[Cite as State v. Benton , 2012-Ohio-4080.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MIAMI COUNTY STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2010-CA-27 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Ca se No. 2010-CR-94 v. :

: TIMOTHY BENTON : (Criminal Appeal from : ( Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : :

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 7 th day of September, 2012.

. . . . . . . . . . . ROBERT E. LONG, III, Atty. Reg. #0066796, Miami County Prosecutor’s Office, 201 West Main Street, Safety Building, Troy, Ohio 45373 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee JOHN C. MEEHLING, Atty. Reg. #0077630, Holfaster, Cecil, McNight & Mues, 1105 Wilmington Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45420 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. {¶ 1} Timothy Benton appeals the trial cour t’s judgment convicting him of gross 2

 sexual imposition and classifying him as a Tier II sex offender. We affirm the conviction, but we reverse the sex-offender classification becau se Benton committed the offense before S.B. 10 was enacted. {¶ 2} In 2010 Benton was indicted on one count of gross sexual imposition for having had sexual contact with his then 12-year-old st ep daughter. Benton waived his right to a jury trial, and the charge was tried to the court. At the trial, the victim (Benton’s step daughter) testified about two instances of sexual contact that occurred between 1995 and 1997. In the first, Benton was sitting naked on the living-room floo r, watching pornography on television, and masturbating. He called the vic tim into the room and, when she came, took her hand and put it on his penis. In the second instance, the victim was on the couch watching television when Benton came into the room naked. He turned on a pornographic movie and sat down on the couch beside the victim. Bent on then reached over and, sliding his hand underneath her shorts, rubbed her vaginal area through her underwear. Te stifying in his own defense, Benton denied that he watched television naked or masturbated in front of the victim. He further denied ever touching her sexually. {¶ 3} Saying that it believed the victim, the trial court found Benton guilty. The court sentenced him to 5 years in prison and cla ssified him as a Tier II sex offender. {¶ 4} Benton appealed. A. The Conviction {¶ 5} Of the three assignments of error presen ted, the first and second allege that the trial court erred by convi cting Benton of gross sexual impositi on. The first assignment of error contends that the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment of error contends that the statute of limitations for the offense had expired before the 3

 state indicted Benton. 1. Manifest weight of the evidence {¶ 6} Benton was charged with violating R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which provides that “[n]o person shall have sexual cont act with another * * * [or] cause another * * * to have sexual contact with the offender” when the other person is younger than 13 years of age. R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). “Sexual contact” in this case “m eans any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, ge nitals, buttock, pubic region, or * * * a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifyi ng either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). The victim’s testimony supports a finding that Benton engaged in sexual contact with her and made her engage in sexual contact with him. She also testified about other things that Benton did, like walking around the house naked, watching television naked, and masturbating in front of her. Benton took the stand and denied all these alle gations. In support of his argument that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, Benton contends that the trial court should not have believed th e victim’s testimony over his becaus e, he says, her testimony is not accurate nor is she credible. {¶ 7} In a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate court, “‘reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way.’” State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting
State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). “[T]he credibility of the witnesses [is] primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St. 2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of th e syllabus. “[T]he trier of fact is free to believe all, part or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Green , 117 Ohio App. 3d 4

 644, 654, 691 N.E.2d 316 (1st Dist.1996), citing State v. Antill , 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). The trier of fact does not lose its way if its resolution of c onflicting testimony is reasonable. See State v. Lawson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4-5 (Aug. 22, 1997). {¶ 8} Here, in announcing its verdict, the trial court made explicit credibility determinations: “Based upon the evidence pres ented I find the Defendant guilty based upon the credibility of the victim and the lack of credibility in the Defendant’s testimony.” (Tr. 85). Reviewing the evidence, we see no reason to think that the trial court lost its way. None of the grounds on which the court could have rejected the victim’s testimony, identified by Benton, compelled the court to do so. The trial court reasonably chose to believe the victim over Benton. {¶ 9} The first assignment of error is overruled. 2. Statute of limitations {¶ 10} Benton next contends that he should not have been convicted because the statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition had expired before the state indicted him. The indictment alleges that Bent on committed the offense between 1995 and 1997. At that time, the statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition was 6 years, see former R.C. 2901.13(A)(1), meaning in this case that it would expire, at th e earliest, in 2001. But as the state points out, in 1999 the Legislature amended the statute and extended the limitati ons period for gross sexual imposition to the current 20 years, see R.C. 2901.13(A)(3)(a). See State v. Warren , 168 Ohio App.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-4104, 859 N.E.2d 998, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Am.H.B. No. 49, 1998 Ohio Laws 188. {¶ 11} In the bill that amended the statute of limitations, the Legislature specifically stated that the amended statute of limitations “‘applies to an offense committed prior to the 5

 effective date of this act if prosecution for that offense was not barred under section 2901.13 of the Revised Code as it existed on the day prior to the effective date of this act.’” Id ., quoting Am.H.B. No. 49, Section 3, 1998 Ohio Laws 188. In other words, as long as the limitations period for an offense had not yet expired when the amendment took effect, the new limitations period applies. Courts do not consider a statute-of-limitations extension to be an unconstitutional ex post facto law. See , e.g. , id . at ¶ 15 (“[T]he extension of an unexpired statute of limitations is not an invalid ex post facto law.”); State v. Swint , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2003CA00165, 2004-Ohio-614, ¶ 28 (same). The reason is that “t he extension of the statute of limitations [is] procedural, not substantive.” Swint at ¶ 28. {¶ 12} Benton does not address the amendment issue. {¶ 13} In this case, when the statute of limitations was extended in 1999, the then 6-year limitations period for prosecuting Benton for gross sexual imposition had not yet expired. For the reasons given by the courts c ited above, we agree that the 20-year expanded limitations period applies in this case, meaning that the statute of limitations did not expire, at the earliest, until 2015. {¶ 14} The second assignment of error is overruled. B. The Classification {¶ 15} Benton contends, in the third assignment of error, that the trial court erred by classifying him as a sexual predator. He says that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to make this classification, that the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors relevant to the determination, and that the c ourt failed to make a finding about his status as a habitual sex offender. As the state points out, though, the tria l court did not classify Benton as a sexual predator but as a Tier II sex offender. 6

 {¶ 16} Tier classification for sex offenders re placed the previous “sexually oriented offender” designations in 2008 when S.B. 10 wa s enacted. In March 2011, after the defendant’s sentencing but while this appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court held that S.B. 10 may not be applied to a sex offende r who committed an offense before the bill’s enactment because doing so violates the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. See State v. Williams , 129 Ohio St. 3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 22. Benton committed his offense well before S.B. 10 was enacted, and the state concedes that the trial court’s designation of him as a Tier II offender under S.B. 10 is error. We agree. {¶ 17} The remedy here, as we said in a previous decision in this case, is “‘remand for classification under the law in effect at th e time the offense was committed.’” Decision and Entry (Nov. 29, 2011), quoting State v. Smith , 196 Ohio App. 3d 431, 2011-Ohio-3786, 964 N.E.2d 3, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.), citing Williams at ¶ 22. {¶ 18} The third assignment of error is sustained. {¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is affirm ed in part and reversed in part. Benton’s conviction is affirmed, but his cl assification as a Tier II sex o ffender is reversed. This case is remanded for the limited purpose of reclassifi cation, consistent with this opinion.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . GRADY, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur. Copies mailed to: Robert E. Long, III John C. Meehling Hon. Christopher Gee