Independent Assessment of the Afghan 

National Security Forces 

Jonathan Schroden • Catherine Norman • Jerry Meyerle • Patricio Asfura-Heim • 

Bill Rosenau • Del Gilmore • Mark Rosen • Daniella Mak • Nicholas Hutchinson 

with Mary Ellen Connell • Nilanthi Samaranayake • Sarah Vogler • 

Michael Markowitz • Jim Gavrilis • Michael Connell 
 This assessment, tasked by the United States Congress, was made by analysts in CNA’s

Center for Strategic Studies. Dr. Jonathan Schroden led this work, and many CNA analysts contributed to the results. Their names are on the cover. The CNA analysts involved in this assessment have considerable experience with Afghanistan’s security situation, many having been

assigned in Afghanistan and having worked with United States, NATO, and Afghan security

forces, and knowing the local language. 

 The Center for Strategic Studies engages in analysis of security matters of many kinds in all

parts of the world. We have significant expertise in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin

America. On-the-ground experience, knowledge of local languages, and use of local primary

source data to produce empirically-based analyses are hallmarks of our regional work. 

 This report contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily

represent the opinion of the Sponsor, the Secretary of Defense. 

 This report (DRM-2014-U-006815-Final) is approved for distribution: January 2014. 

Eric V. Thompson, Ph.D. 

Vice President and Director 

CNA Strategic Studies 

 

 

This report is cleared for public release, distribution unlimited. Specific authority: N00014-11-

D-0323. Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information 

Center at www.dtic.mil or via www.cna.org/research. 

Cover photo: Afghan national security forces stand in formation after the flag-raising ceremony that established Security Base Najil in the Alishang Valley of Laghman Province during Operation West Hammer in December 2012 (U.S. Army photo/Capt. Paul McCarthy). 

Copyright © 2014 CNA 

This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in 

this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 

252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongovernmental users may 

copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, provided that this copyright 

notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading 

or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any 

manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved. 

ii

This page intentionally left blank 
iii

Senior Review Panel members 

The Senior Review Panel was convened by CNA’s chief executive officer, the Honorable Robert J. Murray, and was asked to signify that 

they endorsed “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by 

CNA’s analysis, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” They participated in the Senior Review Panel in their individual, rather than their institutional, capacities. 

Mr. Thomas A. Betro

Former Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Mr. Bart R. Johnson

Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Dr. Stephen Biddle 

Professor of Political Science, The George 

Washington University 

Lieutenant General Francis H. 

(Frank) Kearney III, USA (Ret.) 

Former Deputy Combatant Commander, 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

General James T. Conway, USMC 

(Ret.) 

Former 34th Commandant of the U.S. 

Marine Corps 

Dr. Katherine A. McGrady 

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, CNA 

Lieutenant General Lawrence P. 

Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret.) 

Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans 

and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air 

Force 

Mr. Dean G. Popps 

Former Acting Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology 

The Honorable Nelson M. Ford 

Former Under Secretary of the Army 

General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA 

(Ret.) 

Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and 

former Combatant Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

 
iv

This page intentionally left blank 
v

Contents 

Executive summary ............................................................................ 1

NDAA mandated assessment ........................................................... 1

Additional assessments ..................................................................... 5

Conclusion ........................................................................................ 8

Summary of assessments .................................................................. 11

Introduction ................................................................................... 11

Summary of independent assessment of the ANSF..................... 18

Summary of additional assessments .............................................. 33

Summary of conclusions ................................................................ 40

NDAA mandated independent assessment of the ANSF ................... 43

Threat assessment .......................................................................... 43

ANSF force-sizing framework ........................................................ 79

Assessment of ANSF size, structure, capabilities, posture, 

and regional differentiation ...................................................... 83

Assessment of post-2014 ANSF capability gaps .......................... 147

Assessment of current ANSF resource proposals ...................... 159

Conclusion of independent assessment of the ANSF ............... 162

Additional assessments ................................................................... 165

Supporting the ANSF: Assessment of the capabilities of the 

MoD and MoI and the requirement for MoD and MoI 

advising ...................................................................................... 165

Supporting the assistance mission: Assessment of legal 

authorities required post-2014 ................................................ 186

Supporting regional stability: Assessment of the ANSF – 

PAKMIL relationship ............................................................... 201

Testing our assumptions: Assessment of likely ANSF 

responses to political scenarios ............................................... 224

Conclusion of additional assessments ........................................ 252

Appendix A: Biographies of the authors......................................... 253

Appendix B: Biographies of Senior Review Panel members .......... 259
vi

Appendix C: Organizations contacted during the study ................. 267

Appendix D: Threat assessment case studies ................................. 271

1987–1992: Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, 

collapse of the government ..................................................... 271

1994–2000: The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan.................. 282

2006–2009: Taliban offensive in the south and east .................. 289

Today: Assessment of current threats ......................................... 307

Appendix E: Afghanistan’s districts by security tier ........................ 319

Appendix F: Ministry of Defense and Interior organizational 

charts .......................................................................................... 325

Appendix G: Matrix of authorities ................................................. 327

Appendix H: Model law for Afghanistan authorities post-2014 ...... 337

Acronyms ....................................................................................... 345

Bibliography ................................................................................... 349

List of figures ................................................................................. 363

List of tables .................................................................................. 365
1

Executive summary 

The 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1215, 

directs: “The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the conduct of an 

independent assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) capable of providing security for their own country so 

as to prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for 

terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.” The 

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked CNA to make this independent assessment. The Under Secretary also requested CNA make 

several additional assessments of related issues. 

NDAA mandated assessment 

The NDAA mandates that the independent assessment of the ANSF 

should address the following matters, which this report does: 

1. The likely internal and regional security environment for Afghanistan over the next decade, including challenges and 

threats to the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan from 

state and non-state actors. 

2. The strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities 

required to make the ANSF capable of providing security for 

their own country so as to prevent Afghanistan from ever again 

becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, 

the region, and the world. 

3. Any capability gaps in the ANSF that are likely to persist after 

2014 and that will require continued support from the United 

States (U.S.) and its allies. 

4. Whether current proposals for the resourcing of the ANSF after 2014 are adequate to establish and maintain long-term security for the Afghan people, and implications for U.S. national 

security interests of the under-resourcing of the ANSF. 
2

These tasks are focused on the future security environment in Afghanistan. They do not address topics of political stability, such as 

governance, social development, corruption, or tensions among Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian groups. As such, we do not consider 

these topics when sizing and structuring the ANSF. Rather, we assume 

that the current level of political stability in Afghanistan will remain 

during the timeframe of this study. We recognize that events that 

might perturb this political stability—such as changes in the stability 

of Afghanistan’s neighbors, their policies and actions with respect to 

insurgents targeting Afghanistan, reconciliation of insurgent groups, 

the upcoming Afghan presidential election, and whether the international community continues to support Afghanistan—have the potential to alter the security situation in Afghanistan in significant 

ways. We therefore consider these events and their implications for 

the ANSF in the section of this report addressing ANSF responses to 

political scenarios. 

To make our assessment of the ANSF, we assessed the future security 

environment; defined a set of operational objectives for the ANSF 

that support the U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan through 2018; conducted a troop-to-task analysis of ANSF force structure required to 

achieve these operational objectives; identified critical gaps in the 

ANSF’s capabilities to achieve these objectives; and assessed the adequacy of current resource plans to support the ANSF in the coming 

years. Subject to this method and the caveats above, we draw the following conclusions in regards to the questions posed by Congress. 

We conclude that the security environment in Afghanistan will become more 

challenging after the drawdown of most international forces in 2014, and 

that the Taliban insurgency will become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s 

stability in the 2015–2018 timeframe than it is now. 

The insurgency has been considerably weakened since the surge of 

U.S. and NATO forces in 2009, but it remains a viable threat to the 

government of Afghanistan. The coalition’s drawdown will result in a 

considerable reduction in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

operations by Afghan, U.S., and NATO forces. History suggests that 

the Taliban will use sanctuaries in Pakistan to regenerate their capabilities as military pressure on the movement declines. In the 2015–

2016 timeframe, we assess that the Taliban are likely to try to keep 

military pressure on the ANSF in rural areas, expand their control 
3

and influence in areas vacated by coalition forces, encircle key cities, 

conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other urban areas, and 

gain leverage for reconciliation negotiations. In 2016–2018, once the 

insurgency has had time to recover from the last several years of U.S. 

and NATO operations, a larger and more intense military effort will 

become increasingly likely. 

We conclude that a small group of al Qaeda members, many of whom have 

intermarried with local clans and forged ties with Afghan and Pakistani insurgents, remains active in the remote valleys of northeastern Afghanistan.

However, as a result of sustained U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism 

operations, this group of al Qaeda members does not currently pose 

an imminent threat to the U.S. and Western nations. Further, so long 

as adequate pressure is maintained via U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operations, the group is unlikely to regenerate the capability to become a 

substantial threat in the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

We conclude that, in the likely 2015–2018 security environment, the ANSF 

will require a total security force of about 373,400 personnel in order to provide basic security for the country, and cope with the Taliban insurgency 

and low-level al Qaeda threat. 

This number is slightly smaller than the current ANSF force size of 

382,000.1

 We assess that this small reduction in force size can be 

achieved, despite the expectation of a growing insurgent threat, by 

redistributing some of the ANSF from areas of low threat to those of 

higher threat—for example, from the northern and western regions 

of the country to the east—and by restructuring some elements of 

the ANSF. For example, we conclude that the Afghan National Army 

needs fewer combat battalions, but substantially more logistics and 

support forces to enable sustained combat operations. 

We conclude that the ANSF will continue to have significant gaps in capability that will limit their effectiveness after 2014.

 

1

 This includes the 352,000 personnel approved in the ANSF Plan of Record 

and an additional 30,000 Afghan Local Police. By comparison, our figures include a base force of 344,300 plus 29,100 Afghan Local Police 

(for a total of 373,400 ANSF). 
4

We identify critical capability gaps in six areas: mobility; air support; 

logistics (e.g., supply, maintenance, and contracting); intelligence 

gathering and analysis; communications and coordination among 

ANSF components; and recruiting and training of people with specialized skills. These are systemic gaps in capability that can be mitigated via materiel solutions but not closed by them. 

We therefore conclude that international enabler support—to include advisors—will be essential to ANSF success through at least 2018. 

We were unable to conduct a detailed analysis of the cost of an ANSF 

sized at 373,400 personnel, due to a lack of data to support an independent cost estimate. Rough estimates using two existing models 

put the sustainment costs of the 373,400-member force in the range 

of $5-6 billion per year, though these are highly approximate and further work should be done to develop a more accurate cost estimate. 

The last formal announcement of the international community’s 

plan for the post-2014 ANSF came at the 2012 Chicago Summit. At 

this conference, it was agreed that, subject to the developing security 

environment, the ANSF should be drawn down to a force size of 

228,500 (not including an additional 30,000 Afghan Local Police to 

be sustained by the United States). The estimated annual cost of this 

force was $4.1 billion per year. 

Our calculated ANSF of 373,400 personnel is significantly larger, and likely 

to be more expensive, than the force envisioned by the United States and 

NATO at the Chicago Summit.

Our earlier conclusion that the threat in Afghanistan is likely to increase in 2015–2018 stands in direct contradiction to the assumption of a 

reduced insurgent threat made at the Chicago Summit. 

We therefore conclude that proceeding with the drawdown of the ANSF as 

announced at the Chicago Summit will put the current U.S. policy goal for 

Afghanistan at risk. Instead, we recommend that the international community establish a new plan to fund and sustain the ANSF at an end-strength of 

about 373,400, with a proportionally sized assistance mission (including 

advisors), through at least 2018. 
5

If the international community did this, and if the ANSF are successful 

through 2018:

We assess that a negotiated political settlement to end the war would become 

much more likely in the 2019–2023 timeframe.

Additional assessments 

In addition to our independent assessment of the ANSF, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked us to conduct additional assessments on several related issues. 

Task: Assess the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of 

Interior (MoI) to perform required functions in support of their respective forces 

and the appropriate proportion of military and civilian advisors to assist these 

ministries and their required expertise. 

We conclude that for the MoD and MoI to carry out their responsibilities to 

support army and police forces in the field, they require four core capabilities: logistics; strategy and policy planning; financial management; and personnel management. 

In addition, we found that six institutional enablers are important for 

ministerial success: anti-corruption; gender integration; local ownership; information technology; intelligence; and civilianization. 

We conclude that the MoD and MoI are not likely to be independently capable in any of these areas by 2018. We therefore assess that international advisors within the MoD and MoI will be required through at least 2018. 

Our analysis suggests that the absence of these advisors has the potential to undermine the ANSF’s combat effectiveness over the 

timeframe of this study, thereby imparting additional risk to the U.S. 

policy goal for Afghanistan. 

Task: Assess legislative authorities that would enable—or hinder—success of 

the U.S. assistance mission. 

We identified over 20 specialized legal authorities and many more 

standing authorities and international agreements that enable the 

U.S. military’s mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. military will likely focus on four missions in Afghanistan in 2015–2018: counterterrorism; 
6

training, advising, assisting (and possibly equipping) the ANSF; retrograding personnel and equipment; and protecting U.S. civilians 

working on the ground. Having analyzed the authorities required to 

conduct these missions: 

We conclude that the U.S. Department of Defense will require the same types 

of authorities that it has today with the possible exception of authorities for 

counterinsurgency programs which are not part of the envisioned post-2014 

mission set for the U.S. military. 

We also conclude that the decentralized and makeshift nature of the current 

authorities regime promotes waste and inefficiencies. 

Accordingly, we suggest that a new, consolidated approach consisting 

of a single, omnibus authority be considered. 

Task: Assess opportunities for cooperation—or prevention of conflict—between 

the ANSF and the Pakistani military. 

We conclude that there will be areas of enduring conflict in the relationship between the ANSF and the Pakistani military that may prevent full normalization of relations between the two countries and 

will threaten to periodically escalate tensions between them. These 

include Afghanistan’s reluctance to recognize the border with Pakistan; Pakistan’s continued relationship with elements of the Taliban; 

and Afghanistan’s growing security relationship with India. However, 

we also find that there are areas of common interest, as well as enduring mechanisms for cooperation, that could help reduce conflict and 

stabilize the relationship over time. These include cross-border trade; 

repatriation and resettlement of Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan; and countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

In our interviews with officers in both countries’ militaries, we identified interest in continuing, and in some areas expanding, initiatives 

for cooperation. However: 

We conclude that if the United States and NATO significantly decrease their 

commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, areas of enduring conflict are 

likely to be exacerbated and areas of potential cooperation are unlikely to 

reach their full potential.
7

If the U.S. and NATO continue their commitment to Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, it will help mitigate some, but not all, of the areas of 

enduring conflict between the two countries and it will bolster opportunities for cooperation. 

Task: Assess likely ANSF responses to several political scenarios. 

We created three scenarios to identify possible ANSF reactions to 

events that might impact political stability in Afghanistan. Our first 

scenario considered Taliban reconciliation. 

We conclude that as long as the Afghan president adequately consults, listens 

to, and addresses the concerns of ANSF leaders as part of the reconciliation 

process and during the implementation of a settlement, the ANSF are likely 

to accept the settlement’s terms.

That said, we assess that there is a low probability of the Taliban reconciling by 2018. 

Our second scenario considered the possibility of a “bad” presidential 

election or transfer of power in 2014. 

We conclude that as long as the winning presidential ticket maintains the 

current ethnic balance of power, the ANSF will largely accept the results of 

the election.

If a non-Pashtun were to win, it could lead to desertion or defection 

among rank-and-file ANSF along with increased violence in the south 

and east of the country and protests in the major cities. We assess 

these possibilities are of low-to-moderate likelihood. 

Our third scenario considered the loss of international community 

support. 

We conclude that if the United States and NATO do not maintain a training 

and advisory mission in Afghanistan, the absence of advisors in 2015 is likely to result in a downward spiral of ANSF capabilities—along with security 

in Afghanistan—unless the ANSF can find other patrons to fill the resulting 

“enabler vacuum.”

We find this excursion to be of moderate likelihood. Further: 
8

We conclude that the loss of international community funding, or even a toorapid decline in funding, is likely to result in another civil war in Afghanistan. 

Conclusion 

Taking all of our assessments into consideration, we conclude that for 

the ANSF to successfully support the U.S. policy goal of preventing 

Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that 

threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world, they will need a 

force size of about 373,400 with some structural and posture adjustments, through at least 2018. We conclude that this force is not likely 

to defeat the Taliban militarily, but that if it can hold against the Taliban insurgency through 2018, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the war will increase. We conclude that this force, as well as 

the security ministries that support it, will require international enabling assistance—including advisors—through at least 2018, and that 

this assistance mission will need authorities similar to those of the 

mission in Afghanistan today. Finally, we conclude that sustained 

commitment of the international community in Afghanistan is likely 

to mitigate tensions in the region and increase prospects for regional 

cooperation, but that withdrawal of international community support 

is likely to have consequences up to and including a renewed civil war 

in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region. 

 
9

This page intentionally left blank 
10

Figure 1. Afghanistan and Pakistan administrative divisions (University of Texas, available at: 

<www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia>, accessed September 2013). 
11

Summary of assessments 

Introduction 

The 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states, “The 

Secretary of Defense shall provide for the conduct of an independent 

assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

capable of providing security for their own country so as to prevent 

Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that 

threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.2

” The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked CNA to conduct this assessment. 

The NDAA mandates that the independent assessment of the ANSF 

should address the following matters, which this report does: 

1. The likely internal and regional security environment for Afghanistan over the next decade, including challenges and 

threats to the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan from 

state and non-state actors 

 

2

 For the purposes of this paper, and per the NDAA, the ANSF are defined 

as including all forces under the authority of the Afghan Ministries of 

Defense and Interior (MoD and MoI, respectively). These include: the 

Afghan National Army (ANA); the pillars of the Afghan National Police 

(ANP), which are the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National 

Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP); the Afghan Local Police (ALP); the Afghan Air Force (AAF); Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces 

(ANASOF); Afghan Police Special Units; and the Special Mission Wing 

(SMW). While the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) does have a 

relationship with the MoI, it is a state-owned for-profit enterprise and 

thus fell outside the scope of this study. Also, while we acknowledge the 

important role played by the National Directorate of Security (NDS), direct consideration of that organization was also outside the scope of this 

study. 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, Section 

1215, accessed Sep. 10, 2013, at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310enr.pdf. 
12

2. The strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities 

required to make the ANSF capable of providing security for 

their own country so as to prevent Afghanistan from ever again 

becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, 

the region, and the world 

3. Any capability gaps in the ANSF that are likely to persist after 

2014 and that will require continued support from the United 

States (U.S.) and its allies 

4. Whether current proposals for the resourcing of the ANSF after 2014 are adequate to establish and maintain long-term security for the Afghan people, and implications for U.S. national 

security interests of the under resourcing of the ANSF 

In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) directed the 

study to analyze and provide recommendations on the following: 

1. ANSF regional differentiation in capacity, capabilities, resources, challenges, and relationships with Kabul 

2. The capabilities of the MoD and MoI to perform the planning, 

programming, budgeting, management, oversight, and sustainment functions for their respective forces 

3. The appropriate proportion of military and civilian advisors to 

assist these ministries and the required functional/professional 

expertise 

4. Recommendations on legislative authorities that would enable—or hinder—success of the U.S. assistance mission 

5. Assessment of opportunities for cooperation—or prevention of 

conflict—between the ANSF and the Pakistani military, especially along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 

6. Difficulties the ANSF may face—and likely responses and directions they could go—under several potential political scenarios 

We address all of these additional topics in this report, though not 

separately in each case. During the course of our study, we discovered 

that the first additional task was naturally addressed in our analysis of 

the NDAA tasks, so we have integrated discussion of it with our independent assessment of the ANSF. Additionally, tasks 2 and 3 above 
13

both pertain to the MoD and MoI, so we have combined the discussion of these tasks in the report. 

Methodology 

In order to ensure that our assessment of the ANSF was independent, 

we identified and used a method that has not been applied to this 

problem before. This methodology consisted of the following steps: 

1. Create a future threat assessment. 

a. We performed a comparative historical case study analysis 

of periods in which non-state actors launched large-scale 

military campaigns against the government of Afghanistan 

in order to understand insurgents’ past actions and their 

implications for the future. We focused on three case studies: the years following the Soviet withdrawal (1989–1992); 

the emergence of the Taliban (1994–2000); and the Taliban’s resurgence as a guerrilla force (2006–2008). 

b. We conducted interviews and gathered data (e.g., U.S., 

NATO, and Afghan threat assessments) in the United 

States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in order to understand 

and characterize the current security situation in Afghanistan. 

c. We used an understanding of the past and present generated via the previous two steps to make judgments about the 

likely future threat beyond 2014. These take the form of 

narrative assessments of the Taliban’s intent and capabilities 

at strategic, operational, and tactical levels (with regional 

nuances), as well as a map of Afghanistan assessed against 

the security tiers defined below. 

2. Conduct a troop-to-task analysis to determine the ANSF’s size, 

structure, capabilities (and capability gaps), posture, and required resources in the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

a. We used the future threat assessment to identify the missions that the ANSF would need to conduct, and in which 

areas, in order to achieve the operational goals that support 

the U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan through 2018. We used 
14

this force-sizing framework to calculate the size, structure, 

capabilities, and posture of each component of the ANSF. 

b. We compared our calculated ANSF to the current ANSF, in 

order to identify capability gaps that are likely to persist after 2014. 

c. We compared current U.S. and international community 

resourcing plans for the ANSF to the resources that would 

be needed to address these capability gaps. 

To link our qualitative future threat assessment with our quantitative 

troop-to-task analysis, we created a construct that enables the categorization of areas of Afghanistan by threat—via the following five “security tiers”: 

1. Strategic/National areas: These are areas that the insurgency 

would need to gain control of in order to topple the current 

government and claim political control of the country. 

2. Operational areas: These are areas that the insurgency would 

want to control in order to project power and influence into 

the Strategic/National (Tier 1) areas. 

3. Tactical areas: These are areas that the insurgency would want 

to control in order to project power and influence into the 

Operational (Tier 2) areas. 

4. Support/Transit areas: These are areas that the insurgency 

would utilize in order to move fighters or materiel into Tactical (Tier 3) areas or seek to temporarily control as peripheral 

support zones. 

5. Civil Order areas: If Afghanistan did not have an active insurgency, it would still require a base level of security forces to 

maintain civil order and protect the population from criminality. These are areas in which the insurgency is not likely to 

have a presence during the timeframe of this study. This could 

be due to a number of reasons, to include inhospitable local 

populations (e.g., due to ethnic or religious differences) or 

disinterest by the insurgency. 
15

There is a certain “linearity” to this construct, in which insurgents 

take control of tactical areas to enable taking control of operational 

areas, to eventually enable taking control of national/strategic areas. 

While this may not be universally applicable to all insurgencies, it 

does apply to the situation in Afghanistan, as will be explained in the 

threat assessment below. 

Since the additional directed assessments were stand-alone topics and 

not analytically connected, we used distinct methodologies for each. 

These will be described briefly with the summary of each individual 

assessment below. 

Execution 

In the execution of this method, we followed three lines of effort. 

1. An integrated, multi-functional, and diverse study team. This 

team comprised a nucleus of senior analysts with Afghanistan 

and military functional expertise and served as the core of the 

analytic effort. It included the travel team described below and 

reached across CNA to bring in additional expertise as required. Appendix A contains biographies of the core study 

team members. 

2. A Senior Review Panel. The Senior Review Panel consisted of 

10 members with experience in leading major organizations 

that focused on the military functional areas (e.g., ground 

forces, air forces, personnel, intelligence, logistics), as well as 

law enforcement and policing. None of them were employed 

by the U.S. government at the time of the study. The panel met 

twice during the study to critically review CNA’s methodologies, 

assumptions, and interim analytical results, and to provide recommendations for further analysis. The panel members were 

also asked to review this report, and to signify that they endorsed “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by 

CNA’s analysis, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” All 10 panel members so affirmed. Biographies 

for the Senior Review Panel’s members can be found in Appendix B. 

3. A small travel team composed of experienced analysts. A significant amount of the data required for this assessment could on-
16

ly be obtained via interviews of military officers, civilian officials, and political leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our 

travel team consisted of four senior analysts, all with significant 

prior experience in Afghanistan. This team was on the ground 

from 10 to 25 August and traveled individually to each of four 

geographic regions: the Kabul cluster; eastern Afghanistan; 

southern and south-western Afghanistan; and western and 

northern Afghanistan. One analyst also traveled to Pakistan to 

speak with the Pakistani military, the Office of the Defense 

Representative – Pakistan (ODR-P), and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. In all cases, we interviewed Afghan and Pakistani 

leaders and those from other pertinent organizations in addition to members of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and U.S. commands. A list of the organizations with 

whom we engaged can be found in Appendix C. 

Timeframe 

The wording of the 10 tasks for this study makes clear that the study’s 

focus is on the future. We were not asked to conduct an independent 

assessment of the ANSF’s current capabilities. Accordingly, this study 

will not assess the ANSF’s current fighting effectiveness or military 

proficiency. Rather, it will focus on identifying requirements for the 

ANSF and the Afghan ministries in the future. Moreover, while the 

NDAA states that the timeframe for the future threat assessment 

should be “the next decade,” this study will focus mainly on 2015–

2018, and less on 2019–2023. Our analysis of historical case studies 

and the current security situation allows us to make plausible conjectures about events in Afghanistan through 2018, but making predictions beyond that timeframe with sufficient granularity to inform 

force structure analyses is exceedingly difficult and would not serve as 

a sound basis for policy decisions. 

Overarching assumptions 

In order to set the analytic parameters of our assessment and focus 

on the ANSF as a force for security in support of political stability, we 

made the following assumptions. 

 The current level of political stability in Afghanistan remains 

during the timeframe of this study. 
17

 The current level of political stability in Pakistan remains during the timeframe of this study. 

 Regional powers continue to meddle in Afghanistan’s internal 

affairs and Pakistan continues to support armed proxy groups 

in Afghanistan,3

 but these activities are tempered so as not to 

significantly alter the level of political stability in Afghanistan. 

 The Taliban do not reconcile with the Afghan government during the timeframe of this study.4

 The 2014 Afghan presidential election is acceptable to Afghans 

and the international community and leads to a peaceful transfer of political power. 

 The international community continues to fund and resource 

the government of Afghanistan and the ANSF. 

 The United States and NATO continue a training and advisory 

mission, and the U.S. maintains a counterterrorism mission, in 

Afghanistan during the timeframe of this study. 

Our Senior Review Panel highlighted that these assumptions should 

be the subject of detailed studies themselves, as it is unclear that all of 

them will hold true.5

 In particular, invalidation of any of the first 

three would lead to such a radically different security environment in 

Afghanistan as to make our findings irrelevant. In this study we cannot fully explore the ramifications of each assumption proving false; 

however, we will examine the last four and analyze how the ANSF 

 

3

 Jerry Meyerle. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History. CNA Report DRP-2012-U-003250-Final. Nov. 2012. 

4

 The insurgency in Afghanistan is composed of a host of insurgent groups 

beyond the Taliban (e.g., the Haqqani network, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). However, for the sake of 

simplicity, in this report we will generally use the terms “Taliban” or “insurgents” to encompass these groups unless the discussion warrants 

more specific language. 

5

 Our Senior Review Panel was especially concerned about the future role 

that Pakistan might play and its ability to impact events in Afghanistan in 

both positive and negative ways. They highlighted the importance of the 

U.S.–Pakistan relationship in that regard. 
18

might respond if they proved invalid. We will do this as part of our assessment of likely ANSF responses to various political scenarios. 

Organization 

The remainder of this summary will be divided into three sections. 

The first section contains the major conclusions and recommendations from our independent assessment of the ANSF, per the requirement in the 2013 NDAA. This section constitutes the heart of 

the study and its sub-sections are analytically connected. The second 

section contains the major findings from our additional assessments 

on the topics that were directed by the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Policy). The third section provides some overarching conclusions to 

our assessments. 

Summary of independent assessment of the ANSF 

This section contains our independent assessment of the ANSF. In 

addition to addressing the four NDAA-mandated tasks, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked us to look separately at ANSF regional differentiation. Over the course of the study, we discovered 

that this was naturally addressed in our force size and structure analysis. Therefore, we have integrated these tasks in our discussion below. 

Summary of threat assessment 

Our analysis of Afghanistan’s modern insurgencies concludes that 

although the current insurgency in Afghanistan has been considerably weakened since the surge of U.S. and NATO forces in 2009, it remains a viable force. The continued drawdown of U.S. and NATO 

forces in the coming year will lead to a considerable reduction in 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations by Afghan as 

well as coalition troops. Precedent suggests that the Taliban will use 

sanctuaries in Pakistan to regenerate at least some of its lost capability 

as military pressure on the movement declines. From 2015 to 2018, 

insurgents are likely to increase operations in order to gain leverage 

in reconciliation negotiations and test the ANSF’s capabilities in the 

absence of large numbers of U.S. and NATO forces. 

We assess that the reduction in U.S. and NATO counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations combined with the continued existence of insurgent 
19

sanctuaries in Pakistan will make the insurgency a greater threat in the 

2015–2018 timeframe than it is now.

Our historical analysis of three case studies in which insurgents conducted a campaign against the Afghan government (Appendix D) 

showed that in all three cases, insurgents employed a strategy in 

which they focused first on controlling and influencing rural areas, to 

enable a later focus on taking key urban areas and cities—and they 

were largely successful at doing so in all three cases.6

 Based on these 

past precedents: 

We conclude that the Taliban will follow a gradualist campaign in the two 

years immediately following the drawdown of coalition forces.

Such a campaign will involve keeping military pressure on the ANSF 

in rural areas, expanding insurgent control and influence in areas vacated by coalition forces, encircling key cities, and conducting highprofile attacks in Kabul and other important urban areas. 

In the medium term (2016–2018), once the insurgency has had time to recover from the last several years of U.S. and NATO operations, we conclude 

that a larger and more intense military effort will become increasingly likely. 

We assess that the Taliban will conserve resources in the near term for 

such an offensive, while carrying out enough attacks in the interim to 

remain relevant. 

In Tier 1 areas, the Taliban is likely to escalate complex attacks and 

assassinations against leaders and institutions—especially in Kabul. 

These attacks will pose the greatest near-term strategic threat to the 

national government. Insurgents will seek to expand bases in the rural areas around Kabul, especially in the south, from which to conduct terrorist attacks in the capital. The Taliban is likely to use similar 

 

6

 These cases are: the years following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989-1992; the 

emergence of the Taliban in 1994-2000; and the Taliban’s resurgence as 

a guerrilla force during 2006-2008. In the third case, the Taliban were ultimately unsuccessful in achieving their strategic aims, but it took a significant surge of forces by the U.S. and NATO and a sizeable increase in 

ANSF end-strength to reverse the Taliban’s momentum. 
20

methods against regional capitals, especially Jalalabad in the east and 

Kandahar in the south. 

In Tier 2–3 areas, there are likely to be various small offensives aimed 

at expanding insurgent control and regaining ground lost during the 

surge of U.S. and NATO forces. 

We conclude that the Taliban will continually test the ANSF—first in outlying areas and then, if Afghan forces fare poorly, increasingly in more central 

locations. 

Most of these attacks will be small, but we also expect massed assaults 

in outlying areas where insurgents have freedom of movement. The 

Taliban will use captured ground to rebuild its military capabilities 

and surround and put pressure on district centers and other key areas. 

