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POWER OUTAGE ON METRO-NORTH’S NEW HAVEN 

LINE: HOW TO PREVENT FUTURE FAILURES 

ALONG PASSENGER RAIL’S BUSIEST CORRIDOR 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 

AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 28, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT 

MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY 

MARK WARNER, Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri, Ranking Member 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on October 28, 2013 .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Blumenthal .......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES

Jim Himes, U.S. Representative, Fourth Congressional District, Connecticut .. 3 

Elizabeth Esty, U.S. Representative, Fifth Congressional District, Connecticut .................................................................................................................. 5 

Howard Permut, President, MTA Metro-North Railroad ..................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Craig Ivey, President, Consolidated Edison Company of New York ................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

James P. Redeker, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Transportation 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Otto Lynch, P.E., Fellow, Structural Engineering Institute, American Society 

of Civil Engineers ................................................................................................. 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Hon. Christopher Murphy, U.S. Senator from Connecticut ................................. 48 

John Hartwell, Member, Connecticut Commuter Rail Council ........................... 54 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Joseph H. Boardman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Amtrak .............. 59 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60 

Joseph McGee, Vice President, The Business Council of Fairfield County ........ 62 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64 

APPENDIX

Letter dated October 25, 2013 to Senator Jay Rockefeller from Robert A. 

Mezzo, Mayor, Bourough of Naugatuck ............................................................. 73 

Letter dated October 25, 2013 to Senator Jay Rockefeller from Neil M. 

O’Leary, Mayor, The City of Waterbury ............................................................. 74 

Letter dated October 25, 2013 to Senator Jay Rockefeller from Samuel S. 

Gold, AICP, Acting Executive Director, Council of Governments, Central 

Naugatuck Valley ................................................................................................. 75 

Response to written questions submitted to Howard Permut by: 

Hon. Richard Blumenthal ................................................................................ 75 

Hon. Christopher Murphy ................................................................................ 76 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to 

Craig Ivey ............................................................................................................. 77 

(1) 

POWER OUTAGE ON METRO-NORTH’S NEW 

HAVEN LINE: HOW TO PREVENT FUTURE 

FAILURES ALONG PASSENGER RAIL’S 

BUSIEST CORRIDOR 

MONDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND

MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Bridgeport, CT. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in Bridgeport City Council Chambers, Bridgeport City Hall, Hon. Richard 

Blumenthal, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am very pleased to call to order this field 

hearing of the United States Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation, a field hearing that I would like to thank Senator Rockefeller, our Chairman, for permitting us to hold here in 

Bridgeport, Connecticut. I thank him and the staff of the Commerce Committee for their excellent planning and to Jeff Long of 

my staff, and I thank the City of Bridgeport for hosting us here 

this morning. 

This hearing is really prompted by the breakdown in service that 

occurred on September 25, barely more than a month ago, in the 

Mount Vernon area. But it is really the result of much broader and 

deeper problems that have manifested themselves over many years 

and that are the subject of complaints to me, repeated complaints 

to me and I suspect to many of my colleagues and elected officials 

who are here this morning, and I thank them very much for being 

here. 

Let me just take one comment from a Westport commuter who 

wrote to me, quote, ‘‘Enough is enough. The outage due to the electrical problem obviously is a major failure, one for which the cause 

should be determined and the appropriate people held responsible.’’ 

But the fact is that this is only the latest manifestation of the serious service deterioration that Metro-North riders have been putting 

up with for some time. 

When I’m asked why we are having this hearing, I think that letter from a Westport commuter sums it up as well as anything I can 

say. The fact of the matter is that I was dismayed and frustrated 

and outraged as much as that commuter and others by the 12-day 

2 

service disruption caused by Con Ed’s failure to carry out its work 

and prepare adequately for the possibility of a large-scale power 

outage. 

We’re here today as part of a continuing fact finding and investigation that I intend to carry on beyond this hearing, because it 

has larger implications for service not only in the Northeast, but 

throughout the country. The fact of the matter is that this outage 

and disruption in service was due either to inadequate management or insufficient funding in necessary equipment, infrastructure, and other essentials, or both. 

The failure to plan for this kind of contingency and provide 

backup sources of power was a failing that we cannot permit to be 

repeated. It simply cannot recur. So the goal today is not only to 

hold accountable whoever was responsible, but also to make sure 

that it’s prevented in the future. 

This hearing will focus closely on Con Edison and the particular 

equipment that was permitted to last beyond its normal design life, 

specifically the feeder cable that was 36 years old, 6 years over its 

recommended use. But it will also focus on Metro-North and others 

who could and should have planned for the contingency that occurred to avoid this disruption. 

My hope is that there will be lessons learned, enabling us to 

avoid this kind of occurrence in the future. I’ll be interested to 

learn whether Federal regulations should be strengthened, regulations of the Federal Railway Administration. The May 17 derailment which preceded this breakdown in service and caused disruption on the same line involved requirements for electrical maintenance and other kinds of maintenance that perhaps were involved 

here as well. We’re going to be exploring whether Metro-North and 

similar railroads should be required to have backup sources as a 

matter of the Federal Railway Administration’s requirements. 

One point is very clear, and that is that Con Ed should be reimbursing Metro-North, Amtrak, and others for all the costs that occurred in this service outage—$2 million a day is estimated to have 

been the cost for Metro-North, $62 million in costs to Connecticut’s 

economy, and other costs incurred by riders and commuters. So 

that kind of reimbursement ought to be a given. 

Another question is whether Amtrak should be doing more. Its 

contribution over the last 10 years of $64 million to upgrade and 

improve equipment compared to the $3.2 billion invested in that infrastructure raises the question about whether it should be expected to shoulder a fair share. 

And perhaps most immediately, and the reason that we have 

Commissioner Redeker here, is that there are other substations 

along the line in Connecticut, three more now, two more planned, 

where the same points of vulnerability may exist. Those substations are serviced by CL&P and Northeast Utilities as well as 

United Illuminating, and we’ll want to know at this hearing or in 

fact finding to be pursued, whether more has to be done to make 

sure that those lines are secure, reliable, and safe. 

Finally, I’m concerned about reports that Con Edison is understaffed, that the failure to ensure adequate staffing means that an 

important operation, maintenance activities, are not done properly. 

We know, for example, in the last four years that Con Edison has 

3 

cut nearly 17 percent of its full time work force, even though the 

company recently testified at the New York State Public Service 

Commission hearing that its loads have grown. 

At my and Senator Schumer’s request, the New York Public 

Service Commission is conducting its own investigation. We will eagerly await the results of that investigation and also the investigation, apparently, that Con Ed is doing on its own. I’m disappointed 

that Con Ed so far has not provided the preliminary review that’s 

mentioned in a September 30 New York Times article. If that review is available, I ask that it be provided to the Committee. 

I hope that we can anticipate the continued cooperation of both 

Con Ed and Metro-North, as well as others who are represented 

here today. And I want to thank them for being here today to give 

us the benefit of what they have found so far. 

Our first panel is composed of two of our elected representatives, 

two Members of Congress, who represent the individuals who are 

affected most immediately, United States Congressman Jim Himes 

and United States Congresswoman Elizabeth Esty. 

Thank you so much for being here today. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF JIM HIMES, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, FOURTH 

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CONNECTICUT 

Mr. HIMES. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal, and thank you 

very much for holding this hearing here in Bridgeport. I’m delighted to be joined by my colleague, Elizabeth Esty, a member of 

the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the U.S. 

House of Representatives, as well as by any number of state-elected officials, municipal officials, and, of course, representatives of 

Metro-North and Con Edison. 

I’m happy you’re holding this hearing, because this is the second 

time in 6 months that my constituents in the Fourth District of 

Connecticut and your constituents, Senator, have had both their 

safety and their economic well-being put at risk by crumbling infrastructure. You and I visited the scene of a very dangerous accident 

just two miles up the road here, where, thank God, there was no 

loss of life. But it could have, as we acknowledged at the time, been 

much worse. 

One month after the outage that inconvenienced and did economic damage to many of our constituents, we reflect on what went 

wrong and how the problem was handled. It is important that we 

achieve total clarity regarding what occurred and how it can be 

avoided in the future. 

It is also clear we must re-review plans for redundant power during maintenance projects. We owe it to the 125,000 travelers who 

ride Metro-North every day to do our best to ensure these kinds of 

prolonged outages do not occur again in the future. 

Just as important as accountability is understanding that this 

outage underscores the urgent need to invest in our aging transportation energy and infrastructure. Talk to any one of the business 

groups in this area, and they will tell you that one of the—perhaps 

the main reason why businesses find it difficult to move into the 

area is the aging infrastructure, the difficulty of moving employees 

around and getting them to their places of work. This is something 

4 

that is essential economically for Fairfield County and, frankly, for 

Connecticut as a whole. 

Between last year’s power outages that left passengers in sweltering heat, this year’s train derailment caused by unstable rails 

and loose embankments, and now this wide scale power outage, it 

is clear that there is more we can and must do to bring our national infrastructure into the 21st century. According to Transportation for America, today, in Connecticut’s Fourth District, over 40 

percent of our highway and roadway bridges are either structurally 

deficient or functionally obsolete and in dire need of repair. 

This represents, like all that we’ve talked about in the rail world, 

both an unacceptable lack of transportation efficiency and a dangerous public safety concern. It is clear that we need to commit 

long-term Federal, state, municipal, and private sector funding to 

infrastructure improvement. 

Infrastructural neglect compromises our safety. Nearly 45 percent of the 34,000 annual U.S. highway fatalities occur in crashes 

where substandard road conditions, obsolete designs, or roadside 

hazards were a factor. The train derailment on the BridgeportFairfield border this spring is just the latest reminder of the very 

real danger of failing to invest in our transportation infrastructure. 

As a father and a husband, I worry about the safety of my family 

on Connecticut’s highways and railroads. And, of course, I worry 

about the safety of each and every one of my constituents. As a representative of the citizens of the Fourth District of Connecticut, I 

will do everything I can to prevent future accidents caused by inadequate infrastructure. 

There’s a lot of work we need to do. But I remain optimistic that 

we can get the job done. With so much at stake, with safety and 

with jobs and with the economic vitality of this region at stake, we 

simply cannot afford not to make these crucial investments in our 

outdated infrastructure. In the weeks and months ahead, as we 

continue investigating the recent power outage, I hope we can 

begin a long needed discussion on making a down payment for our 

safety and in Connecticut’s economic vibrancy by investing in 

transportation and energy infrastructure that is in dire need of repair. 

This process, of course, will be to some degree about accountability, and it’s important that we understand what happened and 

who was responsible for avoiding what happened. But at the end 

of the day, our infrastructure is in the position that it is in because 

all of us, from the Federal to the state to the municipal to the private sector, have not been adequate stewards of this essential life 

blood of our economy. 

So I look forward to working with Metro-North, Amtrak, Con 

Edison, with you, Senator, and with my colleagues at the Federal, 

state, and municipal level to make sure that we have a region that 

is economically vibrant and safe for our constituents in the 21st 

Century. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Congressman Himes. 

Congresswoman Esty? 

5 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH ESTY, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, 

FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CONNECTICUT 

Ms. ESTY. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, for chairing this 

hearing here today. And I want to thank and acknowledge Senator 

Murphy, who I know will be joining us, Representative Himes and 

all of our colleagues in the Connecticut delegation, and all the state 

and local officials who are here today for our continued collaboration and work on this matter on behalf of the citizens of Connecticut. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the power outage 

along Metro-North’s New Haven Line. As Representative Himes 

underscored, and you did, yourself, Senator, the disruption around 

the New Haven Line is unacceptable and an avoidable failure that 

caused significant damage both to our state’s economy and to people’s lives. 

The analysis conducted by the Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development estimates the incident cost the 

Connecticut economy $62 million and reduced state revenues by $2 

million and, beyond that, interrupted lives of approximately 62,500 

Metro-North commuters over the eight work days that work was 

suspended. Many of these people depend on reliable rail service for 

their livelihoods. In this day and age, it is simply inexcusable for 

the loss of one feeder cable to an electrical substation to impose 

such a costly burden on our state and on its residents. 

As a member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee and especially as a member of the Rail Subcommittee, 

I’ve called on my colleagues in the House to hold similar hearings, 

because it is a matter of critical importance both for our state and 

for our country. When our transportation infrastructure fails, negative consequences cascade across state boundaries. 

In this case, the service disruption on Metro-North also harmed 

Amtrak customers and disrupted travel for customers all along the 

entire Northeast Corridor. The failure of the Con Edison electrical 

line shows how one vulnerable piece of infrastructure can threaten 

service reliability on a massive scale across our state and beyond. 

That’s why this hearing is so important and why I will continue to 

urge the House Subcommittee on Railroad to hold its own hearing. 

This concern is especially timely because my committee will soon 

be addressing legislation reauthorizing Amtrak, and that deliberation must be informed by a clear understanding of Amtrak’s infrastructure needs. The only way we can prevent service failures like 

this one from happening again is to understand what caused them 

in the first place. Only then will we be able to make the necessary 

investments and policy changes to ensure reliable service both for 

commuters in Connecticut and for the growing ranks of rail passengers nationwide. 

To that end, I’d like to make three broad points. First, the investments ahead for Amtrak, especially along the Northeast Corridor, 

are going to be significant. I’m sure Mr. Boardman and Commissioner Redeker will cover this in greater detail. But just consider 

the following facts. 

In 2012, Amtrak’s total traction power consumed almost 940 mil- lion kilowatt hours at a cost of $92 million. The 25 Hz network 

powering service from New York to Washington, D.C., was inVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
6 

stalled between 1910 and 1938. This equipment is long overdue 

and in need of replacement. 

Amtrak’s state of good repair program identifies equipment that 

will directly affect train delays in the event of a failure and either 

rehabilitates or replaces that equipment first. Still, it will take continued and significant investment to get the energy substations 

along that route to a state of good repair. 

Second, I believe passenger rail is a good investment, and that 

continuing to improve Amtrak’s service on the Northeast Corridor 

will bear enormous positive returns over time. Ridership is at an 

all-time high, with 46 percent growth along the Northeast Corridor 

since 1998. Amtrak’s operating profit along the Northeast Corridor 

was $308 million last year. On-time performance is improving, and 

Amtrak is the least energy intensive mode of travel when measured in terms of BTU per passenger mile. 

Third, Congress must also evaluate the service providers on 

whom Amtrak and Metro-North rely. Amtrak and Metro-North 

cannot provide reliable service to commuters unless partners like 

Con Edison are also reliable. Metro-North didn’t damage the electrical cables in question, and it wasn’t a lack of Federal investment 

that caused Mount Vernon substation to fail. That’s why we need 

to consider the roles and responsibilities of utilities like Con Edison 

to prevent these kinds of failures. 

There are troubling indications of woefully insufficient standards 

and practices that exposed our transportation system and our constituents to unacceptable risk. Senator, as you have already referenced, in the last four years, Con Edison has cut nearly 17 percent of its full time workforce, even though loads have increased. 

It’s my understanding that in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, reports were filed with Governor Cuomo’s Moreland Commission that 

expressed concerns regarding insufficient staffing levels. These concerns were reflected in the Moreland Commission’s final report 

which recommended that, quote, ‘‘Utilities should review existing 

staffing levels and evaluate the impacts of an aging workforce on 

their ability to respond to a major event.’’ 

It would be inexcusable if, after the findings of the Moreland 

Commission, low staff levels either contributed to the New Haven 

Line outage or hindered Con Edison’s ability to respond. I hope Mr. 

Ivey addresses these concerns. 

This outage should never have happened. We owe it to our constituents to get to the bottom of what happened. And we owe it to 

our country to have the kind of 21st Century transportation system 

in which this will not happen again. 

Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, for inviting us here to testify, 

and I look forward to hearing from the other witnesses. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you both. Thank you for being here 

today. Thank you for your leadership, and I know that you are very 

directly concerned and involved in these issues. I really thank you 

for your very thoughtful and insightful testimony here today. 

Thank you very much. 

I know that you have other engagements, and you’ll have to 

leave before the conclusion of the hearing. But you being here is 

very, very important. Thank you very much to both of you. 

7 

Our next panel will consist of Howard Permut, President of MTA 

Metro-North Railroad; Craig Ivey, President of Consolidated Edison; James Redeker, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department 

of Transportation; and Otto Lynch, a Fellow of the Structural Engineering Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers. My 

thanks to each of you for being here today. I’m going to dispense 

with an elaborate lengthy introduction of each of you because I 

think you’re well known to me and other members of the Committee. 

Perhaps we can begin with you, Mr. Permut. 

STATEMENT OF HOWARD PERMUT, PRESIDENT, 

MTA METRO-NORTH RAILROAD 

Mr. PERMUT. Good morning Senator Blumenthal and members of 

the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 

My name is Howard Permut, President of Metro-North Railroad, 

and I thank you for holding this critically important hearing today. 

I would also like to thank Congressman Himes and Congresswoman Esty for speaking here this morning. As the elected representatives of our customers who travel on the New Haven Line 

in the state of Connecticut, I value their input and perspective. 

Between September 25 and October 7, service on Metro-North’s 

New Haven Line was severely curtailed when the only in-service 

electric feeder cable that was providing power to a critical eightmile section of the line failed. For those 12 days, the Nation’s busiest commuter railroad corridor was cut in two, crippling both the 

New Haven Line and Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor service and resulting in very limited and, at times, difficult transportation options for these customers. 

The electric feeder that failed is one of two feeder cables that 

connect to a Metro-North substation in Mount Vernon. That substation then converts the electricity it receives from Con Edison’s 

system to a voltage that can be used for the railroad’s traction 

power needs. On September 25, one feeder was already offline to 

advance work to modernize and expand the capability of that substation. 

Prior to taking the feeder offline, Metro-North and Con Ed had 

many discussions of how to best accomplish the work. We assessed 

the risk of only having one feeder in service. Part of that assessment included prior history of performance and preparation. 

In 2006, Metro-North reconfigured this same substation to enable one feeder to be taken out of service while continuing to provide sufficient traction power from the remaining single feeder so 

that Con Ed could do work elsewhere on its system. After MetroNorth’s reconfiguration was completed, we were able to operate 

without any problem on one feeder for a total of 38 days while Con 

Ed performed their work. We also operated on one feeder during 

this past summer, a good test of performance, giving us more confidence in our ability to provide service. 

Nevertheless, on September 25, something went wrong in the 

freeze pit where work was being done by Con Ed, and the railroad’s 

service plan was insufficient to meet our customers’ needs. Craig 

Ivey and I both agree that our companies will redouble efforts to 

ensure that we are better prepared in the future. 

8 

As soon as the power failure occurred, the employees of both 

companies sprang into action. At Metro-North, our goal was to provide as much service as possible as soon as possible. Con Ed began 

working on providing an alternate power source. 

The truth is that there is no alternative transportation service 

that can carry 132,000 daily customers. Initially, through a combination of diesel trains and buses, we could provide 33 percent of 

a regular New Haven Line schedule. Con Edison was able to reengineer, secure, and install a temporary power source, allowing us 

to operate a limited number of electric trains. 

With that assistance, we were able to increase the number of 

trains to approximately 50 percent to 60 percent of a full schedule. 

In addition, our partners at the state and local level, as well as our 

colleagues at New York City Transit, helped us create a robust 

park-and-ride program, with a total of 8,600 free park-and-ride 

spaces at four sites in the Bronx and Westchester County. We also 

added rail cars on the Hudson and Harlem trains during this disruption. 

Ultimately, these options provided service alternatives for approximately 70 percent of our customers. Throughout the disruption, we worked constantly to communicate with our customers 

through the use of our website, e-mail alerts, station and train announcements, social media, press releases and press conferences. 

Customer service representatives were on hand to provide assistance on the phone and in person at stations. 

After Con Edison completed their work on the new feeder line, 

our service was finally restored on Monday, October 7. Restoring 

the service was nothing short of a herculean effort by everyone involved at both Metro-North and Con Ed. I want to personally 

thank these men and women, all of whom worked tirelessly in performing such a monumental task in trying to deliver service to our 

customers during this difficult period. 

We recognize the hardship that this event caused our customers, 

and because of the unparalleled magnitude and duration of this 

disruption, the MTA Board authorized Metro-North to credit a future ticket purchase for New Haven Line customers holding monthly or weekly tickets valid for travel during this period. This credit 

can be applied between now and March 31. Mail and Ride customers will have the credit automatically deducted from the price 

of their December monthly ticket. 

Con Edison is conducting an investigation into what caused the 

feeder to fail. In addition, the New York State Department of Public Service is conducting an independent analysis of what happened, what went into planning the work and both Metro-North’s 

and Con Ed’s response. Metro-North will participate fully in this 

analysis. 

But the reality is that power supply is only one area of the New 

Haven Line infrastructure that requires attention. For example, 

there are four moveable bridges in the state of Connecticut, all of 

which are more than a century old, that need replacement. And 

while our maintenance forces work hard to keep them safe for train 

operation and functioning as a movable bridge, they must be replaced in the coming years. If not, we could be facing a disruption 

9 

just as significant as the one we just experienced for a far longer 

period of time. 

Governor Cuomo has recognized the need to invest in transpor- tation. As a result, New York State has provided $4.8 billion in direct funding to all public transportation in the state, with $4.3 billion going to support the services provided by the MTA. This is 

more than 46 other states combined. In the last 10 years, the State 

of Connecticut has also invested $3.2 billion in the New Haven 

Line infrastructure and rolling stock. 

Yet despite this level of self-help, the fact is that Federal investment in mass transit and Amtrak is simply insufficient to address 

our current state of good repair needs, let alone to build redundancy and contingency. This critical underfunding of our public 

works and infrastructure has to change. We look forward to working with you to increase the investment necessary for maintaining 

the rail infrastructure in a state of good repair. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

welcome any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Permut follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOWARD PERMUT, PRESIDENT, MTA METRO-NORTH RAILROAD

Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Senator Murphy and members of the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. My name is Howard Permut, 

President of Metro-North Railroad and I thank you for holding this critically important hearing. I would also like to thank Congressman Himes and Congresswoman 

Esty for speaking here this morning. As the elected representatives of our customers 

who travel on the New Haven Line in the state of Connecticut, I value their input 

and perspective. 

Between September 25 and October 6, service on Metro-North’s New Haven Line 

was severely curtailed when the only in-service electric feeder cable that was providing power to a critical 8-mile section of the line failed. For those 11 days, the 

Nation’s busiest commuter railroad corridor was cut in two, crippling both the New 

Haven Line and Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor service and resulting in very limited 

and, at times difficult, transportation options for these customers. 

The electric feeder that failed is one of two feeder cables that connect to a MetroNorth substation in Mount Vernon. That substation then converts the electricity it 

receives through Con Ed’s system to a voltage that can be used for the railroad’s 

traction power needs. On September 25, one feeder was already off-line to advance 

work to modernize and expand the capability of that substation. 

Prior to taking the feeder off-line, Metro-North and Con Ed had many discussions 

of how to best accomplish the work. We assessed the risk of only having one feeder 

in service. Part of that assessment included prior history of performance and preparation. In 2006, Metro-North reconfigured this same substation to enable one feeder 

to be taken out of service while continuing to provide sufficient traction power from 

the remaining single feeder so that Con Ed could do work elsewhere on its system. 

