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TSA INTEGRITY CHALLENGES: EXAMINING 

MISCONDUCT BY AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 31, 2013 

Serial No. 113–29 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

GREG HILL, Chief of Staff 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

RYAN CONSAUL, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

WITNESSES

Mr. John W. Halinski, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Services, 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Ms. Deborah L. Outten-Mills, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

(1) 

TSA INTEGRITY CHALLENGES: EXAMINING 

MISCONDUCT BY AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL 

Wednesday, July 31, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY, AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan [Chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency] 

presiding. 

Present: Representatives Duncan, Hudson, Rogers, Miller, 

Barletta, Daines, Brooks, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Richmond, Barber, and Payne. 

Also present: Representative Mica. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittees on Oversight and Management Efficiency and Transportation 

Security will come to order. It is a joint hearing today with Members from both subcommittees. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the misconduct by airport security screening personnel and 

the effects that misconduct has on the integrity of TSA. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

The Transportation Security Administration was created after 

the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in an effort to 

strengthen the security of our Nation’s transportation systems, especially our airports. Considering the nature of the attacks and the 

other terrorist attempts, like the 2009 Christmas day underwear 

bomber, the 2001 shoe bomb plot, the American public looks to TSA 

to keep them safe while flying. 

However, with countless TSA misconduct cases spread throughout the country, confidence in airport security is quickly waning. 

For example, in 2011 a transportation security officer at Newark 

Airport pleaded guilty to stealing thousands of dollars in cash and 

other valuables from unsuspecting travelers. In March of this year, 

a wanted rape suspect made his way through a security checkpoint 

at JFK carrying a 3,800K-volt stun gun, which is definitely on the 

list of banned items for airplane travel. 

In February this year, TSA improperly detained a 3-year-old disabled wheelchair-bound girl, suffering from spina bifida, on her 

way to Disney World with her family. It is a terrible YouTube video 

to watch that reminds us of some of these incidents. This instance 
2 

specifically was heartbreaking. TSA must do more to focus on the 

true threats and stop the invasive screening of low-risk travelers. 

The TSA lists integrity as one of its core values, but unfortunately integrity has been lost in many cases. When workers on the 

front line fail to live up to TSA’s established guiding principles and 

standards of conduct, management must step up and hold individuals accountable. TSA created the Office of Professional Responsibility to promote timeliness, accountability, and consistency within 

the disciplinary process. However, according to the Government Accountability Office’s—GAO—report on TSA misconduct that was 

just released yesterday, timeliness, accountability, and consistency 

are still major issues for TSA when misconduct arises. 

For example, while TSA has established standards for investigating and adjudicating misconduct cases, TSA does not track 

how long it takes to complete and adjudicate investigations. As a 

result, TSA could miss systemic problems across airports, allowing 

misconduct to go unchecked. Furthermore, according to TSA data, 

out of 56 cases of theft from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, 31 resulted in termination, 11 resulted in letters of reprimand, 11 resulted in suspension of a defined period, and 2 resulted in indefinite suspension, and 1 resulted in resignation. Stealing is stealing, 

and these are incidents of stealing from American travelers. 

According to recommended penalty range on TSA’s table of offenses and penalties for theft or unauthorized taking, a letter of 

reprimand is not included. Additionally, when questioned by the 

former Transportation Security Subcommittee Chairman last year, 

Deputy Administrator Halinski stated that, and I will quote: 

‘‘When we have personnel that have committed, let us say, stealing, 

drugs, or lack of security that we can immediately identify, those 

personnel are terminated. They are walked out the door.’’ 

Well, which is it Deputy Administrator? Are they removed from 

employment or sent home with a slap on the wrist? I would hope 

that a Federal employee that engages in theft of trusting American 

travelers would be disciplined with more than just a letter. These 

statistics tell the American people that TSA isn’t terribly concerned 

if its employees steal from the traveling public. TSA should have 

no tolerance for such behavior. The American people demand accountability. 

In addition, of the 1,936 cases in fiscal year 2012 that fall in the 

misconduct category of screening and security, around 4 percent of 

those cases involve sleeping while engaged in security-related duties. I believe that is about 77 cases, and I will tell you, that is 77 

cases too many. 

Yet, rather than punishing these employees using standard penalties, TSA chose to go easy on those who find it hard to stay 

awake while protecting the American people. GAO reported that 

about half of the penalties for sleeping on duty didn’t even fall into 

the recommended range, which is a 2-week suspension to termination. Instead, half of the cases were resolved with a reprimand 

letter or a 1- to 3-day suspension. 

Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of the larger problem. According to GAO’s analysis of fiscal year 2012 data on screening and security offenses that include failing to follow standard operating procedures, sleeping on duty, and allowing individuals to bypass 
3 

screening, again, 1,936 cases, 55 percent of the offenses result in 

a letter of reprimand even though a letter of reprimand is not part 

of the recommended penalty range for any of those offenses. So 

where is the consistency? 

While I know that there are many thousands of hard-working, 

dedicated employees working at airports throughout the country, 

and it is unfair to generalize to the whole workforce, unfortunately, 

a few bad apples can ruin the bunch. These findings are especially 

hard to stomach since so many Americans today are sick of being 

groped, interrogated, and treated like criminals when passing 

through checkpoints. If integrity is truly a core value, then, TSA, 

it is time to prove it. Stop with the napping, the stealing, the tardiness, and the disrespect, and earn Americans’ trust and confidence. 

Disciplinary action should be standardized, tracked, and processed 

in a timely manner so that the agency can compare performance 

Nation-wide, analyze significant differences in data, and make 

changes where changes are due, whether that is through additional 

training or stricter enforcement of policies and procedures. 

The TSA plays a vital role in the security of our country and it 

is time that the American people look to TSA favorably instead of 

with disdain and distrust. One important step in achieving this is 

to fully respect American civil liberties when flying. 

I appreciate the participation of our distinguished witnesses here 

today, and I am eager to hear about the Transportation Security 

Administration’s process and progress for handling misconduct 

cases within its workforce. It is critical that our airports are secure 

and that the tarnished reputation of the agency is turned around 

and the traveling public can once again trust and appreciate those 

working the front lines to keep our country safe. 

The Chairman will now recognize the Minority leader of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber, for an opening 

statement that he may have. 

[The statement of Chairman Duncan follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN

JULY 31, 2013 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created after the horrific 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in an effort to strengthen the security of our 

Nation’s transportation systems, especially our airports. And considering the nature 

of the attacks, and other terrorist attempts, like the 2009 Christmas day underwear 

bomber and the 2001 shoe bomb plot, the American public looks to the TSA to keep 

them safe when flying. 

However, with countless TSA misconduct cases spread throughout the country, 

confidence in airport security is quickly waning. For example, in 2011, a Transportation Security Officer at Newark Airport pleaded guilty to stealing thousands of 

dollars in cash and other valuables from unsuspecting travelers. In March of this 

year, a wanted rape suspect made his way through the security checkpoint at JFK 

carrying a 3,800K-volt stun-gun, which is definitely on the list of banned items for 

airplane travel. And, in February of this year, TSA improperly detained a 3-yearold disabled, wheelchair-bound child suffering from spina bifida on her way to Disney World with her family. This instance specifically was heart-breaking. TSA must 

do more to focus on the true threats and stop with invasive screening of low-risk 

travelers. 

The TSA lists ‘‘Integrity’’ as one of its core values, but unfortunately, integrity has 

been lost in many cases. When workers on the front line fail to live up to TSA’s 

established guiding principles and standards of conduct, management must step up 

and hold individuals accountable. 
4 

TSA created the Office of Professional Responsibility to promote timeliness, accountability, and consistency in the disciplinary process. However, according to the 

Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report on TSA misconduct that was just 

issued yesterday, timeliness, accountability, and consistency are still major issues 

for TSA when misconduct arises. For example, while TSA has established standards 

for investigating and adjudicating misconduct cases, TSA does not track how long 

it takes to complete and adjudicate investigations. As a result, TSA could miss systemic problems across airports allowing misconduct to go unchecked. 

Furthermore, according to TSA data, out of 56 cases of theft or unauthorized taking from fiscal years 2010–2012, 31 resulted in termination, 11 resulted in letters 

of reprimand, 11 resulted in suspension of a defined period, 2 resulted in indefinite 

suspension, and 1 resulted in resignation. According to the recommended penalty 

range on TSA’s Table of Offenses and Penalties for theft/unauthorized taking, a letter of reprimand is not included. Additionally, when questioned by the former 

Transportation Security Subcommittee Chairman last year, Deputy Administrator 

Halinski stated that ‘‘when we have personnel that have committed, let us say, 

stealing, drugs, or lack of security that we can immediately identify, those personnel 

are terminated. They are walked out the door.’’ Well, which is it, Deputy Administrator? Are they removed from employment or sent home with a slap on the wrist? 

I would hope that a Federal employee that engages in theft of trusting travelers 

would be disciplined more than with just a letter. These statistics tell the American 

people that TSA isn’t terribly concerned if its employees steal from the traveling 

public. TSA should have no tolerance for such behavior. The American people demand accountability. 

In addition, of the 1,936 cases in fiscal year 2012 that fall in the misconduct category of ‘‘Screening and Security,’’ around 4 percent of those cases involved sleeping 

while engaged in security-related duties. I believe that’s about 77 cases. That’s 77 

cases too many. Yet rather than punishing these employees using the standard penalties, TSA chose to go easy on those who find it hard to stay awake while protecting the American people. GAO reported that about half of the penalties for 

sleeping on duty didn’t even fall into the recommended range (which is a 2-week 

suspension to termination). Instead, half of the cases were resolved with a reprimand letter or 1- to 3-day suspension. 

Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of the larger problem. According to GAO’s 

analysis of the fiscal year 2012 data on ‘‘Screening and Security’’ offenses that include failing to follow standard operating procedures, sleeping on duty, and allowing 

individuals to bypass screening—again of 1,936 cases, 55 percent of the offenses resulted in a letter of reprimand even though a letter of reprimand is not part of the 

recommended penalty range for any of those offenses. Where is the consistency? 

While I know there are many—thousands—of hard-working, dedicated employees 

working at airports throughout the country, and it’s unfair to generalize to the 

whole workforce, unfortunately, a few bad apples can ruin the bunch. These findings 

are especially hard to stomach since so many Americans today are sick of being 

groped, interrogated, and treated like criminals when passing through checkpoints. 

If ‘‘Integrity’’ is truly a core value, then, TSA, prove it. Stop with the napping, the 

stealing, the tardiness, and the disrespect. Earn Americans’ trust and confidence. 

Disciplinary actions should be standardized, tracked, and processed in a timely 

manner so that the agency can compare performance Nation-wide, analyze significant differences in data and make changes where changes are due—whether that’s 

through additional training or stricter enforcement of policies and procedures. The 

TSA plays a vital role in the security of our country and it’s time the American people look to TSA favorably instead of with disdain and distrust. One important step 

to achieving this is to fully respect Americans’ civil liberties when flying. 

I appreciate the participation of our distinguished witnesses here today and am 

eager to hear about the Transportation Security Administration’s process and 

progress for handling misconduct cases within its workforce. It is critical that our 

airports are secure and that the tarnished reputation of the agency is turned around 

and the traveling public once again trust and appreciate those working the front 

lines to keep our country safe. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you, Chairman Duncan, for convening 

this hearing, and it is a critical area that we are examining today 

because the American public every single day, the flying public at 

least, deals with the TSA officers, and we need to make sure that 

they are treated properly. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, those terrorist attacks 

resulted in the formation or creation of the Transportation Security 
5 

Administration, and the main purpose was to protect air travel and 

keep the traveling public safe. In order to implement its mission, 

the TSA employs thousands of TSOs, transportation security officers, and on a daily basis screen almost 2 million passengers at 450 

airports throughout the United States. 

These dedicated and hard-working civil servants perform their 

duties in the face of frustration. I have seen it in my many travels 

back and forth between my home and Washington, face frustration 

from weary travelers and critics of the TSA’s often-changing policies. They serve as our front line of defense in aviation security and 

we rely on them and the technology that they use to keep us safe 

from harm. 

As I mentioned, I have now been in Congress for 1 year. I fly 

back home almost every weekend. I have gone through TSA security lines at least 100 times in this last year. I would have to say 

that I look and observe what is going on around me with other passengers, and almost always, with few exceptions, the public is 

treated with respect and professionalism. But there are problems 

that remain. 

According to media reports, from December 2010 through February 2013, 108 transportation security officers have been arrested 

and 93 crimes related to their employment have been committed. 

According to the GAO, from 2010 through 2012, the annual number 

of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. The GAO 

also reported that 1,936, or 20 percent of the aforementioned misconduct cases, were classified as security and screening violations. 

These pertain to incidents that do not include conducting security 

or equipment checks and allowing people or baggage to bypass the 

screening. 

TSA’s most important responsibility is to ensure the safety and 

the security of travelers in a professional manner. We cannot allow 

one bag or one person to go unscreened. This percentage of 

unscreened baggage and people is absolutely unacceptable. 

When compared to the TSA workforce in total, which numbers 

more than 55,000 employees, the overall misconduct numbers indicate that around 6 percent of TSA’s employees were involved in 

wrongdoing. These statistics clearly show that more work can and 

must be done to properly train and effectively hire transportation 

security officers. 

It should be noted that this data from the GAO also indicates 

that the vast majority of TSO, transportation security officers, are 

law-abiding citizens and professional in carrying out their most important duties and fulfilling the mission of the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

According to GAO, TSA has made some progress in improving 

the professionalism and accountability of its workforce. For example, having a table of offenses with clearly-defined ranges of penalties ensures that consistency and fairness exist in what was previously a very ad hoc, arbitrary process. Furthermore, the creation 

of TSA Office of Professional Responsibility has resulted in reduced 

backlog of cases and quicker decisions for employees waiting to resolve their matters. The TSA has also added additional training 

classes for its airport-based personnel so that managers and supervisors are better able to identify and investigate misconduct. 
6 

While these steps are good and important, they do not rule out 

the need for the TSA to improve weaknesses that still exist in the 

agency. Risks or weaknesses such as ensuring that misconduct 

cases are recorded in TSA’s centralized database, and making 

sure—making sure—that misconduct cases are properly handled in 

accordance with TSA policies and procedures. 

Furthermore, when addressing misconduct, Congress and TSA 

have a responsibility to ensure proper oversight over the entire 

TSA workforce, including management and supervisors. According 

to a recent Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 

General report, supervisors at TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office have exhibited a pattern of poor 

management practices and inappropriate use of formal—informal 

administrative processes to assess and address misconduct. 

This report is yet one more example of why an examination of 

TSA’s misconduct should be extended beyond the TSO workforce. 

I therefore look forward to hearing from both GAO and the OIG 

this morning on how TSA can improve its processes, and from TSA 

on how it intends to comply with GAO and OIG recommendations. 

I thank our witnesses for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening the meeting. I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER RON BARBER

JULY 31, 2013 

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) was created in an effort to protect air travel and 

keep the travelling public safe. 

In order to implement its mission, TSA employs thousands of Transportation Security Officers that on a daily basis screen almost 2 million passengers at 450 airports throughout the United States. 

These dedicated, hardworking civil servants perform their duties in the face of 

frustration from weary travelers and critics of TSA’s often frequently-changing policies. 

They serve as our first line of defense in aviation security and we rely on them, 

and the technology they utilize, to keep us safe from harm. 

Most organizations have experiences where employees do not live up to an organization’s work standards. Unfortunately, this is also true sometimes for the Transportation Security Administration. 

According to media reports, from December 2010 through February 2013, 108 

TSOs have been arrested and 93 crimes—related to their employment—have been 

committed. 

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2010 through 

2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. 

The GAO also reported that 1,936, or 20 percent, of the aforementioned misconduct cases, were classified as security and screening violations. These pertain to 

incidents that include not conducting security or equipment checks and allowing 

people or baggage to bypass screening. 

TSA’s first and foremost responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of travelers in a professional manner. We cannot allow one bag or one person go 

unscreened and this percentage is simply unacceptable. 

When compared to the TSA workforce in total, which numbers more than 55,000 

employees, the overall misconduct numbers indicate around 6 percent of TSA’s employees were involved in wrongdoing. 

These statistics clearly show that more work can and must be done to properly 

train and effectively hire Transportation Security Officers. 

It should be noted that this data from GAO also indicates that the vast majority 

of TSOs are law-abiding citizens, seeking to carry out the mission of the Department 

of Homeland Security. 
7 

According to GAO, TSA has made some progress in improving the professionalism 

and accountability of its workforce. 

For example, having a table of offenses with clearly defined ranges of penalties 

ensures that consistency and fairness exists in what was previously an ad hoc and 

arbitrary process. 

Furthermore, the creation of the TSA Office of Professional Responsibility has resulted in a reduced backlog of cases and quicker decisions for employees waiting to 

resolve their matters. 

