SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections

STRATEGY AND RESOURCES NEEDED TO 

SUSTAIN AFGHAN ELECTORAL CAPACITY

September 22, 2009
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

September 22, 2009

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

Department of State

Alonzo L. Fulgham

Acting Administrator

U.S. Agency for International Development

This report discusses U.S. and donor assistance in preparation for the presidential and 

provincial council elections held on August 20, 2009, in Afghanistan, the first elections managed

directly by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. U.S. and other donors have 

invested almost $500 million to support the elections in Afghanistan. The development of a 

sustainable electoral capacity is critical to the success of future elections and to lessen future 

dependence on international support. This report includes two recommendations for the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 

developing a sustainable institutional capacity of the Independent Election Commission. 

A summary of our report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of 

the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 

110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final report, 

we considered written comments from the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. The comments are in 

appendix IV of this report. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections

 Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

i

.

`

 

What SIGAR Reviewed 

Building institutional electoral capacity is critical for sustaining a legitimate and fairly elected government. Afghanistan will 

hold four major elections from 2009 through 2010. On August 20, 2009, the first two of these elections—the presidential 

and provincial council elections—were held and managed, for the first time, by the Afghanistan government. In 2010, the 

Afghanistan government will hold parliament and district council elections. This report (1) identifies U.S. and donor 

assistance and coordination of support for election preparation, and (2) assesses the assistance provided to strengthen the 

capacity of the Afghan electoral institution, specifically the Independent Election Commission. We conducted this 

performance audit in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from March to August 2009 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found

The international community made available nearly $490 million in assistance to support a legitimate Afghan election 

administered by the Independent Election Commission, of which the United States support comprised over half ($263 

million), as of August 2009. Lessons learned from the 2004 and 2005 elections highlighted the need for increased 

coordination to avoid duplication of effort and enhance the flow of information. To coordinate international support for the 

electoral process for the 2009 elections, the United Nations managed the majority of the international contributions. The 

United Nations focused on fulfilling the immediate operational and logistical needs, such as supporting the development of 

regulations and procedures and hiring of temporary staff, procuring electoral supplies, and coordinating security planning.

While the United Nations recognizes the need for capacity development, it has not established a long term capacity building 

strategy to ensure that transfer of skills occurs. Several donors we interviewed expressed disappointment with the lack of 

focus on sustainability and the need for a longer-term perspective on capacity building to lessen future international 

support. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) faces significant challenges, particularly for the 2010 parliament 

elections, because it lacks the resources to undertake future elections without continued international support. Conducting 

credible and acceptable elections not only depends on the integrity of the election process but also the willingness and 

ability of the next Afghan government to continue to build the Commission’s capabilities so that democratic principles and 

the electoral processes are sustained. On July 6, 2009, SIGAR recommended the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan urge the 

United Nations to take immediate action to fill a key advisor position responsible for monitoring the progress of capacity 

building, sustainability, and exit strategies. However, the position remains unfilled, and there is no detailed strategic plan 

to maximize and leverage the substantial investment made by the donors.

SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections September 22, 2009

STRATEGY AND RESOURCES NEEDED TO 

SUSTAIN AFGHAN ELECTORAL CAPACITY

What SIGAR Recommends 

SIGAR recommends the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, in 

consultation with the U.S. Agency for International Development, assist 

the Afghan government to jointly develop, with IEC and other 

stakeholders, a (1) strategic plan to address national electoral capacity, 

matched with an Afghan budget and human resource structure capable 

of supporting sustainable electoral processes; and (2) request United 

Nations hire a capacity development advisor or appoint an executive 

agent to coordinate an overall strategy with IEC, United Nations, and 

major donors and stakeholders, for monitoring the status and progress 

of all capacity building efforts in Afghanistan. The U.S. Embassy Kabul 

and U.S. Agency for International Development concurred with SIGAR’s

recommendations and stated they will work through diplomatic and 

assistance channels to implement them.

 International and U.S. Contributions for 

 Afghanistan Elections, (USD in millions)

Type of International 

Assistance

Total 

Assistance

U.S. 

Assistance

United Nations $331.2 $120.0

Bilateral $157.4 $143.1

Total $488.6 $263.1

Source: UNDP/ELECT and SIGAR analysis
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND 2

SUBSTANTIAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT SUPPORTS AFGHAN ELECTIONS 3

NO LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINING AFGHAN ELECTORAL CAPACITY AND RESOURCES 8

CONCLUSIONS 10

RECOMMENDATIONS 11

APPENDIX I: Scope and Methodology 12

APPENDIX II: 2009 Afghanistan Elections Timeline 13

APPENDIX III: UNDP/ELECT 2009 Budget 14

APPENDIX IV: Comments from U.S. Embassy Kabul 15 

TABLES

Table 1: United Nations and Bilateral Assistance for Elections 3 

Table 2: U.S. Assistance to Support Elections 4 

GRAPHIC

Graphic 1: Depiction of Management and Coordination Structure for Afghan Elections 7 

ABBREVIATIONS

IEC Independent Election Commission

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP/ELECT United Nations Development Programme/Enhancing Legal and Electoral 

Capacity for Tomorrow 

USAID United States Agency for International Development
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 2 

Strategy and Resources Needed to Sustain Afghan Electoral Capacity

This report (1) identifies the assistance and coordination provided by the United States and international 

donors in support of Afghanistan’s preparation for the August 2009 presidential and provincial council 

elections; and (2) assesses the assistance provided to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan electoral 

institution for future elections, specifically the Independent Election Commission. 

To accomplish these objectives we interviewed IEC managers, United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP) officials managing the Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) project, 

U.S. officials and representatives from donor countries and non-governmental organizations that 

supported the election process. We also attended coordination meetings and/or met with UNDP/ELECT, 

IEC, donor country representatives, and other stakeholders; and reviewed documents and reports 

analyzing and/or providing updates on aspects of the election process. 

This report focused on the preparation for the August 2009 presidential and provincial council elections. 

We did not assess the security situation; providing security for the election was the primary 

responsibility of the Afghan National Security Forces. The results and conduct of this election, including 

lessons learned and women’s participation will be discussed in separate reports. We conducted work in 

Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from March to August 2009 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is 

in appendix I. 

BACKGROUND

Afghanistan will hold four major elections between 2009 and 2010: presidential and provincial council 

elections held on August 20, 2009, and parliament and district council elections in 2010. Unlike the 

elections in 2004 and 2005, which were internationally-led and managed, the August elections were the 

first managed by the IEC, an independent Afghan institution. The IEC was the sole authority in charge of 

preparing and conducting the national elections in Afghanistan. For many IEC staff, this was their first 

substantive experience conducting an election. 

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1806 directed the United Nations Assistance Mission in

Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to lead international 

civilian efforts to support the elections, at the request of the Afghan authorities, by providing technical 

assistance and donor coordination, and by channeling existing and additional funds earmarked to 

support the process. 1

 

1

UNAMA’s mandate cited in Resolution 1806 (2008) was extended in resolution 1868 (2009) until March 23, 2010.

 Within this framework, UNAMA established UNDP/ELECT to provide technical 

assistance and capacity building to the IEC for all electoral activities. See appendix II for the 2009 

elections timeline. The UNDP/ELECT, headed by a Chief Electoral Advisor, includes an operations unit 

providing advice and technical support to the IEC. As of June 2009, UNDP/ELECT employed 44 

international advisors assigned to IEC headquarters and 71 advisors at IEC’s regional and some of its 

provincial offices.
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 3 

SUBSTANTIAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT SUPPORTS AFGHAN ELECTIONS 

The international community invested $488.6 million to primarily support the 2009 elections in 

Afghanistan. Financial support for the presidential and provincial council elections was made primarily 

through (1) contributions by donors to the United Nations’s UNDP/ELECT project, and (2) bilateral 

contributions by donors for specific activities related to the electoral process, such as civic education. 

In addition to the $488.6 million provided by the international community, the Afghanistan government 

budget included $1.5 million to fund the salaries of IEC core staff and temporary staff for conducting the 

election. As shown in Table 1, $331.2 million was pledged to the UNDP/ELECT project and donor 

countries provided an additional $157.4 million in bilateral aid. In comparison, the cost estimate of the 

prior presidential and provincial council elections in 2004 and 2005 was about $416 million ($339.6 

million from the United Nations and $76 million from U.S. bilateral programs). 

The $331 million budget for the UNDP/ELECT project

covered costs for voter registration and election 

administration, primarily for the 2009 presidential and 

provincial council elections. While the UNDP/ELECT 

project spans from October 2006 to December 2010 

and was intended to cover the 2010 elections, 

UNDP/ELECT has not prepared a separate budget for 

the 2010 parliament and district elections. Appendix 

III shows a breakdown of the budget for the 

UNDP/ELECT project by broad categories. The 

majority of international support for Afghanistan’s 

elections consisted of donor contributions to a “basket 

fund” managed by UNDP/ELECT. Twenty-four donors 

contributed to the UNDP/Elect project, including

Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 

Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 

Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.2

 Source: UNDP/ELECT and SIGAR analysis. 