After Metro-North’s reconfiguration was completed, we were able to operate without 

any problem on one feeder for a total of 38 days while Con Ed performed their work. 

We also operated on one feeder during this past summer—a good test of performance, giving us even more confidence in our ability to provide service. 

Nevertheless, on September 25, something went wrong in the ‘‘freeze pit’’ where 

work was being done by Con Ed and the railroad’s service plan was insufficient to 

meet our customers’ needs. Craig Ivey and I both agree that our companies will redouble efforts to ensure that we are better prepared in the future. 

As soon as the power failure occurred, the employees of both companies sprang 

into action. At Metro-North, our goal was to provide as much service as possible as 

soon as possible. Con Ed began working on providing an alternate power source. 

The truth is there is no alternative transportation service that can carry 132,000 

daily customers. Initially, through a combination of diesel trains and buses, we 

could only provide 33 percent of a regular New Haven Line schedule. Con Ed was 

able to re-engineer, secure and install a temporary power source, allowing us to operate a limited number of electric trains. With that assistance, we were able to inVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
10 

crease the number of trains to approximately 50 to 60 percent of a full schedule. 

In addition, our partners on the state and local level, as well as our colleagues at 

New York City Transit, helped us create a robust park-and-ride program—with a 

total of 8,600 free park-and-ride spaces at 4 sites in the Bronx and Westchester 

County. We also added rail cars on Hudson and Harlem Line trains during this disruption. Ultimately, all these options provided service alternatives for approximately 

70 percent of our customers. 

Throughout the service disruption, we worked constantly to communicate with our 

customers through the use of our website, e-mail alerts, station and train announcements, social media, press releases and press conferences. Customer service representatives were on hand to provide assistance on the phone and in person at stations. 

After Con Edison completed their work on the new feeder line, our service was 

finally restored on Monday, October 7. Restoring the service was nothing short of 

a herculean effort by everyone involved at both Metro-North and Con Ed. I want 

to personally thank these men and women, all of whom worked tirelessly in performing such a monumental task in trying to deliver service to our customers during 

this difficult period. 

We recognize the hardship that this event caused our customers and, because of 

the unparalleled magnitude and duration of this disruption, the MTA Board authorized Metro-North to credit a future ticket purchase for New Haven Line customers 

holding monthly or weekly tickets valid for travel during this period. This credit can 

be applied between now and March 31. Mail&Ride customers will have the credit 

automatically deducted from the price of their December monthly ticket. 

Con Edison is conducting an investigation into what caused the feeder to fail. In 

addition, the New York State Department of Public Service is conducting an independent analysis of what happened, what went into planning the work and both 

Metro-North’s and Con Ed’s response. Metro-North will participate fully in this 

analysis. 

But the reality is that power supply is only one area of the New Haven Line infrastructure that requires attention. For example, there are four moveable bridges in 

the state of Connecticut—all of which are more than a century old—that need replacement. And while our maintenance forces work hard to keep them safe for train 

operation and functioning as a movable bridge, they must be replaced in the coming 

years. If not, we could be facing a disruption just as significant as the one we just 

experienced for a far longer period of time. 

Governor Cuomo has recognized the need to invest in transportation. As a result, 

New York State has provided $4.8 billion in direct funding to all public transportation in the state, with $4.3 billion going to support the services provided by the 

MTA. This is more than 46 other states—combined. 

In the last 10 years, the State of Connecticut has also invested $3.2 billion in the 

New Haven Line infrastructure and rolling stock. 

Yet despite this level of self-help, the fact is that Federal investment in mass 

transit and Amtrak is simply insufficient to address our current state of good repair 

needs—let alone to build redundancy and contingency. This critical underfunding of 

our public works and infrastructure has to change. We look forward to working with 

you to increase the investment necessary for maintaining the rail infrastructure in 

a state of good repair. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and I welcome any questions you have. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Permut. 

Mr. Ivey? 

STATEMENT OF CRAIG IVEY, PRESIDENT, CONSOLIDATED 

EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK 

Mr. IVEY. Good Morning, Senator Blumenthal. My name is Craig 

Ivey, and I am the President of Con Edison of New York, the utility 

which provides electric, gas, and steam to the City of New York 

and parts of Westchester County. I want to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this morning’s hearing. I would also like 

to recognize Senator Murphy, Congressman Himes, and Congresswoman Esty for their ongoing engagement in this issue. 

11 

Before I begin, I want to express on behalf of Con Edison that 

we clearly recognize the hardships endured by Metro-North’s commuters during the train service interruption and regret the set of 

circumstances that led to the disruption. And I want to make clear 

to this panel, as well as to Metro-North riders, that we are committed to doing everything within our role to support the MTA to 

prevent anything like this from happening again, particularly as 

the agency’s substation project moves forward. 

I also want to commend our employees and Metro-North employees, who reacted so quickly and professionally in this emergency to 

restore partial service, and then full service, to the New Haven 

line. 

On September 13, 2013, one of the two Con Edison transmission 

lines, or feeders, serving the Metro-North New Haven Corridor was 

taken out of service at Metro-North’s request to accommodate work 

they were conducting at their Mount Vernon substation. To clarify, 

this is Metro-North’s substation, not Con Edison’s substation. The 

feeder was scheduled to be out of service from September 13, 2013, 

until October 13 so that the line could be repositioned and reconnected to their new equipment in Mount Vernon. 

On Wednesday, September 25, at 5:22 a.m., the remaining inservice feeder cable failed and caused a total loss of power supply 

to Metro-North’s Mount Vernon substation. A preliminary review 

indicates that the feeder fault was related to our work on the 

scheduled feeder shutdown. I will go into greater detail shortly. 

Within a few days of the feeder failure, Con Edison successfully 

erected a temporary substation at the Harrison station to provide 

enough power to allow for the partial restoration of Metro-North 

service on September 30. This was an innovative, unconventional, 

and ultimately successful effort to transform low voltage, residential 13,000 volt power into higher voltage, 27,000 volt power, for 

the train line. 

On October 3, we were able to reconnect and reenergize the 

138,000 feeder that had been removed from service at MetroNorth’s request 10 days sooner than scheduled. This reconnection 

allowed Metro-North to return to its regular commuter schedule on 

Monday, October 7. Our crews worked around the clock to expedite 

repairs to the failed feeder, which was reenergized on October 19, 

returning the Metro-North supply to its normal configuration of 

two transmission feeders. 

We are conducting a thorough review of the cause of the feeder 

failure to understand how this incident occurred and prevent it 

from happening again. The New York Public Service Commission 

is also conducting its own independent review. 

High-voltage transmission feeders are housed in oil-filled pipes. 

As a result, removing these feeders from service is a complex process. We have to freeze the insulating oil in the pipe within a freeze 

pit in order to contain the oil. 

We located the fault on the failed feeder just outside of the freeze 

pit work area. We found that the ground surrounding the work 

area was frozen, which we believe contributed to the failure. 

Having completed these freeze operations for decades, approximately 20 times a year, we have no records of a condition of this 

nature developing at any other time. Our investigation will include 

12 

a forensic analysis of the cable, the pipe, and the surrounding work 

area to help pinpoint the cause. 

It is important to note that Con Edison continuously assesses the 

condition of its underground feeder cables with respect to possible 

degradation due to aging. Over the past several years, several sample sections of cable similar in construction to those supplying the 

Metro-North Railroad have been subjected to in-depth engineering 

evaluations. These evaluations and our experience with these cable 

systems indicate that the condition and performance of the cable is 

primarily a function of the thermal and electrical stresses to which 

the cable is subjected as opposed to the age of the cable. 

Con Edison recognizes how critical Metro-North service is to the 

New York-Connecticut area. Con Edison bears an equally monumental responsibility in powering our dynamic region. This is why 

we are having extensive discussions with Metro-North regarding 

their future substation replacement work and the need to ensure 

that this type of event does not happen again. 

Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ivey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CRAIG IVEY, PRESIDENT, CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK

Good morning Senator Blumenthal. My name is Craig Ivey and I am the President of Con Edison of New York, the utility which serves electric, gas and steam 

to the City of New York and parts of Westchester County. I want to thank you for 

the opportunity to participate this morning’s hearing. I would also like to recognize 

Senator Murphy, Congressman Himes and Congresswoman Esty for their ongoing 

engagement in this issue. 

Before I begin, I want to express on behalf of Con Edison that we clearly recognize 

the hardships endured by Metro-North’s commuters during the train service interruption and regret the set of circumstances that led to the disruption. And I want 

to make clear to this panel, as well as to Metro-North riders, that we are committed 

to doing everything within our role to support the MTA to prevent anything like 

this from happening again, particularly as the agency’s substation project moves forward. 

I also want to commend our employees, and Metro-North employees, who reacted 

so quickly and professionally in this emergency to restore partial service, and then 

full service, to the New Haven line. 

On September 13, 2013, one of the two Con Edison transmission lines, or feeders, 

serving the Metro-North New Haven corridor was taken out of service at MetroNorth’s request to accommodate work they were conducting at their Mount Vernon 

substation. To clarify, this is Metro-North’s substation, not Con Edison’s substation. 

The feeder was scheduled to be out of service from September 13, 2013 until October 

13, at the request of Metro-North, so that the line could be repositioned and reconnected to their new equipment in Mount Vernon. 

On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 at 5:22 a.m. the remaining in-service feeder 

cable failed and caused a total loss of power supply to Metro-North’s Mount Vernon 

Substation. A preliminary review indicates that feeder fault was related to our work 

on the scheduled feeder shutdown. I will go into greater detail shortly. Within a few 

days of the feeder failure, Con Edison successfully erected a temporary substation 

at the Harrison station to provide enough power to allow for the partial restoration 

of Metro-North service on September 30. This was an innovative, unconventional 

and ultimately successful effort to transform low voltage, residential (13kV) power 

into higher voltage (27kV) power for the train line. 

On October 3, we were able to reconnect and re-energize the 138kV feeder that 

had been removed from service at Metro-North’s request. This reconnection allowed 

Metro-North to return to its regular commuter schedule on Monday, October 7. 

Our crews worked around-the-clock to expedite repairs to the failed feeder, which 

was re-energized on October 19, returning the Metro-North supply to its normal 

configuration of two transmission feeders. 

We are conducting a thorough review of the cause of the feeder failure to understand how this incident occurred and prevent it from happening again. The New 

13 

York Public Service Commission is also conducting its own independent review. 

High-voltage transmission feeders are housed in oil-filled pipes. As a result, removing these feeders from service is a complex process. We have to freeze the insulating 

oil in the pipe within a ‘‘freeze pit’’ in order to contain the oil. 

We located the fault on the failed feeder just outside of the ‘‘freeze pit’’ work area. 

We found that the ground surrounding the work area was frozen, which we believe 

contributed to the failure. Having completed these freeze operations for decades— 

approximately 20 times a year—we have no records of a condition of this nature developing at any other time. Our investigation will include a forensic analysis of the 

cable, the pipe and surrounding work area to help pinpoint the cause. 

It is important to note that Con Edison continuously assesses the condition of its 

underground feeder cables with respect to possible degradation due to aging. Over 

the past several years, several sample sections of cable similar in construction to 

those supplying the Metro-North Railroad have been subjected to in-depth engineering evaluations. These evaluations and our experience with these cable systems indicate that the condition and performance of the cable is primarily a function of the 

thermal and electrical stresses to which the cable is subjected as opposed to the age 

of the cable. 

Con Edison recognizes how critical Metro-North service is to the NY-CT area. Con 

Edison bears an equally monumental responsibility in powering our dynamic region. 

This is why we are having extensive discussions with the Metro-North regarding 

their future substation replacement work and the need to ensure that this type of 

event does not happen again. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Ivey. 

Commissioner Redeker? 

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. REDEKER, COMMISSIONER, 

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. REDEKER. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for 

this chance to testify. I am Jim Redeker, the Commissioner of the 

Connecticut Department of Transportation, and I am also the current Chair of the Northeast Corridor Commission. I’m honored to 

have the opportunity to discuss the power outage on the MetroNorth New Haven Line, the impacts it had on the Northeast Corridor, and the need to ensure investments in the infrastructure to 

sustain this critical transportation and economic driver in the region and for the entire Northeast Corridor. 

For over 160 years, the New Haven Line has been an essential 

transportation and economic link between Manhattan, the northern 

suburbs of New York City, and the cities in southwestern and central Connecticut. The New Haven Line is also critical to the entire 

Northeast Corridor, linking Boston to New York and Washington. 

The New Haven Line is the single busiest rail line in North 

America. Over 39 million passengers are served by Metro-North 

annually on the commuter system, and an additional 3 million 

intercity passenger trips are served by Amtrak. The ridership performance is record setting, indicating the attractiveness and importance of the New Haven Line to Connecticut, to New York, and the 

entire region. 

The State of Connecticut plays a unique role in the Northeast 

Corridor, since the state owns 46 miles of the Northeast Corridor 

infrastructure between New Haven and the New York border, as 

well as three branch lines. In total, Connecticut owns 235 track 

miles on the Northeast Corridor and branches. 

As the owner, Connecticut has invested significant state and 

Federal resources to upgrade the rail infrastructure, including 

track, catenary, and bridges. Connecticut has funded the replaceVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
14 

ment of 405 New Haven Line electric passenger vehicles and the 

construction of related maintenance facilities to support that fleet. 

As a result of the state’s investment, progress toward a state of 

good repair has been strong. In the last 10 years, Connecticut has 

invested over $3.2 billion in the New Haven Line, and out of that, 

two-thirds or $2 billion has been funded by state bond funds, while 

the remainder is Federal Transit Administration rail formula or 

discretionary funding. 

Unfortunately, even this amount of funding is not enough to address the infrastructure upgrades or improvements necessary for 

the New Haven Line. And Connecticut is not alone in addressing 

the backlog of investment in infrastructure. The Northeast Corridor relies on over 1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of which were 

constructed a century ago and are in desperate need of replacement 

or repair. 

Key segments of the Northeast Corridor are operating at or near 

capacity, such as the Hudson River tunnels between New York and 

New Jersey, which carry 70,000 riders a day and have no space for 

additional trains during rush hour. Major components of the Northeast Corridor electrical and signaling systems date back to the 

1910s, making service on the corridor highly susceptible to malfunctions and delay. 

Major investments in the corridor are essential to reduce delays, 

achieve a state of good repair, and build capacity for growth. In 

2010, the Northeast Corridor infrastructure master plan estimated 

that the corridor required $2.6 billion in annual expenditures over 

20 years, or $52 billion total, to achieve a state of good repair and 

build infrastructure capable of supporting passenger rail demand 

forecast for 2030. 

Investment levels over the past several decades have been critical in supporting the Northeast Corridor’s enviable record of continuous safe operation, but have barely covered the cost of normalized replacement of basic components. They fall far short of the levels needed to address repair backlogs and meet future needs. The 

Northeast Corridor Commission is currently in the process of developing an updated capital investment plan for the corridor that will 

address the needs of freight, commuter, and intercity services. 

The New Haven Line receives power from four substations. The 

substation in Mount Vernon, New York, which experienced the failure on September 25 is the single point of power between Pelham 

and Harrison, New York. 

In Connecticut, there are three substations that provide power 

for the New Haven Line. These are designed so that if one substation is offline, the others can provide redundant power. In addition, Connecticut is constructing two new substations, one in New 

Haven and one in Cos Cob. With the addition of these two new substations, there will be additional power to support the expansion of 

service with the new M8 rail fleet and provide complete redundancy in Connecticut to power the New Haven Line if any of the 

substations is offline. 

These projects are scheduled to be completed by the end of the 

calendar year. They provide an example of the proactive strategic 

investments Connecticut is making to upgrade the New Haven 

15 

Line and support future improvement and expansion of service for 

all users of the line. 

Unfortunately, on September 25, there was an unprecedented 

failure of the power supply at the substation in Mount Vernon, 

New York. The substation was undergoing a planned necessary upgrade, but a failure of a feeder cable left the New Haven Line without power in a critical section of New York. As a result, no MetroNorth or Amtrak electric trains operated, leaving well over 130,000 

customers without train service, and for 11 days, the Nation’s busiest rail line was crippled. 

Impacts to New York and Connecticut customers and businesses 

had a compelling economic impact that cannot be simply modeled. 

The impact on people’s livelihood and mobility was profound. While 

we don’t know what caused the failure, we certainly know that 

thousands of people were without the critical service, and we obviously need to do everything possible to avoid a similar incident 

from occurring again. To that end, we await feedback from Con 

Edison so critical lessons learned might be included in all future 

projects. 

I want to take a moment to reflect on the efforts to provide service during the 11 days without Mount Vernon substation in service. 

As soon as the incident occurred, Connecticut DOT was in direct 

contact with Metro-North to initiate the delivery of substitute services. Recognizing there is no solution that can provide full capacity 

of the New Haven Line, the MTA, Metro-North, and Connecticut 

DOT developed and implemented substitute rail, bus, and parkand-ride options that provided the most service that could possibly 

be delivered during the repair period. 

With the ultimate addition of temporary power by Con Edison, 

substitute services ultimately were able to provide options for an 

estimated 85 percent of normal weekday New Haven peak ridership. The immediate response by Governor Malloy to urge people 

to find alternatives, telecommute, or stay home was instrumental 

in the ability to manage this crisis. Consistent and thorough updates on the progressive addition of service were also communicated, and, above all, customers and other citizens rose to deal 

with the crisis and deserve a great deal of credit as they coped 

through this long service impact. 

The impact that this outage had resulted in an unprecedented 

action by the MTA board of directors to authorize a credit to customers. The action is not something that should be taken lightly, 

but it was clearly due to a once in a lifetime failure that had an 

extraordinary impact. In fact, this singular action is not recommended for the ongoing business practices that govern the New 

Haven Line. 

The New Haven Line, as part of the Northeast Corridor, is a critical transportation and economic system. The line has seen and 

will continue to see significant investments in ongoing maintenance 

and system upgrades. Its performance as the busiest rail commuter 

line in the country is exceptional. On average, it delivers consistent, high-quality, reliable service that exceeds 95 percent ontime performance. 

The quality of the system is improving consistently with the 

rapid delivery of new rail cars, upgraded power supply and catVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
16 

enary systems, new stations, and new parking. Those investments 

have also seen the implementation of the most significant additional weekday and weekend services in the history of the line. The 

results are proven by the growth in ridership in all markets in this 

region and for trips along the Northeast Corridor. 

Thank you for your time. I’ll be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Redeker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES P. REDEKER, COMMISSIONER, 

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Senator Murphy, and members of the Subcommittee. I am Jim Redeker, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of 

Transportation (CTDOT). I am also the current Chair of the Northeast Corridor 

Commission. I am honored to have the opportunity to discuss the power outage on 

Metro-North’s New Haven Line (NHL), the impacts it had on the Northeast Corridor (NEC), and the need to ensure investments in the infrastructure to sustain 

this critical transportation and economic driver in the region and for the entire 

Northeast Corridor. 

New Haven Line—Infrastructure and Investments 

For over 160 years, the New Haven Line has been an essential transportation and 

economic link between Manhattan, the northern suburbs of New York City and the 

cities in southwestern and central Connecticut. The New Haven Line is also critical 

to the entire Northeast Corridor, linking Boston to New York and Washington. The 

New Haven Line is the single busiest rail line in North America. Over 39 million 

passengers are served by Metro-North annually on the commuter system, and an 

additional 3 million intercity passenger trips are served by Amtrak. The ridership 

performance is record-setting, indicating the attractiveness and the importance of 

the New Haven Line to Connecticut, to New York and to the entire region. 

The State of Connecticut has a unique role on the NEC, since the State owns 46 

miles of the NEC infrastructure between New Haven and the New York border as 

well as three branch lines. In total, Connecticut owns 235 track miles on the NEC 

and three branch lines. As the owner, Connecticut has invested significant state and 

Federal resources to upgrade the rail infrastructure, including track, catenary and 

bridges. Connecticut has funded the complete replacement of 405 New Haven Line 

electric passenger vehicles (M8 rail cars) and the construction of related new maintenance facilities to support that fleet. As a result of the State’s investment, 

progress toward a State of Good Repair has been strong. In the last 10 years, Connecticut has invested over $3.2 billion in the NHL. Of that, two-thirds, or over $2 

billion has been funded by state bond funds, while the remainder is Federal Transit 

Administration rail formula or discretionary funding. 

Unfortunately, even this amount of funding is not enough to address the infrastructure upgrades or improvements necessary for the New Haven Line. And Connecticut is not alone in addressing the backlog of infrastructure investments. The 

NEC relies on over 1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of which were constructed over 

a century ago and are in desperate need of replacement or repair. Key segments of 

the NEC are operating at or near capacity, such as the Hudson River Tunnels between New York and New Jersey, which carry over 70,000 riders daily and have 

no space for additional trains during rush hour. Major components of the NEC’s 

electrical and signaling systems date back to the 1910s, making service on the Corridor highly susceptible to malfunctions and delay. Major investment in the Corridor 

is essential to reduce delays, achieve a state-of-good-repair, and build capacity for 

growth. In 2010, the NEC Infrastructure Master Plan (Master Plan) estimated that 

the Corridor required approximately $2.6 billion in annual expenditures over twenty 

years ($52 billion total) in order to achieve state-of-good-repair and build infrastructure capable of supporting passenger rail demand forecasts for 2030. Investment levels over the past several decades have been critical in supporting the NEC’s enviable record of continuous safe operation but have barely covered the costs of normalized replacement of basic components. They fall far short of the levels needed to address repair backlogs and meet future needs. The NEC Commission is currently in 

the process of developing an updated capital investment plan for the NEC that will 

address the needs of freight, commuter and intercity services. 

17 

New Haven Line Power 

The New Haven Line receives power from four substations. The substation in 

Mount Vernon, New York which experienced the failure on September 25, 2013 is 

the single point of power between Pelham and Harrison, New York. In Connecticut, 

there are three substations that provide power for the New Haven Line. These are 

designed so that if one substation is off line, the others can provide redundant 

power. In addition, Connecticut is constructing two new substations—one in New 

Haven and one in Cos Cob. With the addition of these two new substations, there 

will be additional power to support the expansion of service with the new M8 rail 

fleet and provide complete redundancy in Connecticut to power the New Haven Line 

if any of the substations is off line. These projects are scheduled to be completed 

by the end of this calendar year. These projects are an example of the proactive, 

strategic investments Connecticut is making to upgrade the New Haven Line and 

support the future improvement and expansion of service for all the users of the 

line. 

Power Outage 

Unfortunately, on September 25 there was an unexpected failure of the power 

supply at the substation in Mount Vernon, New York. The substation was undergoing a planned, necessary upgrade, but the failure of a feeder cable left the New 

Haven Line without power in the critical section in New York. As a result, no 

Metro-North or Amtrak electric trains could be operated, leaving well over 130,000 

customers without train service. For eleven days, the Nation’s busiest rail line was 

crippled. The impacts to New York and Connecticut customers and businesses had 

a compelling economic impact that cannot be simply modeled. The impact on people’s livelihood and mobility was profound. 