TSA has also added additional training classes for its airport-based personnel so 

that managers and supervisors are better able to identify and investigate misconduct. 

While these steps are important, they do not rule out the need for TSA to improve 

weaknesses that still exist, such as ensuring that misconduct cases are recorded in 

TSA’s centralized database and making sure that misconduct cases are properly 

handled in accordance with TSA policies and procedures. 

Furthermore, when addressing misconduct, Congress and TSA have a responsibility to ensure proper oversight over the entire TSA workforce, including management and supervisors. 

According to a recent Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) report, supervisors at TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and 

Credentialing Office, have exhibited a pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate use of informal administrative processes to assess and address misconduct. 

This report is but one example of why an examination of TSA misconduct should 

extended beyond the TSO workforce. 

I therefore look forward to hearing from both GAO and the OIG on how TSA can 

improve its processes and from TSA on how it intends to comply with GAO and OIG 

recommendations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the Ranking Member. 

I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Mica, be permitted to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Hudson, for any statement he may have. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Chairman Duncan. 

I would like to thank our panel of witnesses for being here today 

to discuss this very important issue. As we work this week in the 

House to hold Government accountable to the American people, I 

appreciate your willingness to address these issues before the subcommittee. 

I recognize that TSA screeners have a tough job. Screeners spend 

all day inspecting hundreds of people, and their personal possessions, trying to find—to stop a disaster, but never knowing exactly 

what the threat looks like or when it will strike. It is precisely the 

nature of the job that leaves absolutely no room for misconduct at 

screening checkpoints. At best, misconduct is a distraction to the 

screeners who are actually focused on preventing a bomb from getting on an airplane and killing thousands of innocent people. At 

worst, it is gross negligence and undermines the security of the 

United States and the confidence of the citizens in our Government. 

Earlier this year, my subcommittee held a series of hearings on 

TSA’s efforts to advance risk-based security where we discussed the 

seriousness of the threats we face and what it will take for TSA 

to successfully implement PreCheck and other risk-based screening 

initiatives. Now more than ever, as TSA continues its much-needed 

transition towards risk-based security, the agency must fine-tune 

its hiring practices to ensure that it is employing the best qualified 
8 

candidates to secure our Nation’s airports, and that once hired each 

employee is held to the highest possible standard. 

It is critically important that as TSA moves towards a more concentrated and agile screening process, it also focuses in quality over 

quantity of the screening personnel. It is no secret that TSA’s 

image with the American public has been tarnished and security 

has been compromised with certain cases of wrongdoing among a 

few TSA employees. These instances may not represent the majority of TSA employees, but they do have a direct impact on TSA’s 

relationship with travelers and the overall screening environment. 

Reports that cases of employee misconduct have increased by nearly 30 percent over the last 3 years do little to instill confidence in 

an agency that is already fighting an uphill battle. 

Today’s hearing will provide the opportunity to hear from TSA 

and from the Government Accounting Office about what steps can 

be taken to reduce employee misconduct, improve consistency in 

how these cases are handled by TSA, and identify new opportunities to promote integrity and professionalism within the workforce. 

GAO’s recent report makes several important recommendations to 

TSA on ways to improve how it handles employee misconduct, and 

I look forward to discussing those recommendations and what steps 

TSA has already taken to address those here today. 

Finally, I am concerned that TSA’s attention to conduct stops 

short in addressing the issue of failing a covert test. TSA conducts 

covert testing at airport checkpoints as a way to identified security 

weaknesses. If a screener fails a covert test, he or she is taken off 

the line and instructed on what part of the test he or she failed. 

However, there is apparently no consequence or penalty. Instead, 

the person is retrained and allowed to go back to the checkpoint 

to screen for explosives. 

I think this issue is worth exploring further. If someone fails 

multiple tests and a simulated bomb is able to get through security 

and onto an airplane, what should be the penalty for that individual if our ultimate goal is maximizing the security that is being 

provided? 

I look forward to the witnesses’ perspective on this, as well as 

the other areas for improvement identified by the GAO in its report. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD HUDSON

JULY 31, 2013 

I recognize that TSA screeners have a tough job. It is hard to imagine spending 

all day inspecting hundreds of people and their personal possessions, trying to stop 

a disaster from happening, but never knowing exactly what the threat looks like or 

when it might strike. 

It is precisely the nature of the job that leaves absolutely no room for misconduct 

at the screening checkpoints. At best, misconduct is a distraction to the screeners 

who are actually focused on preventing a bomb from getting on an airplane and killing thousands of innocent people; at worst it is gross negligence that undermines 

the security of the United States and the confidence of citizens in Government. 

Earlier this year, my subcommittee held a series of hearings on TSA’s efforts to 

advance risk-based security, where we discussed the seriousness of the threats we 

face, and what it will take for TSA to successfully implement Pre-Check and other 

risk-based screening initiatives. 
9 

Now, more than ever, as TSA continues its much-needed transition toward riskbased security (RBS), the agency must fine-tune its hiring practices to ensure that 

it is employing the best-qualified candidates to secure our Nation’s airports and that 

once hired, each employee is held to the highest possible standard. It is critically 

important that as TSA moves toward a more concentrated and agile screening process, it also focuses in quality over quantity of its screening personnel. 

It’s no secret that TSA’s image with the American public has been tarnished, and 

security has been compromised with certain cases of wrongdoing among TSA employees. These instances may not represent the majority of TSA employees, but they 

do have a direct impact on TSA’s relationship with travelers and the overall screening environment. Reports that cases of employee misconduct have increased by 

nearly 30 percent over the past 3 years do little to instill confidence in an agency 

that is already fighting an uphill battle. 

Today’s hearing will provide the opportunity to hear from TSA and GAO about 

what steps can be taken to reduce employee misconduct, improve consistency in how 

these cases are handled by TSA, and identify new opportunities to promote integrity 

and professionalism within the workforce. GAO’s recent report makes several important recommendations to TSA on ways to improve how it handles employee misconduct, and I look forward to discussing those recommendations here today. 

Finally, I am concerned that TSA’s attention to conduct stops short of addressing 

the issue of failing a covert test. 

TSA conducts covert testing at airport checkpoints as a way to identify security 

weaknesses. If a screener fails a covert test, her or she is taken off the line and 

instructed on what part of the test he or she failed. However, there is apparently 

no consequence or penalty; instead the person is retrained and allowed to go back 

to the checkpoint and screen for explosives. 

I think this issue is worth exploring further: If someone fails multiple tests and 

a simulated bomb is able to get through security and onto an airplane, what should 

be the penalty for that individual, if our ultimate goal is to maximize the security 

that is being provided? 

I look forward to the witnesses’ perspectives on this, as well as the other areas 

for improvement identified by the GAO in its report. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. 

The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member 

of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, the gentleman from 

Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for a statement he may have. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust that this hearing will be used to facilitate a constructive discussion regarding 

TSA’s application of its disciplinary policies and not a platform for 

demeaning TSA’s front-line workforce. 

Transportation security officers have an undeniably hard job and 

the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves honorably 

and in accordance with TSA’s protocols. With any large agency and 

organization, instances of misconduct and the failure to follow 

standard operating procedures will occur. This principle applies to 

CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and the TSA alike. 

The distinction with TSA however, is the broad latitude the administrator has been provided to discipline the screener workforce. 

When TSA was established, Congress granted the administrator 

sweeping powers to set the terms of employment for screeners, notwithstanding any other provision of law. That means TSOs do not 

have the right to appeal adverse employment actions to the Merit 

Systems Protection Board, commonly referred to as the MSPB. This 

is the case despite the fact that managers and supervisors have the 

right to appeal to the MSPB themselves should they face disciplinary action. It also means TSOs do not enjoy the protections of the 

Rehabilitation Act, Equal Pay Act, and a litany of other employment laws. 

This dynamic makes it critical for TSA to handle allegations of 

misconduct in a fair and consistent manner. According to the GAO 
10 

report released yesterday, TSA lacks the controls necessary to do 

just that. The result is a disciplinary system for TSOs that results 

in what happens—what appears to be arbitrary punishment. 

I am pleased that TSA has concurred with all of the GAO recommendations contained within the report. If implemented properly, these recommendations will provide both the public and the 

transportation security officers assurances that discipline is uniform and allegations of misconduct are properly adjudicated. 

I look forward to hearing from Deputy Administrator Halinski on 

the steps TSA intends to take to implement GAO’s recommendations. I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Halinski on the challenges TSA faces in ensuring Nation-wide uniformity as it relates 

to discipline for screeners who engage in misconduct in light of the 

Screening Partnership Program. 

While TSA has the authority to set the terms of employment and 

propose disciplinary action for TSOs, its ability to do so for contract 

screeners is subject to the terms of the various contracts it has 

with private screening companies. This leads to both Congress and 

TSA lacking visibility into the disciplinary policies of companies 

providing passenger screening at over a dozen airports across the 

country. 

I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Lord of the GAO office 

during the hearing today. His expertise on matters of aviation security and TSA’s policies continue to be of great value to the committee as it conducts its oversight of TSA. 

Finally, I look forward to hearing from Ms. Outten-Mills—and I 

hope I didn’t mess that up too bad—of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. Her testimony will provide insight into how the OIG and the TSA work collaboratively on 

allegations of misconduct. 

Mr. Chairman, before yielding back, I would like to reiterate my 

appreciation for you holding this joint hearing today. Approximately one-quarter of the transportation security officer workforce 

are veterans, and a vast majority of screeners wake up every day 

with one goal in mind: Protecting our transportation systems from 

terrorist attacks. Despite Congress neglecting to provide these men 

and women the standard employment protections afforded to their 

colleagues in the Federal Government, we should not settle for a 

system of arbitrary and ad hoc discipline by TSA. Both the screeners and the flying public deserve better. 

I would also like to point out that while there is a tendency to 

focus on allegations of misconduct, we should not ignore the instances of exemplary conduct by TSOs. Earlier this year a TSO in 

Georgia discovered a total of $1,000 left unattended in an ATM’s 

cash dispenser. She turned it in. A TSO in New York who was on 

her way to the baggage room noticed an envelope on the ground 

with over $500 inside. Like her colleague in Georgia, she turned 

the money in. Hopefully, the detour did not result in her being disciplined for tardiness, the most common charge against TSOs, according to the GAO report. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:] 
11 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER CEDRIC L. RICHMOND

JULY 31, 2013 

I trust that this hearing will be used to facilitate a constructive discussion regarding TSA’s application of its disciplinary policies and NOT a platform for demeaning 

TSA’s front-line workforce. 

Transportation Security Officers have an undeniably hard job and the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves honorably and in accordance with 

TSA’s protocols. With any large agency or organization, instances of misconduct and 

the failure to follow standard operating procedures will occur. 

This principle applies to CBP, ICE, the Secret Service, and TSA alike. The distinction with TSA, however, is the broad latitude the administrator has been provided 

to discipline the screener workforce. 

When TSA was established, Congress granted the administrator sweeping powers 

to set the terms of employment for screeners notwithstanding any other provision 

of law. That means TSOs do not have the right to appeal adverse employment actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board—commonly referred to as the MSPB. 

This is the case despite the fact that managers and supervisors have the right to 

appeal to the MSPB themselves—should they face disciplinary action. It also means 

TSOs do not enjoy the protections of the Rehabilitation Act, Equal Pay Act, and a 

litany of other employment laws. 

This dynamic makes it critical for TSA to handle allegations of misconduct in a 

fair and consistent manner. According to the GAO report released yesterday, TSA 

lacks the controls necessary to do just that. The result is a disciplinary system for 

TSOs that results in what appears to be arbitrary punishments. I am pleased that 

TSA has concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations contained within the report. 

If implemented properly, these recommendations will provide both the public and 

Transportation Security Officers assurances that discipline is uniform and allegations of misconduct are properly adjudicated. 

I look forward to hearing from Deputy Administrator Halinski on the steps TSA 

intends to take to implement GAO’s recommendations. I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Halinski on the challenges TSA faces in ensuring Nation-wide uniformity as it relates to discipline for screeners who engage in misconduct in light 

of the Screening Partnership Program. 

While TSA has the authority to set the terms of employment and propose disciplinary action for TSOs, its ability to do so for contract screeners is subject to the 

terms of the various contracts it has with private screening companies. 

This leads to both Congress and TSA lacking visibility into the disciplinary policies of companies providing passenger screening at over a dozen airports across the 

country. 

I also look forward to hearing from Mr. Lord of the Government Accountability 

Office during the hearing today. His expertise on matters of aviation security and 

TSA’s policies continue to be of great value to the committee as it conducts oversight 

of TSA. 

Finally, I look forward to hearing from Ms. Outten-Mills of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. Her testimony will provide insight 

into how the OIG and TSA work collaboratively on allegations of misconduct. 

Mr. Chairman, before yielding back, I would like to reiterate my appreciation for 

you holding this joint hearing today. Approximately one-quarter of the Transportation Security Officer workforce are veterans and the vast majority of screeners 

wake up every day with one goal in mind—protecting our transportation systems 

from terrorist attack. Despite Congress neglecting to provide these men and women 

the standard employment protections afforded their colleagues in the Federal Government, we should not settle for a system of arbitrary and ad hoc discipline by 

TSA. 

Both the screeners and the flying public deserve better. I would also like to point 

out that while there is a tendency to focus on allegations of misconduct, we should 

not ignore the instances of exemplary conduct by TSOs. Earlier this year, a TSO 

in Georgia discovered a total of $1,000 left unattended in an ATM’s cash dispenser. 

She turned it in. A TSO in New York who was on her way to the baggage room 

noticed an envelope on the ground with over $500 inside. Like her colleague in 

Georgia, she turned the money in. 

Hopefully, the detour did not result in her being disciplined for tardiness, the 

most common charge against TSOs according to the GAO report. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana. 
12 

The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking Member of the 

full committee, Mr. Thompson, gentleman from Mississippi, for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. At the 

outset, I would also remind you that the Democratic Caucus is 

meeting and the President of the United States is speaking with 

them at the exact time that we are holding this hearing. So I know 

why a number of my Members are absent, and I am certain one 

or two of the Members of this committee might slip out during the 

hearing also. 

Thank you for holding today’s hearing. In the aftermath of the 

terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, multiple layers of security 

were put in place to protect our aviation system from terrorists and 

those who seek to do us harm. One of those many layers include 

the passenger and baggage screening conducted by transportation 

security officers, commonly referred to as TSOs. Every day, over 

400 airports across the country, 47,000 TSOs utilize their training 

and available technologies to screen passengers and their baggage 

for weapons and explosives. 

The vast majority of TSOs are hard-working, dedicated, diligent 

Federal employees who take their role within the homeland security enterprise seriously and carry out this mission of the Transportation Security Administration in exemplary fashion. However, as 

many organizations have, there are some bad apples in the bunch. 

Yesterday, the Government Accountability Office released a report entitled ‘‘Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct.’’ According to the report, although TSA has improved training and taken steps to improve investigations of misconduct, it still does not have a system 

in place to ensure that allegations of employee misconduct are adjudicated consistently and uniformly. The bulk of employee misconduct cases are handled at the airport level, meaning that what 

happens at one airport may differ from what happens at another. 

Fortunately, TSA concurred with the full recommendations made 

by GAO that seeks to improve TSA’s procedures and bring consistency to its actions. Some steps, such as establishment of the Office 

of Professional Responsibility and the creation of a table of offense 

and penalties, have already been put into action. I look forward to 

hearing from TSA on how it plans to implement the recommendations made by GAO. 

It must be noted, however, that the misconduct that served as 

the basis for the GAO report covered a wide range of offenses. Fortunately, the largest percentage of cases examined by GAO, 32 percent, covered TSO attendance and leave issues as opposed to matters directly related to security. Those matters which did involve 

screening and security, accounting for 20 percent of the examined 

cases, range from sleeping on duty to subjective enforcement of violations of standard operating procedures. 

While not making light of these matters, it is important to view 

them in the proper context and also bear in mind that these incidents were committed by less than 1 percent of the TSO workforce. 

This is important to highlight because there are some who advocate 

for doing away with the vital TSO workforce and replacing them 

with contract screeners. However, there is no indication that dis-
13 

placing 47,000 Federal employees would result in less misconduct 

or result in lower costs. In fact, contractor screeners are fully funded by taxpayer dollars that would simply be transferred from public to private-sector jobs. 

Moreover, cost analysis indicate that contract screeners cost taxpayers 3 to 9 percent more than the cost of Federal screeners at 

the same airport, and there is no indication that instances of misconduct would decrease. To the contrary, in a December 2012 report released by GAO it was noted that misconduct occurs among 

contract screeners as well. In particular, GAO found that, among 

other things, contract screeners have mishandled sensitive security 

information. 

