# Official Journal C 291/2006

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 291 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 4930 November 2006 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 291

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 4930 November 2006

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Information |
| | Commission |
| 2006/C 291/1 | Euro exchange rates | 1 |
| 2006/C 291/2 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its 391st meeting on 30 may 2005 concerning a Draft Decision in case COMP/A.37.507/B2 — AstraZeneca | 2 |
| 2006/C 291/3 | Final report of the hearing officer in the case COMP/A/37.507 — AstraZeneca (pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21) | 3 |
| 2006/C 291/4 | State aid — United Kingdom — State aid No C 39/06 (ex NN 94/05) — First Time Shareholders scheme — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| 2006/C 291/5 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 10 |
| 2006/C 291/6 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections | 15 |
| 2006/C 291/7 | Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of okoumé plywood originating in the People's Republic of China | 19 |
| 2006/C 291/8 | Value added tax (VAT) (exempt investment gold) — List of gold coins meeting the criteria established in article 26B(a) (ii) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 As amended by Council Directive 98/80/EC of 12 October 1998 (Special scheme for investment gold) | 21 |
| 2006/C 291/9 | Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia | 34 |
| 2006/C 291/0 | Revision by France of a public service obligation in respect of scheduled air services between Paris (Orly) and Béziers | 38 |
| 2006/C 291/1 | Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid (
  1
  ) | 39 |
| 2006/C 291/2 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections | 41 |
| 2006/C 291/3 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4415 — Motorola/Symbol) (
  1
  ) | 43 |
| 2006/C 291/4 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4481 — Onex Corporation/Sitel Corporation) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 44 |
| 2006/C 291/5 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4421 — OJSC Novolipetsk Steel/Duferco/JV) (
  1
  ) | 45 |
| 2006/C 291/6 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4293 — Nordic Capital Fund VI/ICA MENY) (
  1
  ) | 45 |
| | EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA |
| | EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| 2006/C 291/7 | Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement | 46 |
| | Standing Committee of the EFTA States |
| 2006/C 291/8 | EMAS — The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme — List of registered sites in Norway in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the council of 19 March 2001 | 66 |
| 2006/C 291/9 | Amendments to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice | 68 |
| 2006/C 291/0 | List of marketing authorisations granted by the EEA EFTA States for the second half of 2005 | 69 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Information

Commission

2006/C 291/1

Euro exchange rates

1

2006/C 291/2

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its 391st meeting on 30 may 2005 concerning a Draft Decision in case COMP/A.37.507/B2 — AstraZeneca

2

2006/C 291/3

Final report of the hearing officer in the case COMP/A/37.507 — AstraZeneca (pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

(pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

3

2006/C 291/4

State aid — United Kingdom — State aid No C 39/06 (ex NN 94/05) — First Time Shareholders scheme — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (
  1
  )

1

5

2006/C 291/5

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

10

2006/C 291/6

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections

15

2006/C 291/7

Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of okoumé plywood originating in the People's Republic of China

19

2006/C 291/8

Value added tax (VAT) (exempt investment gold) — List of gold coins meeting the criteria established in article 26B(a) (ii) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 As amended by Council Directive 98/80/EC of 12 October 1998 (Special scheme for investment gold)

21

2006/C 291/9

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia

34

2006/C 291/0

Revision by France of a public service obligation in respect of scheduled air services between Paris (Orly) and Béziers

38

2006/C 291/1

Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid (
  1
  )

1

39

2006/C 291/2

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty — Cases where the Commission raises no objections

41

2006/C 291/3

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4415 — Motorola/Symbol) (
  1
  )

1

43

2006/C 291/4

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.4481 — Onex Corporation/Sitel Corporation) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

44

2006/C 291/5

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4421 — OJSC Novolipetsk Steel/Duferco/JV) (
  1
  )

1

45

2006/C 291/6

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4293 — Nordic Capital Fund VI/ICA MENY) (
  1
  )

1

45

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

2006/C 291/7

Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement

46

Standing Committee of the EFTA States

2006/C 291/8

EMAS — The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme — List of registered sites in Norway in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the council of 19 March 2001

66

2006/C 291/9

Amendments to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice

68

2006/C 291/0

List of marketing authorisations granted by the EEA EFTA States for the second half of 2005

69

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Information

Commission

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/1

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Euro exchange rates (1)

29 November 2006

(2006/C 291/01)

1 euro=

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3157 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 153,01 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4547 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,67430 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,0801 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,5889 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | 90,61 |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 8,2520 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CYP | Cyprus pound | 0,5780 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,988 |
| EEK | Estonian kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 257,16 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,6978 |
| MTL | Maltese lira | 0,4293 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 3,8243 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 3,4610 |
| SIT | Slovenian tolar | 239,65 |
| SKK | Slovak koruna | 35,531 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 1,9330 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,6800 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4953 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,2303 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,9398 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 2,0333 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 224,39 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 9,3790 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 10,3036 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,3532 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 12 060,36 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,7727 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 65,430 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 34,6550 |
| THB | Thai baht | 47,477 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3157

JPY

Japanese yen

153,01

DKK

Danish krone

7,4547

GBP

Pound sterling

0,67430

SEK

Swedish krona

9,0801

CHF

Swiss franc

1,5889

ISK

Iceland króna

90,61

NOK

Norwegian krone

8,2520

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CYP

Cyprus pound

0,5780

CZK

Czech koruna

27,988

EEK

Estonian kroon

15,6466

HUF

Hungarian forint

257,16

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,6978

MTL

Maltese lira

0,4293

PLN

Polish zloty

3,8243

RON

Romanian leu

3,4610

SIT

Slovenian tolar

239,65

SKK

Slovak koruna

35,531

TRY

Turkish lira

1,9330

AUD

Australian dollar

1,6800

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4953

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,2303

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,9398

SGD

Singapore dollar

2,0333

KRW

South Korean won

1 224,39

ZAR

South African rand

9,3790

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

10,3036

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,3532

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

12 060,36

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,7727

PHP

Philippine peso

65,430

RUB

Russian rouble

34,6550

THB

Thai baht

47,477

---

(1)

Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/2

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its 391st meeting on 30 may 2005 concerning a Draft Decision in case COMP/A.37.507/B2 — AstraZeneca

(2006/C 291/02)

| 1. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission to apply both Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission to apply both Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement.

| 2. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission's definition of the relevant product market (that is the market for oral formulations of prescription PPI's, thereby excluding the H2 blockers). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission's definition of the relevant product market (that is the market for oral formulations of prescription PPI's, thereby excluding the H2 blockers).

| 3. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission's definition of the relevant geographical market (especially the national nature of the market). |
| --- | --- |

3.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission's definition of the relevant geographical market (especially the national nature of the market).

| 4. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that AstraZeneca has a dominant position in each of the relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that AstraZeneca has a dominant position in each of the relevant markets.

| 5. | The majority of members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that AstraZeneca has abused its dominant position by its pattern of misrepresentations which were made over a long period of time to patent offices in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom and to national courts in Germany and Norway, taking into account the fact that the pattern of misrepresentations was part of AstraZeneca's strategy for omeprazole. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The majority of members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that AstraZeneca has abused its dominant position by its pattern of misrepresentations which were made over a long period of time to patent offices in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom and to national courts in Germany and Norway, taking into account the fact that the pattern of misrepresentations was part of AstraZeneca's strategy for omeprazole. A minority abstains.

| 6. | The majority of members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that AstraZeneca has abused its dominant position by systematic misusing the procedures for the authorisation of pharmaceutical products by selective deregistration of Losec capsules in Denmark, Sweden and Norway combined with a switch from Losec capsules to Losec MUPS tablets as part of AZ's LPPS strategy. A minority abstains and an other minority disagrees. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The majority of members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that AstraZeneca has abused its dominant position by systematic misusing the procedures for the authorisation of pharmaceutical products by selective deregistration of Losec capsules in Denmark, Sweden and Norway combined with a switch from Losec capsules to Losec MUPS tablets as part of AZ's LPPS strategy. A minority abstains and an other minority disagrees.

| 7. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission on the gravity of the infringement. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission on the gravity of the infringement.

| 8. | The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission on its considerations in relation to the existence of mitigating circumstances (that is the novel features). |
| --- | --- |

8.

The members of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission on its considerations in relation to the existence of mitigating circumstances (that is the novel features).

| 9. | The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion.

| 10. | The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to publish this opinion. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to publish this opinion.

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| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/3

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Final report of the hearing officer in the case COMP/A/37.507 — AstraZeneca

(pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings — OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21)

(2006/C 291/03)

The draft decision in the abovementioned case gives rise to the following observations:

The investigation was initiated subsequent to a joint complaint lodged on 12 May 1999 by the company Generics (UK) Ltd and the company Scandinavian Pharmaceuticals Generics AB (both referred to hereinafter as ‘Generics’ or ‘the complainant’) under Article 82 EC and Article 54 EEA against the pharmaceutical companies Astra AB (currently AstraZeneca AB) and AstraZeneca Plc (both referred to hereinafter as ‘AstraZeneca’) (1) pursuant to Article 3 of Council Regulation No 17/62 (2).

The case concerns abuses by AstraZeneca of government procedures aimed at excluding generic firms and parallel traders from competing against AstraZeneca's product ‘Losec’. The abuses consisted in the misuse of the patent system by knowingly making misrepresentations to patent offices with a view to extending the basic patent protection for Losec as well as in the misuse of the system for authorising the marketing of medicines by deregistering the original capsule version of Losec in selected countries with a view to preventing the authorisation of generic versions of Losec as well as excluding parallel trade.

A Statement of Objections was sent to AstraZeneca on 29 July 2003 in accordance with Article 2 of Regulation No 2842/98 (3). At the same time, AstraZeneca was provided with a list of the documents on the Commission file together with copies of accessible documents from that list in the form of two CD-Roms.

AstraZeneca submitted a joint reply on 3 December 2003 (date of receipt) and requested an oral hearing pursuant to Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/98.

I should mention, with regard to their right to access to file, that AstraZeneca took the view that the Commission services were obliged to take notes of their meetings with the complainant and that these notes should have been placed on the file. DG Competition stated that in the final decision they would rely exclusively on the written submissions that the complainant made in connection with the meetings in question. They considered that they were under no obligation to draft notes of these meetings unless such notes would be used as evidence in the final decision. I consider that this point of view is supported by the case-law of the Court of First Instance (joined cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 — Atlantic Container Line, paragraphs 377, 386, 394-395). On the basis of this case-law, notes that the Commission may — or may not — make of meetings with the complainant constitute internal documents which do not in principle have to be disclosed, unless the Commission relies on them in the final decision.

The complainant was provided with a non-confidential version of the Statement of Objections on 7 November 2003 and with a non-confidential version of AstraZeneca's reply on 8 January 2004. The complainant submitted comments on the Statement of Objections on 16 December 2003, which were transmitted to AstraZeneca.

With a view to enabling two former employees of AstraZeneca to attend the oral hearing, the setting up of the hearing was somewhat delayed. It took place on 16 and 17 February 2004. AstraZeneca and Generics were both represented. Both before and after the oral hearing, on 9 March 2004, AstraZeneca submitted new information, in particular with a view to further responding to matters raised at the oral hearing.

By letter of 23 November 2004 the Commission then afforded AstraZeneca the opportunity to comment on a number of factual elements and considerations not explicitly mentioned in the Statement of Objections to which the Commission could refer in the final decision against AstraZeneca (‘letter of facts’). Upon request, I extended the delay for commenting on this letter of facts to 13 January 2005. Furthermore, I ensured that AstraZeneca was provided with all additional non-confidential documents that had been placed on the Commission's case file subsequent to the issuance of the Statement of Objections. AstraZeneca provided its observations on the letter of facts by letter of 21 January 2005.

It is my opinion that the draft decision only contains objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views.

In the light of the above, I consider that the rights to be heard of all participants to the procedure have been respected in this case.

Brussels, 31 May 2005

Serge DURANDE

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(1)  With effect from 6 April 1999, Astra AB merged with Zeneca Group Plc to form the United Kingdom company AstraZeneca Plc.

1

(2)  Regulation No 17 of the Council of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204)

2

(3)  Regulation No 2842/98/EEC of the Commission of 22 December 1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under Article 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, pp. 18-21).

3

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| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/5

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STATE AID — UNITED KINGDOM

State aid No C 39/06 (ex NN 94/05)

First Time Shareholders scheme

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty

(2006/C 291/04)

(Text with EEA relevance)

By means of the letter dated 13 September 2006 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the abovementioned aid.

Interested parties may submit their comments within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate General for Fisheries |
| DG FISH/D/3 ‘Legal Issues’ |
| B-1049 Brussels |
| Fax: (32-2) 295 19 42 |

European Commission

Directorate General for Fisheries

DG FISH/D/3 ‘Legal Issues’

B-1049 Brussels

Fax: (32-2) 295 19 42

These comments will be communicated to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

SUMMARY

In June 2004 the Commission was informed of aid granted by the Shetland Islands Council, the public authority in the Shetland Islands of the United Kingdom, to the fisheries sector which possibly concerned illegal State aid.

Under the scheme for first time shareholders grants were given as contribution to matching own financial contribution for the purchase of a share in an existing or new fishing vessel. Aid of 50 % of the acquisition costs of the share, with a maximum of GBP 7 500 in case of an existing vessel and GBP 15 000 in case of a new vessel, with a maximum of 25 % of the value of the vessel, was granted to persons over 18 years old that do not yet own a share in a fishing vessel. The aid was granted under the condition that the vessel was used for full time fishing for the next 5 years and that the beneficiary retained his share in the vessel for a period of five years from receipt of the aid.

According to Article 88 (3) of the EC Treaty Member State have to inform the Commission of any plans to grant or alter aid. According to the United Kingdom, the scheme has been applied from 1982 until 14 January 2005. However, the United Kingdom confirmed that the scheme was never notified to the Commission, as result of which the aid measure has to be considered as new aid.

Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (1) does not lay down any limitation period for the examination of unlawful aid. However, Article 15 of that Regulation stipulates that the powers of the Commission to recover aid is subject to a limitation period of ten years, that the limitation period begins on the day on which the aid is awarded to the beneficiary and that that limitation period is interrupted by any action taken by the Commission. Consequently, the Commission considers that it is not necessary in this case to examine the aid granted more than ten years before any measure taken by the Commission concerning it. The Commission considers that the limitation period was interrupted by its request for information sent to the United Kingdom on 24 August 2004. Accordingly, the limitation period applies to aid granted to beneficiaries before 24 August 1994 and the Commission assesses below only aid granted by decisions taken between 24 August 1994 and 14 January 2005. According to the information available to the Commission. It seems that during that time approximately GBP 8 000 000 have been granted under the scheme.

The measures appear to be State aid in the sense of Article 87 of the EC Treaty. State aid can be declared compatible with the common market if it complies with one of the exceptions foreseen in the EC-Treaty. State aid to the fisheries sector may be deemed to be compatible with the common market if they comply with the conditions of Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture applicable at the time of granting of the aid (2).

With regard to the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a used vessel, according to the 1994, 1997 and 2001 Guidelines, the aid may be deemed compatible with the common market when the aid is intended to enable sea-fishermen to acquire part ownership or to replace a vessel after its total loss and the vessel is not older than 20 years and can be used for at least another 10 years. The 2004 Guidelines are more strict and refer to the conditions laid down in Article 12(3)(d) an 12(4)(f) of Regulation (EC) No. 2792/1999, which contain additional requirements with regard to the age of the beneficiary and the overall length of the vessel. According to the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines the total amount of aid to be granted may not exceed 30 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel. Under the 2001 Guidelines this is lowered to 20 %.

At this stage the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a used vessel seems not to comply with the conditions established by the Guidelines. Furthermore the scheme allows aid up to a maximum of 25 % of the actual cost of the acquisition of the vessel, which would be incompatible with the requirements under the 2001 Guidelines.

With regard to the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel, according to point 2.2.3.1. of the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines aid for the construction of new fishing vessels may be deemed compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the relevant conditions of Regulation (EC) No 3699/93. The vessels must be built in compliance with the objective under the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP) and must comply with the regulations and directives governing hygiene and safety and Community provisions concerning the dimension of vessels. The vessels have to be registered in the fleet register.

Under the 2001 Guidelines reference is made to the conditions of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999, where it is stated that an entry of new capacity should be compensated by the withdrawal of a capacity without public aid which is at least equal to the new capacity introduced in the segments concerned. Until 31 December 2001, where the objectives were not yet respected, the withdrawal of capacity should at least be 30 % more than the new capacity introduced. Further condition is that the aid may only be granted where the Member State has submitted the information concerning the application of the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP) as required under Article 5 of that Regulation and has complied with its obligations under Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 concerning the characteristics of fishing vessels, has implemented the arrangements under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 and has complied with the overall MAGP-objectives.

As the scheme makes no reference to the reference level for the size of the fishing fleet nor to the hygiene and safety requirement and there is no obligation for the registration of the vessel in the fleet register, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts on the compatibility of the aid for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel granted in the period after 1 July 2001.

In view of the foregoing analysis the Commission has decided not to raise any objections to this aid scheme as far as it concerns the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel granted before 1 July 2001. However, with regard to the aid granted under the scheme for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel after 1 July 2001 and all aid granted for the acquisition of a share in second hand vessels, the Commission has, at this stage, serious doubts on the compatibility with the common market.

In accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, all unlawful aid can be subject to recovery from the recipient.

TEXT OF LETTER

| ‘(1) | The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

‘(1)

The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty.

1.   PROCEDURE

| (2) | By letter of 15 June 2004 the Commission was informed by a citizen of the UK of unlawful aid granted by the authorities of the Shetland Islands of the UK. By letters of 24 August 2004, 4 February, 11 May and 16 December 2005 the Commission has requested the UK authorities to provide information about these measures, to which the UK authorities responded by letters of 10 December 2004, 6 April, 8 September 2005 and 31 January 2006. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter of 15 June 2004 the Commission was informed by a citizen of the UK of unlawful aid granted by the authorities of the Shetland Islands of the UK. By letters of 24 August 2004, 4 February, 11 May and 16 December 2005 the Commission has requested the UK authorities to provide information about these measures, to which the UK authorities responded by letters of 10 December 2004, 6 April, 8 September 2005 and 31 January 2006.

2.   DESCRIPTION

| (3) | The Shetland Islands Council (SIC), the public authority in Shetland, has made payments to the fisheries sector under the scope of two general aid measures named “Aid to the Fish Catching and Processing Industry” and “Aid to the Fish Farming Industry”, which actually consisted of several different types of aid schemes. One of these schemes is the so-called First time shareholders scheme. Under the First time shareholders scheme, which was applied from 1982 until 14 January 2005, grants could be given as contribution to matching own financial contribution for the purchase of a share in an existing or new fishing vessel. Aid was only granted to persons over 18 years old that did not yet own a share in a fishing vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Shetland Islands Council (SIC), the public authority in Shetland, has made payments to the fisheries sector under the scope of two general aid measures named “Aid to the Fish Catching and Processing Industry” and “Aid to the Fish Farming Industry”, which actually consisted of several different types of aid schemes. One of these schemes is the so-called First time shareholders scheme. Under the First time shareholders scheme, which was applied from 1982 until 14 January 2005, grants could be given as contribution to matching own financial contribution for the purchase of a share in an existing or new fishing vessel. Aid was only granted to persons over 18 years old that did not yet own a share in a fishing vessel.

| (4) | Aid was granted for 50 % of the acquisition costs of the share, with a maximum of GBP 7 500 in case of an existing vessel and GBP 15 000 in case of a new vessel. The other 50 % may only be financed by the beneficiaries own contribution, derived either from his own savings or from any interest-free family loan. The amount of aid may never exceed 25 % of the value of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Aid was granted for 50 % of the acquisition costs of the share, with a maximum of GBP 7 500 in case of an existing vessel and GBP 15 000 in case of a new vessel. The other 50 % may only be financed by the beneficiaries own contribution, derived either from his own savings or from any interest-free family loan. The amount of aid may never exceed 25 % of the value of the vessel.

| (5) | The aid was granted under the condition that the vessel is used for full time fishing for the next 5 years and that the beneficiary retained his share in the vessel for a period of five years from receipt of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The aid was granted under the condition that the vessel is used for full time fishing for the next 5 years and that the beneficiary retained his share in the vessel for a period of five years from receipt of the aid.

3.   COMMENTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

| (6) | The United Kingdom states that the aid measures concerned have already been applied already before the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom is however not able to provide any evidence of the existence of these measures at the time of accession. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The United Kingdom states that the aid measures concerned have already been applied already before the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom is however not able to provide any evidence of the existence of these measures at the time of accession.

| (7) | The United Kingdom confirms that the aid measures have been changed over the years and that these changes have not been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty (former Article 93(3)). The United Kingdom states however that the expenditure and application of the measures have been reported yearly to the Commission by way of the annual State aid inventory and that the officials responsible for the aids believed that by transmitting the annual reports no notification of the aid would be necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The United Kingdom confirms that the aid measures have been changed over the years and that these changes have not been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty (former Article 93(3)). The United Kingdom states however that the expenditure and application of the measures have been reported yearly to the Commission by way of the annual State aid inventory and that the officials responsible for the aids believed that by transmitting the annual reports no notification of the aid would be necessary.

| (8) | Finally the United Kingdom states that where the measures and the amendments to the schemes might have been applied without prior notification to the Commission, they were applied in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture applicable at the time aid was granted under the measures. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Finally the United Kingdom states that where the measures and the amendments to the schemes might have been applied without prior notification to the Commission, they were applied in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture applicable at the time aid was granted under the measures.

| (9) | In addition, with regard to the First time shareholder scheme the United Kingdom states that the scheme was in operation until 14 January 2005, but that actually no assistance has been awarded during the financial years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 as there were no applications. Furthermore, they state that they consider the aid to have been compatible with Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture applicable at the times concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In addition, with regard to the First time shareholder scheme the United Kingdom states that the scheme was in operation until 14 January 2005, but that actually no assistance has been awarded during the financial years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 as there were no applications. Furthermore, they state that they consider the aid to have been compatible with Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture applicable at the times concerned.

4.   ASSESSMENT

| (10) | It must be determined first if the scheme can be regarded as State aid and if this is the case, if this aid is compatible with the common market. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

It must be determined first if the scheme can be regarded as State aid and if this is the case, if this aid is compatible with the common market.

| (11) | Aid has been granted to a limited number of companies within the fisheries sector and is thus of a selective nature. The aids have been granted by the Shetland Islands Council, the public authority of Shetland, from State resources and are in the benefit of these companies which are in direct competition with other companies in the fisheries sector of both within the United Kingdom as well as in other Member States. Therefore, the measures distort or threaten to distort competition and appear to be State aid in the sense of Article 87 of the EC Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Aid has been granted to a limited number of companies within the fisheries sector and is thus of a selective nature. The aids have been granted by the Shetland Islands Council, the public authority of Shetland, from State resources and are in the benefit of these companies which are in direct competition with other companies in the fisheries sector of both within the United Kingdom as well as in other Member States. Therefore, the measures distort or threaten to distort competition and appear to be State aid in the sense of Article 87 of the EC Treaty.

4.1.   Legality

| (12) | According to the United Kingdom, the two general schemes have been applied before the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. However, the Commission notes that according to the provided information, the First time shareholders scheme was put in place only 1982. In any event, due to the absence of past records, the United Kingdom acknowledged that it is not able to provide evidence that the aid measures existed already before the United Kingdom joined the union and thus would have to be regarded as existing aids. In addition, the United Kingdom confirmed that the aid schemes have been changed over the years and that these changes have not been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty (former Article 93(3)). As a result, the aid measures have to be considered as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

According to the United Kingdom, the two general schemes have been applied before the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community. However, the Commission notes that according to the provided information, the First time shareholders scheme was put in place only 1982. In any event, due to the absence of past records, the United Kingdom acknowledged that it is not able to provide evidence that the aid measures existed already before the United Kingdom joined the union and thus would have to be regarded as existing aids. In addition, the United Kingdom confirmed that the aid schemes have been changed over the years and that these changes have not been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty (former Article 93(3)). As a result, the aid measures have to be considered as new aid.

| (13) | The Commission regrets that the United Kingdom did not respect Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, under which Member State are obliged to inform the Commission of any plans to grant or alter aid. In this respect the United Kingdom has stated that its authorities were mistakenly convinced that the inclusion of the measures into the annual State aid inventory, yearly submitted to the Commission, would be sufficient to inform the Commission of the aid in question. It must be noted however that such reporting to the Commission can not be considered as notification of the aid as required under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The Commission regrets that the United Kingdom did not respect Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, under which Member State are obliged to inform the Commission of any plans to grant or alter aid. In this respect the United Kingdom has stated that its authorities were mistakenly convinced that the inclusion of the measures into the annual State aid inventory, yearly submitted to the Commission, would be sufficient to inform the Commission of the aid in question. It must be noted however that such reporting to the Commission can not be considered as notification of the aid as required under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.

4.2.   Basis for the assessment

| (14) | Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (3) does not lay down any limitation period for the examination of unlawful aid within the meaning of Article 1(f) thereof, i.e. aid implemented before the Commission is able to reach a conclusion about its compatibility with the common market. However, Article 15 of that Regulation stipulates that the powers of the Commission to recover aid is subject to a limitation period of ten years, that the limitation period begins on the day on which the aid is awarded to the beneficiary and that that limitation period is interrupted by any action taken by the Commission. Consequently, the Commission considers that it is not necessary in this case to examine the aid covered by the limitation period, i.e. aid granted more than ten years before any measure taken by the Commission concerning it. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (3) does not lay down any limitation period for the examination of unlawful aid within the meaning of Article 1(f) thereof, i.e. aid implemented before the Commission is able to reach a conclusion about its compatibility with the common market. However, Article 15 of that Regulation stipulates that the powers of the Commission to recover aid is subject to a limitation period of ten years, that the limitation period begins on the day on which the aid is awarded to the beneficiary and that that limitation period is interrupted by any action taken by the Commission. Consequently, the Commission considers that it is not necessary in this case to examine the aid covered by the limitation period, i.e. aid granted more than ten years before any measure taken by the Commission concerning it.

| (15) | The Commission considers that in this case the limitation period was interrupted by its request for information sent to the United Kingdom on 24 August 2004. Accordingly, the limitation period applies to aid granted to beneficiaries before 24 August 1994. Consequently, the Commission will asses below only the aid granted by decisions taken between 24 August 1994 and January 2005. It seems that during that time approximately GBP 8 000 000 have been granted under the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Commission considers that in this case the limitation period was interrupted by its request for information sent to the United Kingdom on 24 August 2004. Accordingly, the limitation period applies to aid granted to beneficiaries before 24 August 1994. Consequently, the Commission will asses below only the aid granted by decisions taken between 24 August 1994 and January 2005. It seems that during that time approximately GBP 8 000 000 have been granted under the scheme.

| (16) | State aid can be declared compatible with the common market if it complies with one of the exceptions foreseen in the EC Treaty. As regards the State aid to the fisheries sector, State aid measures are deemed to be compatible with the common market if they comply with the conditions of Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture. According to point 5.3 of the current Guidelines (4) an “unlawful aid” within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 will be appraised in accordance with the guidelines applicable at the time when the administrative act setting up the aid has entered into force. The aid is thus to be assessed on the compatibility with the Guidelines of 1994, 1997 and 2001 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

State aid can be declared compatible with the common market if it complies with one of the exceptions foreseen in the EC Treaty. As regards the State aid to the fisheries sector, State aid measures are deemed to be compatible with the common market if they comply with the conditions of Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture. According to point 5.3 of the current Guidelines (4) an “unlawful aid” within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 will be appraised in accordance with the guidelines applicable at the time when the administrative act setting up the aid has entered into force. The aid is thus to be assessed on the compatibility with the Guidelines of 1994, 1997 and 2001 (5).

4.3.   Used vessels

4.3.1.   Guidelines of 1994, 1997 and 2001

| (17) | With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in a second hand vessel, according to point 2.2.3.3 of the 1994, 1997 and 2001 Guidelines, such aid may be deemed compatible with the common market when the vessel can be used for at least another 10 years. Under the 1994, 1997 Guidelines the vessel has to be at least 10 years old, under the 2001 Guidelines 20 years. According to all guidelines the aid should be intended to enable sea-fishermen to acquire part ownership or to replace a vessel after its total loss. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in a second hand vessel, according to point 2.2.3.3 of the 1994, 1997 and 2001 Guidelines, such aid may be deemed compatible with the common market when the vessel can be used for at least another 10 years. Under the 1994, 1997 Guidelines the vessel has to be at least 10 years old, under the 2001 Guidelines 20 years. According to all guidelines the aid should be intended to enable sea-fishermen to acquire part ownership or to replace a vessel after its total loss.

| (18) | With regard to the aid rate, under the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines the total amount of aid to be granted may not exceed 50 % of the participation rate provided for in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 3699/93, applying the scale relating to construction aid set out in that Annex. As Shetland is an Objective I region, the maximum participation rate is set at 60 %. Thus the aid for sea-fishermen to acquire part ownership of a second hand vessel may not exceed 30 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

With regard to the aid rate, under the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines the total amount of aid to be granted may not exceed 50 % of the participation rate provided for in Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 3699/93, applying the scale relating to construction aid set out in that Annex. As Shetland is an Objective I region, the maximum participation rate is set at 60 %. Thus the aid for sea-fishermen to acquire part ownership of a second hand vessel may not exceed 30 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel.

| (19) | Under the 2001 Guidelines this provision is amended and it is stated that the rate of the aid may not exceed in subsidy equivalent 20 % of the actual cost of the acquisition of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Under the 2001 Guidelines this provision is amended and it is stated that the rate of the aid may not exceed in subsidy equivalent 20 % of the actual cost of the acquisition of the vessel.

4.3.2.   Compatibility

| (20) | Under the scheme aid was granted for individuals who acquired for the first time a share in a second hand vessel. According to the Guidelines aid could only be granted with regard to vessels, not older than 20 years, that could be used for at least another 10 years. The scheme does not contain any conditions with regard to the age of the vessels. The fact that the beneficiaries of the aid are obliged to keep their share in the vessel for at least another five years and to use the vessel for fishing during those years seems to insure that aid is granted for vessels that are still operational and to be used for some years. However, this condition is insufficient to comply with the requirements established in point 2.2.3.3. of the 1994, the 1997 as well as the 2001 Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Under the scheme aid was granted for individuals who acquired for the first time a share in a second hand vessel. According to the Guidelines aid could only be granted with regard to vessels, not older than 20 years, that could be used for at least another 10 years. The scheme does not contain any conditions with regard to the age of the vessels. The fact that the beneficiaries of the aid are obliged to keep their share in the vessel for at least another five years and to use the vessel for fishing during those years seems to insure that aid is granted for vessels that are still operational and to be used for some years. However, this condition is insufficient to comply with the requirements established in point 2.2.3.3. of the 1994, the 1997 as well as the 2001 Guidelines.

| (21) | In addition, according to the information provided, under the scheme the aid may not exceed 25 % of the value of the vessel. Under to the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines, applicable until 1 July 2001, it is allowed to grant aid with a maximum of 30 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel and thus the aid rate of the scheme of 25 % is compatible with that condition. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

In addition, according to the information provided, under the scheme the aid may not exceed 25 % of the value of the vessel. Under to the 1994 and 1997 Guidelines, applicable until 1 July 2001, it is allowed to grant aid with a maximum of 30 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel and thus the aid rate of the scheme of 25 % is compatible with that condition.

| (22) | However the 2001 Guidelines, which Member States were to apply as from 1 July 2001, require that the aid shall not exceed 20 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel. The aid rate of the scheme of 25 % therefore no longer complies with the conditions established under the Guidelines. Therefore, from 1 July 2001, the aid rate of the scheme of 25 % exceeds seems no longer compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

However the 2001 Guidelines, which Member States were to apply as from 1 July 2001, require that the aid shall not exceed 20 % of the actual costs of the acquisition of the vessel. The aid rate of the scheme of 25 % therefore no longer complies with the conditions established under the Guidelines. Therefore, from 1 July 2001, the aid rate of the scheme of 25 % exceeds seems no longer compatible.

| (23) | With regard to the above, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts on the compatibility with the common market of the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in used vessels. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

With regard to the above, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts on the compatibility with the common market of the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in used vessels.

4.4.   New vessels

4.4.1.   Guidelines of 1994 and 1997

| (24) | With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in new vessels, point 2.2.3.1 of the 1994 and the 1997 Guidelines apply. According to those guidelines, aid for the construction of new fishing vessels may be deemed compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the relevant conditions of Regulation (EC) No 3699/93 (6). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in new vessels, point 2.2.3.1 of the 1994 and the 1997 Guidelines apply. According to those guidelines, aid for the construction of new fishing vessels may be deemed compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the relevant conditions of Regulation (EC) No 3699/93 (6).

Regulation (EC) No 3699/93

| (25) | According to the conditions laid down in Articles 7 and 10 and Annex III (paragraph 1.3) of Regulation (EC) No 3699/93, the vessels must be built in compliance with the objectives set for the size of the fishing fleet of the Member State concerned under the mulitannual guidance programme (MAGP) and must comply with the regulations and directives governing hygiene and safety and Community provisions concerning the dimension of vessels. The vessels have to be registered in the fleet register. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

According to the conditions laid down in Articles 7 and 10 and Annex III (paragraph 1.3) of Regulation (EC) No 3699/93, the vessels must be built in compliance with the objectives set for the size of the fishing fleet of the Member State concerned under the mulitannual guidance programme (MAGP) and must comply with the regulations and directives governing hygiene and safety and Community provisions concerning the dimension of vessels. The vessels have to be registered in the fleet register.

