OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

FULL IMPACT OF DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE PROGRAM TO RESTART

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE

SIGIR--09--09 

JJAANNUUAARRYY 3300,,22000099
 

 

January 30, 2009

Full Impact of Department of Defense Program to Restart 

State-owned Enterprises Difficult to Estimate

What SIGIR Found

Task Force efforts have served to help restart state-owned enterprises and 

provide employment in a difficult security environment. However, the full 

measure of the Task Force’s impact is difficult to estimate because of the 

absence of good baseline data and weaknesses in the methodology used to 

identify the number of jobs impacted by the effort. Task Force officials cited 

two primary reasons why reliable baseline data could not be obtained. First, 

security considerations limited the time available to tour factories and identify 

potential projects that could improve operations. Second, assessment teams had 

to rely on testimonial evidence on the status of production and number of 

employees working. Absent reliable data, the task force developed an alternate 

methodology that estimated a 24,500 jobs impact. Impact was defined as 

returning people to work that were already on an SOE’s payroll but not 

working because a factory was inoperable and/or had limited work for all 

employees. However, SIGIR was unable to validate the methodology used and 

does not believe it provides a reliable basis for estimating job impact. In some 

cases the estimate is based on the total number of employees in a company

rather than the number of employees at an individual factory receiving 

assistance. Going forward, Task Force officials have established performance 

metrics involving impact on employment, production, and sales, and plans to 

establish a baseline for these metrics to better assess the impact of the FY 2008 

projects.

Additionally, the Task Force has not impacted employment as quickly as 

initially expected because projects have taken longer to implement than 

planned. The Task Force anticipated that most of the FY 2007 projects would 

be implemented within six months. However, only one project was completed 

within six months and implementation of most projects is now estimated to take 

more than 13 months from inception.

SIGIR’s work identified three areas where internal controls can be improved. 

First, SIGIR found that although the Task Force verifies that items purchased 

directly by SOEs are received, it does not obtain copies of invoices to verify the 

cost of these items. Because about $18 million (61%) of the funds disbursed as 

of November 30, 2008 have been transferred electronically or by cash payment 

directly to SOEs to purchase raw material or equipment, it is important for the 

Task Force to verify the cost of these items to ensure full accountability of 

funds. Second, SIGIR found two cases in which the Task Force provided the 

equivalent of $229,400 in Iraqi dinars to two SOEs, but has not verified how 

these funds were used. Third, SIGIR found that items purchased on U.S. 

contracts are often paid for before verifying receipt of the items by the SOEs. 

Although SIGIR found that verification of receipt has occurred after the fact, 

such a practice creates a vulnerability to fraud.

DoD does not plan to request any additional funding for projects to restart 

SOEs because the Government of Iraq has significantly increased its capital 

budget to rehabilitate SOEs and has begun to enter into joint ventures with 

foreign investors to manage some SOEs. Any remaining assistance is likely to 

be technical in nature, rather than involving purchases of equipment.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs 

at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-009

Why SIGIR Did This Study

In June 2006, the Department of Defense 

(DoD) established a Task Force in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense to focus on efforts 

to stimulate economic development and 

employment in Iraq. One of the Task Force’s 

major efforts has been to revitalize Iraqi stateowned enterprises (SOE). These enterprises 

include factories that were important in Iraq’s 

pre-war economy, employing about 200,000 

Iraqis, according to DoD officials. The Task 

Force has received about $103 million to 

revitalize state-owned factories.

SIGIR undertook this audit to determine the

baseline data and performance metrics the 

Task Force used to assess the impact of its 

program to restart state-owned enterprises, the 

adequacy of internal control procedures used 

to mitigate risk and ensure that the funds are 

used for intended purposes, and future Task 

Force plans. SIGIR performed work at Task 

Force locations in Arlington, Virginia and 

Baghdad, Iraq. We also visited five stateowned enterprises assisted by the Task Force. 

Security requirements limited the number of 

SOEs that SIGIR could visit, and the time 

available at each site.

What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR recommends that the Task Force (1) 

establish milestones to ensure that baseline 

data required to assess the impact of the Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2008 projects is obtained in a 

timely manner, (2) obtain copies of invoices 

to verify the cost of items purchased directly 

by SOEs, and (3) verify receipt of items 

before payment is made under contracts 

awarded by the Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan.

DoD agreed with the report’s 

recommendations. However, DoD was 

concerned that the report neither reflected the 

difficult operating environment, the 

conservative nature of its employment 

estimates, nor the full measure of DoD’s 

controls over disbursements. SIGIR’s report 

addresses these concerns.

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

SIGIR
SPE CI AL INS P EC TOR G EN ERA L F OR IR AQ EC ONS TRU CT ION 

January 30, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR BUSINESS 

TRANSFORMATION

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

SUBJECT: Full Impact of Department of Defense Program to Restart State-owned Enterprises 

Difficult to Estimate (SIGIR 09-09)

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. It discusses efforts to reopen 

state-owned enterprises in Iraq, led by the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Task Force to 

Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq. The audit was conducted by the Special

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) as project 8035, under the authority of Public 

Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors 

general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.

We considered comments from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business 

Transformation when preparing the final report. The comments are addressed in the report, 

where applicable, and a copy is included in the Management Comments section of this report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on this 

report, please contact Glenn Furbish at (703-428-1058/glenn.furbish@sigir.mil).

