alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 39

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas catastrophic natural disasters are occurring with

greater frequency, a trend that is likely to continue for

several decades according to prominent scientists;

Whereas the Federal Government has responded to disasters

by appropriating relief funds, which provide only shortterm assistance to victims but long-term burdens to taxpayers; and

Whereas the increasing reliance on Federal disaster relief has

overshadowed the need to perform more comprehensive

disaster planning and rely on private insurance for protection against disaster risks: Now, therefore, be it
2

•HCON 39 EH

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

3 (1) persons who live in areas at high risk to

4 natural disasters should assume more responsibility

5 for their actions by insuring against such risks in

6 order to minimize the rising cost of Federal disaster

7 relief;

8 (2) sensible, cost-effective disaster mitigation

9 programs should be encouraged and enhanced at the

10 State and local level;

11 (3) insurers should create a privately funded

12 pooling mechanism for the spreading of disaster risk

13 in order to encourage the continued availability and

14 affordability of private insurance in all parts of the

15 Nation; and

16 (4) a fundamental overhaul of Federal disaster

17 policies should be undertaken to reduce costs to tax18 payers and encourage more effective partnerships

19 between the private sector and government at all lev20 els in anticipation of future catastrophes.

Passed the House of Representatives March 14,

1995.

Attest:

Clerk.

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 39

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding

Federal disaster relief.
**
Exhibit 31.1 

Certification of Senior Officer in Charge of the Servicing Function 

of the Servicer Pursuant to Rule 15d-14(d)

**CERTIFICATION**

I, KevinJ. Cullum, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Nissan Auto Receivables 2015-C Owner Trust(the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; 

4. I amresponsible for reviewing the activities performed by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except asdisclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports onassessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by thefollowing unaffiliated party: U.S. Bank National Association 

Date: June 27, 2019 

 
By: 
/s/ Kevin J. Cullum
Kevin J. CullumPresident and Chief Executive Officer ofNissan Motor Acceptance Corporation(senior officer in charge of the servicing function)**
§ 49.4253-6 Exemption for common carriers and communications companies. ( a ) *In general.* ( 1 ) The taxes imposed by section 4251 on amounts paid for wire mileage service and wire and equipment service do not apply to amounts paid for any such services to the extent that the amounts paid are for services utilized by a common carrier, telephone or telegraph company, or television or radio broadcasting station or network in the conduct of its business as such.
( 2 ) The tax imposed by section 4251 on amounts paid for general telephone service does not apply to amounts paid for the use of a continuous telephone or radio telephone line or channel to the extent that the amounts paid are for use by a common carrier, telephone or telegraph company, or television or radio broadcasting station or network in the conduct of its business as such, if such line or channel connects stations between any two of which there would otherwise be a toll charge. A line or channel connects stations between which there would otherwise be a toll charge if the telephone company makes a toll charge for a single message transmitted between the two stations in the case of the ordinary residential and business or commercial telephone service. A line or channel connecting two stations is considered a continuous line or channel if such line or channel does not connect with any switchboard interposed between the two stations, which makes it possible to carry on two or more independent conversations simultaneously. Where a line or channel connects with such a switchboard, the exemption is inapplicable to so much of the amount paid as is attributable to the portion of the line or channel which extends from a station to a switchboard located in the same local service area.
( b ) *Exemption inapplicable.* This particular exemption is not applicable in the case of the taxes imposed on amounts paid for other services by section 4251, even though such services are utilized by the companies described in the conduct of their business as such.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 250 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 250

  To refer S. 2409 entitled ``A bill for the relief of D.W. Jacobson, 
 Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of Grand Rapids, Minnesota.'' to the 
 chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims for a report 
                                thereon.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

              August 19 (legislative day, August 18), 1994

 Mr. Durenberger submitted the following resolution; which was referred 
                   to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  To refer S. 2409 entitled ``A bill for the relief of D.W. Jacobson, 
 Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of Grand Rapids, Minnesota.'' to the 
 chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims for a report 
                                thereon.

