Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

IRREGULAR WARFARE 

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

2 JUNE 2011

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

IRREGULAR WARFARE 

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., USASOC Project Lead

Summer Newton, Editor

United States Army Special Operations Command

and 

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department
This publication is a work of the United States Government in 

accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105. 

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the 

United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is 

performed in support of the requirements stated by the United States 

Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. This 

research is accomplished at The Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, 

a nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the 

USASOC Special Programs Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions 

of the U.S. Army or The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Special Programs Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil

under the ARIS link. 
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to 

develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and 

revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast 

amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, 

professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique 

adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various 

environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in 

the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and 

in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

FUTURE STUDIES

The Legal Status of Personnel in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

SORO STUDIES

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub.1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954–1962 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Study in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) INTRODUCTION............. 1

I. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)...................... 5

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 5

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................ 7

II. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT) ................................... 31

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 31

BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................... 33

III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) ................... 69

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 69

BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................... 72

IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) ............................ 93

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................... 96

APPENDIX ....................................................................... 131
vi
1

IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) INTRODUCTION

In a 2011 speech to West Point cadets, Secretary of Defense Robert 

Gates highlighted the changing operational environment facing U.S. 

military forces and the shifts needed in military doctrine to successfully meet these challenges. He pinpointed the necessity of military 

advisement and speculated that large-scale COIN operations such as 

those in Afghanistan and Iraq will be relics of the past. The future 

focus, instead, will be on naval and air engagements as well as shortterm counterterrorism strikes and disaster relief.1

 Secretary Gates is, 

in part, describing a security environment that is characterized by 

irregular warfare, or IW.

The term IW first gained widespread attention after its inclusion 

and importance in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 (QDR 2006), 

a document that “[helps] shape the process of change to provide the 

United States of America with strong, sound, and effective warfighting 

capabilities in the decades ahead.” The QDR 2006 described the operational environment as one dominated by IW, requiring extended 

unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; counterterrorism; and security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.2

 Indeed, one of the fundamental imperatives of 

the U.S. military as described in the publication was to “reorient the 

[DoD’s] capabilities and forces to be more agile in this time of war, to 

prepare for wider asymmetric challenges . . . .”3

 The Pentagon’s “execution roadmap” for IW was intended to combat the growing threat 

from enemy actions beyond the conventional, “state-to-state military 

conflict.”4

 IW has gained more prominence after the Bush Administration launched the GWOT, which, to date, has significantly involved 

features of IW. Since 2005, Special Operations Forces (SOF) skill sets 

have launched SOF to the forefront of the GWOT and warfare in a 

security environment dominated by IW.

IW as a term has been used as interchangeable with non-doctrinal concepts such as fourth generation warfare, asymmetric warfare, 

or unrestricted warfare, but it retains important distinctions from 

those concepts. At its core, IW is a departure from military-to-military 

1 Greg Jaffe, “In One of Final Addresses to Army, Gates Describes Vision for Military’s 

Future,” Washington Post, February 25, 2011. 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 36. However, SSTR operations are typically not SOF tasks. See 

also U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats (Washington 

D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 5. 3 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 1. 4 Jeffrey Hasler, “Defining War: New Doctrinal Definitions of Irregular, Conventional, 

and Unconventional Warfare,” Small Wars Journal 20, no. 2 (2007): 18.
2

warfare to operations that seek to gain popular support and favors 

“indirect, asymmetric methods”5 and protracted warfare in order to 

“erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”6 JP 3-0 defines IW 

as “marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.” IW may take 

several forms, “including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking)”7

 and 

non-state, state, or other actors:

The continued growth and power of non-state actors 

will remain a key feature of the environment. Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of 

actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies. 

As technological innovation and global information 

flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain 

influence and capabilities that, during the previous century remained largely the purview of the state.8

The operational landscape in which the U.S. Armed Forces engage 

has experienced significant shifts. The dominance of U.S. conventional forces has encouraged outgunned adversaries to employ methods that offset our conventional advantages. “From non-state actors 

using highly advanced military technology and sophisticated information operations to states employing unconventional technologies, our 

current adversaries have shown that they will tailor their strategies 

and employ their capabilities in sophisticated ways.”9

 The concept of 

“hybrid warfare” captures this complexity, highlighting the blurring of 

traditional conflict categories, with state adversaries adopting unconventional, or protracted warfare strategies while some non-state actors 

adopting sophisticated or “high-end capabilities” heretofore exclusive 

to sovereign states. Furthermore, adversaries will possibly employ a 

number of other novel methods, including the use of criminal and 

terrorist networks, manipulation of the information environment, or 

preventing access to resource and energy markets.10

5 Bryan H. Cannady, “Irregular Warfare: Special Operations Joint Professional Military 

Education Transformation” (thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 

42. 6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 2010), xi. 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, VII-7. 8 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 7. 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 8. 10 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 8.
3

As its complexity suggests, IW does not rely on military prowess 

alone, but also “the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal 

politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores.”11

Its constituent activities, of which only several are discussed here—

unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, 

and counterterrorism12—reflect the necessity of engaging the population in order to align popular support with U.S. objectives in the state 

or region.

Policy analysts, military leaders, and scholars continue to debate 

the importance of the emerging threat of IW. In particular, to what 

extent the U.S. military forces should adapt to irregular warfare in 

addition to the continued emphasis on conventional warfare. BG Bennett Sacolick endorsed the need to develop conventional forces to be 

more “SOF-like,” as U.S. Army Special Forces are specially trained in 

IW, in careful consideration of the adversaries the U.S. is likely to 

face in the 21st-century. This sentiment was repeated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who noted that “the one requirement 

that jumps off the page is the requirement for all services to be SOFlike—to be netted, to be much more flexible, adaptive, faster, lethal, 

and precise.”13 However, others, including executives within the Army, 

do not endorse a similar position. An April 2006 White Paper issued 

by the Chief of Staff of the Army argued that “warfare is warfare,” 

whether conventional, irregular, or hybrid. The capabilities used in 

one can and must be adapted for use in the other— “Shifting our aim 

is not exchanging one “Either-Or” position for another. Aiming at the 

center of the conflict spectrum will enable us to respond quickly and 

effectively to these hybrid threats across the spectrum, as the situation 

and mission dictate.”14

The following annotated bibliography is arranged according to 

the core tasks associated with IW: foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and counterinsurgency. Each 

bibliography is meant to act as a stand-alone document, thus many 

sources are repeated in each section as many sources address issues 

pertinent to the spectrum of the core tasks discussed here. Addition11 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Unconventional Warfare

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), I-5. 12 USSOCOM lists these four tasks as four of seven core SOF operations. USSOCOM 

Public Affairs, Fact Book, 2013, http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_

Book_2013.pdf (accessed June 26, 2013). 13 Bennett Sacolick, “SOF vs. SOF-like,” Small Wars Journal, April 30, 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/sof-vs-soflike/. 14 Chief of Staff of the Army, Adapting our Aim: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy, 

April 2009, 6, http://asc.army.mil/docs/divisions/rm/CSA_White_Paper.pdf (accessed 

March 3, 2011).
4

ally, each source provides a link to large library database, WorldCat. 

Using the link when searching for a source will ensure that the correct 

one is accessed and give information on the nearest library holding 

the document or book. In the event that the source is available online, 

WorldCat also provides a link. In the rare event that a document was 

not listed in the extensive WorldCat database, a general link is used 

for the source.

The aim of this bibliography is to provide readers an offering of 

both a more traditional military perspective as well as perspectives 

from social scientists, including political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists studying similar phenomena. The following sources include general history and analysis related to each 

core task; operational or “how-to” guides; and works discussing particular insurgencies. Additionally, while by no means comprehensive, 

the social science literature included in the following bibliographies 

addresses questions and concerns common in academia. Social science is the study of society and human behavior and unlike some hard 

sciences rarely provides definitive answers on what are undoubtedly 

highly complex matters. For example, to date, social scientists have 

not unearthed any hard and fast answers addressing the necessary and 

sufficient conditions for rebellion or the termination of insurgencies. 

Instead, the following sources present the scope of the debate surrounding conflict and contention, offering differing theories, oftentimes accompanied by empirical evidence, on the nature of resistance 

movements and insurgencies; motivations for rebellion; the dynamics 

of collective action; and the changing international system, among 

others.
5

I. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)

INTRODUCTION

Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, is a legislatively mandated task 

of SOF since the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department 

of Defense Reorganization Act. It includes programs which encompass 

“the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency.”15 Traditionally, such assistance has concentrated on 

helping a host nation defeat an organized movement attempting to 

overthrow the legitimate government authority in line with the host 

nation’s strategy, known as the Internal Defense and Development 

(IDAD).16 However, FID operations also address other threats to host 

national security such as “civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism.” JP 3-0 Joint Operations notes that it is these latter concentrations 

which may predominate in the future.17 Both conventional and special 

forces engage in FID operations. After the Cold War, it was typically SOF 

that led FID operations, sometimes augmented by conventional forces. 

After the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), however, general purpose forces (GPF) have increasingly played a role in FID operations. Attention to SOF FID doctrine has increased accordingly.18 The 

JP 3-05 Doctrine for Special Operations identifies two key tasks performed 

by SOF in FID-related activity, host nation military assistance and population security. The former, as the name suggests, involves the training 

host nation military personnel in “tactical employment, sustainment, 

and integration of land, air, and maritime skills.” In addition, SOF also 

provides advice to military leaders and provides training necessary to 

protect the host nation from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

The term Security Force Assistance (SFA) is also frequently used 

to describe host nation military assistance tasks.19 SFA is a relatively 

newly designated task in light of increased conventional force involve15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, VII-7. 16 Thomas R. Matelski, Developing Security Force Assistance: Lessons from Foreign Internal 

Defense (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 6.

17 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, VII-7. 18 Matelski, Developing Security Force Assistance, 2. 19 The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, or JCISFA, states that 

SFA was coined in 2006 in part to clarify and distinguish military advisement operations. 

FID is primarily concerned with countering internal threats, while SFA doctrine can address 

a variety of threats. “SFA was coined to fix this problem by including all the activities done 

to support FSF [Foreign Service Forces] development yet avoiding a complete rewrite of 

existing doctrine.” JCISFA, https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/jointtext.aspx (accessed March 15, 

2011).
6

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

ment under the large-scale Nation Assistance (NA) umbrella, defined 

by JP 3-0 as including FID, security assistance, humanitarian and civic 

assistance (HCA), antiterrorism, and counterdrug operations (CD), 

among others. The long-term goal of NA is regional stability.20

However, the contexts in which SFA and FID are applied do suggest qualitative differences. FID is generally regarded as a mission conducted in the context of IW, which focuses on swaying populations to 

favorable positions while successfully engaging enemy combatants. In 

addition, FID mission are typically concerned with neutralizing internal threats exclusive of external threats. SFA, in contrast, while similar 

to FID, combines aspects of IW, major combat operations (MCO), 

SSTR, and involves neutralizing internal and external threats.21 In 

addition, SFA also includes training of security forces, not just military 

personnel, as does FID, including police, border guards, and others.22

Prior to 9/11, FID operations supported or assisted existing host 

nation military infrastructure, typically states with capable militaries, 

in accordance with its IDAD.23 In the post-9/11 operating environment and the GWOT, the U.S. military has responded to the changing security environment by providing support to failing or failed 

states that have little or poor existing military infrastructure as the 

importance of non-state combatants increased. Such states often do 

not have the resources or capability to produce a viable IDAD. Both 

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were 

conducted in such circumstances. The scale of effort involved in 

developing a nation’s military infrastructure from ground level has 

made for challenging FID operations.24 FID operations have also traditionally focused on developing the host nation’s capability to deter 

internal, not external, threats in their initial phases. With the activation of AFRICOM, the potential for SOF involvement in FID operations in African states has likewise increased, including failing and 

failed states that have may or may not have a viable IDAD strategy, 

and have numerous active insurgencies past the initial phase. In such 

cases, may be advisable to direct the efforts to conventional forces to 

conduct SFA operations.25

20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, VII-6. 21 Matelski, Developing Security Force Assistance, 12. 22 Matelski, Developing Security Force Assistance, 13. 23 Jeffrey N. James, Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense and Military 

Advisement: Not Just a Semantic Exercise (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies, 2008), 4. An IDAD (Internal Development and Defense) strategy is a “preemptive strategy but can be active in order to combat and insurgency, illicit drugs, terror, or 

other internal threats.” 24 James, “Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense,” 6–7. 25 James, “Understanding Contemporary Foreign Internal Defense,” 8.
7

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alinsky, Saul David. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Vintage Books, 1989, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/611392318.

Alinsky was a radical, and successful, community organizer who compiled these controversial organizational 

tactics in the 1970s. This primer is The Prince for the havenots—it is firmly grounded in the politics of power with 

minimal ethical considerations. Several generations of 

community organizers from across the ideological spectrum have now utilized these tactics to help achieve their 

objectives. Alinsky explains that the first task of an outside organizer is overcoming suspicion and establishing 

credibility among the local population. After this first 

step has been accomplished, the organizer must then 

agitate the local population by stirring resentments and 

hostilities in order to overcome apathy and encourage 

participation. Recruitment is most successfully accomplished through established networks, like unions, 

gangs, churches, or other extant organizations. Lastly, 

Alinsky lists 13 “rules” for organizers that act more as 

general guidelines than hard and fast directives.

Ang, Cheng Guan. The Vietnam War from the Other Side: 

The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940.

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the 

perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author 

uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, 

Chinese, and Soviet sources.

Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: 

The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365.

This collection of essays describes how the “bad guys,” 

whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to 

differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated 

with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requi-
8

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

site suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The 

authors in the volume discuss the tactics used by antiWorld Trade Organization demonstrators during the 

1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet 

and international crime; “hacktivism,” or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen. “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.” Millennium Journal of 

International Studies 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/86384874.

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for 

rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie 

this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because 

rebels no longer have access to government or state 

backing, many have turned to looting and other profitseeking behavior.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2000, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785.

This edited volume identifies the economic and social 

factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The 

authors consider the economic rationality of conflict 

for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use 

to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites 

find war to be more profitable than peace.

Brittain, James J. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The 

Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP. London; New York: Pluto 

Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/424560012.

Brittain offers an insider’s account of the Colombian 

Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive 

research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary Colombia.
9

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, 

and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/472893615.

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external 

support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other 

non-state actors back these movements. In addition, 

they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and 

which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.

Caporaso, James A. “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, 

Public Authority, and Sovereignty.” International Studies Review 2, no. 

2 (2000): 1–28, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/357004001.

In this article, Caporaso discusses the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 by the major European powers. The 

Treaty is significant for modern politics because it was 

an important first step in the establishment of the modern state system, which was born in Europe after centuries of religious turmoil and comprises a multiplicity 

of states, each with its own territory and sovereignty. 

He identifies and clarifies four concepts that together 

undergird the state system: authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. Lastly, he discusses, using 

Britain as an example, how this international system is 

changing in the contemporary era.

Cassidy, Robert M. “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for 

Counterinsurgency.” Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006): 47–62, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/109440694.

Cassidy describes a shift in national strategic interest 

to small-scale, protracted warfare emphasizing bolstering local security forces. As early as 2006, national 

security personnel began to adopt the term “long war” 

in describing contemporary efforts against insurgents 

and terrorists. This protracted form of warfare may be 

replacing large-scale conventional war, giving way to 

small-scale insurgency operations. As a result, many 

national strategic documents emphasize the need to 

build the operational capacity of indigenous security 

forces of allied partners.
10

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Clark, Todd. “Forging the Sword: Conventional U.S. Army Forces 

Advising Host Nation (HN) Forces.” Armor 115, no. 5 (2006), http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/103749224.

Clark discusses his experiences and recommendations 

in training security forces in Iraq.

Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, 

Power, and Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1984, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, 

offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing 

on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes 

the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources 

and first-hand recollections.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Justice-Seeking and LootSeeking in Civil War.” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/

491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, 

or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed 

conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some 

role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear 

to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like 

diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In 

justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action 

can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict 

because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one participates in their procurement. On the other hand, 

collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking 

behavior because it can potentially provide incentives 

for participation in armed conflict by the promise of 

private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war 

episodes from 1965 to 1995, they find that the risk of 

conflict does not appear to be significantly increased 

by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective 

action presented by the source of grievances, like social 

fractionalization or government repression, appear to 

reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also 

found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or 

profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in loot-
11

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

ing rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. 

Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not 

wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep 

profiting from the local population and exploiting 

resources they have captured.

Corum, James S. Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A 

Tale of Two Insurgencies. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/69241012.

The author discusses the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces 

during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two 

insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue 

of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British 

developed a very successful strategy for training the 

Malayan police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces was 

generally ineffective. The author argues that some 

important lessons can be drawn from these case studies 

that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.

Crawford, George A. Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for 

Irregular Warfare. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/465191240.

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power 

to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in 

order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy 

would allow the military to counter threats without the 

expense and turbulence of major military operations. 

Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting 

and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, 

the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines 

how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.
12

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43095934.

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the 

problems of policing in a divided society. The authors 

trace the history of Northern Ireland’s primary police 

force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its 

inception in 1922 until its reorganization following 

the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 

insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC 

lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sympathetic to the 

insurgent’s nationalist demands, affecting how everyday 

policing was conducted in the region. The authors also 

discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence 

in 1969 and the RUC’s reorganization in the 1970s and 

1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization 

of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic 

nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force 

in a divided society while offering alternative models of 

policing such as community policing and local control.

English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford; 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/51266166.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional 

IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the 

Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the 

Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then 

details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA 

during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which 

he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the 

Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, 

and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 

Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate 

that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation 

of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Con-
13

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

ventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, 

has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. 

However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal war is 

the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the 

post-Cold War international system. When per capita 

income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously 

diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative 

explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political instability; rough terrain; 

and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War 

on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515.

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of 

illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. 

Conventional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of 

drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and 

fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies 

focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid 

insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular 

support. The author examines Peru’s Shining Path, the 

FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban 

as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples 

of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy 

toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents’ popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among 

other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more 

effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

Fukuyama, Francis. “The Imperative of State-Building.” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 17–31, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/362130890.

Weak or failed states are at the root of many of the world’s 

most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS, to drug 
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FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

trafficking and terrorism, to the failure of democracies. 