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Inspector General
Table of Contents

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Background 1

Lack of Reliable Baseline Data and Performance Metrics

Make It Difficult to Fully Estimate Impact 4

 

Controls over Disbursements Can be Improved 9

Future Assistance to SOEs Expected to be Limited 12

Conclusions and Recommendations 13

Management Comments and Audit Response 14

Appendices

A. Scope and Methodology 15

B. State-owned Enterprises Assisted with FY 2007 Funds 17 

C. Acronyms 19

D. Audit Team Members 20

E. Management Comments 21
i

Full Impact of Department of Defense’s Program To 

Restart State-owned Enterprises Is Difficult To 

Estimate

SIGIR-09-009 January 30, 2009

Executive Summary

Introduction

Since the inception of the war in 2003, Iraq has reportedly had an approximate 60 % 

underemployment/unemployment rate. The Department of Defense (DoD) believed that this 

high rate was a factor in fueling insurgency in the country in 2006. In June 2006, DoD

established a Task Force to Improve Stability and Business Operations in Iraq (Task Force) to 

stimulate economic development and employment in Iraq. One of the Task Force’s major efforts 

has been to revitalize Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOE), which are factories that played an 

important role in Iraq’s pre-war economy. SOEs employed about 200,000 Iraqis, according to 

DoD officials. The Task Force received about $50 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 and $53 

million in FY 2008 to revitalize SOEs. Projects associated with the FY 2007 funding are being 

implemented, although most of projects associated with the FY 2008 funding have not yet been 

given final approval for implementation. Once a project is selected for funding, the Task Force 

enters into a cooperative agreement with the SOE to implement the project. These agreements 

describe the assistance to be provided, the project time frames, and the procedures for the 

disbursement of funds. SIGIR’s reporting objectives for this report were to assess the following:

the baseline data and performance metrics the Task Force used to estimate the impact of 

its projects

the adequacy of management controls the Task Force has in place to mitigate risk and 

ensure funds are used for the intended purposes

the Task Force’s future plans to assist state-owned enterprises

In July 2008, SIGIR reported on the financial resources devoted to the Task Force, and the major 

areas of economic development assistance, along with examples of projects.1

 

1

Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster Economic Recovery in Iraq, SIGIR-08-024, 

July 29, 2008.
ii

Results

The Task Force faced a very difficult security environment, particularly as it launched the initial 

phases of its efforts. Nonetheless, its efforts have served to help restart SOEs and provide 

employment. However, the full measure of the Task Force’s impact is difficult to estimate

because of the absence of good baseline data and weaknesses in the methodology used to 

identify the number of jobs impacted by the effort. Task Force officials cited two primary 

reasons why reliable baseline data could not be established on actual production levels and 

numbers of employees working at each SOE prior to providing assistance. First, security 

considerations limited the time available to tour individual factories and identify potential 

projects that could improve operations. Second, Task Force assessment teams had to rely on 

testimonial evidence on the status of production and number of employees working. Absent 

reliable data, the Task Force developed an alternate methodology to estimate job impact.

Because the goal of the FY 2007 projects was to return people to work, the Task Force decided 

to use employment impact as the sole performance metric to assess the impact of the projects.

Job impact was defined as returning people to work that were already on an SOE’s payroll but 

were not working because the factory was inoperable or did not have sufficient work for all 

employees. The Task Force estimated the FY 2007 projects impacted about 24,500 jobs. 

However, SIGIR was unable to validate the methodology used because there was no supporting 

documentation on how it was developed. Also, SIGIR found a number of anomalies in 

individual impact projections. For example, some estimates were based on the total number of 

employees in a state-owned enterprise rather than the number of employees at the individual 

factory being assisted. SIGIR does not believe that this approach provides a reliable basis for 

predicting job impact. Going forward, the Task Force has developed performance metrics 

involving impact on employment, production, and sales and plans to establish a baseline for 

these metrics to better assess the impact of FY 2008 projects.

Additionally, the Task Force has not been able to impact employment as quickly as initially 

expected because projects are taking longer to implement than planned. The Task Force 

originally expected to implement most of the FY 2007 projects within six months. However, 

only one project was completed within six months and most of the projects are now estimated to 

take more than 13 months to implement. Task Force officials stated that projects are taking 

longer to implement because of delays in obtaining detailed requirements from the SOEs and the 

time required to process procurement actions.

SIGIR’s work identified three areas where internal controls can be improved. Two related to 

funding provided directly to SOEs through electronic transfer or cash payments to make 

purchases, and the third area involves contracts awarded directly by the U.S. for items to be 

delivered directly to SOEs. In the first instance SIGIR found that although the Task Force 

verifies that items purchased directly by SOEs are received, it does not obtain copies of invoices 

to verify the cost of these items. Because about $18 million (61%) of the funds disbursed as of 

November 30, 2008 have been transferred directly to SOEs to purchase raw material or 

equipment, it is important for the Task Force to verify the cost of these items to ensure full 

accountability of funds. In the second instance, SIGIR found two cases in which the Task Force 

provided the equivalent of $229,400 in Iraqi dinars to two SOEs, but has not verified how these 

funds were used. In the third instance, SIGIR found that items purchased on U.S. contracts were 
iii

often paid for before verifying receipt of the items by the SOEs. SIGIR found that receipt 

verification has occurred after the fact, but this practice creates a vulnerability to fraud. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, the Director noted that only one payment was made for 

general operating expenses and that the other payments were made to procure raw materials and, 

in the case of the Tikrit Flour factory, for expenses to open the factory. We were unable to 

verify this new information but included it to fully present the Task Force’s position. We will 

verify this data when we follow up on our recommendations.

The Director of the Task force told SIGIR that there are no plans to request any additional 

funding for projects to restart SOEs because the GOI has significantly increased its capital 

budget to rehabilitate SOEs and has begun to enter into joint ventures with foreign investors to 

manage some SOEs. He noted, however, that the Task Force has contracts with two consulting 

firms to provide technical assistance and build the capacity of the Iraq Ministry of Industry and 

Minerals and the management of the SOEs. These contracts will extend until the end of FY

2009. The contracts include helping the Ministry negotiate joint ventures with foreign investors 

and helping SOEs develop business plans. Further assistance beyond 2009 would be contingent 

upon GOI funding. 

Recommendations

To ensure that reliable data is available to assess the impact of projects being implemented with 

FY 2008 funds, SIGIR recommends that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business 

Transformation require the Task Force to establish milestones for the timely collection of 

baseline data associated with the recently created performance metrics. 

