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56–145 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–810 

THE FORT HOOD ATTACK: A PRELIMINARY 

ASSESSMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 19, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

GORDON N. LEDERMAN, Counsel 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member 

SEAMUS A. HUGHES, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

IVY A. JOHNSON, Minority Senior Counsel 

JOHN K. GRANT, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 26 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 29 

Senator Ensing ................................................................................................. 32 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 43 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 45 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 47 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 48 

Senator Bennett ................................................................................................ 49 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2009 

General John M. Keane, USA, Retired, Former Vice Chief of Staff of the 

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 5 

Frances Fragos Townsend, Former Assistant to President George W. Bush 

for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ................................................... 7 

Mitchell D. Silber, Director of Intelligence Analysis, New York City Police 

Department ........................................................................................................... 11 

Hon. Juan Carlos Zarate, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism .................................................................................................. 15 

Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser, RAND Corporation ............................... 20 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Jenkins, Brian Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 72 

Keane, General John M., USA, Retired: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Silber, Mitchell D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

Townsend, Frances Fragos: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Zarate, Hon. Juan Carlos: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

APPENDIX 

Statement submitted for the Record from Alejandro J. Beutel, Government 

Liaison, Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), November 18, 2009, with 

attached report and handbook ............................................................................ 77 


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THE FORT HOOD ATTACK: A PRELIMINARY 

ASSESSMENT 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Pryor, McCaskill, 

Collins, McCain, Ensign, and Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. This 

morning, our Committee begins an investigation as serious and 

consequential as any it has ever undertaken. An American soldier, 

Major Nidal Malik Hasan, has been charged with killing 12 of his 

fellow soldiers and one civilian on an American military base in 

Texas in what I believe, based on available evidence, was a terrorist attack. 

The purpose of this Committee’s investigation is to determine 

whether that attack could have been prevented, whether the Federal agencies and employees involved missed signals or failed to 

connect dots in a way that enabled Major Hasan to carry out his 

deadly attack. If we find such errors or negligence, we will make 

recommendations to guarantee as best we can that they never 

occur again. That is our purpose here. 

We are conducting this investigation because we believe it is our 

responsibility to do so according to law and Senate rules. We are 

both the Homeland Security Committee and, over the long term, 

the Governmental Affairs Committee, which under the rules has a 

special responsibility to conduct oversight of Executive Branch actions, particularly when, as in this case, there are questions about 

those actions. We know it will be very difficult to fulfill our Committee’s responsibility without the cooperation of the Executive 

Branch. 

Yesterday, I want to report, I spoke with Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates and Attorney General Eric Holder and asked their cooperation in allowing the bipartisan staff of this Committee to 

interview relevant individuals in their Departments and obtain relevant documents as part of this investigation of the murders at 

Fort Hood, Texas. Secretary Gates and Attorney General Holder 

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tigation and wanted to work out an understanding in which they 

could cooperate so long as our investigation did not hamper or compromise the criminal investigation and prosecution of the accused 

murderer Major Hasan. 

I assured them that our Committee understood and respected the 

difference between their criminal investigation and our congressional investigation. Their criminal investigation is to bring an accused to justice. Our congressional investigation is to learn whether 

the Federal Government or any of its employees could have acted 

in a way that would have prevented these murders from occurring. 

Their investigation in one sense looks backward and is punitive; 

ours looks forward and is preventive. 

I am optimistic that we will work out a way for both investigations to proceed without compromising either. Our staffs will be 

meeting with representatives of the Departments of Justice and 

Defense very soon to try to work out ground rules for both investigations without interfering with each other. 

But I can say that I am encouraged and appreciative that Senator Collins and I, and our top-level staff, have received one classified briefing on Major Hasan’s case and will soon receive another 

and have been given access to some very relevant classified documents relating to this matter. So we are off to a good, cooperative 

start. And we are going to be insistent about this because it really 

is our responsibility to do so. 

At the conclusion of our investigation, we will issue a report and 

recommendations. I want to make clear this morning that we intend to carry out this investigation with respect for the thousands 

of Muslim-Americans who are serving in the American military 

with honor and the millions of other patriotic, law-abiding Muslims 

who live in our country. But we do no favor to all of our fellow 

Americans who are Muslim by ignoring real evidence that a small 

number of their community have, in fact, become violent Islamists 

and extremists. 

It seems to me here at the outset, and based on what we know 

now, that there are three basic areas of importance in which our 

Committee in this investigation will want to gather facts and draw 

conclusions. 

First, if, as seems to be the case, there were colleagues of Major 

Hasan in the U.S. Army who heard him say things or watched him 

do things that raised concerns in their minds about his mental stability and/or his political extremism, the question is: Were those 

concerns conveyed up the chain of command? And were they recorded anywhere in Major Hasan’s personnel files? And did the 

Army do anything in response to those concerns? 

Second, what information did the Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

(JTTF) headed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 

about Major Hasan, including transcripts of e-mails which he had 

with a subject of investigation that the FBI acknowledged publicly 

it had in its possession? Acknowledgment came last week. What 

judgments were made about those e-mails? Was any attempt made 

to investigate Major Hasan further after his e-mail traffic with the 

subject of an ongoing Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation was 

intercepted? 


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And, third, was the information which the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force had on Major Hasan shared with anyone in the U.S. Army, 

the Department of Defense, or anyone else in our government? 

Those to me are three central questions, though by no means all 

the questions, we will pursue painstakingly and answer as completely as we can before we reach conclusions and make recommendations. 

This morning, we are really grateful to have with us to help us 

consider both those questions and others a very experienced and 

thoughtful panel of witnesses, with experience in terrorism, 

counterterrorism, law enforcement, and the military. We have 

asked our witnesses to give us their first reactions to what we 

know of the murders at Fort Hood and to what we know of the accused murderer, Major Hasan, based on the publicly available evidence. I also hope that they will offer us their advice about what 

other questions our investigation should raise regarding the focus 

of our inquiry, which is the conduct of employees of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, or any other Federal 

agency or department. 

I really want to thank the witnesses for being here, and I look 

forward to your testimony, which I am confident will get this Committee’s investigation off to exactly the right start. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, let me begin this morning by saluting you for 

your leadership and for your courage in proceeding with this investigation and these hearings. I can think of no more important task 

for this Committee to undertake. 

In investigating the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 

9/11 Commission led by Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton discovered 

vital information scattered throughout the government, confined by 

agency silos, that might have prevented the deaths and destruction 

of that terrible day if only the dots had been connected. 

In the wake of the mass murder at Fort Hood, we once again 

confront a troubling question: Was this another failure to connect 

the dots? 

Much has been done since September 11, 2001, to respond to the 

failures exposed by those attacks. We created the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), additional Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces, and fusion centers. We revised information-sharing policies 

and promoted greater cooperation among intelligence agencies and 

law enforcement. And the results have been significant. Terrorist 

plots, both at home and abroad, have been thwarted. The recent arrest of Najibullah Zazi demonstrates the tremendous benefits of information sharing and joint efforts by the NCTC and other intelligence agencies as well as Federal, State, and local law enforcement. 

But the shootings at Fort Hood may indicate that communications failures and poor judgment calls can defeat the systems intended to ensure that vital information is shared to protect our 

country and its citizens. This case also raises questions about 

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mate dissemination of information, making it too difficult to connect the dots that would have allowed a clear picture of the threat 

to emerge. These are the overarching questions that we will explore 

with our expert witnesses today. 

Our ongoing investigation will also seek answers to questions 

specific to the Fort Hood case. For example, how did our intelligence community and law enforcement agencies handle intercepted communications between Major Hasan and a radical cleric 

who was a known al-Qaeda associate? Did they contact anyone in 

Major Hasan’s chain of command to relay concerns? Did they seek 

to interview Major Hasan himself? 

When Major Hasan reportedly began to openly question the oath 

that he had taken to support and defend the Constitution of the 

United States, did anyone in his military chain of command intervene? When Major Hasan in his presentation at Walter Reed in 

2007 recommended that the Department of Defense allow ‘‘Muslim 

soldiers the option of being released as conscientious objectors to 

increase troop morale and decrease adverse events,’’ did his colleagues and superior officers view this statement as a red flag? 

Were numerous warning signs ignored because the Army faces a 

severe shortage of psychiatrists and because the Army was concerned, as the Chief of Staff has subsequently put it, about a backlash against Muslim soldiers? 

These are all troubling questions that we will seek to answer. 

For nearly 4 years, this Committee has been investigating the 

threat of homegrown terrorism. We have explored radicalization in 

our prisons, the cycle of violent radicalization, and how the Internet can act as a virtual terrorist training camp. We have warned 

that individuals within the United States can be inspired by alQaeda’s violent ideology to plan and execute attacks even if they 

do not receive any direct orders from al-Qaeda to do so. And we 

have learned of the difficulty of detecting lone-wolf terrorists. 

To prevent future homegrown terrorist attacks, we must better 

understand why law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and our 

military personnel system may have failed in this case. Major 

Hasan’s attack targeted innocent civilians and soldiers, regardless 

of their religious faith. The patriotic soldiers and citizens of all 

faiths who were injured and killed, not on a foreign battleground 

but, rather, on what should have been safe and secure American 

territory, deserve a thorough investigation. 

With so many questions still swirling around this heinous attack, 

it is important for our Nation to understand what happened so that 

we may work to prevent future incidents. We owe that to our 

troops, to their families and communities, and to all the American 

people. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, 

for that excellent opening statement. 

We will now go to the witnesses and begin with Jack Keane, retired General of the U.S. Army, former Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army. We are honored to have him here, a decorated American soldier, who in particular has relevant experience here about which 

I hope General Keane will testify. He was commander of the base 

at Fort Bragg right after a soldier with white extremist views was 

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1The prepared statement of General Keane appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

ence I think informs his view of this incident, and, of course, we 

would welcome his reflections on that and the broader issue of extremism in the military and how we hope the Army has handled 

this situation. 

General Keane, it is a great honor to have you here, and we welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA, RETIRED,1

FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Members of the Committee. I truly appreciate you inviting me here 

to testify this morning on a subject of such national importance 

which directly affects the security of the American people and in 

this case, equally or more important, our soldiers and their families. 

How painfully and devastatingly ironic that our soldiers were 

gunned down at Fort Hood while preparing to deploy overseas to 

fight jihadist extremism. As we are rapidly becoming aware, the 

preliminary reports suggest that Major Hasan himself is a jihadist 

extremist as he indicated during the act of shooting our soldiers by 

crying out the jihadist refrain, ‘‘Allahu akbar.’’ It appears likely 

that Major Hasan’s targets and his radical beliefs are directly related as he chose to kill those who were destined to fight jihadist 

extremism. 

We all welcome the investigations that the Army, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other 

agencies of government, and this Congress are conducting to determine who was Major Hasan; what were the patterns of his behavior and attitude; what did we know about what appears to be his 

extremist beliefs; how did we share that information, and what actions did we take or fail to take as a result; and, most definitely, 

what must we do to prevent such incidents in the future? 

The Department of Defense has a longstanding policy of intolerance for organizations, practices, or activities that are discriminatory or extremist in nature. This policy was updated in 1986 as a 

result of service member participation in supremacist activities and 

again in 1996 after two Army soldiers committed two racially motivated murders at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, resulting in the 

death of two African-Americans and prompting a DOD review of 

the 1986 policy and a subsequent revision in 1996. In fact, the 

Army issued a pamphlet titled ‘‘Extremist Activities’’ as a result of 

that incident. 

I took command of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps 

weeks after that incident occurred, and there was much that we 

learned that eventually became Army policy. First and foremost, 

we were tolerating racially motivated skinheads who were in our 

units at Fort Bragg. When extremism occurs in a unit, there is a 

natural tendency for soldiers to pull away from it because it is so 

disturbing to their beliefs and to the beliefs of the Army. As such, 

it can often polarize a unit and directly affect its cohesion, morale, 

and capability to perform at a very high standard. 


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What we found at Fort Bragg is that our policies were not clear 

in identifying what extremist behavior was—in this case, tattoos, 

specific dress, racial rhetoric, Nazi symbols, etc. As a result, racial 

extremists were allowed to exist in our units. Twenty-one soldiers 

were eventually eliminated from the service for exhibiting such behavior—unfortunately, all after the racially motivated murders 

were committed. Two soldiers were tried and convicted for these 

murders. 

The Army investigation determined that we needed to update our 

policies and, equally important, educate Army soldiers and leaders 

on the patterns of behavior and signs and symbols of racially motivated extremism. Those policies require soldiers and leaders to 

identify such behavior and to report it so that commanders can 

take appropriate action. 

