JSOU Report 11-6 Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces Howard

Cultural and 

Linguistic Skills 

Acquisition for 

Special Forces: 

Necessity, 

Acceleration, and 

Potential Alternatives

Russell D. Howard

JSOU Report 11-6

December 2011

Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University

and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men 

and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and 

interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 

effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM provides fully capable and enabled 

SOF to defend the nation’s interests in an environment characterized by 

irregular warfare.

USSOF mission. USSOF conduct special operations to prepare the 

operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, 

aggression, and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction 

in academic, interagency, and United States military communities. 

The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil. 

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; Dona Stewart, Ph.D., Geography;

William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. — Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

James F. Powers, Jr. 

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida and JSOU 

Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History, 

JSOU Senior Fellow

John B. Alexander

Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle 

Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 

Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel,

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret. 

JSOU Associate Fellow 
On the cover: U.S. soldiers meet with local villagers 30 June 2011 

in Al Wahida, Iraq. Soldiers of 97th Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th 

Civil Affairs Brigade and Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 15th 

Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, along with 

Iraqi national police met with local villagers to address and assess 

concerns they might have about security, education, electricity, water 

and health. Photo courtesy USSOCOM Public Affairs. 

JSOU Report 11-6

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2011

Cultural and Linguistic 

Skills Acquisition 

for Special Forces: 

Necessity, Acceleration, 

and Potential 

Alternatives

Russell D. Howard
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.

mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are invited and should 

be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 

*******

The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-933749-62-4
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or 

position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Oman: The Present in the Context of a Fractured Past, September 2011, 

Roby Barrett

2011 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, September 2011 

USSOCOM Research Topics 2012

Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context, May 2011, 

Roby Barrett

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 

Manual, Second Edition, April 2011

Report of Proceedings, 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference 

(7–10 November 2010) 

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking 

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism,

March 2011, Stephen Sloan 

Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way 

SOF are, March 2011, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations,

December 2010, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking and Joint Special Operational Planning 

Doctrine and Procedures, September 2010, Laure Paquette 

Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law 

Enforcement, July 2010, John B. Alexander

Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power, June 2010, James B. Love 

Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach, April 2010, 

Thomas H. Henriksen 

U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 

Future, March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.
vii

Contents

Foreword ....................................................................................... ix

About the Author ........................................................................... xi

Preface ........................................................................................ xiii

Introduction .................................................................................... 1

1. How Important Are Culture and Language? ................................ 3

2. The Relationship between Culture and Language ........................ 5

3. Accelerating Cultural Knowledge and Competency .................. 15

4. Foreign Languages .................................................................... 19

 

5. Conclusion ............................................................................... 35

 

Endnotes ....................................................................................... 41

ix

Foreword

Avariety of factors have driven an increased interest in the language 

capabilities and cultural knowledge of members of the U.S. military 

in general, as well as U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). The employment 

of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the growing 

emphasis on population-centric approaches highlight the need for an indepth understanding of people and communities. Post Iraq and Afghanistan operational environments will emphasize the underlying conditions 

and issues that create instability in areas of key strategic interest to the U.S. 

This will require SOF to have language and cultural skills capabilities that 

reflect the wider range of locales and ethnic groups with which SOF engage 

while carrying out a diverse mission—a mission that ranges from building 

partner capacity in counterterrorism operations to providing support in 

humanitarian crises. The 2010 realignment of most Special Forces, under 

a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) directive, has 

already altered the regional focus of many Special Forces groups, creating 

an immediate need to learn new languages and new cultures.

In this monograph, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special 

Forces: Necessity, Acceleration and Potential Alternatives, Brigadier General 

Russ Howard articulates the need for both cultural and linguistic skills, 

while distinguishing between the two. Although the concept of ‘culture’ 

remains largely ill-formed in U.S. military doctrine, Howard explores various definitions of culture and highlights the relationship between cultural 

understanding and the ability to predict behavior on the ground, an invaluable asset for the SOF operator.

There is no consensus regarding how much language and cultural expertise is needed by SOF, or members of the U.S. military in general. This issue, 

currently under consideration by Department of Defense senior leadership, 

is recognized as a vital capability for enhancing U.S. national security and 

defense. Howard discusses the role of cultural knowledge at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic levels, delineating between cultural awareness, 

cultural literacy, and cultural competency, with each level denoting a more 

fully developed capability.

Drawing on his experience leading the Special Forces Language School, 

Howard explores the relationship between learning a language and culture, 
x

and the implications for SOF. The AfPak Hands program, based on cultural 

and linguistic immersion, provides one possible learning approach, though 

it may be difficult to replicate outside the Afghanistan theater.

 Throughout the monograph Howard raises the many ongoing challenges 

to providing language and cultural training to SOF. Which languages should 

be the focus of training efforts? Will the languages in demand today be the 

same ones needed in the future? Should emphasis be on the most widely 

spoken languages or low density languages spoken only by specific ethnic 

groups? The SOF deployment cycle and career track are further hindrances 

to persistent language and culture training.

As USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces rebalance the force for a 

posture of persistent presence in complex operating environments, the need 

for language and cultural awareness training is likely to increase. General 

Howard’s monograph is an important contribution to the discussion of just 

how this capability should be defined, prioritized, and developed.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
xi

About the Author

Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard is an Adjunct Professor of Terrorism Studies 

at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at Joint Special 

Operations University and a Senior Adviser to 

Singapore’s Home Team Academy. Previously, 

General Howard was the founding Director of 

The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, the 

Head of the Department of Social Sciences and 

the founding director of the Combating Terrorism 

Center at West Point. 

His previous Army positions include chief of staff fellow at the Center 

for International Affairs, Harvard University, and commander of the 1st 

Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Other recent 

assignments include assistant to the Special Representative to the Secretary 

General during United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, deputy 

chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for the 

Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. Previously, 

he was commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group 

(Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also served as the administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a special assistant to the 

commander of SOUTHCOM.

As a newly commissioned officer, he served as an “A” team commander in 

the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active component 

and then served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During this 

period he served as an overseas manager, American International Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia, and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific 

Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served initially in Korea 

as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included 

classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command, Fort 

Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 1st Battalion, 1st 

Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 
xii

General Howard has a B.S. in Industrial Management from San Jose State 

University and a B.A. in Asian Studies from the University of Maryland. He 

also has an M.A. in International Management from the Monterey Institute 

of International Studies and an MPA from Harvard University. He was an 

assistant professor of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy and a 

senior service college fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

Tufts University. 

His previous JSOU publications are Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New 

Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (December 2007) and Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment 

(July 2009).
xiii

Preface

Imagine yourself as a Special Forces group commander, and your group’s 

regional alignment has just been changed. While not entirely useless, 

the cultural knowledge and foreign language acumen your personnel have 

acquired and retained have now become much less relevant. The invaluable 

personal bonds and friendships made during multiple deployments to familiar 

areas of operation are gone with a stroke of a pen. If the change in alignment 

were to be gradual, with a little time to learn new languages and cultures, 

you might be able to plan a phased training and education program, but 

this is not the case; the change is effective almost immediately. If the change 

had occurred during peacetime and your main concerns were conducting 

exercises, joint combined exchange training (JCETs), or military training 

team (MTT) events, you could probably find enough people qualified in the 

linguistic and cultural basics to get by. However, this change occurs in the 

midst of two conflicts, and your group will be engaging in combat. 

So, what do you do now, Colonel? 

Perhaps the scenario is a little dramatic, but the question—what do you 

do now?—is nonetheless relevant as Special Forces group commanders from 

the 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 10th Special Forces groups have undergone fairly rapid 

regional realignments and had to deal with similarly difficult questions. 

Driving these changes was a 2009 United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) directive “realigning the traditional regional orientation 

of most Special Forces groups.”1 Most affected were the 3rd Group, which 

changed its regional focus from Africa to the eastern and northern parts of 

the Central Command region (including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan), and the 10th 

Group, which assumed responsibility for Africa from the 3rd Group, while 

retaining responsibility for Europe.2 The 5th Group’s focus is on the western 

and southern Central Command region, including Iran, Lebanon, and the 

Arabic speaking countries in the Middle East. The 7th Group retains all of 

Central and South America, while picking up Mexico and the Northern 

Command area of responsibility. Only the 1st Group is unaffected by the 

directive, keeping its Asia and Pacific orientation intact. 

The realignments, which were effective 1 February 2010, present many 

challenges for the Special Forces groups—particularly the 3rd and 10th— as 
xiv

their personnel learn new languages and new cultures, and establish rapport 

with new indigenous colleagues.3

The realignments also present challenges for the various Special Operations and Special Forces commands and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) as they consider several possible 

personnel training and education requirements to overcome language and 

cultural competency shortfalls. So, what to do? Other than complicated 

personnel shifts between and among groups, are there ways to speed up 

the absorption of new languages and cultures? Aside from Special Forces 

soldiers in existing groups having to learn new foreign languages and/or 

cultures, are there ways to achieve communication relevance in the operational area? Is there a technological “silver bullet” that will enable Special 

Forces soldiers to communicate with allies and adversaries without learning 

other languages? Are there methods to rapidly assimilate foreign culture 

expertise without long and tedious study? Are some individuals more adept 

at learning culture and/or languages than others? These and other related 

questions are addressed in the following pages. 
1

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

Introduction

This study, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration and Potential Alternatives, was initiated before 

the directive mentioned in the Preface. However, the directive is well-timed 

in that it makes the findings and recommendations from this monograph—

and its post-publication debate—more timely and relevant. 

This study focuses mostly on the “accelerating” question and alternative 

solutions to culture and language competency requirements. While revisiting the past and restating the present successes and failures of language and 

culture programs might provide a useful review, the exploration of future 

programs, alternative concepts, or new ways of using proven methods is the 

added value of this work. 

Organized in five sections, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for 

Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration and Potential Alternatives, will begin 

by discussing the requirements for culture and language competencies in 

Section 1. Section 2 develops the relationship between culture and language 

from a military training and education perspective. Section 3 addresses 

culture education and training, while Section 4 does the same for language 

education and training. Where possible, Sections 3 and 4 discuss desired 

capabilities for both culture and language and alternative or accelerated 

means of achieving those capabilities. Finally, Section 5 will conclude and 

provide some suggestions on the “way ahead.”

3

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

1. How Important Are Culture and Language?

The unsurprising conclusion of nearly every study, panel, lessonslearned report, after-action review, and a host of other assessments is 

that culture and language are very important knowledge sets for military 

personnel. For example, the Army Research Institute’s recent “Cultural 

Understanding and Language Proficiency” analysis proclaims that “lessons from recent and current operations reflect consensus” that culture and 

foreign language competencies for many military personnel are more than 

important—they are necessary for mission accomplishment.4 However, 

given career and training time constraints, the challenge is to determine 

how much, at what level, and what mix of culture and language training and 

education “can best equip leaders and soldiers with the necessary knowledge 

and skills” to accomplish future missions.5 Competencies in both culture 

and language, while largely viewed as requirements for general purpose 

forces, are particularly important for Special Forces soldiers. However, the 

Special Operations community features differing opinions about required 

competency levels for Special Forces, particularly given training time constraints and wartime deployment cycles. 

Culture, Language and the Post-Iraq & Afghanistan 

Operational Environment

At the time of publication, 85 percent of all Special Forces soldiers were 

deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, and this percentage may not change 

much in the near future even as conventional forces draw down in Iraq.6

Other areas of the world also requiring Special Forces expertise include 

the tumultuous Korean Peninsula, illicit drug-infested South America, and 

other areas in the Middle East and Africa where al-Qaeda proxies and surrogates have expanded their operations. Even after Iraq and Afghanistan 

are able to shoulder their own security responsibilities, the requirements 

for Special Forces expertise and capabilities are unlikely to decrease. And, 

while no one can accurately predict exactly where Special Forces will operate 

post- Iraq and Afghanistan, a good bet would be along the arc of instability, 

a swath of territory from the Caribbean to the Indonesian Archipelago7 and 

home to an unfathomable number of languages and cultures. 

Most future threat assessments concur that the area along the arc 

will be contentious for a number of reasons. For example, a shortage of 
4

JSOU Report 11-6

resources—including 

water, food and energy—

is becoming a serious 

problem in much of the 

world, but particularly 

along the arc. Demographic factors such 

as long-term fertility 

trends, urbanization, 

migration and changes 

in the ethnic composition and age profile of 

populations will influence the likelihood and nature of conflict among and within nations, 

particularly along the arc.8 Irregular warfare in the guises of terrorism, 

insurgency, criminal activity (such as human, weapons, and drug trafficking), ethnic conflict, and civil wars will prevail along the arc.9

 

In truth, the arc of instability as depicted in the above graphic might be 

too shallow. Many believe that the arc should also encompass a deeper swath 

of western, central and eastern Africa. There are many reasons for identifying a larger area of instability, but increased al-Qaeda activity conducted 

by surrogates such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram, a 

sometime al-Qaeda “wannabe” in Nigeria, top the list. Also in Nigeria, the 

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, a nasty commercial terrorist group, is also continuing its activities despite offers of amnesty by the 

Nigerian government.10 Hezbollah is firmly entrenched in the West African 

states of Senegal, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, where large Lebanese Shi’a 

populations control much of the illicit commercial market.11 

No matter how the arc is defined, its territory clearly includes a multitude 

of security interests and threats too numerous to mention here. In turn, this 

requires Special Forces capabilities in the role of both “commando”—which 

“places a premium on speed, surprise, stealth and precision in the use of 

force”—and “warrior-diplomat”—which “privileges the use of cross-cultural 

engagement skills for influencing, training and conducting operations with 

indigenous populations and foreign forces.”12 And, while those conducting 

commando-type missions might not require culture and language competency for mission success, those in warrior-diplomat roles will.

Figure 1. Arc of Instability (Created by 

USSOCOM Graphics)
5

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

2. The Relationship between Culture and 

Language

Most concur that there is an important link between cultural education and language competency. However, the extent of the linkage 

and importance of each is the subject of debate. Which is more important 

to the Special Forces soldier: language or culture? Should culture be a component of language training, or should language be a component of culture 

training? 

Academics tend to agree that foreign language and cultural education 

are complementary; an appreciation of culture facilitates foreign language 

competency, and speaking a foreign language facilitates the in-depth understanding of culture.13 However, there is some debate as to whether each of 

the two competencies is “essential” for learning the other.14 According to 

Patrick R. Moran, author of Teaching Culture: Perspectives in Practice, it is 

not necessary to master a language in order to build cultural competency; 

however, learning a language can serve as a “critical step” in understanding culture:

Making the effort to understand another language, listening, 

negotiating meanings, all these facets of communication through 

language demonstrate respect, which allows the learner to engage 

in an authentic inquiry into a culture. As the process builds, 

relationships emerge. And relationships become the foundation 

for meaningful cross-cultural engagements.15

Some believe that the teaching of culture should be an integral part of 

foreign language instruction.16 For example, in an article titled “The Importance of Teaching Culture in the Foreign Language Classroom,” Dimitrios 

Thanasoulas argues that cultural awareness must be viewed as “something 

more than merely a compartmentalized subject within the foreign language 

curriculum.” Instead, says Thanasoulas, culture must “inhabit” the classroom and “undergird every language activity.”17

U.S. allies in the United Kingdom have a different view. According to 

UK Joint Doctrine Note 1/9, culture does facilitate the use of language, and 

“linguistic skills facilitate the gaining and exploitation of cultural knowledge.”18 However, while linguistic ability does not guarantee knowledge 
6

JSOU Report 11-6

of culture, “all personnel can benefit from enhanced cultural capability.”19

According to this perspective, “It is possible for a relatively high level of 

cultural capability to be achieved with limited language ability. However, to 

be an effective linguist, a reasonable level of cultural capability is required 

in order to maximize the opportunities presented through direct engagement.”20 Colonel Brett Lewis, author of “Developing Soldier Competency,” 

agrees, but for more practical reasons. He argues that foreign language 

proficiency is not an essential component of cultural competency because 

“not all soldiers have the aptitude to learn another language,” too much time 

is required to develop and maintain proficiency, and secondary options, 

including translators or technology in the form of “near-universal language 

translations” on hand-held devices or laptops, are usually available.21 With 

regards to Special Forces soldiers, Colonel Lewis’ observations are only partially correct; by definition, Special Forces soldiers do have the competency 

to learn another language, or they would not have been selected to be in 

Special Forces. However, his other observations, particularly on the evolution and availability of technology, are very relevant and will be addressed 

later in this paper. 

Culture: We Need Some of That!22

Particularly because of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, the requirement for cultural knowledge for military operations has been actively promoted by defense policymakers and military leaders.23 While some may 

view the culture requirement as new, in actuality cultural knowledge and 

warfare are “inextricably bound” and have been for centuries—at the very 

least, since “Herodotus studied his opponents’ conduct during the Persian 

Wars (490-479 BC).”24 More recent and better known are the exploits of 

Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), who, after the 1916 

Arab rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, immersed himself in local 

cultures, often at extreme personal risk, and is known to have remarked, 

“Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, 

standards were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own 

side.”25 

The post-Cold War emphasis on coalition and counterinsurgency operations has increased the importance of culture for military operations. By 

definition, successful coalition operations require militaries from different 

cultures to work together successfully. Also by definition, the focal point of 
7

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

counterinsurgency operations is the “hearts and minds” of those from different cultures who are at risk. In both instances, ignoring the significance 

of culture creates barriers to interaction and increases the risk of mission 

failure.26 Cultural knowledge—even at basic levels—reduces these risks 

and enhances the opportunities to work with allies, defeat adversaries, and 

operate successfully in not just counterinsurgency operations, but other 

forms of irregular warfare (IW) as well.27

Defining Culture—A Difficult Task

A standard definition of “culture” is difficult to pin down; a recent book on 

the subject presents more than 300 definitions of culture.28 Some definitions are brief and simple: “Culture is the learned and shared behavior of a 

community of interacting human beings.”29 Some, such as the following, 

are long and detailed:

Most social scientists today view culture as consisting primarily of 

the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of human societies. 

The essence of a culture is not its artifacts, tools, or other tangible 

cultural elements but how the members of the group interpret, 

use, and perceive them. It is the values, symbols, interpretations, 

and perspectives that distinguish one people from another in 

modernized societies; it is not material objects and other tangible 

aspects of human societies. People within a culture usually interpret 

the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviors in the same or in 

similar ways.30

And some, such as the definition used by the U.S. Department of Defense 

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), make little sense: 

“Culture is a feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. 

Included are such items as roads, buildings, and canals; boundary lines; 

and, in a broad sense, all names and legends on a map.”31 

Army Colonel Timothy R. Williams’ definition is the one used for the 

purposes of this paper. In his 2006 essay, “Culture—We Need Some of That! 

Cultural Knowledge and Army Officer Professional Development,” Colonel 

Williams deftly ties the importance of culture to the accomplishment of 

military objectives in the emerging international security environment.32

He defines culture as “learned ideals, beliefs, values and assumptions 
8

JSOU Report 11-6

characteristic of an identifiable community or population which cumulatively result in socially transmitted behavior patterns.”33 Williams notes 

that there are two aspects to his definition: “an invisible dimension (ideals, 

beliefs, values and assumptions) and a visible dimension (behavior).”34

Without an understanding of the invisible dimension, it is very difficult to 

“understand, predict or change behavior”—three vitally important competencies required of today’s Special Forces soldiers. 

Our Enemies Understand the Importance of Culture—We 

Should, Too!

Al-Qaeda, America’s principal adversary, certainly understands the importance of culture, and has actually chided the United States for lacking cultural awareness.35 More important, al-Qaeda leaders understand—and 

are trying to change—the cultural awareness limitations of their own foot 

soldiers. In terms Western analysts certainly understand, Abu Bakr Naji 

warned al-Qaeda extremists not to project their own motivations on the 

enemy.36 Critical of mirror imaging, Naji explained that, unlike al-Qaeda 

members, who are motivated by an ostensibly religious cause, the “motive 

of religion among many of the factions of the enemy [the West] is secondary”37 However, these explanations have not been fully internalized by the 

al-Qaeda rank and file: 

Despite Naji’s warnings, ideological and cultural misperceptions 

occur at every level within the movement. A telling example is the 

conclusion drawn in one al Qaida affiliated Web site’s chat room 

that a flyer promoting a ROTC blood drive on a U.S. university 

campus proved the huge undisclosed losses inflicted on the U.S. 

Army and hence an urgent need for blood.38

Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Guantanamo prisoner and current Taliban 

ambassador to Pakistan, contemptuously notes America’s “myopic understanding of Afghanistan.”39 He recently commented, “How long has America been in Afghanistan? ...And, how much do Americans know about its 

people? Do they understand its culture, its tribes, and its population? I am 

afraid they know very little.”40 
9

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

Culture: The Strategic Corporal and the Foreign-PolicyImplementing Captain

Because of the speed and availability of information with today’s technology, one soldier’s “cultural misstep can quickly turn ... into a situation with 

strategic implications.”41 While the expectation is that “strategic corporals” must possess “technical mastery in the skill of arms,” they must also 

be aware that their “judgment, decision-making and action can all have 

strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of a given 

mission” and their national reputations.42 One picture of a soldier defacing 

the Koran43 can have the same impact as a Florida minister threatening to 

burn a truckload of Korans.44 

While there are few, if any, corporals in Special Forces, the Department 

of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 elevates the “strategic corporal” concept by 

pointing out that Special Forces operations “focus on the operational and 

strategic levels” and that their “continuous forward presence of Special 

Forces can assist in creating the conditions necessary for stable development.”45 Therefore, the Special Forces captain who will be leading a detachment well forward in potentially failed and failing states and denied areas 

is more than a “strategic corporal”—he is the implementer and executor of 

American foreign policy, and each action he and his detachment make has 

strategic implications.46 As a result, all members of the detachment—officers 

and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) alike—must understand more than 

basic culture “dos and don’ts” that can be found in a tour book. They must 

be able to make quick decisions that not only account for their own cultural 

proclivities, but also anticipate the reactions of those from other cultures 

whom they are trying to influence. 

It seems logical, then, that developing a higher level of cultural competency in Special Forces soldiers is important at least to a level that will 

“improve communications and reduce misunderstandings in cross-culture 

interactions” with both allies and adversaries.47 Ideally, the ultimate goal 

would be for culturally competent Special Forces soldiers—particularly 

leaders—to be adept at understanding the strategic culture of America’s 

adversaries as an analytical tool for the present operations and a possible 

predictive tool for the future. But with so many diverse cultures and the 

enormous amount of study required to become an expert on any given one, 
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JSOU Report 11-6

how can the field be narrowed to determine which “Lawrences” are needed 

now and in the future, and how should they be educated and trained?48 

How Much Culture is Enough?

Unfortunately, there is no standard terminology or categorization system 

for various levels of cultural knowledge or capability, nor is there agreement 

on how much cultural capability is enough for different operational levels. 

Some experts, such as Maxie McFarland, a retired Army colonel, author of 

“Military Cultural Education,” and strong advocate of enhanced culture 

training for the military—describe two cultural knowledge levels: cultural 

literacy and cultural competency. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, author of On the Uses 

of Cultural Knowledge, distinguishes between levels of cultural knowledge 

and utility in tactical, operational and strategic terms. While dissimilar in 

some ways and complementary in others, their analysis is instructive.