    Resolved, That the bill S. 2409 entitled ``A bill for the relief of 
D.W. Jacobson, Ronald Karkala, and Paul Bjorgen of Grand Rapids, 
Minnesota.'' now pending in the Senate, together with all the 
accompanying papers, is referred to the chief judge of the United 
States Court of Federal Claims. The chief judge shall proceed with the 
same in accordance with the provisions of sections 1492 and 2509 of 
title 28, United States Code, and report thereon to the Senate, at the 
earliest practicable date, giving such findings of fact and conclusions 
thereon as shall be sufficient to inform the Congress of the nature and 
character of the demand as a claim, legal or equitable, against the 
United States or a gratuity and the amount, if any, legally or 
equitably due to the claimants from the United States.
                                 <all>
```
From: Topham.Nathan@epamail.epa.gov

From: 

Mark Morris/RTP/USEPA/US 

To: 

"Teresa S. Bowers" <TBOWERS@gradientcorp.com>, "Stotts, Stacy" 

<SStotts@stinson.com>, "Marucheau, Louis" 

<lmarucheau@doerun.com>, "'Miller, Aaron'" <amiller@doerun.com>, Joe Stolle 

<joseph@shellengr.com>, Nathan 

Topham/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Michael Stewart/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Sharon 

Nizich/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Dave 

Guinnup/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Steve Fruh/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Jan Tierney/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Ted 

Palma/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Richard Daye/R7/USEPA/US@EPA, bern.johnson@dnr.mo.gov 

Date: 

04/12/2011 03:41 PM 

Subject

: 

Doe Run Property Map

All, 

Attached is a property boundary map (and shapefile) we created to use in excluding 

model receptors 

that are within property boundaries of Doe Run. There were two maps used to create 

the attached map: 

1) the Doe Run property map provided by Terri Bowers, and 2) a boundary map provided

by the MO 

DNR. Although the map Terri provided includes all Doe Run property, it is not 

contiguous. This is 

because there are some parcels not owned by Doe Run within the overall extents of 

Doe Run's property. 

 We must not exclude model receptors within these parcels. The MO DNR seems to have

a contiguous 

boundary map; however, it doesn't seem to include all of Doe Run's property (e.g., 

wooded areas to the 

south). We created the attached map to hopefully capture all of Doe Run's property 

that is contiguous. 

We intend to use the attached map for any future analysis of Doe Run. Please let us

know if you think 

the boundaries should be different than the attached map. 

Thanks. 

Page 1
Mark Morris 

USEPA 

Mailcode C539-02 

109 TW Alexander Drive 

RTP, NC 27711 

(919) 541-5416 

morris.mark@epa.gov

Page 2
39732.

#### CLEMENTS v. THE STATE.

Decided October 8, 1962.

*Wesley R. Asinof,*for plaintiff in error.

*Paul Webb, Solicitor General, John I. Kelley, Solicitor, Robert F. O’Neil, Hinson McAuliffe, Eugene L. Tiller,*contra.

Jordan, Judge.

The sole assignment of error argued and insisted upon in this court by counsel for the defendant is that the State failed to prove that the offense of abandonment was com*730mitted in Fulton County, Georgia. The evidence adduced upon the trial of this case disclosed that the defendant and the mother of the child allegedly abandoned by the defendant lived at a named address in Fulton County, Georgia, from the date of their marriage in July, 1960, until November, 1960, when the defendant left the mother; and that the mother lived at the same address in Fulton County at the time of the trial. The evidence further showed that the child was bom on February 17, 1961; that the child lived continuously with her mother from the timé of her birth; and that the child had been in a dependent condition while living with the mother.

It is the contention of the counsel for the defendant that since there was no direct evidence that the mother had continuously lived in Fulton County from the time the defendant left her until the time of the trial during which period of time the child was bom and had been in a dependent condition, the evidence was insufficient to establish the venue of the offense of abandonment as being in Fulton County, Georgia.

This contention is without merit. Venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence and when there is nothing in the record to raise an inference to the contrary, slight circumstances may be sufficient to prove such element of the offense. *Brooks v. State,*98 Ga. App. 13 (104 SE2d 620). “Evidence as to venue, though slight, is sufficient where there is no conflicting evidence.” *Climer v. State,*204 Ga. 776 (2) (51 SE2d 802). The evidence in this case showing that the mother lived at a named address in Fulton County at the time the defendant left her and that she lived at the same address in Fulton County at the time of the trial, and there being no evidence in the record warranting even a bare conjecture that she had resided at some other place during the intervening period of time, the jury was fully authorized to infer from the above circumstances that the mother had lived continuously at the same address in Fulton County from the time the defendant left her until the time of the trial which interval necessarily included the time when the offense of abandonment was consummated. *Code*§ 38-123.

Accordingly, the contention of the defendant that the State failed to establish the venue of this offense to be in Fulton *731County is without merit and the Superior Court of Fulton County did not err in denying the petition for the writ of certiorari.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*