 

Israeli-Palestinian peace process, counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and participation in UN 

peacekeeping operations in MENA are among China's contributions to regional security and stability. 

However, China also has undermined security in the region with its support for the Assad regime in Syria 

and its continued economic and political ties to Iran. 

As China's interests and presence in MENA grow, they inevitably will impact U.S. objectives 

and influence. Although Beijing has in the past avoided directly opposing Washington on issues related to 

MENA, this appears to be changing. Beijing's relationship with Tehran and its position on the Syrian 

conflict seem to indicate that, when key interests are at stake, China is willing to challenge the United 

States. 

Taiwan 

Cross-Strait economic ties continue to expand and deepen. Prom January through July 2013 (the 

most recent months for which official statistics are available), the total value of trade between China and 

Taiwan was $71.8 hillion. The total value of cross-Strait trade during this period grew by 2.79 percent 

compared to the same period in 2012. Through the tirst seven months of2013, China remained Taiwan's 

largest export market, accounting for approximately $47.3 billion worth of exports (26.9 percent of 

Taiwan's total exports). China followed behind Japan as Taiwan's second-largest source of imports, 

accounting for approximately $24.5 billion worth of imports (15.5 percent of Taiwan's total imports). 

Although China remained the top destination for Taiwan PDT in 2012, Taiwan's approval of $10.9 billion 
66 

in investments in China in 2012 represented a 16.6 percent decrease from the previolls year and a threeyear low. From January through July 2013, the valuc of Taiwan FOI to China continued to decrease, 

slipping 17.23 percent from the previous year. Officials at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which 

scrves as the de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan, told the Commission that Taiwan businesses increasingly 

are looking for investment opportunities in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America as manufacturing 

costs in China continue to rise. Mainland investment in Taiwan continued to grow in the first seven 

months of 2013, with the value of investments increasing 79.34 percent compared to the same period in 

2012. 

In 2013, Taiwan used creative diplomacy to secure participation in a key international 

organization and to sign two free trade agreements despite China's continued efforts to restrict Taiwan's 

full participation in the international community. The president of the UN's International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) in September 2013 invited a Taiwan delegation to attend the upcoming ICAO 

assembly as his "guests." Furthermore, Taiwan and New Zealand signed a free trade agreement in July 

2013, which marks Taiwan's first such deal with a country with which it does not have official diplomatic 

relations; Taiwan and Singapore agreed in principle to a free trade agreement in May 2013; and Taiwan is 

participating in negotiations with 22 other WTO members, including the United States, on a multilateral 

Trade in Services Agreement. Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs told the Commission that Taiwan's 

eflorts to expand its trade ties with the Asia Pacific region are part of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's 

larger push to diversify Taiwan's economic partners to avoid overreliance on China. Other Taiwan 

officials explained to the Commission that the agreements will help promote Taiwan's inclusion in Asia's 

broader economic integration, including participation in multilateral trade pacts such as the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. 

In April 2013, Taiwan and Japan signed a fisheries agreement after 17 years of intennittent 

negotiations. President Ma said the agreement demonstrates Taiwan's constmctive role in reducing 

tension in the East China Sea without compromising Taiwan's maritime claims and could be used as a 

blueprint and impetus for a similar agreement between Taiwan and other countries with claims in the 

South China Sea. 

In Mareh 2013, the Philippine Coast Guard opened tire on a Taiwan fishing boat operating in 

disputed waters in the South China Sea, resulting in the death of a Taiwan fishem1an and sparking a 

diplomatic row with Taiwan. Manila and Taipei both asse11 the incident took place within their respective 

exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea. After Taiwan claimed that the Philippines failed to 

adequately address its demands in the aftermath of the shooting, Taiwan stopped accepting new Filipino 

labor applications; suspended trade, fishery, and technology exchanges with the Philippines; and removed 

the Philippines from Taiwan's visa waiver program. Taiwan removed the sanctions in August after the 

Philippines offered an official apology on behalf of the Philippine president, agreed to pay compensation 

to the victim's family, and recommended homicide charges for the Philippine Coast Guard personnel who 

opened fire on the Taiwan fishing boat. Taiwan and the Philippines also are discussing measures to 

reduce the risk of future ineidents and working to establish a bilateral fisheries mechanism. 

Taiwan's ability to defend against China's growing military capabilities is declining. The key 

shortcoming in Taiwan's defensive capabilities is its inability to survive initial Chinese air and missile 

strikes due to insufficient infrastntcture hardening and lack of mobile systems. China's overwhelming 

quantitative and qualitative advantage over Taiwan also will challenge the Taiwan military's ability to 

sustain high-intensity operations during a conflict. Nevertheless, Taiwan's defense budget continues to 

decline. Taiwan's official defense budget contracted to $10.5 billion in 2013 from $10.6 billion in 2012. 

Taiwan's 2013 defense spending represents 2.1 percent of its GOP, a record low matched only in 2006 

and 20 II. This is less than 3 percent of GOP-the level at which President Ma pledged to maintain 

defense spending-and marks a substantial decrease from 3.8 percent of GOP in 1994. In response to 
67 

concerns about Taiwan's declining defense budget relative to GDP, President Ma has explained defense 

spending cannot be expected to keep pace with Taiwan's GDP growth. Taiwan's GDP growth rate was 

10.7 percent in 2010, 4 percent in 2011, and 1.3 percent in 2012. 

Despite warming cross-Strait ties. China continues to engage in aggressive espionage activities 

against Taiwan. Since September 2012, Taiwan has arrested at least six former or active Taiwan military 

officers, including one nag officer. for espionage. In one case. a former Taiwan Navy officer may have 

provided to China classified submarine nautical charts as wel1 as hydrographic information about the 

waters surrounding Taiwan. These cases underscore the breadth and depth of China's espionage activitics 

against Taiwan and highlight the increasing counterintelligence risks to Taiwan and U.S. military 

information shared with Taiwan. 

The recent cross-Strait rapprochement benefits the United States by reducing the likelihood of a 

U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan; contributing to peace, prosperity, and stability in East Asia; and 

allowing U.S. policymakers to focus their time and attention on other priorities in the U.S.-China and 

U.S.-Taiwan relationships. At the same time. warming ties between China and Taiwan raise concerns for 

Washington and Taipei. Increasing cross-Strait economic integration will continue to tie Taiwan closer to 

China. This could strengthen China's bargaining power over Taiwan and allow China to make progress 

toward its long-term goal of unification. Responding to these concerns, officials from Taiwan's National 

Security Council insisted to the Commission that Taipei's economic engagement with Beijing is carefully 

calibrated to promote both Taiwan's economic growth and continued autonomy. 

lt1acau 

The gaming sector is the most important element of the Macau Special Administrative Region 

(SAR) economy and is the highestgrossing gambling location in the world. Tax collections from the 

gaming sector in 2012 totaled $13.9 billion. which accounted for 87.5 percent of total government 

revenue. Macau's casino-oriented economy and its proximity to the PRC present a significant risk of 

money laundering. The main channel for money laundering is in the gaming sector through 

underregulated junket operators and their affi liates, which include the underground banking system that 

supports their operations. Junket operators in Macau are significantly more involved in gambling 

operations than is common throughout the world. operating with far fewer restrictions. Macau's 

independent junket operators and independent VIP rooms are not subject to the same regulatory 

requirements as casinos. There is a risk of money laundering within the independent VIP gaming room 

operations which are physically conducted within the casinos but can remain outside of the casino's 

official oversight. The risk is enhanced because so much of the money that is wagered in Macau goes 

through the loosely regulated independent VIP rooms. In 2012. VIP baccarat rooms in Macau casinos 

accounted for 69.3 percent of total revenue from games of chance. 

A 2007 evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force recognized the risk of money laundering in 

Macau's gaming sector and noted multiple deficiencies in its anti-maney-laundering and counter-tenoristfinancing framework. The evaluation also discovered several specific deficiencies in Macau's compliance 

with the Financial Action Task Force recommendatinns, including the refusal to respond to foreign 

requests to freeze assets. the inability to effectively implement UN Security Council resolutions on the 

financing of terrorism, and the inability of Macau's Customs Service to investigate money-laundering 

cases. 

Since the report was published in 2007, there remain significant vulnerabilities with unlicensed 

junket operators and the junket affiliates that play an integral role in Macau's gaming system. Macau's 

junket operators are not subject to the same transparency requirements as casinos, and strict privacy 

controls prevent U.S. regulators from obtaining information on individuals operating in Macau 
68 

subsidiaries of U.S. parent casinos. The Macau SAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 

Macau's gaming regulator, does not disclose financial information. The lack of information presents 

difficulties in determining the origin of money flowing through such operations, and U.S. state regulators 

do not have the authority or resources to independently conduct investigations in Macau or other foreign 

jurisdictions. 

The PRe's capital controls have caused more money to cycle through Macau due to Macau's 

thriving VIP gaming industry, which relies on juuket operators and their affiliates to facilitate crossborder money transfers for clients via underground banks. However, Beijing is beginning to take some 

measures to restrict illicit cross-border transfers and money laundering in Macau as pm1 of the nationwide 

crackdown on corruption promoted by PRC President Xi. 

Hong Kong 

The most significant problem for democratic rights activists is the Hong Kong government's lack 

of progress toward ensuring universal suffrage in the election of the Legislative Council and thc chief 

executive (Hong Kong's highest office). At present, the chief executive is chosen from a slate of 

nominees by a 1,200-person election committee. The Basic Law states that the ultimate aim for chief 

executive elections is through universal suffrage, and current Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying (CY 

Lcung) has indicated that the city is working toward this goal. In March 2013, Chief Executive Leung 

said in meetings with Chinese President Xi that he was committed to the process of achieving universal 

suffragc in Hong Kong by 2017. In July he also promised free and open elections for the Legislative 

Council by 2020. 

Despite these stated goals, the dominance of the Hong Kong government by politicians allied to 

Beijing has stymied progress in achieving universal suffrage. The current election committee is heavily 

populated with business figures as well as politicians and labor leaders with strong connections to Beijing, 

giving it a distinctly pro-Beijing slant. Beijing effectively controls roughly 950 of the 1,200 election 

committee votes for chief executive. Currently, 30 members of the 70-person Legislative Council are 

elected by traditional functional constituencies, in which professionals in specific fields such as insurance, 

transportation, health care, finance, and tourism are allowed to cast a vote in addition to their vote in their 

geographic constituency. The greater representation of some segments of society as a result of the 

functional constituencies, combined with the dominant support for pro-Beijing candidates among 

functional constituency voters, ensures that the Legislative Council remains controlled by pro-Beijing 

representatives. 

Between 2005-2012, Hong Kong's Freedom House ranking for press freedom fell from a status 

of "free" to "partly free." The Hong Kong press itself reports a sense of diminishing freedom. 

Following the election of Mr. Leung to chief executive in 2012, press freedom advocates reported an 

escalation in government efforts to censor and control media access to otTicial information. Free press 

advocates contend that the government has reduced the number of full press conferences it holds for Hong 

Kong media, thereby denying journalists the opportunity to ask questions. Media self-censorship is also a 

pervasive concern. A poll conducted in May 2013 by the Public Opinion Program of the University of 

Hong Kong found that 48 percent of respondents believed that the local news media practiced selt~ 

censorship. Selt~censorship has increased as the Chinese central government has co-opted media 

company owners. According to the 2013 annual report of the Hong Kong Journalists Association, roughly 

50 percent of Hong Kong media owners have been appointed to the National People's Congress or the 

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 

Newly proposed legislation would further limit journalists. An antistalking bill that may be 

considered this year could hinder journalists' ability to seek out information from sources. Another law 
69 

would limit personal data that corporate directors must make puhlic. While supporters argue that this law 

is important for enhancing protections of individual personal data, detractors are concerned that it will 

unduly shield directors from media scrutiny. 

Police surveillance is also a growing concern in Hong Kong. The 2006 posthandover Interception 

of the Communications and Surveillance Ordinance granted police broader and more explicit authority to 

conduct physical and communications surveillance for the sakc of public security. The introduction of 

police cameras comes at a time when protests against the Hong Kong leadership are up sharply. [n 

addition to the Occupy Central efforts and the rallies against the national education proposal, thousands of 

Hong Kong residents have participated in protests calling for the resignation of Chief Executive Leung. 

Pan-Democratic legislators meeting with Commissioners in Hong Kong reported that police are now 

monitoring and arresting prodemocracy demonstrators as much as 12 to 24 months after their 

participation in political events. [n July 2013, for example, Yau Ka-yu was reportedly arrested and 

charged with illegal assembly in relation to bel' 15-month-old participation in an April 2012 protest 

outside the China Liaison Office in Hong Kong. 

Conclusions 

China and the Middle East and North AfTica 

China is expanding and deepening its trade and investment ties with countries in MENA. More 

than half of China's crude oil imports are from MENA producers, and China increasingly looks (0 

the region as an export market for manufactured goods and services. 

• Energy security is a key driver of China's engagement in MENA. As China's continued 

economic growth becomes more dependent on a steady supply of oil and natural gas from the 

region, Beijing likely will augment already robust economic ties with stronger political and 

security engagement. 

Taiwan 

China, driven primarily by its growing demand for energy, seeks to promote a framework for 

stability in MENA that supports its own economic, political, and security interests. These efforts 

include supporting the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian contlict, conducting counterpiracy 

operations, and participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Conversely, China's position on the 

Syrian contlict and its support for [ran undermine peace and stability in the region. 

China struggled to diplomatically adapt to regime changes across MENA during and after the 

Arab Spring. Beijing's instinct has been to support sitting regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Syria and 

to oppose international intervention in these countries. 

Most MENA governments appear to judge China plays a positive role in the region. Oil- and 

natural gas-producing states in particular look to China as their future primary market. Moreover, 

governments in China and some MENA countries appear to share similar stances on issues of 

sovereignty, human rights and democracy, and the role of the state in the economy. However, 

many MENA countries have criticized China for its support for the Assad regime in Syria. 

Historically, China largely has avoided challenging U.S. influence and power in the Middle East. 

[n recent years, however, when key Chinese interests are at stake, China has made use of its 

permanent membership in the UN Security Council to oppose U.S. policies and objectives in the 

region. 
70 

Cross-Strait economic, cultural, and educational ties continue to expand and deepen. However, 

domestic political dynamics and priorities in China and Taiwan still constrain movement on 

political and security issues. 

Since the Commission's 2012 report, Taiwan has used creative diplomacy to sign two free trade 

agreements and secure participation in a key international organization. Taiwan's expanding 

international space helps the country counterbalance its economic reliance on China by increasing 

its competitiveness in the world economy, raises the cost to Beijing of military coercion against 

Taiwan, and promotes regional stability. 

• President Ma since his reelection in January 2012 has accelerated etforts to increase Taiwan's 

economic engagement with the United States and gain U.S. support for expanding Taiwan's 

international space, while continuing to advocate for future U.S. anns sales. 

Taiwan's military over the last decade has improved its ahility to conduct joint operations and has 

developed some asymmetric capabilities. However, China's rapid military modernization during 

this time has outpaced these improvements and negated many of the military advantages Taiwan 

previously held over China. 

Macau and Hong Kong 

The rapid inflow of money to Macau, its casino-oriented economy, and its proximity to the PRC 

present a significant risk of money laundering and financing of terrorism, particularly in the 

underregulated shadow banking and junket system supporting the VIP gaming business in Macau. 

• A combination of the PRe's strict capital controls and restrictions on the collection of gambling 

debts has given rise to grey market alternatives to facilitate the movement of gambling funds into 

Macau. Gambling debt collection conducted hy unregulated third-party affiliates in the Mainland 

is susceptible to organized crime and violence. 

• Macau's junkets with alleged criminal aftiliations present legal risks tor U.S.-licensed casinos 

operating VIP rooms in Macau. Casinos found to be working with junkets directly or indirectly 

associated with Asian organized crime may be subject to revocation of their state-issued license 

to operate in the United States. 

Macau's loose regulation of the junket system and its strict privacy law prevent U.S. regulators 

from accessing information they are accustomed to, and U.S. state regulators lack the authority 

and resources to independently conduct investigatious in toreign jurisdictions. This prevents U.S. 

regulators from accurately accessing the situation in Macau and effectively stops them hom 

evaluating individuals conducting business with U.S.-licensed casinos. 

• Macau's anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing tramework has fallen short in 

complying with internationally recognized standards. Numerous vulnerabilities remain in its 

regulations, including deficiencies relating to Macau's inability to effectively freeze financial 

assets and its inadequate inspection and oversight of casinos and junket operators and promoters. 

• Despite reports that the PRC aims to more closely monitor Macau's gaming industry as part of its 

nationwide initiative to crack down on corruption, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that 

Beijing intends a crackdown on illicit money transfers and money laundering in Macau. 

To protect their licenses to do husiness in the United States, American casinos have adopted a 

number of measures designed to prevent illegal activities in their VIP rooms. The Commission is 
71 

not in a position to evaluate whether those measures are fully adequate to insulate the operations 

of those rooms from illegal activity. 

• Despite official statements of support from Beijing and the Hong Kong chief executive, the 

continued lack of meaningful progress calls into qucstion Beijing's real intentions. Prospects for 

universal suffrage by 2017 are dimming. Political interference, government restraints on access to 

infonnation, and self-censorship continue to take a toll on press freedom in Hong Kong. Public 

perceptions of media credibility have declined since the handover. Violent attacks on 

prodemocracy news outlcts and thcir owners are on thc rise, and thc totality of the evidence 

suggests that Beijing does not intend to allow real democracy to develop in Hong Kong. 

• Prodemocracy activists express alarm over stepped-up police surveillance at protests, which they 

fear may be aimed at chilling public discourse or quelling public dissent. 

All of these trends run counter to the Basic Law's assurances that Hong Kong's traditional 

democratic and civil rights would be preserved for the first 50 years following the handover. 

