Marines from BIT 3/9 came ashore on 8 March 1965 at RED

Beach 2, northwest 0/ Da Nang. The heavy surfdelayed the

landing/or an hour. (USMC PhotoA183676)
U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM

THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

1965

by

Jack Shulimson

and

Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1978
Library of Congress Card No. 78-600120

PCN 190 003076 00

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 (Paper Cover)
Foreword

This is the second volume in a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the

Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps

involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965,

the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the

conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine

Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the Ill Marine Amphibious Force, which

by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines.

During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase

to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This

volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed

krces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964,

The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

The co-author, Mr. Jack Shulimson, is the senior civilian historian on the Vietnam

project. He has been with the division since 1964 and has worked on Vietnam studies since

1965. Mr. Shulimson has a MA in history from the University of Michigan and is a PhD

candidate in American Studies at the University of Maryland.

Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Charles M. Johnson was with the History and

Museums Division from September 1972 until September 1973. He has a BA in history

from the University of Minnesota and was commissioned in the Marine Corps upon

graduation in 1959. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson served two tours in Vietnam, first as

Commanding Officer, Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines from May 1966 until May

1967 and then from December 1970 until August 1971 as public information officer in the

Public Information Office, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in Saigon. He is

now Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Support

Group at Camp Pendleton, California.

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Reviewed and Approved:

15 June 1978

hi

Preface

U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965 is largely based on previously classified studies prepared

by the History and Museums Division in the l960s and early l970s. These are: Lieutenant

Colonel John J. Cahill and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in

Vietnam, January-June 1965"; Jack Shulimson, "U. S. Marine Corps Operations in the

Republic of Vietnam, July-December 1965"; and Jack Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in

Vietnam, Introduction,'' and "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, May-December 1965," Parts 1

and 2 of a then projected eight-part, single-volume history, entitled "Marines in Vietnam,

1954-May 1968."

In 1972, Major Johnson was given the task of combining these four separate histories

into one coherent narrative. Upon Major Johnson's departure from the division the

following year, Mr. Shulimson continued with the revision, incorporating new research

material as it became available. In addition to the four studies listed above, the authors have

consulted the official records of the U. S. Marine Corps, records of other Services when

appropriate, the Oral History Collection of the History and Museums Division, comment

files of the History and Museum Division, and pertinent published primary and secondary

works. Although none of the information in this history is classified, some of the

documentation on which it is based still has a classified designation. Comment drafts of the

manuscript were reviewed by over 110 persons, most of whom were directly associated

with the events and many of their remarks have been incorporated into the narrative. A list

of all those asked to comment is included in the appendices. All ranks used in the body of

the text are those ranks held by the individual in 1965.

The production of this volume has been a cooperative effort on the part of several

members of the History and Museums Division. The manuscript was prepared under the

editoral direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums

Division. Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers completed the final editing and also wrote the

reconnaissance section of Chapter 11. Mr. Benis M. Frank prepared the index. Mr. Paul D.

Johnston, head of the Publications Production Section, skillfully shepherded the

manuscript through the various production stages. Special thanks go to Mrs. Mary Lewis,

who helped type the first comment draft, and Miss Catherine A. Stoll, Corporal Denise F.

Alexander, and Lance Corporal Paul W. Gibson of the Production Section, who worked

unstintingly on both comment editions and the final version. Staff Sergeant Jerry L. Jakes

was responsible for preparing all maps, charts, and cover layouts. Unless otherwise

credited, photographs are from official Marine Corps files. The authors, of course, assume

sole responsibility for the content of the text, including opinions expressed and any errors in

Charles M. Johnson Jack Shulimson

V

Table of Contents

Page

Foreword .jj

Preface v Table of Contents vii

Maps x

Introduction xi

PART I ESTABLISHING THE ENCLAVES 1

Chapter 1 The Call for Marines 3

Alert and Realert 3

Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HAWKS 4

Land the Marines 6

The Landing 9

Chapter 2 The 9th MEB in Vietnam 16

The First Weeks 16

Estimate of the Situation 20

More Marines Arrive 23

An Expanded Mission 27

ChuLai

Chapter 3 Formation and Development of Ill MAF 36

The Birth of III MAF 36

The Le My Experiment 37

Building the Chu Lai Airfield 39

Ill MAF in Transition 42

The Seeds of Pacification 46

June Operations in the Three Enclaves 48

Chapter 4 Reinforcement and Expansion 50

The Need for Further Reinforcements 50

The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave 53

The Attack on the Airfield 56

Expansion to the South 58

Further Reinforcements 65

PART H THE BIG BATTLES 67

Chapter 5 Operation STARLITE: The First Big Battle 69

Intelligence and Planning 69

The Battle 72

The Aftermath 79

Chapter 6 The Enemy Refuses to Give Battle: September-November Operations 84

Operation PIRANHA 84

vii
viii THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Much Ado About CS, Operation STOMP 88

October-November Operations 91

Chapter 7 The 1st VC Again: Operation HARVEST MOON 98

The Abandonment of Hiep Duc 98

Activation of Task Force DELTA and Planning the Operation 101

The VC Strike and the Marines are Committed 103

The Search of the Phouc Ha Valley 106

The Fight at Ky Phu 108

The Wrap-Up 109

PART III THE CONTINUING WAR 113

Chapter 8 Defending and Expanding the Base Areas 115

The Evolution of a Strategy 115

Further Deployments and Realinements 116

Refinement of Command Relations 120

Expanding the TAORS 122

Attacks on the Airfields and Hill 22 125

Base Defense 129

Extended Patrolling 131

Chapter 9 Pacification 133

The Combined Action Program 133

Protection of the Harvest: GOLDEN FLEECE 138

Cordon and Search: The Seeds of COUNTY FAIR and Population Control 141

Civic Action 142

The Ngu Hanh Son Campaign and the Frustrations of Pacification 144

PART IV SUPPORTING THE TROOPS 147

Chapter 10 Marine Aviation in Vietnam 149

Deployments 149

Control of Marine Aviation 151

Fixed-Wing Operations 152

Helicopter Operations 158

Air Defense Responsibilities 162

Chapter 11 Fire Support and Reconnaissance 164

Artillery Support 164

Naval Gunfire 167

Other Ground Combat Support 169

Marine Reconnaissance 170

1st Force Reconnaissance Company: The Early Days 172

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, Opening Moves 174

Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged 179

Chapter 12 Logistics and Construction 181

The Logistic Situation 181

Ill MAF Naval Responsibilities 182

RED BALL and CRITIPAC 184

The Force Logistic Support Group 185

Engineeringand Construction 186
CONTENTS

PART V OTHER MARINE ACTEVII1ES 191

Chapter 13 The SLF of the Seventh Fleet 193

Disbandment of the SLF 193

A New Mission 193

The Reestablishment of the SLF 194

Command and Control Changes 194

The First DAGGER THRUST Raids 197

Further Changes in the SLF 200

The Saigon Conference 201

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids 202

The SLF at the End of the Year 203

Chapter 14 Advisors and Other Marine Activities 204

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps 204

Marine Advisors to the Rung Sat Special Zone 207

U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group 208

Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters in Saigon 209

Company L, Marine Support Battalion 210

Embassy Marines 211

Chapter 15 Conclusion 212

NOTES 213

APPENDICES

A. Marine Task Organizations and Command List January-December 1965 227

B. Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 232

C. Chronology of Significant Events 235

D. Medal of Honor Citations, 1965 241

E. List of Reviewers 245

F. Table of Organization:

III MAF and Naval Component Command as of 31 Dec 1965 246

Index 251
X THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Maps

Da Nang Area, Spring 1965 8

ICorps, 1965 13

Da Nang Area, July-December 1965 60

Operation Starlite, 18-19 August 1965 74

Operation Piranha, D-Day, 7 September 1965 86

Operation Stomp, D-Day, 5 September 1965 89

Operation Red Snapper, D-Day, 22 October 1965 92

Operation Black Ferret, D-Day, 3 November 1965 95

Operation Blue Marlin I, D-Day, 10 November 1965 95

Operation Blue Marlin II, D-Day, 16 November 1965 97

Operation Harvest Moon, Area of Operations, December 1965 102

Chu Jai TAORs, December 1965 119

Hue-Phu Bai TAOR, December 1965 123

Da Nang TAORs and RAORs 1965 171

Chu Lai TAORs and RAORs 1965 173

Hue -Phu Bai TAORs and RAORs 1965 176

Dagger Thrust Operation 1965 199
Introduction

In 1965, the Marines were the first of the U. S.

Armed Services to deploy large ground combat units

to South Vietnam. By the end of the year, more than

38,000 Marines made up the Ill Marine Amphibious

Force (Ill MAF) under the command of Major

General Lewis W. Walt. Ill MAF was part of the

United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (USMACV), commanded by General

William C. Westmoreland. General Westmoreland

in turn was responsible to Admiral Ulysses S. Grant

Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CinCPac) in

Hawaii, and through Sharp to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) in Washington. The American command's

mission in Vietnam was to assist the Republic of

Vietnam (RVN) in its war against the Communist

insurgents, the Viet Cong, who were being provided

with leadership, reinforcements, and supplies from

the north by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRVN).

Since July 1954, when the Geneva Accords ended

the Communist Viet Minh war against the French in

what was then called Indochina, Vietnam remained

divided along the 17th Parallel with a Communist

government in the north and an anti-Communist

regime in the south. Throughout the following

decade, Vietnamese Communists conducted a subrosa political war, which after 1960 became an active

guerrilla war to overthrow the southern government.

Long before 1965, the United States had been involved in this embattled nation.

A U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG) existed in Vietnam as early as 1950 and

continued to function after the signing of the Geneva

Accords. At the end of 1954 the United States agreed

to support the South Vietnamese Armed Forces in

conjunction with the French. After the last French

military advisors departed Vietnam in 1957, the

entire advisory effort came under American auspices.

In the first year of his administration, 1961,

President John F. Kennedy sent a high-level mission,

headed by former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General

Maxwell D. Taylor, to determine what the United

States could do to prevent a Communist takeover in

South Vietnam. Acting on General Taylor's

recommendations, President Kennedy directed the

implementation of a series of military and political

measures to strengthen the South Vietnamese

regime. Ttese actions included the provision of

substantial amounts of military equipment, as well as

sending U.S. military advisors and support units to

Vietnam.

With the growing U.S. commitment in South

Vietnam as a result of the Communist insurgency,

on 8 February 1962 the United States established the

United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam under Army General Paul D. Harkins. By

the end of the year, more than 12,000 U.S. military

personnel, induding technicians, advisors,, pilots,

and supply and administrative personnel, were in

Vietnam. Among this number were 18 Marine

advisors to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps and

a Marine helicopter task group, code named

SHUFLY, consisting of a helicopter squadron and

support elements.

Despite this infusion of American assistance, an

open dispute between the South Vietnamese

government and the Buddhist hierarchy tore apart

the delicate fabric of the South Vietnamese political

structure. Faced with increasingly violent and

dramatic Buddhist demonstrations against his rule,

Ngo Dinh Diem, the controversial President of the

RVN, attempted to crush the Buddhist movement in

August 1963 by arresting its leaders. The crisis

eventually resulted in a successful military coup

against Diem's government in November and his

death.

Following the coup, there was a drastic realignment of the South Vietnamese civil and military

apparatus. More than 31 high-ranking military

officers were dismissed for having actively supported

the Diem regime. On 6 January 1964, the provisional

government appointed a three-man military junta

consisting of Major General Duong Van "Big"

Minh,* as Chief of Staff, Major General Tran Van

'Ironically General Minh was to be the last President of South

Vietnam. He ordered the surrender of South Vietnam to the

Communist forces on 30 April 1975, two days after assuming

the Presidency when the South Vietnamese cause was already

lost.

xi
xi THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Don, and Major General Le Van Kim, to run the

government and the armed forces. Twenty-three

days later, a new personality, Major General Nguyen

Khanh, assumed the leadership from the junta. He

became the chairman of the Revolutionary Military

Council while General Minh remained as the

nominal chief of state. In August, Khanh, having

encountered Buddhist opposition, promised

liberalization of his regime. On 26 September, the

Vietnamese Revolutionary Council elected Phan

Khac Suu as Chief of State, and the former mayor of

Saigon, Tran Van Huong, as Premier. Real power,

however, continued to lie with the military, which

on 20 December dissolved the Civilian High National

Council. although Suu and Huong remained in their

respective positions.

With this political instability and growing enemy

strength, the U.S. increased its military support to

the South Vietnamese regime. By the end of 1964,

the United States Military Assistance Command,

now commanded by General Westmoreland, had

grown to over 20,000 men.

The Marine contingents in Vietnam showed a

corresponding increase in 1964. Of the over 800

Marines in Vietnam, the bulk were in South

Vietnam's I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) consisting

of the five northern provinces. Sixty Marine advisors

were attached to the Army of the Republic of

Vietnam (ARVN) units in ICTZ. The SHUFLY

unit, reinforced by a Marine rifle company for airfield

security, was at the Da Nang Airbase just south of

the city of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province. The

remaining Marines served as advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps (20 Marines served in this

capacity), as members of the Marine guard detachment at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and with the

MACV staff in Saigon.

In May 1964, a Marine radio detachment supported by a reinforced Marine infantry platoon

deployed to Tiger Tooth Mountain, north of Khe

Sanh in northwestern South Vietnam. This composite force, designated Advisory Team One, later

redeployed to Dong Bach Ma, a 3,500-foot mountain

25 miles west-northwest of Da Nang, Advisory

Team One returned to Da Nang in September 1964

and then was disbanded. During its short existence,

Advisory Team One became the first Marine ground

unit to conduct independent operations in South

Vietnam. *

During 1964, the U. S. government examined the

possibility of sending U.S. combat troops to South

Vietnam for the defense of critical U.S. installations

within the country. At that time General Taylor,

then the U. S. Ambassador to South Vietnam,

warned Washington against overstressing static

security and observed that aggressive field operations

by the Vietnamese Armed Forces were the best

means for restoring law, order, and public safety in

the Republic of Vietnam.'

In August 1964, tensions between North Vietnam

and the United States reached a new high when

North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked two U.S.

destroyers, the Turner Joy (DD 951) and Maddox

(DD 731), in the Gulf of Tonkin. On 4 August, the

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended retaliatory

air strikes against several North Vietnamese patrol

boat bases and fuel storage areas. The President

approved the recommendation and on 5 August

Seventh Fleet carrier aircraft carried out bombing

missions against selected targets in North Vietnam.

On 7 August, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution in which it approved and supported "the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures

to repel any armed attack against the forces of the

United States and to prevent further aggression."

The possible involvement of American forces was

of special concern to the Marine Corps. In the

summer of 1964, the most combat ready American

troops in the Far East were those of the 3d Marine

Division (3d MarDiv) on Okinawa, commanded by

Major General William R. Collins, and the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) at Iwakuni,

Japan, and Okinawa, under the command of Major

General Paul J. Fontana. These two Marine units

were task-organized under several provisional

headquarters to support the various contingency

plans for Southeast Asia. The largest of the

provisional commands was the Ill Marine

Expeditionary Force (III MEF) consisting of the

entire 3d Division and the 1st MAW. Components

See LtGen Victor H. Krulak Ret), comments on draft MS, dtd

2Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File) and Captain Robert H.

Whitlow, U. S. Marines in Vietnam; The Advisory and

Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964 (Washington, D. C.:

History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1977), pp. 138-41.
INTRODUCTION

of the division and wing could also be combined

provisionally into a Marine expeditionary brigade

(MEB), essentially composed of a regimental landing

team (RLT) and a Marine aircraft group (MAG).

Both the air and ground components could be quickly

loaded on board Navy amphibious shipping for

deployment to South Vietnam or anywhere in the

Pacific.

Following the attack against the U.S. destroyers in

the Gulf of Tonkiri, the U.S. Pacific Command

activated the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th

MEB). The MEB, under the command of the

assistant division commander of the 3d Marine

Division, Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, a

holder of the Medal of Honor, consisted of the 9th

Marines regimental headquarters and three battalion

landing teams (BLTs). On 6 August, the 6,000

Marines of the MEB embarked on board Seventh

Fleet amphibious shipping. A composite Marine

aircraft group (MAG), with headquarters and fixed

wing squadrons in Japan and helicopter squadrons on

Okinawa, was alerted to support the MEB, but was

not embarked. Although the brigade did not land in

Vietnam at this time, the August crisis resulted in

the transformation of the 9th MEB from a paper

organization into an effective force in readiness,

capable of landing whereever needed on extremely

short notice.

When the Gulf of Tonkin crisis faded, the am -

phibious task force carrying the MEB relaxed. Of the

three BLTs making up the brigade, one returned to

Okinawa, another to the Philippines, and a third

remained afloat as part of the Special Landing Force

(SLF) of the Seventh Fleet. While General Davis

returned to Okinawa, he maintained a skeleton

headquarters at Subic Bay on board the U.S. task

krce command ship, Mount McKinley (AGC 7).

Brigadier General John P. Coursey relieved General

Davis as brigade commander on 16 October 1964.

As 1965 began the Viet Cong had entered a new

phase of their insurgency against the South Vietnamese government. The Communists departed

from their usual hit and run guerrilla tactics and

engaged the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam

(RVNAF) near the village of Binh Gia, 40 miles east

of Saigon, in a pitched battle which lasted from 28

December 1964 until 1 January 1965. During the

struggle for Binh Gia, two regiments from the 9th

VC Division ambushed and virtually destroyed two

battalions of South Vietnamese troops, including the

4th Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC),

and inflicted heavy casualties on relieving armored

and mechanized forces. According to General

Westmoreland, Binh Gia marked the start of the final

Communist offensive, "it meant the beginning of an

intensive military challenge which the Vietnamese

government could not meet with its own resources.''2

PART I

ESTABLISHING THE ENCLAVES

CHAPTER 1

The Call for Marines

Alert and Realert—Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HA WKS—Land the Marines—The Landing

Alert and Realert

On 22 January 1965, Brigadier General Frederick

J. Karch, the assistant division commander (ADC) of

the 3d Marine Division and a veteran of several

amphibious campaigns during World War II,

assumed command of the 9th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade. The brigade consisted of two Marine

battalion landing teams, * BLTs 1/9 and 3/9, which

had been embarked in ships of the Seventh Fleet's

Task Force 76 since the beginning of the year in the

South China Sea. At this time, the brigade was the

U.S. combat force most readily available for

deployment to South Vietnam. As General Karch

later remarked, "When the temperature went up we

got closer.''1

At this stage of the war the United States was not

yet prepared to make the decision to intervene in

Vietnam with ground combat units. On 23 January,

the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a recommendation by Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp,

Commander in Chief, Pacific, for a relaxation of the

alert status for the 9th MEB. BLT 1/9, then embarked in the ships of Navy Task Group 76.5, 30

miles off Cap St. Jacques, a point 70-miles southeast

of Saigon, reverted to a 96-hour reaction time for a

landing in South Vietnam while BLT 3/9 resumed

normal operations.

Political instability within South Vietnam caused

this reprieve to be of short duration. On 22-23

* Battalion lanthng team (BLT) is the basic Marine unit in an

assault landing. It is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced by necessary combat and service elements. The reinforcements are usually a battery of artillery; a platoon each of

trucks (motor transport), tanks, amphibian tractors, reconnaissance, and engineers; and detachments of communications,

shore party, beachmasters, medical, and logistical support.

Although BLTs are tailored to meet specific needs, the average

strength of a BLT is about 1,500 men.

January, Buddhist-inspired antigovernment riots

with anti-American overtones rocked Saigon and the

former imperial capital of Hue. As a result, the

Vietnamese military continued their political version

of "musical chairs" and ousted Premier Tran Van

Huong on 27 January. BLT 1/9, which had been on

its way to Hong Kong, was diverted first towards a

position off Da Nang and then back to its former

position off Cap St. Jacques. Arriving at its previous

location on the 28th, the battalion stood by to land in

Saigon if so directed. BLT 3/9, embarked in the ships

of Navy Task Group 76.7, reached its assigned

position off Da Nang on 29 January. The South

Vietnamese formed an interim government and the

Marines returned to normal shipboard routine.

The confusing alert status of the amphibious forces

resulting from the unstable conditions in Vietnam

was the subject of extensive message traffic between

General Westmoreland, Commander, U. S. Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam (ComUSMACV),

and Admiral Sharp. On 30 January, ConiUSMACV

requested that the Seventh Fleet position one amphibious group off Cape Varella within 24 hours of

either Da Nang or Saigon. Admiral Sharp only

approved a 72-hour alert statuS for the. forward

amphibious group, explaining the disadvantages of

maintaining a Marine battalion for an extended

period of time in amphibious shipping. In an earlier

message to the Joint Chiefs, Sharp observed that

since August 1964 the amphibious forces had

proven, "we can react quickly as the occasion

demands.' '2

While still concerned about possible commitment

of Marine forces to South Vietnam, the Pacific

Command had made arrangements with the Thai

Government for combined maneuvers in Thailand.

From 26-30 January, General Karch attended a

planning conference at Subic Bay for the MEB-size

exercise, JUNGLE DRUM III, scheduled to take

3
4 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184433

A Marine HA WK missile launcher is in position at the Da Nang Airfield. The HA WKSare designed to defend

against low-flying enemy aircrafl.

place in March. On 31 January, both BLTs 1/9 and

3/9 departed for Subic Bay with the. latter on.72-hour

reaction time for landing in Vietnam. Once more

events in Vietnam were to alter training and

deployment plans.

Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HA WKS

On 7 February 1965, the Viet Cong (VC) attacked

the U.S. compound at Pleiku in the Central

Highlands, a provocation that altered the entire

course of the war. In the early morning of the 7th,

the Viet Cong attacking force laid down a mortar

barrage on the advisors' quarters and airfield, killing

9 Americans, wounding 128 others, and damaging or

destroying 122 aircraft. At the urging of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and with the concurrence of

Ambassador Taylor, President Lyndon B. Johnson

ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. Addressing the nation later that day, the

President announced the withdrawal of U.S.

dependents from Vietnam and warned that the

United States might take further actions. He

declared: "I have ordered the deployment to South

Vietnam of a HAWK air defense battalion. Other

reinforcements, in units and individuals, may

follow.' 3*

Late on the evening of 7 February, Lieutenant

Colonel Bertram E. Cook, Jr., the commanding

officer of the 1st LAAM Battalion, which had arrived

on Okinawa in December from the U. S., received

orders to move one battery to Da Nang. The battalion had originally been slated to deploy to Vietnam

sThe acronym HAWK stands for Homing-All-the-WayKiller. The HAWK air defense is a mobile, surface-to-air

guided missile system designed to defend against enemy lowflying aircraft. It also has a capability to defend against shortrange missiles/rockets. In the Marine Corps, this system is

found in the light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalions.
THE CALL FOR MARINES 5

in 1964 but the decision was deferred because of

facility construction cost. Budgetary considerations

on 7 February were of minor relevance; the battalion

commander alerted his Battery A, commanded by

Captain Leon E. Obenhaus, to prepare for an airlift to

an unknown destination. The battery had just

completed a firing exercise at Bob Point, four miles

northwest of Kadena, and its equipment was still

emplaced there. After a rapid overnight breakdown

from "the firing exercise configuration" and delays

caused by the morning rush hour, the first echelons

of Battery A arrived at Naha Air Force Base, 14

miles to the south of Bob Point '

Through the night of the 7th and the early

morning of the 8th, Lieutenant Colonel Cook had

worked out with Colonel Clarence B. Slaughter,

commander of the 6315th U.S. Air Force Operations

Group, the complicated details of moving a HAWK

battery by air from Okinawa to Da Nang. Several

years later, he recalled:

Colonel Slaughter had been a student at the Marine

Corps Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course . . . at

the time I was attending the Junior Course. We had been

personal friends then and this friendship plus his appreciation of our problems greatly contributed to an

extremely smooth, well coordinated operation. His first

comment to me upon receipt of his orders to provide

aircraft for the airlift was, "How many aircraft of what

type do you want and what time do you want them?" He

immediately dispatched Air Force loadmaster personnel

to work with the 1st LAAM Bn embarkation personnel to

iron out possible problem areas. However, 1st LAAM

Bn. had participated in several airlift exercises prior to

departure from CONUS, and I immediately gave him our

requirements— 26 C-130 type aircraft and 1 C-124.'

The first aircraft took off at 1045 on the morning of

8 February. The LAAM battalion commander

planned that the battery would have a "limited"

operational capability after the arrival of the 8th or

10th planeload at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Cook

remembered, "This was not to be, due to my lack of

knowledge that two different models of C-130 were to

be used in the airlift and Colonel Slaughter's lack of

knowledge that sequential loads were of great importance to our operational readiness." The older C130A models of the Lockheed Hercules transports

held 1,700 fewer gallons of fuel than the newer C1 30B models and therefore had to make a refueling

stop in the Philippines before flying on to Da Nang.

According to Cook, "our sequencing was in trouble.

This caused substantial delay (several hours) in

achieving both partial and full operational status."

Nevertheless, Battery A was set up on the northwest

side of the Da Nang Airfield runway and prepared to

fire less than 12 hours after the arrival of the first

aircraft. On 8-9 February, the Air Force transports

had lifted 52 loads of LAAM personnel and equipment, carrying 309 passengers and 315 tons from

Okinawa to Da Nang 6

Lieutenant Colonel Cook had attached additional

officers to the battery to facilitate the establishment

of the battalion at Da Nang and to make liaison with

Detachment 1, 619th Tactical Command and

Control Squadron, U.S. Air Force, already at the airbase. On arrival, Battery A established radio

communication with the Air Force Control and

Reporting Post (CRP), located east of the city on top

of Monkey Mountain on the Tiensha Peninsula. For

missile firing control, the Air Force detachment and

the Marines used as their guide a Southeast Asia

Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been

developed in November 1964 when Major George G.

Long, the LAAM battalion executive officer, and

USAF 2d Air Division representatives met at

MACV headquarters in Saigon "to effect a common

understanding." The Air Force determined under

what conditions the HAWKS could be used, but

employment authority remained with the Marines.

On 14 February, Captain Ronald G. Richardson, the

battalion operations officer, collocated the Marine

Antiaircraft Operations Center (AAOC) with the

Air Force CRP on Monkey Mountain .' * On 16 February, the remaining units of the battalion, with the exception of Battery C, which

remained on Okinawa, arrived at Da Nang on board

the attack cargo ship USS Washburn (AKA 108),

and the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD

5). Because 'the one pier at Da Nang was shallow

draft, the cargo of the two ships was lightered from

the bay to the military ramp in the port. Trucks

transported the Marines of the LAAM Battalion's

Battery B and Headquarters and Service Battery and

their equipment through the city to the airfield.

Battery B, under Captain Everett L. Cowley, set

up a HAWK site in the southwestern sector of the

airfield complex in an old bunker area which the

In the following months, the Air Force expanded its CRP

facilities and capabilities and redesignated it a Control and

Reporting Center (CRC), which reported to the USAF Tactical

Air Command Center (TACC) at Tan Nhut Airfield in Saigon.
6 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

(Courtesy of Maj Gary W. Parker) USMC Photo A70714

An aerial view of Da Nang Airfield looking towardthe northeast. The city ofDa Nang is to the right or east of the

airfield.

Japanese had built during their occupation of the

airfield in World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Cook

housed the battalion's command post in an abandoned French military compound adjacent to the

airfield located midway between the two firing

batteries. The Marine LAAM battalion and Air

Force detachment established a communication

network, linking the two batteries, the battalion CP,

and the AAOC/CRP. On 18 February, Company C,

7th Engineer Battalion, a Force Troops unit of

FMFPac, arrived on board the amphibious tank

landing ship USS Vernon County (LST 1161) at Da

Nang from Okinawa to provide construction support

for the LAAM battalion. The HAWK deployment

to South Vietnam was complete.8

Although chances of air retaliation by the small

North Vietnamese Air Force were slim, the U.S.

Government considered that the deployment of the

HAWK missiles in conjunction with the air strike,

code named FLAMING DART, on 7 February,

would convince Hanoi of American determination to

support South Vietnam. The Communists, nevertheless, continued attacks against U.S. installations.

On 10 February, the Viet Cong destroyed a U.S.

enlisted billet in the coastal city of Qui Nhon, killing

23 U.S. soldiers and wounding 22 others. Once

more, President Johnson, on the recommendation of

the Joint Chiefs, ordered U.S. aircraft to bomb the

north in retaliation. On 11 February, more than 100

Navy carrier planes in FLAMING DART H struck

at military targets in North Vietnam.9

Land the Marines

During this period, American authorities in

Vietnam and Washington were reappraising the U.S.

effort in Vietnam. In early February, President

Johnson sent a delegation, headed by Presidential

Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, to Vietnam.

The President specifically instructed Bundy to

discuss with General Westmoreland and Ambassador

Taylor the feasibility of air strikes against North

Vietnam and the value of such attacks in deterring

the Communists. Returning to Washington after the

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THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP 7 Pleiku attack, Bundy included in his report the

recommendation that the U.S. develop a "sustained

reprisal policy'' using air and naval forces against

North Vietnam. According to Bundy, the situation

in South Vietnam was:

deteriorating, and without new U.S. action, defeat

appears inevitable—probably not in a matter of weeks or

perhaps even months, but within the next year or so.

There is still time to turn it around, but not much. 10

On 9 February, just prior to the VC attack on Qui

Nhon, General Westmoreland offered his appraisal of

the war. He recalled that in the past he had considered requesting American combat troops to

provide for close-in security of the U. S. bases in

Vietnam. This course of action had been rejected for

a variety of reasons, not the least of which was that

the presence of American forces might cause the

South Vietnamese to lose interest and relax. The

general was now of the opinion that the attack on

Pleiku marked a new phase of the war. With direct

Communist attacks on American personnel and

facilities, MACV could no longer ignore the

question of protecting these troops. Westmoreland

believed that this would require at least a division

declaring: "These are numbers of a new order of

magnitude, but we must face the stark fact that the

war has escalated."1'

Following the Qui Nhon attack, on 11 February

the Joints Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the Secretary of

Defense a program of reprisal actions to be taken

against Communist provocations. The chiefs observed that the retaliatory air raids against North

Vietnam had not achieved the intended effect. They

recommended in its place a "sustained pressure"

campaign to include continuing air strikes against

selected targets in North Vietnam, naval bombardment, covert operations, intelligence patrols and

cross-border operations in Laos, and the landing of

American troops in South Vietnam. On 13 February,

President Johnson approved a "limited and

measured" air campaign against North Vietnam,

which took the code name ROLUNG THUNDER.

The ROLLING THUNDER campaign was delayed

until 2 March because of a combination of bad

weather and the instability of the South Vietnamese

political situation.'2

In mid-February, the South Vietnamese were in

the midst of another power struggle. The South

Vietnamese Armed Forces Council declared on the

15th that it alone had the responsibility for selecting

the Premier and Chief of State. While the veteran

politician Phan Khac Suu remained as Chief of State,

the Council appointed a Saigon physician, Dr. Phan

Huy Quat, who had formerly served as Foreign

Minister in 1964, as the new Prime Minister. Six

days later, a group of senior generals led by Major

General Nguyen Van Thieu, the South Vietnamese

IV Corps Commander, and Air Vice Marshal

Nguyen Cao Ky, Commander of the Air Force,

deposed General Khanh, a veteran of other coup

attempts, as Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces.

Confronted with both a deteriorating political and

military situation, General Westmoreland directed

his deputy, Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton, USA, to determine what American ground

forces were needed for base security. After corn - pleting his survey, Throckmorton recommended the

deployment of a three-battalion Marine ex- peditionary brigade to Da Nang because of the vital

importance of the base for any air campaign against

the north and "the questionable capability of the

Vietnamese to protect the base.'' General Westmoreland several years later recalled:

While sharing Throckmorton's sense of urgency, I

nevertheless hoped to keep the number of U.S. ground

troops to a minimum and recommended instead landing

only two battalions and holding the third aboard ship off

shore.

On 22 February, General Westmoreland forwarded this request to Admiral Sharp who in turn

informed the JCS that he agreed with Westmoreland's assessment of the situation. Although

expressing strong reservations about sending any

American ground forces to Vietnam, Ambassador

Taylor, in a message to the State Department on 22

February, agreed to placing one Marine BLT at Da

Nang "in view of General Westmoreland's understandable concern for the safety of this important

base."4

By this time, BLTs 1/9 and 3/9 were back on

board ship at their former stations near Cap St.

Jacques and Da Nang. The Task Force 76 flagship,

the USS Mount McKinley (AGC 7), with the task

force commander, Rear Admiral Don W. Wulzen,

and General Karch on board, accompanied the

amphibious task group carrying BLT 1/9 off Vietnam. General Karch had met with Westmoreland

and the MACV staff in Saigon. The Marines were
8 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Chicu Esso Depot

DA NANG AREA

0 I M iI

Kilometers r

0

SPRING

South China
THE CALL FOR MARINES 9 prepared for any eventuality and ready to land at Da

Nang or Saigon as the situation required.

By the end of February, President Johnson had

made the decision to commit a two-battalion Marine

expeditionary brigade to Da Nang with the mission of

protecting the base from enemy incursion. General

Karch and members of his staff once more visited

General Westmoreland on 25 February to discuss

plans for a Marine landing at Da Nang. The MEB

commander left Saigon two days later for Da Nang

where he coordinated his plans with the South

Vietnamese I Corps Commander, Major General

Nguyen Chanh Thi, the virtual warlord of South

Vietnam's five northern provinces. Karch later

recalled:

On our way back into Thi's headquarters a jeep came

out with a New York Times reporter in it. Westmoreland's J-3 [BGen William E. DePuy, USA] turned

to me and said, "That is bad news." When he got in he

had a phone call from Saigon saying, "Get K arch and his

staff out of the country as quickly as posible."

General Karch and his staff immediately departed Da

Nang for Subic Bay and then Okinawa.

On 27 February (26 February, Washington time),

the Department of State cabled Ambassador Taylor

that the Marines were to be landed and that he was to

secure approval from the Government of Vietnam for

this eventuality. On the afternoon of the 28th,

Ambassador Taylor met with Vietnamese Prime

Minister Phan Huy Quat to discuss with him the

proposed American landing. The following day, 1

March, the Ambassador met with the Minister of the

Vietnamese Armed Forces, General Nguyen Van

Thieu and the Vietnamese Chairman of the Joint

General Staff, General Tran Van Minh ("Little

Minh") to discuss the details of the deployment of

the 9th MEB. The two Vietnamese officers posed no

objections to the proposed commitment of American

combat troops. They did, however, express concern

about the reaction of the Vietnamese population and

requested that the American forces be brought into

Da Nang "in the most inconspicuous way

feasible.' '16

Evidently this "inconspicuous way" statement

had some effect on U.S. officials in Washington. On

3 March, Ambassador Taylor received a message

from Assistant Secretary of Defense John T.

McNaughton stating that it was desirable to deploy

the Army's 173d Airborne Brigade by air from

Okinawa instead of the 9th MEB.'7 Some

Washington planners obviously believed that the

light infantry of an airborne brigade landing at Da

Nang airfield would be a "quieter arrival" than the

more formidable appearance of a Marine brigade with

its tanks, amphibian tractors, and other heavy

weapons arriving in an armada of amphibious ships.

General Westmoreland, supported by the American

Ambassador, immediately objected to the proposed

change. Both considered that the Marines were more

self-sustaining. Admiral Sharp, Commander in

Chief, Pacific, cabled the JCS:

Since the origination of OPLAN 32 in 1959, the

Marines have been scheduled for deployment to Da Nang

• . . contingency plans and a myriad of supporting plans at

lower echelons reflect this same deployment. As a result,

there has been extensive planning, reconnaissance, and

logistics preparation over the years. The CG, 9th MEB is

presently in Da Nang finalizing the details for landing the

MEB forces in such a way as to cause minimum impact

on the civilian populace . . . I recommend that the MEB

be landed at Da Nang as previously planned. 18

The objections to the MEB landing were overruled

and on 7 March 1965 (6 March 1965, Washington

time) the JCS sent the long-awaited signal to land the

9th MEB at once with two of its three BLTs.

The Landing

The days before the landing were a hectic period

for General Karch and the Marines of the brigade.

General Karch and his staff had completed 9th MEB

Operational Plan 37D-65 for the amphibious landing

of a BLT and the airlift of another battalion from

Okinawa to Da Nang on 26 February. The MEB staff

then- conducted a command post exercise (CPX) on

Okinawa. According to Major Ruel T. Scyphers, the

MEB G-1, the operations order for the deployment of

the MEB, "was put together following a non-stop 48

hour CPX. . . we got word about 2000 [27 February]

and armed with a staff manual and some borrowed

derks we put together an order and had it boxed

about 0300...

Still on Okinawa at the beginning of March,

General Karch scheduled a two-day map exercise of

the Da Nang area beginning on 2 March and a

briefing for Lieutenant Colonel Herbert J. Bain,

commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

whose battalion was slated to fly to Da Nang. On the

* Lieutenant Colonel Bain was a combat veteran of World

War 11. He had earned a battlefield commission in November

1944 and later was awarded the Silver Star for his heroic actions

during the Okinawa campaign in 1945.
10 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A183676

Marines from BLT 3/9 came ashore on 8 March 1965 at RED Beach 2, northwest of Da Nang. The heavy surf

delayed the landing for an hour.

2d, however, Karch cancelled both the exercise and

the briefing when he received orders to proceed

immediately to Da Nang. Boarding a Marine KC130F, the tanker/transport model of the C-130,

General Karch and 28 members of his staff departed

Okinawa at 2300. The aircraft stopped at Cubi Point

to pick up staff members of Navy Task Force 76 and

arrived in Da Nang the morning of the 3d. MACV

liaison officers met General Karch and his group as

they landed and escorted them about the airbase and

landing beaches. At 1600, the MEB staff boarded its

plane for the return flight to Subic Bay.

The next day, the general issued a warning order

to BLT 3/9, which had been off the coast of Da Nang

in Navy amphibious shipping since early February,

to be prepared "to administratively land the landing

force." The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Charles E. McPartlin, Jr., was to land his battalion at

RED Beach 2, north of the airbase and west of the

city of Da Nang, and move by truck convoy along

Route 1 to defensive positions at the airfield.20*

At the same time, the Marines and the Navy made

refinements in dispositions of their tactical units.

BLT 2/9, embarked on the ships of the amphibious

ready group, relieved BLT 1/9 at Subic Bay. The

JUNGLE DRUM Ill exercise was rescheduled for 14-

31 March and was scaled down from a MEB-size

exercise with only BLT 2 / 3 slated as the participating

unit.

General Karch flew back to Da Nang on 6 March

and joined Admiral Wuizen on board the Mount

McKinley, which was 10 miles off Da Nang with the

rest of the task force. As the MEB commander later

recalled:

* Lieutenant Colonel McPartlin had enlisted in the Marine

Corps in 1932. A first sergeant at the outbreak of World War

H, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1942. He saw

combat in both World War II and Korea.

C

• 2: -.
THE CALL FOR MARINES 11

USMC Photo A183798

Marines from BLT 3/9 continue landing across RED

Beach 2. A member of the beach party (holding flag

in foreground) directs traffic.

On 7 March, 1 was sitting in my stateroom when

Admiral Wulzen comes in and says, ''Here is a dispatch,'' which said, "Close Da Nang, land the landing

force." I looked at the dispatch, I looked at Admiral

Wulzen, and I said ''Don, do you think in Washington

they know what time it is in Da Nang? This means a

night landing if we close Da Nang at this point."

Karch went on to exdaim:

And not only that—we were in the worst weather we

had encountered in the South China Sea ever. Visibility

was limited to 150-200 yards, and it was about 12 o'clock.

The move into the Da Nang harbor from which the

landing would be launched was going to take about four to

five hours. 21*

Upon his return to the command ship that

evening, General Karch radioed Lieutenant Colonel

McPartlin. He assured the battalion commander that

Route 1 would be closed to civilians for 36 hours and

that McPartlin would control traffic in the beachhead

area. The Vietnamese would regulate movement

along the rest of the route. The MEB commander

concluded: "Unless the situation ashore changes

during the night, you can count on an administrative

move from beachhead to airfield. Speed in execution

is essential ''22

* A last minute requirement to coordinate the public announcement of the Marine landing with the South Vietnamese

may have accounted for the timing of the JCS message. See

"Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang,'' Pentagon Papers,

bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. 8.

Shortly afterward, General Karch ordered the

execution of OPlan-37D. The plan, with H-hour set

for 0800, 8 March, scheduled general unloading to be

completed by 1600 the next day. Lieutenant Colonel

McPartlin planned for Company I to land over the

northern portion of RED Beach 2 and Company K

over the southern sector. They were to insure that

the landing area was secure and provide the advance

guard for the movement to the airfield. Company M

was designated battalion reserve.

At 0545 on the 8th, the four ships of Amphibious

Task Force 76, the flagship Mount McKinley, the

attack transport USS Henrico (APA 45), attack

cargo ship USS Union (AKA 106), and amphibious

transport dock USS Vancouver (LPD 2) closed to

within 4,000 yards of the Da Nang shore and archored in the harbor. Admiral Wulzen gave the

order ''land the landing force'' at 0600. At this time,

other than an intermittent drizzle, weather conditions were moderate. Visibility was five miles and

the wind was blowing at eight knots from the northwest. Near the shoreline, waves were cresting from

two to four feet, spilling gently onto the landing

beach. Unfortunately, these conditions did not last

long.

USMC Photo A183780

South Vietnamese children wave at a Marine vehicle

heading for the Da Nang Airbase. A South Vietnamese flag flies above the banner welcoming the

Marines to Vietnam.

VTNMU.

L -

_______

'RLCOMES

/:;. I/44& -o,•r1'
12 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

In the transport area, swells reached 8 to 10 feet,

playing havoc with the debarkation. It was almost

impossible to hold the nets for the troops to debark;

several of the lines mooring landing craft to their

mother ships snapped under the strain. At 0730 it

became impossible to load small boats alongside;

Admiral Wulzen postponed H-hour until 0900. At

the same time, General Karch left the Mount

McKinley for the airbase by helicopter. An hour

later, the first planes arrived from Okinawa with

additional shore party personnel to aid in clearing the

beach.

At 0830 the task force commander confirmed the

0900 H-hour. A high surf plan was put into effect

which directed that the loads for the smaller landing

craft (LCVPs) be rescheduled for larger and heavier

landing craft (LCMs). The first wave of assault troops

in 11 Marine amphibian tractors (LVTPs) touched

down at RED Beach 2 just three minutes late and the

fourth and final assault wave of 3/9 landed at 0918. * On the beach, the commander of I Corps Tactical

Zone (I CTZ), General Thi, and the Mayor of Da

Nang welcomed General Karch while a group of

Vietnamese university students led by a vanguard of

pretty girls holding leis of flowers greeted the

Marines. * * Vietnamese troops secured the

beachhead and the route to the airfield. The first

echelons of Company L moved out from the

beachhead at 0945. Banners in both Vietnamese and

English were strung along the route of march

welcoming the troops; Vietnamese children lined

The landing craft, mechanized (LCM) is a steel-hulled boat.

Two versions exist, the LCM-6 (weight of 29 tons empty which

carries 80 troops or 24 tons of cargo), and the LCM-8 (weighs

61 tons empty and carries 200 troops or 60 tons of cargo). The

personnel and vehicle landing craft (LCVP) is a wooden-hulled

landing craft weighing nine tons and capable of carrying 36

troops or four tons of cargo. The landing vehicle tracked,

personnel (LVTP-5) is a steel amphibian tracked vehicle

weighing 45 tons and capable of carrying 34 troops or six tons

of cargo. The LCM and LCVP are landing craft organic to the

Navy while the LVTP-5 is a Marine Corps vehicle. * * The picture shown at upper right appeared in many

American newspapers depicting a dour General Karch with a

garland of flowers around his neck. Karch later remarked:

"That picture has been the source of a lot of trouble for me.

People say, 'Why couldn't you have been smiling?' But you

know, if I had it to do over, that picture would be the same.

When you have a son in Vietnam and he gets killed, you don't

want a smiling general with flowers around his neck as the

leader at that point.'' Karch Intvw.

Photo courtsey of Associated Press and Wide World Photos

Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, the Commanding General, 9th MEB, watches the landing

bedecked with flowers presented to him by South

Vietnamese schoolgirls. This picture received wide

distribution in the U.S.press.

both sides of the road, waving and shyly smiling at

the Marines. The lead company was followed by

Company I, artillery attachments, and Company K,

which formed the rear guard of the motor march to

the southern portion of the airbase. Company M

remained behind as beach security for general

unloading.

Simultaneously with the preparations for the

landing of the BLT across the beach, the Marines had

-
THE CALL FOR MARINES

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14 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184402

Marines from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines disembarkfrom U.S. Air Force C-130 transports at the Da Nang Airbase on 8 March. The airlift of the battalion was held up for 24 hours shortly after these Marines arrived.

begun the airlift of Lieutenant Colonel Bain 's battalion from Okinawa to Da Nang. On the morning of

7 March, Major General William R. ("Rip")

Collins, the 3d Marine Division commander, as

directed by a CinCPac message, requested the 315th

Air Division of the U.S. Air Force to provide the

transportation to move the unit to Vietnam. On

Okinawa the 3d Division commander alerted

lieutenant Colonel Bain, and the first elements of the

battalion moved from Camp Schwab to the air facility

at Futema that night. The BLT was organized into

assigned aircraft loads, then moved from Futema to

Naha Air Base. At 2200, the Air Force approved the

movement orders, establishing 30-minute intervals

between launches of the C-130 aircraft.

Shortly after midnight, General Collins radioed

MACV headquarters in Saigon for authority to

launch the first plane of the airlift which was

scheduled to arrive at Da Nang at 0900 on the 8th.

Six hours later, MACV granted this clearance but

later changed the arrival hour to noon. After a threehour wait, the first elements consisting of the

command group of the battalion and part of Company

C left Naha Air Base at 0725. In reporting the move,

General Collins observed that the entire lift could

take place during daylight if he were allowed to

expedite aircraft departures. The MACV Chief of

Staff, Major General Richard G. Stilwell, called the

CinCPac Command Center and stated that Da Nang

could not accommodate two BLTs arriving at the

same time. Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon,

an outstanding Marine aviator of both World War II

and Korea then serving as the CinCPac J-3,

reminded Stilwell that MACV had already granted

dearance for the air movement. General Stilwell

replied that conditions had changed and that the

airlift would have to be held up. CinCPac so instructed the Commanders, Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Air Force.23

The first planes carrying the lead elements of the

1st Battalion, 3d Marines, arrived at the Da Nang

Airbase about 1300 on the afternoon of 8 March.

Although snipers fired at them during their landing

approach, the aircraft were undamaged. After the
THE CALL FOR MARINES 15 arrival of 13 planes at Da Nang, the airlift was halted

with Companies C and B assembled in defensive

positions on the western portion of the airfield.

Company D, the security company already at Da

Nang for protection of the SHUFLY helicopter unit,

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163,

reverted to parent control. Only Company A was left

on Okinawa. Lieutenant Colonel Bain later recalled

that the '''arbitrary' cutoff [of the airlift] separated

the units which had landed from their backup

rations.''24

Although the arrival of the remainder of Bain's

battalion was held up, a different airlift occurred on 9

March. The helicopter carrier USS Princeton (LPH

5) with HMM-365 (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph

Koler, Jr.) on board, arrived off Da Nang shortly

after sunrise that morning. Between 0700 and noon

on the 9th, all 23 of the squadron's helicopters were

transferred to HMM-162, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, whose personnel arrived by Marine KC-130 aircraft at Da

Nang from Okinawa the same day. The pilots of

HMM-365 returned to the Princeton which then

steamed for Okinawa to take on replacement aircraft.

That same afternoon, General Karch, who on the

8th had been given operational control of all Marine

units at Da Nang, reporting directly to MACV,

The squadron, HMM-162, was no stranger to operations in

Vietnam. It had been in the Far East since 1 June 1964 and had

been previously assigned to SHUFLY for four months. Much

of the intervening time had been spent on board Navy LPHs in

Vietnamese waters as part of the Special Landing Force. It had

just returned to Okinawa on 4 March from SLF duty. Now,

only five days later, the squadron again was in Vietnam. LtCol

Oliver W. Curtis had previously commanded this squadron in

1964 when it was assigned to SHUFLY. He was a veteran of

both World War II and Korea and had been awarded a

Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for his actions at Okinawa

and later three more DFCs for his aerial feats in Korea.

telephoned General Westmoreland and received

permission to resume the airlift of BLT 1 / 3. The first

planes took off from Okinawa shortly after midnight

and arrived at Da Nang the morning of the 10th. By

12 March, the rest of the battalion landing team,

with the exception of its attached tanks and low

priority vehides, was in Vietnam.

On that date, general unloading of the 9th MEB

was completed. Because of a fire fight on the night of

8-9 March between VC elements and Vietnamese

Army troops only two miles north of RED Beach,

the ships of the amphibious task force had moved to

anchorages near the mouth of the Song Han (Da

Nang River). The next day unloading continued up

the river over a ramp into the city. This too had its

limitations as Admiral Wulzen brought out:

The complete lack of port facilities—cranes, heavy duty

fork lifts, cargo nets, and lighterage—coupled with

unmarked channels, single small off-loading point (which

can only handle two LCMs simultaneously), distance

from anchorage to pier (four miles average), lack of

staging area at the pier are contributing to slow offloading."

The administrative landing of the 9th MEB occurred in an uncertain atmosphere; the JCS order

directing the landing, bore the laconic title

"Improved Security Measures in the Republic of

Vietnam." Adding a further surrealistic touch to the

Marines' arrival, a few days after the landing General

Thi invited the commanders and staff of the 9th MEB

to a garden reception, replete with "several orchestras and accompanying nicities." Lieutenant

Colonel Bain ironically recalled that the festivities

were "followed by a return to my foxhole and C

rations.' '26

Nevertheless, a new phase of the Vietnam war had

begun. About one-third of the Marine ground forces

and two-thirds of the Marine helicopter squadrons in

the Western Pacific had been committed to South

Vietnam.
CHAPTER 2

The 9th MEB in Vietnam

The First Weeks—Estimate of the Situation—More Marines Arrive—An &panded Mission—Chu Lai

The First Weeks

Despite the arrival of the 9th MEB, the Marine

intervention in Vietnam was still of a limited nature.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made this very clear in their

landing order of 7 March which directed that "the

U.S. Marine Force will not, repeat will not, engage

in day-to-day actions against the Viet Cong."

General Westmoreland gave the 9th MEB the

responsibility to protect the vital Da Nang Airbase

from enemy attack but declared that ''overall

responsiblity for the defense of Da Nang area remains

a RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces]

responsibility. ''1

To carry out this limited mission, General Karch

had nearly 5,000 Marines under his command,

including McPartlin 's and Bain 's infantry battalions,

two helicopter squadrons, and limited logistic and

combat support forces. The brigade had absorbed the

former Marine Unit Vietnam (MUV), or Task Unit

79.3.5, better remembered as SHUFLY. On 9 March

the MUV became Marine Aircraft Group (IVIAG)

16. Colonel John H. King, Jr., the former MUV

commander and veteran Marine aviator who had

commanded a helicopter squadron in Korea, assumed

command of MAG-16.

The 9th MEB air-ground team at Da Nang faced a

difficult logistical situation. General Karch later

recalled:

In late February, Bob Oddy [Colonel Robert J. Oddy,

CO, 3d Force Service Regiment] came to me and said,

''Your biggest problem is going to be logistics and I am

going to find you the best people I have to get you through

this test.'' And bless old Bob, he did just that, otherwise

the Brigade would have been flat on its back.2

The 3d Service Battalion and Force Service

Regiment on Okinawa provided the personnel for the

Brigade Logistic Support Group (BLSG). According

to Colonel Oddy, "When the time came to embark

the Brigade, we split the Service Battalion 50/50, and

16

supported by personnel from the Force Service

Regiment, we were ready to launch the fledging

BLSG. * Original plans called for a BLSG in excess

of 1,000 men, but because the Joint Chiefs imposed a

personnel ceiling on the number of Marines who

could be brought into Vietnam the group had been

cut to 660 men. Colonel Oddy recalled in 1976,

"The personnel ceiling resulted in an extremely

austere staff group that made service and support a

big question mark . . . .' ' General Karch remarked

that there were several contingency plans which

fitted the situation in Vietnam better than the one

that was used.4

The only representatives of the brigade logistic

group who participated in the first phase of the

landing were the executive officer, Major Pat

Morgan, and 11 other Marines. They arrived on 10

March by air with elements of BLT 1 / 3 and assumed

control of the entire logistic operation, but the advance echelon could accomplish very little "except

to console the MEB that supplies were on the way."

Despite the activation of the BLSG on 12 March

and the arrival of its commanding officer, Lieutenant

Colonel George H. Smith, six days later, the first two

weeks for the MEB were a logistic nightmare. The

entire brigade subsisted on the 15 days of rations that

had landed with McPartlin's battalion and an

'Colonel Oddy wrote in 1976:'' . . . this was a time when

unrestricted officers with infantry MOSs could be assigned

command of service units. This was fortunate for me as I had

previous command experience with infantry platoons, companies and battalions and it seemed unlikely I would command

one of the infantry regiments of the Division. Command of a

large service organization and the opportunity to formulate

from scratch a larger task organized service and support group

was certainly a major high point in my career.'' Col Robert J.

Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam

Comment File).
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 17

emergency airlift from Saigon. Major Morgan later

wrote: "Lieutenant Colonel Smith and I almost lost

our sanity until matters were straightened out.' '6

On 22 March, the ships carrying the seatail of the

9th MEB entered the port. They were unloaded at

the ramp near the base of Monkey Mountain, across

the Song Han from the airfield. Since the bridge

spanning the river had been destroyed by the Viet

Cong the year before, the Marines had to rely on a

ferry to carry the supply-laden trucks to the airbase.

Despite the complicated unloading, the arrival of its

seatail ended the MEB's first logistic crisis.

In this transitionary phase of U.S. involvement,

some confusion existed as to whether the MEB was

to subsist from Marine Corps and Seventh Fleet

mount-out stocks, or whether MACV would assume

part of the logistic burden. MACV apparently

believed that the Marine Corps had received permission from the Department of Defense to use its

mount-out supplies, which was not the case. This

authority was not given until June. (See Chapters 3

and 12). Marine Colonel Webb D. Sawyer, who

headed the MACV J-4 Plans Branch, later provided

a MACV perspective of the situation in the following

comment:

When the Marine Brigade landed at Da Nang I had a

representative from my J-4 office there, an Air Force

Officer, Major Robinson. When Robby returned to

Saigon, he brought a very long, very complete, listing of

all types of supplies that were being requested by the

Marine Brigade. I knew that most of the items were in the

Code Plan stocks [mount-out stocks} aboard the shipping

that had brought the Marines. I asked Robby why the

Marines weren't using the Code Plan supplies. His reply

was that the Marines said those supplies were for an

emergency. My reaction was that the Marines had just

participated in the emergency.

General Karch later recalled that for days the air was filled with messages regarding rations and

ammunition. At the end of March, General

Westmoreland declared that his command could take

on the task of supplying the Marines with basic

rations and ammunition for the time being.

Although the question was not resolved at this time,

the Marines were equipped, armed, and fed; supplies

were unloaded and stockpiled; and the MEB was

functioning.8

During this same period, Colonel King reorganized MAG-16, the air arm of the MEB, to reflect the

changes in his command. On 14 March, the

headquarters sections became Headquarters and

Maintenance Squadron 16 (—) (H&MS-16) under

Major John J. McMasters while the housekeeping

section became Marine Airbase Squadron 16 (—)

(MABS-16) under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E.

Vernon. Colonel King also retained the

LAAM battalion as well as the two helicopter

squadrons.

The Marine helicopters continued to operate

under MAG-16 much the same as they did when

under SHUFLY. Most of their missions were flown

in support of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)

forces throughout I Corps. Initially, after the landing

of the 9th MEB, most of these flights were made by

Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers' HMM-163.

The newly arrived squadron, HMM-162, under

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtis, became

operational on 12 March, but at first was confined to

support of the MEB. By the end of March, both

squadrons were supporting the Marines and the

ARVN.

In support of the AR\TN operations, the Marine

pilots flew both resupply and strike missions. The

former missions, consuming a majority of the flight

hours, involved moving troops and cargo to outposts

located throughout I Corps. The resupply cargo was

a mixture of military supplies, as well as pigs, cows,

thickens, and other items required by the sometimes

isolated Vietnamese detachments. Strike missions

consisted of lifting company- or battalion-size ARVN

units in helicopter assault operations.

These strike missions produced the only

significant enemy contact experienced by Marines

during this period. On 31 March, the group flew

helicopter support for ARVN Operation QUYET

THANG 512. A force of 17 UH-34Ds from HMM163, 2 UH-34D SAR/maintenance* helicopters'from

I-IMM-162, and 7 U. S. Army Bell UH-1 'Huey'

gunships was assigned to lift 465 troops of the ARVN

5th Airborne Battalion. The air task force was to

move the ARVN paratroopers from the vicinity of

Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province to a landing zone

(LZ) about 25 miles south of Da Nang.

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Ewers, the helicopters

encountered such heavy antiaircraft fire when they

approached the landing zone that Ewers later

remarked that the squadron might have flown into a

* SAR/maintenance teams are search, rescue, and maintenance teams used to expedite the recovery of downed aircraft.

These teams, composed of mechanics and infantry, were placed

on board helicopters which remained well above the strike

force, or acted as decoys during the initial assault.
18 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

trap. In the first lift, Ewers' wingman, First

Lieutenant Wendell T. Eliason was killed in the

landing zone, but his co-pilot, First Lieutenant

Donald R. Wilson, managed to fly the badly damaged

craft back to Da Nang. Four other helicopters in this

lift also had to be returned to Da Nang for battle

damage repair.

The enemy shot down one of the Marine UH34Ds, whose pilot, First Lieutenant Dale D. Eddy,

"was wounded in the neck and initially believed

KIA.'' Eddy's copilot, First Lieutenant James E.

Magel, also wounded, was able to make his way to

another helicopter, but then died. According to

Ewers, Eddy's crew chief, Sergeant Cecil A. Garner,

"himself wounded, took his M-60 machine gun with

him and joined the firefight on the ground."

Another pilot from HMM-163, Major Bennie H.

Mann, Jr., landed his craft in the face of the heavy

enemy fire and rescued Gamer and Eddy. According

to Ewers, Mann's crew chief, Staff Sergeant Stanley

J. Novotny, "somehow found the strength

singlehandedly to lift the concious but paralyzed"

six-foot, 200-pound Eddy out of the downed craft.

Mann was awarded the Navy Cross and Novotny

received the Silver Star for the rescue

Despite heavy enemy opposition, HMM-163

continued to make three lifts into the zone until the

entire 5th Airborne Battalion had been landed. All

told, 25 Marine helicopters and 10 U.S. Army

helicopters took part in the operation.* Nineteen of

the aircraft sustained battle damage. Two Army UHis, in addition to the Marine UH-34D, also were

shot down. The Army craft were later recovered but

Eddy's aircraft was a complete loss. The Marines

suffered a total of 19 casualties including the two

killed while two U.S. Army personnel required

hospitalization. Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, at the

time the lst MAW Chief of Staff, later wrote: ''It

was obvious to us in Japan from battle damage and

casualty reports of this mission that the VC were

really moving into the Da Nang area in strength and

that the situation was changing. ''10

In contrast to the helicopter squadrons, the

*The U. S. Army helicopters belonged to the Utility

Tactical Transport Detachment, 68th Aviation Company,

USA, also located at Da Nang. This unit provided the armed

helicopter escorts for Marine air operations since the Marines

did not have their organic fixed-wing attack aircraft support

with them at this time.

USMC Photo A183859

Lieutenant General Krulak, Lieutenant Colonel

Charles E. McPartlin, Jr., Commanding Officer, 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines; Brzadier General Karch,

and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir, 9th MEB

operations officer (left to right) study the terrain from

Hill 327 west of Da Nang. This hill was the highest

point in the 9th MEB area of operations.

Marine infantry battalions were confined to the

approximately eight square miles of relatively unpopulated terrain encompassing the airfield and the

high ground to the west which made up the MEB's

tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). * * Within the

Marines' TAOR, Bain's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

manned defenses on the airfield while McPartlin's 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines moved to forward positions

on hill mass 268- 327 due west of the base. There, the

latter battalion not only protected the airfield but also

provided security for Battery B of the LAAM

Battalion which moved to Hill 327. To accomplish

the mission of airfield defense, Bain's battalion

established an extensive system of listening posts

forward of the company defensive areas around the

According to Dictionary of United States Military Terms

for Joint Usage (JD), JCS Pub I (Washington: Dec 64), p. 169, a TAOR was 'a defined area of land in which responsibility is

specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the

development and maintenance of installations, control of

movement and the conduct of tactical operations involving

troops under his control

— -
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 19

USMC Photo A184119

HA WK missiles move to new positions on Hill 327 from the airfield. The missiles are from Battery B, 1st LAAM

Battalion.

airfield perimeter. The battalion was prepared to

support these posts with a strong reaction force

which could deploy rapidly to any sector of the

airfield. The inherent difficulty of the unit's

defensive assignment was that the battalion could not

establish listening posts or conduct defensive

reconnaissance patrols beyond the confines of the

airfield.

Although McPartlin's battalion ran patrols into

the hills to the west, his Marines encountered no

Viet Cong. In fact, the first Americans casualties

were inflicted by another Marine when two men

from a three-man listening post left their positions to

investigate a suspicious movement to their front.

The two men apparently lost their way in the dark

and came upon their remaining partner from the

rear. He turned and opened fire, mortally wounding

his two comrades.

Initially, the Marine infantrymen suffered more

from the heat and humidity than from the combat

situation. In order to reduce the number of heat

prostration casualties, General Karch restricted

defensive patrols and heavy work to the cooler hours

of the early morning and late afternoon.

Although acclimatization only required time,

other problems were not so easily solved. Relations

with the South Vietnamese often were difficult. For

example, Bain's relief of some ARVN forces at the

airfield on 13 March was delayed when the Vietnamese refused to leave their positions. The Marines

had to make further liaison with the ARVN

headquarters before completing the relief the next

day.

McPartlin's battalion recorded a similar ex- perience. The Marines attempted to establish a mutual check point with the Popular Forces (PF),

Vietnam's home defense militia.t The PFs showed

* Popular Forces were Vietnamese who were recruited and

served in their local villages and hamlets. Regional Forces

(RFs) were Vietnamese forces recruited within a province and

assigned to the province chief. Although comparison with the

U. S. institutions is not exact, one could say that PFs were

county- or parish-type troops while RFs were state forces.

..

•. •''
20 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

up at the check point, but then quickly disappeared.

These experiences with the PFs led McPartlin to

comment, ''that the PFs were most unreliable

military personnel.'" To add to the 3d Battalion's

problems, fire discipline in an ARVN training camp

southeast of the battalion was nonexistent.

Periodically, uncomfortable moments occurred as

ARVN recruits inadvertently fired towards the

unit's positions.

The area south and east of the airbase remained the

responsibility of the ARVN because General Thi

wanted to keep the Marines away from the populated

area, fearing that the Americans might provoke

incidents in the villages which would antagonize the

local populace.'2 Generals Thi and Karch reached an

agreement upon a set of "rules of engagement"

which also restricted the activities of the Marines.

The Marines were not to fire at persons beyond the

defensive wire of the airbase boundary, but they were

to report persons outside the wire to the Combined

Coordination Center established by the two corn - mands. General Karch made no secret about his

unhappiness with the defensive perimeter assigned to

the brigade: ''Actually this was not a satisfactory

arrangement. As a practical matter there is no doubt

that the brigade commander would have been held

responsible for any successful assault on the airfield.'"3

Estimate of the Situation

When the MEB was in place at Da Nang, General

Westmoreland and his staff reexamined the entire

American military effort in Vietnam. According to

the MACV commander:

We considered it appropriate to undertake a classical

USMC Photo A801078

Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler, Commanding Officer, 3d Marines (center), discusses the tactical situation with

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clement, commanding officer of the newly arrived 2dBattalion, 3d Marines (right).

The other officer in the picture is First Lieutenant Marx H. Branum, the forward air cont roller for the battalion.

e

V
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 21

USMC Photo A184342

Marines from BLT 3/4 on board a Marine helicopter en route to Phu Bai from Da Nang, These tro ops just arrived

in Vietnam.

commander's estimate of the situation to think through

in a logical and precise manner, strategy, objectives,

enemy capabilities, and our own courses of action before

making what may prove to be in the light of history, a

momentous recommendation .

By 26 March, Westmoreland had completed his

estimate and was prepared to provide the Washington

authorities with a resume of recommendations

already forwarded to Admiral Sharp and the Joint

Chiefs." He saw the military objectives of his

command in relatively simple terms. The American

goal was to cause the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (North Vietnam) to cease its support of the

VC, thus enabling an anti-Communist South

Vietnam to survive. To carry Out this policy, the

American general provided three alternatives.

Under the first, the United States Government

would give more aid to the buildup of the Vietnamese

Armed Forces, continue and expand air strikes

against North Vietnam, and use the resources of the

Seventh Fleet to interdict infiltration by sea. General

Westmoreland frankly did not believe this was

enough. It would not stabilize the Government of

South Vietnam and would offer no assurance for the

survival of the country.

The second proposal was the deployment of five

divisions, including three American, across Vietnam

and the Laotian panhandle near the 17th Parallel.

This would be coordinated with stepped-up air attacks against the north, while at the same time

strengthening the South Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Other American and Free World troops would be

sent to South Vietnam to deal with the Viet Cong

I, •.f

Jr

1 Iii
22 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184117

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace

M. Greene, Jr., inspects an honor guard at Da Nang

during a visit to Vietnam in April 1965. The

Commandant later told the press that the Marines

would be conducting more aggressive operations.

insurgency. General Westmoreland also rejected this

alternative; he did not think that in 1965 the lines of

communication or the port facilities in the country

could supply and support five divisions strung along

the parallel. He feared that by the time this could be

done, the war would be lost.

According to the general, this left only one feasible

solution. This was to continue the buildup of the

ARVN, intensify the air war against North Vietnam, and land the equivalent of two U.S. divisions

with their necessary combat and service support in

South Vietnam. The American forces would have a

three-fold mission: protection of vital U.S. installations; defeat of the Communist efforts to control

Kontum and Pleiku Provinces; and the establishment

of enclaves in the coastal region. General Westmoreland visualized that the total U.S. reinforcement

would consist of approximately 33,000 troops

deployed by June. He believed that the insertion of

American strength would blunt the Communist

offensive in the two northern corps areas and stiffen

the backbone of the South Vietnamese forces

throughout the country.

Most important for the Marine Corps was the

recommendation to reinforce the 4,685 personnel of

the 9th MEB. In addition to rounding out the force at

Da Nang with a third battalion, Westmoreland

suggested that a fourth be stationed at the Hue/Phu

Bai airstrip approximately eight miles south of Hue.

The MACV commander later wrote:

1 remained disturbed about possible enemy action

against other bases, notably a U.S. Army communications facility [manned by the U.S. Army 8th

Radio Research Unit] and a small airfield at Phu Bai, near

Hue, not a good field but at the time the best we had

north of the Hai Van Pass.'6

Although Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs had

already recommended approval of the Marine

deployment to Phu Bai, one influential Marine

general opposed this suggestion at the time.

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak,t then

Commanding General, fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(FMFPac) and perhaps the Marine Corps' leading

theoretician on counterinsurgency, later commented:

Here is an example of where dollar economics wagged

the tail of the military deployment. Phu Bai is as tactically

indefensible as anyone could imagine. General Westmoreland was determined, however, that we should go

there because of the existence of the 8th RRU. There was

an investment of probably 5 million dollars in the unit. It

was firmly locked to the Phu Bai plain and he was

determined not to see it move. He was reinforced by the

testimony of experts who said its location was particularly

good from a "technical'' point of view. Whether or not

this is true and our own . . . people strongly questioned it,

he insisted that we go there despite the tremendous land

barrier between Da Nang and Phu Bai, difficulty of

providing logistical support, and the many better uses to

which a Marine BLT could have been put. 1 believe we

would have been better off by far to have moved the 8th

RRU to another place and to have kept our forces more

concentrated. General Westmoreland felt differently and

Admiral Sharp was not prepared to override him.'" *

In any event, General Westmoreland's J-3,

General Krulak had served as the Special Assistant for

Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities for the Joint Chiefs

of Staff just prior to his assumption of command of FMFPac.

Although as CGFMFPac, General Krulak did not have

operational control of any of the Marine units committed to

Vietnam, he was responsible for the combat readiness and

logistic support of all Marines in the Pacific. A 1934 Naval

Academy graduate, the general earned the Navy Cross during

World War II. He was affectionately known throughout the

Corps as ''Brute,'' a nickname gained by the fact that he is five

feet, five inches tall.

The Center of Military History, Department of the Army,

made the following observation in its comments on the draft

manuscript, ''General Westmoreland also desired the BLT for

the defense of the air strip in that he intended to eventually

move the helicopters from Da Nang to Phu Bai to reduce

airfield congestion at Da Nang." CMH Comments on draft

MS, dtd 15Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

• .1 r ii.

11
THE 9TH MEB IN ViETNAM 23

Brigadier General William E. DePuy, accompanied

Ambassador Taylor to hand carry the MACV

"Estimate of the Situation" to Washington for a

special meeting of the National Security Council. At

this 1 April meeting, President Johnson made

several far-reaching decisions, two of which were of

particular concern to the Marine Corps. He approved

an 18,000- to 20,000-man increase in the U.S. forces

in Vietnam to include the deployment of additional

Marine forces. Furthermore, the President permitted

a change of mission for the 9th MEB which would

allow the use of Marines "in active combat under

conditions to be established and approved by the

Secretary of Defense in consultation with the

Secretary of State."18

More Marines Arrive

Initial Marine reinforcements were to consist of

both ground and air units. With growing tension in

the Far East, General Krulak had made plans at the

beginning of the year for the movement of Marine

forces and large-scale preparatory maneuvers. In

early February, he alerted two U.S. Marine fixedUSMC Photo A185086

Brigadier General Karch greets Lieutenant Colonel

William C. McGraw, Jr., Commanding Officer,

VMFA -531, upon arrival of the squadron at Da

Nang. VMFA -531, flying F-4B Phantom H aircraft,

was the first Marine fixed-wing tactical squadron to

deploy to Vietnam in 1965.

wing squadrons in the United States for deployment

to Japan in late March. Coincidentally, the FMFPac

commander scheduled the largest landing exercise

since World War II to take place on the west coast of

the United States in early March. The scenario for

the exercise, code named SILVER LANCE, reflected

the situation in Vietnam, featuring guerrillas, hard -

core aggressor forces, and political-military

problems.

In Hawaii, the ist Marine Brigade, consisting of

the 4th Marines and MAG- 13, made preparations to

reinforce the 1st Marine Division and the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing in SILVER LANCE. With the imminent landing of the 9th MEB in Vietnam, the

Pacific Command ordered the curtailment of forces

for the exercise at the last minute. At this time, 7

March, the Marines of the 1st Brigade were already

embarked in amphibious shipping. Crediting General

Krulak for "the amazing coincidence of the readiness

of the Brigade" for movement, Lieutenant Colonel

Rex C. Denny, Jr., then the Brigade G-3, 11 years

later recalled:

We were on again/off again for Okinawa. Then on

precisely the planned sailing date for SILVER LANCE

the shipping sailed from Pearl Harbor and turned

right instead of left. Perfect timing for the movement to

the Far East to be in position for the April troop

deployment to Vietnam.'9

The hastily planned deployments of Marine units

from Hawaii and the west coast to Okinawa and

Japan went smoothly. The 4th Marines, reinforced

by a reconnaissance company, antitank company,

and by an artillery battalion, the 3d Battalion, 12th

Marines, arrived and reported to the 3d Marine

Division on Okinawa by the end of March. At the

same time, MAG-13 became part of the ist Marine

Aircraft Wing in Japan.2°

On 25 March, Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)

311, one of the two squadrons alerted in February,

began its air transit from California to Japan,

followed two days later by the second air unit,

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 542.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. "Doc"

Savage, squadron commander of VMFA-542, the

two squadrons refueled in flight from Marine KC- 130

tankers, and "in leap frog fashion flew the Pacific in

some seven days time.'' The last elements of

VMFA-542 landed in Japan on 2 April, thus ending

Operation HAMMERHEAD, the code name for the

trans-Pacific flight. Savage wrote in 1976:

This movement not only marked the largest and

--
24 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184344

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines have just debarked from helicopters at Phu Bai. The troops in the

background, ready to embark in the same helicopter for the return trip to Da Nang, are from the 2d Battalion, 3d

Marines.

longest in-flight refueling operation for the Marine Corps

at this time, but dramatically illustrated the capability of

the Marines to move their air resources rapidly to meet a

possible combat situation.21

While the units of the 1st Brigade and the two

squadrons from the United States arrived in the

Western Pacific, plans for the deployment of the

Marine reinforcements authorized by the President

from Okinawa and Japan to Vietnam were completed. Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler's Regimental

Landing Team (RLT) 3, composed of the PIT

headquarters and two battalion landing teams, BLT

2/3 from his own regiment, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clement, and BLT 3/4

from the newly arrived 4th Marines, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Jones, made up the

ground component. Air elements of the reinforcements consisted of Lieutenant Colonels Paul L.

Hitchcock's Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS)

2 and William C. McGraw, Jr.'s VMFA-531. The

3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade headquarters,

which General Collins had activated on 14 March

under Lieutenant Colonel Edward Cook after the

landing of the 9th MEB, was to control the

movement. On 4 April, the 1st Brigade commander,

Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, a World War II

flying ace who had downed 18 Japanese aircraft,

assumed command of the 3d MEB. He left Okinawa

the following day to join Admiral Wuizen on board

the Mount McKinley at Subic Bay.

As the Mount McKinley weighed anchor for the

South China Sea, Task Force 76 and 3d MEB staffs

completed embarkation and landing plans. RLT 3,

BLT 3/4, and MASS-2 would sail from Okinawa on

board five tank landing ships. VMFA-531 would fly

its aircraft to Da Nang, while its heavy support

equipment would follow in amphibious shipping.

Lieutenant Colonel Clement's BLT 2 / 3 was already

on board the ships of Navy Task Group 76.6, having

completed the JUNGLE DRUM Ill exercise in

Thailand. On 4 April, while underway for the

Philippines, the task group received instructions to

move to a position 50 miles off the coast of Da Nang.

The amphibious squadron arrived there the next day

and awaited further landing instructions.

Landing plans of the 3d MEB directed Lieutenant

Colonel Clement, a holder of the Silver Star from the

Korean War, to land his battalion over RED Beach 2

while the supplies and heavy equipment of the

battalion landing team were unloaded at the LST

landing on the Tiensha Peninsula, across the Da

I,

.4* - r

/ I
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 25

Nang River from Da Nang. * Two companies of BLT

2/3 were to be lifted to Phu Bai and await BLT 3/4.

Upon the arrival of Jones' battalion, two of his

companies were to land across RED Beach 2 and

were then to relieve Clement's force at Phu Bai. The

rest of BLT 3/4 would remain on board the transports and the task group would move north to the

mouth of the Hue River where the Marines and their

equipment would unload into landing craft for the

trip to Hue City. Lieutenant Colonel Denny, then

the 3d MEB G- 3, later recalled:

coordination for this landing plan had to be worked

closely with the 9th MEB, requiring several trips from

the Mount McKinley to Da Nang. In fact, command

relations were not clear to all at this point. The 9th MEB

wanted control and those of us on the 3d MEB staff

wanted control until the troops were ashore 22 It was finally resolved that the 9th MEB would

assume control of each unit as it landed.

On the morning of 10 April, Navy Task Group

76.6, joined by the flagship Mount McKinley,

entered Da Nang harbor. In contrast to the landing of

8 March, the sea was calm with only a light wind

blowing from the south. Visibility was unrestricted

with a slightly overcast sky.

At 0823, the first of five waves touched down on

RED Beach 2. By 1310, the landing was completed.

The ships then moved to positions off Tiensha

Peninsula and general unloading continued. A

provisional task force under Lieutenant Colonel

Clement, consisting of Companies F and G of the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines and support elements was

helilifted to Phu Bai. At Da Nang, Company H took

up positions on Hills 278 and 312 north of the high

ground held by the lst Battalion, 3d Marines while

Company E remained on board the ships to assist

with the unloading. The next day, Company E joined

Company H. General Westmoreland complimented

General Karch:

MACV staff officers who observed the amphibious

landing at Da Nang and air movement to Phu Bai of

elements of your command on 10 April report the

movement was accomplished smoothly and profes-

*According to Major Marc A. Moore, the S-3 of the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines, ''The original plan called for unloading

BLT 2/3 at the mouth of the Hue River and moving to Hue via

the river with flank security on each bank. A specific plan was

drawn up to carry Out this operation, but was canceled in favor

of the plan described in the text.' 'BGen Marc A. Moore,

Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov76] (Vietnam Comment

File).

sionally, reflecting high standards of training, discipline,

and esprit. Congratulations to you and others responsible. 23

On the same day that BLT 2/3 landed, VMFA-531

arrived at Da Nang from Atsugi, Japan. Lieutenant

Colonel McGraw's squadron was an all-weather jet

fighter/interceptor unit equipped with the

Navy/Marine Corps version of the McDonnell

Phantom II, the F-4B. General Westmoreland had

requested a Phantom squadron because it was capable

of performing both tactical missions within South

Vietnam and strike missions against North Vietnam.

McGraw had received his deployment orders at 0930

from General Fontana 's headquarters and the first

flight of four Phantoms was airborne within five

hours. * * * Refueling in flight from two Marine KC1 30s southwest of Okinawa, the planes arrived at Da

Nang five and one-half hours after takeoff. Later that

afternoon the remaining 11 F-4Bs took off. These

aircraft stopped for refueling at the Naval Air

Station, Cubi Point, Philippines and arrived in

Vietnam the next morning. Most of the squadron

personnel and light support equipment arrived the

same day in Marine KC-130s of Marine Transport

Refueler Squadron (VMGR) 152. The heavy

equipment closed on Da Nang 11 days later on board

the tank landing ship Snohomish County (LST 1126).

The entire squadron movement had gone so

smoothly that the wing commander, General

Fontana, remarked: "it was a splendid demonstration of operation and coordination of all concerned . . . a fine professional performance. "24

On 12 April, RLT 3 headquarters, which had

embarked on amphibious shipping at Okinawa,

arrived at Da Nang. Colonel Wheeler, a former

Marine raider, had arrived in Vietnam by aircraft a

week earlier than his command. This was not his first

* * Lieutenant Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr. was a veteran

of World War II and Korea; in the latter war he had flown 82

combat missions and had earned the Distinguished Flying

Cross. In 1962 while serving as a test pilot, he set two world

class records in aerial flight in a F-4H Phantom II. * * Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor wrote in November 1976:

"The movement of VMFA 531 was impeded somewhat by a

last minute question among the major commands involved, as

to whether it was appropriate for a combat air unit to deploy

directly from a base in Japan to South Vietnam. The delay

involved questions of Japan's neutrality in the South Vietnam

situation. For this reason, later flights of combat aircraft flew

via the Philippines." Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
26 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A 184049

Marines from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines hurry to board a waiting helicopter. They will reinforce a recon -

naissance patrol south of Da Nang.

visit to Vietnam; he had landed with airlifted Marine

elements on 10 March and had remained in Vietnam

for 10 days to discuss the possibility of the future

deployment of the remainder of the 9th MEB. Now

upon his return, Wheeler quickly completed a survey

of the areas for which he would be responsible upon

the arrival of RLT 3 and BLTs 2/3 and 3/4: the

defense of Da Nang Airfield, and the 8th RRU area

and airstrip at Phu Bai. He flew to Hue to meet with

Brigadier General Nguyen Van Chuan, commanding

general of the 1st AR\TN Division, to discuss and

coordinate Marine activities there. On the 18th, he

reorganized his RLT under the 9th MEB structure as

the 3d Marines, Reinforced.

While the Da Nang landings presented few

problems to the Marines, Hue posed an entirely

different situation. On 23 March, a detachment of

the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, under the

command of Captain David Whittingham, and a

Navy underwater demolition team surveyed landing

beaches and movement routes to the Phu Bai area.

The intelligence collected indicated that unloading at

sea off the coast and then boating up the Hue River

(or Song Huong, better known to westerners as the

Perfume River) to Hue by landing craft was the most

feasible plan. Personnel and equipment could then

move south by truck along Route ito Phu Bai.

Rear Admiral Wulzen and his staff were not

convinced that the Hue River transit was desirable.

They believed that there was a lack of detailed information on sandbars, water depth, and most im -

portant, VC strength in the area. To overcome the

Navy's objection, the 3d MEB commander decided

to take a look for himself. General Carl flew to Hue

where Brigadier General Chuan provided him with

four outboard motor boats. With four ARVN

soldiers in both the lead and rear boats, General Carl

and his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Denny, in the

second boat, and two American noncommissioned

officers in the third, the ''armada'' set out. They

traveled the entire length of the river to the South

China Sea and returned to Hue, the trip taking

approximately five hours. Although uneventful, the

trip provided the desired information. Denny later

recalled:

when the Navy at the next planning meeting

brought up the hazards of the Hue River, General Carl

said he had personally reconnoitered the river [and] this

ended all discussion on the subject and the Navy put the

stamp of approval on the landing plans.2'

On 14 April, BLT 3/4 began landing. The amphibious ships had arrived from Okinawa and anchored in the Da Nang harbor at 0500 that day.

Three and one-half hours later, two companies

• s__a
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 27

landed across RED Beach 2 and were flown to Phu

Bai, where they relieved the task force from the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines that had been positioned there

four days earlier. The last elements of the latter

battalion departed for Da Nang on the 15th. Colonel

King, in the meantime, stationed 10 UH- 34Ds at the

Phu Bai airstrip to support the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines.

The remainder of the Navy Task Group 76.7 had

sailed up the coast to the mouth of the Hue River

where the ships anchored late on the evening of the

14th. Before dawn on the 15th, the ships lowered

their LCMs and LCVPs; the boats were divided into

small groups of four to six craft and the first of these

groups departed for Hue, 11 miles inland, at 0640.

As the craft approached the landing site in the city,

they turned, beached, and lowered their front ramps

together. The Marines in full combat gear stepped

ashore to be met by an AR\TN band and 500 cheering

Vietnamese holding aloft a large banner reading

"Welcome, U. S. Marines." Dressed in summer

white uniforms, the sailors of the Navy beach group

supporting the operation also were on hand to greet

the Marines. The troops piled into trucks and

proceeded south through the city to the base at Phu

Bai. The river operation was completed on 19 April.

The Navy landing craft made 263 trips, carried 1,371

tons of cargo, and traveled 6,000 miles.

Two other Marine units arrived at Da Nang

during April. Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Hitchcock's MASS-2 debarked during the morning of 16

April. The squadron proceeded to the airfield, where

it was assigned to a living area with the LAAM

battalion elements west of the runway. The MASS-2

troops immediately began erecting facilities for a

direct air support center (DASC) and an air support

radar team (ASRT) site.4

The last Marine unit to arrive in Vietnam during

the month was Marine Composite Reconnaissance

Squadron (VMCJ) 1, less detachments, with six

Douglas EF-1OB (F3D-2Q) Skynight jets. Lieutenant

* DASC provides the tactical air control system required for

control and direction of close air support and other tactical air

support operations; it is normally collocated with fire support

coordination elements. An ASRT is a subordinate operational

component of the DASC. These teams vector aircraft to targets

and provide ground-controlled precision flight path guidance

and weapons release at night and during periods of low ceiling

and reduced visibility.

Colonel Otis W. Corman, commander of the unit,

led the squadron onto the Da Nang Airfield on 17

April. This squadron, previously based in Japan, was

not new to air operations in Southeast Asia. Since

1964, it had provided the Navy and Air Force with

electronic countermeasure support. Although administratively assigned to MAG-16 upon arrival, the

unit's activities were directed by the U.S.Air Force

2d Air Division. According to Lieutenant Colonel

Corman, the directive which placed VMCJ-1 under

the operational control of MACV authorized U.S.

Navy Forces to use:

Marine air in accordance with their normal and

established practices. . . . It directed MACV to coordinate U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force requirements for

Marine air EW [electronic warfare] support. This

coordination was accomplished by designating 2d Air Div

as his coordinating authority.26

With the arrival of two fixed-wing squadrons, two

infantry battalions, and support elements, the MEB

reached a strength of 8,878 by the end of April. The

brigade now consisted of a four-battalion regiment

and a four-squadron Marine aircraft group, as well as

artillery and engineer groups and a logistic support

group. General Karch was satisfied that he could

handje anything that the enemy could throw at

him.27

An Expanded Mission

As significant as the arrival of reinforcements was

the Presidential decision to lift the restrictions on the

Marine infantry battalions and permit them to

engage in counterinsurgency operations. On 14

April, General Westmoreland provided the MEB

with a concept of operations which he divided into

four phases: establishment of defensive bases; deep

reconnaissance patrols of the enemy's avenues of

approach; offensive action as a reaction force in

coordination with the Vietnamese; and finally,

"undertake in coordination with RVN I Corps, an

intensifying program of offensive operations to fix

and destroy the VC in the general Da Nang area."28

General Karch immediately attempted to implement his new orders. He met with General Thi

the same day to negotiate for the realignment of the

Marine TAOR in the Da Nang area. After two days

of talks, they agreed to a four square mile increase in

the Marine area of responsibility, but this still did not

include the terrain just south of the airbase. The

number of villages in the Da Nang sector under
28 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marine control increased from one to three, and

hamlets from three to 15, with a total population of

11,441.

General Krulak was present at the discussion. He

recalled that:

Thi was opposed to any patrol or offensive action on

our part outside the airfield perimeter. With respect to the

area south of the field and on the bank of the Da Nang

River, he said, ''This is enemy country. You are not

ready to operate there.'' 29

Marine operations in the Phu Bai area were also

the subject of discussion with Vietnamese

authorities. Colonel Wheeler and Lieutenant Colonel

Jones held several informal conferences at Hue and

Phu Bai with Brigadier General Chuan, the commanding general of the 1st ARVN Division and the

Phu Bai Special Sector, concerning the assignment of

the Marines and their mission. It was decided that

the Vietnamese would be responsible for the defense

of the villages bordering the base on the north and

east. Within the Marine sector, the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines would conduct defensive operations "with

emphasis on quick reaction offensive moves" within

the TAOR.3° The Marines and South Vietnamese

troops of the Phu Bai (Dong Da) Special Sector would

establish a combined operations center for the

coordination of efforts. Check points along Route 1 in

the Marine TAOR were to be manned by ARVN

personnel and supported by the Marine battalion.

On 20 April, the Marines began patrol activities

beyond their TAORs at Da Nang and Phu Bai, as far

as six miles in front of their former positions. These

patrols included ARVN troops and Vietnamese civil

affairs officers to avoid incidents with Vietnamese

villagers. The extended patrolling resulted in the

Marines' first fire fights with the VC. On the 22d, a

patrol from Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion accompanied by 38 South Vietnamese troops,

encountered a Viet Cong force of approximately 105

men near the village of Binh Thai, nine miles southwest of Da Nang. A company from Lieutenant

Colonel Bain's battalion was helilifted into the area

to reinforce the reconnaissance unit. They pursued

the enemy to the south and west, but lost contact and

returned to the battalion area. The results of this first

engagement were one Viet Cong killed and one

Marine slightly wounded. A second engagement

occurred two days later when a Marine reconnaissance platoon was attacked on a hilltop 2,000

meters south of Phu Bai by an undetermined number

USMC Photo A184031

Lieutenant Colonel Herbert J. Bain, Commanding

Officer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (center left),

confers with his operations officer, Captain Gaetano

F. Squillace (right), and his forward air controller

Captain John W. Garriott, in a VC-dominated

hamlet south of Da Nang. The arch under which

they are standing was built by the Viet Cong.

of enemy. Two Viet Cong and two Marines were

killed.

Very little was known about the enemy. A Marine

staff officer commented, "intelligence of what the

situation was, was non-existent.' '31 This of course

was an exaggeration; the MEB and MACV staffs had

some idea of enemy forces in the area. They credited

the VC with seven combat units totaling 560 troops

within 25 miles of Da Nang; within 50 miles, 14

enemy combat units, ranging from company to

regimental size, with a total of 1,480 personnel.

What was lacking was knowledge of the day -to-day

movements of the Communist forces, their

disposition, and their influence upon the people.

General Karch remarked that, from the day of the

landing, reports indicated a continuing enemy

buildup in the area. Most of this intelligence had

been attained from hired agents who were paid ac-

- -t

... ——- :• --
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 29

Navy Photo 1111761

cording to the significance of their information.

Their veracity was highly doubtful at best.

Even with the expansion of the Marine mission,

contact with enemy forces remained slight. General

Karch noted:

when we had reached the limit of our Phase 11

TAOR we still had encountered no VC in strength other

than undersized platoons . . . After a few sniper shots

were fired at the patrol and [the Marines] moved out to

attack, the VC disappeared. Also the only attack . . . at Phu Bai could well have been a mistake . . . or a chance

encounter . . . it was broken off immediately after the first

exchange of fire.

The Marines had accomplished their basic mission,

the defense of the Da Nang and Phu Bai bases, but as

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant

of the Marine Corps, observed during a visit to the

MEB: "You don't defend a place by sitting on your

ditty box."33

Chu Lai

By the end of April, the days of the 9th MEB in

Vietnam were numbered. Throughout the month,

the question of American participation in the war

preoccupied those in authority. On 20 April, a highlevel conference convened at CinCPac headquarters

in Honolulu attended by Secretary of Defense Robert

S. McNamara, his Assistant Secretary of International Security Affairs, John McNaughton,

Ambassador Taylor, Generals Wheeler and

Westmoreland, and Admiral Sharp. The conferees

reached a consensus that the relatively light Viet

Cong activity was the lull before the storm and

recommended the additional deployment of 42,000

U.S. servicemen to Vietnam, induding 5,000 more

Marines. These Marine forces, organized into three

reinforced battalions and three jet aircraft squadrons,

were to establish another enclave at Chu Lai, 57

miles southeast of Da Nang.34

The Chu Lai coastal plain lies astride the boundary

dividing the two southern provinces of I CTZ,

Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. A few miles inland and

west of the plain are the heavily jungled and extremely rugged Annamite Mountains. Route 1, an

all-weather, macadam road, parallels the sea,

bisecting the plain. This national highway, stretching from Saigon to the DMZ, connects the area with

Da Nang to the northwest and Quang Ngai City, 20

miles to the south.

The selection of Chu Lai as the base for the next

increment of Marine forces resulted from an exMarine amphibian tractors move across Route 1 after landingat Chu Lai,

—''-' —

a — - —: .

- : —

4. —.- V
30 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

tended Pentagon debate which lasted over several

months concerning the building of an expeditionary

airfield south of Da Nang. The proposal for the

construction of the expeditionary field originated

with General Krulak. Krulak had selected the Chu

Lai site on an inspection tour the previous year and

gave the future base its name. According to the

FMFPac commander, a naval officer accompanying

him on the trip remarked that the place looked good,

but was not marked on the maps. Krulak replied that

the name was "Chu Lai" but later explained: "In

order to settle the matter immediately, I had simply

given him the Mandarin Chinese characters for my

name."3' In any event, Krulak suggested that the

Chu Lai airfield be built according to a Marine Corps

concept still in its early stages which employed metal

runways and taxistrips. The program, called short

airfield for tactical support (SATS), had been

developed to meet Marine Corps requirements for

the rapid construction of short expeditionary airfields, in effect shore-based carrier decks. Although

the proposed field at Chu Lai would not qualify as

"short," it would make use of SATS components

including catapults and arresting gear.4

On 30 March 1965, Secretary McNamara tentatively approved the building of the SATS field at

Chu Lai but the final decision, according to General

Krulak, was not made until late April after the highlevel Honolulu Conference. At this conference,

representatives from the U. S. Pacific Air Forces

command had made a presentation stating that it

would take about 11 months to build a concrete

airfield. General Krulak then described the SATS

concept after which, Krulak remembered:

[Secretary of Defense] McNamara, in his characteristic

bottom line manner, said "how long?'' I hesitated for a

moment and then said, "25 days." Keith McCutcheon

had to live with my estimate. 36

to Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Goode, who

was the 1st MAW engineering officer: "The concept of a short

Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) is for a runway 2,000 to

3,000 feet long by 72 feet wide, with a parallel taxiway and the

necessary parking space for aircraft. It was envisioned that the

Chu Lai field would be required to be in operation for a longer

period of time, and would be required to support many more

aircraft; therefore, the design was made accordingly. The final

design specified a runway 8,000 feet long by 102 feet wide.

Obviously this could no longer be termed a Short Airfield for

Tactical Support. It was Sometimes facetiously referred to as a

LATS—a Long Airfield for Tactical Support." LtCoI Charles

L. Goode, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam

Comment File).

After the McNamara decision of 30 March, Major

General Paul J. Fontana, the commander of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing in Japan, briefed his senior

officers about the proposed Chu Lai airfield. He

selected the MAG-12 S-i, Major Frank P. Costello,

Jr., who had worked with SATS since its inception at

Quantico, to be the wing project officer.