 

 

2

List of donor countries excludes 10 other countries and the United Nations Development Programme and United 

Nations Democracy Fund.

UNDP/ELECT Project:

 Voter Registration $102.2

 Election Administration $229.0

Total UN Contribution $331.2

Bilateral Assistance:

 United States $143.1

 Canada $9.2

 Denmark $1.7

 Germany $0.4

 the Netherlands $2.5

 Switzerland $0.5

Total Bilateral Assistance $157.4

Total Assistance $488.6

Table 1: United Nations and Bilateral 

Assistance for Elections (USD in millions)
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 4 

United States Was the Largest Donor

 

The United States contributed $263.1 million, or approximately 54 

percent of the total amount ($488.6 million) provided by the 

international community. As shown in Table 2, the United States 

contribution was made to the UNDP/ELECT and bilaterally through 

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 

In addition to UNDP/ELECT funding, several donor countries 

provided direct funding for specific election activities for the 

elections. The bilateral funding was intended to supplement

UNDP/ELECT capacity and expertise, particularly in the area of civic 

education, public outreach, and media development. Some 

donors stated that the amount allocated by UNDP/ELECT for civic 

education was insufficient. Canada, Denmark, Germany, the 

Netherlands3

, and Switzerland provided a total of $14.3 million4

 Source: UNDP/ELECT and SIGAR analysis

primarily for this purpose. 

 

Like other donor countries, the United States provided bilateral funding primarily for civic education 

activities. Of the $143.1 million provided through USAID, $67.4 million funded the International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems, $58.5 million was provided to the Consortium for Elections and 

Political Process Strengthening, $11.5 million was provided for observation activities through nongovernmental institutions and for air transportation, and $5.7 million was used to upgrade security at 

IEC headquarters. 

• The $67.4 million USAID contract for a project called, “Support to the Electoral Process in 

Afghanistan” through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems is to be implemented 

over a three-year period from 2008-2011. The assistance under this project includes training 

and capacity building at the IEC. It also includes technical advisors to IEC departments for 

periods ranging from 44 to 110 days. 

• The $58.5 million contract with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, 

for the period 2008 to 2011, is intended to strengthen the ability of political stakeholders to 

articulate, organize, and compete in the elections. The Consortium partners – International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems, National Democratic Institute, and International Republican 

Institute – work collaboratively to implement the Consortium’s objectives. The International 

Republican Institute focused on training in platform development, media outreach, and other 

skills to increase candidates’ confidence in the election results. The National Democratic 

Institute focused on promoting electoral participation by political parties, candidates, and nongovernmental organizations; and tailored activities to address organizational capacity, strategic 

planning, and outreach to constituents. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems

aimed at increasing citizen participation through such activities as voter outreach, press corps 

training, and other activities, as well as special attention to women, youth, and the disabled. 

 

3

The Netherlands plans to provide $2.5 million but this amount has not yet been obligated as of August 2009.

4

Approximate amount in U.S. dollars based on July 2009 exchange rate.

Contribution to UNDP:

 Voter Registration $65.0

 Election Administration $55.0

UN Contribution $120.0

USAID:

 Foundation $67.4

 Consortium $58.5

 Global Security $5.7

 Other projects $11.5

Funded by USAID $143.1

Total US Assistance $263.1

Table 2: US Assistance to Support 

Elections (USD in millions)
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 5 

UNDP/ELECT Managed International Assistance

UNDP/ELECT developed a four-fold approach to support the IEC and the election process: (1) support 

the IEC Secretariat by having international advisors work alongside IEC department directors to 

gradually transfer capacity through coaching, training, and mentoring; (2) coordinate international 

assistance through the United Nations to avoid conflicts, program overlaps, and gaps in international 

support; (3) create two key cross-cutting advisory roles – Capacity Development Advisor and Gender 

Advisor – to ensure capacity development remains at the forefront of the UNDP/ELECT project and that 

gender equity and access issues are mainstreamed within the IEC ; and (4) continue to advocate for 

relevant legislative changes consistent with the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National 

Development Strategy. A focus of the UNDP/ELECT project was to support the IEC in fully developing a 

capacity to deliver credible, sustainable electoral processes. According to UNDP/ELECT, reliance on the 

international community for election support is costly and unsustainable. 

