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REGULATORY CRIME: 

IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVER-CRIMINALIZATION TASK FORCE OF 2013 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 30, 2013 

Serial No. 113–60 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

OVER-CRIMINALIZATION TASK FORCE OF 2013 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

KAREN BASS, California 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Chief Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OCTOBER 30, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Vice-Chairman, Over-criminalization Task Force of 2013 ........ 1 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Over-criminalization Task 

Force of 2013 ........................................................................................................ 3 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 4 

WITNESSES 

Reed D. Rubinstein, Partner, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Rachel E. Barkow, Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, 

New York School of Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23 

Lawrence Lewis, Bowie, Maryland 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

Mr. and Mrs. Steven Kinder, Grand Rivers, KY 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 44 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 6 

Material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 61 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Letter from Rachel E. Barkow, Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law 

and Policy, New York School of Law; and Reed D. Rubinstein, Partner, 

Dinsmore & Shohl LLP ....................................................................................... 72 

Response to Questions for the Record from Reed D. Rubinstein, Partner, 

Dinsmore & Shohl LLP ....................................................................................... 76 

Letter from Benjy Kinman, Deputy Commissioner, Kentucky Department of 

Fish and Wildlife .................................................................................................. 79 

Prepared Statement of the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies ............... 81 

(1) 

REGULATORY CRIME: 

IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OVER-CRIMINALIZATION TASK FORCE OF 2013 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Task Force met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2237, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Louie Gohmert, presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bachus, Gohmert, Holding, Scott, Conyers, Nadler, Bass, and Jefferies. 

Staff present: (Majority) Robert Parmiter, Counsel; Daniel Huff, 

Counsel; Alicia Church, Clerk; (Minority) Ron LeGrand, Counsel. 

Mr. GOHMERT. The meeting will come to order. 

Good morning. Welcome to the Over-criminalization Task Force’s 

third hearing. 

Thus far, the Task Force has examined over-criminalization 

issues in Federal statutory law. Chief among them is the absence 

of a defined mens rea or intent requirement from the Federal criminal code. Congressional statutes, though, are merely the tip of the 

iceberg. Over the last 50 years, there has been enormous growth 

in Federal regulatory, state and, with it, a shift of power from 

elected officials to unaccountable bureaucrats at Federal regulatory 

agencies. 

Now the vast majority of laws governing individuals and businesses in the United States are passed not by Congress but are 

issued as regulations crafted by unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats. There are at least an estimated 4,500 criminal statutes on 

the books today, up from 165 in 1900, but as many as 300,000 

criminally enforceable regulations. In other words, the ratio of regulatory crimes to statutory crimes is 67 to 1. 

This hearing is not about the substance of all these regulations. 

That is a discussion for a different day. 

The question before us is solely on the propriety of criminal rather than civil penalties. Criminal sanctions are serious. They carry 

terms of imprisonment, create stigma, and can have lasting economic consequences such as diminished employability and ineligibility for government benefits, in addition to other life-changing 

problems as the stroke that we have seen with one of the victims 

of this over-criminalization. Accordingly, they should only attach to 
2 

violations that society generally recognizes as morally blame-worthy. 

This hearing is about when, if ever, such onerous criminal sanctions are appropriate punishment for violating agency regulations. 

If so, how should those crimes be defined, and most important, who 

should be making those decisions? 

It has become a routine practice for Congress to authorize an 

agency generally to promulgate regulations while providing that 

violating the yet-to-be-seen regulations will be a criminal offense. 

This poses a series of fundamental problems beyond the already familiar lack of adequate notice of intent requirements. 

First, the bureaucrats who create the regulatory crimes are unaccountable to an electorate. This makes them immune from public 

opinion which operates as a check when it is, instead, the legislative branch making criminal law. 

By contrast, legislators have the broader societal perspective necessary to determine what behavior society deems most blameworthy and therefore the proper subject of criminal sanction. 

Similarly, as a result of these broad congressional delegations, 

the substantive regulatory standards that define regulatory crimes 

are drafted by agency bureaucrats largely shielded from public debate. Their efforts do not have the benefit of the full open and public scrutiny that helps improve the legislative definition of crimes 

in Congress. The result is less transparency and deliberation precisely when such procedural protections are most needed because 

individual liberty is at stake. 

Regulations are also much more dynamic than traditional statutory crimes. Requirements that change with evolving science and 

standards sometimes rest upon assumptions about the efficacy of 

unproven technology. This complicates notice and compliance, 

which seems unfair if violations are to bear criminal penalties. 

Another factor is that regulatory crimes can be created indirectly 

when statutes forbidding certain general behaviors such as lying to 

officials are applied to regulatory infractions that are not otherwise 

criminal. The result is criminal sanctions for activity that may be 

far removed from what Congress contemplated when it delegated 

rulemaking authority to the agency. 

Finally, prosecutorial discretion and appeals to the courts may 

not be sufficiently effective failsafes for unfair results from regulatory crimes. A collection of liberal and conservative groups, including the ACLU and the Heritage Foundation, produced a pamphlet of examples of cases that I believe most Americans would 

agree should never have been brought. 

In the courts, precedents have eroded intent requirements in the 

context of regulatory offenses while demanding greater deference to 

agencies’ interpretation of the scope of their rulemaking power. Accordingly, agencies are now able to expand their criminal lawmaking power even to areas that Congress did not specifically commit to the agency. In short, the enormous growth in the regulatory 

state has been accompanied by an explosion of regulatory crimes. 

If unaddressed, the growing problem of otherwise law-abiding citizens jailed for violation of ill-defined regulations is a morass of 

rules of which they cannot possibly be fully aware, and that threat-
3 

ens to undermine the legitimacy of the criminal law and dilute its 

moral force. 

We have an excellent panel of witnesses with us today, and I 

thank them for being here. I know you are not here because of the 

pay you get, and for people that may not know, they do not get 

paid. They are here because they care about what we are doing. 

And so we are very grateful for your presence. And knowing the 

story of some of our witnesses, I feel like an apology is due. 

But in any event, I look forward to hearing your testimony today, 

appreciate you all being here. 

And people sometimes ask why don’t you guys in Congress get 

along. Well, it depends on what the issue is. 

But I now want to recognize a friend, the Ranking Member of the 

Task Force, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Bobby Scott. Together, we have been concerned about this issue and working together for years. And it is an honor to recognize Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you pointed out, during the 111th Congress, when you were 

Chair of the Crime Subcommittee, the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee held two hearings addressing the problem of over-criminalization of conduct, over-federalization of criminal law, and the 

resulting over-incarceration, a lot because of regulatory crimes. 

Earlier this year, this Task Force examined the problem of overcriminalization in the absence of a mens rea requirement in too 

many laws and regulations that carry criminal sanctions. Through 

all of these hearings, there has been no dispute that the problem 

exists and that something has to be done to address and resolve 

this situation. 

As we commence with today’s hearing on the issue of regulatory 

crime, we are challenged to define the problem, and that is, is the 

conduct in question truly criminal? Are the criminal elements properly defined? Is the penalty appropriate? Does regulatory crime 

lead to a larger incarceration rate and prison overcrowding? Does 

regulatory crime stifle job creation and innovation? And who is 

wrongly affected by these regulations? 

Now, the very nature of regulatory crime means that much of it 

is categorized as malum prohibitum crimes, and that is what poses 

a significant challenge for us. Unlike malum in se crimes, in which 

the society clearly recognizes the behavior as inherently wrong, 

these regulated activities are not generally viewed as objectionable 

in principle. Rather, these regulations are intended to protect public health, the environment, public welfare, commerce, finance, and 

safety. And they serve a purpose, and to that end, they are appropriate. 

But having said that, we must ensure that regulations, especially 

those that impose criminal sanctions, provide fair notice to everyone and punish only the appropriate violators. It is incumbent 

upon Congress to ensure that Federal agencies have clear and sufficient guidance when Congress delegates to them the authority to 

issue regulations which carry criminal penalties. 

It is true that some individuals have, without notice or intent to 

violate a law, found themselves arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and 

even incarcerated for engaging in seemingly harmless behavior 

which turned out to be a violation of law or regulation. Such occur-
4 

rences have caused us to criticize the lack of prosecutorial discretion, but prosecutorial discretion cannot replace clarity in criminal 

law. 

We obviously need some regulations. They are necessary to help 

us reduce the incidence of outbreaks of salmonella and e. coli contamination in our food supply or to avoid tragedies such as the explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. 

The home foreclosure crisis, the 2008 financial crisis, and subsequent great recession all stem from the fact that regulators lacked 

the direction, resources, or authority to confront the highly reckless 

behavior in the financial services and mortgage industries. So some 

regulatory offenses should be criminal, but they should include offenses where there is an endangerment of health and safety and 

where a reasonable person should have known the risk. But to ensure that the criminal statutes are clear and concise and that the 

penalties are proportional, we need to make sure that any of those 

criminal statutes involve a process going through the Judiciary 

Committee so that we can make sure that the language is clear 

and the penalties are proportional. 

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses, and thank 

you for convening the hearing. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Under the agreement of the Task Force, there were two potential 

other opening statements, one by the Chairman of the full Judiciary Committee who is not here, but the other was the Ranking 

Member of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Conyers, if he wishes to make an opening statement. It looks by 

lowering the microphone, he does. So my friend, Mr. Conyers, you 

are recognized. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Judge. I will be brief and put most of 

it in the record. 

But I wanted to commend everyone that has been sensitized to 

the fact that over-criminalization is one of the most challenging 

issues of our criminal justice system. The explosive growth of the 

Federal criminal code has played an important role in that. We incarcerate more people proportionally than any other country on the 

planet, and it is a matter of great importance to me in raising some 

considerations about some principles that should be examined as 

we go through the distinguished witnesses before us. 

What purpose do criminal penalties serve in the regulatory context? Do provisions that impose criminal penalties for regulatory 

violations provide fair notice of the criminality of the conduct in 

question? Can we reasonably expect citizens to comply with all 

such regulations on pain of criminal sanctions? 

So I think this is an opportunity to take a long, hard look at the 

scourge of mandatory minimums. And it is my posture to begin 

with that eliminating judicial discretion has failed to make our system more fair or just. We have the statistics that I will not go into 

at this point, but racial disparities are overwhelming. African 

Americans make up 38 percent of the prison population, 6 times 

the rate among White Americans. In fact, some inner city communities have an incarceration rate 40 times the international average. The result of all these excessive and ill-conceived criminal 

statutes is over-incarceration. 
5 

And so the Task Force should also focus on the primary criminal 

laws that lead to convictions. We spend $51 billion on a so-called 

‘‘war on drugs,’’ and we even have 700,000 arrests for marijuana 

law violations. And so I am here to join with you as we examine 

what the real contributors to over-criminalization and over-incarceration are. 

And I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make these remarks. I will put the rest of my statement in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Task Force, when we created this Task Force 

we did so in order to address the explosive growth of the federal criminal code and 

the incredible number of federal regulations that carry criminal sanctions—an estimated 300,000! The work of the Task Force is very important, and it’s work that 

is long overdue. 

It’s vitally important that we rein in such explosive growth and ask ourselves 

whether all of these laws and regulations are truly important. What purpose do they 

serve? Are they redundant, obsolete or an unnecessary duplication of state laws? We 

should ask whether these laws and regulations provide fair notice of the criminality 

of the conduct in question? How can we reasonably expect citizens to comply with 

all of them? It’s also time we asked whether all of these behaviors truly warrant 

treating an individual as a criminal or should the remedy be addressed with civil 

sanctions? 

As we proceed with this hearing, I ask our witnesses to consider these questions 

that I’ve raised, and I also want to raise three points: 

First, when good people find themselves confronted with accusations of violating 

regulations that are vague, address seemingly innocent behavior and lack adequate 

mens rea, fundamental Constitutional principles of fairness and due process are undermined. I should note that these regulations were promulgated by unelected officials executive branch agencies, and without the benefit of any consideration by this 

committee or any other Congressional committee. 

When crimes are defined by regulation, we run the risk of Americans encountering unpleasant surprises in the form of being confronted with accusations that 

we violated criminal laws of which we not only have no knowledge, but have no reasonable way of knowing about them. That places all of us at risk of being arrested, 

prosecuted and incarcerated for questionable reasons. 

I believe that it is fair and reasonable to ask whether there should be some mechanism or process for Congressional review of those offenses that would potentially 

deprive citizens of their freedom and impose a lifetime label of ‘‘criminal’’ on them. 

Second, mens rea, the concept of a ‘‘guilty mind’’, is the very foundation of our 

criminal justice system. We have established clear standards for what constitutes 

most criminal conduct. The prohibited conduct is malum in se, that is, the act is 

wrong by its very nature and everyone knows it. We’re talking about offenses such 

as murder, rape and robbery. That’s not what we’re here to discuss today. 

Conduct covered by regulatory offenses is generally not wrong in itself and someone who knowingly engages in the prohibited conduct might not be culpable in the 

traditional sense. Further consideration is required before assigning criminal liability to the conduct. For example, one might know that he or she is engaging in a 

particular conduct but have neither the knowledge nor the intent to do wrong. Is 

that sufficient to arrest, prosecute and convict? In previous hearings on the subject 

of over-criminalization we’ve heard wrenching testimony from victims who were 

prosecuted for seemingly innocent conduct, and it is my understanding that we will 

hear testimony from more witnesses who feel they have been caught in the web of 

regulatory crime. 
6 

I do not doubt that there is reason to review and, where appropriate, rein in the 

promulgation of regulations that are issued without the benefit of Congressional review. 

I want to caution, however, against downplaying the benefits of regulation and 

any exaggeration of its costs. The benefits of regulation can far exceed its costs, 

whether those benefits are defined in monetary terms or in terms or promoting values like protecting public health and safety and ensuring civil rights and human 

dignity. 

For example, value can be found in the regulations prohibiting lead in gasoline 

and house paint. It has been clearly documented how the increased I.Q. attainments 

of our children have benefitted from these regulations. 

Regulatory failure, on the other hand can lead to tragedies such as the Massey 

coal mine explosion in 2010 which took the lives of 29 miners, or the re-emergence 

of black lung disease among coal miners, an issue that was supposed to have been 

addressed years ago but continues to plague miners because of lax regulation. 

So, I encourage my colleagues to be measured and careful when considering the 

benefit of regulation. Let’s make sure that regulations are fair, provide appropriate 

notice of criminal sanctions, and let’s continue to encourage prosecutorial discretion 

when deciding whom to pursue criminally versus civilly. 

Finally, while it makes sense to review the estimated 300,000 criminal regulations, it’s also important to understand that a major result of over-criminalization 

is over-incarceration. Regulatory crime offenses make up less than 1 percent of the 

prison population. To the extent that the Task Force is concerned with prison overcrowding and steadily rising incarceration rates, I urge it to look beyond regulatory 

crime. Let’s put drug policy, firearms and immigration offenses on the table for the 

Task Force’s consideration. These are the very real contributors of over-criminalization and over-incarceration in the federal system. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Without objection, any other Members’ opening statements will 

be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goodlatte follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 

Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner, for holding this hearing on regulatory 

crimes. 

What struck me most as I reviewed the materials was a sense of how easy it is 

to become a victim. There are so many federal crimes on the books that the government itself does not have an accurate count. And they do not just cover inherently 

dangerous activities like murder, sexual assault or robbery. The federal code is riddled with statutes that impose criminal penalties for regulatory conduct. Certain 

regulations serve the important purpose of public safety and we expect individuals 

and businesses who engage in potentially dangerous conduct to know the rules. But 

these rules can too often ensnare innocent citizens. I say innocent because perhaps 

the most pernicious aspect of these regulatory crimes is weak or even non-existent 

intent requirements. 

Often a criminal conviction requires only that a defendant knowingly take an action; it does not require that he knew the act was prohibited. This construct is appropriate for traditional malum in se crimes that society at large has deemed unacceptable. 

However, the question before the Task Force is whether this construct is appropriate for malum prohibitum crimes—or conduct that is not inherently immoral but 

is criminalized by statute or regulation. 
7 

We are going to hear from two victims today and there are many more. Examples 

include a 23-year-old man who found a buried skull on a hunting trip in Alaska, 

and turned it over to the U.S. Forest Service only to be charged with removing an 

archeological resource from public lands; or the young girl who saved a woodpecker 

from the family cat, and whose parents were fined for violating the Migratory Bird 

Act because it is a crime to take or transport a woodpecker. These cases raise the 

issue of congressional intent. Are they representative of how Congress intended the 

laws it has passed to be used? If not, it is Congress’s duty to do something. As I 

stated when this Task Force was formed, ‘‘Overcriminalization is an issue of liberty.’’ We owe our constituents nothing less than a thorough review of overcriminalization and solutions to reverse this growing trend. 

One possible solution the Task Force will evaluate is a default mens rea provision, 

in large part to ensure that criminal penalties are applied to only those who act 

with the requisite guilty mind. I hope that today’s hearing—coupled with our November hearing on regulatory crimes—will lead to solutions to ensure that our federal laws distinguish between the truly guilty and the merely unlucky. 

I thank the witnesses and look forward to their testimony. 

Mr. GOHMERT. And without objection, the Chair is authorized to 

declare a recess during votes on the House floor. I think we should 

be done before that happens. 

At this time, I want to proceed with the introduction for our distinguished panel. First of all, Mr. Reed D. Rubinstein. Mr. Rubinstein is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Dinsmore & 

Shohl, LLP, and has experience in litigation, regulatory, legislative, 

and appellate advocacy representing publicly traded corporations, 

small business, individuals, and nongovernmental organizations in 

matters before the Departments of Justice, Defense, Energy, and 

Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and 

Drug Administration, the U.S. Congress, State agencies, and in the 

civil and criminal courts. He joined Dinsmore after serving as Senior Counsel for Environment, Technology, and Regulatory Affairs 

for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Prior to joining the U.S. Chamber, he was a shareholder of the Washington, D.C. office of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, where he practiced environmental and administrative law litigation, corporate, and real estate law. 

He has regularly published and has spoken around the world on 

environmental regulatory trends, U.S. Government programs, antiterrorism strategies, and litigation matters. 

He also received his bachelor of arts, master of arts, as well as 

juris doctorate from the University of Michigan. 

And with that, let me mention to all the witnesses you may have 

more of a written statement that exceeds 5 minutes, and that will 

be made part of the record, is part of the record. But for purposes 

of the hearing here, if you would restrict your opening statements 

to 5 minutes, and you can see the light will go from green to yellow 

to red, and red is time to complete. So thank you. At this time, we 

will start with our first witness. 

TESTIMONY OF REED D. RUBINSTEIN, PARTNER, 

DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Scott, Task Force Members and staff. 

My name is Reed Rubinstein, as you have heard. I am here testifying today on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Re-
8 

form. ILR is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that 

works to make our Nation’s legal system simpler, fairer, and faster 

for all. 

The U.S. Chamber is the world’s largest business federation, 

dedicated to defending America’s free enterprise system. 

As, Mr. Chairman, you pointed out in your opening remarks, regulatory over-criminalization is a big problem. It is big for the people who are caught up in the system, and it is big from a systemic 

standpoint. No one knows precisely how many Federal regulations 

of possible criminal consequences. The best estimates are in the 

tens of thousands. But what we do know is that this kind of a 

sprawling code based substantially on regulations is especially likely to contain crimes in which the prohibited conduct and state-ofmind elements are incompletely fleshed out. This kind of a code engenders abuses, especially in agencies unencumbered by the cultural limits that restrain, for the most part, State and Federal 

prosecutors. 

Regulatory over-criminalization is a particularly pernicious phenomenon for at least three reasons. 

First, regulations criminalize vast expanses of conduct without 

notice to the ordinary person that his or her everyday activities 

may be subject to criminal punishment. 

Second, regulatory crimes are the product of bureaucratic not 

legislative action. Given that the criminal law is the primary system for public communication of societal values, it is unwise and 

generally improper for crimes to be defined through convoluted 

agency rulemaking processes. 

Third, criminalizing regulatory violations without respect for intent has a chilling effect on small businesses, entrepreneurs, and 

scientific innovation. ILR supports laws that conserve our environment, guard the quality of our food, and ensure the efficacy of our 

medicines. But it is simply wrong to give unaccountable Federal 

agencies functionally limitless discretion first to make the law by 

rule and then to criminally prosecute citizens for their violations 

without either predictability or proof of wrongful intent. 

The human cost of regulatory over-criminalization has been well 

documented, and you will hear stories today that ought to cause 

this Committee’s Task Force substantial concern. Reports of armed 

administrative agency agents breaking into homes, factories, and 

even animal shelters on the pretext of enforcing arcane Federal 

and State regulations ought to be unsettling. From a systemic 

standpoint, however, the chief vice of regulatory over-criminalization is the wholesale abandonment of the basic principle of legality 

upon which law enforcement in a democratic community must rest. 

That is, close control over the exercise of the delegated authority 

to employ official force through the medium of carefully defined 

laws and judicial and administrative accountability. The paucity of 

carefully defined laws and the minimal administrative accountability that define our current system inevitably lead to abuses. 

Regulatory over-criminalization has very strong secondary and 

tertiary effects that inhibit economic and personal liberty. Generally speaking, for a company or an individual caught up in this 

morass, settlement or a plea is almost always the only cost-effective and rational strategy. Public companies facing charges of 
9 

criminal violations settle, at least in part, because the risk of insolvency associated with an indictment is so great that contesting a 

charge amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty in many circumstances. Small businesses lack the resources to effectively contest enforcement actions. Therefore, it is only a very rare few who 

are capable and willing to stand up and defend themselves and 

their rights when facing charges. 

Furthermore, agency decision-making in this environment is 

rarely clear, consistent, or predictable. If a law declares a practice 

to be criminal, but the agency does not or cannot apply its policy 

with consistency and predictability and fairness, the law’s moral effect and public faith in government are necessarily weakened. 

Time and again in the course of my practice in many contexts 

and in various ventures, I have seen large companies, small companies, entrepreneurs, individuals assess the risks and the uncertainty posed by regulatory over-criminalization and then decline to 

build, to invest, or to grow. I do not know and cannot point you to 

an empirical study that authoritatively accounts for the jobs lost 

and the economic activity aborted by regulatory over-criminalization, but the harm is unquestionably pervasive and real. 

Again, ILR strongly supports good laws that protect the public 

welfare and the well-ordered administrative agencies that implement them. But regulatory over-criminalization needlessly conflicts 

with our constitutionally enshrined commitment to individual freedom and unduly interferes with entrepreneurship, investment, and 

job growth. 

This Task Force and the Congress must take a hard look at a 

general and clear mens rea statute for all Federal crimes, especially 

those based on regulations. There are simply too many offenses and 

regulations for Congress to act piecemeal. The reality is that a 

large solution, a generally applicable statute, is the only practical 

and effective one. 

Also, we call upon this Task Force and the Congress to explore 

carefully the secondary and tertiary effects of the over-criminalization phenomenon. There ought to be mechanisms for meaningful 

agency oversight, transparency, and accountability to counteract 

some of the more egregious secondary and tertiary effects of this 

phenomenon. These mechanisms should include reasonable limits 

on agencies’ prosecutorial discretion and stronger procedural guarantees to ensure that the targets of agency action are given an 

independent, fair, and level review of their cases. 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I am 

happy to answer any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubinstein follows:] 
10 

BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON 

JUDICIARY'S TASK FORCE ON OVERCRIMINALIZATION 

"REGULATORY CRIME: DEFINING THE SCOPE OF 

THE PROBLEM" 

TESTIMONY OF REED D. RUBINSTEIN, ESQ. 

