alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Lee K. Bronson, Appellant, v Nuria Bronson, Respondent. (And Another Related Proceeding.)

[805 NYS2d 142]

Peters, J.

Appeals (1) from- an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Pines, J.), entered July 29, 2004, which, inter alia, dismissed petitioner’s application, in two proceedings pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody, and (2) from an order of said court, entered July 29, 2004, which issued an order of protection.

The parties are the parents of Jason (born in 1995) and respondent is the parent of Ezequial (born in 1991). Petitioner began living with Ezequial and respondent when Ezequial was two years of age. Petitioner and respondent were married in 1994. Petitioner left the marital home in September 2003. In *933March 2004, petitioner was awarded, joint custody of Jason with visitation every other weekend. After one month, petitioner commenced these proceedings seeking temporary custody of both children by alleging, among other things, child abuse by Rusty Baker, respondent’s paramour. Following hearings held in June 2004, Family Court modified its order and granted petitioner joint legal custody of Ezequial with visitation and dismissed his application for primary custody of both children. Family Court also issued an order of protection prohibiting petitioner’s contact with respondent except for the purpose of visitation. In addition, petitioner was prohibited from possessing firearms for one year. Petitioner appeals and we affirm.

Although the order of protection was not specifically requested, Family Court was well within its authority to have devised this no-contact order which included a restraint on petitioner’s access to firearms *(see*Family Ct Act § 656; *Matter of Morse v Brown,*298 AD2d 656, 657 [2002]; *Matter of Mongiardo v Mongiardo,*232 AD2d 741, 744 [1996]). Record evidence revealed petitioner’s disruptive and bizarre behavior, which included his threats to respondent and Baker.

Nor do we find Family Court to have abused its discretion in permitting Baker’s contact with the children. While record evidence did establish that Baker’s inappropriate conduct had prompted an investigation pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1034, such investigation resulted in inadequate guardian reports being filed against the parties as well as Baker. Family Court, finding Baker candid with respect to his shortcomings, concluded that the majority of the difficulties presented in this proceeding were due to petitioner’s extreme and inappropriate behavior, stemming from his “bitter animosity” towards Baker. According appropriate deference to Family Court’s determination, we find it properly supported by the record *(see Matter of Chantel ZZ.,*279 AD2d 669, 672 [2001]; *Matter of Emily PP.,*274 AD2d 681, 683 [2000]). While the Law Guardian’s position was to the contrary, it is not determinative *(see Matter of Daniels v Guntert,*256 AD2d 940, 941 [1998]; *Matter of Richard YY. v Sue ZZ.,*249 AD2d 885, 886 [1998]).

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Carpinello and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs.
39537.

#### ROXY FURNITURE & NOVELTY COMPANY, INC. v. BRAND.

*105Decided May 23, 1962.

*Samuel L. Eplan, Holcomb & McDuff,*for plaintiff in error.

*Hicks ■& Howard, Claud M. Hicks, G. Robert Howard,*contra.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

1. “Where a principal advances money to his agent on a drawing account against his commission to be earned as a salesman for selling merchandise, and his commission does not amount to the sum advanced, the employer can not, in the absence of an express or implied agreement, or promise to repay any excess of advances' over the commissions earned, recover such excess from the employee. 2 Am. Jur. 229; Richmond Dry Goods Co. v. Wilson, 105 W. Va. 221 (141 SE 876, 57 ALR 31, 33); 2 CJ 787; 39 CJ 153. And see *Fried v. Portis Hat Co.,*41 Ga. App. 30 (152 SE 151).” *106*Smith v. Franklin Printing Co.,*54 Ga. App. 385 (2) (187 SE 904). See also *Valdosta Roofing &c. Co. v. Lawrence,*89 Ga. App. 168 (79 SE2d 10); and *Foster v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,*103 Ga. App. 420 (1) (119 SE2d 289). The employment contract, dated November 1, 1958, called for advances to be made for a period of ninety days only and of necessity the express agreement to repay any deficiency could apply only to the advances which the employer expressly agreed to make. The petition expressly alleged that the defendant was not “overdrawn” on December 31, 1959, that he began his employment on November 1, 1958, and that the amount sued for accrued during the first ten months of 1960. The petition fails to allege either an express or implied agreement on the part of the defendant to repay any advances made after the first ninety days of employment and the trial court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s general demurrer and dismissing the petition.