While we do not know what caused the failure, we certainly know that thousands 

of people were without this critical service, and we obviously need to seek to do everything possible to avoid a similar incident from occurring again. To that end, we 

await feedback from Con Edison so that critical lessons learned might be included 

in all future projects of this kind. 

Customer Service 

I want to take a moment to reflect on the efforts made to provide service to customers during the eleven days without the Mount Vernon substation in service. As 

soon as the incident occurred, Connecticut DOT was in direct contact with MetroNorth to initiate the delivery of substitute services. Recognizing that there is no solution that can provide the full capacity of the New Haven Line, the Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority (MTA), Metro-North and CTDOT developed and implemented substitute rail, bus and park/ride options that provided the most service 

that could possibly be delivered during the repair period. With the ultimate addition 

of temporary power by Con Edison, the substitute services ultimately were able to 

provide options for an estimated 85 percent of normal weekday New Haven Line 

peak ridership. 

The immediate response by Governor Dannel Malloy to urge people to find alternatives, telecommute or to stay home was instrumental in the ability to manage this 

crisis. Consistent and thorough updates on the progressive addition of service were 

also communicated. Above all, customers and other citizens rose to deal with the 

crisis and deserve a great deal of credit as they coped through this long service impact. 

The impact that this outage had resulted in an unprecedented action by the MTA 

Board of Directors to authorize a credit to customers. This action is not something 

that should be taken lightly, but it was clearly due to the once-in-a-lifetime failure 

that had an extraordinary impact. In fact, this singular action is not recommended 

for the ongoing business practices that govern the New Haven Line. 

Summary 

The New Haven Line, as part of the Northeast Corridor, is a critical transportation and economic system. The line has seen, and will continue to see, significant 

investments in ongoing maintenance and in system upgrades. Its performance, as 

the busiest rail commuter line in the country, is exceptional. On average, it delivers 

consistent, highly reliable service that exceeds 95 percent on-time performance. And 

the quality of the system is improving consistently and rapidly with the delivery of 

all new rail cars, upgraded power supply and catenary systems, new stations and 

new parking. Those investments have also seen the implementation of the most significant additional weekday and weekend services in the history of the line. The results are proven by the growth in ridership in all markets in this region and for 

trips along the entire Northeast Corridor. 

18 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. Lynch, thank you for being here today. I know you’ve submitted lengthy testimony, and all of the testimony is going to be 

made part of the record along with the exhibits that you submitted. 

So let me suggest that you summarize your testimony this morning. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF OTTO LYNCH, P.E., FELLOW, 

STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, 

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 

Mr. LYNCH. My name is Otto Lynch, and I’m a member of the 

American Society of Civil Engineers, and I’m currently serving on 

their Committee on America’s Infrastructure, representing the energy division. The ASCE would like to commend you for having this 

hearing today on the power outages and the larger issues related 

to the need for power delivery redundancy and improved reliability 

for the nation’s electric grid. 

Virtually all infrastructure systems, from trains and traffic 

lights, to clean drinking water delivery and wastewater disposal, 

rely on electricity. This hearing today, on the eve of the anniversary of Superstorm Sandy, serves as an important reminder of just 

how vulnerable we are and how quickly one event can have a crippling effect on our communities when we are not adequately prepared. 

I am here to testify not on the specific events, but on the big picture questions to keep them from happening again here or anywhere in America. Our infrastructure is the foundation on which 

the national economy depends, yet it is taken for granted by most 

Americans. Most of us do not notice until the road is closed, the 

water stops running, the lights go out, or the commuter trains quit 

working. 

ASCE’s 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure graded 

the Nation’s infrastructure a D+. This is based on 16 categories 

and found that the Nation needs to invest approximately $3.6 trillion by 2020 across those sectors to maintain the national infrastructure in good condition. The energy category also received a D+ 

in the 2013 Report Card. 

To update just our energy systems would cost $736 billion between now and 2020. Unfortunately, we are only on schedule to 

spend $629 billion. That leaves an investment gap of $107 billion. 

America relies on an aging infrastructure, electrical grid, and 

pipeline distribution systems, some of which originated in the 

1880s. This interconnected system includes power plants, a transmission grid, and distribution networks. The transmission grid 

forms the critical link between generation infrastructure and the 

distribution of electricity to households and businesses. Like our 

interstate highway system, failing to maintain adequate investment in this national asset has created congestion and the inability 

for power to flow efficiently from point A to point B. 

At one time, the U.S. had the best electric grid in the world. Unfortunately, that is no longer true. Aging equipment has resulted 

in an increasing number of intermittent power disruptions as well 

as a vulnerability to cyber attacks. It is my understanding that in 

19 

this specific case, the underground transmission line was 36 years 

old and was only designed for 30 years. 

Reliability issues are also emerging due to the complex process 

of rotating in new renewable energy sources and retiring our older 

energy sources. According to a recent report by the Executive Office 

of the President of the United States, ‘‘Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience Due to Weather Outages,’’ severe 

weather is the leading cause of power outages in the United States. 

The Edison Electric Institute reports that while transmission 

system outages do occur, over 90 percent of the outages occur along 

distribution systems. With respect to the failures in our distribution systems, The National Electrical Safety Code, which is adopted 

by all states except California, currently exempts all utility structures less than 60 feet tall, or distribution structures, from meeting 

the loads normally required in extreme weather for other structures. 

Structures greater than 60 feet tall, transmission structures, 

must meet the minimum ASCE requirements. The only storm 

hardening that structures less than 60 feet tall must meet was last 

revised in 1941, and the minimum load was actually decreased at 

that time. 

Florida Power and Light began a storm hardening program in 

2007 that included a significant decision to design all structures, 

regardless of height, according to the ASCE standards. As a result, 

in May 2013, it was announced that Florida Power and Light’s experience with the recent tropical storms shows main power lines 

that have been hardened are roughly half as likely to experience 

an outage during severe weather. 

On the transmission side, congestion at key points in the electric 

transmission grid has been rising over the last five years, which 

raises concerns with distribution, reliability, and cost of service. 

This congestion can lead to system-wide failures and unplanned 

outages. As we saw with the blackout of 2003 and other recent 

blackouts, these outages are not only an inconvenience, but they 

put public safety at risk and increase costs to consumers and businesses. The ASCE has determined that the average cost of a 1-hour 

power outage is just over $1,000 for a commercial business. 

Although we currently have adequate power generation, we are 

shifting to more and more renewable energy sources and also retiring our coal plants. You don’t build a new wind farm on the side 

of a retired coal plant. Thus, we are seeing a major shift in the locations of our power sources. We now have to transmit electricity 

from entirely different regions of our country than we ever have before. I equate it to moving the fuse panel on your house to the 

other side. As such, just like you would have to rewire your house, 

we are essentially having to rewire all of America. 

We would like to build more transmission lines for redundancy 

purposes. But the permitting and siting of these needed lines, especially when they are redundant, meets very stiff public resistance, 

which can result in significant project delays or even cancellations 

while significantly driving up the cost. It shouldn’t take 10 or 15 

years to permit a transmission line that only takes less than a year 

to build. It shouldn’t take five times as much to permit the line as 

it costs to build it. 

20 

1 ASCE was founded in 1852 and is the country’s oldest national civil engineering organization. It represents more than 146,000 civil engineers individually in private practice, government, industry, and academia who are dedicated to the advancement of the science and profession of civil engineering. ASCE is a non-profit educational and professional society organized 

under Part 1.501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. www.asce.org 

As detailed in the ASCE Failure to Act Study, unless investment 

is accelerated, the performance of the U.S. economy will suffer. 

Americans will lose jobs. Personal income will fall. Business productivity will go down, and U.S. exports will fall. If we invest an 

additional $11 billion per year from now until 2020, we can prevent 

these losses. This investment gap is not insurmountable. I would 

venture to say if we could streamline the permitting process, the 

annual investment could be significantly lowered. 

There are a number of solutions that can help ensure that the 

Nation’s interconnected electric grid remains reliable and efficient. 

First, we need to adopt a national energy policy that anticipates 

and adapts to future energy needs and promotes the development 

of sustainable energy sources, while increasing the efficiency of energy use, promoting conservation, and decreasing dependence on 

fossil fuels as sources are depleted. Such a policy must be adaptable and scalable to local and state policy. 

Two, we need to provide mechanisms for timely approval of 

transmission lines to minimize the time from preliminary planning 

to operation. Three, we should design and construct additional 

transmission grid infrastructure to efficiently deliver power from 

remote geographic locations to developed regions that have the 

greatest demand requirements. 

Four, we need to encourage the adoption of the same minimum 

design standards and storm loads for distribution poles as are used 

for transmission poles based on ASCE standards. And, finally, we 

need to continue research to improve and enhance the Nation’s 

transmission and generation infrastructure as well as the development of technologies such as smart grid, real-time forecasting for 

transmission capacity, and sustainable energy generation which 

provide a reasonable return on investment. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lynch follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS

‘‘THE NEED TO MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE THE NATION’S ELECTRIC GRID’’ 

The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)1 would like to commend the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for holding a hearing on 

the power outages that recently affected Metro-North’s New Haven line, and the 

larger issues related to the need for redundancy and improved reliability for the Nation’s electric grid. Virtually all infrastructure systems from trains and traffic lights, 

to clean drinking water delivery and wastewater disposal, rely on electricity. 

This hearing today, on the eve of the anniversary of Hurricane Sandy, serves as 

an important reminder of how vulnerable we are, and how quickly one event can 

have a crippling effect on our communities when we are not adequately prepared. 

An Aging Infrastructure System 

Our infrastructure is the foundation on which the national economy depends, yet 

it is taken for granted by most Americans. Most of us do not notice until the road 

is closed, the water stops working, or the lights go out. 

Deteriorating and aging infrastructure is not only an inconvenience, it financially 

impacts our families, local communities, and our entire country. Our inability to 

21 

2www.infrastructurereportcard.org 

3 Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages, Executive Office of the President (of the Unities States), August 2013. p. 3 http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ 

files/2013/08/f2/Grid Resiliency ReportlFINAL.pdf 4 Edison Electric Institute. ‘‘Underground vs. Overhead Distribution Wires: Issues to Consider.’’ Washington, D.C. Accessed July 22, 2013. 5 2012 National Electrical Safety Code, p. 191–203, http://standards.ieee.org/about/nesc/ 6 ASCE 7–10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, http:// 

www.asce.org/Product.aspx?id=2147487569&productid=194395836 7FPL announces plan to accelerate strengthening of Florida’s electric grid during annual 

storm drill, May 2, 2013, http://www.fpl.com/news/2013/050213.shtml 

keep our infrastructure in good working condition undermines our Nation’s competitiveness and economic strength. 

As stewards of the Nation’s infrastructure, civil engineers are responsible for the 

design, construction, operation and maintenance of our vital public works. With that 

responsibility comes the obligation to periodically assess the state of the infrastructure, report on its condition and performance, and advise on the steps necessary to 

improve it. 

ASCE’s 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure 2 graded the Nation’s infrastructure a ‘‘D+’’ based on 16 categories and found that the Nation needs to invest 

approximately $3.6 trillion by 2020 across those sectors to maintain the national infrastructure in good condition. 

The energy category also received a grade of ‘‘D+’’ in the 2013 Report Card. To update just our energy systems would cost $736 billion between now and 2020. Unfortunately, we are only on track to spend $629 billion during that time period, leaving an investment gap of $107 billion. 

The Report Card highlights the fact that, like everything, infrastructure has a 

lifespan. Good maintenance can extend that lifespan, but not forever, and a lack of 

maintenance can shorten it. This is not something that happens dramatically overnight, but a gradual worsening over time. 

Far too many of our infrastructure systems lack the funding needed for proper 

maintenance and we continue to see categories that simply are not seeing the investment to improve day to day performance and save money in the long-term. The 

backlog of projects to maintain and modernize our infrastructure keeps growing. 

Conditions of the Nation’s Electric Grid 

America relies on an aging electrical grid and pipeline distribution systems, some 

of which originated in the 1880s. This interconnected system includes power plants, 

a transmission grid, and distribution networks. The transmission grid forms the 

critical link between generation infrastructure and distribution of electricity to 

households and businesses. Like our interstate highway system, failing to maintain 

adequate investment in this national asset has created congestion and the inability 

for power to flow efficiently from point A to point B. 

Aging equipment has resulted in an increasing number of intermittent power disruptions, as well as vulnerability to cyber attacks. Reliability issues are also emerging due to the complex process of rotating in new energy sources and ‘‘retiring’’ older 

infrastructure. According to a recent report by the Executive Office of the President 

of the United States, Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to 

Weather Outages, severe weather is the leading cause of power outages in the 

United States.3 The Edison Electric Institute reports that while transmission system outages do occur, roughly 90 percent of all outages occur along distribution systems.4

The National Electrical Safety Code,5 which is adopted by all states except California, currently exempts all utility structures less than 60 feet tall, i.e., ‘‘distribution poles’’, from meeting the loads normally required in extreme weather for other 

structures derived by ASCE standards.6Structures greater than 60 feet tall, i.e., 

transmission structures, must meet these minimum ASCE standards. The only 

‘storm loading’ that structures less than 60 feet tall must meet was last revised in 

1941, and the minimum load was actually decreased at that time. 

Florida Power and Light (FPL) began a Storm Hardening program in 2007 that 

included a significant decision to design all structures, regardless of height, according to the ASCE standard. As a result, in May 2013 it was announced that ‘‘FPL’s 

experience with the recent tropical storms shows main power lines that have been 

hardened are roughly half as likely to experience an outage during severe weather.’’ 7

Congestion at key points in the electric transmission grid has been rising over the 

last five years, which raises concerns with distribution, reliability and cost of service. This congestion can also lead to system-wide failures and unplanned outages. 

These outages are not only an inconvenience, but they put public safety at risk and 

22 

8 ASCE, Failure to Act: Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in Electricity Infrastructure, 2012, p. 30. 9 NERC 2011 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, p. 35 

10Transmission and distribution numbers from Edison Electric Institute, 2012 Report, table 

9–1; generation investment was estimated from reporting forms of the EIA and Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, with averages applied for investment cost per kilowatt hour for applicable generating technologies [close up space between lines] 

increase costs to consumers and businesses. The average cost of a one-hour power 

outage is just over $1,000 for a commercial business. 

In the near term, it is expected that energy systems have adequate capacity to 

meet national demands. From 2011 through 2020, demand for electricity in all regions is expected to increase 8 percent or 9 percent in total, based on population 

growth and projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. After 

2020, capacity expansion is forecast to be a greater problem, particularly with regard to generation, regardless of the energy resource mix. Excess capacity is expected to decline in a majority of regions, and generation supply could dip below 

demand by 2040 in every area except the Southwest without prudent investments.8

The permitting and siting of needed transmission lines often meets with public 

resistance, which can result in significant project delays or eventual cancellations 

while driving up costs. Over three times as many low-voltage line projects, which 

are typically built in more urban areas, were delayed in 2011, compared to highvoltage lines.9 The result is that while new transmission lines are anticipated and 

planned, they are not being built due to permitting issues. 

Investment for transmission has been increasing annually since 2001 at a nearly 

7 percent annual growth rate. For local distribution systems, however, national-level 

investment peaked in 2006 and has since declined to less than the level observed 

in 1991.10 Construction spending has decreased in recent years, although the aging 

of local distribution networks, lack of funding for maintenance, and resulting equipment failures have received public attention and put pressure on some utilities to 

make improvements. 

Economic Implications of Continued Underinvestment 

In an effort to examine the broader economy’s link to the health of the Nation’s 

infrastructure, ASCE released a series of economic studies in 2012 that answers a 

critical question—what does a ‘‘D+’’ mean for America’s economic future? The study 

on energy, Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in 

Electricity Infrastructure shows that an investment in our Nation’s generation, 

transmission, and distribution systems can improve reliability, reduce congestion, 

and build the foundation for economic growth. 

While investments in the transmission sector have been promising since 2005, unless the investment gap is filled, electricity interruptions will rise, increasing costs 

for households and businesses. 

Interruptions may occur in the form of equipment failures, intermittent voltage 

surges and power quality irregularities due to equipment insufficiency, or blackouts 

or brownouts as demand exceeds capacity for periods of time. The periods of time 

can be unpredictable in terms of frequency and length. 

By 2020, there is estimated to be an investment shortfall of $107 billion across 

generation, transmission and distribution systems needed to keep up with the projected demand for energy. Shortfalls in grid investments (transmission and distribution) are expected to account for almost 90 percent of the investment gap, equaling 

nearly $95B in additional dollars needed to modernize the grid. 

By 2020, the cumulative costs of service interruptions to households will be $71 

billion, or $565 per household over the period. Businesses will lose approximately 

$126 billion. 

Thus, the total cost to the U.S. economy will be $197 billion from now until 2020, 

and annual costs to the economy will average $20 billion by 2020. These costs are 

not felt equally across the United States, with larger cost increases in the South 

and West. 

Unless investment is accelerated, the performance of the U.S. economy will suffer. 

• Americans will lose jobs. The U.S. economy will end up with an average of 

529,000 fewer jobs than would otherwise occur by the year 2020. Impacts will 

fall heavily on the retail and consumer spending sectors with a 40 percent drop 

in employment in retail, restaurants, and bars as households spend more on 

electricity. 

• Personal Income Will Fall: Personal income will fall by a total of $656 billion 

by 2020. 

23 

• Business productivity will go down. GDP is expected to fall by a total of $496 

billion by 2020. 

• U.S. exports will fall. The U.S. will lose $10 billion in exports in 2020, which 

could grow to $40 billion by 2040. The hardest hit industrial sectors will be: 

» Aerospace 

» Electronic components 

» Air transport 

If we invest an additional $11 billion per year from now until 2020, we can prevent these losses. This investment gap is not insurmountable. 

Moving Forward to Modernize our Nation’s Electric Grid 

There are a number of solutions that can help ensure that the Nation’s interconnected electric grid remains reliable and efficient: 

• Adopt a national energy policy that anticipates and adapts to future energy 

needs and promotes the development of sustainable energy sources, while inVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE

1028ASCE1.eps
24 

creasing the efficiency of energy use, promoting conservation, and decreasing 

dependence on fossil fuels as sources are depleted. Such a policy must be adaptable and scalable to local and state policy. 

• Provide mechanisms for timely approval of transmission lines to minimize the 

time from preliminary planning to operation. 

• Design and construct additional transmission grid infrastructure to efficiently 

deliver power from remote geographic generation sources to developed regions 

that have the greatest demand requirements. 

• Encourage the adoption of the same minimum design methods and storm loads 

for distribution poles as are used for transmission structures derived by ASCE 

standards. 

• Continue research to improve and enhance the Nation’s transmission and generation infrastructure as well as the deployment of technologies such as smart 

grid, real-time forecasting for transmission capacity, and sustainable energy 

generation which provide a reasonable return on investment. 

Conclusion 

Electricity is the basis for a competitive U.S. economy and contributes to the success or failure of American businesses. Our quality of life also depends on access 

to affordable and reliable energy. 

Looking ahead in the 21st century, our Nation is increasingly adopting technologies that will automate our electric grid and help manage congestion points. In 

turn, this will require robust integration of transmission and distribution systems 

so that the network continues to be reliable. Investments in the grid, select pipeline 

systems, and new technologies have helped alleviate congestion problems in recent 

years, but capacity and an aging system will be issues in the long term. 

To compete in the global economy, improve our quality of life and raise our standard of living, we must maintain and modernize America’s infrastructure and the 

electric grid. 

25 

APPENDIX


1028APP1.eps

Accredited 

Standards 

Committee 

C2-2012 

National Electrical Safety Code® 

Secretariat 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Approved 14 April 2011 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Approved 3 June 2011 

American National Standards Institute 

2012 Edition 

Abstract: This Code covers basic provisions for safeguarding of persons from hazards arising from the 

installation, operation, or maintenance of (1) conductors and equipment in electric supply stations, and 

(2) overhead and underground electric supply and communication lines. It also includes work rules for the 

construction, maintenance, and operation of electric supply and communication lines and equipment. The 

Code is applicable to the systems and equipment operated by utilities, or similar systems and equipment, of 

an industrial establishment or complex under the control of qualified persons. This Code consists of the 

introduction, definitions, grounding rules, list of referenced and bibliographic documents, and Parts 1, 2, 3, 

and 4 of the 2012 Edition of the National Electrical Safety Code. 

Keywords: communications industry safety; construction of communication lines; construction of electric 

supply lines; electrical safety; electric supply stations; electric utility stations; high-voltage safety; operation of 

communications systems; operation of electric supply systems; power station equipment; power station 

safety; public uti lity safety; safety work rules; underground communication line safety; underground electric 

line safety 

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 1001 6-5997, USA 

Copyright © 201 1 by the 

Institute of Eleclrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

All rights reserved. Published 20 I [ 

Printed in the United States of America 

National Electrical Safety Code and NESC are registered trademarks and service marks in the 

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by 

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated 

TIle NESC logo is a ~egis ered ra~ema k in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by 

'roe instItute of ElectrIcal and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated. 

1 August 2011 

National Electrical Code, NEC, and NFPA 70 are registered trademarks in the 

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by the 

National Fire Protection Association 

ISBN 978-0-738 1-6588-2 

Public authorities are granted per:m.issioll to republish the material 

herein in laws, regulations, adnulUstrative orders, ordinances, or 

similar docmnents. No other party may reproduce in any fonn, in an 

electronic retrieval system or otherwise, any portion of this document, 

without the prior written pcnnission of the publisher 

STDPT97085 
26 


1028APP2.eps

250 Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines 250C 

Section 25. 

Loadings for Grades Band C 

250. General loading requirements and maps 

A. General 

1. It is necessary to assume the wind and icc loads that may OCCliT on a line. Three weather loadings arc specified in Rules 2508 , 250C, <md 2500 . Where all three rules apply, the required 

loading shall be Ihe one that has the greatest effect. 

2. Where constmclion or maintCI1l11lCe loads exceed those imposed by Rule 250A I, the asslimed 

loadings shall be increased accordingly. When temporary loads, slich as lining of equipment, 

stringing operations. or a worker on a stmcture or its componenl, arc to be imposed on a 

structure or component, the strength of the sln-clure or componenl should be taken into account 

or other provisions should be made 10 limit the likelihood of advcrse cffects of stmclure or 

component fa ilure. 

l ... ·OlE: Other provisions could include cranes that can support the equipment loads, guard poles and 

spotters with radios, and stringing equipment capable of promptly halting stringing operations. 

3. It is recognized that loadings actually experienced in certain areas in each of the loading districts may be greater, or in some cases, may be less than those specified in these mles. In the 

absence of a detailed loading analysis, using the same respective statistical met hodologies used 

to develop the maps in Rule 250C or 2500 , no reduction in thc loadings specified therein shall 

be made without the approval of the administrative authority. 

4. 11le structuml capacity provided by meeting the loading and strength requirements of Sections 

25 and 26 providcs sufficient capability to resist ea rthquake ground Illotions. 