PARTNER, DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 

FOR 

THE U.S. CI-Li\MBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFOIUvI 

October 30, 2013 
11 

BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON 

JUDICIARY'S TASK FORCE ON OVER-CRIMINALIZATION 

"Regulatory Crime: Defining the Scope of the Problem" 

Testimony of Reed D. Rubinstein, I '~sq. 

Partner, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 

for 

The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform 

October 30, 2013 

'vIy nmne is Reed D. Ruhinstein ~nd I am a p~rtner in the \Vashington, D.C office of 

Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP. I also represent and am Senior Vice President for Litigation of CaLise of 

Action, Inc., a 50 1 (c) (3) non-profit corpootion focused on federal agency accountability and 

transparency. 

For over tv,!cnty-tlvc ycars~ T have practiced cflvlronrncntai and adrninistrativc bw~ defending 

indivichuls and con1panies in federal civil and crin1inal enforcen1ent n1'ltters. I also h,lve senTed as 

the C.S. Ch,1ll1i>er of Con1n1erce's Senior Counsel for Environn1ent, Technoloh7 (U1.d RehTLllatory 

i\fhirs ;1nd \vas for mMy years (111 :1djunct professor of env-ironmentalla"\v;1t the \,lesten1 1'\e"\v 

England School ofL~w. 

I am testifying today on heh~lf of the U.S. Chamher Institute for Leg~1 Reform ("ILR") to 

help define the scope of the regulatory over-criminalization problem. n.R is an affiliate of the C.S. 

Charnber of Con1n1crcc dedicated to rnaking our nation's overal1kgal systern sirnpkr, fairer, and 

faster for all participants. 'I he L .S. Chamber of Commerce is the world's largest business 

federation, rerresenting the interests of n10re them three million businesses emd organiz~ltions of 

eyery size, sector, and region and dedicated to pr0111oting, protecting, emd defending -"'\merica's free 

en terprise sys tern. 

1. SUMMARY 

'lhe consensus that "over-crin1inalization" presents a dear and present dcmger to -L\.merican 

freedom and individual civil liberties is broad and deepl The metlstatic growth in the number of 

federal crimes, the broad score of n10dern crin1inal codes emd, n10st import.u1tly, past Congresses' 

willingness to provide the Executive Branch ,,~th plenary police powers unconstrained by traditional 

meliJ rea requ1rcrnents protecting those \),Iho did not intend to cornrn1t cnrncs frotn un\varranted 

prosecution and conviction, are eroding foundational j\nglo-Atnerican jurisprudential nortns that 

preserve liberty.' 

Smith, Cl?m:omit!g Chm:riminaiization, HI2 J. Ct(J~1. L. & Ct(JM1~()I.()(~Y 537, 538-39 

(2012) (ritatiollj' omitted). 

'Baker, HERITi\C;E FOUND., LEC;"\L 'vIEMOR.i\NDUM :'\0.26: REVISITING THE 

EXPLOSIVE GROWl'H OF FEDER.i\L CRI'vIES 5 (200R), cited in Smith, .wpm at En. -I. 

According to Baker: 
12 

Regulatory over-criminalization is particularly corrosive to our fundamental freedoms. First, 

regulatory "cntnes" nearly always punish conduct that is or wrongful only because 

it is prohibited and all too often "consciousness is irrelevant.' Vast expanses of 

conduct are crinlinalized \vithout any explicit Congression~tl s;-lllction or notice to the ordinary 

rerson that his or her eyeryday ,lctivities may be subject to crimirul punishnlent.4 

Second, regt-datory crimes ,tre the product of bureaucratic actions, not legislative enactnlents. 

Criminru law is the primary system for puhlic communication of societal vruues, and it is unwise and 

generally improper for crimes to he defined hy unelected, unaccountahle hureaucrats through 

convoluted rulemaking processes. 

Third, crinlinalizing regulatory violations \vithout respect for intent, or mell.1 n:a, has a 

chilling effect on snl,lll businesses, entrerreneurs, (lnd scientific innov'ltion. ILR supports h\vs that 

conserve our environrnent, guard the quality of our food, and ensure the efficacy of our rnedicines. 

But it is sirnply \\!rong for unaccountable federal agencies to have functionally lirnitlcss discretion to 

first tnakc the law by protnulgating regulations and thcn to crinlinally prosecute citiL;cns for their 

"violations" without prosecutorial consistency, predictability, or proof of wrongful intent. 

ILR believes that Congress should enact a general statute that ensures inclusion of 

appropriate threshold mellJ rra requirements in criminal laws, including laws the criminalize violations 

of administrrttive reh,TLdations. Such ~t statute could re4uire ,tIl ne\v h\vs to rrovide adequate 

detlnition of both the ad/!.\' reu.1 (lJ,uilty act) and the men.r rea in specitlc and unatnbiguous tenns. -"'\ny 

general men,' If a statute should also pnwide a default intent standard that would apply in the event 

that a law, whed1er new or existing, fails to adequately define an ad/IS lelf;' and tllfl/J" Ira. Additionally, 

Congress should consider tal~ing steps to put in place nlechanisl11s for nleaningful agency oversight, 

transparency and accountability in order to counteract some of the more egregious secondary and 

tertiary effects of regulatory oyer-critninalization.5 These tnechanistns ought to include reasonable 

The fedeetl governnlent is supposedly a government of limited po\vers ,md, therefore, 

limited jurisdiction. Each new crime expands the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement and 

federal courts. Regardless of whether a statute is used to indict, it is available to establish the 

legal basis upon which to show probable cause that a crime has been committed and, 

therefore, to authorize a search and seizure .... Historically, nearly all crinles concerned acts 

that were malum in Je, or wrong in themselves, such as murder, battery, and theft. Today, 

ho\vever, ne\v crimes and petty offenses created by statute altnost ahvays concern acts that 

are malulJJ probibitu!!!, or wrong only because it is prohibited. 

B:lker, .>lIpnr at 6. 

"United StateJ DottennidJ, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). Regulatory offenses differ from the 

types of crimes punishahle at common law, which were deemed mala ill Je, or wrong in and of 

themseh-es. Jee l\JoriJJette I'. UNited JtateJ, 342 C.S. 2·U" 2S1-.o7 (19.02) (distinguishing common law 

and regulatory offenses). 

'Walsh and Joslyn, HERITACE POU"lD./NACDL, WITHOCT INTENT: HOW 

CO,(GRESS TS EROm,(G TTTE CRIMTNAL TNTEKT REQUTREME"lT T,( FEDERAL LAW, 

11 (2010). 

& Joslyn, WnHOU'j' I,,'j'Eh'j': How COhGRESS Is EROm"G 'l'HE I,,'lEN'j' 

REQU1RL\lEh'l Ih FEDERAL U, w 2(, - 31 (2010) al'ailable at http://www.mcdl.org/withoutintent/ 

(accessed July 8,2013). 
13 

litnits on agencies' prosecutonal discretion and stronger procedural guarantees to ensure that the 

targets of agency action receive -eUl independent, fair, and level review of their cases than current law 

provides. 

II. DISCUSSION . 

.i\.. The Scope of "Refutatory Crilnes. n 

Over-crinlinalization results .... vhen Congress exptU1ds crimirlttlliability through strict liability 

offenses that dispense with culpable mental states; imposes vicarious liability without some evidence 

of personal advertence; int1icts grossly disproportionate penalties tlut hear no relation to the 

\vrongfulness of the underlying critne, the hannfulness of its cotntnission, or the blatne\vorthiness of 

the cnrnmal; and broadly delegates cnrninal enforcernent authority and discretion to executive 

agencies (, 

'rhe threat posed by o\'er-crinlinahl.ation to .''\rnericans' individual freedonl and ci\'illiberties 

has long been recogni~ed. As Sanford j(-adish wrote in 1967: 

Atnerican cntninalla\v ... has extended the critninal sanction \vell beyond ... fundatnental 

offenses to include very different kinds of behavior. kinds which threaten far less serious 

harnls, or else highly intangible ones about \vhich there is no genuine consensus, or even no 

harnls at all. The existence of these crinles and attempts at their eradication raise problems 

of inestimable importance for the crimimJ law. Indeed, it is flir to say that until these 

prohlems of over-crimin;!lization are systematically examined and effectively dealt with, 

sorne of the rnost besetting problerns of critninal-la\v adtninistration are bound to continue. 

For t,,'1o generanons, the over-criminalization prohlem has grown at a fantastic rate in scope, 

depth and complexity. :\ccording to a ,v~dely-cited 1998 :\merican Dar :\ssociation report, an 

incredible 40°, () of the thousands of federal crirninallaws passed since the Civil \"X/ar \vcre enacted 

after 1970, many incident to broad economic and environmental regulatory statutes that eviscerate 

trtlditional mel/.)' rea requirenlents. Estinlates ~lre th~lt +,.100 fedeLtl h\vs clrry crinlin~tl pen~tltjes.8 

"Thus, .... vhether crime rates are rising or t~tlling, the one constant-as predictable as death and 

taxes-is that scores of new federal criminal statutes are heing enacted.,,9 No one knows, precisely, 

'j'a Luna, The Cl?'errriltJillali,atioli PhtilOltJefIOII, 54 A \ll.llICAN CNIV. L Rlw. 703, 715 (2005); 

Rosenzweig, '[he Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, 7 HERITAGE l'Ol'\D. 

LECAL MEM. 1, 3-12 (2003) (discussing elimination of mOL.!' 1m requirements and limitations on 

vicarious lial)ility). 

j(-adish, The Crisis ofOL'l'ftlitllillaii,,atioll, AN'.JALS Ale!. ACAD. POL SCI. 157,158 (Nov. 1%7). 

'Gary Fields and John R. Jimshwiller, "As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Arc Jinsnared," 

'l'he Wall Street Journal Uuly 23, 2011) ami/aM- at 

http://online.wsj.com/ news/ articles/SBI00014240527487037 49504576172714184601654 

(accessed October 28, 2013) (citation omitted). 

'Smith, .llIpm at .138 citing AM. Rill ASS'N, THE rEDERAlIZATIOI'\ or CRIMINAL 

L'\. \V 7 (1998); Baker, Jr., Corporations: :V!easuring the Explosive Crowth of l'edenJ Crime 

Legislation, E:-\Gi\C;E: J. FEDERALIST SCleY'S PRAc:. GRClCPS, Clct. 2004, at 23, 27, al'aiiabie 

at http://wwv'1.fed-soc.org/ doclih/20080313_CorpsDaker.pdf (finding more than a one-third 

increase in the number of federal crimes since the early 1980s). 

+ 
14 

ho"\v many federal regulations have possible critninal consequences - the best estitnates are in the 

tens of tholisands. I

(' 

Our apparently insatiable appetite for broad and indistinct strict liability criminal regulatory 

schemes" has weakened the bedrock principles of Anglo-American criminal law. Simply put, these 

scheD1es degrade the crirninal la\V and prevent the irnposition of just and proportional pllnishrnents 

for offenses. A sprawling crimimJ code based subst;mtially on :lgency regulations is especi:llly likely 

to contain crimes in "\vhich the ;111-import;1nt conduct (actlfJ It?1f.0 ;1nd state of lnind (meJl.) rea) elements 

are incompletely Heshed out. 12 Such a system engenders prosecutorial ahuses, especiruly hy 

bureaucratic agencies unencutnbered by the cultural and pnldentiallimits that restrain state and 

federal prosecutors. 

To begin with: 

One of the niost elenient,lry requirenients of criniinal rmd constitution,tl h"\v is th,lt the 

government must offer the puhlic adequate notice of what the law forbids hefore a person 

can he held liahle for violating a criminru statute .... Today, however, the proposition that 

everyone kno\vs the layv is not just a fiction or a "legal cliche"; it is an absurdity. The 

criminal hl\V no longer merely expresses societal condernnation of inherently nefarious acts 

that everyone kno"\vs are "\vrong (e.g., murder), so-called malum in Yf offenses. It also regulates 

the conduct of individurJs by niaking it rl crinie to comniit a vrlriety of ,lcts th,lt are un!a\vttil 

only because Congress has said so, crilnes kno\vTI as ma!um pf'O/;ihillfm offenses .... c iiven this 

reality~ it is dishonest to prcsurne that anyone~ D1uch less everyone, knows everything that the 

federru penal code outlaws today.'·; 

Congress and the Executive Branch, each for their own reasons, have discarded traditionru 

constraints on culpab1lity when ostensibly acting on behalf of the public wc1farel1 Tn addition, the 

l]ohn C. Coffee, Jr., [)oeJ" "UtliaJ~/lir i\lean "C,imina!')(: R~J!ec/i()IlJ on fhl! [)i.\"{}ppearif{~ 

"1'OIt/ Crime Distillctioll in Amelitall La))', 7113.U. L. REv. 193,216 (1991). 

llSee, e.,-~., Jeffrey Strl11den, All b"COll()!Jlic Per:lpedil·e Oil Federa! Climina! Lall' 

CRIM. L. REV. 2cl9, 289 (1998) (citing over three hundred federal proscriptions 

misrepresentation). 

I'See Smith, 102]. OF CRI'v!. L. & CRIMIKOLOGYat 5clO. 

213CFF. 

fraud and 

Dpaul]. Larkin, ]r., The Heritage l'oundation Senior Legal Research Pellow, O,,'e1J(~bi llea!i;z~ 

0" ·11" Lace} Atl: lVhy Should US. Glize!JJ llm'e If) Comply Ilifh h!1ri~!J LaIJ>J? TESTIMC lNl13El'ORE 

THE HOUSE C:OMMITTEE O:\J NATURALRESOURC:ES SC13C:OMMITTEE O:\J 

FISHERIES, WILDLIFE, OCE'\NS, lL'\D INSCL.\RAFFAIRS at 2-cl 0uly 17, 20 Ll) (citations 

omitted). 

11 :\ccording to Kadish: 

The plain sense t11at the criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control, useful for 

certain rurposes but not for others; that "\vhen iniproperly used it is capable of producing 

rnore evil than good; that the decision to cnD1inali;...:c any particular behavior rnust follow 

only after an asscssrnent and balancing of gains and losses-this obvious injunction of 

rationality has been noted widely for over 250 years, from Jeremy Bentl1an1 lforwardJ ... And 

those \vhose daily business is the administration of the crinunal b\v have, on occasion, 

exhihited acute awareness of the folly of departing from it. The need for restraint seems to 

5 
15 

u.s. Supreme Court long ago acqUlesced to federal crimes that lack a JJJens Ira requirement and 

instead itnpose liability without regclrd for a guilty rnental state.I.~ Contetnporary regulations often 

reject historic limitations on vicarious criminal responsibility for the acts of others. And, Congress 

h~lS delegated the inltllenSe rO\ver to detlne prohibited conduct through nllenlaking to 

unaccountd)le, opaque buretiUceicles, (md then to pn)secute violatl()lls \vith un-Gtbined enf()rCenlent 

·'discretion." 

The criminal prosecution of a well-respected marine biologist, Kancy Dlack, illustrates the 

prohlem. 16 Black's research has led to important advances in sClentific knowledge regarding whale 

range, behavior, and population structure. Nevertheless, for reasons that cannot be readily 

ascertained frorn the record, she v,las singled out to suffer the full v,!cight of the govcrnnlcnt's POV,!Cf, 

and charged with a variety of cnrncs including one count of violating 18 L .S.C. § lSl () (alteration of 

a record ,-vith the intent to inlpede, obstnlct, or int1uence ~ln investigation), one count of violating 18 

U.S.C 1001(a)(2) (knowingly and willtully m'tking a fillse statement in a matter), and two 

misdemeanor counts of violating 1(1 U.S.C Ll75(b) and 50 CF.R. §§ 216.3 and 2j(>.l1(b) 

(knowingly violating a Marine Mammal Protection '\ct ("MMP :\") regulation that prohihits 

"feeding" marine mammals in the wild). A forfeiture allegation was also alleged under 16 L.S.C. 

1377(d) and 1377 (e) (3) (B) and 2S usc. 2461 (c) (seeking forfeitore of a 22-foot dinghy and its 

gear). Black eventually pled guilty to one count of violating a regulation prohibiting feeding.1'i 

According to the Department of Justice ("DO)"). the genesis of the prosecution is that killer 

whales (orcas) enJov eating graywh,Jes in the Monterey Bav National Marine Sanctuary. \Vhen 

orcas manage to kill a gray whale, they do not always eat it all at once. Often, portions of the 

he recognized hy those who deal with the criminal laws, hut not hy those who make them or 

by the general pu blic which lives under d1em. 

Kadish, Jltpra. 

15.>" [lniled'>lale.II'. Pmk, 421 U.S. 6.18, 663-64, 670-73 (1975) (holding that the Federal Food, 

Drug, and C:osmetic Act does not require a guilty ment:ll states and affIrming C:EO's conviction for 

unsanitary food storage conditions): Dottetll.eidJ. 320 U.S. at 285 (1943) (holding a corporate 

president criminally liahle widlOut proof of a culpable mental state because he stood in "responsihle 

relation" to the distribution of mislabeled pharmaceuticals); Jfe aim United Slatc! Balinl, 258 U.S. 

250,251-52 (1922) (refusing to impose the common law requirement of a culpable mental sttte 

when legislative intent was to create strict Iiahility on a class of persons); United SUiteJ I'. !r7eitzenhoff, 

35 F.3d 1275,1283-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (strict liability for Clean Water Act violations without 

knowledge of the law or illegality of conduct); UnitedState,-!'. HallOlfSek, 176 F.3d 1116,1120-22 (9th 

Cir.) etlt. denied 528 L.S. 1102 (2000) (upholding conviction of a supenisor under the Clcan Water 

Act when a backhoe operator ruptured a pipeline because, inter alia, legislation was enacted for the 

puhlic welfare). 

IOCause of Action. Inc. is part of the team representing .'vIs. Black. 

"See C.S. Dep't of Justice, Office DfPublic Affairs, "Califol71ia Woman PlerliiJ Gllilty to Feedil(g 

U/bale.1 Mmille .lmutumy," (April 23, 2013), aJ,ai/aNe al 

http://wvv-w.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-enrd-463.html (accessed October 27,2013). As part 

of the plea agreement, the Government agreed to, inter alia, dismiss C:ount One (violation of 18 

U.S.C § 1519) and Count 2 (18 C.S.C § 10(1). At the change of plea hearing, the Government 

moved to dismiss Counts 1,2 and 4. 

6 
16 

carcass, including strips and chunks of blubber (some over six feet in length and \veighing oyer a 

hundred pounds), remain floating or semi-submerged after a kill. Orcas and sea birds feed on the 

leftovers while they are still available in the arealS 

DOJ reports that according to the plea agreement, on or about April 25,2004, Black was on 

her boat in the i\,lonterey Ray National I\larine Sanctuary, \\'hen she and her assistants encountered 

orcrls eating ,l baby gray \vhale. She \v,ltched the orC1S eat pieces of the ctlf t1o;lting in the \vater. 

To facilitCLte her research, she or her crew grabbed a t10ating bit of the unlucky calt; cut a hole 

through the corner and inserted a rope through the hole to s top the blubher from floating away 

from the boat. They rehImed the piece of blubber to the water and monitored the feeding behavior 

of the orcas, which ate the blubber off of the rope. Black and her crew repeated the process with the 

rope and other calf pieces. In court papers, Black admitted that, although she had a valid pennit to 

resetrch orG'S, she did not have a permit for this. She also admitted that on or about April 11, 200\ 

she or her crew did the same thing. 

'1"0 understand how it could be that this relatively innocuous conduct led Black to spend 

more dun eight years in a very pu blic and immensely burdensome regulatory and criminal morass of 

investigations, mdictments and charges, it is necessary to walk carefully through the relevant statutes 

and regulations. 

Pirst, Congress enacted 16 U,S,c' § 1375(b) as a statute of general application criminalizing 

prohibited conduct. It provides that 'lI]ny person who knowingly violates any provision of this title 

or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder (except as provided in section 118 l16 USc. § 

1387J) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than S 20,000 for each such violation, or 

irnprisoned for not l110re thclil one year, or both." The statute's mC1H rca requirenlent ("knowingly," 

not "willfully") is weak. A person need not know d1at his or her conduct is prohibited by the 

vIMP:\ to suffer criminal liability, only proof of general intent and knowledge of the facts 

constihIting the offense arc needed. 

Second, 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (a) , t,Jls within § 137S(b),s scope and prohibits the "taking" of a 

marine mammal, "Taking" is de tined at 16 U.S.C. 1362(13) to mean "harassment." "Harassment," 

in hIm, is dciined at 16 USc. l362(18) to mean anything that could "disturb" marine mammals 

by "causlingJ disruption of behavioral pattenlS ... including ... feeding." 

Third~ bureaucratic regulations prohibit (and thus criminalize) any attetnpt to "feed or 

attempt to feed" a marine mammal in the wild without a permit. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.3 ("Take" 

means to harass ... landJ includes, without limitation, any of d1e following: ... feeding or attempting 

to feed a n1arine n1an1n1al in the \vild.')), 216.11(h) (taking is unb\vtul). The anti-feeding regulation 

\V,lS designed to prevent for-protlt comp,lllies fron1 "htliting" n1,lrine n1an1n1,lls to cre<lte a "sho\1/' 

for their customers, For-protit companies that have run afoul of NO:\.i\'s anti-feeding regulations 

have typically been served with notices of violation and paid civil fi.ncs. 19 In one case, a forfeiture 

"Td. 

19See, e.X" '\O"c\j,\ Office of General Counsel, Enforcement Actions: July 1, 2012, through 

December 31,2012,;,t 17 (Peb, 2013), ami/able al 

http://www.gc.noaa.gov / documents/20 13/ enforce_Feb_021120 13.pdf (accessed July 17, 2(13) 

("SF 1003031, \;larine \;lammal Protection Act $5,000 NOV settled for ~5,000, with $1,000 

suspended for eighteen months. Owner and operator were charged for feeding wild dolphins."); 

'\JOAA Settlement Agreement, Marine Mammall'rotection Act, Case No. SE0902854,VL\;[ (Aquatic 

Adventures Management Group settles $.\000 NOV violating MMPA regulations prohibiting 
17 

action "\vas filed against a company in "\vhich the alleged violahons "\vere far tnore extensive and 

egregious d,an in d,e Black case." Yet only Black has been prosecuted." 

n. The Corrosi,"e Fffect of Regulatory Over-cnminali7-ation. 