According to McFarland’s approach, cultural literacy is the understanding of one’s own beliefs, behaviors, values, and norms—and also the awareness of how perspectives might affect other cultures’ views.49 Taking a 

cue from Sun Tzu’s oft-quoted axiom, “If you know your enemy and know 

yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt,”50 McFarland notes that 

culturally literate soldiers should strive for “self-awareness” of their own 

“cultural assumptions” in order to understand how their perspectives could 

affect other cultures’ views.51 Therefore, before venturing into the cultural 

unknown, one must first become conversant with what it means to be part 

of his or her own culture—which, in turn, allows for reflection upon new 

cultures “with a higher degree of intellectual objectivity.”52 

As important and elemental as McFarland’s observations are, cultural 

identification can be difficult for Americans for several reasons. First, a 

person may be largely unaware of his or her own cultural orientation—

particularly aspects that undergird fundamental belief systems and values—and thus, the exercise of self-awareness is often incomplete. Second, 

our own insufficiently-understood cultural orientation is often projected 

onto others; without understanding why or how, our cultural background 

shapes our “attitudes, emotions, beliefs and values,” and we then project 

this native frame of reference on the cultures we are attempting to work 

with (or against), with dangerous results. And third, those in the military 

who have lived on several different Army posts around the nation should 

easily understand recent research showing that cultural identification is 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

subjective, varying from region to region, state to state, and individual to 

individual.53

If cultural literacy is understanding one’s own culture and how it might 

affect another, then cultural competency, says McFarland, is “a more indepth and application-oriented understanding of culture:”54 

Competency is demonstrated through organizational leadership 

capable of crossing cultural divides within organizations and 

establishing cooperative frameworks between communities and 

groups from different cultures. Competency is about building 

successful teams with a common vision, effective communications, 

and acceptable processes that benefit from cultural [knowledge and] 

diversity.55 

McFarland notes that cultural competency’s utility is in “managing group, 

organizational, or community, cross or mixed cultural activities.”56

In contrast to McFarland’s emphasis on deeper cultural self-awareness 

and its impact on the interpretation of new cultures, Jager asserts that there 

is a place for simpler cultural knowledge at the tactical and operational 

levels, while agreeing that strategic-level knowledge requirements are more 

complex and nuanced. According to Jager, the kinds of cultural knowledge 

required at the tactical and operational levels are “how-to” and practical in 

nature—for example, awareness of specific customs (such as “do not spit 

in public,” or “take off your shoes before entering a house”) is tactically 

relevant.57 In Jager’s view, the practical cultural knowledge required at the 

operational level is anthropological and should include the “intricacies” of 

distinct belief systems, customs, values, symbols, and traditions that can 

be usefully applied to enhance the cultural awareness of American forces 

in foreign countries.58 

At the strategic level, Jager believes cultural knowledge might include 

how other regions, nations, and societies view themselves and others and 

what effect this awareness has on policy and strategy formulations and 

outcomes. As Jager explains, “Cultural knowledge as applied to the level of 

strategy assumes that cultures are dynamic entities, not static categories.”59

Therefore, in formulating an overarching strategic framework for post-9/11 

military operations, it is important to grasp not merely the cultural logic 

of an enemy’s identity, but how the enemy has “invoked these traditional 
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JSOU Report 11-6

values, historical experiences, and belief-systems in the contemporary context to justify” their hostile actions.60 For example, al-Qaeda has “appropriated and reinterpreted Islamic texts, belief-systems, and traditions to justify 

their own radical ideology”—an “instrumental” use of culture that must be 

understood properly in order to defeat al-Qaeda.61

As illustrated previously, Jager notes that the types of cultural knowledge required at the tactical and operational levels—the “how-to,” practical 

applications—are quite separate from the more abstract notions required to 

formulate strategy and policy, though many tend to erroneously conflate the 

two.62 However, although quite distinct, the uses of culture as they apply to 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels are interrelated and complementary. A “sound strategic framework based on a deep cultural and historical 

understanding of an adversary culture will necessarily give rise to sound 

operations and tactics necessary for waging successful counterinsurgency” 

and addressing other irregular warfare threats.63

Clearly, both Jager and McFarland’s explanations have merit. Jager’s tactical, operational and strategic framework is easy for a Special Forces soldier 

to comprehend, even if her explanations are a bit theoretical. McFarland’s 

approach does not highlight the tactical, but does—at least in the abstract—

address the operational and strategic levels. McFarland also makes the very 

important point that awareness of one’s own culture is an important prerequisite to understanding another culture. At the risk of being overly simplistic (and very unscientific), this paper suggests a composite of Jager’s and 

McFarland’s models as a more Special Forces user-friendly answer to how 

much cultural knowledge is required at various levels of decision making 

and planning. 

This conception of the Jager-McFarland composite uses the term cultural capability as the baseline for all levels of understanding culture. The 

composite uses Jager’s categories—tactical, operational, and strategic—as 

the levels of cultural capability while concurring with McFarland (and Sun 

Tzu) that, before an attempt to comprehend another culture, one should first 

understand the basics of his or her own culture. 

So, how much cultural capability is required at each level?

At the tactical level, cultural awareness is required. A culturally aware 

person understands that there are differences—particularly in attitudes and 

values—between him or herself and people from other countries or other 

backgrounds. Cultural awareness is what Special Forces soldiers need to 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

avoid simple, though sometimes deadly, cultural misunderstandings. Cultural awareness is more than an understanding of simple dos and don’ts; 

it is a basic recognition of the existence of different cultural backgrounds, 

values, and perspectives that must be considered before conducting operations. Cultural awareness allows one to avoid faux pas or cross-cultural 

miscues that can result in negative consequences due to a failure to understand simple cultural nuances.64 At minimum, culturally aware soldiers 

understand that there are differences in cultures, and that cultural norms 

must be understood at the tactical level in order to avoid situations that 

could negatively affect operations and mission accomplishment. 

At the operational level, cultural literacy is required. In addition to being 

culturally aware, culturally literate soldiers understand individual cultural 

patterns and know their own cultural norms in relation to other cultures. 

According to McFarland, “understanding the way your culture affects 

someone else’s culture can profoundly affect ... chances for success.”65 An 

additional challenge for military leaders, says McFarland, is that they “must 

understand and appreciate their own military culture, their nation’s culture, 

and the operational area’s culture.”66 

At the strategic level, cultural competency is required. Cultural competence is a “set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come 

together in a system, agency, or among professionals that enables effective 

work in cross-cultural situations.”67 Further, competence “implies having 

the capacity to function effectively” in an integrated fashion within the context of the cultural beliefs, behaviors, and needs of both allies and adversaries.68 A culturally competent person is both culturally aware and culturally 

literate, but also has an in-depth understanding of local religions and basic 

belief systems, sources of pride and of shame, and most important, what 

aspects of the culture must be influenced in order to initiate change.69 

Finally, if one agrees with the premise that Special Forces soldiers will be 

increasingly deployed along the arc of instability, undertaking coalition and 

multinational cooperative military efforts to address a menu of asymmetrical, demographic, and resource-related threats, then cultural competence 

will be a critical leadership requirement for such missions. Additionally, 

operations along the arc of instability will often be in failing or failed states 

and in denied areas where logistics support is sparse or nonexistent. The 

local markets will of necessity be a source of logistical support—so too 

will private and international non-governmental organizations. Therefore, 
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JSOU Report 11-6

leaders with the cultural competency to work within the local community 

and with international and private organizations whose members come 

from widely divergent cultural backgrounds, will have a greater chance of 

success than those who do not. This will be not only true for Special Forces, 

but for conventional forces who may very well find themselves in the same 

operational area and logistics conundrum.70
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

3. Accelerating Cultural Knowledge and 

Competency

Selecting the Right Students

Unlike the case of foreign languages, where evidence exists that some have 

better aptitude for learning another language than others, there is no such 

reliable evidence regarding the learning of culture. Recent studies attempting to measure a person’s cultural intelligence (CQ) are interesting and 

informative, but inconclusive.71 Some tests indicate that people with certain 

CQ personality traits have better aptitude for learning intercultural skills, 

and other studies indicate that those with certain CQ cognitive skills have 

better intercultural acumen. However, neither of these reports, nor several 

others too numerous to mention here, agree.72 In many analysts’ opinion, 

CQ is a new construct and is worthy of further research. In fact, some are 

marketing CQ as a viable testing process.73 Others are a bit more skeptical, arguing that CQ may have the potential to improve understanding of 

acculturation and adaptation, including the prediction of psychological 

wellbeing and the acquisition of culturally appropriate skills.74 At the present time, however, realization of CQ’s potential is limited by its academic 

measurement, which is inconclusive at best.75 

Most anthropologists believe that the best and quickest way to learn 

about other cultures is to immerse oneself in the culture: move there, live 

there, learn the language(s), and experience daily life over an extended 

period of time. Since culture primarily relates to the way societies interact 

with each other, anthropologists believe the “best way to really get to know 

another society and its culture is to live in it as an active participant.”76

Through this form of “participant observation,” whereby one “physically 

and emotionally participate[s] in the social interaction of the host society, it 

is possible to become accepted as a member of the society.”77 While JCETs, 

MTTs and Joint Exercises conducted by the five regionally aligned Special 

Forces Groups ensure that members of the various groups have intermittent 

opportunities to be “participant observers,” most Special Forces soldiers 

do not have adequate time to fully immerse themselves in a culture for any 

extended period. 

The conventional Army’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Hands (AfPak 

Hands) program understands the importance of cultural and linguistic 
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JSOU Report 11-6

immersion. Developed in 2009 and with its first training in May 2010, 

AfPak Hands is a new initiative conceived and developed by Navy Admiral 

Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. AfPak members 

complete an intensive 17-week Defense Language Institute (DLI) course in 

Dari or Pashto and attend service-specific pre-deployment training before 

departing for Afghanistan, where they complete a week-long counterinsurgency course and four weeks of immersion training with Afghan government and security forces counterparts.78 

In addition to culture, language, and counterinsurgency training, each 

AfPak Hand has “expertise in governance, engineering, intelligence, finance, 

and force protection.”79 Initially, AfPak service personnel are assigned to 

a variety of one-year assignments in Afghanistan or Pakistan, where they 

assist and mentor indigenous forces and ministries. They then rotate to 

the United States, where they “stay involved in AfPak issues at one of four 

major hub locations and further develop their language and culture skills 

with DLI instructors” before redeploying, “ideally to the same area and 

position in Afghanistan or Pakistan.”80 This is a long-term commitment; 

service members assigned to the program commit to serving three to five 

years with two to three one-year tours of duty in Afghanistan or Pakistan.81

The program’s goal:

...is not to reinvent the wheel each time a new service member 

replaces someone returning from a deployment, but to have a cadre 

of military and civilian experts that will rotate into key staff and 

leadership positions that are in-theater and the continental United 

States to provide continued 

expertise in support of U.S. 

objectives in the region.82

AfPak Hands is a multiservice program and includes 

Special Operations Forces, but 

according to Lieutenant Colonel Chris Watrud, DLI chief of 

staff, Special Forces individuals are not designated as official “Hands,” though they may 

Figure 2. AfPak Course Graduate 

Converses with Afghan Soldier 83
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

volunteer for the training through the Pakistan-Afghanistan Control Cell. 

Watrud said Special Operations Forces officers and NCOs go thru AfPak 

Hands language training at all three designated hubs (Washington, D.C.; 

Tampa, Florida; and Norfolk, Virginia), as well as at the SWCS language 

program at Fort Bragg, which is offering the same 16-week program as an 

“unofficial hub.”84 However, the long-term nature of AfPak assignments 

most likely would prevent Special Forces soldiers from fully participating 

in the program; likewise, Special Forces Command is not likely to replicate 

the AfPak program. Given all that Special Forces officers and NCOs have 

to do to remain competitive for rank and command assignments, it would 

be nearly impossible for an officer and extremely difficult for an NCO to 

participate in a three-to-five-year “advisory” program offering marginal 

advancement opportunities. 

Anthropology as a “Quick Start” to Understanding Various 

and Different Cultures

Perhaps a way to compensate for the lack of immersed “participant observer” 

time would be to have a basic understanding of cultural anthropology. 

Anthropology is “the study of people and their cultures,” and the aim of 

anthropological studies is to “develop cultural patterns and find the inherent reasons for their practices and traditions.”85 Unlike many other social 

science disciplines, which focus on understanding relationships between 

states (such as international relations) or American societal relationships 

(such as sociology), anthropology focuses on understanding how foreign 

societies work in microcosm. 

More specifically, cultural anthropology is “the study of human society 

and culture [which] describes, analyzes, interprets, and explains social and 

cultural similarities and differences.”86 A course in cultural anthropology 

would be a good baseline for Special Forces soldiers (particularly officers) in 

anticipation of a career in which they will have to become familiar with—

perhaps expert in—several different and disparate cultures over an extended 

career. 