B. Combined ice and wind district loading 

Four ge ncral dcgrees of district loading due to weather conditions are recognized and are designatcd 

as heavy, medium. light, and wann island loading. Figure 250-1 shows the districts where these 

loadings apply. Wann island loading applies to Hawaii and other island systems located in tIle range 

of 0 10 25 degrees latitude, north or south. 

NOTE: '!llC localities arc classified in the different loading districts according to the relative simultaneous 

prevalence of the wind velocity and lhickness of ice that accumulates on wires. Light loading is for places 

where little, if any, ice accumulates 011 wires. In the "'ann island loading zone, cold temperatures and ice 

accumulation on wires only occurs at high altitudes 

Table 250-1 shows the radiallhickness of ice and the wind pressures to be used in calculating loads. 

Ice is assumed to weigh 9 13 kg/mJ (57 IbIftJ). 

C. Extreme wind loading 

If no portion of a st ructure or its supported facilities exceeds 18 m (60 ft) above ground or water 

level, the provisions of this mle are 11 0t required. except as specifi ed in Rule 26 1 A Ie, 26 1 A2e, or 

261A3d. Where a stmcture or its supportcd facilities exceeds 18 III (60 ft) above ground or watcr 

levcllhc structure and its supported facilities shall be designcd to withstand thc cxtreme wind load 

associated wit h the Basic Wind Speed, as spec ificd by Figure 250-2. Thc wind pressures calculated 

shall bc applied to Ole cntire stmcture and supported fac ilitics without ice. The following fonnula 

shall be used to calculatc wind load. 

Load in nc,,10ns = 0.6 13 . (Vrnls)2 . kz . GRF . I . Cr' A(m2) 

Load in pounds = 0.00256 . (Vmilh)2 . kz . GRF . I . Cr' A(ft2) 
27 


1028APP3.eps

250C1 Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines 

where 

0.6 13 Velocity-pressure nume rical coefficient reflects the mass density of ,lir 

0.00256 for the standard atmosphere, i.e., temperature of 15 °C (59 OF) and sea 

level pressure of 760 nun (29.92 in) of mercul)'. l1le numerical 

coefficient 0.6 13 metric (0.00256 customary) sha ll be used except where 

sufficient climatic data are availab le to j ustify the selection of a different 

value of this factor for a design application. 

kz Velocity pressure exposure coefficient. as defined in Rule 250CI. 

Table 250-2 

V Basic wind speed, 3 s gust wind speed in Ill/s at JO III (mi/h al 33 ft) 

aboveground, Figure 250-2 

GRF Gust responsc factor, as defined in Rule 250C2 

I Importance factor, 1.0 fo r utility structures and the ir supported faci lities 

Cr Force coeffi cient (shape facto r). As derined in Rules 25 1 A2 and 2528 

A Projected wind area, m2 (ft2) 

250C2b 

The wind pressure parameters (kz, V, and GRF) are based on open terrain with scattered obstmctions 

(Exposure Category C as de ri ned in ASCE 7-05). Exposure Category C is the basis of the NESC 

e:->treme wind criteria. Topographical fea tures such as ridges, hills, and escarpments may increase 

Ihe wind loads on site-specific stmctures. A Topographic Factor, K..n • from ASCE 7-05, may be used 

to <lccount for these speci<ll cases. 

NOTE': Special wind regions-Although lhe wind speed map is valid for most regions of the COlUltry. special 

wind regions indicated on lhe map are known to have wind speed anomalies. Winds blowing over mountain 

ranges or through gorges or river valleys in these special regions cml develop speeds lhat arc substantially 

higher than the values indicated on the map. 

I. Velocity pressure e:->posure coefficient, kz 

The velocity pressure exposure coeffic ient, kz• is based on the height, h, to the center-ofpressure of the wind area for the following load applications: 

a. kz fo r the stmcture is based on 0.67 of the total height, h, of the stmcture above ground 

line. 

NOTE: In Table 250-2, for h :;; 75 m (250 fi), lhe structure kz values are adjusted fo r lhe wind load to 

be determined at lhe center-of-pressure of the structure assumed to be at 0.67 h. I1te wind pressure is 

assumed unifonnly distributed over the structure face nonnal to the wind. 

b. kz for the wire is based on the height, h, of the wire at the structure. 

In special terrain conditions (i.e., mountainous teTrnjll and canyon) where the hcight of thc 

wire aboveground at mid-span may be substa ntially higher than al the stmcture, 

cngineeringjudgment may be used in determining an appropriate value for the wire kL • 

c. kz fo r a spec ific height on a stmcture o r component is based on the height, h, to the centerof-pressure of the wi nd area being considered. 

TIle fonnu las shown in Table 250-2 shaJl be used to delenni ne all values of kz. 

E.XCEPTlON: 111C selected values ofkz tabulated in Table 250-2 may be used instead of calculating 

the values. 

2. Gust response fac tor, GRF 

a. The structure gust response factor, GRF, is dete nnilled using tbe total stmctu re height, It 

When calculating a wind load at a speciric height on a stmcture. the stmclure gust 

response factor, GRF• detennined using the total structure height, h. shall be used. 

b. The wire gust response factor is detennined using the height of the wire at the structure, h, 

and the design wind span, L. Wire attachment points that are 18 III (60 fO or less above 

ground or water levell11l1st be considered if the total structure height is greater than 18 m 

(60 £I) above ground or water. 
28 


1028APP4.eps

250C2c Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead lines 250D3 

In special terrain conditions (i.e. , mountainous terrain and canyon) where the height of the 

wire aboveground at mid-span may be substantially higher Olan at the attaclunent point, 

engineering judgment may be used in detennining an appropriate value for the wire GRF. 

c. The gust response factor, GRF, to be used on components, such as antennas, transfonners, 

etc., shall be Ole stmcture gust response factor detennined in Rule 250C2a. 

Selected values of the stmcture and wire gust response factors are tabulated in Table 250-3. 

The structure and wire gust response factors may also be detennined using the fonnulas in 

Table 250-3. For valucs of h > 75 m (250 ft) and L > 600 m (2000 ft), Ole GRF shall be 

detennined using the fonnulas in Table 250-3. 

NOTE: Where structure heights are 50 111 ( 165 ft) or less and spans are 600 111 (2000 ft) or less, the 

combined product of kz and GRF may be conservatively taken as 1. 15 if it is desired to simplify 

calculations. 

D. Extreme ice with concurrent wind loading 

If no portion of a stmcture or its supported facilities exceeds 18 m (60 ft) aboveground or water 

level, the provisions of tIlis rule are not required. Where a structure or its supported facilities 

exceeds 18 m (60 ft) aboveground or water level, the stmcture and its supported facilities shall be 

designed to withstand thc icc and wind load associated WiOl the U nifonn Ice Thickness and 

Concurrent Wind Speed, as specified by Figure 250-3. The wind pressures for Ole concurrent wind 

speed shall be as indicated in Table 250-4. The wind pressures calculated shall be applied to the 

entire structure and supported facilities without ice and to the iced wire diameter detennined in 

accordance with Rule 251. No loading is specified in this rule for extreme ice with concurrent wind 

loading for warm islands located from 0 to 25 degrees latitude, north or south. 

Ice is assumed to weigh 913 kg/m3 (57 Ib/ft3). 

I. For Grade B, the radial thickness of ice from Figure 250-3 shall be multiplied by a factor of 

1.00. 

2. For Grade C, Ole radial Olickness of ice from Figure 250-3 shall be multiplied by a factor of 

0.80. 

3. 111e concurrent wind shall be applied to Ole projected area resulting from Rules 250D I and 

250D2 multiplied by a factor of 1.00. 
29 


1028APP5.eps

F-2S0-1 

ALASKAHEAVY 

Part 2: Safety Ru les for Overhead Lines 

/"'-M~DI'(,M ( U)ADlNG---

,,_tONE . 

-- 'i.,... 

-"": 

~; ~ ... .' 

-\. ., ~ ......... --.. 

F-2S0-1 

The Warm Island Loading District includes American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii , Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, 

and other islands located from 0 to 25 degrees latitude , north or south. 

Figure 250-1-Generalloading map of United States with respect to 

loading of overhead lines 
30 


1028APP6.eps

F-2S0-2(a) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines F-2S0-2(a) 

Figure 250-2(a)-8asic wind speeds 

NOTE: Figure 250-2(a) reprinted with permission from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 201 91 

from ASeE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
31 


1028APP7.eps

F-250-2(b) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines 

140(63) 

Special Wind Region 

Location V mph (m/5) Hawaii 105 (47) Puerto Rico 145 (65) Guam 170 (76) 

Virgin Islands 145 (65) 

American Samoa 125 (56) 

Notes: 

1. Values are nominal design 3-second gust wind speeds in miles per hour (mls) 

at 33 ft (10 m) above ground for Exposure C category. 

2. Linear interpolation between wind contours is permitted. 

3. Islands and coastal areas outside the last contour shall use the last wind speed 

contour of the coastal area. 

4. Mountainous !crrain, gorges, ocean promontories, and special wind regions 

shall be examined for unusual wind conditions. 

Figure 250-2(b)-Basic wind speeds 

F-250-2(b) 

100(45) 

NOTE: Figure 2S0-2(b) reprinted witl1 pennission from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 2019 1 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
32 


1028APP8.eps 1028APP9.eps

F-250-2(c) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines F-250-2(d) 

110(49) 120(54) 

Notes: 

1. Values are nominal design 3-second gust wind 

speeds In mil .. per hour (mls) at 33 ft {10 m} 

above ground for Exposure C category. 

2. LI,..- interpolation between wind contours Is 

pennItIod. 

3. Islands and ~I areas outside the last contour shall usa the last wind speed contour 

of the coastal area. 

4. Mountainous terrain, got'gM. ocean 

promontories, and special wind regions shall 

be examined for unusual wind condftIons. 

Figure 250-2(c)-Western Gulf of Mexico hurricane coastline 

NOTE: Figure 250-2(e) reprinted with pennissian from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20 19 1 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimwn Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Copyright © 2005. 

90(40) 

100(45) 

110(49) 

120(04) '-;:::j;~~il::~~ 130(58) 

130(58) 

140(63) 

SpedaI Wind Region 

Notes: 

1. Val .... are nominal design 3-second gust wind spMds In mil .. per hour (mls) at 33 fl (10 m) 

above ground for Exposure C category. 

2. Linear interpolation between wind contours is 

pormIt1ad, 

3. Islands and coastal ..... outside the last 

contour shall use the lut wind speed contour 

of the coastal areL 4. MountaJnous terrain, gorges, oc:aan promontories, and special wind regions shall 

be examined for unusual wind conditions. 

Figure 250-2(d)-Eastern Gulf of Mexico and southeastern U,S, hurricane coastline 

NOTE: Figure 2S0-2ed) reprinted with pemlission from ASCE, 1801 A lexander Bell Dr. , Reston, VA 20191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Stmctures. Copyright © 2005. 
33 


1028APP10.eps

F-250-2(e) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines 

100(45) 

Special WInd RegJon 

-, 1. Values are nomInll_lgn 34eeond gUlt wind 

speeds in miles per now (mls)'-: 33 ft (10 m) 

abov. ground roc Exposure c category. 

2. Unew IntM'poIlItIon between wind contoufS Is 

permitted. 3 . ....,. and coastal ..... outaJdiI 1M last 

contour shall UlMttM latwlnd speed c:ontouT 

cfthecoast.l aNa. 

4. Mountainous terrain, gorges, ocean promonton.., and speel .. wind regions shall 

be examlMd lot unusual wind conditions. 

Figure 250-2(e)-Mid and northern Atlantic hurricane coastline 

F-250-2(e) 

NOTE: Figure 250-2(e) reprinted with pennission from ASCE, 180 1 Alexander Bell Dr. , Reston, VA 20 191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Struchlres. Copyright © 2005. 
34 


1028APP11.eps

F-250-3(a) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines 

Notes: 

1. Ice thicknesses on structures in exposed locations at elevations 

higher than the surrounding terrain and in valleys and gorges may 

exceed the mapped values. 

2. In the mountain west. indicated by the shading. ice thicknesses 

may exceed the mapped values in the foothills and passes. 

However, at elevations above 5,000 ft, freezjng rain is unlikely. 

3. In the Appalachian Mountains, indicated by the shading, 

ice thicknesses may vary significanUy OVef short distances. 

50-YEAR MEAN RECURRENCE INTERVAL UNIFORM ICE THICKNESSES DUE TO FREEZING RAIN WITH CONCURRENT 3-SECOND GUST SPEEDS: CONTIGUOUS 48 STATES. 

Figure 250-3(a)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

F-250-3(a) 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(a) reprinted with pennission from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20 191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and OLher Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
35 


1028APP12.eps

F-250-3(b) Part 2: Safety Rules far Overhead Lines 

lCt;l lhk:kness zones -- Gust speed zones - - -

51).YEAR MEAN RECURRENCE INTERVAL UNIFORM ICE THICKNESSES DUE TO FREEZING RAIN WITH CONCURRENT 3-SECOND GUST SPEEDS: CONTIGUOUS 48 STATES. 

Figure 2S0-3(b)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

F-250-3(b) 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(b) reprinted with pennissian from ASCE, 180 1 Alexander Bell Dr , Reston, VA 20 191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimmll Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
36 


1028APP13.eps 1028APP14.eps

F-250-3(c) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines F-250-3(d) 

LAKE SUPERIOR DETAIL 

Figure 2S0-3(c)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(c) reprinted with pennission from ASCE, 1801 Alexmlder Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Struchlres. Copyright © 2005. 

fRASER VALLEY, WASHIIlGTOlf DETAIL 

Figure 2S0-3(d)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(d) reprinted wi til pennission from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimlilll Design Loads for Buildings mId Otiler Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
37 


1028APP15.eps

F-250-3(e) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines F-250-3(e) 

COLUMBIA RlIIER GORGE, WASHIIIGTOIl DETAIL 

Figure 250-3(e)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(e) reprinted with penl1ission [rom ASCE, 180 1 Alexander BeU Dr., Reston, VA 20191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Struchlres. Copyright © 2005 . 
38 


1028APP16.eps

F-250-3(f) Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines F-250-3(f) 

Ice thickness zones-- Note: 

Gust speed zones --

Weather stations • Ice thicknesses In exposed locations at elevations htgher than the surrounding 

terraIn and in valleys and gorges may exceed the mapped values 

SO-YEAR WEAN RECURR~CE INTERVAL UNIFORM teE TtiCKNESSES DUE TO FREEZING RAIN WrTIi CONCURREHT 3-SECOND GUST SPEEDS: ALASKA 

Figure 250-3(f)-Uniform ice thickness with concurrent wind 

NOTE: Figure 250-3(1) reprinted with pennission from ASCE, 1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Reston, VA 20 191 

from ASCE 7-05, Minimwn Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Copyright © 2005. 
39 


1028APP17.eps

T-250-1 Part 2: Safety Rules for Overhead Lines T-250-1 

Table 250-1-lce, wind pressures, and temperature§. 

Loading districts (for use with Rule 250B) 

Warm ishmds located at Extreme Extreme ice 

Mcd- o to 25 degrees latitude <D wind lo ,ding with 

Heavy ium Light loading concurrent 

see sec (for use with wind 

Figure see Figure Altitudes Altitudes (for usc with 

250-1 Figure 250-1 sea level to above Rule 250C) Rule 250D) 250-1 2743 m 2743 m 

(9000 ft) (9000 ft) 

Radial 

thickness of 

ice 

(mm) 12.5 6.5 0 0 6.5 0 See Figure 

250-3 

(in) 0.50 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 See Figure 

250-3 

Horizontal 

wind 

pressure 

(Pa) 190 190 430 430 190 See Figure See Figure 

250-2 250-3 

(Ib1f\2) 4 4 9 9 4 See Figure See Figure 

250-2 250-3 

T cmperature 

("C) - 20 - 10 - I + 10 -10 + 15 - 10 

("F) 0 + 15 +30 +50 + 15 +60 + 15 

<l.lIslands located at 0 to 25 degrees latitude include American Samoa ( 14°8), Guam (J3°N), Hawaii (22°N), Puerto 

Rico (18°N), and Virgin Islands (18°N). 
40 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you very much to all 

of you. I’m going to begin my questioning with Mr. Ivey, if I may. 

Let me just say I appreciate that all of you agree, and I strongly 

share the view, that our nation needs to make additional investments in infrastructure. 

As you may know, I proposed a National Railway Trust Fund, 

similar to our highway fund, to help provide the funds that are 

necessary for that investment. Our nation has been laggard and lax 

in making sufficient investments, and so I think we begin on that 

common ground. 

We begin also, I think, on the common ground that this failure 

had costs that are intolerable and disruptive, not only to the commuters that you serve, but also to freight and our economy. The 

ripple effects were far reaching and profound. 

Mr. Ivey, speaking about cost, can you commit to us today that 

Con Ed will reimburse Metro-North for the refunds that it has to 

make to its riders? 

Mr. IVEY. Thank you, Senator. Con Edison recognizes the critical 

role that this line plays to the New York and Connecticut area. We 

also know that adequate contingency plans are important for critical infrastructure providers, whether they are water treatment facilities or hospitals. 

The MTA has already provided for refunds for customers. We, as 

a utility, don’t believe our customers should bear the risk when a 

customer decides to take one of the feeders out of service, because 

we do know that failures can happen. In this case, it’s a very improbable circumstance, but the failure did occur. But we think it 

unfair to ask our customers to bear the risk when a customer takes 

a piece of equipment out of service at their request. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It was your line that failed, was it not? 

Mr. IVEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And it was your responsibility to maintain 

and make sure that line served the substation owned by MetroNorth. Is that correct? 

Mr. IVEY. Again, Metro-North requested on September 13 that 

one of the two feeders that serve the Mount Vernon substation be 

taken out of service to facilitate their upgrade. We were performing 

freeze operations in order to facilitate that work on our feeders. As 

I said in my testimony, this is a process that we’ve done over many 

years, back decades. The earliest procedures on this were written 

back in the 1950s. Our employees were following time-tested, documented procedures for these freeze operations. 

As I said earlier, we’re going to do forensic analysis on the cable, 

the pipe, and the work area, to learn what has occurred here. We 

think it more likely than not that the freeze operations contributed 

to the failure of the in-service feeder. So that’s something, as I said 

earlier, that the Public Service Commission of New York is going 

to review, and they’re going to be part of that investigation. 

But, again, it goes back to our customers not bearing the risk 

when an individual customer like Metro-North decides to take one 

of the two feeders out of service. And we’re doing work—again, it’s 

unfortunate. The circumstances around the feeder failure is something we’ve not seen in our history. We do a number of these operations on an annualized basis, and we just haven’t seen this occur. 

41 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Those two substations were served by two 

feeder cables side by side, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you’ve provided me and my office 

with a diagram showing the two feeder cables, 38W09 and 38W10, 

correct? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And they were, in effect, right next to 

each other, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. The freeze pit that you’re describing there is—the dimensions are eight foot by six foot by five foot deep, and the two 

feeders coming through that freeze pit, as the picture you have described—my recollection is that the feeders are roughly two feet 

apart. So we’re conducting freeze operations on the one feeder. Inside the freeze pit, we actually protect the other feeder while we’re 

performing operations on the one. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. In effect, you surround the feeder cable on 

which work is being done with a freeze jacket, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. With a jacket, yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you pump in the liquid nitrogen to 

freeze the cable. 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in this instance, through whatever 

mechanism or dynamic that occurred in the freeze pit, the other 

cable suffered damage as a result, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. It’s important to note that inside the 

freeze pit—an excavation, if you will, eight foot by six foot by five 

foot deep—we protected the other in-service feeder. So the area 

where the failure occurred was outside the freeze pit some five feet 

below grade, not visible to any of the workers that were—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And, normally, there would be no failing 

as a result of this procedure. Is that correct? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. We do—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in this instance, the cables —at least 

one of the cables, the one that failed, was 36 years old, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. I believe these particular cables were installed roughly 

in 1976, Senator, as I recall it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the normal design life is 30 years. 

Mr. IVEY. We believe that thermal and mechanical issues are 

more correlated to failures of these feeders than age. We’ve done 

engineering evaluations on these cables, and we’ve pulled cables 

out of the field that are of this vintage that are 60 years of age, 

and we find that the thermal insulation is very much not degraded 

at all with an awful lot of life left. 

Additionally, as we look back at the performance of these feeders 

over 10, 20, 30, 40 years, we tend to see three to four failures on 

an annualized basis on a base of around 700 miles of these sorts 

of cable systems. So as we look backward, we see really strong performance of these feeder cables, regardless of the age. And as we 

take feeders out and do engineering evaluations, we don’t find degradation of the insulation level which would be indicative of a potential of a future failure. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So my belief—and I think a rational person would conclude—is that the fact that this cable was 6 years beVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
42 

yond its normal design life was a contributing factor, if not the 

cause, of perhaps its deteriorating and ultimately its failing. You 

would deny that that was a rational and logical conclusion? 

Mr. IVEY. Again, we have to go through the forensic analysis of 

the cable, the pipe, and the work area. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you’re doing that forensic analysis 

now? 

Mr. IVEY. That starts this week, I believe. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And when will it be done? 

Mr. IVEY. Early November, as I recall, Senator, we’ll finish the 

analysis on the cable, the pipe. That’s our projected date. But it’s 

important, again, to note that we’re saying it’s more likely than not 

that the operations we were doing at the freeze pit likely contributed to the cause of the failure. 

I said in my direct testimony we saw freezing of the ground outside the freeze pit, not visible to the naked eye, five feet below 

grade. And I believe, absent this work, we’re not talking about this 

feeder failure. These feeders have a long history of very good performance. We’ve not seen feeder failures on these feeders. So 

there’s strong performance with these feeders. So, again, age is not 

the factor that causes these feeders to fail. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I apologize for putting it in sort of 

simplistic layman’s language. But, in effect, the feeder cable, 6 

years beyond its normal design life, was somehow impacted by this 

freezing which caused it to fail. Is there any other reason that your 

forensic analysis would disclose other than that failing being the 

result of the freezing? 

Mr. IVEY. I believe, again, it’s more likely than not that what the 

forensic analysis will confirm are early indications that the freeze 

operations contributed to the failure of the feeder. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And are you saying that the fact that it 

was 6 years beyond its normal design life was irrelevant or should 

be dismissed as a possible cause? 

Mr. IVEY. Our experience has indicated that age is not the factor. 

It’s mechanical and thermal loading of these feeders that contribute to failure, not—age is not the factor here. In fact, these 

feeders, again, that go into the Mount Vernon substation were installed in 1976. We’ve not seen any failures on these feeders. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But one way or the other, it was your 

equipment that failed, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. It was, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So why should you not cover the cost? 

Mr. IVEY. Again, this particular failure is something we’ve not 

seen. Our employees were following documented, time-tested procedures. Again, we want to learn about what happened here by going 

through the forensic analysis and gain benefit from the lessons 

learned. But we have not seen this sort of phenomenon before. 