4.4.2.   Guidelines of 2001

| (26) | With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in new vessels, point 2.2.3.1 of the 2001 Guidelines applies. According to those guidelines, aid for the construction of new fishing vessels may be deemed compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the relevant conditions of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

With regard to aid for the acquisition of a share in new vessels, point 2.2.3.1 of the 2001 Guidelines applies. According to those guidelines, aid for the construction of new fishing vessels may be deemed compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the relevant conditions of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 (7).

Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999

| (27) | Articles 6, 7, 9 and 10 and Annex III (point 1.3) of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 (8), as applicable until 1 January 2003, require that the entry of new capacity is compensated by the withdrawal of a capacity without public aid which is at least equal to the new capacity introduced in the segments concerned. Until 31 December 2001, where the objectives were not yet respected, the withdrawal of capacity should at least be 30 % more than the new capacity introduced. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Articles 6, 7, 9 and 10 and Annex III (point 1.3) of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 (8), as applicable until 1 January 2003, require that the entry of new capacity is compensated by the withdrawal of a capacity without public aid which is at least equal to the new capacity introduced in the segments concerned. Until 31 December 2001, where the objectives were not yet respected, the withdrawal of capacity should at least be 30 % more than the new capacity introduced.

| (28) | The aid may only be granted where the Member State has submitted the information concerning the application of the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP) as required under Article 5 of that Regulation and furthermore, has complied with its obligations under Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 concerning the characteristics of fishing vessels, has implemented the arrangements under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 and has complied with the overall MAGP-objectives. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The aid may only be granted where the Member State has submitted the information concerning the application of the Multi-annual Guidance Programme (MAGP) as required under Article 5 of that Regulation and furthermore, has complied with its obligations under Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86 concerning the characteristics of fishing vessels, has implemented the arrangements under Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 and has complied with the overall MAGP-objectives.

| (29) | When the vessel is deleted from the fishing vessel register of the Community, within 10 years from construction, the aid should be recovered pro rata temporis. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

When the vessel is deleted from the fishing vessel register of the Community, within 10 years from construction, the aid should be recovered pro rata temporis.

| (30) | Finally, the vessels must be built to comply with the regulations and directives governing hygiene and safety and Community provisions concerning the dimension of vessels. The vessels have to be registered in the fleet register and must be entered in the Community fishing fleet register. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Finally, the vessels must be built to comply with the regulations and directives governing hygiene and safety and Community provisions concerning the dimension of vessels. The vessels have to be registered in the fleet register and must be entered in the Community fishing fleet register.

| (31) | With regard to the compatibility of aid for the construction of new fishing vessels with the common market, the 2001 Guidelines aid also make reference to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 as mentioned above. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

With regard to the compatibility of aid for the construction of new fishing vessels with the common market, the 2001 Guidelines aid also make reference to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 as mentioned above.

Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002

| (32) | However, on 1 January 2003 the relevant Articles and Annex of Regulation (EC) No. 2792/1999 were amended by Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 (9). This amendment introduced the phasing out of aid for construction of new fishing vessels. According to the amended provisions, the conditions have been broadened in the sense that aid for the renewal of fishing vessels may only be granted until 31 December 2004 and for vessels of less than 400 GT. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

However, on 1 January 2003 the relevant Articles and Annex of Regulation (EC) No. 2792/1999 were amended by Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 (9). This amendment introduced the phasing out of aid for construction of new fishing vessels. According to the amended provisions, the conditions have been broadened in the sense that aid for the renewal of fishing vessels may only be granted until 31 December 2004 and for vessels of less than 400 GT.

4.4.3.   Compatibility

| (33) | Under the scheme grants can be given for the purchase of a share in a new fishing vessel. Aid can only be granted to persons over 18 years old that do not yet own a share in a fishing vessel. The beneficiary is obliged to use the vessel for fishing for the following 5 years and must retain their share in the vessel for at least the same period. In case of breach of the conditions under the scheme the authorities can require pro rata temporis repayment of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Under the scheme grants can be given for the purchase of a share in a new fishing vessel. Aid can only be granted to persons over 18 years old that do not yet own a share in a fishing vessel. The beneficiary is obliged to use the vessel for fishing for the following 5 years and must retain their share in the vessel for at least the same period. In case of breach of the conditions under the scheme the authorities can require pro rata temporis repayment of the aid.

| (34) | As the scheme seems to make no reference to the reference level for the size of the fishing fleet nor to the hygiene and safety requirement and there is obligation for the registration of the vessel in the fleet register, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts that the conditions for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel during the period starting from 1 July 2001 can be considered compatible with the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As the scheme seems to make no reference to the reference level for the size of the fishing fleet nor to the hygiene and safety requirement and there is obligation for the registration of the vessel in the fleet register, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts that the conditions for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel during the period starting from 1 July 2001 can be considered compatible with the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture.

| (35) | Furthermore the scheme does not seem to contain any provisions with regard to the additional requirements introduced by Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 (point 32), applicable as from 1 January 2003. Although the United Kingdom has stated that no aid has been granted under the scheme during the financial years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, aid has been granted during the financial year 2002/2003 which could include aid granted after 1 January 2003. Therefore at this stage the Commission also has doubts whether the additional conditions established by Regulation (EC) No. 2369/2002 have been complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Furthermore the scheme does not seem to contain any provisions with regard to the additional requirements introduced by Regulation (EC) No 2369/2002 (point 32), applicable as from 1 January 2003. Although the United Kingdom has stated that no aid has been granted under the scheme during the financial years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005, aid has been granted during the financial year 2002/2003 which could include aid granted after 1 January 2003. Therefore at this stage the Commission also has doubts whether the additional conditions established by Regulation (EC) No. 2369/2002 have been complied with.

| (36) | With regard to the above, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts on the compatibility with the common market of the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in new vessels after 1 July 2001. Aid granted before that date however is deemed to be compatible with the guidelines in force at the time the aid was granted and thus compatible with the common market. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

With regard to the above, the Commission at this stage has serious doubts on the compatibility with the common market of the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in new vessels after 1 July 2001. Aid granted before that date however is deemed to be compatible with the guidelines in force at the time the aid was granted and thus compatible with the common market.

5.   DECISION

| (37) | In view of the foregoing analysis the Commission has decided not to raise any objections to this aid scheme as far as it concerns the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel granted before 1 July 2001. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In view of the foregoing analysis the Commission has decided not to raise any objections to this aid scheme as far as it concerns the aid granted for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel granted before 1 July 2001.

| (38) | With regard to the aid granted under the scheme for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel after 1 July 2001 and all aid granted for the acquisition of a share in second hand vessels, the Commission observes that there exist, at this stage of the preliminary examination, as provided for by Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 88 of the EC Treaty, serious doubts on the compatibility of these aids with the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to Fisheries and aquaculture and, therefore, with the EC Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

With regard to the aid granted under the scheme for the acquisition of a share in a new vessel after 1 July 2001 and all aid granted for the acquisition of a share in second hand vessels, the Commission observes that there exist, at this stage of the preliminary examination, as provided for by Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 88 of the EC Treaty, serious doubts on the compatibility of these aids with the Guidelines for the examination of State aid to Fisheries and aquaculture and, therefore, with the EC Treaty.

| (39) | In the light of the foregoing conditions, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, requests the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to further assess the aid, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

In the light of the foregoing conditions, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty and Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, requests the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to further assess the aid, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the recipients of the aid immediately.

| (40) | The Commission wishes to remind the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that Article 88 (3) of the EC Treaty has suspensory effect and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Commission wishes to remind the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that Article 88 (3) of the EC Treaty has suspensory effect and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| (41) | The Commission warns the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.’ |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The Commission warns the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.’

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1. Regulation as amended by the Act of Accession of 2003.

1

(2)  OJ C 260, 17.9.94, p. 3; OJ C 100, 27.3.1997, p. 12 and OJ C 19, 20.1.2001, p. 7; OJ C 229, 14.9.2004, p. 5.

2

(3)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1. Regulation as amended by the Act of Accession of 2003.

3

(4)  OJ C 229, 14.9.2004, p. 5.

4

(5)  OJ C 260, 17.9.1994, p. 3; OJ C 100, 27.3.1997, p. 12 and OJ C 19, 20.1.2001, p. 7.

5

(6)  Council Regulation (EC) 3699/93 of 21 December 1993 laying down the criteria and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries and aquaculture sector and the processing and the marketing of its products, OJ L 346, 31.12.1993, p. 1.

6

(7)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector OJ L 337, 30.12.1999, p.10, as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 485/2005, OJ L 81, 30.3.2005, p. 1.

7

(8)  Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector OJ L 337, 30.12.1999, p.10, as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 485/2005, OJ L 81, 30.3.2005, p. 1.

8

(9)  OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 49.

9

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/10

---

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs

(2006/C 291/05)

This publication confers the right to object to the application pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006. Statements of objection must reach the Commission within six months from the date of this publication.

SUMMARY

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

Application for registration according to Article 5 and Article 17(2)

‘RISO DI BARAGGIA BIELLESE E VERCELLESE’

EC No: IT/PDO/005/0337/26.02.2004

PDO ( X ) PGI ( )

This summary has been drawn up for information only. For full details, interested parties are invited to consult the full version of the product specification obtainable from the national authorities indicated in section 1 or from the European Commission (1).

1.   Responsible department in the Member State:

| Name: | Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via XX Settembre n. 20 — I-00187 Roma |
| Tel.: | (39-06) 481 99 68 |
| Fax: | (39-06) 42 01 31 26 |
| e-mail: | qtc3@politicheagricole.it |

Name:

Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali

Address:

Via XX Settembre n. 20 — I-00187 Roma

Tel.:

(39-06) 481 99 68

Fax:

(39-06) 42 01 31 26

e-mail:

qtc3@politicheagricole.it

2.   Applicant group:

| Name: | Associazione Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Via F.lli Bandiera, 16 — c/o Consorzio di Bonifica della Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese — I-13100 Vercelli |
| Tel.: | (39-0161) 28 38 11 |
| Fax: | (39-0161) 25 74 25 |
| e-mail: | — |
| Composition: | Producers/processors ( X ) Other ( ) |

Name:

Associazione Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese

Address:

Via F.lli Bandiera, 16 — c/o Consorzio di Bonifica della Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese — I-13100 Vercelli

Tel.:

(39-0161) 28 38 11

Fax:

(39-0161) 25 74 25

e-mail:

—

Composition:

Producers/processors ( X ) Other ( )

3.   Type of product:

Group 1.6 — Fresh or processed Annex II fruit and vegetables — Rice

4.   Specification (summary of requirements under Article 4(2))

4.1   Name: ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’

4.2   Description: The PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ exclusively denotes the rice product obtained by processing rough rice into ‘whole-grain’, ‘white’ and ‘parboiled’ rice.

The varieties of rice grown are those listed and described below:

In addition to the above parameters, the biometric properties and physio-chemical characteristics identifying and defining the varieties of rice concerned are set out below.

4.3   Geographical area: The defined area for the protected designation of origin ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ is in the North-East of Piedmont, comprising the following municipalities: Albano Vercellese, Arborio, Balocco, Brusnengo, Buronzo, Carisio, Casanova Elvo, Castelletto Cervo, Cavaglià, Collobiano, Dorzano, Formigliana, Gattinara, Ghislarengo, Gifflenga, Greggio, Lenta, Massazza, Masserano, Mottalciata, Oldenico, Rovasenda, Roasio, Salussola, San Giacomo Vercellese, Santhià, Villanova Biellese and Villarboit in the Provinces of Biella and Vercelli.

4.4   Proof of origin: Each stage of the production process must be monitored by the inspection body referred to in 4.7, according to the provisions set out in the monitoring plan, with all inputs and outputs recorded. This, along with the compilation of specific lists managed by the inspection body of the land registry parcels in which the production, producers, packagers are located, and timely notification to the inspection body of the quantities produced, packaged and labelled ensures product traceability. All natural and legal persons recorded in the lists may be subject to checks by the monitoring body, according to the terms of the production specification and the corresponding monitoring plan.

4.5   Method of production: The product specification states that, inter alia, any fertilisation used must be for the purpose of producing healthy and perfectly ripe produce. The use of nitrate fertilisers and composts or fertilising mixes containing heavy metals is prohibited. Without prejudice to full compliance with the applicable rules governing the use of plant health care, fungicide and insecticide crop treatments must be carried out at least 40 days before harvesting. The seed required to produce the crop must be a seed product certified by E.N.S.E. to guarantee purity of variety, germination quality and the absence of fungal parasites.

Processes of drying rough rice must be carried out using methods that avoid or minimise contamination of the rice hull from any fuel residues and external odours. Indirect heat dryers are preferable, possibly fuelled by methane, LPG or the like.

Rough rice in storage or sold for processing must not have a moisture content of more than 14 %.

When storing rough rice, rice farmers must take all steps to minimise the presence of animal or parasite funguses and abnormal fermentation. At the end of the summer, and in any case before the rough rice is harvested and then stored, the following processes must be carried out in storage barns or units, silos and adjacent areas:

The following treatments of rough rice are permitted:

To prepare whole-grain rice or for further refined produce

Dehusking or pearling — designed to remove the glumellae of rice grain husks, after which the rice is measured.

To prepare white rice

Refining or milling — designed to remove the cellular pericarp layers from the rice grain surface through abrasion. These processes must be carried out to produce a level of refining defined as 2nd grade.

The refining processes must follow methods designed to prevent the grains from displaying micro fractures.

4.6   Link: The production area as defined in 4.3 is made up of one core zone characterised by the difficulty of levelling land due to its particular clay and iron-rich structure, which leads to uneven levels of submersion. The climate is another feature, characterised by rather cool summer months and frequent thermal inversions due to the winds blowing from the mountains. In addition, cold water sources in the area, located at the foot of the Alps, make it the first to be irrigated by mountain springs.

As a result of these characteristics of the production area, a feature of ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ is that it is highly suitable for cooking, has a superior consistency and low glutinosity. These characteristics are unanimously recognised by consumers and are partly due to lower yields and lower growing cycles than varieties from other areas.

Ever since the early 1900s, rice — a historic crop in Baraggia — also had symbolic use in public events, including sporting events, especially cycling, used by the champions Coppi, Bartali and Magni.

The diversity of Baraggia and its rice was described for about 50 years in the ‘Giornale di Risicoltura’ (journal of rice growing), which was published monthly between 1912 and 1952 by the former Institute for Experimental Rice Growing in Vercelli, which often published technical-scientific articles demonstrating the particular features of the Baraggia area and the rice produced there. In 1931 this Institute acquired a rice producer in the municipality of Villarboit (centre of the rice area in Baraggia) and used it as a research centre for the purpose of perfecting the specific features of production in the Baraggia area. In 1952 this monthly journal gave way to the publication ‘Il Riso’ (Rice), published by the ‘Ente Nazionale Risi’ (National Rice Body), in which several articles mentioned the specific qualitative features of rice produced in this area.

Rice was grown in the area defined in Baraggia in the early 17th century and was also recorded in notarised documents in 1606 in the Municipality of Salussola, which is part of the defined area.

4.7   Inspection body:

| Name: | Ente Nazionale Risi |
| --- | --- |
| Address: | Piazza Pio XI — I-20123 Milano |
| Tel.: | (39-02) 885 51 11 |
| Fax: | — |
| e-mail: | — |

Name:

Ente Nazionale Risi

Address:

Piazza Pio XI — I-20123 Milano

Tel.:

(39-02) 885 51 11

Fax:

—

e-mail:

—

4.8   Labelling: To be eligible for consumption, the product PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ must bear on the packaging the specific name of the variety grown in the area (not an equivalent, even if authorised under the applicable rules). Various types of processing and packaging are carried out depending on the end market. Packages of PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ released for consumption must be of the following weights in Kg: 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 10.0 or 25.0 and must be presented in bags, small bags of fabric or plastic that are suitable — in health and safety terms — for containing food products or boxes of various materials provided they are authorised under the rules governing the health and safety conditions for food products.

The following names must be printed on the packaging:

The EU PDO mark;

The logo of PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’, which must be clearly distinguishable on the packaging by the size and colour, together with the PDO mark as above;

the rice mill and husking plant logos, company names and name of variety.

Promotional or misleading information is not authorised.

Products prepared using PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’, even after processing, may be released for consumption in packaging bearing the name of the PDO without affixing the EU logo provided that:

the protected designation product certified as such is the sole component of the product group concerned;

users of the protected designation product are authorised by the holders of the intellectual property right concerned, grouped together in a syndicate and assigned a supervisory role by the Ministry for Agricultural Policy. The syndicate will be responsible for registering them and keeping watch on correct use of the protected designation. In the absence of a supervisory syndicate, these functions will be carried out by the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry Policy, as the national authority responsible for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92.

The logo of the PDO ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’ is a circle with three grains of straight, white rice depicted side-by-side at the base, as they are usually presented and visible to the consumer. The colours of the logo are set out in detail in the production specification. At the top of the grains is the tiny gap where the embryo of the rice caryopsis is located before refining.

The white background to the logo contains the image of the Monte Rosa massif. The mountain's glaciers are the source of the water which directly and primarily irrigate the Baraggia rice crops, which produce the rice exclusively designated ‘Riso di Baraggia Biellese e Vercellese’.

In addition to the logo, the top part bears the name ‘Riso di Baraggia’ and the lower part the represented area, Biellese e Vercellese.

4.9   National requirements: —

---

(1)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, Agricultural Product Quality Policy, B-1049 Brussels.

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/15

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(2006/C 291/06)

| Date of adoption of the decision | 12.10.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 131/06 |
| Member State | Netherlands |
| Title | Groeifaciliteit |
| Legal basis | Wet van 29 februari 1996, houdende vaststelling van regels inzake de verstrekking van subsidies door de Minister van Economische Zaken (Kaderwet EZ-subsidies); |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Small and medium-sized enterprises |
| Form of aid | Guarantee |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 900 million |
| Intensity | Measure does not constitute aid |
| Duration | 1.6.2006 — 1.6.2012 |
| Economic sectors | All sectors |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministry of Economic Affairs |
| Bezuidenhoutseweg 20 |
| Postbus 20101 |
| 2500 EC Den Haag |
| Nederland |

Date of adoption of the decision

12.10.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 131/06

Member State

Netherlands

Title

Groeifaciliteit

Legal basis

Wet van 29 februari 1996, houdende vaststelling van regels inzake de verstrekking van subsidies door de Minister van Economische Zaken (Kaderwet EZ-subsidies);

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Small and medium-sized enterprises

Form of aid

Guarantee

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 900 million

Intensity

Measure does not constitute aid

Duration

1.6.2006 — 1.6.2012

Economic sectors

All sectors

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministry of Economic Affairs

Bezuidenhoutseweg 20

Postbus 20101

2500 EC Den Haag

Nederland

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 12.10.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 349/06 |
| Member State | France |
| Region | Ile-de-France |
| Title | Aide à la formation en faveur de Rioglass France SA |
| Legal basis | Protocole d'accord pour la formation des salariés Thomson Vidéoglass Bagneaux-sur-Loing du 21 octobre 2005 |
| Type of measure | Individual aid |
| Objective | Training |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 1,5 million |
| Duration (period) | 1.11.2005 — 1.4.2007 |
| Economic sectors | Manufacturing industry |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministère de l'emploi, de la cohésion sociale et du logement + Conseil régional Ile-de-France |

Date of adoption of the decision

12.10.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 349/06

Member State

France

Region

Ile-de-France

Title

Aide à la formation en faveur de Rioglass France SA

Legal basis

Protocole d'accord pour la formation des salariés Thomson Vidéoglass Bagneaux-sur-Loing du 21 octobre 2005

Type of measure

Individual aid

Objective

Training

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 1,5 million

Duration (period)

1.11.2005 — 1.4.2007

Economic sectors

Manufacturing industry

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministère de l'emploi, de la cohésion sociale et du logement + Conseil régional Ile-de-France

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 11.1.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 613/05 |
| Member State | Czech Republic |
| Title | Změna úlevy spotřební daně a provozních subvencí na bionaftu (Česká republika) |
| Legal basis | Nařízení vlády ze 7. prosince 2005, kterým se mění nařízení vlády č. 148/2005 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Environmental protection |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Annual budget: EUR 77 million; |
| Duration (period) | 1.1.2006 — 31.12.2006 |
| Economic sectors | Energy |

Date of adoption of the decision

11.1.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 613/05

Member State

Czech Republic

Title

Změna úlevy spotřební daně a provozních subvencí na bionaftu (Česká republika)

Legal basis

Nařízení vlády ze 7. prosince 2005, kterým se mění nařízení vlády č. 148/2005

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Environmental protection

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Annual budget: EUR 77 million;

Duration (period)

1.1.2006 — 31.12.2006

Economic sectors

Energy

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 20.10.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N. 625/06 |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | Piemonte |
| Title | Bando regionale sulla ricerca industriale e attività di sviluppo precompetitivo |
| Legal basis | Determinazione dirigenziale n. 501 del 25.7.2006 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Research and development |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 32 million |
| Intensity | 50 % |
| Duration | 31.12.2008 |
| Economic sectors | All sectors |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Regione Piemonte |
| Piazza Castello 165 |
| Torino (Italia) |

Date of adoption of the decision

20.10.2006

Reference number of the aid

N. 625/06

Member State

Italy

Region

Piemonte

Title

Bando regionale sulla ricerca industriale e attività di sviluppo precompetitivo

Legal basis

Determinazione dirigenziale n. 501 del 25.7.2006

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Research and development

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 32 million

Intensity

50 %

Duration

31.12.2008

Economic sectors

All sectors

Name and address of the granting authority

Regione Piemonte

Piazza Castello 165

Torino (Italia)

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 19.1.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 643/05 |
| Member State | Netherlands |
| Title | Milieu-investeringsaftrek (MIA) |
| Legal basis | Artikel 3.42a van de Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Environmental protection |
| Form of aid | Tax base reduction |
| Budget | Annual budget: EUR 91 — 123 million |
| Duration (period) | 1.12.2006 — 31.12.2009 |

Date of adoption of the decision

19.1.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 643/05

Member State

Netherlands

Title

Milieu-investeringsaftrek (MIA)

Legal basis

Artikel 3.42a van de Wet inkomstenbelasting 2001

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Environmental protection

Form of aid

Tax base reduction

Budget

Annual budget: EUR 91 — 123 million

Duration (period)

1.12.2006 — 31.12.2009

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 26.9.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid No | N. 51/06 |
| Member State | Italy |
| Title | Poste Italiane SpA: compensation by the Member State for universal postal service obligations 2000-2005 |
| Legal basis | Contratto di programma 2000-2002 tra il Ministero del tesoro, del bilancio e della programmazione economica e le Poste italiane SpA, Contratto di programma 2003-2005 tra il Ministero delle comunicazioni di concerto con il Ministero dell'economia e delle finanze e la società per azioni Poste Italiane |
| Type of measure | Aid compatible |
| Objective | SGEI |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | EUR 2,4 billion over the period |
| Duration | 2000-2005 |
| Economic sectors | Postal services |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministero dell'economia e delle finanze |

Date of adoption of the decision

26.9.2006

Aid No

N. 51/06

Member State

Italy

Title

Poste Italiane SpA: compensation by the Member State for universal postal service obligations 2000-2005

Legal basis

Contratto di programma 2000-2002 tra il Ministero del tesoro, del bilancio e della programmazione economica e le Poste italiane SpA, Contratto di programma 2003-2005 tra il Ministero delle comunicazioni di concerto con il Ministero dell'economia e delle finanze e la società per azioni Poste Italiane

Type of measure

Aid compatible

Objective

SGEI

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

EUR 2,4 billion over the period

Duration

2000-2005

Economic sectors

Postal services

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministero dell'economia e delle finanze

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 8.11.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | NN 54/06 |
| Member State | Czech Republic |
| Region | Olomouc |
| Title | Vysoká škola logistiky, o.p.s |
| Legal basis | Ad hoc contracts |
| Type of measure | Measure does not constitute aid |
| Budget | EUR 229 000 |
| Intensity | Measure does not constitute aid |
| Economic sectors | Education |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Magistrát města Přerova, Česká republika |

Date of adoption of the decision

8.11.2006

Reference number of the aid

NN 54/06

Member State

Czech Republic

Region

Olomouc

Title

Vysoká škola logistiky, o.p.s

Legal basis

Ad hoc contracts

Type of measure

Measure does not constitute aid

Budget

EUR 229 000

Intensity

Measure does not constitute aid

Economic sectors

Education

Name and address of the granting authority

Magistrát města Přerova, Česká republika

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/19

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Notice of initiation of a partial interim review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of okoumé plywood originating in the People's Republic of China

(2006/C 291/07)

The Commission has received a request for a partial interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’) (1), as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 (2). The review is limited to the examination of the product scope.

The request was lodged by the European Federation of the Plywood Industry (FEIC) (‘the applicant’).

1.   Product

The product under review is okoumé plywood, defined as plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm thickness, with at least one outer ply of okoumé not coated by a permanent film of other materials originating in the People's Republic of China (‘the product concerned’), currently classifiable within CN code ex 4412 13 10. This CN code is given only for information.

2.   Existing measures

The measures currently in force are a definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1942/2004 (3) on imports of okoumé plywood, defined as plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm thickness, with at least one outer ply of okoumé not coated by a permanent film of other materials, falling within CN code ex 4412 13 10 (TARIC code 4412131010) and originating in the People's Republic of China.

3.   Grounds for the review

The applicant has provided sufficient evidence that the scope of the existing measures is no longer sufficient to counteract the dumping which is causing the injury.

The applicant alleges that new product types have appeared on the market such as plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood, each ply not exceeding 6 mm thickness, with at least one outer ply of bintangor, red canarium, kedondong or certain other species, not coated by a permanent film of other materials, falling within CN code ex 4412 13 10, ex 4412 13 90 and ex 4412 14 00. These CN codes are only given for information. These products should be included in the scope of the measures on the grounds that they share the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and end uses as the product covered by the existing measures. Both the product concerned and the new product types should therefore be considered as a single product.

4.   Procedure

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that sufficient evidence exists to justify the initiation of a partial interim review, the Commission hereby initiates a review in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation, limited in scope to the definition of the product concerned. The investigation will assess the need for the amendment of the scope of the existing measures.

(a)   Questionnaires

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the applicant, to the importers, to the users, to exporting producers in the People's Republic of China and to the authorities of the exporting country concerned. This information and supporting evidence should reach the Commission within the time limit set in point 5(a).

(b)   Collection of information and holding of hearings

All interested parties are hereby invited to make their views known, submit information other than questionnaire replies and to provide supporting evidence. This information and supporting evidence must reach the Commission within the time limit set in point 5(a).

Furthermore, the Commission may hear interested parties, provided that they make a request showing that there are particular reasons why they should be heard. This request must be made within the time limit set in point 5(b).

5.   Time limits

(a)   For parties to make themselves known, to submit questionnaire replies and any other information

All interested parties, if their representations are to be taken into account during the investigation, must make themselves known by contacting the Commission, present their views and submit questionnaire replies or any other information within 40 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified. Attention is drawn to the fact that the exercise of most procedural rights set out in the basic Regulation depends on the party's making itself known within the aforementioned period.

(b)   Hearings

All interested parties may also apply to be heard by the Commission within the same 40-day time limit.

6.   Written submissions, questionnaire replies and correspondence

All submissions and requests made by interested parties must be made in writing (not in electronic format, unless otherwise specified) and must indicate the name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers of the interested party. All written submissions, including the information requested in this notice, questionnaire replies and correspondence provided by interested parties on a confidential basis shall be labelled as ‘Limited’ (4) and, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation, shall be accompanied by a non-confidential version, which will be labelled ‘FOR INSPECTION BY INTERESTED PARTIES’.

Commission address for correspondence:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate General for Trade |
| Directorate B |
| Office: J-79 5/16 |
| B-1049 Brussels |
| Fax (32-2) 295 65 05 |

European Commission

Directorate General for Trade

Directorate B

Office: J-79 5/16

B-1049 Brussels

Fax (32-2) 295 65 05

7.   Non-co-operation

In cases in which any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, findings, affirmative or negative, may be made in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available.

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information shall be disregarded and use may be made, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, of the facts available. If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially, and use of facts available is made, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

8.   Schedule of the investigation

The investigation will be concluded, according to Article 11(5) of the basic Regulation within 15 months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 17.

(3)  OJ L 336, 12.11.2004, p. 4.

(4)  This means that the document is for internal use only. It is protected pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). It is a confidential document pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement).