Cultural anthropology provides a foundation in the understanding of 

cultural patterns—a template of sorts that enables a person to assess any 

culture quickly based on a set of rules or patterns affecting all cultures. A 

good comprehension of cultural anthropology would enable Special Forces 

soldiers to understand basic social structures (such as tribes, networks, and 
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JSOU Report 11-6

identity groups), be sensitive to local customs and patterns of communication, be reflexive about their own biases and mental models, and, perhaps 

most important, help them ask the right questions about what they need to 

know.87 An understanding of cultural anthropology would enable them to 

“fast forward” their ability to understand a new culture and, in the early 

stages of operations in areas of new or unknown cultures, avoid the previously mentioned “cross-cultural miscues” that might jeopardize an entire 

operation.

Despite all of the positives of cultural anthropology, it will be a challenge 

to sift through and integrate the many available approaches in order to tailor 

the right course for Special Forces soldiers. Any such course would require 

materials that are not only relevant, but presented in such a way that they 

could be quickly comprehended and used. 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

4. Foreign Languages

From 1990 to 1992, this author was in charge of the Special Forces Language School and oversaw the transition of the Special Forces Language Immersion Course (SFLIC), which taught military-specific language, 

to the Basic Army Language Training Course, which taught a more traditional, functional skill-building approach88 based on an upgraded Defense 

Language Institute model. SFLIC was not a traditional immersion course; 

instead, immersion meant learning mostly “Army speak,” which would 

enable the user to teach indigenous soldiers how to move, shoot and communicate using specific military vocabulary. SFLIC was problematic for 

two reasons. First, it did not work very well; most soldiers could not learn 

how to use “soldier-specific” vocabulary without a more comprehensive 

understanding of the language. And second, even those few who did well 

at SFLIC did not have the language skills to get from the airport to the 

training site to put it to use. 

The Basic Army Language Training Course was an improvement over 

SFLIC in that the standard six-month course had a high success rate at getting Special Forces soldiers to a higher reading and listening comprehension 

level, even in “category four” (the most difficult classification level in the 

U.S. government system) languages such as Arabic. In the past two decades, 

several improvements have been made to the language program. Presently, 

language training in some form is taught throughout the entire six-month 

Special Forces Qualification Course (Q Course) cycle, not just in a separate 

“language course” taught after Q Course completion. Teaching language 

throughout the course adds realism and reinforces the notion that language 

training and learning is a continuous process—not a one-time event.

The Age-Old Question: Which Foreign Languages Should 

Special Forces Soldiers Learn?

When this author was in charge of the Special Forces foreign language training, Major General David Baratto, SWCS commander in the early 1990s, 

asked with some frequency, “Are we teaching the right languages, teaching 

too many languages, and what other languages should we teach?” Answers 

to his questions always varied and, other than adding Chinese, there was no 

consensus on which additional languages should be taught—or dropped, for 
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JSOU Report 11-6

that matter. Certainly, Dari and Pashto—so important today—were not on 

any wish list then. However, the same discussion—which languages should 

be taught today and in the future?—is still a core topic of discussion.89

Two decades ago, nine foreign languages were taught at SWCS: French, 

Russian, Spanish, German, Arabic (Egyptian and Modern Standard), 

Korean, Tagalog, Thai, and Vietnamese.90 Today, SWCS teaches 17 primary 

languages, including: Polish, Tagalog, Bahasa (Indonesia), French, Spanish, 

Urdu, Czech, Hungarian, Arabic, Chinese (Mandarin), Korean, Russian, 

Persian (Farsi), Turkish, Thai, Dari, and Pashto. Additionally, and depending 

on today’s requirements, several “surge” languages, such as Dari, Pashto, 

Laotian, Turkish, Serbian, Arabic (Iraq), Bengali, Vietnamese, German, 

Punjabi, and Portuguese (Brazil), may also be offered.91 Yet, even with this 

wider menu of language options, the decades-old questions remain: Are 

these the right languages to teach? Should some be dropped and others 

added?

The answers depend on different points of view. Some would contend 

that most of the world’s population speaks one of ten or so languages either 

as a native speaker or second language speaker—so stick with those. Others 

might argue that English is increasingly becoming the international language—so if a person speaks English, there is little incentive to learn a 

foreign language. Still others believe that, within the decade, technology 

will be such that a person speaking any language will be able to, with the 

help of a laptop and special software, speak with another person using any 

other language—so, new technology will override the need to learn new 

languages. Finally, there are those who contend that the ability to speak 

low-density languages, particularly along the arc of instability, will continue 

to be an important “force multiplier”—so, continuing to identify those who 

can learn foreign languages easily and those who have already demonstrated 

foreign language acumen is important because new, uncommon languages 

requiring quick study and learning will continuously be a factor in the present and future security environments. To some degree, all of these opinions 

have merit; each will be discussed in the following pages. 

Learn the traditional and most commonly spoken languages

In 2010, as part of the research for this paper, this author interviewed a professional interpreter and long-time colleague. His name is Martin Kwame 

Matrevi, and his native language is Ewe, but his two specialty languages are 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

French and English. Martin does simultaneous translation from English to 

French and French to English and is quite good at his trade. When asked 

about the importance of Special Forces soldiers learning African languages, 

his response was somewhat surprising. In his words, “If you can speak 

French, English and/or Arabic, you pretty much have Africa covered.”92

He went on to explain that if you know a dozen or so of the most common 

languages, you can effectively communicate with most of the world.

Interestingly, studies conducted by George Weber from 1993 through 

1999 support Martin’s opinion and also reinforce SWCS’s decisions on which 

languages to teach over the past two decades. The multi-year Weber Study, 

though a bit dated, contains findings that are still relevant. Weber’s goal was 

to determine which were the world’s most influential languages by examining several “language importance” categories, including the numbers of 

primary speakers, secondary speakers, countries where used and populations of those countries, and major fields using the language internationally. Additionally, it examined the economic power of countries using the 

languages and their socio-literary prestige.93 For the purpose of this paper, 

the numbers of primary and secondary speakers of each language are most 

important. According to Weber’s studies, the rank order of languages by 

number of primary (native) speakers is:

1. Mandarin Chinese (1.1 billion) 

2. English (330 million) 

3. Spanish (300 million) 

4. Hindi/Urdu (250 million) 

5. Arabic (200 million) 

6. Bengali (185 million) 

7. Portuguese (160 million) 

8. Russian (160 million) 

9. Japanese (125 million) 

10. German (100 million) 

11. Punjabi (90 million) 

12. Javanese (80 million) 

13. French (75 million)94
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JSOU Report 11-6

And, the rank order of those languages spoken as second languages was:

1. French (190 million) 

2. English (150 million) 

3. Russian (125 million) 

4. Portuguese (28 million) 

5. Arabic (21 million) 

6. Spanish (20 million) 

7. Chinese (20 million) 

8. German (9 million) 

9. Japanese (8 million)95

Thus, if one combines the native speaker populations to the secondary speaker populations, approximately 60 percent of the world’s population speaks one of the following languages as either a first or second 

language:96 

1. Mandarin Chinese (1.12 billion) 

2. English (480 million) 

3. Spanish (320 million) 

4. Russian (285 million) 

5. French (265 million) 

6. Hindi/Urdu (250 million) 

7. Arabic (221 million) 

8. Portuguese (188 million) 

9. Bengali (185 million) 

10. Japanese (133 million) 

11. German (109 million)97

The 60 percent figure is calculated using the global population figures from 

1995, when this study was first completed (5.7 billion). Today’s population is 

a bit more than 6.7 billion,98 but according to an update by George Weber 

in 2008, “the number of speakers of all the top ten languages have gone up 

in the last quarter century but relative to each other, the situation among 

the top ten remains unchanged.”99

While Weber’s findings emphasize the importance of several core languages and seem to support both the decisions of the SWCS and the opinion 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

of the Ghanaian translator, there are some flaws in this approach. What 

about the 40 percent of the world’s population that does not speak one of 

the major languages? Also, while the data above can provide a good argument for learning the world’s major languages, they are a poor argument 

for not learning others. For example, a village elder in Peshawar is unlikely 

to know any of the major languages listed, but Pashto-speaking skills can 

be vital for a unit operating there. The premise also assumes away the need 

for any cultural awareness if English is the global lingua franca.100

The Importance of English

Several years ago, at a multinational Cobra Gold Exercise, a Thai senior 

colonel expressed that he appreciated Special Forces soldiers’ attempts to 

learn and speak Thai, but that it would really be more efficient if Thai soldiers learned how to speak English. His rationale was that Thai soldiers 

would be more motivated to learn English than Americans would be to 

learn Thai because of English’s preeminence in a globalized world. If his soldiers learned English, the Thai colonel reasoned, two-way communication 

between our soldiers would be much easier, and thus operations would be 

more effective. His suggestion, given somewhat in jest, was to put an American English instructor in every Thai Special Forces training installation. 

The Thai colonel had a point; English is an important language. According to the CIA World Fact Book, less than 5 percent of the world’s total 

population speaks English as a primary language.101 However, that number 

doubles when people who speak English as a second or third language are 

counted. According to recent British Council statistics, English is spoken 

as a native language by approximately 375 million and as a second language 

by another 375 million speakers in the world, and speakers of English as a 

second language will soon outnumber those who are primary speakers.102

Clearly, two different data sets confirm the fact that, depending on how you 

count, one out of four or five of the world’s population speaks English at 

some level of competence. Adding emphasis to the importance of English, 

the Council notes that English has official or special status in at least 75 

countries with a total population of over two billion.103

The English language is widely recognized as the most dominant 

language of international business. Other languages are indisputably 

growing in influence—most notably, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic—but 

English’s predominance is reflected in and solidified by its emphasis within 
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JSOU Report 11-6

international business schools.104 English is the official language for the airline industry, and now all commercial pilots and air traffic controllers must 

speak English.105 English is also a key language for legal systems around the 

world—so much that in one part of Germany, commercial law cases can be 

conducted in English.106 In South Asia, English is the prevalent language in 

higher education, science, and inter-state communication, and is an official 

co-language in India (alongside Hindi).107 And the list goes on. 

While the data above encourage wider English-speaking capabilities 

around the world, teaching English as a foreign language has a reverse 

culture benefit. Much of this paper has argued for more culture training 

from a “know yourself, know your ally, and know your enemy” point of 

view. However, just as al-Qaeda believes it is important for its operators to 

understand American culture, it can be argued that U.S. allies should also 

understand American culture. 

There are several excellent university-level programs offering bachelor’s 

and master’s degrees programs in Teaching English as a Second Language 

(TESOL, which is also called English as a Second Language, or ESL, and 

Teaching English as a Foreign Language, or TEFL). However, one does not 

have to have a degree to be a qualified TESOL instructor. The only requirement is a certificate that can be obtained from a recognized training institution for a few hundred dollars. Earning a certificate is fairly straightforward. 

Usually, TESOL certificate courses taught in the United States are intensive, 

full-time courses that run four to six weeks and focus on practical training 

and different language methodologies. Most reputable courses include more 

than 100 contact hours in the classroom, and better courses also include a 

student teaching component.108 Some programs offer a distance learning 

option, with credits completed online and at a student’s individual pace.109

So how might the ability to teach English as a second language fit into 

Special Forces operational planning and professional development? Recall 

the Thai colonel’s comment that it would be a good idea to have an English 

instructor at every Thai Special Forces base. Interestingly, maintaining an 

English instructor at allied Special Forces installations would have several 

benefits. First, the instructor would have status and the gratitude of the host 

nation, so that the instruction presented would have lasting value. Second, 

more friends and allies speaking English would enhance global communications. Third, the TESOL instructor’s foreign language and culture capability 

would also be enhanced because he or she would be “immersed” in a foreign 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

language and culture. And finally, the instructor could learn valuable “capability and intentions” information by observing activities at a foreign base. 

Other than personnel availability issues, there probably is no good reason 

for there not to be a TESOL “skill identifier” for at least one member on 

every Special Forces team. While current requirements probably prevent 

Special Forces personnel from being TESOL instructors, there would be 

nothing preventing Department of Army government civilian employees 

or contractors from serving as TESOL instructors. Also, in “SOF for Life” 

terms, being a TESOL instructor for allied Special Forces organizations 

could be an ideal retirement career.

However, according to the Chief of Staff at the Defense Language Institute, while teaching English to allies is not a bad idea per se, reliance only 

on English would leave Americans at a severe disadvantage for everything 

from dealing with friendly forces in a meaningful way to understanding 

when things go wrong. Developing a relationship with an ally is one thing, 

says Watrud, but becoming completely dependent on them is another. There 

may be an ulterior motive, as it leaves the “host” forces holding all the cards 

when it comes to information.110 Explains Watrud:

While it always helps to work with allies to speak English well, 

improving our forces’ ability to speak their language has a multiplied 

effect: in addition to allowing us to work with the members of their 

military that we normally encounter (often a small subset of their 

leaders or key individuals), training our forces to speak a target 

language lets us interact with their entire population—and that can 

extend far beyond the military to anyone else we might need to deal 

with. Furthermore, the contribution to mutual respect, acceptance, 

and a positive working relationship brought by just making the 

effort to learn their language can prove extremely beneficial.111

Speech-to-Speech Technology—Wave of the Future?

In Douglas Adams’s humorous sci-fi novel series, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 

the Galaxy, a special kind of fish—the Babel Fish—has amazing translation 

capabilities. When inserted into a human’s ear, the Babel Fish translates any 

spoken language into whichever language the listener understands. It is a 

very nifty device that many companies are trying to replicate, including 

Yahoo!, which has adopted the Babel Fish name for its online text translation 
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JSOU Report 11-6

product, and Google, whose evolving phone software for instantaneous 

translation owes a debt to Adams’s Babel Fish concept.112

In 2007, a venture capital firm asked this author to test some text-totext language translation software developed by an Australian who was a 

principal in a Malaysian firm based in Kuala Lumpur. In the testing of a 

Chinese–to-English and English-to-Chinese text-to-text translation product 

he was developing, the system worked fairly well—better than the systems 

available at the time on Google and Yahoo!. The developer said he believed 

speech-to-speech capability might be viable; within 10 years, technology 

will enable two people with a single laptop, two earphone portals, and two 

microphones to converse in any language with 90 percent accuracy. 

Globalization, induced increased commerce, and travel have created an 

ever-increasing demand for a Babel Fish-type device that can deliver instant 

speech-to-speech translation between different languages. Potential military 

applications for such a device are clearly evident, as U.S. military personnel 

struggle to communicate with allies and adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan. More important, particularly for Special Forces, the requirement for 

real-time, speech-to-speech capabilities will only continue to increase in 

the post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan security environment, as most future 

threat scenarios predict that Special Forces will be very busy in areas where 

English is not a first or second language. Thus, the military will benefit from 

the ultimate goal of speech-to-speech translation (sometimes referred to as 

S2S) to “enable real-time, interpersonal communication via natural spoken 

language for people who do not share a common language.”113

Recent progress in the field of computer-assisted speech and language 

processing has advanced the creation of automated speech-to-speech systems. However, none of the systems are quite up to Adams’ fictitious Babel 

Fish capabilities: 

Creating speech-to-speech translation systems for cross-lingual oral 

communication has been the dream of speech and natural language 

researchers for decades. It is technically extremely difficult because 

of the need to integrate a set of complex technologies – Automatic 

Speech Recognition (ASR), Natural Language Understanding (NLU), 

Machine Translation (MT), Natural Language Generation (NLG), 

and Text-to-Speech Synthesis (TTS) – that are far from mature on 

an individual basis, much less when cascaded together.114 
27

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

In addition to Google’s emerging phone-based software, there are several 

“aspiring” products on the market, including some being tested by Department of Defense agencies. Two of those are the Multilingual Automatic 

Speech-to-Speech Translator (MASTOR) system being developed by IBM for 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Jibbigo system, which 

has an iPhone, iPod, and/or iPad application now being tested at DLI. 

Conceptually, the MASTOR system has advantages over commercially 

available translation systems, which “can only work with pre-programmed 

fixed phrases” that would be impossible to configure for military use, particularly in combat.115 According to IBM, MASTOR “offers users the ability 

to have a free-form conversation without having to memorize any pre-determined phrases.”116 

Recently, this author had an opportunity to test the Jibbigo speech translator system used at DLI. Supposedly a person using the system can speak 

a sentence aloud into an iPhone, iPod or iPad in one language, and the 

sentence is broadcast aloud in another selected language, “much like a personal human interpreter would.”117 Jibbigo also shows the text translation 

on the instrument, so the translation’s accuracy can be verified if the users 

can read the language. Results with the Jibbigo system have been mixed. In 

one test, this author participated in the English-to-Chinese translation was 

nearly perfect, but the spoken Chinese was translated at a correctness rate of 

approximately 60 percent, which could have been due to poor pronunciation 

or background noise in the conference room. However, the vocabulary was 

quite simple, the translation time was prohibitively slow, and the controlled 

environment certainly did not replicate what could be encountered in the 

field, particularly in a combat setting. This seems to be the case with all 

of the speech-to-speech technology available to the military and civilian 

markets; generally, they are not robust enough to meet the scale, breadth, 

and tempo required for the mission areas/needs of deployed forces. The 

threshold for effective use of speech-to-speech translation in the business 

world is lower than in the military, where there is “a need for ‘street’ level 

communication that accounts for unstructured/colloquial speech, varied 

sub-dialects, noisy environments, the need for hands-free communication, 

and the need for increased accuracy in real-time, tactical translation,” which 

is just not yet available.118
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JSOU Report 11-6

Low-Density Languages—Africa Case Study

Those who favor learning the world’s major languages or believe universal English or technology will negate the need to learn foreign languages, 

might reconsider if they took a close look at areas of low-density languages 

where colonial languages like English or French are only spoken by the 

elite, and technology will be a long time coming. For example, in Africa, 

where al-Qaeda and like-minded groups are expanding operations at a rapid 

rate and Special Forces will most likely be engaged in future decades, lowdensity languages predominate. Of the 7,000 languages spoken throughout 

the world,119 more than 2,000 are spoken in Africa.120 Which of these should 

be learned in order to help friends and allies address future threats? 

Certainly, Arabic needs to be included because it is the official language 

of several North African states. However, other African languages, such as 

Berber, Igbo, Swahili, Hausa, Amharic and Yoruba, which are spoken by 

tens of millions of Africans, might also merit consideration. Additionally, 

another hundred or so African languages are used by millions for interethnic communication. If multi-tribal interoperability is a goal, should 

a capability in those languages also be important? And what of Nigeria, 

which has one of the greatest concentrations of language diversity in the 

world? More than 500 languages are spoken in Nigeria,121 many of them 

used within the Niger Delta, where the U.S. has major oil interests, and 

Special Forces could conceivably be called upon to assist Nigerian forces 

for countering economic terrorism. So which languages should be learned, 

and by whom?

Some, such as the translator in Ghana, would argue that French, English, 

and Arabic should suffice. However, according to retired Colonel David 

McCracken, former 3rd Special Forces Group commander and knowledgeable of language requirements in Africa, this is not the case.122 Based on his 

numerous deployments across the African continent, McCracken believes 

that “legacy languages, such as French, Portuguese and Arabic (with wide 

utility), as well as Spanish, German and Italian (of lesser value) are important 

languages to know when operating in Africa.”123 However, says McCracken, 

throughout that entire continent, those languages are spoken by the educated class and elites, not the local populations that Special Forces soldiers 

work with most extensively and will most likely continue to be working with 

in the future. Despite some analysts’ assertions to the contrary, it remains 
29

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

extremely important to learn local languages and dialects in order to work 

effectively in Africa. Many cultures in Africa place significant value in personal relationships, and those are best developed when applying the local 

language or dialect. As McCracken asserts, “The traditional colonial languages may work in the capitals and major cities, but in rural and denied 

areas where we most often work, they are of limited use.” The Special Forces 

soldier must therefore be able to speak grammatically-correct English to our 

leaders at the embassy level, communicate in viable legacy linguistics with 

partner nations’ leaders, and also adequately dialogue with his local-level 

counterparts who actually know the operationally valuable information he 

needs to succeed.124

Clearly, teaching all African languages within Special Forces is impossible; in fact, teaching even the “most relevant” is also impossible, because 

there are still too many dialects to systematize, and the notion of relevance 

changes according to ethnic politics, regional activity, and priority relationships. Even narrowing the focus to the languages spoken in a troubled 

African region, such as the Niger Delta, is not realistic, as in that particular 

area approximately 25 languages and 153 dialects are spoken.125 Perhaps the 

answer is not which low-density languages to learn in Africa and other areas 

of operation, but who should be selected to learn them. 

Selecting the Right Candidate for Foreign Language 

Instruction

As noted previously in this paper, the ability to identify those with “special 

culture learning acumen” is questionable and a matter of debate. This is not 

the case with foreign language-learning capabilities, as there are tried and 

tested ways to identify those with the capacity to learn foreign languages, 

as well as some new “brain training” testing that indicates that this capacity 

can be stimulated and improved. Also, there are some hypothetical parallels between the suggestion that studying anthropology might establish 

a baseline for accelerated culture learning and the notion that learning 

foreign languages becomes easier the more languages you learn. Finally, 

in recognition of those who suffered SFLIC in the Special Forces Language 

School in the 1980s, the premise might have some merit; there actually is 

some evidence that vocabularies common to a profession, be they military, 

religious, business, scientific, or some other, make learning a foreign language easier for those in a given profession. 
30

JSOU Report 11-6

Identifying Foreign Language Aptitude 

Unlike the open question of cultural aptitude, there is ample evidence that 

foreign language aptitude is testable. An important question for this study, 

then, is whether foreign language aptitude is different from general aptitude 

or intelligence. The answer, based on a number of studies and applications, 

is “yes.” A number of foreign language aptitude tests, including the Defense 

Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB)—well known to the Special Forces community—have demonstrated the ability to exceed a “general intelligence test 

in the prediction of success in learning a foreign language.”126 J. B. Carroll, 

one of the most noted and prolific authors on the subject of foreign language 

aptitude, has suggested that “foreign language aptitude comprises four cognitive abilities,”127 each of which are reflected, to one extent or another, in 

DLAB and other foreign language aptitude tests that have been developed 

subsequent to Carroll’s original research in the early 1960s:

The first of these abilities is phonetic coding, which is the ability 

to segment and identify distinct sounds, to form associations 

between those sounds and symbols representing them, and to retain 

these associations. This is a rather unique auditory component of 

foreign language aptitude. It is especially important in classes that 

emphasize spoken language.

The second component is grammatical sensitivity, the ability to 

recognize the grammatical function of words or other linguistic 

structures in sentences. This component may be especially important 

in classes that emphasize an analytical approach to learning a 

foreign language. 

The third component is rote learning ability as it applies to foreign 

language learning situations. Rote learning ability is a kind of 

general memory, but individuals seem to differ in their ability to 

apply their memory to the foreign language situation. 

The fourth component is inductive language learning ability. This is 

the ability to infer the rules that govern the use of language. Again, 

this component is probably like general inductive learning ability, 
31

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

but individuals may vary in their ability to apply it to the foreign 

language learning situation.128 

There are two language aptitude tests widely used by the federal government to select potential students: the DLAB, used by the Department 

of Defense and the FBI, and the Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT), 

used by most other federal offices and intelligence agencies. The DLAB is a 

bit different from the MLAT in that it is used not only as a selection mechanism, but also for placement; a “certain minimum DLAB score is associated 

with qualification for studying the languages” in each of four categories of 

difficulty as classified by the U.S. government.129 

Tests such as the DLAB are important because they remove students who 

will have difficulty learning a foreign language and thus save money and 

instructor and student time. It makes no academic or professional sense to 

set a student up to fail, and the DLAB does much to eliminate that possibility. As this paper goes to press, DLAB 2 is on the drawing board. Now under 

development at the University of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of 

Language (CASL), DLAB 2 “will develop a new version of the DLAB that 

is based on advances in cognitive science, personality and trait psychology, and foreign language education. The new test will improve prediction 

of foreign language learning potential and prediction of the likelihood of 

attrition” —and thus hopefully save even more time and money.