To improve accountability over U.S. funds and reduce vulnerability to fraud, SIGIR recommends

that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation direct the Task Force to 

(1) obtain copies of invoices to verify the cost of items purchased directly by SOEs; and (2)

follow existing internal control procedures and verify receipt of items at SOEs before payment is 

made under contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan.

Management Comments and Audit Response

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, Director, Task Force to 

Improve Business and Stability Operations, Iraq provided comments on a draft of this report. A 

copy of the comments is in Appendix E. The Director stated that he appreciated the 

recommendations made in the report and is working to implement them. However, he also noted 

that he believes the report falls short in acknowledging the environment that existed at the time 

the program was started, and their conservative approach to establishing an estimate of jobs 

impacted, the strong validation and verification procedures in place, and the impacts to the 

stabilization of Iraq the program has made. He further noted that the Task Force’s ability to 

spend time and money doing detailed ―baselining‖ during the worst period of insurgent activity 

was very limited. However, they are acquiring the services of a professional accounting firm to 

audit the entire ―value chain‖ impact of their efforts.
iv

Our final report notes that the Task Force faced a very difficult security environment, 

particularly as it launched the initial phases of its efforts. Nonetheless, the task force’s efforts 

have served to help restart state-owned factories and provide employment. However, we 

continue to believe that the program’s full success is difficult to measure without adequate 

baseline data. We are encouraged that the Task Force plans to engage an accounting firm to 

determine the impact of their efforts. The Task Force Director also noted that Task Force’s

efforts have led to foreign and private investment in the SOEs it has reopened, and that it is 

working with the GOI to increase the budget of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. Our draft 

report discussed both of these issues and this report was updated to reflect information provided 

by DoD. 

The Director recognized SIGIR’s concern regarding controls over disbursements but went on to 

note various risk mitigation measures they had in place including that Task Force personnel 

physically verify receipt of equipment and material. Our draft report recognized that the Task 

Force verifies physical receipt of equipment and material, but we continue to believe that 

obtaining an invoice is a standard part of an effective management control process.

The Director provided additional information on disbursements which we incorporated into this 

report as appropriate. Finally, DoD noted that a system is in place to ensure that the Task Force 

and JCC-I/A coordinate before an invoice is paid. Our draft report stated that a system is in 

place; however, our work shows this process was not always followed. 
1

Introduction

This report, the second SIGIR report on efforts of the Department of Defense (DoD) Task Force 

to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (Task Force), examines DoD’s efforts to 

restart and revitalize Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOEs).2 For several years SIGIR has focused 

heavily on audits of Iraq reconstruction projects under its oversight authority, which has been

tied to the sizeable Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Over time, the Congress has provided 

SIGIR increased oversight authority over other funds that provide support to Iraq relief and 

reconstruction activities, such as the Economic Support Fund, and similar funding provided by 

DoD to support economic recovery in Iraq. SIGIR has initiated audits in these areas to assess 

management of the efforts and outcomes.

Background

In a memorandum dated June 22, 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation to lead an effort in accelerating 

reconstruction operations in Iraq. In the memorandum, the Deputy Secretary established the 

Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq and stated that ―Economic 

development and job creation in Iraq are critical success factors to build a stable country.‖ The 

memorandum stipulated that in leading Task Force, the Deputy Under Secretary was to draw on 

the resources of the Business Transformation Agency.3 The Task Force has offices in Arlington, 

Virginia and in Baghdad, Iraq. The Task Force has 6 U.S. government personnel and 28

contractor personnel involved in the effort to restart state-owned enterprises. U.S. government 

personnel approve projects for funding and provide overall management oversight while the 

contractors monitor project execution, business plan development, and verify that items 

purchased are delivered to the SOEs.

Before the war, about 200 SOEs were in Iraq. These enterprises included cement, chemical, 

construction, dairy, industrial, and textile operations. According to DOD, these enterprises

employed about 200,000 people. This workforce was largely idled as a result of the war and its 

aftermath. The Congress authorized about $100 million and DoD allocated an additional $3 

million of its FY 2008 funds for Task Force efforts to revitalize SOEs. As shown in Table 1, 

about $67.6 million have been obligated and about $27 million had been disbursed as of 

November 30, 2008. 

 

2

Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster Economic Recovery in Iraq, SIGIR-08-024, 

July 29, 2008.

3 The Deputy Under Secretary oversees the Business Transformation Agency, which is accountable for delivery of 

common processes and systems supporting logistics, acquisition, finance, and personnel activity in DoD.
2

Table 1 – Funding to Revitalize State-owned Enterprises (dollars in millions)

Funding Source Authorized Obligations Disbursements

FY07 Iraqi Freedom Fund $50.0 $49.0 $27.0

FY08 Emergency and Extraordinary 

Expense Fund $ 3.0 $3.0 $0

FY08 Iraqi Freedom Fund $50.0 $15.6 $0

Totals $103.0 $67.6 $27.0

Source: DoD. 

As of November 30, 2008, about $35.4 million of the authorized funds have not been obligated.

The Task Force evaluated over 70 projects and funded projects in 34 SOEs in FY 2007. These 

projects were primarily located in Baghdad and in central Iraq and were selected to help reduce 

unemployment and insurgency in densely populated areas. The majority of the FY 2007 funding 

has been used to purchase equipment, spare parts, and raw materials as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1 – Use of FY 2007 Funding

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoD data.

Appendix B shows the items purchased with FY 2007 funds by SOEs.

For FY 2008, the task force received requests for about $224 million in assistance from SOEs. 

The Task Force used eight criteria to evaluate project requests. These criteria included the 

Multi-National Force Commander’s priorities, impact on employment, sustainability, and market 

for products. As of November 30, 2008, the Task Force had approved 12 projects for $15.8 
3

million and another 18 projects for about $30.1 million were still under review. The remaining 

$4 million is being held in reserve for new projects, or changes to ongoing projects.