The hUfficHl cost of regulatory over-crin1in~Jization has been "\vell documented. Reports of 

anned adminis tratiYe agency agents breaking into hOlnes, factories tU1d even anilnal shelters on the 

pretext of enforcing arcane federal and state regulations arc particularly unsettling. Rut from a 

systetnic standpo1t1t, the chief ... -ice of regulatory over-critninali7.ation is the "\vholesale abandonment 

of what l,-adish called "the basic principle of legality upon which law enforcernent in a delnocratic 

community must resto-close control OYer d1e exercise of d1e delegated authority to employ official 

force through the n1ediun1 of clrefully defined Lt\VS ~llld judicial and administrative accountability.,,23 

Such ,lbandonment h,ls h,ld ,l tren1endously corrosive effect, tl11d the systen1ic Lick of "clrefully 

feeding for $+,000); Notice of Violation and Assessment of AdministratiYe Penalty, Marine _Vlammal 

Protection Act, issued to Ben Chancey and Eric 'vlannino, Case '\10. SE090371 T'v[M ($5,000 NOV 

for ;Jleged violation of 'vlvlP A re!"l.lbltion prohibiting feeding of marine mamm;Js in the wild.) 

20 Complaint for Forfeiture, Uillted State,- I'. i'vIanji,-b, CV -13-2690-EJD, Dkt. 1 Qune 12,2013). 

21 Virginia I Jennessy, "Coustcau hands over boat to settle v,!hale ChUf11f11ing case: Sarne 

footage used in ctiminal case ag"inst marine biologist Nancy Black," MOKTEREY llCIDIlD (Oct. 7, 

2013), al'ailabie at http:/ h"yw.montereyher.lld.com/ news/ ci_2+260396/ cousteau-hands-over-boatsetde-whale-chumming-case (accessed Oct. 28, 2013); Daniel Dew, Sm'e /be ~ L'\lOAA 

(September 5, 2(12) amilable athttp://blog.heritage.org/2012/09/05/save-the-whales-noaa/ 

(accessed October 27, 2(13). 

~~.i\'Ll11Y federal and state tldministrative agencies lnaintain their o\vn anned police forces to 

enforce regulations. For exmnple, during the infamous C;ibson C;uitar raid, ~rmed federal agents 

swarmed ml iconic guitar maker, herding its employees at gunpoint based on allegations Gibson was 

using wood exported in violation of lndicul dornestic content laws to rnake nlusical instrurnents. 

[lox I'\ews, "Fed Ralll TargetJ Glii/an iHade Fmm Lndangeml TlreI," (Aug. 26, 2011) aI)ai!ab!e a/ 

http:/ h"yw.foxnews.com/ politics / 20 11 /08/26/ feds-environmental-enforcement -on -guitarsleaves-musicians-in-fear/ (accessed October 27, 2(13). 

In {mother case, the Huftlngton Post reports th,lt thirteen armed state b'\v enforcement 

agents reportedly r~ided an ~nimal shelter to capture Md then kill a 35-pound orphM baby deer. 1\11 

shelter employees were corralled near the parking lot while agents went through the property. W1,en 

a young volunteer took photos of the raid on his phone, officers took his phone and deleted the 

pictures. 'I'he armed agents took the fawn, which was about to be sent to an animal rehabilitation 

facility in Illinois, stuffed it into a body bag, carried it out of the shelter and killed it. The search 

\V~lrLl11t for the [{lid lists ~l \"x?isconsin st;-lte la\V forbidding the possession of \vildlife \vlthout proper 

pennits, and the likelihood that shelter employees might hide the a111mal, as reasons for the raid. 

Ilunter Stuart, "Baby Dee!; 'Gigg!eJ, ' Ki!!ed /lfter Raid on Sf. PI<lnds Soriety /11Iima! Sheftel;" (Aug. 2,2013) 

al'ailable at http://www.hufiingtonpost.com/20 13/08/02/baby-deer-killed-raid_n_36913 17.html 

(accessed October 27, 2013). 

"Kadish, mpnl. 
18 

defined la"\vs" and the absence of "adtninistrative accountability" have unquestionably resulted in 

abuses by federal and state adnlinistrative agencies. 24 

Furthennore, regulatory over-critninali;:;;ation has very strong secondary and tertiary effects 

that inhibit econonlic and personal liberty. The broad authority to "till in" and detine the tenns of 

strict liability crinles and the unlirnited prosecutorial discretion given by Congress to unaccountable 

bureaucratic regulators con1bine to chill con1rHnies ,tnd individuals fron1 contesting even civil 

rel'ula"JIvabuse. In most cases, tmgets of agency action must defend themselves in proceedings rUII 

by 'ige!h)'. Some agencies have even effectively done aw~y with the limited due process 

protection provided by independent administrative law judges. Yet courts generally require targets 

of agency action to "exhaust" adrninistrative rcnledies, often at great expense over a penod of years, 

before corning to court for an independent, fair, and level review. 

Gene-rally speaking, settlement is almost always the only cost-effective strategy. Public 

companies facing charges of criminal regulatory violations often settle at least in part because the 

risk of insolvency associated with a criminal indictment (sec Arthur Anderson) is so great ti,at 

contesting a charge could amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. Small businesses usually lack the 

resources to effectively contest reguhtory enforcement ~ctions and there is no equinlent of the 

Federal Pubhc Defender's Ofttce for targets of administrative action. Theretore, only a few rare 

individuals arc capable of standing up and vigorously defending themselves and their rights when 

facing charges with respect to alleged criminal (and often even alleged civil) regulatory violations. 

Also, 

or predictable. 

decision-nuking in an over-crirninali:,.;ed environnlent is rarely clear, consistent, 

Certainly, if a law declares a practice to be criminal, but cannot apply its policy with 

2"The legal restrictions imposed on the bureaucracy's po"\ver to cntninahze and punish are far 

and fe\v be"t\veen, "with the only vigorous substantive boundaries set in areas like speech and 

reproductive freedom." Generally applicable limitations such as judicially-imposed ml'lIJ lea and 

actual notice requiren1ents, barriers ,tgainst shifting evidenti,try burdens to the defense, rl11d b,l11s on 

strict liability status offenses are "derelict[sJ on the waters of the bIW." This is likely due to a v;lTiety 

of reasons, including hesitance to limit the political br~nches in their enactment and enforcement of 

substantive ctirnes and punislunetlts. 'l'hus: 

Every augmentation provides officials a new legal instrument to apply ~gainst members of 

the so-called "criminal class" (many of whom look remarkably similar to the class of 

"nonnal" folks). \"X>11ether any given instance nlight be seen as abusive, of course, depends 

on an individual's personal predispositions and intellectual commitments, whatever they may 

be. But in generrJ, "An1eriGUl crimin,tl h"\v's historiGJ developn1ent has borne no relation to 

any phusible normative theory," \Villi= Stuntz suggests, "unless 'more' counts ~s a 

nonnative theory." 

See Erika Lum, rlie OI'emiminaiL,ation PhelWJJlelWn, ~-I Am. Univ. L. Rev. 70-1, 711, 723 (2005) 

(citations omitted). 

"ror example, on August 2-1, 2011, Gibson Guitar factories in Nashville and 'v!emphis were 

raided bv armed agents from the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. ['ish & \Vildlife 

Service for alleged Lacey Act violations. The cornpany was not accused of irnporting banned wood. 

Rather, the raid apparentl y occurred because Gibson ran afDul of a technical Indian regulatiDn 

goveming the export of iinished wood products, which was designed to protect Indian 

woodworkers from foreign competition. Seu Affidavit of Special Agent John 'VI. Rayfield in support 

ofSe~rch Warrant ll-M.J-IO()7 A, 13, C:, D ~t'I'11S-18 (Aug. 18,2011) ami/able at 
19 

consistency, its tnoral effect is necessarily "\veakened.:::6 But the agencies' lack of consistency, 

transparency, and accountability also underrnines public faith in the rule of law, itnpairing innovation 

and interfering "\'lith business investn1ent and job-creation. Tin1e and again in the course of my 

rractice, in vrlrious regulatory contexts rlnd in various \-ennlres, I have seen hrge con1r~l11ies, sn1all 

comr,lnies, and entrerreneurs assess the risks and uncerttunty rosed by regubtory overcrirninah:,.;ation, and then decline to build, to invest, or to grow. \"X>11ile I knoy\/ of no ernpirical study 

that authoritatively accounts for the jobs lost and/or the economic activity aborted by regulatory 

over-criminaliLation, the harm is unquestionably pervasive, palpable, and real." 

http://wvvw.scribd.com/srCClhiba/ d/ 63869~S 7 -US-(; overnment -s-Aft!dayit -in-Support -ot~Search­

\,:-'arrant-at-Ciibson-Ciuit,lr-Pactory (accessed J\by 4, 2012). To make n1tltters "\vorse, ,llthough the 

Indian government certiEed that the wood was properly and legally exported, the regulators 

substituted their o\\'n opinion to support their clairns of a l.acey Act violation. 

On July 27, 2012, Gihson and the government settled all of their outstanding Lacey ,\ct 

matters. As to the Indian ebony and rost\vood that led to an anned raid: 

The Government and Gibson ... agree that certain questions and inconsistencies no\v exist 

regarding the tariff classification of ebony and rosewood fingerboard blanks ... Accordingly, 

the Governrnent will not undertake enforceDlent actions related to (:;ibson's future 

orders ... or itnports of ebony and rosewood ... frorn India, unless and until the Govcrnnlent 

of Indi,l rrovides specific clarification that ebony and rose\vood tlngerbotlrd bbnks ,lre 

expressly prohioited oy laws related to Indian Foreign Trade Policy. 

See Letter from Jerry E. Martin to Donald A. Carr dated July 27,2012 at 3 aL'aliabie a[ 

http://wvvw2.gibson.com/.\ ews-Lfestyle /I' eatures / en-us / c..; ibson -Comments-on -Department -ofJustice-Settlemen.aspx (accessed July 1~, 2(13). 

~evrhe burerlUcratic impulse to grab discretion in order to punish selectively and for sho"\v is 

deeply rooted. As a \Vorld \Var II Oft!ce of Price Violations tmmual noted, "Criminal prosecution 

against a corporation is rather ineffectiye unless one or more of the indiyiduals is also proceeded 

against." '1'0 justify selective enforcement, d,e Manual stated: 

One of the most difficult pro hI ems 111 this tleld is to comhat the attitude, so preyalent in this 

country, that the cnminallaws are made for the criminal classes and do not apply to 

respectable people. This attitude is clearly incompatible with enforcing general compliance 

on d1e part of d1e consumers. '\[eeting it calls for the judicious and telling selection of 

vioLttions by rlverage reople in the v,lrious economic and soci,ll str<ltrl of society. 

See j('adish, Some ObwwtiollS on the UJe ofC"cminai Sam/iollJ Elljoning EWIIOtllle lli!glliatioIIJ, 30 U. CIIl. 

L. REv. 423,426,439 (1962)(citatiolls omitted) . 

.:!7Brownfield developtnent (or nlore accurately, the lack thereot) is one rnanifestation of this 

phenomenon. "Browntlelds" are formerly productive factory or commercial sites that are vacant or 

underutilized due to the legal risk and uncertainty caused by the federal and state regulations 

governing responsibility for environn1ental cont,unln,ltion, le<ld paint or ;lS hestos insulation. The 

conduct that led to the environDlental contarnination, the presence of lead paint or the use of 

asbestos insulation in the first instance was generally legal and CODunon at the tirne it occurred. Yet, 

federal and state regulations promulgated in d,e 1980s and 1990s shifted the risk of civil and criminal 

liability for the condition of these properties to new owners. It took years of work by stakeholders, 

primarily including local govemments, developers and community activists, plus the development of 

10 
20 

IV. CONCLUSION. 

ILR strongly supports measures to protect puhlic health and safety ~nd recognizes the 

importance of laws that protect the puhlic welfare and of the agencies that implement them. 

"onetheless. TLR believes that Congress should take action to address regulatory overcrirninah:,.;ation, which is contrary to our constitutionally-enshrined cotlunitrncnt to individual 

freedoll1 and discourages entrerreneurship, investll1ent, rl11d job gro\vth. Specifically: 

Congress should take a hard look at the cnacttncnt of a general and clc-ar fllCIiJ {ta 

requirement for ~ll federal crimes, including those lnsed on regulations promulgated hy 

administrative agenCles. There ~re simply too m~ny federal offenses and regulations for 

Congress to act piecetneal. And, even in cases \vhere Congress has included a JJJenJ rea 

rcquircrncnt in an authorizing statute, that language can be so far rcrnovcd froD1 the language 

in federal regulations detining specitlc prohibited conduct that it is difficult to determine 

\vhat mel!.\" n:a requirenlent, if clny, (lpplies to each given elenlent of the (llleged crime. The 

reality is that the "large solution'? (e.g. a generally applicable menJ rea stltute) is the only 

prtlctictll and effective one.::s 

Congress, rU1d this Task Porce, should nl0re fully explore rehTLlbtory over-crinlin,llization's 

corrosive secondary and tertiary effects, which must he addressed to presetye the rule of law 

and protect our system of free enterprise. 

Thank YOLl for your attention to this important matter. I am h~ppy to answer ~ny questions 

you tnay have regarding my testitnony. 

adVrU1ced remedirltion techniques an.d insurance products hy the rrivate sector, to nlitig,lte the 

regulatory risk. 

~s-,-'\_q~TLuhly, the met!.\' rea standard for "crinles" due to regubtory viobtions should he at least ,1 

",,~llful" violation, meaning that ~ person does not just intend to achieve a result hut that he or she 

knows that what he or she is doing is prohihited hy the reguhtions hefore he or she can he held 

criminally liahle. See Cheek IC United StateJ, 498 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1991). 

11 
21 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Rubinstein. We appreciate the testimony. 

At this time, we will hear from Professor Rachael Barkow. She 

is the Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy and 

Faculty Director of the Center on the Administration of Criminal 

Law at NYU. In June of 2013, the Senate confirmed her as a member of the United States Sentencing Commission. Since 2010, she 

has also been a member of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Policy Advisory Panel. Professor Barkow 

teaches courses in criminal law, administrative law, and constitutional law. 

She has written several articles on sentencing and has explored 

in numerous articles the role of prosecutors in the criminal justice 

system. In a series of major articles, she has explored the relationship between separation of powers and the criminal law and the relationship between federalism and the criminal law. Professor 

Barkow has been invited to present her work in various settings 

and has testified before Congress. 

She previously served as a law clerk to Judge Lawrence Silberman on the District of Columbia Circuit and Justice Antonin Scalia 

on the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Professor Barkow received her bachelor of arts degree from 

Northwestern University and her juris doctorate from some place 

called Harvard Law School. [Laughter.] 

It is an honor to have you here, Professor, and we look forward 

to your comments. 

TESTIMONY OF RACHEL E. BARKOW, SEGAL FAMILY PROFESSOR OF REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY, NEW YORK 

SCHOOL OF LAW 

Ms. BARKOW. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the Task Force for inviting me today to talk to you about the problem of over-criminalization as it relates to regulatory crimes. 

I want to briefly raise three issues associated with regulatory 

crimes that I believe are worth further consideration by the Task 

Force. 

First, regulatory crimes are unique among criminal laws in that 

they often lack mens rea requirements that establish that a defendant was blameworthy when he or she acted as he or she did. Now, 

some of these offenses are strict liability, and to establish criminal 

liability for these offenses, all the government has to show is that 

the defendant engaged in conduct and there is no requirement that 

the government has to demonstrate that the defendant knew that 

he or she was engaging in the prohibited conduct. Strict liability 

offenses have long been criticized by criminal law scholars because 

they lack any culpability requirement that would merit criminal 

punishment and the stigma of a conviction. 

Other regulatory crimes are not pure strict liability but they, 

nevertheless, criminalize conduct that the defendant may not know 

is wrongful. The law normally adopts the view that ignorance of 

the law is no excuse, and for most crimes, it is common knowledge 

that the act is prohibited. With regulatory crimes, however, this 

common knowledge may be lacking. Sophisticated players may be 
22 

aware of regulations, but people who are not regular industry players may have no reason to know there is a regulatory landscape 

that requires compliance at the risk of a criminal sanction. 

The Supreme Court has dealt with this issue by interpreting 

some statutes to require an awareness of wrongdoing or illegality, 

even when the statute is silent about that element. But the Court 

has not interpreted all regulatory criminal laws this way, and it 

typically does not do this if it believes that a reasonable person 

should know that the area is subject to stringent public regulation. 

So if Congress wishes to tie regulatory crimes to traditional notions 

of criminal liability, modification of many of these laws may be in 

order. 

The second point I want to make is that regulatory violations 

have been subject to criminal penalties on the theory that criminalization will make the regulatory scheme more effective. So this is 

an empirical question, whether criminalization is the optimal strategy for addressing the violation of all regulatory offenses or whether civil enforcement and penalties could achieve the same levels of 

deterrence and regulatory compliance for some provisions. Sound 

criminal justice policy, I believe in all areas, not just regulatory offenses, should rest on an assessment of the costs and benefits of 

criminal punishment to determine whether limited Federal dollars 

are best spent on prison terms or if less costly options are available 

and just as effective. 

In assessing whether criminalization is necessary for an effective 

regulatory regime, I believe Congress should evaluate particular 

regulatory provisions to assess their importance instead of simply 

making blanket determinations to criminalize an entire regulatory 

area without attention to detail. And that leads to my final point. 

So currently, Congress is typically not aware of the specific regulations that an agency will pass when Congress authorizes criminal 

punishment for their violation which effectively delegates to agencies the authority to fill in details about what is criminalized. So 

whatever the usual merits of delegating authority to agencies, I believe criminal law is distinct for at least four reasons. 

First, criminal law is about blameworthiness and should reflect 

society’s moral judgments, and Congress has a decided advantage 

over administrative agencies because Congress represents the 

broadly held views of the electorate. 

Second, constitutional principles of separation of powers have 

special force in criminal law where government power is at its 

height. 

Third, Congress is more attuned to the problem of the unmanageable expansion of criminal laws. 

And fourth, the administrative landscape constantly changes 

which means that criminal laws tied to regulations will be a moving target. Having Congress take the lead in identifying those situations that merit criminalization would inject more stability and 

make it easier for actors to keep track of their obligations. 

Thank you again for allowing me to testify and share my 

thoughts, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Barkow follows:] 
23 

Statement of Rachel E. Barkow 

Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy 

Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law 

New York University School of Law 

Before the House Committee on the Judiciary 

Task Force on Over-criminalization 

Regulatory Crime: Overview - Defining the Problem 

October 30, 2013 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Task Force: Thank you for inviting me to 

testify before you regarding the problem of over-criminalization as it relates to regulatory 

crime. It is an honor to appear before you. 

I am testifying today in my personal capacity and not as a member of the United 

States Sentencing Commission. 

It is my understanding that the "regulatory crimes" that are the primary focus of 

this hearing are those statutes that criminalize the violation of agency regulations. These 

statutes occur across a wide range of substantive areas but generally share in common a 

format that "delegate[s] to an agency the power to promulgate regulations, while 

providing that violations of the yet to be written regulations will be crimes subj ect to 

statutory penalties."[ A common form is a law that "provides for criminal punishment of 

anyone 'who knowingly violates any other [regulatory] requirement set forth in [a 

specific title] or any regulation issued by the Secretaries to implement this Act, [or] any 

provision of a permit issued under this Act.,,2 An example would be pollution-control 

statutes, which criminalize the release of pollutants in broad terms but leave agencies to 

define through regulation "[ w ]hat constitutes a pollutant, what kind of pennitting is 

required to handle that pollutant, how the pollutant may be stored, and who within an 

organization may be subject to criminal penalties.",3 

Before addressing some specific issues raised by federal regulatory crimes, 

would like to situate regulatory crimes more generally within the larger mission of the 

Task Force to address the problem of "over-criminalization." Over-criminalization has 

several connotations It could refer to a concern that federal criminal laws produce 

excessive incarceration rates or prison populations 4 To the extent the Task Force is 

concerned with prison overcrowding and rising incarceration rates in the federal system, 

1 Richard E. Myers II, Complex 'limes f)on H~al1jiJr Complex Crimes. X9 N.C. L. REV. IX49. 1 X52 (2011). 

2 Darry1 K. Bro'\vn, Criminal/.mr·8 Unfortunatelv 'l'riumph Over Administrative I.aw, 7 J.L. Eco'J. & 

POL'y 657, 674 (2011) (quoting RR 3968, 109th Cong .. § 506(g)(2) (2005)). 

3 Myers. supra note I, at 1852. 

4 See, e.g .. Statement of Ranking Member Conyers, House Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task 

Force on Over-Criminalization. availablc atjudieiary.house.gov/news/20 13/05082013.ht.ml (welcoming the 

work of the Task Force in analyzing the issue of "rulnduly expansive criminal provisions in our law 

mmeeessariiy driv[ingJ up incarceration rates"). 
24 

a focus beyond regulat07 crime is necessary. Almost half of all federal prisoners are 

there for drug offenses. Fireanns and immigration offenses make up another large 

segment of the prison population6 Regulatory crimes are a relatively minuscule part of 

the federal prison population. Regulatory crimes largely fall within those crimes that the 

Bureau of Prisons lumps together as "miscellaneous," and collectively they amount to 

only 0.8% of the total prison population 7 Thus, while it is a laudable goal to improve the 

treatment of regulatory crimes, doing so will not address the broader problem of overcriminalization in the federal system insofar as the concern is the number and rates of 

people incarcerated. 

Federal over-criminalization could also refer to the problem of federal laws 

intruding on areas that are adequately addressed by the states. 8 Regulatory crimes, 

however, are typically well suited for federal attention. Indeed, they are the paradigmatic 

example of an area that is appropriate for federal involvement because of their 

complexity and interstate commercial concerns 9 

Over-criminalization may also refer to the sheer quantity of criminal laws, 

partIcularly when citizens are expected to comply wah all of them 10 Regulatory crimes 

are a major culprit in this respect, accounting for a huge chunk of the number of criminal 

laws on the books. By some estimates, there are more than 300,000 federal regulations, 

administered by as many as 200 agencies, that are punishable by criminal penalties. I I 

5 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts Ahout the Hureau of Prisons, aI!ailahle at 

http://,,ww.bop.gov/newsiquick.jsp (last updated August 24, 2013) (46.8% of federal inmates were 

sentenced for a dmg offense). 

G Taken together. these groups account for over a quarter oflile prison population. with 16.-1% of federal 

irunatcs sentcnced for weapons. cxplosiycs ,rod arson offcnses. and 11.7% of federal imnates sentenced for 

~l1lmigration offenses. !d . 

. Ie/. See also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobe)", Debunking Ciaims afOver-Federalization afCriminal 

62 EMORY U. 1. 35 (I012). 

e.g., Statement of Chainllan Goodlatte. House Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on 

Over-Criminalization. availahle at judiciary.house.gov/news/2013l05082013.html (argning that the Task 

Force needs to ""take a closer look at our laws and regulations to make sure that they ... do not duplicate 

state efforts""): Statement of Crime Subcommittee Chairman Sensenbrenner. House Judiciary Committee 

Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over-CriminaliLatiOil ami/able al 

judiciary .house.gov/newsl20 \3/050820 13.html ("Congress must ensure the federal role in criminal 

prosecutions is properly limited to offenses within federal jurisdiction and within the scope of 

constitutionally delegated powers"). 

9 Rachel E. Barkow. Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. 

L. REV. 519, 5.:17-48. 570-71 (2011) (documenting that most states give state-level prosecutors instead of 

local prosecutors the authority to pursue state regulatory crimes and explaining that this allows for the 

development of expertise in "'complex areas whereas local prosecutors may not have a critical mass of these 

cases or sufficient personnel to develop the specialized knowledge necessary to pursue them effectively:' 

which holds tme of federal regnlatory offenses as well). 