On 3 April, Major Costello accompanied General

Carl, members of his staff, and the 1st MAW

engineering officer, lieutenant Colonel Charles L.

Goode, on a reconnaissance of the Chu Lai site.

While making their inspection, the Carl party

happened upon some markers apparently placed there

by a civilian airfield survey team. According to

lieutenant Colonel Denny, Carl's operation officer:

I recall that we . . . were to meet a civilian survey party

on the beach at Chu Lai. They didn't show. General Carl

found some markers . . . and then because we "had to get

on with it'' stepped off the SATS field. . . Lieutenant Colonel Goode remembered that the Carl

party remained on the site for only two hours and,

"From this very brief reconnaissance and from the

available maps and photographs of the area, the

location of the runway and supporting facilities was

determined and detailed planning commenced.' '38

After completing the reconnaissance, General Carl

reported to General Westmoreland in Saigon and

mentioned the survey markers found at Chu Lai. The

MACV Commander replied that he did not know the

specifics of the civilian survey and suggested that the

selection of the exact location for both the SATS field

and a later permanent airfield would require further

study.

Lieutenant Colonel Goode and Major Costello

returned to Japan where they developed the plans for

the operating areas of the airbase. It was determined

that approximately 1,400,000 square feet of

aluminum matting would be required for the runway, taxiways, and supporting areas.44 The end

results would be an airfield with an 8,000 by 102 foot

runway, a 7,916 by 36 foot parallel taxiway, four 300

by 36 foot cross taxiways, and parking and maintenance facilities for three tactical squadrons.

On 25 April, President Johnson approved the

recommendation of the Honolulu Conference to land

Marines at Chu Lai for the construction of the airfield

The 1,400,000 square feet of matting was every plank the

Marine Corps had in the Far East. LtCol Frank P. Costello, Jr.,

Comments on Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2,"

dtd 17Feb70 (Vietnam Comment File).
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 31 and the establishment of a third Marine enclave in

Vietnam. Three days later, the Marine Corps

reactivated General Carl's 3d MEB for the second

time within three weeks, its headquarters having

returned to Okinawa after completing the RLT 3 and

BLTs 2 / 3 and 3/4 deployments. Colonel O'Connor,

the 1st MAW chief of staff, recalled that General

Carl at first wanted to employ the former 1st Brigade

intact, including both the 4th Marines and MAG-1 3,

for the Chu Lai landings. Carl and Colonel Ralph H.

"Smoke" Spanjer, the MAG-13 commander, attempted to convince General Fontana, the wing

commander, to include MAG- 13 as pact of the Chu

I.ai forces. According to O'Connor:

General Fontana listened patiently to the first

presentation, but then informed them that, in view of the

considerable planning that had taken place before their

arrival, MAG-12 at Iwakuni was the group that would

deploy. General Carl and Col Spanjer made at least two

appeals of this decision . . . Col Span jer brought in many

visual aids explaining his concept of operation of a SATS

field at Chu Lai. General Fontana finally tired of the

pressure, and told Spanjer very firmly that MAG-12 was

in and MAG-13 was out!'9

With this decision made, on 29 April General Carl

and his staff flew from Okinawa to the Philippines to

join Admiral Wulzen on board the amphibious

flagship USS .Estes (AGC 12). The 3d MEB landing

forces for Chu Lai were to consist of Colonel Edward

P. Dupras, Jr.'s RLT 4 headquarters, two BLTs,

BLT 1 / 4 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harold

D. Fredericks and BLT 2/4 commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. "Bull" Fisher, and

lieutenant Colonel Don H. Blanchard's 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Wilson's MABS-12 and Commander John M.

Bannister's Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

(NMCB) 10 were attached to the MEB for the construction of the airfield. The rest of MAG-12 would

arrive after the SATS field was completed.

When General Carl and his staff arrived on board

the Esies, the MEB commander delegated planning

* A former member of MAG-13, Major Gary W. Parker,

then a young lieutenant with HMM-161, recalled "Colonel

Span jer in his attempts to persuade the higher echelons of the

merits of MAG-13 had a calling card made up which was

distributed throughout the wing. In the upper left hand corner

it read-'Have MAG-Will Travel.' at the bottom right hand

corner it said-'Wire Smoke-Futema." Maj Gary W. Parker,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Jan77 (Vietnam Comment

File).

for the landing to his chief of staff, Colonel Norman

R. Nickerson. According to Nickerson, General Carl

told him "to run the show and to report to him daily

the progress of planning for the Chu Lai operation."

Colonel Nickerson stated that despite the fact that

time was short and the staff was small, and composed

of "officers that he had not previously known, the

Chu Lai Operation Plan/Order was completed on

schedule."4°

The initial planning concept for the MEB was

based on an opposed landing. According to the intelligence available to the planners, the VC operated

in strength throughout the Chu Lai area, with approximately 500 Viet Cong living in the local villages

and hamlets. The sector included a Communist

resupply route from the sea to the VC Do Xa base

area, 50 miles to the west. It was estimated that the

enemy could mass 2,000 trcops in 24hours and could

reinforce with another 2,000 men within 72 hours.

The plan called for RLT 4 to land BLTs 2/4 and

1/4, minus two companies, across the beach; two

BLT 1/4 companies would make a helicopter assault

of an area inland from the beach. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion was to follow the two assault

battalions across the beach. The planners scheduled

a traditional prelandirig air and naval bombardment

to isolate the beach area. They also planned that the

2d ARVN Division would secure the outer perimeter

for an extended period of time.

General Westmoreland was dubious about the

landing concept. He believed that two infantry

battalions, even if reinforced by a reconnaissance

battalion, were an inadequate force to guarantee the

permanent defense of Chu Lai. The MACV commander was of the opinion that the 2d ARVN

Division, because of its other responsibilities, could

not provide adequate perimeter defense for more than

a few days. He strongly urged that an additional

Marine infantry battalion be added to the Marine

brigade. On the other hand, Westmoreland considered the possibility of the enemy opposing the

landing to be extremely remote and recommended

that the naval and air bombardment be eliminated,

although the ships and planes should remain on

station. He declared that elements of the 2d ARVN

Division would secure the landing site.

General Westmoreland radioed General Collins

requesting a meeting in Saigon to iron out the differences. On 30 April, Generals Collins and Fontana

departed for Saigon, stopping off at Subic Bay to
32 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A 184206

South Vietnamese troops secure the Chu Lai area. Their U.S. Army advisors have made a sign to greet the

Marines.

confer with General Carl and Admiral Waizen, the

task force commander. General Throckmorton,

Deputy ComUSMACV, chaired the conference held

in Saigon on 1 and 2 May. He declared that there

were three assumptions that everyone present had to

accept: the landing would be unopposed; the area at

Chu Lai would have been cleared; and that there

would be some civilians in the general area of the

landing. An agreement among all the participants

was finally reached. A third battalion, BLT 3/3, was

added to the 3d MEB to be brought ashore after the

initial landing was completed. The prelanding air

strikes and naval shore bombardment were changed

to planned on-call missions to be used only if the

enemy opposed the landing. Marine Aircraft Group

16 would provide limited fixed-wing and helicopter

support; Navy Task Force 77 aircraft would fly cover

for the Marines; and the U.S. 2d Air Division would

be available for additional support. The conferrees

agreed to postpone the landing until 7 May to allow

for further coordination with the Vietnamese

authorities 41

After the Saigon meeting was over, Generals

Collins and Fontana departed for Da Nang. Colonel

Hardy Hay, the 3d Marine Division operations

officer, recalled:

The coverage given the Saigon meeting for the Chu Lai

landings was really the major springboard for General

Collins and Ito remain in Da Nang . . . Up to this point

we had, since leaving Okinawa, sort of ignored sending

movement reports. 42

From another vantage point, Colonel O'Connor,

the 1st MAW chief of staff, remembered:

I was aware of the very poor high level command

communications. Reports of enemy activity in the Chu

Lai area had generated a strong inclination on the part of

the sea-based forces to make a conventional preparation of

the objective area, in anticipation of an opposed landing.

O'Connor remarked further:

The air was full of messages about enemy capabilities,

friendly plans, and schedules of coordinating meetings at

Saigon, Okinawa, Subic Bay and Da Nang. Finally, it was

apparent that message traffic was completely Out of phase

with reality, and the two-day postponement of the landing

was invoked to prevent the disaster of an amphibious task

force firing on friendly forces in the objective area.43

On 3 May, the Estes rendezvoused with the rest of

the amphibious task force off the coast of South

Vietnam and then proceeded to the vicinity of Da

Nang where Admiral Wulzen and General Carl met

with General Collins to discuss the landing. At the
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM 33

end of these talks, the commander set H-Hour for the

amphibious portion of the operation at 0800, 7 May.

Units from the ARVN 2d Division which had

secured the Chu Lai area were joined on 6 May by

Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines from Da

Nang to provide additional beach security. All was

ready and the U.S. Army advisors with the ARVN

had even prepared their own sign to greet the landing

force, "Ahoy Marines: Welcome Aboard, Area

Secured." Colonel Edward Cook, who at the time

was General Collins' G-2, in 1976 wrote:

Prior to the landing, I was at General Lam's[Brigadier

General Hoang Xuan Lam] headquarters for his briefing

on the coordination required between units from his

ARVN 2d Division and the Landing Force. I asked him to

show me specifically where his units would be and how

they would phase their withdrawal as our landing force

advanced. He called for a piece of overlay paper, put it

over a map and drew a series of phase lines. When he was

completed with the clear, concise, and explicit overlay, he

gave it to me and said, ''Just like they do it at Quan- tico. ''

Early on the morning of the 7th, the ships of the

task force arrived at the transport area off Chu Lai.

As planned, at 0800, BLT 1/4 Companies C and D

and BLT 2/4 began landing over RED Beach. After

crossing the beach, the two companies of the 1st

Battalion moved to Landing Zone ROBIN, approximately three miles from the waterline and

overlooking Route 1. They quickly secured the LZ

and then the helicopters of HMM-161, Lieutenant

Colonel Gene W. Morrison commanding, flew in the

battalion's remaining two companies from the USS

. The troops met no resistance and occupied their planned objectives. The only casualties

were four Marines suffering from the heat and

humidity. The scene on the beach was reminiscent of

the previous landings the Marines had made in

Vietnam. In addition to the usual number of Vietnamese flower maidens and members of the press

* HMM-161 supported the RLT-4 landing from the Princeton until 7 May. On that day, the Navy changed amphibious

assault ships (LPHs), substituting the Iwo Jima (LPH-2) for the

Princeton. Morrison's squadron moved to the Iwo Jima which

remained positioned off the Chu Lai coast until 12 June.

During that period, the squadron provided helicopter support

for Colonel Dupras' Marines. On 13 June, the ship moved to a

position off the coast from Phu Bai where the squadron

unloaded, moved to the Phu Bai airstrip, was placed under the

operational control of MAG-16, and began to fly in support of

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.

Navy Photo 1111513

Troops from the 4th Marines move inland across the

soft Chu Lai sand under a welcoming Vietnamese

banner. Marine helicopters are seen flying overhead,

corps, Generals Thi, Throckmorton, and Collins

were on hand to greet the first waves of troops. The

Marines were too busy to pay much attention to the

festivities.

By the end of the first day, Colonel Dupras had

established his headquarters ashore; his infantry

battalions and supporting arms were all in place. The

4th Marines' defensive perimeter extended in an

irregular arc from the Ky Ha Peninsula in the north,

to the high ground in the west, and from there

seaward to a point three miles south of RED Beach.

The southern flank was screened by the 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion.

The landing of troops and establishment of the

defensive lines proved to be the easiest part of the

entire operation. The movement of supplies across

the beach was a frustrating experience. General

Krulak described the Chu Lai Beach area "as great a

challenge as any foreshore that I have ever seen. The

sand is of powdered sugar consistency and no

wheeled vehicle can negotiate it with success."4'

Although reducing tire pressure provided some

traction, a shortage of beach matting and the fine

sand forced the Marines to use tracked vehides to

move material inland. Colonel William M. Graham,

Jr., at the time the 3d Marine Division engineering

officer, related that a:

civilian soil consultant was hired to sample the sand

iflL

ik 1AC ci l-PLit&V RI
34 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184276

Brigadier General Karch (center, 1st row) poses with members ofhis 9th MEB staffat Da Nang. The 9th MEB

was shortly afterwards deactivated and replaced by the newlyformed III MAP.

in the area and report its physical properties so a decision

could be made whether to put rubber tired or tracked

equipment in the area. The report indicated rubber tired

equipment, therefore the "Snafu." I never did find out

whether they gave a wrong analysis or took the samples

from the wrong site. 46·

A tempor,;lry impasse occurred on 9 May when the

attempt was made to unload the airfield matting. The

• Colonel Graham was of the opinion that the markers that

the Carl party found during their 3 April reconnaissance of Chu

Lai may have been left by the civilian soil party, but General

Wallace M. Greene, Jr., suggested that the markers may have

been placed there during a reconnaissance of the beach area by

the Marine 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. Col William

M. Graham, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File); Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr.,

Comments on draft MS, dtd lAug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

See Chapter 11, Reconnaissance Section, for an account of the

1st Force Reconnaissance Company's beach surveys of the Chu

Lai area.

first lift, 68 tons, was placed on flatbed trailers and

brought ashore by an LCU. The entire unloading

came to a complete standstill; the heavily laden

trucks could not move in the deep sand without

assistance. The movement of the matting to the

airfield site took five and a half hours. To try to

expedite the process, the Navy beach group decided

to break up the causeway installed on the south end

ofthe beach and use the floating sections as makeshift

barges. Approximately 200 bundles of matting could

be loaded on one "barge" which could then be

floated to a point directly opposite the proposed

airfield site, thereby reducing the movement

distance. Although this eased the situation, the

problem of movement on the beach remained.

Finally, on 10 May, the 3d Marine Division provided

an additional 2,500 feet of badly needed beach

matting which somewhat alleviated the situation.

At noon on 12 May, the amphibious operation
THE 9TH MEB IN VIETNAM

officially came to an end. On this date, the first

elements of BLT 3/3, arriving in amphibious

shipping from Okinawa, assumed defensive positions

on the southern flank, relieving the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. During the five-day period, 7-12

May, more than 10,925 tons of equipment and

supplies had been unloaded and moved across the

beach.

With the completion of the Chu Lai amphibious

landing, seven of the nine infantry battalions of the

3d Marine Division, supported by most of the 12th

35 Marines, the artillery regiment of the division, and a

large portion of the 1st MAW were in South

Vietnam. As a result, the 9th MEB was deactivated

and replaced by a new Marine organization, the Ill

Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).

*

In the Pacific, one other change in designation of Marine

units occurred during May. On the 25th, the 1st Marine

Brigade (Rear) at Hawaii consisting of the brigade support

elements under the command of Colonel Jack E. Hanthorn was

redesignated the 1st Marine Brigade. Colonel Hanthorn

relieved General Carl as brigade commander.
CHAPTER 3

Formation and Development of III MAF

The Birth of III MAF—The Le My Experiment—Building the Chu Liii Airfield—ill MAE

in Transition—The Seeds of Pacification —June Operations in the Three Enclaves

The Birth of HI MAF

The birth of III Marine Amphibious Force occurred almost simultaneously with the landing at

Chu Lai. On 5 May, the Joint Chiefs relayed

Presidential approval for the deployment to Da Nang

of a Marine ''force/division/wing headquarters to

include CG 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing.' 1 The following day, Major General

Collins, who had remained in Vietnam after the

Saigon meeting earlier in the month, assumed

command of the Naval Component Command and

also established the headquarters of the Ill Marine

Expeditionary Force and the 3d Marine Division in

Vietnam. The former 9th MEB commander,

Brigadier General Karch, resumed his duties as

assistant division commander and left for Okinawa to

take over the units of the division remaining there.

Brigadier General Carl became Deputy Commander,

HI MAF after the Chu Lai landing.

The HI Marine Expeditionary Force became the III

Marine Amphibious Force on 7 May. General

Westmoreland had recommended to the Joint Chiefs

that the Marines select a different designation for

their command because the term "Expeditionary"

had unpleasant connotations for the Vietnamese,

stemming from the days of the French Expeditionary

Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Commandant, General Greene, to come up with another

name. Although a III Marine Amphibious Corps had

existed in the Pacific Theater during World War H,

and was a logical choice for the name of the new

Marine organization in Vietnam, several of the

Commandant's advisors believed that the Vietnamese might take exception to the word "Corps."

Consequently, General Greene chose the title Ill

Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) for the Marine

k)rces in Vietnam and extended this revision to the

Marine brigades.2

36

One other major headquarters arrived at Da Nang

during this period. On 11 May, Major General

Fontana established a forward headquarters of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing in Vietnam (1st MAW

Advance). Four days later, his Da Nang

headquarters assumed command of all Marine

aviation in the country. The Marine division/wing

team was in Vietnam.

The expanded Marine force operated under

guidelines provided by General Westmoreland, In his

letter of instruction to General Collins, the MACV

commander outlined the general mission of the

Marines. They were directed to coordinate the

defense of their three bases with General Thi; to

render combat support to the South Vietnamese; to

maintain the capability of conducting deep patrolling,

offensive operations, and reserve reaction missions;

and, finally, to carry out any contingency plans as

directed by ComUSMACV.3

The U.S. relationship with the Vietnamese

military was a sensitive one. Since the Americans

were the guests of the Vietnamese, they could offer

advice to their allies, but could not compel action.

Means had to be devised so that the two military

forces could cooperate, but remain independent

entities,

General Westmoreland elaborated further on this

relationship between the U.S. and South Vietnamese

commands in a message to Admiral Sharp.

According to the MACV commander the

requirement was for cooperation and agreement

among senior commanders of different nationality

groups. One of General Westmoreland's more intriguing phrases was that of ''tactical direction.'' In

actuality it was identical to operational control, but

the general explained that tactical direction was a

more palatable term to the Vietnamese. Westmoreland warned: ''U.S. commanders at all levels
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 37

must accommodate to a new environment in which

responsibility is shared and cooperatively discharged

without benefit of traditional command relationship." He emphasized that simple and easily understood plans were a prerequisite for success

Taking these assumptions into consideration,

General Westmoreland observed that American

operations would take place in three successive

stages: base security, deep patrolling, and finally

search and destroy missions.' For the Marines in

Vietnam at this time base security was of the utmost

concern; only at Da Nang had Ill MAF begun to

move into the second stage of operations.

The Le My Experiment

At Da Nang, the most significant development

was the beginning of a nidimentary pacification

program involving Lieutenant Colonel David A.

Clement's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. Since its arrival

in April, the battalion had been on the high ground

in the northwest fringe of the Da Nang TAOR,

overlooking the village complex of Le My. The

village consisted of a cluster of hamlets located on the

southern bank of the Cu De River in the Hoa Vang

District of Quang Nam Province, eight miles northwest of the Da Nang Airfield. According to the

district chief, there had been little security in this

area for over a year. Although the AR\TN had

conducted several operations, their krces had never

remained to root out the Viet Cong political cadre

and to provide security for the people.6 Security was

one thing the Marines could furnish. Lieutenant

Colonel Clement explained that the occupation of Le

My gave him the needed depth of defense around the

Da Nang Airbase to carry out his mission)'

Beginning on 4 May, the Marines maintained

pressure on the VC in the village complex by

repeated patrolling of the area. On the 8th,

Lieutenant Colonel Clement, accompanied by his SUSMC Photo A184123

In one of the first extensions of Marine positions into a populated area in May, Marines from the 2d Battalion, 3d

Marines move into the hamlet of La My. Three villagers watch the troops enter the vilkge gate.

:fr-

- • -,— ',

-, Zr. !!,:I' "—

.:,

r

' •. £

1 —
38 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

The Marines roundup VC suspects in lie My. A South

2, Captain Lionel V. Silva, the district chief, Captain

Nguyen Hoa, and the battalion's S-2 scouts, visited

the hamlets. They surveyed the neighborhood,

talked to the villagers, but then came under Viet

Cong fire, which killed one of the scouts. This incident confirmed Clement's opinion that in order to

secure Le My, he first had to clear it.

On 11 May, the Marine battalion returned in

strength. In an opposed fire fight, Clement's

Company E "conducted the assault . . . and cleared

the hamlets."8 This time the battalion stayed and

took up defensive positions in Le My. The Marines

rounded up the male villagers who were put to work

destroying punji traps, filling in trenches, and

dismantling bunkers. Fifty of the men were sent to

Da Nang for further questioning. Three days later,

Vietnamese regional and popular forces relieved the

Marines in the hamlets and the battalion moved to

positions around the village. The actual eradication

USMC Photo A184166

Vietnam Popular Force soldier is in the foreground.

of the guerrillas was left to the South Vietnamese,

while the Marines saturated the area with patrols and

established ambushes to prevent the enemy from

moving or massing forces.

To provide the villagers the means of fending for

themselves, Clement's battalion trained the Vietnamese local forces, helped to prepare the defenses,

and set up medical aid stations. The Marines emphasized self-help projects such as the building of

schools and market places so that the local populace

could continue on their own. Captain Silva, who was

also Clement's civil affairs officer, stated that the

battalion's goal was ''to create an administration,

supported by the people, and capable of leading,

treating, feeding, and protecting themselves by the

time the battalion was moved to another area of

operations.' '

The Marines also assisted the villagers in

rebuilding two bridges, which, according to the

.1

'.. ... •;'•!

t;:-t .:

• * 4.

• •
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 39

battalion's operations officer, Major Marc A.

Moore, symbolized the spanning of the "broken link

in the road which separated territory previously

controlled by the VC from the RVN controlled

villages immediately south of Le '10 Apparently

well aware of this symbolism, a VC main force unit

attacked one of the bridges on the night of 20 May.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Clement, both the

VC and the local population discovered the effectiveness of U.S security: "The attack was repulsed, the bridge unharmed, and four VC were

killed and abandoned."

The village held a dedication ceremony the next

day at the two newly built bridges. Local government

officials made speeches and cut a ribbon strung across

the two spans. The festivities also presented grim

reminders of the war; the chief displayed the bodies of

the VC killed in the attack on the bridges at the gates

of the village. This technique had been employed by

both the government forces and the Communists to

impress on the people what awaited the enemy.

At this early stage of the Marine intervention, the

Le My experiment held promise for the future.

General Collins stated that the "Le My operation

may well be the pattern for the employment of

Marine Corps forces in this area.'"2 On a visit to III

MAF in mid-May, General Krulak described the

pacification efforts in Le My as a:

beginning, but a good beginning. The people are

beginning to get the idea that U.S. generated security is a

long term affair. This is just one opportunity among

many . . . it is the expanding oil spot concept in action.

Building the Chu Lai Airfield

At Chu Lai, the main effort in May was the

building of the airfield. On 7 May, Lieutenant

Colonel Charles L. Goode, the 1st MAW

engineering officer, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander

Wilson, the commanding officer of MABS-12, and a

small advance party from the MABS arrived at Da

Nang from Iwakuni. While at Da Nang, they

discussed the Chu Lai airfield problem with Colonel

Graham, the Ill MAF/3d Marine Division

engineering officer. According to Goode, he brought

Graham "up to date on the runway layout and

location as I knew it, including the fact that . . . [the

civilian contractor] had not yet provided the coordinates of the runway."4

The following morning, Lieutenant Colonel Goode

USMC Photo 185766

A South Vietnamese official stands in front of a

bridge at Le My rebuilt by Marines. The VC had

destroyed the old bridge.

and the MABS-12 advance party flew to Chu Lai.

There they conferred with Commander Bannister,

the NMCB-10 commander, and several members of

his staff concerning the initial phases of the airfield

construction. Commander Bannister informed

Lieutenant Colonels Goode and Wilson that he had

received a message from Saigon that listed the

coordinates for the runway. The two Marines, with

Bannister and his operations officer, then toured the

area of the proposed location for the SATS field.

According to Goode, ''the site was completely

unacceptable." It was several hundred yards west of

the original site selected by General Carl during the

reconnaissance of Chu Lai in April. Goode related:

the line being surveyed at the time was on the west

edge of the natural drainage course, which would have

placed the cross taxiways, parallel taxiway and the entire

operations area in the center of the drainage course. From

the signs of water in the area, it was obvious that most of

this area would be inundated during the rainy SeasOn."

Commander Bannister agreed with Lieutenant

Colonel Goode's observations, but stated that he was

F —— -

I-
40 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

only following his instructions. The Seabee commander also told Goode that the message from Saigon

indicated that a representative of the civilian construction firm would "be on hand to advise on the

specific locations to avoid interference with work on,

and operations from, the permanent runway,"

which the civilian firm was to construct. This

representative never showed up.16

To avoid further delays and to settle the question

of the location of the SATS field once and for all,

Lieutenant Colonel Goode attempted to contact

General Carl on board the Fstes, only to learn that

the general had come ashore. Goode finally located

General Carl at the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines CP.

With Carl and members of the 3d MAB staff,

Commander Bannister and Lieutenant Colonels

Goode and Wilson returned to the proposed runway

site. According to Carl's Chief of Staff, Colonel

Nickerson, "It was spontaneously determined by all

that the intended location was not correct . "17

General Carl directed that a resurvey be made on the

basis of the recommendations that he and the original

survey group had made in April. The original site

was on a plateau, just inland from a tree line and

above the flood waterline, paralleling the sandy berm

north of the landing beach. Only a shift of 500 yards

USMC Photo

Seabees lay down aluminum for the SATSfieId. Two

full crews were required for each 12-hour work shift

to relieve each other at 30-minute intervals because

of the heat and humidity.

USMC Photo A184233

Navy Seabees with their heavy equipment prepare to

start on the building of the Chu Lai SA TSfield. The

area to the right will be leveled for the emplacement

of the aluminum matting of the runway.

to the north was necessary to avoid a low area just

south of the mid-point of the runway. According to

Goode, "This caused no inconvenience because it

was just moved to a point that was to be graded for

the overrun in any event."8

Following the selection of the SATS site,

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's MABS-12 Marines and

Commander Bannister's Seabee construction crews

launched an intense struggle against time and nature.

The initial planning envisioned an operational

airfield by 28 May, 21 days after the landing. The

Marines had relocated the 400 civilians who lived on

or near the airfield site so that the construction could

begin. Heat and humidity quickly sapped the

strength of the work crews. Temperatures often

climbed over the 100 degree mark and the humidity

was not much less. The heavy earth moving

equipment could be operated only by alternating

crews every 30 minutes. During each 12-hour work

shift, at least two full crews were necessary for each

piece of machinery, but the work continued on a 24-

hour basis.

Sand played havoc with the operation. It worked its

way into everything; bearings, brake linings, and

clutches were quickly ruined. At times more than

half of the tractors and dump trucks were deadlined.

Some of the frustrations encountered by the work

crews were reflected in an informal log maintained by

Lieutenant Colonel Goode:

9 May . . . My general impression of the entire day was

that there was much wheel spinning, disorganization, and

little work accomplished, all compounded by the fact that

three of the C.B. TD-24 tractors went out of corn-
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 41

mission—one because of a front PCV clutch and two for

master clutches.

10 May . . . MCB-10 has provided MAG-12 (Adv.)

with all the necessities. They even provided one Jeep

which broke down this afternoon . . . . Because of the

continued shortage of tractors, TD-24s, I intend to ask

CO. 3/12 tomorrow if he can provide some to help.

11 May . . Earth moving on the runway is going

slowly. Three of the 6 C.B. TD-24's are deadlined. Two

are for main clutches, none of which are available.

Eventually, the 3d Engineer Battalion at Da Nang

contributed nearly all of its equipment to the Chu Lai

construction, leaving the Marine engineers with only

one bulldozer for their own use.

As the equipment situation gradually improved,

the major problem for the contruction crews was that

of soil stabilization. Initially, it was planned to mix

sand and asphalt in order to form a firm base on

which to lay the aluminum matting. On 14 May,

Lieutenant Colonel Goode wrote: "My biggest

concern is the stabilization process. Will the rollers

be capable of moving across the asphalt-treated

surface? What will be the curing time?" On the

14th, Goode scheduled a test on the asphalt sand

mixture in an area adjacent to the MABS command

post so that the test site could be used as a helicopter

pad after the test. On 15 May, Goode reported:

"The test of the asphalt failed completely. Asphalt

was shot from a distributor onto the dry sand. There

was practically no penetration. Twenty-four hours

after the asphalt . . . was put down, it is still not

cured." After consulting with Colonel Graham,

Lieutenant Colonel Goode decided that the solution

for the problem was to stabilize the sand with a sixinch layer of laterite, a red ferrous soil obtained from

pits north of the field.2°

On 16 May, the first piece of runway matting was

laid on the north end of the strip. Hauling the red soil

was time consuming and it was soon obvious that the

runway would not be completed on the scheduled

date. The Seabees and Marines were still confident

that they could build a usable field by the target date

by emplacing the arresting gear for landing and using

jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) for the takeoffs. Soon it

was evident that even this limited objective was in

doubt. On 25 May, Lieutenant Colonel Goode wrote:

As of 1000 this date, there was in place 2,650 feet of

matting leaving 650 feet of matting to be placed. One

hundred fifty feet of taxiway is in place. A total of 1,200

feet of matting must be placed to meet the goal. Since

matting started nine days ago, the average rate was 275

feet per day. The remainder would require that a rate of

USMC Photo A184311

Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, greets

Colonel John D. Noble, Commanding Officer,

MAG-12. Colonel Noble had just landed the first

aircraft at the newly constructed Chu .Lai SA TSfield.

400 feet per day be placed in the next three days . . . It is questionable whether the goal can be met.21

The arrival of the first aircraft had to be postponed.

The delay was a short one. By 31 May, the Seabees

had completed nearly 4,000 feet of runway and about

1,000 feet of taxiway and the SATS field was

prepared to accept its first aircraft. Colonel John D.

Noble, Commanding Officer, MAG-12, who had

established his CP at Chu Lai on 16 May, recalled

that he "caught a logistics flight from Da Nang to

Cubi Point . . . so I could bring the first flight of

tactical aircraft to Chu Lai."22 June 1st dawned

bright and clear, and at 0810, Colonel Noble led his

four-plane division of Douglas A-4 Skyhawks from

VMA-225 into Chu Lai. The other three pilots were

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Baker, commanding

officer of VMA-22 5, and Majors Donald E. Gillum

and David A. Teichmann. General McCutcheon,

who was at Chu Lai for the landings, recalled, "the

NCOIC of the arresting gear cut off the tail of
42 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Noble's skivy shirt, a practice aboard carriers of the

Fleet, carried over to our shore-based carrier

O)5. ''23

Later in the day, on 1 June, four other A-4s from

Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Stender's VMA-311

arrived at the field. The Chu Lai-based aircraft flew

their first combat sorties that same day. At 1315, the

four VMA-225 aircraft, with Lieutenant Colonel

Baker in the lead, conducted air strikes in support of

ARVN units six miles north of the field.

Although the field was operational, it was still

unfinished and soil stabilization would continue to be

a problem, especially during the rainy season.

Eventually the field had to be rebuilt. Lieutenant

Colonel Baker observed:

for a week or so before the rains came, this

alum mum field was as flat and even as a pooi table—the

smoothest, bump-free surface lever flew from. Later with

rain cavitation the laterite was pumped up through the

matting forming a slipping roller coaster effect.

Baker exclaimed:

But we flew! The Chu Lai operation used every

capability my squadron had . . . We were trapped on

landings, jato'd on takeoff. Refuelled by our GV's en

route to our primary target. Loaded to the hilt with ordnance, we couldn't take off with much fuel. We did close

air support . . . in all weather and flew [radar controlled

missions] all over the area in foul weather conditions day

and night. 24

The SATS concept worked, but as Colonel Hardy

Hay, the Ill MAF G-3, later remarked:" . . . no one

will ever know what the [Chu Lai] project did to men

and equipment unless they were there."2'

III MAF in Transition

The Ill Marine Amphibious Force and its ground

and air' components experienced major changes of

command within their first six weeks in Vietnam.

Generals Collins and Fontana were near the end of

their 13-month overseas tours and the Commandant,

General Greene, appointed Brigadier General Lewis

W. Walt, newly selected for promotion to major

general, to replace Collins and Brigadier General

* General McCutcheon also told the story that General

Krulak had bet Major General Richard G. Stilwell, the MACV

Chief of Staff, a case of scotch that a squadron would be

operational within 30 days. General Krulak paid off the bet ''on

the basis that a full squadron was not operating there in the

forecast time, only hail of one." McCutcheon, "Marine

Aviation in Vietnam, " p. 129.

USMC Photo A184616

Major General Lewis W. Walt (left) relieves Major

General William R. Collins (right) as Commanding

General, III Marine Amphibious Force in an indoor

ceremony at Da Nang on 4 June 1965. The

ceremony was held indoors because the American

colors were not permitted to be displayed outside.

Keith B. McCutcheon, also selected for promotion to

major general, to be Fontana' s replacement.** Walt

looked the part of the football lineman that he was in

* *According to Colonel O'Connor, the 1st MAW chief of

staff at the time, the question of who was to be CG III MAF

was discussed several times. O'Connor recalled that ''General

Fontana earnestly desired to have that assignment. He and

General Collins were both nearing the ends of their overseas

tours, and that General Collins would leave first. He talked to

General Krulak about the matter several times . . . He

[Fontana] even volunteered to extend his overseas tour one

year to take command of III MAF. General Krulak was very

understanding, but explained that General Greene had already

selected General Walt. This did not stop Fontana. He was

senior to Walt, and stressed the doctrinal point that either an

aviator or a ground officer could be in command . . . Finally he

realiasd that the Commandant's decision would prevail . . when he realized his time was limited in the Far East, he

decided to take his last opportunity to command a wing in

combat . . . he would go to Da Nang to command the wing

until he was forced to leave." Col Thomas J. O'Connor,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment

File).
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 43

USMC Photo A184614

Major General Walt speaks to troops of the 4th Marines at Chu Lai in June 1965, The new III MAFcommander

toured all three Marine bases shortly after taking command.

his college days. Upon promotion, he would be the

junior major general in the Marine Corps and was

one of the Corps' more decorated officers, two Navy

Crosses and the Silver Star and combat service in

both World War II and Korea. He had just completed

a tour as the Director, Landing Force Development

Center at Quantico.

In contrast to the physical bulk of Walt,

McCutcheon was a short, slim man in appearance,

but held equally imposing military credentials.

Decorated with the Silver Star and Distinguished

Hying Cross and a veteran of both World War II and

Korea, McCutcheon was one of the pioneers in the

development of close air support and helicopter

tactics. In April 1965, he arrived in Japan as the 1st

MAW assistant wing commander after completion of

his duties as the CinCPac J-3. On 24 May, he

assumed command of the wing's headquarters at Da

Nang. Two weeks later, McCutcheon assumed

command of the entire wing, upon General Fontana's departure for the United States.

After an informal promotion ceremony in the

Commandant's office in Washington and a ceremonial battalion parade at Quantico, Major

General Walt left for Vietnam at the end of May.26

On 5 June, he officially relieved General Collins as

Commanding General, III MAF and Commanding

General, 3d Marine Division.

During this period, there were other command

changes. Upon his arrival, General McCutcheon also

became Deputy Commander, HI MAF, relieving

General Carl, who then departed Vietnam as

Commander, Task Force 79. On 12 June, General

Carl, as assistant wing commander, assumed control

of the wing's rear headquarters in Japan after

General Fontana '5 departure. Six days later, General

I;'

I1

. I4
44 FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF Ill MAF

Karch returned to Vietnam as assistant division

commander of the 3d Marine Division while

Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson assumed

command of the 3d Marine Division (Rear) on

Okinawa. These changes at the top were followed by

rapid adjustments in staff assignments. The new

layers of command contrasted sharply with the

almost spartan simplicity of the old 9th MEB and

could not help but cause some initial confusion. One

former member of the 9th MEB staff, Major Ruel T.

Scyphers, remembered:

Two full staffs arrived in Vietnam and superimposed

authority over the brigade in a very short time. In this

connection there wasn't a single moment of liaison or

coordination between or among either staff. There was at

one time 13 colonels roaming around headquarters

without assignments or functions. With the limited space

for billeting, messing, and working space—it was a

nightmare. 27*

Perhaps these growing pains were most

dramatically reflected in the field of communications.

During a visit to Vietnam in May, General Krulak

remarked: ''I have never seen a worse situation than

at Da Nang where a message which has immediate

precedence has taken as long as 30 hours to get out of

country, some incoming messages do not arrive at

all."28 According to Colonel Hardy Hay, the HI

MAF G-3:

We were totally unprepared for the communication

load that included an outrageous number of classified

messages. Higher echelons simply did not have time to

send letters by regular mail. Consequently, letters came

by electronic means. 29

Colonel Nickerson, who had become the Ill MAF

* Colonel Rex C. Denny, from the III MAF G-3 Section,

recalled that the fact that General Walt was both the 3d Marine

Division and III MAF commander "caused some humorous

and often confusing staff work. MAF staff and division staff

working on same project or MAF staff doing work division staff

rightly should.'' Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on draft MS,

dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant General

Leo J. Dulacki, who in 1965 was the III MAF G-2, remarked

that "when III MAF was deployed to RVN, it was assumed

that the Hqs would be a skeleton Hqs, dependent on the Wing

and Division Hqs for substantial personnel support and, in fact,

for many of the operational functions." Dulacki pointed out

that this concept of organization, which had been accepted as

standard for years, was for the first time ''put to the test." He

noted that the subsequent, ''necessary, but agonizingly slow,

growth of the III MAF headquarters in order to perform its

tasks would indicate that this concept lacks vitality especially in

a commitment of forces of long duration." LtGen Leo J.

Dulacki, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Oct76 and [Jul] 77

(Vietnam Comment File).

G-4, later explained that much of the message

backlog was due to periodic power shortages "with

the down-time of generators" exceeding "uptime.'' He commented that the number of classified

"dispatches that had not been encrypted or decrypted often exceeded 5,000" and that "manual

processing was tedious." Nickerson also remarked

on the fact that ''higher, comfortable, well-staffed

headquarters were firing questions or assigning

responsibilities at a prolific rate . . ''30 Colonel

Nickerson praised the efforts and ingenuity of

Colonel Frederick C. Dodson, the III MM communications officer, and the communications section

for reducing the backlog to manageable proportions.

Finally Nickerson observed:

Reading, analyzing, answering, dodging, eliminating

these dispatches was a tremendous load. Colonel Regan

Fuller, MAF Chief of Staff, challenged, cajoled, and led

the staff in his cantankerous manner on a crippling

schedule in order to catch up. . . . After many weeks he

was successful and he accomplished all of this while ill

with a bleeding ulcer.3'

Communications was only one of the trouble areas

caused by the transformation of the command. The

troops sent into Vietnam had to be supplied and

maintained, and MACV had planned to establish a

Da Nang Support Command under the Army's 1st

Logistic Command to provide common item supply

for Ill MAF. At the Honolulu Conference in April,

this plan was modified and Admiral Sharp directed

that the Commanding General, III MAF, in his

capacity as Naval Component Commander, would

assume the responsibility for common item supply

from Marine and Navy sources, as well as the

operation of the ports in I Corps. Since the Navy had

not yet established a support activity in Vietnam to

run the ports, the job had to be done by Marine

Corps personnel and equipment. This placed a heavy

burden on 111MM.32

Following the Chu Lai landings, Colonel

Nickerson, the III MAF G-4, held nightly meetings

"as the hectic problems spanned the logistic spectrum." These meetings were "designed for

liquidating problems, coordinating efforts and insuring that all had the necessary information to do

their jobs.' On 16 May, Nickerson presented a

logistic support concept for the Marine command.

While assuming that the Navy would eventually

establish a support activity, the concept directed the

Ill MAF to run the ports and at the same time make
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 45

USMC Photo A184622

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines cross the Cu De River in amphibian tractors. The troops later

evacuated village rs from the hamlet ofPho Nam Thuong to La My.

distribution of its supplies through its own force

logistic support group (FLSG).34

The Ill MAF FLSG, commanded by Colonel

Mauro J. Padalino, was built around the nucleus of

the 3d Service Battalion from the 3d Marine Division

and reinforced by support elements from the 3d Force

Service Regiment on Okinawa. Colonel Padalino, a

veteran supply officer who had served in both World

War II and Korea, maintained his headquarters at Da

Nang while two force logistic support units, FLSU-1

and -2, serviced Chu Lai and Phu Bai. Despite

shortages compounded by breakdowns in equipment

and a complex peacetime supply system, the FLSG

managed to meet the most urgent requirements of

the fully operational MAF. * The logistic situation

gradually improved after the Defense Department

permitted the Commandant of the Marine Corps to

release the emergency FMFPac mount-out supplies

for shipment to Vietnam on 5 June.

In spite of the logistic strain, more than 9,000

personnel had been added to the Marine force in

Vietnam by mid-June. They were spread over an

area of 130 square miles and engaged in a wide

variety of tactical, support, and combat support

activities. Both the 3d Marines and the 4th Marines

* See chapter 12 for a more detailed account of the logistic

situation.

___

- — .—. —-- -.

—S .

I

---

- -a.- -

- -- - L.. — - — -

- — -.---.-

.: —' -

- --. Z ;.•- e- - -. --- — -. - -

-

I_a

I
46

USMC Photo A184799

Mannes from the 2d Battalion, 4th Mannes cross a

stream in the northern sector ofthe Chu!Ai TA OR.

The Marine in the foreground appears to be able to

smile despite a cigarette in his mouth andwater up to

his neck.

had established their command posts in Vietnam.

Elements of the 12th Marines, the division artillery

regiment, were located at all three enclaves. The 1st

Battalion, 12th Marines under Major Gilbert W.

Ferguson supported both Da Nang and Phu Bai,

while Lieutenant Colonel Arthur B. Slack, Jr. 's 3d

Battalion, 12th Marines provided artillery support

for the 4th Marines at Chu Lai. Other supporting

units, spread throughout the three enclaves, included

major elements of the 3d Motor Transport Battalion,

the 3d Engineer Battalion, and the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The wing consisted of two

aircraft groups, MAGs-12 and -16 with five

helicopter squadrons, an equal number of fixed-wing

squadrons, and ancillary ground components.

Upon taking command, General Walt had toured

the three base areas and familiarized himself with

each. Based upon his own observations, supported by

available intelligence, he concluded that the VC were

building up their forces in the areas contiguous to the

THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marine enclaves. Walt decided that the Marines had

to extend their T AORs and at the same time conduct

deeper and more aggressive patrolling. Colonel

Hardy Hay, the m MAF G-3, recalled that shortly

after Walt's arrival:

He asked me one night, 'What is our major G-3

problem?' My answer-We have got to convince Saigon

that by trying to establish a ring around Chu Lai, Da

Nang, and Phu Bai-we will never have enough men and

material to adequately do it.

Yet as Hay observed, the Marines were unable to

undertake offensive operations because their' 'hands

were tied by ComUSMACV directives.' '3'

On 15 June a significant change in the role for the

Marines took place when General Westmoreland

permitted General Walt to begin search and destroy

operations in the general area of his enclaves,

provided that these operations contributed to the

defense of the bases. The MACV commander further

directed that the Marines at Chu Lai conduct

operations to the west of their TAOR into the

suspected Do Xa VC supply complex.

With this new authority and with the concurrence

of General Thi, the I Corps commander, General

Walt enlarged the TAORs at all three enclaves. The

enlargements gave the units of the division more

room for offensive operations and provided

distinguishable lines of demarcation on the ground

since the trace of the new TAORs followed natural

terrain features. At Da Nang, the area occupied by

the 3d Marines consisted of 172 square miles and

contained a civilian population of over 50,000 persons, but the populated region directly to the south

and east of the base still remained the responsibility

of General Thi's forces. Within the new Chu Lai

TAOR of 104 square miles, there were 11 villages,

containing 68 hamlets, and a civilian population of

over 50,000. The area of responsibility for the 3d

Battalion, 4th Marines at Phu Bai was much smaller,

consisting of 61 square miles, but within that area

civilian population numbered almost 18,000.

The Seeds of Pacification

Shortly after General Walt assumed command of

III MAF he had a survey made which revealed that

over 150,000 civilians were living within 81mm

mortar range of the airfield, and consequently, the

"Marines were into the pacification business. "36 In

fact, General Greene later observed:

From the very first, even before the first Marine
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 47

battalion landed in Da Nang, my feeling, a very strong

one which I voiced to the Joint Chiefs, was that the real

target in Vietnam were not the VC and the North

Vietnamese, but the Vietnamese people . .

. Other than the Le My experiment, in June 1965

Marine pacification consisted largely of an embryonic

civic action program which had begun a few months

earlier as an offshoot of the former Marine task

element's "people to people" medical assistance

program. In April, the civil affairs officer of the 3d

Marines, 1st Lieutenant William F. B. Francis, in

cooperation with local officials, established a dispensary in the village of Hoa Phat, known to the

Marines as Dog Patch, on the western perimeter of

the Da Nang Airbase. A Vietnamese nurse ran the

facility, while a Navy hospital corpsman and a lab

technician paid occasional visits. Lieutenant Francis

begged and borrowed medicines from various U.S.

agencies, both military and civilian.

Medical assistance programs of this type expanded

throughout the Marine TAORs. Lieutenant Colonel

Clement's battalion at Le My established another

dispensary and opened sick call to the civilian

population every other day, while the 3d Battalion,

3d Marines did the same in its area of operations.

The artillery battalion at Chu Lai, the 3d Battalion,

12th Marines, in conjunction with Company B, 3d

Medical Battalion, provided daily dispensary service

for the local populace. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

at Phu Bai established a weekly medical service in

three small hamlets nearby. In all three Marine

enclaves, hospital corpsmen accompanied Marine

patrols into the local villages where they dispensed

soap and treated minor illnesses.

Civic action, even at this very early stage in its

development, encompassed more than merely

dispensing medicine. At Chu Lai, the 400 people who

were displaced by the airfield were resettled in a new

area with the assistance of the 4th Marines and the

local district government. The need of much of the

rural population for food, clothing, and shelter was

apparent to all. The Marines could not hope to

eliminate all of the suffering, but they could furnish

some assistance. They made contact with private

charitable organizations, such as CARE and the

Catholic Relief Society, and were able to obtain over

10,000 pounds of miscellaneous supplies to be

distributed within their TAORs. The Marines

discovered other means besides charity for making

life more pleasant for the villagers. In one instance

the 3d Marine Division band, marching through Hoa

Phat, suddenly struck up a gay tune, and then, to the

delight of hundreds of Vietnamese who had gathered,

the b'nd played an impromptu concert for over an

hour.

There was a need for overall guidance and

direction since civic action was too important to leave

to the good will and natural enthusiasm of individual

Marines. On 7 June, III MAF published an order

which established civic action policy. Major Charles

J. Keever, the Ill MAF Civil Affairs Officer who

prepared the directive, had visited hamlets around

both Da Nang and Chu Lai to obtain the details of the

home life of the Vietnamese villagers, as well as the

civic action programs conducted by the Marines. In

the order he defined civic action as the "term applied

to the employment of the military forces of a nation

in economic and social activities which are beneficial

to the population as a whole.''38 On 14 June,

General Walt held a meeting with 25 of his senior

officers and reiterated Ill MAF civic action policies.

The goal was to stabilize the political situation and to

build up the government by providing it with the

respect and loyalty of its citizens.

The Marines attained their first measurable

success in the struggle for the people when villagers

in two hamlets, five and a half miles northwest of I.e

My, elected to move into an area under Marine

protection. Lieutenant Colonel aement's battalion

had ronducted several sweeps along both banks of the

Song Cu De, up river from Le My. According to

Clement:

The movement of the people from these two hamlets,

of Pho Nam Thuong and Nam Yen, was very important

to me because I did not want to extend my defensive

posture to include Pho Nam, yet I did not want the VC to

have those people. The people were hesitant to move—reluctant to give up their homes; apprehensive

about the rice harvest to come; and fearful that

association with government forces would mark them for

retaliation by the VC.39

Clement then decided to convince the villagers

tha: their hamlets were in a combat zone and that

''they would be safer to accept refugee status and

relocate near Le My . . . ." The battalion commander, several years later, recalled:

I directed that H&I [harrassing and interdiction] fires

be brought close in to the hamlet, night after night. The

attitude of the people about relocation ''improved'' in

time and the relocation operation was scheduled . . . not

only did I have to "convince" the people of Pho Nam and

[Nam Yen] to relocate, but I had to convince the Vietnamese authorities of the necessity of this move since the

official policy was to discourage refugees.
48 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

On 15 June, Lieutenait Colonel Clement drew up

plans for a three-comp ny action in conjunction with

the ARVN and Populai Forces. Three days later, the

Marine battalion and Vietnamese forces moved

through the hamlets and brought out more than 350

villagers, who then moved into the Le My complex.

Clement later admitte. 1, ''I suppose given a free

choice, the people woul I not have left their hamlet, I

influenced their decision by honesty, sincerity, and a

hell of a lot of H&I fires.' '4°

By this time, Le My had become a show case for

pacification. Lieutenant Thlonel Clement explained:

by virture of their success and notoriety, the

Marines at Le My . . . ,ere not maneuvered around.

This permitted the )attalion to conduct a counterinsurgency campaigi based upon the situation as it

appeared to the people on the ground. This privileged

position permitted a great deal of person-to-person

confidence to develop, and, along with it, a personal

commitment to the government cause.4'

June Operations in the Three Enclaves

With the enlarged TA )Rs and broader mission in

June, General Walt base I his concept of operations

on the establishment f an elaborate defensive

network for the base ar as together with forward

outposts and extended i atrolling in the outlying

areas. He envisioned ''thi creation of a series of dugin timbered mutually-sup orting defensive positions

into which infantry units nay withdraw in the event

of heavy enemy attack" a the main defensive line for

each enclave. Some 3,000 to 5,000 meters forward of

this line, Walt wanted the establishment of a ''lightly

fortified combat outpost Une" for a more mobile

defense. Concurrently, te Ill MAF commander

ordered all units to contirn e ''aggressive patrolling''

in all TAORS "as a means of keeping the enemy off

balance, forcing him to leploy, and giving early

warning of any attempts to concentrate along TAOR

boundaries. ''42

At Da Nang, the resulting expanded operations

resulted in increasing coi itacts with enemy small

units. The 3d Marine )ivision for the month

reported:

10 June. In the western sector of the Da Nang TAOR,

a company patrol uncoveed a VC base camp capable of

supporting 150 people. Thi camp was destroyed.

21 June. During the mo fling, 2 reinforced squads from

2/3 were attacked while ol patrol in the Da Nang TAOR

by an estimated 8 VC, wing small arms and grenades.

One Marine was KIA and 3 WIA, while the VC lost 4

KIA and 2 women captured . 22 June. In a brief fire fight at an outpost manned by

Company C, 1/3, in the southern portion of the Da Nang

enclave, two VC were killed with no Marine casualties.

24 June. Elements of 1/9, under operational control of

3d Marines, and the 1st Bn, 4th ARVN Regiment

conducted a combined sweep and clear operation south of

Da Nang Air Base along the Song Cau Do . . . 1/9 apprehended 19 suspected VC and the ARVN 1/4 had killed

2 VC. There were no Marine casualties.

The 4th Marines at Chu Lai was equally busy.

Lieutenant Colonel Fisher's 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines provided security for the Seabees while they

constructed the airfield. Shotgun riders from one rifle

company were assigned to every vehicle day and

night. Two of Fisher's other rifle companies and his

headquarters and service company manned the main

defensive line, while his fourth rifle company

manned forward outposts and conducted patrols.

The other infantry battalions at Chu Lai, the 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines and the 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines, made similar dispositions.

With the consolidation of the Chu Lai base area,

Colonel Dupras gradually extended the 4th Marines

TAOR so that the air facility was out of range of

enemy mortars and light artillery. Lieutenant

Colonel Fredericks, the commanding officer of the

1st Battalion, 4th Marines, recalled that initially the

Marines had to operate in a very restricted zone and

that the enemy was aware of this restriction.4' With a

combination of extended patrolling and civic action

within the villages in the TAOR, by the end of June

Colonel Dupras was confident that his troops had

eliminated the ability of the Viet Cong to mass and

attack the airfield. Enemy action was limited to small

probes against outposts, sniping, and occasional hand

grenade incidents. At the end of the month, the 4th

Marines and its supporting units had killed 147 VC

while suffering four dead and 23 wounded.

In the Marines' northernmost endave at Phu Bai,

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines faced a large challenge.

General Krulak commented that although the unit

was operating aggressively throughout its TAOR, it

was too much to expect the base to be safe from

enemy mortar attack. He believed that the Marines

would require two more battalions and probably a

regiment to defend the base properly.46 The low

rolling hills and swampy gullies in the area were

divided just to the right of center of the TAOR by a

prominent north-south ridgeline dominated at the

north end by Hill 180. More disturbing was the fact
FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF III MAF 49

USMC Photo A18570J.

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines take

cover near Phu Bai. Their patrol had just been fired

upon by the VC.

that the area directly to the north and east of the

airstrip, designated Zone A, was not induded in the

Marine area of responsibility.

Lieutenant Colonel William W. "Woody"

Taylor, the battalion commander, was unhappy

with the tactical arrangements and commented that

the VC could apparently come in and shoot up the

villages with impunity while the Marines were not

permitted to operate in Zone A.47 On 21 June,

General Nguyen Van Chuan, the 1st AR\TN division

commander, incorporated the sector into the Phu Bai

TAOR, and at the same time gave Lieutenant

Colonel Taylor limited operational control of the five

South Vietnamese Popular Force platoons in Zone

A. This eventually led to the development of the

highly successful Marine and South Vietnamese

combined action company. (See Chapter 9)

By the end of June, the stepped-up activity in all

three Marine enclaves had placed a heavy strain on

III MAF, in terms of both men and material. During

the month, General Walt requested the remaining

battalions of the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa. *

It was now obvious in both Saigon and Washington

that more American forces were needed and the

entire subject of the total U.S. troop commitment to

the war in Vietnam was undergoing reconsideration.

* LtCol Taylor relieved LtCol Jones when the latter suffered a

heart attack on 28 April 1965.

**On 11 June, 1/9 arrived and relieved 3/9, which returned

to Okinawa for transfer back to the United States. This exchange of units was in line with the peacetime battalion

transplacement system then in effect and could not in any sense

be considered a reinforcement.
CHAPTER 4

Reinforcement and Expansion

The Need for Further Reinforcements—The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave—The Attack

on the Airfield—Expansion to the South—Further Reinforcements

The Need for Further Reinforcements

Despite increasing U. S. involvement, the major

Viet Cong effort bypassed American concentrations

during the spring of 1965. Most of the contacts

between the Marines and the VC were the results of

American initiative. Other than sporadic

harassment, the Communists generally left the U.S.

troops alone, and reserved their major efkrts for the

Vietnamese Armed Forces. Apparently the Communist strategy was to finish off the South Vietnamese before more American forces could be

deployed to South Vietnam.

In many respects, the moment for concentrated

VC action appeared opportune; the South Vietnamese government's war against the Communists

was in disarray. According to the government's

campaign plan for 1965, the South Vietnamese had

established as their objectives the defense of bases and

lines of communications, the harassment of VC bases

and lines of communications, surveillance of border

and coastal areas, and most important, support of the

Chien Thang (''Struggle for Victory'') pacification

program. Promulgated in early 1964 and based on the

"spreading oil"concept, the hien Thang program

placed priority on the consolidation of the secure

populous area by a combination of military,

paramilitary, police, economic, and social reform

activites. At the heart of the program was the ''New

Life'' hamlet, a variation of the planned community.

Although similar in many respects to the abortive

''Strategic Hamlet'' program of the Diem regime,

the Chien Thang campaign was supposedly better

planned and more realistic, in that security was to be

"restored in one area prior to going to another."

These secure areas were then to serve as

''springboards to pacify the areas'' which were

insecure.'

50

Once more the South Vietnamese pacification

plans proved to be too ambitious. In I Corps, for

example, where the 1965 campaign plan called for

pacification of the coastal plain inland to the railroad

in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces, the

situation had deteriorated by the end of March 1965

to the extent that the government controlled only the

areas surrounding the provincial capitals. Only in the

Saigon region, where the South Vietnamese had

begun an intensive pacification campaign in 1964,

code named HOP TAC, did the government enjoy a

modicum of success in its efforts against the Communists during the spring of 1965 2

Compounding the difficulties for the South

Vietnamese, the government, at the end of May, was

in the throes of another internal crisis. Head of State

Suu and Prime Minister Quat disagreed over the

makeup of the cabinet and were unable to resolve

their differences. They both stepped down and

handed the reins of power to a military directorate

presided over by Generals Thieu and Ky. As one

study on pacification concluded, this entire period

was marked by governmental instability and ''as a

consequence, Saigon's military efforts and related

pacification programs sputtered both at the national

and local levels,'' and there was ''neither the time

nor the inclination on the part of the various

* Coincident with the Chien Thang program, the South

Vietnamese, at the urging of MACV, launched the HOP TAC

(Working Together) campaign in mid-1964 with the aim of

linking together the six rural provinces surrounding Saigon.

Using Saigon-Cholon as a hub, the provinces were divided into

four concentric zones. The idea was to first pacify the closer

zones and then move outward until all six provinces were

pacified. A special HOP TAC directorate was formed with

U.S. advisors to coordinate the military, police, social, and

economic activities of the program. In 1965, an effort was made

to use the HOP TAC example in other Corps areas. See the

Ngu Hanh Sonh Section in Chapter 9 for the effects of this

effort in I Corps.
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 51

USMC Photo A 194964

Major General Walt provides Admiral Ulysses S.

Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with an

inflight briefing on III MAF operations in Vietnam.

The trace of the Marine area of operations can be

seen on the briefing map.

governments in Saigon to deal with anything but the

most urgent military threats."3

The VC spring-summer offensive, which opened

on 30 May, caught ARVN units widely dispersed in

support of the Chien Thang campaign. As a result,

the enemy was able to chew up the ARVN battalions

piecemeal. In I Corps, the 1st VC Regiment ambushed the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment

outside of the small hamlet of Ba Gia, 20 miles south

of Chu Lai. Of the 500 men in the battalion, only 65

soldiers and 3 U.S. advisors were able to break

through the Communist lines. General Thi threw in

his last reserves, the 39th Vietnamese Ranger

Battalion and the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion.

Marine F4Bs from VMFA-531 flew close support for

the South Vietnamese units. When the battle ended

on the 31st, the South Vietnamese had lost 392 men

killed and missing, as well as 446 rifles and carbines,

and 90 crew-served weapons. They claimed to have

killed 556 Viet Cong and captured 20 weapons. Two

battalions of U.S. Marines had been alerted, but were

not committed.

The question arose concerning the circumstances

under which U.S. combat troops would go to the aid

of the South Vietnamese. It was answered on 8 June

when the White House issued the following

statement:

If help is requested by the appropriate Vietnamese

commander, General Westmoreland also has authority

within the assigned mission to employ these troops in

support of Vietnamese forces laced with aggressive attack

when other elfective reserves are not available and when

in his judgment, the general military situation urgently

requires it.

Despite his new authorization, there was little

General Westmoreland could do to alleviate the

situation. Other than Ill MAF in I Corps, he could

only call on one other U.S. infantry formation, the

U.S. Army 173d Airborne Brigade, which had

arrived at Bien Hoa near Saigon in May. During

June, the South Vietnamese Army was losing the

equivalent of one infantry battalion a week to enemy

action.

General Westmoreland had come to the conclusion that the South Vietnamese, by themselves,

were incapable of holding back the Viet Cong, who

were being reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars.

In a message to the Joint Chiefs on 7 June, the

MACV commander painted a stark picture depicting

enemy strength and corresponding ARVN

weakness. Westmoreland told the JCS, ''I believe

that the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] will

commit whatever forces it deems necessary to tip the

balance and the GVN cannot stand up successfully to

this kind of pressure without reinforcement.''

Specifically, General Westmoreland asked for the

immediate approval for the deployment to Vietnam

of those forces already being considered in various

plans. These forces included the remaining two

battalions of the 3d Marine Division, as well as two

Army brigades and an airmobile division. In addition, Westmoreland requested the deployment,

already under consideration, of a Republic of Korea

division to South Vietnam, as well as the possible

deployment of more American forces at a later date.'

In an exchange of messages between MACV,

CinCPac, and JCS, units were added and deleted to

the "shopping list" that MACV had proposed in the

7 June request. By 22 June, the Joint Chiefs, in a

message to Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, cited an eventual 44 battalion-size force in

South Vietnam exclusive of the South Vietnamese

Armed Forces. These 44 battalions were to be largely

U.S. Army and Marine Corps, although supplemented by units from South Korea, Australia, and

New Zealand. In this same message, the Joint Chiefs

r .
52 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

discussed the immediate approval of a 23 U.s.

battalion commitment to South Vietnam, but failed

to mention the two battalions of the 3d Marine

Division on Okinawa. They also remarked on the

possibility of returning the 173d Airborne Brigade to

Okinawa after the scheduled July arrival of the 1st

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Finally, the JCS

wanted to know if Westmoreland and Sharp thought

that the 44-battalion force "would be enough to

convince the DRV/VC they could not win.' '6

In his reply two days later, General Westmoreland

opposed any decision to withdraw any U.S. units and

objected to any suggestion that 23 U.S. Army and

Marine battalions were the upper level of the U.S.

commitment. In response to the JCS inquiry on the

adequacy of a 44 battalion-size force, Westmoreland

answered, ''I saw 44 battalions as no force for victory, but as a stop-gap measure to save the ARVN

from defeat.'' In his message to the Joint Chiefs, he

stated: ''The premise must be that we are in for the

long pull . . . it is time all concerned face up to the

fact that we must be prepared for a long war which

will probably involve increasing numbers of U.S.

troops.'

By the end of the month, the Joint Chiefs informed

ComUSMACV and CinCPac that the U.S. forces

that Westmoreland had asked for in his 7 June and

subsequent requests had been approved. This

decision allowed for the movement of 8,000 more

Marines to Vietnam including the 9th Marines

headquarters. It also permitted deployment of the

airmobile division, then being formed at Fort

Benning, Georgia, as well as the already approved

deployments of the 101st Airborne Brigade and a

brigade from the 1st Infantry Division.

The same time that he requested more troops,

General Westmoreland also asked for the authority to

employ American forces in offensive operations

against the enemy. He claimed that the:

enemy's shift to big unit war was drawing ARVN

troops away from the heavily populated regions

American and Allied troops . . . would have to assume

the role of fighting the big units, leaving the . . ARVN

free to protect the people. No more niceties about

defensive posture and reaction . . we had to forget about

enclaves and take the war to the enemy.8

This concept was soon to be known as the search

and destroy tactic, with the aim of searching out and

destroying the main force units. On 26 June,

Westmoreland received permission from Washington

to commit U.S. forces to battle "in any situation

when in ComU5MACV's judgment, their use is

necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN

forces.' '9 This in effect gave the MACV commander

a relatively free hand to employ his forces.

General Westmoreland's particular concern at this

time was the military situation in South Vietnam's ii

Corps. Intelligence reports indicated that North

Vietnamese regular units were infiltrating through

the Central Highlands in the western provinces of

Kontum and Pleiku, while the coastal provinces of

Binh Dinh and Phu Yen remained major sources of

enemy manpower and food. Westmoreland placed

the highest priority on preventing the linkup of the

North Vietnamese regulars in the mountains with

the VC on the coast. The key to the entire area was

Route 19, which runs from the city of Qui Nhon to

Pleiku City where it joins with Route 14 which

continues north to Kontum.

In making his plans to counter the expected

Communist offensive, General Westmoreland relied

heavily on the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) which had been specifically designed as a

mobile force "that could be moved from one trouble

spot to another.'"° As early as April, Westmoreland contended that such a division was ideally

suited to conduct helicopterborne operations in the

Central Highlands. The MACV commander

maintained that the division could be supplied

overland from the coastal logistic bases at Qui Nhon

and Nha Trang via Route 19, and augmented by

aerial supply. Finally, Westmoreland argued, "If the

VC choose to mount a major campaign against Highway 19, this is a better place than most for a

showdown. '

*During the spring of 1965, the Army formed the 11th Air

Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning, Georgia, for final

testing and evaluation. "The decision to activiate the test

division as part of Army force structure and to subsequently

deploy it to Vietnam required the reorganizing, retraining and

reequipping of the division in a period of 90 days. Activated as

the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on 1 July 1965, the

division was composed of the men and equipment of the air

assault division and the 2d Infantry Division, plus aviators

procured from Army units worldwide.'' As reorganized for

deployment to Vietnam the newly formed 1st Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) consisted of three brigades which included eight

infantry battalions, an air cavalry squadron, an aerial artillery

battalion, three helicopter battalions, and three 105mm

howitzer battalions. The division had a strength of over 15,000

men and was equipped with 1600 vehicles and 434 helicopters.

CMH, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Nov76 (Vietnam

Comment File).
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 53

USMC Photo A185286

General Walt greets Marines from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines at the newly established Qui Nhon enclave. The

2d Battalion had just relieved the SI_F battalion, BLT 3/7

Within the defense establishment, there was some

opposition to the deployment of the airmobile

division so far from its logistic bases. Admiral Sharp,

supported by Ambassador Taylor and some members

of the Joint Chiefs, wanted the airmobile division

based in the Qui Nhon area:

Until both Route 19 and the vital coastal area had been

secured, primarily out of concern that the logistical

backup for the Division, 600-800 tons per day, would

severely overtax the existent limited airlift and airfield

facilities ii the ground supply route should be closed off.

After further study, according to Admiral Sharp,

General Westmoreland agreed to base the division at

An Khe, 35 miles west of Qui Nhon. From this base,

which could be resupplied by road, the airmobile

division could launch operations "into the Pleiku

Highlands as well as into the surrounding countryside of Binh Dinh Province." Despite this

compromise, the deployment of the airmobile

division so far inland would be a departure from the

earlier Marine deployments in secure coastal endaves 12

The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave

Because of the serious situation in II Corps in

June, General Westmoreland had to make difficult

decisions. Faced with the fact that the 1st Cavalry

Division would not arrive until September, he

considered, but finally rejected, moving two III MAF

Marine battalions into the Central 1-lighlands.

Moreover, the MACV commander was concerned

that the security for the Army's Qui Nhon logistic

base was no longer adequate and so informed

0.

, —

'V

At
54 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Admiral Sharp on 21 June. In his message, he stated

that he could not divert units from Ill MAF, or from

the 173d Airborne Brigade at Bien Hoa, for base

defense in II Corps. Although a brigade from the

Army's 1st Infantry Division was to arrive at Qui

Nhon in mid-July, Westmoreland feared that the

existing U.S. Army logistic buildup there offered too

lucratlve a target for the VC. Consequently, he

requested that a Marine battalion be flown to Qui

Nhon from Okinawa as soon as possible.

Admiral Sharp agreed to the request for reinforcement, but suggested a modification to the

deployment of the Marine battalion. During June,

the 7th Marines, a 1st Marine Division regiment,

had arrived at Okinawa from Camp Pendleton with

all three of its battalions. The regiment's arrival

permitted the Navy and Marine Corps to embark one

battalion on amphibious shipping and reconstitute

the special landing force (SLF) of the Seventh Fleet.

Sharp proposed that the SLF land at Qui Nhon,

rather than redeploy another battalion by air. This

alternative would allow the Marines to reembark in

their own shipping when they were relieved by the

Army's 1st Division brigade. The Joint Chiefs

agreed with Sharp and ordered him to land the SLF at

Qui Nhon on 1 July.

During the period 24-26 June, Lieutenant Colonel

Charles H. Bodley's BLT 3/7 and Lieutenant

Colonel Norman G. Ewer's HMM-163 embarked on

board the amphibious ships iwo Jima (LPH 2),

Talladega (APA 208), and Point Defiance (LSD

31). * The ships sailed for Vietnam on the 26th.

lieutenant Colonel Bodley, who had been on a staff

visit to the Philippines and to Vietnam, recalled,

''our return flight to Okinawa arrived just in time to

permit us to wave down a local helicopter and still be

able to catch the departing SLF at sea.' '

On 30 June, the amphibious task group arrived off

Qui Nhon; ashore General Westmoreland was on

hand to greet the Marines. Lieutenant Colonel

Bodley flew ashore by helicopter to meet Westmoreland, who, according to Bodley, "wanted to

personally brief me and resolve on the spot any

landing/operating problems existing or anticipated.''

The MACV commander offered to support the SLF

* There had been no Seventh Fleet SLF since mid-May. The

helicopter squadron, HMM-163, had just returned from

Vietnam on 21 June where it had been replaced by Lieutenant

Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261. See Chapter 13 for a

further discussion of the SLF.

USMC Photo A184870

Captain Michael F. Welty, Commanding Officer,

Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, (kneeling)

discusses the tactical situation with his battalion

commander, Lieutenant Colonel Leon N, Utter,

(seated) at Qui Nhon. Master Sergeant E. J.

McCarthy, the Company F First Sergeant, is seated

in the middle.

battalion with rations, ammunition, and other

common items of supply. Bodley recalled that when

General Krulak was notified of this offer, he

''disapproved declaring that Marines would be selfsufficient.'''4

According to plan, on 1 July, Lieutenant

Colonel Bodley landed three of his infantry companies and the attached lO7mm Mortar Battery from

the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. The fourth infantry

company, Company L, and other attachments

remained on board ship as the BLT reserve. By 1700

the amphibious phase of the operation was over and

the battalion had established positions on the high

ground south of the city.

The SLF battalion's stay at Qui Nhon was shorter

than anticipated. On 2 July, General Westmoreland

advised Admiral Sharp that, with the mounting

enemy offensive in II Corps and northern III Corps,

he believed it was necessary to release the 173d

Airborne Brigade from its static mission of

protecting the Bien Hoa airfield and use it as a mobile

reserve. He recommended that the 1st Infantry

Division brigade scheduled for Qui Nhon be diverted
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 55

(Courtesy of Major Gary W. Parker) USMC Photo A707619

Marine helicopters from HMM-161 approach Qui Nhon airfield from the northwest. The base area of the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines was located four miles to the west of the airstrip.

to Bien Hoa and that one of the Marine battalions

slated to reinforce Ill MAF relieve BLT 3/7 at Qui

Nhon so that the SLF could once again function as a

floating reserve. The incoming Marine battalion

would remain at Qui Nhon until relieved by Republic

of Korea (ROK) troops scheduled to arrive later in

the year. Admiral Sharp approved the request and

General Krulak assigned Lieutenant Colonel Leon N.

Utter's BLT 2/7 for the Qui Nhon mission.Is*

The Marines of BLT 2/7 had been embarked in the

* 2/7 was substituted for 3/9 to go into Vietnam because

the latter battalion had just arrived on Okinawa from the U.S.

under the battalion transplacement system. Under this system,

a battalion from the 1st Marine Division in California relieved a

battalion of the 3d Marine Division in the Western Pacific,

exchanging designation and mission. Thus the 2d Battalion,

5th Marines when it arrived in Okinawa at the end of June

became the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. In the movement of the

7th Marines battalions there was no change in designation

since they actually reinforced the 3d Marine Division.

dock landing ship Alamo (LSD 33) and the attack

transport Okanogan (APA 220) at Okinawa since 30

June, awaiting permission to deploy to South

Vietnam. When the battalion received its new

mission, the ships sailed, arriving off Qui Nhon on

the evening of 6 July. The selected landing area,

GREEN Beach, was south of the city and had been

secured by Bodley's battalion. At 0800 the next

morning, the first troops landed and the relief was

completed by that evening. Supplies and equipment

of Utter's battalion were brought ashore during the

night and the entire operation was over by daybreak.

BLT 3/7 reembarked in its own shipping on the

afternoon of the 8th, but the amphibious squadron

remained off Qui Nhon for several days in position to

reinforce BLT 2/7 if the need arose.

Upon arriving at Qui Nhon, Lieutenant Colonel

Utter's battalion came under the operational

command of Ill MAF. General Walt directed the

battalion to deploy its forces about ''the key terrain

j:(T:•t

'lM

k

1. —

- -

-— .' -

•1. 'a...

4-

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56 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

in Qui Nhon in order to reinforce the RVNAF and to

defend the airfield, port, logistic facilities, and U.S.

supporting installations.' '16

To fulfill the requirements of his mission, on 6

July Lieutenant Colonel Utter issued his threephased concept of operations; the first phase was

completed on the afternoon of the 7th with the relief

of BLT 3/7, the second began on the 8th with the

occupation of Hill 586, the dominant ridge line

running north and south, while the third phase was

to consist of aggressive patrolling of the TAOR. The

defensive perimeter consisted of three concentric

areas: close-in defensive positions around the airfield,

a defensive zone out to mortar range, and an outer

zone to the limit of organic artillery range.

The establishment of the Qui Nhon enclave made

General Walt's mission in I Corps more difficult.

Not only did he lose the services of one infantry

battalion, which could have been used either at Phu

Bai or Da Nang, but also he had to position a detach -

ment of 10 UH-34s from HMM-161 at Qui Nhon to

provide helicopter support for the Marines there.

The need for still more Marines in I Corps became

disturbingly evident in July.

The Attack on the Airfield

On 1 July, a Viet Cong mortar and ground attack

on the Da Nang airfield exposed the vulnerability of

the base to enemy hit-and-run tactics. The Communists had carefully planned and rehearsed this

operation for over a month, taking advantage of the

fact that the entire area south of the perimeter fence

was the responsibility of the South Vietnamese

k)rces. On the night of 30 June, an 85-man enemy

force, armed with automatic weapons, demolitions,

grenades, one 57mm recoilless rifle, and four 81mm

mortars, crossed the Cau Do River south of Da

Nang. The attack force, a VC special operations

company and a mortar company, reinforced by a 13-

man North Vietnamese sapper team reached the

southeastern perimeter of the base by midnight.

The enemy mortar company divided into two

sections; the first section was to fire on the helicopter

parking area, the other was to support the demolition

team. Two rifle squads took up blocking positions to

counter any reaction force, while the recoilless rifle

team backed up the mortars. At approximately 0115,

the 13 men of the demolition team tunneled under

USMC Photo A194609

Marines from Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th

Marines stop a Vietnamese civilian bus on Route 1,

12 miles south of Da Nang in a search for VC

guerrillas. The troops are checking civilian ID cards

and looking for unauthorized weapons and ammunition

the outer defensive wire, crossed the open area, and

cut a hole in the inner perimeter fence.'7

Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was responsible for airfield

defense. All four companies and the battalion CP had

been located on the airfield, but ''there were continuing talks and plans between and among myself

[Ludwig], Colonel Wheeler, and General Walt to use

1/9 to increase the offensive capability in the Da

Nang area.'' As a result, Companies B and D, the

CP, and most of Headquarters and Service Company

had been moved to a more forward base area to begin

a series of sweeps south of Da Nang. Two companies,

A and C, augmented by MAF Logistic Support

Group troops and Ontos [106mm recoilless rifles]

strong points, provided the defense of the airfield

proper. Ludwig later observed that these two

companies were responsible for the same area that

the entire battalion had previously covered and

''This meant, of course, that our positions were

spread out, with the spaces between covered with

roving sentries. This was the situation in the area

penetrated by the sappers.

The night of 30 June had been quiet, with the

exception of two minor probes on the extreme

western portion of the Marine TAOR. About 0130

on 1 July, one of the Marine sentries near the fence

heard a suspicious noise and threw an illumination

grenade. At the moment the grenade burst, the

enemy opened fire. Under the protection of concentrated covering fire and grenades, ten sappers ran
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 57

onto the field. The 3d Division journal contains the

following description of the initial confusion at the

base:

0130—Heard incoming at the airfield

0142—Counter-mortar radar is oriented toward

BTOO-77

0143—Counter-radar is working but we don't have

anything yet. Sounds like we are getting more incoming

now. 0150—Called G-3. Major Foster said a F-102 and C-130

are burning. Lieutenant Colonel Muir said incoming all

seemed to be on Air Force side of field in area of F-lOOs

and C-130s.

0208—3d Marines just got permission to fire 81mm

illumination. 19

Some of the infiltrators managed to throw their

satchel charges on the Air Force aircraft, destroying

a Convair F-102 and two C-UOs, and damaging two

F-102s and one C-130. Company C immediately sent

two squads to the vicinity of the attack to reinforce

the sentries on post. In the minutes it took for the

additional Marines to arrive, the sappers were

already withdrawing in the same direction from

which they had arrived. As the reinforcing squads

approached the southern fence, enemy small arms

fire wounded two of the Marines; a 57mm shell hit

the top of a concrete bunker and wounded the guard

inside.

The Marines could not cut off the demolition

team, but the enemy had not escaped unscathed.

Troops of Ludwig's battalion found blood trails

leading from the airfield, and Lieutenant Colonel

Muir picked up a pistol at the cut in the wire during

his early morning reconnaissance. Fifty minutes after

the attack, Marine artillery opened fire on suspected

enemy avenues of escape. Company D and a platoon

from Company B arrived to reinforce the defenders.

Two companies of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

deployed along Route 1 to block any attack from the

west and northwest.

General Walt, several years later, recalled that

from the time the attack began that he was:

in an amphibian tractor Out fl the rice paddies west

of the Air Base. This tractor was my combat command

post where I slept at night. I had both wire and radio

communication capability. I directed Colonel Wheeler

(CO 3d Marine Regiment) to commit our Air Base

reserve company and to personally go to the Air Base and

direct the defense, which he did immediately. 20

Colonel Wheeler called in Lieutenant Colonel

Ludwig at 0300. They outlined a plan to find the

retreating enemy force. Assisted by ARVN units,

Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was to sweep

the northern bank of the Cau Do, under operational

control of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion which

would search the area south of the river. The

commanders planned to start the mission at first

light, but all units were not in place until 0700. One

platoon of Company B, in LVTs, patrolled the river

and remained ready as a mobile reserve. The other

platoons of the company deployed along the road

north of the Phong Le Bridge, a mile and a half south

of the airbase. At 1700, the operation ended. The

Marines returned to the base with 14 suspects, but

none proved to have been involved in the attack. The

South Vietnamese were more fortunate. They found

a wounded North Vietnamese who turned out to be

the intelligence officer of the sapper team. He

identified his parent unit as the 3d Battalion, 18th

NVA Regiment.

Although the damage on the airfield was not

extensive and there were a few casualties, the

spectacular nature of the VC attack caused worldwide publicity and renewed command attention to

the vulnerability of the American bases. General

Walt, in 1977, remarked:

During the period of 0200 to 0400 I received phone calls

from MACV Hq, CinCPac Hq, FMFPac Hq,

Headquarters US Marine Corps, Secretary of the Navy's

Office, Secretary of Defense Office and from the White

House ''Watch Officer'' not President Johnson. All of

the callers wanted to know all about the attack and what I

was doing about it. Fortunately I had given instructions to

Colonel Wheeler before the phone started ringing. This

points out one of the hazards (for a commander) of having

present day instantaneous communications to the battlefield, all over the world. 21

General Walt ordered Brigadier General Karch to

conduct an investigation concerning the circumstances surrounding the attack. In his findings,

Karch concluded that the counter-mortar radar

installation failed to function properly, thus hampering the Marines in their effort to locate the enemy

mortar position. Nevertheless, the reaction force

from Ludwig's battalion had responded rapidly.22

Ludwig, himself, later wrote:

It was my understanding all along that the division of

my battalion . . . was a bit of a calculated risk with

Colonel Wheeler and General Walt. Yet both believed

that the need for more sweeps and offensive action

justified this thinning of the airfield defense.23

Colonel Hardy Hay, the Ill MAF G-3, later

remarked:

I believe what really got us going and extending our

patrols was the attack on the Da Nang air base. We then

REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 59

USMC Photo A185018

Marines from Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines are seen in Operation BLASTOUTIsoathwest of Da Nang.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines conducted its search of the Cam Ne village complex, four miles to the north, in

conjunction with this operation.

operations emphasis was on coordination and

cooperation; the Americans were to be careful not to

give the appearance of occupation troops. General

Thi remarked that he hoped the expansion would be

carried out "by both parties in a spirit of friendly

cooperation in order to obtain good results.' '29

Even the smoothest of relations could not disguise

the need for more Marines at Da Nang. The increased demands for airfield security and the expanded Da Nang TAOR, as well as the deployment

of BLT 2/7 to Qui Nhon, forced General Walt to

scrap his original plans to reinforce Phu Bai with a

regiment. Instead, most of the Marine reinforcements authorized by the JCS, with the exception of

BLT 2/7 at Qui Nhon and the 4th Marines (Rear)

which was slated for Chu Lai, arrived at Da Nang on

6 July. These included all of RLT-9 headquarters,

BLT 2/9, the remainder of the 12th Marines, and

support units of the 1st MAW and 3d Marine

Division.

With the arrival of the last units of the 3d Division,

General Walt made some adjustments in the

disposition of his infantry at Da Nang. While the 3d

Marines retained operational control over the battalion at Phu Bai and responsibility for the defense of

the western and southwestern perimeters of the Da

Nang Base, Walt assigned the defense of the airfield

and the southern portion of the TAOR to Colonel

Frank E. Garretson, the 9th Marines commander.

Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig's 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines was retained as the airbase defense battalion,

but reverted to parent unit control, while the 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel

George R. Scharnberg, was given the responsibility

of expanding Marine control to the south.

To free the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines from a static

role on the airfield itself, General Walt ordered the

establishment of a provisional airbase defense battalion to be formed from the personnel of the various

service units at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel

William H. Clark, the executive officer of the 9th

Marines, was assigned as the provisional battalion

commander. The provisional battalion was to be

organized as a conventional infantry battalion with a

headquarters and service company and four infantry

companies and a total strength of 38 officers and 911

enlisted men. On 19 July, Clark activated his new

command. Three days later his newly formed

Company A relieved one of Ludwig's companies on

the airfield perimeter, and on 1 August, Company B

relieved another 1st Battalion company.

The formation of the provisional base defense

battalion released infantry companies from the

airfield security mission, but the organization had a

debilitating effect on the support and service units of

III MAF. Too many specialists needed on their own

jobs were serving as infantrymen. As early as 17

July, Lieutenant Colonel Clark had recommended

t 4

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lit IdSb' ., iG'•
60 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Chieu Esso Depot

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Must

Kilometers

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Marble Mountain

Air Facility

Marble

Mountain

South China

Sea

DA NANG AREA

JULY - DECEMBER 1965
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 61

against activating his own command, arguing that

"The overall effect of the creation of the Provisional

Base Battalion is uneconomical from personnel,

equipment, and airfield security viewpoints. ''30

Although this recommendation was rejected, it soon

became apparent that he was right. Qark later

recalled that during General Walt's 7 August

morning briefing, Colonel Edward Cook, the

commanding officer of the 3d Motor Transport

Battalion:

Reported a significant number of vehicles deadlined for

lack of drivers or for required maintenance. Seems the

drivers and mechanics were TAD [temporary additional

duty] for their 60 days with the ADB [airfield defense

battalion]. General Walt said deactivate.3'

Although the order to deactivate came on 7

August, the provisional battalion remained in

existence for two more weeks, sharing the airfield

defense mission with the two companies of the 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines and later with the newly

arrived 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. The 3d Battalion

assumed the entire mission of base defense on the

formal deactivation of the provisional battalion on 22

August.

The provisional battalion had served its purpose,

in that the 9th Marines was able to begin the occupation of its new TAOR. Of particular concern

was the area to the south of the Cau Do. The 9th

Marines area of responsibility now extended to the

South China Sea on the east, the Yen River on the

west, and approximately three and a half miles to the

south of the Song Cau Do, about 30 square miles in

all. This entire region was densely populated with

innumerable clusters of villages and hamlets. The

term ''village'' in Vietnam denoted an administrative unit, while the true local community was the

hamlet, several hamlet clusters making up a village.

An example of the confusion this caused for III MAF

staffs was the fact that in the 9th Marines TAOR

there were six hamlets with the name of Cam Ne and

three Duong Sons, identified only by a parenthetical

number alter the hamlet name. Often the hamlets

had different names from that of their administrative

village, while clusters had no names at all, or none

that the Americans could determine.

Prior to the extension of their TAOR, the Marines

had only limited contact with the Vietnamese civilian

population and then only in areas such as Le My

where the people had shown basic loyalty to the

government cause. This was not the case in the

region south of the Cau Do. It was difficult to build

loyalty to the Government of South Vietnam where

fathers, brothers, and relatives were part of the VC

structure and had been for a generation. A Buddhist

priest who lived in one of the Duong Son hamlets

furnished the Marines with some basic intelligence of

the VC strength and organization, typical of the area.

He revealed that the Viet Cong maintained a

roadhiock near the railroad tracks between Duong

Son (2) and (3) manned by a four-man squad. A 40-

man VC force which lived in his village was contructing bunkers, foxholes, punji traps, and setting in

booby traps. Enemy political cadres were also active

and VC tax agents collected 270 piastres annually

from each family living in the area. The priest

laconically summed up: "The attitude of the people

is generally friendly to the VC and unfriendly to the

government forces.' '32

With General Thi's concurrence, the Marines

entered the new TAOR on 12 July; Lieutenant

Colonel Scharnberg's 2d Battalion moved into the

vicinity of Duong Son (1), a mile south of the Phong

Le Bridge. While two companies formed a perimeter

defense around the hamlet, Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, moved through the hamlet. The

Marines from Company B met strong resistance;

three men were killed and four wounded. Further

south, Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion,

attached to the 2d Battalion for the operation, came

under sniper fire; eight were wounded. Most of the

enemy fire appeared to be coming from the direction

of Cam Ne (1), approximately 1,800 to 2,000 yards

northwest of the jumping-off point. The Marines

pulled back and called for close air support. F-4Bs

from MAG-li answered the request and blasted the

enemy positions. An aerial observer in an 0-lB

confirmed six VC dead and secondary explosions in a

minefield.

With Duong Son (1) secured, Lieutenant Colonel

Scharnberg established a forward command post

under his executive officer, Major John A. Buck, in

"the old French reinforced concrete bunker at the

northwest end of the Phong Le Bridge," to control

the two companies remaining in the hamlet. Buck

recalled that he maintained "almost daily contact

with. . . [the] village chief of Duong Son," believing

this ''liaison was essential in order to obtain raw

information . . . and in general to develop a rapport

without which the Marines could not achieve their

full potential."33 Nevertheless, the two Marine
62 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184783

A Marine searches for caches of VC weapons in a

hamlet south of Da Nang. The five small children in

the background appear to be unconcerned about the

presence of the American Marines.

companies in Duong Son (1) continued to receive fire

from Cam Ne (2) directly to the west and from

Duong Son (2) to the south. Throughout July and

into August, the Marine units encountered resistance in the area.

An incident that perhaps best mirrored the perplexities which faced the 9th Marines was a mission

conducted in the Cam Ne village complex on 3

August by Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.

It was planned in conjunction with a 3d Marines'

operation, BLASTOUT I, carried out by the 1st

Battalion, 3d Marines and an ARVN battalion four

miles south of the Cam Ne complex along both banks

of the Yen River. The 3d Marines battalion would

provide a blocking force to the south while Company

D cleared the Cam Ne complex.

Cam Ne was a well-known VC stronghold and its

residents were long-time Communist sympathizers,

dating back to the time of the French. American

intelligence officers estimated that VC local and main

force troops were present in company size in the

village complex.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig, the 1st

Battalion, 9th Marines commander, his orders were

"to search out the VC and to destroy them, their

positions, and fortifications.'' Captain Herman B.

West, Jr., the Company D commander, briefed his

platoons to the effect that if they received fire from a

''a position, hedgerow, trench line, bunker, spider

trap, hut, or any other location,'' they were ''to

overcome and destroy.'

The company was to embark in a platoon of LVTs

at the northern end of the Phong Le Bridge, navigate

the Cau Do to its junction with the Yen River, and

land opposite the Cam Ne complex, 1,200 yards

downstream. The Marines were to attack east and

occupy Cam Ne (1) and Cam Ne (2), two and a half

miles from the line of departure. A forward battalion

command post was to be established on the northern

bank of the Song Cau Do. The attack was to begin at

1000 with the Marines scheduled to reach their

objectives at 1500 that afternoon.

Complications arose at the very beginning. Three

of the LVTs stuck in the mud of the Cau Do. Two

tractors were able to get free, but the troops in the

third had to transfer to another vehicle. The entire

company did not arrive at its line of departure until

1040.

The objective area consisted of a maze of open rice

paddies, tree lines, hamlets, and hedgerows. When

the Marines dismounted from the tractors, they were

greeted by occasional small arms fire from the tree

line in front of the builtup area to the southeast. The

troops quickly advanced on a 1,000-foot front, all

three platoons were on line. It took the company

approximately 10 minutes to cross the open paddy

land and reach the cover afforded by the nearest

treeline. One Marine was wounded during this phase

of the attack. As the Marines edged foward, the VC

withdrew into the hamlets. The hedgerows around

the hamlets caused other difficulties. As the LVTs

bore forward and crushed the thick hedgerows they

set off several boody traps. No one was injured and

the Marines proceeded into the cluster of thatched

huts. The VC, however, refused to fight and

disengaged. These tactics added to the frustrations of

the Marines who were spoiling for a fight.

The entire Cam Ne complex favored the enemy

hit-and-run methods. The innocent looking collection of crude structures harbored punji sticks,

spider holes, interconnecting tunnels between

houses, and an uncooperative civilian population.

-
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 63

USMC Photo A184852

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (center) and General William C. Westrnoreland, Commander, United

States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (right), discuss the situation in I Corps with the I Corps corn -

mander, Major General Nguyen Chanh Thi (back to the camera), in July 1965. Secretary McNamara was in

Vietnam to review the U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam with General Westmoreland.

The Marines would search one hut, only to have a

VC sniper turn up behind them, shoot, and disappear. Troops from one of the platoons began to burn

the huts from which they had received fire. The

platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Ray G.

Snyder, claimed that Cam Ne was an "extensively

entrenched and fortified hamlet." Lieutenant

Colonel Ludwig explained, that "in many instances

burning was the only way to ensure that the house

would not become an active military installation after

the troops had moved on past it.""

By midafternoon, Captain West realized that his

men would not be able to reach their objective area

by nightfall. The company uncovered 267 punji stick

traps and pits, 6 Malayan whips, * 3 grenade booby

traps, 6 anti-personnel mines, and 1 multiple booby-

*A Malayan whip is a bent bamboo fence which, when

tripped, whips pointed stakes into the intruder.

trapped hedegrow. The troops demolished 51 huts

and 38 trenches, tunnels, and prepared positions, yet

they had only progressed a quarter of the distance to

their final objective.

Not knowing the strength of the enemy and

realizing that the situation could deteriorate after

dark, Captain West ordered a withdrawal to the Yen.

When the Marines were once again in the open, the

Viet Cong returned to the tree line and opened up

with automatic and small arms fire upon the

Americans. This time the Marine company called on

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and the

battalion 81mm mortar section for cover. Twentyfour 105mm shells and 21 mortar rounds struck the

VC positions in four-to-five minutes. The troops

were not able to observe the results, but the Viet

Cong fire stopped and the Marines boarded their

tractors.

During this engagement it had been impossible for

1
64 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

the Marines to determine accurately how large an

enemy force they had encountered. Estimates of the

size of the Viet Cong unit varied from 30 to 100; the

Marines believed they accounted for at least seven

enemy. The withdrawing VC had carried off their

dead, wounded, and weapons, leaving no vindication

for the four Marines wounded in the day's fighting.

When the tractors entered the Cau Do they were

fired on from the southern bank. The Marines

returned fire and the enemy rifles were once again

silenced. Some thought had been given to going back

to the Phong Le Bridge and again attacking southward into Cam Ne (1) and (:2), where the company

could be supported by the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,

but Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig knew it was too late

to accomplish the mission in the remaining daylight.

He called off the operation.

The company had not attlined its final objective,

but the Marines had learned some valuable lessons.

They realized that one company could not cover the

area and reach its target in the time allotted. Beyond

the tactical lessons learned, Cam Ne forcibly brought

to the attention of the American command both the

political and military dilemmas inherent in the

Vietnam War where the enemy could and did use the

civilian population as a shield. Among the casualties

at Cam Ne were a dead 10-year-old Vietnamese boy

and four wounded villagers, who were caught in the

crossfire between the Viet Cong and the Marines.

The nastiness of the village war was dramatized for

millions of Americans on their television screens. A

CBS television crew had accompanied the Marine

company into Cam Ne and American viewers saw a

Marine casually set a hut on fire with his cigarette

lighter while an old woman pleaded for the preservation of her home. The CBS film version of the

action showed the Marines meeting little or no

resistance, and indeed, Morley Safer, the CBS

reporter, who narrated the film, bluntly stated that

"If there were Viet Cong in the hamlets they were

long gone." Taking exception to the CBS report, the

Marine Corps argued that Cam Ne was a fortified

Viet Cong village and that Captain West's Marines

had received small arms fire, including automatic

weapons, from an estimated VC platoon as Company

D attemptedto enter the hamlets. The editors of the

Marine Corps Gazette, perhaps best stated the

Marine Corps position:

War is a stupid and brutalizing affair. This type of war

perhaps more than others. But this does not mean that

those who are fighting it are either stupid or brutal. It

does mean that the whole story should be told. Not just a

part of it.36*

Realizing that extending the Marine TAOR into

the heavily populated hostile area south of the Caii

Do would cause trouble, General Walt, as early as 10

July, had issued a written directive to keep noncombatant casualties to a minimum. He stated:

It is imperative that all officers and men understand the

nature of the Vietnamese conflict, the necessity of

winning the support of the people, and the primary

importance of protecting and safeguarding civilians

whenever possible . . . the indiscriminate or unnecessary

use of weapons is counterproductive. The injury or killing

of hapless civilians inevitably contributes to the Communist cause, and each incident of it will be used against

us with telling effect.