Once a project is selected for funding, the Task Force enters into a cooperative agreement with 

the SOE. The agreement describes the assistance to be provided, the project time frames, and the 

procedures for the disbursement of funds. Funds can be disbursed through contracts awarded by 

the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A)

4

, or through an electronic fund 

transfer or cash payment directly to a state-owned enterprise to make its own purchases. The 

Task Force prefers that JCC-I/A award contracts to maintain better control over the funds. 

Objectives

SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to assess the following:

the baseline data and performance metrics the Task Force used to estimate the impact of 

its projects

the adequacy of management controls the Task Force has in place to mitigate risk and 

ensure funds are used for the intended purposes 

the Task Force’s future plans to assist state-owned enterprises

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a list of SOEs 

assisted with FY 2007 funds, see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms used in this report, see 

Appendix C. For a list of audit team members, see Appendix D. For comments received from 

the DoD, see Appendix E. 

 

4 The JCC-I/A was created in November, 2004 to manage DoD contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
4

Lack of Reliable Baseline Data and Performance 

Measures Make It Difficult to Fully Estimate

Impact 

The Task Force efforts have helped to restart state-owned factories through the purchasing of 

equipment, spare parts, and raw materials. However, the full measure of its impact is difficult to 

estimate because baseline data on the number of employees actually working and actual 

production could not be established at the SOEs that were assisted. Furthermore, SIGIR was 

unable to validate the methodology used because there was no supporting documentation on how 

it was developed. SIGIR does not believe it provides a reliable basis for estimating job impact.

Additionally, achieving employment impact has taken longer than expected due to the longer 

than anticipated time required to implement the projects. 

Limited Baseline Data from Which to Track Progress 

Our review of factory assessments completed by the Task Force showed that they did include 

estimates of the number of employees currently working and the number that could be achieved 

if the factory was operating at design capacity. In addition, most assessments included 

information on the factory’s designed production capacity but not current actual production. 

Some assessments did include estimates of current production which were obtained from the 

Iraqi management team or estimated by the Task Force site assessment team. For example, the 

assessment for the State Company for Cotton indicated that the operating capacity of the factory 

was unclear but estimated that it was between 30 and 50% depending on employee attendance 

and power.

Task Force officials acknowledge limitations in baseline data and cited two primary reasons why 

reliable baseline data could not be established. First, for security reasons the teams that 

conducted factory assessments had only one hour to tour each of the factories and identify 

potential projects that could improve operations. Secondly, the assessment teams had to rely on 

testimonial evidence from the Iraqi management team on the status of production and number of 

employees working.

The Task Force officials has recently developed performance metrics such as impact on 

employment, production, and sales and plans to establish a baseline for these metrics to better 

assess the impact of FY 2008 projects. In addition, the Task Force plans to have a public 

accounting firm validate the actual jobs created at the SOEs.

Methodology for Estimating Job Impact Has Weaknesses Limiting 

Its Reliability

The Task Force obtained data on employment from six SOEs which it reportedly used in 

developing a methodology to estimate the impact at the 26 other SOEs assisted in FY 2007. The 
5

Task Force visited 12 SOEs and requested they provide data on employment impact. According 

to Task Force officials, six SOEs provided data indicating that 7,560 jobs would be impacted. 

This data indicated that 19 to 60% of the jobs at these SOEs were impacted. For example, the 

State Company for Mechanical Engineering estimated that 1,100 of 5,902 (19%) of the jobs 

would be impacted while the Najaf Ready to Wear Company estimated that 1,800 of 3,019

(60%) of the jobs would be impacted. 

The methodology developed by the Task Force used various percentage factors to multiply 

against the total number of employees in an SOE, to project an employment impact (see table 3). 

For example, the Task Force estimated 1,199 jobs at State Company for Electrical Industries 

would be impacted by multiplying a 25% impact factor times 4,797 (the total number of 

employees in the company). 

Table 3 – Percentage Impact Factors Used to Estimate Employment

 Impact for FY 2007 Projects

Number of

Employees Percentage Impact Factor

1,000 or less 35%

1,001 to 3,000 30%

3,001 to 5,000 25%

Greater than 5,001 20%

Source: DoD.

As noted in the table, various employer impact percentages (multipliers) were used depending on 

the number of employees. According to Task Force officials, the various employment impact 

percentages were developed after evaluating the employment impact data provided by the six 

SOEs. However, no documentation supports how the percentage impact factors were developed, 

and a number of anomalies were identified in individual impact projections.

In some cases, the Task Force estimates of employment impact seem overstated because they

based their estimate on the total number of employees in a company rather than the number of

employees at the factories being assisted. For example:

The Task Force estimated that 1,522 (20%) of the 7,622 jobs at the State Company for 

Dairy Products would be impacted when a milk plant under construction is completed in 

March 2009. However, during our November 2008 visit to the construction site, the 

engineer estimated that about 600 people would be employed once the milk plant is 

completed. The Task Force based its estimate on the total number of employees in the 

entire company. This company had the fifth highest estimated employment impact. 
6

The Task Force estimated that 1,231 (25%) of the 4,822 jobs at the State Company for 

Leather would be impacted. However, during our November 2008 visit to the factory, 

the Director General stated that the factory had 1,386 employees. Thus, using the Task 

Force methodology only 416 jobs would be impacted (1,386 X 30%). This company had 

the sixth highest estimated employment impact. 

The Task Force estimated that 1,199 (25%) of the 4,797 jobs at the State Electrical 

Company would be impacted. The company has several plants but the Task Force 

project involves only the air-conditioning plant. The company’s September 2008 

business plan indicates that 1,545 employees are at this plant. Thus, using the Task 

Force methodology only 464 jobs would be impacted (1,545 x 30%). This company had 

the eighth highest estimated employment impacts. 

Our work identified other areas that raise questions about the actual employment impact, as 

shown in the following examples. 