The systematic disenfranchisement of those who support greater democratic freedoms and civil 

liberties has creatcd a climate of political polarization that may undennine Hong Kong's 

fnndamental governability. 

THE COMMISSION'S KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Commission believes that ten of its 41 recommendations to Congress are of particular significance. 

The Commission recommends: 

Congress fund the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the 

Asia Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by 2020 so 

that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Western 

Pacific, offset China's growing military capabilities, and surge naval assets in the event of a 

contingency. 

• Congress ensure that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) makes it a priority to increase the 

number of physical inspections of Chinese food imports at the border; to increase the rigor of 

those inspections to include testing for pathogens and chemical, pesticide, and drug residues, and 

processed food ingredients; and to conduct more frequent and thorough inspections in food 

facilities in China. Congress should also urge the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 

pennanently assign inspection personnel to China so that the exporting plants receive regular 

visits by USDA inspectors. 

Congress direct the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive, ongoing inventory of 

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDl) in the United States and, on an annual basis, update the 

inventory. The inventory should identifY the ownership structure of the entity engaging in the 

investment. In preparing the inventory, the depat1ment should call on private sector entities 

engaged in monitoring Chinese investments in the United States and such other entities to ensure 

that its report is complete and accurate. The department should prepare a comprehensive report to 

Congress on an annual basis identifying the FDl by Chinese entities that were made in the 

previous calendar year. In its report, the department should indicate those investments that 

received any assistance from the "Select USA" program. The department should also identify, 

on an ongoing basis, the lines of commerce that each of the investments are engaged in. 
72 

Congress direct the Administration to prepare an inventory of existing federal use of cloud 

computing platforms and services and determine where the data storage and computing services 

are geographically located. Such inventory should be prepared annually and reported to the 

appropriate committees of jurisdiction. 

Congress assess whether to amend the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 

(CPlUS) statute to allow review of greenfield investments for threats to U.S. national security. 

• Congress require the USDA and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to conduct a 

comprehensive review of China's agricultural subsidies, discriminatory taxes, state trading, and 

procurement practices; take account of the damages incurred by U.S. farmers and downstream 

industries; and suggest appropriate remedies. 

Congress fund departments of Defense and State efforts to improve the air and maritime 

capabilities of U.S. partners and allies in Asia, particularly with regard to intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance, to improve maritime domain awareness in the East and South 

China Seas. 

Congress assess the extent to which existing laws provide for inadequate or ineffective remedies 

against the anticompetitive actions of Chinese state-owned or state-invested enterprises operating 

in the U.S. market. Additional remedies may be required to account for the fact that these 

enterprises may not be operating based on commercial considerations. 

Congress empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to set minimum standards for 

companies listing and maintaining listings on U.S. exchanges and enable the SEC to directly 

de list foreign companies not in compliance with these standards. 

Congress urge the Administration to expedite progress in its implementation of Section 806 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), which was 

intended to enhance the Department of Defense's ability to address supply chain risks. 

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS 

Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship 

Section 2: Trends in Chinese Investment in the United States 

The Commission recommends: 

I. Congress assess the extent to which existing laws provide for inadequate or inetlective remedies 

against the anti competitive actions of Chinese state-owned or state-invested enterprises operating 

in the U.S. market. Additional remedies may be required to account for the fact that these 

enterprises may not be operating based on commercial considerations. 

2. Congress assess whether to amend the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 

(CFlUS) statute to allow review of greenfield investments for threats to U.S. national security 

3. Congress direct the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive, ongoing inventOlY of 

Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States and, on an annual basis, update the 

inventory. The inventory should identify the ownership structure of the entity engaging in the 

investment. In preparing the inventory, the department should call on private sector entities 

engaged in monitoring Chinese investments in the United States and such other entities to ensure 

that its report is complete and accurate. The department should prepare a comprehensive report to 
73 

Congress on an annual basis identifying the FDl by Chinese entities that were made in the 

previous calendar year. In its report, the department should indicate those investments that 

received any assistance ti'om the "Select USA" program. The department should also identify, 

on an ongoing basis, the lines of commerce that each of the investments are engaged in. 

Section 3: Governance and Accountability in China's Financial System 

The Commission reeommends: 

4. Congress direct the Administration to press China for more cooperation with the intemational 

community in order to address the global economic risks of unregulated and underregulated 

shadow banking and ask the Department of the Treasury to provide an annual report to Congress 

on the risks of shadow hanking. VerDate Mar 

5. Congress direct the Administration, in any bilateral investment treaty negotiations, to make fair 

and equitable market access and treatment for financial services firms a priority. 

6. Congress direct the Administration to assist the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 

the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board by encouraging China to develop beller 

regulatory oversight enforcement capabilities and more transparent markets, during annual and 

biannual bilateral dialogues, as well as multilateral dialogues. 

7. Congress empower the SEC to set minimum standards for companies listing and maintaining 

listings on U.S. exchanges and enable the SEC to directly delist foreign companies not in 

compliance with these standards. 

Section 4: China's Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the US.-China Agriculture Trade 

The Commission recommends: 

8. Congress monitor the implementation of the U.S.-China Plan of Strategic Cooperation in 

Agriculture (2012-2017) to ensure that U.S. funding is being allocated in such a way as to 

improve the safety, sustainability, efficiency, and security of food production in China and the 

United States. 

9. Congress require the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Trade Representative 

to conduct a comprehensive review of China's agricultural subsidies, discriminatory taxes, state 

trading, and procurement practices; take account of the damages incurred by U.S. farmers and 

downstream industries; and suggest appropriate remedies. 

10. Congress urge the Secretary of Agriculture to engage, as part of the Joint Committee on 

Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, with his/her Chinese 

counterparts to address those Chinese policies and practices that limit U.S. exports of value-added 

products. 

II. Congress direct the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) to conduct a review of the 

selective use of value added tax (V A T) rebates by China and determine whether they have a 

trade-distorting effect and whether the selective use of VAT rebates is consistent with the original 

intent of the General Agreement on Taritfs and Trade (GATT) provision allowing for VAT 

rebates. The ITEC should prepare a report for the U.S. Trade Representative and the relevant 

Committees of jurisdiction and identify what steps should be taken to address any GATT 

inconsistencies, should they be found. 
74 

12. Congress direct the USDA to negotiate with China to synchronize approvals of biotechnology to 

ensure stable and predictable market access for U.S. seed companies and crop growers in the 

Chinese market. 

13. Congress require that the USDA prepare an annual rcport on competitive factors in the pork 

industry. In preparing such reports, the department shall evaluate the impact, i[any, of the recent 

purchase of Smithfield Foods on the ability of other U.S. producers to export pork products to 

China. In addition, the report shall identify any changing pricing structures throughout the pork 

production chain to determine whcther therc is price or profit suppression as a result of the 

Smithfield transaction. 

14. Congress direct the USDA to exercise extreme caution in negotiating equivalency status for 

Chinese exports of processed poultry using Chinese-origin birds. Congress should also increase 

its support of USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service in its role as protector of meat and 

poultry food safety so that the United States serves as a world model for high-quality, sciencebased regulations. 

J 5. Congress ensure that the Food and Drug Administration makes it a priority to increase the 

number of physical inspections of Chinese food imports at the border; to increase the rigor of 

those inspections to include testing for pathogens and chemical, pesticide, and drug residues, and 

processed food ingredients; and to conduct more frequent and thorough inspections in food 

facilities in China. Congress should also urge the USDA to permanently assign inspection 

personnel to China so that the exporting plants receive regular visits by USDA inspectors. 

16. Congress require the Secretary of Agriculture to prepare a report to Congress identifying those 

organic food products being imported into the United States from China. The report should 

include a comprehensive evaluation ofthe different methodologies employed by the United States 

and China to certify that a product is organic and what steps, if any, are being taken to harmonize 

any discrepancies that might exist. 

17. Congress evaluate whether a requirement that U.S. food importers purchase insurance against 

food-borne illnesses and pathogens from Chinese imports would improve food safety. Such a 

program would involve private sector risk insurance with insurance companies evaluating the 

safety of various sources and charging risk-based premiums based on the methods employed by 

Chinese exporters to address food-borne illnesses and pathogens. 

Chapter 2: China's Impact on U.S. Security Interests 

Section 2: China's Cyber Activities 

The Commission recommends: 

18. Congress adopt legislation clarifying the actions companies are permitted to take regarding 

tracking intellectual property stolen through cyber intrusions. 

19. Congress amend the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.c. § 1831-1839) to permit a private right 

of action when trade secrets are stolen. 

20. Congress support the Administration's efforts to achieve a high standard of protection of 

intellectual property rights in the Trans-Pacific Partncrship and the Transatlantic Trade and 

Investment Partnership. 
75 

2 L Congress encourage the Administration to partner with other countries to establish an 

international list of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in commercial cyber 

espionage. The Administration and partner governments should develop a process for the list's 

validation, adjudication, and sharcd access. 

22. Congress urge the Administration to continue to enhance its sharing of information about cyber 

threats with the private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized companies. 

23. Congress direct the Administration to prepare an inventory of existing federal use of cloud 

computing platfonns and services and determine where the data storage and computing services 

are geographically locatcd. Such inventory should be prepared annually and reported to the 

appropriate committees of jurisdiction. 

24. Congress urge the Administration to expedite progress in its implementation of Section 806 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), which was 

intcnded to enhance the Department of Defense's ability to address supply chain risks. 

Section 3: China's Maritime Disputes 

The Commission reeommends: 

25. Congress fund the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the 

Asia Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance homepOlis to 60 percent in thc region by 2020 so 

that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Western 

Pacific, offset China's growing military capabilities, and surge naval assets in the event of a 

contingency. 

26. Congress fund Departments of Defense and State efforts to improve the air and maritime 

capabilities of U.S. patiners and allies in Asia, particularly with regard to intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance, to improve maritime domain awareness in the East and South 

China Seas. 

27. Congress urge the Department of Defense to continue to develop the U.S.-China maritime 

security relationship in order to strengthen strategic trust. The relationship should be within the 

bounds of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) and 

based on the principles of reciprocity and transparency. 

28. Congress fund U.S. Coast Guard engagement efforts with coast guard and maritime law 

enlorcement agencies in the Western Pacific to increase understanding among civilian maritime 

bodies in the Asia Pacific. 

Chapter 3: China and the World 

Section 1: Chino and the Middle East and North Africa 

The Commission recommends: 

29. Congress support efforts by the Department of Defense to strengthen cooperation with China on 

counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. 

30. Congress consider the merits of including fuel oil purchases in the current sanctions regime 

prohibiting countries from purchasing crude oil li'OlU Iran. 
76 

31. Congress work with the Departments of State. Commerce, and the Treasury to utilize the full 

range of incentives and disincentives to encourage China to reduce its ties with Iran, including 

exploring conditioning Chinese energy companies' future investments in the United States on 

limiting commercial ties with Iran. 

32. Congress urge the Department of State to elevate the U.S.- China Middle East Dialogue to 

include an annual meeting at the Cabinet level and to increase meetings at the undersecretary 

level from once to twice per year. 

33. Congress direct the Administration to provide a report to Congress on China's enforcement of its 

cxport controls, to include an assessment of the lcvcl of scrutiny the Chinese govcrnment applies 

to end users in transfers that are of proliferation concern. 

Section 2: Taiwan 

The Commission recommends: 

34. Congress direct the Administration to transmit an unclassified report to Congress on U.S. arms 

sales to Taiwan from 2001 to 2013. It should detail each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of U.S. 

weapons, defense items, or defense services during the immediately preceding one-year period; 

describe Taiwan's justification for each request; report on any Administration decision to reject, 

delay, or alter each request; and provide an update on the status of sales that have been previously 

approved. 

35. Congress encourage the Administration to continue discussions between the United States and 

Taiwan concerning a bilateral investment agreement. 

36. Congress urge Cabinet-level officials to visit Taiwan to promote commercial, technological, and 

people-to-people exchanges and direct the Administration to permit official travel to Taiwan for 

Department of State and Department of Defense personnel above the rank of office director or, 

for uniformed military personnel, above the level of 06. 

Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong 

The Commission recommcnds: 

37. Congress urge the State Department to negotiate with the Macanese government to fix the 

shOlicomings in its regulatory framework. Potential reforms would include implementing an 

effective asset-freezing mechanism, an increase in due diligence procedures in casinos, reduction 

in the high threshold for reporting suspicious transactions within casinos, establishing more 

transparent cross-border reporting requirements, and a requirement that junket operators and their 

affiliates disclose detailed financial information and implement stricter licensing requirements. 

38. Congress reconvene a congressional caucus on Hong Kong to ensure continuous attention to the 

region's democraey and civil rights issues. 

39. Congress adopt a resolution urging China to keep its commitments to universal suffrage as 

articulated in the 1984 Sino- British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and the 

Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 

40. Congress reaffirm its support for human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. 

41. Congress renew the biennial reporting requirements of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. 
77 

The Honorable William A. Reinsch, Chairman 

Chainnan William Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Majority 

Leader Harry Reid for a seventh two-yeartenn expiring December 31, 2013. He was elected as 

Chainnan of the Commission for the 2013 Report cycle effective January 1,2013, and 

previously served as Chainnan of the Commission for the 2011 Report cycle. Chainnan Reinsch 

served as Under Secretary for Export Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. As 

head of the Bureau of Export Administration, later named the Bureau of Industry and Security, 

Chainnan Reinsch was charged with administering and enforcing the export control policies of 

the U.S. govemment, including its antiboycott laws. Major accomplishments during his tenure 

included refocusing controls regarding economic globalization, most notably on highperfonnance computers, microprocessors, and encryption, completing the first revisions of the 

Export Administration regulations in over 40 years. In addition, he revised the interagency 

process for reviewing applications and pennitted electronic filing of applications over the 

Internet. 

During this time, Chainnan Reinsch delivered more than 200 speeches and testified 53 

times before various committees of the Congress. Before joining the Department of Commerce, 

Chainnan Reinsch wa~ a senior legislative assistant to Senator John Rockefeller and was 

responsible for the senator's work on trade, international economic policy, foreign affairs, and 

defense. He also provided staff support for Senator Rockefeller's related efforts on the Finance 

Committee and the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. 

For over a decade, Chainnan Reinsch served on the staff of Senator John Heinz as chief 

legislative assistant, focusing on foreign trade and competitiveness policy issues. During that 

period, Senator Heinz was either the chairman or the ranking member of the Senate Banking 

Committee's Subcommittee on International Finance. Senator Heinz was also a member of the 

International Trade Subcommittee of the Finance Committee. Chainnan Reinsch provided 

support for the senator on both subcommittees. This work included five revisions of the Export 

Administration Act and work on four major trade bills. Prior to joining Senator Heinz's staff, 

Chainnan Reinsch was a legislative assistant to Representatives Richard Ottinger and Gilbert 

Gude, acting staff director of the House Environmental Study Conference, and a teacher in 

Maryland. 

Today Chainnan Reinsch is president of the National Foreign Trade Council. Founded in 

1914, the council is the only business organization dedicated solely to trade policy, export 

finance, international tax, and human resources issues. The organization represents over 200 

companies through its offices in New York City and Washington. 

In addition to his legislative and private sector work, Chainnan Reinsch served as an 

adjunct associate professor at the University of Maryland's University College Graduate School 

of Management and Technology, teaching a course in international trade and trade policy. He is 

also a member of the boards of the Executive Council on Diplomacy and the Center for 

International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Chainnan Reinsch's publications include "Why China 

Matters to the Health of the U.S. Economy," published in Economics and National Security; 

"The Role and Effectiveness of U.S. Export Control Policy in the Age of Globalization" and 

"Export Controls in the Age of Globalization," both published in The Monitor. In addition, 

Chainnan Reinsch has published "Should Uncle Sam Control U.S. Technology Exports," 

published in Insight magazine; "Encryption Policy Strikes a Balance," published in the Journal 

a/Commerce, and "Building a New Economic Relationship with Japan," published with others 

in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy. 
78 

"U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013 Report to Congress: China's 

Maritime Dispntes in the East and South China Seas, and the Cross-Strait Relationship" 

Testimony of the Honorahle Dennis C. Shea 

Vice Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

before tbe 

Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on "2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission" 

Novemher 20, 2013 

Chainnan McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee. thank you for the 

opportunity to testify here today on China's maritime disputes and the cross-Strait relationship. As Vice 

Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, I am pleased to share some of 

the Commission's findings on these topics, which we made public today in our 2013 Report to Congress. 

OVERVIEW 

Although China's strategic center of gravity has been largely land-based for centuries, modernization of 

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). particularly its naval force, has enabled a seaward shift since 

the mid-l 990s. The PLA's growing range of missions - now far wider than the singular goal of Taiwan 

unification that once dominated Beijing's military planning - has resulted in increasingly capable naval 

and maritime law enforcement fleets. Despite warming China-Taiwan tics, China remains committed to 

maintaining a cross-Strait balance of power that allows for the eventual unification of Taiwan with the 

mainland. Moreover, China's military modernization, rising economy, and growing diplomatic influence 

are improving China's ability to assert its interests in its "near seas" - the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, 

and South China Sea. 

The Commission continues to maintain a focus on these developments in our 2013 Report to Congress. 

Our fact-finding trip to the Philippines last year informed a section on the South China Sea in the 2012 

Report. This year, Commissioners met with the leaders of the armed forces and political bodies in Japan 

and Taiwan to sharpen our understanding of the East China Sea dispute as well as the current state oftl1e 

cross-Strait relationship. Those conversations served as the basis of two sections in this year's report -

one on China's maritime disputes and one on developments in Taiwan. My testimony focuses on these 

two areas. 

