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THE CABLE ACT AT 20 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 24, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

RICHARD M. RUSSELL, Republican Staff Director 

DAVID QUINALTY, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 24, 2012 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator DeMint ................................................................................. 2 

Statement of Senator Kerry .................................................................................... 4 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 7 

Statement of Senator Isakson ................................................................................. 53 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 55 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 57 

Statement of Senator Udall .................................................................................... 59 

WITNESSES

Hon. Gordon H. Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Broadcasters ........................................................................................ 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Melinda Witmer, Executive Vice President and Chief Video and Content 

Officer, Time Warner Cable ................................................................................ 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Martin D. Franks, Executive Vice President of Planning, Policy and Government Affairs, CBS Corporation ........................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Colleen Abdoulah, Chairwoman and Chief Executive Officer, WOW! Internet, 

Cable, and Phone; Chairwoman, American Cable Association ........................ 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Dr. Mark Cooper, Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America ........ 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Preston Padden, Senior Fellow, Silicon Flatirons Center, Colorado Law, University of Colorado ............................................................................................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47 

APPENDIX

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared statement ............ 65 

Letter dated July 20, 2012 to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV and Senator 

Kay Bailey Hutchison from David Boylan, Chair, ABC Television Affiliates 

Association ............................................................................................................ 65 

Letter dated July 20, 2012 to Hon. Daniel K. Inouye from Jamie Hartnett, 

Executive Director, Hawaii Association of Broadcasters, Inc. .......................... 67 

Letter dated July 23, 2012 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Paul A. 

FitzPatrick, President and CEO, RLTV ............................................................. 67 

Letter dated July 24, 2012 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from Annette 

Garcia, President, Son Broadcasting—KCHF TV 11 ........................................ 68 

Benjamin Orr White, Private Citizen, State of Hawaii, testimony ..................... 69 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Gordon H. Smith by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 84 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 84 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 87 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 88 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 92 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 101 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 103 

Response to written questions submitted to Melinda Witmer by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 105 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 105 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 107 

Page

IV 

Response to written questions submitted to Melinda Witmer by—Continued 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 108 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 110 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 115 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 116 

Response to written questions submitted to Martin Franks by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 116 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 117 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 118 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 119 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 121 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 126 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 127 

Response to written questions submitted to Colleen Abdoulah by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 129 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 129 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 130 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 131 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 132 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 136 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 137 

Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Mark Cooper by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 137 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 137 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 138 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 138 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 141 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 141 

Responses to written question submitted to Preston Padden by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 141 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg ............................................................................... 142 

Hon. Mark Warner ........................................................................................... 142 

Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison ............................................................................. 143 

Hon. Jim DeMint .............................................................................................. 147 

Hon. Kelly Ayotte ............................................................................................. 148 

(1) 

THE CABLE ACT AT 20 

TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in Room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller 

IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

I thank our witnesses for being here, for coming whatever distances you have come, and even if they are short, we are still glad 

you are here. 

Two decades ago we passed the Cable Act to promote competition 

and to provide consumers with expanded choices at lower rates. 

Today many consumers have a choice of video providers, cable, satellite, and phone companies. Hundreds of channels have been created catering to almost every interest imaginable. Most people do 

not watch most of them. The Internet now allows us to watch video 

on not just our televisions but also our computers, our tablets, and 

our phones. 

I know that many in the industry will argue that the Cable Act 

achieved its goals. I will not go along with that argument. I highly 

doubt that many consumers would agree. They feel that they have 

to pay too much and they have very little choice in picking the content that they desire to receive or can receive. 

As this committee continues its discussion about the future of the 

video, we must take a hard look at the Cable Act’s impact on modern television and the marketplace. I understand that some want 

to make this hearing about retransmission consent, and I agree 

that millions of Americans who are currently victims of a number 

of high-profile, ongoing programming disputes deserve answers as 

to why their screens have gone dark. That has happened in West 

Virginia. Overheated rhetoric alleging greed and bad faith is of little comfort to somebody paying for services that they are not getting. 

That is what the health insurance industry did to us, and we 

stopped it. They cannot do that anymore. They are very unhappy 

about it and they have actually had to return $4 billion of rebates 

because we passed a law which the Supreme Court upheld. So $4 

billion. I am getting phone calls from people who have gotten 

checks in the mail because their health insurance company obviVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
2 

ously was going to continue to try and only look at the bottom line, 

forget the consumer until the law passed. Now the law has passed 

and now they know they are going to get caught because they are 

being watched. And $4 billion in a year back to consumers, that is 

pretty good. 

It was certainly of no comfort to the tens of thousands of West 

Virginians who needed access to news, weather, and emergency information as they were recovering from a natural disaster earlier 

this month, actually about the largest one, I guess, in the history 

of the state. When consumers lose channels in these corporate disputes, they should get a refund, I believe. I think you do not believe that. I do and I think it is only fair. 

But retransmission consent is just part of a puzzle. Although 

consumers often have the choice of video providers, rates continue 

to go up faster than the rate of inflation, year in and year out and 

year forever. They are tired of it. I am tired of it. And rather than 

being able to pick smaller packages or choose the channels they 

want, consumers are still forced to purchase larger and larger 

packages of channels no matter how few they actually watch. 

This says to me that the market is not working. Real competition 

should be bringing rates down. It is my general impression that 

those I look at at the witness table, minus one or two, that your 

profit margins are very, very high, maybe 30 to 40 percent per 

year, and the question that I would pose to you is that for you this 

hearing is about how can we make this work for corporate America 

in the world of television, et cetera. My point of this hearing and 

my point in chairing this committee is how can we do a better job 

of protecting consumers. How can we do a better job of protecting 

consumers to make sure they get what they want, that they do not 

have to pay more than they should for it, that the companies involved are thinking about consumers? First, companies always say 

that, but rarely do that. 

Real competition, as I said, should be driving rates down, and it 

should be driving development. It should be bringing consumers 

more choices, and it should be spurring new, innovative products. 

Today I want to take a close look at several core questions about 

the Cable Act. Why has competition not succeeded in bringing rates 

down and more programming choices and more selection within 

those choices? Should the protections in the Cable Act for various 

entities be maintained? How do we make sure that consumers are 

protected and see real benefits as video moves to the Internet, 

where people are increasingly watching? 

To our witnesses, again I say thank you for being here. I look forward to your thoughts on these questions, and thank you for joining us. 

And now Senator DeMint, to be followed by Senator Kerry. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing and for your continued interest in the video market. 

The communications sector, particularly video distribution, is one 

of the most dynamic, innovative, and competitive in our consumer 

3 

economy, as shown by the FCC’s long overdue video competition report released last Friday. 

It is important for us, Mr. Chairman, to remind ourselves of 

what is the role of government as it comes to this industry and others. It is not our role to manage or to control any business or industry in this country. In fact, our role is more of providing a good 

legal and regulatory structure for competition to flourish. When 

that competition is not there, the government does have to play a 

role, a surrogate role, to protect the consumers, but hopefully we 

know, as we look out across the free enterprise system in this country today, that the best protection for consumers is competition and 

choice. 

The law at issue today, the 1992 Cable Act, did not contemplate 

the dynamic market we now have, but rather simply answered 

problems in a snapshot of the market as it was 20 years ago. I 

think today’s competitive offerings from satellite to telephone companies, rapidly expanding online video services, and more than 500 

non-broadcast networks that are now clearly available were not 

available in 1992. 

Last year I introduced the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act to begin withdrawing government meddling from the 

video industry. There are two primary government interventions in 

the video market which my bill repeals: compulsory copyright licenses and retransmission consent. As the Committee educates 

itself and moves toward action on these issues, I want to make 

clear that the repeal of both of these government interventions 

must occur in tandem if we are to make lasting progress. Broadcasting is a wonderful technology and industry. I believe there is 

tremendous consumer interest and benefit in locally oriented programming, and I believe there is tremendous value which locally 

produced broadcast programming brings to the market. 

I do not believe, however, that local broadcasters need government intervention to be viable. It is actually the very competition 

we have today among many competing video distribution services 

that favors broadcasters. To the extent broadcast programming is 

compelling and marketable to viewers, pay-TV providers have an 

interest in acquiring the rights to carry that programming on their 

subscription services. 

It is this competitive dynamic among pay-TV providers which did 

not exist in 1992 that today makes government protection of the 

broadcasting industry unnecessary. That dynamic would not 

change because of my legislation. In fact, it seems that a right 

grounded in constitutional copyright is preferable to a manufactured right, retransmission consent, which will constantly be 

threatened by industry lobbyists, FCC bureaucrats, and meddling 

politicians. I believe my bill removes government intervention, 

thereby allowing unencumbered private parties to negotiate contracts based on private property rights. 

It is time to recognize that retransmission consent negotiations 

are not actually free market negotiations. They are more accurately 

an inefficient proxy for free market carriage negotiations based on 

copyright licensing like those for more than the 500 non-broadcast 

networks which get carried in the market today. Unfortunately, a 

copyright-based negotiation for broadcast programming was preVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
4 

vented by Congress with the passage of the compulsory licensing 

for cable and satellite providers beginning in 1976. They also are 

affected by punitive measures which limit the rights of consumers 

and pay-TV providers, including the mandate on cable companies 

to place broadcast channels on their basic service tiers and the 

mandate on consumers to purchase those basic tiers. That answers 

one of the chairman’s questions, why do consumers have to buy 

things they do not want. Part of it is we require them to. 

Make no mistake. Retransmission consent was and is a construct 

of lobbyists and politicians. It is not the model that would have developed in a free market, and it is not a model rooted in constitutional property rights. It was a right created out of whole cloth to 

combat a cable monopoly and make up for an earlier government 

imposition, the compulsory copyright license. Today the cable monopoly is gone with two nationwide satellite services, widely available competitive video services from traditional telephone providers, and online video distributors available to any home with 

broadband. In short, the 1992 Act is obsolete. 

Also, the existence and widespread copyright-based carriage of 

more than 500 non-broadcast networks is proof that video compulsory licensing is likewise no longer needed. 

Cable and satellite companies have, unfortunately, long sought 

remedies which invite further government involvement in the marketplace, but these suggested fixes would only add to the existing 

framework of mandates and restrictions when what we need is a 

simpler rulebook for all market participants. We should work together in this committee to encourage more innovation, new competition, job creation, and consumer freedom and remove rules 

written to serve the last century’s business and regulatory models. 

The next generation television marketplace does just that. 

Mr. Chairman, our nation’s laws regarding the video marketplace include mandates on individual consumers and businesses, 

they violate the property rights of content creators, and they treat 

similar services differently. I believe we should be creating a deregulatory parity in the video market so investment and innovation, not lawyers and lobbyists, is rewarded in a free economy to 

the ultimate benefit of consumers. 

I want to again express my sincere interest in working together 

with you, Mr. Chairman, to seek ways to improve our laws and regulations to better serve competition, innovation, the national economy, and most importantly, American consumers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator DeMint. 

The Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Kerry? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

it, and I appreciated listening just now to Senator DeMint’s, future 

Ranking Member’s, comments as we sort of examine this. 

The Cable Act at 20. It is interesting to analyze it and look at 

it. I think most people would agree that it kind of brought us what 

we wanted, which was pretty broad-based competition. And I think 

that is one of the things we are going to need to analyze, Mr. 

5 

Chairman, to what degree did we really create a playing field with 

a lot of competition in it. 

It is good to have Senator Smith back. Mr. Smith is back in 

Washington, and I appreciate your being here. I would be very interested in your comments after this hearing of what it is like to 

be on the other side of the table and what your reactions are. 

But as I listened to Senator DeMint, boy, there is a real divide 

here which is going to be interesting to see how we manage it because Senator DeMint would repeal the retransmission consent and 

must-carry systems, along with a number of other things, repeal 

the statutory copyright license, repeal the broadcast television 

basic tier rules, the buy-through prohibition, and the existing 

media ownership rules. That is a mouthful. 

And in the end, what we are going to need to look at, Mr. Chairman, is what is the impact of that, because as I read it, it would 

essentially make broadcast channels just like any other cable channel, meaning that the cable companies could purchase the content 

from a single source or multiple sources rather than from the local 

broadcaster. I think everybody would agree that is going to have 

a profound impact on the distribution in the marketplace. It would 

have a profound impact, I think, ultimately on the concentration of 

ownership, which has been one of the fundamentals that guided us 

as we did the 1992 Act. It would do nothing to resolve this question 

of negotiating stalemates, and it would result probably in very few 

broadcasters being around, I would suspect. So we are going to 

have to look at that very closely. 

And I would just ask the Senator to keep his mind open to think 

about those impacts because to make the cable law in 1992, Mr. 

Chairman, it is good to remember that we had to overcome a Presidential veto. We did. We did it on a bipartisan basis fundamentally 

making the judgment that we were protecting consumers, promoting competition, and preserving the viability of local broadcasting. And as we look to update the law, I think it is going to 

be important for the Committee to keep those goals in mind, and 

we obviously have to put to test the propriety of them or the viability of them, but I would suspect they are pretty viable today. 

So among other things, the 1992 Act created the current retransmission consent regime, and with Time Warner Cable and Hearst 

recently ending the latest retransmission consent dispute, which 

saw service disrupted for millions of households, that subject probably is going to take up some of this hearing. 

Chairman Rockefeller in his opening comments raised this question also of the rising rates and of the hopes for competition to be 

able to deal with that. I might mention that in the most recent dispute, the station that was pulled from Time Warner Cable in the 

Boston area during that period, WCVB, was recently named as the 

Edward R. Murrow Award winner for the Nation’s most outstanding news operation. It is a broadcast operation. And we take 

pride in that. We want to see it succeed and obviously receive fair 

compensation for the retransmission of its signal. But we do not 

want to see the pulling of signals repeatedly used as the common 

tool for arriving at a resolution between distributors and broadcasters. It simply is not fair to consumers who get trapped. 

6 

And this is not a new problem. I chaired a hearing on this in 

2010 after disputes threatened viewer access to the Oscars and the 

World Series that year. I asked the FCC to explore its authority 

to help protect consumers, but the FCC Chairman concluded that 

he lacked the legal authority to intervene during an impasse in negotiations, and as a result, disputes and standoffs now continue 

with millions of consumers being affected. 

Some people argue that these disruptions are okay because cable 

subscribers can simply switch to satellite service, but switching in 

fact does not protect consumers from the disputes. In March 2011, 

Dish customers in 17 markets lost their CBS, Fox, NBC, and CW 

signals for 6 days, and earlier this year, DirecTV and Sunbeam 

Television reached an impasse in the weeks leading up to the 

Super Bowl which, as you can imagine, caused certainly huge consternation in New England because the New England Patriots were 

playing. Fortunately, the signal was restored prior to the game. 

Unfortunately, the Patriots lost the game. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KERRY. In extreme cases, it may be that pulling the signal is a broadcaster’s only choice, but I think good faith negotiations—there ought to be a way to set up a process for a negotiation 

to be exhausted and consumers still ought to be able to have access 

during some kind of temporary negotiating impasse to live events 

like college bowl games or the World Series or debates for public 

officials or the Oscars and so forth. 

Now, I want to personally preserve local broadcasting. I do not 

think that means the government has to somehow intervene or sustain it, but a fair, competitive structure can be set up to recognize 

their values and the values of their programming. And I would not 

personally support a radical proposal to eliminate a retransmission 

consent right or must-carry requirements altogether, but I do want 

to shield consumers from unfair treatment or from being used as 

pawns in negotiations. 

And, Mr. Chairman, the disputes obviously also occur between 

distributors and non-broadcast channel owners, including the recent dispute between Viacom and DirecTV and AMC and Dish. But 

those disputes do not elicit the same level of concern because those 

station owners do not have public interest obligations. They do, 

however, raise questions about how to appropriately value bundled 

channels where stations in the bundle are dramatically more valuable than others, and that is tricky obviously. 

So I would hope the industry would really step up here and construct an alternative to the disruption of service during negotiations, and I would urge the FCC to complete its pending Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking on retransmission consent. And I hope we 

here on the Committee will explore the role of the Internet as an 

alternative vehicle for accessing video content. 

So I think we need to think about the degree to which consumers 

can customize their consumption of media and control over spending. I think that our obligation is to maximize that access and 

maximize that control, and that will come through really fair and 

open competition where you cannot have the kinds of imbalances 

that have occurred. 

7 

So, Mr. Chairman, these are important issues. They have social, 

they have civic, they have economic, and they have in the end, vast 

educational and political implications for all of the working families 

and citizens and consumers of our country. And I look forward to 

working with you on them because they are really critical to how 

information will flow and sort of what kind of discourse and access 

to information we will have in our country. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry. 

The Ranking Member, Senator Hutchison? 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize 

for being late. 

I am not going to read my full statement, but just to say, I guess 

we can tell from the last two statements that have been made 

there will be a lot of disagreement about the way forward. 

We can agree that 20 years ago when the first bill was passed, 

that things have exploded since then, and on the one hand, you can 

say, well, the competition is so diverse now that not having another 

big regulatory overreach is maybe a good thing, which in general 

I think we certainly have a lot of competition. On the other hand, 

the issues that have arisen from all of the proliferation of options 

has also caused some of the investment that has been made to be 

obsolete. So how do we deal with that? 

I am very anxious to hear what our witnesses say because it is 

a very diverse group of experiences that are before us. So I will not 

put my statement in the record, but I will be interested in what 

enlightenment you can give us that would give us only what is necessary to be done. I do not want to regulate any more than is absolutely necessary, but how do we keep a level playing field? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did the gentlelady, as they say in the House, say 

that she did not want to put her statement in the record because 

she did not. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I did not. I will not. 

Senator COONS. Well, what if I want to? 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, my statement is pretty sophomoric 

compared to all of the issues that we are facing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator HUTCHISON. So I am going to just listen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I back off. 

Our first witness will be former Senator, Gordon Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Association of Broadcasters. 

And we do not have a lot of time. We have a lot of charts and 

perhaps a lot of testimony, and we have a lot of people who will 

have a lot of questions. So be concise please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS 

Mr. SMITH. I will be as quick as I can, Chairman Rockefeller. 

Thank you. I thank Ranking Member Hutchison and the members of this committee. It was my privilege to serve with you on 

8 

this prestigious committee. Remembering that privilege, it is my 

pleasure now to return and represent a great trade association, the 

National Association of Broadcasters. I also thank all of the broadcasters from around the country who have come to participate in 

this hearing. 

Part of what has made my new job at NAB so fulfilling is the 

focus that broadcasters have on public service. With a father that 

worked for Eisenhower and a mother with the last name of ‘‘Udall,’’ 

public service remains an important value to me. 

In large cities and small, in blue states and red, local television 

stations are an indispensable source for quality entertainment, 

high profile sporting events, emergency weather warnings and disaster coverage that can literally make the difference between life 

and death. We serve tens of millions of Americans every day, are 

responsible for close to 700,000 U.S. jobs, and are the primary advertising conduit for businesses, small and large, in communities of 

all sizes across this great country. Local broadcast television is a 

wholly unique video service because it is free. It is locally focused 

and it is always on, even when pay-TV, wireless and broadband 

networks may fail. 

That is precisely what is at stake today as we review the 1992 

Cable Act which enables a local television model that is the envy 

of the world. Respectfully, I ask that you focus on the possible devastating impacts that proposed changes in the law could have on 

broadcast localism and on the 56 million Americans that rely on 

free local television stations every day. 

The 1992 Cable Act ushered in an era of unprecedented choice 

of television content and provided local TV stations the opportunity 

to finally realize their full value of our television signals through 

a free market system called ‘‘retransmission consent.’’ Some on this 

panel will argue that the retransmission consent system is 20 years 

old and is somehow broken. I would submit that even after 2 decades, the retransmission consent system is working just as the 

Committee wisely intended. 

There are over 5,800 cable companies in the United States. Only 

three-tenths of 1 percent of those cable companies have ever been 

party to a service disruption. The fact is over 99 percent of deals 

are amicably completed with no disruption to the consumer. If you 

take a closer look at the disruptions, you will find three companies, 

Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and Dish, that are principally the 

party for the vast majority of disruptions. These three pay-TV companies have been involved in three out of every four disruptions in 

2012. 

Now, let me be clear. We do not begrudge our pay-TV friends the 

right to make a profit, but when it comes to programming costs, 

fair is fair. Even after almost 20 years, television broadcasters still 

do not receive compensation commensurate with their ratings. The 

fact is demonstrated by this chart from SNL Kagan. The chart 

shows the total fees paid to cable companies. The dark blue represents the total retransmission fees to broadcasters. The light blue 

are the fees paid to basic cable networks. As you can see, in 2012, 

cable networks received just over $29 billion in fees, but local 

broadcasters received just over $2 billion. The wide disparity between fees for cable and broadcast channels does not reflect our 

9 

value in the marketplace. Broadcasters are not the source of rising 

cable fees. The cost of cable channels and cable profit margins are, 

of course, the source. 

And, of course, I know each of you is concerned with how contractual impasses between broadcasters and pay-TV companies affect 

your constituents. I remember that. What you should know is that 

some proposed changes could actually result in more consumer disruptions. Removing compulsory copyright license, for instance, 

would exponentially increase the number of rights holders that 

need to grant permission before a station’s programming is carried 

by a cable or satellite company, thereby certainly increasing the 

likelihood of increased consumer disruptions. Instead, we encourage more creative solutions to this issue. 

First, we urge the FCC to insist that pay-TV providers give viewers ample notice of a possible disruption in service. 

Second, the FCC should allow customers to easily switch among 

competing pay-TV providers without incurring financial penalties 

and also receive refunds when stations are unavailable. 

And third, we as broadcasters could do a better job by educating 

consumers about the availability of free, over-the-television with 

plugging in the antenna that comes with TV. 

In conclusion, Congress in its wisdom fostered what is unique 

across the globe, a local broadcasting system that provides local 

content and community-focused programming. It is how communities share common experiences. It is how you as Senators communicate with your constituents. It is a lifeline in moments of 

great peril. I urge you to carefully consider any changes to this 

truly remarkable broadcasting system. 

And I thank you all for having me here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

Thank you Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of 

the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today. I share so many 

fond memories of service on this committee and in serving with so many of you, that 

it is very meaningful to be a participant in today’s hearing. 

I am here on behalf of the 1,300 free, local, over-the-air television stations who 

are members of the National Association of Broadcasters. Those members are the 

local television stations that you and your constituents have come to know and depend on: the Quincy station in Bluefield, West Virginia—WVVA; the Post-Newsweek 

station in Houston, Texas—KPRC; the Saga station in Joplin, Missouri—KOAM; the 

Allbritton station in Little Rock, Arkansas—KATV; and the Hubbard station in Minneapolis, Minnesota—KSTP, to name a few. 

Local television stations are iconic brands that Americans identify with and rely 

on as a link to their local communities. I believe that everyone has a unique connection to local television—whether it is in the place where they grew up or where they 

live now. Local television is the go-to choice for news, emergency service, and entertainment and is what people depend on to stay connected daily. Importantly, broadcasters’ over-the-air signals enable these stations to remain available during times 

of crisis when other forms of communication may fail. 

Recent events have helped highlight the role local television stations play in providing life-saving coverage in times of emergency. Local broadcasters alert and inform viewers with critical information, as they did during the June derecho that 

swept through West Virginia and the Washington, D.C. region. Bluefield, West Virginia’s WVVA provided wall to wall coverage on the storm giving updates on power 

restoration, providing locations of shelter areas and cooling stations, and noting 

road closures in southern West Virginia and southwest Virginia. Local stations, like 

10 

WVVA, are a trusted source in such challenging times, and make a difference in 

people’s lives. 

Several times a year, your offices receive NAB’s newsletter, ‘‘License to Serve: A 

Chronicle of Broadcasters’ Community Initiatives.’’ This newsletter illustrates the 

many public service activities broadcasters organize on any given day across the 

country. A recent spring edition highlighted local broadcaster efforts in Kentucky 

and Indiana when tornadoes ripped through those two states. Last year, monthly 

editions covered the local broadcast response to the devastating weather in Missouri 

and Alabama. These newsletters can be found on NAB’s website, NAB.org, under 

Public Service Initiatives, and may be a great resource to your offices. Simply, these 

stories show local broadcasters at their best. 

A vibrant system of local television serving local communities is the underpinning 

of our system of telecommunications. Congress envisioned a system where local stations are given the opportunity to compete within defined television markets while 

serving a larger public interest. Local television stations take that responsibility 

very seriously by providing local news, programming, and services to their communities. As a result, local stations have immense value to all citizens. 

The viability of local broadcast stations, and their continued local service, is tied 

to their ability to negotiate for fair value and carriage of their signals through a 

process known as ‘‘retransmission consent.’’ In today’s competitive video market, retransmission consent compensation enables broadcasters to deliver free and locallyfocused programming and services. Broadcasters continue to reinvest their revenues 

in local news and coverage. In 2011, broadcasters hired more than 1,100 additional 

anchors, reporters, producers and news staff. Total employment in local television 

newsrooms grew by 4.3 percent to 27,653 employees. This is the second highest total 

on record. The average television station also set a new record in 2011 for the 

amount of local news aired—the average amount of news rose to five and a half 

hours per weekday last year. Retransmission consent is particularly significant for 

supporting local news operations in smaller markets with more limited advertising 

revenues. The fundamental fairness is apparent in allowing stations to negotiate for compensation from pay-TV providers that use a local station’s signal to attract subscribers. The value of the local signal encompasses a broadcaster’s assembly of the 

total programming package, as well as its promotion and distribution. Of course, 

this value is enhanced by the quality of broadcast programming, both local and national. With viewership and ratings, broadcast television is unparalleled—95 of the 

top 100 rated shows during the 2010–2011 television season were on broadcast TV. 

With respect to price, broadcasters receive only a fraction of the total carriage fees 

paid by cable companies. Carriers continue to pay considerably more for non-broadcast channels than for broadcast signals, even though the non-broadcast channels 

attract smaller audiences and yield lower ratings. 

When put in terms of the average consumer cable bill, the cost of carriage for 

broadcast-owned signals comprises 2 percent of the cost to the consumer, while nonbroadcast channels comprises 41 percent of that cost. Broadcast television accounts 

for 35 percent of all television viewership, yet broadcasters in total receive only 6.7 

percent of carriage fees. That number is projected for slow growth in coming years, 

but this market dynamic is affected by the suggestion of legislative or regulatory 

change. 

I often hear references to the 20-year-old carriage law as if that, by itself, justifies 

change. These references ignore how new and recent retransmission consent cash 

compensation is for television broadcasters. In the 1992 Cable Act, local television 

stations were given the option for carriage via a must-carry election or through the 

opportunity to negotiate. However, it has only been very recently that many local 

broadcasters have come to receive cash compensation for their signals through these 

negotiations. When some focus only on 1992, we should also remember that for 

many years carriers refused to pay cash to local broadcasters. The simple fact that 

the nature of the compensation for retransmission consent has changed does not 

demonstrate a problem. Rather, it shows the means of achieving the fairness that 

Congress contemplated has evolved along with the market. 

When some suggest that these laws are ripe for a rewrite, they misstate history 

and facts. Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) services were not a truly viable competitor to cable until Congress authorized local-into-local service in the Satellite Home 

Viewer Improvement Act of 1999. For households unable to receive local-into-local 

DBS service for one reason or another, a viable competitor to cable did not come 

until 2003 when regulatory changes brought fiber to the home. When these new 

market entrants began clamoring for local broadcast signals, marketplace competition finally vaulted retransmission consent into a revenue stream that began to 

compensate broadcasters for their true value. 

11 

Some proposals have emerged seeking to address aspects of television carriage 

and video programming. Last Congress, there were suggestions to expand the role 

of government in private business-to-business carriage negotiations. This Congress, 

legislation seeks to de-regulate the video marketplace. In evaluating each proposal, 

NAB suggests that the benchmark should be the impact on local broadcasters and 

their ability to continue offering the level of community service that viewers expect 

and deserve. 

In looking at S. 2008, there are some provisions that broadcast groups may look 

favorably upon and others that raise concerns and may require more thoughtful consideration. Language that would eliminate carriage provisions like retransmission 

consent and must-carry is a chief concern. These suggestions only fuel those carriers 

that would rather seek to change the law than engage in meaningful negotiation. 

They also come at a time when local television stations are more fully realizing the 

value of their signals. 

The legislation also proposes significant changes to cable and satellite compulsory 

licenses. While NAB could look favorably on the elimination of some of these licenses (such as the distant signal licenses), Congress should know that wholesale 

changes may well result in serious disruptions and diminish the availability of programming viewers have come to expect on their local stations. 

I understand that the intent of this proposal is for broadcasters to maintain control of the copyright interests through direct licensing and to allow for carriage negotiation. As I noted earlier, though, the local broadcasters’ value in its signal is 

not the same as the copyright interests in the programming elements. Many stations may be unable to undertake the expensive and cumbersome responsibility of 

direct licensing, and such a change might affect the ability of local stations to serve 

their local markets. 

Another impact is on those stations that simply elect carriage through must-carry 

rules rather than seeking compensation. Telecommunications policy has always acknowledged a public value to these stations and for viewers in a community to have 

access to local offerings. There is a community value in viewers being able to see 

WFMZ in Allentown, Pennsylvania and its localized and extensive news coverage of 

the northern tier of the Philadelphia market. There is also a community value to 

viewers being able to see religious, minority, and other niche programming. The legislation removes this carriage option which will leave many of these stations off systems and may weaken the diversity of offerings in markets and to viewers. 

We will continue to review and engage on this and other legislative proposals before the Committee. Our underlying goal is always to enable the continued viability 

of your local television stations to serve their communities. 

Also, as this committee continues its forward looking approach to communications 

policy, video programming providers—including broadcasters—may benefit from the 

deployment of new online video distribution platforms and competitive subscription 

television services. These platforms could provide new opportunities for local broadcast stations to reach more local viewers and augment program services to their 

communities. 

To achieve these public policy objectives, broadcasters must continue to have the 

right to control the distribution of their signals and to negotiate with broadband 

video service providers seeking to retransmit such signals. If new technologies are 

allowed to evade retransmission consent and exploit broadcasters’ signals without 

local stations’ consent, the viability of those stations—and their ability to serve their 

local communities with high quality programming—will be lost. 

In conclusion, local broadcasters serve the public interest and have a unique position in the telecommunications marketplace, both today and well into the future. As 

Congress shapes policy to address the hyper-competitive television marketplace, it 

is essential that key underpinnings, such as broadcast television carriage, remain 

cornerstone public policy goals. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Smith, and I appreciate your interest in refunds. It has worked well with the 

health insurance industry, as I indicated. 

Our next witness is Ms. Melinda Witmer, Executive Vice President and Chief Video and Content Officer, Time Warner Cable, not 

a small operation. 

12 

STATEMENT OF MELINDA WITMER, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF VIDEO AND CONTENT OFFICER, TIME 

WARNER CABLE 

Ms. WITMER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, and members of the Committee. My name is Melinda 

Witmer of Time Warner Cable. Thank you for inviting me here to 

appear today. 

Nearly 20 years ago, Congress passed legislation intended to promote innovation in the video marketplace by fostering the development of competitive alternatives to cable. The 1992 Act also sought 

to preserve local broadcasting by giving station owners a subsidy 

through a new regulatory right called ‘‘retransmission consent.’’ 

Broadcasters also benefit from a host of other special privileges. 

These include mandatory carriage on cable’s basic tier of service, 

preferential channel placement protection, and territorial exclusivity provisions that limit cable operators’ ability to carry out-ofmarket television signals. These rules were adopted at a time when 

cable operators generally were the only pay-TV option to consumers. That world no longer exists. 

Today cable operators face competition from three or more payTV providers in virtually every community. In fact, cable’s share of 

video households has declined from 95 percent in 1992 to approximately 58 percent today. Cable operators also face growing competition from Internet video offerings and a much more robust digital broadcast distribution system. 

Given the marketplace changes over the last 2 decades, many 

provisions of the 1992 Act are no longer needed and, worse yet, 

have become counterproductive. One provision in particular, retransmission consent, has led to significant and ongoing consumer 

harm. This is the focus of my testimony today. 

Congress established retransmission consent to bolster the continued availability of local broadcast television. Unfortunately for 

consumers, we are seeing the opposite result. Retransmission consent negotiations are now characterized by escalating blackout 

threats as broadcasters make clear that they are willing to pull 

their signals to increase their bargaining leverage. And the Big 4 

broadcast networks now demand a significant cut of the fees obtained by affiliated stations. This creates even more pressure for 

rate increases and more contentious negotiations. 

As a result of these dynamics, the number of disputes and blackouts has risen dramatically. In the first half of this year alone, 

there have already been 69 blackouts, a 35 percent increase over 

all of last year. Owners of broadcast stations have said the sky is 

the limit when it comes to their compensation demands. Unfortunately, we can expect public disputes and blackouts to increase in 

the future. 

Congress also intended retransmission consent to subsidize and 

preserve localism, but that objective has been subverted as well. 

Despite demanding significant increases in retransmission consent 

fees, local broadcasters are cutting costs and scaling back on local 

news programming. Many broadcasters are also duplicating news 

programming across multiple stations in the same market. 

Another unintended and negative consequence of retransmission 

consent is that it allows broadcasters to force distributors to purVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
13 

1 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102–385 (1992). 

2 Id. at Section (2)(b)(2). 

chase a bundle of affiliated cable networks even if there is little or 

no demand for some of those channels. This has resulted in bloated 

packages and higher costs to consumers. 

In 1992, Congress was concerned with the fact that more than 

53 percent of the national cable networks were owned by cable operators. That number has fallen to approximately 14 percent. In 

sharp contrast, due largely to retransmission consent, Big 4 broadcasters now own 60 percent of the top 50 cable networks. 

Finally, it is clear that the social compact between broadcasters 

and the public is broken. Broadcasters were given the free use of 

tens of billions of dollars worth of spectrum and other special privileges in return for a commitment to serve the public interest, but 

broadcasters should not have it both ways. They cannot claim that 

without special treatment they can no longer provide consumers 

with local news and information and at the same time reduce their 

spending on localism and deny pay-TV customers access to their 

signals during disputes. Contrary to broadcaster assertions, retransmission consent and the host of protections that go with it is 

the opposite of a free market. 

The time has come to update the Nation’s laws to reflect the current competitive and technological landscape to best ensure that 

the public interest is served. We applaud the leadership of Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, Senator Kerry, and Senator 

DeMint on this issue. Senator DeMint’s legislation has begun an 

important dialogue and we look forward to working with all of the 

members of the Committee as it undertakes this essential task. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Witmer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MELINDA WITMER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

VIDEO AND CONTENT OFFICER, TIME WARNER CABLE

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the 

Committee. My name is Melinda Witmer, and I am Executive Vice President and 

Chief Video and Content Officer of Time Warner Cable. Time Warner Cable is the 

Nation’s second largest operator of cable television systems and the fourth largest 

multichannel video programming distributor (‘‘MVPD’’), serving more than 12 million subscribers in 29 states. I want to thank you for inviting me to appear before 

you today to share Time Warner Cable’s perspective on the 1992 Cable Act and its 

role in the television marketplace of the twenty-first century. 

As the title of this hearing indicates, the 1992 Cable Act is turning twenty years 

old this year. This legislation, enacted over a presidential veto, has defined the role 

of government in the regulation of the video marketplace for two decades.1 During 

that time, vast changes have occurred in the competitive and technological landscape. Thus, it is both necessary and appropriate for Congress to take a fresh look 

at whether the provisions of the 1992 Act have met their goals and whether they 

continue to serve the public interest. 

The principal goal of the 1992 Act was to protect consumers and promote innovation while fostering the development of competitive alternatives to cable services, 

which at the time constituted the only pay television option for most consumers. 

Congress’s objective was for competition eventually to take the place of regulation. 

This was made clear in the Act’s Statement of Policy, where Congress expressed its 

preference ‘‘to rely on the marketplace’’ rather than regulation wherever feasible.2

Consistent with this policy, several of the Act’s provisions were expressly designed 

to be temporary, such as the rate regulation measures and certain provisions governing competitors’ access to vertically-integrated programming. 

14 

3S. Rep. No. 102–92 (1991) at 1168 (‘‘Senate Report’’). See also 138 Cong. Rec. S14615–16 

(Sep. 22, 1992) (Statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (‘‘if a broadcaster is seeking to force a cable operator to pay an exorbitant fee for retransmission rights, the cable operators will have an opportunity to seek relief at the FCC.’’). 4See In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Program Access Rules, MV Docket No. 12– 

68, Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (filed June 22, 2012) 

at 9. 5 Id. at Section (2)(b)(3). 6 138 Cong. Rec. S643 (Jan. 30, 1992) (Statement of Sen. Inouye). 

7The legislative history indicates that Congress expected demands for retransmission consent 

compensation would be modest because ‘‘broadcasters also benefit from being carried on cable 

systems.’’ Senate Report at 1168. See also 138 Cong. Rec. S643 (Jan. 30, 1992) (Statement of 

Sen. Inouye) (‘‘It is of course in their mutual interests of these parties to reach an agreement: 

the broadcaster will want access to the audience served by the cable system, and the cable operator will want the attractive programming that is carried on the broadcast signal. I believe that 

the instances in which the parties will be unable to reach an agreement will be extremely 

A separate, but related goal of the 1992 Cable Act was to address the concern that 

competition from non-broadcast cable networks, particularly those that were owned 

by cable operators, was diverting viewers and advertisers from local broadcast stations and thus threatening the future of ‘‘free’’ over-the-air local television.3 Among 

other things, Congress created a new regulatory right, called retransmission consent, which broadcasters could elect to invoke when it served their interests. Retransmission consent is one of a number of special privileges given to broadcasters 

by the government as part of a thicket of outdated regulations. These special privileges, which also include must carry rights, territorial exclusivity protection, a guaranteed right to basic tier carriage and, of course, the broadcasters’ free use of the 

public airwaves, were supposed to safeguard the public’s access to broadcast programming. Unfortunately, given the dramatic changes over the last twenty years, 

that is not the case today. 

Over the past twenty years, many of the 1992 Act’s objectives have been accomplished in the marketplace. In particular, cable operators face effective competition 

in virtually every community that they serve from three or more MVPDs (including 

two national direct broadcast satellite services that are now the Nation’s second and 

third largest MVPDs and, in many instances, a well-funded telco-video provider like 

Verizon FiOS or AT&T U-Verse, who are among the ten largest MVPDs). As a result of this competition, traditional cable operators have seen their share of the multichannel video business decline from 95 percent in 1992 to about 58 percent today.4

Cable systems also face growing competition from new platforms that were not even 

imaginable in 1992, such as online video delivery. Moreover, Congress’s hope that 

cable operators would ‘‘continue to expand, where economically justified, their capacity and the programs offered’’ 5 has been fulfilled as the industry, responding to competitive marketplace pressures, invested billions of dollars to provide consumers 

with an unparalleled array of innovative services, including high definition and 3D 

television, video-on-demand, digital video recording and other time-shifting capabilities, high speed Internet, and digital telephone. 

In light of these marketplace changes, several of the provisions of the 1992 Act 

clearly are no longer needed and, in fact, may be working counter to Congress’s intentions. In my testimony, I will focus on how the retransmission consent framework, originally intended to advance the public interest, is now harming consumers. 

The first point I would like to make is that, Congress established retransmission 

consent to ‘‘ensure the universal availability of local broadcast signals’’ to consumers.6 Today, however, this regulatory regime is having the opposite effect. Retransmission consent negotiations are characterized by the broadcasters’ demands 

for massive fee increases backed by blackout threats, and the incidence of actual 

blackouts has spiked as broadcasters increasingly have demonstrated their willingness to withdraw retransmission consent to increase their bargaining leverage. Retransmission consent disputes have increased dramatically in recent years from 12 

in 2010 to 51 in 2011. So far this year there have already been 69 blackouts. And 

these numbers do not capture the fact that every retransmission consent negotiation 

is resulting in dramatically increasing fees ultimately borne by consumers. 

This is not what Congress intended or expected when it gave broadcasters retransmission consent rights. Retransmission consent is a regulatory construct that 

provides broadcasters an opportunity to obtain value for their ‘‘signal’’ not for the 

content contained within that signal. This value was intended to subsidize local stations to ensure the continued viability of local broadcasting. Given the market structure in 1992 with essentially one local broadcaster negotiating against one cable operator in each local market, Congress expected that the rough balance of power between the parties would serve as a check on unreasonable behavior.7

15 

rare.’’); Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 

1992; Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 2965 (1993) at ¶ 115 (expressing the FCC’s belief that ‘‘there are incentives for both parties to come to mutually beneficial arrangements’’ in retransmission consent negotiations). 8 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A). 

9 138 Cong. Rec. S643 (Jan. 30, 1992)(Statement of Sen. Inouye) (‘‘I am confident, as I believe 

other cosponsors of the bill are, that the FCC has the authority under the Communications Act 

and under the provisions of this bill to address what would be the rare instances in which such 

carriage agreements are not reached. I believe that the FCC should exercise this authority, 

when necessary, to help ensure that local broadcast signals are available to all the cable subscribers.’’). 10Michael Katz, Jonathan Orszag, and Theresa Sullivan, An Economic Analysis of Consumer 

Harm from the Current Retransmission Consent Regime, at 32 (Nov. 12, 2009), filed as an attachment to the Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association in MB 

Docket No. 07–269 (Dec. 16, 2009). 

Moreover, even with the expectation that the grant of retransmission consent 

rights to broadcasters did not pose an undue threat of harm to consumers either 

in the form of increased rates or service disruptions, Congress acknowledged, and 

took steps to address, these risks. For example, Congress included in the 1992 Act 

a provision directing the FCC to adopt rules to ensure retransmission consent would 

not adversely impact the rates that consumers paid for multichannel television service.8 In addition, Members of Congress, including Senator Inouye, the floor manager 

of the legislation in the Senate, made clear that the FCC had (and was expected 

to exercise) its ‘‘existing’’ authority to resolve retransmission consent impasses if 

and when they resulted in an interruption of service to consumers.9

Unfortunately, the FCC has adopted a narrower interpretation of its role in overseeing the retransmission consent process and the agency’s inaction, combined with 

broadcasters’ ability to play competing MVPDs against each other, has been a key 

cause of the brinkmanship tactics (or take-it-or leave it demands) that now characterize the broadcasters’ approach to retransmission consent negotiations. 

Ironically, the marketplace-driven increase in competition among MVPDs that has 

occurred since 1992 enables broadcasters to play one MVPD against another while 

each MVPD still only has one broadcaster from which it can obtain programming, 

giving broadcasters a lopsided advantage in retransmission consent negotiations. 

Additionally, territorial exclusivity and the requirement that cable operators place 

broadcast stations on the basic tier of service further exacerbate the harm to consumers by preventing MVPDs from obtaining broadcast programming from alternative sources and consumers from opting not to purchase the broadcast channels. 

As a result, broadcasters—who continue to enjoy their government-created and -supported monopolies—now threaten to withhold consent to the carriage of their stations with the confidence that neither MVPDs nor their subscribers have any recourse. Making matters worse, the Big Four broadcast networks have begun demanding a cut of the retransmission consent fees obtained by affiliated local stations, creating even more pressure for rate increases. 

As a result of these dynamics, consumers lose, or face the threat of losing, access 

to season premieres of popular programming, major events like the Super Bowl and 

the Olympics, and even emergency weather information. Two of the better-known 

examples of retransmission consent-related service disruptions occurred when FOX 

denied Cablevision subscribers in New York access to World Series games and Disney/ABC denied those same subscribers access to a portion of the Academy Awards. 

Earlier this month, over two million of our subscribers lost access to broadcast signals when we would not cave in to Hearst Broadcasting’s demands for huge fee increases. While our dispute with Hearst has been settled, the fact remains that our 

customers are being asked to shoulder ever-increasing rates resulting from each and 

every retransmission consent negotiation, even those that do not result in a public 

dispute. It is also worth underscoring that broadcasters are making much of their 

marquee programming, such as the Olympics and the Super Bowl—not to mention 

much of their entertainment programming, available for free on the Internet. The 

perverse result is that MVPD subscribers are literally paying billions of dollars to 

subsidize content that the broadcasters make available for free both over-the-air and 

via the Internet. While MVPDs recognize that broadcasting has always had an alternative distribution system, it is not economically rational to pay the premium the 

broadcasters are demanding and that ultimately consumers are being asked to bear. 

Nor is there any indication that the situation is going to resolve itself. In 2009, 

it was estimated that retransmission consent fees would reach $1.6 billion in 2015.10

But according to data compiled by SNL Kagan, retransmission consent payments 

grew from $215 million in 2006 to nearly $1.5 billion last year and are now projected to top $2.0 billion this year—a compounded growth rate of 45 percent over 

16 

11See Appendix 1. 12 Id. 13See CableFAX Daily, June 3, 2011, at 2; Communications Daily, May 5, 2011 at page 5. 14See note 5 supra at 37. Given that the Katz/Orszag/Sullivan study underestimated how high 

retransmission consent fees would climb, it is likely that the number of households opting out 

of MVPD services will be even higher than they projected. 15 CableFAX Daily, June 3, 2011, at 2. 16See In the Matter of 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review; Review of the Commission’s 

Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, MB Docket No. 02–182, Comments of the American Cable Association (filed July 12, 2010). Given the difficulty of tracking SSAs in particular, TWC believes that 

the ACA data may well understate the number of instances in which a station licensee has entered into a control-sharing arrangement with another network affiliated station in the same 

market. 17 In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 

MB Docket No. 10–71, Comments of the American Cable Association (filed May 27, 2011). See 

also William P. Rogerson, Joint Control or Ownership of Multiple Big 4 Broadcasters in the 

Same Market and Its Effect on Retransmission Consent Fees (May 18, 2010) (attached to ACA’s 

comments in MB Docket No. 10–71). 

that period.11 SNL Kagan estimates that by 2015, retransmission consent payments will reach almost $4.0 billion, more than double what the 2009 study predicted. 

While the broadcasters like to claim that this rapid escalation in retransmission 

consent fees is part of a ‘‘market adjustment,’’ the fact is that there is no sign that 

retransmission consent costs will level off in the future. Indeed, SNL Kagan forecasts that in the next five years retransmission consent fees will double again, 

reaching just under $5.0 billion.12 This dramatic uptick in retransmission consent 

fees is not surprising given statements by broadcast executives like CBS’s CEO Les 

Moonves, who boasted that when it comes to retransmission consent fees, ‘‘the sky’s 

the limit’’ and by Sinclair Broadcasting Group’s CEO David Smith, who has acknowledged that, in order to meet reverse compensation demands from the networks, local broadcasters will need ‘‘to keep upping’’ their retransmission consent 

fees ‘‘forever.’’ 13

These demands for dramatically escalating fees inevitably impact consumers in 

the pocketbook. In fact, according to the Katz/Orszag/Sullivan study, more than a 

million households ‘‘likely [will] forego the benefits of MVPD services because of the 

higher subscription fees they face as a result of retransmission consent fees.’’ 14 The 

broadcasters’ unreasonable demands also will lead to more blackouts as MVPDs do 

what they can to hold the line. Yet, given the disconnect between a 20-year old law 

and today’s marketplace, it is unclear what will prevent the rising tide of retransmission consent demands. As Mr. Moonves explained, the retransmission consent 

right that Congress created gives broadcasters the ‘‘ultimate leverage’’ in retransmission consent negotiations.15

Incredibly, having the ‘‘ultimate leverage’’ is not enough for some broadcasters. 

Local broadcast station owners have managed to skirt the FCC’s ownership rules 

and now conduct retransmission consent negotiations on behalf of multiple stations 

in the same local market. The advent of multicasting has exacerbated this trend. 

In 2010, a study commissioned by the American Cable Association found that there 

were at least 57 instances in which one station exercised common control of multiple 

Big Four network stations in its local market through some form of contractual arrangement.16 And a review conducted last year by BIA/Kelsey on behalf of Time 

Warner Cable indicated that there are more than 40 examples of ‘‘virtual duopolies’’ 

in which one station uses its multicast capacity to operate as the market affiliate 

of two Big Four networks and nearly 150 instances in which one station’s multicast 

capacity allows it to serve both as an affiliate of a Big Four network and as an affiliate of either CW or MyNetwork. It is likely that this is not the complete picture 

of coordination and consolidation by local stations because there currently is no requirement for broadcasters to disclose these arrangements. 

As you can imagine, being able to deny a cable operator access to the programming of not just one, but of two or three broadcast signals in the same local market 

gives a broadcaster an almost insurmountable advantage in retransmission consent 

negotiations. It also explains why the record in the FCC’s retransmission consent 

reform proceeding indicates that retransmission consent fees for Big Four affiliates 

are more than 20 percent higher where a single station is negotiating on behalf of 

more than one affiliate in a market.17

Not only are broadcasters demanding that consumers bear these exorbitant cost 

increases and deal with threatened and actual blackouts, many are reducing their 

commitment to local programming in order to cut costs. While Congress intended 

for the 1992 Act to subsidize and preserve local broadcasting, the trend in the 

broadcast industry in recent years has been away from localism. As Senator Inouye 

17 

18 138 Cong. Rec. S562–63 (Jan. 29, 1992). Other members of Congress echoed Senator 

Inouye’s statement. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H6491 (July 23, 1992) (Statement of Rep. Callahan) 

(‘‘The right to retransmission consent . . . is a local right. This is not, as some allege, a network 

bailout for Dan Rather or Jay Leno. Networks are not a party to these negotiations, except in 

those few instances where they own local stations themselves.’’) (emphasis supplied); 138 Cong. 

Rec. H6493 (statement of Rep. Chandler) (‘‘The intent of the [retransmission consent] amendment 

was to give bargaining power to local broadcasters when negotiating the terms of cable carriage—not to serve as a subsidy for major networks.’’) (emphasis supplied). 19See, e.g., Letter from Edward O. Fritts, President & CEO, NAB, to Jack Valenti, President, 

MPAA, dated October 7, 1991 (‘‘NAB Oct. 7, 1991 Letter’’); see also Letter from Edward O. 

Fritts, President & CEO, NAB, to Rep. Christopher H. Smith, dated August 9, 1991 (stating, 

in attachment, that characterizations of retransmission consent as a ‘‘network plan’’ are ‘‘sheer 

nonsense’’ and that ‘‘Networks are not involved in any negotiations.’’). Copies of the documents 

referred to in footnotes 19–21 can be found as an attachment to the Joint Comments of 

Mediacom Communications Corporation, Cequel Communications LLC d/b/a Suddenlink Communications, and Insight Communications Company, Inc. filed in the FCC’s retransmission consent reform proceeding, MB Docket No. 10–71, on May 27, 2011. 20See NAB Oct. 7, 1991 Letter (emphasis supplied). 21For example, in May 2011 it was reported that NBC had entered into an arrangement with 

its affiliates by which NBC would hold its affiliates’ proxies and negotiate retransmission consent deals on their behalf, with NBC pocketing as much as 50 percent of the revenues. See 

Harry A. Jessell, NBC’s Affiliate Retrans Plan is 50–50 Split, TVNewsCheck, May 18, 2011 

(available at http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/2011/05/18/51322/nbcs-affiliate-retrans 

-plan-is-5050-split). 22See Les Moonves Insists That Retrans Cash Is Network Driven, Radio & Television Business 

Report, June 3, 2011, available at http://www.rbr.com/tv-cable/les-moonves-insists-that-retranscash-is-network-driven.html (emphasis supplied). The admission by the broadcasters that retransmission consent is all about the value of the broadcast content is, of course, directly contrary to the assertion, made by some of those same broadcasters and their supporters, that retransmission consent is not an intellectual property right and ‘‘has no bearing on the relative 

value’’ of the programming embodied in a broadcaster’s signal. See Testimony of NAB President 

David Rehr, Hearing on Copyright Licensing in a Digital Age, House Committee on the Judiciary, February 25, 2009 (‘‘Retransmission consent rights under the Communications Act are distinct from copyright rights in broadcast programming. Retransmission consent agreements relate to the value of creating and disseminating the broadcast signal.’’). 23See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, Retransmission Consent and Broadcaster Commitment to Localism at 18–25 (Nov. 2011), available at http://fordham.academia.edu/PhilipNapoli/Papers/ 

1163518/RetransmissionlConsentlandlBroadcasterlCommittmetltolLocalism. See also 

Continued 

said during the debate on the Act, the intent of retransmission consent was to ‘‘permit local stations, not national networks . . . to control the use of their signals.’’ 18

NAB expressed a similar view, writing to members of Congress that retransmission 

consent was ‘‘not a ‘network TV’ issue’’ and that ‘‘[t]he television networks will not 

play a role in negotiations between local stations and local cable systems.’’ 19 Indeed, 

NAB not only proclaimed that the networks would have no right to participate in 

retransmission consent negotiations, it also declared that the networks would have 

‘‘no right to dictate their terms, or to demand any part of the benefits which the local 

station might obtain from a cable system.’’ 20

Today, however, retransmission consent has become exactly what it was never intended to be: a subsidy for the national broadcast networks and their affiliated cable 

channels rather than a source of support for local broadcasting. The national networks increasingly dictate to their affiliates whether and on what terms those affiliates may grant retransmission consent. In addition, the national broadcast networks 

have begun demanding ‘‘reverse compensation’’ from their affiliates, completely supplanting the structure that existed in 1992, when networks paid compensation to 

local stations for carriage.21 We turn again to CBS’ Mr. Moonves, who has made 

clear that the national networks believe that they are the ones that should be receiving the bulk of the retransmission consent fees collected by their local affiliates, 

stating that ‘‘[i]f a station is looking at what’s really bringing in the money, it’s the 

NFL, it’s ‘American Idol,’ it’s ‘CSI,’ it’s the primetime strength. It’s not the local news. . . .’’ 22

Faced with the need to satisfy the networks’ demands for compensation, the local 

affiliates are trying to cut expenses while simultaneously increasing the amounts 

they require MVPDs to pay to carry their signals. One of the principal ways in 

which the stations are cutting costs is by entering into agreements that allow multiple stations to share resources. While some sharing of costs may be beneficial for 

the stations and their viewers, the growing use of ‘‘shared services’’ and other similar arrangements has precipitated a significant decline in original, diverse local 

news and public affairs programming as broadcasters combine studio facilities and 

eliminate separate newscasts, lay off employees, and reduce their production of local 

news and other community-oriented programming.23

18 

Danilo Yanich, Local TV News & Service Agreements: A Critical Look (Oct. 2011), available at 

http://www.ccrs.udel.edu/sites/ccrs.udel.edu/files/DYanich%20.Local%20TV%20News%20%26 

%20Service%20Agreements-A%20Critical%20Look.pdf. 24Similar bundling takes place at the local level when a group station owner refuses to grant 

retransmission consent unless the MVPD also agrees to pay for carriage of non-network affiliates, including low value multicast stations. 25See Appendix 2 for a chart showing examples of the Big Four broadcast networks ownership 

of non-broadcast cable networks. This chart is illustrative in nature and is not intended to reflect the full extent of the Big Four’s cable network interests. 

