Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and the commander’s priorities. 

Mission. Provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the 

United States and its interests. Plan and synchronize operations against 

terrorist networks.

Priorities.	 • Deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorist threats.

	 	 • Develop and support our people and their families.

	 	 • Sustain and modernize the force.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff 

colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU portal is https://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, YC-3, Strategic Studies Department Director

William W. Mendel, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

and William S. Wildrick, Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret—Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 

JSOU Associate Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts 

University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, Professor of National 

Security Policy, U.S. Army War College 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Associate Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret., JSOU 

Institutional Integration Division Chief

Brian H. Greenshields 

Colonel, U.S. Air Force 

SOF Chair, Naval Postgraduate School

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Faculty Associate, Defense Critical Language/

Culture Program, Mansfield Center, University 

of Montana and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

18th USAF Special Operations School 

Commandant

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 
On the cover

Top left. Night training mission, two CV-22 Osprey 

aircraft, assigned to the 58th Special Operations 

Wing, at Kirtland AFB. 

Top right. A U.S. Army Special Operations soldier 

scans for insurgents during an engagement in the 

Sangin District area, Helmand Province, Southern 

Afghanistan. 

Bottom left. Marines from the 1st Marine Special 

Operations Battalion discuss their imminent jump 

2,500 feet above Camp Pendleton, California. 

Bottom right. Naval Special Warfare combatantcraft crewmen operate a Rigid Inflatable Boat from 

a forward location. 

USSOCOM

Research Topics

2010
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to Director, 

Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, 

Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. Copies of this publication may be 

obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-1569; FAX 850-884-3917. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant 

to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 

Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-35-0
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008,

Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, 

February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India’s Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Nortern Ireland’s Counterinsurgency, 

October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing 

Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line, 

February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski 

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect 

Approaches, February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, 

Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White 

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, March 2009 

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy:The Past as Present, the Present 

as Future, April 2009, Roby C. Barrett 

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May 2009, 

John B. Alexander

vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................ ix

Preface ................................................................................................... xi

A. Priority Topics ................................................................................... 1

B. Combating Terrorist Networks .......................................................... 9

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy and Operations ......................................15

D. Interagency ....................................................................................... 19

E. Regional and Cultural Studies ...........................................................25

F. Special Interest .................................................................................. 29

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues ....................................................37

H. Topics Retained from Previous Years ............................................. 45

ix

Foreword

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

2010 Research Topics list, produced by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), is intended to guide research projects for 

Professional Military Education (PME) students, JSOU faculty, research 

fellows, and others writing about special operations during this academic 

year. Research is one of the cornerstones of JSOU’s academic mission 

as we strive to produce publications to meet joint Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) operational and planning needs. Each year representatives 

from USSOCOM, the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), 

SOF chairs from the war colleges, and JSOU senior fellows develop a 

list of salient issues confronting SOF in the near term. The list is vetted 

through the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will advance 

SOF missions and support SOF interests. The final recommendations for 

research topics are approved by the USSOCOM commander. 

The topics list is organized into eight sections (A-H) with the first 

seven addressing the most pressing needs or issues facing SOF today. 

Section B focuses on research issues related to Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs) as this is the critical fight the United States and its allies 

are engaged in today. The following sections expand on issues crucial to 

understanding CbTNs: irregular warfare, the interagency process, and 

regional and cultural studies. 

The interagency is often discussed today, but frequently misunderstood. The interagency is best understood as a community or process 

that links different elements of government. Two key locations where the 

interagency comes together are Washington, D.C. and at U.S. embassies in 

foreign countries. The overarching focus of interagency research is how 

to best ensure the interagency process meets requirements for successful 

prosecution of the ongoing irregular form of war. Irregular war engenders much debate, and its concepts are strongly linked to the interagency 

process. The third key element in the current conflict is the critical concept of cultural or regional studies. Defining the cultural, regional, or 

linguistic requirements for CbTN is itself a major challenge. 

These critical topics, concepts, and processes reflect the challenges 

of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for the conflicts 
x

most likely to face us in the foreseeable future. This alone speaks to the 

need for more debate, research, and study. Therefore, I encourage you 

to review the topics and to make use of the research tools found on the 

JSOU Education Gateway at https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/gateway. If 

you have any questions about this document, JSOU Press in general, or 

how JSOU can assist you in your academic research, contact Mr. James 

Anderson, JSOU Research Manager at (850) 884-1569 (DSN 579) or 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Kenneth H. Poole

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
xi

Preface

This booklet represents an effort to list and categorize special 

operations-related research topics presented to professional military education (PME) students, JSOU part-time senior fellows, 

and other SOF researchers. The commander of the United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) places high emphasis on Special 

Operations Forces (SOF) students writing on timely, relevant, SOF-related 

topics. This list is simply a guide to stimulate ideas; topics may be narrowed, broadened, or otherwise modified as deemed necessary (e.g., to 

suit school writing requirements or individual experiences). 

Sections A through G contain new topic categories with major ideas/concepts for 2010 from which topics can be derived, depending on the interest/experience of the researcher and the desired level of detail. 

Section A (Priority Topics) identifies those topics of particular importance that the commander, USSOCOM has selected for special emphasis. 

Each of these seeks to expand SOF understanding of specific challenges 

and to suggest techniques and procedures to increase SOF efficiency in 

addressing them. The Priority Topics reflect a consensus of those participating in the topics project as being particularly useful in addressing 

immediate SOF needs and in building future capabilities. Topics focus on 

the following:

a. Achieving greater understanding of the structure and functioning of terrorist networks through social networking tools and 

other initiatives

b. Employing social marketing techniques and other best practices 

to address terrorist networks

c. Developing assessment protocols to determine effectiveness of 

effort against those networks. 

Other topics solicit fresh insights into combating terrorism through 

direct and indirect approaches; developing new intelligence architectures; 

countering radicalization by working through local indigenous persons; 

and exploring the role for SOF in political warfare, coercive diplomacy, 

and active security campaigns.
xii

Section H is a list of topics retained from previous years. 

Limited TDY funding will be available from JSOU for researchers (e.g., 

PME students) to support their projects (e.g., to conduct interviews or 

visit USSOCOM or component headquarters). These research “grants” are 

subject to approval by the director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 

depending on the topic selected and the value added to the project.

For questions and clarification of a given topic or for requesting funding to support your research, contact the manager of JSOU Research, Mr. 

James D. Anderson, at james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil, DSN 579-1569 

or (850) 884-1569. Share this reference with fellow researchers, thesis 

advisors, and other colleagues; and feel free to submit additional topics 

for inclusion in updated editions. 

JSOU Press has released several publications that may relate to your 

topic of interest; see the complete list at http://jsoupublic.socom.mil. 
1

A. Priority Topics

A. Priority Topics

Topic Titles

A1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks?

A2. How to understand more precisely the employment of social networking tools and techniques in terrorist networks: A quantitative 

analysis of using new technologies for terrorism

A3. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

A4. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the 

appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve SOF 

understanding and effectiveness at the local level? 

A5. Use of social marketing techniques to counter terrorist networks 

A6. How to build capabilities to conduct local, regional, and global 

assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness

A7. How to expand capabilities to identify, locate, target, and disrupt key 

components of terrorist networks

A8. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism

A9. Phase 0, SOFt power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive 

diplomacy, and active security campaigns

A10. Money as a weapon system: Are Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) funds being spent wisely?

A11. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

IW

A12. Building an IW force for the future

A13. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism effort

A14. Role of gender in hearts and minds campaigns 
2

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

Topic Descriptions

A1. What initiatives are necessary to improve SOF capabilities to 

understand local, global, and regional terrorist networks?

For SOF to be successful in defeating and deterring terrorist networks, we must first understand our operational environment, 

whether physical or virtual. To do this, we need the cognitive skill 

sets to provide SOF with local, global, and regional understandings 

of those environments. Historical context is essential for understanding current conditions and to avoid becoming trapped in the 

centuries-old role of under informed westerners confronting radical 

Islamic forces. What is a “network”? How do they find strength in 

their cultural surroundings? What outcomes against terrorist networks are truly possible and acceptable? This study examines current SOF capabilities to learn about and share awareness of terrorist 

network structures, strengths, and vulnerabilities. It then moves forward to propose steps to improve current capabilities while seeking 

initiatives to fill existing gaps. 

A2. How to understand more precisely the employment of social networking tools and techniques in terrorist networks: A quantitative analysis of using new technologies for terrorism

Virtual social networks have become an integral part of contemporary personal interaction. Blogs, instant messaging, My Space, 

Facebook, chat rooms, webcasts, and video games have contributed 

to the alteration of traditional communication methods. This project 

involves a quantitative analysis of the use of social networking tools 

to disseminate messages and techniques for attracting participation in terrorist activities. Previous work has focused on qualitative 

methods. It is important to know and understand how these new 

technologies are used to create social movements in support of terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. Virtual collaboration changes how organizations communicate and how they exercise 

command and control. With the advent of these new technologies 

and techniques, how can DoD best counter and/or exploit these 

technologies? Do SOF need to develop their own virtual operators

to function in this environment? As western studies are typically 

employed to interpret Middle Eastern communication trends, this 

study seeks to employ cross cultural communication methods.
3

A. Priority Topics

A3. Operationalizing combating terrorism: Direct and indirect 

approaches 

Experience teaches that fighting and winning within the counterterrorism effort are separate, though complementary, endeavors. 

Fighting requires direct action to kill or capture terrorists and 

destroy their support networks. However, is reliance on such quick, 

decisive, and measurable missions reflective of a winning strategy? 

How does such a mindset hinder or help win a war when the ultimate effects of such operations may not be apparent for months 

or even years? Thus, is the reliance on Direct Action missions to 

attrit terrorists effective beyond force protection or the defense of 

strategic interests within the broader war on terror? Winning must 

ultimately be about indirect actions intended to eliminate the environment that enables terrorists to flourish and operate. Winning is 

also about eliminating sanctuaries, an effort inevitably requiring a 

mix of direct and indirect actions. This study proposes a “right mix” 

of direct and indirect actions to assure the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives. What is the correct force structure to win and win 

decisively? What does “operationalizing intelligence” mean to collectors, analysts, planners, and operators? How does the process of 

operationalizing look when successfully implemented?

A4. Countering radicalization: How do we identify and recruit the 

appropriate indigenous persons and leverage them to improve 

SOF understanding and effectiveness at the local level? 

One of the lessons of the counterterrorism effort is that “radical” 

Islamic thought and practice represent a very complex and diverse 

mix of groups and agendas. However, by simply labeling terrorists 

and their networks as “Al Qaeda” or some other shorthand reference 

without a more detailed understanding of their nature runs the risk 

of missing important characteristics that are essential to the successful engagement of these networks. Such generalizations also tend to 

assign credit and prestige to Al Qaeda, even when the group and its 

proxies may have nothing to do with a specific situation. SOF need 

to become far more sophisticated in their understanding of Islam in 

general and in categorization of Islam’s radical elements. This study 

surveys the relevant Islamic groups, their belief structures, and their 

agendas. For example, what are the differences between an Iraqi 

Jaysh al-Mahdi follower who adheres to Wilayat al-Fiqh as a political philosophy and an Iranian who espouses similar beliefs? Once 
4

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

the differences are identified and understood, what can be done to 

leverage them to achieve success in the counterterrorism effort? How 

do we counter radicalization by identifying, recruiting, and working with indigenous assets with special emphasis on parents and 

relatives?

A5. Use of social marketing techniques to counter terrorist networks 

Indirect action relies heavily on shaping the environment and creating perceptions that are favorable to counterterrorism activities. This 

study addresses the question, Can the use of accepted communication and marketing techniques have applications for the development of Strategic Communication, Information Operations, and 

Psychological Operations plans? Review the range of relevant techniques and procedures from the fields of social marketing, strategic 

communication, public relations, and rhetoric and propose initiatives to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism 

influence campaigns.

A6. How to build capabilities to conduct local, regional, and global 

assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness

Credible assessments of counterterrorist network effectiveness are 

essential to sustained and successful counterterrorism operations. 

This study explores the purpose of such assessments, USSOCOM’s 

authorities to conduct assessments, the assumptions and components that drive the assumption process, and the complex interactions required with other combatant commands and the wider 

interagency to ensure the most complete assessment products. 

Assessments allow the joint force to determine the effects associated with counterterrorist network operations: the impact upon the 

terrorist network, the effect upon the targeted populace and other 

actors, the effect upon other elements within the operational environment, and the requirements for future joint force contributions 

to counterterrorist network operations. This study also includes an 

overview of planning assumptions to include the understanding of 

the terrorist network, emerging effects, and the changing conditions 

within the operational environment to determine the accuracy of 

understanding, effectiveness of operations, and the course corrections required for future operations.
5

A. Priority Topics

A7. How to expand capabilities to identify, locate, target, and disrupt 

key components of terrorist networks

Central to any counterterrorism effort is the capability to engage 

the full spectrum of a terrorist network and to render the network 

unable or unwilling to continue to function. This study examines 

techniques by which parallel organizations can be established to 

compete with and neutralize components of existing terrorist networks. Engagement of such networks can be either led or enabled 

by the DoD functioning by, with, and through interagency, multinational, and/or nongovernmental partners. Activities may involve 

direct actions focused on specific nodes or links of interest; they may 

also employ indirect methods addressing some aspect of the operating environment and thus rendering ineffective the node or link of 

interest.

A8. SOF contributions to a new intelligence architecture for 

counterterrorism

In the late summer of 2008, the Defense Science Board (DSB) identified key security issues that, if not addressed, could lead to future 

military failure. One of these was a lack of deep penetration capabilities needed for developing actionable intelligence against individual 

terrorists and terrorist groups. More broadly, the DSB underscored 

the need for a new architecture that no longer focused on mainly 

fixed installations, but on people and activities “hiding in plain 

sight” and collection that would be “close-in, intrusive, and must 

achieve deep penetration.” The DSB pointed to SOF as one of the 

“enduring pockets of innovation, agility, and prudent risk-taking” 

within DoD. Using the DSB findings as a point of departure, this 

study will address specific steps that SOF can take to enhance new 

counterterrorism intelligence collection efforts in appropriate and 

feasible ways. Overview reading: Defense Imperatives for the New 

Administration, Defense Science Board, August 2008.

A9. Phase 0, SOFt power: Role for SOF in political warfare, coercive 

diplomacy, and active security campaigns

There is a need to assist the DoD and the interagency to understand 

and integrate Phase 0 operations into the preparation of the environment in support of irregular warfare (IW). This study explores the 

strategic utility of SOF to achieve U.S. policy objectives in nonwar 

and preventive-war scenarios. It is relevant to theater and SOF 
6

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

strategists, campaign planners, the IW community, and the interagency. The discussion should include the achievement of strategic 

effects in periods of political warfare (e.g., secret warfare, ideological warfare, and flexible deterrent options)—also known as “Grey” 

SOF—during coercive diplomacy and as part of COCOM persistent and adaptive Phase 0 theater campaigns. The research should 

explore the ways and means SOF achieves high levels of strategic 

performance in pursuit of national political goals; identify the optimal cooperation and team arrangements among SOF, DoD, and the 

wider U.S. Government interagency to achieve both military and 

political objectives; identify the best war-prevention measures SOF 

can perform; and recommend any necessary changes to the current 

security assistance environment to develop strategically sound, longterm, adaptable campaign lines of operation. 

A10. Money as a weapon system: Are Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) funds being spent wisely?

Dr. Eli Burman recently provided the director of J9 an information 

brief during which he raised the question, “Are CERP funds being 

spent in ways that are truly having a positive effect on the counterterrorism effort?” The basic assumption driving this question is 

that money can be employed as a weapons system as part of indirect 

operations in support of irregular-warfare strategies. This study 

researches the expenditure of CERP funds during the counterterrorism effort in various theaters and reaches conclusions about the 

effectiveness of the decisions taken. It further provides recommendations about how to best utilize CERP resources in the future based 

on lessons learned and the specific environments commanders may 

find themselves.

A11. Integrating General Purpose Forces (GPF) and SOF operations in 

IW

The integration of GPF and SOF operations in IW environments 

raises many familiar questions. This study identifies the most persistent of these and proposes answers that seek to formalize the relationship between the complementary efforts. What lines of authority 

delineate SOF and GPF-controlled portions of an area of operation? 

When is one component the supported and the other the supporting within a specific operation? What are the mechanisms for the 

deconfliction of GPF and SOF rules of engagement? What are the 

mechanisms for ensuring the resolution of other interoperability 
7

A. Priority Topics

issues that may arise? How does SOF gain equitable access to GPFcontrolled sustainment and mission enablers such as transportation, 

communication, intelligence resources, and UAV support? 

A12. Building an IW force for the future 

Emerging thought contends that SOF may not be adequately prepared to interact with indigenous populations in the variety of 

operational environments in which the IW counterterrorism effort 

will be fought and won. Do such shortcomings exist? If so, how 

can SOF better prepare itself for its global missions by addressing 

these shortcomings through employment of proxies, irregulars, or 

surrogates? Propose procedures to identify those with particular 

aptitudes for cultural awareness, intercultural communication, and 

language proficiency. What indicators in secondary school curricula 

can assist in alerting recruiters to individuals with appropriate skill 

sets? Increasing numbers of school systems offer and sometimes 

require Spanish language proficiency. Are similar mandates available for Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Russian, and so on? What is cultural 

awareness? How should proficiency levels in cultural awareness be 

introduced and managed? Should training be focused on individual 

soldiers, units, or force-wide capabilities? How should cultural 

awareness training be tailored for different Military Occupational 

Specialties (MOSs), duty positions, and grades? Is cultural awareness 

sufficient for SOF to meet mission requirements? Should standards 

for specific cross-cultural capabilities be introduced to expand 

individual and unit SOF proficiencies across multiple geographical 

areas? 

A13. Retooling Special Forces for the 21st century counterterrorism 

effort

This research topic focuses on U.S. Army Special Forces and potential changes in how they operate to address the counterterrorism 

effort and related threats. How practical is it to have U.S. Army 

Special Forces prepare themselves primarily for unconventional warfare and FID missions while retaining the capabilities for support 

of remaining core SOF missions? With a narrower lane to travel, 

how can the training of language and cultural skills be upgraded 

to address the specific requirements of unconventional warfare and 

FID? What initiatives are available to establish and sustain stronger and more credible relationships with host-nation personnel? Is 

there utility in forward deploying Special Forces units to draw on 
8

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

improved infrastructures and opportunities for immersion in local 

and regional cultures? Consider historical examples and outline 

potential benefits and drawbacks to these approaches. Shifting to 

the future, how might such initiatives better prepare Special Forces 

units to identify, understand, prepare for, and confront emerging 

threats? Conduct assessments of the ODAs, ODBs, and Groups with 

an eye toward suggesting changes in their structures and skill sets. 

Is a 12-man ODA too large, too small or just right? Are its skill sets 

in need of a fresh assessment? Might the communication sergeant 

become the “Computer Surveillance/Attack Sergeant”? Is the Special 

Forces education and training system outdated? Are we getting the 

maximum benefit from the “brainpower” of ODA members? What 

specific steps are necessary to field the most efficient and effective 

Special Forces capability for the future? 

A14. Role of gender in hearts and minds campaigns 

Women play major motivational roles and assert considerable influence in Muslim and other cultures. The challenge is that the specifics of those roles and influence are frequently unclear to outsiders, 

especially to SOF. Evidence indicates that in some Muslim communities, women act as hard-core motivators behind male jihadist 

activities, including suicide bombings. By contrast, women can also 

serve as powerful motivators to counter radicalization. This study 

surveys the roles that women play in specific regions of interest (i.e., 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa). How do women 

influence activities within their families and wider communities? 

How do women interact with their immediate social environments? 

What values do they bring to those interactions? How can a better 

understanding of the role of women in a given region result in more 

effective engagement by SOF or the U.S. Government interagency? 

How can all-male SOF engage local populations in ways that are 

both appropriate and credible? What are some current initiatives 

for engaging women? What new engagement techniques should be 

added? What specific engagement techniques should be avoided? Is 

there an opportunity to employ women in Civil Affairs and PSYOP 

units to build bridges to indigenous female populations? How might 

the increased attention to gender issues lead to greater sensitivity to 

ethnicity, religion, and other socioeconomic variables? 
9

B. Combating Terrorist Networks

B. Combating Terrorist Networks

Topic Titles

B1. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to 

the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist network?

B2. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis on 

the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks

B3. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter 

violent extremist ideology

B4. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks

B5. Capability to share information with interagency, multinational, and 

nongovernmental partners in local, regional, and global counterterrorist networks

B6. What makes an extremist: The world’s disaffected youth and their 

potential for extremist activity

B7. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist 

activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists? 

B8. The Rules of War and Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

B9. Know your enemy

Topic Descriptions

B1. What capabilities can and should be developed to provide support to the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental 

counterterrorist network?

Joint Forces possess a variety of direct and indirect services, products, and resources to enable counterterrorist network disruption 

operations as well as programs to encourage local development, 

governance, and security. This study identifies possible Joint Force 

contributions that are both appropriate and acceptable to partners 

in the interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental counterterrorist network. The resulting program may include training, security 

assistance, education, command and control, logistics, ISR, funding, 
10

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

support to civil authority, information operations, and direct action 

missions.

B2. Turning the hot war cold: Suggestions for the increased emphasis 

on the indirect lines of operation to combat terrorist networks

It is commonly accepted that indirect action and lines of operation

are central to the efforts to defeat terrorists and their networks. Even 

so, it would appear that direct action missions are the preferred 

choice. This study surveys historical examples, lessons learned, and 

best practices to provide a comprehensive overview of the strategic, long-term nature of the indirect process. Examples such as the 

Marshall Plan and case studies from the Cold War serve as support 

for indirect thinking. What do SOF operators and leaders need 

to relearn about indirect planning and operations? Suggestions to 

improve the quality of indirect efforts should focus on preparing the 

irregular-warfare operational environment through the use of information operations, population influence, strategic communication, 

and civil-military operations.

B3. Engaging the constructive, credible Muslim Ummah to counter 

violent extremist ideology

This topic continues to be one of growing interest among members of the Intelligence community who are seeking strategies for 

countering radicalization or changing the attitudes of those who 

are already extremists. Focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 

Yemen, Algeria, Pakistan, and Europe, what can the U.S. government do to reduce information barriers among 10–40 year-old 

Muslims? Which U.S. policies should be either increased or reduced 

to enhance positive engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah 

organization? Also, how does the U.S. support or encourage credible Muslim voices without discrediting them through our endorsement or support? Identify avenues and methodologies to positively 

engage the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology. Further, look to other nations such as India (home to 

more Muslims than Pakistan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali as venues for similar initiatives. For 

instance, are the techniques that are appropriate in Egypt also 

appropriate in Indonesia or elsewhere?
11

B. Combating Terrorist Networks

B4. Capability to synchronize DoD/DoS networks to counter terrorist 

networks

The complexities of terrorist networks require the establishment and 

synchronization of counterterrorism networks that field the necessary capabilities from the DoD, DoS, and throughout the wider 

U.S. Government interagency. Such arrangements remain elusive 

as stovepipe relationships and legislation prohibiting collaboration 

among various agencies limit network functioning. This study looks 

at how terrorist groups form their social networks and in what areas 

of interest they operate. As we consider the emerging concept of 

“communities of interest” built around social networking, is network

the best way to conceptualize both terrorist and counterterrorist 

structures? What specific steps are necessary to synchronize DoD/

DoS counterterrorist structures so they more efficiently bridge organizational boundaries? How do we construct counterterrorist structures that mirror those of our adversaries? How do we ensure that 

the emerging counterterrorism structures reach down to the operational level and are not blocked by the temptation to over-classify the 

flow of essential information?

B5. Capability to share information with interagency, multinational, 

and nongovernmental partners in local, regional, and global 

counterterrorist networks

One of the challenges of establishing and sustaining counterterrorist 

networks is the need to remember that “all terrorism is local.” Thus 

the requirement to work from the bottom up in many cases becomes 

more important than adherence to classic hierarchy structures. This 

study seeks to maximize the effectiveness of information sharing 

throughout counterterrorist networks. How best can we create a 

Common Operating Picture that is understood by and trusted by 

DoD and its appropriate interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental partners? How can the information-sharing capability 

be exploited to ensure dissemination of useful information that 

establishes a common basis for counterterrorist network decisions? 

Information sharing is currently uneven. During steady state conditions, it is inadequate in granting access to shared plans, lessons 

learned, information exchanges among agencies, and technology 

integration. In times of crisis response, information and relevant 

data are shared, but it does not occur on a regular or recurring 

basis. How can information sharing and harmonization of plans be 
12

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

improved to provide visibility and prepare a diverse set of stakeholders with the most useful information at the right time? How do we 

maximize intelligence and information capabilities, incorporate 

and exploit those capabilities, and determine what information may 

be shared among interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental partners and surrogates? How do we provide information that 

addresses the operational environment, the dynamics of the targeted 

populaces, and vulnerable adversary nodes and links? 

B6. What makes an extremist: The world’s disaffected youth and 

their potential for extremist activity

The lack of opportunity for jobs and upward social mobility has 

much to do with creating a disenfranchised population. Many see 

terrorism as the last chance to change their personal and family 

positions in life. To what extent do such motivations reflect afterthe-fact rationalizations to justify actions already taken? Research 

equally compelling motivations for violence—for example, turf battles, revenge, issues of personal and family honor, desire for status, 

peer pressure, and boredom. Personal interviews with young men 

and women who are at risk of being radicalized or are undergoing 

the process will add certainty about motives. Once those motivations are identified, what can be done to turn those who are vulnerable into neutral, even productive, individuals? How can broader 

understandings about youthful motivation undermine terrorist 

networks by limiting the source pool of new extremists rather than 

expending resources to disrupt the demand for their services?

B7. How can Islamic religious tenets be employed to counter terrorist activities and slow the recruitment of new extremists? 

Islamic extremists justify their behavior by invoking religious principles and elements of faith. This study turns the tables by challenging these claims and suggesting alternative Islamic interpretations 

that discredit terrorist behavior. Survey re-education programs 

such as in Singapore and other countries that use religious teachers to meet with captured extremists or terrorists to challenge their 

interpretation of Islamic teachings, discredit their justifications 

for violent conduct, and reframe Islamic teachings as condemning violent acts rather than endorsing them. Instead of relying on 

imprecise terminology and labels, what Islamic words and verses 

exist that reject the violence committed and “justified” by religion? 

For instance, the often-used terms such as jihadist and mujahedeen
13

B. Combating Terrorist Networks

are, in fact, positive terms that bolster the prestige and morale of the 

Islamic extremist. What Islamic words convey negative judgment 

on a terrorist or evil doer? How can we carefully use Islamic beliefs 

against the extremists? What is the true meaning of fatwas and their 

role in Islamic culture? Propose approaches that originate with credible Islamic voices, not with nonIslamic, noncleric, nonreligious 

scholars. What primary source secular materials exist that highlight 

the hypocrisy and internal contradictions contained in the writings 

and actions of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Pointing out 

that such groups are opportunistic as much as they are ideological 

or religious can serve as an effective way to undermine their propaganda and presumed righteousness. 

B8. The Rules of War and Combating Terrorist Networks (CbTNs)

The counterterrorism effort has revealed various gaps in international security systems that lead to reassessment and modification. 

This study considers the impacts of the Rules of War on the complexities of combating terrorism and terrorist networks, threats 

that have grown in their importance since the establishment of relevant international legal protocols. Does international law and the 

Geneva/Hague Conventions hamper military operations to defeat a 

threat that does not accept or follow the same rules? What are some 

relevant historical examples? How do the Rules of War affect CbTN 

policies and strategy? To what degree has or can the articles of the 

Rules of War be modified or replaced to accommodate current and 

future operational environments where terrorists and their tactics 

are a persistent presence? How can modifications to the Rules of War 

be crafted to avoid long-term detrimental effects to U.S. CbTN activities? What role does the public’s immediate access to information 

and criticism from the news media force our commanders to fight 

a politically correct war? What is the correct balance for allowing 

operational latitude for tactical decisions while ensuring adequate 

checks are in place to avoid abuses? How can request authorities be 

crafted to ensure timely guidance in the face of uncertainty over 

what is appropriate behavior? Because of the increasing role of contractors, what responsibilities do they have to follow the Rules of 

War? What sanctions are available to ensure contractor compliance?

B9. Know your enemy

Analyze several terrorist and nonstate threat leaders, specifically 

focusing on their creative and innovative aspects. Examine the 
14

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

decision-making process, adaptability, and contingency planning of 

threat leaders and their organizations. Determine the feasibility of 

U.S. and allied SOF commanders/leaders adopting any/some of these 

traits to exploit threat weaknesses and enhance mission accomplishment in their own units.
15

C. Irregualar Warfare Strategy and Operations

C. Irregular Warfare Strategy 

 and Operations

Topic Titles

C1. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular warfare (IW) operations?

C2. Hearts and minds: Human influence operations in IW

C3. Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and 

operations

C4. Influence operations within IW

C5. Can SOF effectively accomplish its mission in a high end asymmetric threat environment and at what cost?

Topic Descriptions

C1. What are the appropriate metrics for DoD to assess irregular 

warfare (IW) operations?

The measurement of success in IW operations is extremely difficult because of the absence of “cookie-cutter” solutions to address 

any given situation and the need to develop specific metrics on a 

case-by-case basis. This study tackles the challenge of determining 

how IW operations can be viewed as effects-based when existing 

measurements of success are so rudimentary. Active engagement 

with academia and the application of assessment and analysis tools 

already used by social scientists can greatly assist in IW evaluation efforts. Contrast the need for an “inside out” assessment model 

that considers people, adversaries, and environmental perspectives 

with the traditional U.S. “outside in” approach. How do we arrive at 

data baselines against which to measure effectiveness? How do we 

measure the impact of IW activities (beyond killing the terrorists) 

in achieving geographic combatant command, DoD, and national 

strategic goals? What is the measurement of effect(s) for foreign 

internal defense (FID) in terms of partner preparedness vs. SOF 

relationship building? What are the lines of operation for other SOF 

activities, and how can those measurements be captured? How do 

we define success, and how do we measure it? How do we measure 
16

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

good enough? How do we assess when no action is better than action 

that, though successful, may result in huge strategic costs? What are 

the time horizons across which we should measure?

C2.	 Hearts and minds: Human influence operations in IW

At the core of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and the indirect 

approach lies the concept of hearts and minds. SOF is deeply engaged 

in both counterinsurgency (COIN) and the indirect approach; therefore, the winning of the hearts and minds of indigenous peoples 

is central to their missions. Despite the significance of hearts and 

minds to SOF, the concept is often treated as a buzzword—a phrase 

that is taken at face value with little analysis, historical grounding, 

or precise understanding of what it entails. Its application also differs in recent history and in different theaters. This study looks at the 

concept of hearts and minds from a fresh perspective with the goal 

of deepening understanding of the concept and its relevance to the 

struggle against terrorism. Is winning the compliance and cooperation of the population a more relevant understanding of the task? 

After all, populations need to see good reasons to support government efforts, though not necessarily to like their government. Has 

the emphasis on kinetic operations produced negative consequences 

for hearts-and-minds efforts because of friendly fire/collateral 

damage incidents or because SOF are seen as supporting an unpopular government? How do we address religion (hearts and souls) as a 

component of the hearts-and-minds challenge? This research should 

capture the techniques and best practices as we know them from 

IW experiences. Are we changing minds/opinions, or are we simply 

seeking common ground where interests match? What steps do we 

need to take to at least keep the population neutral? Are hearts-andminds efforts a method or line of operation rather than an objective? 

C3.	 Refining the indirect approach, irregular warfare strategy and

operations

The proper coordination and application of effort in the areas of 

governance, development, security, economics, and social structures 

can result in the unbalancing of our adversaries and/or the alteration 

of environmental conditions. Such indirect approaches normally 

require a long-term commitment and challenge the patience of politicians and publics. Based on lessons learned, this study reviews the 

essential issues of indirect action with an idea of refining the paradigm to account for inevitable long-duration involvement. Attention 
17

C. Irregualar Warfare Strategy and Operations

must be paid to the various leverage points so as to gain maximum 

effect. These include goals/desired end states, levels of operational 

risk, access of U.S. forces and resources, U.S. “anti-bodies,” preconflict vs. conflict roles, security vs. nonsecurity threats, regional 

players (e.g., EU, AU, ASEAN, OAS), and independent players (e.g., 

UN, ICRC, business/industry). What are the indirect action lessons 

learned? How do we prioritize various indirect approaches? How 

do we prepare domestic, partner, and host-nation publics to understand and accept the long-term nature of indirect action? The study 

recognizes the theoretical influence of rhetorical studies and strategic communication theory such as inoculation theory, cultivation 

theory, and the two-step communication process.

C4.	 Influence operations within IW

The understanding and support—or at least the neutrality—of a 

variety of audiences is necessary for the successful prosecution of 

IW operations. These include the populations of the host nation/

region, the U.S., and partner nations, as well as the collective 

endorsement of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations who have an interest in the outcomes. This study takes a fresh 

look at how to synchronize the interagency capabilities of Public 

Affairs, public diplomacy, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and 

strategic communication, both individually and collectively under 

the umbrella of Information Operations. How do practitioners in 

each discipline coordinate their activities with the others? How 

are desired end states defined? What steps are necessary to ensure 

consistency of messages in a way that is perceived as credible by 

each target audience? How can the U.S. accommodate communication programs fielded by host nations, partner nations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations? 

What metrics should be established to be able to accurately assess 

effectiveness?

C5. Can SOF effectively accomplish its mission in a high end asymmetric threat environment and at what cost? 

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) exposure is 

a show stopper to aircraft mobility and utility. Ops tempo cannot 

be sustained more than for a few sorties because expensive air 

assets will be compromised by CBRN-related warfare agents due to 

the lack of tactical indications and warnings to avoid; and lack of 

aircraft decontamination capability to allow timely restoration of 
18

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

operational tempo. Consequently, what would be the impact on SOF 

specifically on aircraft mobility/utility and are there any mitigating 

factors?” 
19

D. Interagency

D. Interagency

Topic Titles

D1. Capability to train, advise, and assist interagency, multinational, and 

nongovernmental governance and security partners in disrupting 

terrorist network resources

D2. Controlling the message: Organizational issues affecting strategic Communication, public diplomacy, and influence within the 

interagency

D3. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive 

and cooperative decision making and their applications to interagency interaction

D4. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency 

interaction

D5. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency 

leads

D6. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of the 

whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus maximizing 

best practices while reducing redundancy and costly overlap with 

other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative countries, 

and multinational organizations? 

D7. Interagency turf battles

D8. Exploring a joint interagency structure such as the Joint Service 

System within the DoD

D9. SOF thoughts on improving security assistance programs

Topic Descriptions

D1. Capability to train, advise, and assist interagency, multinational, 

and nongovernmental governance and security partners in disrupting terrorist network resources

This study considers various ways to increase the capability to prepare a complex mix of actors to take actions to disrupt terrorist networks and their resources. Ideas should include providing training 
20

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

and advice to local, regional, and global partners. Specific recommendations include traditional entities such as intelligence, law 

enforcement, internal security forces, and paramilitary forces. Also 

addressed are nontraditional governance and security partners such 

as private industry or other institutions that share common interests 

in promoting the defeat of terrorist networks. This training may be 

conducted by, with, or through U.S. or other partner forces and may 

be executed in the joint operational area or elsewhere as required in 

support of shared endgame objectives.

D2. Controlling the message: Organizational issues affecting strategic communication, public diplomacy, and influence within the

interagency

A basic principle of strategic communication has always been to 

speak with one voice. This challenge becomes more difficult as messaging moves from the parent organization into the broader U.S. 

Government interagency process. What issues affect the ability of 

the interagency to conduct credible communication and messaging, both domestically and internationally? Areas of interest include 

law, policy, organizational communication, and cultural awareness. 

How does the interagency capture and incorporate the communication and messaging best practices from individual U.S. Government 

organizations? How can the interagency adapt to new technology 

and techniques in competing with other messaging agendas? How 

does the interagency structure itself to accommodate the communication agendas of host nations, partner nations, intergovernmental 

organizations, and nongovernmental organizations? Overview readings include relevant GAO Reports, Defense Science Board Reports, 

and the IO Roadmap.

D3. Game theory and the warrior diplomat: Understanding competitive and cooperative decision making and their applications to 

interagency interaction

When conducting interagency collaboration or negotiations, most 

participants are trained to approach the bargaining table as if they 

are engaged in a zero-sum game—that is, if another agency wins, 

my agency loses. This approach reflects classic competitive decision making. How can the introduction of game theory shift the 

negotiation paradigm from competitive to cooperative decision 

making? Drawing on the assumption that it is in the best interests of 

each participant to cooperate with the others, what techniques are 
21

D. Interagency

available to teach that all participants benefit from cooperative decision making models? How might game theory assist in developing 

lasting interagency decision models that can also be further applied 

to state-to-state negotiations?

D4. Impact of organizational (agency) cultures on effective interagency interaction

Understanding different organizational cultures is essential in 

seeking to reconcile different approaches for dealing with interagency issues. The goal is to achieve a unity of action by identifying 

complementary approaches in framing and addressing a specific 

challenge. Unique organizational cultures determine such things as 

decision-making models, communication styles, goal expectations, 

operational structures, and resource flows. This study explores these 

dimensions within the DoD, DoS, and other key participants in 

the interagency process. How do these differences affect both positive and negative interagency interaction? How might best practices 

in different agencies be documented and adapted throughout the 

interagency? Part of the design of the interagency, especially the 

respective Intelligence nodes within the Intelligence community, 

was to foster competition. The organizational culture within the DoS 

is very different from that within the DoD or CIA, leading in part 

to differing Intelligence estimates. This competition was intended 

to ensure that decision makers had different opinions to weigh 

against one another. Does the creation of the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) run the risk of undermining this competition in 

favor of consensus assessments? What procedures can be developed 

to ensure that decision makers in all functional areas have different 

opinions to weigh against one another? 

D5. Analyze interagency C2, planning, and operational mechanisms 

employed during contingency operations where the interagency 

leads

The interagency has successfully led contingency-based operations, 

many with IW parameters. Around the globe, the interagency leads 

on a daily basis the U.S. Government efforts in combating terrorism, 

counter-finance, counter-criminal business enterprise, counterdrug, and other security missions. During the secret war in Laos 

(Vietnam War era), the covert and paramilitary efforts of the U.S. 

Government, in conjunction with SOF, were led by the U.S. ambassador and his country team with operational control over both U.S. 
22

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

military and civil assets. Successful COIN cases exist where DoS-led 

efforts, enabled by U.S. SOF and other military forces, advanced U.S. 

interests and achieved strategic political objectives (e.g., El Salvador, 

Operation Enduring Freedom, Philippines, and security assistance 

to Greece after World War II). Efforts to win the drug war and assist 

Plan Columbia are interagency-led, specifically by the U.S. ambassador and his military group (MILGRP). However, important differences in approach persist. This study analyzes the various methods 

that different agencies employ. For example, the military uses a very 

structured planning process (MDMP), but the DoS utilizes a different method. How does each department’s planning processes differ, 

and what we can do to fill the gaps resulting from these differences? 

Should we plan on using similar processes, and if not, how do we 

bridge gaps that might result? Study and analyze interagency-led 

contingency-size task force operations to identify and synthesize 

best practices in strategic and operational planning, C2, and implementation. Identify the vital role SOF can play in these indirect 

applications of military power. Identify best uses of GPF to facilitate 

these operations. Recommend a 21st century task organization for 

the country team. This would include the MILGRP, which would 

optimize contingency operations when led by the interagency. What 

are the risks? What challenges and strategic opportunities will dictate the use of interagency task forces? Consider the use of an interagency task force to accomplish soft-power campaigns over extended 

periods. What are the implications of having non-DoD departments 

(e.g. DoS/DoJ/DoE) in charge of DoD elements? Is the DoD prepared 

to place DoD assets under the control of OGA commanders?

D6. What steps can the DoD take to encourage the engagement of 

the whole of government in the counterterrorism effort, thus 

maximizing best practices while reducing redundancy and costly 

overlap with other U.S. Government agencies, partner and cooperative countries, and multinational organizations? 

The skill sets and resources necessary for the successful prosecution of the counterterrorism effort reside throughout the U.S. 

Government. One of the weaknesses of the interagency process is 

the absence of a clear mandate for who is authorized to contribute 

to the requirements generated by the counterterrorism effort. What 

specific steps are necessary to identify and engage the full range of 

U.S. Government capabilities? One of the recurring problems is that 
23

D. Interagency

of information sharing. What can be done within the interagency 

to break down stovepipes and flatten the dynamic process of information exchange? How can DoD improve its capabilities to share 

information with the U.S. Government interagency, partner and 

cooperative countries, and multinational organizations? 

D7. Interagency turf battles

As experiences in Afghanistan and elsewhere have taught, the military frequently finds itself in the position of performing tasks normally performed by DoS or other U.S. Government agencies because 

the magnitude of the work precluded those normally responsible 

from doing it. This reality raises important political/social theory 

questions about the tension among organizations that have been 

given formal mandates/charters to perform while resources have 

been given to another organization, and capabilities perhaps reside 

with yet a third. What examples of both success and failure exist 

in such complex situations? How can objective after-action reports 

prepared by external reviewers (and not intended merely to assess 

blame) assist in identifying best practices in interagency relationships? What are the underlying obstacles to creating a synchronized 

interagency process to execute the counterterrorism effort and 

other theater missions and objectives? How can we convince others 

within the U.S. Government to muster resources towards a common 

goal when no individual and independent agency is subordinate 

to another? How do interagency players overcome the restrictions 

of their legal responsibilities, capabilities, and capacities and yet 

provide the fullest support to a whole-of-government effort? Do 

we need an interagency commission with representatives from the 

DoS, DoD, DNI, DoJ, and other agencies to run the counterterrorism effort? Does such management-by-consensus stifle real leadership? Examine various options or approaches, taking into account 

the human factors involved, with recommendations of how to better 

run the whole-of-government machinery without creating another 

cumbersome layer of bureaucracy. How do we manage/resolve 

conflicting agency missions to achieve true interagency solutions? 

How do we develop practical nonhierarchal C-2 structures to enable 

SOF, GPF, and other government agencies to work together on the 

battlefield?
24

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

D8. Exploring a joint interagency structure such as the Joint Service 

System within the DoD 

Recognizing that the counterterrorism effort and other issues pose 

challenges far greater than the skill sets and resources of the DoD 

alone, is it feasible to establish a joint interagency structure to 

facilitate counterterrorism and other cross-functional priorities? 

How can the lessons learned from the organizational structure of 

AFRICOM assist in building a broader interagency initiative? What 

is the tradeoff in effectiveness between leveraging existing interagency relationships and establishing new informal relationships 

that are activated as situations require vs. establishing a new quasiinstitution (the interagency) that can be resourced and staffed? How 

does the strengthening of interagency structures overcome the problem of part-time members of an interagency task force maintaining 

ultimate allegiance to their parent agencies? Does the evolution of 

the National Security Professional Program provide a path toward 

the establishment of a more formal in-charge agency with a specific 

set of responsibilities such as counterterrorism? What could such an 

organization look like?

D9. SOF thoughts on improving security assistance programs

The interagency nature of establishing, resourcing, and conducting security assistance programs presents significant challenges to 

SOF units at the operational and tactical levels. This study surveys 

current practices in executing such programs and suggests specific 

steps that should be taken to improve their effectiveness. What interagency reforms are necessary, especially between DoS and DoD? 

What can be done to streamline the process of determining resource 

requirements? Once those requirements are established, how can 

greater efficiencies be introduced into the procurement and delivery 

of basic resources such as fuel and ammunition? 
25

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

Topic Titles

E1. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for SOF 

operations 

E2. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: Potential SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and 

U.S. CONUS defense 

E3. Foreign perceptions of the threat and use of special operations: The 

NATO-Europe view

Topic Descriptions

E1. Best practices of providing cultural education in preparation for 

SOF operations 

SOF traditionally place a heavy reliance on operating within unfamiliar cultures. Cultural awareness and language proficiency are the 

building blocks of cultural education. How do different SOF components prepare their personnel to conduct operations with indigenous 

populations? Do specific education methods work better for certain 

missions? How does language proficiency assist with cultural education? Which elements of culture are essential to prepare SOF for 

down-range experiences? Do nongovernmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and other international players conduct education programs that may be helpful in assessing and 

improving SOF cultural education? How might cultural immersion 

programs assist SOF preparations? Identify standards for determining how much education is sufficient in a given situation.

E2. Supporting U.S. southwest border stability in a crisis period: 

Potential SOF assistance to struggling Mexican security institutions and U.S. CONUS defense

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recent articulation of 

the U.S. Joint Operational Environment (JOE) highlights a real 

potential for Mexico becoming a failed state. Sustained pressures 

from organized crime- and gang-fed violence increasingly point to 

weakening Mexican military and security institutions, while at the 

same time entrenched government corruption undermines the most 
26

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

serious reform efforts. JFCOM—in a judgment that may have been 

characterized as excessive just a few years ago—highlights Mexico’s 

weakening institutions as a threat to Western Hemispheric security 

generally, and especially as a U.S. Homeland Security problem of 

“immense proportions.” Visible increases in Mexican cross-border 

violence immediately following the JFCOM report’s release were 

underscored by Phoenix, Arizona being named the top U.S. kidnapping center and the second highest in the world as a consequence of 

Mexican gang and paramilitary violence. Individual U.S. states, in 

response, have begun to formulate their own plans for border crisis. 

The possibility of a sudden catastrophic collapse with ensuing mass 

border crossings, humanitarian crises all point to the broadest U.S. 

support requirements being implemented, and anticipatory planning 

or actions undertaken ahead of time. The U.S. State Department’s 

FY 2009 Strategic Mission Plan: U.S. Mission to Mexico has declared 

four major policy goals. These potentially benefit from the direct or 

indirect support of U.S. SOF to appropriate Mexican institutions 

and to CONUS military, law enforcement, and interagency organizations: enhancing common border security, increasing security 

of a shared North American homeland, strengthening Mexican 

law enforcement and judicial capabilities, and helping Mexico consolidate and strengthen its governmental institutions and the rule 

of law. Research under this topic examines the ways in which U.S. 

special operations components—and especially the roles of U.S. 

NORTHCOM and the interagency community—can effectively support such U.S. policy goals in today’s operational environment that 

blurs distinctions between U.S. and Mexican requirements.

E3. Foreign perceptions of the threat and use of special operations: 

The NATO-Europe view

This study should evaluate European perceptions regarding a range 

of threats, with a view to determining why Europeans tend to view 

threats differently than Americans do. It should also pay particular 

attention to European perceptions of special operations in countering some of these threats. Much current opinion holds many kinds 

of special operations to be illegitimate or illegal. This study will 

examine the reasons for this and suggest possible remedies.

One of the great obstacles to concerted action in the struggle against 

terrorism is the significant variance of what these threats actually 

are and how serious they are taken. Many Europeans, for example, 

believe that the U.S. is the greatest security threat they face. Given 
27

E. Regional and Cultural Studies

this, the potential for building a lasting coalition to fight terrorism 

is nearly impossible. Since security alliances are built on common 

threat perceptions, the future for the counterterrorist alliance is 

grim unless these perceptions can be altered.

The study should identify key threat perceptions on both sides of the 

Atlantic and examine the discrepancies, with a view towards establishing the implications of these discrepancies for combined action. 

Because elite opinion is often closer to American perceptions than 

the public at large, a key element of this study should examine these 

differences.

29

F. Special Interest

F. Special Interest

Topic Titles

F1. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

F2. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and future 

threats

F3. Natural resources battlefield

F4. Nonkinetic measures of effect 

F5. Balancing openness with OPSEC

F6. Consequences of classified information disclosure in news media 

reporting of SOF operations 

F7. Detainee disposition instructions

F8. Deciding on the classification levels of studies on terrorism topics

F9. Differing perspectives: Seeking of effort by the U.S. and Europe

F10. SOF intellectual capital

F11. Law and legal institutions 

F12. Tailoring a new U.S. Government organization

F13. Contemporary space applications for special operations

Topic Descriptions

F1. Leveraging academic support for special operations 

The SOF community, in the form of Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS), was an innovator in the recruiting and use of academic 

specialists—for example, anthropologists, political scientists, historians, and linguists—to advance IW initiatives. Support in the early 

days was typically enthusiastic. While productive relationships have 

continued to some extent, recent years have seen far less enthusiasm in academia for defense and security interaction. Sometimes 

the response is outright rejection and hostility. In a 2008 effort to 

reinvigorate what decades earlier had been productive relationships, 

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates oversaw the development 

of what was called the Minerva Consortia. This initiative included 

academic outreach and a number of programs that included the creation and deployment of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), document 
30

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

exploitation for key areas of interest to both scholars and military 

planners, religious and ideological studies, and other applications 

of history, anthropology, sociology, and evolutionary psychology 

expertise residing in U.S. universities. Some of these programs, however, particularly the HTTs under U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) management, have proven controversial in 

academia and in reviews of implementation and effectiveness. While 

SOF has its own priorities and approaches, concepts for leveraging 

academic support for special operations should be considered in 

light of such controversies and problem areas. This study addresses 

how SOF can most productively use expertise found in U.S. universities and academic research centers to advance SOF knowledge, skills, 

initiatives, and operations. It will consider concepts, approaches, 

specific activities and programs, and the overall nature, appropriateness, and potential of academic/university relationships. 

Overview readings are Speech to the Association of American 

Universities (Washington, D.C.) as delivered by Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., 14 April 2008 and Robin 

Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (Yale 

University Press, 1996).

F2. Strategic culture analysis: Predictive capacity for current and 

future threats

Many feel that strategic culture analysis holds significant promise for 

interpreting and understanding how different states approach matters of war, peace, strategy, and the use of military force. Strategic 

culture analysis emerged from Cold War requirements to understand and possibly predict Soviet nuclear behavior. Strategic culture 

fell out of favor as a concept after the fall of the Soviet Union. More 

sophisticated than its Cold War construct, strategic culture now 

explores belief systems, values, climate, resources, geography, classical text, defense concepts, military doctrine, economic resources, 

and a country’s technological base. Given their structures and purposes, are Al Qaeda and other transnational, nonstate terrorist, and 

criminal groups appropriate candidates for strategic cultural analysis? Consider state-like attributes such as military forces, an international economic base, a sophisticated communication network, 

a system of social services, and clearly articulated international 

security objectives. Can strategic culture analysis of transnational, 

nonstate actors identify strategic personalities, define strategic 
31

F. Special Interest

perspectives, and ultimately predict strategic behavior? Is strategic 

culture analysis a viable tool for understanding current and predicting future terrorist threats?

F3.	 Natural resources battlefield

Competition for natural resources such as oil, water, food, and wood 

has led to conflict throughout history. Research is necessary to identify contemporary vulnerabilities, security measures, and the location of any seams. Second-order effects on population, land use, and 

economic activity are also of immediate concern. More specifically, 

the study identifies potential natural resource battlefields and their 

roles in future acts of terrorism and wider aspects of IW. Examples 

include oil and natural gas reserves sited amidst Iran, Russia, and 

China. What are the implications of U.S. petroleum security commitments to the Gulf states? Discuss the use of oil (controlling 

supply/artificial price manipulation) by oil-producing nations to 

blackmail/damage western economic systems. Analyze historical 

trends from the creation of the OPEC cartel to the present to determine if there is precedent to attempt long-term damage through 

cartel policies. What roles might SOF play in such security scenarios? Examine the current structure of indigenous internal security and military forces as they relate to petroleum infrastructure 

security (oil refineries, wells, pipelines, and offshore facilities). What 

are some emerging security threats to natural resources? What integrated security operational concepts will be required? How would 

those concepts integrate local MoD, MoI, and commercial resources 

into a comprehensive security infrastructure for petroleum and 

other natural resources? How can SOF integrate with local Special 

Security Forces (SSF), typically under the direction of the MoI? How 

do proposed security concepts enhance coordination among MoIs, 

MoDs and SOF?

F4. Nonkinetic measures of effect 

The assessments of the effects of traditional military operations are 

typically straight forward in their measurement and presentation: 

weight of ordnance dropped, number of enemy killed or disabled, 

targets destroyed, terrain occupied or denied to the enemy. However, 

the applications of indirect action or soft power to affect outcomes 

do not yield such precise results. Thus the measurement of nonkinetic effects will not be quantifiable in the familiar formats. For 

instance, it is simple to tabulate the number of strategic messages 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

developed and transmitted. However, assessing the effects generated 

by public receipt, understanding and acceptance of those messages 

is a far different measurement challenge. It is also the more relevant 

assessment. This study looks at the challenges of developing and 

employing nonkinetic measures of effectiveness. How do we measure the effect of a FID mission? What metrics can we use to determine the effectiveness of the relationships developed between SOF 

and host-nation leadership? How do we assess a SOF unit if the most 

effective decision is to avoid direct action? Research the assessments 

on which fielded units have taken decisions to redirect their activities in the face of operational failure. Is there a measurable basis 

for instinctive decisions? How do nongovernmental organizations 

and other aid organizations assess the effectiveness of their efforts? 

How can social science research inform the development of nonkinetic measures of effect? To what extent can best-practices insights 

come from fields such as marketing, business, education, and public 

relations?

F5. Balancing openness with OPSEC

More than ever, public support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts is 

necessary for the successful prosecution of a war of uncertain duration and uneven outcomes. The problem is complicated by the fact 

that the public does not always pay attention to the flow of events in 

the absence of spectacular, and often negative, event coverage. U.S. 

public support is contingent to a significant extent on documented 

successes and the perception that military and interagency competence is sufficient to ensure future victories. This study explores the 

nature of public support, the role of perceptions, and examples of 

efforts to balance public candor with necessary OPSE limitations. 

How can the complexities of the counterterrorism effort be presented credibly to U.S. and other relevant audiences? What measures 

of effectiveness are available to inform the public about what success 

looks like and what has taken place to move efforts closer to those 

goals? How can the U.S. and other relevant publics be informed 

about the role of SOF without jeopardizing mission effectiveness and 

security? How can SOF nurture relationships with the media without alienating them through attempts at control? What specific and 

mutually agreeable ground rules are available to generate the most 

informed and credible news media coverage? 
33

F. Special Interest

F6.	 Consequences of classified information disclosure in news media

reporting of SOF operations 

One of the points of tension between U.S. military forces and the 

news media who cover them is the persistent concern that it is inevitable news-media reporting will disclose important and damaging 

classified information. It already has. Numerous books, magazines, 

and broadcast news/documentary productions have contained sensitive and classified information regarding decision makers, organizations, techniques, and sensitive details about mission failures and 

successes. This study examines the variables of this ongoing debate. 

The prevailing belief is that these disclosures have had a significant 

impact on the missions they address. Consequently, should steps be 

taken to limit future access to SOF information and SOF operations 

because the disclosure of classified information inevitably increases 

the risks and limits the ability of military forces to combat terrorist networks? Can mutually agreed ground rules be established that 

frame both the collection and reporting of information? Is a vetting 

process viable? A contrary opinion holds that the disclosure of specific capabilities and operational details should be a key component 

of an overall national strategy to legitimize U.S. operations and build 

both domestic and international support. Is the over-classification of 

operational information counterproductive, unrealistic, and unmanageable? Survey the consequences of recent classified disclosures on 

military operations, U.S. domestic publics, our partner nations, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, our adversaries, and other nations. What procedures can the Public Affairs 

Office (PAO) follow to identify information that is useful in providing both explanation and context and then vetting that information 

for release? How might embedding journalists improve news-media 

understanding of appropriate operational details and speed their 

disclosure without jeopardizing security concerns? How can the 

commander and PAO conduct effect assessments of such openness?

F7. Detainee disposition instructions

One of the persistent challenges of the global war on terrar has been 

the management of detainees within the context of the wider controversy over their treatment and disposition. This study seeks to 

suggest a program of specific measures and instructions for guiding SOF activities. What should be the decision process both before 

and after capturing detainees in an IW situation? What premission 
34

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

planning considerations should be followed to place SOF in the best 

position to manage detainees? Once captured, what disposition 

alternatives exist for war on terror detainees? Should these detainees 

be treated as law enforcement or military targets? Suggest guidelines that assist in making that judgment. What challenges exist 

for the development and exercise of chain-of-evidence procedures? 

What are the implications of detainee operations for prosecutorial 

authorities?

F8.	 Deciding on the classification levels of studies on terrorism

topics

Any study of terrorism runs the risk of drifting into the discussion 

and inadvertent release of classified information. Obviously it is 

necessary that, for security reasons, some studies remain unavailable to the general public and the news media. However, it is equally 

important that the taxpaying public and others have appropriate and 

vetted access to knowledge about what DoD forces and the wider 

U.S. Government interagency are doing to protect the U.S. and 

our citizens from terrorist threats. As a minimum, such awareness 

breeds confidence in government efforts. This study will discuss the 

issues of access to information about terrorism issues and suggests 

guidelines for determining levels of classification. The role of the 

Internet in spreading information, both accurate and misleading, 

makes such standards especially important. How does the precise 

definition of the audience for a study inform the classification decision? How can classification concerns be communicated to subject 

specialists in academia to provide guidance as to the framing of 

studies and the development of conclusions? How might the partial 

release of unclassified executive summaries or extracts assist in both 

informing the public while preserving their classified nature? 

F9. Differing perspectives: Seeking of effort by the U.S. and Europe

Experience teaches that Europeans and Americans express markedly different threat perceptions, frequently making cooperation and 

coordination on security issues very difficult. This study surveys a 

collection of European and American political, military, diplomatic, 

and academic practitioners and opinion leaders to identify contrasting threat perceptions. Particular emphasis will rest on threats posed 

by terrorism and other nonconventional threats. What are the major 

differences in perceptions about threats facing Europe and the U.S.? 

What specific steps are necessary to align these differing views? 
35

F. Special Interest

Given the differences, what strategies can be prepared, resourced, 

and as necessary, implemented to address those threats? 

F10. SOF intellectual capital

Develop a framework for selection and assessment for the next generation of SOF leaders based on understanding of the strategic level 

of security policy. Discuss how to build a requisite academic body of 

knowledge to support this framework and explain how it might be 

integrated into the existing military education system as pertains to 

SOF leaders. 

F11. Law and legal institutions 

Analyze perspectives from senior lawyers coming out of Iraq and 

Afghanistan on developing rule of law and legal institutions. Discuss 

obstacles to this development, akin to a lessons-learned analysis. 

Collect and examine viewpoints of Staff Judge Advocate personnel 

who have served on Joint Special Operations Task Forces, capturing 

unique issues in providing legal and rules of engagement advice to 

SOF.

F12. Tailoring a new U.S. Government organization 

Outline the feasibility and a construct for an organization using the 

following set of ideas from a “Greybeard”:

A new cadre of officers—not just military, not just Intel, not just 

Special Operations—but perhaps drawn from all three as well as 

from academia, think tanks, and the IT worlds too. I believe we need 

a special cadre under one independent organization and one commander—accountable only to the President and maybe the National 

Security Council, that brings together the new and completely different skill sets and knowledge base required to fight radical Islam. 

This cadre needs its own dedicated set of special operations teams 

that can be moved quickly, quietly, and without endless chains 

of command into a crisis situation on orders from a Presidential 

Directive or Finding. This might be military special operations, but 

it also might be other types of psychological operations, or even 

IW. Irregular and asymmetric warfare definitely is a big part of all 

this, but so are experts on Islam and geographical regions, linguists, 

financial wizards who can track the movement of funds, behavior 

and psychological experts, counterterrorism folks, and computer 

geeks that can create software to connect all the dots. They should 

be brought together under one command...kept very small...no more 

than several hundred overall, every one an expert...no trainees, no 
36

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

journeymen, just masters. Just as the radical Islamist threat is multidimensional, a total way of life, and playing out on a timeframe of 

hundreds of years, so we, too, need to organize to fight this way as 

well. 

F13. Contemporary space applications for special operations 

The current body of knowledge regarding space applications for 

SOF is very basic. In fact, SOF utilize space assets like GPS, ISR, 

SATCOM, Blue Force Tracking, and more. Further, SOF are capable 

of enabling a broad array of space-related missions ranging from 

Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) ops against space-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) to materiel sabotage and beyond. 

Such topics can be discussed at an unclassified level in greater detail 

than what is currently offered in Joint Publications.
37

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues F. Special Interest

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues

Topic Titles

G1. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance 

their capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major strategy of the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but 

have those efforts generated the desired results? 

G2. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations 

G3. Importance of language skills for successful SOF operations 

G4. Indirect benefits of SOF to parent military services and the 

interagency 

G5. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

G6. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

resources

G7. Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military 

services 

G8. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

G9. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)

G10. Preparing the human weapons platform

G11. Planning for Joint special operations for the indirect approach

Topic Descriptions

G1. U.S. SOF training of foreign military/security forces “to enhance 

their capacity” in counterterrorism, COIN, and FID is a major 

strategy of the U.S. and USSOCOM overseas contingency operations, but have those efforts generated the desired results? 

For more than 50 years, SOF has taken the lead role in DoD for 

training indigenous forces in counterterrorism, FID and COIN 

skills. Because of the capacity-building requirements of the effort, 

this strategy has become a major component of DoD’s efforts in 

North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 

Latin America. After all these years, is there sufficient evidence 

that the U.S. commitment of personnel and material resources has 
38

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

been successful in developing the intended capacity in local security forces? Furthermore, does the development of capacity even 

matter if the host-nation government is not willing to employ those 

forces as we intended, or at all? This study looks at the track record 

of SOF training and answers the question, “How do we know if it is 

working?” What are specific cases of both success and failure? Why 

do the outcomes vary? Is the mission truly to “build capacity,” or 

is it merely to establish a sustained presence on the ground? SOF 

has operated in places like the Philippines and Colombia for many 

decades. Should we keep doing it, or should we dramatically change 

how we do it? What are the standards for success? What steps should 

be in place to increase the likelihood of success? To what level and 

extent should host-nation forces be trained and what technologies/

resources should the U.S. provide them? 

G2. Diplomatic agreements to support rapid SOF support for other 

nations 

U.S. SOF possess training, equipment, and mobility capabilities that 

far surpass those of many nations’ police and military forces. In 

the event of a crisis, particularly those involving U.S. persons and 

interests, the employment of U.S. SOF could be the most effective 

and credible response. Recent and ongoing concerns over weapons 

of mass destruction, piracy, and transnational terrorists are relevant 

examples. However, most sovereign governments are adverse to the 

employment of another nation’s military forces within their state 

boundaries. Despite many cases of extensive training and coordination between U.S. and host-nation militaries, the host-nation government still may not be well informed about the shortcomings of 

their own forces, the capabilities of U.S. SOF, and the capabilities of 

U.S. SOF to respond to an immediate threat. Should the U.S. establish diplomatic agreements with other countries prior to a crisis to 

formalize U.S. response options and streamline diplomatic decisions 

in the event of a time-sensitive crisis? Understanding that decisions 

in crisis situations are of a political nature, who should participate in 

the discussions leading to such agreements? What provisions should 

such agreements contain? To what extent should such agreements 

commit the U.S. to supporting a particular government against 

internal threats? What can be done to minimize friction between 

the ambassador/country team and the SOF deployed to the area? 

What provisions with the host nation are necessary for testing the 

response system?
39

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues F. Special Interest

G3. Importance of language skills for successful SOF operations 

Despite the time and money spent on language education and training, language skills remain deficient. Why? What can be done to 

address the shortfall in language proficiency? Does it make sense to 

train all officers in foreign languages as 21st century warfare is heavily coalition based? Examine language proficiency levels as enablers 

for rapport only and for operational applicability. Traditional 

assumptions about the importance of language training are facing 

challenges that cultural awareness is a more important skill for SOF 

operators. Might it be that cross-cultural skills are more useful than 

language proficiency? To avoid an either-or choice of language skills 

vs. cultural awareness, what kinds of immersion programs might be 

useful in simultaneously developing language aptitude and cultural 

understanding? Assess how true immersion can develop an operator’s cognitive ability to learn and understand social networking. 

G4.	 Indirect benefits of SOF to parent military services and the

interagency 

SOF work for USSOCOM and the TSOCs in direct support of U.S. 

foreign policy goals. However, the parent services of SOF often 

derive indirect benefits from their SOF units. For example, images of 

SOF operators are used in recruiting materials by the U.S. Navy. The 

opportunities that SOF missions provide to enlisted personnel can 

increase retention among the best performers within each service. 

Of course, SOF were first created because of direct contributions 

they made to the capabilities of their parent services (i.e., UDTs to 

support amphibious landings; Special Forces to conduct unconventional warfare operations). As a rule, SOF are much more flexible 

and can be applied to perform operations that GPF cannot across 

a variety of mission areas. The interagency also benefits indirectly 

through enhanced training with SOF during exercises; through the 

use of SOF resources for strategic communications; or by recruiting individuals with SOF training in language, interpersonal, and 

cross-cultural skills. This study identifies, compares, and contrasts 

the indirect benefits of SOF to their parent services, noting which 

benefits are common among SOF units and why some indirect benefits are present only in one service but not the others. Ensure that, 

in the complexity of the current threat environment, USSOCOM/

SOF are not viewed by the military services or the interagency as an 

isolated or uncooperative player. Make clear to the military services 
40

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

and the interagency how they benefit from unique USSOCOM/SOF 

capabilities, training, and missions.

G5. Security Force Assistance (SFA) 

This study examines the nature of SFA missions within the context 

of complementary operations and multiple participants. How do we 

determine if a SFA mission set is a SOF or General Purpose Force 

requirement? How do we clearly define SFA? How can USSOCOM 

best organize itself to accomplish the mission of SFA proponency? 

How can the U.S. Government seamlessly integrate DoS, DoD, and 

other members of the interagency into SFA programs? How can 

IGOs and NGOs make contributions consistent with their capabilities and agendas? What needs to be done to gain IGO and NGO 

investment in the process? Examine the issues, similarities, and differences among SFA, Security Assistance, and FID missions. What 

makes them similar? What makes them different? Are those differences merely semantic? FID is supposed to be a noncombat operation. When threat conditions introduce the need for combat, FID is 

more rightly categorized as COIN or support to COIN. Should SFA 

be categorized as combat or noncombat? Could it be both? If SFA 

is a noncombat activity, what approaches become appropriate in 

combat?

G6. SOF interaction with host-nation Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

resources

In the Middle East and other regions, MoIs normally have internal 

security forces that resemble special operations organizations in 

their structure and functions. They may be called Special Security 

Forces or Paramilitary Forces, but they operate as an arm of the 

police. Frequently they are larger than the special operations components of the host-nation military assisted by U.S. SOF. This study 

examines the structure and functioning of such organizations. How 

are they used to protect the ruling government and provide stability 

both within the country and the region? How can U.S. SOF interface 

with these units to improve internal security conditions and build 

counterterrorism capacity? If necessary, how can SOF counterbalance these MoI units within the internal security context?

G7.	 Influence and relationship between USSOCOM and the military

services 

The USSOCOM commander is tasked with conducting SOF core 

activities across a spectrum of missions. To do so, USSOCOM relies 
41

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues F. Special Interest

on the military services for the recruitment, training, development, 

retention, and assignment of SOF personnel. This relationship is 

central to USSOCOM’s abilities to accomplish the assigned missions. 

This study surveys the current relationships and influences between 

USSOCOM and the military services, with particular emphasis on 

issues concerning SOF personnel. Determine whether and where 

there are gaps in these relationships. What can be done to close these 

gaps? What influence does the USSOCOM commander require over 

military service management of SOF personnel, their incentives 

and retention, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) development, assignments, and promotion/career management opportunities to effectively accomplish the USSOCOM mission? What steps 

can be taken to improve the required coordination and cooperation 

between USSOCOM and the military services?

G8. Training systems for USSOCOM and its components 

The rapid procurement and fielding of new equipment and evolving 

technologies present a variety of training challenges. At the same 

time, the standardized training of common tasks remains a familiar 

requirement. This study takes a comprehensive look at ways to provide timely and effective training on new equipment and other systems as fresh initiatives come on line and become forward deployed. 

Who is responsible for developing training programs and ensuring 

that they remain current and relevant? Identify the best ways to train 

the end users in such fast-moving environments. Which media are 

most effective in providing that training? How useful is a simulation 

system that is networked for all receiving components and organizations to access and/or download, especially when deployed? What 

roles can Web-based applications play? Survey ongoing and future 

innovations to address training program development, delivery, 

assessment, and sustainability. Are the Joint Training System (JTS) 

and the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS) 

useful tools to users in the field? Is feeding the system more resource 

intensive than originally envisioned? If it needs improvement, how 

can we make it better? Consider also efficiencies to be gained for 

current training approaches. For instance, resources, throughput 

capacity, and practicality have driven USSOCOM components to 

establish multiple training venues for the same skill set (e.g., military fee-fall, combat dive, and snipers). What is the best process for 

USSOCOM to establish a baseline SOF standard for a particular 

skill set? How should those baselines be evaluated and sustained at 
42

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

required proficiency levels? What potential advantages accrue to the 

establishment of a SOF Training Center of Excellence (SOFTCOE) 

for the standardization and consolidation of SOF common skills 

training? Might a USSOCOM “Training and Education Command” 

represent a more comprehensive approach to training, standardization, and innovation? Review the Joint Special Operations Task 

Force (JSOTF) mission set and make a recommendation on the best 

training a unit can do to prepare for the JSOTF mission. Should 

USSOCOM certify units for the JSOTF mission? If so, what are the 

standards and procedures for awarding such a certification?

G9. SOF aviation: Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)

UASs have provided enhanced capabilities to address a variety of 

operational requirements. The purpose of this study is to explore 

the utility of employing UAS assets to support IW operations. How 

can multimission UASs assist in nontraditional environments? 

What specific capabilities can UASs bring to IW activities? Which 

IW strategies and tasks are appropriate for UASs? Identify specific 

employment profiles for using UASs in IW situations. Consider such 

missions as humanitarian relief operations, civil affairs, disaster 

response and the resulting hybrid threats they may impose on COIN 

and IW operations.

G10. Preparing the human weapons platform

Discussion of new technology and weapons systems is a familiar 

staple. This study returns to basics by focusing on the irreplaceable 

human element of SOF operations and identifying specific steps to 

prepare the human weapons system for the variety of SOF challenges 

it faces. What are the SOF current capabilities to recruit, train, condition, and monitor the full range of individual capabilities inherent 

to each Special Operations warrior? What improvements are necessary to better educate, train, and monitor physical development and, 

when required, to recondition and rehabilitate SOF individuals? 

Consider new concepts for strength building, conditioning, combat 

nutrition, supplemental sports programs, sustainment training techniques, designs for physical fitness facilities, and certifications of 

proficiency. 

G11. Planning for joint special operations for the indirect approach

This study focuses on planning approaches for JSOTF strategic and 

operational missions in current and future environments. It would 

particularly focus on SOF core activities that typically involve 
43

G. USSOCOM and SOF Issues F. Special Interest

indirect approaches to achieving strategic objectives, such as unconventional warfare, SFA, and FID. The study should identify classic 

campaign planning constructs and investigate how SOF joint headquarters (TSOC, JSOTF) conduct campaign planning in the current 

environment. Consideration should include planning for future SOF 

organizations such as expeditionary task forces that incorporate service combat multipliers as inherent parts of the force. Conclusions 

and recommendations should be provided that confirm or advance 

changes to SOF planning procedures. 

45

H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H. Topics Retained from Previous Years

Topic Titles

H1. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain as 

it applies to narcoterrorism: Should SOF do more there?

H2. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy—enabling partners

H3. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations

H4. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement 

agencies (LEAs)

H5. Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various 

types of groups

H6. Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not Hezbollah is not the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

H7. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism?

H8. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use?

H9. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, future 

requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM and other U.S. 

agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less savory options

H10. Antiterrorism: More than defense—SOF contribution to application 

of national power to prevent terrorism

H11. Raising the costs: Counter value strategies in counterterrorism

H12. Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism

H13. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations 

and organized crime?

H14. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a threat 

to any other critical infrastructure or national asset?

H15. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism

H16. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism and 

how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

H17. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned areas
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

H18. Toxic cultures: Long-term strategies for their transformation or 

elimination

H19. Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in 

nonpermissive environments

H20. Information operations and counterterrorism

H21. How to conduct strategic human targeting of a terrorist organization’s senior leadership

H22. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of SOF 

in this strategy?

H23. Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent 

extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans that 

address each organization individually? 

H24. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare (IW) to date 

H25. Revolutionaries and criminal groups

H26. Organizing interagency for IW campaigns

H27. What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in IW?

H28. Clarifying the nuances between IW, stability operations, and special 

operations

H29. Strategic theories on IW

H30. Operational art design for IW-centric campaigns

H31. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in 

IW/counterterrorism efforts

H32. How is IW financed and who controls the resources?

H33. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency)

H34. How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on IW/

counterinsurgency? 

H35. How do policy, strategy, and planning interrelate in IW?

H36. What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in IW? 

H37. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations

H38. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in IW

H39. How to advise host nations engaged in IW

H40. Strategic decision making for IW: Case studies on IW success and 

failure
47

H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H41. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to develop 

the capability for self governance

H42. Building partner capability and capacity: What do our partner 

nations need?

H43. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in IW?

H44. Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the IW fight?

H45. Conventional/SOF cooperation

H46. Embassy role in U.S. Government IW effort

H47. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns

H48. Integrating interagency efforts to build partner capacity

H49. Interagency and SOF minifield exercises in IW environment

H50. Does IW suggest major restructuring of the U.S. government?

H51. Who are the natural supporters of IW in the military, legislature, 

executive branch, academia and intellectual communities, business 

community, and populace at home and abroad?

H52. What are the divisions or types of interagency efforts?

H53. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: Deployable 

civilian departments and agencies

H54. Country team approach

H55. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by 

various types of state and nonstate actors?

H56. Cultural awareness

H57. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating IW?

H58. Cultural knowledge in IW campaign planning

H59. Regional studies

H60. Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not 

change?

H61. Utilizing “SOF for Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural 

awareness

H62. The realities of human terrain (HT): Clarifying what SOF means by 

HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations

H63. SOF and cultural engagement

H64. Culturally attuned engagement

H65. Understanding the underworld: Black markets, gray markets, and 

how to exploit them to U.S. advantage
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

H66. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development?

H67. What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the role 

for SOF?