China's interest in defending its near seas is encompassed in China's overarching maritime defense 

strategy, Offshore Defense. This strategy seeks to achieve the following objectives: 

Deter and defend China against foreign military intervention in Chinese affairs, such as peacetime 

foreign military operations near China that Beijing judges threaten its interests and foreign 

amphibious invasions, blockades, and strikes against the Chinese mainland. 

Deter and reverse any moves by Taiwan toward de jure independence. 
79 

Develop a sea-based nuclear submarine force to support Beijing's nuclear deterrence strategy. 

Deter and defend against threats to China's maritime trade routes. 

Deter and defend against challenges to China's maritime territory, sovereignty, and resources. 

Protect China's interests abroad.' 

During peacetime, the strategy emphasizes gaining control of China's near seas and steadily expanding 

the maritime perimeter out to China's Second Island Chain.' During wartime, the strategy calls for 

engaging opposing naval forces as far from the Chinese coast as possible and, if necessary, overwhelming 

those forces as they approach China. The most important wartime task is to prevent foreign military 

forces from interfering with China's wartime objectives.2 The U.S. Department of Defense characterizes 

these operations as "antiaccess/area deniaL"H China, however, uses the term "counterintervention," 

ref1ecting its perception that such operations are reactive.' 

China's claims in the South China Sea overlap those of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunci, and 

Taiwan. The South China Sca claims of China and Taiwan arc generally coextensive due to thcir origins 

from a shared political heritage. China also has disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and Taiwan. 

Here, China claims not only the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu in China and Diaoyutai in Taiwan) as 

Taiwan docs, but also an extended continental shelf off its castcrn coastline into thc Okinawa Trough:' 

Largely due to Beijing's perception of its growing political and economic clout in the region and its 

modernizing maritime force, China since 2009 - 2010 has grown increasingly assertive in pressing these 

maritime claims. As interactions between Chinese forces and other maritime forces operating in the 

region including the U.S. military become more regular, China's adherence to international protocols 

at sea will hecome increasingly important for the safety of all air and maritime operations in the region as 

well as the stability of the security situation in the East and South China Seas. 

U.S. treaty alliances and forward-deployed military presence in Asia bind the United States to the region 

in ways that link its security interests to the peaceful resolution of sovereignty disputes in the East China 

Sea, South China Sea, and across the Taiwan Strait. The United States maintains treaty alliances with two 

of the claimants - Japan in the East China Sea and the Philippines in the South China Sea - and maintains 

a substantive relationship with its longtime friend and partner, Taiwan. A crisis involving any of these 

parties could trigger U.S. treaty and legislative commitments. The United States also has an interest in 

maintaining peace and stahility in the maritime commons across the Asia Pacific, which serve as crucial 

global and regional trade routes. 

* The primary objectives ofChina"s nuclear deterrence strategy arc to deter nuclear and conventional attacks: should detcn"ence 

fail. survive a nuclear attack and conduct a nuclear counterstrike: from using the threat of nuclear \veapons 

to (:oer'cc 12hina (Jf comiPe! it to back dO\\11; Annual Report to 

Congres's: (V,,'ashington. DC: 2013). pp. 29-

3l. 

., The Second Island Chain refers to a line that stretches fro111 the Kurile Islands through Japan. the Bonin Islands. the Mariana 

Islands. the Caroline Islands. and Indonesia. It encompasses maritime areas out to approximately 1.800 nauticalmilcs from the 

Chinese mainland. 

M "Antiaccess" (A2) actions are those intended to slo\\' deployment forces into a theater or cause the forces to 

from distances farther trom the locus of conflict than they \vould prefer. A2 afIects movement into theater. 

"A.'c"rlcn;"l" (AD) actions arc those intended to impede an adversary's operations within areas where forces cannot or 

WIll 1I0'l pl'eve:n"ICC("'. AD affects movement \vithin theater. U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office. Air Sea Battle: 

May 2013). pp. 2-4, 

2 
80 

As the U.S. defense budget tightens, the United States will face difficult choices in implementing its 

"rebalance" to Asia. A major challenge ahead for Washington, therefore, will be to stand firm on its 

security commitments while allocating sufficient resources to achieve its overall foreign poliey and 

security goals in the Asia Pacifie region.' 

CHINA'S MARITIME DISPUTES: The East China Sea and Sonth China Sea 

China's strategy in the East and South China Seas involves delaying the actual resolution of its maritime 

disputes while strengthening its maritime and air forces to better assert its claims.6 China probably judges 

that as a result of its growing power and intluence vis-it-vis other claimants to the East and South China 

Seas, time is on its side with regard to consolidating control over its maritime claims. 

How Beijing Asserts and Enforces its Maritime Claims 

}vlaritime Law E'1forcement and Naval Forces: China employs its maritime law enforcement ships to 

monitor, protest, and in some eases harass foreign vessels engaging in activities that it believes violate its 

maritime sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. Beijing likely views this approach as less 

provocative than deploying its navy and a means to reinforce its maritime claims by allowing China to 

present the confrontation as a domestic law enforcement issue rather than a foreign defense issue 

requiring the military. Nevertheless, the PLA Navy still plays a role by backing up maritime law 

enforcement patrols from a distance, visibly training and transiting through disputed waters, and 

resupplying Chinese-controlled land features in the South China Sea.' 

Beijing also opportunistically uses its maritime law enforcement and its naval fleets to react to perceived 

attempts by rival claimants to challenge China's sovereignty, and has exploited tactical elTors by some of 

these claimants to change the status quo of its maritime disputes in its favor. Through a highly visible and 

persistent maritime presence, China has obtained de facto control of some disputed land features and 

waters in the East and South China Seas, including most recently Scarborough Reef in the South China 

Sea. When the Philippines deployed a naval vessel in response to a fishing dispute last May, Beijing used 

the opportunity to patrol the reefs vicinity with superior maritime forces and rope off its entrance to 

prevent Philippine vessels from operating there.' Today, over a year after the conclusion of the monthslong standoff; China continues to maintain control over the reef. 

China also has applied this approach with some success in the East China Sea's Senkaku Islands. Viewing 

the Japanese government's September 2012 purchase of several of the Senkaku Islands from a private 

Japanese citizen as a deliberate attempt to change the status of the disputed territory, China used the 

0ppOliunity to advance its claim to the islands. 'I Following the purchase, China's maritime law 

enforcement and naval forces sharply increased maritime and air activity near the islands. By doing so, 

Beijing seeks to underscore its own claim to the islands as well as pressure Japan into officially 

acknowledging a territorial dispute, which Tokyo refuses to do. Likely due in part to a more formidable 

balance of power in the East China Sea than in the South China Sea, China has not sought to obtain de 

facto control over the Senkaku Islands as it did at Scarborough Reef. 

Legal and Administrative Measures: China uses legal mechanisms to demonstrate de jure govemance 

over disputed waters. \0 In an effort to justify its claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 

China has suhmitted its own claims to the UN and contested competing claims through UN mechanisms. 

China also has passed domestic laws declaring rights in its claimed territorial sea and exclusive economic 

zone and outlining regulations for mapping and surveying its claimed waters. For example, in its 

southernmost province of Hainan, China established tishing regulations that enable Hainan authorities to 

board, inspect, and expel foreign vessels "illegally" operating in China's claimed waters." 
81 

Drivers of China's Maritime Disputes 

Sovereignly and "Core Interests": China's position of "indisputable sovereignty" with regard to its 

claims in the East and South China Seas underlies its overall policy approaches to those issues. As 

tensions involving China's maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea have grown 

since 2009, official and unofficial Chinese sources indicate China views the East and South China Seas as 

central to its "core interests," 12 which authoritative Chinese speeches and documents define as China's (I) 

national security, (2) sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (3) sustained economic and social 

development. 13 Beijing makes core interest declarations to signal to other countries that China is 

unwilling to compromise on particular policy issues and to imply that China would use force to defend 

these interests. 

Much to the concern of the Commission's Japanese interlocutors, China appcared to designate the 

Senkaku Islands a core interest this April.'· Subsequent official Chinese statements have not clarified the 

status of the islands, allowing Beijing to maintain flexibility in its approach to thc dispute, prcvent any 

domestic accusations that China is adopting a weakcr stanec, and dcny that it is taking unilateral actions 

or escalating tensions,ls 

Nationalism: China exploits popular nationalism to support its foreign policy goals in the East and South 

China Seas. China's official and popular historical narrative with regard to the East and South China Seas 

is a product of China's education system and ofticial media, which cultivate and promote the notion of 

China's victimization by Japan and the West during what China calls its "century of humiliation" from 

the mid-19'h to the mid-20'" centuries.'6 Due to the strength of popular nationalist and anti-Japanese 

sentiments in China, Beijing sees East China Sea sovereignty as a political legitimacy issue: Whereas a 

robust public defense of China's sovereignty could satisfy popular demands and strengthen the legitimacy 

of Chinese leaders, measures popularly viewed as weak against foreign insults and provocations could 

undermine legitimacy.17 

Economic Development: China views the East and South China Seas as central to its economic 

development, due to their resource potential and signiHcant role as maritime transil routes. The 

development of natural resources - especially fishing - is closely linked to nationalism in the context of 

the maritime disputes because these activities can quickly galvanize popular nationalist sentiment." These 

types of responses to perceived foreign encroachments upon national or historic fishing grounds are 

typical across the region. For example, when the Philippine Coast Guard Hred shots at a Taiwan Hshing 

boat in disputed waters in May of this year, the resulting death of a Taiwan tisherman set off nationalist 

outpourings acrass Taiwan. The incident led to three months of strained relations between Taiwan and the 

Philippines that ended only after Manila offered an orncial apology, agreed to pay compensation to the 

victim's family, and recommended homicide charges for the Philippine Coast Guard personnel who 

opened fire on the Taiwan Hshing boat.'9 

China also has a critical interest both in the seaborne trade of energy supplies via the South China Sea and 

the potentially signincant oil and gas resources that lay beneath it. Currently, nearly one third of global 

crude oil and over half of global liqueHed natural gas pass through the South China Sea, much of it en 

route to China's eastern provinces, the powerhouses of China's export- and manufacturing-driven 

economy.'" In addition to the role the South China Sea plays in China's energy trade, China and the other 

claimants seek to exploit subsea oil and gas resources projected to lie beneath dispuled waters." 

CHINA AND TAIWAN: The Changing Cross-Strait Balance of Power 

China and Taiwan in 2013 enjoyed relatively positive relations, characterized by growing economic ties 

and relatively amicable political relations. Since the Commission's 2012 Report to Congress, the two 

4 
82 

sidcs established reciprocal tradc promotion offices across the Strait,22 enacted a trade in goods agreement, 

signed a trade in services agrcement,23 signed a currency clearing agreement,2-i and continued discussions 

on a cross-Strait trade dispute settlement mechanism. 25 Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou told the 

Commission that his ageuda for cross-Strait diplomatic relations during his second tenu includes securing 

additional economic agreements, expanding cross-Strait educational exchanges, and establishing 

reciprocal representation offices. 

Despite these generally positive trends, China's cross-Strait policy remains focused on pursuing a balance 

of economic, political, and military power that heavily favors China with the goal of eventualunitication 

of Taiwan. 

Since the late 1990s, China's military modernization has focused on improving its capabilities for Taiwan 

contlict scenarios. This modernization program likely is designed to hedge against a failure of Beijing's 

cross-Strait diplomatic strategy; deter Taipei from taking steps toward official independence; signal to the 

United States that China is willing to use force against Taiwan if necessary; and enhance China's ability 

to deter, deny, or delay any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. The PLA is more prepared than in 

the past to conduct several different military campaigns against Taiwan, including a partial naval 

blockade and a limited air and missile campaign. 

China has a large and sophisticated short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force, including over 

1,100 mobile SRBMs that are positioned in southeast China and able to strike Taiwan. China 

continues to improve the range, accuracy, and payloads of its SRBMs with the introduction of 

new missiles or variants and component upgrades. 26 

The PLA has approximately 2,300 combat aircraft capable of participating in large-scale air 

operations, 490 of which are based within range of Taiwan. By contrast, Taiwan's air force has 

approximately 410 combat aircraft, many of which will reach the end of their useful service life 

in the next five to 10 years. 

The PLA has approximately 75 major surface combatants, 85 missile patrol boats, and 60 

conventional and nuclear submarines. These units are available for a range of missions, such as 

enforcing a blockade of Taiwan. As China's naval modemization continues, an increasing 

percentage of these ships and submarines will feature advanced weaponry. In contrast, Taiwan 

has 26 major surface combatants, 45 missile patrol boats, and two operational submarines." 

The PLA Navy has three total amphibious transport docks (LPD), all of which were 

commissioned after 2008. These LPDs which can can')' a mix of air-cushion landing craft, 

amphibious armored vehicles, helicopters, and marines improve China's ability to seize and 

hold Taiwan's offshore islands." However, China at this time does not appear to be pursuing the 

amphibious lift capability necessary to conduct a li,tll-scale invasion of Taiwan; China still only 

has about one third of the lift it would need to conduct such an operation. 

In addition to its military buildup against Taiwan, China continues to work to isolate Taiwan politically 

and diplomatically. Beijing's insistence on the "one China principle" precludes any country or 

international organization from simultaneously recognizing China and Taiwan. This effectively restricts 

Taiwan's participation in international organizations and activities and prevents Taiwan from promoting 

its sovereignty. In addition, China in a subtle yet significant effort to demonstrate its sovereignty over 

Taiwan introduced an inflammatory new passport design in May 2013 that includes images of two 
83 

popular tourist sites in Taiwan and a map depicting Taiwan as part of China: Nevertheless, Taiwan made 

important progress in strengthening its role as an international actor this ycar. For instance, Taiwan signed 

free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore.3\) Taiwan also was invited to send a "guest" 

delegation to a United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization assembly.}It 

RECOMMENDA nONS 

The United States has committed itself to rebalancing its foreign policy to Asia, but now faces the 

possibility of being unable to implement ambitious diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives due to 

declining resources. Out of a total of 41 recommendations, the Commission highlighted ten, believing 

them to be of particular significance. At the top of the list this year is a recommendation that Congress 

fund the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at 

least 60 ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by 2020. The intent is to provide the 

United States with the capacity to maintain rcadincss and presence in the Wcstern Pacific and surge naval 

assets in the event of a contingency. As Lt. Gen. Wallace "Chip" Gregson, Jr., currently Senior Director, 

China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest stated in testimony to the Commission, "no 

matter how capable the ship, it can only be in one place at a time. And power projection that stays is 

about ships.,,]2 

This recnmmendation addresses what has been a growing concern of mine: that resources available to the 

Department of Defense for realizing the Asia rebalance will be insufficient to lend credibility to its 

security commitments or to counter the changing balance of power in the region. PLA modernization 

efforts, many of which are designed to limit U.S. freedom of action throughout the Westem Pacific, could 

undennine U.S. interests and security. As a result, it will be important for the United States to remain 

deeply engaged in the region and demonstrate that it has the capacity and resolve to actively shape - and 

offset - China's growing maritime capabilities." In my view, a strong U.S. military presence in the 

Western Pacific, and the deterrent etfect it provides, is critical to preserving peace and stability in the 

region. 

In addition to strengthening our own capabilities in the Asia Pacific, the United States should build the 

capacity of our partners and allies to improve maritime domain awareness in the East and South China 

Seas. For this reason, the Commission recommends Congress fund Department of Defense and State 

efforts to improve the air and maritime capabilities of our pattners and allies, particularly with regard to 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In another recommendation aimed at building maritime 

domain awareness, we recommend Congress fund U.S. Coast Guard engagement efforts with counterparts 

in the West Pacific, given that most of the operational burden among East and South China Sea claimants 

tends to fall on their maritime law enforcement forces. 

The need to deepen strategic tmst between the United States and China is reflected in our fourth 

recommendation regarding maritime disputes. We recommend Congress urge the Department of Defense 

to continue to develop the U.S.-China maritime security relationship. [n operational environments as tense 

and potentially explosive as the East and South China Seas, strategic trust provides the foundation to 

reduce the potential of miscalculation at sea. 

~ Tal\van does not recognize PRe passports. Chinese citizens visiting Tai'wnn must apply for a "compatriot pass" issued by the 

Immigration Agency. 

In July 2013, President Obama signed legislation directing the U.S. Secretary of State to "develop a strategy to ohtain observer 

status for Tahvan in the IeAO," Public Law 113-17. "'To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer 

status for Taiw<U1 at the triennial International Civil Aviation Assembly, and for other purposes:' 113th Cong" 1st 

scss, July 12, 2013.J'Y112Ji!2:f1!LSQl:W=!!Q!:!JJJ1!ilJl1!1JlQ=:i2!1li1!.'j.L 

6 
84 

Turning to Taiwan, the U's,-Taiwan relationship continues to be a key component of peace and security 

in the Asia Pacific, But while Taiwan remains our close partner, the role of Taiwan in the U.S. rebalance 

to Asia is not entirely clear. In October 2011, then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs Kurt Campbell testified to the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that "an 

important part of this tllrn to Asia is maintaining a robust and multidimensional unofficial relationship 

with Taiwan.,,34 Since then, U.S. officials have not explicitly referred to Taiwan's actual or potential role 

in the U.S. rebalance to Asia in public statements. However, Taiwan should be considered a strong 

potential component in U.S. defense planning in the Asia Pacific. Taiwan's extensive knowledge of the 

PLA and its ability to contribute to situational awareness in the region make it an ideal partner for the 

United States in an antiaccesslarea denial scenario.35 

To support the strengthening of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the Commission recommends Congress 

urge Cabinet-level officials to visit Taiwan in order to promote commercial, technological, and pcople-topeople exchanges. We further recommend Congress direct the Administration to pennit official travel to 

Taiwan for Department of State and Department of Defense personnel above the rank of office director or, 

for uniformed military personnel, above thc level of 0-6. With regard to deepening economic relations, 

the Commission recommends Congress encourage the Administration to continue discussion between the 

United States and Taiwan concerning a bilateral investment agreement. 

Finally, I'd like to highlight the Commission's recommendation to Congress to direct the Administration 

to transmit an unclassitied report to Congress on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan from 2001 to 2013. As one of 

the largest buyers of U.S. arms in the world, and the largest in Asia, Taiwan continues to advocate for 

more advanced weapons from the United States, most notably submarines and fighter aircraft. However, 

progress on such deals remains elusive, threatening the long-term readiness of Taiwan's military and 

turther tipping the cross-Strait balance of military power in China's favor. 

Although the United States approved Taiwan's request to purchase diesel-electric submarines in 2001, to 

date, there has been no progress on that sale due to a number of factors on both sides. These include 

partisan political gridlock in Taiwan's legislature, delays in Taiwan's commitment of funds, and 

protracted cost negotiations. Furthennore, the United Slalcs has not built a diesel-electric submarine since 

the 1950s, or operated one since 1990s. The Commission's 2013 Report dispels the notion that Taiwan is 

no longer interested in these submarines. In fact, earlier this year, Taiwan Ministry of Defense officials 

emphasized to the Commission that the Taiwan Navy's ability to counter China's expanding and 

modernizing submarine fleet will continue to erode as Taiwan's aging submarine force increasingly is 

unable to support Taiwan Navy antisubmarine training. 

Moreover, while U.S. support of Taiwan's fighter program should be applauded, planned U.S. upgrades 

to Taiwan's existing tleet of F-16 AlB aircraft do not adequately address all of Taiwan's air defense 

requirements. The Obama Administration in April 2012 committed to deciding on a "near term course of 

action on how to address Taiwan's fighter gap," but has yet to announce further concrete details. 3(, 

Without additional acquisitions, Taiwan's fighter force will face substantial numerical shortfalls as 

Taiwan's fighters are retired over the next five to 10 years. 

Taiwan's diminishing ability to maintain a credible deterrent capability may provide incentives and create 

opportunities for China to take on greater risk in its approach to cross-Strait relations, including 

pressuring Taiwan to move toward political talks or using military force to achieve political objectives. 

Bearing that in mind, directing the Administration to provide a report on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would 

not only provide accountability on the progress or lack thereof - of planned sales, it also would support 

our own strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait. 

7 
85 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and for the 

Committee's focus on these important topics, f look forward to your questions, 

I Andre\\'- Erickson, "China's Modernization oOts Naval and Air Power Capabilities," in Ashley 1. Tellis and Travis Tanner. cds .. 

Slnllcc';c ,is;" 2(,'12,13: China's Afilitary Challenge (Seattle, WA. and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asia Research. 

60-125: Daniel Hmtnctt and Frederic Vellucci. "Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: 

1990s," in Phillip C. Saunders ct al Expandinx ('apabilities. ";;:I~;~:g ;~~:;'~;n.~ Anoul 

t~~!'i:f:~:;~;;~~N~alt~i~onal Defense Bickford. Uncerlain wa'\Clo,·u:S"llIlli"a. )'flU: 

Department of Defense, Annual Report fo ('!Ingress: "filitm)! and Security Developments Inl'Olving the People's Repuhlic 

qj'China 2013 (Washington. DC: 2013). pp. L 31-33: Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins. "Near Seas 'Anti-Navy" Capabilities, 

not Nascent Blue Water Fleet. Constitute China's Core Challenge to U.s. and Regional Militaries." China Sir;IlFost. March 6. 

2012. htm://l1·ljJ1I'. andreli·erickson. com/20 12/03/china-sia npost-55-near-seas-anti-nal'v-capahil ities-not-nascenl-blue-H'ater-fleelconsO/ufe-chinas¥core-challenuc-/o-us-and-re!!ional-rnilitaries/: Thomas Bickford. [Incerfain Waters: Thinking About ('hin(/ ',,,' 

Emergence as a Maritime Pm'fer (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses. September 2011). pp. 28-29: Toshi Yoshihara and 

James Holmes, Red Slar Over the PacUic: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. A1aritirne S'(rategy (Annapolis. MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2010), pp. 14-44: U.S. Oilice of Naval Intelligence. The People's Liheration Army: A Afodern Navy with Chinese 

('haracferisfic'>' (Suitland. MD: 2009). pp. 5-10: and Roger Cliff et al.. Entering the Dragon ·s Lair· Chinese Antiaccess 5.:trazegies 

and Their Implications.fi;r the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), pp, 3~! 2. 

http://llwH>.rand.org/contenUdam/randi

pubs/monoa raphs,2007/RAND MG524.pdf: 

3 Jonathan Greenert and Mark Welsh. "Breaking the Kill Chain:' Foreign PO/h}'. May 16,2013. 

http:/,lnnr.threi!!npolicl".com/arlicles/2013/05/j6/breaking the kill chain air sea hattle?pa(Te -(ul/: U.S. Department of 

Defense, Annual Report 10 Congress: Jillitary and Security Developments Inl'olving the People's Repuhlic (~f"China 2()j 3 

(Washington. DC: 2013). pp. L 31-33; and Anton Lee \Vishik II. '"An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLA's Active Strategic 

Counterattacks on Exterior Lines," ('hina S'ecurity 19 (2011) . 

..j. People's Republic of China . "Submission by the People's Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental 

Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea: Executive Summary:' December 14.2012, : Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (Republic of China), "The Republic of China's Sovereignty Claims ovcr the Diaoyutai Islands and the East China Sea 

Peace Initiative," http:/\nl·H·, mota. gov.l1tiEnO(ficial/ToDics/ToricsArficleDelail/td8d -15 9-h3ec~.f.ca6~ 9231-.J03f29 ]0090a. 

5 U.S.-China Economic and Security Revie\v Commission. Hearing on China's JVew Leadership and Implications/vI' the United 

,)'tales. \vritten testimony of David Lampton, February 7. 2013: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing 

on China's Nnl' Leadership and Implications/(n' fhe (/nited Slates. written testimony of Michael Auslin. February 7. 2013. 

{:> M. Taylor Fravel, "Xi Jinping's Overlooked Revelation on China's Maritime Disputes," Diplomat. August 15.2013. 

http:/>'Ihedinlomat. com/20 13/08/15l'(i-iinninfc!s-overiooked-revelaf ion-on-chinas-rnarit imc-disPlltes/? all ---otruc: Xinhua. "Xi 

Jinping Stresses the Need to Shmv Greater Care about the Ocean. Understand \10re about the Ocean. and Make Strategic Plans 

for the Use of the Ocean, Push Fonvard the Building ofa Maritime Power and Continuously Make New Achievements at the 

Eighth Collective Study Session of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau:' July 31, 2013. OSC ID: 

C1 tR20 13073! 44047122. httn://wHw.opensource. VOl'. 

~ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. fiearing on China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China 

Seas. \\Titten testimony of Michael McDevitt. April 4. 2013: U.S.-China Economic and Security Revie\\" Commission, 2012 

Annllal Report to Congress (Washington. DC: U.S. Govemment Printing Office, November 2012). p. 215; U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission. [fearing on China's Marifimc Di.\putes in the East and 5;outh China Seas. testimony of Peter 

Dutton, April 4, 2013; [rna U,S. Navy Seventh Fleet senior otlicers, meeting \vith Commissioners, July 2013. 

8 U.S,-China Economic and Security Revie\v Comul.ission, 2012 Annual Report 10 Congress (Washington. DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office. 2012), p. 232. 

9 M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Island Strategy: 'Redefining the Status Quo,'" Diplomat, November 1,2012. 

htln://lhediD/omaf.com/chint.l-poH'er/chinas-islal1d~sfrate({l'-redefine-Ihe-siafl!S-quO/. 

10 U.S.-China Economic and Security Revie\v Commission. Hearing on China·s Maritime Disputes in/he East and S'outh China 

Seas, written testimony of Peter Dutton. April 4. 201 J. 

11 M. Taylor Fravel. "Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: An Update." Diplomat. January 4, 2013. 

htm://thedipl()mal.com/china-nm1·er/hainans-nelv~maritime-regll/ations-an-updale/; ncn Blanchard and Manuel Mogato, 

"UPDATE 4H Chinese police plan to board vessels in disputed seas:' Reuters. November 29. 2012. 

http://lI·H'H'.reufers.com/article/2012/1 j/ 3()/china-seas-idlJSL.fN0991 Z020121130. 

12 Edward \\long, "Chinese Milita/)' Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power:' New York Times, April 23, 2010. 

http://u·wu'. nvtimes.com/20 1 0/0-//2 -//ll·orldiasial2 4navv.html ?pagell'anled---oall; Michael S\yainc, "China' s Assertive Behavior: 

Part One: On 'Core [nterests:" China Leader: ... hip '\'i/onitor 34 (February 22, 2011): 9, 23. 

http://H'wH',hool'er.o''l!/nuh!ic(ftions/china~leadership-m()nilOlianhJe/67966; and Alastair lain Johnston. "How New and 

Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?" International S'ecurily 34:7 (Spring 2013): 17~18. 
86 

UHillary Clinton et a1. "Closing Remarks for ll.s.-China Security and Economic Dialogue" (EisenhO\vcr Executive Office 

Building. Washington, DC, July 28. 2009). http://H'11'11',stale. aov/secrelarw'rm/2009a/iuh>''126599.h1m: Michael Swaine, "China's 

Assertive Behavior: Part One: On 'Core Interests:" China Leadership Monitor 34 (February 22, 101 1). p. 4. 

http://lI'WH'. hoover. off.!lrllblications/china-Ieadershir-monitor/article/6 7966; and Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt (contributor). 

"Does Promoting 'Core Interests' Do China More Harm than Good?" ChinaFile Conversation. May 2, 2013. 

hflp://w.1'H'.chinafile.com/does-pnJfl1oting-core-interesfs-do-china-more-harm-fl(iOd. 

H Kyodo. "China Says Scnkaku Islands arc its 'Corc Interest. .. · April 26, 2013. OSC ID: JPP2013042696907l. 

http:./w11"w.opensource.f!Ov;Asahi5;himbun(Tokyo) . ."Japanese.Chinese Defense Officials :!vleet to Ease Tensions Over 

Senkakus." April 27. 2013. hap::/atH'.a.'>'ahi.comlarticle/asia/china/AJ20I304270049. 

15 Caitlin Campbell et at. China's 'Core Interests' and the East China ,Sea (Washington. DC: C.S,~China F.conomic and Security 

Revie\v Commission, May 2013). p. 5. http."l/lFlt·H'.USCC.gol'/Research/china%E2o/r,sO%99s-%El%.W)%9( 'core~ 

inlereSls%E2%80%9D-and-eaSf-china-sea. 

16 Zheng Wang. "Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations:' Montreal 

Rc\'ielIJ • NO\Tember 2012. hUn:./',}11nr. themontrealrevinl·. com/2009/?v'erer-r or1Tet-National-Hluniliation-Historical-Alemorv-inChinese-Politics-and~Foreign-Re/afions.nhn: "Interview Vvith Zheng Wang. Author of Never FOlget Nationa/ lIumiliation: 

Historical MemOl)' in Chine.se Pulitics and Foreign Relations" (New' York. NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 

http://WHW.CUp.columhia.edu/:\"lalic/zhenfl-ll'anv-interview. 

D} J.S.-China Economic and Security Revie\\t Commission. Hearing on China's .Harilime Di.sputes in the East and S'outh China 

Seas. \\'Titten testimony ofJessica Chen Weiss. April 4. 2013. 

18 U.S.-China Economic and Hearing on China's }'fari/fme Disputes in the East and South China 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~E~~:~~f;iF~;eh;1~>l;lli-Y~2013)' Security Review Commission. Hearing on 

ApriI4,2013, 

U.S.-China Ecomrnicancl S"curity Review Commission. 2012 Annllal Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 2012), p, 234-5, 

22 Central News Agency (Taiwan). "Taiwan opens first trade promotion center in China:' Decemocr 19.2012, 

http://\rwlt'.lmnfchinatimes.com/ncws-suhclass-cnt.asDx?id-2() 12I219{)(j()1 09&cid-120 1; Xinhua. "Taiwan opens 3nJ mainland 

trade promotion office," September 9, 2013. http://ne\vs.xinhuaneLcomieno"lish!chinn!2013-09/05!c132694723.htm; Ministry of 

Commerce (China). Afr. Jhtng Yaoping Affcnded the Opening Ceremony (~fCCCJfE [China Chamher o/"CommercefiJr Imporf 

and f..'xporl qlAfachinclT and Electronic Products} qtflce in Taipei. February 1,2013. 

http:/'envlish.nulicom.flOl·.cn/articie!newsrelease/\·igniticantncH's/20 13{)2/20 13 0100021 O.f.l. shtml. 

23 Elizabeth Hsu_ "Publishing sector not included in cross-strait service trade pact." Central Ne\vs Agency (Taiw'an}; .hme 21. 

2013. hftv://fiJcustaiwan.tw/llews/acs/20 130621 0039.asf)x. 

2 .. Lorraine Luk and Aries POOH, "China. Tai"van Sign Yuan~Clcaring DeaL" Wa1l5'treet Journal. January 25. 2013. 

htm:!/online.1t's;.com/artic/e/SBI OOOI-I241278R732353980-1578263..f.51199261528.hfml. 

25 Bien Chin-fong and Lilian Wu, '"Tajv'ian's top negotiator says cross-strait talks fruitful," Central Ne\vs Agency (Taiwan). June 

22.2013. httP:/·'{()Cl1stuiH·on.tw/nCll'slu('s/201306220()21.aspx. 

26 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to ('ongress: Alilitat)' and S'ecurity Devdopments Involving the People 's RepubliC 

(~fChilla 2013 (Washington, DC: May 2013). p. 5, 

27 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: A;~::~;~::;~~;;~~::~~;~i~;~~r'f~:~~~~:n;;;;;::;':K:;:~,;::0;0/:; q(China 2013 (Washington. DC: May 2013). p. 77; U,S.-Tai"\,van 711C 

(Arlington, Vi\: October 2012), p, 21, 

18 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: lvfililW), and Securi(r Developments Involl'ing the People's Republic 

o(China 2013 (Washington, DC: May 2013), p, 76, 

29 Ronald O'Rourke, ('hina Sand lvfodernization: implications/or US. i'v'av.v Capahilities· M Background and Issues/hI' OmRress 

(\Vashington. DC: Congressional Research Service. July 5. 2013). pp, 33~37: U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to 

Congress on China's A4ilitary Power, Afilitm:}' and Security Developments Involving the People's Repuhlic of China 2013 

(Washington, DC: 2013), pp, 7-8, 39, 

30 Hsieh Chia-chen. Lin Hui-yu and Maia Huang. "Taiwan-NZ deal key to regional economic integration: think tank:' Central 

News Agency (Taiwan). July 11.2013. htlr:,>'fixust(/iwan.tw/l1ews/aeco/201307 I i0025.mnx; Ralph Jennings, nTai\\'an, 

Singapore Sign Free Trade Deal as China Relents." Voice (?/America, November 7. 2013. 

httv:<hl"Wlt'.l'oanews.cof}1/contcnt/laiwan-sinflapore-si'.!n-free-trade-dcal-china-relents/17853S8.hfml. 

31 Central News Agency (Taiwan). "ICAO invitation breaks new ground: foreign minister," September 13.2013. 

,2 U.S.-China Economic and Security Rcview Commission. Hearing on China's lv'ew Leadership and Implicarionsfor the United 

Stales, \\Titten testimony of Wallace ·'Chip" Gregson, February7. 2013. 

33 Craig Murray et aL China's ,\/aral Modernization and implications})r the United States (Washington. DC: U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission. August 2013), p. 8. 

9 
87 

34 U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on Wh}' Tahran Alatters, testimony of Kurt Campbell. 

"Taiwan's Crucial Role in the U.S. Pivot to Asia:' 

10 
88 

The Honorahle Dennis C. Shea, Vice Chairman 

Vice Chainnan Dennis Shea was reappointed by Senate Republican Leader Mitch 

McConnell for a third two-year term expiring December 31, 2014. An attorney with 25 

years of experience in government and publ ic policy, he is the founder of Shea Public 

Strategies LLC, a public affairs firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. Before starting the 

finn, he served as Vice President for Government Affairs-Americas for Pitney Bowes 

Inc., a Fortune 500 company. 

Vice Chainnan Shea's government service began in 1988, when he joined the 

Office of Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole as counsel, subsequently becoming the 

Senator's deputy chief of staff in the Office of the Senate Majority Leader. In these 

capacities, he advised Senator Dole and other Republican senators on a broad range of 

domestic policy issues, was involved in the drafting of numerous pieces oflegislation, and 

was recognized as one of the most influential staffers on Capitol Hill. In 1992, Vice 

Chainnan Shea's service with Senator Dole was interrupted when he ran for Congress in 

the Seventh District of New York. During the 1996 elections, Vice Chairman Shea 

continued to help shape the national public policy debate as the director of policy for the 

Dole for President Campaign. Following the elections, he entered the private sector, 

providing legislative and public affairs counsel to a wide range of clients while employed 

at BKSH & Associates and Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson, and Hand. 

In 2003, Vice Chainnan Shea was named the Executive Director of the President's 

Commission on the United States Postal Service. Many of the Commission's 

recommendations were subsequently adopted in the landmark 2006 postal refonn 

legislation. 

In 2004, Vice Chairman Shea was confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Development and Research at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

As Assistant Secretary, Vice Chairman Shea led a team responsible for conducting much 

of the critical analysis necessary to support the Department's mission. In 2005, Vice 

Chairman Shea left to serve as Senior Advisor to Senator Elizabeth Dole in her capacity as 

chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee. 