But the general made it clear that this order was not

to infringe upon "the inherent right of an individual

to defend himself from hostile attack.''" Rather, the

emphasis was on discretion by the Marines to employ

the necessary force to accomplish their mission.

General Westmoreland, also concerned about

civilian casualties, reiterated his interest on 5 August

with an order to all commands for increased emphasis

on the subject.

On 18 August, the Marines returned to Cam Ne,

this time in greater strength. The 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines established its command post south of the

In 1977, General Walt remembered that he gave Morley

Safer a lift into the Cam Ne area in his personal helicopter on 3

August. According to Walt, he gave permission to the battalion and company commanders ''to burn those thatched

houses which hid or camouflaged pill boxes,'' and that Mr.

Safer heard him give this permission. Walt considered that

the television account of the incident was a misrepresentation

of the facts. Gen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, dtd

10Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant Colonel

Charles Ward, who in 1965 was the 9th Marines S-2, recalled

that in a conversation about the Cam Ne incident with

Newsweek correspondent Francois Sully in 1968, Sully told

him that ''the Marines' orders and efforts to avoid antagonizing and to try to win the cooperation of the local

populace were misplaced in regard to the people of Cam Ne,

and breaking up the group and levelling of the village structures

were the only feasible actions short of a military assault.''

Ward concluded his comments with the observation that the

Marines operated in the area south of Da Nang with ''salient

gaps'' in their knowledge ''regarding the people" and very

often without the cooperation of the local authorities stating,

''too often the Marines had to blunder their way through the

early critical encounters with the people as well as with the

enemy.'' LtCol Charles Ward, Comments on draft Ms, dtd

27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
REINFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION 65

Cau Do and prepared to reinforce the 2d Battalion,

9th Marines which sent two of its companies from

Duong Son (1) westward into the Cam Ne complex.

For two days, the Marines searched and cleared the

entire village without encountering difficulties; the

Viet Cong were not to be found.

During this period the 9th Marines also took over

the new TAOR on the Tiensha Peninsula east of the

airbase, extending from Monkey Mountain south to

the north face of Marble Mountain. The Seabees had

begun construction of an helicopter air facility there

for MAG-16 to relieve congestion at the main airbase. Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig had begun to move

his battalion into this area at the end of July. By the

end of August he had secured the entire peninsula.

Ludwig's 1st Battalion then tied to the west with the

2d Battalion whose area extended to the Yen River.

Further Reinforcements

During July, the Johnson Administration conduded its internal debate concerning the manpower

level of U. S. forces in Vietnam and made some farreaching decisions for the future. Secretary of

Defense McNamara decided to visit Vietnam to

discuss with the field commanders the various

alternatives. The Secretary, accompanied by the

outgoing U. S. Ambassador to RVN, Maxwell D.

Taylor, and his successor, Henry Cabot Lodge, who

was beginning his second tour as U. S. Ambassador,

arrived in Saigon on 16 July. During a four-day

period, McNamara and the MACV commander

made a complete review of the military situation.

Westmoreland stated that the ARVN troops were no

longer able to hold critical rural areas and were

unable to cope with the VC threat and that it was

obvious that unless further American and allied

forces were deployed, ''there was little chance of

arresting the trend." Apparently the MACV

commander convinced McNamara, for, on 28 July,

President Johnson announced to the American

people that the U.S. force level in Vietnam would be

raised to 125 ,000 and that General Westmoreland

would receive reinforcements as needed.38

During the first week in August, another conference was held in Honolulu, attended by

representatives of the Joint Chiefs, CinCPac, and

ComUSMACV to determine what units would be

deployed and when. The troops to arrive in Vietnam

during 1965 were referred to as Phase I forces. For

the Marine Corps, the immediate result of the

conference was the decision to reinforce Ill MAF

with the 7th Marines regimental headquarters and

the remaining two battalions on Okinawa, the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines. The arrival of the 7th Marines at Chu Lai

on 14 August was to signal the beginning of the first

major Marine offensive against a main force Viet

Cong unit.

*The regimental headquarters and BLT 1/7 landed at Chu

Lai on this date. BLT 3/9 arrived at Da Nang and relieved the

1st Battalion, 9th Marines of the responsibility for airfield

defense.

PART II

THE BIG BATTLES

CHAPTER 5

STARLITE: The First Big Battle

Intelligence and Planning—The Battle—The Aftermath

Intellzgence and Planning

Throughout July evidence had accumulated showing a VC buildup in southern I Corps, especially in

the area south of Chu Lai. By the 21st, General

Westmoreland 's intelligence staff, assessing enemy

capabilities, stated that the Viet Cong could attack

Chu Lai with as many as three regiments. The

American command doubted that the enemy was

ready to risk such a large concentration of forces

against American firepower; a more likely course of

action would be a sudden hit-and-run attack against

the Marine base in regimental strength.

On 30 July, General Westmoreland told Walt that

he expected the Marine commander to undertake

larger offensive operations with the South Vietnamese against the enemy at greater distances from

his base areas. General Walt reminded Westmoreland that the Marines were still bound by the 6

May Letter of Instruction that restricted III MAF to

reserve/reaction missions in support of South

Vietnamese units heavily engaged with an enemy

force. The MACV commander replied "these

restraints were no longer realistic, and invited

General Walt to rewrite the instructions, working

into them the authority he thought he needed, and

promised his approval."1

On 6 August, General Walt received official

permission to take the offensive against the enemy.

With the arrival of the 7th Marines a week later, he

prepared to move against the 1st VC Regiment. In

early July, the 1st VC Regiment had launched a

second attack against the hamlet of Ba Gia, 20 miles

south of Chu Lai. The garrison had been overrun,

causing 130 casualties and the loss of more than 200

weapons, including two 105mm howitzers. After the

attack on Ba Gia, American intelligence agencies

located the 1st VC Regiment in the mountains west

of the hamlet. Disturbing reports indicated that the

enemy regiment was once more on the march.

According to Colonel Leo J. Dulacki, Walt's

experienced intelligence officer:

Early in August, we began receiving countless lowlevel reports from the numerous intelligence collection

organizations concerning the movement of the 1st VC

Regiment. The sources for most of these reports were of

doubtful reliability and, indeed, many were contradictory,

nevertheless, it was decided to plot all of the hundreds of

reported movements, regardless of credibility, on a map,

and an interesting picture developed. When the many

''aberrations'' were discounted, it appeared that the 1st

VC Regiment was, in fact, moving towards Chu Lai.

Although most of the intelligence experts, including

ARVN and the U.S. Army I Corps Advisory Group,

discounted such a possibility, I briefed Colonel Edwin

Simmons, III MAF G-3, on what appeared to be

developing and suggested the consideration, if further

indicators developed, of an offensive operation in the area

south of Chu Lai. 2*

Acting on this intelligence, the 4th Marines

conducted a one-battalion operation with the 51st

ARVN Regiment in search for the 1st VC Regiment

south of the Tra Bong River. Code-named

THUNDERBOLT, the operation lasted for two

days, 6-7 August, and extended 7,000 meters south

of the river in an area west of Route 1. The ARVN

and Marines found little sign of any major VC force

in the area and encountered only scattered resistance.

In fact, the Marines suffered more from the 110

degree temperature than at the hands of the enemy,

sustaining 43 heat casualties and only two wounded.

Nevertheless, Colonel James F. McClanahan , * * who

had relieved Colonel Dupras as commander of the 4th

* Both Colonels Dulacki and Simmons had arrived in

Vietnam and assumed their new duties in July. Colonel

Dulacki, who served in World War II and commanded the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines in Korea, had an extensive intelligence

background, including two tours with the Defense Intelligence

Agency. Colonel Simmons, also a veteran of World War II and

Korea, and holder of both the Silver and Bronze Stars, had just

finished a tour with the Strategic Plans Branch of the G-3

Division, HQMC. * $ Colonel McClanahan was a veteran Marine of nearly 30

years of enlisted and commissioned service. He was commissioned in June 1942 and was awarded the Silver Star for his

actions on Guadalcanal. He came to Vietnam after serving as

Commanding Officer of Camp H. M. Smith in Hawaii.

69
70 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marines on 25 July, remembered that at the time the

''operation was considered a successful experiment

in command and control."3

Eight days after THUNDERBOLT, the allies

finally comfirmed the location of the 1st VC

Regiment. On 15 August, a deserter from the enemy

regiment surrendered to the South Vietnamese.

During his interrogation at General Thi's headquarters he revealed that the regiment had

established its base in the Van Tuong village complex

on the coast, 12 miles south of Chu Lai. It planned to

attack the American enclave. The prisoner told his

interrogators that the 1st VC Regiment at Van

Tuong consisted of two of its three battalions, the

60th and 80th, reinforced by the 52d VC Company

and a company from the 45th Weapons Battalion,

approximately 1,500 men in all. General Thi, who

personally questioned the prisoner and believed the

man was telling the truth, relayed the information to

General Walt. At about the same time, Colonel

Dulacki's G-2 section received corroborative information from another source. Convinced of the

danger to the airfield, Colonels Dulacki and Simmons

advised a spoiling attack in the Van Tuong region.4

Agreeing that the situation called for action,

General Walt flew to Chu Lai and held a hurried

council of war with his senior commanders there:

General Karch, who had become the Chu Lai

Coordinator on 5 August, Colonel McClanahan of

the 4th Marines, and Colonel Oscar F. Peatross, the

newly arrived 7th Marines commander. According

to Peatross, ''General Walt laid the situation out

rather plainly . . . ." The Ill MAF commander

remarked that ''General Thi thought this was the

best information he's had in the corps area

throughout the whole Vietnam War." Two obvious

courses were open to the Marines: they could

remain within their defenses and wait for the enemy

to attack, or they could strike the VC before the

enemy was ready to move. The latter course of action

meant reducing the defensive forces manning the

Chu Lai perimeter, but the arrival of the 7th Marines

* See Chapter 8 for the establishment of the Coordinator and

ADC Command Group at Chu Lai. Colonel Peatross was a

veteran of several amphibious operations during World War 11

including the Makin Island Raid and Iwo Jima. For his actions

on Makin Island, he was awarded the Navy Cross. Colonel

Peatross had served previously as a battalion commander under

General Walt when the latter commanded the 5th Marines in

Korea.

and BLT 1/7 on the 14th made the risk acceptable.

Walt told the assembled officers:

At most, all we're going to dig up is two battalions. If

we dig up as many as two battalions, we've got to have

the amphibious means of making a [landing] and our

ultimate action depends upon how we come to grips with

this thing.

He then turned to Colonel Peatross, and according to

the latter stated, ''Pete, you're the only one

available.'' General Walt then returned to Da Nang

and made the final decision to go ahead with the

operation after further consultations with his staff

and, "going to General Westmoreland for permission to carry out the plan.'"

In a hectic two-day period, the III MAF, division,

wing, and 7th Marines staffs assembled forces and

prepared the plans for the attack. The concept for the

operation, code-named STARLITE,* * dictated a

two-battalion assault, one battalion to land across the

beach and the other to land by helicopter further

inland. The division reassigned two battalions

previously under the operational control of the 4th

Marines to Colonel Peatross as the assault battalions,

Lieutenant Colonel Fisher's 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Muir's 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines. General Walt, who wanted a

third battalion as a floating reserve, requested

permission to use the SLF. Admiral Sharp approved

immediately. At the time of the request the amphibious task force was located at Subic Bay, 720

miles away. Based upon its transit time to the

operational area, the planners selected 18 August as

D-Day.

Colonel Peatross, in the meantime, had borrowed

General Walt's helicopter and, accompanied by

lieutenant Colonels Muir and Fisher, made an aerial

reconnaissance of the 10-square mile objective area.

They saw relatively flat terrain occasionally broken

by small wooded knolls and numerous streams. The

many hamlets were surrounded by rice paddies and

**Colonel Don P. Wyckoff, the 3d Marine Division G-3,

designated the code name SATELLITE for the operation, but

as the division plan was being typed, the electrical generators

failed and the typing was completed using candlelight. Inadvertently, the clerk typed STARLITE instead of SATELLITE

throughout the document. The next morning the error was

discovered, but there was insufficient time to correct the error.

Many accounts of the operation have mistakenly spelled the

code name for the operation as STARLIGHT. LtCol Richard J.

Johnson intvw by Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, dtd 24Mar73

(OralHistColl, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 71

USMC Photo A185826

A Marine Ontos patrols a beach area during Operation STARIJTE. The South Vietnamese fishermengo about

their business despite the war.

dry crop areas. The Marine commanders noted two

suitable amphibious landing sites, one beach between

two peninsulas northeast of the Van Tuong Complex

(Nho Na Bay) and another beach 4,000 meters to the

south, north of the coastal hamlet of An Cuong (1).

While airborne, Colonel Peatross and his commanders selected the amphibious assault landing site,

as well as the helicopter landing zones (LZs). They

chose the more southerly beach, later designated

GREEN Beach, for the landing. A force there would

block VC avenues of escape to the south. Three LZs,

RED, WHITE, and BLUE, were selected four to five

miles east of Route 1 and roughly one mile inland

from the coast. LZ BLUE, about 2,000 meters west

of GREEN Beach, was the southernmost of the

landing zones. WHITE was 2,000 meters westnorthwest of BLUE, while RED was 2,000 meters

north of WHITE. From these positions, the Marines

were to move northeast to the South China Sea.

Fortunately for the 7th Marines, the ships of

Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) 7, which had

brought the regiment to Vietnam, were at Chu Lai

unloading BLT 1/7 and Da Nang disembarking BLT

3/9. Colonel Peatross later wrote:

On the evening of 16 August the Amphibious Group

Commander, Captain W. [William]R. McKinney,USN,

under whose command most of the ships operated, had to

be informed of the operation. Colonel Peatross sent his

RLT S-4, Major Floyd J. Johnson, Jr., out to Captain

McKinney's flagship to inform him of the operation and

to brief him on the plans as we knew them. This was a

timely move as one of the ships had just sailed from Chu

Lai and was on its way to Hong Kong. Captain McKinney

was able to turn this ship around and return it to Chu Lai

just in time to make the tight schedule laid Out for the

earliest possible D-Day. 6

On the morning of the 17th, McKinney's staff

joined the Marine aviation and ground planners

ashore and the plans were completed. Lieutenant

Colonel Muir's 3d Battalion was to land across

GREEN Beach at 0630, 18 August with Companies I

and K abreast, K on the right. Company L, the

battalion reserve, was to follow as the lead companies

swerved to the northwest. The remaining company,

Company M, was to make an overland movement

from Chu Lai to a ridgeline blocking position in the

northern portion of the operations area, four miles

northwest of the landing beach and one mile inland

from the sea, closing off the VCs' retreat. Soon after

H-Hour, UH-34s from Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadrons 261 and 361 were to shuttle Fisher's 2d

Battalion into the three LZs. The two battalions were

to join forces when Company H from LZ BLUE

linked up with Company I outside the hamlet of An

Cuong (2), 1,800 meters inland from GREEN Beach.
72 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

From there, the Marines were to sweep to the sea

through the Van Tuong village complex and over the

Phuoc Thuan Peninsula. Artillery batteries at Chu

Lai were to provide artillery support while two U.S.

destroyers, the Orleck (DD 886) and the Prichett

(DD 561), and the cruiser Galveston (CLG 3) were

available for naval gunfire. Aircraft from MAGs-li

and -12 were to fly close support for the operation.

The planning phase was short; Colonel Peatross later

remarked, ''there just wasn't enough time for

anyone to bring up any problems."7

The Battle

With the completion of planning, the Marines

began preparations for the operation. Lieutenant

Colonel James P. Kelly's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

took over the defensive positions of Muir's 3d

Battalion in the Chu Lai TAOR, while two companies, one each from the Da Nang and Phu Bai

enclaves, were flown in to man the perimeter held by

Fisher's 2d Battalion. At 1000 on the 17th, Company

M, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines boarded LVTs at Chu

Lai and moved along the coast to the Trung Phan

Peninsula; then the company marched four miles

south where it established its blocking position. The

Marines of Company M met only minor resistance,

an occasional sniper and booby traps. One man

tripped a mine and suffered superficial wounds; no

one else was injured. Before dawn on the 18th, the

company reached its objective and dug in. Marine

patrols had been active in this area for some time and

to the casual observer the company's activity was

just another small unit movement.

At 1700 on 17 August, the rest of Lieutenant

Colonel Muir's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, with

Colonel Peatross and his staff, embarked on the three

ships of the amphibious task group, Bayfield (APA

33), Cabildo (LSD 16), and Vernon County (LST

1161). Three M-67 flame tanks attached to the 7th

Marines and a platoon of five M-48 tanks assigned to

Fisher's battalion boarded two LCUs, which then

sailed independently towards the amphibious objective area, timing their arrival to coincide with that

of the troop transports. That night at 2200, the larger

ships were under way. The task force first sailed east

to deceive any VC in sampans in the coastal waters.

Once over the horizon, the ships changed course to

the southwest, arriving in the amphibious objective

area shortly after 0500. There they were joined by

the Galveston and the Orleck, which were to cover

the landing.

At 0615, 15 minutes before H-Hour, Battery K,

4th Battalion, 12th Marines, which had displaced to

firing positions on the northern bank of the Tra Bong

River in the Chu Lai TAOR the night before, began

155mm preparation fires of the helicopter landing

zones. The artillery was soon reinforced by 20

Marine A-4s and F-4s which dropped 18 tons of

bombs and napalm on the LZs. The Marines limited

their preparation of GREEN Beach to 20mm cannon

strafing runs by MAG-12 A-4 Skyhawks, because of

the proximity of An Cuong (1) to the landing site.

As the air and artillery fires lifted, the ground

forces arrived, lieutenant Colonel Muir's Companies I and K, in LVTs, landed across GREEN

Beach at 0630 and pushed inland according to plan.

A charge exploded to the front of Company I, but

caused no casualties. The troops quickly spread out

and moved into An Cuong (1). After a futile search

for VC, the company continued advancing to the

west. Company K received sniper fire from its right

as it crossed the northern portion of GREEN Beach.

Two platoons quickly moved northward and the

enemy fire ceased. The third platoon secured the

northern half of An Cuong (1). Fifteen minutes after

H-Hour, Company Glanded at LZ RED. Company F

and Fisher's command group landed at LZ WHITE

and Company H arrived at LZ BLUE 45 minutes

later. On the beach, Lieutenant Colonel Muir, who

had moved his CP ashore, was joined at 0730 by

Colonel Peatross and his staff. Tanks and Ontos

rolled off the LCUs and LCMs and made their way

forward to support the assault companies. Company

L came ashore and established perimeter security for

the supply area at the beach.

Most of the Marine companies met only light

resistance as they moved into the attack. Company G

searched two hamlets in the vicinity of LZ RED and

then advanced to the northeast and linked up with

Company M without incident. At LZ WHITE south

The Prichett did not arrive to support the operation until D

plus 1. Colonel Floyd J. Johnson, Jr., the 7th Marines S-4 for

STARLITE, believes the Marines were able to achieve the

element of surprise because the ships used in the operation

were the same ones that brought RLT-7 to Vietnam and

"When we backloaded and sailed so soon after arrival, it's very

possible the VC paid little attention, since the ships were due to

leave anyway." Col Floyd J. Johnson, Jr., Comments on draft

MS, dtd 29Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 73

of LZ RED, Company E encounted stiffer opposition

from the Viet Cong. The enemy manned firing

positions on a ridgeline east and northeast of the LZ,

employing mortars, machine guns, and small arms.

After dogged fighting, the Marines cleared the hills.

By midmorning, Company E began moving northeast. At one juncture, the Marines spotted about 100

VC in the open and asked kr artillery fire. The

107mm Mortar (Howtar) Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th

Marines, helilifted into the position held by Company M, shelled the enemy force. Fisher, who later

flew over the impact area in a helicopter, estimated

that the artillery mission had accounted for 90 enemy

dead. Company E continued to push forward, finding

only occasional opposition.

Along the coast, Company K had advanced to

Phase Line BANANA, 2,000 meters north of the

landing beach. There a VC force, entrenched on a

hill overlooking the Marine positions, blocked the

advance of the company. Lieutenant Colonel Muir,

who had established his forward CP with Company

K, ordered Company L forward. By midafternoon,

the two Marine companies, aided by supporting

arms, carried the high ground and set up night

defenses.

The major action developed in the south near LZ

BLUE, at the junction of Fisher's and Muir's units.

This area, roughly one square kilometer, was bound

by the hamlets of An Thoi (2) on the north, Nam

Yen (3) on the south, and An Cuong (2) to the east.

USMC Photo A 184967

A Marine helicopter from HMM-361 brings ammunition to a howtar position during Operation STARLITE. The

howtar is a 107mm mortar tube mounted on a pack howitzer chassis, hence the name howtar.

I

t!i )

lh
74 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

2 .1

South China

S.8Se

,

Phuoc Thuan

Peninsula

An Cuong (2)

H><4

LZ BLUE

An Cuong (1

OPERATION STARLITE

18-19 AU ST 1965

Miles

Kilometers
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE

It was a patchwork of rice paddies, streams,

hedgerows, woods, and built-up areas, interspersed

by trails leading in all directions. Two small knolls

dominated the flat terrain, Hill 43, a few hundred

meters southwest of Nam Yen (3), and Hill 30, 400

meters north of An Cuong (2). LZ BLUE was just

south of Nam Yen (3), between Hill 43 and the

hamlet. Company H's LZ was almost on top of the

60th VC Battalion. The enemy allowed the first

helicopters to touch down with little interference,

but then opened up as the others came in. According

to one of the helicopter pilots, Captain Howard B.

Henry from HMM-361, "You just had to close your

eyes and drop down to the ec'8 Three U.S. Army

UH-1B Huey gunships from the 7th Airlift Platoon,

took the VC on Hill 43 under fire while the infantry

oompany formed a defensive perimeter around the

landing zone.

The Company H commander, First Lieutenant

Homer K. Jenkins, was not yet aware of the size of

the enemy force. He ordered one platoon to take the

hill and the rest of the company to secure Nam Yen

(3). Both attacks soon stalled. The platoon attacking

Hill 43 was still at the bottom of the hill when

Jenkins called back his other two platoons from the

outskirts of Nam Yen (3) in order to regroup. He

requested air strikes against both the enemy hill

position and Nam Yen (3). He then renewed the

attack, but this time, Jenkins moved all three of his

platoons into the assault on the hill. The VC fought

tenaciously, but the Marines, reinforced by close air

support and tanks, were too strong for the enemy.

One Marine platoon counted six dead VC near a

heavy machine gun position and more bodies

scattered throughout the brush. Jenkins' men took

one prisoner and collected over 40 enemy weapons.

The airstrikes called by Jenkins against enemy

positions at Nam Yen (3) momentarily halted the

advance of Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at a

streambed east of Nam Yen (3). Bomb fragments

slightly wounded two Marines. After the bombing

run, Company I moved north along the stream for

500 meters to a point opposite An Cuong (2). Under

fire from the hamlets, Captain Bruce D. Webb, the

company commander, requested permission to attack

An Cuong (2), although it was across the bank in the

area of responsibility of the 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Muir approved the

request, after consulting with Colonel Peatross.

An Cuong (2) was a fortified hamlet, ideally suited

to Viet Cong combat tactics. Major Andrew G.

Comer, Muir's executive officer in charge of the 3d

Battalion's rear command group at the 7th Marines

CP, described the area surrounding the hamlet as

heavily wooded with severely restricted fields of fire.

The only open areas were the rice paddies and "even

these were interspersed with hedgerows of hardwood

and bamboo thickets.''9 An Cuong (2), itself,

consisted of 25-30 huts, fighting holes, and

camouflaged trench lines connected by a system of

interlocking tunnels. As the company cleared the

first few houses, a grenade exploded, killing Captain

Webb and wounding three other Marines. No sooner

had the grenade exploded, than two 60mm mortar

rounds fell on the advancing troops, inflicting three

more casualties. First Lieutenant Richard M.

Purnell, the company executive officer, assumed

command and committed the reserve platoon. The

company gained the upper hand and the action

slackened as the troops secured the hamlet. Making a

hurried survey of the battlefield, Purnell counted 50

Viet Cong bodies. He then radioed his battalion

commander for further instructions.

Muir ordered Purnell's company to join Company

K, which was heavily engaged at Phase Line

BANANA, 2,000 meters to the northeast. Company

H remained near Nam Yen (3) to clean out all enemy

opposition there and then planned to link up with

Muir's battalion.

As Company I was preparing to move from An

Cuong (2), a UH-1E gunship from Lieutenant

Colonel George F. Bauman's VMO-2 was shot down

by enemy small arms fire northeast of the hamlet.

Lieutenant Colonel Muir ordered Purnell to leave

some men behind to protect the helicopter. The

lieutenant ordered two squads and three tanks to stay

with the helicopter until the craft was evacuated. As

the company departed, its members could see that

Jenkins' Company H had left Hill 43 and was advancing on the left flank of Company I.

At 1100 Jenkins led his unit, augmented by five

tanks and three Ontos, from the Hill 43 area into the

open rice paddy between Nam Yen (3) and An

Cuong (2). Jenkins bypassed Nam Yen (3) as he

mistakenly believed that Company I had cleared both

hamlets. Suddenly, from positions in Nam Yen (3)

and from Hill 30, the VC opened up with small arms

and machine gun fire, catching the Marine rear

guard in a murderous crossfire. Then mortar shells

began bursting upon the lead platoons. Company H
76 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

was taking fire from all directions, and tracked

vehicles, Ontos and tanks, were having trouble with

the muck of the paddies. Jenkins drew his armor into

a tight circle and deployed his infantry. One squad

moved to the northwest of Nam Yen (3) and killed

nine VC who were manning a mortar, but were

driven off by small arms fire and had to withdraw to

the relative security of the tanks.

Lieutenant Jenkins saw that his position was

untenable, and after radioing for supporting arms, he

ordered his force to withdraw to LZ BLUE. Artillery

hit Nam Yen (3) while F-4s and A-4s attacked Hill

30. About 1400, the company tried to move back to

the landing zone. The lead platoon was forced to alter

course when medical evacuation helicopters tried to

land in the midst of the unit. As it maneuvered off to

the flank of Company H, this platoon became

separated from Jenkins' main body and was engaged

by the Viet Cong. At this juncture, the platoon

unexpectedly linked up with Purnell's helicopter

security detail which had started to move toward its

parent company after the downed helicopter had been

repaired and flown out. The small force was quickly

engaged by a Viet Cong unit, but together the two

Marine units fought their way to An Cuong (2).

Meanwhile, Jenkins and his other two platoons

fought a delaying action and withdrew to LZ BLUE,

arriving there at 1630. Lieutenant Colonel Fisher

directed Jenkins to establish a defensive perimeter

and await reinforcements.

The expected reinforcements never arrived; they

had been diverted to help a supply column that had

been ambushed 400 meters west of An Cuong (2).

Just before noon, Lieutenant Colonel Muir had

ordered Major Corner to dispatch "our mobile

(LVT) resupply" to Company I, which, at the time,

was only a "few hundred yards" in front of Comer's

command group. Major Comer recalled that he

briefed both the five LVTs and the section officers of

* Lance Corporal Joe C. Paul, a fire team leader in Company

H, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his

gallant actions during the engagement near Nam Yen (3). A

copy of his citation is printed in Appendix D.

**Company I senior squad leader, Corporal Robert E.

O'Malley, killed eight VC single-handedly that day. For his

action, O'Malley became the first Marine to receive the Medal

of Honor in Vietnam although Captain Frank S. Reasoner was

later posthumously awarded the medal for an action in July

1965. See Chapter 11. Copies of both citations are printed in

Appendix D.

the three flame tanks, the only tactical support

available at the time, on the location of the company

and marked the routes they were to follow on their

maps.'°

The supply column left the CP shortly after noon,

but got lost between Nam Yen (3) and An Thoi (2).

It had followed a trail that was flanked on one side by

a rice paddy and on the the other by trees and

hedgerows. As the two lead vehicles, a tank and

amtrac, went around a bend in the road, an explosion

occurred near the tank, followed by another in the

middle of the column. Fire from Viet Cong recoilless

rifles and a barrage of mortar rounds tore into the

column. The vehicles backed off the road and turned

their weapons to face the enemy. Using all of the

weapons at their command the troops held off the

closing VC infantry. The rear tank tried to use its

flamethrower, but an enemy shell had rendered it

useless. Throughout the bitter fighting, the convoy

was still able to maintain communications with the

command post.

At the rear CP area, Major Corner received ''word

on the LVT command net . . . that the column was

surrounded by VC and was about to be overrun."

Comer recalled:

The LVT radio operator kept the microphone button

depressed the entire time and pleaded for help. We were

unable to quiet him sufficiently to gain essential information as to their location. This continued for an

extended period, perhaps an hour.

Major Corner relayed the information about the

ambush to lieutenant Colonel Muir. The battalion

commander replied that he was returning Company I

to the rear CP and that Corner "was to gather

whatever other support . . . [he] could and to rescue

them as rapidly as possible." Major Corner told

Colonel Peatross about the proposed rescue mission.

The regimental commander, well aware of the

vulnerable positions of both Company H and the

supply column and fearing that the enemy was attempting to drive a salient between the two battalions, heartily approved and provided Corner with

"the single available M-48 tank for support."11 *

When Company I arrived at the rear CP, Corner

held a hurried briefing with Lieutenant Purnell and

* * * Colonel Peatross later stated that the enemy force which

ambushed the supply column may have been getting ready to

hit the regimental CP when the LVTs rumbled into them.

Peatross, "Victory at Van Tuong,'' p. 9.
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 77

USMC Photo A185824

Marines from the 2dBattalion, 4th Marines assemble near a small hamlet during Operation STARLITE. The unit

pictured is a command group; note the number of radio antennas.

the other leaders of the improvised rescue force. The

plan was to use "a rapidly moving tank, LVT, and

Ontos column through the previously cleared An

Cuong (2) area." Before the meeting broke up, one

of the flame tanks which had been in the supply

column arrived at the CP. According to Corner,

''The crew chief, a staff sergeant, reported to me that

he had just passed through An Cuong (2) without

being fired upon and that he could lead us to the LVT

supply column."2

Shortly after 1300, Corner's force moved out. Just

after cresting Hill 30, the M-48 tank was hit by

recoilless rifle fire and stopped short. The other

vehicles immediately jammed together "and

simultaneously mortar and small arms fire saturated

the area.'' Within a few minutes, the Marines

suffered 5 dead and 17 wounded. The infantry

quickly dismounted and the Ontos maneuvered to

provide frontal fire and to protect the flanks. Major

Comer called for artillery fire and air support. With

the response of supporting arms, the enemy fire

diminished but did not stop. According to Comer,

"It was obvious that the VC were deeply dug in, and

emerged above ground when we presented them with

an opportunity and withdrew whenever we retaliated

or threatened them.'"3

With the letup of the action on Hill 30, Corner

ordered Company Ito resume its advance toward An

Cuong (2) leaving a small rear guard on Hill 30 to

supervise the evacaution of the casualties. The

company entered An Cuong (2) against surprisingly

little resistance, but Corner and the command group

were caught by intense fire from a wooded area to

their right front and forced to take what cover they

could in the open rice paddies. At the time, the

Marines came upon the two reinforced squads from

Company I which had been left to guard the downed

Huey and the platoon from Company H. The two

squads from Company I fought their way to Hill 30

where they were evacuated while the Company H

platoon remained with Corner in the rice paddies. At

this point Corner recalled:

When it became obvious that I could not move the

''B'' group [the command group] in either direction . . . I radioed instructions to Lieutenant Purnell to extricate the

supply column as rapidly as he could as I deemed that the

U -

:.•i-

-...-... ..-.

.. .— -

r
78 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

most urgent matter, and that I would support him from

my present position as best I could I also advised

Lieutenant Colonel Muir of our situation as I had been

doing all day 14 While Company I maneuvered through An Cuong

(2) encountering periodic strong enemy resistance,

Colonel Peatross committed one company of his

reserve battalion to the battle.5 A ship of the special

landing force, the LPH Iwo Jima with Companies I

and L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and HMM- 163 on

board, arrived offshore shortly after 0930. As the

intensity of the battle increased, Colonel Peatross

ordered a halt to the advance of the units from LZs

RED and WHITE and along the coast to prevent the

overextension of his lines. He ordered Company L,

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Captain

Ronald A. Clark, to be landed. This company was

helilifted to the regimental CP at 1730. There it was

placed under operational control of Lieutenant

Colonel Muir, who ordered Clark to reinforce

Corner's group and then join Company I in the

search for the supply train.

Supported by two tanks, Clark's force moved out.

As the company advanced through the open rice

paddies east of An Cuong (2), it came under heavy

fire, wounding 14 and killing four. The Marines

persevered and the VC broke contact as night i..ll.

The addition of a third Marine company to the

area, coupled with the weight of supporting arms

fires available, evidently forced the 60th VC Battalion to break contact. The Marines radioed the

Galveston and Orleck requesting continuous

5MaIor General Peatross recalled that at the time he did not

have the authority to commit the SLF battalion. General Walt

could not delegate this decision without first receiving permission through command channels, himself. General Walt

had arrived at the 7th Marines CP earlier in the day, but had

departed before the heavy fighting broke Out. At this time,

Lieutenant General Krulak, CGFMFPac, who was in Vietnam

on an inspection visit, flew into the CP by helicopter while

"rifle and recoilless rounds were flying around." General

Karch, who was also present, told Peatross ''to keep him

[Krulak] aboard the helicopter and then fly to the command

ship of the SLF, and then obtain permission to employ 3/7."

General Krulak later remarked that he was not entirely successful in this mission: "We watched the confusion then took

off, only to have to land with a hit in our chopper's gas tank.''

Colonel Peatross, nevertheless, received permission to employ

both the SLF infantry and squadron since ''the number of

helicopters seemed to be reduced by the hour.'' MajGen Oscar

F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26Oct76 (Vietnam

Comment File), and Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 2Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

illumination throughout the evening over the Nam

Yen-An Cuong area. * 5 As darkness fell, Colonel

Peatross informed General Walt that the VC apparently intended to defend selected positions, while

not concentrating their forces.1'

Lieutenant Colonel Muir decided that it was too

risky to continue searching for the supply column

that night, especially after having learned that the

column, although immobilized, was no longer in

danger. Muir ordered Captain Clark's Company L to

move to Phase Line BANANA and join Companies

K and L, and establish a perimeter defense there. He

also ordered Company I to return to the regimental

CP. For all intents and purposes, the fighting was

over for Company I; of the 177 men who had crossed

the beach, 14 were dead, including the company

commander, and another 53 were wounded, but the

company could daim 125 dead VC.

During the night of 18 August, Colonel Peatross

brought the rest of the SLF battalion ashore.

Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines arrived at the

regimental CP at 1800 followed shortly by Lieutenant

Colonel Bodley and his command group. Just after

midnight, Company M landed across GREEN Beach

from the Talladega. With the arrival of his third

battalion, Colonel Peatross completed his plans for

the next day.

The regimental commander's concept of action

remained basically the same, squeeze the vise around

the VC and drive them toward the sea. As a result of

the first day's action against the 60th VC Battalion,

he readjusted the battalions' boundaries. At 0730,

lieutenant Colonel Muir's battalion, with Companies K and L abreast and Company L from Bodley's

battalion following in reserve, was to attack to the

northeast from Phase line BANANA. Simultaneously, Fisher's unit, with Companies E and G, was

to drive eastward to the sea, joining Muir's force.

Jenkins' Company H, Comer's group, and Company I were to withdraw to the regimental CP.***

The remainder of Lieutenant Colonel Bodley's 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines was to fill the gap. Companies I and M of his unit were to move out of the

regimental CP, ext rut the ambushed supply column, and then move toward An Thoi (2) to

* 5At about 0530 the next morning, the ships ceased firing;

their magazines had been emptied of star (illumination) shells.

Company H had accounted for 156 dead VC and sustained

45 evacuated casualties; 15 killed and 30 hospitalized.
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 79

USMC Photo A184946

Marines from Company E, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines move out from LZ WHITE during Operation STARLITE.

Shortly after this picture was taken, the company met stiff resistance from Viet Cong entrenched to the right of

the photograph.

establish a blocking position there which would prevent the VC from slipping southward. Company M,

3d Battalion, 3d Marines was to hold its blocking

positions further north. The enemy was to be left no

avenue of escape.

On the 19th, the SLF battalion moved into its zone

of action which included the area of the fiercest

fighting of the day before. The VC were gone. At

0900, Companies I and M of Bodley's battalion left

the regimental CP, and moved through An Cuong

(2), meeting no enemy resistance. They brought out

the supply convoys and by 1500 had established

their assigned blocking position at An Thoi (2).

Although much of the enemy resistance had

disappeared, Fisher and Muir still found pockets of

stiff opposition when they launched their combined

attacks at 0730. The terrain was very difficult. The

0f the 23 Marines assigned to the convoy, five were killed

and several others wounded. Only nine men remained in action

throughout the three-hour period they engaged the VC. The

enemy left 60 bodies behind.

compartmented rice paddies, ringed by dikes and

hedgerows, hindered control, observation, and

maneuverability. The VC were holed up in bunkers,

trenches, and caves which were scattered throughout

the area. Marines would sweep through an area, only

to have enemy snipers fire upon them from the rear.

In many cases, the Marines had to dig out the enemy

or blow up the tunnels. By 1030, Company E had

linked up with Company K and the two battalions,

continued their advance to the sea. By nightfall, the

2d Battalion had completed its sweep of the Phuoc

Thuan Peninsula. Enemy organized resistance had

ceased.

The Aftermath

Although the cordon phase of STARLITE had

been completed, General Walt decided to continue

the operation for five more days so that the entire

area could be searched systematically. He believed

that some of the enemy had remained behind in

underground hiding places. Fisher's and Muir's

— - —.
80 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

A MAG-16 helicopter evacuates STARLITE casualties,

the left carries a M-79 grenade launcher.

battalions returned to Chu Lai on the 20th and

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly's 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines moved into the objective area and joined

Bodley's battalion and units from the 2d ARVN

Division for the search. The Marines killed 54 more

VC in the Van Tuong complex before STARLITE

came to an end on 24 August. The Marines had

killed 614 VC, by body count, taken 9 prisoners, held

42 suspects, and collected 109 assorted weapons, at a

cost of 45 Marines dead and 203 wounded.

The exploits of the infantry battalions were only

part of the story of the battle. Colonel Peatross had

high praise for both the tank and engineer detachments attached to his command. He observed the

engineers were particularly helpful in destroying

enemy fortifications, "mostly trenches and caves

during the heat of battle and many more during the

USMC Photo A184966

while a Marine M-48 tank stands guard. The Marine on

five days that followed the mop up." The regimental

commander later claimed that ''the tanks were

certainly the difference between extremely heavy

casualties and the number that we actually took.

Every place the tanks went, they drew a crowd of

VC.' '16

Another factor in the outcome of the battle was the

vast amount of firepower that the Marines brought to

bear against the enemy. Elements of Lieutenant

Colonel Page's artillery group at Chu Lai, supporting

the operation, fired over 3,000 rounds of highexplosive, white phosphorous, and illumination.

Fifty-eight missions were called in by artillery forward observers. The remainder consisted of

preparation fires, marking concentrations, and

harassing and interdiction missions. On five occasions, aerial observers reported secondary ex-

- .t$

•1
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 81

plosions in fortified villages. The 107mm Mortar

Battery from the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines

operating with Company M, 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines and Battery K, 4th Battalion, 12th

Marines provided most of the artillery support for the

7th Marines, firing over 2,400 rounds.

The ships Orleck, Galveston, and Prichett fired

1,562 rounds in support of STARLITE. One of their

most effective fire missions occurred on 19 August

when 100 VC were spotted on a beach trying to

escape. The destroyer Orleck engaged the target with

rapid salvos from her 5-inch guns with excellent

effect. In addition, the Orleck sank seven sampans in

which VC were attempting to flee.

Close air support provided by Colonel Robert F.

Conley's MAG-Il and Colonel John D. Noble's

MAG-12 was a vital adjunct to the Marines on the

ground. Seventy-five Marine F-4Bs and A-4s from

five squadrons flew air support missions, at times

dropping ordnance within 50 meters of friendly

positions. The fixed-wing planes of the 1st MAW

flew a total of 78 sorties on the first day of the

operation and expended 65 tons of bombs, 4 tons of

napalm, 523 2.75-inch rockets, and 6,000 rounds of

20mm ammunition. Over 290 sorties were flown

during the entire operation.

Colonel Leslie E. Brown, the Wing Operations

Officer, recalled:

The Marines were in trouble . . and our airplanes

were literally just staying in the flight pattern and they'd

land and rearm and take off and be right back again in a

few minutes just dropping and strafing and firing rockets

as fast as we could rearm them . . . in the three day

period, we flew more sorties than in the history of any

other attack group before or since, in support of that one

operation which took place . . . in an area probably about

two miles square . . . . Air control was pretty racy. People

were congested and the helicopters were bouncing in and

Out. Helicopters were being struck and helicopters were

burning. So it was a pretty exciting two or three days.'7

*The Chu Lai artillery group, under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Leslie L. Page, established a forward fire

direction center (FDC) with Battery K on the northern bank of

the Tra Bong. Other Chu Lai artillery units which provided

support for the operation were Battery C, 1/12; Battery M,

4/11; the 3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP); and a platoon, two

guns, of the 1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP). The 105mm

howitzer and 107mm mortar batteries embarked with the SLF

were not committed.

•The A-4s were from VMA-214, VMA-225, and VMA311 while the F-4s were from VMFA-513 and VMFA-342.

General Walt later stated:

I was near the front lines when this close air support

action was taking place. It was an outstanding

professional performance of the highest order. Strafing

was done within 200 feet of our pinned down troops and

was a very important factor in our winning the battle. I

have never seen a finer example of close air support.'8

The helicopters of Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor 's

MAG-16 furnished the infantry with maneuverability and the capability of quick resupply and

casualty evacuation. A task force of 24 UH-34s from

HMM-361 and -261 escorted by Marine and U.S.

Army 'Huey' gunships brought the 2d Battalion,

4th Marines into battle. After the first landings, the

eight helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B.

Porter's HMM-261 returned to Da Nang, leaving

Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd F. Childers' HMM-361 to

carry the burden of resupply and evacuation.

Fourteen of Childers' 16 helicopters were hit

by enemy fire. After the SLF arrived, Lieutenant

Colonel Ewers HMM-163 was able to assume part of

the load. During the entire operation, the helicopter

squadrons flew over 500 sorties in support of the

ground troops. * * *

Logistics for STARLITE became strained as the

operation was extended, nevertheless, every critical

demand was met. Major Floyd J. Johnson, the 7th

Marines S-4 for the operation, later wrote that

Colonel Peatross had directed "that we not maintain

Colonel O'Connor assumed command of MAG-16

from Colonel King on 7 August. He wrote: ''I left Da Nang

about an hour before dawn in a UH-IE, in company with

HMM-361 and HMM-261, and flew to the pickup zones west

of Chu Lai. At this time MAG-16 was based at crowded Da

Nang airfield, and the hazards of getting [the] squadrons

airborne and en route to the objective area in darkness were

apparent. The flight time to Chu Lai for a helicopter was about

50 minutes." Colonel O'Connor also remarked on the poor

marksmanship of the VC gunners: "One feature of battle

damage stood out. Most of LtCol Lloyd Childers' helicopters

took extensive small arms fire but it was not crippling. Most of

the bullet strikes occurred in the tail booms aft of the

passengers compartments. This indicated poor training of VC

gunners on moving targets. Most of these hits occurred when

the helicopters were approaching or leaving landing zones, at

airspeeds under 60 knots." Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Colonel Mervin B. Porter commented that when his squadron,

HMM-261, returned to Da Nang, it ''received word of the

heavy action and 261 returned to the STARLITE area with all

available aircraft and supported operations there until about

2000 or 2030." Col Mervin B. Porter, Comments on draft MS,

n.d. [Nov 76] (Vietnam Comment File).
82 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

a big logistic support area" in order not to lose

mobility and to "reduce the need for security."

Johnson stated that he kept in the logistic support area "one days rations and two days of ammunition." To insure "continuous and responsive

logistic support," the 7th Marines stockpiled

supplies on the helicopter deck of the LSD Cabildo.

Johnson explained, "A special communication link

was created between the RLT CP and the ship and

most of the resupply to the battalions was made by

helo direct from what was really a large floating

dump." One of the greatest demands was for water. Over

1,500 gallons of water per day were supplied to the

troops ashore from the Cabildo, causing the ship to

go on short water rations; even so, high temperatures

and high humidity caused several cases of heat

prostration. An effective means was devised for

bringing the water from the ship to shore. LVTs

loaded with empty cans were floated into the well

deck of the Cabildo where a two-inch water hose was

lowered into the tractors and the cans were filled in

place without having to manhandle them. The heavy

cans still presented a problem; they had to be carried

from the regimental collection point to the operating

units. As a result, Colonel Peatross recommended

that plastic water containers replace the impractical

bulky cans and that in the future, infantry battalions

carry enough water to supply each man with four

gallons per day.

Civilians in the combat zone presented complications. The first attempts to evacuate them were

difficult; the people were frightened and did not trust

the Marines. Eventually most of the local populace

were placed in local collecting points where they

were fed and provided with medical attention.

Although attempts were made to avoid civilian

casualties, some villages were completely destroyed

by supporting arms when it became obvious that the

enemy occupied fortified positions in them. Colonel

Peatross commented:

No . . [supporting fires] were utilized unless called for

by one of the units and each had a forward air controller,

naval gunfire teams and forward observer. All weapons

were controlled and no fire ashore was conducted unless it

could be observed; consequently, neither aircraft nor

naval gunfire made any judgments on "military

necessity.'' Only ground units being supported made

such judgment.2°

There could be no doubt, however, that the

hamlets in the area were used by the Viet Cong as

staging areas for their operations. Lieutenant Colonel

Kelly provided the following description of Van

Tuong (1):

The village was encircled with a trench line and double

apron fence. The streets had punji traps for personnel and

vehicles, as well as spider traps. There were numerous

hand-painted anti-American signs. There were numerous

caves throughout the village

Accumulated evidence indicated that this hamlet

had served as the CP of the 1st VC Regiment. The

Marines found communication equipment, numerous documents, munitions, rice, and propaganda

leaflets in Van Tuong (1).

During Operation STARLITE, III MAF severely

punished the enemy regiment. According to

prisoners, the Marines completely destroyed the 60th

VC Battalion and badly mauled the 80th. General

Krulak credited intelligence as the primary reason for

the Marine success. He later wrote, ''The Marines,

ground and air, just behaved like they were supposed

to behave." According to the FMFPac commander,

it was ''the confluence of all of the many information

sources in a credible picture of what was happening,'' that was the "decisive factor in

STARLITE."22

The reaction to the Marine victory was not

altogether what would be expected. General

Westmoreland reported that several AR\TN general

officers on the Joint General Staff made some rather

disparaging remarks about the Marine operation.

The MACV commander attributed their attitude to

the extensive press coverage that the Marines

received and suggested that on future occasions that

Vietnamese units be included on operations so they

could receive their share of plaudits. Moreover, none

of the Vietnamese General Staff, except for General

Thi and Lam, had been informed about the operation

until after it had started. Colonel I)on P. Wyckoff,

the 3d Marine Division G-3, recalled that none of the

Vietnamese were told, at the insistance of General

Thi. According to Wyckoff:

General Walt, concerned about the reaction of ARVN

forces in the area when a large scale operation flared up

unexpectedly, convinced Thi that General Lam had to

know ahead of time to keep his own forces in rein. To my

recollection, this was done on a person to person basis

from Thi to Lam and Lam kept the information in strict

confidence until the battle began.23

General Walt later stated that he received his

''instructions from General Westmoreland. I had

requested that the 'need to know' among the

Vietnamese be limited to the very minimum," and
STARLITE: THE FIRST BIG BATTLE 83

USMC Photo A801265

General Walt, Commanding General, III MAF, congratulates Colonel Oscar F. Peatross, Commandin' Officer,

7/h Marines, upon the awarding of the Navy Unit Commendation to the 7th Marines for the regiment 's participation in Operation STARLITE. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Bodley, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, looks on.

recommended that only "Generals Thi and Lam be

told. General Westmoreland concurred and approved

my action."24

Regardless of laudable press reports or restrained

Vietnamese reaction, the Marines came out of

STARLITE with a renewed faith in their ability.

They had passed the first big test. What they did not

fully appreciate may have been the cause for the lessthan-enthusiastic Vietnamese response. The veteran

RVN commanders had seen more than one enemy

unit supposedly destroyed, only to reappear on the

battlefield at full strength a few months later. The

60th and 80th VC Battalions had taken a beating, but

they would be back.
CHAPTER 6

The Enemy Refuses to Give Battle:

September-November Operations

Operation PIRANHA—Much Ado About CS', Operation STOMP—October-November Operations

Operation PIRANHA

After Operation STARUTE, III MAF entered a

new stage of operations aimed at striking at enemy

main force units. Having eliminated the threat posed

to the Chu Lai base by the 1st VC Regiment, General

Walt considered the time opportune to complete the

destruction of the enemy regiment. His intelligence

sources indicated that its remnants had withdrawn to

the Batangan Peninsula, eight miles south of Van

Tuong. After consulting with General Thi, General

Walt issued a warning order on 26 August to Colonel

Peatross for the 7th Marines to plan kr a coordinated

operation in the area.*

In contrast to STARLITE, the planning and

preparations for the new operation were extensive.

From 31 August through 2 September, Marine and

naval commanders travelled between Da Nang and

Chu Lai. They were briefed by the Ill MAF staff and

prepared detailed plans. Captain McKinney and

Colonel Peatross once more were to be the respective

* Colonel Wyckoff, the 3d Marine Division G-3 at the time,

recalled that following STARLITE, he worked closely with

Major Charles T. Williamson, the Division G-2, to locate the

1st VC Regiment: ''The Division G-2 staff sought for indicators in two general areas: the eastern edge of the mountains

coming down toward Chu Lai and the cave-dotted Batangan

Peninsula. In the latter they found a 'V' of older field fortifications pointing inland with its open end toward the sea.

Kept under visual and photographic surveillance, a second 'V'

of new positions, inland of the older ones showed under

development. A series of transparent overlays was made up,

showing the progression of activity over several days. General

Walt concurred in the analysis and a staff team was flown down

to Saigon to brief General Westmoreland, using the same set of

maps and overlays." Col Don P. Wyckoff, Comments on draft

MS, dtd 16Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

84

commanders of the amphibious task force and landing forces. They coordinated their activities with the

the South Vietnamese and on 3 September the plans

were complete. That date,the 7th Marines published

Operation Order 423-65, codenamed PIRANHA.

The concept of operations kr PIRANHA was

similar to that of STARLITE. Two Marine battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly's 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines and Muir's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, would

be embarked on Seventh Fleet shipping, while

another battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bodley's 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines, would conduct a heliborne

assault of the objective area. $ On D-Day, Kelly's

battalion would land across WHITE Beach, north of

the Batangan Peninsula, and push south, while

Bodley's helilifted Marines would set up blocking

positions 4,000 meters inland. Muir's battalion

would remain at sea as a floating reserve. Participating Vietnamese battalions, the 2d Battalion,

4th ARVN Regiment and 3d Vietnamese Marine

Battalion, would be moved by helicopter into the

region south of Bodley's position. There the South

Vietnamese would conduct a search and clear

mission on the An Ky Peninsula which was

separated from Batangan by the Sa Ky River.

On 6 September, Captain McKinney's task group,

consisting of the attack transport Bayfield, two dock

landing ships, Belle Grove and Cabildo, and three

tank landing ships, sailed for the amphibious objective area. They arrived early the following

morning and were joined by the naval gunfire ships,

the cruiser Oklahoma City (CLG 5), and two

* * BLT 3/7 joined III MAF on 1 September when it landed at

Chu Lai. The battalion had been replaced in the SLF by BLT

2/1.
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 85

USMC Photo A185836

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley, Commanding

Officer, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, writes an order

for one of his units during Operation PIRANHA.

The operation took place on the Batangan Peninsula,

eight miles south of where Operation STARLITE

took place.

destroyers, Pricheti and Orleck. In addition, the

high-speed destroyer transport Diachenko (APD

123) stood offshore prepared to provide direct fire.

Small boats from the South Vietnamese Navy's

Junk Division 15 screened the local fishing craft from

the American naval task group. By 0500 on the

morning of 7 September, all amphibious forces were

in position, except for the amphibious assault ship

Princeton with Muir's 3d Battalion embarked. It

arrived later that day.

Two days after the operation had started, the

Oklahoma City was replaced by the cruiser Galveston

and the Orleck by the destroyer Braine (DD 630). An

additional destroyer, the Walke (DD 723), also

arrived. The Princeton had stopped off the coast of

Chu Lai to unload newly arriving elements of Colonel

William G. Johnson's MAG-36 before proceeding

southward.

Air operations over the objective area began with

the 0520 arrival of a Marine KC-130, configured to

function as an airborne DASC until one could be

established ashore. Shortly afterwards a USAF

Fairchild C-123 Provider flare plane reported on

station to provide illumination. Under the light of the

flares, eight A-4s from Colonel Noble's MAG-12

strafed the landing beach with 20mm cannon fire

from 0555 to 0615. A lone A-4 laid a smoke screen to

cover the assault of the landing force. Marine pilots

next turned their attention further inland. Beginning

at 0620, eight F-4s and four A-4s dropped eight tons

of "Daisy Cutter" bombs to prepare the helicopter

landing zones. *

While the aircraft bombed the LZs, the first waves

of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines landed across

WHITE Beach at 0635. Two LVTE-1s came

ashore to clear enemy mines on the beach. These two

amphibian tractors were followed by the assault

elements of Companies A and C. The troops

dismounted at the water's edge and deployed. The

enemy reaction was a few sniper rounds.

The entire battalion was ashore within 20 minutes

and enemy resistance continued to be very light. The

tractors proved their worth in ploughing paths

through the numerous hedgerows where any

boobytraps were likely to be hidden. One of the

tractors slightly damaged its dozer blade when it

detonated a VC boobytrap buried in the sand. This

was the first use of the LVTE-1 tractors in combat.

As Kelly's battalion was securing its beachhead,

40 UH-34Ds from MAG-16 helilifted the assault

elements of Bodley's 3d Battalion to their objective

area, LZ OAK, four miles to the west. The Marines

encountered no opposition in the landing zone and

completed the helilift in less than three hours.

* "Daisy Cutter" is a term given to bombs equipped with a

nose probe which causes the bomb to explode above ground.

This causes a clearing by blowing-away the vegetation with a

minimum of cratering. These daisy cutters were of the 250- and

500-pound varieties. * * The LVTE-1 is an amphibian tractor equipped to clear a

path through minefields. It fires a string (line) of demolitions to

its front; these demolitions then explode on the ground setting

off mines. The tractors are also equipped with a front dozer

blade. Only one of the tractors was able to fire its line chargers

without difficulty, but the beach was not mined.
86 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

OPERATION PIRANHA

D-DAY

7 SEPTEMBER 1965

0 MiIc

Kilometers

2

0

3

2 WRITE Beach

4

To Chu Lai

22 Miles

3><7

LZ OAK

Balangan

Peninsula

.LT

2<4

ARVN

ira KhUC

Quang Ngai
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 87

IJSMC Photo A185303

A Marine whistles while searching a hamlet for VC during Operation PIRANHA as two Vietnamese boys watch

him. The Marines encountered relatively little resistance during the operation

lieutenant Colonel Bodley established his command

post and set up his blocking positions on the high

ground.

After inserting the 3d Battalion, 16 of the UH34Ds flew to Quang Ngai and began shuttling the

two South Vietnamese battalions into their landing

zones, LZs BIRCH and PINE. This was the only

opposed helicopter landing of the day. Four U.S.

Army Huey gunships escorting the troop carriers

and two of the Marine helicopters were hit by ground

fire. As the Vietnamese troops moved out of the

landing zones, the firing stopped.

During the three-day operation, only Lieutenant

Colonel Kelly's 1st Battalion found a significant

number of enemy. On 8 September, Kelly's Company B discovered a VC field hospital in a large cave

near the center of the Batangan Peninsula. The

Marines captured four prisoners, but then came

under fire from other VC in the cave. Kelly's men

returned the fire and attempted to convince the

enemy inside to surrender. Marine engineers then

placed explosives in the cave. After the detonation,

the Marines counted 66 Viet Cong bodies inside.

They also found medical supplies, some small arms,

and a small amount of ammunition. While searching

the cave, six of the Marines were overcome by

oxygen starvation. One of them, a lieutenant, died of

asphyxiation.

During PIRANHA, allied forces killed 178 VC,

seized 20 weapons, and captured or detained 360

enemy and suspected enemy. lieutenant Colonel

Kelly's battalion accounted for 106 of the enemy

dead. Allied losses were two Marines and five South

Vietnamese killed, 14 Marines and 33 Vietnamese

wounded.

The low level of artillery and naval gunfire

required during PIRANHA further underscored the

enemy's absence. During the first 24 hours of the

I

'ii i

r1 I;

p
88 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185 340

Marines uncover an enemy underground position

during Operation PIRANHA. One Marine can be

seen inside the tunnel searching for enemy

documents and supplies.

operation, the two artillery units, the 107mm Mortar

Batteries from the 3d Battalions of the 11th and 12th

Marines, fired only 10 missions totaling 110 rounds

from positions on Batangan. The second day they

fired 111 rounds. The naval gunfire ships fired 1,052

rounds, but only two illumination missions of 127

rounds for the American forces. Marine air-naval

gunfire liaison teams (ANGLICO) attached to the

South Vietnamese battalions called in the remainder

of the naval support.

Another reason for the limited use of supporting

arms fire was the elaborate precautions the Marines

took to safeguard the civilian population. The

following excerpts from Lieutenant Colonel Kelly's

operation order furnish some evidence of this:

All naval gunfire, artillery, mortar, and close air

support must be approved explicitly by this headquarters

(FSCC) fire support coordination center prior to being

fired. . . . Once approved, all artillery, mortar, and naval

gunfire will be fired on forward observer's command.

Supporting fires on populated areas will be approved only

when organized resistance is being encountered therefrom. Sniping does not constitute organized resistance.

No houses or villages will be burned or destroyed as a

retaliatory measure.'

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly noted that despite the

attempt of the Marines to assure the local populace

* Two South Vietnamese artillery units, a four-gun 105mm

howitzer battery, and a two-gun section of 155mm howitzers,

supported their portion of the offensive.

that no harm would come to them, the villagers

remained aloof and made no friendly overtures 2

Considering the magnitude of the allied effort,

PIRANHA hardly could be called a success. The

target of the operation, the 1st VC Regiment, had

withdrawn from the Batangan Peninsula before the

operation began. Local villagers told the Marines that

Viet Cong units had been in the area but had left,

some less than 24 hours before PIRANHA started.

Intelligence reports later indicated that the enemy

regiment began leaving the area on 4 September,

coinciding with the increased movement of the

amphibious ships at Chu Lai and the increased activity of the South Vietnamese naval junk force.

The Marine experience in Operation PIRANHA

pointed to the need for the development of tactics to

clear VC out of caves and enclosed areas. After the

operation, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly recommended to

General Walt that Marines be authorized to use riotcontrol gas to save both American and enemy lives.

This suggestion touched on the very sensitive

political subject of gas warfare; there was no

response, for the moment. * $ Much Ado About CS', Operation STOMP

The U.S. and South Vietnamese commands had

suspended the use of riot-control ammunition, including tear gas, in the spring of 1965 after a public

outcry in the United States against such tactics.

When Secretary of Defense McNamara visited

Saigon in July, he told General Westmoreland that

public opinion would not support the use of gas in

any form. Despite this statement, during the continuing deployment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam

and the reorganization of the American Command in

Vietnam, not all echelons of MACV received word

of the prohibition. In H Corps, Lieutenant Colonel

Leon N. Utter's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, which on

5 August came under the operational control of

Army Major General Stanley R. (Swede) Larsen's

* * Lieutenant Colonel Kelly later commented: "It was

apparent from this operation that the enemy could not be talked

out of the caves and therefore some techniques had to be

devised that would enable the Marines to cope with him in his

underground hide-out and at the same time minimize as much

as possible the risks involved." LtCol James P. Kelly, Comments on Shulimson, ''USMC Ops Jul-Dec65,'' dtd 28May71

(Vietnam Comment File).
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 89

2.

LZ SHETLAND

OPERATION STOMP

D-DAY

5 SEPTEMBER

Miles

Kilometers
90 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

(Courtesy of Major Gary W. Parker) USMC Photo A707622

An aerial view of the Operation STOMP area of operations north of Qui Nhon, Smoke from artillery preparatory

fires can be seen in the left center of the picture.

Task Force ALPI-IA, was unaware of the ban. The

Marine battalion employed tear gas (CS) near Qui

Nhon during an operation codenamed STOMP,

which took place from 5-7 September, just before

PIRANHA.

Major Raymond W. Wilson, Utter's executive

officer, curious about a suspected Communist

stronghold some 10 miles north of Qui Nhon, visited

a Special Forces camp on Ky Son Mountain which

overlooked the region in early September. From

intelligence reports, Wilson concluded that the

surrounding area was an operating base for a VC

* Task Force ALPHA was the forerunner of Field Force,

Vietnam, which was established on 25 September with Larsen

as commander. Major General Larsen had much the same

responsibility for U.S. forces in II Corps as General Walt had

for I Corps. See chapter 8 for further discussion of these

command relations.

main force unit. He learned that the terrain was

honeycombed with a network of tunnels. Major

Wilson then suggested to his battalion commander

that their unit conduct a search and clear operation

through Ky Son and its surrounding countryside.

Utter agreed and, after General Larsen gave his

permission, the battalion prepared for a two-company

sweep of the Ky Son area. Lieutenant Colonel Utter

assigned Major Wilson as the commander of the

operation and the battalion S-3 officer, Captain Alvin

J. Doublet, as second in command. The Marines

planned to envelop the Communist forces, with one

company landing by LVTs and the other by

helicopter.

The basic problem was to kill or capture the Viet

Cong, who blended with the civilian population,

without harming the innocent. Captain Doublet had

been attached to the 7th Marines during STARLITE
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 91

where he observed several occasions when CS or CN

riot-control ammunition could have been most effectively employed in routing the VC from shelters

and tunnel complexes. He suggested the use of tear

gas for this purpose when he and Wilson briefed

Lieutenant Colonel Utter on STOMP. When a

thorough review of his orders and message traffic

revealed nothing prohibiting the use of such

munitions, the battalion commander approved and

ordered the execution of the operation.

Operation STOMP unfolded according to plan.

Company H made its LVT assault through the mud

flats of Qui Nhon bay while Company F landed by

helicopter to cut off the VC avenues of retreat. The

two companies closed their cordon around the Viet

Cong, killing 26 and capturing three. With escape

denied, the enemy went underground, taking many

local peasants with them for use as human shields.

During the mop-up of the area, a much-publicized

action occurred. As the Marines slowly and methodically searched out a complex of tunnels, they

threw in tear gas grenades to flush out the occupants.

Seventeen VC were forced from hiding in this

fashion, as well as more than 300 women, children,

and old men, not one of whom was harmed.

When the story broke, the Communist propaganda

machines went to work. Radio Hanoi broadcast on 8

September that the "U.S. Marines imprudently used

toxic gas, killing or seriously affecting many

civilians. ' '3 Both the Communist China News

Agency and Russian TASS organization made

similar charges.

USMACV headquarters in Saigon was surprised

by the news. One of General Westmoreland's

subordinates stated that although BLT 2/7 had not

been told that tear gas was prohibited, nonetheless,

"Everyone knew how Westy felt about it and had

permission been asked to employ it, such permission

would have been denied." Lieutenant Colonel Utter,

fearing the worst, later recalled that he ''already had

his farewell remarks to his troops in mind.' '

General Larsen's headquarters conducted an

investigation following which the general backed the

battalion commander's decision. Larsen dedared that

had he been asked about the use of tear gas in this

operation, he not only would have approved, he

would have directed that it be used. He went on to

state that the use of tear gas was the most humane

way to handle the tactical situation and that he was in

receipt of no restrictions on its use. Major Wilson

later wrote that the order for the operation had been

"submitted to and approved by General Larsen's

headquarters prior to enactment. Although in all

fairness, it is doubtful that it was read by anyone

other than [the] 2/7 liaison officer to the task forA New York Times editorial of 11 September

perhaps best expressed U.S. public opinion, dedaring:

If the government prohibits the use of tear gas it will

thereby order to certain death or injury more Americans

and Vietnamese than the absolute necessities of war

demand. Nonlethal riot-control gases can be far more

humane and will cause far less casualties than many of the

weapons now being used in Vietnam.6

By the end of the month, the Washington

authorities acceded to a request from General

Westmoreland that U.S. forces be permitted to use

riot-control ammunitions in tunnel-clearing operations. In October while on a visit to Qui Nhon,

General Westmoreland told lieutenant Colonel

Utter that it was the successful use by his battalion of

nontoxic gases that had altered world opinion to

accept their employment in combat .'

October-November Operations

In I Corps, Ill MAF increased the number of

battalion-size operations against VC main force

elements outside of the Marine TAORS, but with

disappointing results. For the next two months, the

Viet Cong refused to give battle, except on their own

terms. During October, the Marines mounted six

attacks far afield from their enclaves, but they

resulted in few Communist casualties. Typical of

these were Operation RED SNAPPER and LIEN

KET-lO.

Operation RED SNAPPER was a coordinated

USMC/ARVN search and dear operation conducted

on the Phu Gia Peninsula overlooking Dam Lap An

Bay, 20 miles north of Da Nang. From this region,

the Viet Cong threatened Route 1, the vital main

road link between Da Nang and Phu Bai. *

The operation involved two companies of

Lieutenant Colonel Clement's 2d Battalion, 3d

Marines and one company from the 3d Battalion, 4th

*The strategic Nam 0 Bridge, which was Da Nang's only

northward link over the Cu De River, the Esso storage

facilities, and the Hai Van Pass were all on this route, all good

targets for the VC.
92 THE LA1JDING AND THE BUILDUP

'II,,

G3

ORANGE Beach

Phu Gia

PeninuIa

Esso Depol

South China

Sea

RED SNAPPER

D-DAY

OCTOBER 1965

AREA OF OPERATIONS

4 5 Kitonieter,

MiI. --
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 93

USMC Photo A 186103

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines cross a beach in the second phase of BLUE MARLIN. Vietnamese

fishing boats are in the background.

Marines. The South Vietnamese provided two

ARVN battalions, one ARVN ranger battalion, and

four Regional Force/Popular Force companies for the

offensive. RED SNAPPER began on 22 October

when Clement loaded his command group and

Company F into trucks and left Da Nang in a

motorized column for the Phu Gia promontory.

Coinciding with Clement's arrival, his Company G

landed from two LCUs over ORANGE Beach

halfway up the eastern coast of the peninsula.

Concurrently, the ARVN forces deployed along

Route 1, west of the Marines, in order to block the

withdrawal of any Viet Cong moving away from the

two-pronged Marine attack.

Both Marine elements moved into the objective

area as planned without encountering any opposition. The next day the company from Phu Bai was helilifted into the operation to reinforce

Clement's Company F. At the same time, Clement's

Company G conducted a second amphibious landing

by LCU further north along the coast and then

pushed inland. RED SNAPPER ended on 25 October

with meager results; the VC had left before the

landing began. Marines captured 1 VC, 4 weapons,

and 90 pounds of TNT; ARVN forces killed seven

VC, captured five, and seized four weapons.

Operation LIEN KET-10 was equally disappointing. This operation, mounted by Lieutenant

Colonel Rodolfo L. Trevino's 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines and the 3d Battalion, 6th Regiment of the

ARVN 2d Division, took place in the hills 12 miles

west of Chu Lai in the eastern part of the Viet Cong's

Do Xa base area. On 29 October, after preparation of

the two landing zones by Marine air and artillery, 26

helicopters lifted the two battalions into their

respective zones. The Marines encountered no

enemy, but did find several deserted huts and a 200-

pound rice cache. The second day, Trevino 's force

captured an enemy courier carrying a brief case of

documents. There was little doubt that the combined

force had entered a recently evacuated VC staging

area, but neither Trevino's battalion nor the ARVN

were able to find the enemy. The operation ended

that afternoon when Ill MAF received warning of an

imminent attack on the Chu Lai airfield. Trevino's

battalion was ordered back to reinforce the TAOR;

the attack never materialized.

Although the VC avoided combat, the Marines

were not discouraged and continued their offensive

forays during November. During Operation BLACK

FERRET, elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 7th

Marines joined forces in a coordinated effort with two

4Lieutenant Colonel Trevino, who replaced Lieutenant

Colonel Fisher on 16 October as battalion commander,

commented that he believed that had the operation continued,

it would have resulted in contact in the region adjacent to and

in the western portion of the LIEN KET-lO TAOR. The VC

prisoner captured during the operation later committed suicide

in the Chu Lai compound. Col Rodolfo L. Trevino, Comments

on Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Os, RVN, Jul-Dec65,"

n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

_.*4t _t..,,j

F—
94 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A186116

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines debark from Navy landing craft in Operation BLUE MARLIN. The

troops are deploying from Qui Nhon to Chu Lai,

battalions of the 2d ARVN Division's 4th Regiment

in a search and destroy operation 10 miles south of

the Chu Lai airfield, just north of the Song Tra Bong.

On 3 November, the Marines opened the operation,

attacking southward toward the river from an

assembly point on Route 1. While the ARVN patroled the south bank of the Tra Bong, two platoons of

the Marines' 1st Reconnaissance Battalion were

helilifted into screening positions on the northern

and western edges of the battle area, LZs CONDOR

and ALBATROSS. The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines

furnished artillery support with a battery of six

105mm howitzers, a battery of six 107mm mortars

(howtars), and two sections of 15 5mm howitzers.

Allied intelligence sources reported the presence of a

VC main force battalion in the region and the

BLACK FERRET scheme of maneuver envisioned

the Marines pushing the enemy southward toward

the river where the VC would be trapped between the

two allied forces.

Once more the allies were disappointed. No VC

battalion materialized, just occasional snipers and

booby traps. On the second day of the operation, 4

November, a Marine patrol triggered a booby trap

consisting of a M-26 grenade and an 81mm mortar

shell. In the ensuing blast newswoman Dickey

Chapelle, who had covered Marine operations since

World War II, was killed and six Marines were

wounded. During the entire operation, the Marines

suffered 1 KIA and 13 WIA, while killing at least 2

VC, capturing 6, and taking 79 suspects into

custody.
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 95
96 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A186113

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines use a

Vietnamese fishing boat to cross a river during BLUE

MARLIN. Other Marines wait their turn to cross

There were still many positive results of the

operation. The Marines had entered an area where

the inhabitants had long been sympathetic to the

enemy. Since the Marines indicated that they would

be frequent visitors, the ARVN decided to establish a

permanent outpost on the southern bank of the Tra

Bong. In addition, Marine firepower may have hurt

the VC more than the statistics of the operation

indicated. Marine aircraft hit several enemy craft on

the Tra Bong River and a Marine artillery mission,

fired at a suspected VC concentration area, produced

secondary explosions.

The last large operation initiated in November was

the two-phased BLUE MARLIN. This offensive was

the outgrowth of a realignment of forces and an

abundance of available amphibious shipping, a combination which offered an excellent opportunity

to conduct search and clear operations between the

coast and Route 1 in the 50-mile littoral corridor

between Da Nang and Chu Lai. Responding to a U.S.

appeal for troop assistance from its SEATO allies, the

South Korean government dispatched its famed

"Tiger Division" to Vietnam's Binh Dinh Province

in H CTZ during October. This deployment of forces

freed Lieutenant Colonel Utter's BLT 2/7 from its

mission at Qui Nhon. General Walt decided to

return Utter's unit to its parent regiment at Chu Lai

and to move the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines from Chu

Lai to its parent regiment at Da Nang. Walt received

approval from Seventh Fleet to use the ships of

Amphibious Squadron 5 (PhibRon-5) which were

then in Korean waters embarking the "Tiger"

troops. He then designated Colonel Thell H. Fisher,

the deputy chief of staff of III MAF, as the BLUE

MARLIN landing force commander and sent him to

Pusan, Korea. On the voyage southward, Colonel

Fisher and Captain William J. Maddocks, USN, the

amphibious squadron commander, completed the

preliminary planning for the operation.

After the Korean troops had relieved Lieutenant

Colonel Utter's BLT 2/7 on 4 November, the task

group sailed northward to Chu Lai where the 3d

South Vietnamese Marine Battalion also boarded the

ships. On 10 November, the 190th birthday of the

U.S. Marine Corps, the combined USMC/VNMC

force * landed according to plan 15 miles north of Chu

Lai. Helicopters from Colonel Johnson's MAG-36

ferried the South Vietnamese inland from the beach

to landing zones west of Route 1. The combined force

then swept southward along both sides of the road.

BLUE MARLIN I ended two days later when the

allies reached the Chu Lai TAOR. Except for

numerous booby traps, no other enemy presence was

encountered.

The second phase of BLUE MARIIN followed a

similar pattern. After Phase I ended, the amphibious

task group returned to Chu Lai where Lieutenant

Colonel William H. Lanagan, Jr.'s 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines embarked on the ships. Lieutenant Colonel

Lanagan had assumed command of the battalion five

days after Lieutenant Colonel Muir's death during an

operation south of Da Nang. On 16 November,

the battalion landed over beaches 22 miles south of

Da Nang, and pushed north. The area of operations

for Lanagan's force was a corridor bounded by the

Truong Giang River to the west, the Cua Dai River

*Major Richard E. Romine accompanied the South Vietnamese Marines in BLUE MARLIN. He recalled: "We had a

bad time getting on the beach with the Amtracs due to the

extremely rough surf. . . . we landed north of Tam Ky and

swept towards Chu Lai." On 10 November, he remembered

that he celebrated the Marine Corps Birthday with "a beer that

an H-34 pilot dropped to me that evening." Romine added,

". . . although enemy Contact was very light, the snipers

seemed to single me out from the Vietnamese Marines I was

near." LtColRichardE. Romine, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). *

'The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines had flown from Chu Lai to Da

Nang on 10 September to support a 9th Marines operation. On

the early morning of 11 September, Lieutenant Colonel Muir

stepped on a 155mm shell rigged as a mine and was killed with

his radio operator. Four other Marines were wounded in the

blast. This occurred on Hill 55, a strategically located elevation

8,000 meters south of the Cau Do. The 3d Battalion returned

to Chu Lai on 14 September. In the interim, Major Corner, the

executive officer, was the acting battalion commander until

relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Lanagan. See Chapter 8.

4.
THE ENEMY REFUSES TO GIVE BATTLE 97

to the north and the South China Sea to the east.

Two ARVN ranger battalions conducted a coordinated search and destroy mission west of the

Truong Giang. During the three-day operation, the

combined forced killed 25 Viet Cong. In addition, 15

VC were captured, 79 suspects apprehended, and 9

weapons were seized. Friendly casualties were two

ARVN killed, and one ARVN and three Marines

wounded. At the conclusion of the operation, the 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines moved to Da Nang by amphibious shipping and helicopters where it assumed

the mission of division reserve.

Ranger Rsnger

ARVN ARVN

DA NANG

Miles

Hoi An

South China

OPERATION

BLUE MARLIN II

D-DAY

16 NOVEMBER 1965

o I 2 3 Miles

Kilometer, I o • 2 —/ N
CHAPTER 7

The 1st VC Again—

Operation HARVEST MOON

The Abandonment of Hiep Duc—Activation of Task Force DELTA and Planning the Operation—The

VC Strike and the Marines Are Committed—The Search of the Phouc Ha Valley—The Fiht

at Ky Phu—The Wrap-Up

The Abandonment of Hiep Duc

In November, the 1st VC Regiment, obviously

recovered from the beating received during

Operation STARLITE, attacked the South Vietnamese outpost located at Hiep Duc, 25 miles west of

Tam Ky.* This district capital, situated on the

headwaters of the Song Thu Bon, was the western

gateway to a fertile mountain valley which later

became known to Marines as the Nui Loc Son Basin,

named for a rugged, narrow hill that protrudes from

the center of the valley floor. Also known as the Que

Son Valley, the broad, heavily populated expanse of

farm land constituted one of the more strategic areas

between Da Nang and Chu Lai. During the northeast monsoon season, heavy rain clouds shrouded the

valley and its western approaches, thus allowing the

enemy freedom of movement without being observed

from the air.

On the evening of 17 November, the enemy

regiment, with all three of its battalions, the 60th,

80th, and 90th, overran the small Regional Force

garrison. Enemy units were identified later from

captured documents and by interrogation of a VC

defector. Hiep Duc District leaders reported 174 of

the 433 defenders missing and 315 weapons lost.

* Colonel Wyckoff, remarked in his comments on the draft

that he was unconvinced that the 1st VC ever recovered from

STARLITE. He believes that its ''resurgence as a fully active

unit was the result of reinforcement by North Vietnamese

Regulars." Colonel Wyckoff recalled message traffic at the

time in which the VC main forces were "notifying the local

guerrillas to stick it out on their own until help came down

from the north; that their current role was to be assistance to

the main force, not vice versa.'' Col Don P. Wyckoff, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

98

Soon after reports reached Da Nang of the loss of

Hiep Duc, F-4B Phantoms from MAG-li and A-4

Skyhawks from MAG-12 arrived over the outpost

and conducted strikes against enemy positions in the

surrounding hills. At the same time, the two

helicopter groups, MAG-16 and MAG-36, prepared

to helilift two South Vietnamese battalions into the

battle area.

Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, the MAG-16

commander and airborne coordinator for the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Zitnik, the

commander of VMO-6, and the South Vietnamese

infantry commander made an early morning

reconnaissance flight over the fallen base on 18

November "to look over the area and select a landing

zone." O'Connor remembered as they looked down:

The area was ominously quiet. We didn't see a living

soul. There was much evidence of the fight the day

before. The typical triangular-shaped French fortification

in the village had been penetrated in several places. There

were several corpses hanging on barbed wire around a few

of the outposts across the Song Thu Bon .

In their search for a suitable landing zone, the

three officers rejected a rice paddy about 500 meters

north of Hiep Duc because of the potential of an

enemy ambush. Instead, the South Vietnamese

commander selected a small hill, about 80 meters

high, 700 meters southeast of the village. With this

decision made, the three returned to Tam Ky where

the transport squadron commanders were organizing

the lifts to Hiep Duc.

The site chosen for the landing zone would create

problems. It was quite small and could only accommodate two helicopters at one time. Furthermore, the hill on which the landing zone was

situated was the western end of a ridgeline stretching
HE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 99

USMC Photo A186279

Captain Richard E. Theer, Commanding Officer, Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, describes the battle

situation to General Walt The scene is near the base of Hill 407 in the Qua Son Valley.

about 4,000 meters east of Hiep Duc with some peaks

over 200 meters high. Unknown to the allies, the VC

had emplaced 12.7mm machine gun positions on this

hill mass which dominated the landing zone.

The enemy gunners allowed the first helicopters to

land on 18 November, but then opened fire on the

kllowing waves.* Colonel O'Connor, who was

airborne with Lieutenant Colonel Zitnik over Hiep

Duc during the landing attempt, stated that, ''they

the enemy gunners] were actually firing down on

the landing helicopters.'' Several of the aircraft were

'It was later learned that the intense and well directed

12.7mm antiaircraft fire was delivered by theNVA 195th [also

known as the 9th] Antiaircraft Battalion. This North Vietnamese unit had been formed from elements of theNVA 308th

Division early in the spring of 1965, and moved south via the

Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and arrived in South Vietnam

during September. It had joined the 1st VC Regiment in the

Que Son-Hiep Duc Region on 20 October 1965. III MAF

ComdC, Dec65.

hit and, according to O'Connor, "It became obvious

that we had to knock out those guns on the peaks or

suffer unacceptable helicopter losses.'' Colonel

O'Connor recalled:

I stopped the oncoming helicopter flights, and directed

them to circle their positions about 3 miles east of the hill

mass. Then, A-4's and F-4's from MAG 12 and MAG

11 began a thorough neutralization of gun positions on

the hill under control of some Army light fixed-wing

observation aircraft.

We took a risk in stopping the helicopter lift, because

we had landed less than a company in the zone. Enemy

ground movement was observed after the first helicopter

had landed. They [the enemy troops] began to displace

from their original positions north and west of the paddy

we had scouted, and moved into the village toward the

landing zone. Bob Zitnik and I were fired upon while

circling Hiep Duc observing these movements. But we

had to give the jets a good clear shot at the gun positions,

and they did their job.2

After a 20-minute wait for the Marine jets to

\t:::fflL
100 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

knock out the enemy antiaircraft emplacements,

Colonel O'Connor resumed the troop lift. Although

the VC ground forces were converging on the landing zone, ''we landed a superior force in the zone

without further opposition." For the operation, the

Marines had employed 30 UH-34s, 17 of which were

hit, and 3 badly damaged. One Marine crewman was

killed and three others wounded .

The relief force had its work cut out for it, but with

Marine close air support and determined fighting,

the ARVN gained the advantage. By the end of the

19th, the South Vietnamese reoccupied Hiep Duc,

but the 1st VC Regiment still controlled the critical

terrain to the northwest. The two ARVN battalions

killed 141 VC and captured 87 weapons while suffering 33 killed and 73 wounded themselves.

American advisors with the ARVN estimated that

Marine air support had accounted for another 300

VC killed.

General Thi now had to make a major decision:

either regarrison the district capital with the ARVN

force, or abandon the outpost. In spite of rainy

weather and poor flying conditions, Lieutenant

Colonel Bodley 's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines at Chu

Lai was ready to reinforce the ARVN should the

need arise. The Communists actually decided the

issue when they attempted to overrun an isolated

outpost, Thach Tru, in southern I Corps. * Forced

to commit more forces to this action, Thi ordered the

two ARVN battalions withdrawn from Hiep Duc.4

Instead of reinforcing Hiep Duc, Bodley's battalion was committed to the Thach Tru engagement,

16 miles south of Quang Ngai. The attacking force

was identified as North Vietnamese, the 18th NVA

Regiment reinforced by the 45th VCHeavy Weapons

Battalion. Although the Marines arrived on 22

November, the day after the attack had begun, their

help was never really needed. The defenders, two RF

companies and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion,

repulsed the attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the

enemy. Dense cloud cover over the area hampered

close air support, but two U. S. destroyers provided

*Advance elements of Bodley's 3d Battalion were actually

helilifted to Hiep Duc area on 21 November, but the bad

weather prevented the unit from landing. The battalion had

planned to start Operation QUICK FIRE that day in the Hiep

Duc region in support of the ARVN's ongoing Operation

QUYET THANG 485; the Marine plans were cancelled the

next day when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines went to Thach

Tru.

USMC Photo A801116

Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson, Commanding General, Task Force DELTA (left), and

Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter, Commanding

Officer, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (right), discuss

the commitment of Utter's battalion into Operation

HARVEST MOON. Utter's Marines were inserted

after the VCstruck the 5th ARVNRegiment.

much needed fire support during the engagement.

Two U.S. Marines advisors to the 2d ARVN

Division, flying over the battlefield in 0-lB observation aircraft, directed the 5-inch guns of the

O'Brien (DD 725) and Bache (DD 470) against

enemy formations. The ARVN Ranger commander

credited these two ships with breaking the back of the

enemy attack.' During the three-day battle, the

AR\TN, supported by naval gunfire and Marine air,

killed 175 enemy and captured 136 weapons.

Bodley's force accounted for another three enemy

dead and took 17 prisoners. Unfortunately, one

Marine UH-34D and its four crew members were

lost during a troop lift sortie. The 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines was helilifted back to Chu Lai on the 24th,

after being relieved by the 11th ARVN Ranger

Battalion at Thach Tru.

•1 1

- __
THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 101

attack a supposedly weak position which was actually

"loaded for bear." The place the general mentioned

was Hiep Duc.7

General Walt, concerned about the enemy's

growing control in the Nui Lc Son Basin, met with

General Thi on 4 December to discuss the mounting

threat. According to intelligence reports, the enemy

had moved northeast from Hiep Duc and was

threatening the ARVN outposts at Que Son and Viet

An. Both commanders concurred in the need to

launch a sizeable attack against the VC before the

enemy unit was able to establish a firm base of

operations. The result of this agreement was

Operation HARVEST MOON/LIEN KET 18.

Activation of Task Force DELTA

and Planning the Operation

USMC Photo A 186281

A Marine helicopter brings in supplies to a forward

company during Operation HARVEST MOON.

The Marine in center of the picture is making

landing signals to the pilot.

The two actions at Hiep Duc and Thach Tru

typified the enemy's monsoon strategy. Moving

during periods of poor weather which hampered air

operations, the Communists attacked isolated

outposts and then established ambushes to trap any

relief forces. At Thach Tru the enemy had

miscalculated, but at Hiep Duc, in forcing the

ARVN to abandon control there, the 1st VC

Regiment was in excellent position to enter the

strategic Nui Loc Son Basin, threatening ARVN

outposts at Que Son and Viet An.

To counteract this threat, on 17 November

General Westmoreland ordered General Walt to hold

two battalions on a 12-hour alert so that they could

be deployed rapidly as a mobile reserve. Five days

later, he issued a new letter of instruction in which

he reaffirmed his previous verbal order to Walt that

Ill MAF should "conduct search and destroy

operations against more distant VC base areas to

destroy or drive the VC out."6

At about the same time, General Krulak, though

not in the official operational chain-of-command,

commented on the need for the Marines to recapture

the initiative. General Krulak made several

suggestions including the idea of enticing the VC to

On 5 December, III MAF activated a temporary

command, codenamed Task Force DELTA, under

the Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine

Division, Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson,

to control the upcoming Two battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Utter's 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines from Chu Lai and Lieutenant Colonel

Joshua W. Dorsey's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines from

Da Nang, were assigned to the task force.*** A

provisional artillery battalion was formed from

elements of the 11th and 12th Marines, consisting of

two 105mm howitzer batteries. In addition, III MAF

had received permission to use the SLF as the task

force reserve.

By 7 December, General Henderson had completed planning efforts with his ARVN counterpart,

Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of

This operation should not be confused with the rice harvest

operations, also named HARVEST MOON, conducted during

September-October. These pacification efforts are discussed in

Chapter 9. * *At this time there were two assistant division commanders

of the 3d Marine Division. General Henderson was stationed at

Da Nang while Brigadier General Jonas M. Platt, who had

relieved General Karch on 9 November, was assigned to Chu

Lai and also acted as base coordinator there. * * LtCol Dorsey had relieved LtCol Lanagan as battalion

commander on 1 December. During HARVEST MOON, the

3d Battalion, 3d Marines had only one of its own companies.

Company L, but had attached Company E from 2d Battalion,

9th Marines and Company G from 2d Battalion, 4th Marines

for the operation.

1
102 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

South China

100 y

HARVEST MOON

OF OPERATIONS

DECEMBER 1965
THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 103

USMC Photo A186244

Marines from Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines receive a briefing before boarding helicopters during

Operation HARVEST MOON. The helicopters wait in the background.

the 2d ARVN Division. General Lam, "a figure

familiar to the Marines in his black beret with silver

badges, tanker's jacket, and swagger stick,'' would

establish his operational CP at Thang Binh, while

Henderson would locate his near the artillery

positions at Que Son.8 The largest combined

operation since the arrival of the Marines was about

to begin.

The plan for Operation HAR\TEST

MOON/LIEN KET 18 directed the 5th ARVN

Regiment, consisting of the headquarters group and

1st Battalion, and the 11th Ranger Battalion, to enter

the Que Son Valley along the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc

road on 8 December. The objective for the first day

was a point south of the village of Que Son, eight

miles southwest of Route 1. According to allied

intelligence sources, the 1st VC Regiment was west

of this area; contact was not expected until the

second day. On 9 December, Lieutenant Colonel

Utter's battalion was to be inserted behind the enemy

to force them eastward into the advancing ARVN.

Lieutenant Colonel Dorsey 's battalion would then be

inserted to reinforce Utter's unit when needed.

The VC Strike and the Marines Are Committed

The 5th ARVN Regiment left Thang Binh on

schedule with the 11th Ranger Battalion on the right

of the road, and the regiment's 1st Battalion on the

left. During the first few hours, the advance was

uneventful. At 1330 about halfway to Que Son, the

ranger battalion was ambushed by the 70th VC

Battalion. * The enemy allowed the ARVN to

close within 20 meters and then opened fire. In the

first 15 minutes of the battle, the rangers lost nearly

one third of their personnel and were overrun.

According to an American advisor who was with the

ARVN force, ''They attacked in a mass and hit us

from all sides. . . . People were dropping around us

right and left.''9

The badly mauled ranger unit was able to withdraw to a position 1,200 meters to the northwest and

The 70th, although not organic to the 1st VCRegiment,

was attached during this period. IntellRept, End 2, TF

DELTA AAR, p. 1-2. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Sullivan, at

the time a member of the TF DELTA staff, recalled that information on the operation was severely restricted. According

to Sullivan, the 5th ARVN regimental commander, ''was told

his mission was to be a routine 'sweep and clear' along highway 1 to the vicinity of Ky Lam. On reaching the vicnity of

Thang Binh, [the regimental commander] was brought to the

'bunker' at Da Nang about 1500 on 7 December and apprised

of his actual mission. General Thi warned us not to discuss the

operation with any of the ARVN except for a select few in his

own headquarters and that of General Lam's. The fact that at

1330, 8 December the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion walked

into a prepared ambush is prima facie evidence that if [the

regimental commander] was kept in the dark, the commander

of the 1st VC Regiment was not." LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment

File).

C. -4
104 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A801148

Marines move through a Vietnamese village in Operation HARVEST MOON. Each of the riflemen is carrying

two 60mm mortar rounds in additon to his own weapon and ammunition,

then called in Marine air support. Skyhawks from

MAG-12 at Chu Lai attacked the Communist

positions, while Marine helicopters evacuated many

of the casualties. The 1st ARVN Battalion attempted

to reinforce the rangers, but was unable to cross the

road because of enemy mortar fire and U.S. air

strikes. Later in the afternoon, General Lam, using

10 UH-34Ds from Lieutenant Colonel Rex C.

Denny, Jr.'s HMM-161, moved the 1st Battalion,

6th ARVN Regiment from Tam Ky to reinforce the

surviving rangers. This battalion replaced the

rangers and established a night defensive perimeter.

The next morning, the 5th ARVN Regiment

command group and its 1st Battalion bore the weight

of the VC attack. Although the battalion had been

probed during the night, it had not seen heavy action. On 9 December, about 0645, the 60th and 80th

VC Battalions struck. In the heavy fighting that

followed, both the 1st Battalion and regimental

command group were overrun. The ARVN

regimental commander was killed and the ARVN

krce was scattered to the south and east. At about

the same time, another VC battalion attacked the 1st

Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment to the northeast, but

this ARVN unit managed to hold its ground.

At that point, General Henderson decided to

commit his Marines. At 1000, UH-34Ds from

Denny's HMM-161 and Lieutenant Colonel lloyd F.

Childers' HMM-361 lifted Utter's 2d Battalion from

Tam Ky to a landing zone 5 /2 miles west of the
THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 105

USMC Photo A 194489

General Jonas M. Platt (second from the lefi) discusses plans with III MAF staff officers and officers from the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines The objective areas are outlined on the map overlay.

ARVN troops. After the landing, the battalion

moved northeast, securing a hill mass 2,500 meters

from the landing zone by late afternoon. Utter's

Marines encountered only a few Viet Cong and one

of his platoon leaders later complained: "The enemy

always seemed one step ahead of us."1° The same

afternoon, General Henderson directed Dorsey's 3d

Battalion, 3d Marines to land 1 1/2 southeast of

the 5th ARVN Regiment's 1st Battalion and then

move to link up with the shattered South Vietnamese

unit.

Lieutenant Colonel Dorsey's Marines had left Da

Nang by motor convoy that morning and were at the

logistics support area (LSA) on Route 1, three miles

north of Thang Binh. Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B.

Porter's HMM-261, the SLF helicopter squadron on

board the LPH Valley Forge, was assigned the

mission of ferrying the battalion into a landing zone

southeast of the 5th ARVN Regiment's command

group and its 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion landed

at 1400, and an hour and half later, the battalion's

lead unit, Company L, made contact with elements of

the ARVN battalion and then pushed northwestward

toward Hill 43, 1/2 miles from the landing zone.

Before the Marines could reach the hill, they ran into

a force of 200 VC. The firefight raged into the early

"I- 4

a

'4*-

A. 14-i A
106 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

evening. Supported by Marine air and artillery,

Dorsey estimated that his battalion had killed 75 VC.