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| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/21

---

Value added tax (VAT)

(exempt investment gold)

List of gold coins meeting the criteria established in article 26B(a) (ii) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 As amended by Council Directive 98/80/EC of 12 October 1998 (Special scheme for investment gold)

(2006/C 291/08)

Valid for the year 2007

EXPLANATORY NOTE

| a) | This list reflects the contributions sent by Member States to the Commission within the deadline set by Article 26b (A) of the Sixth Directive (as amended by Directive 98/80/EC, of 12 October 1998). |
| --- | --- |

a)

This list reflects the contributions sent by Member States to the Commission within the deadline set by Article 26b (A) of the Sixth Directive (as amended by Directive 98/80/EC, of 12 October 1998).

| b) | The coins included in this list are considered to fulfil the criteria of Article 26b and therefore will be treated as investment gold in those Member States. As a result their supply is exempt from VAT for the whole of the 2007 calendar year. |
| --- | --- |

b)

The coins included in this list are considered to fulfil the criteria of Article 26b and therefore will be treated as investment gold in those Member States. As a result their supply is exempt from VAT for the whole of the 2007 calendar year.

| c) | The exemption will apply to all issues of the given coin in this list, except to issues of coins with a purity lower than 900 thousandths. |
| --- | --- |

c)

The exemption will apply to all issues of the given coin in this list, except to issues of coins with a purity lower than 900 thousandths.

| d) | However, if a coin does not appear in this list, its supply will still be exempt where the coin meets the criteria for the exemption laid down in the Sixth Directive. |
| --- | --- |

d)

However, if a coin does not appear in this list, its supply will still be exempt where the coin meets the criteria for the exemption laid down in the Sixth Directive.

| e) | The list is in alphabetical order, by names of countries and denominations of coins. Within the same category of coins, the listing follows the increasing value of the currency. |
| --- | --- |

e)

The list is in alphabetical order, by names of countries and denominations of coins. Within the same category of coins, the listing follows the increasing value of the currency.

| f) | In the list the denomination of the coins reflects the currency shown on the coins. However, where the currency on the coins is not shown in roman script, where possible, its denomination in the list is shown in parenthesis. |
| --- | --- |

f)

In the list the denomination of the coins reflects the currency shown on the coins. However, where the currency on the coins is not shown in roman script, where possible, its denomination in the list is shown in parenthesis.

| COUNTRY OF ISSUE | COINS |
| --- | --- |
| AFGHANISTAN | (20 AFGHANI)
  10 000 AFGHANI
  ( AMANI)
  (1 AMANI)
  (2 AMANI)
  (4 GRAMS)
  (8 GRAMS)
  1 TILLA
  2 TILLAS |
| ALBANIA | 50 LEKE
  100 LEKE
  200 LEKE
  500 LEKE |
| ALDERNEY | 25 POUNDS |
| ANDORRA | 50 DINERS
  100 DINERS
  250 DINERS
  1 SOVEREIGN |
| ANGUILLA | 5 DOLLARS
  10 DOLLARS
  20 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS |
| ARGENTINA | 1 ARGENTINO |
| AUSTRALIA | 5 DOLLARS
  15 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  150 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS
  500 DOLLARS
  1 000 DOLLARS
  2 500 DOLLARS
  3 000 DOLLARS
  10 000 DOLLARS
  1/2 SOVEREIGN (= POUND) |
| AUSTRIA | 20 CORONA (= 20 KRONEN)
  100 CORONA (= 100 KRONEN)
  ( 4 DUCATS )
  10 EURO
  25 EURO
  50 EURO
  100 EURO
  4 FLORIN = 10 FRANCS (= 4 GULDEN)
  8 FLORIN = 20 FRANCS (= 8 GULDEN)
  25 SCHILLING
  100 SCHILLING
  200 SCHILLING
  1 000 SCHILLING
  2 000 SCHILLING |
| BAHAMAS | 10 DOLLARS
  20 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  150 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS
  2 500 DOLLARS |
| BELGIUM | 10 ECU
  25 ECU
  50 ECU
  100 ECU
  100 EURO
  5 000 FRANCS |
| BELIZE | 25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| BERMUDA | 10 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  60 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| BHUTAN | 1 SERTUM
  2 SERTUMS
  5 SERTUMS |
| BOLIVIA | 4 000 PESOS BOLIVIANOS |
| BOTSWANA | 5 PULA
  150 PULA
  10 THEBE |
| BRAZIL | 300 CRUZEIROS
  (4 000 REIS)
  ( 5 000 REIS)
  ( 6 400 REIS)
  (10 000 REIS)
  (20 000 REIS) |
| BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS | 100 DOLLARS |
| BULGARIA | 10 LEVA
  100 LEVA |
| BURUNDI | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| CANADA | 1 DOLLAR
  2 DOLLARS
  5 DOLLARS
  10 DOLLARS
  20 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  175 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS
  350 DOLLARS |
| CAYMAN ISLANDS | 25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| CHAD | 3 000 FRANCS
  5 000 FRANCS
  10 000 FRANCS
  20 000 FRANCS |
| CHILE | 2 PESOS
  5 PESOS
  10 PESOS
  20 PESOS
  50 PESOS
  100 PESOS
  200 PESOS |
| CHINA | 5 (YUAN)
  10 (YUAN)
  25 (YUAN)
  50 (YUAN)
  100 (YUAN)
  150 (YUAN)
  200 (YUAN)
  250 (YUAN)
  300 (YUAN)
  400 (YUAN)
  450 (YUAN)
  500 (YUAN)
  1 000 (YUAN) |
| COLOMBIA | 1 PESO
  2 PESOS
  2 1/2 PESOS
  5 PESOS
  10 PESOS
  20 PESOS
  100 PESOS
  200 PESOS
  300 PESOS
  500 PESOS
  1 000 PESOS
  1 500 PESOS
  2 000 PESOS
  15 000 PESOS |
| CONGO | 10 FRANCS
  20 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| COOK ISLANDS | 100 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| COSTA RICA | 5 COLONES
  10 COLONES
  20 COLONES
  50 COLONES
  100 COLONES
  200 COLONES
  1 500 COLONES
  5 000 COLONES
  25 000 COLONES |
| CUBA | 4 PESOS
  5 PESOS
  20 PESOS
  50 PESOS
  100 PESOS |
| CYPRUS | 50 POUNDS |
| CZECH REPUBLIC | 1 000 KORUN (1 000 Kč)
  2 000 KORUN (2 000 Kč)
  2 500 KORUN (2 500 Kč)
  5 000 KORUN (5 000 Kč)
  10 000 KORUN (10 000 Kč) |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | 1 DUKÁT
  2 DUKÁT
  5 DUKÁT
  10 DUKÁT |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | 30 PESOS
  100 PESOS
  200 PESOS
  250 PESOS |
| ECUADOR | 1 CONDOR
  10 SUCRES |
| EL SALVADOR | 25 COLONES
  50 COLONES
  100 COLONES
  200 COLONES
  250 COLONES |
| EQUATORIAL GUINEA | 250 PESETAS
  500 PESETAS
  750 PESETAS
  1 000 PESETAS
  5 000 PESETAS |
| ETHIOPIA | 400 BIRR
  600 BIRR
  10 (DOLLARS)
  20 (DOLLARS)
  50 (DOLLARS)
  100 (DOLLARS)
  200 (DOLLARS) |
| FIJI | 200 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| FRANCE | 10 EURO
  20 EURO
  50 EURO
  5 FRANCS
  40 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| GABON | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS
  1 000 FRANCS
  3 000 FRANCS
  5 000 FRANCS
  10 000 FRANCS
  20 000 FRANCS |
| GAMBIA | 200 DALASIS
  500 DALASIS
  1 000 DALASIS |
| GIBRALTAR | 2 CROWNS
  25 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  100 POUNDS
  1/25 ROYAL
  1/10 ROYAL
  1/5 ROYAL
  1/2 ROYAL
  1 ROYAL |
| GUATAMALA | 5 QUETZALES
  10 QUETZALES
  20 QUETZALES |
| GUERNSEY | 1 POUND
  5 POUNDS
  10 POUNDS
  25 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  100 POUNDS |
| GUINEA | 1 000 FRANCS
  2 000 FRANCS
  5 000 FRANCS
  10 000 FRANCS |
| HAITI | 20 GOURDES
  50 GOURDES
  100 GOURDES
  200 GOURDES
  500 GOURDES
  1 000 GOURDES |
| HONDURAS | 200 LEMPIRAS
  500 LEMPIRAS |
| HONG KONG | 1 000 DOLLARS |
| HUNGARY | 1 DUKAT
  8 FORINT = 20 FRANCS
  50 FORINT
  100 FORINT
  200 FORINT
  500 FORINT
  1 000 FORINT
  5 000 FORINT
  10 000 FORINT
  20 000 FORINT
  50 000 FORINT
  100 000 FORINT
  20 KORONA
  100 KORONA |
| ICELAND | 500 KRONUR |
| INDIA | 1 MOHUR
  15 RUPEES
  1 SOVEREIGN |
| INDONESIA | 2 000 RUPIAH
  5 000 RUPIAH
  10 000 RUPIAH
  20 000 RUPIAH
  25 000 RUPIAH
  100 000 RUPIAH
  200 000 RUPIAH |
| IRAN | (1/2 AZADI)
  (1 AZADI)
  (1/4 PAHLAVI)
  (1/2 PAHLAVI)
  (1 PAHLAVI)
  ( 2 1/2 PAHLAVI )
  (5 PAHLAVI)
  (10 PAHLAVI)
  500 RIALS
  750 RIALS
  1 000 RIALS
  2 000 RIALS |
| IRAQ | (5 DINARS)
  (50 DINARS)
  (100 DINARS) |
| ISLE OF MAN | 1/20 ANGEL
  1/10 ANGEL
  1/4 ANGEL
  1/2 ANGEL
  1 ANGEL
  5 ANGEL
  10 ANGEL
  15 ANGEL
  20 ANGEL
  1/25 CROWN
  1/10 CROWN
  1/5 CROWN
  1/2 CROWN
  1 CROWN
  1 POUND
  2 POUNDS
  5 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  ( 1/2 SOVEREIGN )
  (1 SOVEREIGN)
  (2 SOVEREIGNS)
  (5 SOVEREIGNS) |
| ISRAEL | 20 LIROT
  50 LIROT
  100 LIROT
  200 LIROT
  500 LIROT
  1 000 LIROT
  5 000 LIROT
  5 NEW SHEQALIM
  10 NEW SHEQALIM
  20 NEW SHEQALIM
  5 SHEQALIM
  10 SHEQALIM
  500 SHEQEL |
| IVORY COAST | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| JAMAICA | 100 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| JERSEY | 1 POUND
  2 POUNDS
  5 POUNDS
  10 POUNDS
  20 POUNDS
  25 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  100 POUNDS
  1 SOVEREIGN |
| JORDAN | 2 DINARS
  5 DINARS
  10 DINARS
  25 DINARS
  50 DINARS
  60 DINARS |
| KATANGA | 5 FRANCS |
| KENYA | 100 SHILLINGS
  250 SHILLINGS
  500 SHILLINGS |
| KIRIBATI | 150 DOLLARS |
| LATVIA | 100 LATUS |
| LESOTHO | 1 LOTI
  2 MALOTI
  4 MALOTI
  10 MALOTI
  20 MALOTI
  50 MALOTI
  100 MALOTI
  250 MALOTI
  500 MALOTI |
| LIBERIA | 12 DOLLARS
  20 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  30 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS |
| LUXEMBURG | 5 EURO
  20 FRANCS |
| MACAU | 500 PATACAS
  1 000 PATACAS |
| MALAWI | 250 KWACHA |
| MALAYSIA | 100 RINGGIT
  200 RINGGIT
  250 RINGGIT
  500 RINGGIT |
| MALI | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| MALTA | 5 (LIRI)
  10 (LIRI)
  20 (LIRI)
  25 (LIRI)
  50 (LIRI)
  100 (LIRI) |
| MARSHALL ISLANDS | 20 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  200 DOLLARS |
| MAURITIUS | 100 RUPEES
  200 RUPEES
  250 RUPEES
  500 RUPEES
  1 000 RUPEES |
| MEXICO | 2 PESOS
  2 1/2 PESOS
  5 PESOS
  10 PESOS
  20 PESOS
  50 PESOS
  250 PESOS
  500 PESOS
  1 000 PESOS
  2 000 PESOS
  1/20 ONZA
  1/10 ONZA
  1/4 ONZA
  1/2 ONZA
  1 ONZA |
| MONACO | 20 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS
  200 FRANCS |
| MONGOLIA | 750 ( TUGRIK )
  1 000 ( TUGRIK ) |
| NEPAL | 1 ASARPHI
  1 000 RUPEES |
| NETHERLANDS | ( 2 DUKAAT )
  1 GULDEN
  5 GULDEN |
| NETHERLANDS ANTILLES | 5 GULDEN
  10 GULDEN
  50 GULDEN
  100 GULDEN
  300 GULDEN |
| NEW ZEALAND | 10 DOLLARS
  150 DOLLARS |
| NICARAGUA | 50 CORDOBAS |
| NIGER | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| NORWAY | 1 500 KRONER |
| OMAN | 25 OMANI RIALS
  75 OMANI RIALS |
| PAKISTAN | 3 000 RUPEES |
| PANAMA | 100 BALBOAS
  500 BALBOAS |
| PAPUA NEW GUINEA | 100 KINA |
| PERU | 1/5 LIBRA
  1/2 LIBRA
  1 LIBRA
  5 SOLES
  10 SOLES
  20 SOLES
  50 SOLES
  100 SOLES |
| PHILIPPINES | 1 000 PISO
  1 500 PISO
  5 000 PISO |
| POLAND | 50 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)
  100 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)
  100 ZLOTY
  200 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)
  200 ZLOTY
  500 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle) |
| PORTUGAL | 100 ESCUDOS
  200 ESCUDOS
  500 ESCUDOS
  10 000 REIS |
| RHODESIA | 10 SHILLINGS
  1 POUND
  5 POUNDS |
| RUSSIA | 25 ROUBLES
  50 (ROUBLES)
  200 (ROUBLES) |
| RWANDA | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| SAN MARINO | 1 SCUDO
  2 SCUDI
  5 SCUDI
  10 SCUDI |
| SAUDI ARABIA | 1 GUINEA (= 1 SAUDI POUND) |
| SENEGAL | 10 FRANCS
  25 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS
  250 FRANCS
  500 FRANCS
  1 000 FRANCS
  2 500 FRANCS |
| SERBIA | 10 DINARA |
| SEYCHELLES | 1 000 RUPEES
  1 500 RUPEES |
| SIERRA LEONE | 1/4 GOLDE
  1/2 GOLDE
  1 GOLDE
  5 GOLDE
  10 GOLDE
  20 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS
  500 DOLLARS |
| SINGAPORE | 1 DOLLAR
  2 DOLLARS
  5 DOLLARS
  10 DOLLARS
  20 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS
  150 DOLLARS
  250 DOLLARS
  500 DOLLARS |
| SLOVENIA | 5 000 TOLARS
  20 000 TOLARS |
| SOLOMON ISLANDS | 10 DOLLARS
  25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS
  100 DOLLARS |
| SOMALIA | 20 SHILLINGS
  50 SHILLINGS
  100 SHILLINGS
  200 SHILLINGS
  500 SHILLINGS
  1 500 SHILLINGS |
| SOUTH AFRICA | 1/10 KRUGERRAND
  1/4 KRUGERRAND
  1/2 KRUGERRAND
  1 KRUGERRAND
  1/10 oz NATURA
  1/4 oz NATURA
  1/2 oz NATURA
  1 oz NATURA
  1/10 PROTEA
  1 PROTEA
  1 RAND
  2 RAND
  1/2 SOVEREIGN (= POUND)
  1 SOVEREIGN (= 1 POUND) |
| SOUTH KOREA | 2 500 WON
  20 000 WON
  30 000 WON
  50 000 WON |
| SPAIN | 10 (ESCUDOS)
  10 PESETAS
  5 000 PESETAS
  10 000 PESETAS
  20 000 PESETAS
  40 000 PESETAS
  80 000 PESETAS
  100 (REALES) |
| SUDAN | 25 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  100 POUNDS |
| SURINAM | 100 GULDEN |
| SWAZILAND | 2 EMALANGENI
  5 EMALANGENI
  10 EMALANGENI
  20 EMALANGENI
  25 EMALANGENI
  50 EMALANGENI
  100 EMALAGENI
  250 EMALAGENI
  1 LILANGENI |
| SWITZERLAND | 10 FRANCS
  50 FRANCS
  100 FRANCS |
| SYRIA | (1/2 POUND)
  ( 1 POUND ) |
| TANZANIA | 1 500 SHILINGI
  2 000 SHILINGI |
| THAILAND | (150 BAHT)
  (300 BAHT)
  (400 BAHT)
  (600 BAHT)
  (800 BAHT)
  (1 500 BAHT)
  (2 500 BAHT)
  (3 000 BAHT)
  (4 000 BAHT)
  (5 000 BAHT)
  (6 000 BAHT) |
| TONGA | 1/2 HAU
  1 HAU
  5 HAU
  1/4 KOULA
  1/2 KOULA
  1 KOULA |
| TUNISIA | 2 DINARS
  5 DINARS
  10 DINARS
  20 DINARS
  40 DINARS
  75 DINARS
  10 FRANCS
  20 FRANCS
  5 PIASTRES |
| TURKEY | (25 KURUSH) (= 25 PIASTRES )
  (50 KURUSH) (= 50 PIASTRES)
  (100 KURUSH) (= 100 PIASTRES)
  (250 KURUSH) (= 250 PIASTRES)
  1/2 LIRA
  1 LIRA
  500 LIRA
  1 000 LIRA
  10 000 LIRA |
| TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS | 100 CROWNS |
| TUVALU | 50 DOLLARS |
| UGANDA | 50 SHILLINGS
  100 SHILLINGS
  500 SHILLINGS
  1 000 SHILLINGS |
| UNITED ARAB EMIRATES | (500 DIRHAMS)
  (750 DIRHAMS)
  (1 000 DIRHAMS) |
| UNITED KINGDOM | (1/3 GUINEA)
  (1/2 GUINEA)
  50 PENCE
  2 POUNDS
  5 POUNDS
  10 POUNDS
  25 POUNDS
  50 POUNDS
  100 POUNDS
  (2 SOVEREIGNS)
  (5 SOVEREIGNS) |
| URUGUAY | 5 000 NUEVO PESOS
  20 000 NUEVO PESOS
  5 PESOS |
| USA | 25 DOLLARS
  50 DOLLARS |
| VATICAN | 20 LIRE |
| VENEZUELA | (20 BOLIVARES)
  (100 BOLIVARES)
  1 000 BOLIVARES
  3 000 BOLIVARES
  5 000 BOLIVARES
  10 000 BOLIVARES
  5 VENEZOLANOS |
| WESTERN SAMOA | 50 TALA
  100 TALA |
| YUGOSLAVIA | 20 DINARA
  100 DINARA
  200 DINARA
  500 DINARA
  1 000 DINARA
  1 500 DINARA
  2 000 DINARA
  2 500 DINARA |
| ZAIRE | 100 ZAIRES |
| ZAMBIA | 250 KWACHA |

COUNTRY OF ISSUE

COINS

AFGHANISTAN

(20 AFGHANI)

10 000 AFGHANI

(Formula AMANI)

(1 AMANI)

(2 AMANI)

(4 GRAMS)

(8 GRAMS)

1 TILLA

2 TILLAS

ALBANIA

50 LEKE

100 LEKE

200 LEKE

500 LEKE

ALDERNEY

25 POUNDS

ANDORRA

50 DINERS

100 DINERS

250 DINERS

1 SOVEREIGN

ANGUILLA

5 DOLLARS

10 DOLLARS

20 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

ARGENTINA

1 ARGENTINO

AUSTRALIA

5 DOLLARS

15 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

150 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

500 DOLLARS

1 000 DOLLARS

2 500 DOLLARS

3 000 DOLLARS

10 000 DOLLARS

1/2 SOVEREIGN (= Formula POUND)

AUSTRIA

20 CORONA (= 20 KRONEN)

100 CORONA (= 100 KRONEN)

( 4 DUCATS )

10 EURO

25 EURO

50 EURO

100 EURO

4 FLORIN = 10 FRANCS (= 4 GULDEN)

8 FLORIN = 20 FRANCS (= 8 GULDEN)

25 SCHILLING

100 SCHILLING

200 SCHILLING

1 000 SCHILLING

2 000 SCHILLING

BAHAMAS

10 DOLLARS

20 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

150 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

2 500 DOLLARS

BELGIUM

10 ECU

25 ECU

50 ECU

100 ECU

100 EURO

5 000 FRANCS

BELIZE

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

BERMUDA

10 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

60 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

BHUTAN

1 SERTUM

2 SERTUMS

5 SERTUMS

BOLIVIA

4 000 PESOS BOLIVIANOS

BOTSWANA

5 PULA

150 PULA

10 THEBE

BRAZIL

300 CRUZEIROS

(4 000 REIS)

( 5 000 REIS)

( 6 400 REIS)

(10 000 REIS)

(20 000 REIS)

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

100 DOLLARS

BULGARIA

10 LEVA

100 LEVA

BURUNDI

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

CANADA

1 DOLLAR

2 DOLLARS

5 DOLLARS

10 DOLLARS

20 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

175 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

350 DOLLARS

CAYMAN ISLANDS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

CHAD

3 000 FRANCS

5 000 FRANCS

10 000 FRANCS

20 000 FRANCS

CHILE

2 PESOS

5 PESOS

10 PESOS

20 PESOS

50 PESOS

100 PESOS

200 PESOS

CHINA

5 (YUAN)

10 (YUAN)

25 (YUAN)

50 (YUAN)

100 (YUAN)

150 (YUAN)

200 (YUAN)

250 (YUAN)

300 (YUAN)

400 (YUAN)

450 (YUAN)

500 (YUAN)

1 000 (YUAN)

COLOMBIA

1 PESO

2 PESOS

2 1/2 PESOS

5 PESOS

10 PESOS

20 PESOS

100 PESOS

200 PESOS

300 PESOS

500 PESOS

1 000 PESOS

1 500 PESOS

2 000 PESOS

15 000 PESOS

CONGO

10 FRANCS

20 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

COOK ISLANDS

100 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

COSTA RICA

5 COLONES

10 COLONES

20 COLONES

50 COLONES

100 COLONES

200 COLONES

1 500 COLONES

5 000 COLONES

25 000 COLONES

CUBA

4 PESOS

5 PESOS

20 PESOS

50 PESOS

100 PESOS

CYPRUS

50 POUNDS

CZECH REPUBLIC

1 000 KORUN (1 000 Kč)

2 000 KORUN (2 000 Kč)

2 500 KORUN (2 500 Kč)

5 000 KORUN (5 000 Kč)

10 000 KORUN (10 000 Kč)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1 DUKÁT

2 DUKÁT

5 DUKÁT

10 DUKÁT

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

30 PESOS

100 PESOS

200 PESOS

250 PESOS

ECUADOR

1 CONDOR

10 SUCRES

EL SALVADOR

25 COLONES

50 COLONES

100 COLONES

200 COLONES

250 COLONES

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

250 PESETAS

500 PESETAS

750 PESETAS

1 000 PESETAS

5 000 PESETAS

ETHIOPIA

400 BIRR

600 BIRR

10 (DOLLARS)

20 (DOLLARS)

50 (DOLLARS)

100 (DOLLARS)

200 (DOLLARS)

FIJI

200 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

FRANCE

10 EURO

20 EURO

50 EURO

5 FRANCS

40 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

GABON

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

1 000 FRANCS

3 000 FRANCS

5 000 FRANCS

10 000 FRANCS

20 000 FRANCS

GAMBIA

200 DALASIS

500 DALASIS

1 000 DALASIS

GIBRALTAR

2 CROWNS

25 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

100 POUNDS

1/25 ROYAL

1/10 ROYAL

1/5 ROYAL

1/2 ROYAL

1 ROYAL

GUATAMALA

5 QUETZALES

10 QUETZALES

20 QUETZALES

GUERNSEY

1 POUND

5 POUNDS

10 POUNDS

25 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

100 POUNDS

GUINEA

1 000 FRANCS

2 000 FRANCS

5 000 FRANCS

10 000 FRANCS

HAITI

20 GOURDES

50 GOURDES

100 GOURDES

200 GOURDES

500 GOURDES

1 000 GOURDES

HONDURAS

200 LEMPIRAS

500 LEMPIRAS

HONG KONG

1 000 DOLLARS

HUNGARY

1 DUKAT

8 FORINT = 20 FRANCS

50 FORINT

100 FORINT

200 FORINT

500 FORINT

1 000 FORINT

5 000 FORINT

10 000 FORINT

20 000 FORINT

50 000 FORINT

100 000 FORINT

20 KORONA

100 KORONA

ICELAND

500 KRONUR

INDIA

1 MOHUR

15 RUPEES

1 SOVEREIGN

INDONESIA

2 000 RUPIAH

5 000 RUPIAH

10 000 RUPIAH

20 000 RUPIAH

25 000 RUPIAH

100 000 RUPIAH

200 000 RUPIAH

IRAN

(1/2 AZADI)

(1 AZADI)

(1/4 PAHLAVI)

(1/2 PAHLAVI)

(1 PAHLAVI)

( 2 1/2 PAHLAVI )

(5 PAHLAVI)

(10 PAHLAVI)

500 RIALS

750 RIALS

1 000 RIALS

2 000 RIALS

IRAQ

(5 DINARS)

(50 DINARS)

(100 DINARS)

ISLE OF MAN

1/20 ANGEL

1/10 ANGEL

1/4 ANGEL

1/2 ANGEL

1 ANGEL

5 ANGEL

10 ANGEL

15 ANGEL

20 ANGEL

1/25 CROWN

1/10 CROWN

1/5 CROWN

1/2 CROWN

1 CROWN

1 POUND

2 POUNDS

5 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

( 1/2 SOVEREIGN )

(1 SOVEREIGN)

(2 SOVEREIGNS)

(5 SOVEREIGNS)

ISRAEL

20 LIROT

50 LIROT

100 LIROT

200 LIROT

500 LIROT

1 000 LIROT

5 000 LIROT

5 NEW SHEQALIM

10 NEW SHEQALIM

20 NEW SHEQALIM

5 SHEQALIM

10 SHEQALIM

500 SHEQEL

IVORY COAST

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

JAMAICA

100 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

JERSEY

1 POUND

2 POUNDS

5 POUNDS

10 POUNDS

20 POUNDS

25 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

100 POUNDS

1 SOVEREIGN

JORDAN

2 DINARS

5 DINARS

10 DINARS

25 DINARS

50 DINARS

60 DINARS

KATANGA

5 FRANCS

KENYA

100 SHILLINGS

250 SHILLINGS

500 SHILLINGS

KIRIBATI

150 DOLLARS

LATVIA

100 LATUS

LESOTHO

1 LOTI

2 MALOTI

4 MALOTI

10 MALOTI

20 MALOTI

50 MALOTI

100 MALOTI

250 MALOTI

500 MALOTI

LIBERIA

12 DOLLARS

20 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

30 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

LUXEMBURG

5 EURO

20 FRANCS

MACAU

500 PATACAS

1 000 PATACAS

MALAWI

250 KWACHA

MALAYSIA

100 RINGGIT

200 RINGGIT

250 RINGGIT

500 RINGGIT

MALI

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

MALTA

5 (LIRI)

10 (LIRI)

20 (LIRI)

25 (LIRI)

50 (LIRI)

100 (LIRI)

MARSHALL ISLANDS

20 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

200 DOLLARS

MAURITIUS

100 RUPEES

200 RUPEES

250 RUPEES

500 RUPEES

1 000 RUPEES

MEXICO

2 PESOS

2 1/2 PESOS

5 PESOS

10 PESOS

20 PESOS

50 PESOS

250 PESOS

500 PESOS

1 000 PESOS

2 000 PESOS

1/20 ONZA

1/10 ONZA

1/4 ONZA

1/2 ONZA

1 ONZA

MONACO

20 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

200 FRANCS

MONGOLIA

750 ( TUGRIK )

1 000 ( TUGRIK )

NEPAL

1 ASARPHI

1 000 RUPEES

NETHERLANDS

( 2 DUKAAT )

1 GULDEN

5 GULDEN

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

5 GULDEN

10 GULDEN

50 GULDEN

100 GULDEN

300 GULDEN

NEW ZEALAND

10 DOLLARS

150 DOLLARS

NICARAGUA

50 CORDOBAS

NIGER

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

NORWAY

1 500 KRONER

OMAN

25 OMANI RIALS

75 OMANI RIALS

PAKISTAN

3 000 RUPEES

PANAMA

100 BALBOAS

500 BALBOAS

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

100 KINA

PERU

1/5 LIBRA

1/2 LIBRA

1 LIBRA

5 SOLES

10 SOLES

20 SOLES

50 SOLES

100 SOLES

PHILIPPINES

1 000 PISO

1 500 PISO

5 000 PISO

POLAND

50 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)

100 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)

100 ZLOTY

200 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)

200 ZLOTY

500 ZLOTY (Golden Eagle)

PORTUGAL

100 ESCUDOS

200 ESCUDOS

500 ESCUDOS

10 000 REIS

RHODESIA

10 SHILLINGS

1 POUND

5 POUNDS

RUSSIA

25 ROUBLES

50 (ROUBLES)

200 (ROUBLES)

RWANDA

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

SAN MARINO

1 SCUDO

2 SCUDI

5 SCUDI

10 SCUDI

SAUDI ARABIA

1 GUINEA (= 1 SAUDI POUND)

SENEGAL

10 FRANCS

25 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

250 FRANCS

500 FRANCS

1 000 FRANCS

2 500 FRANCS

SERBIA

10 DINARA

SEYCHELLES

1 000 RUPEES

1 500 RUPEES

SIERRA LEONE

1/4 GOLDE

1/2 GOLDE

1 GOLDE

5 GOLDE

10 GOLDE

20 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

500 DOLLARS

SINGAPORE

1 DOLLAR

2 DOLLARS

5 DOLLARS

10 DOLLARS

20 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

150 DOLLARS

250 DOLLARS

500 DOLLARS

SLOVENIA

5 000 TOLARS

20 000 TOLARS

SOLOMON ISLANDS

10 DOLLARS

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

100 DOLLARS

SOMALIA

20 SHILLINGS

50 SHILLINGS

100 SHILLINGS

200 SHILLINGS

500 SHILLINGS

1 500 SHILLINGS

SOUTH AFRICA

1/10 KRUGERRAND

1/4 KRUGERRAND

1/2 KRUGERRAND

1 KRUGERRAND

1/10 oz NATURA

1/4 oz NATURA

1/2 oz NATURA

1 oz NATURA

1/10 PROTEA

1 PROTEA

1 RAND

2 RAND

1/2 SOVEREIGN (=Formula POUND)

1 SOVEREIGN (= 1 POUND)

SOUTH KOREA

2 500 WON

20 000 WON

30 000 WON

50 000 WON

SPAIN

10 (ESCUDOS)

10 PESETAS

5 000 PESETAS

10 000 PESETAS

20 000 PESETAS

40 000 PESETAS

80 000 PESETAS

100 (REALES)

SUDAN

25 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

100 POUNDS

SURINAM

100 GULDEN

SWAZILAND

2 EMALANGENI

5 EMALANGENI

10 EMALANGENI

20 EMALANGENI

25 EMALANGENI

50 EMALANGENI

100 EMALAGENI

250 EMALAGENI

1 LILANGENI

SWITZERLAND

10 FRANCS

50 FRANCS

100 FRANCS

SYRIA

(1/2 POUND)

( 1 POUND )

TANZANIA

1 500 SHILINGI

2 000 SHILINGI

THAILAND

(150 BAHT)

(300 BAHT)

(400 BAHT)

(600 BAHT)

(800 BAHT)

(1 500 BAHT)

(2 500 BAHT)

(3 000 BAHT)

(4 000 BAHT)

(5 000 BAHT)

(6 000 BAHT)

TONGA

1/2 HAU

1 HAU

5 HAU

1/4 KOULA

1/2 KOULA

1 KOULA

TUNISIA

2 DINARS

5 DINARS

10 DINARS

20 DINARS

40 DINARS

75 DINARS

10 FRANCS

20 FRANCS

5 PIASTRES

TURKEY

(25 KURUSH) (= 25 PIASTRES )

(50 KURUSH) (= 50 PIASTRES)

(100 KURUSH) (= 100 PIASTRES)

(250 KURUSH) (= 250 PIASTRES)

1/2 LIRA

1 LIRA

500 LIRA

1 000 LIRA

10 000 LIRA

TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS

100 CROWNS

TUVALU

50 DOLLARS

UGANDA

50 SHILLINGS

100 SHILLINGS

500 SHILLINGS

1 000 SHILLINGS

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

(500 DIRHAMS)

(750 DIRHAMS)

(1 000 DIRHAMS)

UNITED KINGDOM

(1/3 GUINEA)

(1/2 GUINEA)

50 PENCE

2 POUNDS

5 POUNDS

10 POUNDS

25 POUNDS

50 POUNDS

100 POUNDS

(2 SOVEREIGNS)

(5 SOVEREIGNS)

URUGUAY

5 000 NUEVO PESOS

20 000 NUEVO PESOS

5 PESOS

USA

25 DOLLARS

50 DOLLARS

VATICAN

20 LIRE

VENEZUELA

(20 BOLIVARES)

(100 BOLIVARES)

1 000 BOLIVARES

3 000 BOLIVARES

5 000 BOLIVARES

10 000 BOLIVARES

5 VENEZOLANOS

WESTERN SAMOA

50 TALA

100 TALA

YUGOSLAVIA

20 DINARA

100 DINARA

200 DINARA

500 DINARA

1 000 DINARA

1 500 DINARA

2 000 DINARA

2 500 DINARA

ZAIRE

100 ZAIRES

ZAMBIA

250 KWACHA

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/34

---

Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia

(2006/C 291/09)

The Commission has received a complaint pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’) (1), alleging that imports of ferro-silicon, originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia (‘the countries concerned’), are being dumped and are thereby causing material injury to the Community industry.

1.   Complaint

The complaint was lodged on 16 October 2006 by Comité de liaison des industries ferro-alliages (EUROALLIAGES) (‘the complainant’) on behalf of producers representing a major proportion, in this case more than 50 %, of the total Community production of ferro-silicon.

2.   Product

The product allegedly being dumped is ferro-silicon originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia (‘the product concerned’), normally declared within CN codes 7202 21 00, 7202 29 10 and 7202 29 90. These CN codes are only given for information.

3.   Allegation of dumping

The allegation of dumping in respect of Egypt and Russia is based on a comparison of normal value established on the basis of domestic prices, with the export prices of the product concerned when sold for export to the Community.

The allegation of dumping for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is based on a comparison of a constructed normal value with the export prices of the product concerned when sold for export to the Community.

In view of the provisions of Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation, the complainant established normal value for the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan on the basis of a constructed normal value in a market economy country, which is mentioned in point 5.1(d). The allegation of dumping is based on a comparison of normal value, thus calculated, with the export prices of the product concerned when sold for export to the Community.

On this basis, the dumping margins calculated are significant for all exporting countries concerned.

4.   Allegation of injury

The complainant has provided evidence that imports of the product concerned from the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia have increased overall in absolute terms and in terms of market share.

It is alleged that the volumes and the prices of the imported product concerned have, among other consequences, had a negative impact on the market share held, the quantities sold and the level of prices charged by the Community industry, resulting in substantial adverse effects on the overall performance and the financial situation of the Community industry.

5.   Procedure

Having determined, after consulting the Advisory Committee, that the complaint has been lodged by or on behalf of the Community industry and that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of a proceeding, the Commission hereby initiates an investigation pursuant to Article 5 of the basic Regulation.

5.1.   Procedure for the determination of dumping and injury

The investigation will determine whether the product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia is being dumped and whether this dumping has caused injury.

(a)   Sampling

In view of the apparent large number of parties involved in this proceeding, the Commission may decide to apply sampling in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation.

(i)   Sampling for importers

In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, all importers, or representatives acting on their behalf, are hereby requested to make themselves known to the Commission and to provide the following information on their company or companies within the time limit set in point 6(b)(i) and in the formats indicated in point 7:

| — | name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person, |
| --- | --- |

—

name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers and contact person,

| — | the total turnover in euro of the company during the period 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006, |
| --- | --- |

—

the total turnover in euro of the company during the period 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006,

| — | the total number of employees, |
| --- | --- |

—

the total number of employees,

| — | the precise activities of the company with regard to the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the precise activities of the company with regard to the product concerned,

| — | the volume in tonnes and value in euro of imports into and resales made in the Community market during the period 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006 of the imported product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia, |
| --- | --- |

—

the volume in tonnes and value in euro of imports into and resales made in the Community market during the period 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2006 of the imported product concerned originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia,

| — | the names and the precise activities of all related companies (2) involved in the production and/or selling of the product concerned, |
| --- | --- |

—

the names and the precise activities of all related companies (2) involved in the production and/or selling of the product concerned,

| — | any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample, |
| --- | --- |

—

any other relevant information that would assist the Commission in the selection of the sample,

| — | by providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is chosen to be part of the sample, this will imply replying to a questionnaire and accepting an on-the-spot investigation of its response. If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed to not have co-operated in the investigation. The consequences of non-cooperation are set out in point 8 below. |
| --- | --- |

—

by providing the above information, the company agrees to its possible inclusion in the sample. If the company is chosen to be part of the sample, this will imply replying to a questionnaire and accepting an on-the-spot investigation of its response. If the company indicates that it does not agree to its possible inclusion in the sample, it will be deemed to not have co-operated in the investigation. The consequences of non-cooperation are set out in point 8 below.

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for the selection of the sample of importers, the Commission will, in addition, contact any known associations of importers.

(ii)   Final selection of the sample

All interested parties wishing to submit any relevant information regarding the selection of the sample must do so within the time limit set in point 6(b)(ii).

The Commission intends to make the final selection of the sample after having consulted the parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample.

Companies included in the sample must reply to a questionnaire within the time limit set in point 6(b)(iii) and must co-operate within the framework of the investigation.

If sufficient co-operation is not forthcoming, the Commission may base its findings, in accordance with Articles 17(4) and 18 of the basic Regulation, on the facts available. A finding based on facts available may be less advantageous to the party concerned, as explained in point 8.

(b)   Questionnaires

In order to obtain the information it deems necessary for its investigation, the Commission will send questionnaires to the Community industry and to any association of producers in the Community, to the exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia, to any association of exporters/producers, to the sampled importers, to any association of importers named in the complaint, and to the authorities of the exporting countries concerned.

Exporters producers in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Russia

All such interested parties should contact the Commission forthwith by fax, but not later than the time limit set out in point 6(a)(i), in order to find out whether they are listed in the complaint and, if necessary, request a questionnaire, given that the time limit set in point 6(a)(ii) applies to all such interested parties.

(c)   Collection of information and holding of hearings

All interested parties are hereby invited to make their views known, submit information other than questionnaire replies and to provide supporting evidence. This information and supporting evidence has to reach the Commission within the time limit set in point 6(a)(ii).

Furthermore, the Commission may hear interested parties, provided that they make a request showing that there are particular reasons why they should be heard. This request must be made within the time limit set in point 6(a)(iii).

(d)   Selection of the market economy country

In accordance with Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation, it is envisaged to choose Norway as an appropriate market economy country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan. Interested parties are hereby invited to comment on the appropriateness of this choice within the specific time limit set in point 6(c).

(e)   Market economy status

For those exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan who claim and provide sufficient evidence that they operate under market economy conditions, i.e. that they meet the criteria laid down in Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, normal value will be determined in accordance with Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. Exporters/producers intending to submit duly substantiated claims must do so within the specific time limit set in point 6(d). The Commission will send claim forms to all exporters/producers in the People's Republic of China named in the complaint and to exporters/producers in Kazakhstan who have been included in the sample and to any association of exporters/producers named in the complaint, as well as to the authorities of the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan.

5.2.   Procedure for assessment of Community interest

In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation and in the event that the allegations of dumping and injury caused thereby are substantiated, a decision will be reached as to whether the adoption of anti-dumping measures would not be against the Community interest. For this reason the Community industry, importers, their representative associations, representative users and representative consumer organisations, provided that they prove that there is an objective link between their activity and the product concerned, may, within the general time limits set in point 6(a)(ii), make themselves known and provide the Commission with information. The parties which have acted in conformity with the precedent sentence may request a hearing setting the particular reasons why they should be heard within the time limit set in point 6(a)(iii). It should be noted that any information submitted pursuant to Article 21 will only be taken into account if supported by factual evidence at the time of submission.

6.   Time limits

(a)   General time limits

(i)   For parties to request a questionnaire or other claim forms

All interested parties should request a questionnaire or other claim forms as soon as possible, but not later than 10 days after the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(ii)   For parties to make themselves known, to submit questionnaire replies and any other information

All interested parties, if their representations are to be taken into account during the investigation, must make themselves known by contacting the Commission, present their views and submit questionnaire replies or any other information within 40 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, unless otherwise specified. Attention is drawn to the fact that the exercise of most procedural rights set out in the basic Regulation depends on the party's making itself known within the aforementioned period.

Companies selected in a sample must submit questionnaire replies within the time limits specified in point 6(b)(iii).

(iii)   Hearings

All interested parties may also apply to be heard by the Commission within the same 40 day time limit.

(b)   Specific time limit in respect of sampling

| (i) | The information specified in point 5.1(a)(i) should reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, given that the Commission intends to consult parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample on its final selection within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(i)

The information specified in point 5.1(a)(i) should reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, given that the Commission intends to consult parties concerned that have expressed their willingness to be included in the sample on its final selection within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (ii) | All other information relevant for the selection of the sample as referred to in 5.1(a)(ii) must reach the Commission within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

All other information relevant for the selection of the sample as referred to in 5.1(a)(ii) must reach the Commission within a period of 21 days of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

| (iii) | The questionnaire replies from sampled parties must reach the Commission within 37 days from the date of the notification of their inclusion in the sample. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

The questionnaire replies from sampled parties must reach the Commission within 37 days from the date of the notification of their inclusion in the sample.

(c)   Specific time limit for the selection of the market economy country

Parties to the investigation may wish to comment on the appropriateness of Norway which, as mentioned in point 5.1(d), is envisaged as a market-economy country for the purpose of establishing normal value in respect of the People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan. These comments must reach the Commission within 10 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

(d)   Specific time limit for submission of claims for market economy status and/or for individual treatment

Duly substantiated claims for market economy status (as mentioned in point 5.1(e)) and/or for individual treatment pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation, must reach the Commission within 15 days of the date of publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

7.   Written submissions, questionnaire replies and correspondence

All submissions and requests made by interested parties must be made in writing (not in electronic format, unless otherwise specified) and must indicate the name, address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers of the interested party. All written submissions, including the information requested in this notice, questionnaire replies and correspondence provided by interested parties on a confidential basis shall be labelled as ‘Limited’ (3) and, in accordance with Article 19(2) of the basic Regulation, shall be accompanied by a non-confidential version, which will be labelled ‘For inspection by interested parties’.

Commission address for correspondence:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate General for Trade |
| Directorate B |
| Office: J-79 5/16 |
| B-1049 Brussels |
| Fax (32-2) 295 65 05. |

European Commission

Directorate General for Trade

Directorate B

Office: J-79 5/16

B-1049 Brussels

Fax (32-2) 295 65 05.

8.   Non-cooperation

In cases in which any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within the time limits, or significantly impedes the investigation, provisional or final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, on the basis of the facts available.

Where it is found that any interested party has supplied false or misleading information, the information shall be disregarded and use may be made of the facts available. If an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates only partially and findings are therefore based on facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the result may be less favourable to that party than if it had cooperated.

9.   Schedule of the investigation

The investigation will be concluded, according to Article 6(9) of the basic Regulation within 15 months of the date of the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. According to Article 7(1) of the basic Regulation, provisional measures may be imposed no later than 9 months from the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---

(1)  OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p.17.).

(2)  For guidance on the meaning of related companies, please refer to Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p.1).

(3)  This means that the document is for internal use only. It is protected pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43). It is a confidential document pursuant to Article 19 of the basic Regulation and Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement).

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/38

---

Revision by France of a public service obligation in respect of scheduled air services between Paris (Orly) and Béziers

(2006/C 291/10)

| 1. | France has decided to revise, with effect from 25 March 2007, the public service obligation imposed on scheduled air services between Paris (Orly) and Béziers published in
  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 95 of 19 April 2002 pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes. |
| --- | --- |

1.

France has decided to revise, with effect from 25 March 2007, the public service obligation imposed on scheduled air services between Paris (Orly) and Béziers published in
  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 95 of 19 April 2002 pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes.

2.   The new public service obligation is as follows:

2.1.   Frequency

The following minimum services must be delivered, excepting public holidays:

| — | 2 daily outward flights and 2 daily return flights from Monday to Friday throughout the year; |
| --- | --- |

—

2 daily outward flights and 2 daily return flights from Monday to Friday throughout the year;

| — | 1 outward and 1 return flight on Sunday throughout the year; |
| --- | --- |

—

1 outward and 1 return flight on Sunday throughout the year;

| — | 3 additional outward and return flights per week, 13 weeks per year; |
| --- | --- |

—

3 additional outward and return flights per week, 13 weeks per year;

| — | 1 additional outward and flight on Saturday or Sunday, 13 weeks per year. |
| --- | --- |

—

1 additional outward and flight on Saturday or Sunday, 13 weeks per year.

On public holidays, at least one outward and one return flight must be delivered.

2.2.   Category and capacity of aircraft used

The service must be operated with a pressurised aircraft having a seating capacity of at least 48.

2.3.   Timetables

From Monday to Friday, the timetables must allow passengers to make the round trip within the day and to spend at least seven hours at their destination, be it Paris or Béziers.

2.4.   Flight bookings

Seats on these flights must be marketed using at least one computerised booking system.

2.5.   Continuity of service

Except in cases of force majeure, the number of flights cancelled for reasons directly attributable to the carrier must not exceed 3 % of the minimum number of required flights in any operating year.

The carrier must give at least six months' notice before discontinuing these services.

Carriers are hereby informed that the operation of air services without regard to the abovementioned public service obligation will result in administrative and/or legal penalties.

| 3. | Slots are currently reserved at Paris (Orly) airport for the scheduled Paris (Orly) — Béziers service pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports. Carriers interested in this route can obtain information on the slots from the Paris airports coordinator. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Slots are currently reserved at Paris (Orly) airport for the scheduled Paris (Orly) — Béziers service pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports. Carriers interested in this route can obtain information on the slots from the Paris airports coordinator.

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/39

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Information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to training aid

(2006/C 291/11)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| Aid No | XT 38/06 |
| --- | --- |
| Member State | Hellas |
| Region | Entire country |
| Title of aid scheme | Hellenic Technology Clusters Initiative (HTCI) is an endorsed activity under the auspices of the Hellenic Ministry of Development, that targets the establishment and development of competitive technology clusters in knowledge-intensive and exports-oriented focused segments. The selected clusters are comprised mainly of SMEs. |
| Legal basis | Νόμος 1514/85 όπως τροποποιήθηκε από το Νόμο 2919/01. Ο ρόλος του Ερευνητικού Κέντρου «Αθηνά» περιγράφεται στο Άρθρο 8 του Νόμου 2919/01 και το Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 145/03 όπως τροποποιήθηκαν από το άρθρο 9 του Νόμου 3438/06 και το άρθρο 15 του Νόμου 3460/06. |
| Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company | Annual overall amount | 2006: EUR 200 000
  2007: EUR 200 000
  2008: EUR 106 000 |
| Overall aid amount
  Actual amounts in each year may vary somewhat, but the total is fixed. | 287 000 |
| Maximum aid intensity | The maximum aid intensity will not exceed the ceilings of Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 363/2004. |
| Date of implementation | First call for proposals opened at the beginning of August 2006 |
| Duration of scheme or individual aid award | Until 31 December 2008. Legal commitments until 31 December 2006 |
| Objective of aid | The HTCI programme will support the clustering initiatives by providing support in the form of grants for a short period of time (2006-2008) for general training and specific training for both SME and non-SMEs. The objective of the aid is to help expand cluster-members' activities, promote technology and know-how diffusion among cluster members, focus on the utilization of talented human capital, and improve skills of the firms involved. |
| Economic sectors concerned | Microelectronics and Embedded Systems with the exception of firms with activities linked to the production, processing or marketing of products listed in Annex I to the Treaty establishing the European Community. |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Υπουργείο Ανάπτυξης, Γενική Γραμματεία Έρευνας και Τεχνολογίας, Ερευνητικό Κέντρο ‘Αθηνά’ |
| Γ. Αναστασίου 13 |
| GR-11527 Αθήνα |

Aid No

XT 38/06

Member State

Hellas

Region

Entire country

Title of aid scheme

Hellenic Technology Clusters Initiative (HTCI) is an endorsed activity under the auspices of the Hellenic Ministry of Development, that targets the establishment and development of competitive technology clusters in knowledge-intensive and exports-oriented focused segments. The selected clusters are comprised mainly of SMEs.

Legal basis

Νόμος 1514/85 όπως τροποποιήθηκε από το Νόμο 2919/01. Ο ρόλος του Ερευνητικού Κέντρου «Αθηνά» περιγράφεται στο Άρθρο 8 του Νόμου 2919/01 και το Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 145/03 όπως τροποποιήθηκαν από το άρθρο 9 του Νόμου 3438/06 και το άρθρο 15 του Νόμου 3460/06.

Annual expenditure planned under the scheme or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company

Annual overall amount

2006: EUR 200 000

2007: EUR 200 000

2008: EUR 106 000

Overall aid amount

Actual amounts in each year may vary somewhat, but the total is fixed.

287 000

Maximum aid intensity

The maximum aid intensity will not exceed the ceilings of Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 363/2004.

Date of implementation

First call for proposals opened at the beginning of August 2006

Duration of scheme or individual aid award

Until 31 December 2008. Legal commitments until 31 December 2006

Objective of aid

The HTCI programme will support the clustering initiatives by providing support in the form of grants for a short period of time (2006-2008) for general training and specific training for both SME and non-SMEs. The objective of the aid is to help expand cluster-members' activities, promote technology and know-how diffusion among cluster members, focus on the utilization of talented human capital, and improve skills of the firms involved.

Economic sectors concerned

Microelectronics and Embedded Systems with the exception of firms with activities linked to the production, processing or marketing of products listed in Annex I to the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Name and address of the granting authority

Υπουργείο Ανάπτυξης, Γενική Γραμματεία Έρευνας και Τεχνολογίας, Ερευνητικό Κέντρο ‘Αθηνά’

Γ. Αναστασίου 13

GR-11527 Αθήνα

| (Ministry of Development, General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Research Center Athena |
| --- |
| G. Anastasiou 13 |
| GR-11527 Athens) |

(Ministry of Development, General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Research Center Athena

G. Anastasiou 13

GR-11527 Athens)

Further information

The scheme is in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 363/2004. The aid concerns Action 4.6.3 of the Competitiveness Operational Programme which is jointly funded by Structural Funds.

| Aid No | XT 47/06 |
| --- | --- |
| Member State | Austria |
| Region | Kärnten |
| Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving an individual aid | Carinthian business training offensive |
| Legal basis | Ziel-2-Programm Kärnten 2000 — 2006 |
| Annual expenditure planned or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company | Aid scheme | Annual overall amount (subsid)y | Approx. EUR 1,2 million |
| Maximum aid intensity | In conformity with Article 4(2)-(7) of the Regulation | Yes | General training






  — | Large enterprises: 50 % |

Aid No

XT 47/06

Member State

Austria

Region

Kärnten

Title of aid scheme or name of company receiving an individual aid

Carinthian business training offensive

Legal basis

Ziel-2-Programm Kärnten 2000 — 2006

Annual expenditure planned or overall amount of individual aid granted to the company

Aid scheme

Annual overall amount (subsid)y

Approx. EUR 1,2 million

Maximum aid intensity

In conformity with Article 4(2)-(7) of the Regulation

Yes

General training

—

Large enterprises: 50 %

| — | uzed enterprises (SMEs): 70 % |
| --- | --- |

—

uzed enterprises (SMEs): 70 %

| — | utensity: 70 % of eligible costs |
| --- | --- |

—

utensity: 70 % of eligible costs

Specific training

| — | Large enterprises: 25 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Large enterprises: 25 %

| — | Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): 35 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): 35 %

| — | Maximum aid intensity: 35 % of eligible costs |
| --- | --- |

—

Maximum aid intensity: 35 % of eligible costs

Date of implementation

1 June 2004

Duration of scheme or individual aid award

Until 31 December 2007

Objective of aid

General training

Strengthening of the human resources potential through training,

and support for firms' growth opportunities through future-oriented manpower development strategies

Specific training

Economic sectors concerned

Limited to specific sectors

Yes

Other manufacturing

Manufacture of machinery and equipment (NACE 29, 34 and 35)

Manufacture of wood and wood products (NACE 20)

Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (NACE 24)

Research and development (NACE 73)

Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (NACE 21)

Other services

Electronics, software, hardware and data communications (NACE 30-33 and 72)

Name and address of the granting authority

Amt der Kärntner Landesregierung, Unterabteilung 6 — Bildungs- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik

| Mießtaler Straße 12 |
| --- |
| A-9020 Klagenfurt |

Mießtaler Straße 12

A-9020 Klagenfurt

Large individual aid grants

In conformity with Article 5 of the Regulation

Yes

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/41

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Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(2006/C 291/12)

| Date of adoption of the decision | 18.9.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 556/06 |
| Member State | United Kingdom |
| Region | Wales |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Beef Quality |
| Legal basis | Section 1 of The Welsh Development Agency Act 1975 (as amended) |
| Type of measure | scheme |
| Objective | quality |
| Form of aid | grant |
| Budget | GBP 0,41 million (EUR 0,6 million) |
| Intensity | 40 % |
| Duration (period) | 2 years |
| Economic sectors | agriculture |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Hybu Cig Cymru |
| Aberystwyth |
| Ceredigion SY233YA |
| United Kingdom |

Date of adoption of the decision

18.9.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 556/06

Member State

United Kingdom

Region

Wales

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Beef Quality

Legal basis

Section 1 of The Welsh Development Agency Act 1975 (as amended)

Type of measure

scheme

Objective

quality

Form of aid

grant

Budget

GBP 0,41 million (EUR 0,6 million)

Intensity

40 %

Duration (period)

2 years

Economic sectors

agriculture

Name and address of the granting authority

Hybu Cig Cymru

Aberystwyth

Ceredigion SY233YA

United Kingdom

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 2.10.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 18/06 |
| Member State | Spain |
| Title | Aid for the development of SMEs and its associations in the horse sector |
| Legal basis | Real Decreto 1200/2005, du 10 de octubre, por el que se establecen las bases reguladoras de las subvenciones estatales destinadas al sector equino
  Proyecto de Real Decreto ..../2006, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 1200/2005 |
| Type of measure | Scheme |
| Objective | Investment, technical support, quality products, producer groups, advertising |
| Form of aid | Grant |
| Budget | EUR 7,35 million |
| Intensity | Variable |
| Duration (period) | 5 years |
| Economic sectors | Agriculture |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Autoridades competentes de las 17 Comunidades Autónomas del Reino de España |

Date of adoption of the decision

2.10.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 18/06

Member State

Spain

Title

Aid for the development of SMEs and its associations in the horse sector

Legal basis

Real Decreto 1200/2005, du 10 de octubre, por el que se establecen las bases reguladoras de las subvenciones estatales destinadas al sector equino

Proyecto de Real Decreto ..../2006, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 1200/2005

Type of measure

Scheme

Objective

Investment, technical support, quality products, producer groups, advertising

Form of aid

Grant

Budget

EUR 7,35 million

Intensity

Variable

Duration (period)

5 years

Economic sectors

Agriculture

Name and address of the granting authority

Autoridades competentes de las 17 Comunidades Autónomas del Reino de España

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 18.9.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid No | N 154/06 |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | Veneto |
| Title | Assistance in farming areas affected by natural disasters (hail, high winds and rain from 29 June to 31 July 2005 in the Veneto Region and the provinces of Padua, Vicenza and Verona) |
| Legal basis | Decreto legislativo n. 102/2004 |
| Type of measure | Individual aid |
| Objective | To compensate for damage to farming structures as a result of bad weather. |
| Budget | EUR 560 000 |
| Intensity | Up to 100 % of the cost of the damage. |
| Duration | Measure implementing an aid scheme approved by the Commission. |
| Economic sectors | Agriculture |
| Other information | Measure applying the scheme approved by the Commission under State aid NN 54/A/2004 (Commission letter C(2005)1622 final, dated 7 June 2005). |

Date of adoption of the decision

18.9.2006

Aid No

N 154/06

Member State

Italy

Region

Veneto

Title

Assistance in farming areas affected by natural disasters (hail, high winds and rain from 29 June to 31 July 2005 in the Veneto Region and the provinces of Padua, Vicenza and Verona)

Legal basis

Decreto legislativo n. 102/2004

Type of measure

Individual aid

Objective

To compensate for damage to farming structures as a result of bad weather.

Budget

EUR 560 000

Intensity

Up to 100 % of the cost of the damage.

Duration

Measure implementing an aid scheme approved by the Commission.

Economic sectors

Agriculture

Other information

Measure applying the scheme approved by the Commission under State aid NN 54/A/2004 (Commission letter C(2005)1622 final, dated 7 June 2005).

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

| Date of adoption of the decision | 2.10.2006 |
| --- | --- |
| Reference number of the aid | N 474/06 |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | Campania |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Assistance in agricultural areas hit by natural disasters (frosts on 25 and 26 January 2006 in certain municipalities of the Salerno province in Campania) |
| Legal basis | Decreto legislativo n. 102/2004 |
| Type of measure | Aid scheme |
| Objective | Adverse weather conditions |
| Form of aid | Subsidies |
| Budget | See dossier NN 54/A/04 |
| Intensity | Up to 100 % |
| Duration (period) | Until the final payment is made |
| Economic sectors | Agriculture |

Date of adoption of the decision

2.10.2006

Reference number of the aid

N 474/06

Member State

Italy

Region

Campania

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Assistance in agricultural areas hit by natural disasters (frosts on 25 and 26 January 2006 in certain municipalities of the Salerno province in Campania)

Legal basis

Decreto legislativo n. 102/2004

Type of measure

Aid scheme

Objective

Adverse weather conditions

Form of aid

Subsidies

Budget

See dossier NN 54/A/04

Intensity

Up to 100 %

Duration (period)

Until the final payment is made

Economic sectors

Agriculture

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/43

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.4415 — Motorola/Symbol)

(2006/C 291/13)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| 1. | On 23 November 2006 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Motorola Inc. (‘Motorola’, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Symbol Technologies Inc. (‘Symbol’, USA) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 23 November 2006 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Motorola Inc. (‘Motorola’, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Symbol Technologies Inc. (‘Symbol’, USA) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for Motorola: wireless handsets, communication and network systems, broadband products; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for Motorola: wireless handsets, communication and network systems, broadband products;

| — | for Symbol: ruggedised mobile computers, data capture and scanning devices, wireless local area network infrastructure, radio frequency identification. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Symbol: ruggedised mobile computers, data capture and scanning devices, wireless local area network infrastructure, radio frequency identification.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (fax (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4415 — Motorola/Symbol, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (fax (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4415 — Motorola/Symbol, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.4481 — Onex Corporation/Sitel Corporation)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(2006/C 291/14)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| 1. | On 22 November 2006, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Onex Corporation (‘Onex’, Canada), through its wholly-owned subsidiary ClientLogic Corporation (‘ClientLogic’, Canada), proposes to acquire, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation, sole control of the undertaking Sitel Corporation (‘Sitel’, USA) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 22 November 2006, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Onex Corporation (‘Onex’, Canada), through its wholly-owned subsidiary ClientLogic Corporation (‘ClientLogic’, Canada), proposes to acquire, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation, sole control of the undertaking Sitel Corporation (‘Sitel’, USA) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | For Onex: the acquisition, administration and divestment of participations in undertakings in a wide range of markets; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

For Onex: the acquisition, administration and divestment of participations in undertakings in a wide range of markets;

| — | For ClientLogic: the provision of business process outsourcing services in the customer care services industry; |
| --- | --- |

—

For ClientLogic: the provision of business process outsourcing services in the customer care services industry;

| — | For Sitel: the provision of business process outsourcing services in the customer care services industry. |
| --- | --- |

—

For Sitel: the provision of business process outsourcing services in the customer care services industry.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (fax No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4481 — Onex Corporation/Sitel Corporation, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (fax No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4481 — Onex Corporation/Sitel Corporation, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32.

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| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4421 — OJSC Novolipetsk Steel/Duferco/JV)

(2006/C 291/15)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 20 November 2006, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4421. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4421. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4293 — Nordic Capital Fund VI/ICA MENY)

(2006/C 291/16)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 8 September 2006, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4293. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32006M4293. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)

---

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

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Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement

(2006/C 291/17)

| A. | The present notice is issued pursuant to the rules of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereafter the ‘EEA Agreement’) and the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (hereafter the ‘Surveillance and Court Agreement’). |
| --- | --- |

A.

The present notice is issued pursuant to the rules of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereafter the ‘EEA Agreement’) and the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (hereafter the ‘Surveillance and Court Agreement’).

| B. | The European Commission (hereafter the ‘Commission’) has issued a notice entitled ‘Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’ (1). That non-binding act sets out the principles for the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The notice also intends to set out the methodology for the application of the effect on trade concept and gives guidance on its application. |
| --- | --- |

B.

The European Commission (hereafter the ‘Commission’) has issued a notice entitled ‘Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’ (1). That non-binding act sets out the principles for the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The notice also intends to set out the methodology for the application of the effect on trade concept and gives guidance on its application.

| C. | The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers the abovementioned act to be EEA relevant. In order to maintain equal conditions of competition and to ensure a uniform application of the EEA competition rules throughout the European Economic Area, the Authority adopts the present notice under the power conferred upon it by Article 5(2)(b) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The Authority intends to follow the principles and rules laid down in this notice when applying the relevant EEA rules to a particular case (2). |
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C.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority considers the abovementioned act to be EEA relevant. In order to maintain equal conditions of competition and to ensure a uniform application of the EEA competition rules throughout the European Economic Area, the Authority adopts the present notice under the power conferred upon it by Article 5(2)(b) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The Authority intends to follow the principles and rules laid down in this notice when applying the relevant EEA rules to a particular case (2).

| D. | In particular, the notice sets out the principles for the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. The notice also intends to set out the methodology for the application in the EFTA pillar of the effect on trade concept and to give guidance on its application |
| --- | --- |

D.

In particular, the notice sets out the principles for the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. The notice also intends to set out the methodology for the application in the EFTA pillar of the effect on trade concept and to give guidance on its application

| E. | The present notice applies to cases where the Authority is the competent surveillance authority under Article 56 of the EEA Agreement. |
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E.

The present notice applies to cases where the Authority is the competent surveillance authority under Article 56 of the EEA Agreement.

1.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement are applicable to horizontal and vertical agreements and practices on the part of undertakings which ‘may affect trade between Contracting Parties’. |
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1.

Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement are applicable to horizontal and vertical agreements and practices on the part of undertakings which ‘may affect trade between Contracting Parties’.

| 2. | In the interpretation by the EFTA Court of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the Community Courts of the corresponding Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, the content and scope of the concept of effect on trade between Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (hereafter ‘EEA States’) have already been substantially clarified (3). |
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2.

In the interpretation by the EFTA Court of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the Community Courts of the corresponding Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, the content and scope of the concept of effect on trade between Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (hereafter ‘EEA States’) have already been substantially clarified (3).

| 3. | The present guidelines set out the principles developed by the EFTA Court and the Community Courts in relation to the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the corresponding provisions of the EC Treaty. They further spell out a rule indicating when agreements are in general unlikely to be capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States (the no appreciable affectation of trade rule or NAAT-rule). The guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. The aim is to set out the methodology for the application of the effect on trade concept and to provide guidance on its application in frequently occurring situations. Although not binding on them, these guidelines also intend to give guidance to the courts and authorities of the EFTA States in their application of the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
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3.

The present guidelines set out the principles developed by the EFTA Court and the Community Courts in relation to the interpretation of the effect on trade concept of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the corresponding provisions of the EC Treaty. They further spell out a rule indicating when agreements are in general unlikely to be capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States (the no appreciable affectation of trade rule or NAAT-rule). The guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. The aim is to set out the methodology for the application of the effect on trade concept and to provide guidance on its application in frequently occurring situations. Although not binding on them, these guidelines also intend to give guidance to the courts and authorities of the EFTA States in their application of the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement.

| 4. | The present guidelines do not address the issue of what constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition under Article 53(1). This issue, which is distinct from the ability of agreements to appreciably affect trade between EEA States, is dealt with in the EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (4) (the de minimis rule). The guidelines are also not intended to provide guidance on the effect on trade concept contained in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement on State aid. |
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4.

The present guidelines do not address the issue of what constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition under Article 53(1). This issue, which is distinct from the ability of agreements to appreciably affect trade between EEA States, is dealt with in the EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (4) (the de minimis rule). The guidelines are also not intended to provide guidance on the effect on trade concept contained in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement on State aid.

| 5. | These guidelines, including the NAAT-rule, are without prejudice to the interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement which may be given by the EFTA Court, the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court of First Instance. |
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5.

These guidelines, including the NAAT-rule, are without prejudice to the interpretation of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement which may be given by the EFTA Court, the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court of First Instance.

2.   THE EFFECT ON TRADE CRITERION

2.1.   General principles

| 6. | Article 53(1) provides that ‘the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Contracting Parties and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the territory covered by this Agreement.’ For the sake of simplicity the terms ‘agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices’ are collectively referred to as ‘agreements’. |
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6.

Article 53(1) provides that ‘the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Contracting Parties and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the territory covered by this Agreement.’ For the sake of simplicity the terms ‘agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices’ are collectively referred to as ‘agreements’.

| 7. | Article 54 on its part stipulates that ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the territory covered by this Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting Parties.’ In what follows the term ‘practices’ refers to the conduct of dominant undertakings. |
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7.

Article 54 on its part stipulates that ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the territory covered by this Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting Parties.’ In what follows the term ‘practices’ refers to the conduct of dominant undertakings.

| 8. | The effect on trade criterion also determines the scope of application of Article 3 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement (hereafter ‘Chapter II’) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement (5). |
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8.

The effect on trade criterion also determines the scope of application of Article 3 of Chapter II of Protocol 4 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement (hereafter ‘Chapter II’) on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement (5).

| 9. | According to Article 3(1) of Chapter II the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States must apply Article 53 to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement which may affect trade between EEA States within the meaning of that provision, when they apply national competition law to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Similarly, when the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, they must also apply Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Article 3(1) thus obliges the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States to also apply Articles 53 and 54 when they apply national competition law to agreements and abusive practices which may affect trade between EEA States. On the other hand, Article 3(1) does not oblige national competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States to apply national competition law when they apply Articles 53 and 54 to agreements, decisions and concerted practices and to abuses which may affect trade between EEA States. They may in such cases apply the EEA competition rules on a stand alone basis. |
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9.

According to Article 3(1) of Chapter II the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States must apply Article 53 to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement which may affect trade between EEA States within the meaning of that provision, when they apply national competition law to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Similarly, when the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, they must also apply Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Article 3(1) thus obliges the competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States to also apply Articles 53 and 54 when they apply national competition law to agreements and abusive practices which may affect trade between EEA States. On the other hand, Article 3(1) does not oblige national competition authorities and courts of the EFTA States to apply national competition law when they apply Articles 53 and 54 to agreements, decisions and concerted practices and to abuses which may affect trade between EEA States. They may in such cases apply the EEA competition rules on a stand alone basis.

| 10. | It follows from Article 3(2) that the application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between EEA States but which do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, or which fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement or which are covered by an act corresponding to a Community Regulation for the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty referred to in Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement. EFTA States, however, are not under Chapter II precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. |
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10.

It follows from Article 3(2) that the application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between EEA States but which do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, or which fulfil the conditions of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement or which are covered by an act corresponding to a Community Regulation for the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty referred to in Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement. EFTA States, however, are not under Chapter II precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.

| 11. | Finally it should be mentioned that Article 3(3) of Chapter II stipulates that without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of EEA law, Article 3(1) and (2) do not apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the EFTA States apply national merger control laws, nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement. |
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11.

Finally it should be mentioned that Article 3(3) of Chapter II stipulates that without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of EEA law, Article 3(1) and (2) do not apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the EFTA States apply national merger control laws, nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement.

| 12. | The effect on trade criterion is an autonomous EEA law criterion, which must be assessed separately in each case. It is a jurisdictional criterion, which defines the scope of application of EEA competition law (6). EEA competition law is not applicable to agreements and practices that are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. |
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12.

The effect on trade criterion is an autonomous EEA law criterion, which must be assessed separately in each case. It is a jurisdictional criterion, which defines the scope of application of EEA competition law (6). EEA competition law is not applicable to agreements and practices that are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States.

| 13. | The effect on trade criterion confines the scope of application of Articles 53 and 54 to agreements and practices that are capable of having a minimum level of cross-border effects within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement (hereafter the ‘EEA’). The ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States must be ‘appreciable’ (7). |
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13.

The effect on trade criterion confines the scope of application of Articles 53 and 54 to agreements and practices that are capable of having a minimum level of cross-border effects within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement (hereafter the ‘EEA’). The ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States must be ‘appreciable’ (7).

| 14. | In the case of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, it is the agreement that must be capable of affecting trade between EEA States. It is not required that each individual part of the agreement, including any restriction of competition which may flow from the agreement, is capable of doing so (8). If the agreement as a whole is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, there is EEA law jurisdiction in respect of the entire agreement, including any parts of the agreement that individually do not affect trade between EEA States. In cases where the contractual relations between the same parties cover several activities, these activities must, in order to form part of the same agreement, be directly linked and form an integral part of the same overall business arrangement (9). If not, each activity constitutes a separate agreement. |
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14.

In the case of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, it is the agreement that must be capable of affecting trade between EEA States. It is not required that each individual part of the agreement, including any restriction of competition which may flow from the agreement, is capable of doing so (8). If the agreement as a whole is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, there is EEA law jurisdiction in respect of the entire agreement, including any parts of the agreement that individually do not affect trade between EEA States. In cases where the contractual relations between the same parties cover several activities, these activities must, in order to form part of the same agreement, be directly linked and form an integral part of the same overall business arrangement (9). If not, each activity constitutes a separate agreement.

| 15. | It is also immaterial whether or not the participation of a particular undertaking in the agreement has an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States (10). An undertaking cannot escape EEA law jurisdiction merely because of the fact that its own contribution to an agreement, which itself is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, is insignificant. |
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15.

It is also immaterial whether or not the participation of a particular undertaking in the agreement has an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States (10). An undertaking cannot escape EEA law jurisdiction merely because of the fact that its own contribution to an agreement, which itself is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, is insignificant.

| 16. | It is not necessary, for the purposes of establishing EEA law jurisdiction, to establish a link between the alleged restriction of competition and the capacity of the agreement to affect trade between EEA States. Non-restrictive agreements may also affect trade between EEA States. For example, selective distribution agreements based on purely qualitative selection criteria justified by the nature of the products, which are not restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 53(1), may nevertheless affect trade between EEA States. However, the alleged restrictions arising from an agreement may provide a clear indication as to the capacity of the agreement to affect trade between EEA States. For instance, a distribution agreement prohibiting exports is by its very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States, although not necessarily to an appreciable extent (11). |
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16.

It is not necessary, for the purposes of establishing EEA law jurisdiction, to establish a link between the alleged restriction of competition and the capacity of the agreement to affect trade between EEA States. Non-restrictive agreements may also affect trade between EEA States. For example, selective distribution agreements based on purely qualitative selection criteria justified by the nature of the products, which are not restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 53(1), may nevertheless affect trade between EEA States. However, the alleged restrictions arising from an agreement may provide a clear indication as to the capacity of the agreement to affect trade between EEA States. For instance, a distribution agreement prohibiting exports is by its very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States, although not necessarily to an appreciable extent (11).

| 17. | In the case of Article 54 it is the abuse that must affect trade between EEA States. This does not imply, however, that each element of the behaviour must be assessed in isolation. Conduct that forms part of an overall strategy pursued by the dominant undertaking must be assessed in terms of its overall impact. Where a dominant undertaking adopts various practices in pursuit of the same aim, for instance practices that aim at eliminating or foreclosing competitors, in order for Article 54 to be applicable to all the practices forming part of this overall strategy, it is sufficient that at least one of these practices is capable of affecting trade between EEA States (12). |
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17.

In the case of Article 54 it is the abuse that must affect trade between EEA States. This does not imply, however, that each element of the behaviour must be assessed in isolation. Conduct that forms part of an overall strategy pursued by the dominant undertaking must be assessed in terms of its overall impact. Where a dominant undertaking adopts various practices in pursuit of the same aim, for instance practices that aim at eliminating or foreclosing competitors, in order for Article 54 to be applicable to all the practices forming part of this overall strategy, it is sufficient that at least one of these practices is capable of affecting trade between EEA States (12).

| 18. | It follows from the wording of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the case law of the Community Courts that in the application of the effect on trade criterion three elements in particular must be addressed:






  (a) | The concept of ‘trade between Contracting Parties’, |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

It follows from the wording of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement and the case law of the Community Courts that in the application of the effect on trade criterion three elements in particular must be addressed:

(a)

The concept of ‘trade between Contracting Parties’,

| (b) | The notion of ‘may affect’, and |
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(b)

The notion of ‘may affect’, and

| (c) | The concept of appreciability. |
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(c)

The concept of appreciability.

2.2.   The concept of ‘trade between Contracting Parties’

| 19. | The concept of ‘trade’ is not limited to traditional exchanges of goods and services across borders (13). It is a wider concept, covering all cross-border economic activity including establishment (14). This interpretation is consistent with the fundamental objective of the EEA Agreement to promote free movement of goods, services, persons and capital. |
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19.

The concept of ‘trade’ is not limited to traditional exchanges of goods and services across borders (13). It is a wider concept, covering all cross-border economic activity including establishment (14). This interpretation is consistent with the fundamental objective of the EEA Agreement to promote free movement of goods, services, persons and capital.

| 20. | According to settled case law the concept of ‘trade’ also encompasses cases where agreements or practices affect the competitive structure of the market. Agreements and practices that affect the competitive structure inside the EEA by eliminating or threatening to eliminate a competitor operating within the EEA may be subject to the EEA competition rules (15). When an undertaking is or risks being eliminated the competitive structure within the EEA is affected and so are the economic activities in which the undertaking is engaged. |
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20.

According to settled case law the concept of ‘trade’ also encompasses cases where agreements or practices affect the competitive structure of the market. Agreements and practices that affect the competitive structure inside the EEA by eliminating or threatening to eliminate a competitor operating within the EEA may be subject to the EEA competition rules (15). When an undertaking is or risks being eliminated the competitive structure within the EEA is affected and so are the economic activities in which the undertaking is engaged.

| 21. | The requirement that there must be an effect on trade ‘between the Contracting Parties’ implies that there must be an impact on cross-border economic activity involving at least two EEA States. It is not required that the agreement or practice affect trade between the whole of one EEA State and the whole of another EEA State. Articles 53 and 54 may be applicable also in cases involving part of an EEA State, provided that the effect on trade is appreciable (16). |
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21.

The requirement that there must be an effect on trade ‘between the Contracting Parties’ implies that there must be an impact on cross-border economic activity involving at least two EEA States. It is not required that the agreement or practice affect trade between the whole of one EEA State and the whole of another EEA State. Articles 53 and 54 may be applicable also in cases involving part of an EEA State, provided that the effect on trade is appreciable (16).

| 22. | The application of the effect on trade criterion is independent of the definition of relevant geographic markets. Trade between EEA States may be affected also in cases where the relevant market is national or sub-national (17). |
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22.

The application of the effect on trade criterion is independent of the definition of relevant geographic markets. Trade between EEA States may be affected also in cases where the relevant market is national or sub-national (17).

2.3.   The notion ‘may affect’

| 23. | The function of the notion ‘may affect’ is to define the nature of the required impact on trade between EEA States. According to the standard test developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the notion ‘may affect’ implies that it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement or practice may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between EEA States (18)
   (19). As mentioned in paragraph 20 above the Court of Justice of the European Communities has in addition developed a test based on whether or not the agreement or practice affects the competitive structure. In cases where the agreement or practice is liable to affect the competitive structure inside the EEA, EEA law jurisdiction is established. |
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23.

The function of the notion ‘may affect’ is to define the nature of the required impact on trade between EEA States. According to the standard test developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the notion ‘may affect’ implies that it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement or practice may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between EEA States (18)
   (19). As mentioned in paragraph 20 above the Court of Justice of the European Communities has in addition developed a test based on whether or not the agreement or practice affects the competitive structure. In cases where the agreement or practice is liable to affect the competitive structure inside the EEA, EEA law jurisdiction is established.

| 24. | The ‘pattern of trade’-test, as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, contains the following main elements, which are dealt with in the following sections:






  (a) | ‘A sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact’, |
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24.

The ‘pattern of trade’-test, as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, contains the following main elements, which are dealt with in the following sections:

(a)

‘A sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact’,

| (b) | An influence on the ‘pattern of trade’ between EEA States, |
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(b)

An influence on the ‘pattern of trade’ between EEA States,

| (c) | ‘A direct or indirect, actual or potential influence’ on the pattern of trade. |
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(c)

‘A direct or indirect, actual or potential influence’ on the pattern of trade.

2.3.1.   A sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact

| 25. | The assessment of effect on trade is based on objective factors. Subjective intent on the part of the undertakings concerned is not required. If, however, there is evidence that undertakings have intended to affect trade between EEA States, for example because they have sought to hinder exports to or imports from other EEA States, this is a relevant factor to be taken into account. |
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25.

The assessment of effect on trade is based on objective factors. Subjective intent on the part of the undertakings concerned is not required. If, however, there is evidence that undertakings have intended to affect trade between EEA States, for example because they have sought to hinder exports to or imports from other EEA States, this is a relevant factor to be taken into account.

| 26. | The words ‘may affect’ and the reference by the Court of Justice of the European Communities to ‘a sufficient degree of probability’ imply that, in order for EEA law jurisdiction to be established, it is not required that the agreement or practice will actually have or has had an effect on trade between EEA States. It is sufficient that the agreement or practice is ‘capable’ of having such an effect (20). |
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26.

The words ‘may affect’ and the reference by the Court of Justice of the European Communities to ‘a sufficient degree of probability’ imply that, in order for EEA law jurisdiction to be established, it is not required that the agreement or practice will actually have or has had an effect on trade between EEA States. It is sufficient that the agreement or practice is ‘capable’ of having such an effect (20).

| 27. | There is no obligation or need to calculate the actual volume of trade between EEA States affected by the agreement or practice. For example, in the case of agreements prohibiting exports to other EEA States there is no need to estimate what would have been the level of parallel trade between the EEA States concerned, in the absence of the agreement. This interpretation is consistent with the jurisdictional nature of the effect on trade criterion. EEA law jurisdiction extends to categories of agreements and practices that are capable of having cross-border effects, irrespective of whether a particular agreement or practice actually has such effects. |
| --- | --- |

27.

There is no obligation or need to calculate the actual volume of trade between EEA States affected by the agreement or practice. For example, in the case of agreements prohibiting exports to other EEA States there is no need to estimate what would have been the level of parallel trade between the EEA States concerned, in the absence of the agreement. This interpretation is consistent with the jurisdictional nature of the effect on trade criterion. EEA law jurisdiction extends to categories of agreements and practices that are capable of having cross-border effects, irrespective of whether a particular agreement or practice actually has such effects.

| 28. | The assessment under the effect on trade criterion depends on a number of factors that individually may not be decisive (21). The relevant factors include the nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered by the agreement or practice and the position and importance of the undertakings concerned (22). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The assessment under the effect on trade criterion depends on a number of factors that individually may not be decisive (21). The relevant factors include the nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered by the agreement or practice and the position and importance of the undertakings concerned (22).

| 29. | The nature of the agreement and practice provides an indication from a qualitative point of view of the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. Some agreements and practices are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States, whereas others require more detailed analysis in this respect. Cross-border cartels are an example of the former, whereas joint ventures confined to the territory of a single EEA State are an example of the latter. This aspect is further examined in section 3 below, which deals with various categories of agreements and practices. |
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29.

The nature of the agreement and practice provides an indication from a qualitative point of view of the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. Some agreements and practices are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States, whereas others require more detailed analysis in this respect. Cross-border cartels are an example of the former, whereas joint ventures confined to the territory of a single EEA State are an example of the latter. This aspect is further examined in section 3 below, which deals with various categories of agreements and practices.

| 30. | The nature of the products covered by the agreements or practices also provides an indication of whether trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. When by their nature products are easily traded across borders or are important for undertakings that want to enter or expand their activities in other EEA States, EEA jurisdiction is more readily established than in cases where due to their nature there is limited demand for products offered by suppliers from other EEA States or where the products are of limited interest from the point of view of cross-border establishment or the expansion of the economic activity carried out from such place of establishment (23). Establishment includes the setting-up by undertakings in one EEA State of agencies, branches or subsidiaries in another EEA State. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The nature of the products covered by the agreements or practices also provides an indication of whether trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. When by their nature products are easily traded across borders or are important for undertakings that want to enter or expand their activities in other EEA States, EEA jurisdiction is more readily established than in cases where due to their nature there is limited demand for products offered by suppliers from other EEA States or where the products are of limited interest from the point of view of cross-border establishment or the expansion of the economic activity carried out from such place of establishment (23). Establishment includes the setting-up by undertakings in one EEA State of agencies, branches or subsidiaries in another EEA State.

| 31. | The market position of the undertakings concerned and their sales volumes are indicative from a quantitative point of view of the ability of the agreement or practice concerned to affect trade between EEA States. This aspect, which forms an integral part of the assessment of appreciability, is addressed in section 2.4 below. |
| --- | --- |

31.

The market position of the undertakings concerned and their sales volumes are indicative from a quantitative point of view of the ability of the agreement or practice concerned to affect trade between EEA States. This aspect, which forms an integral part of the assessment of appreciability, is addressed in section 2.4 below.

| 32. | In addition to the factors already mentioned, it is necessary to take account of the legal and factual environment in which the agreement or practice operates. The relevant economic and legal context provides insight into the potential for an effect on trade between EEA States. If there are absolute barriers to cross-border trade between EEA States, which are external to the agreement or practice, trade is only capable of being affected if those barriers are likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. In cases where the barriers are not absolute but merely render cross-border activities more difficult, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that agreements and practices do not further hinder such activities. Agreements and practices that do so are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

32.

In addition to the factors already mentioned, it is necessary to take account of the legal and factual environment in which the agreement or practice operates. The relevant economic and legal context provides insight into the potential for an effect on trade between EEA States. If there are absolute barriers to cross-border trade between EEA States, which are external to the agreement or practice, trade is only capable of being affected if those barriers are likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. In cases where the barriers are not absolute but merely render cross-border activities more difficult, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that agreements and practices do not further hinder such activities. Agreements and practices that do so are capable of affecting trade between EEA States.

2.3.2.   An influence on the ‘pattern of trade’ between EEA States

| 33. | For Articles 53 and 54 to be applicable there must be an influence on the ‘pattern of trade’ between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

33.

For Articles 53 and 54 to be applicable there must be an influence on the ‘pattern of trade’ between EEA States.

| 34. | The term ‘pattern of trade’ is neutral. It is not a condition that trade be restricted or reduced (24). Patterns of trade can also be affected when an agreement or practice causes an increase in trade. Indeed, EEA law jurisdiction is established if trade between EEA States is likely to develop differently with the agreement or practice compared to the way in which it would probably have developed in the absence of the agreement or practice (25). |
| --- | --- |

34.

The term ‘pattern of trade’ is neutral. It is not a condition that trade be restricted or reduced (24). Patterns of trade can also be affected when an agreement or practice causes an increase in trade. Indeed, EEA law jurisdiction is established if trade between EEA States is likely to develop differently with the agreement or practice compared to the way in which it would probably have developed in the absence of the agreement or practice (25).

| 35. | This interpretation reflects the fact that the effect on trade criterion is a jurisdictional one, which serves to distinguish those agreements and practices which are capable of having cross-border effects, so as to warrant an examination under the EEA competition rules, from those agreements and practices which do not. |
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35.

This interpretation reflects the fact that the effect on trade criterion is a jurisdictional one, which serves to distinguish those agreements and practices which are capable of having cross-border effects, so as to warrant an examination under the EEA competition rules, from those agreements and practices which do not.

2.3.3.   A ‘direct or indirect, actual or potential influence’ on the pattern of trade

| 36. | The influence of agreements and practices on patterns of trade between EEA States can be ‘direct or indirect, actual or potential’. |
| --- | --- |

36.

The influence of agreements and practices on patterns of trade between EEA States can be ‘direct or indirect, actual or potential’.

| 37. | Direct effects on trade between EEA States normally occur in relation to the products covered by an agreement or practice. When, for example, producers of a particular product in different EEA States agree to share markets, direct effects are produced on trade between EEA States on the market for the products in question. Another example of direct effects being produced is when a supplier limits distributor rebates to products sold within the EEA State in which the distributors are established. Such practices increase the relative price of products destined for exports, rendering export sales less attractive and less competitive. |
| --- | --- |

37.

Direct effects on trade between EEA States normally occur in relation to the products covered by an agreement or practice. When, for example, producers of a particular product in different EEA States agree to share markets, direct effects are produced on trade between EEA States on the market for the products in question. Another example of direct effects being produced is when a supplier limits distributor rebates to products sold within the EEA State in which the distributors are established. Such practices increase the relative price of products destined for exports, rendering export sales less attractive and less competitive.

| 38. | Indirect effects often occur in relation to products that are related to those covered by an agreement or practice. Indirect effects may, for example, occur where an agreement or practice has an impact on cross-border economic activities of undertakings that use or otherwise rely on the products covered by the agreement or practice (26). Such effects can, for instance, arise where the agreement or practice relates to an intermediate product, which is not traded, but which is used in the supply of a final product, which is traded. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has held under the corresponding Article 81 of the EC Treaty that trade between EC Member States was capable of being affected in the case of an agreement involving the fixing of prices of spirits used in the production of cognac (27). Whereas the raw material was not exported, the final product — cognac — was exported. In such cases EEA competition law is thus applicable, if trade in the final product is capable of being appreciably affected. |
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38.

Indirect effects often occur in relation to products that are related to those covered by an agreement or practice. Indirect effects may, for example, occur where an agreement or practice has an impact on cross-border economic activities of undertakings that use or otherwise rely on the products covered by the agreement or practice (26). Such effects can, for instance, arise where the agreement or practice relates to an intermediate product, which is not traded, but which is used in the supply of a final product, which is traded. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has held under the corresponding Article 81 of the EC Treaty that trade between EC Member States was capable of being affected in the case of an agreement involving the fixing of prices of spirits used in the production of cognac (27). Whereas the raw material was not exported, the final product — cognac — was exported. In such cases EEA competition law is thus applicable, if trade in the final product is capable of being appreciably affected.

| 39. | Indirect effects on trade between EEA States may also occur in relation to the products covered by the agreement or practice. For instance, agreements whereby a manufacturer limits warranties to products sold by distributors within their EEA State of establishment create disincentives for consumers from other EEA States to buy the products because they would not be able to invoke the warranty (28). Export by official distributors and parallel traders is made more difficult because in the eyes of consumers the products are less attractive without the manufacturer's warranty (29). |
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39.

Indirect effects on trade between EEA States may also occur in relation to the products covered by the agreement or practice. For instance, agreements whereby a manufacturer limits warranties to products sold by distributors within their EEA State of establishment create disincentives for consumers from other EEA States to buy the products because they would not be able to invoke the warranty (28). Export by official distributors and parallel traders is made more difficult because in the eyes of consumers the products are less attractive without the manufacturer's warranty (29).

| 40. | Actual effects on trade between EEA States are those that are produced by the agreement or practice once it is implemented. An agreement between a supplier and a distributor within the same EEA State, for instance one that prohibits exports to other EEA States, is likely to produce actual effects on trade between EEA States. Without the agreement the distributor would have been free to engage in export sales. It should be recalled, however, that it is not required that actual effects are demonstrated. It is sufficient that the agreement or practice be capable of having such effects. |
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40.

Actual effects on trade between EEA States are those that are produced by the agreement or practice once it is implemented. An agreement between a supplier and a distributor within the same EEA State, for instance one that prohibits exports to other EEA States, is likely to produce actual effects on trade between EEA States. Without the agreement the distributor would have been free to engage in export sales. It should be recalled, however, that it is not required that actual effects are demonstrated. It is sufficient that the agreement or practice be capable of having such effects.

| 41. | Potential effects are those that may occur in the future with a sufficient degree of probability. In other words, foreseeable market developments must be taken into account (30). Even if trade is not capable of being affected at the time the agreement is concluded or the practice is implemented, Articles 53 and 54 remain applicable if the factors which led to that conclusion are likely to change in the foreseeable future. In this respect it is relevant to consider the impact of liberalisation measures taken into the EEA Agreement or adopted by the EEA State in question and other foreseeable measures aiming at eliminating legal barriers to trade. |
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41.

Potential effects are those that may occur in the future with a sufficient degree of probability. In other words, foreseeable market developments must be taken into account (30). Even if trade is not capable of being affected at the time the agreement is concluded or the practice is implemented, Articles 53 and 54 remain applicable if the factors which led to that conclusion are likely to change in the foreseeable future. In this respect it is relevant to consider the impact of liberalisation measures taken into the EEA Agreement or adopted by the EEA State in question and other foreseeable measures aiming at eliminating legal barriers to trade.

| 42. | Moreover, even if at a given point in time market conditions are unfavourable to cross-border trade, for example because prices are similar in the EEA States in question, trade may still be capable of being affected if the situation may change as a result of changing market conditions (31). What matters is the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States and not whether at any given point in time it actually does so. |
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42.

Moreover, even if at a given point in time market conditions are unfavourable to cross-border trade, for example because prices are similar in the EEA States in question, trade may still be capable of being affected if the situation may change as a result of changing market conditions (31). What matters is the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States and not whether at any given point in time it actually does so.

| 43. | The inclusion of indirect or potential effects in the analysis of effects on trade between EEA States does not mean that the analysis can be based on remote or hypothetical effects. The likelihood of a particular agreement to produce indirect or potential effects must be explained by the authority or party claiming that trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. Hypothetical or speculative effects are not sufficient for establishing EEA law jurisdiction. For instance, an agreement that raises the price of a product which is not tradable reduces the disposable income of consumers. As consumers have less money to spend they may purchase fewer products imported from other EEA States. However, the link between such income effects and trade between EEA States is generally in itself too remote to establish EEA law jurisdiction. |
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43.

The inclusion of indirect or potential effects in the analysis of effects on trade between EEA States does not mean that the analysis can be based on remote or hypothetical effects. The likelihood of a particular agreement to produce indirect or potential effects must be explained by the authority or party claiming that trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. Hypothetical or speculative effects are not sufficient for establishing EEA law jurisdiction. For instance, an agreement that raises the price of a product which is not tradable reduces the disposable income of consumers. As consumers have less money to spend they may purchase fewer products imported from other EEA States. However, the link between such income effects and trade between EEA States is generally in itself too remote to establish EEA law jurisdiction.

2.4.   The concept of appreciability

2.4.1.   General principle

| 44. | The effect on trade criterion incorporates a quantitative element, limiting EEA law jurisdiction to agreements and practices that are capable of having effects of a certain magnitude. Agreements and practices fall outside the scope of application of Articles 53 and 54 when they affect the market only insignificantly having regard to the weak position of the undertakings concerned on the market for the products in question (32). Appreciability can be appraised in particular by reference to the position and the importance of the relevant undertakings on the market for the products concerned (33). |
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44.

The effect on trade criterion incorporates a quantitative element, limiting EEA law jurisdiction to agreements and practices that are capable of having effects of a certain magnitude. Agreements and practices fall outside the scope of application of Articles 53 and 54 when they affect the market only insignificantly having regard to the weak position of the undertakings concerned on the market for the products in question (32). Appreciability can be appraised in particular by reference to the position and the importance of the relevant undertakings on the market for the products concerned (33).

| 45. | The assessment of appreciability depends on the circumstances of each individual case, in particular the nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered and the market position of the undertakings concerned. When by its very nature the agreement or practice is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, the appreciability threshold is lower than in the case of agreements and practices that are not by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The stronger the market position of the undertakings concerned, the more likely it is that an agreement or practice capable of affecting trade between EEA States can be held to do so appreciably (34). |
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45.

The assessment of appreciability depends on the circumstances of each individual case, in particular the nature of the agreement and practice, the nature of the products covered and the market position of the undertakings concerned. When by its very nature the agreement or practice is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, the appreciability threshold is lower than in the case of agreements and practices that are not by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The stronger the market position of the undertakings concerned, the more likely it is that an agreement or practice capable of affecting trade between EEA States can be held to do so appreciably (34).

| 46. | In a number of cases concerning imports and exports the Court of Justice of the European Communities has considered that the appreciability requirement was fulfilled when the sales of the undertakings concerned accounted for about 5 % of the market (35). Market share alone, however, has not always been considered the decisive factor. In particular, it is necessary also to take account of the turnover of the undertakings in the products concerned (36). |
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46.

In a number of cases concerning imports and exports the Court of Justice of the European Communities has considered that the appreciability requirement was fulfilled when the sales of the undertakings concerned accounted for about 5 % of the market (35). Market share alone, however, has not always been considered the decisive factor. In particular, it is necessary also to take account of the turnover of the undertakings in the products concerned (36).

| 47. | Appreciability can thus be measured both in absolute terms (turnover) and in relative terms, comparing the position of the undertaking(s) concerned to that of other players on the market (market share). This focus on the position and importance of the undertakings concerned is consistent with the concept ‘may affect’, which implies that the assessment is based on the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States rather than on the impact on actual flows of goods and services across borders. The market position of the undertakings concerned and their turnover in the products concerned are indicative of the ability of an agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. These two elements are reflected in the presumptions set out in paragraphs 52 and 53 below. |
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47.

Appreciability can thus be measured both in absolute terms (turnover) and in relative terms, comparing the position of the undertaking(s) concerned to that of other players on the market (market share). This focus on the position and importance of the undertakings concerned is consistent with the concept ‘may affect’, which implies that the assessment is based on the ability of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States rather than on the impact on actual flows of goods and services across borders. The market position of the undertakings concerned and their turnover in the products concerned are indicative of the ability of an agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. These two elements are reflected in the presumptions set out in paragraphs 52 and 53 below.

| 48. | The application of the appreciability test does not necessarily require that relevant markets be defined and market shares calculated (37). The sales of an undertaking in absolute terms may be sufficient to support a finding that the impact on trade is appreciable. This is particularly so in the case of agreements and practices that by their very nature are liable to affect trade between EEA States, for example because they concern imports or exports or because they cover several EEA States. The fact that in such circumstances turnover in the products covered by the agreement may be sufficient for a finding of an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States is reflected in the positive presumption set out in paragraph 53 below. |
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48.

The application of the appreciability test does not necessarily require that relevant markets be defined and market shares calculated (37). The sales of an undertaking in absolute terms may be sufficient to support a finding that the impact on trade is appreciable. This is particularly so in the case of agreements and practices that by their very nature are liable to affect trade between EEA States, for example because they concern imports or exports or because they cover several EEA States. The fact that in such circumstances turnover in the products covered by the agreement may be sufficient for a finding of an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States is reflected in the positive presumption set out in paragraph 53 below.

| 49. | Agreements and practices must always be considered in the economic and legal context in which they occur. In the case of vertical agreements it may be necessary to have regard to any cumulative effects of parallel networks of similar agreements (38). Even if a single agreement or network of agreements is not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States, the effect of parallel networks of agreements, taken as a whole, may be capable of doing so. For that to be the case, however, it is necessary that the individual agreement or network of agreements makes a significant contribution to the overall effect on trade (39). |
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49.

Agreements and practices must always be considered in the economic and legal context in which they occur. In the case of vertical agreements it may be necessary to have regard to any cumulative effects of parallel networks of similar agreements (38). Even if a single agreement or network of agreements is not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States, the effect of parallel networks of agreements, taken as a whole, may be capable of doing so. For that to be the case, however, it is necessary that the individual agreement or network of agreements makes a significant contribution to the overall effect on trade (39).

2.4.2.   Quantification of appreciability

| 50. | It is not possible to establish general quantitative rules covering all categories of agreements indicating when trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. It is possible, however, to indicate when trade is normally not capable of being appreciably affected. Firstly, in its notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition in the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (the de minimis rule) (40), the EFTA Surveillance Authority has stated that agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings (SMEs), as defined in the Authority's Decision No 112/96/COL of 11 September 1996 (41), are normally not capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The reason for this presumption is the fact that the activities of SMEs are normally local or at most regional in nature. However, SMEs may be subject to EEA law jurisdiction in particular where they engage in cross-border economic activity. Secondly, the Authority considers it appropriate to set out general principles indicating when trade is normally not capable of being appreciably affected, i.e. a standard defining the absence of an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States (the NAAT-rule). When applying Article 53, the Authority will consider this standard as a negative rebuttable presumption applying to all agreements within the meaning of Article 53(1) irrespective of the nature of the restrictions contained in the agreement, including restrictions that have been identified as hardcore restrictions in acts corresponding to Commission block exemption regulations referred to in Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement. In cases where this presumption applies the Authority will normally not institute proceedings either upon application or on its own initiative. Where the undertakings assume in good faith that an agreement is covered by this negative presumption, the Authority will not impose fines. |
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50.

It is not possible to establish general quantitative rules covering all categories of agreements indicating when trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. It is possible, however, to indicate when trade is normally not capable of being appreciably affected. Firstly, in its notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition in the meaning of Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (the de minimis rule) (40), the EFTA Surveillance Authority has stated that agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings (SMEs), as defined in the Authority's Decision No 112/96/COL of 11 September 1996 (41), are normally not capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The reason for this presumption is the fact that the activities of SMEs are normally local or at most regional in nature. However, SMEs may be subject to EEA law jurisdiction in particular where they engage in cross-border economic activity. Secondly, the Authority considers it appropriate to set out general principles indicating when trade is normally not capable of being appreciably affected, i.e. a standard defining the absence of an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States (the NAAT-rule). When applying Article 53, the Authority will consider this standard as a negative rebuttable presumption applying to all agreements within the meaning of Article 53(1) irrespective of the nature of the restrictions contained in the agreement, including restrictions that have been identified as hardcore restrictions in acts corresponding to Commission block exemption regulations referred to in Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement. In cases where this presumption applies the Authority will normally not institute proceedings either upon application or on its own initiative. Where the undertakings assume in good faith that an agreement is covered by this negative presumption, the Authority will not impose fines.

| 51. | Without prejudice to paragraph 53 below, this negative definition of appreciability does not imply that agreements, which do not fall within the criteria set out below, are automatically capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. A case by case analysis is necessary. |
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51.

Without prejudice to paragraph 53 below, this negative definition of appreciability does not imply that agreements, which do not fall within the criteria set out below, are automatically capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. A case by case analysis is necessary.

| 52. | The EFTA Surveillance Authority holds the view that in principle agreements are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States when the following cumulative conditions are met:






  (a) | The aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant market within the EEA affected by the agreement does not exceed 5 %, and |
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52.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority holds the view that in principle agreements are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States when the following cumulative conditions are met:

(a)

The aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant market within the EEA affected by the agreement does not exceed 5 %, and

| (b) | In the case of horizontal agreements, the aggregate annual EEA turnover of the undertakings concerned (42) in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million Euro. In the case of agreements concerning the joint buying of products the relevant turnover shall be the parties' combined purchases of the products covered by the agreement.
  In the case of vertical agreements, the aggregate annual EEA turnover of the supplier in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million Euro. In the case of licence agreements the relevant turnover shall be the aggregate turnover of the licensees in the products incorporating the licensed technology and the licensor's own turnover in such products. In cases involving agreements concluded between a buyer and several suppliers the relevant turnover shall be the buyer's combined purchases of the products covered by the agreements. |
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(b)

In the case of horizontal agreements, the aggregate annual EEA turnover of the undertakings concerned (42) in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million Euro. In the case of agreements concerning the joint buying of products the relevant turnover shall be the parties' combined purchases of the products covered by the agreement.

In the case of vertical agreements, the aggregate annual EEA turnover of the supplier in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 million Euro. In the case of licence agreements the relevant turnover shall be the aggregate turnover of the licensees in the products incorporating the licensed technology and the licensor's own turnover in such products. In cases involving agreements concluded between a buyer and several suppliers the relevant turnover shall be the buyer's combined purchases of the products covered by the agreements.

The Authority will apply the same presumption where during two successive calendar years the above turnover threshold is not exceeded by more than 10 % and the above market threshold is not exceeded by more than 2 percentage points. In cases where the agreement concerns an emerging not yet existing market and where as a consequence the parties neither generate relevant turnover nor accumulate any relevant market share, the Authority will not apply this presumption. In such cases appreciability may have to be assessed on the basis of the position of the parties on related product markets or their strength in technologies relating to the agreement.

| 53. | The EFTA Surveillance Authority will also hold the view that where an agreement by its very nature is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, for example, because it concerns imports and exports or covers several EEA States, there is a rebuttable positive presumption that such effects on trade are appreciable when the turnover of the parties in the products covered by the agreement calculated as indicated in paragraphs 52 and 54 exceeds 40 million Euro. In the case of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States it can also often be presumed that such effects are appreciable when the market share of the parties exceeds the 5 % threshold set out in the previous paragraph. However, this presumption does not apply where the agreement covers only part of an EEA State (see paragraph 90 below). |
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53.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will also hold the view that where an agreement by its very nature is capable of affecting trade between EEA States, for example, because it concerns imports and exports or covers several EEA States, there is a rebuttable positive presumption that such effects on trade are appreciable when the turnover of the parties in the products covered by the agreement calculated as indicated in paragraphs 52 and 54 exceeds 40 million Euro. In the case of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States it can also often be presumed that such effects are appreciable when the market share of the parties exceeds the 5 % threshold set out in the previous paragraph. However, this presumption does not apply where the agreement covers only part of an EEA State (see paragraph 90 below).

| 54. | With regard to the threshold of 40 million Euro (cf. paragraph 52 above), the turnover is calculated on the basis of total EEA sales excluding tax during the previous financial year by the undertakings concerned, of the products covered by the agreement (the contract products). Sales between entities that form part of the same undertaking are excluded (43). |
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54.

With regard to the threshold of 40 million Euro (cf. paragraph 52 above), the turnover is calculated on the basis of total EEA sales excluding tax during the previous financial year by the undertakings concerned, of the products covered by the agreement (the contract products). Sales between entities that form part of the same undertaking are excluded (43).

| 55. | In order to apply the market share threshold, it is necessary to determine the relevant market (44). This consists of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The market shares are to be calculated on the basis of sales value data or, where appropriate, purchase value data. If value data are not available, estimates based on other reliable market information, including volume data, may be used. |
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55.

In order to apply the market share threshold, it is necessary to determine the relevant market (44). This consists of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market. The market shares are to be calculated on the basis of sales value data or, where appropriate, purchase value data. If value data are not available, estimates based on other reliable market information, including volume data, may be used.

| 56. | In the case of networks of agreements entered into by the same supplier with different distributors, sales made through the entire network are taken into account. |
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56.

In the case of networks of agreements entered into by the same supplier with different distributors, sales made through the entire network are taken into account.

| 57. | Contracts that form part of the same overall business arrangement constitute a single agreement for the purposes of the NAAT-rule (45). Undertakings cannot bring themselves inside these thresholds by dividing up an agreement that forms a whole from an economic perspective. |
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57.

Contracts that form part of the same overall business arrangement constitute a single agreement for the purposes of the NAAT-rule (45). Undertakings cannot bring themselves inside these thresholds by dividing up an agreement that forms a whole from an economic perspective.

3.   THE APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO COMMON TYPES OF AGREEMENTS AND ABUSES

| 58. | The EFTA Surveillance Authority will apply the negative presumption set out in the preceding section to all agreements, including agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States as well as agreements that involve trade with undertakings located in third countries (cf. section 3.3 below). |
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58.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will apply the negative presumption set out in the preceding section to all agreements, including agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States as well as agreements that involve trade with undertakings located in third countries (cf. section 3.3 below).

| 59. | Outside the scope of negative presumption, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will take account of qualitative elements relating to the nature of the agreement or practice and the nature of the products that they concern (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). The relevance of the nature of the agreement is also reflected in the positive presumption set out in paragraph 53 above relating to appreciability in the case of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. With a view to providing additional guidance on the application of the effect on trade concept it is therefore useful to consider various common types of agreements and practices. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Outside the scope of negative presumption, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will take account of qualitative elements relating to the nature of the agreement or practice and the nature of the products that they concern (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). The relevance of the nature of the agreement is also reflected in the positive presumption set out in paragraph 53 above relating to appreciability in the case of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. With a view to providing additional guidance on the application of the effect on trade concept it is therefore useful to consider various common types of agreements and practices.

| 60. | In the following sections a primary distinction is drawn between agreements and practices that cover several EEA States and agreements and practices that are confined to a single EEA State or to part of a single EEA State. These two main categories are broken down into further subcategories based on the nature of the agreement or practice involved. Agreements and practices involving third countries are also dealt with. |
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60.

In the following sections a primary distinction is drawn between agreements and practices that cover several EEA States and agreements and practices that are confined to a single EEA State or to part of a single EEA State. These two main categories are broken down into further subcategories based on the nature of the agreement or practice involved. Agreements and practices involving third countries are also dealt with.

3.1.   Agreements and abuse covering or implemented in several EEA States

| 61. | Agreements and practices covering or implemented in several EEA States are in almost all cases by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. When the relevant turnover exceeds the threshold set out in paragraph 53 above it will therefore in most cases not be necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of whether trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. However, in order to provide guidance also in these cases and to illustrate the principles developed in section 2 above, it is useful to explain what are the factors that are normally used to support a finding of EEA law jurisdiction. |
| --- | --- |

61.

Agreements and practices covering or implemented in several EEA States are in almost all cases by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. When the relevant turnover exceeds the threshold set out in paragraph 53 above it will therefore in most cases not be necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of whether trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. However, in order to provide guidance also in these cases and to illustrate the principles developed in section 2 above, it is useful to explain what are the factors that are normally used to support a finding of EEA law jurisdiction.

3.1.1.   Agreements concerning imports and exports

| 62. | Agreements between undertakings in two or more EEA States that concern imports and exports are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Such agreements, irrespective of whether they are restrictive of competition or not, have a direct impact on patterns of trade between EEA States. In Kerpen & Kerpen, for example, which concerned an agreement between a French producer and a German distributor covering more than 10 % of exports of cement from France to Germany, amounting in total to 350,000 tonnes per year, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that it was impossible to take the view that such an agreement was not capable of (appreciably) affecting trade between EC Member States (46). |
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62.

Agreements between undertakings in two or more EEA States that concern imports and exports are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Such agreements, irrespective of whether they are restrictive of competition or not, have a direct impact on patterns of trade between EEA States. In Kerpen & Kerpen, for example, which concerned an agreement between a French producer and a German distributor covering more than 10 % of exports of cement from France to Germany, amounting in total to 350,000 tonnes per year, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that it was impossible to take the view that such an agreement was not capable of (appreciably) affecting trade between EC Member States (46).

| 63. | This category includes agreements that impose restrictions on imports and exports, including restrictions on active and passive sales and resale by buyers to customers in other EEA States (47). In these cases there is an inherent link between the alleged restriction of competition and the effect on trade, since the very purpose of the restriction is to prevent flows of goods and services between EEA States, which would otherwise be possible. It is immaterial whether the parties to the agreement are located in the same EEA State or in different EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

63.

This category includes agreements that impose restrictions on imports and exports, including restrictions on active and passive sales and resale by buyers to customers in other EEA States (47). In these cases there is an inherent link between the alleged restriction of competition and the effect on trade, since the very purpose of the restriction is to prevent flows of goods and services between EEA States, which would otherwise be possible. It is immaterial whether the parties to the agreement are located in the same EEA State or in different EEA States.

3.1.2.   Cartels covering several EEA States

| 64. | Cartel agreements such as those involving price fixing and market sharing covering several EEA States are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Cross-border cartels harmonise the conditions of competition and affect the interpenetration of trade by cementing traditional patterns of trade (48). When undertakings agree to allocate geographic territories, sales from other areas into the allocated territories are capable of being eliminated or reduced. When undertakings agree to fix prices, they eliminate competition and any resulting price differentials that would entice both competitors and customers to engage in cross-border trade. When undertakings agree on sales quotas traditional patterns of trade are preserved. The undertakings concerned abstain from expanding output and thereby from serving potential customers in other EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

64.

Cartel agreements such as those involving price fixing and market sharing covering several EEA States are by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Cross-border cartels harmonise the conditions of competition and affect the interpenetration of trade by cementing traditional patterns of trade (48). When undertakings agree to allocate geographic territories, sales from other areas into the allocated territories are capable of being eliminated or reduced. When undertakings agree to fix prices, they eliminate competition and any resulting price differentials that would entice both competitors and customers to engage in cross-border trade. When undertakings agree on sales quotas traditional patterns of trade are preserved. The undertakings concerned abstain from expanding output and thereby from serving potential customers in other EEA States.

| 65. | The effect on trade produced by cross-border cartels is generally also by its very nature appreciable due to the market position of the parties to the cartel. Cartels are normally only formed when the participating undertakings together hold a large share of the market, as this allows them to raise price or reduce output. |
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65.

The effect on trade produced by cross-border cartels is generally also by its very nature appreciable due to the market position of the parties to the cartel. Cartels are normally only formed when the participating undertakings together hold a large share of the market, as this allows them to raise price or reduce output.

3.1.3.   Horizontal cooperation agreements covering several EEA States

| 66. | This section covers various types of horizontal cooperation agreements. Horizontal cooperation agreements may for instance take the form of agreements whereby two or more undertakings cooperate in the performance of a particular economic activity such as production and distribution (49). Often such agreements are referred to as joint ventures. However, joint ventures that perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity are covered by the Merger Regulation (50). At the level of the EEA such full function joint ventures are not dealt with under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement except in cases where Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation is applicable (51). This section therefore does not deal with full-function joint ventures. In the case of non-full function joint ventures the joint entity does not operate as an autonomous supplier (or buyer) on any market. It merely serves the parents, who themselves operate on the market (52). |
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66.

This section covers various types of horizontal cooperation agreements. Horizontal cooperation agreements may for instance take the form of agreements whereby two or more undertakings cooperate in the performance of a particular economic activity such as production and distribution (49). Often such agreements are referred to as joint ventures. However, joint ventures that perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity are covered by the Merger Regulation (50). At the level of the EEA such full function joint ventures are not dealt with under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement except in cases where Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation is applicable (51). This section therefore does not deal with full-function joint ventures. In the case of non-full function joint ventures the joint entity does not operate as an autonomous supplier (or buyer) on any market. It merely serves the parents, who themselves operate on the market (52).

| 67. | Joint ventures which engage in activities in two or more EEA States or which produce an output that is sold by the parents in two or more EEA States affect the commercial activities of the parties in those areas of the EEA. Such agreements are therefore normally by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States compared to the situation without the agreement (53). Patterns of trade are affected when undertakings switch their activities to the joint venture or use it for the purpose of establishing a new source of supply in the EEA. |
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67.

Joint ventures which engage in activities in two or more EEA States or which produce an output that is sold by the parents in two or more EEA States affect the commercial activities of the parties in those areas of the EEA. Such agreements are therefore normally by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States compared to the situation without the agreement (53). Patterns of trade are affected when undertakings switch their activities to the joint venture or use it for the purpose of establishing a new source of supply in the EEA.

| 68. | Trade may also be capable of being affected where a joint venture produces an input for the parent companies, which is subsequently further processed or incorporated into a product by the parent undertakings. This is likely to be the case where the input in question was previously sourced from suppliers in other EEA States, where the parents previously produced the input in other EEA States or where the final product is traded in more than one EEA State. |
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68.

Trade may also be capable of being affected where a joint venture produces an input for the parent companies, which is subsequently further processed or incorporated into a product by the parent undertakings. This is likely to be the case where the input in question was previously sourced from suppliers in other EEA States, where the parents previously produced the input in other EEA States or where the final product is traded in more than one EEA State.

| 69. | In the assessment of appreciability it is important to take account of the parents' sales of products related to the agreement and not only those of the joint entity created by the agreement, given that the joint venture does not operate as an autonomous entity on any market. |
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69.

In the assessment of appreciability it is important to take account of the parents' sales of products related to the agreement and not only those of the joint entity created by the agreement, given that the joint venture does not operate as an autonomous entity on any market.

3.1.4.   Vertical agreements implemented in several EEA States

| 70. | Vertical agreements and networks of similar vertical agreements implemented in several EEA States are normally capable of affecting trade between EEA States if they cause trade to be channelled in a particular way. Networks of selective distribution agreements implemented in two or more EEA States for example, channel trade in a particular way because they limit trade to members of the network, thereby affecting patterns of trade compared to the situation without the agreement (54). |
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70.

Vertical agreements and networks of similar vertical agreements implemented in several EEA States are normally capable of affecting trade between EEA States if they cause trade to be channelled in a particular way. Networks of selective distribution agreements implemented in two or more EEA States for example, channel trade in a particular way because they limit trade to members of the network, thereby affecting patterns of trade compared to the situation without the agreement (54).

| 71. | Trade between EEA States is also capable of being affected by vertical agreements that have foreclosure effects. This may for instance be the case of agreements whereby distributors in several EEA States agree to buy only from a particular supplier or to sell only its products. Such agreements may limit trade between the EEA States in which the agreements are implemented, or trade from EEA States not covered by the agreements. Foreclosure may result from individual agreements or from networks of agreements. When an agreement or networks of agreements that cover several EEA States have foreclosure effects, the ability of the agreement or agreements to affect trade between EEA States is normally by its very nature appreciable. |
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71.

Trade between EEA States is also capable of being affected by vertical agreements that have foreclosure effects. This may for instance be the case of agreements whereby distributors in several EEA States agree to buy only from a particular supplier or to sell only its products. Such agreements may limit trade between the EEA States in which the agreements are implemented, or trade from EEA States not covered by the agreements. Foreclosure may result from individual agreements or from networks of agreements. When an agreement or networks of agreements that cover several EEA States have foreclosure effects, the ability of the agreement or agreements to affect trade between EEA States is normally by its very nature appreciable.

| 72. | Agreements between suppliers and distributors which provide for resale price maintenance (RPM) and which cover two or more EEA States are normally also by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States (55). Such agreements alter the price levels that would have been likely to exist in the absence of the agreements and thereby affect patterns of trade. |
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72.

Agreements between suppliers and distributors which provide for resale price maintenance (RPM) and which cover two or more EEA States are normally also by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States (55). Such agreements alter the price levels that would have been likely to exist in the absence of the agreements and thereby affect patterns of trade.

3.1.5.   Abuses of dominant positions covering several EEA States

| 73. | In the case of abuse of a dominant position it is useful to distinguish between abuses that raise barriers to entry or eliminate competitors (exclusionary abuses) and abuses whereby the dominant undertaking exploits its economic power for instance by charging excessive or discriminatory prices (exploitative abuses). Both kinds of abuse may be carried out either through agreements, which are equally subject to Article 53(1), or through unilateral conduct, which as far as EEA competition law is concerned is subject only to Article 54. |
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73.

In the case of abuse of a dominant position it is useful to distinguish between abuses that raise barriers to entry or eliminate competitors (exclusionary abuses) and abuses whereby the dominant undertaking exploits its economic power for instance by charging excessive or discriminatory prices (exploitative abuses). Both kinds of abuse may be carried out either through agreements, which are equally subject to Article 53(1), or through unilateral conduct, which as far as EEA competition law is concerned is subject only to Article 54.

| 74. | In the case of exploitative abuses such as discriminatory rebates, the impact is on downstream trading partners, which either benefit or suffer, altering their competitive position and affecting patterns of trade between EEA States. |
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74.

In the case of exploitative abuses such as discriminatory rebates, the impact is on downstream trading partners, which either benefit or suffer, altering their competitive position and affecting patterns of trade between EEA States.

| 75. | When a dominant undertaking engages in exclusionary conduct in more than one EEA State, such abuse is normally by its very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Such conduct has a negative impact on competition in an area extending beyond a single EEA State, being likely to divert trade from the course it would have followed in the absence of the abuse. For example, patterns of trade are capable of being affected where the dominant undertaking grants loyalty rebates. Customers covered by the exclusionary rebate system are likely to purchase less from competitors of the dominant firm than they would otherwise have done. Exclusionary conduct that aims directly at eliminating a competitor such as predatory pricing is also capable of affecting trade between EEA States because of its impact on the competitive market structure inside the EEA (56). When a dominant firm engages in behaviour with a view to eliminating a competitor operating in more than one EEA State, trade is capable of being affected in several ways. First, there is a risk that the affected competitor will cease to be a source of supply inside the EEA. Even if the targeted undertaking is not eliminated, its future competitive conduct is likely to be affected, which may also have an impact on trade between EEA States. Secondly, the abuse may have an impact on other competitors. Through its abusive behaviour the dominant undertaking can signal to its competitors that it will discipline attempts to engage in real competition. Thirdly, the very fact of eliminating a competitor may be sufficient for trade between EEA States to be capable of being affected. This may be the case even where the undertaking that risks being eliminated mainly engages in exports to third countries (57). Once the effective competitive market structure inside the EEA risks being further impaired, there is EEA law jurisdiction. |
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75.

When a dominant undertaking engages in exclusionary conduct in more than one EEA State, such abuse is normally by its very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Such conduct has a negative impact on competition in an area extending beyond a single EEA State, being likely to divert trade from the course it would have followed in the absence of the abuse. For example, patterns of trade are capable of being affected where the dominant undertaking grants loyalty rebates. Customers covered by the exclusionary rebate system are likely to purchase less from competitors of the dominant firm than they would otherwise have done. Exclusionary conduct that aims directly at eliminating a competitor such as predatory pricing is also capable of affecting trade between EEA States because of its impact on the competitive market structure inside the EEA (56). When a dominant firm engages in behaviour with a view to eliminating a competitor operating in more than one EEA State, trade is capable of being affected in several ways. First, there is a risk that the affected competitor will cease to be a source of supply inside the EEA. Even if the targeted undertaking is not eliminated, its future competitive conduct is likely to be affected, which may also have an impact on trade between EEA States. Secondly, the abuse may have an impact on other competitors. Through its abusive behaviour the dominant undertaking can signal to its competitors that it will discipline attempts to engage in real competition. Thirdly, the very fact of eliminating a competitor may be sufficient for trade between EEA States to be capable of being affected. This may be the case even where the undertaking that risks being eliminated mainly engages in exports to third countries (57). Once the effective competitive market structure inside the EEA risks being further impaired, there is EEA law jurisdiction.

| 76. | Where a dominant undertaking engages in exploitative or exclusionary abuse in more than one EEA State, the capacity of the abuse to affect trade between EEA States will normally also by its very nature be appreciable. Given the market position of the dominant undertaking concerned, and the fact that the abuse is implemented in several EEA States, the scale of the abuse and its likely impact on patterns of trade is normally such that trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. In the case of an exploitative abuse such as price discrimination, the abuse alters the competitive position of trading partners in several EEA States. In the case of exclusionary abuses, including abuses that aim at eliminating a competitor, the economic activity engaged in by competitors in several EEA States is affected. The very existence of a dominant position in several EEA States implies that competition in a substantial part of the common market is already weakened (58). When a dominant undertaking further weakens competition through recourse to abusive conduct, for example by eliminating a competitor, the ability of the abuse to affect trade between EEA States is normally appreciable. |
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76.

Where a dominant undertaking engages in exploitative or exclusionary abuse in more than one EEA State, the capacity of the abuse to affect trade between EEA States will normally also by its very nature be appreciable. Given the market position of the dominant undertaking concerned, and the fact that the abuse is implemented in several EEA States, the scale of the abuse and its likely impact on patterns of trade is normally such that trade between EEA States is capable of being appreciably affected. In the case of an exploitative abuse such as price discrimination, the abuse alters the competitive position of trading partners in several EEA States. In the case of exclusionary abuses, including abuses that aim at eliminating a competitor, the economic activity engaged in by competitors in several EEA States is affected. The very existence of a dominant position in several EEA States implies that competition in a substantial part of the common market is already weakened (58). When a dominant undertaking further weakens competition through recourse to abusive conduct, for example by eliminating a competitor, the ability of the abuse to affect trade between EEA States is normally appreciable.

3.2.   Agreements and abuses covering a single, or only part of an, EEA State

| 77. | When agreements or abusive practices cover the territory of a single EEA State, it may be necessary to proceed with a more detailed inquiry into the ability of the agreements or abusive practices to affect trade between EEA States. It should be recalled that for there to be an effect on trade between EEA States it is not required that trade is reduced. It is sufficient that an appreciable change is capable of being caused in the pattern of trade between EEA States. Nevertheless, in many cases involving a single EEA State the nature of the alleged infringement, and in particular, its propensity to foreclose the national market, provides a good indication of the capacity of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. The examples mentioned hereafter are not exhaustive. They merely provide examples of cases where agreements confined to the territory of a single EEA State can be considered capable of affecting trade between EEA States. |
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77.

When agreements or abusive practices cover the territory of a single EEA State, it may be necessary to proceed with a more detailed inquiry into the ability of the agreements or abusive practices to affect trade between EEA States. It should be recalled that for there to be an effect on trade between EEA States it is not required that trade is reduced. It is sufficient that an appreciable change is capable of being caused in the pattern of trade between EEA States. Nevertheless, in many cases involving a single EEA State the nature of the alleged infringement, and in particular, its propensity to foreclose the national market, provides a good indication of the capacity of the agreement or practice to affect trade between EEA States. The examples mentioned hereafter are not exhaustive. They merely provide examples of cases where agreements confined to the territory of a single EEA State can be considered capable of affecting trade between EEA States.

3.2.1.   Cartels covering a single EEA State

| 78. | Horizontal cartels covering the whole of an EEA State are normally capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The Community Courts have held in a number of cases that agreements extending over the whole territory of an EC Member State by their very nature have the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis by hindering the economic penetration which the EC Treaty is designed to bring about (59). |
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78.

Horizontal cartels covering the whole of an EEA State are normally capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The Community Courts have held in a number of cases that agreements extending over the whole territory of an EC Member State by their very nature have the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a national basis by hindering the economic penetration which the EC Treaty is designed to bring about (59).

| 79. | The capacity of such agreements to partition the internal market follows from the fact that undertakings participating in cartels in only one EEA State, normally need to take action to exclude competitors from other EEA States (60). If they do not, and the product covered by the agreement is tradable (61), the cartel risks being undermined by competition from undertakings from other EEA States. Such agreements are normally also by their very nature capable of having an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States, given the market coverage required for such cartels to be effective. |
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79.

The capacity of such agreements to partition the internal market follows from the fact that undertakings participating in cartels in only one EEA State, normally need to take action to exclude competitors from other EEA States (60). If they do not, and the product covered by the agreement is tradable (61), the cartel risks being undermined by competition from undertakings from other EEA States. Such agreements are normally also by their very nature capable of having an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States, given the market coverage required for such cartels to be effective.

| 80. | Given the fact that the effect on trade concept encompasses potential effects, it is not decisive whether such action against competitors from other EEA States is in fact adopted at any given point in time. If the cartel price is similar to the price prevailing in other EEA States, there may be no immediate need for the members of the cartel to take action against competitors from other EEA States. What matters is whether or not they are likely to do so, if market conditions change. The likelihood of that depends on the existence or otherwise of natural barriers to trade in the market, including in particular whether or not the product in question is tradable. In a case involving certain retail banking services (62) the Court of Justice of the European Communities has, for example, held that trade was not capable of being appreciably affected because the potential for trade in the specific products concerned was very limited and because they were not an important factor in the choice made by undertakings from other EC Member States regarding whether or not to establish themselves in the EC Member State in question (63). |
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80.

Given the fact that the effect on trade concept encompasses potential effects, it is not decisive whether such action against competitors from other EEA States is in fact adopted at any given point in time. If the cartel price is similar to the price prevailing in other EEA States, there may be no immediate need for the members of the cartel to take action against competitors from other EEA States. What matters is whether or not they are likely to do so, if market conditions change. The likelihood of that depends on the existence or otherwise of natural barriers to trade in the market, including in particular whether or not the product in question is tradable. In a case involving certain retail banking services (62) the Court of Justice of the European Communities has, for example, held that trade was not capable of being appreciably affected because the potential for trade in the specific products concerned was very limited and because they were not an important factor in the choice made by undertakings from other EC Member States regarding whether or not to establish themselves in the EC Member State in question (63).

| 81. | The extent to which the members of a cartel monitor prices and competitors from other EEA States can provide an indication of the extent to which the products covered by the cartel are tradable. Monitoring suggests that competition and competitors from other EEA States are perceived as a potential threat to the cartel. Moreover, if there is evidence that the members of the cartel have deliberately fixed the price level in the light of the price level prevailing in other EEA States (limit pricing), it is an indication that the products in question are tradable and that trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. |
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81.

The extent to which the members of a cartel monitor prices and competitors from other EEA States can provide an indication of the extent to which the products covered by the cartel are tradable. Monitoring suggests that competition and competitors from other EEA States are perceived as a potential threat to the cartel. Moreover, if there is evidence that the members of the cartel have deliberately fixed the price level in the light of the price level prevailing in other EEA States (limit pricing), it is an indication that the products in question are tradable and that trade between EEA States is capable of being affected.

| 82. | Trade is normally also capable of being affected when the members of a national cartel temper the competitive constraint imposed by competitors from other EEA States by inducing them to join the restrictive agreement, or if their exclusion from the agreement places the competitors at a competitive disadvantage (64). In such cases the agreement either prevents these competitors from exploiting any competitive advantage that they have, or raises their costs, thereby having a negative impact on their competitiveness and their sales. In both cases the agreement hampers the operations of competitors from other EEA States on the national market in question. The same is true when a cartel agreement confined to a single EEA State is concluded between undertakings that resell products imported from other EEA States (65). |
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82.

Trade is normally also capable of being affected when the members of a national cartel temper the competitive constraint imposed by competitors from other EEA States by inducing them to join the restrictive agreement, or if their exclusion from the agreement places the competitors at a competitive disadvantage (64). In such cases the agreement either prevents these competitors from exploiting any competitive advantage that they have, or raises their costs, thereby having a negative impact on their competitiveness and their sales. In both cases the agreement hampers the operations of competitors from other EEA States on the national market in question. The same is true when a cartel agreement confined to a single EEA State is concluded between undertakings that resell products imported from other EEA States (65).

3.2.2.   Horizontal cooperation agreements covering a single EEA State

| 83. | Horizontal cooperation agreements and in particular non-full function joint ventures (cf. paragraph 66 above), which are confined to a single EEA State and which do not directly relate to imports and exports, do not belong to the category of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. A careful examination of the capacity of the individual agreement to affect trade between EEA States may therefore be required. |
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83.

Horizontal cooperation agreements and in particular non-full function joint ventures (cf. paragraph 66 above), which are confined to a single EEA State and which do not directly relate to imports and exports, do not belong to the category of agreements that by their very nature are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. A careful examination of the capacity of the individual agreement to affect trade between EEA States may therefore be required.

| 84. | Horizontal cooperation agreements may, in particular, be capable of affecting trade between EEA States where they have foreclosure effects. This may be the case with agreements that establish sector-wide standardisation and certification regimes, which either exclude undertakings from other EEA States or which are more easily fulfilled by undertakings from the EEA State in question due to the fact that they are based on national rules and traditions. In such circumstances the agreements make it more difficult for undertakings from other EEA States to penetrate the national market. |
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84.

Horizontal cooperation agreements may, in particular, be capable of affecting trade between EEA States where they have foreclosure effects. This may be the case with agreements that establish sector-wide standardisation and certification regimes, which either exclude undertakings from other EEA States or which are more easily fulfilled by undertakings from the EEA State in question due to the fact that they are based on national rules and traditions. In such circumstances the agreements make it more difficult for undertakings from other EEA States to penetrate the national market.

| 85. | Trade may also be affected where a joint venture results in undertakings from other EEA States being cut off from an important channel of distribution or source of demand. If, for example, two or more distributors established within the same EEA State, and which account for a substantial share of imports of the products in question, establish a purchasing joint venture combining their purchases of that product, the resulting reduction in the number of distribution channels limits the possibility for suppliers from other EEA States of gaining access to the national market in question. Trade is therefore capable of being affected (66). Trade may also be affected where undertakings which previously imported a particular product form a joint venture which is entrusted with the production of that same product. In this case the agreement causes a change in the patterns of trade between EEA States compared to the situation before the agreement. |
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85.

Trade may also be affected where a joint venture results in undertakings from other EEA States being cut off from an important channel of distribution or source of demand. If, for example, two or more distributors established within the same EEA State, and which account for a substantial share of imports of the products in question, establish a purchasing joint venture combining their purchases of that product, the resulting reduction in the number of distribution channels limits the possibility for suppliers from other EEA States of gaining access to the national market in question. Trade is therefore capable of being affected (66). Trade may also be affected where undertakings which previously imported a particular product form a joint venture which is entrusted with the production of that same product. In this case the agreement causes a change in the patterns of trade between EEA States compared to the situation before the agreement.

3.2.3.   Vertical agreements covering a single EEA State

| 86. | Vertical agreements covering the whole of an EEA State may, in particular, be capable of affecting patterns of trade between EEA States when they make it more difficult for undertakings from other EEA States to penetrate the national market in question, either by means of exports or by means of establishment (foreclosure effect). When vertical agreements give rise to such foreclosure effects, they contribute to the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby hindering the economic interpenetration which the EEA Agreement is designed to bring about (67). |
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86.

Vertical agreements covering the whole of an EEA State may, in particular, be capable of affecting patterns of trade between EEA States when they make it more difficult for undertakings from other EEA States to penetrate the national market in question, either by means of exports or by means of establishment (foreclosure effect). When vertical agreements give rise to such foreclosure effects, they contribute to the partitioning of markets on a national basis, thereby hindering the economic interpenetration which the EEA Agreement is designed to bring about (67).

| 87. | Foreclosure may, for example, occur when suppliers impose exclusive purchasing obligations on buyers (68). In Delimitis (69), which concerned agreements between a brewer and owners of premises where beer was consumed whereby the latter undertook to buy beer exclusively from the brewer, the Court of Justice of the European Communities defined foreclosure as the absence, due to the agreements, of real and concrete possibilities of gaining access to the market. Agreements normally only create significant barriers to entry when they cover a significant proportion of the market. Market share and market coverage can be used as an indicator in this respect. In making the assessment account must be taken not only of the particular agreement or network of agreements in question, but also of other parallel networks of agreements having similar effects (70). |
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87.

Foreclosure may, for example, occur when suppliers impose exclusive purchasing obligations on buyers (68). In Delimitis (69), which concerned agreements between a brewer and owners of premises where beer was consumed whereby the latter undertook to buy beer exclusively from the brewer, the Court of Justice of the European Communities defined foreclosure as the absence, due to the agreements, of real and concrete possibilities of gaining access to the market. Agreements normally only create significant barriers to entry when they cover a significant proportion of the market. Market share and market coverage can be used as an indicator in this respect. In making the assessment account must be taken not only of the particular agreement or network of agreements in question, but also of other parallel networks of agreements having similar effects (70).

| 88. | Vertical agreements which cover the whole of an EEA State and which relate to tradable products may also be capable of affecting trade between EEA States, even if they do not create direct obstacles to trade. Agreements whereby undertakings engage in resale price maintenance (RPM) may have direct effects on trade between EEA States by increasing imports from other EEA States and by decreasing exports from the EEA State in question (71). Agreements involving RPM may also affect patterns of trade in much the same way as horizontal cartels. To the extent that the price resulting from RPM is higher than that prevailing in other EEA States this price level is only sustainable if imports from other EEA States can be controlled. |
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88.

Vertical agreements which cover the whole of an EEA State and which relate to tradable products may also be capable of affecting trade between EEA States, even if they do not create direct obstacles to trade. Agreements whereby undertakings engage in resale price maintenance (RPM) may have direct effects on trade between EEA States by increasing imports from other EEA States and by decreasing exports from the EEA State in question (71). Agreements involving RPM may also affect patterns of trade in much the same way as horizontal cartels. To the extent that the price resulting from RPM is higher than that prevailing in other EEA States this price level is only sustainable if imports from other EEA States can be controlled.

3.2.4.   Agreements covering only part of an EEA State

| 89. | In qualitative terms the assessment of agreements covering only part of an EEA State is approached in the same way as in the case of agreements covering the whole of an EEA State. This means that the analysis in section 2 applies. In the assessment of appreciability, however, the two categories must be distinguished, as it must be taken into account that only part of an EEA State is covered by the agreement. It must also be taken into account what proportion of the national territory is susceptible to trade. If, for example, transport costs or the operating radius of equipment render it economically unviable for undertakings from other EEA States to serve the entire territory of another EEA State, trade is capable of being affected if the agreement forecloses access to the part of the territory of an EEA State that is susceptible to trade, provided that this part is not insignificant (72). |
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89.

In qualitative terms the assessment of agreements covering only part of an EEA State is approached in the same way as in the case of agreements covering the whole of an EEA State. This means that the analysis in section 2 applies. In the assessment of appreciability, however, the two categories must be distinguished, as it must be taken into account that only part of an EEA State is covered by the agreement. It must also be taken into account what proportion of the national territory is susceptible to trade. If, for example, transport costs or the operating radius of equipment render it economically unviable for undertakings from other EEA States to serve the entire territory of another EEA State, trade is capable of being affected if the agreement forecloses access to the part of the territory of an EEA State that is susceptible to trade, provided that this part is not insignificant (72).

| 90. | Where an agreement forecloses access to a regional market, then for trade to be appreciably affected, the volume of sales affected must be significant in proportion to the overall volume of sales of the products concerned inside the EEA State in question. This assessment cannot be based merely on geographic coverage. The market share of the parties to the agreement must also be given fairly limited weight. Even if the parties have a high market share in a properly defined regional market, the size of that market in terms of volume may still be insignificant when compared to total sales of the products concerned within the EEA State in question. In general, the best indicator of the capacity of the agreement to (appreciably) affect trade between EEA States is therefore considered to be the share of the national market in terms of volume that is being foreclosed. Agreements covering areas with a high concentration of demand will thus weigh more heavily than those covering areas where demand is less concentrated. For EEA jurisdiction to be established the share of the national market that is being foreclosed must be significant. |
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90.

Where an agreement forecloses access to a regional market, then for trade to be appreciably affected, the volume of sales affected must be significant in proportion to the overall volume of sales of the products concerned inside the EEA State in question. This assessment cannot be based merely on geographic coverage. The market share of the parties to the agreement must also be given fairly limited weight. Even if the parties have a high market share in a properly defined regional market, the size of that market in terms of volume may still be insignificant when compared to total sales of the products concerned within the EEA State in question. In general, the best indicator of the capacity of the agreement to (appreciably) affect trade between EEA States is therefore considered to be the share of the national market in terms of volume that is being foreclosed. Agreements covering areas with a high concentration of demand will thus weigh more heavily than those covering areas where demand is less concentrated. For EEA jurisdiction to be established the share of the national market that is being foreclosed must be significant.

| 91. | Agreements that are local in nature are in themselves not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. This is the case even if the local market is located in a border region. Conversely, if the foreclosed share of the national market is significant, trade is capable of being affected even where the market in question is not located in a border region. |
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91.

Agreements that are local in nature are in themselves not capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. This is the case even if the local market is located in a border region. Conversely, if the foreclosed share of the national market is significant, trade is capable of being affected even where the market in question is not located in a border region.

| 92. | In cases in this category some guidance may be derived from the case law concerning the concept in the corresponding Article 82 of the EC Treaty of a substantial part of the common market (73). Agreements that, for example, have the effect of hindering competitors from other EEA States from gaining access to part of an EEA State, which constitutes a substantial part of the EEA, should be considered to have an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

92.

In cases in this category some guidance may be derived from the case law concerning the concept in the corresponding Article 82 of the EC Treaty of a substantial part of the common market (73). Agreements that, for example, have the effect of hindering competitors from other EEA States from gaining access to part of an EEA State, which constitutes a substantial part of the EEA, should be considered to have an appreciable effect on trade between EEA States.

3.2.5.   Abuses of dominant positions covering a single EEA State

| 93. | Where an undertaking, which holds a dominant position covering the whole of an EEA State engages in exclusionary abuses, trade between EEA States is normally capable of being affected. Such abusive conduct will generally make it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to penetrate the market, in which case patterns of trade are capable of being affected (74). In Michelin (75), for example, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that a system of loyalty rebates foreclosed competitors from other EC Member States and therefore affected trade within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In Rennet (76) the Court of Justice similarly held that an abuse in the form of an exclusive purchasing obligation on customers foreclosed products from other EC Member States. |
| --- | --- |

93.

Where an undertaking, which holds a dominant position covering the whole of an EEA State engages in exclusionary abuses, trade between EEA States is normally capable of being affected. Such abusive conduct will generally make it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to penetrate the market, in which case patterns of trade are capable of being affected (74). In Michelin (75), for example, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that a system of loyalty rebates foreclosed competitors from other EC Member States and therefore affected trade within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In Rennet (76) the Court of Justice similarly held that an abuse in the form of an exclusive purchasing obligation on customers foreclosed products from other EC Member States.

| 94. | Exclusionary abuses that affect the competitive market structure inside an EEA State, for instance by eliminating or threatening to eliminate a competitor, may also be capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Where the undertaking that risks being eliminated only operates in a single EEA State, the abuse will normally not affect trade between EEA States. However, trade between EEA States is capable of being affected where the targeted undertaking exports to or imports from other EEA States (77) and where it also operates in other EEA States (78). An effect on trade may arise from the dissuasive impact of the abuse on other competitors. If through repeated conduct the dominant undertaking has acquired a reputation for adopting exclusionary practices towards competitors that attempt to engage in direct competition, competitors from other EEA States are likely to compete less aggressively, in which case trade may be affected, even if the victim in the case at hand is not from another EEA State. |
| --- | --- |

94.