Vice Chairman Shea received a J.D., an M.A. in History, and a B.A. in 

Government, from Harvard University. He is admitted to the bar in New York and the 

District of Columbia. The Vice Chainnan currently resides in Alexandria, Virginia, with 

his wife Elizabeth and daughter Juliette. 
89 

"U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013 Report to Congress: China's 

Military Modernization, U.S.-China Security Relations, and China's Cyber Activities" 

Testimony of Dr. Larry M. Wortzel 

Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

hefore the 

Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on "2013 Report to Congress ofthe U.S.-China Economic Security Review 

Commission" 

Chainnan McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify. As a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, I will present some of the Commission's findings on China's military 

modernization, U.S.-China security relations, and China's cyber activities from the 2013 Report 

to Congress. The views I present today, however, are my own. I want to acknowledge the fine 

work of our staff in preparing the 2013 Report to Congress, and especially the excellent research 

of our foreign policy and security slaff in helping to prepare this testimony. 

China's Militarv Modernization 

China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is undergoing an extensive modernization 

program that presents significant challenges to U.S. security interests in Asia. This 

modernization includes creating a surveillance and strike architecture that supports operations at 

longer distances away from China's coast. It makes the PLA a more formidable force in all the 

dimensions of war: air, space, land, sea and in the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLA has new, 

multi-mission capable combat ships, aircraft, submarines, and new generations of missiles. 

First and foremost, major elements of this program such as the DF-21 D antiship ballistic 

missile and increasing numbers of advanced submarines anned with antiship cruise missiles -

are designed to restrict U.S. freedom of action throughout the Western Pacific. The PLA is 
90 

rapidly expanding and diversifYing its ability to conduct conventional strikes against U.S. and 

allied bases, ships, and aircraft throughout the region, including those that it previously could not 

reach with conventional weapons, such as U.S. military facilities in Guam. As the PLA's antiaccess/area denial' capabilities mature, the costs and risks to the United States for intervention in 

a potential regional conflict involving China will increase. The Chinese military, of course, 

sensitive to 19th and 20th century history, thinks of these actions as counter-intervention strategies 

designed to prevent foreign militaries from intervening in China's sovereign affairs or territory. 

Furthermore, the PLA's rapidly advancing regional power projection capabilities enhance 

Beijing's ability to use force against Taiwan, Japan, and rival claimants in the South China Sea. 

More seriously, because China's military doctrine emphasizes preemptive attacks, it raises the 

stakes in any crisis. Many potential security scenarios could require the U.S. military to defend 

U.S. regional allies and partners as well as to maintain open and secure access to the air and 

maritime commons in the Western Pacific. 

At the same time, rising unease over both China's expanding capabilities and increasing 

assertiveness is driving U.S. allies and partners in Asia to improve their own military forces and 

strengthen their security relationships with each other. These trends could support U.S. interests 

in Asia by lightening Washington's operational responsibilities in the region. On the other hand, 

if China's neighbors pursue military capabilities that could be used offensively or preemptively 

due to the perception that the United States will be unable to follow through on its commitment 

to the rebalance to Asia, this could undermine U.S. interests in the region. 

In the Commission's 2013 Report to Congress we discuss the following developments in China's 

military modernization: 

I Anti-access" (A2) actions arc those intended to slovv deployment oLm adversary's forces into a theater or cause the fiJrces to 

operate from distances larther from the conflict than they would othenvise prefer. A2 affects movement into theater. "Area 

denial" (AD) actions are those intended to impede an adversary's operations within areas where friendly f()fees cannot or \vil! n01 

pre,.'em access, AD affects movement within theater. U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air Sea Battle: S'ervice Collahoration to 

Ad,iru,,, Anti·Ac,:es,,' & A"'cuDcnia,' ('}l(lllen~cs IAriling.'on. VA: May 2013).2-4. 
91 

Navy 

Aircraft carriers. Since commissioning its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September 2012, 

China continues to develop a fixed-wing carrier aviation capability, which is necessary for the 

carrier to carry out air defense and offensive strike missions. The Liaoning is a former Russian 

aircraft carrier purchased from the Ukraine. [t was refitted and modernized in China. The PLA 

Navy conducted its first successful carrier-based takeoff and landing with the Jian-15 (.1-15) in 

November 2012, certified its first group of aircraft carrier pilots and landing signal officers on 

the carrier's first operational deployment trom June to July 2013, and verified the flight deck 

operations process in September 2013. 1 The Liaoning will continue to conduct short deployments 

and shipboard aviation training until 2015 to 2016, when China's first 1-15 regiment is expected 

to become operational. The J-15 is a Chinese copy of the Russian Su-33. China likely intends to 

follow the Liaoning with at least two domestically produced hulls. The first of these appears to 

be under construction and could become operational before 2020. 

Submarine-launched ballistic missile. China's lulang-2 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic 

missile is expected to reach initial operational capability very soon.2 The missile has been under 

development for a number of years, which shows that Chinese military industries still have some 

problems in developing and lielding new systems. The JL-2, when mated with the PLA Navy's 

lIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), will give China its first credible sea-based 

nuclear deterrent. The l[N SSBN/1L-2 weapon system likely will have a range of over 4,000 

nautical miles, allowing the PLA Navy to target the continental United States from China's 

littoral waters.3 China has deployed three lIN SSBNs and probably will field two additional units 

by 2020.4 

Sea-based land attack capability. China currently does not have the ability to strike land targets 

with sea-based cruise missiles. However, the PLA Navy is developing a land attack capability, 

likely for its Type-095 guided-missile attack submarine and LUY ANG III guided-missile 

destroyer. Modern submarines and surface combatants anned with land attack cruise missiles 

(LACM) will complement the PLA's growing inventory of air- and ground-based LACM and 

3 
92 

ballistic missiles, enhancing Beijing's flexibility for attacking land targets throughout the 

Western Pacific, including U.S. facilities in Guam.s 

Shipbuilding. The PLA Navy continues to steadily increase its inventory of modern submarines 

and surface combatants. China is known to be building seven classes of ships simultaneously but 

may be constructing additional classes.6 Trends in China's defense spending, research and 

development, and shipbuilding suggest the PLA Navy will continue to modernize. China already 

has 65 submarines that can employ intercontinental ballistic missiles, torpedoes, mines, or antiship cruise missiles. The PLA Navy's surface combat force has modernized and its 77 major 

surface combatants are networked and capable of conducting multiple missions? The combat 

fleets are supported by a combat logistics force that can conduct underway replenishment and 

limited repairs. All of these ships will be equipped to take advantage of a networked, redundant 

command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

system (C4ISR) fielded by the PLA. 

Submarines. China has a formidable force of 65 conventional and nuclear submarines.s Some 

are equipped with nuclear and conventional torpedoes and mines as well as antiship cruise 

missiles. In 2012, China began building four "improved variants" of its SHANG-class nuclear 

attack submarine. China also continues production of the YUAN-class conventional submarine, 

some of which will include an air-independent propulsion system that allows for extended 

duration operations, and the JIN-c1ass SSBN. Furthermore, China is developing two new classes 

of nuclear submarines and may jointly design and build four advanced conventional submarines 

with Russia.9 China's growing submarine inventory will significantly enhance China's ability to 

strike opposing surface ships throughout the Western Pacific and to protect future nuclear 

deterrent patrols and aircraft carrier task groupS.IO 

Air Force 

Fighter aircraft. China also is developing two next-generation fighters, the J-20 and the J-31, 

which could feature low observability and active electronically scanned array radar. I I The PLA 

Air Force conducted the first test flights of the J-20 and J-31 in January 2011 and October 2012, 

4 
93 

respectively. These aircraft will strengthen China's ability to project power and gain and 

maintain air superiority in a regional coni1ict. 

Cargo transport aircraft. In January 2013. China conducted the first test flight of its 

indigenously developed cargo transport aircraft, the Yun-20 (Y -20). China previously was 

unable to build heavy transport aircraft, so it has relied on a small number of Russian Ilyushin-76 

(IL-76) aircraft for strategic airlift since the 1990s. Aircraft specifications provided by official 

Chinese media indicate the Y-20 can carry about twice the cargo load of the IL-76 and about 

three times the cargo load of the U.S. C-130.13 The Y-20 will enhance the PLA's ability to 

respond to internal security crises and border contingencies, support military international 

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, and project power in a regional conflict. 14 

The larger aircraft and expanded fleet will enhance the PLA's capability to employ the 15th 

Airborne Army, part of the PLA Air Force. 

LACM-capable bomber aircraft. In June 2013, the PLA Air Force began to receive new 

Hong7ba-6K (H-6K) bomber aircraft. The H-6K, an improved variant of the H-6 (originally 

adapted from a late-I 950s Soviet design) can carry China's new long-range LACM, the CJ-I0. 

The bomber/LACM weapon system has a range of around 2,400 to 3,100 milesls and provides 

the PLA Air Force with the ability to conduct conventional strikes against regional targets 

throughout the Western Pacific, including U.S. facilities in Guam. 16 Although the H-6K airframe 

could be modiJied to carry a nuclear-tipped air-launched LACM, and China's LACMs likely 

have the ability to carry a nuclear warhead, there is no evidence to confirm China is deploying 

nuclear warheads on any of its air-launched LACMs. 17 The H-6K also may be able to carry 

supersonic antiship cruise missiles. IS 

Space and Counterspace 

In May 2013, China fired a rocket into nearly geosynchronous Earth orbit, marking the highest 

known suborbital launch since the U.S. Gravity Probe A in 1976 and China's highest known 

suborbital launch to date. Although Beij ing claims the launch was part of a high-altitude 

scientific experiment, available data suggest China was testing the launch vehicle component of 

5 
94 

a new high-altitude antisatellite (ASAT) capability.19 If true, such a test would signal China's 

intent to develop an ASA T capability to target satellites in an altitnde range that includes the 

U.S.'s Global Positioning System (GPS) and many U.S. military and intelligence satellites. In a 

potential conflict, this capability could allow China to threaten the U.S. military's ability to 

detect foreign missiles and provide secure communications, navigation, and precision missile 

guidance. 

Furthennorc, in September 2013, China launched a satellite into space from the Jiuquan Satellite 

Launch Center in western China. Our 2013 Report to Congress, citing commentary from 

Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists, suggests this launch may represent a 

capacity to launch new satellites in the event Cbina suffers losses in space from space combat.20 

China also has improved its ballistic missile defense capabilities by fielding the Russian-made 

SA-20B surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. In some cases, China's domestically produced 

CSA-9 SAM system should also be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles.21 

On December 27,2012, China announced its Beidou regional satellite navigation system is fully 

operational and available for commercial use. Using 16 satellites and a network of ground 

stations, Beidou provides subscribers in Asia with 24-hour precision, navigation, and timing 

services.22 China plans to expand Beidou into a global satellite navigation system by 2020. 23 

Beidou is a critical part of China's stated goal to prepare for fighting wars under 

"informationized conditions," which includes a heavy emphasis on developing the PLA's C4JSR 

and electronic warfare capabilities. The PLA is integrating Beidou into its systems to improve its 

command and control and long-range precision strike capabilities and reduce the PLA's reliance 

on foreign precision, navigation, and timing services, such as GPS.24 

Strategic Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

China is enhancing its nuclear deterrent capability by modernizing its nuclear force. It is taking 

measures such as developing a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the 

DF-41. This missile could be equipped with a multiple-independently targctable reentry vehicle 

6 
95 

(MIRV), allowing it to carry as many as 10 nuclear warheads2s In addition to MIRVs, China 

could also equip its ballistic missiles with penetration aids and may be developing the capability 

to transport ICBMs by train.26 Furthermore, according to DoD's 2011 report to Congress on 

China's military, the PLA uses underground lacilities "to protect and conceal [its] newest and most 

modern solid-fueled mobile missiles."n 

Defense Spending 

To support its military modernization, China continued to increase its defense spending in 2013. 

In March, China announced its official defense budget for 2013 rose 10.7 percent in nominal 

terms to $117.39 billion, signaling the new leadership's SUppOI1 for the PLA's ongoing 

modernization cfrarts. This figure represents 5.3 percent of total government outlays 28 and 

approximately 1.3 percent of estimated gross domestic product (GDP).29 China's official annual 

defense budget now has increased for 22 consecutive years and more than doubled since 2006. 

Most Western analysts agree Beijing likely will retain the ability even with slower growth rates 

of its GOP and government revenue - to fund its ongoing military modernization. 3o 

It is difficult to estimate China's actual defense spending due to the uncertainty involved in 

determining how China's purchasing power parity affects the cost of China's foreign military 

purchases and domestic goods and services as well as Beijing's omission of major defenserelated expenditures. For example, some purchases of advanced weapons, research and 

development (R&D) programs, domestic security spending, and local government support to the 

PLA are not included in China's official figures on defense spending. The Institute of 

International Strategic Studies assesses China's actual defense spending is 40 to 50 percent 

higher than the official figure. 31 The U.S. Department of Defense (000) estimated China's 

actual defense spending in 2012 fell between $135 and $215 billion, or approximately 20 to 90 

percent higher than its announced defense budget. 32 

7 
96 

U.S.-China Security Relations 

U.S.-China military-to-military relations deepened and expanded in 2013 after several years of 

setbacks. From 2012 to 2013, the number of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts· more than 

doubled from approximately 20 to 40.33 In particular, contact between the U.S. Navy and the 

PLA Navy increased significantly during this timeframe. Key military-to-military contacts in 

2013 included the first port visit by a U.S. Navy ship to China since 2009; the first port visit by a 

Chinese ship to the United States since 2006; and the second ever U.S.-China counterpiracy 

exercise. Additionally, China in March 2013 accepted the U.S. invitation, first extended by then 

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in September 2012, to participate in the U.S.-led 

multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise near Hawaii in 201434 

DoD contends that a strong military-to-military relationship develops familiarity at the 

operational level. The department argues that this reduces the risk of conflict through accidents 

and miscalculations; builds lines of communication at the strategic level that could be important 

during a crisis; contributes to better overall bilateral relations; and creates opportunities to obtain 

greater contributions from China to international security. U.S. Pacific Command Commander 

Admiral Samuel Locklear in July 2013 said, "The progress that we're making between our two 

militaries is quite commendable ... because we are able to have very good dialogue on areas 

where we converge, and there are a lot of places where we converge as two nations, and we're 

also able to directly address in a matter-of-fact way where we diverge.,,35 

There have been eight rounds of strategic dialogue between China and the United States, 

currently managed by the Pacific Forum-CSrS. This is a Track 1.5 dialogue that involves some 

representatives from the U.S. government in attendance, but virtually all Chinese participants are 

from some part of the government. The past several rounds ofthe dialogue have dealt with some 

of the most important strategic issues facing China and the United States, including nuclear 

strategic stability; the relationship between cyber attacks, space warfare and nuclear stability; 

ballistic missile defense and strategic early warning. Omcers from China's strategic missile 

* These contacts include high-level visits, recurrent exchanges, academic exchanges, functional exchanges. and 

joint exercises. 

8 
97 

forces have been in attendance at the dialogue. I see this as one of the most productive dialogues 

that take place with China. The PLA is an active participant. Ideally such discussions should be 

direct, government-to-government talks, but it is encouraging that the PLA and the Chinese 

Foreign Ministry are engaged on these matters. 

In another positive development, in mid-November 20l3, the U.S. Army and the PLA ground 

forces conducted their first ever field exercise together. The exercise was focused on disaster 

relief and took place in Hawaii. 36 

My own experience in direct mi1itary-to-military contacts with China leads me to advise caution 

in what we do with the PLA and what we show it. In my opinion, the wise limitations placed by 

Congress on military exchanges with China in the National Defense Authorization Act (NOAA) 

of 2000 should not be lifted. The Commission's 2013 Report to Congress also reflects this 

sentiment. Military-to-military contacts with China require careful oversight to ensure that the 

U.S. does not improve China's capability against our own forces, Taiwan, or our friends and 

allies in the Asia Pacific region. 

Enhanced military-to-military contacts between China and the United States in 2013 took place 

in the context of China's efforts to re-brand the bilateral relationship as a "new type of majorcountry relationship." This concept, promoted heavily in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping 

and other high-level Chinese officials, posits the United States and China should, as two major 

powers, seek to cooperate on a range of bilateral and global issues while avoiding the kind of 

harmful competition that often characterizes relationships between dominant powers and rising 

ones.3

) Cooperation is a good thing, but U.S. military leaders cannot lose sight of the PLA's 

record on human rights. This dictates practical limitations on what we do with China's armed 

forces. The principal mission of China's military is to keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

in power, as we saw in the way that the PLA was used during the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen 

Massacre and in Tibet. 

9 
98 

China's Cyber Activities 

While China continues to develop its navy, air force, missile forces, and space and countcrspace 

capabilities, in Chinese military writings, cyberspace is an increasingly important component of 

China's comprehensive national power and a critical element of its strategic competition with the 

United States.J8 Beijing seems to recognize that the United States' cun'ent advantages in 

cyberspace are allowing Washington to collect intelligence, exercise command and control of 

military forces, and support military operations. At the same time, China's leaders fear that the 

U.S. may use the open Internet and cyber operations to threaten the CCP's legitimacy. 

Since the Commission's 2012 Report to Congress, strong evidence has emerged that the Chinese 

government is directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the United 

States. China to date has compromised a range of U.S. networks, including those of DoD and 

private enterprises. These activities are designed to achieve a number of broad security, political, 

and economic objectives. 

There are no indications the public exposure of Chinese cyber espionage in technical detail 

throughout 2013 has led China to change its attitude toward the use of cyber espionage to steal 

intellectual property and proprietary information. The report by Mandiant, a U.S. private 

cybersecurity firm. about the cyber espionage activities of PLA Unit 61398 merely led the unit to 

make changes to its cyber "tools and infrastructure" to make future intrusions harder to detect 

and attribute]9 There are about 16 technical reconnaissance (signals intelligence) units and 

bureaus in the PLA as well as a number of electronic warfare and electronic countenneasures 

units supporting the military regions and the services.40 These organizations focus on cyber 

penetrations, cyber espionage, and electronic warfare. 