I understand this is an absolute inconvenience to the folks of 

Connecticut and New York in terms of the impact on this line. So 

I’m not minimizing that for a second. But, again, we have to finish 

the analysis, confirm what happened here and why, so we can 

build those lessons learned into what we do going forward. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, may I just suggest that my own 

view, with all due respect, is that there is an obligation. It cerVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
43 

tainly is an ethical, in my view, obligation, if not a legal obligation, 

for Con Ed to make whole, to compensate, to reimburse MetroNorth and others who suffered as a result of Con Ed’s failure of 

equipment. 

And it may have been the result of a failure to replace a feeder 

cable that was 6 years beyond its normal design life. It may have 

had to do with the way the freeze operation was conducted. But, 

again, I would urge that you cover the cost. 

Let me ask you—did you warn Metro-North about the potential 

risk of this operation? 

Mr. IVEY. Meaning the freeze operation? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The potential negative impacts of the 

freeze operation that was necessary to enable Metro-North to work 

on its station. 

Mr. IVEY. To my knowledge, we did not provide any warning that 

there was potential impact of the freeze operation. Again, it’s important to note that we’ve done this 20 times a year over a long 

period of time. We have time-tested, well documented procedures 

that our employees follow, and we just haven’t seen the freeze operations impact an adjacent feeder. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So there was no warning to Metro-North 

that this freeze operation might have risks of the feeder cable failing. 

Mr. IVEY. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Was there any preparation in terms of 

contingency for the possibility that that feeder cable would fail and, 

therefore, in effect, no power would be provided to the railroad? 

Mr. IVEY. In this instance, on September 13, we take out the one 

feeder on a scheduled basis in order to facilitate Metro-North’s 

work at the Mount Vernon substation. We know at that point that 

we’re down to a single feeder, in a single contingency situation. 

Equipment does fail. It’s improbable in this instance. But failures 

do occur. 

I don’t know Metro-North’s capabilities in terms of diesel train 

losses and capability to move passengers along the New Haven 

Line. What I do know at that point is we’re down to a single feeder, 

and equipment does fail. So I would defer to Mr. Permut at MetroNorth regarding their contingency plans for the improbable instance of a feeder failure. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. There was, in fact, no contingency plan, 

correct? 

Mr. IVEY. Again, I would defer to Mr. Permut about the contingency plan in order to move passengers along this line. After the 

failure, Senator, as you know, we worked—in about 3 days time 

stood up a temporary substation at Harrison. Despite what occurred in advance of the outage, we knew people were being impacted by the outage to this line. 

So we worked very closely with Metro-North and its engineers, 

and we essentially built a substation in three days. And on that 

Saturday before announcing service levels on Monday, we tested 

trains on that line, using residential power to serve train load. We 

had a successful test, and we announced incremental services. So, 

essentially, we created a contingency after the outage in order to 

provide enhanced levels of service to the line. 

44 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Ivey, I want to express my appreciation for the work done by the men and women who work for you 

in so quickly reacting and the enormous effort that it took to construct that temporary station. So my questions are not without appreciation for the extraordinary effort and time and, indeed, expense. How much did it cost to construct that temporary substation? 

Mr. IVEY. I don’t remember precisely, but in round numbers around $4 million to stand up that temporary substation. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. $4 million? 

Mr. IVEY. Around $4 million. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in the diagram that, again, you’ve 

provided my office, that substation is represented by the red diagram here? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And that was at a cost of about $4 million. 

But that substation was unplanned, correct? 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So the plan, in effect, had to be done on 

the fly in reaction to this massive outage that occurred at 3 a.m. 

on September 25. 

Mr. IVEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Wouldn’t it have been a better practice either to have a backup or at least to have a plan? 

Mr. IVEY. Again, in my view, it would be the responsibility of 

Metro-North to determine, in the unlikely event of a single feeder 

failing, what the contingency plan would be. What would be the 

contingency plan? I would use an analogy, Senator, if you would 

allow me. If we had a hospital that had two feeds, and they asked 

Con Edison to take one of the two feeders out of service to upgrade 

their equipment, we would facilitate that. Then they would be on 

one feeder in that instance. 

I don’t see it as my job to figure out how large their generator 

should be, what maintenance and what loads. That’s really—I don’t 

know their business, like I don’t know Metro-North’s business. I 

don’t know their capacity to replace electric trains with diesel 

trains. And, really, I think I would have to rely on them to determine their ability to move people along this really important corridor. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The contingency plan, in other words, or 

the backup system would be solely Metro-North’s responsibility. Is 

that your view? 

Mr. IVEY. We believe—yes, and that Metro-North had a contingency plan for this improbable event. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Permut, was there a contingency 

plan? 

Mr. PERMUT. From our perspective, Senator—and I think it’s important that we start with just a little background for a minute. 

We had been in discussions between Con Edison and Metro-North 

for a number of years in this project, and we had been discussing 

risk. As Mr. Ivey indicated, the probability of an event was extremely low, and that was our understanding as well. Saying that, 

it’s clear that something went wrong, and the plans that we had 

were not sufficient to run the New Haven Line. 

45 

As I said in my testimony, as part of the second part of this 

project, as well as on an ongoing basis, we have agreed to work together to look at what the contingency could be. It’s very clear to 

us that we are unable to have an adequate service plan for our customers if we don’t have sufficient electric power. 

This is, as was pointed out, the largest electric line in the country. We cannot come anywhere close to providing the service that 

our customers deserve and we’d like to deliver without having an 

adequate amount of power. So as we go forward, we are going to 

be working together looking at the question of contingencies tied to 

the power supply, because we know that if there’s not power, we 

cannot operate close to a regular service. 

Mr. Redeker testified—and I can explain further if you’d like— 

that we are working in Connecticut on providing electrical redundancy so we can operate service if we lose a substation. And that’s 

two projects that will be done within a matter of a few months. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I’m going to turn to Connecticut in 

just a moment. 

I should mention, as you can all see, that we’ve been joined by 

my colleague, Senator Murphy, and I’m sure he’ll have some questions, too. I don’t mean to monopolize the proceedings here. 

But your point, Mr. Permut, if I can just cut through what you 

just said, is that, essentially, there was no plan in this instance for 

the Mount Vernon substation, either Dunwoodie or Washington 

Street substation, in the event that power was lost. 

Mr. PERMUT. Senator, there was not a plan. And, again, I would 

just state that there is no—absent having electrical power, we cannot provide New Haven Line service. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But there is the possibility for having a 

backup. And I’m going to ask Mr. Lynch in just a moment about 

the protocols and what those protocols prescribe for backup power 

in this kind of situation. But wouldn’t it have been prudent to have 

either a backup source of power or at least a contingency plan, 

which eventually had to be devised ad hoc on the fly? 

Mr. PERMUT. Let me respond to that. I think that, clearly, when 

we look back, if we had had an alternative source of power, we 

would have avoided this—a third source of power during this operation, we would have avoided this very, very unfortunate event. To 

develop that is something, as I mentioned, again, the parties had 

talked about. There are significant costs associated with that. And 

as you know, and as you actually stated, we are constantly balancing issues of spending money on contingency versus spending 

money—money we desperately need—to just bring the line into a 

regular state of good repair. So that’s the type of thought process 

that we follow. 

The contingency that was set up at Harrison was an improvement. But understand that because of the nature of the high-voltage power that New Haven gets—and the best Con Edison could 

do, using, as I think Mr. Ivey explained, their network—that allowed us, after they did all that work, which was extremely important, to run three trains, electric trains in that section, at the same 

time. The normal New Haven Line schedule requires 10 trains, 10 

electric trains. So that’s a contingency, but it’s a partial contingency. 

46 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. What was the cost of the 12 days of disrupted service? 

Mr. PERMUT. Senator, we’re still calculating that. We have some 

preliminary estimates. I would—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You’re making refunds, or at least you’re 

giving your customers credit. 

Mr. PERMUT. There are refunds, and we lost a significant number 

of riders because of the service was—people didn’t want to take the 

train. We couldn’t collect tickets as well because the trains were so 

jammed. We also, at extra cost, had a lot of people doing a lot of 

work. We had the bussing cost. So on order of magnitude is between, I would say, $8 million and $12 million, and we are still looking at and will be gathering that 

data over the next weeks. We’ll see how many people are asking 

for the refunds. As you know, we just started that last week, and 

we’ll be calculating that and we’ll be finalizing that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The estimate that I saw was about $2 million a day. Is that wrong? 

Mr. PERMUT. No, no, that’s—I’m not sure of the source. Our estimate right now for the 12 days is between $8 million to $12 million. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you concerned that there may be the 

same vulnerability, Mr. Permut, with respect to other substations 

that exist in Connecticut? 

Mr. PERMUT. I’m always concerned about the risks we have on 

the New Haven Line. We have an old infrastructure. I’m very concerned about, particularly, the bridges, the catenary system. The 

moveable bridges are 120 years old. The catenary system is 100 

years old. So I’m always concerned about that. 

With regard to the substations in Connecticut, we have, as I 

think Mr. Redeker testified, three substations. They’re far apart. 

That’s historically what the railroad inherited with the New Haven 

Line built. So we have in round numbers, Senator, a substation 

about every 20 miles between Harrison, New York, which is where 

the Con Ed system ends and CL&P starts, and New Haven. 

Over the past years, Connecticut has invested in expanding that 

supply system. They’ve built new substations, and they’ve expanded the substations, both for redundancy and so we could operate more service. The service has grown so dramatically in the past 

30 years. 

At this point in time, we have two very important projects that 

will give us full—right now, we have redundancy for about 30 miles 

of the 55 miles between Harrison and New Haven, which means 

that if we lost one substation in that 30-mile section, we could continue to operate. The two projects that Connecticut is funding, one 

in Cos Cob and one in New Haven, will give us full redundancy 

from Harrison to New Haven for 55 miles. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And when you say full redundancy, do you 

mean a second backup for every substation? 

Mr. PERMUT. I mean if they lose a substation—substations will 

typically have more than one feed. So it’s not a matter of losing one 

feed. It’s a matter of losing the substation. Typically, the way the 

New Haven Line is built—because it’s AC traction and you have 

fewer substations. When you look at the subway, when you look at 

47 

Metro-North’s Harlem and Hudson lines, you have substations 

every few miles, and they are designed so if we lose one substation, 

which happens, the line can continue to operate. That’s a fairly 

common occurrence. 

On the New Haven Line, it’s somewhat different because of, 

again, how it was built. So when these two projects are completed, 

which should be by the first quarter of 2014, we will then be able 

to operate between Harrison and New Haven if we lose one of the 

substations completely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So if one of the feeder cables fails, or one 

of the substations fails, there will be a backup that—— 

Mr. PERMUT. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—will be absolutely reliable. 

Mr. PERMUT. That’s right. The power can come from another substation. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you agree, Commissioner? 

Mr. REDEKER. Yes, I do. The goal of these two projects is complete redundancy, and our schedule for that is a little delayed because we’ve had to shift resources to the Mount Vernon area with 

Metro-North. But we believe that within a couple of months, we 

will be completely redundant with those systems throughout the 

New Haven Line. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So as of 2014, there’s no possibility that 

this kind of breakdown in service could occur for the reasons that 

it did in Mount Vernon? 

Mr. REDEKER. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Lynch, let me ask you before I turn 

to Senator Murphy—the protocol is moving in a direction of ‘‘N–2’’, 

meaning that there are two backups for this kind of feeder cable, 

‘‘N–1’’ being the one backup situation. Is that generally correct, 

that the recommendation of the American Society of Civil Engineers is moving in that direction? 

Mr. LYNCH. In general, in the industry—speaking outside of 

ASCE—the industry desires to have an ‘‘N–1’’, that is, so that you 

can take any line out for service, maintenance, whatever you need 

to do. We would love to have ‘‘N–1’’. It’s hard to get. 

As I mentioned earlier, just to add a line that isn’t needed—it’s 

very hard to go out and tell the public that we’re going to build a 

new line so that we can have that ‘‘N–2’’ contingency—‘‘you mean, 

it’s not going to be used?’’ ‘‘Well, yes, it’s going to be used if we 

need it.’’ It’s just impossible to do. The public doesn’t want that. 

They don’t want to pay for it. They don’t want to see it. They don’t 

want to deal with it. 

In the case that I’m hearing right here, from what I’m hearing 

at this table, it appears to me there was a redundant system. It’s 

just that one of them was already taken out. Could there have been 

a third one? Sure. Who’s going to pay for that? Who’s going to permit it? Where can we put that line at? I don’t know the specifics 

of the exact situation, but that would be very nice. Is it realistic? 

I’m not sure. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. When work is done on one cable or one 

line, the chances of outage are always there, and the improbable 

often happens, correct? 

Mr. LYNCH. I wouldn’t say often. It can happen. 

48 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So prudent planning would dictate that 

there be some kind of backup, correct? 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. And as engineers, we would love to do that. Unfortunately, there’s cost and everything else that’s involved with 

doing that, and we have to consider that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the entire New Haven Line, when it 

comes to electric power, really is only as strong as its weakest 

point, because if the weakest point fails, as we saw in Mount 

Vernon, the entire line is crippled, correct? 

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Mr. LYNCH. I would like to add, as I sit here, our nation is running on less redundancy than that railroad is out there. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

want to thank you for convening this hearing and having what has 

been a laser-like focus on protecting Connecticut consumers and repairing and upgrading our infrastructure. As a member of this 

committee, you have been on top of this crisis since day one. And 

having taken the unusual step of bringing the Committee here to 

Connecticut shows that you are not giving up in your efforts to try 

to learn from the mistakes made here. 

I want to thank you for giving me the courtesy of being able to 

join the Committee to ask a few questions. And given that this is 

really your hearing, Mr. Chairman, I only have a few. Let me just 

apologize for being a little late and not hearing the testimony of my 

colleagues. But I’m glad that you’ve assembled two very esteemed 

panels to talk about what happened and what happens going forward. 

I have maybe just a few questions to add to yours regarding the 

specific situation at hand. I think, Mr. Chairman, you did a wonderful job of outlining some of the most important questions about 

what happened and how we learn going forward. And then I may 

have a few broader questions about the fragility of the line with 

respect to other potential liabilities down the line. 

First, Mr. Permut, as a lay person who doesn’t spend his time 

on this committee examining these issues in the depth that Senator 

Blumenthal does, can you just explain to me how the responsibility 

for investment in electrical infrastructure along the line and feeding into the line is divided up today between the MTA and Con 

Edison? Who takes care of what pieces of the infrastructure as that 

arrangement stands today? 

Mr. PERMUT. Let me say that we have arrangements with three 

utilities, Con Edison, Connecticut Light and Power, and United Illuminating. Because of the nature of the high voltage that comes 

into the New Haven Line, anything we do has to be done with the 

utility, because together we have to plan—if we want to build a 

substation or make a change, it has to be consistent with the feeder 

network. So there’s regular ongoing dialog between ourselves and 

the utilities. 

49 

The other part of the discussion is between ourselves and Connecticut, the Connecticut Department of Transportation. And we 

make the judgments jointly as to how to spend scarce public dollars. What are the best investments to be made? We made a judgment call, as Mr. Redeker pointed out, about four or 5 years ago 

to invest in the power system in Cos Cob and New Haven to provide additional power, to provide a level of redundancy. 

So once that decision is made between the parties—and we will 

get input from the utilities because that’s the only way we know 

what’s feasible and what it costs—then that project is implemented 

either by the State of Connecticut or by Metro-North staff working 

with the appropriate utility. 

Senator MURPHY. So in this case, where you had Con Ed doing 

either upgrades or improvements or repair work, how is that cost 

distributed, and who pays for that work? 

Mr. PERMUT. Well, in this particular case, we had two separate 

contracts. There’s a contract with NIPA, who was the project manager, and then we had a separate agreement with Con Edison to 

do the work necessary to allow us to do the work at the substation. 

The cost for that is borne by Metro-North in the agreement with 

Con Edison. 

Senator MURPHY. You had some back and forth with Senator 

Blumenthal about the improvements that you’re going to be doing 

along a portion of the line due early 2014 to create redundancies. 

And, Mr. Permut, you referred to ongoing discussions you’re having 

about future options to increase redundancy, I assume, over the 

rest of the line. Can you just talk about what the options are to 

create redundancies along the other section of the line? 

Mr. PERMUT. Well, the other section is the section between Harrison and Pelham, which was powered by this Mount Vernon substation. And Mr. Ivey and I had agreed—our priority, obviously, 

was to get the service back, and then, as Mr. Ivey mentioned, to 

bring the second feeder back, which happened about 10 days ago. 

We also agreed that the next step was to review what the options 

are to provide additional redundancy in this section both during 

the second phase of this project at Mount Vernon as well as on a 

permanent basis, since this section will be different than the rest 

of the New Haven Line where you’ll have that redundancy. So our 

engineering people have just started that discussion, and it would 

be premature for me to say right now it’s this option or this option 

or this option. 

Senator MURPHY. Give me a time frame. Give me a time frame 

of when a decision could be made and then, given the potential options, what the time frame would be for implementation. 

Mr. PERMUT. I think by the end of the year, we’ll have a better 

sense of what the options are and what the time frame is that goes 

with that. I can’t give you a good sense on how long it will take, 

because each option will have its own time frame and have its own 

implications. So we have to jointly look at that, and I don’t want 

to prematurely say something that would turn out to be incorrect. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me to ask 

one broader question while I have the panel—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Sure. 

50 

Senator MURPHY.—in front of me. What we’re really talking 

about here is the fact that we have a string that runs from Boston 

to Washington, D.C., and in a multitude of different ways, that 

string could be cut at any moment by a collision, a storm hitting 

a portion of the string, an electrical disturbance. And any time you 

cut that string, it essentially stops or greatly curtails service along 

the entirety of the stretch. 

And this isn’t our only liability. We have numerous other liabilities. We’ve talked about the decaying state of the bridges along the 

line in Connecticut, which we hope is not the next shoe to drop. 

But here’s the broader question. How on earth do we come up 

with the financing necessary to prevent the next crisis and the next 

interruption in service happening, when, today, our stretch of rail 

line is one of the few profitable ones for Amtrak, throwing off anywhere from $200 million to $300 million to the rest of the country, 

and we have a list of $50 billion worth of repairs along the full extent of the Northeast Corridor that need to be done over the next 

10 to 20 years just to maintain the state of good repair? It seems 

to me that we have to be thinking out of the box in terms of how 

we come up with the money to allow you to invest in the kind of 

work that you need to do, above and beyond just the work that 

you’re going to need to do to create redundancies along the electrical feeder system. 

So let me present that question to you, Howard, and then to you, 

Commissioner Redeker, to just give us a quick snapshot. And I 

know you could talk about this for the entire afternoon. But what 

are the financing mechanisms that we need to be talking about in 

the United States Congress to try to give you the resources to 

make the investments that you know you need to make and everybody knows you need to make? 

Mr. PERMUT. Senator, let me say I think that that discussion and 

the determination of fund sources is one for the U.S. Senate and 

for the Congress itself. I don’t think it’s the place of myself, either 

from an expertise standpoint or from a responsibility standpoint, to 

really identify within the national priority how that should be 

done. 

I will say—which is very concerning to us—that the last time 

Congress passed a bill, funding for transit was roughly flat. That 

bill runs out at the end of next year, and it’s desperately needed, 

the money for both transit and Amtrak, for the railroads for transit 

and Amtrak. That’s absolutely a critical requirement so we can address these needs. 

As the operator of the service, we can prioritize what our needs 

are. But in the end, it’s the funding sources and the funding partners who will be critical in making that determination and making 

that happen. 

Senator MURPHY. Commissioner Redeker? 

Mr. REDEKER. Yes, thank you. It is a national dilemma, and I 

think that it’s important to recognize that it is something that is 

being worked on through the Northeast Corridor Commission for 

the Northeast Corridor; certainly by Congress in terms of reauthorization of important legislation like PRIIA; and states, as members 

and, frankly, as operators. 

51 

You mentioned that Amtrak makes some profit. But Amtrak has 

a huge need from an expense point of view. I think if we look at 

existing funding mechanisms, we know that they’re inadequate to 

do the job that we’ve identified. And I think actions like the PRIIA 

Act that came up with some new solutions about cost allocation, 

you know, give us some new tools. But they too will be inadequate. 

What I think is important is that as we plan for the future, first, 

we identify a realistic amount of funding necessary annually to 

achieve a state of good repair—that’s fundamental to this corridor 

so that it doesn’t have these flaws—and invest those dollars smartly so that projects that are replacement or upgrades of an old infrastructure come with built-in redundancy. Clearly, the impact from 

storms—Superstorm Sandy, as we face that anniversary—indicates 

that systems with redundancy, different routes, different alternatives, are important. 

We, as part of a national effort for the future of high-speed rail, 

are looking at just that issue. Is there an ability to invest in that 

existing state of good repair, but also be looking at redundant or 

alternative systems to provide those options in the case of a tragic 

event or a storm or unanticipated outage? 

So I think if we pick the right number—because if we just say $52 billion without identifying what that means annually and 

where that might come from in any stretch of the imagination, be 

that from the operators, from the states, from the Federal Government—clearly, I think each one of those has a role to play. And 

what we’ve seen in other countries is the successful investments in 

a railroad infrastructure come from a Federal Government. It’s a 

national asset, and the infrastructure itself is typically funded 

principally through the Federal Government. 

The capacity of states taking on more obligations is stretched, 

just as every other one. That’s not going to be a full solution either. 

But I think a realistic number worked through annually is something that, if we put our minds together, we probably can achieve. 

Senator MURPHY. I would just respectfully disagree with you, Mr. 

Permut. I understand maybe the discomfort that comes with proposing a policy solution as an operator. But I think the stakes are 

so grave here that you and your organization, knowing your customers and knowing the infrastructure better than anyone, should 

have a seat at the table and a leading seat at the table in proposing solutions. I know that that’s not an easy thing to do when 

you’re just trying to keep a line up and operating. 

Mr. PERMUT. Well, Senator, if I may, I think what’s most important that we have to do is represent our customers and inform the 

dialog as to what’s needed and what the implications are. We do 

advocate for our customers. We do advocate for the funding. 

What I was addressing, and possibly a little more narrowly than 

the question, was which is the best mechanism, be it a gas tax or 

something else, increasing the gas tax. I didn’t feel, and I don’t feel 

that it would be Metro-North’s role to be putting forward that type 

of detail. Clearly, with regard to what the need is and advocating 

for the need and advocating for the customers, we will do that, and 

we have done that, and we will continue to do so. 

Senator MURPHY. Final question to Commissioner Redeker. Let 

me just ask a hard question about choices. And you’re talking 

52 

about allocating enough money for new improvements to make sure 

that you build in redundancies. So let me just make sure that we’re 

doing this right. 

You have a certain pot of money that could be used to increase 

speed or frequency of travel along an existing line, or perhaps not 

make as big an investment in speed and frequency and instead 

build a redundant system next to it. Are we always better off 

spending the additional money to build redundancy, or are we better off using that money to increase speed and frequency and just 

take the chance that the system may fail for a couple of hours or 

a couple of days, but that that will be offset by the increased delivery to consumers on the day that the system is running? 

And that is not a loaded question. I just think it’s a worthwhile 

question to ask, given the fact that we do have limited money, and 

we’re going to have to choose to use it either on building redundancy or on moving more quickly down the list of the projects that 

we know have to be done. 

Mr. REDEKER. The answer from my perspective is that building 

simply a redundant system for the sake of redundancy is an expense. And I think it’s been mentioned that it’s extraordinary when 

it comes to infrastructure and out of the question, too expensive for 

us with the resources we have. 

But if we look at smart investments for the state of good repair, 

things that also bring travel time improvements, frequency and capacity improvements, and if we can at the same time, using the 

substations in Connecticut as an example, provide redundancy so 

that we spend the same dollars or just a little more when we do 

an investment to add redundancy, then we ultimately build a better system. So I think we have to look at that. 

The choices about priorities really do come, for me, from the 

proper economic cost-benefit investment scenario. We have to look 

at what are the costs and what are the benefits from every dollar 

we spend, so we choose to make the right investments. But I think 

if we do that and look at better, faster, cheaper ways to deliver 

projects, we might be able to add components like redundancy as 

we do them. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Murphy. 

I want to come back to that larger question that Senator Murphy 

asked and really suggest, Mr. Permut and Commissioner and members of this panel and others, that there really is a need for leadership in this area. There’s a need for specific proposals. 

I urge that there be an infrastructure bank as a means of providing that financing and, at the very least, that there be a national rail trust fund, as I mentioned earlier, similar to the Highway Trust Fund. To be very blunt, your customers, Mr. Permut, I 

think, have very little conception about how deteriorating and 

aging infrastructure is imperiling their service and, very possibly, 

their lives. 

They saw it back in May, when a derailment and collision caused 

grave injuries to more than 50 people and jeopardized lives and 

livelihoods for a substantial period of time. But they had no idea 

that the joints connecting two rails were weakened, and, in fact, 

the NTSB very likely will conclude that that infrastructure deterioVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
53 

ration or decay was responsible for the derailment that eventually 

caused the collision. They had no idea that feeder cables were going 

through this maintenance and work beginning September 13. 

So the kind of information and awareness that we’re trying to 

raise here in this hearing, I think, is very important for you and 

other leaders in the industry to raise in the course of public discussion and dialog. And the same goes for other members of the panel 

and others in the industry. So I would just make that observation, 

and I take it you don’t necessarily disagree. 

Mr. PERMUT. No. I agree with you completely, and we will continue to inform the discussion, as you point out, the absolute critical need for investment in infrastructure on the New Haven Line. 

It’s absolutely critical to the economic development, the future safe 

operation and the economic development. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So let me just go back from that global 

line of questioning to more of the detailed questioning, because I 

want to go back to the backup or redundancy on the Metro-North 

line going through Connecticut. My understanding is—and I’m 

holding up a diagram here of the various substations. I know it’s 

difficult to see, but there’s Cos Cob, Sasco Creek, Devon, Union Avenue, and New Haven. 

Without going into the specifics of each of those substations and 

what their current status is, is the plan for there to be backup from 

one of these stations to the other, for example, Sasco Creek to Cos 

Cob, if one of them goes offline? In other words, if Cos Cob goes 

offline, would the backup be sufficient from one of the others—presumably Sasco Creek, because it’s the nearest—to provide the kind 

of power that is necessary to avoid the fiasco or the debacle that 

occurred in New York? 

Mr. PERMUT. I understand. Once these two projects are completed, which will be by, again, the first quarter of 2014, the answer is yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. There would be sufficient power supply 

from these other substations to compensate for the alternative 

neighboring substation if it went offline? 

Mr. PERMUT. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And, finally, Mr. Ivey, can you commit 

that you will provide the forensic analysis as soon as it’s done to 

this committee? 

Mr. IVEY. We will, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And can you commit, also, that you’ll provide the preliminary review? I know we’ve asked for it. 

Mr. IVEY. The review I think you’re referencing was a New York 

Times article where they were just reporting our preliminary findings. There wasn’t really a preliminary report. That was our preliminary findings at that time. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So there’s nothing in writing, no report? 

Mr. IVEY. It wasn’t a report. It was preliminary findings at that 

time. I think the week—the Monday or Sunday right after the 

event occurred on September 25. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I’m going to ask that we continue this discussion about the refund or reimbursement issue, because I don’t 

think, again, with all due respect, I’m satisfied that Con Ed is 

doing as much as it should to provide for the monetary compensaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 18, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87089.TXT JACKIE
54 

tion to Metro-North or to others who may have been harmed. But 

we can continue that discussion after this proceeding. 

Thank you. 

Mr. IVEY. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I thank you all, and we’ll move to the next 

panel. 

Our next panel will consist of John Hartwell, who is a member 

of the Connecticut Commuter Rail Council, a long-time advocate for 

Connecticut riders and consumers; Joseph Boardman, President 

and Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, and a veteran as well as 

a chief executive of that company; and Mr. Joseph McGee, Vice 

President of Public Policy and Programs for The Business Council 

of Fairfield County, a long-time public servant and formerly an official of our state government. 

Welcome to you all and thank you very much for being here. 

We’ll begin with you, Mr. Hartwell. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN HARTWELL, MEMBER, 

CONNECTICUT COMMUTER RAIL COUNCIL 

Mr. HARTWELL. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal and Senator 

Murphy. My name is John Hartwell, and I’m a member of the Connecticut Commuter Rail Council. Created by the state legislature, 

our mandate is to advocate for customers of all commuter lines in 

the state and make recommendations for improvements, a task 

that this Council and its immediate predecessor have undertaken 

for more than a quarter century. 

Our members come from commuter rail lines both currently operating and planned: the New Haven line, including its three 

branches; Shore Line East; and the future New Haven-Springfield 

line. And we serve without pay, budget, or staff. 

In the week following the resumption of full New Haven Line 

service after the Con Ed incident, I went to the Greens Farms station near where I live with three members of the Connecticut state 

legislature to talk with commuters about their experience during 

the service interruption. I used my background in market research 

to create and administer a survey, asking commuters what they did 

to cope with the disruption, how they felt about Metro-North’s response, what they knew about the possibility of refunds, and how 

they rated their overall rail commuting experience. 

Two days later, I repeated this survey at the Westport station, 

gathering 67 responses overall, not enough for real statistical analysis, but certainly enough to get a sense of customer frustration. 

Commuters used a variety of strategies to cope with the reduced 

service. A few drove into the city or to an alternative station, had 

satellite offices they could go to, or worked from home. Most, however, made the best of whatever trains were available, often standing for more than an hour in packed cars to get to their destination. 

To put this in perspective, I–95 is already jammed during morning and evening rush hours. Metro-North customers have the highest fares and the lowest mass transit subsidy in the nation, and 

parking at the stations is limited and expensive. If you’ve paid for 

a monthly ticket and are lucky enough to have a train station parking pass, you want to make use of them. 

55 

When asked about how Metro-North responded to the crisis, the 

most common rating was a three on a five-point scale, with the 

positives and negatives above and below evenly divided. Most who 

volunteered comments felt that Con Ed was to blame for the problem itself, but many said that communication from Metro-North 

about alternatives was poor. They understood that they needed to 

make allowances for a difficult situation, but they also wanted 

much more timely, accurate information so they could make rational choices. 

When asked what they knew about the possibility of refunds, 

most had heard the MTA was going to do something, but almost 

no one at that point had a clear idea of how it was going to work 

or what it was going to mean to them. And in terms of their overall 

satisfaction with Metro-North, they were somewhat more positive, 

a 3.3 on that same five-point scale, but far from satisfied. 

New Haven Line customers have experienced repeated service 

failures in the past few years, including Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Irene, heavy snowfall in October, and ice storms in mid-winter. These were weather-related, but the derailment at Bridgeport 

last May clearly was caused by a deteriorating infrastructure that 

has left people worried and angry. And branch line customers are 

short-changed when their diesel engines are redeployed, leaving 

them with unreliable bus service operated by drivers who have no 

idea where they’re going, or with no service at all. 

Under Governors Rell and Malloy, the state has spent huge 

amounts on new cars, which is terrific, and the Connecticut Department of Transportation has major renovation projects underway. But the fact remains that we are paying the price for years 

of deferred maintenance. Billions more are needed to upgrade or 

replace track, bridges and catenary, install better signal systems 

and positive train control, and give us real-time communication. 

Commuter rail is the lifeblood of Fairfield County, and it’s not 

just the traditional businessmen to Grand Central who are affected 

when the trains don’t run. We have many customers who never 

leave the state, traveling every day to work from Danbury to Stamford, or Waterbury to Bridgeport, or Guilford to New Haven. And 

there are thousands more who reverse commute, including some 

who come up from New York City to work here. 

The railroad is fundamental to Connecticut’s economy and to the 

quality of life that attracts so many who choose to live and raise 

families here. You’ve already been told about how old the infrastructure is, and you’re going to hear about the economic impact 

of these disruptions, both in Connecticut and along the whole eastern seaboard corridor. One hundred years ago, this service was 

state-of-the-art. It should be again. 

I’d like to make one more point before I close about fairness. Two 

years ago, after another major service failure, the Council proposed 

a Passenger Bill of Rights, which I’ve attached to my testimony. It 

called, in part, for monthly and weekly ticket holders to receive a 

credit whenever Metro-North couldn’t provide either scheduled 

train service or a bus substitute. To us, at that time, the problem 

was straightforward. If you don’t get what you paid for, you should 

get your money back. 

56 

I’d like to applaud Governor Malloy’s leadership during this current crisis in prompting the MTA to offer a credit to monthly and 

weekly ticket holders, and I hope that our representatives in Hartford can work together to make this a permanent policy. More than 

50,000 taxpayers who ride the trains every day deserve no less. 

Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hartwell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN HARTWELL, MEMBER, CONNECTICUT COMMUTER RAIL COUNCIL

Good morning. My name is John Hartwell, and I’m a member of the Connecticut 

Commuter Rail Council. Created by the state legislature, our mandate is to ‘‘advocate for customers of all commuter lines in the state and make recommendations 

for improvements,’’ a task that this Council and its immediate predecessor have undertaken for more than a quarter century. Our members come commuter rail lines 

both currently operating and planned—the New Haven line, including its three 

branches, Shore Line East, and the future New Haven—Springfield line, and we 

serve without pay, budget, or staff. 

In the week following the resumption of full New Haven line service after the Con 

Ed problem, I went to the Greens Farms station near where I live with three members of the Connecticut state legislature to talk with commuters about their experience during the service interruption. 

I used my background in market research to create and administer a survey, asking commuters what they did to cope with the disruption, how they felt about 

Metro-North’s response, what they knew about the possibility of refunds, and how 

they rated their overall rail commuting experience. Two days later I repeated this 

survey at the Westport station, gathering sixty-seven responses overall. Not enough 

for real statistical analysis, but certainly enough to get a sense of customer frustration. 

Commuters used a variety of strategies to cope with the disruption. A few drove 

into the City or to an alternative station, had satellite offices they could go to, or 

worked from home. Most, however, made the best of whatever trains were available, 

often standing for more than an hour in packed cars to get to their destination. 

To put this in perspective, I–95 is already jammed during morning and evening 

rush hours, Metro-North customers have the highest fares and lowest mass transit 

subsidy in the nation, and parking at the stations is limited and expensive. If you’ve 

paid for a monthly ticket and are lucky enough to have a train station parking pass, 

you want to make use of them. 

When asked about how Metro-North responded to the crisis, the most common 

rating was a ‘‘3’’ on a five point scale, with the positives and negatives above and 

below evenly divided. Most who volunteered comments felt that Con Ed was to 

blame for the problem itself, but many said that communication from Metro-North 

about alternatives was poor. They understood that they needed to make allowances 

for a difficult situation, but they also wanted much more timely, accurate information so they could make rational choices. 

When asked what they knew about the possibility of refunds, most had heard the 

MTA was going to do something, but almost no one at that point had a clear idea 

how it was going to work or what it meant to them. And in terms of their overall 

satisfaction with Metro-North, they were somewhat more positive (3.3 on that five 

point scale) but far from satisfied. 

New Haven line customers have experienced repeated service failures in the past 

few years, including Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Irene, heavy snowfall in October, 

and ice storms in mid-winter. These were weather-related, but the derailment at 

Bridgeport last May clearly was caused by a deteriorating infrastructure that has 

left people worried and angry. And branch line customers are sometimes shortchanged as their diesel engines are redeployed and they’re left with unreliable bus 

service with drivers who have no idea where they’re going, or with no service at all. 

Under Governors Rell and Malloy the state has spent huge amounts on new cars, 

which is terrific, and ConnDOT has major renovation projects underway, but the 

fact remains that we are paying the price for years of deferred maintenance. Billions 

more are needed to upgrade or replace track, bridges, and catenary, install better 

signal systems and positive train control, and give us real-time communications. 

Commuter rail is the lifeblood of Fairfield County, and it’s not just the traditional 

commuters to Grand Central who are affected when the trains don’t run. We have 

many commuters who never leave the state, traveling every day to work from Danbury to Stamford, or Waterbury to Bridgeport, or Guilford to New Haven. And there 

57 

are thousands more who reverse commute, including some who come up from New 

York to work here. 

The railroad is fundamental to Connecticut’s economy and to the quality of life 

that attracts so many who choose to live and raise families here. You’ve already 

been told about how old the infrastructure is, and you’re going to hear about the 

economic impact of these disruptions, both in Connecticut and along the whole eastern seaboard corridor. One hundred years ago this service was state-of-the-art. It 

should be again. 

I’d like to make one more point before I close, about fairness. Two years ago, after 

another major service failure, the Council proposed a ‘‘Passenger Bill of Rights’’, 

which I’ve attached. It called in part for monthly and weekly ticket holders to receive a credit whenever Metro-North couldn’t provide either scheduled train service 

or a bus substitute. To us at that time the problem was straightforward—if you 

don’t get what you paid for you should get your money back. 

I’d like to applaud Governor Malloy’s leadership during the current crisis in 

prompting the MTA to offer a credit to monthly and weekly ticket holders, and I 

hope that our representatives in Hartford can work together to make this a permanent policy. More than fifty thousand taxpayers who ride the trains every day deserve no less. 

Thank you. 

58 


1028BILL1.eps

Metro North Passenger Bill of Rights 

Metro North customers have a right to expect rail transportation that is safe, 

reliable, and professional: 

1. Rail cars must have essential safety equipment, functional lighting, heat in 

winter, air conditioning in summer, PA system, and clean rest rooms. 

2. Passengers deserve a seat, not just a ride. Metro North will schedule service 

to meet anticipated demand, and conductors will enforce rules to maximize 

seat availability. 

3. Conductors will treat customers courteously, provide accurate and timely 

information, be fully conversant with all safety and emergency procedures 

and protocols, wear clearly visible name badges, and be able to communicate 

with operation centers and the train crew at all times. 

4. Metro North will provide accurate, timely communication regarding on-time 

performance through all means possible, including station displays, platform 

and on-train announcements, web site, email, social media, and RSS feeds. In 

the event of a significant disruption or delay of 15 minutes or more, Metro 

North will specity the problem and its anticipated impact on system 

performance. 

5. If service is canceled, alternative transportation will be provided as quickly 

as possible. Metro North will not leave passengers stranded. 

6. In the event that Metro North cancels train service and fails to provide 

alternative bus service for a period of more than twenty (20) hours, Metro 

North must provide a proportional credit to any passenger who holds a 

current weekly or monthly train ticket. 

7. Metro North, in coordination with federal, state, and local authorities, will 

maintain safety and security protocols, including emergency contingency 

plans, to ensure essential services at all times. 

This Bill of Rights will be prominently displayed on all trains and in Metro North 

stations. 
59 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Hartwell. 

Mr. Boardman? 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMTRAK 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal and Senator 

Murphy. 

Senator Blumenthal, your focus on this disruption in and of itself 

should serve as a wake-up call to what would happen if we had an 

issue at one of the Northeast Corridor’s many single points of failure. Thank you for your leadership on the issue. I believe your investigation and your leadership will help to demonstrate the absolute need for all of us to stop taking this vital infrastructure for 

granted and start investing in the future of the region and the nation. 

Amtrak operates and maintains 401 miles of the 457-mile Northeast Corridor, and we work closely with Metro-North, which operates and maintains the other 56 miles. The Northeast Corridor 

serves a region that houses more than a sixth of the Nation’s population and generates $1 out of every $5 of our gross domestic product on less than 2 percent of the country’s land area. 

The Northeast Corridor is a transportation asset of national importance. Its bridges, tunnels, electrical supply, signal systems, 

rails, and roadbeds are all aging and failure prone and lacks redundant systems to keep it operating in the event of failure. We’ve 

heard about that all morning. 

The incident we are here to discuss demonstrates the consequences of such a failure. But we have many points of failure 

that would demonstrate similar consequences or even greater, 

longer-lasting consequences, particularly if they came at one of the 

many critical points, or single points of failure, in the states of 

Connecticut, New York, or New Jersey. 

I’m talking about a single point of failure where it’s a part of the 

system that, if it fails, will stop the entire system from working, 

like the string being cut, Senator Murphy. In its current state, our 

system faces the threat of a major failure—with comparable impacts to this incident in terms of disruption—on a daily basis, for 

much of our infrastructure is aging and heavily trafficked, while 

capital investment has lagged. 

Between Superstorm Sandy, infrastructure failures, snow storms, 

and other service disruptions, Amtrak’s services that use the 

Northeast Corridor lost a total of about 360,000 riders and $37 million in Fiscal Year 2012. The lost riders and revenues are the clearest record of the problem of aging and decaying infrastructure. 

The ugly truth is that our national failure to invest in the common good of our national infrastructure is eroding the serviceability of this railroad, our highway system, our aviation industry, 

our transit systems, our ports, and our utilities. And as a result, 

it’s eroding the confidence of our future sense of national wellbeing. 

The NEC has suffered from decades of unmitigated deferrals of 

investment needs and reductions in our planned capital investment 

programs. The result is a complicated process of compounding deterioration. Consequently, today, we have an infrastructure that 

60 

1 Includes 37 miles in Massachusetts that are owned by Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority 

but maintained and dispatched by Amtrak. 

while safe—and it is safe—is vulnerable to service disruptions at 

virtually any time and place. And the vulnerability is highest, as 

Superstorm Sandy demonstrated, at the points where congestion is 

greatest and redundancy is nonexistent. 

Amtrak and Metro-North both suffer from the same basic challenge. Since we took over this line in the 1970s, business and traffic have grown, but investment has not kept pace. Amtrak knows 

what it needs for the Amtrak-owned segments of the Northeast 

Corridor. Amtrak needs $782 million per year in today’s dollars to 

bring the infrastructure into a state of good repair every year for 

the next 15 years. And we must be on an equal footing with the 

capital planning formulas for the highway and transit systems. 

The planning for intercity rail is poorly executed because the investments are considered by congressional appropriators on a yearto-year budget basis, rather than funding the program as the highway and transit programs are. In Fiscal Year 2012 and Fiscal Year 

2013, the total funding level was about half of that needed, and 

Amtrak is always subject to deficient levels of planning because of 

the lack of predictable funding on a multiyear basis. 

This level and method of investment isn’t enough to sustain an 

aging system that’s coping with record levels of traffic. There are 

several processes that are now in place that we hope will allow us 

to harness the support of the states with the Federal investment 

in the Northeast Corridor. 

The process of asset aging is irreversible. At some point, everything needs replacement, and replacement is feasible only if adequate funding is available. And for Amtrak, as for Metro-North, 

funding on the required scale will have to come from a strong coalition that involves the Federal government, the states, the users of 

the Northeast Corridor, local government, and the private sector 

where it makes sense. 

We must not take this vital infrastructure for granted. Instead, 

we must start investing in the future of the region and the Nation 

with multiyear investments that will demonstrate our own faith in 

the future of our nation. 

Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Boardman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN, PRESIDENT

AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMTRAK

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. 

Amtrak operates and maintains 401 miles 1 of the 457 mile Northeast Corridor 

(NEC), and we work closely with Metro-North, which operates and maintains the 

other 56 miles. The NEC serves a region that houses more than a sixth of the Nation’s population, and generates $1 out of every $5 of our gross domestic product 

on less than 2 percent of our country’s land area. While our line is a transportation 

asset of national importance, it is aging and failure prone, and lacks redundant systems to keep it operating in the event of failure. While the incident we are here 

to discuss was not necessarily an infrastructure failure, the consequences of such 

a failure would be similar, particularly if they came at one of the many critical 

points, or ‘‘single points of failure,’’ in the states of Connecticut, New York, or New 

Jersey. A single point of failure is a part of a system that, if it fails, will stop an 

entire system from working. In its current state, our system faces the threat of a 

major failure—with comparable impacts to this incident in terms of disruption—on 

61 

a daily basis, for much of our infrastructure is aging and heavily trafficked, while 

capital investment has lagged. 

Amtrak owns 122.5 miles of rail line in Connecticut and we have invested heavily 

in the state over the last two decades. In 2000, we finish the electrification of the 

156 mile segment between New Haven and Boston with $2.6 billion in Federal 

funds, and we also have invested nearly $300 million to replace several bridges in 

recent years, such as the replacement of the movable portion of the Thames River 

Bridge in New London. Some of these projects were completed as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which provided us with a substantial infusion 

of funding in 2009, and we invested more than $167 million in the state of Connecticut to improve every aspect of our railroad. 

As you probably know, Amtrak also does a lot of business in the state of Connecticut, which is served by our Northeast Corridor and Springfield Line trains. We 

operate 46 daily trains, including Acela, Northeast Regional, Vermonter, and Springfield Shuttle services. Last year, we carried more than 1.7 million people to or from 

stations in Connecticut, and we employ 680 residents with a total payroll of more 

than $51 million. We spent another $51 million on goods and services in the state 

in 2012, $11 million of that right here in Bridgeport. 

As you would expect, we work closely with the Connecticut Department of Transportation, who we are pleased to add as a new state partner under a Federal-state 

cost sharing methodology that went in effect in October for service on the line to 

Springfield, MA. We also work very closely with Metro-North Railroad, which is, on 

the basis of train mileage, our sixth largest host railroad—which might not seem 

impressive, until you stop to consider that Metro-North hosts Amtrak trains for only 

fifty-six miles, while some of our services run on host railroad tracks for trips of 

up to 2,400 miles. It’s a busy line, carrying 48 of our trains and about 300 MetroNorth trains on a typical weekday. We are vividly aware of the challenges MetroNorth faces in maintaining an aging and heavily used railroad, because these are 

our challenges, too. For Metro-North, as for Amtrak, the reality is that we are stewards of an aging infrastructure system that requires increasing levels of investment 

just to maintain the existing level of service; faster or more frequent service requires even more. Consequently, when we get a service disruption caused by a point 

of failure on this infrastructure, it can be costly and prolonged. The recent MetroNorth shutdown is a case in point. Because of it, we were unable to offer Acela serv- ice between Boston and New York City. The Acela trains are what we call ‘‘integral 

train sets,’’ with the electric locomotives permanently joined to the coaches, so we 

can’t swap out a diesel engine if the power system fails. That meant cancelling those 

trains, and since approximately 72 percent of all Acela riders on the North End of 

the NEC are travelling between the three Boston area stations and New York Penn, 

we lost about 18,300 Acela riders. Fortunately, we were able to run the Regional 

trains behind diesel power over Metro-North, so we actually picked up some 6,300 

riders on the Regionals (a likely spillover effect from cancelled Acelas), which reduced our net ridership impact to 12,000.This ridership ‘‘bump’’ produced an offsetting gain of about a half a million dollars in Regional revenue, leaving us with a 

net financial impact of $2 million. Acela service was completely halted for six days, 

and we were not able to resume a full slate of scheduled services for another six 

days. This disruption was of slightly longer duration than usual—but it is by no 

means unique. The blocking of all service on the line in the wake of the derailment 

and collision on Metro-North in May cost us about $4 million in revenue losses, and 

a freight derailment in New Haven, on Amtrak’s infrastructure, cost about $700,000 

in lost revenue in March. 