Commanders’ options are numerous, from counseling, efficiency 

reporting, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or legal actions, and involuntary separation. Our commanders then and now 

have full authority by Army policy to ‘‘prohibit military personnel 

from engaging in or participating in activities that the commander 

determines will adversely affect good order and discipline.’’ 

I suspect strongly that after we conduct these investigations, we 

will find that our policies will need revision again to account for 

the specific behavior and attitudes as expressed by radical 

Islamists or jihadist extremists. It should not be an act of moral 

courage for a soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is displaying 

extremist behavior. It should be an obligation. And as such, the 

commanders need specific guidelines as to what jihadist extremist 

behavior is and re-emphasize how to use the many tools and options they have at their disposal to curb the behavior, to rehabilitate soldiers, if possible, or to take legal or separation action. Because jihadist extremists are potentially linked to terrorist organizations that directly threaten the security of the United States, it 

is essential that our government agencies are sharing information 

about such individuals. 

What has been in the media these last few days about Major 

Hasan and his behavior, if determined to be true, is very disturbing. There are allegations such as justifying suicide bombing 

on the Internet, lecturing fellow soldiers using jihadist rhetoric, 

warning about adverse events if Muslims were not allowed to leave 

military service, repeatedly seeking counsel from a radical Imam 

Anwar al-Awlaki with well-known ties to al-Qaeda, attempting to 

convert some of his patients who were suffering from stress disorders to his distorted view of Islam—and, finally, was the FBI 

sharing with the Army what it knew about Major Hasan and alAwlaki, and was the Army sharing what it knew about Major 

Hasan with the FBI? 

While these patterns are preliminary and will be confirmed by 

the investigations that are being conducted, it is very similar to 

what we experienced at Fort Bragg in the late 1990s where we 

were wrongfully tolerating extremists in our organization who had 

displayed a pattern of behavior that put them at odds with the values and character of the Army. 

Let me conclude by saying that the incident and Major Hasan’s 

behavior is not about Muslims, and their religion, who are a part 


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of the fabric of American life, respected and assimilated into every 

aspect of American society, nor is it about the 10,000 Muslims in 

the military who, quite frankly, are not seen as Muslims but as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Their contribution, their commitment, and their sacrifice is not only appreciated, it is honored. 

This is fundamentally about jihadist extremism, which is at odds 

with the values of America and its military and threatens the safety and security of the American people. 

I was in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and felt up close 

the horror of this extremism, as the Army lost more soldiers and 

civilians that day than any day in the last 8 years of war. I know 

our soldiers and families at Fort Hood are stung by this tragedy 

because their friends and loved ones were killed simply because of 

who they are and what they stand for. They were committed to defend this Nation against the very extremism that killed them. 

Radical Islam and jihadist extremism is the most transformational issue I have dealt with in my military service and continues to be so today. In my judgment, it is the most significant 

threat to the security of the American people that I have faced in 

my lifetime. We are a society that espouses tolerance and values 

diversity, and our military reflects those values. But at the same 

time, we must know what a threat looks like, and we must know 

what to do about it. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, General Keane, for that clear, 

strong, principled, and, for myself, stirring statement. I appreciate 

it very much. 

We are honored next to have Fran Townsend with us, former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. We are really grateful to have you here to put this case into 

the context of your experience in the field of counterterrorism generally, so please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, FORMER ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH FOR HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins, 

thank you. It is really a privilege to be here with you today. 

After more than 20 years in the government, most of it as a prosecutor and a Justice Department lawyer, the one thing I think we 

know for sure is that things always look clearer looking back than 

when you are in the heat of battle. So as you well understand, I 

caution the American people to remember that imperfect knowledge and facts in the heat of the investigation often result in less 

than perfect judgments and less than perfect knowledge. And I applaud the effort of the Committee to understand how can we make 

that knowledge, in the heat of the investigation, better so that we 

can ensure better judgments and better action. 

I can say I conducted many such reviews during my time in government. Probably the most well known publicly was the Katrina 

Lessons Learned. What I have found more often than not is that 

in the wake of a national tragedy, while we typically look for single 

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temic weaknesses and systemic failures, and so the importance of 

your work in identifying those so that we can fix them. 

When we look at this particular incident, I, as others I think, 

without knowing all of the facts, come away with many questions. 

I break them down into three distinct areas: First, collection; second, law enforcement and the Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation; and, third, the military. Let me start with collection. 

While we must rely at the moment on public reports, what we 

understand is that there were lawfully intercepted communications 

in an unrelated terrorism investigation. As a result of that unrelated investigation, the intelligence community identified less than 

two dozen communications culled from this unrelated investigation 

that had more than 20,000 communications. 

I must say to you, that is an extraordinary accomplishment on 

the part of the FBI and would not likely have occurred prior to 

September 11, 2001. We must acknowledge what that suggests, 

and that is, a stronger, more capable FBI determined to protect us, 

and that is to be commended. 

Second, I look at the law enforcement and the JTTF investigation. To evaluate that, it is difficult without understanding several 

things. First, the content of the communications they were looking 

at, they remain classified and the subject of the ongoing investigation. Second, when the JTTF investigators looked at those communications, what did they look at them against? What information 

did they have access to at the time that they evaluated those communications? And then, third, once they had that information on 

the JTTF and made a judgment, whether we ultimately agree with 

the judgments that were made there or not, what did they do to 

share that information with individuals who could have taken action outside of a law enforcement context, presumably the U.S. 

military? 

Let me start with content, and while I cannot speak to the specific content of Major Hasan’s communications, here is what we do 

know about al-Awlaki from the 9/11 Commission report. Al-Awlaki 

in late 2000 was an imam in San Diego where also at that same 

mosque were two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In 2001, alAwlaki relocates to the Dar Al-Hijra mosque in Northern Virginia, 

the same mosque that the same two September 11, 2001, hijackers 

from San Diego go to in Northern Virginia, as well as a third September 11, 2001, hijacker. And, finally, al-Awlaki’s phone number 

is discovered in Ramzi Binalshibh’s Hamburg apartment as a result of a search that is conducted. 

The FBI and the counterterrorism community know al-Awlaki 

well. He has been the subject of interest and investigation since before and after he left the United States in 2002. He is well known 

to the international counterterrorism community and to the Yemeni Government. 

Certainly the information regarding what we knew about alAwlaki as well as these communications were shared on the JTTF. 

Certainly the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) was a 

part of that review and participated. Presumably they looked at 

Major Hasan’s personnel file. Of course, the question remains: 

What was in that file? All of the things that General Keane articulated, were they there, were they considered? 


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Frankly, based on the judgment that was made on the JTTF, it 

raises some question whether or not any of that information, negative and derogatory, made it into the personnel file that the JTTF 

had access to. If it was not there, we must ask ourselves why and 

what we can do to ensure that information is in there so that the 

JTTF investigators could have had access to it. 

Now, once that information was shared among the JTTF and 

they made a judgment, what happened next? What information 

was shared? I can tell you from my experience in the Justice Department, depending on how that information was collected will 

dictate what rules apply in terms of information sharing. There are 

two sets of rules that apply. To Senator Collins’ question, these can 

be complicated, perhaps unnecessarily so. 

If the information in those e-mails or those communications was 

collected pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 

typically the warrant that permitted that collection would restrict 

the further dissemination of that information that was collected 

without the permission of the Court. It is not difficult. One can go 

back to the Court, request the information, and get permission for 

sharing. And, in fact, in my experience, I could not recall, thinking 

back on this, a time when the Court did not grant such permissions. So that is a legal restriction on the sharing. 

The second set of rules is a memorandum of understanding that 

the FBI enters into with each agency that participates in the JTTF. 

The essence of those agreements say that information by participants in the JTTF is not to be shared with their home agencies 

without the permission of the JTTF. Presumably that is the FBI 

by whom they are led. Again, that approval can be gotten. There 

is not a reason not to have it. 

I will tell you, as I thought about this case, I think as you read 

the press accounts, the question becomes: Did DOD ask for that information to be shared? Did the DOD representative on the JTTF 

ask for that information to be shared back with the Army? Of 

course, we need to know the answer to that question, but I will tell 

you there is something that offends me about suggesting that the 

obligation was only on the part of the Department of Defense. Certainly any law enforcement investigator there, if they felt that they 

did not have the authority to proceed, but another Federal agency 

could, whether it was on personnel or other reasons, should have 

suggested that the information be shared. 

In the wake of the review, the information and the evaluation of 

the JTTF, when they made that evaluation, did they interview 

Major Hasan? If they did not believe him to be a threat, if they believed the communications to be legitimate, then why didn’t you go 

and interview him? If you didn’t want to interview him, why didn’t 

you go and interview his colleagues at Walter Reed where the information that was not in the file might have been discovered? 

There are three typical responses to those questions. 

First, the protection of sources and methods, that they would not 

have wanted to reveal where they got those communications. I 

would suggest to the Committee that there are ways around that 

concern to mask the source and method by which you did that collection. 


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Second, regrettably, I worry about a sense of political correctness. 

I worry that, in a post-September 11, 2001, world, because we very 

much respect and rely on the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims, 

and we have done tremendous cultural training inside the Federal 

Government and law enforcement agencies, that there might have 

been some sort of self-censoring, if you will, a reluctance for them 

to pursue a senior uniformed military member, a doctor who was 

Muslim. 

Last, there is the FBI’s Domestic Investigation Operational 

Guidelines. They were written in December 2008. They are updated annually, and it has been suggested that they would not 

have gone out to interview Major Hasan or his employers because 

they would have been discouraged from doing that by the FBI’s 

own guidelines. That, too, needs to be looked at and considered and 

whether or not that needs to be changed. 

Last, when we look at the military, we must look at this important aspect. As I have suggested, we have to know whether or not 

there was a method by which the derogatory information made its 

way into Major Hasan’s personnel file. If it did, who was responsible and accountable for following up on that information before 

the intercepts and after the intercepts if they had gotten the information? 

We must ensure that even if the military had gotten the intercepts and the information that would have been required, that they 

have the process and procedures in place to ensure that they not 

fall through the cracks. They must also have adequate resources 

and training within the military to be able to address this issue. 

It is important not simply because you may want to weed out 

someone who is mentally unfit to be deployed, but after all, we 

want to make sure the military has adequate resources to root out 

within their ranks the potential criminal, spy, or terrorist. 

As Senator Collins says, it is important that we assure ourselves, 

we address these issues, because it is at the core of our obligation 

to protect our military service members and their families. We ask 

much of them. We owe them an honest look. We owe them to redouble our efforts to ensure their safety and their security. 

It is easy to offer questions and opinions when we are unburdened by the facts. And I am not here to second-guess the hardworking public servants who investigated this case, but to offer, 

based on my experience, how we might improve the system and 

better protect our men and women in uniform. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Ms. Townsend. I really appreciate the spirit and the context of your testimony, which I think 

will be both very informative and helpful to us as we go forward 

with the investigation. 

Our next witness—and we thank him for coming down from New 

York—is Mitchell Silber, Director of Analysis with the Intelligence 

Division of the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Mr. 

Silber has testified previously before the Committee concerning 

what I would call a seminal report that he co-authored for the 

NYPD, which was titled ‘‘Radicalization in the West: A Homegrown 

Threat.’’ The NYPD has really quite a remarkable preventive approach—understandably, I suppose, when one considers what happened on September 11, 2001—to the threat of terrorism generally, 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Silber appears in the Appendix on page 54. 

including a focus on homegrown terrorism. So we are very grateful, 

Mr. Silber, that you have returned to the Committee, and we welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF MITCHELL D. SILBER,1 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. SILBER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me as the representative of the 

New York City Police Department to testify here today. 

In October 2007, as you mentioned, I testified before this Committee about the findings of a recent study titled ‘‘Radicalization in 

the West: The Homegrown Threat’’ that I had co-authored and the 

NYPD had published concerning the process of radicalization in the 

West and the threat that it potentially posed to the United States. 

As it has elsewhere, this threat has now materialized in the United 

States. 

The Past 12 Months: During the past 12 months, U.S. authorities 

have uncovered a number of radicalized clusters of individuals intent on committing violent jihad within the continental United 

States as well as abroad. These arrests, along with intelligence operations, indicate that radicalization to violence is taking place in 

the United States. 

Approximately 1 year ago, in November 2008, the Department of 

Homeland Security and the FBI issued a warning relating to an alQaeda-linked terrorist plot against the Long Island Railroad commuter network. The origins of this plot was linked directly to Bryant Neal Vinas, a New Yorker, who radicalized to violence in and 

around New York City before traveling to Pakistan to seek out an 

opportunity to participate in violent jihad. 

In April 2009, before their arrest by the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, four men placed what they believed was C4 explosives outside a Jewish synagogue and community center in Riverdale in an 

attempt to carry out a terrorist act. These men were radicalized in 

the United States. 

In July 2009, seven men were arrested by Federal authorities in 

North Carolina. They possessed weapons and more than 27,000 

rounds of ammunition and had plans to attack the Marine Base at 

Quantico, Virginia. These men, known as the Raleigh 7, were inspired by al-Qaeda and radicalized in the United States. 

This past September, Najibullah Zazi, age 24, was arrested as 

part of an al-Qaeda-linked conspiracy to attack locations in New 

York City with hydrogen peroxide-based explosives. The plot has 

been called one of the most serious since September 11, 2001. Zazi, 

who lived in Flushing, Queens, during his formative years—ages 14 

to 23, before departing for Pakistan—radicalized in the United 

States. 

Later that same September, Betim Kaziu, a 21-year-old New 

Yorker from Brooklyn, was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder abroad and support for foreign terrorists. Arrested in Kosovo, 

Mr. Kaziu sought to join a foreign fighter group overseas and ‘‘take 

up arms against perceived enemies of Islam,’’ meaning American 


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troops potentially in Iraq or Afghanistan. He was also radicalized 

in the United States. 

And there are more: In Boston, Tarek Mehanna, age 26 and a 

graduate of the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy, was arrested 

last month. Not only did he seek to fight abroad, but he was also 

charged with conspiring to attack civilians at a shopping mall in 

the United States, as well as two members of the Executive Branch 

of the Federal Government. He was radicalized in the United 

States. 

At least 15 men of Somali descent have radicalized in Minneapolis over the last few years and have left the United States to 

fight in Somalia. They joined al-Shabaab, a terrorist group associated with al-Qaeda and based in Somalia. Our fear is: What happens when they return to the United States? Australia has already 

thwarted a plot just this year involving individuals who fought 

alongside al-Shabaab and then returned to Melbourne seeking to 

attack an Australian military base. 

This past September also saw plots involving lone wolves in both 

Dallas, Texas, and Springfield, Illinois. In Dallas, a large office 

building was targeted with a vehicle-borne explosive. In Springfield, a Federal building was targeted. Though these individuals 

were not part of any group, much of their radicalization seems U.S. 

based. 

And, finally, there were the recent arrests of two Chicagoans 

with direct links to Lashkar-e-Taiba. This is the group that was responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. Though 

these men seemed to be plotting against targets in Denmark, once 

again it appears that these individuals were radicalized in the 

United States. 

Given the evidence of the past 12-month period, one must conclude that radicalization to violence is occurring in the United 

States. 

Process and Radicalization: Given what seems to be a pattern of 

individuals radicalizing to al-Qaeda-inspired violence, the NYPD 

has invested a substantial analytic effort in order to assess the 

causes and process that marked the radicalization trajectory of 

these individuals. Among the cases previously mentioned, we saw 

the pattern repeating itself. It is consistent with the model from 

the 2007 NYPD report that suggested of four phases: Preradicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. 

And driving this process is a combination of the proliferation of alQaeda ideology intertwined with the real or perceived political 

grievances that cite a Western ‘‘war against Islam’’ and provide the 

justification for young men with unremarkable backgrounds to pursue violent extremism. 

Let me describe in greater detail the four phases. 

Phase I, Pre-Radicalization: Pre-radicalization is the point of origin for individuals before they begin this progression. It is their life 

situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi 

Islam as their own ideology. Based on the cases, individuals who 

are vulnerable to radicalization tend to be male Muslims between 

the ages of 15 to 35 who are local residents and citizens from varied ethnic backgrounds. Significant proportions come from middleclass backgrounds and are educated, at least high school graduates, 


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if not university students. Based on our case studies, the vast majority of individuals who end up radicalizing to violence do not start 

out as religiously observant or knowledgeable. 

Phase 2, Self-Identification: Self-identification is the phase where 

individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin 

to explore more literal interpretations of Islam, gradually gravitating away from their old identity and beginning to associate 

themselves with and adopt this ideology as their own. The trigger 

for this ‘‘religious seeking’’ is often a catalytic event or a crisis 

which challenges the individual’s previously held beliefs and causes 

that individual to reconsider their previously held outlook and 

worldview. 

Phase 3, Indoctrination: Indoctrination is the phase in which an 

individual intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts his extremist ideology, and concludes without question that action is required to 

support and further the cause. That action is violence. Indoctrination is the manifestation of accepting a religious-political ideology 

that justifies, legitimizes, and encourages violence against anything 

kufir, or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or 

those whose opinions are contrary to their own extremist agenda. 

The signatures associated with this phase include becoming an 

active participant in a group and simultaneously becoming increasingly isolated from one’s life. Gradually, the individuals begin to 

isolate themselves from secular society and self-radicalize. They 

come to believe that the world is divided between enlightened believers (themselves) and infidels (everybody else). 

Phase 4, Jihadization, or the ‘‘Violence Phase’’: Jihadization is a 

phase in which individuals accept their own individual duty to participate in violent jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Often, individuals will seek to travel abroad 

to participate in a field of jihad such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Kashmir, Chechnya, Somalia, or Iraq, only to be redirected back to 

the West to do ‘‘something for the cause.’’ Frequently, the group 

members participate in outdoor activities like rafting, camping, or 

paintball with the purpose of vetting, bonding, and training. In addition, mental preparation commences as jihadist videos are 

watched. And, last, potential targets are chosen, surveillance and 

reconnaissance begin, and the group weaponizes with readily available components. 

New Analysis: While much of the 2007 radicalization study remains directly applicable to the last 12 months’ events, additional 

research has highlighted some new findings. The most important 

is that the Internet has become an even more valuable venue and 

a driver for radicalization. In fact, this finding was also highlighted 

by a 2008 report that this Committee produced, noting accurately 

that, ‘‘the use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and other violent 

Islamist extremist groups has expanded the terrorist threat to our 

homeland. No longer is the threat just from abroad, as was the 

case with the attacks of September 11, 2001; the threat is now increasingly from within, from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist ideology to plan and execute attacks 

where they live. One of the primary drivers of this new threat is 

the use of the Internet to enlist individuals or groups of individuals 


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to join the cause without ever affiliating with a terrorist organization.’’ 

In 2007, we discussed the concept of a ‘‘spiritual sanctioner,’’ an 

individual who provides religious justification for violent political 

extremists. Within the last 6 months, we have identified a new catalyst for radicalization. We call this the ‘‘virtual spiritual sanctioner,’’ and although he is not the only one, Anwar al-Awlaki, 

though based in Yemen, is an exemplar of this concept. 

Both Anwar al-Awlaki’s extremist ties, as previously discussed, 

as well as his ability to translate literature that promotes violent 

jihad into English have enabled his widespread radicalizing effect. 

Not only has al-Awlaki been a religious authority cited by the convicted Fort Dix plotters, who were disrupted in a 2007 plot against 

Fort Dix in New Jersey, but his tapes were also played for all of 

those who attended the Toronto 18’s makeshift training camp, held 

north of Toronto in the winter of 2005. That group plotted to explode three tons of ammonium nitrate in Toronto in the fall of 

2006. 

Key Judgments: First, in recent years, U.S. authorities have uncovered significant and increasing numbers of radicalized clusters 

or individuals intent on committing violent jihad either in the 

United States or abroad. These arrests confirm that radicalization 

is taking place in the United States today. 

Second, it is also noteworthy that in the past year, there have 

been a half dozen cases of individuals who, instead of traveling 

abroad to carry out violence, have elected to do it here in the 

United States. This is substantially different from what we have 

seen in the past and may reflect an emerging pattern. 

And third, the al-Qaeda threat to the U.S. homeland is no longer 

limited to al-Qaeda core. Rather, it has decentralized and now consists of three primary elements: Al-Qaeda core; al-Qaeda allies, like 

Lashkar-e-Taiba, Islamic Jihad Union, and others who have begun 

to target the West; and, most recently, the al-Qaeda-inspired or 

homegrown threat that has no operational relationship with alQaeda core, but consists of individuals radicalized in the West who 

utilize al-Qaeda ideology as their inspiration for action. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Silber. Just two 

quick comments. 

One, the testimony that you gave, the summary of the various 

homegrown terrorist plots that have been formed and stopped in 

the last year, reminds us that though we are in an unconventional 

war with the Islamist extremists who attacked us on September 11, 

2001, that war increasingly has come within our borders. It started 

here officially, if you will, even though it was coming at us before 

September 11, 2001, but this pattern of homegrown radicalization 

is a very significant new front and is one that law enforcement is 

obviously dealing with quite effectively. Most of these plots, except 

for the ones that were lone wolves such as the Little Rock case and 

presumably Major Hasan’s case, at least what we know of him 

now, were true groups and have been stopped. 

My second comment is that in the question-and-answer period I 

am going to ask you to relate this schematic framework that you 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

have of the phases of radicalization to Major Hasan based on what 

you know about him from public sources now. 

Our next witness is Juan Carlos Zarate, former Deputy Assistant 

to the President, Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating 

Terrorism, and before that Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 

Terrorist Financing. Mr. Zarate comes to us today as Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JUAN CARLOS ZARATE,1 SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES; AND FORMER DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 

Mr. ZARATE. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, 

and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you very 

much for the opportunity to testify today about the horrific attacks 

that occurred on November 5, 2009. 

Mr. Chairman, I have written testimony that I ask be entered in 

the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ZARATE. Thank you. My testimony today, Mr. Chairman, addresses some of the implications of the Fort Hood attack, including 

the continued terrorist threats to our military in the United States, 

the challenges of dealing with the lone-wolf insider threat, and the 

increasing problem of radicalization and the threat of violent Islamic extremism. 

The horrific event at Fort Hood was shocking not only for its 

lethality but because an attack against our men and women of the 

military occurred in our own country, on a major military base, and 

allegedly by an Army officer whose job it was to care for the mental 

well-being of our soldiers. 

The attack has obviously raised legitimate questions about why 

such an event happened; whether authorities, both civilian and 

military, could have prevented such an attack; and the national security implications of this incident moving forward. Unlike any 

event since September 11, 2001, it has also fueled discussion about 

the specter of a violent extremist ideology in our midst. 

I think it is premature, though, to answer any of these questions 

completely or make final judgments without more information 

about the event and the alleged perpetrator. There may indeed 

have been a failure to connect the dots or, more importantly, a failure to evaluate completely what those dots meant, but I think it 

is too early to tell. 

What makes the Fort Hood case particularly difficult to assess, 

especially at this point, is that there may have been a mixture of 

motives or factors at play in the alleged perpetrator’s mind. What 

makes it a case that appears to have been harder to disrupt was 

that Major Hasan seems to have acted alone, in lone-wolf fashion, 

and may have used his medical research to mask his own inner 

turmoil and attraction to a violent ideology. 

Unfortunately, as Mr. Silber points out, this event follows a line 

of attacks against military personnel in separate incidents, includVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:37 Jan 18, 2011 Jkt 056145 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56145.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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ing a murder at a military recruitment center in Little Rock, an 

act of fratricide at Camp Liberty in Iraq, and another act of fratricide at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait in March 2003. The event 

also occurred in the wake of several disrupted terrorist plots in the 

United States, raising questions about whether we are facing a 

new wave of terrorism driven in part by self-radicalized actors. The 

FBI, in concert with other authorities, recently disrupted, as Mr. 

Silber mentioned, a series of serious plots and arrested potential 

terrorists from New York and North Carolina to Texas and Illinois. 

Some of these plots were homegrown and more local in nature, 

while at least two of them appear to have serious international terrorist connections. Some of these plots, like the foiled attack on 

Quantico, the attempt to shoot down a military transport plane in 

Newburgh, and the failed attack on Fort Dix in 2000, were aimed 

directly at our military here at home. 

Even with all these events occurring in a short period of time, 

I think we must be careful not to draw final conclusions about how 

the Fort Hood attack fits into these series of arrests and incidents 

and whether there is a recognizable pattern that ties this event to 

all the others. 

That said, I think it is important in the first instance to recognize the constant threat to our military from terrorist attacks. 

From the attacks at the marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the destruction of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the attack on 

the USS Cole in 2000, to the present day attacks on Bagram Air 

Base in Afghanistan, terrorists have purposefully targeted U.S. 

military and installations abroad. 

For homegrown or self-radicalized individuals or cells, military 

bases provide the most visible and legitimate targets that help 

them justify their actions by tying their attacks directly to the perceived attacks on Muslims by the U.S. military. Attacks on our 

military I think will continue and will grow more likely over time. 

U.S. military presence abroad will remain a visible target for our 

enemies—including Sunni and Shia dominated and inspired terrorist groups. At home, violent radicals will see the military as an 

obvious and legitimate target. It is important, then, for the military 

to continue to review and refine its security procedures at all our 

installations and for all our personnel. The problem in this case, 

the case of Fort Hood, though, seems not to have come from the 

outside but from within. 

Based on publicly available information, it appears likely that 

the alleged perpetrator acted alone. Unlike a classic lone wolf, 

though, the alleged perpetrator in this case used his privileged role 

as an insider—an officer and doctor—to attack the military and 

murder his fellow soldiers. In many ways, the lone-wolf insider 

threat is the most challenging and difficult of problems for the 

counterterrorism and law enforcement communities. The more a 

terrorist is interacting, communicating, and manifesting intent and 

capabilities, the more likely the plot can be prevented. 

The U.S. Government and foreign partners have uncovered a variety of such cells and networks since September 11, 2001, and prevented numerous attacks. If there is no expression of violent tendencies or plans, then it is difficult not only for authorities but also 


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friends, colleagues, and neighbors to determine that a violent 

threat is looming. 

Law enforcement, in addition, is often limited in its ability to inquire or follow up without indications of directly suspicious or 

criminal behavior. The June 1, 2009, murder at the military recruitment center in Little Rock is a sobering reminder of these limitations. 

In retrospect, the Fort Hood case could prove to be even more 

complicated than past events. It may be that we will not see a 

smoking gun that revealed Major Hasan’s true motivations and signaled an intent to resort to violence. Like other such violent incidents in the United States, there will likely be a patchwork of data 

points and behavioral clues which, in light of the incident, and with 

hindsight, as Ms. Townsend indicates, appear to point to a path of 

violence. A key question, then, is whether those data points were 

seen and evaluated properly. 

The most troubling of the alleged data points revealed to date involved suspicious and supposed communications between Major 

Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki. As has been testified to, al-Awlaki is 

Yemeni-American radical cleric with ties to the September 11, 

2001, hijackers and with popular appeal on the Internet and in 

Yemen with Western violent extremists. Al-Awlaki has been and is 

well known to the U.S. Government. 

Though too early to fully evaluate, what may have made these 

communications in the alleged case of Major Hasan more difficult 

to diagnose is that the alleged perpetrator’s own doubts and conflict about serving in the military may have been masked by his 

own academic and medical research about the mind of Muslim soldiers. 

The threat of an American lone wolf—radicalized remotely in the 

United States, perhaps via the Internet—presents the most difficult problem for U.S. law enforcement. The reality is that attacks 

by such actors are difficult to predict and to prevent, even more so 

when they are acting from the inside. 

In light of this attack, there has begun a heightened debate 

about the threat posed by the ideology of violent Islamic extremism. The core narrative of this ideology—that the West is at war 

with Islam and that Muslims around the world must unite to fight 

the United States in defense of fellow Muslims—has widespread 

appeal. This is a simple, straightforward narrative that helps explain world events and local grievances. It is a narrative that is 

widely believed in many corners of the world and acts as a siren 

song for troubled individuals in crisis. 

Al-Qaeda and their adherents take full advantage of this ideology 

to lure cannon fodder for their cause. Osama bin Laden and alZawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number one and two, have frequently crafted 

messages directed to American audiences. In this case, there is no 

doubt that al-Qaeda will reference and use the Fort Hood attack 

in its propaganda as a way of convincing their adherents that the 

U.S. military is under pressure and suffering at the hands of alQaeda. 

Though this is an ideology that is inherently exclusionary and 

violent, it is not illegal to believe in or espouse it. Many do 

throughout the world, including some people in the United States. 


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Given our First Amendment protections, merely espousing such 

views cannot be considered illegal, and absent proximity and causality tied to an act of violence, the preaching of such hatred and 

advocacy of violence is not prosecutable as incitement under U.S. 

law. There are many radical ideologues, like al-Awlaki, who skate 

the line between spreading this hateful ideology and inciting violence under U.S. law. 

Fortunately, the United States has largely been immune from 

the larger social and economic problems of Muslim citizen integration and the attendant problems of radicalization found throughout 

Europe and in parts of Asia. Much of this can be attributed to the 

fundamental integration of all immigrants into American society as 

Americans and to the common ideals and counter-narrative of the 

American dream. The danger of this ideology in the United States 

is for more individuals to fall prey to radicalization and for a divide 

to form within American society. 

This is why I think American citizens—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—have a special responsibility not to play into the hands 

of the violent extremists and their ideology. There cannot be a divide in our society. To the credit of our great country and our citizens, reaction to the horrors of Fort Hood has been measured and 

civil. 

Muslim-Americans, I think, have a special responsibility in this 

ideological battle. Regardless ultimately of the motivations of the 

perpetrator, the attack at Fort Hood is an important moment for 

Muslim-Americans to stand up directly against this ideology that 

has proven to be so deadly and destructive. This involves more 

than just condemnation of violent attacks but an active participation in the debate about how to isolate, discredit, and ultimately 

displace the allure of this false ideology, especially in the United 

States. 

I applaud leaders like Salam al-Marayati, the Executive Director 

of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, who has issued a clarion call 

to fellow Muslim-Americans. In a recent article, he called the Fort 

Hood attacks a ‘‘defining moment for Muslim-Americans’’ and concluded the following: ‘‘We as Muslim-Americans are the answer to 

this frightening phenomenon of terrorism and violent extremism. 

We own our own destiny, and it is fundamentally intertwined with 

our nation’s destiny. Terrorism will be defeated with our work on 

the front lines, not in the battlefields, but in our mosques and community centers and youth associations. By standing up and working for change, we are acting on the best and guiding principles of 

Islam and of America.’’ 

Indeed, I think it is our vibrant American Muslim communities 

and leaders who must rise up and face down the ideology that glorifies death and aims to foment division in our society. 

As the review of this incident unfolds, I think it will be critical 

to ensure that information was shared and evaluated properly. But 

I also think it will be important to preserve the necessary tools to 

law enforcement and the intelligence community that will allow 

them to uncover data points related to domestic extremist terrorism. In this regard, I think the two provisions of the PATRIOT 

Act set to sunset this year, including the roving wiretap provision 

and business records authority, should be renewed. Importantly, 


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the provision from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA), commonly referred to as the ‘‘lone-wolf provision,’’ should also be renewed. These I think should be renewed 

without unnecessary or burdensome requirements that may dissuade or prevent the effective use of these techniques by law enforcement. 

In addition, I think Congress and the Administration should ensure that the revised Attorney General Guidelines, mentioned by 

Ms. Townsend, are fully in effect, fully supported and implemented. 

In addition, the Administration and Congress should look at existing laws and authorities to determine whether modifications or 

more aggressive use would be appropriate against those providing 

material and ideological support to lone-wolf terrorists and violent 

extremists. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Zarate, excuse me for interrupting, 

but if you can come to a close—I actually went over your statement 

last night, and it is very good, including the questions that you 

suggest we raise. But we have got a number of Committee Members here, and I know they will want to get into the questioning 

soon. 

Mr. ZARATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just conclude 

then with a couple of the key questions I think that not only build 

on the questions that have been raised, but also point to some forward-looking dimensions. 

Obviously, the key and core question is whether or not there 

were any restrictions in terms of information sharing, both horizontally and vertically, that affected the ability to see the collective 

body of information about Major Hasan, the suspect. 

Are there existing ties with radical ideologues abroad or via the 

Internet that should be reviewed, again, for the threat of radicalization posed? 

Are there common warning signs in the Fort Hood case and in 

the 2003 Camp Pennsylvania attack that can be used to prevent 

such future attacks? 

Are there realistic expectations about preventing lone-wolf attacks? And in that regard, are there relevant laws and authorities 

in place to allow authorities to get in front of such threats? 

Importantly, how much of this prevention goes beyond the Federal Government? How much of this bears societal response of 

heightened vigilance, without creating an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and recrimination among neighbors? How do we strike that 

balance? 

And, finally, should there be a more formal mechanism for enlisting Muslim-Americans to empower them to take on violent Islamist 

extremist ideology and to allow Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities an ability to more actively address community concerns? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for that very helpful 

testimony. 

Our last witness today is Brian Jenkins, who is Senior Adviser 

at the RAND Corporation. Mr. Jenkins was involved in the study 

of terrorism before most people focused on the concept and a long 

time before we, much to our dismay and surprise, ended up in a 


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1The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears in the Appendix on page 72. 

war with one group of terrorists, as we are now. He was last before 

the Committee in January testifying on the Mumbai attacks of last 

November. We welcome you back and look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS,1 SENIOR ADVISER, 

RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, for inviting me to talk to you 

about this tragic and disquieting and event. 

This small pin I wear on my lapel was designed by a fireman. 

It was given to me in memory of those who were killed on September 11, 2001. I am wearing it this morning out of respect for 

those who were killed and wounded at Fort Hood. 

You may recall that, when I testified before this same Committee 

last January on the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, in response to the 

question, ‘‘Could a Mumbai-style attack happen in the United 

States?’’ I said, ‘‘It could. The difference lies in the scale of events.’’ 

While the recruiting and training of 10 suicide attackers was far 

beyond anything that we had seen in any of the conspiracies uncovered since September 11, 2001, I did point out that we had seen 

lone gunmen and pairs of shooters, motivated by political cause or 

mental illness, run amok, determined to kill in quantity. Therefore, 

an attack carried out by one or a small number of attackers armed 

with readily available weapons, nothing exotic, perhaps causing 

scores of casualties, was certainly not inconceivable. 

I mention that now because the threat we face is not so much 

one of organizations penetrating the United States as it is of the 

spread of ideologies and models of behavior. And that is what we 

are talking about here, models of behavior. It is noteworthy that 

the only terrorist attackers to succeed in harming anyone in the 

United States since September 11, 2001, have been lone gunmen. 

Now, at a glance, Major Hasan’s rampage at Fort Hood looks a 

lot like what used to be called ‘‘going postal’’—a deepening sense 

of personal grievance culminating in a homicidal rampage directed 

against co-workers, in this case, fellow soldiers. For Major Hasan, 

‘‘going jihad’’ reflects the channeling of obvious personality problems into a deadly fanaticism. 

We must wait for a full inquiry to thoroughly understand Major 

Hasan’s motives, his preparations, his objectives, but on the basis 

of what has been reported in the news media, we clearly have a 

troubled man who engaged with extremist ideologies via the Internet that resonated with and reinforced his own anger, leading him 

at some point to a decision to kill. 

The markers on his path to the November 5, 2009, slayings correspond to many of those laid out in previous studies of 

radicalization, notably, the excellent study by the New York Police 

Department. 

If some of the signposts are missing, it is because, except for 

Major Hasan’s reported correspondence with al-Awlaki, his journey 

may have been largely an interior one. 


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I mention signposts. Were there signposts? Clearly, there seemed 

to have been some. Mass killings like the one at Fort Hood invariably prompt the question, could it have been prevented? I am going 

to join the other members of the panel and say that it is premature 

for me, on the basis of what we know now, to make that judgment. 

I do have to say that experience has taught me to be exceptionally 

cautious in this domain. I know that, seen through a rearview mirror, a lot of these clues seem tantalizingly obvious—if only we had 

been able to connect the dots. That famous phrase sometimes seduces us into overestimating what is knowable, especially in the 

realm of human behavior. We are just not very good at predicting 

human violence. We do not have an X-ray for a man’s soul. 

I do, however, think that a very useful line of inquiry, separate 

from the specifics of this case, would be exploring the issue of selfradicalized individuals. Much of what we say about radicalization 

derives from looking at groups. Individual terrorists lie at the edge 

of our knowledge here, implying perhaps a need for the capabilities 

of both forensic psychology and radicalization theory. It would be 

useful to explore what we should be looking for here and, just as 

importantly, what we can reasonably expect to know. 

Senator Collins, you mentioned a shortage of psychiatrists in the 

military. Let me offer an aside here. The long duration and the nature of the conflicts we confront today create exceptional challenges 

to members of our armed forces. The stresses are showing up in the 

form of breakdowns, suicides, sometimes homicides. Now, mark my 

words, this by no means excuses Major Hasan’s acts. It does suggest, however, that we are going to have to be extraordinarily sensitive to the mindset, the morale, and the mental well-being of our 

men and women in uniform upon whom we have placed such a 

great burden. 

Now let me shift quickly from Major Hasan to this event in the 

context of the current terrorist threat. 

According to research at RAND, the number and geographic 

range of al-Qaeda-inspired attacks have grown each year since September 11, 2001, although clearly at the same time there has been 

a decline in the quality of these actions. Some analysts say that alQaeda is following a strategy of ‘‘leaderless resistance’’ as a consequence of the relentless pursuit to which we have subjected it. 

Leaderless resistance envisions an army of autonomous terrorist 

operatives, united in a common cause but not connected organizationally. It is difficult to destroy a leaderless enterprise, but 

leaderless resistance is ultimately a strategy of weakness. As I say, 

we have greatly reduced al-Qaeda’s operational capabilities. And 

outside of Pakistan and Afghanistan, its leaders can do little other 

than exhort others to violence. 

What leaderless resistance does offer is the opportunity for terrorist leaders to assert ownership of just about every homicidal maniac on the planet. And therefore, it is not surprising that Major 

Hasan’s Internet imam was quick to praise the Fort Hood murders 

as another jihad success. 

Since September 11, 2001, authorities in the United States have 

uncovered nearly 30 plots to carry out attacks here in the United 

States or abroad or to provide support for terrorist organizations. 

Not all of these, even if undiscovered, would have resulted in sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:37 Jan 18, 2011 Jkt 056145 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56145.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT

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cessful terrorist attacks, but I do remind you that very little separates the ambitions of terrorist wannabes from deadly terrorist assaults. The essential ingredient is intent, and that is what we are 

talking about here. Therefore, domestic intelligence collection remains a necessary and critical component of homeland security. 

Mr. Silber mentioned the plots discovered in 2009. We have had 

eight plots discovered thus far this year, plus two actual attacks— 

the one in Arkansas and the one at Fort Hood. This is a much 

higher number than in previous years. There appears to be common inspiration. There is no evidence of organizational connection 

between these events. These are individual responses to jihadist 

propaganda in the context of U.S. policy decisions that portray 

what we do as an assault on Islam. 

Six of the plots since September 11, 2001, have been directed 

against American soldiers or military facilities in the United 

States, and, again, this reflects jihadist exhortation as well as the 

plotters’ own perceptions that attacking military targets is more legitimate than attacking civilians—although I hasten to point out 

that the majority of the plots were aimed simply at causing mass 

civilian casualties, especially in public transportation venues. 

What does this case tell us about the radicalization of Muslims 

in America? Here I join you, Senator Lieberman, in saying we have 

to be careful about overreaction. In all of these 30-some plots, 

about 100 individuals who were arrested for terrorism-related 

crimes, almost all of them recruited locally. It does show that 

radicalization and recruitment to terrorism is occurring in the 

United States and is a security concern. It has, however, yielded 

very few recruits. Indeed, the paucity of significant terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001, suggests not only intelligence and 

investigative success, but an American Muslim community that remains overwhelmingly unsympathetic to jihadist appeals. 

What authorities are going to confront going forward are tiny 

conspiracies or the actions of individuals which, in a free society, 

are always going to be hard to predict and prevent. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. Excellent background, excellent context. And you are right, the record shows that 

the number of Muslim-Americans involved in these plots is quite 

small. Obviously what is unsettling is that a small number of people can do terrible harm. But it is very important to put that small 

number in the context of the larger Muslim-American community, 

which obviously is not a part of this. 

We are going to have 7-minute rounds of questions for the Members of the Committee. 

I want to quickly focus on something in your testimony, Dr. Jenkins. After the murders at Fort Hood and information began to 

come out about Major Hasan, there was commentary that he was 

obviously an unstable person, a person under stress and, to some 

extent, going from that to a willingness to conclude that this was 

not a jihadist act or a terrorist attack. 

You comment on that in your prepared testimony, and I just 

want to draw you out on it. My conclusion from your testimony is 

that the existence of mental stress or instability does not mean 

that the act carried out is not a jihadist or terrorist act. Is that correct? 


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Mr. JENKINS. Absolutely. These are not mutually exclusive categories. In many cases, individuals who are terrorists were attracted to these extremist ideologies because of their own personal 

difficulties and discontents. I mean, terrorism does not attract the 

well-adjusted. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. That is the point. 

Mr. JENKINS. So what often happens in these cases is that individuals who are angry at something reach out toward some ideology that, as I say, resonates with and reinforces that and channels them down a path toward a particular action. 

So if we find, for example, that there are many aspects of Major 

Hasan’s personality that are troublesome, that this was a man in 

some type of personal crisis, that clearly does not exclude his act 

from being properly labeled an act of terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

General Keane, I believe Mr. Zarate talked, quite correctly, about 

the premium we put in our country on free speech and where one 

draws the line between free political expressions, even if they are 

extremist, and actionable behavior of any kind. But I think in this 

case, we have to view that in the context of what it means to be 

in the U.S. military? And I wonder if you could just help us understand, particularly in light of the concerns that Ms. Townsend expressed, that others have expressed, that we have been concerned 

about, whether some fear of being politically incorrect inhibited 

earlier action against Major Hasan by those who had heard him express extremist views. 

So does a soldier have the right to say anything he wants to say 

without any consequences? 

General KEANE. Absolutely not. Certainly free speech is an integral part of the rights of Americans, but in the U.S. military, not 

too surprising, the mission comes first. And to be able to perform 

that mission, you need in a team cohesion, morale, discipline, and 

good order. And anyone who is contributing to break that cohesion 

and that moral and good discipline and order with rhetoric, with 

speech, with actions, with behavior, can be held accountable by the 

chain of command for that speech, for that behavior, and, therefore, 

be counseled and rehabilitated for it, and that if there is such an 

unwillingness to change or such a commitment to those beliefs, 

then be separated for it, all of this short of any criminal behavior. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General KEANE. As some of the panelists discussed. A military 

unit cannot function and perform its mission under considerable 

stress without the necessary cohesion, morale, good order, and discipline, it has confidence in each other. When this speech starts to 

occur, this inflammatory speech that aggravates other members of 

the team, it polarizes a unit. It differentiates people in the unit. It 

forces them to choose sides. And that is where the commanders and 

the supervisors have to step in and start to address this issue. Regardless of people’s sensibilities, the order and planning and morale of the unit takes priority over those sensibilities. That is the 

reality of the military and its mission and what the American people are holding us accountable for. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Agreed. What then is the responsibility of 

an individual soldier who hears a fellow soldier express political 


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views that he deems are extremist? In the case in which you were 

involved at Fort Bragg, they were white supremacist views. What 

we are worried about here, obviously, is violent Islamist extremist 

views. But what is the responsibility of a soldier to report up the 

chain of command such observations? 

General KEANE. Yes, the members of the team have an obligation 

to identify and report to the chain of command any of this type of 

extremist behavior, rhetoric, etc. That was clearly one of the problems we had at Fort Bragg inside our units. It was being tolerated 

by the soldiers and also being tolerated by the immediate chain of 

command to a certain degree. 

It is unclear in my mind that we have in the military today and 

in our army units clear, specific guidelines as to what is jihadist 

extremist behavior. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General KEANE. How do you identify this behavior? How does it 

manifest itself? 

I think that is one of the things that this investigation will probably determine, as I said in my remarks, and I believe that the Department of Defense will more than likely have to issue some very 

specific guidelines, as we had to do after the racially motivated 

murders and the skinhead extremism we had in our midst in the 

1990s. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So we will definitely pursue that, and 

that may be an area of recommendation for us. But to the best of 

your knowledge now, does existing army policy about extremism 

generally prohibit extremist activity or is it more focused based on 

the Fort Bragg case on white supremacist activity? 

General KEANE. The Army pamphlet that was published in 

2000—it is titled ‘‘Extremist Activities’’—driven by the Fort Bragg 

incident, deals with racial extremism, period. That is its focus. It 

is under the general capstone of an Army policy that has a much 

broader focus than that. But I think the pamphlet was designed to 

give the commanders and the chain of command some specifics in 

terms of how to deal with this problem given that particular incident. 

So what we are dealing with here now, in my view, dealing with 

jihadist extremists potentially—certainly preliminary evidence 

would suggest that—those kinds of guidelines in terms of defining 

that and how to deal with that as a specific case in that behavior 

and that attitude and that rhetoric are not in the hands of our 

commanders. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. If our investigation finds that is true— 

and I suspect it is—that is a real omission and an area for correction, particularly in light of the record that other witnesses have 

testified on the way in which jihadists or people are actually being 

self-radicalized or radicalized over the Internet, are being exhorted 

to attack the American military on bases, not just abroad but here 

at home. My time is up. Thank you, General. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

General let me pick up where the Chairman left off. I have the 

pamphlet on extremist activities that you just mentioned, and I 

commend you for taking strong action after the racially motivated 


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murder at Fort Bragg. As I read through this pamphlet, however, 

the types of conduct prohibited in the policy manual really do not 

apply in the case of Major Hasan. Would you agree with that? 

General KEANE. I absolutely would agree. The pamphlet, as pamphlets are in the hierarchy of information provided to our leaders 

and our units, normally deals with something that is very specific 

as a result of a particular action under the umbrella of a general 

policy. That is what that was designed to do. We do not have anything like that dealing with Major Hasan’s incident and his behavior and his attitude and what should be the actions that guide the 

leaders and also guide our soldiers. 

Senator COLLINS. That is my conclusion as well. The prohibited 

activities that are listed in this manual are all geared toward organized activities. They really do not apply to the kind of lone-wolf 

conduct that we saw with Major Hasan, and I agree with the 

Chairman that this is an area that we need to pursue. 

Ms. Townsend, there has also been discussion this morning and 

previously about Major Hasan’s First Amendment rights, and I 

want to pursue this issue with you. Both the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Attorney General’s Guidelines prohibit collection based solely—and that is the important word, in my 

view—on activities protected by the First Amendment. And these 

restrictions were adopted to prevent abuses that occurred in the 

past where Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies targeted individuals based solely on their political activities. And no 

one wants to see that. 

I am concerned, however, by reports that our Federal law enforcement and counterintelligence agents may have backed off from 

further inquiries into Major Hasan’s activities based on concerns 

about his First Amendment rights. 

Do the restrictions in FISA or in the Attorney General’s Guidelines in any way prohibit investigations if there are other reasons 

to do so? In other words, to give you a specific, wouldn’t the fact 

that Major Hasan had been in repeated contact with a radical extremist Islamist cleric who was a known associate of al-Qaeda terrorists be a reason to pursue an investigation? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator Collins, I agree with you completely. To 

the extent that there would have been concern of infringing on 

Major Hasan’s either right to free speech or his freedom to practice 

his religion, there were other factors to which you could point beyond that having nothing to do with his religion or his speech that 

could have caused concern. While it is not public, from the content 

of those communications, and now what we are hearing from his 

other colleagues up at Walter Reed, any combination of those factors, as long as it was not based solely on his exercise of his constitutional freedom, could have formed the basis of further inquiry 

and investigation by the FBI. 

Senator COLLINS. So if we are being told that one reason this 

was not aggressively pursued was concerns that it would violate 

the FISA restrictions or the Attorney General’s Guidelines, you 

would disagree with that decision based on what you know? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Based on what I know now, yes, I would disagree with that. And, frankly, this is, Senator, why I mentioned my 

concern about political correctness. I think we have to ensure that 


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our investigators feel sufficiently backed up, if you will, to follow 

the facts wherever they lead them. And if the facts lead them to 

an investigation of a senior member of the uniformed military who 

happens to be a Muslim doctor, then that is where they lead them. 

But they have to feel confident that they can pursue the facts 

wherever they take them against whoever the target may be. 

Senator COLLINS. And the other very important point that you 

made in your testimony is while the members of the JTTF are prohibited from sharing information with their home agency without 

permission of the FBI, not only can they ask permission, but presumably the FBI could direct a referral to the Army or the DCIS. 

Is that correct? It goes in both directions? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. That is right, and I think the best way to explain this to folks is by example. Imagine if you had an intercept 

that was not of a Federal crime. Perhaps it was a rape. Perhaps 

it was child abuse. Suppose you had that sort of information come 

over a wiretap into the JTTF and the local police officer did not 

say, ‘‘Can I share it?’’ Presumably, the Good Lord willing, somebody 

paying attention on the JTTF would say, ‘‘This needs to be shared 

with local authorities to either prosecute a crime or to protect a 

child in my example. 

And so, absolutely, my view of this is all members of the JTTF 

have an obligation when they see information—the NYPD has a 

public program. It’s called ‘‘See It, Say It.’’ Certainly if it passes 

you, just because it is not in the jurisdiction of your particular 

agency, doesn’t relieve you of the fundamental law enforcement obligation to follow it up. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

I just want to say very briefly, in Connecticut, some years ago 

we had a case just as you describe, unrelated to terrorism, where 

a local official was being investigated for corruption, and wiretaps 

picked up the fact that this local official was involved in basically 

sexual abuse of children. And it went right up to the Attorney General at that time to determine whether he should be arrested for 

those acts of abusing the children. And, of course, the correct judgment was made, which was that the corruption investigation was 

forgotten and he was arrested, convicted, and is still in jail for 

those crimes. 

As is our custom on this Committee, we call on order of arrival, 

so the order, for the information of my colleagues, is Senators Carper, McCain, Ensign, Levin, Graham, McCaskill, and Pryor. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses, 

thank you very much for joining us today and for the time that you 

have invested in preparing for your testimony and responding to 

our questions. 

Mr. Chairman, this testimony has been both illuminating and, I 

believe, most constructive. 

I want to return to the testimony that Mr. Zarate gave us, and 

near the end of your testimony, you quoted—I did not catch it, and 

I tried to find it in your statement who actually said these words— 


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I believe it was a Muslim leader who said something to the effect, 

‘‘we, the Muslim-Americans, are the defining answer.’’ Do you remember that? 

Mr. ZARATE. That is right, sir. 

Senator CARPER. Just go back with us and revisit that comment, 

please. 

Mr. ZARATE. Right. This comment comes from Salam alMarayati, who is the Executive Director of a group called the Muslim Public Affairs Council, an important group. He is based in 

Southern California, and soon after the Fort Hood attack, he posted 

on Huffington Post what is, in essence, an op-ed. And as I described it, he called it a defining moment for American-Muslims, 

which was to, in essence, own our own destiny and fundamentally 

deal with terrorism in our midst. 

What I found incredibly important was—and this is based on my 

experience both at Treasury and at the National Security Council 

(NSC), having interacted and engaged with Muslim-American leaders and community members for some time on these issues of terrorism—the realization and the articulation about the importance 

of the battlefields and the front lines in the mosques, community 

centers, and youth associations. I think that is an incredible statement by Salam. I think it is an important realization that MuslimAmericans have to take ownership of the ideological battle happening within Islam itself and have to find ways of isolating those 

who are radicalizing our youth and getting into the heads of American citizens. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Of all the comments that were 

given by witnesses, that one just jumped right off the page at me. 

And I just wanted to ask each of our witnesses to respond to what 

you heard here. 

We are a legislative committee. We are not the FBI. We are not 

the Justice Department. We are not the judge; we are not the jury. 

We are a legislative committee. And one or two of you have given 

us, I think, pretty good advice on some things we may want to do 

legislatively, and I suspect that we will want to do most of those 

things. But in terms of what responsibilities the Muslim community in this country have, what they can do to help the rest of us 

to try to make sure this kind of thing does not ever happen again, 

we have heard one piece of advice here, and I just want the other 

witnesses to respond to that and share your views, please. 

General KEANE. Well, my reaction to that is certainly one of encouragement, and I certainly praise them for making those remarks. In the largest context of what we are dealing with in terms 

of the challenge inside Islam between the radicals and the moderates and traditionalists, and many of those are moderates themselves, it is hard to see defeating radical Islam itself without the 

willing cooperation of the moderates to reject it. I mean, we are 

going to kill a lot of these radical Islamists over the next coming 

years, just as we have done over the last 8 years. But as we all 

know who have been involved up close in this fight, the fact of the 

matter is that killing them will not defeat this movement. This 

movement will have to be defeated by moderate Muslims who reject it. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Ms. Townsend. 


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Ms. TOWNSEND. As you know, Senator, most Muslim-Americans 

are patriotic, law-abiding citizens, and, in fact, while very few actually speak publicly—and I will explain why—many cooperate quietly with local law enforcement and Federal law enforcement, and we 

will not be successful without that continuing, and that is to be 

commended. 

Oftentimes, moderate Muslims are reluctant to speak out because the radicals label them—the word is called ‘‘takfiri,’’ and that 

is ‘‘un-Islamic’’—and separate them from the larger ummah of the 

Muslim world. And it is both discouraging to them and frightening 

to moderate Muslims and intimidates them from speaking out. And 

we have to understand that is the environment they live in, so 

there are few who have got the sort of courage to speak publicly, 

but we do not want to discourage them from privately and quietly 

cooperating with Federal and local officials. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Silber. 

Mr. SILBER. I think the question is in terms of what are the ways 

to combat extremism and what role does the Muslim community 

play, we are informed by our discussions with intelligence officials 

in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands who have 

had to deal with this problem in a magnitude greater than we have 

to date in the United States. And, clearly, their response is right 

along the same lines as that. At the end of the day, it is going to 

be the members of the Muslim community themselves who have to 

de-legitimize this as an ideology, and the challenge is for those governments and local entities to find willing interlocutors to help 

them de-legitimize that ideology. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. I would just underscore what Ms. Townsend said. 

I think it is important for Muslims to speak out publicly, but also 

there is evidence of a great deal of quiet activity going on within 

the community. We are talking about people attempting to ensure 

that their own family members, friends, and colleagues do not go 

down destructive and self-destructive paths. So there is a great 

deal of pressure in the community against this type of activity. 

Senator CARPER. All right. I said earlier we are not the FBI, we 

are not the Justice Department. We are none of those things. We 

are a legislative committee. Several of you have suggested things 

that we should be doing legislatively to reduce the likelihood that 

this kind of horrific thing will happen again in our country—or outside of our country. A couple of you made those legislative recommendations. Just go back and revisit those, re-emphasize them 

for us, please. 

Mr. ZARATE. I had made the suggestion, Senator, of making sure 

that law enforcement and intelligence authorities have the relevant 

legal authorities to be able to investigate domestically because, 

again, what we are talking about in this context—and this has 

been described by the panelists—is a very difficult problem to ferret out, especially when you are talking about a lone-wolf scenario. 

And so it becomes incredibly important for authorities to have not 

only the legal backing, structures, and procedures, but also then 

the resources. 

One of the key questions, I think, for the FBI will be: To the extent that there are additional pressures to try to ferret out these 


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types of actors and events, do they have the resources to cover 

these types of events, to follow up on the kinds of communications 

and leads that may exist, where there may be thousands of communications with a figure like an Anwar al-Awlaki from the United 

States. And so that I think is a critical question moving forward 

in addition to others I have presented. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, the two that I would focus on, one has 

to do with—this is my pet issue, as Senator Collins knows—the information sharing and the rules. Sometimes we make them too 

cumbersome that it is just discouraging. It is not that it is not permitted, but the rules become so cumbersome that they are discouraging, and so people do not do it. And I think the Committee has 

a real opportunity to look at things like the restrictions pursuant 

to FISA, the restrictions in the Attorney General’s Guidelines, and 

the FBI’s own internal guidelines. All taken together, it may be 

that just discouraged people from doing what they really needed to 

do. 

Then the second piece to that I really think is the U.S. military, 

it does not look like the Army got the information that they could 

have acted on within their system. I would not stop there. I think 

we have got to look at whether or not the U.S. military, if they had 

gotten the information, had the training, tactics, procedures, resources, and business process to ensure that they identify and deal 

with these things effectively. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you again very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. Good questions 

and very constructive answers. 

Senator McCain, thanks for being here. You are next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing. 

I would like to ask the witnesses, do you believe that the attack 

on Fort Hood was an act of terror? 

General KEANE. In my mind I do, based on the preliminary reports and what Major Hasan was screaming at the time of the act 

and his behavior and attitude prior to that. Just based on that preliminary report. Certainly investigations will confirm what his motivations are, but what is in front of us right now, I do. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, when you look at just the basic English 

dictionary definition of ‘‘terror,’’ which is the use of violence to instill fear and intimidation, I think it is hard to imagine that this 

was not an act of terror. I think what remains to be seen from the 

investigation is whether or not this is an individual bent on terrorizing or whether he is part of some larger conspiracy. But I do 

think it is an act of terror. 

Mr. SILBER. From the New York City Police Department’s perspective, this is an ongoing investigation run by other agencies, so 

we are not going to prejudge their findings. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I asked your opinion, not your findings. 

If you do not want to voice your opinion, that is fine with me. 

Mr. Zarate. 

Mr. ZARATE. Senator McCain, it certainly looks like an act of terror to me. I think for the technical definition under U.S. law, the 


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question of political motivation behind the attack is going to be 

central, obviously, to determining whether or not you can legally 

classify it as such. But I think it looks like an act of terror to me. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Jenkins. 

Mr. JENKINS. Terrorism is defined in the quality of the act, and 

certainly the act itself, I think, meets the criteria of an act of terrorism. Under a legal definition, in terms of the law, Major Hasan 

is charged with 13 counts of murder, and that is appropriate. We 

do not need to reach into the criminal statutes to find the word 

‘‘terrorism’’ to prosecute him. We have charged him with an ordinary crime, and that is good enough. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Let me just briefly review what we 

do know. We know that Major Hasan had communications with a 

Yemeni-American imam. We know that the FBI had some knowledge of this and reviewed certain communications between Major 

Hasan and the subject. That investigation asserted the content of 

these communications was consistent with research being conducted by Major Hasan in his position as a psychiatrist at the Walter Reed Medical Center. There are allegations of communications 

with other extremists; a Web posting advocating suicide bombing; 

possibly him, an individual named Major Hasan wrote a post on 

the Web site that favorably compared an American soldier jumping 

on a grenade to save the lives of his fellow soldiers to suicide bombers; extremist activities at Walter Reed; and that Major Hasan antagonized some students and faculty by espousing what they perceived to me extremist Islamist views; and, of course, the most notable is his activities while working at Walter Reed was a medical 

presentation to fellow students where he included statements such 

as, ‘‘We love death more than you love life,’’ and ‘‘Fighting to establish an Islamic state to please God, even by force, is condoned by 

Islam.’’ 

General Keane, the military is most sensitive of any organization 

I know to any taint or allegation or impression of being discriminatory, which is appropriate. Do you think that political correctness 

may have played some role in the fact that these dots were not connected? 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. And also I think a factor here 

is Major Hasan’s position as an officer and also his position as a 

psychiatrist contributed to that because of the special category in 

the military I think someone who is operating as a clinician every 

day treating patients is in. It is an individual activity versus a 

group activity, which provides considerably more supervision in 

squads, platoons, companies, and the like inside our units. So there 

is no doubt in my mind that was operating here. 

But, in fairness to many of the people who are associating with 

him, based on what preliminary research I have done and I think 

what the Committee is doing, I think we are going to find very 

clearly that we do not have specific guidelines on dealing with 

jihadist extremism in terms of the obligations of the members of 

the military to identify it, report it, and what actions to take and 

what constitutes jihadist extremism itself. 

So you take some of this burden away from people by having 

those guidelines, and when you have those guidelines in place, you 

are clearly saying to the institution that this is important to us, we 


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are not going to tolerate this kind of behavior, and we want to 

identify it immediately to try to curb the behavior through counseling and rehabilitation, and, if necessary, separate that individual from the service if it cannot be curbed. 

Senator MCCAIN. I have talked to military officers who have stated that they, at least up until now, have had a significant reluctance to pursue what may be these indications because of this political correctness environment. Have you heard the same? 

General KEANE. Well, I know it exists, no doubt about it, and 

what I am trying to say is that the way to deal with that—it 

should not have to be an act of moral courage on behalf of a soldier 

to report behavior that we should not be tolerating inside our military organizations. It should be an obligation. 

The way to make that an obligation is provide very specific 

guidelines through the chain of command as to what their duties 

are in regards to this issue. That begins to take this issue off the 

table because the institution is speaking clearly in terms of what 

its expectations are and what it will tolerate and what it will not 

tolerate. 

Senator MCCAIN. And perhaps err on the side of caution instead 

of erring on the side of correctness. 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Townsend. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, I have the 

same concern that you have articulated in the U.S. military and 

the law enforcement community. We have invested lots of time and 

effort in the post-September 11, 2001, world to ensure that people 

understand we are going to provide people First Amendment protections in their freedom and practice of religion. 

I do fear that because this was a senior member of the uniformed 

military, there was a reluctance to proceed, and I think that this 

is an area that the Committee should and ought to investigate and 

uncover in terms of our law enforcement system that we cannot 

allow them to be reluctant to follow the facts just because they are 

afraid that they are going to be criticized for not being politically 

correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Silber. 

Mr. SILBER. In the NYPD, if we had a concern like that, it would 

be forwarded up the chain of command as well as to the Department of Internal Affairs for investigation. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Zarate. 

Mr. ZARATE. Senator, given my experience with the FBI, I do not 

think there would have been a sense of political correctness with 

respect to the ethnicity or religious beliefs of the individual. This 

is my assessment based on what I know. I think his status in the 

military, the fact that he was a medical doctor, the fact that he was 

engaged in research with respect to potential conflicts in the minds 

of Muslim soldiers, that may have affected the judgment of the FBI 

in this context and much less a question of his ethnicity or beliefs. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if they believe that those kinds of e-mails 

that they detected were a part of research which advocates extreme 

Muslim activity, at least I would find out what kind of research is 

going on. Frankly, I have never heard of such research. So I am 

kind of skeptical about your answer. Go ahead, Mr. Jenkins. 


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Mr. JENKINS. I do not think religion is an acceptable basis for 

any group being stigmatized, but religion provides no shield 

against any legitimate inquiry and therefore should not have inhibited an appropriate inquiry. 

Let me, however, underscore a point made by General Keane 

which I think is important here. My military experience is in combat units. In a combat unit, actions like Major Hasan’s, attitudes 

like his, would be picked up much faster than in the individual professional activity of a psychiatrist even though in military service. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator McCain. An important 

exchange. 

I want to add just this. After the Fort Hood massacre, I received 

a call from a friend of mine who is a high-ranking officer in the 

Army, just to confirm what you said, and also basically to go to 

your point, that we have great respect for diversity of religion, but 

it should not be a cover for bad behavior. And this officer said to 

me that, ‘‘If the Army and the rest of the services make clear that 

Islamist extremist behavior is not tolerated and you have an obligation to report it right away, you will be doing an enormous favor 

to all the other Muslim-American soldiers who serve under me because without that,’’ this officer said to me, ‘‘I worry that the nonMuslim soldiers are going to have hesitation to have what we have 

to have in combat, which is blind trust in one another.’’ 

I think it is a really important point, that insofar as we focus on 

the extremists, we are actually going to be doing a favor to everybody else of that particular religion who is in the military and helping military cohesion. 

Senator Ensign. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this hearing 

has been important for a lot of different reasons, and some of the 

issues you just articulated I think are definitely some of them. 

This whole idea of political correctness, whether that is political 

correctness due to an officer, whether that is political correctness 

of somebody’s particular religion, I am curious, Mr. Silber, when 

you said we would refer up the chain of command, what if that 

chain of command—in other words, what if you had a high-ranking 

officer in the New York City Police Department, you discovered 

that person happened to be of the Islamic faith and was having 

contacts with one of these radical clerics, one of these imams over 

in Yemen, what would be done at that point in the New York City 

Police Department? 

Mr. SILBER. If no action was taken, I would then take it up to 

the deputy commissioner level. 

Senator ENSIGN. Ms. Townsend, you talked about the obligation 

to share with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and I think that is 

important. Does that happen with the military today? In other 

words, would they share that information with the military? Or is 

it just other law enforcement agencies? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. What happens is on the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), sits on it. 


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And in this instance, my understanding is the information came to 

the JTTF, was shared with the Defense Criminal Investigative 

Service, but the memorandum of understanding (MOU), as well as 

perhaps FISA restrictions, would have prevented the DCIS agent 

from sharing it back to the Army and DOD, the Pentagon, without 

permission. Depending on where the information came from, they 

would have—— 

Senator ENSIGN. But you said that permission is pretty easy to 

get. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. They can get it. That is right. And what this sort 

of suggests to me is that the assessment on the JTTF was that 

they did not view it as a close call. They looked at these communications. They looked at, in my understanding, the personnel file. 

There was no derogatory information. And so they saw no reason. 

Now, I think over time, as more information comes out, the Committee will be in a better position to judge whether or not that was 

the right judgment. But mechanisms certainly did exist if there 

was a desire on the part of the JTTF or the Defense Criminal Investigative Service to share that back with DOD. 

Senator ENSIGN. One of the concerns that I see here is, we heard 

about the silos pre-September 11, 2001, and some of the statements 

that he allegedly has made, talking about, in one instance when 

Colonel Terry Lee said that he heard him say that maybe people 

should strap bombs on themselves and go to Times Square in New 

York, the contacts with the imam. Are those silos still in place 

where you hear this over here or you hear something else going on 

where that information is not being shared? Do those still exist? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. To be fair, I think tremendous progress has been 

made in terms of information sharing, and I think when we see 

that there was collection and it came into the JTTF, that is an indication that we have made a lot of progress in that area. 

Based on what I have read publicly—because, of course, we do 

not have all the facts yet—it is not clear to me that the information 

from Walter Reed and his colleagues that would have been in the 

personnel system ever made its way into the personnel file. And if 

that is the case, that means the JTTF and the DCIS agent, when 

they had the communications and would have looked at the bare 

record of the personnel file, if there was no derogatory information 

in it, they were at a disadvantage. And we have to fix that system. 

If there was information inside the military, it needed to make its 

way into a format where it could be shared. 

Senator ENSIGN. I see. General Keane, I think you have brought 

up some of the most important testimony today as far as fixing this 

going forward, and it sounds like this obviously should have been 

in place, as very simple as what the New York City Police Department has as far as their policies and procedures. Going forward, I 

think what Senator Lieberman talked about, if these policies and 

procedures are in place, it does take pressure off somebody in the 

future, if they know they are obligated to report. Let us say that 

you have somebody who is a Muslim who feels that, ‘‘Gee, should 

I report this or not? Maybe I am going to be stigmatized. I do not 

know whether I should report it.’’ Now they have an obligation. 

That actually, I agree that protects them, and so I think that was 

very important. 


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I want to go back to something, Ms. Townsend, you said that is 

a little bit disturbing in the general Islamic community, when you 

say there are moderate Muslims out there, and they feel like they 

would be stigmatized, they would be kind of set apart. It would 

seem to me, getting back to what Mr. Zarate said as far as the obligation of the Muslim-American community, they have an obligation 

to stigmatize, to separate those who are radical, so that somebody 

who is moderate in their views feels like they can come out and 

condemn. That would seem to me the overarching obligation of the 

Muslim-American community, to not let the radicals control their 

community in such a way that if you feel like you are being a loyal 

American, you are actually disloyal to the Muslim community out 

there. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, you and I do not disagree, I do not 

think. 

Senator ENSIGN. And that you were just reporting the facts. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. That is exactly right. I am simply telling you 

that, based on my experience, this is a continuing challenge to law 

enforcement community, that is, to encourage moderate Muslims to 

speak out. And I suppose my only suggestion is we ought to take 

some heart and some reassurance in the fact that there are many 

patriotic, law-abiding Muslim-Americans who actually, while they 

are not speaking out publicly, do what they can to stigmatize those 

who have radical extremist beliefs, bring them to the attention of 

local and Federal law enforcement, and weed them out of their 

communities before they can do harm. And for that, we are very 

grateful. 

Senator ENSIGN. Well, I think this panel, all of you, have had 

some excellent testimony today, have given us some direction, but 

probably have given others in the military even some further direction to go as well. And we need to renew some of the tools, obviously, for law enforcement and maybe make some of the tweaks 

that you all have suggested to make that information sharing a little less cumbersome so it will be done a lot more as well. So I 

thank all the witnesses for your testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Ensign. Thanks very 

much. And, there are obviously lessons here that relate to this particular case for behavior of employees of the Department of the 

Army, the U.S. military generally, and the Department of Justice. 

But there are broader implications for society and particularly in 

these lone-wolf cases, which are the hardest, as our witnesses have 

said. When people hear people saying things that seem extreme, respecting First Amendment rights, you have to begin to reach out 

and see if you can stop somebody before they do something very 

harmful. 

Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is already a great deal in the public record about Major 

Hasan that raises concerns about the adequacy of our law enforcement, about whether the military acted on the information that 

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mented upon in some of Major Hasan’s Department of Defense 

records. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s investigation in this 

matter is going to focus on the military and any connections of 

JTTF to the military. Our investigation is going to be carried out 

in a way that is consistent with the essential need to avoid jeopardizing the criminal investigation into this attack by Major Hasan. 

And I think this Committee has been careful and I want to commend the Committee and the witnesses who have been careful not 

to say something—particularly you, Mr. Silber, to avoid saying anything which could jeopardize the criminal investigation and the 

prosecution of this man. It is essential that we both investigate, 

correct where it is necessary, and hold accountable where it is necessary, but also that we prosecute without running into the defense 

that there has been a prejudgment by people who have either some 

kind of command authority or anyone else that is in law enforcement. 

Ms. Townsend, your testimony, it seems to me, is right on point 

when you talk about the JTTF being encumbered or apparently 

being encumbered by some of its procedures. The memorandum of 

agreement—it looks like a contract, small print—between itself and 

the Department of Defense is 16 pages long. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. That is right. 

Senator LEVIN. It took 3 months for three people to sign that 

agreement. The way it was characterized just in April before a 

House committee by the Los Angeles County sheriff was that a 

local task force officer may not share information with his or her 

home agency without demonstrating the receiving entity’s specific 

‘‘need and right to know.’’ That is not factual, I do not believe. You 

would agree, Ms. Townsend, that is not factual. But that is what 

a sheriff believed. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. And I am afraid there is too much of that feeling 

of restriction as to the reaching out potential for information that 

is in the JTTF files. 

There is also a problem, it seems to me, from what we can tell 

in terms of the JTTF piece here, with the follow-up either into 

other agencies’ records and back into JTTF, but perhaps within 

JTTF itself when subsequent information comes to its attention, in 

particular. And I am wondering if you can quickly tell us, Ms. 

Townsend, whether or not you know that a JTTF, if it gets information in year one, has the ability—and, in fact, does—when it 

gets information in year four, to connect that back to the information that it had. Could you give us a really quick answer if you 

know the answer to that? 

Ms. TOWNSEND. I think it is fair to say the possibility exists that 

they could put that together because there are records and communications involved, so it is possible and that information is indexed, 

and I think you have to look on an individual basis. 

Senator LEVIN. Because there is some question as to whether, in 

fact, that did occur in this case. 

Now, a number of witnesses have said that the fact of these investigations and the need for corrective actions does not impugn 

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icans to our military and to our society. I think you all have said 

that, as have the Chairman, the Ranking Member, and others on 

this panel. The diversity of our Nation’s military and of our Nation 

as a whole has been a great strength. It has been one of our most 

effective weapons against the fanatics of any religion who claim the 

right to murder those who hold different beliefs. 

Mr. Zarate, you quoted a statement which I think is a very significant quote of a Muslim leader here both in terms of the responsibility of the Muslim community, and I share that. But you also 

point out that as a counternarrative, there is no more powerful 

weapon than the promise and the reality of the American dream 

with the opportunity for Muslim-Americans to be integrated, as 

have all other immigrants, into the American society. 

I want to ask you to comment on a statement of Reverend Pat 

Robertson, who recently and very publicly asserted the following: 

That Islam is ‘‘not a religion but a violent political system bent on 

the overthrow of the governments of the world and world domination.’’ And as to whether or not a statement such as that by a wellknown American cleric makes it more difficult for moderate Muslims to make the argument and, indeed, whether that kind of statement really helps the enemy to radicalize people who would then 

commit terrorist acts against us. Do you have a reaction to that 

comment, Mr. Zarate? 

Mr. ZARATE. Senator, I think I will just stand by what I said, 

which is the division of our society would be detrimental and would 

be the worst manifestation and effects of this violent Islamist extremist ideology. Islam is one of the great religions of the world, 

and I think at the end of the day it is going to be Muslim-Americans who help us to defeat this violent brand of it. 

Senator LEVIN. But I want to press you on this question, because 

I think it is important that it be contested and that it be opposed 

for a major religious leader in this country to label Islam—Islam 

as a whole—as a violent political system bent on the overthrow of 

governments, it seems to me plays right into the hands of the extremists and the fanatics. It gives them the propaganda tool that 

they look for, and I would like to know whether or not you believe 

that is the case. 

Mr. ZARATE. I do not think it is helpful, and I do think it plays 

into the radicals’ ideology and narrative of the West, and the 

United States, in particular being at war with Islam. And so I do 

not think those kinds of statements are helpful. 

Senator LEVIN. Does anyone else want to comment on this statement on the panel as to whether or not you believe that kind of 

statement is—— 

General KEANE. Yes, I would comment on it, Senator. I think it 

is an outrageous, irresponsible statement by a religious leader, it 

is full of discrimination, it is offensive to Muslims in general, and 

it no doubt inflames the situation and makes no contribution to 

what we are trying to achieve, and that is, a stable situation. 

Senator LEVIN. Does anybody else want to comment on that? Ms. 

Townsend. 

Ms. TOWNSEND. Senator, I agree completely with General Keane. 

I think it is offensive, it is ignorant, it lacks a basis in fact and 

knowledge. There is a very small extreme wing not only, by the 


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way, of Islam, but there are extreme wings of other religions which 

are found to be deeply offensive to the vast majority of the believers of those religions, just as fundamental extremism is to Islam. 

The vast majority of people, Muslim or not, ought to take grave offense at this irresponsible statement and reject it. 

Senator LEVIN. Anybody else? 

[No response.] 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Thanks very 

much. Thanks for raising that last question. Of course, I agree not 

only was it outrageous, but as you said, it hurts our efforts to succeed in this conflict. 

The other Senators who came earlier had to leave. If the witnesses can stand it, I think Senator Collins and I will do one more 

quick round. 

Mr. Silber, I wanted to ask you some hypotheticals, if you would. 

If the New York Police Department was doing court-ordered surveillance of somebody in the city who was known to be involved in 

Islamist extremist activities, and as part of that surveillance came 

across a member of the NYPD communicating with that individual, 

what would the reaction of the Department be. Let us assume first 

that the communications were of a religious nature, not particularly inflammatory but, still, communicating with an individual 

who is known as an extremist. What would the reaction of the Department be? 

Mr. SILBER. I think the Department would look at the nature of 

the communications because in the nature of the communications 

would give us an insight as to what the purpose of this interaction 

is. Obviously, any type of interaction between a member of the 

service and individuals who are being investigated just across the 

board would be something of concern and would get senior-level attention within the Department. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Right, the simple communication 

with somebody who had a record of being involved in association 

with terrorism or terrorists would raise concerns and raise this up 

to a higher level within the NYPD. 

Mr. SILBER. Yes, Senator. I think the two issues are the pedigree 

of the individual who has been contacted as well as the content of 

the communication. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I assume that if the content took a 

more extreme direction—in other words, let us say an officer in the 

NYPD was found communicating with this subject of an NYPD investigation and was expressing extremist views, and perhaps even 

suggesting the justification for violent actions in pursuit of extremist views, then I presume that would raise real alarm bells. 

Mr. SILBER. Yes, and as I stated earlier, Senator, I think the 

process would be to reach out to our Internal Affairs Bureau to 

move that up the chain of command so that got the appropriate 

level of attention. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, it would depend, I assume, what 

that would mean. In other words, I presume you would watch that 

person more carefully or take more aggressive action. 

Mr. SILBER. Yes, I think we would need to understand, what that 

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zation process and say, is that an isolated interaction or does that 

fit into a larger continuum. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Now let us step back, and you have 

developed from your experience the four phases of radicalization. 

And to the extent you are able, based on the public record, I wanted to ask you if you would apply that framework to what you know 

about Major Hasan. 

Mr. SILBER. Sure. Senator, I think Mr. Jenkins made a good 

point that when you are dealing with a lone wolf, an individual 

actor, to some degree they really are at the margins of the process 

that we have looked at and others have looked at. And, in fact, our 

study primarily looked at groups of individuals. 

That said, we have looked at some of the preliminary information 

out there, and it is suggestive that he went through some type of 

radicalization process. I think the key questions to ask are look at 

his behaviors and see how those correlate through some of the 

phases and through some of the indicators that we have identified 

in the model. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. From what you know—I was interested in 

the concept you introduced of a virtual spiritual sanctioner—that 

is, somebody operating over the Internet. Incidentally, as I understand it, someone like al-Awlaki whom we have been talking about 

operates a public Web site with quite open expressions of exhortation to jihadist behavior. In other words, you do not have to have 

an authorized surveillance of his e-mails—and there are a lot of 

others like this—to conclude that this guy is at war and urging others to get at war. But I wanted to ask you whether from what you 

have heard of al-Awlaki, does that seem to fit into your vision of 

a virtual spiritual sanctioner? 

Mr. SILBER. I think based on his pedigree going back to September 11, 2001, and also looking at what he has done more recently in terms of his Web site, promoting in English jihadist 

views, he is clearly an individual of concern. So I think the next 

question we would ask is: What was the nature of the relationship 

between him and another individual? The spiritual sanctioner functionally moves somebody down that pathway, and that really is the 

key question. Functionally, what was the relationship between him 

and another individual? Did he move that person down the pathway, encouraging him to move from, let us say, self-identification 

to indoctrination, or indoctrination to jihadization? And that I 

think is a key issue. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, it struck me also that we have to go 

into these e-mails. They are classified, of course, but there has been 

some description—and I cannot say whether it is based on fact or 

not—that this was part of Major Hasan’s research, his reported 

communication with the subject of this investigation. But the 

choice of this recipient of e-mails says a lot, I think, about what 

Major Hasan was looking for. In other words, there are a lot of 

Muslim imams, authorities, and scholars that he might have communicated with as part of research or even to ask personal religious questions. Doesn’t it say something about him? And what I 

am getting at is that he may have been looking for spiritual sanctioning of what he is accused of ultimately doing. 


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Mr. SILBER. Yes, Senator, I agree wholeheartedly with that view. 

I think who you reach out to for theological or doctrinal questions 

does give some indication to some degree to what message you are 

looking for. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just a final quick question. Mr. Zarate 

raises a question in his testimony about whether the U.S. military 

is doing enough to protect its bases in the context of the clear appeals by jihadist leaders to attack our military in their bases and 

now the evidence in the United States of this string of plots, fortunately most of them not successful, but tragically, the one in Little 

Rock and Fort Hood, successful. 

General Keane, do you have any response to that? Is there more 

that we should be doing to protect the security of the bases generally, even in the United States, from terrorist attack? 

General KEANE. Well, I think we dramatically changed the security on our bases post-September 11, 2001, for all the obvious reasons, and I am confident that the military goes through continuous 

reviews to ensure that force protection is of the rigor it should be. 

The Fort Hood incident is so dramatically different because it 

comes from within as opposed from without, and in that problem 

lie the issues that we have discussed here. It is more up to the 

members of that organization within to deal with that issue than 

it is to guard at the gate or others who are dealing with force protection issues as associated with a military base. And certainly the 

other thing that goes hand in glove with this is cooperation with 

law enforcement agencies and intelligence services, in terms of 

stopping these incidents before they actually take place—and that 

is crucial and that is what has prevented certainly most of these 

incidents from taking place—is the tremendous work that law enforcement is doing in cooperation with other agencies. And that certainly has got to continue, and if we can improve the process, as 

Frances Townsend is suggesting, that will add to it as well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well said. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Jenkins, we hope that one of the results of our investigation 

will be a new pamphlet on extremist activities that incorporates 

the lessons of this case. That still begs the question of what should 

the military do when it identifies a soldier who is embracing radical views, extremist views. We know, due to the good work of the 

NYPD, about the four stages of radicalization, and it is possible 

that intervention at an early stage could make a difference and 

could lead to something short of discharging the individual from 

the service. 

In 2007, when you testified before Congress about jihadist 

radicalization and recruitment, you talked about the possibility of 

countermessaging. I would like to ask you today whether you see 

opportunities for the Army to intervene at stage one of the 

radicalization process to try to help some members of our military 

get back on track. 

Mr. JENKINS. I think it is important that we look at this in the 

context of military service. I mean, to be quite honest with you, 

Senator, when I was in the military, I did not know, nor did I care 

what the religion was of the members of my unit. I dealt with them 

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erences for method of burial was something that did not concern 

me. 

I think it is entirely appropriate, when an individual is displaying behavior that is inappropriate within the context of the 

military unit or is demonstrating behavior that is contrary to morale or suggests a destructive or a self-destructive path, that there 

be an appropriate intervention. And as I say, in many cases in a 

combat unit, that will be picked up fairly quickly, and there will 

be that appropriate intervention. 

I think what we have to do is empower individuals so that they 

need not be shy about this—our understandable concerns about 

free speech, about protecting civil liberties, should not cause us to 

hesitate where there is clearly manifest behavior that is inappropriate, wrong, contrary, and so on. 

In many cases, I think there is intervention. We know about 

radicalization only from those terrorists who have made it all the 

way through a terrorist act or an arrest. We do not have information about all of those who drop out along the way, and there are 

a lot who do drop out along the way or are counseled along the 

way. 

It will be interesting to know about the radicalization in the case 

of Major Hasan. He has been subjected to extraordinary scrutiny 

in the last couple of weeks because of this event. There are literally 

thousands of reporters who are picking up every statement that he 

made, every piece. That right now is chronologically flat, and one 

would really like to see, in order to compare it to what we know 

here as researchers, a chronology constructed here. When was he 

communicating with this imam? When was he making these statements? What were his actions over time? Can we see a trajectory 

and then at that point identify where there might have been a useful intervention? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just end my comments today by going back 

to the 9/11 Commission Report because it does appear to me that 

we did have—it is too early to say for sure, but that we did have 

a failure to share critical information, a failure to ask questions, 

to initiate an investigation, or at least an inquiry or an interview, 

and that the results were tragic, horrible consequences: A terrorist 

attack. 

The 9/11 Commission reminds us—and I want to read from the 

report. ‘‘In the 9/11 story, for example, we sometimes see examples 

of information that could be accessed—like the undistributed NSA 

information that would have helped identify Nawaf al-Hazmi in 

January 2000. But someone had to ask for it. In that case, no one 

did. Or, as in the episodes we describe in chapter 8, the information is distributed, but in a compartmented channel. Or the information is available, and someone does ask, but it cannot be shared. 

‘‘What all these stories have in common is a system that requires 

a demonstrated ‘need to know’ before sharing. This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the 

information.’’ 

The point is that information must be shared with those that 

have the ability to understand the full context and take action. If 

you look at Major Hasan’s presentations—there were two of them 


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41 

that I am aware of; one I have looked completely through—there 

are warning signs and red flags galore. If you look at his contacts 

with the radical imam, without revealing what those specific emails said, just the fact that he was seeking advice and communicating with a known al-Qaeda associate, when you start to put 

together all of the pieces of information, it reminds me very much 

of the siloed information that was available throughout the Federal 

Government in different agencies prior to the attacks on our country on September 11, 2001. And our challenge is to make sure that 

we have not allowed new silos to build up, that the JTTFs, which 

have been tremendous and have had a lot of successes, do not inadvertently become another silo where information cannot be shared 

without jumping through too many hoops. And that is our challenge, as we learn more through our investigation, to identify legal 

barriers, administrative impediments that may have blocked the 

sharing of information in this case, and to identify in our military 

whether we need better systems to encourage reporting, as the 

General put it so well, that it is no longer a moral act of courage 

but, rather, an obligation to report disturbing information. 

That is what our investigation is aimed at, and, again, I want 

to thank the Chairman for initiating this very important investigation and to express my appreciation to all of you today for your 

forthright, candid, and expert testimony. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. It, as always, 

is a pleasure to work with you. We are going to conduct this investigation in the same thorough and bipartisan/nonpartisan way we 

have done everything on this Committee, including some controversial and sensitive investigations into Federal Government behavior 

prior to September 11, 2001, and also during Hurricane Katrina. 

I think you stated well what we have accomplished today. 

I cannot thank the five witnesses enough for their testimony. I 

cannot imagine a better way to inform our investigation. You have 

brought your experience and considerable expertise to the table. 

You have helped us begin to understand how to best approach this. 

You have made some specific suggestions not just about questions 

to pursue in our investigation, but about reforms to initiate as a 

result of what we already know about Major Hasan and the murders that occurred at Fort Hood. 

So I honestly cannot thank you enough, and I would like to take 

the liberty of keeping in touch with you as this investigation goes 

on. I also would invite you not to hesitate to initiate to us as you 

watch this occurring. 

We are going to continue the investigation now. I hope we can 

conduct the investigation in the cooperative way that we have 

begun with the Executive Branch. It will inevitably now take a less 

public turn with a lot of interviews and reviewing of documents, 

and we will reconvene in public session when and if we think it is 

appropriate and constructive to do so, and then ultimately to issue 

a report and recommendations. 

But you have done a real service not just to the Committee but 

I honestly believe to the homeland security of the people of our 

country. I thank you very much. 


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The record will stay open for 15 days for additional statements 

and questions. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 


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