When confronted with public accusations from the United States about its cyber espionage, 

Beijing usually attempts to refute evidence by pointing to the anonymity of cyberspace and the 

lack of verifiable technical forensic data. It also shifts the media focus by portraying itself as the 

victim of Washington's cyber activities and calling for greater international cooperation on cyber 

security.41 In a press conference on the day after Mandiant released its report in February 20l3, a 

10 
99 

spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "Groundless speculation and 

accusations regarding hacker attacks, for various purposes, is both unprofessional and 

irresponsible and it is not helpful for solving the problem." He also emphasized eyber attacks are 

a serious problem for China.42 

However, a number of public U.S. government reports, admissions by private companies that 

they have been the target of cyber espionage, investigations by cybersecurity firms, and U.S. 

press reporting contradict Beijing's longstanding denials. While attribution is difficult and takes 

great skill, trend analysis is allowing cybersecurity professionals to develop a more 

comprehensive understanding of Chinese cyber actors, tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Threats to U.S. National Security 

China's cyber espionage against the U.S. government and defense industrial base poses a major 

threat to U.S. military operations, the security and well-being of U.S. military personnel, the 

effectiveness of equipment, and readiness. China apparently uses these intrusions to fill gaps in 

its own research programs, map future targets, gather intelligence on U.S. strategies and plans, 

enable future military operations, shorten R&D timelines for military technologies, and identify 

vulnerabilities in U.S. systems and develop countermeasures.43 

Military doctrine in China also calls for attacks on the critical infrastructure of an opponent's 

homeland in case of conflict. Tn July 2013, a threat researcher at Trend Micro. a private Japanese 

cybersecurity firm, claimed he had detected a Chinese cyber intrusion, commencing in December 

2012, of a honeypot.* He had created the honeypot to resemble the industrial control system of a 

water plant in the United States. The researcher attributed the intrusion to Unit 61398, based on 

forensic analysis. 44 If true, this suggests the unit is collecting intelligence on critical 

infrastructure in addition to other targets. Such activities are consistent with PLA doctrine, which 

explains that one function of wartime computer network operations is to "disrupt and damage the 

* A honeypot is part of a honeynet vvhich is a fake or diversionary computer network designed to draw in an adversary in order to 

identity the adversaf)' or give the adversary false information. Honeynets can provide intelligence regarding adversaries' "tools, 

tactics, and motives." The Honeynct Project. "Short Video Explaining lloneypots." 

hllp:/!old.honevnet.org/misC/fiIes/HonevnetWeh.mol'. 

11 
100 

networks of [an adversary's] infrastructure facilities, such as power systems, telecommunications 

systems, and educational systems.,,45 

A number of instances of Chinese cyber espionage targeting U.S. national security programs 

have been identified in recent years. In May 2013, the Washington Post described a classified 

report by the Defense Science Board, which lists more than 24 U.S. weapon system designs the 

board determined were accessed by cyber intruders. The Washington Post reported, "Senior 

military and industry officials with knowledge of the breaches said the vast majority were part of 

a widening Chinese campaign of espionage against U.S. defense contractors and government 

agencies." The list includes the Patriot missile system, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, 

the F/A-IS fighter, the V-22 Osprey multirole combat aircraft, and the Littoral Combat Ship.46 

Information gained from intrusions into the networks of U.S. military contractors likely improves 

China's insight into U.S. weapon systems, enables China's development of countermeasures, and 

shortens China's R&D timelines for militaty technologies.47 In addition, the same intrusions 

Chinese cyber actors use for espionage also could be used to prepare for offensive cyber 

operations. Chinese cyber actors could place latent capabilities in U.S. software code or 

hardware components that might be employed in a potential conflict between the United States 

and China. 

There has been concern in recent years about security risks to DoD's supply chain. In a meeting 

in May 2013, Commissioners and DoD officials discussed the department's interpretation of 

U.S. law regarding procurement sources. DoD oHicials indicated a stricter procurement 

evaluation standard that includes sourcing concerns could be applied only to items on the United 

States Munitions List. Items outside this list are judged by a different standard, which some 

officials believe might preclude concerns about the origin of products. For exatnple, items 

procured for C41SR maintenance facilities are not subject to stricter scrutiny. Commissioners 

raised concerns that this interpretation of the law was limiting the department's ability to address 

potential risks arising from certain procurement sources. Commissioners urged DoD to expand 

the purview of the stricter standard to items beyond the munitions list. 

12 
101 

DoD is currently moving in this direction. Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 

(Public Law 111-383), is intended to address the problem, but it has yet to be fully implemented. 

Section 806 authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force to reject procurement sources for information technology on grounds of protecting supply 

chain security if they receive a recommendation to do so from DoD.48 The department is in the 

process of implementing Section 806, having conducted table-top exercises and written the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Rule implementing Section 806. As of May 

the rule was in the process of interagency coordination.49 These changes to DoD procurement 

ultimately may provide officials with the flexibility they need to protect all DoD systems. 

However, progress has been slow and the problem the Commissioners highlighted will remain 

until the new policy is implemented, potentially posing a threat to national security. Therefore, in 

the 2013 Report to Congress the Commission recommends Congress urge the Administration to 

expedite progress in its implementation of Section 806 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011. 

Developments in cloud computing in China may present cybersecurity risks for U.S. users and 

providers of cloud computing services and may also have implications for U.S. national security. 

Based on the findings of a report by Defense Group Inc. (DGI) for the Commission, the 

relationship between the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Chongqing Special Cloud 

Computing Zone represents a potential espionage threat to foreign companies that might use 

cloud computing services provided from the zone or base operations there.50 In addition, the plan 

to link 21 Vianet's data centers in China and Microsoll's data centers in other countries suggests 

the Chinese government one day may be able to access data centers outside China through 

Chinese data centers.51 With concerns about espionage in mind, in the 2013 Report to Congress, 

the Commission recommends Congress direct the Administration to prepare an inventory of 

existing federal use of cloud computing platforms and services and detel1l1ine where the data 

storage and computing services are geographically located. Such inventory should be prepared 

annually and reported to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction. 

Cloud computing also could improve the PLNs C41SR capabilities. DGI writes that cloud 

computing "could enable more effective and flexible development and deployment of military 

equipment, while at the same time improving the survivability of the PLA's information systems 

13 
102 

by endowing them with greater redundancy (allowing a system's capabilities to survive the 

disabling or destruction of any individual node )."S2 

Threats to U.S. Industry 

China's cyber espionage against U.S. commercial firms poses a significant threat to U.S. 

business interests and competiveness in key industries. This cyber espionage complements 

traditional human espionage. Through these efforts, the PLA and China's defense industry are 

able to leapfrog ahead in technologies and systems and fill in gaps in their own R&D capabilities 

at a considerable savings in time and money. General Keith Alexander, director of the NSA and 

commander of U.S. Cyber Command, assessed the cost to U.S. companies of intellectual 

property theft is about $250 billion a year, although not all the losses are due to Chinese 

activity. 53 Chinese entities engaging in cyber and other forms of economic espionage likely 

conclude that stealing intellectual property and proprietary information is much more costefTective than investing in lengthy R&D programs. 54 These thefts support national science and 

technology development plans that are centrally managed and directed by the PRC government. 

The Chinese government, primarily through the PLA and the MSS, supports these activities by 

providing state-owned enterprises information and data extracted through cyber espionage to 

improve their competitive edge, cut R&D timetables, and reduce costs. The strong correlation 

between compromised U.S. companies and those industries designated by the Beijing as 

"strategic" industriesSS further indicates a degree of state sponsorship, and likely even support, 

direction, and execution of Chinese economic espionage. 56 Such governmental support for 

Chinese companies enables them to out-compete U.S. companies, which do not have the 

advantage ofleveraging government intelligence data for commercial gain: 

It is difficult to quantiiy the benefits Chinese finns gain from cyber espionage. We don't know 

everything about the kinds of information that is targeted and taken, nor do we always know 

~ In the late 1980s and early 90s a dehate took place in Congress on whether the u.s. Intelligence Community (Ie) should share 

infonnation and/or intelligence assets with U.S. companies to prodde those companies an advantage against foreign 

competitors. In 1991, then Director of the Central InteHigence Agency Rohert Gates, in a speech to the Ie, stated clearly that the 

CIA would limit itself to helping U,S. companies safeguard themselves from foreign intelligence operations, Robert Gates. "The 

Future of American Intelligence:" (Washington, DC: U,S. Intelligence Community, December 4.2011). 

14 
103 

which Chinese actor stole the information. Some thefts may take place that are never detected. 

In terms of business intelligence, some targets of cyber theft likely include information related to 

negotiations, investments, and corporate strategies including executive e-mails, long-term 

business plans, and contracts. [n addition to cyber theft, Chinese companies almost certainly are 

acquiring information through traditional espionage activities, which limits our ability to identify 

the impact of cyber espionage in particular. Nevertheless, it is clear that China not only is the 

global leader in using cyber methods to steal intellectual property but also accounts for the 

majority of global intellectual property theft. 57 Chinese actors have on several occasions in recent 

years leveraged cyber activities to gain sensitive or proprietary information from U.S. 

enterprises: 

In the report by Mandiant that I mentioned earlier, there is evidence that since 2006 PLA 

Unit 61398 has penetrated the networks of at least 141 organizations, including 

companies, international organizations, and foreign governments. These organizations are 

either located or have headquarters in 15 countries and represent 20 sectors, from 

information technology to financial services. Of the organizations penetrated, 81 percent 

were either located in the United States or had U.S.-based headquarters. According to 

Mandiant, Unit 61398, gained access to a wide variety of intellectual property and 

proprietary information through these intrusions. 58 Unit 61398 is the Second Bureau of 

the PLA's technical reconnaissance department, based in Shanghai. 59 

[n another high-profile example of a Chinese company allegedly targeting a U.S. 

company's intellectual property through cyber espionage, the Department of Justice 

(Dol) in June 2013 filed charges against Sinovel Wind Group, a Chinese energy linn, 

alleging Sinovel stole intellectual property from Massachusetts-based company American 

Superconductor (AMSC).60 Once Sinovel was allegedly able to reproduce AMSC's 

software after stealing its proprietary source code, the Chinese finn broke the partnership, 

cancelled existing orders, and devastated AMSC's revenue. AMSC has sought 

compensation from Sinovel through lawsuits in China, an effort which is ongoing and has 

resulted in legal fees for AMSC exceeding $6 million. 61 While these lawsuits continue to 

15 
104 

move slowly through the Chinese legal system, adding to AMSC's legal fees, Sinovcl is 

reaping the profits of stolen technology.62 

Deterring Chinese Cyber Theft 

It is clear that naming the perpetrators in China in an attempt to shame the Chinese government 

is not sufticient to deter Chinese entities from conducting cyber espionage against U.S. 

companies. Mitigating the problem will require a well-coordinated approach across the U.S. 

government and with industry. Many potential actions are being discussed by Congress, the 

Obama Administration, and outside experts. These actions include linking economic cyber 

espionage to trade restrictions, prohibiting Chinese firms using stolen U.S. intellectual property 

from accessing U.S. banks, and banning U.S. travel for Chinese organizations that are involved 

with cyber espionage. The Commission recommends Congress take the tollowing actions: 

Adopt legislation clarifying the actions companies are permitted to take regarding 

tracking intellectual property stolen through cyber intrusions. 

Amend the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.c. § 1831-1839) to pelmit a private right of 

action when trade secrets are stolen. 

Support the Administration's efforts to achieve a high standard of protection of 

intellectual property rights in the Trans-Pacific Partncrship and the Transatlantic Trade 

and Investment Partnership. 

Encourage the Administration to partner with other countries to establish an international 

list of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in commercial cyber espionage. 

The Administration and partner governments should develop a process lor the list's 

validation, adjudication, and shared access. 

Urgc the Administration to continue to enhance its sharing of information about cyber 

threats with the private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized companies. 

16 
105 

My personal view is that the President already has the authority to place sanctions on Chinese 

persons, government industries and companies through the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act.6J If the magnitude of the damage to the U.S. economy is as great as that cited by 

General Alexander, the President should exercise that authority. 

Sustaining the U.S. Military's "Rebalance" to Asia 

In closing, I would like to briefly talk about the U.S. rebalance to Asia. In January 2012, DoD's 

Defense Strategic Guidance declared the U.S. military will "of necessity rebalance toward the 

Asia Pacific" by emphasizing existing alliances, expanding its networks of cooperation with 

"emerging" partners. and investing in military capabilities to ensure access to and freedom to 

maneuver within the region. 64 U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert 

explained the U.S. Navy's role in the rebalance: "As directed by the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance ... the [U.S.] Navy formulated and implemented a plan to rebalance our forces, their 

homeports, our capabilities, and our intellectual capital and partnerships toward the Asia 

Pacific.,,65 Specifically, the U.S. Navy aims to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific from 

about 50 ships in 2013 to 60 ships by 2020 and "rebalance homeports to 60 percent" in the 

region by 2020.66 

However, the Commission's 2013 Report to Congress notes that U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck 

Hagel in July 2013 said Washington would have to choose between a smaller, modern military 

and a larger, older one if sequester-level funding continues67 Admiral Greenert has warned 

constraints in the current budget environment could delay or prevent the U.S. Navy from 

achieving its objectives in the rebalance.68 There is growing concern in the United States and 

among U.S. allies and partners that DoD will be unable to follow through on its commitment to 

the rebalance due to declining defense budgets and emerging crises elsewhere in the world. This 

could lead some regional countries to increasingly accommodate China or pursue military 

capabilities that could be used offensively or preemptively. Either scenario could undermine U.S. 

interests in the region. 

17 
106 

I urge you to keep in mind that by 2020, China could have a navy and air force that outnumber 

and almost match the technical capability of our own forces in the Asia Pacific. If our military 

force shrinks because of our own budget problems, we may have sixty percent of our forces in 

the Asia Pacific region, but 60 percent of 200 ships is far less than sixty percent of a 300 ship 

navy. That may not be sufficient to deter China or to reassure our friends and allies in the 

region. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I am happy to respond to any questions you may 

have. 

"Chinese aircraft carrier returns to home pon:' September 22. 2013, 

Xinhua, ''China's carrier-bo111c jet pilots receive certification." Ju!y 4. 

Xinhua. "China's first aircraft carrier leaves homepo!t for sea 

Pel.'ple ".<ijhe-rationAnny ,Ym:;': A /'v!odern ;'v'my with Chinese Characteristics' (Suitland. 

and U.S. 

5-7. 

International Institute of Strategic Studies. The lvfilitary Balance 2013 (Routledge: I.ondon. March 2013). pp.289-290. 

, Ibid. 

9 BBe News, "China "Buys Fighter Jets and Submarines tbm Russia:" March 25, 2013. httn:/iH'w1i'.bbc.co,uk'nnvs/world-asia-

"Russia to SelL Co-Produce Lacia-class Submarines 10 China,"" IllS' Jane's Defence Industry, December 

DC: 

18 
107 

('hina's DH-10 ('ruise j\1issile Program (Arlington, VA: The Project 2049 

Institute, October 2009), pp. 1-6, httn://nrojcd2(U9.nct/documenls/assassin under radar china eruis'c missile. Ddf: 

18 Keck. "Can China's New Strategic Bomber Reach Hcm.'aiiT 

19 Andrea Shalal-esa. "RPT-China's space activities raising U.S, satellite security concerns," Reuters, January 14,2013. 

httn:/'ww\J).reuters.com/article/2013/()1/14/china-usa-satellites-idl!:r:;L2NOAJ1062013()11.f; Central New-s Agency (Taipei). 

"Beijing to Trigger Arms Race by Testing Anti-satellite Missiles." January 13. 2013. OSC ID: CPP20l30115968204, 

http://\rv/w.opcnsollrce.V(}\'; GregOl)' Kulacki. "Is January Chinese ASAT Testing Month?·· All Things }I/uc!ear, Insights un 

Science and Security, January 4.2013. http:/'allthinpsnllclear.on4i:'Hanuarv-chinese-m;af-testim.7 -month/; U.S. Department of Defense. China pLA Activities Report It-3l Oct 2012 (Washington. DC: October 31. 2(12). OSC ID: CPP20121120440020. 

:;l;~~~~~~il~Z{!::~!!~\I)Jt·s~mis!selS!RjCP!O~rtt(!)nlP!la~n~n!COd11;'elstll!,a:un!Clh~O:f~Aim!i-ls~m:el;li~te;~:~i~SS;il~e.;""~o;ct;O:be;'r25' Bill Gertz. "China to Shoot at High Frontier." 

Insights 

Military and S'ecurity Developrnents involving the People 's Republic 

35-36. Chinas Pride."" August L 2012. OSC ID: (,PP20121016680010. 

WashinKton Free Beacon, January 25. 20l3. 

"facts figures: Chinas 2013 Draft Budget Report,"" Mareh 5. 2013. OSC ID: CPP20130305968101. 

/ww-w.onens()urce.gov; Bloomberg, '"China Boosts Defense Spending as Military Modernizes ArsenaL" March 5. 2013. 

hlfl)://11'H'H',h/oombelv.c:om/neH's/2013-()3-05/china-hoosts-defcnse-snending-as-rnilitarv-moderni:::es-its-arsenal.html. 

20 Luo Zheng. "lnvestment in OUf National Defense Expenditure Mutually Conforms with National Security and Development 

Interests -- Intervie\v with SUD Huangtian. Deputy Director ofPLA General Logistics Department. on 2013 National Defense 

Budget." Jiejimgjun Bao (PLA Daily), March 6. 2013. OSC ID: CPP2013030708800!. hll[)://1-I'WH'.onensollrce.g-ov; Bloomberg, 

"China Boosts Defense Spending as Military Modernizes Arsenal," March 5, 2013. httD:l/~nrw.bloomhen'.com/news/2()J3-03-

05/china-hoosts-defense-snendim!-as-militarv-moderni:;es-its-an;enal,html. 