Exclusionary abuses that affect the competitive market structure inside an EEA State, for instance by eliminating or threatening to eliminate a competitor, may also be capable of affecting trade between EEA States. Where the undertaking that risks being eliminated only operates in a single EEA State, the abuse will normally not affect trade between EEA States. However, trade between EEA States is capable of being affected where the targeted undertaking exports to or imports from other EEA States (77) and where it also operates in other EEA States (78). An effect on trade may arise from the dissuasive impact of the abuse on other competitors. If through repeated conduct the dominant undertaking has acquired a reputation for adopting exclusionary practices towards competitors that attempt to engage in direct competition, competitors from other EEA States are likely to compete less aggressively, in which case trade may be affected, even if the victim in the case at hand is not from another EEA State.

| 95. | In the case of exploitative abuses such as price discrimination and excessive pricing, the situation may be more complex. Price discrimination between domestic customers will normally not affect trade between EEA States. However, it may do so if the buyers are engaged in export activities and are disadvantaged by the discriminatory pricing or if this practice is used to prevent imports (79). Practices consisting of offering lower prices to customers that are the most likely to import products from other EEA States may make it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to enter the market. In such cases trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. |
| --- | --- |

95.

In the case of exploitative abuses such as price discrimination and excessive pricing, the situation may be more complex. Price discrimination between domestic customers will normally not affect trade between EEA States. However, it may do so if the buyers are engaged in export activities and are disadvantaged by the discriminatory pricing or if this practice is used to prevent imports (79). Practices consisting of offering lower prices to customers that are the most likely to import products from other EEA States may make it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to enter the market. In such cases trade between EEA States is capable of being affected.

| 96. | As long as an undertaking has a dominant position which covers the whole of an EEA State it is normally immaterial whether the specific abuse engaged in by the dominant undertaking only covers part of its territory or affects certain buyers within the national territory. A dominant firm can significantly impede trade by engaging in abusive conduct in the areas or vis-à-vis the customers that are the most likely to be targeted by competitors from other EEA States. For example, it may be the case that a particular channel of distribution constitutes a particularly important means of gaining access to broad categories of consumers. Hindering access to such channels can have a substantial impact on trade between EEA States. In the assessment of appreciability it must also be taken into account that the very presence of the dominant undertaking covering the whole of a EEA State is likely to make market penetration more difficult. Any abuse which makes it more difficult to enter the national market should therefore be considered to appreciably affect trade. The combination of the market position of the dominant undertaking and the anti-competitive nature of its conduct implies that such abuses have normally by their very nature an appreciable effect on trade. However, if the abuse is purely local in nature or involves only an insignificant share of the sales of the dominant undertaking within the EEA State in question, trade may not be capable of being appreciably affected. |
| --- | --- |

96.

As long as an undertaking has a dominant position which covers the whole of an EEA State it is normally immaterial whether the specific abuse engaged in by the dominant undertaking only covers part of its territory or affects certain buyers within the national territory. A dominant firm can significantly impede trade by engaging in abusive conduct in the areas or vis-à-vis the customers that are the most likely to be targeted by competitors from other EEA States. For example, it may be the case that a particular channel of distribution constitutes a particularly important means of gaining access to broad categories of consumers. Hindering access to such channels can have a substantial impact on trade between EEA States. In the assessment of appreciability it must also be taken into account that the very presence of the dominant undertaking covering the whole of a EEA State is likely to make market penetration more difficult. Any abuse which makes it more difficult to enter the national market should therefore be considered to appreciably affect trade. The combination of the market position of the dominant undertaking and the anti-competitive nature of its conduct implies that such abuses have normally by their very nature an appreciable effect on trade. However, if the abuse is purely local in nature or involves only an insignificant share of the sales of the dominant undertaking within the EEA State in question, trade may not be capable of being appreciably affected.

3.2.6.   Abuse of a dominant position covering only part of an EEA State

| 97. | Where a dominant position covers only part of an EEA State some guidance may, as in the case of agreements, be derived from the condition in Article 54 that the dominant position must cover a substantial part of the EEA. If the dominant position covers part of an EEA State that constitutes a substantial part of the EEA and the abuse makes it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to gain access to the market where the undertaking is dominant, trade between EEA States must normally be considered capable of being appreciably affected. |
| --- | --- |

97.

Where a dominant position covers only part of an EEA State some guidance may, as in the case of agreements, be derived from the condition in Article 54 that the dominant position must cover a substantial part of the EEA. If the dominant position covers part of an EEA State that constitutes a substantial part of the EEA and the abuse makes it more difficult for competitors from other EEA States to gain access to the market where the undertaking is dominant, trade between EEA States must normally be considered capable of being appreciably affected.

| 98. | In the application of this criterion regard must be had in particular to the size of the market in question in terms of volume. Regions and even a port or an airport situated in an EEA State may, depending on their importance, constitute a substantial part of the EEA (80). In the latter cases it must be taken into account whether the infrastructure in question is used to provide cross-border services and, if so, to what extent. When infrastructures such as airports and ports are important in providing cross-border services, trade between EEA States is capable of being affected. |
| --- | --- |

98.

In the application of this criterion regard must be had in particular to the size of the market in question in terms of volume. Regions and even a port or an airport situated in an EEA State may, depending on their importance, constitute a substantial part of the EEA (80). In the latter cases it must be taken into account whether the infrastructure in question is used to provide cross-border services and, if so, to what extent. When infrastructures such as airports and ports are important in providing cross-border services, trade between EEA States is capable of being affected.

| 99. | As in the case of dominant positions covering the whole of an EEA State (cf. paragraph 95 above), trade may not be capable of being appreciably affected if the abuse is purely local in nature or involves only an insignificant share of the sales of the dominant undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

99.

As in the case of dominant positions covering the whole of an EEA State (cf. paragraph 95 above), trade may not be capable of being appreciably affected if the abuse is purely local in nature or involves only an insignificant share of the sales of the dominant undertaking.

3.3.   Agreements and abuses involving imports and exports with undertakings located in third countries, and agreements and practices involving undertakings located in third countries

3.3.1.   General remarks

| 100. | Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement apply to agreements and practices that are capable of affecting trade between EEA States even if one or more of the parties are located outside the EEA (81). Articles 53 and 54 apply irrespective of where the undertakings are located or where the agreement has been concluded, provided that the agreement or practice is either implemented inside the EEA (82), or produce effects inside the EEA (83). Articles 53 and 54 may also apply to agreements and practices that cover third countries, provided that they are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The general principle set out in section 2 above according to which the agreement or practice must be capable of having an appreciable influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between EEA States, also applies in the case of agreements and abuses which involve undertakings located in third countries or which relate to imports or exports with third countries. |
| --- | --- |

100.

Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement apply to agreements and practices that are capable of affecting trade between EEA States even if one or more of the parties are located outside the EEA (81). Articles 53 and 54 apply irrespective of where the undertakings are located or where the agreement has been concluded, provided that the agreement or practice is either implemented inside the EEA (82), or produce effects inside the EEA (83). Articles 53 and 54 may also apply to agreements and practices that cover third countries, provided that they are capable of affecting trade between EEA States. The general principle set out in section 2 above according to which the agreement or practice must be capable of having an appreciable influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between EEA States, also applies in the case of agreements and abuses which involve undertakings located in third countries or which relate to imports or exports with third countries.

| 101. | For the purposes of establishing EEA law jurisdiction it is sufficient that an agreement or practice involving third countries or undertakings located in third countries is capable of affecting cross-border economic activity inside the EEA. Import into one EEA State may be sufficient to trigger effects of this nature. Imports can affect the conditions of competition in the importing EEA State, which in turn can have an impact on exports and imports of competing products to and from other EEA States. In other words, imports from third countries resulting from the agreement or practice may cause a diversion of trade between EEA States, thus affecting patterns of trade. |
| --- | --- |

101.

For the purposes of establishing EEA law jurisdiction it is sufficient that an agreement or practice involving third countries or undertakings located in third countries is capable of affecting cross-border economic activity inside the EEA. Import into one EEA State may be sufficient to trigger effects of this nature. Imports can affect the conditions of competition in the importing EEA State, which in turn can have an impact on exports and imports of competing products to and from other EEA States. In other words, imports from third countries resulting from the agreement or practice may cause a diversion of trade between EEA States, thus affecting patterns of trade.

| 102. | In the application of the effect on trade criterion to the above mentioned agreements and practices it is relevant to examine, inter alia, what is the object of the agreement or practice as indicated by its content or the underlying intent of the undertakings involved (84). |
| --- | --- |

102.

In the application of the effect on trade criterion to the above mentioned agreements and practices it is relevant to examine, inter alia, what is the object of the agreement or practice as indicated by its content or the underlying intent of the undertakings involved (84).

| 103. | Where the object of the agreement is to restrict competition inside the EEA the requisite effect on trade between EEA States is more readily established than where the object is predominantly to regulate competition outside the EEA. Indeed in the former case the agreement or practice has a direct impact on competition inside the EEA and trade between EEA States. Such agreements and practices, which may concern both imports and exports, are normally by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States. |
| --- | --- |

103.

Where the object of the agreement is to restrict competition inside the EEA the requisite effect on trade between EEA States is more readily established than where the object is predominantly to regulate competition outside the EEA. Indeed in the former case the agreement or practice has a direct impact on competition inside the EEA and trade between EEA States. Such agreements and practices, which may concern both imports and exports, are normally by their very nature capable of affecting trade between EEA States.

3.3.2.   Arrangements that have as their object the restriction of competition inside the EEA

| 104. | In the case of imports, this category includes agreements that bring about an isolation of the territory covered by the EEA Agreement (85). This is, for instance, the case of agreements whereby competitors in the EEA and in third countries share markets, e.g. by agreeing not to sell in each other's home markets or by concluding reciprocal (exclusive) distribution agreements (86). |
| --- | --- |

104.

In the case of imports, this category includes agreements that bring about an isolation of the territory covered by the EEA Agreement (85). This is, for instance, the case of agreements whereby competitors in the EEA and in third countries share markets, e.g. by agreeing not to sell in each other's home markets or by concluding reciprocal (exclusive) distribution agreements (86).

| 105. | In the case of exports, this category includes cases where undertakings that compete in two or more EEA States agree to export certain (surplus) quantities to third countries with a view to co-ordinating their market conduct inside the EEA. Such export agreements serve to reduce price competition by limiting output inside the EEA, thereby affecting trade between EEA States. Without the export agreement these quantities might have been sold inside the EEA (87). |
| --- | --- |

105.

In the case of exports, this category includes cases where undertakings that compete in two or more EEA States agree to export certain (surplus) quantities to third countries with a view to co-ordinating their market conduct inside the EEA. Such export agreements serve to reduce price competition by limiting output inside the EEA, thereby affecting trade between EEA States. Without the export agreement these quantities might have been sold inside the EEA (87).

3.3.3.   Other arrangements

| 106. | In the case of agreements and practices whose object is not to restrict competition inside the EEA, it is normally necessary to proceed with a more detailed analysis of whether or not cross-border economic activity inside the EEA, and thus patterns of trade between EEA States, are capable of being affected. |
| --- | --- |

106.

In the case of agreements and practices whose object is not to restrict competition inside the EEA, it is normally necessary to proceed with a more detailed analysis of whether or not cross-border economic activity inside the EEA, and thus patterns of trade between EEA States, are capable of being affected.

| 107. | In this regard it is relevant to examine the effects of the agreement or practice on customers and other operators inside the EEA that rely on the products of the undertakings that are parties to the agreement or practice (88). In Compagnie maritime belge (89), which concerned agreements between shipping companies operating between Community ports and West African ports, the agreements were held to be capable of indirectly affecting trade between EC Member States because they altered the catchment areas of the Community ports covered by the agreements and because they affected the activities of other undertakings inside those areas. More specifically, the agreements affected the activities of undertakings that relied on the parties for transportation services, either as a means of transporting goods purchased in third countries or sold there, or as an important input into the services that the ports themselves offered. |
| --- | --- |

107.

In this regard it is relevant to examine the effects of the agreement or practice on customers and other operators inside the EEA that rely on the products of the undertakings that are parties to the agreement or practice (88). In Compagnie maritime belge (89), which concerned agreements between shipping companies operating between Community ports and West African ports, the agreements were held to be capable of indirectly affecting trade between EC Member States because they altered the catchment areas of the Community ports covered by the agreements and because they affected the activities of other undertakings inside those areas. More specifically, the agreements affected the activities of undertakings that relied on the parties for transportation services, either as a means of transporting goods purchased in third countries or sold there, or as an important input into the services that the ports themselves offered.

| 108. | Trade may also be capable of being affected when the agreement prevents re-imports into the EEA. This may, for example, be the case with vertical agreements between EEA suppliers and third country distributors, imposing restrictions on resale outside an allocated territory, including the EEA. If in the absence of the agreement resale to the EEA would be possible and likely, such imports may be capable of affecting patterns of trade inside the EEA (90). |
| --- | --- |

108.

Trade may also be capable of being affected when the agreement prevents re-imports into the EEA. This may, for example, be the case with vertical agreements between EEA suppliers and third country distributors, imposing restrictions on resale outside an allocated territory, including the EEA. If in the absence of the agreement resale to the EEA would be possible and likely, such imports may be capable of affecting patterns of trade inside the EEA (90).

| 109. | However, for such effects to be likely, there must be an appreciable difference between the prices of the products charged in the EEA and those charged outside the EEA, and this price difference must not be eroded by customs duties and transport costs. In addition, the product volumes exported compared to the total market for those products in the territory of the EEA market must not be insignificant (91). If these product volumes are insignificant compared to those sold inside the EEA, the impact of any re-importation on trade between EEA States is considered not to be appreciable. In making this assessment, regard must be had not only to the individual agreement concluded between the parties, but also to any cumulative effect of similar agreements concluded by the same and competing suppliers. It may be, for example, that the product volumes covered by a single agreement are quite small, but that the product volumes covered by several such agreements are significant. In that case the agreements taken as a whole may be capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. It should be recalled, however (cf. paragraph 49 above), that the individual agreement or network of agreements must make a significant contribution to the overall effect on trade. |
| --- | --- |

109.

However, for such effects to be likely, there must be an appreciable difference between the prices of the products charged in the EEA and those charged outside the EEA, and this price difference must not be eroded by customs duties and transport costs. In addition, the product volumes exported compared to the total market for those products in the territory of the EEA market must not be insignificant (91). If these product volumes are insignificant compared to those sold inside the EEA, the impact of any re-importation on trade between EEA States is considered not to be appreciable. In making this assessment, regard must be had not only to the individual agreement concluded between the parties, but also to any cumulative effect of similar agreements concluded by the same and competing suppliers. It may be, for example, that the product volumes covered by a single agreement are quite small, but that the product volumes covered by several such agreements are significant. In that case the agreements taken as a whole may be capable of appreciably affecting trade between EEA States. It should be recalled, however (cf. paragraph 49 above), that the individual agreement or network of agreements must make a significant contribution to the overall effect on trade.

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(1)  OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 81.

(2)  The competence to handle individual cases falling under Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement is divided between the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission according to the rules laid down in Article 56 of the EEA Agreement. Only one of the surveillance authorities is competent to handle any given case.

(3)  Article 6 of the EEA Agreement provides that, without prejudice to future developments of case-law, the provisions of this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and to acts adopted in application of these two treaties, shall in their implementation and application, be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of signature of the EEA Agreement. As regards relevant rulings by the Court of Justice given after the date of signature of the EEA Agreement, it follows from Article 3(2) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement that the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court shall pay due account to the principles laid down by these rulings.

(4)  EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (de minimis), OJ C 67, 20.3.2003, p. 20 and EEA Supplement to the OJ No 15, 20.3.2003, p. 11.

(5)  When the Agreement amending Protocol 4 to the Agreement of the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice of 24 September 2004 has entered into force, Chapter II of Protocol 4 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement will reflect to a large extent in the EFTA pillar Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ L 1, 4.1. 2003, p. 1).

(6)  See e.g. Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR p. 429, and Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents, [1974] ECR p. 223.

(7)  See in this respect Case 22/71, Béguelin, [1971] ECR p. 949, paragraph 16 and EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision in NSF, OJ L 284, 16.10.1997, p 68, paragraph 77.

(8)  See Case 193/83, Windsurfing, [1986] ECR p. 611, paragraph 96, and Case T-77/94, Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijprodukten, [1997] ECR II-759, paragraph 126.

(9)  See paragraphs 142 to 144 of the judgment in Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijprodukteten cited in the previous footnote.

(10)  See e.g. Case T-2/89, Petrofina, [1991] ECR II-1087, paragraph 226.

(11)  The concept of appreciability is dealt with in section 2.4 below.

(12)  See in this respect Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, [1979] ECR p. 461, paragraph 126.

(13)  Throughout these guidelines the term ‘products’ covers both goods and services.

(14)  See Case 172/80, Züchner, [1981] ECR p. 2021, paragraph 18. See also Case C-309/99, Wouters, [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 95, Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, [2001] ECR I-8089, paragraph 49, Joined Cases C-215/96 and 216/96, Bagnasco, [1999] ECR I-135, paragraph 51, Case C-55/96, Job Centre, [1997] ECR I-7119, paragraph 37, and Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser, [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 33.

(15)  See e.g. Joined Cases T-24/93 and others, Compagnie maritime belge, [1996] ECR II-1201, paragraph 203, and paragraph 23 of the judgment in Commercial Solvents cited in footnote 6.

(16)  See e.g. Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK and FNK, [1997] ECR II-1739, and sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.6 below.

(17)  See section 3.2 below.

(18)  See e.g. the judgment in Züchner cited in footnote 14 and Case 319/82, Kerpen & Kerpen, [1983] ECR 4173, Joined Cases 240/82 and others, Stichting Sigarettenindustrie, [1985] ECR p. 3831, paragraph 48, and Joined Cases T-25/95 and others, Cimenteries CBR, [2000] ECR II-491, paragraph 3930.

(19)  In some judgments mainly relating to vertical agreements the Court of Justice of the European Communities has added wording to the effect that the agreement was capable of hindering the attainment of the objectives of a single market between EC Member States, see e.g. Case T-62/98, Volkswagen, [2000] ECR II-2707, paragraph 179, and paragraph 47 of the Bagnasco judgment cited in footnote 14, and Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, [1966] ECR 337. The impact of an agreement on the functioning of the EEA Agreement is thus a factor which can be taken into account.

(20)  See e.g. Case E-7-01, Hegelstad Eiendomsselskap Arvid B. Hegelstad and others and Hydro Texaco AS, [2002] EFTA Court Report p 310 and Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar, [1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 170, and Case 19/77, Miller, [1978] ECR 131, paragraph 15.

(21)  See e.g. Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim. [1994] ECR II-5641, paragraph 54.

(22)  See e.g. Case C-306/96, Javico, [1998] ECR I-1983, paragraph 17, and paragraph 18 of the judgment in Béguelin cited in footnote 7.

(23)  Compare in this respect the judgments in Bagnasco and Wouters cited in footnote 14.

(24)  See e.g. Case T-141/89, Tréfileurope, [1995] ECR II-791, Case T-29/92, Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid (SPO), [1995] ECR II-289, as far as exports were concerned, and Commission Decision in Volkswagen (II), OJ L 262, 2.10.2001, p. 14.

(25)  See in this respect Case 71/74, Frubo, [1975] ECR 563, paragraph 38, Joined Cases 209/78 and others, Van Landewyck, [1980] ECR 3125, paragraph 172, Case T-61/89, Dansk Pelsdyravler Forening, [1992] ECR II-1931, paragraph 143, and Case T-65/89, BPB Industries and British Gypsum, [1993] ECR II-389, paragraph 135.

(26)  See in this respect Case T-86/95, Compagnie Générale Maritime and others, [2002] ECR II-1011, paragraph 148, and paragraph 202 of the judgment in Compagnie maritime belge cited in footnote 15.

(27)  See Case 123/83, BNIC v Clair, [1985] ECR 391, paragraph 29. See also EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision in NSF, paragraph 79, footnote 7.

(28)  See Commission Decision in Zanussi, OJ L 322, 16.11.1978, p. 36, paragraph 11.

(29)  See in this respect Case 31/85, ETA Fabrique d'Ebauches, [1985] ECR 3933, paragraphs 12 and 13.

(30)  See Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE (Magill), [1995] ECR I-743, paragraph 70, and Case 107/82, AEG, [1983] ECR 3151, paragraph 60.

(31)  See paragraph 60 of the AEG judgment cited in the previous footnote.

(32)  See Case 5/69, Völk, [1969] ECR 295, paragraph 7.

(33)  See e.g. paragraph 17 of the judgment in Javico cited in footnote 22, and paragraph 138 of the judgment in BPB Industries and British Gypsum cited in footnote 25.

(34)  See paragraph 138 of the judgment in BPB Industries and British Gypsum cited in footnote 25.

(35)  See e.g. paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Miller judgment cited in footnote 20, and paragraph 58 of the AEG judgment cited in footnote 30.

(36)  See Joined Cases 100/80 and others, Musique Diffusion Française, [1983] ECR p. 1825, paragraph 86. In that case the products in question accounted for just above 3 % of sales on the national markets concerned. The Court of Justice of the European Communities held that the agreements, which hindered parallel trade, were capable of appreciably affecting trade between EC Member States due to the high turnover of the parties and the relative market position of the products, compared to those of products produced by competing suppliers.

(37)  See in this respect paragraphs 179 and 231 of the Volkswagen judgment cited in footnote 16, and Case T-213/00, CMA CGM and others, [2003] ECR I-, paragraphs 219 and 220.

(38)  See e.g. Case T-7/93, Langnese-Iglo, [1995] ECR II-1533, paragraph 120.

(39)  See paragraphs 140 and 141 of the judgment in Vereniging van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijprodukten cited in footnote 8. See also the judgment in Hegelstad cited in footnote 20.

(40)  See EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance, footnote 4, paragraph 3.

(41)  This decision referred to the definition of small and medium size enterprises laid down in the European Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC (OJ L 107, 30.4.1996, p. 4). With effect from 1.1.2005 this recommendation has been replaced by Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision of 25 September 2004 No 131/2004 (OJ L 64, 10.3.2005, p. 67 and EEA Supplement to the OJ, 10.3.2005, p. 49).

(42)  The term ‘undertakings concerned’ shall include connected undertakings as defined in paragraph 12.2 of the EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on agreements of minor importance, see footnote 4 above.

(43)  See the previous footnote.

(44)  When defining the relevant market, reference should be had to the notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of competition law within the EEA (OJ L 200, 16.7.1998, p. 48 and EEA Supplement to the OJ No 28, 16.7.1998, p. 3).

(45)  See also paragraph 14 above.

(46)  See paragraph 8 of the judgment in Kerpen & Kerpen cited in footnote 18. It should be noted that the Court of Justice of the European Communities does not refer to market share but to the share of French exports and to the product volumes involved.

(47)  See e.g. the judgment in Volkswagen cited in footnote 16 and Case T-175/95, BASF Coatings, [1999] ECR II-1581. For a horizontal agreement to prevent parallel trade see Joined Cases 96/82 and others, IAZ International, [1983] ECR 3369, paragraph 27.

(48)  See e.g. Case T-142/89, Usines Gustave Boël, [1995] ECR II-867, paragraph 102.

(49)  Horizontal cooperation agreements are dealt with in the EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on Guidelines on the applicability of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to horizontal cooperation agreements (OJ C 266, 31.10.2002, p. 1 and EEA Supplement to the OJ No 55, 31.10.2002, p. 1). Those guidelines deal with the substantive competition assessment of various types of agreements but do not deal with the effect on trade issue.

(50)  See the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement (Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004) on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ, L 24, 29.1.2004, p.1 (as incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 78/2004 of 4 June 2004, OJ L 219, 19.6.2004, p. 13 and EEA Supplement to the OJ No 32, 19.6.2004, p. 1).

(51)  The Commission has issued a Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures under the Merger Regulation, OJ C 66, 2.3.1998, p. 1, which gives guidance on the scope of this concept. The EFTA Surveillance Authority has so far not adopted any notices in the field of concentrations. However, the Authority applies the principles set out in the Commission merger notices whenever relevant.

(52)  See e.g. the Commission Decision in Ford/Volkswagen, OJ L 20, 28.1.1993, p. 14.

(53)  See in this respect paragraph 146 of the Compagnie Générale Maritime judgment cited in footnote 26 above.

(54)  See in this respect Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82, VBVB and VBBB, [1984] ECR 19, paragraph 9.

(55)  See in this respect Case T-66/89, Publishers Association, [1992] ECR II-1995.

(56)  See in this respect the judgment in Commercial Solvents cited in footnote 6, in the judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche, cited in footnote 12, paragraph 125, and in RTE and ITP cited in footnote 30, as well as Case 6/72, Continental Can, [1973] ECR 215, paragraph 16, and Case 27/76, United Brands, [1978] ECR 207, paragraphs 197 to 203.

(57)  See paragraphs 32 and 33 of the judgment in Commercial Solvents cited in footnote 7.

(58)  According to settled case law dominance is a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to act to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers, see e.g. paragraph 38 of the judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche cited in footnote 12.

(59)  See for a recent example paragraph 95 of the Wouters judgment cited in footnote 14.

(60)  See e.g. Case 246/86, Belasco, [1989] ECR 2117, paragraph 32-38.

(61)  See paragraph 34 of the Belasco judgment cited in the previous footnote and more recently Joined Cases T-202/98 a.o., British Sugar, [2001] ECR II-2035, paragraph 79. On the other hand this is not so when the market is not susceptible to imports, see paragraph 51 of the Bagnasco judgment cited in footnote 14.

(62)  Guarantees for current account credit facilities.

(63)  See paragraph 51 of the Bagnasco judgment cited in footnote 14.

(64)  See in this respect Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer, [1987] ECR 405, paragraph 50, and Case C-7/95 P, John Deere, [1998] ECR I-3111. See also paragraph 172 of the judgment in Van Landewyck cited in footnote 25, where the Court of Justice of the European Communities stressed that the agreement in question reduced appreciably the incentive to sell imported products.

(65)  See e.g. the judgment in Stichting Sigarettenindustrie, cited in footnote 18, paragraphs 49 and 50.

(66)  See in this respect Case T-22/97, Kesko, [1999] ECR II-3775, paragraph 109.

(67)  See e.g. Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods, [2003] ECR II-, and the judgment in Langnese-Iglo, cited in footnote 38 paragraph 120.

(68)  See e.g. judgment of 7.12.2000, Case C-214/99, Neste, [2000] ECR I-11121.

(69)  See judgment of 28.2.1991, Case C-234/89, Delimitis, [1991] ECR I-935.

(70)  See paragraph 120 of the Langnese-Iglo judgment cited in footnote 38. See also the judgment in Hegelstad cited in footnote 20.

(71)  See e.g. Commission Decision in Volkswagen (II), cited in footnote 24, paragraphs 81 et seq.

(72)  See in this respect paragraphs 177 to 181 of the judgment in SCK and FNK cited in footnote 16.

(73)  See as to this notion the judgment in Ambulanz Glöckner, cited in footnote 14, paragraph 38, and Case C-179/90, Merci convenzionali porto di Genova, [1991] ECR I-5889, and Case C-242/95, GT-Link, [1997] ECR I-4449.

(74)  See e.g. paragraph 135 of the judgment in BPB Industries and British Gypsum cited in footnote 25.

(75)  See Case 322/81, Nederlandse Banden Industrie Michelin, [1983] ECR 3461

(76)  See Case 61/80, Coöperative Stremsel- en Kleurselfabriek, [1981] ECR 851, paragraph 15.

(77)  See in this respect judgment in Irish Sugar, cited in footnote 20 paragraph 169.

(78)  See paragraph 70 of the judgment in RTE (Magill) cited in footnote 30.

(79)  See the judgment in Irish Sugar cited in footnote 20.

(80)  See e.g. the case law cited in footnote 73.

(81)  See in this respect Case 28/77, Tepea, [1978] ECR 1391, paragraph 48, and paragraph 16 of the judgment in Continental Can cited in footnote 56.

(82)  See Joined Cases C-89/85 and others, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö (Woodpulp), [1988] ECR 651, paragraph 16.

(83)  See in this respect Case T-102/96, Gencor, [1999] ECR II-753, which applies the effects test in the field of mergers.

(84)  See to that effect paragraph 19 of the judgment in Javico cited in footnote 22.

(85)  See in this respect Case 51/75, EMI v CBS, [1976] ECR 811, paragraphs 28 and 29.

(86)  See Commission Decision in Siemens/Fanuc, OJ L 376, 31.12.1985, p. 29.

(87)  See in this respect Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83, CRAM and Rheinzinc, [1984] ECR 1679, and Joined Cases 40/73 and others, Suiker Unie, [1975] ECR 1663, paragraphs 564 and 580.

(88)  See paragraph 22 of the judgment in Javico cited in footnote 22.

(89)  See paragraph 203 of the judgment in Compagnie maritime belge cited in footnote 15.

(90)  See in this respect the judgment in Javico cited in footnote 22.

(91)  See in this respect paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Javico judgment cited in footnote 22.

---

Standing Committee of the EFTA States

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/66 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/66

---

EMAS

The Eco-Management and Audit Scheme

List of registered sites in Norway in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the council of 19 March 2001

(2006/C 291/18)

| Registration Number | Company name and address | Tel.
  Fax
  E-mail | Contact person | Industrial sector |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NO-000005 | Kraft Foods Norge AS, avd Disenå |
| N-2114 Disenå |

Registration Number

Company name and address

Tel.

Fax

E-mail

Contact person

Industrial sector

NO-000005

Kraft Foods Norge AS, avd Disenå

N-2114 Disenå

(47) 62 96 82 00

(47) 62 96 82 50

kmellem@krafteurope.com

Kari Benterud Mellem

15.31

NO-000015

| Rescon Mapei AS |
| --- |
| Vallsetveien 6 |
| N-2120 Sagstua |

Rescon Mapei AS

Vallsetveien 6

N-2120 Sagstua

(47) 62 97 20 00

(47) 62 97 20 99

alan.ulstad@resconmapei.no

Alan K. Ulstad

24.66

NO-000016

| Håg ASA |
| --- |
| Sundveien |
| N-7460 Røros |

Håg ASA

Sundveien

N-7460 Røros

(47) 72 40 72 00

(47) 72 40 72 72

mbf@hag.no

Maj Britt Fjerdingen

36.11

NO-000017

| Gyproc AS |
| --- |
| Habornv 59 |
| N-1631 Gamle Fredrikstad |

Gyproc AS

Habornv 59

N-1631 Gamle Fredrikstad

(47) 69 35 75 00

(47) 69 35 75 01

gyprocno@gyproc.com

Jon Gjerløw

26.62

NO-000034

| Savo AS |
| --- |
| Fyrstikkbakken 7 |
| N-0667 Oslo |

Savo AS

Fyrstikkbakken 7

N-0667 Oslo

(47) 22 91 67 00

(47) 22 63 12 09

Birgit Madsen

31.11

NO-000044

| Hydro Aluminium Profiler AS, Magnor |
| --- |
| Gaustadveien |
| N-2240 Magnor |

Hydro Aluminium Profiler AS, Magnor

Gaustadveien

N-2240 Magnor

(47) 62 83 34 15

(47) 62 83 33 00

oyvind.aasen@hydro.com

Øyvind Aasen

27.422

NO-000059

| Ørsta Gruppen AS |
| --- |
| N-6151 Ørsta |

Ørsta Gruppen AS

N-6151 Ørsta

(47) 70 04 70 00

(47) 70 04 70 04

firmapost@orstastaal.no

Rolf O. Hjelle

28.1

NO-000063

| Pyrox AS |
| --- |
| N-5685 Uggdal |

Pyrox AS

N-5685 Uggdal

(47) 53 43 04 00

(47) 53 43 04 04

Eirik Helgesen

29.2

NO-000071

| Forestia AS |
| --- |
| Avd Kvam |
| N-2650 Kvam |

Forestia AS

Avd Kvam

N-2650 Kvam

(47) 62 42 82 00

(47) 61 29 25 30

kvam@forestia.com

Harvey Rønningen

20.200

NO-000083

| Total E & P Norge AS |
| --- |
| Finnestadveien 44 |
| N-4029 Stavanger |

Total E & P Norge AS

Finnestadveien 44

N-4029 Stavanger

(47) 51 50 39 18

(47) 51 50 31 40

firmapost@ep.total.no

Ulf Einar Moltu

11.100

NO-000085

| Kährs Brumunddal AS |
| --- |
| Nygata 4 |
| N-2380 Brumunddal |

Kährs Brumunddal AS

Nygata 4

N-2380 Brumunddal

(47) 62 36 23 00

(47) 62 36 23 01

Knut Midtbruket

20.200

NO-000086

| Grøset Trykk AS |
| --- |
| N-2260 Kirkenær |

Grøset Trykk AS

N-2260 Kirkenær

(47) 62 94 65 00

(47) 62 99 65 01

firmapost@groset.no

Mari L Breen

22.22

NO-000087

| Norske Skogindustrier ASA |
| --- |
| Follum |
| N-3505 Hønefoss |

Norske Skogindustrier ASA

Follum

N-3505 Hønefoss

(47) 32 11 21 00

(47) 32 11 22 00

astrid.broch-due@norske-skog.com

Astrid Broch-Due

21.12

NO-000090

| AS Oppland Metall |
| --- |
| Mattisrudsvingen 2 |
| N-2827 Hunndalen |

AS Oppland Metall

Mattisrudsvingen 2

N-2827 Hunndalen

(47) 61 18 76 70

(47) 61 17 04 71

firmapost@opplandmetall.no

Knut Sørlie

37.00, 60.2

NO-000092

| Forestia AS |
| --- |
| Braskereidfoss |
| N-2435 Braskereidfoss |

Forestia AS

Braskereidfoss

N-2435 Braskereidfoss

(47) 62 42 82 00

(47) 62 42 82 78

braskeriedfoss@forestia.com

Per Olav Løken

20.200

NO-000095

| Grip Senter |
| --- |
| Storgata 23 C |
| N-0184 Oslo |

Grip Senter

Storgata 23 C

N-0184 Oslo

(47) 22 97 98 00

(47) 22 42 75 10

eva-britt.isager@grip.no

Eva Britt Isager

74.2

NO-000096

| Gjøvik Land og Toten Interkommunale Avfallsselskap DA |
| --- |
| Dalborgmarka 100 |
| N-2827 Hunndalen |

Gjøvik Land og Toten Interkommunale Avfallsselskap DA

Dalborgmarka 100

N-2827 Hunndalen

(47) 61 14 55 80

(47) 61 13 22 45

post@glt-avfall.no

Bjørn E. Berg

90

NO-000097

| Hydro Polymers AS |
| --- |
| Rafnes |
| N-3966 Stathelle |

Hydro Polymers AS

Rafnes

N-3966 Stathelle

(47) 35 00 60 94

(47) 35 00 52 98

nils.eirik.stamland@hydro.com

Nils Eirik Stamland

24.140

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/68

---

Amendments to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice

(2006/C 291/19)

The Agreements amending Protocol 4 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice signed in Brussels on 11 March 2005 and 10 March 2006 entered into force on 27 March 2006.