While much is known about state-building, transferring 

strong public institutions to the developing world is 

difficult. In assessing the capacity of state institutions, 

Fukuyama distinguishes between the scope of the state, 

which addresses the breadth of its activities, and the 

strength of the state, which addresses the ability of the 

state to achieve its policy objectives. Disentangling the 

two concepts gives observers a more accurate understanding of the institutional capacity of a given state.

Gant, Jim. One Tribe at a Time. Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters 

Imports, 2009, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/471953295.

Major Gant’s piece narrates his experiences training, 

and becoming an integral part of, the fighting force 

of an Afghan tribe. In what he calls tribal engagement, 

Gant and his Special Operations team integrated closely 

with the tribe, becoming “trusted and respected brothers-in-arms with their leaders and families.” Gant argues 

that his foreign internal defense operation in Afghanistan offers a successful blueprint for future efforts with 

important strategic implications for the U.S. effort in 

that country and elsewhere.

Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New 

York: Berkley Books, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062.

Gunaratna’s work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al 

Qaeda’s internal operations and personnel. The author 

includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders 

such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden’s 

ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of 

the group’s global and Asian networks. Gunaratna’s 

evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The 

author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833.

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative 

deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a 
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discrepancy between what men and women think they 

deserve and what they can actually get in society. The 

resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

Hammes, Thomas X. Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a 

Fourth Generation. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/61322326.

Hammes argues that fourth-generation warfare, a modern form of insurgency, characterizes the conflicts playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth-generation 

practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders 

that their strategic goals are either unachievable or 

too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental 

precept is that superior political will, when properly 

employed, can defeat greater economic and military 

power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather 

than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to 

defeat. Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains 

focused on changing the minds of decision makers. 

Politically, it involves transnational, national, and subnational organizations and networks. Operationally, it 

uses different messages for different audiences, all of 

which focus on breaking an opponent’s political will. 

Tactically, it utilizes materials present in the society 

under attack to include industrial chemicals, liquefied 

natural gas, or fertilizers. Although these modern insurgencies are the only type of war that the United States 

has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), Hammes 

notes that they can be overcome, as such successes in 

the conflicts in Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El 

Salvador (1980s) indicate.

Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967.

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in 

general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the 

author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of 

pragmatic politics.
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FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Herbst, J. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict 

in Africa.” Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517.

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers 

to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel 

leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail 

themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, 

including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will 

depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. 

In particular, those movements that face competent 

national militaries will have to evolve into viable armies 

while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt 

can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and 

pursue economic agendas.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a 

Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/37923319.

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the Leviathan is among the most influential works 

of political theory written in the modern era. In it, 

Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state 

of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all 

against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” 

Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men 

and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which 

encourages them to contract, or consent, with one 

another to form political society. A strong sovereign, 

whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death 

at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

Hopgood, Stephen. “Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.” In Making Sense of 

Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860.

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or 

the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.
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FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982.

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, 

Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained 

in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by 

fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic 

identities may be particularly salient because alternative 

common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict 

as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even 

mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental 

notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition 

of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial 

aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits 

to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is 

in some circumstances malleable.

Hudson, Rex A. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in 

the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.” Federal 

Research Division, Library of Congress, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53312538.

This report assesses the activities of organized crime 

groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in 

general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 

1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics 

related to the issue of the transnational criminal and 

terror nexus.

Jones, D. “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign 

Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter.” Master’s thesis, School of 

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/128284158.

In this thesis, Jones addresses the ongoing debate within 

the Special Forces community regarding whether 

unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense 

are applicable in contemporary and future Special 

Operations environments as they are currently defined 

and operationalized. In regard to unconventional war-
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fare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching 

term for efforts against nonstate actors in the Global 

War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate 

is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign 

internal defense. His thesis argues that unconventional 

warfare needs a clear and concise definition and furthermore that it should not be transformed to fight global 

insurgency. He identifies a transitional point between 

unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense 

signifying the change from unconventional warfare to 

foreign internal defense. Moreover, the operational 

preparation of the environment is not unconventional 

warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own 

doctrine. Lastly, these three concepts, unconventional 

warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational 

preparation of the environment, will be the dominate 

Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/12975032.

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared 

for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their 

conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural 

Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): 

561–84, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247.

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups 

relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, 

timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War 

sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some 

cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based on 

the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource areas 

and trading networks. As such, armed conflict in the 

post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a 

specific political ecology closely linked to the geography 

and political economy of natural resources. Le Billon 
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examines theories of relationships between resources 

and armed conflicts and the historical processes in 

which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability 

resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the risks of 

violence linked to the conflictuality of natural resource 

political economies, and the opportunities for armed 

insurgents resulting from the lootability of resources.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University 

of Michigan Press, 1995, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471.

The rebel’s dilemma holds that according to the theory 

of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. 

If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, 

then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred 

by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the 

free rider. Lichbach’s book is largely about the solutions 

used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective 

dissent, including when they are adopted and when they 

are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are 

atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over 

two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel’s dilemma 

within the context of the market, community, contract, 

and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify 

collective action problems, a struggle constituting the 

primary political struggle between opposition and the 

state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the 

processes used in overcoming the problem of collective 

action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action 

in any given situation, not just conflict.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated by Harvey Claflin 

Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/11623750.

Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, 

especially those founders of new regimes and orders. 

In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, 

Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written 

about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how 

it actually manifests in human society. The result is a 

text that recommends princes and politicians to use all 
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means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. 

The text is considered by some to be the first modern 

treatment of the science of politics.

Malaquias, Assis. “Diamonds are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The 

Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy.” Third World Quarterly

22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/775118562.

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being 

driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or 

perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa 

are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, 

Malaquias suggests that control of important diamondproducing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second 

wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national 

and international levels. The author also highlights the 

political and military miscalculations committed by the 

rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large 

sums of money into rebel coffers.

Maley, William, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the 

Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/38130751.

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays 

by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan 

and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its 

military capabilities and tactics, external support, and 

the failures of the pre-Taliban government. Following 

sections include pieces on the role of outside actors in 

relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding 

sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the 

possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a 

Western model.

Manwaring, Max G. Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59823190.

The author explains the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs to insurgency in terms of the instability 

it wreaks upon government and its challenge to state 

sovereignty. Although there are differences between 

gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of 
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operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena 

are mutated forms of urban insurgency.

McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy 

of Counter-Insurgency. London: Faber, 1966, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/2423079.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, 

McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and 

mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a 

four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent 

campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, 

strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a 

counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the 

long term, and the counterinsurgent government must 

maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to 

defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic 

Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence

18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as 

the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, 

Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 

15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such 

as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state 

repression, and, most significantly, the structure of 

party politics are found to be significant predictors of 

terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or 

the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are 

a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” 

political party system—multitudes of national political 

parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, 

and regional cleavages in society—is positively related 

to incidences of terrorist activity.

Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. 

Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O’Brien, and William Rosenau.

Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343.

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. 

national security from terrorist and other extremist 
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organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by 

groups that embrace Al Qaeda’s worldview but are not 

formally part of the organization; threats posed by other 

extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the 

terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

Ramsey, Robert D. Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in 

Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71845317.

Ramsey observes the FID lessons learned by the U.S. 

Army in their advising capacity in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador. Among the key points are the need for 

advisors to have extensive language and cultural training and technical and tactical skills training, although 

the latter ranks less in importance than the former. 

Additionally, a successful mission requires that the host 

nation actively support performance-based selection, 

training, and promotion.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism 

in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43840039.

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic 

fundamentalism, explaining how the organization 

rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic 

extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains 

how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the 

process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the 

“Great Game” of Central Asia; the role of regional and 

international powers; the historical tensions between 

Sunni and Shi’a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions 

among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

Reed, B. “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.” Parameters 37, no. 2 (2007): 19–30, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/161784355.

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do 

not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author 

argues that conventional understanding and strategies 

need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and 

networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such 
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tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, 

units, and organizations among armed groups.

Rotberg, Robert I., ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557.

A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining 

the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of 

state failure by the editor as well as prescriptions for 

both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation 

and Collapse in the International System. New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888.

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the 

Afghan state from its early 19th-century roots. From 

the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that 

Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically 

applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its 

leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large 

influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, 

sources. The result was a state divided from its society. 

The following communist revolution “from above” left 

the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and 

regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin 

movement against the Soviet incursions, whose development Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional 

and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged 

following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth 

account of state-building, civil war, and the context of 

the international system.

Rubin, Barry M. Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History 

of the PLO. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849.

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin 

catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, 

from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after 
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the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177.

Ghorayeb provides and insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms 

of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of 

jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53972026.

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist 

organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the 

web of interconnections that link its members. Using 

social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among 

“cliques” of young Muslims who encourage one another 

to wage jihad and the “strength of the weaker ties,” or 

the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al 

Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either 

grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

Saskiewicz, Paul E. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - 

People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal 

Enterprise. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166.

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into 

a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of 

its base.

Shelley, Louise. “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2005): 

101–12, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040.

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship 

between the state, transnational organized crime, and 

terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations 

developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term 
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objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing 

in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, 

thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In 

addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly 

allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom operate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law 

enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.

Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, 

Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill. Methods and Motives: 

Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International 

Terrorism. National Institute of Justice, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/62713393.

Researchers commonly believe that the link between 

criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, 

not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives 

and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors 

argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not 

motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to 

grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the 

authors develop a methodology for identifying crimeterror interactions derived from a standard intelligence 

framework that has proven useful in law enforcement 

investigations.

Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and 

Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763.

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and 

other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of 

the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is often interwoven with the local organization 

of society. In the non-Western world, this often means 

confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics 

suitable for the operating environment. The authors 

provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, 

and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed groups into 

more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.
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Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer. Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/58451801.

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to 

resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal 

trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here 

include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal 

organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in 

collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplinary framework of analysis for improving understanding 

of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state 

actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution 1978, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/243910663.

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the 

process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, 

uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he 

develops a theory of political opportunity structure to 

explain how and why collective action develops. The 

theory of political opportunity structures evaluates 

the extent to which existing political systems facilitate 

independent organization and collective action by the 

citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence 

their development, their immediate outcomes, and 

their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, 

and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred 

by those choices in the political and social world in 

which they find themselves. The relationship between 

political opportunity structure and collective action is 

described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are 

given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are 

to engage in collective action because less costly and 

difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is 

too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent 

because citizens have little room to develop the capac-
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ity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in 

collective action. As a result, collective action is most 

likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between 

neither too much repression nor too much openness 

that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for 

collective action.

———. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In 

Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11785182.

Tilly, a prominent sociologist, describes a model for 

the development of the state analogous to the maturation of organized crime syndicates. In Europe, the state 

and war making capabilities developed out of organizations resembling protection rackets. However, vigorous 

resistance by local populations modulated the state’s 

harmful effects. By contrast, states developing in the 

contemporary area have little constraints placed on 

their actions by the population, making the organized 

crime analogy more apt. This points to a key divergence 

in the experience of state formation in the European 

and developing world systems.

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/63807665.

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying 

social movements propose here to unite the previously 

fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. 

They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are 

manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious 

politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, 

public claim-making of groups where the government 

is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, 

strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms 

of contention are studied under the same framework. 

What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse 

events have universal, or common laws, explaining 

their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious poli-
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FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

tics have common and recurring features, what they 

call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways 

across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such 

mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or 

relational (or working on connections among groups, 

people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms 

include: mobilization, political identity formation, and 

elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the 

contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and 

research social contention.

Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. Film Piracy, Organized 

Crime, and Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/273816706.

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime 

and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as 

automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the 

globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some terrorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is 

high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under 

the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide 

compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy 

and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist 

groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance 

their activities.

Urban, Mark. Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA. 

London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/31242701.

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security 

forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in 

the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. 

Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved 

in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force 

apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how 

the British executed tasks in the field.
29

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: 

Methods and Applications. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217.

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences 

to understand relationships among social entities rather 

than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social 

network analysis methodology highlights actors and 

their actions as interdependent; relational ties among 

actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial 

resources; and network models that map the constraints 

and opportunities provided by the network structural 

environment.

West, Bing. The Village. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/51491677.

As a first-hand observer, West recounts the experiences 

of a small Marine unit sent to a village in Vietnam as 

military advisors to defend and train local militiamen.

Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. 

New York: Knopf, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193.

Wright’s work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of 

the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from 

hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves 

the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders 

bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI’s counterterrorist 

chief John O’Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures 

such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure 

of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial 

information that could have potentially averted 9/11.
30
31

II. COUNTERTERRORISM (CT)

INTRODUCTION

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cites success in counterterrorism operations as necessary “whole-of-government capability” in light 

of analyses of the future security environment. Such operations were 

largely left to law enforcement agencies and SOF before the events of 

9/11. Since those attacks, and the subsequent launch of the GWOT, 

CT efforts have also become the domain of conventional forces. Terrorist groups have evolved and adapted to operate more effectively in 

the contemporary security environment. Previously, nationalist and 

secular groups were largely responsible for the use of terror tactics, 

supported by state sponsors such as the Soviet Union. After the end 

of the Cold War, terrorist groups initially declined but shortly thereafter made a precipitous rise. Terrorists, or any group or using terror 

tactics, can be found among the ranks of local insurgents, organized 

criminal syndicates, or part of a larger international terrorist network. 

Moreover, terrorist groups have increasingly also adopted terrorism 

not only as a tactic to induce fear in target populations, but have elevated terrorism to a “transnational threat of strategic proportion.”26

CT is recognized as a part of IW and, as such, is directed not only to 

neutralizing enemy combatants but also to erode popular support for 

extremist ideologies. Central to the CT doctrine is the recognition 

that unfulfillment of basic human needs is often a motivating factor 

in support of terrorist activities. Men and women, regardless of their 

national, cultural, or religious affiliations desire security; control over 

their social and political order; a meaningful and viable livelihood; 

and a society that reflects their cherished values.27

Counterterrorism or CT refers to a set of tasks falling under the 

larger umbrella of combating terrorism, or CbT. CbT is defined as 

“actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to 

oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.”28 CT is a 

narrower mission, one in which “actions [are] taken directly against 

terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and 

regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” CT operations comprise both direct and indirect approaches to “prevent, 

deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” SOF involvement in CT 

26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-26 Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: U.S Government 

Printing Office, 2009), I-1. 27 Ibid., I-11–I-12. 28 Ibid., I-2.
32

COUNTERTERRORISM

includes, but is not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against 

terrorist networks and infrastructure, and other non-kinetic activities 

associated with defeating extremist ideologies that nurture terrorist 

organizations.29

29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2003), II-9.
33

COUNTERTERRORISM

BIBLIOGRAPHY

‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. Tribes and Power: 

Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Saqi, 2003, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169.

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The 

essays included in the volume highlight the salience of 

the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard 

to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those 

tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms 

of political and social institutions.

Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. Islamic Rulings on 

Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857.

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and 

their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of 

war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such 

as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, 

and suicide attacks.

Abrahms, Max. “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives 

and Counterterrorism Strategy.” International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 

78–105, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366012473.

Counterterrorism cannot be successful without understanding what terrorists “really want.” The strategic 

model, the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies, 

holds that terrorists become terrorists when their calculations predict the expected political gains of terrorist action minus the costs outweigh the benefits of any 

other possible form of protest. As a result, counterterrorists attempt to defeat terrorists by minimizing their 

political gains. However, this model has not been tested. 

In this article, Abrahms tests the validity of the argument, finding that terrorists use terrorism primarily to 

develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists.
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COUNTERTERRORISM

Alexander, Yonah. Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures 

of Six Nations. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/65203744.

In this edited volume, experts examine the counterterrorist strategies of six nations for successes and failures. 

The counterterrorist strategies of the United States 

against Al Qaeda, Italy against the Red Brigade, Germany against the Red Army faction, France’s struggle 

against various separatist and international terrorists, Sri Lanka’s long battle with the Tamil Tigers, and 

Egypt’s experience with Islamic terrorism are analyzed 

and compared.

Ang, Cheng Guan. The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940.

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the 

perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author 

uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, 

Chinese, and Soviet sources.

Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: 

The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365.

This collection of essays describes how the “bad guys,” 

whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to 

differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated 

with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requisite suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The 

authors in the volume discuss the tactics used by antiWorld Trade Organization demonstrators during the 

1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet 

and international crime; “hacktivism,” or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.
35

COUNTERTERRORISM

Aussaresses, Paul. The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and CounterTerrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. Translated by Robert L. Miller. New 

York: Enigma Books, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49396263.

General Paul Aussaresses’ memoir details the brutal 

counterterrorist campaign against Algerian insurgents 

during the Algerian War. His controversial, and some 

argue failed, methods include torture and summary 

execution.

Bell, J. Bowyer. The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38248965.

Bell offers an analysis of the underground world of 

insurgent and terrorist networks, drawing on examples from the IRA, Holy Jihad, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian fedayeen, among others. Utilizing 

decades of research experience in the midst of armed 

struggles, Bell offers a look at the subtle, inner dynamics of violent political movements. He emphasizes the 

theatricality of terrorist tactics; the normality and sometimes reluctance of the gunman; and the difficulties of 

mixing political pragmatism with the utopian goals of 

many insurgent movements.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen. “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.” Millennium Journal of 

International Studies 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/86384874.

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for 

rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie 

this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because 

rebels no longer have access to government or state 

backing, many have turned to looting and other profitseeking behavior.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2000, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785.

This edited volume identifies the economic and social 

factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The 

authors consider the economic rationality of conflict 

for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use 
36

COUNTERTERRORISM

to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites 

find war to be more profitable than peace.

Bowman, James. Honor: A History. New York: Encounter Books, 

2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867.

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as 

a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that 

Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to 

the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the 

world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman 

argues, is crucial to understanding the culture of the 

Islamic world and its grievances against the West.

Bremer, L. Paul III. Countering the Changing Threat of International 

Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorism, 

2000, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/45700058.

This article, presented by the National Commission on 

Terrorism, discusses the changing threat of international terrorism, intelligence as a weapon against international terrorism, and aggressive strategies against 

terrorism.

Brittain, James J. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The 

Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP. London; New York: Pluto 

Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/424560012.

Brittain offers an insider’s account of the Colombian 

Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive 

research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary 

Colombia.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, 

and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/472893615.

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external 

support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other 

non-state actors back these movements. In addition, 

they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and 

which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.
37

COUNTERTERRORISM

Choueiri, Youssef M. Islamic Fundamentalism. London: Continuum, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/249033120.

By viewing Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to 

modern civilizations and political structure, the author 

presents an analysis of how and why Islamic values have 

become such a potent contemporary political force. 

This book presents a definition of Islamic fundamentalism that links it to Muslim traditions since the 18th 

century from diverse areas such as Saudi Arabia, India, 

Indonesia, and Nigeria. Choueiri examines how these 

traditions have played out in contemporary Islamic 

movements like Hamas, the Taliban, and Egyptian 

Islamist Association.

Cline, Lawrence. “Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel.” Studies 

in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 10 (2007): 889–99, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/211195507.

The authors discuss terrorism and the GSPC, or the 

Al Qaeda in the Maghreb. The group has maintained 

a small but significant level of terrorist unrest in the 

countries of the Sahel for a number of years. Although 

GSPC activities have been rather small-scale, they have 

added to the host of other security failures plaguing the 

region. The U.S. has begun devoting more attention to 

the regional security gaps and has started to implement 

an overall strategy in response. Cline maintains that the 

more broadly based approaches to dealing with security, economic, and political problems show promise, 

but only if the their focus remains on the long term.

Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, 

Power, and Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1984, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, 

offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing 

on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes 

the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources 

and first-hand recollections.
38

COUNTERTERRORISM

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Justice-Seeking and LootSeeking in Civil War.” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/

491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf.

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, 

or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed 

conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some 

role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear 

to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like 

diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In 

justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action 

can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict 

because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one participates in their procurement. On the other hand, 

collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking 

behavior because it can potentially provide incentives 

for participation in armed conflict by the promise of 

private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war 

episodes from 1965 to 1995, they find that the risk of 

conflict does not appear to be significantly increased 

by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective 

action presented by the source of grievances, like social 

fractionalization or government repression, appear to 

reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also 

found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or 

profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in looting rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. 

Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not 

wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep 

profiting from the local population and exploiting 

resources they have captured.

Crawford, George A. Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for 

Irregular Warfare. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/465191240.

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power 

to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in 

order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy 

would allow the military to counter threats without the 
39

COUNTERTERRORISM

expense and turbulence of major military operations. 

Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting 

and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, 

the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines 

how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.

Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics

13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4892279645.

In investigating the underlying causes of terrorist activity, Crenshaw highlights the political and social contexts 

in which terrorism is likely to arise. She argues that terrorist groups are drawn from disaffected segments of 

elite population, rather than from mass discontent or 

deep societal cleavages, that take it upon themselves to 

act for a majority. In the centralized modern state, such 

disaffection is unlikely to be effectively addressed, leaving terrorism as an attractive strategy to achieve their 

objectives. Lastly, while motivations for terrorism vary 

widely, the psychological mechanisms of group interactions, like commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, and 

revenge, are better explanations of terrorist activity 

than individual psychological makeup.

———. “The Causes of Terrorism, Past and Present.” In The New 

Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, edited by Charles 

W. Kegley. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/50198425.

In examining terrorist behavior, Crenshaw argues that 

beginning from the characteristics required of terrorist 

activity is more fruitful than looking for common personality types. She notes that in addition to acceptance 

of extreme personal danger, terrorist activity requires 

group solidarity, pointing to the necessity of a study of 

group dynamics rather than individual psychology, for 

best explaining terrorist behavior. Groups establish and 

reaffirm notions of self-righteousness, the image of a 

hostile world, and a sense of mission.
40

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———. “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st 

Century.” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000): 405–20, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/4653145772.

Crenshaw reviews terrorist and counterterrorist 

research and points to salutary ways of thinking about 

the definition of terrorism, the psychology of terrorism, 

and forms of terrorism. In her review of the psychology 

of terrorism, she argues that the motivations for terrorism are best understood in terms of group solidarity and 

shared ideological commitment rather than as a result 

of specific “terrorist profiles” or psychological disorders. In addition, she cautions analysts against theorizing a rise of a “new” terrorism in the contemporary era.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52962946.

This edited volume is a compilation of essays on terrorism and counterterrorism by leading scholars and policy makers in the field. The first section includes articles 

on the sources of contemporary terrorism (Audurey K. 

Cronin), the four waves of modern terrorism (David 

C. Rapoport), and U.S. strategies for deterring terrorism (Martha Crenshaw). The next section details counterterrorist deterrence from a number of perspectives 

such as diplomacy (Michael A. Sheehan), intelligence 

(Paul Pillar), military force (Timothy D. Hoyt), and others. Concluding sections detail a comprehensive counterterrorist “grand strategy.”

Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43095934.

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the 

problems of policing in a divided society. The authors 

trace the history of Northern Ireland’s primary police 

force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its 

inception in 1922 until its reorganization following 

the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 

insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC 

lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sympathetic to the 

insurgent’s nationalist demands, affecting how everyday 

policing was conducted in the region. The authors also 
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COUNTERTERRORISM

discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence 

in 1969 and the RUC’s reorganization in the 1970s and 

1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization 

of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic 

nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force 

in a divided society while offering alternative models of 

policing such as community policing and local control.

English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford; 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/51266166.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional 

IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the 

Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the 

Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then 

details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA 

during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which 

he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the 

Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, 

and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer.

America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and 

Covert Attack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38856210.

This book focuses on the vulnerability of all open societies to terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 

weapons share three characteristics: immense lethality, 

portability, and accessibility. A covert NBC attack could 

be carried out in peacetime or during war and could 

target civilians, military forces, or infrastructure. The 

nature of nonstate violence is changing in a way that 

strongly suggests risking NBC risks. The consequences 

of covert NBC attacks and terrorism are massive casualties, contamination, panic, degraded response capabilities, economic damage, loss of strategic position, and 

social-psychological damage and political change. Recommendations to reduce the vulnerability of the United 

States included establishing an NBC response center; 

reinvigorating the intelligence community; improving 
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the detection of small-scale NBC weapons programs; 

and improving capability for post-attack attribution.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War 

on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515.

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of 

illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. 

Conventional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of 

drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and 

fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies 

focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid 

insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular 

support. The author examines Peru’s Shining Path, the 

FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban 

as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples 

of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy 

toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents’ popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among 

other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more 

effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

Forest, James J. F., ed. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 

21st Century: International Perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/230811941.

This edited series includes three volumes of essays 

by scholars, military, and intelligence personnel on 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The series 

addresses understanding and defeating terrorist and 

insurgent threats. The first volume, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, considers the use of differing instruments of national power through which states pursue 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts—

hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence. The 

next volume in the series, Sources and Facilitators, covers 

state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, 

networks of trade and trafficking, and various societal 

issues. The final volume, Lessons Learned from Combating 

Terrorism and Insurgency, includes a number of case studies, including singular terrorist operations such as the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as long-term 
43

COUNTERTERRORISM

counterinsurgent and counterterrorist efforts like ETA, 

the LTTE, the Shining Path, and Israeli efforts against 

numerous Palestinian organizations.

Ganor, Boaz, ed. Countering Suicide Terrorism. Herzliya, Israel: 

Interdisciplinary Center Projects Pub. House, 2002, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/49911201.

This edited volume is a compilation of conference proceedings presided over by the International Institute for 

Counter-Terrorism. Leading scholars and intelligence 

experts on terrorism, including Martha Crenshaw and 

Ehud Shprinzak, contributed research on suicide terrorism. The contributors provide historical perspective 

on suicide terrorism and address the phenomena of 

suicide attacks in different regions in the world, with a 

focus on Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Lebanon, and Turkey.

Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New 

York: Berkley Books, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062.

Gunaratna’s work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al 

Qaeda’s internal operations and personnel. The author 

includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders 

such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden’s 

ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of 

the group’s global and Asian networks. Gunaratna’s 

evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The 

author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833.

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative 

deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a 

discrepancy between what men and women think they 

deserve and what they can actually get in society. The 

resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.
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Hafez, Mohammed. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies.” Terrorism 

and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 95–115, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/102978918.

Jihadists in Iraq are adept at using various media to construct myths of heroic martyrdom, demonize intended 

targets, and appeal to potential recruits across the Muslim world. The jihadists use three primary narratives in 

service of these goals: humiliation of Muslims at hands 

of foreigners; impotence of official Muslim governments; and redemption through faithful sacrifice.

Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967.

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in 

general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the 

author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of 

pragmatic politics.

Herbst, J. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict 

in Africa.” Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517.

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers 

to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel 

leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail 

themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, 

including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will 

depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. 

In particular, those movements that face competent 

national militaries will have to evolve into viable armies 

while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt 

can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and 

pursue economic agendas.

Heymann, Philip B. Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/52418129.

Heymann argues that diplomacy, intelligence, and 

international law should play a larger role than military 

action in U.S. counterterrorism policy. Rather than wag-
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ing “war” against terrorism, the United States needs a 

broader range of policies. Heymann believes that many 

of the policies adopted since September 11—including 

trials before military tribunals, secret detentions, and the 

subcontracting of interrogation to countries where torture is routine—are at odds with American political and 

legal traditions and create disturbing precedents. He 

argues that these policies are the logical consequences 

of the government declaring its response to terrorism 

to be a “war.” Unlike conventional wars with more or 

less clearly defined beginnings, ends, and enemies, the 

fight against terrorism is open-ended and conducted on 

multiple fronts against a loosely confederated international network of groups and individuals.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a 

Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/37923319.

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the Leviathan is among the most influential works 

of political theory written in the modern era. In it, 

Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state 

of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all 

against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” 

Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men 

and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which 

encourages them to contract, or consent, with one 

another to form political society. A strong sovereign, 

whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death 

at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/21026149.

Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass 

movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of 

mass movements, and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also 

details the behavior of mass movements once they have 

formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer’s book 
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has remained an influential and widely read work since 

its publication in the early 1950s.

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/39085494.

Hoffman provides a solid introduction to the study of 

terrorism in this volume. Early chapters explore the definition of terrorism and its evolution into contemporary 

forms. Hoffman also examines the connection between 

religion and terrorism; the internationalization of terrorism; and how terrorist groups have developed and 

used sophisticated communications campaigns to further their objectives.

Hoffman, Bruce, and Gordon H. McCormick. “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 4 

(2004): 243–81, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/363940862.

The authors examine the strategic utility of suicide terrorism, arguing it can be thought of as a form of strategic “signaling.” They define terrorism as a signaling 

game in which terrorist attacks are used to communicate a group’s character and objectives to a set of target 

audiences. This is followed by an examination of the 

utility of suicide attacks as a signaling tactic. The relative effectiveness of suicide operations is evaluated in 

relation to other tactical options that are traditionally 

available to terrorist organizations. They conclude by 

examining the institutional and social context of suicide terrorism, in particular the evolutionary use of suicide attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations and 

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Hopgood, Stephen. “Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.” In Making Sense of 

Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860.

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or 

the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982.

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, 

Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained 

in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by 
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fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic 

identities may be particularly salient because alternative 

common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict 

as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even 

mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental 

notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition 

of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial 

aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits 

to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is 

in some circumstances malleable.

Hudson, Rex A. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in 

the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.” Federal 

Research Division, Library of Congress, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53312538.

This report assesses the activities of organized crime 

groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in 

general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 

1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics 

related to the issue of the transnational criminal and 

terror nexus.

Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: 

Lessons for Countering Al Qa’Ida. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/231745621.

While many researchers address the origins of terrorist 

groups, Jones and Libicki research the most effective 

methods for ending terrorist groups. Using statistical 

analysis of 650 terrorist groups, the authors conclude 

that the most effective methods involve arrest and killing of key members by local police and intelligence 

agencies and inclusion of terrorist groups in the political process. They argue that policing and intelligence, 

not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. 

efforts against Al Qaeda.
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Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise 

of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52109207.

The author undertakes a comparative study of religious 

terrorism using extensive interviews with participants. 

Juergensmeyer compares Christian, Muslim, Jewish, 

Sikh, and Buddhhist advocates of religiously inspired 

violence. His analysis indicates that within the logic of 

religious violence, violence takes on symbolic rather 

than strictly strategic significance. Those participating 

in the acts regard them as religious performances in a 

cosmic war of good against evil. In sociological terms, 

these performances also empower the alienated and 

marginalized in society. Juergensmeyer concludes by 

suggesting solutions to the problem of religious violence 

by providing more outlets for religion in public life.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the 

Midst of a Big One. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/221155251.

Kilcullen offers a perspective on modern warfare that 

distinguishes localized conflict from global conflicts 

like the War on Terror. He argues that the U.S. military often erroneously conflates these localized struggles, the “accidental guerrilla,” with worldwide terror 

networks.

———. “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies

28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/356605661.

Kilcullen was among the first to suggest that the War on 

Terrorism was a campaign against a globalized Islamist 

insurgency. In order to be effective, counterinsurgent 

and counterterrorism tactics should be adapted to this 

new phenomenon to include “disaggregation,” breaking or dismantling the links of the global jihad.

Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malecková. “Education, Poverty 

and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic 

Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/822557017.

Policymakers and scholars have frequently called for 

increased aid and educational assistance to combat terrorism. Krueger and Malecková argue, however, that 
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low market opportunities or poor education have little 

to do with participation in terrorist activity. Instead, 

they point to the importance of political conditions and 

feelings of “indignity and frustration” as better markers 

for terrorist participation.

Laqueur, Walter. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 

Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Laqueur investigates the evolution of terrorist activity 

from ancient times until the present.

Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural 

Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): 

561–84, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247.

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups 

relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, 

timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War 

sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some 

cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based 

on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource 

areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict 

in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the 

geography and political economy of natural resources. 

Le Billon examines theories of relationships between 

resources and armed conflicts and the historical processes in which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather 

than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the 

risks of violence linked to the conflictuality of natural 

resource political economies, and the opportunities 

for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of 

resources.

Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 84, 

no. 4 (2005): 120–35, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4896603056.

Radical Islam is spreading across Europe among descendants of Muslim immigrants. Leiken discusses how, 

disenfranchised and disillusioned by the failure of integration, some European Muslims are taking up jihad 

against the West.
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Lewis, Bernard. The Multiple Identities of the Middle East. New York: 

Schocken Books, 1999, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052.

Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the 

domestic, regional, and international tensions of the 

modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, 

socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab 

notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic 

scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political 

experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of 

the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis 

traces the growth and development of Islamic political 

language from the Prophet and the promulgation of 

the Qur’an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse 

in modern times.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University 

of Michigan Press, 1995, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471.

The rebel’s dilemma holds that according to the theory 

of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. 

If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, 

then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred 

by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the 

free rider. Lichbach’s book is largely about the solutions 

used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective 

dissent, including when they are adopted and when they 

are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are 

atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over 

two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel’s dilemma 

within the context of the market, community, contract, 

and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify 

collective action problems, a struggle constituting the 

primary political struggle between opposition and the 

state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the 

processes used in overcoming the problem of collective 
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action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action 

in any given situation, not just conflict.

Lynch, Marc. “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies: Jihad Is as Virtual as 

It Is Real.” The National Interest no. 83 (2006), http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/101299221.

Al Qaeda has exploited the potentials of Arab media 

to communicate its message to followers and potential 

recruits since its inception. However, Lynch argues that 

the media environment in the Arab world has changed 

dramatically since the onset of Al Qaeda’s global insurgency. In particular, Al-Jazeera has increasingly offered 

an alternative voice to radical Islamists dominating 

the air and cyber waves. Often misunderstood as simply anti-Israeli, anti-American, and unqualified supporters of radical Islamists like Al Qaeda in the West, 

Al-Jazeera’s programs are also anchored by unveiled 

women, include talk show hosts vociferously opposed 

to bin Laden’s ideology, and feature favorable coverage of democratic elections and developments in the 

Middle East. Other Arab media outlets have followed 

suit. The most important combatants of the jihadists is 

not, as some think, U.S. propaganda, but the ideas of 

Arab nationalists and moderate Islamists who offer a 

compelling, and homegrown, alternative to the political discourse of the jihadists.

Macdonald, Douglas J. The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and 

Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy. Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. 

Army War College, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/634910022.

Macdonald argues that the “clash of civilizations” is not 

yet occurring but rather is the goal of radical Islamist 

grand strategy. Like the fascist and communist totalitarians before them, they cannot allow alternative value 

systems to flourish in areas under their control. Instead, 

they seek to spread their totalitarian beliefs to Muslim 

societies to encourage a violent “clash” with non-Muslim 

societies. As a result, little room for negotiation exists 

between the West and radical Islamists of the totalitarian ilk.
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Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/38079204.

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, 

Makiya describes how the Ba’athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly 

refined techniques of fear used by the Ba’athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success 

of the Ba’athist regime can be understood against this 

backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.

Maley, William, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the 

Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/38130751.

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays 

by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan 

and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its 

military capabilities and tactics, external support, and 

the failures of the pre-Taliban government. The following sections include pieces on the role of outside actors 

in relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding 

sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the 

possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a 

Western model.

McCallister, William. “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal 

Rebellion.” First Monday 10, no. 3 (2005), http://firstmonday.org/

htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215.

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally 

networked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and 

the Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the 

motivations and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy 

of Counter-Insurgency. London: Faber, 1966, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/2423079.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, 

McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and 

mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a 

four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent 

campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, 
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strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a 

counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the 

long term, and the counterinsurgent government must 

maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to 

defeat the targeted insurgent movement.

Oberschall, Anthony. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of 

Collective Action Theory.” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4653940375.

Terrorism is an extreme, violent response to a failed 

political process engaging political regimes and ethnic 

and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues. Applying the theory of collective action, 

the author explains the dynamic of violence escalation 

and persistence. Recent Islamist terrorism stems from 

the conviction that a theocracy is the only answer to 

the multiple problems of Middle Eastern and Muslim 

countries. Checks on terrorism result both from external social control and from the internal contradictions 

of theocratic states.

Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 

Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909.

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory of 

collective action. According to his theory, rational, selfinterested individuals will not pursue collective goods, 

or those that will be of benefit to all in society, because 

of the problem of “free riding,” or the logic that supposes the collective goods will be available to one 

through the work of others whether or not one actually 

expends efforts in procuring them. Olson argues that 

because of the problem of free riding, mobilization, or 

collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, or 

distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the 

group is small enough that the benefits will be worth 

the expended cost to procure them.

O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/57465511.

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing 

its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, 
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tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case 

studies include insurgencies in the past several decades 

as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of 

Insurgency.” The New Yorker (2006), http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/101605816.

Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery 

McFate. Both discuss the importance of “knowing the 

enemy” and the key role social science can play in this 

strategy. Highlights include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in 

insurgent participation.

Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” 

American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 343–61, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/365004917.

To advance understanding of the growing phenomenon 

of suicide terrorism, Pape analyzes the universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 to 2001, 188 

in all. He shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic 

logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal 

democracies to make significant territorial concessions. 

Moreover, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism 

has been rising largely because terrorists have learned 

that it works. Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon 

in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli 

forces to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 

and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an 

independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish 

government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 

1990s. As a result, Western democracies should pursue 

policies that teach terrorists that the lesson of the 1980s 

and 1990s no longer applies, policies which in practice 

may have more to do with improving homeland security 

than with offensive military action.
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Pelletiere, Stephen C. A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into 

the Origin and Development of the Movement. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/33372632.

Pelletiere examines the origins of numerous fundamentalist groups posing a security threat to some of the 

most adept security services in the world. Developing 

a theory of fundamentalism, Pelletiere maintains that 

the most appropriate method to quell the groups’ influence is not repression, which has not proved successful, 

but exploiting divisions within the movements between 

the more socially constructive and violent elements.

Petraeus, D. H. “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from 

Soldiering in Iraq.” Military Review 86 (2006): 45–55, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/204243520.

Highlighting that the U.S.’s superior conventional 

power makes it likely that future threats will be asymmetrical, Petraeus catalogs 14 observations gathered 

from his experiences during the Iraq counterinsurgency efforts.

Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic 

Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence

18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, 

inequality, and poor economic development as the root 

causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza 

studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year 

period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of 

such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party 

politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the 

presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a 

more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political 

violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and 

regional cleavages in society—is positively related to 

incidences of terrorist activity.
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Pillar, Paul R. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, 

D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/637306727.

Pillar analyzes whether the tenets of U.S. official counterterrorist policy—make no concessions; bring them to 

justice for their crimes; isolate and pressure state terrorist sponsors; and others—are effective deterrents. 

In looking at the nature of varying terrorist groups, he 

determines the most effective policies appropriate for 

each. Pillar also examines states that sponsor, or enable, 

terrorist activity, why the United States is a prime terrorist target, and other crucial aspects of terrorism, concluding with recommendations for amendments to U.S. 

counterterrorist policy.

Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. 

Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O’Brien, and William Rosenau.

Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343.

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. 

national security from terrorist and other extremist 

organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by 

groups that embrace Al Qaeda’s worldview but are not 

formally part of the organization; threats posed by other 

extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the 

terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

Rapoport, David C., ed. Inside Terrorist Organizations. New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1988, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/16832545.

In this edited volume, the contributors outline the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations, their patterns 

of organizational behavior, and sources of ideological 

inspiration. Authors examine, in turn, the “instrumental 

approach” to terrorist organizations that focuses on the 

group as intentional, strategic actors pursing ideological goals. Other contributors approach terrorist groups 

from an “organizational” perspective that see terrorist 

behavior as a complex amalgam of personal intentions 

and organizational motives such as factional conflict, 

the cost of entering and exiting the group, and others. 

Terrorist groups covered include the Quebec Libera-
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tion Front, the Shining Path, the PLO, Gush Emunim, 

Sikh terrorism, and Armenian terrorism.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism 

in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43840039.

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic 

fundamentalism, explaining how the organization 

rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic 

extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains 

how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the 

process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the 

“Great Game” of Central Asia; the role of regional and 

international powers; the historical tensions between 

Sunni and Shi’a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions 

among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

Reed, B. “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.” Parameters 37, no. 2 (2007): 19–30, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/161784355.

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do 

not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author 

argues that conventional understanding and strategies 

need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and 

networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such 

tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, 

units, and organizations among armed groups.

Reuter, Christoph. My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/53901226.

Many theories exist as to why an individual would wish 

to become a suicide bomber. Popular views portray 

them as crazed fanatics or brainwashed. Using extensive interviews with the friends, relatives, and trainers 

of suicide bombers, and “would-be” martyrs, Reuters 

argues that the primary motivation of suicide bombing 

is a heroic dynamic. Individuals appear to be more concerned with making a “mark,” and how their lives will be 

remembered, than the promise of eternal reward.
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Richardson, Louise. What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, 

Containing the Threat. New York: Random House, 2006, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/64771109.

The author argues that while terrorist movements have 

differing ideologies and goals, they often follow similar paths. Their beginnings, the strata of society drawn 

to political violence, and participant motivations, especially a sense of injustice, are among the commonalities. 

Richardson also discusses general methods of countering terrorist activity.

Rotberg, Robert I., ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557.

A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining 

the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of 

state failure by the editor as well as prescriptions for 

both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation 

and Collapse in the International System. New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888.

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the 

Afghan state from its early 19th-century roots. From 

the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that 

Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically 

applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its 

leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large 

influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, 

sources. The result was a state divided from its society. 

The following communist revolution “from above” left 

the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and 

regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin 

movement against the Soviet incursions, whose development Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional 

and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged 

following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth 
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account of state-building, civil war, and the context of 

the international system.

Rubin, Barry M. Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History 

of the PLO. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849.

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin 

catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, 

from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after 

the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177.

Ghorayeb provides and insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms 

of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of 

jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53972026.

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist 

organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the 

web of interconnections that link its members. Using 

social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among 

“cliques” of young Muslims who encourage one another 

to wage jihad and the “strength of the weaker ties,” or 

the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al 

Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either 

grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

Saskiewicz, Paul E. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise. 

Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166.

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into 

a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of 

its base.
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Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/21375275.

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of 

resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate 

groups of society against the powerful despite their 

often public displays of deference to domination. Such 

groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, 

folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden 

transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront 

repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as 

an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful 

often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly 

conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot 

be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, 

state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology 

to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations 

between the power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics 

different, but no less important, than more overt forms 

of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance 

available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

Shelley, Louise. “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2005): 

101–12, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040.

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship 

between the state, transnational organized crime, and 

terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations 

developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term 

objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing 

in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, 

thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In 

addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly 

allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom operate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law 

enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.
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COUNTERTERRORISM

Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, 

Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill. Methods and Motives: 

Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International 

Terrorism. National Institute of Justice, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/62713393.

Researchers commonly believe that the link between 

criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, 

not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives 

and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors 

argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not 

motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to 

grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the 

authors develop a methodology for identifying crimeterror interactions derived from a standard intelligence 

framework that has proven useful in law enforcement 

investigations.

Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and 

Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763.

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and 

other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of 

the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is often interwoven with the local organization 

of society. In the non-Western world, this often means 

confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics 

suitable for the operating environment. The authors 

provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, 

and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed groups into 

more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.

Silke, Andrew. “Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Theme 

of Terrorist Abnormality in Psychological Research.” Psychology, 

Crime, and Law 4, no. 1 (1998): 51–70, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/211281236.

Silke examines the long-running attempt to apply a psychopathology label to terrorists, particularly antisocial, 

narcissistic, and paranoid personality disorders. How-
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COUNTERTERRORISM

ever, the research findings supporting the pathology 

model are rare and generally of poor quality. In contrast, the evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both 

more plentiful and of better quality.

———. Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives 

on Terrorism and Its Consequences. Chichester, West Sussex, England; 

Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50959030.

In this edited volume, the contributors investigate terrorist activity from a psychological perspective rather 

than a political, ethnic, or religious one. The essays 

examine individual psychology of terrorists, such as 

family, societal, and personality influences; the impact 

of terrorist activity on victims and society; and proper 

methods of responding to terrorism from this psychological perspective.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 

and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 

(1986): 464–81, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4890428170.

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for 

collective action, or social movements. They claim that 

not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how 

individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and transmit and diffuse their 

interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, 

or “schematas of interpretation,” that help individuals 

explain occurrences and events within the context of 

their lives and the world at large. In doing so, frames 

make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a 

guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement 

organizations strategically align their frames with the 

values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in 

order to encourage participation in collective action. 

The underlying premise is that some sort of frame 

alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The 

authors identify and explain four frame alignment 

processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 

extension, and frame transformation.
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COUNTERTERRORISM

Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants 

Kill. New York: Ecco, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/52030499.

Relying on extensive interviews with extremists adhering to various religions and ideologies, the author finds 

that extremist movements, whether Islamic or Christian, have much in common. She explains how terrorist 

organizations are formed by opportunistic leaders who 

recruit the disenfranchised using religion as motivation and justification. That moral fervor is then transformed in organizations that strive for money, power, 

and attention.

Taillon, J. Paul de B. The Evolution of Special Forces in CounterTerrorism: The British and American Experiences. Westport, CT: Praeger, 

2001, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43977888.

Elite military forces have been at the forefront of security threats from low-intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, 

and terrorist activity. In this volume, Taillon writes an 

account of the development of U.S. and British Special 

Forces counterterrorist roles. Taillon examines British 

Special Forces activities in Malaya, Borneo, Oman, and 

Northern Ireland and other missions such as the Iranian 

Embassy siege in London. He takes U.S. operations in 

Greece, Korea, and Vietnam and others such as Operation Eagle Claw under consideration. Taillon compiles 

a list of necessary requirements for successful hostage 

rescue missions; intergovernmental cooperation in 

intelligence gathering and dissemination; forward basing of counterterrorist assets; and others. While British 

forces often met these full requirements, U.S. forces did 

not, leading to the former’s relative successes and the 

latter’s failures.

Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer. Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/58451801.

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to 

resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal 

trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here 

include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal 

organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in 

collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplin-
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COUNTERTERRORISM

ary framework of analysis for improving understanding 

of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state 

actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution 1978, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/243910663.

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the 

process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, 

uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he 

develops a theory of political opportunity structure to 

explain how and why collective action develops. The 

theory of political opportunity structures evaluates 

the extent to which existing political systems facilitate 

independent organization and collective action by the 

citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence 

their development, their immediate outcomes, and 

their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, 

and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred 

by those choices in the political and social world in 

which they find themselves. The relationship between 

political opportunity structure and collective action is 

described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are 

given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are 

to engage in collective action because less costly and 

difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is 

too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent 

because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in 

collective action. As a result, collective action is most 

likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between 

neither too much repression nor too much openness 

that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.
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COUNTERTERRORISM

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/63807665.

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying 

social movements propose here to unite the previously 

fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. 

They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are 

manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious 

politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, 

public claim-making of groups where the government 

is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, 

strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms 

of contention are studied under the same framework. 

What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse 

events have universal, or common laws, explaining 

their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they 

call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways 

across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such 

mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or 

relational (or working on connections among groups, 

people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms 

include: mobilization, political identity formation, and 

elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the 

contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and 

research social contention.

Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. Film Piracy, Organized 

Crime, and Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/273816706.

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime 

and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as 

automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the 

globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some ter-
66

COUNTERTERRORISM

rorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is 

high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under 

the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide 

compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy 

and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist 

groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance 

their activities.

Urban, Mark. Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA. 

London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/31242701.

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security 

forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in 

the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. 

Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved 

in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force 

apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how 

the British executed tasks in the field.

Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: 

Methods and Applications. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217.

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences 

to understand relationships among social entities rather 

than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social 

network analysis methodology highlights actors and 

their actions as interdependent; relational ties among 

actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial 

resources; and network models that map the constraints 

and opportunities provided by the network structural 

environment.

Weinberg, Leonard. “Turning to Terror: The Conditions Under 

which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities.” Comparative Politics

23, no. 4 (1991): 423–38, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/79311551.

Political parties are often regarded as benign institutions critical to democratic political order. Yet, in recent 

decades, as in the case of Hizbullah, political parties 

have often been associated with organizations committed to terrorist activity. Weinberg examines the relation-
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ship between the two seemingly dissimilar organizations. 

He notes that links between the two have increased. 

The appearance and disappearance of terrorist organizations, furthermore, is often linked to developments 

internal to political parties alongside those in the political system in which they operate. Additionally, political 

parties likely to spawn or harbor terrorist organizations 

often have grandiose goals, sometimes which meet little 

success at the polls, and a commitment to the illegitimacy of the prevailing political order.

Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. 

New York: Knopf, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193.

Wright’s work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of 

the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from 

hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves 

the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders 

bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI’s counterterrorist 

chief John O’Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures 

such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure 

of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial 

information that could have potentially averted 9/11.
68
69

III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)

INTRODUCTION

Secretary Gates called UW the “soul of the Special Forces,” a 

“uniquely” Special Forces mission. However, settling on an exact 

definition of unconventional warfare and what activities constitute it 

has not been without controversy. As the environment in which SOF 

operates changes, so too has the understanding of UW altered. Most 

recently, in a January 2011 publication, the Army established the following definition of UW, describing it as “activities conducted to enable 

a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow 

a government or occupying power by operations through or with an 

underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area.”30 UW 

operations also usually occur as part of a larger mission undertaken 

by conventional forces or other U.S. government agencies. The focus 

on UW activity, as opposed to a specific operation, brings attention to 

the fact that UW is not something practiced solely by the U.S., or even 

by SOF. Rather, the concept describes activities - the enabling of resistance movements - taking place across the globe. In this regard, UW 

is conducted by numerous organizations, from Hizbullah in Lebanon 

to FARC in Colombia, among a host of others.31

UW encompasses a broad range of military activities. As a careful 

reading of the definition notes, UW is more than the overthrowing 

of governments as it can also aim to “coerce and disrupt” legitimate 

30 Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, January 2011 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-1. As suggested by the definition 

participants of the resistance are always indigenous. Foreign fighters and UW practitioners 

are not technically considered part of the insurgency. Ibid., 2-1. 31 David S. Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train and Educate for Unconventional 

Warfare? Why Is It So Important? A Quick Response to Robert Haddick,” Small Wars Journal, 

April 25, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/why-does-special-forces-train/

(accessed May 5, 2011). Maxwell even notes that while the War on Terror and against other 

violent extremists is often thought of in terms of counterinsurgency, that what in fact is taking place is a countering of unconventional warfare operations. Additionally, he notes that 

the updated definition listed may not sufficiently address threats to U.S. interests increasingly posed by non-state actors. Practitioners of UW might find themselves confronting 

organizations, like Hizbullah in Lebanon, that are quasi-states residing within a traditional 

sovereign state. These quasi-states provide many of the same services to their “citizens” as 

does the traditional state in addition to holding similar, or even superior, resources, such as 

advanced military capabilities. However, such actors do not necessarily fall under the current UW definition, which describes only legitimate states and occupying powers. Others, 

like Col. David Witty, more doctrinally purist, argue that confronting such enemies falls 

under other SOF missions such as counterterrorism. See the engaging discussion regarding 

the updated UW definition at the Small Wars Journal website, http://smallwarsjournal.com/

blog/2010/04/this-week-at-war-do-we-still-n/.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

powers without necessarily replacing them.32 Moreover, UWs’ practitioners develop not only the guerrilla force, or the traditional fighting 

force, but also the underground as well as supporting auxiliaries for 

both.33 These combined efforts serve to produce the end result of UW 

campaigns.34 UW operations have historically occurred in both general war scenarios, as in Kuwait in 1990-1991, or in limited war scenarios, such as in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Additionally, although UW is 

frequently associated with guerilla warfare, JP 3-05 Joint Special Operations also cites the subversion of the military, economic, psychological, or moral well-being of a given nation; the sabotage of preferred 

targets; intelligence gathering and assessment; and unconventional 

assisted recovery operations which “seek out, contact, authenticate, 

and support military and other selected personnel as they move from 

an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly 

control” as falling under UW operations.35 Although the terms FID 

and UW are often used interchangeably, UW activities are differentiated from FID by the support of irregular forces in the latter and the 

support of the regular forces of the legitimate governing power in the 

former.36 Finally, the goals of UW are usually understood more broadly 

than purely military objectives within a strategic context which recognizes the geopolitical impact support of a given resistance movement 

will engender and the resulting effect s on U.S. national interests.37

UW activities can manifest in several ways. In situations in which 

an overt U.S. military presence is undesirable, UW activities can take 

the form of indirect support through a “coalition partner or a thirdcountry location.” In such cases, support is limited to logistical aid 

and training. Where overt support is less controversial, SOF provide 

direct support, offering a “wider scope of logistical support, training, 

and advisory assistance.” Lastly, SOF support can entail combat support, encompassing both indirect and direct support as well as combat operations.38

Determining the fit of a resistance movement with the overall 

U.S. national strategy as well as the feasibility of gaining the stated 

objectives of an UW mission is a critical component of the planning 

process. In doing so, UW practitioners consider not only the physical 

32 Maxwell, “Why Does Special Forces Train?” 33 See Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 1-1–1-2 for a discussion of the definition and role of undergrounds and auxiliaries. 34 Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 1-1. 35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, II-8. 36 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal 

Defense, June 2008 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-1.

37 Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 1-2–1-3. 38 Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 1-2–1-3.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

terrain in which the operations will take place, but also the human 

one. UW practitioners must examine the predominant ideology, the 

objectives and capabilities of resistance leaders, the source of the 

cohesion of resistance forces, and fractures within society and governing structures, among others, to determine the possibility of a successful operation that aligns resistance behavior with U.S. objectives.39 An 

expanded understanding of the doctrines of war, insurgencies, and 

the dynamics of conflict in general, as well as what motivates men and 

women to rebel, are all useful tools in this regard.

39 Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 1-2–1-7.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. Tribes and Power: 

Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Saqi, 2003, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169.

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The 

essays included in the volume highlight the salience of 

the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard 

to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those 

tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms 

of political and social institutions.

Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. Islamic Rulings on 

Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857.

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and 

their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of 

war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such 

as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, 

and suicide attacks.

Alinsky, Saul David. Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Vintage Books, 1989, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/611392318.

Alinsky was a radical, and successful, community organizer who compiled these controversial organizational 

tactics in the 1970s. This primer is The Prince for the havenots—it is firmly grounded in the politics of power with 

minimal ethical considerations. Several generations of 

community organizers from across the ideological spectrum have now utilized these tactics to help achieve their 

objectives. Alinsky explains that the first task of an outside organizer is overcoming suspicion and establishing 

credibility among the local population. After this first 

step has been accomplished, the organizer must then 

agitate the local population by stirring resentments and 

hostilities in order to overcome apathy and encourage 

participation. Recruitment is most successfully accomplished through established networks, like unions, 

gangs, churches, or other extant organizations. Lastly, 
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Alinsky lists 13 “rules” for organizers that act more as 

general guidelines than hard and fast directives.

Ang, Cheng Guan. The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940.

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the 

perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author 

uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, 

Chinese, and Soviet sources.

Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. London: Penguin, 2009, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/315071889.

A philosophical and historical analysis of the importance, and meaning, of revolution in the contemporary 

world. Arendt analyzes the French and American Revolutions to highlight the successes in the latter and the 

failures in the more radical French struggle. She argues 

that the most important outcome of the American Revolution was its emphasis on the creation of an enduring 

republic that encouraged a politically active citizenry. 

The French revolutionaries, by contrast, overemphasized issues of social inequality to their detriment.

Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318410521.

An in-depth survey of unconventional warfare throughout history. Beginning with the ancient world and 

ending with the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, Asprey also discusses 

unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, 

launching a trenchant critique of U.S. military’s leaders’ knowledge of guerrilla warfare during Vietnam.

Bowman, James. Honor: A History. New York: Encounter Books, 

2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867.

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as 

a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that 

Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to 

the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the 

world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman 

argues, is crucial to understanding the culture of the 

Islamic world and its grievances against the West.
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Brittain, James J. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The 

Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP. London; New York: Pluto 

Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/424560012.

Brittain offers an insider’s account of the Colombian 

Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive 

research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary 

Colombia.

Caporaso, James A. “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, 

Public Authority, and Sovereignty.” International Studies Review 2, no. 

2 (2000): 1–28, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/357004001.

In this article, Caporaso discusses the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 by the major European powers. The 

Treaty is significant for modern politics because it was 

an important first step in the establishment of the modern state system, which was born in Europe after centuries of religious turmoil and comprises a multiplicity 

of states, each with its own territory and sovereignty. 

He identifies and clarifies four concepts that together 

undergird the state system: authority, sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. Lastly, he discusses, using 

Britain as an example, how this international system is 

changing in the contemporary era.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2428983.

Clausewitz’s 19th-century work was one of the first, and 

most influential, books written in the modern Western 

world to systematically and philosophically examine 

the phenomenon of war. Some of the commonly circulated ideas he originally espoused include the inherent 

advantage of the defense; strategic and operational centers of gravity; and the fog of war. His dialectical method 

of instruction renders quick distillations of his theory 

challenging.

Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, 

Power, and Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1984, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, 

offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing 

on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes 

the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources 

and first-hand recollections.

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/76073943.

Collier argues that one of the most pressing threats in 

the 21st century is the “bottom billion,” or the poorest 

segments of the world’s population occupying mostly 

failing states, the majority of which are in Africa. He 

identifies several “traps” facing these states: armed conflict, dependence on natural-resource extraction, poor 

governance, and geographic isolation from good markets. Armed conflict in these areas, while often characterized as ethnic strife, is more often the result of 

profiteering and resource grabbing. Greed, rather than 

grievances or ideology, is the primary motivating factor 

for political violence in these poverty-stricken areas.

English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford; 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/51266166.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional 

IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the 

Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the 

Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then 

details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA 

during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which 

he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the 

Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, 

and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 

Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate 

that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation 

of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Conventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, 
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has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. 

However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal war is 

the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the 

post-Cold War international system. When per capita 

income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously 

diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative 

explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political instability; rough terrain; 

and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

Ganguly, Sumit. “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political 

Mobilization and Institutional Decay.” International Security 21, no. 2 

(1996): 76–107, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4892940232.

Ganguly traces the rise of the insurgency in Kashmir 

to the failure of the Kashmir state to properly address 

the political and social demands of its ethnic classes. In 

addition, when discontent first arose, state institutions 

were ill-prepared to offer political solutions and instead 

adopted coercive and military strategies to quell the 

emerging conflict.

Gant, Jim. One Tribe at a Time. Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters 

Imports, 2009, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/471953295.

Maj. Gant’s piece narrates his experiences training, and 

becoming an integral part of, the fighting force of an 

Afghan tribe. In what he calls tribal engagement, Gant 

and his Special Operations team integrated closely with 

the tribe, becoming “trusted and respected brothersin-arms with their leaders and families.” Gant argues 

that his foreign internal defense operation in Afghanistan offers a successful blueprint for future efforts with 

important strategic implications for the U.S. effort in 

that country and elsewhere.

Guevara, Ernesto. Guerrilla Warfare. United States: BN Publishing, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/315888777.

Considered a classic treatise on the how-to of guerrilla 

warfare, socialist revolutionary “Che” Guevara describes 
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the hit-and-run tactics he used to overthrow the Cuban 

government and install the Castro regime. Guevara’s 

guerrilla doctrine is oriented strategies and tactics of 

small, rural-based guerrilla forces.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833.

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative 

deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a 

discrepancy between what men and women think they 

deserve and what they can actually get in society. The 

resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967.

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in 

general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the 

author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of 

pragmatic politics.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a 

Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/37923319.

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the Leviathan is among the most influential works 

of political theory written in the modern era. In it, 

Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state 

of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all 

against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” 

Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men 

and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which 

encourages them to contract, or consent, with one 

another to form political society. A strong sovereign, 

whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death 

at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.
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Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/21026149.

Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass 

movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of 

mass movements, and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also 

details the behavior of mass movements once they have 

formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer’s book 

has remained an influential and widely read work since 

its publication in the early 1950s.

Hopgood, Stephen. “Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.” In Making Sense of 

Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860.

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or 

the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

Hopper, Rex D. “Indicators of Revolutionary Potential: Transcript 

of Dr. Hopper’s Presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, 

Rock Island, May 1964.” Special Operations Research Office, The 

American University, 1964, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/22699470.

A transcript of Hopper’s presentation at the Operations 

Research Symposium, 1964, discussing the role of social 

science in studying internal war and his own research 

in isolating indicators of revolutionary potential, or 

anticipating revolutions. He isolates the emergence of 

a numerically significant, economically powerful, and 

intellectually informed, but yet politically marginal, 

group as one of the leading indicators of a coming 

revolution.

———. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for 

the Study of Revolutionary Movements.” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (1950): 

270–79, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4892708806.

In this article, Hopper describes the revolutionary 

process in four stages: the preliminary stage of mass 

(individual); the popular stage of crowd (collective) 

excitement and unrest; the formal stages of formulation 

of issues and formation of publics; and the institutional 

stage of legalization and social organization.
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Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982.

In this seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, 

Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained 

in terms of material or economic interests, but rather by 

fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic 

identities may be particularly salient because alternative 

common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict 

as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even 

mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental 

notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition 

of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial 

aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits 

to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is 

in some circumstances malleable.

Irwin, Will. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special 

Forces, France 1944. London: Ebury, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/63185790.

Irwin, a U.S. Special Forces colonel, details the history of the Jedburghs, three-man teams of American, 

French, and British soldiers dropped in enemy territory 

during World War II. Behind enemy lines, the Jedburgh 

teams trained and led local resistance fighters in support of the Allied invasion of Normandy and the liberation of France.

Jones, D. “Ending the Debate: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign 

Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter.” Master’s thesis, School of 

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/128284158.

In this thesis, Jones addresses the ongoing debate within 

the Special Forces community regarding whether 

unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense 

are applicable in contemporary and future Special 

Operations environments as they are currently defined 

and operationalized. In regard to unconventional warfare, the debate surrounds its current broad and confusing definition and whether it can be an overarching 
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term for efforts against nonstate actors in the Global 

War on Terrorism. The foreign internal defense debate 

is not over definitions, but responsibilities, as the conventional military begins to play a larger role in foreign 

internal defense. His thesis argues that unconventional 

warfare needs a clear and concise definition and furthermore that it should not be transformed to fight global 

insurgency. He identifies a transitional point between 

unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense 

signifying the change from unconventional warfare to 

foreign internal defense. Moreover, the operational 

preparation of the environment is not unconventional 

warfare, but an emerging operation requiring its own 

doctrine. Lastly, these three concepts, unconventional 

warfare, foreign internal defense, and operational 

preparation of the environment, will be the dominate 

Special Forces missions in the Global War on Terrorism.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/12975032.

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared 

for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their 

conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

Laqueur, Walter. Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study. 

New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/254422371.

The author reviews historical incidences of guerrilla 

warfare from Biblical times, the Middle Ages, and into 

the 18th century, but especially the Napoleonic era, 

which he argues fostered the roots of modern guerrilla 

warfare, and on into the 20th century. Eschewing a systematic theory of the successes, failures, and conditions 

giving rise to guerrilla warfare, the author does identify 

12 common patterns relevant to understanding these 

processes.

Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. London: Vintage Books, 2008, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/

435728007.

A personal account of famed T.E. Lawrence’s experiences in leading a successful Arab guerrilla resistance 
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against the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the World 

War I era.

Lewis, Bernard. The Multiple Identities of the Middle East. New York: 

Schocken Books, 1999, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052.

Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the 

domestic, regional, and international tensions of the 

modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, 

socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab 

notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic 

scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political 

experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of 

the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis 

traces the growth and development of Islamic political 

language from the Prophet and the promulgation of 

the Qur’an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse 

in modern times.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University 

of Michigan Press, 1995, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471.

The rebel’s dilemma holds that according to the theory 

of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. 

If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, 

then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred 

by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the 

free rider. Lichbach’s book is largely about the solutions 

used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective 

dissent, including when they are adopted and when they 

are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are 

atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over 

two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel’s dilemma 

within the context of the market, community, contract, 

and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify 

collective action problems, a struggle constituting the 

primary political struggle between opposition and the 
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state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the 

processes used in overcoming the problem of collective 

action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action 

in any given situation, not just conflict.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated by Harvey Claflin 

Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/11623750.

Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, 

especially those founders of new regimes and orders. 

In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, 

Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written 

about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how 

it actually manifests in human society. The result is a 

text that recommends princes and politicians to use all 

means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. 

The text is considered by some to be the first modern 

treatment of the science of politics.

Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/38079204.

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, 

Makiya describes how the Ba’athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly 

refined techniques of fear used by the Ba’athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success 

of the Ba’athist regime can be understood against this 

backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.

Malaquias, Assis. “Diamonds are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The 

Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy.” Third World Quarterly

22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/775118562.

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being 

driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or 

perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa 

are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, 

Malaquias suggests that control of important diamondproducing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second 
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wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national 

and international levels. The author also highlights the 

political and military miscalculations committed by the 

rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large 

sums of money into rebel coffers.

Malcom, Ben S., and Ron Martz. White Tigers: My Secret War in 

North Korea. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/51566610.

Malcom, a U.S. Army lieutenant, recounts the U.S. 

Army’s unconventional warfare operations during the 

Korean War. Malcom recruited, trained, and lead a 

North Korean guerrilla resistance against the Chinese 

and North Korean forces.

Mao, Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare. Urbana: University of Illinois 

Press, 2000, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/44446629.

Mao’s classic treatise on the conduct of guerrilla warfare in underdeveloped countries, especially those with 

a rural/urban divide. The Mao doctrine includes an 

emphasis on the local population and blending guerrilla and conventional military tactics to achieve success.

McCallister, William. “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal 

Rebellion.” First Monday 10, no. 3 (2005), http://firstmonday.org/

htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215.

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally 

networked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and 

the Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the 

motivations and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy 

of Counter-Insurgency. London: Faber, 1966, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/2423079.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, 

McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and 

mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a 

four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent 

campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, 

strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a 

counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the 

long term, and the counterinsurgent government must 

maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to 

defeat the targeted insurgent movement.
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Melnik, Constantin. The French Campaign Against the FLN. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/16946601.

Melnik, a high-placed official in the French government 

during the Algerian War, details the counterinsurgent 

campaign waged against the Algerian National Liberation Front.

Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and 

the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States 

in Vietnam. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51274584.

Merom argues that democratic institutions are less 

effective in waging small wars or counterinsurgencies. 

In particular, the moral values implicit in democratic 

society make it difficult to sustain the casualties and brutality inherent in small wars. The result is a “normative 

gap” between the values of society and those of the state, 

making it difficult for the state to continue its focus on 

the external threat.

Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/61343149.

The authors argue that insurgencies in the 20th century are dissimilar to those in the 21st century. They distinguish between “national” insurgencies in the former 

century and “liberation” insurgencies in the contemporary era. Accordingly, the United States must address 

21st-century insurgency and revise its strategy, doctrine, 

operational concepts, and organization.

Molnar, Andrew R. Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 

Insurgencies. Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1966, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2069125.

This work, representing research conducted under the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO), describes 

the organizational, motivational, and behavioral characteristics of undergrounds in insurgent movements 

along with an analysis of 24 insurgencies.
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Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 

Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909.

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory of 

collective action. According to his theory, rational, selfinterested individuals will not pursue collective goods, 

or those that will be of benefit to all in society, because 

of the problem of “free riding,” or the logic that supposes the collective goods will be available to one 

through the work of others whether or not one actually 

expends efforts in procuring them. Olson argues that 

because of the problem of free riding, mobilization, or 

collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, or 

distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the 

group is small enough that the benefits will be worth 

the expended cost to procure them.

O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/57465511.

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing 

its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, 

tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case 

studies include insurgencies in the past several decades 

as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of 

Insurgency.” The New Yorker (2006), http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/101605816.

Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery 

McFate. Both discuss the importance of “knowing the 

enemy” and the key role social science can play in this 

strategy. Highlights include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in 

insurgent participation.
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Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic 

Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence

18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, 

inequality, and poor economic development as the root 

causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, Piazza 

studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 15-year 

period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of 

such explanations. He finds that factors such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most significantly, the structure of party 

politics are found to be significant predictors of terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or the 

presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are a 

more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political 

violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” political party system—multitudes of national political parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, and 

regional cleavages in society—is positively related to 

incidences of terrorist activity.

Plaster, John L. Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite 

Warriors of SOG. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/54537114.

A Vietnam commando unit leader shares the story of 

secret operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos 

and Cambodia, describing the efforts of small teams 

to capture enemy officers, rescue pilots, and collect 

intelligence.

Rothstein, Hy S. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/62324474.

In his examination of Operation Enduring Freedom, 

Rothstein maintains that while it is to be praised for its 

creativity, it was fought in a conventional manner despite 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s emphasis on unconventional capabilities. Furthermore, the use of conventional methods 

increased after the fall of the Taliban. Rothstein presents an overview of the “conventionalizing” of the U.S. 

Special Forces and makes suggestions to regain the lost 

unconventional capacity.
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Rubin, Barry M. Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History 

of the PLO. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849.

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin 

catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, 

from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after 

the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177.

Ghorayeb provides and insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms 

of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of 

jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

Saskiewicz, Paul E. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - 

People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal 

Enterprise. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166.

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into 

a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of 

its base.

Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/21375275.

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of 

resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate 

groups of society against the powerful despite their 

often public displays of deference to domination. Such 

groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, 

folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden 

transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront 

repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as 

an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful 

often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly 

conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot 
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be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, 

state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology 

to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations 

between the power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics 

different, but no less important, than more overt forms 

of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance 

available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 

and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 

(1986): 464–81, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4890428170.

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for 

collective action, or social movements. They claim that 

not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how 

individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and transmit and diffuse their 

interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, 

or “schematas of interpretation,” that help individuals 

explain occurrences and events within the context of 

their lives and the world at large. In doing so, frames 

make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a 

guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement 

organizations strategically align their frames with the 

values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in 

order to encourage participation in collective action. 

The underlying premise is that some sort of frame 

alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The 

authors identify and explain four frame alignment 

processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 

extension, and frame transformation.

Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence, edited by Jeremy Jennings. 

United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40595298.

Sorel, a radical French syndicalist writing in the early 

20th century, offers his views on the role of violence 

in modern politics and what prompts men to engage 

in political action. He highlights the importance of 
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“myths” in motivating and maintaining conflict, arguing that myths are essentially irrational constructs insulating adherents from empirical reality. He contrasts 

these with the more “utopian” rational blueprints for 

political objectives. Sorel also discusses the use of violence as theater and spectacle and its role in inspiring 

and maintaining resistance momentum.

Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla 

Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/49942647.

A description and analysis of the similar tactics used by 

guerrilla fighters to advance their cause, whether fighting for religious, nationalistic, or a host of other political 

agendas. First published in 1965 and considered a classic in the field, Taber’s evidence is drawn from numerous cases, including French experience in Indochina, 

the Irish war for independence, and British experience 

in Cyprus and Malaya.

Thayer, Charles Wheeler. Guerrilla. New York: New American 

Library, 1965, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/5106211.

The author examines several guerrilla wars in which the 

military has been engaged, the Vietnam War, the Bay 

of Pigs, and the war waged against the Hukbalahaps in 

the Philippines, discussing the reasons for failure in the 

former two and success in the latter. He also extracts 

general lessons of guerrilla warfare from several cases, 

including the Greek civil war, Yugoslavia, Indochina, 

and others.

Thucydides. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide 

to the Peloponnesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler and Richard 

Crawley. New York: Free Press, 1996, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/34788895.

Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian, called his 

account of the Peloponnesian War between ancient 

Athens and Sparta a “possession for all time.” For the 

past 2,000 years it has stood as a key text in the liberal 

education of generals, statesmen, and citizens. While 

detailing one of the first major conflicts of civilization, 

Thucydides offers military, political, moral, and philosophical perspectives on man and society. Perhaps most 
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famously, Thucydides distills human motivation to the 

triad of “fear, profit, and honor.”

Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution, 1978, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/243910663.

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the 

process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, 

uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he 

develops a theory of political opportunity structure to 

explain how and why collective action develops. The 

theory of political opportunity structures evaluates 

the extent to which existing political systems facilitate 

independent organization and collective action by the 

citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence 

their development, their immediate outcomes, and 

their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, 

and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred 

by those choices in the political and social world in 

which they find themselves. The relationship between 

political opportunity structure and collective action is 

described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are 

given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are 

to engage in collective action because less costly and 

difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is 

too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent 

because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in 

collective action. As a result, collective action is most 

likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between 

neither too much repression nor too much openness 

that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for collective action.

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/63807665.

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying 

social movements propose here to unite the previously 

fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social move-
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ments, among others—into a single research discipline. 

They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are 

manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious 

politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, 

public claim-making of groups where the government 

is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, 

strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms 

of contention are studied under the same framework. 

What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse 

events have universal, or common laws, explaining 

their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they 

call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways 

across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such 

mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or 

relational (or working on connections among groups, 

people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms 

include: mobilization, political identity formation, and 

elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the 

contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and 

research social contention.

Volckmann, R. W. We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines 

in the Philippines. New York: Norton, 1954, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/1535784.

After escaping from Bataan in 1942, Volckmann led a 

three-year-long successful local resistance against the 

Japanese in the Philippines during World War II. Volckmann later helped found the U.S. Army Green Berets.

Von der Heydte, Friedrich August Freiherr. Modern Irregular 

Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon. New York: 

New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/15364848.

Von der Heydte, a German Luftwaffe officer during 

WWII, discusses the phenomenon of irregular warfare, 

its strategic importance, and its practice.
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UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Xenophon. The Anabasis of Cyrus. Translated by Wayne Ambler. 

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/154706657.

The Anabasis is the account of Xenophon, an ancient 

Greek general and philosopher, of his successful leadership of a band of 10,000 Greek mercenary soldiers 

from the heart of the Persian Empire back to Greece. 

Surrounded by numerically superior forces in a foreign 

land, Xenophon’s tale is a classic tale in military leadership by example, unit cohesion, and human nature in 

trying circumstances.
93

IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

INTRODUCTION

The most comprehensive doctrinal approach of COIN available 

today is in the 2006 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency document. While not 

without its detractors, the document has exercised some influence over 

how military personnel practice and think about counterinsurgency 

strategies and tactics. Within the document, COIN is broadly defined 

as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 

and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”40

Of course, contemporary insurgents wage war in an IW context. As a 

result, their objectives are often not a final, decisive military victory. 

The “thinking enemy” is one that recognizes the U.S.’s comparative 

advantage in conventional warfare.41 As a result, insurgents often seek 

to influence conditions favorable for political solutions. COIN operations, guided by these insurgent objectives, are oriented toward sufficiently securing the environment to allow national institutions to be 

effective in maintaining law and order. These unconventional terms of 

victory demand more than military prowess and more resources than 

those available to the U.S. unilaterally. Instead, it requires a willing 

and able host-nation government as well as a population supportive 

of COIN and host-nation efforts against insurgent elements.42 It may 

also require interagency effort and cooperation from allied nations 

and supra-governmental agencies.

COIN presupposes the presence of an insurgency, or a “protracted 

politico-military struggle,”43 whose ultimate goal is to overthrow, control, or otherwise weaken the legitimate ruling authority primarily 

through the use of political violence. FM 3-24 states that achieving 

victory depends on large part on the insurgent’s ability to “mobilize 

support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) 

and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences.”44

COIN tactics, then, require individuals of a country to take control 

of their own affairs and accept the legitimacy of the ruling regime. 

40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 102.

41 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-2. 42 Hasler, Defining War, 23. 43 As Clausewitz famously noted in On War, “The political object is the goal, war is 

the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their 

purposes.” 44 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-1.
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Stability is understood as coterminous with legitimate, as opposed to 

primarily coercive, rule. Providing security for the local population, 

in terms of establishing legitimate government, is of primary importance. 45 In the currently accepted COIN doctrine, it is the population, 

not the enemy insurgents, which form the center of gravity.46

In addition, COIN in FM 3-24 aims to eliminate as many of the 

underlying motivations for the insurgency as is feasible, eventually providing for the rule of law and order and growth of social and economic 

sectors. As presented in FM 3-24, simply killing insurgents, although 

necessary, the primary emphasis, as suggested by its understanding 

of the nature of insurgency,47 is swaying the will of the population 

to favor counterinsurgent objectives.48 To this end, coercive violence 

should be appropriate to the situation at hand and analyzed in terms 

of its impact on overarching political objectives.49 The emphasis of FM 

3-24 relies on a “hearts and minds” strategy over, but not in exclusion 

of, coercive violence. To this end, civilian-led development projects 

take on new importance. In this regard, COIN operations can be considered “armed social work,” essentially requiring redressing “basic 

social and political problems while being shot at.”50 FM 3-24 emphasizes that nation-building efforts are not exclusive to civil affairs personnel or the Department of the State, but also part of the mission of 

the military.51

The conceptualization of COIN, as codified in FM 3-24, is not without its detractors. Among other critiques often lobbed by military per45 Ibid., 1-23–1-24. The importance of human security in legitimate governance has 

a long history, going back to the 17th-century publication of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, 

which argues that the surest method of convincing individuals to consent to rule is the 

introduction of a strong ruler capable of protecting his citizens from violent death at the 

hands of their neighbors. 46 “At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support.” Ibid., 1-28. 47 As Clausewitz advised, among the first tasks in war is comprehending the particulars of the conflict, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 

statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are 

embarking.” Some detractors of FM 3-24 note that its population-centric approach was 

heavily influenced by Operation Iraqi Freedom and that potentially not every counterinsurgency campaign will have the same center of gravity. Social scientists, as the comments 

in the concluding paragraph indicate, agree. One controversial detractor, COL Gian Gentile, has made similar connections to Clausewitz’s theory, noting that the center of gravity 

is discovered within, not before, each conflict. Octavia Manea, “Thinking Critically About 

COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile,”

Small Wars Journal, December 14, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/12/

thinking-critically-about-coin/. 48 Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6 (2008): 347. 49 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-25. 50 Ibid., A-7. 51 Ibid., 1-27.
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COUNTERINSURGENCY

sonnel include the emphasis of winning hearts and minds as opposed 

to coercive violence; the defense of civilian populations as opposed 

to offensive action against the enemy; and the merit of waging COIN 

with large, conventional forces as opposed to smaller footprint special 

operations forces with the appropriate enablers. Social scientists have 

also criticized FM 3-24 for the assumptions it makes regarding the 

nature of insurgencies, especially in regards to its emphasize on the 

population as the center of gravity. In wars involving issues of identity, 

for instance, it may not be as simple as the population siding with the 

government or the insurgents. Lastly, when the host nation government represents entrenched interests of only a segment of the population, other measures, such as coercive bargaining, might be called for, 

otherwise COIN efforts might only produce more efficient sectarians.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

‘Abd al-Jabbar, Falih, and Hosham Dawod, eds. Tribes and Power: 

Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Saqi, 2003, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47676169.

This edited volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on “Tribes and Power.” The 

essays included in the volume highlight the salience of 

the tribal factor in modern Iraq, especially with regard 

to how Saddam Hussein was able to manipulate those 

tribal values and allegiances to implement his reforms 

of political and social institutions.

Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. Islamic Rulings on 

Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74273857.

The authors explain the principles of jihad and war and 

their conduct as found in key Islamic texts, the controversies that have emerged from the Quranic verses of 

war and peace, and the conflict between liberal or moderate Islamic voices and the extremists on matters such 

as the definition of combatants, treatment of hostages, 

and suicide attacks.

Ang, Cheng Guan. The Vietnam War from the Other Side: 

The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59501940.

Ang provides an account of the Vietnam War from the 

perspective of the Vietnamese Communists. The author 

uses extensive original research, including Vietnamese, 

Chinese, and Soviet sources.

Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: 

The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318260365.

This collection of essays describes how the “bad guys,” 

whether street gangs or terrorists, organize their networks and make use of modern communications technology. The editors develop the concept of netwar to 

differentiate threats in the contemporary security environment from ordinary war. The former is inundated 

with highly adaptable, often leaderless, and horizontally organized combatants and activists with the requi-
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site suppleness to quickly mount swarming attacks. The 

authors in the volume discuss the tactics used by antiWorld Trade Organization demonstrators during the 

1999 Seattle riots; relationships between the internet 

and international crime; “hacktivism,” or the convergence of activism and hacking; and terrorist organizations networking and communication strategies.

Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318410521.

An in-depth survey of unconventional warfare throughout history. Beginning with the ancient world and 

ending with the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, Asprey also discusses 

unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, 

launching a trenchant critique of U.S. military’s leaders’ knowledge of guerrilla warfare during Vietnam.

Aussaresses, Paul. The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and CounterTerrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. Translated by Robert L. Miller. New 

York: Enigma Books, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49396263.

General Paul Aussaresses’ memoir details the brutal 

counterterrorist campaign against Algerian insurgents 

during the Algerian War. His controversial, and some 

argue failed, methods include torture and summary 

execution.

Beckett, Ian F. W. Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2005.

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of European colonization, new ideological, political, and commercial imperatives emerged encouraging intrastate 

conflict and insurgency. Beckett considers the patterns 

of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how 

much the conflict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts 

Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as 

those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, 

Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much 

that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli 

experience.
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Bell, J. Bowyer. The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38248965.

Bell offers an analysis of the underground world of 

insurgent and terrorist networks, drawing on examples from the IRA, Holy Jihad, Algerian fundamentalists, and Palestinian fedayeen, among others. Utilizing 

decades of research experience in the midst of armed 

struggles, Bell offers a look at the subtle, inner dynamics of violent political movements. He emphasizes the 

theatricality of terrorist tactics; the normality and sometimes reluctance of the gunman; and the difficulties of 

mixing political pragmatism with the utopian goals of 

many insurgent movements.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Keen. “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications.” Millennium Journal of 

International Studies 26, no. 3 (1997): 795–818, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/86384874.

Berdal and Keen argue that economic incentives for 

rebellion have increased in recent decades. They tie 

this rise in economic incentives to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War. Because 

rebels no longer have access to government or state 

backing, many have turned to looting and other profitseeking behavior.

Berdal, Mats R., and David Malone, eds. Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

2000, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/43296785.

This edited volume identifies the economic and social 

factors underlying the perpetuation of civil wars. The 

authors consider the economic rationality of conflict 

for belligerents, the economic strategies that elites use 

to sustain their positions, and in what situations elites 

find war to be more profitable than peace.

Bowman, James. Honor: A History. New York: Encounter Books, 

2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178867.

Bowman details the history of honor, and its decline as 

a guide to behavior, in the Western world. He notes that 

Western notions of honor are remarkably peculiar to 

the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage and are challenging to the distinctive notions of honor in the rest of the 
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world. Understanding the concept of honor, Bowman 

argues, is crucial to understanding the culture of the 

Islamic world and its grievances against the West.

Brittain, James J. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP. London; New 

York: Pluto Press and Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/424560012.

Brittain offers an insider’s account of the Colombian 

Revolution and one of the long-standing guerrilla organizations in Colombia, the FARC-EP. Using extensive 

research, including contact with the FARC itself, Brittain examines its history and trajectory in contemporary 

Colombia.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, 

and David Brannan. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/472893615.

The authors assess post-Cold War trends in external 

support for insurgent movements, describing the frequency with which states, diasporas, refugees, and other 

non-state actors back these movements. In addition, 

they assess the motivations of insurgent supporters and 

which types of support are most crucial for insurgents.

Cassidy, Robert M. “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for 

Counterinsurgency.” Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006): 47–62, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/109440694.

Cassidy describes a shift in national strategic interest to 

small-scale, protracted warfare emphasizing bolstering 

local security forces. As early as 2006, national security 

personnel began to adopt the term “long war” in describing contemporary efforts against insurgents and terrorists. This protracted form of warfare may be replacing 

large-scale conventional war, giving way to small-scale 

insurgency operations. As a result, many national strategic documents emphasize the need to build the operational capacity of indigenous security forces of allied 

partners.
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Choueiri, Youssef M. Islamic Fundamentalism. London: Continuum, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/249033120.

By viewing Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to 

modern civilizations and political structure, the author 

presents an analysis of how and why Islamic values have 

become such a potent contemporary political force. 

This book presents a definition of Islamic fundamentalism that links it to Muslim traditions since the 18th 

century from diverse areas such as Saudi Arabia, India, 

Indonesia, and Nigeria. Choueiri examines how these 

traditions have played out in contemporary Islamic 

movements like Hamas, the Taliban, and Egyptian 

Islamist Association.

Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, 

Power, and Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1984, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/9919629.

Cobban, a correspondent in Beirut from 1976 to 1981, 

offers a comprehensive account of the PLO. Focusing 

on the central role played by Al-Fateh, Cobban describes 

the evolution of the PLO using documentary sources 

and first-hand recollections.

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries 

are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford; New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/

76073943.

Collier argues that one of the most pressing threats in 

the 21st century is the “bottom billion,” or the poorest 

segments of the world’s population occupying mostly 

failing states, the majority of which are in Africa. He 

identifies several “traps” facing these states: armed conflict, dependence on natural-resource extraction, poor 

governance, and geographic isolation from good markets. Armed conflict in these areas, while often characterized as ethnic strife, is more often the result of 

profiteering and resource grabbing. Greed, rather than 

grievances or ideology, is the primary motivating factor 

for political violence in these poverty-stricken areas.
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Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Justice-Seeking and LootSeeking in Civil War.” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKNOWLEDGEFORCHANGE/Resources/

491519-1199818447826/28151.pdf.

Collier and Hoeffler distinguish between justice seeking, or grievance-based motivation, and loot seeking, 

or greed-based motivation, to explain intrastate armed 

conflict. Clearly, grievances, or “causes,” play some 

role in conflict. However, many rebellions also appear 

to be linked to the capture of valuable resources, like 

diamonds in Sierra Leone or narcotics in Colombia. In 

justice-seeking rebellions, problems of collective action 

can potentially curtail participation in armed conflict 

because the rewards are collective goods—goods available to society at large regardless of whether one participates in their procurement. On the other hand, 

collective action problems are reduced in loot-seeking 

behavior because it can potentially provide incentives 

for participation in armed conflict by the promise of 

private gain. Using statistical analysis of 53 civil war 

episodes from 1965 to 1995, they find that the risk of 

conflict does not appear to be significantly increased 

by the severity of grievances, and obstacles to collective 

action presented by the source of grievances, like social 

fractionalization or government repression, appear to 

reduce the risk of conflict. Meanwhile, the authors also 

found evidence to suggest that the promise of loot, or 

profit, increases the risk of conflict. In addition, in looting rebellions, belligerent objectives are also altered. 

Unlike belligerents that seek justice, looters need not 

wholly defeat a government as long as they can keep 

profiting from the local population and exploiting 

resources they have captured.

Crawford, George A. Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for 

Irregular Warfare. Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/465191240.

Crawford argues that manhunting should be an important future element of U.S. national security policy. Manhunting entails the concentration of national power 

to find, influence, interrupt, or kill an individual in 

order to disrupt or destroy human networks. The policy 

would allow the military to counter threats without the 
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expense and turbulence of major military operations. 

Crawford reviews historical cases related to manhunting 

and derives lessons from a large number of these historical manhunting operations. Building on these lessons, 

the monograph then explores potential doctrine, evaluates possible organizational structures, and examines 

how to best address the responsibility to develop manhunting as a capability for American national security.

Ellison, Graham and Jim Smyth. The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43095934.

Ellison and Smyth offer a penetrating analysis of the 

problems of policing in a divided society. The authors 

trace the history of Northern Ireland’s primary police 

force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), from its 

inception in 1922 until its reorganization following 

the outbreak of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 

insurgency. A former colonial police force, the RUC 

lacked legitimacy with Northern Irish sympathetic to the 

insurgent’s nationalist demands, affecting how everyday 

policing was conducted in the region. The authors also 

discuss policing after the outbreak of political violence 

in 1969 and the RUC’s reorganization in the 1970s and 

1980s, focusing on the various structural, legal, and ideological components as well as the professionalization 

of the force. The analysis highlights the problematic 

nature of using the police as a counterinsurgency force 

in a divided society while offering alternative models of 

policing such as community policing and local control.

English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford; 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/51266166.

An authoritative volume on the rise of the Provisional 

IRA in the 1960s. English begins with an analysis of the 

Irish republican tradition and its popularity among the 

Northern Irish since the 1916 Easter Rising. He then 

details the relationship between the largely dormant IRA 

during the 1960s and the civil rights movement, which 

he argues was first conceived as a strategy within Republican circles. English goes on to explain the break of the 

Provisional IRA from the Official IRA, its early activities, 
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and its eventual adoption of a political strategy that culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 

Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/365081096.

Using statistical analysis, Fearon and Laitin illustrate 

that the conventional wisdom about the proliferation 

of war in the post-Cold War era is problematic. Conventional wisdom holds that civil war, or insurgencies, 

has proliferated rapidly because of ethnic and religious antagonisms with the end of the Cold War era. 

However, the authors argue, with the support of statistical evidence, that the prevalence of internal war is 

the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, not any changes in the 

post-Cold War international system. When per capita 

income is taken into account, ethnically and religiously 

diverse countries are no more likely to experience conflict than other countries. Instead, they offer alternative 

explanations for the proliferation of insurgencies, citing poverty, which characterizes financially and bureaucratically weak states; political instability; rough terrain; 

and large populations as factors that increase the likelihood of insurgency in a given country.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War 

on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/368050515.

Many insurgent organizations make extensive use of 

illicit narcotic trafficking to finance their operations. 

Conventional wisdom holds that stopping the flow of 

drug money is a sound policy for defeating such insurgencies. However, Felbab-Brown, using interviews and 

fieldwork from affected regions, argues that policies 

focusing on narcotic eradication paradoxically aid 

insurgencies by increasing their legitimacy and popular 

support. The author examines Peru’s Shining Path, the 

FARC, other paramilitaries in Colombia, and the Taliban 

as illustrations in addition to less well-known examples 

of the drug-insurgent nexus in Northern Ireland, Turkey, and Burma. She suggests that a laissez-faire policy 

toward illicit crops can help decrease belligerents’ popular support and promote intelligence gathering, among 
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other benefits. Combined with targeting major traffickers, Felbab-Brown argues that these policies offer more 

effective tools for combating insurgency and drugs.

Forest, James J. F., ed. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 

21st Century: International Perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/230811941.

This edited series includes three volumes of essays 

by scholars, military, and intelligence personnel on 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The series 

addresses understanding and defeating terrorist and 

insurgent threats. The first volume, Strategic and Tactical Considerations, considers the use of differing instruments of national power through which states pursue 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts—

hard power, soft power, and counterintelligence. The 

next volume in the series, Sources and Facilitators, covers 

state failure, border controls, democracy promotion, 

networks of trade and trafficking, and various societal 

issues. The final volume, Lessons Learned from Combating 

Terrorism and Insurgency, includes a number of case studies, including singular terrorist operations such as the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as long-term 

counterinsurgent and counterterrorist efforts like ETA, 

the LTTE, the Shining Path, and Israeli efforts against 

numerous Palestinian organizations.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/71250738.

Galula, a French military officer who served in the Algerian war, provides a template for the defeat of insurgents seeking to define the laws of counterinsurgency 

warfare, discuss its principles, and outline the corresponding strategy and tactics. Galula draws upon his 

experiences in counterinsurgency in Algeria, Greece, 

and Indochina. His ideas regarding counterinsurgency 

were influential in the development of U.S. COIN doctrine codified in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, especially 

in regard to its assertion that the population forms the 

center of gravity in insurgent campaigns.
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Ganguly, Sumit. “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political 

Mobilization and Institutional Decay.” International Security 21, no. 2 

(1996): 76–107, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4892940232.

Ganguly traces the rise of the insurgency in Kashmir 

to the failure of the Kashmir state to properly address 

the political and social demands of its ethnic classes. In 

addition, when discontent first arose, state institutions 

were ill-prepared to offer political solutions and instead 

adopted coercive and military strategies to quell the 

emerging conflict.

Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New 

York: Berkley Books, 2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/318265062.

Gunaratna’s work on Al Qaeda provides details on Al 

Qaeda’s internal operations and personnel. The author 

includes biographical sketches on Al Qaeda leaders 

such as Osama bin Laden; an account of bin Laden’s 

ideology and strategies; and a thorough analysis of 

the group’s global and Asian networks. Gunaratna’s 

evidence includes documentary and interview material from terrorists and those who confront them. The 

author concludes with prescriptions for successful counterterrorist campaigns.

Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610855833.

In this seminal text on the root causes of political violence, whether it is riots, rebellions, coups, or insurgencies, Gurr develops what is known as the relative 

deprivation theory. In this theory, essentially an economic argument, political violence is attributed to a 

discrepancy between what men and women think they 

deserve and what they can actually get in society. The 

resulting frustration culminates in incidences of collective political violence by social groups.

Hafez, Mohammed. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies.” Terrorism 

and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 95–115, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/102978918.

Jihadists in Iraq are adept at using various media to construct myths of heroic martyrdom, demonize intended 

targets, and appeal to potential recruits across the Mus-
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lim world. The jihadists use three primary narratives in 

service of these goals: humiliation of Muslims at hands 

of foreigners; impotence of official Muslim governments; and redemption through faithful sacrifice.

Hammes, Thomas X. Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a 

Fourth Generation. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, National Defense University, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/61322326.

Hammes argues that fourth-generation warfare, a modern form of insurgency, characterizes the conflicts playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth-generation 

practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders 

that their strategic goals are either unachievable or 

too costly for the perceived benefit. The fundamental 

precept is that superior political will, when properly 

employed, can defeat greater economic and military 

power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather 

than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to 

defeat. Strategically, fourth-generation warfare remains 

focused on changing the minds of decision makers. 

Politically, it involves transnational, national, and subnational organizations and networks. Operationally, it 

uses different messages for different audiences, all of 

which focus on breaking an opponent’s political will. 

Tactically, it utilizes materials present in the society 

under attack to include industrial chemicals, liquefied 

natural gas, or fertilizers. Although these modern insurgencies are the only type of war that the United States 

has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia), Hammes 

notes that they can be overcome, as such successes in 

the conflicts in Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El 

Salvador (1980s) indicate.

———. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul, 

MN: Zenith Press, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/456160698.

An analysis of how the U.S. military has not successfully met the challenge of fourth-generation warfare. 

Hammes argues for a network-based rather than a hierarchical-based approach to modern warfare.
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Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56490967.

In this book, Hamzeh provides an understanding of Hizbullah and the challenge and rise of Islamist groups in 

general. Drawing on original and archival sources, the 

author analyzes Hizbullah through a study of its leadership, political parties, guerrilla warfare, and its use of 

pragmatic politics.

Herbst, J. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict 

in Africa.” Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/364926517.

Herbst reviews how rebel leaders motivate followers 

to fight in wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost all rebel 

leaders do use economic incentives, but they also avail 

themselves of other strategies to motivate their soldiers, 

including political indoctrination, ethnic mobilization, and coercion. The type of incentive employed will 

depend primarily on the nature of the state confronted. 

In particular, those movements that face competent 

national militaries will have to evolve into viable armies 

while rebels fighting states that are weak and corrupt 

can afford to lead movements that employ coercion and 

pursue economic agendas.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a 

Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, edited by Michael Joseph Oakeshott. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/37923319.

First published among the turmoil of 17th-century England, the Leviathan is among the most influential works 

of political theory written in the modern era. In it, 

Hobbes argues that all men are born equal into a state 

of nature outside of political society. There, a war of all 

against all reigns and life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” 

Remedying this dismal state requires appealing to men 

and women’s natural desire for self-preservation, which 

encourages them to contract, or consent, with one 

another to form political society. A strong sovereign, 

whose duty it is to protect his citizens from violent death 

at the hands of their neighbors, is the third-party enforcing the social contract.
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Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Perennial Library, 1989, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/21026149.

Drawing on his experiences as a migrant worker during the Depression, Hoffer details the appeal of mass 

movements, populations vulnerable to the appeal of 

mass movements, and the factors promoting self-sacrifice and united action in mass movements. Hoffer also 

details the behavior of mass movements once they have 

formed. Written in an aphoristic style, Hoffer’s book 

has remained an influential and widely read work since 

its publication in the early 1950s.

Hopgood, Stephen. “Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002.” In Making Sense of 

Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford; New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/56903860.

Hopgood provides an account of the Tamil Tigers, or 

the LTTE, especially as it relates to their suicide bombing tactics.

Hopper, Rex D. “Indicators of Revolutionary Potential: Transcript 

of Dr. Hopper’s Presentation at the Operations Research Symposium, 

Rock Island, May 1964.” Special Operations Research Office, The 

American University, 1964, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/22699470.

A transcript of Hopper’s presentation at the Operations 

Research Symposium, 1964, discussing the role of social 

science in studying internal war and his own research 

in isolating indicators of revolutionary potential, or 

anticipating revolutions. He isolates the emergence of 

a numerically significant, economically powerful, and 

intellectually informed, but yet politically marginal, 

group as one of the leading indicators of a coming 

revolution.

———. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for 

the Study of Revolutionary Movements.” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (1950): 

270–9, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4892708806.

In this article, Hopper describes the revolutionary 

process in four stages: the preliminary stage of mass 

(individual); the popular stage of crowd (collective) 

excitement and unrest; the formal stages of formulation 

of issues and formation of publics; and the institutional 

stage of legalization and social organization.
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Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/10948982.

A seminal book in the studies of ethnic conflict, Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict cannot be explained in 

terms or material or economic interests, but rather by 

fear of domination. Newly formed states, where ethnic 

identities may be particularly salient because alternative 

common identities have not developed over a long history, are especially vulnerable to this form of conflict 

as ethnic groups fear permanent minority status, even 

mass expulsion or extinction. This makes these conflicts difficult to end because they involve fundamental 

notions of identity that are easily reconcilable or subject to bargaining. Horowitz also develops a definition 

of ethnic identity that privileges some of its primordial 

aspects, arguing that ethnicity is based on myths of collective ancestry, which usually hold certain ethnic traits 

to be innate. He notes, however, that ethnic identity is 

in some circumstances malleable.

Hudson, Rex A. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in 

the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America: A Report.” Federal 

Research Division, Library of Congress, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53312538.

This report assesses the activities of organized crime 

groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in 

general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period since 

1999. Hudson discusses governmental and police corruption, anti-money-laundering laws, and other topics 

related to the issue of the transnational criminal and 

terror nexus.

Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: 

Lessons for Countering Al Qa’Ida. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/231745621.

While many researchers address the origins of terrorist 

groups, Jones and Libicki research the most effective 

methods for ending terrorist groups. Using statistical 

analysis of 650 terrorist groups, the authors conclude 

that the most effective methods involve arrest and killing of key members by local police and intelligence 

agencies and inclusion of terrorist groups in the politi-
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cal process. They argue that policing and intelligence, 

not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. 

efforts against Al Qaeda.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the 

Midst of a Big One. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/221155251.

Kilcullen offers a perspective on modern warfare that 

distinguishes localized conflict from global conflicts 

like the War on Terror. He argues that the U.S. military often erroneously conflates these localized struggles, the “accidental guerrilla,” with worldwide terror 

networks.

———. “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic 

Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/

356605661.

Kilcullen was among the first to suggest that the War on 

Terrorism was a campaign against a globalized Islamist 

insurgency. In order to be effective, counterinsurgent 

and counterterrorism tactics should be adapted to this 

new phenomenon to include “disaggregation,” breaking or dismantling the links of the global jihad.

———. Counterinsurgency. Oxford; Toronto: Oxford 

University Press, 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/

652490349.

A compilation of 28 articles by Kilcullen serving as a 

practitioner’s handbook on counterinsurgency.

Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and 

Peacekeeping. London: Faber and Faber, 1991, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/471701587.

Kitson, a British officer and veteran of numerous counterinsurgent operations, analyzes the evolution of typical insurgent campaigns. Connecting with a grievance 

that resonates with a goodly proportion of the population is central to subversive campaigns. As a result, 

counterinsurgency measures should address the causes 

of unrest and thwarting the leadership seeking a revolution that extends beyond a particular grievance. Kitson 

also highlights the importance of intelligence operations for planning tactical operations as well as the types 
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of units, equipment, and specialized personnel required 

for effective counterinsurgent operations.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/12975032.

The author argues that the U.S. Army was ill-prepared 

for the insurgency in Vietnam and failed to adapt their 

conventional strategy to meet the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

Le Billon, Philippe. “The Political Ecology of War: Natural 

Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20, no. 5 (2001): 

561–84, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/93250247.

In this article, Le Billon explains the contemporary relationship between natural resources and collective political violence. Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups 

relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, 

timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War 

sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some 

cases motivated, conflicts and shaped strategies based 

on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territorialization of sovereignty around valuable resource 

areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict 

in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the 

geography and political economy of natural resources. 

Le Billon examines theories of relationships between 

resources and armed conflicts and the historical processes in which they are embedded. He stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather 

than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance, the 

risks of violence linked to the conflictuality of natural 

resource political economies, and the opportunities 

for armed insurgents resulting from the lootability of 

resources.

Lewis, Bernard. The Multiple Identities of the Middle East. New York: 

Schocken Books, 1999, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40940052.

Lewis examines how issues of identity figure in the 

domestic, regional, and international tensions of the 

modern Middle East. He also describes how Western concepts, such as liberalism, nationalism, fascism, 
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socialism, and others, have permeated customary Arab 

notions of community, self-perception, and aspirations.

———. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/16682191.

The political language of Islam is rooted in Islamic 

scriptures and classics and shaped by Islamic political 

experiences. It uses metaphors and symbols that sometimes coincide with and sometimes differ from those of 

the Western world, and it operates within a frame of reference and allusion often unlike that of the West. Lewis 

traces the growth and development of Islamic political 

language from the Prophet and the promulgation of 

the Qur’an in the seventh century through the transformation of political thought, institutions, and discourse 

in modern times.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University 

of Michigan Press, 1995, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/31076471.

The rebel’s dilemma holds that according to the theory 

of collective action, rebellion ought never to occur at all. 

If everyone will benefit from the outcomes of rebellion, 

then there is little incentive to pay the costs incurred 

by joining a rebellion—the perennial problem of the 

free rider. Lichbach’s book is largely about the solutions 

used to overcome the dilemma of mobilizing collective 

dissent, including when they are adopted and when they 

are effective. Continuing to assume that individuals are 

atomistic and self-interested, Lichbach unearths over 

two dozen solutions to the so-called rebel’s dilemma 

within the context of the market, community, contract, 

and hierarchy typology he develops. While the dissidents try to build solutions, regimes attempt to intensify 

collective action problems, a struggle constituting the 

primary political struggle between opposition and the 

state. Lastly, his argument provides evidence that the 

processes used in overcoming the problem of collective 

action in protest and rebellion are similar to the processes used in overcoming problems of collective action 

in any given situation, not just conflict.
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Macdonald, Douglas J. The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and 

Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy. Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. 

Army War College, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/634910022.

Macdonald argues that the “clash of civilizations” is not 

yet occurring but rather is the goal of radical Islamist 

grand strategy. Like the fascist and communist totalitarians before them, they cannot allow alternative value 

systems to flourish in areas under their control. Instead, 

they seek to spread their totalitarian beliefs to Muslim 

societies to encourage a violent “clash” with non-Muslim 

societies. As a result, little room for negotiation exists 

between the West and radical Islamists of the totalitarian ilk.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated by Harvey Claflin 

Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/11623750.

Writing in 16th-century Florence, Machiavelli published his controversial work as a primer for princes, 

especially those founders of new regimes and orders. 

In a significant break with ancient theories of politics, 

Machiavelli argues that politics ought not to be written 

about as men and women wanted to it to be but as how 

it actually manifests in human society. The result is a 

text that recommends princes and politicians to use all 

means, whether fair or foul, to secure power and order. 

The text is considered by some to be the first modern 

treatment of the science of politics.

Makiya, Kanan. Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/38079204.

In this book, first published before the 1991 Gulf War, 

Makiya describes how the Ba’athist regime in Iraq established and maintained itself through fear. The highly 

refined techniques of fear used by the Ba’athists legitimized their rule by making large numbers of the population complicit in the violence of the regime. The success 

of the Ba’athist regime can be understood against this 

backdrop of public acceptance of their authority.
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Malaquias, Assis. “Diamonds are a Guerrilla’s Best Friend: The 

Impact of Illicit Wealth on Insurgency Strategy.” Third World Quarterly

22, no. 3 (2001): 311–25, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/775118562.

Current internal wars in Africa are increasingly being 

driven by the desire to control important sources of revenue, not by revolutionary ideals of redressing real or 

perceived injustices. Some of the nastiest wars in Africa 

are being fought in countries richly endowed with natural resources. Examining the phenomenon in Angola, 

Malaquias suggests that control of important diamondproducing areas gave the rebel UNITA group a second 

wind after suffering serious setbacks at the national 

and international levels. The author also highlights the 

political and military miscalculations committed by the 

rebels and attributes them to the quick infusion of large 

sums of money into rebel coffers.

Maley, William, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the 

Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/38130751.

This volume is a comprehensive compilation of essays 

by acknowledged experts on the politics of Afghanistan 

and the Taliban. The first section includes articles dealing with the rise of the Taliban, including pieces on its 

military capabilities and tactics, external support, and 

the failures of the pre-Taliban government. Following 

sections include pieces on the role of outside actors in 

relation to Afghanistan and the Taliban. Concluding 

sections detail the future of Afghanistan, including the 

possibility of the success of an Afghan state based on a 

Western model.

Manwaring, Max G. Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/59823190.

The author explains the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs to insurgency in terms of the instability 

it wreaks upon government and its challenge to state 

sovereignty. Although there are differences between 

gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of 

operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena 

are mutated forms of urban insurgency.
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Marston, Daniel, and Carter Malkasian, eds. Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare. Oxford; New York: Osprey, 2008, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/166380048.

Insurgency has been a prominent form of warfare 

throughout history. Likewise, regular armies have often 

struggled to counter the threat posed by irregular 

forces. In this edited volume, experts from the field provide case studies of U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns 

from early efforts in the Philippines to current struggles 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recurring themes throughout 

the cases include the nearly universal failure to initially 

understand the problem; the necessity, but not the sufficiency, of firepower; the political dimensions of insurgent conflicts; and the central role played by police 

work and intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency 

efforts.

McCallister, William. “The Iraq Insurgency: Anatomy of a Tribal 

Rebellion.” First Monday 10, no. 3 (2005), http://firstmonday.org/

htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1215.

McCallister argues that the dynamics of traditionally 

networked tribes and clans, particularly in Fallujah and 

the Sunni Triangle, have significantly contributed to the 

motivations and maintenance of the insurgency in Iraq.

McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy 

of Counter-Insurgency. London: Faber, 1966, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/2423079.

One of the classics in the field of counterinsurgency, 

McCuen looks at the organization, operations, and 

mobilizations of 20th-century insurgencies. He offers a 

four-fold template for successfully deterring insurgent 

campaigns: the state of insurgency must be identified, 

strategic counterinsurgent bases must be secured, a 

counterinsurgent campaign must be engaged in for the 

long term, and the counterinsurgent government must 

maintain the will and deliver the resources necessary to 

defeat the targeted insurgent movement.
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Melnik, Constantin. The French Campaign Against the FLN. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1967, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/16946601.

Melnik, a high-placed official in the French government 

during the Algerian War, details the counterinsurgent 

campaign waged against the Algerian National Liberation Front.

Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and 

the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States 

in Vietnam. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2003, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51274584.

Merom argues that democratic institutions are less 

effective in waging small wars or counterinsurgencies. 

In particular, the moral values implicit in democratic 

society make it difficult to sustain the casualties and brutality inherent in small wars. The result is a “normative 

gap” between the values of society and those of the state, 

making it difficult for the state to continue its focus on 

the external threat.

Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/61343149.

The authors argue that insurgencies in the 20th century are dissimilar to those in the 21st century. They distinguish between “national” insurgencies in the former 

century and “liberation” insurgencies in the contemporary era. Accordingly, the U.S. must address 21st-century 

insurgency and revise its strategy, doctrine, operational 

concepts, and organization.

Molnar, Andrew R. Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 

Insurgencies. Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1966, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/2069125.

This work, representing research conducted under the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO), describes 

the organizational, motivational, and behavioral characteristics of undergrounds in insurgent movements 

along with an analysis of 24 insurgencies.
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Munck, Ronaldo, and Purnaka L. De Silva, eds. Postmodern Insurgencies: Political Violence, Identity Formation, and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/41223903.

This edited volume explores how the identity of groups 

is formed and changed in the midst of violent struggle 

and peacemaking. The volume includes several conceptual chapters as well as case studies ranging from Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, South Africa, 

Somalia, and others.

Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

A co-author of the Army’s FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 

Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency 

doctrine in the Vietnam and Malayan wars. Using 

archival sources and interviews of those involved in 

the engagements, he argues that the British military’s 

adaptable organizational culture, based in part on their 

experience as a colonial police force, was key in its success in its Malayan counterinsurgent campaign while 

the inflexible U.S. military failed to adapt to the insurgent tactics characterizing the Vietnamese conflict.

Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 

Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/717575909.

In this classic work, Olson develops a rational theory 

of collective action. According to his theory, rational, 

self-interested individuals will not pursue collective 

goods, or those that will be of benefit to all in society, 

because of the problem of “free riding,” or the logic 

that supposes the collective goods will be available to 

one through the work of others whether or not one 

actually expends efforts in procuring them. Due to the 

problem of free riding, Olson argues that mobilization, 

or collective action, will only occur if selective benefits, 

or distinct, divisible benefits, are offered and when the 

group is small enough that the benefits will be worth 

the expended cost to procure them.
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O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/57465511.

The author uses a comprehensive framework to understand insurgent and terrorist activity through analyzing 

its constituent components, such as their ultimate goals, 

tactics, means of acquiring popular support, organizational dynamics, external support, and others. Case 

studies include insurgencies in the past several decades 

as well as the more contemporary examples in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia.

Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy: The Anthropology of 

Insurgency.” The New Yorker (2006), http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/101605816.

Packer interviews David Kilcullen and Montgomery 

McFate. Both discuss the importance of “knowing the 

enemy” and the key role social science can play in this 

strategy. Highlights include discussions of the importance of social networks, as opposed to ideology, in 

insurgent participation.

Pelletiere, Stephen C. A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into 

the Origin and Development of the Movement. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/33372632.

Pelletiere examines the origins of numerous fundamentalist groups posing a security threat to some of the 

most adept security services in the world. Developing 

a theory of fundamentalism, Pelletiere maintains that 

the most appropriate method to quell the groups’ influence is not repression, which has not proved successful, 

but exploiting divisions within the movements between 

the more socially constructive and violent elements.

Petraeus, D. H. “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from 

Soldiering in Iraq.” Military Review 86 (2006): 45–55, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/204243520.

Highlighting that the U.S.’s superior conventional 

power makes it likely that future threats will be asymmetrical, Petraeus catalogs 14 observations gathered 

from his experiences during the Iraq counterinsurgency efforts.
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Piazza, James. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic 

Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence

18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/366056343.

Popular hypotheses point to the incidence of poverty, inequality, and poor economic development as 

the root causes of terrorism. Using statistical analysis, 

Piazza studies terrorist incidents and casualties over a 

15-year period in 96 countries to determine the feasibility of such explanations. He finds that factors such 

as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state 

repression, and, most significantly, the structure of 

party politics are found to be significant predictors of 

terrorism. Piazza finds instead that social cleavages, or 

the presence of numerous deep divisions in society, are 

a more appropriate predictor for acts of terrorist political violence. In particular, the presence of a “weak” 

political party system—multitudes of national political 

parties representing socioeconomic, ethnic, religious, 

and regional cleavages in society—is positively related 

to incidences of terrorist activity.

Rabasa, Angel, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. 

Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin A. O’Brien, and William Rosenau.

Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 2, the Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe. Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/442245343.

This report details the shape of future threats to U.S. 

national security from terrorist and other extremist 

organizations. The authors discuss the threat posed by 

groups that embrace Al Qaeda’s worldview but are not 

formally part of the organization; threats posed by other 

extremist or terrorist groups with no actual or ideological affiliation with Al Qaeda; and threats posed by the 

terrorist and transnational crime nexus.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism 

in Central Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/43840039.

Rashid examines the Taliban and its version of Islamic 

fundamentalism, explaining how the organization 

rose to power. Arguing that there is more than Islamic 

extremism in the Taliban equation, Rashid explains 

how numerous factors shaped the tenor of the organization, tracing its long historical and political roots in the 
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process. Salient topics include petroleum politics; the 

“Great Game” of Central Asia; the role of regional and 

international powers; the historical tensions between 

Sunni and Shi’a Muslims; and ethnic and tribal tensions 

among various groups and leaders in Afghanistan.

Reed, B. “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.” Parameters 37, no. 2 (2007): 19–30, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/161784355.

Because many insurgencies posing security threats do 

not have the traditional hierarchical model, the author 

argues that conventional understanding and strategies 

need to be adapted to meet more interconnected and 

networked armed groups. Network analysis offers such 

tools, considering the linkages between people, groups, 

units, and organizations among armed groups.

Rotberg, Robert I., ed. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51655557.

A compilation of essays by leading scholars examining 

the political, social, and economic reasons for state failure. The volume includes a theory and taxonomy of 

state failure by the editor as well as prescriptions for 

both prevention of state failure and state resuscitation.

Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/49935888.

Rubin details the tribulations of the formation of the 

Afghan state from its early 19th century roots. From 

the inception of the Afghan project, Rubin argues that 

Afghanistan began as a rentier state, a concept typically 

applied to wealthy oil-producing countries, freeing its 

leaders from internal revenue sources such as taxation, livestock, and commerce, relying instead on large 

influxes of foreign aid from Western, and later, Soviet, 

sources. The result was a state divided from its society. 

The following communist revolution “from above” left 

the Afghan state with little to no influence over its society other than through the military, eventually disintegrating when it met local resistance. Ethnic, tribal, and 

regional networks converged to sustain the mujahidin 

movement against the Soviet incursions, whose develop-
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ment Rubin treats in great detail, including the regional 

and ethnic powers, like the Pashtuns, which emerged 

following the collapse of the central state and dissolution of the army in 1992. Rubin provides an in-depth 

account of state-building, civil war, and the context of 

the international system.

Rubin, Barry M. Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History 

of the PLO. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/28799849.

A historical and political analysis of the PLO. Rubin 

catalogues the PLO’s evolving method of operations, 

from its use of terrorism, changes in operations after 

the 1983 war, and eventually moving toward a more diplomatic approach.

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. Hizbullah: Politics and Religion. London; Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/46835177.

Ghorayeb provides and insightful account of the development of the radical political party Hizbullah in terms 

of religion and politics, focusing on its interpretation of 

jihad and martyrdom operations; its views on its struggle with the West; and its conflict with Israel.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/53972026.

Sageman argues that successfully confronting terrorist 

organizations like Al Qaeda requires uncovering the 

web of interconnections that link its members. Using 

social network analysis, he depicts the strong ties among 

“cliques” of young Muslims who encourage one another 

to wage jihad and the “strength of the weaker ties,” or 

the loose links with other cadres that link them to Al 

Qaeda. Sageman argues that social bonds trump either 

grievance or ideological explanations for the motivations to join terrorist organizations.

Saskiewicz, Paul E. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - 

People’s Army (FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency Or Criminal 

Enterprise. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/74286166.

In addition to providing a background on FARC, Saskiewicz argues that the organization has not devolved into 
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a wholly criminal enterprise. Instead, FARC’s criminal enterprise is a means to an end, but recent developments have eroded the ideological commitment of 

its base.

Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/21375275.

Scott, a social scientist, describes the hidden forms of 

resistance wielded by the powerless and subordinate 

groups of society against the powerful despite their 

often public displays of deference to domination. Such 

groups create a secret discourse in the form of gossip, 

folktales, songs, jokes, and theater that critique the powerful behind their backs—what Scott refers to as hidden 

transcripts. When subordinate groups finally confront 

repressive power openly, these transcripts can act as 

an effective common language. Likewise, the powerful 

often have their own hidden transcripts that publicly 

conceal the goals and practices of their rule that cannot 

be openly admitted, often using devices like parades, 

state ceremony, and rituals of subordination of apology 

to project an image of hegemony. Scott furthers his concept of “everyday resistance” to explain power relations 

between the power and the powerless. Such acts of resistance, like peasant foot-dragging, are a form of politics 

different, but no less important, than more overt forms 

of resistance. Often they are the only forms of resistance 

available to individuals living in repressive or authoritarian regimes.

Shelley, Louise. “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2005): 

101–12, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/206563040.

Shelley discusses the evolution of the relationship 

between the state, transnational organized crime, and 

terrorist organizations. Formerly, criminal organizations 

developed within state institutions and relied on corruption in those institutions to secure their long-term 

objectives. Criminal organizations are now developing 

in post-conflict areas with little to no state presence, 

thriving in regions dominated by chaos and conflict. In 

addition, these criminal organizations are increasingly 

allying with terrorist organizations, both of whom oper-
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ate with little fear from ineffective or highly corrupt law 

enforcement regimes in largely ungovernable regions.

Shelley, Louise I., John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, 

Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Dr Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill. Methods and Motives: 

Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime & International 

Terrorism. National Institute of Justice, 2005, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/62713393.

Researchers commonly believe that the link between 

criminal and terrorist organizations is one of methods, 

not motives, with criminals pursuing profit objectives 

and terrorists pursuing political objectives. The authors 

argue that while this analytic approach, “methods, not 

motives,” is oftentimes accurate, the approach fails to 

grasp the more complex, intimate connections developing between criminals and terrorists. In addition, the 

authors develop a methodology for identifying crimeterror interactions derived from a standard intelligence 

framework that has proven useful in law enforcement 

investigations.

Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and 

Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/62342763.

The authors argue that confronting insurgencies and 

other non-state armed groups requires a knowledge of 

the local cultural and historical context. The forms warfare takes is often interwoven with the local organization 

of society. In the non-Western world, this often means 

confronting warrior cultures led by local chieftains possessing local knowledge, popular authority, and tactics 

suitable for the operating environment. The authors 

provide a conceptual framework to analyze how, when, 

and why these modern warriors fight while also facilitating the disaggregation of non-state armed groups into 

more refined categories of insurgents, militias, terrorists, and others.
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Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 

and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 

(1986): 464–81, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/4890428170.

In this article, the authors use frame alignment processes in order to explain participation and support for 

collective action, or social movements. They claim that 

not only do grievances matter, but it also matters how 

individuals, and groups seeking to redress them, interpret those grievances and transmit and diffuse their 

interpretations to others. Frames are essentially lenses, 

or “schematas of interpretation,” that help individuals 

explain occurrences and events within the context of 

their lives and the world at large. In doing so, frames 

make events and occurrences meaningful, acting as a 

guide to collective or individual action. Frame alignment is the process through which social movement 

organizations strategically align their frames with the 

values, interests, and beliefs of target populations in 

order to encourage participation in collective action. 

The underlying premise is that some sort of frame 

alignment is necessary to encourage participation. The 

authors identify and explain four frame alignment 

processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 

extension, and frame transformation.

Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence, edited by Jeremy Jennings. 

United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 

http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/40595298.

Sorel, a radical French syndicalist writing in the early 

20th century, offers his views on the role of violence 

in modern politics and what prompts men to engage 

in political action. He highlights the importance of 

“myths” in motivating and maintaining conflict, arguing that myths are essentially irrational constructs insulating adherents from empirical reality. He contrasts 

these with the more “utopian” rational blueprints for 

political objectives. Sorel also discusses the use of violence as theater and spectacle and its role in inspiring 

and maintaining resistance momentum.
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Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla 

Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002, http://www.worldcat.

org/oclc/49942647.

A description and analysis of the similar tactics used by 

guerrilla fighters to advance their cause, whether fighting for religious, nationalistic, or a host of other political 

agendas. First published in 1965 and considered a classic in the field, Taber’s evidence is drawn from numerous cases, including French experience in Indochina, 

the Irish war for independence, and British experience 

in Cyprus and Malaya.

Thomas, Troy S., Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer. Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors. Lanham, 

MD: Lexington Books, 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/

58451801.

As non-state armed groups gain greater access to 

resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal 

trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Non-state actors here 

include terrorist organizations, transnational criminal 

organizations, guerrillas, and other groups engaged in 

collective violence. The authors offer an interdisciplinary framework of analysis for improving understanding 

of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Functions of violent non-state 

actors included in the framework include environmental, organizational, and internal operations.

Thucydides. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide 

to the Peloponnesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler and Richard 

Crawley. New York: Free Press, 1996, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/34788895.

Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian, called his 

account of the Peloponnesian War between ancient 

Athens and Sparta a “possession for all time.” For the 

past 2,000 years it has stood as a key text in the liberal 

education of generals, statesmen, and citizens. While 

detailing one of the first major conflicts of civilization, 

Thucydides offers military, political, moral, and philosophical perspectives on man and society. Perhaps most 

famously, Thucydides distills human motivation to the 

triad of “fear, profit, and honor.”
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Tilly, Charles. From Mobilization to Revolution 1978, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/243910663.

Tilly’s work attempts to understand and explain the 

process of collective action, whether it is revolts, strikes, 

uprisings, or other facilitators of social change. In it, he 

develops a theory of political opportunity structure to 

explain how and why collective action develops. The 

theory of political opportunity structures evaluates 

the extent to which existing political systems facilitate 

independent organization and collective action by the 

citizenry. Within the theory, interactions between collective actors and the world around them influence 

their development, their immediate outcomes, and 

their influence over time. If context, or structure, matters, then activists do not choose their goals, strategies, 

and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, they do so in accordance with the advantages and disadvantages incurred 

by those choices in the political and social world in 

which they find themselves. The relationship between 

political opportunity structure and collective action is 

described as curvilinear—the more access citizens are 

given in a state to affect politics, the less likely they are 

to engage in collective action because less costly and 

difficult ways of influencing politics are routinely available. On the other hand, when the political system is 

too repressive, collective action is likewise largely absent 

because citizens have little room to develop the capacity, whether organizational or cognitive, to engage in 

collective action. As a result, collective action is most 

likely to occur when the state hits a sweet spot between 

neither too much repression nor too much openness 

that either wholly prevents or obviates the need for 

collective action.

———. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In 

Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/11785182.

Tilly, a prominent sociologist, describes a model for 

the development of the state analogous to the maturation of organized crime syndicates. In Europe, the state 

and war making capabilities developed out of organizations resembling protection rackets. However, vigorous 
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resistance by local populations modulated the state’s 

harmful effects. By contrast, states developing in the 

contemporary area have little constraints placed on 

their actions by the population, making the organized 

crime analogy more apt. This points to a key divergence 

in the experience of state formation in the European 

and developing world systems.

Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/63807665.

Two of the most prominent social scientists studying 

social movements propose here to unite the previously 

fragmented study of social contention—studies of revolution, insurrection, strikes, riots, and social movements, among others—into a single research discipline. 

They do so by arguing that all forms of contention are 

manifestations of the same phenomena—contentious 

politics. They define the latter as ongoing, collective, 

public claim-making of groups where the government 

is the target, or at least a party to, the claims which contenders are attempting to realize. Ethnic conflicts, riots, 

strikes, social movements, and a host of other forms 

of contention are studied under the same framework. 

What the authors do not do is claim that such diverse 

events have universal, or common laws, explaining 

their emergence, dynamics, or other processes. However, they do argue that all forms of contentious politics have common and recurring features, what they 

call mechanisms, that appear to work in similar ways 

across the spectrum of contentious politics, with different combinations producing different results. Such 

mechanisms might be environmental, cognitive, or 

relational (or working on connections among groups, 

people, and networks). Some examples of mechanisms 

include: mobilization, political identity formation, and 

elite defection. Although a difficult work at times, the 

contentious politics research agenda has had considerable influence on how social scientists think about and 

research social contention.
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Treverton, Gregory F., Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham, Jeremiah Goullka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong. Film Piracy, Organized 

Crime, and Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009, http://www.

worldcat.org/oclc/273816706.

The authors assess the involvement of organized crime 

and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products such as 

automobile parts, pharmaceuticals, and computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the 

globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal, and some terrorist, groups utilizing novel funding methods. Piracy is 

high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under 

the radar of law enforcement. The case studies provide 

compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy 

and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist 

groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance 

their activities.

Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

An account of French rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and’50s 

in Indochina. Trinquier, a veteran of the operations, 

describes his tactics for combating the insurgents.

Urban, Mark. Big Boys’ Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA. 

London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1993, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/31242701.

Urban provides an in-depth account of the counterinsurgent activities of the British SAS and other security 

forces in the Northern Ireland conflict beginning in 

the 1970s and ending with the 1987 Loughgall incident. 

Urban draws on extensive interviews with those involved 

in intelligence and special operations in Northern Ireland during this time. He details how the security force 

apparatus was structured, effectively deployed, and how 

the British executed tasks in the field.
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Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. Social Network Analysis: 

Methods and Applications. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/30594217.

A reference book on social network analysis, a methodology widely used in the social and behavioral sciences 

to understand relationships among social entities rather 

than focusing solely on individuals as lone actors. Social 

network analysis methodology highlights actors and 

their actions as interdependent; relational ties among 

actors transferring the flow of material and nonmaterial 

resources; and network models that map the constraints 

and opportunities provided by the network structural 

environment.

West, Bing. The Village. New York, NY: Pocket Books, 2003, http://

www.worldcat.org/oclc/51491677.

As a first-hand observer, West recounts the experiences 

of a small Marine unit sent to a village in Vietnam as 

military advisors to defend and train local militiamen.

———. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random House, 2011, http://www.worldcat.org/

oclc/659766251.

West offers a trenchant criticism of the use of the “benevolent” counterinsurgent strategies adopted in Afghanistan. The winning the hearts and minds strategy failed 

among the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan to encourage action against the Taliban. More troops, and more 

money, are required for an extensive nation-building 

effort in Afghanistan. He recommends that U.S. forces 

there transition to an adviser corps and continue to 

train Afghan security forces to defeat the Taliban.

Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. 

New York: Knopf, 2006, http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/64592193.

Wright’s work on Al Qaeda and 9/11 is a rich narrative history of the events leading up to the collapse of 

the World Trade Towers. His evidence is compiled from 

hundreds of interviews with jihadists, scholars, and antiterrorist officials across the globe. The narrative weaves 

the stories of the central characters of Al Qaeda leaders 

bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, the FBI’s counterterrorist 

chief John O’Neill, and the former head of Saudi intelli-
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gence Prince Turki al-Faisal, as well as influential figures 

such as Sayyid Qutb. Wright also highlights the failure 

of the U.S. intelligence community to share crucial 

information that could have potentially averted 9/11.
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APPENDIX

In addition to the above bibliographic sources, the following websites are crucial resources for further investigating irregular warfare 

and its associated core tasks.

• U.S. Army War College bibliographies:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibliographies.htm

• Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Irregular Warfare

bibliography:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/irregular2010.htm

• Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Special Operations 

bibliography:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/specops2010.htm

• Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Terrorism – Groups 

and Methods bibliography:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/terrorgroups2010.htm

• Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Warfare in the 21st 

Century bibliography:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/war21stcent.htm

• National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College 

bibliographies:

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/library/publications/bibliography/

• Naval Postgraduate School, Dudley Knox Library bibliographies:

http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research%20Tools/Bibliographies/index.html

• U.S. Army War College Library bibliographies:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibliographies.htm