30 Adam LifT and Andrew Erickson. "Demystifying China's Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate:' ('hin(l 

Quarterly (2013). 

31 The Institute ofIntemational Strategic Studies. "China's defence spending: new questions," Strategic Comments. August 2, 

2013. htln;//u·1-I·lV. ,iss. orf.!/cniuuh/ications/slrafel!ic%20commenls/secfions/ 20 13 -a8h5/china--39-s-defencc-snendinf!--nel1'-

auestions-e625. 

31 C.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: /vlilifaJY and S'ecurilJ' Developments Inl'olving the People's Repuhlic 

otChino 20J3, p. 45. 33 Ibid .. pp. 69-71. 

34 Shirley Kan. U.S.-China Afilitary Contacts: is-sllesfor Congress (Washinsrton, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 25. 

Karen Parrish. "U.S.-China Military Ties Growing. Pacom Commander Says:" U.S. Armed Forces Press Service, July 11, 

2013. hftp'/\nnr.de!ense.w;v/news/newsartide.asnx,!id=120440. 

19 
108 

~~~~~~~~~~;::~Chase"'Chil1a's 2012): 14, 

(W:]sh:ingjon, DC: Potomac Books. 

Significantly Impacted. Though Active & Rebuilding:" M-unition. May 2 L 

2013. hltns:/'wwH'. mandianr com/hl()~7/aDt l-rnonths-sipnificantlv-imnacted-active-rcbuildil1£r/; Richard Bcjtlich (chief security 

of1iccr at Mandiant). telephone interview \yith Commission stan: August 21. 2013. 

-1-0 U.S. Department of Defense. Directory (~lPRC Military Personalities (Washington. DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, JVfarch 

2013). 

41 William C. flannas. James Mulvcnoll. and Anna B. 

DC: ns Government 

aUQ'ht'l'akinQ Over !)ccov Water Plant" .iffT Technology Review. August 2. 2013. 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 111-383). tIlth Cong., 2nd SCSS., January 

2013. 

C/O'lIdCml1jJlllin,g in' Clrina' (Vienna, VA: Defense Group Inc. for the U.S.~China 

Economic and 32-34, 

.' ~~Ik,e Mlcl"onnclt Michael Chertoff. and William Lynn. "China's Cyber Thievery is a National Policy - And Must Be 

Challenged:' Wall Street Journal. January 27. 2012. 

hltp://ol1line. H'si.com/arlicle<';Bl OO() 1-l24052Y702037185U457717883233fW3217(i,html. 

55 The Commission on the Theft oflntellectual Property. The IP Commission Report. (Washington. DC: National Bureau of 

Asian Research. May 2013), 12. hltn.'//ipcommi,s'siol1.oriJ/'rcnort/JP ('ommission Renort 052213.nd( 

56 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, p. 156. 

57 The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Propoerty, The IP C0f111ui.s'/.,'ion Report, p. 3, 18. 

58 Mandiant. APT1: Exposing One q/China's C):her E.\pionage Units (Alexandria. VA: February 2013), pp. 2. 3. 4, 9. 21-23. 

hllp://inleirenorl.mandiant.com/iVtandianl APT] Report.pdt: 

59 Mandiant, APT]: Eyposing One l?lChina 's (~l'ber E~pionage Units. p. 9. 

60 U.S. Department ofJusticc. "Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of AMSC Trade 

Secrets" (Washington. DC: June 27, 2013). httD://WH'll'.jllstice.gov/opa/pr/2013<June/13~LTm-730.htmI. 

6! Melanie Hart, "Criminal Charges Mark New Phase in Belhvcther U.S.-China Intellectual Property Dispute" (Washington. DC: 

Center for American Progress. Jtme 2013). hftp:l/www.americanproeress.ora/issues/china/news/2013/06/27/68339/cril11inalcharees-mark-nnr-phase-in-heIlH'cther-u-s-china-il1tellectual-pronerlv-dispUIC/ 

62 1bid. 63 § 1701. htlp://uscode.hollse. eov/riew.xhlml?path-- mrelim(d'litle50/chapter 35&edilion ""prelim 

Department of Defense. Sustaining [J.S. Global Leadership: PrioritiesjiJr 21st CentllrJ' Leader,I,'hip (Washington. DC: 

January 2012). hllp://li'Hw.defense.eov/ne11's/Defi::nse 5;tralevic Guidance.ndt: 

20 
109 

·'Foreword:· in li.:'l Nw,,'l'rov;·-wn Guide 2013 (Washington. DC: 2013). 

Pentagon press hriefi1w; remarks hy 

H20,·./ ()'ndl'er'spe'clh;e.l' .~I t.',e Military 

Services on the S'frategic rhoices and j{anagement Review. 

21 
110 

Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D. 

LaiTY Wortzel was reappointed by Speaker of the House John Boehner for a seventh twoyear tenn expiring on December 31, 2014. Dr. Wortzel has served on the Commission since 

November 200], was the Commission's Chairman lor the 2006 and 2008 Report cycles, and 

served as Vice Chairman for the 2009 Report cycle. 

A leading authority on China, Asia, national security, and military strategy, 

Commissioner Wortzel had a distinguished career in the U.S. Armed Forces. Following three 

years in the Marine Corps, Commissioner Wortzel enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1970. His first 

assignment with the Army Security Agency took him to Thailand, where he focused on Chinese 

military communications in Vietnam and Laos. Within three years, he had graduated from the 

Infantry Officer Candidate School and the Airborne and Ranger schools. After four years as an 

infantry officer, Commissioner Wortzel shifted to military intelligence. Commissioner Wortzel 

traveled regularly throughout Asia while serving in the U.S. Pacific Command from 1978 to 

1982. The following year, he attended the National University of Singapore, where he studied 

advanced Chinese and traveled in China and Southeast Asia. He next worked for the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, developing counterintelligence programs to protect emerging 

defense technologies from foreign espionage. Also, the Commissioner managed programs to 

gather foreign intelligence for the Army Intelligence and Security Command. 

From 1988 to 1990, Commissioner Wortzel was the Assistant Anny Attache at the U.S. 

Embassy in Beijing, where he witnessed and reported on the Tiananmen Massacre. After 

assignments as an anny strategist and managing army intelligence officers, he returned 

to China in 1995 as the army attache. In December 1997, Commissioner Wortzel became a 

faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, serving as the Director ofthe Strategic Studies 

Institute. He retired from the anny as a colonel. 

After his military retirement, Commissioner Wortzel served as the director ofthc Asian 

Studies Center and vice president lor foreign policy at The Heritage Foundation from 1999 to 

2006. Commissioner Wortzel's books include Class in China: Stratification in a Classless 

Society; China's Military Modernization: International Implications; The Chinese Armed Forces 

in the 21st Centw)'; and Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History. His newest 

book, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global, was published by 

Potomac Books, Inc., in 2013. 

A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Anny War College, 

Commissioner Wortzel earned his Bachelor of Arts from Columbus College and his Master of 

Arts and Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii. He and his wife live in Williamsburg, Virginia. 
111 

I).S.-China Economic and Secnrity Review Commission 

2013 Annnal Report: China's Foreign Policy 

Testimony of Carolyn Bartholomew 

before the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee 

November 20, 2013 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. The Commission in 2013 continued its ongoing examination of China's foreign policy 

and its emergence as a global power. The Commission focused in particular on China's policies in the 

Middle East and North Africa; it also discussed China's evolving relationships with two of its neighbors, 

North Korea and India.' Before I begin, I would like to remind the Committee that due to the dynamic 

nature of foreign affairs, some of the issues covered in the 2013 Annual Report have already seen 

developments that will not necessarily be captured in this testimony. 

As China's global interests expand, Be(iing is becoming increasingly assertive and active in its foreign 

affairs. This trend is apparent in the Middle East and North Africa, where China's ever-growing demand 

for energy imports has driven Beijing to pursue greater political and security involvement. Beijing's 

emergent influence in this part of the world has at times competed with or challenged U.S. strategic 

interests, particularly in Syria and Iran. As in other parts of the world, it remains to be seen whether 

China's stated interests in regional stability and peace will make a lasting, positive impact in the Middle 

East and North Africa. Given the United States' deep security interests in the region, China's developing 

role there presents geostrategic opportunities and challenges for U.S. diplomats, policymakers, and armed 

forces. 

Similarly, China was newly assertive in its relations with India this year, which I discuss briefly below. 

And while China has recently taken steps to rein in North Korea after a series of provocative actions, it 

appears Beijing will continue to support the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Given Pyongyang's 

aggressiveness toward the United States and its allies and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, this 

has significant implications for thc United States. 

China and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 

In the past decade, China's trade and economic ties with MENA have grown substantially. Between 2003 

and 2012, China-MENA annual trade increased more than twelvefold from $20.8 billion to $262.1 

billion.' The region is an important export market for China, and in 2009, China overtook the United 

States to become the world's largest exporter to MENA2 

Energy security is the key driver of China's trade ties with MENA.l In 2012 and the first eight months of 

2013, the region accounted for about 54 percent of China's imported crude oil." Among the MENA 

producers, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, and Iraq, respectively, exported the most oil to China in that 

period.' Qatar and Yemen are China's third- and fifth-largest sources of liquefied natural gas (LNG), 

providing J 8 percent and seven percent of China's LNG imports in 2011, respectively.6 China's reliance 

For additional information, see the Commission's 2013 Annual Report to Congress. particularly "China and the 

Middle East and North Africa" (chapter 3, section I). and "Military and Security Year in Review" (chapter 2, 

section I). 
112 

on energy flows from the region likely will continue to grow significantly.' By 2035, China's oil imports 

from the region are estimated to reach 6.7 million barrels per day, up from 2.9 million barrels per day in 

2011 8 In addition to imports, China's national oil companies (the state-owned "national champions" of 

China's energy sector) have invested heavily in energy companies and projects throughout the region. 

China's burgeoning energy ties with Traq are illustrative of the robust China-MEN A energy nexus. 

Between 2008 and 2012, the value of Iraqi crude oil cxports to China increased by almost 870 percent9 

Moreover, China is the largest foreign investor in Traqi oilfields. 1O China National Petroleum Corporation 

(CNPC), a Chinese national oil company, and British Petroleum are jointly developing Iraq's Rumaila 

field, which accounted for one-third of Iraqi oil production in 2012." That year, Rumaila was CNPC's 

most productive overseas project and accounted for nearly half of the company's net overseas oil and gas 

production. CNPC is invested in two other Iraqi oilfields,12 and its listed subsidiary PetroChina is in talks 

to become an investor in a $50 billion Exxon Mobil-operated project to develop one of Iraq's largest 

oilfields, West Qurna-I .13 

As China almost certainly will become more dependent on energy flows from MENA, the Commission 

expects Beijing will increasingly augment its economic ties in the region with stronger political and 

security engagement in an effort to protect and enhance its energy security interests. Thc Commission 

also found that China, in an effort to protect its interests, may be more willing to challenge U.S. influence 

and policy objectives in MENA. Historically, China has avoided directly opposing U.S. power in the 

region, content to "free ride" on the U.S. security presence there. Tn recent years, however, Beijing 

appears increasingly willing to take positions on impot1ant regional issues that directly oppose or 

undermine U.S. interests and objectives. 

This is clearly the case with Syria. Despite its emphasis on neutrality and peaceful resolution in public 

statements, China's position has protected the Assad regime and prevented necessary international 

measures to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflict. China repeatedly has used its veto power to 

prevent the UN Security Council (and other UN bodies) from singling out, blanling, or imposing 

sanctions on the Syrian government." • China, along with Russia, also has opposed any military action, 

even in support of humanitarian efforts, in Syria. 15 

Likely in response to widespread criticism of its Syria policy, t Beijing has in recent weeks and months 

sought to be perceived as less supportive of Assad and more helpful in bringing about a solution to the 

conflict. China has made occasional efforts to reach out to the Syrian opposition; 16 has called for talks 

between the regime and the opposition in Geneva; 17 and has supported efforts to eliminate chemical 

China has vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions to take action against President Assad and exercised three 

'"no" votes to punish President Assad in the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council. I-wei Jennifer 

Chang, "China's Evolving Stance on Syria," Middle East [nstitule, February 18,2013. 

http://lVlt'lY.lhemiddleeaslinstitute.orgicontentlchinas-evolving-stance-svria; United Nations General Assembly, 

"General Assembly Adopts Text Condemning Violence in Syria, Demanding that all Sides End Hostilities," (New 

York, NY: May 15,2013). hltp:llwww.ul1.orWNewsIPressldocsI20l3Igal1372.doc.htm . 

. , Then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice in February 2012 said the United States was "disgusted" by China's 

(and Russia's) vetoes of otherwise unanimous UN Security Council resolutions on Syria and remarked that the UN's 

mission was being "held hostage" by China and Russia. Even the MENA countries, which generally hold favorable 

views of China, have issued harsh criticisms of Beijing's position. Luis Martinez, "US 'Disgusted' by China, Russia 

Veto of UN Resolution to End Violence in Syria," ABC News. February 4,2012. 

http://abcnel-vs.go. comlblogs/polilics/20 12102Ius-disgusted-bv-russia-china-velo-o(.un-resolution-to-end-violencein-syria/; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing on China and the Middle East, vvritten 

testimony of Dawn Murphy, June 6,2013. 

2 
113 

weapons from the country, contributing experts to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons to help verify and destroy chemical weapons.'" 

These recent efforts notwithstanding, China's fundamental posItIOn on the conflict has not changed. 

Despite the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria, China appears to judge that the benetits of 

continuing to shield and enable the Assad regime outweigh the potential costs of supporting international 

action to undermine the regime. 

Another problematic element of China's MENA engagement is Beijing's continued ties with and support 

for Iran.' The mUltiple facets of this relationship - including energy ties, arms and dnal-usc technology 

sales, and diplomatic support - have enabled Tehran's destabilizing policies and damaged U.S.-China 

relations and China's international reputation. However, Beijing appears to judge these consequences are 

worth the energy security benefits gained from continued cooperation with Iran. 

Energy interests are a primary driver of the Sino-Iranian relationship. China is Iran's top crude oil 

customer, and about eight percent of China's oil imports (by volume) were from Iran in the period from 

January 2012 to August 2013. 19 Iran was China's third-largest supplier of crude oil globally for much of 

the 2000s, but in 2012 and in the first eight months of2013 Iranian exports to China dropped, likely due 

to U.S. sanctions on Iran's energy sector and a pricing dispute between Chinese oil trader Unipec and the 

National Iranian Oil Company in 2012. 20 

Although China has calibrated its trade to levels it judges will keep Iran [rom becoming a flashpoint in 

U.S.-China relations, China has not halted its energy trade with Iran despite U.S. sanctions, probably 

because Beijing views steady access to oil as essential to its continued economic growth. Instead, Beijing 

maximizes its economic leverage over Tehran to secure advantageous oil trade deals, then seeks 

exemptions from or exploits loopholes in the sanctions to ensure steady access to energy. t For example, 

China in 2013 apparently began to exploit a loophole in U.S. sanctions by dramatically increasing its fuel 

oil imports from Iran, which are not technically covered by U.S. sanctions. According to the Wall Street 

Journal, China in the first seven months of 2013 imported $495 million worth of Iranian fuel oil, 

compared to $1 million in 2012. While fuel oil is less valuable and more difficult to refine than crude oil, 

'Commission publications on China and Iran from 2011 to 2013 include Marybeth Davis et a1.. China-Iran: A 

Limited Partnership (Washington, DC: CENTRA Technology, Inc. for the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, April 2013). http://origin. www.uscc.govisites/default/fileslResearch/China-Iran--

A%20Limited%20Partnership.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to 

Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), pp. 334-336; and U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 20 11), pp. 252-260. 

t Since January 2012, the U.S. Department of State has consistently exempted China on a biannual basis from 

sanctions on foreign countries importing crude oil from Iran because, although China had continued to import crude 

oil from Iran, the State Depmtment judged China had "significantly reduced'" those imports. The Department of 

State is scheduled to announce the next round o[exemptions in December 2013. U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 

pp. 335-336; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Middle East, 

written testimony of Erica Downs, .Tune 6, 2013; Keith Johnson, '''Beijing Gets a Pass on Iran Sanctions," Wall Street 

Journal, June 5, 2013; Gabe Collins, "Chinese Oil Traders Will be Big Winners From EU Oil Embargo Against 

Iran,'" China Oil Trader 5 (June 2012). http://ww1V.chinaoil{rader.comj?p~112: and Marybeth Davis et aL ChinaIran: A Limited Partnership (Washington, DC: CENTRA Technology, Inc. lor the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, April 2013). http://origin.H'lfW. uscc. gov/sitesldefaultlfilesIResearchIChina-Iran--

A %20Limited%20Partnership. pdf 

3 
114 

Chinese oil companies appear to have imported large amounts at discounted rates from Iran, enabling 

China to partially compensate for its reduction in crude oil imports.'" 

Concerns persist about the role of China in proliferation of weapons to Iran. In the past, China sold 

tactical ballistic and antiship cruise missiles to Iran. More recently, open source reporting indicates China 

continues to provide SUppOIt to Iran's advanced conventional weapons programs. A 2011 report by the 

U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that "Chinese entities - including private and state-owned 

firms continue to engage in weapons of mass destruction related proliferation activities ... Chinese 

entities continue to supply a variety of missile-related items to multiple customers, including Iran, Syria, 

and Pakistan."" Since 2009, the United States has sanctioned six Chinese entities for missile or weapons 

proliferation to Iran." 

China also assisted Iran in the development of its civilian - and perhaps military - nuclear program. Much 

of this assistance, including uranium enrichment, has military applications. While Beijing insists it has not 

provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program since 1997, open source reporting suggests that Chinese 