The broadcasters would have policymakers believe that if the retransmission consent rules are changed, they will be unable to provide local programming content 

that they, and they alone, are capable of producing. But not only are broadcasters 

already cutting back on their local content, cable and other sources (including the 

Internet) are rushing to fill the void. For example, Time Warner Cable now has 

nineteen channels that offer full-time coverage of local news, politics, sports and 

weather. In fact, Time Warner Cable produces three daily local newscasts that are 

aired by an ABC affiliate owned by Sinclair in Greensboro, NC. 

In sum, while Congress expected retransmission consent to sustain and improve 

the quality of local broadcasting without causing an unreasonable increase in consumer prices or disruptions to consumers’ access to local stations, the opposite has 

occurred. Prices for retransmission consent are soaring while the quality of local 

broadcast programming continues to erode. In addition, consumers face a growing 

level of disruption in their access to local broadcast programming as stations more 

frequently deny MVPDs’ retransmission consent in order to enforce their demands 

for unreasonable compensation. 

Next, I would like to address the bundling practices that are engaged in by programmers, particularly the Big Four broadcast networks, which are another unanticipated consequence of the 1992 Act. When MVPDs sit down with the broadcast 

networks to negotiate for the carriage of their owned and operated affiliates, they 

often are met with demands that the MVPD agree to carry and pay for not only 

the Big Four broadcast stations, but an array of non-Big Four stations and nonbroadcast channels as well.24 These bundling agreements also typically require the 

distributor to offer all or most of these channels on preferred tier locations. The effect is to force distributors and their subscribers to take and pay for an array of 

services that often includes channels for which there is limited (if any) subscriber 

interest. 

The broadcasters’ ability to engage in these bundling practices is an unfortunate 

byproduct of the 1992 Act and, in particular, of the Act’s retransmission consent 

provisions. In 1992, Congress was concerned about vertical integration—the fact 

that more than 53 percent of the national cable networks available at the time were 

owned by cable operators. Ironically, retransmission consent actually fostered a dramatic increase in vertical integration between cable networks and broadcasters. 

Today, broadcast networks and their affiliates are the dominant providers of cable 

networks. In fact, sixty percent of the top 50 basic cable networks are owned by 

broadcasting companies and their affiliates.25 This is due in large part to the way 

retransmission consent developed in its early days, where broadcasters sought retransmission consent compensation in the form of carriage of, and payment for, new 

cable networks. 

Now that the number of linear cable channels is reaching a saturation point, and 

with the ever-growing competition among distributors, broadcasters have shifted 

their demands to payment in cash, not just for carriage of the local television station, but also for carriage of bundles of cable channels. Because of the broadcasters’ 

retransmission consent leverage, there is no check on the amount that they can demand for these bundles of broadcast and non-broadcast channels or on the size of 

those bundles. Thus, bundling is a major impediment both to controlling the price 

of service and to giving consumers other benefits (including more flexible packaging 

of services) that they should be enjoying as a result of the robust competition that 

now characterizes the multichannel video distribution marketplace. 

It is ironic that the 1992 Act, which sought to protect free, over-the-air television 

from supposedly ‘‘unfair’’ competition from non-broadcast cable networks has led to 

a regime in which the national broadcast networks take retransmission consent revenues obtained either directly from MVPDs (in the case of network-owned affiliates) 

or indirectly (in the form of reverse compensation payments from their independently owned affiliates) and use them to support the many non-broadcast channels 

that they now operate and not local broadcasting. Furthermore, these cable channels now feature major programming events—such as Monday Night Football and 

college bowl games—that used to be available on over-the-air broadcast channels. 

19 

26 138 Cong. Rec. H8652 (Sep. 17, 1992) (Statement of Cong. Markey). 27See Thomas W. Hazlett, If a TV Station Broadcasts in the Forest: An Essay on 21st Century 

Video Distribution (May 19, 2011), filed in MB Docket No. 10–71 (May 24, 2011). 

It also is worth remembering that, during the debate over the 1992 Act, the Act’s 

proponents dismissed concerns that retransmission consent would drive up consumer prices by suggesting that cable operators would simply shift a portion of their 

programming budget away from the non-broadcast cable networks and towards local 

broadcasters. As Representative Markey (the chairman of the House Commerce 

Committee’s Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the sponsor of the Cable Act 

in the House) stated, 

If [cable operators] have to pay Nashville a little bit less, to pay the sci-fi channel a little bit less, to pay some of these other channels a little less in order 

to get revenues over to Channel 4, 5, 7, and 9 so that the local children’s programming, the local news and public programming that the rest of watch on 

free television, fine. It is meant to be within the same existing pool of money; 

no additional monies are going to the cable industry or to the broadcasters; it 

is the same pool of money.’’ 26

The assumption that retransmission consent would have no impact on a cable operator’s programming costs was questionable in 1992. But even if it was valid, 

MVPDs today do not have the choice of ‘‘paying a little less’’ for non-broadcast programming to cover their growing retransmission consent expenses. The very broadcasters that are demanding increased retransmission consent fees own the nonbroadcast cable channels and are not about to lower the amounts that they are paid 

for those. 

My final point flows directly from my first two points: despite, or possibly because 

of the 1992 Act, the broadcast model on which Congress relied in adopting retransmission consent is broken. That broadcast model assumed the broadcasters’ acceptance of the social compact under which local stations are given free use of the public 

airwaves and certain related privileges in return for a commitment to serve the public interest—to put the needs of the communities that they are licensed to serve 

ahead of all other considerations.27

Today, however, the Big Four networks are looking to increase the profits of their 

cable channels and the affiliates are looking to cut costs by entering into sharing 

agreements and reducing local programming in order to be able to pay reverse compensation to the networks. Furthermore, broadcasters are often arguing to reduce 

or avoid their public interest obligations often citing some of the same changes in 

the competitive and technological landscape that we believe justify revising the 1992 

Act. Yet, when it comes to preserving the special privileges that have been accorded 

local television stations—from free spectrum to black out rights—the broadcast industry claims that nothing has changed over the past twenty years that warrants 

revisiting those privileges. For example, the broadcasters not only oppose suggestions that they be limited in their ability to engage in joint retransmission consent 

negotiations, they even oppose efforts to make them simply report the details of 

those sharing arrangements online where they would be more readily accessible to 

public and regulatory scrutiny. 

The broadcast industry is sitting on spectrum worth tens of billions of dollars. It 

is not surprising that they would use their position as custodians of the public interest when it is to their benefit. But the broadcasters should not have it both ways. 

They cannot claim that without special treatment they will no longer be able to provide consumers with local news and information, and at the same time, reduce their 

spending on localism and deny cable and other pay-TV customers access to their signals during disputes. Nor should they be allowed to have the benefit of special protections such as mandatory basic tier carriage and territorial exclusivity protection—privileges that were premised on broadcasters fulfilling their public interest 

obligations. 

In conclusion, two years ago, Time Warner Cable’s CEO, Glenn Britt, testified before this Committee and stated that Time Warner Cable agrees with the principle, 

embedded in the 1992 Act, that free markets are preferable to regulated markets 

wherever feasible. We stand by that position today. Contrary to broadcaster assertions, retransmission consent is not now and has never been a free market. Rather, 

it is a government-created regulatory regime established to address vastly different 

conditions than those that exist today. That regulatory regime was intended to safeguard the public’s access to local broadcast programming. But today, the law is having the opposite effect. It is resulting in consumers losing access to local broadcast 

stations and bearing the costs of increased fees as vertically integrated broadcast 

networks are permitted to siphon support away from local broadcasters to increase 

20 

their profits and those of their non-broadcast cable networks. No one could have 

foreseen how broken this regulatory regime ultimately would become. 

We applaud the leadership shown by Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, Senator Kerry, Senator DeMint and other Members of the Committee 

and their recognition that the status quo is not sustainable. We are particularly appreciative of Senator DeMint’s efforts to begin the dialogue on the role that government should play in the television marketplace by proposing to replace the outdated 

regulatory regime embodied in the 1992 Cable Act with a genuine free market approach. We also have made clear that, as long as the regulatory regime established 

by the 1992 Act remains in effect, the FCC should make targeted changes to protect 

consumers from the broadcasters’ abusive retransmission consent practices. We look 

forward to working with all of the Members of the Committee as it undertakes the 

essential task of updating the 1992 Act. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before the Committee today. I 

would be happy to answer any questions you might have. 

21 

APPENDIX 1 


724WIT1.eps

Article 

Tuesday, November 22, 2011 2:03 PM ET SNL Kagan 

Boosting retrans projections as TV station owners succeed 

in pushing rates 

By Robin Flynn 

We are issuing new projections for broadcast industry retransmission revenues, based on evidence of rising fees being paid in the curren! round of 

negotiations, as TV station owners seek to boost their net intake from relrans fees even as they begin to pay network partners programming fees We 

projecllhat industry retrans fees could increase to $3.9 billion by 2015 (versus our $3.0 bill ion projection in May), al which time retrans fees would still 

represent just 8% of the almost $50 billion that mu~ichannel operators are projected to pay to basic cable networks, regional sports networks and premium 

channels in affiliate fees. 

TV station owners always Ihoughtthat increasing retrans fees would be a stair-step process, with the traumatic initial step of going from zero to a fee of 

20 cents to 30 cents per sub per month followed in the second or third round of negotiations by going to potentially twice that (higher for owned-andoperated stations). Even with recent increases, TV station owners say that they are still not at fair value given the ratings that they deliver. versus a cable 

network like ESPN, which we project will receive license fees of $5.06 per sub per month in 2012 

Station owners say their ability to obtain retrans fees on par with cable networks such as ESPN has been hampered, given that the negotiations are 

localized or in a limited number of markets and that affiliate groups do not make as much of an impact on a large multichannel operator as a cable network 

with a national footprint. However, if NBC succeeds in its plan to negotiate on behalf of its 0&0 group as well as affiliates, that dynamic would change for at 

least one broadcast network 

The potential for group negotiations has prompted a strong response from the multichannel industry, which is protesting arrangements that allow stations to 

negotiate in any sort of group outside of outright ownership. On Nov. 14, a group including the American Cable Association, Time Warner Cable Inc. and 

DISH Network Corp. sent a letter to the FCC (see attached) to allege that if stations affiliated with the Big Four negotiate together, they have the market 

power to increase carriage fees by 21.6% versus situations where Big Four stations negotiate separately. Similarly, in a press release, the ACA took issue 

with Raycom Media Inc.'s Nov. 15 shared services agreement with Belo Corp. to take over operations of two Belo stations in Tucson, Ariz., (affiliates of 

News Corp.'s FOX and MyNetworkTV) since Raycom already has an affiliate of CBS Corp.'s CBS in that market. 

The fac t that networks are now taking what can be half of affiliates' retrans income as a "programming fee" or other such payment means that increasing 

the retrans revenue stream has been made much more of an economic necessity for TV station owners, since it is no longer such a pure contribution to 

cash now. That's especially true for arrangements such as one implemented by FOX, which is taking a set fee per sub per month no matter what the TV 

station is getting . In the larger markets, FOX is asking for 50 cents per sub per month within four years, indicating that the level received by TV stations in 

those markets would ideally be at least $1 per sub per month. 

Magnitudeof Potential Broadcast Retransmission Fees 

($mil.J 

.~ 

~ ::~ I _C.bll!" 

.. ~ 

l.~ 

.~ $215 $313 

12 $11 

~ $168 1217 

... 

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$3.281 

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02011 SS"'_!QgZl,a <MilCrlarsw_ "Ina.'l:U tC. 5 I.T.aIa6. Mrlgllli l"5!l\'eo!l. 

Ultimately , station owners will be faced with paying a programming fee to the networks that may not have anything to do with what they are getting from the 

MSOs. As Gray Television Inc. President and COO Robert Prather Jr. said at the Wells Fargo Technology, Media & Telecom conference Nov. 9, ''They are not 

going to care what you get in retrans. They"re going to say, this is our fee for providing our program and take it or leave it:· Prather projected that the deals 

Walt Disney Co:s ABC did last yea r have proven too cheap, and when his company ta lks to the ABC networK in 2013 it will be paying closer to market rate. 

") think the networks are going to wind uP. in the long run, probably getting close to 50% of whatever retrans we have going fO lWard," predicted Prather 

Source : SNL Financial I Page 1 of 3 
22 


724WIT2.eps

Article 

The new affiliate agreements spell the end of rapidly waning "network comp," whereby the networks used to pay stations to carry their programming . As 

les Moonves said on the company's third-quarter earnings call Nov. 3, "On the reverse camp side, we signed a new deal with one of our largest affiliate 

groups during the quarter. In this deal that comes into full effect nex! summer, we took a previous arrangement in which we had been paying our partners 

and turned it into a deal in which they will now be paying us the kind of compensation we've told you we can expect" The upside afthe new arrangement 

for stations is thai they are now much more important to their network partners. As Gray's Prather said, ''We are going 10 be important customers. They're 

not going to be as willing to treat us like a stepchild, I think, as they have in the past" 

As for rising fees, many TV station owners have recently discussed the expanding pie of retrans dollars. Gannett Co. Inc. President and CEO Gracia 

Martore said Oct 17, "People need to understand that there's a lot of room for the pie to grow. So there's room to share. And the growth of that pie , we see 

pretty clearly as we are seeing deals being done in the marKetplace and we see our opportunity over the next few years as our deals come up to expand 

that pie of dollars for us." Regarding increasing fees, Gray's Prather told the Wells Fargo conference Nov. 9, "I will give you an example,l won't use the 

names, but one of the big operators has countered our proposa l and they offered more than double what they are paying right now, as Just the nrst counter. 

So I think it's a good sign, we're going to get some pretty good money.' For more on rising fees, click here. 

Total Retrans By Network 2010-2D15 

($ mil.) 

4,200 I. UVN • NBC II FOX • CBS • ABC I 3.500 

2.800 

2. 100 

700 

$3,894 

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 201~ 

~(JNote!!'..Di!I' <011 0<011 s.'I'_ KagZl, a ll'>Ulalars.'I'_ "Ira'lCU1 _C. e-o.L'l".Ni. MrI9lGffi<!rVed 

Our updated retransmission revenue projections show total industry retransmission revenue rising from $1.45 billion in 2011 to $4.9 billion by 2017, with the 

majority ofretrans revenue by 2017 still coming from cable MSOs. We have continued to assume a mix of rates between 0&0s and large and small market 

affiliates in our projections spreadsheet (click here), yielding a blended average rate for MSOs per sub per month by 2017. As shown, the growth in retrans 

fees is supported by slow growth in multichannel subscribers (for more on multichannel subscriber projections, click here) 

We have validated our projections by building up the number not only from the top down, but also from the bottom up. Last month , we published our detailed 

reverse retrans projections. In this analysis, for the first time, as shown, we have also broken out retrans fee projections by affiliate group, assembling 

these numbers by working on a station-by-station basis across the various affiliate groups, utilizing publicly released retransmission revenues from TV 

station groups, and backing inlo implied quarterly payments per subscriber per month by calculating multichannel subs reached by station based on data 

from MediaBiz . More on specific fees per sub per month by station owner can be found by clicking here 

As shown, we project that by 2015, CBS and FOX, by virtue of the size of their 0&0 station groups as well as emphasis on pushing rates, will be 

generating the largest chunkS of retrans revenue, at more than $1 billion each. Given that CBS is already allocating half of its 0&0 retrans revenues to its 

networks, that would mean significantly more funds available to invest in programming than existed before the broadcast retrans funds began flowing 

Station owners are counting on some olthat money being invested in high-value programming to allow them to continue to grow loca l spot rates, deliver 

viewers 10 local news and attract political dollars. Local news is still an important revenue generator for TV stations , with early morning news increasing in 

imporlance even as late night news for some stations declines. 

Source: SNL Financial I Page 2 of 3 
23 


724WIT3.eps

Article 

TV Station Retransmission Revenues by Network: 201 0·201 5 2010 

IS mil.) 

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with Ihe rloetwol'k dioASion .As of Nowmt>.f 2011. c>20 11 SNl ~giH\iI d i¥ision of SNI. fllli nc~1 LC. 

i~us I rights rewr .... d. 

Broadcast Investor is a regular feature from SNL Kagan offering exclusive analysis and commentary. 

Source : SNL Financial I Page 3 of 3 
24 

APPENDIX 2 


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25 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And now Mr. Martin Franks, Executive Vice President for Planning, Policy and Government Affairs, CBS Corporation. 

STATEMENT OF MARTIN D. FRANKS, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT OF PLANNING, POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 

AFFAIRS, CBS CORPORATION 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Hutchison, and members of the Committee. 

Allow me several observations based on 24 years at CBS before 

I take your questions. 

Retransmission consent is neither broken nor an antique in need 

of refurbishment. In the 6 years since CBS split from Viacom, we 

have successfully negotiated nearly 100 retrans agreements without a word of public discord between a willing seller and willing 

buyers, including Ms. Witmer’s and Ms. Abdoulah’s companies. And 

this, despite many Wall Street analysts pegging CBS’s negotiated 

retrans fees at the top of the market. 

While any disruptions to consumers are unfortunate, only a 

small handful of negotiations break down each year. That does not 

sound like a dysfunctional marketplace to me. In fact, bad weather 

is a far greater source of consumer disruption than marketplace 

failure. 

Development of a robust retrans marketplace has helped CBS 

and our affiliates invest billions both to retain marquee programming, including the NFL, SEC football, the Grammy’s, March Madness, the Kennedy Center honors, and the U.S. open tennis, and to 

continue our considerable investment in local and national news. 

Calls for fixing a supposedly broken retrans system arose only 

after a fully competitive marketplace among video distributors developed. Retrans was basically a non-factor in carriage negotiations 

until it became a teenager at the same time that DirecTV, Dish, 

Verizon, and AT&T became full-fledged competitors to the original 

cable monopoly. Far from a flawed system, retrans is a triumph of 

Washington policymaking by restoring balance and competition to 

a sector previously dominated by a monopoly with a perfect business plan, namely receiving its most valuable product, broadcast 

television, for free, reselling it at an enviable margin, and using the 

proceeds to build a dominant marketplace position. Nice work if 

you can get it. 

Some liken retrans to an antique relic of a bygone era. Gee, in 

every other sense a 20-year-old is barely emerging from adolescence. 

Moreover, the notion that retrans has not been subject to review 

since its passage neglects to take into account that in 1999, when 

retrans was extended to DirecTV and Dish at their fervent request, 

then again in 2004, and most recently in 2010, retrans has been 

subject to review by this committee and its House counterpart and 

both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees in the context of 

the Satellite Home Viewer Act and its successors, to say nothing 

of countless oversight hearings and FCC and GAO reports. 

Rather than a legitimate public policy problem, what we have 

now is an unholy alliance among distributors that are supposed to 

compete with each other but who have, instead, banded together to 

26 

undo retrans and return to their halcyon days of depriving broadcasters of the compensation that our popularity in the marketplace 

so clearly merits. 

Turning to another question before this committee, with respect, 

those who believe doing away with retrans and the compulsory license will lead to fewer consumer disruptions are, I fear, mistaken 

and therefore I strongly urge the Committee to look before you leap 

for unanticipated consequences. Introducing even more claimants 

into an already challenging negotiating environment may lead to 

more disputes, not fewer, will be a lawyer’s paradise, and is unlikely to yield any relief to consumer pocketbooks. That brave new 

marketplace would also be an extraordinarily capital-intensive one. 

Make no mistake. CBS will do just fine. One way or the other, 

we will be able to invest in our content, continue to attract audiences, and figure out how to monetize our performance. But what 

of the impact on companies without CBS’s heft and access to capital? Many smaller players, including small cable operators, will be 

squeezed out of the business. West Virginians may have access 

only to larger regional super players from Washington, D.C. and 

Pittsburgh, or South Carolinians may lose the wonderful localism 

tradition earned by their State’s broadcasters in favor of service 

solely from Atlanta, Charlotte, or even New York City. How will 

local economies and consumers adapt to that change? How will a 

local car dealer, bank, or restaurant in Spartanburg reach its potential consumers on a broadcast originating in Atlanta? 

In conclusion, for all its flaws, American television is the envy of 

the world. Tomorrow, as a very proud father, I am leaving for London where my younger son will coach in the Olympics. I am looking 

forward to every moment of the trip except for being stuck watching British television. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Conversely, our 500 channel universe, largely in 

high definition, has many somethings for everyone. Whatever you 

do, be careful you do not undermine the existing system that functions much more successfully than is recognized and that almost 

any other country in the world would gladly have instead of what 

their own economic, political, creative, and technological cultures 

have been able to achieve. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franks follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN D. FRANKS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF

PLANNING, POLICY AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, CBS CORPORATION

Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and members 

of the Committee. My name is Martin D. Franks, and I am Executive Vice President, Planning, Policy and Government Relations of CBS Corporation. I appreciate 

the opportunity to speak with you today about the state of the video marketplace 

20 years after the Cable Act. 

In a nutshell, as CBS can attest—as can I personally in my role as the principal 

retransmission consent negotiator for the company—the market for video programming is one of the country’s most robust and competitive sectors in the U.S. economy. 

I believe that the retransmission consent regime enacted in 1992 is actually one 

of the great Washington public policy accomplishments of the intervening two decades. It has given renewed vitality to broadcast television that prior to 1992 was 

being consigned to the dust heap of history. That there are some calling for a return 

to the old regime, when they got their most popular product for free, and then resold 

27 

it and used the proceeds to build their own businesses, is hardly a surprise. Congress should resist those entreaties, especially since retransmission consent is not 

broken. 

It has been estimated that some 15,000 retransmission consent negotiations take 

place every three years. And almost all of them are completed successfully. Over the 

last six years CBS has completed all of its retransmission consent negotiations successfully and without incident. 

Any tampering with retransmission consent laws and rules now could trigger severe negative results to a broadcast television industry that is actually contributing 

positively to the U.S. economy. To the extent that impasses in negotiations occur 

with more frequency today, it is due, at least in part, to the belief by a handful of 

distributors that disruptions may help them advance their public policy goals in 

Washington, that is, by trying to make a working model look broken. Sometimes, 

too, these few distributors hold back from successful conclusions to retransmission 

negotiations in hopes that the government will step in to assist them. 

Fortunately, from my perspective, competition in the communications world has 

never been so robust. But that is the real concern of those in our industry calling 

for a change to retransmission consent. They are unnerved, nay threatened, by competition. And that is why we are here today. Because they now believe that deleting 

retransmission consent will end the balance of power and tip the scales in their 

favor. Yet, the very MVPDs who today are calling for deregulation of retransmission 

consent are the very same entities who have been filing reams of paper and making 

countless visits to the FCC over the last two or three years trying to do the very 

opposite, that is, to impose brand NEW retransmission consent-related regulations—such as mandated standstills and arbitration—to benefit their own bottom 

lines at the expense of broadcasters. 

Encouraging the FCC to become an active participant in retransmission consent 

negotiations, as the leaders of the American Television Alliance have suggested, 

would serve to hinder the current free market negotiations, not set them free. Retransmission consent negotiations are complex and time-intensive negotiations that 

involve much more than price. Inserting a government-run arbitration provision 

coupled with a standstill requirement would lead to an FCC that focused on nothing 

but retransmission consent negotiations to the detriment of the agency’s core mission. Broadcasters across the country want to be carried by distributors, and distributors want to carry broadcast television stations because of the popularity of our 

local and national programming. This equal amount of ‘‘skin in the game’’ is the 

best incentive to reasonable agreements. 

In exchange for use of the public’s spectrum, broadcasters are bound to operate 

in the public interest. Accordingly, to this day, we fulfill that requirement with 

great enthusiasm, pride and excellence. But never did we agree that the valuable 

programming we develop, purchase, produce and offer over-the-air on our stations 

can be retransmitted by another entity without our permission. 

CBS understands the real world of innovation and the challenges it brings. We 

were one of the founders of television more than 80 years ago, and today we are 

a leader in the video marketplace. Our company not only has businesses with origins that date back to the dawn of the broadcasting age, it also has new ventures 

that operate on the leading edge of media. We own the most-watched television network in the U.S. and one of the world’s largest libraries of entertainment content. 

We believe in innovation and the power of broadcasting. 

The CBS Television Network serves almost every household in the Nation via a 

broadcast distribution platform made up of about 200 affiliated TV stations. These 

stations, in turn, supplement the CBS content we license to them with their own 

packages of local news and public affairs programming, as well as syndicated and 

other product that they either acquire from other suppliers or produce themselves. 

Stations do not own much of the non-news content they transmit; instead they obtain from content producers and owners the rights to broadcast it. 

Each year, CBS spends billions of dollars to produce and acquire top-notch programming. As for sports, CBS pays hundreds of millions of dollars each year to the 

NFL and to the NCAA for rights to March Madness alone, and that is before you 

consider rights fees for SEC Football, regular season NCAA basketball, PGA golf 

and to the USTA for rights to the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament. 

Our investment in superior programming helps not only the CBS network and our 

owned-and-operated television stations, but also our affiliated stations nationwide. 

When network programming is of high quality and compelling, local stations benefit. 

From large DMAs like Boston and Dallas to smaller DMAs like Myrtle Beach and 

Clarksburg-Weston, local stations are able to present this network programming to 

obtain advertising dollars so that they, in turn, can make significant financial investments in the production, gathering and reporting of local news, sports, weather 

28 

and other information. Local stations also are able to invest in rights to syndicated 

programs, such as ‘‘Wheel of Fortune,’’ ‘‘Jeopardy,’’ ‘‘Ellen,’’ ‘‘Dr. Oz,’’ ‘‘Seinfeld’’ and 

‘‘Friends,’’ which are obtained from other content producers. 

And, may I add, broadcasting is the most desirable platform for advertisers on 

both the local and national levels. Advertising is a powerful engine in the U.S. economy and subsidizes much of the programming in this country. Additionally, because 

of the unique nature of the network-affiliate system, small businesses are able to 

buy promotional time at affordable rates in their communities and get the most 

bang for their advertising buck. 

CBS looks forward to continuing to vigorously compete in the open marketplace 

this Committee created in 1992. As you recognized then in the report to accompany 

the Cable Act, ‘‘It is the Committee’s intention to establish a marketplace for the 

disposition of the rights to retransmit broadcast signals; it is not the Committee’s 

intention in this bill to dictate the outcome of the ensuing marketplace negotiations.’’ We thank the Committee for including us in discussions surrounding the future of the industry in which we plan to constructively contribute for many decades 

more. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

Ms. Colleen Abdoulah, CEO and Chairwoman of the Board, 

WOW! Internet, Cable, and Phone. 

STATEMENT OF COLLEEN ABDOULAH, CHAIRWOMAN AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WOW! INTERNET, CABLE, AND 

PHONE; CHAIRWOMAN, AMERICAN CABLE ASSOCIATION 

Ms. ABDOULAH. Thank you. I too really appreciate all of you for 

taking the initiative to open this review up because there are a lot 

of things to consider and it is extremely complex, especially because the pace of change is so rapid. I heard a gentleman in one 

of your last hearings from Microsoft, I believe, say that we will see 

more change in the next 18 months than we have seen in the last 

5 years, and I really believe that. 

We know that laws written in 1992, 1996 do not serve or support 

consumer behaviors and the expectations of consumers that are a 

direct result of the technological revolution that we are experiencing. Consumers tell me directly that what they want is more of 

what they want to buy and watch and they want to do so on different devices using different technologies. Yet, our outdated laws 

do not address these changing behaviors in consumers demands. 

Instead, they create significant problems for consumers. 

Specifically, programming and retransmission consent negotiations are failing and they are resulting in blackouts, as was stated. 

In fact, 69 blackouts have occurred in 2012 alone, up 35 percent 

since 2011, affecting literally tens of millions of viewers. Retransmission fees are skyrocketing and consumers are paying the price. 

Media consolidation has led to rampant tying and bundling of unwanted, unwatched programming. 

So consumers often ask us why do they have to pay for so many 

networks they do not want. And I believe that is what we love 

about the Internet. We get to choose what we pay for. 

And speaking of the Internet, access to online video distribution 

rights is currently being withheld and slow-rolled to the smaller 

cable operator by the big content providers, and that puts our customers at a disadvantage. 

Then we have the big broadcasting cable networks paying what 

I think to be crazy, astronomical fees for sports programming because they know with the current business model, they can force 

that cost onto consumers. 

29 

The distortions caused by these outdated rules are really serious 

and not without consequence, particularly for the smaller cable operator. My colleagues and I within the American Cable Association, 

with members in 49 states, represent the small player in the small 

versus big business arena. In fact, 82 percent of ACA members 

serve fewer than 5,000 customers; 30 percent serve fewer than 500 

customers. And what I find so disturbing is that in the past 4 years 

alone, 800 small cable systems have literally gone out of business 

due in part to escalating retrans fees and overall programming 

costs. So we are already getting squeezed out. And when these 

businesses close, there is not only a loss of video to that community, there is a loss of broadband services as well. Smaller operators just simply do not have the leverage to negotiate fair market 

pricing for our video content. 

Since 1992, the tidal wave of media consolidation between broadcasters and cable networks has given enormous bargaining power 

to the Big 4 networks, power that abuses the Government-sanctioned protections that may have made sense 20 years ago in a 

completely different business environment, but they do not today. 

And who pays for this? We do because we are all consumers. 

This abuse of power should be outlawed. There are at least 46 

cases that we know of where separately owned, same-market 

broadcasters coordinate their retransmission consent negotiations. 

Now, they use a benign term for this collusion. They call it ‘‘shared 

services agreements.’’ The impact of their collusion is that broadcasters who are supposed to be competing with one another use one 

single broker to negotiate carriage rights for two or more competing 

stations. We have given evidence to the FCC that proves that this 

unjust practice results in fees that are 21 to 161 percent higher 

than the fees that are created by broadcasters who negotiate carriage separately. Now, we as operators are not allowed to practice 

collusion, and appropriately so. Broadcasters should not be either. 

I have heard members in these hearings ask what should be 

done when you choose to reform the current laws. There are many 

improvements I think to consider, and I offer you just a few today. 

Prohibit coordinated negotiations by separately owned broadcasters in the same market. 

Provide special considerations for the small operators because 

they need them. 

Require continuous carriage of signals during a retransmission 

consent dispute to stop consumers from being held hostage by these 

blackouts. 

Require binding baseball-style commercial arbitration of such 

disputes. 

And give consumers and pay-TV providers the right to embrace 

new technologies to access broadcast signals. 

Thanks for having me. I look forward to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Abdoulah follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLLEEN ABDOULAH, CHAIRWOMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, WOW! INTERNET, CABLE AND PHONE; CHAIRWOMAN, AMERICAN CABLE

ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hutchison, thank you for the opportunity to 

participate on this panel. 

30 

As I prepared for today’s event, I reviewed recent hearings and comments from 

the members of this Committee and am pleased that so many of you recognize what 

I and my fellow small cable operators also know: 

Today’s communications market has moved on while the 20-year-old laws 

that govern it have stayed the same. 

While the 1992 Cable Act may have worked for the realities of the early ’90s, it 

has been bypassed by a technological revolution that it never anticipated and is illequipped to handle. 

Today, we have smart phones, laptops, tablets, and other smart devices that access rich video content via Internet technologies, yet the law that governs video distribution assumes we still live in a world of one local broadcaster working with one 

local cable franchisee. 

I appreciate your awareness that the law is outdated, and I am excited about the 

benefits that consumers will see through updating the law. 

Consumers are harmed because the laws have not kept pace with the 

times. 

Specifically, the 1992 Act lags behind profound technological developments and 

business innovation. (Truthfully, the 1996 Telecommunications Act lags behind too.) 

As a result, outdated laws applied to a rapidly changing marketplace create serious 

problems for consumers. 

These consumer harms manifest themselves in a number of ways: 

• Programming and retransmission consent negotiations are failing, causing 

blackouts. 

• Retransmission consent fees, for what the broadcasters call ‘‘free over-the-air 

TV,’’ are skyrocketing, and consumers pay the increased price. 

• Broadcasters collusively coordinate agreements with other broadcasters in the 

same market, driving retransmission consent rates even higher. 

• Growing media consolidation by the large networks and programming owners 

has led to rampant tying and bundling of unwanted, unwatched and unmarketable programming. 

• Because tying and bundling is forced on Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs) by the media giants, there is hardly any difference today in 

the price and packages of video services offered by cable, satellite, municipal 

and telco video providers, let alone any choice for the consumer. 

• Access to online video distribution rights is being slow-rolled by the big content 

providers, giving consumers little choice for online video. 

On the retransmission consent front, there is even more evidence of consumer 

harm. For instance, in the retransmission consent market today: 

• There are regular breakdowns in negotiations between broadcasters and 

MVPDs, leading to a record number of blackouts. In fact, 69 blackouts have already occurred in 2012, affecting dozens of television markets across the country and literally tens of millions of TV viewers. 

• Retransmission consent blackouts in 2012 are up 35 percent over 2011, and this 

year is hardly even half over. 

• It is now the standard practice of big broadcast networks to agree to pay astronomical fees for sports programming, in part because they can force down the 

cost to consumers through reverse compensation and retransmission consent 

payments. 

• The outdated retransmission consent rules give big media companies the means 

to require the carriage of additional, less desirable cable programming. 

The impact on smaller, independent MVPDs is magnified, and systems in 

rural America are being lost. 

Distortions caused by these outdated rules are serious and not without consequences, particularly for smaller cable operators. 

My colleagues and I within the American Cable Association have a unique view 

of the pay-television marketplace as compared with larger MVPDs. 

Our members include the smallest operators in the market. In fact, 82 percent 

of ACA’s members serve fewer than 5,000 subscribers, and 30 percent serve fewer 

than 500 subscribers. Since 2008, nearly 800 of these small systems have closed 

across the country due in large part to escalating retransmission consent and programming costs that cannot be passed along to consumers, a trend I fear will continue in many rural communities. And the loss of a business that offers video proVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
31 

gramming often means the devastating loss of broadband services as well, because 

an operator needs a healthy business model on both ends to survive. 

How did we get here? 

I would like to present a view of how the video marketplace has changed over the 

last 20 years, and why your sense is accurate that these changes demand modernization of the Cable Act, particularly with respect to the rules governing retransmission consent. As Chairwoman of the Board of the American Cable Association 

(‘‘ACA’’), I provide my perspective on behalf of a group of 850 cable operators, including Wide Open West!, for which I serve as Chief Executive Officer. 

Retransmission consent was crafted to give broadcast stations control over the redistribution of their signals in a marketplace that existed before cable faced competition from: 

• Direct broadcast satellite companies, such as DirecTV and DISH Network, providing an all-digital video service that includes local channels; 

• Telephone companies, like Verizon, AT&T, and mid-sized and smaller companies, providing a wireline video service that also includes broadband and phone; 

• Online video distributors, such as Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu, providing a 

streaming and on-demand video service, including broadcast content over the 

Internet, not just to TV sets but also to laptop computers, tablets like the iPad, 

and an assortment of hand-held mobile devices. 

Moreover, the provision was written before a tidal wave of media consolidation 

that has left the Big 4 broadcast networks (ABC, NBC, Fox, and CBS) in the hands 

of media giants like Disney, Comcast, News Corp., and Viacom’s Sumner Redstone, 

all of whom own many of the most popular cable channels. And now too retrans 

cash is king for CBS and the others as they predict annual earnings of billion dollar 

retransmission consent fees to come. 

Today, retransmission consent rules fail to reflect the wide disparity in bargaining 

power between a pay-TV provider and a local broadcast station affiliated with a Big 

4 network. In the distant past, negotiations were between one local broadcaster and 

one cable operator, each having exclusivity within its service territory. Although 

today there is still only one local station affiliated with a broadcast network per 

market, in nearly every market there are many multichannel video programming 

distributors in each market competing against one another. The original delicate 

balance between the two parties was predicated on the fact that both sides needed 

each other in roughly equal measure. However, unanticipated consolidation and 

business practices have transformed this situation into one in which the broadcaster 

can now extract evermore egregious fees from MVPDs and their subscribers as a 

result of government sanctioned protections that may have made sense in a completely different business environment, but not today. 

Today, the MVPD still needs the Big 4 signal on its channel line-up just as much 

as before, but, unlike in 1992, the broadcaster no longer needs any single MVPD 

quite so much. In my situation, I know, and my local broadcaster also knows, that 

if I do not carry its signal my customer will easily go to one of my competitors to 

get it. 

Retransmission consent fees are out of control. 

To put all of this into context, but without violating the non-disclosure requirements embedded in the contracts we all must sign, I have calculated that the retransmission consent costs for WOW!, starting in January of this year, have increased at an appalling year-over-year pace of almost 90 percent. And that’s in this 

grim economy for a product that Congress has legally obligated broadcast licensees 

to provide free and over-the-air to the public. This exorbitant rate hike follows on 

the heels of a 117 percent increase from the fees just prior to this round of retransmission consent. 

According to SNL Kagan research, retrans fees will increase 18-fold by 2015, and 

we’re talking BILLIONS per year taken from consumers. Imagine the political reaction to that kind of increase if it was forecast for corn, gasoline, clothing, or any 

other consumer product. 

Cable consumers are forced to pay for Internet content they don’t access. 

Let me shed light on another disturbing trend that should concern you. Some 

major content distributors continue to deny ACA member companies like WOW! fair 

and equitable Internet distribution rights for their high-value programming. Or, 

they unfairly tie these media rights to access to their core programming, requiring 

that our customers pay for what is often also available for free on the networks’ proprietary websites. In one situation with a very well-known entity, we must charge 

32 

EVERY customer on our system a fee for the right to access that company’s online 

content over the subscriber’s own broadband Internet connection, even though the 

programmer’s audits reveal that, on average, less than two-tenths of one percent of 

our subscribers visit its website on any given day. If that kind of trend continues, 

both cable and broadband service will be priced out of reach for most consumers. 

This situation highlights the looming problem you will face if you do not in the very 

near future get ahead of the consumer and MVPD concerns surrounding video programming content and how it is distributed. 

Coordinated negotiations by broadcasters stifle competition. 

I believe the problems that WOW! and other MVPDs face are best illustrated by 

understanding the sheer unfairness of coordinated retransmission consent negotiations. Broadcasters have perverted what they call ‘‘marketplace negotiations’’ for retransmission consent by engaging in collusive coordinated negotiations. A longstanding fundamental policy goal of our local broadcast television licensing system 

is the promotion of competition among top rated, same-market broadcasters licensed 

by the Federal Communications Commission. 

Today, there are at least 46 instances where separately owned, same-market 

broadcasters affiliated with a Big 4 network coordinate their retransmission consent 

negotiations. The practical impact of these collusive alliances is that local broadcasters, who are supposed to be competing against one another, are using a single 

representative to negotiate carriage rights for two or more competing stations. And 

consumers pay the price for this kind of collusion. 

Evidence ACA members presented to the FCC shows that broadcasters who coordinate their retransmission consent charge fees that are at least 21 percent higher 

than the fees collected by broadcasters who negotiate carriage separately. Just 

imagine if the reverse were to occur. Imagine the outrage you would hear from the 

local broadcasters if Comcast, WOW!, DirecTV, DISH Network, and AT&T U-Verse 

all decided to negotiate as one block with the TV stations in a single broadcast market in which we operate. We shouldn’t do that and neither should the broadcasters. 

ACA brought the issue to the FCC’s attention on multiple occasions, beginning as 

early as May 2010 in response to the FCC’s request for comment on a Petition for 

Rulemaking to reform the rules governing retransmission consent. Each time we argued that the FCC should deem coordinated negotiations by broadcasters to be a 

per se violation of its good faith rules. More than two years later, we are still awaiting action. Our hope is that Congress will find a way to convince the FCC to act 

or will itself prohibit this practice in making revisions to the Cable Act. 

The good news: there’s no shortage of solutions! 

But there is good news. After years of hearings, industry discussions, and constant debate, it’s clear the time for Congress to act is now. And when it does, there 

will be many solutions to consider that will improve the situation for consumers 

and, in combination, have a material benefit. As you begin your rewrite of the 1992 

Cable Act, I urge you to consider: 

1. Prohibiting coordinated negotiations by separately owned broadcasters in the 

same market; 

2. Ensuring continued carriage of signals during a retransmission consent dispute 

in order to stop consumers from being held hostage by blackouts; 

3. Requiring binding baseball-style commercial arbitration of such disputes; and, 

4. Authorizing consumers and pay-TV providers to employ new and innovative 

technologies that allow consumers to receive broadcast signals over-the-air as 

an alternative to receiving and paying for that content through retransmission 

consent. These are but a few possibilities, and I urge you to consider them all. 

As you have noted, the broadcast signal carriage rules codified in 1992 are antiquated and have escaped reform for far too long. They reflect neither the realities 

of MVPD competition today engendered by the 1992 Act, nor the impact of the pervasive consolidation in the broadcast and media industry, not to mention the advent 

of the Internet as a platform for video programming delivery. 

Mr. Chairman, if you want to provide your constituents with the best services and 

options that a 21st Century telecommunications network can provide, then it is time 

to reform and overhaul the 20th Century law that prevents cable operators from delivering them. 

The status quo is unacceptable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. Abdoulah. 

33 

And now we end with—no, we do not—Dr. Mark Cooper, Director 

of Research, Consumer Federation of America. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARK COOPER, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, 

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA 

Dr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank 

you for giving this opportunity. 

In order to provide a fair evaluation of the Cable and Consumer 

Protection Act of 1992, it is important to recall that many of the 

most important provisions of that Act were superseded or repealed 

by the 1996 Act, and some of the most important policies pursued 

in the spectrum space since then have been outside of both the 

1992 and 1996 Acts. 

Nevertheless, the 1992 Cable Act does provide an important 

baseline because Congress recognized that the cable market was afflicted by severe anti-competitive problems and anti-consumer practices. Congress knew that access to distribution media and control 

of market content are critical inputs that determine the fate of 

competition and the treatment of consumers. Congress believed 

that the incumbent market power in the video space was sufficiently pernicious and tenacious, that it overrode President Bush’s 

only veto to enact the 1992 Act into law. 

Unfortunately, the competition promised by the Congress in the 

1996 Act failed to develop with the sufficient speed, breadth, and 

scope to discipline cable market power. Relentless cable price increases returned soon after the 1996 Act and continue to this day 

because the multi-channel video market and the broadband wireless access market remain very highly concentrated. Competition 

was undermined in those markets by a series of mergers which culminated in the last few years and cross-technology mergers like 

Comcast/NBC and joint ventures like Verizon and big cable. A 

quasi-monopoly is developing where cable could compete against 

fiber. They have run up the white flag, and in the rest of the country, inferior technologies cannot compete against the single dominant coaxial hybrid fiber network. 

The failure to deconcentrate wireline distribution is equaled by 

the failure to deconcentrate commercial programming. Congress 

granted a lucrative right in retransmission, extending the transmission rights with its retransmission rights. But it gave broadcasters those rights without new responsibilities. The broadcasters 

use their rights for retransmission to build cable programming 

bundles and force them into the cable network. Those fees paid for 

the cable networks—much of it goes to broadcasters. 

The cable operators are not innocent in this. They used their 

vertically integrated programming to dominate where they could, 

and so the broadcasters leveraged their retransmission to respond 

to the cable operators’ vertical market power. The end result was, 

of course, that independent production has disappeared in prime 

time. 

Bargaining over retransmission has become ugly, but no matter 

who wins between the cable operator and the broadcasters, the consumer always loses. The public occasionally loses access to programming, frequently is forced to pay more for programming, and 

34 

1The analyses that are most directly relevant to this testimony include: Mark Cooper, The 

End of the End of Competition for Digital Access Services: The Verizon-Cable Spectrum Sale and 

Collaborative Agreements Mark the Final Failure of the 1996 Telecommunications Act to Provide 

Consumers with Effective Competition in Local Markets, Consumer Federation, July 2012; Efficiency Gains and Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to the Public Airwaves: The Dramatic 

Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access, Silicon Flatirons, January 2012; 

‘‘Structured Viral Communications: The Political Economy and Social Organization of Digital 

Disintermediation,’’ Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9 (2011); The 

Central Role of Wireless in the 21st Century Communications Ecology: Adapting Spectrum and 

Universal Service Policy to the New Reality,’’ Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 

September 2011; ‘‘Round #1 in the Digital Intellectual Property Wars: Economic Fundamentals, 

Not Piracy, Explain How Consumers and Artists Won in the Music Sector,’’ Telecommunications 

Policy Research Conference, September 2008.; The Case Against Media Consolidation (Donald 

McGannon Communications Research Center, 2007); ‘‘Will the FCC Let Local Media Rise from 

the Ashes of Conglomerate Failure,’’ International Communications Association, May 2007. The 

always is forced to buy massive amounts of programming it never 

watches. 

In contrast to the failure in those spaces, the success of the 

FCC’s decision to use the spectrum from mini to mini communications is remarkable. Indeed, the biggest success has come in the 

area where the FCC decided that it could allow the spectrum to be 

used without exclusive licenses at all. It concluded that a simple 

set of rules for sharing the spectrum would make the public airways open to speech. It invented Wi-Fi in the junk bands of the 

spectrum, and WiFi today is as big as cellular in terms of traffic. 

The remarkable success of unlicensed spectrum requires a radical 

deregulatory free market shift in public policy thinking about how 

the spectrum is used. We can return the public airways to the public for more direct use than at any time in exactly 100 years. 

And let us be clear. The original sin here is not compulsory copyright, not retransmission. It is exclusive broadcast licenses that 

were tolerated 100 years ago because of technology, but are a fundamental affront to the First Amendment. 

If Congress intends to bring spectrum and video policy into the 

21st century, it must avoid making another 100-year mistake. It 

must move the broadcasters out of the way and provide the maximum opportunity for all the people to use the public airways for 

their public purposes. If Congress intends to rely on competition to 

fix the video space, as it should, public policy must ensure that 

competition on the small number of broadband platforms is not 

used to impede the development of competition. Internet distribution of video must not be starved of professional content by content 

owners, and it must not be strangled by cable gatekeepers, especially when they seek to defend the incumbent rents left over from 

antiquated 20th century policies. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cooper follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARK COOPER, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

My name is Dr. Mark Cooper. I am Director of Research at the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), which is an association of non-profit consumer organizations 

that was established in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, 

advocacy, and education. Today, nearly 300 of these groups participate in CFA and 

govern it through their representatives on the organization’s Board of Directors and 

the annual Consumer Assembly. CFA has been involved in communications, media 

and Internet policy for decades in legislative, regulatory and judicial arenas and has 

advanced the consumer view in policy and academic publications.1

35 

Impact of the Vertically Integrated Television-Movie Studio Oligopoly on Source diversity and 

Independent Production, 2006; ‘‘Independent Noncommercial Television: Technological, Economic 

and Social Bases of A New Model of Video Production,’’ Telecommunications Policy Research 

Conference, October 2005; Broken Promises and Strangled Competition: The Record of Baby Bell 

Merger and Market Opening Behavior (Consumer Federation of America, June 2005); ‘‘Spectrum 

as Speech in the 21st Century,’’ The Public Airwaves as a Common Asset and a Public Good: 

Implications for the Future of Broadcasting and Community Development in the U.S., Ford 

Foundation, March 11, 2005; ‘‘Explorations Of Anti-Consumer, Anticompetitive Practices,’’ Cable 

TV Rates: Has Deregulation Failed?, Manhattan Institute, November 2003; Open Architecture 

as Communications Policy (Stanford Law School, Center for Internet and Society: 2004); ‘‘Ten 

Principles For Managing The Transition To Competition In Local Telecommunications Markets,’’ 

Triennial Review Technical Workshop National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 

Denver CO, July 27, 2003; Media Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information Age: Promoting Diversity with First Amendment Principles and Rigorous Market Structure Analysis 

(Stanford Law School, Center for Internet and Society: 2003); Cable Mergers and Monopolies: 

Market Power In Digital Media and Communications Networks (Washington, D.C.: Economic 

Policy Institute, 2002); ‘‘Open Access To The Broadband Internet: Technical And Economic Discrimination In Closed, Proprietary Networks,’’ University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 69, Fall 

2000; ‘‘Picking Up the Public Policy Pieces of Failed Business and Regulatory Models,’’ Setting 

The Telecommunications Agenda, Columbia Institute For Tele-Information November 3, 2000; 

‘‘Antitrust As Consumer Protection In The New Economy: Lessons From The Microsoft Case, 

Hastings Law Journal, 52: 4, April 2001; ‘‘Evolving Concepts of Universal Service,’’ The Federalist Society, October 18, 1996; ‘‘Delivering the Information Age Now,’’ Telecom Infrastructure: 

1993, Telecommunications Reports, 1993. 2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medial (communication). 

I appreciate the opportunity to offer CFA’s reflections on the Cable and Consumer 

Protection Act of 1992, an Act to which CFA devoted a substantial amount of attention during its development. However, in order to provide a fair evaluation of the 

1992 Cable Act, we believe it is important to recall that many of the most important 

policies adopted by the 1992 Act were repealed or superseded by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It is also important to recall that some of the most important 

policies that affected the video product space in this time period (like the repeal of 

the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules) were implemented outside of the Act. 

Finally, it is important to recognize that the 1992 Cable Act dealt with and integrated rights to two media—wireless and wireline, using media in the broad sense 

of ‘‘storage and transmission channels or tools used to store and deliver information 

or data . . . to communicate any data for any purpose.’’ 2 The first sentence of the 

Communications Act demands no less, defining the purpose of the act to be 

to make available to all people of the United States, without discrimination on 

the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient nationwide and worldwide wire and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges. 

Dealing with a big issue over a long period, especially one where there has been 

rapid technological and economic change, also requires that we evaluate the outcome in relation to the broadly defined media sector we have today. Because the 

video policy of the early 1990s affected wireless (over-the-air terrestrial and satellite) and wireline (cable) distribution media, any effort to write a new policy for 

the 21st century must affect both. Thus, to evaluate where we have come in the past 

20 years, we really need to look at the ‘‘Video/Media Policies of the early 1990s. 

Once we take this broad perspective, we should be open to another possibility. 

While we hope to learn important lessons from from studying those aspects of wireless and wireline communications that were addressed by the 1992 Act, we should 

be open to the possibility that we may learn more about what we should do in the 

future from what happened in the recent past in areas of wireless and wireline communications policy that were not addressed by the 1992 Cable Act. 

With all that said, the 1992 Cable Act does provide an important baseline against 

which to evaluate the video/media policy of the early 1990s. In the 1992 Act Congress recognized that the cable market was afflicted by severe, anticompetitive problems and anti-consumer practices. Congress knew that access to distribution media 

and control of marque content are critical inputs that determine the fate of competition and the treatment of consumers. Congress believed the problems were sufficiently grave and so in need of repair that it overrode President Bush’s only veto 

to put the 1992 Cable Act into law. Congress was right to express these concerns; 

the central lesson of the video/media policy of the early 1990s is that incumbent 

market power in the video space is pernicious and tenacious and it requires vigorous 

public policies to prevent abuse of consumers. Checking that market power remains 

the central policy challenge after twenty years. 

36 

Wireline Service: The Failure of Competition to Discipline Cable Market 

Power 

Cable Rates: The market power of the cable operators unleashed by the 1984 deregulation of cable had driven up rates dramatically. The rate regulation sections 

of the 1992 Act effectively controlled that runaway price escalation (see Exhibit 1). 

Unfortunately, the 1996 Telecom Act abandoned rate regulation and promised that 

competition would protect consumers. It did not. In fact, the only time when consumers have had a respite from relentless price increases for multichannel video 

programming services since the 1984 deregulation of cable was the brief period in 

which the rate regulation of the 1992 Cable Act was in place. 

Exhibit 1: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index (1982–83=100) 

Thus the heart of the analysis of the video/media policy of the early 1990s must 

focus on the decision to rely on competition to replace regulation as the essential 

source of consumer protection in the video space. Unfortunately, the Telecom Act 

provisions that promised competition failed and when sufficient competition to discipline cable pricing failed to materialize, the abusive pricing returned with a vengeance. Measured by the price consumers pay for multichannel video programming 

services, the policy failed miserably. 

Horizontal Limits: The horizontal and vertical limits policy that congress enacted 

in the 1992 Cable Act to help control cable market power also failed. Although the 

Congress told the FCC to impose horizontal and vertical limits, the language was 

not clear enough in the statue to overcome the steadfast opposition from cable in 

the courts. The FCC was not able to get a rule past the courts and cable exploited 

loopholes to undermine competition. The intermodal and intramodal competition 

that Congress hoped in the 1996 Act would replace regulation also failed to develop 

with sufficient speed, breadth and depth, to break the stranglehold that the incumbent distribution and content companies had on the video space. New entrants have 

failed to discipline cable’s pricing power at the level of local of distribution and a 

handful of companies still dominate the prime time dial, which is where the money 

is in the video space. 

Program Access: Congress also recognized that access to marquee content was important, if new distribution media were to have a chance to compete against entrenched incumbents. If a new distribution media is denied access to the programming that people watch most often, it cannot attract the viewers necessary to make 

it a viable economic operation. Access to popular programming is a huge barrier to 

entry. The Congress recognized that antitrust law and practice were insufficient to 

prevent this barrier from being used to undermine competition, so it wrote specific 

provisions to promote and ensure access to content under the broader, public interest standard of the Communication Act. The 1992 Act recognized that potential satellite distributors of video content had been the victims of the withholding of content 

by cable operators. The Act included a number of provisions to check this anticompetitive behavior. 

The program access rules were among the most effective aspects of the 1992 Act 

that were not replaced by the 1996 Act. The program access rules did free satellite 

from the stranglehold of vertically integrated cable operators, but that success was 

limited by the weakness of intermodal competition. Because of differences in technology, satellite made its greatest inroads in rural areas, where cable was weakest, 


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37 

but never did discipline cable’s pricing power anywhere. In urban areas, it did push 

cable to digitize and expand its capacity, but ultimately, that undermined satellite’s 

ability to compete because satellite cannot deliver broadband connectivity. The cable 

broadband pipe now dominates the market for local digital connectivity. 

The impact of the program access rules was also limited in the case of intramodal 

competition. Head-to-head competition between cable operators and overbuilders 

was undermined when cable claimed a ‘‘terrestrial loophole,’’ which allowed it to 

withhold ‘‘must have’’ content, like local sports from overbuilders. Even large potential entrants like telephone companies have complained about the problem of access 

to programming. 