Eleven Marines were dead and 17 wounded. The VC

broke contact as darkness fell and the battalion

established night positions. The next morning, the

Marines took Hill 43, where they joined 40 South

Vietnamese soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 5th

Regiment.

On the 10th, General Henderson ordered Utter to

drive east and Dorsey to push northwest to compress

the enemy between them. The avenue of escape to

the south was to be closed by Lieutenant Colonel

Robert T. Hanifin Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,

the SLF battalion which would be lifted into the area

by Porter's HMM-261.

At 1100, 15 UH-34Ds from the Valley Forge lifted

the assault elements of Company F to a landing zone

near the hamlet of Cam La, five miles southeast of

Que Son. As the helicopters landed they came under

heavy 12.7mm machine gun fire from emplacements

on Hill 407, 2,000 meters to the south. The intense,

heavy caliber enemy fire surprised the Marines.

Colonel Michael R. Yunck, the 1st MAW G-3, who

had volunteered to act as Tactical Air Controller

(Airborne) for the assault mission, remembered:

"We thought the LZ was far enough from the hill to

the south to nullify effective fire from that distance

and had pretty well scrubbed the immediate area of

the LZ." As the assault helicopters lifted off, Yunck

maneuvered his UH-1E over the landing zone to

locate the enemy gunners, but in the process was

wounded by a 12.7mm round. His co-pilot, Major

Edward L. Kuykendall, took control of the air

operation and directed the remaining helicopters

carrying Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin's command

group and Company G to land in another landing

zone further west.'1

Company F at the first landing site was in trouble.

The enemy kept the Marines under continuous

machine gun fire and then opened up with mortars

and small arms fire. The company took what cover it

could in the open rice paddies and waited for reinforcements. Since the rest of the battalion had landed

to the west, the task krce commander ordered a

company from Lieutenant Colonel Utter's battalion

Colonel Yunck was the 1963 Marine Aviator of the Year.

He was awarded his second Silver Star for his actions during

HARVEST MOON. His leg had to be amputated as a result of

the wound he suffered during the battle.

to move south to aid the hard-hit unit. Company E,

2d Battalion, 7th Marines pushed southward towards

Hanifin's Company F, but was hit on its right flank

by enemy fire. With some difficulty, Company E

reached an area from which it could support the

stranded company. Company F began withdrawing

under the relief force's covering fire. Ten hours after

the first helicopter had landed, Hanifin's battalion

command group, Companies G and F, and Company

E from Utter's battalion joined forces. Both companies E and F had suffered substantial casualties

during the day, 20 dead and over 80 wounded. * * As darkness fell on the battlefield that day,

General Walt relieved General Henderson. Brigadier

General Jonas M. Platt became head of Task Force

DELTA. General Platt, appraised of the battle

situation, ordered another of Utter's companies to

reinforce the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Company G,

2d Battalion, 7th Marines arrived at Hanifin's

position at 0300 the next morning.

The Search of the Phouc Ha Va/ky

On the 11th, Task Force DELTA maneuvered to

consolidate its position and General Platt, airborne in

a helicopter, studied the terrain from which the

Marines of Company F and helicopters of HMM-261

had received such extensive fire on the 10th. The

general, surprised that his craft did not draw enemy

fire, surmised that the Viet Cong must have abandoned their positions on Hill 407 during the night.

Platt, therefore, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Utter to

seize the hill, a task which the 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines accomplished without opposition)2

In the interim, Lieutenant Colonel Dorsey's 3d

Battalion searched the area to the north of Hill 407,

while the remaining two companies of Hanifin's 2d

Battalion, 1st Marines were helilifted from the ARG

ships to join the battalion, * * * By the end of the day,

* * One of the casualties was Captain James E. Page, Company

F commander, who had been pronounced dead on the battlefield. The next day medical personnel checking the bodies

detected a faint heart beat and evacuated Captain Page to a

hospital. The captain recovered.

***When the SLF was assigned to HARVEST MOON on 7

December, Companies E and H on board the APA Mont rose

were en route to Okinawa and the ship had to be diverted to

Vietnam. It arrived offshore from the objective area at about

1600 on the 10th.
THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 107

USMC Photo A186243

Lieutenant Colonel Joshua W. Dorsey III (left), Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, confers with

Brigadier General Jonas M. Plait (right), Commanding Task Force DELTA. Dorsey 's battalion is about to enter

the Phouc Ha Valley, a known VCmain base area.

it was apparent that the enemy, except for a few

snipers, had vanished. General Platt suspected that

the regiment had retreated into the Phouc Ha Valley,

a smaller valley paralleling the Que Son Valley, five

miles to the southeast. The Phouc Ha Valley was a

known VC base area. When General Thi was

questioned about going into the valley after the

Communists, the I Corps commander replied, "be

very, very careful.' " On the afternoon of the 11th,

Brigadier General Platt was visited by Brigadier

General William E. DePuy, USA, General Westmoreland's J-3, who suggested that USAF B-52

Boeing Stratofortresses from Guam could strike the

objective area before the Marines entered. General

Platt accepted the offer and the first of several B-52

raids occurred on the morning of the 12th.

General Platt, on board a UH- 1E piloted by the

Assistant 1st MAW Commander, Brigadier General

Carl, observed the first strike and directed Lieutenant

Colonels Dorsey and Hanifin to move their battalions

in to exploit the bombing mission. During the afternoon, Hanifin 's battalion deployed south of the

valley, while Dorsey moved along two ridges, Hills

100 and 180, overlooking northern entrances to the

Phouc Ha Valley. During the night of 12 December,

General Platt ordered Dorsey to move 1,000 meters

to the north so that the USAF B-52s could strike the

valley again. *

* General Platt had received a message from General

Westmoreland's staff that ground troops should be no closer

than 3,000 meters from a B-52 strike, the reason for Dorsey's

move. Piatt interview, Jan 70. General Platt observed in his

Comments on the draft that General DePuy had previously told

him ''1,000 meters off the line of flight.'' MajGen Jonas M.

Platt, Comments on MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment

File).

I
108 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

The next morning, after the second B-52 strike,

the two Marine battalions entered the valley from

both the north and south. While searching the target

area, Dorsey's battalion did not find the 1st VC

Regiment, but discovered large amounts of enemy

supplies and equipment. The two battalions

remained in the valley for the next few days, but

encountered little organized resistance.

The Fight at Ky Phu

While the two Marines battalions were operating

in the Phouc Ha Valley, Lieutenant Colonel Utter's

battalion sought the VC along the northern bank of

the Song Chang, also known as the Khang River,

seven miles south of Que Son. The battalion then

turned eastward toward Tam Ky, sweeping the

southern boundary of the HARVEST MOON

objective area. The Marines had more trouble with

the weather than the enemy. Except for occasional

snipers, the enemy could not be located, but the

monsoon rains harassed the Marines' every step.

During the prolonged search, the battalion slogged

over 20 miles through extremely rugged terrain,

varying from flooded rice paddies to jungle-covered

hills.

On 18 December, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

on the last leg of its long trek, encountered the 80th

VC Battalion in strength. Earlier that morning, after

evacuating 54 Marines suffering from immersion

foot,* the battalion had moved out in a column

formation with Company G in the lead, followed by

Company F, Headquarters and Service Company,

and Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.t * The

Marines moved along a narrow road which wound

through hedgerow-bordered rice paddies. The Viet

Cong allowed the lead company to pass through the

village of Ky Phu, four miles from Route 1, bekre

opening fire on the Company G advance guard. At

*

Immersion foot is an extremely painful foot condition, a

symptom of which is swelling which takes on a puffy, wrinkled

look. This malady was caused by prolonged wear of wet

footgear and continued to plague the Marines throughout the war. * Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines had been attached

to Utter's battalion on 13 December, replacing Company E

which had taken heavy casualties. Company H, 2d Battalion,

7th Marines was not with the column. It was providing

security for the 107mm Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th

Marines.

first, Lieutenant Colonel Utter thought that the

enemy fcrce consisted only of a few snipers, and

ordered Company G to clear the area south of the

road and moved Company F forward.

Company F had just passed through the east end of

Ky Phu when enemy mortar rounds dropped on

H&S Company, still in the open paddies west of the

hamlet. Two Viet Cong companies tried to enter the

gap between Company F and H&S and envelop

Utter's command group and the H&S Company.

First lieutenant Nicholas H. Grosz, Jr., the commander of H&S Company, recalled that he crossed

the area between his company and the battalion

command group and told Lieutenant Colonel Utter of

the ''H&S deterioriating situation.'' Realizing that

he was engaged with a major enemy force, the

battalion commander ordered Company F to turn and

attack the "main VC positions on the H&S right

flank."4

Supported by "Huey" gunships and accurate

artillery fire from Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th

Marines, the Marines counterattacked. Company F

rolled up the VC from the rear while H&S Company

fought its way into Ky Phu. According to Grosz,

who accompanied the lead elements of Company F in

the attack, "Once we got them going, the VC just

broke and ran. It was just like a turkey shoot."

At the rear of the column, Company H remained

in contact with the enemy; a VC company struck the

Marines from both flanks and the rear. Both the

company commander and his radio operator were

mortally wounded. First Lieutenant Harvey C.

Barnum, the attached artillery forward observer, did

what he could to save the two dying Marines,

strapped the radio on his back and assumed command. The young officer rallied the company and the

Marines established a defensive position on a small

hill north of the road. After four hours of heavy

fighting, Barnum led Company H into Ky Phu and

rejoined the battalion. * * By nightfall the fight at Ky Phu was over. The

80th VC Battalion broke, leaving 104 bodies on the

* * * Lieutenant Barnum was performing temporary duty in

Vietnam from his permanent duty station at Marine Barracks,

Pearl Harbor. He had volunteered for 60 days of "on-the-job"

training under the FMPac combat indoctrination program. For

his heroic exploits in this engagement, Lieutenant Barnum was

awarded the Medal of Honor.
battlefield, 76 of them killed by the artillery .

lieutenant Colonel Utter's command had sustained

11 killed and 71 wounded.

The Wrap-Up

The next day, the 19th, all three of the Marine

battalions completed their movement out of the

operation area. For all practical purposes the

operation was over, but Operation HARVEST

MOON/LIEN KET 18 ended officially on the 20th

when all allied forces returned to their enclaves. The

combined USMC-ARVN operation had accounted

for 407 enemy killed, 33 captured, and 13 crewserved and 95 individual weapons seized. In addition,

60 tons of food and ammunition were taken in the

Phouc Ha Valley. Marine casualties were 45 killed

and 218 wounded. General Lam's forces suffered 90

'Lieutenant Grosz observed that, ''we counted 76 enemy

KIA in the arty impact area to the H&S right flank (south)"

but believes that a portion of the number must be credited to

the Marine ground attack. Maj Nicholas H. Grosz, Jr.,

Comments on draft MS, dtd Dec76 (Vietnam Comment File).

killed, 91 missing, and 141 wounded, most occurring

during the first two days of the operation.

Despite the poor flying conditions, airpower played

a major role in the outcome of the battle for the Nui

lec Son Basin. The F-4 Phantom pilots from Colonel

Emmett 0. Anglin, Jr.'s MAG-li at Da Nang and

A-4 Skyhawk pilots of Colonel Brown's Chu Laibased MAG-12 flew numerous tactical support

missions under marginal flying conditions. * * During

the 12-day operation, Marine F-4 pilots (Lieutenant

Colonel Clyde R. Jarrett's VMFA-115 and

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew W. O'Donnell's

VMFA-323) logged 227 flight hours on 205 sorties,

striking enemy targets with 215 tons of bombs and

628 rockets. The A-4 pilots from Lieutenant Colonel

William E. Garman's VMA-211, Lieutenant

Colonel Keith O'Keefe's VMA-214, and Lieutenant

Colonel Thomas E. Mulvihill's VMA-224 delivered

another 235 tons of ordnance in support of HARVEST MOON/LIEN KET-18. During the operation, Marine attack aircraft were credited with

killing 95 of the enemy.

* * Colonel Anglin had replaced Colonel Conley as CO,

MAG-li on 3 November.

THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 109

USMC Photo A 186280

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines move along a dike across a flooded rice paddy during HARVEST

MOON. The battalion suffere4 several cases of immersion foot during the operation.

••• -r n

.3t.•. e * •_.., . :.
110 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marine helicopters made an equally important

contribution to the operation. The seven helicopter

squadrons of Colonel O'Connor's MAG-16 and

Colonel Johnson's MAG-36, and Lieutenant Colonel

Porter's HMM-261 flew 9,230 sorties, carried

12,177 troops, and transported 638 tons of supplies. * Besides providing battlefield mobility to the

infantry, the pilots of these aircraft accomplished

medical evacuation, reconnaissance, resupply, and

other operational and administrative missions. The

UH-lEs of Marine Observation Squadrons 2 and 6,

armed with 7.62mm machine guns and 2.75-inch

rockets, provided valuable close air support when

fixed-wing aircraft could not attack targets due to low

visibility. These Huey gunships also served as escorts

for truck convoys and UH-34D helicopters and

performed a number of medical evacuations. Lastly,

these squadrons provided the airborne ''eyes'' for

the commanders of HARVEST MOON; two UHlEs were continuously assigned to the Task Force

DELTA commander for command and control

purposes.

The six-plane detachment of Sikorsky CH-37C

heavy-lift helicopters attached to Headquarters and

Maintenance Squadron 16 proved invaluable for

lifting 105mm howitzers into the battle area. Two

U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters, "on loan"

to the Marines from the 1st Cavalry Division

(Airmobile), supported the operation by retrieving

several downed helicopters. During the course of the

operation, Marine helicopter pilots reported over 100

occasions in which they received enemy fire. Fiftythree helicopters sustained battle damage, and the

Marine crews suffered 1 killed, 12 wounded, and 2

helicopters destroyed.

A significant contribution to the success of the

operation was the establishment of a logistic support

area near Thang Binh on Route 1. Truck convoys

from Da Nang and Chu Lai brought in supplies

which could then be quickly helilifted to the using

units. A company from the 3d Engineer Battalion,

attached to Task Force DELTA, had the mission of

* MAG-16 squadrons participating in HARVEST MOON

were Bauman's VMO-2, Denny's HMM-161, Clark's HMM263, and Childers' HMM-361. MAG-36 squadrons were

Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Zitnik's VMO-6, Lieutenant

Colonel James Aldworth's HMM-362, and Lieutenant Colonel

William R. Lucas' HMM-364.

keeping Route 1 open and trafficable. Lieutenant

Colonel Nicholas J. Dennis, commander of the 3d

Engineer Battalion, later wrote:

Culverts, bridges, earth fill, and equipment were

transported in daily convoys down Route 1. We repaired

many road cuts or sites where the road was blown. I visited the task force CP daily, and performed helicopter

recons. 16

Artillery also was moved out of the TAORs into

the battle area to provide support for the infantry

units. Five Marine artillery batteries fired 6,386

rounds during HARVEST MOON. ** The mortar

battery, using helicopter mobility, deployed to

hilltops in a leapfrog manner.*** HARVEST

MOON furnished reinforcing evidence that Marine

artillery could both move and be resupplied by rotary

wing aircraft.

HARVEST MOON was not without its problems.

The hastily established provisional headquarters, the

fast moving ground situation, poor weather conditions, and the large number of tactical aircraft

operating over the Que Son Valley caused coordination and control difficulties. Colonel Leslie E.

Brown, who had relieved Colonel Noble as commander of MAG-12 on 19 September, believed that

better advance planning prior to the operation could

have alleviated some of the problems encountered by

his pilots. His group operated throughout HARVEST MOON "with practically no coordination

with supported units except that which was accomplished in the air over the target area." As an

example, on 10 December his group launched 32

sorties under an alert declared by Task Force

DELTA, but when the attack aircraft arrived over

the objective area, control was so poorly synchronized that many of the aircraft were unable to

drop their ordnance.'7 At other times, fixed-wing

and rotary-wing aircraft maneuvered at the same

altitude in the same general area. Still, even with

these difficulties, Marine aviation significantly influenced the results on the battlefield. Through these

**Artillery support was furnished by Batteries A, 1/11; F,

2/12; M, 4/11; L, 4/12 (from 11 December); and 107mm

Mortar Battery (only three tubes), 1/12. * * * According to General Platt, the displacement of artillery units during HARVEST MOON was ''a crude

forerunner of the fire base concept" in that the deployed units

were always in range of some form of artillery. Platt PhonCon,

Jun71.
THE 1ST VC AGAIN: OPERATION HARVEST MOON 111

problems, Marines learned valuable lessons in airground coordination for future operations. *

HARVEST MOON/LIEN KET 18 was the last of

the Marines' big battles in 1965. These large-scale

'Colonel Roy C. Gray, Jr., who relieved Colonel Yunck as

G-3 of the 1st MAW, agreed with Colonel Brown's remarks on

coordination. He later wrote: ''The Wing G-3 Section subsequently assigned a senior experienced aviator to TF

headquarters on operations such as HARVEST MOON and

Air/Ground preplanning and coordination was given greater

emphasis." Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

31Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). Although agreeing with

Colonel Brown's observations, Colonel Peatross attributed the

lack of coordination to too much secrecy and inexperience on

the part of the HARVEST MOON planners, stating ''there

could be no better advance planning without experience on the

part of the planners." MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments

on draft MS, dtd 26Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

efforts had become a regular feature of the war for

General Walt's forces. During the last half of its first

calendar year in country, III MAF conducted 15

operations of battalion-size or larger. American

intelligence agencies indicated that during 1966,

General Walt's forces would face even larger enemy

frrces as North Vietnamese troops entered South

Vietnam to join their Viet Cong comrades. The big

unit actions were only one aspect of the Marine war,

nevertheless, in I Corps. According to General

Krulak:

we cannot be entrapped in the dangerous premise that

destruction of the VC organized units per se is the whole

answer to winning the war, any more than we can accept the

erroneous view that pacification and civic action will solve the

problem if major enemy forces are free to roam the countryside .'

PART III

THE CONTINUING WAR

CHAPTER 8

Defending and Expanding the Base Areas

The Evolution of a Strategy—Further Deployments and Realinements—Refinement of Command

Reiations—&panding the TA ORs—Attacks on the Airfields and Hill 22—Base Defense

Extended Patrolling

The Evolution of a Strategy

During the second half of 1965, the American

command in Vietnam began to formulate basic

operational concepts for fighting the Vietnam War.

With President Johnson's approval of General

Westmoreland 's request for U.S. reinforcements and

for an expanded role for U.S. ground troops, the

MACV commander had completed his overall plan

for the employment of these forces by the end of

August. He divided the war into three phases. The

first, to end in 1965, was simpiy ''commit those

American and allied forces necessary to halt the

losing trend." Beginning in 1966, the secondphase,

allied forces were to take the offensive in selected

high priority areas. At an undetermined date, the

allied forces were to begin phase three, the total

destruction of enemy forces and base areas. For the

remainder of 1965, General Westmoreland planned

to employ American combat troops "to protect

developing logistical bases, although some might

have to be committed from time to time as 'fire

brigades' whenever the enemy's big units posed a

threat . . . Based on general directives from ComUSMACV

and its own experience gained during this period, III

MAF developed a concept of operation for I Corps.

Essentially, the Marines stressed the ''oil spot"

approach, in which Ill MAF was to secure its coastal

endaves and gradually extend them as manpower and

material became available. The 21 November

MACV Letter of Instruction, which superseded the

amended 6 May directive, prescribed five missions

for Ill MAF. These were: to defend and secure its

base areas; to conduct search and destroy operations

against VC forces which posed an immediate threat

to these bases; to launch other search and destroy

operations against more distant enemy base areas; to

extend clearing operations in selected areas contiguous to the major bases; and finally to execute any

contingency plan in I Corps or elsewhere in Vietnam

as directed by ComUSMACV.2 Given these all

encompassing objectives, the Marines produced what

they called the "Balanced Strategy" to fight the war.

Basically it consisted of a counterguerrilla campaign

within the TAORs, search and destroy operations

against enemy main force troops outside the TAORs,

and a pacification campaign within the hamlets to

eradicate the VC ''infrastructure'' and win the

loyalty of the people to the government's cause. *

Although both MACV and Ill MAF used the

same terminology in defining their strategies, by the

end of 1965 there was a decided difference in perception as to where the enemy posed the greatest

danger. Confronted with the pervasive VC guerrilla

strength, especially in the rich and heavily populated

rice lands south of Da Nang, General Walt insisted

that his first priority was to clear out this region. He

recognized the threat of the VC main force units, but

he wanted good intelligence before denuding his base

area defenses to go after them. General Westmoreland, on the other hand, perceived the growing

NVA and VC main force to be the main target for

U.S. forces. Brigadier General Karch, General

Walt's assistant division commander, recalled that

General Westmoreland has stated that the term search and

destroy ''has been fully distorted." He explained that he

adopted the term in 1964 as a "teaching aid to the South

Vietnamese'' when he believed the South Vietnamese Army

"was static and the enemy was taking full advantage of the

situation." Search and destroy simply meant offensive

operations against enemy main force units. The former MACV

commander observed that he dropped the terminology in 1968

when he ''realized that it was being distorted." Gen William

C. Westmoreland, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Nov77

(Vietnam Comment File).

115
116 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185832

General Walt speaks to the men of the newly arrived

1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Da Nang. The III MAF

commander tells the troops, ''We need you here; our

job is just beginning.

this difference in priorities was evident as early as

July when MACV required the Marines to report

''Battalion Days in the Field.'' Karch remembered

that he first heard of this report, ''at the usual

morning briefing for General Walt." When the HI

MAF commander asked the reasons for the

"disparity of Army versus Marine 'Days in the

Field,' the briefing officer explained that battalions

engaged in pacification operations were not counted

as battalions in the field."3

General Westmoreland reiterated his emphasis on

the big unit war, on 10 December, in a letter to a

subordinate commander. He wrote: "I am increasingly concerned about the fact that we are not

engaging the VC with sufficient frequency. . . to win

the war in Vietnam." Although relatively satisfied

with the American counterguerrilla effort, he

believed, "we have not yet proved that we have

mastered the art of finding and destroying major VC

forces through sustained campaigns against them in a

given area." The MACV commander recognized

the validity of the Marines' concern with

pacification, but he wanted General Walt to create a

two- or three-battalion force capable of moving

quickly into enemy-dominated regions, to join with

the ARVN in operations of sufficient size to punish

the enemy's big units and disrupt bases and supply

caches. In his memoirs, General Westmoreland

declared that he had no desire ''to precipitate an

interservice imbroglio,'' and recognized that:

General Walt had a mission-type order which by

custom afforded him considerable leeway in execution.

Rather than start a controversy, I chose to issue orders for

specific projects that as time passed would gradually get

the Marines out of their beachheads.4*

Lieutenant General Krulak claimed that the

difference between what was called at the time ''the

Army Strategy" and "the Marine Strategy" was

more a matter of emphasis than of substance; both

formulas were sound. Krulak believed that the

''Army maneuver technique'' was correct in the

area around Plei Me in the Central Highlands, but

observed, "You cannot shoot anything that moves

in the rich area south of Da Nang, where the

population runs as high as 1,000 per square mile."

The FMFPac commander argued that in I Corps the

enemy was mixed in with the civilian population and

"we have to root him out, and separate him from the

people; which is to say, fight a guerrilla/counterinsurgency war, and clean the area up a bit at a

time." In any event, to fight both the big unit war

and the war in the enclaves, the Marines needed

more men.'

Further Deployments and Realinements

In the summer of 1965, General Walt infrrmed

MACV that Ill MAF required a force of two Marine

* General Westmoreland qualified his views in the following

comment: ''There was a recognized difference in the

deployment of troops between the I and the II Regions because

of terrain, roads, population dispersion, Vietnamese political

and psychological considerations. To try to make a big point of

a difference in strategy is to take an unreasonable and narrow

view . . . . In the final analyses, the strategy and tactical

operations of the war obviously required both pacification and

military Main Force units. The degree of emphasis between

these two types of operations varied as a function of the local

situation.'' The former MACV commander observed ''The I

Corps Region was more vulnerable to attack by Main Force

units than any other region because of its proximity to North

Vietnam." Gen William C. Westmoreland, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 22Jul77 (Vietnam Comment File).
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 117

USMC Photo A185789

A South Vietnamese interpreter questions a farmer

and his wife about the VC as Marines watch. The

hamlet is located in the heavily populated area south

of Da Nang.

divisions supported by a reinforced Marine aircraft

wing to carry out its mission in I Corps. Furthermore, the III MAF commander stated that if he

were to be responsible for the entire area from Quang

Ngai Province to the DMZ, he would need three

more battalions.6

These new force requirements would have

repercussions throughout the Marine Corps. In

August, the Marine Corps was authorized a 30,000-

man increase, for a total strength of 223,000, to

support the Vietnam effort. By October, HQMC

furnished the Secretary of Defense with plans for

obtaining another 55,000 Marines to allow for the

formation of the 5th Marine Division in California,

18 infantry battalions in Vietnam, and 3 battalions on

Okinawa. This plan was approved and funded by the

end of the year.7

The reinforcement of III MAF during this period

caused continuing realinement and readjustment of

personnel and units in the Western Pacific. On 24

August, the 1st Marine Division, under Major

General Lewis J. Fields, established its CP on

Okinawa, as did the 1st Marines. Only one regiment

of the division, the 5th Marines, remained at Camp

Pendleton. As noted earlier, one battalion of the 1st

Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin's 2d Battalion,

relieved BLT 3/7 as the SLF battalion of the Seventh

Fleet, and at the end of August Lieutenant Colonel

Bodley's 3d Battalion rejoined its parent regiment,

the 7th Marines, at Chu Lai. At the same time,

Lieutenant Colonel Donald V. McCloskey's 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines arrived at Da Nang and

relieved the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, which

returned to the United States. Another battalion

from the United States, the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, was moved to Okinawa to become the new

1st Battalion, 3d Marines. This relief ended the

intertheater battalion transpiacement system.

The end of the battalion rotation between East Pac

and West Pac caused the institution of an individual

personnel replacement system for all units of Il

MAF. Under the designator Operation MIXMASTER, Marines in Vietnam were transferred

between units so that everyone in each unit would

not have the same overseas tour expiration date. This

homogenization process involved thousands of

Marines and took place over several months.

With the termination of the intertheater transplacement system in September 1965, FMFPac

immediately began planning for the rotation of

battalion landing teams from Vietnam to Okinawa,

then to the Seventh Fleet, and back to Vietnam

again. This program was designed to allow BLTs to

refit and retrain in a non-combat environment where

emphasis could be placed on training rather than

operations. The intratheater rotation began in

November when the new BLT 1 / 3 relieved the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines at Da Nang. The latter unit

* This process did not always go smoothly. In November

1965, the 9th Marines regimental commander stated that there

was a lack of replacements which resulted in a personnel

shortage throughout the regiment. 9th Marines ComdC,

Nov65, p. 1-1. The following excerpt furnishes an example of

how Operation MIXMASTER worked: ''On 19 November,

Company E, 2/7 was exchanged with Company A, 1/4 and on

30 November Company A, 1/7 was exchanged with a company

from 3/4." 7th Marines ComdC, Nov65, p. 3. Colonel

Nicholas J. Dennis, who at the time commanded the 3d

Engineer Battalion, wrote that MIXMASTER "was a two

edged sword for my battalion, We could only infuse with the

7th Engineers and the 1st Engineers. In the case of the 7th,

except for 'Charlie' company, the rest had arrived in RVN on

the same date. The mixing with the 1st Engineer Battalion was

more practical, however, it provided a one on one situation."

Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File).

1'
118 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

reformed as BLT 2/3 and became the Seventh Fleet

SLF ground force in late December, replacing BLT

2/1 which replaced the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at

Phu Bai.

There were other reinforcements and readjustments in Vietnam during this period. In August,

the 7th Engineer Battalion and the rear echelon of

the 3d Division headquarters battalion arrived, as

well as the 7th Marines. During September, MAG36, a helicopter group, and the 2d LAAM Battalion

were established at Chu Lai. In November,

lieutenant Colonel Utter's 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines left Qui Nhon to reinfr)rce Colonel Peatross'

7th Marines at Chu Lai. The return of Utter's unit to

Ill MAF control allowed General Walt to reinforce

units at Da Nang by transferring the 3d Battalion, 3d

Marines there from Chu Lai.

By the end of December, there were six infantry

battalions at Da Nang, five at Chu Lai, and one at

Phu Bai. At Da Nang, the 9th Marines controlled

the southern and southeastern sectors of the TAOR

with four battalions, all three of its own battalions

and the attached 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The 3d

Marines was responsible for the western and northern portions of the TAOR with two battalions, the

1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 1st Battalion. 3d

Marines. The battalion at Phu Bai also reported to

the 3d Marines. At Chu Lai the TAOR was divided

between the 4th and 7th Marines. The 7th Marines

controlled the southern sector with its own three

battalions while the 4th Marines operated to the

north with its 1st and 2d Battalions.

In addition to the infantry units, by the end of the

year Ill MAF had a reinforced artillery regiment,

eight fixed-wing squadrons, and eight helicopter

squadrons. Since the beginning of July, III MAF had

USMC Photo A184953

The village chief of Thuy Phu points out to General Walt an artillery -targeted impact area in the Phu Bai TA OR.

Lieutenant Colonel William W. ''Woody'' Taylor (left) looks on.

1

____ 1

—4.

'4
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 119

2/4

2/7

I/

,

2/73/7

I /

South China

Sea

Ha Airfield

Chu Lai Airfield

-'

CHU LAI TAOR

DECEMBER

MiIe

K ibm cit r!
120 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185897

Marines from the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines move through a village south of Da Nang. The Vietnamese farmer

continues with his hoeing, apparently ignoring the Marines,

received over 25,000 reinforcements for a total of

approximately 45,000 Marine and Navy personnel.

Refinement of Command Relations

With the buildup, command relationships became

increasingly important; any conflict of interest had to

be resolved. For III MAF, this applied not only to its

association with MACV, but with the U.S. Army in

II Corps, civilian and military Vietnamese authorities

in I Corps, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force's

2d Air Division.

General Walt was well aware of the possible pitfalls

that lay before him in this sensitive area. When he

split his division staff and established the coordinating headquarters at Chu Lai under General

Karch on 5 August, part of the rationale was:

to anticipate and alleviate actual possible

conflicts of interest before irreversible action, plans, or

commitments are taken that would adversely affect: A.

Another command or commands. B. Relationships with

the Vietnamese Government. ,

Until August General Walt had dealt with the

Vietnamese only in relation to Marine operations,

but the 6 August MACV amendment to the Ill

MAF Letter of Instruction also made General Walt

the Senior U.S. Advisor to I Corps, responsible for

the U. S. military advisory effort in the five northern

provinces. The significance of this authority is indicated in the following excerpt pertaining to the

responsibilities of the I Corps Advisory Group:

To advise, assist and support the RVN military and

para-military units and staffs in all combat, support, and

combat service support operations and training; to assist

the RVN in developing and maintaining an effective

conventional and counter-insurgency military capability;

to exercise operational control of all assigned U.S. units;

and to perform liaison among U.S., RVN, and international Military Assistance (third country) Force

Commanders.

On 7 August, General Walt assumed his new

responsibility and Colonel Howard B. St. Clair,

USA, the former senior advisor, became his deputy.

The influx of large numbers of U.S. Army forces

caused General Westmoreland to reexamine the basic

command structure within MACV. He told the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that he desired the option of

placing Ill MAF under Field Forces, Vietnam if the

war escalated to the proportions of the Korean

conflict, but saw no advantage to changing the

C
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 121

USMC Photo A423023

An aerial view of the Da Nang Airfield looking north, The airfield and the buildup of III MAFforces at Da Nang

made the airbase a prime target for VC hit-and-run attacks,

ç: I.

t'.4 S

L 44.-
122 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

present command relations as long as the Marines

operated only in I Corps. In October, the MACV

commander established an interservice steering

committee to study the problem. The committee

reported on the 19th and recommended that the

command structure remain basically the same;

General Walt, as Commanding General, Ill MAF

would report directly to General Westmoreland for

operations in I Corps while General Larsen would

retain a similar responsibility in II Corps.'°

Command relationships with the South Vietnamese were just as sensitive. Here, too, no basic

change was made in the fundamental understandings

that had been worked out with the South Vietnamese. In the new Letter of Instruction furnished to

subordinate commands in November, Westmoreland

continued to stress coordination and cooperation.

The MACV commander told the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that any mention of a combined headquarters was

politically infeasible at the time. Colonel Wyckoff,

the 3d Division G-3, recalled that after briefing

General Westmoreland on one occasion, the general

gave quite an extensive rundown on his feeling

regarding the conduct of the war where his major thrust

was getting the GVN and the ARVN on their own feet

with the proper leadership and the proper attitude so they

could carry on the war more as a unilateral thing, rather

than depending on the support of the United States.'1

Under the guidelines furnished by CornUSMACV, Ill MAF developed its own special

expedients fur operating with the South Vietnamese.

The Marines made few formal agreements with their

Vietnamese counterparts, but, on the other hand,

several informal understandings emerged. There was

nothing in the MACV directives that prevented

temporary ''tactical direction'' of Vietnamese forces

by U.S. commanders under certain circumstances.

One of the more important ingredients of the Marine

relationship with the Vietnamese authorities of I

Corps was the mutual understanding and friendship

which formed between General Thi and General

Walt. The Marine general realized that the ARVN

desired American assistance and cooperation, as long

as the Vietnamese retained their pride and face. The

Marine Corps concept of operations was based on

these factors.'2

&panding the TAORs

An indication of the growing coordination between the III MAF and the I Corps commands was the

continued extension of the Marine tactical areas of

responsibility. From the eight square miles around

the Da Nang Airbase that constituted the Marine

area of operations on 8 March, III MM had extended its influence into the rich coastal plain in all

three enclaves, containing a total area of 804 square

miles. This area was populated by 506,732 people

living in more than 100 villages which included

nearly 550 hamlets. Most of this population lived in

the fertile farming area south of the Da Nang Airbase.

By the end of August, the 9th Marines had

completed its TAOR extension south of the Cau Do

according to the terms of General Thi's letter of 20

July.* On 13 September, General Walt asked the I

Corps commander for a further extension of the

Marine Da Nang TAOR. This time Walt requested

that the Marine area of operations be extended to the

La Tho and Thanh Quit Rivers, three kilometers

south of the former boundary. Walt pointed out that

the Marines would have the advantage of a natural

boundary and would be in position to help the South

Vietnamese drive the Viet Cong out of the rice-rich

region.'3 Eight days later, General Thi granted

permission for the larger Marine TAOR, but

cautioned General Walt to closely coordinate his

forward movement with local Vietnamese authorities

and forces. The I Corps commander noted that the

area was densely populated and he wished to "avoid

deplorable incidents to the local people.' "4

Anticipating the enlargement of its TAOR, the 3d

Marine Division began an adjustment of lines. In

August, the 3d Marines, now under Colonel

Norman R. Nickerson, the former III MAF G-4 who

assumed command on the 16th, positioned the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines to cover the movement of the

1st Battalion, 1st Marines south of the Tuy Loan

River. The following month, the 9th Marines, now

under Colonel John E. Gorman, began Operation

RICE STRAW, which was the first of a three-phase

move in which the regiment eventually planned to

reach the Ky Lam River. It was during this operation

* See Chapter 6 for the details of this letter. * * Colonel Nickerson recalled that he and Colonel Gorman

were platoon leaders of sister platoons in Company A, 1st

Parachute Battalion in the capture of the island of Gavutu

during World War II and now some 23 years later, "both

officers were in command of Sister regiments at the same

time." Col Norman R. Nickerson, Comments on draft MS,

dtd 27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 123
124 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo

Marines clean up the debris after the sapper attack on Marble Mountain. Helicopter parts are being salvaged.

that Lieutenant Colonel Muir, whose 3d Battalion,

3d Marines had arrived at Da Nang from Chu [.ai to

act as a blocking force, was killed on 11 September.

By the middle of November, both regiments had

made appreciable advances to the south. The 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines established defenses 3,500

meters south of the Tuy Loan and its combat patrols

covered over 13,000 square meters. The 9th

Marines' forward battalions had formed a defensive

line roughly five miles south of the Cau Do River. On

the 20th, the Marines incorporated the former

reconnaissance zone, the three-mile area between the

La Tho and Ky Lam Rivers, into the TAOR. The 9th

Marines then established new defenses along the line

of the La Tho and Thanh Quit Rivers and made plans

to advance to the southern boundary of the TAOR.

At Chu Lai, the Marines also expanded their

TAOR, but to a more limited extent. On 8 October,

General Thi approved an extension of approximately

six square miles to the northwest, and Colonel

McClanahan moved his 4th Marines into this area.

There was no further expansion of the TAOR in

1965, but Colonel Peatross prepared plans to extend

See Chapter 6.

the frontline of his 7th Marines southward to the Tra

Bong River. *

A different situation existed around the northern

enclave at Phu Bai, where the one battalion, the 3d

Battalion, 4th Marines, was spread very thin. The

Marines had incorporated the populated area immediately north and south of the base into the

battalion's TAOR by the end of September. The

terrain to the west consisted of rolling hills with very

little vegetation or population; both aerial and

ground observation were excellent.

Lieutenant Colonel Sumner A. Vale, who assumed

command of the battalion on 1 October, later

commented:

gradual increases were made as the result of a cat

and mouse game played between the Marines and the VC.

The VC would determine the general boundaries of the

TAOR by plotting the sites where they were engaged by

Marine ambushes. Then the VC would move their

* * Since 13 September, one company of 1/7 already operated

south of the river, maintaining a combat base on the Trung

Phan Peninsula. General Peatross stated that the lines of the

7th Marines were on the Tra Bong in October, but after the

attack on the Chu Lai airfield (see next section), ''the lines of

the 7th were pulled back by General Walt.'' MajGen Oscar F.

Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26Oct76 (Vietnam

Comment File).
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 125

avenue of approach to north and south to avoid the

TAOR. The Marines countered by setting up ambushes

outside the TAOR (with the permission of the CO, 3d

Marines and the CG, 1st ARVN Division). The CG, 1st

ARVN Division would then arrange to have the TAOR

enlarged to encompass these ''new operating areas.'"

Attacks on the Airfields and Hill 22

Despite the Marines' extension of their TAORs,

the enemy still had the ability to mount wellcoordinated hit-and-run attacks, similar to the 1 July

Da Nang raid. On the evening of 27-28 October, the

VC struck the newly built Marble Mountain

helicopter facility on the Tiensha Peninsula and the

Chu Lai SATS field.

At Chu Lai, the infiltrators entered the Marine

base from the northwest and split into two groups.

According to the MAG-12 commander, Colonel

Leslie E. Brown, the first knowledge the Marines had

of the attack was when they heard machine gun fire

and satchel charges blowing up. Brown recalled:

a couple of the airplanes were on fire, and the

sappers had gotten through intact . . . . they were barefooted and had on a loin cloth and it was kind of a

John Wayne dramatic effect. They had Thompson

submachineguns and they were spraying the airplanes

with the Tommy guns and . . . throwing satchel charges

into tail pipes . . . Some went off and some didn't, but the

net effect was that the machine gun fire caused leaks in

the fuel tanks, so that JP fuel was drenching the whole

area . . . and in the middle of that, the airplanes were on

fire.'6

The Marines killed 15 of the force of 20 VC, but

not before the attackers had destroyed two A-4s and

severely damaged six more. General Karch, the Chu

Lai Base Coordinator, remembered that when he

arrived "Les Brown . . . was on the scene [and] the

armament crews were going up and down the flight

line disarming bombs . . . I couldn't give Brown too

much credit for the job he and his crews did there

that night—it was fabulous."7

The Communist attack on Marble Mountain was

larger and better coordinated. A VC raiding party of

approximately 90 men quietly assembled in a village

just to the northwest of the Marble Mountain Air

Facility. Under cover of 60mm mortar fire, four

demolition teams struck at the Marble Mountain

airstrip and a hospital being constructed by the

Seabees. At least six of the enemy, armed with

bangalore torpedos and grenades, reached the MAG16 parking ramp. Colonel O'Connor, the MAG-16

commander, remembered:

I awoke to the sound of explosions shortly after midnight . . . arriving at the group command post, I received

a phone call from General McCutcheon. He was warning

me that the airfield at Chu Lai had been attacked and to be

on the alert. I told him no one was asleep at Marble

Mountain, as we had also been under attack for about 15

minutes.'8

After leaving the command post, Colonel

O'Connor drove to the aircraft parking ramp where

"Helicopters were burning all over. . . .VMO-2 was practically wiped out." Before the VC could be

stopped they destroyed 19 helicopters and damaged

35, 11 of them severely.* Across the road, much of

the hospital, which was nearing completion, was

heavily damaged. After 30 minutes, the Viet Cong

withdrew, leaving behind 17 dead and four wounded.

American casualties were three killed and 91

wounded.'9

During the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Verle E.

Ludwig's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, south of

Marble Mountain, came under small arms fire, but

apparently this was a feint designed to fix the unit in

its defensive positions. All units at Da Nang went on

full alert, but the damage had been done.

The VC attacking forces at both Chu Lai and Da

Nang were not ordinary guerrillas. There were

indications that these troops were from hardcore

main force VC units, although the VC unit which

attacked Marble Mountain was better trained than

the one which hit Chu Lai. Captain Hoa, the Hoa

Vang District Chief, believed that the enemy group

which attacked Da Nang was North Vietnamese, but

the four prisoners captured by the Marines there

came from small hamlets in Quang Nam and Quang

Tin Provinces.20

The enemy had been well equipped for the

mission. At Marble Mountain, Marines recovered a

considerable stock of fragmentation, concussion, and

thermite grenades, as well as three bangalore torpedoes, several Chinese Communist B-40 antitank

rockets, and miscellaneous ammunition. The

American troops also captured several weapons, a

* Colonel O'Connor observed that the destruction of the

helicopters at Marble Mountain resulted in "a 43 percent loss

of division mobility'' and that it ''put a crimp in division plans

for several months afterward." Col Thomas J. O'Connor,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment

File).
7.62mm AK assault rifle, two .45 caliber automatic

weapons, and a 7.62mm Tokarev automatic pistol.2'

One of the more significant aspects of the events of

28 October was an attack which did not occur. The

enemy had also planned to hit the main airfield at Da

Nang. Two separate occurrences may have frustrated

this attack. General Walt's staff received word on 27

October that a VC main force battalion was moving

out of its base in ''Happy Valley,'' 10 miles southwest of Da Nang, and heading towards the base. At

1930, division artillery fired 680 rounds into the area.

Later intelligence reports indicated that the shells hit

the VC unit, forcing itto disperse.

Shortly afterward, a 9th Marines squad ambushed

a strong VC force near the An Tu (1) hamlet, five

miles south of Da Nang. The Marine patrol, 11

Marines and a Navy corpsman from Company I, 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines, had arrived at the ambush

126 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo

An aerial view of the damage caused by the VC sapper attack on Marble Mountain. Nearly one-third of the

Marine helicopers were destroyed or damaged during the attack.

-

'- ..

.'- I "

'I

1

/

I' 1 / /

/

I

,, ft
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 127

USMC Photo A185986

Sergeant John A. Anderson describes his squad's

patrol action. His squad was credited with preventing

a major attack on the Da Nang Airbase,

site after dark. By 1945 they had established their

positions; only 15 minutes later the Marines heard

movement along the trail. The squad leader,

Sergeant John A. Anderson, ordered his troops to

hold fire until the enemy was at pointblank range.

Seven VC had passed the site of the most forward

Marine before Anderson triggered the ambush. At

this moment, the VC were only six to seven feet

away from the Marine's M-60 machine gun position.

The machine gunner initiated the engagement with a

long burst, followed by heavy fire from all the

weapons of the rest of the squad. This volley killed all

seven VC.22

The seven dead were only the advance party for a

larger enemy force which moved forward to engage

the Marines. Sergeant Anderson fired several M-79

rounds at the muzzle flashes of the approaching VC.

The firefight continued for another minute, but then

the enemy began to disengage. Sergeant Anderson

realized that his troops had to get out of the area; he

was outnumbered. The squad leader ordered his men

to count the dead VC before leaving; they counted

15. The Marines moved out to their battalion's

position, but during the return two squad members

were wounded by Viet Cong firing from a dike.

Anderson called for fire support and after 60 rounds

of 81mm mortar fire hit on the enemy position, the

VC stopped firing. At first light the next day, 28

October, Company I sent two platoons to search the

ambush site more thoroughly. Of the 15 known VC

dead only two bodies were found.23

General Walt and his staff believed that Sergeant

Anderson's patrol probably had foiled an attack on

the airbase. Apparently the patrol had intercepted a

VC company from the same unit that carried out the

Marble Mountain attack:

This belief is supported by the fact that the company

was moving in the direction of the Da Nang base, and

time and distance being considered, the time of the attack

on the Marble Mountain Air Facility.24

Two days after the airfield attacks, the Viet Cong

attempted another probe of the Marine defenses, not

at the base area, but against the defensive perimeter

on Hill 22, south of the Tuy Loan River, manned by

the Marines of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines. The action began at 0100, 30 October,

*Captain Charles Ward, at the time the 9th Marines S-2,

debriefed the Anderson patrol. He recalled that the VC advance party had been preceded by a point element carrying

candles and flashlights to give the appearance of villagers

returning home. According to Ward, Anderson's men had

seen the point men but ''were uncertain as what to do—after

all, the men wore villagers' clothing, held lighted candles, and

the ambush location was on a well-travelled trail leading to

Highway 1 only 200-250 meters away and was only 100 meters

from occupied huts. The question became academic when the

main body traipsed into the squad's position. So surprised was

Anderson by the unexpected appearance of the column of men

on the trail, he almost forgot to give the order to the machine

gunner.'' Ward concluded his remarks with the observation

that ''reportedly this was Sgt Anderson'sfirst combat patrol.''

LtCol Charles Ward, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File).

;#1 ?4

- —'
128 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

when 10-15 VC walked into a squad ambush 1,000

meters south of the hill. The Marines opened fire and

killed three of the enemy, but the squad had not been

able to maintain communications with the company

and was unable to notify the company commander of

the contact. All was quiet for about two hours, when

suddenly approximately 25 enemy enveloped the

Marine squad, killing three and wounding six.2' At

0315 the rest of the VC force attacked the main

Marine positions on Hill 22. Enemy troops, supported by two recoilless rifles, penetrated about a

third of the northwestern perimeter, capturing three

M-60 machine guns, two 3.5-inch rocket launchers,

and one 60mm mortar. They also gained access to

the company's ammunition bunker.

Lieutenant Colonel Harold A. Hatch, who had

assumed command of the 1st Battalion on 27 September, immediately sent reinforcements and ammunition to Company A. One resupply helicopter

was "so fully loaded that it barely could get off the

ground" and its "rotor wash blew the supply tent

down." The battalion commander also called for

supporting artillery fire and close air support 26

About 45 minutes after the enemy had launched

the main attack on Hill 22, three UH-34s landed

Sergeant Russell L. Kees' 13-man squad from

Company C on the hill. Kees stated, "The VC were

everywhere; in the tents, on the tents, and in the

trenches.' '27 Supported by air, artillery, and mortars,

the Company A commander, Captain John A.

Maxwell, rallied the Marines; they counterattacked

and drove off the enemy. Marines casualties were 16

dead and 41 wounded, while the Communists left

behind 47 bodies and one wounded.28

Marine air accounted for a few more enemy when

the VC unit tried to cross the eastern bank of the

Song Yen three miles south of Hill 22. The Marine

pilots reported destroying 10 boats and seeing 10

bodies in the water.29 Villagers in the area told the

American troops that the Viet Cong forced them to

USMC Photo A 184893

Two young Vietnamese boys assist a Marine in directing traffic through a checkpoint. The boys are the sons of a

South Vietnamese Air Force sergeant.

1,3
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 129

USMC Photo A185921

A Marine from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines mans

a defensive position on top of an old French fort in the

Marble Mountain area. The Marines used the fort to

store supplies.

bury several bodies, apparently casualties of the Hill

22 fight.3°

The VC had planned the operation thoroughly.

They hit the critical portions of the perimeter and

knew exactly which bunker contained ammunition.

American intelligence sources discovered that the

VC unit involved in the attack was the R-20 Battalion

which had just completed training. The Hill 22

attack was apparently its final training exercise .3' * Base Defense

The enemy attacks on the airfields and on Hill 22

gave added impetus to the improvement of base

defenses. After the dissolution of the provisional

defense battalion in August, one Marine infantry

battalion was kept on the Da Nang Airbase as the

airfield defense battalion. On 21 August III MAF

assumed direct control of the airfield defense bat-

*The enemy battalion also was known as the Doc Lap

Battalion. According to General Simmons, it was not "a new

battalion, but one which had just been filled up with new

recruits, most from the city of Da Nang, and retrained." BGen

Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on Shulimson, "USMC Ops

RVN Jul-Dec65,'' dtd 12May71 (Vietnam Comment File).

talion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Tunnell's newly

arrived 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which relieved the

1st Battalion, 9th Marines on the airfield. Lieutenant

Colonel Clark still retained the position of base

defense coordinator. His job, according to his

successor, was to collect statistics on Marine

''saturation-type patrolling'' and to inform the

battalion commander "where to alternate the

emphasis'' in the airfield defense battalion's

patrolling effort 32

The main physical security problem of the airfield,

other than keeping the Viet Cong out, was overlapping American and Vietnamese authority.

There was a heterogeneous mixture of U.S. and

Vietnamese units at Da Nang, each responsible for

its own internal security. The 41st Fighter Wing,

VNAF was responsible for its defensive perimeter,

while U.S. Air Police and Vietnamese MPs con -

trolled the main gate. This situation was further

complicated when the Marble Mountain Air Facility

east of the main airfield opened in September. At

Marble Mountain, MAG-16, the Seabees, and

support troops provided their own security. The

various security forces both at Da Nang and Marble

Mountain integrated their efforts as much as possible

with the plans of the airfield defense battalion.

General Walt exercised "a sort of presuptive

authority over the tenants."33

Obtaining a dear decision for relations between

the various commands was a continuing problem. On

4 October, the III MAF staff proposed that General

Walt ask ComUSMACV for permission to activate a

base defense command to exert "coordinating

authority over the internal security provided by the

various commands and units at Da Nang."34

General Walt expanded the authority of the base

defense coordinator and appointed Colonel George

W. Carrington to this position in place of Lieutenant

Colonel Clark. After the enemy attacks at the end of

October, the new coordinator visited the Da Nang

airfield tenants to ensure that an integrated defense

did exist. He also planned the trace of a fence around

the airfield. Carrington's duties also included advising, coordinating, and drawing together the

defensive measures of the other two Marine enclaves.

According to Colonel Carrington, his responsibility extended to and:

included field artillery battery positions (but I could

not infringe upon command responsibilities of the artillery regimental commander), water points, bridge and

I
130 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185856

A VC prisoner leads a Marine squad to a weapons

cache. The prisoner claims that the VC are using the

Buddhist Pagoda in the picture to store their arms,

ferry crossing sites, LAAM Sites Ofl mountain peaks,

ammunition dumps, supply dumps, and units of the

MAW. I arranged for rotation of the war dogs, temporary

augmentation from scarce infantry assets to help in nighttime guarding or patrolling, or improvement of the

physical barriers. I withheld infantry assistance on occasion for our assets were too thin. We had to tell some

sailors, soldiers, Marines, even civilians, to ''do the best

you can, to be alert. ''s'

Security coordinators were established at all

Marine airfields. The commanding officer of the 9th

Marines assumed the additional title of IVIarble

Mountain airfield coordinator with the responsibility

of overseeing the defense for the helicopter field.

After the October raid, the 3d Engineer Battalion,

with the assistance of MAG-16 personnel, built a

barrier of minefields and barbed wire.36 Similar

measures were taken at the other installations.

Each Marine enclave developed its own procedures

k)r providing internal airfield security. At Da Nang,

one infantry battalion provided security; each of its

four companies was assigned a defensive area from

2,100-3,400 meters wide. The battalion conducted

patrols outside the airfield perimeter to add depth to

the Marine defense, as well as to prevent the VC

from setting up mortar and recoilless rifle firing

positions .' The Vietnamese Air Force defense sector

remained separate from the battalion's area of

operations. At Chu Lai, the Marines also assigned

one infantry battalion to airfield security, but only

two of the battalion's companies were deployed on

the airfield perimeter. These two companies were

reinforced by two provisional rifle companies

composed of personnel from MAG-12, the Seabees,

and the 2d LAAM Battalion.38 At Phu Bai, the 3d

Battalion, 4th Marines developed the combined

action company to deal with the unique situation

existing there.

III MAF experimented with several techniques to

ensure the security of the major airbases. These

included the use of dogs and sophisticated electronic

devices. In August, 11 sentry dogs and their Marine

handlers arrived at Da Nang from Japan. After three

weeks of intensive training, the dogs were assigned to

posts at ammunition supply points, LAAM battery

sites, and Marble Mountain. In November, some of

the dogs accompanied Marine patrols along the

airfield perimeter. The Marines learned that the dogs

were most 2ffective when employed in remote areas

whe few people worked or lived. The dogs were

extremely valuable at the LAAM battery site on

secluded Monkey Mountain, but proved to be unsatisfactory at the ammunition supply point where

Marines worked around the clock. The continuous

activity at the latter site only confused the animals.39

In November and December 1965, III MAF

received 600 seismic detection sets for perimeter

defense. These electronic devices were extremely

sensitive to ground vibrations and relayed seismic

disturbance signals to Marine-monitored control

boxes. These instruments operated well, but, as

Colonel Carrington pointed out:

We had known in the first place that there were always

plenty of human beings Out there in front of us in the

paddies, huts, jungles, and hills. No tricky devices or

stunts, however, could help Marines determine friend

from foe.4°

Even so, the Marines found the devices useful. As

one battalion commander explained:

We used the seismic devices in each one of these

situations, very successfully so. We shot a few water

buffalo and a few dogs . . . [the devices allow] you, of

course, to maintain and secure a much greater perimeter

with a lot less people.41t

tColonel Carrington recalled one rather humorous useof the

seismic device: '' . . . a senior USMC officer was concerned

that sappers might be tunneling under our MAF headquarters.

Use of seismic detectors to confirm this was inconclusive, but

after resort to bull dozers to dig futilely for the assumed tunnel,

I was chatised by another senior USMC officer for allowing

destruction of a projected, ceremonial parade ground.'' Col

George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

4—,fl
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING THE BASE AREAS 131

Extended Patrolling

Throughout the latter half of 1965, Marine units

concentrated on small unit operations. General Walt

referred to such actions as the ''bread and butter of

my command."42 A month-by-month comparison of

the number of patrols, ambushes, listening posts, and

other activities of Marine platoons and squads shows

a steady increase in the tempo of operations. In

October 3d Marine Division units at all three enclaves conducted 2,877 patrols and 1,061 ambushes

which resulted in 70 contacts with the enemy. In

December, the division reported a total of 9,698

offensive operations which resulted in 510 contacts.43 One battalion commander observed that

each of his platoons conducted two night patrols and

one daylight patrol during an average 24-hour

period.44

III MM developed and modified techniques and

tactics fir the employment of small Marine units.

The Marines experimented with specially trained and

equipped sniper teams. Fifty of the best marksmen

were selected from each of the regiments. These

troops were divided into four-man teams and

equipped with Winchester Model 70 rifles and

telescopic sights. After training, the teams rejoined

their regiments. During November and December,

20-30 teams operated in the Marine TAORs daily.

On 23 November, a sniper team at Phu Bai killed two

VC and wounded another at a distance of more than

1,000 meters.

Aggressive small unit patrolling continued to pay

dividends. On 5 December, a platoon from Company

C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines surprised 70 VC on the

* These statistics must be used with care. They

are reliable for showing general trends, but are not absolutely

accurate. As an example, CG FMFPac's staff stated that in

October the Marines conducted 3,900 patrols of squad and

platoon-size, in addition to 1,361 ambushes which resulted in

323 contacts. III MAF, on the other hand, reported 3,520 small

unit actions resulting in 287 VC Contacts for the same period.

III MAF ComdC, Oct65 and FMFPac, IIIMAF, Ops, Oct 65.

In the text, the figures provided by the division are used in that

it furnished both III MAF and FMFPac with the figures they

used. On the general subject of reporting, Brigadier General

Edwin H. Simmons observed that as III MAF G-3 he ''spent

60 percent of my time reporting or generating reports (in two

directions: Hawaii and Saigon) BGen Edwin H.

Simmons, ltr to Col George W. Carrington, dtd 2Dec76

(Vietnam Comment File).

Trung Phan Peninsula, six miles southeast of the

Chu Lai airfield. The platoon, operating from its

company's combat base, had been assigned the

mission of searching the Tuyet Diem (1) hamlet on

the banks of the Moi River. The platoon had

established an ambush site 2,000 meters south of the

hamlet. At 0300, four VC walked into the trap and

were killed by a burst of Marine fire. First Lieutenant

Charles D. Jones, the platoon commander, fearing

that the noise had compromised his position, ordered

two of his squads to deploy to the left and right of the

village while he led the third squad into the hamlet.

At 0600 the 3d squad entered Tuyet Diem (1) and

caught the VC completely unaware. According to

one report: ''At that time it [the hamlet] became

alive with VC. They ran into the streets, some of

them naked; all of them carrying weapons, and of

course the squads on the right and left took them

under fire.''4'

At the same time, the 3d Squad pushed the enemy

toward the river where the platoon killed 30 VC and

captured seven more. A search of the area turned up

a squad leader's diary, three weapons, and a medical

kit.

Several hours later there was a sequel to this ac -

tion. Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly, the battalion commander, ordered Company A to move into

the same area. Kelly believed that there was a good

chance that VC might still be there.47 He was

correct, The Marines of Company A killed eight VC

and captured three more weapons.

Another significant engagement occurred in the

Da Nang TAOR on 27 December when a 17-man

patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

engaged a large enemy force near the small hamlet of

Quang Ha, 11 miles south of the base. As the

Marines approached the hamlet they were fired on

from a tree line to their front and from their right

flank. The first burst killed the patrol's radioman,

destroyed his radio, and damaged one of the two M60 machine guns. The heavy fire lasted about 15

minutes, seven members of the patrol were hit, and

one Marine died of wounds.

Earlier the patrol leader, First Lieutenant James P.

Weller, had sent a fire team to a sandy ridge on his

right flank to cover the patrol's approach. The main

body of the patrol and the flanking fire team immediately returned fire. The enemy launched a

frontal attack. The VC were caught in a crossfire

between the main body and the fire team on the right
132 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

flank. The Marines killed nine of the attackers, but

40 to 50 more VC moved into positions behind the

ambush site. Lieutenant Weller set off a smoke

grenade, the prearranged signal to the battalion for

help in case of radio failure. After 30 minutes, the

Americans heard a shrill whistle and the enemy fire

diminished. The Marines continued to fire 60mm

mortar rounds. At this point, Marine reinforcements, including two Ontos and two tanks,

arrived. According to Lieutenant Weller, fire from

the tanks caused another 13 VC casualties. An armed

helicopter covered the Marines as they withdrew

from the area, while artillery fire was placed on the

suspected enemy escape routes. The engagement

resulted in 41 confirmed enemy dead and another 15-

20 probable kills. The Marines suffered seven

casualties, all during the initial burst of fire.48

As small unit patrolling expanded into the

populated ricelands of the growing Marine enclaves,

III MAF soon realized the futility of such actions

unless the Viet Cong infrastructure there was

destroyed. Several programs were established to

accomplish this end. They had many different labels,

but pacification was the true name of the game.
CHAPTER 9

Pacification

The Combined Action Program—Protection of the Harvest: GOLDEN FLEECE—Cordon and Search.•

The Seeds of COUNTY FAIR and Population Control—Civic Action—The Ngu Hanh Son Campaign

and the Frustrations of Pacification

The Combined Action Program

Fighting guerrillas was not a new experience for

the Marine Corps. General Walt recalled that as a

young officer he learned the fundamentals of his

profession "from men who had fought Sandino in

Nicaragua or Charlemagne in Haiti."1 Based on

earlier experiences in the Caribbean republics, in

1940 the Marine Corps published the Small Wars

Manual, which contains the statement:

In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness

should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of

the population . . . The purpose should always be to

restore normal government . . . and to establish peace,

order, and security.

General Walt expressed much the same sentiment

when he described pacification, The name doesn't

matter, the idea does: sympathy, understanding,

regard for the people .

The Marines recognized the close interrelationship between defense of the base area and the

extension of Marine influence into the countryside.

This was clearly demonstrated at Phu Bai where the

3d Battalion, 4th Marines faced the situation of

*A former III MAF staff officer in 1965 and, later, a battalion and combined action group commander, Colonel John E.

Greenwood, cautioned that the relationship between Marine

Corps counterinsurgency theory and the earlier Marine experience in the Caribbean can be overdrawn. Colonel

Greenwood remarked that during the Kennedy era ''guerrilla

warfare expertise" was one of the ''popular 'in' topics," and

the ''hundreds of Marine officers," including himself, "attended Army schools and studied the doctrine developed and

articulated by the British and by the U.S. Army." He made

the point that for officers of his generation, as opposed to the

senior commanders such as General Walt, ''our insights in war

of this kind came from this nearly contemporary effort, not

from Marine Corps experience 30 years previous." Col John E.

Greenwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd Nov77 (Vietnam

Comment File).

defending an expanding area of operations with a

limited number of troops. They responded by

developing the Combined Action Program. When

Zone A, * * the 10-square-mile built-up area directly

north and east of the airfield, was incorporated in the

Marine TAOR on 21 June, Lieutenant Colonel

William "Woody" Taylor expected reinforcements

from the 3d Marine Division to control the added

area, but the diversion of Utter's battalion to Qui

Nhon forced Taylor to make do with the forces he

had on hand.

At the suggestion of Captain John J. Mullen, Jr.,

the battalion adjutant and civil affairs officer, Taylor

decided to tap a neglected resource, the South

Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF). There were six PF

platoons in the Phu Bai TAOR; one each in the

villages of Thuy Luong, Thuy Tan, Phu Bai, and Loc

Son, and two guarding the railroad and Highway 1

bridges. In July, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor was

granted limited operational control of the PF units in

Zone A by General Chuan, the 1st ARVN Division

commander. Major Cullen C. Zimmerman, Taylor's

executive officer, developed plans for the incorporation of Marines into the PF units. Lieutenant

Colonel Taylor then discussed the concept with

Colonel Wheeler, still commander of the 3d Marines,

and General Walt. Colonel Wheeler assigned a

young, Vietnamese-speaking officer from his staff at

Da Nang, First Lieutenant Paul R. Ek, the

responsibility for establishing the program at Phu

Bai. Ek was to integrate a Marine squad into a PF

* * Zone A consisted of the ARVN Dong Da training camp, a

series of hamlets, and low, wet rice lands extending to the

waterways which formed a semicircle around the Marine base.

The rivers in the area roughly defined the boundaries for the

entire Marine TAOR: the Ta Trach in the west, the Dai Giang

to the north and east, and the Nong to the east and south. See

Chapter 3 for the incorporation of Zone A in the TAOR.

133
134 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185708

At Phu Bai, 1st Lieutenant Paul R. Ek, commander of the Combined Action Company (holding the rifle), inspects a combined squad of Vietnamese Popular Force troops and U.S. Marines.

* General Walt made the following statement concerning

the origins of the Combined Action Program: ''I can unequivocally state that the original suggestion was made by

Captain John J. Mullen, Jr., the first plans made by Major

Cullen C. Zimmerman, with the approval of the Commanding

Officer of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Regiment),

Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor.'' Walt, Strange War,

Strange Strategy, p. 105. According to Captain Paul R. Ek, the

first commanding officer of the Combined Action Company,

the Province Chief of Thua Thien Province, Lieutenant

Colonel Khoa 'indicated to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor that

there should be only one commander for all troops, Marines

and Popular Forces, in the area.'' Ek MR, 10Nov72.

sidered adapting this experience to the Vietnam

situation. General Greene, then chief of staff at

HQMC, met with Edward H. Forney, a retired

Marine general, home on leave from his post in

Saigon where he was the Public Safety Advisor with

the U.S. Operations Mission. Forney, a Naval

Academy graduate and a veteran of both World War

H and Korea, had served two years with the 1st

Marine Brigade in Haiti during the early 1930s.

According to General Greene, Forney believed that:

The Marine Corps should get into the Vietnam job

with both feet and that it should be a real grass roots level

operation, not tied in with the MAAG; but rather an

effort to be linked with the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense

Corps, and the local Militia in the village and boondock

level. This would be similar to the Guardia effort in

Nicaragua or the Gendarmerie operation in Haiti and

Santo Domingo. Forney thinks that this is the type of

operation around which the common people of South

Vietnam would rally; that this is the big deficiency in the

platoon, forming what was

action company," patterned

British companies used in

1950s.*

The Marine Corps had

pacification precedents in the

Marine officers, as early as

then called a ''joint

along the lines of the

Malaya during the

established its own Caribbean and senior

February 1963, con-
PACIFICATION 135

USMC Photo A185800

Lieutenant Paul R. Ek (on the right) discusses the

situation with a South Vietnamese officer (left). The

South Vietnamese soldier in the center with the

floppy wide-brim hat is the interpreter.

present operation and the one in which the USMC could

make a solid contribution.4

Unlike the Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua or

Haitian Gendarmerie, the joint action company was

to be a cooperative effort rather than a Marineofficered native constabulary. The first, and perhaps

most important, task was the selection of the

Marines for the program. All of the Americans were

hand-picked by Ek, and, as far as he was concerned,

they were the best men available. They were highly

motivated volunteers. The Marine lieutenant spent a

week teaching his recruits about Vietnamese

customs and the political structure in the countryside. The men were to live in the surrounding

hamlets and they needed to know their exact place in

this society. In Ek's words, they had to know

''whom to call 'sir' and whom to call 'you'.'"

When the school period was over, each of Ek's

four Marine squads was assigned to a PF platoon.

The Marine squad leader became the platoon

commander while the Vietnamese commander

became his assistant. A Marine fire team was the

nucleus of each combined squad with Marines filling

most of the leadership billets, but with Vietnamese

counterparts. This relationship existed on the

company level as well; Vietnamese Warrant Officer

Nyugen Diem Duong was to be Ek's executive officer. The company headquarters included a Marine

first sergeant and three Vietnamese radio operators

who manned the ARVN radio nets. These nets

included the hamlet chief as well as the 3d Battalion's

fire direction center. At first, Ek's headquarters

served only as an administrative and coordinating

center for the activities of each platoon, but, in time,

the headquarters controlled company-size operations

in which the combined unit operated with Regional

Force and ARVN units.

The command structure was flexible. Although

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had operational command, the Vietnamese district chief retained administrative responsibility for the PF. Correspondingly, in each village where the joint action platoons

were garrisoned, the village chief kept his administrative civil responsibilities, while the combined force was responsible for military security. A

great deal depended on the tact and resourcefulness of

each Marine, especially the platoon commander who

had to maintain harmonious relations among his

subordinates, the village chief, and his PFs.

Ek's concept of operations for the employment of

the PF with Marines was patterned on the

organization of the VC infrastructure, using

''assistance rather than terror to win the people's

loyalties.'' He believed that as the PFs and Marines

built their "infrastructure . . . they would be

destroying that of the Viet Cong." The combined

force would have several basic assignments:

''security, counter-intelligence, obtaining the good

will of the people . . . . These formed the spokes of

the wheel while training was the hub of the entire

program.''6

Training was accomplished jointly. The Vietnamese taught local customs, Vietnamese language,

local terrain peculiarities, and furnished inkrmation

about the VC in the area. The Americans taught

tactics, discipline, and civilian population control.

On 1 August, the joint action company was

formally established and two days later the first

platoon made a reconnaissance of its assigned village.

During the first week, the platoons entered the

villages only during daytime. At first the Marines

ignored the villagers and worked solely with the PFs.

The Americans had to learn the terrain and local

patterns. Each Marine carried a small notebook in

which he recorded the daily habits of the people in

the hamlets, such as what time the buffalo boys took

their animals out to the fields and when the people
136 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marines andPF.

got up in the morning. He was to pay particular

attention to all deviations from the daily pattern.

When there was a break in the routine, it was his job

to find out the reason why. Eventually the Marines

were able to talk with the people, at first using a

combination of sign language, and then "pidgin"

Vietnamese and English.

The main obstacle to the establishment of mutual

trust between the Marines and the Vietnamese was

the sub rosa control that the VC maintained in the

area. They did not rule with a tight rein, but would

come into the villages several nights a week to

distribute propaganda, make speeches, and collect

taxes. According to Ek, the understrength Vietnamese territorial forces were unable to cope with the

VC. The government troops appeared to lack the

initiative to go after the Communists. Ek suspected

that some of the Vietnamese village chiefs and the

VC commanders had reached informal, unwritten

agreements, not as a conspiracy, but as an understanding of the realities of the situation. The

Communist troops had the freedom to move during

the night, and, in turn, offered no interference to

government operations during the day.

Once Lieutenant Ek's combined force began to

enter the hamlets, much of the collusion stopped.

During the first weeks, the joint platoons saturated

the area with patrols, day and night. They introduced

several innovations in population control. One of the

most successful was accomplished with the aid of the

USMC Photo A185799

complete integration of

local Vietnamese National Police. The PFs and

Marines would enter a hamlet just before dawn and

gather the people in the village street. The troops

would first apologize to the inhabitants for disturbing

them, but then state that it was necessary to check

their identification cards in order to protect them

from the Communists. The actual identification and

questioning of the people was done by an accompanying force of policemen.

The allied commands were unsure how the VC

would react to the U.S. Marines living in the

hamlets. Ek believed that the Communists had two

alternatives. They would either attack the hamlets

and wipe out the joint platoons, or ignore the

Americans altogether. The VC chose the latter

course. As the Marines lived among the people, in

time the Americans were able to sense if they were

welcome or not. They had to be especially careful in

hamlets where the inhabitants were overly friendly.

That usually meant that the people had something to

hide, and that something usually turned out to be

VC.

The first significant engagement between a combined action unit* and the Viet Cong occurred

*The name of the joint action company was changed to

combined action company by III MAF in October since

'joint'' pertains to two or more services of the same country

and ''combined" means services of different countries. See

Mullen Study, p. C-H. Captain John J. Mullen, Jr., became

the commanding officer on 25 September when Lieutenant Ek

completed his overseas tout and left Vietnam.

A Combined Action Company patrol moves across a dike near Phu Bai showing the
PACIFICATION 137

USMC Photo A185740

Marines and PF troops of the Combined Action Company patrol the Nong River near Phu Bai in Vietnamese

boats, The two Marine swimmers are apparently searchingfor any VC who may be hiding under the water.

on 29 November during a successful ambush near

Phu Bai. As a VC platoon started to cross a bridge

into the hamlet, a combined action squad opened fire

on the VC, killing four and capturing one of the

enemy troops. The enemy platoon fled to the south

where it was engaged by another combined action

squad and then forced to turn west through blocking

artillery fires. There were no Marine or PF

casualties. One of the dead VC was later identified as

the enemy unit commander, Phan Van Thuong.7

The combined action platoons did not kill many

VC during this early period, but by protecting their

assigned hamlets they accomplished the primary

mission for which they had been formed. In addition,

the platoons furnished the Marine battalion with

defense-in-depth protection of the base at Phu Bai.

* Thuong, a member of the Communist party,was born only

a few miles from where he died and was a veteran of the Viet

Minh War against the French.

The enemy was duly impressed by this factor.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Vale, who had

relieved Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, a report found

on a VC body read "There were at least 4,000

Marines in the area. You could not move anywhere

because Marines were always in the way.' '8

The platoons also became an important source of

information. The combined action troops soon

learned about the VC organization in the area. They

knew that it was led by a man named Vo Dai, who,

although born in the Phu Bai area, had lived in

North Vietnam for several years. The Marines and

PF troops discovered where Vo Dai's mother and

wife lived and paid frequent visits to the two women.

The combined action units never captured Vo Dai,

but they managed to keep him on the run.

Indicative of combined action effectiveness was the

close bond forged between the Marines and the local

villagers. When Vale's battalion was replaced at Phu

Bai by Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin 's 2d Battalion, 1st

A"''

i qk

'' c.'' ' ___

-

___

p Z4 -__

_

- — '- • • r. - - -

- 2
138 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Marines in December, 40 of the 66 Marines assigned

to the combined action company at Phu Bai

volunteered to extend their tour with the PFs rather

than return to Okinawa with their battalion.9

Marines in the other sectors of I Corps also experimented with the employment of local Vietnamese defense forces. On Ky Ha Peninsula, north

of Chu Lai, the local chief, with the cooperation of

lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Perrich's 1st Battalion,

4th Marines, established a self-defense corps in

September, composed entirely of local village

volunteers. Their duty was to patrol the five hamlets

which made up Ky Ha village during the night. On

the 25th, members of this force began accompanying

Marine patrols in the area. In the sectors of both the

4th and 7th Marines at Chu Lai, PF units were

brought into the battalion sectors for introduction

and training. At Da Nang, two Regional Force

companies' operations were coordinated with' the

Marine regiments, the 3d and 9th Marines. In addition, both regiments also used PF units during

offensive operations to serve as guides and interpreters. Where PF defensive positions were near

to those of the Marine battalions, close coordination

was maintained for mortar and artillery fires, night

ambushes, patrols, and listening posts.

General Walt watched the Marine employment of

local forces with intense interest. He realized that the

PF soldier had the poorest training and worst

equipment of the South Vietnamese armed forces,

but he considered him to be a vital link in the process

of providing real security for the population. He

noted:

He had a signal advantage over all others; he was

defending his own home, family, and neighbors. The

Popular Force soldier knew every person in his community by face and name; he knew each paddy, field,

trail, bush, or bamboo clump, each family shelter, tunnel,

and buried rice urn. He knew in most cases the local Viet

Cong guerrilla band, and it was not uncommon for him to

be related to one or more of them by blood or other family

ties.

During November, the III MAF commander

persuaded General Thi to release eight PF platoons at

Da Nang to the operational control of the 3d Marine

Division. Seven of the PF units were assigned to the

airfield defense battalion and the eighth to Lieutenant

Colonel Ludwig's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,

operating south of Marble Mountain." Marine and

PF troops patrolled the defensive perimeters of the

airfield area together. Reports of innocent people

USMC Photo A185847

Two Marines from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

stack newly harvested bags of rice inside a Marine

amphibian tractor in Operation GOLDEN FLEECE.

The rice is to be taken to a central collection point for

safe keeping and marketing.

being detained at the airfield decreased considerably,

and the PFs received valuable combat training. On 5

January 1966, General Walt asked General Thi to

extend combined action operations between PFs and

Marines to all three enclaves, which Thi agreed to do

on 28 January.'2

Protection of the Harvest: GOLDEN FLEECE

The expansion of the 9th Marines TAOR into the

populated area south of Da Nang during Operation

RICE STRAW coincided with the autumn rice

harvest and resulted in another task for the Marines,

rice harvesting protection. The most publicized effort

involved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines along the

eastern perimeter of the 9th Marines' area of

operations.

.
PACIFICATION 139

USMC Photo A186015

A Marine guards a Viet Cong prisoner during

Operation GOLDEN FLEECE in September 1965.

The Viel Cong had taken a percentage of the rice

harvest for their own use for years in this area south

of Da Nang prior to the arrival of the Marines.

In mid-August, the battalion was released from

duty as the airfield defense battalion and was assigned

to the area south of Marble Mountain bordering the

South China Sea. Operating from a central base area,

Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig sent out small patrols to

bait the VC. When these units made contact, a

mobile reaction force, composed of Marines mounted

on tanks, Ontos, and amtracs, sped to the point of

contact. At the same time, the battalion commander

attempted to enlist each of the four village chiefs in

his area of operations to support his efforts against

the Viet Cong.'3t The chiefs were wary until the

* One of Ludwig's company commanders was an Australian

exchange officer, Captain Michael J. Harris of the New South

Wales Light Infantry, who had served with the British forces in

Malaya and gladly shared his experiences with the Americans.

He suggested the formation of an area security council consisting of the four chiefs, a program which Ludwig later implemented. Ludwig inlvw.

Americans proved themselves, which did not take

long. On 29 August, the battalion defeated a Viet

Cong company, killing 12, capturing 12 more, and

dispersing the remainder.

Impressed by this action, Huynh Ba Trinh, chief

of Hoa Hai village, contacted the battalion intelligence officer the next day and reported that his

villagers had told him that more than 30 of the enemy

had been killed in that engagement.tt Trinh then

asked that the battalion provide security for the

villagers when they began harvesting their rice on 10

September. The chief explained that the VC came

each year and took what they considered to be their

share of the harvest. According to South Vietnamese

and Marine intelligence sources, the Viet Cong had

already moved one battalion and several companies

into the 9th Marines TAOR to accomplish their rice

collection.'4 Trinh proposed that the Marines help

the farmers bring the rice to central collection points

where it could be stored in warehouses. He would

then give the people receipts for their crops and

distribute the rice when the need arose.tt *

Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig did not believe that the

local chiefs could administer such a large undertaking. He suggested that a meeting be held with

the four chiefs on 7 September. The battalion

commander had lunch that day with the chiefs and

proposed that the Marine battalion, through active

patrolling, ambushes, and sweep operations, screen

the VC from the people, freeing the peasants to

harvest their rice. The farmers could keep the rice in

their homes and the Marines would try to keep the

VC Out. The chiefs were agreeable and Ludwig,

borrowing from Greek mythology, labeled the

operation GOLDEN FLEECE. General Walt cleared

the operation with General Thi, the I Corps Com-

* tThe 9th Marines S-2, Major John A. Buck, commented:

''Regardless of the accuracy of the reported 30 VC

KIAs—which is not an improbable total for the action referred

to—the fact that the village chief accepts this figure is, in itself,

important.'' 9th Marines Intelligence Summary No. 54, dtd

1Sep65, 9th Marines S-2 Section, Journal and Intelligence

Summaries, Sep65. $ * * The 9th Marines intelligence summary of 1 September

indicated the significance of Trinh's proposal: ''Hoa Hai

village has a population of over 3,000 and has been considered

VC controlled territory. If the villagers are now willing to risk

possible VC reprisals by refusing to pay the usual rice tax, it

would indicate a confidence and firmness heretofore lacking in

this locality.''

—
140 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185845

Marines of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines help South Vietnamese farmers load bags of rice into a Marine LVT.

Note that the Vietnamese have hung the bags on their traditional carryingpole.

mander, and on 9 September, Colonel John E.

Gorman, the 9th Marines commander, ordered both

his forward battalions, the 1st and 2d, to render all

possible assistance to the Vietnamese in the

protection of the harvest." The 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines later replaced the 2d Battalion.

The campaign produced results quickly. About

noon on 12 September, Chief Trinh told Lieutenant

Colonel Ludwig that a VC main force unit had moved

into a hamlet south of Marble Mountain to collect its

rice tax. The battalion commander immediately sent

a two-company attack force, supported by Ontos,

tanks, and amtracs into the area. The Marines met

strong opposition from VC mortars and recoilless

rifles. Shortly after dark, the enemy broke contact

and fled. The next morning the Marines found no

enemy bodies, but later learned that the VC had

taken refuge during the night in a leper hospital, five

miles south of Marble Mountain. The Viet Cong had

taken medicines and supplies from the leprosarium

and moved out of the area. Ludwig believed this

battle broke the back of the VC tax collection

organization in his battalion's TAOR.'6 After this

encounter, the 1st Battalion Marines met only

sporadic resistance as GOLDEN FLEECE continued

through the rice harvesting season.

Rice protection was not only the preserve of the

9th Marines. In the northwestern portion of the Da

Nang TAOR, lieutenant Colonel Clement's 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines conducted a similar harvest

protection operation in the Cu De Valley near the

hamlets of Pho Nam Thuong Ha and Nam Yen.

When the peasants of this region voluntarily left their

homes to resettle in the pacified village of Le My,

-. \'t a-
PACIFICATION 141

they agreed to do so only if the Marines would

protect their autumn harvest, lieutenant Colonel

Clement accepted this condition and fulfilled his

promise in September.'7 On the 15th, the battalion

intelligence officer, Captain Lionel V. Silva,

discussed plans for the harvest with the district chief.

A Marine helicopter flew a group of farmers from Le

My to their fields near their former homes to survey

the crops. By 18 September the battalion and South

Vietnamese had completed preparations and the

harvest began in earnest on the next day. During the

period 18-23 September, the Marines moved approximately 150 villagers to their fields for the

harvest. Marine helicopters and LVTs brought over

12,000 pounds of harvested rice into Le My, as well

as some civilians who had decided to resettle there.

The helicopters flew 14 sorties while the LVTs

logged 800 miles in this GOLDEN FLEECE

operation. *

In October, rice protection operations were extended to two other areas of operations. At Da Nang,

lieutenant Colonel Hatch's 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines, in the southwestern portion of the Da Nang

TAOR, assisted the villagers of Hieu Duc District in

their harvest of over 71,000 kilograms of rice. During

this same month, Lieutenant Colonel Fisher's 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines conducted two operations

labeled HARVEST MOON* * in "Western

Valley,'' five miles west of Chu Lai airfield. The

village chief of Ky Ha (2) reported that the battalion

protected the harvesting of over 102,000 kilograms of

rice.

On 26 November, Lieutenant Colonel Clement

submitted a study for General Walt evaluating the

GOLDEN FLEECE Operations.** * Using figures

furnished by the Vietnamese village chiefs, he

declared that, ''512,410 pounds of rice, threshed,

was denied the VC. At the accepted rate of 1.5

pounds per person per day, this could have subsisted

1,900 VC for the six months until next harvest."9

* The battalion did not call its operation GOLDEN FLEECE,

but this name was soon adopted to refer to all rice harvesting

protection missions.

**III MAF records indicate that 2/3 also conducted a rice

harvest operation named HARVEST MOON. The early

HARVEST MOON operations should not be confused with

the multi-battalion combat operation HARVEST MOON

conducted by Task Force DELTA in December.

* * Lieutenant Colonel Clement was detached from 2/3 on 10Nov65 and assigned to the III MAF G-3 Section.

USMC Photo A185783

A Marine officer assists a South Vietnamese woman

gather the rice into a shock while another Marine

stands guard during Operation GOLDEN FLEECE.

Qement concluded that the operation was both a

psychological and economic success, it had kept the

rice in the hands of the people while denying it to the

VC. General Walt, confident of further success,

ordered that plans be drawn up to implement

GOLDEN FLEECE II for the spring harvest.

Cordon and Search: The Seeds of

COUNTY FAIR and Population Control

During this period, III MM started what was to

become the COUNTY FAIR technique, a cordon

and search operation with psychological overtones.

Although the 9th Marines was to give the technique

its name, the concept evolved from the experience of

several units and techniques they had developed to

meet local conditions. In the 3d Marines TAOR,

southwest of the airfield, several operations were

conducted, initially by the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

and later by the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, during

which one company would surround a hamlet while

another would search it for VC. In the Le My area,

the regiment's nothern TAOR, the 2d Battalion, 3d
142 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A41 3090

Major Charles J. Keever was the III MAF Civil

Affairs Officer in 1965. He was the author of the III

MAF Civic Action Order.

Marines conducted a ''similar type operation . . . in

conjuction with RVN civic action personnel provided

by the Province Chief and National Police."20

Prior to reentering Cam Ne after the ''Zippo''

lighter incident, the 9th Marines planned to use

loudspeakers to call the villagers out of the hamlets to

a holding area where they would be fed and given

medical treatment. Marines, reinforced by local

krces, would then enter the empty hamlets to search

for VC. The difficulty lay with obtaining the

cooperation of the local South Vietnamese

authorities. Colonel Edwin H. Simmons, the III

MAF G-3, met with the I Corps chief of staff to

discuss the problems of operating in the villages

south of Da Nang, but failed to reach any agreement

on methods. Simmons recalled:

His [Colonel Thanh, the I Corps Chief of Staff] solution

was to react with fire at the first hostile action. I got the

distinct impression that I Corps preferred a dead villager

to a live refugee.2'

Although the 9th Marines plan, which in effect was a blueprint of future COUNTY FAIR

operations, was not immediately adopted, Lieutenant

Colonel Ludwig's 1st Battalion tried a similar

operation during GOLDEN FLEECE I. When a

company from the battalion entered a village, all the

people were gathered at a collection point. The

Marines fed them and a Navy corpsman held sick

call, while the village chief checked identity cards and

attempted to identify any VC. Ludwig later admitted

that these sweeps were too ambitious. At times, the

Marines had more than 1,000 people from various

hamlets collected in one location, but they had

neither the time or personnel to properly screen all of

them.22

By the end of year, nevertheless, the 9th Marines

S-2, Captain Charles Ward, and the S-3, Major

Vincente T. Blaz, had improved the COUNTY

FAIR concept to the degree that it was ready to be

implemented on a regular basis in 1966. It would

become a sophisticated procedure, combining civic

action, population control, and psychological

operations. Captain Ward stated: "COUNTY FAIR

operations were distinguished by two features: the

pre-eminence given to the role of the GVN, and the

protraction of the duration of the cordon and search

to surface the hidden enemy.' 23*

Civic Action

All of these battlefield tactics were coordinated

with an ever increasing civic action program, what

General Walt sometimes referred to as the ''Velvet

Glove.''24 Civic action programs were basically

Marine efforts to assuage the effect of the ravages of

war, poverty, and sickness upon the population.

There was more to the concept than just pure

* Lieutenant Colonel Ward remembered that the Hoa Vang

District Chief, who had always found a ready excuse "when

participation of his people was concerned," became much

more cooperative after his wife's vehicle was shot at in late

1965. The chief wanted a sweep of the hamlet from which the

shot was fired and his ''insistence, and his promises of future

cooperation if the Marines would assist him in this action,

finally convinced the 9th Marines that this might be the

opening they 'were seeking.'' LtCol Charles Ward, Comments

on draft MS, dtd 27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

/
PACIFICATION 143

USMC Photo A185777

Navy Lieutenant James R. McMillian, the surgeon for the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, examines a South Vietnamese infant. The child is the 10,000th Vietnamese patient treated by the battalion 's medical team,

benevolence; it was to be used as a weapon. General

Walt and his staff hoped that American civic action

would sever the populace from Viet Cong control and

perhaps induce popular loyalty to the government.

The Marines knew that the entire effort could be

dissipated through lack of direction. In addition to

the Ill MAF civic action program, several U. S.

civilian agencies, * administered by the United

States Operations Mission in Vietnam (USOM),

* These agencies included representatives from AID,

JUSPAO, and CIA.

dispensed American aid throughout South Vietnam.

On 25 August General Walt met with Mr. Marcus J.

Gordon, the regional director of USOM in I Corps.

He suggested that a council be established to

coordinate American participation in the Vietnamese

Rural Construction Program. * * Mr. Gordon agreed

* * The South Vietnamese pacification program changed

names frequently during 1965-1966. The program was originally known as 'rural pacification" until 5 April 1965

when it was changed to ''rural construction.'' In May 1966,

the name was changed again to "revolutionary development.''

These were simply other names for ''pacification.''
144 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

and, on 6 September, the I Corps Joint Coordinating

Council (JCC) came into being. Both Mr. Gordon

and General Walt hoped to bring the South Vietnamese into the council, but only American

representatives attended the first session: Mr.

Gordon; Colonel St. Clair, the Deputy Senior

Advisor to I Corps; and the Ill MAF Civil Affairs

Officer, Major Charles J. Keever.2'

Apparently, the Vietnamese authorities took a

wait-and-see attitude before joining in the council's

deliberations. On 28 September, General Walt

visited General Thi and prevailed upon him to send a

representative to the next council meeting. The I

Corps commander appointed a representative from

his staff to attend the October session, and he became

a permanent member of the JCC.26t

The I Corps JCC soon became the coordinating

hub for "the Vietnamese government's rural

construction plan" in the northern five provinces.

Most of the important work was done by committees;

and by January 1966, six were functioning. These were: public health, education, roads, food

distribution, psychological warfare, and the Port of

Da Nang. In November, General Walt further

underscored the importance of the progress of the

council by appointing Brigadier General Keith B.

McCutcheon, Deputy Commanding General, Ill

MAF as his personal representative. He was subsequently elected chairman of the council. Mr.

Gordon later declared:

The fact that senior officers from all military commands under General Walt . . . Sat together every

Tuesday morning with the Regional Directors of Civilian

Agencies contributed greatly to facilitating coordination.

But to me the most important fact about the JCC was that

''the word went out'' through all command channels.

All commands were working on a seven-day week basis

around the clock. The desire to cooperate was there, but

coordination required special effort. The existence of the

JCC stimulated coordination at all levels.27

During this same period, General Walt also

concentrated on internal coordination of the civic

action program within III MAF. On 29 October, he

changed the designation of his III MAF general staff

*Colonel Keever wrote in his comments: "The Vietnamese military leadership (and MACV for that matter) tended

to overlook the vital importance of the civil side of pacification.

The support of General Thi and GVN military leadership in I

Corps for the so-called people-to-people program was the result

of General Walt's leadership and persuasive powers." Col

Charles J. Keever, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Dec76

(Vietnam Comment File).

G-5 Section from plans and programs to civic action.

More significantly, the new organizational

designation was reflected throughout Ill MAF with

the creation of division and wing G- 5 and regimental

and battalion 5-5 sections.

Ill MAF developed some tentative conclusions. In

October, the Marine command noted that programs

of commodity distribution to the people and medical

and dental care were most successful in reaching

hamlet inhabitants. The emphasis was on shortterm, high-impact, low-cost projects. The Marines

had perceived that long-term projects, which

required continual supervision and large amounts of

material, failed to have the desired effect; the people

did not see any immediate results.28 One of the most

important reasons why the Marines emphasized

short-range activities was the fact that the battalions

just did not have the time to attempt more ambitious

programs. * * The Marines primary tactical duties left

very little time for action in direct support of the local

government or rural construction 29

The Ngu Hanh Son Campaign

and the Frustrations of Pac/icat ion

During the autumn of 1965, the South Vietnamese

revamped their pacification program in I Corps.

Earlier in the year, MACV had urged the South

Vietnamese to prepare new pacification plans in each

corps area based on the HOP TAC campaign in the

Saigon * The idea was for each corps com -

mander to select a critical region and develop plans

for coordinating and focusing both the military and

civilian activities in an intensive pacification campaign in the selected area. At a meeting of South

Vietnamese corps commanders in April, the Joint

General Staff directed them to make such plans. The

following month, at a follow-up meeting, General

Thi, the I Corps commander, declared that his

pacification efforts would be centered in the area

south of Da Nang in Quang Nam Province.30

**There were some exceptions to the above: the 7th Marines

and 4th Marines help in the construction of the ''new life"

village of Chu Lai; the 9th Marines reconstruction effort at

Cam Ne; and the Le My effort in the 3d Marines TAOR. All of

these met with varying degrees of success, depending on the

degree of security the Marines and the local government could

provide. * * * For a description of the HOP TAC program see Chapter
PACIFICATION 145

In October, Lieutenant Colonel Le Trung Tuong,

the Quang Nam Province Chief, developed the Ngu

Hanh Son (Nine Villages) pacification campaign in a

nine-square-mile area of Hoa yang District, south of

the Cau Do River. Tuong divided the objective

area into two sectors, one consisting of a five-village

complex west of Route 1 and the other, a kur-village

complex east of the highway. Taking advantage of

the protective screen afforded by the 9th Marines'

advance south of Da Nang, the province chief

proposed to pacify the western sector by the end of

the year. This area included the villages of Cam Ne,

Duong Son, and Yen Ne where the 9th Marines first

encountered organized VC resistance during July

and August. Lieutenant Colonel Tuong planned to

insert a political action team (PAT) and a Regional

Force company from the 59th Regional Forces

Battalion into each of the five villages of this sec-

* * He then hoped to recruit 1,000 Popular

Forces troops to relieve the RF companies. Tuong

intended to station one PF squad in each hamlet and a

platoon in each village. The 9th Marines was to

coordinate its activities to provide additional security

for the pacification efforts, as well as furnishing some

material resources."

The VC were quick to realize the threat of the new

program, but the enemy also quickly found a

vulnerability. The program for the PFs and the RFs

was too ambitious. PF recruiting policy had not

Lieutenant Colonel Tuong was also Assistant Commander

of the Quang Nam Special Sector, which was established on 1

September 1965, and reported directly to I Corps. As such, he

a med responsibility for rural construction in both Quang

Nam Province and Da Nang Special Sector. The Quang Nam

Speciai Sector, a military command, controlled all ARVN

forces in Quang Nam Province. The authority of the Quang

Nam Special Sector commander often overlapped that of the

Quang Nam province chief, which was one reason why Tuong

was the assistant commander of the special sector as well as

province chief. By combining both responsibilities, he

remained in the chain of command for the military aspects of

pacification, while retaining authority over the political and

administrative functions of the province. * The political action teams were American-trained

pacification cadre. While part of the teams provided limited

security within the hamlets, the other members assisted the

villagers in building up the local economy and meeting

community needs. Colonel Simmons, the III MAF G-3, later

observed that the formation of the 59th Regional Forces

Battalion "actually was an innovation. RF Companies had not

previously been combined into battalions.'' BGen Edwin H.

Simmons, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26Sep76 (Vietnam

Comment File).