Accelerating Foreign Language Competency 

CASL is also involved in research that will potentially accelerate a person’s 

ability to advance and retain foreign language competencies. Advertised 

as “brain training,” the objective of the program is to “enhance foreign 

language professionals’ working memory capacity via a time-intensive and 

mentally stimulating training regimen” that improves foreign language 

text processing and comprehension. The concept involves strengthening a 

person’s “working memory” (WM), which is “the small amount of memory 

that stores and manipulates information for ongoing use” and “supports 

problem solving and intelligent behavior; action planning; and language 

abilities such as reading, spoken language comprehension, and drawing 

inferences.”132 By strengthening WM, researchers at CASL believe that a 

stronger working memory will lead to quicker and more accurate translation 
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JSOU Report 11-6

and interpretation, even in the face of “complex, ambiguous, or incomplete 

text.”133 

Learning one foreign language makes it easier to learn the 

next, and the next...

Approximately 20 years ago, this author recalls general consensus at the 

Special Forces Language School was that there was a point of diminishing 

returns with regard to the number of foreign languages one could learn. 

Learning a third language was easier if you could successfully learn a second 

language—that was understood. However, the thinking at the time was that 

there were limits to the efficiencies of learning more languages; that there 

was a “saturation point,” if you will. 

This turns out not to be the case. The educated and proven thinking now 

is that learning foreign languages gets easier the more languages you learn. 

By learning different languages, a person becomes “accustomed to different 

ways of putting sentences together, different ways of marking the relationships between words, different sounds and intonation patterns, and different ways of thinking,” all of which “help when learning new languages.”134

Those who learn multiple languages also “develop strategies for learning 

vocabulary and grammar, and for paraphrasing and generally communicating with whatever words [they] can remember.”135 Furthermore, multiple 

experts agree that not only does learning a third or fourth language become 

easier once a second language is mastered, but that language learning has 

the overall benefit of keeping the “brain actively engaged.”136 In fact, the 

skills developed through language learning have even been found to delay 

the onset of Alzheimer’s disease, illustrating the unique functions exercised 

by language study.137 

Professional vocabulary is an important independent variable in accelerating the learning of one or more languages. It helps to have vocabulary 

common to a profession that is familiar in several different languages, says 

professional translator Martin Kwame Matrevi. In his case, the common 

vocabulary was found in the Bible, which he knew in English and, according to him, made it accessible to learn in French. Having common reference 

vocabulary across languages made conversation easier because he at least 

knew some of the words and was not embarrassed to try to speak.138 Similarly, many professions, such as engineering, science, mineral exploration, 

and of course, the military have standard terms that are relatable across 
33

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

languages or, in some cases, nearly universal. Therefore, in these professions 

and others, having a familiar base vocabulary to work with makes learning 

the rest easier.

Asking which language to learn is the wrong question—it is 

better to ask who can best learn any language

“Which languages should we be learning?”—the question General Baratto 

asked decades ago, and many within the defense community still ask—is 

probably the wrong question. In truth, any language is learnable given available time and effort. The real question is, “Who can learn a language quickly 

and to a high level of proficiency, no matter what the language is?” This question is manageable for the reasons articulated in the past few pages. First, 

tests such as the DLAB provide clarity on who can learn foreign languages 

and who cannot. Second, new and continuing research provides insights 

on manipulating and strengthening portions of the brain responsible for 

cognitive and language aptitude—much like the all-pro linebacker in the 

off-season weight room, those with a facility with foreign languages will 

be able to “exercise” parts of the brain to make them even better. Third, 

those successful at learning one or more foreign languages will be able to 

continue learning other foreign languages at a quicker rate. Therefore, the 

key to taking on new and particularly low-density languages has more to do 

with selecting the right personnel to learn the language than the language 

itself. In Special Forces, the right candidates are available. They have been 

tested and speak—or have the acumen to speak—several different languages 

and most likely can have their abilities strengthened. However, knowing 

who these language superstars are and managing them effectively is the 

challenge. 

Some final thoughts: not either/or, but both?

This piece has not provided a comprehensive, comparative study regarding 

the relative merits of studying either foreign languages or cultures. Yet two 

earlier conclusions of the study were that foreign language competency 

is more difficult to achieve than cultural competency, and that cultural 

competency may have greater short-term benefit than foreign language 

competency. More than a year has passed since the author has reached that 

initial conclusion, and the truth is that both culture and foreign language 
34

JSOU Report 11-6

are learned better if learned simultaneously. The answer is not “either/or,” 

but “both”—if time is available. 

This has also been the conclusion of the foreign missionary community. 

Other than the Special Forces, foreign missionary work is one of the best 

examples of a profession that requires foreign language and culture competency. Indeed, the Army’s premier language unit is the 1,600-member 300th 

Military Intelligence Brigade, a popular and much sought-after reserve Army 

unit in Utah. The 300th and its two battalions were initially staffed primarily 

with Mormons who learned their foreign language and culture skills while 

on two-year missions overseas.139 Mormon missionaries are immersed in 

both the language and culture of the country where they are “on mission.” 

Most Mormon missionaries who learn a second language intuitively “understand that it is necessary for them to learn the vocabulary and grammar 

of the new language.” They also learn to understand that “cultural literacy, 

or knowledge of the culture, will also significantly improve their ability to 

speak and understand the language.”140 Not surprisingly, the Institute for 

Cross-Cultural Training at Wheaton College’s Billy Graham Center, which 

offers preparatory materials for cross-cultural ministry work, also advocates a combination of language and culture learning for its missionaries. 

According to the Institute, “good” language learners tightly integrate cultural knowledge into their study of language, developing a high proficiency 

in each.141 Furthermore, “good” language learners are highly motivated 

individuals who have positive attitudes toward their new language and culture; they realize the importance of becoming accepted members of their 

new societies in order to become effective communicators.142 
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Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

5. Conclusion 

Given the operational tempo and the places where Special Forces will 

serve in the next several decades, the requirements for foreign language and culture competencies are sure to increase. While there is some 

debate over which is more important—language or culture—most agree that 

learning about culture is easier than learning a foreign language, and more 

useful to the soldier in the short-term. However, there is a growing body of 

evidence indicating a certain symbiotic effect when learning language and 

culture together, which in turn yields more long-term benefits. 

In an ideal world, language and culture students would not be detached 

learners that form a distant and static view of a culture. Instead, they would 

be active participants in culture and language learning that is designed to 

be more dynamic and directly engaged. Ideally, immersion learning is the 

best way to achieve direct engagement, but absent the time, funding and, in 

some cases, access (training in Waziristan, for example, is not an immediate 

possibility), there are some alternatives worth considering.143 

Student selection is important. There is no sense selecting a student who 

is going to have difficulty mastering the topic, be it culture or language. 

Unfortunately, there is not yet a mechanism that can test a person’s ability 

to learn culture; however, there are several ongoing but inconclusive studies that attempt to measure a person’s CQ, which would be an indicator of 

cultural learning aptitude. Some studies suggest that people with certain 

CQ personality traits have better aptitude for learning intercultural skills, 

and other studies indicate that those with certain CQ cognitive skills have 

better intercultural acumen.144 The fact that the results are inconclusive 

does not limit the value of the studies, and the studies should continue, 

perhaps with the help of the Special Forces community as researchers and/

or subjects of the research.

Selecting students who have a proclivity for learning foreign languages 

is relatively straightforward, as foreign language aptitude is and has been 

a successfully-implemented standard. As mentioned in previous sections 

of this piece, the DLAB has been used by all Department of Defense language training institutions for decades. Passing the DLAB is a prerequisite 

for entrance into language training programs, and the score attained on 

the battery is used for placement; the higher a prospective student’s score, 
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JSOU Report 11-6

the more difficult a language he or she is encouraged to study. Now in the 

testing phase, DLAB 2 will improve the assessment and placement process 

by adding personal history (place of origin, family background, cultural 

heritage, other foreign language competencies, and so forth), cognitive and 

psychological elements to the test.145 According to Colonel Dino Pick, Commandant of the Defense Language Institute, “Early testing of DLAB 2 is 

encouraging and, once implemented, will save time and money by better 

selecting candidates who can more easily learn foreign languages.”146

The prospect of accelerating the ability of a person to learn culture is 

limited, but for language there are some new possibilities. With regard to 

culture, and based on research for this paper, two findings are of interest. 

First, many professionals in the field suggest that a foundation in anthropology, and particularly cultural anthropology, for all Special Forces soldiers 

would “jump start” their ability to learn the fundamentals of nearly any culture more quickly and easily; cultural anthropology provides the “template” 

from which any culture can be addressed. Second, this paper also posits that 

different levels of culture learning and application are important. Obviously, 

the optimum level of cultural understanding would be native, but this is an 

unrealistic expectation of most Special Forces soldiers other than those who 

are immigrants or strongly-oriented second generation soldiers. Therefore, 

the level of cultural understanding required might coincide with the type of 

mission set: tactical, operational, or strategic. In conventional terms, this is 

relatively easy to apply to unit size and mission. A generalization (especially 

given the present threat environment) would be: platoon = tactical = cultural 

awareness; company = operational = cultural literacy; and battalion-brigade 

and higher levels = strategic = strategic competency.

Source: Margaret Nencheck (used with permission)
37

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

Table 1. Taxonomy

However, in Special Forces terms, this logic does not easily apply, because 

the smallest unit—the Special Forces team—by definition operates across 

the tactical, operational and strategic levels. To address this complexity, 

one suggestion is that each team trains some members at each of the levels: 

awareness (at a minimum), literacy, and competency. One might assume 

that more senior members of the team would attain a literacy or competency 

level, but that would not have to be the case, particularly given the increased 

emphasis on recruiting immigrants and second-generation citizens into 

the force.

The notion that language education can be accelerated has basis in fact. 

Those who have learned a foreign language can then learn another foreign language, and another, and another at quicker rates. The special skills 

required for foreign language aptitude take time to acquire. However, once 

the skills are learned, they can be applied to the next language, and the next. 

BASELINE Level Description

Case Studies

Somalia Iraq Afghanistan

C

U

L

T

U

R

A

L

C

A

P

A

B

I

L

I

T

Y

Tactical

Awareness

Understanding 

that there are 

differences 

between 

cultures; the 

dos and don’ts.

Showing the 

bottom of one’s 

feet is offensive 

to Somalis.

Iraqi men often 

hold hands in 

public as a sign 

of affection or 

brotherhood.

Use your right 

hand to pass 

things or eat; 

using the left 

hand is a sign of 

shame.

Operational 

Literacy

Understanding 

individual 

cultural 

patterns and 

knowing your 

own cultural 

norms.

Clan strife 

was predicated 

on nomad vs. 

agriculturalists conflicts 

over available 

pasture. 

Contemporary 

Kurdish TV 

still references 

the gassing of 

Halabja in 1988.

Although 

hundreds 

of tribes in 

Afghanistan 

share the same 

religious background, they are 

very different.

The baseline 

for 

understanding 

all levels 

of culture; 

grounded in the 

understanding 

of one’s own 

culture.

Strategic 

Competency

Congruent 

behaviors, 

attitudes, and 

policies that 

enable work in 

cross-cultural 

settings.

TV images of 

Somali mobs 

from the 1990s 

fuel anti-Somali 

sentiments 

toward immigrants in U.S. 

communities 

today.

Corruption in 

business and 

government 

is pervasive, 

as Iraqis place 

more value 

on honor than 

transparency.

The drawing 

of the “Durand 

Line” between 

Pakistan and 

Afghanistan in 

1893 put tribes 

and families 

on opposite 

borders.
38

JSOU Report 11-6

Therefore, if a new mission requires learning a new, low-density language, 

then the talent pool to draw on are those who have already learned—with 

some competency—one or more foreign languages. 

New research also indicates that a person may be able to accelerate language learning and enhance retention by exercising portions of the brain. 

While still in the testing phase, the research conducted by the University 

of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language suggests that the 

working memory portion of the brain, which stores memory important 

for language learning and retention, can be strengthened through a series 

of intense mental exercises. Advocates of “brain training,” as it is known 

at the Defense Language Institute, believe that by strengthening working 

memory linguists can overcome many traditional obstacles to translation 

and interpretation.147

While there is some evidence that foreign language learning and competence can be accelerated and some sense that a foundation in cultural 

anthropology will accelerate one’s ability to learn different cultures, suggestions that there are alternatives to learning mission-required languages 

and cultures are less convincing. The notion that learning one or more of 

the ten most used languages in the world can get you by in 60 percent of 

the world is interesting—but what about the other 40 percent, particularly 

when the 40 percent are located in areas where Special Forces are most likely 

to be operating in the next decades? This is not to say that learning “legacy 

languages” is not important; knowing a legacy language might get a person 

by with the educated and elites, even in denied areas. More important, learning any language, including a legacy language, is the premier indicator that 

a person can learn more languages easier and faster.

Those who advocate technological applications to replace the need for 

foreign linguists have a while to wait. Field systems still being tested remain 

less than 90 percent accurate, difficult to manipulate, and do not account 

for idiom, jargon and dialect. Watrud sums up the problem with technology best. Despite advances in technology, says Watrud (and according to 

regular reviews of current offerings), nothing yet comes close to skilled 

human translators. Issues with vocabulary, ability to operate in a “less than 

pristine” environment, handling background noise, and understanding 

slang or sarcasm are just some of the shortcomings of pre-programmed 

technology. Even at a generous 90 percent accuracy rating, if the 10 percent 
39

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

a machine gets wrong consists of critical operational information, the other 

90 percent alone might be useless.148

Additionally, those who are enthusiastic about the English-only option 

should reconsider. True, English has become a global lingua franca over 

the past several decades, but this should have little bearing on a decision to 

learn a foreign language—especially considering that nearly 80 percent of 

the world’s population does not know English.149 Remaining monolingual 

restricts educational development and communication abilities, as well as 

the opportunity to fully understand another culture, given the symbiotic 

relationship between language and culture learning this study has explored. 

Still, the Thai senior colonel’s suggestion that Special Forces English instructors should be made available to teach English at allied Special Forces installations is solid; the benefit of doing so would likely have benefits lasting for 

generations to come.

Finally, there is no “silver bullet” to attaining levels of foreign language 

capability and cultural knowledge, awareness, literacy, and competency. 

Innate talent helps, particularly with learning foreign languages. However, 

hard work is the key to success in both endeavors, particularly if both language and culture are learned simultaneously. In the end, good language and 

culture learners assume responsibility for their own learning. They make 

use of a wide range of available resources, including school-based language 

and culture instruction with independent learning opportunities, including lifetime learning through native culture interaction.150 Self-direction 

is key; rather than innate ability, personality, or resource availability, the 

most important factor in successful language and culture learning is the 

motivation of the individual learner.151 

41

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

Endnotes

1. Sean D. Naylor, “SOCom Directive Announces Major Changes,” Army Times, 

August 30, 2009. Available at: <www.armytimes.com/news/2009/08/army_spec_

ops_shakeup_082709w/> (accessed November 29, 2010).

2. Ibid. 

3. Deirdre Tynan, “Central Asia: Pentagon Plans for Deployment of Special Forces 

to States Outside Afghanistan,” Eurasianet.org, September 18, 2009. Available at: 

<www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav091709.shtml> (accessed 

November 29, 2010).

4. Allison Abbe, “Building Cultural Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations, U.S. 

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Study Report 

2008-04 (January 2008), 1. Available at: <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/

sr2008-04.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2010). 

5. Ibid.

6. Conversation with Admiral Eric Olson at the Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany, March 7, 2010.

7. Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: Penguin, 2004), 183-

187. See also: Gregory J. Parker, “The Future of Seabasing: Moving Beyond the 

Post-Cold War Unilateral Approach,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2010, 

available at:<www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/12/4997685> (accessed January 

31, 2011).; and The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Center (DCDC), UK Ministry of Defence (2007), 3, 

available at: <www.cuttingthroughthematrix.com/articles/strat_trends_23jan07.

pdf> (accessed December 3, 2010).

8. “Demographics and the Changing National Security Environment,” Rand Policy 

Brief 5035 (2000). Available at: <www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB5035/

index1.html> (accessed December 3, 2010).

9. Russell D. Howard, “International Security Environment,” unpublished paper 

prepared for Universal Strategy Group, Inc. (March 2009).

10. Ochereome Nnanna, “MEND with a tarnished halo,” Vanguard (Nigeria), November 25, 2010. Available at: <www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/mend-with-a-tarnished-halo> (accessed December 3, 2010).

11. Douglas Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin 

America,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, August 4, 2006. Available at: <www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.118/pub_detail.asp> (accessed 

December 3, 2010).

12. Michele L. Malvesti, “To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an 

Era of Persistent Conflict,” Center for a New American Security, June 2010. Available at: <www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_To percent20Serve 

percent20the percent20Nation_Malvesti.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2010). While 

Dr. Malvesti attributes the two different types of specialties to Special Operations 
42

JSOU Report 11-6

Forces, the example is most prevalent in Special Forces, the largest component of 

Special Operations Forces. 

13. “The Significance of Culture to the Military,” Joint Doctrine Note 1/09, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defense (January 2009), 

1-3. Available at: <www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/85A05A02-B2FE-4965-B1CD-E9

DF1E913A0B/0/20090219JDN_1_09UDCDCIMAPPS.pdf> (accessed December 

3, 2010).

14. Kevin D. Stringer, “Educating the Strategic Corporal: A Paradigm Shift,” Military Review, September/October 2009, 92. Available at: <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/milreview/stringer_strat_corp.pdf> (accessed December 4, 2010).

15. Steve Wilmarth, “Learning through the Lens of Cultural Anthropology...,” Curriculum21 Blog, March 18, 2010. Available at: <http://curriculum21.ning.com/

profiles/blogs/learning-through-the-lens-of> (accessed December 4, 2010). The 

author bases his post on the work of Patrick R. Moran in Teaching Culture: Perspectives in Practice (Boston: Heinle ELT, 2001).

16. Dimitrios Thanasoulas, “The Importance of Teaching Culture in the Foreign 

Language Classroom,” Radical Pedagogy, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (December 2001). 14. 

Available at: <http://radicalpedagogy.icaap.org/content/issue3_3/7-thanasoulas.

html> (accessed December 5, 2010).

17. Ibid.

18. “The Significance of Culture to the Military,” 15.

19. Ibid., 15.

20. Ibid., 15-16. 

21. Brett G. Lewis, “Developing Soldier Cultural Competency,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (March 2006), 4. Available at: <www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/army-usawc/soldier_cultural_competency.pdf> (accessed December 

12, 2010).

22. I used this sub-title from Colonel Timothy R. Williams, whose paper of the 

same title is quoted later in this paper. See Timothy R. Williams, “Culture—We 

Need Some of That! Cultural Knowledge and Army Officer Professional Development,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, (March 2006). 

Available at: <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDo

c.pdf&AD=ADA448821> (accessed December 12, 2010).

23. Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” Military Review, March-April, 

2005, 62. Available at: <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mcfarland.pdf> 

(accessed December 12, 2010).

24. Montomery McFate, “The military utility of understanding adversary culture,” 

Joint Force Quarterly (July 2005). Available at: <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/

mi_m0KNN/is_38/ai_n15631265> (accessed December 12, 2010).

25. Ibid.

26. “The Significance of Culture to the Military,” 1-3.
43

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

27. Peter R. Mansoor, “The Softer Side of War: Exploring the Influence of Culture on 

Military Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 2011, 170-171. Available at: 

<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67051/peter-r-mansoor/the-softer-side-of-war> 

(accessed February 6, 2011). 

28. Mike Levy, “Culture, Culture Learning and New Technologies: Towards a Pedagogical Framework,” Language Learning and Technology, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 

2007), 104. Available at: <http://llt.msu.edu/vol11num2/pdf/levy.pdf> (accessed 

December 12, 2010).

29. J. Useem, R.H. Useem, and J.A. Donoghue. “Men in the Middle of the Third-Culture: The Role of American and Non-Western People in Cross-Cultural Administration,” Human Organization, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1963), 169-179. Definition is 

available at: <www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html> (accessed December 

12, 2010).

30. James A. Banks, “Multicultural Education: Characteristics and Goals,” in James 

A. Banks and Cherry A. McGee Banks, eds., Multicultural Education: Issues and 

Perspectives, 7th edition(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2010), 8.

31. “Culture.” DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Department 

of Defense, 12 April 2001 (amended through September 2010). Available at: 

<www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/c/3554.html> (accessed December 

12, 2010). 

32. Timothy R. Williams, “Culture—We Need Some of That!” 3. 

33. Colonel Williams’ definition combines the explanations of culture from the following five books: Richard Brislin, Understanding Culture’s Influence On Behaviors (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1993), 1-27; Gordon Curphy, Robert 

Ginnett, and Richard Hughes, Leadership: Enhancing The Lessons of Experience 

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 157; Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Dynamics

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 3-10; Carl Coon, Culture Wars And The Global 

Village (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2000), 53-61; and Craig Storti, 

Figuring Foreigners Out: A Practical Guide (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 

1999), 5.

34. Timothy R. Williams, “Culture—We Need Some of That!” 3.

35. Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, and John R. Schindler, with Jim Lacey, The 

Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Perspectives of Al-Qaeda 

and Associated Movements (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 

2008) 72. 

36. Ibid.

37. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through 

Which the Umma Will Pass, translated by Will McCants, funding provided by 

the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 May 2006, 90. Available at: 

<http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/Management_of_Savagery.pdf> (accessed 

December 12, 2010).

38. Mark E. Stout et al. 78.
44

JSOU Report 11-6

39. Seth G. Jones, “It Takes the Villages: Bringing Changes from Below in 

Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010). Available at: 

<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-villages> 

(accessed December 12, 2010). 

40. Ibid.

41. Brett G. Lewis, “Developing Soldier Cultural Competency,” 2.

42. Lynda Liddy, “The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education,” The Australian Army Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Autumn 2005), 140. Available 

at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf> (accessed December 12, 

2010). 

43. Josh White and Dan Eggen, “Pentagon Details Abuse of Koran,” Washington 

Post, June 4, 2005. Available at: <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2005/06/03/AR2005060301654.html> (accessed December 12, 2010).

44. Krissah Thompson and Tara Bahrampour, “Obama renews call for religious tolerance after Koran-burning cancelled,” Washington Post, September 10, 2010. 

Available at: <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/09/

AR2010090900743.html> (accessed December 12, 2010).

45. Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (February 1, 2010), 166-167. Available at: 

<www.career-satisfaction.army.mil/pdfs/DA percent20Pamphlet percent20600-3_

Commissioned_Officer_Professional_Development_and_Career_Management.

pdf> (accessed December 12, 2010).

46. Robert G. Louis, “Professional Development of Special Forces Captains,” U.S 

Army War College Strategy Research Project (April 9, 2002), 3. Available at: 

<www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404519&Location=U2&doc=Get

TRDoc.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2010).

47. Brett G. Lewis, “Developing Soldier Cultural Competency,” 10.

48. Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” 65.

49. Ibid., 64.

50. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. Lionel Giles (New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 

2003), 160. This oft-cited quote has many different interpretations.

51. Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” 63.

52. DimitriousThanosoulas, “The Importance of Teaching Culture in the Foreign 

Language Classroom,” 11. 

53. Mike Levy, “Culture, Culture Learning and New Technologies: Towards a Pedagogical Framework,” 111.

54. Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” 63.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Shelia Miyoshi Jager, On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 

U.S. Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007), 4.
45

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

58. Ibid., 8.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 9.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., 4.

63. Ibid.

64. Gary Ferraro, Cultural Anthropology: An Applied Perspective, 7th Edition, (Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 2008), iv.

65. Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” 64.

66. Ibid.

67. “What is Cultural Competency?” The Office of Minority Health, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, October 19, 2005. Available at: 

<http://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=11> (accessed 

December 12, 2010). The health profession was one of the first in the U.S. to 

grapple with the culture issue, and this definition has been derived from several 

similar and well-known definitions of cultural competency in the health industry. 

See also “Definitions of Cultural Competence,” Curricula Enhancement Module 

Series, National Center for Cultural Competence, Georgetown University Center 

for Child and Human Development. Available at: <www.nccccurricula.info/

culturalcompetence.html> (accessed December 12, 2010).

68. Ibid.

69. Elizabeth Bledsoe, “The Use of Culture in Operational Planning,” Thesis presented 

to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 16, 2005, 45.