The Failure of Competition Policy 

Relying on the theory that intermodal competition from satellite and entry by 

telephone companies would discipline cable’s market power, a series of mergers was 

approved that consolidated the cable’s control over both the video and broadband 

markets in its local service area (see Exhibit 2). The long standing failure of 

intramodal video competition (between cable companies, between broadcasters, between telephone companies) has been joined by the dramatic failure of intermodal 

competition between (broadcasters and cable, between satellite and cable, between 

cable and telephone companies). 

Exhibit 2: The Telecom Act Path to a ‘‘Collaborating’’ Duopoly in Local 

Digital Connectivity 

Source: Author based on Cable Mergers and Monopolies (Economic Policy Institute, 2002), Broken Promises and Strangled Competition: The Record of Baby Bell Merger and Market Opening 

Behavior (Consumer Federation of America, June 2005); ‘‘Picking Up The Public Policy Pieces 

Of Failed Business And Regulatory Models,’’ Setting The Telecommunications Agenda, Columbia 

Institute For Tele-Information November 3, 2000. 

The measure of market structure that has been used by the Department of Justice 

and the Federal Trade Commission for decades is the HHI index. The DOJ/FTC recently raised the threshold they use for considering a market to be highly concentrated. They have declared that when the HHI is at a level equivalent to four 

equal sized firms (HHI=2500) a market is considered to be highly concentrated market and likely to get close scrutiny in transactions like mergers and joint ventures. 

The HHI index for local distribution shows that local distribution for MVPD service remains very highly concentrated, affording less competition than even a pure 

duopoly (see Exhibit 3). The fact that there is more competition than there was before the 1992 cable Act is not the most important point; the central lesson in these 

statistics is the fact that there is not enough competition to produce the beneficial 

results that competition is supposed to deliver and Congress promised. 

Moreover, this simple statistic does not even fully capture how bad the situation 

is at the local level, as discussed below, because the competitors are not evenly 

matched in terms of the technologies used to supply services. The cable operators 

have added broadband to their video bundle and in at least three-quarters of the 

country they have the network that will dominate the broadband space in speed and 

capacity. The steady increase in the concentration of local connectivity for 

broadband access is evident in Exhibit 3. 


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Exhibit 3: HHI for Local Digital Wireline Connectivity 

Source: Mark Cooper, The End of the End of Competition for Digital Access Services: The 

Verizon-Cable Spectrum Sale and Collaborative Agreements Mark the Final Failure of the 1996 

Telecommunications Act to Provide Consumers with Effective Competition in Local Markets, Consumer Federation, July 2012; Eli Noam, Media Ownership and Concentration in America, 2009, 

for pre-2008; author estimates based on national trends in Federal Communications Commission 

reports on, High Speed Internet and Wireless applied to local market shares data in International Strategy and Investment Group, Media and Cable, October 24, 2011. 

The 21st Century Policy Challenge: Ensuring the Emerging QuasiMonopoly in Wireline Broadband Services the Public Interest 

When cable competition policy failed, it opened the door to the dangerous possibility that these problems will persist in the age of digital distribution. The failure 

to introduce vigorous and effective competition into local video distribution now 

threatens the new distribution medium—broadband. We are repeatedly told that the 

broadband Internet will solve everything, but in the production and distribution of 

professional video, it has not yet done so and the dominant players are engaged in 

vigorous efforts to ensure that their dominance is preserved by manipulating access 

to consumers or withholding content from Internet video distribution. 

The end of the end of the fairy tale of competition has been highlighted in the 

past two years by cross-technology mergers (Comcast-NBC) and joint ventures 

(Verizon and big cable). It is no longer possible to maintain the fiction that competition will protect consumers in the video market. The lesson for policymakers is quite 

clear. 

• In those parts of the nation where there are two networks that are wellmatched in capacity, the competitors have waved the white flag and proposed 

a joint marketing agreement and strategic produce development joint venture. 

• Poorly matched intermodal technologies are no substitute for head-to-head competition. Telco DSL or 4G wireless networks cannot deliver the speed and bandwidth that fiber and hybrid fiber coaxial cable networks can. 

The difference between wireless broadband and wireline is quite clear. The fourth 

generation wireless technology aspires to deliver capacity and speed in the range 

of 10 to 20 megabits per second (mbps). The technologies used by advanced wireline 

service deliver 50 to 100 mbps. As a real world reminder of this difference, the 

wireline broadband service providers set their caps about 125 times as high as the 

wireless carriers. While none of the caps, as implemented, makes economic sense, 

the dramatic difference in their levels reflects the fundamental differences between 

the technologies. 

Exhibit 4 shows a recent comparison of the best available broadband services 

available from each technology in fifteen cities across the globe, based on a recent 

analysis by the New America foundation. These 15 cities had complete data on 


724COOP3.eps
39 

upload and download speeds for each of the major technologies. These are very 

dense areas ranging from 2300 per square mile in Riga Latvia to almost 30,000 per 

square mile in New York. The Exhibit 4 shows that DSL and Wireless broadband 

delivers a fraction of the speed that cable/fiber does. As cable and fiber move to 

higher speed, DSL and wireless fall farther behind. 

Exhibit 4: Average Speed for ‘‘Best’’ Available Technologies in 15 Cities 

Source: Hibah, Husain, et al., The cost of Connectivity, New America Foundation, July 23, 

2012. 

Policy Lessons 

I believe mobile broadband is a terrific technology that will be at the center of 

the communications ecology of the 21st century digital economy, but it is not a substitute for wireline broadband. On the contrary, wireline broadband is a vitally important complement and a necessary input for wireless broadband. It is the ‘‘fat 

pipes’’ of wireline broadband that bring the exaflood of data close to the consumer, 

data which covers the first mile through wireless. This critically important role of 

wireline broadband makes it all the more alarming that we are headed to at best 

a quasi-monopoly of full capacity broadband networks (a duopoly with either two 

poorly matched or collaborating rivals). Moreover, to the extent that wireless 

broadband might provide competition for cable, it has the added problem in the U.S. 

that the dominant telephone companies also dominate the wireless broadband space. 

Worse still, one of he two dominant wireless broadband providers has signed a peace 

treaty with the major cable operators. I believe that this is illegal under the Communications Act, but if the courts find that the Act is ambiguous in this area, the 

Congress should make it clear that this type of close collaboration between two wireless broadband networks is unacceptable if competition is to remain the primary 

thrust of public policy. One and a half firms is not enough competition to protect 

consumers, but that is what we have in the U.S. 

Twenty years of failure to break the strangle hold of the incumbent broadcasters 

and cable operators should have reinforced the premises on which the 1992 Cable 

Act rested: access to the means of distribution and ‘‘must have’’ content are key bottlenecks. The campaign by the cable operators and content producers to prevent content from going online or ensure that it is behind a pay wall if it gets online, is 

intended to defend the rents of their offline businesses. In the absence of effective 

competition, this rent collection is not socially productive. Rather than support the 

necessary infrastructure, it contributes to outrageously high rates of profit and undermines the competitiveness of and innovation in the digital distribution models. 

The pattern of anti-competitive, anti-consumer behavior that cable exhibited in 

the pre-broadband era has been transferred to the broadband product space. 

Comcast was caught red-handed degrading the quality of service of applications that 

competed against its core product. It has recently begun to charge consumers who 

use competing digital distribution service over their broadband connections. In both 

cases, it gave its own, identical services better treatment. I believe that this is illegal under the Communications Act, but if the courts find that the Act is ambiguous 

in this area, the Congress should make it clear that broadband communications networks must be operating in a nondiscriminatory manner, the way all of the major 

communications networks have been throughout the history of the Republic. 


724COOP4.eps
40 

If Congress intends to rely on competition to fix the video space, it must ensure 

that the Internet is not starved of content or strangled by cable gatekeepers. The 

very small number of distribution networks means that competition between platforms will be feeble at best. ‘‘Dynamic’’ duopolies just won’t cut it, ‘‘collaborative’’ 

duopolies are a joke and ‘‘benevolent’’ monopolies are a fiction. If policymakers intend to rely to the greatest extent possible on competition, then public policy must 

ensure that competition on the small number of platforms is unimpeded by the market power of the network owners or the dominant content producers. 

Wireless: The Failure of Broadcast Spectrum Policy 

Retransmission Consent: Twenty years ago, when Congress chose to extend the lucrative transmission rights it had granted to broadcasters by adding retransmission 

rights, it was attempting to protect the national broadcast networks that had come 

to play an important part in democratic discourse in America. The retransmission 

consent provisions of the 1992 Act were intended to ensure that national broadcast 

networks were available over cable and supported by broadcasters. Unfortunately, 

Congress gave the broadcasters these new rights without new responsibilities and 

they abused them. They were not used to strengthen the broadcast networks; they 

were used by the broadcasters to build suites of cable programming that were 

crammed into the bundles that cable offered. Consumers were forced to purchase 

large bundles of programs, most of which they do not watch. 

Repeal of FinSyn: The repeal of the FinSyn rules also contributed to this consolidation, allowing the broadcasters to eliminate independent programming from prime 

time, which provided the broadcasters with the incentive to purchase movies studios. The result of these policies was to unleash a wave of horizontal mergers and 

vertical integration, as shown in Exhibit 5. 

Exhibit 5: The Evolution of the Cable/Broadcast Content Oligopoly 

Source: Mark Cooper, The Impact of the Vertically Integrated Television-Movie Studio Oligopoly on Source diversity and Independent Production, 2006; Columbia Journalism Review, Who 

Owns What, August 22, 2006. 

Today the video dial is dominated by a handful of companies, many of which have 

proposed to collaborate, as shown in Exhibit 6. 


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41 

Exhibit 6: Programming Controlled by the Content Oligopoly and 

Collaborators 

Source: Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Annual Assessment of competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming: fourteenth Report, July 20, 2012, Appendix B; Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What, July 21, 2012. 

The cable operators were not entirely innocent in this process. The broadcasters 

were confronted with the problem that cable operators, often vertically integrated 

with cable programming, gave their affiliated programming preference in carriage 

and high fees. To match the cable operators, who were leveraging the advantage of 

vertical integration, the broadcaster leveraged their retransmission rights to gain 

carriage. For a long period the cable operators and broadcasters solved their problem by increasing the bundles and charging higher prices. The bargaining over retransmission has become contentious lately, but no matter who wins between the 

cable operators and the broadcasters, one thing is certain, the public always loses. 

The public occasionally loses access to programming, frequently is forced to pay 

more for programming, and always is forced to pay for massive amounts of programming it never watches. 


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Spectrum Policy Beyond the 1992 and 1996 Acts: Time to Return the Public 

Airwaves to the Public 

Use of the public airwaves (transmission and retransmission rights) is a good 

place to start a broad and meaningful reform agenda. Spectrum is a shared resource 

used by humans to communicate. Human speech uses the airwaves, which are accessible to all who have a voice, and people have been using technology to expand 

the reach of their communications through the spectrum for as long as they have 

been speaking. The invention of the radio a little over a hundred years ago was a 

technological breakthrough that vastly increased the ability to transmit signals over 

long distances to many more people. 

Exactly a hundred years ago with the signing of the Radio Act of 1912 (August 

13, 1912), public policy started down the road of granting licenses to transmit signals whose range was boosted by electronics. Given the technology of the day, using 

the spectrum to transmit one signal to many potential listeners appeared to be the 

best use of the spectrum. Exclusive licenses seemed to be a good way to solve two 

problems—(1) prevent interference between speakers by designating one, privileged 

person to use specific frequencies in the spectrum in specific areas and (2) provide 

incentives to investment in the transmitters, receivers and content that would fill 

the airways with sound. In exchange for the privilege of an exclusive right to use 

the public airwaves, broadcaster were asked to shoulder public interest obligations. 

Economists have debated for decades whether broadcast licenses were the best 

use of the spectrum, but two remarkable experiments in the past quarter century 

have made it clear that, whatever the original rationale may have been, it no longer 

holds. About a quarter of a century ago, public policy allowed the spectrum to be 

used in other ways by other technologies to provide manyto-many conversations. 

The FCC began to issue licenses for cellular communications under the theory that 

licenses were still necessary to control interference and incent investment in the 

technology necessary to exploit the resource in this new way. As shown in Exhibit 

7, the value of the economic activity in the spectrum used for two-way communications now dwarfs the value of the activity in the spectrum set aside for broadcasting, even though the broadcast spectrum is considered to be of much higher 

quality. 

Exhibit 7: Broadcasting v. Wireless Annual Revenue (million $) 

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various issues, Information Sector Services— 

Telecommunications Estimated Revenue and Expenses; Mark Cooper, ‘‘The Central Role of 

Wireless in the 21st Century Communications Ecology: Adapting Spectrum and Universal Service Policy to the New Reality,’’ Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, September 2011. 

At roughly the same time, however, the FCC undertook an even more deregulatory free market experiment in the use of the spectrum. It realized that issuing licenses to transmit signals was not the only way to control interference or incent 

people to invest in the technology to make more communications possible. Given 

new technology, allowing everyone to use the spectrum to transmit signals, subject 

to simple rules of sharing, also produces an immense amount of communications 

without interference. WiFi was born in parts of the spectrum that had been considered ‘‘junk’’ or ‘‘garbage’’ by those wishing to use the spectrum for commercial purposes. 

As shown in Exhibit 8, the number of WiFi enable devices deployed has increased 

at a remarkable pace. In the contemporary world of wireless broadband communicaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE

724COOP8.eps
43 

3Mark Cooper, Efficiency Gains and Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to the Public 

Airwaves: The Dramatic Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access, Silicon 

Flatirons, January 2012. 

tions, firms that hold the privileged position of licensed cellular carriers have found 

it efficient and effective to dump as much as half their data traffic into the unlicensed space. 

Exhibit 8: U.S. Wireless Connectivity Potential 

Source: Nick Flaherty, ‘‘Consumer Wi-Fi drives Global growth,’’ The Embedded Blog, May 28, 

2010, Peter King, Digital Home Wi-Fi Enabled Devices: Global Market Forecast and Outlook,’’ 

July 2007; FCC, Internet Access Services, various issues; Mark Cooper, Efficiency Gains and 

Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to the Public Airwaves: The Dramatic Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access, Silicon Flatirons, January 2012. 

The value of unlicensed spectrum goes well beyond a convenient place for cellular 

services to offload their traffic. It provides a variety of services that have unique 

value. In a recent paper I showed that the value of the many uses of WiFi has 

grown to equal or exceed the value of wireless broadband and wireline broadband 

(as shown in Exhibit 9).3 As the Internet of things expands, to tens of billions of 

transmitters, unlicensed spectrum will fill a larger and larger role. Wi-Fi is a central feature of the 21st century communications technology. 

The remarkable success of unlicensed spectrum requires a radical, deregulatory, 

free market shift in public policy thinking about how to use spectrum. It is now possible to return the public airwaves to the public for much more direct use than at 

any time since the passage of the Radio Act a hundred years ago. 

The unlicensed model has succeeded because it is not free. In order to utilize the 

unlicensed spectrum, device manufacturers must design, build and market devices 

that consumers buy. To induce consumers to do so, useful applications must be written and distributed. Service provides must deploy hundreds of thousands of base 

stations and they must pay for the transport of traffic to and from the Internet. The 

unlicensed model succeeded by bringing new and unique services to market, increasing the value of broadband by extending it to new devices, and providing a lower 

cost, more efficient avenue to deliver data to consumers. 


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44 

Exhibit 9: Use of Unlicensed Spectrum Accounts for a Significant Part of 

the Value of Broadband 

Sources: Cellular data estimated as $50/month for 84,000 million subscribers year-end 2010 

Industry Analysis and Technology Division, Internet Access Services: Status as of December 2010, 

Federal Communications Commission, October 2011. WiFi standalone value is calculated as 110 

million users are $20 per month value based on charges for standalone Wi-Fi services (as advertised in websites of Boingo, AT&T, T-Mobile). Most cellular providers bundle Wi-Fi with cellular 

broadband subscriptions. Hot Spot Connectivity estimated by scaling up AT&T 1.2 billion per 

year to 3.6 national total valued at average per session charge of $3. Consumer surplus is from 

Richard Thanki, The Economic Value Generated by Current and Future Allocations of Unlicensed Spectrum, Perspective, 2009 (adjusting his 30 percent scenario for the current level of 

broadband subscribers). Speed is from, Paul Milgrom, Jonathan Levin and Assaf Eilat, The Case 

for Unlicensed Spectrum, October 12, 2011). Intermediate Inputs from Richard Thanki, The Economic Value Generated by Current And Future Allocations of Unlicensed Spectrum, Perspective, 

2009 and Yochai Benkler, Unlicensed Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market 

Adoption, 2011. Mark Cooper, Efficiency Gains and Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to 

the Public Airwaves: The Dramatic Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access, 

Silicon Flatirons, January 2012. 

• The unlicensed model removes the spectrum barrier to entry, which is the primary obstacle by allowing anyone to transmit signals for any purpose, as long 

as the devices used abide by the rules. 

• Removing this barrier to entry removes the threat of hold up, in which the firm 

that controls the bottleneck throttles innovation by either refusing to allow uses 

that are not in its interest, or appropriating the rents associated with innovation. 

• It lowers the hurdle of raising capital, by reducing the need for network investment and focusing on devices and applications. 

• It fosters an end-user focus that makes innovation more responsive to consumer 

demand; indeed, it allows direct end-user innovation. 

• It de-concentrates the supply of services compared to the exclusive licensed 

model, especially for high bandwidth services which tends to result in a very 

small number of suppliers, particularly in lower density markets. 

Policy Lessons: Moving the Broadcasters out of the Way 

This historical background must be the starting point for policies to address the 

problem of the retransmission consent. Retransmission of broadcast signals may or 

may not be a necessary extension of the early twentieth century broadcast license 

approach to using the spectrum, but the fundamental problem at the start of the 

21st century is that the underlying broadcast licenses are an anachronism born of 

an antiquated technology. They use far too much spectrum to provide a specific form 

of communications that is of relatively little value compared to the alternative uses 

of the public airwaves that technology now makes possible. Simply put, the U.S. is 

wasting tens of billions of dollars a year because the broadcast licenses prevent people from using the public spectrum in much more valuable ways. 

If Congress reforms retransmission rights without reforming the underlying 

transmission rights, it will have done only a small part of what is necessary and 

in the public interest. If Congress reforms the underlying transmission rights without providing the maximum opportunity for all the people to use the spectrum in 


724COOP10.eps
45 

the freest manner possible, it will have failed miserably to bring the management 

of spectrum in to the 21st century. Congress will make another hundred year mistake. 

Using 21st century technology, broadcasters can continue to transmit their signals 

while using much less spectrum. They should be required, not bribed, to do so. To 

be fair, the cost of retooling their equipment to transmit more efficiently might be 

defrayed with public funds, but that is it. They have no claim to the value that the 

spectrum can generate with other uses. Since the signals they will be able to transmit will be just as strong and clear (perhaps even better in both regards), there will 

be no harm to them and they deserve no special compensation. The exclusive right 

to transmit in the public airwaves is already a privilege of immense value. If a 

broadcaster does not move, the next time the broadcast license is up for renewal, 

part should be set aside for unlicensed use and the other part should be auctioned. 

If the broadcasters want it badly enough, they will win the auction and make the 

investment necessary to use the spectrum, just like every other potential bidder. 

The spectrum that is freed up by relocating the broadcasters should be split between 

cellular licenses and unlicensed use. 

Reforming the management of the public airwaves in this way is the most important step policymakers can take, but reforming transmission rights in this way will 

not solve the problem of retransmission rights. Broadcasters will still have the privilege of holding exclusive rights to use the public airwaves to transmit their signals 

and the current law gives them retransmission right, too. 

Congress could simply eliminate retransmission rights and the public interest 

would be no worse off. The original license to transmit was a valuable privilege. The 

broadcasters received the right to transmit signals over-the-air for free to the public. 

That is all they deserved and should have expected. 

In the alternative, Congress could tie retransmission right to other public purposes for those who choose to continue their current licenses and accept the offer 

to move their transmission signals, much as it tied the original transmission rights 

to public interest obligations. In order to exercise retransmission right on multichannel video distribution platforms, broadcasters should be required to make those 

programs available over the Internet at the same time and on the same terms as 

they make their programming available over-the-air. This would replicate the original deal between the public and broadcasters—the right to transmit signals that are 

freely available to the public. 

Conclusion 

Digital distribution is a powerful, consumer-friendly, competition-friendly force in 

the 21st century media sector, but it is not immune to the abuse of market power 

by entrenched physical space incumbents. Media policy in the 21st century will have 

to be sensitive to the new economic reality, where small numbers of platforms play 

an important role. Large firms dominate platforms at the center of the digital economy because of the superior economics made possible by dramatic reductions in 

transaction costs and the ease and importance of vertical linkage in digital production. The economics that dictate a small number of platforms with market power, 

do not prevent the abuse of that market power. It becomes vitally important to ensure competition for the complements that flow on those platforms is not undermined by market power. 

The need for access is a two edged sword. The owners of the platforms must not 

be allowed to leverage their market power to distort competition on the platform. 

The suppliers of the complements (content) must not be allowed to manipulate the 

supply of ‘‘marque’’ content to distort platform competition or extract monopoly 

rents, especially in the name of defending inefficient, outdated physical space business models. 

The media policy of the early 1990s failed in large measure because it pinned its 

hopes on competition between media distribution platforms and gave broadcasters 

more rights, while failing to control cable market power. After the Comcast-NBC 

merger and in light of the Verizon-cable joint venture, the prospects that platform 

competition will provide the necessary check on the market power of incumbent content producers and network owners are dimmer than ever. 

If Congress intends to legislate in the media and spectrum area, it must get back 

to the principle that the primary means of communications must be available to all 

on a nondiscriminatory basis, a principle that has been successfully applied to the 

dominant means of communications throughout U.S. history, regardless of the dominant technology—roads, canals, steamships, railroads, and the telephone network. 

It would be a grave mistake, another hundred year mistake, to allow the information superhighway to be turned into a private toll road dominated by one or two 

network owners. 

46 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, sir. 

We move now on to Mr. Padden, and I could identify you. You 

are an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Colorado. 

Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF PRESTON PADDEN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

SILICON FLATIRONS CENTER, COLORADO LAW, 

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 

Mr. PADDEN. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the Committee. My name is Preston Padden. I am a Senior Fellow at the Silicon Flatirons Center 

for Law, Technology, and Entrepreneurship at the University of 

Colorado School of Law and an Adjunct Professor of Communications Law. 

We have 11 of our students interning in communications-related 

offices in Washington this summer, and I thank the Committee 

very much for accommodating some of them here today. 

The views I express are my own, and I have at least three things 

I did not have in earlier appearances before this committee. They 

are arthritis, hearing aids, and the broad perspective that comes 

from no longer being employed in one of these warring industry 

segments. 

America’s television regulatory policies have come to look like 

that old closet in your basement that you keep promising yourself 

one day you will finally clean out. I appear today to offer a fullthroated embrace of S. 2008 and H.R. 3675, the Next Generation 

Television Marketplace Act, that would affect principled deregulation. 

Priority number one must be the repeal of the cable and satellite 

compulsory licenses. These licenses seize all the programs on local 

TV stations and give them for free to Time Warner Cable and 

DirecTV, but not to new online video distributors like Netflix. This 

creates a huge impediment to the growth of online video distributors, the distributors that hold the most promise of new competition for the benefit of consumers. Since multinational and bilateral 

treaties prohibit Congress from enacting a compulsory license for 

television programs on the Internet, the only way to level the playing field between Time Warner Cable and Netflix is to repeal the 

cable and satellite compulsory licenses. 

These licenses were first adopted in 1976 because Congress did 

not then believe that there was a reasonable marketplace mechanism to clear the copyrights for cable and satellite retransmission 

of broadcast programs. But today the programs on more than 500 

non-broadcast networks, which are not subject to the compulsory licenses, get retransmitted all across the country through simple 

marketplace negotiations. The non-broadcast channel owners simply aggregate the rights in all of the programs on their schedule 

and then engage in a simple copyright-based negotiation with the 

cable operator or satellite operator. Broadcasters could do exactly 

the same thing. 

The worst of all possible results would be to modify or repeal retransmission consent while leaving the compulsory copyright licenses in place. That would produce a totally unwarranted windfall 

47 

for cable and satellite operators and would do nothing to help consumers gain access to new video options from online distributors. 

The bedrock principle that broadcasters and program creators deserve to be compensated when another party sells their programs 

at retail is not outdated. It is timeless, as old as capitalism itself. 

So I ask the Committee to distinguish between an antiquated regulatory structure and indeed needs to be examined and the 

unarguable principle that the creators of broadcast programming 

deserve to be compensated for their product. 

S. 2008 and H.R. 3675 would bring about other much needed deregulation as further described in my written testimony. For example, because of the TV-newspaper cross-ownership rule, the Times 

Picayune newspaper did not have the option of seeking to merge 

with a local television station, and as a result, consumers in New 

Orleans now get only three newspapers a week. 

By championing principled deregulation, I do not mean to tilt for 

or against any industry segment. I love them all. Broadcasters provide consumers with free over-the-air access to the most watched 

programming and to vital news and community service. Cable, led 

by Dr. Richard Green and his team at Cable Labs, deserve enormous praise for developing the doxis standard and investing more 

than $175 billion of private capital to build America’s only nearly 

nationwide high-speed broadband network. Satellite carriers and 

online video distributors offer a much needed alternative source of 

video programming, and without the program creators, nothing else 

in the television ecosystem would matter. 

I have confidence that all of these industry segments will thrive 

in a deregulated future. I understand that a regulated environment, especially one that your industry helped to shape, is known 

and secure, but I firmly believe that the future of all of these industry segments and of segments not yet even conceived lies not 

in regulation but in the freedom to innovate in the service of consumers. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Padden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PRESTON PADDEN, SENIOR FELLOW, SILICON FLATIRONS

CENTER, COLORADO LAW, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

‘‘Congress gives Comcast, but not Netflix, a free copyright license for all 

the programs on local TV Stations. Why?’’ [From testimony below] 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and members of the Committee, my name is Preston Padden and I am a Senior Fellow at the Silicon 

Flatirons Center for Law, Technology and Entrepreneurship at the University of 

Colorado School of Law and an Adjunct Professor of Communications Law. I enjoyed 

a 38 year career in the television industry during which I held senior positions in 

almost every segment of the business—local television stations, television networks, 

cable networks and satellite television, including serving as President of The ABC 

Television Network. 

I have appeared before the Committee many times, but this is the first time that 

no one is paying me to advocate a particular point of view. The views I express 

today are my own. I am strongly pro-broadcaster, pro-cable/satellite/telco operator, 

pro-online video distributor and pro-content creator. I am anti-no one. Most importantly I am passionate about allowing dynamic market forces to provide consumers 

with the best possible television services. I am honored to be sharing the witness 

table with distinguished and accomplished industry leaders, including longtime 

friends. 

48 

America’s television regulatory policies have come to look like that old closet in 

your basement that you keep promising yourself that one day you will finally clean 

out. The span of my career has allowed me to be an observer, and occasionally a 

participant, as one regulatory structure after another was stuffed into that closet. 

In my opinion, the day has come to clean it out. I appear today to offer a fullthroated embrace of S. 2008 and HR. 3675, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act. 

Compulsory Licenses and Retransmission Consent 

Because of the inextricable link between Communications policy and Copyright 

policy, I urge this Committee to find a way to move forward in lockstep with the 

Committee on the Judiciary as you clean out this dusty regulatory closet. Repeal 

of the cable and satellite Compulsory Copyright Licenses in Sections 111, 119 and 

122 of Title 17 should be an absolute prerequisite to action by this Committee, or 

by the FCC, to repeal or modify related Communications Statutes and Regulations 

including Retransmission Consent. Many of the Communications Act provisions 

were adopted expressly to prevent unfair and unintended consequences that otherwise would flow from Compulsory Licensing. They are inseparable. Repeal of the 

Communications provisions without also repealing the Compulsory Copyright Licenses would result in an unjustifiable windfall for cable/satellite/telco operators 

(‘‘Multichannel Video programming Distributors’’ or ‘‘MVPDs’’) at the expense of 

broadcasters and program creators. 

Today, MVPD distribution of broadcast programming is governed by a Rube Goldberg regulatory structure. Wikipedia describes Rube Goldberg as ‘‘complex gadgets 

that perform simple tasks in indirect, convoluted ways.’’ Rube would have loved our 

system of Compulsory Licenses and Retransmission Consent. First in 1976 and then 

in 1988 the government seized the private property of program creators—all the 

programs on local TV stations—and gave them for free to for-profit cable and satellite companies under Compulsory Licenses. Then in 1992, instead of simply repealing the Compulsory Licenses, the government layered on Retransmission Consent— 

a requirement that cable and satellite companies get the consent of the same local 

TV stations for the use of their signal, as distinguished from their programs. The 

end result of these two government interventions is a negotiation between the local 

TV stations and the cable and satellite companies. As explained below, that is the 

same result that most likely would have resulted if the government had adopted 

neither the Compulsory Licenses nor Retransmission Consent. We have created 

complex statutes that perform simple tasks in indirect, convoluted ways. 

S. 2008 and HR. 3675 achieve the right public policy balance by repealing both 

the Compulsory Copyright Licenses and Retransmission Consent provisions thereby 

favoring no industry over another. The result would be to allow dynamic marketplace forces to manage the distribution of broadcast programming in response to 

consumer demand, just as those same forces have successfully managed the distribution of non-broadcast programming for the last three decades. Those marketplace forces will do a better job of serving the American people than do these ancient Statutes and Regulations that virtually lock in place viewing patterns dating 

back to 1972. 

The Cable Compulsory Copyright License (17 U.S.C. Section 111), enacted in 1976 

when television in America consisted almost entirely of just ABC, CBS and NBC, 

is one of the oldest and most outdated Statutes gathering dust in the back of our 

nation’s regulatory closet. The Compulsory License is so old that very few people 

in the industry or in the Congress even know that it exists. Even fewer understand 

what it does. Unfortunately, I am so old that I was present when the Compulsory 

License, which commentator Adam Thierer has dubbed ‘‘the original sin of video 

marketplace regulation’’ (Forbes 2/19/12), was committed. 

In November 1971, as a young law Student, I was clerking for a great lawyer and 

a wonderful mentor named Tom Dougherty, Assistant General Counsel of 

Metromedia, Inc. the then owner of channel 5 in Washington, D.C. Tom sent me 

to observe the latest in a series of meetings between Vince Wasilewski, President 

of The National Association of Broadcasters, Bob Schmidt, President of the National 

Cable Television Association and Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America. Senior Staff members of the Senate and House Commerce and 

Judiciary Committees and of the White House Office Of Telecommunications Policy 

were present at the meeting. The goal was to break the logjam of copyright and 

communications policy issues that had prevented the growth of cable television systems. It was my good fortune to be present as the negotiators, prodded sternly by 

Congressional and White House Staff, reached what became known as the ‘‘Consensus Agreement’’ (Appendix D to 36 FCC 2d 143 at 284–286 (1972)). 

The principal components of the Consensus Agreement were: 

49 

1. The Copyright Act would be amended to make it clear that cable retransmission of the program schedule of a broadcast station would be considered a 

‘‘performance’’ of those programs; 

2. But cable operators would get a government conferred Compulsory Copyright 

License allowing the performance of those programs, paying nothing for retransmitting the programs on local stations and paying a statutory fee for retransmitting the programs on out-of-market stations; 

3. The FCC would enact an agreed upon set of communications regulations including ‘‘must carry’’ and regulations designed to ameliorate the marketplace 

disrupting capability of the Compulsory License—the capacity of a Compulsory 

License to otherwise trump the rights of parties to exclusive program contracts 

that were negotiated in the marketplace. 

The Network Non-Duplication Rule and the Syndicated Exclusivity Rule are examples communications regulations designed to ameliorate the effects of the Cable 

Compulsory License. These regulations do not confer upon the broadcaster any exclusive rights. Instead, these regulations merely allow a broadcaster to actually realize such exclusivity as it has negotiated with the program owner notwithstanding 

the Compulsory License bestowed on Cable by the Congress. In other words, in the 

absence of a government conferred compulsory license, parties in the marketplace 

that contract for exclusive rights can bring litigation to enforce those exclusive 

rights. But, when the government steps in and imposes a compulsory license, that 

license can ‘‘trump’’ negotiated licenses unless the government adopts rules like Network Non-Duplication and Syndicated Exclusivity. 

Compulsory licenses are an extraordinary exception to and departure from normal 

copyright principles. Under a compulsory license a program creator is actually compelled by the government to license its program to a government-favored party at 

government-set rates. Pursuant to International Copyright Treaties and Conventions, compulsory licenses are to be used only as a last resort in instances of market 

failure. As memorialized in the House Report, the cable compulsory license was justified by the universal belief ‘‘that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome 

to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work 

was retransmitted by a cable system.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 

89 (1976). 

No one in the negotiating room in November 1971 thought of the possibility that 

the television station owner could act as a ‘‘rights aggregator’’—assembling the performance rights to all of the programs that the station produced, or licensed from 

others, and then offering the cable operator a single point of negotiation to reach 

a marketplace license agreement to retransmit the station’s programming. But, a 

few years later, the first non-broadcast television channels emerged (e.g., HBO, 

CNN, A&E, History Channel, etc.) using exactly that rights aggregator model. 

The programs on non-broadcast television channels are not subject to the Compulsory License. The owners of these channels produce or license programs, secure the 

right to sublicense those programs to MVPDs and then offer those MVPDs a simple 

‘‘one-stop-shopping’’ source to license the necessary performance rights in the programs. Today, more than 500 non-broadcast television channels are distributed by 

MVPDs nationwide without any need for government compulsory licensing. 

The success of the marketplace ‘‘rights aggregator’’ model in facilitating the distribution of the programs on non-broadcast channels demonstrates that there is no 

longer any need for government Compulsory Licensing of broadcast programming. 

Just like the non-broadcast channels, broadcast stations easily could aggregate the 

rights in the programs on their schedule and then negotiate with MVPDs. 

In 1988 Congress extended the Compulsory Copyright License to satellite systems. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Title II, Pub. L. No. 100–667. MVPDs sell 

their subscribers the programming on a combination of broadcast and non-broadcast 

channels. By the early 1990s, Congress concluded that it was wrong for MVPDs to 

pay (through marketplace negotiations) for the programs on non-broadcast channels 

but to not pay (because of the Compulsory Licenses) for the programs on broadcast 

channels: 

‘‘Cable operators pay for the cable programming services they offer to their customers; the Committee believes that programming services which originate on 

a broadcast channel should not be treated differently.’’ S. Rep. No. 102–92 

(1991), at 35. 

But, rather than repeal the Compulsory Licenses (as then advocated by the U.S. 

Copyright Office, Fox Broadcasting Company and others) Congress, in the 1992 

Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act, instead created a new Communications Act Retransmission Consent right in broadcast signals. This new right reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
50 

quires MVPDs to secure the permission of a broadcast station before retransmitting 

the programs on its schedule thus setting up a negotiation that essentially is a substitute for the copyright negotiations that would take place absent the Compulsory 

Licenses. 

The creation of this new Retransmission Consent right was a major public policy 

accomplishment. It prevented broadcasters, and the important public interest they 

serve, from being left behind in the new economics of television. Broadcasters absolutely deserve to be paid by any commercial business that wishes to retransmit their 

programs for a fee to consumers. But, a far better course would have been to simply 

repeal the Compulsory licenses. The Retransmission Consent right is fundamentally 

flawed because it is based on a legal fiction—the notion that consumers and MVPDs 

are interested in a broadcast station’s signal rather than in the programs on that 

signal. 

Contrary to the Retransmission Consent legal fiction, it is absolutely clear that 

MVPDs negotiate with broadcast stations so that they can offer the broadcast programs, for a fee, to consumers. In defending Retransmission Consent at the FCC, 

a joint filing by the National Association of Broadcasters and the ABC, CBS, NBC 

and Fox Affiliate Associations emphasized the popularity of broadcast programming 

as distinguished from broadcast signals: 

‘‘Retransmission consent fees for local stations whose programming service—national and local—is the most popular of all programming services represent but 

a fraction of the rates paid by MVPDs for other, less popular programming 

channels.’’ Opposition Of The Broadcaster Associations in MB Docket 10–71, 

May 18, 2010 (emphasis added). 

A group of eight Broadcast Companies (Barrington, Bonten, Dispatch, Gannett, 

Newport, Post-Newsweek, Raycom and Weigel) echoed this same argument: 

‘‘Congress established the retransmission consent regime in order to ensure that 

local television broadcast stations could negotiate for fair compensation for their 

programming. ’’ Opposition Of Local Broadcasters in MB Docket 10–71, May 18, 

2010 (emphasis added). 

This argument is 100 percent correct. I have made the same argument many 

times myself. But, this argument makes it absolutely clear that Retransmission 

Consent payments are made for the broadcast programs—not the broadcast signal. 

In addition to being based on the legal fiction that MVPDs bargain for the broadcaster’s signal rather than for the programs on the broadcaster’s schedule, the decision to adopt Retransmission Consent rather than to repeal the Compulsory Licenses has adverse consequences for consumers. The Compulsory Licenses apply to 

broadcast stations whose carriage is deemed ‘‘local’’ and therefore permissible under 

FCC Regulations. Those Regulations actually incorporate ratings from the A.C. 

Nielsen Company as measured in 1972! 1972! See 47 CFR Sec 76.54. Those 1972 

audience ratings were attached as Appendix B to the FCC’s 1972 Cable Television 

Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d 143, and, subject to special administrative showings, 

continue to define the stations that may be carried by MVPDs. The need to legislatively override this ancient ratings data enshrined in the FCC Rules is why this 

Committee, and the Committee On The Judiciary, repeatedly have been dragged 

into controversies over what television programming is deemed ‘‘local’’ in what 

areas. 

By contrast, the distribution of programs on non-broadcast channels is not governed by FCC Rules and 1972 ratings data. Programs on non-broadcast channels 

may be carried wherever the program owners and MVPDs sense an opportunity to 

satisfy consumer demand. Repeal of the Compulsory Licenses would enable program 

owners, broadcasters and MVPDs similarly to deliver to consumers the programs 

they want—not just the programs on channels buried in a 1972 FCC Appendix. 

The continued existence of the Compulsory Licenses also creates a major impediment to the emergence of new competitive Online Video Distributors (OVDs) like 

Netflix. Congress gives Comcast, but not Netflix, a free copyright license for all the 

programs on local TV Stations. Why? OVDs are the technology future of television 

and the hope of new competitive options for consumers. But OVDs are not eligible 

for the Compulsory Licenses. In fact, it would violate International treaties to extend the Compulsory Licenses to OVDs. For example, the United States is a party 

to several free trade agreements which contain the obligation that ‘‘. . .neither 

Party may permit the retransmission of television signals (whether terrestrial, 

cable, or satellite) on the Internet without the authorization of the right holder or 

right holders. . ..’’ Australia FTA, U.S.-Austl., Article 17.4.10(b). See also, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA, U.S.-Costa Rica-Dom. Rep.-El 

Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar. FTA, Art. 15.5.10(b), Aug. 5, 2004; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, U.S.- 

51 

Bahr., art. 14.4.10(b), September 14, 2004; Morocco FTA, U.S.-Morocco, Art. 

15.5.11(b), June 15, 2004. These treaty provisions clearly prohibit a statutory license 

for the retransmission of any broadcast television programs on the Internet. 

In addition to not being eligible for the Compulsory Licenses, as a practical matter, OVDs cannot negotiate direct licenses with local broadcast stations. Because of 

the existence of the Compulsory Licenses, broadcast stations—unlike non-broadcast 

channels—do not routinely secure the right to authorize retransmissions of the programs they license for their schedule. So, the OVDs, and the consumers they seek 

to serve, are simply out-of-luck. Unlike cable, satellite and telcos, OVDs must try 

to compete without the ability to obtain the right to simultaneously retransmit the 

most popular programs in television—broadcast programs. This is a substantial impediment to the emergence of a more competitive video marketplace. Repeal of the 

Compulsory Licenses would prompt broadcasters to secure the right to authorize retransmissions of the programs on their schedule. Then all retransmitters—cable, 

satellite, telco and OVDs—could negotiate on a level playing field with the broadcasters. 

Because the Compulsory Licenses distort the marketplace for the distribution of 

broadcast programming, several Federal entities have call for their repeal. The U.S. 

Copyright Office repeatedly has called for the repeal of the Compulsory Licenses. 

In it’s latest Report it stated: 

‘‘Although statutory licensing has ensured the efficient and cost-effective delivery of television programming in the United States for as long as 35 years in 

some instances, it is an artificial construct created in an earlier era. Copyright 

owners should be permitted to develop marketplace licensing options to replace 

the provisions of Sections 111, 119 and 122, working with broadcasters, cable 

operators and satellite carriers, and other licensees, taking into account consumer demands.’’ Copyright Office Satellite Television Extension and Localism 

Act Section 302 Report: a report of the Register of Copyrights, August 2011. 

The FCC also has called for the repeal of the Compulsory Licenses: 

‘‘We hereby recommend that the Congress re-examine the compulsory license 

with a view toward replacing it with a regime of full copyright liability for retransmission of both distant and local broadcast signals. . ..Our analysis suggests that American viewers would reap significant benefits from elimination of 

the compulsory license.’’ 4 FCC Rcd 6562 (Docket No. 87–25) 

Today broadcasters want to maintain the status quo. Cable operators want to repeal or modify Retransmission Consent. S. 2008 and HR. 3675 would chart a third 

path—returning to fundamentals and repealing both the Compulsory Licenses and 

Retransmission Consent. After a brief transition period during which broadcasters 

would secure the right to authorize retransmissions of the programs on their schedules, broadcast programming would be distributed based on consumer demand just 

like non-broadcast programming. In my view, this is absolutely the right course. 

I would like to address briefly a couple of the arguments I hear from my broadcast 

and cable friends. 

Some cable operators complain that local network affiliate broadcasters have a 

‘‘monopoly’’ on the programs on their network. These cable operators seek the right 

to retransmit the network programs as broadcast by out-of-market affiliates. But 

the broadcast networks and their affiliates should remain free to negotiate such exclusive or non-exclusive affiliations as they deem appropriate in the marketplace. 

And the outcome of those negotiations should not be superseded by government 

intervention. I would point out to my cable friends that the non-broadcast channels 

meet the same test of ‘‘monopoly’’. There is only one source for the non-broadcast 

channel ‘‘AMC’’, and that is AMC Networks, a ‘‘spin-off’’ of the cable company Cablevision. There is only one source for the non-broadcast channel ‘‘Bravo’’ and that is 

NBCUniversal, which is owned by the cable company Comcast. There is only one 

source for CNN, one source for Discovery, etc. All of these channels operate in an 

intensely competitive marketplace and the fact that there is only a single source for 

the rights to retransmit any one of them is no cause for government intervention. 

I know that the members of this Committee would like to shield consumers from 

any fallout from program carriage disputes. It is noteworthy that two of the latest 

fights—the AMC channels dropped by DISH and the Viacom channels dropped by 

DirecTV—have nothing to do with Retransmission Consent. These are garden-variety disputes between buyers and sellers over price, a common occurrence in any line 

of commerce. I know of no way to protect consumers from the temporary inconvenience of dropped channels. If history is a guide, these channels will soon be restored 

to DISH and DirecTV. In the meantime, there are many substitute channels available. 

52 

Some broadcasters resist the repeal of both the Compulsory Licenses and Retransmission Consent worrying that program owners will ‘‘hold them up’’ when the broadcasters seek the right to authorize retransmission of the programs they have licensed to broadcast. I fully understand that broadcasters would rather maintain the 

legal fiction that MVPDs and consumers are seeking their signal rather than the 

programs. But that legal fiction is not tenable. And there is no objective basis to 

fear a ‘‘hold up’’ over retransmission rights. Program owners grant those retransmission rights every day to non-broadcast channels. Program owners, particularly 

an owner renewing a hit program, could ‘‘hold up’’ the non-broadcast channels 

today. But they do not do so for a very good reason. A non-broadcast channel that 

could not authorize MVPDs to retransmit its programs would cease to be a potential 

customer for program creators. Similarly, a broadcast station that could not authorize MVPDs to retransmit its programs in its market would cease to be a potential 

customer for program creators. There is every reason to believe that program owners and broadcasters would adapt quickly to the marketplace negotiations that work 

so well today for 500+ non-broadcast channels. And constitutionally based Copyright 

is a much stronger foundation for broadcasters to generate a second revenue stream 

than is Retransmission Consent. 

Ownership Rules 

I fully support the public policy goal of diversity in media voices. And I would 

strongly defend any Statute or Rule that is truly necessary to assure that consumers have access to multiple and diverse sources of news and information. But, 

in no small part because of the efforts of this Committee, consumers now enjoy a 

multiplicity and breadth of media sources and voices unmatched in our history. 

Today, I find myself almost drowning in the plethora of diverse news outlets competing for my time. I start each morning in Boulder, Colorado watching multiple 

channels of broadcast and cable news while combing through online news sources 

on my iPad—The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 

The Denver Post, The Los Angeles Times, Salon, Drudge, Real Clear Politics, The 

Hill, Politico, The Daily Beast, The Wrap, Communications Daily, CableFax, etc. I 

even still read my local newspaper—The Daily Camera. Some mornings I have a 

hard time tearing myself away from all the diverse news sources at my fingertips 

so that I can actually start my day. 

Sitting squarely, but awkwardly, in the middle of this sea of media diversity are 

Media Ownership Rules designed for a bygone era. All of these Rules were sensible 

and necessary when adopted. But, some of these Rules have become counterproductive while others have been rendered merely nonsensical. The TV/Newspaper 

Cross-Ownership Rule is an example of a Rule that has become counterproductive. 

It is well know that daily newspapers are under great financial stress. Recently 

the Pulitzer Prize-winning Times Picayune of New Orleans announced that it was 

cutting back to three printed papers per week, a devastating blow to its local readers. Because of the TV/Newspaper Cross-Ownership prohibition, the Times Picayune 

did not have the option of pursuing a merger with a local Television Station as a 

way of achieving the economies that might have permitted continued publication of 

a daily paper. The existence of this Rule clearly disserved the citizens of New Orleans and their interest in diverse sources of news. 

The Tribune Company provides another example. This venerable source of awardwinning newspaper and television journalism is struggling to emerge from an arduous three year bankruptcy proceeding. And yet, the new ownership of The Tribune 

Company will need waivers of the TV/Newspaper Cross-Ownership Rule just to be 

allowed to try to maintain the Company’s existing television and print news operations. 

To understand how outdated and illogical our media ownership policies have become, contrast the regulatory plight of Tribune and the Times Picayune with the recently approved merger of Comcast (the nation’s largest cable TV and Internet Company) with NBC Universal (owner of a vast array of broadcast and cable channels, 

including news channels, and a major movie studio). Both consumers and industry 

participants should be forgiven if they have trouble following the logic of what is 

allowed and what is not allowed under current, but outdated, government policy. 

For an example of a Rule that has become merely nonsensical, I would point to 

the 50 percent UHF ‘‘discount’’ that is a part of the limitation on ownership of multiple television stations. For the six decades of analog television broadcasting in this 

Country, UHF stations operated at a distinct and well documented disadvantage 

compared to VHF stations. UHF stations produced weaker signals and smaller coverage areas. 

In light of this UHF handicap, the Rule limiting the total theoretical ‘‘reach’’ of 

TV stations that one entity is allowed to own wisely and sensibly incorporated a 50 

53 

percent UHF discount. If one owns a VHF station in a market that constitutes 3 

percent of U.S. TV households, the station owner is charged with 3 percent against 

the theoretical maximum permissible reach of 39 percent. But, if the station is a 

UHF, the owner is charged with only 11⁄2 percent. This discount continues to be applied today. 

The problem is that the factual predicate for the UHF discount has evaporated. 

In digital broadcasting today UHF stations not only are not at a disadvantage: they 

actually provide coverage superior to VHF stations. For example, after the digital 

transition, the ABC Owned television station in Chicago continued to operate on 

VHF channel 7. However, the propagation of the VHF channel 7 digital signal was 

so deficient that the station’s engineers had to scramble to find a vacant UHF channel and promptly switched to UHF channel 44 with dramatically improved results. 

Other stations around the Country also switched from VHF channels to UHF. The 

superiority of UHF frequencies in the digital world was evident in the lobbying over 

the recent Incentive Auction legislation. The National Association of Broadcasters 

advocated successfully for statutory language ensuring that no television station 

would be forced to shift from a UHF channel to a VHF channel as part of the ‘‘repacking’’ process. 

So, why not simply repeal the 50 percent discount? Because the result would be 

to require unjustifiable, and politically untenable, divestitures by broadcasters that 

relied on the discount in assembling their station groups. ‘‘Grandfathering’’ these 

station groups would be profoundly unfair to future competitors. And so, like the 

Emperor’s Clothes, we all just look the other way and pretend that the UHF discount continues to make sense. 

S. 2008 would recognize the reality of today’s robust marketplace of diverse and 

competitive media voices and would repeal outdated media ownership restrictions 

that are relics of a bygone era of scarcity. Our Nation’s anti-trust laws would continue to be available to address any undue concentrations of power and any market 

failure. 

Conclusion 

I urge this Committee to follow the roadmap of S. 2008 and HR. 3675 and repeal 

the many outdated provisions in our nation’s Television Regulatory closet. In particular I urge the Committee to work in lock step with the Committee on the Judiciary to repeal the Compulsory Licenses before considering repeal or modification of 

Retransmission Consent. Television consumers will best be served if broadcast programs can be distributed based on viewer demand and if new market forces like 

OVDs are given a chance to compete on a level playing field. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman has obviously made a mistake here because we 

started at 2:30. It is now 3:30, and that is fundamentally unfair to 

Members who came, some of whom have already departed. I 

checked with the Ranking Member. What we are going to do—and 

all those who gave testimony, obviously they have come long distances. They wanted to do their 5 minutes. Some went beyond that. 

But in any event, what we are going to do now is skip me, skip 

Kay Bailey—Senator Hutchison, that is—Senator DeMint. We are 

going to start with Senator Isakson and then go to those who did 

not give opening statements but who are still here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that as 

one who came hoping to get out before I had the chance to ask a 

question. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. I appreciate the great opportunity you have 

given me. 

Let me say this. I am a cable subscriber who watches the Sunday 

shows that are delivered by the broadcasters, and I appreciate retransmission allowing me to be able to subscribe to cable and see 

54 

those shows on TV. So all of you, I am a customer of all that you 

sell. 

And I listened to all the testimony because I know there is a lot 

of contention, and the number of phone calls I have gotten in the 

office lead me to believe there is going to be probably a lot more 

contention. But the best way to get all the facts on the table are 

to have hearings like this, and I appreciate the Chairman doing so. 

And I might add, the Chairman and I also share an interest. We 

both are big fans of the Atlanta Braves, and thanks to access at 

night, I can go home and watch my Atlanta Braves on TV even 

though I am 800 miles away. So I appreciate the services you all 

bring us. 

I actually have a few questions, all of which were raised by comments that you made, and I will start with Mr. Padden. Are you 

a doctor? 

Mr. PADDEN. No. I am a recovering lawyer. 

Senator ISAKSON. Recovering lawyer. Good. Those are the best 

kind. 

Let me ask this. You said the marketplace is better than licensing for the future. Is that right? 

Mr. PADDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. And you were evidently employed by one of 

these entities 20 years ago when the cable bill passed. Is that 

right? 

Mr. PADDEN. Yes. I was at Fox Broadcasting Company. 

Senator ISAKSON. Would you elaborate on the licensing platform 

that caused the licensing regime to be set up in 1992? 

Mr. PADDEN. Well, actually it starts in 1976. The Supreme Court 

had twice ruled that cable retransmission of broadcast programming was not a performance under the then 1909 Copyright Act. 

So no copyright liability attached to retransmitting broadcast programming. And the Supreme Court urged Congress to amend the 

Copyright Act, and that was done in 1976 to make retransmission 

of broadcast programming a performance for which copyright was 

due. But because at the time everyone thought it would be unduly 

burdensome for the cable operator to have to negotiate with the 

owner of each individual program on the schedule, Congress conferred a compulsory license, a rare act to be done only when there 

is a market failure and the rights cannot be cleared in the marketplace. 

Subsequent to that, cable networks were invented, channels like 

HBO and The History Channel, and they are not subject to this 

compulsory license because they were not around when it was 

adopted. So what they did was the channel owner licenses programming from various parties and gets the right to sublicense 

that programming to cable and satellite operators. So the cable and 

satellite operators do not have to negotiate with all these different 

program owners. They just have a single negotiation with the channel owner. 

And my proposition to you today is the fact that more than 500 

of these non-broadcast channels are distributed all across the country without needing this Government intervention of a compulsory 

copyright license shows that the broadcast channels could be distributed exactly the same way. Each station, Channel 7 here in 

55 

Washington, in addition to licensing a show like Oprah would get 

the right to sublicense that show to the cable operators in the 

Washington area. The cable operators would have a single negotiation with that station, and you could get rid of a whole bunch of 

Communications Act regulation that was adopted specifically to 

ameliorate the impact of the compulsory license. And I wish it was 

simpler to explain this. 

Senator ISAKSON. You have still got a little lawyer left in you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for that answer. 

Dr. Cooper, you used a term I need an explanation for. I did not 

quite understand it. You said ‘‘cable gatekeepers.’’ In what context 

did you use that? 

Dr. COOPER. Well, I used that in the context of the cable companies putting together big bundles of packages, as Senator Rockefeller mentioned, and then deciding which programming gets into 

those bundles. Consumers do not get a choice of channels. They get 

to choose a couple of big bundles, and as Senator Rockefeller mentioned, they end up paying for many more channels than they ever 

watch. So they are the gatekeepers between the consumer and the 

programming, and they actually have a very large market presence. They have a market share at the local level which is, of 

course, the only way I can reach those programs, see those programs. They have a very large market share. There is more competition than there was in 1992, for sure, but there is not enough 

to break that anti-consumer bundling. So they are the gatekeeper. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Chairman, can I have just one more question? Would that be OK? 

The CHAIRMAN. With rapidity. 

Senator ISAKSON. All right. Well, I will tell you what. Knowing 

the question I am going to ask, it is not going to be a rapid response. So I will yield back to my next time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are a gentleman. 

Senator Pryor? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both 

for having this hearing today. 

Let me just jump right in. Ms. Abdoulah, you know, when I think 

of the Cable Act, it is 20 years old. What I see when I look at the 

landscape is I see a lot of innovation, a lot of investment, a lot of 

creative efforts, and a lot of really good things. So I guess my question is why should we change that, and how do we know, if we do 

make some changes, it is actually going to be better? 

Ms. ABDOULAH. A great question. 

On the latter, I think it is just with real thoughtful consideration 

to the consequences when reform and changes are made, to really 

try to think through those consequences. 