For the 2009 elections, UNDP/ELECT funded voter registration and election administration. 

UNDP/ELECT focused on fulfilling the immediate operational needs to conduct the August election, 

limiting their ability to devote substantial time and resources to institutional capacity-building activities. 

UNDP/ELECT activities included assisting the IEC in reviewing or formulating regulations and procedures 

for elections management; procuring and installing infrastructure, equipment, and other logistical 

supplies; recruiting, training, and managing temporary electoral staff; and coordinating security 

planning. Of the $331 million budget for the UNDP/ELECT project, $229 million primarily supported the 

IEC, the Electoral Complaints Commission and Media Commission for the 2009 elections; technical 

support; and the costs of a possible run-off in 2009; as well as broader stakeholder support for 2009 and 

2010 elections.5

 Prior to the elections, $102 million supported voter registration, specifically the 

registration update exercise conducted in four stages countrywide.6

 

UNDP/ELECT funded observers to report on the registration exercise through the Free and Fair Election 

Foundation of Afghanistan.7

 The Foundation observed all four phases of the voter registration process 

and reported that there were some cases of under-age registration, multiple registrations by individuals, 

and registration of absentees, particularly women registered by male relatives, and other violations. 

Similar violations were reported in all of the phases, potentially undermining the fairness and 

transparency of the election process. Of particular concern, the Foundation noted a lack of IEC 

monitoring over field staff. 

 

5

According to UNDP/ELECT, the specific budget and activities for the 2010 elections will be submitted to donors 

following the 2009 election. 

6

According to the Afghanistan Compact, a permanent civil and voter registry with a single national identity 

document was to be established by the end of 2009. However, the Afghan government decided in May 2008 to 

delink the two processes because of limited capacity within the Ministry of Interior, security concerns, and 

implementation complexity. 

7

The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan states that it is an independent and impartial umbrella 

organization which has been established by a number of civil society organizations to monitor elections to ensure 

that they are free and fair; promote democracy in the country; promote public participation in electoral affairs; 

and help consolidate public trust and faith in democracy and elections.
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 6 

While it was possible for people to hold multiple registration cards, according to UNDP/ELECT, indelible 

ink was used on polling day to deter voters from voting more than once. According to the International 

Crisis Group, an estimated 17 million voter cards were in circulation, and in some provinces, successive 

registration exercises resulted in more registration cards distributed than the estimated population. For 

planning purposes, IEC assumed the eligible voting population was 15 million. However, lacking a 

census or basic population data, there was no reliable way to reconcile discrepancies and increased the 

potential for fraud. In commenting on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy Kabul stated that, while 

indelible ink may deter voters from voting more than once, the most effective measure against fraud 

would be a reliable voter registration list linked to individual polling stations to eliminate the possibility 

of duplicate voter cards. In addition, the U.S. Embassy Kabul stated that failure to build an accurate 

voters list contributed to challenges experienced during voter registration and facilitated fraud and 

irregularities during the 2009 election.

The UNDP/ELECT budgeted approximately $11 million, as of January 2009, for the Electoral Complaints 

Commission, an independent Afghan body established to adjudicate challenges and complaints related 

to the electoral process.8

 The Commissioners consist of three international appointees of the United 

Nations, based on the 2005 Electoral Law, as well one Afghan commissioner appointed by the 

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and another Afghan commissioner appointed by 

the Supreme Court. The electoral appeals body was intended to exist only over electoral periods and 

complete its work within 30 days of the certification of results. According to a commissioner, the 

Electoral Complaints Commission was to start in January 2009 but due to delays in appointing them, the 

Commission did not start until May 2009 and as a result, the recruiting and training of over 270 Afghan 

officers was rushed. Since the Commission is not a permanent institution, much of the Afghan 

knowledge and expertise gained for that election could be lost, similar to what happened after the 2005 

election. Nevertheless, the Commission formed a management structure capable of adjudicating a large 

number of complaints, as evidenced in its public reporting. In commenting on a draft of this report, the 

U.S. Embassy Kabul stated that UNDP/ELECT procurement practices contributed to the slow 

establishment of the Electoral Complaints Commission in Kabul and the provinces and that the 

Commission should be separated from UNDP/ELECT in the future.