10 See. e.g.. Statement of Crime Subcommittee Ranking Member Scoll, House Judiciary Commillee Creates 

Bipartisan Task Force on Over-CriminaliLatioIl amilable al 

judiciary.house.gov/news/20 \3/050820 13.htnll (refeniug to the large number of criminal offenses): Paul J. 

Larki" Jf.."1 "fistake of Loll' Defense as a Remedvfor Overcrilllinalization. 29 CRIMINAL JL STICE 10, II 

(Spring 2013). 

II Myers, supra note 1. at 1865. 

2 
25 

Finally, over-criminalization may refer to treating behavior as criminal that is 

either innocent or that is more properly addressed with civil sanctions12 This might be 

called "a divorce between legal guilt and moral blameworthiness.,,'3 The remainder of 

my testimony will address three key areas related to this aspect of over-criminalization 

and regulatory crimes. 

First, regulatory crimes may lack sufficient mens rea requirements to ensure that 

defendants charged under those laws are sufficiently blameworthy to merit the stigma and 

severity of a criminal sentence. A "guilty mind" has long been a bedrock requirement for 

the blameworthiness of a criminal conviction. It may be absent in some regulatory 

offenses, however, because the conduct is not wrongful in itself and individuals may lack 

adequate notice that their conduct has been criminalized. 

Second, regulatory violations have been subj ect to criminal penalties on the theory 

that criminalization will make the regulatory scheme more effective. But it is an 

empirical question whether criminalization is the optimal strategy for addressing the 

violation of all regulatory offenses or whether civil enforcement and penalties could 

achieve the same levels of deterrence and regulatory compliance for some provisions. 

Ihird, Congress typically is not aware of the specific regulations that the agency 

will pass when it authorizes criminal punishment for their violation. That delegates to 

agencies the authority to till in the details about what is criminalized. This framework 

raises the question whether Congress should take a greater role in making criminalization 

determinations because of institutional advantages associated with the legislative process. 

T. The Importance of Mens Rea and Notice 

Mens rea - the concept of a guilty mind - is a cornerstone of our criminal justice 

system14 The common law respected the notion of "[alctus non facit reum nisi mens sit 

rea - an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty."" This notion "reflects 

the common sense view of justice that blame and punishment are inappropriate in the 

absence of choice." 16 Herbert Wechsler, the legendary criminal law scholar, explains 

why mens rea is so important to blameworthiness: "Unless the actor realized or should 

have realized that his behavior threatened such unjustifiable injury; unless he knew or 

should have known the facts that gave his conduct its offensive quality or tendency, it 

"See. e.g.. Stntement of Chairman Goodlatte. supra note X (observing that "Americans who make innocent 

mistakes should not be charged with criminal offenses"): Statement of Ranking Member Scott, supra note 

10 (noting with concern thnt many criminal provisions do not "'requirLeJ that criminal intent be shown to 

establish guilt). 

13 Larkin, supra note 10, at 10. 

I' "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of. rather than the exception to. the principles of AngloArucricancrinrinaijurisprudcncc.·' Dennis\'. United States. 3H U.S. ~94. 500 (1951). 

I' EDWARD COKE, THE THIRl.lPAKl OF THE INS'llTUTE OF THE LAWS oFE)JULA)JD 107 (William S. Hcin & 

Co. 1986) (1644). 

16 SAKFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIylI'-JALLAW A'-JD ITs PROCESSES 242 (9"' ed. 2012). 

3 
26 

was an accident.,,17 

For most crimes, the prohibited conduct is malum in se, or wrong in itself, such 

that it is common knowledge that engaging in the conduct is unlawful. Thus, in most 

cases, criminal om~nses need only specify that the defendant has the requisite awareness 

or knowledge that he or she is engaging in the underlying conduct, without an additional 

requirement that the government also establish that the defendant was aware that the 

conduct itself was unlawful, for a defendant to have the traditional culpability that that 

criminal law requires. 

Other crimes, including regulatory offenses, are not wrong in themselves. Thus a 

defendant who knowingly engages in the conduct that the law prohibits may not be 

culpable in the traditional sense. But if the defendant knows the conduct is illegal or is 

aware of the risk that it may be illegal and engages in the conduct in any event, 

culpability can be supplied by the defendant's willingness to flout the democratically 

enacted law. 

Mens rea is so foundational to American criminal law that even when a statute is 

silent as to whether mens rea is required, courts generally presume that its omission was 

not an intentional one by the legislature and interpret the law to require mens rea. 1g 

Indeed, an animating principle of the Model Penal Code 19 is that, "unless some element 

of mental culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no 

valid criminal conviction may be obtained.,,20 The Model Penal Code therefore has a 

default rule that, in the absence of a stated mens rea requirement, the government must 

show that a defendant was at least reckless with respect to each offense element 21 

While the Model Penal Code was hugely influential in the states,22 it had less of 

an impact at the federal level. The federal code thus lacks a comparable default rule to 

1; Herbert Wechsler, cl Thoughtfiil Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRr'>!. L.. CRl!VlIt-:OLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 

524. 527-2X (1955). 

18 Staples v. United States. 511 U.S. 600,619 (1994) (applying the "'backgronnd mle of the common law 

favoring mens rea"): John F. Manning. The Ahsurdi~v Doctrine. 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2466 (20o:l) 

C[I]nthe absence of clear congressional direction to tile contrary. textualists read mens rea requirements 

iuto otherwise unqualified criminal statutes because established judicial practice calls for interpreting such 

statutes in light of common law mental statc rcquircmcnts."). 

I' Thc Model Pcnal Codc was thc product of a law refonn effort of the American Law Institute. Herbert 

WecllSler, with the assistance of distinguished judges, law professors and lawyers. drafted a model code 

that distilled and organized funcl1me ntal principles from the common law into a systematic criminal code. 

Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber. 'Ine American Model Penal Code.~ RriefOverview, 10 NEW 

CRn ... 1. L. REV. 319. 322-26 (2007). 

20 Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. 1 (19X5). 

21 Model Penal Code § 2.02(1). The Model Penal Code includes another default interpretive nde that 

"[w]henthe law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the connnission 

of an offense. without distinguishing among the material elements thereof. such provision shall apply to all 

the material clcmcnts of the offense, urness a contrary purpose plairny appears." !d. §2.02(4). 

22 Roughly two-thirds of the states rcfolliled their O"~l codes in light of the Model Penal Codc. 

Ronald L. Gainer, Relllarks all the Introductioll ofCrimillal Law Reform Illitiatives, 7 J. L. ECON. & 

POL'y 587, 588 (2011). 

4 
27 

the one in the Model Penal Code. To be sure, the federal courts follow the common law 

presumption that statutes require mens rea even when they do not state the requirement 

explicitly, but a notable exception in the federal case law applies to public welfare 

offenses, which include regulatory crimes23 

Regulatory crimes are unique among criminal laws in that they often lack the kind 

of mens rea requirements that establish that a defendant was blameworthy in acting as he 

or she did. Regulatory crimes without traditional mens rea requirements fall into two 

general categories. 

Some regulatory crimes are strict liability. To establish criminal liability for these 

offenses, the government need only prove that the conduct occurred. There is not even a 

requirement that the defendant knew he or she was engaging in the prohibited conduct. 

So, for example, a defendant can be criminally liable for shipping a mislabeled drug, 

even ifhe or she was not conscious of the fact that the drug was mislabeled24 

The rationale behind strict liability offenses is that the underlying activity affects 

"the lives and health of the people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, 

are largely beyond self-protection.,,25 So, the argument goes, the risk of any error should 

fall not on the innocent consumers, but on the people who are opting to engage in the 

underlying activity of distributing the products. If those individuals engaging in the 

commercial activity know that they will be strictly liable for any violations of the law and 

subject to criminal punishment, the theory is that those individuals will take great care in 

conducting those activities. And because the government will not need to prove even 

negligence, there is no risk that the manufacturer or distributor will escape liability by 

claiming he or she exercised reasonable care, even when more could have in fact been 

done to prevent the harm. This strict liability category of regulatory crimes therefore 

lacks any cul~ability requirement and has been widely criticized by criminal law scholars 

and theorists. 6 

Other regulatory crimes are not pure strict liability offenses, but they nevertheless 

criminalize conduct that a defendant may not know is wrongful. These laws require the 

government to prove that the defendant was aware or intended the prohibited conduct, but 

there is no additional requirement that the government also prove that the defendant knew 

that conduct was against the law. Most criminal laws do not require the government to 

show that the defendant was aware that his or her conduct was unlawiul. The absence of 

this requirement is not problematic in most cases because it is common knowledge that 

23 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246. 262 (1952). See also United States v. Halint, 25X U.S. 250. 

252 (1922) (recognizing that legislatures could dispense with mens rea and observing ,.[ m]any instances of 

this are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the 

emphasis of the statnte is evidently upon the achievement of some social betterment rather than the 

punislunent of the crillles as in the cases of lIlala in se "). 

" Uniled Siaies v. Dollerweich. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 

2' ld. at 280. 

2(, Kadish. supra note 16, at 300 (observing that "rtlhe great majority of academic writing has opposed 

absolute liability"). Reflecting these criticisms, the Canadian Supreme COlli! has concluded that 

imprisolllllent on the basis of strict liability is Ullconstitntional under Canadian law.ld. at 299. 

5 
28 

the activity is unlawful. It would make little sense to add a requirement to murder statutes 

that defendants know that killing is unlawful because that is a shared understanding that 

is pervasive in society27 

In the case of regulatory offenses, a common knowledge of wrongfulness is 

unlikely to be present. Thus the risk of not including an element that requires the 

government to show that the defendant knew the activity was unlawful is that innocent 

individuals may find themselves facing criminal liability. If it is not common knowledge 

generally or among people engaged in an activity that a certain product needs to be 

registered or that the activity must be conducted in a particular way, then people without 

any reason to know of those facts or to investigate the regulatory landscape will become 

ensnared in the criminal justice system28 On the other hand, critics have pointed out that 

requiring the government to prove a defendant's knowledge of the law would be a 

difficult undertaking29 

For its part, the Supreme Court has interpreted some statutes to require an 

awareness of wrongdoing or illegality, even when the statute is silent about that element, 

because of a concern that statutes would otherwise reach innocent conductJO 

The Court has not interpreted all regulatory criminal laws this way. The Court 

has observed that, in most of the cases where it has not interpreted a regulatory crime to 

require an awareness of wrongdoing, "Congress has rendered criminal a type of conduct 

that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may 

seriously threaten the community's health or safety.,,31 

The line, then, has been based on the Court's assessment of when Congress would 

and would not require such proof. That, in turn, depends on whether the Court believes 

27 Henry M. Hart Jr.. 'Ine Aims of the Criminall.aw, 23 LAW & COI\TF.MP. PROBS. 401,413 (195X) 

(observing that when criminal laws align with "conununity attitudes and needs ... knowledge of 

wrongfulness can fairly be assumed" and "any member of the community who does these things without 

knowledge that they are crimil18l is blameworthy. as much for his lack of knowledge as for his actual 

conduct"). 

" Arthur Leavens, Bevond Blame - ]Viens Rea and RegulolOry Crime, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. I, I 

(2007) (explaining how "mens rea serves a notice function" in the context of regulatory crimes). 

"' See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr .. Reconsidering the 111istake ofIm!> Defense, 102 J. CIillcl. L. & 

CRIMINOLOGY 725. 749-752 (2012) (discussing the merits of this view). 

30 "Where the conduct covered by the statute is neither inherently wrongful nor dangerous, the Court 

interprets the st8tute to require actual knowledge of the law." John F. Stinneford. I'unishment Without 

Culpahilitv. 102 J. CRn,l. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 651. 69X-699 (2012). See. e.g.. I.iparota v. [jnited States. 

471 U.S. 419. 426 (1985) (interpreting a statute to require the government to show that a defendant knew 

that the manner in which he or she possessed or acquired food stamps was unlawful and doing so to avoid 

"crimil18lizLingJ a broad range of apparently innocent conduct"); Cheek v. United States. 49X U.S. 192.201 

(1991) (interpreting a statute that eriminalizes one "who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 

any tax" to require the govennnent to show that the defendant knew of the duty established by the law and 

"voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty"). For a broader summary of cases in which courts have 

interpreted statutes to require a knowledge of illegality, sec Sharon L. Davies. The Jurisprudence of 

Wil/jiilness: "in Evolving Theorv of Excusable Ignorance. 48 DlJKE L.J. 341, 343-346 (1998). 

31 iiparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 

6 
29 

individuals are reasonably on notice that their conduct may be subj ect to regulations32 If 

an activity is highly regulated and the actors participating in it are typically sophisticated, 

the Court is more comfortable reading statutory silence with respect to mens rea as 

intentional. The Court in that instance assumes that Congress prefers to create an 

incentive for individuals to develop knowledge of the relevant regulatory scheme in order 

to comply with itJJ 

Regulatory offenses thus involve a substantial amount of guess work about what 

level of liability Congress intends. If Congress wishes to tie regulatory crimes to 

traditional notions of criminal liability in an effort to check what it views as overcriminalization, modification of many of these laws would be advisable. 

II. Is Criminalization Necessary? 

A second issue raised by regulatory crimes is whether criminalization is necessary 

to achieve the public policy goals of the regulatory framework. When the Supreme Court 

upheld the use of a strict liability criminal regulatory statute in Uniled Siaies v. 

Dottenveich,34 it observed that Congress elected a regime that "dispenses with the 

conventional requirement for criminal conduct - awareness of some wrongdoing" in 

order to achieve "the larger good.,,35 The assumption was that making individuals who 

sold food and drugs strictly liable and subject to criminal punishment for adulterated 

products would make them act more carefully. Or, in the Court's words, criminal 

"penalties serve as effective means of regulation.,,3G 

It is a key empirical question whether criminalization is necessary to achieve "the 

larger good" of a regulation or whether other mechanisms would do so just as 

effectively37 Strict liability could still be used in a civil regime, so the inquiry does not 

center on mens rea options. Rather, the question is what quantum of punishment is 

necessary to deter violations of the act. A criminal sanction, unlike a ci vii sanction, can 

include a tenn of imprisonment. Criminal sanctions also connote a judgment of 

blameworthiness that carries a stigma. Convictions carry collateral consequences as well, 

such as the loss of licenses and ineligibility for certain government programs, depending 

on the crime. Policymakers could therefore assess whether these additional features of 

criminal punishment are necessary to achieve the ends of the regulatory scheme. 

"See, e.g, United States v. Int'LIfinera/s & Chem. Corp., -102 U.S. 558,565 (1971) (noting in a case 

ilNolving the shipment of corrosive liquids that "'[tlhe probability of regulation is so great that anyone who 

is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing "ith them must be presumed to be aware of the 

regulation"). 

33 Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Overfederalization ofCriminall.aw? It's a :vlvth, 28 CRIMINAL 

J\TSTICr. 23, 28 (Spring 201 3). 

3'1 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 

35 Id. at 2X1. 

36 !d. at 280·281. 

37 In tile Sentencing Re[onn Act. Congress embraced the parsimony principle that punislnnenl should not 

be greater than necessary to achieve its goals. 18 V.S.c. §3553(a) (instmcting courts "sentence sufficient. 

but not greater than necessary" to achieve the purposes of punislunent set out in the statute). While that 

law addresses sentences in individual cases, the principle should apply at the macro level in setting up 

sanction regimes in the interest of fiscal responsibility and limited govennnent. 

7 
30 

For some would-be individual violators, the prospect of prison and the collateral 

consequences of a conviction may be necessary. They may view the risk of civil 

penalties "as a mere cost of doing business" that can be passed along to consumers 3S 

Even if that is not possible - because the individual does not own a business to pass 

through fines or the fines are too high - bankruptcy may be an option that allows for a 

"fresh start.,,39 Prison, in contrast, cannot be passed through to someone else, nor does 

the stigma of a conviction. 40 

Until now, my testimony has focused on individual defendants, but the question 

of the need for criminal versus civil sanctions is one that should also be asked with 

respect to corporate defendants. Corporations cannot be imprisoned, of course, so 

criminal laws do not provide that added disincentive. But criminal actions against 

companies do produce a greater stigma than civil actions do. The reputational sanction 

that comes with criminal charges and convictions can in some cases put in jeopardy a 

finn's ability to survive 41 In addition, criminal convictions subject defendant companies 

in many regulatory areas to "'debarment,' meaning that the company is not eligible to 

enter into a contract with the federal government for a specified time period.,,42 That is 

effectively a death sentence for some companies43 

Prosecutors, armed with the leverage that the threat of a criminal prosecution 

brings, can often extract significant concessions from companies eager to avoid 

indictment. This leverage typically encourages companies to assist the government in 

identifying individual law violators within the company. In addition, federal prosecutors 

are increasingly reaching deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and nonprosecution 

agreements (NPAs) with companies that allow companies to avoid indictment in 

exchange for agreeing to prosecution demands that may include significant changes to 

corporate practice and personnel and often the installation of a monitor to oversee the 

changes. In effect, these DPAs and NPAs give prosecutors additional regulatory power 

over the company. While DPAs and NPAs can enhance the effectiveness of a regulatory 

regime, they raise questions about the competency and propriety of prosecutors to impose 

regulatory conditions44 

Regulatory provisions may differ in terms of whether they require the additional 

disincentives that criminalization provides. And in weighing the benefits that 

"Richard J. Lazams, ,1ssimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the ProbleJllwith 

Environmental Crime. 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 867, 880 (1994). 39 1d. 

',old. (noting the impact of prison "can be devastating" and "LtJhe moral stigma associated with a criminal 

conviction can, standing alone. irreparably destroy not only existing and fuhlre economic relations. but 

social and familial relations as weJr'). 

·11 Samuel W. BuelL PotentialsI' Perverse Fffects of Corporate CiI'il Uahili(v, in PROSECLTORS N THE 

BOARDRCUvI: USIKG CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATL CO'lDUCT 87,90-91 (Anthony S. Barkow 

& Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 

4' Lazarus. supra note 38. at 880. 

43 Jd.: Kadish, supra note 16, at 784-785, 802. 

44 See general!v PROSECUTORS IK THE BOARDROO:VI (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds .. 2011) 

(collecting essays that assess the benefits and costs associated with the increasing nse of 0 PAs and NP As). 

8 
31 

criminalization can bring, it is also important to take into account the added costs of 

employing a criminal regime to detennine if those costs are worth it, or if civil sanctions 

could achieve the same ends just as effectively and at a lesser cost in some cases. 

Sound criminal justice policy - in all areas, not just regulatory offenses - should 

rest on an assessment of the costs and benefits of criminal punishment to determine 

whether limited federal dollars are best spent on prison tenns or if less costly options are 

just as efIective. Civil regulatory agencies are often underfunded to achieve their 

regulatory goals, so money that would otherwise go to prison tenns may be better spent 

on more civil personnel to investigate and detect violations. The deterrence literature is 

clear that would-be ofIenders care much more about the odds of detection than the 

amount of punishment should they be caught. 45 And if deterrence can be achieved just as 

effectively at a lesser cost, that frees up funds to use on additional public safety measures. 

In assessing the question of whether to make incarceration an available option,46 it 

is also important to keep in mind that it may have a negative effect on public safety. 

While an individual serves his or her sentence, he or she is incapacitated from 

committing additional crimes. But some individuals may become more prone to 

committing crimes after being released from prison because of the greater difficulty they 

will have in maintaining family ties and obtaining employment upon release 47 This 

problem is exacerbated by the collateral consequences that flow from felony convictions 

and that often stand in the way of an individual's ability to reintegrate into society and 

live a law-abiding life going forward. Thus, it is necessary to weigh the deterrence 

benefits of incapacitation against the possible crime-increasing effects of incarceration. 

This comparison of the costs and benefits of criminal and civil punishments may 

vary based on the regulatory context. 1 lack the data or expertise to make an assessment 

of whether criminal provisions are required in a given regulatory area, and 1 take no 

position here. I do hold the view, however, that it is critical to ask the question of whether 

criminalization is necessary for an effective regulatory regime. Answering that question 

will require weighing the costs and benefits described above and a more granular analysis 

that looks to particular regulatory provisions to assess their importance and subject 

45 JohllBrailhwaile & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expecied Ulilify lHodel o[Corporate Deterrence. 25 Lyw 

& Soc'y REv. 7. 8 (1991) (citing studics finding that thc ccrtainty of a sanction is a more reliable dcterrent 

than the sevcrity of a sanction): Robert J. MacComl. Testing Drugs ['ersus Testingfor Drug Use: Private 

Risk Management in the Shadow o.fCriminal Law, 5G DEPAULL. REv. 507.514 (2007) (citing studies 

finding thM "certainty of punishment has a modest but reliable causal impact on offending rates. even for 

offenses with very low detection probabilities. but the severity of punishment has no reliable impact"); Paul 

H. Robinson & John M. Darley. Does Criminal T.aw Deter?~ Behavioral Science Tnvestigation. 24 

OXFORD J. LEGAl. Snm. 173. lX3-193 (2004) (citing studies finding high probability of punishment is an 

effective deterrent but that increasing the duration of a sentence to increase the severity of a punishment 

does not increase deterrence). 

46 Congress made clear lhat "imprisomnent is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 

rehabilitation." 18 U.S.c. § 3582(a), so rehabilitation is not an indcpendentjustification for incarceration. 

also Tapia \'. United States. 131 S.C! 2382. 2388-2389 (2011). 

Joam13 Shepherd. The Imprisonment Puzzle, Understanding How Prison Growth "l{fects Crime. 

CRIMINOLOGY A'lD PUBLIC POLICY 285, 291-292 (200G). 

9 
32 

matter, instead of simply making blanket determinations to criminalize without attention 

to detail4~ 

A cost-benefit analysis need not, however, dictate the outcome. Congress may 

decide that criminal punishment is necessary or inappropriate for a different reason. One 

purpose of punishment is "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 

the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.,,49 Whether the stigma of a 

criminal conviction and imprisonment are required to provide a defendant with his or her 

just deserts may depend on the mens rea of a defendant in committing the regulatory 

violation and the extent of the harm caused. 50 Intentional and repeat violations may merit 

criminal sanctions whereas other violations may not. Thus, the just deserts inquiry will 

be critically intertwined with the resolution of the issues of mens rea and notice discussed 

above. 

III. Delegating the Question of Criminalization 

The last issue I would like to highlight is the question of who is in the best 

position to make the decision of whether criminalization is appropriate. Under the 

current framework that dominates the U.S. Code, Congress is not aware of the specific 

regulations that the agency will pass when it authorizes criminal punishment for their 

violation. Congress just makes a blanket determination to allow for criminal penalties 

without attention to the particular character of any regulation and its significance or to the 

culpability associated with its violation 51 To be sure, Congress must provide an 

intelligible principle to guide agencies in promulgating regulations, 52 but those principles 

are far more general than the specific rules that are ultimately adopted. 

Thus the agency is effectively deciding the specific content of the criminal 

offenses through its regulatory authority. Once the agency's regulations take effect and 

are violated under the terms of the criminalization statute, the criminal penalties can be 

pursued without any further action by Congress to detennine if criminalization makes 

sense for the specific regulations that are ultimately passed. Rather, it is up to individual 

prosecutors whether criminal prosecution makes sense or whether an individual should be 

left to the civil process. The current framework therefore places the criminalization 

decision with executive branch officials. 