These Agreements and the updated consolidated version of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice have now been published on the EFTA Secretariat's website.

They can be found through the following links:

| | http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/legaldocuments/ESAAndEFTACourtAgreement/Amendments |
| --- | --- |

http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/legaldocuments/ESAAndEFTACourtAgreement/Amendments

| | http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/legaldocuments/ESAAndEFTACourtAgreement/Documents/ |
| --- | --- |

http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/legaldocuments/ESAAndEFTACourtAgreement/Documents/

---

| 30.11.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 291/69 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 291/69

---

List of marketing authorisations granted by the EEA EFTA States for the second half of 2005

(2006/C 291/20)

With reference to EEA Joint Committee Decision No 74/1999 of 28 May 1999, the EEA Joint Committee is invited to note, at the meeting on 2 June 2006, the following lists concerning marketing authorisations for medicinal products for the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| Annex I | List of new marketing authorisations |
| --- | --- |
| Annex II | List of renewed marketing authorisations |
| Annex III | List of extended marketing authorisations |
| Annex IV | List of withdrawn marketing authorisations |
| Annex V | List of suspended marketing authorisations |

Annex I

List of new marketing authorisations

Annex II

List of renewed marketing authorisations

Annex III

List of extended marketing authorisations

Annex IV

List of withdrawn marketing authorisations

Annex V

List of suspended marketing authorisations

---

ANNEX I

1.   New Marketing Authorisations:

The following marketing authorisations have been granted in the EEA EFTA States during the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| EU-Number | Product | Country | Date of authorisation |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EU/1/00/129/001-003 | Azopt | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/131/001-030 | PegIntron | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/134/008-011 | Lantus | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/135/002 | DaTSCAN | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/009-010 | NovoMix | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/011-016 | NovoMix | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/017-022 | NovoMix | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/01/198/007-010 | Glivec | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/02/215/001/NO-010/NO | Pritor Plus | Norway | 7.9.2005 |
| EU/1/02/227/003 | Neulasta | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/02/228/003 | Neupopeg | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/03/255/001-003 | Ventavis | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/03/258/013-014 | Avandamet | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/03/263/001-003/IS | Dukoral, Suspension of vaccine and effervescent granules for oral solution | Iceland | 6.10.2005 |
| EU/1/03/265/003-004 | Bonviva | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/03/266/003-004 | Bondenza | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/03/269/001 | Faslodex | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/03/270/003 | Kentera | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/021-032 | Abilify | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/033-035 | Abilify | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/04/279/030-032 | Lyrica | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/04/280/007 | Yentreve | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/04/283/007 | Ariclaim | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/04/289/002 | Angiox | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/296/005-006 | Cymbalta | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/297/005-006 | Xeristar | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/05/310/001/NO-005/NO | Fosavance | Norway | 6.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/310/001-005 | Fosavance | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/310/001-005/IS | Fosavance tablets | Iceland | 20.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/311/001/NO-003/NO | Tarceva | Norway | 26.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/311/001-003 | Tarceva | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/311/001-003/IS | Tarceva | Iceland | 18.10.2005 |
| EU/1/05/312/001/IS | Xyrem | Iceland | 18.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/312/001/NO | Xyrem | Norway | 18.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/313/001/NO-009/NO | Vasovist | Norway | 14.10.2005 |
| EU/1/05/313/001-009 | Vasovist | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/313/001-009/IS | Vasovist | Iceland | 2.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/314/001 | Kepivance | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/314/001/IS | Kepivance | Iceland | 24.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/314/001/NO | Kepivance | Norway | 22.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/315/001 | Aptivus | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/315/001/IS | Aptivus | Iceland | 25.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/315/001/NO | Aptivus | Norway | 2.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/316/001/NO-014/NO | Procoralan | Norway | 10.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/316/001-014 | Procoralan | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/316/001-014/IS | Procoralan | Iceland | 24.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/317/001/NO-014/NO | Corlentor | Norway | 10.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/317/001-014 | Corlentor | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/317/001-014/IS | Corlentor | Iceland | 24.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/318/001 | Revatio | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/318/001/IS | Revatio | Iceland | 28.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/318/001/NO | Revatio | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/319/001/NO-002/NO | Xolair | Norway | 7.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/319/001-002 | Xolair | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/319/001-002/IS | Xolair | Iceland | 25.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/320/001 | Noxafil | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/320/001/IS | Noxafil | Iceland | 20.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/320/001/NO | Noxafil | Norway | 23.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/321/001 | Posaconazole SP | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/321/001/IS | Posaconazole SP | Iceland | 24.11.2005 |
| EU/1/05/321/001/NO | Posaconazole SP | Norway | 23.11.2005 |
| EU/2/01/030/003-004 | Virbagen Omega | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/04/047/001-002/IS | Purevax RCPCh Fel V, powder and solv. for susp. for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/04/048/001-002/IS | Purevax RCP Fel V, powder and solv. for susp. for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/04/049/001-002/IS | Purevax RCCh, powder and solvent for suspension for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/04/050/001-002/IS | Purevax RCPCh, powder and solv. for susp. for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/04/051/001-002/IS | Purevax RC, powder and solvent for suspension for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/04/052/001-002/IS | Purevax RCP, powder and solvent for suspension for injection | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/2/05/053/001 | Naxcel | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/2/05/053/001/IS | Naxcel, suspension for injection | Iceland | 9.6.2005 |
| EU/2/05/053/001/NO | Naxcel | Norway | 17.6.2005 |
| EU/2/05/054/001/NO-017/NO | Profender | Norway | 30.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/054/001-017 | Profender | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/05/054/001-017/IS | Profender Spot-on solution | Iceland | 26.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/055/001/NO-002/NO | Equilis Te | Norway | 12.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/055/001-002 | Equilis Te | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/05/055/001-002/IS | Equilis Te, susp. for injection | Iceland | 2.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/056/001/NO-002/NO | Equilis Prequenza | Norway | 12.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/056/001-002 | Equilis Prequenza | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/05/056/001-002/IS | Equilis Prequenza, susp. for injection | Iceland | 2.08.2005 |
| EU/2/05/057/001/NO-002/NO | Equilis Prequenza Te | Norway | 12.8.2005 |
| EU/2/05/057/001-002 | Equilis Prequenza Te | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/05/057/001-002/IS | Equilis Prequenza Te, susp. for injection | Iceland | 2.8.2005 |
| EU/2/97/004/011 | Metacam | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/2/97/004/012-013 | Metacam | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |

EU-Number

Product

Country

Date of authorisation

EU/1/00/129/001-003

Azopt

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/00/131/001-030

PegIntron

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/134/008-011

Lantus

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/135/002

DaTSCAN

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/142/009-010

NovoMix

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/142/011-016

NovoMix

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/142/017-022

NovoMix

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/01/198/007-010

Glivec

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/02/215/001/NO-010/NO

Pritor Plus

Norway

7.9.2005

EU/1/02/227/003

Neulasta

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/02/228/003

Neupopeg

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/03/255/001-003

Ventavis

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/03/258/013-014

Avandamet

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/03/263/001-003/IS

Dukoral, Suspension of vaccine and effervescent granules for oral solution

Iceland

6.10.2005

EU/1/03/265/003-004

Bonviva

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/03/266/003-004

Bondenza

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/03/269/001

Faslodex

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/03/270/003

Kentera

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/021-032

Abilify

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/033-035

Abilify

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/04/279/030-032

Lyrica

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/04/280/007

Yentreve

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/04/283/007

Ariclaim

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/04/289/002

Angiox

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/04/296/005-006

Cymbalta

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/04/297/005-006

Xeristar

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/05/310/001/NO-005/NO

Fosavance

Norway

6.9.2005

EU/1/05/310/001-005

Fosavance

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/05/310/001-005/IS

Fosavance tablets

Iceland

20.9.2005

EU/1/05/311/001/NO-003/NO

Tarceva

Norway

26.9.2005

EU/1/05/311/001-003

Tarceva

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/05/311/001-003/IS

Tarceva

Iceland

18.10.2005

EU/1/05/312/001/IS

Xyrem

Iceland

18.11.2005

EU/1/05/312/001/NO

Xyrem

Norway

18.11.2005

EU/1/05/313/001/NO-009/NO

Vasovist

Norway

14.10.2005

EU/1/05/313/001-009

Vasovist

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/313/001-009/IS

Vasovist

Iceland

2.11.2005

EU/1/05/314/001

Kepivance

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/314/001/IS

Kepivance

Iceland

24.11.2005

EU/1/05/314/001/NO

Kepivance

Norway

22.11.2005

EU/1/05/315/001

Aptivus

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/315/001/IS

Aptivus

Iceland

25.11.2005

EU/1/05/315/001/NO

Aptivus

Norway

2.11.2005

EU/1/05/316/001/NO-014/NO

Procoralan

Norway

10.11.2005

EU/1/05/316/001-014

Procoralan

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/316/001-014/IS

Procoralan

Iceland

24.11.2005

EU/1/05/317/001/NO-014/NO

Corlentor

Norway

10.11.2005

EU/1/05/317/001-014

Corlentor

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/317/001-014/IS

Corlentor

Iceland

24.11.2005

EU/1/05/318/001

Revatio

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/318/001/IS

Revatio

Iceland

28.11.2005

EU/1/05/318/001/NO

Revatio

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/05/319/001/NO-002/NO

Xolair

Norway

7.11.2005

EU/1/05/319/001-002

Xolair

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/319/001-002/IS

Xolair

Iceland

25.11.2005

EU/1/05/320/001

Noxafil

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/320/001/IS

Noxafil

Iceland

20.11.2005

EU/1/05/320/001/NO

Noxafil

Norway

23.11.2005

EU/1/05/321/001

Posaconazole SP

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/05/321/001/IS

Posaconazole SP

Iceland

24.11.2005

EU/1/05/321/001/NO

Posaconazole SP

Norway

23.11.2005

EU/2/01/030/003-004

Virbagen Omega

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/04/047/001-002/IS

Purevax RCPCh Fel V, powder and solv. for susp. for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/04/048/001-002/IS

Purevax RCP Fel V, powder and solv. for susp. for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/04/049/001-002/IS

Purevax RCCh, powder and solvent for suspension for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/04/050/001-002/IS

Purevax RCPCh, powder and solv. for susp. for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/04/051/001-002/IS

Purevax RC, powder and solvent for suspension for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/04/052/001-002/IS

Purevax RCP, powder and solvent for suspension for injection

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/2/05/053/001

Naxcel

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/2/05/053/001/IS

Naxcel, suspension for injection

Iceland

9.6.2005

EU/2/05/053/001/NO

Naxcel

Norway

17.6.2005

EU/2/05/054/001/NO-017/NO

Profender

Norway

30.8.2005

EU/2/05/054/001-017

Profender

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/05/054/001-017/IS

Profender Spot-on solution

Iceland

26.8.2005

EU/2/05/055/001/NO-002/NO

Equilis Te

Norway

12.8.2005

EU/2/05/055/001-002

Equilis Te

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/05/055/001-002/IS

Equilis Te, susp. for injection

Iceland

2.8.2005

EU/2/05/056/001/NO-002/NO

Equilis Prequenza

Norway

12.8.2005

EU/2/05/056/001-002

Equilis Prequenza

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/05/056/001-002/IS

Equilis Prequenza, susp. for injection

Iceland

2.08.2005

EU/2/05/057/001/NO-002/NO

Equilis Prequenza Te

Norway

12.8.2005

EU/2/05/057/001-002

Equilis Prequenza Te

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/05/057/001-002/IS

Equilis Prequenza Te, susp. for injection

Iceland

2.8.2005

EU/2/97/004/011

Metacam

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/2/97/004/012-013

Metacam

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

---

ANNEX II

2.   Renewed Marketing Authorisations

The following marketing authorisations have been renewed in the EEA EFTA States during the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| EU-Number | Product | Country | Date of renewal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EU/1/00/129/001/NO-003/NO | Azopt | Norway | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/1/00/129/001-003/IS | Azopt, eye drops, suspension, 1% | Iceland | 30.6.2005 |
| EU/1/05/131/001/NO-005/NO | PegIntron | Norway | 24.06.2005 |
| EU/1/00/131/001-050/IS | PegIntron | Iceland | 28.6.2005 |
| EU/1/00/131/031-050 | PegIntron | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/05/132/001/NO-005/NO | ViraferonPeg | Norway | 24.6.2005 |
| EU/1/00/132/001-050 | ViraferonPeg | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/132/001-050/IS | ViraferonPeg | Iceland | 28.6.2005 |
| EU/1/00/133/001/NO-008/NO | Optisulin | Norway | 27.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/133/001-008 | Optisulin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/133/001-008/IS | Optisulin | Iceland | 29.8.2005 |
| EU/1/00/134/001/NO-029/NO | Lantus | Norway | 27.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/134/001-007, 012-029 | Lantus | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/134/001-029/IS | Lantus | Iceland | 29.8.2005 |
| EU/1/00/135/001 | DaTSCAN | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/135/001/NO-002/NO | DaTSCAN | Norway | 20.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/135/001-002/IS | DaTSCAN | Iceland | 11.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/137/001/NO-012/NO | Avandia | Norway | 27.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/137/001-012 | Avandia | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/137/001-012/IS | Avandia | Iceland | 16.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/140/001 | Visudyne | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/140/001/IS | Visudyne 15 mg Powder for solution for injection | Iceland | 14.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/140/001/NO | Visudyne | Norway | 27.7.2005 |
| EU/1/00/141/001 | Myocet | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/141/001/IS | Myocet | Iceland | 13.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/141/001/NO | Myocet | Norway | 28.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/004/NO-005/NO | NovoMix Penfill | Norway | 13.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/004-005 | NovoMix | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/004-005/IS | NovoMix 30 Penfill | Iceland | 21.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/009/NO-010/NO | NovoMix Flexpen | Norway | 13.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/009-010/IS | NovoMix 30 FlexPen | Iceland | 21.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/143/001/NO-006/NO | Kogenate Bayer | Norway | 7.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/143/001-006 | Kogenate | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/143/001-006/IS | Kogenate Bayer | Iceland | 7.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/144/001/NO-003/NO | Helixate NexGen | Norway | 7.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/144/001-003 | Helixate | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/144/001-003/IS | Helixate NexGen | Iceland | 7.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/145/001 | Herceptin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/145/001/IS | Herceptin | Iceland | 28.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/145/001/NO | Herceptin | Norway | 23.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/146/001/NO-029/NO | Keppra | Norway | 08.8.2005 |
| EU/1/00/146/001-029 | Keppra | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/146/001-029/IS | Keppra | Iceland | 12.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/148/001/NO-004/NO | Agenerase | Norway | 12.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00/148/001-004 | Agenerase | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/148/001-004/IS | Agenerase | Iceland | 16.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00/149/001 | Panretin | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/149/001/IS | Panretin | Iceland | 16.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00/149/001/NO | Panretin | Norway | 9.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00/150/001/NO-015/NO | Actos | Norway | 2.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/150/001-015 | Actos | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/150/001-015/IS | Actos | Iceland | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/151/001/NO-013/NO | Glustin | Norway | 2.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/151/001-013 | Glustin | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/151/001-013/IS | Glustin | Iceland | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/152/001-018 | Infanrix hexa | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/153/001-010 | Infanrix penta | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/153/001-010/IS | Infanrix penta | Iceland | 16.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00/153/001-010/NO | Infanrix penta | Norway | 7.12.2005 |
| EU/1/00152/001-018/NO | Infanrix hexa | Norway | 7.12.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/001, 003-005, 009, 012, 021-022, 025-028, 031-035/IS | Gonal-F | Iceland | 15.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/001/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/003/NO-006/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/009/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/012/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/021/NO-022/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/025/NO-028/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/95/001/031/NO-035/NO | Gonal-F | Norway | 11.11.2005 |
| EU/1/98/093/002 | Forcaltonin | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/99/127/001/NO-044/NO | IntronA | Norway | 20.6.2005 |
| EU/1/99/127/001-044 | IntronA | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/99/127/001-044/IS | IntronA | Iceland | 27.6.2005 |
| EU/1/99/128/001/NO-037/NO | Viraferon | Norway | 20.6.2005 |
| EU/1/99/128/001-037 | Viraferon | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/99/128/001-037/IS | Viraferon | Iceland | 27.6.2005 |
| EU/2/00/018/001 | Incurin | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/2/00/018/001/NO | Incurin | Norway | 16.6.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022//002b-03a | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/001/NO-017/NO | Ibaflin | Norway | 31.8.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/001-017/IS | Ibaflin | Iceland | 15.07.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/001a | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/001b-02a | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/003b-04a | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/004b | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/022/005-017 | Ibaflin | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/2/00/024/001/IS | Pruban | Iceland | 16.12.2005 |
| EU/2/99/016/001/NO-006/NO | Porcilis Pesti | Norway | 18.7.2005 |
| EU/2/99/016/001-006 | Porcilis Pesti | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/2/99/016/001-006/IS | Porcilis Pesti | Iceland | 13.7.2005 |
| EU/2/99/017/001/NO-006/NO | Ibraxion | Norway | 2.6.2005 |

EU-Number

Product

Country

Date of renewal

EU/1/00/129/001/NO-003/NO

Azopt

Norway

30.6.2005

EU/1/00/129/001-003/IS

Azopt, eye drops, suspension, 1%

Iceland

30.6.2005

EU/1/05/131/001/NO-005/NO

PegIntron

Norway

24.06.2005

EU/1/00/131/001-050/IS

PegIntron

Iceland

28.6.2005

EU/1/00/131/031-050

PegIntron

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/05/132/001/NO-005/NO

ViraferonPeg

Norway

24.6.2005

EU/1/00/132/001-050

ViraferonPeg

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/00/132/001-050/IS

ViraferonPeg

Iceland

28.6.2005

EU/1/00/133/001/NO-008/NO

Optisulin

Norway

27.7.2005

EU/1/00/133/001-008

Optisulin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/133/001-008/IS

Optisulin

Iceland

29.8.2005

EU/1/00/134/001/NO-029/NO

Lantus

Norway

27.7.2005

EU/1/00/134/001-007, 012-029

Lantus

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/134/001-029/IS

Lantus

Iceland

29.8.2005

EU/1/00/135/001

DaTSCAN

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/135/001/NO-002/NO

DaTSCAN

Norway

20.9.2005

EU/1/00/135/001-002/IS

DaTSCAN

Iceland

11.10.2005

EU/1/00/137/001/NO-012/NO

Avandia

Norway

27.7.2005

EU/1/00/137/001-012

Avandia

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/137/001-012/IS

Avandia

Iceland

16.9.2005

EU/1/00/140/001

Visudyne

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/00/140/001/IS

Visudyne 15 mg Powder for solution for injection

Iceland

14.7.2005

EU/1/00/140/001/NO

Visudyne

Norway

27.7.2005

EU/1/00/141/001

Myocet

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/141/001/IS

Myocet

Iceland

13.10.2005

EU/1/00/141/001/NO

Myocet

Norway

28.9.2005

EU/1/00/142/004/NO-005/NO

NovoMix Penfill

Norway

13.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/004-005

NovoMix

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/142/004-005/IS

NovoMix 30 Penfill

Iceland

21.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/009/NO-010/NO

NovoMix Flexpen

Norway

13.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/009-010/IS

NovoMix 30 FlexPen

Iceland

21.10.2005

EU/1/00/143/001/NO-006/NO

Kogenate Bayer

Norway

7.9.2005

EU/1/00/143/001-006

Kogenate

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/143/001-006/IS

Kogenate Bayer

Iceland

7.10.2005

EU/1/00/144/001/NO-003/NO

Helixate NexGen

Norway

7.9.2005

EU/1/00/144/001-003

Helixate

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/144/001-003/IS

Helixate NexGen

Iceland

7.10.2005

EU/1/00/145/001

Herceptin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/145/001/IS

Herceptin

Iceland

28.11.2005

EU/1/00/145/001/NO

Herceptin

Norway

23.9.2005

EU/1/00/146/001/NO-029/NO

Keppra

Norway

08.8.2005

EU/1/00/146/001-029

Keppra

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/00/146/001-029/IS

Keppra

Iceland

12.9.2005

EU/1/00/148/001/NO-004/NO

Agenerase

Norway

12.12.2005

EU/1/00/148/001-004

Agenerase

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/148/001-004/IS

Agenerase

Iceland

16.12.2005

EU/1/00/149/001

Panretin

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/149/001/IS

Panretin

Iceland

16.12.2005

EU/1/00/149/001/NO

Panretin

Norway

9.12.2005

EU/1/00/150/001/NO-015/NO

Actos

Norway

2.11.2005

EU/1/00/150/001-015

Actos

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/150/001-015/IS

Actos

Iceland

11.11.2005

EU/1/00/151/001/NO-013/NO

Glustin

Norway

2.11.2005

EU/1/00/151/001-013

Glustin

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/151/001-013/IS

Glustin

Iceland

11.11.2005

EU/1/00/152/001-018

Infanrix hexa

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/153/001-010

Infanrix penta

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/153/001-010/IS

Infanrix penta

Iceland

16.12.2005

EU/1/00/153/001-010/NO

Infanrix penta

Norway

7.12.2005

EU/1/00152/001-018/NO

Infanrix hexa

Norway

7.12.2005

EU/1/95/001/001, 003-005, 009, 012, 021-022, 025-028, 031-035/IS

Gonal-F

Iceland

15.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/001/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/003/NO-006/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/009/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/012/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/021/NO-022/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/025/NO-028/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/95/001/031/NO-035/NO

Gonal-F

Norway

11.11.2005

EU/1/98/093/002

Forcaltonin

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/99/127/001/NO-044/NO

IntronA

Norway

20.6.2005

EU/1/99/127/001-044

IntronA

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/99/127/001-044/IS

IntronA

Iceland

27.6.2005

EU/1/99/128/001/NO-037/NO

Viraferon

Norway

20.6.2005

EU/1/99/128/001-037

Viraferon

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/99/128/001-037/IS

Viraferon

Iceland

27.6.2005

EU/2/00/018/001

Incurin

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/2/00/018/001/NO

Incurin

Norway

16.6.2005

EU/2/00/022//002b-03a

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/022/001/NO-017/NO

Ibaflin

Norway

31.8.2005

EU/2/00/022/001-017/IS

Ibaflin

Iceland

15.07.2005

EU/2/00/022/001a

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/022/001b-02a

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/022/003b-04a

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/022/004b

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/022/005-017

Ibaflin

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/2/00/024/001/IS

Pruban

Iceland

16.12.2005

EU/2/99/016/001/NO-006/NO

Porcilis Pesti

Norway

18.7.2005

EU/2/99/016/001-006

Porcilis Pesti

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/2/99/016/001-006/IS

Porcilis Pesti

Iceland

13.7.2005

EU/2/99/017/001/NO-006/NO

Ibraxion

Norway

2.6.2005

---

ANNEX III

3.   Extended Marketing Authorisations

The following marketing authorisations have been extended in the EEA EFTA States during the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| EU-Number | Product | Country | Date of extention |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EU/1/00/142/011/NO-013/NO | NovoMix Penfill 50 | Norway | 1.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/001-013/IS | NovoMix 50 Penfill suspension for injection | Iceland | 5.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/014/NO-016/NO | NovoMix Flexpen 50 | Norway | 1.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/014-016/IS | NovoMix 50 FlexPen suspension for injection | Iceland | 5.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/017/NO-019/NO | NovoMix Penfill 70 | Norway | 1.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/017-019/IS | NovoMix 70 Penfill suspension for injection | Iceland | 5.10.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/020/NO-022/NO | NovoMix Flexpen 70 | Norway | 1.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/142/020-022/IS | NovoMix 70 FlexPen suspension for injection | Iceland | 5.10.2005 |
| EU/1/03/265/003/NO-004/NO | Bonviva, film-coated tablets | Norway | 28.9.2005 |
| EU/1/03/265/003-004/IS | Bonviva, film-coated tablets | Iceland | 25.10.2005 |
| EU/1/03/266/003/NO-004/NO | Bondenza, film-coated tablets | Norway | 28.9.2005 |
| EU/1/03/266/003-004/IS | Bondenza, film-coated tablets | Iceland | 21.10.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/021/NO-023/NO | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 5 mg | Norway | 18.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/021-023/IS | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 5 mg | Iceland | 14.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/024/NO-026/NO | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 10 mg | Norway | 18.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/024-026/IS | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 10 mg | Iceland | 14.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/027/NO-029/NO | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 15 mg | Norway | 18.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/027-029/IS | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 15 mg | Iceland | 14.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/030/NO-032/NO | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 30 mg | Norway | 18.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/030-032/IS | Abilify, orodispersible tablet 30 mg | Iceland | 14.7.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/033/NO-035/NO | Abilify 1mg/ml, oral solution | Norway | 9.11.2005 |
| EU/1/04/276/033-035/IS | Abilify 1 mg/ml, oral solution | Iceland | 1.12.2005 |
| EU/1/96/026/002/IS | Invirase, filmcoated tablet 500 mg | Iceland | 19.7.2005 |
| EU/1/96/026/002/NO | Invirase | Norway | 9.6.2005 |
| EU/2/97/004/012/NO-013/NO | Metacam, 0,5 mg/ml oral suspension for dogs | Norway | 5.9.2005 |
| EU/2/97/004/012-013/IS | Metacam, 0,5 mg/ml oral suspension for dogs | Iceland | 2.9.2005 |

EU-Number

Product

Country

Date of extention

EU/1/00/142/011/NO-013/NO

NovoMix Penfill 50

Norway

1.11.2005

EU/1/00/142/001-013/IS

NovoMix 50 Penfill suspension for injection

Iceland

5.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/014/NO-016/NO

NovoMix Flexpen 50

Norway

1.11.2005

EU/1/00/142/014-016/IS

NovoMix 50 FlexPen suspension for injection

Iceland

5.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/017/NO-019/NO

NovoMix Penfill 70

Norway

1.11.2005

EU/1/00/142/017-019/IS

NovoMix 70 Penfill suspension for injection

Iceland

5.10.2005

EU/1/00/142/020/NO-022/NO

NovoMix Flexpen 70

Norway

1.11.2005

EU/1/00/142/020-022/IS

NovoMix 70 FlexPen suspension for injection

Iceland

5.10.2005

EU/1/03/265/003/NO-004/NO

Bonviva, film-coated tablets

Norway

28.9.2005

EU/1/03/265/003-004/IS

Bonviva, film-coated tablets

Iceland

25.10.2005

EU/1/03/266/003/NO-004/NO

Bondenza, film-coated tablets

Norway

28.9.2005

EU/1/03/266/003-004/IS

Bondenza, film-coated tablets

Iceland

21.10.2005

EU/1/04/276/021/NO-023/NO

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 5 mg

Norway

18.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/021-023/IS

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 5 mg

Iceland

14.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/024/NO-026/NO

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 10 mg

Norway

18.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/024-026/IS

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 10 mg

Iceland

14.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/027/NO-029/NO

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 15 mg

Norway

18.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/027-029/IS

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 15 mg

Iceland

14.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/030/NO-032/NO

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 30 mg

Norway

18.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/030-032/IS

Abilify, orodispersible tablet 30 mg

Iceland

14.7.2005

EU/1/04/276/033/NO-035/NO

Abilify 1mg/ml, oral solution

Norway

9.11.2005

EU/1/04/276/033-035/IS

Abilify 1 mg/ml, oral solution

Iceland

1.12.2005

EU/1/96/026/002/IS

Invirase, filmcoated tablet 500 mg

Iceland

19.7.2005

EU/1/96/026/002/NO

Invirase

Norway

9.6.2005

EU/2/97/004/012/NO-013/NO

Metacam, 0,5 mg/ml oral suspension for dogs

Norway

5.9.2005

EU/2/97/004/012-013/IS

Metacam, 0,5 mg/ml oral suspension for dogs

Iceland

2.9.2005

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ANNEX IV

4.   Withdrawn Marketing Authorisations

The following marketing authorisations have been withdrawn in the EEA EFTA States during the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| EU-Number | Product | Country | Date of withdrawal |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EU/1/00/158/001-034/IS | Opulis | Iceland | 9.9.2005 |
| EU/1/00/168/001/NO-006/NO | Tenecteplase | Norway | 9.8.2005 |
| EU/1/00/168/001-006 | Tenecteplase | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/02/208/001-008/IS | Xapit | Iceland | 9.9.2005 |
| EU/1/02/210/001/NO-008/NO | Rayzon | Norway | 22.7.2005 |
| EU/1/02/210/001-008 | Rayzon | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/02/210/001-008/IS | Rayzon | Iceland | 5.7.2005 |
| EU/1/02/242/001-024 | Valdyn | Liechtenstein | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/02/242/001-024/IS | Valdyn, filmcoated tablets | Iceland | 5.07.2005 |
| EU/1/02/244/001/NO-024/NO | Valdyn | Norway | 22.7.2005 |
| EU/1/02/244/001-024/IS | Valdyn | Liechtenstein | 31.7.2005 |
| EU/1/96/009/010/NO-017/NO | Zerit | Norway | 30.9.2005 |
| EU/1/96/009/010-017/IS | Zerit prolonged-release capsules | Iceland | 29.11.2005 |
| EU/1/96/023/001 | Cea-Scan | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/96/023/001/IS | CEA-Scan | Iceland | 9.11.2005 |
| EU/1/97/048/001-014/IS | Infanrix HepB, suspension for injection | Iceland | 15.6.2005 |
| EU/2/00/023/001-003 | Pulsaflox | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |

EU-Number

Product

Country

Date of withdrawal

EU/1/00/158/001-034/IS

Opulis

Iceland

9.9.2005

EU/1/00/168/001/NO-006/NO

Tenecteplase

Norway

9.8.2005

EU/1/00/168/001-006

Tenecteplase

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/02/208/001-008/IS

Xapit

Iceland

9.9.2005

EU/1/02/210/001/NO-008/NO

Rayzon

Norway

22.7.2005

EU/1/02/210/001-008

Rayzon

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/02/210/001-008/IS

Rayzon

Iceland

5.7.2005

EU/1/02/242/001-024

Valdyn

Liechtenstein

30.9.2005

EU/1/02/242/001-024/IS

Valdyn, filmcoated tablets

Iceland

5.07.2005

EU/1/02/244/001/NO-024/NO

Valdyn

Norway

22.7.2005

EU/1/02/244/001-024/IS

Valdyn

Liechtenstein

31.7.2005

EU/1/96/009/010/NO-017/NO

Zerit

Norway

30.9.2005

EU/1/96/009/010-017/IS

Zerit prolonged-release capsules

Iceland

29.11.2005

EU/1/96/023/001

Cea-Scan

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/96/023/001/IS

CEA-Scan

Iceland

9.11.2005

EU/1/97/048/001-014/IS

Infanrix HepB, suspension for injection

Iceland

15.6.2005

EU/2/00/023/001-003

Pulsaflox

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

---

ANNEX V

5.   Suspended Marketing Authorisations

The following marketing authorisations have been suspended in the EEA EFTA States during the period 1 June — 31 December 2005:

| EU-Number | Product | Country | Date of suspension |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EU/1/00/147/001/NO-012/NO | Hexavac | Norway | 17.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/147/001-008 | Hexavac | Liechtenstein | 30.11.2005 |
| EU/1/00/147/001-008/IS | Hexavac | Iceland | 17.11.2005 |

EU-Number

Product

Country

Date of suspension

EU/1/00/147/001/NO-012/NO

Hexavac

Norway

17.11.2005

EU/1/00/147/001-008

Hexavac

Liechtenstein

30.11.2005

EU/1/00/147/001-008/IS

Hexavac

Iceland

17.11.2005

---