2. The remaining assignment of error, that the trial court erred in overruling the plaintiff’s oral motion to strike the defendant’s answer, in view of the above ruling, is nugatory and will not be passed upon.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*
Opinion issued April 1 6 , 2024

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 2 3 - 00 746 - C R

——————————— REBECCA ANN OLDAKER , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e On Appeal from the 78 th District Court Wichita County, Texas 1 Trial Court Ca se No. DC78 - CR2020 - 1063
MEMORANDUM OPINION

1 Pursuant t o its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas transferred this appeal to this Court
. S ee Misc. Docket No. 23

– 9079 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2023); see also T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 73.001 (authorizing transfer cases); T EX . R. A PP . P. 41.3.2

Appellant Rebecca Ann Oldaker appealed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of July 20, 2023. On January 20, 2024, she filed her brief, challenging only the trial court’s assessed costs. The State filed an Unopposed Motion for Limited and Temporary Abatement asking this Court to abate the appeal to provide the State an opportunity to file a motion in the trial court requesting that the court waive the
assessm ent of the challenged court costs. We granted the motion and abated the appeal. Subsequently, t he trial court grant ed the State’s Unopposed Motion for the Waiver of Court Costs . T he State then filed in this Court an Unopposed Motion for Lift of Abatemen t and for Briefing Extension stating that given the trial court’s ruling, the appeal should be deemed moot. We granted the State’s motion , lifted the abatement, and requested a response from Appellant. Appellant filed a response, stating that “she agrees with the State that the appeal is now moot.” No opinion has issued in this appeal. We dismiss the appeal as moot
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42. 2 , 43 .2(f)
. We deny all other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Countiss, and Rivas

- Molloy. Do not publish. T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.2(b).
#### In the Matter of Leon T., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 79]

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Alma Cordova, J.), entered on or about June 15, 2004, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon his admission of an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of attempted assault in the second degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In his application to withdraw his admission, appellant did not raise his current challenges to the court’s allocution procedure, and we decline to review these unpreserved claims in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that the allocution met all constitutional requirements *(see Matter of Jermaine J., 6*AD3d 87 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 606 [2004]). Appellant’s principal complaint concerns the sequence of events at his allocution. The court first asked appellant if he intended to admit to the particular criminal act in question and obtained an affirmative response; it then thoroughly explained the rights appellant was waiving; and it finally elicited appellant’s formal admission to attempting to seriously injure the victim. We find nothing defective about this sequence. Appellant’s assertion that he was forced to “incriminate” himself *257prior to receiving any warnings is meritless; the admission had no “incriminating” effect until it was finally accepted by the court.

The court properly denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his admission *(see People v Frederick,*45 NY2d 520 [1978]). The record establishes the voluntariness of the admission, and appellant did not offer any substantial reason for withdrawal. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Nardelli, Williams, Gonzalez and McGuire, JJ.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 94

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring),

3 SECTION 1. DEDICATION CEREMONY AND PLACEMENT OF

4 A BUST OF RAOUL WALLENBERG IN THE CAP5 ITOL.

6 The rotunda of the Capitol may be used on November

7 2, 1995, for a ceremony incident to the placement of a

8 bust of Raoul Wallenberg in the Capitol as previously au9 thorized by Congress.
2

•HCON 94 EH

1 SEC. 2. SECURITY AND PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS.

2 The Capitol Police Board shall take such action with

3 respect to security as may be necessary to carry out sec4 tion 1. The Architect of the Capitol shall make appropriate

5 physical preparations for the ceremony referred to in sec6 tion 1.

Passed the House of Representatives September 29,

1995.

Attest:

Clerk.
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 94

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the use of the rotunda of the Capitol

itol.ment of a bust of Raoul Wallenberg in the Capfor a dedication ceremony incident to the place-
NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsApplication of SAE ARP4754A to Flight Critical SystemsThis report documents applications of ARP4754A to the development of modern computer-based (i.e., digital electronics, software and network-based) aircraft systems. This study is to offer insight and provide educational value relative to the guidelines in ARP4754A and provide an assessment of the current state-of-the- practice within industry and regulatory bodies relative to development assurance for complex and safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems.Document ID20160001634Acquisition SourceLangley Research CenterDocument TypeContractor Report (CR)AuthorsPeterson, Eric M.*(Electron International II, Inc. Phoenix, AZ, United States)*Date AcquiredFebruary 5, 2016Publication DateNovember 1, 2015Subject CategoryComputer Programming And SoftwareReport/Patent NumberNF1676L-22604NASA/CR-2015-218982Funding Number(s)TASK: NNL14AB74TCONTRACT_GRANT: NNL13AA04BWBS: WBS 999182.02.50.07.02Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightPublic Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType20160001634.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
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#### Robert P. Yohon, Jr., Respondent, v Maria Yohon, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 167]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County (Charles F. Graney, J.H.O.), entered February 11, 2004. The order granted the parties joint custody of their child with primary physical residence with plaintiff and visitation with defendant.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: On appeal from an order awarding the parties joint custody of their child with primary physical residence with plaintiff, defendant contends that the Judicial Hearing Officer (JHO) erred in conducting a de novo hearing on the issue of custody and that the matter should have been treated as a modification proceeding. Even assuming, arguendo, that the JHO erred in conducting a de novo hearing, we conclude that plaintiff established a change of circumstances that “reflects a real need for change to ensure the best interest of the child,” thus warranting the change in primary physical residence of the child *(Matter of Irwin v Neyland,*213 AD2d 773, 773 [1995]; *see generally Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer,*55 NY2d 89, 95-96 [1982]). Following the parties’ most recent agreement with respect to the issues of custody and visitation, the child was diagnosed with major developmental delays necessitating aggressive treatment. Plaintiff established at the hearing before the JHO that all treatment providers have recommended that treatment be provided in one location. Therefore, the existing custodial arrangement, wherein plaintiff would have the child for one month in New York and defendant would have the child for two months in Georgia, is no longer in the child’s best interests. We see no basis to disturb the determination of the JHO that it is in the best interests of the child to reside with plaintiff in New York *(see generally Irwin,*213 AD2d at 774).

With respect to defendant’s contention that plaintiff failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to require a hearing, we *989note that defendant failed to include the pleadings in the record on appeal, and thus we are unable to review that contention. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

The regulations contained in this part have been recodified in 46 CFR part 287.

#### § 2.1-27 Controlled corporation.

For the purpose of section 511 of the Act and the regulations in this part a new vessel is considered as constructed, reconstructed, reconditioned, or acquired by the taxpayer if constructed, reconstructed, reconditioned, or acquired by a corporation at a time when the taxpayer owns not less than 95 percent of the total number of shares of each class of stock of the corporation.
Exhibit 32.2

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 In connection with the Quarterly Report of American HealthChoice, Inc.  (the
 "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2006 as filed  with
 the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
 John C. Stuecheli, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
 to 18 U.S.C. S 1350, as adopted pursuant to S 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act
 of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:

           (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements of  Section
           13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

           (2)  The information contained in  the Report fairly presents,  in
           all material  respects,  the  financial condition  and  result  of
           operations of the Company.



