OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

TIKRIT LOCATION COMMAND PROJECT

ACHIEVING CONTRACT GOALS BY

USING SOUND MANAGEMENT

PRACTICES

SIGIR 09--024

JUULLYY 30,, 2009
Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

SIGIR

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Summary of Report: SIGIR 09-024 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare a 

final forensic audit on funds made available for 

Iraq reconstruction prior to its termination. This 

review examines the Tikrit Location Command, 

a $37.8 million project to construct a new area 

support base for the Iraqi Army. The project is 

a joint effort between the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

and the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission–

Army (ITAM). The Joint Contracting 

Command-Iraq/Afghanistan awarded the 

contract and is responsible for contract 

oversight. The Gulf Region-North District 

(GRN) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

provides program management and engineering 

oversight. The project is funded by the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF). 

SIGIR’s objectives were to examine contract 

costs, outcomes, management oversight, and 

issues related to the transfer and sustainment of 

the project, with an emphasis on vulnerabilities 

to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Lessons Learned 

As SIGIR has previously identified in other 

reconstruction projects, involving GOI officials 

in the design and construction phases of projects 

that they will ultimately use contributes to GOI 

acceptance of and commitment to the project. 

Further, requiring project managers to 

implement lessons learned from other 

reconstruction projects helps to achieve better 

overall program management and outcomes. 

Iraq lessons should be shared with 

reconstruction project managers in Afghanistan.

MNSTC-I provided written comments, and 

ITAM provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

July 30, 2009 

TIKRIT LOCATION COMMAND PROJECT ACHIEVING CONTRACT 

GOALS BY USING SOUND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

What SIGIR Found 

Completing the Tikrit Location Command project has taken longer than 

originally planned; nevertheless, the project has not experienced cost 

growth, the facilities are nearing completion, project management oversight 

controls are working well, and plans for transferring and sustaining the 

project are being developed. 

As of May 2009, the contractor is meeting the requirements of the contract, 

and cost disbursements were commensurate with management’s estimate of 

the construction status. The building exteriors are mostly complete, and the 

contractor is completing the interiors and other infrastructure and is adding 

the utilities. The GRN Program Manager estimates that overall construction 

is 78% complete, and both the GRN manager and the contractor believe that 

construction will be completed by the end of the current period of 

performance, which is September 26, 2009. About $25.2 million of the 

$37.8 million—nearly 67% of the modified contract price—has been 

disbursed to the contractor. 

Strong program, project, and contract management controls were in place 

from the beginning of this contract, and they have improved over time. 

When construction deficiencies were identified, action was taken to resolve 

the issues. Additionally, lessons learned from prior construction projects 

were implemented. MNSTC-I officials indicated that a good security 

situation at Tikrit, among other factors, contributed to the positive outcome. 

The project is approximately three months from its scheduled completion 

date. Thus, it has not yet been transferred to the Government of Iraq (GOI). 

Nonetheless, MNSTC-I has an asset transfer plan in place and is working 

with the GOI to address several training and sustainment issues, including 

securing an adequate power supply for the facility and training Iraqis to 

operate the reverse-osmosis water treatment facility. To monitor the project 

after its transfer, a logistics military advisory team will be located at the site 

to advise the location command’s commander. A logistics training 

assistance team will also be formed to provide focused training, and ITAM 

officials will conduct capability assessments to track the GOI’s progress in 

base services, water treatment, and other areas. 
S PE CI AL I NS PECTO R GE NE R AL FO R I RA Q RE CO NST R UC TIO N 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

July 30, 2009 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY 

TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

COMMANDER, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMANDIRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 

SUBJECT: Tikrit Location Command Project Achieving Contract Goals by Using Sound 

Management Practices (SIGIR 09-024) 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is providing this audit report for 

your information and use. The report discusses current reconstruction efforts at the Tikrit 

Location Command. We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory responsibilities 

under Public Law 108-106, as amended. This law provides for independent and objective audits 

of policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs and 

operations and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR 

project 9017. 

This report does not contain recommendations; accordingly, the addressees were not required to 

provide comments. However, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq provided 

written comments, which we incorporated in the body of the report as appropriate and included in 

Appendix E. The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Army also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

draft report, please contact Joan Hlinka, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

(Washington, DC), (703) 604-0945/ joan.hlinka@sigir.mil, or Nancee Needham, Deputy 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Baghdad), (240)-553-0581, ext. 3793/ 

nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 1

Responsible Organizations 4

Objectives 5

Contract Cost and Outcome Goals Are Being Achieved 6

Costs Are Consistent with Work Performed 6

Contract Objectives Are Being Achieved 8

Program, Project, and Contract Management Were Strong 11

Effective Program and Project Management Controls Were Used 11

Effective Contract Management Processes Were Used 12

Lessons Learned Have Been Implemented 12

Transfer and Sustainment Issues Are Being Addressed 14

GOI Input on Project Design Appears To Be Helping the Transfer Process 14

Successful Transition and Sustainment Depends on Implementation of Existing Plans 15

Conclusion and Lesson Learned 16

Conclusion 16

Lessons Learned 16

Management Comments and Audit Response 16

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 17

Appendix B—Contract Costs by Line Item 19

Appendix C—Acronyms 20

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 21

Appendix E—Management Comments 22
1 

Tikrit Location Command Project Achieving Contract 

Goals by Using Sound Management Practices

SIGIR 09-024 July 30, 2009

Introduction 

The Tikrit Location Command is a $37.8 million project funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund 

(ISFF) to build a new location command near the city of Tikrit. Iraqi Army location commands 

provide direct support to a specific division and tenant units. Support includes third line supply, 

maintenance support, base management, and life support. The project is a joint effort of the 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Iraq Training and 

Advisory Mission-Army (ITAM). The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) 

awarded the Tikrit Location Command contract on May 23, 2008, and is responsible for contract 

oversight. The Gulf Region Division-North District (GRN) of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) provides program management and engineering oversight. 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) prepare a final forensic audit report ―on all amounts appropriated or 

otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq.‖ To help meet this requirement, SIGIR 

is reviewing major Iraq reconstruction contracts. These audits examine contract costs, outcomes, 

management oversight, and issues related to the transfer and sustainment of the project, with an 

emphasis on vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Background

The Tikrit Location Command, located between the cities of Tikrit and Baiji, is one of 13 area 

support bases that are being established throughout Iraq.1 When completed, it should provide a 

fully functional and self-sufficient logistics complex for the Iraqi Army’s Fourth Division and 

other security forces in the Tikrit area. The completed project will provide billeting for 

approximately 1,000 troops, supply warehouses and other storage areas, repair and maintenance 

facilities, a dining facility, and other buildings. Location commands are part of a larger goal to 

develop logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Security Forces. For the project’s site layout, see 

Figure 1. 

 

1

 Tikrit is one of four newly constructed location commands. The other nine location commands are reconstruction 

and renovation projects. 
2 

Figure 1—Tikrit Location Command Site Plan 

Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers-Gulf Region North District 

The Tikrit Location Command contract (W91GY0-08-0027) was awarded as a sole source 

contract, as allowed under Section 886 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act.2

 Section 886 permits the use of other-than-competitive procedures to award a contract to a 

particular source from Iraq or Afghanistan if the product or service to be acquired is in support of 

military operations or stability operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Before using these 

procurement strategies, the Secretary of Defense must make a determination that the product or 

service being procured is to be used only by the military forces, police, or other security 

personnel of Iraq or Afghanistan, or that it is in the national security interest of the United States. 

SIGIR reviewed the available award documentation for the Tikrit Location Command contract 

and noted that it included adequate justification for the use of the procedures allowed under 

Section 886. Specifically, the award file contained a memo, dated March 28, 2008, from the 

Director for Defense Procurement, Acquisition Policy, and Strategic Sourcing in Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to the Commander, JCC-I/A, which delegated the authority and 

responsibility to make determinations required by Section 886(b). The file also contained two 

 

2

 Public Law 110-181, January 28, 2008. 
3 

determination-and-findings memos issued by JCC-I/A, which stated that the Tikrit Location 

Command will be used exclusively by the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Typically, the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a contracting officer to provide a detailed 

justification when using procurement mechanisms other than full and open competition. 

However, these justification requirements do not apply to procurements under Section 886.

The contract price has been modified twice: 

In September 2008, the construction of ammunition storage facilities was eliminated from 

the contract, reducing the contract price by $3,296,800. 

Also, in September 2008, modifications were made for additional roadways, parking 

areas, and lighting, increasing the price of the contract by $2,110,000. 

The net effect of these changes was to reduce the overall contract price from $38,994,630 to 

$37,807,830. 

In addition to these price changes, the period of performance for this contract has been extended 

four times, without an increase to the contract’s fixed price. The initial period of performance 

was 210 days after the contractor signed the notice to proceed. In August 2008, 17 days were 

added to the period of performance after the discovery of explosive ordnance at the construction 

site. In April 2009, 150 days were added to the period of performance based on a USACE 

government estimate of the time needed for construction required under the contract. Also, in 

April 2009, another 29 days were added for the installation of a well. Finally, in May 2009, the 

contractor was granted an additional 66 days based on requests for equitable adjustments for 

weather, holiday, and security delays. Key dates and events for the contract are shown in 

Table 1. 
4 

Table 1—Key Dates and Events for Contract W91GY0-08-C-0027 

Source: SIGIR Analysis of Contract Documents 

Responsible Organizations 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 

According to United Nations Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004), Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I) was to help build the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces and institutions through a 

program of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring. On June 28, 2004, 

MNSTC-I was established as a subordinate MNF-I organization to execute this mission. 

MNSTC-I’s mission is to help the GOI develop, organize, train, equip, and sustain the Iraqi 

Security Forces and ministries so they are capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable 

environment in which representative government, individual freedom, the rule of law, and free 

market economy can evolve, according to MNSTC-I’s 2007 Campaign Action Plan. The success 

of the mission will contribute to Iraq’s external security and the security of the Gulf region. 
5 

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) 

On November 4, 2004, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq was created to provide contracting 

services in support of Iraq relief and reconstruction.3 On July 6, 2005, its mission was expanded 

to include Afghanistan, and JCC-I became known as Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A).4

The mission of JCC-I/A in Iraq is to provide responsive and effective contracting support of vital 

supplies, services, and construction to the Chief of Mission and MNF-I. 

Gulf Region Division (GRD) 

Since March 2003, USACE has been involved in Iraq reconstruction, providing contingency 

engineering support through the deployment of field engineering teams and electricity and oil 

restoration task forces. To consolidate its Iraq operations under a single general officer and to 

provide long-term engineering support for military operations, USACE activated GRD in 

January 2004. GRD provides full-spectrum engineering and logistical services in support of 

civil/military construction in Iraq at its Baghdad headquarters and three districts: Gulf Region 

North (GRN), Gulf Region Central, and Gulf Region South. GRD also provides services to 

MNF-I and the GOI. 

Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Army (ITAM) 

ITAM’s mission is to advise and support the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in developing institutional 

capacity at a strategic level and a self-reliant and effective headquarters that can command, 

generate, and sustain the Iraqi Joint Forces in accordance with the approved National Military 

Strategy. ITAM advises and enables the Iraqi Joint Headquarters and Army to develop a 

professional, self-sustaining initial ground-defense force. 

Objectives

Our reporting objectives for this audit were to examine contract costs, outcomes, management 

oversight, and issues related to the transfer and sustainment of the project, with an emphasis on 

vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse.

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For a summary of contract costs by line-item number, see Appendix B. For 

acronyms used, see Appendix C. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix D. For 

MNSTC-I’s written response, see Appendix E. 

 

3

 Fragmentary Order 09-668, Contracting and Organizational Changes, ―Evolution of JCCI,‖ Army Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology, January-March 2006. 

4

 The mission was expanded in Fragmentary Order 09-270, Contracting and Organizational Changes, July 6, 2005. 
6 

Contract Cost and Outcome Goals Are Being 

Achieved 

As of May 31, 2009, the contractor appears to be meeting the contract’s cost estimates and 

desired construction outcomes. Funds are reportedly being disbursed commensurate with 

management’s estimate of the status of construction. GRN Program Managers estimate that 

overall construction is 78% complete; GRN managers and the contractor stated that construction 

will be completed by the end of the current period of performance, which is September 26, 2009. 

About $25.2 million of the $37.8 million—almost 67% of the modified contract price—has been 

disbursed to the contractor. Although we did not assess the quality of construction, we did 

observe that the building exteriors are mostly complete and that the contractor was working to 

complete the interiors and infrastructure and to add utilities. Strong management oversight 

practices contributed to the success of this project, including: 

considering the lessons learned from previous reconstruction projects in Iraq 

building to Iraqi capacity 

in-depth program and project management controls 

Costs Are Consistent with Work Performed 

As of May 31, 2009, the total modified value of the contract is $37,807,830. This amount is 

lower than the initial contract amount of $38,994,630 because two contract modifications 

affected cost. One modification removed the offices for ammunition personnel and the 

ammunition storage facilities from the contract, which decreased cost by $3,296,800. MNSTC-I 

officials told us that the Iraqis were not interested in having an armory at the Tikrit Location 

Command. Another modification added technical specifications to the roadways, parking lots, 

and lighting protection requirements, which increased costs by $2,100,000. The combined result 

was a net decrease of $1,186,800. 

As of May 2009, almost 67% ($25,158,693) of the total contract amount has been disbursed. 

Agency officials told SIGIR that they view present outcomes positively, and we note that 

disbursements correspond with reported construction progress. Table 2 summarizes reported 

construction status, obligations, and disbursements for selected contract line items. 
7 

Table 2—Comparison of Costs Incurred Through May 2009 to Work Performed 

Source: SIGIR observations during site visit, GRN data, and SIGIR analysis of GRN data. 

Table 2 compares the reported percentage complete to the percent disbursed. This analysis 

shows that for the larger line items, construction is near or ahead of amounts disbursed for the 

line item. The Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) informed us that in those cases 

where disbursements are higher than construction status, the situation is likely due to the 

purchase of materials necessary before construction can proceed. For example, steel purchases 

are a significant portion of the contract line item for a steel framed building. In total, nearly 67% 

of the contract price has been disbursed; nevertheless, as of May 2009, the project is 78% 

complete, according to the bi-weekly, line item by line item assessment prepared by GRN. 

Based on GRN’s assessment of construction status, it appears likely that sufficient funds will be 

available for the remaining work. 

MNSTC-I officials have stated that they do not believe that the contract cost will increase 

significantly; however, final costs have not yet been determined. Price stability can be attributed 

largely to the fact that firm-fixed-price contracts place maximum risk and responsibility for costs 

on the contractor. Generally, firm-fixed-price contracts provide maximum incentive for the 

contractor to control costs and perform effectively. 

To attempt to verify whether the negotiated, firm-fixed-price was appropriate, we reviewed 

documents related to the contract’s award and price negotiations. We noted that JCC-I/A 

compared the contractor’s proposal to an independent government estimate and other proposals 

received for similar work. We also noted that the independent government estimate was 

questionable, and the price range that JCC-I/A used during negotiations with the contractor 

seemed wide—$31.0 million minimum, $46.3 million maximum. Nevertheless, the contract 

price of just under $39 million was in line with the three other new-build location commands—

Al Shaiba ($42.7 million), Al Memona ($35.9 million), and Al Ghizlani ($32.4 million)—and it 

was also in line with most of the proposals JCC-I/A received for similar work. Based on this 
8 

information and our observations of construction completed to date and the costs to date, the 

price appears to be reasonable. 

Contract Objectives Are Being Achieved 

The Tikrit Location Command contract is a firm-fixed-price contract that required the contractor 

to prepare detailed design plans based on an initial U.S. government-supplied site plan and to 

build the location command. The plan includes approximately 62 buildings, necessary utilities, 

and other improvements to support a 1,000-man facility. The site Program Manager and COR 

stated that the project started slowly, primarily because the contractor took longer than 

anticipated to design the project, but construction is now going well. Most of the buildings 

provided under this contract are shells with finish work kept to a minimum; farm-grade fixtures 

were used in many applications. Figure 2 is an aerial view of the Tikrit Location Command. 

Figure 2—Aerial View of the Tikrit Location Command 

Source: GRN 

SIGIR visited the Tikrit Location Command on May 27, 2009. SIGIR did not conduct an 

engineering assessment of construction quality during the visit; however, SIGIR plans to conduct 

such an assessment in the near future. At the time of our visit, we noted that concrete work and 

most building exteriors were complete and that the contractor was installing wiring and running 

power lines to the buildings. In the billeting structures, flooring was complete, and framing for 

drop ceilings was in place. Workers were in the process of installing electrical conduit and 

outlets. Figure 3 shows the interior of enlisted and non-commissioned officer billeting. 
9 

Figure 3—Interior of Enlisted and Non-commissioned Officer Billets 

Source: SIGIR photo from site visit 

During our site visit, we also noted that latrine construction was underway. Concrete block walls 

were in place and the plumbing was partially installed, but concrete flooring, doors, windows, 

and interior finish remained to be completed. Figure 4 below shows the exterior and interior of a 

latrine. 

Figure 4—Example of the exterior and interior construction status of latrines 

Source: SIGIR photo from site visit 

Also, during our site visit we noted that the contractor was in the process of installing street 

lights and power lines, erecting fresh water tanks, and welding fuel tanks. Six diesel generators 

were on site but had not yet been installed. Similarly, a reverse-osmosis water treatment plant 

was on site but had not yet been installed. Also, the well for a water supply had not yet been 

drilled. Figure 5 shows the six diesel generators and construction of fuel tanks. 
10 

Figure 5—Diesel Generators and Fuel Tanks 

Source: SIGIR photo from site visit 

The original 210-day period of performance for construction has been extended four times 

through contract modifications. The period of performance was extended for various reasons, 

primarily because of a government estimate that provided a more realistic period of performance. 

After all modifications to the contract, the current period of performance is 472 days. Although 

a considerable amount of work remains to be done, the Project Manager, COR, and the 

contractor believe that the project will be completed by the end of the current period of 

performance. 
11 

Program, Project, and Contract Management Were 

Strong 

Program, project, and contract management controls were in place at the beginning of this 

contract and improved over time. This resulted in the identification and remediation of a number 

of construction deficiencies and the continuing progress of the project. Program and project 

management have succeeded on this contract due to effective planning, commitment of 

resources, on-site representatives, a good working relationship with the contractor, and a periodic 

reporting process that provides informational awareness. In written comments on a draft of this 

report, MNSTC-I attributed the success of the project to a secure environment at the construction 

site, the short distance between the GRN resident office and the construction site, and 

unrestricted access to the construction site. 

Effective Program and Project Management Controls Were Used 

GRN put an effective on-site Quality Assurance (QA) system in place that used from one to four 

local nationals as on-site representatives and the COR as reviewer. As of May 2009, at least two 

and as many as four QA representatives were on site every day. The COR was located near the 

project site and made regular site visits. The COR received daily reports from the QA 

representatives and reviewed progress reports and contractor invoices for receipt of goods and 

services and percentage complete. We noted instances where the COR challenged the 

contractor’s billed amounts and occasionally returned invoices for correction. The COR signed 

off on contractor invoices prior to payment. Detailed records were maintained documenting the 

QA process. 

The QA process was successful in identifying construction deficiencies, which were corrected 

without an increase in the contract’s fixed price. For example, block-and-mortar latrines were 

found to be construction-deficient so the contractor was required to demolish and rebuild them. 

QA representatives noted another deficiency—the quality of concrete being delivered. The 

drivers would add water en route, causing inconsistent batches. To remedy the situation, the 

contractor switched to small on-site batch processing. 

In addition to the local COR, a local Program Manager works with the COR and liaisons with the 

MNSTC-I Program Manager. This allows the COR to easily elevate issues, such as safety and 

construction deficiencies, to the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and MNSTC-I 

officials. For example, the ACO issued a stop-work order when the contractor failed to 

implement safety standards and lifted the order as soon as the contractor took corrective action. 

Also, the local Program Manager prepares weekly project status reports for MNSTC-I officials. 

The MNSTC-I Program Manager regularly communicates with and receives weekly project 

status reports from the local GRN Program Manager. The MNSTC-I Program Manager reviews 

these reports and prepares a monthly status briefing for ITAM. 

In written comments on a draft of this report MNSTC-I highlighted conditions which contributed 

to the success of the project. MNSTC-I indicated that the construction site is located in a 
12 

relatively secure environment, which permitted government personnel to spend extended time 

on-site. During the time on-site, the government personnel could identify construction 

deficiencies and educate the contractor on quality standards. In addition, the short distance 

between the GRN resident office and the location command facilitated more timely and 

numerous site visits, which, according to MNSTC-I, improved construction oversight and 

allowed for better mentorship of the contractor. MNSTC-I also attributed site access as a factor 

that contributed to the success of the project. Construction sites that are on active Iraqi Army or 

Iraqi Police installations may have access restrictions that impact material deliveries or 

contractor personnel. MNSTC-I indicated that free movement at the Tikrit Location Command 

construction site allowed the contractor to execute construction as planned. See Appendix E for 

MNSTC-I’s written response. 

Effective Contract Management Processes Were Used 

For this contract, JCC-I/A’s MNSTC-I Support Division used a centralized file management 

system to maintain key contracting documents and correspondence. We reviewed the files and 

noted that they were well organized with checklists and tables of contents. Centralizing the 

contract documents provides a number of benefits: 

allows for better transition when there is a change in contracting officials 

provides a basis for decisions in the acquisition process 

supports actions taken 

provides information for reviews and investigations 

To date, there have been only nine modifications to the contract. Other reconstruction contracts 

in Iraq have been modified more than 100 times, significantly increasing the value of the 

contract. 

We also noted that the ACO is located close to the project and works closely with the GRN 

Program Manager and COR. The ACO reviews periodic program and project management 

reports. Being located close to the project and working with program and project management 

expedites contracting actions, such as the suspension of work that occurred briefly on this 

contract. 

Lessons Learned Have Been Implemented 

SIGIR has long reported on the importance of implementing lessons learned. In March 2009, 

MNSTC-I promulgated as official policy the best practices in construction gathered over the past 

year. Several of these lessons learned pertain to building only to the user’s capacity and ability 

to maintain and operate the facility. For example, one lesson recommends the use of simple 

high-strength plumbing fixtures in barracks and gravity-fed water storage so that water will be 

available during a power failure. MNSTC-I requested that GRD and its subordinate districts 

implement the MNSTC-I lesson learned for all contracts under development and future contracts. 

MNSTC-I also requested that the GRD districts notify MNSTC-I of the cost and schedule 
13 

impacts, if any, to implement the lessons for contracts that were already under development, 

such as the Tikrit location command contract. 

Both the MNSTC-I Program Manager and the COR expressed the importance of implementing 

lessons learned. Our review found that the GRN program manager was required to report to 

MNSTC-I on the status of 61 lessons learned.5 GRN identified 53 of the 61 lessons learned as 

applicable to the Tikrit Location Command; of these, GRN reported that all but five had been 

implemented. Examples of lessons learned that have been implemented include: 

Consider placement and number of exterior lighting in conjunction with neighboring 

buildings. 

Back-up power should only be provided for mission critical facilities. 

Electrical wiring of buildings must ensure proper bounding. 

Load bearing masonry walls require vertical steel reinforcement. 

Contractors must have a comprehensive quality control plan. 

The GRN’s efforts to implement MNSTC-I’s lessons learned appear to have had a positive 

impact on construction outcomes at the Tikrit Location Command. 

 

5

 The MNSTC-I policy contained additional lessons, which were not included in GRN’s lessons learned status 

report. For example, MNSTC-I’s policy included, but GRN’s report to MNSTC-I did not include, the lesson to use 

simple charcoal filtering, chlorination, ultraviolet water treatment systems instead of reverse-osmosis units. 
14 

Transfer and Sustainment Issues Are Being Addressed 

MNSTC-I has made efforts to involve GOI officials in the project, and their involvement has 

increased over the life of the project. Specific changes to the project have been made at the 

GOI’s request, which should help ensure the successful transfer of the project. MNSTC-I and 

ITAM officials have procedures in place to facilitate the transfer. The major equipment systems 

will require continued maintenance for the location command to achieve its full capacity. The 

contract contains requirements for the contractor to provide classroom training for the major 

equipment systems; it also requires the contractor to warrant all equipment, material, and 

workmanship and to provide operations and maintenance on all installed equipment for 12 

months after contract completion. The impact of these efforts remains to be seen, and it is up to 

the GOI to make the most of the U.S. investment. 

GOI Input on Project Design Appears To Be Helping the Transfer 

Process 

At the onset of the project, Iraqi officials had limited involvement in the Tikrit Location 

Command project; however GOI involvement increased over the life of the project. A key Iraqi 

official we interviewed reported that initially there was no Iraqi involvement in the project’s 

design. A senior ITAM official we interviewed stated that GOI officials did pick the location 

command construction sites. In January 2009, MNSTC-I held the first of three design review 

meetings in which Iraqi Army logistics officials were provided the opportunity to review the 

location commands’ design plans and recommend changes. When the design review meeting 

was held for the Tikrit Location Command, construction had already begun. Nevertheless, the 

meeting culminated in specific changes that will be made at the GOI’s request, such as relocating

a parking lot to a site adjacent to the repair and maintenance company facility. 

Iraqi input extended beyond these design review meetings. For example, a senior Iraqi logistics 

official responsible for the location commands told SIGIR that he specifically requested the 

water treatment system for installation at the site. In addition, during our site visit, one of the 

contractor’s principals told SIGIR that an Iraqi Army official visits the site on a fairly regular 

basis to observe the status of construction. 

MNSTC-I is currently negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the GOI that would 

grant Ministry of Defense engineers access to the location command sites still under construction 

and would give them a formal means for providing feedback and making recommendations, 

among other agreements, such as providing access to QA training materials. Given the amount 

of construction that has already been completed, the memorandum of understanding will likely 

not affect the Tikrit Location Command significantly, yet MNSTC-I officials believe it will have 

a positive impact on the other location commands. 

To gain GOI’s perspective on transfer and sustainment, we met with a key Iraqi official 

responsible for location commands. The official spoke favorably of the memorandum of 

understanding, which would allow an Iraqi engineer to participate in the on-site construction 

process. The Iraqi official also said that the Iraqi Security Forces are ready to take ownership of 
15 

the location command once construction is complete. Currently, soldiers are living in the desert 

in tents awaiting completion of construction. 

Successful Transition and Sustainment Depends on Implementation 

of Existing Plans 

MNSTC-I officials told SIGIR that a process is in place to transfer the Tikrit Location Command 

to the Iraqis after it is completed. Letters are generally sent 90 days and 30 days prior to contract 

completion to alert the GOI that the project is nearing completion, and a recognition letter is 

signed by an appropriate GOI official when the project transitions. After transfer, the GOI is to 

supply most of the equipment to make the location command functional.6

 

ITAM and MNSTC-I officials also said that they have a number of plans to help the Iraqi 

Security Forces transition into the site. For example, once construction is complete, a logistics 

military advisory team will be located at the site; its main function will be to advise the 

commander of the Iraqi location command. A logistics training assistance team will also be 

formed to provide focused training, and ITAM officials will conduct capability assessments to 

track the GOI’s progress in base services, water treatment, and other areas. 

Several project sustainment issues remain but are being addressed by program officials. The 

Tikrit Location Command initially will be powered by a centralized group of six generators, 

which were being installed when SIGIR visited the construction site. During the time that the 

generators serve as the main source of power, fuel availability will directly impact the location 

command’s activities. The Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Defense have established 

an agreement to connect the location commands to the national electric grid; nevertheless, as of 

June 2009, the initial utility assessment had not yet been conducted for the Tikrit Location 

Command, and the funding source to connect the location command to the grid has not been 

determined. MNSTC-I officials said that coalition funds might be used to assist the Iraqis in 

installing electrical power at the site. 

Training in maintaining the electrical power system and the reverse-osmosis water treatment 

system also still must be conducted. The contractor is required to provide classroom training for 

the major systems; additionally, MNSTC-I officials said they plan to provide supplemental 

training on the water treatment system. When asked whether the GOI would fund periodic 

maintenance and repairs to keep the facility operating, the Iraqi official we interviewed 

responded that the GOI would fund needed maintenance and repair costs. 

 

6 One exception is the equipment to be used in the medical clinic, which will be provided through a separate, U.S.-

funded effort. 
16 

Conclusion and Lesson Learned 

Conclusion 

Notwithstanding unforeseen events, it appears that the Iraqi Army will receive the logistics 

complex that was envisioned at the outset of the contract, and costs will likely be in line with the 

contract amount. Effective program, project, and contract management practices and the 

implementation of lessons learned have contributed to the project’s positive outcomes to this 

point. Further, involvement of GOI in the decision and implementation process of this project 

helped to create a sense of ownership and to help accomplish the transfer process. MNSTC-I’s 

asset transfer plan and ITAM’s military advisory and training assistance teams have set the 

framework to provide the GOI with the continued guidance and assistance needed to ensure 

sustainment of the project. Taken together, all of these efforts have reduced overall program risk 

and helped to protect this U.S. reconstruction investment. 