Furthermore, we have a clear picture of a TSO’s misconduct, insight into how to rectify current situations, and a direct avenue for 

exercising oversight of the process. The same is not true when it 

comes to contractors. In attempting to conduct oversight of the employment practices and discipline policies of contract vendors who 

provide screening services, I have made repeated requests to the 

company policies that govern screener activities and the number of 

instances of misconduct that have occurred among contract screeners. Instead of being provided with this information, the committee 

was informed that corporate rules prevented the release of this information because it was considered to be proprietary in nature. 

If every airport was populated by these contract screeners, that 

would be the answer Nation-wide, and hearings like the one we are 

conducting this morning would be an exercise in futility. Moreover, 

while we are conducting a hearing to publicize the missteps of a 

very small number of more than 47,000 TSOs, misconduct continues to flourish at other TSA offices outside of the airport environment. 

For example, at my request, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, whom we will also hear from this 

morning, found TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and 

Credentialing Office, TTAC, exhibited a pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate use of informal administrative 

processes to assess and address misconduct. They also found that 

when TTAC personnel attempted to report managerial misconduct, 

such as workplace bullying, a hostile work environment, and discrimination based on gender, race, religion, age, and disability, 

they were prevented from filing their actions in some instances, 

and in other instances remained silent due to fear of retaliation or 

damage to their careers. 

As a result of the OIG report, I requested the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission to dig deeper into these allegations and 

conduct their own review to determine if these problems exist 

across the entire TSA. I look forward to hearing from OIG on 

whether the TSA has followed up on the recommendations. I thank 

the witnesses for appearing today and yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
14 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 31, 2013 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, multiple layers 

of security were put in place to protect our aviation system from terrorists and those 

who seek to do us harm. 

One of those many layers included passenger and baggage screening conducted by 

Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). Every day, at over 400 airports across the 

country, 47,000 TSOs utilize their training and available technologies to screen passengers and their baggage for weapons and explosives. 

The vast majority of TSOs are hard-working, dedicated, diligent Federal employees who take their role within the homeland security enterprise seriously and carry 

out the mission of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in exemplary 

fashion. 

However, as with any organization, there are some bad apples in the bunch. Yesterday, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report entitled: 

‘‘Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee Misconduct.’’ According to the report, although TSA has improved training 

and taken steps to improve the investigations of misconduct, it still does not have 

a system in place to ensure that allegations of employee misconduct are adjudicated 

consistently and uniformly. 

The bulk of employee misconduct cases are handled at the airport level meaning 

that what happens at one airport may differ from what happens at another. Fortunately, TSA concurred with the four recommendations made by GAO that seek to 

improve TSA’s procedures and bring consistency to its actions. 

Some steps such as the establishment of the Office of Professional Responsibility 

and the creation of a Table of Offense and Penalties have already been put into action. I look forward to hearing from TSA on how it plans to implement the recommendations made by GAO. 

It must be noted, however, that the misconduct that served as the basis for the 

GAO report covered a wide range of offenses. Fortunately, the largest percentage 

of cases examined by GAO—32%—covered TSO attendance and leave issues, as opposed to matters directly related to security. Those matters which did involve 

screening and security, accounting for 20% of the examined cases, ranged from 

sleeping on duty to subjective enforcement of violations of standard operating procedures. 

While not making light of these matters, it is important to view them in the proper context and also bear in mind that these incidents were committed by less than 

1% of the TSO workforce. This is important to highlight because there are some who 

advocate for doing away with the vital TSO workforce and replacing them with contract screeners. 

However, there is no indication that displacing 47,000 Federal employees would 

result in less misconduct or result in lower costs. In fact, contractor screeners are 

fully funded by taxpayer dollars that would simply be transferred from public to private-sector jobs. Moreover, cost analysis indicates that contractor screeners cost taxpayers 3 to 9 percent more than the cost of Federal screeners at the same airports. 

And there is no indication that instances of misconduct would decrease. To the 

contrary, in a December 2012 report released by GAO, it was noted that misconduct 

occurs among contract screeners as well. In particular, GAO found that, among 

other things, contract screeners have mishandled sensitive security information. 

Furthermore, we have a clear picture of TSO misconduct, insight into how to rectify current situations, and a direct avenue for exercising oversight of the process. 

The same is not true when it comes to contractors. 

In attempting to conduct oversight of the employment practices and discipline 

policies of contract vendors who provide screening services, I have made repeated 

requests for the company policies that govern screener activities and the number of 

instances of misconduct that has occurred among contract screeners. 

Instead of being provided with this information, the committee has been informed 

that corporate rules prevented the release of this information because it was considered to be proprietary in nature. 

If every airport was populated by these contract screeners, that would be the answer Nation-wide and hearings like the one we are conducted this morning would 

be an exercise in futility. 

Moreover, while we are conducting a hearing to publicize the missteps of a very 

small number of the more than 47,000 TSOs, misconduct continues to flourish at 

other TSA offices outside of the airport environment. 
15 

For example, at my request, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, whom we will also hear from this morning, found TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office (TTAC) exhibited ‘‘a pattern of 

poor management practices and inappropriate use of informal administrative processes to assess and address misconduct.’’ They also found that when TTAC personnel attempted to report managerial misconduct, such as workplace bullying, a 

hostile work environment, and discrimination based on gender, race, religion, age, 

and disability, they were prevented from filing their actions in some instances, and 

in other instances, remained silent due to fear of retaliation or damage to their careers. As a result of the OIG report, I have asked the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission to dig deeper into these allegations and conduct their own review to 

determine if these problems exist across the entire TSA. 

I look forward to hearing from the OIG on whether TSA has followed up on its 

recommendations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. Thank the Ranking Member for being here. 

I know you all will need to step out, but we will continue the 

hearing and welcome you back when you come. 

I just want to pause for a minute and give much thanks to both 

the Majority and Minority staff who helped prepare these hearings, 

prepare the witnesses, and prepare the Members. So I thank you 

guys for the tremendous work you do for the committee. 

Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before 

us today on this important topic. Let me remind the witnesses that 

their entire written statement will appear in the record. I will introduce each of you first and then recognize you individually for 

your testimony. 

Our first witness is Mr. John Halinski, currently serving as deputy administrator for the Transportation Security Administration. 

Mr. Halinski has joined TSA in July 2004, and served as assistant 

administrator in the Office of Global Strategies before assuming his 

role as deputy administrator. As assistant administrator from 2010 

to 2012, Mr. Halinski was responsible for enhancing international 

transportation security through compliance, outreach, and engagement and capacity development. Previously, Mr. Halinski served 25 

years in the Marine Corps in a variety of positions. 

As I have said before, thank you, sir, for your service to our Nation in the United States Marine Corps. 

Mr. Stephen Lord is director in the Government Accountability 

Office, GAO Forensic Audit and Investigative Services team. Until 

recently he was a director of homeland security and justice issues 

responsible for overseeing and directing the GAO’s various engagements on issues related to aviation and surface transportation. His 

recent reviews of TSA’s screening programs for passengers, checked 

baggage, and air cargo led to significant improvements in the agency’s operations. Before being appointed to this position in 2007, Mr. 

Lord worked with the GAO on a number of important issues related to international security, trade, and finance. 

Ms. Deborah Outten-Mills currently serves as the acting assistant inspector general for inspections for the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Ms. Outten-Mills has 

been with DHS OIG since 2006, also served as chief inspector. 

Prior to her service at DHS, Ms. Outten-Mills was the director of 

Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Quality Assurance Division with the responsibility for offices located Nation- 
16 

wide. Since her Federal career began in 1980, she has served in 

multiple leadership positions for various offices of inspectors general, including Department of Agriculture, the Naval Audit Service, 

and the Department of Labor. 

I want to thank you all for being here today. I will now recognize 

Mr. Halinski for his opening testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HALINSKI. Good morning. I am not sure it is working, sir. 

Good morning, sir. Good morning, Chairman Hudson, Chairman 

Duncan. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the committee’s interest in helping TSA develop, achieve, and 

maintain the highest professional standards for the diverse National workforce we employ. 

Every day, our agency’s employees screen 1.8 million air travelers, vetting more than 14 million passengers and over 13 million 

transportation workers against terrorist watch lists each week. As 

public servants dedicated to protecting the Nation’s vital transportation network, the TSA workforce must adhere to the highest 

standards of conduct, integrity, professionalism. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Director Halinski, we are going to just ask you to 

pause for just a second. Let’s see if we can get that mike going. We 

do have—it is running on some broadcasts, so we want to make 

sure we get that going. 

Mr. HALINSKI. I can use Mr. Lord’s if it makes it easier. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay, you can continue. I apologize. 

Mr. HALINSKI. All right, sir. 

As public servants dedicated to protecting the Nation’s vital 

transportation network, the TSA workforce must adhere to the 

highest standards of conduct. Integrity, professionalism, and hard 

work are more than the principles to guide employee behavior. 

They are the expectations we have for every TSA employee. 

The overwhelming majority of TSA employees are good people 

doing good work. Nonetheless, misconduct occurs, and when it does 

TSA takes prompt and appropriate action. Accountability is vital to 

our success. Our reputation is tarnished any time a TSA employee 

violates the public trust and fails to live up to TSA’s high standard 

of conduct. 

As Administrator Pistole and I have shared in previous testimony, excellence in the workplace begins with a dedicated and professional workforce. With this in mind, Administrator Pistole established two new offices within TSA, the Office of Training and 

Workforce Engagement and the Office of Professional Responsibility. 

Shortly after Mr. Pistole was confirmed, he led a series of town 

hall meetings at which employees expressed concern regarding the 

consistent application of the agency’s disciplinary process. To address their concerns, Administrator Pistole established the Office of 

Professional Responsibility to ensure that allegations of misconduct 

are thoroughly investigated and that discipline is appropriate, consistent, and fair across the agency. 
17 

Since it was established the Office of Professional Responsibility 

has brought greater efficiency, timeliness, and objectivity to the 

discipline process. To complement these fundamental improvements, the office developed a table of offenses and penalties which 

is published and available to all TSA employees. Our Office of Professional Responsibility promotes greater efficiency by implementing and tracking time lines associated with adjudicating allegations of misconduct. 

With recent improvements, TSA welcomes GAO recommendations on how we can further refine these important efforts. A recent GAO audit reviewed a total of 9,622 cases over 3 years where 

individuals failed to meet TSA’s standard of conduct. The majority 

of these cases involved administrative issues such as attendance 

and leave, and issues associated with not following management directives. 

Instances involving threat from 2010 to 2012 were less than 0.07 

percent of our total workforce. Issues involving sleeping accounted 

for less than 0.1 of 1 percent of our workforce or 1.3 percent. 

While even those cases are too many, the agency investigates all 

allegations of misconduct and takes appropriate action, which can 

include referral to law enforcement and termination of employment. In most serious cases of workforce misconduct, involving 

drugs, threat, and intentional security breaches, TSA uses an expedited removal process. As GAO noted, TSA responds to instances 

of misconduct through a series of actions ranging from letters of 

reprimand to suspension from work, and in instances where the 

nature of the misconduct is more serious, removal from the TSA 

workforce. 

To maintain a high-caliber workforce, TSA recognizes that all aspects of its employment system must be reviewed, including the 

methods used to monitor allegations of employee misconduct. As 

such, TSA concurs with the four recommendations GAO provided 

and is undertaking these efforts to achieve those objectives. Some 

of these efforts are discussed in greater detail in the written statement I have submitted for the record. 

Towards the end of 2012, Administrator Pistole directed the TSA 

Office of Inspection to begin conducting covert integrity tests at airports around the country, noting we cannot and do not tolerate 

theft and will take swift action to hold accountable any employees 

engaged in criminal activity. The tests are on-going, and since December the Office of Inspection has conducted more than 640 integrity tests in 76 airports around the country. Only three TSA employees, each in a different airport, have been caught stealing during the Office of Inspection’s integrity testing and were subsequently terminated within 24 hours. 

If you consider how many employees Nation-wide were exposed 

to the test items throughout the screening process, many employees had the opportunity to do the wrong thing but only three did. 

TSA’s workforce has a fundamental role in providing security for 

the traveling public. The public has every right to expect the TSA 

workforce to adhere to the highest professional standards. 

On a personal note, let me be clear that Administrator Pistole 

and I maintain a zero tolerance policy with respect to employee 

misconduct. We appreciate the opportunity to work with each of 
18 

you to strengthen the quality of our workforce. Thank you, and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Halinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI

JULY 31, 2013 

Good morning Chairmen Hudson and Duncan, and Ranking Members Richmond 

and Barber. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the Transportation 

Security Administration’s (TSA) role in promoting a strong counterterrorism workforce to safeguard the traveling public and secure our Nation’s transportation systems. TSA appreciates the committee’s interest in helping TSA achieve the highest 

professional standards for our workforce. 

Both in the field and at headquarters, the TSA workforce is vigilant in ensuring 

the security of people and commerce that flow through our Nation’s vast transportation networks. TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent 

terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation’s transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to 

stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the 

flow of legitimate travel and commerce. TSA’s security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our 

security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures are carried out, and how screening is conducted. 

The TSA workforce occupies the front line in executing the agency’s transportation security responsibilities in support of the Nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

These responsibilities include security screening of passengers and baggage at 450 

airports in the United States that facilitate air travel for 1.8 million people per day; 

vetting more than 14 million passengers and over 13 million transportation workers 

against terrorist watch lists each week; and conducting security regulation compliance inspections and enforcement activities at airports, for domestic and foreign air 

carriers, and for air cargo screening operations throughout the United States and 

at last point of departure locations internationally. 

TSA also ensures the security of surface transportation operations. To date, we 

have conducted more than 29,000 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response or 

VIPR operations in surface transportation. We have 37 multi-modal VIPR teams 

working in transportation sectors across the country to prevent or disrupt potential 

terrorist planning activities. Since 2006, TSA has completed more than 290 Baseline 

Assessments for Security Enhancement for transit, which provides a comprehensive 

assessment of security programs in critical transit systems. We are seeing the benefits of how these important steps—combined with our well-trained and highly-motivated workforce and our multiple layers of security including cutting-edge technology—keep America safe every day. 

TSA is committed, not only to improving the effectiveness of security, but to doing 

so in the most cost-effective manner possible. Through advancements in workforce 

efficiency, TSA has been able to accommodate the increased workload that has accompanied the current practice of many airlines to charge fees for all checked baggage, the restrictions on liquids aerosols and gels we had to implement to counter 

a known terrorist threat, and the screening required for the significant increase in 

the number of laptops carried by passengers. By employing smarter security practices in developing and deploying our people, processes, and technologies we are delivering more effective security in a more efficient manner, and we will continue to 

do so. 

MAINTAINING A WORKFORCE OF THE HIGHEST CALIBER

A dedicated TSA workforce assures the traveling public that they are protected 

by a multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. An effective 

workforce must be properly trained while good management and appropriate pay 

are key ingredients in preserving a motivated and skilled workforce. To this end, 

TSA has implemented employee development initiatives like the Leaders at Every 

Level (LEL), through which TSA identifies high-performing employees and fosters 

commitments to excellence and teamwork, and the Associates Program, which 

builds morale and provides the workforce an opportunity to enhance technical and 

non-technical skills through formal training and education programs. The implementation of a new four-tier performance management program for non-Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) enables the workforce to actively engage in developing their annual performance goals in collaboration with their supervisors, while 
19 

promoting two-way communication between employees and their supervisors 

throughout the performance year. Providing a mechanism to proactively identify opportunities to improve their performance has increased employee morale. 

As public servants, TSA employees must adhere to the highest ethical and personal conduct standards. All aspects of our workforce regimen—hiring, promotion, 

retention, training, proactive compliance inspections, investigations, and adjudications—are driven by adherence to the highest ethical standards. In 2011, Administrator Pistole established two new offices within TSA—the Office of Training and 

Workforce Engagement (OTWE) and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). 

In order to strengthen training and ensure that it continues to receive the appropriate level of attention, OTWE oversees the development and delivery of training, 

learning, formal development, and workforce engagement programs for employees. 

New hire training modules feature an introduction to TSA’s employee responsibilities and conduct while leadership training is designed to prepare candidates to address conduct issues through required rotations in the Office of Inspection (OOI) and 

OPR. 

Through a series of town hall meetings with field employees, TSA recognized the 

need for consistent application of the agency’s disciplinary process. As a result, Administrator Pistole established OPR to ensure that allegations of misconduct are 

thoroughly investigated and that discipline is appropriate, consistent, and fair 

across the agency. In addition, OPR developed a Table of Offenses and Penalties in 

September 2011, which is available to all TSA employees and identifies TSA policies 

and possible consequences of violation including penalties for each type of offense. 

OPR also promotes greater efficiency for disciplinary actions by implementing and 

tracking time lines for adjudicating allegations of misconduct. OPR officials are required to issue closure letters, corrective actions, and proposal notices within 30 

days from receipt of the report of investigation, and OPR must issue a decision within 21 days from receipt of the employee’s reply. 