70. The author acknowledges Colonel Maxie McFarland; a succinct paragraph from 

his piece was adapted to provide the framework for this paragraph. See Maxie 

McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” 64. 

71. See, for example, Colleen Ward, Ronald Fischer, Fara Sheyna Zaid Lam, and 

Leonie Hall, “The Convergent, Discriminate, and Incremental Validity of Scores 

on a Self-Report Measure of Cultural Intelligence,” Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 69, No. 1 (February 2009), 85-105. Abstract available at: 

<http://epm.sagepub.com/content/69/1/85.abstract> (accessed December 12, 

2010).

72. Conversations with Dr. Gayle L. Watkins, author of an unpublished piece on 

cross-cultural competence and West Point cadets.

73. It appears that CQ is being marketed as a viable measurement testing process 

by some entrepreneurs; see David Livermore, “CQ: The Test of Your Potential 

for Cross-Cultural Success,” Forbes, January 6, 2010. Available at:< www.forbes.

com/2010/01/06/cq-cultural-intelligence-leadership-managing-globalization.

html> (accessed February 1, 2011).

74. Colleen Ward, et al., 103. 

75. Ibid., 103.
46

JSOU Report 11-6

76. Dennis O’Neil, “Methods for Learning About Culture,” Human Culture: An Introduction to the Characteristics of Culture and the Methods Used by Anthropologists to Study It, May 22, 2009. Available at: <http://anthro.palomar.edu/culture/

Default.htm> (accessed December 12, 2010). 

77. Ibid.

78. Matthew Chlosta, “‘AfPak Hands’ Begin Immersion Training,” American Forces 

Information Service, May 5, 2010. Available at: <www.militaryconnection.com/

news percent5Cmay-2010 percent5Cafpak-hands-immersion.html> (accessed 

December 14, 2010).

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. “First Af-Pak Hands Grads Deploy Overseas,” United States Central Command 

American Forces Press Service, April 23, 2010. Available at: <www.centcom.mil/

en/news/first-af-pak-hands-grads-deploy-overseas.html> (accessed December 

14, 2010).

82. Ibid.

83. U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Irene Mason speaks Pashto with an Afghan National 

Army officer on Apr. 28 at the COIN Academy, Camp Julien, Afghanistan. Photo 

by U.S. Army Sergeant 1st Class Matthew Chlosta, ISAF HQ PAO. Photo available at: <www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/afpak-hands-begins-immersion-inafghanistan.html> (accessed February 6, 2011). 

84. Conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Watrud, Defense Language Institute 

Chief of Staff, December 14, 2010.

85. Elizabeth Bledsoe, “The Use of Culture in Operational Planning,” 4. 

86. Definition used in Conrad P. Kottak, Cultural Anthropology 9th edition (McGrawHill, 2002). Available at: <http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/0072500506/

student_view0/chapter1/key_terms.html> (accessed December 14, 2010).

87. Conversations with Dr. Montgomery Mcfate on November 6 and 12, 2010.

88. Brian J. Bush, “A Comparison of Innovative Training Techniques at the Defense 

Language Institute Foreign Language Center,” Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Report No. 1426 (June, 1986), 4.

89. Discussions with Colonel Paul S. Burton, Director of Regional Studies and Education, USAJFKSWCS, March 25, 2010.

90. Conversations with LTC (RET) Kelly Hicks, who was the D Company (Language 

Company) Commander from 1991 to 1993.

91. Colonel Paul Burton.

92. Martin Kwame Matrevi, multiple discussions 2010.

93. George Weber, “The World’s 10 Most Influential Languages,” Language Today, 

Vol. 3 (December 1997), 12-18. Available at: <www.andaman.org/BOOK/reprints/

weber/rep-weber.htm> (accessed December 15, 2010). 
47

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

94. Milton Alan Turner, “The World’s Most Widely Spoken Languages,” St. Ignatius 

High School Website, updated December 5, 2010, Available at: <www2.ignatius.

edu/faculty/turner/languages.htm> (accessed December 15, 2010”).

95. Ibid.

96. Matt Rosenberg, “Current World Population,” About.com: Geography, November 

17, 2010. Available at: <http://geography.about.com/od/obtainpopulationdata/a/

worldpopulation.htm> (accessed December 15, 2010). While not very scientific, 

the 60 percent figure is calculated by dividing the number of primary and secondary language speakers by the population of the world in 1995 (the year the study 

was first completed), which equaled 5.7 billion.

97. Milton Alan Turner, “The World’s Most Widely Spoken Languages.”

98. Matt Rosenberg, “Current World Population.” 

99. George Weber, “The World’s 10 Most Influential Languages.”

100. Conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Watrud, Chief of Staff of Defense 

Language Institute, October 2010.

101. “Field Listing: Languages,” CIA World Factbook, updated November 17, 2010. 

Available at: <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.

html?countryName=World&countryCode=xx®ionCode=oc#xx > (accessed 

December 15, 2010). 

102. “Frequently Asked Questions: The English Language,” The British Council website. Available at: <www.britishcouncil.org/learning-faq-the-english-language.

htm> (accessed December 15, 2010).

103. Ibid.

104. See, for example, Doreen Carvajal, “In many business schools, the bottom line 

is English,” The New York Times, April 10, 2007. Available at: <www.nytimes.

com/2007/04/10/world/europe/10iht-engbiz.2.5212499.html> (accessed December 

15, 2010).

105. David Millward, “English to become compulsory for pilots,” The Telegraph, March 

5, 2008. Available at: <www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/761307/English-to-becomecompulsory-for-pilots.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

106. Graham Sandy P. Davenpor, “Commercial Court Cases in English on Trial 

in Germany,” Ezine Articles, July 10, 2010. Available at: < http://ezinearticles.

com/?Commercial-Court-Cases-in-English-on-Trial-in-Germany&id=4580668> 

(accessed December 15, 2010).

107. “A Guide for South Asian Language Learners,” South Asia Studies, University 

of Pennsylvania website. Available at: </www.southasia.upenn.edu/sas_pages/

language_guide.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

108. There are any number of ways to earn a English as a Second Language (ESL)/

Teacher of English as a Second Language (TESOL) certificate. Provided here is 

a composite explanation based on information provided in several websites. For 

example: http://www.english-schools.org/english-language/tesol-qualification.

htm and http://www.tesol.org/s_tesol/seccss.asp?cid=1770&did=9326.
48

JSOU Report 11-6

109. <http://www.teflonline.net/> (accessed February 24, 2009).

110. Conversations with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Watrud, Chief of Staff of Defense 

Language Institute, October 2010.

111. Ibid.

112. See Yahoo! Babel Fish, available at: <http://babelfish.yahoo.com> (accessed 

December 15, 2010); and Chris Gourlay, “Group Leaps Language Barrier with 

Translator Phone,” The Times, February 7, 2010. Available at: <http://technology.

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/personal_tech/article7017831.ece> 

(accessed December 15, 2010).

113. “Speech-to-Speech Translation-: Innovation Matters,” IBM-User Face Technologies website. Available at: <http://domino.research.ibm.com/comm/research.nsf/

pages/r.uit.innovation.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

114. Ibid.

115. “Made in IBM Labs: Speech Translation Technology Breaks Through Language 

Barrier for U.S. Forces in Iraq,” IBM Pressroom, October 10, 2006. Available at: 

<www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/20423.wss> (accessed December 15, 

2010).

116. Ibid.

117. Jibbigo Website. Available at: <http://www.jibbigo.com/website/en/products/

quick-overview>.

118. Andre van Tilborg (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology), “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

of the Senate Armed Services Committee” (April 25, 2007). Available at: <www.

globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070425-van percent20_

tilborg.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2010).

119. John Noble Wilford, “World’s Languages Dying Off Rapidly,” New York Times, 

September 18, 2007. Available at: <www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/world/18cndlanguage.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

120. “Major Languages of Africa,” PanAfriL10n, modified December 24, 2007. Available at: <www.panafril10n.org/index.php/PanAfrLoc/MajorLanguages > (accessed 

December 15, 2010).

121. Uwe Seibert, “The Language Ecology of Nigeria,” Department of Languages and 

Logistics, University of Jos, April 24, 2000. Available at: <www.kwintessential.

co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/nigeria.html> (accessed December 15, 2010).

122. Conversation with retired Colonel David McCracken on December 14, 2010.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Conversations with Naomi Akpan-Ita, Director of Finance and Treasury for the 

West Africa Network for Peace and Recovery. January 31, 2011.
49

Howard: Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces

126. Charles W. Stansfield, “Language Aptitude Reconsidered,” ERIC Digest, ERIC 

Identifier ED318226 (December 1989). Available at: <www.ericdigests.org/pre9215/language.htm> (accessed December 19, 2010).

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Michael Bunting, Anita R. Bowles, Jared Linck, and Medha Tare, “Defense Language Aptitude Battery 2 (DLAB 2): New Ways to Identify Foreign Language 

Learning Potential,” University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language, 2010. Available at: <www.casl.umd.edu/node/543> (accessed December 

19, 2010).

131. Michael Bunting and Jared M. Novick, “Brain Training: Enhancing Working Memory to Improve Language Skills,” University of Maryland Center for 

Advanced Study of Language, Fact Sheet, 2009. Available at: <www.casl.umd.edu/

sites/default/files/TTO3501_FS_200912.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2010).

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Dave Khayat, “The More Languages You Learn, the Easier it Gets?” Language 

Trainers Blog, April 10, 2009. Available at: <www.languagetrainers.com/

blog/2009/04/10/the-more-languages-you-learn-the-easier-it-gets> (accessed 

December 19, 2010).

135. Ibid.

136. “Cognitive Aspects of Learning Language,” American Council on the Teaching 

of Foreign Languages, reprint of an interview with Martha G. Abbott, Therese 

Sullivan Caccavale, and Ken Stewart, “Duke Gifted Letter,” the Duke University 

Talent Identification Program, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2007). Available at: <www.actfl.

org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=4724> (accessed December 19, 2010).

137. Ibid.

138. Multiple conversations with Martin Kwame Matrevi in June of 2010.

139. Elizabeth Stuart, “Utah Guard’s Military Intelligence Battalion Marks 50th: Battalion Makes Use of Returned Missionaries’ Foreign Language Skills,” Deseret 

News (Salt Lake City, Utah), February 28, 2010. Available at: <www.deseretnews.

com/article/700012785/Utah-Guards-military-intelligence-battalion-marks-50th.

html> (accessed December 19, 2010). 

140. Jimmy Smith, “Cultural Literacy and Language Learning,” MormonMissionPrep.

com, August 19, 2010. Available at: <www.mormonmissionprep.com/2010/08/19/

cultural-literacy> (accessed December 19, 2010). 

141. Lonna J. Dickerson, “Basic Assumptions for Language and Culture Learners,” 

ICCT LearnerNotes, Institute for Cross-Cultural Training, Billy Graham Center, 

Wheaton College, 2008 (revised), 1. Available at: <www.wheaton.edu/bgc/ICCT/

pdf/LN percent20assumptions.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2010). 
50

JSOU Report 11-6

142. Ibid., 1-2.

143. See, for example, suggestions for use of new technologies for culture learning in 

Mike Levy, “Culture, Culture Learning and New Technologies: Towards a Pedagogical Framework.”

144. Conversations with Dr. Gayle L. Watkins, author of an unpublished piece on 

cross-cultural competence and West Point cadets.

145. Discussions with Colonel Dino Pick, Commandant, Defense Language Institute, 

January 21, 2011.

146. Ibid.

147. Michael Bunting and Jared M. Novick, “Brain Training: Enhancing Working 

Memory to Improve Language Skills.”

148. Conversations with LTC Chris Watrud, Chief of Staff of the Defense Language 

Institute. Multiple conversations over a period from February 2010 until December 2010.

149. “Why Learn Languages? 10 Good Reasons You Should Be Learning a Foreign Language,” VistaWide World Languages and Cultures website. Available at: <www.

vistawide.com/languages/why_languages.htm> (accessed December 19, 2010).

150. Lonna J. Dickerson, “Basic Assumptions for Language and Culture Learners,” 

1-2.

151. Ibid., 2.