Lessons Learned 

As SIGIR has previously identified in other reconstruction projects, involving GOI officials in 

the design and construction phases of projects that they will ultimately use contributes to GOI 

acceptance of and commitment to the project. Further, requiring project managers to implement 

lessons learned from other reconstruction projects helps to achieve better overall program 

management and outcomes. Iraq lessons should be shared with reconstruction project managers 

in Afghanistan. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

Since SIGIR did not make recommendations in this report, no management comments were 

required. However, MNSTC-I provided written comments, which we incorporated in the body of 

the report as appropriate and included in Appendix E, and ITAM provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated. 
17 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 9017 in April 

2009 to examine contract costs, outcomes, and management oversight of a firm-fixed-price 

construction contract, W91GY0-08-C-0027, awarded to construct a location command in Tikrit, 

Iraq. The audit also addresses the GOI’s involvement in the project and information related to 

the transfer and sustainment of the location command. 

To provide information on the costs of the project, we reviewed documents supporting the 

contract award process, price negotiations, subsequent modifications to the contract, and 

payment data. To determine contract line-item obligations and disbursements through May 

2009, we used data that the local program manager provided from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) financial management system, which we compared to and found consistent 

with payment documents in the contract files. 

To determine the outcome of the project and assess project and contract oversight, we visited the 

construction site on May 27, 2009, where we observed the progress to date and spoke with one 

of the prime contractor’s principals. We did not evaluate the adequacy of the location 

command’s construction; SIGIR’s inspections team will perform a subsequent analysis. In 

addition to the site visit, we reviewed the contract, modifications, quality control reports and 

plans, quality assurance reports and plan, program management reports, and other documents 

related to contract outcome and oversight, such as correspondence between the relevant 

contracting officials, program management officials, and the contractor. We also interviewed 

relevant officials from Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan, Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Iraq Training and Advisory Mission—Army (ITAM), 

and Gulf Region Division North District, and we questioned the current and former Contracting 

Officer’s Representatives. 

To provide information on Iraqi involvement in the project and information related to the transfer 

and sustainment of the location command, we reviewed related documents and interviewed 

appropriate MNSTC-I and ITAM officials. We also interviewed the Iraqi official responsible for 

location commands. 

We performed this audit under authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended. We conducted this review from May 2008 through July 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We used computer-processed data minimally to perform this audit. To determine contract lineitem obligations and disbursements through May 2009, we used data that the local program 
18 

manager provided from USACE’s financial management system, which we compared to and 

found consistent with payment documents in the contract files. Accordingly, we determined that it 

was not necessary to perform substantive testing of the reliability of the computer-processed data.

Internal Controls 

We identified and reviewed internal controls used in managing and administering the contract. 

Our review included controls related to the contract award and program management oversight. 

To conduct this review, we examined documents in the contract file, such as quality assurance 

reports, and held discussions with key oversight officials for insight on internal controls. We did not 

examine the contractor’s internal management and financial controls. We presented the results of 

our review in the body of this report. 

Related Reports by SIGIR 

Prior SIGIR reports relevant to this audit are identified below and can be accessed at the SIGIR 

website http://www.sigir.mil. 

Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight 

Problems, SIGIR-09-014, April 26, 2009. 

Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraqi Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown and 

Root Services, SIGIR-09-008, January 13, 2009. 

Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Governance Program Contracts with Research Triangle,

SIGIR-09-003, October 21, 2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,

SIGIR-08-019, July 28, 2008. 

Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC,

SIGIR-08-018, July 15, 2008. 
19 

Appendix B—Contract Costs by Line Item 

Summary of obligations, amount disbursed, and comparison of percent disbursed to percent 

complete, as of May 31, 2009. 

Source: GRN Payment Records and Biweekly Project Status Reports 
20 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

ACRONYM DESCRIPTION

ACO Administrative Contracting Officer

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative

GOI Government of Iraq

GRD U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division

GRN Gulf Region Division North District

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

ITAM Iraq Training and Advisory Mission—Army 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

P.L. Public Law

QA Quality Assurance

QC Quality Control

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
21 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Paula A. Braun 

Richard R. Kusman 

Nancee K. Needham 
22 

Appendix E—Management Comments 
23 
24 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective:

oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations

advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse

information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil).

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline:

Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html

Phone: 703-602-4063

Toll Free: 866-301-2003

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg

Assistant Inspector General for 

Congressional Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-604-0368

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil

Public Affairs Daniel Kopp

Assistant Inspector General for Public Affairs

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Phone: 703-428-1217

Fax: 703-428-0818

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil