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IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM: 

STILL WAITING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 13, 2013 

Serial No. 113–54 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAUL LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

NOVEMBER 13, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 3 

The Honorable Trey Gowdy, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 4 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ........................................ 4 

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

Janice Kephart, former Special Counsel, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 

former Counsel to the 9/11 Commission 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

James N. Albers, Senior Vice President of Government Operations, 

MorphoTrust USA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 67 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 69 

Julie Myers Wood, President, Compliance, Federal Practice and Software 

Solutions, Guidepost Solutions 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 80 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 82 

David F. Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 92 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 94 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Listing of Material submitted by the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 139 

(1) 

IMPLEMENTATION OF 

AN ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM: 

STILL WAITING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Coble, Smith of Texas, 

Chabot, Bachus, King, Gohmert, Poe, Chaffetz, Marino, Gowdy, 

Labrador, Farenthold, Holding, Conyers, Scott, Watt, Lofgren, 

Jackson Lee, Johnson, Chu, Gutierrez, DelBene, Garcia, and 

Jeffries. 

Staff present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Dimple 

Shah, Counsel; Kelsey Deterding, Clerk; (Minority) Perry 

Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle 

Brown, Parliamentarian; Tom Jawetz, Counsel. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will 

come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare 

recesses of the Committee at any time. 

I will begin with my opening statement. 

Successful immigration reform must address effective interior enforcement. An important component of interior enforcement is dealing with legal immigrants who violate the terms of their visas and 

thus become unlawfully present in the United States. 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 

Act of 1996 first required the creation, within 2 years of the date 

of enactment, of an automated system to track the entry and exit 

of all travelers to and from the United States. Since that time, 

Congress has reiterated and expanded on this requirement over 

half a dozen times, mandating an exit monitoring system at all air, 

land, and sea ports of entry. 

In 2004, Congress added the requirement that the exit program 

be implemented using biometric technology. Yet despite numerous 

pieces of legislation enacted by Congress, these statutorily mandated requirements have never been implemented by either 

present or past Administrations. 
2 

In the meantime, numerous estimates indicate that as many as 

40 percent of all individuals unlawfully present in the United 

States entered the country legally and violated the terms of their 

visas by overstaying. To make matters worse, in July of 2013 the 

General Accountability Office found that the Department of Homeland Security has more than 1 million unmatched arrival records; 

that is, arrival records for which the DHS does not have a record 

of departure or status change. 

The ability to effectively track who arrives in and subsequently 

departs from the United States is a necessary first step for immigration reform. An effective exit tracking program must help identify all of those who arrived lawfully but remain in the U.S. in violation of the law. 

To compound matters, experts say that terrorist overstays are 

also a significant issue which under the current system can be 

tracked down only through difficult, tedious, and time-consuming 

investigations. Recent reports indicate that terrorist overstays include Hosan Smadi, a Jordanian national who plotted to blow up 

a Dallas skyscraper in 2009, and Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan 

whose visa expired in 1999 and who was arrested in an attempt 

to bomb the U.S. Capitol in 2012. 

Not having an exit system in place led the former commissioners 

of the 9/11 Commission to conclude in 2011 that, ‘‘The Department 

of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should 

complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening 

system. As important as it is to know when foreign nationals arrive, it is also important to know when they leave. Full deployment 

of the biometric exit should be a high priority. Such a capability 

would have assisted law enforcement and intelligence officials in 

August and September 2001 in conducting a search for two of the 

9/11 hijackers who were in the United States on expired visas.’’ 

Seventeen years after Congress required an entry-exit system, no 

exit system is in place. This Administration and past Administrations had plenty of time to get this done, yet they continue to make 

excuses as to why it cannot be completed. In fact, this Administration has openly violated the law. 

The Department of Homeland Security has moved to implement 

biographic exit contrary to law even though former Department of 

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano told the GAO that 

she has no confidence in the current biographic data system. Biographic systems are especially vulnerable to fraud. 

Unfortunately, not only does the Administration continue to ignore statutory mandates, but numerous congressional proposals actually seek to roll back current law with respect to a biometric exit 

system at all ports of entry. For example, the Senate bill erodes enforcement mechanisms in current law by requiring biometric exit 

initially at the top 10 international airports and a total of only 30 

airports within 6 years, although there are 74 international airports in the United States and 34 international seaports. The bill 

does not even address land and sea ports. 

It is estimated that the majority of the millions of people who 

come to the United States each year come through the land ports 

of entry, and the GAO found that roughly one-third of all overstayers came through land ports of entry. No single proposal effec-
3 

tively addresses this issue with the exception of H.R. 2278, the 

SAFE Act. Mr. Gowdy’s bill, via Mr. Smith’s amendment, contains 

the only language that requires a biometric entry-exit system at all 

ports of entry within a definite time period. In order to be effective, 

any entry-exit provisions must have a definite and prompt timeframe for total implementation. If not, we will send the message 

that Congress is not serious. 

The SAFE Act shows how to avoid the mistakes of the past with 

regard to immigration law enforcement. I look forward to hearing 

from all of our witnesses today and thank Mr. Gowdy for introducing this game-changing legislation, and Mr. Smith for his crucial amendment to reassert that Congress is serious about ensuring 

a fully functioning exit system at all ports of entry. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member of the 

Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte. 

Members of the Committee, we are here today to find out and 

learn what the Department of Homeland Security is doing to implement a system that tracks who enters our country and who leaves 

our country. We are pleased to have the Assistant Secretary for 

Policy of the Department here with us. 

The Department is required by law to establish an entry-exit system that relies upon the collection of biometric data. Many of my 

colleagues are frustrated that the system, particularly the biometric exit system, is not yet in place. 

Nevertheless, we should recognize that today we are more able 

than ever to screen people who are applying for visas or requesting 

entry into our country. We now collect fingerprints from people at 

each of these stages, and we have a biometric entry system at our 

land, sea, and airports. We are also better able to confirm whether 

people have left the country or overstayed their visas. Airlines 

share information from passenger and crew manifests before aircraft doors are secured. 

So we have a pretty good idea who is on an international flight 

before the plane leaves the gate, and we can now use that information to identify people who have overstayed their visas and to run 

that information through our various security checks. 

We also have a very productive exchange of information with Canadian authorities that helps us identify exits along our northern 

land border. 

But, of course, there is still more that can be done, and that is 

why today’s hearing allows us to hear from the Department of 

Homeland Security itself, as well as other witnesses who will share 

their perspectives on the topic. 

But I have to observe one thing before I yield back my time. It 

is now the middle of November, and the House of Representatives 

has done almost nothing to fix our broken immigration system. The 

Senate passed S. 744, a bipartisan immigration reform bill, in 

June, 139 days ago. Republican leadership in the House called it 

‘‘dead on arrival.’’ Our colleague, Joe Garcia of this Committee, introduced another bill, H.R. 15, last month, and already the bill, to 

date, has 191 co-sponsors. Republican leadership has pledged to 

take no action on the bill. And now press reports that Republican 
4 

leadership intends to bring no immigration bill to the floor before 

the end of the year because there isn’t enough time on the calendar. 

The very first hearing that the House Judiciary Committee held 

in the 113th Congress was on the need for immigration reform. My 

hope at the time was that the hearing signaled the beginning of an 

open dialogue focused on the creation of an immigration system 

that serves American businesses, families and security. Instead, I 

read time and time again that House Republicans oppose comprehensive immigration reform but support a piecemeal approach 

to fixing the problem. 

We keep hearing that five bills are ready for consideration and 

more are being drafted. Where are they? If House Republicans oppose comprehensive immigration reform but support a piecemeal 

approach to fix our immigration system, show us. Do something. 

We have been trying to fix our broken system for well over a decade, and I believe we are closer together today than we have ever 

been before. But now is not the time for more talk, talk, talk. Now 

is the time for action. 

Mr. Chairman, let’s work together to bring immigration legislation to the floor immediately to fix our broken system. 

I thank you and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. 

And I will now turn to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, for his opening statement. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I yield to Mr. Smith, I couldn’t help but note, when our 

colleague from Michigan was talking, that from 2008 to 2010, when 

our colleagues on the other side of the aisle controlled every single 

gear of government, no comprehensive immigration reform package 

was put together. 

Now, I have some colleagues like Luis Gutierrez and Zoe Lofgren 

that have worked their entire lives for it, but let’s don’t rewrite history and blame this Committee for what a Democrat-controlled 

Committee didn’t lift a finger to do from 2008 to 2010. 

With that, I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman from 

Texas, former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Lamar Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I am tempted not to say anything at all, 

but I appreciate the gentleman from South Carolina, the Chairman 

of the Immigration Subcommittee, for sharing his time. 

Over 40 percent of immigrants in illegal status came here legally 

but overstayed their visas. A recent Bloomberg poll shows that 85 

percent of Americans support a system to track foreigners that 

enter and leave the country. This scores higher than any other immigration question. 

New biometric technology has reduced the cost of implementation 

significantly. Five-year-old cost estimates that some opponents of 

biometrics cite are clearly out of date. 

Congress required the use of biometrics instead of biographic 

data to track foreign nationals because biographic information is 

very susceptible to fraud, and I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte 

and Subcommittee Chairman Gowdy for including biometric entryexit language in H.R. 2278, the SAFE Act, at our mark-up in June. 
5 

Our language is the only proposal being considered by Congress 

that requires a definite implementation deadline for a biometric 

entry-exit system at all ports of entry. 

It has been 17 years since the entry-exit system was first enacted 

in a 1996 immigration bill I introduced. We are long overdue in 

fully implementing a biometric tracking system. 

Again, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for yielding 

me time and yield back at this point. 

Mr. GOWDY. I thank the gentleman from Texas. He is correct. 

Seventeen years ago the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was enacted. The law requires an automated system to track the entry and exit of visitors to and from 

the United States. Despite Congress reiterating its mandate for an 

exit system over the past 17 years, DHS has failed to execute the 

law. The law’s entry mandate was completed in a reasonable 

amount of time. However, exit has never been completed. 

This is problematic for myriad reasons. Not only should we be 

concerned with who is entering the country, but just as importantly 

we need to know who is exiting or not exiting our country, and not 

knowing who resides here is an issue of national security. As many 

as four of the 9/11 hijackers had either overstayed or violated the 

terms of their visas, and several other high-profile terror plots have 

originated with aliens who entered the country legally and overstayed. 

The 9/11 Commission was keenly aware of the problem, Mr. 

Chairman, in their report issued over 9 years ago. The Commission 

recommended the Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by Congress, should complete as quickly as possible a biometric entry-exit screening system. It is estimated that as many as 

40 percent of undocumented immigrants come to the United States 

on temporary visas and remain in violation of the law. A biometric 

exit screening system would provide a means to know which temporary visitors failed to adhere to our immigration laws, and we 

could begin to tackle the issue of visa overstays. 

In Fiscal Year 2012, ICE arrested 1,374 individuals who overstayed their visa, and for those who may have thought I misread 

that, 1,374. However, they have estimated there are 2.3 million 

people who have overstayed their visas in the United States. So 

1,374 out of 2.3 million is not very good. 

So where are we? Seventeen years after Congress mandated an 

automated entry and exit system to track all travelers coming into 

and departing the United States, 13 years after Congress reaffirmed that mandate and extended it to high-volume land border 

points of entry and exit, and 12 years after the Patriot Act mandated the entry-exit system be biometric, we are precisely where 

we started in 1996, Mr. Chairman, which is we have no automated 

system to track existing foreign visitors. 

I hope the witnesses before the Committee today will provide information on the challenges preventing the implementation of a biometric entry-exit system and ideas for a way forward. 

And with that, I would yield the remainder of my time back to 

the Chair. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Gowdy. 
6 

And I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security, the congresswoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, for her opening statement. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t think anyone opposes the idea of keeping track of when 

people enter and exit the country. With that knowledge, we would 

be able to determine when people had overstayed their periods of 

authorized admission and were present in violation of the law. We 

would be able to make informed decisions about how to use our 

limited enforcement resources to apprehend and remove such people, and we would also be able to make changes to improve our visa 

issuance practices, the visa waiver program, and a host of other 

things. 

So I hope today we will learn precisely what DHS has done over 

the years to set up our current entry-exit system, what work the 

Department is doing to improve that system, and what we can expect to see in the future. 

As has been mentioned, Congress first mandated the creation of 

the automated entry-exit system in 1996, and we built upon that 

mandate several times. The ultimate goal is to establish a system 

that is realistic and cost-effective, that promotes national security 

and compliance with immigration law, and that does not overly disrupt the legitimate flow of persons and goods through our ports of 

entry. That flow represents billions of dollars in freight and travel 

each day and is an essential part of our Nation’s economy and job 

market. 

We know this is a challenge. I remember a witness from the Heritage Foundation pointed out in a hearing in 2011 before the Subcommittee, and this is a quote, ‘‘If this was a mandate that could 

have been easily fulfilled, it would have been fulfilled back in the 

1990’s when it was first implemented.’’ 

Despite the challenge, I think we have made progress over the 

years. It is true we do not have a biometric exit system at our land, 

sea and airports. I suspect this has already been mentioned—that 

will be a major focus of the hearing. But I would like to also focus 

on what has been done. 

We have improved our ability to identify visa overstays and to 

track people exiting the country through deployment of biometric 

entry systems and enhancements to our biographic exit systems. 

We have made improvements in data sharing capabilities and we 

have an innovative cooperative agreement with the Canadian government, our partner to the north. 

Let me say one thing further about the development of a biometric exit system. Many of us have long believed that the Department’s goal should be to fulfill its statutory obligation to establish 

a biometric exit system at land, sea and airports. That was my position after reviewing the 9/11 Commission recommendations, and 

I still believe that is something we should continue to explore. 

I have been frustrated with the lack of progress, but I am also 

pleased to hear the Department continues to pursue this objective 

and that it is poised to test and pilot a variety of new technologies 

and approaches to the problem in the next couple of years. 

It is one thing to complain that the Department has not made 

progress toward that goal, and it is another to understand exactly 
7 

what it would take to get there. And that is why I think when it 

comes to biometric exit, the three important questions for today’s 

hearing are: one, is it possible for us to have a biometric exit capability at every land, sea and airport; two, if it is possible, how much 

would it cost, how long would it take, and what would have to happen to make it a reality; and three, what would we get from a fully 

deployed biometric exit system that we would not be able to get 

through an enhanced biographic exit system and cooperative partnerships with neighboring countries? 

We need answers to these questions because we must know 

whether the task before the Department is achievable. If it is, we 

must all have a realistic understanding of what it will take to get 

there. This will be expensive. 

Several years ago, the Department concluded that implementing a biometric exit system at airports would cost $3 billion over 10 

years. At land ports, the cost would be exponentially greater and 

require not only a large increase in personnel but also very large 

investments in port infrastructure. For a Congress that is intent on 

cutting spending at every turn, that just narrowly avoided a default on the Nation’s debt, that actually shut down the government 

for a period of weeks because of an intent not to pay bills that had 

already been incurred, these costs must be front and center in our 

discussion. 

Finally, we need to understand what marginal improvements a 

biometric exit system would have over an enhanced biographic system paired with our Beyond the Borders agreement with Canada. 

I am a fan of technological solutions. I come from Silicon Valley. 

But I also want to know exactly what problem we are trying to 

solve and how the new solution is better than what we currently 

have. 

I hope we can get answers to these questions today. I look forward to the witnesses. But before I close, let me just say how disappointed I was to hear the news that the House is not intending 

to consider immigration bills before the end of the year. I think we 

have an historic opportunity before us to work together to improve 

our immigration laws. 

I thank the Chairman of the Subcommittee for his kind comments about myself and Mr. Gutierrez. I am mindful that we did 

not do immigration reform in a comprehensive way when we had 

the majority. As Democrats we were actually, in the House, deferring to the Senate, hoping that they could have bipartisan agreement, and they ultimately failed. The gentleman was not a member 

of that Congress, but we did pass the Dream Act when Democrats 

were in the majority, and it fell short in the Senate. 

I just believe that we can put our hands across the aisle and 

work together and improve our laws. I would hope that the spirit 

and intent to do that has not faded on the part of the majority. 

Certainly I would hope to continue to work with the majority to 

solve this problem for our country, and I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman for her 

statement. 

And I also appreciate her closing comments and her gesture and 

her long-time work, along with other Members of the Committee, 

on this issue, and I want to assure you that you have my commit-
8 

ment and many Members on my side of the aisle’s commitment to 

continue to work to try to advance immigration reform. It is something that is badly needed, and we are going to be very dedicated 

to continuing to work in that direction. 

Without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

And at this time I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. 

As is customary with this Committee, if you would all rise, I will 

begin by swearing you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. Let the record reflect 

that all of the witnesses responded in the affirmative. 

I will begin by introducing Janice Kephart. Ms. Kephart recently 

returned from a Special Counsel position with the Senate Judiciary 

Committee, where she advised and supported work during the 

Committee’s consideration of immigration legislation. Ms. Kephart 

also served as counsel to the 9/11 Commission and was a key author of the staff monograph, ‘‘9/11 and Terrorist Travel,’’ as well as 

the immigration-related Facts and Recommendations in the 9/11 

Commission Report. Ms. Kephart holds degrees from Duke University and Villanova School of Law. 

Mr. James Albers is the Senior Vice President of Government 

Operations for MorphoTrust USA, a company that provides identity 

solutions in biometrics, background checks, and secure credentials. 

In this role, Mr. Albers is responsible for all of MorphoTrust’s Federal business operations across the three market segments—enterprise, identity, and services. Prior to joining MorphoTrust, Mr. 

Albers served as Vice President of Government Operations for 

Sarnoff Corporation and was President at Frequency Engineering 

Laboratories. Mr. Albers graduated from George Washington University with a degree in political science. 

Ms. Julie Myers Wood is the President of Compliance, Federal 

Practice and Software Solutions at Guidepost Solutions LLC, an 

immigration investigation and compliance firm. Ms. Wood served 

as the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 

at Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, for nearly 3 

years. Under her leadership, the agency set new enforcement 

records with respect to immigration enforcement, export enforcement, and intellectual property rights. Ms. Wood earned a Bachelor’s degree at Baylor University and a J.D. cum laude from Cornell Law School. 

Mr. David Heyman currently serves as the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where he 

focuses on terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, bioterrorism, and risk-based security. Prior to his appointment, Mr. 

Heyman served in a number of leadership positions in academia, 

government, and the private sector. He was the Founding Director 

of the Homeland Security Program and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Heyman holds an 

M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. in Biology from Brandeis 

University. 

Each of the witness’ written statements will be entered into the 

record in its entirety, and I ask that each witness summarize his 
9 

or her testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that 

time, there is a timing light on your table. When the light switches 

from green to yellow, you will have 1 minute to conclude your testimony. When the light turns red, that is it. It signals that the witness’ 5 minutes have expired. 

And it is now my pleasure to welcome all of you and to recognize 

first Ms. Kephart. 

TESTIMONY OF JANICE KEPHART, FORMER SPECIAL COUNSEL, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, FORMER 

COUNSEL TO THE 9/11 COMMISSION 

Ms. KEPHART. Than you. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, for the opportunity to testify about a biometric immigration departure or exit system for foreign nationals, an 

issue that spans eight statutes and 17 years. 

With the Terrorist Screening Center tracking 10,000 to 20,000 

suspected foreign terrorists inside the U.S., knowing who is coming 

and who is going is critical to our national security and our law enforcement needs. 

The 9/11 Commission did not recommend a name-based exit system because it can never fully verify that people are who they say 

they are, nor negate human error. Nine years later, this past April, 

the Commission’s biometric exit recommendation was justified 

again when the JTTF lost a critical lead prior to the Boston Marathon bombing when terrorist Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the lead perpetrator, managed to slip out of the U.S. unnoticed because his name 

was misspelled on the outgoing airline manifest to Russia. If a biometric exit had been in place, Tsarnaev’s departure as a foreign national would have been known to the FBI more than a year before 

lives were lost and others changed forever. 

Today, the core issue should not be whether to have or not to 

have a biometric exit system but whether a biometric exit system 

is cost-effective and feasible. My testimony concludes that it is. 

As to an air/sea exit, DHS established feasibility in 2009 when 

two pilots, one in Detroit and the other in Atlanta, concluded, and 

I quote, ‘‘Overall, the air exit pilots confirm the ability to biometrically record the exit of aliens departing by air.’’ In that pilot, only 

one in 30,000 persons refused the biometric, nobody missed a 

flight, and more than 1 percent of those processed hit watch lists. 

Today, feasibility is evident around the world, where at least 16 

Nations are using biometrics to manage entry and exit of foreign 

nationals. Let me provide a few examples. 

In 2011, Indonesia installed a biometric border solution at nine 

airports and one seaport. Indonesia’s largest airport handles 10 

million international passengers annually. That is nearly as busy 

and second in place to JFK, which handles 12 million annually. Indonesia’s system fuses real-time biometric matching with watch-list 

vetting, all compiled into one person-centric file that eliminates 

fraud. That was done in 6 months. 

New Zealand just rolled out its second generation of biometric 

borders at its largest airport, Auckland International, where immigration processing and boarding passes are combined into one single step. 
10 

Both Argentina and Nigeria are implementing biometric borders 

now, and Nigeria is doing it with the U.S. help. 

So while I commend the work CBP is doing to begin testing of 

an air biometric exit in January, that still means we lag behind the 

rest of the world in using cutting-edge, efficient biometric solutions 

to manage both entry and exit. 

Moving on to cost, a careful analysis shows that first-year implementation costs for all air and sea ports, even assuming cost overruns of 50 percent, would range from about $400 to $600 million. 

These numbers are derived from DHS’ 2008 Regulatory Assessment on this exact issue, but my numbers are six times lower because of newer, faster, better solutions that require no airport infrastructure changes, no air carrier involvement, and require little 

manpower to operate. With a little ingenuity, implementation can 

be budget neutral. 

One solution is to simply increase visa and security application 

fees by $10 on the 40 million foreign visitors that come by air. That 

is not asking a lot when Brand USA, by law, gets $10 per applicant 

now to promote tourism. This alone would generate about $400 million, enough to probably cover most, if not all, of air exit deployment. 

Let me turn to land borders, which I know is of great interest 

to the Committee. A more nuanced approach is necessary here, but 

I think it is doable. Step one is pretty easy. For pedestrians at land 

borders, replicate the air/sea solution inside land ports. That is 

quick. 

Step two, enable those truckers and individuals already enrolled 

in Trusted Traveler programs that exist at the 39 busiest ports of 

entry and represent 95 percent of crossings to use their Trusted 

Traveler cards not just for entry but for exit too. That would mean 

replicating Trusted Traveler for entry to exit lanes, a quick and 

proven solution already in place that folks understand and works 

pretty well. 

Step three is to basically replicate a Trusted Traveler into sort 

of a trusted everyone where you are replicating the Trusted Traveler technology used in the cards into visas, border crossing cards, 

and other travel documents over time. Verified departure would be 

recorded and relayed to the arrival/departure systems. 

On the northern border, DHS could leverage the good work of the 

shared biographic system with Canada that David will testify 

about and worked so hard on. The goal would be to treat land border exit as close as possible to Trusted Traveler entry to speed 

commerce, meet the statutory requirement, with proven cost-effective technologies that already exist on the land border. 

I hope that helps. Thank you, and I am happy to take your questions afterwards. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kephart follows:] 
11 

Testimony before the 

House Judiciary Committee 

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN 

ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM: Still 

Waiting After All These Years 

Wednesday. November 13, 2013, lOam 

Janice Kephart 

former Spec ial Coun se l, Senate Judiciary Committee (during 

consideration of S. 744, Border Secllrity, Economic Opportullity, and 

Immigration Modernization Act) 

fonner Counse l. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

Un ited States 
12 

Chainnan Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, as well as Border Security Subcommittee 

Chainnan Gowdy and Ranking Member Lofgren, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 

implementation of a biometric exit, a critical immigration, security and law enforcement issue 

that spans eight statutes and 17 years. 

My name is Janice Kephart, and I approach the of border security and the entry/exit issue as a: 

former border counsel on the 9/11 Commission that proposed recommendation of a biometric 

entry/exit system; twice counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee (in the late 1990s for the 

then Subcommittee on Tec1mology, Tenorism and Govenllnent Infonnation, and again during 

the 2013 consideration of immigration refOlm); as fonner National Security Director and now 

Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies; as an specialist on identity and border security; 

and president of my own consulting fum, 9/11 Security Solutions LLC. 

Summary 

2 

Tracking the arrival and departure of foreign visitors to the United States is an essential part of 

immigration control, with collateral effects on law enforcement and national security. The need 

for arrival controls is obvious, but recording departures is also important; without it, there is no 

way to know whether travelers have left when they were supposed to. Creating a feasible and 

cost-effective solution for foreign visitors has emerged as the linchpin in fully implementing the 

eight statutes first passed beginning 16 years ago. 

It is also vital that such exit tracking employ biometric indicators - for instance, the travelers' 

photos or fingerprints. Using ouly biograplric infonnation, such as names or passport numbers, 

provides no assurance that the person departing is the one whose original anival was recorded. 

Tltis testimony demonstrates that a biometric exit -tracking system for aliens depmting by air or 

sea is feasible immediately at a reasonable cost and a phased-in approach is available for land 

ports of entry. Due to the vast differences between air/sea and land ports of entry, they are 

treated as separate solutions. 

It is a marked potential improvement that Customs and Border Protection is now responsible for 

implementation of a comprehensive biographiclbiometric entry/exit solution. Their conclusion 

in the September 27, 2013 "Comprehensive Exit Plan" issued pursuant to the statutory 

requirements of the "2103 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act" is 

encouraging: 

CRP is progressing on a/isca!!y conservative, though/tid, and responsihle pa/h to deploy 

a comprehensive biographic and biome/ric en/ry exi/ sys/em. 

CBP and DRS S&T con/inue /0 advance the research and development/or po/ential 

biometric air exit program options and are idenflfying operational concepts that are 
13 

3 

feasible in the current environment at US. airports and seaports. CRP and TJHS S&T 

will begin testing concepts in early calendar year 201-1, which will significantly injimnfilture 

efjiJrts. 

Overall, TJHS has significantly improved the existing entry-exit ,Iystem throughout all 

operational environments and will fi;rther the biographic efforts while working tmvard a 

feasible biometric solution. 

With DHS now actively working towards a solution that incorporates biometrics at air and sea 

ports, Congressional oversight and discussion is particularly welcome. 

For brevity, a system that tracks the departure offoreign nationals will often be referred to 

simply as "exit". 

Implementing Biometric Exit at Air and Sea Ports of Entry 

The fust section of this testimony demonstrates that a biometric exit-tracking system for foreign 

nationals depatting by air or sea is feasible immediately at a reasonable cost. This section is a 

reprint of my Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) repOlt published in September 2013, 

"Biometric Exit Tracking: A feasible and cost-effective solutionforforeign visitors traveling 

by air and sea" fomld here, published in my cmTent capacity as National Security Fellow at 

CIS. 

Among the findings: 

The first-yeat· implementation costs for all air and sea ports would ratIge from $400 

million to $600 million, even assuming significatIt cost ovenUllS. 

This estimate is based on the current costs of existing devices and on the April 2008 

"Air/Sea Biometric Exit Project RegulatOlY Impact Analysis". 

Implementation costs could be covered by a relatively small fee increase on foreign 

nationals arriving by air or sea and likely does not require an appropliation. 

Such a system could be implemented with minimal impact on the 40 million foreign 

visitors who travel by air. 

The Oct. 2009 Congressional report, "US-VISIT Air Exit Pilots Evaluation Report" that 

studied data from two airport biometric pilot programs concluded that "Overall, the Air 

Exit Pilots confirmed the ability to biometrically record the exit of aliens subject to USVISIT depalting the United States by air." Today, technologies are faster, more diverse, 

and cost-effective. 

The Biometrics Institute (based in Australia), an international forum representing 

governments, suppliers and researchers in its published 2013 survey said that the number 

one most significant trend noted by its members for this year was Biometrics at the 

Border. In fact, 16 nations already have, or are in the process of implementing, biometric 
14 

processing of foreign air travelers including Ghana, while New Zealand has combined 

airline check-in and immigration control in its second generation system, The UAE has 

had no issues with its biometric border control at all land, air and sea ports since 

installation in 2004, Indonesia has implemented real time watchlist entry/exit biometric 

checks in six months at its largest airport that processes 10 million intemational 

passengers annually, just second in the U,S, to New York JFK's annual processing of 12 

million, The list goes otL 

4 

Congress has mandated the deployment of an exit-tracking system in eight separate 

statutes, starting in 1996, The tlu'ee most recent laws require a biometric element But the 

executive branch has so far refused to implement such a system, 

In contrast to the rejection of biometric exit-tracking at home, the same federal 

govemment is helping install biometric border systems abroad, in Nigeria and the 

Philippines, 

Implementing Biometric Exit at Land Ports of Entry 

The second section of this testimony describes biometric solutions at land ports of entry. The 

focus for implementation should be on 39 busiest land ports representing 95 percent of the total 

northem and southern border traffic. Tracking the departure of visitors by land is a very 

different challenge because of completely different conditions at land ports of entry versus 

air/sea ports of entry. To be clear, any movement on a biometric exit deployment on our 

northem border should be in counsel and cooperation with Canada, building on the good work 

in implementing a biographic enl1y/exit data exchange at northem land potts of enl1y, to the 

extent possible. 

• A biometric exit-tracking system for foreign nationals departing by pedestrians at land ports of 

entry is likely feasible immediately at a reasonable cost, mimicking processing at air/sea ports 

of entry using interior locations at ports of entry. 

• A biomel1ic exit is feasible in the near future for individuals and truckers already enrolled in 

trusted traveler proKrums with little port infrasl1ucture change and little cost. A 

straightforward solution duplicates the trusted traveler Radio Frequency Identification (RFTD) 

teclulOlogy used at enl1y lanes to exit lanes. No new IDs would require to be issued to these 

individuals. 

• The backbone of the solution for vehicular lrafflc would be trusted traveler RFID teclulOlogy 

that exists at entry replicated in exit lanes, "smart cards" that mimic the technologies, security 

and privacy features of trusted traveler documents. This type of solution was tested in 2005 by 

US-VISIT and the Smart Border Alliance, and determined to be feasible. 

• The difference with a biomel1ic exit solution and today's l1usted traveler systems is that the 

verified departure data would be recorded and then relayed to Arrival/Departure and Advanced 

Passenger Information Systems. 
15 

• RFID and corresponding ID card technologies are proven, cost -effective and significantly 

better and relatively inexpensive. 

5 

• Using trusted traveler systems as a base model for biometric exit, the essential trade, 

facilitation and departure collection goals of border controls can be met, including 

incorporating the good work of DHS and Canada in their shared entry/exit information system 

and other cooperative border agreements that aTe maturing rapidly. 

• For all foreign nationals seeking enuy into the United States not CtllTently emolled in Dusted 

traveler programs, the United States should strongly consider expanding the RFTD / secure 

identity electronic framework into issuance of visas, border crossing cards, and other travel 

documents accepted to use for entry/exit across U.S. borders. According to the Smart Card 

Alliance, chips holding biomenics and RFTD capable cost only a few dollars a piece. 

• Cost for travel documents enhanced with biomenics and RFID capable could be folded into 

visa and other program fees. 

Implementing Biometric Exit Air and Sea Ports 

DevelopinK and implementinK a biometric exit capability to collect biometric data, such 

as jingerprints, which is required by jederallaw, has been a long-standing challenge jur 

DHS. in May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support the planninK 

jur a biometric exit capability at ai1l)orts - TJHS's priority ji)r biometric exit capabilities 

-Ihat could also be implemenled al seaports in thefi,ture . ... TJHS of Ii cia Is stated Ihat 

the deparlment's goal is 10 develop information and report to Congress aboul the benefits 

and costs olbiometric air exil options hefore thefiscal year 2016 hudget cycle. 

- "Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data and 

Improve PlaIming for a Biomenic Air Exit Program", GAO-13-683. July 30,2013. 

Tntroduction 

This report attempts to show the way. for the first time, to a clear path toward a feasible, costeffective biometric exit-tracking program at all air and sea ports of enny The report concludes 

that a wide anay of solutions are available immediately with a total first year implementation 

cost ranging from $400 to $600 million. This cost includes a 50 percent lisk factor of $125 

million aIld is based on CtllTent indusuy device costs and a 2008 Deparnnent of Homeland 

Security (DHS) regulatOlY assessment of costs associated with deploying biomenic exit to all air 

and sea ports. 

According to the U.S. Depar1:1nent of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Indusu'ies, 

approximately 40 million foreign visitors traveled by air to the United States in 2012, willi 

overall travel and tourism to the United States up 7 percent. This level of traffic could be 

covered by an air and sea biometric exit system willi minimal impact on individual travelers. In 

fact, small increases in visa waiver and visa application fees would cover costs without affecting 
16 

budget constraints. The more expensive options are unmanned solutions used around the world 

today, while the less expensive options can require higher ongoing labor costs. None require air 

carrier support or air/sea port infrastructure changes. All are proven technologies. 

The results of a 2009 DHS evaluation report that tested biometric exit solutions at two large 

US. international airports is further evidence that a biometric exit is feasible now. Moreover, at 

least 14 nations have or are deploying biometric border solutions at airports. and three nations 

have or are deploying biometric guest worker tracking programs. Some nations have had 

biometric solutions at all air, land, and sea POlts for a decade, with superb results in data 

integrity and border control. 

6 

The key elements of a practical biometric exit program are reasonable, real cost estimates; tested 

and mission-capable teclUlologies; and, in order to drive govenunent accountability and longtelm efficiencies in deployment, assmance that only immigration authorities will implement and 

collect the departing aliens' biometric information. 

Biometric exit tr'acking is well established as a cornerstone of arl efficient, enforceable 

inlmigration system. However, fom main inlpediments to inlplementation remain in the United 

States. These are: (1) DHS's policy that the CUlTent biograplric exit system, which relays 

departing flight manifest lists to immigration authorities, is sufficient for national secmity and 

law enforcement purposes: (2) unsubstantiated assumptions that costs would be exorbitantly 

high; (3) speculation that quick, accurate biometric processing of departing aliens is not feasible; 

and (4) refusal of the air carriers to abide by current law requiring air carrier collection of 

biometric exit data from departing aliens. 

Eight statutes currently require an exit system. The three most recent statutOlY requirements all 

include a biometric element. However. despite a consistent reiteration of congressional intent to 

require a biometric exit program over the past decade and clear technological capability for 

deployment, the executive branch continues to refuse to implement such a system. This report 

seeks to dispel myths and put forth solutions on cost and feasibility, as well as to identify where 

legislative streamlining may be needed and assess the policy reasons for implementing biometric 

exit. 

This report focuses on concmrent deployment of exit tracking for air and sea travelers. This is 

because carTiers at seaports process depar·ting foreign nationals in a similar marmer to catTiers at 

airports. The land solutions will be addressed in a separate report because of the different 

requirements for a different type of port of entry, one that must accommodate dense. incoming 

vehicular' and pedestrian traffic, and outgoing traffic that currently undergoes little, if any, 

processing. 

BiometJics in US. Border Management 

Digital facial images and 10 fingerprints taken at air ports of entry and consular offices abroad 

offoreign nationals seeking admission into the United States are a cornerstone of US. border 

management. Biometrics also have become a foundation for intelligence and law enforcement 
17 

7 

investigations within the United States. The biometric facial images and fingerprints taken at 

ports of entry are queried an average of 30,000 times every day by authorized federal, state, and 

local government users. The United States also shares some of this data with international 

partners such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom to help apprehend 

intelllational criminals and tenorists who have been caught uying to change their names and 

other biographic infmmation in an attempt to fmd safe haven in the United States or one of these 

intelllational parulers. 

Accorc1ing to DHS's US-VISIT (US Visitor and Immigrant Starns Inc1icator Technology) 

website, the purpose of taking biometric data at enu'y is to: 

/A/ccurately identifY people and determine whether they pose a risk to the United States. 

lfS-VISiT supplies the technology/or collectinii and storinii biometric data, provides 

analysis o/the data to decision makers, and ensures the inteKrity olthe datu. By usinK 

biometrics, (/S-ViSiT is helpinii to prevent the use offraudulent documents, protect 

visitors/rom identity theft, and stop thousands o/criminals and immiKration violators 

fi'om entering the country. 

US-VISIT was appropriated $232 million and reorganized in the 2013 Homeland Secmity 

Appropriations Act. The office was divested of two difficult areas for which it had been 

responsible over the past decade that reflected more operational policy management than 

biometric development and integrity. These were (1) identifying visa overstays and detelmining 

visa overstay rates; and (2) the development and implementation of a biometric exit program. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is responsible for enforcing 

immigration law against foreign nationals who overstay or violate the terms of their admission, 

is now responsible for identifying overstays and determining overstay rates. This workload 

would be minimal with a biomeuic exit, which would do much of the work for ICE and enable 

the agency to focus on enforcing the law rather than diverting hundreds of agents to this task as 

it does now. 

The development of a biometric exit program is now squarely with Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), which is already wholly responsible for biomellic entry inspections. The only 

lost budget item in the 2013 DHS appropriations bill is US-VISIT losing its mission to support 

intelllational parulers in establishing their own US-VISIT-style programs, an illlderstandable 

move at a time of tight budgets. 

In the wake of9111, the purpose of US-VISIT was to eliminate passport and visa fraud by using 

biometrics to assure that those presenting travel documents at consular offices overseas during 

the visa application process. or those applying for admission at U.S. ports of entry. were who 

they claimed to be, a core recommendation in the 9111 Commission repOlt. 

In 2013. approptiators in the House of Representatives gave US-VISIT a new name - it is now 

the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBTM) - and rejected a budget request by the 

Obama administration to submerge US-VISIT in CBP. Essentially, House appropriators' refusal 

to accept the adminisu'ation's budget request was an acknowledgment that US-VISIT had grown 
18 

8 

well beyond its initial mandate, becoming a biometric program cornerstone serving immigration, 

law enforcement, and national security concerns equally. 

The value of OBIM's biometric data will double when it acquires departure information from a 

CBP-implemented exit solution. Biometrically verified exit data will significantly augment 

OBIM's partners' ability to conduct investigations. This infOlmation can determine eligibility 

for an immigration benefit, for example. In other instances, biometric exit data can determine 

whether a foreign national deemed a threat is inside or outside the United States. This is not a 

hypothetical situation; whether a tenorist had dep31ted was a key issue with two 9/11 hijackers 

two weeks before the attacks, where law enforcement gave up looking for watchlisted 

individuals on the inconect assumption that they had already departed the United States. 

More specifically, accurate 311d real-time exit data will SUppOlt OBlM authorized law 

enforcement, immigration, and national security government clients as follows: 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses OBIMOBIM's services at U.S. POltS of 

entry to make sure the person seeking entry is the person to whom a visa was issued, to 

protect travelers against identity theft, to prevent fraudulent document use, and to ensure 

w311ted criminals 311d terrorists 31'e kept out. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (UserS) uses OBTM's services to establish 

and velify the identities of people applying for immigration benefits, including asylum or 

refugee status. 

The U~S. Coast Quard uses OBIM biometrics-based mobile services at sea by checking 

the biometrics of apprehended criminals and immigration violators on the spot, and using 

the data to prosecute illegal migrants 311d smugglers. 

The Department of Defense and the intelligence community use OBTM to compare latent 

fmgerprints or other biometric infOlmation fomld dming telTOr investigations to verify 

identities of known or suspected ten'orists on watch lists. 

The Department of Justice 311d state and local law enforcement use OBIM's services to 

ensure that they have accurate immigration information about individuals they arrest: 

interoperability exists between OBIM's Automated Biometric Identification System 

(TDENT) and the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 

fingerprint databases. OBTM's Biometric Support Center (BSC) helps many federal. 

state, and local agencies with their investigations by providing forensic biometric support 

2417. Some ofthese cases help solve crime and tenor cases that may match records in 

state fingerprint database systems as well. 

The Departrnent of State uses OBIM's services to establish 311d verify the identities of 

visa applicants at embassies and consulates 31'omld the world tlu'ough its Bio Visa 

program. Consular officers use this information in determining visa eligibility. 

Statutory Authority 
19 

9 

Various laws requiring exit control have sat on the books since 1996. In 2000. two separate laws 

were passed, one that established an exit system and one that tied it to the Visa Waiver Program. 

In 2001. the USA Patriot Act chimed in again. demanding exit. In 2002, the Border Security 

Enhancement law again required exit and in 2004 the Intelligence RefOlID Act emanating from 

9/11 Commission recommendations included a biometric exit. Begitming in 2004, and until 

2007, pilot programs for exit were undertaken at the demand of Congress. The technology 

worked, but compliance rates were low since the kiosks were not clearly mandatory or placed in 

locations that required compliance. 

In 2007, the 9111 Commission Recommendations Act reiterated the need for exit and required 

exit apply to all foreign nationals entering under the Visa Waiver Program, adding in a biometric 

component and requiting the airlines to carry out the processing. In 2008. DHS put out a 

proposed rule-making for the "Collection of Alien Biometric Data Upon Exit From the United 

States at Air and Sea Ports of Departure". requiting the airlines to collect biometric data 

anywhere in the intemational departure process. The airlines refused. A viable exit system was 

far' from implementation. 