Richard Lazarus sums up the current approach with respect to environmental 

crimes as follows: 

18 See Lazams. supra note 38, at 881 (observing that in the environmental context, "Congress made 

relatively little effort to define thresholds for when a defendant's conduct justified adding the possibility of 

crimilk1l sanctions to civil penalties"). 

19 18 US.c. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 

50 LaLarus. supra note 38, at 888 ("Congress needs to replace the existing indiscriminate broad-brush 

approach by defining cnviromucntal crimes in ways that better cstablish criminal culpability and better 

identify the kind of conduct !bat Congrcss in fact e"'Pccts to be prosecuted criminally.") 

'I Lazams, supra note 38. at 888 

52 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361. 372 (1989). 

10 
33 

To date, Congress, however, has made no meaningful or systematic effort 

to consider criminal sanctions as presenting an issue distinct from that 

presented by civil sanctions. Congress has not tried to identify those 

circumstances in which the culpability of conduct warrants taking the next 

step of imposing criminal sanctions. Congress has not tried to identify 

those kinds of environmental standards for which criminal sanctions are 

more appropriate. By criminalizing far more conduct than it would 

expect to be the subject of criminal enforcement, Congress has, in effect, 

delegated all of the line-drawing issues to the executive branch without 

providing any guidance on how that discretion should be exercised53 

The traditional justification for delegation in the civil regulatory sphere rests on 

the notion that expert agencies are well suited to fill in gaps in the law and to address the 

resource constraints of having Congress address every issue that may arise. Whatever the 

merits of that argument in the civil context, there are reasons to view criminal law 

differentl y. 

First, because criminal law is about blameworthiness, many believe that "criminal 

law should reflect society's moral judgments, not the judgments of experts.,,54 On this 

view, Congress has a decided advantage over administrative agencies because Congress 

represents the broadly held views of the electorate. Thus, Congress should make the 

determination which regulatory violations, if any, are insuHiciently deterred through civil 

sanctions and suHiciently blameworthy that they merit criminal punishment. That means 

Congress cannot criminalize in advance of knowing what those regulations are and 

whether civil enforcement works efIectively. 

Second, constitutional principles of separation of powers have special force in 

criminal law. "One of the animating features of the Constitution is its preoccupation with 

the regulation of the government's criminal powers. ,,55 The Constitution's text and 

structure "provide[] ample evidence that the potential growth and abuse of federal 

criminal power was anticipated by the Framers and that they intended to place limits on it 

through the separation of powers.,,56 Bicameralism and presentment allow for careful 

deliberation before the government can criminalize conduct. But if only the most general 

decision to allow criminalizing of regulatory violations is made at the legislative level, 

then the real action is taking place through the administrative process. Thus the key 

decisions about the content of criminal laws are being made through the less deliberative 

administrative process, allowing eHiciency to trump the greater accountability and 

consideration that the traditional legislative process provides. But because criminal law 

involves the greatest threat to individual liberty, it merits the most careful procedures. 

53 L~z~ms. supra note 38. ~t XX3-XX4. 

51 Myers. supra note I, ~t I X64. 

55 Rachel E. Barkow. Separation oJPowers and the Criminal Law. 58 STAN. L. REV. 989. 1012-1020 

(2006) (describing the Constitution's focus on criminal law through prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex 

post facto laws, limits on the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, a strong judicial check in the 

foml of independent judges and the jury. the President' s pardon power. and many of the provisions in the 

Bill of Rights). 

56 ld. at 1017. 

11 
34 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you very much, Professor. 

At this time our next witness is Lawrence R. Lewis, Sr., a licensed class one steam engineer originally from Washington, D.C. 

In 2007, while working as the Chief Engineer of the Knollwood 

Military Retirement Residence, Mr. Lewis was arrested for unknowingly violating the Clean Water Act. He pleaded guilty and 

was sentenced to 1 year of probation in 2008. His story has been 

featured in the Wall Street Journal and in a video series by the 

Heritage Foundation. He is a single father with 2 daughters, ages 

22 and 17, and resides in Bowie, Maryland. 

Mr. Lewis, it is an honor to have you here. We look forward to 

your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE LEWIS, BOWIE, MARYLAND 

Mr. LEWIS. I just wanted to share with—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am sorry. Would you pull that microphone a little closer? You are an important man and your testimony is important, and we want to make sure everybody hears. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. I just wanted to share with everyone the human impact that the new Federal laws have on ordinary citizens like myself. 

You know, I was born and raised in the projects and through the 

grace of God, was able to get through the criminal justice system 

without being a part of it. In fact, I am proud to say several members of my family, my sister’s two daughters, are a part of the D.C. 

Police Department, police officers. 

And after working so hard to make my family, my parents and 

my children, proud of me, I go to work at an Army military retirement home, a place that meant something special to me, along with 

other places I have been, because my father was in the military for 

20 years, and the kind of care and stuff I expected him to have and 

wanted him to have—that is what I wanted to provide for the people there. 

This particular institution had a history of sewage problems, to 

my knowledge, at least 28 years prior to when I came there. And 

we did everything we could to prevent the sewage from affecting 

the most vulnerable people, which is the people that were in the 

hospice section of that retirement home, which is on the ground 

floor. That is the first area that it affected. So the protocol was 

when flooding started, you get a pump, pump it to the sewage 

drain while you are trying to unstop the drain. Other than doing 

it, you are going to flood all these areas. And these areas are not 

areas that you can just sanitize. I mean, it takes extensive sanitization. And a lot of people were bed-ridden. You just could not 

move them quickly. 

And sometime in March 2007, I think on the 29th, someone there 

in a nearby park saw a white substance that they thought could 

be some threat. So law enforcement came about and they traced 

the substance back to Knollwood. The substance was not sewage. 

Sewage is not white. The substance was from a new building the 

contractors were building. They were doing some testing because 

the blueprints were not adequate to see where did their sewage go 

where they are trying to. 
35 

Law enforcement traced that white substance back to Knollwood, 

but to the new facility. So they thought since during that same 

time we were having a spillage, a sewage backup to. So they 

thought that was actually sewage. 

I was home. I came back on site, which I was asked to come 

back. And I took the men aside and showed them there is nothing 

white in color in that facility in the sewage system anywhere. We 

went in and we looked at it, pulled up different sections of the sewage part of the facility and were able to verify there was nothing 

in there that associated with the white substance. 

At that time, I did not know the contractor was doing any testing. I did not find out until the following morning, but I knew it 

was not sewage. 

In any event, the law enforcement force threatened with arresting me, saying I violated some law and they had a pre-written 

statement they wanted me to sign to implicate my superiors that 

they had knowledge of it. They were saying some of the military 

officers had suggested that. And I was telling them I had no personal knowledge of them knowing the effects that the sewage 

would have on anything. And for that reason, I was threatened 

with a 5-year prison sentence if I did not provide—really lie on 

someone, which I was not able to do. I was taught better than that. 

So subsequently I had to worry. My immediate effect of it was 

worrying about where my mother and my kids are going to live. I 

had a 13-year-old and a 16-year-old then and an 86-year-old mother. Where are they going to live at for 5 years because I cannot pay 

a mortgage for 5 years from prison. I knew I had enough in my 401 

to pay for a year. So I subsequently pleaded guilty to something I 

really did not do in order to make sure my family had some place 

to live. 

So that is the impact it had on me is I really lost confidence in 

law enforcement even though I had family law enforcement. I feel 

like if they are prosecuting me for something I had no knowledge 

of, I was not aware of—and there was nothing in the records ever 

saying that it was a violation for this to go on. They looked at all 

the records where the plumbing companies came for years and 

years and years. Nothing suggested that this was a violation. This 

stuff took place regularly. 

Also, there had been times when D.C. and Federal inspectors 

which come several times a year was there when this happened. No 

one—the fire department, no one—ever said this was improper. 

They usually seemed to admire the fact that we were doing everything we could to maintain and control it until we could get a contractor in. 

So, I would just like to make sure that this Committee understands that there are real lives being affected, normal people, because we do not know. We are not aware of the law. And I would 

hope that we could send regulations to the facilities to educate the 

people who work in the facilities and send them to the schools, 

have it a part of schooling where people would be aware of the new 

laws that exist because like myself there are many other people 

who are going to experience the exact same thing. 

So I believe I have a little more time. So what I am saying to 

you is that the best thing that could come from what to me is if 
36 

Congress could go back and look at the new laws and the parts 

that say having knowledge or intent to get prosecuted and/or if a 

fine could be implemented, in this particular case, it would be appropriate, I would think, that you initially fine the institution and 

not the individual should be the norm and not prosecuting individuals from a history of a facility functions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis follows:] 
37 

"REGULATORY CRIME: 

IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM" 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY 

COMMITTEE 

TASK FORCE ON OVER-CRlMINALIZA TION 

OCTOBER 30,2013 

LAWRENCE LEWIS 

FORMER CHIEF ENGINEER AT KNOLL WOOD MTLTT ARY 

RETIREMENT RESIDENCE 
38 

Lawrence Lewis 

Thank you for the opportunity to tell you my story. I hope that my story will persuade 

you to change the law so that other people do not also become victims of over-criminalization. 

Like many other people, I had challenges growing up. My family was poor. My mother 

and my father were separated, and my mom had to raise fi ve children on her own. I had three 

brothers, and we slept in one room. What was devastating, though, was having all of my 

brothers murdered before I was 20 years old. Shortly after my third brother died, my father died 

- I believe of a broken heart. That left me alone to take care of my mother and sister. I took care 

of my mother until three weeks ago when she passed away. When I became a father, I tried to be 

a role model for my two daughters, to let them know that you could live well and grow up 

without becoming a criminal. I have worked hard at many jobs throughout my life to support my 

family. After high school, I began working at the D.C. Department of Education as a janitor 

earning $1.80 an hour. I took night classes and obtained promotions at the Department of 

Education, and in 2004, I was hired as the chief engineer at Knollwood, a retirement home in 

D.C. for military veterans and their families. That's when I wound up becoming a "criminal" for 

trying to help and for doing something that I had no idea was illegal. 

At Knollwood, I was in charge of the maintenance staff. This facility had a history of 

sewage blockages. Many of the residents were elderly, they wore adult diapers, and they flushed 

them down the toilet because they were embarrassed. We used to find them when we had to 

clean out a blockage. 

The morning of March 29, 2007, we had a particularly bad sewage blockage. The ground 

floor of that facility is the hospice area, where the most critically ill people live. When we had 

sewage overflow due to a blockage, this is the area that would flood first Those people are the 

most vulnerable people in the whole institution, and my thinking was we can't let anything 

2 
39 

Lawrence Lewis 

happen to them. So the staff did what they had been doing for years to deal with the blockage. 

After calling a plumber, they pumped the sewage to a drain in the parking lot to keep it from 

flooding the area where the critically ill residents were living I always had assumed that the 

drain in the parking lot ran into the building's sewage drainage system and the waste wound up 

at a water treatment facility. I left work at 2:30 p.m. like I normally did. The problem wasn't 

resolved, but it was under control. Around 4 p.m., I got a lot of phone calls. One of the people 

on the phone was a federal investigator from the Park Service, and he said he wanted me to 

return to work immediately. So, I went back to work. 

When 1 arrived in the parking lot, there were 30 or 40 emergency vehicles. Someone 

must have identified me as the chief and the federal officers took me into the building They told 

me, to my surprise, that we had been pumping sewage into Rock Creek. They also told me that 

unless I gave them a written statement implicating the generals and the captain, who were 

supervisors, that I was going to jail. I told the officer that I didn't have knowledge of what they 

knew, and T wasn't able to sign what they wanted because I'd be signing a lie. So T couldn't sign 

the statement the agents wanted me to. 

Because of my own personal integrity, 1 can't sign something that can destroy or damage 

someone else's career just because someone else wants me to do that. And that's what 1 teach 

my children. You've got to be an independent thinker. You've got to do what's right regardless 

of whether it's popular or not. And in this case, that's what I did. I refused to sign something 

that I didn't have any direct knowledge of, that I couldn't say it was 100 percent correct. 

I stayed at that building from 4 to 9 p.m, and during that time the agents said they'd 

decide whether they were going to put me in jail that night or not So around 9 p.m. they told 

me that 1 wasn't going to be arrested that day but 1 was going to be arrested later, so 1 shouldn't 
40 

Lawrence Lewis 

leave the area. As they had threatened, I was later arrested and charged with a felony violation 

of the Clean Water Act. 

I had no idea that what we did to clean up the blockage was a crime. No one gave me 

any legal training. I took engineering classes at George Washington University, at the University 

of the District of Columbia, in Northern Virginia, and none of those classes offered me any legal 

training in my responsibilities. 

It turns out to be guilty of the crime, I didn't have to know that the sewage was going into 

Rock Creek Instead, I only had to know that I was directing sewage into a drain, which I 

obviously did. As a result, 1 wound up pleading guilty to a federal misdemeanor because the 

prosecutors said that if 1 pled guilty, they wouldn't oppose probation. As a single dad, 1 was 

worried that if I went to prison there would be nobody to raise my children or care for my 

mother. Even though the government was not "opposing" probation, the judge could have 

sentenced me to time in prison. When I came to court for sentencing, I had to tell my 16-yearold daughter that she might have to drive the car home by herself because the judge might 

sentence me to prison and require me to start serving time immediately. Fortunately, the judge 

didn't send me to prison but rather to one year of probation and six months of community 

service. I served that six months community service and much longer at the Union Temple 

Mission Church. But conviction has been a ball and chain upon my life. Two months after the 

conviction, I resigned from my position at the Army retirement home. I just couldn't bear 

coming back into there every day, reliving this stuff over and over. It was just too much for me 

But finding a new job with a criminal conviction was extremely difficult I presently work two 

jobs including a night shift 

4 
41 

Lawrence Lewis 

After having children, I dedicated my life to being a good role model. I wanted to show 

my children that not all African American men need to be part of the criminal justice system 

Failing to accomplish that objective has been devastating for me, and it has soured my children 

on the criminal justice system. They have lost confidence and faith in the judicial system. 

Now, I want to prevent somebody else from going through what I went through. I'm 

done. I got crushed. But for me it isn't fair to go through life and watch it happen to someone 

else. That's my commitment today - to do everything humanly possible to make sure that what 

happened to me doesn't happen to anyone else. My commitment is to keeping some other family 

from going through what we went through. 

I would hope the Congress would go through these new laws and take out the ones that 

are unfair or that no one knows about. There are enough real criminals in our society to keep 

the government busy. Why destroy good families for reasons that they don't understand? Right 

now, no one is safe from being unfairly prosecuted. 

Thank you for your time. 
42 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. I imagine we will be exploring those thoughts further during our questions. And thank 

you for the testimony. 

At this time, we will hear from Ms. Cornelia Joyce Kinder of 

Grand Rivers, Kentucky. She is the former owner, along with her 

husband Steven, of two Kentucky caviar businesses. Their business 

involved collecting paddlefish eggs in the Ohio River and exporting 

them. They had all of the appropriate licenses, reported all of their 

catches in the State of Kentucky. However, the Ohio River forms 

the Ohio-Kentucky border. The Kinders would connect one side of 

their net to land in Kentucky and the other to land in Ohio. Therefore, some of the caviar was actually harvested from Ohio waters. 

Federal investigators charged the Kinders with violating the 

Lacey Act, which makes it a felony to import flora or fauna in violation of another State’s or Nation’s laws. The Kinders faced up to 

$250,000 in fines and 5 years in prison because of the possible 

steep penalties. The Kinders pleaded guilty and were sentenced to 

3 years probation and a $5,000 fine, and they were forced to forfeit 

their fishing boat and a work truck. 

Ms. Kinder, I look forward to your testimony. Thank you. And, 

yes, go ahead and pull that close to you as well and speak right 

into the microphone. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. AND MRS. STEVEN KINDER, 

GRAND RIVERS, KY 

Ms. KINDER. I have had an asthma attack this morning. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, let’s get it right up close to your mouth so 

you don’t have to try too hard. 

Ms. KINDER. Can you hear me now? 

Thank you for having me here today to tell my story. My name 

is Joyce Kinder. 

My husband Steve and I just wanted to run a caviar business. 

We did not hurt anybody. We did not deliberately violate any law. 

But in 2011, we were convicted of Lacey Act violations because we 

unknowingly fished on the wrong side of that Ohio River. We have 

lost everything. 

I am here because I want the over-criminalization caused by the 

Lacey Act and other laws to stop. 

My husband and I live and work in Owenton, Kentucky. We own 

Kinder Caviar and Black Star Caviar Company. We use nets to collect the paddlefish eggs. We harvest them into caviar and we export them to foreign countries. Ever since we started, we fished in 

the Ohio River. We never connected anything that was not to be 

done. We, in fact, connected one end of our nets to the land in Kentucky and the other end to the branches out in the water of the 

Ohio River on the Ohio side. 

We did not come from a wealthy family, but we did work hard 

and we loved our work. We were the first established caviar company in Kentucky, and we were the first to export Kentucky caviar. 

This was our American dream. We never took chances with the 

law. We were fully licensed and permitted to fish in Kentucky waters. We always have reported all of our catches. We knew that 

paddlefish are a protected species. We never deliberately fished in 

Ohio’s portion of the water. We knew that the Lacey Act makes it 
43 

a felony to export fish in violation of another State’s laws. That is 

why we hired two law enforcement officers and an ex-fish and 

game officer to work for us. We thought we were obeying the law. 

But on May the 5th, 2007, my husband was confronted with Federal agents from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The agents 

told him that he was fishing in Ohio because his nets extended 

past the Ohio-Kentucky boundary out in that river. 

On March 14th, 2011, my husband and I were charged in Federal court in a four-count indictment with illegally harvesting the 

paddlefish in Ohio waters and falsely reporting that we caught the 

fish in Kentucky waters. 

How were we supposed to know where the boundary line was? 

There is no buoy. There is no sign, and there is no markings of any 

kind on the river to identify the border. Even Kentucky and Ohio 

officials were confused where the boundary was. We fished in the 

clear light of day and no official ever told us to move our nets. 

We felt then and we still feel now that we did nothing wrong. 

But on January 17th, 2012, we made the painful and humiliating 

decision to plead guilty. We were facing prison time. We could not 

suffer the emotional and financial trauma of a trial. We did not 

want to risk losing our freedom, as well as our property. 

Today we are in poverty, and during our probation, we are prohibited from fishing and from applying for or receiving an export 

permit that would allow us to engage in international business. We 

cannot pay our fishermen. We have lost our customers. My husband and I are not physically able to work anymore. We cannot 

make ends meet. Our conviction has devastated us psychologically 

as well. We feel humiliated, utterly helpless. We do not feel as if 

the law protects us anymore right here in our own country. 

The only thing that got me through this community service that 

I was to serve was the hope that I could come and tell my story 

so that what happened to us would not happen to anyone else. The 

Government should go after people who have done things that we 

all know are wrong. We still think this is the best Government and 

the best country in the world. In fact, I had hoped, after my retirement, to go into public service. But we are living proof that it is 

becoming impossible for decent, honest people to work without fear 

of unknowingly breaking a criminal law and end up in prison. If 

this can happen to us, as it did, it can happen to anyone. 

I beg you make it stop. 

I thank you for your time, and I will be happy to answer any 

questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kinder follows:] 
44 

Prepared Statement of Mr. and Mrs. Steven Kinder, 

Grand Rivers, Kentucky 

Thank you for inviting me here to tell my story. 

My name is Joyce Kinder. My husband and I have been convicted ofa federal crime 

because we followed commercial fishing b'Uidelines as we understood them. We didn't hurt 

anybody, steal from anybody, or damage anybody's property. We didn't deliberately violate any 

law. But, in 2011 my husband Steve and I were sentenced by a federal judge to three years of 

probation, fined $5,000 dollars, and had our boat and work truck taken from us. We ended up on 

the wrong side of the law because we unknowingly fished on the wrong side of the Ohio River. 

Because we did something that we had no reason to think was illegal, our lives were ruined. I'm 

here to tell our story because I don't want anyone else to fall victim to a weapon called the Lacey 

Act; an Act that has become the weapon of choice by wildlife agents. I'm here because I want 

overcriminalization caused by this Lacey Act and similar acts to stop. 

My husband and I live and work in Owenton, Kentucky, where we own Kinder Caviar 

and Black Star Caviar Company. We collect paddlefish eggs, harvest them into caviar, and 

export them to customers in other countries. To catch the paddlefish, we use gill nets. Ever since 

we started our business, we've fished in the Ohio River. We connected one side of our nets to 

land in Kentucky and the other to branches out in the water on the Ohio side of the river. 

We don't come from a wealthy family, but we did learn to work hard and we loved this 

work. We had big plans to grow the caviar business. We were the first established caviar 

company in Kentucky. We were the first to take caviar made in Kentucky into international 

markets around the world. Although small, we had in fact built an industry. We provided for our 

family, created jobs, and brought new business to Kentucky. We are proud of our business and 

what we have achieved as a family. We were so proud to have earned the confidence and the 
45 

trust of our government, which allowed us to engage in international trade and all that it entails. 

We never took chances that we knew would jeopardize our business, credibility or the reputation 

that we worked so hard to earn. This was our American Dream I 

We were very careful about whom we hired. The fishermen that fished for us weren't 

strangers. Most of them belonged to the same family. They included an active sheriff with 30 

years of service, a police officer, a construction worker, a Kentucky disabled fish & wildlife 

officer, and a congressman's aid's son-in-law. 

We've never tried to hide anything that we've done from anyone. The state of Kentucky 

has recognized our success and applauded it. In 2008, I was appointed to the state's Aquaculture 

Task Force, where I represented wholesalers of aquaculture products. I testified before my state 

legislature about laws that harshly punished commercial fishennen for accidentally breaching 

water boundaries. I testified that the boundaries were inaccurate because of GPS positioning 

lying somewhere on the bottom of the Ohio river. There were three (3) established boundary 

lines out in that river. Not even the law enforcement of either state, Kentucky or Ohio, knew 

where either line was positioned, nor did they know which was the true line. 

That same year, our company was featured on the Kentucky Department of Agriculture's 

website. Here's what the Department of Agriculture said about our business: 

"Caspian Sea style caviar made right here in the Bluegrass I American caviar now 

comparable to the caviars of the Caspian Sea! 

[A]s the catch and quotas of Caspian Sea caviar continue to decline, prices will steadily 

increase. Kinder Caviar is fast becoming the choice for the caviar savvy consumer. 
46 

We've always done our best to obey the state laws. In Ohio v. Kentucky (1980), the 

Supreme Court stated that Ohio River is "not the usual river boundary between states" because 

the "northerly edge" of the river, rather than the river itself, forms the border between Ohio and 

Kentucky. The Court also found that, historically, the Ohio River has been controlled by 

Kentucky. 

We were fully licensed and permitted to commercial fish in Kentucky waters, therefore, 

as long as we stayed in the water, we were in Kentucky, or so we thought. In September of 2012, 

three months after the conviction, we applied for and received harvesting permits that cost $500, 

which was specifically designed for harvesting paddlefish and sturgeon and was effective for the 

entire fishing season, which was through May of 20 13. Four months after this condition, 

Kentucky Fish and Wildlife made a law that said that if any fisherman was convicted of a Lacey 

Act violation, he could not even work as a helper to any commercial fisherman in any manner. 