USMC Photo A186322

As part of their civic action program, the Marines

provided dental care to the South Vietnamese

villagers. This makeshift dental clinic near Da Nang

is obviously very popular.

showed the hoped-for success. The PFs, the RFs, and

PATs offered lucrative targets; the VC were quick to

take advantage. By the end of November, about 10 to

15 percent of the PAT members had resigned,

fearing reprisals from the VC, forcing the 9th

Marines to increase its involvement in the area to

offset VCgains.

The 9th Marines provided security for nearly a

quarter of the campaign area during December, but

the Viet Cong avoided the Marine-held territory and

continued their offensive against the PFs. During the

last week of the year they halted almost all government progress. On 21 December, the enemy attacked one of the PAT units, killing four of its

members. Later that afternoon, 60 VC, sheltered for

two days by the peasants of Cam Ne and Yen Ne,

struck the 593d RF Company, whose sole mission
146 THE LANDiNG AND THE BUILDUP

was to protect the PATs. The government force

suffered heavy casualties, During the next week, the

VC systematically continued their campaign against

local defense forces. The Marines could do little to

prevent it. The PFs were to provide continuous

security in the hamlets, but events had proved

conclusively that they were incapable of carrying out

their mission. Instead of strengthening their security

forces the Vietnamese authorities changed leaders.

The Ngu Hanh Son Program was allowed to drift

until March 1966.

As early as September, 1965 General Krulak

observed that "the Marines have never felt that the

war stands to be won by the grand maneuvers of large

forces, by brilliant marshalship in the Tannenberg or

Chancellorsville image, ''but rather in the villages.32

The problem, was to provide security in the hamlets,

and, in this, the Marines were not always successful.

On the night of 25 October, a VC terrorist squad

threw a grenade and fired a submachine gun into the

house of Chief Trinh of Hoa Hai Village, the village

chief who had cooperated with Lieutenant Colonel

Ludwig's battalion in GOLDEN FLEECE. The chief

and four of his family were wounded. * General Walt

took the occasion to order all regimental commanders to insure the personal protection of village

and district chiefs in their TAORs.33 This was more

easily said then done. On 24 December, in the

supposedly secure I.e My area, Lieutenant Colonel

Dickey reported that the Viet Cong tortured and

buried alive the assistant chief of Hoa Hiep.34**

* Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig later commented: "we moved

Trinh and his family into a special tent complex in our battalion

CP. The family remained safe, and Trinh 'went to work' each

day in the village. But his intelligence was never as good after

that." Col Verle E. Ludwig, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). * Colonel Clement, who had commanded the 2d Batttalion,

3d Marines in the Le My area, commented: ''It was security

that failed. In the absence of firm security, there will be a VC

intrusion every time." Col David A. Clement, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 5Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

USMC Photo A800917

A South Vietnamese interpreter with a Marine

patrol talks with a South Vietnamese boy. The boy's

father had been killed by the Viet Cong.

The following excerpt from the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines command chronology at Chu Lai graphically

depicts the Marines' frustrations:

12 December: Marines from 3/7 were invited to attend

the celebration . . . After the religious ceremony the

Marines participated at the banquet with the hamlet chief

and elders in the local village of Tn Binh (1).

13 December: A flag raising ceremony was conducted

in the local village of Tn Binh(1). The hamlet chief invited Captain Long, the District Chief, and representatives from 3/7.

24 December: 3/7 Civil Affairs teams conducted a

Christmas party in the local villages of Tn Binh(1) . . 25 December: The CO 3/7 invited the children of the

local villages of An Thien and Tn Binh(1) to attend the

Christmas celebration at the Battalion CP.

31 December: Hamlet chief of Tn Binh(1) was shot and

killed by an unknown assassin. . . The best that could be said for the Ill MAF

pacification effort by the end of 1965 was that the

Marines had realized the problems and had started to

challenge the VC control of the countryside. There

was still much to learn and do.

A
PART IV

SUPPORTING THE TROOPS

CHAPTER 10

Marine Aviation in Vietnam

Deployments—Control of Marine Aviation —Fixed- Wing Operations—

Helicopter Operations—Air Defense Responsibilities

Deployments

The 1965 buildup of Marine aviation in Vietnam

paralleled that of the III MAF ground forces.

Following the landing of the 9th MEB in March, two

Marine fixed-wing squadrons, VMCJ-1 and VMFA531, later relieved by VMFA-513, joined MAG-16

at Da Nang in April. MAG-16 had been, until that

time, the MEB's composite helicopter group. J

May, the wing established its forward headquarters

in Vietnam, and the next month MAG-12 arrived at

the newly built SATS airfield at Chu Lai. On 14 July,

MAG-1 1 headquarters assumed operational control

of the fixed-wing squadrons at Da Nang from MAG16. These now included the photo reconnaissance

* Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, the 1st MAW chief of staff

in the spring of 1965, recalled: ''The arrival of VMFA-531 and

VMCJ-1 marked the end of a long period of planning, coaxirg,

cajoling, begging, and outright pressure to obtain space for

these units to operate Out of Da Nang . . . . During the early

planning stages, high level commands battled in the Pentagon,

CinCPac, and in the Far East over who would conduct air

operations out of Da Nang. Navy and Marine commands

invoked the nebulous authority of Marine Air-Ground task

forces. But these plans were overtaken by events. The Air

Force was there—and, they invoked the military equivalent of

squatters rights . . . they occupied the entire east side of the

airfield. The USAF was extremely unwilling to move around

and vacate more space for the deploying Marine fixed-wing air

units . . . Finally under the weight of plans approved at high

levels, and with Marine deployment dates irrevocably approaching, the Air Force finally gave in. Some promises about

future construction to enlarge their area, commitments of

Marine support of various projects, and a lot of Sweet talk did

the trick." Aircraft facilities remained overcrowded until the

helicopter field at Marble Mountain was opened and the expansion construction of Da Nang Airfield was completed.

O'Connor observed: "The final area occupied by two Marine

fighter squadrons and the VMCJ-1 squadron was of such

restricted size that effective operations were only marginally

possible . . . .The three units were like three peas in a pod, but

they were operational." Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments

on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

squadron, VMCJ-1, and two F-4B Phantom II

squadrons, VMFA-513 and VMFA-542, the latter

squadron having arrived on 11 July. After the

President's 28 July proclamation announcing further

reinforcement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized

the deployment of a second helicopter group, MAG36, and another missile battalion, the 2d LAAM

Battalion. The first elements of the helicopter group

arrived on 31 August. The LAAM battalion

followed 10 days later.

On 2 September, Colonel William G. Johnson, the

MAG-36 commander, established his headquarters

on the Ky Ha peninsula, north of the SATS field,

where construction had begun on a helicopter facility

for the Chu Lai base. When the group arrived, "the

helicopter pad had been fully graded and about one -

third or more of the matting laid.. . " The MAG36 squadrons remained at Da Nang until Ky Ha was

operational. By the end of the month, most of the

MAG-36 units, including HMM-362, HMM-364,

VMO-6, H&MS-36, and MABS-36, were at Ky Ha.

The only exception was HMM-363 which had

relieved a detachment from HMM-161 at Qui Nhon.

The other Marine helicopter group in Vietnam,

MAG-16, also had moved into new facilities. Colonel

Thomas J. O'Connor, who relieved Colonel King as

group commander on 7 August, established his

headquarters at Marble Mountain Air Facility on

Tiensha Peninsula, across the Da Nang River from

the main base. The group's aircraft were operating

from Marble Mountain by the end of August. In

August 1965 MAG-16 consisted of three medium

helicopter squadrons, HMM-261 and -361 at Da

Nang and HMM-161 at Phu Bai with a 10-plane

detachment at Qui Nhon, one observation squadron,

VMO-2, and two support squadrons, MABS-16 and

H&MS-16. In September a six-plane detachment of

Sikorsky CH-37C heavy-lift helicopters from HMH462 was attached to H&MS-16. There was a continuing rotation of helicopter squadrons between

149
150 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

South Vietnam, the Seventh Fleet, and Okinawa, but

no change in the total group strength.

Marine fixed-wing squadrons, as well as the

helicopter units, continued to deploy to Vietnam.

MAG-li, under the command of Colonel Robert F.

Conley and his successor in November, Colonel

Emmett 0. Anglin, Jr., made three more squadron

changes during 1965. On 15 October, VMFA-115

replaced VMFA-513, which rotated back to Japan.

VMFA-323 relieved VMFA-542, which also

returned to Japan on 1 December, and on 19

December, a F-8 Crusader squadron, VMF(AW)-

312, joined MAG-il at Da Nang. Lieutenant

Colonel Richard A. Savage, at the time commanding

VMFA-542, later commented: "These rotations

were used to refurbish and change aircraft and train

new aircrews as overseas tours drew to a close.' '2

MAG-12, under the command of Colonel John

D. Noble, 16 May-18 September, and later Colonel

Leslie E. Brown, 19 September through the end of

the year, operated from the SATS airfield at Chu Lai.

Three A-4 Skyhawk squadrons, VMA-225, VMA311, and VMA-214, made up the aircraft group in

July 1965. A fourth squadron, VMA-211, joined

MAG-12 on 11 October. Although the group

remained at basically the same strength, there was a

rotation of squadrons between Iwakuni and Chu Lai.

The fixed-wing squadrons of MAG-12 engaged in

the rotation program during this period were VMA224 for VMA-225, 30 September-4 October, and

VMA-223 for VMA-311, 14-19 December. At the

end of the year, Brown's group consisted of VMA211, VMA-214, VMA-223, and VMA-224.

By the end of 1965, most of the elements of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing had arrived, although a rear

headquarters remained in Japan. Brigadier General

Marion E. Carl, the assistant wing commander,

arrived at Da Nang on 31 August to assist the wing

commander, Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, who also was Deputy Commanding General,

HI MAF. Colonel Harry W. Taylor assumed

command of the rear headquarters (1st MAW Rear)

at Iwakuni on that date; he still controlled a sizeable

organization. MAG- 13 with three fixed-wing

squadrons remained in Japan, and one helicopter

squadron was on Okinawa. One transport squadron,

VMGR-152, and elements of a second, VMGR-352

(Fwd), with several service and supply elements of

the 1st MAW, also remained under the rear

headquarters' operational control. In addition to

these units, two Marine helicopter squadrons, one

attached to the Seventh Fleet SLF and the other to the

U.S. Army's Field Force Vietnam in II Corps, were

not available to Ill MAF. In spite of these exceptions,

USMC Photo A 184074

Marine F4B Phantoms from VMFA -531 arrive at Da Nang in April 1965. The drag parachute in the foreground

helps to slow the aircraft 's landing rollout.

"Iys.,Is
MARINE AVIATiON 151

USMC Photo A185714

Colonel William G. Johnson, Commandin! Officer, MA G-36, speaks to one of his officers on board the Princeton

(LPH 5). Colonel Johnson is about to establish the newly arrived helicopter group 's headquarters at Ky Ha in the

ChuLi TAOR.

the preponderance of General McCutcheon 's operational units were in South Vietnam supporting

General Walt's ground forces. By December, 9,402

of the 12,655 officers and enlisted men of the 1st

MAW were in South Vietnam.

Control of Marine Aviation

Control of Marine aviation in Vietnam was a very

sensitive issue. Many Marine aviators remembered

their experience in Korea where the 1st MAW had

been under the operational control of the Air Force.

They believed that Marine aircraft had been used

unwisely, at least from a Marine point of view, and

had not furnished the Marine infantry with the close

air support that could have been provided if the

Marine command had retained control of its

aviation . Marine generals were determined not to

allow the Korean experience to repeat itself.

In 1964, when air operations were undertaken over

Laos and North Vietnam, Admiral Sharp authorized

General Westmoreland to designate the senior U. S.

Air Force commander in Vietnam as coordinating

authority, since both Air Force and Navy air units

were participating in these operations. When the

decision was made to land Marines at Da Nang in

1965, it was natural for Admiral Sharp to direct that

a similar arrangement be devised to coordinate the

fixed-wing aviation of the 9th MEB. General Karch

reported directly to ComUSMACV and coordinating

authority was granted to the Air Force component

commander, Major General Joseph H. Moore, for

matters pertaining to tactical air support and air

traffic control.

This emphasis on coordinating authority was

reaffirmed by CinCPac in late March 1965, just

before the assignment of a Marine fighter squadron

to the MEB, General Westmoreland had wanted to

put the Marine F-4 squadron under the operational

control of General Moore, but Admiral Sharp immediately objected and repeated his earlier guidance.4

One month later, Admiral Sharp published a

directive on the conduct and control of close air

support. He stated that close air support was the chief

mission of U.S. aviation in South Vietnam and that

A

'.

—I -

— —

lb
152 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A 184307

A Douglas A-4 Skyhawk from VMA -225 makes the

first landing at the Chu Lai SA TSfield. Colonel John

D. Noble, Commanding Officer, MAG-12, piloted

the aircraft.

top priority was to go to ground troops actually

engaged with the enemy. Sharp maintained that such

support should be directly responsive to the ground

combat units. The directive also noted that "nothing

herein vitiates the prior CinCPac provision that

ComUSMACV's Air Force component command

shall act as coordinating authority for matters

pertaining to tactical air support and air traffic

control in South Vietnam."

After receiving CinCPac 's instruction, General

Westmoreland ordered that a revision be made to his

air support order. The new MACV directive,

published on 13 July 1965, reiterated CinCPac's

appointment of General Moore as the coordinating

authority. In addition, the order charged him with

the responsibility of insuring that coordination was

established between his service and the other allied

commanders. General Walt retained operational

control of Marine aviation, but to insure maximum

use of all aircraft, the III MAF commander was to

notify the 2d Air Division daily of those aircraft

available in excess of his requirements so that additional sorties could be allocated. * Finally, Walt, as

Naval Component Commander, Vietnam, was

charged with preparing joint operating instructions,

in coordination with General Moore, to insure an

integrated air effort.6

Concurrently, with the revision of MACV's air

directive, General McCutcheon met with Major

General Moore to coordinate air efforts as related to

*Colonel Roy C. Gray, Jr., the 1st MAW G-3, commented,

"At the wing G-3 level it was always extremely difficult to

identify those air assets that were in excess of III MAF needs.

Generally both III MAF and the Air Force wanted far more

than the wing could muster.'' Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).

air defense operations. Moore wanted operational

control of all air defense, but McCutcheon pointed

out that the F-4B Phantom II was a dual-purpose

plane, capable of both close air support and air-to-air

defense. To relinquish these aircraft would deprive

the Marine ground commanders of an important

supporting arm.

Nevertheless, General McCutcheon recognized

the necessity of having one overall air defense

commander. After several meetings between the

generals and their staffs, it was decided to publish a

memorandum of agreement to set forth the basic

policies, procedures, and responsibilities. Under this

agreement, the Air Force had overall air defense

responsibility. McCutcheon designated those Marine

forces that would participate in air defense. He

agreed that the U. S. Air Force had the authority to

handle alert aircraft, designate targets, and control

HAWK missile readiness status, including firing

orders. Generals Moore and McCutcheon signed the

document in August 1965.7**

The revised MACV air directive and the

memorandum of agreement provided the basic policy

for command, control, and coordination of Marine

aviation, an arrangement completely satisfactory to

General Walt. These arrangements were to remain

unchanged until 1968, when General Westmoreland

received approval from higher authority to establish a

single management system for tactical air control.

Fixed- Wing Operations

The system of close air support which was em -

ployed by the Marines in South Vietnam in 1965 was

born during the island campaigns of World War II.

Since then, Marine air support doctrine had been

continuously modified to keep pace with technological advances.

Marine attack aircraft were required to fly close air

**Colonel O'Connor recalled that he ''was present at the

key meeting of this series in Da Nang. . . . I observed General

McCutcheon cross swords with General Moore. The Air Force

general used every argument at his command. He appealed

across service lines, as aviator to aviator, enumerating the

advantages of centralized control of aviation in a theater of

operations. But General McCutcheon held his ground. He had

his orders from III MAF and CGFMFPac. He was also buttressed by several policy directives [from] CinCPac Col

Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File).

152
MARINE AVIATION 153

USMC Photo A184866

Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Commander in Chief

Pacific (left), Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon, Commanding General, is! Marine Aircraft

Wing (center), and Major General Walt are seen

inside a Marine helicopter. Admiral Sharp supported

the Marine position on air control.

support missions against enemy troops who were as

close as 15 meters from friendly lines. To reduce the

risk to allied infantry, close air support strikes were

controlled either by a tactical air controller (airborne)

(TAG (A)) in a high performance aircraft; a forward

air controller (airborne) (FAG (A)) in a light spotter

plane or UH-1E gunship; or a forward air controller

(FAG) on the ground. In addition, many of the III

MAF aerial observers (AOs) flying in light observation aircraft were qualified air controllers and

directed air strikes, as well as artillery and naval

gunfire.

The airborne controllers, familiar with the tactical

situation on the ground, remained on station for

extended periods of time. They maintained contact

with the supported infantry unit on a FM tactical

radio net while directing the attack aircraft over a

UHF net. Gommunications for the control of air

support was a flexible arrangement, depending on the

circumstances and ground radio availability.

Frequency-modulated (FM) radios of infantrymen

could not net with ultra-high frequency (UHF) radios

of jet aircraft; usually the UHF radios at the infantry

battalion level were not available for use by the

company or smaller unit commanders in contact with

the enemy. After the controller relayed pertinent

target information and mission requirements to the

attack pilots on station, he then marked the target

with a white phosphorus rocket or a colored smoke

grenade. When he was sure the attack pilot had

properly identified the target, the controller cleared

the pilots to make their firing runs.

At this time, the lead pilot rolled in toward the

smoke marker and dropped his ordnance. Using the

lead pilot's ''hits'' as a reference, the controller

furnished the second plane in the flight with

whatever corrections were necessary and cleared the

second aircraft target run. The same procedure

continued until all of the attack aircraft in the flight,

usually two aircraft per strike, had completed their

missions.

Two basic types of close air support strikes were

flown by Marine aviators in South Vietnam,

preplanned and on-call. The preplanned mission was

a complex process. A Marine battalion commander

would submit a request for fixed-wing aircraft

through his air liaison officer the afternoon before his

battalion was to begin an operation. The request

would go to the direct air support center (DASG) and

to the tactical air direction center (TADG) of the

wing at Da Nang. At this level, all the requests were

assimilated and orders were issued to both MAGs-li

and -12, the fixed-wing groups. The groups then

scheduled flights for the next day and issued mission

requirements to the individual squadrons. This

procedure required approximately 20 hours from the

initial time of request to the delivery of the ordnance

on the target.

On-call missions could be processed and executed

almost instantaneously. These missions were flown

either in support of troops in contact with the enemy,

or against targets of opportunity located by airborne

or ground controllers. In the case of an emergency,

the TADC or DASG could divert in-flight aircraft

from their original missions to a new target. The

TADG could also call upon aircraft which each group

maintained on an around-the-clock alert for just such

contingencies.

Marine air provided this combat support for other
154 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

than Marine units. During the battle of Ba Gia in

June 1965, the A-4s of Colonel Noble's MAG-12

took off on their first night launch from Chu Lai to

provide support for the embattled outpost 20 miles to

the south. For three days, the MAG-12 A-4

Skyhawks and the F-4B Phantom ITs of Da Nangbased VMFA-513 bombed and strafed the enemy

positions around the clock. Four months later, the F4Bs of Colonel Anglin's MAG-il and the A-4s of

Colonel Brown's MAG-12 flew 59 sorties in support

of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops at the Plei Me

outpost, 20 miles southwest of Pleiku in northwestern H Corps. The attack against the outpost

resulted in a major engagement, the Battle of Ta

Drang Valley, in which the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry

Division (Airmobile) killed 1,238 enemy in 12 days.

In the 3d quarter of 1965, the two Marine air

groups flew 4,614 sorties in support of Marine units

and 1,656 sorties for the AR\TN. Six hundred thirtyfive of these sorties in support of the ARVN were

close air support attacks supporting friendly forces

engaged in close combat.8 In the month of

December, in spite of poor flying oonditions, 1st

MAW fixed-wing aircraft still flew 119 close air

support missions for ARVN troops .

Marine attack aircraft performed several other

duties in addition to their primary task of close air

support. Both the F-4Bs and A-4s flew direct air

support missions. Similar in some respects to close

air support, these strikes were not conducted in the

immediate vicinity of friendly lines and did not

require integration with the ground unit's fire

support plan, although coordination did take place at

an echelon of command above that of the maneuver

unit. The aim of the direct air support strikes was to

isolate the enemy from the battlefield and destroy his

troops and support . The two MAGs also played a vital role in

protecting the MAG-36 and -16 helicopters. For a

typical helicopter landing zone preparation, Marine

* Strictly speaking, this definition of direct air support applies

to deep support missions. The Marines used the term direct

support, as defined in the text, to differentiate between interdiction missions and ground support missions. Even so,

Colonel Gray remarked that the distinction between close air

and direct support was at times vague since, ''The powers to be

always wanted missions logged as close air support where

possible to weigh in the right direction when assessing Marine

air support operations." Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on

draft MS, 28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).

USMC Photo A185852

Major General Walt climbs into the back seat of a

Marine F-4B Phantom II jet at Da Nang for a

reconnaissance flight. The aircraft is piloted by

Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Stewart, Commanding

Officer, VMFA -513.

jet aircraft, in coordination with other supporting

arms, would cover the landing area and surrounding

region with bombs, napalm, rockets, and cannon

fire. As the transport helicopters approached the LZ,

armed UH-lEs, acting as escorts, would take over

suppression of light small arms fire. Meanwhile,

Marine fixed-wing close air support aircraft would

orbit overhead, prepared to attack any enemy offering

heavy resistance!°

Besides landing zone preparation, the attack

aircraft from Da Nang and Chu Lai were called upon

to provide armed escort for helicopters. Lieutenant

Colonel Norman G. Ewers, who commanded HMM163 in 1965 and whose squadron developed a close

working relationship with VMFA-531, remarked,

"Some people commented that using F-4s to escort

helos was like driving tacks with a gold plated sledge

hammer. That may be. All I know is that it worked,

and worked very well. "11

While most of the combat strikes of the 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing were flown within South Vietnamese

air space, Marine pilots also crossed the DMZ. On 6

May, Captain Don K. Hanna led a flight of kur F-
MARINE AVIATION 155

USMC Photo A185339

A ground crew member arms the bombs on a Marine

A-4 Skyhawk at Chu Lai. The A-4s could carry up to

3,000 pounds of ordnance

4Bs from VMFA-531 over North Vietnam to

provide antiaircraft suppression fires for a pilot rescue

mission. A USAF RF-101 reconnaissance aircraft

was down. Arriving at the crash site just north of the

DMZ, the Marine pilots joined Air Force F-lOS

pilots attacking NVA antiaircraft gun positions while

the rescue was being completed. This ifight was the

first occasion of Marine aviators conducting a combat

strike in North Vietnam. In the last half of 1965,

Marine F-4Bs flew 87 combat air patrols over North

Vietnam.

On 6 December, the 1st MAW again expanded its

participation in the air war when Marine aircraft

struck enemy infiltration and supply routes in Laos.

These operations, coordinated by the 2d Air

Division, were part of the STEEL TIGER program,

started by the Air Force and Navy in the spring of

1965 to reduce the enemy flow of men and material

through southern Laos. From 6-31 December,

MAG-li aircraft flew 140 sorties and MAG-12

planes flew 159 sorties over the Laotian panhandle 12

As Marine fixed-wing operations increased, a new

problem appeared with the onset of the monsoon

season. This was especially true at Chu lai, where

the SATS field had to undergo extensive renovation

which reduced the runway there to 4,500 feet for

periods of time. Normally, this was enough room for

operations when using jet-assisted takeoff and

mobile-arresting gear for takeoffs and landings, but

the monsoon weather made landing and takeoff

conditions at the base marginal. Low ceilings, high

winds, and heavy rains from 25-27 November caused

all missions to be cancelled.'3 Fortunately, Ill MAF

was able to use the TPQ-10 radar to guide the

Phantoms and Skyhawks to their targets once the

planes were airborne in spite of the bad weather.

Although the number of missions flown increased in

December, over 600 scheduled sorties were cancelled

because of poor flying conditions.'4

There were other frustrations for the Marine pilots

beside the monsoon weather. During a one-week

period in October, MAG-il suspended all flights

because salt water accidentally mixed with the

group's fuel supply, but the largest problem for the

Marine aviators was aviation ordnance. No missions

were cancelled because of lack of munitions, but the

pilots were not always able to use the type of ordnance best suited for a specific target. To preserve

scarce munitions, 1st MAW policy stated:

only ordnance required to destroy the target would be

expended, and all remaining ordnance would be returned

unless doing so constituted a hazard, as is the case in

landing into the arresting gear at Chu Lai with napalm

15* tanks.

In 1965, there were three occasions of operational

aircraft loss, resulting in the death of Marine

aviators. Two crashes occurred on the same day, 26

October, when two F-4Bs returning from a combat

mission crashed into the side of Monkey Mountain.

One of the Phantoms had reported engine trouble

before the crash. Both crews of the two aircraft were

killed.16 The third incident occurred on 29 December

south of Chu Lai. An A-4fromVMA-211, piloted by

1st Lieutenant Thomas F. Eldridge, was escorting a

flight of helicopters attempting to resupply a besieged

South Vietnamese district headquarters. As the

helicopters approached, the enemy opened fire with

three heavy machine guns. The Marine lieutenant

* Colonel Gray wrote: ''1st MAW policy did state that only

ordnance required would be expended and the remainder of the

load returned to base. Statistics to bear on this would be impossible to obtain, but from experience if on a mission there

was anything to bomb 'at' the ordnance would be expended

many times in the interest of practice. I don't think we really

brought home nearly as much as we might have wanted people

to think." Col Roy C. Gray, Comments on draft MS, dtd

28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File). The Office of Air Force

History in its comments observed: ''During 1964-65, MACV

rules severely curtailed a pilot's choice of alternative targets;

established certain free-drop zones; and required [pilots] to

jettison all ordnance in designated jettison areas before landing

for safety reasons Office of Air Force History, Fact

Sheet: Expenditure of Ordnance, Jan 77 (Vietnam Comment

File).

:;; ,'
156 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A701478

An aerial view of the Chu I.ai SA TSfield showing the A-4s of MAG-12 parked between temporary revetments.

The SA TS runway was reduced to 4,500feetforperiods of time in November and December.

rolled in on the enemy machine gunners in spite of

fast approaching darkness and poor weather. Eldridge

succeeded in dropping his napalm, but his aircraft

was hit and he was wounded in the leg. The wounded

Marine nursed his A-4 toward Chu Lai, but it

crashed 13 miles from the field. Eldridge was killed.17

A significant contribution of Marine fixed-wing air

support during 1965 was the performance of Marine

Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1. This jet

aircraft unit performed the missions of electronic and

photo reconnaissance and electronic countermeasure

operations. Flying the Douglas EF-1OB, affectionately called ''Willie the Whale,'' the pilots of

the squadron provided electronic countermeasure

(ECM) and electronic intelligence (EUNT) support

under the code name FOGBOUND for the 2d Air

Division's and Navy Task Force 77's (carrier task

krce) ROLLING THUNDER missions over North

.4

4The EF-1OB was a modified version of the Navy F3D

Skynight, a two-engine jet night-fighter aircraft first built in

1956.

The primary purpose of these flights was to

identify and jam enemy fire control radars. During

1965, the VMCJ-1 ''Whales'' flew 791 sorties in

support of strikes over North Vietnam and Laos.'8

Photo reconnaissance missions were flown in

Chance-Vought RF-8As, the photoplane version of

the Crusader fighter. In this role, the pilots of

VCMJ-1 supported III MAF, as well as the Navy and

Air Force, by supplying aerial photos which pinpointed targets in South Vietnam, Laos, and North

Vietnam.444

44The Crusader was a swept-wing, single-jet fighter, first

built in 1958.

4Lieutenant Colonel Otis W. Corman, the squadron

commander, later wrote: "During May and June the EF-1OB

were operated at 300 percent of normal utilization. Due to the

limited total of EF-1OB resources (both aircraft and spare parts)

General McCutcheon directed that the utilization rate be

limited to 200 percent or 60 hours per month per plane. To

achieve this, a 1st MAW liaison officer was assigned to

MACV's electronic warfare coordinating authority and

VMCJ-1 was tasked to support Air Force and Navy operations

in only high threat areas; i.e. strikes inside the SA-2 missile

envelope complex.'' Col Otis W. Corman, Comments on draft

MS, dtd [Nov 75J (Vietnam Comment File).

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MARINE AVIATION 157

USMC Photo A421519

An F8E Crusader is shown at the Da Nang Airbase with all the armament it is capable of carrying. In 1965, one

Crusader squadron, VMF(A W)-312, operated from Da Nang, while VMF(A W)-212 was stationed on the attack

carrier USS Oriskany (CVA 34).

Another fixed-wing component of the 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing which performed yeoman service was

the Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152

(VMGR-152). This squadron, reinforced with

aircraft from VMGR-353, was based at the Marine

Air Station, Futema, Okinawa, but maintained a

detachment, usually four aircraft, at Da Nang. The

Lockheed KC-1 30 Hercules aircraft of the squadron

orbited over the South China Sea to provide a ready

fuel supply to American aircraft.* The presence

of these flying fuel tanks was especially valuable

during the monsoon season when pilots had to take

into consideration that their home field might be

closed because of weather. The KC-130s also were

used extensively for resupply within South Vietnam

and for shuttling personnel and material between

South Vietnam, Japan, and Okinawa. Additionally,

* Colonel John D. Noble, who commanded MAG-12

until 19 September, remarked in his comments that the KC130s "provided in-flight fueling to MAG-12 A-4s during most,

if not all, of June 1965 while the strip was under construction.

In order to carry the optimum ordnance loads from the short

operating length of the strip and not disrupt the Seabees' efforts

down field at every launch, all A-4 takeoffs were made with

light fuel loads. One or more KC-130s would orbit over the

field to top off the A-4s with fuel to give them the range and/or

endurance needed for their missions." Col John D. Noble,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

the aircraft furnished an important service to the

Marine ground units by providing illumination in

numerous flare drop missions.

During 1965, one Marine fixed-wing squadron,

VMF(AW)-212, participated in the Navy's air war

over both North and South Vietnam. VMF(AW)-

212, as one of the five squadrons of Attack Carrier

Wing 16 (CVW-16), flew combat air strikes for seven

months from the attack carrier USS Oriskany (CVA

34). On 27 January 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Charles

H. Ludden led his squadron from the Marine Corps

Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii to San Diego,

California where it embarked on board the Oriskany.

The squadron, with 12 Ling-Temco-Vought F-8E

Crusader jet fighters, boarded the carrier with a

complement of 22 officers, of whom 16 were pilots,

and 173 enlisted men.

After a two-month training period, Oriskany

sailed from San Diego on 5 April, arriving off the

Vietnamese coast on 8 May. That same day, the

pilots of VMF(AW)-212 exchanged their peacetime

orange flight suits for green combat clothing and

then flew their first combat missions. Their first

strikes over South Vietnam ranged from the Mekong

Delta to northern II CTZ. Controlled by U. S. Air

Force tactical air controllers (airborne), the

"Lancers," as 212 was known, struck enemy troops

and supply areas with 5-inch Zuni rockets and 20mm

—-—
158 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

cannon fire; the F-8s were not equipped to carry

bombs.

Two days later, Oriskany sailed northward to a

position 70 miles off Da Nang known as YANKEE

STATION. That day, the 212 pilots flew their first

suppression escort for U.S. Navy A-4s of CVW-16

attacking targets south of Hanoi. By 11 June, the F8Es had been modified. After that date VMF(AW)-

212 was capable of carrying MK82 (570 pound),

MK83 (983 pound), MK84 (1,970 pound), and

MK79 (napalm) bombs. Interestingly, some of the

pilots had never trained for dropping bombs with the

F-8s and consequently their first bomb drops were

made in combat.

The Oriskany rotated between YANKEE and

DIXIE STATION, established 16 May 100 miles

southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, with brief visits to the

Philippines for the next seven months. During that

USMC Photo A42282

A helicopter from HMM-361 lands troops from the

2d Battalion, 3d Marines under flare light in

Operation MIDNIGHT. This was the first night

helicopter assault for the Marine air/ground team in

Vietnam.

time, Ludden's squadron was credited with flying

3,018 combat hours and 1,588 combat sorties; 1,058

hours and 595 missions were flown over South

Vietnam. Crusaders of the unit were battle damaged

on 26 separate occasions; on 5 November one F-8E

was lost to enemy ground fire.

When the squadron struck the Hai Duong rail and

highway bridge on 5 November 30 miles east of

Hanoi, enemy antiaircraft fire hit Captain Harlan P.

Chapman's plane. Forced to eject, Chapman

parachuted safely but was captured immediately.

Chapman was awarded the Distinguished Flying

Cross for the mission and was promoted to lieutenant

colonel while a prisoner-of-war. He was repatriated

to the United States by the North Vietnamese on 12

February 1973. Captain Chapman commented that

the CVW-16 commander, Commander James B.

Stockdale, USN, had been shot down in September

1965 and that "Lieutenant Colonel Ludden as the

senior squadron commander took command of

CVW-16 for about two months, making him one of

the few Marines to command a CVW. ''19

In November, Oriskany completed its WestPac

deployment and sailed for the United States. Fifteen

days later on 10 December, Ludden led his Crusaders

back to MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, while the rest of the

squadron unloaded at Pearl Harbor. VMF(AW)-212

transferred to the control of the 1st Marine Brigade

from CVW-16.

Helicopter Operations

A Marine helicopter squadron had been operating

in Vietnam since 1962. The Marine UH-34s furnished the South Vietnamese with mobility and

logistical support. To the individual Marine infantryman in 1965, the helicopter was the vehicle

which carried him into battle, provided him with

rations, ammunition, and even close air support, and

carried him Out of battle, dead or alive.

During the July-December period, Marine

aviators and ground commanders experimented with

new helicopter tactics. One of the more innovative of

these experiments occurred on the night of 12

August 1965. Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd F. Childers'

HMM-361 and Lieutenant Colonel Clement's 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines tried their experiment in an

area 10 miles northwest of Da Nang known as

Elephant Valley, a narrow river plain between some

of the steepest mountains in I CTZ.

IL
MARINE AVIATION 159

USMC Photo A185722

Marines carry a wounded Marine to an evacuation helicopter. A Navy Corpsman (at left without helmet) helps to

lift the stretcher.

One week before the operation, appropriately

labeled Operation MIDNIGHT, Major Marc A.

Moore, Qement's S-3, approached Childers about

the feasibility of conducting a night heliborne

operation in the valley. The battalion had received

information that approximately 50 VC entered the

villages in the valley after dark and left the next

morning before dawn. The squadron commander

studied the problem and decided it was possible for

his helicopters to carry out the mission, under

favorable weather and moonlight conditions.

The battalion and squadron staffs then worked out

the details. They planned for artillery preparation of

the landing zone, after which the helicopters would

land the troops under the light of flares dropped by

Air Force C-123 Providers. A Navy gunfire ship,

lying offshore, was to fire star shells to provide wind

drift data for the Air Force flare drop. By 12 August,

preparations were complete and Lieutenant Colonel

Childers told his pilots at the preflight briefing:

"You have the dubious distinction of being the first

men to fly a nightime combat helicopter strike.''20t

To ensure surprise, the nights before the actual

landing Marine artillery and the Navy gunfire ship

fired missions in the same general area and at the

same hour as the proposed landing. The night of 12

August, the artillery slightly increased the intensity

of its fire for the landing zone preparation and the

* This was an overstatement. HMM-362, under Lieutenant

Colonel Archie J. Clapp, had helililted ARVN forces in a night

assault on the Plain of Reeds in the Mekong Delta in 1962. See

Whitlow, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64, Chapter 5.

MajGen William R. Quinn observed that HMR-161 'made

the first tactical airlift at night in Korea.'' MajGen William R.

Quinn, Comments on draft MS, dtd 30Sep76 (Vietnam

Comment File). Night helicopter medical evacuation flights by

VMO-6 were almost routine in the last year of the Korean

War, one reason the squadron was awarded a Presidential Unit

Citation.

__.,_ -C
160 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

now we have a springboard to concentrate on the full

potential of night assaults. ''21

In October, helicopters from Colonel Johnson's

MAG-36 and ground troops from Lieutenant Colonel

Bodley's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines furnished

another example of tactical experimentation during

Operation HERCULES. Twenty-six UH-34Ds carried 697 troops of the battalion into the action after

Marine fixed-wing aircraft had prepared the landing

zones. Four of the troop-laden helicopters did not

land, they orbited the objective kr two hours,

providing a mobile ready reserve force for instant

support, if and when necessary.22"4

During the same period, on 24 October,

Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd J. Childers' HMM-361

brought out two Marine reconnaissance companies

from the rugged country west of Da Nang, known as

USMC Photo A422610

Marine helicopters carry diverse cargoes while

resupplying ARVN outposts. Iivesto.:k such as

geese, ducks, and chickens were often ''passengers.

Navy ship fired star shells. Escorted by four UH-1E

gunships from VMO-2, Lieutenant Colonel Childers

led his flight of 20 UH-34Ds, 14 from his squadron

and 6 from HMM-261, to the objective area. As the

helicopters flew through a pass in a ridgeline west of

the landing zone, the artillery shifted its fires to the

north and east and flare planes began dropping their

loads. The UH-34s landed safely and disembarked

Company H and a platoon from Company F without

incident. Four waves of helicopters landed within 28

minutes and the Marine infantry moved to encircle

the Viet Cong. Most of the enemy managed to elude

the Marines; Clement's troops killed two VC and

detained 30 suspects. Despite the small returns in

terms of enemy casualties, the Marines did prove the

practicality of night helicopter assaults. Colonel

Leslie E. Brown, the operations officer of the wing,

concluded: "We've still got to study night lifts, but

"Major Marc A. Moore, the operations officer of the 2d

Battalion, remarked that, "The VC were surprised, but many

had time to go underground before a detailed search could be

made at daylight. Results would have been more complete if the

assault units had been permitted to maintain their cordon and

conduct a detailed 48-hour search; the only method to obtain

extensive results in a VC controlled village. Instead the assault

force was ordered to sweep the valley to the west soon after

daylight, enabling those VC driven underground to slip into

the mountains to the north and south." According to Moore,

the detainees reported that "villagers and VC alike were not

aware of the landing'' until after the helicopters began lifting

off after the troops had disembarked. BGen Marc A. Moore,

Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov] 76 (Vietnam Comment

File). * * This is the first time these tactics had been employed by

the Marine air-ground team, but Marine helicopters carried

ARVN EAGLE and TIGER FLIGHTS as early as 1962.

EAGLE FLIGHTS of Marine UH-34Ds loaded with ARVN

soldiers orbited the ground operational area as a ready reaction

force, should contact be made with the enemy. TIGER

FLIGHTS differed in that the ARVN reaction force was not

airborne, but was positioned at a designated pickup zone, ready

for immediate airlift, should the tactical situations so dictate.

At Da Nang in January 1966, the 9th Marines and MAG-16

devised a tactical arrangement termed SPARROW HAWK for

which each battalion of the regiment maintained a squad-sized

force at a special landing zone as a reaction force. When the

decision to commit this force was made, UH-34Ds and UH-1E

gunships on strip alert at Marble Mountain Air Facility flew to

the LZ, picked up the squad, and transported it to the area of

contact. Employment of SPARROW HAWK differed from the

TIGER FLIGHTS as the Marines used the squads as separate

maneuver elements and not as reinforcements. Whitlow,

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Chapter 5, and CO, 9th Marines ltr

to CMC, dtd 4Jul66, Subj: Updating of "A Brief History of the

9th Marines.''
MARINE AVIATION 161

"Happy Valley" in what Colonel O'Connor, the

MAG-16 commander called, "one of the most

death-defying feats I've ever seen in aviation.''

According to O'Connor, who was Childers' co-pilot

kr the mission, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had

completed its operation and wanted to be picked up

on a ridge, south of Happy Valley:

The ridge was pretty well covered with timber and

foliage. The ground troops had picked Out a landing zone

that was relatively unobstructed. However the zone had a

45 degree slope and could handle only one aircraft at a

time. We approached in flights of three, and two aircraft

went in to pick up the troops. Approaching the zone,

pilots went in under overhanging trees and hovered on

the slope while troops clambored aboard. We took a

maximum of five or six each trip, depending on the

weight of the troops and the age of the helicopter engine.

The whole force of two companies was extracted one

helicopter load at a time, as each aircraft penetrated to the

slope, and then sneaked out to the valley through

overhanging foliage.23*

Marine helicopter support was not limited to

Marine operations. Both MAGs ferried South

Vietnamese troops into battle and resupplied both

ARVN and US Special Forces outposts in the I Corps

Tactical Zone. MAG-16's record of air operations

for September 1965 provides a sample of the support

furnished to both Marines and allied forces: its

helicopters flew 15,245 sorties, carried 23,991

passengers, hauled 2,504,663 pounds of cargo, and

evacuated 410 wounded troops.24

At Qui Nhon, the Marine helicopter detachment,

later replaced by a complete Marine helicopter

squadron, flew in support of both South Vietnamese

units and U.S. Army troops, as well as the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines. In one operation,

GIBRALTAR, seven of the aircraft from the HMM161 detachment helped helilift the 1st Brigade, 101st

Airborne Division into a suspected enemy base area

near An Khe on 19 September. First Lieutenant Gary

W. Parker, a member of HMM-161, recalled that the

first lift went without incident:

And I remembered thinking to myself that this looked

like another cake walk; however, on the second wave we

started receiving automatic weapons fire which was

extremely accurate and soon took its toll on all the

helicopters, both Army and Marine Corps. In a very

short time the air was full of chatter from the pilots

reporting hits upon their aircraft and the locations of the

enemy gun emplacements. . . . it became quite obvious

See Chapter 11 for an account of the reconnaissance

operation.

USMC Photo A186125

A Marine CH-37 heavy helicopter lifts a damaged

UH-34 helicopter from a combat zone. Ground

crewmen dismantled the damaged aircraft so it could

be carried back to Da Nang.

that we had landed in the middle of a fairly large and well

armed enemy force; more firepower was needed

All seven of the Marine aircraft sustained battle

damage. One aircraft was downed, but its crew was

rescued by another helicopter. The downed craft was

recovered the following day. The Marines counted

57 bullet holes in the seven UH-34s and Parker later

wrote: ''We all felt that we had been very lucky that

day.' 26*

The intensity of helicopter operations naturally

caused maintenance problems. By August the UH34s had exceeded planned flying hours and had to be

overhauled four to six months earlier than they

would have been under normal operating conditions.

* *During Operation GIBRALTAR, the 101st Brigade

aborted the helilift after two companies of one battalion had

been helilifted into the objective area. Another force of U. S.

troops and ARVN rangers was helilifted into another landing

zone 1,500 meters to the east and linked up with the two

stranded companies the next day. The allies kiiled 226 VC and

captured nine while sustaining losses of 13 dead and 44

wounded. MACVComdHist, 1965, p. 167.

• I
162 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A422611

A HA WK missile is seen lifting off during a firing exercise near Chu Lai. During the exercise, the LAAM battalions fired at propeller-driven drones, jet drones, and targets towed by F-8 aircraft.

The arrival of MAG-36 in September helped to

relieve the burden, but the helicopters in both groups

still remained extremely active. The UH-34, in

service since 1957, could carry no more than five to

eight Marines in the heat, humidity, and high

altitudes of much of! Corps. Moreover, the 34s had a

cargo capacity of only 1,500 to 2,000 pounds, but

these medium helicopters succeeded in getting the

job done. A Ill MAF press release furnished a vivid

description of the accomplishments of the UH-34:

These Marine copters have been overloaded and flown.

They've been punctured more than arms in a sickbay,

and flown. They've coughed, sputtered, and smoked, and

still they've flown. They've landed in water, on mountainsides, through elephant grass, in ditches, on

beaches, and in hedgerows . . . and have taken off again

after debarking assault troops or picking up wounded •27

Air Defense Responsibilities

Even though it was not likely that the North

Vietnamese would launch an airstrike against South

Vietnam, the possibility could not be ignored. * An

enemy air attack could have caused tremendous

damage, especially at the large facilities at Da Nang

and Chu Lai. To meet the threat of any enemy air

The Office of Air Force History observed that as of March

1965, the North Vietnamese Air Force had 35 MIG-15s and

17s. By May, the North Vietnamese had a total of 63 MIG-15s

and -17s. All of these aircraft were based at Phu Yen airfield

near Hanoi. In May, the first three IL-28 Beagle bombers

arrived at Phu Yen and by early June totaled eight. These

totals remained the same for the rest of 1965. Office of Air

Force History, Fact Sheet: North Vietnamese Air Force in

1965, dtd Jan77 (Vietnam Comment File).

I

-. I.. - .."s, S. - —
MARINE AVIATION 163

action, four Marine F-4Bs were on alert around the

clock, and two Marine light antiaircraft missile

battalions, the 1st and 2d, armed with HAWK

surface-to-air missiles, were deployed at Da Nang

and Chu Lai respectively.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force

(CinCPacAF) was responsible for all air defense in

mainland Southeast Asia. He exercised this

responsibility through General Moore, Commanding

General, 2d Air Division, who was the Mainland

Southeast Asia Air Defense Regional Commander.

General Walt, the Naval Component Commander

Vietnam, acknowledged this Air Force responsibility in the joint memorandum of agreement

signed by his deputy, General McCutcheon, and

Moore in August.

The air threat from the north never materialized

and the LAAM battalions were not called upon to

fire their missiles in anger, yet, Colonel George G.

Inng remembered:

My main concern as executive officer and [then]

commanding officer of the 1st LAAM Battalion . . . was

that we would not be granted firing permission early

enough on an initial raid to provide the air defense

needed. Often there were occasions . . . when unidentified radar tracks were observed at various altitudes

inbound to the Da Nang complex from North Vietnamese

airspace and after repeated failures at identification they

would arrive at the airfield. . . . In every case the CRC

[the Air Force Control and Reporting Center] on Monkey

Mountain suspected they were friendly and "hold fire''

conditions were maintained up to their actual arrival over

the field. The LAAM Battalion early warning radars

would, as a matter of normal course, acquire these tracks

and perform lock-on with the illumination radars. Many

of these flights were tracked with the illuminators out to

110 kilometers and at altitudes below 5,000 feet.28

During 1965, the two LAAM battalions conducted numerous training exercises and, during the

first week of December, both battalions held their

first firing exercise on an island north of the Ky Ha

Peninsula. The exercise was extremely realistic using

a combination of targets: propeller-driven drones, jet

drones, and targets towed by F-S aircraft. Colonel

Edward F. Penico, who then commanded the 2d

LAAM Battalion, recalled:

This shoot was the only time that a target towed by

piloted aircraft was fired at by a HAWK battery. The

computer simulations said it could not be done. The

skipper of the target squadron was confident enough that

he flew the plane himself. •29

though the firing barter ies performed well, 11 of

the first 18 missiles failed to function for one reason

or another. They were old HAWKS,and doubts

lingered about the reliability of the missile stocks.so*

Colonel Long remarked that the problems with the

'shoot . . . are attributable to the lot of the missiles used and

should not be considered as an air deficiency.'' Col George G.

Long, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 11

Fire Support and Reconnaissance

Artillery Support—Naval Gunfire—Other Ground Combat Support —Marine Reconnaissance—

1st Force Reconnaissance Company, The Early Days— 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, Opening

Moves—Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged

Artillery Support

Marine artillery units arrived in Vietnam

piecemeal. By mid-July, Colonel William P. Pala had

established the 12th Marines headquarters, the

artillery regiment of the 3d Marine Division, at Da

Nang.' His 1st and 2d Battalions were at Da Nang,

but under the operational control of the infantry

regiments they supported, the 3d and 9th Marines,

respectively. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines had

two 105mm batteries at Da Nang, D and E, while its

third battery, F, remained on Okinawa. Two of the

1st Battalion's 105mm batteries, A and B, were at

Da Nang and its Battery C was attached to the 3d

Battalion, 12th Marines at Chu Lai.

At Phu Bai, the headquarters of the 4th Battalion,

12th Marines, which also arrived in July, took

control of the artillery units there. These were one of

its 155mm howitzer batteries, Battery M; a 105mm

battery, Battery I, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines; and

the mortar battery from the 2d Battalion, 12th

*A Marine division had a variety of available artillery

support. Its artillery regiment consisted of three direct support

and one general support battalions. The three direct support

battalions, the 1st, 2d, and 3d, contained three batteries, each

with six M1O1AI 105mm towed howitzers (range 11,300

meters), and one battery of six 107mm howtars (range 5,600

meters), a 4.2-inch mortar tube mounted on the frame of the

old 75mm pack howitzer. The 4th Battalion, the general

support battalion, had three batteries, each equipped with six

155mm howitzers (range 14,600 meters). In 1965, M-109 selfpropelled 155mm howitzers were being phased in to replace the

older M114A towed howitzers. The 4th Battalion, 12th

Marines deployed to Vietnam with two batteries equipped with

self-propelled howitzers and one towed battery. In Vietnam,

the Marines found they had a use for both weapons. The heavy,

tracked M1O9SP was largely road bound, while the lighter

towed howitzer could be moved either by truck or by

helicopter.

164

Marines. On 16 September, Battery M received six

of the newer M-109 155mm self-propelled howitzers

and its older M-114A towed pieces were then

distributed throughout the artillery battalion.

Headquarters Battery and Batteries I and M each

manned two of the towed 155s. Lieutenant Colonel

Sumner A. Vale later remarked:

seldom if ever has an infantry battalion commander

had so much artillery support under his control as did

Taylor, I, and then Hanifin . . . We had the 105 battery

within the BLT organization, [the equivalent of] two

batteries of 155 howitzers, one towed and one selfpropelled, and a battery of howtars . . . . These 24 artillery pieces compensated, in part, that 3/4 had only 3

rifle companies, one being stationed in the Da Nang area.'

The reinforced 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, under

the operational control of the 4th Marines, provided

the artillery support for the Chu Lai TAOR. It included three 105mm batteries, C, G, and H, its

107mm mortar battery, the 1st Platoon, 1st 8-inch

Howitzer Battery (SP), and Battery K from the 4th

Battalion, 12th Marines equipped with 155mm

howitzers.

The 12th Marines headquarters assumed direct

control of the two general support batteries at Da

Nang. These units were Battery L of 155mm

howitzers from the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines and

two platoons of the Force Troops 1st 8-inch Howitzer

Battery (SP).

As the buildup continued, General Walt made

further changes in his artillery dispositions. Battery

F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, arriving from

Okinawa, joined its parent battalion at Da Nang. In

August, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines and the

Force Troops 3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP) arrived,

reinforcing the artillery at Chu Lai. General Karch,

the assistant division commander and Chu Lai

coordinator, placed all of the Chu Lai artillery in a

battalion group commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 165

Leslie L. Page, the commander of the 3d Battalion,

12th Marines and senior artillery officer at the base.

The 3d Battalion, 11th Marines provided direct

support for the 7th Marines with two 105mm batteries, G and I, and 15 5mm howitzer Battery M, 4th

Battalion, 11th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Page

attached the 3d 155mm Gun Battery to his 3d

Battalion, which provided direct support for the 4th

Marines and general support for the entire TAOR.

At Da Nang, General Walt returned operational

control of the 1st and 2d Battalions to the 12th

Marines on 1 September. The command structure of

the artillery units remained unchanged through the

end of the year, but batteries continued to be attached

and detached 2

Coordination of artillery fire, particularly in the

densely populated Da Nang TAOR, was a constant

source of concern to the artillery commanders and

their staffs. Lieutenant Colonel Jack K. Knocke,

whose 2d Battalion, 12th Marines supported the 9th

Marines, reported in July that "dearance to fire

became a critical factor in the timely delivery of

fires.'' Artillerymen had to obtain clearances to fire

from the Marine fire support coordination centers*

(FSCC) at battalion, regimental, and division level

and the South Vietnamese district headquarters as

well .

The reduced responsiveness of Marine artillery

was a prime topic of discussion in September. The 3d

Marine division FSCC, the responsibility of Colonel

James M. Callender's 12th Marines,* * reported that

working relations with the South Vietnamese

southern sector were extremely cumbersome. The

Marines remarked that slow processing of fire

clearance requests by the South Vietnamese resulted

in excessive loss of time, except in the case of

emergency requests. The ARVN had no centralized

coordination center and only one or two senior officers possessed the authority to grant clearance for

the Americans to shoot. To improve the situation,

* A FSCC is a single location in which are centralized

communication facilities and personnel to effect the coordination of all types of fire support. * * Colonel Callender became 12th Marines commander on 30

July. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel Pala was sent to Qui

Nhon as the senior Marine officer in the area to coordinate

activities with the U.S. Army command there. Lieutenant

Colonel Walter E. Stuenkel was acting commander of the

regiment from 15-30 July. See Col William P. Pala, Comments

on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

USMC Photo A 184062

Marines from the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines clean

their 1 05mm howitzer in newly established positions

at the Da Nang Airbase in March. The Marines have

emplaced the camouflaged netting under standing

operating procedures, not because of a North

Vietnamese air threat.

General Walt ordered his staff to establish more

positive fire support liaison with the ARVN.4

During the next few months, cooperation between

the 3d Division FSCC and the South Vietnamese

military authorities in southern Quang Nam

Province gradually improved. In October, the South

Vietnamese granted the Marines additional free fire

zones in both the northern and southern portions of

the Da Nang TAOR. * * * Although South Vietnamese clearance still remained slow in the southern

sector, the American advisors at Hoi An, in

cooperation with the 3d Marine Division FSCC,

exerted pressure to improve the situation. By

November the division fire support center reported

that communications with South Vietnamese officials had improved to the extent that in addition to

supporting Marine units, division artillery frequently

delivered fire in support of ARVN forces in the

southern sector. The expansion of the 9th Marines

TAOR in November caused a few problems. Some

PF and ARVN units were operating in a portion of

the new sector, but these difficulties were easily

resolved.'

* * * In free fire zones, all targets were considered to be

hostile, so Marine batteries did not have to obtain South

Vietnamese clearance before firing.
166 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Coordination with the South Vietnamese was not

the only concern of the Marine artillerymen. They

also had to worry about low-flying aircraft due to the

proximity of major airbases. The intensity of both air

operations and artillery fire in the air space above the

TAOR presented problems which demanded

solution.

The doctrine limiting helicopters to designated

routes proved to be too restrictive for both artillery

supporting fires and helicopter operations because of

the ever increasing volume of helicopter traffic in the

TAORs. To alleviate the situation, the wing and the

12th Marines worked out a more flexible policy. The

new system provided the pilots with the location of

which areas were ''hot" and which were "safe." It

enabled the aviators to plan their flights accordingly.

If the pilot had to fly into a "hot" area, he would

receive additional information which enabled him to

avoid impact areas and firing positions. The plan

operated as follows:

The pilot reports in to the Direct Air Support Center

upon becoming airborne, the DASC gives the pilot the

firing and gun positions which are ''hot,'' with times of

firing, if applicable. The pilot can then proceed

throughout the remaining (safe) portions of the TAOR

without restrictions. If the pilot is required to proceed

through a "hot" area, the DASC will provide him with

fixes to allow the helicopter to proceed within "hot"

areas with maximum safety.6

This method of coordinating air and artillery fire

allowed the Marines to employ artillery more extensively. Artillery missions fired in September show

the degree of Marine artillerymen's support of III

MAF infantry operations:

Observed combat missions 650

Unobserved call fires 439

USMC Photo A185923

Marine gunners from the 12th Marines fire off a round from a 4.2-inch mortar. The Marine Corps in 1965 was

replacing its howtars (a mortar tube mounted on a 75mm howitzer frame) with the 4.2-inch mortars in the artillery mortar batteries.

— \

I- ."... _•t-

•1

-

WI'-

IA
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 167

Harassment and interdiction missions 6,448

Registrations 125

Destruction missions 4

The artillery expended over 35,800 rounds of ammunition to complete these missions.7

By December, the 12th Marines was firing over

45,000 rounds a month; 6,000 were fired in support

of Task Force DELTA in Operation HARVEST

MOON.8 The 12th Marines achieved this fire

support increase in spite of an ammunition shortage.

During December, the regiment found it necessary

to restrict 155mm howitzer firing to targets of opportunity.9 No infantry unit was refused support

because of the lack of ammunition, but the artillerymen were not always able to use the caliber,

type of shell, or fuse best suited for a specific target.

These restrictions were temporary; the supply

situation would improve during the next few months.

Naval Gunfire

Complementing Marine shore-based artillery,

naval gunfire support provided another important

weapon to General Walt's forces. The Marines

expressed their appreciation of naval gunfire in the

following terms:

The current deployment of Marine Corps forces is based upon the sea, with the overwhelming majority

within range of naval gunfire support. Naval gunfire is one of the means whereby the material superiority of the

United States can be brought to bear against Communist

manpower. 10 The first agreement to employ U.S. naval

gunfire against targets in South Vietnam was made in

April 1965. On the 17th, the South Vietnamese

informed Ambassador Taylor that they agreed in

principle with the United States that naval gunfire

should be used to support anti-sea infiltration efforts

and ground operations of both South Vietnamese

and American forces. At that time, Admiral Sharp

ordered ComUSMACV and CinCPacFlt to submit

plans for the employment of this supporting arm in

Vietnam.'1

In May, representatives from MACV, CinCPacFlt. Seventh Fleet, FMFPac, and HI MAF met in

Saigon to develop procedures for the conduct

of naval gunfire. During the meetings, held on 3-5

May, the conferees ironed Out differences of opinion

and forwarded a concept of operations to Admiral

Sharp for his approval. CinCPac approved the

procedures and ordered them to be implemented. On

16 May, the USS Henry W. Tucker (DD 875) fired

USMC Photo A185706

Colonel James M. Callender, Commanding Officer,

12th Marines (left), Major General Walt, Commanding General, III MAF (center), and Major

General William J. Van Ryzin, Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-4, Headquarters Marine Corps (right), pose

with the 99,999th and 100,000th artillery rounds to

be fired by the 12th Marines in Vietnam. After the

picture was taken the two general officers pulled the

lanyard on the 105mm howitzers that fired these

rounds.

the first U.S. naval gunfire missions at targets in II

Corps.'2

Under the terms of the agreement reached at the

May conference, Rear Admiral Raymond F. Dubois,

Commander of Navy Task Group 70.8, the Seventh

Fleet cruiser and destroyer group, furnished the

gunfire ships, but retained operational control of

them. Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, who headed

the Naval Advisory Group, MACV, was designated

Commander Coastal Surveillance Force (CTF 115)

and, in this capacity, assigned gunfire missions and

provided coordination with land forces.'3

Until the autumn of 1965, all naval gunfire

missious had to be adjusted by either ground or air

observers, and could be undertaken only on order of

CTF 115, in cooperation with South Vietnamese

officials. In November, General Westmoreland

amended this policy to allow unobserved fire against

unpopulated target areas which had been declared

hostile by the South Vietnamese. On 22 December

Admiral Sharp lifted the restrictions even further

when he authorized the commanding officers of naval

gunfire ships to initiate unobserved fires in

emergency situations when friendly forces were

I

1
168 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184097

A Marine-Navy ANGLIçO team plots firing targets for the USS Canberra (CAG 2) lying offshore. The UHF

radio and antenna that can be seen in the middle of the picture permits the team to talk with both aircrafi overhead

and ships offshore.

under fire and "when gunfire support could be effected with positive assurance that the friendly forces

and/or non-combatants would not be harmed."4

Control of naval gunfire did not pose a problem for

III MAF. Each of General Walt's direct support

artillery battalions had naval gunfire liaison and naval

gunfire spotter teams within its organization to be

attached to infantry units as required. In addition,

the Marine tactical air observers and reconnaissance

personnel had been schooled in the methods for

control of naval gunfire support.

To provide control and direction of naval gun

support for other American and allied units, a detachment of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Company (ANGLICO), a FMFPac Force Troops

unit was ordered to Vietnam. Led by Lieutenant

Colonel George H. Albers, the detachment arrived

*The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company is a Marine

unit specifically designed to support U. S. Army or allied units.

It provides the control and liaison agencies associated with the

ground elements of a landing force to control and employ naval

gunfire and Navy and Marine close air support in the amphibious assault, or other operations when such support is

required. In addition to Marines, ten Navy line officers and

four enlisted men are assigned to the company.

in Saigon on 21 May. Officially designated Subunit 1,

1st ANGLICO, the unit consisted of 11 officers and

103 enlisted men organized into two shore fire

spotting teams and four shore fire control parties.

The subunit provided a gunfire liaison team for each

corps tactical operations center (TOC). These teams

provided the personnel and communications

necessary to permit the U.S. senior advisor in each

corps area to control naval gunfire through the South

Vietnamese TOCs."

In I Corps, the U.S. Air Force was reluctant to

allow the use of naval gunfire near Da Nang Airbase

for fear of interfering with U. S. air operations. On 8

June, the U.S. Air Force base commander at Da

Nang agreed to permit Navy ships to fire at targets

beyond a 10-mile radius from the base. The first

naval gunfire mission in support of the Marines was

not fired until July because of the limited availability

of Navy gunfire ships.16

On 9 July, General Krulak recommended to

General Walt that the Marines make every effort to

increase their use of naval gunfire support. On the

18th the Ill MAF commander ordered all of his

subordinate units to take full advantage of naval

gunfire ships. In July, four ships, two cruisers and

two destroyers, fired 934 rounds in support of Marine
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 169

USMC Photo A 186266

155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines in position to support infantry from forward firing positions during

Operation HARVEST MOON, Ammunition and supplies have been brought in by truck from Chu Lai and Da

Nang.

operations. During August, navy gunships fired

5,096 rounds for the Marines, including 1,061

rounds in support of Operation STARLITE during

which naval gunfire played a major supporting role.

The number of missions dedined during the

remainder of the year; only 2,873 rounds were fired

during this period. Nevertheless, two Navy ships

remained on station, assigned to I Corps, one that

could be deployed anywhere off the coast and the

other in Da Nang harbor for harbor defense, but

available in a naval gunfire support role during

daylight)7

In 1965, 72 ships of the U. S. Seventh Fleet

provided naval gunfire support for U.S. and allied

forces. The Marine-Navy ANGLICO teams of Subunit 1 controlled the firing of nearly 70,000 rounds

at 2,411 targets.* In at least one instance, during the

* Major Richard E. Romine, who assumed command of

Subunit 1 on 25 August 1965, remarked that most of these

missions were controlled from the rear Seat of L-19 observation

aircraft provided by senior U. S. advisors to the corps areas.

The subunit operated under MACV control and received

administrative support from the Naval Advisory Group in

Saigon. Romme commented that much of his time was spent

coordinating ''at the four Corps headquarters and the spot

team sites. This meant that I traveled frequently to Can Tho,

Vung Tau, Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Quang Tn, Qui Nhon and Da

Nang from my office in Saigon." LtCol Richard E. Romine,

Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment

File). Romine had relieved Lieutenant George M. Wasco,

USN, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Albers on 28 July

as Officer-in-Charge, Sub-unit 1.

successful November defense of the Thach Tru

outpost 20 miles south of Quang Ngai City by the

37th Ranger Battalion, naval gunfire from the U.S.

destroyers O'Brien (DD 725) and Bache (DD 470)

was the decisive factor. O'Brien fired 1,392 5-inch

rounds in 26 hours. The destroyers' fire broke the

back of the enemy attack. General Walt witnessed

the naval bombardment:

From a helicopter at about a half mile distance. The

destroyer shells stopped the attacking force within fifty

yards of the outpost. It was a total and effective surprise to

the enemy forces. It nearly annihilated the assault forces

of the 18th NVA Regt!8

Other Ground Combat Support

In addition to air, artillery, and naval gunfire,

Marine infantry units received vital combat support

from the 3d Marine Division amphibian tractor

companies and tank companies. The experience of

the 3d Tank Battalion was typical of how these

organizations functioned in Vietnam. The 3d Tank

Battalion Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel States

Rights Jones, Jr., and Company B arrived at Da

Nang on 8 July. The battalion's other two gun

companies were already in Vietnam, attached to the

infantry units. On 24 July, the battalion was assigned

a general support mission, but retained operational

control only of its Headquarters and Service Company. At Da Nang, Company A was in direct

support of the 3d Marines, while Company B was in

direct support of the 9th Marines. Company C was

'LI — -— —

.:
170 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

attached to the 4th Marines at Chu Lai, with one

platoon attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at

Phu Bai. In August, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion

arrived at Chu Lai with the 7th Marines and

remained in support of that regiment. Four months

later Company A, 1st Tank Battalion landed with the

2d Battalion, 1st Marines at Phu Bai.

Lieutenant Colonel Milton L. Raphael, who

relieved Lieutenant Colonel Jones on 31 August,

explained the complicated command and control

problems of the tank battalion:

The battalion commander maintains administrative

control of the reinforced battalion and exercises logistic

control and/or supervision of all units regardless of

location or support status. Tactical control of the gun

companies is for the most part in the hands of the supported infantry commander.'9

Raphael related that he, his staff, and company

commanders attempted to influence the tactical

employment of their tanks by keeping abreast of

friendly and enemy situations in all enclaves and then

advising the infantry unit commanders on the

employment of tanks to enhance the accomplishment

of their missions. The battalion commander exercised control, in that:

The four gun companies committed outside of the

battalion command post maintain daily contact with the

USMC Photo A185834

In a change of command ceremony on 31 August,

Lieutenant Colonel Milton L. Raphael (left) accepts

the colors of the 3d Tank Battalion from Lieutenant

Colonel States R. Jones. Lieutenant Colonel Jones

brought the battalion headquarters into Vietnam the

previous month.

battalion. . . . The two companies in the Chu Lai enclave

submit a consolidated weekly report of all phases of their

operations . . . all company commanders come to the

battalion command post to attend the monthly battalion

command and staff meeting.2°

By December, the Ill MAF tank force consisted of

65 M-48 tanks and 12 flame tanks deployed at the

three Marine enclaves, hi addition to the tanks,

there were 65 ONTOS*S from both the 1st and 3d

Anti-Tank Battalions and 157 amphibian tractors

(LVTP5)*** from the 1st and 3d Amphibian

Tractor Battalions attached to Marine infantry units.

Marine Reconnaissance

All Marine units were exposed to severe doctrinal

tests in 1965; for the ''Recon'' Marines the year was

one of change and adjustment. The two committed

reconnaissance units, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, an integral 3d Marine Division battalion, and

the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, a Force

Troops unit, both experienced great difficulty in

responding to demands imposed by the three growing

TAORs at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Hue/Phu Bai.

The two ground reconnaissance units were different

in many respects, which caused many re-evaluations,

as well as revelations, during the opening months of

Marine ground action in Vietnam.

Reconnaissance missions were clearly defined by

tables of organization. A division reconnaissance

battalion, in this case the 3d, was charged with the

primary mission of conducting ''reconnaissance in

support of a Marine Division and its subordinate

elements." A force level company, on the other

* The M-48 was armed with a 90mm gun and two machine

guns. The flame tank was identical to the M-48, with the

exception that the gun tube which housed the flame thrower

was shorter and slightly larger in diameter than the 90mm gun

tube.

* * The ONTOS was a full-tracked, lightly armored, mobile

carrier mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, four .50 caliber

spotting rifles, and one .30 caliber machine gun.

* * *The Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel (LVTP-5) was

an armored amphibian assault, personnel, and cargo carrier.

The LVTP-5 was armed with two .30 caliber machine guns.

Modifications of the LVTP-5 used in Vietnam included the

LVTR, which could be used to retrieve and repair other LVTs,

and the LVTE which could be employed to breach minefields

and clear obstacles during amphibious operations and river

crossings. In addition, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion at

Da Nang included a Provisional Armored Amphibian Platoon

of six LVTHs. This vehicle was armed with a turret-mounted

105mm howitzer and one .50 caliber and one .30 caliber

machine gun.

Jr •T
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 171

a — — a — — —

—

South China

Sea

TAOR Extension

14 June 65

NANG

TAORs & RAORs

Miles I

Kilometers

)

I

F

I\

F — —— — .— — V..- — —

TAOR Extension

15 Juoe 65
172 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

hand, was to "conduct pre-assault and distant postassault reconnaissance in support of a landing force.''21

1st Force Reconnaissance Company,

The Early Days

Early beach reconnaissance efforts of Captain

David Whittingham's Subunit 1, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company were textbook examples of

proper employment of the company. On 23-27

February, Subunit 1, in conjunction with

Underwater Demolition Team 12, operating from

the USS Cook (APD 130), accomplished the

reconnaissance of RED Beaches 1 and 2 at Da Nang.

As a result, RED Beach 2 was selected as the landing

beach for BLT 3/9, the first element of the 9th MEB

to land in Vietnam.

The period 15-20 March was devoted to the

reconnaissance of the beaches and terrain near Phu

Bai. Subunit l's reports resulted in 3d MEB's

decision to send its first BLT to Phu Bai by way of the

river approach to Hue and then overland to Phu Bai.

The proposed landing beaches were backed by impassable lagoons which made exit almost impossible.

For Subunit 1, this was its first real test. The VC

were active in the area, but the mission was accomplished without loss and with excellent results.

Eight days later, Subunit 1 undertook the reconnaissance of the beach which was to be the site of the

3d MEB landing, Chu Lai. Its reconnaissance was

finished on 30 March, again with excellent results.

On 20 April, 18 days before the Chu Lai landing,

the force reconnaissance Marines started a survey of

a beach south of the Tra Bong River 10 kilometers

southeast of the proposed 3d MEB landing beach. On

the 22d the reconnaissance party encountered light

resistance. That was not the case the next day. Five

Marines on the beach were caught in the crossfire of

25 VC. Corporal Lowell H. Merrell was wounded

twice and two sailors in the beach party's LCVP also

were hit; all three subsequently died. The 1st Force

Reconnaissance Company had lost its first Marine to

VC fire. In memory, the new force reconnaissance

camp would be named Camp Merrell.

In May, Subunit 1 teams were sent to Special

Forces camps to serve as patrol leaders for CIDG

patrols. Other teams were assigned to reconnaissance-in-force patrols composed of U.S. - and

Australian-led Nung? which operated from Da

Nang. A third mission was to provide quick response

patrols to act as security for downed Marine

helicopters. Initially, all force reconnaissance reports

and debriefings were coordinated by the LII MAF G2, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Gruenler.

On 10 July, another platoon reinforced Subunit

1, and during July and August the two platoon subunit operated from the 4th Marines' Chu Lai base.

Another force platoon was conducting beach surveys

for the Commander, Task Force 76; still another

platoon was assigned to the SLF; while the rest of the

company was still at Camp Pendleton.

On 11 August, Major Malcolm C. Gaffen, the

company commander, arrived and relieved Captain

Whittingham as subunit commander. During

Operation STARLITE, in August, Subunit 1 was attached to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and the 3d

Platoon, attached to the SLF, landed with BLT 3/7.

At the conclusion of STARLITE, Subunit 1 returned

toDaNang.

The company headquarters and a fourth platoon

arrived on 24 October while the subunit was participating in Operation RED SNAPPER with the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines north of Da Nang. At the

conclusion of RED SNAPPER, the four platoons

were reunited at their Camp Merrell base on China

Beach south of Da Nang. The China Beach site had

been selected because of its ready access to the ocean

for amphibious training and because it provided

enough room for parachute requalification.

The arrival at Camp Merrell of two-thirds of the

company and the fact that the 5th and 6th Platoons

had moved west to Okinawa suggested that soon the

company would be operating as an independent force

unit carrying out the "distant port-assault reconnaissance'' specified in the table of organization.

During the summer and fall, company units had

experienced a variety of operational difficulties.

Communications problems were rampant. The force

* Nungs are ethnic Chinese, residents of Kwangsi Province,

but an appreciable number inhabited northern North Vietnam.

They are noted for their martial skills. As such, many served,

willingly, under the French, and, for this reason, emigrated to

South Vietnam in 1954. At one time after the formation of the

Republic, the South Vietnamese Army included a division of

Nungs, but it was broken up because of its potential threat to

the incumbent government. Nungs, hired on as mercenaries,

eventually came under the domain of U.S. Special Forces and

other agencies involved in unconventional warfare.
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 173

Bxtenion Requceted

22 September 65

CHU LAI

TAORs & RAORs

Lai Airfield

South China

Sea

—

Miles

K I loni eter.
174 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A184814

Marines from Company C, 3d Reconnaissance

Battalion cross the Nong River near Phu Bai in a

rubber raft. The reconnaissance company, attached

to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, is supporting a

battalion search and clear operation,

platoon with BLT 2/1 during DAGGER ThRUST II

in September had to be extracted because radio

contact could not be established. Another unit was

landed from a Coast Guard patrol boat on the

relatively secure coast near Hai Van Pass north of Da

Nang to test communications and control, and this

operation, too, was a "bust." The company's

vehicles were "down;" supply problems were

legion; and the partially developed MAF staff was not

designed to deal with such difficulties.22

General Walt's solution was to transfer Subunit 1

to the operational control of the 3d Marine Division,

which in turn transferred the unit to "opcon" 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion. The transfer was effective

30 October; two days later Subunit 1, 1st Force

Reconnaissance Company became 1st Force

Reconnaissance Company (-) with a strength of nine

officers and 103 enlisted men.23

In effect, the force company became a sixth, albeit

smaller, company of the reinforced 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Although the "in country"

elements of ''1st Force'' were assembled at last, the

assimilation by "division recon" was not an entirely

satisfactory solution; some knotty problems arose.

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, Opening Moves

When the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang on 8

March, a platoon from Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion attached to BLT 3/9, became the

first division reconnaissance element to be

''resident" in Vietnam. Other platoons arrived as

attachments to BLTs, a platoon from Company B

with BLT 3/4, a platoon from Company Dwith BLT

1 / 3, and a second Company D platoon with BLT

2/3. Platoon attachments lasted until 13 April, at

which time the four "in country" reconnaissance

platoons were regrouped as a new Company D, 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion. Captain Patrick G.

Collins' Company D operated as the brigade

reconnaissance company of the 9th MEB until 7

May, when Lieutenant Colonel Don H. "Doc"

Blanchard, his battalion staff, and the rest of the

battalion landed at Chu Lai with the 3d MAB.

"Doc" Blanchard did not stay at Chu Lai very long;

on the 12th, he, his staff, battalion headquarters, and

Companies A and C moved to Da Nang where they were reunited with Company D. Company B

remained at Chu Lai. In the process, Companies A

and B were brought up to strength by integrating the

Company D platoons which had arrived with the

battalion at Chu Lai; there were no longer two

Company D elements. Company C was detached

from Da Nang to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at

Hue/Phu Bai on 26 May.

On 13 September, Company C moved again,

returning to Da Nang, leaving its 3d Platoon at

Hue/Phu Bai still attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines. Battalion integrity was improved somewhat

on 19 September by a directive from General Walt

which stated that the reconnaissance battalion should

be used in general support of the 3d Marine

Division •24 Although this measure simplified

command and control, the division was still

operating from three separate enclaves, and three

separate reconnaissance elements were required. On

the 19th, reinforcement of division reconnaissance

was accomplished by attaching Company C, 1st

Reconnaissance Battalion, which had arrived in

August as an attachment to the 7th Marines.

The new battalion commander since 1 September,

Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Van Cleve, ordered some

adjustments on 20 September in order to comply with

Ill MAF's general support order. The new

dispositions were: Headquarters, Companies A, C(-),

and D at Da Nang; one Company C platoon at

Hue/Phu Bai; and newly designated Reconnaissance

Group ALPHA, composed of Company B and attached Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, at

Chu Lai.2'

During this entire period, the reconnaissance

—--
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 175

battalion was faced with the question of ''reconnaissance of what." The Hue/Phu Bai, Da Nang,

and Chu Lai enclaves were essentially defensive

positions. By virtue of Ill MAF's mission, all

reconnaissance efforts were defensive patrols, but the

restrictions imposed by the TAORs limited the

patrols to ''their own front yard,'' and there were

many people in the "yard."26

Geography solved part of the problem. The

physical characteristics of the Hue/Phu Bai

lodgment provided the Marines with excellent observation. This had resulted in the reduction of the

reconnaissance force there to only one platoon in

September.

At the other two enclaves, RAORs (reconnaissance areas of operation) evolved slowly. On 19

June, at the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel

Blanchard, General Walt had approved the furmation

of a RAOR that extended from 4 to 10 kilometers

furward of the Da Nang defensive positions.27 At

Chu I.ai, the RAORs were as required by the two

regiments there, the 4th and 7th Marines. Even with

the formation of Reconnaissance Group ALPHA in

September, the two Chu Lai-based reconnaissance

companies continued to function as direct support

companies for the respective regiments.

Another limiting factor which influenced the

range and duration of reconnaissance patrols was the

radio equipment then in use. The PRC-47 radio was

too big and too heavy for small teams, but it did have

sufficient range. The smaller, lighter PRC-10 did not

have the range for deep patrols. Both sets used up

batteries at a high rate, and battery consumption was

accelerated by the climate which reduced battery life

by more than half. Of all the patrol equipment, only

water had a higher priority than batteries, and both

were heavy. Patrols were caught up in the simple

equation which restricted patrol duration to the

number of batteries that could be carried, which, in

turn, was reduced still further by the amount of other

equipment and supplies which had to be carried.

Radio relay stations helped to solve the radio range

problem to some degree, but the arrival, in

November, of the PRC-25 radio with its long-life BA

386 battery finally enabled reconnaissance Marines

to carry out deeper, long duration patrols. Although

communications were vastly improved, reconnaissance units were continually faced with the grim

reality of heavier loads for longer patrols.

The size of reconnaissance patrols, especially in

USMC Photo A185990

LtCol Roy R, Van Cleve, commander of the 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion, holds up a Viet Cong flag

captured in Operation TRAILBLAZER. The

operation took place in a VC-dominated area, 16

miles southwest of Da Nang, nicknamed "Happy

Valley.''

the Da Nang TAOR, became a matter of great

concern. Although the Marines were operating from

fixed bases in relatively secure areas, patrols had to be

large enough to fight their way out of any entrapment

and deal with the possibility of ambush. Sergeant

Richard A. Van Deusen of Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion recalled this uneasy situation:

It's very hard in an alien country to hide yourself—I

mean, you're going along, and people are all over the

place, and they know you're out there, so this right away

compromises any chance of "recon.'' It all depends on

the area you're in. Now if you're in the mountains, you

can live there for days before they ever realize you're up

there. Sometime they never know you're up there. But if

you're south—and each treeline has a village on it—the

only good chance you have is moving at night.28

By mid-1965, both force and division reconnaissance formations began experiencing utilization

problems which ranged from assignments in total

disregard of existing doctrine to assignment that had

nothing to do with reconnaissance.

-::

—.

V
176 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

\ I
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 177

Reflecting on this situation, the 3d Reconnaissance

Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Van

Cleve, recalled:

They were being used for any mission that might come

up. If you didn't have somebody else to do it, why, give it

to recon. They ended up on some raider-type missions;

they ended up as CP security frequently on operations. As

a result of this, General Walt decided that the reconnaissance effort should be controlled at the reconnaissance battalion level, and that any request for reconnaissance type missions would come through the Division staff, the Division reconnaissance officer, G-3/G-2,

advising, 'Yes, this is a reconnaissance type mission,''

or ''No, this is not a reconnaissance type mission.''

Division would task reconnaissance battalion to provide

to whatever organization was asking for the necessary

forces. People were realizing there was a lot of talent in

the Recon Battalion that was not being used for strictly

recon purposes, and the Divisions and MAF were losing a

lot of potentially valuable information.29

Were reconnaissance Marines ''fighters'' or

''finders''? When the first revision of the provisional

M-Series table of organization was published on 20

February 1958, it stated that ''The [Division]

Reconnaissance Battalion may be employed as a unit

to screen the advance of the Division or execute

counter reconnaissance missions.'' These were

dearly defined fighting missions. The publication of

the approved M-1428 (Division Reconnaissance

Battalion) Table of Organization, 5 March 1961,

reversed this concept stating ''The Reconnaissance

Battalion . . . will be employed to gain intelligence,''

and "It is not equipped for decisive or sustained combat . . . . It is not capable of screening or

counterreconnaissance missions,'' but, the concept

went on to explain, commanders supported by

division reconnaissance could, in the event the

reconnaissance element was in danger of being

''overwhelmed,'' ''reinforce the reconnaissance

furce, directing that force to destroy the enemy.' '30

Revision 1 of 23 September 1963, still in effect in

1965, carried the transition a step further by deleting

the "destroy the enemy" option, and reiterated the

"not equipped for decisive or sustained combat"

restriction, but some damage had been done.

Misinterpretation of mission and the natural

aggressiveness engendered by the demanding

physical conditioning program required by reconnaissance units produced a strange analgam

of ''fighting'' and ''finding'' reconnaissance

31

Many senior Marines had been members of special

units during World War II, notably the raider and

parachute battalions, and all Marines were familiar

with their legendary exploits. Of the senior commanders in Vietnam in 1965, four were raider

battalion veterans: Major General Walt and three of

his regimental commanders, Colonels Wheeler,

Dupras, and Peatross. There was bound to be some

"raider" thinking, but the Commanding General,

FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, resolutely

insisted that ''Combat assault operations, including

amphibious raids, are missions to be conducted by

rifle companies, rather than reconnaissance units.' '32

Nevertheless, during the summer and fall of 1964,

Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had actually trained as the battalion's ''raid'' company.33

The die was cast.

By 12 March 1965, Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had been reconstituted in

Vietnam. It was the 9th MEB's reconnaissance

company, and, as such, in April it claimed more VC

''kills'' than all of the ''in country'' infantry units,

even through patrolling beyond the Da Nang and

Chu Lai TAORS was not authorized until 20 April.

The company commander, Captain Patrick G.

Collins, recalled: ''. . . surveillance and observation

USMC Photo A185989

Marines from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

prepare to make camp during Operation

TRAILBLAZER in an enemy base area. The VChad

used the hut in the background for food storage, class

rooms, living area, and as a medical aid station.

i
178 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185530

The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion honor guard stands in front of the monument dedicating its base camp to First

Lieutenant Frank S. Reasoner, former Company A commander who was killed on 12 July 1965 Lieutenant

Reasoner was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honorfor his actions during that engagement.

missions quite frequently turned into contact with

the Viet Cong and having some quite spirited actions

More specifically, Colonel Frank E. Garretson, the 9th Marines Commander, would tell

Captain Collins: "You find [them]; we'll bail you out.' '

As a result, early reconnaissance patrols were

large, usually between 12 and 22 Marines; a number

were even larger company-strength patrols. Large

patrols did not guarantee absolute safety. On 12 July,

an 18-man patrol from Company A operating near

Dai Loc 18 kilometers southwest of Da Nang tangled

with a VC company. One officer was killed and three

men were wounded.

The dead officer, First Lieutenant Frank S.

Reasoner, was posthumously awarded the Medal of

Honor for his actions on 12 July, the first Marine

action in Vietnam to merit the nation's highest

honor. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion's camp at

Da Nang was named Camp Reasoner, but the

lieutenant's heroic death did little to solve the patrol

security dilemma. This enigma was only solved later

when the TAORS were enlarged to include the

rugged, sparsely inhabited terrain to the west, and

when reconnaissance efforts were concentrated on

the business of finding the enemy.

The III MAF commander, General Walt, realized

that reconnaissance units, properly utilized, were
FIRE SUPPORT AND RECONNAISSANCE 179

well equipped to locate an enemy who had already

established a reputation for blending into the

surroundings, a phantom army which was seldom

seen armed and concentrated. Even when VC concentrations were sighted, they were usually on the

move, and presented fleeting targets at best. Regular

Marine ground formations were too clumsy for this

mission; the VC they found generally wanted to be

found. General Walt decided that since reconnaissance patrols could find the VC, then the patrols

should be provided with a means to destroy the

enemy. Accordingly, he allowed patrols to call in air

and artillery strikes. Slow clearance procedures

hindered this application in the Da Nang TAOR, but

the system proved to be successful at Chu Lai. The

concept was refined, and in 1966 it was adopted as a

standard tactic, then known as STINGRAY.3'

Any doubts about the mission of reconnaissance

Marines were resolved by General Walt's September

directive which restored the division reconnaissance

battalion to its general support role. Lieutenant

Colonel Van Cleve's appreciation of his mission

essentially put an end to the ''raider'' days, although

some experimentation still persisted.

On 18 October, two 3d Reconnaissance Battalion

companies hiked into "Happy Valley" for Operation

TRAILBLAZER. Their mission was to determine

the size of enemy concentrations in the hills west of

the Da Nang TAOR. For six days, 18-24 October,

the reconnaissance force prowled the hills. Two VC

were killed, but five separate enemy base areas were

discovered and a vast amount of trail network information was accumulated. TRAILBLAZER was

the last of the reconnaissance-in-force operations

conducted by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. A

new trend was in motion. By December, the battalion was concentrating on patrolling, sending out

more, smaller patrols; a company-size patrol was the

exception.

Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged

The force reconnaissance Marines viewed their

attachment to division ''recon'' with trepidation,

and the first weeks of the new arrangement were not

without some trying moments. During November,

1st Force Reconniassance Company executed

division reconnaissance-type patrols in the Da Nang

area, but the Ill MAF planners had not forgotten the

force company's capabilities. As a result, on 27

November the 2d Platoon was returned to Ill MAF

operational control and sent to Special Forces Camp

A-106 at Ba To, 42 kilometers south-southwest of

Quang Ngai. On 7 December, III MAF reassigned

another force platoon, the 3d, to Camp A-107, Tra

Bong, 27 kilometers southwest of Chu Lai, on the

upper reaches of the TTa Bong River. Their mission,

code named BIRDWATCHER, was".. . to test the

feasibility of deep patrols.''36 At last force ''recon''

was going deep, but the 2d Platoon at Ba To was in

for a tough school session.

At 0530, 15 December three reconnaissance teams

(20 Marines and CIDG troops), plus a 61-man base

defense reaction force, moved out ''to determine

location, identity, strength, movement, and armament of VC/PAVN units." More than 70

Communists were sighted during the next two days,

but the U.S.!Vietnamese reconnaissance force had

made a serious mistake. The patrol base had not been

moved for two nights. The only redeeming feature of

this situation was that the base was on a hill, the best

defensive terrain in the area.

By 1730 16 December all teams had returned to

the patrol base, but the planned move back to Ba To

was cancelled when dense fog settled over the camp.

The force of 81 Marine, Special Forces, CIDG, and

Nung troops was stuck in the same camp site for the

third consecutive night.

At 1900 the Viet Cong began walking mortar

rounds across the patrol base. The Vietnamese

lieutenant in charge of the patrol was mortally

wounded and a U.S. Special Forces sergeant was hit.

Enemy automatic weapons swept the hill position as

the mortar bombardment continued. Then the

assault started. Between 150 to 200 Viet Cong attacked. Confusion swept through the mixed force of

defenders; they broke up into small groups. The

Marines, now led by Gunnery Sergeant Maurice J.

Jacques, withdrew into a small perimeter, but of the

13 Marines assigned to the patrol five were already

missing. In the perimeter, a Marine was hit, their

corpsman was seriously wounded, and a second

Marine was killed. Jacques' Marines moved off the

hill into the darkness. They hid in a clump of banana

trees, formed a defensive perimeter, and waited for

the dawn, hoping that aerial observers would spot

them in the morning Of the 13 Marines, 4 were still

missing and one was known to be dead.

Dawn came, but the fog persisted. There was no

possibility of being seen from the air. The Marines

tried to regain the trail back to Ba To, but enemy
180 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

troops firing at what were probably other stragglers

drove them back into the bush. After moving about

four kilometers they found thicker cover and started

moving up a ridgeline; they knew the trail to Ba To

was on top of the ridge. At this time they were joined

by two CIDG survivors, but the two Vietnamese

almost were killed in the process. A Vietnamese with

the Marines saved them by causing the Marines to

hold fire as they came out of the bushes.

The Marines reached the Ba To trail, but again

they were faced with a tough decision. It is a bad

practice to use trails in enemy territory, but the

Marines had to get away quickly and fog still

blanketed the area. Fortunately the wind picked up,

and it was so loud that it covered any noise the patrol

made, so Jacques decided to "head for home."

Putting the two Vietnamese stragglers out as the

point on the trail, the Marines moved out. They

reached Ba To without incident.

An hour after Gunnery Sergeant Jacques' party

arrived at the base, another Marine survivor,

wounded Lance Corporal Donald M. Woo, was

brought in. Determined to survive, Lance Corporal

Woo had been captured and escaped twice, and, in

turn, captured two NVA soldiers and forced them, at

knife point, to carry him to Ba To.

On 21 December the two missing Marines were

found, dead. A patrol found 14 bodies: three

Marines, the Special Forces sergeant, the Vietnamese lieutenant patrol leader, and nine CIDG

troops.

As a result of the Ba To experience, and some

other misadventures, a long standing force reconnaissance operational procedure was suspended.

Previous training practices had dictated that when a

force reconnaissance patrol was discovered it was to

split up, each member evading on his own. After Ba

To, force patrols went in together, stayed together,

and came out together.

The 2d and 3d Platoons were returned to 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion control on 24 December.

On the 28th, Captain William C. Shaver relieved

now Lieutenant Colonel Gaffen who was transferred

upon his promotion.

As the year ended, both force and division

reconnaissance units could state that their respective

situations were much improved. Although "force"

was not pleased with the prospect of remaining under

the paternal hand of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, the force company was, at last, able to conduct deep missions, and the company's supply

situation was vastly improved. Division reconnaissance was still spread between three endaves, but

it also had room to maneuver; the threat of compromise was vastly diminished. Coordination,

cooperation, and understanding of reconnaissance

capabilities and limitations were improving.

''Recon'' had a clear view of the future.
CHAPTER 12

Logistics and Construction

The Logistic Situation—Ill MAF Naval Responsibilities—RED BALL and CRITIPAC—

The Force Logistic Support Group—Engineering and Construction

The Logistic Situation

When the decision was made in early 1965 to

commit major U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam,

MACV was prepared to support only the 20,000

U.S. troops already there. General Westmoreland,

therefore, requested the commitment of Marines to

the I Corps area since the Marine units were the only

readily available forces prepared to support themselves over the beaches in an area of few ports and

airfields.' According to one source:

The Marine Corps equipment posture was at its highest

peacetime level of readiness since the Korean War.

Modern equipment and ammunition with adequate

backup stocks were available to equip and support units

required for mobilization, and to improve the combat

capability of the Fleet Marine Forces.2

This report overstated the case of Marine logistic

preparedness. Logistics for the Marines in Vietnam

soon became a major problem, despite the fact that

for the first time a combat force had been deployed

with a computerized supply system. The computerization broke down "right off the bat. . . when

the stock cards began swelling due to the high

humidity and the cards wouldn't fit in the

machine." Record keeping had to be accomplished

manually for an extended period, slowing down the

entire operation.°

A malfunctioning requisition system compounded

supply difficulties. In contrast to the practice in

World War II and Korea, the Marine Corps in

Vietnam used a ''pull'' system of resupply rather

than forced feeding. Units made requisitions based on

predicted usage, but the predictions, even with the

incorporation of a ''Combat Active Factor,'' underestimated the unique demands of the Vietnam

situation. Colonel Mauro J. Padalino, the Ill MAF

Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) commander,

later explained:

Those calculations never envisioned either the harsh

environment (degraded roads, Chu Lai, etc.) nor the

garrison, war-time 24-hour around-the-clock type

operations the Corps experienced. In a free-type battlefield situation where there is constant forward

movement with minimal pauses for consolidation, there is

less wear and tear on equipment and supplies by comparison, to the in-place situation4

Padalino pointed out that the dirt roads were

initially trafficable, but in time ''they were reduced

to deep powder or mud" resulting in an

''astronomical rise in demand for repair parts.'' The

FLSG commander concluded "the garrison environment imposed a much broader base of demand

on the supply system—requisitions fur salt and

pepper shakers competed with requisitions for

combat essentials.'"

Many commodities such as fork lifts, barbed wire,

and field fortifications were in short supply. One of

the most acute shortages was radio batteries, which,

since there was no refrigeration, ''instead of lasting

25 hours. . . pooped out in four hours."6 For a short

period in May, III MAF found it necessary to limit

patrol activity because of the lack of batteries for

PRC-10 radios. The logistic situation saw some

improvement on 5 June, when the Defense

Department finally permitted General Greene to

release emergency FMFPac mount-out supplies for

shipment to Vietnam.

The impact of the release of the mount-out supplies was still modest. One Marine commander later

remarked that this action ''was akin [to applying] . a bandaid to a massive wound.' '' By the end of June,

the Marine Corps pipeline, designed to support a

peacetime consumption rate, was beginning to show

the strain. Colonel Nickerson, the Ill MAF G-4 at

the time, commented: '' . . . there was no magic

solution fur the deluge of problems except hard,

intelligent work—the use of imagination, ingenuity,

and common sense was ever important."8 Nickerson

would assign a particular problem to a member of his

181
182 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Navy Photo K31362

At the end of December 1965, 12 ships

staff and that officer would then become the "duty

expert" and action officer for that matter. Colonel

Harold A. Hayes, who became the Ill MAF G-4 on

26 August, recalled the early morning briefings that

he held for General Walt and the rest of the III MAF

staff where he had to report on the ''low, low supply

levels at different times in aviation gas, artillery

ammunition, and even rations."9

One particularly serious shortage during 1965 was

that of aviation ordnance. The data used to forecast

aviation ammunition needs in early 1965 failed to

reflect the actual combat needs or delivery

capabilities of the aircraft deployed to Vietnam.'°

Thus, from the very beginning, the F-4B pilots, and

later the A-4 pilots, had to conserve ammunition and

to make value judgments on the necessity for firing at

assigned targets. No targets were left unhit, but the

Marines had to employ their resources sparingly and,

on at least one occasion, the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing ordered F-4B squadrons not to expend rockets

unless they were being used to support Marines."

According to Colonel Robert F. Conley, who

commanded MAG-li from July to November 1965:

"Without the Navy's strong support in this field, we

would not have been able to function."2 The

aviation ammunition situation, like the rest of the

logistic problems that the Marines faced, could not

be corrected until a productive pipeline was

established and adequate port and storage facilities

were built. * III MAF Naval Responsibilities

In his role as Naval Component Commander

(NCC),** the Ill MAF commander was in the U.S.

Pacific Fleet chain of command rather than that of

MACV. In this capacity he was responsible for base

construction in I Corps and the operation of all ports,

beaches, and depots from Quang Ngai to the DMZ.

Colonel Nickerson, in his 16 May concept of logistic

support for HI MAF, projected a Naval Support

Activity under the NCC that would carry out the

above assignments, as well as provide common item

support for all U.S. forces in I Corps, but the Navy

did not have the available manpower for the activation of such a unit. In a message to Admiral

*Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, 1st MAW chief of staff until

August 1965, observed: "We discovered that we had dipped

deeply into the national war reserve ammunition supplies in the

United States. That's what happens when you initiate a war,

but try to conduct business as usual in the United States as if no

war were going on." Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File). * *As NCC, General Walt did not control all U.S. Naval

Forces in South Vietnam. The Naval Advisory Group and CTF

115 remained separate entities.

Merchant ships in Da Nang Harbor wait their turn to unload their cargo.

were in the harbor waiting to be unloaded.
LOGISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION 183

Navy Photo K31382

Stacks of cargo crowd the unloading pier at Da Nang. The overcro wded and undermanned Naval Support Activity

at Da Nang was unloading 2,505 measuredtons a day by the end of 1965.

Sharp on 28 May, Admiral David L. McDonald, the

Chief of Naval Operations, pointed out that a Naval

Support Activity could not be formed without the

mobilization of certain units of the reserve.

McDonald stated that he was asking for more personnel, "but in the meantime, the task will have to

be accomplished within our existing resources.'' On

5 June, nevertheless, Admiral Roy L. Johnson,

CinCPacFlt, ordered the NCC to take over common

item support in I Corps, stating that he and General

Krulak, Commanding General, FMFPac, would

provide additional personnel and equipment .'

In an evaluation of the NCC responsibility for

running the ports and providing logistic support in I

Corps, Colonel Nickerson observed on 15 June that

"Port operations continue to be conducted by CG III

MAF under the cognizance of the NCC staff" and

that III MAF would have to continue using it own

personnel and equipment for this task until the

establishment of a Naval Support Activity.

Nickerson concluded that until the matter of the

Naval Support Activity was ''resolved, Commander

Seventh Fleet and the NCC must work together to

get the job done."4

With the complex problems confronting them, the

Marines and the Navy attempted to organize their

available resources to best carry Out the mission of

operating port terminals, unloading and moving

cargo, and all the other tasks associated with an

advance naval base. On 10 July, General Walt

krmally activated a Provisional Naval Component

Support Activity and assigned Colonel Robert W.

Boyd as its commander. In effect, Boyd, who had

already been acting in this capacity, was the Da Nang

port director. On 17 July, the Secertary of the Navy

authorized the establishment of a Naval Support

Activity, Da Nang and four days later Admiral

Johnson promulgated the mission and tasks for the

new organization. The Naval Support Activity was

to be under the command of Commander, Service

-- S.,:;

itI
184 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, but under the operational

control of the NCC. It was not until 15 October,

however, that the Naval Support Activity was officially activated and began relieving Marine amphibious forces of this basic Navy mission. Finally,

on 24 December, General Walt deactivated the

Provisional Naval Component Support Activity and

established a permanent Naval Component Command staff, observing that there had been no formal

staff distinction between his responsibilities as Commanding General, UI MAF and NCC and that

''the steady increasing magnitude of the staff

requirements" required the separation of the staff

functions of the two commands. Colonel Boyd then

became Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Component

Command and reported directly to General Walt. At

the same time, Marine and Navy senior commanders

began discussing whether the entire Naval Component Command responsibility should be assumed

by a separate Navy command, rather than remaining

under HI MAF."

The importance of the Naval Support Activity to

ill MAE was obvious in that all resupply was

provided by either sea or air. In July 1965, slippage in

air and sea schedule deliveries caused Ill MAE to

reduce its stock level of individual combat rations

from a 30-day to a 15-day supply level.'6 The

situation gradually improved as additional personnel

and equipment arrived to reinforce the Naval Support

Activity. From an average daily discharge of only

slightly over 1,000 measured tons at the port of Da

Nang prior to September, the rate increased to a

figure of 2,505 measured tons by the end of the

year.'7 There were still problems because of

inadequate unloading facilities at the port. At the end

of November, 17 ships were in Da Nang harbor

unloading or waiting to be unloaded. This figure was

reduced to 12 by the end of December, but seven of

these ships had been in port longer than two weeks,

and four had been in port over a month.'8

At Chu Lai, heavy seas caused by the monsoon

season brought about further complications. In

October, huge swells damaged the causeway causing

the seaward portion to start to sink. This expeditionary dock was inoperative for an extended

pern d since it was not considered practical to restore

it tint tithe worst of the monsoon was over. In spite of

this frustration, 19 LSTs were unloaded at Chu Lai

during October.19

A much more critical handicap was a leak which

developed in the fuel line of the amphibious assault

fuel system (AAFS) at Chu Lai during October. Two

amphibious assault fuel systems, one at Da Nang and

the other at Chu Lai, were established after the 5

August VC attack on the Esso POL depot at Lien

Chieu which destroyed most of the commerical fuel

storage in I Corps. Each of these two systems was

capable of holding 300,000 gallons of various types of

fuel, resupplied directly from tankers off the coast or

in the harbor. When the leak developed in the fuel

line at Chu Lai, heavy seas prevented divers from

making repairs until December. During the interim,

the NSA devised a temporary expedient by installing

a buoyant system of 5,000 feet of flexible hose from

the AAFS supported by empty 55-gallon drums. Chu

Lai depended upon this source for fuel until the

bottom-laid line was repaired.2° In December,

aviation fuel for MAG-12 at Chu Lai again became

critically short for a two-day period because of a break

in the offshore lines.2' *

RED BALL and CRITIPAC

With the rapid influx of the remainder of the 3d

Marine Division, new elements of the 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing, and the introduction of units of the

1st Marine Division into the already overcrowded

facilities at Da Nang and Chu Lai, logistic problems

could be expected. These were reflected in shortages

of equipment, fuel, ammunition, and supplies. As

already stated, one of the main problems was slow

unloading of ships at the undeveloped ports in South

Vietnam. Colonel Harold A. Hayes, the III MAF G4 during the second half of 1965, observed:

The ''humor" of having to dump truck loads of canned

soft drinks to get in the cargo holds for much needed

artillery ammunition (the soft drinks were deck loaded in

boxes which disintegrated in the rains); the arrival of

soap for the Vietnamese—partially used bars from hotels

the Wives' Clubs gathered—which truly lathered on

decks, in trucks, and in storage (what a mess); the horror

of unloading ammunition in Da Nang Harbor and having

* Lien Chieu is inside the Da Nang Harbor on the south

shore of Hai Van Peninsula. At the time of the attack, the area

was outside of the Marines' Da Nang TAOR and was guarded

by two understrength Regional Force companies. Two JP-4

storage tanks were destroyed and three others damaged

resulting in the loss of 1,650,000 gallons of aviation fuel.

**The wing's chronology goes on to state: ''In order to

conserve fuel available at this airfield and continue to meet

operational commitments, A-4 aircraft were launched with

light fuel loads, then refueled from KC-130F tankers before and

after conducting missions.'' 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65.
LOGISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION 185

to stack and temporarily Store [it] at dock side in the city.

One VC could have erased a huge hunk of Da Nang had

he gotten in! 22

In I Corps, all shipping was offloaded at Da Nang

and then some cargo had to be reloaded on LSTs to

support the base at Chu Lai. This created fluctuations

in the volume of supplies reaching committed units.

The heavy wear and tear on equipment caused by the

heat, humidity, and monsoons created additional

frustrations.

Solutions had to found. In August, a logistics

assistance team from FMFPac arrived at Da Nang to

study the situation there. By the 24th, the team had

completed its report and made its recommendations.23 General Krulak's headquarters instituted two new programs based on the team's

findings, the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC

systems.

The first of these, the RED BALL Program, which

went into effect on 22 September, sought to identify

and solve critical supply shortages throughout the

Western Pacific. When an important item of supply

or equipment was found to be in short supply it was

given a RED BALL designation. This meant that as

soon as an item was designated RED BALL, all

FMFPac supply echelons were alerted and the status

of these items was closely monitored by individual

action officers at each intermediary headquarters. It

was their responsibility to see that the RED BALL

item was shipped to Vietnam in the most expeditious

manner possible, including specially arranged air

shipment.24 For an item to be placed on RED BALL,

it had to be combat essential and meet specifications

determined by FMFPac, which were refined

periodically in the light of experience. For example,

the 3d Marine Division reported in December:

During the month. . . the number of RED BALL items

increased to such a number that it became necessary to

refine the criteria for placing an item on RED BALL. It

must be a repair part for equipment, the loss of which

would put the unit in . . . Combat Readiness Category 3

or 4. At this time, the number of line items on RED

BALL is 80.25*

The second supply innovation, the CRITIPAC

Program, was established by FMFPac in November.

Under this concept, the Marine Corps Supply Center

at Barstow, California automatically furnished,

without request, each major Marine unit in ViettCategory 3 indicated that a unit was marginally capable for

combat while Category 4 shows that a unit is unprepared for

combat.

nam, usually battalion or squadron size, one shipment of critical supplies which were normally

required on a routine basis. As a result of the first

shipment which arrived in November, the 3d Marine

Division indicated that 51 combat essential items were removed from deadline. General Walt

recommended that some modifications be made in

future shipments to include some items which were

essential and to delete others which were not.26 Both

new additions to the Marine Corps Supply system,

the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC, helped to

alleviate the Ill MAF logistic situation.t *

The Force Logistic Support Group

The Force Logistic Support Group under Colonel

Padalino had grown from 700 personnel who

deployed with the 9th MEB to nearly 3,000 officers

and men by the end of the year.tt * Under the overall

control of the FLSG at Da Nang, two force logistic

support units (FLSU) had been established at Chu Lai

and Phu Bai. Built on the nucleus of the 3d Service

Battalion, the FLSG was reinforced by personnel

from the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa and

from the 1st Force Set-vice Regiment at Camp

Pendleton, California. The FLSG at Da Nang

centrally controlled all furnished material, assisted by

two data processing platoons. Supplies were provided

either from one of the three stock points in I Corps,

or the requisition was transmitted electronically to

the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa. The

FLSG was also responsible for first to third echelon

* * The extent of this relief is a matter of some conjecture.

According to FMFPac, the RED BALL and CRITIPAC

Programs resulted in a decrease in percentage of deadlined

equipment from 15 percent in the fall to 12.5 percent by the end

of 1965. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar6)-Sep67,

v.1, p. 8-14. MACV on the other hand reported: ''Year end

deadline rate for III MAF was: overall. 14 percent; electronic,

11 percent; engineer, 32 percent; motor transport 11 percent;

and ordnance, 5 percent.'' MACV, ComdHist, 196.5, p. 116.

In any event there was no doubt that the supply situation was

better than in October 1965, when III MAF reported:

"Shortage of spare parts affected readiness to the extent that

the operation readiness of several units decreased to the

marginally combat ready category.'' III MAF ComdC, Oct65,

p. 7. * Colonel Robert J. Oddy commanded the Force Logistic

Support Group from 6-29 May 1965. Colonel Oddy also

continued to command the 3d Service Battalion which left a

rear echelon behind on Okinawa. Col Robert J. Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
186 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

maintenance; fourth echelon maintenance was

performed on Okinawa by the 3d Force Service

Regiment.

Some measure of the size of FLSG operations is

indicated in the following excerpts from its December

report:

a. Data Processing key punched 66,100 cards, and

processed 8,777,700 transactions.

b. Clothing in the amount of $98,063 was provided.

c. Shipping and Receiving processed 3,688 short tons,

360,900 cubic feet of outgoing material and 2,014 short

tons, 225,271 cubic feet of incoming material.

d. 6,469 maintenance work orders were received and

6,250 work orders were completed during the period.21

The FLSG organization had grown to such an

extent that in September 1965, General Krulak stated

that he had decided to transform the FLSG into a

Force I.ogistic Command (FLC), but this did not

happen until 1966.28

Engineering and Construction

A significant construction and engineering effort

took place at all three Marine endaves during 1965.

Civilian firms and Seabee units worked on port

development, airfield construction, and base development. Marine engineering units not only assisted

in these projects when required, but also continued

to furnish combat support to III MAF. Colonel

William M. Graham, Jr., the Ill MAF engineering

officer, observed: "For my money, Vietnam in 1965

was an engineers' war and not many other units

could satisfactorily fulfill their mission without

engineer support."29

The 3d Engineer Battalion, like the rest of the 3d

Marine Division support units, deployed to Vietnam

as attachments to other units. In May, Major

Bernard A. Kaasmann established a forward battalion headquarters at Da Nang. Under his control at

Da Nang were Companies A from the 3d and C from

the 7th Engineer Battalions. Company B, 3d

Engineer Battalion was at Chu Lai with one platoon

at Phu Bai.

8At that time, all depot or 5th echelon maintenance was

performed in the U.S. According to FMFPac, ''as the effects of

climate and sustained usage amplified maintenance

requirements and as forces-in-country steadily grew, this

concept became too costly For example by the end of

1965, 5,500 items had been evacuated from RVN for repair. To

alleviate this situation, some fourth echelon maintenance was

moved to South Vietnam in 1966. FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, v. I, p. 8-14.

USMC Photo A184410

Marine engineers from Company C, 7th Engineer

Battalion wield a pick and shovel in building a new

road up Hill 327 in March 1965. This was one of the

first tasks completed by the engineers.

To build the Chu Lai SATS field, the engineers

had to send aimost all of their earthmoving equipment from Da Nang to Chu Lai. Roads at Da Nang

began to deteriorate rapidly and manual labor

replaced mechanization. Lieutenant Colonel

Nicholas J. Dennis, who had assumed command of

the 3d Engineer Battalion on Okinawa in early May

and later in the month arrived in Vietnam, recalled

that he questioned the necessity for the transfer of

equipment between the two enclaves, but that

Colonel Graham "easily convinced me that the

transfer was ordered.' '30

Even after the Chu Lai airfield was completed, the

tasks facing the engineers were enormous. Major

Kaasmann later commented:

To maintain the staggering miles of road network and

make repairs on existing and destroyed bridges with

:

-w

• •••#

V

/
LOGISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION 187

USMC Photo A 184985

Marine engineers construct the 3d Marine Division command post bunker. When completed it was estimated that

the massive timber and concrete complex would be capable of supporting the weight of three battleships.

construction material available required a great deal of

ingenuity and improvisation. . . . Heavy engineer earthmoving equipment and dump trucks were operated

from dawn until dusk, seven days a week. Mechanics

worked during hours of darkness performing required

preventative maintenance and making repairs so

equipment and vehicles were ready to roll at first light.3'

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis, after touring all three

enclaves, officially assumed command of the 3d

Engineer's forward headquarters at Da Nang on 29

May. He suggested an extensive road improvement

program to General Walt, which included building

bridges and laying culverts throughout the TAORs

to prepare for the forthcoming monsoon season.

Dennis also recommended the deployment of the

remaining battalion units from Okinawa, Company

C, Headquarters and Service Company, and Support

Company. By 8 July, the entire 3d Engineer Battalion was in Vietnam.32

One of the major engineering accomplishments

during this period was the installation of the LAAM

battery on Monkey Mountain. According to Colonel

O'Connor:

The engineering unit had to move southward along the

Monkey Mountain ridge from the Air Force control

position through dense jungle. The distance was about

three miles to the highest point on the ridge. They

constructed a shelf road suitable for military vehicles

along the contours of several steep slopes. Upon arrival at

the selected peak, they shaved off the top of it to make a

flat area for emplacement of a section of a battery. The job

took about three weeks and required explosives,

bulldozers, and graders to establish cuts and culverts

along the way.33

About the same time, Dennis' battalion completed

construction support for the 3d Medical Battalion,

which included "air-conditioned operating rooms,

strongbacked, screened ward tents, air-conditioned

recovery room tents." According to Dennis:

I vividly recall General Walt visiting 'Charlie Med' and

directing immediate construction of the above listed

I
188 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC Photo A185678

A Marine stands guard on a newly built 195-foot span near Marble Mountain. The engineers erected the bridge in

three days.

facilities. We completed this project . . . [ with the

cooperation] of many other units . . . including special air

shipment from Okinawa of the refrigeration units and

lumber.34

Following the 1 July attack on the Da Nang

Airfield and the enlargement of the TAOR, General

Walt ordered the movement of the 3d Marine

Division command posts away from the airfield and

the construction of bunkers along the main line of

resistance (MLR) in the new areas. According to

Dennis, General Walt personally informed him of his

construction requirements for the 3d Marine

Division CP complex. It was located north of Hill 327

and:

evolved into a monster [bunker] in excess of 300

feet long and 40 to 50 feet deep. It was designed to absorb,

without damage, a hit by a 120mm mortar. The columns

(12' 'x12" timbers) were on 10' centers and in most cases

anchored to a 4' cube of concrete . . . The columns

supported 12''x12" caps and roof members consisting of

a layer of 8' 'x8" timbers, three laminations of 3' 'x12"

with three feet of earth and six inches of crushed rock as a

burster layer. It was air conditioned, lighted and included

some private toilet facilities. 35

Dennis assembled a force of 60 troops for the

construction of troop quarters, the division CP, and

the MLR bunker program which was to consist of

1,098 units. At the same time, other engineering

requirements ranged from clearing new areas and

building new roads to taking down strong-backed

tents, moving them, and then putting them up again.

The battalion also kept the roads open, built new

bridges, and repaired those that were down.36

On 24 August, the 7th Engineer Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Ermine L. Meeker, joined the 3d

Engineers in Vietnam. The 7th Engineers, a Force

Troops unit, had a greater heavy construction

capability. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dennis,

"The 7th Engineers were most welcome. The

engineer support tasks were just too massive and

overwhelming for a combat engineer unit."37

The 7th Engineers, unlike the 3d, operated

directly under III MAF rather than the division. *

During its first month in Vietnam, the battalion built

Company C of the 7th Engineers remained under the

operational control of the 3d Engineer Battalion. Company C of

the 1st Engineer Battalion arrived with the 7th Marines at Chu

Lai. Both engineer companies at Chu Lai were under the administrative control of the 3d Engineer Battalion.

a-
LOGISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION 189

USMC Photo A186354

A member of the 3d Engineer Battalion use a mine detector to sweep a road as South Vietnamese civilians driving

oxen veer off to the right. As evidenced by the heavy tire tracks, the road is in great use and an obvious place for

the VCto plant their mines,

a large ferry boat to carry supplies between the Da

Nang Airbase and Tiensha Peninsula and erected

two bridges spanning rivers south of Da Nang.

Monsoon weather had caused extensive flooding of

many of the main supply routes and storage dumps in

the area and better drainage facilities were required.

By the end of the month, the battalion could list 16

major projects that it had undertaken in support of

the MAF, division, and wing. These ranged from

extensive road building to the erection of 33

warehouses for the FLSG.38

During the last quarter of 1965, despite shortages

of material and repair parts, problems with

Colonel Dennis observed that material requirements ''far

outstripped our sources of supply, even though we had

requisitioned all materials via special channels." The battalion

obtained some of its material from cantonment program

supplies controlled by the Seabees, some through Marine Corps

channels, and some through local purchase. Colonel Dennis

remembered: ''I kept one SNCO in Da Nang searching for

material and a representative in Saigon performing the same

task. Without them we would not have accomplished the task.

There was a continuous material shortage." Cal Nicholas J.

Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76 (Vietnam

Comment File).

equipment, and washouts and flooding caused by the

monsoon, the 3d Engineers was able to provide effective combat and combat service support to the 3d

Division. The engineers furnished mine detection

and demolition teams in support of infantry

operations and made daily sweeps of the main supply

routes for mines and booby traps. Lieutenant Colonel

Dennis established a mine warfare course, one week

for engineer personnel and one day for other troops,

at the 3d Engineers' base area. All 3d Marine

Division replacements were required to go through

the program.

South of Da Nang, the battalion removed 16

kilometers of unused railroad rails and converted the

railroad bed into a road to become part of the

division's main supply route. By December,

Companies A and C were primarily committed to

road and bridge construction in the Da Nang TAORs

of the 3d and 9th Marines, while Company C, 7th

Engineer Battalion was involved in cutting timbers to

be used for bunkers along the division's main

defensive lines .

The construction requirements at both Da Nang

and Chu I.ai were too extensive for Marine Corps

j >—-

r

4

•1.• I'.. • •_ •—
190 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

engineering units to undertake by themselves. A

civilian construction firm worked on the expansion of

the main airfield at Da Nang, while the 30th Naval

Construction Regiment, Captain Harold F. Liberty,

USN, with four Seabee battalions built helicopter

facilities at Marble Mountain and Ky Ha. The

Marble Mountain facility construction was approved

by CinCPac in July and by 25 August MAG-16 was

operating from the base. The Seabees also built a 400-

bed hospital just west of the Marble Mountain Air

Facility, but construction there was temporarily

disrupted by the VC attack on 28 October. At Chu

Lai, Seabees, assisted by Major Kennedy's Marine

Air Base Squadron 36 and Marine engineers, built a

second helicopter air facility on the Ky Ha Peninsula.

Colonel Johnson's MAG-36 flew its first missions

from the new facility on 12 September.4°

The experience of the Seabees, who were supported by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's MABS-12

and Marine engineering units at the Chu Lai SATS

field, was typical of the frustration that the contruction units faced in South Vietnam. On 3 July,

the Seabees finished the last portion of the 8,000-foot

runway, but only a few weeks later the northern half

of the runway had to be closed because of soil erosion

under the matting. No sooner had this project been

completed than the Marines discovered that heavy

rains and sand erosion had caused the kundation of

the southern half of the runway to crumble. The

matting became wavy and disjointed, unsafe for jet

operations.4' On 25 September, the Marines closed

the southern portion of the runway and the Seabees

applied a soft cement base mixed with sand under the

AM-2 matting to try to attain stabilization.42 This

work was completed onlO November, but by that

time the northern foundation was eroding again. The

Seabees made nightly repairs, but by the end of year

it was apparent that the northern half would have to

be lifted once more and restabilized with the same

cement-sand mixture used on the southern portion.

This time the sand was packed without using any

other material, and then a light layer of asphalt was

applied over the sand. Before replacing the aluminum

matting, a thin plastic membrane was installed to

keep rain from settling in the soil and undermining

the runway.43 These efforts proved successful, and

the ''tinfoil strip'', as the runway became

nicknamed, was still in use five years after it had been

built. Not even the SATS planners at Quantico in

1955 had envisioned that a SATS field could be

constructed in such soil conditions and then used in

all types of weather for such an extended period.44

General Walt expressed his appreciation of the

engineering effort in the following terms:

Never have the Marine Engineers and the Navy CB's

been faced with more urgent and difficult problems, and

never have they responded more positively and effectively

than in the Vietnam I Corps area during 1965-66. Their

support was magnificent and of the highest professional

order. They worked as an integrated team with always the

"can do'' attitude.4'

The entire Marine logistics and support effort was

perhaps summed up best by General McCutcheon's

description of the SATS field: "It worked, but it took

some doing."
PART V

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 13

The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

Disbandment of the SLF—A New Mission—The Reestablishment of the S]IF—Command and Control

Changes—The First DAGGER THRUST Raids—Further Chan,'es in the SLF—The Sai'on Conference—

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids—The SLF at the End of the Year

Disbandment of the SLF

The landing of the 9th MEB and the deployment of

reinforcing Marine units to Vietnam during the

spring of 1965 seriously depleted the Marine forces

with the Seventh Fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Edmund

G. Derning's BLT 2/9 which had become the

Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force (SLF) battalion

in late February, was tasked as the floating reserve for

the Da Nang landing of 8 March. Derning's attached

shore party and the landing craft from the attack

transport USS Bexar (APA 237) and the landing ship

dock USS Thomaston (LSD 28) assisted in landing

the brigade's supplies and men. In addition, the

pilots of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr.'s

HMM-365, the SLF helicopter squadron on board

the amphibious assault ship USS Princeton (LPH 5),

flew their aircraft from the ship to the Da Nang Airbase. There the 23 UH-34s were turned over to

HMM-162 whose personnel arrived by KC-130 from

Okinawa. After Koler's pilots returned to the

Princeton, the ship sailed for Okinawa to take on

replacement aircraft. The other ships of the amphibious ready group (ARG) carrying the SLF,

Thomaston and Bexar, recovered their landing craft

and reembarked the BLT's shore party on 12 March

and steamed northward to rendezvous with the

Princeton.

After a seven-day port call at Hong Kong, the

force returned to Subic Bay for refurbishing of

equipment and for training. In mid-April, the SLF

was once more off the coast of Vietnam, covering the

landings of BLTs 2 / 3 and 3/4. The group then sailed

for Okinawa where both HMM-263 and BLT 2/9

disembarked. At this point, the Seventh Fleet and

FMFPac dissolved the SLF, because its amphibious

shipping was required for the landing of the 3d

Marine Amphibious Brigade at Chu Lai.

The senior Marine and Navy Pacific commanders

recognized that the disbandment of the SLF was a

temporary measure. During a visit to Vietnam and

Okinawa in May, Lieutenant General Krulak, the

FMFPac commander, met with Vice Admiral Paul

P. Blackburn, Commander Seventh Fleet; the two

agreed that the SLF should be reconstituted when

additional amphibious shipping became available.

Krulak suggested that this should take place when

the first elements of the 7th Marines arrived on

Okinawa from California.'

A New Mission

Throughout the spring, American commanders in

the Pacific discussed the possibility of employing the

Seventh Fleet's SLF in a series of amphibious raids on

VC/NVA infiltration and marshalling points along

the coast of South Vietnam. On 14 March,

representatives from MACV and the Pacific Fleet

reached an agreement in Saigon for a naval coastal

surveillance campaign, Operation MARKET TIME.

The agreement contained provisions for carrying out

amphibious raids using South Vietnamese Marines,

U.S. Marine battalions, or combined South Vietnamese and U.S. Marine forces. The MACV and

CinCPacFleet staffs were to evaluate available intelligence and agree on suitable target areas for these

raids. The first targets were to be in unpopulated

areas, which would allow the amphibious forces

relative freedom of action. After the two commands

had agreed on suitable target areas, the CinCPacFleet

staff was to prepare a concept of operations from

which the amphibious commander was to make his

detailed plans. Completed plans were then to be

submitted to ComUSMACV for his concurrence and

for South Vietnamese clearance for the raids 2

Both General Westmoreland and Admiral

Johnson ratified the results of the Saigon conference.

In their transmittal of the agreement to Admiral

193
194 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Sharp, CinCPac, on 14 May for approval, Westmoreland and Johnson observed that the planning

guide for the raids ''insofar as possible will be

Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (FM 31-

ll/NWP 22 (A))." The two commanders noted that

although the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were

to request such raids, ''in fact ComUSMACV will

stimulate RVNAF requests for operations desired by

the U.S.''3

Although General Westmoreland was enthusiastic

about the prospects of amphibious raids, he wanted

them to be conducted solely by South Vietnamese

forces.4 It soon became obvious that the South

Vietnamese Armed Forces were so overextended that

they could not carry out these operations alone. On 9

June, General Westmoreland informed Admiral

Sharp that U.S. amphibious operations would be

welcome and inquired about the status of the 14

March agreement. The CinCPac commander replied

that the agreement was still under review, but that

U.S. raids could be conducted. By mid-June,

General Krulak radioed General Walt:

We should get the SLF reconstituted as soon as possible, because it is plain that CinCPac and MACV are

getting serious about amphibious raids as a part of

MARKET TIME. I am asking CinCPacFleet to press 7th

Fleet to get the SLF shipping to Okinawa in advance of the

currently 1 July date.6

The Reestablishment of the SLF

On 19 June, FIVIFPac reactivated the Marine

special landing force for planning purposes. It was to

consist of Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley's

BLT 3/7, which had arrived on Okinawa from Camp

Pendleton, and Lieutenant Colonel Norman G.

Ewers' HMM-163, which had arrived on Okinawa

from Da Nang. Since Ewers was the senior of the

two, he became the SLF commander as well as

retaining command of his squadron. On 24 June, the

two units embarked in the ships of Task Group 76.5,

the Seventh Fleet designation for its amphibious

ready group. Commanded by Captain David A.

Scott, USN, the task group was composed of the USS

Iwo Jima (LPH 2), USS Point Defiance ([SD 31), and

the USS Talladega (APA 208). The force sailed from

Buckner Bay, Okinawa on 26 June for South

Vietnam.

Because of increased enemy activity in II Corps

during May and June and the fear of a general

Communist offensive there, the first mission of the

SLF was the protection of the U.S. Army's large

logistic facilities at Qui Nhon. General Westmoreland had requested the deployment of a Marine

battalion to Qui Nhon until U.S. infantry forces

arrived. On 1 July, Bodley's BLT 3/7 made an

administrative landing at Qui Nhon. The battalion

remained ashore for six days until relieved by

Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter's BLT 2/7.

Reembarked, the SLF remained offshore. Ewers'

squadron, flying from the Iwo Jima, provided

helicopter support for Utter's battalion at Qui Nhon.

On 20 July, HMM-163 was relieved of this support

mission when a 10-plane detachment from HMM161 arrived at Qui Nhon from Da Nang. The

ARG/SLF reverted to its role as the Pacific Fleet's

ready reserve and sailed for Subic Bay.

Command and Control Changes

At the time Seventh Fleet and FMFPac reconstituted the SLF, some changes were made in the

administrative chain of command of the fleet's

amphibious forces. With the deployment of the 3d

Marine Division and skeleton III MAF headquarters

from Okinawa to Vietnam, General Collins

relinquished the designation Commanding General,

FMF, Seventh Fleet (CG TF 79). This role was

assumed by Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson, the assistant 3d Marine Division commander, commanding the division's forces remain -

ing on Okinawa.

Admiral Blackburn wanted Henderson's

assignment as CG TF 79 to be made a primary duty;

General Krulak demurred. He explained that the

position had always been an additional duty task,

"discharged by the senior officer of those FMFPac

Forces assigned to the operational control of

Com7thFlt." According to Krulak, that senior

officer's primary mission was to the "total command

responsibilities related to his force.'' Specifically

referring to General Henderson, Krulak continued:

The obligation implicit in his duties, pivoting as they

will upon readying forces for service in Vietnam and

supervision of 3d MarDiv (Rear) administrative and

logistic matters related to support of our forces engaged in

the conflict, mitigate against changing the basic

procedure followed in the past. However, am confident

that Henderson will be able to fulfill the TF 79 responsibilities to your satisfaction following the past system,

and I will ensure that he is provided with proper staff

support to do the job.7

Krulak ended his message to Blackburn mentioning
THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET 195

Navy Photo 1142349

Ships of the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group (from left to right) the attack transport USS Bexar (APA

237), the amphibious assault ship USS Princeton (LPH 5), the dock landing ship USS Thomaston (ISD 28), and

destroyer escort USS Joseph E. Connelly (DE 450) information in the South China Sea with BLT2/9 and HMM365 embarked, in March 1965. Helicopters of HMM -3 65 fly above the ships while the Princeton's crew spell out

the groups' designations, TG 76.5 and 79,5, on the flight deck,

that he had discussed the situation with Admiral

Johnson and that the latter concurred.

Admiral Blackburn acknowledged that Henderson's primary assignment was as 3d Marine

Division assistant division commander, but he still

had certain reservations. The Seventh Fleet commander told Krulak that although they both understood the command relationships between

CGFMFSeventhFlt, CGFMFPac, and ComSeventhFIt, other might not. To avoid any misunderstanding, Blackburn suggested:

It must be understood by all concerned that CGFMFSeventhFlt as CTF 79 will be immediately responsible to ComSeventhFlt for planning and operations and, in

that context, his primary duty is a CGFMFSeventhFlt

rather than as Assistant Commander, 3d Marine

Division.8

At this point, General Krulak replied that he did

not believe any further discussion of the topic would

prove fruitful. He told Blackburn:

As you say, you and I understand the matter. There are

only two other key personages involved, Walt and

Henderson. I have ensured that they are both familiar

with . . . your order. There is no reason that I can see to

fear that Henderson will not carry out his instructions as

stated in your Op Order. Those instructions are clear,

and certainly they are binding.9

With this reply, General Krulak believed that he had

"put the whole affair on ice."°

Admiral Blackburn, nevertheless, elected, with

the concurrence of General Krulak, to activate a

second Marine FMF command within the Seventh

Fleet. On 28 June, he ordered the establishment of a

Ready Afloat Force within the fleet, which included a

Ready Afloat Marine Amphibious Brigade

(RAMAB) headquarters. This headquarters, which

at this juncture consisted of Marine Colonel Horace

E. Knapp, Jr. and a small staff, was assigned the

Navy designation TF 78. Admiral Blackburn

transferred control of the SLF from TF 79 to TF 78,

thus resulting in a change of designation for the SLF

from TG 79.5 to TG 78.5.

The Marines were not wholly satisfied with the

new command arrangements. There were, in effect,

two parallel Marine commands within the Seventh

Fleet, which blurred command responsibility.

General Henderson, as CTF 79 and CGFMFSeventh

Fleet, lost direct administrative control of the SLF,
196 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

but retained responsibility for the amphibious

readiness of the Marine forces on Okinawa. Colonel

Knapp, as Commander TF 78, reported operationally to Rear Admiral Don W. Wuizen, TF 76

commander, but administratively to FMFPac.

Lieutenant Colonel Ewers as SLF commander

retained operational control of both BLT 3/7 and his own helicopter squadron. While afloat, Ewers

reported operationally to the ARG commander and

administratively to Task Force 78.

Several of the senior Marine commanders believed

that the ensuing dilution of Marine authority within

the fleet could allow the SLF to be used for nonamphibious purposes, to the detriment of its mission.

A case in point took place on 22 July. After the SLF

had been released from its reserve role at Qui Nhon,

the Navy diverted the ships of the ARG to assist in a

salvage mission off Pratas Reef, 200 miles southeast

of Hong Kong, where the destroyer USS Frank Knox

(DD 742) had run aground. Two of the three ARG

ships, the Talladega and the Iwo Jima, remained at

the salvage site until 31 July. After a short port visit

to Hong Kong, both ships arrived back at Subic Bay

on 12 August. In the meantime, a third ARG ship,

the LSD Point Defiance, had unloaded some of its

equipment at Subic Bay to make more deckroom and

then returned to the salvage operation where it

remained until 19 August. On that date, all three

ships were ordered to sail directly to Vietnam so that

the SLF could participate in Operation STARUTE.

According to the SLF commander, splitting the

amphibious ready group resulted in leaving behind

some of the amphibious equipment unloaded by the

Port Defiance at Subic and the incremental arrival of

BLT 3/7 in the battle area."

After Operation STARLITE, General Henderson,

as TF 79 commander and senior Marine officer in the

Seventh Fleet, expressed his concern to General

Krulak about the involuntary diversion of the SLF

from training and refitting to salvage operations:

It appears that both the battalion commander and the

SLF commander were concerned about the degradation of

physical fitness of Marine personnel caused by confinement aboard ship. . . - The SLF commander although

concerned, felt that higher authority was directing these

movements with full appreciation of effect on integrity

and readiness of SLF and refrained from objecting or

coming up on the air to set forth his concern.'2

General Henderson suggested that new liaison

arrangements had to be made with both the SLF and

the Seventh Fleet so there would not be a reoccurrence of similar incidents.

Since General Henderson, as 3d Marine Division

assistant division commander, was about to depart

kr Da Nang, the responsibility for establishing the

new relationships devolved upon his successor as

CGFMFSeventhFlt, Major General I.ewis J. "Jeff"

Fields, the commanding general of the 1st Marine

Division. General Fields had assumed command of

the 1st Division on 11 August, just before its

deployment to the Western Pacific. Accompanied by

a small command group, the new division commander left California four days later for Okinawa,

stopping en route at FMFPac headquarters in

Honolulu. On 24 August, he opened the command

post of the 1st Marine Division (Fwd) on Okinawa

and at the same time assumed his new command

responsibilities in the Seventh Fleet as CG TF 79.

General Fields had his own doubts about command

relationships within the Seventh Fleet. He believed

that the organization of the SLF at the time "was still

a reflection of our peacetime activities in the Western

Pacific,'' and ''to think that whoever was senior of

the two commanders, helicopter squadron or infantry

battalion, would command the SLF as well as his own

unit was ridiculous . . . ." According to Fields, he

decided, after much discussion with his staff, that the

next SLF would be provided with an expanded

headquarters to command both the helicopter

squadron and infantry battalion, "leaving their

commanders to carry out the duties for which they

had been intended and assigned." By furnishing

such a command, Fields thought that he "would

have a commander of the force who could properly

assist, and respond to the Navy commander's

operations and plans.'"3

On 11 September, he incorporated these views in a

message to Admiral Blackburn. Fields proposed

making the RAMAB/TF 78 commander and his

staff the headquarters of the SLF. The Marine

general further suggested that, ''in order to provide

for clearer lines of communication and to accurately

portray actual relationships, I shall redesignate TG

78.5 as TG79.5.'' He then declared, ''my larger TF

79 staff will conduct all required joint planning

functions with CTF 76 as well as providing you with

advice concerning landing force matters.'' In effect,

Fields was recommending the abolishment of the

RAMAB command except as a paper designator

until that time an actual MAB was activated.'4
THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET 197

Admiral Blackburn did not concur with the

proposed alterations and stated that he would ''make

all decisions concerning the organization of the

Seventh Fleet." According to General Krulak, the

Seventh Fleet Commander misunderstood General

Fields' intentions and believed that the latter had

overreached himself. Krulak explained:

While not Blackburn's idea, the TF 78 and TG 78.5

organization made its advent under his regime, and I'm

sure he views its existence with a certain amount of

personal pride. Furthermore it has been my experience

that whereas the Navy has sometimes abused the SLF

they, at the same time, have been sensitive and jealous of

the slightest interference with it. 16

General Krulak advised General Fields "to pick up

the pieces and try to make something of it." The

FMFPac commander observed that he was not interested in ''either challenging or assuaging Blackbun, but rather in making things better for our forces

afloat." Krulak stated that the SLF had been

nialtreated and that this concerned him. In his view,

the problem stemmed, in part, from the disparity in

rank between the Navy and Marine commanders of

the amphibious forces ''and lack of an appropriate

air/ground (SLF) headquarters." Krulak recommended that Fields remind the Seventh Fleet

commander that the latter's responsibility did not

include the internal organization of the Marine Corps

forces, ''specifically the assignment of a Marine

colonel as SLF commander is outside the authority of

the operational commander."7

General Fields, in his reply to Admiral Blackburn,

remarked that he had no intention of usurping any of

the prerogatives of the Seventh Fleet commander,

but stood his ground on the reorganization of the SLF

command. He insisted that as the officer responsible

for organizing, equipping, training, and providing

forces for the SLF, he was in the best position ''to

determine who should be placed in direct command

of these forces •' ' 18 At this point, the entire question of the

organization and control of the SLF was held in

abeyance. General Fields stated that for the time

being he would hold off the transfer of the commander of the RAMAB to the SLF. On the other

hand, Admiral Blackburn, who wanted two SLFs in

the Seventh Fleet, which would justify an amphibious brigade headquarters, was denied this

request by CinCPacFlt. Admiral Johnson informed

Blackburn that with the continuing commitment to

Vietnam there were neither enough Marine troops or

helicopters in the Western Pacific to form a second

SLF.'9

In the meantime, some changes had occurred in

the unit composition of the SLF. After STARLITE

and a short refurbishing visit to Subic Bay, BLT 3/7

was unloaded at Chu Lai and was attached to III

MAF in early September. The ARG sailed for

Okinawa where it embarked Lieutenant Colonel

Robert T. Hanifin 's BLT 2 / 1, the new SLF battalion.

HMM-163 was retained as the SLF helicopter

squadron and Lieutenant Colonel Ewers still kept his

"two hats" as commander of the SLF and the

squadron. The ARG/SLF returned to Vietnamese

waters on 10 September as the covering force for the

landing of the U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division

(Airmobile) at Qui Nhon.

The First DAGGER THRUST Raids

While off Qui Nhon, the SLF prepared to carry out

the first of the long delayed series of amphibious raids

in support of the MARKET TIME anti-infiltration

operations. Since June, CinCPac, CinCPacFJt,

Seventh Fleet Amphibious Forces, and MACV had

worked out the details of the raids, to be known as

DAGGER THRUST. In late July, Admiral Sharp

approved the outline plans for three DAGGER

THRUST raids, as well as the implementation of the

14 March MAC V-CinCPacFlt anti-infiltration

agreement. In accordance with this agreement, the

raids were to be quick thrusts by the SLF into

suspected enemy concentration points followed by

immediate retraction of the landing force.

Established amphibious doctrine dictated that the

Navy amphibious commander would retain control

of the Marine forces -ashore since no permanent

beachhead was to be established. Admiral Blackburn

designated Rear Admiral Don W. Wulzen, CTF 76,

as the amphibious task force commander for the

DAGGER THRUST mission. By mid-September,

Wulzen had completed his detailed landing plans

and, on 21 September, General Westmoreland

obtained South Vietnamese clearance for the first

raids.

This series of DAGGER THRUST operations was

to consist of three raids in rapid succession on widely

dispersed coastal objective areas. After carrying out

the first raid on the Vung Mu Peninsula, 20 miles

south of Qui Nhon, the SLF was to strike a second

target 50 miles to the south in the Ben Goi area, 27
198 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Navy Photo K-32579

Marines from BLT2/1 return to their quarters on board the Iwo Jima (LPH2)afierdebarkingfrom HMM-163's

helicopters. They have just completed DAGGER THRUST I, the first of a series of amphibious raids against

suspected enemy concentration points, which took place in September 1965 on the Vung Mu Peninsula, 20 miles

south of Qui Nhon.

miles north of Nha Trang. The third obective was

Tam Quan, 30 miles south of Quang Ngai City. All

three DAGGER THRUST raids were to take place in

as brief a period as circumstances permitted.

On 22 September, the command ship USS Estes

(AGC 12), Admiral Wuizen's flagship, and the high

speed transport USS Diachenko (APD 123) rendezvoused with the ships of the ARG off Qui Nhon.

Colonel Edwin G. Winstead, who had relieved

Colonel Knapp as commander of the RAMAB/TF78 after STARLITE, had joined Admiral Wuizen on

board the USS Fstes and was the designated commander of the landing force, the Marine counterpart

to the amphibious task force commander. The task

force then proceeded to Chu Lal where the SLF

carried out a dress rehearsal for DAGGER THRUST

on the 2 3d. After reembarkation, the task force was

joined by two destroyers, the USS Mason (DD 852)

and the USS Small (DD 838), and steamed for Vung

Mu, the first target.

All three DAGGER THRUST raids were disappointing. During DAGGER THRUST I, the

SLF landed over the beach and by helicopter on the

morning of 25 September. After searching the

peninsula and finding no sign of the enemy battalion

that was supposed to be there, the Marines reembarked and sailed for Ben Goi Bay. During

DAGGER THRUST II, Lieutenant Colonel

Hanifin's BLT did not even land. Three Marine

reconnaissance teams from a force reconnaissance

detachment, embarked on board the Iwo Jima,

transferred to the Diachenko , and then, accompanied

by South Vietnamese UDT personnel, went ashore

in small boats on the evening of 27 September. One

team lost radio contact, but the helicopters of HMM163 found it.2° Since none of the teams had reported

'4

— —

I
THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET 199

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DAGGER THRUST lU

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25 Sep 1965

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Phan Thiet

Ben Goi 21 Sep 1965

OAGGER THRUST II

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DAGGER THRUST IV

DAGGER THRUST

OPERATIONS

1965

Miles

K horn tiers

o 100 ISO

0 50 100 200
200 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Navy Photo 1117017

Marines from BLT2/1 land near Tam Quan, 30 miles south of Quang Ngai City, during DAGGER THRUSTIII.

The battalion encountered a small VCguerrilla force during the operation.

any enemy and the Marines had lost the element of

surprise, Admiral Wulzen decided to cancel the

landing. The battalion came ashore at Tam Quan on

1 October for DAGGER THRUST Ill and met some

resistance from local guerrillas. The next day

lieutenant Colonel Hanifin received orders ''to

break contact and withdraw. ''21 As the Pacific

Command's contingency force, Admiral Sharp had

ordered the SLF to be reembarked and sail for

Indonesian waters where Communist forces had

attempted to overthrow the government. The first

DAGGER THRUST series was over.

Colonel Ewers observed that although he believed

the overall concept was valid, the DAGGER

THRUST operations revealed several limitations,

especially in planning and command relations. The

SLF commander declared that the intelligence was

dated and that the SLF/ARG staffs should have been

more involved in the planning. He claimed that the

detailed scheme of maneuver prepared at the amphibious task force commander's level allowed

almost no flexibility on the part of the BLT commander. Ewers concluded:

In amphibious raiding the initiative is ours and there is

no compelling reason to rush from target to target. . .BLT

planners were harried by changes and the urgent

requirements of naval counterparts 22

Ewers' position was supported by other Marine

commanders. In a later report, General Krulak also

maintained that the raid concept was sound,

declaring that ''raids cause VC in an area to move

• . . exhibit a U.S. presence . . . and . . . serve as ex- cellent training for battalions to be committed . . • like Ewers, the FMFPac commander was of the

opinion that "the full impact of these benefits has not

been realized . . . a review of target intelligence and

planning procedures would appear prudent.' '23

Further Changes in the SLF

Several changes occurred in October following the

release of the ARG/SLF from the Indonesian alert.

Captain Thomas R. Weschler, USN, relieved

Captain Scott as the ARG commander. There was

also an exchange of amphibious shipping. The new

ARG consisted of the USS Valley Forge (LPH 8),

USS Montrose (APA 212), and USS Monticello

(LSD 35). At the same time, 11 October, Lieutenant

Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 replaced

HMM-163 as the SLF helicopter squadron and

Porter also relieved Ewers as the SLF commander.

The relief of units and shipping was relatively

routine and had been planned for some time, but

Generals Krulak and Fields took this occasion to

institute their long-delayed restructuring of the SLF

command and staff. On 17 October, General Krulak

notified Headquarters Marine Corps that ''due to

—U..'. A
THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET 201

accelerated tempo . . increased complexity of

command and control, and for continuity," General

Fields was assigning a Marine colonel "with an

initial staff of 3 officers and 5 enlisted men'' to the

SLF.24 General Fields decided to make his IT 79 chief

of staff, Colonel John R. Burnett, the new SLF

commander, rather than Colonel Winstead, who

remained as TF 78 and RAMAB commander.

According to General Fields:

It was obvious that the commander of the RAMAB

was of little consequence to me at the time and particularly to the operations of the SLF. He, naturally,

could advise CTF 76, but he could never command the

SLF as such. I decided to let him be and designated my

Chief of Staff, Colonel Burnett, who had been a naval

aviator and was an excellent solid Marine versed in all

aspects of operations in the area, as Commander of the

SLF.2'

The SLF kept the 78.5 designator, and thus, on

paper, remained subordinate to RAMAB. Nevertheless, Krulak and Fields, without directly

challenging Admiral Blackburn, not only

strengthened the SLF commander's position vis-a-vis

his Navy counterpart, but made the RAMAB

headquarters obviously superfluous. Colonel Burnett

assumed command of the SLF from Lieutenant

Colonel Porter on 18 October. With the SLF

reconstituted and restructured, American planners

began discussing a second series of DAGGER

THRUST raids.

The Saigon Conference

The Marines were not the only ones who were

unhappy with the command and control of the SLF

and the DAGGER THRUST raids. During a discussion with General Walt in July, General

Westmoreland indicated his dissatisfaction with the

limited authority he enjoyed over the force.26 The

MACV commander wanted an arrangement in

which it would be unnecessary for him to go to the

Seventh Fleet when he wanted the SLF. Furthermore, MACV and CinCPacFlt had debated,

since the Chu Lai landing in May, what criteria

should be used to establish an amphibious objective

area (AOA) during an amphibious landing or raid in

Vietnam. According to doctrine, the amphibious

task force commander controlled all air, land, and sea

forces in the geographical area delineated as the

AOA during an amphibious operation. In Vietnam,

this raised two specific questions which impinged

upon Westmoreland's authority and South Vietnam 's sovereignty "the control of air traffic within

the AOA. . . and coordination with friendly ground

forces who are conducting operations inland within

the perimeter of the AOA. ''27

After the first DAGGER THRUST raids, on 8

October General Westmoreland proposed a joint

MAC V-CinCPacFleet conference in Saigon to

discuss the raids and to plan future ones. He

suggested a 10-point agenda which induded critiques

of DAGGER THRUST I, II, and III from both

Seventh Fleet and MACV perspectives; intelligence

for furture raids; target acquisitions; and "resolution

of amphibious objective area and restricted air space

problems for future raids."28 Admiral Johnson'

agreed to the conference and added some agenda

items of his own. The CinCPacFleet Commander,

flke General Westmoreland, wanted to resolve the

AOA problem and was willing to make some concessions. He directed that Navy and FMFPac representatives to the conference hold to a ''Navy/Marine

position which will allow flexibility within the AOA,

but will not weaken the doctrine.

The conference took place on 26-28 October 1965

in Saigon. Captain Weschler, the ARG comander, as

the senior officer present, served as chairman. There

were representatives from the various MACV

component commands, induding HI MAF and 2d

Air Division, as well as the amphibious commands

under the jurisdiction of CinCPacFleet. During the

two-day meeting, the conferees came to several

understandings. They agreed on three specific targets

for the next series of DAGGER THRUST raids, but

at the same time called for a revision of the criteria

for establishing targets. They planned for the new

series of raids to take place from 25 November

through 7 December and allowed that "predicated

on the early approval and dissemination of revised

target list and success of in-country briefings, the

requirement for specific raid notification can be

reduced" from 60 to 24 hours. They settled the

sensitive issue of command and control of air and

ground units in the AOA by simply reducing the

AOAs used during the previous DAGGER

THRUST raids "to a 10-mile arc inland and a 25-

mile arc seaward unless specific target situation

dictates an increase.'' This decision satisfied both

sides, for the time being. MACV could work with

the restrictions imposed on it by the 10-mile inland
202 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

arc, while the reduced AOA still permitted the Navy

amphibious task force commander to control naval

gunfire and other supporting arms including

aviation. The amphibious commander was to reserve

a 10-nautical-mile-wide air corridor at an altitude of

7,000 to 10,000 feet for civilian aircraft. This

compromise was possible without any violation of

amphibious doctrine since the chances of any enemy

air opposition were nil and because of the limited

range of the VC antiaircraft weapons 30

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids

By 10 November both Admiral Johnson and

General Westmoreland approved the recom - mendations of the Saigon conference and the Seventh

Fleet amphibious forces began preparing for the next

DAGGER THRUSTs. After completion of detailed

plans on 26 November, the ARG/SLF, which earlier

in the month had been the floating reserve for the

BLUE MARUN operations, sailed for the DAGGER

THRUST IV amphibious objective area, Lang Ke

Ga, in HI Corps. This VC-controlled and suspected

infiltration point was on the coast, 90 miles east of

Saigon.

For DAGGER THRUST IV, the Marines and

Navy had made some more changes in command and

control. Although Admiral Wuizen in the USS Eldorado (AGC 11) had joined the amphibious task

group, Captain Weschler, the ARG commander,

retained his position as amphibious task force

commander. Colonel Burnett, the SLF commander,

was to be the commander of the landing force, unlike

the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids when this

position was assumed by the TF 78/RAMAB

commander. Admiral Blackburn had bowed to the

inevitable and, on 24 November, announced his

intention to dissolve TF 78. In the interim, he made

General Fields commander of both TF 78 and TF

7931

DAGGER THRUST IV followed the same pattern

as the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids. On 30

November, the SLF battalion landed as planned at

Lang Ke Ga, but, with the exception of scattered tank

traps in the beach area and isolated incidents of small

arms fire, it encountered no opposition. The next day

the battalion reembarked, ending the operation, with

no casualties to either side.

The final DAGGER THRUST raid, DAGGER

THRUST V began on 5 December near the Phu Thu

Navy Photo 1114070A

Marines of BLT 2/1 run to board HMM-261 helicopters on board the Valley Forge (LPH8) during Operation

DAGGER THRUST V, in December 1965 The white -capped Navy crewman in the left forefront has just led the

Marines to their specific helicopter.

—7
THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET 203

village complex, 40 miles north of Qui Nhon. This

time the battalion was moderately successful, surprising a small VC force. During the two-day

operation, the Marines killed 26 enemy and detained

38 suspects. The Marine battalion sustained

casualties of three dead and 10 wounded. In

retrospect, the DAGGER THRUST raids failed to

achieve their overall objective, the quick exploitation

of intelligence and resulting contact with large

enemy formations. Admiral Johnson, several years

later, observed:

The excessive time involved in planning and coordinating with the MACV levels resulted in completely

stale intelligence. Furthermore, by the time MACV had

completed his all important coordination and alerting of

ARVN forces and Province Chiefs, we had also completely spooked the VC and they had flown the coop.32

The SLF at the End of the Year

Following the completion of DAGGER THRUST

V, Colonel Burnett attended the final III MAF

planning briefing for Operation HARVEST MOON

on 8 December. General Walt had requested that the

SLF be assigned as the reserve force for the multibattalion U.S. Marine-ARVN operation in the Que

Son Valley. The enemy was the old STARLITE foe,

the 1st VC Regiment, Both MACV and CinCPacFlt

approved the request, and the SLF helicopter squadron was committed to the operation on 9 December.

The infantry battalion landed the next day. When the

operation ended on 19 December, the SLF reembarked in its shipping. Hanifin's battalion suffered 12

dead and 52 wounded during the extended operation.

After HARVEST MOON, the SLF underwent

further changes in unit composition and designation.

On 21 December, Hanifin's battalion was unloaded

at the mouth of the Hue River and replaced

lieutenant Colonel Sumner A. Vale's 3d Battalion,

4th Marines at Phu Bai. The latter battalion embarked on the SLF ships for a return voyage to

Okinawa as a unit of the FMFPac intratheater

transplacement program. At the same time, Vice

Admiral John J. Hyland, who had relieved Admiral

Blackburn earlier in the month as Seventh Fleet

commander, officially dissolved the RAMAB/TF 78

headquarters. The SLF assumed the fleet designation

TG 79.5 and reported administratively to General

Fields in his capacity as CG TF 79. On 29 December,

BLT 3/4 landed at Okinawa and on New Year's

Eve, BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

William K. Horn, became the new SLF battalion."

During the year, the SLF proved its value as a

mobile floating reserve. Although the results of the

DAGGER THRUST raids were less than expected,

the SLF air and ground units played important roles

in both STARLITE and HARVEST MOON. The

SLF served as a successful contingency force for the

Qui Nhon landing in July, and, later in the year,

during the Indonesian crisis. By the end of 1965, the

organizational problems with the Navy had been

resolved and some of the doctrinal debates with

MACV had been temporarily put aside. Nevertheless the questions about the extent of the amphibious objective area and command and control of

forces in the AOA would continue to arise periodically for the rest of the war.

* The former Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Roy L.

Johnson, remarked: "Command relationships and who

exercised operational control over what, where, and when were

controversial in varying degrees from the very beginning of

active involvement of U. S. forces in N. and S. Vietnam." In

reference to the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces, the former

CinCPacFlt stated that the "ARG/SLF was kicked around and

whipsawed more than any other operational unit that I can

think of." Admiral Johnson declared that much of this "had

its genesis in the CTF 79/78 arguments.'' He did not believe

that the establishment of TF 78 (RAMAB) was a good

solution, but stated that Admiral Blackburn did not have

''very many options open to him.'' Admiral Johnson faulted

the Marines for not being willing to appoint a full time CTF 79

(Commanding General, FMF Seventh Fleet), and this failure,

the former Pacific Fleet commander claimed, seriously diluted

"the command prerogative of Com7thFlt He also

observed that ''There were others who had designs on control

of the SLF, notably MACV, who did not want to be bothered

with going through any [other] command if he wanted to use

them in some emergency of his determination.'' Adm Roy L.

Johnson, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Aug77 (Vietnam

Comment File). Admiral John J. Hyland, who relieved

Admiral Blackburn as Commander Seventh Fleet in November

1965, commented in the same vein as Admiral Johnson: ''The

potential problem with the SLF had nothing to do with its

performance or its excellence or its utilization. The difficulty

was principally a political one between Navy and Army doctrine. . . . Specifically with regard to the SLF the Army wanted

operational control. I always felt that once they had been given

it they never would have released it, and the SLF would simply

become another Army unit ashore. We would never be able to

get it back aboard ship for use in some other area which might

be more important.'' Adm John J. Hyland, Comments on

draft MS, dtd 3Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 14

Advisors and Other Marine Activities

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps—Marine Advisors to the Rung Sat Special Zone—

US Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group—Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters in Saigon —

Company L, Marine Support Battalion—Embassy Marines

Marine Advisors to the

Vietnamese Marine Corps

The Marine Corps principal advisory effort outside

of I Corps was with the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

Headquartered in Saigon and under the operational

control of the MACV Naval Advisory Group, the

Marine Advisory Unit, commanded by Colonel

William P. Nesbit, functioned as the advisory liaison

link between the South Vietnamese Marines and the

American command. At the beginning of 1965, the

Marine Advisory Unit had an authorized strength of

19 officers and one enlisted man. The Marine

Advisory Unit consisted of the senior Marine advisor, his deputy, 5 major or captain infantry battalion advisors, 1 captain artillery advisor, and 10

lieutenant advisors, 6 of whom served as assistant

advisors to the battalions. The remaining four

lieutenants served as motor transport, supply, corn -

munications, and engineer advisors. One noncommissioned officer served as the unit's administrative

assistant *

At this time the South Vietnamese Marine Corps

consisted of a Marine brigade (VNMB) of five infantry battalions supported by its own artillery and

amphibious support battalions. The Commandant,

Brigadier General Le Nguyen Khang, who had led

the Vietnamese Marines since 1960 except for a short

three-month period following the Diem coup, was

also the Commander of the Capital Military Region,

Saigon and the surrounding area, and reported

'MACV strength reports of 31 December 1964 listed the

actual strength of the Marine Advisory Unit as 22 officers and

seven enlisted. Seven of these Marines were performing temporary duty as on-the-job trainees from the 3d Marine Division. This program ended in April 1965.

204

directly to the Joint General Staff.** The Vietnamese Marine battalions together with the South

Vietnamese airborne brigade made up the nation's

strategic reserve, and normally operated as ''fire

brigade'' reinforcements wherever needed in

Vietnam. One Marine battalion always remained

near Saigon, ostensibly to protect the capital.

Although Khang was responsible for administrative

and logistic support of his units, he had operational

control only over those battalions in the Capital

Military Region.

The South Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC)

had suffered its worst defeat of the war on 31

December 1964, when the 9th VC Division

eliminated the 4th Battalion of the VNMC as an

effective fighting force near Binh Gia, a Catholic

resettlement village 40 miles east of Saigon. * * Major I..ane Rogers, advisor to the 3d VNMC

Battalion, who had volunteered on 1 January to go to

Binh Gia and assist with the evacuation of the dead

and wounded, recalled:

The next three days were spent searching for bodies;

we found mote than 100 (friendlies) and no VC. - - - The

body hunt was a mess. It was stinking hot and you could

not get away from the smell. . - . The third day, after

finally getting bodybags - - - we bagged up the 4th Battalion bodies.1

Rogers remembered that Colonel Nguyen Thanh

Yen, the Assistant Commandant of the Vietnamese

Marine Corps, was in charge of the body recovery

operation and had issued "vats of local saki" to the

* On 5 January, the Vietnamese Marine Corps became a

separate service from the Vietnamese Navy, although for a

two-week period in April General Khang also served as the

Navy CNO when the Joint General Staff ousted the then CNO,

Rear Admiral Chung Tan Cang.

***See Whitlow, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64, for a

detailed account of the Binh Gia battle.
ADVISORS AND OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 205

USMC Photo A186435

Colonel John A. MacNeil, senior Marine advisor,

inspects Vietnamese Marines' M-1 rifles, Material

readiness was a matter of primary concern for the

Marine Advisory Unit in 1965.

working party, all survivors from the 4th Battalion.

The American Marine advisor later remarked:

We were all sick . . . (and so you can guess what the

''bag detail" was like). That evening we loaded troops

and bodies into about ten 6x6s and drove off to Vung Tau.

As we made the turn at Ba Ria onto Route 15 . . . one of

the body bags rolled off one of the trucks. The messy

recovery action drew a crowd and the wailing started. The

word was Out that the 4th Battalion was wiped out.2

The results of Binh Gia were an ominous portent

for 1965. MACV and the South Vietnamese command feared that the Viet Cong Communists might

be ready to enter into the final phase of their war to

take over the county. At the time, no one knew the

exact size of the enemy force that had defeated the

government units at Binh Gia. Rumors abounded,

including one that the VC had been led by a general

riding a white horse. Even discounting such stories,

the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff knew the

enemy force had been larger than any encountered

before, although it was not until later that MACV

learned that the Communists had formed the 9th VC

Division from two independent regiments. After

clearing the Binh Gia battlefield, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff ordered a joint airborne

and Marine operation to find and destroy the

Communist attacking force. In response to the Joint

General Staff order, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade

launched Operation NGUYEN VAN NHO, named

after the slain commander of the 4th Battalion.

General Khang committed all three of his effective

infantry battalions (the 5th Battalion was still being

formed) to the operation. He maintained one battalion in reserve near the brigade's headquarters at

Vung Tau while establishing a two-battalion task

force headquarters under Colonel Yen at Ba Ria

(Phouc Le), 14 miles to the north. The two forward

battalions then swept a 25-square-mile area extending

10 miles northeast of Ba Ria and including Binh Gia.

The results of the operation, which lasted until 7

February, were disappointing. According to Colonel

Nesbit, NGUYEN VAN NHO, under brigade

control, revealed the weaknesses of the brigade staff

in directing a large force in the field and the

"inadequacy of the brigade TO [Table of

Organization] for sustained operations." In order to

fully man the advisory staff billets for the two

headquarters, FMFPac provided eight Marine officers and 11 enlisted men while MACV sent two

officers and seven enlisted men. Although this

improvised American advisory staff quickly

established itself at Vung Tau "and functioned

well,'' Colonel Nesbit described the operation ''as

one of cautious defense, and therefore not eminently

successful in destroying VC.'' Another Marine

advisor, Major William G. Leftwich, Jr., called the

operation ''lethargic'' and observed that the task

force headquarters played a static role while the ''two

battalions operated sometimes independently and

sometimes in concert."4 Even more bluntly, Major

Rogers provided the following description of the

operation:

[Colonel] Yen was TF Commander at Ba Ria, while

General Khang commanded from Vung Tau. . . . I was

(briefly, thank God) TF advisor to Yen at Ba Ria and did

nothing there, nor did Yen. . . . We found no VC, no

caches, no traces, nothing. Reportedly the VC were long

gone. I was told the Airborne [operating north of the

Marines] did find some rice. As for the ''VC general,"

the "VC Division,'' the general's "white horse,'' we

never saw a sign.

Following the end of NGUYEN VAN NHO, the

Joint General Staff ordered General Khang to send a

VNMC task force to II Corps to bolster the ARVN

forces holding Binh Dinh Province. Once more

Colonel Yen commanded the task force headquarters, now called Task Force ALPHA. Absorbing

some of the lessons learned during the NGUYEN

VAN NHO campaign, TF ALPHA consisted of a

72-man headquarters and two infantry battalions, the
206 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

1st and 3d, and totaled 1,360 men. The Marine

Advisory Unit also beefed up its advisory effort to the

task force by providing a two-man headquarters team

headed by Major Leftwich in addition to the fourbattalion advisors. Arriving at Bong Son, Yen

reported to the Commanding General, 22d ARVN

Division.

On 9 March, Task Force ALPHA had its first

significant encounter with the enemy. Yen's

Marines evaded a planned ambush by the 2d VC

Regiment. The VNMC force had been ordered south

from Bong Son that day to provide relief for the

besieged district town of Hat An. Before leaving

Bong Son, Yen learned from intelligence sources that

while one VC battalion had entered the town,

another had been positioned along the road to ambush any relief column. The Marine force conducted

a 10-mile forced march and struck the flank of the VC

ambush.

Major Leftwich played a significant role in the

action that followed. Before leaving Bong Son, the

Marine advisor arranged for tactical air support and

when contact was established with the Viet Cong late

that afternoon, he moved forward with the assault

elements to control air strikes against the enemy

positions. As darkness set in, the outmaneuvered

enemy disengaged, leaving behind 63 dead. Thus,

the Marines had forced the relief of Hai An. Task

Force ALPI-IA casualties were four killed and 11

wounded, including the two headquarters advisors;

Major Leftwich was wounded, and his assistant, First

Lieutenant Dempsey H. Williams, was killed.6 * * One month later, the 2d VNMC Battalion tangled

with the 2d VC Regiment. * * * At midnight on 7

April, elements of the 93d, 95th, and 97th Viet Cong

* Although the authorized strength of the battalions was 931 men each, in 1965 Marine battalions only reached this strength

when they returned to their base camps; a field strength of 600

was not uncommon. Each battalion maintained its own base

camp and a handful of troops, including wounded, remained

behind as guards and logistic and administrative support.

* * For their actions, Major Leftwich was awarded the Navy

Cross and Lieutenant Williams posthumously awarded the

Silver Star Medal. Major Leftwich returned to his duties as

Task Force ALPHA senior advisor on 25 March after 17 days

hospitalization.

The 2d Battalion had replaced the 3d on 9 March.

Throughout 1965, the battalions of Task Force ALPHA

rotated about every three months between other assignments

and II Corps.

Battalions struck the defensive position of the

Vietnamese Marines. The battle raged for five hours

during which the Vietnamese Leathernecks repulsed

10 consecutive waves of attackers. As daylight

neared, the 2d VC Regiment withdrew leaving

behind 59 dead, 10 wounded, and 71 weapons.

Intelligence sources later stated that the Viet Cong

had carried away another 70 dead and over 200

wounded. Marine losses were remarkably low

considering the ferocity of the action. Four Marines

had been killed and 22 wounded. For its heroic stand,

the 2d VNMC Battalion was later awarded the U.S.

Presidential Unit Citation .

Task Force ALPHA, which remained in II Corps

for the balance of 1965, fought one other significant

engagement with the enemy. On the 5th of August,

the Special Forces camp at Duc Co near the Cambodian border was attacked by a VC regiment. Three

days later, Task Force ALPHA and an ARVN armored task force, departed Pleiku to relieve the Duc

Co garrison. The next day, they came into heavy

contact with a NVA battalion dug in astride Route

19. The South Vietnamese attacked and dislodged

the enemy, only to have the rear of the column attacked by another reinforced NVA battalion. Battered by air strikes all night long, the enemy unit,

later identified as the 32d NVA Regiment, launched

a final attack at dawn and then withdrew from the

battlefield. The next day, the South Vietnamese

moved into Duc Co and broke the siege. The South

Vietnamese infantry, with the support of U.S. and

VNAF air strikes, claimed to have killed over 400 of

the enemy and captured 71 weapons. VNMC losses

were 28 killed, 60 wounded, and 3 missing.

Significantly, the 5th VNMC Battalion, which had

become operational on 22 May and then replaced the

2d Battalion two weeks later, had acquitted itself well

in this its first major combat action. The battle was

the first major contact with North Vietnamese forces

operating in South Vietnam.8

While two VNMC battalions operated continuously with Task Force ALPHA, the other infantry battalions also saw extensive action. Two were

assigned as a major reaction force to be used

anywhere in South Vietnam while the remaining one

was held near Saigon under the control of General

Khang in his capacity as Capital Military Region

commander.

Several indications of increased combat effectiveness began to appear after mid-year. In
ADVISORS AND OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 207

USMC Photo A 186439

Captain William H, Bond, senior Marine advisor to

the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, checks

machine gun alinement with Captain Do Dinh

Vuong, commander of the battalion 's 4th Company.

Note the Vietnamese Marine Corps insignia on

Captain Do 's cap.

November 1965, the two-battalion Task Force

ALPHA achieved a casualty ratio of five to one in

favor of the Marines. On 10 November, the 3d

Battalion participated with the 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines in an amphibious landing from Seventh

Fleet Ships during Operation BLUE MARLIN.

South Vietnamese Marine morale was on the rise, as

evidenced by a declining desertion rate in the second

half of 1965.

Many problems still remained especially in

logistics, administration, delegation of authority,

unit training, and assumption of responsibility by

junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Both

Colonel Nesbit and his successor, Colonel John A.

MacNeil, who relieved Nesbit in September, continued to work on correcting shortcomings.9

The senior Marine advisors, supported by General

Westmoreland, objected to a Joint General Staff midyear plan to form a sixth Marine battalion in the fall

of 1965. Colonel Nesbit pointed out to General

Khang that it would be best to wait until July 1966

''when the present five battalions woild be better

operationally and some prior planning could be

done. '"° Khang accepted the American advice and

postponed the formation of the 6th VNMC Battalion

until 1966. The South Vietnamese Marine staff and

the Marine Advisory Unit, nevertheless, continued

to plan for the expansion of the South Vietnamese

Marine Corps.

The Marine Advisory Unit also grew in size,

corresponding with the expansion and planned

expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. In

May, five more billets were added to the advisdry

unit. These included: an operations officer/task force

advisor (major); an amphibious support advisor

(major); an administrative specialist (warrant officer); an administrative clerk (corporal); and a

supplyman (staff sergeant). In November, MACV

authorized two Marine advisors for the planned 6th

Vietnamese Marine battalion and a Navy chief

hospital corpsman was added as medical advisor. By

the end of 1965, the Marine Advisory Unit had an

authorized strength of 24 officers, 1 warrant officer,

and 4 enlisted men."

Marine Advisors to the Rung Sat Special Zone

The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) was an area of

about 400 square miles, 85 percent of which is dense

mangrove swamp. Literally translated, Rung Sat

means ''assassins' forest'' and was so named because

of the bandits and rebels who inhabited its marshlands. It lies along the Long Tao River which connects Saigon with the South China Sea.

On 15 April 1964, responsibility for the Rung Sat

was assigned to the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). Lieutenant Commander Nguyen Van Tai, a former

VNMC major, was assigned to command the 1,200-

man military garrison which consisted of six

Regional Force companies, 13 Popular Force

platcons, and one river boat company (eight LCVPs).

Since all Rung Sat operations would be amphibious

efforts and the VNN had been assigned primary

responsibility for the area, the U.S. Naval Advisory

Group requested U.S. Marines to advise the VietThe MACV history shows the actual strength of the

Marine Advisory Unit on 31 December 1965 as 25 officers and

five enlisted. MACV ComdHist 1965, p. 90.

-?\ L.

•. A..'

. .I
208 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

namese forces. The advisory staff consisted of a U.S.

Marine major as senior military advisor to the Rung

Sat Special Zone and a headquarters team of three

officers and two enlisted and two subsector teams,

each with one officer and three enlisted.'2

Major Edward J. Bronars, who arrived in Vietnam

during the summer of 1964, was the first senior

military advisor to the Rung Sat Special Zone. On 30

July 1965, Major Albert C. Smith, Jr., succeeded

Bronars as the senior advisor and remained in that

position through the end of the year. During this

period, the authorized number of U.S. advisors in the

Rung Sat was reduced to nine, eight Marines and one

Navy corpsman. In addition to the billet of senior

advisor, there were two other officer billets, an infantry advisor and an intelligence advisor. The five

enlisted billets were operations, intelligence,

psychlogical warfare, communication, and Navy

hospital corpsman.'3 *

Advisor duties encompassed aiding the Vietnamese in planning and executing small amphibious

operations to rid the Rung Sat of the Viet Cong

hiding in its swamps. Advisors accompanied the

Vietnamese troops on all operations. The Marines

also arranged for coordinated aerial observation of the

Rung Sat, close air support of operations, and naval

gunfire spotters and liaison personnel whenever U.S.

warships were available for support. Requests for

medical evacuation, flare ship support, photo

reconnaissance, and command and control helicopter

support were also initiated by the advisory staff.'4

U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group

In September 1964, the Marine Corps agreed to

furnish 60 Marines to the I Corps Advisory Group to

assist the U.S. Army in advising the 1st and 2d

ARVN Divisions. These 24 officer and 36 enlisted

billets were intermingled with the Army advisory

positions of the 1st through 6th ARVN Regiments

and the artillery battalions of both divisional and

corps artillery.

General Westmoreland proposed to General

Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant, during the

$ The MACV Strength Report 1Jan65, dtd 11Jan65, p. 77,

indicates that the advisory staff of the Rung Sat Special Zone on

1 January consisted of 13 Marines, seven permanently assigned

to fill nine permanent billets and six assigned under long-term

temporary duty (in excess of 120 days).

USMC Photo A 186444

Communications advisor to the Rung Sat Special

Zone, Marine Sergeant Raymond S. Komo, stands

guard on the banks of the Long Tao River as a

Vietnamese Regional Force mortar team sets up. The

long Tao was the northern tributary feeding into the

Rung Sat.

latter's visit to Saigon in April 1965, that the Marine

Corps should take over the entire advisory

responsibility for ICTZ. This proposal would have

raised the number of Marine advisors in I Corps to

about 800 men." The plan was never implemented,

but on 7 August General Walt assumed the role of

senior U.S. advisor to I Corps and became responsible for the U .S. military advisory effort in the five

northern provinces. The makeup of the I Corps

advisory group remained predominately Arrny.

* * The exact number of Marines serving as advisors in I Corps

is not known. The authors have not been able to uncover any

Joint Table of Distribution for the I Corps Advisory Group that

would provide this information. Furthermore, all Marine

advisors in 1965 administratively were carried on the roles of

Headquarters Battalion, HQMC. The unit diary entries for

many of these Marines do not indicate the assignment to a

specific unit, but simply state "assigned to advisory duty

MACV.'' MACV strength figures show a total of 98 Marines

serving in an advisory capacity on 31 December 1965

throughout Vietnam. (MACV ComdHist, 1965, Table -11-6).

A MACV Joint Table of Distribution for the Naval Advisory

Group shows 53 Marines authorized to that command including the Marines in the Rung Sat and serving as advisors to

the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMACV, US Naval

Advisory Group, Joint Table of Distribution, dtd 15Nov65

(OAB, NHD). Presumably 45 Marines were serving as advisors in I Corps.
ADVISORS AND OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 209

USMC Photo A183650

Major Charles ''Uncle Charles'' K. Whitfield, artillery advisor (on the left of the picture), and his assistants,

Captain Richard J. Coogan (extreme right) and Staff Sergeant Ronald M, Blakely (third from right) supervise gun

laying. During 1965, the Vietnamese Marine artillery battalion was converting from the 75mm pack howitzer to

the 1 05 mm ho wit zer as pictured.

The Marines in the I Corps Advisory Group were

assigned to battalion advisory teams consisting of two

officers, a noncommissioned officer, and a radioman.

Marine captains occupied positions as senior battalion advisors, while lieutenants became assistant

battalion advisors. The Marine infantry and artillery

noncommissioned officers served as weapons advisors, and the Marine radiomen manned the advisor

communications network.

The role of advisor to the Vietnamese Armed

Forces during 1965 was a difficult task, but one with

many rewards. Major I.etfwich, after serving with

the Marine Advisory Unit, provided the following

advice to future Marine advisors, and indeed any

advisor:

So much has been written about the advisory business

that I felt some sort of mystic aura has grown up around

the much overworked subject of "rapport." My modest

experience with the Vietnamese, and that of many others,

is that they generally recognize, admire, and respond to

the same qualities that we—or any nationality do. There

are peculiar customs to be sure, but these are insignificant

beside those characteristics that transcend all boundaries

of language and nationality. The officer who is knowledgeable in his trade, unafraid of work, wellmannered, and possessed of a sense of humor will succeed

here as he does everywhere else. . . . A single American

is obviously casting his lot with his counterparts and is

generally accepted on this basis, unless he isolates himself

by his own misactions.'6

Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters

in Saigon

On 1 January 1965, 25 Marines were serving on

the MACV staff in Saigon. The senior Marine was

General Westmoreland 's J-2, Brigadier General Carl

A. Youngdale, who had filled the billet of MACV

intelligence officer since January 1964. When

3

- —. 'a-
210 ThE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

General Youngdale completed his overseas tour on

13 July, he was not replaced by another Marine. *

Early in 1965, a discussion took place between the

Department of the Army and ComUSMACV over

the replacement of Youngdale. Although the joint

staff of MACV was already preponderantly Army,

U. S. Army authorities thought that the billet should

be assigned to an Army brigadier. General Westmoreland explained:

Much of the MACV staff consists of a purely Army

advisory effort and results in a staff which appears to be

heavily weighted with Army personnel. The RVNAF

and Joint General Staff organizations are both

predominately Army and demand a large Army contingent in the MACV staff.'7

When the Marine Corps informed General Westmoreland in March that it would not be able to

provide an officer of equal rank to replace Youngdale,

the matter was settled and the billet was assigned to

the Army.

With the rapid influx of American troops into

Vietnam, the authorized strength of the MACV staff

grew from 1,702 men in January to 2,427 servicemen

at the end of 1965. Marine Corps billets on the joint

staff correspondingly increased to 131 that year.

Because of the time requirements necessary to

transfer personnel overseas, only 56 of these

positions had been filled by 31 December.

During 1965, 35 Marine officers arrived to fill staff

positions. Among these officers were Colonels

George L. Hollowell, Chief, Operations Branch, J-3;

Webb D. Sawyer, Chief, Plans Branch, J-4; Maxie

R. Williams, Chief, US/SEATO Division; and

Francis F. Parry, Combat Operations Center.

On 11 November, a MACV steering committee

recommended the establishment of a combat

operations center within the J- 3 Division to provide a

centralized MACV agency for the collection and

dissemination of information to enhance MACV

direction of operations and control of subordinate

commands. General Westmoreland approved the

recommendation and proposed to Admiral Sharp that

the operations center be headed by a Marine Corps

According to Colonel Webb 0. Sawyer, General Westmoreland appointed him "Commanding Officer of the Marine

Corps Unit, Headquarters, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,'' in that he had become the senior Marine on

the MACV staff upon the departure of GeneralYoungdale.

BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File).

brigadier general. After consulting with General

Greene and the other Joint Chiefs, Sharp concurred.18

When the Combat Operations Center was activated in mid-November, its first director was a

Marine, Colonel Parry. Describing his assignment to

the MACV staff, Parry stated when he departed for

Vietnam the previous month, he was told that he was

to be the plans officer for a joint command. Upon

arrival, he discovered that MACV had decided not to

activate such a command and he was assigned, instead, to the MACV J-3 Division. Colonel Parry

remembered that: "After several days in J-3

Operations learning the ropes, Bill DePuy [Brigadier

General William E. DePuy (USA), the MACV J-3]

called me in and told me that General Westmoreland

had decided to organize a Combat Operations

Center." According to Parry, General DePuy told

him that the "Air Force was holding up the

assignment of a Marine BG to MACV because they

wanted more general officer slots on the staff. Bill

asked me to organize the COC and be its director

until such time as the Marine BG arrived."9

Marine Brigadier General William K. Jones relieved

Colonel Parry as director of the Combat Operations

Center on 31 December 1965.

Another Marine MACV staff officer, Colonel

Webb D. Sawyer, recalled his service as head of

MACV J-4 Plans Branch:

From the time of the landing of the Marine Brigade,

throughout the buildup of forces within Vietnam, the

logistic planners at MACV never came down from the

overhead. It was a never ending cycle of short-fuzed

studies, high level conferences in Honolulu, SEATO

logistic planning meetings in Bangkok, and consultations

with ARVN.2°

Confronted with this myriad of problems, Sawyer

found his job challenging but satisfying. He conduded: "Anyway, all in all, it was a most exciting

and interesting year."2'

Company L, Marine Support Battalion

One small and unheralded Marine unit, Company

L, Marine Support Battalion, redesignated on 1

January 1965 from Subunit 1, Company C, Marine

Support Battalion, provided a vital intelligence

function for MACV during 1965. Headquartered at

Phu Bai with the Army's 8th Radio Research Unit,

the unit consisted of one officer and 31 enlisted

cryptologists. The company was augmented by one
ADVISORS AND OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 211

officer and 10 enlisted men from Naval Communications Station, Philippines. Both contingents

formed Detachment ALPHA, NavComSta,

Philippines. Captain Donald J. Hatch, the Company

L commander, was also the Detachment ALPHA

commander. On 21 July, Major William A. Scott,

Jr., relieved Captain Hatch. By the end of December,

Company L consisted of two officers and 77 enlisted

Marine cryptologists. Captain Hatch observed:

The stationing of this unit in Vietnam was an

outgrowth of a detachment from the First Composite

Radio Company, FMFPac having been in country on a

TAD basis for many months. Company L was the first

permanent unit assigned.22

Embassy Marines

The Marine Security Guard, led by Staff Sergeant

William D. Kerakos, at the American Embassy in

Saigon numbered 30 men. The mission of the

Marines was to safeguard classified material and to

protect U. S. personnel and property. During the

year the detachment established two new watches,

one at the U. S. Information Service Building and the

other at the home of the Deputy Ambassador. An

individual guard was on post an average of 49 hours a

week.

During periods of political unrest, the guards were

kept busy preventing Vietnamese street crowds from

entering the Embassy. The physical threat against

the building became a reality on the morning of 30

March when a bomb, secreted in a car across the

street from the Embassy, exploded. The blast killed

11 persons and wounded 163, and did extensive

damage to the building. A secretary to the Deputy

Ambassador was the only American fatality, but 52

U. S. citizens were injured. The other dead victims

were Vietnamese nationals, four policemen, the

civilian driver for the Marine guard, and a Viet Cong

terrorist. All of the Marines escaped unscathed. Off

duty personnel immediately returned to the

Embassy. The building was closed, a security check

conducted; by mid-afternoon the Embassy was back

to normal routine. This incident, more than any

other during 1965, demonstrated to the detachment

that it too was in the frontlines.
CHAPTER 15

Conclusion

The 10-month period of March to December 1965

was one of expansion and experimentation for

Marine forces in Vietnam. During the year, Marine

units from California to Okinawa prepared for

deployment to Vietnam. General Karch's 9,000

Marines of the 9th MEB were quickly absorbed by

the division-wing force, Ill MAF. By the end of the

year, General Walt had over 42,000 men in ICTZ.

Since the landing on 8 March, the Marines had

extended their influence from eight square miles

around the Da Nang Airfield to three coastal enclaves containing over 804 square miles.

As Ill MAF's TAORs expanded into the densely

populated coastal ricelands, the Marines found the

Viet Cong intermingled with the local villagers and

turned to a variety of pacification experiments to

ferret out the Communists and win back the

population. They employed counterguerrilla

techniques such as combined action companies and

civic action projects such as the GOLDEN FLEECE

rice harvesting operations. By the end of 1965, the

Marines were still unable to measure many real

pacification gains.

General Walt's balanced approach for the

elimination of the Communist threat initially

stressed the establishment of secure beachheads at Da

Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. During the MarchJune consolidation phase the Marines lost 34 killed

and 157 wounded, while killing 270 Viet Cong. By

mid-1965 with this phase completed, Ill MAF began

a two-pronged campaign to destroy main force

Communist units, and at the same time root out the

Viet Cong infrastructure. Operations STARLITE

and HARVEST MOON encountered the Viet Cong

in regimental strength. During the last six months of

212

1965 the Marines suffered 420 killed and 1,936

wounded, while killing 2,295 enemy soldiers and

capturing more than 700 weapons.'

There could be no doubt that large-scale, conventional operations were to play a much larger role

during the coming year. By the end of 1965, General

Westmoreland ' s intelligence staff estimated that

eight regular NVA regiments had arrived in South

Vietnam. General Walt had received approval of his

request for two full divisions and a reinforced aircraft

wing. The 1st Marine Division was scheduled for

deployment to I CTZ in early 1966, as were more

aircraft squadrons.

Despite the emphasis on troop movement,

reinforcement, and engagement of the enemy's

larger units, the war was far from conventional.

General Krulak cautioned:

The conflict between the North Vietnamese and the

hardcore VC on the one hand and the U. S. on the other

hand could move to another planet today and we would

still not have won the war. On the other hand if the

subversion and guerrilla efforts were to disappear, the war

would soon collapse as the Viet Cong would be denied

food, sanctuary, and intelligence.2

As 1965 drew to a close there was some hope for

peace. Both the allies and the Viet Cong agreed to

short truces over the Christmas and New Year

holidays and President Johnson opened his "peace

offensive." He ordered the bombing of North

Vietnam suspended for an extended period and

dispatched American envoys to visit world capitals in

an effort to initiate peace negotiations with the other

side. Everyone involved in the war in Vietnam talked

of peace, but there was no peace. The prediction of a

Vietnamese soothsayer would come true; 1966 would

be a year of a ''lot of fighting and killing."3
Notes

PART I

ESTABLISHING THE ENCLAVES

Introduction

1. MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, General Staff, Hq,

USMACV, Comd Hist, 1964, dtd 15Oct65 p. 102.

2. Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, CinCPac, and Gen

William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV, Report on the

War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) (Washington: GPO,

1968), P. 95, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the

War. For a more detailed account see Capt Robert H. Whitlow,

USMCR, U. S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964 (Washington:

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1977), Chap. 10, hereafter Whitlow,

U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64.

Chapter 1

The Call for Marines

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, General Staff, Hq,

USMACV, Comd Hist, 1965, dtd 20Apr66, hereafter MACV

ComdHist, 1965; 9th MEB ComdD Mar65; MAG-16 ComdD

l6Jan-Mar65, dtd 8Apr65; HQMC Msg File; CNO, Flag Plot

Msg File, Jan-Mar65 (OAB, NHD), hereafter Flag Plot File; BGen Frederick J. Karch, intvw by Oral HistU, Hist Div,

HQMC, dtd 15Jan72 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC), hereafter Karch Intvw; Vietnam Comment File;

Department of Defense, United States- Vietnam Relations,

1945-1967, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter

Pentagon Papers with appropriate section title and book, and

section, volume or tab, and page number; LtCol John J. Cahill

and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps

Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 65," MS (Hist&Mus Div,

HQMC), hereafter Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN,

Jan-Jun 65''; Jack Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in Vietnam,

Introduction,'' MS, Pt 1 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody, et. al.,

"Marines in Vietnam, 1954-May 1968,'' MS, 8 pts

(Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter, Shulimson, ''U. S.

Marines in Vietnam, Pt 1."

Alert and Realert

1. BGen Frederick J. Karch, Presentation to the Command

and Staff College, MCS, Quantico, dtd 27May65 (Oral Hist

Coil, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Karch Presentation.

2. See MCCC, Items of Significant Interest for 20 and

3 1Jan65.

Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HA WKS

3. Washington Post and Times Herald, 8Feb65, p. 1.

4. LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cook Comments.

See also Col George G. Long, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Long Comments.

5. Cook Comments.

6. Ibid. 7. Long comments. See also Capt Ronald G. Richardson,

intvw by MCS Quantico, dtd 8Feb66 (No. 50, Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

8. Long Comments. See also MajGen Andrew W.

O'Donnell and staff, Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Donnell and staff

Comments. 9. ''The Rolling Thunder Program Begins," Pentagon

Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. xii-xiv, and pp. 27-47. See also

JCS Historical Section, Joint Secretariat, Comments on draft

MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter JCS

History Comments. Land the Marines

10. Quoted in ''The Rolling Thunder Program Begins,"

Pentagon Papers, bk4, sec. IV-C-3, p.31. See alsoJCS History

Comments.

11. ComUSMACV msg to JCS, dtd 9Feb65 (Flag Plot File).

12. JCS Memorandum (JCSM) 1.00-65, dtd 11Feb65 as cited

in "Marine Units Go To Da Nang," Pentagon Papers, bk 4,

sec. IV-C-4, p. ix. See also "The Roiling Thunder Program

Begins," Ibid., bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. 31-47 and JCS History

Comments.

13. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports

(New York, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 123,

hereafter Westmoreiand, A Soldier Reports; MACV Comd

Hist, l965,p. 30.

14. Quoted in "Marine Units Go to Da Nang," Pentagon

Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-c-4, pp. 2-5.

15. Karch Intvw.

16. MACVComdHist, 1965, p. 31.

17. DOD Tigram 6166, dtd 2Mar65 as cited in "Marine

Units Go to Da Nang," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p.

6.

18. CinCPac msg to JCS, dtd 3Mar65, as cited in Ibid., pp. 7-

8.

213
214 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

The Landing

19. Maj Ruel T. Scyphers, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. 3/9ComdD, Mar65, ptII, P. 5.

21. Karch Intvw.

22. 3/9 ComdD, Mar 65, Pt III.

23. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill

and Shulimson draft MS. ''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd

24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. LtCol Herbert J. Bain, Comments on draft MS, dtd

30Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bain Comments.

25. CTF 76 Sit Rep No. 18, dtd 9Mar65 (Flag Plot File).

26. Bain Comments.

Chapter 2

The 9th MEB in Vietnam

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; 9th MEB ComdDs, MarApr65; HQMC Msg File; Flag Plot File; Vietnam Comment

File; Karch Intvw; Karch Presentation; Pentagon Papers,

Cahill and Shulimson, ''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65'';

Shulimson, ''U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1''; Jack

Shulimson ''U. S. Marines in Vietnam, May-December

1965,' MS, Pt 2 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody et. al., ''Marines in

Vietnam 1954-May1968,'' hereafter Shulimson, ''Marines in

Vietnam, Pt 2',; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, ''Marine Corps

Operations in Vietnam, 1965-66,'' Naval Review, 1968

(Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 2-35, hereafter

Simmons, ''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66.''

The First Weeks

Additional sources for this section are: BLSG ComdDs,

Mar-Apr65; MAG-16 ComdDs, Mar-Apr65.

1. JCS msg to CinCPac, dtd 6Mar65 as cited in ''Marine

Combat Units Go to Da Nang," Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec.

IV-C-4, p. 1. Westmoreland quoted in FMFPac, ''Operations

of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, MarchSeptember 1965,'' nd., hereafter FMFPac, III MAF Ops,

Mar-Sep65.

2. BGen Frederick J. Karch ltr to Col Clifford B. Drake, dtd

26Mar65, covering Itr to Karch Presentation.

3. Colonel Robert J. Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

4. Karch Presentation.

5. LtCol George H. Smith, intvw by MCSC Albany, dtd

21Apr66 (No. 111, Oral Hist CoIl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

6. Maj Pat Morgan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File).

7. BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

8. Karch Presentation.

9. Col Norman G. Ewers, Comments on draft MS, dtd

7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also O'Donnell and staff

Comments.

10. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd

27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Connor

Comments.

11. 3/9ComdD, Mar65.

12. FMFPac,IIIMAFOps, Mar-Sep65,p. 21.

13. Karch Presentation.

Estimate of the Situation

Additional sources for this secton are: Dept of the Army, SE

Asia Msg File (CMH, DA), hereafter CMH Msg File and

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports.

14. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (CMH

Msg File). See also Westmoreland, A SoldierReports. pp. 126-

29.

15. See ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the

Debate,'' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp 56-59 for

copies of these earlier recommendations.

16. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (CMH

Msg File). This message provides a resume of the 26 March

MACV 'Estimate of the Situation." See also Westmoreland,

A So6/ierReports,p. 125.

17. I.tGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on Shulimson draft

MS. ''U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1," dtd 11Aug69

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, 69.

IS. NSAM 328, dtd 6Apr65 as reprinted in ''Phase I in the

Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate,'' Pentagon Papers. bk 4,

see. IV-C-5, pp. 124-26. See also Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp. 130-31.

More Marines Arrive

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac ComdC,

Mar-Dec65; FMFPac Deployment SitReps, 1965; 3d MEB Sit

Reps. 5-12Apr65; 3d Marines ComdD, Apr65; MAG-16

ComdD, Apr65.

19. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on draft MS, dtd

10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Denny Com- m ents. 20. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 31Mar65 in FMFPac

Deployment SitReps 1965.

21. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 1Apr65 in Ibid; Col

Richard A. Savage, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File).

22. Denny Comments.

23. ComUSMACV msg to CG9thMEB, dtd 12Apr65

(HQMC Msg File).