 /s/ John C. Stuecheli


 John C. Stuecheli

 Chief Financial Officer

 August 21, 2006
#### Chris Limniatis, Respondent, v Greenburgh Central School District No. 7, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 438]

Appeal by Greenburgh Central School District No. 7 from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Barone, J.), entered October 19, 2004, which granted its application for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e, the court should consider certain factors, including whether (1) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, (3) an infant is involved, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *Matter of Doe v Goshen Cent. School Dist.*13 AD3d 526 [2004]; *Matter of Cotten v County of Nassau,*307 AD2d 965 [2003]; *Matter of Brown v County of Westchester,*293 AD2d 748 [2002]). The determination of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the court (see *Matter of Andrew T.B. v Brewster Cent. School Dist.,*18 AD3d 745 [2005]; *Matter of Doe v Goshen Cent. School Dist., supra; Matter of Tumm v Town of Eastchester,*8 AD3d 581 [2004]).

Upon considering all of the statutory factors, under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the subject application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; *Matter of Andrew T.B. v Brewster Cent. School Dist., supra).*Goldstein, J.P., Skelos, Fisher and Lunn, JJ., concur.
IV

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 58

Providing for an adjournment of the two Houses.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 6, 1995

Mr. GOSS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was considered

and agreed to

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for an adjournment of the two Houses.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That when the House adjourns on the legisla3 tive day of Friday, April 7, 1995, it stand adjourned until

4 12:30 p.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, or until noon on

5 the second day after Members are notified to reassemble

6 pursuant to section 3 of this concurrent resolution, which7 ever occurs first; and that when the Senate adjourns or

8 recesses at the close of business on Thursday, April 6,

9 1995, Friday, April 7, 1995, Saturday, April 8, 1995,
2

HCON 58 ATH

1 Sunday, April 9, 1995, or Monday, April 10, 1995, pursu2 ant to a motion made by the majority leader, or his des3 ignee, in accordance with this concurrent resolution, it

4 stand recessed or adjourned until noon on Monday, April

5 24, 1995, or such time on that day as may be specified

6 by the majority leader or his designee in the motion to

7 recess or adjourn, or until noon on the second day after

8 Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section

9 3 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.

10 SEC. 2. When the House adjourns on the legislative

11 day of Wednesday, May 3, 1995, it stand adjourned until

12 12:30 p.m. on Tuesday, May 9, 1995, or until noon on

13 the second day after Members are notified to reassemble

14 pursuant to section 3 of this concurrent resolution, which15 ever occurs first.

16 SEC. 3. The Speaker of the House and the Majority

17 Leader of the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with

18 the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority Lead19 er of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House

20 and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in

21 their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>        5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM ACG
HOLDINGS, INC.'S UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
THREE MONTH PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
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<NAME>                                              ACG HOLDINGS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                        1,000
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</TABLE>
NO T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. FR ANC ISC O M ISAEL AM AYAPOR TILLO, AKA Fra

nc isc o Am ay a Portillo, De fe nda

nt-Appe l la

nt. No. 15-10533

D.C . No. 2:15-c r-00955-SR

B -1 M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ariz o na Susa n R . B olton, District Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Se pte m

be r 12, 2016 * * San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : W . FLETC HER , C HRISTEN, a nd FRIEDLAND, C i rc uit Judge s. Afte r Franc isc o Am ay a -Portillo ple a d e d guilty to viola ting 8 U.S.C . § 1326(a ), the distric t c o urt se nte nc e d him to 18-m onths of im

prisonm e nt, followe d 

# FIL ED SEP 19 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).by

thre e y e ars of supe rvise d re le a se . W e hav e jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291, and a ffirm

the se nte nc e . Am ay a -Portillo’ s sole c la im on a ppe a l is tha

t the gove rnm e nt bre a c h e d the ple a a gre e m e nt he ha d e nte re d into by im plic itly arguing for a

ha rshe r se nte nc e tha n the a gre e m e nt a llowe d . W e disa gre e . While the gove rnm e nt c ould ha ve re c o m m e nde d the a g re e d -upon se nte nc e m ore e nthusia stic a lly , it ha d no obliga tion to do tha t. Se eUnite d State

s v . J ohnson , 187 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th C ir. 1999). He re , the gove rnm e nt re c om m e nde d the prope r se nte nc e , ga ve re a sons to support it, a nd a ddre sse d like l y obje c t ions. This is a ll thea gre e m e nt re a sona

bly de m ande d . AFFIRM E D.

2