The Task Force estimated that its project would impact 1,885 of the 9,424 jobs at the 

State Company for Textiles-Hilla. However, the November 9, 2006 factory assessment 

relied on by the Task Force indicates that 3,000 employees were working and they 

already were at maximum plant capacity, and the Task Force funding was simply used to 

purchase raw materials. This company had the highest estimated employment impact. 

The Najaf Ready to Wear Company reported to the Task Force that 1,800 jobs were 

impacted. The November 6, 2006 factory assessment relied on by the Task Force 

indicated that 1,700 people were currently working and 800 more could be employed if 

more orders were received. The company’s September 2008 business plan indicates the

company has 1,710 employees. This company had the second highest estimated 

employment impact. 

A Task Force official stated that the Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MoIM) provided the 

number of employees at each SOE. This official indicated the data may represent total 

employees for each SOE versus employees by factory, but stated that it was the best data 

available at the time. Finally, the Task Force official stated that some of the projects are 

assisting more than one factory per SOE. We also recognize that increased employment at a 

given factory could have a secondary impact through creation of jobs in supporting industries 

such as truckers and distributors. The Task Force’s methodology, as described to us, did not 

specifically account for this secondary impact, and the data issues we identified make it difficult 

to rely on the data to estimate real employment impact.

The Task Force estimates that the FY 2008 projects already approved and under consideration 

will impact about 3,200 jobs, which is significantly less than the FY 2007 projects for the same 

investment. Task Force officials stated that the majority of the estimated impact is based on 

SOE project proposals from business plans that they had developed, but which did not exist in 

2007. Task Force officials noted that once all FY 2008 projects are approved, they plan to 

interview management staff at each factory being assisted to verify the number of employees that 
7

will be impacted. Task Force officials believe the number of jobs impacted will increase based 

on data collected during their site visits. 

Quick Impact on Employment Difficult to Achieve 

The Task Force has not impacted employment as quickly as anticipated because projects are 

taking longer to implement than planned. The Task Force originally planned to implement most

of the FY 2007 projects within six months from the date the cooperative agreements were signed. 

However, only one project was completed within six months and most projects are now 

estimated to take more than 13 months to implement. According to Task Force officials, the 

180-day estimate proved to be unrealistic and that they set this as a goal since MNF-I was 

encouraging them to complete the projects quickly to help improve the security environment. 

Our analysis indicates that 20 of the 34 (59%) of the FY 2007 projects at SOEs being assisted are 

now estimated to take more than one year to implement, as shown in table 4. 

Table 4 – Estimated Time to Complete FY 2007 

Projects and Estimated Employment Impact

Estimated Months to 

Complete

Number

of Projects Percent

Estimated

Employment

Impact

6 or less 1 3% 84

7 to 12 13 38% 8,915

13 to 18 19 56% 14,403

More than 18 1 3% 1,027

Total 34 100% 24,429

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoD data.

Projects are taking longer to complete for several reasons. First, it is taking longer than 

anticipated to implement projects because of the time required for the SOEs to develop their 

requirements. For contracts awarded by JCC-I/A, our analysis indicates that it takes an average 

of 180 days (from a range of 30 to 330 days) for JCC-I/A to award a contract once a cooperative 

agreement has been signed. Task Force officials stated that obtaining a detailed list of 

requirements from some SOEs has taken longer than anticipated. For example, the Task Force 

signed a cooperative agreement with the Fallujah Cement Company in September 2007 to 

purchase generators and equipment, but the company did not provide the Task Force with 

detailed equipment requirements until June 2008. Secondly, Task Force officials stated that 

some projects are delayed because of the time required for JCC-I/A to award a contact once it 

receives the requirements from the Task Force. 

Thirdly, some projects have been delayed because some SOEs changed how they were going to 

use the funds after the cooperative agreement was signed. For example, in 2008 the State 
8

Company for Northern Fertilizer signed a cooperative agreement for $5 million to purchase 

generators. However, in February 2008 the company notified the Task Force that it had 

purchased the generators from another source and now wanted to use the funds to buy various 

other pieces of equipment. JCC-I/A awarded contracts for $1.7 million in August and September 

2008 for the other items; however, the equipment is not scheduled to be delivered until March 

through July 2009. Furthermore, requirements for the remaining $3.3 million in available funds 

have yet to be determined. 

Based on their experience with FY 2007 projects, the Task Force has increased the planned 

implementation period for FY 2008 projects to one year. Task Force officials recognize that one 

year is still shorter than the projected implementation period for the majority of the FY 2007 

projects. Task Force officials stated they have taken steps to improve communications with the 

SOEs. First, the kick-off meetings are limited to four SOEs at a time to allow for more one-onone attention. One official stated that this provides the opportunity to inform the SOEs that the 

faster they identify their specific requirements the faster their operations will be impacted. In FY

2007, the Task Force had one kick-off meeting with all 34 SOEs. In addition, the Task Force has 

moved staff to Basrah to manage the projects in southern Iraq to increase interaction between the 

Task Force and SOEs that are being assisted, and are considering moving some staff to mange 

projects in northern Iraq. 
9

Controls over Disbursements Can be Improved

SIGIR’s work identified three areas where internal controls can be improved, two related to 

funding provided directly to SOEs to make purchases, and a third area involving contracts 

awarded directly by the U.S. for items to be delivered directly to SOEs. In the first instance 

SIGIR found that while the Task Force verifies that items purchased directly by SOEs are 

received, it does not obtain copies of invoices to verify the cost of these items. In the second 

instance, we found two cases where the Task Force provided the cash equivalent of $229,400 in 

Iraqi dinars to two SOEs, but has not verified how these funds were used. In the third instance, 

SIGIR found that items purchased on U.S. contracts were often paid for before verifying receipt 

of the items by the SOEs. SIGIR found that verification of receipt has occurred after the fact, but 

this practice creates a vulnerability to fraud.