According to the Kentucky legislative research commission compiler, this law would not be 

etIective until January of2013. However, the fact remained that it was imposed upon us in 

December of 2012. Six months after this conviction, Kentucky Fish & Wildlife revoked all of 

our licenses and permits that allowed us to engage in the commercial fishing industry in any 

capacity. These bullying tactics continue today. 

We've always reported every one of our catches to the Kentucky Fish and Wildlife 

Department, as usual, with the added instruction from the Department of the Interior to list the 

boat ramp we used as well as the body of water where we fished. No other fisherman was 

requested to do this. We knew that paddlefish are a threatened and protected species worldwide, 

not just under Ohio law. We also knew that Ohio law prohibits commercial fishing for 

paddlefish, as well as the possession or use of gill nets. We interpreted this to mean inland bodies 
47 

of water. We worked the same locations and the same water holes in the Ohio River for seven 

years, almost every day of the season, in the light of the day, before being charged with fishing 

in Ohio's portion of the river. We never deliberately tished in Ohio's waters. 

We've also always done our best to obey federal law. We knew that the Lacey Act makes 

it a felony to export plants or animals in violation of another state's laws. We took the Lacey Act 

seriously. That's part of the reason we hired two law enforcement officers and an ex-fish and 

game otlicer to help catch the fish we needed for export. 

We thought we knew the law, and we thought we were obeying the law. But we didn't 

know that, according to the GPS coordinates setting the boundary between Ohio and Kentucky 

sides of the Ohio River, we were actually fishing in Ohio waters as well as Kentucky waters. 

How could we" This GPS boundary line was not established or made known to have been 

established to law enforcement officers of either state, Kentucky or Ohio, or to Kentucky 

commercial fishermen, until late in the year 2008, one and a half years after the incident. The 

regulation setting the GPS boundary line didn't even come into effect until late in the year 2008. 

Yet, that fact wound up making us into criminals, even though we always wanted to, and we 

always tried to, and we always thought we did comply with the law. 

On May 5, 2007, my husband was tending our nets when he was confronted by federal 

agents from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The agents told my husband they "had 

to hold" him for a compliance check and questioned him for hours. He told the agents what he 

was doing. He explained that, as far as he knew, he was fishing in Kentucky waters, but "they 

had ajob to do." He knew then that he was a target. The agents informed him that he was 

actually fishing in Ohio because his nets extended past the Ohio/Kentucky boundary. The agents 
48 

told him that what he was doing was a federal crime-that even removing two fish (blue cat fish) 

from nets in Ohio's portion of the river and throwing them back into Kentucky's portion of the 

river was a Lacey Act violation. And so, on March 14, 20 II, my husband and I were charged in 

federal court in a four-count indictment with illegally harvesting paddlefish from Ohio waters 

and falsely reporting to the Kentucky Department ofFish and Wildlife Resources that we caught 

the fish in Kentucky's water. 

How were we supposed to know where the boundaries were" The GPS coordinates have 

changed over the years. No one ever sent us updates. The boundary is not marked in any fashion, 

even today there are not any boundary signs or indicators. No state or federal official ever told us 

to move our nets, or said we were anywhere near any boundary line, not even during seasonal 

boat inspections by Ohio game wardens, Kentucky game wardens or the coast guard. Everyone 

knew about our business. All it would have taken was a simple warning. We'd have stopped 

what we were doing immediately. There are state laws in place for these types of incidents that 

are purposed for decency between two states. But instead, the Lacey Act was the weapon of 

choice for the agents and officers involved. What we experienced at the hands of those officers 

was 5 years of pure abuse, bullying, harassment, and intimidation tactics, to the extent of 

destroying a large international caviar contract in 2007. The Lacey Act made this possible. 

We weren't the only ones confused about the boundary line. On August 8,2008, Chief 

David Graham of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources' Division of Wildlife wrote a letter 

to Deputy Commissioner Benjy Kinman of the Kentucky Department ofFish and Wildlife. Chief 

Graham recommended that both states take measures to help "clarify issues concerning 

Kentucky commercial fishers in the Ohio River experiencing problems or confusion with Ohio 

laws" and expressed hope that those measures would "aid in clarifying the boundary issue 
49 

between the two states." He acknowledged that "there is some error associated with [the] 

downloadable track line" used to indicate the boundaries between the two states and emphasized 

the need to "use the same state boundary information," as well as make the same "GPS 

coordinates. available to commercial fishers as well as officers of both states." In 201 0, our 

fellow fishennan, with 30 years of service and still an active sherifI', John Dunn, testified before 

a grand jury that he wasn't sure where the boundary was. He also told the grand jury that the 

GPS coordinates had recently caused confusion for police when they were trying to figure out 

which department had jurisdiction over a drowning incident near a boundary. 

We felt then, and we still feel now, that we did nothing wrong. But, on January 17, 2012, 

we made the painful and humiliating decision to plead guilty because we didn't think we had a 

choice. We were facing a maximum penalty of up to five years in prison, a $250,000 fine, or 

both, on each of four counts. Our companies could have been fined up to $500,000 per count. 

We couldn't suffer the emotional and financial trauma ofa trial, and we didn't want to risk 

losing our freedom as well as our property. We have three grandchildren and are very involved 

in their lives. Going to prison was not an option, but a threat. Being a felon was not an option, 

but a threat. We were concerned that we wouldn't get a fair trial before an Ohio jury, given that 

Ohio and Kentucky have been fighting over the water rights in the Ohio River for 200 years. 

Also, we were told that even if we happened to win at the federal court level, we would have had 

to go into the court for crimes against animals. We were told that there was no way for us to win. 

So, our companies each pleaded guilty to one felony labeling violation. This means that we 

reported (labeled) our catch as being in Kentucky water when Ohio says it was actually from 

their portion of the water. This is considered false labeling of where the fish came from My 

husband and I each pleaded guilty to one count that we "should have known" that we were 
50 

fishing in Ohio's portion of the river, a misdemeanor trafficking violation. This means that we 

took the fish out of Ohio's portion of the river and brought them into Kentucky's portion of the 

river (thus, trafficking). Many business owners in our position have made similar decisions when 

threated with prison time. 

Today, we're in poverty. During our probation, we've been prohibited from fishing 

anywhere in the Ohio River where that river forms the border between Ohio and Kentucky, as 

well as prohibited from applying for or receiving an export permit. We told our fishermen to go, 

we could no longer pay them. Our customers left us - b'llilt by association, a couple of them used 

the situation to not pay an existing huge invoice. I am not physically able to work anymore. My 

husband can't even get back in a commercial fishing boat. Our entire way oflife has been 

destroyed. They have us in a hole and they won't let us out. We have completed one year and 

four months of probation and fulfilled every condition. We have filed a motion for early release 

from probation, but the prosecutor denied our request on grounds that we have not been punished 

enough, and it was upheld. Every means of working has been stripped from us. The Food Safety 

Branch of the Kentucky Department of Public Health refused to renew our permit to operate a 

business based on a phone call from "somebody up north" and a letter that Kentucky Fish & 

Wildlife sent directly to the Kentucky DPH. And, based on that letter from Kentucky Fish & 

Wildlife, the Kentucky DPH told us that they (DPH) would not allow us to process any roe 

bearing fish, including paddlefish, and that they would be monitoring our facility to ensure that 

we were not processing paddlefish. We had to close the facility because paddlefish is the only 

business we do. The main purpose of Kentucky DPH is to make sure that companies are 

permitted in order to operate a business. Now, they are claiming the authority to monitor my 

business in order to ensure that I am not producing caviar. By the time the Kentucky DPH 
51 

realized they did not have authority to deny us a pennit to operate a business, it was too late to 

start up. We don't have a way of working, not even to make ends meet. The power that the Lacey 

Acts gives government agents to use at their discretion against the people of the United States is 

unconstitutional at best. No matter what we do to start working again, we can't fish for 

ourselves, we can't atTord to pay fishennen to fish for us now, buyers will only buy at cut-throat 

rates - all of which will not sustain life Enduring this every day for five years, one finally 

succumbs. Stop. We never wanted to fight them, and we can't win. They took every means away 

for us to work, I don't want to live like this anymore. Life has become so painfully worthless. 

The Lacey Act has enabl ed the government agents to steal and destroy our lives. 

Our conviction has devastated us psychologically as well. You can't imagine what it's 

like for me to know that, in the eyes of the law, my government, my country, I am a criminal. 

We feel ashamed for what our family has had to endure, humiliated, demeaned in every way, 

utterly helpless. We don't feel as if the law protects us anymore - we have been victimized by it. 

All that we have endured at their hands because we established a caviar/commercial fishing 

business. 

One of the conditions of our probation was that we complete 100 hours of community 

service. The only thing that got me through those 100 hours was the possibility that I could one 

day tell my story and draw attention to the devastation and destruction caused by 

Overcriminalization. There are far too many laws out there like the Lacey Act, that agents use as 

tools to punish people for doing things that aren't morally wrong and which ordinary people 

have no reason to think would be illegal. Innocent mistakes shouldn't get you threatened with 

prison time and drive you into poverty levels beyond anyone's imagination, as well as disgrace. 

Criminal law shouldn't be used to punish people who are morally blameless. Police, agents and 
52 

prosecutors should spend their time and the taxpayer's money going after people who have done 

things that we all know and recognize are wrong. We have been told that the goremment spent 

"upwardl' offtve million dollars" prosecuting ollr case. 

In spite of all that my husband and I have endured, we don't hate the government. I've 

always hoped to go into public service, and I still have hope that I'll be able to do so in the 

future We still think this is the best country in the world, with the best government in the world. 

But we also want decent, honest people to be able to live, work and prosper here in the United 

States of America, peacefully without fear of unknowingly breaking a criminal law and ending 

up in prison. We are living proof that it's becoming impossible to do that anymore. We didn't 

ask to be martyrs, but we're here in the hopes that a lot of good will come of our pain and 

suffering. If this can happen to us, it can happen to anyone. We have, sadly, come to know that it 

happens more often than most people think. I beg you: help make it stop. 

Thank you for your time. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 
53 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you very much, Ms. Kinder. 

At this time, we will begin questioning. Each of us will have 5 

minutes, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Lewis, Ms. Kinder, as a judge, I have looked into the eyes 

of many hardened criminals and sent them to prison. I have looked 

into the eyes of a couple of people and ordered they be taken and 

put to death. But I look in your eyes and my heart breaks for what 

you have been through. And I am very sorry for your travails that 

was brought on by a system that does not seem to have worked as 

it should. So thank you for being here to hopefully help us get our 

system corrected. 

Professor, you clerked for Antonin Scalia. I was with a group 

that he was speaking to, a small group. When he said what questions you got, one of them said would you say our country is the 

freest in history because we have the best Bill of Rights. And you 

know Justice Scalia. He is very abrupt, and he said, oh, gosh, no. 

He said the Soviet Union had a better bill of rights than we do. 

And I had forgotten. I did a paper on the Bill of Rights in college, 

and they did. They had more enumerated rights than we do. That 

was not the key, and Justice Scalia pointed out we are the freest 

Nation in history because the Founders did not trust government. 

And so they made it as difficult as they possibly could to create 

laws. 

I see the case of Mr. Lewis and Ms. Kinder, so many others that 

Mr. Scott and I have listened to over the years and read about. 

And it looks like one of the biggest problems is when none of those 

safeguards are utilized and agencies, bureaucrats, totally unaccountable, make the rules, make criminal laws. 

Mr. Lewis, you mentioned a civil penalty. Obviously, this whole 

thing was embarrassing, take the criminal violation alleged out. Do 

you think you would have ever been a part of sewage moving as 

it did if you had been fined or had your pay docked and some civil 

penalty like a fine without ever going through the criminal court? 

Do you think you ever would have done that again? 

Mr. LEWIS. Absolutely not. In fact, everywhere I have been since 

then, I made everybody around me aware, look, it’s out there you 

may not be aware of, and there are certain things that I see, if I 

see some concerns with it, some possibilities with it, I share that 

with the people around, the employer and my coworkers. No, if I 

had any idea, there is no way I would risk my family being in a 

shelter somewhere to stop water for anyone. I would have never 

done that knowing that would result in me going to a prison. I 

would have never. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Ms. Kinder, do you think given the embarrassment just from having Government agents come and talk to you— 

do you think if you had been civilly fined without ever having to 

go through the criminal justice system, that you would have ever 

violated such a regulation again? 

Ms. KINDER. Of course, not, Your Honor. I would like to say a 

little bit more about that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. 

Ms. KINDER. We operated in the day of light. Our nets were— 

you could see them for a long distance away. We had big buoys 

that floated on top of the water. We fished that river in those same 
54 

holes for 7 years. No one ever told us that we were doing anything 

wrong. No one ever told us to move our nets. No one ever said anything that we were doing wrong. Even the Ohio and Kentucky officials—they did not know that there was a boundary. I guess they 

figured there was a boundary out there, but no one knew how to 

identify it. So in 7 years, we were never told anything that we were 

doing anything wrong by Ohio, Kentucky, or the Coast Guard. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

Mr. Rubinstein and Professor Barkow, just one last question before my time runs out. And our lights have been really messed up 

here. 

But do you think that we can solve the biggest part of our problem by adding an intent, a mens rea requirement to statutes such 

as what captured Mr. Lewis and Ms. Kinder? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Just before I answer, in answering the questions, these are my opinions, not necessarily those of ILR. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, it is you that is testifying, so it is your opinion. I am not asking anybody else’s. 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. My opinion, yes. The lack of an intent requirement, particularly when you are imposing criminal penalties, is 

tremendously problematic, at a human level, as you heard, and at 

a systemic level. It undermines, you know, the basic bedrock propositions of our entire polity. It has to be fixed. 

Ms. BARKOW. I agree with that. The only thing I would add is 

it is complicated to draft that in a way that is not going to raise 

some of the same issues because the Federal criminal code does not 

have any default rules about how you apply mens rea to different 

elements. So unlike lots of States that follow the model penal code 

where you just assume if Congress puts a mens rea term in there, 

it applies to everything. But there is no default standard for congressional statutes. So even if you plopped in the word ‘‘knowingly’’ 

or ‘‘willfully,’’ there would still be an interpretive question for the 

courts of what it applies to. So if you did do that, you would want 

to make clear or pass a default rule that says it applies to all the 

elements of this provision. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, thank you. We would welcome your submission of anything in writing you think would do that trick. 

My time has expired, and at this time, it is my pleasure to recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. This has 

been very helpful. 

Professor Barkow, one of the questions that we had is the effect 

of regulatory crime on over-incarceration. I think in your written 

statement you had a comment on that. Could you comment on the 

effect on over-incarceration? 

Ms. BARKOW. Yes. It actually does not make up a large proportion of the number of people who are incarcerated in Federal prisons. So the number of people in the Bureau of Prisons who are 

there for regulatory crimes is not actually categorized separately. 

It would fall under the category that BOP calls ‘‘miscellaneous.’’ So 

it is going to include things other than regulatory crimes as well. 

So at most it would be .8 percent of the total prison population and 
55 

something south of that because ‘‘miscellaneous’’ includes other 

things. 

Mr. SCOTT. That is .8 of the Federal system, and the Federal system is a small portion of the overall national incarceration. 

Ms. BARKOW. That is correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. You mentioned also that there are some crimes— 

there appears to be a mens rea requirement, intent implied. How 

can we ensure that health and safety regulations may qualify for 

criminal prosecution when you have actually endangered people’s 

lives? 

Ms. BARKOW. So I think there are a lot of statutes and regulations out there. So you would want to identify which ones, if any, 

that you wanted to have mens rea requirements to, and obviously, 

Congress has the power to decide that it wants to have different 

mental state requirements depending upon the regulatory scheme. 

But you could certainly distinguish those regulations that are designed to protect health and safety and go to the core of those 

issues and then decide what you thought the appropriate mental 

state would be that you would want to have. 

Mr. SCOTT. So it should be one at a time, individualized? 

Ms. BARKOW. Well, right now what Congress does typically is it 

just passes a general provision that basically says any regulations 

that are going to be passed under this statute—they are all subject 

to this criminal fine. And so what it essentially does is it puts it 

in the hands of Federal prosecutors to decide who will be charged 

and who will not. 

What you could do instead would be to identify, after regulations 

are passed, which regulations you believe should, in fact, be subject 

to criminal penalties. So you could identify those that really go to 

the core of these health and safety concerns, and if you wanted to, 

you know, you certainly have the power to make those strict liability or you could have a negligence standard, whatever you saw fit, 

whereas you could have more paperwork type regulations, things 

that you do not view as serious, as not being subject to criminal 

penalties. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Now, Mr. Rubinstein, one of the problems we have with this is 

that the regulators may not have the expertise in criminal law to 

make them precise and have proportional penalties. But we also 

have the problem that Congress may not have the expertise to figure out which regulations in the nuclear plant ought to be subject 

to criminal sanctions. Can you help us with how we would actually 

write laws in areas where we may not have the expertise? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Well, I think it goes back to something that 

Professor Barkow just said, which is that there needs to be some 

communication with respect to the core health and safety issues 

that are of concern. The fact of the matter is in a large number of 

Federal statutes, differentiations are made between conduct that is 

theoretically going to lead to criminal penalties and conduct that 

is not. The problem is, though, as the professor pointed out, that 

in many cases Congress will enact a general statute that effectively 

criminalizes a whole set of behavior and then leave it to the agencies to fill in afterwards. 
56 

So what you have, practically speaking, are cases in which there 

is a statutory standard but then there is an incorporation of these 

regulations, and by the time you work your way through the chain, 

you have situations, for example, of that of a marine biologist 

named Nancy Black who just is in the middle of a criminal matter 

in California as the result of feeding orcas, killer whales, or alleged 

feeding. The conduct that she was charged with was prohibited by 

a regulation, but legally walking up the chain, eventually you 

ended up with a much more stringent prohibition of behavior that 

the regulation was really never meant to reach. And so there is a 

disconnect between what Congress said in the first instance and 

what the regulators ultimately did. 

It is a very knotty question, I agree, but at some point, as I said 

in my testimony and wrote in some detail in the written submission, the big solution here may be the only one that is practical, 

which is creating a default mens rea provision perhaps with a 

carve-out for certain kinds of core health and safety violations that 

are just so egregious that per se they are wrong. But the way the 

system is working now, you end up with these terrible abuses. You 

end up with stories like we heard this morning, and it needs to be 

fixed. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

At this time, we recognize the distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Spencer Bachus. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

First of all, I want to commend each of you for, I think, your pursuit of justice, which is what I think this is all about. 

Most of us had heard anecdotal evidence, stories like the two of 

you shared, but I do not think any of us—and I am an attorney 

who has tried many cases, including criminal cases, murder cases 

early in my career. But I never imagined that this was out there. 

And it is almost like an iceberg in that it is invisible to the general 

public and to most of us until someone hits it and, obviously, people hit it every day. And the result is not a benefit to society—cost/ 

benefit. But it also violates, I think, our sense of justice and of democracy. It is inconsistent—and, Professor, you said this—with our 

democratic values. 

In some respects, I think the Constitution as our forefathers 

drafted it—they would have never imagined this. It certainly violates, I think, our traditions and our values. 

I think for most of us or all of us—we are, as the sitting Chairman said—in a bipartisan way, the bigger problem that I was focused on was criminalization of drug cases and that sector and that 

we are, by a multiple of many times, incarcerating more people. 

And I was actually shocked that sentences are now longer than 

they ever have been in the history of our country, which was a 

shock, I think, to me. 

But the question now is not whether this problem exists. It is 

how do we address it. 

And my first question was, is there anyone making up, say, a 

database catalog of these offenses? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Not that I am aware of. There have been a couple of studies that are published in the literature, and some of 

these are older. The American Bar Association did a very widely 
57 

cited study in the late 1990’s. The numbers, though—they are estimates. I think it is about 4,500 Federal crimes, so to speak. And 

then, as I said, it is pretty much anybody’s guess about the number 

of regulations. One professor estimated it, I think, at about 

300,000, and that seems to be the study that is out there most significantly. 

As I suggested, the problem is that the way the law is written 

and the discretion that the agencies have and then that the prosecutors have allows them to take laws that Congress wrote, never 

intending to reach the conduct that the regulations prohibit, and 

back into a criminal violation. And then what you end up with, as 

you heard, are situations where people who are thinking they are 

doing nothing wrong are put in a position where they have to make 

a cost/benefit analysis between standing up and fighting or watching their lives be destroyed even more. So the obvious, rational 

thing to do is to do exactly what they did, to do what most people 

do. 

Mr. BACHUS. And you would think discretion will be used with 

good judgment, but obviously it is being used to make bad judgments or people that do not have, I think, the legal background. 

Let me ask you this. You know, we could come at it by saying, 

okay, here are all of them, and it would be almost impossible, if 

you are talking about 300,000. You testified that the actus reus of 

prohibited conduct is not always spelled out in the regulations. 

And, of course, I think that is a start, that we just require that. 

And I would like maybe to get from you later some examples of 

that. 

Should Congress consider codifying a mistake or an ignorance of 

the law defense for regulatory offenses? I will ask anyone. First, I 

am going to ask the legal experts because your stories speak for 

themselves. 

Ms. BARKOW. So I guess I will give you the pros and the cons. 

Right? So the benefits of doing that would be that it would make 

a defense available to people who could say that they were unaware of the law. The con against it—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Of course, they would have to prove that. 

Ms. BARKOW. Well, now I am getting to the con part, which is 

that the Government, I think if you had a government witness 

here, would tell you that it may be difficult to demonstrate. And 

so if that is a requirement of a statute, it is going to make it harder 

for the Government to bring prosecutions. 

Mr. BACHUS. It ought to be hard if we are talking criminal. 

Ms. BARKOW. That is your decision, obviously. 

Mr. BACHUS. Not in civil, but if we are talking criminal. 

Let me ask one more question, if I can. Under a ‘‘knowingly’’ 

standard, a person can be convicted of a crime for knowingly engaging in the conduct without knowing that the conduct is illegal. 

And I think that was in your testimony. And that is the essence 

of it. 

Ms. BARKOW. Yes. Some statutes have been interpreted that the 

‘‘knowing’’ just refers to that you knowingly engaged in the conduct, but you do not have to have the additional knowledge that 

the conduct was against the law. So you could either cure that by 

doing what you said, which is to have a mistake of law defense, or 
58 

you could make it clear that ‘‘knowing’’ actually applies to the 

knowledge that there are regulations that you violated. 

Mr. BACHUS. I would think we need a default mens rea standard, 

and I would invite you all to give us your thoughts and elaborate 

at some point in time. 

And I appreciate the Chairman’s indulgence. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

At this time, I will recognize the distinguished gentleman from 

Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Underlying this important hearing is the concern that has not 

been cleared up for me about whether or not mens rea should apply 

in which cases. And, Professor Barkow, I wanted to engage you in 

this discussion because regulatory crime violations—sentencing is 

less than 1 percent, while all these other offenses, particularly drug 

offenses, weapons, explosives, immigration, robbery, all constitute 

the rest. Can you point out to the Committee the circumstances 

under which mens rea is determined to be a requirement or not? 

Ms. BARKOW. So if I understand the question correctly, you 

know, I think it is a very difficult question to answer—— 

Mr. CONYERS. It is. 

Ms. BARKOW [continuing]. Because I think it is really a congressional policy call. I do not feel like I have the expertise to give you 

the answer of what conduct you view as sufficiently morally blameworthy that you want to have criminal sanctions attached to it. I 

mean, I can tell you that I think if we are talking about 300,000 

regulations, that not all of them are probably going to go to the 

core of health and safety protection that I think you would want 

to use this very powerful hammer on. I think if you say, well, 

maybe we need criminal law in order to deter because the consequences of violations are so great that we want to stop these 

things from happening, I think it just requires careful attention to 

what those consequences are that you think justify lowering the 

traditional notions of mens rea and culpability. 

So when all this started when Congress initially started doing 

this sort of thing, you know, it was basically industrialization and 

lots of products going out there and drugs and harmful food that 

could kill hundreds of thousands of people, and the idea was we 

have to make sure that does not happen. So we will just pass strict 

liability offenses, and now we know that these big industrial players will know that if they make a mistake, they are going to face 

heavy sanctions. And I think the question for Congress is when do 

you feel that those circumstances are analogous that you want to 

continue to maintain criminal penalties. 

And then the second would be whether you need them because 

the other thing I would add is that it may be that a civil sanction 

regime where companies could lose their license, for example, if 

they engage in certain conduct, that that may be sufficient in some 

contexts. So you just want to know when do you need the threat 

of criminal punishment because the way it plays out in practice is 

exactly as we heard, which is it is a way to get pleas and it is a 

way to get offenders to agree to terms. It is something that Government prosecutors like very much because it enables them to threat-
59 

en something quite severe in order to get the sanction that they 

think is appropriate. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, that is a good start. We are confronted here 

on this end with some incredible questions that have not been 

raised before. This is a separation of the Subcommittee on Crime, 

and you are on the commission. And I am wondering—this could 

be the beginning of a huge inquiry into where mens rea is required 

and when it is not. 

What about the mandatory minimums that are found so much in 

the drug offenses? Has your commission—have you inquired into 

that very deeply? 

Ms. BARKOW. So I am testifying today in my personal capacity 

and not as a member of the Sentencing Commission. So it would 

not be appropriate for me to comment at this time on the matters 

that are relevant to the work of the commission at this hearing. I 

myself have written, before I joined the commission, about the topic 

of mandatory minimums and would be happy to talk about that in 

another context. But today I am just here in my personal capacity 

and not as a member of the commission. 

Mr. CONYERS. So we can get your testimony after you give it 

today. 

Ms. BARKOW. My longer written statement? 

Mr. CONYERS. No. The one that you are going up for this afternoon. 

Ms. BARKOW. I am not testifying about mandatory—in my academic capacity, I have written quite a bit about mandatory minimums. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, I see. 

Ms. BARKOW. That is separate from what the commission’s work 

is. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, can you talk about mandatory minimums in 

an individual capacity like you are here for today? 

Ms. BARKOW. Well, I am here today actually to talk about the 

regulatory crimes and not questions about sentencing. So I do not 

think it would be appropriate for me to comment now as a member 

of the Sentencing Commission because there is a spectrum of views 

on the commission as they relate to mandatory minimums. 

Mr. CONYERS. All right. I will accept that. I do not know if the 

gentleman from New York is going to let you off the hook as easily 

as I do. 

But at any rate, what is the bottom line that Chairman Gohmert 

and us are struggling with here? And this has sort of crept up over 

the years. My time is also out. This is my last question to you then. 

Is there any organized way we could go about this? Maybe Ranking Member Scott and Chairman Gohmert could have Committee 

staff go through all of the laws and recommend to us what is mens 

rea and where it is not. And I say that, Chairman Gohmert, because we have just had one of the biggest financial collapses on 

Wall Street, and they are just beginning to bring people into court 

charged with crimes. And it seems that there is a stark reminder 

of the privilege that many white-collar defendants enjoy when they 

violate regulations. Well, I guess maybe they do not have a mens 

rea element. Oh, they do. Okay. 

Can you help close this out with a few ideas on this subject? 
60 

Ms. BARKOW. The one thing I will say is that the Federal system 

decided not to follow the model penal code, which was a model code 

to try to help States put their criminal laws in order and avoid 

some of the things that we have seen happen in the Federal system. In the 1970’s, Federal code reform was considered and ultimately was abandoned. But if Congress were serious about these 

issues and wanted to do something like that again, I do think that 

it is possible to think of some sort of body that could think systemically and broadly about Federal code reform and maybe do something similar to the model penal code project. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, could I put the Public Citizen comments on this 

subject that were sent to the Over-criminalization Task Force in 

the record? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
61 

215 Pennsylvania A"""" ., SE ' W .... ." .... (I.e, 20003' 202/1)46-4996' www.cIIll<In.orc 

PUBLICCITIZEN 

The """Of able Jim Sen.enbrenner 

Ct>Ioi'man 

l'Ioust al Representatives Committtt on tile Judiciary 

Ove,.a1mlnlliutlon r"sk For« 

Washington, DC 20515 

1M HonOfable Bobtly Scott 

Rlnkin, Member 

1io\I •• of ~epr~ent3! iv e< Comm lt~ on Ihe Judiciary 

~<rimin.li at jo n rISk force 

Washington. DC20515 

RI!: Htari..,: on "Rrgu1310ry Crime<: Identifying Ihe Scope of the Problem' 

Public Citizen urge< member"$ of th e House ludlclary Over·Criminallt.ation Task Foree to distinguish 

carefully between e-greglou. regulatory offenses and minor offenses In Its ",nslderatlon of over· 

c1iminal;Z3lion of regulatory crime-s. Rallter than numerauS esof ove,..crimlnali",t"'n, we believe thai 

under-crlminali.ation i. the currenl norm when it come< 10 enforcill.$ major a nd egregious violations of 

federal regUlatory .tand~ d$. 

For example. those who claim o"",..criminali ... t"'n of regulatory offen..,. bemoan the growth in the 

raw number of offenses subject to criminal liability. Yct. this numb.". is m~aningl<"'5 when taJ«on oul of 

contexl and igno'es Ihe re;tl W<)rld of ","minal Justice enfarcemenL Although the number of .ach offen.<es hn 

~rown. fc<1cral p"",ecutors have InvokN new crlmlnal~utharltyonly In exceptIonallyra,. Instane.s.' Rather, 

federal prostaltors contInue to ,."Iy on older "tried and true" criminal statutes In a few discrete areas that 

represent the overwhelming majority of federal criminal prosecutions. SpeciflUlly. In 2011. 30% of all fed.",1 

criminal defendants were charred with druZ offenses whil e 29% were charged wilh immigration viobtlo)1!. 

Regulatory offenses, on the other hand, comprised only 2% of.n fed.",l defend. nu in criminal c~ses in 2011 

which I. actually down from 7% in 1980.' Given thai Criminal p'oSeculions of regul~lory Violations are 

anually de<:rt;,u/ng, II . ppears that solving the issu e of over·crimina lizatlon of regulatory crimes Is very mach 

a solution In search of. problem. 

Indeed. Ihe lack of any sl~;r.ca l criminal pl"OSt'Culions of reckless activity conducted by financlal 

firms on Wall Stre", and high.ranki ng officials with in Ihose firms lcadin~ up 10 the 2008 financial collapSe ' is 

telling evidence of ou r governm.n!"s Inab ility to hold deep-pocketed defenda nts acco unt::l ble a nd a stari< 

reminder ohhe privilege while coll ar defendants enjoy In the crimina) justice system when they violale 

,.",ulot;ons. Leg.l experts havepo imed to themen<rN element which requires proving inl"ntto defraud as 

one of the primary explanations fo , the lack of prose<ution .. the failure of m051 to meet that high bor l5 • key 

factor to consider as lhe Task ~orcc considers increasing mens rea requirements.' More recenlly. the size of 

's.. Susan R. Kltin lfl&rid II. On>beJ.lRh"MJ"lCi<Jj",,<>/o.v-F~lir~lilHt<>/Crlmhli>/I.JN. ~l EIl'oOI)' L I. I (2612) ,~ . , http ~/wy,w.h"ffi"gIOnpo$l.<:Ofl\"20 13J09/11/,,1llI·'1«d .J'fCIS«"I .... _ n _391 m2.html 

, s.. I'&rJ. limning. Malj,,,.<:.Jn "11tt Bud SIOf>r II.,.. ·, BD"Ult; F.xmsJ.Iw./oI' C"'IXJ">1t "... 10_. lOll U OIl. I..cpl F. 

"",iklWe at ht",J/~...",.""""",,I3Ip>p<n.cfm?"""KC.)d-2 J j 1553 
62 

financial institutions appears to be playing a role in prosecutors' decisions to enter intn deferred or nonprosecution agreements with the financial institutions rather than criminally indicting them. The deferred 

prosecution agreement the Department of justice reached with HSBC, Europe's largest bank. even after HSBC 

admitted to laundering $881 million dollars of drug cartel money, has left the public wondering how much 

'money a bank has to launder before being subject to criminal sanctions, or whether a financial institution is 

so large that it has blanket immnnity from criminal liability. 

In fact, a focus on issues regarding enforcement of major and egregious regulatory violations reveals 

problems that do need solutions. In many areas of regulatory violations, genuine enforcement of those 

violations is hobbled by criminal penalties that are too low to incentivize federal prosecutors to hold criminal 

actors accountable. Approximately 4,693 U.S. workers were killed on the job in 2011,5 yet penalties for 

worker safety violations remain exceedingly small and criminal prosecutions are all but non-exLstent. This is 

because the Occupational Safety and Health Act only authorizes criminal penalties resulting in a maximum of 

six months in jail for "willful" workplace safcty violations that results in a worker's death, thereby ignoring 

cases of serious hodily injury, 

In many other instances1 civil enforcement of' major regulatory violations has resulted in fines for 

large corporations that are significantly reduced in practical terms once the favorable tax treatment oflhose 

fines is taken into account.' For example, British Petroleum [BP) has claimed over $10 billion in tax deductions 

for the cost.. of cleaning up the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico,· meaning that taxpayers 

have been left to subsidize UP's irresponsible behavior. Lawmakers should be looking for ways to ensure that 

settlement agreements that already offer corporate defendants the advantage of not having to admit guilt 

don't also offer the added benefit of a tax deduction on top of it. Compliance with regulatory standards should 

be the goal of enforcement regimes, rather than an expectation that noncompliance will only result in fines 

that are considered nothing more than the cost of doing business. 

justifying hroad claims of over-criminalization of regulatory crimes by primarily referencing minor 

regulatory offenses ignores the prevailing under-criminalization of major regulatory offenses by large and 

sophisticated corporations which recklessly endanger the public's health, safety, and financial security. 

Recent egregious regulatory offenses have resulted in little accountability in the form of criminal penalties 

despite strong evidence of corporate wrongdoing at the highest levels, In the interest of appropriate 

accountability for past violations of regulatory standards and effective deterrence offutllre violations, the 

House judiciary Committee Task Force should be looking for ways to strengthen criminal enforcement of 

major regulatory crimes, not weaken it 

Lisa Gilbert, Director 

Public Citizen's Congress Watch 

Amit Narang, Regulatory Policy Advocate 

Public Citizen's Congrcss Watch 

5 BL"REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Qvail~ble at http://wwv,.·,bls.gov/op\lb/btn/volume-2/death-on-the-jQb.fatal~work-injurieswin~ 

201 Lhlm 

6 http;//wv.'W,uspirg.orglblog.c;lhloglusplfour-reasons-la'i\'IDakers-are-scrutinizing-how-companies-tum-settlements-\:vrongdomgtax 
63 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. 

At this time, we recognize the distinguished gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Nadler. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Barkow, I cannot resist this. Without compromising 

your status as a member of the Sentencing Commission, without 

testifying perhaps about your current opinions, could you tell us in 

a couple sentences the thrust of the conclusions of your prior academic writing on mandatory minimums? 

Ms. BARKOW. I will say this, and I will try this approach instead. 

And I am going to apologize in advance that I said in advance I 

was going to leave early. It is not because of this line of questioning. 

Mr. NADLER. This is my last question in that line. 

Ms. BARKOW. I will say that the commission as a body recently 

submitted to the Senate its views on some of the proposed mandatory minimum reform legislation that is pending in the Senate. 

And so as a body, there is a statement that reflects the commission’s views on possible reforms to improve those things. 

Mr. NADLER. We could get from NYU, I assume, your prior academic—— 

Ms. BARKOW. You could get that from your Senate—you could get 

it. It is a public document. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Let me just switch topics now. Obviously, the question of mens 

rea and the question of intent and the question of knowledge is a 

very serious question, and it is not as simple as it might appear 

at first glance. 

Secondly, the obvious question of very few big-time bankers 

being prosecuted, if any, for causing the catastrophe that happened 

when the—obviously, many crimes were committed and people getting away without criminal prosecutions and the blow-up of the 

British Petroleum rig in the Gulf years ago shows one extreme of 

not prosecuting people who perhaps should be, but maybe they are 

too powerful or whatever. And here we have two witnesses who, assuming the truthfulness of their testimony—and I have no reason 

to doubt it—were obviously victims of very bad prosecutorial decisions and perhaps badly drafted laws and regulations. 

My question is this because certainly Mrs. Kinder’s testimony 

raises a different problem for me. Let me ask you this, Mrs. 

Kinder. Your testimony is that—first of all, I am not familiar with 

the Lacey Act, but I assume from your testimony that the Lacey 

Act is a Federal law which makes it a crime to do something with 

fishing in the wrong State? 

Ms. KINDER. Actually the State of Ohio claims that their portion 

of water—the paddlefish is threatened or endangered in. Kentucky 

it is not. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. So the Lacey Act makes it a crime to take 

endangered fish which would only be endangered in Ohio in this 

case? 

Ms. KINDER. Right, in that body of water. 
64 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. It would certainly be an element of the alleged crime that you were, in fact, taking fish in Ohio. If you were 

doing it in Kentucky, it would not have been a problem. 

Ms. KINDER. That is true. 

Mr. NADLER. And your testimony is that there is no way to tell 

the boundary, that the GPS was confused and no one knew anything about this and so forth. Given that, it would seem to me that 

the real problem here—although that may be one problem, but the 

other problem here is that the Federal Government comes down, 

threatens a prosecution which you could have, had you had the 

money and the time and the funds and the lawyers, defeated because based on what you are saying, you would not have met the— 

you did not commit any crime even unknowingly because there was 

no delineation of the boundary between the two States and so 

forth. One real problem here is the way the Federal Government 

comes down on people who end up feeling compelled to plead guilty 

to a lesser included offense to avoid a risky, expensive trial. And 

I suspect that that is a bigger problem, that a lot of people plead 

guilty to things they are not guilty of simply because they cannot 

fight the might of the Federal Government in court. Do you agree 

with that? 

Ms. KINDER. Thank you, sir. Thank you so much. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. And that to me is not the question of over-regulation, although there may be over-regulation here too. I do not 

know. But it is a larger problem that I think this Committee ought 

to deal with, where people feel compelled to plead guilty simply because they do not have the resources that you need to fight the 

Federal Government in court. It is something I think this Committee has to deal with quite separately from whatever we do in 

the area of over-regulation or non-over-regulation. 

In coming back to over-regulation, let me just say that the mandate of this Subcommittee is really not just regulatory crimes. It 

is over-incarceration, et cetera. The regulatory problem is a problem, but it results in less than .8 of 1 percent of the people in jail. 

That is not say we should not deal with it because one person being 

a victim of injustice is one person too many. But we also have to 

deal with 30 percent of drug crimes. 30 percent of the people in 

Federal jail are there for drug crimes, most of which in my opinion 

should not be crimes at all. 

So it seems to me we have three different problems here: the alleged over-regulation, the whole function of mens rea and state of 

mind being one very serious problem which leads to witnesses and 

the testimony of the two academic witnesses illustrate. Second, the 

problem is, of course, the whole drug problem. The third problem 

is the problem of how do you deal with people who may be coerced 

into plea bargains because of the power of the Federal Government. 

You look like you wanted to say something, Mr. Rubinstein. 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Just briefly with respect to the Lacey Act, the 

Congress has been considering amendments because it does apply 

without respect to knowledge, and it criminalizes not only all 

United States laws but all foreign laws. 

Mr. NADLER. How does it do that? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Because that is what Congress said. It says specifically that any law that deals with fish or game or plants, so 
65 

forth—a violation of that can lead to criminal sanctions. And you 

may remember a case involving Gibson Guitar, the guitar company, where agents came in in the middle of the day, herded all 

the employees into the offices at gunpoint and so forth because of 

allegations with respect to the illegal importation of Indian wood. 

The law that was violated in that case was an Indian domestic content regulation. And so the United States Government in its wisdom in this particular case decided that that warranted an armed 

raid on Gibson’s factories. 

The Lacey Act has some significant issues. I mean, obviously, it 

serves a very salutary purpose and you do not want to throw the 

baby out with the bath water, but that is actually a pretty good 

paradigm for the issue that we are talking about today with respect to regulatory over-criminalization. 

Mr. NADLER. Because it violates any foreign act too, any foreign 

law? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Absolutely. 

Mr. NADLER. So if Russia passed a law that said Americans who 

fish in this area, but nobody else, are guilty, that would make that 

an American claim too? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. That is correct. Or if you are failing, if somebody fails to pay taxes to the local czar of whatever the province 

is or so forth, yes. In that respect Lacey is unique, but as I said, 

as a paradigm it works really well because essentially what the 

statute says and the way that it has been interpreted and enforced, 

if you violate a foreign law, even if you did not know about it, you 

can go to an American prison. 

Mr. NADLER. The question of regulatory relief—it sounds like we 

ought to take a look at the Lacey Act too. 

Thank you. I have exceeded my time. I yield back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

Ms. Bass, the Chair recognizes the gentlelady for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. I actually wanted to follow up on my colleague’s question and wanted to ask you if maybe you could give 

a little more history about the Lacey law, when it was passed, why. 

Are there parts of it that you think are positive? 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Last question first. There are certainly parts of 

it that are positive. The reason it was passed—and that is actually 

the first of the Federal environmental laws. It was passed really 

at the beginning of the last century to prevent poaching and to prevent killing of what we today call endangered species. 

But what has happened, as typically does, over time the expanse 

of the statute has grown. There was a determination made that in 

order to stop the international trade in things like elephants and 

rhinoceroses and so forth, that it was important to add this extra 

criminalization component. Several years ago, Congress expanded 

Lacey to include plants and plant products. And so the way it is 

written and as the world has become more—economies become 

more integrated, the way it is written, it charges pretty much 

Americans with the obligation to know foreign laws. 

The Department of Justice and the various agencies charged 

with enforcing it have said they are not able to provide a database. 

That is one of the suggestions that stakeholders have made. Give 

us a place we can go to find the laws. And the answer is that we 
66 

are not going to do that. You are charged with knowledge. And if 

it is a tax law, if it is a law about domestic content in India, if the 

foreign government itself you are not in violation of the law, it does 

not matter. Lacey needs some work. 

Ms. BASS. Well, I think it was Professor Barkow was mentioning 

about what should be done prospectively about the law, and I 

wanted to know your opinions about what should be done with the 

laws that are already on the book, the regulations. 

And I also want to associate myself with Congressman Nadler’s 

comments in regard to both of the witnesses, Lewis and Kinder, because as I listened to your testimony, you know, I thought of just 

numerous times where there were other offenses that were not regulatory but where people really wind up pleading to crimes they 

did not commit because they really did not have the resources, you 

know, to defend themselves. And that is certainly a problem here, 

but it is a general problem within our system. Maybe you could respond to that. 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. Certainly. And one of the issues with the overcriminalization discussion generally is that to some extent overcriminalization is in the eye of the beholder, and there is a lot of 

good writing about this. Depending on sort of where you sit, you 

see different aspects of the problem. So it is important to take a 

step back, as the Task Force is doing, in a bipartisan way and really get back to first principles. And the first principles, the way the 

system is supposed to work, the way we assume the criminal law 

works is that the criminal law is supposed to reflect deeply held 

societal values about what is or is not right and wrong, and that 

individuals are able to exercise, through their own reason, the ability to identify what is and is not right and wrong in a given situation within limits. And obviously there are exceptions, but generally, that is the way it is supposed to work. 

The problem with the regulatory state, for want of a better word, 

is that you have many moving parts. It is very arcane. The law is 

very convoluted. And if you are very wealthy, you can hire a whole 

raft of lawyers, people like me, to sit down and try and tease this 

all out. If you are like these people, that is just not an option. And 

so there is a reason that we have laws to protect clean water, and 

there is a reason that we have laws to protect the fish. But there 

has to be some balance and there has to be some transparency and 

there has to be some accountability. And right now, particularly 

with respect to regulatory crimes, there just is not. 

Ms. BASS. Let me ask you a question. It is a little bit off topic, 

but your answer kind of raises it with me and that is our drug 

laws, which several people have referenced. But you talk about 

something that is changing in our society, and that is certainly one 

area of law that is changing depending on what State you live in. 

So we have on our books now, if you are a student applying for financial aid and you want Federal financial aid, there is a box that 

you have to check as to if you have had a drug conviction. But we 

have States now that have legalized the use of marijuana. So what 

is your thought on that. I mean, I have legislation to try to address 

that, but I would like to know your thoughts on that. 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. It is a very complex topic. Obviously, this is a 

big country and we have very different attitudes toward all sorts 
67 

of things in many of the States, and frankly, that is reflected in 

many cases in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Years ago, 

I was working in Michigan and drug offenses in the northern part 

of the State would be prosecuted very aggressively but drunk driving would not. But if you were in the southern part of the State, 

you would have the exact opposite. Drunk driving would be prosecuted very aggressively, but drug offenses would not. And that 

was reflective of local norms and mores. And that is just in one 

State. That is not all over the country. So it is a very difficult topic. 

Part of the problem again is just sort of a proliferation of laws. 

By one count, there are over 300 Federal statutes that deal with 

fraud, going to the banking question earlier. There are plenty of 

laws on the books and it comes down to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 

The space that I know best is the regulatory one, and here again 

the issue is framed in a very specific way. The solution is, frankly, 

to go back to first principles, things like mens rea, things like making it clear what the prohibited actions are, and then perhaps letting localities, the States work it out in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 

Federal agencies are a different beast, and that is part of a 

longer discussion frankly. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. We thank the gentlelady from California. 

At this time, we recognize Mr. Jeffries, the gentleman from New 

York. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And let me thank the witnesses for your testimony here today 

and certainly Mr. Lewis and Mrs. Kinder for your presence, for 

your willingness to relive what I think we all understand would be 

a difficult moment, unnecessarily difficult moment in your lives, 

but also to take the opportunity to share that moment with us in 

the hopes that Congress will act and that we can prevent others 

from going through the similar trauma that you have gone 

through. And certainly I think the power of the narratives that you 

have both communicated are compelling in that regard. 

Let me ask Mr. Lewis first. It is my understanding that initially 

you were charged with a Federal felony offense. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And then ultimately you pled to a misdemeanor. 

