J-S37009-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: NAME CHANGE OF: A.G.S., A 

MINOR BY C.B.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

APPEAL OF: K.S.

No. 1993 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered November 4, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Civil Division at No: CI-16-01409

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2017

Appellant, K.S., appeals pro se from the November 4, 2016 order 

permitting Appellant’s son, A.G.S. (“Child”), to change his surname. We 

affirm. 

On February 19, 2016, C.B. (“Petitioner”), maternal grandmother of 

Child, filed a petition to change Child’s surname to “B____,” after Petitioner 

and S.B. (“Mother”). Appellant is serving life in prison without parole for the 

murder of Mother, to whom Appellant was never married. The murder took 

place when Child was approximately six months old. Child has been in 

Petitioner’s custody since the day of the murder. The trial court conducted a 

hearing on November 3, 2016, at which Appellant participated by video 

conference from SCI Camp Hill. As recounted by the trial court, Petitioner 
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testified that the murder of Mother received significant local media coverage, 

to the detriment of Child’s emotional well-being. The Petitioner also 

expressed concern about [Child’s] abuse and harassment from other kids. 

Petitioner further testified that Appellant on several occasions denied his 

parentage of Child. Petitioner therefore believes it is in Child’s best interests 

to share a surname with Petitioner and Mother rather than Appellant. 

Appellant testified that he never denied he was Child’s father, and that his 

conviction remains pending on collateral review. Thus, he opposed the 

name change petition. 

On November 4, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting the 

name change petition. Appellant raises three assertions of error in this 

timely appeal: 

I. Did the trial court erred and abused [sic] its 

discretion by finding a name change to be in [Child’s] best 

interest, due to prejudice, bias, or ill-will towards [Appellant?]

II. Did the trial court erred and abused [sic] its 

discretion by failing to find [Petitioner’s] reluctance to use 

[Appellant’s] surname for [Child] was rooted in hostility, 

animosity, and vindictiveness towards [Appellant?]

III. Did the trial court erred and abused [sic] its 

discretion by not having the hearing postponed until after the 

disposition of Appellant’s PCRA, which is still pending review[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

We will address the first two contentions together. Pennsylvania 

permits name change by order of court. 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702. The statute 

provides no criteria but, in cases involving a minor child, our Courts have 
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held that the trial court must consider the child’s best interests. “Specific 

guidelines [for a child’s best interests] are difficult to establish, for the 

circumstances in each case will be unique, as each child has individual 

physical, intellectual, moral, social and spiritual needs.” T.W. v. D.A., 127

A.3d 826, 828 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re Change of Name of 

Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes–

Palaia, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992) (plurality)). 

[G]eneral considerations should include the natural bonds 

between parent and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a 

particular name within the community, and, where the child is of 

sufficient age, whether the child intellectually and rationally 

understands the significance of changing his or her name. 

Id. The party seeking the name change bears the burden of producing 

evidence that the name change is appropriate. Id. 

We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion: 

Our standard of review involving a petition for change of 

name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether there 

was an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion exists if the 

trial court has overridden or misapplied the law, or if the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain the order. Further, resolution 

of factual issues is for the trial court, and a reviewing court will 

not disturb the trial court’s findings if those findings are 

supported by competent evidence. It is not enough for reversal 

that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have made a differing 

finding or reached a different result.

Id. at 827. 

In In re Christjohn, 428 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1981), this Court 

considered facts very similar to those before us. There, child’s mother 

petitioned to change the child’s surname after the child’s father killed the 
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child’s stepfather. Id. at 598. The mother had taken the stepfather’s 

surname, and she wanted the child to do the same. The child suffered 

significant emotional trauma after the death of her stepfather. Id. We 

wrote that “[t]he notoriety and truculence of [the father’s] shooting of [the 

stepfather] subjected [the child] to emotional stress and resulted in the 

cessation of all contact between father and daughter.” Id. at 599. We 

therefore affirmed the order granting the name change. Id. 

Christjohn is highly instructive in the instant matter. The trial court 

offered these observations, all of which are supported in the record: 

In the present case, this court determined that [Petitioner] 

did meet her burden of showing a name change was in her 

grandson’s best interest. In her testimony, [Petitioner] 

expressed concern about harassment, embarrassment, and 

abuse towards [Child] from other kids because of publicity 

surrounding the murder of his mother, the fact that [Child] has 

the same last name as Appellant, and the knowledge that his 

father killed his mother. [Petitioner] also discussed her 

grandson’s mental health, and the fact that [Child] has struggled 

to feel secure. As noted by [Petitioner], changing the last name 

from [S_____] to [B_____] is essential to protecting [Child’s] 

mental and emotional well-being. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/17, at 8. Further, the court noted that the name 

change would have no detrimental effect on the relationship between 

Appellant and [Child], as child was an infant when he was removed from 

Appellant’s custody and Appellant is in prison for life. We discern no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s decision to grant the name change under 

these circumstances. 
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Similarly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision 

to grant the name change prior to the conclusion of Appellant’s collateral 

attack of his murder conviction. Appellant was convicted of the murder of 

Mother, and that conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. We can conceive 

of no reason why Child should continue to bear Appellant’s surname until an 

uncertain future date when Appellant has no further collateral petitions 

pending. 

In summary, Appellant’s pro se brief offers no coherent basis for 

reversing the trial court’s order. We conclude that the trial court acted 

within its permissible discretion in granting the petition, and we therefore 

affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2017