H68. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic 

combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional 

community

H69. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop IW skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic 

communications)

H70. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems

H71. Counterinsurgency methods 

H72. SOF role in current/future Afghanistan

H73. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations 

H74. Maritime SOF and overseas contingency operations

H75. Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST)

H76. SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT

H77. Roles of SOF and nongovernmental organizations in complex 

humanitarian emergencies 

H78. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, West 

Africa, and Central Africa 

H79. Future role of contracting and SOF

H80. Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities?

H81. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development

H82. SOF and Joint Fires

H83. Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements 

H84. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for joint 

SOF combat command 

H85. Cross area-of-responsibility operations

H86. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism 

effort 

H87. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population
49

H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

Topic Descriptions

H1. What are the missions and roles of SOF in the economic domain 

as it applies to narcoterrorism: Should SOF do more there? 

Discuss how SOF leverages and grows host-nation capacity to deter 

narcoterrorism. Analyze one or both of the two levels to this issue: 

a. The operational/tactical level may deal with the training of law 

enforcement agencies, conducting operations against the drug 

fields/lords, intelligence activities, and coordination of assets 

(information operations, allies, and interministerial). Clearly, 

SOF has roles at this level (training, planning, and executing).

b. The strategic/operational level areas of interest deal with strategic relations, crop substitution, justice, drug treatment, money 

laundering, and international legal issues. 

H2. Developing regional counterterrorism strategy: Enabling partners 

Our partners and allies do not view the counterterrorism effort as a 

global problem and often have a problem with preemptive strategies. 

Counterterrorism is often viewed from the perspective of the host 

nation and its relations with its bordering states. Gather, analyze, 

and consolidate best practices in combating-terrorism strategy that 

could be useful at a regional level—similar to a counterterrorism 

Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plan. What are some 

important regional factors and issues with combating terrorism? 

What are some useful policy, strategy, and operational techniques 

for consideration when developing a host-nation’s counterterrorism 

IDAD plan? This study should be a regional specialist topic—analyze 

selected partner nation(s) facing common problems to determine 

U.S. priorities and appropriate methods of assistance. 

H3. Getting beyond Al Qaeda and looking to the future of counterterrorism policy and operations 

Analyses of groups using terrorist activities have resulted in typologies of different sorts (e.g., groups with political aspirations, ideological/religious motivations, financial/criminal basis; and Rapoport’s 

four historical “waves”). Review these typologies, looking for differences and commonalities. Assess our experience with Al Qaeda 

against them and assess the utility of each. Apply the results of these 

analyses to the current geopolitical climate to discuss possible future 

terrorist activities. This effort may support strategic and perhaps 

operational planning. 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

H4. Counterterrorism partnerships between SOF and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 

The focus is how to make LEAs work complementary with SOF. At 

least 75 percent of successful counterterrorism operations are as a 

result of law enforcement or other internal security forces (nonmilitary); in combat, much intelligence to run down terrorists can come 

from police access to population. SOF will never achieve effectiveness and strategic utility in combating terrorism if it disregards 

coordination, cooperation, and combined operations with LEAs. 

Ascertain roles for SOF to operate in conjunction with LEAs, both 

international and host nation when operating abroad; identify policy 

and regulatory changes, including budget, needed for SOF to operate in this domain. Recommend unique training and equipping 

requirements for SOF to perform this function. Illustrate the role 

of community policing and international law enforcement in combating terrorism, then explain why SOF is failing to operate in this 

medium, hamstringing our efforts to fully prosecute counterterrorism plans designed by USSOCOM. This project could describe a successful indirect strategy for overseas contingency operations and one 

which SOF could perform well.

H5. Sharing of methods and long-range power projection of various 

types of groups 

Terrorist groups are accelerating their learning from each other 

and their collaboration. This situation makes counterterrorism 

exponentially more difficult. Identify trends in how terrorist groups 

learn and how they collaborate. Examine case studies of past attacks 

where collaboration existed at the greater or smaller scope of activities. Identify trends and extrapolate. Consider global trends in 

causes of terrorism and anticipate where/to what those trends will 

lead. The product of this research could be a road map of what is 

coming, innovative methods to interdicting this collaboration, and a 

method to keep updating the road map.

H6. Disaggregating counterterrorism operations: Al Qaeda is not 

Hezbollah is not the FARC 

Because of the information age and Web use, terrorist networks 

share common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), both 

successful and unsuccessful. Identify links between various 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

organizations, training, and education. The Irish Republican Army 

(IRA) was caught in Colombia, showing a link between IRA and the 

FARC. Repeated activity in propaganda shows support to Middle 

East insurgents from Brazil, which in turns shows a link between 

the two regions. Breaking apart the organizations is one piece, but 

showing how they are interlinked may be useful when looking for 

elusive targets. 

H7. How does cultural awareness contribute to effective activities in 

combating terrorism? 

A lack of understanding in how people in a given society see 

things—you cannot influence them, neither with your message nor 

your largesse. Acquaintance with language, culture, and local customs is only the first step in entering into a foreign environment. 

This study would provide analyses of specific terrorist or insurgent 

organizations highlighting how their cultural background has influenced their choices and actions. Show how cultural values determine 

the correctness or rationality of specific terrorist actions. Objective is 

to raise awareness in this area and lead to additional studies of specific terrorist organizations focused on the culture that shapes their 

operational planning, decisions, actions, and reactions.

H8. What levels of analysis model should the U.S. military use? 

We are beginning to understand that adversaries adopt terrorism as a strategy for the simple reason that it works. The literature 

on terrorism has grown exponentially over the past 5 years. One 

useful technique that has grown in popularity is the level of analysis approach. A number of experts have advanced specific models. 

Levels of analysis are useful in allowing the military to understand 

the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon and where and how it 

can be countered. Yet no one has articulated an approach that has 

universal appeal to the military. The articulation and logic for such a 

common military model would improve both the quality of thinking 

and communication about terrorism, its appeal, and why it works. 

It is a contribution that the SOF community can provide because of 

extensive experience and credibility.
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

H9. Intelligence for counterterrorism operations: Best practices, 

future requirements, possible synergies among USSOCOM 

and other U.S. agencies—for example, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—allies, and other less 

savory options 

Discuss and analyze the following statements: The intelligence 

community is moving beyond need to know to need to share. 

Counterterrorism operations need to be in the share business, and 

lessons observed from Iraq show success in this area. Agencies, 

tactical to national, need to share information because target sets 

are illusive; and the most current information/intelligence supports 

operations. The counterterrorism mission is global in scale, and the 

ability to have the most current intelligence, at all levels, predictive 

in nature (as applicable), is available to planners at any possible time. 

Each day this topic is more relevant. U.S. SOF must acknowledge 

that HUMINT is essential in this business. 

H10. Antiterrorism: More than defense—SOF contribution to application of national power to prevent terrorism 

How can SOF contribute to expanded national power (DIMFILE) 

globally to prevent terrorism? Specifically, which interagency partners should SOF be involved with in which activities? How does this 

fit with Ambassadorial Mission Performance Plans? This study can 

result in suggested strategy and could be regionally based.

H11. Raising the costs: Counter value strategies in counterterrorism 

Most counterterrorism work is counterforce targeting—how to 

find and kill terrorists. The study objective is to examine the terrorist organization at all levels to identify what that enemy values, 

determine vulnerabilities in those areas, and propose strategies to 

attack those vulnerabilities. This approach provides a foundation 

for deterring terrorist actions rather than responding to their initiatives. Study could examine general principles or a specific terrorist 

organization and also focus on one specific area of vulnerability or 

contrast the vulnerabilities of different levels of the terrorist organization (leaders value control, ideology; ideological supporters may 

value their social standing or business interests). Proposed strategies 

could range from information campaigns to economic manipulation 

or various kinetic options.
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H12. Use of surrogates for clandestine counterterrorism 

How can the U.S. accomplish counterterrorism objectives without 

direct involvement? Should SOF be the basis for external support to 

state or nonstate actors pursuing U.S. counterterrorism strategies or 

counterterrorism strategies complementary to U.S. counterterrorism 

goals? What is the cost benefit of such an approach? Do historical 

examples or recent situations exist where this approach could have 

been considered? What are some examples where this approach 

would not be viable?

H13. What are the funding relationships between terrorist organizations and organized crime? 

Consider one of two approaches:

a. The global operating environment is changing to where transnational criminals and transnational terrorist organizations are 

“cooperating” to replace the state-sponsored system with a new 

system of business enterprise to raise funding. As this threat 

becomes larger, it will work to delegitimize international regulatory control over business and trading. Study this phenomenon 

as it relates to national security interests and threats to the 

U.S.; ascertain what requirements and capabilities SOF needs 

to thwart this threat. Describe current nexus, identify costs to 

national interests, predict trends, and provide solutions using 

SOF. 

b. Treasury officials in many countries, with a U.S. lead, have been 

successful in interdicting the flow of terrorist and drug networks 

through transnational cooperation, particularly since 9/11. 

Establish a compendium of best practices and lessons learned 

from the most successful of those rooting out terrorist financing. 

H14. Is the cyber terrorism threat real? Is it different in kind than a 

threat to any other critical infrastructure or national asset? 

Identify possible targets for cyberterrorist attacks. Who might 

conduct these attacks and for what gain? SOF has the mission of 

counterterrorism, and does a cyberterrorist fall into USSOCOM’s 

mission when attacks are taken against critical and economic 

infrastructure targets? Does LEA/FBI have the lead inside the U.S., 

and USSOCOM/other government agencies have the lead outside 

the U.S.? Where does the Joint Task Force for Global Network 

Operations (JTF-GNO)/JTF-Naval War College (NWC) fit into the 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

problems of cyberterrorists and what agreements need to be made 

between USSOCOM, the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and 

other agencies? Analyze and prepare for possible cyber attacks from 

terrorist organizations against vital U.S./allied interests.

H15. When counterterrorism is counterproductive: Case studies and 

theories of the misapplication of counterterrorism 

Discuss and analyze the current U.S. government strategy for counterterrorism through this lens, with recommendations for adjustments. The Shining Path in Peru is a great case study for excessive 

governmental response to terrorism. Another approach is to reexamine USSOCOM CONPLAN 7500; using the unclassified threat 

model, campaign framework, and method, determine if the strategy 

is sufficient to achieve U.S. goals and which aspect are necessary to 

reach U.S. goals. What is missing? What is unnecessary or insufficient and why?

H16. Poverty is a pawn: The myth of poverty as genesis of terrorism 

and how poverty is used by terrorist leaders 

Terrorist leaders prey on the poor as a pool for foot soldiers, suicide 

bombers, and both witting and unwitting supporters through various means of exploitation. However, the vast majority of terrorist leaders do not come from poverty, but rather from the middle 

(Zarqawi) and even upper classes (bin Laden). How can governments mitigate this exploitation of the poor, knowing that poverty 

cannot be extinguished? Discuss the mix of conditions that serve 

to create fertile territory for developing terrorist actors. Establish 

a list of conditions (e.g., poverty, religious fervor, education levels, 

distribution of wealth) that when existing concurrently, create an 

environment for growing terrorist actors. Will SOF need to prepare 

for contingencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

H17. Terrorist safe havens/sanctuaries/ungoverned spaces 

The intelligence apparatus of the U.S. government has fairly precise 

locations for terrorist safe havens throughout the world. Moreover, 

U.S. SOF, coupled with interagency partners, arguably has the capability to terrorize the terrorist in selected locations such as training 

camps and marshaling areas. Examine needed changes in policy, 

force structure, and legalities for the U.S. government, with or without host-nation cooperation/approval, to affect these strikes against 

terrorists in their safe havens—that is, no longer make them safe. 

History is replete with examples of rear-area attacks destroying 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

critical nodes of command and control, demoralizing the enemy, 

and degrading his ability to go on the offensive. Determine which 

are the most problematic of current and future safe havens—that is, 

which provide most succor and protection to terrorists and fellow 

travelers.

H18. Toxic cultures: Long-term strategies for their transformation or 

elimination 

While many conditions give rise to terrorism and violence, specific 

cultures and societies seem more prone to lashing out in this way. 

The study would analyze historical campaigns (ancient warfare, 

Mongols vs. sedentary populations, Tamerlane vs. Arabs, U.S. vs. 

plains Indians, Cold War, post-World War II Japanese reconstruction) where specific cultural change or destruction was required to 

achieve victory or peace. Principles derived would be applied to the 

global conflict against terrorists, but would expand to encompass 

actions to change or destroy those cultures that produce transnational terrorists.

H19.	 Employing private security firms to conduct counterterrorism in

nonpermissive environments 

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this idea. Numerous 

issues surround this course of action, very few of them good (e.g., 

disregarding the checkered history of private security firms in Iraq 

and assuming the firms had a clear-cut chain of command, mission 

set). Analyze the value added to employing these elements in the 

battlespace. 

H20. Information operations and counterterrorism 

Discrediting our enemies’ extremist ideologies is a major part of 

eroding their support. The Colombian government and use of Plan 

Colombia changed the perceptions of the FARC to the populous 

and to the world. Can the experience and activities taken by the 

Colombian government be applied to activities and actions by U.S./

allied entities in the realm of information operations and strategic 

communications? Several angles to study could be to research the 

history of using terror and where it has been effective in turning the 

population either for or against the government, examine successful counterinsurgencies and their use/work of the media dealing 

with terrorism, review how a government can gain support during 

a period of terrorism, and identify groups by the type of terror tools 

used (e.g., Taliban uses different tools than Al Qaeda) in order to 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

point blame. Products of the study could be to develop training 

tools for mobile training teams to present to host nations, develop 

training tools for use in military education, and to review/update, as 

required, information operations/PSYOP tools.

H21. How to conduct strategic human targeting of terrorist organizations’ senior leadership 

Does strategic human targeting of senior leadership truly affect the 

organization? Research should look at how many toppled/seized 

leaders have lead to the demise of an organizational whole—Is it 

possible to pull the head from a snake and not have a Hydra? Use 

social network analysis and other organizational analysis techniques 

to characterize a selected terrorist organization. Use computational 

tools, as appropriate, combined with qualitative analyses. Identify 

and justify key targets. Suggest possible organizational reactions 

based on your analysis if the targets are eliminated. The value of this 

study will lie in lessons learned from the combination of a range of 

analytic techniques. It is possible that the most valuable outcomes 

will be identification of what existing analytic approaches cannot tell 

us (either applied singly or in combination) and the identification of 

areas of theoretical or computational development.

H22. What strategy should the U.S. pursue to break the power jihadist 

terrorist hold over third world population and what is the role of 

SOF in this strategy? 

Despite all the effort U.S. policy makers and media pundits have 

contributed to talking about the problem, no one has produced a 

satisfactory answer. Because this question has not been properly 

examined and appropriately answered, the U.S. largely plays a game 

of “whack a mole” in a global landscape where the moles look like 

everyone else. If insights to an answer were developed and successfully advocated, the potential for success in the counterterrorism 

effort would increase exponentially. Obviously, such a strategy 

would involve multiple instruments and might even change the classical way in which some instruments like to view themselves. What 

will be the SOF role?

H23. Should there be a single DoD campaign plan to address all violent extremist organizations, or should there be multiple plans 

that address each organization individually? 

There is currently one DoD campaign plan for the counterterrorism 

effort, broadly addressing all violent extremist organizations. Is it 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

appropriate to maintain a single campaign, or are terrorist organizations so different in structure and integration (or nonintegration) 

into various cultures and societies that different campaign plans 

need to be developed to address each? In a broader campaign plan, 

is it possible to account for the different organizations by simply 

adding annexes or appendices? For a broad campaign plan, is it 

necessary to provide the level of analysis and detail related to each 

violent extremist organization that might be better expressed in 

separate plans? 

H24. Lessons not learned in irregular warfare (IW) to date 

The counterterrorism effort has occurred for 5 years in Iraq and 6 

years in Afghanistan. Since their respective beginnings, much experience has been garnered in both countries. While many lessons 

have been learned, much has yet to be realized. These unlearned lessons need to be explored to determine if they are of value for learning and if so, what lessons are we missing or failing to understand? 

Information operations do not seem to be effective, campaign planning continues to be conducted in the absence of the host nations, 

and operations are still being run without complete integration. 

Who needs to learn these lessons and why they are important may 

help in the successful desired outcomes to these current conflicts.

H25. Revolutionaries and criminal groups 

The lines are blurring between insurgents, revolutionaries, militias, 

and gangsters. The focus of this topic would be on their similarities, 

differences, and why they are natural partners. FARC represents a 

model, but the question is whether they are the model for the future. 

Does the consolidation of these groups necessitate a rethinking of 

key overseas contingency operations/counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrine?

H26. Organizing interagency for IW campaigns 

The current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the struggle 

in interagency coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. 

As these events blur into the long war, the U.S. needs to review 

whether an organizational structure exists to fight IW from an 

interagency design. Who has the lead, when do they lead, and why 

is an agency/organization in the leadership role? What is the process 

used to make the interagency design function properly? How does 

USSOCOM fit into the interagency design?
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

H27. What is the role of strategic communications for SOF in IW? 

The roles and responsibility for strategic communication by SOF 

is still in the maturing process. Much misunderstanding and some 

competition exists between the players. Key to the issue is how to 

effectively synchronize the effort from the national level down to at 

least the operational level. Additionally, how are the disciplines of 

PSYOP, information operations, Public Affairs, and strategic communication linked/coordinated in the current conflict or in IW? 

H28. Clarifying the nuances between IW, stability operations, and special operations 

The lines between these terms and environments have become 

confusing to the general audience. Articulating them ensures their 

proper application. An important element of this issue is to ensure 

SOF is their best use within this environment.

H29. Strategic theories on IW 

What approaches can be considered for the study of IW as a traditional (nationalistic) or nontraditional underdog. Like unconventional study, Is there merit in approaching IW from the position of 

the insurgent/terrorist? This writing could begin with a review of 

current unconventional-warfare doctrine and experience to determine if they need to be revalidated or require rethinking. 

H30. Operational art design for IW-centric campaigns 

This study should focus on the development of a format of campaign 

designs for SOF planners specifically and conventional planners generally. The design would be meant to ensure the proper application 

of SOF in the fight. This view is important because little exists to 

help planners, SOF, or otherwise. 

H31. Understanding police investigation and intelligence operations in 

IW/counterterrorism efforts 

Law enforcement, in all nations, is essential in maintaining stability 

throughout all levels of IW. The employment of criminals, the illegal 

drug industry, and insurgency all require law enforcement that must 

be integrated into the campaign plan of any country. One of the 

measures of legitimacy is the public confidence in their law enforcement and legal systems. The role of law enforcement, linkage with 

other security force, and their integration into plans require study. 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H32.	 How is IW financed and who controls the resources?

The topic for study would include the current conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, how are they the same, how are they different, and 

are they models for future nonstate IW players? This scope includes 

examination of past IW funding and the constraints legitimate governments have in fighting IW.

H33. Security Forces assistance (anti-insurgency) 

This topic would examine the effectiveness of the shape/deter phases 

in struggling countries. It implies that countries can identify they 

are facing problems, and the U.S. (or other nations) has interests to 

protect. This writing would include review and examination policies 

and programs for the counterterrorism effort and drug wars. An 

historical review may also be useful to determine where, when, and 

how the shape/deter phases have been effective.

H34. How have affected host nations been engaged and advised on 

IW/counterinsurgency? 

This topic deals with combining advising and adapting based on the 

specific country (e.g., culture, history). Is there an art to advising 

and if so, what should be taught to qualify a soldier to be an advisor?

H35. How do policy, strategy, and planning interrelate in IW? 

The topic begs for leadership in linking strategy, policy, and planning into a cohesive process. This study will help clarify the process 

from beginning to end, assist in the tasking of the proper organizations for the correction of missions in the proper sequence, and 

define an end state that is achievable. 

H36. What is the joint, common operating environment for SOF in 

IW? 

This study will analyze the joint and global environment to understand and ascertain distinct and unique threats, trends, and opportunities for SOF in the next decade. Recommend any force structure 

changes and new capabilities required as a result of this analysis.

H37. Building Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) plans for key 

partner nations 

This topic is one that is undefined, except for a planning guide in 

Appendix B of Joint Publication 3-07.1 written several years ago. 

A methodology for framing the situation faced by a host nation 

to determine an IDAD strategy is absolutely necessary. The Civil 
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Affairs course provides a political-social analysis guide as an initial 

starting point. However, it is not widely known, disseminated, or 

understood by the conventional military. Case studies (such as El 

Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan) to highlight success and failure in 

this endeavor are a good study vehicle.

H38. Case studies of SOF creating strategic effects in IW 

This topic could be a basis for strategic special operations theory 

and/or serve as a primer for geographic combatant command planners. If we do not understand how to create strategic effects, SOF 

becomes less effective. To better understand, identify what is the 

range of strategic effects that might be of use to SOF—that is, how 

SOF produces each of those types of strategic effects, looking at case 

studies with effective and ineffective creation of strategic effects.

H39. How to advise host nations engaged in IW 

Advising host-nation counterparts is a slow process (requires time). 

We suffer with time conditions that cause pushing rather than guiding counterparts to a resolution of a problem. A need exists to teach 

the art of advising, much like what was done during the Vietnam 

era, yet no time goes to adequately train advisors. The other condition of time is length of service “in the box” by the respective services. These vary from 4 to 6 months to a year. Nothing effective can 

be achieved in 4 to 6 months. Advising/mentoring tours need to be 

at least 18 months, and an effective handoff to the incoming advisor 

is necessary. Finding and interviewing Vietnam-era advisors would 

greatly benefit this study.

H40. Strategic decision making for IW: Case studies on IW success and 

failure 

Understanding how key decisions are made at the national level 

helps prepare for the next conflict/incident. Who made what recommendations to whom with regard to force structure, size, objectives 

of war in Afghanistan? For example, examine transitions of the 

lead effort from CIA to SOF to conventional force to NATO. How 

did we get approval to use CIA predators to strike terrorist targets 

in Yemen? Analyze recent case studies of IW to understand the 

decision-making process, planning mistakes, incorrect assumptions, and mission effectiveness. Operational planners will use the 

case-study analysis to improve the planning process. Possible case 

studies include Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, U.S. assistance 

to Ethiopian forces engaged in Somalia, effectiveness of Operation 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara targeting AQIM, JTF-510 and the 

ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, Coalition Air 

Force Transition Team (CAFTT) origins, methods and effectiveness. 

The purpose of this study is to capture lessons learned from recent, 

relevant IW activities to better understand national decision-making 

process, accuracy of planning assumptions, and effectiveness of 

operations to improve future operations.

H41. Various roles for SOF in helping host-nation governments to 

develop the capability for self governance 

This task may be beyond the means of the DoD, let alone SOF. DoD 

SOF can certainly provide initial support, based on the short-term 

Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) objectives developed by the 

Department of State (DoS) Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization (S/CRS). However, that support should be based on 

a plan of providing for the DoS and the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) to assume responsibility for 

the development program as soon as the security situation allows. 

Given this stipulation and the S/CRS PCR objectives, what steps 

can SOF take to ensure that indigenous political structures are on 

track to support U.S. objectives in a country as the security situation 

is resolved? How do SOF liaise with and coordinate for the arrival 

of the DoS and USAID representatives? What are the measures of 

effectiveness to be agreed upon by both DoD/SOF and DoS/USAID 

that will determine when transition of mission responsibility occurs? 

Upon transition of mission responsibility, how much stay-behind 

support do SOF provide?

H42. Building partner capability and capacity: What do our partner 

nations need? 

It is difficult to create an effective capacity in much lesser developed 

partner nations if no legal and judicial system is developing. Perhaps 

the best approach would be to train partners as follows:

a. How to interact with other parts of their government to develop 

the lines of communication between military, Intel, social agencies, and the political class

b. How to include partner contingents in foreign operations, where 

they will be free to develop their skills outside their home environment, and where indigenous power relationships hinder their 

operation. 
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USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

c. Discuss the simple differences between capability and capacity, 

perhaps using the elements of national power as a framework. 

This writing would be a study of before and after—what a given 

nation had in the way of capacity and capability before SOF 

involvement (e.g., FID, military training team, and/or joint/

combined exchange training) and how the capacity and capability differed after the interaction with U.S. SOF. Examine certain 

indicators of capacity and capability—for example, strength 

levels, operations conducted, and human-rights issues.

H43. What strategic factors are key to success or failure in IW? 

In the 21st century environment, IW is assumed to play a significant 

role. If true, what is really important in regard to IW at the strategic level for the U.S. and its adversaries, friends, and other state 

and nonstate actors? What is important would be the key strategic 

factors. A generic discussion or model that helps strategists and 

planners to grasp both the need and potential characteristics of 

such factors would contribute significantly to a theory of IW and 

help define the roles and capabilities of both SOF and conventional 

forces. Discussing the ends that ensure balance with ways and means

and adapting as needed, success will generally be realized. Strategic 

factors would be maintaining will to accomplish the job, maintaining alliances, guaranteeing legitimacy of the friendly regime, 

separating populace from effects of adversary, and destroying or 

neutralizing the enemy’s message, leadership, and key organizational 

structures.

H44.	 Are Rangers and MARSOC contributors to the IW fight?

Research and analyze the role of specialized units conducting longrange, long-duration operations behind enemy lines or in denied 

territory, with particular focus on U.S. Marines and Army Rangers. 

Determine why these roles no longer exist doctrinally within these 

two forces and propose recommendations to doctrine and missions 

for providing more capability to USSOCOM. Historically, Rangers 

have been used both for long-duration raids behind enemy lines and 

for extended reconnaissance patrols. MARSOC’s added capabilities 

to USSOCOM do not include their historical role in raiding behind 

enemy lines. IW requires specialized forces to operate for long duration behind enemy lines or in denied enemy territory (i.e., hunterkiller teams). Neither MARSOC nor the Rangers currently provide 

this capability. 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H45. Conventional/SOF cooperation 

Conventional forces and SOF have coordinated and cooperated to an 

unprecedented degree in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, SOF 

have developed a reliance on conventional forces for certain battlefield operating systems (e.g., maintenance, logistics, and quick reaction forces). Discuss the impact of the potential drawdown of GPF 

in theater on this reliance on SOF units in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility.

H46. Embassy role in U.S. Government IW effort 

This topic would explore initiatives for restructuring the DoS—Do 

they go far enough to address the requirements for the long war/persistent conflict of the 21st century? Should more of a regional hierarchy exist to DoS than independent embassies that can report directly 

to the President of the U.S.? How can/should SOF better work with 

embassies in pursuit of U.S. interests in the long war? How can 

interagency-SOF synergy at the embassy level better achieve U.S. 

interests?

H47. Legislative requirements for effective interagency campaigns 

This topic would review current and pending legislation required to 

establish organizations and authorities to effectively conduct IW and 

large-scale FID for combating terrorism. It could also suggest who 

should write this interagency campaign.

H48. Integrating interagency efforts to build partner capacity 

This topic could examine what interagency partnerships exist today 

or use historical, regional, and nation-specific Internal Defense and 

Development (IDAD) plans to frame the process that integrates 

interagency efforts. The FID design should be developed to force 

whole-of-government activities around IDAD plans, thereby causing 

actions that meet objectives to help friendly nations protect themselves from lawlessness, insurgency, and subversion. 

H49.	 Interagency and SOF minifield exercises in IW environment

This study objective is, How do we operationalize FID? How do we 

begin shaping the campaign of unconventional warfare for longterm, persistent conflict focused on U.S. embassy direction? Specific 

tactical DoD units and other U.S. government agencies seldom 

meet—let alone exercise—together prior to real-world operations 

in a consistent and meaningful way. Thus both sides struggle to 

overcome different cultural perspectives, organizational structures, 
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and operating procedures to achieve the operational objectives in 

support of national objectives. 

H50. Does IW suggest major restructuring of the U.S. government? 

This topic would determine how we enhance cooperation among 

institutions, particularly U.S. agencies that will create a national 

security community of interest. This community would include military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, aid lobbies, and other 

interests.

H51. Who are the natural supporters of IW in the military, Congress, 

executive branch, academia and intellectual communities, business community, and populace at home and abroad? 

This topic begs two questions: Who are the natural supporters and 

the adversaries of IW and why? This study would provide the SOF 

community these initial benefits:

a. Basis for understanding the resistance to the concept of IW

b. Ideas about how to pursue convincing arguments 

c. How to build constituencies for gaining the necessary support 

and resources to prepare for such a future.

H52. What are the divisions or types of interagency efforts? 

Does it make sense to divide interagency efforts into groups: 

domestic (relationship in the U.S.), international (within a given 

host nation and to include coalition partners), and regional (the 

host nation and it regional partners)? What degree of disconnect 

exists between interagency coordination, at least overseas? Give any 

areas of interest for SOF and interagency toward understanding 

the desired end states of developing military plans and operations. 

Where are the regional relationships located—that is, those that may 

be more indirect in their supported nation (surrounded by hostile 

nations vs. friendly nations)?

H53. Resourcing essential 21st century strategic capacity: Deployable 

civilian departments and agencies 

This study will address measures needed to enable various government departments (e.g., State, Commerce, and Justice) to train and 

equip personnel toward supporting U.S. policy goals and related 

activities in the international environment. U.S. policy goals require 

applying all the elements of power that are represented by the various government agencies, not just the military. Examine what is 

important to SOF because they must interact with various government agencies overseas in accomplishing their mission.
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H54. Country team approach 

In an era of IW, SOF may find itself deployed in a number of countries and supporting the ambassador’s country team. Does SOF 

need specific representation on the country team or is the normal 

representation sufficient? In either case, how would this work? 

What interaction is appropriate or required? Who is in charge of 

what? How are disputes resolved? How can this support be revived, 

updated, or replaced to ensure that U.S. players in a given country 

are working for common causes?

H55. What are the evolving standards for judging legitimacy made by 

various types of state and nonstate actors? 

This topic goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy—that is, who to 

support. Are some terrorist’s groups “legitimate” in the eyes of their 

fellow citizens (Kosovo)? The evaluation of a potentially supported 

group would implicitly point out what needs to be done to build 

legitimacy. Problems of understanding legitimacy for a given society 

and what is acceptable from our perspective requires further study 

as well. Understanding legitimacy from an economic point of view 

is another challenge to be investigated. One of the little appreciated aspects of globalization is an evolving conceptualization of 

legitimacy. In power relationships, legitimacy is important to great

powers because it defines what must be done to sustain a world order 

favorable to them. The small powers and nonstate actors see legitimacy as a means to limit the actions of great powers. 

H56. Cultural awareness 

Understanding of culture will assist in finding an enemy’s weakness, 

especially in IW where the enemy will resort to any action to achieve 

objectives. The need is to understand what is acceptable to that 

enemy, what is not, what his cultural constraints are, and what does 

not constraint his actions. This information will permit development 

of successful courses of action. Population’s trust/will is culturally 

based, and the effective understanding of it is critical to a successful 

outcome. Three areas of potential study follow: a) regional specific 

information for a culture and population, b) generic information on 

awareness, and c) tools to rapidly get specific information on a culture to operators. 

H57. Are culture, religion, and worldview factors in motivating IW? 

Cultural education must include orientation on comparative analysis 

of religions of the world. Americans have a secular culture; some 
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estimates put 80 percent of the rest of the world as more faith based. 

Many of the conflicts throughout world history have been motivated 

by religion. Warrior culture is the way in which violence is valued 

and managed by the collectivity, and it varies from culture to culture. Research how each group handles violence and threats against 

the collectivity; two example questions follow:

a. Is fighting a recognized road to high status? 

b. Are fighters separated from the group in some formal 

way—as we do with our military—or are they integrated and 

interspersed?

c. Are there forms of warfare/fighting seen as higher status than 

others? 

H58. Cultural knowledge in IW campaign planning 

This lack of cultural understanding also has led to confusion. 

Because some cultures do not like to be confrontational, their 

acknowledgement is believed to be agreement. The fact, however, 

is they are only agreeing that they understand a position or proposal vs. accept it. The lack of cultural understanding is a handicap 

in achieved outcomes by set time schedules. Examine the need to 

understand the actors in the environments that the campaign will be 

conducted. How can this lead to some understanding of the motivations of these actors? How can this better prepare planners to tailor 

the campaign plan toward influencing those actors in accordance 

with the commander’s intent? 

H59. Regional studies 

Review regional studies to better meet the needs of the combatant 

commanders. Courses that look at the regions from a strategic and 

operational perspective are desired, illustrating the linkage between 

the countries within a given commander’s area of responsibility 

as well as the adjacent countries. Many of the countries currently 

engaged in the conflict were drawn in Europe and do not reflect 

what is occurring in either the country or the region. Ethnic groups 

straddle those borders and are unrecognized by the people, and the 

numbers of languages further complicate the region. This writing 

is an opportunity to leverage the revamped discipline of geography, 

which is now more than maps and physical terrain. Geography is 

now a multidisciplinary study area involving traditional geography 

as well as aspects of sociology, geology, political science, and economics (and some cultural anthropology may also exist).
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H60.	 Ethics for SOF behavior: What are the first principles that do not

change? 

This paper would address behavioral expectations—including cultural accommodation in the field—that may conflict with traditional 

military ethics as taught during formation at the service academies 

and other personnel acquisition programs. What major issues exist, 

and how are they accommodated? How are outcomes affected by 

cultural awareness?

H61.	 Utilizing “SOF for Life” to rapidly and flexibly increase cultural

awareness 

The U.S. has countless former SOF warriors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The topic would be how to capture and share the knowledge, not 

only for the current operations but also as a database. How can they 

be engaged in-country and upon return to the U.S.? There probably 

are many ways to extract the information that they have acquired 

while in-country. That information could be used to better support 

the deploying troops. The result would be a valuable and flexible reservoir of cultural knowledge combined with SOF experience. What 

are the pros and cons of utilizing this resource? Do legal, experiential, procedural, cultural, or other barriers preclude it?

H62. The realities of human terrain (HT): Clarifying what SOF means 

by HT and how that applies to strategy, planning, and operations 

This topic can focus on defining HT, how it is applied, and determining its benefits. Examination of its outcomes can also be considered and whether better ways to accomplish this mission exist.

H63. SOF and cultural engagement 

The SOF community has cultural challenges; a few examples follow:

a. One “big mother” service relationship with SOF subculture 

b. Interagency cultural issues with SOF as well as the nongovernmental organization environment 

c. Cultural concerns for the host nation and its regional role. 

These different cultures all require a different approach/strategy. 

Examine one or more of the cultures, balanced against the SOF warrior culture. These challenges could be approached like engagements 

to ensure that the right applications of resources are used for the 

desired result. 
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H64. Culturally attuned engagement 

One of the tenets of the USSOCOM mission is to “emphasize culturally attuned engagement.” Analyze the critical need for cultural 

skills (not just language skills) and discuss specific ways to enhance 

these skills. Give lessons learned from deployments, advantages of 

forward-based SOF elements, and leveraging of educational opportunities (e.g., fellowships and exchange assignments). 

H65. Understanding the underworld: Black markets, gray markets, and 

how to exploit them to U.S. advantage 

This topic would focus on the study of criminal activities and how 

they are similar to that of insurgent activities. Further, it could 

compare activities of FARC and that of the Taliban/drug lords 

in Afghanistan. Does a transfer of tactics and techniques occur 

between terrorist groups? Does a link exist between crime and terrorism in the early phases or is this aspect a natural progression? 

H66. How is strategy developed for special operations and what is the 

framework for such development? 

This question should consider the operational role of SOF in each 

of the phases (0-V) and assess the effectiveness of their employment 

in those phases. Afghanistan and Iraq could serve as case studies. 

The unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan are excellent 

examples of pre-phase III operations. They lead into two questions: 

a. How does the U.S. government as well as DoD consider SOF use 

in all campaign phases?

b. What are effective employment techniques in terms of strategy 

and operational art for SOF/interagency synchronization to 

include measures of effectiveness?

H67.	 What is the nature of conflict in the 21st century and what is the

role for SOF? 

This study will consider the viability of technology, impacts of cultural/religion, and other variables. What tools can be developed for 

early detection of an irregular conflict? Will the battlefield be economic rather than terrain oriented? How will SOF be employed in 

an economic conflict?
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H68. Why is Phase 0 important and how can SOF support the geographic combatant commander strategy: Informing the joint conventional community 

Phase 0 can be described in terms of anti-insurgency, in the same 

manner that the Army delineates between antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Phase 0 is rapidly becoming an outdated term. 

H69. Develop SOF internships with Fortune 500 companies in order to 

develop IW skill sets (marketing; influence, investigations, strategic communications) 

This topic would study the value of creating internships for SOF in 

successful companies or organizations to develop a knowledge base 

of nonmilitary functions (e.g., power-economic and diplomatic). 

Strategic communication could be explored from a marketing point 

of view. Strategic thinking at the multinational should also be considered. Computer operation and electronic transfer of funds could 

be examined because are often the terrorist’s means of moving illegal money around the world. Also respond to the question, What 

academic credit should be granted from the internship (M.A. or 

Ph.D.)?

H70. Integrating SOF and “big service” requirements/systems 

Survey and analyze current U.S. and allied approaches to integrating 

SOF requirements and equipment into “big service” requirements 

and equipment. Include recommendations and associated impact 

analysis of potential alternative approaches. 

H71. Counterinsurgency methods

Treating this new era of conflict as a form of global insurgency 

implies that counterinsurgency methods are fundamental in combating the new form of transnational terrorism. These methods 

include the following:

a. Focus on protecting and securing the population

b. Politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning 

the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted 

political and development measures, and conducting precise 

intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy 

elements with minimal collateral damage. 
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H72. SOF role in current/future Afghanistan 

In the context of the U.S. national interest, examine the SOF impact 

and effects of the war in Afghanistan and recommend strategic 

options based on this 4 to 5 year assessment. Which elements of U.S. 

national power can/should be applied there to counter drug production, empower the national government, and continue the progress 

made since 2002?

H73. Impact of crossing borders to conduct military operations 

Assess the actual impact of arresting religious leaders and/or entering into mosques/madrassas as a tactic against Islamic extremists. 

The thesis posed via this topic is that when we are oversensitive and 

overstate Middle East sensitivities, we hamstring our efforts. Costs 

and benefits are associated with this type of approach. Can the real 

protagonists of terror be stopped using this method? Consider U.S. 

public opinion, reprisals against the U.S., reaction of coalition partners, and other factors.

H74. Maritime SOF and overseas contingency operations 

Explore and develop a detailed concept of operations for maritime 

SOF involved in counterterrorism efforts. Evaluate the statement 

that the vast majority of weapons of mass destruction proliferation 

transport is maritime. Pay particular attention to the force structure, 

basing implications, and logistics support required for Naval Special 

Warfare and U.S. Marine Corps SOF. Other areas that could be 

addressed are joint command and control, relationships with other 

governmental agencies, and interoperability with coalition forces.

H75. Countering ideological support for terrorism (CIST) 

The concept of CIST is integral to the U.S. government and military strategy for counterterrorism efforts. Investigate the tenets of 

CIST and provide an awareness of the culture, customs, language, 

and philosophy of the enemy. Analyze measures to more effectively 

counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing 

cover for them to operate within their society.

H76. SOF and HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT 

SOF success is inextricably linked to the quality and quantity of 

intelligence professionals. Examine the current and future capabilities of one of the aspects of intelligence crucial to SOF. A sample 

of the subsets studied under this intentionally broad topic follows: 

how to better share data collected, improved ways to use geospatial 

products, how a conventional intelligence soldier becomes a SOF 
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

intelligence professional, the synchronization of various systems, or 

new SOF intelligence-support structures.

H77. Roles of SOF and nongovernmental organizations in complex 

humanitarian emergencies 

SOF have played an increasingly critical role in the international 

response to complex humanitarian emergencies. The liaison between 

these two elements requires that SOF understand the diversity of 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) objectives and organizational cultures. This topic could take an approach of the division 

of labor involved or education of SOF (e.g., on NGO capabilities, 

limitations). Give advantages and disadvantages of “collaborating” 

with NGOs. Include a discussion of the International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations. The 

relationships between SOF and other U.S. contractors could also be 

explored.

H78. Islamic and Islamist movements in the Sahel region of Africa, 

West Africa, and Central Africa

According to most experts in this region, this area of Africa is a safe 

haven for terrorists, replete with failed or failing states, and with 

conditions ripe for insurgency. Analyze the Islamic strongholds in 

the region and examine religious conflict and its implications for 

regional stability in Africa. Determine if a U.S. national interest 

exists there. If so, offer suggestions for development of democracy 

and predict the impact of SOF involvement, either in a FID or Civil 

Affairs role. Include the evolution of professionalism in African 

militaries in the region and the future of modernization in African 

military forces.

H79. Future role of contracting and SOF 

Should USSOCOM expand capacity—for example, in training, 

force protection, and convoy security—through the use of contractor personnel? Analyze issues deemed germane to this concept—for 

example, resourcing, legal ramifications, and physical readiness.

H80. Should SOF be given Title 50 responsibilities? 

This Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis would 

address the topic in enough detail to fully answer the question, 

which would include the following subareas of investigation:

a. What are the facets of Title 10 responsibility for SOF? 

b. What are the facets of Title 50 for covert agencies? 
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c. What are the unique aspects of SOF missions that are conducted 

under Title 10 authority? 

d. What are the unique aspects of missions conducted under 

authority of Title 50 responsibilities? 

e. What authorities would have to change under both Titles 10 and 

50 to allow U.S. SOF to conduct covert-action missions that are 

currently being conducted under Title 50? 

f. If these authorities have to be changed, is Congress willing?

g. What would be the impacts on force structure, personnel 

requirements, training, and equipment for SOF conducting Title 

50 missions? 

h. What would the impact be on other governmental agencies associated with this change of mission? 

The magnitude of the study suggests a group effort (5 to 7 personnel). Each member of the group would be responsible for a portion 

of the research, such as Title 10 responsibilities for SOF, Title 50 

responsibilities for other government agencies, SOF missions conducted under Title 10 authority, and covert-action missions conducted under Title 50 authority.

H81. Oral histories of SOF leaders for publication/professional 

development 

Provide a collection of personal SOF accounts throughout recent 

history. While this perspective has been done (e.g., in support of 

briefings and courses), a research-paper-length compendium will 

yield not only lessons learned but aspects of strategy, revolutionary 

thinking, and command-and-control issues for future planners and 

commanders from interviews with senior SOF leaders. The finished 

product will benefit SOF leaders as a handbook on relationships with 

interagency and coalition partners and furnish a range of considerations for SOF noncommissioned officers and officers. Some travel 

may be involved, or the collection could be gleaned from individuals 

living near the respective PME schools; this topic is ideal for a U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) or School 

of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) student because of access to a 

wide range of distinguished SOF senior leaders supporting the SOF 

elective at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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H. Topics Retained from Previous Years F. Special Interest

H82. SOF and Joint Fires 

Review current thoughts and insights on integration of Joint Fires 

across the spectrum of conflict in special operations, focusing on 

concepts of how Joint Fires support SOF core tasks and small-scale 

counterinsurgency. Discuss the capabilities needed in the future 

operating environment to provide timely, accurate, and deconflicted 

Joint Fires support.

H83. Capabilities of services’ SOF logistical units/elements 

After examining each of the services’ logistical requirements, analyze the feasibility and costs/benefits of a joint SOF logistics command. Propose a framework for this organization, determine roles 

and missions, interface with existing service logistical units, and so 

forth. 

H84. SOF senior leader competencies for joint warfare: Preparing for 

joint SOF combat command 

Explore organizing Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs) 

at the O6 level of command and the associated leader competencies required, based on actual experiences of recent commanders of 

combined JSOTFs. Offer solutions of successful wartime leadership 

techniques for ongoing and near-future senior SOF leaders, anticipating wartime commands during counterterrorism efforts. Derive 

key lessons learned from the research for possible incorporation into 

current leader development methodologies.

H85. Cross area-of-responsibility operations 

At the operational level, command and control as well as support relationships need to be well-defined early on in the operation. Examine the supported/supporting relationships between 

USSOCOM and conventional forces belonging to the regional combatant commander and/or Joint Task Force commander. This topic 

could be discussed in the context of tactical operations, then at the 

operational level. 

H86. U.S. national security initiatives in Africa and the counterterrorism effort 

Address the question of creating an African unified command or 

a U.S. subunified command within Africa in order to protect U.S. 

national interests. Analyze a proposal to establish a political-military 

organization, such as an African regional Joint Task Force/Special 
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Operations Command within Africa, to promote democratic initiatives and influence regional stability. Discuss roles and capabilities 

for Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Operations (CA/CMO) and interagency partners, framing operational preparation of environment 

throughout Africa, FID opportunities in the region, and the rising 

U.S. national interests in Africa.

H87. Effective PSYOP in a mostly illiterate population 

Determine the effectiveness of a full PSYOP campaign in an area 

where most of the intended audience is illiterate. Using detailed 

analysis, develop possible operations—taking in account the literacy 

and technology of targeted audiences—for future PSYOPs in these 

environments. How do we reach and educate such audiences?