To the former question, why should we change it, for the reasons 

I have said. I love the competitive landscape. We know how to compete. That is what we are all about. So it is not about wanting to 

limit competition, innovation, and creativity. We welcome that. We 

want that as a small operator or large operators. It is simply takVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
56 

ing regulation that currently allows monopolistic activity to go on— 

to remove that so that it truly is based on a fair market and fair 

market pricing because, unfortunately, Dr. Cooper is wrong in that 

we are not gatekeepers from the standpoint of being able to—we 

do not decide how we offer our programming. I wish we could. I 

wish I could offer a sports tier so that 50 percent of our viewers 

who do not watch sports are not subsidizing these enormous sports 

costs. I do not have that right. The programmers, the broadcasters, 

tell us and mandate—and the laws help them do this—how we 

carry it. So that is why it has to change because consumers are 

saying give me choice, give me what I want when I want it, and 

we cannot do that due to the rules today, and that is why they 

have to change to allow more innovation and more flexibility. 

Senator PRYOR. If I have time, I want to come back to that, but 

I do want to ask Mr. Smith a question. It is always great to see 

my former colleague. Welcome back. 

One of the things you mentioned—and I just want to make sure 

I have this clear is that the Cable Act’s requirement and sort of the 

connection to localism and retransmission, and why they are connected. I know why localism is important. I see it every day in my 

local TV stations, but tell me what the connection is there. 

Mr. SMITH. I believe what this committee and the Congress intended was to make sure that in retransmission consent, small 

broadcasters in Arkansas and other small rural communities, along 

with their networks, had an opportunity to recoup the value of 

their content but also their signal. Both things have great value. 

And when you consider retransmission consent, must-carry, compulsory copyright, this is a three-legged stool. You pull one of those 

legs out and you will dramatically damage the rural broadcaster. 

You will dramatically damage those who are underprivileged and 

cannot afford $150 a month for cable. You will dramatically damage the ability of rural states to be able to sell a car in Pierre, 

South Dakota. They may have to go to Minneapolis. They may 

have to go to Denver. And I think that it is very important. If you 

want a robust, national system that focuses on the localism, the resources have to get to local, as well as to networks. And so it is 

a very careful balance that is structured, and I just was offering 

caution. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Witmer, let me ask you. I saw that you 

nodded your head when Ms. Abdoulah a few minutes ago was talking about the cost of programming and things like that. And I 

know the cost of programming is high, or at least I understand it 

is high. But also I understand that that is not a very transparent 

system. So as a subscriber, when I buy a local cable package, whatever it is, I do not always know what my cable provider, i.e., what 

I am paying for, but what my cable provider had to pay for all the 

various programming. A lot of it, as we have all talked about—we 

all agree. A lot of it we do not want, but it is just part of the package. 

So what is wrong with more transparency. Why should the consumer, the subscriber, the end user, not have a right to know how 

much you all have paid for it to know if we are being charged fairly? 

Ms. WITMER. Thank you for your question, Senator Pryor. 

57 

I think that for us, our consumers, first of all, are first and foremost in our minds. 

I also was nodding at Ms. Abdoulah’s characterization of us not 

being gatekeepers. We operate in an incredibly competitive environment. I think one of the things that may not be well understood 

is the competitive environment in which we are operating every 

day. And we are consumer-facing. We are dealing with consumers 

directly. We are in their homes. We are talking to them from our 

call centers, and we bill them for their services and engage directly 

with consumers. So we are very, very close to them, and the competition we face is all about the consumer. So we understand their 

desire for transparency. 

What we find from our consumers is they do not well understand 

the system through which they buy television and they receive content. We still find many consumers do not necessarily understand, 

first of all, that cable operators do not program the networks that 

they receive, and they do not necessarily understand that we actually pay for and negotiate for licenses to carry all of that programming. 

There is no doubt that the biggest issue facing video customers 

of multi-channel operators today is skyrocketing programming 

costs. I was unable to see the chart from this side, but I can tell 

you that Time Warner Cable spends—— nearly 60 percent of our 

costs every year in programming are paying owners of broadcast 

stations. We spend over $2 billion a year compensating those companies. So we know that the system feels that it lacks some transparency for consumers. I think they understand not a lot about 

how it works, and more transparency might help them. At the end 

of the day, though, for the consumer that wants to watch a single 

program, their perception of value may be very different from one 

network to the next, and that transparency is not always an immediate translation for them. 

Ms. ABDOULAH. And more specifically, we cannot. We cannot tell 

you what we pay. The programming agreements that we have to 

sign do not allow us to share it with anyone, to share it with consumers, with each other, with anyone. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am beyond my time. 

I understand what you are saying on that last statement. I do 

not like that aspect of the agreements. 

Ms. ABDOULAH. Yes, right on. 

Senator PRYOR. I do not like the lack of transparency. 

But, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Senator Thune, to be followed by Senator Udall. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 

hearing. I hope that we can find 21st century solutions to 21st century challenges. One thing about the television marketplace is that 

we have seen just remarkable improvements over time. With technology and all the change that has occurred out there, it has been, 

I think, very good for most Americans. But obviously there are 

issues that come up along the way that need to be addressed, and 

58 

I think this committee needs to be informed by all of your input 

as we try and address that. 

Senator Smith, welcome back. Nice to have you with us again 

here today. 

One of the things that I hear is that television blackouts due to 

disputes between providers and distributors are on the rise—and I 

think everybody has alluded to various statistics that bear that out 

today—and are likely to increase if we retain the current regulatory regime for television. 

I ask this question as someone who believes in the free market, 

whose instincts are that deregulation is a good, solid, preferred approach. My question is with regard to those types of blackouts, 

what is your assessment as to whether we are going to see fewer 

TV blackouts or more TV blackouts if we were to completely deregulate and to go to an approach like what Senator DeMint has 

proposed in his legislation. I open that up to whomever. Senator? 

Mr. SMITH. Senator Thune, good to see you. 

As I said in my testimony, I think when you increase by 10 times 

the number of rights holders that would have to come to an agreement, you are apt to have a tenfold increase in the likelihood of 

disruptions of some kind. That is just logical to me, but perhaps 

others have a perspective on that. 

Ms. WITMER. I think the other perspective that I would share is 

that part of the regulatory landscape that we are dealing with here 

is that the 1992 Act requires cable operators to sell broadcast stations as a point of entry to purchasing anything else from us, and 

that is unlike any other platform. Satellite providers are not required to sell the broadcast stations. Certainly access to entry to 

viewing content, even broadcast content, on the Web does not require that subsidy to be paid in order to be able to use any other 

form of content. 

And so part of the tension I think for the operator, as these costs 

are skyrocketing, is that we cannot sell a consumer anything else 

without being obligated by virtue of the privileges of this law to 

pay those broadcasters. And it is unique to cable and it is placing 

greater and greater tension on our ability to compete and our ability to provide consumers with access to other content that they 

want without having to pay that toll to enter our store. 

Mr. FRANKS. Senator Thune, if I may. I guess two points. 

As I said in my testimony, I guess my fear is, along the lines of 

what Senator Smith said, if you introduce more players—and some 

of these players are hard to find even to clear the rights. So I fear 

that it is going to lead to many more disputes rather than fewer. 

But I guess I would like to make a related point if I may. I was 

in a situation last year in a negotiation where we were getting fairly close, and the FCC announced its proceeding and the operator 

pulled back because he thought that he was on the verge of getting 

a better deal from Washington. And it is frustrating to me. 

As a company, we own television stations. So CBS only negotiates for the stations we own. Our CBS O&O’s cover 32 percent 

of the country. So that is 32 million television households. And I 

have been doing this for 6 and a half years. We have done 100 

agreements, including two with Ms. Abdoulah and one with Ms. 

Witmer. We have not had blackouts. And so I almost do not recogVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
59 

nize the environment in which I am sitting because they are describing a world that does not exist amongst our three companies. 

So I guess my concern is I know that you are all worried about 

the current system. For a businessman who needs to make a 

plan—we invest $5.5 billion a year in programming. $5.5 billion a 

year. We need to be able to plan. We need to know what the rules 

are going to be. We know how this system works. It has its flaws, 

but it basically works. Abandoning it for some whole new system 

or a system that repeals retrans and leaves the compulsory license, 

I guess we prefer the devil we know. 

Ms. ABDOULAH. Well, I think we all have something to say. 

Two things on that is that we may like this. Some people may 

like the model that is for lots of reasons, but the consumers do not 

and the consumers do not have that same model on the Internet. 

It is time that the businesses that we are talking about create a 

new, sustainable, innovative business model that serves consumers 

and reduces confusion. That is one point. 

The second point is I sure hope we do not evaluate the success 

of deals getting done based on blackouts because that is not the 

only measure of success or failure. There is a failure in the fact 

that we have these double-digit, triple-digit increases that are not 

rationalized by ratings or anything else on many networks. They 

are not rationalized. We have to pass them through to consumers, 

and every year they take the brunt of those increases. That is failure in my mind because I can tell you the services that we do manage, Internet and phone, we have not taken those services up. We 

have not taken an increase in years. And I can represent many 

ACA members who will tell you the same thing, some that have not 

taken HSD or phone up for 10 years. Where are the price increases 

coming from? Programming on video. 

Dr. COOPER. Let me briefly follow up. We have testified together 

before. 

The only way to reform this market is to restore consumer sovereignty, to make sure that consumers have the right to choose to 

pay for the programs they want. That is the fundamental problem 

in this marketplace. And you can fool around with retrans. You will 

just shift the balance from one big entity to another big entity. The 

only way to break the market power is to ensure that the consumers have choices of what to pay for and not being forced to buy 

these huge bundles. That is what she wants because she faces the 

consumer, and she is willing to face consumer sovereignty. She 

does not have any market power. The big cable operators and the 

big broadcasters, content providers, do have market power. 

The CHAIRMAN. With all due respect, I have to cut that question 

off here because we are already 2 minutes and 20 seconds over, 

and Senator Udall is waiting. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking 

Member Hutchison. And I really thank the panel. I think this has 

been very lively and a very, very good discussion. 

I understand my cousin, Senator Smith, reminisced a little bit 

earlier about his service on the Committee, on the Commerce ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
60 

mittee, and also about the Udall tradition of public service. I can 

vouch for that. We are very close cousins. I am not going to go 

down the road, Senator Smith, of saying I regret—my one big regret is not serving with you in the Senate because, as you know, 

you were succeeded by a Democrat. And I am going to get myself 

in big trouble there. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. You can stop there, Tom. 

Senator UDALL. OK. I am going to stop there. 

But I wanted to start with you on a question, and others may 

be interested in this. I have heard from a small religious broadcaster based in New Mexico about the importance of must-carry 

rules for making their programming available to cable and satellite 

TV customers. And there is a proposal that you all have been talking about before the Committee to abolish these rules. If mustcarry rules went away, would small local channels, such as a religious broadcaster with a relatively small audience or regional 

focus, have the same access to TV audiences as they do today? 

Mr. SMITH. Senator Udall, when I served on this committee, 

there was an appropriate concern for diversity and fostering niche 

markets, and I understand some do not like the must-carry provision, but the idea was to foster that in America. To get rid of mustcarry—most of my members do not count on must-carry, but some 

do, and who are they? They are the religious broadcaster. They are 

the rural. They are the foreign language. They are often minority 

communities. I mean, you would not have Univision today, you 

would not have Fox today—you might like that, Mr. Chairman—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. These great networks developed with must-carry because of the wisdom and foresight of this committee to foster this 

diversity, this niche, this service of all of America in its great complexions and its great needs. 

So must-carry is important to many small rural communities, 

and if it goes away—again, I go back to if you want to sell a Chevy 

in Pierre, South Dakota and must-carry goes away, Rapid City may 

have to go to Denver, and if you are a Chevy dealer, you are not 

going to be able to afford that. Sioux Falls may have to go to Minneapolis. You will not be able to afford those markets. So if you 

want to continue fostering localism, must-carry is important. 

Senator UDALL. Ms. Abdoulah, small cable companies that operate in rural parts of New Mexico tell me they pay more in retransmission consent fees than larger cable companies pay in places like 

New York or Los Angeles. What explains this difference in cost for 

these smaller companies versus larger cable and satellite TV providers? 

Ms. ABDOULAH. Great question. Leverage. They do not have the 

leverage in the negotiation. So in they walk with the same service, 

same delivery system, same costs, and they charge us double-digit, 

higher rates than the big guy because if I say to them, oh, I am 

going to take off 1,000 customers if you do not get reasonable, they 

say OK. But if Comcast says be reasonable, give me what I want 

or I am going to shut off 24 million customers, they have a lot more 

leverage. So it comes down to the big versus small guy. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Franks? 

61 

Mr. FRANKS. I am real worried about Ms. Abdoulah here. She is 

just suffering so horribly in the marketplace and needs protection. 

She does just fine when she is at the table with CBS. And in fact, 

there is a cable network we own called the CBS Sports Network 

that we wish she was carrying. We could not persuade her to do 

it. We did not have the leverage and the clout. The big, bad media 

company in New York could not persuade the struggling ACA 

member to carry one of our channels. This notion that there are 

these weak players that need protection—let me tell you they are 

not in the negotiating rooms I am in. They do just fine. 

Ms. ABDOULAH. It is not a notion. We can prove that we pay 

more. We can prove. And if there was more transparency, you 

would know exactly how much more. I would welcome that. 

Mr. FRANKS. So are you going to carry the sports network for 

me? 

Ms. ABDOULAH. No. 

Mr. FRANKS. Why not? 

Ms. ABDOULAH. It is not a good value. Customers are not asking 

for it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. So you can intervene here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why do not each of you send us the numbers to 

find out which of you is telling the truth? 

Ms. ABDOULAH. I wish we could, sir. We are not allowed to. Our 

contracts do not allow us to share what we pay for this programming. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am a very confidential source. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall, go ahead if you want. 

Senator UDALL. I am out of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you are. 

Senator UDALL. So I was urging you to intervene in the middle 

of that so I could get out of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I was enjoying it. 

Senator DeMint and then Senator Hutchison, and then Senator 

Hutchison and I need to talk. And I will be brief in the way I thank 

all of you, and Senator Hutchison and I will go behind the door 

here, but please forgive me for that. OK? Senator DeMint? 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you will be brief, I know. 

Senator DEMINT. This has really been a very helpful hearing 

today. I am convinced if we kept talking, that you would convince 

yourselves that this free market approach is the best approach because, as Mr. Franks was just saying, they do not need protection. 

We have got a very dynamic market and I am convinced that if we 

let this continue to work, it would work a lot better. I am convinced, Senator Smith, that broadcasters would find themselves in 

the catbird seat because of their owning control of such a package 

of content, local, national, syndicated programs, that you negotiate. 

It is essentially your property through contracts. All the other distributors have to negotiate with you to get it. So I think your 

broadcasters would be in a great position to do this. 

62 

And I think we need to realize that the innovation and a lot of 

the dynamic that is going on in the market that you talk about is 

going on with these 500 or more channels that do not operate 

under any kind of compulsory license or retransmission. When we 

are talking about taking away retransmission, we are not talking 

about taking away carriage negotiations which again the broadcasters will have the ability to continue to do. My bill does not affect non-commercial, PBS, most religious broadcasters. And as you 

know, Senator Smith, with the new digital signals, all of these 

broadcasters have the ability to send a free, crystal clear signal to 

100 percent of the market that is in their DMA. So we have an 

amazing dynamic. If cable or other distributors are not willing in 

this environment to deliver a la carte programming that the consumers want, someone will give it to them, and that is why you see 

the growth of streaming or Netflix types of programming today. 

But again, instead of asking a question, I just hope, Mr. Chairman, we can continue to do this because the more everyone talks, 

I think the more we realize that we have got a very dynamic and 

competitive marketplace, and if in a thoughtful, systematic way we 

let this work, I think we would find that the consumer gets what 

they want, but at the same time, there is another player, Mr. 

Chairman. We certainly want the consumer to have the choices 

they want, but private property, whether it be copyrights, content 

control, is our responsibility as well. And I do not think the Government should be telling the cable companies what they have to 

buy or the broadcasters what they have to sell or the networks 

what they charge. I am convinced again that we would find a very 

competitive and active, dynamic marketplace with lots of choices if 

we continue to talk through this. 

But thank you all for coming and getting this conversation started. I think that is what it is. And I heard from a lot of the folks 

on the panel here that there may be a lot of common ground if we 

proceed through this thoughtfully. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Hutchison? 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just have one more question. I think we have had a great discussion here, but I want to go back to the newspaper-television 

cross-ownership rules which, Senator Smith, you and I had as 

issues when you were on this committee. And I thought Mr. 

Padden’s remarks were very interesting. I was a strong proponent 

of that cross-ownership ban because there were two markets, one 

with which I was very familiar, Dallas, Texas, but also Atlanta, 

Georgia, where there was such a lock on the media outlets with the 

only newspaper in town plus the major television station being 

owned by the same companies in a grandfather that superseded the 

ban. 

However, I have quickly retreated from my position because of 

the proliferation of media outlets, which came just in the last 10 

years and changed the whole marketplace. And I think, Mr. 

Padden, you mentioned the New Orleans situation which now is 

the opposite and has caused great harm to the Picayune, which is 

one of our nation’s oldest and most revered newspapers, because 

63 

they could not invest in television which would be the money that 

would keep the newspaper going. 

So my question to Mr. Smith and Mr. Padden is, if the FCC either eliminated or modified the cross-ownership ban, do you think 

it would hurt localism or do you think, in fact, as you have stated, 

that in some cases it would actually promote localism? And are 

there other instances where you think it could have the opposite 

effect, or do you think that would be universal? I would be interested in both of your views. 

Mr. SMITH. Senator Hutchison, I think it is very clear that we 

live in a different world on this score, and there are many, particularly our brothers and sisters in the newspaper industry, and the 

journalism, the solid journalism, that they do is under assault and 

real threat. We care about them. And every market is a little bit 

different, and that is why the NAB has supported relaxation, particularly in some communities, of the cross-ownership rule so that 

there are economies of scale that a radio, a TV, and a newspaper 

in a small community could pool together and be able to survive 

so that you have legitimate journalism in this country without a 

taxpayer subsidy but with the logic that comes with those kinds of 

synergies and economies of scale. So we support a relaxation. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. 

Mr. Padden? 

Mr. PADDEN. Yes, Senator Hutchison. I agree with Senator 

Smith. There was a time when newspapers and television stations 

were the only games in town. Thanks largely to the efforts of this 

committee, we now have a much more robust media marketplace. 

We have cable. We have the Internet. We have everything else. But 

one side effect of that wonderful new diversity is it has gotten 

tougher for the entities that used to be the only games in town. So 

I really think before newspapers and small market local television 

stations completely wither and die, I urge you to provide some relief from that rule so that they can combine and survive. 

And if I could very quickly respectfully disagree with Senator 

Smith and Mr. Franks that passage of Senator DeMint’s bill would 

cause more blackouts because there would be a tenfold increase in 

the number of parties that would have to negotiate. I just do not 

think that is true at all. What we have today is the compulsory license confers the program rights to cable, and then the cable operator negotiates with the broadcaster regarding the signal. In the 

world that Senator DeMint’s bill would create, there would still 

only be a single negotiation between the broadcaster and the cable 

company only instead of it being this legal fiction that it is about 

the signal, it would be a negotiation about the program rights. And 

there is no reason in the world why that should lead to an increase 

in the number of blackouts. 

Dr. COOPER. Senator Hutchison, may I submit a written answer 

to your question from a somewhat different point of view, to your 

question on newspaper-TV cross-ownership? 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I would be happy for you to disagree 

right now. 

Dr. COOPER. Oh, I was not going to disagree. I was actually going 

to point out that they did relax the rules in the last round and we 

supported that relaxation and the court upheld that relaxation. So 

64 

in the markets where the newspapers have been under the most 

pressure and where there are the most alternatives, they did relax 

the rules. I have to go back and look to see where exactly New Orleans fell. But there have been no mergers in those markets. 

Senator HUTCHISON. You have to go before the FCC to go 

through—— 

Dr. COOPER. Yes, but there is no—no, the presumption was that 

the merger would be found in the public interest, rebuttable, but 

it shifted the burden. It said it could happen, and we supported 

that change. 

In addition, if there is a failing firm problem, there has always 

been that exception. So if the Picayune wanted to declare themselves a failing firm and get bought out by a TV station, they have 

always had that option. So to look at that case and say it was the 

result of this bad policy, I think is misleading. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I think my view is it is obsolete now, 

and I am 180 degrees different from where I was because I felt like 

it stifled any other voice in the market 20 years ago or 15 years 

ago. But now, as Mr. Smith said, with which I agree, we need legitimate news organizations to be able to function and have a voice 

because there is such a proliferation of voices with no capability for 

in-depth reporting or even in some cases ethical standards. So I 

think that we do want to save newspapers and legitimate broadcasters to the extent that we can even when I disagree with them 

100 percent. 

Dr. COOPER. We should not equate journalism with newspapers. 

There may well be other ways to have legitimate journalism in this 

new world that do not involve newspapers, and that is the transition we are going in. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, absolutely. I did not mean to indicate 

that there is no journalism except in newspapers, but certainly 

newspapers and other legitimate broadcasters have exhibited 

standards that I think we want to assure have a voice in the marketplace as well and not get drowned out with a proliferation of 

voices that might not have even the resources for in-depth reporting. 

So I thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, and I thank all of you very, very 

much. Senator Hutchison and I are going to disappear behind 

closed doors for a second. And it may be some time before I have 

six witnesses again. However, you did very well, and it was a very 

interesting discussion, and I think we all learned a lot from it. I 

thank you. 

And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(65) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

I commend Chairman Rockefeller for convening this hearing to consider the impact of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 on 

the modern television marketplace. I agree with the Chairman that consumers 

should be the focal point of our discussions. As he noted, although consumers often 

have the choice of video providers, rates continue to go up faster than the rate of 

inflation. 

Local broadcasters are an important source of news, emergency services, and entertainment in our communities. I request unanimous consent to include in the 

hearing record a letter dated July 20, 2012, from the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters relating to the issues before the Committee today. 

Broadcasters should be allowed to negotiate for fair value and carriage of their 

signals. The unanswered question is how to protect consumers when there is an impasse in negotiations. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission 

consent dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas such as the State 

of Hawaii where a single multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) 

dominates the state. 

I look forward to continuing the dialog on these important issues with my colleagues on the Commerce Committee. 

ABC TELEVISION AFFILIATES ASSOCIATION

July 20, 2012 

Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, 

Chair, Senate Commerce Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, 

Ranking Member, Senate Commerce 

Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison: 

It is our understanding the issue of retransmission consent, among other matters, 

will be discussed during the Senate Commerce Committee hearing on July 24. The 

ABC Television Affiliates Association, whose members consist of some 170 local television stations throughout the country affiliated with the ABC Television Network, 

respectfully submits these comments to the Committee with the request that they 

be incorporated into, and made part of the record of, the hearing. 

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of retransmission consent to the 

economic sustainability of network-affiliated, local television stations. Without retransmission consent revenues, local stations simply could not afford, today, to purchase popular, national network entertainment and sports programming nor 

produce the expensive local news, weather, sports, public safety, and public interest 

programming on which the American people have come to rely. The core economics 

of television have changed in dramatic ways over the years from a time when local 

broadcast stations were the only viable local distribution platforms for network programming. 

The local video distribution market today is a highly competitive market. Robust 

competition between video distributors affords program producers and aggregators 

(i.e., national networks and syndicators) multiple program distribution platforms. 

Having produced or acquired expensive national program content, networks, understandably, have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to maximize the return on 

that investment, and, in doing so, they now have the ability to select among competing platforms (i.e., local television stations, cable systems, satellite companies, 

the Internet, or other video platforms) for the most financially advantageous distribution arrangement. 

To compete in the program acquisition market, local network-affiliated stations 

now have to compensate their networks for programs, not only as in the past, by 

66 

providing them significant amounts of local advertising inventory for network commercials, but, unlike the past, also by paying large sums of cash in ‘‘program fees’’ 

for the right to broadcast network programs. If affiliates are financially unable to 

pay a competitive market-based rate for those programs, the networks will place 

them on a local fee-based platform, i.e., cable, satellite, or the Internet. This is simply a function of a competitive program distribution market—a public policy goal 

long advocated by public officials and consumer groups. 

To illustrate, Disney, which owns and operates both the ABC Television Broadcast 

Network and ESPN, bids and competes in a competitive market against Fox, CBS, 

NBC, Turner, and other aggregators for expensive sports programming. After acquiring that content, Disney must decide which distribution platform, the ABC Television Network or ESPN, will yield the highest return on that investment. Placement of sports programming on ESPN, reportedly, yields Disney program fees in excess of $5.00 per month for each cable and satellite subscriber, along with substantial cable and satellite commercial advertising inventory. If placed on the ABC Television Network for free, over-the-air broadcast, Disney now demands and receives 

both commercial advertising inventory and a program fee from its affiliated stations. 

Otherwise, Disney, understandably, will place its most expensive and popular programs on cable and satellite. Thus, it is not surprising that so many of the most 

popular traditional broadcast sports programs have migrated in recent years to 

ESPN’s advertiser-based and fee-based cable and satellite platforms. 

The above illustration applies equally to entertainment programming, and the 

same local platform distribution choices for that programming are made by the parent companies of the CBS, Fox, and NBC Television Networks. 

Therefore, to compete for the most popular national programming with cable and 

satellite fee-based and advertiser-based revenue streams, local television stations, of 

necessity, must now charge fees to their competitors for the retransmission and resale of their signals. It is indisputable that if the ability of local stations is handicapped or impaired by Congress or the FCC in developing a fee-based revenue 

stream from the resale, for profit, of their signals by competitive cable, satellite, and 

other video distributors, local television stations simply will no longer be competitive 

in the acquisition of national programming, and they will, plainly, not be able to 

afford to produce and broadcast local news, weather, sports, public safety, and public interest programming. Two revenue streams will always trump one, and if local 

television stations are not permitted to compete, at arm’s length, in a competitive 

market, the best programming will ultimately migrate to subscription-based cable, 

satellite, or Internet platforms. The reality is consumers will ultimately pay for that 

programming, one way or the other. 

Not only do local stations compete with cable, satellite, and other video distributors for program content, they also compete head-to-head with cable, satellite, and 

other distributors for audience share and advertising revenue. Congress recognized 

in 1992, with adoption of the current statutory retransmission consent requirement, 

the absurdity of allowing competitors of local television stations to pirate and resell 

their signals for profit without their consent and adopted a regulatory framework 

to allow local television stations to negotiate at arm’s length in a competitive market 

for the resale of their signals. 

Looked at another way, laws that prohibit cable and satellite companies from 

pirating, retransmitting, and reselling the signals of local television stations without 

their consent are no more unfair or unreasonable than laws that prohibit a local 

television station from pirating and retransmitting the signals of satellite and cable 

companies—without their consent—or the signals of other television stations, for 

that matter. 

Volumes have been written and spoken about the fundamental fairness and procompetitive aspects of the Communications Act’s retransmission consent requirements. Retransmission consent is more important today than when it was enacted 

for preservation of America’s free, over-the-air, local television broadcast service. 

We, therefore, respectfully urge the Committee not to impair or handicap the ability of local television stations to control the distribution of their signals by other 

competitive video distribution platforms. 

Sincerely, 

DAVID BOYLAN, 

Chair. 

cc: Members of the Senate Commerce Committee 

67 

HAWAII ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, INC. 

Honolulu, HI, July 20, 2012 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Inouye: 

As the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation prepares to 

hold a hearing to examine video issues and related aspects of the Cable Television 

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the ‘‘Cable Act’’), I write on behalf of Hawaii’s local television broadcasters to underscore the importance of both 

the current regulations, and the extension of their underlying principles to the online video market. 

Every one of the Hawaii television stations who are members of the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters believe these bedrock principles remain as vital today as 

when the Cable Act was enacted. 

As you are aware, our local ABC-TV affiliate, KITV just yesterday resolved an impasse with Time Warner Cable over retransmission consent negotiations. While an 

unfortunate disruption of service left Hawaii cable TV viewers without the KITV 

signal for a number of days, the parties were able to resolve the issue and come 

to a retransmission consent agreement through a fair market-based discussion. 

Since the enactment of The Cable Act, literally thousands of retransmission consent contracts have been successfully negotiated in Hawaii to the mutual benefit of 

broadcasters, pay television companies and consumers. In the increasingly competitive video market, these deals ensure the continued viability of local broadcasters 

and our ability to deliver local news, emergency services and high quality programming to the communities that we serve. 

It is Hawaii viewers who are the real beneficiaries of the current retransmission 

consent process. Retransmission consent fees enable stations to hire reporters and 

engineering staff, buy live remote trucks, cameras, and production equipment, maintain transmission towers and the infrastructure necessary to produce daily programming and produce high quality local news that is an increasingly expensive proposition. Retransmission consent compensation allows stations to reinvest in valuable 

local content and services to our communities, providing more choices and better 

programming for all consumers. 

It is these very fees that allow TV stations to produce and provide meaningful 

local programming in prime time hours such as the week-long Merrie Monarch Festival, the Kamehameha Schools Song Contest, The Na Hoku Hano Hano Music 

Awards and others. 

This Committee was wise to craft legislation that recognized the value of local 

broadcasting. The Hawaii Association of Broadcasters asks that you support our 

local television stations in the upcoming Senate hearing on video carriage and further resist any efforts to eliminate retransmission consent, which allows our local 

stations to freely negotiate with pay television providers for carriage of those signals. The current system is good for your local television stations and your constituents, and it supports the continued creation of locally driven, community-focused 

programming. 

Sincerely, 

JAMIE HARTNETT, 

Executive Director, 

Hawaii Association of Broadcasters, Inc. 

RLTV 

Baltimore, MD, July 23, 2012 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, 

Chairman, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller: 

I serve as the President and Chief Executive of RLTV, which began service as a 

24/7 linear programming network in 2008. Our core purpose is to create, acquire 

and distribute compelling content—both television and online—for those who are 50 

years of age and older, a group we term ‘‘Generation 50+.’’ There are over 100 million of us with $3 billion of spending power. As active, highly engaged and experiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
68 

enced citizens, we care deeply not only about issues and pursuits that will enhance 

this next stage in our personal lives, but also about the future well-being of our children, grandchildren and other loved ones who are among the 40 million caregivers 

in this country. 

There is no other network like RLTV. But unlike most networks or programming 

channels today, we are an ‘‘independent.’’ RLTV started with a vision and the financial resources of our founder, John Erickson. But lacking the deep pockets and 

brand awareness of large media companies, RLTV and a handful of other independent programmers have had to compete on a very uneven surface to secure distribution and advertiser acceptance. The result for RLTV and the other handful of 

independent programmers is a fundamentally longer, more difficult and certainly 

more costly undertaking and, as such, one that imposes great odds against the successful introduction and nurturing of additional independent editorial voices from 

which the public can choose. 

One particular cause of this circumstance is retransmission consent. For example, 

unlike the broadcasters, RLTV has no special government granted privileges, such 

as mandatory carriage rights or basic tier placement guarantees. When retransmission consent was created in 1992, it was intended to preserve local broadcasting, 

not to subsidize national broadcast television networks. In effect retransmission consent has had the unintended consequence of limiting choice and imposing more difficult playing field conditions for programmers such as RLTV. 

Despite these conditions, MVPDs such as Comcast, Verizon FiOS, and several 

dozen distributors fortunately have validated our mission. Additional carriage later 

this year, due in part to Time Warner Cable and Bright House Networks, will result 

in RLTV being seen in almost 30 million homes compared to the 14 million plus 

households we’re in today. For this we are greatly appreciative. Still, this is a long 

way from where RLTV should be. 

Recently, the Chairman and Chief Executive of a large MVPD was quoted in a 

recent interview that he felt ‘‘badly for independent companies in general because 

they don’t have the leverage against the distributors. It’s not a fair fight,’’ he added. 

No, it’s not, Mr. Chairman. But unfortunately for distributors and independent networks such as RLTV, the ground rules, as noted above, have put us both between 

a rock and a very hard place. 

Reform of retransmission consent will be a good start toward fixing unintended 

consequences and enhancing the prospects of independent voices such as RLTV to 

be seen and heard. 

Sincerely, 

PAUL A. FITZPATRICK, 

President and CEO, 

RLTV. 

SON BROADCASTING NETWORK

Albuquerque, NM, July 24, 2012 

Hon. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chairman Rockefeller: 

I understand that the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation plans to examine video carriage issues and related aspects of 

the 1992 Cable Act at an upcoming hearing, including the current ‘‘must-carry’’ regulations. On behalf of our station and others throughout the nation, I write to emphasize the importance of these ‘‘must-carry’’ regulations to our station, which has 

provided New Mexicans with unique high quality Christian programming for more 

than 25 years. 

Congress enacted the ‘‘must-carry’’ regulations to prevent a cable system from refusing to carry lower-rated local television stations on its system. At that time, Congress found, after establishing a significant record, that if these local broadcast stations lost access to their cable audiences, it would diminish the quality and diversity 

of programming available in local communities. The Supreme Court agreed that the 

public benefits of must-carry far outweigh the minimal burdens it would impose on 

cable systems. 

The public benefits of ‘‘must-carry’’ that Congress anticipated at the time of the 

Cable Act’s enactment have been borne out over the past two decades. While in 

1992, there were only three nationwide sources of broadcast programming, mustVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
69 

carry laws have succeeded in creating an explosion of diverse broadcast television 

content across the country. Fox, Univision, the CW, MyNetwork, ION, Azteca, 

Telemundo and others—all began as ‘‘must-carry’’ stations. ‘‘Must carry’’ provided 

them with the broad exposure that introduced them to new audiences and enabled 

them to thrive. 

Today, viewers across New Mexico continue to benefit from ‘‘must-carry’’ regulations through the services that our station provides to the local community. Back 

in 1984 when we went on the air only a fraction of viewers in our Santa Fe/Albuquerque DMA were able to pick up our signal. Viewers, businesses and ministries 

advocated to the cable companies on our behalf from 1984–1992 at no avail. And 

it wasn’t until the 1992 Cable Act went into effect that we were able to fully serve 

the viewers in our community. 

Since then we have produced thousands of hours of local programming covering 

a variety of formats from health and healing, to issues, entertainment, and talk programs that continue to serve the community and highlight the lives and stories of 

New Mexicans. Included are culturally diverse programs that are featured on our 

station. Ministries across our state who rely on us to share their stories of servicing 

the needs of New Mexicans would also be affected. As you may not be aware, our 

state has many needs; some of which are homelessness, hunger, drug addiction, 

family issues, health problems, and poverty. Our Christian television station has 

been a strong vehicle to address these issues and works with other ministries and 

agencies to communicate the services they offer. Son Broadcasting continues to provide a prayer line for people to call when they need encouragement, hope and prayer. There have been cases of suicide and financial need where we have bridged the 

caller to the appropriate professional or non-profit that can help with the particular 

need. 

Eliminating ‘‘must-carry’’ would threaten our ability to exist and we would no 

longer be able to serve the community with local quality Christian programming. 

We currently broadcast to the entire Santa Fe/Albuquerque DMA, close to 800,000 

households. Without ‘‘must-carry’’ we would be reduced down to serving approximately 18 percent of our current DMA, and many other stations around the country 

would be affected this same way. I ask that you stand in support of our station, 

and other local broadcasters that serve communities throughout the country in the 

upcoming Senate hearing on video carriage. Please resist any legislative efforts that 

eliminate the ‘‘must-carry’’ regulations. 

Thank you for your consideration. 

ANNETTE GARCIA, 

President, 

Son Broadcasting—KCHF TV 11. 

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN ORR WHITE, PRIVATE CITIZEN, STATE OF HAWAII

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Attention—Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman 

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Ranking Member 

Senator Daniel Inouye, Past Chairman (2007–2009) 

Fellow Senators and Committee Members 

Washington, DC. 

The following testimony is respectfully submitted to Chairman, John D. Rockefeller and fellow Committee members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, & Transportation on July 23, 2012 for your consideration from the perspective of a ‘‘Private Citizen’’ from the State of Hawaii regarding the Cable Act at 20 

hearing scheduled for July 24, 2012 at 14:30 in the Russell Senate Office Building— 

253. 

The Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992 authored by Senator 

John C. Danforth has become legacy legislation which has protected the consumer, 

cable companies, and programming media over the past twenty years. It has met 

the burden of protecting a substantial governmental interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology media. The 1992 Cable Act has 

with stood the challenges of the Judicial Branch being upheld by the U.S. Supreme 

Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (95–992), 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 

In 1992 the estimate was 56,000,000 households, over 60 percent of the households 

with televisions subscribe to cable television and the number has definitely grown 

since the legislation’s enactment. 

70 

In the case of private citizen from Hawaii like myself please allow me to explain 

how this legislation has had an imperative attempt on protecting Consumer and 

First Amendment rights in Hawaii within the past month. On July 11, 2012 Oceanic 

Time Warner Cable a subsidiary of Time Warner Cable blacked out the local commercial broadcast station KITV an American Broadcasting Company (ABC) affiliate 

owned and managed by Hearst Television. Oceanic then removed KITV from their 

cable line up without any notice to the consumer. All parties (Time Warner, Oceanic 

Time Warner, Hearst Television, and KITV) began to blame each other for the removals over a failure to come to a fiscal agreement regarding retransmission consent. For the next ten days 350,000 Oceanic Time Warner Cable subscribers and 

citizens in Hawaii were held hostage to the negotiations of these corporations. Cable 

subscribers were not able to watch ABC’s news and programming (a national affiliate). The existing legislation requires cable companies to provide a 30 day advance 

notice to their subscribers of any changes. This did not occur. As a private citizen 

I sought to seek remedy through the FCC, FTC, and State Cable Division and failed 

to receive any recourse. As a last result a Federal lawsuit was filed to seek recourse. 

(See attached documentation) Without the 1992 Cable Act there would have been 

no consumer protection from the infringement of first amendment rights by cable 

companies and programming media. 

Moving forward more and more media is being viewed over the Internet. It is important to establish legislation that will protect media companies, consumers, and 

Internet providers. More and more Internet cable companies are charging for the 

amount of data citizens are viewing on the Internet thus making the overall cost 

of media and freedom a speech quite expensive. Future legislation needs to look at 

how the Internet is competing against cable television. Cable television is an organized medium governed by individual station programming. The Internet is not governed by scheduled programming but by individual preferences with global implications. The Cable Act of 1992 did a great job of protecting local commercial and non 

commercial broadcast stations. Any future legislation should provide the same first 

amendment protection to view media over the Internet. 

On a more personal note I am proud to say that I am Veteran of 16 years who 

takes great pride in having had the opportunity to defend this legislation, freedom 

and First Amendment Rights. I have been to other countries where the freedom of 

speech is restricted over cable networks, satellite providers, and Internet cable companies. 

Thank you for your consideration and may God Bless this Committee, the U.S. 

Senate, the U.S. Legislative Branch and the United States of America. 

Respectfully submitted, 

BENJAMIN ORR WHITE. 

71 


724WHITE1.eps

STATE OF HAWAII 

CABLE TELEVISION DIVISION 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS 

P. O. Box 541 

Honolulu, HI 96809 

Phone: (808) 586-2620 

Fax: (808) 586-2625 

COMPLAINT/INQUIRY FORM 

Ms. ( ) 

Mrs. 

Mr. l ' ~ Benjamin White 

Your Name (Complainant) 

2227 Apoepoe Street 

Address (Forwarding, if applicable) 

Pearl City HI 96782 

City State Zip Code 

( 808 ) 386-5784 ( 808 ) 386-5784 

Residence Phone Business Phone 

COMPLAINT. Please type or print clearly your specific complaint against the cable 

company/organization (Respondent). Include photocopies of all pertinent documents (contract, 

letters, billings, receipts, or other relevant documents); and the names and telephone numbers of 

persons you contacted in trying to resolve your complaint. If you attach a credit card or bank 

statement, be sure your account number is removed or obliterated. If you need additional space, 

continue on a separate sheet of paper and attach to this form. 

Name of cable company/organization 

(Respondent) against 

whom this complaint Is made: Oceanic Time Warner Cable 

Date(s) problem occurred: -,1-,1-,J..,U"-L,=--,1 ... 2,-,-...;P,-r ... e",s",e,,,nC\.t ____________ _ 

Date(s) complained to the 

cable company/organization : -,1-,1...;J~U=L_1!.!2=--________________ _ 

Person(s) to 

whom you complained to: -'C"'U"'s"'t"'o"'mw:e2JrW<S"'e'-rv,...i"'c"'e _____________ _ 
72 


724WHITE2.eps

DESCRIPTION OF COMPLAINT: 

Oceanic Time Warner has a cable license to operate in the state of Hawaii. They 

have an obligation to the consumer to carry cable stations as well as national 

broadcast station like ABC, NBC, CBS. 

Oceanic IS fail ing to provide ItS basIc cable package which Includes ALL local 

broad cast affiliates. As a consumer not all promised services are being 

provided. 

An acceptable resolution to my complaint Is: (I understand that what I want as a 

resolution may not be within tho authority of your office) 

Revoke or suspend Oceanic Time Warner's Cable license until KITV's (ABC) is 

restored to broadcast over Oceanic's cable network. 

Also notify Oceanic that a compliant has been filed against their license. 

Date 

A copy of this complaint may be given to the Respondent. It willi/SO become a public record. If there Is 

Information that you feel Is confidential, such as an unlisted home t./ephone number, or Social Security 

number, pl •••• do not include it on this form or any IItrllchment. Thank you. 

Oil06 
73 


724WHITE3.eps 724WHITE4.eps

FCC Consumer Complaints Page 1 of 1 

FCC tedrl I ,t ,,,,,,,,,,>,,,,:: (JI,IH lr,f"jl]'''l!l!lY 1 1 ' • .1 ,~,~ 

< ) ~~~ ~'~rs~r:1 'W' • :.IIJIMII-'*"- ~ -..,... 1 ~ 

p 

"'., Com pl, "' !Sl.brrli~"'C" 

~ .. "c~~~~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~d , ·~ii~~~~II~. 

FCC Submission Confirmation: 2000E 

Acknowledgement of Submission from Benjamin White on 07111 /20 12, reference 

number 12-C00409060. 

Thank you for your information. The FCC will contact you jf additional information is 

required. Please keep this information for future reference. 

ATIENTION: Vvhen sl,Ibmrtling additionallnfocmation vSlfIg en. FCC $uDmiSSlOt'I Confirmation sheet please anacn 

OIItyone untOll<:lIed 'lIX advertisement (or munlple advec'tlsetT\en1s ~~lhalmatche$yOlJr 

Q)(I'Iplalfll number ilnd Qmer company named 11'1 ttus complaInt 00 NOT II'Iclu<le multiple unlohcrted faxes from 

(lifterenl senders WIth Inis unlqloe c:..so numoer. Your complaint is sub)ect to I)e rejected. if mote ItI&I'I OI'Ie un50tlcrtel1 

lax a(lvenlSemenl (rom dlffefenl seMor, accompanle' thiS FCC SubmiutOn Conllrmatlon sneel 

Please use thiS page os 0 Fall Cover 5t\<eet when IUII\i addlllOnal det.lIs to the FCC al 1866) 418-0232 

f(.r. Home 

Foooral CommlJOIGaIl(l(Is OO'l "' '' 1OI'\ 

445 I2IhSUeelSW 

Pnone 1-88&-CALL.fCC P ..aa!·22$-5322) 

ll'Y 1..$8-TELl ·FCC p-8S8 S3~5322 1 

Wasrungloo. DC 20554 

FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection· Consumer Information 

FT( . Complaint Assistant 

We have received your complaint 

Thank you for flllng:ill complaint with the Federal Trade Commlnlon. e .. ed on thelnfonnatlon 

you have given us, we recommend that you take the following stept, If you have not already. 

Step 1: 

Step 2: 

Step 3: 

You should contact the company In question regarding your SIIutatlon 

You may find useful Information on our Consumer Protection '.ve::> sae 

If you have done the above ,taps and have any additional questions or any 

addition .. 1 information you would like to add to your file. please call 877-38Z .... 357 

~8raa4~ ~o~~~~~o~u=nr!~~:I~g~~~: ~;:ot~~s reference number' 

Submit Another Complaint 

Page I of I 
74 


724PLAIN1.eps

Case 1:12-cv-00406-BMK-NONE Document 1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 1 of 10 PagelD #: 1 

BENJAMIN O. WHITE 

2227 Apoepoe Street 

Pearl City, Hawaii 96782 

Telephone: (808) 386-5784; (512) 535-2397(f) 

bw968488@gmail.com 

Plaintiff in Pro Per 

ORIGIN A FII.EDINTHE UNIT"C "TA rFS DlsrmCT COURT DI::::::TQICT OF HAWAII 

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII 6 8M' 

r.v 1 2 0 0 4 0 lit 

BENJAMIN ORR WHITE, CIVIL NO: _____ _ 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

TIME WARNER CABLE, 

OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE, 

HEARST TELEVISION, 

KITV, 

Defendants. 

COMPLAINT 

COMPLAINT; SUMMmlS .&...,-

DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 

BENJAMIN ORR WHITE, Plaintiff above-named, sets forth the following 

Complaint against Defendants TIME WARNER CABLE, OCEANIC TIME 

WARNER CABLE, HEARST TELEVISION, and KITV, and alleges and avers as 

follows: 
75 


724PLAIN2.eps

Case 1:12-cv-00406-BMK-NONE Document 1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 2 of 10 PagelD #: 2 

JURISDICTION 

1. This action is brought pursuant to The Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, Title 47 U.S.C. 614, et seq., and The Cable & Television Consumer 

Protection Act of 1992, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. Section 533, et seq. 

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 

1331, which states that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States. 

3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties as a result of the 

Defendants' wrongful acts hereinafter complained of which violated the Plaintiffs 

rights as a consumer and cable subscriber. The Defendants' wrongful act consisted 

of failing to notify the Plaintiff as a consumer and cable television subscribers of a 

cable operator's change to programming. The change in programming occurred in 

the State of Hawaii. 

VENUE 

4. Pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. Section 614, venue is proper in the District of 

Hawaii because a substantial part of the events or Omissions giving rise to the 

claim occurred in this District. 

2 
76 


724PLAIN3.eps

Case 1:12-cv-00406-BMK-NONE Document 1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 3 of 10 PagelD #: 3 

THE PARTIES 

5. The Plaintiff, BENJAMIN ORR WHITE, is and at all relevant times 

mentioned was, a private citizen with sole residence located at 2227 Apoepoe 

Street, Pearl City, Hawaii 96782 

6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon Defendants TIME 

WARNER CABLE a national parent cable, and/or media corporation 

headquartered in New York, New York, and/or owner, and/or an entity with 

dominion, control, oversight and management of OCEANIC TIME WARNER 

CABLE a cable, and/or media, and/or owners, and/or operators, and/or licensees, 

and/or permitees, and/or corporation rebroadcasting national commercial affiliates 

and cable station herein referred to as television media station broadcasting over a 

cable network in the State of Hawaii with executive offices at 200 akamainui 

Street, Mililani, Hawaii 96789. 

7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon Defendants HEARST 

TELEVISION owner, and/or operator of29 television stations, and two radio 

stations wholly owned by the Hearst Corporation with corporate headquarters in 

New York, New York is the parent, and/or owner, and/or operator, and/or an 

entity with dominion, control, oversight and management of KIT V an American 

Broadcasting Company affil iate also hereinafter referred to as abc was 

3 
77 


724PLAIN4.eps

Case 112-cv-00406-BMK-NONE Document 1 Filed 07/19/12 Page 4 of 10 PagelD #: 4 

broadcasting nation commercial programming in the State of Hawaii located at 801 

S. King Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96782. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

8. Defendant OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE rebroadcast KITV an abc 

affiliate on OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE channel six. On or about July 11, 

2012 defendant TIME WARNER CABLE ordered, and/or directed, and/or 

mandated OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE to terminate rebroadcast of KIT V 

on channel six thus blackening out hereinafter referred as blacked out channel six 

and replacing it within 24 hours with the Hallmark Channel, a national cable 

programming station. 

9. Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE after the blackout of KIT V was 

informed July 12,2012 and believes therein were a fiscal dispute, and/or [mancial 

disagreement, and/or negotiation failure between defendants TIME WARNER 

CABLE and HEARST TELEVISION resulting in the aforementioned black out of 

KITV programming on OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE network 

10. Defendants TIME WARNER CABLE, OCEANICE TIME WARNER 

CABLE, HEARST TELEVISION, and KITV have not provided the defendant 

BENJAMIN ORR WHITE or the OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE network 

subscribers with a specific restoration date of KIT V over the OCEANIC TIME 

WARNER CABLE NETWORK to channel six. 

4 
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II. Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE is infonned and believes OCEANIC 

TIME WARNER CABLE was a cable television network provider to 350,000 

household, and/or domiciles in the State of Hawaii providing a minimum basic 

cable television network service package costing $14.88 per calendar month for 23 

national and local commercial broadcast stations to include KITV resulting in an 

average channel cost of $0.65 per calendar month. 

12. Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE makes a monthly financial payment on 

the second day of every calendar month of$IIO.95 to OCEANIC TIME 

WARNER CABLE, P.O. Box 30050, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820-0050 under the 

Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE's OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE 

account number, 1-199932-01-7. 

13. Defendant OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE is the only cable television 

provider in the State of Hawaii resulting in a monopoly on cable television. 

14. Defendant KITV is !he only abc affiliate in the State of Hawaii. 

CLAIM I 

(Violation of Title 47 U.S.c. Section 533) 

I 5.Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE, hereby incorporates by reference all of 

the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-14, inclusive, as though set fOlth herein 

at length. 

16. By consumer and cable subscriber contract, Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR 

WHITE paid a cable television network subscription package to OCEANIC TIME 

5 
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WARNER CABLE for commercial cable and national broadcast stations herein 

referred to as channels. 

17. Title 47 U.S.C Section 614, et seq., mandates a cable operator shall provide 

written notice to a local commercial television station at least 30 days prior to 

either deleting from carriage or repositioning that station. 

18. Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHITE believes defendants TIME WARNER 

CABLE, OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE, HEARST TELEVISION, and 

KITV failed to resolve their fiscal dispute leading to of Title 47 U.S.c. Section 

614, et seq. and are equitably responsible for the violation. 

19.By reason of the aforesaid mentioned conduct, the aforementioned 

Defendants violated Title 47 U.S.C. Section 614, et seq. by failing to provide 

written notice to the local commercial television station, KITV and the Plaintiff 

BENJAMIN ORR WHITE as a cable subscriber and viewer ofKITV. 

20. By doing the acts described above in Paragraph 17, Defendants caused 

andlor permitted the violation of the Plaintiffs protection under The Cable & 

Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, thereby entitling Plaintiff to seek 

damages. 

CLAIM II 

(Violation of Title 47 U.S.C. 552) 

21. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in 

paragraphs I-20, inclusive, as though set forth herein at length. 

6 
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22. By consumer of Defendants TIME WARNER CABLE and OCEANIC 

TIME WARNER CABLE network services, and/or cable stations, and/or cable 

channels the Plaintiff BENJAMIN ORR WHlTE is entitled to consumer protection 

and customer service from said Defendants. 

23. Title 47 U.S.C. Section632, et seq, establishes standards which cable 

operators may fulfill their customer service requirements, such standards shall 

include , at a minimum, requirements governing installations, outages, and service 

calls; and communications between the cable operator and the subscriber. 

24. By reason of the aforesaid mentioned conduct, Defendants TIME 

WARNER CABLE and OCEANIC TIME WARNER CABLE violated Title 47 

U.S.C. 552 Section 632(b )(2)(3). 

25. By doing the acts described above in Paragraph 22, Defendants caused 

and/or permitted the violation of the Plaintiffs protection under The Cable & 

Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, thereby entitling Plaintiff to seek 

damages. 

CLAIMID 

26. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in 

paragraphs 1-26, inclusive, as though set forth herein at length. 

27. The Communications Act of 1934 was amended to increased consumer 

protection and promotes increased competition in the cable television and related 

7 
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markets. An act amending the Communications Act of 1934 will herein and 

thereafter be referred to as Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 

Act of 1992. 

28. Section 2(a)(I)(2)(3)(6)(9) of Cable Television Consumer Protection and 

Competition Act of 1992 covers the substantial governmental and First 

Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple 

technology media. 

29. By actions taken resulting in the removal ofKlTV from OCEANIC TIME 

WARNER CABLE's network the Defendants TIME WARNER CABLE, 

OCEANIC TIME WARNER, HEARST TELEVISION, AND KITV infringed on 

the Plaintiff's First Amendment Right during their alleged carrier negotiations. 

CLAIM IV 

30. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in 

paragraphs 1-30, inclusive, as though set forth herein at length. 

31. Section 2(b )(1)(2)(3)( 4)(5) covers the policy of Congress in matter 

pertaining to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 

1992. 

32.By actions taken resulting in the removal ofKlTV from OCEANIC TIME 

WARNER CABLE's network the Defendants TIME WARNER CABLE, 

OCEANIC TIME WARNER, HEARST TELEVISION, AND KlTV violated 

8 
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Congressional Policy through their willful neglect to settle a carriage agreement 

resulting in the disregard of consumer interest and furthermore each defendant 

respectively created undue market power vis-it-vis video programmers and 

consumers. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

A. For statutory damages, declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant Title 

47 U.S.C. 533 Section 614(9) of$50,OOO. 

B. For statutory damages, declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant Title 

47 U.S.C. 552 Section 632(b)(2) of $230,000 including each willful violation an 

additional amount of enhanced damages of $230,000 pursuant to Title 47 

U.S.C. 552 Section 632(b )(3). 

C. For willful disregard of Section 2(a)(1)(2)(3)(6)(9) of the Cable 

Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, damages, 

declaratory and injunctive relief of $450,000. 

D. For willful disregard of Section 2(b)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) of the Cable 

Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, damages, 

declaratory and injunctive relief of $450,000. 

E. Compensatory damages in an amount according to proof against 

Defendants. 

9 
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10 

F. Punitive damages in an amount according to proof against 

Defendants. 

G. For attorney fees and costs pursuant to statute. 

H. For such other and fmther relief as this Honorable Court may deem 

just and propel'. 

Dated: Honolulu, Hawaii ___ 1--'1_/...:1-'1_2_0_('2- ___ _ 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: BENJAMIN O. WHITE 

Plaintiff in Pro Per 

2227 Apoepoe Street 

Pearl City, Hawaii 96782 

808386-5784 

512-535-2397 (Fax) 

Bw968488@gmail.com 

10 
84 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission consent 

dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas where a single MVPD 

dominates an entire state. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Answer. Broadcasters all across the country have a strong incentive to conclude 

retransmission consent negotiations successfully and avoid carriage disputes, which 

result in the immediate loss of both retransmission consent compensation and advertising revenues for local stations and networks. As a result, retransmission consent negotiations are almost always concluded successfully, with disruptions affecting only hundredths of one percent of annual television viewing hours. In the rare 

instance of a negotiating impasse, broadcasters take steps to educate our viewers 

about available options. 