‘‘INSIDER THREAT’’ PROGRAM ADDRESSES POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY

While the vast majority of TSA employees are hard-working, professional, and 

abide by the highest ethical standards, a single bad act by one employee can create 

a security vulnerability. TSA has also developed and implemented an Insider Threat 

Program aimed at deterring, detecting, and mitigating insider threats to TSA’s personnel, operations, information, and critical infrastructure. The Insider Threat Program conducts a multi-layered approach to gather and analyze information identifying possible vulnerabilities involving personnel or information systems; coordinates with DHS and other counterintelligence programs to assess and mitigate allegations of insider threat activity; and conducts employee awareness training to educate TSA personnel and airport stakeholders regarding insider threats. TSA employees are encouraged to report any suspicious encounters, activities, or behaviors that 

might constitute an insider threat to their immediate supervisor or through an 

available Insider Threat Program website or phone number. 

GAO REVIEW OF TSA EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT

A recent audit by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed data 

from TSA that found a total of 9,622 cases over a 3-year period (fiscal years 2010 

through 2012) where individuals failed to meet TSA’s standards of conduct. It is important to note the report covers a broad range of misconduct ranging from tardiness to serious security risks. Of the total cases reviewed by GAO, 3,117 involved 

attendance and leave, which are issues that challenge all employers in both the public and private sectors. The most serious categories including neglect of duty, integrity, and ethics, and falsification represented 11% or 1,122 cases. TSA investigates 

all allegations of misconduct and takes appropriate action, which can include referral to law enforcement and termination of employment. In the most serious cases 

of screening workforce misconduct involving drugs, theft, and intentional security 

breaches, TSA uses an expedited removal process while ensuring due process. 

The majority of misconduct cases are handled by the Office of Security Operations 

(OSO) management officials at the airports. These cases include attendance and 

leave, security and screening violations, and alcohol-related violations involving 

TSOs, Lead and Supervisory TSOs, Transportation Security Managers, Transportation Security Inspectors, Behavior Detection Officers, and other airport staff. TSA 

responds to instances of misconduct through a series of actions, ranging from Letters of Reprimand to suspension from work, and in instances where the nature of 

the misconduct is egregious, removal from the TSA workforce. Generally, to effect 

these actions, TSA management officials issue a Notice of Proposed Action and provide the employee the opportunity to review the evidence supporting the charge and 
20 

the opportunity to respond orally and/or in writing. Management officials then consider the input from the affected employee prior to issuing a written decision. 

CONCLUSION

As we review and evaluate the effectiveness of TSA’s aviation security enhancements, we must always be cognizant of the fact that these enhancements are only 

as good as the people who operate, staff, and manage them. As we strive to continue 

strengthening transportation security and improving, whenever possible the overall 

travel experience for all Americans, we must always remember that our success is 

defined in the final analysis by our people. Whether it is for business or for pleasure, the freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to our way of life, and 

to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA is fully committed. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to address any questions you may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

The Chairman will now recognize Mr. Lord for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, FORENSIC AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Member 

Thompson, thanks for inviting me here today to discuss the results 

of our TSA misconduct report released yesterday. I think this is a 

timely hearing given recent press accounts about these types of incidents, and also TSA’s recent efforts to address them. 

I think it is important to note as context that TSA manages a 

transportation security officer workforce of 56,000 spread across 

450 airports. In some ways it is a difficult workforce to address, 

and it also underscores the need to have clearly-defined and consistently-applied procedures to not only investigate, but adjudicate 

instances of misconduct. 

Today I would like to discuss two issues highlighted in our recent 

report. The first is the magnitude of the problem; and second, it is 

a little more insight on how TSA investigates and adjudicates these 

allegations. 

Regarding the numbers, TSA investigated, adjudicated 9,600 

cases over the last 3 years. That is an average of about 3,200 per 

year. As Mr. Halinski noted, about half of these cases focused on 

two areas, attendance and leave, as well as security and screening. 

It is interesting when you look at how TSA responded to these 

cases, of the 9,600 cases, about half resulted in letters of reprimand; 31 percent resulted in suspensions; and 17 percent resulted in the employee’s removal from TSA. 

It is important to note that TSA has taken some positive steps 

to address these issues recently. For example, they established the 

Office of Professional Responsibility and also rolled out a new 

training program for airport staff. However, as we highlighted in 

the report issued yesterday, they still need to enhance the current 

process by taking four key actions. 

First, they need to verify that airport staff complied with the procedures for adjudicating these cases. Why is that the case? We 

found that the TSA review board, once they have reviewed some 

of these misconduct cases, they either overturned or rolled back the 

penalty in 15 percent of the cases. We looked at over 800 of these 
21 

1GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Could Strengthen Monitoring of Allegations of Employee 

Misconduct, GAO–13–624 (Washington, DC: July 30, 2013). 2The total number of TSA employees at TSA-regulated airports represents personnel within 

the Office of Security Operations, such as TSOs, supervisory TSOs, lead TSOs, transportation 

security managers, transportation security inspectors, and behavior detection officers. This 

Continued 

cases, and again, this suggests the need for more consistency in the 

process. 

A second key point is TSA needs to do a better job of recording 

the results of its adjudication in its so-called Integrated Database. 

We found when we visited seven airports, five of the airports we 

interviewed the staff, they weren’t using the so-called Integrated 

Database to record all the incidents. Recording the outcome of 

these cases is important, especially when TSA employees move 

across airports. You really need to know what their track record is 

if you are going to have any disciplinary issues with them. 

Third, TSA needs to do a better job of tracking the time taken 

to not only investigate the cases, but adjudicate them. I call that 

the start-to-finish time. You really need a little more awareness of 

how long it has taken to close these cases. It is interesting to note, 

while TSA has standards it expects its staff to comply with, it really doesn’t track performance against these standards in terms of 

timeliness. We think tracking these cycle times would really give 

management some good insights on what airports—if there are any 

special issues or what types of cases are problematic. 

Finally, we recommended that TSA establish so-called reconciliation procedures. That means once you complete an investigation 

you need to adjudicate it. That is, apply the appropriate penalty. 

We noticed they weren’t, they didn’t close the loop on a few cases. 

We looked at 50. We found two that hadn’t been fully adjudicated. 

That is a small number, but, you know, given the numbers involved, we thought that could be symptomatic of a larger problem. 

In closing, as we highlighted in our report released yesterday, 

TSA still needs to take some key actions to enhance the current 

process, and this will help instill greater public confidence in the 

TSA staff interacting with the public at over 450 airports. As Mr. 

Halinski and some Members already noted, you do not want the 

misdeeds of a few bad apples to sully the reputation of a lot of 

hard-working, dedicated employees. 

The good news, as Mr. Halinski said, is TSA has endorsed our 

recommendations, and we will work with them closely over the 

next few months to see how they implement them in practice. 

Chairman Duncan, this concludes my prepared statement. I look 

forward to responding to any questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

JULY 31, 2013 

GAO–13–756T

Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Members Barber and Richmond, and 

Members of the subcommittees: I am pleased to be here to discuss the findings of 

our report issued yesterday assessing the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) efforts to address employee misconduct.1 TSA employs approximately 56,000 

transportation security officers (TSO) and other TSA personnel to ensure the security of the traveling public at more than 450 TSA-regulated airports Nation-wide.2
22 

statement is focused on TSA personnel at TSA-regulated airports. We excluded TSA employees 

at headquarters, the Federal Air Marshal Service, regional offices, and other non-airport locations, and do not include private-sector screeners employed by contractors providing screening 

services at airports participating in TSA’s Screening Partnership Program. 3GAO–13–624. 

4GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD–00–21.3.1 

(Washington, DC: Nov. 1, 1999). 5 Employee misconduct cases refer to allegations for which TSA has completed an investigation and adjudication. 

News stories in recent years have highlighted several high-profile allegations of misconduct by TSA employees, including TSOs being involved in theft and drug-smuggling activities, as well as circumventing mandatory screening procedures for passengers and baggage. For example, in 2011, a TSO at the Orlando International Airport pleaded guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement and theft for stealing more 

than 80 laptop computers and other electronic devices, valued at $80,000, from passenger luggage. TSOs engaging in misconduct raise security concerns because these 

employees are charged with helping to ensure the security of our Nation’s aviation 

system. 

The process of addressing TSA employee misconduct involves various components 

within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For example, depending on the 

facts and circumstances of a case, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), TSA 

Office of Inspection (OOI), or TSA Office of Security Operations (OSO) may conduct 

an investigation into allegations of TSA employee misconduct. OSO generally adjudicates cases at airports—that is, determines whether the evidence is sufficient to 

propose and sustain a charge of misconduct and determines the appropriate penalty. 

The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), an independent office that TSA established in 2010 to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty determinations, adjudicates a more specialized set of cases, such as misconduct involving senior-level TSA employees at airports and other locations. 

My testimony this morning will address the key findings from the report on TSA’s 

efforts to address employee misconduct that we issued yesterday.3 Specifically, like 

the report, my statement will address: (1) Data on TSA employee misconduct cases 

and (2) TSA efforts to manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications 

process. 

For the report, we reviewed standard operating procedures, policy statements, and 

guidance for staff charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of employee misconduct, and analyzed TSA misconduct data from fiscal years 2010 

through 2012. While we identified some limitations with the data, we found the data 

sufficiently reliable for providing general information on the nature and characteristics of employee misconduct. We compared TSA processes for investigations and adjudications with TSA policies and procedures and Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government.4 In addition, we selected a sample of 7 airports, based on 

variances in number and type of past cases of employee misconduct and geographic 

dispersion, from the approximately 450 TSA-regulated airports Nation-wide, and 

conducted site visits and interviews with TSA officials responsible for addressing 

employee misconduct. While not generalizable, the airport interviews provided us 

with the perspectives of TSA officials responsible for conducting TSA employee misconduct investigations or adjudications. We also analyzed a random, nongeneralizable sample of 50 allegations referred from the DHS OIG to TSA to identify follow 

up actions. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology 

can be found in our published report. 

TSA INVESTIGATED AND ADJUDICATED APPROXIMATELY 9,600 MISCONDUCT CASES FROM

FISCAL YEARS 2010 THROUGH 2012

In July 2013, we reported that TSA investigated and adjudicated approximately 

9,600 cases of employee misconduct from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, according 

to TSA employee misconduct data that we analyzed.5 Two offense categories accounted for about half of all cases—(1) Attendance and leave, which accounted for 

32 percent; and (2) screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent. Charges 

for screening and security-related incidents pertain to violating standard operating 

procedures, including not conducting security or equipment checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. TSA developed a Table of Offenses and Penalties that delineates common employee charges, along with a suggested range of 

penalties. Of the cases that we analyzed, 47 percent resulted in letters of reprimand, which describe unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a disciplinary action; 31 percent resulted in suspensions of a definite duration; and 17 percent re-
23 

sulted in the employee’s removal from TSA. The remaining cases covered a variety 

of outcomes, including suspensions of an indefinite duration. 

TSA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO HELP MANAGE THE INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS

PROCESS, BUT COULD DEVELOP ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES TO BETTER MONITOR EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT CASES

In our July 2013 report, we found that TSA has taken steps to help manage the 

investigations and adjudications process, such as creating OPR in 2010 to provide 

greater consistency in misconduct penalty determinations and providing training for 

TSA staff at airports responsible for investigating and adjudicating allegations of 

employee misconduct. While TSA has taken these steps, we reported weaknesses in 

four areas related to monitoring of employee misconduct cases: (1) Verifying that 

TSA staff at airports comply with policies and procedures for adjudicating misconduct, (2) recording case information on all adjudication decisions, (3) tracking the 

time taken to complete all phases of the investigations and adjudications process, 

and (4) identifying allegations not adjudicated by the agency. 

Verifying that TSA staff comply with policies and procedures for adjudicating misconduct.—TSA does not have a process for reviewing misconduct cases to verify that 

TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating 

employee misconduct. According to TSA policies and procedures, adjudicating officials need to collect sufficient evidence to support penalty charges and consider factors, such as an employee’s disciplinary track record, in making a penalty determination. However, some misconduct cases have been overturned or the penalties 

reduced through the appeals process because staff at airports had not supported the 

charges with sufficient evidence, among other things. For example, from January 

2011 to June 13, 2013, the OPR Appellate Board—which reviews appeals made by 

TSOs on certain actions, such as suspensions of 15 days or more—either overturned 

or reduced the penalty in 125 out of 836 cases (15 percent). A senior TSA official 

agreed that TSA would benefit from a review process to help verify that staff at airports are making adjudication decisions in conformance with policies and procedures. Without a review process, it is difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that cases have been adjudicated properly and that risk to the agency is mitigated accordingly. Therefore, in our July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA 

establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff 

at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee 

misconduct. DHS concurred and stated that TSA is developing a process to provide 

increased auditing of disciplinary records. TSA expects to develop this process by 

March 31, 2014. 

Recording case information on all adjudication decisions.—TSA does not record 

the results of all misconduct cases that have been adjudicated by TSA airport staff 

in its Integrated Database, which is TSA’s centralized system for tracking and managing employee misconduct cases. For example, the agency does not record all cases 

that resulted in a corrective action, which are actions that are administrative in nature, such as a letter of counseling. Specifically, we found that 5 out of the 7 airports included in our sample do not consistently track corrective actions in the Integrated Database. A senior TSA official agreed that there is a strong need for TSA 

to clarify that TSA staff at airports should record corrective actions in the database. 

Recording all outcomes in the Integrated Database would help provide a centralized, 

institutional record on past misconduct. It would also enable managers to follow a 

progressive discipline approach, which is the process of taking progressively more 

severe action, when appropriate, until the unacceptable conduct is corrected or the 

employee is removed from the agency. Thus, in our July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for 

TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated 

Database. DHS concurred and stated that TSA will develop and disseminate additional guidance to the field to ensure that all outcomes are recorded in the database. 

TSA expects to develop and disseminate additional guidance to the field by August 

30, 2013. 

Tracking the time taken to complete all phases of the investigations and adjudications process.—While TSA has established standards for the amount of time to complete the investigations and adjudications process, the agency has not required TSA 

staff at airports to track their performance against the standards. Specifically, our 

review of TSA data from the Integrated Database on misconduct cases handled by 

TSA airport staff identified that TSA does not capture information on the amount 

of time taken to complete the investigations and adjudications process, including the 

number of days to complete an investigation and issue a notice of proposed action. 

Tracking cycle times would provide TSA with operational information, such as dif-
24 

ferences in processing time by, among other things, type of case, and could allow 

the agency to identify any delays, such as challenges associated with evidence collection. According to TSA senior officials, tracking cycle times for investigations and 

adjudications completed by airport staff would also provide valuable information on 

the differences in case processing time frames across airports. In our July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA establish an agency-wide policy to track cycle times 

in the investigations and adjudications process. DHS concurred and stated that TSA 

will develop a process and mechanism to track cycle times for misconduct cases handled by TSA airport staff. TSA expects to develop a process and mechanism by 

March 31, 2014. 

Identifying allegations not adjudicated by TSA.—TSA does not have reconciliation 

procedures—that is, procedures to follow up on completed misconduct investigations 

to ensure that the agency has identified cases requiring adjudication. According to 

a random sample of 50 allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 

2012, we found that 2 were not adjudicated by TSA. As a result of our review, TSA 

made adjudication decisions on these allegations, one of which resulted in a 14-day 

suspension for the employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace. The 

results from our sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of over 1,300 

allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012; however, it raises 

questions as to whether there could be additional instances of allegations referred 

to TSA in this population that the agency has not adjudicated. A senior TSA official 

agreed that a reconciliation process would offer benefits to TSA as there may be 

other allegations the agency is unaware of that have been investigated but not adjudicated. Therefore, in our July 2013 report, we recommended that TSA develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not previously 

addressed through adjudication. DHS concurred and stated that TSA will implement a reconciliation process to ensure that completed misconduct investigations 

are adjudicated. TSA expects to implement a reconciliation process by March 31, 

2014. 

Chairmen Duncan and Hudson, Ranking Members Barber and Richmond, and 

Members of the subcommittees, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to responding to any questions that you may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lord. 

The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Outten-Mills for 5 minutes. Am I pronouncing that correctly, Outten-Mills? 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. Outten-Mills. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Outten? Okay. I apologize for mispronouncing it 

earlier. Ms. Outten-Mills is recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH L. OUTTEN-MILLS, ACTING ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. Thank you. Good morning, Chairmen Hudson and Duncan and Ranking Member Thompson. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on integrity and misconduct challenges in 

TSA. 

To protect the American people in their homeland, it is paramount to maintain employee integrity and accountability. Within 

DHS, OIG maintains primary law enforcement authority to investigate allegations of employee misconduct and fraud involving DHS 

programs, operations, and activities. Other Departmental internal 

affairs units investigate allegations of employee misconduct that 

OIG either refers back to them or that do not require referral to 

OIG. These allegations generally relate to administrative or noncriminal matters. 

For fiscal year 2004 through 2012, DHS received approximately 

130,000 allegations through the OIG hotline and from various internal affairs offices within the Department, and we initiated investigation on about 10,000 allegations. OIG investigations hotline 
25 

staff processes all complaints that come to the OIG. When OIG declines a case, it is referred back to the applicable component agency 

for further inquiry or investigation. Unless specifically requested, 

OIG does not track what happens to the complaint after it is referred to the component. 

Within TSA, the Office of Inspection is responsible for conducting 

internal investigations of employee misconduct. This office operates 

under a blanket waiver that waives referrals to OIG for certain alleged offenses. The waiver was based on our observation that we 

had accepted for investigation about 3 percent of these types of referred allegations and had requested reports of results for only 10 

percent of the cases referred back to TSA for investigation. 

In fiscal year 2012, OIG received approximately 16,400 complaints of misconduct. Of these cases, 1,358 were related to TSA. 

OIG initiated investigations for approximately 90 cases and referred about 1,268 complaints to TSA’s Office of Inspection. 

While none of our work focused primarily on TSA’s challenges in 

dealing with misconduct issues, we identified reports that may provide some insight into TSA’s efforts to address allegations of employee misconduct and strengthen their ability to monitor employee 

misconduct. 

In October 2012, we issued a report, ‘‘Personal Security and Internal Control at TSA’s Legacy Transportation Threat Assessment 

and Credentialing Office,’’ TTAC, to determine whether personnel 

with critical roles in transportation security had sufficient oversight. TTAC was established as the lead for conducting security 

threat assessments and credentialing initiatives for domestic passengers, transportation industry workers, and individuals seeking 

access to critical infrastructure. 

We determined that within the legacy TTAC office there has 

been a pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate 

use of informal administrative processes to assess and address misconduct. Senior legacy TTAC leaders sought to address allegations 

of misconduct through training and informal internal administrative processes, but its efforts were not successful. Employee complaints channelled through TSA’s formal grievance processes were 

managed and documented appropriately, but not all employees had 

sufficient information to access formal redress options. 

We recommended that TSA, for a minimum of 2 years, that the 

legacy TTAC office refer all personnel-related complaints, grievances, disciplinary actions, investigations, and inspections to appropriate TSA or DHS offices with primary oversight responsibility. 

We also recommended that they provide employees with a Know 

Your Rights and Responsibilities website, and that they establish 

an independent review panel through which legacy TTAC employees may request a review of desk audits. We also conducted a review of allegations of misconduct and illegal discrimination retaliation in the Federal Air Marshal Service. In 2010, CNN reported allegations of misconduct and illegal discrimination and retaliation in 

the FAMS Orlando field office. While our review did not find widespread discrimination and retaliation within FAMS, we identified 

inconsistencies in how field offices handle and report misconduct 

incidents to headquarters, the severity of discipline decisions for 
26 

employee misconduct, and timeliness issues for executing various 

portions of the discipline process. 

We recommended that TSA provide guidance regarding the types 

of incidents that should be reported to the Office of Inspections, 

that they provide clarification about discipline actions, and develop 

a comprehensive tracking system. 

This concludes my prepared remarks, and I welcome any questions that you or the Members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Outten-Mills follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEBORAH L. OUTTEN-MILLS

JULY 31, 2013 

Good morning Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Chairman Hudson, 

and Ranking Member Richmond. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on integrity and misconduct challenges in the Transportation Security Administration. 

To protect the American people and their homeland, it is paramount to maintain 

employee integrity and accountability. Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General Act of 1978 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 give 

the Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) primary law enforcement authority to investigate allegations of employee misconduct and contractor or grantee 

fraud involving DHS programs, operations, and activities. Other Departmental internal affairs units investigate allegations of employee misconduct that OIG either 

refers to them, or that do not require referral to OIG. These allegations generally 

relate to administrative or non-criminal matters. 

For fiscal years 2004 through 2012, DHS OIG received about 130,000 allegations 

through the OIG Hotline, and from various internal affairs offices within the Department, and initiated investigations on about 10,000 allegations. 

OIG Office of Investigations (INV) hotline staff process all complaints that come 

to the OIG. Allegations are logged into the Enterprise Data System (EDS), which 

links OIG headquarters to its field offices. When OIG headquarters sends an allegation to a field office, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the field office has 5 days 

to retain or decline the case. Cases declined by field offices are returned to the hotline staff for transmittal to applicable component agency for further inquiry or investigation. Unless specifically requested, INV does not track what happens to the 

complaint after referring it to the component. 

When OIG INV refers a matter to a component, the component uses its personnel 

to investigate. Within TSA, the Office of Inspection (OOI) is responsible for ensuring: (1) The effectiveness and efficiency of TSA’s operations and administrative activities through inspections and internal reviews, and (2) the integrity of TSA’s 

workforce. OOI is delegated authority to conduct internal investigations of employee 

misconduct. 

Management Directive 0810.1 requires that OOI, immediately upon receipt, refer 

to OIG all allegations of criminal misconduct by a DHS employee; allegations of misconduct by a GS–15 level (K band) or higher, or OOI employee; allegations of serious 

noncriminal misconduct against a law enforcement officer; discharges of firearms resulting in injury or death; and allegations of fraud involving contractors, grantees, 

or DHS funds. OOI must notify OIG of all other allegations within 5 days. OIG assigns investigative responsibility for allegations by: (1) Initiating an investigation, 

(2) referring allegations back to OOI for handling, or (3) administratively closing 

matters without further action. 

OOI operates under a blanket waiver that waives referrals to OIG for certain alleged offenses. These offenses include: (1) Thefts from TSA checkpoints of less than 

$2,000, (2) time, attendance, and travel fraud; (3) domestic violence by employees 

who were not law enforcement officers; (4) accidental firearms discharge not involving injury; (5) workers’ compensation fraud; (6) local criminal charges such as failure to appear, (7) traffic offenses and driving under the influence; and (8) other local 

misdemeanors (provided they involve employees below K band, and the offenses are 

not indicative of systemic problems). The waiver was based on our observation that 

we had accepted for investigation about 3 percent of these referred allegations, and 

had requested reports of results from only 10 percent of such cases referred to TSA 

for investigation. 

In fiscal year 2012, OIG received approximately 16,400 complaints of misconduct. 

Of these cases, 1,358 were related to TSA. OIG INV initiated investigations for approximately 90 cases, and referred approximately 1,268 complaints to TSA’s Office 
27 

of Inspection. Categories for complaints received include employee corruption, civil 

rights and civil liberties, program fraud, and miscellaneous. 

The effectiveness of TSA and the safety of the flying public depend, in part, on 

the agency’s ability to curtail and prevent corruption within its workforce. While 

none of our work focused primarily on TSA’s challenges in dealing with misconduct 

issues, we identified two reports that may provide some insight into TSA’s efforts 

to address allegations of employee misconduct, and strengthen their ability to monitor employee misconduct across the agency. 

In October 2012, we issued a report, Personnel Security and Internal Control at 

TSA’s Legacy Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office. The objective of this review was to determine whether personnel in the legacy Transportation 

Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office with critical roles in transportation security had sufficient oversight. 

PERSONNEL SECURITY AND INTERNAL CONTROL AT TSA’S LEGACY TRANSPORTATION

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND CREDENTIALING OFFICE

Congressman Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member of the House Committee on 

Homeland Security, requested that we review the background investigations and 

suitability determinations conducted for personnel within TSA’s Transportation 

Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) Office. TTAC was established as the 

lead for conducting security threat assessments and credentialing initiatives for domestic passengers on public and commercial modes of transportation, transportation 

industry workers, and individuals seeking access to critical infrastructure. In 2010, 

TSA began a restructuring initiative that included an administration-wide review 

of personnel position descriptions and a reorganization of TSA, which realigned 

TTAC functions among three different TSA operational organizations. We reviewed 

the potential effect of these changes on oversight of legacy TTAC personnel, but did 

not review oversight of personnel from any other TSA offices or programs. 

We determined that TSA employee background investigations met Federal adjudicative standards, but were not timely. We also determined that within the legacy 

Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing Office, there has been a pattern of poor management practices and inappropriate use of informal administrative 

processes to assess and address misconduct. Legacy TTAC employees made allegations of improper conduct through formal and informal processes, including allegations of poor management practices and violations of Equal Employment Opportunity laws. While all employees said they would report National security 

vulnerabilities, some feared retaliation for raising other concerns. 

Senior legacy TTAC leaders sought to address allegations of misconduct through 

training and informal internal administrative processes, but efforts were not successful. For example, use of informal administrative processes did not address or expose the extent of workplace complaints and eventually led to internal investigations being managed inappropriately. Employee complaints channeled through 

TSA’s formal grievance processes were managed and documented appropriately, but 

not all employees had sufficient information to access formal redress options. 

Unaddressed workplace complaints of favoritism, discrimination, and retaliation 

hindered TSA’s efforts to streamline its operational structure and align compensation with appropriate authorities and responsibilities. 

Of the eight recommendations we made in this report, three were related to monitoring allegations of employee misconduct: 

• For a minimum of 2 years, direct legacy TTAC offices to refer all personnel-related complaints, grievances, disciplinary actions, investigations, and inspections to appropriate TSA or DHS offices with primary oversight responsibility. 

• Provide employees a Know Your Rights and Responsibilities website and brochure that compiles appropriate directives on conduct, processes, and redress 

options. 

• Establish an independent review panel reporting to the Office of the Chief 

Human Capital Officer through which legacy TTAC employees may request a 

review of desk audits and reassignments. 

ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN THE

FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE

In January 2010, CNN reported allegations of misconduct and illegal employment 

discrimination and retaliation in the Federal Air Marshal Service’s Orlando field office. The reports included descriptions of an agency rife with cronyism; age, gender, 

and racial discrimination; and unfair treatment in promotions, assignments, and 

discipline. Senator Bill Nelson and Congressmen Edolphus Towns and Darrell Issa 
28 

requested a review of these allegations in Orlando and throughout the Federal Air 

Marshal Service. 

While our review did not find widespread discrimination and retaliation within 

the Federal Air Marshal Service, we identified inconsistencies in regards to: (1) How 

field offices handle and report misconduct incidents to headquarters; (2) the severity 

of discipline decisions for employee misconduct; and (3) the timeliness for executing 

various portions of the discipline process. 

Of the 12 recommendations in this report, 3 were aimed at improving TSA’s handling of misconduct cases: • Provide guidance regarding the types of incidents the Federal Air Marshal Service should and should not report to the Office of Inspection in an incident tracking report. • Provide guidance and clarification regarding how long prior corrective or discipline actions should be considered and for which types of incidents. • Develop a comprehensive system to track individual cases through the discipline process. 

At the time of our review, various components within TSA (Office of Professional 

Responsibility (OPR), Office of Human Capital (OHC), and OOI) were working together to develop a shared database to track all misconduct cases. 

Chairman Duncan and Chairman Hudson, this concludes my prepared remarks. 

I welcome any questions that you or the Members of the subcommittees may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ms. Outten-Mills. 

We are going to begin the questioning portion, and Members are 

reminded we will adhere to the 5-minute rule. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. 

First off, let me just say that I understand the tremendous challenge that TSA has in keeping Americans safe as they travel 

through the Nation’s airports. But Americans expect that TSA will 

practice best management practices and that their officers will experience some sort of consistency in disciplinary action. I think that 

is what we owe to the employees of TSA. 

Mr. Halinski, last year you gave your word that TSA would take 

appropriate action to deal with misconduct. Over the past 2 years, 

about half the misconduct cases have been closed by issuing reprimand letters. Do you feel that that is an appropriate action? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, what I talked about last year was if we can 

prove an individual is stealing, if we can prove that an individual 

is taking drugs, if we can prove that an individual is intentionally 

subjugating the security system, and we can prove it, immediately 

they are out the door. What happens if we can’t immediately prove 

it is we give them the due diligence any American is able to get 

through a process, sir, and that is, we run an investigation, we look 

at the circumstances, a recommendation is made for punishment, 

if it is appropriate, and then that individual has an appeal process. 

That is taken into account. 

So if the individual is given a letter of reprimand, sir, then it 

meant that he is innocent until proven guilty and we couldn’t prove 

that he did that, sir. That is the various degrees that we have. I 

think it is important to note, if there is X number of allegations 

of theft, if I can prove that they are stealing, we are going to walk 

them out the door. If I can’t, then we are going to run an investigation. I have to give that person the fact that they are innocent until 

proven guilt, and we have to let an investigation run its course. I 

think that is the way we do business in this country. 

If there is a letter of recommendation or suspension, it means 

that we couldn’t unequivocally prove that he had done that, or he 

may have done it and there were some mitigating circumstances 

that means that he wasn’t stealing. I am using the case stealing 
29 

right now, but in all of these cases of misconduct that we are talking about, we labeled this misconduct, over one-third of these cases, 

time and attendance. People showed up late for work, sir. We are 

classifying it as misconduct. 

We have a very good workforce. We look at the process. We investigate it if we can’t prove it. I have given you my word, if they 

are stealing, they are doing drugs, or they are breaching the security system intentionally and I can prove it, they are out, and we 

have taken those actions. 

The rest of the time, sir, I think it is what we have to do as 

Americans, and give them the due process, and let them go through 

the investigation process. We have shortened that. Let it go 

through an appeal process, and give them the rights they deserve, 

sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I appreciate everything you said. Just understand that I think your workers want to see a set of guidelines followed. They want to see some consistency in disciplinary action. 

When you come up with a set of guidelines that this is the disciplinary action that is going to happen for XY&Z infractions, then 

there has to be some sort of consistency with that. I think that is 

important. I think Americans see a slap on the wrist for some of 

those infractions as not enough disciplinary action being taken. 

So I would just say that going forward implementing a lot of 

things GAO has recommended is the right thing, and I appreciate 

your comments that you are working on that. I look forward to 

hearing back from you in the future about how that is working out. 

According to GAO, 4 percent of the screening and security misconduct cases involve sleeping on duty. I understand some of that 

may have been in the break room while they were on break, and 

I get some of that. But, you know, officers that are sleeping on 

duty, and as you mentioned those that just fail to show up for work 

on time, that frustrates Americans because, the way I understand 

it, if an officer fails to show up on time or fails to call their supervisor and say, look, I am taking a leave day or a family day, it 

takes X number of persons to open up a checkpoint. Any delay of 

someone not showing up on time or not showing up at all causes 

delay for the American travelers by that checkpoint not being 

opened on time and properly screening in an expedited manner. 

So how do you go forward with that sort of idea, that we have 

got to have employees show up on time, we have got to have them 

actually show up for work, and if they don’t, if they fail to let their 

supervisor know, that is important to America’s safety and security. So what is the disciplinary action you would take at that 

point? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Well, sir, first I would like to say that it starts 

with training and education, and we have put together through our 

Office of Training and Workforce Engagement a very robust ethics 

and integrity training program, and also a training program for our 

entire workforce, because that is how we get to an efficient workforce in the future, a high-performance workforce. We have put together a very substantial, required training that all TSOs have to 

go through. 

Mr. DUNCAN. How do you train? I am baffled. How do you train 

someone to know to call their supervisor and tell them, I am not 
30 

going to be at work, or I may be a little late? That is common 

sense. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir, it is common sense. I would tell you that 

we have ethics training, we have integrity training, we have situational training on videos for our people. We are trying to train a 

workforce that is about 47,000 screeners, and they have to do their 

job and they have to be trained. They hit that training on an annual basis. We stress it, sir. We put out messages. 

I will tell you, sir, on the issue of tardiness, you are right. I am 

not going to disagree with you. Everybody should be on time when 

they come to work. If they are not, they can be disciplined in the 

case of TSA. I don’t think it is an offense that they need to be fired 

of unless it is the third, fourth, or fifth time and it is a consistent 

pattern. Hopefully, the first time gets the word. A letter of reprimand, it is not something you should take lightly. A letter of reprimand means that you are not going to get a bonus that year, possibly. You are not going to get promoted. It is going to stay in your 

jacket. It is a serious thing, sir, and it escalate from there. A suspension, it is a serious thing, and we take this serious, sir, I mean 

we do. 

When you look at the numbers and the percentages, I do have 

a large workforce, sir, and I can’t control the behavior of everybody. 

We can train them. We can hold them accountable. That is what 

I believe we are doing, and we have a good workforce, sir. 

Our people take an oath when they come into service, it is the 

same oath that you take, sir, as a Congressman. We raise our right 

hands and we commit to that. The one thing that I find very good 

about our workforce is year in and year out there is that Federal 

employee survey that they have. TSA morale-wise, people will say, 

well, you are in the low percentages. But do you know what we are 

every year, sir, 80 percent and above? The belief in our mission. 

That mission is to protect the traveling public. 

We will have people that will do stupid things, guarantee it, sir. 

I was a Marine for 25 years, we had knuckleheads that did stupid 

things on the weekends or other times. That is going to happen. 

We will hold them accountable, sir. I have told you that, and I am 

committed to it. So is Mr. Pistole. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I look forward to hearing about how they are 

held accountable going forward based on some of the things we are 

hearing. 

I am out of time, so I am going to yield now to—since we don’t 

have the Ranking Member of the subcommittee—to Mr. Thompson, 

the Ranking Member of the full committee. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Outten-Mills—hope I pronounced it okay—last fall the OIG 

reported on the mishandling of the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission complaints within TSA’s legacy Transportation Threat 

Assessment and Credentialing office. Now, in response of the allegations of favoritism and EEO violations, the Inspector General 

recommended that TSA establish an independent review panel 

through which legacy TTAC employees could request a review of 

desk audits and reassignments. Why did the Inspector General believe this recommendation was important? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, is that for me or the IG? 
31 

Mr. THOMPSON. The IG. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Thanks. 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. During our review of TTAC we found that 

there was favoritism being shown for various different employees. 

We found that TTAC had—there is a formal TSA process in place 

for handling allegations and complaints, but within TTAC they had 

developed a system that circumvented the formal process where 

employees, many of the employees weren’t even aware of what the 

TSA’s formal process entailed. As part of that, as part of what we 

found was happening in TTAC, employees were being removed 

from their positions into other positions that had no responsibilities. 

Now, TSA started in 2010 a restructuring and realignment which 

included legacy TTAC employees. So for those employees that in 

past years had been downgraded when their position descriptions 

and their current roles are reviewed, it might result in downgrades. 

So our recommendation would—what we wanted to address was 

the fact that there could be seen as no favoritism, that there could 

be an equal playing field in reviewing TTAC’s current positions and 

the roles, and that there would be some fairness in the system. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Now, can you tell me whether or not since that 

recommendation was put out, have you worked with TSA and have 

some of your concerns been satisfied? 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. We have worked with TSA, and the formal 

written response that TSA provided is responsive to our recommendation to create this independent review panel over the desk 

reviews. What we are waiting for right now, we are monitoring 

what TSA is doing, but the response that they provided to us did 

address our concerns if they put that in place. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Mr. Halinski, you can take the other part 

of that. What you have just heard, is that basically where you are? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. In fact, I would like to say also that 

TTAC does not exist any longer. That organization was integrated 

into our Office of Intelligence, that the individuals at the senior 

level no longer work for our agency. We took those recommendations on board, we believe we have worked with the IG on this, and 

we will continue to work with it. 

The piece on the desk audits, we did go through a restructuring 

transformation within our headquarters over the last 2-year process where we have done desk audits of individual positions. We 

think that is in line with Government policy. We believe that that 

also met those requirements from that particular case, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I want to talk a little bit about the mishandling of sensitive security information. In July 2010, a new hire training manual containing sensitive security information about screening practices 

was stolen after a private security company employee removed it 

from the San Francisco International Airport without authorization. 

Mr. Halinski, what is the recommended penalty for a TSO who 

mishandles sensitive security information? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, for a TSO that mishandles SSI information it 

can range from a letter of reprimand to a 14-day suspension, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Letter of reprimand—— 
32 

Mr. HALINSKI. There is a range in between, from a 14-day suspension to a letter of reprimand, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. What is the recommended penalty for a 

contract screener who mishandles sensitive security information? 

Mr. HALINSKI. For a contract screener, sir, we do not deal directly with the contract screener. We deal with the company under 

contractual procedures. The contracting company could be fined for 

that particular type of incident, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you fine the company but you don’t deal with 

the employee? 

Mr. HALINSKI. No sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the Ranking Member. 

The Chairman will now recognize the Chairman of the Transportation Security Subcommittee, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Halinski, one of the things in the GAO report that concerned 

us was the idea of staff not complying with policies and procedures 

for adjudicating misconduct. Some of the cases have even been 

overturned because staff at airports did not document sufficient 

evidence or properly apply penalty factors. Whose responsibility is 

it to review misconduct cases at airports? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. Let me give you a two-prong answer on 

that. It depends on the severity of the case, sir. But I also want 

to say that the transportation security officers, if they are found 

guilty of anything, have the right to appeal under our OPR Appellate Board. So if there is an incident and it is, let’s say, tardiness 

for work, the process is handled at the airport at the local level. 

If it is a more severe case, it will be handled with our Office of Investigation. It will be looked at through our Office of Professional 

Responsibility. If it is a serious case and a recommendation will be 

made, then the individual has a right to appeal that. 

There is one difference, sir, as was mentioned earlier. Our TSOs, 

under ATSA, do not have the right for MSPB appeal. But what we 

have created to ensure that there is equity in the process is we 

have given them the ability—and we have had 800-plus TSOs use 

this—appeal to our OPR Appellate Board. It was mentioned by Mr. 

Lord that about 15 percent there was a turnover of those appeals. 

That is about the same amount, roughly the same percentage that 

MSPB has. So we believe we are in line with that. 

We have to give our people an appeal process. So we put that in 

place. But there is a process. We recognize what GAO said, sir, and 

we are putting into place, by and large, most of the four recommendations that they have made we have put into place, we feel 

that they will be complete some time by the end of September, beginning October. We welcome GAO to come back and take a look 

at what we have done. I think it is a much tighter system with a 

lot more oversight at this point, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. Well, just to understand, so the Federal security director’s role then would be to sort of determine is this violation important enough to kick it upstairs or do I deal with it 

here? Is that—— 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON [continuing]. That sort of the role? 
33 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. Okay. What steps has TSA taken to remedy this 

problem in particular of the failure to document correctly these incidents? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Well, I think, sir, one of the things we had to do 

was we had to clean up the database and we had to make it a 

much more efficient database. It is one of those things that sometimes you run into Government where you have multiple databases. So we have combined it into one, which we call our Integrated Database. We have made it a much stronger process. We 

have professionals who are trained, H.R. people who are trained to 

input it in. Then there is oversight to make sure that it is being 

inputted in correctly. 

Our FSD is responsible for auditing all inputs. We also have our 

legal field counsel there to help with inputting those offenses into 

the system, and then our Office of Investigation and our Office of 

Human Capital are responsible for doing spot audits. We have 

asked that they put out a regular schedule on that and increase 

that. So we have four levels of oversight now. We think that will 

fix the problem that was identified by the GAO. 

Mr. HUDSON. Great. Pivoting a little bit, how does TSA recruit 

airport personnel, and what are some of the key qualifications that 

TSA looks for? Has this evolved over time? Has this changed? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I would tell you we use a variety of methods 

to recruit personnel. We use the normal USAJobs, we use social 

media to recruit our personnel. But let me talk a little bit, because 

I think in the context of this hearing, what is important is how we 

hire our personnel. 

First off, they are fingerprinted. There is an NCIC check, a Federal criminal record check that is done. There is a credit check 

done of our personnel before they come in. Then there is an interview with a manager for suitability. Then, at a certain point, there 

will also be an interview by our personnel security people because 

we want all of our people to have the potential to hold a security 

clearance. 

That being said, sir, as you have seen and as evidenced by the 

GAO, we are going to have people that sometimes do stupid things. 

I think that is endemic with the entire system when you have security clearances or anything else. We believe that we do the due diligence through two different types of interviews, fingerprinting, 

credit checks to bring people on-board to work as TSOs. 

Mr. HUDSON. I thank you for those answers. 

As my time is running down I will go ahead and yield back, and 

then hopefully we will have a second-round opportunity to ask 

questions. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chairman will recognize the gentlelady from 

Indiana, Mrs. Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This question is to you, Mr. Halinski. I understand that there is 

a table of offenses that is provided to all of the airports and the 

supervisors that sets out kind of appropriate suggested discipline 

for offenses and penalties for misconduct cases. However, the GAO 

report indicated that there have not been, it has been fairly inconsistent in the manner in which it is used among the airports when 
34 

issuing the penalties. Can you talk about that lack of consistency 

in the use of this table of offenses and the recommended penalties? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. I think it was important when Mr. 

Pistole came in, he created the Office of Professional Responsibility 

modeled on the office that is in the FBI. Quite frankly, we built the 

table of offenses and penalties based on many systems that are in 

the Government and other agencies, not just within DHS, but other 

outside departments. It goes, once again, back to the seriousness 

of the offense. 

What you have is a range of options. What is the offense? It may 

go from this level to the most extreme level. If it is a serious offense, it is taken out of the hands of the local airport and it is 

given to our Office of Investigation, which is then adjudicated by 

our Office of Professional Responsibility. If it is an offense such as 

you are out of uniform when you come to work, you are late for 

work, you may have mouthed off to a supervisor, then it is handled 

at the FSD level. 

Now, I think what is important to remember is before we had 

this table, before we had OPR, the TSO had no appeal rights in 

any case that was out there. Now they have the right to appeal, 

and they can go to that OPR Appeals Board and say, I believe 

based on my time in service, by my clean record, by the evidence 

I have provided you, that I shouldn’t be held accountable for this. 

So there is an appeal process which is based on OPR, based on that 

table that was built. It has been a very helpful tool for us. 

Mrs. BROOKS. I think my concern might be, and I have also been 

Federal Government, I was a U.S. attorney and often working with 

the AOUSA, if there were any discipline issues with respect to my 

employees at the time, they often wanted to compare what our discipline might be to other U.S. attorney’s offices’ discipline, and that 

is very important when you have large agencies like TSA. So I 

guess the concern is: How often are airports issuing penalties that 

are varying from those tables and how are you keeping track of 

that? Because I think that opens the agency up for a lot more problems beyond the appeals process, the inconsistency of penalties. So 

to your knowledge how often are the airports, you know, wavering 

from that table? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. What we are trying to do through 

that process that was recommended by the GAO is we have made 

a much stronger Integrated Database so that we can track that information now. The one piece that I think is very important is the 

ability to do trend analysis. Basically what you are talking about 

is one airport not doing things similar to another airport. We believe some time in the fall, I think end of September, early October, 

we are going to have that capability to do trend analysis. The key 

is oversight, it is oversight by the headquarters. We have our Office 

of Investigation and our Office of Human Capital. It is dedicated 

to that type of analysis and those spot audits, which I think are 

very important, ma’am. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Is that how you determine if people, though, aren’t 

using the Integrated Database that you are referring to, that I 

heard that some—that was also part of the GAO report, is that 

some airports aren’t using it—— 
35 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. What we found was—and I think 

when you go in, and Mr. Lord can correct me on this—but when 

you went in, it wasn’t that they weren’t using the system for serious offenses. What we found when we went back in is the lower 

the offense, or if it wasn’t—we need to have that information so if 

someone moves across airports, as was mentioned earlier, we can 

keep track of that. At some airports it wasn’t being done. It has 

been tightened in a management directive that has gone out and 

it is inspected when we inspect our airports. 

I might also add one other thing which I think is very important. 

Our Office of Professional Responsibility now puts out a newsletter 

every month, and it lists for our entire workforce what the offenses 

were and what the actions were and what the adjudication was. We 

also include the number of covert tests that we do for integrity. I 

think it is important because it sends a signal to the workforce that 

if you do this, this is what happens. But I think it also sends a signal to the workforce that we have consistency across the board. 

Mrs. BROOKS. I think that is a great way to communicate with 

your workforce, and I applaud you for doing that. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chairman will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you so much. I want to thank you and 

also for Mr. Hudson for holding this hearing. 

I had been an original requester of this report by GAO because, 

again, having been involved in creating TSA, I was concerned that 

some of the public reports we had of misconduct were mounting. 

This report does, in fact, confirm that TSA employee misconduct 

has spiraled almost to an unbelievable level, and that is very disappointing. 

Mr. Halinski, you pointed out that TSA actually with Mr. Pistole’s ascension instituted two offices. What were they? 

Mr. HALINSKI. The Office of Professional Responsibility and the 

Office of Training and Workforce. 

Mr. MICA. When did he institute those? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Approximately 2 years ago, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. In the last 3 years, Mr. Lord, you reviewed this. 

What is the increase in incidents over that 3-year period? Percentage of increase? 

Mr. LORD. It is 27 percent. 

Mr. MICA. I have used 26, but 27 percent. So maybe we should 

go back to not having that office. We were probably doing better 

before. But you have instituted, again, these two offices and we 

have actually had a 27 percent increase. 

I mean some of the incidents have been totally embarrassing, 

embarrassing to the thousands of TSA employees that get up and 

do a good job every day. Orlando airport, they featured—which is 

one of my airports, local airports—an employee was caught in a 

media sting stealing a computer. There is another case I think in 

your report, Mr. Lord, of, again, theft there. We have the Newark 

situation was so embarrassing, the supervisor was advising the 

TSA employee on how to steal contents of passengers’ luggage. 

Again, this has been totally embarrassing for everyone. 
36 

So I think one of the Members on the other side said this involves about 6 percent of the employees given the 9,000 incidents 

over 3 years? I mean, that is the figure that was used by the other 

side. Not to mention how many criminal incidences and arrests of 

TSA employees, which isn’t acceptable. 

Now, the other thing this report identifies, and it was sort of 

glossed over, it is just I guess 32 percent of the offenses are attendance and leave, unexcused or excessive absences. Is that right Mr. 

Lord? 

Mr. LORD. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. These aren’t just missing a day or two, these 

are more extensive offenses. Would that be correct? 

Mr. LORD. Actually I think it varies, but it does include some 

more egregious cases. 

Mr. MICA. Well, the problem you have, too, is you don’t have 

standard reporting, which your report said. Is that right? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, that was one of the issues. 

Mr. MICA. So actually I think that the number of incidents that 

are reported, 9,600, because we have such a variance probably 

underreports what is actually taking place. Would that be an appropriate assumption, Mr. Lord? 

Mr. LORD. That is one of the issues we identified in our report, 

a lack of consistent reporting. 

Mr. MICA. But it would indicate that they are not all reported. 

This 32 percent doesn’t sound like much of an impact, an unexcused absence, but it throws the whole system into chaos. People 

don’t show up for work. How can you properly screen folks? Mr. 

Lord, for the record, is shaking his head in the affirmative. 

Mr. LORD. I think it depends on particular facts and circumstances. It does have the potential to disrupt screening operations. 

Mr. MICA. Right. The other thing, too, is the cost. Mr. Halinski, 

do we still have a National screening force that we send in at great 

taxpayer expense to make up where you don’t have screeners? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, we do have a National screening force. 

Mr. MICA. How many millions of dollars does that cost us a year? 

I asked you this I think at another hearing and you couldn’t answer. Can you answer today? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir, I can answer today. I would tell you that 

that screening force has been reduced to approximately 250 personnel. 

Mr. MICA. What is the cost? Again, for the record, and, Mr. 

Chairman, I would like in the record the cost of this National 

screening force, if you could provide it to the committee, for the 

past 3 years. Because, again, it is disgraceful that people don’t 

show up for work, there is great cost to the taxpayers and great 

disruption. 

A couple of quick closing comments. Are you still recruiting people from ads on the top of pizza boxes and ads on discount gas 

pumps for employment at TSA? 

Mr. HALINSKI. No, sir, we are not. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. That has stopped. Then the fingerprint check 

and all of that, I would like to—I will put in the record a letter 

from one of my sheriffs that notified me that two people he dis-
37 

* The information was not available at the time of publication. 

ciplined for misconduct he next found employed at the Daytona 

Beach airport. If you would, I would like that made part of the 

record. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered.* 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentleman’s time has expired, so we will enter 

into a second round of questioning here. 

Mr. Lord, the other side of the aisle was talking about private 

companies that are doing security screening. Is there an incentive 

for the private companies to keep folks employed that have stolen 

or continue to show up at work not on time? 

Mr. LORD. I don’t think there is an incentive if the company is 

private or Federal, if you have problematic employees. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Halinski just testified a few minutes ago that 

there is a financial penalty for companies that, you know, someone 

in their employ has stolen or show up not on time and that sort 

of thing. So I would say for the record there is a disincentive for 

the private companies to continue those practices. 

Mr. Lord, many of the offenses that the TSA employees have 

been accused of could have led to severe aviation security risk. Is 

there any evidence that due to an employee’s direct or indirect action security at an airport was breached? 

Mr. LORD. Well, by definition 20 percent of the cases we looked 

at were labeled security- and screening-related. So obviously we believe those cases do have some nexus to security. But again it all 

depends on the particular circumstances of the case. But those are 

the ones I view as more serious compared to the cases related to 

time and attendance. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Of the 56 cases of theft and unauthorized taking 

from 2010 to 2012, 31 resulted in termination, 31 of the 56 resulted 

in termination, 11 resulted in letters of reprimand, 11 resulted in 

suspension of a defined period, 2 resulted in indefinite suspension, 

and 1 resulted in a resignation. 

Mr. Lord, despite the recommended penalty range for these offenses, not including termination, Deputy Administrator Halinksi 

told the committee last year that TSA took that seriously and TSA 

could prove it, the TSA would terminate those who would steal. Do 

you see that happening in your report? 