From the moment of the initial charge to the ultimate plea, what 

was the time period. 

Mr. LEWIS. I believe 10-11 months, 12 months, something like 

that. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And during that time period, did you retain counsel or was counsel appointed? 

Mr. LEWIS. The company that I worked for obtained counsel that 

represented me, yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And, Mrs. Kinder, initially you were charged with 

a felony and ultimately pled guilty to a felony. Is that right? 

Ms. KINDER. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And what was the sort of duration of the legal 

process from initial charge to plea? 
68 

Ms. KINDER. All together, we went through about 5 years. I cannot remember the date today. We went through about 5 years of 

wondering day to day. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And are you still under Federal supervision, probation? 

Ms. KINDER. We are on probation. Even though I have satisfied 

all of the requirements, they still hold us on probation. They will 

not let us go. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And as a consequence of the felony conviction—I 

am not as familiar with Kentucky law in terms of disenfranchisement, but have you lost your ability to vote? 

Ms. KINDER. I am sorry. Would you ask me that again? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Have you lost your ability to vote as a result of 

the conviction? 

Ms. KINDER. Not that I know of to vote. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay. Well, I appreciate the testimony of both of 

you. Obviously, under certain State laws, one gets a felony conviction and they are prohibited from participating in the electoral 

process in some instances temporarily, in some instances permanently. 

Ms. KINDER. May I elaborate on that? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Sure. 

Ms. KINDER. They offered us a $25 fine and a misdemeanor. So 

we had to weigh that. Did we want to go to trial where we could 

not afford a trial to start with at that point in time and take 

chances on going to prison? So we could not refuse. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Well, I think that both of the stories that you have 

told illustrate the point that several of my colleagues have mentioned. In facing the power of the Federal Government and possibly 

in the absence of the inability to bring to bear an equivalent level 

of legal representation, folks are put in an untenable situation in 

terms of ultimately having to plead guilty. And in the continuum 

of justice, which moves from congressional action to administrative 

rulemaking to prosecutorial discretion and judicial review, obviously there is a breakdown, at least I believe respectfully, in that 

prosecutorial discretion phase that requires some measure of corrective action. 

Mr. Rubinstein, if you can comment on sort of the notion of one 

of the things that have been explored is the possibility of default 

mens rea. Another possibility, maybe additive, is the notion of applying the rule of levity to some degree which, as I understand it, 

would require construing the defendant’s behavior in the best possible light as it relates to criminality. Can you make an observation 

on that possibility in addition to—— 

Mr. RUBINSTEIN. That is certainly one of the tools in the toolbox. 

There are a variety of options available to you to try and solve the 

problem, particularly in dealing with it from the regulatory standpoint. And part of it could be related to a regulatory reform issue 

to open up the process to make sure that there is, as I said, some 

transparency in terms of how agencies make rules so that there is 

more notice and that people have the ability to understand what 

the law is. 

There are potential limits on prosecutorial discretion. For example, the way the Department of Justice now handles RICO viola-
69 

tions or RICO prosecutions. There is this kind of centralized process that might be appropriate with respect to these kinds of regulatory decisions to take them away from the people who are making the laws, so to speak, writing the regulations, and giving those 

functions to an independent body to make determinations about enforcement because, again, regulatory agencies are kind of unique 

beasts. In many cases, they act as—they write the laws, they enforce the laws, and then they prosecute the violations. More often 

than not, those are civil, than criminal instances obviously, but the 

problem obtains in both realms. 

So I think there are certainly solutions, and the one you suggest 

absolutely ought to be part of the mix. It is not a simple problem, 

but it is one that you need to fix and there are fixes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I thank the gentleman. 

At this time, we have finished the questioning. However, it is important to note that all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witnesses, and the witnesses may have 5 additional days, if you think of something else 

you would like to have submitted for the record in this hearing. 

But that at this time concludes today’s hearing. Thank you to the 

witnesses very much for your assistance, as we pursue this problem. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Task Force was adjourned.] 

(71) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
72 

November 27,2013 

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chainnan, Over-Criminalization Task Force 

House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 

2449 Russell House Office Building 

Washington, DC, 20515 

The Honorable Bobby C. Scott 

Ranking Member, Over-Criminalization Task Force 

House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 

1201 Longworth House Office Building 

Washington, DC, 20515 

Re: Mens Rea Requirementsfor Regulatory Crimes/Follow Up to the OverCriminalization Task Force Hearing on "Regulatory Crime: Identifying the 

Scope of the Problem" 

Dear Chairman Sensenbrenner and Ranking Member Scott: 

We write to follow-up on an issue that was raised at the October 30,2013 hearing of the 

House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary's Over-Criminalization Task Force titled 

"Regulatory Crime: Identifying the Scope ofthe Problem." Some Members expressed an interest 

in addressing the absence of mens rea requirements for many regulatory crimes, and, in 

particular, identifying specific strategies for doing so to stop prosecutorial over-reach and to 

ensure criminal enforcement of federal regulatory violations is consistent with our core notions 

of due process. 

While this is a complex issue that Congress may wish to address in different ways 

depending on the substantive area, one option is to adopt default rules of interpretation. The 

drafters of the Model Penal Code followed this path, and we thought it might be helpful for the 

Task Force to have the benefit of seeing what that approach entails. 

Criminal offenses are comprised of elements that the government must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt. These elements may include conduct, results, or attendant circumstances. 

Sometimes statutes list elements without specifying what mens rea a defendant must have with 

respect to those elements. For example, a statute may prohibit the emission ofa chemical, 

without specifying whether the defendant has to know he or she was engaged in such emission or 

whether the defendant knew what the chemical was. If a court concludes that statutory silence 

means that no mens rea is required, these become strict liability offenses, where the government 
73 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

The Honorable Bobby C. Scott 

Over-Criminalization Task Force Hearing "Regulatory Crime: 

Identifying the Scope of the Problem" 

November 27, 2013 

Page 2 

need only prove the prohibited conduct, without also having to show that the defendant had a 

particular degree of knowledge or awareness of what was happening, 

The Model Penal Code contains a default rule so that statutory silence is not interpreted 

as creating a strict liability offense. For statutes that fail to mention a mens rea term at all, the 

Model Penal Code states that "such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly 

or recklessly with respect thereto.") Of those three mental states, recklessness is the easiest for 

the government to establish. The Model Penal Code notes that "a person acl~ recklessly with 

respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.,,2 Thus, in the 

above example, the government would have to at least demonstrate the defendant consciously 

disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he or she was emitting the chemical. 

Congress could adopt a similar rule and eliminate all strict liability crimes. 

A second mens rea issue that comes up with regulatory crimes is whether a mens rea term 

in a statute applies to all the elements orjust some of them. The Model Penal Code addresses 

this issue with another default rule. It states that "[w]hen the law defining an offense prescribes 

the kind of culpability that is sufticient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing 

among the material elements thereof; such provision shall apply to all the material elements of 

the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.,,3 Thus, if a law makes the "knowing 

emission of chemical X" or the violation of a regulation a crime, this default rule would mean 

that the government would have to prove both that the defendant knew he or she was emitting a 

substance and that the defendant had knowledge of what the substance was. 

These detault rules would fill many ofthe mens rea gaps that exist in federal law 

cUiTently, but they would not address situations where individuals knew exactly what they were 

doing but had no awareness that the behavior constituted a crime. While typically this kind of 

mistake oflaw is not a defense to a charge, Congress may wish to create an exception for 

regulatory crimes as a group or some subset ofthose crimes because of a concern that nonsophisticated participants in a field may be unaware of their obligations. 

Often, a statute may authorize an agency to promulgate rules and establish that the 

violation ofthose rules can be subject to criminal enforcement, but without specifying whether, 

or under what circumstances, a defendant's mens rea affects potential criminal jeopardy. Thus, 

) MODEL PENAL CODES 2.02(3). 

2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 

3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4). 
74 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr, 

The Honorable Bobby C. Scott 

Over-Criminalization Task Force Hearing "Regulatory Crime: 

Identifying the Scope ofthe Problem" 

November 27, 2013 

Page 3 

criminal enforcement could apply to even the most minor or arcane regulatory violations, 

Without specifying a mens rea requirement related to knowledge ofthe law, Congress in these 

instances theretore delegates to agencies broad powers to define prohibited conduct by 

administrative rule and to decide which rules to enforce with criminal sanctions, 

There are at least two avenues for Congress to address this issue should it wish to make 

awareness of the law a prerequisite to criminal liability. One approach would be for Congress to 

make knowledge of a regulatory requirement itself an element of an offense. Simply stating that 

a defendant must "willfully" violate a law or regulation would not be sufficient to make this 

clear, however, as courts have often concluded that this term docs not require knowledge ofthe 

regulation itself.4 If Congress wanted courts to interpret willfully in a statute to require 

knowledge of a specific statute or regulation, it would have to specify that is what the term 

means. 

Another approach would be for Congress to adopt a general mistake of law defense. An 

example of a law that takes this latter approach is a New Jersey statute that provides a defense 

when an actor "otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and 

application ofthe offense to bis conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is 

not an offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so 

conclude."s 

Congress could address tbe mens rea issues raised by regulatory crimes in a general 

fashion through default rules. It could also apply different standards to different substantive 

areas. However, this letter has the modest goal of offering some examples that we bope are 

helpful to Congrcss should it make the policy decision that default rules are the best approacb for 

dealing with the many laws that raise these issues. 6 

* * * * * 

4 See, e.g., United States v. Overholt, 307 FJd 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). 

5 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:2-4(c)(3). 

6 Mr. Rubinstein's written testimony for the October 30,2013 hearing reflects the U.S. Cbamber 

Institute tor Legal Reform's official position regarding regulatory over-criminalization. This 

letter reflects solely the personal views of Prof. Barkow and Mr. Rubinstein and not those ofILR 

or any other person or entity. 
75 

f 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

The Honorable Bobby C, Scott 

Over-Criminalization Task Force Hearing "Regulatory Crime: 

Identifying the Scope of the Problem" 

November 27, 2013 

Page 4 

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please feel free to contact us if you have any 

questions or if we can be of additional assistance. 

Sincerely yours, 

Rachel E. Barkow 

Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy 

Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law 

New York University School of Law 

Partner. Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 

cc: Robert B. Panniter, Esq., Counsel to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland 

Security and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 

Ron Legrand, Esq., Democratic Counsel to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

Homeland Security and Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 

Judiciary 
76 

Dinsmore 

VIA ELECTRONIC MAil 

Al icia Church 

c/o Committee on the Judiciary 

U.S. House of Representatives 

2138 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20615 

January 31, 2014 

Legal Cow, ... , DlNSMOf!E & SIfOHl ~ eol.......,.._ Avo .. HW • Su •• eto 

w.otWY:'"', O,C. ;.w()oI ---.001II 

_O.R"""",,,"' 

(202) 372-9120 I_I 

.---~.""" 

REo ' Regulatory Crime: Identifying the Scope of the Problem'/Questions for the Record 

Oear Ms. (hurel>: 

This responds to the leller dated January 9, 2014 from Chairman Goodlalle providing 

Questions for the record from Representative Spencer Bachus with respecllo Ihe Judiciary 

Over-Criminal izalion Task Force hearing titled "Regulatory Crime; Identifying Ihe Scope of Ihe 

Problem" held on Wedoesday, October 3D, 2013. 

Question one: In your testimony. you stated that "3 sprawling criminal code based 

substantially on agency regulations is eS>Jecially likely to contain crimes in which the allimportant condlKt (actus reus) and state of mind (mens rea) elements are incompJi!tely 

fleshed out." Would you please provide uamples of cases where individuals have been 

prosecuted lor crimes in which the actus reus is incompletely fleshed out? Would you 

please provide examples of cases where individuals have been prosecuted for crimes in 

which the mens rea is incompletely fleshed out? 

Answer: The case studies presented at the hearing are quite typical oltlli! kinds of 

situations in which citizens find themselves at risk of incarceration for ·crimes· that lack 

meaningfulac\Us reus and mens rea elements, 3tleast in my experience. The datil base 

of case studies found on the Heritage foundation's Over-<riminalization page has been 

cited as a useful source of information on such cases. Su Stephen Smith, "Overcoming 

Over-criminaliz3tion: 102 J.Of C~IM. L & OiIMINOLOGY 537, 542 In, 16 (2012) citing 

hllpHwww .heritage_org/issues/legal/overcriminalization (accessed January 31, 2014). 

Also, both the scholarly literature and the media, dating b<lck to the early 1960s at least 

is replete with examples of dtizens who suffer criminal penalties for conduct that is 

simply not appropriately subject to the government's criminalauthorilies, A December 

17,2011 Wall Street Journalarticie is reasonable typkal. See Radnofsky, et ai, "Federal 
77 

Alicia Church 

January 31,2014 

Page 2 

Police Ranks Swell to Enforce a Widening Array of Criminal Laws," The Wall Street 

Journal (Dec. 17, 2011) available at 

http://online.wsj.com(news!articles!SBl00014240529702035184045770948614973836 

78?mod=ITP pageone O&mg=reno64-

wsj&ul"l=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Fartic!e%2FSB100014240529702035184045 

n094861497383678.html%3Fmod%3DlfP pageone 0 (accessed January 31,2014). 

I am unaware of any statistical studies quantifying the cases in which individuals have 

been prosecuted from crimes in which the actus reus and mens rea have been 

incompletely fleshed out. 

Question two: Could you elaborate further on your views regarding a default mens rea 

standard? 

Answer: Please see the attached joint letter from Prof. Rachel Barkow and Reed D. 

Rubinstein, Esq. regarding a default mens rea standard. 

Question three: Please submit any relevant studies or information that would shed 

light on the number of criminally enforceable regulations. 

Answer: A leading study is by James A. Strazzella, and is titled The Federalization of 

Criminal Law, Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association (1998) available at 

b1!JdJ..ww'"y.3 m QI.ifEllPilJJ:l rg/ co D.t~rJf.d a ml a b§.lllllJ1.li.?b.i.!l&'giDl i niJl.ild.sjJ',L sect jon _r),g 

wsletter!cnmiust pubs catalog fedcrimlawl.authcheckdam.pdf (accessed January 31, 

2014). This study concludes that it was virtually impossible to get an accurate count of 

all of the federal crimes because the statutes are complex, there are so many, their 

location in the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations is so scattered, and 

there are nearly 10,000 regulations that are nearly impossible to categorize because 

they mention some sort of criminal or criminal-type sanction. Id. at 10. 

Another leading study is by John S. Baker, Jr., and titled Revisiting the Explosive Grawth 

of Federal Crimes, Heritage Foundation Legal Memo. No. 26, June 16, 2008 available at 

http://www.heritage.org!research!reports!2008!06!revisiting-the-explosive-growth-offederal-crimesll ftn20 (accessed January 31,2014). Professor Baker, while 

acknowledging many of the same difficulties encountered by the ABA Task Force in 

trying to accurately count the total number of federal criminal laws, concluded that by 

the end of 2007 the United States Code contained at least 4,450 federal criminal laws. 

He cites estimates of up to 300,000 regulations that may have criminal consequences. 

Id. at fn. 20. 

Another leading study is by Marie Gryphon, and titled It's a Crime?: Flaws in Federal 

Statutes That Punish Standard Business Practice, Manhattan Institute for Policy 

Research (Dec. 2009) available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/hrml/cjr 12.hll11 

(accessed January 31, 2014). This study concludes: "Today, the regulatory state so 
78 

f 

Alicia Church 

January 31,2014 

Page 3 

thoroughly encompasses the range of commercial activity that businesses and 

businesspeople trying to reduce their costs, better their products, best their rivals-do 

all of the things, in short, on which survival in a market economy depends-run an everpresent risk of becoming ensnared in the criminal law. In many instances, the laws in 

question are so voluminous and loosely drafted that even a student of the legislation 

would not have fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and what was not." 

Please feel free to contact me if I can provide additional information. 

RDR:alm 

Enclosure 

Best regards, 

DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP 

aQjQ{2J-~ Reed D. Rubinstein 
79 

TOURISM. ARTS AND I-IERITAGE CABINET 

K ENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF FISH & WILDLIFE FlESOUFICES 

The-'blrJim~nner.Jr. 

'Is.a-.. ~ F ..... b!. Kenluclly 00601 _ (5(121 564-3.aoo 

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ro. (50:1 !6oO.o5OIi 

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244'~_0ff«"""" 

United SlOtH ........ of R~pt_n"ltves 

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wiklilfe. Orltln.11y elllCled 10 Iddr~ .. problem. with IPIe Introduction of no,,· ... Uve. or ~><OIic S!>KiH of 

wftcIWe Into .... "'" KOIysIefM. " now abo ........ as.n imporUnt ledenl btfdce for ptOIeCIl .. >tale 

fi.n Ind wikllife lows .Irudy In exi"ence. The Aoott poOlec .. /kII. wiIcIWe. and pion .. by ..... ti ... cMI and 

csWnirIaI po1"III~le. 10< • wide r .... of YioIalio ... irwo/vIrc Irade In wildlife. li.n •• nd plo nl'lhal h,ve 

bHn IlIepIIr -.ken. _«td. Ir.lR$porIod or $Old. TIlt ACt" abo ..... 01 1M broadHt.nd_" 

comprehe"I""" tooilin the f,der.l l,owJIIlto ,ombal wildlif<l , ....... WIth Inc ......... KlIvity In 

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• dd ..... "'" the pro<eculion of two K.nt .... kia .... nd tholt a.Iaf compo .... '""" had pIoadedlJUlltv 10 

tr.lfflclifll.nd .l~ iabell ... llle/:ally ha""'''ed paddlefl.h. SI ...... nd Cornelia Joyce Kinder owned.nd 

oper.Ited IOnIIet ~ Inc..nd iliaci; St.-CMa. Company. ~ In tho IMInHs of .. portIrc 

po<IdleHoh eu .... colll .. lo ,uO!"","" In Io<e." countrle .. 

n Is ._1 10< I .... kentudty I of A!.h .nd Wildlife ~~ (~IJ 10 ad<i1'fl$1hi< 

K.o ...... Ihe ~.I trade of poddleH<Io ea. conli ...... lo be • , fOWl". ptoblern In hnl..:ky.nd ott .... 

............,., .... es.. I\quIotions ........ bHn .... bI;o/Iod 10 protect. ded/tl1 ... paddlelbh populo'io" 

while ..... in"'lnl ..... ",,,,inoble """",,"rOol fbherv. _10 ~ pro-dude lhe need to lit! tho 

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n is .Iso Impona"t 10 Iddre ... nd do~fy _.1 pointS In M •• Kinder'. te>limOn'! wherelhe Deport .... n' 

moln ...... she mis>lflt<l_la<t> "'Prdlnl lhe ....--..600'1 of her """"",rdoI/ishinI .nd ~ 

I;"'nse. in Kenl<>d<y. 
80 

f 

Ms. Kinder purchased and received the necessary commercial permits in September 2012; 

however, these licenses were revoked in December 2012 following the receipt of her Lacey Act 

conviction. Pursuant to our regulations the Department shall revoke a license if a person is 

convicted of a federal commercial fishing violation. 

It is true that the Department revised the commercial fishing regulations in January 2013. The 

intent of these updates was to prevent commercial anglers from hiring helpers that were 

convicted of federal commercial fishing violations because there was a regulatory loophole that 

allowed these individuals to continue in the industry during their license revocation period. 

Ms. Kinder was also involved in establishing a new regulatory framework for the paddlefish 

industry in Kentucky in 2008. She worked with the Department and state representatives to 

establish penalties that would address the violators in this industry. Included in this new 

frameworl< was a list of provisions that would require automatic revocation of commercia! 

fishing licenses. Ms. Kinder was in agreement with these provisions. 

Ms. Kinder repeatedly testified regarding the boundary line of the closed fishing area along the 

Ohio River in the state of Ohio. While a boundary line is difficult to mark on an open river 

system, KDFWR did collectively agree with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois on a set of GP$ points to 

delineate this boundary. These points were established after the conviction of the Kinders. Prior 

to this time Mr. I(inder was officially told by Department officials on multiple occasions to avoid 

the Ohio bank side of the Ohio River since commercial fishing was prohibited in that state. Our 

Department subsequently learned that commercial fishing gear was tied to trees on the Ohio 

shoreline; in fact old commercial gear tags registered to Mr, Kinder were located on these trees. 

Ms. Kinder testified they had to close their fish processing business since the Kentucky 

Department of Public Health would not issue them a permit due to their paddlefish conviction. 

Our records indicate they received 2013 permits for both Kinder and Black Star Caviar. Health 

officials claimed they could not restrict their processing of paddlefish from other sources 

provided they were not collected by Steve or Joyce Kinder. 

This was a case where the Lacey Act was effective for the continued protection of a fish species that has 

been subject to numerous illegal trade incidents. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify these issues 

and would welcome the opportunity to provide any additional information that might be helpful in your 

Committee's findings. 

Sincerely, 

~-r.~ Benjy Kinman 

Deputy Commissioner 
81 

House Committee on Judiciary Over-Criminalization Task Force 

Regulatory Crime: Identifying the Scope of the Problem 

Hearing on October 30, 2013 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

SUBMITTED BY THE 

ASSOCIATION OF FISH AND WILDLIFE AGENCIES 

Tuesday, November 5, 2013 

The Association ofFish and Wildlife Agencies (Association) is a bipartisan organization, 

representing the state fish and wildlife agencies of all 50 states, and supports and advocates for 

state, territorial and provincial authority for fish and wildlife conservation and assists those 

agencies in promoting science-based resource management in collaboration with public and 

private partners. 

For over 100 years the Lacey Act has been an important interstate mechanism for the protection 

offish and wildlife. Originally enacted to address problems with the introduction of non-native, 

or exotic species offish and wildlife into native ecosystems, it now also serves as an important 

federal bridge for protecting state fish and wildlife laws already in existence. The Act protects 

fish, wildlife, and plants by creating civil and criminal penalties for a wide range of violations 

involving trade in wildlife, fish, and plants that have been illegally taken, possessed, transported 

or sold. The Act is also one of the broadest and most comprehensive tools in the federal toolbox 

to combat wildlife crime. Activity in international and domestic wildlife trafficking continues to 

increase, and the Act has evolved to become an important tool to protect these wild resources 

domestically and abroad from over-exploitation. The Lacey Act is considered a vital tool to 

helping state fish and wildlife agencies protect the fish and wildlife that they manage as public 

trust resources in every state across the country. 

The Association supports the rights of state fish and wildlife agencies to manage and restrict 

harvest of species within their borders and fully supports the states' authority and right to make 

and enforce their fish and wildlife laws. States' decisions to set harvest regulations, seasons, bag 

limits and the like are based on sound science and through processes that involve the public. 

These harvest regulations and restrictions are established to ensure fish and wildlife populations 

continue to thrive while allowing for sustainable harvest. Over-harvesting and deviation from 

these regulations leads to population declines and ultimately listings of species under state and 

federal endangered species laws. 

The paddlefish is listed as a threatened species in the state of Ohio and the population is actively 

monitored for progress. Because it is a listed as a state threatened species, it is illegal to harvest 

paddlefish in Ohio. Kentucky allows the commercial harvest of paddle fish by pennit only, and 
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