Understanding the unique circumstances we have in Hawai’i, where Time Warner 

Cable has near-monopoly control of the market, our signal is available free, overthe-air to your constituents. Furthermore, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

it would be beneficial to arm consumers with more protections in the rare event of 

a disruption. First, more information should be given with enhanced notice of a potential service disruption. Second, consumers who pay for an MVPD package should 

be reimbursed for loss of service and allowed to change systems without penalty. 

Question 2. Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 percent) of total MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. Senator, ten MVPDs serve over 90 percent of the pay-TV subscriber base 

nationally, in addition to geographic cable system ‘‘clusters.’’ Local broadcasters 

often have to negotiate retransmission consent agreements with extremely large systems with vertically integrated programming that are competing for the same local 

and national advertisements. All in all, we feel that consumers should be given 

more options in the retransmission consent process, outlined in our previous answer. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. In her testimony, Ms. Witmer of Time Warner Cable notes that national broadcast networks ‘‘have begun demanding reverse compensation from their 

affiliates,’’ which she alleges is contributing to the increase in retransmission fees 

local affiliates have been requesting in renegotiations. 

Please respond to this point, providing detail on the extent that national broadcast networks are involved in retransmission fee negotiations, including any relevant information on the percentage of retransmission fees for affiliate signals that 

are allocated to national broadcast networks. 

Answer. As a trade association, NAB does not have access to the specific contractual terms of either network affiliation agreements or retransmission consent agreements. Indeed, as a matter of antitrust law, it would not be appropriate for NAB 

to have information on the specific terms and conditions of the agreements between 

and among its members (such as network affiliation agreements) or between and 

among its members and entities within the pay-TV industry (such as retransmission 

consent agreements). Information about network involvement in retransmission consent negotiations and any retransmission consent-related compensation arrangements would only be available from the actual agreements and/or the networks and 

stations that are parties to such agreements. 

Question 2. What are NAB’s views on Senator Kerry’s idea of requiring alternative 

styles of negotiation—i.e. baseball-style arbitration—to be used in disputes between 

multichannel video programming distributors and affiliates to ensure viewers are 

not treated unfairly when retransmission consent negotiations breakdown? 

Answer. There are several reasons why requiring arbitration would be contrary 

to the public interest and contrary to existing law. 

Under the retransmission consent system established by Congress, the government does not and should not attempt to choose winners or losers among broadcast 

stations and pay-TV providers but instead allows broadcasters and MVPDs to negotiate freely and reach marketplace agreements. Government-enforced arbitration 

would undermine this market-based system and disrupt the carefully balanced combination of laws and regulations governing carriage of television broadcast signals. 

85 

The complexity of retransmission consent negotiations makes mandatory arbitration 

or a similar dispute resolution mechanism neither viable nor practical. 

Retransmission consent negotiations typically involve many complex and multidimensional issues, including such matters as video on demand, purchase of broadcast advertising by the MVPD (and vice-versa), broadcast station promotion by the 

MVPD (and vice-versa), connectivity between the station’s studio/transmitter and 

the MVPDs headend/local receive facility, digital and multicast channel carriage, 

electronic program guide placement, and news insertion options, to name a few. 

Given the complexity of these agreements, significant experience and unique expertise would be required to assist parties in resolving disputes. For this reason, retransmission consent agreements generally also address matters such as the manner of dispute resolution, venue and jurisdiction. NAB believes that mandating arbitration would result in costly battles between economists and lawyers, bleeding economic resources that local stations could better use to invest in high-quality programming and public service stewardship. This would only be compounded with 

smaller stations in California negotiating against MVPDs with far greater leverage. 

Question 3. In recent years, the breakdown of retransmission consent negotiations 

has threatened the television access of millions of Americans to major events like 

the Super Bowl, the World Series, and the Oscars, not to mention the critical access 

of viewers to local news broadcasts. The FCC has proposed to strengthen notice requirements for consumers when there is the possibility that certain services may 

lapse. Does NAB support this proposal? 

Answer. NAB agrees that viewer notification requirements should be strengthened. In comments filed with the FCC last year, NAB urged the FCC to adopt certain changes to its rules to promote the interests of viewers. 

First, we urged the FCC to extend its consumer notice requirements to all 

MVPDs. This requirement, which requires advance notice to consumers of any 

changes to their channel line-ups, currently applies only to cable operators. Extending this rule to all MVPDs would ensure that consumers have adequate information 

to make informed decisions about how to access programming in the rare instances 

when they may be impacted by a negotiating impasse. 

We also proposed two other changes that we anticipate will assist viewers. We observed that many MVPDs now require that their subscribers pay early termination 

fees (‘‘ETFs’’) when canceling services prior to the termination of a service agreement, which could impede subscribers’ ability to cancel and/or change their MVPD 

service in the event of a retransmission consent dispute. NAB urged the Commission to ensure that the ability and freedom of consumers to make such decisions are 

not impeded by the use of ETFs. Finally, NAB has noted that there is a dearth of 

information about MVPD ownership, operations, and geographic coverage. Current 

information about such matters is critical to broadcasters’ ability to make timely 

carriage elections and retransmission consent-related communications. Accordingly, 

we urged the FCC to consider rules that require MVPDs to periodically file with 

the FCC data on their ownership (including contact information), operation, and geographic coverage. This greater transparency could be achieved in a manner that 

is not unduly burdensome but would promote more effective and timely communications between broadcasters and MVPDs. 

Question 4. Does NAB support requiring affiliate broadcast signals to remain on 

the air—i.e., continuous carriage—during retransmission consent disputes? 

Answer. Since the establishment of the current system of retransmission consent, 

thousands of major sporting and entertainment events have come and gone without 

incident or disruption to any consumer. The system works so well that studies show 

that consumers are more likely to face a power outage or an outage of their entire 

pay-TV service than to be affected by a retransmission consent dispute. Even in the 

rare instances that a disruption occurs, local stations’ signals remain available free 

over-the-air, and can also be viewed via other pay-TV services. 

The current regime specifies that both broadcaster and pay-TV parties must, as 

part of their good faith negotiation obligations, negotiate at reasonable times and 

locations, and must not unreasonably delay negotiations. Further government intervention into the timing of the negotiating process, including when those agreements 

commence or terminate, easily could create disincentives to timely reaching agreement. Certainly the requirement on broadcasters proposed in this question would 

substantially reduce the incentives of pay-TV providers to conclude retransmission 

negotiations, if those operators know they can continue to use broadcasters’ signals 

for their own profit, even in the absence of any agreement between them. 

I also want to stress that, during many retransmission negotiations, television 

stations reach short-term agreements with pay-TV providers, allowing them to continue carrying the stations’ signals while negotiations continue. 

86 

1TV Stations Multiplatform Analysis ’12 Update: New Digital Networks, Mobile TV Channels 

Expand Content Options, SNL Kagan (Jan. 31, 2012) at 1. 2Television Bureau of Advertising, TV Basics Report (June 2012) at 25, available at: http:// 

www.tvb.org/media/file/TVlBasics.pdf. Local television broadcast stations also are the top 

source for local weather, traffic and sports. Id. 3See University of Southern California, National USC Annenberg-Los Angeles Times Poll 

Shows Local Television News Rules with Voters, Press Release (Aug. 27, 2012), available at: 

http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/newsroom/newslrelease.php?id=2795 (visited Aug. 28, 2012); 

The Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for 

Most News Organizations at 5 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at: http://www.people-press.org/files/ 

2012/08/8-16-2012-Media-Believability1.pdf (visited Aug. 28, 2012). 4 Bob Papper, RTDNA/Hofstra University, ‘‘2012 TV and Radio Staffing and News Profitability 

Survey,’’ summarized at http://www.rtdna.org/pages/medialitems/2012-tv-and-radio-newsstaffing-and-profitability-survey2094.php, Part I–II. 5See GfK-Knowledge Networks, Home Technology Monitor 2012 Ownership Survey and Trend 

Report (Spring 2012-March 2012). See also NAB, Over-the-Air TV Viewership Soars to 54 Million 

Americans, Press Release (Jun. 18, 2012), available at: http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease.asp?id=2761. 6See Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Kevin W. Caves, The Effects of Regulation on Economies of Scale 

and Scope in TV Broadcasting 1 (2011), Attachment A to Reply Declaration of Jeffrey A. 

Eisenach and Kevin W. Caves (June 27, 2011) in NAB Reply Comments to Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking in MB Docket No. 10–71, at Appendix A (filed June 27, 2011). 

Question 5. Local broadcasting provides local programming and assistance in 

times of emergency. Broadcasters increasingly recognize that compensation from retransmission consent fees is an important revenue stream going forward. Can you 

explain what the retransmission consent fees paid to a broadcast station support? 

Answer. Retransmission consent fees help support the quality, quantity and diversity of broadcast programming and services. Broadcasters are airing ever-increasing 

amounts and types of programming through the use of multiple programming 

streams or ‘‘multicasting.’’ The total number of over-the-air television channels skyrocketed from 2,518 channels as of year-end 2010 to 4,552 channels as of year-end 

2011.1 Multicasting has fostered the development of entirely new programming networks, many of which are aimed at meeting the needs and interests of specific ethnic groups. Another significant development is the increase in programming available in high definition (‘‘HD’’) format, with an estimated three-fifths of broadcasters 

having upgraded their production facilities so that they can offer local news in HD. 

Mobile DTV also is on the rise, with more than 130 stations in 30 states now making significant amounts of programming accessible via handheld mobile devices. 

As you have observed, television broadcast stations are an unrivaled source of 

local and national news and vital emergency information and alerts. Broadcast television is the leading news source, with 37.4 percent of American adults reporting 

that they consider broadcast television to be their primary source of news.2 Recent 

surveys also show that viewers consider local television news more trustworthy than 

other news sources.3

To meet the needs and high expectations of their viewers, local television stations 

invest heavily in their local news operations. Recent survey data show that television news staffing has risen to the second highest levels on record, with stations 

adding 1,131 jobs for a total of 27,653 full time staff in 2011. In addition, 42.4 percent of stations added to their newscasts last year, and a significant number (31.2 

percent) plan to increase news during the coming year. Despite challenging economic times, most stations either increased or maintained their news budgets during the past year.4

Significantly, free over-the-air broadcast signals are relied upon by an increasing 

proportion of the American public. The most current data show that 17.8 percent 

of U.S. television households—a total of 20.7 million households (or 53.8 million 

Americans)—rely solely on free over-the-air broadcast television. Broadcast-only 

households are more likely to be racial and ethnic minorities, have lower household 

incomes, and are younger.5

Local television stations today increasingly rely upon revenue streams other than 

over-the-air advertising to support the varied services described above. Thus, the 

ability to engage in fair negotiations with pay-TV providers for the value of the 

broadcast signal is critical to broadcasters’ ability to generate revenue and re-invest 

those dollars in local news operations and a range of digital services. Changes to 

the current system would impair the ability of local stations to serve their local markets.6

87 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. Broadcasters tend to argue that retransmission consent fees are critical to broadcasters being able to support local news broadcasts. WWOR, owned by 

FOX, has faced significant criticism for its coverage of local New Jersey news. Since 

FOX and Cablevision came to an agreement on retransmission fees after a blackout 

during the World Series in 2010, New Jersey customers have not seen real improvement of local news coverage on WWOR. If broadcasters get use of the public airwaves for free, while also charging retransmission fees, what are New Jersey customers getting in return? 

Answer. Senator, broadcasters are proud stewards of the Nation’s airwaves. In 

fact, most broadcasters were not given anything for ‘‘free’’ as they purchased their 

licensed stations at market price and perform countless hours of public interest 

services, on the air and in the community. In return, broadcasters continue to reinvest retransmission consent revenues in local news and other programming services. 

For example, in 2011, broadcasters hired more than 1,100 additional anchors, reporters, producers and news staff. Total employment in local television newsrooms 

grew by 4.3 percent to 27,653 employees. This is the second highest total on record, 

thanks to retransmission consent in many cases. New Jersey residents are served 

by WWOR–TV, a broadcast television station licensed to Secaucus, New Jersey, 

which is affiliated with MyNetworkTV and owned by Fox Television Stations. In addition to MyNetworkTV entertainment programming, WWOR–TV provides local 

viewers with local news coverage, public affairs programming, special election coverage and children’s educational programming. 

Question 2. Do broadcasters have an obligation to provide local news coverage? If 

so, how much is adequate? 

Answer. Local broadcasters are licensed by the FCC on the condition that they 

will serve the public interest. Each and every station is different and tailors its programming to fit the needs of the community. 

Question 3. S. 2008, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011, 

would provide for the deregulation of retransmission consent. But as we saw last 

month with DirecTV and Viacom, blackouts occur due to disputes between cable programmers and cable providers in a non-regulated environment too. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in a deregulated world, why 

would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for broadcasters too? 

Answer. Removing important laws like retransmission consent and must-carry 

will harm local stations and television viewers alike. For example, certain proposals 

would eliminate the ability of the FCC to enforce privately negotiated contracts between program distributors and stations for the distribution of network and syndicated programming. Allowing pay-TV providers to import from distant markets 

signals carrying duplicative network and syndicated programming ultimately will 

harm viewers, by undermining local stations’ economic base for producing local news 

and information—including critical emergency information. Specifically, limiting 

broadcasters’ ability to enter into and/or enforce exclusive contracts will jeopardize 

stations’ advertising revenues because the lack of program exclusivity in a market 

makes television stations less attractive to advertisers. Without sufficient advertising revenue streams, local stations cannot afford to invest in valued informational 

and entertainment programming. Both local stations and their viewers would be severely harmed if pay-TV providers could undermine stations’ exclusivity rights by 

importing distant stations’ signals. 

Furthermore, if some legislative proposals were to become law, many believe that 

the number of consumer disruptions will multiply. Removing the compulsory copyright license, for instance, would exponentially increase the number of rights holders that need to grant permission before a station’s programming is carried by a 

cable or satellite company, thereby increasing the likelihood of consumer disruptions. In addition to this, many stations, particularly smaller and independent stations, may be unable to undertake the expensive and cumbersome responsibility of 

direct licensing, and such a change might affect the ability of local stations to serve 

their local markets. 

Question 4. News Corporation, a member of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), has been found to have misled the British Parliament, has been accused of misrepresenting itself to the FCC, and has seen its employees arrested for 

crimes including bribery of police, phone hacking, e-mail hacking, and the perversion of justice. What, if anything, does the NAB do to ensure that its members are 

living up to the character requirements expected of a broadcast licensee? 

88 

Answer. NAB advocates on behalf of a broad membership, which is comprised of 

local radio and television stations and broadcast TV networks. To be a member of 

NAB, stations must hold a valid broadcast license from the Federal Communications 

Commission. 

Question 5. In light of the numerous allegations against News Corporation, is the 

NAB conducting investigations into or taking any action against News Corporation? 

Answer. No. 

Question 6. Today’s video marketplace is very different than what it was in 1992. 

Since the enactment of the Cable Act, satellite carriers and telephone companies offering video services compete with cable operators. And in the last few years, we 

have seen the enormous growth of online video. In your view, given these changes 

in the video marketplace, are the existing rules working? Why or why not? 

Answer. NAB feels that the system established by the 1992 Act is functioning as 

Congress intended and serving the public interest. Some local broadcasters are for 

the first time receiving monetary compensation for carriage of their signals, and 

consumers are benefiting with enhanced local offerings and other highly valued 

sports and entertainment programming. As new entrants, such as online video distributors, provide consumers with even more options we believe that applying the 

same basic principles for retransmission consent and exclusivity to both new and 

traditional providers is paramount. Leaving broadcasters unable to control Internet 

distribution of their signals, and without the means to negotiate for fair compensation for others’ commercial use of their signals, would contradict Congress’ mandate 

that ‘‘anyone engaged in retransmission consent by whatever means’’ obtain stations’ consent, and would seriously undermine local stations’ ability to fulfill their 

public service obligations. 

REPSONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. Stakeholders on all sides of the retransmission consent debate appear 

to agree that the visibility and frequency of retransmission disputes has increased 

over the last few years. Some have argued that retransmission consent is working 

and that some growing pains are reasonable because many broadcast stations are 

electing to pursue deals instead of must-carry for the first time since enactment of 

the 1992 Cable Act which created the dual regimes of must carry and retransmission consent. On the other hand, distributors argue that private sector retransmission consent deals are taking longer to negotiate, and that it is becoming harder 

to reach agreement regarding mutually agreeable terms. 

If you believe must-carry and retransmission consent are important to localism, 

how do you recommend that the Congress measure the success of localism? 

If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can you provide? 

Answer. Must carry and retransmission consent have yielded important benefits 

for American television viewers, whether they access broadcast television over-theair, via pay-TV services, or online. 

Must-Carry. Congress adopted ‘‘must-carry’’ because it found that cable systems 

were increasingly refusing to carry certain local television stations or carrying them 

in ways that made it difficult to receive them (such as placing them on channels 

that could only be received with additional equipment). 

Congress found, after assembling a massive record, that if stations lost access to 

the cable audience, their ability to provide quality diverse programming to their 

local communities would decline, and those stations would either be forced to change 

to less expensive programming or go off the air altogether, reducing the diversity 

of programming available to local communities. 

The must-carry policy has succeeded. Congress can measure that success by looking at the results. In 1992, there were only three nationwide sources of broadcast 

programming. In the past 20 years, new and diverse programming networks have 

grown, including Univision, Fox, the CW, MyNetwork, ION, Telemundo, Azteca and 

others. Each of them first obtained widespread distribution over must-carry stations 

and produce local news thus serving localism. Other local stations that provide foreign language or other niche programming are able to operate only because they can 

reach the entire audience due to must-carry requirements. 

Although some cable companies complain that must-carry reduces the opportunity 

for new cable programming, the facts don’t support that claim. Must-carry stations 

occupy no more than one to two percent of the capacity of most cable systems, and 

as cable systems convert to all-digital operations, their capacity grows even further. 

Those cable systems also often devote many channels to carrying feeds of popular 

cable networks from multiple time zones. 

89 

7TV Stations Multiplatform Analysis ’12 Update: New Digital Networks, Mobile TV Channels 

Expand Content Options, SNL Kagan (Jan. 31, 2012) at 1. 8Television Bureau of Advertising, TV Basics Report (June 2012) at 25, available at: http:// 

www.tvb.org/media/file/TVlBasics.pdf. Local television broadcast stations also are the top 

source for local weather, traffic and sports. Id. 9See University of Southern California, National USC Annenberg-Los Angeles Times Poll 

Shows Local Television News Rules with Voters, Press Release (Aug. 27, 2012), available at: 

http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/newsroom/newslrelease.php?id=2795 (visited Aug. 28, 2012); 

The Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for 

Most News Organizations at 5 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at: http://www.people-press.org/files/ 

2012/08/8-16-2012-Media-Believability1.pdf (visited Aug. 28, 2012). 10 Bob Papper, RTDNA/Hofstra University, ‘‘2012 TV and Radio Staffing and News Profitability Survey,’’ summarized at http://www.rtdna.org/pages/medialitems/2012-tv-and-radionews-staffing-and-profitability-survey2094.php. 11See Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Kevin W. Caves, The Effects of Regulation on Economies of Scale 

and Scope in TV Broadcasting 1 (2011), Attachment A to Reply Declaration of Jeffrey A. 

Eisenach and Kevin W. Caves (June 27, 2011) in NAB Reply Comments to Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking in MB Docket No. 10–71, at Appendix A (filed June 27, 2011). 

Television broadcasters are committed to providing a wide variety of channels and 

programming that connect the cultures and communities they serve and reflect the 

diverse nature of their viewing audiences. Must-carry laws have succeeded in helping broadcasters accomplish these goals. 

Retransmission Consent. Retransmission consent allows stations electing this option to negotiate with pay-TV providers in good faith for the value of their signals. 

Retransmission consent fees help support the quality, quantity and diversity of 

broadcast programming and services. Broadcasters are airing ever-increasing 

amounts and types of programming through the use of multiple programming 

streams or ‘‘multicasting,’’ which has resulted in enhanced localism. The total number of over-the-air television channels skyrocketed from 2,518 channels as of yearend 2010 to 4,552 channels as of year-end 2011.7 Multicasting has fostered the development of entirely new programming networks, many of which are aimed at 

meeting the needs and interests of specific ethnic groups and community focused 

programming. Another significant development is the increase in programming 

available in high definition (‘‘HD’’) format, with an estimated three-fifths of broadcasters having upgraded their production facilities so they can offer local news in 

HD. Mobile DTV also is on the rise, with more than 130 stations in 30 states now 

making significant amounts of programming accessible via handheld mobile devices. 

Television broadcast stations are an unrivaled source of local and national news 

and vital emergency information and alerts. Broadcast television is the leading news 

source, with 37.4 percent of American adults reporting that they consider broadcast 

television to be their primary source of news.8 Recent surveys also show that viewers consider local television news more trustworthy than other news sources.9 To 

meet the needs and high expectations of their viewers, local television stations invest heavily in their local news operations. Recent survey data show that television 

news staffing has risen to the second highest levels on record, with stations adding 

1,131 jobs for a total of 27,653 full time staff in 2011. In addition, 42.4 percent of 

stations added to their newscasts last year, and a significant number (31.2 percent) 

plan to increase news during the coming year. Despite challenging economic times, 

most stations either increased or maintained their news budgets during the past 

year.10

Local television stations today increasingly rely upon revenue streams other than 

over-the-air advertising to support the varied services described above. Thus, the 

ability to engage in fair negotiations with pay-TV providers for the value of the 

broadcast signal is critical to broadcasters’ ability to generate revenue and re-invest 

those dollars in local news operations and a range of digital services. Changes to 

the current retransmission consent system would impair the ability of local stations 

to serve their local markets.11

Question 2. Some distributors have indicated concerns about the ability of content 

creators to tie affiliated programing to retransmission consent deals because they 

argue this practice contributes to programming cost increases. Broadcasters and 

content creators argue that current practices provide necessary financial support for 

a greater variety of programming options which they say is a benefit to consumers. 

To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost increases 

over the past several years? 

If you believe programming cost increases merit a fresh look at the 1992 Cable 

Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by distributors should be passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers? 

90 

12See GAO, Issues related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO–04–8 at 43 (Oct. 2003) (‘‘few retransmission consent agreements include cash payment 

for carriage of the local broadcast station’’). 13 Id. at 20, 43–44. 14 Id. 15SNL Kagan, Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2009 and SNL Kagan, Nielsen November 

2009 Prime-Time Live Coverage. 16See Declaration of Jeffrey Eisenach and Kevin Caves, Attachment to NAB Comments in MB 

Docket No. 10–71 (filed May 27, 2011) at 16–24. 17 Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Economics of Retransmission Consent (March 2009), attached to 

Reply Comments of NAB, MB Docket No. 07–269 (filed Jun. 22, 2009) at 33. 

If you support changes to current law, would your company provide consumers 

with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? If not, why not? 

Answer. As a threshold matter, it is important to recognize that programming 

costs are declining, not rising, relative to other key economic indicators in the payTV industry. Thus, pay-TV industry contentions that retransmission consent fees 

drive consumer are patently false. 

For years, cable operators consistently refused to pay cash for retransmission consent of local broadcast signals.12 Despite this, the average monthly rate subscribers 

were charged for the combined basic and expanded-basic tiers of service rose from 

$26.06 in 1997 to $36.47 in 2002—a 40 percent increase over the five years.13 This 

rate of increase was much greater than the general rate of inflation, as measured 

by the Consumer Price Index (‘‘CPI’’), which rose 12 percent over the same period.14

Clearly, these rate increases were entirely unrelated to broadcast retransmission 

consent compensation. 

Even today, the prices paid by MVPDs for retransmission consent are very modest 

when compared to other key indicators, such as MVPDs’ other programming-related 

expenses, revenues and profits. Broadcasters’ compensation is significantly less than 

that paid to non-broadcast program providers whose programming earns lower ratings. For example, in 2009, MVPDs paid an average of $2.08 per subscriber per 

month to carry one of the four most expensive cable networks and $1.49 per subscriber per month to carry one of the four most heavily viewed cable networks, while 

each of the ‘‘Big 4’’ broadcast network affiliates only received an average of approximately $0.14 per subscriber per month in retransmission consent fees.15 MVPDs 

paid almost fifteen times more in fees for carriage of the four most expensive cable 

networks and approximately ten times more for carriage of the four most heavily 

viewed cable networks than they paid in retransmission consent fees for carriage 

of the Big 4 broadcast network affiliates. 

As further evidence that retransmission consent fees are not driving higher cable 

rates, programming expenses, of which retransmission consent fees account for only 

a small fraction, are rising more slowly than other sectors of the cable industry’s 

overall economic structure. For example, between 2005 and 2010, with respect to six 

publicly-traded cable operators: 

• the share of cost of revenue accounted for by programming costs declined from 

54 percent to 49 percent; 

• the share of cost of revenue, plus selling, general, and administrative costs accounted for by programming costs declined from 36 percent to 34 percent; 

• the ratio of programming expenses to total cable operating costs decreased 

(from 27 percent in 2005 to 26 percent in 2010); 

• Cable operators monthly revenue per subscriber increased by $53.06 per subscriber per month, from $80.95 to $134.01, while programming expenses increased by just $10.03 per subscriber per month (from $18.21 to $28.24); stated 

differently, for every dollar increase in programming expenses, MVPDs raised 

monthly subscription rates by $5.29. 

• The average retransmission fee per cable subscriber per month increased from 

zero in 2005 to $0.86 in 2010. Thus, in 2010, retransmission consent fees, at 

$0.86 per subscriber per month, were approximately six tenths of one percent of 

cable operator revenues.16

Further, retransmission consent fees are not expected to drive up cable subscriber 

rates in the future. A March 2009 study estimated that cable revenues per subscriber are predicted to rise 45 times more than retransmission consent fees between 

2006 and 2015.17

Accordingly, NAB does not believe that programming costs generally have driven 

the steady increases in consumer prices for pay-TV service. In particular, the modest retransmission consent fees paid to broadcasters are not the cause of consistent 

91 

subscriber rate increases above the rate of inflation. We therefore do not see any 

reason for modifications to the current system. 

Question 3. Given that retransmission consent deals are private sector negotiations under the 1992 Cable Act, it is difficult for observers and participants to track 

pricing trends. 

Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers could help 

to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific 

recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. There are several reasons why disclosure of retransmission consent pricing would not be helpful, and could in fact be harmful, to the current system of retransmission consent. 

First, such proposals implicitly assume that retransmission consent negotiations 

are only about money. To the contrary, retransmission consent negotiations typically 

involve many complex and multidimensional issues, including such matters as video 

on demand, purchase of broadcast advertising by the MVPD (and vice-versa), broadcast station promotion by the MVPD (and vice-versa), connectivity between the station’s studio/transmitter and the MVPD’s headend/local receive facility, digital and 

multicast channel carriage, electronic program guide placement, and news insertion 

options, to name a few. Disclosure of ‘‘price’’ is not a simple matter, there are often 

myriad elements beyond cash fees that constitute the overall price compensation in 

a retransmission consent agreement. 

Another issue to consider is whether such disclosures could effectively establish 

either a ‘‘floor’’ or a ‘‘ceiling’’ for retransmission consent fees in a given market. This 

could harm broadcasters and/or pay-TV providers because each transaction should 

reflect unique and specific marketplace circumstances involving the parties to that 

transaction. For example, a broadcaster may wish to offer a lower rate to a specific 

MVPD because that MVPD is able to offer the broadcaster a unique video-on-demand partnership. When other MVPDs learn of the reduced rate, they may seek 

that same rate when their retransmission consent agreements are up for renewal 

(even if they are not willing or able to offer the same types of non-price terms and 

conditions). In light of that likely outcome, the broadcaster in this scenario may be 

deterred from offering a lower rate and entering an arrangement that would otherwise have created new programming options for viewers. As you can see, disclosure 

could create disincentives that harm both the industry and the viewing public. 

Finally, it is important to consider how one-sided it would be to require only retransmission consent rates to be disclosed. Interestingly, the pay-TV providers who 

have supported proposals for rate disclosure do not seek ‘‘transparency’’ across the 

board. Rather, these providers wish for broadcasters to lay all their cards on the 

table while pay-TV providers get to keep theirs close to the vest. Under their proposals, MVPDs would not have to disclose the rates that they pay to non-broadcast 

programming services with substantially less audience appeal, or any of the data 

relevant to determining their costs per channel. 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. I think there are several key indicators that the existing retransmission 

consent system is working, and that these indicators can continue to be monitored 

by Congress and/or the Commission. The leading indicator is that the overwhelming 

majority of retransmission consent deals are getting done. Studies that show that 

retransmission consent disputes affect only hundredths of a percent of annual television viewing hours. Congress and the FCC could use such metrics to help assess 

the extent and nature of negotiating impasses. Congress and the Commission also 

should consider the extent to which certain pay-TV providers are repeatedly involved in disputes with broadcasters and other programmers. Such repetitive conduct suggests that these pay-TV providers may be more focused on generating interest in government intervention on their behalf than engaging in genuine attempts 

to reach agreement. 

Another key indicator that the system is working is the extent to which broadcasters are upgrading and expanding their services to the public. Retransmission 

consent fees help support the quality, quantity and diversity of broadcast programming and services. As discussed in response to question #1 above, this includes offering ever-increasing amounts and types of programming through the use of multicasting, more HD programming, mobile DTV, and the local news and emergency information on which so many Americans rely. Because local television stations today 

increasingly rely upon revenue streams other than over-the-air advertising to support the varied services they offer, the ability to engage in fair negotiations with 

92 

1See, Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 26 FCC Rcd 

2718, 2728–29, ¶ 18 (2011) (FCC concludes that it lacks ‘‘authority to adopt either interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding dispute resolution procedures applicable to retransmission consent negotiations’’). 

pay-TV providers for the value of the broadcast signal is critical to broadcasters’ 

ability to generate revenue and re-invest those dollars in local news operations and 

a range of digital services. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. NAB believes that the current systems of must carry and retransmission 

consent are functioning effectively. In comments filed with the FCC in 2011, however, NAB proposed a small number of modifications to FCC rules that we believe 

would assist American television viewers. These proposals could certainly be taken 

up by Congress in an effort to promote the interests of viewers as part of a review 

of the 1992 Cable Act. 

First, NAB urged the FCC to extend its consumer notice requirements to all 

MVPDs. This requirement, which requires advance notice to consumers of any 

changes to their channel line-ups, currently applies only to cable operators. Extending this rule to all MVPDs would ensure that consumers have adequate information 

to make informed decisions about how to access programming in the rare instances 

when they may be impacted by a negotiating impasse. 

Second, NAB observed that many MVPDs now require that their subscribers pay 

early termination fees (‘‘ETFs’’) when canceling services prior to the termination of 

a service agreement, which could impede subscribers’ ability to cancel and/or change 

their MVPD service in the event of a retransmission consent dispute. NAB urged 

the Commission to ensure that the ability and freedom of consumers to make such 

decisions are not impeded by the use of ETFs. 

Finally, NAB has noted that there is a dearth of information about MVPD ownership, operations, and geographic coverage. Current information about such matters 

is critical to broadcasters’ ability to make timely carriage elections and retransmission consent-related communications. Accordingly, we urged the FCC to consider 

rules that require MVPDs to periodically file with the FCC data on their ownership 

(including contact information), operation, and geographic coverage. This greater 

transparency could be achieved in a manner that is not unduly burdensome but 

would promote more effective and timely communications between broadcasters and 

MVPDs. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Existing FCC Authority 

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (‘‘1992 

Cable Act’’) amended the Communications Act to include Section 325, which provides television stations with certain carriage rights on local market cable television 

systems. The Commission established rules related to the retransmission/mandatory 

carriage election cycle, but did not adopt rules governing the negotiation process of 

retransmission consent. 

However, the statute clearly calls for the FCC to ensure that broadcasters act in 

‘‘good faith during negotiations.’’ During the Sinclair-Mediacom dispute back in 

2007, the Commission didn’t intervene because then Chairman Martin interpreted 

the law didn’t and stated that the agency didn’t have the authority to impose binding arbitration. At the time, he stated ‘‘It’s not clear to me that the commission does 

have the authority to order arbitration.’’ 

Yet, during that time in January 2007, Senator Inouye and the late Senator Stevens wrote the FCC stating that the Commission did indeed have authority to intervene and, if necessary, use binding arbitration to resolve any failed negotiations. 

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

Answer. The short answer to your question is—as the Commission has consistently concluded—it does not have the authority to require mandatory arbitration.1

Mandatory arbitration would be inconsistent with Section 325 of the Act. Section 

325(b) expressly states that broadcasters, and only broadcasters, can provide multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) with authority to retransmit their 

93 

2 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A). 

3See S. Rep. No. 102–92 (‘‘Senate Report’’) at 36 (stating that the Cable Television Consumer 

Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (‘‘1992 Cable Act’’) created a ‘‘marketplace for the disposition of the rights to retransmit broadcast signals’’). 4 Id. 

5 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(1). See Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures in Commission Proceedings and Proceedings in which the Commission is a Party, Internal Policy Statement and 

Order, 6 FCC Rcd 5669 (1991). See also S. Rep. No. 101–543 at 13 (1990). 6 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(3). 

7S. Rep. No. 101–543 at 13 (1990). 

8See Letter from Steven Broeckaert, Media Bureau, to Jorge L. Bauermeister, Counsel for 

Choice Cable T.V., 22 FCC Rd 4933 (2007) (cable operator failed to meet good faith standard). 9See EchoStar Satellite Corp. v. Young Broadcasting, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 

16 FCC Rcd 15070 (2001) (broadcaster met good faith standard while complaining MVPD was 

admonished for abuse of FCC processes and lack of candor). 

broadcast signals.2 The plain language of Section 325(b) makes clear that no party— 

neither the FCC nor an arbiter—can authorize an MVPD to transmit a station’s 

broadcast signal without the broadcaster’s consent. If the FCC were to mandate that 

broadcasters and MVPDs engage in arbitration to resolve retransmission consent 

disputes, the parties would have no choice but to submit to arbitration, which, by 

definition, involves the arbitrator rendering a ‘‘final and binding’’ decision. Thus, the 

adoption of mandatory binding arbitration as a mechanism to resolve retransmission consent disputes contravenes the plain language of Section 325(b) because 

it would permit the arbitrator, not the broadcaster, to decide the terms upon which 

to grant permission to a MVPD to carry a broadcaster’s signal. 

Mandatory arbitration is contrary to the most fundamental premise of the retransmission consent marketplace established by Congress, in which local television 

stations have the opportunity to negotiate for compensation from MVPDs in exchange for the right to retransmit and resell their broadcast signals.3 Congress 

made it quite plain that this retransmission consent marketplace is to function 

without government intervention. In particular, Congress emphatically rejected the 

notion that it or the Commission should or would ‘‘dictate the outcome’’ of the negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs.4 By forcing the parties into mandatory 

binding arbitration, the FCC would impermissibly intervene in retransmission consent negotiations. Thus, mandatory arbitration contravenes congressional intent. 

Mandatory arbitration is also contrary to the Administrative Dispute Resolution 

Act (‘‘ADRA’’) which authorizes an agency to use arbitration only when all parties 

consent.5 The ADRA expressly prohibits an administrative agency from requiring 

arbitration. In particular, Section 575(a)(3) of the United States Code states that: 

‘‘an agency may not require any person to consent to arbitration as a condition of 

entering into a contract or obtaining a benefit.’’ 6 This ‘‘prohibition is intended to 

help ensure that the use of arbitration is truly voluntary on all sides.’’ 7

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. The FCC has established rules implementing the statutory good faith negotiation requirement and has a process in place for adjudicating complaints of violations of the good faith rules. In the cases that the FCC has decided on the merits, 

broadcasters have never been found to have violated the good faith negotiation 

standard, although one MVPD was found to have violated the standard,8 and another was found to have abused the complaint process.9

NAB has urged the FCC to adopt certain changes to its rules to promote the interests of viewers. First, we urged the FCC to extend its consumer notice requirements 

to all MVPDs. This requirement, which requires advance notice to consumers of any 

changes to their channel line-ups, currently applies only to cable operators. Extending this rule to all MVPDs would ensure that consumers have adequate information 

to make informed decisions about how to access programming in the rare instances 

when they may be impacted by a negotiating impasse. Second, NAB observed that 

many MVPDs now require that their subscribers pay early termination fees 

(‘‘ETFs’’) when canceling services prior to the termination of a service agreement, 

which could impede a subscriber’s ability to cancel service in the event of a retransmission consent dispute. NAB urged the Commission to ensure that the ability and 

freedom of consumers to make such decisions are not impeded by the use of ETFs. 

Third, NAB has noted that there is a dearth of information about MVPD ownership, 

operations, and geographic coverage. Current information about such matters is critical to broadcasters’ ability to make timely carriage elections and retransmission 

consent-related communications. Accordingly, we urged the FCC to consider rules 

94 

10See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 26 FCC Rcd 

2718, 2727 ¶ 17 (2011). 11See GAO, Issues related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO–04–8 at 43 (Oct. 2003) (‘‘few retransmission consent agreements include cash payment 

for carriage of the local broadcast station’’). 12See GAO, Issues related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in the Cable Television Industry, GAO–04–8 at 20, 43–44 (Oct. 2003). 13 Id. 14SNL Kagan, Economics of Basic Cable Networks 2009 and SNL Kagan, Nielsen November 

2009 Prime-Time Live Coverage. 

that require MVPDs to periodically file with the FCC data on their ownership (including contact information), operation, and geographic coverage. This greater transparency could be achieved in a manner that is not unduly burdensome but would 

promote more effective and timely communications between broadcasters and 

MVPDs. 

Reasonable Basic Service Tier Rates 

Question 3. While I understand programming costs are growing, I am concerned 

about the significant increase in retransmission compensation that has occurred 

over the past several years. For example, retransmission consent revenue climbed 

more than 30 percent for six broadcasters in the first nine months of 2008. By 2017, 

SNL Kagan—an industry analysis firm—projects retransmission fees will grow to 

$3.61 billion, with average per-subscriber fees potentially doubling. So, as broadcasters look to increase revenue streams through retransmission fee, it seemingly 

puts upward pressure on the price of basic cable and ultimately consumers. Such 

increase may also infringe upon the existing statute. 

Section 623(b)(1) requires the FCC to ensure that basic cable service rates are reasonable. In addition, Section 325(b)(3)(A) requires the Commission to consider the 

impact that retransmission consent has on basic cable service rates and that any 

regulations do not conflict with the FCC’s ‘‘obligation under Section 623(b)(1)’’ to ensure such rates are reasonable. 

According to SNL Kagan, the average cable TV subscriber in 2011 paid $78 a month compared to only $40 per month in 2001. Whereas the average household income fell 6 percent between 2006 and 2010, according to the U.S. Census. 

Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing retransmission fees in relation to basic cable rates? 

Answer. In its rulemaking proceeding on retransmission consent initiated last 

year, the FCC specifically inquired whether there is an impact on the basic service 

rate that consumers pay as the result of retransmission consent fees or disputes.10

Various parties commented on that issue, as well as the myriad others raised in the 

Notice. This proceeding remains pending at the FCC. As discussed in response to 

Question 4 below, NAB has presented evidence demonstrating that rising cable 

rates are not caused by retransmission consent fees. In fact, retransmission fees are 

miniscule in comparison to cable revenues. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for (1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and (2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. Any suggestion that retransmission consent fees drive the rates subscribers pay for MVPD service is patently false. For years, cable operators consistently refused to pay cash for retransmission consent of local broadcast signals.11

Nevertheless, the average monthly rate subscribers were charged for the combined 

basic and expanded-basic tiers of service rose from $26.06 in 1997 to $36.47 in 

2002—a 40 percent increase over the five years.12 This rate of increase was much 

greater than the general rate of inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index 

(‘‘CPI’’), which rose 12 percent over the same period.13 These rate increases were 

entirely unrelated to broadcast retransmission consent fees. 

Even now, the prices paid by MVPDs for retransmission consent are very modest 

when compared to other key indicators, such as MVPDs’ other programming-related 

expenses, revenues and profits. Broadcasters’ compensation is significantly less than 

that paid to other programmers of equal or lower, ratings. For example, in 2009, 

an MVPD paid an average of $2.08 per subscriber per month to retransmit one of 

the Top 4 most expensive cable networks and $1.49 per subscriber per month to retransmit one of the Top 4 most heavily viewed cable networks, while each of the 

‘‘Big 4’’ broadcast network affiliates only received an average of approximately $0.14 

per subscriber per month in retransmission consent fees in 2009.14 MVPDs paid almost fifteen times more in fees for carriage of the Top 4 most expensive cable netVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
95 

15See Declaration of Jeffrey Eisenach and Kevin Caves, Attachment to NAB Comments in MB 

Docket No. 10–71 (filed May 27, 2011) at 16–24. 16 Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The Economics of Retransmission Consent (March 2009), attached to 

Reply Comments of NAB, MB Docket No. 07–269 (filed Jun. 22, 2009) at 33. 17 United States Copyright Office, Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act Section 302 

Report, A Report of the Register of Copyrights (Aug. 29, 2011) at 66–128. 

works and approximately ten times more for carriage of the Top 4 most heavily 

viewed cable networks than they paid in retransmission consent fees for carriage 

of the Big 4 broadcast network affiliates. 

As further evidence that retransmission consent fees are not driving higher cable 

rates, programming expenses, of which retransmission consent fees account for only 

a small fraction, are rising more slowly than other sectors of the cable industry’s 

overall economic structure. For example, between 2005 and 2010, with respect to six 

publicly-traded multiple system operators (‘‘MSOs’’): 

• the share of cost of revenue accounted for by programming costs declined from 

54 percent to 49 percent; 

• the share of cost of revenue, plus selling, general, and administrative costs accounted for by programming costs declined from 36 percent to 34 percent; 

• the ratio of programming expenses to total MSO operating costs decreased (from 

27 percent in 2005 to 26 percent in 2010); 

• MSOs’ monthly revenue per subscriber increased by $53.06 per subscriber per 

month, from $80.95 to $134.01, while programming expenses increased by just 

$10.03 per subscriber per month (from $18.21 to $28.24); stated differently, for 

every dollar increase in programming expenses, MVPDs raised monthly subscription rates by $5.29. 

• the average retransmission fee per cable subscriber per month increased from 

zero in 2005 to $0.86 in 2010. Thus, in 2010, retransmission consent fees, at 

$0.86 per subscriber per month, were approximately six tenths of one percent of 

cable MSO revenues.15

Further, retransmission consent fees are not expected to drive cable subscriber 

rates in the future. A March 2009 study estimated that cable revenues per subscriber are predicted to rise 45 times more than retransmission consent fees between 

2006 and 2015.16

Eliminating Retransmission Consent and Compulsory Licenses 

Question 5. While there is no question that Congress must examine and reform 

outdated provisions in the statute, there are legislative proposals before Congress 

that propose sweeping changes to laws governing cable and broadcast obligations. 

In particular these bills propose repealing retransmission consent, must carry, and 

the Copyright Act’s ‘‘compulsory license’’ provisions. 

During the hearing, witnesses provided conflicting testimony on the impact such 

eliminations would have on the marketplace and with retrans negotiations—some 

said it would only increase disputes and others said it would wouldn’t. 

Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and parties 

that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, please 

compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the current 

retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. If the compulsory licenses for MVPDs were eliminated, in order for an 

MVPD to carry a broadcast signal, some party would be required to obtain the necessary copyright clearances for every copyrighted work that was broadcast on that 

signal. This would include the copyright owners of movies, syndicated programs, 

sports, news and information programs, and all segments contained therein, all 

music included in any program, etc. Some of these rights are held directly by the 

program creator. Others are assigned or licensed to program syndicators or collectives who have the rights to negotiate for the public performance of a work by a 

television station, but currently probably do not have the rights necessary for an 

MVPD to retransmit a program or piece of music included in a station’s signal. 

In studies, the Copyright Office has identified three possible user entities that 

could negotiate for these rights: broadcast stations, the MVPDs, or possibly some 

sort of rights collective.17 None are particularly satisfactory, and it is anticipated 

that any of these parties would incur extraordinary expense in making such a transition. The typical broadcast station simply is not equipped, either with the perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
96 

sonnel, resources or expertise, to undertake such complicated and multifaceted negotiations. Moreover, it is unlikely that a station could begin to recoup such costs in 

negotiations with multiple MVPDs. For the same reasons, most MVPDs also have 

no desire to undertake these licensing tasks. Before the Copyright office, associations for small and large cable systems have opposed elimination of these licenses. 

The third option would be the formation of licensing collectives. The paradigm for 

these would be ASCAP and BMI, the large music collectives. The history of these 

collectives is that they were sued for antitrust violations, entered into consent decrees, and the license fees and conditions they impose are administered by a Federal 

rate court. It is difficult to see how that paradigm is any improvement over the existing compulsory licenses. 

There are several other consequences detrimental to the public interest that could 

be foreseen by elimination of the compulsory licenses. First, because rights for certain programs or categories of programs (such as certain sports programming) might 

not be obtainable by individual stations, they might simply disappear from free 

over-the-air television. Specifically, there could be the problem of the ‘‘holdout’’ 

where, for example, the rights to a program were secured, but not the music within 

it. Depending on the timing of these negotiations, the holder of such rights could 

be in a position to demand confiscatory rates. Second, there is the possibility that 

some quality programming now available on free over-the-air television would migrate to pay channels which are better equipped to negotiate such rights. Third, 

whatever entities undertook these new and extensive negotiations would seek to recoup their costs, which could well be passed on to consumers. 

The response to this question would not be complete without pointing out that 

under currently introduced legislation, a station’s property right in its signal would 

be eliminated. Hence, stations would have far less to negotiate with, their only remaining rights being those in the programming which they produce and in which 

they owned the copyrights. 

Question 6. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to more 

disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. Elimination of the compulsory licenses would significantly increase the 

potential for many more disputes, simply because there would be scores more individual negotiations for each program and program segment, any one of which could 

result in disputes, stalemates or, at the least, delays. 

Question 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. Eliminating these provisions would not lead to fewer disputes, but would 

increase the number of disputes. See response to Question 6. 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. NAB does not keep track of the number of disputes that occur between 

MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers. We checked with a leading 

media industry research/analysis firm, which reported that it did not compile this 

data either. 

However, there have been and continue to be a number of carriage disputes between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks that result in interruptions of service to 

consumers, some of which last for months. For example, the continuing dispute between the AMC Networks and DISH had led to AMC being unavailable to DISH 

subscribers since June 30, 2012. There also have been service disruptions this year 

due to disputes between DirecTV and Viacom’s non-broadcast networks (e.g., Comedy Central, MTV, Nickelodeon, etc.) and high profile disputes between Time Warner Cable and sports programmers, such as the New York-based MSG network. 

Question 9. It is my understanding that while there has been a 15 percent increase in commercials television stations from 1996 to 2010, there has also been a 

33 percent decrease in the number of station owners. There has also been a continued dearth of ownership by minorities and women—which is approximately only 5 

percent and 3.3 percent of TV market share, respectively (both well below their population representation). Both indicate a significant deficit in achieving the policy 

goals of localism and diversity. 

A free exchange of a wide range of viewpoints is the lifeblood of our democracy, 

and the print and broadcast media serve an indispensable function by exposing our 

society to diverse thoughts and viewpoints. 

What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from the law have 

on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the MVPD to 

carry the station? 

97 

18See, e.g., G.S. Ford and J.D. Jackson, ‘‘Preserving Free Television? Some Empirical Evidence 

on the Efficacy of Must-Carry,’’ 13 J. Media Econ. 1 (2000). 19 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming (Fourteenth Report), FCC 12–81 (rel. July 20, 2012) at p. 3. 20See 2012 SNL Kagan Media Census Estimates, First Quarter 2012. 21 U.S. Telecommunications and U.S. Cable & Satellite: Nature Versus Nurture, Sanford C. 

Bernstein & Co. (May, 2012) at pp. 63–94. 

Answer. Elimination of the must-carry requirements would have devastating consequences for a number of stations, typically those unaffiliated with major networks 

and often serving niche audiences, including minority and foreign-language speaking viewers and religious groups. Without must-carry, it is possible that the only 

way some of these stations could obtain carriage, if at all, would be by paying the 

MVPD, which niche stations generally cannot afford. 

Elimination of these rules would also significantly impede the introduction of new 

and diverse programming to the viewing public—programming that is not owned or 

selected by the MVPD. A number of the now popular Hispanic-oriented networks 

and even the Fox broadcast network relied on must-carry at their inception. 

Studies have confirmed that must-carry promotes Congress’ goal of helping to preserve a multiplicity of free, over-the-air broadcast stations and that must-carry is 

especially important for the preservation of independent stations.18 Elimination of 

the must-carry rules and the consequent loss of audience and advertising revenues 

clearly could result in the loss of many these stations and their unique and diverse 

programming, which benefits both MVPD subscribers and non-subscribers alike. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

Answer. For the reasons set forth in response to Question 9, the elimination of 

the must-carry rules clearly would lead to more concentration in the media marketplace and in the muting of the diversity of media voices. The religious, ethnic, and 

culturally diverse programming carried on the generally small, non-major network 

affiliated must-carry stations is not duplicated elsewhere on MVPD channel lineups. 

And these stations are not owned or controlled by the MVPDs, unlike many other 

program networks that they typically carry. Cable operators, along with Verizon and 

AT&T, collectively control about 70 percent of the pay-TV market,19 and the ten 

largest MVPDs (including satellite operators) control 91.3 percent of that market.20

At least one leading industry analyst sees satellite and telephone company market 

penetration peaking, while forecasting future growth for cable.21 With these concentration levels for cable specifically and for MVPDs generally, must-carry is essential to maintaining the diversity of media voices. 

Online Video vs. Traditional Video 

Question 11. According to Nielsen Media, the average American watches over 153 

hours of video per month on traditional television compared to only 4.5 hours per 

month of online video. Also, approximately 97 percent of American households have 

a television whereas 68 percent of households have broadband (the U.S. currently 

ranks 23rd in broadband penetration). 

In addition, a 2011 Project for Excellence in Journalism survey found that local 

TV remains America’s most popular source of local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news—89 percent of surveyed adults get information 

about local weather and 80 percent follow local breaking news through local television. Only about 51 percent of smartphone users use the device to get news. 

While the Internet is a very value medium for media and news and provides incredible benefit to users, most Americans still rely heavily on traditional television 

for programming, local news, and even weather. 

With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a ‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? If not, what 

do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional television and 

local news? 

Answer. The Internet provides consumers with access to information, news and 

entertainment from innumerable sources around the world. These online sources increasingly compete with traditional broadcast television stations for viewers’ time 

and attention and for advertisers’ dollars. However, the Internet is far from a ‘‘perfect substitute’’ for traditional television programming, especially for local news and 

emergency information. I think the Internet might more accurately be described as 

one of the mix of platforms and sources that consumers now use to access information and entertainment. 

98 

Another reason the Internet is not a perfect substitute for local television is the 

relative availability of the two mediums. Broadband access has increased rapidly 

and is continuing to increase today, but—unlike broadcast television—it is not yet 

universal and certainly not free. The broadcast television availability advantage is 

especially apparent when Americans need access to critical information, as they 

would during severe weather or other emergencies. No other medium matches the 

ability of local broadcasters to deliver potentially life-saving information to local 

communities. Particularly when the power fails and Internet connections and wireless networks are overwhelmed, nothing surpasses the one-to-many architecture of 

over-the-air broadcasting, both TV and radio, to provide uninterrupted critical information to citizens. 

Finally, I note that no web-only company makes the same kind of commitment 

to local journalism as local TV stations. A 2012 survey by the Radio Television Digital News Association found that, despite the struggling economy, television news 

employment is at its second highest level ever and that the average television station set a new record last year for the amount of local news aired (five and half 

hours per weekday). 

Value of Public Broadcasting 

Question 12. Harris Interactive, an independent, non-partisan research firm, 

found—for the ninth year in a row—that PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) is the 

Nation’s most-trusted institution by the American public. PBS ranked higher than 

our court system, newspapers, our Federal government, and, surprisingly, even Congress. 

In addition, 74 percent of the American public surveyed believe Federal funding 

for PBS is money well spent. PBS was also the most trusted and safe place for children to watch television—88 percent of Americans surveyed agreed. 

What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. Public broadcasting continues to be a valuable part of the local television 

environment. 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. I believe that public broadcasters share many of the same concerns that 

commercial broadcasters have (as expressed above) with the pending proposals. 

Gentlemen’s Agreement Not to Pull Signal 

Question 14. Several of the negotiation disputes have threatened or have actually 

disrupted cable customers’ viewing of major television programming—whether that 

is sporting events, season finales of shows, or the Oscars. It is my understanding 

cable operators are prohibited from pulling broadcast signals during sweeps when 

ratings determine advertising rates—the life blood of your business. 

Why shouldn’t there be a similar prohibition on broadcasters to not pull their signals in a retransmission negotiation impasse during a major sporting event or other 

highly watched programming like the Oscars—in order to limit the disruptive nature of negotiation disputes to consumers? 

Answer. Since the establishment of the current system of retransmission consent, 

hundreds of major sporting and entertainment events have come and gone without 

incident or disruption to any consumer. The system works so well that data shows 

that consumers are more likely to face a power outage or an outage of their entire 

pay-TV service than to be affected by a retransmission consent dispute. Even in the 

rare instances that a disruption occurs, local stations’ signals have not been 

‘‘pulled’’—they remain available free over-the-air, and can also be viewed via other 

pay-TV services. 

The current regime specifies that both broadcaster and pay-TV parties must, as 

part of their good faith negotiation obligations, negotiate at reasonable times and 

locations, and must not unreasonably delay negotiations. Further government intervention into the timing of the negotiating process, including when those agreements 

commence or terminate, easily could create disincentives to timely reaching agreement. Certainly the prohibition on broadcasters proposed in this question would 

substantially reduce the incentives of cable operators to conclude retransmission negotiations prior to a major sporting event or a ‘‘highly watched’’ program (however 

defined), if those operators knew they could continue to use broadcasters’ signals for 

their own profit, even in the absence of any agreement between them. 

Question 15. Would you (and/or your affiliates/members) agree to voluntarily 

adopt an arrangement of where you would not pull your signal prior to a major 

99 

22Television Bureau of Advertising, TV Basics Report (June 2012) at 25, available at: http:// 

www.tvb.org/media/file/TV Basics.pdf (‘‘TV Basics Report’’). Local television broadcast stations 

also are the top source for local weather, traffic and sports. Id. 23See University of Southern California, National USC Annenberg-Los Angeles Times Poll 

Shows Local Television News Rules with Voters, Press Release (Aug. 27, 2012), available at: 

http://www.usc.edu/uscnews/newsroom/news release.php?id=2795 (visited Aug. 28, 2012); See 

The Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for 

Most News Organizations at 5 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at: http://www.people-press.org/files/ 

2012/08/8–16–2012-Media-Believability1.pdf (visited Aug. 28, 2012) (‘‘believability ratings for 

local TV news are [currently] higher than those for the three cable news outlets’’ and, over the 

years, ‘‘credibility ratings for local TV news have remained more stable than have ratings for 

the three main cable news outlets’’). 

sporting or highly watched/anticipated event if negotiations are at an impasse? You 

could obviously still pull your signal after the event, if you so desired. 

Answer. For the reasons discussed above in responding to Question 14, I do not 

think this will benefit the public. Under the current system, both broadcasters and 

pay-TV providers have strong incentives to reach agreement prior to the termination 

of retransmission consent agreements. Modifications to the system, including additional public commitments by broadcasters to offer extensions of existing agreements because of a major sporting or other special event, could delay final resolution 

of negotiations and reduce incentives for pay-TV providers to negotiate in a timely 

manner prior to these events. Ultimately, consumers are unlikely to benefit from 

policies that reduce incentives to negotiate in good faith. 

I also want to stress that, during many retransmission negotiations, television 

stations reach short-term agreements with pay-TV providers, allowing them to continue carrying the stations’ signals while negotiations continue. On occasion, however, pay-TV providers have attempted to condition their agreement to these shortterm carriage arrangements on the broadcaster not providing notice to its viewers 

of a potential programming disruption. See response to Question 2 above. 

Local Programming & Independent Programming 

Question 16. I have long been a champion of promoting localism and diversity in 

television. Local media—be it newspaper, radio, or television—play a critical role in 

informing citizens about important decisions made by their local, state, and Federal 

officials. Even with the Internet and other media sources, a 2011 Project for Excellence in Journalism survey found that local TV remains America’s most popular 

source of local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news— 

89 percent of surveyed adults get information about local weather and 80 percent follow local breaking news through local television. Also, locally owned stations also air 

more local news and programming than non-locally owned stations, typically 5 1/ 

2 minutes more per day. 

It seems to me that one way to make sure that local television stations can continue to invest in local journalism is to allow them to recoup the investments they 

make in local programming. I am concerned about the impact that various legislative proposals would have on localism. Some have proposed to significantly alter the 

negotiating leverage of the parties in a way that could make it more difficult for 

local broadcasters or independent programmers to receive fair value for their programming. 

Do you agree? Can you discuss your concerns with the various legislative proposals and its impact on local stations and the availability of local programming to 

consumers that rely on overthe-air broadcasting?’’ 

Answer. I wholeheartedly agree. Television broadcast stations are an unrivaled 

source of local and national news and vital emergency information and alerts. 

Broadcast television is the leading news source, with 37.4 percent of American 

adults reporting that they consider broadcast television to be their primary sourceof 

news.22 Recent surveys also show that viewers consider local television news more 

trustworthy than other news sources.23

To meet the needs and high expectations of their viewers, local television stations 

invest heavily in their local news operations. Recent survey data show that television news staffing has risen to the second highest levels on record, with stations 

adding 1,131 jobs for a total of 27,653 full time staff in 2011. In addition, 42.4 percent of stations added to their newscasts last year, and a significant number (31.2 

percent) plan to increase news during the coming year. Despite challenging ecoVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
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24 Bob Papper, RTDNA/Hofstra University, ‘‘2012 TV and Radio Staffing and News Profitability Survey,’’ summarized at http://www.rtdna.org/pages/medialnitems/2012-tv-and-radionews-staffing-and-profitability.survey2094.php. Part I–II. 

nomic times, most stations either increased or maintained their news budgets during the past year.24

Local television stations today increasingly rely upon revenue streams other than 

over-the-air advertising. Thus, the ability to engage in fair negotiations with payTV providers for the value of the broadcast signal is critical to broadcasters’ ability 

to generate revenue and re-invest those dollars in local news operations. Legislative 

proposals that would eliminate broadcasters’ retransmission consent rights are 

fraught with risks of greater disruptions in service and the possibility that broadcasters will no longer be able to secure compensation for the value of their signals. 

Although I understand that the intent of these proposals is for broadcasters to 

maintain control of their copyright interests through direct licensing and to allow 

for carriage negotiation, local broadcasters’ value in their signals is not the same 

as the copyright interests in the differing programming elements (e.g., network, syndicated, local). Many stations may be unable to undertake the expensive and cumbersome responsibility of direct licensing (see response to Question 5 above), and 

such a change likely will impair the ability of local stations to serve their local markets. 

Similarly, any legislation that would interfere with privately negotiated exclusivity contracts between broadcasters and networks or syndicators also would harm 

the public interest. Some legislative proposals would eliminate the FCC’s rules permitting the enforcement of privately-negotiated non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity agreements. NAB stresses that these rules do not actually create any exclusive rights. Rather, they provide a means for parties to the exclusive contracts 

to efficiently enforce them. In fact, the FCC’s rules actually limit and restrict program exclusivity by limiting the geographic area in which television stations may 

enter into program exclusivity agreements with network and syndicated program 

suppliers. 

Moreover, allowing pay-TV providers to import from distant markets signals carrying duplicative network and syndicated programming ultimately will harm viewers, by undermining local stations’ economic base for producing local news and information—including critical emergency information. Specifically, limiting broadcasters’ ability to enter into and/or enforce exclusive contracts will jeopardize stations’ advertising revenues because the lack of program exclusivity in a market 

makes television stations less attractive to advertisers. Without sufficient advertising revenue streams, local stations cannot afford to invest in valued informational 

and entertainment programming. Both local stations and their viewers would be severely harmed if pay-TV providers could undermine stations’ exclusivity rights by 

importing distant stations’ signals. 

Question 17. How important are media ownership rules to promoting competition, 

diversity, and localism? Some broadcasters have called for relaxing media ownership 

rules but could that cause greater consolidation and concentration, which would be 

counter to goals in the statute of promoting competition, localism, and diversity? 

Answer. I disagree that reforming out-of-date ownership restrictions would undermine localism, competition and diversity. As NAB has explained in detail in many 

FCC submissions, these broadcast-only ownership restrictions do not reflect today’s 

multichannel, multiplatform marketplace. These limitations distort marketplace 

competition and place local broadcasters at a severe disadvantage. The rules limit 

broadcasters’ ability to respond to market forces, as satellite, cable and Internetbased outlets proliferate and compete for audiences and advertising revenues without comparable restrictions. As a result, many broadcast stations struggle to maintain their economic vibrancy and to continue providing a high level of service to 

local communities. Broadcast outlets in small markets with more limited advertising 

potential face a particularly challenging economic environment. 

Reform of these outmoded restrictions would enhance competition by strengthening the ability of local stations to compete against their multichannel and online 

competitors. Competitively viable local stations will have both the resources and the 

incentives to offer programming that meets the needs and interests of their diverse 

communities, including niche audiences and smaller demographic groups that are 

increasingly better served through stations’ digital capabilities, particularly multicasting. 

Finally, numerous studies, including a number conducted by or for the FCC, have 

shown that common ownership enhances local service in local markets, including 

stations’ news and informational programming. In its previous quadrennial reviews 

of the broadcast ownership rules, the FCC has found that common ownership of 

101 

multiple media outlets in local markets can enhance localism, a finding that has 

been upheld by the courts. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

Answer. Although I understand the intent of these proposals is for local television 

stations to maintain control of their copyright interests through direct licensing and 

to allow for carriage negotiation, local broadcasters’ value in their signals is not the 

same as the copyright interests in the differing programming elements (e.g., network, syndicated, local). Many stations may be unable to undertake the expensive 

and cumbersome responsibility of direct licensing, and such a change likely will impair the ability of local stations to serve their local markets. 

Question 2. A written statement delivered by David Barrett, on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters (the NAB), at a June 27, 2012, House Energy and 

Commerce Hearing on ‘‘The Future of Video’’, included the following: 

Two bills currently before Congress, H.R. 367S and S. 2008, both known as 

‘‘The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011,’’ will harm local stations and television viewers in at least three ways. First, they would turn back 

the clock to a time when cable and satellite providers confiscated and resold 

broadcast signals to their subscribers without obtaining broadcasters‘ consent— 

a time when broadcasters were forced to subsidize their pay-TV competitors. . . 

Will you please provide for the Committee the legal analysis used by the NAB 

to reach this understanding of these pieces of legislation? 

Answer. That statement appears to be a general reference to a time before broadcasters had a right to negotiate for compensation for carriage of their signals. This 

prompts a broader discussion on current bill language and whether it fully protects 

the broadcast ‘‘signal’’ versus protecting various aspects of the content through copyright. Several legal analysts have drawn distinctions between the two—signal vs. 

copyright—and may have suggestions on how that may be better addressed. 

Question 3. Are cable subscribers required by Federal law to purchase a certain 

package of channels when they buy cable video service? 

Answer. Perhaps this may be better answered by the cable witnesses, but my understanding is that the broadcast tier is a component of any cable package given 

the critical nature of the service provided by local broadcasters and their public and 

community value. 

Question 4. Are cable providers prevented by Federal law from selling a subscriber 

only a single channel, Discovery Channel for example, or only a package of sports 

channels? 

Answer. Again, the cable witnesses may be better suited to answer. My understanding is that beyond the basic tier requirements, a la carte type packaging is neither required nor prohibited by the current regulatory structure. 

Question 5. Do you believe it is ‘‘free market’’ for Federal law to force cable companies to carry your member stations—whether by must-carry or retransmission consent—on the ‘‘basic tier’’ and effectively force cable subscribers to purchase the basic 

tier? (47 USC § 543(b)(7)(A)) 

Answer. Congress has long-held the view that local television stations are a 

foundational part of any community. The public interest obligations are unique to 

local broadcast and the corresponding service in times of emergency is unparalleled. 

I think the decades long policy direction has and continues to be correct. 

Question 6. Currently, more than 500 non-broadcast channels engage in copyrightbased negotiations with pay-TV companies for carriage of their programming. Many 

of your broadcast members negotiate based on a different model, retransmission 

consent. Copyright is a Constitutionally-based property right. Retransmission consent, on the other hand, is a right made up by Congress 20 years ago, and consequently will likely always be under threat. I believe my bill, S. 2008, would actually strengthen property rights for the creators of programming, like broadcasters. 

Do you agree? And if not, please explain. 

Answer. I appreciate and understand the intent. We may want to spend more 

time discussing whether changing to the protections envisioned under the bill will 

fully and easily—especially for small broadcasters—protect the broadcast signal, as 

opposed to protecting content under copyright. The broadcast signal is a compilation 

102 

of various copyrighted content and rights holders, and differs significantly from that 

of non-broadcast channels. 

Question 7. The NAB’s comments in the FCC’s ongoing retransmission consent 

proceeding include the following statement: 

Contrary to Petitioners’ assertions, viewers will not ‘‘lose access’’ to a broadcast 

station’s programming if retransmission consent negotiations with an MVPD 

break down. Each television station’s signal is available at all times to all consumers over the air and for free, and it is also available from other competing 

MVPDs. 

The 1992 Cable Act includes a finding that: 

Consumers who subscribe to cable television often do so to obtain local broadcast signals which they otherwise would not be able to receive, or to obtain improved signals. 

a. Is the 1992 Cable Act wrong or is the NAB filing wrong? 

b. Do you have an idea of how many households in America today cannot receive 

satisfactory over the air television broadcast signals? 

Answer. The delivery of the local broadcast signal has improved dramatically over 

the years, and significantly in 2009 when television stations transitioned to digital. 

Local broadcast signals are always on and always available—free and over-the-air. 

Regardless of which provider a household may subscribe to, the fact remains that 

consumers can get their local broadcast signals free and over-the-air with a digital 

antenna. The recent STELA law and FCC data may be instructive in defining how 

many households cannot receive a satisfactory signal off-the-air. At the same time, 

broadcast industry statistics show the number of broadcast only homes continues to 

grow to 54 million consumers. 

Question 8. You and NAB members have consistently made the observations: 

• Broadcast television is available at all times to all consumers over the air and 

for free; 

• 95 of the top 100 rated shows are on free broadcast television; 

• A record amount of local news is now available for free on broadcast television; 

• Much of the most popular live sports and entertainment events are available 

for free; and, 

• Since the recent DTV transition, many new multicast channels are now available for free. 

With all of that popular content available to every TV household in America for 

free, why do you think so many people, in fact nearly 90 percent of those households, spend around $1,000 every year on pay-TV subscriptions. 

Answer. Current industry statistics show that 17.8 percent of households are 

broadcast only. That said, it seems the majority of consumers today want broad access to content and channels. One trend, at least of concern to local broadcasters, 

is the migration of sports to pay-TV as opposed to their continued availability on 

local broadcast stations. The broadcast product continues to evolve, improve, and is 

enhanced with mobile and multi-cast options, which we believe will be a continued 

attractive option to consumers. 

Question 9. You spend the majority of your testimony explaining the local focus 

and local content created by your member stations that elect retransmission consent 

and their relatively large viewership compared to non-broadcast channels. But, you 

make only a passing note of must-carry regulations and their impact on local news 

programming and local services. 

a. Do you have data available to quantify the amount of local programming produced by your commercial must-carry member stations and the viewership of those 

stations’ programs? 

b. What is your understanding of S. 2008’s effect on must carry regulations, specifically for public television, educational, and non-commercial television broadcasters? 

Answer. My understanding is that the legislation exempts certain must-carry stations while also eliminating this carriage option for many others. With respect to 

data, that is not something the trade association would be able to compile. Stations 

maintain information about programming that addresses the needs and interests of 

their communities in their public inspection files and must certify that this information is available as part of the FCC license renewal process. 

Question 10. Does Federal law in any way limit a cable company’s ability to negotiate with broadcasters regarding how they sell their programming to subscribers? 

103 

1See 47 U.S.C.§ 325(b)(3)(c); 47 C.F.R § 76.65. 

Answer. Both broadcasters and pay-TV providers are required by statute and related FCC rules to negotiate retransmission consent in good faith.1 Among other 

things, the good faith negotiation standards prohibit broadcasters and pay-TV providers from refusing to negotiate; refusing to designate a negotiating representative; 

refusing to meet at reasonable times/locations; refusing to put forth more than a single, unilateral proposal and failing to respond to proposals. The FCC also has a separate ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ test. If the negotiating tactics of a broadcaster 

or cable operator violated these standards, they would violate Federal law. I do not 

know of other Federal laws affecting cable operator’s ability to negotiate with broadcasters. 

Question 11. Are you comfortable that Federal law mandates that cable subscribers purchase local broadcast channels whether or not they want them? (47 USC 

§ 543(b)(7)(A)) 

Answer. As also referenced in Question #5, there is a public value to a local broadcast station and the service provided to their communities. There are unique requirements and obligations as part of their license, and local broadcasters embrace 

that public service role. I am sure many broadcasters might welcome regulatory relief from the current structure, making them more like any non-broadcast channel 

on an MVPD’s line-up. The fact remains that local broadcast stations are not like 

any other channel. They are a critical part of their communities, viewers deserve 

the opportunity to see those stations, and they are the most watched and most desired because of their service. 

Question 12. You indicate that monetary compensation for retransmission consent 

is a recent development. How much do you attribute this recent change in the nature of retransmission compensation to the growth of competition among MVPDs? 

Answer. There may be several factors involved and MVPD competition may be 

one of those. As MVPDs have come to pay more and more for non-broadcast channels, the weekly and annual ratings show that broadcast television dominates the 

viewer ratings. That realization perhaps more than any other is to account for the 

change. 

Question 13. The FCC’s latest video competition report indicates that the ‘‘Big 

Four’’ broadcast networks and several broadcast television group owners own about 

100 non-broadcast cable networks, including many of the most-watched cable channels in the market. How has the viewership and related advertising revenue of NAB 

member stations been affected by the development of these broadcaster-affiliated 

cable channels? 

Answer. Unfortunately, I may not be able to offer an informed perspective on this 

question. Broadcasters compete within markets for viewership, ratings, and advertising revenue against other local broadcast stations. As opposed to non-broadcast 

channels, viewers will continue to attract to those stations due to their local service 

and coverage. I’m not sure what affect ownership of non-broadcast channels might 

have on that competition within markets. 

Question 14. In your testimony, you indicate that retransmission consent revenue 

has provided broadcasters the resources to hire more employees, such that ‘‘total 

employment in local television newsrooms . . . in 2011 . . . (was) the second highest total on record.’’ A recent survey conducted by Hofstra University supports that 

finding. That same study also states that there were more stations doing local news 

in the year 2000. Why were more local broadcasters doing local news and employing 

more newsroom staff at a time when they were unable to realize retransmission consent revenue? 

Answer. As you point out, it is interesting that the study shows a previous employment high in the year 2000. While the economy may have been the contributing 

factor, certainly the growth of online and alternative news outlets over the last decade has affected traditional news organizations, newspapers, and journalism. What 

is known today is that retransmission consent compensation is contributing to the 

renewed growth in news resources with local television. We are very proud of that 

growth and hope the trend continues. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

HON. GORDON H. SMITH

Question 1. I wanted to get your opinion on free-markets and how they are defined. In March of this year, the American Conservative Union sent a letter to the 

Hill on retransmission consent calling it ‘‘a functioning market’’. The day before the 

104 

hearing, I received a letter from Citizens against Government Waste claiming the 

current system, as currently structured ‘‘inhibits the free market’’ and ‘‘reduces competition’’. What are your thoughts on the free market as it relates to retransmission 

consent? 

Answer. The retransmission consent process is simply the right to negotiate between two private parties. It is a business-to-business discussion between broadcasters and MVPDs. These discussions occur and are common in so many other industries in the private sector where a producer of a good or service negotiates with 

another who wants to purchase and re-sell that service. The fact remains that retransmission consent agreements are reached all the time and without fanfare. 

More recently, some have hoped to publicize agreements that may not have been 

reached in a timely manner to try to paint a picture that the underlying policy is 

wrong or needs reform. The current retransmission consent framework is a true 

free-market process of negotiation. There is no guarantee of an outcome or of compensation to a broadcaster. Those are left to the parties to negotiate privately, business-to-business, and in the free market. 

Question 2. My constituents are adamant about receiving local news coverage. 

Even in the southern-most part of my state, we want New Hampshire news, not 

Boston news. One of the objectives of the 1992 Cable Act was to ensure consumers 

have access to locally originated programming. Has this goal succeeded? Are your 

members producing more or less local programming today? Are there any proposed 

changes to the Cable Act that could reverse this trend? How can we maintain and 

maximize localism? 

Answer. Local television stations serving their local communities is the foundation 

of broadcasting, and telecommunications policy over time has served to strengthen 

and enhance that goal. Recent survey data shows that television news staffing has 

risen to the second highest level on record, with stations adding jobs to bolster their 

local coverage. As for potential future impacts on this growth, the ability to engage 

in fair negotiations with pay-TV providers for the value of the broadcast signal is 

critical to broadcasters’ ability to generate revenue and re-invest those dollars in 

local news operations. Legislative proposals that would eliminate broadcasters’ retransmission consent rights pose the risk of greater disruptions in service and the 

possibility that broadcasters will no longer be able to secure compensation for the 

value of their signals. 

Question 3. Federal law prohibits blackouts during ‘‘sweeps,’’ which are critical to 

broadcasters. Federal law, however, permits blackouts before marquee events like 

the Super Bowl and the Oscars, which are most important to viewers. Do you think 

this disparity contributes to blackouts? 

Answer. Since the establishment of the current system of retransmission consent, 

hundreds of major sporting and entertainment events have come and gone without 

incident or disruption to any consumer. The system works so well and data shows 

that consumers are more likely to face a power outage or an outage of their entire 

pay-TV service than to be affected by a retransmission consent dispute. Even in the 

rare instances that a disruption occurs, local stations’ signals are not ‘‘blacked 

out’’—they remain available free over-the-air, and can also be viewed via other payTV services. 

The current law requires broadcasters and pay-TV providers to negotiate in good 

faith. As part of that obligation, the parties must negotiate at reasonable times and 

locations and must not unreasonably delay negotiations. Further government intervention into the retransmission consent negotiating process, such as placing limits 

on when those agreements may commence or terminate, easily could create disincentives to timely reaching agreement. Placing new restrictions on stations’ control of their signals actually would reduce the incentives of MVPDs to conclude retransmission negotiations, perhaps especially prior to marquee events, if those 

MPVDs knew they could continue to use broadcasters’ signals for their own profit, 

even in the absence of a retransmission agreement. 

In my opinion, the reduction of the currently strong incentives for both broadcasters and pay-TV providers to reach agreement on retransmission would ultimately lead to more disruptions for consumers, not fewer. Finally, I want to emphasize that, during many retransmission negotiations, television stations reach shortterm agreements with pay-TV providers, allowing them to continue carrying the stations’ signals while negotiations for a final agreement continue. 

105 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission consent 

dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas where a single MVPD 

dominates an entire state. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Answer. Time Warner Cable shares the Senator’s concern about the growing harm 

to consumers under the current retransmission consent regime. While many new 

video competitors have entered most local areas over the past 20 years, even in 

areas where a single MVPD serves an especially high percentage of consumers, 

broadcast stations still have all the leverage in retransmission consent negotiations. 

They are able to exploit territorial exclusivity protections, tier-placement rights, and 

a host of other government-granted preferences to pull down their signals as a negotiating tactic, which harms consumers and drives up fees. As these disputes have 

grown increasingly contentious, consumers, confronted with either losing access to 

popular programming or switching to another video provider facing the same blackout threats from broadcasters, are caught in the middle. 

TWC believes that the best way to protect consumers in the long run is to do 

away with the retransmission consent regime altogether. Eliminating the various 

artificial preferences for broadcasters in the rules would help discourage them from 

engaging in brinkmanship and, in turn, should reduce service disruptions. Pending 

such legislative changes, the FCC has authority to make targeted changes to its 

rules to protect consumers. In particular, the FCC can establish dispute-resolution 

mechanisms and provide for interim carriage while a dispute is ongoing. The Senator presciently observed as early as 1992 that viewers would be harmed in those 

‘‘instances in which [retransmission consent] agreements are not reached,’’ and explained that the FCC has broad authority under Section 325 of the Communications 

Act to ‘‘address’’ those instances by ‘‘requir[ing] arbitration’’ and other dispute resolution methods. See Letter from Sens. Inouye and Stevens to Chairman Kevin Martin, Federal Communications Commission (Jan. 30, 2007) (quoting statements of 

Sen. Inouye during the drafting of the 1992 Cable Act). Later, in a 2007 letter to 

the FCC, the Senator urged the FCC to begin actively engaging in dispute resolution, noting that, ‘‘[a]t a minimum, Americans should not be shut off from broadcast 

programming while the matter is being negotiated among the parties and is awaiting [FCC resolution].’’ Id. TWC supports the Senator’s call to action and believes 

that such reforms would go a long way toward preventing broadcast programming 

blackouts and threats of blackouts. 

Question 2. Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 percent) of total MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. While it is clear that a broadcaster that pulls its signal from a large 

MVPD affects a greater number of consumers, TWC believes that any loss of a 

broadcast signal affiliated with one of the four major broadcast networks causes significant consumer harm, and that any actual or threatened blackout by a broadcaster is at odds with the broadcaster’s obligation to act in the public interest. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. In recent years, the breakdown of retransmission consent negotiations 

has threatened the television access of millions of Americans to major events like 

the Super Bowl, the World Series, and the Oscars, not to mention the essential access of viewers to local news broadcasts. The FCC has proposed to strengthen notice 

requirements for consumers when there is the possibility that certain services may 

lapse. Does Time Warner Cable support this proposal? 

Answer. TWC believes that the existing notice rules are sufficient, and that broadcasters’ efforts to impose additional notice obligations on MVPDs are driven only by 

their desire to apply greater pressure on MVPDs to give into their outrageous demands. In particular, as broadcasters increasingly resort to blackout threats as a 

negotiating ploy, rigid notice requirements that force MVPDs to state well in advance that a broadcast station may withdraw retransmission consent likely would 

be counterproductive. TWC always attempts to apprise its customers of possible 

service disruptions, but imposing new notice obligations on MVPDs seems backwards, as the MVPD often does not know until the moment before a retransmission 

consent agreement expires whether the broadcast station will grant an extension. 

106 

It would be far more sensible for the FCC to require the broadcast station to provide 

clear notice of its intention to withdraw its signal by a date certain. 

In addition, imposing rigid notice requirements on MVPDs likely would only 

heighten subscriber anxieties. Broadcasters already run advertisements and 

‘‘crawls’’ telling consumers to switch providers because they might lose access to 

broadcast programming. Such switching, however, again places consumers in the position of shouldering burdens and inconvenience that they should not face. If consumers decide to switch MVPDs, they often are forced to choose a less-preferred provider simply to ensure access to over-the-air content (of which the retransmission 

consent regime was supposed to ensure continuous availability). And a customer 

who switches MVPDs may soon find her new provider in a similar dispute with a 

broadcast station, facing the prospect of having to undertake the time and expense 

of switching yet again. The FCC should reject any proposals that would facilitate 

broadcast stations’ manipulation of consumers. (Also see the response to question 

4.) 

Question 2. Does Time Warner Cable believe that continuous carriage during retransmission consent disputes would help end disputes? 

Answer. To the extent that the retransmission consent regime remains in place, 

an interim carriage remedy not only would help resolve retransmission consent disputes once they arise, but also would help avert disputes before they begin. The 

availability of interim carriage would prevent broadcasters from using actual or 

threatened blackouts as a negotiating ploy, thereby reducing the risk of programming loss for consumers and ensuring that negotiations produce reasonable and 

non-coercive rates for retransmission consent. Interim carriage also would prevent 

broadcasters from undermining the government’s interest in localism by exploiting 

their government-granted preferences while withholding their signal from a substantial portion of the viewing public. 

Question 3. Ms. Abdoulah’s written testimony noted WOW!’s support for requiring 

alternative styles of negotiation, like baseball-style arbitration, in retransmission 

consent disputes. Does Time Warner Cable agree? 

Answer. While TWC continues to believe that the best path to reform ultimately 

is to do away with regulatory impediments to efficient carriage negotiations between 

broadcasters and MVPDs, TWC agrees that, unless and until these deregulatory reforms are adopted, the establishment of some type of alternative dispute resolution 

mechanism or other rate-setting procedure is necessary to prevent broadcaster 

abuses of the current system. The FCC has clear authority under Section 325 of the 

Communications Act to protect consumers by ensuring that the rates charged by 

broadcasters are fair and reasonable. Section 325(b)(3) instructs the Commission to 

consider ‘‘the impact of the grant of retransmission consent by television stations 

may have on the rates for the basic service tier’’; to make sure that its rules are 

consistent with its obligation ‘‘to ensure that the rates for the basic service tier are 

reasonable’’; and to prevent broadcasters from insisting on rates that are not ‘‘based 

on competitive marketplace considerations.’’ 47 U.S.C. §§ 352(b)(3)(A), (C). 

Question 4. Cable consumers who have the ability to shop for different providers 

often face exorbitant termination fees to switch services, limiting competition. The 

FCC indicated this was an issue in their recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 

Please provide for the record information on Time Warner Cable’s termination fee 

policy. Has Time Warner Cable examined dropping these fees in the future? 

Answer. TWC subscribers generally are not required to pay termination fees to 

switch services. In any event, any focus on termination fees risks missing the broader point that retransmission consent disputes impose unnecessary burdens on consumers. Congress and the FCC should emphasize reforms that protect consumers 

from the inconvenience of switching providers in order to avoid broadcaster blackouts. Such switching frustrates consumer choice, as many consumers choose a provider not only for its video service, but also for its broadband, voice, and wireless 

offerings. Switching also imposes unnecessary costs on consumers who must obtain 

new equipment and stay home to switch providers. And switching is ultimately ineffective as a strategy for avoiding broadcaster blackouts; all MVPDs must regularly 

renegotiate their carriage agreements with broadcasters and face increasing threats 

from broadcasters to go dark unless their cash demands for retransmission consent 

are met. Thus, as discussed above, any reform effort either should focus on the 

elimination of the artificial, government-granted preferences that enable broadcasters to make good on threats to pull their signals frustrating consumer access 

to broadcast programming and to the service providers of their choice, or should 

take advantage of existing rulemaking authority to protect consumers caught in the 

middle of these disputes. 

107 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. S. 2008, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011, 

would provide for the deregulation of retransmission consent. But as we saw last 

month with DirecTV and Viacom, blackouts occur due to disputes between cable programmers and cable providers in a non-regulated environment too. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in a deregulated world, why 

would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for broadcasters too? 

Answer. TWC believes that eliminating the substantial regulatory distortions that 

characterize negotiations between MVPDs and broadcasters would reduce the number of blackouts, even if it does not eliminate them entirely. Notwithstanding the 

highly publicized dispute between DirecTV and Viacom, there have been fewer disputes between MVPDs and pay television programmers in recent years than disputes arising under the retransmission consent regime. In 2012, for example, there 

have been more than 80 retransmission consent blackouts, as compared to only two 

known blackouts involving a cable programming service. This discrepancy is due in 

part to the significant differences between the operative legal rules. Unlike cable 

programming, for which MVPDs acquire a simple copyright license negotiated in a 

free market setting without intrusive government regulation, broadcast programming is subject to the artificial and heavily intrusive retransmission consent regime, 

which Congress made clear was separate and in addition to copyright law. See S. 

Rep. No.102–92, at 36 (1991), reprinted in1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1169 (noting that 

Congress was ‘‘careful to distinguish between the authority granted broadcasters 

under the new section 325(b)(1) of the 1934 Act to consent or withhold consent for 

the retransmission of the broadcast signal, and the interests of the copyright holders 

in the programming contained on the signal’’). And while Congress in 1992 believed 

that the retransmission consent regime would help preserve viewers’ access to local 

broadcast television, today the rules are undermining that purpose by enabling and 

encouraging broadcasters to pull their signals and ‘‘go dark’’ on MVPD systems as 

a negotiating tactic. Based on TWC’s substantial experience negotiating with pay 

television programmers and broadcasters, we expect that a truly 5 market-based approach to broadcast carriage negotiations would better protect consumers than the 

existing regime, which has seen an alarming increase in blackouts and dramatically 

escalating fee demands. 

Question 2. Today’s video marketplace is very different than what it was in 1992. 

Since the enactment of the Cable Act, satellite carriers and telephone companies offering video services compete with cable operators. And in the last few years, we 

have seen the enormous growth of online video. In your view, given these changes 

in the video marketplace, are the existing rules working? Why or why not? 

Answer. The existing rules are now undermining rather than advancing the goals 

Congress identified when it enacted the Cable Act in 1992. Congress and the FCC 

created retransmission consent and must-carry based on conditions that existed in 

1992. Among other things, that marketplace was characterized by broadcast networks’ paying compensation to their broadcast affiliates and far fewer choices for 

consumers among MVPDs. Based on those circumstances, Congress granted powerful protections and new rights to broadcast stations. These rights for broadcasters 

included the ability to seek compensation from cable operators for the carriage of 

broadcast signals (even though cable operators already pay a separate fee to the 

Copyright Office for the programming contained in those signals), and the ability 

to prevent a cable operator from importing a distant signal containing the same network programming. But the emergence of strong competition among MVPDs nationwide has greatly reduced cable operators’ bargaining power and increased that of 

broadcast networks, who have gained additional leverage from their ‘‘must have’’ 

programming and from collusive tactics. The broadcast networks are also increasingly interfering in the retransmission consent negotiations of their affiliated local 

stations—a dynamic that upends the intent of Congress in creating retransmission 

consent by contravening the plain language of Section 325(b)(1), which provides that 

retransmission consent is a right that belongs to the ‘‘station,’’ not to the network. 

Broadcasters thus can wield these one-sided rules in ways that Congress did not expect in 1992—namely, to demand excessive retransmission consent fees by credibly 

threatening to go dark on one or more local MVPD systems. Broadcasters’ ability 

to hold consumers hostage by threatening to withhold programming is antithetical 

to the reason Congress established retransmission consent and must carry in the 

first place: to ensure that local communities retain access to the ‘‘diversity of voices’’ 

and local programming that broadcasters have a public interest obligation to provide. 

108 

Question 3. Packages of programming are getting bigger and more expensive. 

Shouldn’t consumers have a range of programming options at variety of price 

points? Why does that not seem to be the case? 

Answer. TWC agrees that smaller and more flexible tiers would be better for consumers, and we actively seek ways to offer these options to our subscribers. For instance, in 2010, TWC launched a service called ‘‘TV Essentials,’’ which offers access 

to a subset of our programming at a lower cost, but our flexibility in creating that 

package was limited by programmers. Indeed, the size and cost of virtually all of 

our programming packages is largely programmer-driven. Not only do video programmers typically insist that MVPDs purchase their full line of programming services as a condition of purchasing any programming service, but they also demand 

tiering or penetration requirements that dictate how broadly an MVPD must distribute those programming services to subscribers. Cable operators in many local 

areas also are required by law to carry all local television signals on a basic service 

tier ‘‘to which subscription is required for access to any other tier of service.’’ 47 

U.S.C. § 543(b)(7). Absent these contractual and regulatory impediments, TWC 

would have far more flexibility to meet consumer demand by offering smaller and 

less expensive programming packages. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. Stakeholders on all sides of the retransmission consent debate appear 

to agree that the visibility and frequency of retransmission disputes has increased 

over the last few years. Some have argued that retransmission consent is working 

and that some growing pains are reasonable because many broadcast stations are 

electing to pursue deals instead of must-carry for the first time since enactment of 

the 1992 Cable Act which created the dual regimes of must carry and retransmission consent. On the other hand, distributors argue that private sector retransmission consent deals are taking longer to negotiate, and that it is becoming harder 

to reach agreement regarding mutually agreeable terms. If you believe must-carry 

and retransmission consent are important to localism, how do you recommend that 

the Congress measure the success of localism? 

Answer. TWC does not believe that today’s retransmission consent regime is advancing the governmental interest in localism. To the contrary, the regime is undermining localism by enabling broadcasters to pull their signals and deprive MVPD 

subscribers of local content as a negotiating tactic. Moving forward, Congress should 

measure the success of localism by evaluating the extent to which industry participants are actually investing in local content. Multiple recent studies show that 

broadcast stations are retreating from localism, as their increasing use of ‘‘sharing’’ 

agreements has precipitated a significant decline in original, diverse local news and 

public affairs programming. By contrast, TWC is an active contributor to localism 

in the communities it serves, having launched local news channels and local interest 

channels that focus on public affairs, politics, sports, cultural affairs, entertainment, 

and other content of interest to the community. Critically, TWC has done so not because of any regulatory mandate, but in response to the needs of its subscribers. 

Question 1a. If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can 

you provide? 

Answer. No one seriously disputes the fact that retransmission consent disputes 

have grown increasingly contentious in the past few years and have led to greater 

number of programming blackouts for consumers. There have been more than 80 

retransmission consent disputes so far this year. And as broadcasters have grown 

increasingly willing to use blackout threats to increase their negotiating leverage— 

and to make good on those threats when MVPDs do not accede to demands for significant increases in compensation—the fees that MVPDs pay for retransmission 

consent have risen dramatically. SNL Kagan estimates that MVPDs paid $758 million in retransmission consent fees in 2009, $1.24 billion in 2010, and $1.76 billion 

in 2011, and projects that those fees will soar to a staggering $6.05 billion by 2018. 

See Robyn Flynn, SNL Kagan, Retrans projections update: $6B by 2018, at 1 (Oct. 

18, 2012) (‘‘October 2012 SNL Kagan Report’’). Recent studies show that this precipitous rise in retransmission consent fees is a significant contributor to the overall 

rise in programming costs industry-wide by nearly 10 percent a year, and that retransmission consent payments will drive 30 to 40 percent of the industry’s total 

programming cost growth through 2014—all of which translates into higher prices 

for MVPD subscribers. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Cable/Satellite: Pricing, Programming, and Payout Keys to 2010, at 11 (Jan. 26, 2010). 

109 

There is also growing evidence that, even though Congress made clear that retransmission consent is a right that belongs to stations and not to the networks, all 

four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX) are interfering in the 

retransmission consent negotiations of their independently owned affiliates and are 

requiring those affiliates to pay a substantial portion of their retransmission consent 

revenues to the networks. SNL Kagan estimates that today the four major networks 

are collecting $487 million annually from their independently owned affiliates as a 

cut of their retransmission consent revenues, and that this amount will almost triple to $1.37 billion by 2015. See October 2012 SNL Kagan Report at 2. These demands from the networks put even greater upward pressure on retransmission consent fees and, in turn, on the rates consumers pay for MVPD service. 

These spiraling fees and increasingly contentious negotiations directly undercut 

the purpose of the 1992 Cable Act. Congress created retransmission consent and 

must-carry because it believed that preserving access to broadcast television would 

benefit the American consumer. But broadcasters’ abuses of the retransmission consent regime are now harming consumers—by depriving MVPD subscribers of broadcast signals as a bargaining tactic, and by driving up the fees that MVPDs and their 

subscribers pay for supposedly free, over-the-air broadcast programming. The retransmission consent regime is undeniably broken, and Congress and the FCC must 

take swift action to reform the regime and protect consumers once again. 

Question 2. Some distributors have indicated concerns about the ability of content 

creators to tie affiliated programing to retransmission consent deals because they 

argue this practice contributes to programming cost increases. Broadcasters and 

content creators argue that current practices provide necessary financial support for 

a greater variety of programming options which they say is a benefit to consumers. 

To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost increases 

over the past several years? 

Answer. The skyrocketing cost of programming should be of significant concern 

to Congress, and Congress should further examine the conduct that results in these 

higher costs. Your question correctly targets program tying as one of the major culprits for programming cost increases. Each of the four major broadcast networks 

typically requires MVPDs to purchase the network’s affiliated programming services 

in a package that includes retransmission consent for the network’s owned-and-operated stations. Program tying thus enables programming providers to obtain carriage for affiliated cable networks on more favorable terms than they would otherwise enjoy, while also crowding out non-affiliated program networks and damaging 

their ability to obtain carriage. TWC has urged the FCC to prohibit program tying 

as a per se violation of a broadcaster’s duty to negotiate in good faith, but the Commission has taken no action to date. 

Question 2a. If you believe programming cost increases merit a fresh look at the 

1992 Cable Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by distributors should be 

passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers? 

Answer. If legislative changes curbed abusive tying practices and otherwise resulted in programming cost savings, consumers would undoubtedly (and should) 

benefit from those savings. In today’s competitive environment, any MVPD that 

failed to pass on savings to subscribers would be quickly underpriced by its competitors. TWC also has urged the FCC to expressly confirm that cable operators are permitted to make subscription to the basic tier optional in areas that satisfy the statutory standard of ‘‘effective competition,’’ or to carry broadcast stations that elect retransmission consent in such areas on a separate tier, so that subscribers can avoid 

paying for these stations as the stations’ fee demands continue to spiral upward. 

Question 2b. If you support changes to current law, would your company provide 

consumers with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? If 

not, why not? 

Answer. TWC is eager to introduce smaller and less expensive programming tiers 

for our customers who would prefer such packages, but programmer demands combined with today’s legal restrictions impair our ability to do so. If Congress were 

to address those impediments, TWC likely would offer a variety of new service options. TWC has managed—even under existing constraints—to offer the slimmer 

‘‘TV Essentials’’ package mentioned above, as well as certain programming services 

on an a la carte channel basis or on an a la carte program basis. But it is not in 

consumers’ interests to mandate a one-size-fits-all model, whether that model resembles today’s tier-based approach or requires a la carte-only distribution. Instead, 

Congress should eliminate artificial constraints on the ability of MVPDs to innovate 

in programming packaging and to meet consumer demand. Indeed, in TWC’s experience, many consumers would prefer not to subscribe to channels on a pure a la carte 

basis. An a la carte distribution model also could be less efficient and more expenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
110 

sive for some consumers, and could force some independent programmers out of 

business. 

Question 3. Given that retransmission consent deals are private sector negotiations under the 1992 Cable Act, it is difficult for observers and participants to track 

pricing trends. Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers could help to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

Answer. Reforms targeted only at increasing transparency would not address the 

core problems with the retransmission consent regime. It is not clear, for example, 

that a rule requiring parties to reveal their latest offers to consumers or ‘‘observers’’ 

would affect the outcome of a dispute. In a handful of recent disputes, each side’s 

offers were widely reported in the press, and yet these reports had no apparent effect on the negotiating postures of the parties. In addition, consumers probably have 

little interest in refereeing disputes between broadcasters and MVPDs by sorting 

out whose offer is more ‘‘fair.’’ 

Other transparency-based proposals, such as requiring broadcasters to reveal the 

rates they charge to MVPDs, may be useful in providing negotiating parties with 

more context, but would do little to help consumers who simply want to avoid blackouts of the video programming that they have come to rely on. It also is not clear 

that greater transparency would constrain broadcasters’ excessive demands; many 

of these demands become widely known during and after the disputes, and yet 

broadcasters persist in making them. 

Question 3a. If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. As noted in response to Question 3a, TWC believes that adopting transparency requirements likely would not solve the core problems with retransmission 

consent. 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. Among other potential metrics for evaluating whether the rules are working, Congress and the FCC should look to the growing number of disputes leading 

to programming disruptions each year, the annual increase in retransmission consent fees (well above the rate of inflation), and the resulting increases to MVPDs’ 

overall programming costs. Congress and the FCC should also track how much of 

the retransmission consent fees broadcasters obtain goes to support local programming. Going forward, independent industry analysts uniformly believe that, without 

significant reforms by Congress and/or the FCC, disputes will grow more common, 

retransmission consent fees will continue their rapid rise for the foreseeable future, 

and broadcasters will continue to spend less on local programming. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. TWC has suggested two possible paths for preventing the disruptions 

caused by broadcaster abuses of the retransmission consent regime. 

First, Congress and the FCC could pursue a deregulatory path aimed at eliminating the special protections for broadcasters under the existing rules and thus facilitating genuine market-based negotiations—including by repealing the network 

non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity provisions, clarifying and modifying the 

tier-placement requirements applicable to stations electing retransmission consent, 

and amending the good-faith rules to prevent anticompetitive conduct by networks 

and stations alike. TWC looks forward to working with this Committee as it continues to consider such reforms. 

Alternatively, if such regulatory interventions remain in place, Congress or the 

FCC should amend the current rules to create a more balanced regime that curbs 

broadcasters’ abuses of the regulatory regime, including in particular their use of 

blackout threats and actual blackouts to drive up retransmission consent fees. Such 

reforms could include new rules that would establish rate-setting and dispute-resolution mechanisms and require interim carriage in the event of negotiating impasses. As TWC explained in response to post-hearing questions from Senator 

Snowe, the FCC already has ample authority under Title III of the Communications 

Act to address harms occurring in the retransmission consent process. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

111 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

Answer. There is no legal impediment that prevents the Federal Communications 

Commission (‘‘FCC’’) from concluding that it has authority under Section 325 of the 

Communications Act to adopt dispute resolution mechanisms. As an initial matter, 

Chairman Martin’s statement in 2007 that the FCC’s authority in this regard was 

‘‘not clear’’ was by no means an official interpretation of the statute by the full Commission; rather, he made that statement in an interview with reporters after testifying before this Committee. In any event, the FCC’s broad authority to order arbitration is clear from the plain language of Section 325, as Senators Inouye and Stevens pointed out in their January 2007 letter to the FCC. Section 325(b)(3)(A) empowers the FCC ‘‘to govern the exercise by television broadcast stations of the right 

to grant retransmission consent.’’ 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(A). In addition to that general mandate, Congress directed the FCC to consider ‘‘the impact that the grant of 

retransmission consent by television stations may have on the rates for the basic 

service tier’’ and to make sure that its rules are consistent with its obligation ‘‘to 

ensure that the rates for the basic service tier are reasonable.’’ Id. This authority 

dovetails with the FCC’s power to ensure that broadcast stations, as FCC licensees, 

act in accordance with ‘‘the public interest, convenience, and necessity’’ under Section 309(a), see id. § 309(a), as well as the good-faith negotiation requirement in Section 325(b)(3)(C), which instructs the FCC to ensure that the terms and conditions 

for retransmission consent are ‘‘based on competitive marketplace considerations,’’ 

id. § 325(b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii). These far-reaching grants of authority empower the FCC to 

adopt specific measures—including dispute resolution procedures—to ensure that 

the retransmission consent regime conforms to the public interest. 

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. In comments filed at the FCC, Time Warner Cable (‘‘TWC’’) has laid out 

two possible paths for preventing the disruptions caused by broadcaster abuses of 

the retransmission consent regime. 

First, Congress and the FCC could pursue a deregulatory path aimed at eliminating the special protections for broadcasters under the existing rules and thus facilitating genuine market-based negotiations—including by repealing the network 

non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity provisions, clarifying and modifying the 

tier-placement requirements applicable to stations electing retransmission consent, 

and amending the good-faith rules to prevent anticompetitive conduct by networks 

and stations alike. TWC looks forward to working with this Committee as it continues to consider such reforms. 

Alternatively, if such regulatory protections for broadcasters remain in place, the 

FCC should amend its rules to curb broadcasters’ abuses of the regulatory regime, 

including in particular their use of blackout threats and actual blackouts to drive 

up retransmission consent fees. Such reforms could include new rules that would 

establish rate-setting and dispute-resolution mechanisms and require interim carriage in the event of negotiating impasses. As explained above in response to Question 1, the FCC has ample authority under Title III of the Communications Act to 

address harms occurring in the retransmission consent process. 

Question 3. Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing 

retransmission fees in relation to basic cable rates? 

Answer. I am unaware of any active FCC examination of the impact of rising retransmission consent fees on basic cable rates. The FCC’s 2011 Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking on retransmission consent asked commenters to weigh in on whether 

‘‘there [is] an impact on the basic service rate that consumers pay as a result of the 

retransmission consent fees or disputes.’’ See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules 

Related to Retransmission Consent, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd 

2718 ¶ 17 (2011). But it is unclear what, if anything, the FCC has done with the 

information provided by commenters in response indicating that rising fees have a 

substantial and growing effect on basic cable rates. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for (1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and (2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. The impact of rising retransmission consent fees on overall programming 

costs—and by extension on the downstream cost to consumers for MVPD service— 

is significant. Recent studies show that retransmission consent fees have been inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
112 

creasing by roughly 40 percent annually, that this precipitous rise is helping to 

drive up overall programming costs industry-wide by nearly 10 percent a year, and 

that retransmission consent payments will drive 30 to 40 percent of the industry’s 

total programming cost growth through 2014. 

Question 5. Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and 

broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now 

be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and 

parties that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, 

please compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the 

current retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. If Congress were to eliminate retransmission consent, must-carry, and 

the compulsory licensing regime, there would be a number of possible alternatives 

for MVPDs to clear the rights to retransmit broadcast programming to consumers. 

For instance, under the proposed Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 

2008, a local station presumably would aggregate the necessary copyrights from content owners and negotiate an omnibus sublicense with the requesting MVPD. If this 

approach were adopted, the identity of the negotiating parties would likely remain 

the same as under today’s regime. The Copyright Office identified a handful of other 

possible approaches in last year’s Section 302 Report to Congress, each with its own 

particular advantages and disadvantages. For instance, content owners could empower some entity other than the local station to act as a clearinghouse, or could 

negotiate individually with MVPDs to clear the rights to particular programs. In 

TWC’s view, the latter alternative would impose substantial transaction costs on 

MVPDs and could significantly drive up the cost of MVPD service to consumers. 

At a minimum, however, each of these proposals would do away with the legal 

fiction on which the retransmission consent regime is based—that stations ought to 

be compensated merely for their ‘‘signals,’’ over and above the compensation paid 

to the owners of the programming content contained in those signals under the 

copyright licensing regime. In addition, a deregulatory approach presumably would 

eliminate the various other regulatory advantages enjoyed by broadcasters in negotiations with cable operators, such as the FCC’s territorial exclusivity protections 

and statutory tier placement rights. As a result, broadcasters would be forced to 

compete on the merits of their program offerings rather than rely on artificial, government-granted preferences. Competition should enhance the quality of broadcast 

programming, moderate the burgeoning cost of that programming for MVPDs and 

their subscribers, and reduce the incentive and ability of broadcasters to wield 

blackout threats as a weapon in carriage negotiations. 

Question 6. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to more 

disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. TWC believes that eliminating these provisions would lead to fewer disputes, for the reasons set forth in response to Question 7. 

Question 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. The deregulation of carriage negotiations between broadcasters and 

MVPDs would lead to fewer disputes for multiple reasons. As I explained during my 

initial testimony, the retransmission consent regime is fraught with artificial, government-granted preferences for broadcasters, and eliminating these preferences 

would help discourage broadcasters from engaging in brinkmanship and reduce disruptions for consumers. For instance, eliminating the FCC’s network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules, which allow broadcasters to prevent cable operators from mitigating the effects of a blackout by replacing a local signal with a 

distant signal containing the same network and syndicated programming, see 47 

C.F.R. §§ 76.92, 76.101, would limit the effectiveness of broadcasters’ holdout strategies and encourage them to reach agreement. Moreover, eliminating the requirement that cable operators place broadcasters on the basic service tier, see 47 U.S.C. 

§ 543(b)(7), would facilitate the ability of cable operators to offer broadcast stations 

to subscribers on an optional basis, thus helping to temper broadcasters’ excessive 

fee demands. Congress thus should strongly consider eliminating these and other 

unjustified and harmful preferences for broadcasters in the law. 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. Although I am unaware of the exact number of disputes involving nonbroadcast programmers this year, I believe there have been fewer non-broadcast disputes than the 69 retransmission consent disputes that had occurred by July (notwithstanding the highly publicized impasses this summer between DISH Network 

113 

and AMC and between DirecTV and Viacom). The reason for this disparity is clear: 

Negotiations with non-broadcast programmers involve far less regulatory distortion 

than do negotiations with broadcasters over retransmission consent—which is the 

product of a government-created regime premised on a two-decades-old conception 

of the video marketplace. 

Question 9. What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from 

the law have on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a 

local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the 

MVPD to carry the station? 

Answer. If the must-carry statute were repealed, local independent stations would 

bargain for carriage just like any other broadcaster. Because it is in MVPDs’ interest to carry programming that their subscribers demand, a station that offers attractive programming should be able to secure carriage on the merits of its content 

under appropriate and reasonable economic terms. Moreover, while cable operators 

faced far less competition in 1992 when the must carry provisions were adopted, 

today broadcasters today have many other avenues for reaching viewers. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our Nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

Answer. The elimination of must-carry should not adversely affect diversity. As 

mentioned above, stations that once relied on must-carry rights would have the option to negotiate for carriage on the merits of their programming. And even if some 

stations were unable to obtain carriage without must-carry rights, the loss of those 

stations still would not significantly affect diversity, as must-carry stations rarely 

provide original programming and often rely instead on syndicated programming 

and local newscasts borrowed from other broadcasters. The very notion that guaranteeing cable carriage to local independent stations is necessary to enhance diversity 

is an anachronism in today’s vibrant media landscape, where consumers have access 

to a growing number of outlets for news, information, and entertainment programming. In particular, the emergence of the Internet and online video distribution affords consumers substantially more source and content diversity than ever. Indeed, 

compelling carriage of broadcast stations ultimately harms diversity by displacing 

other programming services that viewers would prefer. 

Question 11. With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a 

‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? 

If not, what do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional 

television and local news? 

Answer. No video service is a ‘‘perfect substitute’’ for another; each one has its 

own particular advantages and disadvantages. But the Internet has numerous advantages over broadcast television as a video distribution platform. Internet video 

is more accessible than traditional television programming, as it is available not 

only on Internet-connected television sets but also on computers, smartphones, and 

tablets. Moreover, whereas video programming aired by a broadcast station typically 

can be viewed only in the station’s local area, video content uploaded to the Internet 

can be viewed anywhere in the world. Internet video also enables a far more 

customizable viewing experience for consumers. And unlike local broadcast stations, 

Internet video providers do not need to hold scarce spectrum resources in order to 

offer service. 

Question 12. What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. Public television has played a valuable role in producing and providing 

informational and educational programming to viewers for decades. TWC has long 

viewed public television stations as key partners in delivering high-quality content, 

including local programming, to our subscribers. 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. TWC does not believe that PBS stations or other public broadcasting stations would be affected by current proposals for legislative or regulatory reform. Notably, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008 would not repeal 

Section 535 of the Communications Act, which governs the carriage of noncommercial educational television stations. See 47 U.S.C. § 535. Moreover, when regulatory 

reforms have presented carriage issues for public television in the past, the cable 

industry and public television stations have worked together to resolve these issues 

on an industry-wide basis. For instance, in 2005, when the transition to digital teleVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
114 

vision was underway, the National Cable and Telecommunications Association 

reached an omnibus agreement with the Association of Public Television Stations 

for multicast carriage of public television stations once the transition was complete. 

Question 14. While this might seem appropriate, I am concerned about the impact 

such allowance would have on localism. As the Supreme Court has stated ‘‘fairness 

to communities [in distributing radio service] is furthered by a recognition of local 

needs for a community radio mouthpiece.’’ If this scenario was allowed, how could 

we protect localism? What safeguards could be implemented to ensure local programming? 

Answer. No regulatory safeguards are necessary to ensure access to local programming; to the extent viewers value local programming, the market will find a 

way to deliver it. Moreover, it is no longer correct to assume that protecting local 

broadcasters from market forces necessarily promotes localism or improves the quality or quantity of local programming. Multiple recent studies show that broadcast 

stations are retreating from localism, as their increasing use of ‘‘sharing’’ agreements has precipitated a significant decline in original, diverse local news and public affairs programming. See, e.g., Philip M. Napoli, Retransmission Consent and 

Broadcaster Commitment to Localism, at 18–25 (Nov. 2011), available at http:// 

www.americantelevisionalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Retransmission 

Consent-and-Localism-Paper-by-Napoli-FINAL.pdf; Danilo Yanich, Local TV News & 

Service Agreements: A Critical Look, at 105–07 (Oct. 2011), available at http:// 

www.udel.edu/ocm/pdf/DYanichSSAFINALReport-102411.pdf. By contrast, TWC is 

an active contributor to localism in the communities it serves, having launched local 

news channels and local interest channels that focus on public affairs, politics, 

sports, cultural affairs, entertainment, and other content of interest to the community. 

Question 15. How feasible is it actually for a cable or satellite operator to negotiate with out of market affiliate? There is still the primary owner of the content— 

the programmer. If the cable operator is having a dispute with the in-market Fox 

or Disney broadcaster, how could the cable company turn to an out-of-market Fox 

or Disney affiliate and successfully negotiate? It’s still Fox or Disney and it seems 

that if the out-of-market affiliate did engage, Disney could threaten to pull the affiliation to prevent such action? 

Answer. Although TWC has entered into numerous agreements that include broad 

rights for ‘‘out of market’’ carriage, broadcast networks often do impose restrictions 

on their affiliates in the sale of retransmission consent to MVPDs, making it challenging to secure the necessary carriage rights. In particular, the networks have increasingly hijacked the retransmission consent process by dictating when, where, 

and at what price their affiliates may enter into agreements with MVPDs, and by 

extracting a ‘‘cut’’ of affiliates’ retransmission consent revenues for themselves. As 

TWC has explained to the FCC on several occasions, this network interference in 

affiliates’ retransmission consent negotiations is starkly anticompetitive, undercuts 

the FCC’s localism goals, and harms consumers. Network interference increases the 

risk of impasse in retransmission consent negotiations, siphons off funds intended 

to support local broadcasting, and drives up the cost of retransmission consent to 

MVPDs and their subscribers. TWC and many other parties accordingly have asked 

the FCC to prohibit network interference in stations’ retransmission consent negotiations. 

Question 16. If a MVPD feels that the retransmission fee the broadcasters is asking for is not reasonable then why not just simply not pay it, stop retransmitting 

the signal over the cable plant indefinitely, and, if need be, give every customer in 

the market an antenna? It seems over time, the number of subscribers MVPDs have 

(over 101 million subs) would make broadcasters come to the table sooner rather 

than later. 

Answer. MVPDs compete vigorously in the video distribution marketplace and 

thus can hardly leverage their total subscriber count to ‘‘make broadcasters come 

to the table.’’ Since cable operators face vigorous competition in nearly every local 

area from an array of satellite, telecommunications, and Internet-based distribution 

platforms, broadcasters can play one distributor against another and wield blackout 

threats in an effort to maximize their bargaining leverage in negotiations. Moreover, 

the suggestion that an MVPD may respond to broadcasters’ tactics by dropping a 

station’s signal ‘‘indefinitely’’ overlooks the fact that consumers—and not just 

MVPDs—are harmed by the loss of network-affiliated broadcast programming. 

Consumers cannot avoid these harms simply by switching to another video provider. All MVPDs must regularly renegotiate their carriage agreements with broadcasters, and because broadcasters are increasingly threatening to go dark unless 

their cash demands for retransmission consent are met, consumers may be forced 

115 

to engage in an endless cycle of switching among MVPDs in an effort to avoid the 

potential for a blackout. Such switching is not only a source of inconvenience for 

consumers, but imposes unnecessary costs on consumers who must obtain new 

equipment and stay home to switch providers. Additionally, many consumers are 

not just purchasing video service and may have chosen their video provider also for 

its broadband and voice services. 

Moreover, those cable subscribers who would rather forego purchasing broadcast 

stations as part of their cable package—and thereby avoid the spiraling cost of retransmission consent—are prohibited from doing so under Federal law. As explained 

below in response to Senator DeMint’s questions, 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(7) limits the 

flexibility of cable operators to offer broadcast stations on an optional basis. Congress should strongly consider eliminating not only the ‘‘tier buy-through’’ requirement responsible for this, but also the various other regulatory distortions in the 

retransmission consent regime that actively harm consumers. . 

Question 17. If all MVPDs feel that the retransmission fees are unreasonable then 

why don’t you all agree not to pay the broadcasters—hold an industry-wide boycott? 

Answer. Even apart from the antitrust issues presented by group boycotts generally, such an approach would not serve the interests of consumers. Any action to 

curb broadcaster abuses of the current system should focus on preserving consumers’ 

access to broadcast programming, not depriving consumers of that programming. 

Question 18. Are you concerned if we go too far with reforming retransmission 

consent and/or copyright law that might limit rights of broadcasters and/or programmers we could possibly erode the fundamental protections to intellectual property 

and copyright that this country has enforced? 

Answer. Reforming the broken retransmission consent regime would not erode 

traditional protections for copyright or other intellectual property. Indeed, when 

Congress created this regime in 1992, it took pains to clarify that the retransmission consent right is not a copyright interest. See S. REP. NO. 102–92 (1991), 

reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1169 (‘‘The Committee is careful to distinguish 

between the authority granted broadcasters under the new section 325(b)(1) of the 

1934 Act to consent or withhold consent for the retransmission of the broadcast signal, and the interests of the copyright holders in the programming contained on the 

signal.’’). Rather, retransmission consent is an artificial right granted by the government to local stations with the understanding that stations, as stewards of a valuable public spectrum resource, would exercise the right in the public interest. But 

when stations use retransmission consent as a weapon to black out broadcast programming and drive up programming costs for MVPDs and their subscribers, Congress should not hesitate to reform the regime to protect consumers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

Answer. No. The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act (‘‘NGTMA’’) requires MVPDs to obtain the consent of a local television broadcast station before retransmitting the programming broadcast by the station. See NGTMA § 3(c)(5)(C). 

Question 2. Are Time Warner Cable subscribers required by Federal law to purchase a certain package of channels when they buy your video service? 

Answer. Yes. As a general matter, Section 623(b)(7) of the Communications Act, 

as amended, provides that a cable operator ‘‘shall provide its subscribers a separately available basic service tier to which subscription is required for access to any 

other tier of service,’’ and that basic service tier must include ‘‘any signal of any 

television broadcast station’’ provided to subscribers in a given local area. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 543(b)(7). In the local areas where this provision applies, broadcasters can insist 

on automatic placement on the basic service tier despite the fact that, in a more 

competitive marketplace, broadcasters would be required to compete on price and 

quality to gain access to desired tiers. As a result, skyrocketing retransmission fee 

increases must be built into the mandatory basic cable rates that subscribers cannot 

avoid paying. And as long as consumers are forced to subscribe to (and pay for) 

broadcast programming—creating an effective tax on access to cable programming— 

there is no market-based mechanism to discipline retransmission consent fees. 

While eliminating the tier buy-through requirement is a necessary step, such a 

move would not be sufficient, on its own, to prevent harms to consumers. Carriage 

negotiations between MVPDs and broadcasters will never be a truly market-based 

116 

process unless Congress eliminates all of the regulatory distortions pervading the 

retransmission consent regime. 

Question 3. Is Time Warner Cable prevented by Federal law from selling a subscriber only a single channel, Discovery Channel for example, or only a package of 

sports channels? 

Answer. Yes. As mentioned above, cable operators in many local areas are required to provide subscribers with a basic service tier containing a statutorily mandated lineup of programming services, and to make the purchase of the basic tier 

a prerequisite to the purchase of all additional programming services. See 47 U.S.C. 

§ 543(b)(7). Moreover, video programmers often require cable operators to purchase 

a bundle of programming services all at once and to sell those programming services 

to consumers on highly penetrated cable tiers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

MELINDA WITMER

Question. I wanted to get your opinion on free-markets and how they are defined. 

In March of this year, the American Conservative Union sent a letter to the Hill 

on retransmission consent calling it ‘‘a functioning market.’’ The day before the 

hearing, I received a letter from Citizens against Government Waste claiming the 

current system, as currently structured, ‘‘inhibits the free market’’ and ‘‘reduces 

competition.’’ What are your thoughts on the free market as it relates to retransmission consent? 

Answer. Retransmission consent does not involve ‘‘free market’’ negotiations for 

carriage. Since its creation in 1992, retransmission consent has existed as part of 

a complicated system of government-created rights designed to promote policy goals 

regarding the perceived special importance of free over-the-air television. That system of rights includes a host of special protections—such as must-carry, preferential 

tier placement and channel positioning rights, territorial exclusivity, and the 

‘‘sweeps’’ rule—that further prevent market forces from operating. In a truly ‘‘free 

market,’’ a station would not be able to demand automatic placement on the basic 

tier, but rather would have to bargain for such favorable positioning based on the 

popularity of its programming. Likewise, a station operating in a ‘‘free market’’ 

would not be able to insulate itself from competition by invoking the FCC’s territorial exclusivity rules; instead, that station would be required to compete with 

other stations on quality, price, and other bases. The current regime thus bears little resemblance to a ‘‘free market.’’ It is entirely a creature of regulation, and that 

regulatory regime needs to be updated to prevent abuses by broadcasters that harm 

consumers. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Question 1. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission consent 

dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas where a single MVPD 

dominates an entire state. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Answer. CBS has been an independent company since 2006, and in that time has 

concluded nearly 100 retransmission consent agreements without a single public 

dispute with an MVPD. Therefore, we are pleased to report that the viewers in the 

markets served by CBS owned-and-operated stations have not had to deal with 

MVPD disruptions of our programming. 

I believe that in a free marketplace, the best way to serve consumers is to arm 

them with information about options and choices, particularly with respect to how 

they can continue to obtain the programming they want during an MVPD-programmer disruption. 

I have often praised Congress for succeeding in achieving its goal of competition 

in the video marketplace. Today, thanks to this congressional focus, the American 

viewer in a given local market has robust options with respect to video distribution 

platforms, including at least one cable operator, two satellite services, as many as 

two telcos and, of course, several broadcast television stations. When a disruption 

of broadcast programming occurs on a particular platform, the viewer can always 

count on the originating platform—the broadcast television station—to continue 

service. Contrary to the allegations of some MVPDs, there is no ‘‘blackout’’ and a 

television station does not ‘‘go dark’’ when a disruption occurs. Rather, the station 

117 

still operates in the public interest and transmits its signal over the air to almost 

every household with a television receiver. In addition, that station’s programming 

is still available on competing MVPD platforms not engaged in a dispute with that 

station. 

It is important to note that any disruptions involving retransmission consent are 

local in nature, affecting an individualized market and a limited amount of MVPD 

subscribers, while disruptions involving non-broadcast programmers affect the nationwide carriage of that programming and, therefore, millions of MVPD subscribers. 

Question 2. Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 percent) of total MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. Congress has succeeded in its goal of establishing a highly competitive 

video distribution market. A disruption of a single station’s service to one MVPD 

provides an opportunity for a competing MVPD to acquire a new subscriber. That’s 

how competition works: Consumers shop where the products they want are available. Thus, where a lone MVPD has more than half of all MVPD subs in a given 

state, a disruption just might have the collateral benefit of creating greater competition among video distributors. Specifically, in Hawaii, a retrans disruption with 

Time Warner Cable could inure to the benefit of DirecTV and DISH. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

MARIN FRANKS

Question 1. In her testimony, Ms. Witmer of Time Warner Cable notes that national broadcast networks ‘‘have begun demanding reverse compensation from their 

affiliates’’, which she alleges is contributing to the increase in retransmission fees 

local affiliates have been requesting in renegotiations. 

Please respond to this point, providing detail on the extent that CBS is involved 

in retransmission fee negotiations, including any relevant information on the percentage of retransmission fees for affiliate signals that are allocated to CBS. 

Answer. At CBS, we view our affiliated broadcast television stations as true partners in helping us deliver high quality network entertainment, news, information 

and sports programming to the American public. And our affiliates realize that that 

partnership is good for them, in large part because of what the network is delivering, as a complement to their locally provided content. The network-affiliate relationship is symbiotic. 

Most of our affiliates are still on long-term contracts that do not expire for several 

more years. The renewal of those contracts will be the point at which reverse compensation will be negotiated. We have said publicly that the structure of the reverse 

comp deals varies, but in most cases, we are asking for a fixed fee rather than a 

percentage of the affiliates’ retrans fee. 

The value of a CBS affiliation goes far beyond what the station can secure from 

retransmission consent. Our time-period-winning 10 PM dramas bring a larger audience to a local station’s 11 PM broadcasts in which they sell all of the advertising 

and retain all of that revenue. The opportunity to sell spots in the network’s news, 

sports and entertainment programming brings a local affiliate additional value. 

When we assess the value of a CBS Television Network affiliation, we take into 

account all of the ways we help to create value for a local station and negotiate a 

mutually beneficial agreement accordingly—and utterly independent of how much 

that station may obtain in retrans fees from a given MVPD. 

Question 2. What are CBS’s views on Senator Kerry’s idea of requiring alternative 

styles of negotiation—i.e. baseball-style arbitration—to be used in disputes between 

multichannel video programming distributors and affiliates to ensure viewers are 

not treated unfairly when retransmission consent negotiations breakdown? 

Answer. Section 325(b) expressly states that only broadcasters can provide 

MVPDs with authority to retransmit their signals. Therefore, neither the FCC nor 

an arbiter can authorize an MVPD to carry a station’s signal without the station’s 

consent. 

As the FCC states in the NPRM which launched its pending proceeding on retransmission consent: 

‘‘[W]e believe that mandatory binding dispute resolution procedures would be 

inconsistent with both Section 325 of the Act, in which Congress opted for retransmission consent negotiations to be handled by private parties subject to 

certain requirements, and with the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 

118 

(‘‘ADRA’’), which authorizes an agency to use arbitration ‘‘whenever all parties 

consent.’’ 

Broadcasters spend hundreds of millions of dollars to produce or acquire content 

that is popular with viewers—much of which is produced in California and employs 

thousands of Californians. Mandating carriage of our content –even for a limited 

time—effectively would put the government’s thumb on the MVPDs’ side of the 

scale. The consequences of such government intervention in the free market of negotiations likely would result in lower fees to broadcasters which, in turn, would impair our ability to produce and obtain the high quality programming that viewers 

want. 

Let me emphasize that when a retrans disruption occurs and a station’s signal 

is not available on a particular MVPD platform, that station’s programming is still 

widely available –via competing MVPDs in the market, as well as over the air. 

Finally, if Congress were to take the extraordinary step of granting the FCC the 

authority to arbitrate or mediate disputes, with the thousands of retrans negotiations that occur each year on average, it is likely that parties would run to the Commission instead of trying to work out issues in the marketplace. At such point, the 

FCC would become the ‘‘Federal Arbitration Commission,’’ with retrans disputes 

tying up a substantial portion of valuable agency resources. The marketplace has 

worked –and with very few disruptions and, even in those rare cases, have lasted 

only a short time. 

Question 3. In recent years, the breakdown of retransmission consent negotiations 

has threatened the television access of millions of Americans to major events like 

the Super Bowl, the World Series, and the Oscars, not to mention the critical access 

of viewers to local news broadcasts. Consumers should not be losing access to programming that they have paid for because of the failure of retransmission consent 

negotiations. The FCC has proposed to strengthen notice requirements for consumers when there is the possibility that certain services may lapse. Does CBS support this proposal? 

Answer. While I do not advocate further regulation or rules, I believe that it is 

important for MVPD subscribers to be notified of their options for obtaining the programming of a station in a retrans dispute. Perhaps subscribers should be given a 

heads up when it appears as if a retrans term is set to expire and negotiations are 

going badly and a signal disruption is anticipated in order to give them adequate 

time to connect an antenna or seek another multi-channel provider who has secured 

access to the relevant programming. 

Question 4. Does CBS support requiring affiliate broadcast signals to remain on 

the air—i.e., continuous carriage—during retransmission consent disputes? 

Answer. CBS would be ‘‘on the air’’ in any event in that our free, over-the-air 

broadcast is always available to anyone who chooses to employ an antenna. 

Having clarified that point, no, we do not support any proposal that would require 

us to provide our signals to MVPDs against our will. Not only is this type of proposal prohibited under Section 325(b) of the Communications Act, but such a requirement would lead to the same result described in response to the preceding 

question. However, we may elect to grant an extension of a retrans deadline as part 

of the to-and-fro of negotiations in a free market. Indeed, we have done so in the 

past when we believe that discussions were going well with the MVPD. These extension periods have covered major broadcast events. But these extensions were made 

in our discretion, and not based on a regulatory obligation to do so. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Question 1. S. 2008, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011, 

would provide for the deregulation of retransmission consent. But as we saw last 

month with DirecTV and Viacom, blackouts occur due to disputes between cable programmers and cable providers in a non-regulated environment too. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in a deregulated world, why 

would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for broadcasters too? 

Answer. I agree that any attempt to transform the retransmission consent regime 

into one looking more like the national cable network model would be misguided. 

In the end, I believe that eliminating retrans and the compulsory license would 

lead to far more disruptions, not fewer. Introducing even more claimants into an already challenging negotiating environment likely will lead to more, not fewer, disputes. In the end consumers will suffer. 

119 

While this reorganized retrans marketplace would also be an extraordinarily capital intensive one, I testified that in that new world CBS would do just fine. One 

way or another, we will be able to invest in our content, continue to attract audiences, and figure out how to monetize our performance. But the adverse impact on 

smaller companies –both on the broadcaster and MVPD sides—could be substantial. 

Question 2. Today’s video marketplace is very different than what it was in 1992. 

Since the enactment of the Cable Act, satellite carriers and telephone companies offering video services compete with cable operators. And in the last few years, we 

have seen the enormous growth of online video. In your view, given these changes 

in the video marketplace, are the existing rules working? Why or why not? 

Answer. Actually, the marketplace is even more competitive now, and therefore 

not only is retransmission consent not broken, it is more suited to today’s vibrant 

marketplace, with manifold alternate sources of programming for consumers. 

I believe that the retransmission consent regime enacted in 1992 is one of the 

great Washington public policy accomplishments of the last two decades. It has 

given renewed vitality to broadcast television that prior to 1992 was being consigned 

to the dust heap of history. 

Estimates are that some 15,000 retrans negotiations take place every three years 

and almost all of them are completed successfully and without disruption. As the 

principal retransmission consent negotiator for CBS, I can tell you that over the last 

six years, since CBS split from Viacom, we have completed ALL of our negotiations 

successfully and without incident. 

Question 2a. Why are we even discussing changes to a system that works? 

Answer. Because there are some in the MVPD industry calling for a return to the 

old days, when they got their most popular video product for free and then resold 

it and then used the proceeds to build their own businesses. We urge Congress to 

resist calls for change. To the extent that impasses in retrans negotiations occur 

with more frequency lately, it is due, at least in part, to the belief by a handful of 

distributors that disruptions may cause Congress to act—and in a way that would 

end the current balance of power to tip the scales in their favor. Congress should 

resist calls for legislation because some MVPDs today use this in negotiations in an 

attempt to gain leverage over broadcasters. Legislation only serves to slow down negotiations or leads to increased disruptions. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Question 1a. Stakeholders on all sides of the retransmission consent debate appear to agree that the visibility and frequency of retransmission disputes has increased over the last few years. Some have argued that retransmission consent is 

working and that some growing pains are reasonable because many broadcast stations are electing to pursue deals instead of must-carry for the first time since enactment of the 1992 Cable Act which created the dual regimes of must carry and 

retransmission consent. On the other hand, distributors argue that private sector 

retransmission consent deals are taking longer to negotiate, and that it is becoming 

harder to reach agreement regarding mutually agreeable terms. If you believe mustcarry and retransmission consent are important to localism, how do you recommend 

that the Congress measure the success of localism? 

Answer. As I stated at the hearing, I believe that the retransmission consent regime enacted 20 years ago has given renewed vitality to broadcast television. 

In adopting retrans, Congress recognized that broadcast programming ‘‘remains 

the most popular programming on cable systems, and a substantial portion of the 

benefits for which consumers pay cable systems is derived from carriage of the signals of network affiliates, independent television stations, and public television stations.’’ Congress found that cable operators enjoyed great benefits from the local 

broadcast signals that they were able to carry without broadcaster consent. Thus, 

Congress adopted retransmission consent provisions to allow broadcasters to negotiate to receive compensation for the value of their signals. 

Retrans, therefore, was meant to address more than just localism. It was meant 

to allow broadcasters to monetize their performance in the marketplace. 

Broadcast television stations around the country deliver top-notch local news, 

public affairs and emergency content to their hometown viewers. But local stations 

deliver much more than that—that is, they provide national network content that 

represents some of the highest quality sports and entertainment programming in 

the world. In a tough economy, it is no small benefit to Americans that they can 

sit in their living rooms and access via broadcast television, free of charge, major 

120 

sporting and entertainment events that would cost hundreds of dollars to view at 

a sports arena or movie theater. 

The ability of broadcasters to provide this superior product to the American consumer is due, in great part, to retransmission consent fees. 

With great respect, I urge Congress not to get in the business of measuring ‘‘success’’ of localism or any other aspect of video programming. The American viewer 

should be the final arbiter of what content they wish to view. And by most accounts, 

local broadcast news is considered the most popular and credible while broadcast 

network programming is the most watched. There are plenty of organizations studying broadcaster performance, some commercial and some not-for-profits. For example, entities such as the Pew Research Center and the Knight Foundation regularly 

issue reports on the state of local news. And there are commercial ratings enterprises, such as Nielsen and new entrant Rentrak, which are in the business of 

measuring the country’s television viewing habits. In the end, satisfying viewers is 

what motivates broadcasters. 

Question 1b. If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can 

you provide? 

Answer. I do not believe that retransmission consent is failing in any sense of the 

word. 

Question 2a. Some distributors have indicated concerns about the ability of content creators to tie affiliated programing to retransmission consent deals because 

they argue this practice contributes to programming cost increases. Broadcasters 

and content creators argue that current practices provide necessary financial support for a greater variety of programming options which they say is a benefit to consumers. To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost increases over the past several years? 

Answer. Again, with respect, I urge Congress not to get involved in the costs of 

video programming. American television is considered the best in the world, thanks 

to the innovation and flexibility of the marketplace. And it in this weakened economy, television is one of the sectors performing quite strongly and is not in need 

of a ‘‘fix.’’ In fact, any regulation of programming costs likely would lead to the deterioration of the product. 

In the marketplace, if a product is too costly or is undesirable, demand will wane. 

And the industry will adapt accordingly. CBS is committed to investing in programming. Our ability to invest in the acquisition of broadcast rights to premier sporting 

events, as well as in the production of the highest quality entertainment and news 

programming, is made possible today by a variety of revenue streams, including advertising and retransmission consent fees. In a free, unfettered market, broadcasters 

should be permitted to obtain revenues from any combination of sources as it can 

in order to provide the American consumer with a service that almost every household can access free of charge. Costs of providing this service should be determined 

in the market and not through regulation. 

Question 2b. If you believe programming cost increases merit a fresh look at the 

1992 Cable Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by distributors should be 

passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers?I 

do not believe that Congress should review programming cost increases. And I 

would not support any resurrection of rate regulation of my MVPD partners. 

Answer. I do not believe that Congress should review programming cost increases. 

And I would not support any resurrection of rate regulation of my MVPD partners. 

Question 2c. If you support changes to current law, would your company provide 

consumers with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? If 

not, why not? 

Answer. Tiering options are available today from various MVPDs. If the American 

viewer demands more tailored, channel-by-channel, a la carte options, the market 

will supply it. 

Question 3a. Given that retransmission consent deals are private sector negotiations under the 1992 Cable Act, it is difficult for observers and participants to track 

pricing trends. Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers could help to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

Answer. Those seeking retrans pricing trends need only search the Internet for 

the numerous analyst reports available to the public. 

Providing the public with the wholesale cost of retrans is a solution in search of 

a problem. Some MVPDs assert that disclosure of retrans pricing, especially to consumers, would benefit the public. I am mystified as to how the public would be better positioned by the disclosure of such discrete information in the absence of the 

same disclosure with respect to MVPD costs for non-broadcast programming and 

their set-top boxes and other equipment. These are ALL costs which are passed 

121 

along by MVPDs to their customers. Thus, forced disclosure of the wholesale cost 

of retrans is akin to forced disclosure of the wholesale costs of only a few ingredients 

in a loaf of bread. It would reveal no meaningful information for the consumer. 

Moreover, I question whether such disclosure of this retrans fee might be a vehicle 

for price-signaling among competitors. 

Question 3b. If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. See response to Question 3(a). 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. That the current system is working or not working should be based on 

consumer reaction. The hue and cry to ‘‘fix’’ retrans is not coming from consumers. 

Rather, it is coming from MVPDs. Calls for fixing a supposedly broken retrans system arose only after a fully competitive marketplace among video distributors developed. 

Retrans was essentially a non-factor in carriage negotiations until several years 

back when DirecTV, DISH, Verizon and AT&T became full-fledged competitors to 

the cable monopoly. Yes, when a retrans disruption occurs, consumers in a given 

local market may experience inconvenience. But disruptions are few and far between. It has been estimated that some 15,000 retrans negotiations take place every 

three years. And almost all of them are completed successfully. 

There is no need to overhaul a well functioning retrans system that has inured 

to the benefit of consumers –in the form of continued high-quality broadcast service. 

Congressional and/or FCC involvement in retrans would serve to hinder negotiations, not assist them. Broadcasters across the country want to be carried by distributors and distributors want to carry broadcast television stations because of the 

popularity of our local and national programming. As long as this balance exists, 

the system is working. 

Finally, let me note again that to the extent that impasses in retrans negotiations 

occur with more frequency lately, it is due, at least in part, to the belief by a handful of distributors that disruptions may cause Congress to act—and in a way that 

would end the current balance of power to tip the scales in their favor. Congress 

should resist calls for legislation because some MVPDs today use this in negotiations in an attempt to gain leverage over broadcasters. Legislation only serves to 

slow down negotiations or leads to increased disruptions. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. I believe that the retransmission consent regime enacted in 1992 is one 

of the great Washington public policy accomplishments of the last two decades. 

Therefore, I do not see the need for Congress to address any part of the 1992 Cable 

Act pertaining to retrans. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Existing FCC Authority 

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (‘‘1992 

Cable Act’’) amended the Communications Act to include Section 325, which provides television stations with certain carriage rights on local market cable television 

systems. The Commission established rules related to the retransmission/mandatory 

carriage election cycle, but did not adopt rules governing the negotiation process of 

retransmission consent. 

However, the statute clearly calls for the FCC to ensure that broadcasters act in 

‘‘good faith during negotiations.’’ During the Sinclair-Mediacom dispute back in 

2007, the Commission didn’t intervene because then Chairman Martin interpreted 

the law didn’t and stated that the agency didn’t have the authority to impose binding arbitration. At the time, he stated ‘‘It’s not clear to me that the commission does 

have the authority to order arbitration.’’ 

Yet, during that time in January 2007, Senator Inouye and the late Senator Stevens wrote the FCC stating that the Commission did indeed have authority to intervene and, if necessary, use binding arbitration to resolve any failed negotiations. 

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

122 

Answer. Section 325(b) expressly states that only broadcasters can provide 

MVPDs with authority to retransmit their signals. Therefore, neither the FCC nor 

an arbiter can authorize an MVPD to carry a station’s signal without the station’s 

consent. 

As the NPRM in the pending proceeding at the FCC on retransmission consent 

states: 

‘‘[W]e believe that mandatory binding dispute resolution procedures would be 

inconsistent with both Section 325 of the Act, in which Congress opted for retransmission consent negotiations to be handled by private parties subject to 

certain requirements, and with the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 

(‘‘ADRA’’), which authorizes an agency to use arbitration ‘‘whenever all parties 

consent.’’ 

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. Congress has, on two occasions, directed the FCC to adopt rules that 

compel both broadcasters and MVPDs to negotiate for retransmission consent in 

good faith. In response, the FCC has established rules that guide parties as to what 

conduct is deemed good faith in retrans negotiations and has implemented an enforcement regime. However, there have been very few complaints filed alleging violations of the rules. There has only been one finding that a party to a retransmission consent agreement negotiated in bad faith—and that party was an MVPD. 

Reasonable Basic Service Tier Rates 

While I understand programming costs are growing, I am concerned about the significant increase in retransmission compensation that has occurred over the past 

several years. For example, retransmission consent revenue climbed more than 30 

percent for six broadcasters in the first nine months of 2008. By 2017, SNL Kagan 

an industry analysis firm—projects retransmission fees will grow to $3.61 billion, 

with average per-subscriber fees potentially doubling. So, as broadcasters look to increase revenue streams through retransmission fee, it seemingly puts upward pressure on the price of basic cable and ultimately consumers. Such increase may also 

infringe upon the existing statute. 

Section 623(b)(1) requires the FCC to ensure that basic cable service rates are reasonable. In addition, Section 325(b)(3)(A) requires the Commission to consider the 

impact that retransmission consent has on basic cable service rates and that any 

regulations do not conflict with the FCC’s ‘‘obligation under Section 623(b)(1)’’ to ensure such rates are reasonable. 

According to SNL Kagan, the average cable TV subscriber in 2011 paid $78 a 

month compared to only $40 per month in 2001. Whereas the average household income fell 6 percent between 2006 and 2010, according to the U.S. Census. 

Question 3. Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing 

retransmission fees in relations to basic cable rates? 

Answer. The FCC has a pending proceeding on retransmission consent. I do not 

know whether the FCC is studying programming fees as part of this proceeding or 

any other. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for (1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and (2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. I have no independent knowledge of the impact of retransmission fees on 

the cost of cable service, but public analysts’ reports state that they are but a fraction of a cable operator’s overall programming expenses and a minute portion of its 

revenues. In comments in the FCC’s pending retransmission consent proceeding, 

NAB submitted an economic report that contained the following conclusions: 

In 2008, for example, the average MVPD programming expense per subscriber 

per month was approximately $26 and average MVPD revenue was more than 

$99 per subscriber per month. In contrast, as noted above, in 2009 MVPDs paid 

retransmission consent fees totaling only $0.70 per subscriber per month. Thus, 

retransmission consent fees are just 2.7 percent of programming expenses and 

about 0.71 percent of revenues. A March 2009 study estimated that cable revenues per subscriber are predicted to rise 45 times more than retransmission 

consent fees through 2015. 

123 

These conclusions are well illustrated in an article in an MVPD industry trade 

publication, which I have included with my response. 

Eliminating Retransmission Consent and Compulsory Licenses 

While there is no question that Congress must examine and reform outdated provisions in the statute, there are legislative proposals before Congress that propose 

sweeping changes to laws governing cable and broadcast obligations. In particular 

these bills propose repealing retransmission consent, must carry, and the Copyright 

Act’s ‘‘compulsory license’’ provisions. 

During the hearing, witnesses provided conflicting testimony on the impact such 

eliminations would have on the marketplace and with retrans negotiations some 

said it would only increase disputes and others said it would wouldn’t. 

Question 5. Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and 

broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now 

be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and 

parties that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, 

please compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the 

current retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. As I noted at the hearing, introducing even more claimants into an already challenging negotiating environment may lead to more disputes, not fewer, 

will be a lawyer’s paradise, and is unlikely to yield any relief to consumer pocketbooks. 

That brave new marketplace would also be an extraordinarily capital intensive 

one. I testified that in that new world CBS would do just fine. One way or the other, 

we will be able to invest in our content, continue to attract audiences, and figure 

out how to monetize our performance. But the adverse impact on smaller companies 

–both on the broadcaster and MVPD sides—could be substantial. 

Many smaller players will be squeezed out of the business. West Virginians may 

have access only to larger regional super players from Washington, D.C. and Pittsburgh, or South Carolinians may lose the wonderful localism tradition earned by 

their state’s broadcasters in favor of service solely from Atlanta, Charlotte or even 

New York City. 

This move to a more regional system will come at the expense of local economies 

and consumers. 

Question 6. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to more 

disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. I believe that in the absence of a compulsory license and retransmission 

consent there would be far more disputes if for no other reason than that many, 

many more parties would be involved. 

As the Copyright Office concluded in a 2011 report to Congress pursuant to the 

Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA): 

In the absence of the statutory licenses, the businesses of cable operators and 

satellite carriers would be much different, and presumably more difficult, because they would have to negotiate with copyright owners through private 

transactions for the public performance rights to copyrighted broadcast content. 

Question 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. Please see response to Question 6. 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. I have no independent information as to such disputes, but there have 

also been reports of numerous disruptions of non-broadcast programming in 2012. 

It is important to note that any disruptions involving retransmission consent are 

local in nature, affecting an individualized market and a limited amount of MVPD 

subscribers, while disruptions involving non-broadcast programmers affect the nationwide carriage of that programming and, therefore, millions of MVPD subscribers. 

CBS has been an independent company since 2006, and in that time has concluded nearly 100 retransmission consent agreements without a single public dispute with the relevant MVPD. 

Question 9. It is my understanding that while there has been a 15 percent increase in commercials television stations from 1996 to 2010, there has also been a 

33 percent decrease in the number of station owners. There has also been a continued dearth of ownership by minorities and women—which is approximately only 5 

124 

percent and 3.3 percent of TV market share, respectively (both well below their population representation). Both indicate a significant deficit in achieving the policy 

goals of localism and diversity. 

A free exchange of a wide range of viewpoints is the lifeblood of our democracy, 

and the print and broadcast media serve an indispensable function by exposing our 

society to diverse thoughts and viewpoints. 

What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from the law have 

on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the MVPD to 

carry the station? 

Answer. But for one instance in which a station we acquired had already elected 

must carry, CBS does not rely on must carry and would not be affected, but the 

impact on smaller stations and the ensuing diversity of voices Congress strives to 

provide might be adversely impacted. I note this despite the fact that any adverse 

impact may benefit CBS from a competitive standpoint. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our Nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

Answer. Please see response to Question 9. 

Online Video vs. Traditional Video 

According to Nielsen Media, the average American watches over 153 hours of 

video per month on traditional television compared to only 4.5 hours per month of 

online video. Also, approximately 97 percent of American households have a television whereas 68 percent of households have broadband (the U.S. currently ranks 

23rd in broadband penetration). 

In addition, a 2011 Project for Excellence in Journalism survey found that local 

TV remains America’s most popular source of local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news—89 percent of surveyed adults get information 

about local weather and 80 percent follow local breaking news through local television. Only about 51 percent of smartphone users use the device to get news. 

While the Internet is a very value medium for media and news and provides incredible benefit to users, most Americans still rely heavily on traditional television 

for programming, local news, and even weather. 

Question 11. With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a 

‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? 

If not, what do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional 

television and local news? 

Answer. In economic terms, a good or service is deemed to be a ‘‘perfect substitute’’ if it is completely substitutable with another good or service. The American 

public looks to and depends upon their local television stations –and not to the 

Internet—as the primary ‘‘go to’’ source for news, weather, traffic and information. 

Moreover, local television stations offer a news service and platform that is ubiquitous and free of charge. While broadcasters compete with the Internet for audience and advertisers, local broadcasters do not merely aggregate or regurgitate news 

from other sites. Instead, they invest millions of dollars annually to produce news 

and information programming that is original and fresh. This means investing in 

personnel—including reporters, writers, producers, camera operators—and purchasing technical equipment that allows live coverage of local events and the production of high-quality content. This is a model the Internet is not currently able 

to match. Therefore, the Internet is not yet a perfect substitute for local broadcast 

news. 

Value of Public Broadcasting 

Harris Interactive, an independent, non-partisan research firm, found—for the 

ninth year in a row—that PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) is the Nation’s mosttrusted institution by the American public. PBS ranked higher than our court system, newspapers, our Federal government, and, surprisingly, even Congress. 

In addition, 74 percent of the American public surveyed believe Federal funding 

for PBS is money well spent. PBS was also the most trusted and safe place for children to watch television—88 percent of Americans surveyed agreed. 

Question 12. What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. All local broadcasters, including public television stations, compete 

against each other for viewers. Competition is good and we hope to see public television stations remain vibrant. 

125 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. I defer to our PBS colleagues on this question as I have no particular 

expertise on the challenges facing public broadcasting. 

Gentlemen’s Agreement Not to Pull Signal 

Several of the negotiation disputes have threatened or have actually disrupted 

cable customers’ viewing of major television programming—whether that is sporting 

events, season finales of shows, or the Oscars. It is my understanding cable operators are prohibited from pulling broadcast signals during sweeps when ratings determine advertising rates—the life blood of your business. 

Question 14. Why shouldn’t there be a similar prohibition on broadcasters to not 

pull their signals in a retransmission negotiation impasse during a major sporting 

event or other highly watched programming like the Oscars—in order to limit the 

disruptive nature of negotiation disputes to consumers? 

Answer. I would oppose such a prohibition. As noted in response to Question 1 

above, under Section 325(b), consent for retransmission of a station’s broadcast signal is within the sole province of the station. No party, not even the FCC, can permit retransmission of a signal, even for a short period of time or for a given program. Broadcasters spend hundreds of millions of dollars to produce or acquire content that is popular with viewers. Thus, mandating carriage of our content –even 

for a limited time—effectively would put the government’s thumb on the MVPDs’ 

side of the scale. The consequences of such government intervention in the free market of negotiations likely would result in lower fees to broadcasters which, in turn, 

would impair our ability to produce and obtain the high quality programming that 

viewers want. Finally, let me emphasize that when a retrans disruption occurs and 

a station’s signal is not available on a particular MVPD’s platform, that station’s 

programming is still widely available –via competing MVPDs in the market, as well 

as over the air. 

Question 15. Would you (and/or your affiliates/members) agree to voluntarily 

adopt an arrangement of where you would not pull your signal prior to a major 

sporting or highly watched/anticipated event if negotiations are at an impasse? You 

could obviously still pull your signal after the event, if you so desired. 

Answer. Making such a ‘‘voluntary’’ commitment across the board would lead to 

the same result described in response to Question 14. However, we may elect to 

grant an extension of a retrans deadline as part of the to-and-fro of negotiations in 

a free market. Indeed, we have done so in the past when we believe that discussions 

were going well with the MVPD. These extension periods have covered big-ticket 

broadcast events, such as the Super Bowl. But these extensions were made in our 

discretion, and not based on a regulatory obligation to do so. 

Local Programming & Independent Programming 

I have long been a champion of promoting localism and diversity in television. 

Local media—be it newspaper, radio, or television—play a critical role in informing 

citizens about important decisions made by their local, state, and Federal officials. 

Even with the Internet and other media sources, a 2011 Project for Excellence in 

Journalism survey found that local TV remains America’s most popular source of 

local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news—89 percent 

of surveyed adults get information about local weather and 80 percent follow local 

breaking news through local television. Also, locally owned stations also air more 

local news and programming than non-locally owned stations, typically 5 1/2 minutes more per day. 

It seems to me that one way to make sure that local television stations can continue to invest in local journalism is to allow them to recoup the investments they 

make in local programming. I am concerned about the impact that various legislative proposals would have on localism. Some have proposed to significantly alter the 

negotiating leverage of the parties in a way that could make it more difficult for 

local broadcasters or independent programmers to receive fair value for their programming. 

Question 16. Do you agree? Can you discuss your concerns with the various legislative proposals and its impact on local stations and the availability of local programming to consumers that rely on over-the-air broadcasting?’’ 

Answer. I am also concerned that the various legislative proposals relating to retransmission consent would have an adverse impact on local broadcasting. For further detail, please see response to Question 5. 

126 

Question 17. How important are media ownership rules to promoting competition, 

diversity, and localism? Some broadcasters have called for relaxing media ownership 

rules but could that cause greater consolidation and concentration, which would be 

counter to goals in the statute of promoting competition, localism, and diversity? 

Answer. CBS has been one of the broadcasters calling for less restrictive ownership rules. Today, broadcasters compete with an ever-increasing and constantly 

changing array of alternative sources of news, information, and entertainment. 

Broadcasters undoubtedly contribute to competition, localism and diversity, and if 

we are to continue to do so, we must be released from structural regulations that 

do not bind our competitors. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

Answer. No. 

Question 2. Besides several local CBS broadcast stations, like WCBS–TV in New 

York City, your company owns the non-broadcast Showtime and Smithsonian Channels. Your company negotiates copyright-based carriage agreements for these channels with pay-TV providers without any compulsory license or retransmission consent legal structure involved. 

a. Are you able to receive fair compensation from pay-TV companies for carriage 

of Showtime and Smithsonian Channels? 

Answer. Yes, based on free market negotiations. 

b. Are pay-TV providers able to retransmit Showtime and Smithsonian Channel 

programming without your consent? 

Answer. No. 

c. My legislation envisions you negotiating carriage agreements in that same manner for WCBS–TV and your other broadcast stations. Could CBS negotiate for carriage of its broadcast stations the way it does for its non-broadcast properties if payTV compulsory licenses and retransmission consent were both repealed? 

Answer. Eventually, yes, but only after a period of several years of considerable 

disruption. And to what end? As I noted at the hearing, I can say without equivocation from my position as the principal retransmission consent negotiator for CBS, 

the market for video programming is already one of the country’s most robust and 

competitive sectors in the Nation. Retransmission consent is not broken and not currently hampered by government intervention. In fact, the mere suggestion of Federal legislation has made retransmission consent negotiations more difficult. Any 

tampering with it now could negatively impact consumers and trigger severe negative results to a broadcast television industry that is positively contributing to the 

U.S. economy. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you explain how CBS affiliates leverage CBS network programming into advertising revenue. You state, ‘‘When network programming is of high quality and compelling, local stations benefit . . . (by) . . . using 

this network programming to obtain advertising dollars.’’ They then use those advertising revenues to produce local programming and obtain syndicated programming. I was surprised that you did not discuss retransmission consent revenue received by CBS affiliates or the way in which they use that revenue. 

a. How much retransmission consent revenue did CBS make from its owned & 

operated (O&O) stations last year? 

Answer. CBS has publicly reported that we expect retransmission consent revenues of approximately $250 million in 2012. 

b. Does CBS charge its non-O&O affiliates reverse compensation or some similar 

fee in exchange for their affiliation? 

Answer. CBS negotiates with each of our affiliated stations over the various terms 

of their carriage of CBS Television Network programming. In many cases, affiliates 

do compensate us for that carriage. 

c. How much reverse compensation or similar revenue did CBS receive last year 

from its affiliates? 

Answer. We do not break out that revenue. Moreover, most of our affiliates are 

still on long term contracts that do not expire for several more years. The renewal 

of those contracts is the point at which reverse compensation will be negotiated. 

127 

d. How much retransmission consent revenue did CBS’s non-O&O affiliates receive last year? 

Answer. We have no access to the retrans revenues of our affiliates. 

Question 4. Your prepared remarks indicate that ‘‘CBS pays hundreds of millions 

of dollars each year to the NFL and to the NCAA for rights to March Madness 

alone.’’ You also mention fees paid for ‘‘SEC Football, regular season NCAA basketball, PGA golf, and the U.S. Open tennis tournament.’’ How much of the cost of 

these programs is covered by the revenue from advertising sold within these programs? 

Answer. CBS’s ability to invest in the acquisition of broadcast rights to premier 

sporting events, as well as in the production of the highest quality entertainment 

and news programming, is made possible today by a variety of revenue streams, including advertising and retransmission consent fees. In a free, unfettered market, 

broadcasters should be permitted to obtain revenues from any combination of 

sources as it can in order to provide the American consumer with a service that almost every household can access free of charge. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

MARTIN FRANKS

Question. Mr. Franks, if compulsory licensing is eliminated, what would be the 

effect on smaller providers? Would individual deals need to be cut? Is it easier for 

those already in the marketplace, therefore hurting competition? 

Answer. As I noted at the hearing, introducing even more claimants into an already challenging negotiating environment may lead to more disputes, not fewer, 

will be a lawyer’s paradise, and is unlikely to yield any relief to consumer pocketbooks. 

That brave new marketplace would also be an extraordinarily capital intensive 

one. I testified that in that new world CBS would do just fine. One way or the other, 

we will be able to invest in our content, continue to attract audiences, and figure 

out how to monetize our performance. But the adverse impact on smaller companies—both on the broadcaster and MVPD sides—could be substantial. 

Many smaller players will be squeezed out of the business. West Virginians may 

have access only to larger regional super players from Washington, D.C. and Pittsburgh, or South Carolinians may lose the wonderful localism tradition earned by 

their state’s broadcasters in favor of service solely from Atlanta, Charlotte or even 

New York City. 

This move to a more regional system will come at the expense of local economies 

and consumers. 


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129 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question 1. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission consent 

dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas where a single MVPD 

dominates an entire state. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Answer. I believe that one of the best ways to protect consumers while companies 

work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast 

signals is to grant MVPDs and broadcasters the right to interim carriage. This is 

not a novel idea. Over the last decade, as part of conditions in several media mergers, the FCC has granted interim carriage rights to MVPDs while they seek to resolve their programming disputes. 

An additional way to protect consumers is for Congress or the Commission to provide a market-oriented means for resolving these disputes and impasses. I believe 

that ‘‘baseball style’’ (‘‘final offer’’) commercial arbitration, another remedy imposed 

by the FCC on several media mergers, including most recently the Comcast-NBCU 

merger, can be an effective way to encourage the parties in a negotiating dispute 

to reach a resolution prior to dropping a signal. The FCC’s use of baseball-style arbitration is based on the theory that the availability of arbitration alone will push the 

parties towards agreement prior to a breakdown in negotiations. The FCC has found 

that ‘‘final offer’’ arbitration has the attractive ability to induce the two sides to 

reach their own agreement lest they risk the possibility that the arbitrator will 

choose the relatively extreme offer of the other side. The prospect of submission of 

a dispute to arbitration supports market forces and aids in preventing a transaction 

from distorting the marketplace. Since ‘‘baseball style’’ commercial arbitration can 

take time to resolve, it is important that MVPDs be permitted to continue carrying 

the networks that are the subject of the dispute during the pendency of the dispute 

resolution process. Moreover, while ‘‘baseball style’’ commercial arbitration can be 

prohibitively costly for small cable operators, the Commission could adopt special 

rules for operators of this size to make it work in a cost-effective manner. 

Question 2. Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 percent) of total MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. The consumer dislocations caused by broadcaster blackouts may be of 

greater breadth in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage of total MVPD subscribers in a DMA, however, consumers served by the market’s smallest MVPDs—who, rather than the largest, are taken advantage of the 

most in retransmission consent negotiations,—are most in need of special consideration. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question 1. In recent years, the breakdown of retransmission consent negotiations 

has threatened the television access of millions of Americans to major events like 

the Super Bowl, the World Series, and the Oscars, not to mention the essential access of viewers to local news broadcasts. The FCC has proposed to strengthen notice 

requirements for consumers when there is the possibility that certain services may 

lapse. Does WOW! support this proposal? 

Answer. WOW! questions whether the consumer benefits of the notice requirements proposed by the Commission would be outweighed by consumer harm and 

confusion. In some instances, consumers might respond to the notice of a potential 

loss of service by switching providers only to learn afterwards that such action was 

unnecessary because the dispute was resolved without any consumer impact. In 

other instances, consumers might heavily discount or ignore the notice believing 

that the dispute will be resolved, realizing that there would be no agreement only 

after losing service. We believe a better approach to addressing the problem of consumers losing access to broadcast stations is to reform the underlying retransmission consent rules. 

Question 2. Your written testimony indicated your support for continuous carriage. Why does WOW! believe continuous carriage during retransmission consent 

disputes would help end disputes? 

Answer. WOW! supports continuous carriage in order to ensure that consumers 

are not unnecessarily harmed while retransmission consent negotiations are ongoing. In particular, interim carriage can be an effective way to protect consumers 

130 

while the FCC determines whether the good faith rules have been violated by either 

party. This is not a novel idea. Over the last decade, as part of conditions in several 

media mergers, the FCC has granted interim carriage rights to MVPDs while they 

seek to resolve their programming disputes. 

Question 3. Please provide for the record information on WOW!’s termination fee 

policy. 

Answer. WOW! does not require residential customer to sign contracts for our 

services, therefore we have neither termination fees nor policies regarding them. 

Rather, we rely on the quality of our service and products as the incentive for continued customer loyalty. 

Question 4. Has your company examined dropping these fees in the future? 

Answer. Please see above answer. 

Question 5. Your written testimony noted WOW!’s support for requiring alternative styles of negotiation, like baseball-style arbitration, in retransmission consent 

disputes. Can you elaborate on why you feel this would be beneficial? 

Answer. WOW! believes that ‘‘baseball style’’ (‘‘final offer’’) commercial arbitration, 

a remedy imposed by the FCC on several media mergers, including most recently 

the Comcast-NBCU merger, can be an effective way to encourage the parties in a 

negotiating dispute to reach a resolution prior to dropping a signal. The FCC’s use 

of baseball-style arbitration is based on the theory that the availability of arbitration alone will push the parties towards agreement prior to a breakdown in negotiations. The FCC has found that ‘‘final offer’’ arbitration has the attractive ability to 

induce the two sides to reach their own agreement lest they risk the possibility that 

the arbitrator will choose the relatively extreme offer of the other side. The prospect 

of submission of a dispute to arbitration supports market forces and aids in preventing a transaction from distorting the marketplace. Since ‘‘baseball style’’ commercial arbitration can take time to resolve, it is important that MVPDs be permitted to continue carrying the networks that are the subject of the dispute during 

the pendency of the resolution process. Moreover, while ‘‘baseball style’’ commercial 

arbitration can be prohibitively costly for small cable operators, the Commission 

could adopt special rules for operators of this size to make it work in a cost-effective 

manner. 

In addition to arbitration, the FCC has found it necessary, as part of its media 

merger conditions, to require interim carriage of the broadcast signal while negotiations are ongoing under the prices, terms and conditions of the expired agreement 

to protect consumers against loss of access to broadcast programming. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question 1. S. 2008, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011, 

would provide for the deregulation of retransmission consent. But as we saw last 

month with DirecTV and Viacom, blackouts occur due to disputes between cable programmers and cable providers in a non-regulated environment too. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in a deregulated world, why 

would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for broadcasters too? 

Answer. We believe that reform of the existing system is necessary to ensure that 

consumers are protected. With regard to some rules that are part of the retransmission consent regulatory scheme, deregulation may be appropriate. In instances 

where both parties at the negotiation table have roughly the same market power, 

there may be less need for regulations to avoid disruption to the consumer. However, this is not always the case, and in some cases, new rules may be necessary. 

Question 2a. Today’s video marketplace is very different than what it was in 1992. 

Since the enactment of the Cable Act, satellite carriers and telephone companies offering video services compete with cable operators. And in the last few years, we 

have seen the enormous growth of online video. In your view, given these changes 

in the video marketplace, are the existing rules working? 

Answer. No. 

Question 2b. Why or why not? 

Answer. The rules were designed for a period of time when a cable operator was 

the dominant provider of multichannel video service in its franchise area. Times 

have changes, and the rules governing the market need to change as well. 

131 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question 1a. Stakeholders on all sides of the retransmission consent debate appear to agree that the visibility and frequency of retransmission disputes has increased over the last few years. Some have argued that retransmission consent is 

working and that some growing pains are reasonable because many broadcast stations are electing to pursue deals instead of must-carry for the first time since enactment of the 1992 Cable Act which created the dual regimes of must carry and 

retransmission consent. On the other hand, distributors argue that private sector 

retransmission consent deals are taking longer to negotiate, and that it is becoming 

harder to reach agreement regarding mutually agreeable terms. If you believe mustcarry and retransmission consent are important to localism, how do you recommend 

that the Congress measure the success of localism? 

Answer. If Congress wants to determine whether retransmission consent is important to localism, Congress should inquire as to how much of broadcasters’ retransmission consent revenue is being invested into the production of local programming. 

Question 1b. If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can 

you provide? 

Answer. Failed retransmission consent negotiations have resulted in 80 blackouts 

this year alone, which is the largest number of blackouts in a year since the rules 

were passed in 1992. Moreover, the wholesale prices for retransmission consent are 

rising despite the fact that the ratings for these stations are dropping. 

Question 2a. Some distributors have indicated concerns about the ability of content creators to tie affiliated programing to retransmission consent deals because 

they argue this practice contributes to programming cost increases. Broadcasters 

and content creators argue that current practices provide necessary financial support for a greater variety of programming options which they say is a benefit to consumers. To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost increases over the past several years? 

Answer. Congress should be very concerned about the programming cost increases 

over the past several years because these costs are largely passed along to consumers in the form of higher subscription rates. These rate increases are felt most 

acutely by consumers at the lowest end of the economic scale, because they have 

the least amount of discretionary income (or, more pointedly, no discretionary income), to spend. Bernstein Research has published a series of studies starting in 

2009 on what it calls a ‘‘looming affordability crisis in Pay TV and telecommunications’’ where ‘‘dislocations at the low end of the income scale in the wake of the 

Great Recession must be viewed as structural rather than cyclical.’’ Their most recent research reveals that the bottom 40 percent of households not only has no discretionary income with which to purchase pay-TV and telecom services after meeting the most basic necessities of food, shelter, transportation and health care, they 

‘‘are already underwater to the tune of $1,322 annually, or more than $100 per 

month.’’ [Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, U.S. Cable & Satellite Broadcasting, 

‘‘Weekend Media Blast: The Poverty Problem 2012 (Oct. 12, 2012)] For residents of 

areas where a good quality over-the-air broadcast signal does not reach because of 

topography, this can mean the complete loss of access to vital news, emergency information, and entertainment for an entire household. 

Increased programming costs from the major content companies also threaten 

independent programming voices whose opportunities for carriage are threatened by 

the outsized demands of the media giants. 

Question 2b. If you believe programming cost increases merit a fresh look at the 

1992 Cable Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by distributors should be 

passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers? 

Answer. Given the amount of competition among MVPDs in the market, I believe 

that market forces will cause cost savings to be passed onto consumers, either 

through lower prices, or more limited rate increases. 

Question 2c. If you support changes to current law, would your company provide 

consumers with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? If 

not, why not? 

Answer. WOW! would like the flexibility to provide its customers some channels 

or blocks of channels on an a la carte or tiered basis, particularly higher cost networks, such as broadcast stations, regional sports networks, and national sports networks. 

Question 3a. Given that retransmission consent deals are private sector negotiations under the 1992 Cable Act, it is difficult for observers and participants to track 

132 

pricing trends. Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers could help to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

Answer. Generally speaking, I believe that greater transparency for distributors 

and for consumers would help alleviate tensions over content deals. However, greater transparency must come with certain safeguards to prevent sellers and buyers 

from using the available information to collude. 

Question 3b. If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. The FCC should be required to gather data and evidence for the purpose 

of producing a pricing report to Congress on the costs of retransmission consent. 

Today, unfortunately, the non-disclosure provisions that are part of nearly every retransmission consent agreement prevent even the FCC from knowing what MVPDs 

are paying for broadcast programming, or the level of pricing discrepancies among 

MVPDs of varying sizes. 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. The Commission should seek access to the prices, terms, and conditions 

of retransmission consent agreements, and issue an annual report to Congress on 

the matter. At a minimum, the report should measure how many blackouts have 

occurred in the covered period. Moreover, it should include an analysis of the difference in prices paid by small MVPDs versus large ones. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. At a minimum, Congress should consider adopting interim carriage to ensure that consumers do not lose access to broadcast stations during retransmission 

consent disputes, and adoption of baseball style commercial arbitration as a means 

of resolving impasses. Neither of these ideas are novel. Over the last decade, as part 

of conditions in several media mergers, the FCC has adopted these solutions. But 

Congress must go further to ensure adequate protections for small MVPDs, similar 

to those adopted by the FCC in its recent Comcast-NBCU merger order, such as 

one-way fee shifting if a small MVPD prevails in arbitration, and right of an MVPD 

with 3 million or fewer subscribers to use a bargaining agent to negotiate and arbitrate. In addition, Congress should adopt a ban on coordinated retransmission consent negotiations by separately owned, same market broadcast stations. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Existing FCC Authority 

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (‘‘1992 

Cable Act’’) amended the Communications Act to include Section 325, which provides television stations with certain carriage rights on local market cable television 

systems. The Commission established rules related to the retransmission/mandatory 

carriage election cycle, but did not adopt rules governing the negotiation process of 

retransmission consent. 

However, the statute clearly calls for the FCC to ensure that broadcasters act in ‘‘good faith during negotiations.’’ During the Sinclair-Mediacom dispute back in 

2007, the Commission didn’t intervene because then Chairman Martin interpreted 

the law didn’t and stated that the agency didn’t have the authority to impose binding arbitration. At the time, he stated ‘‘It’s not clear to me that the commission does 

have the authority to order arbitration.’’ 

Yet, during that time in January 2007, Senator Inouye and the late Senator Stevens wrote the FCC stating that the Commission did indeed have authority to intervene and, if necessary, use binding arbitration to resolve any failed negotiations. 

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

Answer. Yes, the current Commission can interpret the statute differently from 

previous Commissions, and it is my belief that the Commission has the statutory 

authority to be significantly more involved in helping to resolve retransmission consent disputes. I do not know what is precluding the current Commission from being 

more involved in dispute resolution. 

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

133 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. The Commission could prohibit separately owned, same-market broadcasters from coordinating their retransmission consent negotiations as a per se violation of the good faith rules. Also the Commission could prohibit all forms of thirdparty interference with the exercise of retransmission consent for out-of-market carriage as a per se violation of the good faith rules. 

Moreover, the Commission could make available dispute resolution mechanisms 

in cases where retransmission consent negotiations have reached an impasse and 

the broadcaster and MVPD cannot reach a deal on prices, terms, or conditions of 

carriage, even in the absence of a showing that a broadcaster has not acted in ‘‘good 

faith.’’ 

It could also create a process that provides interim carriage based on the terms 

of expiring retransmission consent deals while (i) an MVPD continues to negotiate 

in good faith towards a carriage agreement; or (ii) during the pendency of a dispute 

resolution proceeding. 

Reasonable Basic Service Tier Rates 

While I understand programming costs are growing, I am concerned about the significant increase in retransmission compensation that has occurred over the past 

several years. For example, retransmission consent revenue climbed more than 30 

percent for six broadcasters in the first nine months of 2008. By 2017, SNL Kagan— 

an industry analysis firm—projects retransmission fees will grow to $3.61 billion, 

with average per-subscriber fees potentially doubling. So, as broadcasters look to increase revenue streams through retransmission fee, it seemingly puts upward pressure on the price of basic cable and ultimately consumers. Such increase may also 

infringe upon the existing statute. 

Section 623(b)(1) requires the FCC to ensure that basic cable service rates are reasonable. In addition, Section 325(b)(3)(A) requires the Commission to consider the 

impact that retransmission consent has on basic cable service rates and that any 

regulations do not conflict with the FCC’s ‘‘obligation under Section 623(b)(1)’’ to ensure such rates are reasonable. 

According to SNL Kagan, the average cable TV subscriber in 2011 paid $78 a 

month compared to only $40 per month in 2001. Whereas the average household income fell 6 percent between 2006 and 2010, according to the U.S. Census. 

Question 3. Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing 

retransmission fees in relations to basic cable rates? 

Answer. No, I do not know. However, increasing retransmission consent rates are 

having a large impact on our basic cable rates, and we would strongly encourage 

the FCC to launch such an examination. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for (1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and (2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. We are prohibited by confidentiality language in our retransmission consent agreements from disclosing fees paid to the stations. However, during the past 

two retransmission consent cycles we have seen an average of 100 percent increases 

when the agreements get renegotiated. The internal year-over-year increases then 

moderate for the balance of the term of the agreement but essentially always represent a multiple of the consumer price index (CPI). 

Based on the retransmission consent agreements we are negotiating now for 2013 

and beyond we expect that trend to continue, if not worsen. 

WOW!, like all other MVPDs, has no real option other than to pass some or all 

of these costs along to our customers. The impact of out-of-control programming cost 

increases, including retransmission consent fees, is felt most acutely by elderly and 

low-income customers. 

Eliminating Retransmission Consent and Compulsory Licenses 

While there is no question that Congress must examine and reform outdated provisions in the statute, there are legislative proposals before Congress that propose 

sweeping changes to laws governing cable and broadcast obligations. In particular 

these bills propose repealing retransmission consent, must carry, and the Copyright 

Act’s ‘‘compulsory license’’ provisions. 

During the hearing, witnesses provided conflicting testimony on the impact such 

eliminations would have on the marketplace and with retrans negotiations—some 

said it would only increase disputes and others said it would wouldn’t. 

134 

Question 5. Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and 

broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now 

be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and 

parties that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, 

please compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the 

current retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. If these provisions were eliminated, the copyright owners of the content 

that airs on broadcast stations would gain greater control over the distribution of 

their content. Some of these copyright owners may choose to license their content 

to MVPDs on their own, and others may choose to grant broadcasters the right to 

sublicense their content to MVPDs 

The new negotiation process that would emerge from the elimination of the statutory license and the retransmission consent provisions seems likely to carry with it 

at least as many of the same flaws as the current process, with the added problem 

that the changeover would inject a great deal of uncertainty into the marketplace 

that could be significantly harmful to consumers and competition. 

If the must carry requirements were eliminated from the law, there would be no 

obligation on an MVPD to carry any broadcast station, and station owners that had 

relied on the must carry rules would have to negotiate for carriage with MVPDs, 

similar to the way retransmission consent stations negotiate carriage with MVPDs. 

Question 6. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to more 

disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. To the extent that MVPDs have to negotiate carriage deals with an increased number of copyright holders and their sub-licensees, the likelihood of negotiating impasses would be greater. The result may be fewer total broadcast signal 

blackouts, but more partial content blackouts where individual programs are no 

longer available to the viewer. 

Question 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. I do not believe that eliminating all of these provisions would lead to 

fewer disputes. 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. Carriage disputes between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers seem to occur less often than disputes regarding retransmission consent. I am 

aware of only two such disputes this year, each involving satellite providers. First, 

Dish Network continues to be unable to reach to reach a carriage deal with AMC 

Networks, which includes AMC, WE, IFC, and Sundance. This dispute has been ongoing since July. Second, DirecTV could not reach a carriage deal with Viacom for 

its 26 channels, including MTV, Nickelodeon and Comedy Central. The networks 

were off DirecTV for nine full days. 

It is my understanding that while there has been a 15 percent increase in commercial television stations from 1996 to 2010, there has also been a 33 percent decrease in the number of station owners. There has also been a continued dearth of 

ownership by minorities and women—which is approximately only 5 percent and 3.3 

percent of TV market share, respectively (both well below their population representation). Both indicate a significant deficit in achieving the policy goals of localism 

and diversity. 

A free exchange of a wide range of viewpoints is the lifeblood of our democracy, 

and the print and broadcast media serve an indispensable function by exposing our 

society to diverse thoughts and viewpoints. 

Question 9. What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from 

the law have on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a 

local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the 

MVPD to carry the station? 

Answer. If the must carry requirements were eliminated from the law, there 

would be no obligation on an MVPD to carry any broadcast station, and station owners that had relied on the must carry rules would have to negotiate for carriage with 

MVPDs, similar to the way retransmission consent stations negotiate carriage with 

MVPDs. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our Nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

135 

Answer. If must carry stations could not strike carriage deals with an MVPD, and 

as a result these stations went out of business, then it is possible that one would 

perceive there to be greater concentration in the media market due to these stations’ 

exit. However, one must then assess the magnitude of the impact of the loss of these 

stations on the diversity of media voices in the current marketplace. 

Online Video vs. Traditional Video 

According to Nielsen Media, the average American watches over 153 hours of 

video per month on traditional television compared to only 4.5 hours per month of 

online video. Also, approximately 97 percent of American households have a television whereas 68 percent of households have broadband (the U.S. currently ranks 

23rd in broadband penetration). 

In addition, a 2011 Project for Excellence in Journalism survey found that local 

TV remains America’s most popular source of local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news—89 percent of surveyed adults get information 

about local weather and 80 percent follow local breaking news through local television. Only about 51 percent of smartphone users use the device to get news. 

While the Internet is a very value medium for media and news and provides incredible benefit to users, most Americans still rely heavily on traditional television 

for programming, local news, and even weather. 

Question 11. With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a 

‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? 

If not, what do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional 

television and local news? 

Answer. I do not believe that today Internet video is a ‘‘perfect substitute’’ for traditional television programming and local broadcast news. Thus far, we have seen 

little evidence that significant numbers of consumers are abandoning traditional 

MVPD services (‘‘cutting the cord’’) and relying instead entirely on video delivered 

over the Internet, which is how an economist would view a ‘‘perfect substitute.’’ 

Rather, most Internet video appears to be complementary to MVPD offerings, with 

many consumers using both services. 

Value of Public Broadcasting 

Harris Interactive, an independent, non-partisan research firm, found—for the 

ninth year in a row—that PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) is the Nation’s mosttrusted institution by the American public. PBS ranked higher than our court system, newspapers, our Federal government, and, surprisingly, even Congress. 

In addition, 74 percent of the American public surveyed believe Federal funding 

for PBS is money well spent. PBS was also the most trusted and safe place for children to watch television—88 percent of Americans surveyed agreed. 

Question 12. What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. While many of the smaller markets we serve don’t receive much if any 

locally originated programming from their respective PBS affiliates, we continue to 

believe that PBS programming is an important service for our subscribers and expect it to remain a valued part of our channel lineups. 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. The elimination of the must carry rules and the compulsory license could 

have a near term adverse impact on PBS and other public broadcast stations. However, I believe that many MVPDs would continue to carry one or more PBS stations 

on their systems even without the must carry rules in place. Nonetheless, these stations would need to quickly adapt to the new regulatory environment, particularly 

a marketplace without a statutory license, and their success would depend on how 

well they make the transition. 

Affiliate Negotiation & Impact on Localism 

One of the arguments for reform is that the current law is outdated and doesn’t 

allow for true marketplace negotiations because it allows local stations to block 

cable systems from importing network programming from another affiliate of the 

same broadcast network. For example, the network non-duplication rule prohibits 

distributors from negotiating with other suppliers of the same content—taking away 

a basic component of any free market. 

Some have stated that this prohibits ‘‘free market’’ negotiations since cable operators have only one source to receive the programming. And therefore have recVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
136 

ommended to open up the market where a cable or satellite operator could negotiate 

with an out-of-market affiliate. 

Question 14. While this might seem appropriate, I am concerned about the impact 

such allowance would have on localism. As the Supreme Court has stated ‘‘fairness 

to communities [in distributing radio service] is furthered by a recognition of local 

needs for a community radio mouthpiece.’’ If this scenario was allowed, how could 

we protect localism? What safeguards could be implemented to ensure local programming? 

Answer. The relationship between elimination of the network non-duplication and 

syndicated exclusivity rules and the amount of local programming aired on local 

broadcast stations is indirect, at best. 

Question 15. How feasible is it actually for a cable or satellite operator to negotiate with out of market affiliate? There is still the primary owner of the content— 

the programmer. If the cable operator is having a dispute with the in-market Fox 

or Disney broadcaster, how could the cable company turn to an out-of-market Fox 

or Disney affiliate and successfully negotiate? It’s still Fox or Disney and it seems 

that if the out-of-market affiliate did engage, Disney could threaten to pull the affiliation to prevent such action? 

Answer. It is increasingly difficult for small cable operators to negotiate retransmission consent with broadcasters for out-of-market carriage. It is now common for 

the national broadcast networks to prohibit contractually their affiliates from granting an MVPD the right to re-broadcast their signal outside of their local market. 

At the same time, in-market broadcasters are increasingly conditioning their grant 

of retransmission on MVPDs agreeing not to import out-of-market broadcast stations. These practices mostly harm consumers who benefit from receiving out-ofmarket stations in some circumstances where the out-of-market station offers instate news and more relevant weather compared with the in-market station. 

Where not restricted by exclusivity rules and contractual provisions, carriage of 

out-of-market stations is often made available to MVPDs at a more competitive 

price than the in-market affiliate. This often has the effect of moderating the demands made by the in-market affiliate, thus creating savings that can be passed 

through to consumers. 

Retransmission Fee 

As mentioned in a prior question, I am concerned about the significant increase 

in retransmission fees that has occurred over the past several years. But at the 

same time, given that retransmission consent is a negotiation between private parties, the MVPD is under no obligation to pay the fee being demanded by the broadcaster or carry the signal under Section 325(b)(4). 

Question 16. If a MVPD feels that the retransmission fee the broadcasters is asking for is not reasonable then why not just simply not pay it, stop retransmitting 

the signal over the cable plant indefinitely, and, if need be, give every customer in 

the market an antenna? If seems over time, the number of subscribers MVPDs have 

(over 101 million subs) would make broadcasters come to the table sooner rather 

than later. 

Answer. If an MVPD stops retransmitting the signal of a Big 4 broadcast network 

affiliate, the MVPD would expect to lose a significant number of subscribers, which 

will threaten their competitive standing in the marketplace. Providing an antenna 

to every customer using traditional antenna technology is not an option, particularly 

for smaller MVPDs serving rural areas, because not all customers can receive a good 

quality broadcaster signal over the air. 

MVPDs don’t object to paying a retransmission consent fee to broadcasters. 

MVPDs are troubled that rules and regulations that were created 20 years ago have 

not kept up with the times, and now give broadcasters advantages in negotiations 

which allow them to charge prices that are above fair market value. 

Question 17. If all MVPDs feel that the retransmission fees are unreasonable then 

why don’t you all agree not to pay the broadcasters—hold an industry-wide boycott? 

Answer. Such an act would be considered collusion prohibited under the Sherman 

Antitrust Act. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

137 

Answer. No. 

Question 2. Are WOW! subscribers required by Federal law to purchase a certain 

package of channels when they buy your video service? 

Answer. Yes, current Federal law requires that WOW! subscribers must purchase 

at a minimum a basic cable service tier, which MUST include must carry signals, 

local public, educational and governmental access programming required under its 

franchises, and any signal of any television broadcast station that WOW! provides 

to any subscriber. Broadcast stations that elect retransmission consent generally require carriage in the basic cable service tier as a non-negotiable condition of retransmission consent. [Note the operator must put ALL broadcast signals on the basic 

tier without distinction as to whether they are there under must carry or retrans. 

See Section 623(b)(7)(A)(iii). The above paragraph has been modified.] 

Question 3. Is WOW! prevented by Federal law from selling a subscriber only a single channel, Discovery Channel for example, or only a package of sports channels? 

Answer. Except as set forth above in my answer to question 2, Federal laws do 

not prevent WOW! from selling a subscriber a single channel, like Discovery Channel, or a package (tier) of sports channels. However, in practice, media conglomerates that own many channels condition carriage of their most popular channel 

with carriage of their less popular channels and require them to be distributed on 

MVPD’s most widely sold packages. Moreover, media conglomerates also require 

that their programming be carried in the same package of service as programming 

owned by other media conglomerates. The result for the consumer is a bloated and 

expensive tier of cable channels where the consumer has little to no choice in what 

channels to purchase. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

COLLEEN ABDOULAH

Question. Mr. Franks, if compulsory licensing is eliminated, what would be the 

effect on smaller providers? Would individual deals need to be cut? Is it easier for 

those already in the marketplace, therefore hurting competition? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

DR. MARK COOPER

Question 1a. Whenever signals are pulled as a result of a retransmission consent 

dispute, consumers lose. The impact is magnified in areas where a single MVPD 

dominates an entire state. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 1b. Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in 

geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 

percent) of total MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

DR. MARK COOPER

Question 1. S. 2008, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act of 2011, 

would provide for the deregulation of retransmission consent. But as we saw last 

month with DirecTV and Viacom, blackouts occur due to disputes between cable programmers and cable providers in a non-regulated environment too. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in a deregulated world, why 

would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for broadcasters too? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 2a. Today’s video marketplace is very different than what it was in 1992. 

Since the enactment of the Cable Act, satellite carriers and telephone companies offering video services compete with cable operators. And in the last few years, we 

have seen the enormous growth of online video. In your view, given these changes 

in the video marketplace, are the existing rules working? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 2b. Why or why not? 

138 

Answer. No answer provided. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

DR. MARK COOPER

Question 1a. Stakeholders on all sides of the retransmission consent debate appear to agree that the visibility and frequency of retransmission disputes has increased over the last few years. Some have argued that retransmission consent is 

working and that some growing pains are reasonable because many broadcast stations are electing to pursue deals instead of must-carry for the first time since enactment of the 1992 Cable Act which created the dual regimes of must carry and 

retransmission consent. On the other hand, distributors argue that private sector 

retransmission consent deals are taking longer to negotiate, and that it is becoming 

harder to reach agreement regarding mutually agreeable terms. If you believe mustcarry and retransmission consent are important to localism, how do you recommend 

that the Congress measure the success of localism? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 1b. If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can 

you provide? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 2a. Some distributors have indicated concerns about the ability of content creators to tie affiliated programing to retransmission consent deals because 

they argue this practice contributes to programming cost increases. Broadcasters 

and content creators argue that current practices provide necessary financial support for a greater variety of programming options which they say is a benefit to consumers. To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost increases over the past several years? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 2b. If you believe programming cost increases merit a fresh look at the 

1992 Cable Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by distributors should be 

passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 2c. If you support changes to current law, would your company provide 

consumers with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? If 

not, why not? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 3a. Given that retransmission consent deals are private sector negotiations under the 1992 Cable Act, it is difficult for observers and participants to track 

pricing trends. Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers could help to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 3b. If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. No answer provided. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

DR. MARK COOPER

Existing FCC Authority 

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (‘‘1992 

Cable Act’’) amended the Communications Act to include Section 325, which provides television stations with certain carriage rights on local market cable television 

systems. The Commission established rules related to the retransmission/mandatory 

carriage election cycle, but did not adopt rules governing the negotiation process of 

retransmission consent. 

However, the statute clearly calls for the FCC to ensure that broadcasters act in 

‘‘good faith during negotiations.’’ During the Sinclair-Mediacom dispute back in 

139 

2007, the Commission didn’t intervene because then Chairman Martin interpreted 

the law didn’t and stated that the agency didn’t have the authority to impose binding arbitration. At the time, he stated ‘‘It’s not clear to me that the commission does 

have the authority to order arbitration.’’ 

Yet, during that time in January 2007, Senator Inouye and the late Senator Stevens wrote the FCC stating that the Commission did indeed have authority to intervene and, if necessary, use binding arbitration to resolve any failed negotiations. 

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

Answer. Changing statutory interpretations are quite challenging. One must 

prove a material change in circumstances to reverse an earlier interpretation. 

Should the FCC try to do so, it would certainly be sued. 

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. If the Congress has the will and ability to take action, it should do a lot 

more than ‘‘good faith.’’ Good faith negotiations will require arbitration and enforcement. Congress will do better o mandate specific criteria or standards. 

Reasonable Basic Service Tier Rates 

While I understand programming costs are growing, I am concerned about the significant increase in retransmission compensation that has occurred over the past 

several years. For example, retransmission consent revenue climbed more than 30 

percent for six broadcasters in the first nine months of 2008. By 2017, SNL Kagan— 

an industry analysis firm—projects retransmission fees will grow to $3.61 billion, 

with average per-subscriber fees potentially doubling. So, as broadcasters look to increase revenue streams through retransmission fee, it seemingly puts upward pressure on the price of basic cable and ultimately consumers. Such increase may also 

infringe upon the existing statute. 

Section 623(b)(1) requires the FCC to ensure that basic cable service rates are reasonable. In addition, Section 325(b)(3)(A) requires the Commission to consider the 

impact that retransmission consent has on basic cable service rates and that any 

regulations do not conflict with the FCC’s ‘‘obligation under Section 623(b)(1)’’ to ensure such rates are reasonable. 

According to SNL Kagan, the average cable TV subscriber in 2011 paid $78 a 

month compared to only $40 per month in 2001. Whereas the average household income fell 6 percent between 2006 and 2010, according to the U.S. Census. 

Question 3. Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing 

retransmission fees in relations to basic cable rates? 

Answer. I do not. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for 1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and 2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. Retransmission fees are a small part of the total bill. However, retransmission has played a large part in driving up cable bills. By giving the broadcasters 

the ability to create bundles that have driven up costs. 

Eliminating Retransmission Consent and Compulsory Licenses 

While there is no question that Congress must examine and reform outdated provisions in the statute, there are legislative proposals before Congress that propose 

sweeping changes to laws governing cable and broadcast obligations. In particular 

these bills propose repealing retransmission consent, must carry, and the Copyright 

Act’s ‘‘compulsory license’’ provisions. 

During the hearing, witnesses provided conflicting testimony on the impact such 

eliminations would have on the marketplace and with retrans negotiations—some 

said it would only increase disputes and others said it would wouldn’t. 

Question 5. Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and 

broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now 

be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and 

parties that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, 

140 

please compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the 

current retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. Repeal of these provision would completely unbalance the bargaining 

process. MVPDs have market power over access to viewers. MVPDs would eat the 

lunch of the broadcasters. Consumers would ultimately pay the price. 

Question 6. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to more 

disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. I do not believe they would lead to more disputes. The MVPDs’ would 

prevail on terms that suite them. 

Question 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. I do not have this information. 

Question 9. What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from 

the law have on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a 

local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the 

MVPD to carry the station? 

Answer. They could not gain carriage. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our Nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

Answer. Elimination of must carry would reduce the availability of local broadcasting. The local broadcasting would be replaced by content from dominant firms. 

Online Video vs. Traditional Video 

According to Nielsen Media, the average American watches over 153 hours of 

video per month on traditional television compared to only 4.5 hours per month of 

online video. Also, approximately 97 percent of American households have a television whereas 68 percent of households have broadband (the U.S. currently ranks 

23rd in broadband penetration). 

In addition, a 2011 Project for Excellence in Journalism survey found that local 

TV remains America’s most popular source of local news and information, particularly for weather and breaking news—89 percent of surveyed adults get information 

about local weather and 80 percent follow local breaking news through local television. Only about 51 percent of smartphone users use the device to get news. 

While the Internet is a very value medium for media and news and provides incredible benefit to users, most Americans still rely heavily on traditional television 

for programming, local news, and even weather. 

Question 11. With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a 

‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? 

If not, what do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional 

television and local news? 

Answer. The Internet is, at best an emerging partial substitute. Professional, long 

form video is a distinct product that is dominated by a handful of vertically integrated media conglomerates, who have controlled the availability of their content on 

the Internet to prevent it from becoming an effective distribution mechanism for 

this content. 

Value of Public Broadcasting 

Harris Interactive, an independent, non-partisan research firm, found—for the 

ninth year in a row—that PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) is the Nation’s mosttrusted institution by the American public. PBS ranked higher than our court system, newspapers, our Federal government, and, surprisingly, even Congress. 

In addition, 74 percent of the American public surveyed believe Federal funding 

for PBS is money well spent. PBS was also the most trusted and safe place for children to watch television—88 percent of Americans surveyed agreed. 

Question 12. What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. In 50 years public television has not played a significant role in providing 

local content and there is no reason to believe it will do so in the foreseeable future. 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

141 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. I do not know. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

DR. MARK COOPER

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

Answer. Cable would have to reconfigure distribution as a private performance, 

as Aereo has done. 

Question 2. Do you believe the Federal law requiring cable subscribers to purchase the so-called ‘‘basic tier’’ of channels prescribed by the government is at odds 

with consumer choice, since it effectively forces consumers to purchase channels 

they may not want? (47 USC § 543(b)(7)(A)) 

Answer. Mandatory unbundling would be in the consumer interest, but it must 

cover all programming, not just the basic tier. 

Question 3. Do you believe wireless voice services and VoIP services are an adequate substitute for traditional wireline telephony for consumers? 

Answer. No. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

DR. MARK N. COOPER

Question. Mr. Franks, if compulsory licensing is eliminated, what would be the 

effect on smaller providers? Would individual deals need to be cut? Is it easier for 

those already in the marketplace, therefore hurting competition? 

Answer. No answer provided. 

RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question. What is the best way to protect consumers while companies work to resolve disputes and impasses in negotiations for the carriage of broadcast signals? 

Should any special consideration be given to protect consumers in geographic locations where a single MVPD serves a high percentage (more than 50 percent) of total 

MVPD subscribers in a state? 

Answer. The television marketplace is moving toward more consumer choice 

among video distributors, more package options and, with services like ABC.com, 

Hulu and Netflix, more a la carte offerings. As this pro-consumer migration continues, not every channel is going to be a part of every video distribution platform 

and every service offering. For example, DISH recently decided to not carry the 

channels of AMC Networks. In our free market economy, DISH is perfectly free to 

make that decision. Fans of the AMC channels are equally free to abandon DISH 

and to choose a different subscription video provider. 

As sports costs escalate, it seems inevitable that some subscription television platform will decide that there is a market for a less expensive service without sports 

channels. One day (after the concept of ‘‘Must Carry’’ is retired), some cable/satellite 

subscription platform will elect to go to market without broadcast signals concluding 

that there is a market to serve consumers who can receive broadcast channels well 

over-the-air. And, someday one or more broadcasters and/or non-broadcast channels 

will elect to not even offer their channels to one or more distribution platforms— 

perhaps because those platforms insist on stripping out the channels’ commercial 

foundation. 

My point in painting this vision of what I believe to be the inevitable future of 

the television marketplace is respectfully to nudge the Congress (and hopefully the 

FCC) away from the notion that every instance of non-carriage of a TV channel on 

some cable/satellite video distribution platform is a matter for government intervention. Respectfully, in my opinion, it is not. 

Thanks to the leadership of this Committee, American consumers are now served 

by a workably competitive video distribution marketplace featuring competition between cable companies, two nationwide satellite companies, telephone companies 

and emerging Online Video Distributors. Instead of maintaining statutes and regulations designed to manage the channel lineups of each cable/satellite video service 

offering, I urge the Congress to focus on removing outdated statutes and regulations 

142 

left over from a bygone era of scarcity—regulations designed to enforce some government preferred outcome such as the inclusion of every channel on every video service offering. The dynamics of competition between multiple and diverse video offerings will be a far better servant of consumers than is detailed government regulation. 

A market where a single MVPD serves more than 50 percent of total MVPD customers does come closer to a situation that warrants government intervention. But, 

I would urge the Congress to take steps to promote more distribution competition 

(for example by repealing the cable and satellite compulsory licenses that currently 

disadvantage emerging online distributors) rather than trying to regulate the behavior of any distributor. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question. If we see customers, like those who subscribe to DirecTV, suffering in 

a deregulated world, why would we want to deregulate the negotiation process for 

broadcasters too? In your view, given these changes in the video marketplace, are 

the existing rules working? Why or why not? 

Answer. Please see the answer to Senator Inouye’s questions above. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARK WARNER TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question 1. If you believe must-carry and retransmission consent are important 

to localism, how do you recommend that the Congress measure the success of localism? If you believe retransmission consent is failing, what evidence can you provide? 

Answer. Please see the answer to Senator Inouye’s questions above. 

Question 2. To what extent should Congress be concerned about programming cost 

increases over the past several years? If you believe programming cost increases 

merit a fresh look at the 1992 Cable Act, do you believe cost savings garnered by 

distributors should be passed onto consumers? If so, how would any savings be realized by consumers? If you support changes to current law, would your company provide consumers with the same flexibility to pursue a la carte programming options? 

If not, why not? 

Answer. The best antidote to program cost increases is to maximize the number 

of distributors offering service to consumers. In my opinion, competition is always 

a better servant of consumers than is regulation, no matter how well intended the 

regulation. There have been numerous studies of government mandated a la carte. 

Most of those studies have concluded that in an a la carte world, consumers would 

pay more and get less. The studies also show that government mandated a la carte 

would diminish program diversity. Online distributors like Hulu and Netflix are beginning to offer consumers a la carte options without government mandates. These 

options are likely to increase in the future. Congress should repeal the cable and 

satellite compulsory licenses that presently discriminate against the online distributors. 

Question 3. Do you believe pricing transparency for distributors and for consumers 

could help to alleviate tensions over content deals? If not, why not? 

If you do believe pricing transparency could be beneficial, please provide specific 

recommendations for such a proposal could be implemented. 

Answer. There are good and valid reasons why confidentiality provisions are a 

part of most contracts in American free market commerce. In my opinion, there is 

no reason for the government to mandate a departure from this nearly universal 

business practice with respect to television programming. 

Question 4. Going forward, how should Congress and/or the Federal Communications Commission measure whether or not the current system is working? Please 

provide specific metrics to support your answer. 

Answer. Please see the answer to Senator Inouye’s questions above. 

Question 5. If Congress were to revisit the 1992 Cable Act, are there improvements to the law which you believe Congress should consider? 

Answer. In my opinion, Congress should repeal the cable and satellite compulsory 

licenses that discriminate in favor of cable and satellite distributors and against online distributors. I do not understand why Congress chooses to discriminate in this 

manner. 

One of the most important public policy benefits of S. 2008 is that it would remove this huge current impediment to the development of competitive Online Video 

143 

Distributors. The compulsory copyright licenses apply to cable and satellite systems, 

but not to Online Video Distributors. That means that the government gives cable 

and satellite—but not Online Video Distributors—a royalty free license to use all 

the programs on local broadcast stations. In other words, the government gives a 

huge windfall to cable and satellite but not to Online Video Distributors. 

Even worse, because of the existence of the compulsory licenses, broadcasters (unlike non-broadcast channels) traditionally contract only for the right to broadcast a 

program—not for the right to sublicense that program to distributors who wish to 

retransmit the program. Because they have never needed to do so (because the compulsory license was there to fulfill this role), broadcasters typically do not contract 

for the right to authorize anyone to retransmit their programs. So, the poor Online 

Video Distributor not only cannot get the right to retransmit broadcast programs 

from the compulsory license; the OVD also cannot get the rights directly from the 

broadcaster. 

There are two ways to fix this glaring problem. The first would be to add Online 

Video Distributors to the parties covered by compulsory licensing. As outlined in my 

written testimony, the problem with this approach is that the United States is a 

party to numerous International agreements and treaties that expressly prohibit 

granting compulsory licenses for Internet retransmission of television programs. The 

second way to solve the problem is to repeal the antiquated compulsory licenses so 

that cable, satellite and online distributors are all on a level playing field when it 

comes to securing rights in broadcast programming. This is the approach embodied 

in S. 2008. 

In my opinion, consumers would reap huge benefits from the increased television 

distribution competition that would result from repeal of the cable and satellite compulsory licenses. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question 1. Given the existing statute and the Congressional letter, couldn’t the 

current Commission interpret the statue differently than Chairman Martin to where 

they do have the statutory authority to be involved in any disputes? What is precluding them from doing so? 

Answer. The television marketplace is moving toward more consumer choice 

among video distributors, more package options and, with services like ABC.com, 

Hulu and Netflix, more a la carte offerings. As this pro-consumer migration continues, not every channel is going to be a part of every video distribution platform 

and every service offering. For example, DISH recently decided to not carry the 

channels of AMC Networks. In our free market economy, DISH is perfectly free to 

make that decision. Fans of the AMC channels are equally free to abandon DISH 

and to choose a different subscription video provider. 

As sports costs escalate, it seems inevitable that some subscription television platform will decide that there is a market for a less expensive service without sports 

channels. One day (after the concept of ‘‘Must Carry’’ is retired), some cable/satellite 

subscription platform will elect to go to market without broadcast signals concluding 

that there is a market to serve consumers who can receive broadcast channels well 

over-the-air. And, someday one or more broadcasters and/or non-broadcast channels 

will elect to not even offer their channels to one or more distribution platforms— 

perhaps because those platforms insist on stripping out the channels’ commercial 

foundation. 

My point in painting this vision of what I believe to be the inevitable future of 

the television marketplace is respectfully to nudge the Congress (and hopefully the 

FCC) away from the notion that every instance of non-carriage of a TV channel on 

some cable/satellite video distribution platform is a matter for government intervention. Respectfully, in my opinion, it is not. 

Thanks to the leadership of this Committee, American consumers are now served 

by a workably competitive video distribution marketplace featuring competition between cable companies, two nationwide satellite companies, telephone companies 

and emerging Online Video Distributors. Instead of maintaining statutes and regulations designed to manage the channel lineups of each cable/satellite video service 

offering, I urge the Congress to focus on removing outdated statutes and regulations 

left over from a bygone era of scarcity—regulations designed to enforce some government preferred outcome such as the inclusion of every channel on every video service offering. The dynamics of competition between multiple and diverse video offerings will be a far better servant of consumers than is detailed government regulation. 

144 

Question 2. If Congress directed the FCC to ensure broadcasters act in ‘‘good 

faith’’ during negotiations, how do you believe the FCC can go about fulfilling that 

responsibility and to limit or prevent the disruption of programming to cable and/ 

or satellite customers? 

Answer. As described above, the video marketplace is moving from a world of a 

limited number of platforms offering nearly identical channel lineups to a far more 

consumer friendly world of many platforms offering diverse and differentiated channel lineups. This evolution, which inevitably will involve some disruption, is wildly 

pro-consumer. The forces of competition and diversity will be a much better servant 

of consumer interests than government regulation ever could be. Therefore, I urge 

the FCC to find a lack of good faith negotiating in only the most egregious circumstances. 

Question 3. Do you know if the FCC is actively examining the impact of increasing 

retransmission fees in relations to basic cable rates? 

Answer. Retransmission fees to broadcasters are increasing rapidly to correct for 

several decades in which cable companies paid nothing for the use of broadcast 

channels—the most popular and valuable channels that the cable companies sell to 

consumers. I do not know whether the FCC is investigating this long overdue marketplace correction. I do know that in 1992 this Committee stated, ‘‘Cable operators 

pay for the cable programming services they offer to their customers; the Committee 

believes that programming services which originate on a broadcast channel should 

not be treated differently.’’ S. Rep. No. 102–92, at 35. 

Question 4. Can you elaborate on what impact these retransmission fees have on 

the cost of basic cable service? What percentage of a cable customer’s monthly cable 

bill is attributed to retransmission fees paid to the broadcasters (a rough estimate 

will suffice) for 1) a customer subscribing to basic cable and 2) a customer subscribing to the most expensive cable TV package? 

Answer. I do not have access to the data necessary to answer this question. I do 

know that for decades cable operators charged consumers approximately $15 or 

more per month for ‘‘Lifeline’’ services consisting almost exclusively of broadcast 

channels and paid the broadcasters nothing. That the transition from this patently 

unfair situation would have some impact on consumer cable bills is not surprising. 

Question 5. Can you elaborate, in detail, on how negotiations between MVPDs and 

broadcasters (and/or programming/content owners and anyone else that might now 

be included) would be carried out, if the compulsory license, must carry, and retransmission consent provisions were eliminated? Please lay out the process and 

parties that would exist in negotiating the rights to use programming/content. Also, 

please compare/contrast the new negotiation process that would result versus the 

current retransmission consent negotiations. 

Answer. There is no need to guess or to speculate about how negotiations between 

broadcasters and cable/satellite distributors would work in the absence of compulsory licensing. One need only look at the current negotiations between NON-broadcast channels—channels NOT subject to the existing cable/satellite compulsory licenses—and the cable/satellite distributors. The channels not subject to compulsory 

licensing routinely engage in a single negotiation with program owners for both (1) 

the copyrights necessary to telecast a program and (2) the right to sublicense the 

program to cable/satellite distributors. Then these non-broadcast channels engage in 

a single negotiation with each cable/satellite distributor providing them with the 

necessary copyright clearances to exhibit ALL of the programs on the channel’s 

schedule. The process is simple, straightforward and has resulted in cable/satellite 

carriage of more than 500 non-broadcast channels nationwide without any difficulty, 

complication or ‘‘hold-outs’’. 

When the compulsory licenses are repealed (as surely will happen at some point), 

broadcasters and program owners will need a brief period (perhaps 12 or 18 months) 

to adjust their existing contracts to include the right to sublicense programs to 

cable/satellite distributors. Today, program owners routinely give these sublicensing 

rights to non-broadcast channels when those channels license a program for their 

schedule. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the process would work any 

differently for broadcast channels. 

Some proponents of continued compulsory licensing fear that clearing these cable/ 

satellite-sublicensing rights in the marketplace could be messy and difficult creating 

the opportunity for program owners to ‘‘hold up’’ the broadcast channels. These fears 

can be convincingly laid to rest by the fact that hundreds of non-broadcast channels 

today obtain these cable/satellite-sublicensing rights in the free market without 

mess, difficulty or ‘‘hold-ups’’. 

Other proponents of continued compulsory licensing fear that small broadcasters 

lack the staff and expertise necessary to negotiate the same cable/satellite-subVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
145 

licensing rights routinely secured today by non-broadcast channels. This fear also 

is unfounded. For programs licensed today to non-broadcast channels, the burden 

of assembling all the necessary rights, including music rights, is borne by the program owner. Then, the non-broadcast channels engage in a single, simple negotiation with the program owner. Again, there is no reason to believe that the process 

would work any differently for broadcast channels after the end of compulsory licensing. 

Finally, some advocates of continued compulsory licensing fear that program owners (sometimes referred to as ‘‘Hollywood’’) would charge broadcasters above and beyond the basic program exhibition license fee for the right to sublicense to cable/ 

satellite distributors. To test this fear I sought the advice of a major television programming syndicator. I asked the direct question, ‘‘Would you charge broadcasters 

extra for the right to sublicense program rights to cable/satellite distributors’’. The 

Syndication Executive did not answer immediately but instead met with that organization’s rank and file syndication salespeople to consider the question. In the end 

they concluded that there would be no additional charge. Their reasoning was as 

follows. Today, the syndication salespeople fly to a city, make presentations to the 

likely buyers among the local TV stations, play those stations against each other 

and seek to extract the highest possible license fee for their program—leaving no 

money ‘‘on the table.’’ After repeal of compulsory licensing, the program sales process would unfold in exactly the same way with the program sales executive seeking 

the highest possible license fee. With no change in the negotiating dynamics, there 

is no reason to expect a different outcome. 

To summarize, today broadcasters engage in a one-on-one negotiation with cable 

and satellite companies for the right to retransmit the broadcast signal. Following 

repeal of compulsory licensing, broadcasters would engage in a one-on-one negotiation with cable and satellite companies for the right to retransmit the broadcast programs. After a brief transition period, repeal of compulsory licensing would not introduce any complexity or complication to the process. And, a copyright-based negotiation is the strongest possible foundation for broadcasters to seek fair compensation for cable and satellite use of their programming. 

Questions 6 and 7. If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to 

more disputes, can you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

If you believe that eliminating these provisions would lead to less disputes, can 

you elaborate, in detail, on why? 

Answer. In my opinion, repeal of compulsory licensing would not cause any 

change in the number of disputes between broadcasters and cable/satellite distributors. 

NAB President and CEO Gordon Smith and CBS Executive VP Marty Franks, 

both good friends of mine and both highly respected industry leaders, testified to 

their opinion that repeal of compulsory licensing would increase the number of parties ‘‘at the table’’ by ten-fold and therefore would increase the number of disputes. 

Although I have no doubt that their testimony reflected their sincere beliefs, I respectfully disagree with their opinions. I believe that they may misperceive how the 

market would operate. 

The best evidence of how a market without compulsory licensing would work is 

to look at the process that takes place today regarding cable/satellite retransmission 

of non-broadcast channels. The programs on those channels are not subject to compulsory licensing and therefore provide a real world example of how broadcast negotiations with cable/satellite distributors would work in the absence of compulsory licensing. 

Today, non-broadcast channels engage in a single negotiation with a program seller for both (1) the right to include a program on their channel and (2) the right to 

sublicense that program to cable/satellite distributors. After securing those copyright rights, the channel then engages in a single negotiation with any cable/satellite distributor who wishes to distribute their channel. The process is simple. It 

happens every day without complication and without a tenfold increase in the parties ‘‘at the table’’. 

There is absolutely no reason why broadcast channels could not operate in exactly 

the same way in the absence of compulsory licensing—no tenfold increase in parties 

and no increase in disputes. 

Question 8. In witness testimony, it was indicated that for 2012, to date, there 

have already been 69 disputes regarding retransmission consent. How many disputes have occurred between MVPDs and non-broadcast networks/programmers? 

Answer. I do not know the answer to this question. But, as I explained in Answer 

number 1, there is every reason to expect disputes between programmers and cable/ 

satellite distributors as the market transitions from a world with only a few disVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:33 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\86916.TXT JACKIE
146 

tribution platforms with identical channel lineups to a world with more numerous 

distribution platforms with diverse channel lineups. This transition is underway 

and is decidedly pro-consumer. 

Question 9. What would the impact of eliminating must carry requirements from 

the law have on local and independent stations? Without must carry how could a 

local independent station get carried by a MVPD? Is there any obligation of the 

MVPD to carry the station? 

Answer. The following answer relates exclusively to commercial television stations. 

As President of the Association Of Independent Television Stations from 1985 to 

1990, I was a strong advocate for ‘‘Must Carry’’. At the time, cable systems had no 

competition in the subscription television market—no competition from satellite television distributors like DirecTV and DISH, no competition from Telco television 

distributors like FIOS and U-Verse and no competition from online television distributors like Hulu and Netflix. Government regulation in the form of Must Carry 

was necessary to protect consumers from cable’s then monopoly power. By documenting numerous instances of cable systems not carrying or dropping independent 

stations, I helped to build the factual record that the Congress relied upon in 1992 

to codify Must Carry, and that the Supreme Court subsequently relied upon to affirm the Must Carry statute. 

But, today’s television marketplace is radically different from the circumstances 

that existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today consumers and broadcasters 

have the opportunity to interface with multiple distribution platforms. Broadcasters 

can authorize distribution of their programming by cable, satellite, telephone companies and on the Internet. Some broadcasters already stream a portion of their program schedule online and that trend will only grow. 

In my opinion, these marketplace changes call into the question the continued 

need for Must Carry. Moreover, earlier this year Congress authorized the FCC to 

conduct Incentive Auctions to reclaim some broadcast spectrum so that it can be 

auctioned for wireless broadband. The broadcast stations most likely to give up their 

spectrum are the same stations most likely to elect Must Carry. Therefore, these 

auctions will almost certainly drastically reduce the universe of Must Carry stations 

raising further questions about the continuing need for a Must Carry statute. 

Congress will need to decide the future of Must Carry. In any event, repeal of the 

compulsory licenses should proceed. In the absence of compulsory licensing, commercial stations electing Must Carry would simply need to certify that in acquiring their 

programming they had secured the copyrights necessary to enable cable/satellite distributors to retransmit those programs. 

Question 10. Would the elimination of must carry possibly lead to more concentration in the media market and, as a result, further muting the diversity of media 

voices, which has been a resolute policy of our Nation’s telecommunications and 

media laws? 

Answer. The elimination of Must Carry would not lead to concentration in the 

media market. The media market is exploding with competitive and diverse voices. 

As outlined in my written testimony, consumers today have access to more, and 

more diverse, media options than at any time in history. As just one consumer, I 

frequently find myself drowning in diverse media options. 

Some of these new media options are on the Internet. But other new options are 

sprouting up in traditional media environments including broadcast television. For 

example, Bounce TV, created by co-founders Andrew Young and Martin Luther King 

III, describes itself as ‘‘the first 24/7 digital multicast broadcast network created exclusively for African Americans’’. There is no reason to fear that repeal of Must 

Carry would lead to more concentration in the media market. 

Question 11. With the current penetration and marketplace, is the Internet a 

‘‘perfect substitute’’ to traditional television programming and local broadcast news? 

If not, what do believe is required for it to be a substitutable good to traditional 

television and local news? 

Answer. Clearly the Internet is not yet as ubiquitous as television. But, it is rapidly closing the gap. And, the Internet has characteristics that make it better than 

merely a substitute for broadcast news. Traditionally broadcast news was available 

at only certain hours—hours selected by the broadcaster. Cable news channels offered consumers the first taste of ‘‘on-demand’’ news. Some broadcasters have taken 

advantage of the digital transition to offer consumers free on-demand news on a 

multicast channel. For example, Station KMGH, the ABC Affiliate in Denver, owned 

by Scripps Howard Broadcasting, provides consumers with 24/7 news on a digital 

multicast channel. 

147 

The Internet provides consumers with a vast array of diverse on-demand news 

‘‘channels’’. At any time they choose, consumers can go online and find multiple 

sources of mainstream news, business news, political news, minority news, women’s 

news, foreign news, automobile news, culinary news, motorcycle news, etc. The 

Internet is far better than merely a substitute for broadcast news. 

Question 12. What role do you see public television playing in providing local programming? 

Answer. My experience is limited to commercial television. I have no expertise in 

public television. 

Question 13. To your knowledge, do you believe PBS or any other public broadcasting station would be adversely impacted by any of the legislative proposals (that 

would do away with must carry, retrans, or compulsory licenses) currently in Congress? 

Answer. S. 2008 was drafted to not have any impact on the cable carriage rights 

of public broadcasting stations. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JIM DEMINT TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question 1. If enacted as written, would the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, S. 2008, allow a pay-TV company to retransmit the programming aired 

on broadcast signals without consent? 

Answer. No. If enacted, S. 2008 would require subscription television companies 

to negotiate with broadcasters for the right to retransmit their programs. S. 2008 

would repeal the cable and satellite compulsory copyright licenses in Title 17 of the 

United States Code. Under these outdated statutes, the government seizes the programs broadcast by TV stations and grants to cable and satellite distributors a government conferred copyright license to make those programs a part of the service 

that the cable/satellite companies sell to consumers. 

By repealing the compulsory copyright licenses, S. 2008 makes the retransmission 

consent provision of Title 47 of the United States Code unnecessary. Currently, the 

retransmission consent provision requires cable/satellite distributors to negotiate for 

the right to use a broadcaster’s signal. After repeal of compulsory licensing, cable/ 

satellite distributors will be required to negotiate for the right to use a broadcaster’s 

programs. 

In my opinion as a Thirty-Eight year veteran of the television business, S. 2008 

actually strengthens the position of local broadcasters. I say that because a negotiation based on traditional, and unarguable, copyright grounds is the strongest possible foundation for broadcasters to seek fair compensation for cable/satellite use of 

broadcast programming. S. 2008 would give broadcasters the same copyright based 

negotiating platform enjoyed today by non-broadcast channels like ESPN. 

Question 2. How did the existence of video compulsory licenses impact the creation of retransmission consent by Congress in 1992? 

Answer. Retransmission consent was enacted in 1992 to counter the effect of the 

compulsory copyright licenses. 

In 1992, this Committee stated, ‘‘Cable operators pay for the cable programming 

services they offer to their customers; the Committee believes that programming 

services which originate on a broadcast channel should not be treated differently.’’ 

S. Rep. No. 102–92, at 35. It is the compulsory license that enabled cable operators 

to offer broadcast programs to their customers without paying for those programs 

(unlike the programs of non-broadcast channels). The most direct way to achieve the 

result desired by the Committee would have been to simply repeal the compulsory 

license. 

But, this Committee does not have jurisdiction over the compulsory license because it is in Title 17 of the United States Code. Retransmission consent was conceived as a Commerce Committee vehicle to require cable operators to pay for broadcast programs. 

S. 2008 would correct the 1992 jurisdictional ‘‘end around’’ by straightforwardly 

repealing both the compulsory licenses and retransmission consent. 

Question 3. Do you believe a copyright-based carriage negotiation for broadcast 

programming, as envisioned by S. 2008, would necessarily increase the number of 

negotiating parties and increase ‘‘blackouts’’? 

Answer. No. In my opinion, passage of S. 2008 would not increase the number 

of negotiating parties and would not increase the number of disputes between 

broadcasters and cable/satellite distributors. 

148 

NAB President and CEO Gordon Smith and CBS Executive VP Marty Franks, 

both good friends of mine and both highly respected industry leaders, testified to 

their opinion that S. 2008, by repealing the compulsory license, would increase the 

number of parties ‘‘at the table’’ by ten-fold and therefore would increase the number of disputes. I respectfully disagree with their opinions. I believe that they may 

misperceive how the market would operate. 

The best evidence of how a market without compulsory licensing would work is 

to look at the process that takes place today regarding cable/satellite retransmission 

of non-broadcast channels. The programs on those channels are not subject to compulsory licensing and therefore provide a real world example of how broadcast negotiations with cable/satellite distributors would work in the absence of compulsory licensing. 

Today, non-broadcast channels engage in a single negotiation with a program seller for both (1) the right to include a program on their channel and (2) the right to 

sublicense that program to cable/satellite distributors. After securing those copyright rights, the channel then engages in a single negotiation with any cable/satellite distributor who wishes to distribute their channel. The process is simple. It 

happens every day without complication, without government involvement and without a tenfold increase in the parties ‘‘at the table’’. 

There is absolutely no reason why broadcast channels could not operate in exactly 

the same way in the absence of compulsory licensing—no tenfold increase in parties 

and no increase in disputes. 

Question 4. Would S. 2008 allow pay-TV providers to buy broadcast programming 

from anywhere? 

Answer. S. 2008 would restore the right of program creators (including broadcasters), and their contractual licensees, to maximize the availability of broadcast 

programming to consumers based on market demand. The compulsory licenses take 

away those rights. Under the compulsory licenses, the question of what broadcast 

programs may be distributed to which consumers is governed by audience ratings 

from 1972. (I know this sounds so stupid that it is hard to believe but I promise 

that it is true.) 1972! Some things have changed since 1972—but not the rules governing which broadcast programs may go where. 

Under S. 2008, program creators, networks and stations would work together to 

satisfy consumer demand. In a free market, if there is a program consumers want 

to see, a distribution platform to get it to them and money to be made doing so, 

it will happen. 

Historically, program syndicators and networks have granted local stations exclusive rights to exhibit their programs to the viewers in their market. I would expect 

that to continue. But, S. 2008’s repeal of compulsory licensing also would enable the 

parties in the marketplace to respond to any demonstrated consumer demand. Specifically, after enactment of S. 2008 getting in-State news to viewers will no longer 

take an act of Congress to override antiquated rules based on 1972 ratings. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KELLY AYOTTE TO

PRESTON PADDEN

Question 1. My constituents are adamant about receiving local news coverage. 

Even in the southern-most part of my state, we want New Hampshire news, not 

Boston news. One of the objectives of the 1992 Cable Act was to ensure consumers 

have access to locally originated programming. Has this goal succeeded? Are there 

any proposed changes to the Cable Act that could reverse this trend? How can we 

maintain and maximize localism? 

Answer. In my opinion, the problem being experienced by your constituents is 

caused by the outdated compulsory copyright license. This government-conferred license uses 1972 audience ratings by the A.C. Nielsen Company to dictate where 

broadcast programs may be distributed by cable. The 1972 ratings actually are enshrined in the FCC’s Rules that govern where cable systems may distribute broadcast programs. 

S. 2008 repeals the compulsory license and the 1972 ratings. After passage of S. 

2008 New Hampshire broadcasters and cable/satellite companies serving New 

Hampshire households will be able to work together to satisfy consumer demand for 

New Hampshire news. And it will be easier for consumers to receive messages from 

their State’s elected leaders. 

Question 2. Mr. Padden, you have spent a large part of your distinguished career 

working for a broadcast company, and in your testimony you argue that the 1992 

Act is outdated and that it stifles innovation by maintaining hurdles for Online 

Video Distributors to get into the market. New Hampshire is home to countless 

149 

numbers of innovators, especially smaller ones just trying to penetrate a competitive 

marketplace. Can you elaborate from your testimony on the affect The Act has on 

innovation? 

Answer. In my opinion, one of the most important public policy benefits of S. 2008 

is that it would remove a huge current impediment to the development of competitive Online Video Distributors. The compulsory copyright licenses apply to cable and 

satellite systems, but not to Online Video Distributors. That means that the government gives cable and satellite—but not Online Video Distributors—a royalty free license to use all the programs on local broadcast stations. In other words, the government gives a huge windfall to cable and satellite but not to Online Video Distributors. 

Even worse, because of the existence of the compulsory licenses, broadcasters (unlike non-broadcast channels) traditionally contract only for the right to broadcast a 

program—not for the right to sublicense that program to distributors who wish to 

retransmit the program. Because they have never needed to do so (because the compulsory license was there to fulfill this role), broadcasters typically do not contract 

for the right to authorize anyone to retransmit their programs. So, the poor Online 

Video Distributor not only cannot get the right to retransmit broadcast programs 

from the compulsory license; the OVD also cannot get the rights directly from the 

broadcaster. 

There are two ways to fix this glaring problem. The first would be to add Online 

Video Distributors to the parties covered by compulsory licensing. As outlined in my 

written testimony, the problem with this approach is that the United States is a 

party to numerous International agreements and treaties that expressly prohibit 

granting compulsory licenses for Internet retransmission of television programs. The 

second way to solve the problem is to repeal the antiquated compulsory licenses so 

that cable, satellite and online distributors are all on a level playing field when it 

comes to securing rights in broadcast programming. This is the approach embodied 

in S. 2008. 

In sum, the best way to end the discrimination against online innovators in New 

Hampshire is to pass S. 2008. 

Question 3. Mr. Padden, can you elaborate on your contention that retransmission 

consent and compulsory licensing are linked together? 

Answer. The only reason that it was necessary for the Congress to enact retransmission consent in 1992 was because of the existence of the compulsory license. 

In 1992, this Committee stated, ‘‘Cable operators pay for the cable programming 

services they offer to their customers; the Committee believes that programming 

services which originate on a broadcast channel should not be treated differently.’’ 

S. Rep. No. 102–92, at 35. It is the compulsory license that enabled cable operators 

to offer broadcast programs to their customers without paying for those programs 

(unlike the programs of non-broadcast channels). The most direct way to achieve the 

result desired by the Committee would have been to simply repeal the compulsory 

license. 

But, this Committee does not have jurisdiction over the compulsory license because it is in Title 17 of the United States Code. Retransmission consent was conceived as a Commerce Committee vehicle to require cable operators to pay for broadcast programs. 

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