The lost riders and revenues are the clearest manifestation of the problem of 

aging and decaying infrastructure. This process, which is continual, is gradually 

eroding the serviceability of the railroad as underfunding takes its toll. To get some 

idea of what the consequences of underfunding are, I asked our Chief Engineer to 

study the problem of decapitalization earlier this year, because the NEC has suffered from decades of unmitigated deferrals of investment needs and reductions in 

our planned capital investment programs. The result is a complicated process of 

compounding deterioration. When we defer maintenance on one part of the infrastructure, we see that other effects that show up in areas of the infrastructure 

where we might not otherwise have had a problem. For example, where tunnel deterioration is an issue, we find that one of the effects can be greater corrosion of the 

rails, which correlates strongly to tunnel condition. When we find problems, we can 

either address them in large, comprehensive programs, or we can do spot repairs. 

Large programs cost more, of course, but the unit cost is significantly lower than 

the unit cost for spot repairs. Unfortunately, when we don’t have enough money for 

the larger programs we need, we have no choice but to go with spot repairs. But 

spot repairs don’t renew the infrastructure or prevent further decay—they simply 

62 

fix the problems that affect day-to-day operations and safety. But as the infrastructure continues to deteriorate, you have to do more spot repairs, which in turn consume more resources. And we have an infrastructure that, while safe, is vulnerable 

to service disruptions at virtually any time and place—and the vulnerability is highest, as Super Storm Sandy demonstrated, at the points where congestion is greatest 

and redundancy is nonexistent. While I have spoken principally about the Amtrakmanaged segments of the railroad, these cannot be disaggregated from the larger 

problem of disinvestment. Amtrak and Metro-North both suffer from the same basic 

challenge: since we took over this line in the 1970s, business and traffic have both 

grown, but investment has not kept pace. Consequently, we are running more and 

more service on a line that is now several decades older—but major components of 

that line should have been replaced years ago. 

To address this need, Amtrak studied state of good repair investment needs for 

the Amtrak-owned segments of the NEC in 2011. At the time, our proposal envisioned the spending of about $782 million per year in today’s dollars, to bring the 

infrastructure into a state of good repair by 2026. Unfortunately, funding has not 

been available, and in FY 2012 and 2013, the total funding level was about half of 

that need. It simply isn’t enough to sustain an aging system that’s coping with 

record levels of traffic. 

There are several processes that are now in place that we hope will allow us to 

harness the support of the states with the Federal investment in the NEC. I am 

hopeful that the ongoing Section 212 process, mandated by the 2008 Passenger Rail 

Investment and Improvement Act, will allow us to continue the process of building 

a collaborative relationship with the states to better manage and fund the NEC. The 

Northeast Corridor Commission’s excellent report on ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Needs 

on the Northeast Corridor,’’ published earlier this year, outlines the need: the challenge ahead of us is balancing a growing demand for the services of all of the NEC’s 

users with the needs of the infrastructure. It is old and aging, and the process of 

asset aging is irreversible: at some point, everything needs replacement, and replacement is feasible only if adequate funding is available—and for Amtrak, as for 

Metro-North, funding on the required scale will have to come from a strong coalition 

that involves the Federal government, States, users of the NEC, local government 

and the private sector where it makes sense. This disruption should serve as a 

wakeup call to what would happen if we had an issue at one of the NEC’s many 

single points of failure. We must stop taking this vital infrastructure for granted 

and start investing in the future of the region and the Nation. And we must not 

only address the current vulnerabilities, but also provide the capacity that is urgently needed—not just for the decades of growth we expect to see, but the ongoing 

growth that is stretching a fragile and vulnerable but nevertheless vital transportation system. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Boardman. 

Mr. McGee? 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MCGEE, VICE PRESIDENT, 

THE BUSINESS COUNCIL OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY 

Mr. MCGEE. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal and Senator 

Murphy. My name is Joseph McGee, and I represent the Business 

Council of Fairfield County. Our members include businesses both 

in Stamford as well as in Fairfield County. We estimate that over 

5,000 of our employees of member companies come to work by 

train. 

I want to summarize my testimony and shift a bit after listening 

to this presentation this morning. While the economic impact of the 

Con Ed outage is significant, the 11-day disruption, in reality, focuses on our need to understand the potential vulnerabilities of the 

New Haven Line and their impact on the economy of Connecticut 

and the U.S. 

I want to just parenthetically say what’s interesting to me this 

morning is I had chaired the Two Storm Panel for Governor 

Malloy. We had 9 days of hearings and 100 witnesses on the risk 

to Connecticut for extreme weather. At the time, we looked at the 

63 

railroad, and it was very clear that this was an area of huge vulnerability, because it runs along the coast. 

But what was very interesting in that testimony—you know, it 

was a year and a half ago now—was that the New Haven Line is 

either the single largest energy user or the second largest energy 

user in the state of Connecticut. And at that time, when we asked 

the utilities what was the nature of their interaction with the rail 

system in terms of energy efficiency, it was surprising. The railroad 

had not used any of the state incentives for energy efficiency at 

that time, and a red flag went off. 

When I began looking at this whole issue of risk on the rail line, 

which came up this morning, this issue of redundancy needs to be 

clearly understood. The view that was presented here is that we 

have like a Christmas tree line, right, and if one bulb goes out, the 

line goes out. But maybe if we have a redundant system, if a bulb 

goes out, the line stays on. 

The reality is that if you look at the standard for financial services which you require, we have tertiary backup. So we protect our 

financial data and the movement of it with three systems, primary, 

secondary, and tertiary. In the movement of people to work, we 

have a system that is essentially a primary system with a questionable level of redundancy. And that raises a very serious question 

on this whole issue of energy policy, vis-a`-vis, the railroad. 

If you look at the state of Connecticut right now, we’re looking 

at micro grids for areas of communities so that in a storm, critical 

resources can come back to power quickly. We learned in the storm 

that our telecommunication system had battery backup that lasted 

2 days. In a 10-day outage, how does that work? 

So when you’re looking at this issue—and I would really encourage the Senate committee to look very carefully at this issue of 

electric power and redundancy, vis-a`-vis, the rail system, and the 

whole issue of a large system funded through large-scale power 

versus micro grids and the advantage of power delivered in a different way. 

This is a really big deal, and it gets very short shrift. But it goes 

to the heart of can this system survive a risk of severe weather or 

just human screw-up? It’s a big deal. I don’t think it was adequately addressed this morning. 

On this issue of infrastructure—and I know it’s a money issue, 

but it’s kind of like, ‘‘Well, we need so much money, we need so 

much money. I didn’t really want to put the secondary system in 

place because it would have cost money.’’ I’d like to know what 

Howard’s answer would be after what he went through on his risk 

analysis of making that decision. 

There’s a lot of finger pointing of who was responsible. Con Ed 

says to you today, ‘‘Well, yes, it was our equipment, but it was the 

customer who made us do it. Therefore, I don’t think I should be 

responsible for paying customers for their lost time at work.’’ 

There’s the beginning of a finger pointing here over a much bigger 

question: How is this going to work? Who is responsible? 

I’ll conclude on this note. In looking at the state of good repair, 

we know that the New Haven Line needs about $3 billion to bring 

it up to a state of good repair—the 100-year-old bridges, the catenary system, the control system. We haven’t heard what it’s going 

64 

to take to bring the New York side up to a state of good repair. 

That number could be $3 billion, $4 billion, $5 billion. 

One of the issues here is while there is a capital plan for the 

New Haven Line, we in Connecticut always hear about the Connecticut side of this. But in the business community, we’re interested in how the whole line works. What’s the investment required 

for the whole system? 

Let me put this in context. Right now, today, the New Haven 

Line, the single busiest rail line in America, is at 70 percent capacity. It’s estimated that within 20 or 25 years, it’ll be at 100 percent 

capacity. That means we’ll be congested on the rail line. We have 

congested highways. We will, in a very short period of time, have 

congested railways. 

The rail system is the single economic driver for Fairfield County. If you look at what has happened in downtown Stamford, it is 

the rail system. The most expensive property in Connecticut, in 

Stamford, is now around the train station. Twenty years ago, it 

was up by the Merritt Parkway. 

The growth of our downtown housing market and the employment labor force has seen 10,000 new residents in downtown Stamford. That group of urban professionals is tied to the rail system. 

So this rail system is the economic driver of Fairfield County, of 

Stamford, and the state of Connecticut. 

When you tell us that we have a $3 billion backlog on state of 

good repair, and then you don’t lay out to us—well, what does the 

future look like? As we grow the economy in Connecticut, we have 

to expand the capacity of this rail line. Where is the plan for that? 

All we talk about is a state of good repair. This system needs to 

be running much more frequently. 

Parenthetically, if New Haven was only an hour from New York 

by train, it revitalizes New Haven. If Bridgeport was 45 minutes 

from New York, it revitalizes Bridgeport. If Stamford was 30 minutes instead of 46, it’s an economic boom. If we want an economic 

driver for the state of Connecticut, it’s improved and more frequent 

and faster rail service. 

So this hearing this morning, while I applaud you for having it, 

really raises some fundamental issues about our commitment to 

economic growth in the state of Connecticut tied to a rail system 

which all operators admit is behind the times, is archaic, and out 

of date. I think there’s an urgency here that needs to be felt. If 

we’re going to grow the economy here, this has got to be fixed. The bottom line is $3 billion right now on the Connecticut side 

is a hefty investment in a state with the highest per capita debt 

in the Nation. So there has to be a role for Boardman and Amtrak 

in paying their fair share for the Connecticut experience. I’m using 

the rail in Connecticut. 

And I’ll end on that note. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGee follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MCGEE, VICE PRESIDENT, THE BUSINESS COUNCIL

OF FAIRFIELD COUNTY

Good morning, Senator Blumenthal, Senator Murphy and members of the Committee, I am Joseph McGee, Vice President of The Business Council of Fairfield 

County. The Business Council’s members include businesses in Stamford and 

throughout Fairfield County. 

65 

1 Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development. ‘‘An Evaluation of the 

Con Edison Power Outage on the Metro-North Railroad New Haven Line: A Department of Economic and Community Development Economic Impact Analysis (EIA).’’ Available at: 

www.courantblogs.com; Accessed: 10/23/13. 

While the economic impact of the Con Edison outage is significant, the 11 day disruption in reality focuses our need to understand the potential vulnerabilities of the 

New Haven Line and their impact on the economy of Connecticut and the U.S. 

Commissioner Redecker in testimony before this Committee last April stated that 

the Northeast Corridor (NEC) generates $1 out of every $5 in U.S. gross domestic 

product and that one out of three Fortune 100 companies are headquartered within 

close proximity to the NEC rail system. The Northeast Corridor (NEC) in which the 

New Haven Line is a 46 mile segment is a major national economic driver. 

On a regional level, ridership on the New Haven Line has surpassed a record 38.8 

million total rides in 2012. Of equal importance, while ridership from Stamford to 

Grand Central on a daily basis has increased to 9,243 passengers, daily commuters 

to Stamford now exceed those commuting to NYC. That shift in daily commuter destinations reflects the emergence of Fairfield County as a regional economic center 

in its own right not just a group of bedroom communities for Manhattan executives. 

On a local level, property in proximity to the Stamford railroad station is the 

highest assessed property in the city. Twenty five years ago corporate campuses in 

North Stamford near the Merritt Parkway were the most valuable. However, today 

the New Haven Rail Line is the key transportation investment that powers the 

Fairfield County economy and the emergence of a dynamic and growing corporate 

and residential housing market in downtown Stamford. 

In a 2013 demographic analysis of the Downtown Stamford residential market, 

the Stamford Downtown Special Services District reported that 80 percent of its 

residents had a 4 year college degree and 40 percent of that group had an advanced 

degree. For comparison, Connecticut’s workforce, the most educated in the U.S. has 

a 36 percent college degree achievement level. This highly educated labor force 

which numbers close to 10,000 and will double over the next 6 years is choosing 

Stamford because it fun, convenient and close to rail. In fact of the 6000 housing 

units in Downtown, 60 percent studio or one bedroom and 40 percent 2 bedrooms 

the actual car per unit is just under one per unit, far different than a suburban 

standard of more than 1.5 cars per residence. This young professional population is 

the labor force that corporations covet and provides Stamford and Connecticut with 

an economic competitive advantage but it must be understood that it is highly mobile and thrives in a high quality urban environment. Reliable rail service with frequent service to NYC is the critical element in the downtown Stamford construction 

boom. 

Consequently, estimates of the economic damage to Connecticut as a result of the 

recent Con Edison outage while dramatic are not surprising. The Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development (CT DECD) estimates 1 a $62 

million loss in state GDP from the outage, which includes approximately $5.3 million in lost industry sales, $3 million in addition production costs (incurred by the 

need to run diesel trains and busses), and $2.25 million in aggregated reallocation 

of spending by consumers. Finally an estimated $14.94 million amenity and time 

value loss (included in the DECD’s overall $62 million figure) represents a cost in 

travel time, alternative transport methods, fuel and wage hours incurred not only 

by regular rail commuters, but also by highway users. Failure of the New Haven 

Line affected all travelers and industries in the region. 

When surveyed last week about the impact of the outage on their companies, the 

common theme that emerged was best summed up by Purdue Pharma, ‘‘We moved 

to Stamford. The rail road was a big part of the decision and we have invested considerable resources to encourage our employees to use it.’’ 

Overall our members initiated resiliency measures that allowed them to function 

during the outage. However, members of our Transportation Roundtable have grown 

increasingly concerned about the need to insure that the New Haven line operates 

at a state of good repair. 

While we recognized that the State of Connecticut and the Federal Government 

have invested significant dollars in the New Haven line over the last 5 years, estimates that the Connecticut portion of the rail line needs over $3 billion to simply 

bring it up to a state of good repair are chilling. Four bridges in Fairfield County 

that are over 100 years old on the busiest single rail line in America raise serious 

questions of the risk of a catastrophic failure. The question of course is how to pay 

for the investment in the New Haven Rail Line? Connecticut’s current capacity to 

fund $3 billion in rail improvements is highly problematic. This situation demands 

66 

a national response. Amtrak’s role and the appropriate level of their support for rail 

improvements on the New Haven line needs a full airing. 

Investment in Connecticut’s rail infrastructure would provide the single largest 

boost to our state’s economic growth. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you to each of you for 

your very helpful and illuminating testimony. 

Mr. McGee, you may not know, but I actually have supported the 

idea of improving our rail system so as to enable an hour trip from 

New Haven to New York and 45 minutes from Bridgeport to New 

York. I agree, as well, that that would really empower and enable 

tremendous economic growth throughout Fairfield County and Connecticut as well. 

Mr. MCGEE. Senator, if you could do an economic analysis of that 

investment—you know, it’s curious. We do an economic analysis 

when the system fails. It costs us $62 million or it costs us $8 million when it fails. We’d love to see an economic analysis done of the 

impact of investment in the New Haven Line and what it would 

mean to the Connecticut economy. That could be a very powerful 

driver of public opinion on this issue. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Now, you may know that Metro-North has 

taken the position that it is impossible. I’m not sure whether I’m 

quoting exactly the Metro-North spokesperson. But my belief is 

that not only is it possible, but it will come someday that we will 

see that kind of rapid rail service on this line with sufficient investment. That’s the condition, that there be sufficient investment. And 

I’d be very interested in your economic analysis. 

Mr. MCGEE. Senator, you know, it’s really interesting that New 

York City is building a whole new station under Grand Central. I 

think it’s going to cost $12 billion. So we’re bringing riders in from 

Long Island now. They used to go to Penn Station—half of them 

now coming to Grand Central. It’s cutting 20 minutes off their trip 

into Manhattan—$12 billion. D’Amato got that rolling as a challenge—Senator Pothole—did great work in getting the Federal 

funding for that station. 

That begins to put us at a disadvantage competitively. We have 

not increased our speeds to Manhattan in 50 years. And to say simply that we can spend $12 billion in New York to create the 

eastside access, but we can’t fix the tunnels for the New Haven 

Line—this is not acceptable. 

Does that mean we’re at the end of the economic line here? Long 

Island and New Jersey can make these investments, but we can’t 

make these investments in New York to benefit the Connecticut 

line? That’s a serious question. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Hartwell, let me ask you for, number 

one, perhaps your description of the impacts of this disruption in 

service on the lives of commuters, but also the very positive impacts that this kind of expanded or enhanced service would provide 

to them. 

Mr. HARTWELL. Thank you, Senator. It’s clear that at the individual level, there were tremendous impacts on people’s lives. But 

most of them simply soldiered through it. I talked to people who 

had been commuting 10, 15, 20—actually one man for 40 years on 

the railroad. All of them said that the service is better today than 

it used to be. They understood that this was a big problem, and 

67 

many of them simply, as I said, soldiered through it, because they 

had to get to work. So they did what they had to do to get to work. 

Would they like more service? Absolutely. We have the new cars, 

for example, which are really very nice cars. But, by the way, each 

one of them carries fewer passengers than the old cars. So scheduling is now a problem. There are trains now that used to run with 

seats available that no longer have seats available because they’re 

running the same number of cars with fewer seats. 

These sorts of things have to get worked out. As Joe said, the 

railroad is the lifeblood of Fairfield County. And if we were looking 

for more service, for example, we should have what some people 

call subway service, meaning a train that comes so often on a local 

basis that you wouldn’t need a schedule. You would simply go to 

the train station and know that if you wanted to get from Greens 

Farms to East Norwalk, you could do so with a reasonable expectation of spending only 10 or 15 minutes at the station, and you 

wouldn’t need to be carrying a schedule with you. 

Those sorts of things, nobody is talking about, because we’re only 

talking about trying to fix the problems. But there is a tremendous 

amount of up-scale capacity here if we could bring it online. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I think people often fail to realize 

that the connectivity, the interdependence of the line—it’s a lifeblood, but in a way it’s more like an artery. If an artery is blocked 

at some point, the whole body fails. 

Mr. HARTWELL. Let me give you just one quick example if I 

might. The three branch lines—if you are on the Danbury line, all 

the trains in the morning run north to south, because right now, 

we can only put one train on a line at the time because there isn’t 

positive train control. Now, that’s supposed to be coming. But there 

also aren’t enough places for trains to pass each other. 

So what’s the import of that? If you live in Bridgeport or in Norwalk, you can’t take the train in the morning to Danbury. You 

would have to wait until all of the morning passengers who are 

coming down—there are three trains coming down. Same thing on 

the Waterbury line. 

So there isn’t this kind of connectivity that you would expect to 

have with this basic piece of infrastructure here. It’s still too limited. So those are things, again, that no one is talking about, but 

that could provide a lot of internal economic development in the 

state. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I want to join, by the way, in your expressing appreciation to Governor Malloy and to Commissioner 

Redeker for their commitment to improving infrastructure as they 

did by investing in the new cars that, very likely, helped to save 

lives as a result of the derailment and collision that occurred back 

in May. 

Mr. Boardman, talking about interdependence or connectivity, 

obviously, Amtrak uses these rails. I cited earlier—I think you 

were here—the figure of $64 million invested in the past 10 years 

out of the $3.2 billion that has been invested in the stretch of 

track. Wouldn’t it be fair to expect Amtrak to invest more? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Can you commit that you will work toward providing a larger share? 

68 

Mr. BOARDMAN. If you commit, Senator, we’ll commit, because 

the bottom line is we receive our funding from the Federal government. And as Senator Murphy talked about a few minutes ago, 

we’re spending off operating money off the Northeast Corridor in 

the neighborhood of $200 million to $300 million. I’ll use your numbers. That goes to support long distance trains. It doesn’t go to reinvest in the Northeast Corridor. It doesn’t go for capital. It goes 

to show a lower subsidy for Amtrak, which shouldn’t even be considered subsidy. 

It’s an availability for transportation the same way that you 

maintain interstate highways or that you maintain an air traffic 

control system or a port. And yet go back to 1971 when this was 

created, when Amtrak was created, and it was created with the 

idea of a subsidy because this was supposed to be a profit-making 

railroad, even though no railroads had made money with passenger 

transportation. So we believe more needs to go into Connecticut, 

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and even 

those states south of New York and south of this area. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Wherever it comes from, in other words, 

Connecticut and the Northeast deserve a fair share. 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Absolutely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for allowing 

me to ask a few questions. 

Mr. Boardman, can you talk a little bit about what the standard 

for redundancy along the portion of the Northeast line that Amtrak 

owns is? Of course, we have an anomaly in Connecticut in which 

you operate a lot of trains that do very well, but you don’t own the 

line. So can you talk a little bit about how you think about redundancy, especially with respect to electrical service on the lines that 

you do operate? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, we have an idea of a gateway program 

from the south into New York. The biggest bottleneck is Penn Station in New York. The biggest bottlenecks are Connecticut, New 

York, and New Jersey. So redundancy for us there is two new tunnels. 

Also—and you can go back to Superstorm Sandy just a year 

ago—Substation 41 failed. So we had a problem with electricity 

south of New York, not just north of New York. And, today—and 

I thought Joe really did a good job of this—talked about these 

micro grids, and that’s being discussed in New Jersey right now for 

the improvements that are necessary for that kind of redundancy. 

There has to be some redundancy. But, as others have said, it 

can be expensive. There are techniques that maybe we can follow 

to keep the cost down. But one of the best things is to have a reliable system, a system that’s kept up to a good standard. 

Senator MURPHY. You talked a little bit about the importance of 

ultimately having multiyear funding. There’s two problems. You’re 

underfunded and you get money one year at a time. I think probably the highway folks would say that they still enjoy one of those 

problems, that they’re underfunded even if they get the money at 

2 years to 5 years at a clip. 

69 

But can you just talk, with specificity, if you have it, as to what 

kind of decisions you could make if you had multiyear funding? 

What are you doing now that you shouldn’t be doing simply because you’ve got to make decisions 12 months at a time? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I think that’s a great question. And I brought 

this book for that purpose, and I’m sure Jim Redeker has got it 

with him as well. Every one of the projects and bridges and difficulties that we’ve identified is in here, and most of them are identified, Senator, as feasibility and conceptual engineering, and then 

preliminary engineering. And most of them aren’t beyond that. 

They need to be in final design and construction. And with a 

plan for the future—I was a New York State Commissioner of 

Transportation for a few years, and what we found in New York 

with the highway program—and I learned this—is that when you 

have a program management, once you’ve started studying a 

project, you get it done. It may not be the exact year you want it 

done. It might be a couple of years later, because you’ve got environmental processes and so forth. 

But because you had the contract authority from Congress to get 

that money out of the trust fund, as you’ve talked about, Senator 

Blumenthal, we built it. That’s what needs to happen for the railroad in the Northeast Corridor. We need to have contract authority 

and move these projects and stop dealing with it one year at a 

time. 

Senator MURPHY. You talked about how the operating profit 

made on the Northeast line primarily through the Acela service offsets operating losses in other places. Can you just explain to me 

what prevents you from making a commitment that that money is 

spent back in Connecticut by essentially making a commitment 

through your capital dollars to increase commitments to the Northeast to effectively offset the fact that our operating money is offsetting losses in other places? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. There are a couple of things. If we’re going to 

use those dollars, we have to get approval to indebt ourselves. We 

just can’t take the $380 million and put it into the infrastructure. 

It wouldn’t be the right way to do it. We need to finance it over 

the life of the actual investment itself. 

That means we go to, usually, the RRIF program, for example, 

if we’re going to buy new locomotives, which we’ve done—70 new 

electric locomotives for the Northeast Corridor. And we’re looking 

right now at having an RFP out at the end of November for new 

high-speed trains with more seats than we currently have in order 

to increase the capacity. So those dollars have to be approved 

through the RRIF program through the USDOT. 

What we can do is really held in the hands of Congress. If Congress says, ‘‘We don’t want you to use those dollars for those purposes; instead, we need those revenues,’’ and so they sweep out the 

revenue and they send it to a lower overall subsidy for us, we don’t 

have control over that. The appropriators do. 

Senator MURPHY. But you’ve got a capital account that comes on 

an annual basis that you have authority with which to allocate, 

correct? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, and it only covers about half of our capital 

costs. 

70 

Senator MURPHY. Right. But I guess my question is why couldn’t 

you just make a different allocation decision within that budget to 

make sure that the Northeast is offset for the operating revenue 

that comes off of this line? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, we think we ought to have more flexibility 

in that area, and we’d like to discuss that with you. 

Senator MURPHY. And then, last, Mr. Boardman, we’re discussing 

a new cost-sharing plan along the line in terms of who pitches in 

and how much money for the maintenance of the line. And some 

initial reports suggest that Connecticut is due some increased 

money from Amtrak in order to help us maintain our line. What 

is Amtrak’s position on the NEC process right now that’s taking a 

look at this issue? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I say this with a smile, Senator. We also look 

forward to the Shoreline East paying us more for its use of Amtrak’s corridor. We agree this needs to get fixed. We are in total 

agreement with that. We’ve got it with New Jersey Transit. We’ve 

got it with Long Island Railroad. Everybody needs to be there. 

But if it just becomes robbing Peter to pay Paul, and we don’t 

make the investments necessary that Joe talked about, we’re not 

getting the growth that we really need to protect the economy of 

this nation. 

Senator MURPHY. I got you. We sort of think that there’s already 

a lot of robbing Peter to pay Paul, and we feel like we’re more often 

than not Peter. 

Joe, you did a great job, so I don’t have any questions for you. 

But I have one for John, my final one, which is this. You know, 

there might be an impression out there—I’m not suggesting on behalf of MTA or Con Ed, but maybe, amongst others as well—that 

rebates for lost days just doesn’t need to be a priority because the 

people that use this line to get to and from New York can afford 

the loss, that this is just a bunch of people who are making a lot 

of money in New York who go back and forth, and so if they don’t 

get rebates, who cares? Their money will come from someplace else. 

Can you tell us a little bit about who the people are that use this 

line? And I know that you will attempt to dispel the notion that 

this is just a bunch of people who are making a couple of hundred 

thousand dollars a year going back and forth to New York every 

day. 

Mr. HARTWELL. There are a lot of people that think of Fairfield 

County as the ATM of the state, and I definitely object to that. If 

you stood on the platforms, as I’ve done, and talked to commuters, 

you’ll see that, yes, there are some people who are making 

$200,000 or more riding the trains every day and paying very high 

taxes because of that. 

But you’ll also find that there are single mothers, there are people who are unemployed and trying to find a job, there are students, there are—everybody is on the trains. And the people in 

Fairfield County—there are pockets of enormous wealth. That is 

obvious. There are also pockets of extreme poverty, and those people are on the trains, too. 

If you are on the train going to work, you’re probably a taxpaying 

citizen, and you should get a fair deal. And a fair deal says if you 

don’t get the service, you should get your money back. That seems, 

71 

to me, so completely obvious. If you buy a plane ticket, and the 

plane doesn’t fly because there’s bad weather, you get your money 

back. So why not on the trains? It makes no sense to me. 

Some people have said, ‘‘Look, you’re getting a monthly deal 

here, so why should we give you any money back?’’ But let’s think 

about that for a second. If everybody bought a daily ticket, how 

much more transaction costs would there be for the railroad to actually sell those tickets? You couldn’t possibly do it. 

So the fact that people are buying monthly tickets actually saves 

the railroad money, and that money, in some respects, is passed on 

to the customer. These are basic economic positions, and I do not 

understand how anyone could take the opposite side of that argument, except that, of course, it’s going to cost somebody some 

money. But it shouldn’t come out of the pockets of the people who 

have paid for a service and don’t get it. 

Senator MURPHY. Well said. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Murphy. 

And I might just expand on your answer to say that the ridership is not only going into New York. It’s also, within Connecticut, 

going both ways, from Stamford up to Bridgeport to New Haven. 

I was at two of the Fairfield stations this morning and saw ridership on both sides of the tracks, students going from Fairfield 

north or east, as well as commuters going into New York. So we’re 

really talking about commuting both ways, and I think Mr. McGee 

would agree that the companies and employers that come to Connecticut in Fairfield County depend increasingly on commuters 

coming to them by rail both ways, from both parts of the state and 

even from New York. 

Now, increasingly, our economic vibrancy depends on people 

being able to access Fairfield County from New York by rail. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. MCGEE. Yes, Senator. It’s changed, you know. The view that 

everyone on the train goes to Manhattan is not true anymore. More 

people come into Stamford on a daily basis than go to New York, 

and that shifted about probably 6 or 7 years ago. But I don’t think 

people have caught up to the fact that that’s really occurred. People 

use the train in Connecticut now. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Boardman, let me just ask you and 

others a question. We’ve talked about redundancy in terms of micro 

grids. But what about fuel cells? Are they a promising source of potential power? 

Mr. BOARDMAN. I don’t believe—from what I’ve known about 

them in the past, unless there’s something that’s really upgraded, 

they’re not going to be something we can use soon. 

Mr. MCGEE. Senator, if I could add, in a 2007 case, the Connecticut Academy of Science has looked at that issue about fuel 

cells on the rail line and concluded that, at that point, the technology wasn’t there for it to be practical. Now, there has been a lot 

of improvement in fuel cells since that period, so it’s probably 

worth looking at again. But when it was looked at in 2007, it was 

concluded it wasn’t appropriate. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

72 

I want to thank each of you for your testimony. It has been very, 

very helpful and important to the work of this committee. And I 

want to thank our previous panel as well, and most especially 

Chairman Rockefeller for his permitting us to have this field hearing and for me to chair it, and for the excellent work of our Committee staff, again, and my staff. 

For anyone who has additional thoughts or submissions for the 

record, we’re going to hold it open for 10 days. And with that, I’m 

going to adjourn the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(73) 

A P P E N D I X 

BOROUGH OF NAUGATUCK, OFFICE OF MAYOR ROBERT A. MEZZO

Naugatuck, CT, October 25, 2013 

Senator JAY ROCKEFELLER, Chairman, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Surface Transportation Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: UNITED STATES SENATE TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE HEARINGS SUPPORT

FOR WATERBURY—BRIDGEPORT METRO-NORTH BRANCH LINE

Dear Senator Rockerfeller: 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony in support of improvements to the Waterbury—Bridgeport Metro-North Branch Rail Line (‘‘Waterbury 

Line’’). This section of transportation infrastructure is critical for expanded economic 

development in all the communities through which it passes. 

The Borough of Naugatuck, a community of approximately thirty two thousand 

(32,000) citizens located in southwest Connecticut, is currently entertaining development proposals for multiple, town-owned properties in its urban core. The Waterbury Line is a pivotal component of what we collectively envision as a smart-growth, 

transit oriented revitalization of downtown Naugatuck. Many of our citizens work 

in densely populated communities to our south, and rely on southbound transportation networks for travel to and from work. 

Currently the primary means of travel from the Naugatuck River Valley to Fairfield County and New York is Connecticut Route 8. Unfortunately congestion on this 

limited access highway is significant during morning and evening drive times as motorists attempt to link with the Merritt Parkway and Interstate 95. While each community from Waterbury south to Derby has a station along the Waterbury line, commuters are reluctant to use public transportation because of the limited and often 

poor rail service currently in place. 

The recent power outage along the main line, which is the subject of Monday’s 

(10/28/2013) Transportation Committee hearings, undoubtedly created inconvenience and frustration on behalf of Metro-North commuters. Unfortunately this is 

something that is a continuous feeling shared by many regular Waterbury Line passengers. When there have been problems with rail cars on the main line, it has become common practice to move Waterbury Line diesel trains to the main line. This 

generally results in extended periods during which buses are substituted for trains 

along the Waterbury Line. 

Another major concern for Waterbury Line commuters is the frequency by which 

trains depart and return to stations along the Naugatuck River Valley corridor. A 

major obstacle to increasing trains on the Waterbury Line is that it is a single track 

which prevents multiple trains from traveling at different times. A recent Connecticut Department of Transportation study of the Waterbury Line suggested the 

installation of multiple side tracks at strategic locations along the rail line which 

would allow for trains to pass one another. Unfortunately limited resources combined with the Federal mandate to provide positive train control along the entire 

Waterbury Line have prevented any action on this recommendation. 

The limitations to service and frequency of disruption provide a serious inconvenience to those who rely on the Waterbury Line as their primary means of transportation. Equally concerning are all the countless other commuters who refuse to consider public transportation because of the inherent inconveniences imposed by current Waterbury Line service. Many of these Naugatuck River Valley commuters believe they have no other choice than to drive to and from their destinations south 

on the already congested network of state and interstate roads. 

Building a first class, convenient public transportation system for these United 

States is a big idea that requires commitment and vision from the Federal government. For generations the communities throughout the Naugatuck River Valley 

74 

have been leaders and innovators during our Industrial Age. As we seek to revitalize the historic downtowns in each of our communities, we require a reliable and 

sustainable transportation system that will meet the needs of the modern economy. 

We strongly urge you and the honorable members of United States Senate Transportation Committee to support and fund improvements to the Waterbury Line. I 

would be pleased to further discuss this matter with you at your convenience. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT A. MEZZO, 

Mayor. 

THE CITY OF WATERBURY

Waterbury, CT, October 25, 2013 

Senator JAY ROCKEFELLER, Chairman, 

U.S. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Surface Transportation Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Rockefeller: 

Please accept this written correspondence as testimony for the Committee hearing 

being conducted in Bridgeport, Connecticut on October 28, 2013. 

As Mayor of the City of Waterbury, I have been a staunch advocate for improvements to and investments in the State of Connecticut’s rail system, including the 

Waterbury Branch of the New Haven Line. We all know that Connecticut’s passenger rail system is a strategic link between the major northeast urban centers of 

New York City and Boston as well as a major component of the entire eastern rail 

corridor. In addition to the benefits of being in a strategic location, Connecticut is 

rich in natural and human resources that place us in the forefront of the national 

economy in terms of science and technology, aviation, manufacturing, education, and 

a variety of financial services. Capitalizing on these resources requires the development and upkeep of a rail system that allows us to offer an attractive business environment; high quality, efficient mobility options; and, a high quality of life. Improving the productivity of our rail transportation system is essential to the competitive 

advantage of Connecticut, its regions and urban centers, and in turn, the national 

economy. 

Waterbury is situated at the terminus of the Waterbury branch of the New Haven 

Line. Operations on the branch line are dependent upon and affected by the reliability of the main New Haven line. Any disruptions to electrical service on the New 

Haven line ultimately impact the cities and towns up and down the Naugatuck 

River Valley. Such disruptions include power outages, whether manmade or natural, 

accidents or delays. With the New Haven line being over 100 years in age, such disruptions are certainly not rare. When the New Haven line ‘‘goes down,’’ diesel locomotives are pulled off the Waterbury Branch line, causing disruptions for passengers on the Branch line, whether or not they plan to connect to the New Haven 

Line. 

When our diesel trains are redeployed, the result is stranded commuters who 

have to wait for CTDOT to implement a bus system in place of the suspended rail. 

The bus system is then fraught with its own delays and inefficiencies as drivers try 

to familiarize themselves with the route and connections are missed. 

It is crucial that the Federal Government take a hard look at rail conditions in 

the State of Connecticut and support the upgrades and major investments that will 

result in a more resilient public rail system that can meet the challenges of the 21st 

century. Such investments should include improvements to the New Haven main 

line, as well as significant upgrades to the Waterbury Branch. 

The Waterbury Branch line is in need of passing sidings, full signalization and 

a transfer station at Devon Wye so that more than one train can operate on the 

line. Without these improvements, our Valley economy is severely hamstrung and 

mobility options for our residents are limited. The City of Waterbury and the State 

of Connecticut are investing in improvements to Waterbury’s Train Station, with the 

goal of encouraging transit-oriented development. We are redeveloping brownfields, 

planning and designing sustainable riverfront development and reusing our historic 

downtown buildings as we build a new City economy. Efficient and reliable rail passenger service on the New Haven Line, and specifically, the Waterbury Branch line, 

is at the heart of our economic development strategies. 

As Mayor of the City of Waterbury, I ask the Committee to make the needed investments in the New Haven line and the Waterbury Branch that will ensure their 

reliability and efficiency so that Connecticut can offer viable transportation options 

75 

to its businesses and residents that will drive the growth of our local, state and national economies. 

Yours truly, 

NEIL M. O’LEARY, 

Mayor. 

COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, CENTRAL NAUGATUCK VALLEY

Waterbury, CT, October 25, 2013 

Senator JAY ROCKEFELLER, Chairman, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Surface Transportation Committee, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Rockefeller: 

The power outage along the New Haven Line, which stranded over a hundred 

thousand commuters and tens of thousands of Amtrak passengers, highlights the 

fragile nature of our aging passenger rail network in Connecticut. Along with the 

recent storms and accidents of the last two years, it is clear that more needs to be 

done to ensure the resiliency of the passenger rail network upon which so many people and communities depend. We appreciate your committee’s interest in learning 

about this issue and ask for your support of this essential transportation facility. 

The future economic development and vitality of our communities is directly 

linked to dependable, convenient, and regular rail service. Greater investment in the 

rail line is essential to keep the line in a good state of repair, grow ridership, and 

minimize the potential for accidents, mistakes, and storm damage. Investments in 

the New Haven Line, and its branches, immediately benefit millions of people, reducing commute times and traffic congestion, increasing opportunities for economic 

development and activity, and support the redevelopment of the historic, walkable 

centers of our communities. 

Disruptions on the New Haven Line ripple throughout the entire Metro-North 

system. When the power is cut on the main line, the diesel train sets that serve 

the Naugatuck Valley’s Waterbury Branch are redeployed to the main New Haven 

Line, leaving our passengers stranded until busing can be started. Replacement 

buses are less dependable and deter reliance on the Waterbury Branch. Such disruptions in service hinder our communities’ revitalization efforts, which are based 

around the branch line. 

Our municipalities are making significant efforts to revitalize their downtowns 

and economies by investments in their train stations and support for transit-oriented development. Federal support, along with local, state, and private investment, 

is essential to making these projects work. We are hopeful that you will recognize 

the opportunities along the Waterbury Branch and support our efforts to improve 

it. 

Thank you for your interest and giving us this opportunity. 

Sincerely, 

SAMUEL S. GOLD, AICP, 

Acting Executive Director. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL TO

HOWARD PERMUT

Question 1. What levels of redundancy do you have for electricity along the New 

Haven line in CT? How is that different from what currently exists in NY where 

Con Ed operates? 

Answer. The general function of a substation is to take power from the utility and 

make it useable for railroad operations. Every substation in New York and Connecticut has full redundancy for normal service operations. This means that substations are designed so that the loss of a major electrical component (e.g., feeder, 

transformer) at the substation will not affect electric train service and full operations can continue. This function is called ‘‘second order contingency’’ or ‘‘N+1’’ design. 

If a major component is taken offline for either short or long term maintenance, 

this redundancy can become compromised, as was seen last fall in Mt. Vernon. 

Currently, the catenary system on the New Haven Line, east of the state border, 

has three supplying substations, Cos Cob, Sasco Creek, and Devon. If the Sasco 

Creek substation is offline completely, the adjacent substations are able to bridge 

76 

the gap so that train service is not affected. Metro-North and Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT) are working to bring this type of additional 

power capability to the Cos Cob and Devon substations. Construction of a new substation in the New Haven Yard at the far east end of Metro-North territory will 

allow service to continue to operate if the Devon substation is offline, and the fortification of the electric tie system in New York described below will provide this 

capability if the Cos Cob substation is offline. 

The New Haven Yard substation and the fortification of the electric tie system 

are scheduled to be completed the first quarter of 2014. 

Regarding operations in New York State, Con Ed is not the only power supplier. 

NYS Electric and Gas also provides power in portions of the State. 

All New York substations—no matter which utility supplies the power—are designed and built to the same type of second order contingency or N+1 design described above, so train service is not impacted due to loss of a major electrical component in the substation. All 54 DC substations on Metro-North’s Harlem and Hudson Lines, as well as the Mt. Vernon substation on the New Haven Line are designed and built to this standard. As noted above, second order contingency allows 

substations to continue to operate if a major component within the substation is offline. 

Question 2. How will your contingency plans change in the future as a result of 

this incident? 

Answer. Metro-North is making a number of changes to its project planning and 

contingency planning processes as a result of the Mt. Vernon incident. New processes and procedures have been used to plan the substation improvements currently 

underway at Cos Cob. Prior to beginning this project, Metro-North, ConnDOT and 

Connecticut Light & Power (CL&P) met, developed and jointly agreed to: project 

management plans for the actual transformer replacement; a power contingency 

plan that provides a primary and back up source; contingency plans for rail and rail/ 

bus service in the event of a disruption; a plan for, communications with customers 

and other stakeholders. This same process will be used before any future major substation maintenance projects. 

In addition, Metro-North is working to build redundancy at all substation locations to cover periods when maintenance is underway. 

As noted above, in the remaining CT territory east of Devon, construction of a 

new supply substation in New Haven Yard will provide redundancy to the existing 

Devon supply substation. 

In New York, Metro-North will fortify an existing emergency electrical tie system, 

to allow for a contingency power supply in case the utility serving the area is interrupted. While Con Edison and CL&P systems cannot be tied together, this system 

will provide redundancy for our Cos Cob substation, where power is provided by CT 

Light and Power, and our Mt Vernon substation, where Con Ed provides power. 

Once complete, this tie will allow the railroad to continue to operate train service 

should the Cos Cob or Mt. Vernon substation fail, although trains would operate 

more slowly and with delays. 

Although Metro-North remains in discussion with Con Ed to build an additional 

supply substation, identifying a location is challenging given the availability of utility transmission voltage sources near the right of way. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY TO

HOWARD PERMUT

Question. While the effort to install full electrical redundancy along the Connecticut portion of line is already underway, any additional light that can be shed 

on the parallel plan for the New York track segments would be much appreciated. 

What is the menu of options being considered? What are the accompanying installation timelines for each potential option? When will a formal decision be made on 

the final redundancy plan? 

Answer. Please see the answer provided in question 2 above for discussion of 

measures in New York. 

The fortified emergency tie between the New York and Connecticut sections is anticipated to be complete in March 2014. The Mt. Vernon substation is scheduled for 

completion summer 2015. 

77 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL TO

CRAIG IVEY

Question 1. Are you aware of CL&P’s plan to get electricity from nearby substations to power CT track in times of need? Do you plan to build similar redundancy? 

Answer. James Redeker, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Transportation, described redundancy in the power supply to the New Haven line along 

the Connecticut portion of the route in the opening statement of his testimony at 

the October 28, 2013 hearing in Bridgeport. He noted two ongoing projects intended 

to enhance the redundancy by the first quarter of next year. Mr. Redeker’s testimony was corroborated by Howard Permut, President of the Metro-North Railroad, 

in his response to a question asked during the hearing. This redundancy is achieved 

through Metro-North’s design and investment along the Connecticut portion of the 

route, in collaboration with the Connecticut Department of Transportation. It’s our 

understanding through conversations in industry forums that CL&P supports the 

ongoing projects as a contractor to Metro-North, but has not made any changes in 

their own electric system to provide redundancy to the New Haven line. 

In the aftermath of the September 25 event, Metro-North has been actively seeking to establish an additional and redundant supply for the portion of track in New 

York State from Harrison to Pelham, initially on a temporary or interim basis to 

allow the upgrade project at their Mount Vernon substation to move forward without delay, and then on a permanent basis. Con Edison has assembled a team of engineers, operators, planners, and managers to fully support Metro-North’s efforts 

along these lines. The New York Power Authority (NYPA) is also supporting this 

effort. All three entities—Metro-North, Con Edison, and NYPA—have met on multiple occasions, and will continue to meet, to achieve the goal of establishing an additional and redundant supply as quickly and effectively as possible. 

Question 2. Can you provide my office with more information on the amount of 

money that ConEd spends on repair, maintenance and upgrades for the lines that 

supply Metro-North? Does ConEd have a capital improvement plan for such supply 

lines? Can you please provide it to my office? 

Answer. The two 138kV feeders that supply electric service to the Metro-North 

Mt. Vernon substation are 38W09 and 38W10. Each underground feeder is 3.65 

miles long and has 14 manholes which contain splices. Each feeder consists of three 

cables housed in a steel carrier pipe filled with a dielectric fluid which cools and 

electrically insulates the cables. The steel carrier pipe is protected from corrosion 

with a cathodic protection system. The feeders have circuit breakers, switches and 

associated protective relay equipment at the substations where they originate and 

terminate. Except for the current failure, these two supply feeders have never experienced any cable faults since they were energized. 

Con Edison regularly inspects, tests, and maintains feeders 38W09 and 38W10 

and their associated equipment. From 2009 through 2013 (year to date) Con Edison 

spent $271,782 to maintain the feeders and their associated equipment. 

In 2013, Con Edison invested $2.4M in capital improvements to upgrade a circuit 

breaker, switches, and protective relays associated with feeder 38W10. The Company has plans to invest an additional $2.4M in capital improvements to upgrade 

substation equipment associated with feeders 38W09 and 38W10. 

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