The Task Force disburses funds through contracts awarded by JCC-I/A or direct transfers to 

SOEs. As of November 2008, about $16.7 million (61%) of disbursements have been direct

transfers to SOEs, as shown in table 5.

Table 5 – Disbursement of Funds (as of November 2008)

Method Amount

Disbursed Percentage

Contracts awarded by JCC-I/A $10,567,353 39%

Direct disbursements to SOEs1$16,702,140 61%

Total $27,269,493 100%

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoD data.

Note: 1 Electronic and cash payments.

The Task Force prefers to award contracts though JCC-I/A to maintain better control over the 

funds. When JCC-I/A awards a contract, funds are not supposed to be disbursed until the Task 

Force verifies that items have been delivered to an SOE. However, under direct fund transfer, 

funds are considered disbursed when the transfer occurs, which is before delivery of material. 

Task Force officials recognize that direct transfers create a greater vulnerability to fraud and 

waste because it has less visibility regarding actual purchases. Nevertheless, we noted 

weaknesses in each of these areas.

Control over Use of Funds Provided Directly to SOEs Can Be 

Improved

Funds provided directly to SOEs are either in the form of an electronic fund transfer or cash 

payment. The Task Force verifies that items purchased directly by SOEs are received, but does 

not obtain copies of invoices to verify the cost of these items. Additionally, we identified a 
10

couple of instances where cash was disbursed directly to SOEs to be used for general operating 

expenses without follow-up to see how these funds were used. The absence of a verification

requirement creates a vulnerability to undetected fraud since about $16.7 million (60%) of 

disbursements as of November 30, 2008 were made through fund transfers made directly to 

SOEs. 

The following example illustrates the importance of obtaining copies of invoices to support 

SOE’s direct purchases. During March and May 2008, the Task Force transferred $635,000 

electronically to the Ninewa Furniture factory to purchase raw materials, equipment, and spare 

parts. In August 2008, the Task Force verified that the State Company for Furniture-Ninewa had 

purchased and received spare parts valued at $55,565, and that two pieces of equipment costing 

$245,000 were ordered but had not been delivered. While the Task Force performs visual 

inspections to verify that the spare parts were delivered, it did not obtain copies of invoices or 

contracts that showed the dollar value of the spare parts received or the equipment on order. 

In November 2008, the Task Force returned to the company to verify that the equipment on order 

during their previous visit had been received. During this visit, the Task Force learned that the 

Director General had been fired for his failure to follow the company’s procedures for 

purchasing equipment. Available documentation indicates that the Director General had 

purchased a generator and forklift without prior approval and solicited only one bid for the 

various purchases, while company policy requires three bids to be obtained. The Director 

General was able to purchase the generator and fork lift for $27,000 because the contract for the 

spare parts was for $23,839 and not $55,565 as previously reported. Finally, the Task Force 

learned that the company had terminated the contract for the two pieces of equipment that had 

not been delivered. However, a certain portion of these funds were wasted because the company 

lost the $23,700 down payment it had made on the original contract.

Furthermore, in two cases, involving cash given directly to SOEs, the Task Force provided the 

equivalent of $229,400 in Iraqi dinars to two SOEs. Between September and November 2007, 

the Task Force provided the Director General of Tikrit Flour the equivalent of $150,000 in Iraqi 

dinars and in June provided $27,400 in Iraqi dinars. Likewise, in June 2008, the Task Force 

gave the Director General of KRG Carpet the equivalent of $52,000 in Iraqi dinars. According 

to Task Force officials these cash payments were for general operating expenses and represent 

the only cases where cash was disbursed. However, we found that the Task Force had not 

verified how these funds were actually used by the SOEs. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director noted that only one payment was made for 

general operating expenses and that the other payments were made to procure raw materials and, 

in the case of the Tikrit Flour factory, for expenses to open the factory. We were unable to 

verify this new information but included it to fully present the Task Force’s position. We will 

verify this data when we follow up on our recommendations.

Payments Made On U.S. Contracts before Verification of Receipt 

The internal control procedures for contracts awarded by JCC-I/A call for the Task Force to 

verify receipt of items before payment is made by JCC-I/A. However, we found this procedure 
11

is not being followed. Our analysis indicates that about $7.6 million of the $10.6 million (72%)

of disbursements under JCC-I/A awarded contracts through November 30, 2008 was disbursed 

prior to the Task Force verifying receipt of the items. For example, JCC-I/A disbursed $211,863 

in March 2008 for various pieces of equipment purchased for the State Company for Drugs, but 

the Task Force did not verify receipt of the items until September 2008. This occurred because 

JCC-I/A processes invoices for payment as they are received and does not have procedures to 

check with the Task Force if the items have been received. The Director, in responding to our 

draft report commented that procedures are in place to ensure verification of receipt of goods 

before funds are disbursed. Nonetheless, our analysis indicated that verification had not taken 

place.
12

Future Assistance to SOEs Expected to Be Limited

According to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, DoD does 

not plan to request any more funding for projects to restart SOEs. He stated that no further 

funding is needed because the Government of Iraq has significantly increased MoIM’s capital 

budget to rehabilitate SOEs and has begun to enter into joint ventures with foreign investors to 

operate some SOEs. 

The Advisor to the Minister of Industry and Minerals noted that when DoD efforts to restart 

SOEs began in 2006, MoIM’s capital budget for SOE’s improvement projects was about $10 

million, and it was about $30 million in 2007. He noted that the DoD funding allowed MoIM to 

begin revitalizing some SOEs. However, the Director, in commenting on our draft report, noted 

that the capital budget increased to $500 million in 2008. Furthermore, the Special Advisor 

noted that Government of Iraq’s strategy is to invest in SOEs to make them attractive for joint 

ventures with foreign investors. The Advisor noted that MoIM is responsible for 67 SOEs and 

believes that between 15 to 25% are currently attractive to investors; 35 to 55% need some 

additional GoI funding to make them attractive; and the remainder are not viable for foreign 

investment. He stated that the GoI has recently entered into joint ventures with foreign investors 

for two state-owned cement companies and is in the process of negotiating additional 

agreements. In addition, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation 

noted that the GoI has recently signed memorandums of understanding with foreign investors to 

invest $280 million in a state-owned fertilizer company and $80 million in a state-owned 

electrical company, and in commenting on our draft report noted that over $900 million in 

foreign private investment was secured in formerly idled state owned factories in Iraq. The 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense believes these joint ventures also demonstrate the impact of 

the Task Force’s efforts in Iraq.

The Task Force has contracts with two consulting firms to provide technical assistance and build 

the capacity of MoIM and the SOE management which will extend until the end of FY 2009. 

These contracts include helping MoIM negotiate joint ventures with foreign investors and 

helping SOEs develop business plans. According to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Business Transformation, if MoIM wants this technical assistance to continue beyond FY 2009, 

they will have to pay for it. 
13

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

The Task Force faced a very difficult security environment, particularly as it launched the initial 

phases of its efforts. Nonetheless, the Task Force’s efforts have served to help restart stateowned factories and provide employment. However, without baseline data it is difficult to 

accurately estimate the full impact of Task Force efforts to restart state-owned enterprises. In 

addition, there is some question about the extent of employment impact related to the projects 

funded in FY 2007. We are encouraged that the Task Force has established performance metrics 

for projects being implemented with FY 2008 funds, and plans to develop baseline data. 

Although controls were in place to ensure the receipt of items before payments were made, they

were not always followed. Further, effective controls were not in place for electronic and cash 

payments, thus creating a vulnerability to fraud and waste.

Recommendations

To ensure that reliable data is available to assess the impact of projects being implemented with 

FY 2008 funds, SIGIR recommends that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business 

Transformation require the Task Force to establish milestones for the timely collection of 

baseline data associated with the recently created performance metrics. 

To improve accountability of U.S. funds and reduce vulnerability to fraud, SIGIR recommends

that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation require the Task Force 

to (1) obtain copies of invoices to verify the cost of items purchased directly by SOEs; and (2) 

adhere to existing internal control procedures and verify receipt of items at SOEs before payment 

is made under contracts awarded by JCC-I/A. 
14

Management Comments and Audit Response

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, Director, Task Force to 

Improve Business and Stability Operations, Iraq (TFBSO) provided comments on a draft of this 

report. A copy of this letter is in Appendix E. The Director stated that he appreciated the 

recommendations made in the report and is working to implement them. However, he also noted 

that he believes the report falls short in acknowledging the environment that existed at the time 

the program was started, and their conservative approach to establishing an estimate of jobs 

impacted for use in internal MNF-I reporting, the strong validation and verification procedures in 

place, and the impacts to the stabilization of Iraq the program has made. He further noted that 

TFSBO’s ability to spend time and money doing detailed ―baselining‖ during the worst period of 

insurgent activity was very limited. However, they are acquiring the services of a professional 

accounting firm to audit the entire ―value chain‖ impact of their efforts.

Our final report notes that the Task Force faced a very difficult security environment, 

particularly as it launched the initial phases of its efforts. Nonetheless, the task force’s efforts 

have served to help restart state-owned factories and provide employment. However, we 

continue to believe that the program’s full success is difficult to measure without adequate

baseline data. We are encouraged that the Task Force plans to engage an accounting firm to 

determine the impact of their efforts. The Task Force Director also noted that Task Force efforts 

have led to foreign and private investment in SOEs it has reopened, and that it is working with 

the GoI to increase the budget of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. Our draft report 

discussed both of these issues and this report was updated to reflect information provided by 

DoD.

The Director recognized SIGIR’s concern regarding controls over disbursements of equipment 

and funds but went on to note various risk mitigation measures that were in place including that 

Task Force personnel physically verify receipt of equipment and material. Our draft report 

recognized that the Task Force verifies physical receipt of equipment and material, but we 

continue to believe that obtaining an invoice is a standard part of an effective management

control process.

The Director provided additional information on disbursements which we incorporated into this 

report as appropriate. Finally, DoD noted that a system is in place to ensure that the Task Force 

and JCC-I/A coordinate before an invoice is paid. Our draft report stated that a system is in 

place; however, our work shows this process was not always followed.
15

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

Under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 

SIGIR performed an audit of the performance metrics and internal controls used by the Task 

Fore to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq to ensure that U.S. funds have been 

used for their intended purposes. We performed our work in Arlington, Virginia and Baghdad, 

Iraq. We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through January 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform an audit to obtain sufficient information, and appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our results based on our audit objectives. Based on those 

objectives, we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our results.

We conducted work at the Task Force locations in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. We 

also visited the following five state-owned enterprises: the State Company for Dairy Products, 

the State Company for Heavy Equipment Engineering, the State Company for Leather Industries, 

the State Company for Rubber Industries and the State Company for Woolen Industries. We 

selected these companies because they were in the top ten for funding or for estimated 

employment impact. Security requirements limited the number of state–owned enterprises we 

could visit, and the time available at each site.

To assess the baseline data and performance metrics used to evaluate the program’s impact, we 

reviewed data in the Task Force project management system, known as Mercury, and 

interviewed Task Force officials to identify the baseline data on the estimated employment 

impact from the Task Force. For FY 2007 projects, we interviewed Task Force officials

regarding the methodology they used to estimate employment impact. For FY 2008 projects, we 

reviewed SOE projects proposals that estimated employment impact. We also obtained 

information on employment impact from Iraqi officials at the five factories we visited. To 

analyze the time to implement the FY 2007 projects, we compared the completion dates in the 

cooperative agreements to the actual or estimated completion dates in the Mercury project 

management system. To determine why projects were taking longer to implement than planned, 

we analyzed the time between the signing of cooperative agreements and contract awards as well 

as time between contract award and the receipt of equipment at the SOE. We also interviewed 

Task Force officials to obtain their views on why projects were taking longer to implement than 

planned and the actions they have taken to improve implementation of FY 2008 projects.

To assess the management controls established to guide project execution and mitigate risk, we 

interviewed Task Force, JCC-I/A, and contractor officials, who developed internal control 

procedures and reviewed those procedures. In addition, we interviewed a senior official from the 

firm hired by the Task Force to verify receipt of goods at the SOEs. We tested the internal 

controls over disbursements through JCC-I/A and those made directly to SOEs through direct 

fund transfers. For direct fund transfers, we reviewed documentation supporting the transfer and 

receipt of funds to an SOE’s bank account. In addition, we reviewed all site visit reports that 

verified the receipt of raw material or equipment purchased directly by an SOE.
16

To determine the Task Force’s future plans to assist state-owned enterprises, we interviewed the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation regarding DoD plans to assist 

SOEs beyond FY 2008. We also interviewed the Advisor to the Minister of Industry and 

Minerals regarding GOI plans and funding for SOEs. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data

For the purposes of this review, we obtained information from the Task Force’s project 

management database referred to as Mercury and the JCC-I/A’s Joint Contingency Contracting 

System. The Task Force provided SIGIR with direct access to the Mercury database. For 

individual projects, we reviewed information such as overall timeframes, cooperative agreements 

and modifications to these agreements, site visit reports, and other information related to contact 

with the SOEs being assisted for each FY 2007 project. Task Force officials stated that they 

began using this system in August 2008 and that it may not contain all the documentation for FY

2007 projects because they were generally started between August and September 2007. We 

relied on the database primarily for actual or estimated completion dates and for copies of the

site visit reports. 

We also obtained data on disbursements from JCC-I/A’s Joint Contingency Contracting System. 

We verified the data with a spreadsheet maintained by JCC-I/A for the Task Force that showed 

the status of obligations and disbursement by project. 

Prior Coverage

SIGIR previously reported on the financial resources devoted to the Task Force, and the major 

areas of economic development assistance, along with examples of completed and planned 

projects.5

 

5

Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster Economic Recovery in Iraq, SIGIR-08-024, 

July 29, 2008.
17

Appendix B—State-owned Enterprises Assisted 

with FY2007 Funds

State-owned enterprise

FY 2007

Funding Description of items purchased

Abu Ghraib Dairy $3,425,000 Construction of a milk processing plant

Al Faris State Company $220,000 Welding and bending machines

Al Furat Company $1,500,000 Generators, fuel tank, welding machines, and spare 

parts for heat exchanger 

Anna Ready to Wear $275,000 Fabric

Baiji Fertilizer $6,600,000 Caustic soda flakes, cement, motors, and spare parts

Basrah Chemical $250,000 Seals, gaskets, and valves for boilers

Diyala Electric $1,550,000 Equipment to improve transformer and power 

distribution production lines

Fallujah Cement $1,500,000 Generator and spare parts

General Systems Company $150,000 Engineering services

KRG carpet $52,000 General operating expenses

Mosul Ready to Wear $1,825,000 Fabric, embroidery and dying machines, an d spare 

parts

NASSR $460,000 Forklift, welding machines, plasma cutter, and control 

panels for heating system

National Bike $128,850 Brake presses for wheelchairs

Najaf Ready to Wear $1,500,000 Spreading machines, scanner, bias group equipment, 

sewing machines, and final pressing equipment

Ninewa Furniture $635,000 Wood to build furniture for trailers

State Company for Agricultural 

Supplies

$400,000 Helicopter engines, rotors and spare parts

State Company for Automotive 

Industries

$1,500,000 Welding machines, forklifts, semi-trailer axles, 

torches, and compressors 

State Company for Cotton 

Industries

$2,350,000 Cotton, drawing and bleaching machines, and 

generators 

State Company for Design and 

Engineering Consultation

$150,000 Engineering services

State Company for DrugsNineveh$1,000,000 Production line equipment and spare parts

State Company for Electrical 

Industries

$625,000 Parts for air-conditioning assembly

State Company for Electronic 

Industries

$500,000 Test equipment and spare parts for computer repair

State Company for FurnitureBaghdad$570,000 Plywood and forklift

State Company for Glass and 

Ceramic

$935,000 Training and spare parts

State Company for Handmade 

Carpets

$750,000 Various fabrics, sewing machines and computers
18

State Company for Heavy 

Equipment Engineering

$1,743,610 Oxygen PSA generator, Computers and Auto CAD 

software, and generators

State Company for Industrial 

Design and Construction

$150,000 Engineering services

State Company for Leather 

Industries

$1,000,000 CNC Cutting machines, tanning equipment, and sheep 

skin machine

State Company for Mechanical 

Industries

$5,693,742 Tractors, backhoes, tillers, and tools

State Company for Rubber 

Industries

$2,160,785 Fuel oil burners, control panel, pipe, valves, flanges 

for water treatment system

State Company for Textiles-Hilla $2,000,000 Various yarns, and sewing equipment

State Company for TextilesWassit$1,350,000 Various yarns

State Company for Woollen 

Industries

$2,000,000 Various fabrics, sewing machines, and forklift

Tikrit Flour $177,800 General operating expenses
19

Appendix C—Acronyms

DoD Department of Defense

FY Fiscal Year

GoI

JCC-I/A

MoIM

Government of Iraq

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

Ministry of Industry and Minerals

SIGIR

SOE

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

State-owned Enterprise

Task Force Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations
20

Appendix D—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the review conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to this report include: 

Ken Bowen

Ziad Buhaissi

Ben Comfort

Mike Kennedy
21

Appendix E – Management Comments
22
23
24
25
Draft Report 

For Official Use Only

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective:

oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations

advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil).

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief 

and Reconstruction 

Programs

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:

Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html

Phone: 703-602-4063

Toll Free: 866-301-2003

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg

Assistant Inspector General for 

Congressional Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-604-0368

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1217

Fax: 703-428-0818

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil