THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND INFORMATION WARFARE

Larry M. Wortzel

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Strategic Studies Institute

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U.S. Army War College Press

THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND INFORMATION WARFARE

Larry M. Wortzel

March 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-608-5
v

FOREWORD

On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air 

defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by 

the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. The new ADIZ also included 

a submerged rock that falls inside overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) claimed by China, Japan, 

and South Korea. Pundits and policy analysts quickly 

engaged in a broad debate about whether China’s expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or 

is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition 

of China’s territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed 

to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the 

U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and 

State are devising new means to protect intellectual 

property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations.

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel’s monograph puts these 

events into perspective. The ADIZ announcement by 

China, at one level, is an example of the PLA General Political Department engagement in what it calls 

“legal warfare,” part of the PLA’s “three warfares.” 

In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching International Civil Aviation Organization regulations to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands, 

administered by Japan. China calls these the Diaoyu 

Islands and, along with Taiwan, claims them for its 

own. On another level, the Chinese government will 

use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace it can 

monitor and control off its coast; it already is suing the 

navy and maritime law enforcement ships to enforce 
vi

these claims at sea. Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government have sent a major signal to Taiwan, 

demonstrating another aspect of the “three warfares.” 

When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put 

its expanded ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully 

avoided any infringement into Taiwan’s ADIZ, signaling that in addition to the improved economic ties 

with Taiwan, there is room for political improvement 

across the Taiwan Strait.

The PLA spent more than a decade examining U.S. 

military publications on network-centric warfare and 

the evolution of American doctrine on information 

warfare. After observing American information operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the PLA 

saw the effect of modern information operations on 

the battlefield and in the international arena. The PLA 

then began to implement its own form of information 

warfare. The Chinese military has adopted information warfare concepts suited to its own organization 

and doctrine, blending its own traditional tactics, concepts from the Soviet military, and U.S. doctrine to 

bring the PLA into the information age. At the same 

time, the PLA has modernized and improved upon its 

own psychological warfare operations and expanded 

the role for its legal scholars in justifying military 

action and territorial claims.

The PLA’s command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs support the ground forces, navy, 

air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and space 

warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on incorporating information technology and networked information operations. The PLA’s operational concepts 

for employing traditional signals intelligence and 

electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber 
vii

warfare; kinetic and cyber attacks on satellites; and 

information confrontation operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. In doing so, as Dr. Wortzel’s 

monograph explains, the PLA used innovative means 

to expand on Cold War Soviet doctrine on “radioelectronic combat,” which called for a combination 

of jamming and precision air, missile and artillery 

strikes on North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. 

The Chinese military, however, apparently intends to 

conduct these activities at the tactical, operational and 

strategic levels of war, envisioning attacks on an enemy’s homeland critical infrastructure and points of 

embarkation.

Along with these more technical aspects of information operations, the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the manipulation of public opinion, 

or media warfare; and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security 

position—or what China calls “legal warfare”—join 

together in a comprehensive information operations 

doctrine. This monograph explains how the PLA is 

revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees 

as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations” for 

the 21st century. An understanding of thee PLA’s new 

concepts are important for U.S. and allied military 

leaders and planners. 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LARRY M. WORTZEL is a retired U.S. Army colonel 

who spent much of his career in the Asia-Pacific region. 

He is a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission. After 3 years as a U.S. 

Marine, he joined the Army and trained in Mandarin 

Chinese. He was assigned as a signals intelligence 

collector in northeast Thailand for the Army Security 

Agency. He was commissioned in the infantry in 1973, 

and transferred to military intelligence in 1977. He 

served as assistant Army attaché in China from 1988 

to 1990 and was Army attaché in China from 1995 to 

1997. Dr. Wortzel was director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College from 1997 

to 1999. After retiring from the military, he served as 

Asian studies director and vice president at The Heritage Foundation. He has written or edited 11 books 

about China, as well as numerous policy papers and 

journal articles. This monograph is developed from 

his latest book, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese 

Military Power Goes Global (Potomac Books, Inc., 2013). 

Dr. Wortzel is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff 

College and the U.S. Army War College, and holds a 

Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii.
SUMMARY

On November 23, 2013, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air 

defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by 

the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by 

Japan, China, and Taiwan. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether 

China’s expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension 

in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new 

definition of China’s territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations 

attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA), the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect 

intellectual property and secrets from the PLA’s computer network operations.

The ADIZ announcement by China is an example 

of the PLA General Political Department engagement 

in what it calls “legal warfare,” part of the PLA’s “three 

warfares.” In expanding its ADIZ, China is stretching 

International Civil Aviation Organization regulations 

to reinforce its territorial claims over the Senkaku 

Islands. On another level, the Chinese government 

will use the ADIZ as a way to increase the airspace 

it can monitor and control off its coast; the Chinese 

government is already suing the navy and maritime 

law enforcement ships to enforce these claims at sea. 

Additionally, the PLA and the Chinese government 

have sent a major signal to Taiwan, demonstrating 

another aspect of the “three warfares.” When the Chinese Ministry of National Defense put its expanded 

ADIZ into effect, the new zone carefully avoided any 

infringement into Taiwan’s ADIZ, signaling that in 

x
xi

addition to the improved economic ties with Taiwan, 

there is room for political improvement across the 

Taiwan Strait.

The PLA spent more than a decade examining U.S. 

military publications on network-centric warfare and 

the evolution of American doctrine on information 

warfare. After observing American information operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the PLA 

saw the effect of modern information operations on 

the battlefield and in the international arena. The PLA 

then began to implement its own form of information 

warfare. The Chinese military has adopted information warfare concepts suited to its own organization 

and doctrine—blending its own traditional tactics, 

concepts from the Soviet military, and U.S. doctrine 

to bring the PLA into the information age. At the same 

time, the PLA has modernized and improved upon its 

own psychological warfare operations and expanded the role of its legal scholars in justifying military 

action and territorial claims.

The PLA’s command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs support the ground forces, navy, 

air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and space 

warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on incorporating information technology and networked information operations. The PLA’s operational concepts 

for employing traditional signals intelligence and 

electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber 

warfare; kinetic and cyber attacks on satellites; and information confrontation operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. As this monograph explains, the 

PLA used innovative means to expand on Cold War 

Soviet doctrine on “radio-electronic combat,” which 

called for a combination of jamming and precision air, 
missile, and artillery strikes on North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization forces. The Chinese military, however, 

apparently intends to conduct these activities at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, envisioning attacks on an enemy’s homeland critical infrastructure and points of embarkation.

Along with these more technical aspects of information operations, the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the manipulation of public opinion, 

or media warfare; and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security position, or what China calls “legal warfare,” join 

together in a comprehensive information operations 

doctrine. This monograph explains how the PLA is 

revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees 

as the new mode of “integrated, joint operations” 

for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA’s 

new concepts is important for U.S. and allied military 

leaders and planners.

xii
1

THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND INFORMATION WARFARE1

CHINA’S MILITARY IMPLEMENTS 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

spent a decade or so examining U.S. military publications on network-centric warfare and the evolution 

of American doctrine on information warfare. For a 

while, this was an all new and interesting theory to 

the PLA, but after observing American information 

operations in the Balkans and the first Gulf War, the 

PLA saw the effect of modern information operations 

on the battlefield and in the international arena. The 

PLA then began to implement its own form of information warfare. Over a 20-year period, the Chinese 

military has adopted information warfare concepts 

suited to its own organization and doctrine—blending 

its own traditional tactics, concepts from the Soviet 

military, and U.S. doctrine to bring the PLA into the 

information age. 

The PLA’s command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) programs support the ground forces, 

navy, air force, missile forces, nuclear doctrine, and 

space warfare. China’s military doctrine depends on 

incorporating information technology and networked 

information operations. The PLA’s warfighting concepts for employing signals intelligence and electronic warfare have expanded to include cyber warfare, 

attacks on satellites, and information confrontation 

operations (xinxi duikang zuozhan).2 Along with these 

more technical aspects of information operations, 

the PLA’s combination of psychological warfare; the 
2

manipulation of public opinion, or media warfare; 

and the manipulation of legal arguments to strengthen China’s diplomatic and security position, or what 

China calls “legal warfare,” join together in a comprehensive information operations doctrine.

INFORMATION AGE WARFARE AND 

INTEGRATED NETWORK 

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

In modern military operations, it is nearly impossible to find forms of military activity that do not in 

some way depend on information technology. Navigation and positioning is no longer done with compasses 

or sextants, maps, or charts; it is done with satellite 

broadcasts. Physical reconnaissance is complemented 

by electronic means and a range of sensors employed 

on land or in the in air, sea, and space. Information 

systems support logistics activities, such as resupply 

and refueling, and facilitate personnel and casualty 

management. Information technology and instantaneous data exchange provide commanders and deployed forces with a shared awareness of the battle 

area. In most military organizations, units that were 

engaged in signals intelligence collection and electronic warfare also have taken on the mission of cyber 

warfare and cyber penetration.

During World War II and into the Cold War, opposing forces used electronic warfare techniques 

such as jamming, imitative communications deception, and meaconing (the interception, alteration, and 

rebroacasting of navigation signals) to disrupt an 

adversary’s communication system and radar or to 

alter electromagnetic signals. In the information age, 

similar actions are possible, and cyber exploitation or 
3

attacks can supplement electronic warfare. This matters because operational concepts such as cooperative 

target engagement—in which different combat platforms in the air, on the sea, on land, or on submarine 

share data on a target and fire at it simultaneously 

from various directions with different weapons—are 

based on information systems being linked. These linkages, however, also create opportunities for systemswide attacks.

For the PLA, information warfare is directed at 

“the enemy’s information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision making systems.”3

 The goals are information superiority, disruption of the enemy information control 

capabilities, and maintaining one’s own information 

systems and capabilities. 

In the age of information operations, militaries that 

embrace information systems have begun to think 

about information dominance, or the ability to identify 

a range of threats against their own forces; to counter 

them; and to attack the enemy’s information systems.4

The PLA is working to create an information-based 

“system of systems operations capability that forms an 

all-inclusive master network.”5 This effort depends on 

the redundant national command-and-control architecture that the PLA began to develop in the 1990s. In 

July 1997, at an exhibition in the PLA Military History 

Museum in Beijing, the author observed an overlay 

for a national and theater-level automated commandand-control system. 

The PLA’s national command-and-control system 

is a redundant military region or theater of war networked system linking the General Staff Department 

headquarters and the PLA’s arms and services with 

regional combat headquarters and their subordinate 
4

major organizations. An Indian defense researcher described this Qu Dian system as using fiberoptic cable, 

high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications, microwave systems, and multiple satellites to 

enable the Central Military Commission, the General 

Staff Department, and commanders to communicate 

with forces in their theater of war on a real-time basis.6

 The system also permits data transfer among 

the headquarters and all the units under the PLA’s 

joint command. 

Leaders and military strategists in the PLA observed the transformation taking place in American 

and other Western military forces and worked hard to 

understand what was happening. The Chinese military moved steadily to take advantage of information 

technologies.7 In a New Year’s Day 2006 editorial, the 

PLA Daily reminded the armed forces to transform 

itself from a force that operates under mechanized 

conditions to one that operates under “informatized 

conditions.”8 Less than a month before this reminder, 

in a testimonial to Hu Jintao’s speech on the historic 

missions of the PLA, PLA Daily made it clear that the 

military had to “improve integrated combat operations capabilities under informatized conditions.”9

A range of military activities depends on how information technologies make military units and systems “interconnected.” But the PLA still is not fully 

able to connect various command posts at different 

levels of the military to the national level and to each 

other. Nor are all the arms and services of the PLA 

fully interconnected yet. The PLA’s goal is to create a 

“system of systems in operations” (ti xi zuozhan) that 

can coordinate activities across the military inside 

and between military regions, arms, and services.10

One objective of the effort is to develop a networked 
5

command-and-control system inside the PLA at the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, ultimately extending from the national command level 

to the soldier.11 It is clear, however, that China’s military ultimately envisions an information system or 

complex that can ensure that reconnaissance, electronic warfare, cyber systems, and combat strikes are 

integrated.12

In their book, The Science of Military Strategy, Peng 

Guangqian and Yao Yunzhu highlight the effectiveness of precision-guided weapons and information 

age technologies. They note that in the Gulf War, 

which depended a great deal on information systems, 

“precision-guided weapons made up only 7 percent 

of all weapons used by the U.S. military, but they destroyed 80 percent of important targets.”13 Further, 

Peng and Yao argue that “under high tech conditions, 

the outcome of war not only depends on the amount of 

resources, manpower and technology devoted to the 

battlefield,” but also on “the control of information on 

the battlefield.” Battle effectiveness, they maintain, is 

a function of the acquisition, transmission, and management of information.14

The PLA, however, moved into the information 

age from a less advantageous position than did the 

United States. For decades, military culture in China 

emphasized the importance of people, not equipment, 

in warfare and employed massed forces or weapons—the strengths China brought to bear in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam 

War.15 Although the PLA had electronic systems, it 

did not modernize a force with the intent to use and 

even depend on these systems. The educational base 

of the average soldier in the PLA is probably lower 

than that of American or European soldiers, and the 

same is still true of many PLA officers.
6

At all levels of the PLA, however, attitudes about 

the relative importance of technology in warfare are 

changing. As China’s military moves into the second 

decade of the 21st century, it is embracing the information age. The PLA is updating 20th-century mechanized and joint operations, and combining them with 

electronic warfare, warfare—what the PLA calls “firepower warfare”—and precision strike. In a book published by the PLA Academy of Military Science, Ye 

Zheng describes information age operations as “a new 

type of operations that are derived from the basis of 

mechanized operations moving from ‘platform-based 

operations’ to systematic operations and networkcentric operations.”16

Even though some PLA theorists argue that “the 

next 20 years are a period for China’s ‘peaceful rise,’ 

meaning that China should not threaten others,” this 

does not mean that China cannot be prepared to defend itself from aggression.17 Further, information age 

warfare involves the Global Information Grid, a term 

the U.S. National Security Agency uses to describe 

“interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing” information for warfighters and 

policymakers.18 For the PLA, this means connecting 

global command-and-control systems and global positioning satellites to provide data for strategic operations and theaters of war.19 Ultimately, however, PLA 

theorists acknowledge that warfare is about killing 

and destruction, “just as mechanization in war made 

war more destructive, information age warfare will allow fires to be more destructive.”20
7

First “Informatize,” then Network.

Setting the tone for wider implementation of the 

PLA’s “informatization,” the General Staff Department explains that the process will be both long and 

dynamic.21 The PLA must embrace information age 

operations in support of all forms of military operations: in creating space-, ground-, and service-based 

system networks by integrating electronic systems in 

military regions, and by establishing effective command organizations and structures that will “possess 

powerful capabilities with regard to mobile suppression of the enemy [jidong zhi di], long-range strikes 

[yuancheng daji], precisions support [jingque baozhang], 

and three-dimensional defense [quawei fanghu].”22

Space-based information networks are described 

as the “backbone” of any informatization effort for 

the PLA. Surface-based systems are the key elements 

of the effort, supported by air and sea platforms, and 

the “integrated ground air and space elements must 

be compatible with the various services and their surrounding regions.”23 The PLA also is concerned about 

such matters as bandwidth, which is the basis for the 

ability to support a high volume of transmissions and 

system survivability and to confront enemy information systems.24

An article in PLA Daily emphasized that today we 

are all living on a “smart planet,” which is interconnected, with economic, political, and cultural activities 

all available to see on information systems—allowing 

military forces to take advantage of this transparency 

on the battlefield.25 PLA strategists argue that “battlespace awareness is the core of information age warfare,” which means that one’s forces must be able to 

destroy or jam the adversary’s systems that are funda-
8

mental to situational awareness. Given this, PLA experts believe that “information age warfare will take 

place in a range of strategic battle-space: land, maritime, air, space, and ‘knowledge areas’.”26 

Using the same formula for decisionmaking in the 

information age relied on by the U.S. Armed Forces, 

Ye Zheng tells the PLA that the interaction of systems, 

platforms, communications, and decisions shortens 

the “OODA [observe, orient, decide, and act, or faxian, juece, jihua, xingdong] loop,” allowing a military 

to take action in real time.27 Moreover, as he explains, 

in information operations the traditional concepts of 

air, land, and sea battlespace expand to include the 

electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, and space, becoming “virtual battle space” (xu kong jian).28 The PLA 

defines this as “the space created by technology, computers and the ‘web’ [Internet] that is subject to human 

control and reflects human will.”29 Its components are 

cyberspace (saibo kongjian), information space (xinsi 

kongjian), and digital space (shuxue kongjian).

The truly distinguishing characteristic of operations in the information age in PLA doctrine, however, is that “information power and various types of 

firepower are merged” so that mobility and precision 

fires are integrated to increase their operational effects.30 Ultimately, the PLA must execute integrated 

operations combining computer network warfare, 

networked firepower warfare, electronic warfare, and 

sensor systems.

Part of the dilemma for the PLA, however, is to 

develop new cyber warfare doctrine appropriate for 

the PLA’s level of modernization, while at the same 

time taking advantage of the Chinese armed forces’ 

existing strengths in electronic warfare, electronic 

information gathering, precision attack, and massed 

firepower.31 
9

The PLA also lacks a deep reservoir of personnel 

who can manage or operate such systems. Chinese 

military leaders, however, recognize this weakness 

and intend to develop a talent pool of troops who can 

conduct or plan joint military operations, manage information systems and cyber technology, and use or 

maintain advanced weapon systems.32 The PLA’s goal 

is to have these personnel by 2020.

However, the degree to which individual units 

or combat platforms are truly integrated into a datasharing and command system varies in the PLA by 

service, branch, and arm. In major ground formations 

(infantry, armor, artillery), few units are networked 

below the regimental level. In the PLA Navy (PLAN), 

the majority of surface combatants and submarines 

have the communications and data-sharing capabilities to be networked, as do PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 

combat and support aircraft and Second Artillery 

Corps missile-firing battalions. By comparison, in the 

U.S. military, the networked C4ISR system extends to 

every major combat platform and organization—often 

down to the rifle squad or individual combat vehicle. 

All aircraft and ships are in the networked system. 

The GSD Communications Department calls for 

establishing five major networked systems:

1. Theater-level joint operational command communications and liaison subsystems that will synchronize broadband, multimedia information transmission.

2. Integrated processing subsystems for the operational command services such as message processing, 

mapping, simulations, and automated decisionmaking for peacetime, exercises, and wartime.

3. Fixed and mobile or portable theater reconnaissance and detection systems to improve intelligence, 
10

reconnaissance, detection, information processing, 

and the rapid relay of such information to other defense posts, ports, stations, and substations. These 

should be able to cover four levels of units: military 

regions, group army-level organizations, divisions or 

brigades, and regiments. They should include such 

arms as air defense and missile units.

4. Electronic countermeasures and intelligence 

database systems that can integrate and share electromagnetic intelligence among headquarters, service 

arms in a theater of war, command posts at different 

levels, and reconnaissance stations.

5. Theater subsystems for political work operations, logistics, equipment monitoring, managing information systems, and managing theater-level intelligence-integrated processing systems.33

The Communications Department, however, anticipates challenges in reaching its goals. One problem 

is that the PLA cannot include units at the lower echelons in its communication and data exchange information networks. For the ground forces, in 2004, the 

information network extended only to the regimental 

level. By 2013, battalion command posts seem to be 

included in the network. The PLA wants to integrate 

information attack, attacks on enemy C4ISR systems, 

and precision strikes in “integrated network electronic 

warfare [INEW],” discussed later in this monograph.34

In An Introduction to Informationalized Operations,

Ye Zheng explains that the PLA concept of informationalized operations means “networked firepower 

warfare employed across the domains of war.”35 The 

Chinese military realizes that integrated network 

electronic warfare attacks must be combined with integrated firepower warfare. This use of precision fires 

includes beyond-visual-range fires.36
11

To a great extent, when one analyzes the PLA’s 

INEW doctrine, it is similar to the concept of radioelectronic combat (REC) in Cold War-Soviet military 

doctrine.37 China’s military, however, has added additional dimensions to this older concept. Taking a cue 

from U.S. operations in Iraq and the Balkans, China has 

moved beyond the tactical and theater realm of operations to elevate integrated network electronic warfare 

to a strategic level of war. Also, the PLA has added cyber attacks and attacks on satellites, or space warfare, 

to its offensive operations. Dai Qingmin envisions future combat operations focusing on “the destruction 

and control of the enemy’s information infrastructure 

and strategic life blood, selecting key enemy targets, 

and launching effective network-electronic attacks.”38

In doing so, the PLA expects to weaken and paralyze 

an enemy’s decisionmaking and also to weaken and 

paralyze the political, economic, and military aspects 

of the enemy’s entire war potential. This suggests that 

INEW operations would take place within a theater of 

war but would also extend to an enemy’s homeland, 

including the civil infrastructure and the economy.39

The concepts applied by the PLA are derivatives of 

both Soviet and American doctrine, as discussed earlier. A major contribution from U.S. doctrine resulted 

from the PLA’s research into the U.S. Navy’s writings 

about network-centric warfare.40

One American researcher characterizes the PLA’s 

efforts at information age warfare as “a focused transformation of the nation’s mode of thinking” to integrate traditional and mechanized military operations 

into a “systems-oriented environment characterized 

by rapidly changing time-space relationships.”41 Just 

as INEW theory seems to have evolved from Chinese 

research into Soviet military doctrine, the PLA’s ideas 
12

on expanding REC to include information operations 

and space attacks were based on observations by China’s military thinkers of U.S. and allied operations in 

Iraq and Kosovo.42

This mode of thinking involved maintaining information superiority over an adversary; integrating 

air, ground, and naval warfare; and taking “command 

and control of forces as a major part of military science.”43 In essence, for the PLA, the information and 

communication networks of engaged forces became 

the focal point for the conduct of military operations, 

as well as for finding and engaging enemy forces. 

Wang Zhengde conceived it as “merging weapons, 

equipment, resources, operational structure, and information resources to enable operational troops to 

truly form a grand system that fully exploits overall 

effectiveness.”44

If we take Wang’s embrace of information warfare 

concepts as a barometer of how the PLA approached 

the concept, by 2007 the threads of integrated network 

electronic warfare begin to emerge. In the book, On 

Informationalized Confrontation, he explores warfare 

(or military confrontation) in the electronic realm (dianzi lingyu duikang). Wang argues that “both sides in 

any conflict want control of the electromagnetic spectrum,” making jamming and electronic countermeasures critical parts of military operations.45 Further, as 

the PLA and other militaries evolve in the information 

age and come to depend on networks, the PLA’s effort 

at informationalized confrontation evolves into “network confrontation operations,” in which each side in 

a conflict is seeking to immobilize the other’s communications, data, command, and sensor networks.46
13

INEW, Computer Network Warfare, 

and Strike. 

One way to understand what the PLA is doing to 

expand and modernize what it learned is to think of 

Soviet REC on Chinese steroids. That is, by combining electronic warfare and precision strikes and adding cyber warfare and attacks on space systems, the 

PLA believes it can improve operational success on 

the modern battlefield.47

China’s military strategists expand the Soviet concept further. Whereas the Soviet military applied REC 

to tactical situations in a limited battlespace or within 

a theater of operations, such as Europe, PLA military 

theorists introduce strategic attacks on an adversary’s 

homeland sustainment and supply systems. This new 

doctrine, as China’s armed forces envision it, extends 

across all levels of warfare, from the tactical battlefield 

to the theater of operations and to the strategic level 

of war. None of these effects can be achieved without 

the PLA realizing its objectives in integrated, or networked, operations.48

China’s military researchers are aware of the Soviet REC doctrine and acknowledge the goals that the 

Soviet military set for REC.49 In conceiving the REC 

concept during the Cold War, the Soviets expected 

their forces would inflict 60-percent casualties or combat damage on enemy forces through a combination 

of traditional electronic warfare and combat strikes 

by aircraft, helicopters, missiles, rockets, and artillery in the opening moves of any conflict.50 The Soviet 

military goal was to destroy “30 percent by jamming 

and 30 percent by destructive fires.”51 The U.S. Army 

described REC as “the total integration of EW [electronic warfare] and physical destruction resources to 
14

deny us the use of our electronic systems.”52 Chinese 

researchers imply that in the information age, by adding in cyber warfare and attacks on space systems, the 

PLA can improve on the Soviet casualty ratios, even if 

they do not give specific numbers.53

Soviet REC was part of a broader operational campaign. Soviet forces intended to employ radio-direction finding, signals and radar intercept, and artillery 

radars to attack U.S. troop formations and headquarters—in addition to electronic systems to support 

strikes by artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, and 

rockets or missiles. Among some of the measures included in Soviet REC operations were suppressive 

fires, jamming an adversary’s communications assets, 

deceptively entering an adversary’s radio nets, and 

interfering with the normal flow of an adversary’s 

communications.54

Starting in the 1970s, the American response to 

Soviet doctrine, in the event of war in Europe, was 

AirLand Battle, an integrated attack plan using airpower, special operations forces, artillery, armor, and 

electronic warfare.55 The United States also employed 

AirLand Battle doctrine in the Gulf War during the 

campaign to drive the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, a 

campaign that the PLA studied with intense interest.56

Ultimately, the PLA rolled all these concepts into 

what it now terms “integrated network electronic 

warfare,” or INEW. On the information systems side 

of China’s INEW planning, Ye Zheng discusses integrated network information attack (wangdian yiti xinxi 

gongji) as integrating electronic warfare and computer 

warfare to destroy the enemy’s information systems 

and to preserve one’s own.57 Other PLA operations experts, however, expand the concept to include attacking and destroying enemy equipment and personnel, 
15

bringing the PLA’s doctrine in line with the way that 

the Soviet Union conceived REC doctrine.

Chinese military thinkers built on the American 

concept of network-centric warfare to introduce concepts such as precision weapon strikes and the use of 

space-based and battlefield sensors with the goal of 

moving away from what one Chinese strategist called 

“obsolete and rigid conceptual thinking.”58 Unlike 

the Soviet publications on REC, Chinese publications 

do not give explicit estimates of battle casualties. As 

explained by Major General Dai Qingmin, then director of the PLA General Staff Department’s Electronic 

Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures Department 

(Dianzi Duikang/Leida Bu, aka, the Fourth Department), the operational concepts are similar. However, 

the PLA expands on and modernizes REC doctrine 

by including “the integrated use of electronic warfare 

and computer network warfare . . . to paralyze an opponent’s information systems.”59 These concepts are 

incorporated into military exercises, including “forceon-force” confrontation, in which a “red” unit, representing the PLA, is in confrontation with a “blue” 

unit, representing the enemy—an advanced military 

force capable of operating at the highest levels of 

information age warfare.60

INEW is a “systems-versus-systems” form of 

military confrontation on the 21st-century battlefield, 

dependent on space, cyber, and various information 

technologies.61 One objective is to destroy the enemy’s 

C4ISR, to blind the enemy and prevent enemy forces 

and commanders from communicating. But the PLA 

also wants to inflict battlefield casualties on an enemy 

force and to disrupt logistics, resupply, and personnel systems in the enemy’s homeland so that combat 
16

losses cannot be restored and the deployed force cannot sustain battle. As Dai Qingmin states: 

after the information attack succeeds in suppressing 

the enemy, the enemy’s plight of temporary ‘blindness, deafness, and even paralysis’ can be exploited for 

the quick organization of an ‘information/firepower’ 

assault.62

Dai advocates integrating “soft and hard attacks,” 

employing information suppression, information 

warfare, and the firepower of missiles.”63

Other cyber warfare strategists, such as Xu Rongsheng, chief of cyber security research at the Chinese 

Academy of Sciences, writes that in wartime, cyber 

warfare should be targeted to “disrupt and damage 

the networks of infrastructure facilities, such as power 

systems, telecommunications systems, and educational systems.”64 This approach is not something new in 

the PLA; the two PLA senior colonels who wrote the 

book, Unrestricted Warfare, introduced these concepts 

in 1999.65 However, it took people like Dai Qingmin 

to formalize these ideas as military doctrine. As for 

those Western-based specialists on China and journalists who dismissed Unrestricted Warfare when it was 

published because it was written by two PLA political 

commissars, it should be noted that by 2011, one of 

them (Qiao Liang) was a major general at the PLAAF 

Command College.

Cyber Warfare.

PLA military thinkers include cyber warfare as 

part of information age warfare. Cyber warfare takes 

place in the electromagnetic spectrum; thus, there is a 

good deal of conceptual and operational overlap with 
17

traditional electronic warfare. These operations are 

designed to penetrate, exploit, and perhaps damage 

or sabotage, through electronic means, an adversary’s 

“information systems and networks, computers and 

communications systems, and supporting infrastructures.”66 As outlined above, cyber operations are a 

component of INEW. Cyber operations also are closely 

linked to operations in space and to traditional forms 

of espionage or information-gathering. Indeed, most 

thinking about cyber warfare in China is “an extension of its traditional strategic thinking.”67

China, like other states, is heavily involved in 

computer network operations. They are conducted 

primarily for five reasons:

1. To strengthen political and economic control in 

China; 

2. To complement other forms of intelligence collection and gather economic, military, or technology 

intelligence and information; 

3. To reconnoiter, map, and gather targeting information in foreign military, government, civil infrastructure, or corporate networks for later exploitation 

or attack; 

4. To conduct the exploitation or attacks using the 

collected information; and,

5. To develop defenses or conduct defensive operations in the PLA (and China’s) own cyber systems.68

With respect to strengthening political and economic control in China, skilled computer operators 

exploit computer systems to gain information about 

what political dissidents say, how they use the World 

Wide Web, and with whom they communicate. The 

organizations in China most likely to engage in these 

activities, however, are those responsible for internal 
18

security, repression, and control of the Chinese population, and control over the distribution of information. These are the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the system of Public 

Security Bureaus and People’s Armed Police the MPS 

oversees, and organizations of the Communist Party 

such as the Central Propaganda Department.69 Still, 

the PLA has the expertise to conduct such operations 

and is sometimes involved.70

The second type of malicious activity, essentially, 

is intelligence gathering designed to collect information of military, technical, scientific, or economic 

value. Gathering this intelligence information may 

speed the development and fielding of weapons in 

China and improve technology in sectors of China’s 

industries while saving time and money in research 

and development; it often compromises valuable intellectual property. The organizations of the Chinese 

government with the missions and capabilities to 

conduct such activities span both military and civilian agencies in China, to include the PLA’s Technical 

Reconnaissance Department (aka Signals Intelligence, 

or the Third Department), the Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic Countermeasures Department 

(aka the Fourth Department), the Ministry of State 

Security, and the state-owned companies in China’s 

broad military-industrial complex.71 Foreign business 

visitors to China with whom the author has had contact also have reported that in some localities Public 

Security Bureau personnel have cooperated with local 

authorities to gather information of economic value.

Reconnoitering, mapping, and gathering targeting information in foreign military, government, civil 

infrastructure, or corporate networks for later exploitation or attack may be the most dangerous cyber 
19

activity for American national security. This is where 

foreign intelligence or military services penetrate the 

computers that control our vital national infrastructure or our military, reconnoiter them electronically, 

and map or target nodes in the systems for future 

penetration or attack. Malicious code is often left behind to facilitate future entry. Regarding this third 

type of computer network penetration by China, the 

danger is that it could lead to a devastating computer 

attack. General James Cartwright, then commander 

of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and 

recently vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

said, “I don’t think the [United States] has gotten its 

head around the issue yet, but I think that we should 

start to consider that [effects] associated with a cyberattack could, in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon 

of mass destruction.”72

General Cartwright testified in 2007 before the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that China is actively engaging in cyber reconnaissance by probing the computer networks of U.S. 

Government agencies as well as private companies.73

A denial-of-service attack by China has the potential 

to cause cataclysmic harm if conducted against the 

United States on a large scale; it could paralyze critical infrastructure or military command and control. 

China currently is thought by many analysts to have 

the world’s largest denial-of-service capability.74 In 

2010 former National Security Agency director and 

director of National Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell reinforced General Cartwright’s admonition. 

He argued that just as during the Cold War, when the 

United States aimed to protect itself against nuclear 

attack, today it must endeavor to protect its “power 

grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunica-
20

tions, and water filtration systems” against the chaos 

that could result from successful cyber attacks.75

PLA Lieutenant General Liu Jixian, of the PLA’s 

Academy of Military Science, writes that the PLA must 

develop asymmetrical capabilities against potential 

enemies, including space-based information support 

and networked-focused “soft attack.”76 Xu Rongsheng 

told a Chinese news reporter that: 

cyber warfare may be carried out in two ways. In 

wartimes, disrupt and damage the networks of infrastructure facilities, such as power systems, telecommunications systems, and education systems, in a 

country; or in military engagements, the cyber technology of the military forces can be turned into combat 

capabilities.77

Other military strategists from China’s military 

academies and schools of warfare theory have suggested that the PLA ought to have the capability to 

alter information in military command-and-control 

or logistics systems to deceive U.S. forces on resupply 

missions or divert supplies. They say it also should be 

able to paralyze ports and airports by cyber or precision-weapon attacks on critical infrastructure.78

Although armed conflict between the United States 

and China is not a certainty, a cyber war already is under way, and besides penetrations for intelligence collection, there are regular attacks on the United States 

from sites in China.79 PLA organizations are being 

trained and prepared in military doctrine to “expand 

the types of targets or objectives for armed conflict to 

command-and-control systems, communications systems and infrastructure.”80 Military strategist Wang 

Pufeng argues that “battlefield situational awareness 

is the core of information age warfare, which means 
21

that one must be able to destroy or jam the systems 

that are fundamental to [an adversary’s] situational 

awareness.”81

With regard to information warfare, Wang Baocun, one of the leading information warfare specialists 

in the Chinese military, reminds readers in China that 

“the global information grid and global commandand-control systems are fundamental to the American 

defense system, including global positioning satellites.”82 Other Chinese military publications suggest 

that to be successful in information age warfare, one’s 

own military must have certain capabilities and must 

be able to interfere with an adversary’s ability to exploit the results of “reconnaissance, thermal imaging, 

ballistic missile warning, and radar sensing.”83

PLA Responsibilities and Cyber Penetrations, 

Exploitation, Espionage, and Warfare.

In terms of organizations, the PLA has divided responsibility for the conduct of electronic warfare, electronic defense, the collection of signals intelligence, 

and cyber operations. Notwithstanding the divided 

responsibilities, the Chinese military is well equipped 

and staffed to conduct such activities.84

The Third Department (Technical Reconnaissance 

Department, or Jishu Zhencha Bu) of the PLA’s General 

Staff Department is responsible for technology reconnaissance, or signals collection, exploitation, and analysis, as well as communications security for the PLA.85

The Third Department is often compared to the U.S. 

National Security Agency. Third Department intelligence officers are trained for various forms of electronic 

warfare and electronic espionage, but they apparently 

are also trained for similar activities in the realm of 

cyber operations. 
22

The GSD’s Fourth Department (Electronic Warfare and Electronic Countermeasures Department) 

is responsible for offensive electronic warfare and 

electronic countermeasures, such as the jamming 

and counter-jamming of various types of signals or 

communications.86 Fourth Department personnel 

are skilled in electronic warfare and, according to a 

Northrop Grumman Corporation study, they are also 

probably charged with cyber penetrations.87

Given the Third Department’s analytical and language capabilities, its personnel probably analyze and 

exploit the cyber information gathered in Fourth Department offensive actions. Each of China’s military 

regions, as well as the PLAAF, PLAN, and Secondary 

Artillery Force (SAF), has assigned to its headquarters 

department at least one technical reconnaissance bureau subordinate to the Third Department that monitors foreign communications (and cyber activity).88 In 

addition to the technical reconnaissance bureaus assigned to the military regions, Project 2049 Institute 

also documents more Third Department organizations, including three research institutes, four operational centers, and twelve operational bureaus that 

have a regional or functional orientation. This orientation can monitor phone, radio, satellite, or computer 

communications.89 In the military regions, arms, and 

services, the technical research bureau alignment is:

• Beijing: 1

• Chengdu: 2

• Guangzhou: 1

• Jinan: 1

• Lanzhou: 2

• Nanjing: 2

• Shenyang: 1

• PLAAF: 3
23

• PLAN: 2

• SAF: 190

Penetrations of U.S. Government agencies and 

defense contractors attributed to organizations in 

China had been detected for some time prior to the 

2006 penetration. The National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) suffered a series of other 

breaches attributed to Russia and China.91 In Time 

magazine, one author opened the door on a series of 

Chinese breaches of U.S. Government and industry 

systems, introducing the efforts of a computer specialist who tracked breaches into Department of Energy 

systems—“following the e-trail to China.”92 But cyber 

penetrations traced back to China have plagued U.S. 

contractors and agencies for a year or so before this. 

A second Time article explained how a computer security analyst at a Department of Energy facility, Sandia National Laboratory, traced computer attacks and 

penetrations he detected to Guangdong Province.93

Guangzhou Military Region, which includes Guangdong Province, is the site of another of the PLA’s technical reconnaissance regiments. 

It is difficult at times to distinguish the origin of a 

cyber attack or penetration, and attribution of a cyber 

operation is not always possible. The PLA may be acting through its Third or Fourth Departments or the 

Ministry of State Security may be acting. The origin 

might be from groups known as “patriotic hackers” 

(even if the PLA sometimes uses such groups), or it 

could be some company or organization in China engaged in electronic espionage.94 That said, it is clear 

that in terms of its military doctrine and approaches 

to modern warfare—whether one calls it the informational, electromagnetic, or cyber domain of war—the 

PLA has embraced the medium. 
24

Three former U.S. officials—Admiral McConnell; 

Michael Chertoff, former secretary of Homeland Security; and William Lynn, former deputy secretary 

of defense—said in a January 2012 Wall Street Journal 

opinion piece that “the Chinese government has a national policy of espionage in cyberspace. In fact, the 

Chinese are the world’s most active and persistent 

practitioners of cyber espionage today.” They pointed 

out in the same op-ed that “it is more efficient for the 

Chinese to steal innovations and intellectual property 

than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.”95

Further, there are very clear linkages between 

China’s traditional espionage efforts against military 

technologies and the targets of cyber espionage; the 

target sets are roughly the same. The U.S. Department 

of Justice has prosecuted a number of cases in which 

long-term Chinese agents working for defense companies sent back to China information on naval propulsion systems, naval electronic control systems, and 

stealth aircraft design. For the most part, these agents 

were convicted of economic espionage—violation of 

laws prohibiting the transfer of military-related information to China.96 These are some of the same targets 

of Chinese cyber espionage.

In a 2011 report, the U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), an agency subordinate to the 

Directorate of National Intelligence, made the point 

that cyberspace is unique because it provides foreign 

intelligence “collectors with relative anonymity, facilitates the transfer of vast amounts of information, and 

makes it more difficult for victim and governments to 

assign blame by masking geographic locations.”97 The 

Directorate added that “Chinese actors are the world’s 

most active and persistent perpetrators of economic 

espionage.”98 The Northrop Grumman Corporation, 
25

in a second report for the U.S. China Economic and 

Security Review Commission in 2012, suggests that 

when “highly technical defense engineering information, operational military data, or government policy 

analysis is the target of a cyber penetration from China,” it probably is not the act of a criminal group.99

According to The Washington Post, China has managed to gather data on “more than two dozen major 

weapons systems” by breaching design data stored on 

computers.100 The compromises reportedly included 

information on Patriot anti-missile and air defense 

systems, the V-22 Osprey aircraft, the Navy’s Littoral 

Combat Ship and F/A-18 fighter, and the F-35 strike 

fighter, among other systems. One computer security 

firm, Mandiant, in a report on computer threats, reported that on average, companies go 243 days with 

attackers on their networks extracting information before detecting the activity.101 In a report on a detailed 

investigation it conducted on one PLA Technical Reconnaissance Bureau unit based in Shanghai, the 61398 

unit, Mandiant exposed the identities of several of the 

unit’s soldiers involved in hacking U.S. systems.102

These reports make it clear that besides a robust cyber 

and electronic warfare program, the PLA is supporting China’s national defense, science, and technology 

development through cyber espionage.

Implications for the United States.

Considering how China is approaching war and 

the electromagnetic spectrum, the PLA is a worldclass player in the cyber domain. China’s cyber warriors have been able to penetrate computer systems, 

steal or manipulate data, and engage in electronic 

warfare on a global basis. The governments of the 
26

United States, Australia, Japan, Germany, and Great 

Britain, to name a few, all have tracked cyber penetrations back to China. Much of this activity, given the 

nature of the defense-related systems that are being 

exploited, probably traces back to the PLA or goes to 

support defense production in China that helps the 

PLA. In addition, military publications in China make 

it clear that the PLA intends to use computer network 

operations in conflicts, along with integrated network 

electronic warfare. 

PLA military planners and strategists are aware 

of the strengths and weaknesses in China’s armed 

forces. There are limitations of how far the PLA, especially the PLA Army, can go in embracing information systems. PLA leaders understand that given the 

education base of many of the soldiers brought into 

the PLA, not every soldier will be able to function in 

a fully automated, computer-driven environment, nor 

will all soldiers be able to use or even have access to 

information systems. Still, the PLA is doing an excellent job of adapting these technologies to its forces. 

Moreover, China’s military thinkers are developing 

their own doctrine and no longer depend on what 

they see happening in the U.S. Armed Forces or other 

militaries.

Two decades ago, in the wake of the U.S.-led coalition action in Iraq, the PLA realized that its military 

was not ready to take on a modern adversary that 

used networked C4ISR systems. For almost a decade, 

virtually all of the publications from PLA institutions 

quoted from or cited American military doctrine or 

manuals. Beginning in the mid-2000s, however, Chinese military thinkers began to develop indigenous 

doctrine on information systems and operations in the 

information age. Moreover, the PLA is fielding equip-
27

ment, satellites, and communications systems to support information age operations. 

The transition to information age operations has 

not reached down into every level of the PLA. In the 

SAC, it appears that full automation, information 

flows, and data flows only extend down to the missilefiring brigades.103 But one can be sure that individual 

missile batteries can take advantage of limited data 

links and satellite-based timing and positioning data. 

In the PLAN, all of the major combat ships are networked and can share data. In the PLAAF, a majority 

of newer fighter aircraft are able to share data and be 

part of an information system managed by the PLA’s 

own airborne early-warning aircraft. For the ground 

forces, automation and information age systems appear to have penetrated down to the regimental level. 

By comparison, in the U.S. military, data exchange and 

situational awareness extend to squads and weapon 

crews—in some cases to individual Soldiers, Sailors, 

Marines or Airmen. 

Some in the PLA believe that because the United 

States operates its forces over extended distances and 

depends on satellites and information systems, it has 

a weakness that can be exploited in conflict. They take 

comfort in the fact that the PLA does not depend as 

much on information sharing as does the U.S military. 

But what the PLA sees as one of its strengths is becoming a weakness, because as Chinese forces depend 

more on information systems, they become more vulnerable to interference, manipulation, and jamming. 

In a notional assessment of how the PLA could 

exploit some of the weaknesses it sees in the U.S. dependence on information systems, researchers at the 

Northrop Grumman Corporation point out weaknesses in the unclassified Internet systems used by the 

U.S. armed forces.104 The U.S. military operates two 
28

forms of Internet protocols. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is part of the Defense 

Data Network, wich carries classified information. So 

far, Department of Defense (DoD) authorities do not 

believe that it has been penetrated. The Non-secure 

Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) carries 

sensitive, but unclassified, information. It has suffered 

a number of penetrations, many of which have been 

traced back to China. PLA publications consistently 

identify “U.S. logistics and C4ISR systems as the most 

important centers of gravity to target in a conflict.”105

Unfortunately, vital logistical, personnel, and 

unit movement data are all carried on the nonsecure 

NIPRNET, and this network likely already has been 

mapped and penetrated by the PLA. This leaves the 

U.S. military open for exploitation by PLA forces in the 

event of a conflict. The PLA’s emphasis on surprise, 

striking the enemy’s center of gravity, and achieving 

information superiority means that in the event of a 

conflict, the PLA would likely initiate cyber and electronic warfare first, in the Asia-Pacific region, in the 

United States, and around the globe.

The PLA is not solely focused on information superiority in the cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. 

The General Political Department (GPD)—often in coordination with the Communist Party’s International 

Liaison Department, its Propaganda Department, and 

military intelligence—also has modernized traditional 

propaganda and psychological operations for wars in 

the information age. 

The United States also must think through how 

it intends to respond to the PLA’s cyber operations. 

Defensive measures are important, but, increasingly, 

Congress and American companies are discussing the 

potential for offensive cyber operations designed to 

disrupt the networks of attackers and of “honeypots,” 
29

or traps designed to lure in a hacker and either allow 

the attacker to extract bad information or to attack the 

hacker’s system. 

THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 

AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The GPD is broadly responsible for Communist 

Party political and ideological training in the PLA. 

That covers a wide range of activities, from building 

troop morale through cultural shows, movies, the arts, 

and literature, to supporting museums and sports activities.106 More importantly for the PLA and the Communist Party’s internal security, the GPD serves as a 

personnel department, controlling dossiers on the political reliability of troops and officers, their training 

records, their security clearances, and their promotions. Internally, framing and molding public opinion 

through the media also falls to the GPD.107 This department works closely with other Communist Party 

organizations, especially the International Liaison Department, the Propaganda Department, and the Organization Department—a central Chinese Communist 

Party organization that keeps track of the careers, advancement, and personnel dossiers of 70 million party 

members. In some cases, the GPD also works hand 

in hand with the PLA’s Second Department (Military 

Intelligence). 

As if the GPD’s responsibilities were not broad 

enough, in 2003, the Communist Party’s Central 

Committee and the Central Military Commission approved a new warfare concept for the PLA, the “three 

warfares” (san zhong zhanfa, generally abbreviated in 

Chinese as san zhan).108 These are: (1) public opinion 

(media) warfare (yulun zhan); (2) psychological war-
30

fare (xinli zhan); and, (3) legal warfare (falu zhan).

109

The PLA Daily makes it clear that the three warfares 

doctrine is part of the PLA regulations for the conduct 

of “political work.”110 These three forms of political or 

information warfare can be performed in unison or 

separately, bringing into harmony the PLA’s actions, 

the intent of the Communist Party, and the goals of 

the senior party leadership.

In the public opinion (or media) warfare effort, the 

PLA wants to influence both domestic and international public opinion in ways that build support for 

China’s own military operations, while undermining 

any justification for an adversary who is taking actions 

counter to China’s interests. In the conduct of psychological warfare, the PLA seeks to undermine the will 

of foreign civil populations and the enemy’s ability to 

conduct combat operations. The PLA’s psychological 

warfare goals are to demoralize both enemy military 

personnel and their countrymen at home. In legal 

warfare, the PLA seeks to use international law and 

domestic law to justify its own actions and assert its 

interests while it undermines the case for an adversary’s actions. Legal warfare also tries to establish an 

argument by precedent in customary international 

law for China’s position on an issue, when possible, 

by tying the matter to domestic law in China.111

Media (Public Opinion) Warfare.112

The idea in public-opinion warfare is to use all 

forms of media to influence both domestic and international public opinion on the rectitude of China’s 

policies and actions. This includes newspapers, television, radio, social media, and the use of front organizations to convey messages to foreigners. Some of 
31

these activities are close to traditional propaganda 

operations, but others border on sophisticated deception operations or perception management.113 In this 

sense, psychological warfare and media warfare have 

similarities. 

Inside China, the PLA (and the Communist Party) want to guide public opinion to conform to party 

policy and objectives, and to ensure that workers, the 

intelligentsia, and the populace understand and embrace the party’s line on matters. When aimed at Taiwan, media warfare efforts are designed to promote a 

“united front” between the citizens of Taiwan and the 

Chinese Communist Party on specific policy issues. 

The Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and the GPD take the lead on Taiwan-related 

“united front” operations. 

Internationally, media warfare efforts seek to 

counter the dominance (hegemony) of the Western 

media, while promoting the Communist Party’s positions and views. These efforts are increasingly sophisticated and include such measures as inserting paid 

advertisements, written like news articles from Chinese publications, into American or other target foreign newspapers. In assessing this phenomenon, the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2011 report to Congress noted as an example 

that China Daily, a Communist Party–affiliated stateowned newspaper, paid for inserts in newspapers 

such as The Washington Post and The New York Times. 

The insert made the argument that one-party rule in 

China benefits both American and Chinese economic 

policies because it keeps harmony in Chinese society 

and keeps the steady production of goods at cheap 

prices for the U.S. economy.114 The obvious objective 

of such advertising efforts is to attempt to discourage 
32

Americans and their elected representatives from putting any emphasis on human rights in China.

China Central Television (CCTV) also has a number of stations operating overseas—broadcasting in 

the native language of the host country and in Chinese—carrying the targeted messages of the Chinese 

Communist Party. Often these broadcasts feature 

military shows depicting PLA exercises or training 

and military life, documentaries on China’s military 

history, and features that highlight how the PLA is 

contributing to international peace and stability. 

In the broader national realm of perception management and image shaping, an initiative by the 

Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

Ministry of Education to establish Confucius Institutes in foreign universities around the globe with 

funding from China is another sophisticated example 

of public opinion warfare that seeks to “use foreigners as a bridge” to promote and convey the message 

of the Chinese government and Communist Party. 

The institutes provide services, such as language and 

cultural instruction, on the campuses and in the communities where they are located. Some Americans, 

however, argue that Confucius Institutes are a way to 

engage in “soft power diplomacy,” shaping opinions 

about China.115

Turning back to the PLA, one way the PLA contributes to perception management and image shaping is through senior officers’ visits to other countries. 

Senior Chinese military leaders visiting the United 

States often use speeches and other forms of public 

diplomacy to develop themes consistent with China’s 

defense and security interests. For example, when 

PLA General Chen Bingde, the chief of the General 
33

Staff Department, delivered a speech in the United 

States in May 2011, he emphasized China’s peaceful 

military tradition and the need for the United States 

to respect China’s “core interests,” such as its control 

over Taiwan.116

Another tactic in media warfare is to open for selective study the parts of the PLA that help deliver 

the message that the GPD and the Propaganda Department want delivered to foreign audiences while 

concealing other areas of PLA activity. This effort is 

designed to influence foreign observers’ perceptions 

of China in a way that serves the purposes of the 

Communist Party and PLA. Domestically, the effort is 

designed to reinforce stability and Communist Party 

control around China. 

One way that the GPD seeks to shape messages 

to foreigners is to sponsor visits to China by foreign 

groups with military affiliations, by military retirees, 

and by veterans groups—visits that include tours and 

contact with selected PLA personnel. The group that 

is often used as a proprietary organization for such 

activities is the China Association for International 

Friendly Contact (CAIFC). CAIFC is controlled by the 

GPD, but it also works closely with the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and 

the PLA’s Military Intelligence Department in choosing its foreign targets. The author accompanied American groups invited or sponsored by CAIFC around 

China while he was a military attaché in the 1980s 

and 1990s. American targets included business people 

involved in heavy industry, electronics, aviation or 

defense, and leaders of veterans organizations. Invariably, on the Chinese side, the escorts came from the 

PLA’s Military Intelligence Department.117 The GPD 

maintains its own liaison department, subordinate to 

which is an intelligence bureau and the CAIFC.118
34

One recent propaganda and perception management initiative by the GPD and CAIFC involved a 

multiyear program to bring retired senior U.S. generals and admirals to China to meet with their retired 

PLA counterparts. In the Sanya Initiative, the meetings took place in the town of Sanya on Hainan Island, 

which has a climate similar to Hawaii’s.119 The lead 

for the Chinese side was General Xiong Guangkai, the 

former PLA chief of military intelligence.120 The Sanya 

Initiative sought to soften the views of the U.S. military toward China and to influence the United States 

to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. The American participants reportedly were encouraged to return home and 

meet with active military leaders, informing them of 

what they learned from the trip. 

Media warfare, or public opinion warfare, generally is targeted against both domestic and foreign 

audiences. Both audiences are influenced to adopt the 

main line from the Chinese Communist Party’s Liaison Department and GPD, sometimes acting through 

the latter’s “loose” cover organization, CAIFC. 

Psychological Warfare.

The second of the three forms of warfare has a 

longer history and primarily targets enemies and potential adversaries. Psychological warfare has been a 

central responsibility of the GPD since it was established. The PLA targeted Nationalist forces and the 

Japanese with psychological operations and also used 

them in the Korean War. The PLA believes that this 

form of warfare serves national defense. It targets the 

adversary’s will to fight and is designed to lower the 

efficiency of enemy forces by creating dissent, disaffection, and dissatisfaction in their ranks.121
35

Historically in China, psychological operations involved the use of stratagem (moulue) and deception. In 

its psychological warfare operations, the PLA may target an enemy’s values, its motivation for fighting, and, 

in peacetime or wartime, the logic of an adversary’s 

foreign policy, security policy, or national decisions.122

In this sense, psychological operations may target an 

adversary’s civil populace and its leaders, as well as 

military personnel. Historically, psychological warfare operations also were intended to divide alliances. 

The PLA’s objectives were to cause an adversary’s allies to take a neutral position or become disaffected 

from the ally. This is still the focus of psychological 

operations today. 

Quoting a former U.S. military attaché to China, 

one study sums up the means and methods of PLA 

psychological operations this way: 

Political signals may be sent through (1) public or private diplomacy at international organizations, such 

as the United Nations, and/or directly to other governments or persons; (2) the use of the Chinese and 

foreign media in official statements or opinion pieces 

written by influential persons; (3) nonmilitary actions, 

such as restrictions on travel or trade; or (4) by using 

military demonstrations, exercises, deployments, or 

tests, which do not involve the use of deadly force.”123

In an analysis of the PLA’s psychological warfare 

operations, Mark Stokes, a former U.S. Air Force attaché in China, quotes PLA strategist Yu Guohua, stating in China Military Science that the PLA: 

should sap the enemy’s morale, disintegrate their will 

to fight, ignite the anti-war sentiment among citizens 

at home, heighten international and domestic conflict, 

weaken and sway the will to fight among its high level 
36

decision makers, and in turn lessen their superiority in 

military strength.124

When the PLAN or the maritime or coastal patrol 

organizations in China stage incidents with foreign 

navies or fishing fleets, they are engaging in psychological operations. Such actions intimidate neighbors 

and other claimants to disputed territories, whether in 

the South China Sea or the East China Sea. By creating 

the impression that acting counter to China’s interests 

or desires may cause China to use force, the PLA is 

able to dissuade or deter an adversary without resorting to combat.

In 1996, just before the presidential election in Taiwan, the PLA engaged in a major psychological warfare operation that, at the same time, was a display of 

military force and a warning to Taiwan not to go too 

far in moves toward democracy and independence. 

China did not want to see Lee Teng-hui become the 

first popularly elected president of Taiwan. Chinese 

military officers sought to meet with foreign military 

attachés in Beijing, including the author, to tell them 

that if the election went to Lee, it could mean immediate war. The PLA then conducted a series of military 

exercises off the Taiwan coast, firing ballistic missiles 

into preannounced impact zones at sea in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, conducting an amphibious 

exercise, and leading artillery practice. Before the exercises, the PLA announced to international shipping 

and aviation that certain areas of airspace and the sea 

would be danger zones because of the exercises and 

that all aircraft and ships should avoid them.125 The 

PLA’s choice of the impact zones, which bracketed 

Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, had the effect of a temporary blockade or embargo of shipping and air travel 

to Taiwan.
37

Beijing’s message to the people of Taiwan was, 

“Vote the wrong way, and you face a missile attack.” 

To other countries, especially the United States, which 

has encouraged free elections in Taiwan, the message 

was that Taiwan was a major concern of China and if 

events went the wrong way, China would use military 

force. 

Unfortunately for the PLA and the Communist 

Party leadership, this psychological warfare campaign backfired. On March 23, 1996, Lee became the 

first democratically elected president of Taiwan, with 

54 percent of the vote. When the PLA missile-firing exercises began on March 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton 

announced that two U.S. carrier battle groups would 

be dispatched to the area around Taiwan. The carriers stayed in the area throughout the PLA exercises, 

which ended on March 25, 1996, after Taiwan’s presidential election.126

The PLA sees psychological warfare as an integral 

part of the three warfares and modern information 

operations. Chinese legal scholars and members of the 

GPD also are active in what the PLA has named “legal 

warfare.” 

Preparation for War and Legal Warfare.

While students of warfare are thinking through 

Beijing’s military doctrine in space, other Chinese 

strategists and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate on how traditional ideas of sovereignty 

and the laws of war apply in space. The authoritative PLA book, The Science of Military Strategy, puts 

the legal aspects of the three warfares at the top of 

its means to “influence and restrict international law 

and the conduct of modern war.” The PLA sees war as 
38

a struggle in the military, political, economic, diplomatic, and legal domains. For the PLA, “international 

law is a powerful weapon to expose the enemy, win 

over sympathy and support of the international community [for China], and to strive to gain the position 

of strategic initiative.” The Science of Military Strategy 

further argues that one must: 

publicize one’s own humanitarianism and reveal a 

lot of the war crimes committed by the opponent in 

violation of law so as to win over universal sympathy 

and support from the international community . . . to 

compel [the] opponent to bog down in isolation and 

passivity.127

Those who follow China’s military development 

cannot ignore this area of PLA activity. Often the arguments are nuanced and ahead of international customary law in an effort to establish a legal precedent 

for China’s actions or policies. With respect to actions 

in the global commons such as the seas, international 

airspace, outer space, and cyberspace, the legal warfare precedents and arguments in China imply that, 

before using military force, China would telegraph its 

intentions or justify its planned operations through 

public opinion operations or legal action. 

One authoritative volume on the military legal system, The New Revolution in Military Affairs and Building 

a Military Legal System (Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi 

Fazhi Jianshe), explored the importance of ensuring 

that the PLA sets out legal justifications for military 

actions in advance of any conflict.128 The essays in this 

volume imply that even now, as debates take place in 

China over the range of sovereignty and China’s authority in the South China Sea or in space, the GPD of 

the PLA is developing ways to justify in domestic law 
39

its potential military actions. The ultimate objective is 

to establish positions in domestic law that can be used 

to create a precedent or to have an impact in the future 

on international law and international opinion. 

One reason for trying to ensure that the legal positions China seeks to take in the international arena are 

grounded in its domestic laws is that the PLA believes 

that this strengthens its legal arguments. In disputes 

with Japan and Southeast Asian nations, Beijing now 

refers to its 1992 Territorial Seas Law adopted by the 

National People’s Congress as justification for its territorial claims in disputes.129 The Territorial Seas Law 

extended sovereign claims over three million square 

miles of area in the East and South China Seas, demarcating it as Chinese territory on its maps. After 

that, when Chinese diplomats or legal representatives 

argued with officials of other nations, the domestic 

law was used as one of the justifications for the territorial claims. The 2005 Anti-Secession Law is another 

example of how domestic law is used by Beijing to justify potential military action in the future, in this case, 

against Taiwan.

To reiterate a point made in Chapter 7 of my book, 

The Dragon Extends its Reach, PLA officers argue that 

setting forth legal arguments for military action is important if a nation is to get international support—laying out the justification for legal warfare.130 PLA legal 

preparation for a military campaign complements the 

use of military force.131 The major PLA text explaining 

this rationale was validated at a military-wide August 

2004 critique session.132

One aspect of this is not new; since the establishment of the PRC, the Communist Party leadership 

has been careful to establish a casus belli before taking 

military action. Such justification has been in legal or 
40

political terms. Prior to the entry of PLA troops into 

the Korean War, the PRC telegraphed its actions publicly with a declaration from Mao Zedong through 

the Indian government.133 In the case of the 1962 SinoIndian War, Chinese diplomats and military leaders 

carefully staked out their legal positions as early as 3 

years before the conflict.134 They did the same in 1969 

with the Soviet Union and in 1979 prior to their attack 

on Vietnam. Thus, this concept of legal warfare has 

roots in China’s diplomatic practice, which has been 

reinforced by its leaders’ practice of modern war. 

Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, two officers 

from the PLA’s Xian Political Affairs College, believe 

that prior to any conflict, a nation must “muster public 

opinion in its favor” and conduct propaganda, psychological, and legal campaigns to ensure support for 

military action. They also suggest developing domestic law that justifies military action in international legal terms. These authors see this as a means of developing “comprehensive national power” and believe 

that the United States demonstrated the importance 

of such actions in the period before the 2003 attack 

on Iraq.135

Lu Hucheng and Zhang Yucheng, of the General 

Staff Department Political Department, classify “legal 

warfare” as a “special form of military operations” to 

be undertaken in preparation for a conflict. Lu and 

Zhang define these legal actions as “political preparation of the battlefield.” They see legal arguments, 

propaganda, and international agreements worked in 

advance as justifying any necessary military action.136

Why is this concept of legal warfare important? 

In the recent past, Chinese scholars have set out their 

views on national sovereignty, sovereignty in space, 

and the need for “space control” in modern war. 
41

These actions are consistent with this concept of legal 

warfare, and, should any conflict come about in space, 

they would provide the outlines of any PLA justification for military action. Monitoring the outlines of 

the PLA’s legal warfare arguments is important. It is 

also critical that American military theorists interact 

with Chinese scholars and diplomats when possible 

as a means of limiting their ability to define the justifications for conflict and evolving international law on 

their own terms.

Justifying China’s actions in international law and 

establishing positions in domestic law increasingly are 

important for the PLA as its strategists and planners 

think about space warfare. Officers in the GPD are setting out positions now that China can use in the future 

to justify attacks on foreign satellites or other space 

bodies, while other scholars in China deal with the 

limits and range of national sovereignty in the global 

commons. These legal warfare efforts are designed to 

establish positions in domestic and international law 

as a legal basis for military action or as a mean of limiting the freedom of action of other nations.137

China is developing its own ballistic missile defenses and has tested them against an incoming Chinese 

warhead. However, that does not mean China thinks 

the United States should field missile defenses.138 The 

PLA is very aware of the deep political schisms in the 

United States over renewed nuclear testing, placing 

even defensive weapon systems in space, and the foreign basing of American forces. Debate rages in Congress, the scientific community, academia, and the policy community on these issues, with near-theological 

disputes taking place on issues of nuclear testing and 

ballistic missile defense. PLA legal warfare efforts are 

applied in these areas at academic conferences and in 
42

meetings with foreigners to reinforce agreement with 

Chinese positions. It is likely that the concept of legal 

warfare will be applied to these disputes as well.

The author was once invited to an international 

conference in England run by a group of British pacifists to debate issues related to arms control and space. 

The English group’s partner from China was the Chinese Association for Peace and Disarmament. However, when I met the members of the Chinese delegation, 

I saw that four of them were either PLA officers or 

Ministry of State Security (MSS) officers I had met in 

China at other arms control events. In England, however, they operated under cover and identified themselves as “disarmament researchers.” 

China’s “Peaceful Rise” Theory 

as a Case Study of the Three Warfares.

The PLA has managed to act globally in its media 

and propaganda campaigns and is increasingly able to 

do so in a nuanced way. The promulgation of China’s 

“peaceful rise” as a new theory of international relations through a major propaganda campaign is a good 

example of a relatively successful effort designed to 

reassure China’s neighbors and the world that China 

has peaceful intentions.139

In April 1998, four of China’s national security 

scholars published a book discussing the theory of 

how China can rise peacefully as an international 

power without upsetting the international system.140

(Earlier in their careers, some of these scholars were 

affiliated with the MSS.) The book examines how the 

rise of China as a world power (or superpower) can 

take place in such a way as to avoid war and another 

Cold War.141 The authors began their work on the theo-
43

ry in 1994 and, through the China Philosophy Society, 

further researched the topic. With respect to Southeast Asia, one of the scholars, Yan Xuetong, explained 

that the strategists who had developed the theory of 

China’s peaceful rise designed it as a response to the 

“China threat theory” advanced at the time by former 

Prime Minister and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan-yew of 

Singapore and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of 

Malaysia.142

Later, the Central Communist Party School was the 

major actor in promulgating the peaceful rise theory 

internationally, an effort led by its executive vice president, Zheng Bijian. When he moved on to chair the 

China Reform Forum, a Communist Party–affiliated 

organization, Zheng continued to discuss the theory, 

and he advanced it at the Bo’ao Forum on Hainan Island in 2003.143 The Bo’ao Forum for Asia is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization (NGO) committed 

to regional economic integration in Asia that meets 

annually at its permanent site, Bo’ao, Hainan Island, 

China. In 2005, he published a version of his speech, 

“China’s Peaceful Rise,” in the magazine of the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs.

144

The peaceful rise theory is an interesting one. It 

suggests that China’s rise as a great power is inevitable 

and that the different interests of a rising power and 

an existing superpower in the same region will create 

friction. Implicit, however, is the suggestion that it is 

up to the United States, as the lone superpower in the 

world, to accommodate China’s rise.145 Some American scholars have argued that the rise of great powers 

usually creates instability in the international system, 

particularly when those powers are nondemocratic 

states. The Americans cited the cases of Germany and 

Japan in the lead-up to the world wars as examples 
44

of the tension created by rising powers as they confront leading powers. Zheng responded with a new 

formulation:

Our path is different from both the paths of Germany 

in World War I and Germany and Japan in World 

War II, when they tried to overhaul the world political landscape by way of aggressive wars. Our path is 

also to be different from that of the former U.S.S.R. 

[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] during the reign 

of Brezhnev, which relied on a military bloc and arms 

race in order to compete with the United States for 

world supremacy.146

It was not only CCP intellectuals who put forth 

the formula. On December 10, 2003, Premier Wen 

Jiabao told an audience at Harvard University that, 

as a developing country, China would seek to rise 

peacefully as it resolves its natural resource and energy problems.147 Sixteen days later, celebrating the 

110th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth, Hu Jintao 

told an audience that China would “develop along its 

own socialist course . . . and would follow a peaceful 

road to development.”148 Hu repeated the formulation 

on February 23, 2004, to a Politburo study meeting of 

senior CCP leaders, telling them that the peaceful development path would also follow a policy of self-reliance.149 In addition, on March 14, 2004, Wen repeated 

the theory, telling a session of the National People’s 

Congress that although China’s peaceful rise would 

take a long time, it would not depart from the general 

interests of the world.150

The PLA and some in the Chinese Communist Party did not accept the peaceful rise formulation without 

some internal debate. At a meeting of senior PLAAF 

officers in May 2004, Jiang Zemin suggested that per-
45

haps the formulation should be set aside, since the thesis potentially limited China’s military development 

and modernization. His objection was both a manifestation of the friction between himself and Hu Jintao in 

the transfer of his power to Hu and a demonstration 

of genuine concern within the PLA that it could continue to modernize and strengthen.151 In the end, after 

some period of debate, the Chinese Communist Party 

arrived at the position that “there is no contradiction 

between military modernization or military strength 

and China’s peaceful rise.”152 China’s policymakers in 

the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party see military development as complementing China’s peaceful 

rise and feel that accommodating this rise requires an 

adjustment in attitude by the United States and Southeast Asian nations.153

There are unspoken elements in the peaceful rise 

formulation. An analogy that illustrates Beijing’s attitude toward the peaceful rise debate is to imagine 

oneself walking down the middle of a sidewalk when 

another person comes unseen from around a corner 

and walks in your direction. That person’s course does 

not deviate, as he or she expects you to shift your own 

course to accommodate his or hers. Failure to accommodate the new arrival could be interpreted as hostile 

and a direct challenge toward him or her. Moreover, 

since the path of the new arrival is not shifting, any 

failure to adjust your route could result in a clash. In 

discussions in Beijing and Shanghai in 2004 and 2005, 

some Chinese scholars made it clear to the author that 

the peaceful rise thesis implied that China expected 

other powers such as the United States to shift policy 

to accommodate China. However, in Southeast Asia, 

the campaign to promote the peaceful rise theory 

was relatively successful and won Beijing increased 

diplomatic influence. 
46

The PLA part of the action is a series of military-tomilitary dialogues around Southeast Asia reassured 

China’s neighbors of its peaceful intentions. Unfortunately for the PLA and the makers of China’s foreign 

policy, a generally more aggressive policy on disputed territories, resource claims, and fishing rights in 

the South China Sea by the PLA and China’s maritime 

surveillance authorities undermined several years of 

diplomatic effort.154

Responding to the Three Warfares.

Much of the PLA’s campaign, whether in public 

opinion and media warfare or psychological warfare, 

depends on the fact that Westerners in general enjoy a 

free press. Thus, the PLA seems to believe that by constantly repeating its message in the Western press and 

in other forms of contact, it will be accepted. In China, 

there is no free press, and the PLA uses the controlled 

media there and Hong Kong’s Communist-controlled 

media to deliver its message to the Chinese populace. 

In the United States and other Western countries, 

the free press remains the major counter to China and 

the PLA’s controlled messages. Most reporters are 

careful enough or cynical enough not to accept every 

message they are given; they check facts. Still, many 

Americans have no idea that the China Association for 

International Friendly Contact is controlled by an intelligence bureau under the PLA’s GPD. Nor are most 

Americans or others in the West aware of the relationships among the Military Intelligence Department 

of the PLA, its GPD counterpart, and CAIFC. Public 

education, therefore, also is an excellent way to counter the PLA’s efforts at public opinion, or media, and 

perception management; and psychological warfare. 
47

The U.S. Government is working to counter China’s internal propaganda campaigns through broadcasts on media outlets such as Voice of America or 

Radio Free Asia as a means to keep Chinese citizens 

informed. The Internet and social media also make it 

more difficult for the PLA to succeed with the type 

of controlled molding of public opinion it conducts. 

However, that does not stop the Chinese government 

from working to control social media and the Internet 

as well as to identify Internet activists.155 This vying 

for public opinion and countering of propaganda is 

an example of one area in which the PLA has become 

more sophisticated, and its reach more global. In legal 

warfare, the PLA may be ahead. Few American legal 

or military scholars are engaging in arguments in legal 

journals that counter China’s positions. At U.S. military schools and headquarters, there is no systematic 

effort to establish precedent or to counter some of the 

PLA’s positions. International awareness of the PLA’s 

strategy would be useful, making this another area in 

which public education could be the most effective 

counterbalance to propaganda.

ENDNOTES

1. This monograph was developed from Chapter 8 (Information Age Warfare and INEW) and Chapter 9 (The General Political Department and Information Operations) of Larry M. Wortzel, 

The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global,

Herndon, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2013. It is published with the 

permission of Potomac Books, Inc.

2. Wang Zhengde, ed., Xinxi Duikang Lun (Information Confrontation Operations), Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 2007, 

pp. 174-175, 199; Wang argues that confrontation in the electromagnetic spectrum is a major part of modern warfare space, the 

missile guidance, and command-and-control networks.
48

3. Zhang Yuliang, ed. Zhanyi Xue (The Science of Military 

Campaigns), Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 

2006, p. 155.

4. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 6th 

Ed., Boulder, CO: Westview, 2012, pp. 88–89.

5. Li Wuchao and Wang Yonggang, “Fen Jin de Bu Dai Yong 

bu Tingxie” (“The Pace of Progress Never Stops”). Kongjun Bao 

(Air Force Daily), August 13, 2012, p. 2.

6. The Central Military Commission is the Chinese Communist Party’s highest level military body. The chairman is Party 

General Secretary, and President Xi Jinping and the other members are the directors of the PLA departments; the army, navy, 

air force; and Second Artillery Corps. The General Staff Department (GSD) is one of four general departments of the PLA and is 

responsible for command and control of all forces. On the qu dian

system, see Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military 

Power Goes Global, Herndon, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2013, pp. 

37, 40, 134. Also see K. K. Nair, “China’s Military Space Program,” 

Promoting Strategic and Missile Stability in Southern Asia, Special 

Report 17, MIT/IPCS/CAPS Conference, March 28–29, 2006, 

New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2006, 

pp. 9–10, available from www.ipcs.org.

7. Li Naiguo, Xinxizhan Xinlun (A New Discussion on Information Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 

2004, pp. 35–45.

8. “Laolao Bawo Guofang he Jundui Jianshe de Zhidao Fangzhen” (“Firmly Grasp the Important Guidelines for National Defense and Army Building”), Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily), January 1, 

2006, p. 1, available from www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2006-01/

01/content_374878.htm.

9. Liu Mingfu, Cheng Gang, and Sun Xuefu, “Renmin Jundui 

Lishi shiming de You Yi Ci yu Shi Jujin” (“The Historic Missions 

of the People's Army Again Advances with the Times”), PLA Daily, December 8, 2005, p. 6.
49

10. Wu Zhu, Wang Lili, Hou Xiangyang, “Lianhe Jidong 

Biandui Zuozhan Tixi Wangluo Hua Maioshu” (“Using a Network to Describe Joint-task Fleet Battle System of Systems”), Zhihui Kongzi yu Fangzhen (Command, Control, and Simulation), Vol. 34, 

No. 4, August 2012, pp. 12-17. 

11. Wang Zhengde, ed., Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan (Interpretation of Network-centric Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense Industries Press, 2004, p. 316.

12. Wang Xianhui, Yuan Jianquan, and Lu Junjie, “Zhencha 

Duikang Daji Yiti Hua Xitong Yanjiu” (“Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Strike-integrated System”), Hangtian Dianzi 

Duikang (Spaceflight Electronic Confrontation), Vol. 25, No. 1, July 

28, 2008, pp. 37–39.

13. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds. The Science of 

Military Strategy, Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 

2005, p. 337.

14. Ibid., p. 338.

15. See Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation in the 21st Century, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 

12-14. On PLA history, see Wortzel, Dictionary of Contemporary 

Chinese History, Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1999, pp. 132-

136, 224-225, 258-259. See also Xiaobing Li, History of the Modern 

Chinese Army, Louisville, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2007, 

pp. 94–112, 198–204, 250-259. 

16. Ye Zheng, Xinxihua Zuozhan Gailun (An Introduction to Informationalized Operations), Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 

2007, pp. 17–18. 

17. Shen Weiguang, Jie Xijiang, Ma Ji, and Li Jijun, eds., 

Zhongguo Xinxi Zhan (China’s Information Warfare), Beijing, China: 

Xinhua Press, 2005, pp. 2–3.

18. Ibid., pp. 86–87. The authors seems to adapt the formulation used by the United States. See National Security Agency, 

“Global Information Grid,” November 14, 2008, available from 

www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/global_information_grid/index.shtml.
50

19. Ibid., p. 122.

20. Ibid. 

21. This refers to the Communications Department of the 

General Staff Department, or Zongcanmoubu Tongxinbu. See 

Tongxinbo, “Zhanqu Xinxi Hua Jianshe Chubu Gouxiang” (“The 

Initial Concept of Theater Informatization Efforts”), Junshi Xueshu 

(Military Art), No. 7, July 1, 2004, p. 20. 

22. Ibid., p. 21.

23. Ibid., p. 20.

24. Ibid., p. 126.

25. Wang Yeming, “Zhiming Diqiu: Rang Weilai Zhanchang 

Geng ‘Touming’” (“Smart Planet Makes Future Battlefields More 

‘Transparent’”), PLA Daily, December 16, 2010, p. 12. 

26. Shen et al., Zhongguo Xinxi Zhan, pp. 122, 126.

27. Ye et al., Xinxi Hua Zuozhan Gailun, p. 19.

28. Ibid., p. 23.

29. Wei Yufu and Zhao Xiaosong, Junshi Xinxi Youshi 

Lun (Theory of Military Information Superiority), Beijing, China: 

National Defense University Press, 2008, pp. 249–251.

30. Shen et al., Zhongguo Xinxi Zhan, pp. 227–229.

31. Dai Qingmin, “Lun Duoqu Zhi Xinxi Quan” (“On Seizing Information Supremacy”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Vol. 16, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 11–13. Also see Dai 

Qingmin, Wangdian Yiti zhan Yinlun (Introduction to Integrated 

Network and Electronic Warfare), Beijing, China: PLA Press, 2002, 

pp. 112–117.

32. Minnie Chan, “PLA Eyes Talent Pool to Expand Capability,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2011, available from 

www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492
51

d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=f0d7cc9cc2e6f210VgnVCM100000360a0a0a

RCRD&ss=china&s=news. 

33. Tongxinbu, “Zhanqu Xinxi Hua Jianshe Chubu 

Gouxiang,” p. 22.

34. The Chinese term for INEW is wangdian yiti zhan.

35. Ye et al., Xinxi Hua Zuozhan Gailun, p. 229. 

36. Ibid., p. 231.

37. David G. Chizum, Soviet Radioelectronic Combat, Boulder, 

CO: Westview, 1985, pp. 3-4; Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change—1989, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1989; and David R. Beachley, “Soviet RadioElectronic Combat in World War II,” Military Review, Vol. 61, No. 

3, March 1981, pp. 66-72. See also David M. Glantz, Soviet Military 

Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, London, United Kingdom 

(UK): Cass, 1991, pp. 295, especially Chapter 5. 

38. Dai, “Lun Wangdian Yiti Zhan,” p. 113. 

39. Wang Chang-Ho, Chueh-chi I Tong Ya: Chu-chiao Shin Shihchi Chieh Fang Chun (East Asia Rising: Focus on the People’s Liberation 

Army in the New Century), Taipei, Taiwan: LiveABC Interactive 

Corp., 2009, pp. 219-20. Because this study originated in Taiwan, 

which uses the Wade-Giles transliteration system, the Chinese 

is rendered in Wade-Giles rather than pinyin. A similar point is 

made in Wang Wowen, “Chuan Tou Xinxihua Zhanzheng ‘Mi 

Wu’ de Li Qi” (“Sharp Weapons for Penetrating the ‘Dense Fog’ 

of Information Warfare”), PLA Daily, May 16, 2006, p. 11.

40. Wang Zhengde, ed., Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan (Interpretation of Network-Centric Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense Industries Press, 2004, pp. 316-318.

41. Timothy L. Thomas, The Dragon’s Quantum Leap: Transforming from a Mechanized to an Informatized Force, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 2009, pp. 

38-39. See also Timothy L. Thomas, Decoding the Virtual Dragon: 

Critical Evolutions in the Science and Philosophy of China’s Informa-
52

tion Operations and Military Strategy, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 

Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 2007; and Timothy L. 

Thomas, Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2004.

42. Wang, Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan, pp. 317-318. See also 

Thomas, Dragon’s Quantum Leap, p. 39. 

43. Ding Bangyu, ed., Zuozhan Zhihui Xue (The Study of Command and Control Operations), Beijing, China: Military Science 

Press, 2006, p. 4.

44. Wang, Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan, p. 319.

45. Wang, Xinxi Duikang Lun, p. 174.

46. Ibid., p. 199.

47. Defense Intelligence Agency, Future Soviet Threat to U.S. 

Airbreathing Reconnaissance Platforms: A Special Defense Intelligence 

Estimate, DDE-2623-1-86, Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence 

Agency, 1986, p. 4.

48. For studies on informatized operations or information age 

warfare in the PLA, see Che Yajun and Xue Xinglin, eds., Zhanchang Huanjing yu Xinxihua Zhanzheng (The Battlefield Environment 

and Informatized Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 2010; Shen et al., Zhongguo Xinxi Zhan; and Si Laiyi, 

“Lun Xinxi Zuozhan Zhihui Kongzhi Jiben Yuanze” (“On Basic 

Principles for Command-and-Control Information Warfare”), in 

Military Science Editorial Group, Wo Jun Xixi Zhan Wenti Yanjiu 

(Research on Questions about Information Warfare in the PLA), Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 1999.

49. Wang Xianhui, Yuan Jianquan, and Lu Junjie, “Zhencha 

Duikang Daji Yiti Hua Xitong Yanjiu” (“Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Strike Integrated System”), Hangtian Dianzi 

Duikang (Spaceflight Electronic Confrontation), Vol. 25, No. 1, July 

28, 2008, pp. 37-39. 

50. Chizum, Soviet Radioelectronic Combat, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985, pp. 3-4; Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: 
53

Prospects for Change—1989; and Beachley, “Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat in World War II,” Military Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, March 

1981, pp. 66-72. See also Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art, p. 

295, especially chapter 5.

51. Extract from Chapter 1, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 24-

33, Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures, 

Washington, DC: HQ U.S. Department of the Army, July 17, 1990, 

available from www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm24-33/fm243_2.htm.

52. Ibid.

53. Wang et al., “Zhencha Duikang Daji Yiti Hua Xitong 

Yanjiu,” p. 39. 

54. Jeffery W. Long, The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine: From 

Active Defense to AirLand Battle and Beyond, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Command and General Staff College, 1991, available from www.

stormingmedia.us/47/4771/A477142.html.

55. Ibid.

56. Peng and Yao, Science of Military Strategy, pp. 410-412; and 

Zhu Youwen, Feng Yi, and Xu Dechi, eds., Gao Jishu Tiaojian Xia de 

Xinxi Zhan (Information Warfare under High Technology Conditions), 

Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 1994, pp. 56-62.

57. Ye Zheng, An Introduction to Informationalized Operations, pp. 229-230.

58. Wang, Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan, pp. 316-318. See also 

Wang et al., “Zhencha Duikang Daji Yiti Hua Xitong Yanjiu,” 

pp. 39-41.

59. Dai Qingmin, “Lun Duoqu Zhi Xinxi Quan,” pp. 11-13. 

Also see Dai Qingmin, Wangdian Yiti zhan Yinlun, pp. 112-117.

60. Zhang Zhiwei, Xiandai Huoli Zhan (Modern Firepower Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense Science and Technology 

Press, 2000.

61. Thomas, Dragon Bytes, p. 57.
54

62. Dai Qingmin, “Lun Duoqu Xinxi Quan,” pp. 12-13.

63. Ibid., p. 13.

64. Zhang Ying, “Zhanlue Pouxi: Zhonguo Bixu An Junshi 

Duikang Yuanze Yanjiu Wangge Zhan” (“Strategic Analysis: 

China Must Research Cyber Warfare According to the Principles 

of Military Confrontation”), Dongfang Zaobao (Oriental Morning 

Post), July 9, 2009, available from www.dfdaily.com/node2/node23/

node102/userobject1ai178135.shtml.

65. See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Chaoxian Zhan (Unrestricted Warfare), Beijing, China: PLA Arts and Literature 

Press, 1999.

66. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Chairman, The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, 2006, p. 5, available from www.dod.gov/

pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf, cited in Robert Sheldon, “China’s 

Great Firewall and Situational Awareness,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 

10, No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 36-51.

67. Magnus Hjortdal, “China’s Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 

4, No. 2, 2011, p. 1.

68. Wortzel, “China’s Approach to Cyber Operations: Implications for the United States,” testimony before the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, hearing on “The 

Google Predicament: Transforming U.S. Cyberspace Policy to Advance Democracy, Security and Trade,” March 10, 2010, available 

from www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/wor031010.pdf and 

www.uscc.gov/10_03_10_wortzel_statement.php.

69. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

(hereafter, USCC), 2009 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2009, pp. 289-309.

70. Wortzel, “China’s Approach to Cyber Operations: Implications for the United States,” March 10, 2010; and Bryan Krekel et al., 

Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare 
55

and Computer Network Exploitation, McLean, VA: Northrop Grumman Corp., 2009, available from www.uscc.gov/.../NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_ Paper_FINAL_Approved%Report_16Oct2009.pdf. 

71. Ellis L. Melvin, “A Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Region Headquarters Department Technical 

Reconnaissance Bureau,” June 19, 2005. Melvin is a private citizen 

who served in the U.S. military in Taiwan and undertakes a great 

deal of personal research on PLA oroganizations in the Chinese 

language. He provided a copy of this study to the author. See also 

James Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” Roy Kamphausen, 

David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 2009; Wang, Jiedu Wangluo Zhongxin Zhan; 

Wei Baofu and Zhao Xiaosong, Junshi Xinxi Youxiu Lun (Theory of 

Military Information Superiority), Beijing, China: National Defense 

University Press, 2008; and Larry Wortzel, “China Goes on the 

Cyber-Offensive,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 172, Issue 1, 

January/February 2009, p. 56.

72. USCC, 2007 Report to Congress, pp. 95-96. 

73. Ibid.

74. Robert Marquand and Ben Arnoldy, “China’s Hacking 

Skills in Spotlight,” The Seattle Times, September 16, 2007.

75. Mike McConnell, “How to Win the Cyber-War We’re 

Losing,” The Washington Post, February 28, 2010, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/

AR2010022502493.html.

76. Liu Jixian, “Chuangxin he Fazhan Lianhe Zuozhan Yanjiu de Ruogan Wenti” (“Innovation and Development in the Research of Basic Issues of Joint Operations”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 

(China Military Science), Vol. 93, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 1-17. 

77. Zhang Ying, “Zhanlue Pouxi: Zhonguo Bixu An Junshi 

Duikang Yuanze Yanjiu Wangge Zhan.” 
56

78. Min Zengfu, Kongjun Junshi Sixiang Gailun, Beijing, China: 

Military Science Press, 2006, pp. 175-76. See also Jiang Yamin, 

Yuan Zhan (Long Distance Operations) Beijing, China: Military Science Press, 2007, pp. 133-40.

79. Bryan Krekel et al., Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation.

80. Zhao Erquan, “Lun Xinxihua Zhanzheng dui Wuzhuang 

Chongtu fa de Shenyaun Sixiang” (“A Discussion of Far-Reaching 

Thinking on Armed Conflict and Informatized Warfare”), Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, eds., Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe 

(The New Revolution in Military Affairs and Building a Military Legal 

System), Beijing, China: PLA Press, 2005, pp. 498-505.

81. Shen et al., Zhongguo Xinxi Zhan, pp. 82-83.

82. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

83. Wei Yufu and Zhao Xiaosong, Junshi Xinxi Youshi Lun, 

pp. 249-251, 287-290.

84. Krekel et al., Capability of the People’s Republic of China, 

pp. 30-50.

85. Ibid., pp. 30-32. 

86. Ibid. 

87. Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, and George Bakos, Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer 

Network Operations and Cyber Espionage, McLean, VA: Northrop 

Grumman Corporation, March 7, 2012, pp. 45-55, available from 

www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%20Report_Chinese_CapabilitiesforComputer_NetworkOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf#xml= www.

dmssearch.gpo.gov/PdfHighlighter.aspx?DocId=41&Index=D%3a%5c

Websites%5cUseIndex%5cUSCC&HitCount=2&hits=1f+9d4b+.

88. Melvin, “Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” 

pp. 1-2. See also Directory of PRC Military Personalities, 2008, 

pp. 18-19.
57

89. Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber 

Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, November 11, 2011, available from project2049.net/documents/

pla_third_department_sigint_cyber_stokes_lin_hsiao.pdf.

90. Wortzel, “The Chinese Way of Cyber War: The PRC 

Boasts an Extensive Cyber Strategy for Espionage and Battlefield 

Dominance,” Defense Dossier, Vol. 4, August 2012, p. 3, American 

Foreign Policy Council, available from www.afpc.org/files/august

2012.pdf.

91. Paul Rosenzweig, The Alarming Trend of Cyber Security 

Breaches and Failures in the U.S. Government, Washington, DC: The 

Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 2695, May 24, 2012, available from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/the-alarmingtrend-of-cybersecurity-breaches-and-failures-in-the-us-government. 

Also see Keith Epstein and Ben Elgin, “The Taking of NASA’s 

Secrets,” BusinessWeek, December 1, 2008, pp. 72-79. 

92. Nathan Thornburgh, “Inside the Chinese Hack Attack,” 

Time, August 25, 2005, available from content.time.com/time/nation/

article/0,8599,1098371,00.html.

93. Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies, and the Man Who Tried to Stop Them,” Time, August 29, 2005, 

available from www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1098961,00.html.

94. Hjortdal, “China’s Use of Cyber Warfare,” pp. 1-24. See 

also Shane Harris, “China’s Cyber Militia,” National Journal, May 

31, 2008, available from www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/china-scyber-militia-20080531.

95. Mike McConnell, Michael Chertoff, and William Lynn, 

“China’s Cyber Thievery Is National Policy—and Must Be Challenged,” The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2012, available from 

online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020371850457717883233803

2176.html.

96. Interested readers can explore these cases by searching out 

indictments on the Department of Justice website at www.justice.

gov/usao/. Another excellent compendium of espionage cases in 
58

the United States is maintained by the CI Centre, a Washingtonbased security education company, available from www.cicentre.

com/?page=asset_prc_cyber.

97. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive 

(hereafter, NCIX), Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 

Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 

Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011, Washington, DC: NCIX, October 

2011, p. 1. 

98. Ibid., p. i.

99. Krekel, Adams, and Bakos, Occupying the Information High 

Ground, p. 96.

100. Ellen Nakashima, “Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs Compromised by Chinese Cyberspies,” The 

Washington Post, May 27, 2013, available from articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-27/world/39554997_1_u-s-missile-defenses-weapons-combat-aircraft.

101. Mandiant, Trends: Attack the Security Gap: 2013 Threat 

Report, available from www.mandiant.com/news/release/mandiantreleases-annual-threat-report-on-advanced-targeted-attacks1/.

102. Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage 

Units, available from intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.

103. Huang Luwei, Bi Yiming, and Yang Jifeng, “Daodan 

Budui Wangge Zhongxin Zhan Wenti Yanjiu” (“Research on 

Problems of Network-Centric Warfare for the Missile Forces”), 

Zhihui Kongzhi yu Fangzhen (Command, Control, and Simulation), 

Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 18-21. 

104. Krekel et al., Occupying the Information High Ground, 

pp. 27-43.

105. Ibid., p. 31.

106. Larry Wortzel, “General Political Department and Evolution of Political Commissar System,” in James Mulvenon, David 
59

Finkelstein, and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation 

Army as an Organization: Reference Volume 1.0, Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand, 2002, pp. 229-233.

107. Liu Gaoping, Yulun Zhan Zhishi Duben (Textbook on Media 

Warfare), Beijing, China: National Defense University Press, 2005, 

pp. 83-100.

108. For an excellent discussion of the three warfares in an 

article about training in a group army in Shenyang Military Region, see Mei Yushen and Yan Yongfeng, “Shenyang Junqu Mou 

Jituanjun Lakai ‘San Zhan’ Xumu” (“A Certain Shenyang Military 

Region Group Army Opens the Curtain on ‘Three Warfares’”), 

Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), July 17, 2004, available 

from zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2004-07/17/content_910023.htm. See also 

Hou Baocheng, “Zhengzhi Gongzuo Weishenme Yao Jiaqiang dui 

‘San Zhan’ de Yan Jiu” (“The Need to Step Up the Study of ‘Three 

Warfares’ in Political Work”), PLA Daily, July 29, 2004, available 

from www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2004/07/29/20040729001087.

html. There is a good summary of the three warfares in English in 

Timothy A. Walton, China’s Three Warfares, Herndon, VA: Delex 

Systems, 2012.

109. Bhaskar Roy, “China: The Military and Leadership Power,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 4052, 

September 20, 2010, available from www.southasiaanalysis.

org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4052.html. 

110. Hou Baocheng, “Zhengzhi Gongzuo Weishenme Yao Jiaqiang dui ‘San Zhan’ de Yan Jiu.”

111. See Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives,” 

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, Autumn 2011, pp. 43-67. 

See also Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, 2011, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011, p. 26.

112. A direct translation of yulun is “public opinion”; thus, in 

many English translations, the term “public opinion warfare” is 

used. In some PLA translations of book titles and articles, however, it is called “media warfare.”
60

113. In perception management, a nation or organization undertakes conscious actions to convey certain information or indicators of intent to foreign audiences to influence their emotions 

and reasoning. Perception management also may deny specific 

items of information to foreign audiences for the same reasons. 

The goal is to influence foreign public opinion, leaders, and intelligence systems, and to influence official assessment. The goal of 

perception management operations is often to mold foreign behavior in ways that favor the original actor’s objectives. See Stephen Collins, “Mind Games,” NATO Review, Summer 2003, available from www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art4.html.

114. USCC, 2011 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2011, pp. 322-323.

115. Alan H. Yang and Michael Hsiao, “Confucious Institutes 

and the Question of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy,” China Brief, 

Vol. 12, No. 13, July 6, 2012, available from www.jamestown.org/

programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39592&cH

ash=ccbda5a33d17f73e50a7a3d92be5233b. For a counterargument, 

see Peter Mattis, “Reexamining the Confucian Institutes,” The 

Diplomat: Diplomat Blogs, August 2, 2012, available from thediplomat.com/china-power/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/.

116. Chen Bingde, Speech Presented at the National Defense 

University of the United States, Washington, DC, May 20, 2011. 

117. See Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994, pp. 92-93.

118. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects, Berkeley, CA: University of California 

Press, 2002, pp. 131-136. See especially the chart on p. 135.

119. Bill Gertz, “China Using Retired U.S. Officers to Influence 

Policy,” The Washington Times, February 7, 2012, available from 

times247.com/articles/china-using-retired-u-s-officers-to-influencepolicy. See also Gertz, “Chinese Communists Influence U.S. Policy through Ex-Military Officials,” The Washington Free Beacon,

February 6, 2012, available from freebeacon.com/chinese-government-influencing-policy-through-ex-military-officials/. A copy of the 
61

Sanya Initiative’s own report on its 2008 program is available 

from freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Sanya-Initiative-08-

smaller.pdf.

120. USCC, 2011 Report to Congress, pp. 338-340, 352-353, 

notes 141, 142, 143.

121. Stokes, “The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign: Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Modernization,” in Mulvenon and Finkelstein, China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, pp. 271-274.

122. Zhu Wenquan and Chen Taiyi, Xinxi Zuozhan (Information Operations), Beijing, China: National Defense University 

Press, 1999, pp. 349-50; and Li Rongchang, Cheng Jian, and Zheng 

Lianqing, eds., Kongtian Yiti Xinxi Zuozhan (Integrated Aerospace 

Information Operations), Beijing, China: Academy of Military Science Press, 2003, pp. 156-162.

123. Walton, China’s Three Warfares, p. 5. Walton cites personal communication with Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese 

Army Today.

124. Stokes, “Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign,” p. 273.

125. Ibid., pp. 272-273.

126. See Scobell, Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Research Center, January 1999, available from iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/Scobell.pdf.

127. Peng and Yao, Science of Military Strategy, p. 79.

128. Liu and Liu, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe. 

See also Zheng Shenxia and Liu Yuan, eds. Guofang he Jundui Jianshe Guanshe Luoshi Kexue Fazhan Guan Xuexi Tiyao (Study Materials 

for Completely Building the Military and National Defense), Beijing, 

China: PLA Press, 2006, pp. 192-194.

129. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial 

Sea and the Continuous Zone, adoption date, February 25, 1992, 

archived by the United Nations, available from www.un.org/Depts/

los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.
62

pdf. For a discussion of how domestic laws are used by China to 

justify its position in international law, see Hyun-soo Kim, “The 

1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in Light of the UN Convention,” 

International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4, October 

1994, pp. 894-904.

130. One of the most important case studies in the PLA text 

that the authors used to validate the concept was the U.S. action 

in the Security Council justifying its actions in Iraq in 2003 on UN 

Security Council Resolution 1368, 2001, “Threats to International 

Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, available from daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.

pdf?OpenElement; and UNSC Resolution 1373, 2001, with the 

same title, available from daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/

N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement. Also see Xu Ou and 

Tong Yunhe, “Cong Yilake Zhanzheng Kan Guoji Fa Zai Weilai Zhanzheng de Zuoyong” (“From the Standpoint of the Iraq 

War, Examining the Utility of International Law in Future Warfare”), in Liu and Liu, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, 

pp. 475-479. 

131. Zhang et al., Zhanyi Xue, pp. 205-207.

132. Liu and Liu, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, 

p. 581.

133. See Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army 

in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath, New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1967. 

134. See Cheng Feng and Wortzel, “PLA Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962,” Mark A. 

Ryan, David M. Finklestein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The Experience of the PLA since 1949, Armonk, NY: 

M. E. Sharpe, 2003, pp. 173-197.

135. Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, “Fazhizhan de Hanyi 

yu Yunyong” (“The Utility and Implications of Legal Warfare”), 

Liu and Liu, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, pp. 428-434.

136. Le Hucheng and Zhang Yucheng, “Faluzhan Zai Junshi 

Douzheng Zhunbei Zhong de Diwei he Zuoyong” (“The Util-
63

ity and Position of Legal Warfare in the Preparation for Military 

Conflict”), Liu and Liu, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, 

pp. 355-362. See also Liu Zhongshan, “Ziweiquan yu Zhuquan” 

(“Sovereignty and the Right of Self-Defense”), Zhanlue yu Guanli 

(Strategy and Management), No. 1, 2002, p. 50.

137. The concept of “lawfare,” or using the international legal 

system to lay the ground for and to justify military operations, is 

discussed in Qiao and Wang, Chaoxian Zhan. When the book was 

first published and discussed in the United States, many American “China watchers” dismissed it because the two authors were 

senior colonels in the GPD of the PLA. Over the years, however, 

the concepts have been reinforced in other Chinese publications. 

Qiao Liang has been promoted to major general and as of 2010 

was a professor at the PLAAF Command College. See Qiao Liang, 

“Meiguo Ren Wei he Er Zhan,” p. 11.

138. Rajaswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “China’s Missile Defense Test: Yet Annother Milestone?” IDSA Comment, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, February 1, 2010, available from www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasMissileDefenceTest_

rprajagopalan_010210.

139. State Council Information Office, China’s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing, China: State Council Information Office, 

2005, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn/english.doc/2005-12/22/

content_505678.htm. 

140. Yan Xuetong, Wang Zaibang, Li Zhongcheng, and Hou 

Ruoshi, eds. Zhongguo Jueqi: Guoji Huanjing Pinggu (The International Environment for China’s Peaceful Rise), Tianjin, China: Tianjin 

People’s Press, 1998. 

141. Ibid., p. 2.

142. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

143. The concept can be found in a speech by Zheng Bijian 

archived at the Brookings Institution. See Zheng Bijian, China’s 

Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian, 1997-2004, Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution, 2005, available from www.brookings.edu/fp/

events/20050616bijianlunch.pdf. Also see Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo 
64

Heping Jueqi Fazhan Daolu You Liyu Zhong-Mei Guanxi” (“China’s Peaceful Rise Is Conducive to the Sino-U.S. Relationship”), 

Luntan Tongxun, China Reform Forum Newsletter, September 28, 

2004, pp. 3-6. 

144. Zheng Bijian, “China’s Peaceful Rise,” Foreign Affairs, 

Tianjin Vol. 84, No. 5, Summer/Fall 2005, pp. 18-24.

145. Zheng Bijian, in discussion with author, Beijing, China, 

August 23, 2005.

146. The Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) 

in Washington, DC, maintains a regular program of exchanges 

with the Central Communist Party School of China and its China Reform Forum. A compilation of Zheng Bijian’s speeches on 

“China’s peaceful rise” can be found on the CSIS website, available from www.csis.org. See also Zheng, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi 

Fazhan Daolu You Liyu Zhong-Mei Guanxi,” pp. 3-6. 

147. “Remarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, ‘Turning 

Your Eyes to China’,” Harvard University Gazette, December 10, 

2003, available from www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/12.11/10-

wenspeech.html. 

148. Hu Jintao, speech in celebration of the 110th anniversary 

of Mao Zedong’s birth, December 26, 2003, ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. PLA officers in discussion with author, May 2004 and 

August 2005. 

152. Zheng Bijian, in discussion with author, August 23, 2005. 

153. Wortzel, “China’s Peaceful Rise.”

154. USCC, 2011 Report to Congress, pp. 166-172.

155. USCC, 2010 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 5, 

“China and the Internet,” available from www.uscc.gov/annual_

report/2010/Chapter5_Section_1(page221).pdf.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website

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