Mr. LORD. Yeah, that is a good question. I believe under the updated guidelines if there are mitigating circumstances a letter of 

reprimand is one possible option. But, again, it depends on the circumstances. So I think there is some leeway there under the 

new—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. I understand extenuating circumstances and some 

of the appeals process and proving it and whatnot. I guess Americans would be frustrated continuing to see letters of reprimand 

versus termination when theft is proven. I want to make sure that 

TSA does follow through with their protocol. 

I want to go back to the private screening, the private contractors issue. I came from the private sector and there was an incentive to do things right and also to have customer satisfaction with 

people we did business for, to apply the best management practices, and there was a disincentive if we failed to do what we said 
38 

we were going to do. There was a disincentive for me if one of my 

employees didn’t show up at work on time and we weren’t able to 

conduct—we did auctions—and we weren’t able to conduct those in 

the time that we said we were going to and there were delays, both 

on the buyer’s side and the seller’s side. 

So I think prompt and appropriate action and consistency is very, 

very important. I think that is what your GAO report points out 

over and over, that we need to be consistent. I think in the private 

sector you see when companies don’t provide consistency with regard to disciplinary action then that opens them up to a possibility 

of lawsuits, because I think in a personnel situation you have to 

have consistency. You can’t show preferential treatment from one 

employee to the next. We shouldn’t be able to do that in the public 

sector as well. 

So I don’t really have anything further. So with that I will recognize the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your interest in my question. What I want to do is make sure we keep it 

in the right lane. 

My only question dealt with sensitive security information. It did 

not deal with time and attendance or anything like that in the private sector. It is sensitive security information. That kind of information, we all agree, is something that is far more serious than 

someone not showing up for work. 

Now, as important for me in this conversation is whether or not, 

Mr. Halinski, you saw the fact that in the contracting with TSA 

with private contractors, because you did not have the ability to 

deal with personnel found guilty of that, have you now changed the 

contracting document with TSA to get you to where you need to be? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. We have changed the contract for all new 

contracts for SPP airports, and there is a clause in there that requires them to report any type of misconduct activities of their 

workforce, and we also require in this new language that if an employee is identified as with misconduct that appropriate action 

needs to be taken by that company, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Do you have the ability to terminate a contract—it is following 

up on what he was asking—of a private contractor if you find misconduct on the employees? 

Mr. HALINSKI. No, sir. I do not believe that we do. But I could 

get you a more thorough answer. I am not an expert on contracting. I wish I could give you a better answer. But I will get you 

one on that one, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Outten-Mills, we have talked a lot about TSA. What has 

been your analysis in reviewing other components of DHS with respect to claims of misconduct? Is TSA higher? Lower? In the middle? Can you provide some direction to this board? 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. Sir, the body of work that we have conducted 

in OIG at this point has not focused on misconduct and allegations. 

Even with the TTAC job and the FAM project that we conducted, 

we basically looked at pre-adjudication and the policies and proce-
39 

dures that were in place to make sure that credible allegations 

were able to enter the process. As far as how agencies have—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you really can’t. 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. No, we have not. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Well, Mr. Lord, the reference to this increase in complaints, did you change the matrix for review or is it 

the same matrix all along? 

Mr. LORD. I am not sure I understand your question, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, you say you had a 26 percent increase, I 

believe. 

Mr. LORD. Over 3 years, yeah, that is what the data clearly 

shows. It is actually 27 percent. 

Mr. THOMPSON. All right. Is that the same that you generally do? 

Mr. LORD. Oh, you mean when compared to other DHS components? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. LORD. We didn’t do that analysis, but I think it is important 

to recognize all the other, for example, Customs and Border Protection, that they have a different mission, different organizational 

setup, it would be difficult to make direct comparisons, but for purposes of our report we did not include that information. That was 

outside the scope. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Comparison with coming to work, that is in any 

agency, right? 

Mr. LORD. Oh, on time and attendance. I thought you meant 

screening- and security-related violations. I have no comparative 

data available to—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Would you, if you did CBP or anybody, would 

you do time and attendance as part of the review? 

Mr. LORD. Oh, yeah, definitely, definitely. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you have not in your capacity performed any 

have those time and attendance reviews for any other agency? 

Mr. LORD. We have not done that currently. We would be happy 

to work with your staff if you are interested in having a follow-up 

review conducted on that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I am concerned about the increase at TSA. 

But if this situation is peculiar to other agencies, I would like to 

know it also. 

Mr. LORD. Understood. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Halinski, in terms of the amount of time it takes to get 

through an entire investigation and adjudication process, what has 

TSA done to streamline this process? Can TSA be doing more? 

What is the maximum amount of time a TSA employee can remain 

on the job while his or her case is being investigated? If, for example, a screener was accused of failing to follow a standard operating 

procedure at a checkpoint, would that individual be allowed to continue to work the checkpoint or would they be given other responsibilities until the investigation is completed? How does that process work? 
40 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. It depends on the seriousness of the offense. If you are talking about an offense that is on the administrative side and not the criminal side, then the local airport will conduct its investigation, they will take statements, they will put the 

evidence together. It is not a long process, sir, quite frankly. We 

are not talking about an investigation where you are going in and 

it takes months at a time. 

The more serious offenses that come up, that is when you go to 

our Office of Investigation. We have made great strides in that 

area since last year. In those cases we are running, in more than 

50 percent of the cases, under 90 days to conduct a full criminal 

investigation on these folks and send it to our Office of Professional 

Responsibility. 

Mr. HUDSON. So if someone is in one of these serious investigations, are they reassigned to a different duty point? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. While they are in that status they can 

be put on administrative leave, they can be suspended, they can be 

put on at a different part of the airport in a nonscreening role. 

There is a variety of ways. If the allegations are serious enough, 

they are not kept on the line, they are moved out while the process 

takes place, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. Okay. How many TSA employees are currently on 

administrative leave for a process like this? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I do not have that number. I will get back 

with you. I would tell you that we don’t like to put anybody on administrative leave because that means that people are getting paid 

for not working. So we do try to find other duties for them. But I 

will get back with you on that number. I don’t have that number 

right off-hand, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. Okay. Appreciate that. 

Shifting gears a little bit, as I understand current policy, if a 

screener fails a covert test conducted by TSA’s inspectors, the 

screener is retrained and allowed to continue screening passengers 

at the checkpoint. If a screener fails a covert test conducted by 

GAO inspectors, the screener is neither notified right away nor 

pulled off the line. In both cases, the screener in question does not 

receive a suspension or other penalty. 

I recognize there could be a variety of reasons why someone fails 

one of these tests. However, there are certain cases where after 

careful review of the circumstances it would be appropriate for a 

screener who failed a covert test to be suspended. After all, TSA’s 

sole purpose is security and the tests are in place to identify security weaknesses. 

As TSA makes its headway towards risk-based security, I am 

concerned that a security failure at a checkpoint or the genuine— 

or a test—could set us back tremendously. It only takes one mistake to get a bomb on a plane, for instance. 

Now, the ability of screeners to detect explosives and other 

threats and the confidence of the American public is fundamental 

to the success of risk-based security. Would you agree, Mr. 

Halinski, to revisit the policies and procedures for holding accountable those screeners who fail a covert test? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. Let me talk a little bit about covert testing. Covert testing I think is one of the very solid quality assurance 
41 

programs that we have had. I believe the numbers are over 6,000 

covert tests that we have done over the last several years. The 

other thing about covert testing, like any red team organization in 

any organization, you know exactly where the weaknesses are, you 

know how to build the devices so you can make it as difficult as 

possible. 

I am not going to go into a whole lot of detail specifically about 

the tests but I will address your question because we keep that 

classified for a reason. Because threat, they pay attention to what 

we do, and they will use it against us. We have seen it consistently. 

Now, when we have someone who fails a covert test, we try to— 

particularly with our covert testing—we take them off the line and 

try to do immediate quality assurance. If we see a trend, sir, we 

understand people can make a mistake. Let me give you an example, sir. If someone puts a test device, let’s say in a groin area, and 

it is a small device, sir, I think you have seen that device, and they 

do a pat-down and it is clearly not a pat-down that is going to find 

that device, then we take immediate action and tell that individual, 

look, you need to do a better job on that pat-down. 

We will look at that, sir. I will tell you that anybody who fails 

tests consistently is going to be in trouble in the organization, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that, but obviously one failed pat-down 

could lead to a horrible disaster for the public. 

Mr. HALINSKI. We do understand that, sir, and that is one of the 

reasons why we have, and I think it is important to recognize, that 

we have a system of security that is multiple layers. It is a defense 

in depth. We have to have that. Because if we only have one point 

and we based it on one point, it is a single point of failure. That 

is why we have our dogs, that is why we have our BDOs, that is 

why we have our FAMS, that is why we have our intelligence system that vets beforehand. You have to have a defense in depth. 

Anybody that has been involved in security understands this. It is 

like football, sir. If you only have one person on the line and you 

don’t have backs or you don’t have linebackers, you are going to be 

in trouble. That is what we have, a defense in depth. So we try to 

overlap that, sir, and ensure that that one failure doesn’t happen, 

every single day, 1.8 million times a day, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. 

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman will now recognize and welcome back the Ranking 

Member, Mr. Barber, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Halinski, I would like to ask you a few questions about the 

procedures that were addressed or referred to by the GAO in their 

recent report. The GAO indicated that the TSA does not have procedures to identify allegations of misconduct that have not been adjudicated. In other words, there could be allegations of misconduct 

that have never been resolved. So I have a series of questions related to that. 

Can you say how many there are remaining that have not been 

adjudicated? Second, an average length of time that those have 

been pending? How does the agency plan to address this issue 

going forward? 
42 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, to the best of my knowledge, we have taken 

what the GAO said to heart. We have made those changes. I don’t 

believe we have any cases that are outstanding. 

The process we use now is automatic. With this Integrated Database, if you go through the process, there is a system of checks and 

oversight by our Office of Human Capital, by our Office of Investigations, and by other Office of Professional Responsibility. When 

a case is closed, the system now automatically goes back to every 

one of those offices so everybody understands that the case has 

been adjudicated and is put in their records. We took that to heart, 

we made that correction, and it is in place, sir. 

Mr. BARBER. The standard procedures that are now in place so 

that we have what we hope is non-arbitrary or fair across-theboard actions being taken, can you say what a one strike you are 

out looks like? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. We catch an individual—now, let me go 

back to covert testing, sir, that we are doing for integrity. We have 

a screener on the line, we have one of our covert testers go 

through, he has an iPad that he decides he is going to put in his 

pocket. As I said earlier, the vast majority of our people are good 

people that don’t do that. But when that happens, sir, and we have 

absolutely proof that he stole that item, it is 24 hours he is out the 

door. We have put that into effect, sir. 

Drugs, another case. You are caught with drugs, on the spot we 

can put you out and we have done that. Now, if it involves an investigation in drugs, there is an investigation involved, if I can’t 

immediately prove it, sir, we have to do due diligence for our people. They are innocent until proven guilty. That takes a little bit 

of time. But we do give them the benefit of the doubt in those cases 

until the proof shows otherwise, sir. 

Mr. BARBER. What if the infraction has to do with putting the 

public at risk? In your covert investigations someone came through 

with essentially an explosive, is that a one strike you are out? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, if someone is intentionally trying to go 

against the security practices, if he is intentionally trying to bypass 

that system, yes, sir, it is. We have had instances of that in the 

last year, sir, and those people have been removed. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, let me go to a different aspect of this. This 

is a question or an issue we have raised before in other hearings 

with the Department, and that is the concern that I have and I 

think the public has about transparency and accountability with 

the Department, or on behalf of the Department. I guess I am really concerned about how it is that we have transparency in ensuring 

the public that these matters are investigated. I realize there are 

personnel restrictions or privacy concerns but, you know, the GAO 

report is now a public document. People have a right to say, that 

is not good, what are we doing about it? What can the Department 

do more than it has already done to ensure transparency with the 

American people? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, and I will get to that that question, sir, but 

first let me say we are a very large organization and we are an organization probably that is in the public eye more than any other 

Government organization right now. We see the traveling public 

1.8 million times a day, so we are very visible. Every time, sir, and 
43 

we have very good people who do a good job every day, every single 

time we have one knucklehead who decides he is going to do something bad it tarnishes the image of our organization. 

But at the same time, sir, let me point out the fact that last year 

over 10 of our TSOs saved people’s lives either in the airport 

through CPR, by helping accident victims, by pulling people from 

burning cars, by talking down a pilot in a general aviation aircraft. 

You never hear those stories, sir. You very rarely hear them. I 

think that is important when you are talking about image and you 

are talking about transparency, you have to take the good with the 

bad. When you look at the actual percentages they are very low 

and comparable to any other Government organization. I have my 

people on the line 365 days of the year. They know if they fail, 

someone could die. 

Mr. BARBER. Can I just make sure we have the answer to the 

question about transparency? The GAO report is public. The media 

has it. The public will soon understand what is in it. What can you 

do to assure the American people that the issues that are raised 

in that GAO study and report have been properly dealt with? 

Transparency in that regard is what I was really referring to. 

Mr. HALINSKI. All right, sir, I appreciate that. What I would tell 

you is what I said earlier, is that we absolutely embrace the comments made by the GAO. We are in the process and have almost 

completely taken those on-board and completed those; we believe 

they will be complete by the end of September, October. There is 

one big piece that we are looking working on as far as trend analysis. I am sitting here on C–SPAN and I am telling you that we 

embrace them and we are going to do them, sir. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

Mr. HUDSON [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

At this time the Chairman will recognize the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 minutes for any questions she may 

have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you very much 

for what I think is a vitally important hearing. Let me thank the 

Ranking Members and the Chairman, Mr. Duncan, and the full 

committee as well. 

The American people deserve the sense of trust and respect, both 

as they travel, but also for the employees and the officers, as I call 

them, that they work for. I am very pleased that post-9/11 we can 

actually that say that we have a trained, uniform, professional 

workforce called transportation security officers with SOPs, standard operating procedures which they must abide by, that we can 

even have an assessment of the bad apples versus the good apples. 

Now, I would offer to say, as I have always said, Mr. Halinski, 

to Administrator Pistole, you have heard me say this, let’s print the 

good stories, let’s not hide the good stories. That should be part of 

an obligation of management, that should be an SOP, standard operating procedure, report the good stories, because I think it balances what, as you have indicated, the difficulty, but also the numbers that come up for those who are bad apples with the mountain 

of success stories and operational excellence that occurs in the airports every single day, even as we speak today. 
44 

I have a series of questions that relate to that, and I just want 

you to go quickly please because my time is short. 

It is my understanding that you can contract with an SPP, let 

everybody know that is a private contract, privatization, you can 

contract with that contractual entity, but you can enforce various 

rules against them in the contract or against that workforce. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If you saw something and you were in the 

middle of a contract it would be difficult to cancel, is that correct, 

there is a contractual relationship? 

Mr. HALINSKI. There is a contractual process that has to be done. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That has to go through. So we can’t compare 

what we suffer if we privatize or continue to privatize versus your 

ability being able to work with the professional public workforce 

under the Transportation Security Administration with the airports that are under your jurisdiction, you can focus on those individuals, is that correct? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. We have worked on this committee, it has 

been my cause to work on the issue of professional development 

and to make sure TSO officers have the able to rise up, that they 

are complimented as well as criticized. As I noticed the numbers, 

there has been an increase on the study in terms of issues dealing 

with time and attendance, we find that in the private workforce, 

of course, and then some people not following procedure. 

Are you here to suggest or have you sort-of looked and seen that 

it is not excessive beyond the workforces around the country or 

other agencies? Is that something that you attest to? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. I think when you look at this number 

of 27 percent arise, I am going to go back to the figured numbers. 

You can take any number out there and make it any way you want 

to look at it. Quite frankly, with the 27 percent, does that mean 

there it has been an increase in our personnel, that we are doing 

more accountability actions of misconduct? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that is important. Because my time is 

short I want to get you to the kind of things that you are doing 

in the interest of professional development. As I do that let me just 

cite for the record that there was an investigation in Newark of individuals and it was ultimately determined, when the facts came 

out, that the penalty was too high or that they shouldn’t have been 

assessed because there are additional facts that come out. So we 

have to sort of balance when we review the facts with make sure 

the disciplinary action meets the facts. I think in Newark it found 

out that they were cleared of all wrongdoing, certain incidents that 

occurred. 

So my question is: Are you concerned about and do you have a 

matrix for professional development, and are you recognizing the 

important trust that the American people place in TSOs because 

they are one of the front-liners, if you will, one of the front-liners 

that deals with saving lives? They weren’t in place on 9/11, were 

they? TSA was not in place on 9/11. 

Mr. HALINSKI. No, ma’am, it wasn’t. 
45 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So they are the front-liners. Can you say that 

your professional development includes sensitivity to the elderly, 

the disabled, as well as SOPs? Could you answer that please? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. We have made an effort to true to ensure that we don’t have instances where we are conducting ourselves inappropriately. We have do ethical training, we do integrity 

training for our workforce, we have professional development for 

our workforce, and we try to be consistent in the way we do our 

mission. 

Once again I am going to say it and I think it is important to 

say: Our mission is to protect the traveling public 1.8 million times 

a day. It is a big job. It sounds easy. There are many complexities 

to it, not just screening. We have air marshals, we have inspectors. 

We have to worry about foreign flight students. We have to worry 

about general aviation. We have a lot on our plate to secure that 

system. Easy mission in name, very complex in execution. I think 

we do a pretty good job of it, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me just indicate to Mr. 

Halinski that I think this committee is holding this hearing, No. 

1, to contribute to the trust that the traveling public should have. 

I would believe that we could work together, Republicans and 

Democrats, and even provide an added professional development 

structure, if you will, that will, one, enhance the training, and I 

have spoken to those who have gone to the training in Georgia. 

They found it to be one of the best training that they could have 

ever had. I am not sure, I assume you are familiar with the class 

in Georgia. 

But I would like to see an opportunity for legislative structure 

of training to help, and to again reinforce that they are out there 

to save lives and to build the trust that I think you are due as 

servants of the American people, more importantly as officers of 

the Transportation Security Administration. 

So I yield back. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chairman will recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Let me pick up on training. Mr. Halinski, are you 

aware how much we have spent on training of TSA personnel, 

TSOs? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I don’t have that figure. 

Mr. MICA. You know it exceeds $1 billion. Are you aware also, 

sir, that we have actually trained—employed and then trained—recruited, employed, and trained more people than we have actually 

in the workforce, that more than that number have left the workforce, we spent that much money on people who are no longer employed. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, like any organization that is out there, we 

have been in existence about 10 years, sir, and—— 

Mr. MICA. I think you baked the cake on that one. 

Well, first of all, Mr. Halinski, you said in response to Mr. 

Thompson talked about the private screening operation in San 

Francisco and one employee who had misplaced inappropriately 

some sensitive information, you said the penalty would be a letter 
46 

of reprimand and a 14-day suspension for a TSA employee. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. HALINSKI. What I said, sir, was a TSO could receive from a 

letter of reprimand to a 14-day suspension for mishandling of SSI 

material. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Mr. Thompson wondered what had happened, 

so I checked, and that individual was suspended in 10 days, there 

was an investigation, and he was fired. I am telling you, I helped 

set up TSA, and we never intended, first of all, we never intended 

for it to be continually an all-Government operation. It was only set 

up for 2 years. But the intimidation and all the other things TSA 

has done to secure its bureaucracy. 

Those who are interested in helping the poor workers, if there is 

any TSA workers or union folks here, first of all, you should know 

the private screening operations can actually pay and retain people 

more. Second, that we never intended to have some appeal method 

in place where the lax enforcement that you would have and just 

mentioned by the Deputy Administrator here, of a letter, 14 days. 

We wanted those people fired. We are firing some of them, not all 

of them. 

Are you aware, Mr. Halinski, the similarity between Bulgaria, 

Romania, and Poland and the United States? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I lived in Europe for 11 years. I actually escorted you twice to Europe. 

Mr. MICA. Yes, I know. Are you aware of the similarity as regarding airport security? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I know the airports internationally pretty 

well. 

Mr. MICA. Well, those three airports are the only three in the 

Western world that still retain an all-Federal screening force. 

Mr. Halinski, TSA personnel, the TSOs, are they sworn law enforcement personnel? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, our officers—— 

Mr. MICA. Are they sworn law enforcement—— 

Mr. HALINSKI. No, sir. They are not law enforcement personnel. 

Mr. MICA. They are not. Okay. They are screening. They are not 

law enforcement personnel. You know, since you all hijacked TSA, 

then you come here and tell us that you have put in place all of 

this professional organization, Mr. Pistole has opened two offices to 

ensure integrity. Now, didn’t you just hear the testimony that there 

has been a 27 percent increase in the incidence of misconduct? Did 

you hear that? 

Mr. HALINSKI. I did hear that, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Do you think there is still something wrong 

then with the way TSA is handling this misconduct? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, we have looked at the GAO report, we have 

taken those to task, and we are doing what the GAO asked us to 

do, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. You talked about the one-point-million people 

a day. Here is something I want for the record. Your FSD in Orlando just bragged about, we have 55,000 people a day that we 

screen. Then he said, we have 1,200 TSA employees. Would you 

confirm for me and the committee if that is correct? If that is cor-
47 

rect that means each employee is screening 50 people a day. Would 

you say that is a productive workload? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I don’t have those figures in front of me—— 

Mr. MICA. I just asked, could you provide that information, back 

it up to the committee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, would you let 

the witness answer the question? 

Mr. MICA. Well, he doesn’t have the information, Ms. Lee, and 

I didn’t interrupt you. But what I would like him to do is respond 

to the committee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I just would like him to be 

able to answer the question. I appreciate it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. If the witness would just provide the answer in 

writing to Mr. Mica’s question that would be sufficient. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I think, again, Mr. Thompson—he is not 

here, I apologize—but he had said that they indicated it is a 3 to 

9 percent in a GAO study extra costs for private screening, and 

that report was actually an early report. I had another report done, 

investigation, I don’t know if you did that, Mr. Lord, did you do 

that one to check, and didn’t they cook the books? That is how I 

termed it. But in fact you found that there was not correct, they 

did not include other factors as to the cost. Is that correct? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, that is correct, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I will point out, for example, just go to 

Rochester, for example, where they have 18 TSA personnel that 

they don’t need, most of them making on average $100,000 with a 

private screening force. Go to San Francisco and observe the TSA 

monster overhead that they impose on top of private screening that 

you do not need. 

So, again, this is an agency that is unfair to the employees. We spend $1.2 billion on the administrators, and you have somewhere 

between, you can’t tell, because Mr. Thompson said we have 47,000 

screeners, you had 56,000, someone else had 57,000, but we have 

66,000 employees in TSA. So we have $1.8 billion being spent on 

screeners, $1.2 billion on unnecessary and costly bureaucracy. 

I yield back the balance of my time. Thanks for letting me participate today. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica. I appreciate you participating today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like to take a brief second round 

please. I think everyone had a second round. I will be very brief, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

I think those were important questions that Mr. Mica answered. 

I would like for you to come back in writing, first of all, you will 

have to do the research so we can submit into the record, the costs 

to the American people of 9/11. 

My recollection, you can get those numbers I am sure because 

you have a good research arm, in terms of the impact of New York 

and its immediacy, Boston, Pennsylvania, and beyond. The airline 

industry that I understand, it is my recollection, was also hindered 

for a period of time. Just bring those numbers back and submit it 

to the complete committee please. 
48 

Secondarily, I would like to have an assessment of the professional development training that each TSO member gets and what 

you plan to do going forward. 

I would also like to have a response to—a more official response 

to Mr. Thompson’s letter. 

I will just ask the question on the record, are you dealing forthrightly with cases of discrimination, complaints of discrimination 

by your employee base, and taking those discrimination complaints 

seriously? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am, we are. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have a process that indicates to personnel or to employees of a process, an open and conspicuous process, that they know where to go if they feel that they have been 

discriminated against where they will not suffer retaliation? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. We have an Office of Civil Rights and 

Liberties. We also put that as part of our annual training for all 

employees. We have it on our website, ma’am. We have a formal 

process. We adhere to the standards that the U.S. Government has 

to in this case, ma’am. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chairman will note that we have had a period 

of question and answering. She has asked for these items in writing. I have allowed a little leeway, but if we could wrap it up. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

The last question I will ask is: Are you using a billion dollars for 

training, and why, and where does that money go? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Ma’am, there are multiple questions that were 

asked that I didn’t get the opportunity to explain. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Go ahead. 

Mr. HALINSKI. We have a very large workforce training over a 

period of time. You are going to spend money for training for that 

workforce. 

If you want a professional workforce that is going to keep and 

protect the transportation system, I have to be able to train them. 

I can’t give you the exact amount. I will get that to you. 

On the question of the SPP, it is a voluntary program. It has 

been a voluntary program for years. There are 16 airports in the 

SPP program. Any airport in the United States, quite frankly. We 

don’t see a major issue between either. If you talk about costs, we 

don’t see a big cost difference. We don’t see it in operations. We 

don’t see a big difference any way. The point is, it is a voluntary 

program. Any airport can apply. There are 16 that have done it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. There is no great benefit for the SPP as saving money versus the professional transportation security office, is that correct? There is no benefit—there is 

no cheaper process through the SPP. You don’t see any great savings through the SPP versus the transportation security. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Ma’am, we have tried to abide by what the GAO 

has told us. No, ma’am, we don’t. We see no difference in the cost, 

ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. 

I thank the Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Since Mr. Payne showed up we are just going to continue with 

the line of questioning. 
49 

Mr. Hudson, do you have a question? 

Mr. HUDSON. I do. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. The Chairman will recognize Mr. Hudson for 

a line of questioning. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I wasn’t 

prepared for the next round, but I appreciate this opportunity. 

I guess my question, Mr. Halinski, is: How is customer satisfaction measured by TSA, and the customer being the flying public? 

Do you have any metrics by which you are measuring this? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I guess the best metric I am going to use is 

the one that was done by the Gallup Poll last year, and it is online, anybody that wants to look at it, where over 60 percent of 

those polled, the traveling public, say that they were—at least felt 

that TSA was satisfactory to good in their operations. I think that 

is probably the best metric we can do for the traveling public. 

We have customer service reps now at the airport. We are making an effort in our training. We are making an effort in our engagement with our workforce to ensure that they do good public relations. 

We are going to have the one-off, sir. I am going to be straight 

up with you. I am going to have somebody that is going to do something stupid, and it is going to get in the press and it will probably 

make 20 rounds in the press. But for every one of those stories, sir, 

I will tell you, there is probably 10 more great stories about what 

our people do. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. I guess the question is: Should 

there be some formal process where you set up metrics where you 

can judge the customer satisfaction? I believe what you are telling 

me, that there are a lot of good actors there, a lot of people who 

are dedicated to the job, committed to their mission. But if there 

is a way to measure this, it may bear out and be a good tool to 

show the American people that a lot of folks who travel do have 

a good experience. It might be useful to measure that. It might be 

helpful to sort-of identify where the problems are in the public perception. That is just something you may want to think about. 

Mr. HALINSKI. We will work on that, sir. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chairman thanks the gentleman from North 

Carolina and the Chairman of the Transportation Security Subcommittee for being part of this today. 

The Chairman will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, and I 

apologize for my getting here a bit late, but I felt it was important 

that I did show up and get the questions I have on the record. 

This is, you know, basically for all the witnesses. You know, I 

have met with TSOs and the managers at Newark Liberty Airport. 

I found them to be really dedicated to their job and service, and 

they strive to keep our aviation system secure on a daily basis. 

They tell me, too, that there are many instances where TSOs are 

disciplined for doing the very thing that they were trained to do. 

So do you believe that the training of the TSOs has kept up with 

the disciplinary actions and procedures? 
50 

Mr. Halinski. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I believe that we have been consistent in that. 

In specific cases, I am not sure, sir, if there were specifics I could 

answer that. But I believe that we do have a consistent policy. I 

believe that we have consistent training. 

One thing I would say is, we do shift some of our procedures on 

a regular basis, and that is based on threat. We are an organization that bases our operations on threat. What was the standard 

procedure last year may not be a standard procedure this year. If 

somebody is following a procedure because they weren’t up on the 

newest procedure, it is based on threat, but they may be held accountable for that, sir. That may be an inconsistency, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Right. But if they haven’t been trained for it, how 

can they be held accountable for it? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Well, everybody, if we make a change in the policy, sir, or a change in the standard operating procedure, everybody 

is retrained on it. But I am going to go back to human nature, sir. 

Everybody is not on their game 100 percent of the time, unfortunately. In those cases we will take appropriate action for that, and 

that is what this whole hearing has been about, and we are committed to doing that. Our people generally don’t do that, sir. I 

mean, there are a lot of numbers that were thrown around out here 

today, but by and large we do a good job every single day, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. 

Mr. Lord. 

Mr. LORD. That is a difficult question to answer lacking specifics, 

but I do know that TSA has invested a substantial amount of 

money and resources and time in training staff. I think it is important to note the SOPs do change. For example, the enhanced patdown, when that went into effect, I think not only were TSA employees, but the traveling public, you know, they had to make a— 

they had to adjust to that as well. So I think that is important to 

note, the procedures change. People have to be trained in that. 

Sometimes there is a lag between when they master that and how 

they actually apply it in practice. So to me it is not surprising that 

some staff may object to that occasionally. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. 

Ma’am. 

Ms. OUTTEN-MILLS. The OIG, we did conduct one review of the 

Honolulu airport in 2012, where we were coming up with reasons 

why certain screeners may have not been screening as they should 

have. One of the reasons that that could possibly have been was 

because of the changing SOPs, and perhaps TSOs weren’t aware, 

fully aware of what that policy entailed. We did make a recommendation to TSA to ensure that staff were aware of SOPs that 

changed based on the rate of flights coming in, and they have 

worked to do that. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Let’s see. In your opinion, do you believe that 

the standard disciplinary actions or additional training, or some 

combination thereof, is the most effective way in disciplining TSOs? 

You know, I guess in terms of the procedures, you have to be up 

on them because this is important. But if you find someone that 

might have made a mistake or been lacking in one of those areas, 

don’t you feel that prior to disciplining them that maybe making 
51 

sure that they understand what their obligation is, is the best way 

to go? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I would say that when we train our workforce, 

one of the ideas is communication, constant communication with 

the workforce if there are changes. If there is a failure with one 

of our TSOs in some area like that we try to take remedial action. 

One of the differences now with our table of offenses and penalties 

is, we have enough leeway that, based on what the penalty is, that 

it can be from a low end to a high end depending on what the mitigating circumstances is for there, for that particular offense. Consistent training, consistent messaging is what will get them to 

where they need to be. 

We try to be consistent in the way any kind of misconduct is 

handled. That is why we created an appeals board for our TSOs 

with our Office of Professional Responsibility, and they have an 

automatic 7-day period to write an appeal for anything that is 

handed down if they feel that the punishment did not meet what 

they thought that they did. There is an appeal process. In some 

cases, about 15 percent, we find that actually it has been lowered 

because, with the circumstances and the appeals, it has worked to 

their benefit in that case because we didn’t have all the facts. 

I am going to go back to what I said earlier, sir. By and large, 

if we absolutely catch somebody doing something they shouldn’t be 

doing, we take very strong action. But the presumption is people 

are innocent until they are proven guilty, and we have to go with 

that, sir, because that is the way we do business. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is up. There was another question, but I will submit it to the committee, in terms of 

the difference between the private contractors and how our TSOs 

are disciplined, and the oversight that we have over the private 

contractors. I think there is a discrepancy in the manner in which 

the two entities operate, but I will submit that to the committee. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his 

questioning and for submitting written questions. We ask the witnesses will respond to those written questions in a timely manner. 

First off, in wrapping up the hearing today, I want to thank Mr. 

Lord and the GAO for your report and for your continued work in 

investigating not only TSA, but all of the agencies that GAO works 

with Congress the oversight capacity on. 

I also want to thank the gentlelady, Ms. Outten-Mills, for your 

involvement in the Inspector General’s office, because you are having to deal with and investigate some of the things that go on. So 

I certainly appreciate your service to our country. 

Mr. Halinski, in no way did the line of questioning today question your service to our country, and I understand the challenges 

that you face in trying to keep our air travel secure. America is 

counting on you. America is counting on TSA to stop any sort of 

9/11-type attack and make sure that this country and the homeland is secure. So I appreciate what you do, and I appreciate the 

service. 

In our oversight capacity, we have oversight over DHS and TSA. 

We expect that TSA and DHS will have oversight over the private 
52 

contractors as well. I am interested to find out more about that 

oversight relationship. 

I don’t know that we have the oversight ability to bring the private contractors in and question them the way we have questioned 

you today. But somebody needs to as well, because America is 

counting on them as well if they are acting in that capacity as security screeners. So this is a multi-faceted and multi-layered approach to keeping the country safe. I fully understand that. 

I want to make sure that, and I think America expects, that if 

someone has violated either the civil liberties, or slept on the job, 

didn’t show up for work, delayed their air travel because a checkpoint not being open, or someone has stolen from the American 

public, the traveling Americans, that they will be disciplined. I appreciate your responses to those questions today. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony and 

the Members for their questions. I thought we had very good participation today, even from some Members not on the committee. 

The Members of the committee do have additional questions, as 

you have heard, from both Ms. Jackson Lee, from Mr. Mica, and 

from Mr. Payne, and we ask you respond to those in writing in a 

timely fashion. 

So without objection, the subcommittees will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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