assistance continued to augment Iran's nuclear programs well into the 2000s. 2

• As recently as this 

February, an Iranian company reportedly sought to transit 100,000 magnets through China to Iran for use 

in uranium enrichment centrifuges. 25 

When Chinese companies have sold or attempted to sell arms or dual-use technologies to Iran, it is 

unclear whether the Chinese government directs, condones, is merely aware or, or is ignorant of 

continuing proliferation efforts. In any case, the Chinese government's enforcement of export controls 

appears insufficient. 

On a related note, Beijing does not appear to judge Iran's nuclear program as a serious threat to Chinese 

economic or security interests or to security in MENA.26 Joel Wuthnow, researcher at CNA China 

Studies, testified to the Commission, "Although some Chinese analysts accept the premise that an Iranian 

nuclear weapon might spark a regional arms race, few have publicly discussed whether and how such an 

outcome may damage Chinese interests."" However, as China's presence and influence in the region 

grows, Dr. Wuthnow suggested Middle Eastern countries and the United States may find opportunities to 

persuade China that Iran's behavior poses a risk to "regional security, and thus to China's own interests in 

Iran and the region.,,28 

In addition to its involvement in the Iranian energy and weapons manufacturing industries, China also 

likely supports Tehran in an effort to ensure the United States does not enjoy unchecked power and 

influence in the Middle East.''' According to a report by CENTRA Technology, Inc. prepared for the 

Commission this year on Sino-Iranian relations, "China has used its relations with Iran to balance against 

U.S. interests and what it sees as hegemonic policies in the Middle East."J() 

China's growing interest in MENA manifests in several other ways. First, China has participated in 

counterpiracy and peacekeeping operations in the region. Second, China has taken a heightened interest in 

the Middle East peace process, which Beijing views as central to stability and security in the region. 

Earlier this year, Chinese President Xi Jinping articulated a Chinese proposal for peace between the 

Israelis and Palestinians, demonstrating that China's top leaders have an interest in the resolution of the 

conflict. Beijing has yet to take on an active mediation role, however. Third, this year, the U.S. 

'In July 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 850 ("Nuclear Jran Prevention Act of2013"), a bill 

that would, among other things, require countries to reduce their fuel oil as well as crude oil imports in order to 

quality for the State Department's exemption fi'om sanctions. Wayne Ma and Tennille Tracy, "Sanctions Gap 

Allows China to iranian Oii." Wall StreetJournal, 21,2013. 

4 
115 

departments of State and Defense and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the first Middle 

East Dialogue as part of the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ideally, this new 

Dialoguc will enable U.S. and Cbinese policymakers tind common interests in the region and facilitate 

cooperation in areas of mutual concern. 

The Commission's research and bearing on China and MENA informs the following recommendations: 

Congress work with the departments of State, Commerce, and the Treasury to utilize the full 

range of incentives and disincentives to encourage China to reduce its ties witb Iran, including 

exploring conditioning Chinese energy companies' future investments in the United States on 

limiting commercial ties with Iran. 

Congress urge the Department of State to elevate the U.S.-China Middle East Dialogue to include 

an annual meeting at the Cabinet level and to increase meetings at the undersecretary level from 

once to twice per year. 

Congress direct the Administration to provide a report to Congress on China's enforcement of its 

export controls, to include an assessment of the level of scrutiny the Chinese government applies 

to end users in transfers that are of proliferation concern. 

Congress consider the merits of inclnding fuel oil purchases in the current sanctions regime 

prohibiting countries from purchasing crudc oil from Iran. 

Congress support efforts by the Department of Defense to strengthen cooperation with China on 

connterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. 

China and North Korea 

As the Commission discussed in its previous reports, China for decades has provided North Korea with 

economic and political support and shielded Pyongyang from harsh punishment by the international 

community for its destabilizing rhetoric and activities.'l While Beijing appeared increasingly dissatisfied 

with Pyongyang after a series of North Korean provocations in the past year (including its December 

2012 long-range rocket launch and February 2013 nuclear test), the Commission assesses Beijing is not 

likely to significantly alter its North Korea strategy and will continue to offer economic and political 

incentives for Pyongyang to refrain from major provocations and engage in multilateral diplomacy.~ 

The most notable development in China's North Korea policy this year was the Chinese government's 

September release of a new 236-page list of technologies and materials to be banned from export to North 

Korea.32 The list focuses on dual-use items that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction or 

ballistic missiles. However, according to the Nautilus Institute, "nothing indicates that by issuing tighter 

controls, China is fundamentally changing its policy toward North Korea, let alone abandoning it ... The 

degree to which China enforces the prohibition of trade in items on this list will mostly determine the 

success of the program. ,,33 

Other analysts, however, suggest China's policy toward North Korea might be undergoing a subtle shift. These 

analysts cite Beijing's stronger and higher-level public signals of its frustration with Pyongyang. Chinese President 

Xi Jinping himself appeared to indirectly criticize North Korea in an April speech when he said, "No one should be 

allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains." William Wan, ;;'Chinese President 

Xi expresses concern over North Korea's rhetoric," Washington Post, April 7, 2013. 

5 
116 

China and India 

Sino-Indian tensions flared in early 2013, underlining the simmering mutual distrust that continues to 

plague the relationship, particularly regarding the contested border. [n April, New Delhi claimed a 

contingent 0[30 to 50 People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers crossed the China-India border about 12 

miles beyond the Line of Actual Control' and stayed there for three weeks.' Beijing denied Chinese 

troops had crossed into Indian territory. 

Beijing and New Delhi resolved the border impasse in May after a series of talks and agreed to develop a 

formal mechanism to build trust and confidence between the border troops. The agreement was signed 

during the Indian prime minister's trip to China in October 2013.34 

Nevertheless, the potential for periodic low-level confrontations between border patrols to escalate likely 

will persist. Indian media have reported several additional albeit briefer incursions by Chinese troops 

since the April standoff. Furthermore, both China and India continue to boost their militaries' capabilities 

on the border, adding to mutual suspicion. This has left both sides sensitive to each other's border 

activities and disposed toward worst-case perceptions of the other sides' intentions and activities. Ely 

Ratner and Alexander Sullivan of the Center for a New American Security warn: "More intense strategic 

competition between India and China would reverberate throughout the continent, exacerbating tensions 

in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia. Disruptions to the Asian engine of economic 

growth caused by these tensions could debilitate the global economy."" 

Conclusion 

In its ongoing examination of China's foreign policy, the Commission assesses that China increasingly is 

asserting itself on the global stage to protect more actively Beijing's interests. This trend is reflected in 

recent statements by China's top leaders. In late October, President Xi Jinping insisted that China "be 

more active in blueprinting diplomatic strategy and undertaking diplomatic work."" Chinese State 

Councilor Yang Jiechi, China's senior foreign policy official, in early November delivered a speech on 

China's foreign policy in which he remarked, "China's future and destiny are closely connected with 

those of the world ... Developments and changes at home and abroad have put forward new, higher 

requirements for China's diplomacy which now stands at a new historic starting poin!."" 

The impact of China gradually taking on a more assertive global role will be significant. In particular, 

Beijing may become more willing to use its increasing political and economic clout to more openly 

impose a higher cost on countries whose actions and policies challenge China's interests. This trend has 

significant implications for the United States, particularly if China's foreign policies undermine or 

challenge America's. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

, The Line of Actual Control is the effective border between China and India. The 2,400 mile-long Line of Actual 

Control traverses the Aksai Chin, the northern part of the Sikkim State, and crosses the McMahon Line in Arunachal 

Pradesh State. 

t According to New Delhi, PLA soldiers frequently conduct border incursions (more than 600 times over the last 

three years) but do not usually cross more than a few miles over the Line of Actual Control nor stay there longer 

than several hours. Economisl, "]ndia and China: Parsnips Unbuttered," May 25, 2013. 

http://ww1v.economisI.com/news/ asia1215 78412-flmverv-rhetoric-f?lils-hide-difficu llies-bilateral-relationshipparsnips-unbuttered: Open Source Center. Summmy' India Protests PRe Troop 'Intrusion' (Washington, DC: April 

23, 2013). OSC ID: FEA20 130423030877. http://www.opensource.gov. 

6 
117 

! China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC Database. http://wwH·.ceicdata.comJen. 

2 AI-Masah Capital Limited, China and India's Growing Influence in the Mr-NA Region: Their Legacy and Future 

Footprint (Dubai, United Arab Emirates: April 2011), p. 4. 

httv:liae.::awva.comiresearchreportsip 2010 07 22 09 20 27i20IOI2I9 p 2010 07 22 09 20 27 09241 6. pdf 

3 MergerMarket, The New Silk Road: lnvesHng in and venturing lvUh A:fiddle Eastl!l'n companies (Hong Kong: 

Latham & Watkins, 2012), p. 8; Jon B. Alterman, China's Balancing Act in the Gul(,(Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, August 2013), pp. 1,3,4. 

https:!!csis.orgifilesipublicationI130821 Alterman ChinaGul( Web.pdf,- Abdulaziz Sager, "GCC-China Relations: 

Looking Beyond Oil- Risks and Rewards," in China's Growing Role in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Nixon 

Center, 2010), p. 2; Zhao Hongtu, "China's Energy Interest and Security in the Middle East," in China's Gro-wing 

Role in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2010), p. 58; and Dawn Murphy, Rising Revisionist? 

China's Relations with the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War Era (Washington, DC: 

George Washington University, 2012), pp. 103-108. 

4 China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC Database. http://lvwlv.ceicdata.comlen. 

5 China National Bureau of Statistics, via CE1C Database. httv://lvlvw.ceicdata.comlen. 

"U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Analysis: China:' April 22, 2013. 

http://lvllJw.eia.govlcountries/cab.cffll?Ops'---CH. 

7 International Energy Agency, "'World Energy Outlook 2012: Presentation to the Press" (London, United Kingdom: 

Nm1ember 12, 2012), slide 6. http://H-Jlv-w.slideshare.netlinternationalenergvagencvlworld-energv-outlook-20 12-

presentation-to-press; Christopher Johnson, "China oil imports to take over U.S. by 2017: WoodMac," Reuters, 

August 20, 2013. http://lVww.reuters.comiarticleI20 13i08i20ius-china-oil-idUSBRE97 JOBB20 130820. 

x U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing Oil China and the Middle East, written 

testimony of Erica Downs, June 6, 2013, 

9 China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC Database. http://lvww.ceicdata.comlen. 

10 Charlie Zhu and Peg Mackey, "UPDATE 1 - China. Indonesia to join Exxon at giant Iraq oilfield," Reuters, 

August 22, 2013. http://www.reuters.comiarticle!2013i08i22Ioetrochina-iraq-idUSL4NOGN29G20130822. 

II U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing on China and the Middle East, \witten 

testimony of Erica Downs, June 6, 2013. 

12 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Middle East, written 

testimony of Erica Downs, June 6, 2013. 

" Charlie Zhu and Peg Mackey, "UPDATE I - China, Indonesia to join Exxon at giant Iraq oilfield," Reuters, 

August 22, 2013. hltp:!iwmv.reuters.comiarticlei20 13/08i22Ipetrochina-iraq-idUSL4NOGN29G20 130822. 

1·1 Michael Swaine, "Chinese Views ofthe Syrian Conflict," China Leadership Monitor 39 (Fall 2012): 3. 

http://carnegieendowment.orgiOles/Swaine CLM 39 091312 2.pdf 

15 Michael Swaine, "Chinese Views of the Syrian Conflict:' China Leadership Monitor 39 (Fall 2012): 2. 

http://carnegieendowment.nrg/filesISlt'aine CLM 39 091312 2.pdf 

'" Joel Wuthnow, "China as a Swing State on Syria," US-China Focus, October 8, 2013. 

http://lIlWlv.chinausfOclls.comlpeace-securitvlchina-as-a-.n.ving-state-on-srria! 

!7 Xinhua, '''China calls for early peace conference on Syria," November 5, 2013. 

http://wwH .. china.org.cnlv.JorldlsvriasituationI2013-11105!content30499472.htm. 

IX Xinhua, "Chinese experts to join Syria weapons mission," November 4,2013, 

http://englishpeople.com.cn!90786i8445516.htm!. 

19 China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC Database. http://1VWl1:.ceicdata.com/en. 

20 Florence Tan, "Update 4-China Buys Russia, Vietnam oil as [ran supply cut, ,. Reuters, January 3, 2012. 

http://www.rellters.comiarticieI2012101 103Irussiacrude-china-idUSL3E8C31 W120120103; Erica Downs, "ChinaGulfEner6'Y Relations,"in Bryce Wakefield and Susan L. Levenstein, eds" China and the Persian 

Gulf' Implicationsfor the United States (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, 2011), p. 68. 

http://www. wi Isoncenter. orR! si tes/ default/Ii les! ASIA %20Program China%20and%20the%20PG. pdf 

21 Wayne Ma and Tennille Tracy, "Sanctions Gap Allows China to Import Iranian Oil," Wall Street Journal, August 

21,2013. http://online.lVsj.comiarticleiSB1000I4241278873246195045790263336I1696094.html. 

22 James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 

Intelligence Communi(vjor the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 20]2. 

http://wwH-J.intelligence.senate.govI120131!Clapper.pdf 

7 
118 

Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Tssllesfor Congress 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2013), pp. 18-19,69-70. 

http://"}Vlncf{ls.orgl·;gp/crS/flltkdRLJJ555.pdl 

24 Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation a/Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Issues/or Congre/.;s 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2013), p. 7. 

http:/\nnr.{us.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL3J555.pdf." 

25 Agence France-Prcsse, "Iran Using China to Smuggle Nuclear Material? David Albright's ISIS Report Raises 

Concerns," February 14,2013. http:/;-\vH'w.hu(fingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/iran-china-f1uclearsmuggling n 2689266.html?utm hp re(=world. 

16 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Middle East, written 

testimony ofJoe1 Wuthnow, June 6, 2013. 

27 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Middle East, written 

testimony of Joel Wuthnow, June 6, 2013. 

28 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Middle East, written 

testimony of Joel Wuthnow, June 6, 2013. 

29 Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2012), p. 2. 

http://)'vlvw.rand.org/contenf/dam/rand/pllbs/occasional papers/20l2/RAND OP351.pdC Marybeth Davis et al., 

China-Iran: A Limited Partnership (Washington, DC: CENTRA Technology, Inc. [or the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, April 2013), pp. 7, 33. http://origin.www.lIscc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/Research/ChinaIran--A%20Limited%20Partnership.pdf 

30 Marybeth Davis et aL China-Iran: A Limited Partnership (Washington, DC: CENTRA Technology, Inc. for the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Apri12013), p. 7. 

http://origin. lVWW. usee. gov/sites/ default/t; les/Research/China-Iran--A %20Limited% ?OPartnership. pdf 

31 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2012), p. 11. 

32 Jane Perlez. "China Bans Items for Export to North Korea, Fearing Their Use in Weapons," Nelt! York Times, 

September 24, 2013. htfp:!AVlfw.nvtimes.com/20 J3/09/25/1vorldJasialchina-bans-certain-north-korean-exports-fOr-

.fCar-of-lveapons-use.htmf. 

33 Roger Cavazos, Peter Hayes, and David von 

to North Korea," Nautilus Institute for 

"Technical Bulletin #59 on Prohibition of Dual Use Exports 

26,2013. 

Vivek Raghuvanshi, -'"India Sends Draft Border Cooperation Agreement to China," Defense News, August 20, 

2013. htlp:/ /wlt'w. de(ensenews. com/ "rticlel20 13 0820/DEFREG03/3 08200026/India-Sends-Drafi-BorderCooperafion-Agreement-China. 

3, Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan, "The Most Dangerous Border in the World: Why is China picking a fight with 

India?" Foreign Polic)" May 4, 2013. 

http:/Arwlv.fbreignpolicv.com/articles/2013/05/03/China india mO,')'t dangerolls border?page=O O . 

. 06 Xinhua, "Xi Jinping: China to further relations with neighboring countries:' October 26, 2013. 

Conference. 

8 
119 

Æ 

Carolyn Bartholomew 

Carolyn Bartholomew was reappointed to the Commission by House Democratic Leader 

Nancy Pelosi for a sixth two-year term expiring on December 31, 2013. She previously served as 

the Commission's Chairman for the 2007 and 2009 Report cycles and served as Vice Chairman 

for the 20 I 0, 2008, and 2006 Report cycles. 

Commissioner Bmiholomew has worked at senior levels in the U.S. Congress, serving as 

counsel, legislative director, and chief of staff to now House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi. 

She was a professional staff member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

and also served as a legislative assistant to then U.S. Representative Bill Richardson. 

In these positions, Commissioner Bartholomew was integrally involved 

in developing U.S. policies on international affairs and security matters. She has particulm' 

expertise in U.S.-China relations, including issues related to trade, human rights, and the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Bartholomew led efforts in the establishment 

and funding of global AIDS programs and the promotion of human rights and democratization in 

countries around the world. She was a member of the first Presidential Delegation to Africa to 

Investigate the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Children and a member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations' Congressional Staff Roundtable on Asian Political and Security Issues. 

In addition to U.S.-China relations, her areas of expertise include terrorism, trade, 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, U.S. foreign assistance proJ:,rranls, 

and international environmental issues. She is the Vice President for Development and Corporate 

Initiatives for the BlueGreen Alliance and also serves on the board of directors of the Kaiser 

Aluminum Corporation and the nonprofit organization Asia Catalyst. Commissioner 

Bartholomew received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Minnesota, a Master of 

Arts in Anthropology from Duke University, and a Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University 

Law Center. She is a member of the State Bar of California