24. CGlst MAW msg to CD, VMFA-531, dtd 12Apr65

(Ibid).

25. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson

draft MS, ''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65,'' dtd 16Apr68

(Vietnam Comment File).

26. Col Otis W. Corman, Comments on draft MS, nd. [Nov

76] (Vietnam Comment File).

27. Karch Presentation.

An Ecpanded Mission

28.MACVComdHist, 1965,p. 40.

29. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, dtd

2Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, 77.
NOTES 215

30. 3d Marines ComdD, Apr65.

31. Capt Gaetano F. Squillace, intvw by MCS, Quantico, dtd

11Jan66 (No. 27, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

32. Karch Presentation.

33. The Washington Post and Times Herald, 2May65, p. 3.

Chu Lai

Additional sources for this section are: 3d MAB ComdD,

Apr-May65; 3d MEB SitReps, 26Apr-12May65.

34. ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate,''

Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 21. See also Westmoreland, A SoldierReports, p. 132

35. Telephone conversation between FMFPacCC and

MCCC, dtd 28Nov67 as cited in Cahill and Shulimson,

''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65,'' p. 200.

36. Krulak Comments, 77.

37. Denny Comments.

38. LtCol Charles L. Goode, Comments on draft MS. dtd

7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Goode Comments.

39. O'Connor Comments.

40. Col Norman R. Nickerson, Comments on draft MS, dtd

28Oct76 and 9Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter

Nickerson Comments.

41. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson

draft MS. "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65,'' dtd 5May68

(Vietnam Comment File). Hay in this letter provides a detailed

account of the Saigon meeting.

42. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File).

43. O'ConnorComments.

44. Col Edward Cook, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File).

45. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 14-21

May 1965, nd., p. A-8.

46. Col William M. Graham, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Chapter 3

Formation and Development of HI MAF

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV ComdHist, 1965; FMFPac,IIIMAFOps, MarSep65; III MAF ComdD, May65; III MAF ComdC, Jun65; 3d

MarDiv (Fwd) ComdD, May65; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun65;

1st MAW (Adv) ComdD, 'May65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC,

Jun65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Cahill and

Shulimson, ''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun6S"; Shulimson,

"Marines in Vietnam, pt 1''; Shulimson, ''Marines in

Vietnam, Pt 2"; Pentagon Papers; Simmons, ''Marine Corps

Ops, 1965-66."

The Birth of HI MAF

1. Quoted in CinCPacFlt msg to CGIIIMEF, dtd 7May65

(HQMC Msg File).

2. Col Victor J. Croizat, Comments on Shulimson draft MS,

''Marines in Vietnam, pt 1,'' dtd 12Aug69 (Vietnam

Comment File); Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p.

10; Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

1Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

3. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMEF, dtd 5May65, Subj:

Letter of Instruction, end 11, III MAF ComdC, May 65.

4. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 8May65 (HQMC

Msg File).

5. Ibid.

The Le My &periment

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF, Civic

Action Report, 8Mar-15Ju165, dtd 18Jul65, hereafter IIIMAF

Civic Action Report; 3d Marines ComdD, May 65; 2/3

ComdD, May 65; LtCol David A. Clement, intvw by MCB,

Camp Lejeune, dtd 6Aug66 (No. 189, Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&Musl)tv, HQMC), hereafter Clement Intvw; LtCol David A Clement, ''Le My: A Study in Counterlimurgencv. ' Marine Corps Gazette, v. 95, no. 11 (Nov67),

pp. 18 2't. hereafter Clement, ''Le My.''

6. Statement of Capt Nguyen Hoa, dtd 16Jun65, Effect of

Marine Corps Operations in Le My Area, end 5, III MAF

Cu'i Action Report.

7. (:lrt Intvw.

8. BGen Marc A. Moore, Comments on draft MS, nd.

[Nov 76] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Moore Com- ments.

9. Capt Lionel V. Silva, intvw by MSC, Quantico, dtd

2Feb66 (No. 37, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

10. Moore Comments.

11. Col David A. Clement, Comments on draft MS, dtd

5Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Clement Comments.

12. 3d Mar Div (Adv) ComdD, May65.

13. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary. Visit to WestPac, 14-21

May 1965, nd., hereafter CGFMFPac May Trip Summary.

Building the Chu Lai Airfield

Additional sources for this section are: MABS-12 ComdC,

May65; MAG-12 ComdC, Jun65; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, ''Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-70,'' Naval Review 1971 (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-

55, hereafter McCutcheon, ''Marine Aviation''; LtCol

Charles L. Goode, Chu Lai Report, end 2, Goode Comments,

hereafter Chu LaiReport, Goode Comments.

14. Chu Lai Report, Goode Comments.

15. Ibid. 16. Ibid.

17. Nickerson Comments.

18. Chu Lai Report, Goode Comments.

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.

22. Col John D. Noble, Comments on draft MS. dtd 1Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File).

23. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill

and Shulimson draft MS. ''USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65,'' dtd

24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).
216 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

24. LtCol Robert W. Baker, Comments on draft MS, dtd

28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

25. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hay Comments.

III MAF in Transition

Additional sources for this section are: FLSG ComdD, May

65; FLSG ComdC, Jun65.

26. Gen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, dtd

10Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Walt Comments.

27. Maj Ruel T. Scyphers, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

28. CGFMFPac May Trip Summary.

29. Hay Comments.

30. Nickerson Comments

31. Ibid.

32. See MACV ComdHist, 1965, pp. 106-07; LtGen Joseph

M. Heiser, Jr., USA, Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support

(Washington D. C.: Dept of the Army, 1974), pp. 9-11; VAdm

Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Mobility, Support, Endurance

(Washington: NHD, 1972), p. 72, hereafter Hooper, Mobility,

Support, Endurance.

33. Nickerson Comments.

34. AC/S G-4 III MAF memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 16May65,

Subj: Concept of Logistic Support, end 14, III MAF ComdC,

May 1965.

35. Hay Comments.

The Seeds of Pacification

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Civ.

Action Report; Clement, ''Le My"; Capt Russel H. Stolfi,

USMCR, U. S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam

March 1965-March 1966 (Washington: Hist Br, G-3 Div,

HQMC, 1968), hereafter Stolfi, USMC CivicAction, 65-66.

36. Quoted in Capt William D. Parker, USMCR, U. S.

Marine Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of Vietnam, April

1966-April 1967 (Washington: Hist Div, HQMC, 1970), p. 2.

37. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., intvw by Hist Div,

HQMC, dtd 19 May73 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div,

I-IQMC).

38. III MAF Force Order 1750.1, dtd 7 Jun 65, end 7, III

MAF Civic Action Report.

39. Clement Comments.

40. Ibid. 41. Ibid.

June Operations in the Three Enclaves

Additional ources for this section are: 3d Marines ComdC,

Jun 65; 4th Marines ComdC, Jun 65; 3/4 ComdC, Jun65.

42. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun65.

43. Ibid.

44. Col Joseph R. Fisher, Comments on Cahill and

Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd

14May68 (Vietnam Comment File).

45. LtCol Harold D. Fredericks, Comments on draft MS, dtd

24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

46. CGFMFPac May Trip Summary.

47. Unsigned and undated document entitled ''Zone A,

Hue/Phu Bai," end 8, 3d Marines ComdC, Jun65.

Chapter 4

Reinforcement and Expansion

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV ComdHist, 1965; FMFPac,IIIMAFOps, MarSep65; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs,

Jul-Aug65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC, Jul-Aug65; HQMC

Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, ''Marines in

Vietnam, Pt 2''; Jack Shulimson "U. S. Marine Corps

Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Jul-Dec65,'' MS

(Hist&Mus Div HQMC), hereafter Shulimson, "USMC Ops

RVN, Jul-Dec65''; Pentagon Papers; Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports; Gen Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange

Strategy, A General's Report on Vietnam (New York:

Funk&Wagnalls, 1970), hereafter Walt, Strange War, Strange

Strategy; Simmons, ''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66''; Chester

L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E.

Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller, The American Experience

with Pacification in Vietnam, 3 vols. (Washington: Institute

for Defense Analysis, Mar 1972), hereafter Cooperet. al., The

American Experience with Pacification.

The Need for Further Reinforcements

1. MACV ComdHist, 1965, pp. 140-41; Cooperet. al., The

American Experience with Pacification, v. 3, pp. 206-217. The

quotes are from Technique of Pacification Operations, Anx E,

Chien Thang Plan, dtd 22Feb64, as cited in Cooperet. al., The

American Experience with Pacification, v. 3, p. 207.

2. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, p. 141; Cooper, et. al.,

American Experience with Pacification, v. 3, p. 228. 3. Cooper, et. a!., The American Experience with

PacJica1ion,v. l,p.4.

4. Quoted in Simmons, ''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66,'' p. 15.5. Quoted in ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the

Debate,'' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. lV-C-5, P. 90; MACV

Comd Hist, 1965, PP. 35, 40-41; Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp. 139-40.

6. JCS msg 2400, dtd 22Jun65 as cited in ''Phase I in the

Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate,'' Pentagon Papers, bk 4,

sec. IV-C-5, P. 28. See also Pp. 25-28, 90-91, 94, and 104;

MACVComdHist, 1965, pp. 35, 40-41. 7. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 139-40. See also

MACVComdHist, 1965, p. 41.

8. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 140.

9. Quoted in ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the

Debate,'' Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 104.

10. CMH, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Nov76 (Vietnam

Comment File).

11. ComUSMACV memo to CMC, dtd 28Apr65, Subj:

Deployment of an Airmobile Division to the High Plateau. See

also ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 13Jun65 as reprinted
NOTES 217

in ''Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate,"

Pentagon Papers, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 101.

12. Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). See also "Phase I in the

Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate,'' bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp.

26.7; Westmoreland,A SoldierReports, p.144.

The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave

13. Col Charles H. Bodley, Comments on draft MS, dtd

27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

14. Ibid.

15. MACV msg toCinCPac, dtd 2Jul65 (HQMC Msg File).

16. III MAF Op 304-65, dtd 4Jul65, end 8, III MAF

ComdC, Jul65.

The Attack on the Airfield

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Marines ComOL,

Jul65; 1/9 ComdC, Jul65; 1/3 ComdC, Jul65; 2/3 ComdC, Jul

65; Karch Intvw.

17. III MAF Intelligence Rept to ComUSMACV, dtd

3Jul65, Subj: Interrogation of NVA POW.

18. Col Verle E. Ludwig, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ludwig Comments.

19. Entry for 1Jul65, 3d MarDiv G-3 Jnl, 3d MarDiv

ComdC,Ju165.

20. Walt Comments.

21. Ibid. 22. Resume of Activities, Movements and Results, Pt II, 3d

MarDiv ComdC, Jul 65.

23. Ludwig Comments.

24. Hay Comments.

25. Krulak Comments, 77.

Expansion to the South

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC, Cam Ne

Report, Aug-Sep65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 9th

Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 2/9

ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 AAR 1-65, dtd Aug65; LtCol

William H. Clark, intvw by MCB, CamPen, circa Feb66 (No.

63, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).

26. Walt Comments.

27. Krulak Comments, 77; Walt Comments.

28. BGen Nguyen Chanh Thi ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd

20Jul65, Subj: TAOR of III MAF, end 3, III MAF ComdC,

Jul65.

29. Ibid. 30. LtCol William H. Clark memo, dtd 17July65, Subj:

Provisional Base Defense Battalion, end 7, LtCol William H.

Clark, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Nov76 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Clark Comments.

31. Clark Comments.

32. CO 2/9 memo to CO 9th Marines, dtd 9Aug65, Subj:

Debriefing Rept, 2/9 ComdC, Aug65.

33. Maj John A. Buck, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9Nov76

(Vietnam Comment File).

34. Statements of LtCol V. E. Ludwig and Capt H. B. West

in HQMC, Cam Ne Report, Aug-Sep65.

35. LtCol V. E. Ludwig Statement inlbid.

36. CMC (AH-wwg) memo to Asst SecDef (PA), dtd

9Aug65, Subj: Mr. Morley Safer report of Marine attack on

the village of Cam Ne, and Summary of CBS-TV

newsbroadcast, evening, 5Aug65 in Ibid. For the Gazette

editorial quote, see ''The War in Vietnam: Cam Ne (4),"

Marine Corps Gazette, v. 49, no. 10 (Oct 1965), pp. 28-30, p.

30.

37. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 7Aug65 in

HQMC, Cam Ne Rept, Aug-Sep65.

Further Reinforcements

38. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, pp. 40.42. See also ''Phase I

in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," Pentagon Papers,

bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 25-31.

PART II

THE BIG BATTLES

Chapter 5

Operation STARLITE: The First Big Battle

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from MACV Comd Hist, 1965; HqFMFPac, ''U. S. Marine

Corps Forces in Vietnam, March 1965-September 1967,'' nd.,

2 vols., hereafter FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-

Sep67; FMFPac, III MAFOps, Mar-Sep65; III MAF ComdCs,

Jul-Aug65; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65; 1st MAW (Adv)

ComdC, Jul-Aug6S; 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65; HQMC

Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, ''Marines in

Vietnam, Pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65;"

Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66"; BGen Oscar F.

Peatross, "Application of Doctrine: Victory at Van Tuong

Village,'' Naval Review 1967 (Annapolis: U. S. Naval

Institute, 1967), pp. 2-13, hereafter Peatross, ''Victory at Van

Tuong"; Col Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by HistDiv, HQMC,

dtd 15Jul66 (No. 157, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&Mus Div,

HQMC), hereafter Peatross Intvw, 1966.

Intelligence and Planning

1. Simmons, "Marines Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 18.

2. MajGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on Shulimson draft

MS ''USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 14May71 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Dulacki Comments, 71; LtGen Leo

J. Dulacki, Comments on draft MS, nd. [Jul 77] (Vietnam

Comment File).

3. Col James F. McClanahan, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Marines

ComdC, Aug65.

4. Dulacki Comments, 71.

5. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC, dtd 12Apr73 (Oral Hist Ccli, Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC); Walt Comments.
218 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

6. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on Shulimson draft

MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 7Jun71 (Vietnam

Comment File), hereater Peat ross Comments, 71.

7. Peatrosslntvw, 1966.

The Battle

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-16 ComdC,

Aug65; MAG-il ComdC, Aug65; MAG-12 ComdC, Aug65;

CTF 79.5 CorndC, l9Jun-100ct65, dtd 27Oct65; 2/4 ComdC,

Aug65; 3/3 ComdC, Aug65; 3/7 ComdC, Jun-Sep65; 1st Lt

Richard M. Purnell, intVW by MCB CamPen, dtd 23Feb66

(Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); Gy Sgt Jack Marino,

Jr, intvw by MCB Camp Lejeune, dtd 25Nov66 (No. 246, Oral

Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); ''Statement of Major

Andrew G. Corner, U. S. Marine Corps, concerning personal

observations, impressions and participation in combat

operations while serving as Executive Officer of 3d Battalion,

3d Marines during Operation STARLITE, l6August20August 1965, in the Republic of South Vietnam," nd., end

to Maj Andrew G. Corner, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17 Nov

76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Corner Statement.

8. Maj Howard B. Henry, intvw by MCAS El Toro, circa

Aug66 (No. 188, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

9. Maj Andrew G. Corner, Comments on draft MS, dtd

17Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

10. ComerStatement

11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Entry for 18Aug65, 7th Marines S-3 Jnl, 7th Marines

ComdC, Aug65.

The Aftermath

Additional sources for this section are: 3/12 ComdC,

Aug65; 1/7 ComdC, Aug65; 3/7 ComdC Jun-Sep65.

16. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd

26Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peatross Comments, 76.

17. LtGen Leslie E. Brown, transcrpt of intvw by

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Aug75 (Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 11.

18. Walt Comments.

19. Col Floyd J. Johnson, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

29Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. Peatross Comments, 71.

21. 1/7 AAR, dtd 22Aug65, 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65,

p. 3.

22. Krulak Comments, 77.

23. Col Don P. Wyckoff, Comments on draft MS, dtd

16Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. Walt Comments.

Chapter 6

The Enemy Refuses to Give Battle:

September-November Operations

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65;

HqFMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam,

monthly reports, Sep-Nov65, hereafter FMFPac, III MAF

Ops, with appropriate month; 111 MAF ComdCs, Sep-Nov65;

3d MarDiv ComdCs, Sep-Nov65; 1st MAW ComdCs, SepNov65; TG79.5 ComdCs, Sep-Nov65; HQMC Msg File;

Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, Pt

2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Walt,

Strange War, Strange Strategy; Simmons, "Marine Corps

Ops, 1965-66."

Operation PIRANHA

Additional sources for this section are: 7th Marines ComdC,

Sep65; RLT-7 AAR 2-65, Operation PIRANHA, dtd 25Sep65,

hereafter PIRANHA AAR, MAG-12 ComdC, Sep65; MAG11 ComdC, Sep65; MAG-16 ComdC, Sep65; 1/7 ComdC,

Sep65; 3/7 ComdC, Sep65; 3/3 ComdC, Sep65.

1. BLT 1/7 OpO 123-65,dtd 4Sep65 in PIRANHA AAR.

2.PIRANHA AAR.

Much Ado About CS, Operation STOMP

Additional sources for this Section are: 2/7 ComdC, Sep65;

Col Leon N. Utter, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "U.S.

Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2," dtd 19Jun70 (Vietnam Comment

File), hereafter Utter Comments; Maj Alvin Doublet, intvw by

MCB, CamPen, dtd 14Jun66 (No. 137, Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Doublet Intvw.

3. Quoted in Lester A. Sobel, Editor-in-Chief, Facts on File

Year-book 1965, v. XXV (New York: Facts on File, Inc.,

1966), P. 322.

4. Utter Comments.

5. LtCol Raymond W. Wilson, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. New York Times, llSep65,p. 11.

7. Utter Comments.

Additional sources for this Section are: MAG-16 ComdCs,

Oct-Nov65; MAG-36 ComdCs, Oct-Nov65; 7th Marines

ComdC, Nov65; 2/3 ComdC, Oct65; 3/4 ComdC, Oct65; 2/4

ComdC, Oct65; 1/7 ComdC, Nov65; 2/7 ComdC, Nov65; 3/3

ComdC, Nov65.

October-November Operations
NOTES 219

Chapter 7

The 1st VC Again: Operation HARVEST MOON

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from MACV Co,nd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces In

Vietnam, Mar65 -Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Nov-Dec65;

III MAF ComdCs, Nov-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs, NovDec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov-Dec65; TG 79.5 ComdC,

Dec65; TF DELTA, AAR, Operation HARVEST MOON,

dtd 28Dec65, hereafter TF DELTA AAR Opa HARVEST

MOON; MAG-12 ComdCs, Nov-Dec65; 12th Marines

ComdC, Dec65; 3/3 ComdC, Dec65; 2/7 ComdC, Dec65;

HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson,

"Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN,

Jul-Dec6S''; Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy; Simmons,

''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

The Abandoment of Hiep Duc

1. O'ConnorComments. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. See also MAG-16 ComdC, Nov 65, P. 5.

4. Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 22.

5. Ibid. 6. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Nov65, Subj:

Letter of Instruction, end 2,111 MAF ComdC, Nov 65.

7. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Nov65 (HQMC

Msg File).

Activation of Task Force DELTA and Planning the

Operation

8. Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 26.

The VC Strike and the Marines are Committed

9. Washington Post and Times Herald, 9Dec65, p. 3.

10. Capt Edward J. Lloyd, ifltvw by MCRD, San Diego, dtd

26Oct67 (No. 1640, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

11. Col Michael R. Yunck, Comments on draft MS, dtd'

22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also TFDELTA AAR,

Opn HARVEST MOON.

The Search of the Phouc Ha Valley

12. Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 8Jun71,

Subj: Phone Con with MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Ret) (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter P/att Phone Con, Jun 71.

13. Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 28Jan70,

Subj: Interview with MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Vietnam

Comment File), hereafter Platt Interview, Jan 70. The Fight at Ky Phu

Additional source for this section is LtCol Leon N. Utter,

''Solid Contact for 2/7,'' Marine Corps Gazette, v. 50, no. 4

(Apr66), pp. 25-30.

14, Maj Nicholas H. Grosz, Comments on draft MS, n.d.

[Dec 76] (Vietnam Comment File).

15. Capt Nicholas H. Grosz, intvw by MCRD, Parris Island,

S.C., dtd Aug66 (No. 195, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC).

The Wrap-Up

16. Cot Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd

3Nov76, (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dennis Comments, 76.

17. MAG-12 AAR, Operation HARVEST MOON, dtd

25Dec65, App 1, MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65.

18. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 3-11

Dec65, dtd 14Dec65, pp. 4-5.

PART III

THE CONTINUING WAR

Chapter 8

Defending and Expanding the Base Areas

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, II! MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65;

FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec 65; III MAF ComdCs, AugDec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs,

Aug-Dec65; MAG-11 ComdCs Aug-Dec6S; MAG-12

ComdCs Aug-Dec6S; MAG-16 ComdCs Aug-Dec6S; MAG36 ComdCs, Sep-Dec65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; 4th

Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; 7th Marines ComdCs, AugDec65; 9th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec6S; 3/4ComdCs, AugDec65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson,

"Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2"; Shulimson, 'USMC Ops RVN,

Jul-Dec65''; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports; Walt, Strange

War, Strange Strategy; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops 1965-

66."

The Evolution of a Strategy

1. Quoted in Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 142-45.

See also Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War, p. 100.

2. ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 21Nov65, Subj:

Letter of Instruction, end 2,111 MAF ComdC, Nov65.

3. BGen Fredederick J. Karch, Comments on draft MS, dtd

11Jan77 (Vietnam Comment File); HistDiv, Memo for the

Record, dtd 9Mar72, Subj: Conference with BGen Simmons,

(Ret), Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

(Vietnam Comment File).

4. ComUSMACV ltr to CGField Force, Vietnam, dtd

10Dec65, Subj: Tactical Employment of U.S. Forces and

Defensive Action (Folder No. VA (1) Guidance from MACV),

MACV Historical Records, 1966, NFRC, Washington,

(Accession No. 69A702) and Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports, pp. 165-66.
220 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

5. Copy of LtGen Victor H. Krulak personal ltr to Hon

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, dtd 11Nov65

(LtGen Victor H. Krulak Personal Papers Collection (PC 486)

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

Further Deployments and Realinements

Additional material for this section is derived from: HQMC,

General Officer Symposium Book, dtd 15Jul66, hereafter 1966

General Officer S.ymposium Book.

6. MACVComdHist, 1965, p. 26.

7. ''The Chief of Staff's Overview," Sec. IIB, 1966 General

OfficerSymposium Book, p. 3.

Refinement of Command Relations

Additional source for this section is Col Don P. Wyckoff,

intvw by HQMC, dtd 5Jun67 (No. 762 Oral Hist Coll,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Wyckofflntvw.

8. CGIIIMAF msg dtd 12Aug65, end 3, III MAF ComdC,

Aug65.

9. I Corps Senior Advisor, I Corps Advisory Group ltr to

ComUSMACV, dtd 27Jul65, Subj: I Corps Advisory Group

Responsibilities, end 2, App 1, III MAF ComdC, Aug65.

10. See CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Oct65

(HQMC Msg File) and MACV Comd Hist, 1965, pp. 97-98.

11. Wyckofflntvw.

12. FMFPac, IIIMAF Ops, Mar-Sep65,p. 14.

&panding the TAORs

13. CGIIIMAF ltr to CGICorps, dtd 13Sep65, Subj:

Expansion of Currently Assigned TAOR at Da Nang, end 1,

III MAF ComdC, Sep65.

14. BGen NguyenChanhThi,CGICorps, ItrtoCGIIIMAF,

end 2, III MAF ComdC, Sep65.

15. Cot Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS,

Shulimson, ''USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 4Jun71

(Vietnam Comment File).

Attacks on the Airfields and Hill 22

Additional material for this section is derived from:

CGIIIMAF ltr to CGFMFPac, nd., Subj: Report of Viet Cong

Attack of Marble Mountain Air Facility and Chu Lai Airfield

of 28Oct65, end 6, III MAF ComdC, Oct65, hereafter Viet

Cong Attack Report; 1/1 ComdC, Oct65; Brown Intvw, Karch

Intvw.

16. Brown Intvw, p. 19.

17. Karch Intvw.

18. 0 'ConnorCommenis.

19. Ibid., and Viet Cong Attack Report.

20. Viet Cong Attack Report.

21. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct65, p. 7.

22. CO 9th Marines ltr to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 30Oct65, Subj:

Special Report of Squad-sized Ambush Conducted on 27Oct65,

encl4, 9th Marines ComdC, Oct65.

23. Ibid. 24. Viet CongAttack Report, p.9.

25. 1/1 AAR No. 3, dtd 31Oct65, end 15, 1/1 ComdC, Oct

65.

26. Hist&MusDiv, Memo for the Record, dtd 14 Oct 76,

Subj: Oral Comments of MajGen Harold A. Hatch on draft

MS (Vietnam Comment File).

27. Telephone con between Capt Robert H. Whitlow and

GySgt Russel L. Kess, dtd 10Jul73.

28. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Oct65 (HQMC Msg

File).

29. 3d Marines ComdC, Oct 65, p. 21.

30. 1/1 ComdC, Nov65, p.6.

31. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 28Oct65 (HQMC Msg

File).

Base Defense

Additional material for this section is derived from: BGen

Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on draft MS, Shulimson,

''Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2,'' dtd 2Jan70 (Vietnam Comment

File), hereafter Simmons Comments, Jan 70.

32. Cot George W. Carrington, Comments on draft MS, dtd

24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carrington

Comments.

33. Briefing for Ma;Gen Larsen, CGUSATFA and MajGen

Kinnard, CGlstAirCavDiv, dtd 15Sep65, end to Simmons

Comments, Jan 70.

34. III MAF G-3 Section, Agenda Subject, Base Defense

Command, dtd 4Oct65, end, Simmons Comments, Jan 70.

35. Carrington Comments.

36. Dennis Comments, 76.

37. 3/9 Op0 321A-65, dtd 14Sep65, end 3, 3/9 ComdC,

Sep65.

38. 3d MarDiv Op0 327-65, dtd 15Aug65, end 1, 3d

MarDiv ComdC, Aug65.

39. III MAF G-3 Section, Agenda Subject, War Dog

Requirements, dtd 4Jan66, end 10, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

40. Carrington Comments.

41. LtCol Harold A. Hatch, intvw by MCB, CamPen, dtd

6Jul66 (No. 156, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),

hereafter Hatch Intvw.

Extended Patrolling

Additional material for this section is derived from 1/7

ComdC, Dec65; 1/9 ComdC, Dec65; LtGen Lewis W. Walt,

intvw by III MAF, dtd 30Jan67 (No. 337, Oral Hist Coll,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Walt Intvw; Hatch Intvw;

LtCol James P. Kelly, intvw by MCS, Quantico, dtd 18Oct66

(No. 229, Oral Hist Colt, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter

Kelly Intvw.

42. Walt Intvw.

43. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct and Dec65.

44. Hatch Intvw.

45. Kelly Intvw.

46. MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 5Dec65.

47. Kelly Intvw.

48. CO 1/9 hr to CO 9th Marines, dtd 30Dec65, Subj:

Special Report of Company B patrol of 27Dec65, end 5, 1/9

ComdC, Dec65.
NOTES 221

Chapter 9

Pacification

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar6S-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65,

FMPac, III MAF Ops, OctDec65; III MAF ComdCs, JulDec65; 3d MarDiv ConidCs, Jul-Dec65; HQMC Msg File;

Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, ''Marines in Vietnam, pt

2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65;" MajGen

Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret), Unprocessed Working

Papers on Pacification, hereafter Weller Working Papers;

Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy; Stolfi, Civic Action;

Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, Vietnam 1965-66''; Cooper

et. a!., The American Experience withPaci/ication.

The Combined Action Program

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, ''The

Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam, Aug65-Jan67,''

n.d., hereafter FMFPac, Combined Action Program; 3d

Marines ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 4th Marines ComdCs, JulDec65; 7th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; 9th Marines

ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 3/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 1st Lt Paul R.

Ek, intvw by MCB, CamPen, dtd 10Feb66 (No. 46, Oral Hist

Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Ek Intvw, Feb66;

Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 10Nov72, Subj:

Interview with Capt Paul R. Ek, (Vietnam Comment File),

hereafter Ek MR, 10Nov72; Capt John J. Mullen, Jr. USMC,

Student Staff Study, AWS, Quantico, Va, "Modification to

the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of

Vietnam," dtd 19Dec68, hereafter Mullen Study.

1. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, p. 29.

2. U. S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington:

GPO, 1940), p. 1-32.

3. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, p.81.

4. Copy of LtGen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., personal ltr to

MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, C/S USMACV, dtd

27Feb63 (General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. Personal Papers

Collection (PC 511) Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

5. Eklntvw, Feb66.

6.EkMR, 10Nov72.

7. Stolfi, CivicAction, p. 1.

8. LtCol Sumner A. Vale, intvw by MCRD, Parris Island,

SC, dtd 14Feb67 (No. 372, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv,

HQMC).

9. 3d Marines ComdC, Dec65, P. 3.

10. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, pp. 105-106.

11. III MAF Op0 305-66, Short Title: Phong Bu, dtd

24Nov65 (III MAF Plans/Orders 196)).

12.These letters are reproduced in FMFPac, Combined

Action Program, pp. 32-33. See also III MAF G-3 Section,

Agenda Subj: RF/PF Status and Improvement, dtd 5Jan66,

end 6, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

Protection of the Harvest: GOLDEN FLEECE

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Marines

ComdCs, Sep-Oct6S; 1/9 ComdC, Sep65; 1/1 ComdC, Oct65;

2/3 ComdC, Sep65; 2/4 ComdC, Oct65; LtCol Verle E.

Ludwig, intvw by HQMC, dtd 23Jan67 (No. 294, Oral Hist

Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Ludwig Intvw;

Clement, "Le My"; LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, ''Bus to Tra

Khe,'' Marine Corps Gazette, v. 50, no. 10 (Oct66), pp. 32-

36.

13. Ludwig Intvw.

14. 9th Marines ComdC, Sep65, p. 1.

15. Ludwig Intvw; 9th Marines FragO 36-65, dtd 9Sep65,

end 2, 9th Marines ComdC, Sep65; Walt Comments.

16. Ludwig Intvw.

17. Col David A. Clement, Comments on draft MS,

Shulimson, ''Marines in Vietnam, pt. 2,'' dtd 12Mar70

(Vietnam Comment File).

18. III MAF ComdC, Oct65.

19. III MAF Staff Study, dtd 26Nov65, Subj: Study to

determine data on the USMC assisted Summer/Fall 1965 Rice

Harvest, end 7,111 MAF ComdC, Nov65.

Cordon and Search: The Seeds of COUNTY FAIR

and Population Control

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Marines ComdC,

Aug-Dec65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; Simmons

Comments, Jan 70.

20. Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS,

Shulimson, ''USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 4Jun71

(Vietnam Comment File).

21. Simmons Comments, Jan70.

22. Ludwig Intvw.

23. LtCol Charles Ward, Comments on draft MS, dtd

27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Civic Action

Additional source for this section is the I Corps Joint

Coordinating Council Minutes, v. I, Sep65-Dec66, hereafter

ICJCC Minutes, with specific date.

24. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, ch.7.

25. See ICJCC Minutes, dtd 6Sep65.

26. ICJCC Minutes, dtd 4Oct65.

27. Mr. Marcus J. Gordon, Comments on draft MS,

Shulimson, ''Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2," dtd 10Feb70

(Vietnam Comment File).

28. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct65, p. 25.

29. Stolfi, CivicAction, p. 53 and footnote 28, p.90.

The Ngu Hanb Son Campaign and the Frustrations

of Pacefication

Additional sources for this section are: Reports on Quang

Nam Pacification Program, Nov65-Feb66 in Weller Working

Papers.

30. MACV Comd Hist, 1965, p. 233; Cooper et. a!., The

American Experience with Pacification, v. 3, pp. 233-34.

31. I Corps Advisory Group, Fact Sheet on Quang Nam

Special Sector, dtd 8Nov65, end 10,111 MAF ComdC, Oct65.
222 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

32. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 18Sep65 (HQMC Msg

File).

33. CG 3dMarDiv ltr to COs 3d, 9th, 4th, and 7th Marines,

dtd 26Oct65, Subj: Protection of RVN Officials, end 58, 3d

Marines ComdC, Oct65.

34. 1/3 ComdC, Dec65.

35. 3/7 ComdC, Dec65, p. 2.

PART IV

SUPPORTING THE TROOPS

Chapter 10

Marine Aviation in Vietnam

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65;

FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65; FMFPac ComdC, MarDec65; III MAF ComdCs, May-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs,

May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Flag Plot File; Vietnam

Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Pt 1'';

Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, Pt. 2',; LtCol Ralph F.

Moody, Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, and Captain Moyers S.

Shore, "Backing up The Troops," MS, Pt 8 of LtCol Ralph F.

Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-May68,"

hereafter, Moody et. al., "Backing up the Troops, Pt 8'';

Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65";

Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Simmons,

"Marine Corps 0ps, 1965-66"; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon,

"Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," Naval Review

1971 (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55,

hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation."

Deployments

Additional sources for this section are: 1st MAW (Rear)

ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; MAG-il ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; MAG-12

ComdCs, May-Dec6S; MAG-16 ComdCs, Mar-Sep65; MAG36 ComdCs, Sep.-Dec65.

1. Col Robert J. Lynch, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

2Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).

2. Col Richard A. Savage, Comments on draft MS, dtd

2Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Control of Marine Aviation

3. Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj

Norman W. Hicks, The East Central Front—U.S. Marine

Operations in Korea, 1950-1 953, v. IV, (Washington: HistBr,

G-3 Div, HQMC, 1962), pp. 15-18.

4. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 29Mar65 (Flag Plot

File).

5. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 24Apr65 (Flag Plot

File).

6. HqUSMACV Directive 95-4, dtd 13Jul65, end 10, Tab

F, G-3Div, HQMC, Staff Visit West Pac, Nov-Dec65.

7. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug 65, Pt III, sec. 2, Air

Defense, and App 9, Memorandum of Agreement between CG

2d Air Div and CG 1st MAW, n.d.

Fixed-Wing Operations

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-li ComdCs

Jul-Dec65; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; VMF-212 (AW)

ComdC, 1965, dtd 10Dec65.

8. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, v.1,

pp. 6-5—6-6.

9. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, p. 3-5.

10. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, p.4.

11. Col Norman G. Ewers, Comments on draft MS, dtd

7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

12. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65; MAG-11 ComdC, Dec65;

and MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65. See also FMFPac, Marine

Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, v. II, pp. 32-37.

13. 1st MAW ComdC, Nov65, p. 2-4.

14. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, P. 2-2.

15. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, p. 2-3.

16. MAG-il ComdC, Oct65, end 4, p. 13.

17. MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65, p. 1.

18. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-5ep67, v.

II, p. 36.

19. LtCol Harlan P. Chapman, Comments on draft MS, dtd

29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Helicopter Operations

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-16 ComdCs,

Mar-DecflS and MAG-36 ComdCs, Jul-Dec65.

20. III MAF Press Release 428-65, dtd 15Aug65, end 5,

MAG-16 ComdC, Jul-Aug65.

21. Ibid., and BGen Marc A. Moore, Comments on draft

MS, n.d. [Nov76] (Vietnam Comment File).

22. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct65, p. 15.

23. O'Connor Comments.

24. MAG-l6ComdC, Sep65, p. 14.

25. Maj Gary W. Parker, Comments on draft MS, dtd

15Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

26. Ibid.

27. III MAF Press Release 612-65, dtd 16Sep65, end 1,

MAG-16 ComdC, Sep65.

Air Defense Responsibilities

Additional sources for this section are: 1st LAAM Bn

ComdCs, Feb-Dec65 and 2d LAAM Bn ComdCs, Sep-Dec65.

28. Col George G. Long, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

29. Col Edward F. Penico, Comments on draft MS, dtd

13Dec76.

30. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 3-

11Dec65, dtd 14Dec65, p. 14.
Chapter 11

Fire Support and Reconnaissance

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65;

FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65; III MAF ComdCs, MayDec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File;

Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in

Vietnam, Pt 1''; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2";

Moody et. a!., "Backing Up The Troops, Pt 8''; Cahill and

Shulimson "USMC OPs RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shuiimson,

"USMC Ops RVN, Jui-Dec65''; Simmons, "Marine Corps

Ops, 1965-66."

Artillery Support

Additional sources for this section are: 12th Marines

ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 1/12 ComdCs Mar-Dec65; 2/12

ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 3/12 ComdCs, Jun-Dec65; 4/12

ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 3/11 ComdCs, Aug-Dec65. 1. Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS, dtd

12Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File); 4/12 Comd C, Sep65.

2. See for the command changes, 3d MarDiv OpO 327-65,

dtd 15Aug65 and 3d MarDiv OpO 329-65, Aug65, ends land

3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65. See also 12th Marines ComdCs,

Aug and Sep65, and 3/12 ComdC, Aug65.

3.2/12 ComdC, Jul65, p.3.

4. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Sep65, p. 17.

5. FSCC portions of 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec65.

6. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, ptIII, sec. 13, pp. 3-4.

7.12th Marines ComdC, Sep65,p. 5.

8. Ibid., Dec65, p. 5, and Prov Arty Bn AAR, end 1, TF

DELTA AAR, Opn HARVEST MOON, p.6.

9. 3/l2ComdC, Dec65.

Naval Gunfire

An additional source for this section is: Naval Gunfire

Requirements, CMC File 32, (General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

Personal Papers Collection (PC 511) Hist&MusDiv, HQMC),

hereafter Naval Gunfire File (Greene Papers).

10. HQMC, AO3H, Talking Paper, dtd 20Jun65, Subj:

Naval Gunfire Support, Tab U, Naval Gunfire File (Greene

Papers).

11.MACVComdHist, l965,p. 176.

12. Ibid., p. 178, and Naval History Division, "History of

U.S. Naval Operations in the Vietnam Conflict, 1965-67,"

MS, Feb71, v. III, Pt 2, p. 478 hereafter NHD, "History of

U.S. Naval Opns, 1965-67."

13.MACVComdHist 1965, p. 176.

14. Ibid., p. 178.

15. Ibid., pp. 178-9.

16. HqIIIMAF, G-3 Sec, Memo for the AC/S, G-3, dtd

16Sep65, Subj: Naval Gunfire Activities, end 1, III MAF

ComdC, Aug65.

17. Ibid., and HqIIIMAF, G-3 Sec, Agenda Subject: Naval

Gunfire Support, dtd 4Jan66, end, III MAF ComdC, Jan 66.

18. NHD, "History of U.S. Naval Opns, 1965-67," p. 487;

Simmons, ''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 22; 1st

ANGLICO ComdC, Jui-Dec65; Walt Comments.

Additional sources for this section are 3d Tank Bn ComdCs,

Jui-Dec65; 3d Anti-Tank Bn ComdCs, Jui-Dec65; 1st

AmTrac Bn, ComdCs, Jul-Dec65.

19. 3dTankBnComdC, Nov65.

20. Ibid.

Marine Reconnaissance

Additional sources for this section are 1st Force Recon Co

ComdCs, Sep-Dec65; 3d Recon Bn ComdCs, May-Dec65;

Simmons Comments, Jan 70; LtCol Roy R. Van Cieve, intvw

by MCB, CamPen, dtd 17Jun66 (No. 144, Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Van Cleve Intvw; Capt

James L. Compton, intvw by MCB, Quantico, dtd 30Jun67

(No. 339, Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter

Compton Intvw; GySgt Gus A. Koch, intvw by MCB, Camp

Lejeune, dtd 21Apr67 (No. 643, Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Koch Intvw; LCdr Ray W.

Stubbe, USN, ''Paddies, Parachutes, and Patrols,'' MS

(Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Stubbe, "Paddies,

Parachutes, and Patrols."

21. HQMC, Revision 1, Table of Organization M-1428,

Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division, Fieet Marine

Force, dtd 23Sep63, hereafter Rev 1, TO M-1428; HQMC

Table of Organization M-4623, Force Reconnaissance

Company, Fieet Marine Force, dtd 23Sep63.

1st Force Reconnaissance Company: The Early

Days

An additional source for this section is: Capt David Whittingham, intvw by Hq FMFLant, dtd 15Feb66 (No. 81, Orai

Hist Coli, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

22. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, intvw by Hist&MusDiv, dtd

26Aug77 (Oral Hist Coil, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

23. 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Oct65.

3d Reconnissance Battalion, Opening Moves

An additionai source for this section is: LtCol Russell B.

Tiffany, intvw by Hist&MusDiv, dtd Sep77 (Oral Hist Coil,

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Tiffany Intvw.

24. CG 3dMarDiv msg to 3dMarDiv, dtd 19Sep65, end 3,

3d Recon Bn ComdC, Sep65; Van Cleve Intvw.

25. 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Sep65.

26. Tiffany Intvw.

27. 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun65.

28. Quoted in Stubbe, "Paddies, Parachutes, and Patrols,"

p. 553.

29. Van Cleve Intvw.

30. HQMC, Provisional Tabie of Organization M-1428,

Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division, Fleet Marine

Force, dtd 20Feb58; HQMC, Tabie of Organization M-1428,

Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division, Fleet Marine

Force, dtd 8Mar61.

31. Rev 1, TO M-1428.

NOTES 223

Other Ground Combat Support
224 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

32. Quoted in Stubbe, "Paddles, Parachutes and Patrols,"

p.49l.

33. Ibid., p.448.

34. Ibid., p.490.

35. Capt Francis J. West Jr., USMCR, "Stingray 70,"

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 95, no. 11

(Nov69), pp. 26-37.

Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged

36. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on draft MS, dtd

29Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Chapter 12

Logistics and Construction

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1965; FMFPac, Marine Forces in

Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65;

FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65; FMFPac ComdC, MarDec65; III MAF ComdCs, May-Dec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs,

May-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs, May-Dec65; FLSG ComdCs,

May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File;

Shulimson, ''U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Pt 1''; Shulimson,

''U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2"; Moody et. al., ''Backing

Up The Troops, Pt 8"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops

RVN, Jan-Jun65''; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, JulDec65"; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;

Hooper, Mobility, Support, and Endurance; Simmons,

''Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66.''

The Logistic Situation

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War, p. 100.

2. HQMC, Staff Study, dtd 6Jun69, Subj: Logistic Posture at

the Start of the Vietnam Buildup.

3. Nickerson Comments.

4. BGen Mauro J. Padalino, Comments on draft MS, dtd

23Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

5. Ibid.

6. Nickerson Comments.

7. Dennis Comments, 76.

8. Nickerson Comments.

9. Col Harold A. Hayes, Comments on draft MS, dtd

29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

10. CGFMFPac msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 14May65 (HQMC

Msg File).

11. Cahill and Shulimson, ''USMC Opns RVN, JanJun65," P. 189.

12. BGen Robert F. Conley, Comments on draft MS, dtd

28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

III MAF Naval Responsibilities

13. AC/S G-4 III MAF memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 16May65,

Subj: Concept of Logistic Support, end 14, III MAF ComdC,

May 1965; CNO msg to CinCPac, dtd 28May65 (Flag Plot

File); AC/S G-4 III MAF Position Paper, dtd 15Jun65, Subj:

Operation of Ports, Beaches, and Depots from Chu Lai to

DMZ, end, III MAF ComdC, Jun65, hereafter III MAFG-4

Position Paper, Jun 65; Hooper, Mobility, Support, and

Endurance, pp. 70-71.

14.111 MAFG-4 Position Paper, Jun65,

15. III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; Force/Naval Component

Command Order 5400.1, dtd 24Dec65, end 4, III MAF

ComdC, Dec65; Hooper, Mobility, Support, and Endurance,

pp. 37-38, 78.

16.111 MAF ComdC, Jul65, p. 5.

17. FMFPac, Marine Forcesin Vietnam, Mar6S-Sep67, v.1,

p. 8-27.

18. FMFPac,IIIMAFOps, Dec65, p.3.

19. III MAF ComdC, Oct65, p.8.

20. Ibid., p. 7 and FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec65, pp. 43-44.

21. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, p. 2-4.

RED BALL and CRITIPAC

22. Cal Harold A. Hayes, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd

29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

23. III MAF ComdC, Aug65, p. 7.

24. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, v. I,

p. 8-9.

25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec65, p. 14.

26.Ibid.,p. 15, andFMFPac,IIIMAFOps, Dec65.

The Force Logistic Support Group

27. FLSG ComdC, Dec65, p. 2.

28. FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65, p. 16.

Engineering and Construction

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Engr Bn ComdCs,

Jul-Dec65; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, Aug-Dec65.

29. Col William M. Graham, Comments on draft MS, dtd

8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

30. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

31. LtCol Bernard A. Kaasmann, Comments on Cahill and

Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65,'' dtd

24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

32. ''Background of Deployment to the Republic of Vietnam," nd., end 2, Dennis Comments, 76, hereafter

Background of Deployment.

33. O'Connor Comments.

34. Dennis Comments, 76.

35. Ibid., and Background of Deployment.

36. Dennis Comments 76.

37. Ibid.

38. 7th Engr Bn CorndCs, Sep65 p. 5 and Nov65, p. 3.

39. MACV-4PR Memo for the Record, dtd 23Sep65, Subj:

Establishing of Committee to Survey 16 Kms of Railroad Prior

to Acquiring for Use by Marine Corps, end, BGen Webb D.

Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76 (Vietnam

Comment File); Dennis Comments, 76; 3d Engr Bn ComdC,

Dec65.

40. MAG-36 ComdC, Sep65, p. 2.
NOTES 225

41. 1st MAW ComdC, Sep65, p. 2-4.

42. Ibid., p. 3-10.

43. McCutcheon, ''Marine Aviation,'' pp. 129-30.

44. Ibid., p. 130.

45. Walt Comments.

46. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill

and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65,"

dtd 24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

PART V

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Chapter 13

The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV ComdHist, 1965; FMFPac, HIMAF Ops MarSep65; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65; FMFPac, ComdC,

Mar-Dec65; ComPhibFor, U. S. Seventh Flt, "History of

Amphibious Opns in South Vietnam, Mar65-Dec66," n.d.;

SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, l9Jun-100ct65; SLF (TG 78.5/79.5)

ComdC, 1 lOct-31Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Shulimson, "U.S.

Marines in Vietnam, Pt 1''; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, Pt 2''; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, JanJun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, Jul-Dec65''; LtCol

Ralph F. Moody and Benis M. Frank, "SLF Operations in

Vietnam," MS (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

Disbandment of the SLF

Additional sources for this section are: BLT 2/9 ComdD,

23Dec64-7Mar65; BLT 2/9ComdD, Mar-Apr65.

1. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to West Pac, 14-21

May 1965, nd., p. 17.

A New Mission

An additional source for this section is

CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Agreement of 14Mar65, Subj:

Anti-Sea Infiltration Operations, end 2, FMFPac, Provisions

of Close Air Support for Seventh Fleet Operations, Operation

DECKHOUSE III in Support of ComUSMACV in RVN, dtd

19Aug66, hereafter CinCPacFlt/Com USMA CV Mar

Agreement. 2. Amphibious Opns on RVN Coastline and Adjacent

Islands, Anx B, CinCPacFIt/Corn USMA CV Mar Agreement.

3. MACV-J3 hr to CinCPac, dtd [14May65], Subj:

Transmittal of Agreement (CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Mar

Agreement). 4. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to West Pac, 14-21

May 1965, n.d., p. 13.

5. CinCPac msg to PacFlt, dtd 27Jun65 (GP-5 DAGGER

THRUST, Flag Plot File).

6. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 12Jun65 (HQMC

Msg File).

The Reestablishment of the SLF

The general source for this section is SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC,

l9Jun-lOOct6S.

Command and Control Changes

7. As quoted in CGFMFPac msg to AdminO 3d MarDiv,

dtd 13Jun65 (HQMC Msg File).

8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid.

11. SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, l9Jun-lOOct65, p. 5.

12. CTF 79 msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Aug65 (HQMC Msg

File).

13. LtGen Lewis J. Fields, Comments on draft MS, dtd

21Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Field Comments.

14. CTF 79 msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 11Sep65 (HQMC

Msg File).

15. Quoted inCGFMFPac msg toCTF 79, dtd 15Sep65.

16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Quoted in CTF 79 msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Sep65

(HQMC Msg File).

19. MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 14Sep65.

The First DAGGER THRUST Raids

20. O'Donnell and Staff Comments.

21. Col Robert T. Hanifin, Comments on Shulimson draft

MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jul-Dec65,'' dtd 1Jun71 (Vietnam

Comment File).

22. CTF 78.5, Post Opns Report for DAGGER THRUST

Targets 2, 4, and 11, dtd 5Oct65, end 9, SLF (TG 78.5)

ComdC, l9Jun-lOOct65.

23. FMFPac, III MAFOps, Nov65, p.7.

Further Changes in the SLF

24. FMFPac msg to CMC, Sit Rep No. 201, dtd 17Oct65

(HQMC Msg File).

25. Field Comments.

The Saigon Conference

26. As quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 29Jul65

(HQMC Msg File).

27. CinCPacFlt msg to CGFMFPac and ComPhibPac, dtd

20Oct65 (CinCPacFlt Briefer's File, OAB, NHD).

28. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 8Oct65 in Ibid.

29. CinCPacFlt msg, 20Oct65, op.cit.

30. CTF 115 msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 28Oct65 (CinCPacFlt

Briefer's File OAB,NHD).

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids

31. ComSeventhFlt msg to CTF 79, dtd 24Nov65 (GP-5

DAGGER THRUST, Flag Plot File).

32. Adm Roy L. Johnson, Comments on draft MS, dtd

12Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).
226 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

The SLFat the End of the Year

33. FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65.

Chapter 14

LtCol Albert C. Smith, Jr., ''Rung Sat Special Zone," U.S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 94, no. 4 (Apr 1968), pp. 117-

18.

12. NavGp, RSSZ, May65, dtd 7May65.

13. MACVJTD, Nov65.

14. NavGp, RSSZ.

Advisors and Other Marine Activities in Vietnam

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd His! 1965; Unit Diaries of Casual

Company (RUC 54013) and Company B (RUC 54026) HqBn,

HQMC; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, ''U.S. Marines

in Vietnam, Pt 1"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Opns

RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, JulDec65.

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Additional sources for this section are: MAU, NavAdvGp,

MACV, After Tour Reports, hereafter ATR with individual

name and report date; MAU, After Action Reports (AARs);

SMA, MAU, Monthly Evaluation Reports, Jan-Dec65;

NavGp, MACV, Monthly Fact Sheets, Jan-Dec65; SMA,

NavGp, MACV ltr to CMC, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Organization,

Employment, and Support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps;

SMA, MACV, hr to CMC, dtd 22Mar73, Subj: Vietnamese

Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary,

1954-7 3.

1. LtCol Lane Rogers, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jan77]

(Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rogers Comments.

2. Ibid.

3. Col William P. Nesbit, ATR, dtd 1Sep65, hereafter

Nesbit ATR.

4. Maj William G. Leftwich, ATR, dtd 10Jan66, hereafter

Le/twich ATR.

5. Rogers Comments.

6. SMA, TF ALFA AAR, 9-13Mar65, dtd 7Jun65.

7. SMA, TFALFA AAR, 1-26Apr65, dtd 8Jun65.

8. Lefiwich ATR and Maj William G. Leftwich, "Decision

at Duc Co," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 51, no. 2 (Feb66), pp.

34-38.

9. SMA, MAU, Monthly Evaluation Reports, Jan-Dec6S.

10. Nesbit ATR.

11. USMACV, U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Joint Table of

Distribution, dtd 15Nov65 (OAB, NHD), hereafter MACV

JTD, Nov65.

Marine Advisors of the Rung Sat Special Zone

Additional material for this section is derived from: Naval

Advisory Group, MACV, Monthly Fact Sheets No. 17, JanDec65, Subj: Rung Sat Special Zone, hereafter, NavGp, RSSZ;

U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group

15. CMC/CGFMFPac Conference at HqFMFPac, dtd

28Apr65 (No. 6298, Oral Hist CoIl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC);

CGFMFPac msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 13Apr65 (HQMC

Msg File).

16. Le/twich ATR.

Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters Saigon

17. MACV ComdHist, 1965, pp. 93-94.

18.Ibid.,p.94.

19. Cot Francis F. Parry, Comments on draft MS, dtd

18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd

25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

21. Ibid.

Company L, Marine Support Battalion

The material for this section is derived from: Unit Diaries of

Company L, Marine Support Battalion (RUC 54101) 1-4Jan65,

(RUC 54043) 5Jan-31Dec65; MACV Strength Report, 1Jan65,

dtd 11Jan65.

22. LtCol Donald J. Hatch, Comments on draft MS, dtd

22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Embassy Marines

The material for this section is derived from Marine Security

Guard, American Embassy, Saigon, RVN, Quarterly and

Special Incident Reports, 1965.

Chapter 15

Condusion

1. FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-5ep67, v. 1,

p.9-14, and v. 2, pp. 86-98.

2. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon,

and MajGen Lewis W. Walt, intvw by MCDEC, dtd Dec65

(No. 6001, Oral Hist Colt, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).

3. Quoted in Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p.27.
Appendix A

Marine Task Organizations and Command List

January—December 1965

Marine Unit Vietnam (CTU 79.3.5)

lJan-9Mar

Commanding Officer

Col John H. King, Jr lJan-9Mar

Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16

LtCol Thomas E. Vernon lJan-9Mar

HMM-365

LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr lJan-l8Feb

HMM-163

LtCol Norman G. Ewers l8Feb-9Mar

1st LAAM Battalion

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr 8Feb-9Mar

CoL, 3/9

Capt John J. Sheridan lJan-23Jan

CoD, 1/3

Capt Terry Turner 23Jan-9Mar

Co C, 7th Engineer Battalion

Maj William G. Bates l4Feb-9Mar

9th Marine Ereditionary Brigade 8Mar-6May

9th MEB Headquarters

Commanding General

BGen Frederick J. Karch 8Mar-6May

Deputy Commander

Col Donald H. Stapp 8Mar-3Apr

Col Clifford F. Quilici 4Apr-6May

Chief of Staff

Col Lowell D. Grow 8Mar-3Apr

Col Donald H. Stapp 4Apr-6May

G-1

Maj Ruel T. Scyphers 8Mar-l3Mar

Maj Samuel E. Englehart l4Mar-6May

G-2

Maj Edmund J. Regan, Jr 8Mar-6May

G-3

LtColJosephE. Muir 8Mar-6May

G-4

LtCol Joseph G. Cervell 8Mar-l6Apr

LtCol Joseph S. Heitzler l7Apr-6May

MAG-16

Col John H. King, Jr 9Mar-6May

H&MS-16

Maj John J. McMasters l4Mar-6May

HMM-163

LtCol Norman G. Ewers 9Mar-6May

HMM-162

LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 9Mar-6May

VMFA-531

LtCol William C. McGraw,Jr lOApr-6May

VMCJ-1

LtCol Otis W. Corman l6Apr-6May

VMO-2

LtCol George F. Bauman 3May-6May

Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16

LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 9Mar-6May

MASS-2

LtCol Paul L. Hitchcock l6Apr-6May

1stLAAM Battalion

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr 9Mar-6May

3d Marines

Col Edwin B. Wheeler l2Apr-6May

1/3

LtCol Herbert J. Bain 8Mar-27Apr

LtCol William H. Lanagan, Jr 28Apr-6May

2/3

LtCol David A. Clement lOApr-6May

3/9

LtCol Charles E. McPartlin, Jr 8Mar-6May

3/4

LtCol Donald R. Jones l4Apr-27Apr

LtCol William W. Taylor 28Apr-6May

Brigade Logistic Support Group

LtCol George H. Smith l2Mar-6May

Brigade Artillery Group

Captain Myron J. Kandra llMar-llApr

Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson l2Apr-6May

1/12

Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson l2Apr-6May

Brigade Engineer Group

Maj William G. Bates l2Mar-6May

227
228 COMMAND AND STAFF

III Marine Amphibious Force * 6May-3 iDec

111 Marine Expeditionary Force redesignated to III Marine

Amphibious Force on 7 May.

III MAF Headquarters

Commanding General

MajGen William R. Collins 6May-4Jun

MajGen Lewis W. Walt 4Jun-3lDec

Deputy Commanding General

BGen Marion E. Carl l2May-24May

BGen Keith B. McCutcheon 6Jun-3lDec

Chief of Staff

Col Regan Fuller 6May-llSep

Col George C. Axtetl, Jr l2Sep-3lDec

Deputy Chief of Staff

Col Olin W. Jones, Jr l5Jun.l8Aug

Col Howard E. Wertman l9Aug-3lDec

G-1

Col Frederick C. Dodson 6May-24May

LtCol Donald T. Doxey 25May.7Aug

Cot Don W. Galbreaith 8Aug-3lDec

G-2

Cot Horace E. Knapp, Jr 6May-lOMay

LtCol Edward Cook llMay-3OJun

Maj Robert E. Gruenler lJut-9Jul

LtCot Dale N. Davis lOJul-26Jul

Cot Leo J. Dulacki 27Ju1-3lDec

G-3

Cot Hardy Hay 6May9Jul

LtCoI Rex C. Denny, Jr lOJul-l4Jul

Cot Edwin H. Simmons 15Ju1-3lDec

G-4

Cot Norman R. Nickerson l2May-27Jul

LtCot Joseph S. Heitzler 28Ju1-25 Aug

Cot Harold A. Hayes, Jr 26Aug-3lDec

G-5

Cot Elmer G. Glidden, Jr 23Aug-28Oct

Maj Charles J. Keever 29Oct-3lDec

0n 29 October, the G-5 changedfrom Plans Officer to Civil

Affairs/Psychological Warfare Officer and a new billet, G-6

Plans officer, was established.

G-6

Cot EtmerG. Gtidden, Jr 290ct-3lDec

3d Marine Division * 6May-3lDec

Until the arrival of the 9/h Marines on 6 July, the 3d Marine

Division had two command echelons, the 3d Marine Division

(Forward) at Da Nang and the 3d Marine Division (Rear) on

Okinawa.

3d Marine Division Headquarters

Commanding General

MajGen William R. Collins 6May-3Jun

MajGen Lewis W. Watt 4Jun-3lDec

Assistant Division Commander, Da Nang

BGen Frederick J. Karch l8Jun.3Aug

BGen MetvinD. Henderson 4Aug.lODec

BGen Lowell E. English 22Dec-3IDec

Assistant Division Commander, Chu Lai

BGen Frederick J. Karch 5Aug-8Nov

BGen Jonas M. Platt 9Nov-3lDec

Chief of Staff

Cot Clifford F. Quilici 6May-l4May

Cot Andrew I. Lyman l5May-l3Aug

Cot Donald W. Sherman l4Aug-3lDec

Cot Edward H. Greason 6May-27Jun

Cot Robert M. Port 28Jun-3lDec

G-2

Maj Charles T. Williamson 6May-24Aug

LtCot Richard J. Schriver 25Aug-3lDec

G3

Cot Royal E. North l2May-l2Aug

Cot Don P. Wyckoff l3Aug.3lDec

G4

LtCol John D. Ross l2May-3OJun

Cot Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr lJut-3lDec

G-5

Maj John Cotia l5Dec-3lDec

The division established the billet of Civil Affairs

Psychological Warfare Officer on 15 December.

Headquarters Battalion

Maj Charles W. Abbott 6May-l8Jut

Maj John E. Watson, Jr l9Jul-3lDec

3d Marines

Cot Edwin B. Wheeler 6May-l5Aug

Cot Norman R. Nickerson l6Aug-22Nov

Cot Thelt H. Fisher 23Nov31Dec

4th Marines

Cot Edward P. Dupras, Jr 7May-24Jut

Cot James F. McCtanahan 25Jut-3lDec

7th Marines

Cot Oscar F. Peatross l5Aug-3lDec

9th Marines

Cot Frank E. Garretson 6Jut-llAug

Cot John E. Gorman l2Aug-3lDec

12th Marines

Cot William P. Pata 8Jut-l4Jut

LtCol Walter E. Stuenket 15Ju1-3OJul

Cot James M. Caltender 3lTut-3lDec

1/1

LtCot Donald V. McCloskey 28Aug-27Sep

LtCol Harold A. Hatch 28Sep-3lDec

2/1

LtCol Robert T. Hanifin, Jr 23Dec-3lDec

Part of the SLF5Sep-22Dec.

1/3

LtCot William H. Lanagan, Jr 6May-lSep

LtCot Robert R. Dickey III l9Nov-3lDec

1 .1 relieved 1/3 on 3lAug ending the intert heater battalion

transf'Idcemer.it system. 1/1 did not redesignate to 1 '3.

2/3

LtCot David A. Clement 6May-lONov

LrCoI Wilt am K. Horn llNov-l9Nov

•2/3 departed Vietnam for Okinawa as the first battalion

involved in the newly instituted intra-theater battalion rotation

program. The newly formed 1/3 replaced 2/3 at Da Nang.
COMMAND AND STAFF LISTS 229

3/3

LtCol Wiiliam D. Hall l2May-3OJun

LtCol Joseph E. Muir ijul-lOSep

Maj Andrew G. Corner llSep-l4Sep

LtCol Willirn H. Lanagan, Jr l5Sep-29Nov

LtCol Joshua W. Dorsey III 3ONov-3 lDec

1/4

LtCol Harold D. Fredericks 7May-3OMay

LtCol Robert J. Perrich 3lMay-3lDec

2/4

LtCol Joseph R. Fisher 7May-l4Oct

LtCol Rodolfo L. Trevino l5Oct-3lDec

3/4

LtCol William W. Taylor 6May-3OSep

LtCol Sumner A. Vale IOct-22Dec

'2/1 relieved 3/4 at Phu Bai on 22Dec and the latter unit

sailed for Okinawa under the intra-theater battalion rotation

system. 1/7

LtCol James P. Kelly l5Aug-3lDec

2/7

LtCol Leon N. Utter 7Ju1-3lDec

'Located at Qui Nhon 7Ju1-4Nov. During the period 7Jul4Aug, III MAF had operational control of 2/7. After that

period, the U. S. Army's Task Force Alpha, which became I

Field Force, Vietnam in November, had the operational control

of the unit. 3/7

LtCol Charles H. Bodley 3Sep-3 iDec

'Part of the SLF Jun-Sep.

1/9

LtCol Verle E. Ludwig l6Jun-3lDec

2/9

LtCol George R. Scharnberg 6Ju1-3lAug

LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr lSep-3lDec

3/9'

LtCol Charles E. McPartlin, Jr 6May-l7Jun

LtCol Robert J. Tunnell, Jr l4Aug-3OSep

LtCol William W. Taylor lOct-3IDec

'3/9 departed Vietnam on l7Jun under the battalion intratheater transplacement system. The newly formed 3/9

returned to Vietnam on l4Aug.

3/11

LtCol William H. Peck l6Aug-29Dec

LtCot Paul B. Watson, Jr 3ODec-3lDec

1/12

Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson 6May-8Ju1

LtCol Warren E. McCain 9Ju1-3lDec

2/12

LtCol Jack K. Knocke 7Ju1-lSep

LtCol Eugene 0. Speckart 2Sep-3lDec

3/12

Maj Jesse L. Gibney, Jr 7May-9Jul

LtCol Leslie L. Page lOJul-3lDec

LtCol Edwin M. Rudzis fl2 8Ju1-3lDec

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

LtCol Jack Glenn 21Ju1-3OJul

LtCol William D. Pomeroy 3lJul-3lDec

3d Anti-Tank Battalion

Maj Edward E. Brooks 9Ju1-15 Jul

LtCol Bruce A. Helm 16Ju1-3lDec

3d Engineer Battalion

Maj Bernard A. Kaasman 2OMay-28May

LtCol Nicholas J. Dennis 29May-3lDec

3d Medical Battalion

LCdrJohnW. Davis, USN 9Jun-20Ju1

Cdr Almon C. Wilson, USN 21Ju1-3lDec

3d Motor Transport Battalion

LtCol Arthur C. Beverly l6Jun-26Jun

Capt William D. McGuire 27Jun-3Ju1

Col Edward Cook 4Jul-llAug

Maj Freddie J. Baker l2Aug-3lDec

3d Reconnaissance Battalion

LtCol Don H. Blanchard 7May-3OAug

LtCol Roy R. Van Cleve 3lAug-3lDec

3d Shore Party Battalion

Maj John M. Dean lNov-3lDec

3d Tank Battalion

LtCol States R. Jones, Jr 8Ju1-3OAug

LtCol Milton L. Raphael 3lAug-3lDec

5th Communication Battalion

LtCol llcrcules R. Kelly, Jr l2Nov-3lDec

7th Engineer Battalion

LtCol Ermine L. Meeker 24Aug-3lDec

9th Motor Transport Battalion

Maj Joseph F. Jones lNov-3lDec

1st Marine Aircraft Wing *

1 lMay-3 iDec

'Designated 1st MA W (Advance) 11 May-31A ugust.

1st MAW Headquarters

Commanding General

MajGen Paul J. Fontana llMay-23May

BGen Keith B. McCutcheon 24May-3lDec

Assistant Wing Commander

BGen Marion E. Carl lSep-3lDec

Chief of Staff

Col Thomas J. O'Connor llMay-4Aug

Col Thomas G. Bronleewe, Jr 5Aug-3lDec G- 1 Col Jack W. Morrison llMay-2lMay

LtCol Wilbur D. Wilcox 22May-26May

Maj Roger D. Swanson 27May-l4Aug

Col Wilbur D. Wilcox l5Aug-3lDec

G-2

Col Lowell 0. Grow ilMay-lijun

LtCol Jack W. Dindinger l2Jun-16Ju1

LtCol Billy H. Barber 17Ju1-3lDec

G-3

Col Douglas A. Bangert llMay-2lMay

LtCol Robert L. Lamar 22May-lJul

Col Leslie E. Brown 2Jul-l7Sep

Col Michael R. Yunck l8Sep-9Dec

Col Roy C. Gray, Jr lODec-3lDec

G-4

Col Martin B. Roush llMay-l7Jun

Col RobertJ. Lynch, Jr l8Jun-3lDec
230 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

G-5

Col Fred J. Frazer 22Sep-3lDec

Plans officer for Base Development and Military Constru c/ion.

MWHG-1

Col Albert L. Jones 29Jun-14Ju1

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr 15Ju1-lAug

Col Edward!. Lupton 2Aug-3lDec

MAG-li

Col Robert F. Conley 7Jul-2Nov

Col Emmett 0. Anglin, Jr 3Nov-3lDec

MAG-12

Col John D. Noble l6May-l8Sep

Col Leslie E. Brown l9Sep-3lDec

MAG-16

Col John H. King, Jr 6May-6Aug

Col Thomas J. 0'Connor 7Aug-3lDec

MAG-36

Col William G. Johnson lSep-3lDec

H&HS-1

Maj Robert A. Walker llMay-26Jul

Mal Chester A. Liddle, Jr 27Jul-3lDec

H&MS-1 1 LtCol Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr 7Jul-5Aug

Capt Albert K. Charlton 6Aug-lOAug

LtCol William H. Bortz, Jr llAug-3lDec

1-I&MS-12

LtCol John W. Kirkland 25May-26Dec

Maj William E. Garman 27Dec-3lDec

H&MS-16

Maj John J. McMasters 6May-9Sep

LtCol Jerome L. Goebel lOSep-3lDec

H&MS-36

LtCol Thomas G. Mooney lSep-3lDec

MABS-il

LtCol Eddie E. Pearcy 7Ju1-9Dec

Maj Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr lODec-3lDec

MABS-12

LtCol Alexander Wilson 7May-24Sep

LtCol John W. Parchen 25Sep-3lDec

MABS- 16

LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 6May-3lDec

MABS-36

Maj Jack A. Kennedy lSep-3lDec

MASS-2

LtCol Paul L. Hitchcock 6May-26May

LtCol Edward!. Lupton 27May-lAug

LtCol Ralph L. Cunningham, Jr 2Aug-3lDec

HMM-161

LtColGeneW. Morrison 7May-l8Sep

LtCol Rex C. Denny, Jr l9Sep-3lDec

HMM-162

LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 6May-l5May

Relieved by HMM-365. Unit then returned to Okinawa for

rotation to ConUS.

HMM-163

LtCol Norman G. Ewers 6May-2lJun

Relieved by HMM-261,' assigned as SLF squadron 27JunlOOct when it was relieved by HMM-261.

HMM-261'

LtCol Mcrvin B. Porter 22Jun lOOct

SLF squadron lOOct-3lDec.

HMM-263

l.iCol Truman Clark l2Oct-3lDec

H MM -361

LtCol lloyd F. Childers lAug-3lDec

HMM-362

LtCol James Aldworth 2Sep-3lDcc

HMM-363

Maj Willis D. Kellogg l-2Sep

LtCol George D. New 3Sep-3lDec

Located at Qui Nhon lSep-3lDec; under operational

control of CG, Task Force Alpha (USA).

HMM-364

LtCol William R. Lucas 4Sep-3lDec

HMM-365

LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr l5May-3OJul

HMM-365 relieved by HMM-361.

VMA-211

LtCol Williaii E. Garman llOct-3lDec

VMA-214

LtCol Keith O'Keefe 2IJun-3lDec

VMA-223

LtCol Alexander Wilson l5Dec-3lDcc

* VMA-311 relieved by VMA-223 under intra-thea/er

rotation program.

VMA-224

LtCol Thomas E. Mulvihill . . .4Oct-3lDec

* VMA-224 replaced VMA -225 under intra-t heater rotation

program.

VMA-225

LtCol Robert W. Baker lJun-3OSep

VMA-311

LtCol Bernard J. Stender lJun-24Nov

LtCol Jack W. Harris 25Nov-l4Dec

V MCJ - I

LtCol Otis W. Corman 6May-3Nov

LtCol Francis C. Opeka 4Nov-3lDec

VMFA-1 15

l.tCol Clyde R. Jarrett 1 5Oct-3 I Dec

VMFA-323

l.tCol Andrew W. O'Donnell lDec-3lDec

VMFA-513

LtCol Walter C. Stewart, Jr l5Jun-l4OCt

VMFA -513 replaced by VMFA-115 under intra-theater

rotation program.

VMFA-531

LtCol William C. McGraw, Jr 6May-l5Jun

VMFA-542

LtCol Richard A. Savage lOJul-3Dec

VMF(AW)-312

LtCol Richard B. Newport l9Dec-3lDec

VMO-2

LtCol George F. Bauman 3May-3lDec

VMO-6

LtCol Robert J. Zitnik lSep-3lDec
COMMAND AND STAFF 231

1st LAAM Battalion Naval Construction Regiment-30

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr 6May-14Ju1 Capt Harold F. Liberty, USN l9May-3lDec

MajGeorgeG. Long 15Ju1-l4Nov Naval Construction Battalion-4

LtCol Clyde L. Eyer l5Nov-3lDec Cdr Worthcn A. Walls, USN . I 5Dec I Dec

2d LAAM Battalion NMCB4 replaced NMCB-1O at Chu Lai, the latter unit

LtCol Edward F. Pen ico lOSep-3lDec rotatrngto ConUS,

Naval Constuction Battalion-5

Force Logistic Support Group Cdr William F. Russel,USN 26May-3lDec

Col Robert J. Oddy 6May-24May Naval Constuction Battalion-8

Col Mauro J. Padalino 25May-3lDec Cdr Pharo A. Phelps, USN 26Sep-3 [Dec

Force Engineer Group * Naval Constuction Battalion -9

Maj William G. Bates 6May-l2May Cdr Richard E. Anderson, USN 27Jun-3lDec

Maj Bernard A. Kaasmann l3May-2OMay Naval Constuction Battalion-lO

Force Engineer Group was dissolved on 20 May. Cdr John M. Bannister, USN 7May-1 5Dec
Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine,

attack aircraft also known as the AD-5

A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, light-attack jet bomber

in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with

land-based Marine attack squadrons.

AAR—After Action Report

AdminO—Administrative Officer

Adv—Advanced

AGC—Amphibious Command Ship

AKA—Attack Cargo Ship

ANGLICO— Air&Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

AOA—Amphibious Objective Area

APA—Attack Transport Ship

APD—High Speed Transport Ship

ARG—Amphibious Ready Group

ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASP—Ammunition Storage Point

ASRT—Air Support Radar Team

ArtyGru—Artillery Group

BGen—Brigadier General

BDA—Bornb Damage Assessment

BLSG—Brigade Logistic Support Group

BLT—Battalion Landing Team

Bn—Battalion

C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine, transport aircraft

which became operational in the Marine Corps in 1943

C- 130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine, turboprop transport

aircraft

Capt—Captain

CAS—Close Air Support

CG—Commanding General

CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, assault, heavy transport helicopter which carried three crew members and 36

passengers

Chron—Chronology

ChronHist—Chronological History

CinCPac—Commander in Chief Pacific

CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet

Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I

Rations; Class III - POL; Class V - Ammunitions

CMC—Cornmandant of the Marine Corps

CNO—Chief of Naval Operations

CO—Commanding Officer

Col—Colonel

Corn—Commander

232

ComUSMACV —Commander, U.S. Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam

ComdC—Command Chronology

ComdD—Command Diary

Composite Marine Aircraft Group—An aircraft group consisting of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft

squadrons

CP—Command Post

CPX—Command Post Exercise

CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone

DASC— Direct Air Support Center—A subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for

control and direction of close air support and other direct

air support operations

DD—Destroyer

DFC—Distinguished Flying Cross

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

Dtd—Dated

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South

Vietnam

ECM—Electronjc Counter Measures

ELINT—Electronic Intelligence

Engr—Engineer

F-48—McDonnell Phantom 11, a twin-engined, two-seat,

long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber

F-4C—U.S. Air Force version of the above

FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group

FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Free Strike Area—A zone in which air strikes could be directed

without prior RVN clearance

FSR—Force Service Regiment

Fwd—Forward

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would

refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2

Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Logistics; etc.

GCI— Ground-Controlled Intercept

Gen—General

GVN—Government of Vietnam

H-Hour—In connection with planned operations, it is the

specific hour the operation begins
ACRONYMS 233

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air, guided missile designed to

defend against enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes and

short-range rocket missiles

HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

HistMusDiv, HQMC—History and Museums Division,

HQMC. Replaced HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC

HistOff—Historical Office

HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

J-—The designations for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible

for personnel; J-2 Intelligence; J-3 Operations; J-4

Logistics; etc.

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)

JTD— Joint Table of Distribution

KC 131)- The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C131) Lockheed Hercules.

L-l-Iour-- In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific

hour the helicopters land in the landing zone

LCM—Landing Craft, Mechanized

LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel

LogSptG ru - Logistic Support Group

LPD-- Amphibious Transport Dock

LPI I Amphibious Assault Ship

LSD—Dock Landing Ship

LST—Tank Landing Ship

LSI._) — I.ogi.sL ii Sup it 1_lit it Lt— Lieutenant

LtCot - Lieutenant Colonel

LtGen Lieutenant General

Ltr Letter

LVTP Landing Vehicle Tracked, Personnel

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MA B- - Marine Amphibious Brigade

MABS Marine Air Base Squadron

MAC-- Marine Amphibious Corps

MACS-- Marine Air Control Squadron

MACV— Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MAF Marine Amphibious Force

MAG— -Marine Aircraft Group

Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and

regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups

Maj--Major

MajGen— Major General

MarDiv—Marine Division

_Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines

MASS--- Marine Air Support Squadron

MATCU—Marine Air Traffic Control Unit

MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing

MCAF— Marine Corps Air Facility

MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEBLEX—MEB Landing Exercise

MedCap— Medical Civilian Assistance Program

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force

MilHistBr—Military History Branch

Mogas—Motor gas

MS—Manuscript

Msgs— Messages

MUV—Marine Unit, Vietnam

MWHQ—Marine Wing Headquarters

NAG—Naval Advisory Group

NAS—Naval Air Station

NIS—National Intelligence Survey

NLF—National Liberation Front

NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion

NMCC—National Military Command Center

NWC— National War College

0-lB—Cessna. single-engine, observation plane, also known

as the OE- 1

O\ I). NI II) Operational Archives Branch, Naval History

in Op( )rdcr Operation-Order

OPlan— Operation Plan

OpSum --Operation Summary

OSJS(MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam)

PAR--Progressive Aircraft Rework

PA I Political Action Team, the forerunner of the

Revolutionary Development Teams. Vietnamese political

cadre who were assigned missions of pacification and

represented the government of Vietnam in the hamlets of

V jet n am

PF Popular Force; Vietnamese militia who were usually

employed in the defense of their own communities

P01. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

Regt Regiment

RF Rcional Force; Vietnamese militia who were employed

in a specific province

RI- )A The reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance

\ ought Crusader fighter

Rl.l Regimental Landing Team

RRU Radio Research Unit

ROl l.ING THUNDER—Code name for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S I would refer to the staff member responsible for perooncl: 5-2 Intelligence; S-3 Operations; S-4 Logistics, etc.

SAM ---Surface-to-Air Missile

SA R Search and Rescue

SAR/Maint Team—Search, rescuand maintenance team

SEAsia—Southeast Asia

Seatail— Follow-on shipping

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
234 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

SecState—Secretary of State

SHUFLY—The designation for the Marine Aviation Task

Unit in RVN until January 1965 when it was redesignated

Marine Unit, Vietnam (MUV)

Sit Rep Situation Report SL.F Special Landing Force

Song Vietnamese word for river

Sortie An operational flight by one aircraft

Sqdron Squadron

TAC(A) tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)

TAOR tictical Area of Responsibility

TE— Task Element

TF—Task Force

TG—Task Group

USMAAG—U .S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

USMACV—U .S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

VC—Viet Cong

VCC- Viet Cong Captured

\'CS- Viet Cong Suspect (captured)

VMFA-- Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

VNAF-— Vietnamese Air Force

VN MB-—Vietnamese Marine Brigade

VNMC— Vietnamese Marine Corps VM A — Marine Attack Squadron

VMGR Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron

VMO Marine Observation Squadron
Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

1 Jan—TE 79.3.3.6 at Da Nang was designated Marine Unit,

Vietnam (MUV), TU 79.3.5, by direction of CG FMFPac.

The organization and its operations remained essentially as

before.

7 Feb—Communist guerrillas attacked a United States compound at Pleiku, and U.S. aircraft retaliated by striking

targets in North Vietnam, initiating a new phase of the

war. U.S. forces in South Vietnam totaled 23,000. U.S.

dependents were ordered evacuated from RVN.

8 Feb—Battery A, 1st LAAM Battalion arrived at Da Nang via

C-130; it was operational the next day.

10 Feb—The Viet Cong blew up a U.S. military billet at the

coastal city of Qui Nhon killing 23 soldiers.

13 Feb—More elements of the 1st LAAM Battalion (-),

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bertram E. Cook, Jr.,

arrived at Da Nang by sea and air. Two full batteries and

supporting elements were 100 percent operational five days

later.

17 Feb—Company C of the USMC 7th Engineer Battalion

began arriving at Da Nang by LST. HMM-163, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers, relieved

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr.'s HMM-365 as the

operating squadron of TU 79.3.5.

28 Feb—USMC tactical unit strength in RVN was 1,248,

broken down as follows:

HMM-163 230

Sub-Unit I 203

Security Company (D/1/3) 260

Total MUV 693

1st LAAM Bn (-) 405

CO C, 7th EngrBn 150

Total, New Elements 555

Total, USMC (Tactical) 1,248

These figures do not include USMC advisors, Embassy

Marines, MACV staff personnel, and various other

categories of Marines assigned outside the Da Nang area.

8 Mar—The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

commanded by Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch,

landed at Da Nang. The MEB included two Marine

Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) — 3/9 (Lieutenant

Colonel Charles E. McPartlin, Jr.) which landed over Red

Beach 2, and 1/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert J. Bain)

which arrived by air from Okinawa. The 9th MEB mission

was to defend the Da Nang Airbase. This was the first U.S.

ground combat unit to land in RVN.

9 Mar—The MUV (TU 79.3.5) was placed under operational

control of the 9th MEB and designated MAG-16, cornmanded by Colonel John H. King, Jr. HMM-163

remained in direct support of ARVN I Corps; other

elements of the expanding MAG (Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16)

were in direct support of the 9th MEB. The 1st LAAM

Battalion was placed under operational control of MAG-16

with a mission to defend Da Nang Airbase from air attack.

9 Mar—Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtiss' HMM-162

arrived at Da Nang.

14 Mar—Sub-Unit 2 was redesignated MABS-16; H&MS-16

was activated at Da Nang under the operational control of

MAG-16 (-).

23 Mar—Current composition of 9th MEB is as follows:

9th MEB 4,612

HqCo 145

BLT 1/3 1,124

BLT3/9 1,115

Brigade Logistic Support Group 583

Brigade Engineer Group 224

Brigade Artillery Group 235

MAG-16(-)

H&MS-16(-) 88

MABS-16(-) 208

HMM-162 233

l-IMM-163 246

1stLAAM 411

2 Apr—The United States announced the intention of sending

several thousand more troops to Vietnam.

10 Apr—Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clement's BLT 2/3

landed at Da Nang. Task Force Alpha of the BLT was

helilifted to the Phu Bai airstrip, 45 miles north of Da

Nang near Hue, to assume the defense of that area.

Lieutenant Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr.'s F-4B

squadron, VMFA-531, arrived at Da Nang.

12 Apr—The RLT-3 commander, Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler,

and his headquarters arrived; he assumed command of all

BLTs ashore.

13 Apr—An HMM-162 detachment of 10 UH-34D helicopters

was established at Phu Bai. VMFA-531 flew its first

combat mission in RVN.

14 Apr—Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Jones' BLT 3/4

arrived in Vietnam and moved to Phu Bai where it relieved

Task Force Alpha.

16 Apr—MASS-2 (Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Hitchcock)

arrived Da Nang and established the DASC west of the

runway. Lieutenant Colonel Otis W. Corman's VMCJ-1

arrived at Da Nang, coming under operational control of

MAG-16 but remaining under administrative control of

MAG-12, which was still located at Iwakuni, Japan.

235
236 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

19 Apr—RLT-3 reorganized as 3d Marines (Rein); a larger

Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) was established at

Da Nang and a TAOR was established at Phu Bai for 3/4.

20 Apr—ComUSMACV authorized a change in General

Karch's mission for ground forces to include (1) aggressive

combat patrolling within TAORs and (2) preparation for

conducting offensive operations as a mobile reaction force.

High-level Honolulu conference recommended to

President Johnson the deployment of III MEF to Da Nang

and the landing of a MEB at Chu Lai.

20 Apr—The landing of additional Marine Corps units at Da

Nang resulted in the following organization:

9MEB

HqCo 240

3d Marines (-)(Rein) 3751

HqCo (286)

lstBn, 3d Marines (1099)

2dBn, 3d Marines (1267)

3dBn, 9th Marines (1099)

Brigade Artillery Group 548

HqBtry (-), 12th Marines (26)

BtryA, lstBn, 12th Marines (120)

Btry B, lstBn, 12th Marines (119)

Btry F, 2dBn, 12th Marines (120)

Btry L, 4thBn, 12th Marines (112)

lst8''HowBtry (51)

Brigade Engineer Group 299

Brigade Logistics Support Group 656

MAG-16 1613

H&MS-16 (-) (111)

MABS-16 (-) (232)

VMFA-531 (-) (300)

HMM-162 (126)

HMM-163 (233)

1stLAAM Bn (413)

MASS-2 (100)

VMCJ-1 (98)

BLT 3/4 & DetHMM 162 1500

Total 9th MEB 8607

All units were located at Da Nang, except for BLT 3/4 and a

detachment of 10 UH-34 helicopters from HMM-162,

located at Phu Bai.

21 Apr—VMCJ-1 flew its first electronic countermeasures

(ECM) missions from Da Nang Airfield and MASS-2

became fully operational.

22 Apr—The first real Marine ground action with the Viet

Cong occurred--a reconnaissance company on patrol was

fired on by an estimated 10 to 150 Viet Cong; VMFA-531

provided air support; one enemy was killed, one Marine

was slightly wounded.

28 Apr—Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines

participated in the first coordinated ground operation with

ARVN forces in RVN.

3 May—The advance party of the 111 MEF, including its

commander, Major General William R. Collins, arrived at

Da Nang.

5 May—ComUSMACV promulgated a Letter of Instruction

giving the mission of III MEF: 'In general render combat

support to RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces).

In coordination with CG, I Corps, participate in or provide

for the defense of Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai

airfields and ancillary facilities. Maintain the capability to

conduct, on order, deep patrolling and offensive operations

and reserve reaction operations in coordination with CG, I

Corps. Be prepared to execute U. S. contingency plans as

directed by ComUSMACV.''

6 May—The III MEF headquarters was established at Da Nang

Airbase, commanded by Major General Collins, who was

also designated the Naval Component Commander (NCC)

for ComUSMACV. The 9th MEB was deactivated as an

operating unit and the 3d Marine Division (Forward), also

commanded by Major General Collins, was established and

assumed command of its assigned units in RVN. With the

Chu Lai landings on 7 May, seven of the 3d Division infantry battalions were committed in RVN, supported by

most of the 12th Marines and substantial portions of all

other elements of the division.

7 May—Ill MEF was redesignated III MAF. 3d MAB,

commanded by Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, consisting of RLT-4 (Colonel Edward P. Dupras, Jr.), the

advance elements of MAG-12 (Colonel John D. Noble),

and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 (Commander

John M. Bannister, USN) landed at Chu Lai with the

mission of occupying the terrain necessary to construct an

expeditionary airfield there. The 173d Airborne Brigade,

the U.S. Army's first ground combat unit, arrived in RVN

on this date.

10 May—The first radar-controlled bomb drops in combat

were made by VMFA-531, controlled by MASS-2; 24

MK-81 (260 pound) bombs were expended in "Happy

Valley'' and the target was reported completely covered.

11 May—2d Battalion, 3d Marines cleared the village of Le

My, liberating it from over two years of Viet Cong control.

The village became a model of the Marine Corps civic

action program. The 1st MAW (Adv), commanded by

Major General Paul J. Fontana, was established at Da

Nang.

12 May—Lieutenant Colonel William D. Hall's BLT 3/3

landed at Chu Lai. Brigadier General Carl was designated

III MAF deputy commander. RLT-4 was redesignated 4th

Marines as the Chu Lai amphibious operation terminated.

15 May—HMM-365, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Joseph Koler, Jr., relieved Lieutenant Colonel Curtiss'

HMM-162 at Da Nang.

24 May—Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon arrived and

relieved Major General Fontana as CG 1st MAW (Adv).

31 May— USMC strengths by area:

Da Nang 9,224

ChuLai 6,599

Hue-Phu Bai 1,614

TAD in-country 121

Total 17,558

1 Jun—Eight A-4 Skyhawk jet attack aircraft from VMA-225

(Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Baker) and VMA-311

(Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Stender) landed at the Chu

Lai expeditionary airfield. The first aircraft, piloted by

Colonel Noble, the MAG-12 commander, touched down

at 0801 to signify the opening of the airfield. (Construction
CHRONOLOGY 237

had started after the 3d MEB landed on 7 May, 24 days

earlier). Only 3,600 feet of the runway was complete on 1

June—therefore, the A-4s used jet-assisted takeoff (JATO)

for launching and mobile arresting gear (MOREST) for

landing. Four Skyhawks led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert

W. Baker, VMA-225, launched the first Chu Lai-based

strike at 1329, flying sorties seven miles southwest of the

Chu Lai TAOR in support of ARVN forces.

4 Jun—Major General Lewis W. Walt assumed command of III

MAF and the 3d MarDiv (Fwd) at 0900, relieving Major

General Collins in a formal indoor ceremony.

5 Jun—Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon relieved

Major General Fontana as CG 1st MAW at Iwakuni,

Japan. He returned to Da Nang on7 June.

13 Jun—ComUSMACV directed 111 MAF to prepare an

emergency contingency plan for the movement of two

infantry battalions to Pleiku in II Corps area. The plan was

completed and forwarded to ComUSMACV on 14 June.

15 Jun—At Da Nang VMFA-513, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Walter C. Stewart, Jr., relieved VMFA-531,

which chopped to 1st MAW (Rear) marking the first incountry relief of a USMC jet squadron.

17 Jun—Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig's 1st Battalion,

9th Marines relieved the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Da

Nang and assumed the responsibility formerly held by 3/9

in the defense of the airbase; 3/9 was the first Marine

battalion to be rotated from RVN.

18 Jun—Brigadier General Karch returned to Da Nang and

assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander (ADC),

3d MacDiv (Fwd).

19 Jun—Approximately 350 inhabitants of Pho Nam Thuong

and Nam Yen villages moved into the Le My area.

21 Jun—Lieutenant Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 relieved

Lieutenant Colonel Ewer's HMM-163 at Da Nang;

HMM-163 became the SLF helicopter squadron.

27 Jun—Lieutenant Colonel Clement's 2d Battalion, 3d

Marines received 12,000 pounds of clothing and food for

distribution to the refugees at Le My. Three days later the

4th Marines at Chu Lai distributed over 800 pounds of

clothing to local residents who had been relocated to clear

real estate for the airfield.

30 Jun—Ill MAE strength in RVN not including Seabees was

as follows:

Da Nang 9,618

Chu Lai 6,771

PhuBai 1,652

Other 115

Total 18,156

Total arrived by area during June:

Da Nang 1,496

Chu Lai 2,002

PhuBai 204

Total 3,702

1 Jul—Viet Cong forces conducted a mortar/infantry attack on

the Da Nang Airbase under cover of darkness, providing

cover for demolition teams that broached the tactical wire

surrounding the field and severely damaged six USAF

aircraft. The one Viet Cong captured in the attack reported

that he was from the 3d Battalion, 18/h Regiment, 325th

People's Army of Vietnam (PA VN) Division and that the

attack force trained and rehearsed for 30 days before

executing its mission. The SLF, composed of the 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Charles H.

Bodley) and HMM-163 (Lieutenant Colonel Norman G.

Ewers), landed at Qui Nhon to protect an enclave at the

seaward end of Route 19, the main highway from Pleiku.

3 Jul—The Chu Lai SATS runway (8,000 feet) and taxiway

were completed.

6 Jul—RLT-9 (Colonel Frank E. Garretson) with BLT 2/9

(Lieutenant Colonel George R. Scharnberg) landed at Da

Nang.

8 Jul—Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter's BLT 2/7 relieved

the SLF battalion, Bodley's BLT 3/7, which then reembarked in ARG shipping.

10 Jul—Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Savage's F-4B

squadron, VMFA-542, arrived at Da Nang and commenced operations.

14 Jul—MAG.11 (Colonel Robert F. Conley) assumed

operational control of VMFA-542 and VMFA-513 at Da

Nang.

21 Jul—Written confirmation was received for expansion of the

Da Nang TAOR and for the establishment of a reconnaissance zone for the Chu Lai TAOR.

29 Jul—Official sources announced plans to increase the U.S.

active duty military force by about 300,000 men. The 1st

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division arrived in RVN on this

date. 31 Jul—Ill MAF strengths in RVN not including Seabees were

as follows.:

DaNang 15,204

ChuLai 6,949

Phu Bai 2,052

QuiNhon 1,644

Other 115 Total 25,964

Total arrived by area during July:

Da Nang 5,743

ChuLai 395

PhuBai 178

QuiNhon 1,651

Total 7,967

2 Aug—Operation BLAST OUT, a coordinated USMC/

ARVN operation involving 1/3 and elements of the 4th

ARVN Regiment, was conducted 10 miles southwest of

Da Nang.

3 Aug—Company D, 1/9 conducted a one day operation in the

vicinity of Cam Ne, south of Da Nang. A CBS television

crew, accompanying the company, filmed a Marine setting

fire to a Vietnamese hut. This film, which was shown on

the evening news, led to a debate in the press about U.S.

tactics in Vietnamese villages.

5 Aug—The Viet Cong attacked the Esso POL storage terminal at Lien Chieu, destroying two JP-4 storage tanks and

inflicting extensive damage on three more. Operational

control of 2/7 (at Qui Nhon in the II Corps area) passed to

U.S. Army Task Force ALFA, the Army field command

in RVN.

7 Aug—The CG III MAF was designated as the Senior Adviser

(SA) for I Corps and assumed operational control of the I

Corps Advisory Group.

11 Aug—The first tactical delivery of the cluster bomb unit

(CBU) by USMC aircraft took place. The addition of this
238 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

weapon to the aviation ordnance arsenal broadened the air

support capabilities of the 1st MAW.

12 Aug—The first all-Marine night helicopter assault took

place starting at 2400.

14 Aug—The Navy announced four-month involuntary extensions of duty for Navy and Mirine Corps enlisted

personnel. Coordinating headquarters were established at

Chu Lai under the 3d MarDiv ADC, Brigadier General

K arch.

15 Aug—The Headquarters of the 7th RLT and 1/7 came

ashore at Chu Lai. Colonel Oscar F. Peatross commanded

the regiment. At Da Nang, elements of 3/9 came ashore

making it the first battalion to be re-introduced into RVN

(See 8 March and 17 June 1965 entries).

16 Aug—3/9 relieved 1/9 as the Base Defense Battalion at Da

Nang.

17 Aug—2/4 and 3/3 were assigned to the 7th Marines for

Operation STARLITE.

18-24 Aug—Operation STARLITE. Three Marine battalions—1/7, 2/4, and 3/3—attached to the 7th Marines,

and supported by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, conducted an amphibious-heliborne search and destroy

operation in the Van Tuong village complex south of Chu

Lai. The purpose of the attack was to eliminate an enemy

force—the 1st VC Regiment, reportedly 2,000

strong—which had built up for an attack on Chu Lai.

Strong resistance was encountered, requiring the support

of BLT 3/7 from the SLF. The USMC units advanced

through the objective area in two days, and then were

joined for mopping up operations by Vietnamese forces.

Casualties were as follows:

KIA DOW WIA

USMC 45 6 203

VC 614 9

The Viet Cong dead were confirmed by body count. It was

estimated that the actual enemy KIA total ran much

higher because of the large number of caves and tunnels

that were sealed or destroyed. (On 9 September an agent

source reported that the VC had suffered 1,430 KIA, in

Operation STARLITE).

26 Aug—In response to a CG III MAF request made in June,

11 sentry dogs and handlers arrived as the initial element of

the 1st Provisional Dog Platoon, which was planned to

consist ultimately of two squads, a sentry dog squad and a

patrol dog squad.

28 Aug—i/i arrived at Da Nang to relieve 1/3.

31 Aug—President Johnson called for "a new and mighty

people-to-people program to bring American aid to victims

of the war in RVN." The total Ill MAF strength in RVN

not including Seabees was broken down as follows:

DaNang 18,063

ChuLai 10.277

PhuBai 2,114

QuiNhon 1,616

Other 92

Total 32,162

Total arrived by area during August:

DaNang 4,725

Chu Lai 2,684

Total arrived 7,409

Total departed by area during August:

Da Nang 1,029 (1 / 3 departed)

PhuBai 68

QuiNhon 35 Total departed 1,132

Net Gain, August 6,277

1 Sep—1/3 departed RVN for Okinawa, where it was relieved

by BLT 3/5, and then returned to CONUS. A total of

10,919 personnel of FMFPac remained in Okinawa and

Japan.

7-10 Sep—Operation PIRANHA. Following the decisive

Marine Corps victory over the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in

Operation STARLITE (18-24 August), intelligence information disclosed that other VC forces were building up

on the Batangan Peninsula, still farther south of Chu Lai.

Operation PIRANHA, another regimental-level am- phibious-heliborne attack, was executed to clear the area.

It exacted at least 163 Viet Cong killed and served notice

once again upon the VC of the hazards of concentrating

their forces. Subsequently they reverted to small unit

operations in I Corps area.

11 Sep—BLT 2/1, which arrived on Okinawa 27 August from

CONUS and subsequently embarked as the SLF, assumed a

position within six-hours reaction time of Qui Nhon,

prepared to land and provide security, if required, for

debarkation of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

18 Sep—The first elements of the Army's 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division landed at Qui Nhon.

23 Sep—The Defense Department said that General Westmoreland had the authority to permit use of tear gas.

28 Sep—The total III MAF strength in RVN not including

Seabees by area was as follows:

Da Nang 18,641

ChuLai 13,601

Phu Bai 2,172

QuiNhon 1,773

Total 36,187

Total arrived by area during September:

DaNang 3,222

ChuLai 3,384

QuiNhon 327

Total 6,933

Total departed by area during September

PhuBai 26

Net Change 6,907

14 Oct—The CG, I Corps approved extension of the Chu Lai

TAOR. A USMC sniper team was formed in the Hue-Phu

Bai TAOR. The team used Winchester Model 70 rifles

with 8-Unertl telescopic sights and killed two Viet Cong at

a range of more than 700 yards in the first exercise of the

new tactic. Later, M-1D rifles with telescopic sights were

utilized.

18 Oct—Operation TRAIL BLAZER, a six-day deep patrol and

series of ambushes by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion,

began from a patrol base about 15 miles southwest of Da

Nang. The purpose of the operation was to determine the

extent of VC concentration in the main valleys leading

from the mountains into the Da Nang TAOR and to

determine the probability of enemy attack from that area.
CHRONOLOGY 239

Two VC were killed in the operation, and five enemy

complexes of training camps, workshops, and bivouac

areas were destroyed. Accumulated intelligence was used

in developing an aerial target list. Two companies from 3/3

launched Operation TRIPLE PLAY, a two-day search and

destroy effort conducted 12 miles north of Chu Lai. The

results: 16 VC KIA, 6 VCC, and 18 VCS, with only two

Marines wounded.

26 Oct—Operation DRUM HEAD, a coordinated two-day

sweep effort involving 3/7 and an ARVN platoon, began

southwest of Chu Lai. Results: one VC killed and 26

suspects captured; one USMC killed and two wounded.

27 Oct—Operation GOLDEN FLEECE (begun 8 Sep 65) was

terminated. This operation by the 9th Marines was an

effort to deny as much rice as possible to the VC during the

Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest. USMC units provided

protection for Vietnamese farmers in their fields while the

rice crop was harvested. It is estimated that 512,400 lbs. of

threshed rice were denied the VC as a result.

28 Oct—On the night of 28 October, Viet Cong suicide squads

launched simultaneous and coordinated attacks on Marine

installations at Marble Mountain near Da Nang and at

Chu Lai. Even though most of the attackers were killed,

the few who got through used satchel charges to blow up

19 helicopters and damage the hospital at Marble

Mountain, while at Chu Lai they destroyed two fixed-wing

attack aircraft. Ground actions during the night indicated

that other planned attacks were thwarted by Marine

patrols.

3 Nov—BLACK FERRET, a three-day combined USMC/

ARVN search and destroy operation of regimental scope,

began in an area 10 miles south of the Chu Lai airstrip, on

the north side of the Song Tra Bong. Participating were:

two companies from 1/7; two companies from 3/7; 3/11;

two platoons from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and

two battalions from the 4th Regiment of the 2d ARVN

Division. VC forces avoided contact, limiting their

resistance to sporadic small arms fire and booby traps. In

one instance, a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round

wounded six Marines and killed Miss Dickie Chapelle, the

war correspondent, who was accompanying USMC units

on the maneuver. Numerous fortifications and tunnels

were destroyed by attacking forces, and Marine strike

aircraft wiped Out a number of boats and structures along

the Song Tra Bong. Results: 2 VC killed, 20 captured (5

WIA), and 64 suspects apprehended. Eight Marines and

one Navy corpsman were wounded. Helicopters returned

the Marines to Chu Lai upon conclusion of the operation

on 5 November.

7 Nov—BLT 2/7 was withdrawn from Qui Nhon (see 10-12

November entry below); HMM-161 remained at Qui

Nhon in support of II Corps forces.

10-12 Nov—Operation BLUE MARLIN, a combined

USMC/VNMC operation between Chu Lai and Tam Ky,

20 miles to the north, took place. On 7 November, BLT

2/7 was lifted in amphibious shipping from its former

TAOR at Qui Nhon to Chu Lai, where it was joined by the

600-man 3d Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps. The two

units conducted a combined amphibious assault on 10

November across beaches just north of Tam Ky. Four

companies of BLT 2/7 in one LVT wave and two LCM

waves landed unopposed, followed by the remainder of the

BLT and the 3d Battalion, VNMC, in on-call boat serials

and helicopters. Surf at the beach was very high, and the

anchor chains of the APA Paul Revere and the LST

Windham County parted. After sweeping inland to Route

1, the landing force pivoted southward astride the highway

and executed a search and destroy operation to the Chu Lai

TAOR. Resistance was light, and casualties were few. A

Vietnamese civilian reported that the VC had withdrawn

from the objective area two days previously. At the

conclusion of the operation, the RVN Marines were

returned by helicopter to their base area south of Quang

Ngai. 2/7 rejoined its parent regiment at Chu Lai,

replacing 3/3, which embarked for Phase II of BLUE

MARLIN (see 16-18 November entry) and subsequent

operations at Da Nang.

16-18 Nov—BLUE MARLIN (Phase II), similar in scope and

concept to Phase 1(10-12 November), was conducted. At

Chu Lai, 3/3 embarked in the same amphibious shipping

used in Phase I and landed on 16 November over beaches

south of Hoi An, about 22 miles south of Da Nang. The

landing was accomplished smoothly, with one wave of

LVTs and two of LCMs, followed by artillery and Ontos in

on-call serials. Ashore, the landing force was joined by two

RVN Ranger battalions and two RVN special companies in

a coordinated search and destroy operation north to the

Song Cua Dai. Activity was characterized by scattered but

sharp contacts as the VC again avoided confrontation with

the landing force. Fortifications, tunnels, and man-traps

were destroyed in quantity. Combined results were: 25 VC

killed, 15 captured, 79 suspects apprehended, and 9

weapons seized. Two ARVN soldiers were KIA, one

ARVN was wounded, and three USMC were wounded. At

the conclusion of the operation, 3/3 was lifted to the Da

Nang area by amphibious shipping and helicopter.

17-18 Nov—Marine air elements from III MAF were instrumental in preventing a Viet Cong victory at Hiep Duc,

about 25 miles west of Tam Ky. On the 17th, 30 UH-34D

helicopters, supported by fixed-wing attack aircraft, lifted

788 ARVN troops to the relief of an invested ARVN

garrison at Hiep Duc. In this initial lift, 20 of the 30

transport helicopters were hit by ground fire as they approached the landing zone. Despite marginal flying

weather, accompanying attack aircraft and armed

helicopters dropped some 14 tons of high explosive bombs

and fired 512 rockets, as well as 1,532 rounds of 20mm

cannon projectiles, into VC positions near the landing

areas. VC losses during the period were a comfirmed 38

KIA, with many more probables. The following day, 22

UH-34Ds lifted 463 more ARVN troops to Hiep Duc,

making the total lift for two days 1,251. The helilifted

troops were successful in defeating the assault on Hiep

Duc, but were unable to clear the VC from the critical

areas to the northwest. At the request of CG I Corps, 3/7

was alerted to reinforce the ARVN units. Extremely bad

weather prevented the heliift of 3/7 into Hiep Duc. While

awaiting improved weather, the battalion was diverted to

assist an ARVN Ranger battalion under siege at Thach

Tru, south of Quang Ngai (see 22-24 November entry).
240 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC

22-24 Nov—On the late afternoon of 22 November, at the

request of CG, I Corps, 3/7 began reinforcing an ARVN

Ranger battalion which had come under attack by an

estimated VC regiment about 20 miles south of Quang

Ngai. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet SLF moved to a

position off Quang Ngai, ready to land on two hours

notice. Before the Marines arrived, 71 ARVN had been

killed, 74 wounded, and 2 were missing. VC losses were

175 KIA by U.S. body count and 225 by ARVN estimate,

not including those killed by air or naval gunfire beyond

the immediate battle area. Three VC were captured, in

addition to 5 recoilless rifles, 9 machine guns, 2 submachine guns, and 114 rifles. Six enemy 60mm mortars

were destroyed. An undetermined number of enemy dead

were credited to Marine strike aircraft, which flew 39

sorties in marginal weather against the initial assaults.

When the Marines landed, they secured the landing zones,

occupied night defensive positions, and early the next

morning cleared the critical terrain, capturing 17 Viet

Cong, killing 3, and seizing 2 rifles and 5 carbines. On the

morning of the 24th the Situation was stabilized and 3/7

returned to Chu Lai by helicopter. Marine losses in the

encounter were two killed and one wounded.

23 Nov—By this date there were approximately 20

scout/sniper teams of four men each positioned

throughout the III MAF area. On 23 November a team at

Phu Bai killed two VC and wounded one at a range of 1,000

meters.

30 Nov-i Dec—Operation DAGGER THRUST IV. On 30

November the SLF (BLT 2/1 and HMM-261) executed an

amphibious raid at Lang Ke Ga, on the coast 17 miles

southwest of Phan Thiet and about 70 miles east of Saigon.

Immediately prior to the landing, leaflets were dropped

along the routes of advance, giving brief warning to the

villagers. Contact was negligible.

Nov III MAF summary:

Patrols 3,488

Ambushes 2,576

Sniper posts 175

Total offensive ground operations 6,242

Enemy contacts 226

Enemy KIA 126

Enemy WIA 33

Enemy captured 22

Fixed-wing strike sorties 2,551

Helicopter sorties 23,629

Rainfall more than 30 inches

Most rain in one day 7.8 inches

30 Nov— The III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees

and Naval SuDnort Activity was as follows: DaNang 21,948

Chu Lai 14,452

PhuBai 2,328

QuiNhon 254

Other 89

Total 39,071

Personnel strengths fluctuated by area during

November due to reassignment between enclaves,

replacenent, attrition, and movement of battalions. Net

strength change for November 422

8-20 Dec—Operation HARVEST MOON was conducted

approximately 25 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Units involved were Task Force DELTA, 2/7, 3/3, 2/1 (from

SLF), and 3 ARVN battalions. These units were supported

by USMC aircraft and artillery and by four B-52 strikes.

KIA WIA MIA

USMC 51 256 1 KIA VCC VCS RALLIERS

VC 407 33 231 3 22 Dec—The U.S. military command in Vietnam ordered a 30-

hour Christmas cease-fire. A military spokesman said that

similar instructions had been issued by South Vietnamese

Government military leaders. No action would be taken by

allied or RVNAF forces except in sell-defense.

31 Dec—USMACV released the following figures to news

media in Saigon:

U.S. Military Strength in RVN 1Jan65 23,000

U.S. Military Strength in RVN 31Dec65 181,000

RVNAF Total Strength 1Jan65 559,500

RVNAF Total Strength 31Dec65 679,000

Enemy Military Strength in RVN 1Jan65 103,000

Enemy Military Strength in RVN 31Dec65 230,000

U.S. losses during the year 1,300

RVNAF losses during the year 11,000

Enemy losses during the year(KIA) 34,000

Enemy losses during the year(captured) 6,000

III MAF total arrived during December:

DaNang 188

ChuLai 138

PhuBaj 81

Total 407

III MAF total departed during December

ChuLai 452

QuiNhon 25 Total 477

Net Change -70

31 Dec—Ill MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees and

Naval Support Activity was as follows:

Da Nang 22,464

ChuLai 13,995

Phu Bai 2,354

QuiNhon 226

1st Anglico

Total 39,092

31 Dec—Ill MAF ground operations for the week ending 31

December were as follows:

Patrols 1,169

Ambushes 633

Platoon Operations 40

Company Operations 6 Battalion Operations 3 VCKIA 81

VC Captured 6 31 Dec—Results of III MAF Operations Since 8 March 1965:

KIA and DOW WIA MIA

342 2,047 18

KIA WIA POW VCS

VC 2,627 314 535 2,827

31 Dec—A total of 14,528 FMFPac personnel remained in

Okinawa and Japan.
Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations, 1965

TJie President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANK S. REASONER

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving

as Commanding Officer, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine Division in action against hostile

Viet Cong forces near Da Nang, Vietnam on 12 July 1965. The reconnaissance patrol led by Lieutenant Reasoner

had deeply penetrated heavily controlled enemy territory when it came under extremely heavy fire from an

estimated 50 to 100 Viet Cong insurgents. Accompanying the advance party and the point that consisted of five

men, he immediately deployed his men for an assault after the Viet Cong had opened fire from numerous con -

cealed positions. The slashing fury of the Viet Cong machine gun and automatic weapons fire made it impossible

for the main body to move forward. Repeatedly exposing himself to the devastating attack he skillfully provided

covering fire, killing at least two Viet Cong and effectively silencing an automatic weapons position in a valiant

attempt to effect evacuation of a wounded man. As casualties began to mount his radio operator was wounded and

Lieutenant Reasoner immediately moved to his side and tended his wounds. When the radio operator was hit a

second time while attempting to reach a covered position, Lieutenant Reasoner, courageously running to his aid

through the grazing machine gun fire, fell mortally wounded. His indomitable fighting spirit, valiant leadership

and unflinching devotion to duty provided the inspiration that was to enable the patrol to complete its mission

without further casualties. In the face of almost certain death he gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.

His action upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

241
242 MEDAL OF HONOR WINNERS

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR to

CORPORAL ROBERT E. O'MALLEY

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the communist (Viet Cong) forces at the risk of his

own life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Squad Leader in Company "I", Third Battalion, Third

Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), near An Cu'ong 2, South Vietnam, on 18 August 1965. While

leading his squad in the assault against a strongly entrenched enemy force, his unit came under intense small arms

fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Corporal O'Malley raced across an open rice paddy to a

trench line where the enemy forces were located. Jumping into the trench, he attacked the Viet Cong with his rifle

and grenades, and singly killed eight of the enemy. He then led his squad to the assistance of an adjacent Marine

unit which was suffering heavy casualties. Continuing to press forward, he reloaded his weapon and fired with

telling effect into the enemy emplacement. He personally assisted in the evacuation of several wounded Marines,

and again regrouping the remnants of his squad, he returned to the point of the heaviest fighting. Ordered to an

evacuation point by an officer, Corporal O'Malley gathered his besieged and badly wounded squad and boldly led

them under fire to a helicopter for withdrawal. Although three times wounded in this encounter, and facing

imminent death from a fanatic and determined enemy, he steadfastly refused evacuation and continued to cover his

squad's boarding of the helicopters while, from an exposed position, he delivered fire against the enemy until his

wounded men were evacuated. Only then, with his last mission accomplished, did he permit himself to be removed

from the battlefield. By his valor, leadership, and courageous efforts in behalf of his comrades, he served as an

inspiration to all who observed him, and reflected the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the United States

Naval Service.
MEDAL OF HONOR WINNERS 243

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JOE C. PAUL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Fire

Team Leader with Company H, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, during Operation STARLITE near Chu Lai in

the Republic of Vietnam on 18 August 1965. In violent battle, Corporal Paul's platoon sustained five casualties as

it was temporarily pinned down by devastating mortar, recoilless rifle, automatic weapons, and rifle fire delivered

by insurgent communist (Viet Cong) forces in well-trenched positions. The wounded Marines were unable to

move from their perilously exposed positions forward of the remainder of their platoon, and were suddenly subjected to a barrage of white phosphorous rifle grenades. Corporal Paul, fully aware that his tactics would almost

certainly result in serious injury or death to himself, chose to disregard his own safety and boldly dashed across the

fire-swept rice paddies, placed himself between his wounded comrades and the enemy, and delivered effective

suppressive fire with his automatic weapon in order to divert the attack long enough to allow the casualties to be

evacuated. Although critically wounded during the course of the battle, he resolutely remained in his exposed

position and continued to fire his rifle until he collapsed and was evacuated. By his fortitude and gallant spirit of

self-sacrifice in the face of almost certain death, he saved the lives of several of his fellow Marines. His heroic

action served to inspire all who observed him and reflect the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the

United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.
244 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

FIRST LIEUTENANT HARVEY C. BARNUM, JR.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Forward

Observer for Artillery, while attached to Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division

(Reinforced), in action against communist forces at Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 18

December 1965. When the company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy fire and was

quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over five hundred meters of open and fire-swept ground,

and casualties mounted rapidly, Lieutenant Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area seeking

targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle company commander mortally wounded and radio operator killed, he,

with complete disregard for his own safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from the

dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at

once into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace

the loss of key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His

sound and swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant

example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with two

armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched

enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a successful counter-attack on the key enemy positions. Having

thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of

the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion's objective. His

gallant initiative and heroic conduct reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest

traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
Appendix E

List of Reviewers

USMC General Officers

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. (Ret.)

Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret.)

LtGen Leslie E. Brown

LtGen Leo J. Dulacki (Ret.)

LtGen Lewis J. Fields (Ret.)

LtGen Victor H. Krulak (Ret.)

MajGen Marion E. Carl (Ret.)

MajGen Paul J. Fontana (Ret.)

MajGen Harold A. Hatch

MajGen Joseph Koler, Jr.

MajGen Andrew W. O'Donnell

MajGen Oscar F. Peatross (Ret.)

MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Ret.)

MajGen William R. Quinn (Ret.)

MajGen Donald M. Weller (Ret.)

MajGen Carl A. Youngdale (Ret.)

BGen Robert F. Conley (Ret.)

BGen Frederick J. Karch (Ret.)

BGen Marc A. Moore

BGen MauroJ. Padalino (Ret.)

BGen Webb D. Sawyer (Ret.)

BGen Edwin H. Simmons (Ret.)

USMC Colonels

Col Emmett 0. Anglin, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot Charles H. Bodley (Ret.)

Cot Robert W. Boyd (Ret.)

Col George W. Carrington, Jr. (Ret.)

Col Edward Cook (Ret.)

Cot Otis W. Corman (Ret.)

Cot Nicholas J. Dennis (Ret.)

Cot Rex C. Denny, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot Alvin J. Doublet

Cot Joshua W. Dorsey III

Col Edward P. Dupras, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot Norman G. Ewers (Ret.)

Cot Joseph R. Fisher (Ret.)

Cot Don W. Galbreaith (Ret.)

Cot Jesse L. Gibney, Jr.

Cot John E. Gorman (Ret.)

Col William M. Graham, Jr. (Ret.)

Col Roy C. Gray, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot Edward H. Greason (Ret.)

Col John E. Greenwood

Col Hardy Hay (Ret.)

Cot Harold A. Hayes, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot George L. Hollowell (Ret.)

Cot Floyd J. Johnson, Jr.

Col Charles J. Keever

Cot James P. Kelly (Ret.)

Cot Horace E. Knapp, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot Jack K. Knocke (Ret.)

Cot Robert L. La Mar (Ret.)

Cot George G. Long (Ret.)

Cot Verle E. Ludwig (Ret.)

Cot Andrew I. Lyman (Ret.)

Cot Robert J. Lynch, Jr. (Ret.)

Cot James F. McClanahan (Ret.)

Cot William P. Nesbit (Ret.)

Cot Norman R. Nickerson (Ret.)

Cot John D. Noble (Ret.)

Col Royal E. North (Ret.)

Cot Thomas J. O'Connor (Ret.)

Cot RobertJ. Oddy (Ret.)

Cot Keith 0 'Keefe (Ret.)

Cot Leslie L. Page (Ret.)

Cot William P. Pala (Ret.)

Cot Francis F. Parry (Ret.)

Col Edward F. Penico (Ret.)

ColRobertM. Port (Ret.)

Ccl Mervin B. Porter (Ret.)

Cot Richard A. Savage (Ret.)

Cot Richard J. Schriver (Ret.)

Cot Donald W. Sherman (Ret.)

Cot Donald H. Stapp (Ret.)

Cot William W. Taylor (Ret.)

Cot Rodollo L. Trevino (Ret.)

Cot Leon N. Utter (Ret.)

Cot Sumner A. Vale (Ret.)

Col Roy R. Van Cleve (Ret.)

Col Maxie R. Williams (Ret.)

Cot Don P. Wyckoff (Ret.)

Col Michael R. Yunck (Ret.)

USMC Lieutenant Colonels

LtCol Herbert J. Bain (Ret.)

LtCol Robert W. Baker (Ret.)

LtCol Billy H. Barber (Ret.)

LtCol Harlan P. Chapman (Ret.)

LtCol Lloyd F. Childers (Ret.)

LtCol William H. Clark (Ret.)

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr. (Ret.)

LtCol Samuel E. Englehart (Ret.)

LtCol Harold D. Fredericks (Ret.)

LtCol Charles L. Goode (Ret.)

LtCol Donald J. Hatch

LtCol Lane Rogers

LtCol Richard E. Romine (Ret.)

LtCol Walter E. Stuenkel (Ret.)

LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan (Ret.)

LtCoI Russell B. Tiffany

LtCol Charles Ward

LtCol Raymond W. Wilson (Ret.)

USMC Majors

Maj John A. Buck (Ret.)

Maj Andrew G. Comer (Ret.)

Maj Paul R. Ek

Maj Nicholas H. Grosz, Jr.

Maj Pat Morgan (Ret.)

Maj John J. Mullen, Jr.

Maj Gary W. Parker

Maj Ruel T. Scyphers (Ret.)

Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Center of Military History, Department of the Army

Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force

Naval History Division, Department of the Navy

Gen William E. DePuy, USA (Ret.)

Adm John J. Hyland, USN (Ret.)

Adm Roy L. Johnson, USN (Ret.)

Adm Ulysses S.G. Sharp, USN (Ret.)

Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret.)

VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.)

RAdm Don W. Wulzen, USN (Ret.)

Mr. Peter Braestrup

245
Appendix F

Task Organization:

Ill MAF and Naval Component Command

as of 31 Dec 1965

USMC USN

Off En! Off Eni TOTAL

I. Naval Component Command (I CTZ) 9 19 224 4789 5041

A. Headquarters (DA NANG) 6 18 1 25 1. Det, Sub Unit 2, H&SCo HqBn 5 7 1 13 2. Det, 5th Comm Bn 10 10

3.Det,H&HS-1,MWHG,FMAW 1 1 2 B.3OthNCR 3 1 78 2023 2105

1. Hq, 30th NCR (DA NANG) 3 1 6 25 35 2. MCB-4 (CHU LAI) 18 498 516

3.MCB-5(DANANG) 17 552 569

4.MCB-8(DANANG) 21 397 418

5. MCB-8 (PHU BAI) 1 49 50

6.MCB-9(DANANG) 15 502 517

C.NavSuptAct 145 2766 2911

1. DA NANG (PCS) 101 2281 2382

2.DANANG(TDY) 15 291 306

3. Station Hospital (DA NANG) 29 184 213

4. CHU LAI Detachment 10 10

II. Ill Marine Amphibious Force 2429 35869 194 1497 39989

A.HQIIIMAF(DANANG) 97 723 5 11 836

1. Staff 75 120 5 2 202

2. 5th CommBn(-) 18 584 9 611

3.ProvDogPlt 1 11 12 4. 7th CI Tm (CHU LAI) 3 8 11 B. Base Defense Bn (DA NANG) 32 955 3 51 1041

1. 3d Bn 9th Marines 32 955 3 51 1041

C. 7th EngrBn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 35 998 1 16 1050

1. 7th EngrBn (- Co C) 29 855 1 16 901

2. 1st Bridge Co (-) 6 143 149

D. 9th MT Bn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 18 397 1 9 425

E. Sub Unit -1, 1st ANGLICO 5 42 6 53

1. SAIGON 1 14 1 16

2.BIENHOA s 1 6 3.BERIA 1 3 4.DANANG 4 1 5 5.QUANGNGAI 1 3 4 6.QUINHON 1 2 3 7.PLEIKU 4 1 5 8. NHA TRANG 2 1 3 9.CANTHO 1 5 1 7 F. DetJ, 1st Radio Bn FMF 2 65 67

1.HQ&TM1(DANANG) 1 35 36

246
TASK ORGANIZATION 247

USMC USN

Off Eni Off Eni TOTAL

2. Team 2 (CHU LAI) 1 26 27

3. Team 3 (PHU BAI) 4

G.3dMarineDivision(-)(Rein),FMF 1056 21162 106 1045 23369

1. HqBn (-) (DA NANG) 155 1508 13 27 1703

a. HqCo 119 690 13 27 849

b. Comm Co (-) 11 356 367

c.ServiceCo 15 318 333

d.MPCo(.) 5 111 116

e.3dCIT 4 16 20

f. Det, 1st ITT 1 17 18

2. 3dMarines (.)(Rein)(DA NANG.PHU BAI) 168 3830 10 174 4182

a. HqCo (Rein) (DA NANG) 17 219 1 5 242

(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv 3 3 b. lstBn, 1st Marines (DA NANG) 37 983 3 57 1080

c. lstBn, 3d Marines (DA NANG) 39 1023 3 53 1118

d. 2dBn, 1st Marines (Rein) (PHU BAI) 75 1602 3 59 1739

(1) 2dBn, 1st Marines 40 999 3 50 1092

(2) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv 1 6 7

(3) 1st Pit (Rein), Co A, 1st ATBn 1 19 20

(5 M5OA1 Ontos)

(4) 1st Pit (Rein), Co A, 1st EngrBn 1 44 45

(5) 1st Pit(Rein), Co A, 1st TkBn 1 27 28

(5 M48A3 Tanks)

(6) 1st Pit (Rein), Co A, 1st Recon Bn 1 23 24

(7) 4thBn, 12th Marines () (Rein) (PHU BAI) 30 484 9 523

(a) HqBtry () (Rein) (CMR Team) 14 161 3 178

(b) Btry M, 4thBn (SP) (6.l55How) 4 120 2 126

(c) Btry B, lstBn, llthMar, (6105How) 8 124 2 134

(d) 107mm Mortar Btry, lstBn, 11th Marines 4 79 2 85

(6 Mortars)

3.ADCCommandGroup(CHULAI) 7 26 33

4. 4th Marines () (Rein) (CHU LAI) 107 2654 6 128 2895

a. HqCo 24 268 2 2 296

(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv 3 16 19

b.lstBn,4thMarines 35 968 2 58 1063

c. 2Bn, 4th Marines 34 969 2 58 1063

d. CoB () (Rein), 3d ATBn 2 67 2 71

(1)CoB () 1 40 41

(2) Det, H & S Co, 3d AT Bn 1 27 2 30

e. CoB () (Rein), 3dEngrBn 3 119 2 124

(1) Co B(.) 3 75 78

(2) Det Support Co 44 2 46

f. CoA () (Rein), 1st AmTracBn, FMF 5 168 4 177

(34 LVTP-5, 1 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1, 2 LVTE)

g. Co C(-) 3d TkBn, FMF 4 95 2 101

(12 M48A3 Tanks)

(1) Co C(.) 4 85 89

(2) Det, H&SCo (3 M67A2 Flame Tanks) io 2 12

5. Artillery Bn Group (CHU LAI) 76 1273 6 24 1379

a. 3dBn (), 11th Marines 36 593 2 11 642

(1) Hq Btry 11 150 2

3 166

(2) Btry G (6-105 How) 7 118 2 127

(3) Btry H (6.105 How) 8 120 2 130

(4)Btry 1(6.105 How) 7 125 2 134

(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars) 3 80 2 85
248 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

USMC USN

Off Eni Off Eni TOTAL

b. 3dBn (-) (Rein), 12th Marines 40 680 4 13 737

(1)HqBtry (Rein) 14 164 4

11 193

(a)HqBtry 14 150 4

11 179

(b) Det, CMR HqBtry, 12th Marines 14 14

(2) Btry G (6-lO5How) 8 114 122

(3) Btry H (6-lO5How) 7 113 120

(4) Btry M, 4thBn, llthMar (6-l55How) 5 131 2 138

(5) 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP) (-) FMF (4-l55Guns) 4 113 117

(6) 1st PIt, 1st 8" HowBtry(SP) (2-8" How) 2 45 47

6. 7th Marines (Rein) (CHU LAI) 147 3576 ii 183 3917

a. HqCo (-) (Rein) 21 281 2

3 307

(1) HqCo (-) 17 224 2

3 246

(2) Det, HqBn, 3dMarDiv 4 57 61

b. 1st Bn, 7th Marines 39 979 3 62 1083

c. 2dBn, 7thMarines 38 914 3 55 1010

d. 3dBn, 7th Marines 37 942 3 57 1039

e. Co C(Rein), lstATBn (15 M5OA1 Ontos) 3 85 2 90

(1)CoC 2 59 61

(2) HqCo (-) 1 26 2 29

f. Co C (Rein), 1st EngrBn 4 157 1 162

g. CoA (Rein), 3dAmTracBn 5 21 3 226

7. 9th Marines (DA NANG) 115 3090 10 168 3383

a. HqCo 15 193 2 3 213

b. 1st Bn, 9th Marines 35 969 3 56 1063

c. 2dBn, 9thMarines 36 958 2 54 1050

d.3dBn,3dMarines 29 970 3 55 1057

8. 12th Marines (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 111 1705 8 36 1860

a. HqBtry (-) (2-CMRS) 22 209 3 4 238

b. 1st 8'HowBtry(SP)(-) (Rein) (4-8'' How) 7 161 3 171

c. 3dPlt, 3d 155 Gun Btry (SP), FMF (2-l55Guns) 1 35 1 37

d. 1st Bn, (-) 12th Marines 43 701 2 14 760

(1) HqBtry 14 163 2 4 183

(2) Btry A (6-lO5How) 7 115 2 124

(3) Btry A, 1st Bn, llthMar (6-lO5How) 8 124 2 134

(4) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars) 3 75 2 80

(5) Btry C, 1st Bn, l2thMar (6-lO5How) 8 110 2 120

(6) Btry K; 4thBn, l2thMar (6-155 (SP)) 3 114 2 119

e. 2dBn (-), 12th Marines 38 599 3 14 654

(1) HqBtry 14 153 3 5 175

(2) Btry 0 (6-lO5How) 7 114 2 123

(3) Btry E (6-lO5How) 7 109 1 117

(4) Btry F (6-lO5How) 7 106 3 116

(5) Btry L, 4thBn, l2thMar (6-155 (SP)) 3 117 3 123

9. 3dA T Bn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 15 305 10 330

a. H&SCo 9 147 7 163

b. Co A (-) (Rein) (10 M5OA1 Ontos) 3 63 1 67

c. CoC(Rein)(2OM5OAlOntos) 3 95 2 100

10. 3dEngrBn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 28 686 1 13 728

a. H&SCo 10 117 1 13 141 b.SupportCo 4 268 272

c. C0A(-) 5 74 79

d.CoC 6 147 153

e.CoC,7thEngrBn 3 80 83

11. 3dMedBn (-)(DA NANG) 3 101 27 153 284

a. H&SCo 3 101 8 45 157

6 CoC 18 102 120

c.CoD 1 6 7
TASK ORGANIZATION 249

USMC USN

Off Eni Off Eni TOTAL

12. 3dReconBn (DA NANG) 21 302 1 17 341

a. H&SCo 9 99 1 6 115

b.CoA 4 66 4 74 c.CoC 4 68 3 75 d.CoD 4 69 4 77 13. Recon Group Alpha (CHU LAI) 8 132 5 145

a. Co B (-) (Rein), 3d ReconBn 4 63 2 69

(1) H&SCo

(2) 1st PIt

(3) 2d Pit

b. Co C (Rein), 1st ReconBn 4 69 3 76

14. 1st Force ReconCo (DA NANG) 9 128 5 142

15.3dMTBn(-)(DANANG) 10 154 8 172

a. H&SCo 7 84 8 99

b. Co A (-) (15 M-35, 2 1/2-ton trucks) 2 39 41

c. 2dPlt, CoB (15 M-35, 2 1/2 ton trucks) 1 31 32

16. lstAmTracBn (-)(Rein),FMF(DA NANG) 26 639 2 13 680

a. H&SCo(12LVTP-5, 3LVTC-1, 1LVTR-1) 17 319 2 11 349

b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Pit (6 LVTH-6) 2 74 2 78

c. Co B (Rein) (54 LVTP-5, 4 LVTC-1, 1 LVTR-1) 7 246 253

17. 3d TkBn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG) 23 489 1 11 524

a. H&SCo (-) (2 M48A3 Tks) 15 267 1 7 290

b. Co A(-) (Rein) (12 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks) 3 89 2 94

c. Co B(Rein) (17 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks) 5 110 2 117

d. 1st PIt, Co C (5 M48A3 Tks) 23 23 18. 3dShore Party Bn (-) (DA NANG) 22 438 1 25 486

a. H&SCo 12 184 1 10 207

b.CoA 3 86 5 94

c.CoB 4 82 5 91 d.CoC 3 86 5 94

19. Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn (CHU LAI) 5 126 1 10 142

20. 3dDental Co (DA NANG) 8 35 43

H. First Marine Aircraft Wing 1086 8332 40 147 9605

1.MWHG-1 267 2159 12 50 2488

a. H&HS-1 (DA NANG) 141 803 10 28 982

b. MASS-2 19 119 138

(1) Det A (CHU LAI) 4 18 22

(2) Det B (DA NANG) 4 19 23

(3) Det C (CHU LAI) 3 13 16

(4) DASC (DA NANG) 7 19 26

c. MACS-7 23 221 2 246

(1) Det A (PHU BAI) 3 17 20

d. 1st LAAM Bn (DA NANG) 31 481 1 10 523

e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI) 32 449 1 10 492

2. MAG-lI (DA NANG) 178 1817 5 21 2021

a. H&MS-11 34 416 450

b.MABS-11 13 490 3 16 522

c. VMFA-115 41 274 1 2 318

d. VMFA-323 43 278 1 2 324

e. VMCJ-1 29 222 251

f. VMF (AW)-312 18 137 1 156

3. MAG-12 (CHU LAI) 166 1654 6 26 1852

a. H&MS-12 41 364 405

b. MABS-12 19 519 3 22 563

c. VMA-211 29 179 2 210

d. VMA-214 24 176 1 201
250 THELANDINGANDTHEBUILDUP

USMC USN

Off Eni Off Eni TOTAL

e. VMA-223 27 178 1 2 208

f. VMA-224 22 176 1 199

g. MATCU-67 4 62 66

4. MAG-16 240 1407 9 21 1677

a. H&MS-16 (DA NANG) 31 281 312

b. MABS-16 (DA NANG) 13 441 5 6 365

c. Det MABS (PHU BAI) 12 12 d.DetMABS(QUANGNGAI) 2 2 e. DET MABS (QUANG TRI) 2

2 1. SU 1,MABS-16(DANANG) 10 61 1 72

g. HMM-161 (PHU BAI) 50 178 1 3 232

h. HMM-263 (DA NANG) 46 175 1 3 225

i. HMM-361 (DA NANG) 51 158 1 3 213

j. VMO-2 (DA NANG) 33 136 1 5 175

k.MATCU-68(DANANG) 6 61 67

5.MAG-36 235 1295 8 29 1567

a. H&MS-36 (CHU LAI) 34 315 349

b. MABS-36 (CHU LAI) 14 342 4 26 386

c. HMM-362 (CHU LAI) 53 160 1 214

d. HMM-363 (QUI NHON) 54 176 2 3 235

e. HMM-364 (CHU LAI) 54 152 1 207

f. VMO-6 (CHU LAI) 26 150 176

I.ForceLogistics Support Group 98 3195 32 218 3543

1. Force Logistics Support Group (DANANG) 52 1649 4 31 1736

a. H&SCo (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn 22 373 3 15 413

b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn 22 750 1 16 789

c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn 6 399 405

d. Truck Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn 2 127 129

2. Force Logistic Support Unit-I (CHU LAI) 38 1308 19 130 1495

a. FLSU Headquarters 24 871 8 903

(1) H&SCo (Provisional) 11 197 8 216

(2) Supply Co (Provisional) 7 326 333

(3) Maint Co (Provisional) 6 348 354

b. Shore Party Group (Provisional) 4 136 1 10 . 151

(1)CoC,lstSPBn 4 136 1 10 151

c.MTGroup (Provisional) 10 268 4 282

(1) Co A(-), 7th MTBn 3 84 2 89

(2) 2dPlt, Co C, 9th MTBn 1 27 28

(3) Co C(-) 1st MTBn 3 81

1 85

(4)CoC, 3dMTBn 3 76 1 80

d.CoB,3dMedBn (Rein) 33 18 108 159

3. Force Logistic Support Unit -2 (PHU BAI) 8 238 9 57 312

a. FLSUHeadquarters 6 190 4 200

(1) H&SCo (Provisional) 3 40 4 47

(2) Supply PIt 62 62

(3) Maint Pit 3 88 91

b. CoB, 3dMTBn (-) 2 37 39

c.CoA,3dMedBn 11 9 53 73
INDEX

Units

Field Force, Vietnam, 90n, 120. 150

Atsugi, Japan, 25

Australia, 51

78-80, 84, 87, 100, lOOn,

1st Logistic Command, 44

Da Nang Support Command, 44

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 52n, 53, 110, 154, 197

1st Infantry Division, 52,54

11th Air Assault Division (Test), 52n

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 52, 161, 161n

Task Force Alpha, 90, 90,s, 205-206, 206n, 207

7th Airlift Platoon, 75

Utility Tactical Transport Detachment, 68th Aviation

Company, 18n

8th Radio Research Unit, 22, 26, 210

Special Forces, 172n, 206

Aircraft

Types

A-4 (Skyhawk), 41-42, 72, 76, 81, 81n, 85, 98, 99n, 104,

109, 125, 150, 154-156, 157n, 158, 182; illus., 151, 155

B-52 (Stratofortress), 107-108

C-123 (Provider), 85, 159

C-124 (Globemaster), 5

C-130A (Hercules), 5, 14, 57; illus., 14

CH-37C (Deuce), 110, 149; illus., 161

CH-47 (Chinook), 110

EF-1OB (F3D-2Q) (Skynight), 27, 156, 156n

F3D (Skynight), 156n

F-4B (Phantom II), 25, 51, 61, 72, 81, 81n, 98, 99n, 109,

149, 151, 154-155, 163, 182; illus., 150, 154

F-8 (Crusader), 150, 156, 156n, 157-158, 163; illus., 157

F-102 (Delta Dagger), 57

F-los (Thunderchief), 155

IL-28 (Beagle), 162n

KC-130 (Hercules), 9, 15, 23, 85, 157, 157n, 193

0-lB (Bird Dog), 61, 100

RF-8A (Crusader), 156

RF-l01 (Voodoo), 155

UH-1E (Huey), 17, 75, 81, 81n, 106-107, 110, 153-154, 160,

l6On

UH-34D (Sea Horse), 17-18, 27, 56, 71, 81, 85, 87, 95n,

100, 104, 106, 110, 128, 160, 160n, 161-162, 193; illus., 161 Air Force, 5,14, 149n, 151, 159

Units

2d Air Division, 5,27, 32, 120, 151, 155-156, 163, 201

315th Air Division, 14

6315th Operations Group, 5

Detachment 1, 619 Tactical Command and Control

Squadron, 5

Alamo (LSD 33), 55

Albers, LtCol George H., 168, 169n

Aldworth, LtCol James, liOn

American Embassy, Saigon, 211

An Cuong, 78

An Cuong (1), 71-72

AnCuong(2), 71, 73, 75, 77-79

Anderson,SgtJohnA., 127, 127n;illus., 127

Anglin, Col Emmett 0., Jr., 109, 109n, 150, 154

An Khe, 53, 161

An Ky Peninsula, 84

Annamite Mountains, 29

AnThien, 146

An Thoi (2), 73, 76, 78-79

An Tu (1), 126

Army, 18n

Bache (DD 470), 100, 169

Ba Gia, 51,69, 154

Bain, LtCol HerbertJ., 9, 9n, 14-16, 18-19, 28; illus., 28

Baker, LtCol Robert W., 41-42

Bangkok, Thailand, 210

Bannister, Cdr John M., USN, 31, 39-40

Ba Ria, 205

Barnum, lstLt Harvey C.,Jr., 108, 108n

Barstow, California, 185

Batangan Peninsula, 84, 84n, 87-88

Ba To, 179-180

Bauman, LtCol George F., 75, liOn

Bayfield(APA 33), 72,84

Belle Grove (LST 1), 84

Ben Goi Bay, 197-198

BexarCAPA 237); t93; illus., 195

BinhDinh Province, 52-53, 95, 205

BinhGia, vii, 204n, 205

BienHoa, 51, 54-55, 169n

Binh Thai, 28

Blackburn, VAdm Paul P., USN (See also Seventh Fleet), 193-

195, 197, 201-202

Blakely, SSgt Ronald M., 209

Blanchard, LtCol Don H., 31, 174-175

Blaz, Maj Vincente T., 142

Bodley, LtCol Charles H., 54-55,

117, 160, 194; illus., 83,85

Bob Point, Okinawa, 5

Bond, Capt William H., illus., 207

Bong Son, 206

Boyd, Col RobertW., 183-184

Braine (DD 630), 85 Branum, lstLt Marx H., illus., 20

Brown, Cob Leslie E., 81, 109-110, lila, 125, 150, 154, 160

Bronars, Maj Edward J., 208

Buck, Maj John A., 61, 139n

Buckner Bay, Okinawa, 194

251
252 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Burnett, Cot John R., 201-203

Cabildo (LSD 16), 72, 82, 84

Catlender, Col James M., 165, 165n; illus., 167

Cam La, 106

Cam Ne, 61-65, 142, 144n, 145; map, 60

Camp Merrell, Vietnam (See also Cpl Merrell), 172

Camp Pendleton, California, 54, 117, 172, 185, 194

Camp Reasoner, 178

Camp Schwab, Okinawa, 14

Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, 69n

Cam Ranh Bay, 158

Cang, RAdm Chung Tan, VNN, 240n

Can Tho, 169n

Cape Varella, 3

Capital Military Region, 204, 206

Cap St. Jacques, 3, 7

CARE (Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere),

47

Carl, BGen Marion E., 24, 26, 30-32, 35n, 36, 39-40, 43, 107,

150

Carrington, Cot George W., 129-130, 130n

Catholic Relief Society, 47

Cau Do River, (See also Song Cau Do), 48, 56-58, 61-62, 122,

124, 145

Central Highlands, 4, 52, 116

Chapetle, Dickey, 94

Chapman, Capt Harlan P., 158

Chien Thong ''Struggle for Victory'' pacification program, 50,

50n, 51

Childers, LtCot Lloyd F., 81, 81n, 104, liOn, 158-160

China Beach, 172

Chuan, BGen Nguyen Van, ARVN, 26, 28, 49, 133

Chu Lai, 48-71, 98, 117-118, 120, 138, 154, 164, 174-175, 179,

186, 189-190, 193, 197; maps, 119, 173

Chu Lai Airfield, 30, 30n, 31, 39-42, 47, 125, 130-131, 149-

150, 154-156, 186, illus. 40-41, 156

CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group), 172, 179-180

Civic action program, 46-47, 142-144

Civilian High National Council, vi

Ctapp, LtCol Archie J., 159n

Clark, Capt Ronald A., 78

Clark, LtCol William H., 59, 129

Clement, LtCol David A., 24-25, 37-39, 47-48, 91, 93, 140-

141, 141n, 146n, 158-159; illus., 20

Code Plan stocks, 17

Collins, Capt Patrick G., 174, 177-178

Collins, MajGen William R. ''Rip,'' vi, 14, 24, 31-33, 36, 39,

42, 42n, 43, 194; illus., 42

Combined action companies, platoons, 134n, 136, 136n, 137-

138

Combined Action Program, 133, 134n

Combined Coordination Center, 20

Comer, Maj Andrew G., 75-78, 95n

Commander, Coastal Surveillance Force, 167

Commander in Chief, Pacific (See also Adm Sharp), 3, 14, 29,

43, 51-52, 57, 65, 149n, 151, 151n, 190, 194,197

Commander In Chief, Pacific Air Force, 14, 30, 163

Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (See also Adm Johnson),

167, 183, 193, 197, 201, 263, 203n

Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 183

Conley, Cot Robert F., 81, 109n, 150, 182

Control and Reporting Center, Sn

Coogan, Capt Richard J., illus., 209

Cook (APA 130), 172

Cook, LtCol Bertram E., Jr., 4-6

Cook, LtCol Edward, 24, 33; Col, 61

Corman, LtCol Otis W., 27, 156n

Corps Tactical Zones

I Corps, vi, 9, 12, 17, 27, 29, 44, 50-51, 56, 58, 69, 90n, 91, 100, 107, 111, 115-116, 116n, 117, 122, 138-139, 142-

144, 144n, 145n, 161-162, 168-169, 181-185, 196, 204,

208, 208n, 212; map, 13

II Corps, 52-54, 88, 90n, 95, 116n, 120, 122, 150, 154, 157,

167, 194, 205-206

III Corps, 54, 202

IV Corps, 7

Costello, Maj Frank P., Jr., 30

Coursey, BGen John P., vii

Cowley, Capt EverettL., 5

CRITIPAC, 185, 185n

Cubi Point, Philippines, 10, 41

Cu De River (See also Song Cu Dc), 37, 47, 91n

Cu De Valley, 140

Curtis, LtCol OliverW., 15, 15n, 17

DaiGiang, 133n

Dai Loc, 178

Dam Lap Au Bay, 91

Da Nang, vi, 4-5, 9, 18, 20, 22, 25, 33, 36-37, 39, 44, 46-48,

59, 98, 115-118, 124, 138, 149, 149n, 150, 154, 164, 174-

175, 186-187, 189; illus. 6; maps, 8,60, 171

Da Nang Airfield, vi, 5, 9, 26-27, 37, 47, 57-59, 122, 129-130,

188-190, 193; illus., 6, 14, 121, 127, 157, 165

Da Nang River, 28, 149

Da Nang Special Sector, 145n

Davis, BGen Raymond G., vii

Demilitarized Zone, 29, 117, 155, 182

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (See also North Vietnam), v,

21, 51

Dennis, LtCol Nicholas J., 110, 117n, 186-189, 189n

Denny, LtCol Rex C., Jr., 23, 25-26, 30, 44n, 104, liOn

Department of Defense, 17,45

Department of the Army, 210

DePuy, BGen William E.,USA, 9,23, 107, 107n, 210

Derning, LtCol Edmund G., 193

Diachenko (APA 123), 85, 198

Diem, Ngo Dinh, v, 50, 204

Direct air support center, 27, 85, 153, 166

DIXIE STATION, 158

Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (FM 31-11/NWP

22(A)), 194

Dodson, Col Frederick C., 44

Don, Gen Tran Van, ARVN, v-vi

Dong Bach Ma, vi

Dong Da training camp, 133n

Dorsey, LtCol Joshua W., III, 101, lOin, 103, 105-108; illus.,

107

Doublet, Capt Alvin J., 90

Do Xa, 31,46,93
INDEX 253

Dubois, RAdm Raymond F., USN, 167

Duc Co, 206

Dulacki, Col LeoJ., 69, 69n, 70; LtGen, 44n

Duong, WO Nyugen Diem, ARVN, 135 Duong Son, 61, 145

Duong Son (1), 61-62, 65

Duong Son (2), 61-62

Duong Son (3), 61

Dupras, Cot Edward P., Jr., 31, 33,33n, 48, 69, 177

Eagle Flight, 160n

Eddy, lstLt Dale D., 18

Ek, lstLt Paul R., 133; Capt, 134n, 135-136; illus., 134-135

Eldorado (AGC 11), 202

Eldridge, lstLt Thomas F., 155-156

Elephant Valley, 158

Eliason, lstLt Wendell T., 18

Estes (AGC 12), 31-32, 40, 198

Ewers, LtCol Norman G., 17, 54, 81, 154, 194, 196-197, 200

Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, 3, 10, 24

Exercise SILVER LANCE, 23

Ferguson, Maj Gilbert W., 46

Fields, MajGen Lewis J., 117, 196-197, 200-201, 203

Fisher, LtCol Joseph R., 31, 48, 70-73, 76, 78-79, 93n, 141

Fisher, Cot Thell H., 96

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (See also LtGen Krulak),6, 22, 22n,

23, 45, 57, 116-117, 151n, 167-168, 177, 181, 183, 185,

185n, 193-196, 200, 203, 205

Fontana, MajGen Paul J.,vi, 25, 30-32, 36, 42, 42n, 43

Forney, BGen Edward H., 134

Fort Benning, Georgia, 52, 52n

Francis, lstLt William F. B., 47

Frank Knox (DD 742), 196

Fredericks, LtCol Harold D., 31, 48

French Expeditionary Corps, 36

Fuller, Cot Regan, 44

Futema, Okinawa, 14, 157

Gaffen, Maj Malcolm C., 172; LtCol, 180

Galveston (CVG 3), 72, 78, 81, 85

Garman, LtCol William E., 109

Garner, Sgt Cecil A., 18

Garretson, Cot Frank E., 59, 178

Garriott, Capt John W., illus., 28

Geneva Accords, v

Gillum, Maj Donald E., 41

Goode, LtCol Charles L., 30, 30n, 39-41

Gordon, Marcus J., 143-144

Gorman,ColJohnE., 122, 122n, 140

Graham, Cot William M., Jr., 33, 34n, 39, 41, 186

Gray,ColRoyC.,Jr., llln,151n,154n

Green Beach, 55, 71-72

Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr., 29, 34n, 36, 42, 42n, 46, 134,

181, 208; illus., 22 Greenwood, Col John E., 133n

Gruenler, LtCol Robert E., 172

Grosz, lstLt Nicholas H., Jr., 108, 109n

Guadalcanal, 69n

Guam, 107

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 135

Gulf of Tonkin resolution, vi-vii

Gunston Hall (LSD 5), 5

Hai An, 206

Hai Duong, 158

Haiti, 133-134

Haitian Gendarmerie, 135

Hai Van Pass, 22, 58, 91n, 174

Hai Van Peninsula, 184n

Hanifin, LtCol Robert T., Jr., 106-107, 117, 137, 164, 197-

198, 200, 203

Hanna, Capt Don K., 154

Hanoi, 6, 158, 162n

Hanthorn, Cot Jack E., 35n

''Happy Valley,'' 126, 161, 179

Harkins, Gen Paul D., USA, v

Harris, Capt Michael J., Australian Army, 139n

Hatch, Capt DonaldJ., 211

Hawaii, 23, 35n

Hay, Cot Hardy, 32, 42, 44, 46, 57-58

Hayes, Cot Harold A., Jr., 182, 184

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 57, 69n, 117, 134, 200 Henderson, BGen Melvin D., 44, 101, lOin, 104-106, 194-

196; illus., 100

Henrico (APA 45), 11

Henry, Capt Howard B. 75

HiepDuc,98-100, lOOn, 101, 141 Highway 1, 127n, 133

Hill 11, 12.

Hill 22, 127-128

Hill 30, 75-77

Hill 43, 75, 105-106

Hill 55, 95n

Hill 100, 107

Hill 180, 48, 107

Hill 278, 25

Hill 312, 2

Hill 327, 18, 188; illus., 186

Hill 407, 106

Hill 586, 56

Hitchcock, LtCol Paul L., 24, 27

Hoa, Capt Nguyen, ARVN, 38, 125

Hoa Hai, 139, 139n, 146

Hoa Hiep, 146

Hoa Phat, 47

I-ba Vang, 37, 125, 142n, 145

HoChi Minh, 99n

1-boi An, 96, 165; map, 60,97

Hollowell, Col George L., 210

Hong Kong, 3, 193, 196

Honolulu, Hawaii, 65, 196

HOP TAC (Working Together) campaign, 50, SOn, 144, 144n

Horn, LtCol William K., 203

Hue, 22, 25-26, 170, 172, 174-175; maps, 123, 176

Hue River (See also Perfume River, Song Huong), 25, 25n, 26-

27, 203

Huong, Premier Tran Van, vi, 3

Hyland, VAdm John J., USN (See also Seventh Fleet), 203,

203n
254 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Ia Drang Valley, 154

I Corps Advisory Group, 69, 120, 208-209

I Corps Joint Coordinating Council, 143-144

Iwakuni, Japan, 31, 39, 150

Iwo Jima (LPH 2), 33n, 54, 78, 194, 196; illus., 196

Jacques, GySgt Maurice J., 179-180

Japan, 24, 25n, 30, 43, 150, 157

Jarrett, LtCol Clyde R., 109

Jenkins, lstLt Homer K., 75, 76

Johnson, Maj FloydJ., Jr., 71; Col, 72n, 81-82

Johnson, President Lyndon B., 4, 6-7, 9, 23, 30, 57, 65, 115,

212

Johnson, Adm Roy L., USN (See also Commander in Chief,

Pacific Fleet), 183, 193-195, 197, 201-203, 203n

Johnson, Col William G., 85, 95, 110, 149, 160, 190; illus.,

151

Joint action company, platoon, 133-135, 136n

Joint Chiefs of Staff, v-vi, 3-4, 6-7, 15-16, 21-22, 22n, 36, 47,

51-54, 59, 65, 120, 122, 149

Joint General Staff, 9, 82, 144, 204, 204n, 205, 207, 210

Jones. lstLtCharlesD., 131

Jones, LtCol Donald R., 24-25, 28, 49n

Jones, LtCot States R., Jr., 169-170; illus., 170

Jones, BGen William K., 210

Joseph E. Connelly (DE 450), illus., 195

Kaasmann, Maj Bernard A., 186

Kadena, Okinawa 5

Karch, BGen Frederick J., 3, 7, 9-12, 15-17, 19-20, 25, 27-29,

36, 44, 57, 70, 78n, lOla, 115-116, 120, 125, 164, 212;

illus., 12, 18, 23, 34

Kees, Sgt Russell L., 128

Keever, Maj Charles J., 47, 144; Col, 144n; illus., 142

Kelly, LtCol James P., 72, 80, 82, 84-85, 87-88, 88a, 131

Kennedy, Maj Jack A., 190

Kennedy, President John F., v

Kerakos, SSgt William D., 211

Khanh, Gen Nguyen, ARVN, vi

Khang, BGen Le Nguyen, VNMC, 204, 204n, 205-207

Khang River, 108

Khe Sanh, vi

King,ColJohnH.,Jr.,16-17,27,81n,149

Knapp, Col Horace E, Jr., 195-196, 198

Knocke, LtCol Jack K., 165

Koler,LtColJoseph,Jr., 15, 193

Komo, Sgt Raymond S., ilus., 208

Kontum Province, 22, 52

Korea (See also Republic of Korea), iOn, 14, 15n, 16, 25n, 43,

51, 69n, 95, 134, 151, 159n

Korean War, 24, 120

Krulak, LtGen Victor H. (See also Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific), 22, 22n, 23, 28, 30, 33, 39, 42n, 44, 48, 54-55,

58, 78n, 82, 101, 111, 116, 146, 168, 177, 183, 185-186,

193-195, 197, 200-201, 212; illus., 18

Kuykendall, Maj Edward L., 106

Kwangsi Province, 172n

Ky, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao, VNAF, 7, 50

Ky Ha, 138, 149, 190

Ky Ha Peninsula, 33, 138, 163

Ky Lam, 103n

Ky Phu, 108

Ky Son Mountain, 90

Lam, BGen Hoang Xuan, ARVN, 33, 82-83, 101, 103, 103n,

104 109

Lanagan, LtCol William H., Jr., 95, 95n, lOin

Lang Ke Ga, 202

Laos, 7,990,151, 155-156

Larsen, MajGen Stanley R., USA, 88, 90n, 91, 122 LaThoRiver, 122, 124

Leftwich, Maj William G.,Jr., 205-206, 206n, 209

Le My, 3739, 46, 48, 61, 140-141, 144n, 146, 146n; illus., 37-

39

Liberty, Capt Harold F., USN, 190

Lien Chieu, 184n

LocSon, 133

Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot, 65

Long, Maj George G., 5; Col, 163, 163n

Lucas, LtCol William R., liOn

Ludden, LtCol Charles H., 157-158

Ludwig, LtCol Verle E., 56-57, 59, 62-65,

146, 146n

MacNeil, Cot John A., 207; illus., 205

Maddocks, Capt William J., USN, 95

Maddox (DD 731), vi

Magel, lstLt James E., 18

Malaya, 139n

Malayan whips, 63

Mann, Maj Bennie H., Jr., 18

Marble Mountain, 65, 125, 138-140

Marble Mountain Air Facility, 125, 125n, 127, 129-130, 149,

149n, 160n, 190; illus., 124, 126

Marine advisors, 204-209

Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, 157-158

Marine Corps Gazette, 64

Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center, Quantico,

Virginia, 43

Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California, 185

Marine Corps Units

III Marine Amphibious Force, v, 35-37, 39, 42, 42n, 43, 44n,

46-47, 49, 53-55, 57-58, 61, 65, 69-70, 82, 84n, 91, 93,

95, 101, 111, 115-118, 120, 122, 129-132, 133n, 136n,

138, 141, 141n, 142-144, 145n, 146, 149-151, 151n, 153,

155, 162, 167-168. 170, 172, 174-175, 178-179, 181-184,

186, 188, 194, 197, 201, 203, 212

HI Marine Expeditionary Force, vi, 35

1st Marine Brigade, 23-24, 31, 35n, 134, 158

3d Marine Amphibious Brigade, 40, 172, 174, 193

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 24-25, 31-32, 172

Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet, 195

Ready Afloat Marine Amphibious Brigade, 195, 198, 201-202

Special Landing Force, vii, 15n, 54, 54n, 55, 70, 78n, 79, 81,

81n, 84n, 101, 105-106, 106n, 117-118, 150, 172, 193-

194, 196-198, 200, 203, 203n

Marine Advisory Unit, 204, 204n, 206-207, 207n, 209

Advisory Team One, vi

Marine Unit Vietnam, 16

125, 138-140, 142,
INDEX 255

FMF Air

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, vi, 18, 23, 30, 30n, 31-32, 35-36,

39, 42n, 43, 59, 81, 106, ilin, 149n, 150-151, 151n, 154-

155, 155n, 156n, 157, 182, 182n, 184

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 23

MAG-li, 61, 72, 81, 98, 99n, 109, 109n, 149-150, 153-155,

182

MAG-12, 30, 41, 72, 81, 85, 98, 99n, 104, 109-110, 125,

130, 149-150, 153-155, 157n, 184

MAG-13, 23, 31, 3m, 41, 46, 50

MAG-16, 16-17, 27, 32, 33n, 46, 65, 81, 81n, 98, 110,

liOn, 125, 129-130, 149, 154, 160n, 161, 190

MAG-36, 85, 95, 98, 110, liOn, 118, 149, 154, 160, 162, 190 HMH-462, 149

HMM-161, 3m, 33, 33n, 56, 104, liOn, 149, 161, 194

HMM-162, 15-16, 15n, 17, 193

HMM-163, 15, 17-18, 54, 54n, 78, 81, 154, 194, 196-197,

200; illus. 198

HMM-261, 54n, 71, 81, 81n, 105-106, 110, 149, 159n, 160,

200; ilius. 202

HMM-263, liOn, 193

HMM-361, 71, 81, 81n, 105-106, 110, 149, 159n, 160, 200

HMM-362, liOn, 149, 159n

HMM-363, 149

HMM-364, liOn, 149

HMM-365, 15-16, 193

HMR-161, 159n

H&MS-16, 17, 110, 149

H&MS-36, 149

MABS-12, 31, 39-40, 190

MABS-16, 17, 149

MABS-36, 149, 190

MASS-2, 24, 27

VMA-211, 109, 150, 155

VMA-214, 81n, 109, 150

VMA-223, 150

VMA-224, 109, 150

VMA-225, 41, 81n, 150

VMA-311, 23, 42, 81n, 150

VMCJ-1, 27, 149, 149n, 156, 156n

VMFA-115, 109, 150

VMFA-323, 109, 150

VMFA-342, 81n

VMFA-513, 81n, 149-150, 154

VMFA-531, 24-25, 25n, 51, 149, 149n, 154-155

VMFA-542, 23, 149-150

VMF (AW)-212, 157-158

VMF (AW)-312, 150

VMGR-152, 25, 150, 157

VMGR-352, 150

VMGR-353, 157

VMO-2, 75, 110, liOn, 125, 149, 160

VMO-6, 98, 110, liOn, 149, 159n

FMF Ground

1st Marine Division, 23, 54, 55n, 117, 184, 196, 212

3d Marine Division, vi-vii, 3, 14, 23, 32-36, 39, 43-44, 44n,

45, 47-49, 51-52, 55n, 57, 59, 70n, 82, 84n, 101, 122, 131,

133, 138, 164-165, 169-170, 174, 184-186, 188-189, 194-

196, 204n

5th Marine Division, 117

Task Force DELTA, 101, 103n, 106, 110, 141n, 167

Force Logistic Command, 186

Force Logistic Support Group, 45, 56, 181, 185, 185n

Force Logistic Support Unit-i, 45

Force Logistic Support Unit-2, 45

Brigade Logistic Support Group, 16

1st Force Service Regiment, 185

3d Force Service Regiment, 16, 45, 185-186

1st Marines, 117

1st Battalion, 117-118, 122, 124, 128, 141

CoA, 127-128

CoC, 128

2d Battalion, 84n, 106-107, 117-118, 137, 170, 174, 197-

198, 200, 202-203

CoE, 106

CoF, 106

CoG, 106

3d Marines, 24, 26, 45-47, 57, 59, 62, 118, 122, 125, 133,

138, 141, 144n, 164, 169, 189

1st Battalion, 9,14-16,18-19, 25, 28, 62, 117-118, 141, 174

CoA, 15

CoB, 15

CoC, 14-15,48

CoD, 15

2d Battalion, 10, 24, 25n, 26-27, 31, 37-38, 47, 57, 70-72,

91, 117-118, 122, 140, 141n, 146n, 158-159, 160n, 172,

174, 193, 203

CoE, 25,38

Co F, 25, 93, 160

Co G, 25, 93

CoH, 25, 75-76, 76n, 77, 160

3d Battalion, 32, 35, 47-48, 70-80, 84-85, 93, 95-96, 95n, 97,

101, lOin, 103, 105-109, 118, 124, 141

Co 1,71-72, 74-78

CoK, 71-75, 78-79

CoL, 71-73, 78, lOin, 105

CoM, 71-73,79,81

4th Marines, 23-24, 31, 33n, 45-48, 59, 69-70, 118, 124, 138,

144n, 164-165, 170, 172, 175

1st Battalion, 31, 48, 118, 138

CoA, 33, 11Th

CoB, 33

CoC, 33

CoD, 33

2d Battalion, 31, 33, 40, 48, 70-79, 93, 118, 141, 172; illus.

46,77

Co E, 72-74, 78-79

CoG,72, 74, 78, lOin

Co H, 71-72, 74-78

3d Battalion, 24-28, 31, 33n, 46-48, 91-92, 117n, 118, 124,

130, 133, 134n, 135, 142, 164, 170, 174, 193, 203; illus.

21, 24,49

Co I, 71

CoK, 79

CoL, 72

5th Marines, 117

1st Battalion, 106

2d Battalion, 55n

3d Battalion, 117
256 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

7th Marines, 54, 55n, 65, 69, 69n, 70-72, 72n, 75, 78n, 81-

82, 84, 90, 117-118, 124, 124n, 138, 144n, 165, 170, 174-

175, 188n, 193

1st Battalion, 65, 65n, 70-72, 80, 84-85, 87, 93-94, 124n

Co A, 85, 11Th, 131

Co B, 87,

CoC,85, 131

2d Battalion, 55, 59, 88, 90-91, 95-96, , 101, 103-106, 108-

109, 118, 133, 161, 194, 207; ilus. 53, 97, 105

CoE, 106,11Th

CoF, 91, 108

CoG, 106, 108

CoH,91, 108n

3d Battalion, 54-56, 78-80, 84, 84n, 85, 87, 93-94, 100,

lOOn, 117, 146, 160, 172, 194, 196-197

Co 1, 78-79

Co L, 54, 78

CoM, 78-79

9th Marines, vii, 52, 59, 61-62, 64n, 65, 11Th, 118, 122, 124,

126, 127n, 130, 138-139, 140-142, 142n, 144n, 145, 160n,

164-165, 169, 178, 189

1st Battalion, 3-4, 7, 10,48, 49n, 56-57, 59, 61-65, 65n, 125,

129, 138, 140, 142; ilius. 129, 140

H&S Co, 56

CoA, 56

Co B, 56-57, 61, 131

CoC, 56-57

Co D, 56-57, 62-64

2d Battalion, 10, 59, 61, 64-65, 108-109, 140, 193

H&S Co, 108

Co E, lOin, 108n; illus. 103

CoH, 108, 108n

3d Battalion, 3-4, 7, 10, 12, 16, 18-20, 49n, 55n, 61, 65,

65n, 71, 129, 140, 172, 174; ilius. 10-11, 120

Col, 11-12, 126

CoK, 11-12,33

CoL, 12 CoM, 11-12

11th Marines, 101

1st Battalion, liOn

Battery A, liOn

3d Battalion, 88, 94, 165

107mm Mortar Battery, 54, 88

4th Battalion, 165

Battery M, 81n, 108, liOn

12th Marines, 35, 46, 59, 101, 164, 165n, 166-167

1st Battalion, 46, 164-165

Battery C, 81n

107mm Mortar Battery, 108n, liOn

2d Battalion, 164-165; illus. 165

Battery D, 63

Battery F, liOn

107mm Mortar Battery, 73, 81, 164

4th Battalion, 164

Battery K, 71,81

Headquarters Battalion, HQMC, 208n

Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division, 118

Marine Support Battalion, 210

Col, 210

CoL, 211

Subunit 1,CoC, 210

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 170, l7On

1st Anti-Tank Battalion, 170

1st Engineer Battalion, 117n

CoC, 188n

1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion, 4-5, 17, 163

H&S Battery, 5

Battery A, 5

Battery B, 5,18

Battery C, 5

1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 94

CoB, 174

CoC, 174

CoD, 174

1st Tank Battalion, 170

CoA, 170

CoB, 170

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion, 118, 130, 149, 163

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 170

3d Anti-Tank Battalion, 170

3d Engineer Battalion, 41, 46, 110, 117n, 130, 186-188, 188n,

189

H&S Co, 187

Support Co, 187

CoA, 186, 189

CoB, 186

CoC, 187, 189

3d Medical Battalion, 187

Co B, 47

3d Motor Transport Battalion, 46, 61

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 31, 33, 35, 46, 57, 161, 170,

174, 177-180

Co A, 174, 178

CoB, 174

CoC, 177

CoD, 28,61, 175, 177

3d Service Battalion, 16, 45, 185, 185n

3d Tank Battalion, 169

CoA, 169

CoB, 169

CoC, 169

7th Engineer Battalion, 117n, 118, 186, 188

Co C, 6, 188n, 189; illus. 186

Provisional Base Battalion, 61

1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO),

88, 168-169

Subunit 1, 168-169

First Composite Radio Company, 211

1st 8-inch Howitzer Battery (SP), 81n, 164

1st Force Reconnaissance Company, 26, 34n, 170, 174, 179

Subunit 1, 172, 174

3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP), Sin, 164-165

Detachment ALPHA, Naval Communications Station,

Philippines, 211

Marine Security Guard, American Embassy, Saigon, vi, 211

Reconnaissance Group ALPHA, 174-175

Mason (DD 852), 198

Maxwell, Capt John A., 128

McCarthy, MSgt E. J., illus., 54

McClanahan, Col James F., 69-70, 124
INDEX 257

McCloskey, LtCoI Donald, V., 117

McCutcheon, BGen Keith B., 14, 30, 41-43, 125, 144, 150-

151, 155n, 156, 163, 190; illus., 41, 153

McDonald, Adm David L., USN, 183

McGraw, LtCol William C., Jr., 24-25, 25o; illus., 23

McKinney, Capt William R., USN, 71

McMasters, Maj John J., 17

McMillian, Lt James R., USN, illus., 143

McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 29-30, 65, 88;

illus., 63

McNaughton, John T., 9, 29

McPartlin, LtCol CharlesE., Jr., 10, iOn, 11, 16,18-19; illus.,

18

Meeker, LtCol Ermine L., 188

Mekong Delta, 157, 159n

Merrell, Cpl Lowell H. (See also Camp Merrell), 172

Minh, Gen Duong Van, ARVN, v-vi

Minh, Gen Tran Van, ARVN, 9

Moi River, 131

Monkey Mountain, 5, 17, 65, 130, 155, 163, 187 Monticello (LSD 35), 200 Mont rose (APA 212), 106n, 200

Moore, Maj Marc A., 25n, 39, 159, 160n

Morgan, Maj Pat, 16-17

Morrison, LtCol Gene W., 33

Mount McKinley (AGC 7), xiii, 7, 10-12, 24-25

Muir, LtCol Joseph E., 57, 70-73, 75-76, 78-79, 84-85, 96,

96n, 124; illus., 18

Mullen, Capt John J., Jr., 133, 134n, 136n

Mulvihill, LtCol Thomas E., 109

Naha Air Force Base, 5, 14

Nam 0 Bridge, 91n; map, 60

Nam Yen, 47, 78, 140

Nam Yen (3), 73, 75-76, 76n

National Security Council, 23

Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, Philippines, 25

Naval Communications Station, Philippines, 211

Naval Units/Activities

U.S. Seventh Fleet (See also VAdms Blackburn, Hyland), vivii, 17, 21, 54, 540, 84, 95, 117, 150, 167, 169, 183, 193-

197, 201-203, 203n, 207

Task Force 76,3,7, 10-11, 24, 172, 196-197

Task Force 77, 32, 156 Task Force 78, 195-197, 201, 202 Task Force 79, 43, 195-196 Task Force 115, 182n Task Group 70.8, 167

Task Group 76.5,3, 194 Task Group 76.6, 24-25

Task Group 76.7,3,27

Task Group 78.5, 195, 197

Task Group 79.5, 203

Task Unit 79.3.5,16

Amphibious Ready Group, 194, 196-198, 200, 202, 203n

Amphibious Squadron 5,95

Amphibious Squadron 7, 71

Attack Carrier Wing 16, 157-158

30th Naval Construction Regiment, 190

Mobile Construction Battalion 10,31,39,41

Naval Component Command, 36, 44, 151, 163, 182-184

Naval Support Activity, 182-184

Provisional Naval Component Support Activity, 183-184

Underwater Demolition Team 12, 172

Nesbit, Col William P., 204-205, 207

"New Life" hamlet, 50

New Zealand, 51

Ngu Hanh Son, 50n, 145-146

NhaTrang, 52, 198

Nicaragua, 133

Nickerson, Col Norman R., 31, 40, 44, 122, 122n, 181-183

'4oble, Col John D., 41, 81, 85, 110, 150, 154, 157n; illus., 41,

152

Nong River, 133n North Vietnam (See also Democractic Republic of Vietnam),

vii, 4, 6-7, 22, 116n, 155-156, 172n, 212

North Vietnamese Air Force, 6, 162n

North Vietnamese Army, 206, 212

195th NVA Division, 99n

308th NVA Division, 99n

18th NVA Regiment, 100, 169

3d Battalion, 57

32d NVA Regiment, 206

Novotny, SSgt Stanley J., 18

Nui Loc Son Basin, 109

Nungs, 172, 172n, 179

Obenhaus, Capt Leon E., 5

O'Brien (DD 725), 100, 169

O'Connor, Col Thomas J., 18, 25n, 31-32, 42n, 81, 81n, 98-

100, 110,125, 125n, 149n, 151n, 161, 182n, 187

Oddy, ColRobertJ., 16, 16n, 185n

O'Donnell, LtCol Andrew W., 109

Okanogan (APA 220), 55

O'Keefe, LtCol Keith, 109

Okinawa, vii, 4-6, 9-10, 12, 14-15, iSo, 16, 23-26, 31-32, 35-

36, 44-45, 49, 49n, 52, 54-55, 55n, 65, 117, 138, 150, 157,

164, 172, 185-187, 193-194, 196-197, 203, 212

Oklahoma City (CLG 5), 84-85

O'Malley, Cpt Robert E., 76n, 242

Operational Plan 32, 9

Operational Plan 37D-65, 9, 11

Operation COUNTY FAIR, 141-142

Operation FLAMING DART, 6

Operation FOGBOUND, 156

Operation GOLDEN FLEECE, 138-142, 146, 212; illus., 138,

139, 140, 141

Operation HAMMERHEAD, 23

Operation MARKET TIME, 193-194, 197

Operation MIXMASTER, 117, 117n

Operation ROLLING THUNDER, 7, 156

Operation STEEL TIGER, 155

Operations, tactical BIRDWATCHER, 179

BLACKFERRETT, 93-95; map; 96

BLASTOUT I, 62; illus., 59

BLUE MARLIN, 95-97, 202, 207;illus., 93, 94, 96; maps, 96,

97 DAGGER THRUST, 174, 197-200, 201-203; map, 199

GIBRALTAR, 161, 161n
258 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

Radio Hanoi, 91

Raphael, LtCol Milton L., 179; illus., 170

Reasoner, lstLt Frank S., 76n, 178, 241

RED BALL, 185, 185n

RED Beach 15, 33

RED Beach 1, 172

RED Beach 2, 10-12, 24-25, 27, 172; illus. 10-11

Regional Forces, 19n, 38, 93, 98, 135, 138, 145, 207

Republic of Korea (See also Korea), 51, 55

Revolutionary Military Council, vi

Richardson, Capt Ronald G., 5

Rogers, Maj Lane, 204

Romine, Maj RichardE., 95n, 169n

Route 1, 10, 26, 28-29, 33, 57, 69,

108, 110, 145

Route 14, 52

Route 15, 205

Route 19, 52-53

"Rules of engagement," 20

Rung Sat Special Zone, 207-208, 208n

Rural Construction Program, 143

Popular Forces, 19, 19n, 20, 38, 48-49, 93, 133, 136-138, 145-

146, 165, 207

Porter, LtCol Mervin B., 54n, 81, 81n, 105, 110, 200-201

Pratas Reef, 196

PRC-10, 175, 181

PRC-25, 175

PRC-47, 175

Pricheti (DD 561), 72 72n, 81, 85

Princeton (LPH 5), 15, 33, 33n, 85, 193; illus., 195

Puni stick traps, 38, 61-63,82

Purnell, lstLt Richard M., 75-76

QuangHa, 131

Quang Nam Province, 37, 50, 125, 144-145, 145n, 165

Quang Nam Special Sector, 145n

Quang Ngai Province, 29, 50, 87, 100, 117, 179, 182

Quang Ngai City, 169, 198

Quang Tin Province, 17, 29, 125

Quang Tn City, 169n

Quantico, Virginia, 43, 190

Quat, Prime Minister Phan Huy, 7, 9, 50

Que Son, 99n, 101, 103, 106, 108

Que Son Valley, 98, 107, 110, 203

Qui Nhon, 6-7, 52-56, 59, 89-91, 95, 118, 133, 149, 161, 165n,

169n, 194, 196, 203

Quinn, MajGen William R., 159n

HARVEST MOON, 101-111, 141,167, 203, 212; illus.,100,

103; maps 102

HERCULES, 160

JUNGLE DRUM 111, 3, 10, 24

LIEN KET 10,91,93, 93n

LIEN KET 18, 101, 103, 109, 111

MIDNIGHT, 159

NGUYEN VAN NHO, 205

PIRANHA, 84-90; illus. 88; map, 86

QUICK FIRE, lOOn

QUYET THANG 485, lOOn

QUYET THOANG 552,17

RED SNAPPER, 91-93, 172; map 92

RICE STRAW, 122, 138

SATELLITE (See also Operation STARLITE), 70n

STARLITE, 70-84, 84n, 90, 98, 98n, 169, 172, 196-198, 203,

212, illus. 73, 77, 79; map, 74

STOMP, 90-91, illus. 90; map 89

THUNDERBOLT, 69-70

TRAILBLAZER, 179

ORANGE Beach, 93

Oriskany(CVA 34), 157-158

Orleck (DD 886), 72, 78, 81,85

Pacification, 39, 46-47, 50, 116, 132-133, 143n, 144, 146

Padalino, Cot MauroJ., 45, 181, 185

Page, Capt James E., 106n

Page, LtCoI Leslie L., 80, 81n, 164-165

Pala, Col William P., 164, 165n

Parker, lstLt Gary W., 161; Maj, 3m

Parry, Cot Francis F., 210

Paul, LCpl Joe C., 76n, 243

Pearl Harbor, 158

Peatross, Col Oscar F., 70, 70n, 71-72, 75-76, 76n, 78, 80-82,

84, llln, 118, 124, 177; BGen 124n; illus., 83

Penico, Col Edward F., 163

Perfume River (See also Hue River, Song Huong), 25, 25n, 26-

27, 203

Perrich, LtCoI Robert J., 138

Philippines, 5, 24, 25n, 31, 54, 158

Pho Nam Thuong Ha, 47, 140

Phong Le Bridge, 57, 61-62, 64

Phuoc Ha Valley, 107-109

Phuoc Le, 205

Phuoc Thuan Peninsula, 72, 79

Phu Bai, 22, 25-26, 45-48, 118, 133, 142, 149, 174-175, 203;

maps, 123, 176

Phu Bai Special Sector, 28

Phu Gia Peninsula, 91, 93

Phu Thu, 202

Phu Yen Province, 52, 162n

Plain of Reeds, 159n

Platt, BGen Jonas M., lOin, 106-107, 107n, liOn; illus., 105,

107

Pleiku, 4,7,52,154, 169n, 206

Pleiku Highlands, 53

Pleiku Province, 22

Plei Me, 116, 154

Point Defiance (LSD 31), 54, 194, 196

Political action teams, 145, 145n, 146

71, 91, 93-95, 103, 105,

Safer, Morley, 64, 64n

Saigon, vi-vii, 5, Sn, 7, 9, 14, 17, 29-32, 36, 40, 46, 49-51, 65,

84n, 88, 91, 134, 144, 167-168, 169n, 189n, 201-202, 204,

206-207, 209, 211

St. Clair, Col Howard B., USA, 120, 144

Sa Ky River, 84

San Diego, California, 157

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 134n

Savage, LtCol Richard A, 23, 150

Sawyer, Col Webb D., 17, 210, 210n

Scharnberg, LtCol George R., 59,61
INDEX 259 Scott, Capt David A., USN, 194, 200

Scott, Maj William A., Jr., 211

Scyphers, Maj Rue! T., 9, 44

Seabees (See also Naval Units/Activities), 48, 65, 125, 129-

130, 186, 189n, 190 SEATO, 210

Seismic detection sets, 130

Sentry dogs, 130

17th Parallel, v, 21

Sharp, Adm Ulysses S. Grant, USN (See also Commander in

Chief, Pacific), v, 3, 7, 9, 21-22, 29, 36, 44, 51-55, 70,

151, 167, 183, 194, 200, 210; illus., 51, 153 Shaver, Capt William C., 180

Short Airfield for Tactical Support, 30-31, 39-41, 125, 150,

155, 186, 190;illus., 152

SHUFLY (See also Marine Unit Vietnam), v-vi, 15, 15n, 16-17

Silva, Capt Lionel V., 28, 141

Simmons, Col Edwin 1-1.69, 69n, 70, 142, 145n; BGen 129n

Slack, LtCol Arthur B., Jr., 46

Slaughter, Col Clarence B., USAF, 5

Smith, Maj Albert C., Jr., 208

Smith, LtCol George H., 16-17

Small(DD 838), 198

Small Wars Manual, 133

Sniper teams, 131

Snohomish County (LST 1126), 25

Snyder, 2dLt Ray G.,63

Song Cau Do (See also Cau Do River), 48, 56-58, 61-62, 122,

124, 145

Song Chang, 108

Song Cu De (See also Cu De River), 37, 47, 91n

Song Han, 15, 17

Song Huong (See also Hue River, Perfume River), 25-27, 203

Song Thu Bon, 98

Song tra Bong (See also Tra Bong River), 69, 72, 94-95

Song Yen (See also Yen River), 61-62, 65, 128

South China Sea, 3, 11, 24, 61, 71, 97, 139, 157, 207

South Vietnam, v-vi, 3-4, 6-7, 15, 21, 25, 50-52, 134n, 151,

153, 156-158, 167, 172n, 181, 190, 194, 206

South Vietnamese Armed Forces, v, 16, 51, 206

South Vietnamese Armed Forces Council, 7

Units

Vietnamese Air Force, 56, 130, 194, 210

41st Fighter Wing, 129

South Vietnamese Army, 17, 19-20, 22, 48, 51-52, 69, 82,

93, 100, 103n, 115, 122, 135, 145n, 154, 159n, 160-161,

161n, 165, 203, 210

1stARVN Division, 26, 28, 49, 125, 133, 208 2d ARVN Division, 31, 33, 80, 100, 103, 208 22d ARVN Division, 206

1st Regiment, 208

4th Regiment, 94

1st Battalion, 48

2d Battalion, 84

5th Regiment, 103, 103n, 105

1st Battalion, 103-105

6th Regiment, 208

1st Battalioi, 104

3d Battalion, 93

51st Regiment, 69

1st Battalion, 51

5th ARVN Airborne Battalion, 17-18

11thARVN Ranger Battalion, 100, 103, 103n

37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, 100, 169

Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, 51

59th Regional Force Battalion, 145, 145n

593d RF Company, 145

South Vietnamese Marines, v-vi, 193, 204, 204n, 207

2d Battalion, 206

3d Battalion, 51, 84,95

4th Battalion, vii, 204-205

5th Battalion, 205-206

Vietnamese Navy, 204n, 207

Junk Division 15,85

Span jer, Col Ralph H., 31

SPARROW HAWK, 160n

Special Forces camps, 90, 172; Camp A-106, 179; Camp A107, 179

Squillace, Capt Gaetano F., illus., 28

Stender, LtCol Bernard J., 42

Stewart, LtCol Walter C., illus., 154

Stilwell, MajGen Richard G., USA, 14, 42n

STINGRAY, 179

''Strategic Hamlet'' Program, 50

Stockdale, CdrJamesB., USN 158

Stuenkel, LtCol Walter E., 165n

Subic Bay, Philippines, vii, 3-4, 9-10, 31-32, 70, 193, 196-197

Sullivan, LtCol Ralph E., 103n

Sully, Francois, 64n

Suu, Phan Khac, vi, 7, 50

Tactical air command center, Sn

Tactical air direction center, 153

Tai, LCdr Nguyen Van, 207

Talladega (APA 208), 54, 78, 194, 196

Tam Ky, 17, 95n, 98, 104, 108

Tam Quan, 198, 200

Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Sn

TaTrach, 133n

Taylor, Col Harry W., 150, 164

Taylor Ambassador Maxwell D., v-vu, 4, 6-7, 9, 23, 29, 53,

65, 167

Taylor, LtCol William W., 49, 49n, 133, 134n, 135, 137;

illus., 115

Teichmann, Maj David A., 41

ThachTru, 100, lOOn, 101, 169

Thang Binh, 103, 103n, 105, 110

Thailand, 3, 24 Thanh Quit River, 122, 124

Theer, Capt Richard E., illus., 99

Thi, MajGen Nguyen Chanh, ARVN, 9, 15, 20, 33, 36, 58-

59, 61, 70, 82-84, 101, 122, 138, 144

Thieu, MajGen Nguyen Van, ARVN, 7, 9, 50

Thomaston (LSD 28), 193; illus., 195

Throckmorton, LtGen John L., USA, 7, 32-33

Thua Thien Province, 134n

Thuong, Phan Van, 137, 137n

Tiensha Peninsula, 5, 24-25, 58, 65, 125, 189

TIGER FLIGHT, 160n

Tiger Tooth Mountain, vi
260 THE LANDING AND THE BUILDUP

TPQ-10, 155

Tra Bong River (See also Song Tra Bong), 69, 72, 94-95, 124,

124n, 172, 179

Trevino, LtCoI Rodolfo L.,93, 93n

Tn Binh (1), 146

Trinh, Huynh Ba, 139, 139n, 140, 146

Troung Giang River, 95,97

Trung Phan Peninsula, 72, 124n, 131

Tunnell, LtCol Robert J., 129

Tuong, LtCol Le Trung, ARVN, 145, 145n

Turner Joy (DD 951), vi

Tuy Loan Riven, 122, 124, 127

Union (AKA 106), 11

United States, 49n, 158

U.S. Information Service Building, 211

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, v-vu, 3, 5, 7,

10, 14-15, 17, 20, 22, 27, 30, 32, 36, 42n, 44, 46, SOn, 51-

52, 65, 69, 88, 91, 115-116, 116n, 122, 129, 144, 144n,

151, 155n, 156n, 167, 169n, 181-182, 185, 193-194, 197,

201, 203, 204n, 205, 207n, 209-210, 210n

Combat Operations Center, 210

Naval Advisory Group, 167, 169n, 182n, 204, 207

United States Operations Mission in Vietnam, 134, 143

U.S. State Department, 7, 9

Utter, LtCol Leon N., 55-56, 88, 90-91, 95, 101, 103-104, 106,

108-109, 118, 133, 194; illus., 54, 100

Vale, LtCol Sumner A., 124, 137, 164, 203

Valley Forge (LPH 8), 105-106, 200; illus., 202

Van Cleve, LtCol Roy R., 174, 177, 179; illus., 175

Vancouver (LPD 2), 11

Van Deusen, Sgt Richard A., 175

Van Ryzin, MajGen William J., illus., 167

Van Tuong, 70-72, 80, 84

Van Tuong (1), 82

Vehicles, See Weapons and Vehicles

Vernon, LtCol Thomas E., 17

Vernon County (LST 1161), 6, 72

VietAn, 101

Viet Cong, v, vii, 6-7, 16-17, 19, 21, 28-29, 31, 37, 39, 46, 48-

51, 62-65, 69, 73, 75-77, 79, 82, 87-88, 91, 93, 105, 108,

111, 115-116, 122, 127, 129, 132, 136-137, 139, 142-143,

145, 159-160, 178-179, 190, 205, 208, 212

Units

9th VC Division, vii, 204-205

1st VC Regiment, 51, 69-70, 82, 84, 84n, 88, 98, 98n, 99n,

100-101, 103, 103n, 108, 203

2d VC Regiment, 206

45th Heavy Weapons Battalion, 70, 100

60th VC Battalion, 70, 75, 78, 82-83, 98, 104

70th VC Battalion, 103

80th VC Battalion, 70, 82-83, 98, 104, 108

90th VC Battalion, 98

93d VC Battalion, 206

95th VC Battalion, 206

R-20 Battalion (Doc Lap Battalion), 129, 129n

52d VC Company, 70

Viet Minh War, v, 137n

Vietnamese National Police, 136

Vo Dai, 137

Vung Mu Peninsula, 197

VungTau, 169n, 205

Walke (DD 723), 85

Walt, MajGen Lewis W., v, 42, 42n, 43, 44n, 46-49, 55-56,

58-59, 61, 64, 64n, 69-70, 78n, 79, 81-82, 84, 88, 90n, 95,

101, 106, 111, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124n, 126-127, 129,

131, 133, 133n, 134n, 138, 141-144, 144n, 146, 151, 163-

165, 167-169, 174-175, 177-179, 182, 182n, 184-185, 187-

188, 190, 194-195, 201, 203, 208, 212; illus., 42-43, 51,

53, 83, 99, 116, 118, 153-154, 167

Ward, Capt Charles, 127n, 142; LtCol, 64n, 142n

Ward, Adm George M., USN, 169n

Washburn (AKA 108), 5

Washington, D.C., 6,9, 11, 21, 23, 43, 49

Weapons and Vehicles

Bangalore torpedos, 125

B-40 antitank rockets, 125

Bombs, 158

"Daisy Cutter'' bombs, 85

81mm mortars, 46, 56-57, 127

57mm recoilless rifles, 56

5-inch Zuni rockets, 157, 187

Flame tanks, 170, 170n

4.2-inch mortar; illus., 166

HAWK, 4, 4n, 5-6, 151, 163; illus., 4, 19, 162

LVTE-ls, 85, 170n

LVTHs, 170n

LVTs, 57, 62, 72, 77, 90, 140-141; ilus., 29, 140

M-48 tanks, 72, 76-77, 140, 170, 170n; illus., 80

M-79 grenade launchers, 127; illus., 80

M-60 machine guns, 18, 128, 131

155mm howitzers, 94, 164, 164n, 165, 167; illus., 169

105mm howitzers, 81n, 94, 164n, 165; illus., 165

107mm howtars, 94, 81n, 164n; illus., 73

Ontos, 56, 72, 75, 77, 140, 170n; illus., 71

SA-2 missiles, 156n

7.62mm AK assault rifles, 126

7.63mm Tokarev automatic pistols, 126

60mm mortars, 75, 125, 128

Tear gas (CS), 90-9 1

3.5-inch rocket launchers, 128

12.7mm machine guns, 99

20mm cannon, 81, 157

2.75-inch rockets, 81

Winchester Model 70 rifles, 131

Webb, Capt Bruce D., 75

Weller, lstLt James P., 131-132

Welty, Capt Michael F., illus., 54

Weschler, Capt Thomas R., USN, 200-201

West, Capt Herman B., Jr., 62-63

''Western Valley,'' 141

Westmoreland, Gen William C., USA, v-vu., 3, 6-7,9, 15-17,

20-22, 22n, 25, 27, 29-31, 36-37, 46, 51-54, 64-65, 69-70,

82-83, 84n, 88, 91, 101, 107, 107n, uS, 115n, 116, 116n,

120, 122, 151, 167, 181, 193-194, 197, 201-202, 207-210,

210n, 212; illus., 63

Wheeler, Gen Earle G., USA, 29

Wheeler, Col Edwin B., 24-25, 28, 56-57, 133, 177; illus., 20
INDEX 261

WHITE Beach, 84-85

Whitfield, Maj Charles K., illus., 209

Whittingham, Capt David, 26, 172

Williams, lstLt Dempsey H., 206, 206n

Williams, Col Maxie R., 210

Williamson, Maj Charles T., 84n

"Willie the Whale,'' 156

Wilson, LtCol Alexander, 31, 39-40

Wilson, lstLtDonaldR., 18

Wilson, Maj Raymond W., 90-91

Winstead, Col Edwin G., 198-201

Wo, LCpI Donald M., 180

World War II, 3,6, 9n, iOn, 14, 15n, 22n, 25n, 43, 69n, 122n,

134, 151, 181

Wulzen, RAdm Don W., USN, 7, 10-12, 15, 24, 26, 31-32,

196-198, 200, 202

Wyckoff,ColDonP.,70a,82,84n,98n, 122

YANKEE STATION, 158

Yen Ne, 145

Yen, Col Nguyen Thanh, VNMC, 204-206

Yen River (See also Song Yen), 61-62, 65, 128

Youngdale, BGen Carl A., 209-210, 210n

Yunck, Col Michael R., 106, ilin

Zone A, 49, 133

Zimmerman, Maj Cullen C., 133, 134n

Zitnik, LtCol Robert J., 98-99, liOn

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1980 0 — 321-836

The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military

insignia in continuous use in the United States. Ii first appeared in 18O4 With the stars changed to five points, this

device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present

day.