NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JAMES BRADFORD DEAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0384 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2014-138333-001

The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge 

AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix 

By Consuelo M. Ohanesian 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. DEAN 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Andrew W. Gould joined. 

N O R R I S, Judge: 

¶1 James Bradford Dean timely appeals from his conviction and 

sentence for unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, a class 5 

felony. After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable 

question of law that was not frivolous, Dean’s counsel filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 

2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking 

this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted 

counsel’s motion to allow Dean to file a supplemental brief in propria 

persona, but Dean did not do so. After reviewing the entire record, we find 

no fundamental error and, therefore, affirm Dean’s conviction and 

sentence. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 On August 9, 2014, police officers received a radio call 

concerning a red Jeep being driven by Dean. Two police units in the area—

a fully-marked patrol vehicle and a helicopter—responded to the radio call. 

The patrol unit—driven by Officers D.Y. and M.F.—spotted the Jeep 

heading in the opposite direction, made a U-turn behind it, and followed it. 

While waiting for a stoplight, Dean turned right and began driving at “a 

high rate of speed.” Officers D.Y. and M.F. followed. 

¶3 After Dean made a second right-hand turn, the patrol unit 

activated its lights for “four to five seconds” before also activating its sirens 

for an additional “four to five seconds.” Dean did not slow down or pull 

over for the officers. Officer M.F. relayed to the dispatcher and helicopter 

that Dean was failing to yield, and Sergeant K.V.—the “observer” in the 

helicopter—noticed Dean was not slowing down or attempting to pull over 

and told the patrol unit to “back off.” 

 

 

1We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Dean. See

State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989). 
STATE v. DEAN 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶4 The helicopter unit followed Dean and advised the patrol unit 

that Dean had stopped the Jeep at a nearby hotel. Dean jumped out of the 

Jeep and ran through the courtyard and pool area of the hotel. Officers D.Y. 

and M.F. arrived at the hotel, ran in opposite directions looking for Dean, 

eventually found him, and arrested him. After reading Dean his Miranda 

rights, and after Dean acknowledged to Officer M.F. that he understood his 

rights and agreed to talk to her, Officer M.F. asked him if he knew why he 

was under arrest. Dean answered, “Yes, because I ran from you.” Dean 

also told Officer M.F. he knew the police were attempting to stop him, and 

admitted he had seen the lights on the patrol unit and had also seen the 

police trying to pull him over. 

¶5 On the third day of trial, Dean did not return to court after the 

lunch recess. Dean’s attorneys tried calling him numerous times, but were 

unable to reach him. The court proceeded in Dean’s absence. The next day, 

Dean again did not show up for court and the superior court issued a bench 

warrant for his arrest. The jury found Dean guilty of unlawful flight from 

a law enforcement vehicle. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 28-622.01 (2012). 

¶6 Police apprehended Dean on March 23, 2015. The superior 

court conducted Dean’s “priors hearing” and sentencing on May 15, 2015, 

finding the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Dean had been 

convicted of six prior felonies, which included four historical prior felony 

convictions. See A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(d) (Supp. 2012). The court then 

sentenced Dean, as a category three repetitive offender, to a less-thanpresumptive term of 4 years’ imprisonment with 69 days’ presentence 

incarceration credit. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J) (Supp. 2015).2

DISCUSSION 

¶7 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Dean received a fair 

trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and 

was present for the beginning of his trial and sentencing.3

 

2Although the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. § 13-703 

in 2015, the revisions are immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. Thus, 

we have cited the current version of this statute. 

3The superior court found, and the record supports its 

finding, that Dean waived his right to be present for those portions of the 

trial he missed. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1 (court may infer voluntary absence 
STATE v. DEAN 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶8 The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports 

the verdict. The jury was properly comprised of eight members and the 

court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charges, Dean’s 

presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the necessity of 

a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a 

presentence report, Dean was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing 

and did so, and his sentence was within the range of acceptable sentences 

for his offense. We do, however, correct the sentencing minute entry to

remove the reference to A.R.S. § 13-604, and insert a reference to A.R.S. § 

13-703. The superior court sentenced Dean pursuant to § 13-703, but 

omitted any mention of the statute from its minute entry and instead 

referenced A.R.S. § 13-604, an inapplicable statute. 

CONCLUSION 

¶9 We decline to order briefing and affirm Dean’s conviction and 

sentence as corrected.

¶10 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Dean’s representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Dean of the outcome of this appeal 

and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue 

appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).

¶11 Dean has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s own 

motion, we also grant Dean 30 days from the date of this decision to file an 

in propria persona motion for reconsideration.

 

if defendant had notice of proceeding, right to be present, and warning that 

proceeding would go forward should he fail to appear).