UNDP/ELECT Groups Established to Coordinate International Support

UNDP/ELECT established coordination groups to review project progress and regularly engage with the 

IEC on a full range of issues. According to UNDP/ELECT, lessons learned from the 2004 and 2005 

elections highlighted the need for increased coordination among the various United Nations entities and 

donor partners to avoid duplication of effort and enhance the flow of information. The project 

management and coordination arrangement is depicted in graphic 1 below. Additional groups were 

established to coordinate specific issues, such as the Joint Electoral Security Planning Group, for 

security-related issues. 

 

8

Electoral Complaints Commission was established under Article 52 of the Electoral Law of Afghanistan.
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 7 

Graphic 1: Depiction of Management and Coordination Structure for Afghan Elections

Source: UNDP/ELECT. 

 

A description of the groups comprising the coordination meetings follows: 

• The UNDP/ELECT Project Board met quarterly to approve its budget and budget revisions, work 

plans, and progress reports. The Board had overall management control of the project and was

chaired jointly by the UNDP Senior Country Director, the IEC, and Assistant Country Director of 

Democratic Governance Unit. Financial donors to UNDP/ELECT attended and made decisions by 

consensus; however, in the event of a split, UNDP made the final decision. 

• The Donor Group was comprised of political and developmental representatives from donor 

countries and met at least monthly. The Group was co-chaired by a donor nominated by the group 

on a rotating basis. Meetings were facilitated by UNDP and all interested donors could attend 

regardless of their financial contribution to the project. The Group was a forum by which donors 

exchanged information and provided advice and recommendations to UNDP/ELECT management. 

• The project steering committee meetings were generally held monthly at the IEC Headquarters. It

was co-chaired by IEC and UNDP/ELECT and included major donors such as the United States, 

Canada, United Kingdom, Japan and the European Union. The primary focus was on project 

implementation issues. 
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 8 

• The Election Stakeholders Meeting, held weekly, was co-chaired by the IEC and UNAMA. It served 

as a forum for updates and decisions taken by IEC to key stakeholders in pre-election planning and 

implementation.

Generally, the coordination meetings appeared to communicate progress and share information, 

although some communication issues affected the quality of technical and managerial assistance 

provided. For example, in some instances, both UNDP/ELECT and the International Foundation for 

Electoral Systems provided support to the same department in the IEC. While technical assistance and 

managerial advice was provided by both UNDP/ELECT and USAID-funded advisors through the 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, specific capabilities and expertise varied among the 

advisors; and sometimes, UNDP/ELECT assigned or reassigned advisors without first communicating 

with the IEC department head, according to IEC managers we interviewed. According to these IEC 

managers, the international advisors that were assigned did not always match the skills needed. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy Kabul added that the advisers to IEC were 

frequently called on at the last minute to compensate for deficiencies of UNDP/ELECT.

NO LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINING AFGHAN ELECTORAL CAPACITY AND RESOURCES

UNDP/ELECT recognizes the need for capacity development; however, it has not established a long-term 

capacity-building strategy to ensure Afghan electoral capacity building and transfer of skills. According 

to UNDP/ELECT’s project document, staff retention, staff recruitment, training and operational tasks will 

impact on IEC’s limited current capacity. The document further states that international advisors will 

partially cover for this inexperience however a strong focus on capacity development and skills transfer 

is expected of the UNDP/ELECT programme. Several donors we interviewed expressed disappointment 

about the lack of focus on sustainability and long-term capacity building of the IEC. One donor 

representative stated that there should have been dedicated resources of national and international 

staff to ensure knowledge transfer, and that UNDP/ELECT and IEC should have jointly developed a 

detailed plan, establishing mutual expectations and goals to identify what could realistically be

accomplished during the election timeframe. Otherwise, according to another donor representative, 

donors will need to continue to fund the election process time and time again, particularly if broader 

capacity development concerns are not addressed. 

In 2008, UNDP/ELECT and IEC management agreed on the need for a Capacity Development Advisor to 

provide direct management advice and mentoring to the IEC and ensure capacity development 

remained at the forefront of the UNDP/ELECT project. The advisor would be expected to continually 

monitor the capacity building and sustainability impact of the program; provide direct management 

advice and mentoring to the IEC; work with the team of international advisors to support and monitor 

skills transfer; and report directly to UNDP/ELECT management on the progress of capacity building, 

sustainability and exit strategies. The Capacity Development Advisor was supposed to be partnered 

with an Afghan national officer in 2009 with a view to the national officer assuming full responsibility for 

this role in 2010. 

UNDP/ELECT planned to hire a Capacity Development Advisor but has been unable to find a suitable 

candidate for the position. In July 2009, SIGAR recommended UNDP/ELECT take immediate action to 

hire a Capacity Development Advisor with election managerial experience to leverage the substantial 

investment not only for this electoral cycle but 2010 and beyond. As of August 26, 2009, this position 
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 9 

remains vacant. According to the U.S. Interagency Elections Team, capacity building efforts were 

suspended until after the August 20 election due to the immediate operational needs of conducting the 

election. 

The Chief Electoral Advisor, UNDP/ELECT, stated in May 2009, that the lack of a capacity development 

advisor did not mean that capacity development was not taking place. We acknowledged that 

international advisors worked alongside their IEC counterparts; however, there was no strategic plan 

that established mutual expectations in capacity building and measurable benchmarks on transferring 

skills and knowledge. Such a plan would have helped maximize and leverage the substantial investment 

made by the international community in the short time that the technical experts and advisors were 

embedded at the IEC. 

 

Afghanistan Lacks Resources to Conduct Future Elections

While IEC’s 2009 budget was approximately $1.5 million, the IEC Chief Electoral Advisor expressed 

concern the Afghanistan government will have little interest or capability to fund IEC at sustainable 

levels between election cycles.9

 According to a benchmark in the Afghanistan Compact, the IEC is

expected to undertake elections in an “increasingly fiscally sustainable manner.” 10 However, the IEC is

financially dependent upon the Afghanistan government. Continuing to fund the IEC is important 

between election cycles to recruit and train Afghan staff, build institutional infrastructure, and have 

time to implement any changes in electoral law. Following the election, the budget will likely be 

reduced, according to the IEC Chief Electoral Advisor. Moreover, IEC risks losing many trained staff due 

to a relatively low civil service salary structure. 

The head of Information Technology at IEC was concerned about the ability to train Afghan personnel

once the international advisors leave, and in particular, the capacity to operate and maintain the 

biometric voter registration system used during the registration update exercise. The system uses 

biometric software (fingerprint and facial recognition) and is presently operated and maintained under a 

one-year contract. There was no plan to provide extensive hands-on or comprehensive training for local 

nationals or financial support to continue operating and maintaining the contract, according to IEC. 

The salaries, established by the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, are 

generally too low to keep experienced staff. In IEC’s Communication and Information Technology 

Department, for example, salaries have not increased in the last three years although the market 

demand for individuals with information technology expertise is rising. According to an assessment of 

the IEC by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, it is likely that individuals with 

information technology expertise will find higher-paying jobs. 

 

9

The prior fiscal year IEC budget was 35 million Afghanis (roughly $700,000).

10The Afghanistan Compact is a government document that sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks, and timelines 

for delivery, based on goals set by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Annex I of the Compact, titled 

Benchmarks and Timelines, includes a section titled Elections, which states “The Afghanistan Independent Electoral 

Commission will have the high integrity, capacity, and resources to undertake elections in an increasingly fiscally 

sustainable manner by end-2008, with the Government of Afghanistan contributing to the extent possible to the 

cost of future elections from its own resources.”
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 10

To ensure the IEC’s ability to conduct elections in a neutral manner, greater autonomy from the 

executive branch of government is necessary. The weakest aspect of IEC independence is the budgetary 

procedure and financial management of the IEC, which is almost entirely overseen by the Ministry of 

Finance.11 To enhance its independence, the IEC Chief Electoral Advisor suggested the IEC have its own 

funding mechanism, separate from the Ministry of Finance and recommended establishing the IEC as a 

standard budget line item. This action would support IEC’s independence, reduce potential for fraud 

and corruption, increase professionalism by retaining trained staff, and avoid the crisis preceding each 

election and dependence on international support, according to the Chief Electoral Advisor. 

The cost of support for future Afghan elections will remain significantly high, according to an April 2008 

assessment by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development.

12 The aim in the 2010 

polls, according to a June 2009 International Crisis Group report on Afghanistan’s election challenges,

should be substantive technical improvements and, more broadly, sustainable and widely accepted

Afghan electoral institutions. The report states that strategic planning is urgently needed, and in the 

area of operational planning and budget, facilities and equipment built up for 2009 should be retained 

and decisions made to ensure Afghan budget lines and donor commitments are in place for the bridge 

period and the 2010 polls. Moreover, the elections should be followed by a wide ranging analysis of the 

process to ensure the creation of a permanent infrastructure and electoral framework.13 

CONCLUSIONS 

Capacity development intended to build and create a stable and effective IEC is critical for sustaining a 

legitimate and fairly elected government. Developing sustainable institutional capacity at the IEC will 

require the participation and coordination of the United Nations, international donors, and the 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The IEC faces significant challenges as it strives to 

become a self-sustaining institution free from dependence on international support. Once institutional 

capabilities are established, the IEC needs to retain qualified staff from one election cycle to the next. 

Such capabilities will also be needed at the Electoral Complaints Commission, should it be established as 

a permanent electoral institution. Conducting credible and acceptable elections not only depends on 

the integrity of the election process but also the willingness and ability of the next Afghan government 

to continue to build electoral capabilities so that democratic principles and the electoral process are 

sustained. We believe a greater focus on capacity building will better position the IEC to fully assume 

technical duties and lessen dependence on international support in future elections. To prepare for the 

2010 elections, it is particularly important to retain expertise and take action to leverage the 

international investment in the elections. 

 

11Institutional Assessment of the Independent Electoral Commission, Rafael Lopez-Pintor, International Foundation for Electoral 

Systems, Senior Electoral Cycle Advisor, September 30, 2008, pg. 20.

12Assessment Report, Programme Options for DFID Support to Elections in Afghanistan 2008-2011, Department for International 

Development, U.K. Government, April 23, 2008.

13Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, International Crisis Group, June 24, 2009, pg. 27.
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 11

RECOMMENDATIONS

To help build sustainable capacity of Afghanistan’s electoral institutions, we recommend that the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan, in consultation with USAID:

• Assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan jointly develop, with IEC, United 

Nations, and other stakeholders, a detailed strategic plan for capacity development. This plan 

should include mutual expectations and benchmarks for developing sustainable institutional 

electoral capacity; a commensurate Afghan budget and human resource structure capable of 

sustaining the electoral processes; and training and professional development for the IEC and 

the Electoral Complaints Commission, if integrated as a permanent presence into the election 

process. 

To ensure that capacity building and transfer of skills occur between technical advisors and IEC staff, we 

recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan:

• Urge the United Nations to hire a Capacity Development Advisor, or appoint an executive agent 

to coordinate an overall strategy for building and sustaining electoral capacity. The advisor or 

executive agent should, in coordination with IEC, United Nations, and other stakeholders, 

monitor all capacity building efforts, including evaluating performance and skills transfer, 

identifying skill gaps and professional development needs, and addressing sustainability and exit 

strategies.

COMMENTS

The U.S. Interagency Elections Team and USAID Mission, representing the U.S. Embassy Kabul, provided 

joint written comments on a draft of this report, which is included in appendix IV. In their response, 

they fully endorsed our recommendations and stated that they will work through both diplomatic and 

assistance channels to accomplish them. They also provided additional comments which we have 

incorporated in the report, as appropriate.

In their additional comments, the U.S. Embassy Kabul underscored the weak management of 

UNDP/ELECT as a major factor behind some of the weaknesses identified in this report. They stated that 

UNDP/ELECT needs more transparency and needs to retain more experienced experts and advisors with 

technical skills. Further, the U.S. Embassy noted other factors for consideration to improve the 

sustainability of the electoral process beyond the institutional development of the IEC, which included 

reforming the legal framework, electoral system, and constitution. This report does not address such 

reforms, because the scope was limited to institutional capacity. However, we agree that these matters 

are significant to the overall issue of establishing an electoral system that can produce credible and 

acceptable results. 
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 12

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To identify the amount of elections assistance and coordination, we met with UNDP officials to discuss 

donor funding and coordination. We reviewed documents showing the amount pledged by each donor 

country and the amount received, and we verified funding information from donor countries, including

United States, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark, to include bilateral 

assistance targeting specific programs, such as civic education. We interviewed officials at the United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UNDP/ELECT and observed information sharing and 

coordination at regular coordination meetings with the donors and stakeholders. 

To assess the assistance provided to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan electoral institution, the IEC, 

to sustain its electoral capacity for future elections, we met with IEC department heads, nongovernmental institutions such as the International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute,

and International Foundation for Electoral Systems; as well as The Asia Foundation and the United 

Kingdom’s Department for International Development. We interviewed ten of 24 donor countries to 

obtain their views on the election process, in general, and specifically, on issues such as capacity 

building within the IEC. In addition, we reviewed various documents, including assessments and 

progress reports by donors, stakeholders, research institutions, and the IEC.

14 We met with the 

Interagency Election Team in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, Afghanistan to discuss U.S. assistance and 

coordination.

We conducted work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C. from March to August 2009. We 

conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. The audit was conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction under the authority of Public Law 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended.

 

14The ten countries are (1) Canada, (2) Denmark, (3) Germany, (4) Italy, (5) the Netherlands, (6) Norway, (7) 

Sweden, (8) Switzerland, (9) United Kingdom, and (10) United States.
SIGAR Audit-09-6 Elections Page 13

APPENDIX II: 2009 AFGHANISTAN ELECTIONS TIMELINE 

The table below shows the estimated timeframes for the 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council 

elections in Afghanistan.

 Table 1: Timeline for 2009 Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections

 

 

 Source: IEC.

April 25 to May 8 - Nomination of candidates

Presidential candidates nominated themselves at IEC headquarters; Provincial Council 

candidates nominate at IEC provincial offices.

May 16 to 21 - Display of preliminary candidate list

Display preliminary list of candidates at all IEC offices.

May 16 to June 8 - Electoral Complaints Commission hearings and decisions

Registered voters challenge eligibility of candidates with the Electoral Complaints 

Commission.

June 12 - Publication of final list of candidates

Following Electoral Complaints Commission decisions, IEC displays the final list of 

candidates.

June 16 to August 18 - Political campaign period

Candidates mount campaigns. Campaigning concludes 48 hours prior to the 

commencement of polling.

August 20 - Polling day 

Voters go to the polls. Domestic and international observer groups observe polling 

and counting. UNAMA and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission jointly 

conduct political rights’ monitoring.

September 17 – Final results and certification

After polling closes, ballots are counted; IEC announces preliminary results. After 

adjudication of any complaints, IEC announces final results.

October 1 - Approximate date of presidential run-off

If no presidential candidate receives 50% +1 of votes cast, a presidential run-off is held 

between the two candidates who receive the highest number of votes.
SIGAR-Audit-09-6 Elections Page 14

APPENDIX III: UNDP/ELECT 2009 BUDGET 

This appendix contains information on the 2009 UNDP/ELECT budget for the 

elections, which was the basis for donor contributions. The table below shows the 

broad categories of the UNDP/ELECT budget.

Table 1: UNDP/ELECT 2009 budget 

Presidential and provincial council elections (2009) 

Temporary staffing (including civic educators) $23,523,573

Election materials $25,664,064

Transport and Infrastructure $22,869,605

Communications IT $2,905,218 

Gender $569,899

Public outreach $20,404,950

Training and capacity development $596,007

External relations $1,122,463

Media commission $721,210

International technical assistance $29,371,714

Sub Total $127,812.543

General Management Support @ 7% 9,620,299

Election operations and technical assistance $137,432,842

Presidential second round (2009) 

Temporary staffing $10,332,960

Election materials $4,893,788

Transport $8,120,211

Sub Total $23,346,959

General Management Support @ 7% $1,757,298

Presidential second round $25,104,256

Electoral Complaints Commission (2009) 

Staffing $2,838,958

Infrastructure $1,916,037

Transport $2,299,372

International advisors and support $2,494,756

Project management $719,293

Sub Total $10,268,416

General Management Support @ 7% $772,891

Electoral Complaints Commission $11,041,307

Outputs 7 and 8 (2009-10) 

Civic empowerment $14,000,000

Media training $4,500,000

Media monitoring $2,500,000

Targeting programming 

Police Training

Candidate/party agent training

$5,000,000

$6,000,000

$4,000,000

Domestic observation 

$4,000,000 

Security Costs

OSS Costs

$3,050,000

$1,291,500

Sub Total $41,341,500

General Management Support @ 7% $3,337,532

Outputs 7 and 8 (2009-10) $47,679,032

Project management (2009) 

International Staff $4,595,335

National Staff $694,266

Infrastructure $1,861,880

Sub Total $7,151,480

General Management Support @ 7% $538,283

Project management $7,689,764

ELECT TOTAL COSTS (includes presidential run-off) $228,947,201

Source: UNDP/ELECT. 
SIGAR-Audit-09-6 Elections Page 15

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM U.S. EMBASSY KABUL
SIGAR-Audit-09-6 Elections Page 16

APPENDIX IV: COMMENTS FROM U.S. EMBASSY KABUL (p.2)

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-006A).
_________________________________________________________________________________ 

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

 reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline: 

 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202