Today, there ar'e three core statutes that provide the parameters of a biometric exit for air, sea, 

and land ports of entry. These are: 

• The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (8 USC § 1365b). This act 

streamlined the prior five statutory requirements for exit by defining a "biometric entry and exit 

data system" as the applicable sections of: 

1. The lllegal Immigration Refonn arId Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 

104-208); 

2. The lnunigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 

(Public Law 106-205); 

3. The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106-396); 

4. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry RefOlID Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-

173) [8 U.S.c. 1701 et seq.]; and 

5. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 

Intercept and Obstrnct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of2001 (Public Law 107-

56). 

• The 2007 9/11 Commission Implementation Act, Section 711, Section 217(i) oflNA, of the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 CotlUnission Act of2007 (P.L. 110-53), which 

places collection onus on air carTiers. 

• The March 2013 Department of Homelarld Security Appropriations Act that requires Customs 

and Border Protection to implement a biometric exit program. 
20 

10 

The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The 2004 law begins as 

follows: "Consistent with the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 

United States, Congress finds that completing a biometric entry and exit data system as 

expeditiously as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by 

preventing the entry of terrorists." The law requires full implementation of a biometric entry/exit 

system at all ports of entry by December 2004. More specifically, the 2004 law lists the "Entryexit system goals" as follows: 

The Department of Homeland Security shall operate the biometric entry and exit system so that 

it: 

Serves as a vital counterterrorism tool: 

2. Screens travelers efficiently and in a welcoming manner; 

J. Provides inspectors and related personnel with adequate real-time infOlmation; 

4. Ensures flexibility of training and secUlity protocols to most effectively comply with security 

mandates: 

5. Integrates relevant databases and plans for database modifications to address volume 

increase and database usage: and 

6. Improves database search capacities by using language algorithms to detect alternate names. 

All immigration component databases held by ICE, CBP, USClS, the Department of Justice's 

Executive Office oflrmnigration Review, and State's Bmeau of Consular Affairs were to be 

integrated with the biometric exit system. By December 2006, a fully interoperable electronic 

data system, as required by Section 202 of the Enhanced Border Secmity and Visa Entry Reform 

Act (8 U.S.C. 1722), was to provide standardized "current and immediate access to information 

in the databases of federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community that is 

relevant to determine - (A) whether to issue a visa; or (B) the admissibility or deportability of 

an alien." Guidelines were also provided for assuring the security of the data. and enabling 

correction of elToneous data by the public. 

FUlther seeking to implement core 9/l1 Commission recommendations, the 2004 law required 

that entry/exit data be available electronically and used in determining immigration benefit 

application outcomes, including visas, work permits, inunigration comt cases and investigations, 

and creating a tracking system tied to tlle biometric identifier to assme accmate identification of 

applicants or tllOse llilder investigation. 

The 2007 Visa Waiver Program for Certain Visitors_ Section 217(h) of Immigration and 

Nationality Act was amended in 2007 to require air carriers to "'collect and electronically 

transmit" passenger "arrival and departure" data to "the automated entry and exit control 

system" developed by the federal government. Deployment of an exit system was also tied to 

further expansion of the Visa Waiver Program. The exit requirement was ignored, however, by 
21 

both the Bush and Obama administrations, which both actively expanded the Visa Waiver 

Program without a biometric exit program, 

11 

The 2013 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. For 10 years Congress has tried to force 

DHS to establish an exit program to no avail. US-VISIT was involved with the issue because of 

a statutory call for a biometric exit Being the only true biometJic and immigration program 

office in the federal government, US-VISIT was saddled with conducting exit pilots and 

rendeling massive reports that the CUITent administration has refused to make public, 

Meanwhile, CBP, which only in the past few months has been made responsible for fnll 

implementation of a biometric exit program, was included in pilots and contJibuted input, but 

never had final say, conti'ol, or accofmtability for getting the job done, In the 2013 Homeland 

Secm-itv Appropriations Act. the appropriators took the issue off the table and made clear that 

CBP is fully in control, and also accountable, for planning and deploying a biometric exit 

program. 

The appropriators also finally streamlined the variou s legal requirements pertaiuing to exit and 

set forth a viable, practical, phased approach that was desperately needed, CBP now has clear 

marching orders: the agency must produce an enhanced biographic exit system first, and 

quickly, with a later phase-in of a biometric exit system. While it is unnecessary to continue 

with a biographic system considering the maturity of biometric border exit solutions cmTently 

available (see below), the good news is that the agency that is responsible for border inspections 

at entry, is now also the responsible agency for the border inspections at exit 

One more potential benefit of the new shift of overstay analysis to ICE and exit implementation 

to CBP: This change may cause the necessary friction to achlally make exit happen, ICE relies 

on many forms of exit data now, but getting the same data in the same marmer with the same 

standardized information consistently from CBP would make ICE overstay operations much 

more efficient However, that will likely require either the Obama administi'ation to develop and 

implement a biometric exit system, or significant congressional oversight that is satisfied only 

with results, not excuses for failing to inrplement a program fust required 17 years ago. Below is 

the current budget allocation for OBTM from the 2013 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 

which clarifies the new set of responsibilities for OBTM, CBP, and ICE relative to biometric exit 

program development (emphasis added): 

OFFTeR OF RJOMRTRIC lTJRNTITY MANAGRMRNT 

A tolal ofS232,422,OOO isprovidedfor the "()fJice of Rio mel ric Idenlity Managemenl." 

This level includes: S",O, 546,000 for Salaries and Expenses (S&E); 515,980,000.(or 

Systems Rngineering; Sf 55,840,OOO/iJr Operations and Maintenance (O&M), 10 include 

S65,500,000./'or IDENT; and S20, 056,000 for Identity Management and Screening 

Sen'ices. ". [he bill proVides $19,917,000 to Ie}.' in order tofidly/imd overstay analysis 

previously performed by US VJ.WT, to include the Data Integrity Group. The bill also 

provides $12,284,000 to eBl' related to entry-eXit policy and operations. 

Implications of a Biometric Exit on National Secwity and Overstays 
22 

12 

As mentioned in the introduction, 40 million foreign nationals visit the United States by air 

annually. This number represents nationals from visa waiver countries where the United States 

does not require a visa for tourism or business travel lasting 90 days or less from the current list 

of 37 qualified countries. The 40 million also includes anyone from a Visa Waiver country that 

is applying outside of tourism or short-tenn business, as well as any counhy that is not in the 

Visa Waiver Program. 

National Security. Little has changed on progress to implement an exit program since the 9111 

Commission made this finding of fact in its 911 and Terrorist Travel monograph: "On August 

23,2001, the CIA provided biographical identification infmmation about two of the hijackers to 

border and law enforcement authorities. The CIA and fBI considered the case important, but 

there was no way of knowing whether either hijacker was still in the COill1try, because a border 

exit system Congress authorized in 1996 was never implemented." 

Not having an exit system in place led the 9/11 Commissioners to conclude in2011 that our 

border system must include data about who is leaving and when, with the following 

recommendation: "The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, 

should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system. As important 

as it is to know when foreign nationals arrive, it is also important to know when they leave. full 

deployment of the biometric exit ... should be a high priority. Such a capability would have 

assisted law enforcement and intelligence officials in August and September 2001 in conducting 

a search for two of the 9/11 hijackers that were in the United States on expired visas." (See 

"Tenth Anlliversatv Report Cat'd: The Status of the 9/11Commission Recommendations"). 

Our more recent experience with tenorist threats and attempts reiterates the commissioners' 

point. In the wake of the Cluistmas Bomb Plot and the near-getaway by would-be Times Square 

bomber faisal Shallzad (who had already boarded a flight to leave the United States when he 

was atTested), we are once again reminded that a biomehic exit system is needed to prevent a 

terrorist from "fooling" the system and getting away. 

Overstay Enforcement Efforts and the Visa Waiver Program. Biomeh-ic exit is a key 

component to assuring the integrity of the Visa Waiver Program, by assuring that overstay rates 

are accurate and readily available to determine either a nation's qualifications to be accepted 

into the program or its continued participation in it. The fact that DHS officials told the GAO 

during its investigation for the May 2013 report "Immigration Enforcement: Preliminary 

Observations on DHS' s Overstav Enforcement Efforts" that there remains no confidence in the 

current biographic data system, is strong evidence that a biometric system is needed to support 

the Visa Waiver Program. 

More specifically, the inadequacies of visa overstay analysis today make clear that biographic 

data alone are inadequate in assuring the identity of foreign nationals coming at1d going through 

the inunigration system. According to the May 2013 GAO report referenced above, there are 

currently more that1 one million "illlillatched atTival records" in the DHS's AtTival at1d 

Departure Information System (ADIS), or potential cases where inlmigrants mayor may not 

have remained in the country with expired visas, and cannot be identified. 
23 

13 

Foreign air travelers benefit from accurate data regarding their arrivals and departures because it 

minimizes errors that may affect future travel. The relationship between overstay data and the 

need for a biometric air exit was further emphasized in the July 2013 GAO report "Overstay 

Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning for a 

Biometric Air Exit Program", which notes the following: 

In 201 I, TJHS reviewed this hacklog of 1.6 million records, closed ahout 863,000 

records, and removed them from the backlog. As new unmatched arrival records have 

accrued, DHS has continued to review all of these new recordsfor national security and 

public safety concerns. As of June 2013, DHS's unmatched arrival records totaled more than 

one million. 

Federalla11' requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessor has 

not regularly done so since J99.f..inApriI20iJ, GAO reported that DHS officials said 

that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence 

in the quality Ii/ifs overstay data. in February 20i3, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

testified thai TJHS plans 10 report overstay rates hy TJecemher 2013. However, TJHS has 

not assessed or documented improvements in the reliahility Ilj'data used to develop 

overstay estimates, in accordance with federal internal control standardl·. Without sllch a 

documented assessment to ensure the reliability olthese data, decision makers would not 

have the information needed to use these datafor policy-makinfi purposes. 

Terrorist overstays are also a significant issue, which, under the current system, can be tracked 

down only through difficult, tedious, and time-consuming investigations. Recent terrorist 

overstays include Hosan Smadi, a Jordanian national who plotted to blow up a Dallas skyscraper 

in 2009, and Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan whose visa expired in 1999, who was arrested in an 

attempt to bomb the U.S. Capitol in 2012. 

Assuring Identity. These one million "U1llnatched" records would likely not exist, or be 

substantially reduced, with biometrics. Biometrics enable identity to be verified instantly and 

eliminate the risk of missing a tlu'eat due to the misspelling of a name or other biographic elTors. 

Instead, biometrics allow instant, real-time assurance that people are who they say they are. 

Biometrics also prevent identity theft, preventing the swipe of lost or stolen passports from 

being used to manipulate the system as to who has actually left the country. 

Instant, verified overstay data would give CBP and the State Department better information to 

determine who gets to visit the United States again, and ICE better information about who 

returned or illegally overstayed. Exit data would also support all CutTent customers ofOBIM 

biometric data. and may even give Joint Terrorism Task Forces the ability to curtail terrorist 

absconders who slip out ofthe United States Ulilloticed based on velified watchlist hits - akin 

to the attempted escape by the Times Square bomber, who was boarded 31ld on the jetway when 

apprehended, having bypassed a biographic-only exit system and TSA security. 

U.S. Supports Biometric Border Programs Abroad. Although the federal govenunent 

cUlTently does not have a biometric exit program, the United States is actively supporting 

biometric border programs in both Nigeria and the Philippines. In April 2013, a U.S. delegation 
24 

14 

arrived in Nigeria to discuss installation ofa biometric system through its Ministry of the 

Interior to help secme its borders, with the overall goal of stemming the tide of rising insmgency 

and helping to stabilize the Nigerian regime. According to Dwight Brown, the U.S. delegation 

program manager. "You can change your name. you can get a new passport, but you can't 

change yom fIngerprints and this system checks the fingerprint of evelY traveler that comes 

through it. ... Our system is powered by biometrics and fmgelprints. the most powerful 

identifIcation teclmology available today." The Nigerian newspaper report noted that "The 

teclmologies will be provided by the USA while the Nigeria Immigration Service persormel will 

be h'ained to man them." 

In April 2013, the United States donated two fIngerprint scamlers to the Philippines Bmeau of 

Immigration at the N inoy Aquino International Anport to take fIngerplints of all arrested aliens 

and build a photo and fIngerprint biometric database of illegal aliens and foreign fugitives 

wanted by immigration intelligence persormel. A Filipino immigration official commented that 

"This will prevent these blacklisted aliens from re-entering the country even if they assume a 

different name. use a different passport. or disguise their physical appearance." The country's 

Immigration Commissioner thanked the U.S. government for its support in upgrading its 

facilities and enhancing the Filipino authority's ability to enforce immigration laws. 

Biographic Only vs. Biometric Plus Biographic 

There continues to be a debate over whether a "biographic-only" approach to exit is suffIcient. 

But that is essentially the system currently in place, whereby advance passenger data and name 

records of foreign nationals who have checked in for departure are logged into the inunigration 

anival-departme database. As discussed, a biographic-only system has numerous problems, 

including the inability to confrrm identity. The only way to confnm identity is through biometric 

means such as facial recognition software, iris scans, and fIngerprints. This section explores the 

policy and practical reasons as to why, in each instance, a biomehic solution is the only one that 

provides the benefIts for government, the traveler, the airport, and the airline (or, in the case of 

the sea ports, the sea carrier). 

The Problem with Names. A serious issue that remains unsolved more than a decade after 9/11 

is misspelled or inaccurately recorded names. The 19 hijackers collectively had over 300 

spellings of their names. Recently it was discovered that Boston Marathon bomber Tamerlan 

Tsarnaev's name was misspelled on a manifest list of a flight to Russia, meaning that the FBI 

did not have the benefIt of an nnportant lead in investigating his terrorist ties. Problems with the 

biographic-only approach continue despite software to help conect misspelled names. Simply 

requiring a "next generation" version of such software will not solve the problem; merely 

enllancing software that picks up name anomalies can never be sufficient because thousands of 

varieties of uncommon names from all over the world are spelled differently in English or even 

purposefully misspelled. Nor does such software pick up complete biographic identity changes, 

a much more nefarious problem that biometrics solves in seconds. 

Identity verification produces actionable information. When an individual pmchases a plane or 

boat cruise ticket, the federal government (indeed, most all governments) require advance 

passenger identity information, including Passenger Name Records (PNR) taken by airlines. 
25 

This information is then turned over to government authorities for risk assessments. Upon 

arrival at the airport for departure, the identity associated with the passenger must be verified. 

The seconds it takes to process a biometric solution is essential to assuring that the name 

matches the individual, eliminating nearly all vmieties of fraud. 

15 

Without biometrics. either no vetting occurs or it is simply a name-based vetting, which is both 

inaccurate and unable to be fully verified. The result is inordinately long - sometimes hours -

queues for a slow, manual, and inaccurate process cmlied out by overworked border agents. 

However, automated, unmanned depmiure zones that scan biographic passpOli data and capture 

biometrics provide biometric identity verification within seconds by matching it against the 

biometric infOlmation obtained at entry, which in the United States is a digital photo and 10 

fingerplints. Departure requires only verification against one of these biometrics. Using 

fingerplints as a base for a U.S. system, for exmnple, would require verification of only two 

prints, a much quicker mld easier solution thml already exists at air ports at enhy. 

Using the smne device - a set of monitored kiosks, unmmllled gates, or hmldheld devicespassport data would be scanned concurrently with whatever biometric was captured. This data 

can be matched against the advmlced passenger infOlmation and PNR data, mld identity mld 

biometrics can be vetted against existing law enforcement, intelligence, and watchlist 

information. 

This does not mean that "hits" will result in a denial of departure or secondary inspection. In 

fact, that is not the point of an exit program. Instead, an exit program's primary purpose is to 

record a confirmed departure that enables better decision- making by immigration, law 

enforcement, and intelligence authorities after the fact. But that does not mean real-time 

depmiure data could not be acted upon, which may be essential during an active criminal or 

intelligence investigation where the foreign national sought represents a significant flight risk. 

Focus on High-Risk Passengers with Better Information. The cunent TSA docnment check 

neither confirms identity nor authenticity of a passport (or any other travel docnment presented). 

An option could be to place a biomeh"ic solution at the front of the TSA checkpoint, replacing 

the cmTent check by a TSA agent with a mandatOlY biomettic-biographic identity check and 

departure record that would enable security personnel to focus on high-risk passengers and 

enable the majority of low-lisk passengers to go tluough a more stremnlined secmity process, 

improving throughput rates. At the same time, high-risk passengers can be given informed 

additional security checks that aid aviation safety and immigration departure information 

integrity. The result would be a better-informed and more secure aviation environment while 

fulfilling a federal mandate of a biometric exit system. 

In 2008. US-VISIT conducted an in-depth "Air/Sea Biomettic Exit Project Regulatory Impact 

Analysis". In compming a biographic-only exit to a biometric exit, the assessment concluded 

that biometl;c was a far better choice for the following reasons: 

Overstays. The ability to determine overstays with the cunent biographic-only air exit is 

difficult and "the likelihood is high that not all overstays are identified." 
26 

Failure to confirm identity. "Reliance on biographic data, such as matching the name 

provided by the traveler to stored names, is fraught with risk." 

16 

Incomplete immigration records. "Without accmate and immediate recording of an inscope traveler's exit, the traveler's entry-exit record is not complete. A risk exists that the 

h'aveler will be admitted into the United States without sufficient understanding of his or 

her entry-exit history." 

Ability to expedite entry. "When the entry-exit, identity, or watch list infmmation on a 

traveler is not current or accurate, or if the CBP officer does not trust the data, the CBP 

officer may reqnest the traveler be sent for second31Y inspection more often than would 

othelwise be the case. This delays the enh'ance of the specific h'aveler 311d potentially the 

admission of other travelers." 

Effects admission/participation of Visa Waiver Program countries. "The database of 

entry-exit records of in-scope travelers risks being incomplete. Thus, calculation of exit 

compliance is not accmate." 

Supports resource allocation decisions for law enforcement officers. "Confidence in 

the entry-exit record of the in- scope traveler would be increased if the collection of exit 

data and recording of exit data were automated, and the identity of the in-scope traveler 

could be assured." 

Solution 

A biometric air/sea exit solution is available right now, as it was in 2009. It requires no 

infrastructure changes to airports, and can be deployed immediately. Neither TSA nor airlines 

need be direct! y involved; CBP should be fnlly responsible for implementation, m311agement, 

and processing, as reqnired nnder the 2013 Homeland Secmity Appropriations Act. Today, 

unmanned options that require only monitOling and customer support are available. The system 

would inform immigration law enforcement on overstays and reduce enforcement costs, and 

inform intelligence and law enforcement officials ofterrOlist and ctiminal departures. 

The air/sea exit solution is based on biomeh'ic and airline industry queries, an extensive review 

of both the June 2009 US- VISIT Air Biomehic Evaluation 311d the 2008 regulatOlY cost 

analysis by US-VISIT, and a review of both mature and newly implemented biomeh'ic bordercontrol solntions deployed intemationally. 

Note that CBP, responsible for border protection 311d inspection within DHS, has condncted 

multi-modal biomehic air entry processing since 2007 (based on a photo 311d 10 fmgerprints). 

The cmrent entry processing had signific311t infrastructrn'e, interview, 311d biomehic 

requirements that were snccessfully implemented - all of which are not required for 311 air/sea 

exit deployment. Solntions are mobile, manned or nnmanned. and employ proven technologies 

that can facilitate processillg oflarge volUllles of foreigll natiollals without 31ly significant 
27 

17 

impediments to travel. In short, deploying a biometric exit solution is much easier to put in place 

than the biometric entry solution installed in 2005. 

Key Elements of a Successful Deployment 

Review of All Relevant Materials. Recent industry letters to Congress - listed as appendices 

at the end of this report - pro- vide information specifically on cost and feasibility. The first is 

a detailed letter and separate memo from leading biometric provider, Safran MorphoTrak, 

formerly Sagem Morpho, which services the Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems 

(AFIS) in 28 states and 30 counties as well as immigration biometric entry/exit systems 

internationally. The second is a de- tailed letter from the International Biometrics & 

Identification Association relating current costs for full deployment of an air/sea biometric exit, 

and a "myths vs. facts" sheet. The last section of this report summarizes international 

deployments of biometric border solutions. 

Applicability Only to Foreign Nationals_ Depmture requirements would not apply to U.S. 

citizens, but rather only to for - eign nationals, including (1) foreign visitors seeking visas at 

consular offices overseas; (2) legal immigrants seeking immigra- tion benefits in the United 

States; and (3) mly foreign nationals grmlted temporary legal status, including those enrolled in 

any amnesty program. 

Use of Proven Technologies. Air and sea infrastructures should integrate proven passport 

capture and biometric technol- ogy currently used in international immigration settings, by 

OBTM, and by U.S. law enforcement. Numerous vendors offer off-the-shelf mobile, kiosk, and 

e-gate fingerprint, facial recognition. and even iris and retina scan technologies. Fingerprint 

scanners, for example, are available as both contact and contactless and would be rather easily 

incorporated into OBTM's existing fingerpl;nt system management. Some operate as quickly as 

two seconds. The goal is to minimize cost, maximize speed, and assure the integrity of the 

depmture data while protecting the data's privacy and secnrity. 

"Exit" Data Captured. The system would link the reading of the passpOlt mId fingerprint data 

captured at the POlt of entlY in real time to the existing Anival and Depmture InfOlmation 

System, the same system used now to record biometric entries mId receive electronic mmrifest 

departure data. 

Mobile Infrastructure and Technologies. Air and sea ports should be given a menu of options 

listing a handful of approved teclmologies that will most efficiently ensure 311 exit protocol that 

achieves immigration control without exorbitant costs or flow-through issues. Kiosks, e-gate 

zones, and handheld devices are all potential options, depending on the different needs of 

various jetway configurations. Such options exist currently at air, sea, and land ports around the 

world today. 

International Air Travel Statistics. According to the Department of Commerce. the fee 

revenue should continue to rise if air exit is deployed within the next two to four years. The 

April 2013 press release reads "U.S. Commerce Secretm'y Jo1m Bryson today affilounced that the 

United States can expect 4-5 percent average mutual growth in tourism over the next fIve years, 

and that 65.4 million foreign travelers are projected to visit the United States in 2012 alone. The 
28 

Spring 2012 Travel and Tourism Forecast, released semi-annually by the U.S. Commerce 

Departmeut's Iuternatioual Trade Admiuistration (ITA), predicts contiuued strong growth 

through 2016 following two consecutive visitor volume records set in 20 I 0 and 20 II." 

18 

The 65 million foreign visitors include all entries by air. and sea, as well as those land entries 

that are recorded (many are not since passport iuspection of vehicle passengers is visual, unless 

there is a secondary inspection referral). Statistics on foreign air travelers are provided by the 

Commerce Department's Office of Travel and TOUlism Industries in "International Visitation to 

the United States: A Statistical Summmy of U.S. Visitation (2012)". The repOli's statistics show 

that all air visitors - most of whom are now required to pay security application or visa 

application fees - totaled 39.6 million. The breakdown is as follows: Air visitors from Canada 

increased 3 percent from 2011 to 2012, with 7,695,000 visitors iu 2012; air visitors from Mexico 

increased 9 percent from 20 II to 2012, with 2, I 17.951 visitors; and all other nations combined 

increased 7 percent from 2011 to 2012, with 29,761,038 total overseas visitors. 

To clarify further that most of the increase iu the entry offoreign nationals will likely be by air, 

this same report summarized the countries of origin where tourism is currently increasing the 

most: "Top inbound countries with the largest increases in visits in 2012 were: the People's 

Republic of China (excluding Hong Kong) (+35 percent). Colombia (+21 percent), Venezuela 

(+20 percent), Argentina (+20 percent) and Brazil (+ 19 percent). All five countries set new 

records for visits to the United States." Nem' all entries from these countries are by air. 

Funding. A $10 increase in the current $14 Electronic System for Travel Authorization (EST A) 

fee for a newly created Bio- metric Exit Trust Fund, for a total fee of $24, could be implemented 

to cover costs. ESTA is a tax paid by Visa Waiver ap- plicants for pre-admission screening 

when they make travel plans to the United States. Current law requires that only $4 of the fee be 

used by CBP to support the ESTA progrmn, while $10 is used by "Brmld USA" to promote 

tourism to the United States. Another $10 for a biometric exit - the smne amount already 

provided to promote tourism - should not be too much to ask to help enforce the nation's 

immigration laws and implement a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to ensure our 

security. 

Tn addition, a $10 increase in visa application fees for those foreign nationals not eligible for 

Visa Waiver status would cover the remaining costs. Applicants in many visa categories spend 

well over $100 already. Another $10 is a modest addition con- sidering all the other costs of 

travel and immigration. 

Based on the current level of foreign air anivals, without even taking iuto account the projected 

increases in foreign tourism. these fee increases could raise $400 million in the first year alone, 

more than enough to deploy an air/sea exit solution in a quick, phased approach over two years, 

and without iucurring debt. 

Any funds left over could be used to maintain and improve exit, implement full interoperability 

of iulmigration databases with other immigration components, and to enforce iulmigration law 

against visa overstays. 
29 

19 

Feasibility 

Tltis section covers the feasibility, cost, and backgromld issues for immediate, full 

implementation of a biometric air/sea exit program. In 2009, congressional appropriators 

required two airport biometric pilot programs before appropriating further monies for exit. One 

pilot tested handheld biometric-biographic devices at TSA checkpoints at Atlanta's RartsfieldJackson International Airport, the other required CBP to screen departures with mobile laptops 

configured for a biometric-biographic exit on the jetway at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. Both 

worked well. Airlines refused to participate in the pilot programs. reiterating the argument that 

exit, like entry, is plimarily a government function. 

The study's conclusion was: "Overall, the Air Exit Pilots confumed the ability to biometric ally 

record the exit of aliens subject to US-VISIT departing the Ultited States by air." 

In the one month of processing between June and July 2009 - heavy international travel times 

- the study found that "The Customs and Border Protection pilot at the jetway in Detroit 

processed 9,448 aliens and identified 44 watch list hits and 60 suspected overstays. The TSA 

pilot processed 20,296 aliens subject to US-VISIT and identifIed 131 watch list hits and 90 

overstays", for an aggregate of "ltits" of 1.10 percent for the CBP pilot and 1.09 percent of the 

TSA pilot. 

The study also found that line lengths at the TSA checkpoint did not increase, and CBP officers 

on the jetway had little to no impact on departure times. The biometric exit solutions caused no 

costs or delays in travel queues that increased flight delays or resulted in missed flights. In 

addition. 99.99 percent of those identified to participate in the study. did participate - only one 

person in 30,000 refused. The study further found that DRS databases were able to maintain the 

quality and matching requirements using the fingerprints collected, assuting that people were 

who they said they were, and their exit data conelated to their identity. 

Tltis pilot program verifIed that a successful biometric exit can be as minimal as providing a 

fingerplint match and passport "swipe" to assure identity of a travel document holder who has 

departed. Exit deployment is thus sigrtificantly less complicated than the biomehic entry system 

in place today that takes a digital photo and 10 fingerprints of each of the ammal 170 million 

foreign visitors. Since the 2009 pilots, teclmology has significantly improved, cost has declined, 

and options - including umnarmed but marldatory multi-modal (more tharl one biomehic) 

biometric-biographic solutions - are in operation around the world. 

Technology Today Is Better, Faster 

Biomehic teclmology is sigrtificantly improved over the 2009 US-VISIT fmdings: 

Processing is signifIcantly faster, requiring less than two seconds for fmgerprint capture 

in some cases and many complete biographic-biometric options operating in less than 20 

seconds for full processing. In conh'ast, biographic enhy operates at about a minute per 

traveler, and even in 2009 full processing was expected to take 66 seconds per passenger. 
30 

20 

Many solutions are multi-modal, allowing a simultaneous read of the digital photo stored 

in an e-passport matched against a real time facial image taken during departure, 

alongside a fingerprint scan that conducts a match against arrival fingerprint records, and 

the input ofbiographic passport data. Some systems also upload watchlists and cull in 

real time, for seclli1ty purposes. 

Mobile units designed for flexibility and efficiency, enable throughput to be maximized 

based on the volrune of passengers and assuring that no infrastructure changes are 

required. These mobile units can come in a variety of formats, including handheld 

devices. see-through lightweight "e-gates", and mobile kiosks. 

Most systems aTe urunaImed, enabling self-checkout, fast tluoughput, the highest levels 

of security, passenger convenience, and high efficiency for border personnel. 

Systems are fully encrypted to protect privacy and data integl1ty. 

Eliminating Air Carriers from Processing 

The 2007 Visa Waiver Act places collection ofbiometl1cs squarely on air Call1ers. To date, the 

air caITiers have successfully blocked implementation of any exit progrant that places the onus 

of collection on the caITiers, citing hidden costs, slowing of tluoughput, and passenger 

dissatisfaction. From an oversight perspective, the chief concern of Congress should be to 

eliminate air carrier concern by simply voiding the current mandate that the air carriers collect 

biometric data of departing aliens. Not one COlliltly in the world currently requires air caITiers to 

collect this data, and for good reason: air carriers should not be in the business of administering 

immigration inspection, which is a government function. 

Moreover, if CBP already conducts thorough biometric inspections at ently, that same entity 

should be ultimately responsible for implementing, managing, and processing "inspections" at 

exit. As enforcement action w111 not take place at exit except in exigent circrunstances, few 

personnel will be required. Tn exceptional cases, such as a terror investigation, the FBT would 

likely be the arresting authority, not CBP. All in all, there is no reason to involve air carriers in 

processing or enforcement due to information arising from data acquired during departnre. 

Deployment to All Air Exits 

While about 40 percent of international travel is concentl'ated in the United States' top 30 

international airports, the remaining 40 international and other airports slowly aCClUe the 

remainder of international air travel. Thus, any solution must incorporate these smaller volume 

airports. The easiest way to do so would be to minimize maIlpower aIld airport outlay by simply 

enabling smaller airports to install mandatory kiosks or e-gates as a subset of the security 

processes already in place, taking the place ofthe current TSA "document check". At larger air 

and sea ports, where CBP already has manpower deployed for biometric entry, minimal 

manpower would be necessary to ensure compliance and customer support. 
31 

Table 1. International Passenger Throughput at U.S. Airports 

I ... ·~ \W. -n...I \ ... -'-- _. ~ 

, ~ 

• 

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.. " 41,tN "'. Jlj<Ioj.JI:l 

, ... u ... "'_.Ill - "IWo I ..... _ *"-I __ otT ........ _ .... ""'"J~_ ... _-,~ .... ~ ____ ..... "".-dIioc_" ............ ...,....· __ ~· __ ...,..... .. _ · nMIotIlo_".LI _ ..... _~.,.......... ..... lMoouI __ ........................ .. _ .. IIoo_w..'" ~· 

_ ... Io""-.-__ IoIloo ....... _ l ... , ......... __ .... ioIiIloI~ . ..... ,......~ 1oM._ .... JOII __ LAO-""' .. 5CI __ ........... _ ... ""c....cLI ... --.t~ ..... lM -----_ ... ""'--. 
32 

[Footnote reprinted to include 

links]: 

22 

l'hi" table ,yas derived from13ureau of Inmsportation statistlcs of intenwtional passenger ±low determined by querymg the 

dcpartun.: ml01111ahon by scarchmg cl.[l.:h of Lhe "a11111<1JOT aIrports" und lhl,..~l qUi .. :Tymg all olhlvT mlcmallonal mrports to 

detennine a ranking in term" of2012 intemational pa%enger'> departure throughput here. The total international passenger 

tllwugbput for all airp0l1s is found at the same link. by clicking "all" in the airport search engine in the top nght search. The 

ranling for airports and initial determination as to the largest airports, \vas taken from the 20 [2 North American (ACT-NA) 

lop 50 anports spreadsheet found on the COllne]1 for Tnternational Aiqlorls' 'l-vebsile. The percentages \vere JeLermined based 

on this infOlmation. 

CBP should be encouraged to engage airports to choose the most cost-effective solutions for 

their infrastructure and passenger thoughput needs. Flexibility in solutions would allow airpOlts 

with CBP to choose from an approved menu of solutions depending on airpOlt infrastructme 

design and the large differences in throughput that would best fit the needs of particular 

deprutme jetways. The same would be the case for seapOlts. 

According to Department of Transportation statistics on international air travel at 150 U.S. 

airports that provide international service, over 171 million passengers depruted from the United 

States on international flights in 2012. In 2012, the top 10 airports represented about 35 percent 

of international departures, while the top 20 only increased the throughput by another 10 

percent, at 45 percent of that travel. The top 30 airports represented 47.5 percent of that travel. 

The top 40 airports represented only 48 percent of that travel, a significant drop in volume. The 

remaining middle- and smaller-sized international airports only have a few thousand 

intelllational deprutmes rumually. All totaled, 110 of the 150 airports together amount to 52 

percent of the international departure traffic, with each producing less than a 112 of 1 percent of 

all traffic. 

For example, Jolm F. Kemledy Airport in New York receives almost 12.4 million intelllational 

passengers annually. In contrast to JFK, Minneapolis, ranked 20th, at 1,081,000 intelllational 

deprutmes, produced just 10,000 in volume to JFK's December 2012 throughput of 1,071,000. 

Miami, ranked second, produces significantly less volume than JFK at just over 9.3 million. 

Washington, D.C.'s Dulles Airport ranks 9th, at just under 3.2 million. The top 30th airport. 

Washington D.C. Ronald Reagan Airport ranks at 190,000 per year. New Orleans (not in Table 

1) ranks at 50, with only about 22,000. 

Cost 

Industry Costs. The International Biometrics & Identification Association (TElA) calculated its 

cost range based on the same 2008 DHS cost study used in the cost chart in this report, 

concluding costs of approximately $9 million for handheld fingerprint/passport readers 

(requiring an immigration inspector to man each device) to $200 million for biometric and 

boarding pass/passport reader e-Gates (requiring only one immigration inspector to man many 

devices at one time). These cost estimates were obtained by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) from 

industry representatives dming consideration and mru'kup of immigration refol1nlegislation. The 

goal was to answer cost and feasibility questions regarding implementation of a biometric exit. 

The infOlmation attached to this report from Morphotrak ruld the TElA ru'e reproduced here with 
33 

the senator's express permission. Morphotrak's cost estimates for the top international airports 

representing 40 percent of the international traffic is $90 to $150 million for hardware and 

software depending on the solution chosen, including customization. 

Added Values that Reduce Costs in Other Government Functions. The 2008 "Air/Sea 

Biometric Exit Project Regulatory Impact Analysis" noted the following improvements over a 

biographic exit system provided by an air/sea biometric exit system that provided added value 

and reduction in overall costs to the immigration system and national security: 

"Improved detection of aliens overstaying visas" (300 ICE agents do overstay analysis 

today). 

23 

"Cost avoidance resulting from improved Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

efficiency attempting apprehension of overstays" (in 2007, costs for removal per visa 

violator was $18.375 per individual). 

"Improved efficiency of processing Exit/Entry data". 

"Improved national security environment". 

Manpower and Other Costs. Manpower costs for CBP to assure and support processing would 

vary depending on choice ofbiometr"ic solution; some mobile solutions require only monitoring 

and support, thus significantly reducing CBP manpower costs. The more popular international 

choice, e-gates, require little or no manpower. Handheld devices, in contrast, require a reader 

per inspector. 

Total First Year Deployment Cost. Aggregating the 2008 US-VISIT impact analysis data and 

industry data, the greatest total cost for first year technology implementation would be 

approximately $400-600 million. depending on collection units chosen. The more expensive 

units do not require an attendant per reader, but a single monitOling attendant who can supervise 

a number of mobile kiosks at once. 

The 2008 US-VISIT analysis assumes that the solution would be deployed to 73 

international airports and 33 seaports, for a total of 11,990 individual devices (9,248 at 

airports and 2,742 at seaports). This may be significantly higher than actually necessary 

consideling today's new e-gates and kiosk technology. Thus, the 2008 numbers here are 

likely significantly higher than actual cost for deployment. 

The 2008 analysis also calculated costs based on a 66.6 second processing time per alien. 

This number today would likely be less than 20 seconds per alien. 
34 

Table 2. Costs for Full Deployment to 

nlntemational Airports and 33 International Seaports 

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The 2008 analysIs delcmllncd that a\x)ul 52 [mll,on aliens would exit each year through 

air and sea ports. which is significantly more than emerillS .ooay. 

This chart does nOl include airport infrastructure change costs, as these are flOt necessary 

wilh mobile solutions, 
35 

25 

Personnel costs are not included, as current solutions require only monitoring for multiple 

machines, not an attendant per device; the 2008 assessment included over 5,000 

attendants required for all air and sea ports assuming an attendant per device for 18 hours 

a day, seven days a week at airpOlts, and six hours a day, four days a week at seapOlts at 

about $60,000 per officer or about $300 million atmually. In addition, costs were based 

on average salaries for air carrier personnel, not CBP. Thus, it was impossible to transfer 

or use persOlmel costs from the 2008 assessment. However, assuming three agents for 

eveIY four gates at $50,000/yeatlagent, that cost would be about $39 million armually. 

The ongoing persomlel cost as detennined by CBP is easily covered by relatively small 

ES TA atld visa fee increases as discussed above. 

Technology costs for air carrier collection of data. and transfer of that data between air 

caniers to the govenilllent, is not relevant as it was in 2008. 

Time per foreign national enrollment in exit average about one minute or more in 2008; 

that time is now reduced to anywhere between two seconds and twenty seconds per 

foreign national, also reducing both technology and labor costs. 

The 2008 atlalysis calculated the devices at $7,700 apiece for a total of $35.5 million in 

cost. The price of the devices discussed in this repOlt vary, depending on the solution 

provided. 

Morphotrak costs were recalculated for full deployment, using the DHS numbers in the 

2008 assessment of 106 combined airpOlts and seaports. This report assumes that CBP 

would require the same deployment to the same listing of airports. 

High-end collection devices require only supervision of multiple devices at once, not 

collection and personnel per reader. 

Costs not included from the 2008 assessment at'e either no longer releVatlt without air/sea 

carrier involvement nor infrastructure changes needed, or would be covered by the 

provider. 

Biometric Systems Worldwide 

The United States has failed to create the efficiencies and effectiveness that the rest of the world 

is realizing in biometric entry/exit systems. In fact, The Biometrics Institute (based in Australia), 

an international forum representing governments, suppliers and researchers in its published 2013 

survey said that the number one most significant trend noted by its members for this year was 

Biometrics at the Border. The solutions vary from fingerprint atld facial recognition devices to 

iris scan technologies; from marmed to unmanned stations; from land to air to sea programs; 

from guestworker to entry/exit solutions. Biometrics is considered the fOfUldation for 

optimization of passenger processing, atld thus integral to the futrue tr'end in airline atld 

immigration processing where the mission is to increase self-service, drive effIciencies, reduce 

queues, and simplify processing for passengers. 
36 

26 

For example, Saudi Arabia has been using iris recognition technology since 2002 to manage the 

huge influx of visitors during the Haij, using the system to both enhance security and prevent 

visa overstays, One vendor already has 30 government clients for its automatic facial 

recognition border solutions throughout the world. Another vendor verified in a 2010 DHS 

National Institute of Standards and Tec1mology report that it has excellent facial recognition 

software for border control environments, which is now being installed throughout the European 

Union. Some places, like Amsterdam, are already on their second-generation deployment of 

biometric border controls. 

Biometric border systems are not necessmily concentrated in developed countries; lessdeveloped countries are deploying, or have already deployed, biomel1ic systems to contr'ol their 

borders. Some m'e doing so with help from the U.S. government. Others m'e doing so with nextgeneration technologies. Some international airlines are testing biometrics to replace paper 

tickets and multiple presentations oftr'avel documents plior to boarding. In the United States, 

Chicago O'Hare International Airport recently began automating some of its immigration 

controls for arrivals. The most advanced systems, such as New Zealand's second-generation 

deployment, are integrating airline check-in and boarding with immigration entry/exit. This 

section summmizes many of those advances. 

International Airport Entry/Exit Systems 

Biometric entry and exit immigration systems are deployed worldwide to enhance security, 

customer experience. and facilitation. Some countries. such as New Zealand, are deploying 

second-generation systems that incorporate passenger check-in and ticketing. Facial recognition, 

iris, mld fingerprint technologies all provide amplified benefits mld relatively negligible 

differences in speed and accuracy from each other; all are markedly better than any "enhanced 

biographic" system. Mmly of these systems m'e lliUllmmed, mld while immigration or customs 

officials are on site to conduct inspections as necessmy, their deployment is efficient, allowing 

the technology to conduct exit data recording and identity verification, while facilitating 

processing of all others. 

Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi was one of the first countries to deploy a biometric border entry/exit 

system. Its primary purpose was to make sure that those "expelled" from the country did not 

change their name, obtain a new passport, and rerurn with a new identity that a biographic 

system could not discern. From a 2004 article: 

Over a dislrihuled netlt'ork involving all 17 air, land, and sea ports inlo the r:mirales, the 

iris pal terns of all arriving passengers are compared in real-time exhaustively againsl an 

enrolled central datahase. According 10 the Ministly oj1nterior, ~vhich controls the 

database, safar not a single false match has been made, despite some 2.7 billion iris 

cross- comparisons bein;; done every day. 

On a typical day, more than 6,500 passengers enter Ihe UAr: via seven inlernational 

airports, three land ports, and seven sea ports. By looking at an iris camerafor a second 

or two lvhile passin); throll);h immi);rution control, each passen);er 's iris patterns are 

encoded mathematically and the resulting JrisCodes sent over a distrihuted 
37 

27 

communications network to a central database controlled by the General Directorate of 

Abu Dhabi Police. There they are compared exhaustively aKainl't an enrolled database of 

-120,000 lrisCodes ojpersons who were expelledfrom the UAFfin' various violations, 

many o.fwhom make repeated eflorts 10 re-enler the UAE with new identities uSingforged 

trm'el documents. Ihus the current daily number of iris cross-comparisons performed 

under Ihe UAE expellee tracking and border-crossing control syslem is about 2. 7 billion. 

it is theftrst system of its kind in the world, with more than 2.1 million arriving 

passengers already checked in this way. Ihe time required/or each passenger to be 

compared against thefitl! database of registered Iris Codes is less than one second. 

Safar more than 9,500 personl' have been caught by this system trm'elling lVithforged 

identities. According to Lt. Col. Ahmad Naser Al-Raisi, Director of the injiJrmation 

Technology Department at the General Directorate ojAbu Dhabi Police, "Wefinmd the 

system to be very' etlective and extremelyfust. its speed, accuracy, and ease-oFuse 

enabled us to deploy the project without difJiculties. " 

Australia. U.S. Global Entry members can now use a new biometric gate system, based on a 

combined protocol between U.S. and Australian Customs and Border Protection using facial 

recognition technology. These e-gates are similar to the ones deployed in New Zealand (see 

description below). U.S. Global Entry is a CBP "trusted traveler" program that allows expedited 

clearance for pre-approved, low-risk travelers upon anival in the United States who, instead of 

standing in line for inspection by a border agent, can enter the United States by using automated 

kiosks located at select airports. Rigorous background checks are required for participation. 

Upon anival, Global Enuypa:rticipants scan their machine-readable passpOlt or U.S. permanent 

resident ca:rd at the kiosk, place their fingeltips on the scarmer for fmgerprint verification, and 

make a customs declar·ation. The kiosk issues the u'aveler a u'arlsaction receipt arid directs the 

traveler to baggage claim and the exit. 

Bulgaria. Bulgaria's Sofia Airport has installed automated border clearance using both epassports and facial recognition technologies that process passengers in 7-10 seconds. The new 

gates are available for European and Swiss travelers over 18 years of age. Border inspection 

desks still exist for those who do not qualify for the expedited processing. 

Canada. The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency began using iris recognition technology for 

frequent travelers at Toronto and Vancouver International Airports in 2003. The Expedited 

Passenger Processing System uses iris recognition technology to conduct matching on those preregistered with the system, which includes both Americans and Carladians registered in the 

trusted traveler NEXUS program. Today iris recognition technology is used to verify visitors 

tlu'ough NEXUS at eight major Carladiarl international airllOlts in addition to Varlcouver, at 

Calgary, Edmonton, Wimripeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Monu'eal and Halifax. 

Czech Republic. The Czech Border Police's installation of an enuy/exit e-gate system at 

Prague's Vac1av Havel Airllort won the Czech Republic's "IT Project of the Year" in 2012. The 

Czech Minister for the Interior said this about the system: "The EasyGo project is a practical 

example of how biometric IDs can be used. The highly developed solution offers a self-service 

for crossing the border with a high level of security and saves the passengers time." The 
38 

software solution combines individual biometric components such as passport readers or 

cameras with background systems. According to the vendor, crossings are completed in an 

average speed of 18 seconds per person. The system has already had over 130,000 passengers 

from European Union countries use the system. 

28 

Ireland. The Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service and Dublin Airport Authority 

implemented an automated facial recognition border control gate pilot at Dublin Airport 

beginning in May 2013, velifying that the passport holder is the same individual seeking to enter 

Ireland and is authorized to do so, The system operates in about 7.5 seconds and the pilot is 

processing about 1,000 passengers per day. Authorities are already noting that staff workload is 

reduced, document fraud is better prevented, and border contI'ol waiting times are reduced. If 

verification fails, the passenger is led directly to the manual passport control without blocking 

the passenger flow. A spokesman for the vendor said, "There needs to be more convergence, too 

- the sh31ing of information between airports, airlines and authorities. Using biometrics for 

identification could lead to more secure, more comfortable and faster processes." 

Alan Shatter, Minister for Justice, Equality and Defense, commented: "Border control 

arrangements at Dublin Airport are currently undergoing major change. Immigration control 

processes are being reviewed and leading-edge border technology such as automated gates is 

being tested. Many major European airports are adopting a similar trend towards the deployment 

of automated gates for innnigration contI'ol functions to enhance passengers' experience on 

anival at airports while also strengthening border security." 

European Union, European Union member states began implementation of recommendations to 

move to self-service border control using automated border contI'ol gates that incorporate facial 

recognition, and optionally fingerprint velification, run against e-passport data for verifying the 

passport belongs to the passenger. The EU recognizes that umnanned gates t1lat only require 

manual intelVention by an innnigration officer in rare cases when a match is illlsuccessful reduce 

immigration personnel requirements and wait times, increase airline activity, and produce more 

revenue at the airport. The particular face recognition algorithm used by the EU is listed as one 

of the best by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in testing 

commissioned by DHS, 

Ghana. With the help of the World Bank, Ghana Immigration SelVices (GIS) is implementing an 

electronic visa and border management electronic entry/exit gate solution that will enable 

intelligence and law enforcement information shating in real time. Ghana has become 

increasingly concemed with its cross-border tI'afftc, and will now be able to supelvise and 

manage an automated passport inspection while recording border crossings using entry and exit 

data recorded into the system. All pOliS of entry will be automated, including Accra's Kotoka 

Intemational Airport. In addition, Ghana is deploying a biomehic visa processing system. 

France. Paris's major intemational airpOlt, Charles de Gaulle, now has 33 fingerprint automated 

border gates since deployment after a successful 2009 pilot. These gates have processed more 

than one million individuals departing France since their installation. The French claim that egates are a win-win, with passengers spending more time shopping in duty-free areas and shorter 

lines. The e-gates assure that only one person is in the gate, detect abandoned luggage, and then 
39 

verify the passenger's identity. Tn 2012, French citizens holding biometric passports could also 

use the gates. 

The success of the program has resulted in the first deployment to a regional airport, the 

Marseille Provence airport. "We will now be targeting deployment of our systems in other 

intemational airports throughout France," explained Jean-Paul Jainsky, Morpho Chailman & 

CEO. "With a very low rejection rate -less than 3 percent - and proven technology, 

biometric gates are an iron-clad investment. In the future, other biometrics such as face or iris 

registration, might be added to the P ARAFE system, it should make life easier for the millions 

of travelers using European airports." 

29 

Indonesia. A biometric border solution installed at nine airports and one seaport in Indonesia in 

October 20 II can match and manage up to 20 million unique biomeh'ic identities. The first 

installation was completed in six months in one of Indonesia's largest airports that handles 10 

million intemational passengers a year. The system provides real-time matching against a 

biometric watch-list. The technology is multi-modal, "capturing face and fmgerprint data of 

arriving travelers and manages it in a person-centric database of identities. Duplicate identities 

are consolidated into a single person record allowing people who are claiming multiple identities 

to be easily tracked. This data is used by all departments to prevent identity fraud, including 

controlling the issue of stay permits. and managing plimary line operations and illegal migrant 

activity." 

Latvia. Self-boarding gates at Riga Tnternational Airport allow passengers to use a combination 

of iris, fmgerprint, and facial recognition biometric technologies to validate identity and process 

infOlmation. The gates can process both a plinted boarding pass as well as a digital boarding 

pass displayed on a smartphone. "This project enabled us to provide a better service to those 

visiting us and at the same time improve the overall airport operational efficiency and passenger 

flow. In the first day of operation the self-boarding gates served more than 1,000 passengers and 

the objective is for this number to continue to rise," according to Raimonds Arajs, Riga 

Airport's IT Director. 

The Netherlands. The first deployment of a biometric border entry system was in October 2001 

when an iris recognition system was installed at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. The system 

expedites the way for travelers from 18 European countries into the Netherlands, including 

frequent travelers in a two-phase process. Enrolled travelers pay $89 annually for the service. 

which allows them to bypass long immigration lines. Similar to U.S. land border trusted traveler 

programs, passengers undergo a background check and a passport review. Users also undergo an 

iris scan. The template is encrypted and embedded on a smart card. This phase takes about 15 

minutes but once the passenger has the smart card, it can be used for each enhy through 

Schiphol airport. Once the individual has the smart card, instead of standing in line, the smart 

card is scamled at the immigration checkpoint, identifying and verifying the registered traveler. 

Each time the smart card is scarmed, it is compared with a real-time scan of the iris. This process 

typically takes about 10 to 15 seconds. 

Tn 2006. the system was upgraded for a quicker process for both arrivals and departures with 

improved security, deploying automated border control e-gates that use facial recognition 
40 

technology to verify identity against the digital photo embedded in the e-passports. As of 

January 2013, one million travelers have used these automated border control e-gates at 

Schiphol. There are a total of36 units at the airport, located in the Departure 3. Arrival 3 and 

transit areas between Schengen and non- Schengen. 

30 

New Zealand. The New Zealand Customs Service has rolled out a next generation of 

SmartGates at its largest airport. Auckland International, an upgrade to their SmartGate system 

implemented in 2009. As ofJuly 2013, six million passengers have used the CUlTent system, and 

more than 70 percent ofthose eligible to use the system do so. Customs officials state the 

technology is so precise that it allows them to focus on high-risk travelers while everyone else 

has an improved experience. 

The latest version of the SmartGate creates a one-step concept for both boarding and secmity. 

The passpOlt is scamled at the gate, eliminating the need for the kiosk and ticket. SmartG ate Plus 

is a Morpho Aush'alasia product that uses "face-on- the-fly" tecimology. A three-dimensional 

facial image of a user's face is taken as the individual approaches the gate and then compares it 

to the image stored in a presented e-passport. The individual barely has to slow down while the 

technology uses a 3D facial recognition for matching. The new system will be available for 

passengers over 16 years old carrying a New Zealand. Australian, U.S., or UK e-passport. 

Saudi Arabia. At the King Abdul Aziz Airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, iris recognition tracks 

and identifies the entry and exit of visitors on pilgrimage for the H~ti season of worship. The 

process includes a random check at passport control. database enrollment, and subsequent 

identification on departure. The systems ensure that visitors do not overstay their visas and also 

identify potential secmity tlueats. 

Taiwan. In 2008, Taiwan set up a three-in-one fingerplint. face. and retina biometric system for 

Taiwanese nationals at major airports in 2008 at a cost of $1.2 million. The Taiwanese Minish'y 

of the Interior is cUlTentiy extending biomeh"ic immigration cap hue to both "lllu'egistered" 

Taiwanese and foreign nationals at a cost of $6 million. This system will use a dual facial 

recognition and fmgerprint tecimology captmes. The pmpose is to assme that depaThues have 

occurred and verify identity. 

In comparing the new biometric system to a "photo tool," the Taiwanese Minister Chia-chi said: 

"Plastic smgery can change the way a person looks, but it camlOt change biological feahues 

such as the distance between two pupils," Chia-chi said. "If the system fails to identify the 

person by comparing facial features, we would then check their fingerprints." 

To date, more than 9,400 foreign nationals living in Taiwan registered for the new automated 

system. As of May 27,40.459 entries and exits had been made through the e-gate system by 

foreign residents in Taiwan. Altogether. over 5.08 million entries and exists by both Taiwanese 

and foreign nationals have been recorded through the e-gates since the system was launched in 

2011. 

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's Border Agency is requiring Manchester AirpOlt to 

capture facial images of all departing passengers upon both entry into the deparhu'e temtinal, 
41 

31 

and again upon leaving the tenninal, to assure that identity and immigration data is accurate and 

verified prior to boarding. Anyone refusing compliance is denied boarding. 

Biometric Guest Worker Systems 

Australia. Frustrated by illegal workers, overstays, visa fraud, and a $4 billion annual cost of 

identity fraud, Australia's immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence services now have 

access to digital fingerprints and photos from driver's licenses, nightclubs, and passports. In 

addition, facial recognition and fingerprint software is required to verify worker eligibility. 

"According to the report in AustraliaForum.com, employers convicted of employing illegal 

workers face fines up to $13,200 and two years' imprisonment while companies face fines of up 

to $66,000 per illegal worker." 

India. India is testing secUling its mmitime borders with biometric smart cards. 

BiomentricUpdate.com notes that, "Set to stmi in September 2013,800 local fishennen will 

initially be included in the test and an estimated 300,000 more would be covered. Reported in 

lhe Hindu, the govenllnent plmls to use card readers at "hm'bour and authorized fish lmlding 

centres for authorities to verify the identities of fishermen, in an attempt to [prevent] terrorists 

from entering mainlmld India." 

Singapore. Iris recognition is used to admit workers who travel into Singapore from Malaysia 

each day by motorcycle. The workers' irises are scanned by a camera installed in kiosks in 

designated lanes, instead of their having to present their paperwork to an official. About 50.000 

workers cross the border each day. 

Airline Boarding Systems 

U.S. airlines have long fought current statutory requirements that require air carriers, not 

immigration authorities, to support departure processing of foreign nationals. Their arguments 

included that immigration is a government, not a commercial function; slows facilitation; 

decreases customer experience: and creates associated costs. All of these arguments are valid. 

However, assuming the inevitability of an exit system, the airlines have also supported a 

biographic departure system over a biometric solution for the same reasons of perceived slower 

processing and decreased customer satisfaction. Intemational competitors of U.S. air cmTiers are 

proving the falsehood of these perceptions. 

Instead, cutting-edge intemational air carriers are taking lessons lemned from biometric border 

management and beginning to apply them to passenger check-in mld boarding. These cmriers 

recognize that enhancing security while decreasing hassle for travelers in a more semnless 

airport environment creates a safer and less stressful experience for everyone. Travel and 

tourism need not be pitted against security. Instead, biomehic solutions pave the way for better 

business models for government, airports, and commercial airlines when identities are quickly 

verified, airlines require less or no paper tickets, and airports have the oppOliunity for increased 

commerce from the time saved with biometric border and check-in solutions. 

Referred to as "SmartGates". "e-gates", or "self-boarding", airlines in conjunction with 

intemational airports are begiillling to test biometric boarding for the similar reasons as 
42 

32 

immigration authorities, to gain efficiency, facilitation, and heightened security simultaneously. 

International airlines and airports now see biometrics as the wave of the future, speeding up 

processing. reducing paper, and assuring identity. Heathrow Airport is the first to use these gates 

for airline processing. 

United Kingdom. South African Airways is working in conjunction with London's Heathrow 

Airport in a "self-boarding" program that requires airline staff to only check a passenger's 

identity once during the departure process. Using self-boarding gates, passengers pass through 

an automatic electronic banier that takes an infrared scan of their face. This information is 

checked against the biometric data that was taken at the check-in stage. If the data matches, the 

barrier opens and the passengers can pass tlu'ough and board their flights. A Heatlu'ow press 

release notes the following: 

lhe technolo!!}' means that a passenJ,;er 's identity needs to be checked by airline stalf 

only once in the whole departure process, reducinfi the time it takes{or passenfiers to fiet to 

their seats ready/or take 011 It also allows airline stalfto spend more time with those 

passengers who require greater assistance, The personal dolo is stored securely and will 

he destroyed at the end of the trial. 

Heathrow's Terminal One director, Tan Hanson, said this: "We are working in partnership with 

our airlines to trial this technology which should help make our passengers' journeys smoother 

and simpler. Since its introduction we have had positive feedback from both airlines and 

passengers." These gates are produced by the same company that built the Schiphol Airport egates that have processed over a million passengers. 

Automated Customs Entry for U.S. Citizens at Chicago's O'Hare Airport 

Tn May 2013, Chicago O'Hare became the first U.S. airport to implement a customs declaration 

kiosk that allows U.S. citizens to fill out a digital customs declaration, doing away with the 

paper cards provided on airlines prior to arrival. The 32 kiosks were provided by the Vancouver 

Airport Authority, which had recently undergone a successful trial of the kiosk technology, and 

installed on July 1, 2013, The touch-screen kiosks ask passengers a series of questions, then 

produce a paper receipt. The receipt is then presented to CBP personnel upon leaving baggage 

claim along with the current procedure of showing passport and boarding pass. The kiosks are 

free and require no prior registration. The automated procedure is designed to speed up 

departure from arrival zones. 

According to Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, "This technology will help expedite customs 

processing for passengers arriving to O'Hare, further strengthening Chicago as a global 

destination. Being the first airport in the U.S. to implement these advances demonstrates how 

serious we are about making Chicago the fnst, best and most welcoming city in the country." 

While not a biometric solution and significantly less technologically advanced than other 

nations' biometric SmartGate and kiosk solutions, the endorsement and implementation of 

automated immigration procedures at an American airport by a major political figure is a 

significant step in the right direction, and bodes well for the nonpartisan nature of an automated, 

biometric exit solution. 
43 

BIOMETRIC INDUSTRY LETTERS 

INTERNATIONAL 

BIOMETRICS & IDENTIFICATION 

ASSOCIATION 

91918TH STREET, NW, SUITE 901 , WASHINGTON, DC 20006 USA 

TEL 202.587.4855 FAX 202.587.4888' WWW.lBIA.ORG 

JuneS. 20 1) 

Re: US· VISIT Dilllllt trie Exit 

Dear Senators: 

TIle Honorable JeITSessiollS 

326 Rnsscll Senate Oflice Bnilding Washington, DC 20510 

TIle Honorable John Comyn 5 17 

Han Senate Office Building Wa5hinlltoll. DC 10510 

The HOllorable Dianll~ Feinstein 331 

Hart Senate Office Building Washin!jtoll, DC 20510 

The HOlloJ1'lbli.' Orrin G. Haleh 

104 Ilnrt Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 

3 16 ~Iart Senme Office Building Washingtoll. DC 205 HI 

The HonOJ1'lbli.' Marco Rubio 

2K4 Russell Senate OITIce Building Washingtoll, DC 10510 
44 

34 

On behalf of the members of the International Biometrics & Identification Association, 

comprised of the leading global providers of identification, we would like to thank each of you 

for your commitment and interest in fulfilling the mandate in both federal and regulatory law for 

implementing a biometric exit control system for foreign nationals, We appreciated your joint 

leadership and public commentary during the Senate Judiciary Committee markup of S, 744, 

"Border Security, Economic OppOltunity, and Immigration Modernization Act" 

As S,744 heads to the Senate floor for consideration, we are sending this letter to provide you 

with the specific information you requested on the feasibility of implementing a biometric exit 

as well as the cost of implementing the malldatOlY program, 

In summmy, the industJy is confident that it can implement an effective, reliable and efficient 

biometric exit progr311l at U, S. airports that process international tJ'avelers, using proven mId 

reliable off the shelf technologies and without dislUpting airline operations mId passenger travel. 

The industry also believes that the use of biometrics will provide the low cost solution to a 

mandatory exit program, at a cost that is significantly less than the exceedingly uncertain and 

dated $3.5 billion cost estimate that has circulated (from "Air/Sea Biometric Exit Project", April 

17,2008, DHS- 2008- 0039- 002). 

The International Biometrics & Identification Association (TBIA) is a non- profit trade group 

that advocates and promotes the responsible use of identification technologies for managing 

human identity in our digital world. The membership is comprised of global leaders who are 

involved in virtually all the major biometJ'ic government projects around the world as well as in 

the commercial mId consumer mobile, financial, healthcm'e, mId entertaimnent markets. 

Feasibility of Implementing US- VISIT Biometric Exit 

For the following reasons that are discussed in detail below, the identification technology 

industry is confident that it is feasible to implement a biometric exit: 

This is not an untried program. Such systems are commonplace arOlllld the world. 

2 US- VISIT has been highly successful, providing a strong foundation for a biometric 

exit. 

Biometric exit leverages the biometric emollment at US- VISIT entry. 

4 Biometric exit will be simpler and more efficient than other suggested solutions and will 

establish with a high degree of certainty that the person leaving the country is in fact the 

person who entered. 

Biometric entry/exit programs are commonplace around the world, 
45 

35 

Biometric entry/exit systems are already successfully deployed around the world, including 

Amsterdam, France, the United Kingdom, and other countries in the Emopean Union, Australia, 

New Zealand, Hong Kong, South Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. These systems use a 

variety of biometrics (fingerplints, ilis, face), depending on their specific needs. Many of the 

companies represented by this letter are involved in these projects and have the expertise and 

expelience to implement a biometric exit in the U.S. 

Biometrics is already the cornerstone of U.S. immigration programs. 

Biometrics are at the core of US- VISIT entry today. Under the current US- VISIT entry 

system, U.S. Government personnel take a digital photo and 10 fingerprints for all foreign 

nationals who enter the country at our international airp011s, including those who are required to 

obtain visas to enter the U.S. and those from visa waiver countries. For visa holders, these 

fingerplints are matched against the US- VISIT database and watch lists. If the fingerprints 

match those collected for the visa and there are no watch list alerts, and the individual does not 

exhibit behavior that requires further inquiry, they are admitted to the U. S. For visa waiver 

countries, the fingerprints are matched against the watch lists. If there are no hits, the person is 

admitted. 

There are over 150 million fingerprints in the US- VISIT database and the search time per 

person is approximately 8- 10 seconds. This database handles over 200K total transactions per 

day, This includes an average of 30,000 queries a day by the Depal1ments of Defense, Justice 

and State; local and federal law enforcement; Interpol and intelligence agencies to verify 

identities for the purpose of immigration, law enforcement and national secUlity. 

As background, the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), the organization that 

sets technology standards for the government, analyzed the feasibility of US- VISIT in 2004 at 

the request of DHS and concluded it was feasible. Indeed it should be noted that NIST 

determined the system's feasibility at the outset. The exceptionally successful record of USVISIT in the past decade confirms NIST's conclusions. 

The biometrics industry also has years of successful expelience in large scale deployment at 

embassies and consulal' offices overseas where it is responsible for the intake of the digital 

photos and fingerprints that populate US- VISIT database today as well as at airports of entry. 

In addition, other biometrics, such as face and iris, al'e available now and Call be added to USVISIT as the progralll expallds to incorporate these so- called "stalld- off' biometric 

technologies. 

Biometric Capture and Document Authentication Technology - How it Works at Exit. 

A biometric exit is technologically simpler than ently. After enrollment, the biometric Sealdl at 

entry requires searching against large- scale databases to identify whether a person is on a watch 

list. This requires 10 fingerprints and significant computational power. 

In contr'ast, at exit, all that needs to be checked is whether the person leaving is the same person 

who entered the country through US- VISIT. There is no need to take another photograph, or to 
46 

36 

search the large watch list databases. This search can quickly be done using two (2) fingerprints 

to match against the fingerprints of the claimed identity already in the record in the database. 

The process on exit will require the passenger to fust submit a passport or other travel 

document. The document number will lead to the traveler's record in the US- VISIT database. 

Then the traveler submits the two (2) fingerplints. If there is a match with the fingerplints in the 

fik the individual will be cleared to exit, unless there are behavioral questions that would 

justify further screening. 

Biometric exit will be simpler, more accurate, and more efficient than other proposed solutions. 

Checking biometrics on departure is the most accurate way to know with a high degree of 

certainty who has exited the country and, in the most efficient way. All that is required is to 

match the fingerprints of the visitor with the existing database the entr·y system has developed. 

Compming photos and documents visually, attempting to match names, and asking a few secret 

personal questions are not as effective as biometlics as a means of identification. In its recent 

F1PS 201- 2 publication, N1ST concluded that visual inspection of credentials provides little or 

no confidence of identity, whereas adding biometrics provides a high degree of assurance of 

positive identity. 

The proposal to use enhanced biographical data with 'secret personal' questions with no 

biometrics, does not provide identity with the high degree of certainty. Like Passwords, PINs, or 

other codes. the secret personal questions can easily be forgotten, lost, stolen, shared with 

others, or sold. Also, much of this data is collected ii-om the web, which is notOliously incorrect, 

and the source ofinfonnation for identity thieves who build virtual identities that they then use 

or sell. With this approach, both privacy and security are at greater risk. 

Moreover, it is quite difficult to see how visual comparisons and asking questions is more 

efficient than processing biometrics on departure. This kind of processing is labor intensive and 

slower than an automated biometric check. 

Biometric Exit will not disrupt aviation operations or passenger travel. 

While we appreciate the concerns noted by certain aviation stakeholders that the mandatory 

biometric exit might be disruptive to operations and passengers, the identification technology 

industry believes that an effective and secure biometlic exit control system can be implemented 

without disrupting airport operations, or unnecessarily delaying travelers, and, further that a 

biometric exit can facilitate exit and reduce the burden on airline employees. Some of this 

push- back revolves around the concem that airline employees will be "consclipted" to do the 

Exit processing. 

DHS 2009 biometric pilot found no traveler delays 

The fmdings of the 2009 US- VISIT pilot program, predicated on the existing gate system, 

concludes there were no adverse effects on tTaveler line queues or incollvenience in making 
47 

37 

flights. Only foreign travelers are processed, which, depending on the airport and specific flight, 

is a variable fraction of total travelers. 

Processing ojjiJreign passengers departing the u.s. 

Rather than use airline employees to process foreign travelers on exit, there are two options. One 

option. as provided in S. 744. is the use of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel to 

staff the exit processing, as they do on entry, the cost of which would be covered by the 

government. 

An alternative option is to use fully automated systems similar to e- Gate systems in use at 

airports in Europe. Asia, and Australia. This would significantly reduce the number of personnel 

required as one (I) border control agent can monitor multiple automated gates. Figure I shows 

an example of an automated e- Gate installation, such as might be used at the entrance to an 

intemational terminal (after the security checkpoint) or to a group of airport jetway gates. 

Cost Estimates of a Biometric Exit 

As representatives of the identification technology industry, we are confident about providing 

costs of the biometric component teclmologies that could be used in a biometric exit system. 

However. that is not the case with overall system costs. Without an understanding of the system 

requirements and specific implementation objectives (e.g., which air, mmitime, and land pOlis 

m'e involved), it would be irresponsible to attempt to estimate ml overall cost. 

The indusuy believes, however, a velY robust, viable biometric system cml be developed at 

significantly less than half of the estimated $3.5 B proposed in the 2008 DHS study referenced 

em·lier. (This estimate is for 73 airports and seven seaports and not the 10 airports in the 

Senate bill.) Although the analysis prepared in 2008 was based on the best available knowledge 

at the time, the report itself is quick to point out that it is only a Rough Order of Magnirude 

(ROM) estimate based on "lack of data conceming several variables in this analysis," as a result 

of which the estimated costs are significantly overstated. 

Most significantly, the 2008 study designated their cost estimate as a "Class 5" cost estimate as 

defined by the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering International (AACEI). 

Class 5 estimates are done where the requirements are not at all well understood. As such. some 

companies and organizations have elected to determine that due to the inherent inaccuracies, 

such estimates cannot be classified in a conventional and systemic manner." Accuracy ranges 

for Class 5 estimates are 20% to 50% on the low side, and 30% to 100% on the high side. 

Consequently, a very high risk multiplier was applied to the 2008 analysis because the 

requirements for biometric exit and the effort it would take to build an effective system 

were not well understood at the time. We understand a lot more today and what once 

would have been a custom development (as estimated) can now predominately be 

performed by lower cost commercially available off- the- shelf (COTS) biometric 

solutions. 
48 

38 

Since 2008, US VISIT has matured and is better understood by the industry: interoperability 

between airline systems and DRS and CBP systems are better defmed; and the biometrics 

industry has developed commercially available off the shelf tools and software which largely 

take the place of custom development which was estimated in the 2008 study, Consequently, our 

lower estimate is based on a more thorough understanding of the likely requirements 

surrounding a biometric exit strategy in the U.S, and is based readily available commercial 

biometric technology, 

There are many other factors associated with the 2008 that are wOlthy of update that would 

reduce the 1isk and associated costs. 

In addition, there are other considerations to point out, pending the identification of the specific 

implementation objectives or requirements: 

The biometric cost component of the exit system is likely to be small relative to other costs like 

on- going staffing. Our indushy makes many components as commercial- off- the- shelf 

(COTS), and prices have declined markedly over the last five years, while features and variety 

of offerings have increased. 

There is a cost trade- off, depending on the operational concept, between increased 

staffing with low- cost mobile exit ve1ification devices, vs. lower staffing with higherpriced fixed and automated electronic exit gates, called "e- Gates" or" ABC gates" 

(Automated Border Control gates). 

2 Depending on the airport gate shucture for intemational operations, adding US- VISIT 

Exit infrastructure may actually lessen the load on airline personnel. if automated 

boarding pass processing is part of the function in an e- Gate implementation. Depending 

on the airport gate structure for intemational operations, adding US- VISIT Exit 

infrastructure may actually lessen the load on airline personnel, if automated boarding 

pass processing is pmt of the function in an e- Gate implementation. We llilderstand that 

not imposing additional work on airline persOlmel is a key issue for that industry's 

acceptance of an Exit fllilction. 

Under mly operational concept, biomehics m'e the low cost solution because the USVisit biometric infrashucture is already in place. The exit system is essentially adding 

input devices into the existing system for symmet1ical operation (biomehics- in, 

biomehics- out). This is not the case for the proposed enhmlced biographic system with 

secret personal questions. Not only is such a system less secure and subject to spoofing. 

but there is no infrastructure in place, nor are there any published estimates on the cost of 

such a system. 

4 There are different business models the industry can offer to help facilitate the 

establishment of an Exit capability. There is the obvious traditional technique of initial 

capital outlay with annual maintenance contracts. Increasingly, however, options are 

being offered for level service agreements, wherein the initial capital costs are mnortized 

over a period, and a periodic service fee is charged to cover provision and maintenance of 

the equipment. Think of this as "US- VISIT Exit as- a- Service." 
49 

39 

Reader costs 

6 In determining the cost of readers necessary to fulfill a robust biometric exit requirement, 

we believe that the results of the 2008 US- VISIT "Air/Sea Biometric Exit Project 

Regulatory Impact Analysis" are useful as a starting point, if updated with the latest data 

from our industry. That analysis provided costs for 1,010 gates at the 73 airports and 

seven sea gates where CBP currently has personnel. It also assumed a total of 1,342 

devices to cover multiple readers where throughput needs extra support due to high 

volume or potential reader malftmction. Of course we know that a likely implementation 

in 2015 would have different requirements and assumptions, and certainly very different 

component costs. 

7 The reader costs provided below include software (but not system design and operations 

and maintenance). Each of the readers, at a minimum, would need to be configured to 

swipe two fingers and also be equipped with an MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) reader to 

scan travel documents (e.g. passports and boarding passes). We start with the simplest 

technology first (albeit requiring more attendant labor). and end with the most automated 

technology last (requiring the least attendant labor). 

FOR ORDER OF MAGNITUDE COMPARISONS ONLY, we are showing the math for the 

total of 1,342 referenced in the 2008 study: 

Portable fingerprint readers. with passport readers. on a cart that can be moved from lane 

to lane depending on which lane is assigned for foreign travelers and passenger 

2. throughput. CUll'ent costs range from $3,000 to $5,000. One- time maximum cost 

($5,000/per reader x 1,342 readers) = $6,710,000_ Requires one attendant per reader 

during use. 

3. Hand held fmgerprint readers, with passport readers, that can be used at lanes to facilitate 

passenger throughput. CUll'ent costs fall in the $5,000 to $7,000. One- time maximum 

cost ($7,000/per reader x 1,342 readers) = $9,394,000. Requires one attendant per 

reader during use. 

4. Contactless fingerprint mobile readers (with passport readers) with costs in the range of 

$8,000 to $10,000. One- time maximum cost ($10,000/per reader x 1,342 readers) = 

$13,420,00. Requires one attendant per reader during use. 

5. Automated e- Gates, to include passpOlt readers and fmgerprint readers. Face and iris 

readers and boarding pass readers are options on some models. Prices range from 

$50,000 per unit to $150,000 per unit, depending on features and configuration 

ordered. One- time maximum cost ($150,000/eGate x 1342 gates) = $201,300,000. 

This option requires far less labor, since one attendant can monitor multiple 

e- Gates. 
50 

Possible future options include face and iris biometrics, which DHS S&T, in cooperation with 

US- VISIT, has triaTed for uses at border crossings, Prices for such featrues range from less 

than $1500 per unit, up to about $35,000 per unit for the most sophisticated stand- off iris 

readers, 

40 

It should be noted that prices for iris readers are declining rapidly, particularly since the country 

of India has recently embraced iris as a primary biometric for their nationwide UIDAI Aadhaar 

identification project 

Conclusion 

Based on the successful and expanding use of biometric entry/exit systems worldwide and their 

acceptance by the public, along with the highly successful operation of US- VISIT biometric 

entry for more fuan a decade, which provides a solid infrastructure and foundation for a 

biometric exit, the identification teclmology industry is confident that a biometric exit can be 

effectively implemented, 

While properly subject to requirements definition and operational concept determination, we 

believe that cost effective biometric exit can be implemented now at U,S, intemationaT airports, 

Indications are that this could be done at a fraction of the dated DHS estimate, Designed and 

implemented properly, with good project management, such implementations not only support 

US- VISIT Biometric Exit Page 8 of 8 

existing passenger throughput, but could actually enhance boarding operations ofthe airlines 

themselves, while minimizing impacts on Govemment personnel. We very much appreciate the 

opportnnity to share this information with you, and look forward to working with you to resolve 

this critical statutory mandate, 

We hope fuis information is useful and would be pleased to review fuis wifu you and any 

questions and requests for further information, 

We greatly appreciate the opportunity to provide this data to you and look forward to working 

with you to implement this important national secUlity program, 

Sincerely, 

Tovah LaDier 

TBIA Managing Director 
51 

113 South Columbus Street, Suite 400 Alexandria, VA 22314 

Tel: (703) 797-2600 

Fax: (703) 706-9549 

June 5, 2013 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

326 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable Diarme Feinstein33! Hart Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510 

The Honorable John Cornyn 517 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Mike Lee 

316 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 

Re: Biometric Air Exit Solution 

Dear' Senators Sessions, Feinstein, Cornyn, arId Lee: 

41 

On behalf of MorphoTrak, I Watlt to thank you for your leadership atld public support for 

biometrics in an immigration setting. Biometrics is and always will be the best means to assure 

identity. Right now, we are able to deployatl effective atld viable biometric air exit system using 

proven technologies without inconveniencing foreign nationals departing on international 

flights. We appreciate the opportunity to provide this infOlmation as requested. 

Who is MorphoTrak 

MorphoTrak is a world leader in multi-biometric technologies and an acknowledged expert in 

identification systems. Our solutions meet a wide range of security needs for people, companies 
52 

and governments worldwide. We are a U.S. company with about 500 employees dedicated to 

biometric product innovation, project implementation, and customer support. 

42 

Our headquarters are in Alexandria, VA, with large facilities in Anaheim, CA and Federal Way, 

WA. 

MorphoTrak provides the FBI with fingerprint matching solutions including those used in the 

new Next Generation Identification (NGI) System. MorphoTrak has also deployed and currently 

supports Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) solutions for law enforcement in 

28 states and over 30 cities and counties, including the New York (City) Police Department, 

New York State, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Harris County and the City ofEl 

Paso Texas, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Orange County California Sheliff's 

Department, Colorado Bureau of Investigation, Missouri State Highway Patrol, New Jersey 

State Police, NOlth Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, South Carolina Law Enforcement 

Division, State of Wisconsin Department of Justice, and a large alTay of interoperable AFIS 

systems across the U.S. National Capital Region and surrounding jurisdictions. 

Biometrics Used for Immigration 

Biometrics serve as the basis for OBIM (fOlmerly known as US-VISIT), which today is used to 

take a digital photo and 10 fingerprints for all foreign nationals that enter at US ports of entry. 

There are currently over 150 million visitors in OBIM that are queried an average of 30,000 

times a day by the Department of Homeland Security. Department of Defense and state, local 

and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to verify identities and identify potential 

criminals and terrorists. 

The results of the "2009 US-VISIT Air Exit Pilots Evaluation Report" that Senator Sessions 

made public during the Senate Judiciary Committee markup of S. 744. "Border Security, 

Economic Opportunity. and Immigration Modernization Act". clarify that an air biometric exit 

mandate could have been fulfilled in 2009 without operational or compliance issues that plagued 

the earlier January 2004 to May 2007 pilot. Biometrics can provide the level of security needed 

to have a cost-effective and comprehensive system for both entry and exit. 

Feasibility of Implementing Biometric Air Exit 

Morpho Trak is part of a global corporation which deployed large-scale biometric intake and 

matching systems for immigration purposes including Automated Border Control Solutions 

(ABCS) installed recently in 9 cOlllh1es at 20 international airports. These systems include the 

Austr'alia and New Zealand SmartGates, the French Pa:rafe, UK IRIS, and UAE Abu Dhabi 

systems processing in excess of 700,000 passengers per month. MorphoTrak is cllTently the 

only biometric provider capable of fielding a contactless fingerplint capture technology (also 

known as "finger-on-the-fly") ideally suited for high-throughput immigration and border control 

applications. 
53 

43 

WHAT: The purpose of utilizing biometrics as the foundation of a comprehensive exit program is to 

accurately match non-US. citizen departure data with previously collected arrival infonnation The exit 

solution requires the collection of a biometric (i.e. fingerprints), along with biographic data, from 

foreign nationals in order to enable biometric matching and identity verification at departure gates 

andlor TSA security checkpoints. 

HOW: Non-U.S. citizen visitors with an international destination are directed to areas near the departure 

gate or at the TSA checkpoint for biometric information collection. Using a mobile or portable (cartbased) collection device (such as finger-on-the-tly), the officers collect one or more fingerprints 

electronically. The fmgerprints can be matched locally on the collection device or remotely. A biometric 

match returns the associated biographic information that is then compared with the biographic data in 

the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) of a passport, such as name, country, passport number and date of 

birth. In the attached estimates, we assume 23 airports for our calculations which comprise 40% of the 

international travel from the US. 

PRTV ACY: All data remains encrypted during the entire transmission process. High level security 

protocols and procedures are used to protect all devices and data used by CBP, TSA or other officials 
54 

rt G~ e Sydne)", Australia Farial HerGgnitioll BGrder CGntrGI 

MorphoTra\: suggests the use of coot act less, "on-the-ny" biometric capture that enables agents to be 

reassigned to tasks thaI require manual intervention. The contacll ess fingcrprint technology does not 

require a passenger to ~top walking to place their hands on a device or be touch~'Il by an agent_ This 

ma~i izes passenger processing. eliminates hygiene concerns and can alleviate cultural or religious 

objections. 

.. 
55 

1\ "~p TrlIk' •• ·ingrr·On· The-Fly 

By u~inl:i COl11atliess Iingl."fJInn! and/or advanced biometric handheld !echnol~ies, Ihe ..,.il process can 

be e~pedi!ed, resulting in less than 2 seronds for lilll:icrprint capture for each passenger All of these 

tcchnol"!J,ics arc available today 

MorphoTrakhas induded an allachmem identifying COStS fOlr multiple options to enable a biometric exit 

sYStem, These estimates include options for (I) mobile devices, (2) iometrickiosk~ will, coutactless 

fingerpnnt capture, (3) e;(ception handlin!!, (4) 1:1 and I "few biomeuic !>earthing fOJf those foreign 

natior,als l,hOl dOl not hal'c biom~tric passpons, (5) mirmrcopy of the US VISIT (OBIM) dalabase. and 

(6) migllltiOfl orlhe US VISIT dalabases 

II lorphoTrak bclie-.'es thallhe biometric p<»1ion of an exil program could fall "ilhin Ihe range of 

$90,000,000 10$1 50,000,000 u~in!! a combination oflhe options mentioned above. 

MorphoTrak greally app'edall"S yOlIr suppon and .... ould be pleased 10 provide any ~ddilional 

information you require 

Sin~erdy, Clark NelsO!t 

Senior Vice Presidenl MorphoTrall, Inc. 

CORJ>ORATE HEADOUARTflRS 

113 South Columbus Street, Suite 400 Alexandria. VA 22114 
56 

46 

Tel: (703) 797-2600 Fax (703) 706-9549 www.morphotrak.com 

Implementing Biometric Exit at Land Borders 

The feasibility and cost of a biometric land port of entry exit solution depends on the type of 

depmture, existing infrastructure capabilities, and ability of the biometric exit to fulfill statutory 

mandates that enhance the integrity of om border system while continuing to support trade mId 

tourism. Despite the challenges, a biometric exit is feasible in a phased-in approach. Biometric 

exit controls for foreign national pedestrians and trusted travelers could be implemented 

relatively quickly, while non-trusted traveler vehicular traffic would take longer. 

An obscure 2005 joint US-VISIT and Smmt Border Alliance study ofland exit using RFIDembedded secure credentials proved that even at that time, an TD could be read at 50 mph under 

good circumstances. Eight years later the technology is better and more accurate. The concept 

is similm' to EZ-PASS in place on highways mId the trusted traveler systems today that operate 

today at the 39 busiest land ports that represent 95 percent of total northern and southern border 

traffic, It is these POIts that should be prioritized for biometric exit deployment 

To be clear, any movement on a biometric exit deployment on our northern border should be in 

counsel and cooperation with Canada, building on the good work in implementing a biographic 

entry/exit data exchange at northern land ports of entry, to the extent possible, 

Key elements for a successful land biometric exit implementation include: 

• Use of proven technologies for quick, well-executed deployment. Incorporating proven 

technology, including useful elements of five different ousted traveler programs, for a quicker, 

well-executed and ousted deployment 

• Applicability. Departure requirements would not apply to U.S. citizens. The departure 

requirement would apply to all foreign nationals, including (I) foreign visitors seeking visas at 

consular offices overseas: (2) legal immigrants but for those exempted by law; (3) any foreign 

nationals granted temporary legal status, including those emolled in any amnesty program. 

• Secure Credentialing. For those visiting and depruting by air or sea, the secure credential 

required would be a passport or equivalent secure identification with embedded Radio 

Frequency Identification (RFID) that links to biometric information secmed by inlmigration 

authorities. Trusted traveler enrollees' travel documents are already embedded with RFID 

technology and thus have the credentials already to SUppOlt a biometric ImId exit All other 

qualifying foreign nationals would register for similar credentials either in the visa, 

immigration benefit, or other qualified immigration setting. 

For temporary visitors without a secure credentiaL major POltS would equip inspectors with 

handheld or other qualified devices to gather biometrics. Technologies exist today to take a 

contactless fingerprint, for exmnple, in two seconds. Iris scans are quick and reliable, mId may 
57 

47 

also be an option. However, it is recommended that this be the last phase-in of a biometric land 

solution when as many individuals as possible are already enrolled. 

• 'Biometric' defined. At land ports. the 'biometric' requirement for pedestrians would be 

modeled on the air/sea solutions. for vehicular traffic, the model would be the uusted traveler 

programs that employ RfID-enabled biometric verification that protects the privacy of the data 

by not storing private infmmation on the u'avel documents, but instead linking the biomeh"ic to 

government-stored data. This way, CBP could still check the stored biomeh"ic (likely facial 

recognition) with the individual, if necesslliy. 

• 'Exit' data captured. The system would link the reading of the RfTD at a land port of entty 

to the Arrival/Departure Tnformation System. 

• Funding. four potential mechanisms, in combination or alone. are available to pay for a land 

border biomeu'ic exit without requiling significant direct appropriations. These include: (1) 

fees for the improved travel documents. based on the five trusted traveler program models that 

exist today; (2) increase in ESTA fees; (3) increase in visa fees; (4) local monies, both private 

and public to fill in the infrashucture gaps. These gaps include adding the RflD teclmology 

already employed in entty lanes at the 39 busiest land ports to the exit lanes in a phased-in 

approach. 

Why Land Borders 

Biometrics at land borders have been dogged with policy issues regarding feasibility, trumping 

the basic fact that most border traffic is across land, not air/sea. In addition, if the Senate 

immigration refmm bill (S. 744) llinnesty is passed, border crossing numbers are likely to rise. 

Even without new immigration legislation, no exit system can be complete without inclusion of 

lllild borders. Most impmtllilt, three laws specifically require biomeu'ic exit to have been 

implemented years ago. 

In regard to why biometric at land borders, please see prior policy discussions in the air/sea exit 

portion of this testimony. The value of biometrics in borders does not change per the locale it is 

obtained; assuring that a person's identity is accurately recorded for departure is equally 

important whether departing by sea, air or land. However, because of the variety of departures 

at land borders, it is worthwhile to include more specificity of the unique attJibutes of pedestrian 

and vehicular crossings on the border. 

• Pedestrian crossers. If S. 744 were passed by this body, it provides for the prov-isionallegal 

status of agriculhual (blue clli'd) llild low skilled workers in a new W program (eliminating H2-

A). The new program caps low skilled workers at 200,000 but is unlimited for spouses and 

children of W applicants, which will likely at least double the numbers of those entering 

through land ports under the new S. 744 W program. The W agricultural workers are capped at 

112,333. However, the Secretary of Agticulture may adjust the cap higher without limitation. 

Past estimates for agricultural workers is that 90 percent of these indi viduals use the land ports 
58 

for enny/exit. The same is the case with the H2-B (low skill) program, whose current cap is 

66,000. 

A biometric exit is absolutely essential when the numbers are this high, and have unlimited 

growth potential, to quickly and with assurance know who is crossing the border, and whether 

these individuals are abiding by the terms of their visas . 

48 

• Vehicular traffic. There are five trusted traveler systems currently in place that deal with 

vehicular traffic in a manner that is fast, accurate, easy to deploy and cost-effective. 

mimicking these programs for exit control could solve a significant portion of the current land 

border conundrum. 

The idea is relatively simple: 

• Turn the 'biomeu;c' requirement of the eight varying 'exit' statutes from requil;ng a 

cadre of inspectors using handheld devices at brand new border gates for exit, to one 

housed in travel documents canled by legal immigrants (travel card) and foreign visitors 

(visa), eliminating many of the infrastlUcture issues that has cllppled the discussion of a 

solution for years. 

• Use the 'biometric' element already used for u.s. citizens in trusted traveler systems, and 

apply those same biomeulc standards to travel documents for foreign visitors and legal 

immigrants. 

• Use the RFID technology aheady used for uusted traveler systems at 39 land ports of 

enhy. 

• A biomeulc exit-u'acking system for foreign nationals departing by pedestrians at land 

ports of enny is likely feasible immediately at a reasonable cost, mimicking processing at 

air/sea pOlis of enhy using interior locations at ports of enuy. 

• A biomeulc exit is feasible in the near fut1ne for individuals and truckers already 

enrolled in trusted traveler systems with little port infrastructure change and little cost. A 

straightforward solution duplicates the trusted traveler RFID technology used at entry lanes 

to exit lanes. No new IDs would require to be issued to these individuals. 

• The backbone of the solution for vehicular traffic would be trusted traveler RFID 

technology that exists at entry replicated in exit lanes, and "smart cards" tllat mimic the 

technologies, security and privacy features of tlUsted traveler documents. 

• RFID and corresponding ID card technologies are proven, cost-effective and significantly 

better and relatively inexpensive. 

• Inclusion biometric element to the land border exit solution was proven in a January 2005 

"US-VISIT Increment 2C RFTD Feasibility Study Final Report" which found that using 

RFID technology such as that already successfully used for DHS vehicular trusted traveler 

programs SENTRl (southem border), NEXUS (northem border) and FAST (shippers on 
59 

both borders) could be used for exit solutions at moderate rates of speed, and different 

types of IDs did not disrupt collection of information, 

• The difference with a biometric exit solution and today's trusted traveler systems is that 

the verified departure data would be recorded and then relayed to ArrivallDeparture and 

Advanced Passenger Information Systems, 

• Using trusted traveler systems as a base model for biometric exit, the essential trade, 

facilitation and departure collection goals of border controls can be met, including 

incorporating in the good work of DHS and Canada in their shared entry/exit information 

system and other cooperative border agreements that are maturing today rapidly and well. 

• For all foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States not currently enrolled in 

trusted traveler programs, the U.S. should consider expanding the RFID / secure identity 

electronic framework into issuance of visas, border crossing cards, and other travel 

documents accepted to use for entry/exit across U.S. borders. 

• According to the Smmt Card Alliance, chips holding biometrics and RFID capable cost 

only a few dollm's a piece. 

• Cost for travel documents enhanced with biometrics and RFID capable could be folded 

into visa and other program fees. 

Satisfying S tatutOly Requirements 

49 

Cunent law requires a biometric exit established at Imld ports of entry. Practicality requires, to 

the extent possible, that the statutory requirements be cost-effective and budget-neutral; provide 

accmate data; mId support tr'ade and tourism. 

'Biometric' legal requirement satisfied. The digital photo and fingerprints already taken for 

the pmposes of obtaining a visa or, in some cases, acquiring an immigration benefit, could be 

the same biometric required for the tr'avel document, pointing back to either (I) for foreign 

visitors who received a visa, to the State Department's consular database; or (2) for legal 

immigrants, to the useIS database. The hardware and software should be multi-modal, 

meaning that while photo and fingerprints are standard, iris scans, now used by the State 

Department and our military, for example, may be incorporated into functionality if need be in 

the future. 

The applicant identity information would not be stored on the travel document itself but would 

only be available to verify the cardholder's identity as having exited the country. The 

'biometric' requirement ofthe law would be satisfied. 

'Exit' legal requirement satisfied. The identity information of the foreign national, once 

verified against biographic information automatically associated with that identity, would in real 

time be recorded in the Arrival Departure Infonnation System (ADIS). The 'exit' requirement 

of the law would be satisfied. 
60 

Use of land port existing technologies. For vehicular traffic where the occupants have been 

issued secure travel authorization documents, the program would work very much like the 

trusted traveler systems on the land border work today: 

• When a vehicle approaches the border, all occupants present their secure travel 

authOlization document. 

• The RFTD cards contain a file number that is read upon arrival. 

50 

• The file number triggers the participant's data that is available to be brought up on the CBP 

Officer's screen. 

• If there is reason for concem, the data is verified by the CBP Officer and the traveler is 

released or refened for additional inspections if proper documentation is mlavailable. 

Use of proven travel document technologies. The proposal uses as its core the proven husted 

traveler programs that cUlTently use relevant background check vetting, CBP access to data, and 

RFlD technologies embedded in h'avel docmnents. This proposal piggybacks on the five husted 

traveler programs now offered for land port entry. 

The descliptions below are examples only, and those for US citizens below, would not be 

necessmy or available for foreign nationals. 

-For U.S. citizens pursuant to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Alternatives to a 

passport for U.S. citizens include PASS Cards issued by the State Deparhnent and Enhanced 

Driver Licenses (EDLs) issued by celiain northem states. Both began availability in 2009, with 

states like Minnesota only issuing EDLs in the past few months . 

• PASS Card~: The PASS Card is a limited use passport in a "wallet size" format used for land 

and sea port entry, and only available to U.S. citizens. This TD establishes both the identity 

and nationality of the bearer. This TD satisfies the 9111 Commission recommendation that 

became the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. requiring all those seeking entry into the 

U.S. to present a passport or equivalent. It is used by business travelers and other individuals 

who live in border communities as well as those that travel frequently (by land or sea) between 

the United States and Canada I Mexico . 

• Enhanced Driver Licenses: State-issued enhanced drivers licenses (EDLs) provide proof of 

identity mid U. S. citizenship, are issued in a secure process, and include technology that 

makes travel easier. They provide h'avelers with a low-cost, convenient altemative for entering 

the United States from Canada, Mexico or the Caribbean through a land or sea pOli of entry, in 

addition to serving as a permit to drive. Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Vermont and 

Washington are issuing enhanced drivers licenses. 

-For U.S. citizens and qualijjling foreign nationals: 

Those foreign nationals emolled in the following husted traveler programs would be the easiest 

to apply a biometric exit requirement. 
61 

51 

• FAST: Available to U.S .• Canadian. and Mexican low risk truck drivers whose personal 

record and driving record are subject to numerous criminal, immigration and driving 

background checks. enabling use of dedicated driving lanes and faster inspection. Available at 

17 northem and 17 southem ports of entry. 

• Nexus: Available to U.S. and Canadian low lisk travelers, NEXUS members now have 

crossing privileges at air. land. and marine ports of entry. Under the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative, the NEXUS card has been approved as an altemative to the passport for air, 

land, and sea travel into the United States for US and Canadian citizens. The program allows 

pre-screened travelers expedited processing by United States and Canadian officials at 

dedicated processing lanes at designated nOlthem border POlts of entry, at NEXUS kiosks at 

Canadian Preclearance airports, and at marine repOlting locations. Approved applicants are 

issued a photo-identification. proximity Radio Frequency Identification (RFTD) card. 

• Sentri: Available only on the southem border, SENTRl provides expedited CBP processing 

for pre-approved, low-risk travelers. Applicants must voluntarily undergo a thorough 

biographical background check against criminal. law enforcement. customs. immigration, and 

terrorist indices; a I O-fingerprint law enforcement check; and a personal interview with a CBP 

Officer. 

Qualifying travel documents. All of the applicant data is stored in the secure users database, 

or for the case of nonimmigrant visa holders, the State Department. No private biometric 

infOlmation is stored on the tr'avel document, and thus no private infollnation is tr'ansmitted with 

the RFID (RFID technology has the potential to track an individual's movements, create a 

profile of an individual's habits. and allow for secondary uses of that information). All 

applicants would already have undergone background checks pmsuant to receiving the relevant 

immigration benefit. This solution is that used in trusted traveler systems, and has worked to 

protect plivate infOlmation. 

• Enhanced visa page for foreign visitors: The current visa issued by the State Department and 

used for presentation for entry at U.S. ports of entry by foreign nationals in their passports 

would receive the enhanced travel document described above. 

• Enhanced travel authorization ID card: Current and future eligible legal immigrants would 

receive the enhanced travel document described above. 

Exit data and overstay data produced real time at land ports. The proposal would generate 

real time, immediate exit data at land ports, minimizing overstay data manually produced by 

ICE today by generating an exit record in the AnivallDeparture Information System for evety 

exit instance. The same could be done for land POlt entries, building on the biographic data 

being gathered today on the northem border in cooperation with Canada. Current legal 

mandates for a biometric exit would be satisfied. Overstay data used for the Visa Waiver 

program and innnigration enforcement generated with significantly less manual labor. National 

secmity would be better served, knowing whether a wanted terrorist or felon is in or out ofthe 

country would no longer be a guessing game. and enabling law enforcement to make better 

decisions about whether to rendition a wanted individual. 
62 

52 

Privacy and security of data. The foreign national's data is kept private because it is not 

stored on the card, but in USCIS or State Department secure database. Instead, the card includes 

a file number which points to a file number in a secure DHS (immigrant) or State 

(nonimmigrant) database that is read upon arrival. This number does not contain any personally 

identifiable infOlmation. 

The file number triggers the participant's data to be brought up on the CBP Officer's screen. 

The data is velified by the CBP Officer and the traveler is released or referred for additional 

inspections. This is exactly how current land border uusted u'aveler systems work. These cards 

are provided a shielded sleeve that prevents anyone from reading the document. 

Minimizing cost. 

• The proposal requires a phased-in RFID add-on dedicated exit lane by dedicated exit lane 

approach. The only new infrastructure likely required is duplicating RFID into exit lanes and 

technology to record cOlTesponding data. 

• Phasing in RFlD teclmology at the POlts would minor (with plalming), the phased-in approach 

of embedding the improved u'avel documents with the RFID teclmology in order to avoid any 

potential negative repercussions for u'ade and tOUlism. 

• The travel docUlnent and biomeu'ic R&D is already established, mld would be incorporated 

into the improved travel docUlllents. Any new costs in embedding RFlD technologies or 

biometrics could be covered by fees. Business models already exist for the travel documents 

mentioned above, and could be replicated in part by this progrmn. 

• The new element--linking the Anival/ Depmture Information System to the improved secure 

credentials-- would be minimal relative to the cost barriers of deploying fingerprint readers or 

other handheld technologies at the ports for all those exiting; instead, handheld devices would 

be the exception, not the norm. 

Differentiating between US citizens, legal immigrants and visitors. To be clear, the 

proposed entry / exit system would not apply to U.S. citizens, only foreign nationals. In 

delineating between foreign nationals and US citizens. it would be efficient and useful to build 

upon the culling process already created by the US and Canada for their shared entry/exit 

biographic exit deployment. 

Phase-in of program. Tn the first years of the program. until all visas were expired and 

included the enhancements necessary for recording exit data, and all aliens received similar 

enhancements to their ID cm'ds, the exit data would be necessarily incomplete. As travel 

docUlllents expire and m'e renewed, these would contain the RFID-enabled /machine readable 

technology. The gathering of exit data would be robust. 

Canada. DHS is working with Cmlada cUlTently on a mutual enuy/exit system at land ports 

(discussed above) as well as enhanced drivers licenses as an alternative to the Canadian 

passport. Four Canadian provinces (British ColUlnbia, Manitoba, Ontmio, mld Quebec) m'e 

issuing EDLs to Canadian citizens. Canadian citizens can present an EDL when entering the 
63 

United States from Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean through a land or sea port of entry. It 

would be worth engaging the Canadians on incorporating EDL linkages to the Arrival! 

Departure Information System, ADIS. 

53 

BIOMETRIC SOLUTIONS AT AIR, LAND AND SEA PORTS 

IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

provided by California-based A Optix (iris recognition) 

BIOMETRIC ENTRY, DUBAI UAE 
64 

BIOMETRIC IRIS-FACE Recognition, Cubai International Tenninal 3 

Over 100 lanes of either immigration stations or automated border control gates (even suitable 

for use by disabled passengers in wheelchairs) have been in place in OX8's largeslterminat 

since early 2013. The airpon is slated to soo major increases in traffic and envisions iris 

recognition as the principal means of authenticating visitors to and transit passengers in the 

Emirates in one of Ihe faslest growing Iranspon hubs in the world. Since Ihe implementation 

of 100 gates in lerminat 3 earliar this year, additional syslems ha~e been Ofdered for 

deployment in terminals 1 and 2 as well as in the new Makloum Airport just outside Dubai en 

route 10 Abu Dhabi. 

BIOMETRIC TRAVEL CONTROL, IRIS RECOGNITION 
65 

Gatwick Airport, London UK 

Over 25 lanes of AOpti~ InSight Iris Recognrtion are deployed at Gatwick in what is cal led a 

~ed use departure area'- where international and domestic-destined passengers utilize the 

same retail and restaurant amenities. Passenger mixing that without proper safeguards. might 

yield boarding pass swapping and an "Immigration Bypass' has of an iris 

system that requires iris template-barcode linkage on boarding passes 

erlfolled passengers (no iriS enrollment on the sterile side of the border) 

technology is simple: instruction fOf self-enrollment is delivered via e~posure to 2 e~posures to 

picture-only LC~ s on the domestic side. The process is simple enough Ihat even a child can 

do it. 

Courtesy AOpl ix TechnologIes 

QATAR BIOMETRIC ENTRY/EXIT, ALL POtNTS ENTRY LAND, AIR, & SEA 
66 

In an installation that dates to 2011 , every point of entry into the State of Qatar relies on an 

AOptix Te<:hnologies InSight"" system for a black-list determ ination- enabled Entry/Exit 

program at every point of entry (SO+ lanes air, land, and sea) in the gas-rdl state. Every 

person entering and leaving the state uses the system. Notice that unlike standard white livery 

seen al Oubai, Qatar actually asked for sheathing that matched the color scheme of the 

immigration booths. More importantly. processing time for individuals with 2-eye recognition is 

Jess than 5 seconds per person. 

Courtesy: AOptix Te<:hnologies 
67 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Ms. Kephart. 

Mr. Albers, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES N. ALBERS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MORPHOTRUST USA 

Mr. ALBERS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Conyers, other distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank 

you for having me here today. I greatly appreciate it. As you heard, 

I work for MorphoTrust, which is one of the leaders in the biometrics industry. I have been working in the biometrics industry 

for 11 years, about as long as there has been a biometrics industry. 

I am going to focus as a member of industry on the technology 

and the state of the technology that is out there right now, and I 

would basically like to make three points, some of which Janice already made very well. Biometrics will offer superior results when 

compared to biographic only. Costs for implementation, integration, 

operation and maintenance are much lower than they were a few 

years ago. And this situation, this solution is well proven around 

the world. Multimodal biometrics is in play at a number of borders 

and airports throughout the world. 

Biometric exit offers greater security than biographic only. Biographic data, such as a person’s name, date of birth, are all vulnerable to fraud. This information and documentation can be falsified 

and stolen. Biographic information is also inconsistently presented 

around the world. We are all familiar with birth dates going day/ 

month/year, backwards. Names can be presented the same way, 

and in our culture, first/last/middle. Biographic information, biographic data is fraught with errors because it depends on human 

collection, as opposed to biometric data, which is based on NIST 

and international standards and is collected using robust, highly 

reliable collection technology. 

Biometric exit controls can provide a higher degree of identity assurance than biographic exit controls alone. Furthermore, this can 

be done in a cost-effective manner without disrupting operations at 

airports, seaports, and other ports of entry and exit. 

As far as costs are concerned, I believe that the $3 billion-plus 

cost estimate in the 2008 report commissioned by DHS for implementing a biometric exit system at airports and seaports is out of 

date and an order of magnitude too high. Since 2008, biometrics 

has moved into the commercial arena, and the costs associated 

with biometric capture devices has dropped dramatically, while the 

convenience and accuracy of these devices continues to improve. 

I recommend a multimodal biometric solution which has already 

been implemented throughout the Federal and some state governments. The Department of Defense uses multimodal biometrics— 

that is face recognition, fingerprint, iris recognition, and a fusion 

algorithm—as standard operating procedure. The FBI has used fingerprints for more than a century, and the next-generation identification program is now adding face recognition and iris recognition. The State Department runs the largest facial recognition 

database in the world. There are over 100 million images in there 

and the visa database, including many of those folks that we are 

talking about that overstayed their visas. 
68 

I believe that DHS should change the collection process and collect additional biometrics from visitors: fingerprints for sure, like 

we do now; high-quality face images that can be used with face recognition systems; and iris images compliant with NIST standards. 

Collecting multiple biometrics at the time of entry will provide CBP 

with more options upon exit. DHS agencies could then take advantage of the relative benefits of each biometric identifier and method 

of capture such as accuracy, passenger throughput, convenience 

and cost. Fingerprints would continue to be collected, allowing for 

a comparison to IDENT and to NGI, while face and iris images at 

the time of entry could be collected and used against the FBI, State 

Department, and DOD databases. 

This solution is proven and low cost. Today, more than 70 international airports throughout the world have biometrically-enabled 

systems. My company alone has deployed over 150 eGate systems 

across eight countries within 24 international airports, processing 

over 1 million passengers per month. Other companies in the industry have done the same thing. These biometrically-enabled systems use a variety of biometrics—fingerprint, face recognition, and 

iris recognition—to verify the identity of the traveler quickly and 

efficiently, with a very high accuracy. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that MorphoTrust speaks for 

the biometric industry when we say that a fully functioning biometric exit system is affordable, can be implemented today without disrupting legitimate trade and travel. We stand ready to work with 

Congress, the Department of Homeland Security and other stakeholders to develop a biometric exit program that can be deployed 

within a short period of time and at a reasonable cost, thus making 

Americans safer while improving the traveler experience. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today 

on these issues. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albers follows:] 
69 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF 

JAMES N. ALBERS 

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

MORPHOTRUST USA 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM: STILL 

WAITING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 

PRESENTED 

NOVEMER 13, 2013 
70 

Written Statement of James N. Albers 

Senior Vice President of Government Operations 

MorphoTrust USA 

Before the Committee on the Judiciary 

United States House of Representatives 

November 13, 2013 

Good afternoon Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and other 

distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. 

My name is Jim Albers. I am the Senior Vice President of Government Operations at 

MorphoTrust USA. I have been working in the biometrics industry for 11 years. I 

am pleased to address the subject of this hearing. I believe we have waited too long 

to complete a biometric exit control system in the United States. Today, advanced 

biometric entry and exit control systems are being used in airports and border 

crossings around the world. These systems are affordable, convenient, and can 

accommodate high rates of traveler throughput. 

Today I would like to address the following topics: 

MorphoTrust's role in large, complex biometrics and identity programs 

The affordability and convenience of biometric exit systems 

• The security benefits of biometrics over biographic information 

• The importance of collecting multi-modal biometrics at entry and exit 

• Different types of biometric exit control systems 

• Examples of successful exit systems around the globe 

MorphoTrust USA's History and Role in Identity Solutions 

MorphoTrust USA, formerly known as L-1 Identity Solutions, is headquartered in 

Billerica, Massachusetts. Our mission is to simplify, protect, and secure the lives of 

the American people. MorphoTrust provides end-to-end identity solutions in 

biometrics, background checks, and secure credentials. We have over 1400 

employees at locations across the country. 

MorphoTrust develops the technology for, and delivers some of the largest, most 

complex biometric systems in the world. Our Automated Biometric Identification 

System (ABlS) is used by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. State Department, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and a number of state and local law 

enforcement agencies to fight terrorism, prevent identity fraud, and provide 

criminal investigative leads. In addition, Morpho has successfully developed and 

deployed biometric entry/exit controls in airport environments around the world. 

1 
71 

MorphoTrust is also the leading domestic provider of secure credentials. We 

produce driver licenses for 42 of 50 states. as well as the Passport Card and Border 

Crossing Card for the U.S. Department of State. Our parent company, Safran, is a 

global high-technology company with concentrations in aerospace, defense, and 

security. In the United States, Safran has 32 subsidiaries and joint ventures, with 

approximately 7000 employees in 22 states. 

Biometric Exit Controls are Affordable and Convenient 

Based on our history of delivering a range of biometric solutions, we feel confident 

to be here today delivering a simple message-biometric technologies are fast, 

convenient, and accurate and can provide increased security without slowing or 

inconveniencing travelers. 

When properly implemented, biometric exit controls can provide a higher degree of 

identity assurance than biographic exit controls alone. Furthermore, we are sure 

that this can be done without disrupting operations at airports, seaports, or other 

ports of entry and at a reasonable cost compared to the benefits. 

All of this is, we know, in stark contrast to what many of you hear on a regular 

basis-that biometric exit controls are both costly and difficult to implement. 

However, we do not believe this to be the case. In reality, the costs associated with 

biometric capture devices have been trending dramatically downward, while 

convenience and accuracy of these capture devices continue to improve. 

In studying the opposition to biometric exit controls, we know there is significant 

reliance on a 2008 report commissioned by the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) that estimates the costs for implementing a biometric exit system at 

airports and seaports to range from $3 billion to $6 billion.1 We believe these cost 

estimates are out of date and orders of magnitude too high, and do not take into 

account the dramatic price declines in biometric technologies in recent years. 

The study assumed building a system to specifications, without consideration ofthe 

range of Commercially Available Off-the-Shelf (COTS) biometric capture devices 

offered by vendors today that are affordable, highly accurate, and are designed 

specifically to fit within an airport footprint. 

The first "lives can" fingerprint devices were put into use 20 years ago, were big and 

bulky, and cost $15,000 or more. Today, lives can devices are small and cheap 

enough to put on an iPhone, and law enforcement agencies buy high volume, "ten 

print" fingerprint devices for less than $1500. 

1 U.s. Dept. of Homeland Security, DHS-2008-0039-0002, Air/Sea Biometric Exit Regulatory Impact 

Analysis [2008). 

2 
72 

AO[ltJx Str3!\lS'" mobil" Identity solution 

Speaking of IPhones· everyone can see how the cost and size of cameras has .. !Iso 

declined. My [Phone 5 has an 8 mcgapixel camera, and the new ones even have 

autofocus. Nokia now has a 41 mega pixel camera. When the study was done in 

2008 you could not buy a 4 1 megapixel camerd atany price. This remarkable 

change has allowed cameras to be ubiquitous, Jnd has facilitated law enforcement 

activities using face recognition. 

Likewise, iris recognition was in its early days in 2008 and has now been recogni7,ed 

as the most effiCient and effective biometric when matching one·to·many. A prime 

example of the scalability of biOmetric enrollment and verincation is the UID 

program in India. 425 million Indian citizens are now enrolled in that Na tional ID 

program. with a goal of enrolling 600 million citizens by 2014. 

Biometric Exit Offers Greater Se curity than Biographic-only Exit Controls 

It is Important to recall that the existing legislative mandates to implement a 

biometric entry-e.-.:il control system are among the recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Report Coincidently, those tragic events of 12 years ago were the 

catalyst for the growth of Federal biometrics programs. 

Since that time, the U.S. Department of State has initiated and operated the largest 

face recognition program In the world. The U.s. Department of Defense uses multimodal biometrics as standard operating procedure. WhUe the FBI has been using 

nngerprints for a century, their Next Gl'neration Identification ("NGI) Program 

Incorporates face recognition and iris recognition tools to also leverage the benefits 

of multiple biomelrit:s modalities. 

Our years uf experience in this market have shuwn us th~t the use of biometrics is 

the single best way to quickly and accurately Ilrove an identity. Blogr.Jphic 

infurmation, such as a person's name, sodal security number, and date of birth, and 

the documents used to verify biographic Information are all vulnerable to fraud. All 

ohhls information and documentation can be falsified and stolen. Additionally, 

biographic data is fr.Jught with errors because it is reliant, in most cases, on homan 

coUection. 

Biographlc data is also presented inconsistently around the world; birth dates can 

3 
73 

be presented as day/month/year or as month/ day/year and names can be 

presented as first/middle/last or the reverse. This is in addition to limitations 

associated with transposed or erroneous numbers or letters. Many namesespecially those associated with foreign languages-allow multiple spellings or use 

of hyphens or other marks that can reduce the reliability ofbiographic systems. 

Biometric identification and verification, on the other hand, is based on 

international standards and is generally not subject to the same vulnerabilities as 

biographic data. Faces, fingerprints, and irises are completely unique to individuals, 

and cannot easily be faked. In addition, each distinct biometric modality offers 

numerous unique identifying features, which, when used together, can dramatically 

increase identity assurance. 

Multi-modal Biometrics 

MorphoTrust is confident that a biometric entry-exit control system that 

incorporates mUltiple modes of biometrics is a more secure solution than the 

current biographic exit approach in place today. 

Today, when a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. port of entry, and applies for 

admission to the United States by air or sea, the only biometrics that U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) collects are fingerprints and photographs (but the 

photographs are often not suitable for use by face recognition technology). Because 

of this, many assume that an exit system should be based on a finger print matching 

system. 

It is our view that DHS should change the entry process and collect additional 

biometrics from visitors-fingerprints for sure, but also photos of a quality that 

work with face recognition systems, and iris captures compliant with recently 

issued National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards. 

Doing so would provide additional flexibility to CBP to employ a system that works 

most effectively in different airport environments. In some instances, this may 

include iris scans; in other instances, face recognition; and in still others, perhaps 

fingerprints. 

Regardless, collecting multiple modalities of biometrics at the time of entry would 

provide CBP with more options for capturing biometrics at exit. CBP would have the 

ability to conduct contactless biometric capture using either face, fingerprint, or iris 

scans (or a combination thereof). This would allow operators to take advantage of 

the relative benefits of each biometric identifier and method of capture, such as 

accuracy, passenger throughput, convenience, and cost. 

In this scenario, fingerprints would continue to be collected during enrollment, 

allowing for comparison against DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System 

(!DENT) database and the FBI's NGI database, which until recently was known as 

the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). This solution 

would continue to do that. However, the addition of iris and face recognition scans 

at the time of entry would provide the added security benefit of allowing matching 

against face recognition and iris databases maintained by the U.S. Department of 

4 
74 

State ;and the U.S. Dep;artment of Defense,;as well;as other f;ace databases m;aintained 

by state ;and loc;allaw enforcement ;agencies. 

With multiple modalitIes (face, Iris, and fingerprints) Implemented, the primary 

modality used on a given day tan be changed, mitigating the ability to plan for 

methods to spoof 'loy single biometric. A multi·modal system ensures thai each 

visitor would h;ave;at least one biometric identifier in the system that c;an be used LO 

confirm identity. While each of the three biometric technologies h;as a relative 

margin of error, coll ectively they can ensure high probability m;atches on data sets 

with tens of millions of records and morc, ;and can be used to reduce the imp;aclof 

failed biometric c;apture (for insta nce, lIue to dry fingerprints). 

StatIstics from the Indonesian multi· modal natlonallD card project, for example, 

shows that there is only a 0.008% ch;ance of false positive identification and a 0.18% 

chance of false negative identification on a database of over 100 mJl1ion records. 

In addItion, multi·modal biometric entry/exIt systems reduce processing times. For 

example, combination f;ace recognition and document sc;anning systems can process 

;a passenger In as little as 8 seconds. Iris sc;a nning systems c;an c;apture ;and process 

an iris image in a few seconds. Conlilctless, finger·on·lhe·fly technology can read 

four fingerprints In as little as 3 seconds. 

Face Recognition 

Face recognition is nol a new concept-police officers have been using face 

recognition for as long as there have been criminals. However, now the algorithms 

for fa ce recognition have progressed to the point where software is much better at 

;:;::;:::::~ faces than the avcnlge humans Is. 

Jtl ustrat olL~ ofth~ 3~as use<! by 3 fa(~ retogll;tion algorithm 

Face recogni tion is a potenti;a! solution for biometric entry lexit as high quality video 

tameras are already installed at most major airports. These cameras, if mounted in 

the gates used for internationa! departure, cou!d c;apture the faces of departing 

visitors. Face recognition has the additional security benefit of ;allowing matching 

against the Department of State's biometric database of visa appHcants. 

5 
75 

Iris Ret:ognition 

One biometric In particular - iris - bears additional discussion, In our view. In 20OS. 

Iris was still a niche technology. Today Iris enrollment and verifie-dtion devices have 

become reasonably priced. as a number of iris camera manufacturers have driven 

down the costs per unit with high quallty image results. Additionally, the recent 

addition of iris to the N 1ST Personal Identity Verification (PIV) specifications has 

added certa inty to the technology and gives it room to grow. 

Iris recognition starts wlth capture of a photograph of the iris using a near-infrared 

Ulumination. The iris is extracted from the photo and the unique features are 

Identified and converted Into a small template. It is this template that Is stored and 

then compared to a template created from the photograph taken when a person is 

requesting verification of identity. An iris template cannot ellsily be reverse 

engineered to the origi nal Iris photo thereby protecting the privacy of the trllveler·s 

biometric information. 

Iris recognition is unobtrusive. The individual does not need to be aware of the 

collection taking place for a successful collecllon to occur. High resolution cameras 

have improved to the point that photographs taken from up to 3 meters aW;ly from 

the subject will have the de~l red quality, with good focus thatis required for iris 

recognition. 

Area within orange «Illcentric cin:leJ I.~ e~trn cted IOf template creation. 

Iris recognition systems are contactless and hygienic. There is no need to touch a 

surface that has been touched by thousands of tr3velers. This prevents the 

transmission of disease via contacL 

Iris recognition systems are stable. The iris is an internal organ that is protected 

against damage and wear by the cornea. On the other hand, fingerprints are subject 

LU wear, distortion and al ter,nion through certain types of activities and manual 

labor. The iris is mostly flat, and Its geometric configuration Is mainly dictated by 

pupn dilation. This makes the Iris shape far more predictable and stable than an 

Individual's face. 

Results arc returned quickly. Iris templates are. very smaiL and as a result, database 

searches are very fast. Current server hardware can match an Iris template to tens 

of millions of templates in less than a second. This means that iris can provide a 

"lights out match" in a one-to-ma ny scenariO fuster than any other biometriC. 

Iris recognition is highly reliable, with the abil ity to reach extremely low false accept 

6 
76 

rates, comparable to that of any other biometric modality. I n addition, considering 

fingerprints arc sometimes associated with criminal behavior, iris may be less 

offensive to some subset of travelers. 

Sta nd -off simultaneous race and dual iris capture 

Additional benefits may be derived by stand-off dual capture units, which 

simultaneously capture both face and Iris images. This is accomplished by the use of 

two cameras; 

I. A high resolution near-infrared camera that takes a photograph afthe irises. 

2. A digital camera that rakes a high resolution color picture of the face. 

Today's dual face and iris cameras are of sufficiently high resolution that a 

photograph taken, with th e appropriate lens and lighting, from the distance shown 

in the photograph below, still has the resolution necessary to perform accurate 

matches. With faster computer systems and advances in computer vision 

algorithms, these systems wJll just keep getting belter. 

AOplix In$iJJhtOJ dual fa~~ and Iris caphlreal theck-in 

Stand·offtechnologies allow for photographs to be taken unobtrusively, in seconds, 

and can be configured to Ilt into natural chokepoints at airports-such as check-in 

counters, security checkpoints. or at the departure gate. 

Within seconds, a stand-off simultaneous face and dual iris biometric collection 

device GIn tlke photographs of your face and eyes and send the images toa backend search engine. Depending on the complex.ity of the search workflows, results 

can return in seconds. Atnatural document handling points, search results could be 

returned berore the document examination is completed. 

Contactless Fingerprint Capture Devices 

There are also exciting advances in fingerprint capture devices that provide new 

options for exit configurations. Morpho has developed a contactless fingerprint 

capture solution called Flnger-on-the-Fly. Other companies have developed similar 

technologies. 

7 
77 

Speaking to our device. It captures rour finger images with a single movement of the 

hand in less than a second. Its fast acquisition capability allows subjects to provide 

fingerprints while on the move. which makes it suited for high-traffic environments. 

This method or fingerprint capture also alleviates hygienic concerns when using a 

commonly touched surface. 

Morpho Flnger·on·!he·Fly wIltactl<!:§5 nllgerprllli reader 

Biometric Exit Systems Interna tionally 

With this in mind, it is also worth noting that biometric entry/exit control systems 

are operating S\lccessrully III airports around tlle world. In fact. when talklllg about 

exit in the United States, we are often a~ked what other nation~ are doing. 

Morpho was the first company in the world to deploy an eGate project based on race 

recognition and ePassporlS in Australia. SmartGa te has since been expanded to New 

Zealand, processing a combined 15.1 milllon passengers since 2007. Currently, 

Morpho has deployed over 150 eGate systems in 24 international airports across 8 

countries within 24 International airports. processing over 1 million passengers per 

month. 

8 
78 

MorphoWay~ fully 3utomarNl eGare'S 

Other major dl.'ployments include fingerprint based systems in France and 

indonesia, iris recognition systems In the United Kingdom and the United Arab 

Emirates. and face recognition systems in Germany and the Czech Republic. Many of 

these systems are not limited to ePassport holders or the host country. Of the 

systems mentioned. holders of second generation U.S. ePassport~ are able to use the 

Australia and New Zealand's SmartGate and the French Parafe. and the systems in 

France. l/le United Kingdom. Germany and the Czech Republic are open to all second 

generation ePassport holders of the European Union. 

MorphoWay'" eG3res read biomerric information contained in ttowel doamlenlS and compare it with 

the dOCllmcnl holder's biometric d~l3. 

Exit Controls for Land Border Ports of Entry 

I can confidently say that, based on successful Implementation around theglobe. 

and using COTS solutions, biometric exit cnntrols for airports. seaports, and 

pedestrian land border crossings can be implemented affordably and within a 

relatively short time frame. Vehicular land border crossings present a unique 

challenge-in part due to the need for Infrastructure improvements at exit points. as 

well as the difficulties in capUtring biometrics of passengers inside the vehicl e,. 

without slowing down border traffic. 

9 
79 

Multi-modal biometric capture systems, such as dual face/iris cameras, could be 

configured within a gantry to capture biometrics of drivers and passengers while 

seated in their vehicles. Additionally, handheld iris/face/fingerprint readers can 

quickly capture biometrics (similar to the HIIDETM and SEEK® devices used by the 

U.S. military) for all vehicle occupants quickly-but, this would require facilitation 

by a trained CBP officer. 

With emerging and improving biometric capture technologies, additional options 

will be available in the future. 

We would recommend addressing biometric exit controls at land border crossings 

through a series of pilot and demonstration projects, in advance of implementation 

at busy border crossings. 

Conclusion 

I believe that MorphoTrust speaks for much of the biometric industry when we say 

that a fully functioning biometric exit system is affordable, and can be implemented 

today without disrupting legitimate trade and travel. Other countries have 

successfully deployed and are operating biometric entry and exit controls at 

airports and other ports of entry. The Federal Government has already embraced 

multi-modal biometrics as a means to establish and verify identity. 

We stand ready to work with the Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and other stakeholders to help develop a biometric exit program that can be 

deployed within a short period of time and at a reasonable cost, making Americans 

safer while improving the traveler experience. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee on these 

important issues. I look forward to answering your questions. 

10 
80 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Albers. 

Ms. Wood, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF JULIE MYERS WOOD, PRESIDENT, COMPLIANCE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS, 

GUIDEPOST SOLUTIONS 

Ms. WOOD. Thank you so much, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking 

Member Conyers, Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning about the enforcement implications of an entry-exit system. 

Efforts to ensure that we secure the border and reform our immigration process must include efforts to transform overstay enforcement and do it more effectively, and exit is a big piece of this. 

Although the lack of an adequate exit program was highlighted 

by the 9/11 Commission and mandated by Congress over many 

years, DHS struggled with how to effectively implement it, and 

really focused on biographic methods and refinement of data. Although this was very frustrating to law enforcement interests, both 

inside and outside of DHS, it was somewhat understandable given 

cost restraints, capacity, and the technological limitations of the 

time. 

Now, however, biometrics are part of mainstream industry and 

security efforts. They are available on everything from your iPhone 

and utilized in locations as diverse as casinos and amusement 

parks. Biometrics should also be utilized to determine exits of foreign nationals from the United States. 

While a biographic exit program is better than no program at all, 

the lack of biometrics leaves a significant gap for criminals and 

others to abuse. Instant verified biometric exit data would be extremely useful to law enforcement both for terrorism cases and for 

routine immigration enforcement. As the Chairman noted, significant national security risks often try to leave the country unnoticed. Biographic-centered systems do little to prevent these determined individuals from escaping the Joint Terrorism Task Force or 

other law enforcement efforts. 

ICE’s routine enforcement efforts also would be enhanced with 

an effective biometric exit program. Currently there are only 300 

dedicated counter-terrorism compliance enforcement unit agents. 

They prioritize leads based on information provided from the law 

enforcement and intelligence community. But because we don’t 

have an effective exit system, oftentimes these ICE agents are 

chasing leads for individuals who have already left the country 

when they could be spending time on higher-priority individuals 

who are still here. 

I have to note, however, and despite the many benefits of exit, 

the overall value of a robust biometric system is greatly diminished 

if the enforcement agencies will not enforce violations that such a 

system identifies. To ensure that we have successful immigration 

reform, a commitment to build exit must also be accompanied by 

a commitment to enforce the law. ICE HSI currently spends only 

1.8 percent of its enforcement hours on enforcement against 

overstays, and with improvements in the biographical data provided to law enforcement, ICE has been getting more and more 
81 

leads every year. Yet, the number of cases that ICE deems worthy 

of opening for investigation continues to go down. 

In 2005, for example, 13,000 non-priority leads were sent to ICE, 

and the agency opened 4,600 for investigation. In 2012, over 

212,000 non-priority leads were sent to ICE, but they opened only 

2,800 investigations. 

Other parts of ICE, including ERO, could have logical responsibility for overstay enforcement. But as they recently told the GAO, 

few records of potential overstays meet ERO’s priorities—not HSI’s 

priorities, not ERO’s priorities. Overstays are no one’s priorities, 

and when they are no one’s priorities, they become everyone’s problem because they undermine the integrity of our overall immigration system. 

To put it somewhat in perspective, if you think about 20,000 border patrol agents, they are focused on only 60 percent of the problem. We have 300 ICE HSI agents to focus on the other 40 percent. 

Such a low level of enforcement suggests that even with biometric 

exit in place, the number of overstays may continue to grow 

unabated due to a lack of enforcement, resources and direction. 

Enforcement, of course, always requires resources and appropriate prioritization, and any immigration reform bill must include 

appropriate resources to address these needs so that we have an 

immigration system that works, so that the benefit of a biometric 

exit does not surpass the immigration components that it needs 

most to do its job. 

Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify before you 

about the enforcement implications, and I would be happy to answer any questions after the testimony is completed. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wood follows:] 
82 

Testimony Before the 

House Judiciary Committee 

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM: 

Still Waiting After All These Years 

Testimony of 

Julie Myers Wood 

President - Compliance, Federal Practice and Software Solutions, 

Guidepost Solutions 

Fonner Assistant Secretary/Director, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

November 13,2013 

Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, Members of the Committee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to testify before you about the enforcement implications of an 

EntrylExit system. 

My name is Julie Myers Wood, and I am President of Guidepost Solutions, an 

investigative and compliance firm. In that position, I work with companies on their 

internal compliance programs, create web-based solutions to assist businesses with export 

and immigration compliance challenges, and consult with companies that work with the 

government. 1 am also a member of the American Bar Association's Commission on 

Immigration and as a Member of the Constitution Proj ecl' s Committee on Immigration. 

1 
83 

I am testifying today solely in my personal capacity and not as a representative of any 

group or organization. 

Before joining the private sector, 1 served as the head of Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (lCE) for nearly three years. 1 also served in a variety of other 

government positions, including Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement at the 

Department of Commerce, Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division at the Department of 

Justice and Deputy Assistant Secretary (Enforcement - Money Laundering and Financial 

Crimes) at the Department of Treasury. In these roles, I saw first-hand the government's 

challenges in developing an overstay enforcement system that works, as well as the law 

enforcement need for accurate data on individuals who are in our country. 

It is widely acknowledged that one of the most significant problems with current 

immigration enforcement is the inability of the government to address the problem of 

visa overstays. It is estimated that approximately 40% of individuals who are in the 

United States without authorization today initially entered the United States legally. 

When their visas expired, these "overstays" have blended into American society with 

little concern that they will be held accountable by any federal law enforcement. Indeed, 

a recent GAO reports notes as ofJune 2013, DRS has more than one million unmatched 

arrival records in ADTS (that is, arrival records for which ADTS does not have a record of 

departure or status change), which do not meet TCE's enforcement priorities1 Although 

ICE has limited resources and must prioritize, one million known - but ignored - records 

is not the sign of a working immigration system. Efforts to secure the border or reform 

I "Ovcrstav Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed To Assess DHS' s Data and I!nIJro'{e ]'Iarmllig for a 

Biometric Exit Program," July 30. 2013, available at l1tt]2l1\\~"'l~ .. g[lC'£(>Y1'lSS(i5/t.S(oi;~l',';6l1~.[>dl 

viewed Septemher 2R. 2(13) 

2 
84 

our immigration process must include efforts to transform overstay enforcement. We 

need both a system that works and a commitment to enforcement of overstays. 

A significant reason that these individuals who overstay their visas are able to 

blend into society is the fact that we do not have an adequate exit system ("Exit"), despite 

seventeen years and eight statutes requiring an Exit program. The lack of an adequate 

Exit program was highlighted by the 9111 Commission 

DRS, properly supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as 

possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system. As important as it is to know 

when foreign nationals arrive, it is also important to know when they leave. Full 

deployment of the biometric exit ... should be a high priority. Such a capability 

would have assisted law enforcement and intelligence officials in August and 

September 2001 in conducting a search for two of the 9111 hijackers that were in 

the U. S on expired visas 2 

Knowing the urgency of these efforts, DHS has made substantial progress since 

9111 in developing and refining an entry program, and working to develop an exit 

program. During the time that I was at DRS, the Department was working to expand 

entry biometrics from two to ten fingerprints, and wrestling with integrating the u.S. 

VISIT (recently renamed the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBTM» 

generated data into the work of the enforcement agencies. As such, during this period, 

the Department's exit work focused on a biographic methods to record exits and ways to 

refine data analysis gathered through the biographic methods, such as passenger records. 

Although this was frustrating to law enforcement interests both inside and outside DRS, 

it was understandable given cost restraints, capacity, and technological limitations at the 

time. 

, A total of 5 of the 9111 hijackers had overstayed their visas 

3 
85 

Five years later, law enforcement remains frustrated with the focus on biographic 

solutions because of the loopholes in such a program. While a biographic Exit program 

is better than no program at all, the lack of biometrics leaves a significant gap for 

criminals and others to abuse. Indeed, ICE, CBP and other DRS agencies have long 

recognized that biographic data is not sufficient to meet its mission. Even senior DRS 

officials told GAO in April 2013 that DRS officials stated that the department had not 

reported overstay rates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its 

overstay data. DRS officials stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not 

reliably report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute 3 The GAO went on to 

link the lack of confidence in overstay data to the current biographic data system, and 

lack of a biometric system to verify identities4 

The law enforcement and the intelligence community is well aware, and today 

rely heavily on, effective biometrics to verify identity immediately and provide real-time 

assurance that people are who they say they are, rather than just the people they are 

pretending to be. As CBP noted in its recent Exit report: 

Biographic data is a good start but is not enough to meet law enforcement, 

national security and other needs. Relying solely on Biographic matches based on 

data such as names and document numbers provide significant evidence that the 

traveler is genuine, but biometrics should otfer a greater degree of assurance that 

the individual is who he or she claims to be, and whether the individual has 

actually departed the United States. With improved matching capabilities, the 

ability to match biometric entry and exit data would become more accurate and 

complete 5 

3 "O'i/erstay }--<:nforcement: Additional Actions Needed '['0 Assess])] IS's Data and Improve 

I3iomelric Exit Program," p. 14, July 30,2013, available al bliir,:I/'."'\'''cg''')RlV~,,,,,~~\S6<:iLQ:;61IIi,r,tU: (I'lSl 

viewed September 28. 2013) 

4 "Immigration I~nforcement Preliminary' Observations on DHS's Overstay I~nforcement [':frorts", May 

2013 

5 "Comprehensive Exit Plan."' U.S. Customs & 130rder Protection, dated September 27,2013 

4 
86 

For these reasons, it is encouraging to see the interest of this Committee and the 

Department in developing a workable biometric Exit program. Although historically 

some technological challenges may have been obstacles to the government from 

implementing a valid program, advances in technology mean that this is no longer a valid 

excuse. 

Biometrics are now part of mainstream industry and security efforts. They are 

available on your iPhone, and utilized at locations as diverse as casinos and an 

amusement park. Similarly, biometrics should also be utilized to determine Exits of 

foreign nationals from the United States. CBP appears to be recognizing this shift and 

improvements in technology by partnering with S&T to identify and leverage pilot 

approaches. Building upon this work, any new immigration reform statute should 

mandate a robust, biometric Exit program, and give the DRS suUicient resources to 

implement and enforce this program. 

Instant, verified biometric Exit data would be extremely useful to law 

enforcement, for both terrorism cases and routine immigration enforcement.G First, 

biometric exit would be extremely effective in particular national security cases. 

Significant national security risks may try to leave the country unnoticed. Biographiccentered exit systems do little to prevent these determined individuals from escaping the 

clutches of Joint Terrorism Task Forces or other law enforcement efforts. One example 

of this is the Times Square bomber, who evaded a biographic-only exit system (but was 

fortunately apprehended on the runway). More recently, the Joint Terrorism Task Force 

6 Biometric exit would also transform the metries and infonnation used by the govemment in evaluating 

the vis;] waiver programs, and also reduce traveler errors caused by confusing or inaccurate bio gn'lphic 

infomlatioll. 

5 
87 

lead provided by the Russian government on Boston Marathon bomber Tamarlan 

Tsarneav, who was a legal immigrant subject to immigration controls, was significantly 

stymied when Tsameav's name was misspelled by the airline. As a result, the FBT did 

not ever know he had actually departed the country. A biometric exit would have 

instantly verified Tsarneavi's identity, whether or not his name was spelled correctly. 

ICE's routine enforcement efforts would also be enhanced with an effective, 

biometric Exit program. Such a system would allow ICE to more effectively enforce 

immigration laws against individuals who overstay their visas. Currently there are 

approximately 300 dedicated Counter Terrorism Compliance Enforcement Unit 

(CTCEU) agents. They prioritize leads based on a threat matrix developed in cooperation 

with the intelligence community. Because we do not have an effective exit system, many 

times ICE agents are inadvertently referred or focus on high priority leads who have 

already left the country. This is a waste of law enforcement efforts. Without a biometric 

component, doing the checking that is involved to guarantee that that individual has 

actually left (and not an imposter, etc.), often ICE has to engage and even deploy 

overseas resources to confirm that the individual has left the country. This is not a simple 

paperwork exercise. Often this requires agents going out in the field and verifying or 

validating departure. Such efforts are not only a waste of time, but a significant drain on 

ICE's limited financial resources. Such a sap on resources would be unnecessary with a 

biometric component. 

An effective biometric Exit program would also be useful to confirm certain types 

of Voluntary Departures. These departures require the individual to check in with the 

consulate. Often this is not done, or the individuals do not understand that they need to 

6 
88 

do it ICE agents are required to investigate and confirm that departures have occurred. 

This takes ICE and State Department hours. 

Even more generally, a robust Exit program would provide enhanced value in 

investigations and criminal cases of all kinds where government is proving travel as part 

of the conspiracy or in furtherance of the criminal behaviors. 

Despite the many benefits of Exit, the overall value of a robust biometric system 

is greatly diminished if the enforcement agencies will not enforce violations that such a 

system identifies. One of the biometric Exit data's core missions is to help restore the 

integrity of the immigration system. Thus, while ICE will be grateful for clear data on 

overstays, not having the resources or focus to ensure the law is enforced against 

overstays will frustrate much of the value of the good work of implementing biometric 

exit To ensure that we have successful immigration reform, a commitment to build Exit 

must also be accompanied by a commitment to enforce the law. 

To that end, we must be realistic as to whether biometric Exit will make a 

significant difference in improving immigration enforcement and reducing the flow of 

overstays given ICE's current posture on overstay enforcement. The July 2013 GAO 

report confirmed that routine overstay enforcement is not a priority of the Department. 

TCE HST currently spends only 1.8% of its enforcement hours on enforcement against 

overstays7 Tn addition, as OBTM has increased its data mining methods and contractors 

understood what ICE was looking for in terms of usable exit data, more and better leads 

have been provided to ICE every year since 2005. Despite the increase in leads, the 

7 "'Overstav Enforcemcnt: Additional Actions Needcd to Assess DHS 's Data and Planning for a 

Biometric Air Exit Program," July 2013, available attlttRj!'iv_\\"".!!:§'()'E.0',!a';,,-cls/6()1);.§215Jl~['cl,f (last 

viewed on September 28, 2013) 

7 
89 

number of cases ICE deems worthy of opening for investigations continues to go down. 

In 2005, for example, 13,000 non-priority leads were sent to ICE and the agency opened 

4,600 for investigations. Tn 2012, over 212,000 non-priority leads were sent to TCE, but 

the agency only opened 2,800 investigations.s 

Further data provided in the GAO July 2013 report highlights the lack of 

enforcement activity against routine overstays. As a part of its review, the GAO 

identified 1.6 million unmatched overstay records that had not been cleared and were 

open. DHS agreed to review those records. The GAO Report notes, 

[a]s a result, DHS closed approximately 863,000 records for individuals who had 

departed, were in status, or had adjusted status, and removed them from the 

backlog by conducting additional automated checks. Second, DHS reviewed the 

remaining 757,000 records against national security and law enforcement 

databases to identify potential national security or public safety threats. As part of 

this national security and public safety review, DHS also reviewed approximately 

82,000 additional records identified by CTCEU that were unresolved or had not 

yet undergone full review because they did not meet TCE' s enforcement priorities 

(a total of approximately 839,000 combined records). As a result of these reviews, 

DRS reprioritized 1,901 of the 839,000 records because the subjects of the 

records could pose national security or public safety concerns and provided them 

to CTCEU for further review and consideration for enforcement action9 

Out of the 1901 records that were determined to be potential public safety or 

national security risks through this process, ICE took action on very few of them: 

, Id. 

Arrested: 

Could not be located 

(investigation closed pending new information) 

Referred to Enforcement & Removal Operations (ERO): 

(no further response provided, see below) 

Previously arrested/in proceedings: 

o Td. at 13 

9 

266 

481 

43 

8 
90 

Already departed U.S 711 

These results are concerning. CTCEU made a significant number of referrals to 

ICE ERO as part of this process, based on potential concerns that these individuals were a 

public safety threat (presumably they did not meet the HSI threshold). However, there is 

no indication whether any of those individuals were arrested or placed on a priority list at 

ERO. Indeed, as ERO officials explained to the GAO, "few records of potential 

overstays have met ERO' s priorities."l0 The information from CTCED also does not 

indicate what communications exist between CTCED and ERO on these overstays which 

were specially referred to ERO. Without further explanation, there appears to be a 

potential disconnect between these parts of ICE - one that benefits those who overstay, 

but reduces the chances of effective enforcement. 

To put these numbers in perspective: 

Your chances of being audited by the IRS: I in 175. 11 

Your chances of being struck by lightening once in your lifetime: lout of3000. 12 

If you were part of the 839,000 unmatched records specifically identified in the 

GAO report, the chances that ICE would arrest you for being out of status: lout 

of 16,134u 

10 Id. at 15 

II "What arc your chances of winning the 10tteIY," Popular Science, November 2012, available at 

blW:l6Y~YlYJ2QJ2~~i· fQQlL~~i~c~~IDSlqL~Ql ~-:llLQ i~!!l~'!l:Qg~ts~ ~igl]mlIigJL~ry:i!).JQgIgpJJi~ (last vicvl"cd on 

Septemher 2X, 2(13) 

September 28, 

13 (,AO July Report, Tahle 3 at 15. leI i HSI indicated that there were 9 an'ests out ofthe 1901 national 

security cases, ilnd lhat an additional 43 people were identified as previously arrested, in removal 

proceedings, or the subject of an investigation. A total of 52 arrests/rcmoval proceedings commenced out 

of 839.000 

9 
91 

Such a low level of enforcement suggests that even with biometric Exit in place, the 

number of overstays may continue to grow unabated due to a lack of enforcement, 

resources and direction. 

Enforcement always requires resources and appropriate prioritization, and any 

immigration reform bill must include appropriate resources to address these needs, so that 

the benefit of a biometric Exit does not surpass the immigration components that need it 

the most to do its job. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you about the enforcement 

implications of an Exit system. I would ask that my entire testimony be placed into the 

record, and I am happy to answer any questions you have at this time. 

1 
92 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Ms. Wood. 

Mr. Heyman, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID F. HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member 

Conyers, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. 

We want to talk about DHS’ role in implementing an exit and 

entry system. I also want to dispel a few myths about biometric 

entry and exit. 

We all agree that a fully functioning entry-exit system is crucial 

for immigration control, law enforcement and national security. 

Tracking the arrival and departure of foreign visitors to the United 

States is important for enforcing the terms of admission for nonimmigrants, identifying and sanctioning overstays, and for managing our visa waiver program. 

To function properly, a system needs a number of things. It 

needs to capture arrival and departure information of travelers 

coming to and leaving the United States. It also needs to record immigration status changes, determine if criminal warrants exist, and 

identify overstay priorities for enforcement action. 

The first myth I want to dispel is the notion that if we aren’t 

using biometrics on the departure, we don’t have a working entryexit system. That is not true. The fact is that DHS today manages 

a fully functioning entry-exit system in the air and sea environments using a combination of biometric and biographic components. The system was built over the last decade. The Department 

collects biometric and biographic information on entry and biographic information on all individuals who are physically on a departing airplane or sea vessel through our Advanced Passenger Information System, or APIS. 

In 2010, DHS began deployment of enhancing the exit system, 

which improved our ability to automatically match the information 

from an individual’s passport or other travel document upon arrival 

and departure, information that can be captured electronically so 

we take human error out of the system. 

As a result of these efforts, since April of this year, the Department is now able on a daily basis to identify and target for enforcement action those who have overstayed their period of admission 

and represent a public safety or national security threat. I want to 

repeat that. On a daily basis now, the Department identifies and 

targets those who have overstayed their period of admission. This 

is a significant improvement over our prior capabilities. And while 

more work needs to be done to integrate a biometric component 

into this system, it is incorrect to say the Department lacks a functioning entry-exit system just because we have yet to implement 

biometrics into the exit processes. 

The second myth is that biographic-centered exit systems do little to prevent determined individuals from escaping law enforcement. Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber, is an 

example of a determined individual who tried to flee the country 

after his failed bombing attempt, but our exit system prevented 
93 

him from escape. Some hours after his vehicle bomb failed to detonate in New York, Shahzad bought a one-way ticket to Pakistan. 

When CBP ran the APIS manifest looking for who was departing 

the U.S. on that flight, Shahzad was identified, matched, and taken 

off the flight into custody. 

The third myth is that DHS is resisting calls to implement a biometric solution on exit. DHS knows full well the congressional 

mandate requiring biometric exit, and we are working toward it. 

DHS has piloted various biometric exit programs in order to determine when a biometric exit system will be cost-effective and feasible. These have been done in previous Administrations as well as 

this one. Through these pilots, the Department concluded that implementation would require over $3 billion in investments. If implemented prematurely, particularly without the support of airlines, we would see disruptions to passenger travel and likely drive 

the costs higher. 

Right now, however, the Department’s Science and Technology 

Office is leading an APIS project called Air Entry Exit Reengineering Project. The purpose of this project is to analyze, develop, and test-pilot and evaluate integrated approaches to biometrically confirm the departure of non-U.S. citizens at U.S. airports. S&T and our CBP are also establishing a physical test facility that mimics real-life port scenarios. That facility will be operational in early 2014 and will be used to test the latest technological advancements which my colleagues here on the panel have 

testified to in biometrics to match departure information arrivals, 

and I would invite anyone here to come see the operation once we 

have it up and running next year. 

Let me conclude by saying that despite significant challenges, 

DHS has implemented and currently manages a full functioning 

entry-exit system in the air and sea environments. The Department is mindful that any exit system must confirm the identity of 

foreign nationals, ensure the individuals depart the United States, 

facilitate enforcement, while also not causing disruptions to the 

flow of passenger travel or airline and airport operations. DHS remains committed to implementing a biometric exit system that 

achieves all these goals and will continue to make substantial 

progress in the year ahead. 

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:] 
94 

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95 

Introduction 

Chainnan Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and other distinguished Members, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before the Committee to highlight the Department of Homeland 

Security's (DRS) critical work on implementing a biometric entry/exit system. Today, DRS 

manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system in the air and sea environments using biometric 

and biographic components. To illustrate the progress the Department has made, ten years ago, 

screening of passengers coming to the United States was limited to the Department of State's 

(DOS) visa process, if applicable, for those individuals requiring a visa; passenger infonnation 

provided voluntarily by air carriers; and the inspection of a person by an immigration officer 

upon their arrival at a United States port of entry. There was no biometric collection for visa 

applicants beyond photographs, nor for individuals seeking admission to the United States. 

There was very limited pre-departure screening of passengers seeking to fly to the United States 

and there was virtually no screening of any kind for domestic flights beyond passing through 

metal detectors at airport checkpoints. There was no advance screening of passengers seeking 

admission under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), and interagency sharing of information on 

terrorist threats was minimal. 

In the last decade, with the support of Congress, and by working with our international partners, 

DRS has significantly adapted and enhanced its ability to detect and interdict threats at the 

earliest opportunity. Individuals intending to travel to the United States under the VWP must 

now obtain authorization through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (EST A) 

program before boarding an air or sea carrier for travel to the United States. ESTA screens 

passengers against various government databases and has virtually digitized the Form 1-94W 

(ArrivallDeparture Record) for authorized travelers from participating VWP countries. 

Additionally, all passengers seeking to fly to, from, or within the United States are similarly 

screened prior to boarding an aircraft under the Secure Flight program. For non-citizens, 

passengers' biometrics are collected and checked against terrorist watch lists prior to being 

issued a ,,;sa or being pennitted to enter the United States, and agencies share infonnation on 

known or suspected terrorists with each other. Further, we have developed new capabilities and 

systems (such as our Advanced Targeting System and Behavioral Detection program) to help 

identify possible terrorists and others who seek to travel to or within the United States to do 

hann. 

It has long been a goal of the federal government to obtain accurate and timely data on those who 

overstay' their period of admission to the United States. Congress enacted legislation on 

implementing an entry/exit system to help achieve that goal. As part ofa 2004 section of the 

legislation, such a system would require some form of biometric (i.e., fingerprints) to be 

collected when a foreign national enters and leaves the United States. The purpose would be to 

match entry and exit records and detennine who is complying with their period of admission to 

the United States and sanction those who have not. 

I An individual is deemed <111 overstny if he or she fails to leave the country ,vithin the authorized period of 

admission. 

Page 11 
96 

As you know, many countries use biographic data, which is essentially text data that is 

commonly included on a data page of a traveler's passport, such as name, date of birth, 

document information, and country of citizenship. A biographic system is an entry/exit system 

that matches the information on an individual's passport or other travel document when he or she 

arrives to and departs the country. By contrast, a biometric system matches data ofa biometric 

or physical component from a person that is unique to an individual (i.e., fingerprints, a facial 

image, or iris scan) collected when a foreign national enters and leaves the United States. 

While the United States did not build its border, aviation, or immigration infrastructure with exit 

processing in mind, the Department of Homeland Security piloted various biometric exit 

programs in 15 ports of entry to try to find a way to achieve such a system2 Through these 

pilots, we found that the limitations of existing technology plus the lack of infrastructure for 

departing passengers would require more than $3 billion in investments as well as significant 

disruptions to passengers and airlines for a biometric exit program in the air environment alone3 

The Department has since worked to bring the existing biographic system to a level offidelity 

equal to, or nearly equal to, a biometric system while continuing to pursue a more cost-effective 

biometric solution4 

Today, the Department manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system that tracks and identities 

overstays. Specifically, the Department is now able, on a daily basis, to identify and target for 

enforcement action those who have overstayed their period of admission and who represent a 

public safety and/or national security threat. Moreover, we continue to move forward in building 

a biometric air exit system that can be integrated in the current architecture once it is costeffective and feasible to do so. 

A Comprehensive Entry/Exit System 

Collecting entry and exit data is one part ofa comprehensive entry/exit system. lfwe look at the 

totality of an entry/exit system, it extends beyond our physical borders to include a number of 

steps that may occur well before a visitor enters the United States and up to the point at which 

that same visitor departs the United States through a land, air or sea port of entry/ port of 

departure. 

2 There arc emerging biometric technologies TIm\' 3\'ailablc in the market that ,,,ere unavailable at the lime of the 

pilots. Accordingly. there will be additional opportunities to pursue researeh and development into a future 

biometric air exit system. on which Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the DRS Science and Teclmolob'Y 

(S&T) Directorate are currently working together. 

3 U.S. airports do not have designated and assured exit areas for outgoing passengers to wail prior to departure. nor 

do they have specific checkpoints through which an outgoing passenger's departure is recorded by an immigration 

officer. Air carriers also have raised objections to this requirement, and in 2008, Congress directed DHS to conduct 

biometric pilots prior to establishing any new system. Tn the land environment, there arc orten geographical fcatures 

that prevent eXl'ansion of exit lanes to acconmlOdate additional hmes or the addition of CBP-manlled booths. 

'1 Typically. most countries use biographic information_ which is essentially text data that is commonly included on a 

dnta page of a traveler's passport, sllch as name, date of birth, and country of citi/.enship. Text data can be 

electronically read through passport features based on intemational standards, such as a machine readable zone or an 

e-Pnssport chip. A biogmphic system is an entry/exit system based on mntching the informntion on an individunl's 

travel document when he or she arrives to and departs the United States. 

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97 

How DHS Collects Arrival Il?iimnation 

In instances where the individual needs a visa to enter the United States, information is captured 

at the time his or her visa application is filed with DOS along with additional information 

developed upon an interview with a consular officer. It is important to note that if the individual 

is from a Visa Waiver Program country and does not require a visa, he or she may be required to 

apply through EST A. Information is then collected through the ESTA application. 

For travelers in the air and sea environment, DHS also receives passenger manifests submitted 

by air and sea carriers, which indicates every individual who actually boarded the plane or ship. 

This information is collected in DHS's Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and then 

sent to the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), where it will be held for matching 

against departure records. 

When a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. port of entry and applies for admission to the United 

States by air or sea, the traveler is interviewed by a CBP officer regarding the purpose and intent 

of travel. His or her document is reviewed, law enforcement checks are run, and biometrics 

(fingerprints and photo) are screened against and stored in the DHS systems. If admission is 

granted, the CBP otlicer will stamp the traveler's passport with a date indicating his or her 

authorized period of admission. Based on electronic information already in DHS' s systems, a 

Form 1-94, ArrivallDeparture Record, is electronically generated for that person and can be 

printed remotely by the individual if the individual needs it to provide evidence oflegal entry or 

status in the United States. The form also indicates how long the person is authorized to stay in 

the United States. 

When an individual bearing a nonimmigrant visa arrives at a land port of entry, the individual is 

sent to secondary inspection where biometrics are collected (if appropriate) and CBP may issue 

that person a Form I-94A, Departure Record, which records their authorized period of admission. 

How DHS Collects Departure Information 

Similar to the way DHS gathers passenger manifests prior to entry through the air and sea 

environments, DHS also collects through APIS passenger manifests submitted by commercial air 

and sea carriers departing the United States. Since 2008, collection of this information has been 

mandatory and compliance is near 100 percent resulting in a fully functioning exit system in the 

air and sea environments using biographic data. Carriers are required to report biographic and 

travel document information to DHS for those individuals who are physically on the airplane or 

sea vessel at the time of departure from the United States and not simply on those who have 

made a reservation or scheduled to be on board. DHS monitors APIS transmissions to ensure 

compliance and issues fines for noncompliance on a monthly basis. CBP transfers this data 

(excluding data for U.S. Citizens) to ADIS, which matches arrivals and departures to and from 

the United States5 

5 DHS uses this informntion for n variety of immigmtion <lnd 1m-v enforcement rensons. including to determine \vhich 

travelers have potentially stayed past their authoriLed period of admission (i.e., overstayed) in the United States. 

Page I 3 
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How TJHS Addresses Overstays of Authorized Period of Admissiof1 

When information reveals that an individual is a confirmed overstay, the Department takes 

action, including working with DOS to revoke visas and apprehending indi viduals. Since 

FY 2011, DHS has made substantial improvements to maximize our ability to identify, prioritize, 

and sanction confirmed overstays. 

As of April 9, 2013, DHS has implemented the following system updates: 

Automation of the flow of information between ADIS and the Automated Targeting 

System for Passengers ATS-P: CBP has updated the flow of information between ADIS 

and ATS-P to reduce manual processes for moving data between the two systems. This 

update saves time, improves processing quality, increases efficiency, and better protects 

privacy, as the transfer of information occurs through secure electronic means instead of 

manually saving information on portable devices. 

Use of ATS-P to enhance name matching for overstay vetting: CBP has leveraged 

existing ATS-P matching algorithms, previously not available to ADIS, for the purposes 

of better matching names in entry and exit records, thereby improving the accuracy of the 

overstay list. Additional matching algorithms have helped identify matches that the 

original ADIS system may have missed. 

Development of Basic Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Overstay "Hot 

List": CBP created an operational dashboard for ICE agents that automatically lists and 

prioritizes validated records of individuals who may have overstayed and who are likely 

still in the United States, pursuant to national security and public safety criteria. This 

reduces the previous manual process in the exchange of data between NPPD/OBIM and 

ICE and allows ICE to allocate resources to those cases of highest priority, on a near realtime basis. 

Implementation of an ADIS to TDENT interface: This etJort created an interface between 

IDENT (the biometric database for DRS) and ADIS, the two systems currently housed at 

the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIMl This helps reduce the number of 

records on the overstay list by providing additional and better quality data to ADIS, 

closing information gaps between the two systems. 

Improved ability of ADIS to match United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' 

(USCIS) Computer Linked Adjudication Information Management System (CLAIMS 3) 

data: The Department has worked to improve the quality, timeliness, and relevance of 

data sent from CLAIMS 3 to ADIS, improving the ability of ADIS to match the data 

accurately with other records. Many aliens enter the United States and then extend or 

change their status lawfully, and therefore have not overstayed even though their initial 

period of authorized admission has expired. 

6 OBIM supports DHS components by prmiding matching scrviccs against its dntabascs (IDENT and ADIS 

collectively) and returning any link:ed infoIDmtion when a match is made as they vet individuals already encountered 

by DHS to identify knmvn or suspected terrorists. nationnl security threats. criminnls, and those "vho have previously 

violated U.S. iUlllligratiolllaws. 

Page I 4 
99 

By mid-FY 2014, DHS plans to develop and deploy: 

Unified Overstay Case Management process: Through a data exchange interface between 

ADIS and ICE's LeadTrac system7

, overstay case management work is being migrated to 

one analyst platfonn, LeadTrac, for DHS. Additionally, ADTS will receive enhanced 

overstay case management updates from ICE. 

Enhanced ADIS and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Alien Flight Student 

Program (AFSP) data exchange: TSA relies on ADIS to identify overstays who are 

enrolled in the AFSP and provide them to ICE for action. ADIS will utilize existing 

overstay vetting operations to increase efficiency and prioritization of TSA AFSP 

overstays within the ADlS overstay population. 

Enhanced Overstay Hot List: The Enhanced Overstay Hot List will consolidate 

immigration data from multiple systems to enable ICE employees to more quickly and 

easily identify current and relevant infonnation related to the overstay subject. DHS will 

expand capability, including the use of additional law enforcement and counterterrorism 

data in the Hot List for ICE, which will return the results from multiple database queries 

in a consolidated dossier, from which analysts can more easily retrieve the relevant 

information. 

User Defined Rules: DHS will develop a capability for ICE agents to create new or 

update existing rule sets within ATS-P as threats evolve, so that overstays are prioritized 

for review and action based on the most up-to-date threat criteria. 

The measures already in place have proven to be valuable in identifying, removing, and 

sanctioning overstays. The above DHS implementations have strengthened data requirements 

through computer enhancements, identified national security overstays through increased 

collaboration with the intelligence community, and automated manual efforts through additional 

data exchange interfaces. DHS looks forward to continuing this progress in FY 2014. 

The TeF: Overstay Analysis Unit (OA U) 

To support DHS' s commitment to enhance its vetting initiatives across the full mission space of 

homeland security. The OAU vets the system identified overstay records to confinn status and 

prepare the records to be sent to the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

(CTCEU) for possible law enforcement action. Specitically, the OAU analyzes biographical 

entry and exit records stored in OB1M's ADlS to further support DHS's ability to identify 

international travelers who have remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods of 

admission. 

, LcadTrac is an ICE system designed to receive overstay leads to compare against other DHS systems and 

classified datasets to uncover potential national security or public safety concenlS for referml to ICE field offices for 

investigation. The system employs a case manngement tracking mechanism to assist \vith analysis, qunlity control 

reviews, lead status and field tracking. 

Page I 5 
100 

The OAU analyzes and validates two types of nonimmigrant overstay records: out-of-country 

overstays (OCO) and in-country overstays (ICO). OCO records pertain to visitors who stayed 

beyond their authorized admission period and subsequently departed the country. The OAU 

validates these violations based on their reported departure dates and creates biometric and 

biographic lookouts for these subjects, in case the subjects attempt to enter the United States in 

the future. The out-of-country overstay violator lookouts are posted in two separate databases: 

the IDENT Secondary Inspection Tool and CBP's TECS8 to alert and notify Department of State 

consular officers and CBP officers of a subject's violation before he or she is granted a visa or 

re-entry to the United States. In-country- overstay records pertain to visitors who remain in the 

United States with no evidence of departure or adjustment of status upon expiration of the tenns 

of their admission. The OAU reviews and validates these ADIS system identified violations 

based upon ICE identified categories of interest 

Typical overstay violators are addressed by nonimmigrant overstay leads, which are used to 

generate field investigations by identifying foreign visitors who violate the terms of their 

admission by remaining in the United States past the date of their required departure and who 

meet the Department's enforcement priorities. 

VWP violators are addressed by CTCEU's Visa Waiver Enforcement Program (VWEP). Visafree travel to the United States builds upon our close bilateral relationships and fosters 

commercial and personal ties among tourist and business travelers in the United States and 

abroad. Today, ICE regularly scrutinizes a refmed list of individuals who have been identified as 

potential overstays who entered the United States under the VWP. One of the primary goals of 

this program is to identify those subjects who attempt to circumvent the U.S. immigration system 

by obtaining travel documents from VWP countries. 

lhe lCli C1CJiU 

In 2003, DRS created CTCEU, which is the first national program dedicated to the enforcement 

of nonimmigrant visa violations. Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of 

thousands of potential status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS/ and the OAU10 along with other infonnation. 

After this analysis, CTCEU detennines potential violations that warrant tield investigations, 

(based on national security or public safety concerns) and/or establishes compliance or departure 

dates from the United States. Between 15,000 and 20,000 of these records are analyzed each 

month and over two million such records have been analyzed using automated and manual 

review techniques. 

8 TEeS (not an acronym) is the updated and modified version of the fanner Treasury Enforcement Conul1unications 

System. It is owned and operated by CBP. 

, SEViS is the dntabase used rormonitoring certified schools. F. M, and J non-immigrant students, and their 

dependents. 

to OAU is in TCE's Nmionni Security Division and is a "sister" unit to the CTCEU. The CTCEU and OAU work 

collaborativel)' to identify and enforce overstays. 

Page I 6 
101 

Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases for investigation in cooperation 

with the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP/ 1 and the OAU These programs enable 

ICE agents to access information about the millions of students, tourists, and temporary workers 

present in the United States at any given time, and to identify those who have overstayed or 

otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their admission and identified as national security 

or public safety concerns. To ensure that the potential violators who pose the greatest threats to 

national security are given priority, ICE uses intelligence-based criteria, developed in close 

consultation with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 

ICE special agents and analysts monitor the latest threat reports and proactively address 

emergent issues. This practice, which is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting 

specific risk factors based on intelligence reporting, including travel patterns, and in-depth 

criminal research and analysis, has supported high-priority national security initiatives based on 

specific intelligence. 

Enhancing the Department's Exit System 

In 2003, DHS began development of a biometric entry/exit system and, in 2004, fully 

implemented a biometric air entry solution into existing inspection booths that is currently in 

operation. Biometric land entry was deployed between 2004-2005. By contrast, implementing a 

biometric exit capability has been a signiticant challenge. The air environment atforded a single 

point where travelers were processed for admission to the United States and biometrics could be 

incorporated, whereas our airports were never architected for an exit control. DHS remains 

committed to maximizing the efticiency and effectiveness of the current entry/exit system, and 

has made progress in the last few years. 

In May 2012, DHS provided a report12 to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees that 

described the Department's plan for enhancing its existing biographic exit program. As part of 

this plan, various DHS Components have been and are currently strengthening systems and 

processes in order to improve the accuracy of data provided to ADTS. This will enable ADTS to 

more accurately match entry and exit records and determine who may constitute an overstay, and 

whether that person presents a national security or public safety concern. Data that is entered 

into ADIS comes trom a variety of sources in the Department including USCIS, CBP, and ICE. 

In addition, DHS has also identified mechanisms to improve the "output" of ADIS, to ensure 

ICE investigators receive priority high-risk overstay cases for resolution in a timely fashion, and 

to ensure other ADIS stakeholders (such as CBP, USClS, and DOS) receive the best possible 

information with which to make immigration decisions. 

To continue to explore the feasibility of a cost-etfective and efticient biometric exit solution, in 

March 2013, CBP and S&T initiated ajoint Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering (AEER) Apex 

project13 to determine how and when a biometric air exit concept would be feasible. The 

purpose of the AEERProject is to analyze, develop, test, pilot, and evaluate integrated 

11 SEVP is the program that raeilitates and manages SEVIS. 

12 Comprehensive Exit Plan, Fiscal rear 2012 Report to Congress. 

L< Apex Programs me S&T initintives that focus on cross-cutting or multi-disciplinary efforts, \vhich me initially 

requested by DHS components and are of a high priority. high value, and urgent nature. 

Page I 7 
102 

approaches to biometrically confirm the departure ofnon-U.S. citizens at U.S. airports, as well as 

to introduce more efficient traveler facilitation processes and effective biometric technologies to 

screen travelers entering the United States. 

Land EntlyExit Program 

Today, as part of the Beyond the Border Action Planl4, the United States has a fully functioning 

land border exit system on its Northern border for non-U.S. and non-Canadian citizens in 

addition to the existing air and sea entry/exit system. In FY 2012, approximately 72 million 

travelers entered the United States through the border with Canada. Canada and the United 

States agreed to exchange land entry records at ports of entry along the US-Canadian border in 

such a manner that land entries into one country will serve as exit records from the other. 

Canada and the United States began with a pilot program that exchanged data on third-country 

nationals at several land ports during a four-month period that ended in January 2013." During 

the pilot, the United States was able to match 97.4 percent ofrecords received from Canada to 

existing entry records. 

The second phase of the project was deployed on time on June 30,2013.'" During this phase, 

Canada and the United States are exchanging the entry data for third-country nationals, 

permanent residents of Canada, and U.S. lawful permanent residents in the United States, who 

enter through all automated common land ports. Over one million records have been received 

from the Canada Border Services Agency since Phase 2 was initiated and the match rate of exit 

records received from Canada against existing U.S. entry records are over 98 percent. 

By June 30,2014, Canada and the United States will implement the third phase of the project, 

expanding the program to include the exchange of entry data for all travelers (including U.S. and 

Canadian citizens) who enter through any automated common land ports on the Northern border. 

Overall, this initiative is expected to enhance the ability to identify departures and successfully 

match entry and exit records at the land border for the first time. 

EnrryExit Going Forward 

A comprehensive entry/exit system is key to supporting DHS' s mission. However, the 

Department's continuing efforts to improve the entry/exit system a system should not be 

construed to mean that DHS does not already have a functioning exit/entry system in place. The 

Department continues to close the entry/exit gap by matching information obtained through air 

and sea manifests and exchanges with Canada. This year, through the FY 2013 DHS 

appropriation, CBP was tasked with the entry/exit mission, including research and development 

into biometric exit programs. CBP has also established an Entry/Exit Transformation Office 

dedicated to managing and coordinating the entire spectrum of entry/exit efforts, including 

expansion of the entry/exit effort with Canada at the land border. This office is pursuing every 

opportunity to leverage DHS's investments in the southwest border and those that can be 

obtained in partnership with Mexico. Other projects to enhance exit management include an 

11 Unfled Slates Canada /Je..vond Jhe Norder: '/ 5,'hared hsion/hr Perimeter Security and r,'co}1omic 

Competitiveness, December 2011 Action Plan. 

t5 The four locations ,,,ere Pence Arch, Pncific Highway, Rainbow Bridge, and QueenstownILewistol1. 

16 hUpJ/,\,\'\'\\ .cbp.go\ !:..;plcgoy/ne\ysToom1nc\,vs reieases/natimmlJ070320 13 .xmL 

Page I 8 
103 

audit of airline manifest departure data in September and October to establish a biographic 

baseline to measure the success of future biographic and biometric exit solutions and 

improvements. In addition, the audit will allow CBP to ensure the credibility of APIS data used 

to calculate the overstay rates. 

Working with S&T, the office is establishing a physical facility that mimics real-life port 

scenarios. This facility, which will be operational in early 2014, will be used to test the latest in 

technological advancements in biometrics that may be candidates for use in matching departure 

infonnation to arrivals. Only through this testing can CBP and S&T identify and qualify 

potential solutions, as well as assess the economic impacts of such solutions. As the test facility 

is being built this fall, CBP will develop strategies, goals, and objectives for the biometric air 

exit system that will be used to infonn the testing process that will begin in 2014. 

DHS anticipates that these initiatives will enhance the existing entry/exit system in a myriad of 

ways that support our mission. The comprehensive entry/exit system will: 

Take full advantage of, and enhance the existing automated entry/exit capability that 

produces infonnation on individual overstays; 

Incorporate and use biometric infonnation as technologies mature and become more 

affordable; 

Improve DHS' s ability to take administrative action against confirmed overstays, 

enhancing the Department's ability to take administrative action as quickly as possibleincluding visa revocation, prohibiting re-entry into the United States, and placing 

individuals on lookout lists, as necessary; 

Support further the administration and enforcement of our country's immigration lawsby improving DHS's ability to identify who exits the United States, thus deterring 

individuals from remaining in the country illegally; and 

Enable DHS to better maintain a focus on individuals who may wish to do us harm and 

facilitate the legitimate travel of those who do not, while protecting the privacy of U.S. 

citizens and legal permanent residents. 

DHS will continue to consider the traveler, stakeholders, and the Department when architecting a 

system that is easily adapted to current physical and infrastructure limitations, minimizes 

disruptions to travel, proves to be cost-effective, and is flexible enough to address not only 

current requirements but also to anticipate future ways of conducting business. 

Page I 9 
104 

Conclusion 

Despite significant challenges, over the past several years, DHS has implemented and now 

manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system in the air and sea environments, and is continuing 

to enhance capability for land. While the United States did not build its border, aviation, or 

immigration infrastructure with exit processing in mind, the Department of Rome land Security 

has worked to bring the existing biographic system to a level offidelity equal to, or nearly equal 

to, a biometric system while continuing to pursue a more cost-effective biometric solution. 

Specifically, the Department is now able, on a daily basis, to identify and target for enforcement 

action those who have overstayed their period of admission and who represent a public safety 

and/or national security threat. Moreover, we continue to move forward in building a biometric 

air exit system that can be integrated in the current architecture once it is cost-effective and 

feasible to do so. 

While implementation of a robust and efficient biometric solution will take time, DRS has and 

will continue to take appropriate steps to evaluate emerging biometric technologies and work 

with appropriate public and private sector stakeholders, such as the airlines and airports and 

other federal agencies. 

The Department's continuing etforts to improve the entry/exit system should not be construed to 

mean that DHS does not already have a functioning exit/entry system in place. Rather than wait 

for a time when funding or capabilities are sufficient to implement a fully biometric system, the 

Department has built and is improving on a system that is etfective today - and one which we 

will continue to enhance in the future. 

Thank you. 

Page 110 
105 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Heyman. 

I will begin the questioning with a question to you regarding 

your comments there about the exit systems that are administered. 

You indicated that you have a biographic system. Isn’t it true 

that more than a million people are unaccounted for in that system 

as to whether or not they have exited the country? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The number that you are referring to dates back 

to 2 years ago when there was an identification of backlog in our 

overstay processing, and it was about 1.6 million at that time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you about your land exit system. Do 

you collect biographic data from individuals departing the country 

by land ports? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There is no infrastructure on the border to collect 

biometric information. On biographic, we have a pilot in the northern border right now with Canada that allows us to receive data 

from Canada every time somebody leaves the United States and 

enters Canada. An entry in Canada counts as an exit in the United 

States. And so we are now piloting that with great effect. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, I am glad you have that pilot. With regard 

to the southern border of the United States, I take it that even 

though that has a very large percentage of the total number of people who exit the United States each day, there is no biographic or 

biometric data collected. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We are in conversations with the Mexican government to do something similar to what we are doing on the northern 

border, and we have begun some pilots to look at the biographic 

system down there as well. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good. Thank you. And I hope you will keep the 

Committee informed of that effort. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Ms. Wood, thank you very much for your testimony. I was struck by your comment that while 35 to 40 percent 

of people who are unlawfully present in the United States are 

overstays who enter the country legally, that ICE is only spending 

1.8 percent of its man hours in terms of dealing with that 35 to 

40 percent of the illegal immigrants in the United States. It seems 

to be a very disproportionate ratio there. 

Ms. WOOD. It certainly does. I mean, ICE has a lot of statutes 

that it has to enforce. This number, 1.8 percent, comes from evidence and information they provided to GAO during the GAO review. You would think that perhaps ERO, which is another part of 

ICE, would also enforce against overstays, but they have said they 

don’t have the funding to do it and that those individuals also are 

not priorities. 

So when you think about how do we go forward and get a workable immigration system, someone has to address kind of the problem of people who will continue to overstay. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Mr. Albers, is a biometric exit system feasible, and can it be completed at land ports, including vehicles, which I understand is the 

greatest challenge, within a reasonable amount of time? 

Mr. ALBERS. I believe that a biometric exit system for air and sea 

could be completed within 2 years. I think there are challenges 

with land. I will tell you that my company and a lot of the bio-
106 

metrics industry really started in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we 

have proven that biometrics works in the toughest of environments 

over there. So I feel very strongly that DHS is proposing a pilot 

program and then rolling biometric controls onto exits at land borders over a period of time. I think that is a wise approach. But I 

do think it can be done. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And what has changed in terms of the technology in the 17 years since we first asked for this and the 9 years 

since we first asked for it to be biometric that makes it more feasible today? 

Mr. ALBERS. Well, I am glad you asked that question, Mr. Chairman. When I first got involved in this business, I worked for a company called Sarnoff, which was the research facility for RCA for 

years, and we developed the first Iris on the Move program. That 

program probably cost $2 million, and the first prototypes that 

rolled off the platform there were about $250,000 each. Now, they 

were put together by a bunch of Ph.D.s, so it was pretty expensive. 

What has happened in the 7 years since that time is a number 

of companies, including Aoptics, which is in Ms. Lofgren’s district, 

have developed Iris on the Move and Face on the Move systems 

that you can buy for $10,000 or $15,000. So not only has the technology gotten way better than it was 7 years ago, it has gotten a 

lot cheaper. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Ms. Kephart, you were on the staff of the 9/11 Commission, and 

that commission recommended ‘‘the Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should complete as quickly as possible a biometric entry-exit screening system.’’ Why did the 

Commission make that recommendation? 

Ms. KEPHART. When we were investigating the terrorist travel 

patterns, which was my job on the commission, we learned in our 

work with others on the commission staff that there were two hijackers in August of 2001 who were watch-listed. We knew they 

had come into the country, but we did not know where they were 

at the time of late August 2001. The FBI could not figure out from 

immigration records if they had ever left. They came under the assumption, after about a week of work and having a lot of other investigations to do, that it wasn’t worth their time because they 

didn’t know whether they were here or overseas and figured they 

had left. They indeed had not left, and 9/11 happened. 

So, you know, not to put it all on those two watch-list items, but 

that was the reason that we looked at name-based and the fraud. 

And remember, too, the hijackers had about 300 different aliases. 

They had any means of name change to use. They had gotten new 

passports and new visas before they came to the United States. 

There were so many ways to trick the system into entry-exit data 

that was not exactly real. 

So we decided and the commissioners decided to take up the recommendation that you need to use a physical verifier that is fraudproof, and that is why we recommended the biometric exit. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you one more question, if I may. 

You recently issued a report entitled ‘‘Biometric Exit Tracking: A 

Feasible and Cost-Effective Solution for Foreign Visitors Traveling 

By Air and Sea.’’ In this study, you discussed numerous statutes 
107 

that have been in place since 1996 mandating an exit system. 

Given that there are numerous statutes in place, what, if anything, 

do you think can be done legislatively in order to ensure biometric 

exit system is implemented at all air, land, and sea ports? 

Ms. KEPHART. Thank you for that question. It is something I 

spent quite a bit of time on when I was special counsel over in the 

Senate a few months ago, working on the immigration reform legislation and really thinking about that question hard. 

I don’t think a lot needs to be done. There are eight statutes on 

the books already. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act lays out the 

mission and requirements of the exit very, very well. What needs 

to be done, however, is there are some contradictions that are left 

because there are so many statutes on the books. 

So one of the biggest contradictions is the 2013 Homeland Security Appropriations Act requires that Customs and Border Protection implement biometric exit, which I think is the right way to go. 

The 2007 Act requires that the air carriers implement the requirement. That has caused a tremendous amount of problems. There is 

no need for the air carriers to be involved with it. 

So, one, air carriers need to be out of the equation statutorily. 

Number two, the airports are a stakeholder in this and need to be 

in the legislation proactively. Number three, we need to fund it. 

You can’t expect DHS to do this without either authorization for 

fees or an appropriation. It is not fair to them. And number four, 

you need to have a deadline, I think, going forward, because we 

have too many statutes on the books where the deadlines have already been overrun by years. 

So a reasonable amount of time to get this done, and I think air 

and sea is pretty quick, and land requires a little more time and 

effort. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, 

for his questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, sir. 

I thank all of the witnesses. 

Secretary Heyman, I wanted to get your understanding about the 

bipartisan immigration reform bills that are still pending in Congress. Now, the other body, the Senate, has already passed their 

immigration bill, and the House bill, one House bill has 191 cosponsors, but we haven’t had a hearing yet on it. And both bills 

contain provisions requiring the Department to make progress implementing such systems. 

What I am wondering is how do you think this comprehensive 

entry-exit system fits into the larger scheme of comprehensive immigration reform? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. The comprehensive immigration reform is a critically important piece to our security, to our 

immigration system, and frankly in the context of this conversation 

and the concern about overstays, perhaps one of the biggest acts 

that Congress could do is to pass it so that we take away the prospect of overstays and eliminate that to the extent that we can, or 

at least mitigate it compared to where we are today, which is obviously a concern of this Committee and the reason why we are having this hearing. 
108 

So in terms of the entry and exit system, we are going to continue to move forward with that. There are statutes on the books 

to do that, and in the air and sea environment we have made substantial progress. We will continue to do that, as I have testified. 

I do think that taking away the magnet to the United States, ensuring that we have greater border security, elements of the comprehensive immigration reform that the Senate has passed would 

be helpful to helping reduce overstays. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Ms. Myers Wood, I am not sure if you are accurate in saying that 

the Times Square bomber evaded a biographic-only exit system 

when, in fact, he was apprehended on the runway, taken into Federal custody. And he was apprehended, it seems to me, because the 

passenger manifest was provided by the airline to Customs and 

Border Protection, and his name came up in a search of Federal 

databases. So I interpret that as a biographic exit success story. 

Would you agree with me on my analysis of this particular situation? 

Ms. WOOD. Yes, certainly I think we were very fortunate that we 

were able to apprehend him on the runway, and that was, in fact, 

because of the biographic systems. I think earlier than the runway, 

if it was biometric, we would have caught him earlier than the runway. But I would agree with you, we were very fortunate that we 

caught him on the runway, and the biographic systems, law enforcement uses them every day, and they catch a lot of individuals, 

and DHS is working hard through the pilots and other things to 

improve those systems. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Secretary, again, what steps has Homeland 

Security taken to enhance the U.S. exit systems for purposes of immigration enforcement and enhancing national security? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Congressman. Just on your last question, biometric would not have helped Shahzad. He was a U.S. person, U.S. citizen, and therefore would not have been part of the biometric system as they are not screened. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. HEYMAN. The improvements that we have done over the last 

3 years, in 2010 we made a decision to enhance the biographic system. What did not exist until April of this year was the ability to 

automate the linkages between the numerous systems that must be 

accounted for to determine if you have overstays and to determine 

whether they are national security concerns. Whether it is a 

change in status because of immigration changes and linked to the 

USCIS systems, whether it is a review of a national security concern and linking to our CBP targeting capability, all of those linkages were put in place over the last 2 years. Our matching algorithms were improved. We have piloted the land border that I mentioned. 

And actually, all of this came out of—the Chairman asked the 

question about the overstays. This all came out of our review of 

those overstays, the backlog, the 1.6 million, and we recognized in 

doing that review that the automation and increased linkages of 

the databases so that we could do real-time overstay identification, 

tracking and sanctioning, that was the beginning of that, and it 
109 

laid a foundation for the entry-exit system that we now have in 

place as of April of this year. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much for your comments. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

North Carolina, Mr. Coble, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to have you all with us, folks. 

Mr. Albers, I was going to ask you about the feasibility of the biometric system. I think you and Chairman Goodlatte pretty well 

discussed that, so I won’t revisit that. 

Ms. Wood, what problems do you foresee if legalization occurs 

without biometric exit in place? 

Ms. WOOD. I think that without biometric exit, ICE and CBP and 

other enforcement agencies are still going to have kind of continued 

difficulty both in their routine enforcement and in identifying terrorists and other individuals that are trying to leave the country. 

I do think DHS has made a lot of progress, but I think given the 

advances in technology so wonderfully highlighted by the other witnesses here, I think DHS is at a point now where they have to 

move forward and give law enforcement really what it needs so 

that we can keep our country secure. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Ms. Wood. 

Ms. Kephart, you and the Chairman may have discussed this 

one. I was going to ask you about if you believe that complete biometric exit of all ports of entry would be a useful national security 

tool. I think you may have addressed that earlier, did you not? 

Ms. KEPHART. Not head-on, sir, so I would be happy to address 

it again if you would like. 

Mr. COBLE. How about trying it? 

Ms. KEPHART. All ports of entry is an interesting question. My 

view is, and the thing that I have always emphasized in my work 

since I worked on the 9/11 Commission, and even before that when 

I was doing terrorist work prior to the 9/11 Commission, is that 

terrorists will use, like any criminal, will use any vulnerability that 

there is in the system to get through. So as long as there is something open, they will use it. 

So to the extent that we can build out, we certainly have our priorities on biggest ports of entry, for example, that we need to do 

first. But as we move it out and as we see the expense and we are 

able to level that expense out, I think you need to include every 

port of entry down the road. I don’t know if we can do that in 2 

years, every single one, but I think all air and sea you can. I am 

not sure about land, but all air and sea you can, for sure. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Ms. Kephart. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield the balance of my time to the 

gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I thank my friend from North Carolina for 

yielding. 

Let me say at the outset that, in my view at least, we are simply 

not going to have other immigration reforms until we secure our 

borders and secure the interior. So there is, in my view, good reason to have bipartisan support for an entry-exit system. And I am 

encouraged by the fact that all of our witnesses today seem to be 
110 

looking for ways to implement such a system rather than looking 

for reasons not to implement such a system. 

Ms. Kephart, let me just follow up on your last response and just 

reemphasize the point that you have already made, and that is we 

are simply not going to be able to either deter or detect the visa 

overstayers unless we have an entry-exit system at all ports of 

entry, including land, air and sea. Is that correct? 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. And then it hasn’t been too long since the 

Department of Homeland Security estimated, for example, that on 

sea and air, the cost would be something like $3 billion. I think we 

now, with modern technology, have really gotten to the point where 

it is about one-sixth of that cost, several hundred million dollars, 

not several billion dollars. How did we get to that point? What is 

it that is reducing the cost of the entry-exit system, whether it be 

air, land or sea? 

Ms. KEPHART. There are a number of factors, and I think Mr. 

Albers can help me with this as well. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I am going to ask him next, right. 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes. There are a number of factors. The solutions 

right now are much less expensive, and they are much better than 

they were a number of years ago. This is a young industry that 

hasn’t fully matured yet, and it is maturing, so you have lots of opportunity. 

There is another piece of it, too. Even in the 2009 pilot that 

worked extremely well, you had about 60 seconds per person, 

whether it was TSA or CBP, conducting the biometric. It took 

about 60 seconds. Now fingerprints, iris, can be done in 2 seconds. 

You can do multimodal face-hands-iris in combination in 20 with 

a travel document, 20 seconds. So it is very quick. 

Think about the time you spend in a TSA line and all the manpower that goes into that, versus that quickness. A lot of these are 

kiosk or eGate solutions. If you decide to go that route, the manpower costs come down substantially. That is where the hub of 

your cost is going to be, is on the manpower. The 2008 assessment 

had both air carriers and CBP doing work on this. Now, if you 

don’t have the air carriers and you only have one-eighth the number of CBP folks in your best possible scenario of an eGate, that 

is significant reduction in cost. 

So you have a lot of networking and et cetera, you don’t have to 

go through the air carriers to bring the data in. You are going to 

go directly government to government. That is also a cost saving. 

There are lots of places and nooks and crannies in this 2008 assessment where the costs really have come down significantly. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Kephart. 

I am going to yield back and then resume my questions. 

Mr. COBLE. I reclaim and yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Heyman, let me nail down the amount of money it would 

cost to get this program up and running. We have had a couple of 

different numbers. Is the number $3 billion? 
111 

Mr. HEYMAN. The numbers that we are citing that everybody is 

using to evaluate are the numbers based upon a 2009 study. So the 

reason we stood up a test facility is to actually evaluate what the 

real costs are today. Our goal has always been to get those costs 

down. 

What is really important for Congress to appreciate is it is not 

just putting technology someplace and making it work. It is a concept of operations which we need to test. What technology are we 

talking about? Are we talking about iris? Are we talking about 

fingerprinting? Are we talking about facial recognition? And how is 

it used? 

Mr. SCOTT. I was looking for a number. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We don’t have an up-to-date number because technology costs have gone down, but the labor costs may be maintained, and how you put that technology in the facility makes a difference. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you anticipating a universal coverage, not just 

the high-volume ports and airports and what-not? I think Ms. 

Kephart just suggested if it is not universal, if it had some holes 

in it, that is where people are going to go. 

Mr. HEYMAN. You are going to want to put it in air terminals at 

every departure gate, I believe, where there is an international departure. If you don’t put it in the departure gate, one of the proposals here is to do it at the TSA check-in. People can come in to 

the check-in and leave the departure area without actually departing the United States, and you don’t have assurances. 

So again, the concept of operations is really important. So departure gates, and they are distributed across airports. So you can’t 

just put 25 eGates in one place and have one guy watching it. Our 

airports were not set up for exits, so they are distributed across the 

entire airport. You are going to have to have people manning those. 

Mr. SCOTT. How accurate are the biometric screens? Do you get 

false positives or false negatives? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the technology has been significantly improved 

since our pilots four or 5 years ago. False positives are down. 

Again, it depends upon which technology you choose, whether it is 

facial recognition, which are a little bit higher and problematic, 

versus iris scans or fingerprinting, where false positives are much 

lower. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can you implement this plan without adversely affecting the flow of commerce at ports? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We wouldn’t want to implement it any other way, 

but that is the question. What is your concept of operation? Once 

we find out what technologies work best, we have to put them in 

play, and the test facility will allow us to do that, to check the flow 

rates, to check the ease of use, to determine if you are putting it 

on the jetway, if vibrations are setting off cameras so that you are 

not getting accurate reads. The environment matters, the operation 

matters, and so that is what we are going to do the test facility for 

next year. 

Mr. SCOTT. You mentioned you are working with Canada and 

will be working with Mexico on coordinating. Are you using any 

other foreign ports of demarcation? I know with port security, we 
112 

are screening some of the containers at the foreign ports. Are you 

thinking about doing that with the biometrics? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So we are talking about people leaving the United 

States across the land border. They either do it by walking across 

or driving, principally. There is no infrastructure right now on our 

southern border, and in some senses on our northern border, for either fingerprinting somebody or getting their iris. You would have 

to get out of the car to do it, which would slow down the entire system; or you would have to develop something, whether it is a toll 

booth concept or otherwise. But even with a toll booth concept, you 

don’t want people sneaking into the car and not knowing if it is the 

person holding the technology. So if you are doing a fingerprint, it 

has to be the right person holding the technology. And two, are 

they hiding? Who is going to be watching to make sure somebody 

is not hiding and trying to leave the country? 

Mr. SCOTT. What biographic and biometric information is gathered? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Where, sir? 

Mr. SCOTT. Coming or going. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We cover all departing air and sea ports. We capture all biographic information. We capture both biographic and biometric on all entry to the United States. 

Mr. SCOTT. What does ‘‘biographic’’ mean? What do you mean by 

‘‘biographic’’? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Biographic, like a travel document, a visa, a passport. The passports these days are now secure passports so that 

you can scan them in with a machine and take the human out of 

the equation and have the biographic information much more accurate. 

Mr. SCOTT. And biometric, are you talking about fingerprints and 

iris? Anything else? 

Mr. HEYMAN. On biometric, we are looking at——— 

Mr. SCOTT. Facial? 

Mr. HEYMAN [continuing]. Facial, vascular. Vascular is your 

blood capillary networks that are unique. They are like a fingerprint. But principally, the key ones are iris, fingerprints, and facial 

recognition. People should realize, though, that if we do decide to 

go with something other than fingerprints at the exit, that will 

have a significant impact on costs on entry because you will not 

have—remember, we do fingerprinting on entry, and if we are deploying the new technologies on exit, we will have to go back to 

State Department and consular affairs around the world where 

they capture fingerprints to do another capture for making sure 

that we link those biometrics using the new technology. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Before the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, actually 

let me recognize him and ask him if he would yield to me for a second, and then ask him to come and take the Chair so that I can 

attend to a meeting outside. But if you would yield to me——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I would be happy to yield to the Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I just want to set the record straight on a couple 

of things. First of all, and I am sorry that the Ranking Member is 

not here because he mentioned one piece of legislation that has 

been introduced in the House and said that we had not held a 
113 

hearing on that particular piece of legislation. But I want the 

record to be very clear that we did hold a hearing in this Committee, the full Committee, on the Senate immigration bill, and the 

House bill is based upon—in fact, I think it is virtually identical 

to the Senate bill, with the exception of the addition of provisions 

from one bill passed out of the House Homeland Security Committee, which is not the jurisdiction of this Committee, with the exception of some parts of it, including the entry-exit visa system, 

which we share jurisdiction, and of course we are holding a hearing 

on that today. So I want to be very clear on that issue. 

Secondly, I just want to note for the record that what we are 

talking about here are foreign nationals that we need to keep track 

of. So while it is commendable that Mr. Shahzad was apprehended 

on the runway in that particular case, being a United States citizen, that is a different system and a different issue than it is for 

us to know of the several million people who are illegally present 

in the United States, who they are, where they are, and why they 

are remaining here after their visas have expired, and a biometric 

entry-exit system will help to solve that problem and assure that 

we are more comprehensively addressing the problem of people 

who are unlawfully present in the United States than what is currently being done by the Department, and we encourage their continued work. 

But it is far from complete and far from a situation where we 

could say that we would not be making the same mistake we made 

in 1986 when, on the promise of a lot of new enforcement measures, we granted an easy pathway to citizenship to nearly 3 million 

people and then found that those enforcement measures never took 

effect. In fact, in spite of additional legislative efforts over that period of time, we still do not have those appropriate enforcement 

measures, and therefore this hearing is about how to avoid the 

problem that was created by the 1986 law and never addressed. 

And now I will ask the gentleman to come here and take the 

Chair and use his time. 

Okay, Mr. Bachus is going to take the Chair, and he will yield 

to the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will 

proceed with my questions. 

Mr. Albers, let me direct my next question to you. Thank you for 

your very expert testimony. This goes to the subject of the experience of airports in other parts of the world, and you have some 

knowledge of that. Other airports around the world have introduced the biometric entry-exit system. Have they incurred any substantial delays as a result of the biometric entry-exit system? 

Mr. ALBERS. The answer is not to my knowledge. If you look at, 

for example, our program called the Global Entry, that is a biometrically-enabled program that speeds people back into the country. So we believe that with the introduction of multimodal biometrics which could be grabbed even faster than a fingerprint, you 

could actually expedite the process for people with that. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. You know what also occurs to me, thinking 

about vehicular traffic where you had those lines, you could also 

have an agent just walking down with a handheld device and 

speeding up the process there as well. 
114 

Mr. ALBERS. That is actually a very good point. Fingerprints still 

require, for the most part, the people to put their fingers down on 

a sensor. Face recognition and iris recognition does not require 

that. Our company and a number of companies are doing face recognition on iOS devices or Android devices now so you can do face 

recognition. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Oh, that’s right. 

Mr. ALBERS. I think of the restaurants that walk up and down 

using a device like this now to check people in. That kind of thing 

could certainly be done at an airport when there is a queue to start 

expediting people like that. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Okay. Thank you. 

Let me go to another subject, biograhpics. Both you and Ms. 

Wood have testified to the great disadvantage of relying upon biographics. You both agreed that it might generate a high incidence 

of fraud, among other things. Ms. Wood actually said it was a 

threat and a danger to Americans to have that kind of entry-exit 

system. 

I don’t know if you want to elaborate on it or not. You went into 

some detail. But the point is, I think, biometrics is far superior to 

biographics. 

Ms. Wood, do you want to comment on that? 

Ms. WOOD. Certainly. I think law enforcement needs every tool 

at its disposal to identify those who are trying to harm the United 

States. I want to just clarify with respect to the Times Square 

bomber, I was speaking of just how individuals evade biographic 

data. Certainly, he would not be covered under an exit program because that is for foreign nationals. 

I think it is important, as the criminal organizations become 

more sophisticated and the cost of technology goes down, the Department continue to evolve and look to see how can they use the 

new technology. I think DHS has actually made a lot of progress. 

If you think about where we were when the Department was 

formed, first two fingerprints, then 10, then working along, I think 

the time is now to look at all these new advances in technology and 

see what we can do, and I think our law enforcement agencies need 

this. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Okay. Thank you, Ms. Wood. 

Let me go to Mr. Heyman and address a couple of questions to 

you real quickly. By the way, I was at the homeland security hearing on this same subject a few weeks ago, and you were not the 

Department of Homeland Security witness, so don’t take this personally, but it was a rare occurrence for me to hear the GAO actually being critical of DHS for not making a good-faith effort to implement more entry-exit systems more quickly. In fact, the Government Accounting Office said that I think DHS could implement 

them about three times as fast as the testimony we heard back 

then. You don’t need to comment on it except that I think it can 

be expedited. 

If I understood you correctly, though, a few minutes ago, you said 

that the Administration was actually identifying a fair number of 

visa overstayers, and if so, it would be roughly 5 million people in 

the country who are visa overstayers. What percentage of those individuals can you now identify? 
115 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the changes that we put in place over the last 

two-and-a-half years have allowed us to do a near-real-time, if not 

real-time overstay identification tracking and sanctioning for enforcement. So on a daily basis, we are sending to the field, to our 

ICE enforcement officers——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Okay, but my question is what percentage 

of the roughly 5 million people who are overstayers are you able 

to identify today? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We spent the last 2 years looking at the overstay 

backlog. After going through those 2 years ago, we are now current 

on a daily basis——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. If you won’t give me a percentage, can you 

give me a number? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, 100 percent currently. We are 100 percent 

currently able to identify overstays on a daily basis. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Again, of the 5 million people in the country who are overstayers, what number, what percentage can you 

identify? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have gone through all of them, all the ones that 

we went through——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. So you know who those 5 million people are 

and where they are? 

Mr. HEYMAN. 1.6 million we have gone through. Over half of 

those have left the country. Another third of those, I believe, were 

change of status, and——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. So you are saying that of the 5 million, you 

can identify 1.6 million of the 5 million? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have gone through the 1.6 million overstay 

backlog 2 years ago, yes. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Right, and you know who they are, where 

they are, and their status. 

Mr. HEYMAN. There are a few that we do not know where they 

are. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. So roughly a third of the people in the 

country who are overstayers you can identify. 

Mr. HEYMAN. No. We have gone through all of them. We know 

who all of them are now. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I don’t——— 

Mr. HEYMAN. The overstays backlog, the——— 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I don’t want to go over my time, but I don’t 

think we are talking about the same thing. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Maybe not. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. I am sorry. Okay, my time has expired. But 

it sounds to me like, at most, the figure would maybe be a third 

of the people who are in the country you know who they are, where 

they are, and their status, about 1.6 million. 

Okay, I will let others explore that. Thank you. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sorry, Congressman. 

Mr. BACHUS [presiding]. Thank you. 

Ms. Lofgren is recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I do think that this has been a helpful 

hearing. The testimony you have just given, that you can actually 

for 100 percent you have identified who has left, who hasn’t left, 
116 

who is adjusting legally under some other provision of law and 

identified who is a problem. Is that what your testimony is, sir? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So, yes. On a daily basis, we are now able to identify who has overstayed. Now, there are in-country overstays and 

out-of-country overstays. What we send to the field is the folks who 

we believe are in-country overstays who are national security and 

public safety risks, and we go after those folks. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Okay. I really don’t have a lot of patience with the 

airline industry’s resistance to this. I mean, I know that they have 

not been celebrating the idea of a biometric exit, and I just think 

that—I am just not sympathetic with that. We need to have that, 

but I agree that we need to do tests. I mean, I remember how much 

money we spent on SBInet, a technology that never worked. I think 

it would make a lot of sense to do some tests before we lay out that 

kind of cash to make sure that what we are pursuing actually will 

get the job done, and I hope that we learned a lesson from the 

SBInet catastrophe. 

Having said that, it is clear that doing something at the TSA line 

is not going to work, because you can go through the TSA line and 

then you can leave. So you really have to have some technology deployed at every single gate in every airport eventually, and it has 

to be something that we can afford to do so you can’t get on the 

plane and leave unless you have done that. Is that really what you 

are looking at, sir? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The airports, I don’t think you can do every airport, just the ones with international departures. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Of course, yes. I mean, it wouldn’t make sense if 

it——— 

Mr. HEYMAN. But, yes, on the jetway where people are actually 

departing, that is the most likely place we will do it. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I have always believed, based on the testimony we 

have received not only in this Committee but during my 10 years 

of service on the Homeland Security Committee, that the major obstacle is at our land borders. Right now, we have backups at the 

southern border. I mean, people trying to come in and leave, it can 

take hours and hours, half a day. We want to have a safe country, 

but we also want to have commerce that works. I mean, Mexico is 

one of our biggest trading partners, and you have a very important 

economic connection between our two countries. 

It was suggested in Mr. Albers’ testimony that we have face and 

iris scans, and I would love to be able to see that. Have you analyzed that proposal, what the impact would be in terms of delay at 

the border of people leaving? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There were a couple of pilots that were done at the 

border but with—I believe it was with fingerprint technologies, and 

this was several years ago, and it was largely pedestrians. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the answer is that the new technologies will 

need to be tested. But I do agree. I think the responsible thing to 

do is to get it working first in the air and sea environment and 

then look to land after you have that fully functional. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Would you—I mean, I wouldn’t ask for a commitment today, but would you take a look at the potential for piloting 

the kind of technology that Mr. Albers has talked about in terms 
117 

of facial recognition or iris scan at the border and see if it actually 

aggravates the delay that we are seeing? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So you definitely need a concept of operations, how 

is that going to work. An iris scan, you need somebody to get out 

and actually do that. So you can’t do it remotely. 

Ms. LOFGREN. But facial recognition would be different. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Facial recognition you can do and stand off some 

distance. As I said, the impact of what you do on exit will affect 

what you do on entry. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Or if you are looking at new technologies, you will 

have to be mindful of the costs that will go into entry. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. But this will be costly, and if we don’t appropriate the funds, we can complain all we want but we should 

really be looking in the mirror about who is responsible. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Right. What we have done on the northern border 

I think merits great attention because it really does allow us for 

the first time—and people didn’t think we would be able to do 

this—to actually get the data from our Canadian partners and 

have now full——— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Right, every exit from us is an entry to them. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Right, and you will have the visibility in the northern border in full next summer. 

Ms. LOFGREN. A final question. If we were to deploy in a ubiquitous manner facial recognition technology at the border, for example, I want to know what thought we have given to the privacy 

rights of Americans, whose data—and we have had a bipartisan 

concern about NSA surveillance, the government getting all the information about Americans. What standards would we need to be 

thinking about in terms of the privacy rights of U.S. persons with 

that kind of technology deployment? 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is absolutely the right question. You want to 

do that actually with all technologies, wherever you deploy—air, 

land, or sea. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Heyman, you got your Bachelor’s degree in Boston at Brandeis? Are you a Boston Celtics fan? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sir, I grew up in Washington, D.C. I am a Washington Wizards fan. But you get converted when you are up there 

for a few years. The Celtics are great. 

Mr. BACHUS. Have you ever heard of M.L. Carr? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Absolutely, great ball handler. 

Mr. BACHUS. He is a great—he played for the Pistons, played for 

Boston Celtics. He was coach and general manger of the Boston 

Celtics and really brought it back. I happen to be a friend of his, 

and he has written a little book called ‘‘Winning Through Persistence’’ which is 49 pages long, and it is one of the best books on 

leadership. 

One of his best quotes—and I looked up some quotes. This is 

Homeland Security, not directed at you personally. But Benjamin 

Franklin said, ‘‘He did as good for making excuses as is seldom 

good for anything else.’’ George Washington Carver: ‘‘Ninety-nine 

percent of the failures come from people who have had the habit 
118 

of making excuses.’’ George Washington: ‘‘It is better to offer no excuse than a bad one.’’ 

I think you have been put in a bad situation by having to testify 

about why we hadn’t put a biometric exit system as a country on 

our border. So I don’t—to me, you have an impossible job of trying 

to explain why we don’t even have one now. 

But M.L. Carr I think has the greatest quote on excuses. He 

said, ‘‘I don’t accept excuses.’’ And I think after 17 years, that is 

what Congress ought to say to those that have been charged by numerous statutes to implement a biometric system. 

And let me just read one paragraph, and this is Ms. Kephart’s 

testimony on page 6. I think we don’t need to know anything else. 

‘‘The results of a 2009 DHS evaluation report that tested biometric 

exit solutions at two large U.S. international airports is further evidence that a biometric exit is feasible now. Moreover, at least 14 

Nations have or are deploying biometric border solutions at airports, and 3 Nations have or are deploying biometric guest worker 

tracking programs. Some Nations have had biometric solutions at 

all air, land and sea ports for a decade, and superb results in data 

integrity and border control.’’ 

And we have heard Nigeria, Indonesia. Mr. Albers’ testimony, I 

mean, he lays out how you do it. The technology is better than it 

has ever been. It is cheaper than it has ever been. 

Mr. Heyman? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to comment. I was 

a Larry Byrd fan, not so much an M.L. Carr fan. 

Mr. BACHUS. And they played on the same team. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, they played on the same team. 

Look, persistence does matter. You are right to be frustrated 

with 17 years of predecessors of mine standing here and testifying 

for you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh, and I am not laying the blame. Nothing personal. 

Mr. HEYMAN. I don’t take it personally, sir. I just want to say 

that despite 17 years of effort and not getting it done, we believe 

we are getting it done today. And rather than waiting for the funding or for the feasibility of biometric to be workable, in 2010 we 

moved forward with enhancing the exit system so we have a full 

functioning system today. You need that as a foundation to add in 

the biometrics. So we have that as a prerequisite for getting biometric exit, and we are moving ahead today, as I said, with a test 

facility that will allow us to test concepts of operations. 

I just want to make one correction. I looked into the international requirements here, and you mentioned Nigeria. Nigeria is 

only——— 

Mr. BACHUS. I don’t want to—Nigeria is probably not who I want 

to compare us to. Ten years ago we toured—in fact, I think Mr. 

King was on it with me. But we toured Europe, and Germany demonstrated a system 10 years ago, and some of the Scandinavian 

countries. 

Mr. HEYMAN. But these biometric entry-exit systems are largely 

biometric entry systems. The exit piece of it, no one has done anything like what we are contemplating doing here in the United 

States. The rare exceptions of exit are based upon the notion that 
119 

in all likelihood the government owns the airport or they designed 

and built it to do exit system, which we haven’t done. 

Mr. BACHUS. Sure. Yes, I understand. But if I were M.L. Carr, 

I would just say no more excuses, and I am not talking about you. 

I am talking about all of us. Everyone knows I very much want an 

immigration bill and a comprehensive fix, but this is one reason 

that the House is taking more time, because people keep saying I 

am not sure we are going to get border security, I am not sure, and 

this is Exhibit 1. GAO says we can do it in 18 months. But again, 

I appreciate your candor, I really do, and you have just been put 

in an impossible spot. 

Ms. Kephart, real quickly. 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, let me respond to the fact that there are not 

exit systems deployed around the world. The UAE has been on the 

forefront of this issue since 2004. Let me read you from the last 

page of my testimony. It is page 57. This shows a picture of Qatar 

right now. This particular installation that they show in this picture dates to 2011. ‘‘Every point of entry in the State of Qatar relies on an iris system enabling entry and exit at every point of 

entry, 80 lanes of air, land and sea. Every person entering and 

leaving the state uses the system. More importantly, processing 

times for the individuals is less than 5 seconds per person.’’ I think 

that hits on facilitation, that hits on location if you look at the photograph, and that hits feasibility, and that hits ability. So I just 

wanted to add that in. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

At this time, I recognize Ms. Judy Chu, the gentle lady from 

California, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I understand, Mr. Heyman, that we have an agreement with 

Canada to exchange entry records so that the land entries of one 

country serve as the exit records of the other. And we have 72 million travelers that are entering the U.S. through the border with 

Canada. And with this pilot program, that you were able to match 

97.4 percent of records received from Canada to existing entry 

records. 

How would you evaluate this program? It sounds successful. And 

could a similar agreement be done with Mexico? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So most people have thought for years that maybe 

we could do air and sea but we would never be able to do the data 

exchange for any kind of exit tracking on our northern or southern 

borders. So the fact that we are able to do it is actually remarkable, and the fact that it is actually now over 98 percent matching 

is also exceptional. 

This is a huge success, and that is why we are looking at trying 

to do something similar on our southern border and have begun 

conversations with the Mexican government as well. 

Ms. CHU. And can you say how far along these talks are? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We began those talks with the new Mexican administration, so they are in the beginning stages. 

Ms. CHU. And are there any other countries that would be logical 

partners for this type of agreement? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I mean, I guess if the whole world did that, you 

would have the system that you wanted, but I am not proposing 
120 

that. I think those two countries are the ones that you would want 

to do it, and then the rest you have air and sea capability that we 

are building in right now, which is what we are all talking about 

in terms of the biometric system. 

Ms. CHU. Ms. Kephart, you were talking about the other Nations 

and what they are doing as far as implementing biometric systems, 

and I understand that there are 16 other Nations that are in the 

process of implementing biometric processing of foreign air travelers. Are there any lessons we can take away from their successful 

experiences? 

Ms. KEPHART. Sure. I think, first of all, that it is feasible; second 

of all, that it doesn’t slow down commerce; third of all, there is another uptick for this, which is that airline processing is starting to 

take place with biometrics as well. They are actually starting in 

some Nations and some airlines to use biometrics as the boarding 

pass to ease flow-through, to get rid of paper and lower the cost 

for the airlines, too. 

So you are seeing a lower level of cost once it is implemented 

that helps everybody. And in some airports, for example, they are 

seeing more commerce in the jetways because people are spending 

less time on processing. For example, if we had something more biometric at TSA’s security lines, imagine how much better that 

would be. We are talking about 5 to 20 seconds to gather very important information for immigration integrity, and we spend anywhere from 5 minutes to an hour in a TSA security line. 

So I think when you make that balance and you look around the 

world, you see how efficient, how quick, how accurate. For example, 

in the UAE right now, that system has been in place since 2004. 

Two hundred and forty million irises are in that system. It takes 

2 seconds to do a verification. That is amazing. 

Ms. CHU. But my question is, why is it that these 16 other Nations are able to do it and we have taken all this time, 17 years? 

And, Mr. Heyman, I would like you to comment on that, too. Why 

is it that the other Nations were able to progress? 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, I think in fairness to DHS, and Julie mentioned this earlier, the technology wasn’t there 10 years ago to do 

this well and cost effectively. It just wasn’t. But it is there now. We 

also had a lot of confusion because we had so much statutory language layered on top, and then in 2007 we put the onus on the air 

carriers when every other Nation in the world has the government 

do it, and the government just implemented as it wants. We have 

more bureaucracy here, and that is part of the problem too, and the 

statutory language is a little bit conflicting, and it needs to be 

streamlined. 

Ms. CHU. Mr. Heyman? 

Mr. HEYMAN. In the United States, we don’t own the airports, 

the government doesn’t have authority over the airports, and the 

infrastructure wasn’t built for exit in mind. In new airports, particularly in countries that have the wealth to build new exit facilities, they can line it up, like we do on entry, and it makes it much 

more feasible and cost effective. In fact, if we had a system like 

that, we would be much more able to do that. 
121 

So I think in the rare instances where there are exit facilities 

internationally, and it is rare, it is because they probably had the 

resources and the ability to design the system from scratch. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. King is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses here. It has been really an interesting testimony, and the questions I intended to ask have moved 

along because you filled in a lot of blanks for me. 

But I have this broad question that hasn’t been addressed, and 

it has to do with if we could get this all done exactly perfectly with 

the technology that has been testified to, especially even within the 

dollar figures that we are talking about, maybe one-sixth of $3 billion and implement this, how wonderful it would be to actually 

have a moving spreadsheet calculation of the identification of everybody that came in, everybody that left, and the sum total would 

be the people in the United States of America. I haven’t heard that 

said yet, but that was the philosophy behind the entry-exit system 

that we hoped to 1 day put in place. 

Now, I just imagine that that can be done, and the testimony 

here tells me that it can. We have the technological ability to do 

that within a reasonable cost figure. In fact, it occurs to me that 

you just sell those 1.6 billion extra rounds of ammunition and we 

could easily fund this, Mr. Heyman, but that is just my little facetious remark today. 

But if we put this all in place in this way and we still have an 

Administration that refuses to enforce the law, what is the point? 

I mean, I would like to get this implemented for the next president, 

but I have no hope that this president would utilize the ability to 

identify the people that overstayed their visas, let alone find a way 

to, I’ll say, collect some of those names as people that come and go 

in our land ports. 

I have stood at the ports of entry and watched as people will pull 

up, have their card swiped, see it show up on the screen and verify 

that they are who they say they are, drive into America, and an 

hour later the same car comes back, they wave and they drive out. 

That is going on millions and millions of times. We all know that. 

But I look at the Border Patrol’s nationwide illegal alien apprehensions that go back clear to 1925, and it just averaged the apprehensions at the border from 1980 until the beginning of the Obama 

administration. The average apprehensions Border Patrol number, 

1,160,199 per year from 1980 until the Obama administration, who 

averages 431,111. So it is a number, just a little bit more than a 

third of the average apprehensions that we have had. 

So I don’t have hope that there is going to be enforcement. When 

I hear that the Gang of Eight’s bill in the Senate is somehow going 

to help us and that we are working down the line of identification, 

tracking and sanctioning, the identification, I believe that your testimony there is fairly clear to me, Mr. Heyman. The tracking point 

is not. I don’t think we can track them. I don’t think we know 

where they are. And the sanctioning part, it is obvious, isn’t taking 

place, because even the border interdictions are just a little more 

than a third of the average going clear back to 1980. 
122 

So this is a lot of exercise in what we might be able to do, but 

if we give the resources that Ms. Wood has asked for, we still have 

to have the will to implement them. 

So I really wanted to turn my question over here to the gentleman, Mr. Albers, and ask this. I saw some facial recognition 

technology implemented that showed a man. He is actually a naturalized American citizen, an immigrant from Germany that had on 

his iPhone 355 facial recognition faces in his storage, and in that 

he was able to instantly use that for his security on his iPhone. If 

he would look at it, it would turn on in an instant. If he would look 

away from it, it would turn off in a couple of seconds. That kind 

of technology is available to us and priced reasonably. 

So can you explain that to us? I mean, is the vision in your head 

how we might be able to set that all up and walk people through 

with that kind of instantaneous response? Can we build that 

spreadsheet so we know the net number and the identification of 

the people? And then I am going to ask Ms. Wood how we find 

them. 

Mr. ALBERS. So let me answer the last question first. The answer 

is yes. So the spreadsheet part I think is relatively easy. 

Let’s step back a little bit, though, and talk about—and Mr. 

Heyman actually mentioned this. Biometrics only works if you have 

an enrollment image and then a match image. So right now we 

have inferior images in the system. We are not doing good face captures, and we are not doing iris captures at all. The technology has 

improved now so that there are devices about this size that will 

take a picture of a face and an iris in one click, will not take a 

whole lot of time. USCIS happens to be one of our customers, and 

we are talking to them about what if you wanted to add? They take 

actually pretty good quality pictures of a face; they don’t do iris at 

all. But you could add that to the process when you bring people 

into USIS right now. 

So to go back to your question, if you have quality images in and 

you have quality matches out, you will have very high rates of accuracy, and you can do it very, very quickly. Like I said, the accounting part is pretty easy. You could tell exactly how many people were in this country and were out. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

And, Ms. Wood, then how would we find them? 

Ms. WOOD. Well, we would have individuals that are dedicated 

to this, more than 300 ICE agents that are actually focusing on 

this. If you think that in 2012 the agency only opened 2,800 investigations into overstay enforcement for kind of non-routine cases, 

that is not a lot, and only arrested 1,273 individuals, that is not 

very many. So ICE needs more resources either in HRI or ERO 

that are designed to do routine enforcement. 

Mr. KING. And the will, and the will? 

Ms. WOOD. And we have got to, then, do it right away. We can’t 

let individuals overstay here by years where they build up a lot of 

equities, and then it causes a lot of difficulty. So we need to have 

more routine enforcement, information coming in very quickly to 

ICE and ERO, and that sort of investigation and action being taken 

routinely, and that would give folks an incentive to go home as 

well. If they know there is going to be enforcement, they would ac-
123 

tually leave. Here, I think people know there is not going to be an 

enforcement. There is no incentive to leave the country if you overstay at this point. 

Mr. KING. Nice word is ‘‘self-deport.’’ 

Can I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman can respond, 

Mr. Albers? 

Mr. BACHUS. Yes. 

Mr. ALBERS. Yes. I didn’t want to denigrate my State Department customers. They actually take very high-quality pictures for 

visas. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Albers. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Our next Member just returned from a GQ screening, I guess, 

with the scarf and sunglasses. I wish folks could see that. 

But are you next, Mr. Gutierrez? The gentleman from Illinois is 

recognized. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is important to note what happens within the context 

of inaction on immigration. I have been in Congress for more than 

two decades, and we have debated the merits of the entry-exit system many, many times. This is not new. I support the implementation of effective entry-exit system and have included it in immigration bills that I have authored in the past. 

Biometrics is important. You can do biometrics tomorrow. There 

is nothing in the law that says you cannot do biometrics. Now, we 

might have a debate about whether you should be forced to do biometrics, but there is nothing stopping us. Let’s stop kidding ourselves. We are having a hearing about nothing, because nothing is 

going to happen until both sides of the aisle get together and get 

serious about comprehensive immigration reform. 

So what? Wonderful testimony. We have heard it all before. 

Great. You want to have a poll here? All of us will agree with all 

four of you, biometrics is better. I bet you it will be unanimous, biometrics is better. So what? What have we accomplished here this 

morning? Absolutely nothing. Because what we do is we have—you 

all know, and I am sure if I asked you—well, what else could 

help?—you would say, well, if we had an eVerify system, that 

would help too because maybe they would leave quicker, because 

without an eVerify system, those just overstay their visas and work 

in this country. You would probably tell me, ‘‘You know, Luis, 

maybe if we had a worker system that had sufficient visas so that 

certain industries could have the workers that they need, like 2 

million people that work in our agricultural industry every day, 

foreign hands picking everything that everyone testifying there and 

everyone on this side eats every day in this country.’’ 

Shame on us. Shame on us. And what do we do? We come here 

to discuss an entry-exit visa program. It will be unanimous, 435 to 

nothing. And you should do it at DHS. It is the right thing to do. 

That is not really the problem here. It is like we are going around 

the issue. 

The issue is what do we do about the 11 million people that are 

already here, and how is it that we fix that in the future? I am for 

security. The first part of the bill that I introduced, the first four 
124 

paragraphs, Mr. Garcia was like, ‘‘Luis, have you gone security 

crazy?’’ Mr. Garcia just introduced a proposal that has security, security, security, security. But when do we get the compassionate 

part? 

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that any good, sound, effective 

immigration policy is cohesive and it is comprehensive, and it 

needs many of the inter-working, interlocking parts in order to be 

effective. You can’t do one and really be effective with the other or 

you overburden and overload the other part of the system. 

Any good agent at the border—everybody says, well, we are not 

enforcing. Well, sure, because we put 20,000 Border Patrol agents, 

because that is the smart thing to do. But wait, stop. Let’s just 

throw 20,000 more Border Patrol agents, even though we have 

heard here that 40 percent of our problem has 300 people. But we 

are going to put 20,000. 

And what does the White House say? ‘‘I’ll sign that bill.’’ What 

does everybody say? ‘‘That is a great bill.’’ Really? That is a great 

bill that militarizes the border between the United States and Mexico. That is a good bill, when we already heard the 40 percent. 

Look, I have to tell the Republican majority, Obama is not here. 

I looked. He doesn’t have a seat in the Judiciary Committee. Last 

time I checked, he is not one of the 435 members of the House. Forget about it. I don’t want an Obama solution. I also don’t want a 

Tea Party solution. I want an American solution to our broken immigration system. We can have all the hearings we want, but 

shame on us, on everybody for not doing the work. 

Now, look, I know everybody says ‘‘I will admit it, we could have 

done more as Democrats.’’ But you know something? I am the first 

one to say that. I said that repeatedly. So what are you going to 

do? Follow in the tradition of do nothing on the issue? ‘‘Oh, you 

guys didn’t do anything, so now’’—you are the majority now. You 

are the majority. But we had a referendum on this issue. 

And here is what I am going to end with. Look, the political consequences of inaction on this issue are going to be grave to the Republican Party. I know many of you don’t believe it, but mark my 

words, it will be grave. If you care about regulatory issues, if you 

care about monetary issues, if you care about any other issue, you 

had better take this issue off the table, because until you do, you 

will never see a presidency of the United States, you will never 

gain the Senate again, and you will see the fight of a lifetime over 

the House of Representatives on the issue of immigration. 

I know it will come as a surprise to many. But remember—and 

I just ask for 30 seconds more. 

Mr. BACHUS. The gentleman is yielded an additional 15 seconds. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you. And I will remind everybody, November 6th of last year there was a referendum. Mitt Romney said 

self-deportation, let’s expand S.B. 1070, and he said he would veto 

the Dream Act. He lost by 5 million votes. Everybody was surprised, all of those people coming out to vote on the issue of immigration. Well, they came out to vote, and they are not going anywhere. Speaker Boehner can’t have breakfast without people coming. 

Mr. BACHUS. The gentleman is granted another 10 seconds. 
125 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. We will not go away. We will persist in this 

issue. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Let me briefly respond just by saying this to the gentleman. He 

has mentioned President Obama and Mitt Romney. Let me just put 

the two of those together. 

Mitt Romney. I talked about excuses earlier. The hearing is 

about implementation of an entry-exit system still waiting after all 

these years. That is what the hearing is about. And Mitt Romney 

said leadership is about taking responsibility, not making excuses, 

and I think that is a message that the President ought to hear and 

this Congress ought to hear. 

And a part of immigration reform is security. In fact, it not only 

has to do with immigration, it has to do with terrorism. This is 

why a lot of the testimony today comes from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. That is another reason that we don’t 

need excuses, we need leadership. 

Mr. Chaffetz is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Chairman. 

And the sad reality for the Democrats, who want to try to portray that they have the high moral ground on this, is the Democrats controlled the House, the Senate, and the presidency, and 

they did nothing. I sat on the Subcommittee here. I campaigned on 

this issue. I want to be part of the solution, not the problem. But 

the reality is, when the Democrats had all three levers of power, 

they did nothing, nothing. We didn’t even consider in the Subcommittee a single bill. 

Mr. GARCIA. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, I won’t, not yet. 

Go ahead, go ahead, I will yield to you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Garcia is recognized. 

Mr. GARCIA. You know, we can keep looking to the past, Mr. 

Chaffetz. We can keep looking to the past, and there will not be 

a solution. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Reclaiming my time, I accept your——— 

Mr. GARCIA. Will you let me finish? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. No, I would rather not. Reclaiming my time. 

Mr. GARCIA. Absolutely. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You made your point, you can keep looking to the 

past. Well, you want to blame us. We have actually taken action 

in this Committee, and shame on the United States Senate. 

Now, I know the gentleman is new, but let’s remember that 

when Republicans took control of the House, because the point was 

made in the previous questions and statements that Republicans 

will bear all the brunt of the political ramifications, let’s remember 

it was this House of Representatives in a bill that I sponsored and 

had broad bipartisan support, including the gentleman from Illinois, the gentlewoman from California and others, we passed a bill 

that would have helped hundreds of thousands of people. It lifted 

the per-country caps on family-based visas from 7 percent to 15 

percent. 
126 

This would have had a real effect. And guess what? The Senate, 

controlled by the Democrats, with no assistance from the White 

House, did nothing about it. We had almost 390 votes in the House 

of Representatives. It doesn’t get much better than that, to have 

that many people supporting that bill, and it went nowhere in the 

Democrat-controlled, Harry Reid Senate. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Will the gentleman yield to me? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Chaffetz. 

Number one, I just want to say this. There are no senators in 

this room and on this panel. The President is not here in this room. 

I think you know, and I can say this to Mr. Labrador, and I can 

say this to Mr. Bachus, I can say it to all of you, you are all my 

friends. Let’s work it out. That is all I am saying. Let’s sit down, 

and let’s not say we can’t do anything. That is all I am saying. I 

know you are of good faith. I just want to work toward a solution, 

please. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Reclaiming my time. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. To continue to make the case that it is only the 

Republicans in the House that are holding back the problem is not 

accurate. The Democrats could have brought up that bill last term, 

last term. Granted, there are no senators in here, but let us be 

united in saying that the United States Senate is the problem, that 

Harry Reid refusing to bring up that bill is a problem. 

There are hundreds of thousands of people who didn’t get relief 

that we offered out of the House, and we did so in a bipartisan 

way. 

So let the record reflect, Mr. Chairman, it is not merely House 

Republicans, as some would want to purport to say. We actually 

took action because the first 2 years, at least that I was here, the 

first 2 years under this President, when the Democrats had the 

House, the Senate, and the presidency, they did zero, and I do appreciate the sincerity and the willingness, particularly of the gentleman from Illinois, to work across the aisle, and I hope he understands that while we, me personally, do not agree on 100 percent 

of the issues, we probably agree on the majority of the issues. 

You are, in part, making the case that I believe that we ought 

to take an incremental approach. And what is terribly frustrating 

is that, as the gentleman from Illinois said, we are unanimous in 

the idea that we need this entry-exit program. It is the law of the 

United States of America. It is the law, and yet it hasn’t been done 

by both a Democrat and Republican administration. 

So let me try to get at least one question in for Ms. Kephart 

here. The estimate originally was some $3 billion that this was 

going to take to implement. Do you know how much has been spent 

so far? Do you have any idea how much it would cost to do it now? 

Ms. KEPHART. To do it now, my estimate, after working with 

some of the folks that worked on the 2009 successful US VISIT 

pilot, is that it would be about $400 to $600 million, not including 

the manpower costs, which I think could be pretty minimal considering the technology possibilities today. The range in cost is wide 

because of the biometric solutions that are available. 
127 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And given that we have something like a $3.7 

trillion budget, Mr. Albers, we are going to run out of time here, 

but I would appreciate perhaps in follow-up understanding a little 

bit about multimodal biometrics, what that means, what are its implications. Perhaps you can give us a quick answer to that before 

we run out of time. 

Mr. ALBERS. So the reason I make the point is because of all the 

databases that are being built with the FBI and the State Department that include multimodal—face, finger, and iris. So to do an 

effective exit program, you would like to be able to get those people 

upon entry when they enroll, find out if they are in any of those 

databases, are they bad guys from Iraq or Afghanistan, and then 

when they exit the country you know they are going, and iris and 

face are very, very fast in terms of the type of time it takes to capture them and hit the database against them. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. And for the record, I said that the hearing, when I said it was about the implementation of an entry-exit 

system, still waiting after all these years, I quoted counsel for the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Ms. Kephart. But it is 

important to know that it is actually the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. We shouldn’t leave that 

out. We are talking about terrorist attacks on the United States, 

something that 17 years ago we said was necessary for the security 

of each and every one of our constituents and citizens. 

Mr. Garcia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARCIA. Mr. Chairman, first I want to point out your excellent fashion sense on pointing out my scarf. I greatly appreciate 

that. 

Mr. BACHUS. The sunglasses also——— 

Mr. GARCIA. They also helped. Thank you, sir. 

When I speak, I speak to the broader point here. It is time we 

stopped pretending to fix our broken immigration system. We are 

sitting here rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Eleven million people are in our country without documentation; we have 

done nothing. The Senate made historic progress, finally reforming 

our immigration system. And you are right, they have made mistakes in the past, and they hadn’t moved. But we are not there; 

we are here. Instead of building on that progress, this Committee 

has passed four useless bills with no chance of going anywhere. 

My hometown is a gateway to Latin American travel. I gravely 

understand the importance of this issue. But it is only part of the 

problem. H.R. 15 provides comprehensive reform while mandating 

the establishment of a mandatory exit system. But whether we consider my bill or other legislation, it is time to stop talking and start 

doing. 

We keep hearing that legislation is coming. First we heard that 

it was a top priority for this Committee. Then we were told that 

we would see legislation in October. Now it is sometime next year. 

Unfortunately, we hear too much, and it is all talk and no action. 

Today, from the Speaker, we hear we have no intention of ever 

going to conference on the Senate bill. Well, Mr. Speaker, this is 

how you make legislation. It is an essential part of what we do. 

You go to conference. What is our bill? What is it we are going to 
128 

put forward? More than enough Members of the House understand 

the benefits of immigration and understand that it is necessary for 

our Nation’s prosperity, and understand that it is what we will do 

inevitably. In the meantime, we fail. 

But with every day that passes, this problem gets bigger. The 

consequences of inaction become more costly to our economy, to our 

country, to our people. This body needs to stop hiding behind 

empty promises and start doing the job we were sent here to do. 

We have been given an unprecedented opportunity. Now is the 

time to pass immigration reform, and we can do the biometrics. 

But it has to be part of a bigger solution. 

And I understand the other side’s frustration with this. Negotiations are always tough. You are in power. You have a lot of things 

pressing on you. But this is something that will not wait. The time 

is now. The moment is now. You have our attention. You have the 

world’s attention. 

The Senate passed a bill. It wasn’t the bill I would have passed, 

but they passed a bill. The President of the United States said he 

would sign a bill. It wouldn’t be what I would want to sign if I was 

president, but you have his attention. Now the ball is in our court. 

The time to act is now. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I point out particularly that you have been 

tremendously generous on this issue, and I know that you have 

been trying to work with all of us on this, and I also appreciate 

my colleagues on the other side because I know I have called, cajoled, perhaps even harassed a few of you to try to get you to join 

on H.R. 15. We need to go to conference, gentlemen and ladies. We 

need to find a solution. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. Let me say this. Members on both sides 

are frustrated, because we do know that we have a broken immigration system and it is not fair to our citizens, it is not fair to the 

12 million residents who are here and have been here for sometimes decades. Mr. Labrador has worked very hard on this, Mr. 

Chaffetz, and part of our frustration is inaction, and part of that 

inaction is that we don’t have an entry-exit biometric system, although 30 other countries in the world do. 

We are the can-do Nation. We are the leader of the free world. 

And that causes frustration. But we also know that we are not 

going to have—and Kevin McCarthy said yesterday that we are 

going to address immigration reform. It would be on our agenda— 

that was my understanding—early next year. We only have 12 legislative days left. But it is a priority for many of us. 

At this time, I would recognize Mr. Marino, the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

I just came out of a hearing over at Foreign Affairs concerning 

terrorism, and although I am a major supporter of getting something done on immigration—I have been working with my colleague, Mr. Labrador, on some language that we have been discussing, reaching across the aisle, working with my colleagues over 

there—I am a little frustrated today with the pointing of the fingers and saying we are not going to talk about this, but we talk 

about it. 
129 

I want to look at this from specifically why we are here from a 

technical aspect, if I could maybe get us back on track, perhaps, 

and I have several questions. I am not going to ask a question of 

any one individual, but if you feel like you can respond to this, 

which I am sure you can, please do. 

The biometrics, we see it all over the place. Go to Disney World, 

put my card in, put my finger in, hey, that is Tom Marino, that 

is his card. Unlock my front door, lock my front door, start my car, 

the whole nine yards. I know much of this has been achieved over 

the last 10 years because we didn’t have the technology beforehand. We do have the technology now, and I think it is getting better by the week, actually. I know my kids, they are a prime example of it. Every time they get an iPad or an iPod or an iPhone, it 

is 6 weeks later, ‘‘Dad, a new one came out, I want to get another 

one.’’ I say, no, I am sorry, we cannot afford this. 

So given the fact that I will be the first one to admit that we 

need to fund this—you cannot do the work that has to be done 

without the proper funding—succinctly, where do we go from here? 

What is the next step, and what do we need to do to get this moving and get it moving quickly? Because I don’t want to be here next 

year or 2 years later talking about the same thing. I get very frustrated. I am a prosecutor, 18 years a prosecutor, and I do not like 

to wait for anything. My wife can testify to that. So, please. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Congressman, I will be happy to take that question, and I appreciate the opportunity. 

We all, I think, agree that the technology has evolved over the 

last several years and provides great opportunity for us to advance 

the biometric component of our entry-exit system. What is needed 

is to identify what the concept of operations is, how will you use 

it. You have national security law enforcement and the interests of 

the traveling public at hand, and you need to figure out where do 

you deploy that to best accomplish all of those goals. 

If you deploy it too early in the system at the TSA checkpoint, 

you have a problem that people can enter the system and exit the 

system without actually departing the United States. Therefore, 

you look at the gateway or the jetway where they are actually leaving onto the plane, and so you have that concept which needs to 

be identified, and the technology needs to be evaluated for the environment that it is in and for all the circumstances. 

We are about to do that right now. We are standing up a test 

facility that will be operational at the beginning of next year, and 

we will be looking at a number of technologies and how you use 

them, what is the most cost-effective way, the fastest throughput, 

ease of use, all of those things that need to be evaluated. We will 

be doing that beginning next year. Once that concept of operations 

is evaluated and you deselect to what is the best one, you deploy 

those best solutions to the field, pilot them in the field, and then 

subsequent to that you begin to deploy the technology. 

Mr. MARINO. Anyone else? Anyone else want to address that? 

Please. 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes, please. I think there is another piece of this. 

David, of course, on the operational side has to deal with the concept of operations, which is a little bit complicated but totally doable, I believe. But there is another piece of it which I have said 
130 

before but I will repeat. We have to provide a means to fund it. 

That is absolutely essential, and I think you can do that through 

authorization of fees. 

The tourism industry right now, Brand USA, gets $10 out of $14 for the visa waiver fee. You add another $10 to that, I think that 

is more than fair, and you can pay for a lot of this. You can even 

increase it more, or you could appropriate it. Either way. But I 

think in a budget situation we are in now, it would be an authorization for fees. 

The other piece of it is you need to make sure the airports are 

a stakeholder in statutory law. They are not considered a stakeholder right now, and DHS has a harder time doing its job on exit 

because the airports are not a stakeholder. And then you have to 

make sure that the air carriers are not in the equation anymore 

because CBP, under the 2013 Homeland Security Appropriations 

Act, has the ability to do that, but air carriers are still in the law 

carrying the burden of implementation. 

So those things. I think statutorily this body, this legislative 

body can do those things. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, we need that information from you people. I 

know when we get elected to Congress, we get taller, smarter and 

better looking, but we don’t have the answers, all the answers, and 

we need these technical answers from you folks. So I appreciate 

any input that you can give us. You can call my office. I am on 

Homeland Security as well, and this is an issue that I am quite focused on. 

So, thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. LABRADOR [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. I 

am glad that is working for you. It hasn’t worked for all of us, that 

we are getting taller and better looking. 

The gentlewoman from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the distinguished gentleman. 

Let me thank the witnesses and indicate that simultaneous to 

this hearing was a hearing in Homeland Security, of which I am 

a Member. So I thank you for your indulgence. 

Let me welcome Ms. Wood. I have seen you appear before this 

Committee in many years past as I was on this Committee, and I 

am glad to see you back, and I know that you have some insight 

that is very important. 

If I could reflect for a moment on using a metaphor or a rhetorical question that Martin King used to ask, ‘‘If not now, then when? 

How long? How long?’’ I think, as we look at the very serious questions of exit and entry, and in actuality an issue that the Homeland Security Committee has addressed and introduced a bill that 

I am an original co-sponsor of and helped work on, H.R. 3141, 

which is the Biometric Exit Improvement Act of 2013, which puts 

it right to the Department of Homeland Security to enact in 180 

days, to submit to Congress a biometric exit system, we have studied this exclusively and extensively, and I am grateful for the collaboration of the House Judiciary Committee. 

But I know that all of us take our work seriously. So we have 

a bill ready to be marked up. We have also introduced H.R. 1417 

that has been passed through the House Homeland Security Committee, a bipartisan bill that deals with a reasoned and reasonable 
131 

response to the security of our borders, northern and southern. I 

always make sure that I make mention of both northern and southern. 

So let me ask the question to Mr. Heyman, who deals with policy 

issues. I know you are aware of these initiatives and aware that 

there are vigorous discussions in the Department on this concept 

of securing America, immigration reform, border security, and you 

have just heard me give the words, ‘‘If not now, then when, and 

how long?′′ 

How much better would we be with a comprehensive approach, 

comprehensive immigration approach to this whole issue of knowing who is in the country, knowing who is entering the country, 

and knowing who is exiting the country? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. I 

would support comprehensive immigration reform as a better condition than we are in today. There is certainly no ability to move 

beyond where we are today absent legislation, but there is the 

prospect of a brighter future for the immigrant community, for border security, for our economic well-being with an immigration legislation that is passed. 

In the context of knowing who is in the country, who is out of 

the country, we have made substantial progress on that with our 

entry-exit system that we have been enhancing over the last several years. The biometric portion of the exit process we have talked 

about extensively today. It is my view that Congress and the government needs to be smart about implementing it. 

The hardest part is the land border. We need to be very prudent 

and make sure that it works in the air and sea environments first. 

That is a costly expense. It is going to be even more costly in land, 

so let’s get it right first. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let’s get land first? 

Mr. HEYMAN. No. I am saying air and sea first, ma’am, air and 

sea first to make sure we get that right, and then we can take a 

look at land. We are doing some very innovative work on the land 

border which will allow us biographically to identify exits. That has 

been piloted with our Canadian partners, to great success. We are 

looking to do something similar on our southern border. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me ask Ms. Wood, in terms of having been 

at ICE before, what is your assessment of being able to look at the 

biometrics in pieces, to be very honest with you, getting pieces 

done, and then putting the whole together? 

And then also, having been in ICE and knowing that you have 

the internal enforcement, the value of having a comprehensive approach so you will know and ICE will have the documentation to 

know who should be detained and who should not, and be able to 

be effective in making sure we are detaining the people who will 

be here to do us harm? 

Ms. WOOD. Thank you for that question. I think certainly ICE 

and all of law enforcement would take a piece-by-piece approach. 

Obviously, law enforcement wants biometrics, and it wants it not 

only at air and sea but also at land border. But I think any improvement in the process, and there have been improvements over 

the last few years, is very useful not only to ICE but to the JTPF 

and all of law enforcement. 
132 

I think it is critical, however, that ICE has enforcement resources and an enforcement mandate to enforce overstays at some 

level. So when we think about comprehensive immigration reform 

and making things different, having a system that works, we have 

to make sure that ICE has the resources to do routine enforcement 

going forward as well. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I just say this, put a question on the 

record? I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you are absolutely right. Resources are necessary for enforcement, and I think that when I spoke piecemeal, I just want 

to correct the record. I want to give comfort to my friends on the 

other side of the aisle, that we need to pass something so that we 

can move forward. When I say ‘‘something,’’ something constructive 

so that we can move forward on a comprehensive approach that is 

killing this country, killing America, killing those who are citizens 

and non-citizens who are desperate for some regular order to make 

this country the great country that it is. 

Biometrics, we have a bill. It deals with land, and I believe we 

can work on the land piece and the border security piece out of 

Homeland Security, meaning legislation, and then be able to match 

it with a very effective, comprehensive immigration approach. And 

I would ask my colleagues not to stop the movement and the 

progress of getting somewhere to be able to stabilize, to work this 

system right and have a comprehensive understanding of who is in 

this country to help us and who is here to hurt us. 

I hope that my good friend who is in the chair today will take 

up the cause and the banner for this Committee and the Speaker 

to move forward on comprehensive immigration reform. And if he 

only needs a piece of a bill, then move forward on 3141, a biometric 

bill from Homeland Security, or 1417, and we will be able to move 

forward on comprehensive immigration reform. We will be able to 

do it now. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back, and I thank the gentleman from 

New York. 

Mr. LABRADOR. The gentle lady’s time has expired, and I yield 

myself 5 minutes. 

I have been a little bit confused by some of the comments today, 

and I want to ask Ms. Kephart, you were obviously counsel to the 

Senate on Senate bill 744. Is that correct? 

Ms. KEPHART. Yes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And I keep hearing that the only way to get biometrics done—I have heard this now several times—is to have comprehensive reform. That makes no sense to me. 

Now, I want a comprehensive approach to immigration reform. 

I am here—I came to Congress specifically to fix the immigration 

system. But I am confused by the statement, and Mr. Heyman 

made it, a couple of other people have made it, that the only way 

to proceed forward on figuring out what to do about biometric 

entry-exit system is to have a comprehensive immigration reform 

plan. Does that make any sense to you? 

Ms. KEPHART. Look, the immigration system is made up of many, 

many pieces. It is convoluted. It is complicated. Each piece has its 
133 

value. Each piece can be dealt with in its own comprehensive bubble. You don’t need everything fixed at once. 

This is a little different than the immigration reform that is sitting here before us because we already have eight statutes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Okay, let me stop you there. That is the question 

that I have. We have had statutes for 17 years on the books, right? 

Ms. KEPHART. Mmm-hmm. 

Mr. LABRADOR. We haven’t done anything to fix this system. 

Now, I hear that we have done some things to make it better, but 

we haven’t done what the law says. The law says that we need to 

have a biometric entry-exit system. 

So the question that I have for all of you, I want to have immigration reform done. I have asked that we have triggers, and one 

of those triggers has to be a biometric entry-exit system. 

How long would it take the United States to have a biometric 

entry-exit system at sea, land and air so we can have a trigger in 

place so we can have this comprehensive reform that some people 

are talking about? 

Ms. KEPHART. If you went by the law that is on the books today 

and you put out requests for proposals tomorrow to industry and 

let them battle this out for a concept of operations, then I think 

you could have this very quickly. You could have it——— 

Mr. LABRADOR. And what is very quickly? 

Ms. KEPHART. Well, if you look at Indonesia, they did a comprehensive rollout that did everything, watch-list vetting, personcentric system, everything, at their largest airport in 6 months’ 

time. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. Albers? 

Mr. ALBERS. If there were funding in place——— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Yes, and funding. We have to assume that, absolutely. 

Mr. ALBERS. If there were funding in place and a contractual vehicle in place, we could do this in 18 months. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Eighteen months. 

Mr. ALBERS. So a part of that, the beginning, sometimes is the 

long part. So getting the funding and getting the contract——— 

Mr. LABRADOR. And you are talking total. If we decide tomorrow 

that we are going to pass reform and we are going to have a comprehensive strategy on immigration, but the trigger is that we have 

to have an entry-exit system, you are saying 18 months. 

Mr. ALBERS. Eighteen months—we call it ARO, after receipt of 

order. So if an order is placed to start air and sea, we could do that 

in 18 months. I think land will take a little longer than that. 

Mr. LABRADOR. How long? 

Mr. ALBERS. Maybe within 2 years. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Two years. 

Ms. Wood? 

Ms. WOOD. I would defer to DHS for the estimate, but I would 

note that getting the receipt of order is very difficult. And so making sure that DHS has sufficient procurement capabilities and 

moves out, and then actually moves on it. If we think about what 

has happened to integrated six towers, for example, or at CBP, 

there has not been a lot of activity. So I think making sure DHS 
134 

has enough resources, and then I would defer to David on the specific time period. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. Heyman? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you. There are a number of statutes on the 

table right now that we are trying to implement. We don’t have the 

funding, as you said, and we don’t have the concept of operations. 

So we are looking to have that within the next year. So by this 

time next year, the concept of operations will be going to the field 

for piloting. Sometime after that, perhaps the 18 months would 

kick in for deploying the technology to air and sea. I think the land 

is exceptionally hard to look at, and I would suggest that there are 

enough statutes out there that we don’t need to tie this to comprehensive immigration reform. You should do the best you can 

with all the different challenges you have on that on its own. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But we don’t need to tie it to it. I actually think 

we already have the laws in place. But the problem is, even if you 

look at the Senate bill, the Senate bill just makes, again, the promise that we are going to have an entry-exit system. It doesn’t solve 

the problem. And according to the estimates of the CBO, even 

under the Senate bill we are going to have over 10 million people 

here illegally in the next 10 to 15 years. 

So it doesn’t fix the problem that we have, and that is what I 

want to do. I want to fix the problem of illegal immigration. I want 

to fix it now, and I am not going to allow a bill to just pass so we 

can have this discussion again 10 or 15 years from now. 

Mr. HEYMAN. So it is my view that an entry-exit system is not 

going to solve your overstay problem. It helps you identify it and 

it helps you to enforce it, but it is not going to solve your overstay 

problem. Only immigration reform will solve that. 

Mr. LABRADOR. That doesn’t make any sense. How will only immigration, when the CBO says that the Senate bill does not solve 

the immigration problem? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Because what biometric does is it allows you to, 

with greater integrity, identify somebody who is leaving the country, and to use that to match it to an entry so that you can know 

whether they have overstayed or not. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But Ms. Wood said if we have actually more enforcement, then we can solve that problem. Isn’t that what you 

were saying, Ms. Wood? 

Ms. WOOD. Yes, I think pairing exit with enforcement. 

Mr. LABRADOR. With enforcement. 

Ms. WOOD. You absolutely have to have enforcement. You can’t 

just have exit without enforcement. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And I agree with that. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We are enforcing today. Number one, we sanction 

those who have overstayed the terms of their visa. Number two, we 

revoke those. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So you think 1,300 investigations is sufficient? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We obviously prioritize those in national security. 

No, some of those have been a 30-year drunken driving offense. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Okay. My time has expired. I just think that to 

come here and say that comprehensive immigration reform is the 

answer when we are not even willing to do the enforcement, we are 

not even willing to use the technology, is actually misleading the 
135 

American public, and I am just really confused about that, and I 

hope that we can get this done. This has been on the books for 17 

years. Let’s get this done. Let’s make it a trigger so we can do what 

all of us want, which is to actually fix this broken immigration system. 

My time has expired. The gentleman from Nevada has 5 minutes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. From New York. 

Mr. LABRADOR. I am sorry, from New York. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Let me just thank the witnesses for their 

testimony here today and for the information that has been shared. 

I want to just direct for the moment a few questions to the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Heyman. 

Is it fair to say that the fundamental purpose of a comprehensive 

entry-exit system is designed to help this country enforce our Nation’s immigration laws and make sure that those who are leaving 

and entering comply with those laws? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. So in that context of immigration enforcement, I 

am interested in exploring the notion of what information DHS either currently collects or intends to collect from permanent residents and United States citizens. Now, as it relates to air-based entries and exits, what information do you collect right now on either 

permanent residents or United States citizens who are leaving the 

country or entering the country via air? 

Mr. HEYMAN. All individuals coming across our borders, we identify who is coming and going, and we retain that information. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Right. And what is the purpose of collecting and 

retaining that information as it relates to permanent residents who 

have lawful status here in the United States, not subject to revocation or expiration, or even more significantly United States citizens? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, we do that for all of those individuals, whether it is a U.S. citizen or otherwise, who come across our borders. 

We do that for admissibility purposes for non-U.S. citizens, we do 

that for security reasons and law enforcement actions, and we do 

that for ensuring the safety and security of our country. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Safety and security as it relates to the entry and 

the exit of United States citizens? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, United States citizens, if there is a warrant 

out for their arrest, if they are a convicted felon, if they are involved in any kind of felon activity, we would be interested in identifying them coming back across our border or leaving our country. 

It is an opportunity for law enforcement to act. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Now, once you determine that there is either no applicable outstanding warrant, this is not a felon, this is 

not anyone who is currently in violation of any United States statute, do you retain that information? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There is a period of time when the data is retained, 

yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And what is the duration of the retention of that 

information? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I would have to get back to you on that, sir. 
136 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. But it is your testimony that subsequent to 

the expiration of that period of time of the retention of that information, the United States Government no longer stores it within 

its electronic database capabilities? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. For all of the databases that we have, there 

is a privacy impact analysis that is done and a statement that is 

issued for the public. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. So it is my understanding also, dealing with 

land-based crossings, that an agreement was signed between the 

President of this country and Prime Minister Harper, I believe, on 

February 4th, 2011; correct? 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And there are three phases to that agreement; correct? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And the third phase, which will be implemented 

in June of 2014, will require the recordation and exchange of information of United States citizens who cross between the United 

States and the Canadian border; correct? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. Just like any border crossing, any arrival and 

departure, we will have all citizens, all persons who travel across 

the border identified. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Now, is that information shared with any 

other government agency beyond DHS? 

Mr. HEYMAN. If there is a law enforcement nexus to it for criminal investigations, it might be shared. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Does the NSA have access to that information? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not know. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. If you can report back to me or to this Committee as to whether the NSA currently has access to that information in terms of the crossings that take place on sea or via air, or 

whether the NSA will have access to that information once it begins to be recorded on June 14th or June of 2014, that would be 

helpful. 

Do you see any reason why, once it is determined that this individual who has crossed the border and is either a permanent resident or a United States citizen, there is no criminal justice nexus, 

why the NSA or any other Federal Government agency should have 

permanent access to that information? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, as I said, on a case-by-case basis for criminal 

investigations, if it becomes necessary for understanding, for example, somebody’s alibi—‘‘I was out of the country’’—and they are in 

a criminal proceeding, that would be helpful to them. If it is at the 

nexus of a criminal action, it would be harmful to them, but that 

would be corroborating information that would be in a criminal investigation. 

Mr. LABRADOR. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you very much. 

I just have one quick question for clarification. I didn’t understand Mr. Heyman’s answer earlier in the hearing. Ms. Wood, 

maybe you can respond to this. 
137 

In April 2011, the GAO reported that there was a backlog of 1.6 

million unmatched arrivals. Then later on we know, as of 2011, as 

of 2013, there is an additional million. But he stated that we have 

100 percent knowledge of the people that are here. So I was confused about those two data points. Can you maybe explain that? 

Ms. WOOD. Sure. With respect to the individuals that were identified, the 1.6 million in the GAO report, DHS agreed to review 

those records, and then this is what happened. Approximately 

863,000 of those individuals had already departed, were in status, 

had adjusted, or there was some other reason they could be removed. So then DHS had left 839,000 records, and they reviewed 

those records. They actually only reprioritized 1,901 of those 

records, and they sent those out to the ICE unit for further investigation. And of the 1,901 records, nine of them were arrested, 266 

could not be located and the investigation was closed pending new 

information, 481 were referred to enforcement and removal operations or ERO, but ERO later told GAO that they didn’t prioritize 

those, very few of those. So we don’t know, but we assume that it 

is a very, very small number, if any, that were arrested from that. 

Forty-three were previously arrested or were in proceedings. So it 

is a very small number of individuals that were actually arrested. 

DHS may have the ability to at least initially identify what information people put on their records. But to say that DHS knows 

where individuals are I think is a little bit of an overstretch specifically because so few leads are actually sent to ICE, and ICE is investigating so few of them. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And, Mr. Heyman, you didn’t mean to say that 

you knew 100 percent of the people were here and where they 

were. 

Mr. HEYMAN. We knew what their disposition was, whether they 

had overstayed. The reason you send them to investigations is you 

are trying to find them. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

This concludes today’s hearing. Thanks to all of our witnesses for 

attending. It was a great hearing. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional 

materials for the record. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(139) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Listing of Material submitted by the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 

The information includes five GAO reports; a statement by Rebecca Gambler before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, House Committee on 

Homeland Security showing the DHS has not met the requirements in implementing a biometric air exit system; a report from Smart Border Alliance to DHS; 

two reports by Customs and Border Protection; a letter report by the Office of the 

Inspector General; and a Pew Research study that documents an increase in the 

number of unauthorized immigrants in the country. 

GAO report entitled Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. 

DHS created this report to better ensure that the US–VISIT program is worthy of 

investment and is managed effectively. To better ensure the effectiveness of this 

program, DHS will fully disclose in future expenditure plans its progress against 

previous commitments and that it reassess plans for deploying an exit capability. 

Acessible at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245389.pdf 

GAO report entitled Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program’s Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Need to 

Be Addressed. DHS has established a program known as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on certain foreign nationals who travel to 

the United States. By Congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for US–VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO reviewed the plan to (1) determine if the plan satisfied these 

conditions, (2) follow up on certain recommendations related to the program, and 

(3) provide any other observations. To address the mandate, GAO assessed plans 

and related documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards and 

interviewed the appropriate DHS officials. 

Accessible at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265802.pdf 

GAO report entitled Homeland Security: Key US–VISIT Components at Varying 

Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. DHS’ U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) program stores and 

processes biometric and biographic information to amongst other things, control and 

monitor the entry and exit of foreign visitors. Currently, an entry capability is operating at almost 300 U.S. ports of entry, but an exit capability is not. GAO has previously reported on limitations in DHS’s efforts to plan and execute its efforts to 

deliver USVISIT exit, and made recommendations to improve these areas. GAO was 

asked to determine (1) the status of DHS’s efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit 

solution and (2) to what extent DHS is applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit solution. To accomplish this, GAO assessed USVISIT 
140 

exit project plans, schedules, and other management documentation against relevant criteria, and it observed exit pilots. 

Accessible at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1013.pdf 

GAO report entitled Homeland Security: US–VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options. DHS’ U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) program is to control and monitor the entry and exit 

of foreign visitors by storing and processing biometric and biographic information. 

The entry capability has operated since 2006; an exit capability is not yet implemented. In September 2008, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and 

Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, directed DHS to pilot air exit scenarios with 

the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and airlines, and to provide a report 

to congressional committees. DHS conducted CBP and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) pilots and issued its evaluation report in October 2009. Pursuant 

to the act, GAO reviewed the evaluation report to determine the extent to which 

(1) the report addressed statutory conditions and legislative directions; (2) the report 

aligned with the scope and approach in the pilot evaluation plan; (3) the pilots were 

conducted in accordance with the evaluation plan; and (4) the evaluation plan satisfied relevant guidance. To do so, GAO compared the report to statutory conditions, 

the evaluation plan, and relevant guidance. 

Accessible at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308630.pdf 

GAO report entitled Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess 

DHS’s Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program. This report 

addresses the current need for additional action by DHS in order to fulfill its responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. 

Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among 

other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States to determine their admissibility to the country and screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine their eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. 

Accessible at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656316.pdf 

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director of Homeland Security and Justice for 

GAO, before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of Representatives; Border Security: Additional Actions 

needed to Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit System. Rebecca Gambler discusses DHS’ efforts to implement a biometric exit system, as well as the full range 

of management challenges that DHS has faced in its effort to deploy a corresponding biometric exit system. Since 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an entry and exit data system to track foreign nationals entering and 

leaving the United States. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate 

implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches available 

information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from 

the U.S. 

Accessible at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658185.pdf 

Smart Border Alliance report to DHS: US–VISIT Increment 2C RFID Feasibility 

Study Final Report. This document records the results of the RF Feasibility Study 

as it was conducted in a simulated environment (Mock Port of Entry). This, and the 

establishment of a Mock POE, must successful prior to Phase 1, POC implementation at POEs. Based upon successful completion of the Phase 1 Increment 2C POC, 

full operating capability will be implemented in Phase 2. Upon completion of Phase 

2, a thorough evaluation will be conducted. Based upon the results of that evaluation, further deployment will be determined. 

Accessible at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/US-VISITlRFIDfeasibility 

lredacted-051106.pdf 
141 

Entry/Exit Information System: Phase I Joint Canada-United States Report. This 

report discusses the planned development of a coordinated Entry/Exit Information 

system between the United States and Canada, as part of the Beyond the Border 

Declaration and Action Plan agreed to by President Obama and Prime Minister 

Harper in 2011. 

Accessible at: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/highlights/can 

adalusreport.ctt/canadalusreport.pdf 

Customs and Border Protection report entitled Comprehensive Exit Plan. This report describes DHS’ recent efforts to implement an enhanced biographic exit system 

and biometric exit planning, to better target foreign nationals who overstay their 

lawful period of admission; the results of pilot programs at the land ports of entry 

along the northern and southern borders; and efforts to align CBP’s missions and 

functions to meet the changes enacted in P.L. 113–6. 

Link not available. This report is inserted at the end of this list (see Attachment). 

OIG Letter Report: Department of Homeland Security US–VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities. This Letter report written by the Assistant Inspector General of IT Audits Frank Deffer to Robert 

Mocny, the Director of US–VISIT, discusses two recommendations aimed at improving US–VISIT as deemed necessary by the OIG. 

Accessible at: 

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIGl12-111lAug12.pdf 

The Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project study: Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed. This study discusses how the 

sharp decline in the U.S. population of unauthorized immigrants that accompanied 

the 2007–2009 recession has bottomed out, and the number may be rising again. 

It further discusses the reasons behind this trend. 

Accessible at: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-un 

authorized-immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed 
142 

ATTACHMENT 

I S CmlOm~ and Earlier Pro/eel/all 
143 

Message from the Acting Deputy Commissioner of CBP 

September 27. 20 13 

I am ple~ to presenl the following report, "Comprehensive 

Exil Plan." prtprued by U.S. Cusloms aoo Bordcr i'rOle<:lion 

(CBP). 

This report responds 10 language in the Explanatory Statement 

nnd Sennte Rem" t 12· t69 that accompany the FI,'CU{ I'rwr 

(FY) }()/J Deparlllllml fJ[Homdultlf Sec/lriry (DHS) 

Approp,;ulioH!l ACI (P.L. 113-6). 

The report, which has been prepared in partncnhip "i!h U.S. 

Immigraiion lind Customs EnrO(l:ement (ICE), National 

Protection and Programs Directorate's Office ofSiomeuic 

Identity Management (OBIM), DHS Science and Technology 

Direclorate (S&T), DHS Officc ofl'o]icy, and DHS Ollke of Privacy, descrilxs DHS's recenl 

efTorts 10 implemenl an enhanced biogrnphic exit system and biometric exit planning. 10 beller 

target foreign national~ wbo overstay their lawful period of admission; the results of pilot 

programs at the land ports of entry (POEs) along the northern and !IOUthcrn borders: and elTons 

10 align CBP's missions and functionSlo meel the changes enactccl in P.L. 113-6. 

Pursuant to congressional tequireml.'IllS. this report is beitlg pruvidl"tlto the following Members 

ofConb~!.S: 

The Honorable John R. Cilfter 

Cbainnan. House Approprialions S\lbcommi1lee on Homdand Security 

The Honornble David E. Price 

Ranking Member. House Appruprintions Subcommit1e~ Qn Homeland Se<:urity 

The Honornhle Mary L. umdricu 

Clwirmon. Senale Approprintions Subcommillec on lomcland SCl:urily 

The Honornblc Duniel COOts 

Ranki ng Member, Senate Appropriations Subeomminl'C nn Homeland Security 

The Honornble Robert Goodlune 

Chairman, House Judiciary Committee 

The Honomble John Conyers, Jr. 

Rankin~ Member, House Judiciary Committee 

The l·lonornble Patrick Jt l.eahy 

Chairman. Senate Judiciary Committee 
144 

The Honorable Charles Grassley 

Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee 

The Honorable Michael McCaul 

Chairman, House Homeland Security Committee 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Ranking Member, House Homeland Security Committee 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper 

Chairman, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Cornmittee 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D. 

Ranking Member, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 344-2001 or the 

Department's Chief Financial Officer, Peggy Sherry, at (202) 447-5751. 

Sincerely, 

Ii!!;~ Acting Deputy Commissioner 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

ii 
145 

Executive Summary 

In May 2012, DHS provided a report titled "Comprehensive Biometric Exit Plan" (May 2012 

report) to the Committees, describing efforts to improve existing operations designed to target 

and penalize those who violate U.S. immigration laws by overstaying their lawful period of 

admission in the United States. 

This report updates the committees on the efforts described in the May 2012 report, answers the 

specific items described in the statutory language of the FY 2013 DHS Appropriations Act 

(P.L. 113-6), and describes CBP's efforts in aligning missions and functions required by changes 

enacted in P.L. 113-6. 

CBP and its partner components within DHS have implemented major changes to the enhanced 

biographic exit program. First, in April 2013, DHS deployed Phase 2 of overstay validation and 

vetting, which is increasing connectivity among DHS systems and efficiencies, to better identify 

and sanction overstays. 1 Second, in June 2013, CBP deployed the second phase of the U.S.-

Canada entry/exit initiative, which allows CBP to receive exit data on the northern border for 

non-Canadian foreign nationals departing the United States into Canada. This is a significant 

deliverable that obtains more data on land departures by third-country nationals than has ever 

been obtained previously by DHS, and will streamline the overstay identification process 

significantly. Finally, CBP is beginning its Southern Border Biographic Exit Initiative, to 

investigate the best methods of obtaining departure data from travelers departing from the United 

States into Mexico, and plans to complete a detailed report by the end of calendar year 2013. 

CBP continues to research biometric exit capabilities using emerging biometric technologies. 

CBP and DHS S&T are partnering to develop a test facility that will examine operational 

concepts using biometric technology to improve all aspects of the CBP mission, including 

development of potential biometric exit program options in the air and sea environments. 

Finally, CBP embraces the new direction within the entry/exit mission, as provided in 

P.L. 113-6, and will work toward development of a nationwide entry/exit system to enhance the 

integrity of the U.S. immigration system. The transitions of staff to CBP and TCE were 

successful and are now complete. CBP has created a home for the entry/exit transformation 

oftlce charged with developing specitied deliverables to implement an entry/exit program over 

the coming months and years that will benefit DHS significantly. 

Overall, this plan illustrates the commitment ofCBP and the rest ofDHS to identifying and 

sanctioning those who abuse our immigration system, and to building an immigration system that 

has the contidence of the Congress and the American people. 

1 For purposes of llris document, a persoll \:'1'110 remains inside the United Slates beyond his or her la",ful period of 

admission is considered an "overstay." 

11l 
146 

Comprehensive Exit Plan 

Table of Contents 

1. Legislative Language .. 

11. Background .. 

A. Mission Need for Data on Foreign Nationals Departing the United States .. 

B. Distinctions between Biographic and Biometric Exit Programs. 

C. Summary of Efforts since 9111. 

III. Progress on Enhanced Biographic Exit. 

A. Overstay Validation and Vetting .. 

B. Document Validation .. 

C. Land EntrylExit Program .. 

1. u.S.-Canadian Border. 

2. U.S.-Mexican Border.. 

IV. Progress on Biometric Exit.. 

A. Apex Agreement.. 

B. Baseline for Biometric Exit .. 

C. Outreach to Carriers and Airports .. 

D. Biometric Exit Test Capability .. 

V. Agency Realignment.. 

VI. Conclusion. 

Vll. Appendix-Acronyms .. 

IV 

2 

2 

2 

3 

7 

8 

8 

10 

11 

11 

12 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 
147 

1. Legislative Language 

This document responds to language in the Explanatory Statement and Senate Report 112-169 

that accompany the FY 2013 DRS Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-6). 

The Explanatory Statement states: 

Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, in conjunction with the Office of Biometric Identity Management and 

any other appropriate partners, such as the Science and Technology Directorate, 

shall report to the Senate Committees on Appropriations, the Judiciary, and 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the House Committees on 

Appropriations, the Judiciary, and Homeland Security on the Department's 

tangible progress in implementing an enhanced biographic exit system and 

biometric exit planning. The report shall include the results of the Canadian pilot 

programs and provide an update on the Mexican pilot program. 

Senate Report 112-169 states: 

The Committee directs the Secretary to report to the Senate Committees on 

Appropriations, the Judiciary, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

within 120 days after the date of enactment of this act, and to brief the Committee 

semiannually thereafter, on the Department's tangible progress in implementing 

an enhanced biographic exit system and biometric exit planning. The report shall 

include the results of the Canadian pilot programs and provide an update on the 

Mexican pilot program. 
148 

II. Background 

A. Mission Need for Data on Foreign Nationals Departing the 

United States 

One of the core missions ofCBP is to enforce and administer U.S. immigration laws. A key 

aspect of effective enforcement of immigration laws is the ability to discern individuals who are 

lawfully present in the United States from those who have violated their terms of admission. 

Without this capability, enforcement efforts regarding overstays have little deterrent effect 

because there is not a consistent sanction for staying beyond one's authorized period of 

admission. An e±Iective immigration system requires an end-to-end process that collects exit 

data and matches those to entry data. Without exit data, there is no meaningful way to determine 

whether foreign nationals have overstayed and no substantive process to allocate the necessary 

resources to determine which foreign nationals remain in the United States. Exit data are critical 

components for CBP to deliver on a core mission goal-to enforce and administer immigration 

laws. 

Exit data are matched to the entry data collected by CBP officers at the time foreign nationals 

enter the United States. Before determining if individuals are overstays, DHS analyzes the data 

on the range of encounters individuals may have had, including whether individuals may have 

lawfully extended their stay in the United States or changed/adjusted their status through U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 

As this report shows, CBP, TCE, and other DRS Components are working to deliver an effective 

immigration system that has the confidence of Congress and the American public, by working 

toward simultaneous goals. These goals include increasing the availability of exit data for all 

DRS decision-makers; enhancing the quality of those data; effectively matching the entry and 

exit data on foreign nationals; and identifying and sanctioning overstays. 

B. Distinctions between Biographic and Biometric Exit Programs 

In previous legislation, as well as in previous programs, there have been significant discussions 

concerning the type of exit data that should be collected. Typically, most countries use 

biographic data, which are essentially text data that are commonly included on the data page of a 

traveler's passport, such as name, date of birth, and country of citizenship2 

CBP has extensive experience and success with its biographic targeting, pre-arrival, and entry 

screening programs. Numerous biographic-based checks are queried simultaneously and, in the 

air environments, biographic-based checks are completed well before the traveler boards the 

aircraft to come to the United States. CBP is working on an equivalent system in the sea 

::: Text data can be electronically captured through passport features on the basis of intcmalional standards, slich as a 

nmehine-readable zone or an e-Passport chip. Many countries like Australia. Japan. and the Ulutcd Kingdom rely 

on biographic data for their immigraLion processing. 

2 
149 

environment. CBP is making progress on implementing the program described in the Secretary's 

plan, which was submitted in May 2012; this plan emphasizes that DHS will enhance its 

biographic exit program while exploring options for biometric exit. 

A biographic program and biometric program follow the exact same process up to the point of 

the collection of the biometric. A biometric program requires additional data collection beyond 

biographic elements, specifically a physical component of a person that is unique to an 

individual, such as a facial image, fingerprint, or iris scan. CBP has collected biometric data 

from nearly all foreign nationals arriving at air and sea POEs, and at all land POEs at secondary 

inspection since 2005. This infonnation is checked immediately against various derogatory 

records, including the known or suspected terrorist watch list. 

CBP now has in place a robust entry/exit system and intends to deploy an entry/exit system that 

achieves two specific benefits: (I) high confidence that the individual is the same person 

encountered before (identification match), and (2) high confidence that persons complied with 

(or did not comply with) their authorized period of admission (entry and exit record match). In 

the exit context, this would mean that a traveler could not depart as an imposter (i.e., by using 

erroneous biographic infonnation) and therefore appear to depart when the traveler has not 

actually departed. Biographic matches based on data such as names and document numbers 

provide significant evidence that the traveler is genuine, but biometrics should offer a greater 

degree of assurance that the individual is who he or she claims to be, and whether the individual 

has actually departed the United States. With improved matching capabilities, the ability to 

match biometric entry and exit data would become more accurate and complete. Continuing to 

take steps to improve our exit system will create more accurate, system-identified overstay 

records, thus reducing the number of overstay records manually vetted before forwarding to field 

offices for enforcement action. 

C. Summary of Efforts since 9/11 

CBP provided a May 2012 report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, which 

described the efforts DHS has undertaken since 2001 regarding improving the ability to identify 

and sanction overstays. The accomplishments described in the report were completed primarily 

by CBP and OBlM (fonnerly the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT) Program). The efforts included 

2002 - Creation of the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), which collects 

and matches biographic entry and exit data collected by DHS. 

2003 - Creation of the US-VISIT program, whose mission was to consolidate the 

collection of entry and exit data, both biometric and biographic, of individuals traveling 

into and out of the United States by air, land, and sea. 

2004 - Deployment of biometric entry capability at all air and sea POEs 3 

2005 - Deployment of biometric entry capability at all land POEs (in secondary 

inspection facilities) . .j 

3 69 Fed. Reg. ~68 (January 5, 200~). 

'69 Fed. Reg. 53318 (August 31, 200~); 70 Fed. Reg. 54398 (September 14. 2005). 

3 
150 

2004-2007 - Deployment of a pilot program collecting biometric data on departing 

passengers through use of kiosks located after the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) checkpoint or hand-held devices utilized at the airline gates 5 

2007 - Establishment of the pre-departure Advance Passenger Information System 

(APIS) that requires air and sea carriers to provide accurate arrival and departure 

manifest information to CBP before boarding6 

2008 - Publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking 7 requiring the airlines to collect 

biometric data upon departure from the United States on behalfofDHS. 

2009 - Deployment ofa second pilot programg collecting biometric data on departing 

passengers at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

airports, based on two operational concepts: collection of biometric data by CBP officers 

in an airport jet bridge (Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport) or by TSA officers 

at a TSA checkpoint (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta Airport). 

20 I 0 - Secretarial policy review to focus on enhancing the existing DRS biographic exit 

system, while simultaneously conducting research and development for a future 

biometric exit program. 

2011 - Development of a DHS inter-Component working group to develop ways to 

enhance the ability of DHS to identify and sanction overstays; checks of all overstay 

records against National Targeting Center data; and checks of all overstay records against 

National Counterterrorism Center data. 

The May 2012 report discussed future and proposed elements of enhancing the biographic exit 

capabilities, as well as the research and development into a biometric exit proposal. Updates on 

both programs are included in the following sections. 

5 69 Fed. Reg. ~68 (January 5. 200~): 69 Fed. Reg. ~6556 (August 3. 2004). 

072 Fed. Reg. ~83~49 (August 23. 2007). 

c 73 Fed. Reg. 22065 (ApriI2~. 2008). 

8 74 Fed. Reg. 26721 (June 3, 2009). 

4 
151 

III. Progress on Enhanced Biographic Exit 

The enhanced biographic exit program increases the ability of DHS to collect accurate 

biographic data and match those data to entry records to identify overstays, as well as provide 

additional methods of ensuring that overstays are sanctioned. The program is currently divided 

into three main elements: Overstay Validation and Vetting, Document Validation, and Land 

EntrylExit program. 

A. Overstay Validation and Vetting 

CBP, TCE, and OBTM have worked together to develop their enhanced biographic exit 

capabilities since the May 2012 report was released to Congress. That report described the pilot 

project in which 1.6 million unvetted potential overstay records 9 accumulated over a 7-year time 

period, would be checked against CBP's Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P), and 

other data, to determine if any of the existing potential overstay records posed a significant 

security threat. These records have all been reviewed and vetted. Through this activity, DHS 

identified specific records that were associated with a public safety or national security concern 

and referred those leads to ICE for further investigation. This was referred to as Phase 1 for 

Overstay Validation and Vetting, designed to better connect various sources ofDHS data, to 

identify and sanction travelers of significant law enforcement interest more accurately and 

efficiently. 

A beneficial byproduct of this effort was the identification of efficiencies and cost savings gained 

through automating this process, including the reduction in time of exchanging data between 

component systems. Through this new automated process, DHS Components identified ways in 

which to enrich data sources, enhance automated matching, eliminate gaps in travel history, and 

aggregate information from multiple systems. 10 As a result, ICE analysts are now able to more 

accurately and more quickly identify "true" overstay cases from potential ones. 

For Phase 2 of Overstay Validation and Vetting, a variety of initiatives were implemented with 

two overall objectives in mind. The first objective is to vet the potential overstay population to 

identify threats. This would maintain Phase 1 activity in ensuring that all potential overstay 

records are immediately checked against certain derogatory data to quickly identify individuals 

who may pose a threat to public safety or are of national security concern. The second objective 

is to provide faster enforcement action on prioritized threats. Once threats are identified, ICE 

agents have infonnation on which action can be taken. 

"-'Ul1vetted overstay records" are those records that are identified by the automated system. ADIS, as possible 

overstays. but that still require further maIlual rcvic\'\' to dctcnninc whether the person truly is an overstay in 

addition to other factors. such as crimiu,;ll history _ other inllnigmtionla\'\- violations. address in the United States. 

alias. etc. 

10 Department analysts arc currcllUy required to manually search different systems to determine \vhellIer a person 

has tIlIl)' 0\ cIsta) cd the terms of his or her admissioll As an example, an individual could have lawfully changed 

his or her Sl.atus VdUrill the Dlrited States and thus not departed when Iris or her original adllrission would have 

required. Nol having all of the required US CIS inIonnalion readily available willrin ADIS is a "gap" lhallhcse 

enlmllcemenls "ill help ftIl. 

5 
152 

The Phase 2 deployment for Overstay Validation and Vetting was implemented on April 9, 2013. 

This multi-pronged effort included: 

Automation of the flow of information among ADIS, ATS-P, and LeadTrac. ADIS 

(currently managed by OBIM), ATS-P (managed by CBP), and the LeadTrac system 

(managed by ICE) now have seamless, automated t10w ofinforrnation among the three 

systems. The purpose of connecting them is to ensure that targeting information can be 

used to best prioritize overstay cases of the most importance and to take advantage of 

ATS-P held information to better monitor departures from the United States. Before 

April 9, 2013, all transfers had to be done manually, which was time consuming and 

inetlicient. The connectivity also allows for continuous vetting of ADIS data for 

overstay leads, ensuring that newly introduced threat information can be included in the 

anal ysis and quickl y provided to ICE agents. 

Use of ATS-P to enhance name matching for overstay vetting. CBP now is able to 

leverage the existing ATS-P matching algorithms, which allow for more accurate 

matching to derogatory records 

Development of a Basic ICE Overstay "Hot List." CBP has created an operational 

dashboard for ICE anal ysts that aggregates data from several source systems, allowing 

ICE analysts to easily view information for lead analysis. This has eliminated the manual 

process of exchange of data among OBTM, CBP, and ICE. 

Enhancement of ADIS/IDENT/CLAlMS 3, and Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS) interfaces. OBTM now has improved connectivity 

between ADiS and IDENT (the DHS biometric storage and matching service), 

CLAIMS 3 (a DRS immigration benetlts database, managed by USerS), and SEVIS (the 

DHS foreign student database, managed by ICE). This ensures ADIS has a more 

complete picture of information held by DHS and closes out many false positive overstay 

cases, saving time and money and allowing for better allocation of DRS resources. 

Collectively, the Phase 2 deployment provides increased etliciency by reducing technical 

operations support and processing time, combined with faster and more secure processing and 

transfer of data. It also reduces workload by decreasing the number of overstay cases requiring 

manual review (through fewer false positives) and overall more etliciently allocates resources. 

Phase 2 creates more t1exibility/agility by reducing time and increasing DRS's ability to quickly 

react to changes in the threat environment on the basis of intelligence received. This increases 

the ability of DHS to react appropriately concerning vetting of overstay records. 

CBP, ICE, and OBTM continue to move forward on Phase 3 of Overstay Validation and Vetting. 

The goals of Phase 3 are to enhance the changes underway in Phase 2 and modernize ADIS. By 

mid-20l4, DRS will develop and deploy: 

Unification of Overstay Case Management Process. By building a data exchange 

interface between ADIS and ICE's LeadTrac's modernized system, overstay case 

management work will be migrated to one analyst platform for DHS. ADIS will benefit 

from enhanced overstay case management updates from both the ICE Overstay Analysis 

Unit and Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit 

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Enhancement of the ADIS/TSA Alien Flight School Program (AFSP) Data 

Exchange. ICE uses ADIS to flag overstays who are enrolled in the AFSP. These data 

exchanges will be done in an automated way instead of manually. 

Continued Enhancement of ADIS/SEVIS Interface. This will ensure ADIS has the 

most complete picture of information held by DHS and the most accurate picture of 

overstays possible; it will close out many false positive overstay cases, saving time and 

money and allowing for better allocation of DHS resources. Additional data elements 

and updates to data processing will be implemented. 

Improved Matching Algorithms. Lawrence Livermore National Labs Matching will 

complete a detailed analysis and provide recommendations as to how to fully incorporate 

biometric identifiers into biographic matching for all transaction types. This will enrich 

biographic matching capabilities by utilizing the confidence of biometrics, and will 

significantly enhance the ADIS/IDENT interface deployed during Phase 2. 

Data Integration. Building on Phase 2, data transfers among CBP, OBlM, and ICE 

systems will be streamlined and further automated. 

Enhance the Overstay Hotlist - Building on Phase 2, CBP will expand capability, 

including the use of additional law enforcement and counterterrorism data in the Hotlist 

for TCE. 

User-Defined Rules Development. Capability will be developed for end users (lCE 

agents) to create rule sets within ATS-P as threats evolve; capability will allow for 

prioritization of overstays meeting certain criteria. 

The Overstay Validation and Vetting effort has proven to be valuable in more quickly and 

accurately identifying overstays. It has strengthened data requirements, identified overstays of 

national security concern, and automated manual efforts. As DHS and CBP proceed into 

Phase 3, we will keep the committees apprised of this information as the program moves 

forward. 

B. Document Validation 

Individuals regularly attempt to travel using fraudulent documents, including imposters 

attempting to use valid documents, documents that have been altered, and fake documents. Air 

carriers may unwittingly transmit this incorrect passenger manifest information to CBP; this 

fraudulent information inhibits CBP's ability to properly vet the traveler for security and law 

enforcement concerns and hinders DHS' s ability to match arrival and departure records. 

CBP's Document Validation program will compare carrier-submitted pre-departure manifest 

data to issuance infonnation. Through Document Validation, incorrect visa infonnation 

submitted in a manifest will be identified before the issuance of a boarding pass, preventing 

individuals from traveling on expired, revoked, or fraudulent visas. Interactive response 

messaging advises the carrier when the traveler: 

Is Authorized to Board - pre-departure manifest information matches a source record. 

Could not be Validated - no matching source record is found; carrier must correct. 

Should not be Boarded - matching source record is found but adverse information exists. 

Is Pending Review - source record is found but requires documentary review. 

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CBP recommends that the carrier only board travelers that receive an "Authorized to Board" 

message. Although CBP cannot prohibit boarding as TSA does through the Secure Flight 

program, CBP will issue a recommendation to the carrier when significant concerns are 

identified. Carriers who board an individual against this recommendation may be subject to 

fines and additional expenses associated with returning the inadmissible passenger. 

Document Validation is being developed and deployed through several phases. CBP is currently 

in the first phase, which is validation of visas (both immigrant and nonimmigrant). Subsequent 

phases will include validation of additional types ofU.S.-issued travel documents. Currently, 

one airline is using document validation for 34 weekly flights, with two additional airlines 

activating test flights in the fall of2013. Outreach to all air carriers has started, and the carriers 

fully support implementing Document Validation. 

As CBP deploys Document Validation, it will need to request additional funding to cover the 

cost of subsequent phases of Document Validation (beyond the first phase) and seek regulatory 

authority to mandate carrier compliance. Although CBP does not today have the legal authority 

to prohibit boarding as TSA does through Secure Flight, CBP is able to fine carriers that provide 

inaccurate APIS manifest information or that board passengers who do not have appropriate 

documentation. CBP expects airlines to fully participate because carriers have a financial 

incentive to do so. 

C. Land Entry/Exit Program 

Recording the exit of travelers departing the United States is especially challenging in the land 

environment, given the lack of physical infrastructure in departure lanes at the land ports. There 

are no inspection booths or facilities at departure lanes comparable to those for entry lanes. For 

example, the port at San Ysidro, California, is the largest entry-exit port for travelers coming to 

or leaving the United States. It has 25 entry lanes for vehicular tramc and approximately 4 for 

exit. For this reason, DHS has explored options for the recording of a foreign national's 

departure that does not rely on significant infrastructure development. Congress has recognized 

the difficulties inherent in development of exit capabilities in the land environment. 

1. U.S.-Canadian Border 

As described in the May 2012 report, the Beyond the Border Declaration II gave DHS an 

opportunity to develop a low-cost way to collect exit information along the northern border of 

the United States. The Beyond the Border Declaration involves a series of commitments made 

by the United States and Canada to exchange data for a number of border enforcement and 

immigration security initiati ves; one of these is that the United States and Canada will serve as 

the exit function for the other country by exchanging entry records. Land entries into one 

country will serve as exit records from the other. 

II Uniled Slales-Camda Be) ond Ihe Border: A Shared Vision [or Perimeler Seetlril) and Eeononrie 

Compeliliveness, AelionPlaI~ December 2011. Accessible aI hllp:!/www.wlrilehotise.gov/silesldcfatllllfiles/tlseamda_ bIb _ aeliollj.Jlan3 .pdf. 

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If a traveler enters Canada from the United States across our shared land border, the Canada 

Border Services Agency (CBSA) transmits that entry data back to CBP, which uses the data as 

the record of the individual's departure from the United States. In return, the United States does 

the same for Canada. Through this mechanism, each country has achieved a land exit solution 

by working together and negating the need for costly new physical infrastructure or processes 

that could interfere with the flow of travel or trade in the border region. 

There are three phases for the entry/exit information system described in Beyond the Border. In 

the first phase, Canada and the United States implemented a pilot project exchanging entry data 

for third-country nationals, permanent residents of Canada, and US. lawful permanent residents, 

who entered either country through four common land ports. 12 The two countries exchanged 

biographic entry data only on third-country nationals and permanent residents, not US. or 

Canadian citizens. The first phase of the project was deployed on time from September 30, 

2012, until January 16,2013. 

The results exceeded expectations in terms of the ability of both countries to reconcile entry and 

exit records. Canada reconciled 94.5 percent of the records received from the United States, 

while the United States reconciled 97.4 percent of the records received from Canada. This 

means that the United States is able to verify the exit of a significant number of individuals, 

which will only increase in subsequent phases. CBP expects that these percentages will increase 

in subsequent phases with the inclusion of all land POEs at the northern border and as the causes 

for any non-reconciliation in this phase are better identified and subsequently rectified. On 

May 14,2013, CBP and CBSA published ajoint report for the first phase of this entry/exit 

project. 13 

In the second phase of the project, which was deployed on time on June 30, 2013,14 Canada and 

the United States expanded the program exchanging the entry data for third-country nationals, 

permanent residents of Canada, and US. lawful permanent residents in the United States, to 

entry points at a11 automated common land ports. 15 As a result of these exchanges, the 

United States now has a fully functioning land border exit system on its northern border for 

non-US. and non-Canadian citizens. Specific data in terms of overstays identified and other 

metrics will be available in the coming months. 

By June 30,2014, Canada and the United States will implement the third phase of the project, 

expanding the program to include the exchange of entry data for all travelers (including U.S. and 

Canadian citizens) who enter through any automated common land ports on the northern border. 

Overall, this initiative is expected to enhance the ability to identify departures and successfully 

match entry and exit records at the land border for the first time. 

12 The four locations were Peace Arcll Pacific Highway. R..'linbow Bridge, and QuccnstovnllLcwislon. 

13 hUp://"" ".cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news _ rcicasesimliomV051420 13_ 6.xml 

I' hUp:/!""" .cbp.gov !xp/cgov /newsroom/news _ rcicasesimliomV070320 13 .xml 

15 An autollmtcd l.'md border port is one in ,,,,hich data arc collected electronically. AUtOll1.'ltcd land ports currcnUy 

colicel well over 99 percelll of lhe traffIc of llrird';::olllllTy naliomls on bolh sides of lhe border. 

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2. U.S.-Mexican Border 

Given the successes in development with the u.S.-Canada entry/exit program, CBP is seeking to 

develop a similar program with the Government of Mexico and determine what options exist in 

terms of collection ofbiographic information on the southern border. CBP is currently 

developing a plan that will analyze the existing opportunities and short- and long-term options 

for the development of exit capability. 

There are stark differences between the northern and southern borders that will make a land 

entry/exit program on the southern border more challenging. Unlike Canada, Mexico does not 

have fixed physical structures at every major POE on its border with the United States to process 

travelers entering Mexico, nor does it have data collection procedures similar to the United 

States and Canada. Additionally, Mexico accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total land 

border crossings. In FY 2012, 234 million travelers crossed into the United States through a land 

POEs. Of the 234 million, 162 million entered through the southern border with Mexico. 

Despite these obstacles, CBP will continue to research the potential for outbound data collection 

at the southern border, including: collection of usable departure information as part of existing 

CBP outbound enforcement processes, such as "pulse and surge" operations 16 ; feasibility of the 

exchange of any available data with the Mexican Government concerning travelers who enter 

Mexico at certain POEs; and feasibility of the exchange of any available data with the Mexican 

Government concerning travelers who are processed at facilities in the interior of Mexico. 

CBP will keep the committees updated on any progress toward a similar data exchange on the 

southern border of the United States. 

10 "Pulse and Surge" arc slralegies whereb~ CBP offIcers morulor oulbound lraffIc on lhe U.S. soullrem border. Sec 

Testimony of COlllmissioner Alan Bersill, U.S. COlllmissioner of Customs and Border Protection before the Senate 

Caucus on Illlenralioml Nareotics Conlrol. March 9. 20 j j. Accessible al 

hUp:!!www.dllS.gOV!nc,vsJ20 IJl03!09llcslilllony -collllllissioner-alan-bersin-us-cusloms-and -border-prolcctionsenate-caucus. Allhollgh the purpose of "pulse and surge" is to counter traffic in drugs. currency. and firearms into 

Mexico. dala collecled during lhesc opcrations could bc used 10 crealc deparlure records [or foreign mliorrals. 

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IV. Progress on Biometric Exit 

The May 2012 report summarized the history of the biometric exit pilot programs already 

undertaken by DHS, the lessons learned from pilot programs, and the DHS shift to researching 

emerging technologies for a biometric exit program. DHS learned from pilot programs that an 

exit system must seamlessly integrate biometric collection into existing traveler procedures and 

travel industry business processes. Deploying a solution that is inconvenient to travelers is not 

likely to be successful and will be met with passenger and private-sector resistance. 

Additionally, an exit system must effectively control labor costs. Tn previous pilots, labor costs 

were the most significant expense and the majority of the cost in implementing a biometric exit 

capability. It is necessary to identify a biometric technology and collection process that can 

collect biometrics at a location that gives the highest assurance that the traveler departed, without 

requiring significant staffing to support biometric collection. Lastly, the pilot programs 

reinforced the principle that impacts should be minimized on the airlines and travel authorities 

DHS Components must be able to work collaboratively with the carriers and facility operators to 

ensure a successful biometric air exit program that does not slow or adversely affect lawful 

travel. 

DHS shifted its approach to research emerging technologies for a biometric exit program and 

turned to DHS S&T, in collaboration with CBP, to conduct further evaluation and testing. As 

part of this etIort, DHS S&T will expand collaboration with the National Institute for Standards 

and Technology to evaluate new operational concepts based on new biometric technologies (not 

previously available for testing in pilots), and inform the design of more effective, cost-effective, 

and atfordable approaches. DHS S&T will conduct testing activities within a formative 

evaluation framework, including process, outcome, and cost components to allow comprehensive 

analysis of the costs and benetits associated with both enhanced biographic exit and biometric 

exit. In addition, DHS S&T will engage private industry to accelerate the development of costeffective technologies that will meet DHS's needs. 

The May 2012 report also provided a schedule toward implementation of such a program, from 

testing in 2015 toward deployment by 2016-2018, iffeasible. The following subsections 

summarize the progress DHS has made in the biometric exit program since then. 

A. Apex Agreement 

CBP and DHS S&T have created an Apex Project titled Air EntrylExit Re-Engineering (AEER) 

to assist CBP in addressing its challenges, as well as to enable DHS to meet the mandate for a 

biometric air exit capability. Apex Programs are DHS S&T initiatives that focus on crosscutting or multi-disciplinary etforts, which are initially requested by DHS Components and are 

of a high priority, high value, and urgent nature. 

The purpose of the AEER Project is to analyze, develop, test, pilot, and evaluate integrated 

approaches to biometrically confinn the departure of non-U. S. citizens at U.S. airports, as well as 

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to introduce more efficient traveler facilitation processes and effective biometric technologies to 

screen travelers entering the United States. Although current legislation focuses on biometric 

exit, improvements must be made to the end-to-end process, from entry to exit, to be most 

effective. 

As an Apex agreement, DHS S&T has authorized funding to support the underlying operations 

and will spend approximately $11 million in FY 2013 on this effort 

The goals of the project are to: 1) develop recommended approaches and implement 

technologies for cost-effective and integrated Air Exit biometric capabilities; and 2) identify and 

implement technologies and enhancements to existing airport Air Entry operations for inspecting 

and examining travelers entering the United States. Deliverables under the Apex agreement 

include development and testing of multiple candidate biometric exit concepts. The program 

also will include computer modeling and simulation of biometric air exit processes to evaluate 

potential candidates, and economic analyses of impacts on operations. 

B. Baseline for Biometric Exit 

DHS, under S&T leadership, conducted operational surveys of US. international airports from 

April through August 2013. The visits are reviewing existing operations and airport facilities in 

order to factor them into upcoming analysis and testing. DHS S&T is visiting major 

international airports in the following cities: 

Atlanta 

Chicago 

Las Vegas 

Los Angeles 

Miami 

New York 

San Francisco 

Washington 

The surveys will depict a baseline of the "as-is" operational processes and capacity and provide 

the operational requirements and capability gaps. Results will be analyzed to identify and 

prioritize which parts of the Air Entry/Exit process are potential areas of opportunity to introduce 

different processes or new technologies that will help CBP facilitate traveler entry and 

implement a biometric exit capability. 

C. Outreach to Carriers and Airports 

Since February 2013, DHS also has begun its outreach to airlines and airports, seeking their 

assistance for biometric air exit testing. DHS has requested operating guidelines from airlines, to 

minimize the impact any future pilot test would have on live exit testing. Discussions with 

airports, airport authorities, airlines, and specific industry organizations are ongoing. 

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D. Biometric Exit Test Capability 

DHS S&T is establishing an Air Entry/Exit Demonstration/Test Bed to test biometric entry and 

exit concepts in a laboratory setting to include simulated scenarios that will mimic operationally 

relevant environments. The design was completed and a test location identified in May 2013 (in 

Landover. Maryland). The test capability is expected to be available by the end of calendar year 

2013 with biometric entry and exit testing commencing in early calendar year 2014. 

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v. Agency Realignment 

P.L 113-6 created a new structure within DHS for operational control of the entry/exit and 

overstay analysis programs. Entry/exit policy and operations were moved from US-VISIT to 

CBP. The overstay analysis function was moved from US-VISIT to ICE. The remaining parts 

of the US-VISIT program became OBIM. 

There are several implications to the shifting offunctions. CBP now maintains the overall 

entry/exit mission for DHS. ICE now conducts analysis of overstays on the basis of data 

collected by appropriate DHS Components and placed in ADTS. OBTM now focuses primarily 

on biometrics and supporting components as biometric capabilities are introduced. Overall, 

operational work in this mission area now resides exclusively in operational components, which 

in tum rely on other parts ofDHS for support. CBP fully supports this realignment, embraces 

the new entry/exit mission, and will work to continue the efforts discussed to improve the 

existing nationwide entry/exit system with the goal offurther enhancing the integrity of the US 

immigration system. 

Because of the extensive planning that occurred over the past year, the transitions of staff to CBP 

and ICE (as directed in the FY 2013 full-year appropriations bill) were successful and are now 

complete. CBP created an entry/exit transformation office, which is developing specified 

deli verables to implement an entry/exit program over the coming months and years. CBP will 

work closely with ICE, OBIM, and other parts ofDHS to further this important mission. 

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VI. Conclusion 

CBP is committed to providing to the American public an immigration system with operational 

integrity. An integral component of this effort is to have an exit system that enables DRS to 

better identify and sanction those who overstay their period oflawful admission to the 

United States. 

CBP is advancing aggressively to enhance our existing capabilities. CBP is improving its data 

collection upon departure, improving its ability to match entry and exit records, and developing 

technology and procedures to take immediate action against overstays who meet national 

security and public safety criteria. In addition, CBP is developing new sources of exit data and is 

taking administrative action, at a minimum, for all overstays identified. CBP is progressing on a 

fiscally conservative, thoughtful, and responsible path to deploy a comprehensive biographic and 

biometric entry/exit system. 

CBP and DRS S&T continue to advance the research and development for potential biometric air 

exit program options and are identifying operational concepts that are feasible in the current 

environment at U.S. airports and seaports. CBP and DHS S&T will begin testing concepts in 

early calendar year 2014, which will significantly inform future efforts. 

Overall, DHS has significantly improved the existing entry/exit system throughout all 

operational environments and will further the biographic efforts while working toward a feasible 

biometric solution. DHS will continue to keep Congress apprised of its efforts in developing an 

immigration system that has the full confidence of the American people. 

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