We assess that insurgents will seek to regain freedom of movement in 

Tier 4 areas through key corridors from Pakistan and between strategically important districts and cities, especially the Ring Road (Highway 1) and the main highways to Pakistan. 

In the south, the Taliban will seek to infiltrate back into northern 

Helmand and districts of Kandahar, from which to put pressure on 

the capitals of both provinces. The Taliban’s primary aim in the south 

is likely to be control or influence over the population in rural areas 

and the seizure of vulnerable district centers. We expect massed attacks on outlying Afghan Local Police positions and targeted killings 

in key towns such as Sangin in northern Helmand. Once insurgents 

have had time to regroup in 2017 or 2018, they may attempt multiple 

massed assaults on outlying district centers, as they did in 2006. 

In the east, we expect insurgents to focus on protecting their key bases and transit areas. A major coordinated campaign of significant 

scope or scale is less likely than it is in the south, though there may be 

intense fighting in some areas. Insurgents in the northeastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan will periodically attack isolated ANA positions and target resupply convoys in the mountains, in order to fix 

the ANSF, disrupt their resupply, and make outlying positions untenable. 
21

A small group of al Qaeda members, many of whom have intermarried with local clans and forged ties with Afghan and Pakistani insurgents, remain active in remote valleys of northeastern Afghanistan. 

However, this group is likely to maintain a low profile and remain 

largely contained to remote valleys in the northeast. These members 

of al Qaeda may regenerate capability if the tempo of U.S. counterterrorism operations declines and the ANSF pull back from Kunar 

and Nuristan. Al Qaeda may also look to expand to other remote areas of the east, such as Ghazni province. 

In the north and west, Taliban influence will remain largely contained to isolated pockets with large Pashtun populations in these regions. We also expect a modest increase in terrorist attacks and 

assassinations in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. 

We assess that Pakistan will not take military action against the Haqqani 

network or other Afghanistan-focused insurgent groups until there is greater 

clarity on the future regime in Kabul and the long-term viability of the 

ANSF. 

It is also unlikely that Pakistan will take action against Quetta-based 

Taliban leaders. Instead, Pakistan will use its control over insurgent 

sanctuaries to ensure that leaders amenable to Pakistani interests 

dominate these movements. 

Iran is likely to engage in activities to oppose the Taliban and stabilize 

the government in Kabul, while pulling back from tactical support to 

Taliban insurgents as additional U.S. forces depart. Iran may, nonetheless, continue to aid insurgents in attacks on strategic bases and 

airfields in the west if U.S. forces or aircraft are present there. 

Using the implications of our case study analyses and current threat 

assessment, we derived a map depicting areas of Afghanistan categorized by the five security tiers defined above (Figure 2; see Appendix 

E for a list of districts by security tier). The Taliban are likely to first 

test the ANSF in Tier 3 and 4 areas, attempting to gain control of 

these in order to project power and influence into many of the Tier 2 

and Tier 1 areas. If they are successful, they are likely to gain recruits 

and momentum, enabling them to increase pressure in Tier 2 areas 

and terrorist attacks in Tier 1 areas in order to discredit the Afghan 

government and the ANSF. If they are successful in doing this, they 
22

will likely continue to ratchet up pressure on the ANSF and in the cities until they can capture the latter and claim political control of the 

country. 

Looking further into the future, if the ANSF achieve their operational goals and hold against the insurgency for several years after 2014, 

they will prove their ability to endure independent of substantial coalition support. This will remove the uncertainties associated with U.S. 

and NATO withdrawal and decrease incentives for insurgents to continue fighting, thereby creating the conditions for an enduring political solution to the conflict. 

Assuming that the ANSF are successful through 2018, we assess that a negotiated political settlement to end the war will become much more likely during the 2019–2023 timeframe. 
23

Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan by security tier 
24

Summary of ANSF force-sizing framework 

The U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan as stated in the 2013 NDAA is: 

“Prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.”7

 

To conduct a troop-to-task analysis, we needed to operationalize this 

policy goal by writing nested goals at the operational level—focused 

on security—that the ANSF could reasonably be expected to achieve 

with U.S. and NATO support (per our overarching assumptions). Using the construct of security tiers, we assess that the operational goals 

for the ANSF in 2015–2018 should be to: 

 Neutralize the insurgency in Tier 1 (National/Strategic) and 

Tier 2 (Operational) areas. 

 Disrupt the insurgency in Tier 3 (Tactical) and Tier 4 (Support/Transit) areas. 

 Maintain civil order in Tier 5 (Civil Order) areas. 

These operational goals are minimalist in nature. They are designed 

to prevent the overthrow of the government of Afghanistan and disrupt insurgent and terrorist safe havens within its borders. They are 

not designed to result in the military defeat of the Taliban. While the 

latter may be a desirable outcome, it is not the stated policy goal of the 

United States.

We assess that if the ANSF can achieve these operational goals 

through 2018, it will translate to achievement of the aforementioned 

U.S. policy goal—but only through 2018. Continued attainment of the 

U.S. policy goal past 2018 will require continued achievement of 

these operational goals or a political settlement to end the war. 

Using these operational goals and our future threat assessment, we 

were able to conduct a troop-to-task analysis to determine the overall 

size, structure, posture, capabilities, and regional differentiation 

needed for the ANSF to achieve the operational goals (in support of 

the U.S. policy goal) in the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

 

7

 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, Section 1215. 
25

Summary of ANSF force size, structure, capabilities, posture, and 

regional differentiation 

Given the immediacy of the study’s timeframe (2015–2018), we took 

the general contours of the ANSF as constant (i.e., it has an army, police force, special operations forces, and so on). We then used a variety of planning factors (Table 1) in conjunction with our force-sizing 

framework to calculate a size for each of the ANSF’s force types. 

Table 1. Summary of ANSF troop-to-task analysis planning factors 

Force type Security tier Planning factor 

Afghan Uniformed Police 

and Anti-Crime Police 

Tier 5 2.2 police per 1,000 population 

Tier 4 2.5 police per 1,000 population 

Tier 3 6.0 police per 1,000 population 

Tier 2 2.9 police per 1,000 population 

Tier 1 (other) 3.5 police per 1,000 population 

Tier 1 (Kabul) 3.8 police per 1,000 population 

Afghan Local Police Tier 3 300 Guardians per each Tier 3 district (97 districts total) 

Afghan Border Police 

Tier 5 0.6 – 2.0 police per 50 square kilometer (sq km) of border zone 

Tier 4 3.8 – 5.9 police per 50 sq km of border zone 

Tier 3 3.8 – 8.8 police per 50 sq km of border zone 

Afghan National Army 

infantry battalions 

Tier 5 Area of operations aligned with political boundaries and 

sized for battalion response within one day 

Tier 4 Simultaneously conduct one battalion-size clearing operation and reinforce one district center per province 

Tier 2 & 3 

(rural areas) Average battalion area of operations of 4,800 sq. km 

Tier 2 (roads) 

Varies by region, but a combination of three factors: 

1. Number of personnel per checkpoint (12–20 soldiers)

2. Response time to each checkpoint (10–20 minutes) 

3. Travel speed between checkpoints (25–100 km/hour) 

Tier 2 

(urban areas) 

“Ring of Steel” based on city circumference relative to 

Kabul 

ANA combat support battalions All 1 combat support battalion per combat brigade 

ANA headquarters and 

logistics forces All Minimum historical U.S. Army tooth-to-tail percentages (16% headquarters and 36% logistics forces) 

Afghan Air Force All Sized to capacity for growth and sustainment 

ANA SOF All Sized to capacity for growth and sustainment 

Other supporting forces 

(e.g., recruiting and training) All Sized based on relative percentage to current force 
26

Using these planning factors, we derived the force structure shown in 

Table 2. As this table shows: 

We conclude that the ANSF will need about 373,400 personnel (including 

ALP) in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe in order to achieve the operational 

goals described above. 

This figure is slightly smaller than the current total end-strength of 

the ANSF (382,000, including ALP8

). We assess that this small reduction in force size can be realized, despite the expectation of a growing insurgent threat, by redistributing some of the ANSF from areas 

of low threat to those of higher threat as described below, and by restructuring some elements of the ANSF. For example, we conclude 

that the Afghan National Army needs fewer combat battalions, but 

substantially more logistics and support forces in order to enable sustained combat operations (Table 3). 

Table 2. Summary of calculated ANSF force levels in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe 

Force type 

Current force 

level 

Calculated 

force level Change 

 Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Anti-Crime Police 97,500 104,000 6,500

 Afghan Local Police 30,000 29,100 (900)

 Afghan Customs and Border Police 23,900 27,300 3,400

 Afghan National Civil Order Police 14,600 0 (14,600)

 ANP support (logistics and medical) 3,200 3,200 0

 ANA infantry battalions 70,100 60,300 (9,800)

 ANA combat support battalions 11,500 10,000 (1,500)

 ANA national swing force (Mobile Strike Force) 4,500 4,500 0

 ANA headquarters (brigade and above) 22,500 25,000 2,500

 ANA logistics and support 37,200 56,100 18,900

 ANA Special Operations Forces 11,900 11,900 0

 Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing 7,800 7,700 (100)

 Recruits and students (ANA and ANP) 19,300 18,700 (600)

 Recruiting and training staff (ANA and ANP) 15,600 15,600 0

 Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior staff 12,400 0 (12,400)

Total forces 382,000 373,400 (8,600)

 

8

 This includes the 352,000 personnel approved in the ANSF Plan of Record 

and an additional 30,000 Afghan Local Police. By comparison, our figures include a base force of 344,300 plus 29,100 Afghan Local Police 

(for a total of 373,400 ANSF). 
27

Table 3. Key force size and structure takeaways, by ANSF force type 

Force Key force size and structure takeaways

Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Anti-Crime 

Police 

Overall assessment: Police require a small (5%) 

increase in force structure 

 The current ratio of police to population in Afghanistan is in line with other countries facing 

significant security threats, but the number of 

police should be increased slightly in certain 

areas (e.g., in eastern Afghanistan). 

 The role of police in Afghanistan is likely to 

begin evolving from paramilitary functions to 

community policing and law enforcement, especially in larger cities and more secure rural 

areas, but we assess that the pace of change 

will be slow and so do not see a need to significantly change the number of police to reflect 

this changing mission by the 2015–2018 

timeframe. 

Afghan Local Police 

Overall assessment: Decrease by 900 personnel 

(3%) 

 The ALP are most effective at securing rural areas from insurgent threats, so we size them to 

provide 300 Guardians in each of the Tier 3 

districts.

Afghan 

Customs and Border Police 

Overall assessment: Increase border police by 15%

 The number of forces providing security and 

customs functions at border crossing points and 

airports is sufficient. 

 The number of border police operating in the 

50-kilometer zone adjacent to the border, especially along the northeastern border with Pakistan, should be increased.

Afghan National Civil Order Police 

Overall assessment: No requirement for the 

ANCOP in our force sizing framework 

 The roles and missions of the ANCOP overlap 

with other police and army functions, so we do 

not see a requirement for their force structure 

and zero them out accordingly. 

 ISAF has argued that the ANCOP are an effective counterinsurgency force in practice and 

that they should be kept. We acknowledge this 

position and recommend further analysis be 

done on the role and size of the ANCOP. 
28

Table 3. Key force size and structure takeaways, by ANSF force type 

Force Key force size and structure takeaways

Afghan National Army 

Overall assessment: Reduce the number of infantry 

battalions from 95 to 81 (15%) but increase logistics and support forces that enable combat operations (net increase of 7% in overall ANA endstrength) 

 Based on our threat assessment, northern and 

western Afghanistan will remain relatively secure and the ANA can maintain that security 

with fewer—but more mobile—forces. 

 The ANA requires significantly more logistics 

forces to support its operations than it has today. 

Afghan Air Force 

Overall assessment: Afghanistan has a significant 

need for air support, but the AAF cannot support 

more air power than is currently planned 

 The AAF is struggling to find sufficient numbers 

of qualified recruits to grow to its planned size.

 Even if additional recruits are found, only a 

small number could be fully trained by 2018. 

Special Operations Forces 

Overall assessment: Afghanistan has a significant 

need for special operations forces, but the ANSF 

cannot support more SOF 

 The ANA could potentially recruit and train 

more SOF—but increasing the number of SOF 

recruits would likely require additional international personnel to provide them training. 

 ANA SOF currently depend on the U.S. and 

ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. 

Simply increasing the number of ANA SOF personnel without addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall 

capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks. 
29

Table 3. Key force size and structure takeaways, by ANSF force type 

Force Key force size and structure takeaways

Other 

Recruiting and training: Reduce the number of recruits proportionally to the overall decrease in 

ANSF force structure 

Ministries: No requirement for uniformed personnel in the security ministries 

 Attrition in the army and police will likely continue at or near current levels, so the ANSF will 

need to recruit and train proportionally as 

many people as they do today. 

 The uniformed ANSF positions in the MoD and 

MoI should be civilianized. If civilians with the 

appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or 

trained for these positions—or if active-duty 

ANSF personnel cannot be transitioned to the 

civil service—then ANSF force structure will 

need to be increased to accommodate them. 

In terms of regional differentiation of the ANSF, our conclusions 

(Table 4) are as follows: 

 The northern parts of Afghanistan are relatively stable today 

and the insurgency is unlikely to make significant inroads into 

these areas in the 2015–2018 timeframe. Thus, we assess that 

the ANA presence in northern Afghanistan can be reduced by 

five battalions. Similarly, we reduced the number of ANA battalions in western Afghanistan by one. 

 The Haqqani network poses a significant threat to eastern Afghanistan and the ANSF should refocus its efforts from a counterinsurgency strategy to a dedicated counter-network strategy 

in that region. Therefore, we reduced the ANA by six combat 

battalions in the remote parts of eastern Afghanistan, but we 

increased the police and border police in those areas, and we 

assess that ANA SOF should increase their presence and operations in these areas as well. 

 Tier 3 areas in southern Afghanistan will continue to require a 

significant ANA presence to conduct up-to battalion sized 

counterinsurgency operations, and a large-scale police presence to protect communities and hold areas after ANA clearing 
30

operations. Based on our threat assessment, however, we assess 

that the Tier 4 areas of southern Afghanistan will be a lower 

priority for the insurgency, and so will require fewer ANA and 

police forces to maintain security in the 2015–2018 timeframe 

than they have today. We also assess that fewer police will be 

required in the Tier 1 and 2 areas of southern Afghanistan, as 

these areas no longer face the same insurgent threats as in the 

past. 

Table 4. Difference between current and calculated ANSF force levels by region9

 Current forces 

Calculated 

forces Difference 

Kabul 26,900 27,300 400 

East 63,500 74,000 10,500 

South & southwest 55,600 44,500 (11,100) 

West 23,700 22,800 (900) 

North 33,300 31,700 (1,600) 

We recognize that the Afghan government might find it politically 

difficult to reduce the number of combat forces in northern Afghanistan, since a reduction could create an imbalance in the current 

power-sharing relationships across regional and ethnic lines. In addition, reducing the number of ANA personnel in the north would result in an increase in unemployment in this region. Although these 

areas are currently more stable than the rest of Afghanistan, reduced 

employment opportunities might adversely affect that stability. Similarly, reducing the police force in Tier 4 areas of southern Afghanistan might mean increased unemployment in these rural areas, which 

could also result in increased instability. While we acknowledge that 

the Afghan government can distribute its forces as it deems appropri-

 

9

 The regional figures shown in this table do not include the Mobile Strike 

Force or the ANCOP, as the MoD and MoI have the option to relocate 

these forces across regions. We also did not apportion the ANA headquarters, logistics, and support forces by region, because we did not assess a specific troop-to-task assignment for the additional headquarters 

or logistics personnel. Thus, it is not clear how many of these additional 

personnel should be physically located in the regions and how many 

should be at the national headquarters in Kabul. 
31

ate, our analysis suggests that the ANSF could be used more efficiently against the future threat by adjusting the regional laydown of forces. 

Summary of post-2014 ANSF capability gaps and resource proposals 

By synthesizing a host of prior studies with our own observations from 

in-theater interviews, we conclude that the ANSF have a number of 

significant capability gaps. Our analysis suggests that six of these in 

particular may prevent the ANSF from adequately performing the 

missions required to achieve their operational goals in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. 

Specifically, the ANSF are likely to have systemic shortfalls in mobility; 

logistics (e.g., maintenance, supply, and contracting); air support; 

communications and coordination between ANSF pillars; intelligence 

gathering and analysis; and the recruiting and training of personnel 

with specialized skills. 

Our analysis suggests that materiel solutions (e.g., the so-called “enhancements above the ANSF Plan of Record (APoR)” currently before the U.S. Congress) can help mitigate some of these capability 

gaps; however, they cannot close them completely, as most of the gaps 

are systemic in nature. As a result: 

We conclude that international support (to include the presence of advisors) 

will be required to address the gaps in mobility, logistics, air support, and 

intelligence gathering and analysis though at least 2018. 

We attempted to calculate the cost of the 373,400-member force, but 

were unable to find detailed data on the costs of the current ANSF 

and did not have adequate time to conduct a detailed cost analysis of 

our own. Rough estimates using two existing models put the sustainment costs of the 373,400-member force in the range of $5-6 billion 

per year, though these are highly approximate and we conclude that 

further work should be done to develop a more accurate cost estimate of our calculated force.
32

Conclusion of independent assessment of the ANSF 

Using a quantitative troop-to-task analysis tied via five security tiers to 

a qualitative future threat assessment: 

We conclude that the ANSF (including the Afghan Local Police) should have 

a total end-strength of about 373,400 through at least 2018. This force size is 

significantly larger, and likely to be more expensive, than that envisioned by 

the United States and NATO at the 2012 Chicago Summit. 

The declaration from the 2012 Chicago Summit stated that: 

The pace and the size of a gradual managed force reduction 

from the ANSF surge peak [of 352,000 plus 30,000 ALP] to 

a sustainable level will be conditions-based and decided by 

the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 

consultation with the International Community. The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the 

International Community and the Government of Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with 

an estimated annual budget of US$4.1billion, and will be 

reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.10

The envisioned drawdown of the ANSF to a significantly smaller force 

size than exists today was predicated on an assumption of a muchreduced insurgent threat in the post-2014 timeframe. Our threat assessment finds this assumption to be faulty. As such: 

We conclude that proceeding with the drawdown of the ANSF as announced 

at the Chicago Summit will put the current U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan 

at risk. Instead, we recommend the international community establish a new 

plan to fund and sustain the ANSF at an end-strength of about 373,400, 

 

10 “Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of 

State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the 

NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.” Chicagonato.org, 

The official Host Committee Website for the Chicago NATO Summit, 

May 21, 2013, accessed Oct. 10, 2013, at www.chicagonato.org/chicagosummit-declaration-on-afghanistan-news-44.php. The 228,500 force described at the Chicago Summit did not include separate U.S. plans to 

maintain an additional 30,000 Afghan Local Police (i.e., these two together would yield a total security force of 258,500). 
33

with a proportionally sized assistance mission (including advisors), through 

at least 2018. 

If the international community did this, and if the ANSF are successful 

through 2018:

We assess that a negotiated political settlement to end the war would become 

much more likely in the 2019–2023 timeframe.

The next section will discuss the findings from our additional assessments. 

Summary of additional assessments 

This section contains summaries of our assessments of the additional 

topics of interest to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). 

Summary of the capabilities of the MoD and MoI and the requirement for MoD and MoI advising 

We were asked to assess the capabilities of the Ministries of Defense 

and Interior to perform the planning, programming, budgeting, 

management, oversight, and sustainment functions for their respective forces. We were also asked to assess the appropriate proportion of 

military and civilian advisors to assist the MoD and MoI and their required functional/professional expertise. 

To do so, we examined the relevant security sector reform (SSR) literature, to identify best practices and “ideal types” of security institutions and what their required capabilities are. We used results from 

our earlier ANSF capability gap analysis, along with our in-country interviews, to identify required core capabilities for the MoD and MoI, 

as well as critical “institutional enablers.” We used these same sources, 

along with organizational charts of the ministries (Appendix F), to 

identify whether the MoD and MoI were likely to be able to perform 

these core capabilities and institutional enabling activities independently by 2018 and if not, what their key shortfalls would be. 

We analyzed field research in Afghanistan, government reports, and 

the SSR literature to identify and assess the characteristics that advisors working in the MoD and MoI should possess, and to identify the 

advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to advising. Fi-
34

nally, we leveraged studies on advising in previous conflicts to provide 

recommendations on identifying, recruiting, and training advisors to 

enhance the effectiveness of ministerial reform in Afghanistan. 

Using this method: 

We conclude that for the MoD and MoI to function at a reasonably proficient level, and to carry out their responsibilities to support army and police 

forces in the field, they require the following four core capabilities: logistics; 

strategy and policy planning; financial management; and personnel management.

In addition, we found that six institutional enablers are important for 

ministerial success: anti-corruption; gender integration; local ownership; information technology; intelligence; and civilianization. 

We also conclude that the MoD and MoI are not likely to be fully independent at any of these capabilities or enablers by 2018. We therefore assess that 

international advisors within the MoD and MoI will be required through at 

least 2018. 

The absence of ministerial advisors will not likely lead to the collapse 

of the fielded forces in the short term, but it has the potential to undermine their combat effectiveness over the timeframe of this study, 

thereby imparting additional risk to the U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan. 

We examine several different ways an advisor program could be constructed (e.g., bilateral versus multilateral, civilian versus military), 

but we conclude that there is no obvious “best choice” as each approach has significant advantages and disadvantages. We therefore 

refrain from making a specific recommendation and instead suggest 

the U.S. should make a clear-eyed decision on the structure of an advisor program based on the pros and cons we identify. Finally, we 

conclude that a thorough and deliberate advisor selection and training process—one that emphasizes previous experience, maturity, professional skills, and the ability to work across cultures—would help 

strengthen the post-2014 ministerial advisory effort. 
35

Summary of legal authorities required post-2014 

We were asked to assess and provide recommendations on legislative 

authorities that would enable—or hinder—success of the U.S. assistance mission post-2014. 

To do so, we constructed a matrix that aligns current assistance missions with mission managers and the legal authorities that allow them 

to operate. We reviewed U.S. operational plans to identify which missions are currently being conducted. Using open source literature 

and our own interviews, we then identified who is conducting these 

missions and under which legal authorities they operate. We reviewed 

public statements from U.S. leaders and government officials, and interviewed U.S. personnel to identify the types of missions the U.S. 

military will carry out in Afghanistan in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. 

We then compared current assistance missions to future planned missions to identify which legal authorities will need to remain in place. 

To present our findings, we prepared a “model law” which details all 

of the legislative components needed enable the post-2014 assistance 

mission. 

Using this method, we identified over 20 specialized legal authorities 

and many more standing authorities and international agreements 

that enable the U.S. military’s mission in Afghanistan. The current 

“authorities regime” is an amalgam of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities with different managers, accounting rules, and reporting requirements (see Appendix G). This collection of laws allows the U.S. 

Department of Defense to maintain a presence and engage in combat operations in Afghanistan, transfer goods and services to the 

ANSF and coalition partner nations, and receive and spend public 

funds on specified programs. Some of the authorities have sunset 

clauses; others are permanent but require funding re-authorization 

each year. 

Our research suggests the post-2014 mission will focus on four missions: counterterrorism operations; training, advising, assisting (and 

possibly continuing to equip) the ANSF; retrograding personnel and 

equipment from Afghanistan; and when called upon, protecting U.S. 

civilians working on the ground. In terms of authorities for this post2014 mission set: 
36

We conclude the U.S. Department of Defense will require the same types of 

authorities that it has today with the possible exception of authorities for 

counterinsurgency programs which are not part of the envisioned post-2014 

mission set for the U.S. military. 

These include civil infrastructure development, economic development programs, and combatant reintegration programs. In addition: 

We conclude that the decentralized and makeshift nature of the current authorities regime promotes waste and inefficiencies.

Having been developed in piecemeal fashion, the existing regime is 

cumbersome and difficult to track and manage. Instead of relying on 

the existing, disjointed assortment of authorities, we recommend they 

be consolidated into one omnibus authority where possible. 

As an illustration of this, we prepared a U.S. assistance mission “model law,” which contains all the authorities necessary for the post-2014 

mission set (see Appendix H for text of the full law). It is structured 

to lower administrative and transactional costs, speed up and simplify 

transfer processes, and provide the on-scene commander flexibility to 

adjust programs as needed. Key features of the model law include: 

 Centralization of management and oversight with the Secretary 

of Defense; 

 Codification and reaffirmation of the right to conduct counterterrorism operations alongside the train, advise, and assist mission; 

 Establishment of a single fund to pay for all incremental expenses associated with the training and assistance mission; and 

 The provision of broad transfer authorities to the ANSF (and 

allies and friends) outside the typical Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) program, since Afghanistan can neither afford nor 

manage participation in this program. 

The difficulties of enacting the model law notwithstanding, we assess 

it can serve as a useful checklist of authorities needed to enable the 

post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. 
37

Summary of the ANSF – PAKMIL relationship 

We were asked to conduct an assessment of the opportunities for cooperation—or prevention of conflict—between the ANSF and the 

Pakistani military (PAKMIL), especially along the AfghanistanPakistan border. 

To do so, we documented the past and current dynamics of the relationship between the ANSF and the PAKMIL, using secondary 

sources in the literature and our own interviews in the U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We then used this understanding of the past and 

present to elicit areas of likely enduring conflict, as well as areas 

where the two countries may increase cooperation or, at the very 

least, reduce tensions in the future. 

Relations between Afghan and Pakistani forces are often strained and 

prone to escalation, yet tensions between the ANSF and PAKMIL 

have yet to lead to open warfare. There is considerable demand 

among officers on both sides for a more stable relationship. We assess 

that there will be continuing opportunities for cooperation between 

the two forces post-2014, especially at the tactical and operational 

levels, as well as a reduction in tensions along the border. At the same 

time, there will be areas of enduring conflict that will require constant attention—some of which may worsen in the coming years. 

Having conducted numerous interviews with Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., 

and NATO forces at multiple levels on both sides of the border: 

We conclude that a significant reduction in the U.S. and NATO commitment 

to Afghanistan or Pakistan will destabilize the border region, exacerbate existing tensions between the two countries, and jeopardize fragile mechanisms 

for cross-border cooperation and de-escalation that have been built in recent 

years. 

Many in the Pakistani military do not believe that the international 

community will provide sufficient resources for the ANSF to survive 

past 2014 or that the U.S. will continue to resource Pakistani military 

operations in the border areas. Uncertainty about the future is forcing the two militaries to plan for worst case scenarios. 

We conclude that there will be continual conflict on a number of issues in the foreseeable future. These include Afghanistan’s reluc-
38

tance to recognize the border, difficulties associated with demarcating the border line, the tendency of some Afghan leaders to exploit 

anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population, Pakistan’s 

continued relationship with elements of the Taliban, insurgent sanctuaries inside Pakistan (and increasingly in parts of Afghanistan as 

coalition forces withdraw), and Afghanistan’s growing security relationship with India. 

Despite the likelihood of conflict over these issues, there are areas of 

common interest as well as potentially enduring mechanisms for 

communication and cooperation that could help reduce conflict and 

stabilize the relationship over time. Some of these include: expanding road networks and cross-border trade, repatriation and resettlement of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, continued 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations on both sides of 

the border, expansion of border coordination mechanisms at the tactical and operational levels, bilateral meetings between the two forces 

at all levels, and, finally, cooperation on countering IEDs, which officers on both sides see as a major future threat to their forces. 

Summary of likely ANSF responses to political scenarios 

We were asked to assess difficulties the ANSF may face—and likely responses and directions they could go—under several potential political situations or scenarios. 

To do so, we used our overarching assumptions to create a set of political scenarios in which some of these assumptions are tested. In 

particular, we chose to individually test our assumptions pertaining to 

Taliban reconciliation, a peaceful and acceptable transfer of political 

power in 2014, and the continuance of U.S., NATO, and international community support. We then conducted literature research to understand which aspects of our scenarios have been studied and 

analyzed previously and what conclusions were drawn by others. We 

interviewed subject matter experts, to include a significant number of 

Afghans, to gather their views on how the ANSF might respond under these scenarios. We consolidated these views to derive most likely 

responses for the ANSF to the scenarios, focusing our attention 

broadly on leadership and rank-and-file reactions. We also considered 

what events might have to occur to cause a negative reaction (e.g., 
39

fragmentation, desertion, military coup) on the part of these aspects 

of the ANSF. 

We considered three political scenarios and the ANSF’s likely response to them. For the first scenario (reconciliation happens): 

We conclude that so long as the Afghan president adequately consults, listens 

to, and addresses the concerns of ANSF leaders as part of the reconciliation 

process and during the implementation of a settlement, the ANSF are likely 

to accept the settlement’s terms.

Given Afghan culture and the current Afghan President’s precedent 

for calling Loya Jirgas prior to making significant national decisions, it 

seems likely there would be considerable behind-the-scenes consensus building before the President agreed to any terms or conditions 

of a settlement. However, we assess that there is a low likelihood of 

reconciliation actually happening before 2018. 

For the second scenario (a “bad” presidential election): 

We conclude that as long as the winning presidential ticket maintains the 

current ethnic balance of power, the ANSF will largely accept the results of 

the election.

That said, it is possible that in a Pashtun versus Pashtun runoff that 

some rank-and-file ANSF members loyal to the losing ticket could desert or defect to the insurgency. If a non-Pashtun were to win the 

election, it could lead to more widespread desertion or defection on 

the part of rank-and-file ANSF (especially within the police) along 

with increased violence in the south and the east of the country and 

protests within the major cities. We assess that these possibilities are 

of low-to-moderate likelihood. 

For the third scenario (loss of international community support), if 

the U.S. and NATO do not continue a training and advisory mission 

for the ANSF: 

We conclude that the absence of advisors in 2015 is likely to result in a 

downward spiral of ANSF capabilities, along with security in Afghanistan—

unless the ANSF were able to find other patrons to fill the resulting “enabler 

vacuum.”
40

We assess that the speed of this downward spiral would likely be most 

strongly dependent on the level of continued international community financial aid. If the U.S. and NATO discontinue training and advising the ANSF, we assess that many ANSF leaders would likely 

soldier on, since they are well-invested in the future of Afghanistan 

and its security forces. At the rank-and-file level of the ANSF, however, 

the loss of U.S. and NATO enablers could have a more dramatic effect—to include increased desertion and defection rates and the possibility of unit fragmentation or dissolution. We find this excursion to 

be of moderate likelihood, with moderate-to-high likelihood of these 

negative ANSF responses as a result. 

With respect to the loss of international community financial support, this was the one point on which every one of our interviewees 

agreed. The loss of funding, or even a too-rapid decline in funding, 

to the ANSF would carry with it a high likelihood of increased desertion rates; fragmentation or fracture of ANSF units; or defection of 

units to the insurgency. As such: 

We conclude that the absence of international community funds for the ANSF 

and Afghanistan’s government is likely to result in another civil war in Afghanistan. 

In the absence of such funding, the centripetal forces of Afghanistan’s various power centers are likely to pull the country apart once 

again. 

Summary of conclusions 

Taking all of our assessments into consideration, we conclude that for 

the ANSF to successfully support the U.S. policy goal of preventing 

Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that 

threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world, they will need a 

force size of about 373,400 with some structural and posture adjustments, through at least 2018. We conclude this force is not likely to 

militarily defeat the Taliban, but if it can hold against the Taliban insurgency through 2018, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement to 

the war will increase. We conclude that this force, as well as the security ministries that support it, will require international enabling assistance—including advisors—through at least 2018, and this assistance 

mission will need similar authorities to the mission in Afghanistan to-
41

day. Finally, we conclude that sustained commitment of the international community in Afghanistan is likely to mitigate tensions in the 

region and increase prospects for regional cooperation, but withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including a renewed civil war in Afghanistan and 

increased instability in the region. 

The next section will provide additional details on our analysis and 

conclusions in support of the NDAA mandated independent assessment of the ANSF. 

 
42

This page intentionally left blank 
43

NDAA mandated independent assessment of 

the ANSF 

This section contains the details of our independent assessment of 

the ANSF. In it, we assess the future internal and regional security environment for Afghanistan over the next decade; the size, structure, 

capabilities, and posture needed by the ANSF to prevent Afghanistan 

from again becoming a safe haven for terrorism; the gaps in capability that might impede the ANSF’s success in doing so; and resources 

required for the ANSF relative to current U.S. and international 

community plans. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked us to look separately at ANSF regional differentiation. Over 

the course of the study, we discovered that this was naturally addressed in our force size and structure analysis. As such, we have integrated these tasks in our discussion below. 

The following sections will address each of the NDAA mandated tasks 

in turn, and will conclude with a summary of our findings. 

Threat assessment 

We analyzed the likely internal and regional security environment for 

Afghanistan over the next decade, including challenges and threats 

to the security and sovereignty of Afghanistan from state and nonstate actors. Given that futures projections are inherently uncertain, 

and become more uncertain the further into the future one looks, we 

broke “the next decade” into two segments (2015–2018 and 2019–

2023). We emphasized the first of these, as it was the most critical 

timeframe for the analysis in our subsequent tasks. 

Scope and caveats 

Given the vast scope of this assessment—which includes the insurgency across Afghanistan, the al Qaeda threat, and regional powers—

we have chosen to focus on the military threat from the Taliban and 

al Qaeda. Below are two aspects that are believed to be significant fac-
44

tors in the threat but that we could not address given the constraints 

of our study. 

 The trade in opium and other illicit drugs and their precursors. Some 

argue that the drug trade is a major driver of the insurgency, 

especially in the south. There is, however, no consensus on the 

degree to which this is the case, or on whether the ANSF could 

in any capacity significantly alter this dynamic. 

 Corruption and poor governance. Some believe that corruption is 

the major threat to the Afghan government—i.e., that the regime is its own worst enemy. Corruption undermines the legitimacy of the government and its security forces and gives 

strength to the Taliban. Yet corruption is too amorphous a 

problem to be adequately addressed in this study. 

Assessment 

This assessment is predicated on understanding the past and present 

of insurgencies in Afghanistan in order to inform judgments about 

the future. We begin with an analysis of three cases in Afghan history 

when insurgents launched major offensives against government forces: 

 The period 1989–1992 when the Soviet military withdrew 

from Afghanistan and various insurgent groups (at the time, 

known as the Mujahideen) attempted to overthrow the government 

 The period 1994–2000 when the Taliban first emerged and 

conquered much of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda established 

bases in the country 

 The period 2006–2009 when the Taliban resumed the offensive and sought to retake large areas of southern and eastern 

Afghanistan. 

For each case, we examined the historical record and derived key 

findings about insurgents’ strategy, operations, and tactics, as well as 

the actions of regional actors. These findings constitute relevant lessons that current insurgents are likely to use when planning their future actions. As such, we use them to derive a plausible set of 

implications for the future actions of the Taliban in the 2015–2018 
45

timeframe, to help inform our understanding of the missions the 

ANSF will need to conduct. We also use them to derive implications 

for future threats at the strategic level (Tier 1 areas), and the operational and tactical levels (areas comprising Tiers 2–4), to help inform 

our categorization of areas via the security tier construct. 

We also independently assessed the current security situation in Afghanistan based predominantly on our own extensive interviews in 

theater, but also via a review of current U.S., NATO, and Afghan 

threat assessments. We used these sources to identify implications for 

future insurgent actions and to categorize areas of Afghanistan by security tier, similar to our analysis of the historical case studies. 

Using the implications for future insurgent actions and threats to various areas of Afghanistan derived from our analysis of the past and 

present, we made judgments about the future in the form of narrative assessments of insurgents’ capabilities and intent, and a map of 

Afghanistan categorized by security tier. 

The following sections provide a brief description of, and the key 

points from, the three historical case studies and our analysis of the 

current threat. Additional details can be found in Appendix D. 

1987–1992: Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the 

government 

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and spent the next 10 

years battling a variety of insurgent groups known as the Mujahideen. 

Soviet forces also rebuilt the Afghan army, police, and security ministries, and they raised irregular forces to secure more remote areas. 

The Mujahideen employed a dual-track strategy focused on terrorism 

in Kabul and massed attacks in the provinces. They used guerrilla tactics against Afghan and Soviet forces, targeting patrols, bases, and 

lines of communication. They intimidated pro-government populations, targeted officials, and built parallel governments. 

In January 1987, the Soviet Union announced the end of major combat operations and the transition of security responsibility to Afghan 

government forces, and began a withdrawal that lasted until February 

1989. The Mujahideen generally conserved their resources until after 

the Soviets withdrew, and then launched a series of major offensives 

in regional cities (e.g., Herat and Kandahar), to include a large-scale, 
46

failed assault on Jalalabad. Pakistan maintained a strategy of covert 

support to the Mujahideen through key commanders, and maintained control over insurgent sanctuaries in the tribal areas. The Afghan army was heavily dependent on Soviet aircraft and money; when 

the Soviets stopped providing these resources, the army failed and 

the government in Kabul collapsed relatively quickly. 

Table 5 summarizes our key findings from this case study and their 

implications for the future threat assessment. This case implies that 

insurgents will likely employ a dual-track strategy again. First, certain 

groups (e.g., the Haqqani network) would target Kabul via terrorism 

and assassinations against targets of national significance from sanctuaries in Pakistan and bases in the rural areas around Kabul. Second, the Taliban would conduct larger attacks in the provinces, to 

expand control in rural areas and enable attacks on central locations. 

The insurgency is likely to hold back its resources as U.S. and NATO 

forces draw down, saving them for actions in the post-2014 

timeframe. There is risk of another massed attack on Jalalabad or 

other regional city. Pakistan will likely preserve control of insurgent 

sanctuaries and use this to influence insurgents’ actions post-2014 

and pressure the Afghan government. Finally, major cuts to air support and funding to the ANSF could have serious negative effects. 

In terms of categorizing areas by security tier, this case study suggests 

that Tier 1 areas should include Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, and 

the cities of Herat and Kandahar. Tier 2–4 areas might include Khost, 

Kunar, Nuristan, significant airfields (e.g., Shindand), and rural district centers and surrounding villages in the south and southwest. 
47

Table 5. Summary of findings and implications of the “Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the go

study 

Finding Implications for future threat assessmen

Threats to the national government (Security Tier 1 implications)

Mujahideen factions close to Pakistani intelligence prioritized attacks on Kabul in order to threaten key members of the regime and force the collapse of the central government. They infiltrated the districts around Kabul and carried out high profile attacks against national leaders and institutions. 

 These factions, which remain a key element of the insurge

to expand bases around Kabul from which to conduct higthe capital against national-level leaders and institutions, i

stabilizing the government at the national level. 

 These groups may continue to utilize terrorist methods an

underground networks in urban areas. 

The majority of Mujahideen leaders focused on seizing key regions and provinces first before moving on Kabul. They did so through a combination of guerrilla attacks and massed assaults on garrisons. The Afghan army held at Jalalabad, but was overrun in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, and Kandahar. Kabul fell soon after. 

 There will likely be debate within Taliban senior leadershi

between focusing on the provinces versus the capital, the sus traditional guerrilla warfare, and the importance of ruras. It is likely that they will pursue all lines of operation simwith varying degrees of emphasis. 

 The vast majority of insurgents, which have local or region

focus on expanding control in the provinces, beginning wand moving to more strategic locations—seeking to surrou

ernment forces before attempting direct assaults on locatioconcentrations of ANSF. The Taliban, which is focused on cially likely to follow this strategy. 

As the Soviet Union pulled back between 1987 and 1989, the Mujahideen reduced their operational tempo in order to conserve resources for major offensives following the full withdrawal of Soviet forces. The Mujahideen launched a number of direct assaults on garrisons beginning in 1989. 

 The Taliban may be conserving resources for a larger serie

2014. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Security Tier 2–4 implications)

During the first year after the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen overran garrisons. Insurgents launched major attacks in Khost, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul, and overran garrisons in Kunar and Nuristan. Remote and difficult-to-reach areas were the first to fall, especially in the mountains near Pakistan. 

 Insurgents may seek control over mountainous areas more 

the rest of the country due to the difficult terrain and easily particularly Khost, Kunar, and Nuristan. 
48

Table 5. Summary of findings and implications of the “Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the go

study 

Finding Implications for future threat assessmen

The largest insurgent operation was against Jalalabad one month after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal. The Afghan army held, by using a series of layered checkpoints that stretched well outside the city, as well as artillery and limited air support. Several thousand insurgents were killed, resulting in an operational-level defeat for the Mujahideen in the east and blunting its momentum. 

 Insurgents may attempt a massed assault on Jalalabad or o

the Pashtun belt if they have the capability and believe thavulnerable. 

 If the ANSF succeed in repulsing such an assault while ho

fractures may emerge within the Taliban and the group matime. If they do not, other towns and cities may fall in shobul in danger. 

The Mujahideen, particularly the Pashtun factions, were not skilled at coordinating large-scale direct assaults involving more than 100–200 fighters. The more effective Pashtun groups were those that employed terrorist and commando-style operations in urban areas involving small numbers of highly trained fighters. 

 Insurgents may achieve tactical victories in outlying areas, 

difficulty overrunning cities or major military garrisons in twinning what could be characterized as operational-level ANA). Terrorist attacks in cities will likely be the greatest imthe stability of provincial governments. 

 The Taliban may have difficulty sustaining large-scale coo

any length of time, especially without the presence of forenize the rank and file. 

The Mujahideen launched major assaults on airfields, especially at Shindand in the west.  The Taliban is likely to target airfields transitioned to the A

Shindand, where insurgents have a significant presence wtance. 

Tactics (Security Tier 3–4 implications)

The Mujahideen employed massed ambushes, and, to a lesser extent, roadside bombs against Afghan convoys. Insurgents surrounded isolated garrisons, tying the Afghan army down and leaving few soldiers available for maneuver in strategically vital areas. 

 Insurgents are likely to use a combination of IEDs and ma

cut or disrupt ANSF lines of communication and ground-bing the ANSF to rely on aerial resupply or to cede outlying date into larger bases. Insurgents may harass outlying posithe ANSF inside their bases and limit their maneuver. 

Insurgents focused on controlling rural areas, while ceding most urban areas to government forces until after the Soviet army withdrew. After 1989, they targeted the cities from established bases in rural areas abutting major cities and towns. 

 The Taliban will likely focus first on surrounding key distri

by controlling adjacent villages, in preparation for later oflarger population centers. 
49

Table 5. Summary of findings and implications of the “Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the go

study 

Finding Implications for future threat assessmen

Insurgents negotiated ceasefires with Afghan forces in many local areas, especially in outlying locations where government positions were vulnerable and the insurgents were in a strong position. 

 The Taliban may seek to co-opt local ANSF through a com

cial inducements and offers of amnesty. 

 Some Afghan Local Police units may defect to the Taliban, 

ing areas where government support and over-watch of thand positions are surrounded and/or under considerable p

External threats and the influence of regional powers

Pakistan’s strategy during the 1980s rested on covert support to the Afghan resistance, in order to raise the costs of the Soviet occupation. Pakistan built an extensive infrastructure of insurgent training camps, recruitment centers, and arms depots near the border with Afghanistan. 

 Pakistan is likely to preserve much of the existing insurgen

its side of the border. Pakistani intelligence may seek to inthis infrastructure in order to influence the insurgency insi

Following the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistani intelligence worked to forge unity among the disparate insurgent factions and to focus their energies on Kabul. 

 Pakistani intelligence will seek to influence Taliban leader

forge consensus among Taliban factions and lending them These efforts may include directives to target Kabul. 

Iran backed various Shia Mujahideen factions, as well as regional warlords in the west and north, against both the Sovietbacked regime and the Sunni Pashtun Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan. Iran deepened its involvement with Hazara and other pro-Iran Shia guerrillas near the end of the war, seeking to influence the makeup of the post-Soviet regime. 

 Iran is likely to work through non-Pashtun (particularly Sh

Iran may deepen this involvement post-2014 in order to inmakeup of the regime and counter Taliban influence. 
50

1994–2000: The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan 

Civil war followed the collapse of the central government in 1992. In 

the absence of law and order, rival warlords fought over control of 

towns and cities and preyed on the population. In 1994, the Taliban 

surged into Afghanistan under the banner of: “Restore peace, disarm 

the population, and enforce Sharia Law.”11 They began as a regional 

movement in the south, but quickly grew to a national force. 

The Taliban moved first on Kandahar, then on Helmand, Jalalabad, 

and Herat. They were welcomed by Afghans in the Pashtun south 

and later in the east, but met resistance in the north and west. They 

often used the offer of amnesty and cash payments to take control of 

areas without a fight. Eventually, they were able to isolate Kabul from 

the south, east, and west. By 1996, the Taliban controlled 22 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, including Kabul. By 2000, they controlled 

over 90 percent of the country. Throughout their campaign to take 

Afghanistan, senior Taliban leaders maintained a firm grip on the 

movement, enforcing a coherent, though changing, strategy. All major military decisions were made by senior leadership and there was 

generally unity among leaders, with few regional or tribal divisions. 

Table 6 summarizes our key findings from this case study and their 

implications for the future threat assessment. This case implies that 

the Taliban would likely focus first on Kandahar, then on Helmand, 

Farah, and southern Herat. If Kandahar were to fall, the Taliban 

would gain momentum and recruits, which they would use to pressure and mass against Kabul. Taliban leaders would likely seek to enforce a coherent but changing strategy while minimizing 

disagreements among operational leaders. The Taliban would likely 

seek defection of ANSF units and powerbrokers at local levels, via a 

combination of threats, financial incentives, and offers of amnesty. In 

terms of categorizing areas by security tier, this case study suggests 

that Tier 1 areas should include Kabul, central Helmand, Jalalabad, 

and the cities of Kandahar and Herat. Tier 2–4 areas might include 

the provinces of Zabul, Kunduz, Farah, Herat, and Nuristan, as well 

as rural district centers and villages across the south and southwest. 

 

11Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010: 22. 
51

Table 6. Summary of findings and implications of “The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan” case study 

Findin

g Implications for future threat assessment

Threats to the national government and in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Security Tier 1

–4 implications)

The Taliban began as a regional movement in Kandahar and Zabul provinces and snowballed into a force with national aims. After Kandahar fell with little fighting, the group gained momentum and recruited thousands of local fighters to launch campaigns further afield. 

 If Kandahar falls, the Taliban would likely gain momentum a

which to expand and put pressure on the national governme

The Taliban took Kandahar first, then Helmand, then Jalalabad, cutting off Kabul from the passes into Pakistan. The group then tried to take Kabul but was repulsed. Taliban forces moved on Herat instead. They then regrouped and again targeted Kabul

—surrounding the city on three sides and forcing rival militia commanders to withdraw before taking the 

city. Fighters also pushed into Kunduz from the northeast. 

 The Taliban will likely put pressure on Kandahar and act to c

bases in Zabul province to the north. They will likely move otempt to expand into Farah and southern Herat, and from thHerat city. 

 The Taliban may activate networks in Kunduz and infiltration 

northeastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan and key areas 

 The Taliban are likely to move on Jalalabad or, at the very le

ham-Kabul road east of Jalalabad. 

 The Taliban may attempt to surround Kabul before any majo

ital. 

Taliban leadership exerted considerable control over the movement, which acted according to a coherent, though changing, strategy. There were few divisions along regional or tribal lines. Major decisions, including on military operations, were made by Mullah Omar and largely obeyed by subordinate commanders. 

 Taliban leadership may seek to regain control over errant co

prove command and control that was attenuated during heigNATO operations from 2009–2013. The group will likely folstrategy and adapt its war aims according to changing circum

Tactics (Security Tier 3

–4 implications)

The Taliban relied largely on support from the Pakistani military and some militia commanders for logistics, air, and other capabilities requiring advanced education or higher-order skills. 

 The Taliban may have difficulty sustaining a prolonged offen

ANSF without substantial external support. 

 Whether Pakistan provides material support and military adv

gents could be a decisive factor in the Taliban’s capability to at the operational level. 

The Taliban bribed many local tribes and militias into switching sides. The group often mixed the threat of military defeat with the promise of generous payments for a peaceful surrender. 

 The Taliban will likely seek the defection of local ANSF, as w

powerbrokers, through a combination of threats, financial inof amnesty. 
52Table 6. Summary of findings and implications of “The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan” case study 

Finding Implications for future threat assessment

The Taliban immediately built rudimentary, but relatively effective, interim administrations in the areas that fell under their control. 

 The Taliban, especially in the south, will likely seek to openl

areas under their control, and use these areas as sources of rfor operations elsewhere. 

The Taliban exploited divisions among the warlords, coopting rival militias and benefitting from fighting among them. 

 The Taliban will likely attempt to exploit infighting and lack 

ANSF. The group may also exploit divisions among local powopting those at odds with the government. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers

The Taliban emerged from madrassas in Pakistan’s border areas. The group’s leaders, as well as most of its early recruits, came from these institutions. 

 It is likely that a major Taliban offensive would be preceded 

madrassas closing their doors and pushing their students into 

The Taliban were largely an extension of Pakistani regional strategy and were greatly influenced and aided at the strategic and tactical levels. Pakistan provided extensive political and military support, increasing its involvement as the Taliban grew stronger. 

 If relations between Islamabad and Kabul deteriorate and th

mentum, Pakistani support to the movement will likely increclude the provision of heavy weapons and military advisors. 

Iran opposed the rise of the Taliban and provided extensive military and financial support to the Northern Alliance and other non-Pashtun militias. 

 Iran is likely to oppose the Taliban, and to provide military a

brokers that oppose the movement. 
53

2006–2009: Taliban offensive in the south and east 

In 2006, after having been strategically defeated in 2001–2002, the 

Taliban tried to make a comeback inside Afghanistan, launching attacks across the south, and to a lesser extent, in the east. Over about 

three years, the Taliban reestablished networks, recruited new fighters, and reconstituted militarily to fight a guerrilla war against coalition and Afghan government forces. The Taliban followed a multifaceted strategy in which they infiltrated rural areas, assassinated and 

intimidated local leaders, overran smaller towns in Kandahar and 

Helmand, surrounded garrisons, and threatened Kandahar city and 

Helmand’s provincial capital at Lashkar Gah. The insurgency was 

more fragmented in the east, but violence there still increased considerably. 

A surge of U.S. and NATO forces managed to blunt the Taliban’s offensive, retake many areas that had fallen under insurgent control, 

and increase the capability and capacity of the ANSF. As thousands of 

additional forces were deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, it became 

clear that the Taliban would not be able to force the collapse of the 

Afghan government or the immediate withdrawal of coalition forces. 

Table 7 summarizes our key findings from this case study and their 

implications for the future threat assessment. This case implies that 

the Taliban would likely seek to press militarily against the ANSF once 

U.S. and NATO forces draw down—following a gradualist campaign 

in which they would likely first target outlying areas by surrounding 

district centers and conducting massed assaults, before moving to 

pressure more strategic locations. They would likely also seek to establish bases in orbital districts of the major cities in order to enable 

terrorist acts in them. But they would likely bide their time in testing 

the ANSF while preparing for major offensives in the future. 

In terms of categorizing areas by security tier, this case study suggests 

that Tier 1 areas should include Kabul, Kandahar city, Jalalabad, and 

Lashkar Gah. Tier 2–4 areas might include the provinces of Logar, 

Wardak, Kapisa, Kunar, Nuristan, Khost, Paktika, Paktiya, Ghazni, and 

Kunduz, along with the districts around Kandahar city and those of 

northern and southern Helmand. They might also include some areas of Takhar, Baghlan, Baghdis, and Ghor provinces, the areas of the 

border with Pakistan in the northeast, and the Ring Road (Highway 

1) and other major lines of communication. 
54Table 7. Summary of findings and implications of “Taliban offensive in the south and east” case study 

Findin

g Implications for future threat assessmen

Threats to the national government (Security Tier 1 implications)

The Taliban sought to force the withdrawal of all coalition forces through a series of concerted military offensives. 

 The Taliban are likely to again seek military victory, this t

ANSF once U.S. and NATO forces are no longer present fort. 

The Taliban’s strategy was to overtake outlying rural areas first through a combination of intimidation and direct assaults on vulnerable ANSF positions and district centers. They established bases along the outskirts of major population centers from which to undermine security in urban areas. The provinces of Logar, Wardak, and Kapisa near Kabul came under increasing pressure.

 The Taliban will likely pressure outlying rural areas and d

before encroaching on more strategic locations. They are idation to control surrounding villages and then launch mvulnerable outposts. 

 The Taliban are likely to make concerted efforts to contro

key cities, especially Kabul and Kandahar, from which to 

rorism and assassination in advance of any major campaPriority areas will likely be around Kabul, especially partWardak south of the capital. 

In urban areas such as Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad, insurgents relied on intimidation, terrorism, and assassination. Wellplanned commando-style attacks involving a mix of suicide bombings, car bombings, and direct fire executed by welltrained operatives emerged as a serious threat to Kabul. These attacks, many of them attributed to the Haqqani network, directly threatened national leaders and centers of power, as well as high-security foreign diplomatic and military installations. 

 Terrorism, assassination, and other high-profile attacks ar

component of the Taliban’s strategy post-2014, especially 

Kandahar and Jalalabad. 

 In Kabul, there are likely to be sophisticated complex atta

national leaders, U.S. and NATO military installations, ancountries supporting the government. These attacks woulimmediate strategic threat to the national government. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Security Tier 2–4 implications)

After facing strategic defeat in 2001–2002, the Taliban regrouped, reorganized itself for guerilla warfare, and planned and executed a series of renewed offensives. It took roughly three years for the group to regenerate. 

 It is likely the Taliban will recover from the last 3–4 years 

and NATO counterinsurgency operations and regenerate lost combat power. While doing so, the group’s leadershiresurge. 

In 2004 and 2005, Taliban cadres quietly laid the groundwork for attacks in 2006, forming alliances, carrying out targeted killings, and infiltrating rural areas around Kandahar city. 

 Any renewed offensives will likely be preceded by a peri

as the Taliban conduct targeted killings, infiltrate the ANSestablish bases, and posture their forces around key gove

 The Taliban will likely place a high priority on regaining 

around Kandahar city, in order to carry out high profile athat they will consolidate these bases before attempting a violence in the city. 
55

Table 7. Summary of findings and implications of “Taliban offensive in the south and east” case study 

Finding Implications for future threat assessmen

In early 2006, the Taliban launched a series of direct and simultaneous military offensives in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. These operations were large scale and centrally directed by Quetta-based leaders. Thousands of fighters were killed during massed attacks in 2006 and 2007, causing the Taliban to operate in smaller groups and avoid direct assaults. 

 It is likely that the Taliban will attempt another series of c

sives in the south some time during the 2015–2018 timefand scale will depend on the group’s capabilities, which generate. 

 The Taliban will be careful not to mass until they have ha

ate, have tested the ANSF in outlying areas, and are confthe meantime, insurgents will likely operate in small formgradualist campaign. 

In the rural areas of Kandahar province, the Taliban targeted 11 of 13 rural districts beginning in January 2006 and escalating into the warmer months. They took over most rural areas, recruited fighters, and built fortified camps near key bases. They attacked outlying ANSF positions, forcing Afghan and coalition forces to become increasingly fixed and spread out. Insurgents withdrew under pressure from clearing operations and then reinfiltrated to target forces left behind to hold and build. 

 In Kandahar, the Taliban may attempt to overrun outlying 

supplant the ANSF, and use these areas as bases from whers and threaten the central areas of the province. 

 Insurgents are likely to pull back in the face of clearing o

reaction forces, then re-infiltrate to target those forces left 

 The Taliban will likely target the police most aggressively

they will likely attempt to lure units into outlying areas ancausing the ANA to become increasingly fixed, spread oumaneuver. 

Tactics (Security Tier 3–4 implications)

In Kandahar city, the Taliban carried out suicide attacks and car bombings aimed at police commanders and other senior officials. 

 The Taliban will likely attempt to assassinate key leaders 

manders in Kandahar city, especially those deemed essenamong the ANSF and key powerbrokers, and those necesof layered security in and around the city. 

In Helmand, there were simultaneous massed attacks on district centers across the northern part of the province, especially Sangin, Musa Qala, and Now Zad districts. When U.S. and NATO forces reinforced these areas, insurgents targeted central Helmand, the heart of the province, and overran positions in southern Helmand. They ambushed convoys and cut ground lines of communication. The Taliban infiltrated Nad Ali west of Lashkar Gah and then massed on the provincial capital. 

 The Taliban will likely focus first on the towns of northern 

ing to overrun outlying positions, and then threaten key despecially Sangin and Musa Qala. 

 Insurgents may attempt to re-infiltrate the districts of cent

will likely maintain a low profile as long as the ANSF holmay attempt targeted killings in Lashkar Gah from rural asuch as Nad Ali. Garmser to the south may come under pthe north succeed. 
56Table 7. Summary of findings and implications of “Taliban offensive in the south and east” case study 

Findin

g Implications for future threat assessmen

In the southeast (Khost, Paktika, Paktiya, and Ghazni provinces), insurgents launched a series of less expansive offensives beginning in 2007 and 2008, attributed mainly to the Haqqani network. The group sought control over key bases and transit areas in the southeast between sanctuaries in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency and the southern reaches of Kabul. Attacks began in Khost and later spread to the Khost–Gardez highway and a number of police positions and district centers. There were massed attacks in western and northern Paktiya and Andar district in Ghazni, fueled by an influx of fighters from Pakistan. 

 There is likely to be an increase in massed attacks on iso

Police positions, especially in key insurgent transit corridstan and Kabul, as insurgents seek to secure these routes of support from which to target Kabul. 

 There are likely to be ambushes along the Khost-Gardez 

seek to cut this key line of communication and sever the the rest of the country. 

 If the Taliban are widely perceived to be resurgent, there 

of Pakistani fighters from South Waziristan, leading to sigmassed attacks in the southeast. 

The Haqqani network was tightly-run and secretive, and employed terrorist methods. Its primary aim was Kabul. The group expanded into Wardak and Logar provinces from bases farther east and targeted outlying ANSF posts. From there they executed high-profile suicide bombings and sophisticated commandostyle assaults on heavily guarded targets in the capital. 

 The Haqqani network will likely continue operating as a 

insurgent organization, organizing as an underground nethe capital but drawing on a larger and more overt insurgthe southeast and in sanctuaries in North Waziristan. This capabilities

—terrorist networks in the capital, secure bas

and across the southeast, safe transit between Pakistan anbust sanctuary inside Pakistan

—will likely make the grou

tegic threat to Afghanistan. 

There was heavy fighting in isolated mountain valleys of central Kunar and eastern Nuristan, especially the Korengal valley and Kamdesh and Barg-e-Matal areas along the northern border with Pakistan. Insurgents targeted convoys, cutting roads through the mountains and forcing U.S. and Afghan forces to use air support and aerial resupply. 

 Local insurgents loosely affiliated with the Taliban are lik

threat in parts of the northeast, if the ANA push into certasuch as the Korengal. These attacks are likely to involve moutlying outposts and massed ambushes from the high-grroads. 

 Insurgents are likely to move freely across the border wit

tional Pakistani militants are likely to find sanctuary in thif the ANA pulls back from the northeast. The ANSF may pressure if they threaten this logistical network or take agagainst Pakistani militants. 
57

Table 7. Summary of findings and implications of “Taliban offensive in the south and east” case study 

Findin

g Implications for future threat assessmen

Al Qaeda cadres fleeing U.S. drone strikes took refuge in Kunar and Nuristan. In some valleys they integrated with local fighters, and in others they were rejected. They kept a low profile and worked behind the scenes. There were various Pakistani, Afghan, and foreign fighters in the region with different goals and areas of influence. 

 There is likely to be further integration of various Afghan, 

foreign militants in the northeast. Those focused primarily avoid direct confrontations with the ANSF. 

 Al Qaeda cadres are likely to maintain a low profile but 

insurgents by providing training, funding, and higher-ordare likely to place priority on maintaining sanctuary, and ment in attacks on the ANSF. 

The Taliban reactivated old networks in pockets of Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan beginning in 2006, and later outlying parts of Baghdis and Ghor. They focused on attacks against key highways running north into central Asia, disrupting ISAF’s northern distribution network. Insurgents moved into Farah province in 2006, fleeing British operations in Helmand. They overran district centers at Bakwa, Bala Baluk and Gulistan, and carried out massed ambushes. There were major battles in the Zerikoh valley in southern Herat near Shindand, as well as sporadic terrorist attacks in Herat city. 

 Insurgents are likely to step up massed ambushes on the 

Farah, and to consolidate their control over the eastern pespecially Bakwa, Bala Baluk, and Gulistan. Southern Hedand airfield, may come under pressure from insurgents district. 

 There may be limited terrorist attacks in the cities of Fara

bases in these areas. 

 With the exception of Farah and southern Herat, the Talib

to make their presence known in pockets of the north anlikely to pose a substantial threat. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers

The Taliban reconstituted their networks and organization, rebuilt their military capabilities, and planned their resurgence from sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Pakistani operations in its tribal areas focused on al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, not insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. No action was taken against the Taliban in Quetta. There is some evidence that Pakistani intelligence provided advice on strategy and brokered agreements among insurgent factions. 

 Pakistan is not likely to take concerted action against insu

Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Pakistan. 

 Sanctuaries in Pakistan will likely make it impossible for 

ly defeat the Taliban. Particularly robust sanctuaries in the cially North Waziristan, will enable the Taliban to regenean escalation in violence after 2014

—particularly agains

ernment in Kabul. Insurgents operating from these sanctuenduring strategic threat to Afghanistan. 

During this period, Iran backed the central government while providing limited military support to factions of the Taliban in the southwest in order to tie down U.S. forces. 

 Iran is likely to support the government in Kabul but cont

tary aid to Taliban field commanders in the southwest as are present. Iran may also provide aid to insurgents targethat Iran views as a potential threat, such as Shindand airHerat or the Bastion airfield in Helmand. 
58

Today: Assessment of current threats 

Since 2009, additional ISAF forces have pushed the Taliban back 

from many areas in the south and east and killed and captured thousands of fighters. The Taliban’s offensives were blunted and they were 

forced to settle into a long war of attrition that has become increasingly difficult to sustain. The last few years of intensified counterinsurgency operations have forced them deeper underground, 

disrupted their communications, and put strains on their organization and command and control. 

Vastly expanded operations by U.S., NATO, and Afghan SOF have 

eliminated many insurgent leaders at different levels and degraded 

their networks. Drone strikes into Pakistan’s tribal areas have eliminated higher-level commanders, removed some of the security provided by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and disrupted insurgents’ ability to 

communicate and plan. Insurgents are not as militarily capable as 

they were in 2006–2008. 

At the same time, the U.S. and NATO built up the ANSF—raising 

new units, such as the 215th Corps in Helmand, expanding training, 

education, and combat advising. As a result, the ANSF now have the 

capability to provide for security in many areas. The ANA can operate 

in difficult areas such as Kunar and Nuristan in the northeast and in 

northern Helmand—areas that have been difficult even for U.S. and 

NATO forces. The capabilities of ANA SOF, including highly trained 

raiding units, have expanded. Compared to the period 2006–2008 

when the ANSF were clearly overmatched in many key areas, the balance of power has shifted towards the ANSF. 

Nonetheless, there are still threats to Kabul and key areas in the provinces. The Taliban have not been strategically defeated and remain a 

viable force capable of targeting national leaders and institutions in 

Kabul and overrunning government positions in the south and east. 

Insurgents have retained their bases in some rural areas around Kabul, and there continue to be attacks in the cities of Kandahar and 

Jalalabad. Insurgents have largely retained key sanctuaries in Pakistan—the Haqqani network in particular—and continue to move 

men and materiel across the porous Afghanistan–Pakistan border. 

Table 8, on the next few pages, summarizes the key findings from our 

analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan and their implications 
59

for the future threat assessment. It is likely the U.S. and NATO withdrawal will reduce pressure on the insurgency, via a reduction in 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, to include 

drone strikes against insurgent sanctuaries. This reduction is likely to 

create space for the Taliban to regroup and regenerate lost capability. 

The Taliban are likely to continually test the ANSF and probe their 

weaknesses in the absence of coalition forces, and to keep pressure 

on them in rural areas in an attempt to reclaim ground lost during 

the surge of U.S. and NATO forces. The Taliban are likely to use 

mainly small probing attacks, but they may also conduct massed assaults in remote locales. They are also likely to try and infiltrate orbital areas around the key cities in order to conduct high profile 

attacks in the cities themselves (especially against national-level targets in Kabul). 

The Taliban’s current state of weakness (relative to their past 

strength) will likely result in their taking a gradualist approach to reconstituting capabilities and influence in the near term; however, in 

the out years (i.e., 2017–2018), they will likely conduct a much larger 

campaign. 

In the short term, the Haqqani network is likely to be the primary 

threat to the national government, as it was not nearly as affected by 

the surge of U.S. and NATO forces. The Haqqanis maintain robust 

sanctuary in Pakistan and have secure bases and transit areas between 

Pakistan and Kabul, which enable them to strike at national-level 

leaders and institutions. 

Looking at the areas of Afghanistan relative to insurgent strength today, our current threat assessment suggests that Tier 1 areas should 

include all of the major population centers (i.e., Kabul, Jalalabad, 

Mazar-e-Sharif, and the cities of Kandahar and Herat). Tier 2 areas 

might include the areas around these population centers and central 

Helmand. Tier 3 and 4 areas might include northern and southern 

Helmand, rural areas of Kandahar province, much of the northeast 

and southeast (especially areas along the border with Pakistan), and 

some small Pashtun pockets in the north and west (e.g., Kunduz). 
60Table 8. Summary of findings from current threat assessment 

Finding

Threats to the national government (Security Tier 1 implications) 

 The Taliban have not fundamentally altered their strategy to undermine the government through a combination of high-profi

and key regional capitals and guerrilla warfare in the provinces. 

 The group remains capable of striking in Kabul, though a number of recent attacks have been foiled or prevented from reach

targets. In support of attacks in Kabul, the Taliban has continued to retain bases near the capital, especially in Logar and Wa

 U.S. and NATO operations since 2009 have significantly degraded the insurgency. The Taliban was pushed out of strategical

tions and relegated to the periphery. Special Operations Forces’ raids and drone strikes killed many mid- and high-level insu

 The Taliban has not been strategically defeated and it remains a viable force in many areas of the south and east, and in sma

north and west. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Tier 2–4 implications) 

 The Taliban have not retaken any district centers. Insurgents overran some local police checkpoints but failed to hold them. T

rorist attacks in cities but no major offensives against population centers. 

 Insurgents have inflicted several tactical defeats on the ANSF in remote areas, but these appear to have been isolated events

yet to achieve any successes at the operational level involving multiple coordinated tactical actions. 

 The Taliban have maintained pressure on key lines of communication—particularly the Kabul–Kandahar highway and parts 

the southwest between Helmand and Herat. Insurgents have also targeted the Kandahar–Spin Boldak and Torkham–Kabul h

 The Taliban remain shut out of key areas in central Helmand and around Kandahar city; its overall capability substantially d

Taliban in the south remain a viable force. They have adapted by improving command and control and reducing factionalisleadership. 

o Kandahar city has remained stable, with relatively few high profile attacks. The rural areas around the city (Zharey, Panjw

have remained relatively secure as well. 

o The Taliban remain active in some outlying areas in northern Kandahar, especially Maiwand district, a key insurgent tran

Kandahar and Helmand. 

o There appears to be little immediate threat to Helmand’s central districts or the provincial capital, though there have bee

Lashkar Gah and assaults on checkpoints in Nad Ali. 

o In northern Helmand, insurgents recently overran local police positions around the Sangin district center and were later 

the help of NATO forces. The northernmost district of Musa Qala has come under pressure. 

o Local powerbrokers in northern Helmand appear to be holding the Taliban back, but fissures have emerged among them
61

Table 8. Summary of findings from current threat assessment 

Finding

o Much of the southwest appears to have fallen under the control of the Taliban and powerbrokers associated with the ins

the districts of Gulistan, Bakwa, and Bala Baluk in Farah province. There have been terrorist attacks in Farah city and sevon the ANSF along the southwestern portion of the Ring Road between Helmand and Herat. 

 The eastern provinces were left relatively unscathed by U.S. and NATO counterinsurgency operations in 2009–2012, which 

south. 

o In the southeast, the Haqqani network lost many mid- and higher-level commanders, but the group remains largely intac

move between Pakistan and Kabul remains substantial. The group is entrenched in parts of Khost, Paktika, Paktiya, and G

o In Ghazni province and parts of Paktiya, insurgents have assassinated leaders of local anti-Taliban movements and mass

checkpoints in key transit areas, killing significant numbers of police but failing to hold ground. 

o Insurgents in the east continue to have access to robust support zones in Pakistan’s tribal areas. There is considerable ins

all sectors, as U.S. forces have pulled back from bases near the border. Many Afghan border posts are under pressure. 

o Terrorist attacks and assassinations in the city of Jalalabad have increased, driven in part by recent inflows of sophisticate

high-end explosives designed for targeted killings. 

o Insurgents have failed to cut any major line of communication in the east. However, there is pressure on parts of the Tork

that runs through Jalalabad, the key highway into Pakistan, as well as parts of the Kabul–Kandahar highway in Ghazni. 

o The Taliban have made gains in some areas of the northeast but remain localized and largely contained to particular val

o Since U.S. forces began pulling back from the northeastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan in 2009, the region has bec

Afghan and Pakistani militants from a variety of organizations whose operations span both sides of the border, as well as 

Qaeda. 

o Fewer than 100 al Qaeda members are taking refuge in parts of Kunar and Nuristan. They have integrated with Afghan a

gents and intermarried with local clans. They continue to move to and from Pakistan and may have a presence in remote southeastern Afghanistan. 

 The insurgency in the north and west is struggling to survive in a handful of isolated pockets with large Pashtun populations. 

o There does not appear to be a concerted push by the Taliban to expand their influence in the north or the west. Links to 

ership in Quetta are weak. Much of the violence attributed to the Taliban is localized and criminal in nature. 

o The Taliban in the north and west have focused on assassinations and attempts to create and exploit divisions among no

brokers. So far, they have had limited success. 

o In parts of the west, insurgents have targeted low-level ANSF, often on their way home on leave from remote outposts. So

commanders in remote areas have agreed to local ceasefires. Few checkpoints have been overrun. 
62Table 8. Summary of findings from current threat assessment 

Finding

o There is little substantial threat to the populated areas in and around Herat. ANSF assisted by non-Pashtun powerbrokers 

gion relatively secure. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

 Haqqani network leadership remains based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency where it has a robust infrastructure 

cruitment centers. The Pakistani military has not moved to shut down the group’s sanctuaries there. Sanctuary in North Waz

for the Haqqani network’s operations in Kabul, which involve considerable planning, coordination, and training. 

 There have been several confrontations between Pakistani and Afghan forces along poorly demarcated portions of the borde

fired artillery into northeast Afghanistan, apparently targeting insurgents taking refuge there. Despite these altercations, there threat of conventional military action by Pakistan along the border. 

 Since 2009, Iran has continued to pursue a hedging strategy in Afghanistan. It has supported the government in Kabul and fu

projects in the west. At the same time, it has provided limited military aid to the Taliban in the southwest. 

 India has increased its involvement in Afghanistan, mainly in the civilian sector. India has invested in government infrastruct

training to ANA officers. India continues to operate consulates in Kabul and the regional capitals. 
63

2015–2018: Assessment of the near- to mid-term future threat 

In order to make predictions about likely Taliban actions in the 

2015–2018 timeframe, we draw on our analysis of the above case studies, looking for courses of action that Afghan insurgents have taken 

in the past and that they are likely to pursue again when U.S. and 

NATO forces draw down. We also make predictions based on our assessment of the current situation mapped against certain near-term 

trends that are all but certain—in particular, the reduction in U.S. 

and NATO forces and concomitant reduction in military pressure on 

the insurgency. Finally, we use all of these sources to categorize areas 

of Afghanistan according to our security tier construct. 

We assess that in the near term (2015–2016), the Taliban will follow a 

gradualist approach of keeping military pressure on the ANSF, expanding its control and influence in areas vacated by coalition forces, 

encircling key cities, and conducting high-profile attacks on strategic 

targets in Kabul—roughly the same mix of actions conducted in all 

three of our historical case studies. The Taliban will seek to press militarily via activities akin to, but lower in intensity than, offensives they 

conducted in 2006–2008 and those by the Mujahideen in 1989. Even 

if the ANSF falter or are under-resourced, the Taliban will not likely 

be capable of direct assaults of substantial scope and scale before 

2016. In the medium term (2017–2018 and beyond), once the insurgency has had time to recover from the surge of U.S. and NATO 

forces, there will be greater likelihood of a larger and more intense 

Taliban military effort. 

Much of the threat post-2014 will depend on the extent to which the 

insurgency is able to regenerate following the drawdown of coalition 

forces. The current state of the insurgency, coming after several years 

of intense U.S. and NATO operations that will not be sustained past 

2014, is only one data point from which to gauge the future threat. 

Past precedents suggest it is highly likely that the insurgency will regenerate at least some of its lost capability. 

We expect there to be internal debates among Taliban leaders over 

the appropriate time, manner, and intensity of future offensives—just 

as there were within the Mujahideen during the Soviet withdrawal. 

These debates will revolve around questions of whether to focus on 

urban or rural areas; what constitutes an appropriate mix of indirect 

methods, such as subversion and intimidation, and direct assaults on 
64

ANSF positions and government centers; and whether to continue 

with a gradualist approach or risk a bid for immediate military victory. 

Threats to the national government (Tier 1 implications) 

We assess that the Taliban will attempt to escalate complex attacks 

and assassinations against high-level targets in Kabul, an aim that they 

have pursued consistently since 2006 and that dates back to the 

1980s. Through these attacks, insurgents will try to directly threaten 

key national leaders and institutions, as well as remaining U.S. and 

NATO personnel. They will also seek to undermine the overall security of Kabul, in order to counteract the perception that the insurgency 

has been confined to rural areas in the provinces. Insurgents—the 

Haqqani network in particular—will attempt to conduct surveillance 

of high-security installations, move weapons and equipment into safe 

houses in the capital, expand their underground networks, and establish sleeper cells to be activated after 2014 at a time deemed propitious by the Taliban senior leadership in Pakistan. 

In support of attacks in Kabul, the Taliban will attempt to expand and 

consolidate control over rural areas around the capital, particularly 

along its southern reaches. Insurgents will maintain a relatively low 

profile in these areas. As in the past, they will place priority on ensuring freedom of movement and securing bases from which to put 

pressure on the capital. To this end, they will seek to control key 

transit and base areas and to protect their networks from exposure 

and penetration; they are less likely to pursue overt political control. 

Insurgents will also protect key transit corridors between safe areas 

around the capital and central bases in Pakistan, particularly North 

Waziristan. 

The seriousness of the threat to Kabul will depend largely on the capabilities of the Haqqani network post-2014 and the robustness of 

layered security in and near the capital. The strength of the Haqqani 

network will depend in turn on the tempo and effectiveness of Afghan intelligence and SOF operations around Kabul and southeast 

towards the Pakistani border. Reduced pressure on the group’s sanctuaries in Pakistan—or, perhaps, support by Pakistani intelligence in 

the form of materiel, intelligence, expertise, or training—could 

greatly increase the group’s striking power. 
65

The Haqqani network has been weakened by several years of hightempo U.S. and Afghan SOF operations, drone strikes in Pakistan, 

U.S. and NATO counterinsurgency operations, and intense pressure 

on the Pakistani military to restrict the group’s activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Despite these efforts, the 

group remains a viable force capable of carrying out attacks in Kabul. 

We believe that future reductions in these efforts will allow the 

Haqqani network to regenerate a significant amount of lost capability, making it a greater threat post-2014 than it is now. 

The Taliban will seek to maintain a limited operational tempo 

through 2014, in order to remain relevant, preserve their momentum, maintain morale within their ranks, and keep pressure on the 

ANSF. At the same time, they will conserve resources for a more concerted series of military offensives in the 2015–2018 timeframe. As 

was the case in the late 1980s, insurgents will keep the war going but 

will not seriously target departing foreign forces or force a confrontation with the ANSF until after the U.S. and NATO have executed 

their planned drawdown of personnel and enablers. 

Following 2014, the Taliban will marshal additional resources to put 

greater pressure on the ANSF, in order to test their strength and 

gauge their weaknesses in the absence of substantial coalition support. This prediction is based on three key findings from our historical case studies: first, that the Mujahideen reduced their operational 

tempo during the Soviet withdrawal in order to conserve resources 

for later offensives; second, that various Mujahideen groups debated 

how and when to target the government following the Soviet withdrawal; and third, that the Taliban spent nearly four years rebuilding 

their capabilities following the U.S. intervention before going on the 

offensive in 2006. 

The various insurgent groups that focus on Afghanistan—particularly 

the Taliban and the Haqqani network—will maintain and perhaps 

strengthen their alliance. As long as the regime in Kabul survives and 

U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan, these groups will remain largely 

united. There will be infighting at local levels as U.S. forces pull back 

and are no longer a conspicuous presence on the ground to unify local factions; this low-level in-fighting will weaken the Taliban in many 

areas. However, we do not expect to see major rifts within the insurgency’s leadership that would make the Taliban vulnerable to strate-
66

gic defeat. This prediction is based on two factors: the Taliban’s long 

record of maintaining unity among their senior echelons and efforts 

to rein in errant field commanders; and on dynamics among the Mujahideen, who remained largely united at the higher echelons until 

the Soviet-backed government ultimately collapsed. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Tiers 2–4 implications) 

In the provinces, we expect there will be various small offensives 

aimed at expanding insurgent control and regaining important 

ground lost during the U.S. and NATO surge. The Taliban will continually test the ANSF, first in outlying areas and then, if the ANSF 

fare poorly, increasingly in more central locations. Most of these attacks will be small-scale assaults on outlying positions, but we also expect there to be massed assaults in areas of the country where the 

Taliban enjoy considerable freedom of movement, as was the case 

prior to the surge. Insurgents will agree to local ceasefires and offer 

amnesty to ANSF members willing to cooperate or switch sides. The 

Taliban will use newly captured ground to rebuild their military capabilities and surround and put pressure on district centers and other key areas. 

Insurgents will seek to regain freedom of movement through key corridors from Pakistan and between internal safe havens and strategically important districts and cities. At the same time, they will step up 

attacks on vulnerable stretches of key highways—especially the Ring 

Road between Helmand and Herat, parts of the Kabul–Kandahar 

highway through Ghazni, the Torkham–Jalalabad road east of Jalalabad, and the Kandahar–Spin Boldak highway towards the border 

with Pakistan. There will also be attacks on smaller arteries passing into outlying areas. The Taliban will target ANSF lines of communication, attempting to disrupt resupply and isolate outlying positions. 

Insurgents will do so mainly with IEDs, but will also conduct massed 

ambushes for effect in remote locations. 

There will be continual assassinations of officials and pro-government 

leaders, particularly in areas where government influence is strong 

and the Taliban are facing difficulties establishing control; most of 

these killings will occur in urban areas where the Taliban are able to 

establish an underground network but are unable to move openly. 
67

They will try to assassinate strong police chiefs in these areas through 

suicide bombings and complex attacks. 

The southern provinces 

The Taliban will focus on Kandahar city, just as they have in past 

campaigns. They will attempt to reestablish support zones in the rural 

areas to the south and west of the city, especially the districts of Zharey and Panjwai. They will also seek inroads into the Arghandab valley 

north of the city, populated by traditionally pro-government tribes; 

they will do so by assassinating elders and exploiting tribal divisions. 

From bases in nearby rural areas, the Taliban will try to penetrate the 

city’s defenses, develop underground networks, and assassinate key 

officials deemed essential to the continued success of layered security 

in and around the city. 

The Taliban’s strategy in 2006 suggests that the group will take a patient approach focused on quietly and gradually building secure bases in the city’s suburbs and executing carefully planned 

assassinations for at least a year or two before attempting larger-scale 

operations in or around the city. Kandahar city has been relatively secure for at least the past year due to a robust layered security apparatus. The Taliban are not likely to risk a direct confrontation in or 

near the city until they are confident that this apparatus has been 

considerably undermined. 

The Taliban will focus on regaining control over outlying districts, 

particularly Maiwand and other areas in the northern part of the 

province. It is likely they will conduct probing attacks on ANSF positions and attempt to lure ANA and police quick reaction forces into 

remote areas, but they will largely refrain from overt attempts to overrun district centers until at least 2016. Once the Taliban have had 

time to recover and consolidate control in outlying areas of the province, they may attempt simultaneous attacks on vulnerable district 

centers, as they did in 2006. It is unlikely that they will attempt such a 

risky campaign before they have had at least one year to recover (i.e., 

in 2016 or later). 

In Helmand province, the Taliban will put considerable pressure on 

the northern districts, especially Musa Qala and Sangin. Indeed, the 

Taliban have already begun to do so—their activities have included a 
68

major attack on ALP positions near Sangin that was ultimately repulsed. They will likely try to surround Musa Qala and establish de 

facto control over the town. From there, insurgents are likely to put 

pressure on Sangin through targeted killings and probing attacks on 

ANSF positions around the town. The Taliban may seek agreements 

with influential powerbrokers in northern Helmand who worked with 

the group in the past, particularly those who provided fighters in 

2006. Whether northern Helmand remains with the government or 

falls to the Taliban will depend in large part on where the allegiances 

of these powerbrokers ultimately lie. 

In central Helmand, the Taliban will follow a less direct approach. 

They will try to return to Marjeh and infiltrate back into Nad Ali. 

From Nad Ali, they will try to put pressure on the provincial capital at 

Lashkar Gah. Assassinations and complex attacks in the city are likely 

to increase in 2015 and 2016. We do not expect another massed attack on Lashkar Gah from bases in Nad Ali. It is highly unlikely that 

the Taliban will be able to mass sufficient forces to conduct direct assaults on government centers in central Helmand for at least two 

years after 2014. After 2016, there will be an increasing likelihood of 

major attacks in the province’s central districts, especially if the Taliban are able to establish secure bases in the northern districts. 

The eastern provinces 

In the eastern provinces, we do not expect a coordinated campaign 

of significant scope or scale, though there is likely to be intense 

fighting in certain pockets. The insurgency in the east has always 

been relatively fragmented and localized, the exception being 

Haqqani network activities in parts of the southeast that have focused 

on maintaining bases and facilitation routes. 

In Kunar and Nuristan provinces in the northeast, we expect a variety 

of different Afghan and Pakistani militant groups to coalesce and develop cross-cutting linkages. There will be an increase in attacks on 

Pakistani government positions from Afghan territory by elements of 

the Pakistani Taliban supported by Afghan insurgents and occasionally involving Afghan fighters. These developments will provoke Pakistan to retaliate by firing over the border and possibly providing 

support to local insurgents targeting Afghan forces. 
69

Insurgents in Kunar and Nuristan will periodically attack isolated 

ANA positions and target resupply convoys in the mountains, in order to fix the ANA in their bases and disrupt their resupply in the 

hopes of eventually making these positions unsustainable. Insurgents 

will have the capability to mass against one or more ANA positions, 

resulting in potentially large losses. Insurgents will not likely attempt 

such an attack as long as the ANA move with caution into capillary 

valleys and avoid confrontations with local powerbrokers. 

We expect that Arab and Uzbek fighters with links to al Qaeda, along 

with a small number of core al Qaeda members, will remain in certain valleys where they enjoy good relations with Pakistani and Afghan insurgents and have intermarried with local tribes and 

powerbrokers. In the near term, al Qaeda members will keep a low 

profile, but will contribute to insurgent activities through training 

and other support. They are likely to prioritize maintaining relations 

with local insurgents and the population over direct involvement in 

the insurgency. 

Beyond 2016, it is possible that al Qaeda may regenerate to some extent, if the tempo of counterterrorism operations declines. If this 

happens, the group could establish networks in areas such as Ghazni 

or other parts of the east. There are many paths through the mountains to Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda and associated groups continue to transit to and from Pakistan, particularly in 

the hard-to-reach northern sectors of the border. 

In the southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktiya, Paktika, and Ghazni, 

we expect the Haqqani network to expand its operational networks 

and control over smuggling, and to expand control over areas of 

transit between North Waziristan and Kabul. The group will relentlessly target and occasionally mass against ALP positions in Ghazni 

and Paktiya that threaten key transit routes to Kabul and the Kabul–

Kandahar highway. The Haqqani network will seek to consolidate 

control over its key support zones in Khost and parts of Paktiya and 

Paktika, as it did in 2006–2008 and during the Soviet withdrawal. If 

the group is successful, it will use these areas to recruit and train additional fighters with which to put additional pressure on Kabul. 

In Ghazni, the Taliban is likely to step up attacks on ALP positions, as 

well as targeted killings of leaders associated with local anti-Taliban 
70

movements. There are likely to be massed attacks against ALP positions in the province. From bases in Ghazni, there are likely to be major attacks on convoys transiting the Kabul–Kandahar highway. 

The north and west 

A serious insurgent threat is not likely to emerge in the north or west 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe. The Taliban will seek to expand their 

influence among Pashtun populations, particularly around Kunduz, 

but will remain largely contained to a limited number of isolated 

pockets. Non-Pashtun local and regional powerbrokers are likely to 

prevent any serious Taliban resurgence in the north and west. Insurgent activities are likely to be focused on creating localized instability 

and limited assassinations of local ethnic powerbrokers, particularly 

leaders affiliated with the former Northern Alliance. If the insurgency 

achieves success in the south and divisions emerge between Kabul 

and powerbrokers in the west, the Taliban may once again seek inroads into Herat through targeted killings and alliances with sympathetic militia commanders. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

We expect that outside powers will take a wait-and-see approach. 

They will not substantially alter current policies towards Afghanistan 

until there is greater clarity in regard to the capabilities of the ANSF 

to stand on their own against the Taliban, the negotiations between 

the insurgents and the government, and the future makeup of the 

government in Kabul. This will be the case with India and Iran; it will 

be so to a lesser extent with Pakistan, which may seek to influence the 

dynamics of the Taliban’s campaign against the ANSF post-2014. 

Pakistan 

We expect that the Pakistani militarily will remain focused on containing the fallout from Afghanistan inside Pakistan. It will fight militants that insist on attacking the Pakistani state, while pushing as 

many as possible into Afghanistan to fight with Afghan insurgents. It 

is not likely that Pakistan will take further military action against the 

Haqqani network in North Waziristan. Pakistan will maintain its relations with the Haqqani network and will lean on the group to carry 

out operations specific to Pakistani interests—in particular, attacks on 

Indian targets. Pakistan will seek to pressure the Afghan government 
71

through the Haqqani network, and may press for an increase in attacks inside Kabul. 

In regard to the Taliban’s leadership in Quetta, Pakistan will not disrupt their movements, but will use its control over insurgent sanctuaries to ensure that Taliban leaders amenable to Pakistani interests 

dominate the movement. It is possible that Pakistan will increase materiel support to the Taliban, including the provision of heavy weapons, especially if relations between Kabul and Islamabad deteriorate 

further after 2014. It will be difficult to monitor this activity, due to 

Pakistan’s past practices of moving weapons and materiel through 

proxies or making it openly available in arms bazaars near the border. 

India 

India will seek to stabilize the Afghan government by maintaining its 

investment and bilateral agreements. India may send a limited number of security forces to Afghanistan to secure its installations, which 

will likely come under increased attacks from Pakistani proxy forces. 

It is unlikely that India will deploy security forces to help stabilize the 

Afghan government, for fear of being drawn into the conflict or risking another war with Pakistan. 

India will, to the extent possible, increase its efforts to strengthen Afghan ministries and train ANA officers in India. If India perceives the 

Taliban as regaining the initiative against the government, it may 

provide support to former leaders of the Northern Alliance and help 

them to rearm. India and Iran are likely to share common interests in 

these areas. 

Iran 

Iran is likely to engage in activities to stabilize the government in Kabul, while pulling back from tactical support to insurgents as additional U.S. and NATO forces depart. Tehran largely shares 

Washington’s objective of ensuring a stable Afghan government that 

is capable of combating Sunni extremists, policing its own borders, 

and stemming the flow of narcotics into Iran—though Iranian officials would not say so openly. The departure of a large U.S. military 

presence on the ground in Afghanistan will remove a major impediment to improved relations between Kabul and Tehran. The histori-
72

cal animosity between Iran and the Taliban is likely to reassert itself, 

especially as Pakistan seeks to fill the void left by the U.S. departure. 

If the Afghan government looks to be in danger of collapsing, or if 

the Taliban come to dominate the central government and shut out 

pro-Iran Afghan leaders, Tehran is likely to shift its focus to former 

commanders in the Northern Alliance and other pro-Iran regional 

powerbrokers. If the U.S. retains a substantial presence inside Afghanistan, especially in the west (e.g., at the Shindand airbase in Herat and possibly the Bastion airfield in Helmand), Iran may assist 

elements of the Taliban in targeting those installations. 

Map of Afghanistan by security tiers 

Using the above narrative assessment along with the implications of 

our case study analyses and current threat assessment, we derived the 

map shown in Figure 3 (this is the same map as in Figure 2, but 

reproduced here for ease of reading). This map depicts areas of Afghanistan categorized via our five security tiers. (Appendix E provides 

a full listing of Afghanistan’s districts by security tier). 
73

Figure 3. Map of Afghanistan by security tier 

As the discussion to this point has highlighted, the Taliban are likely 

to first test the ANSF in Tier 3 and 4 areas, attempting to gain control 

of these in order to project power and influence into many of the Tier 2 and Tier 1 areas. If they are successful, they are likely to gain recruits and momentum, enabling them to increase pressure on the 

Tier 2 areas and terrorist attacks in Tier 1 areas in order to discredit 

the government and the ANSF. If they are successful in doing this, 

they will likely continue to ratchet up pressure on the ANSF and in 

the cities until they are able to capture the latter and claim political 

control of the country. 

Table 9 summarizes our key assessments for the threat in the 2015–

2018 timeframe. 
74Table 9. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2015–2018 

Assessments

Overall key points

 The Taliban in the near term will follow a gradualist approach of keeping military pressure on the ANSF, expanding their con

in areas vacated by coalition forces, encircling key cities, and conducting high-profile attacks on strategic targets in Kabul.

 The Taliban will seek to press militarily via activities akin to, but lower in intensity than, offensives they conducted in 2006–

the Mujahideen conducted in 1989. They will not likely be capable of direct assaults of substantial scope and scale before 2

 In the medium term (2017–2018), once the insurgency has had time to recover from the U.S. surge, there will be greater lik

and more intense military effort. The Taliban will conserve resources in the near term for such an offensive. 

 Following 2014, the Taliban will marshal additional resources to put greater pressure on the ANSF, in order to test their stren

weaknesses in the absence of substantial coalition support. 

 It is highly likely that the insurgency will regenerate at least some of its lost capability as U.S. and NATO forces draw down 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations declines. 

 We expect there to be internal debates within the Taliban senior leadership over the appropriate time, manner, and intensity 

Threats to the national government (Security Tier 1 implications)

 The Taliban will attempt to escalate complex attacks and assassinations on high-level targets in Kabul. Through these attacks

to directly threaten key national leaders and institutions, as well as remaining U.S. and NATO personnel. These attacks pose term strategic threat to the national government. 

 In support of attacks in Kabul, the Taliban will attempt to expand and consolidate control over rural areas around Kabul, par

southern reaches. To this end, they will seek less to exert overt control over key transit and base areas and more to protect thexposure and penetration. 

 The Haqqani network will regenerate a significant amount of lost capability, making it a greater potential threat post-2014. W

forces and enablers will reduce the tempo of intelligence and SOF operations, reducing pressure on the group and enabling 

 Taliban senior leadership will remain united and will continue to follow a coherent strategy for at least several years after 20

U.S. continues to support the Kabul government politically and militarily. 

 Regardless of how well the ANSF perform post-2014, the Taliban will remain a viable force at the strategic level as long as th

safe inside Pakistan. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions (Security Tier 2–4 implications)

 In the provinces, there will be various small offensives aimed at expanding insurgent control and regaining important groun

U.S. surge. The Taliban will continually test the ANSF, first in outlying areas and then, if the ANSF fare poorly, increasingly in tions. 
75

Table 9. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2015–2018 

Assessments

 Most of these attacks will be small-scale assaults, but we also expect there to be massed attacks in areas of the country whe

considerable freedom of movement. 

 The Taliban will use newly captured ground to rebuild their military capabilities and to surround and put pressure on distric

key areas. 

 Insurgents will seek to regain freedom of movement through key corridors from Pakistan and between internal safe havens a

portant districts and cities. 

 The Taliban will target ANSF lines of communication, attempting to disrupt resupply and isolate outlying positions. Insurgen

tacks on vulnerable stretches of key highways. 

 There will be continual assassinations of security officials and pro-government leaders, especially those deemed effective at 

among ANSF units and political factions. 

 In the southern provinces, the Taliban will seek to infiltrate back into Kandahar city and Lashkar Gah, while seeking to regai

northern Helmand and Kandahar. 

o The Taliban will seek to reestablish base areas in the rural areas around Kandahar city, especially Zharey, Panjwai, and A

ses in nearby rural areas, the Taliban will try to assassinate key officials deemed essential to the continued success of layaround the city. 

o In Kandahar province, the Taliban will attempt to regain control over outlying districts, particularly Maiwand and areas i

insurgents have had time to regroup, they may attempt multiple attacks on vulnerable district centers in 2016 or beyond

o In Helmand province, the Taliban will put considerable pressure on the northern districts, especially Musa Qala and San

massed assaults on outlying ALP positions and targeted killings in the town of Sangin. 

o In central Helmand, the Taliban will try to infiltrate back into Nad Ali, and from there conduct high profile attacks in the 

of Lashkar Gah. Massed attacks are unlikely to occur in central Helmand. 

 In the eastern provinces, we do not expect a coordinated campaign of significant scope or scale, though there is likely to be 

certain pockets. Insurgents in the east will focus on protecting key bases and transit areas. 

o Insurgents in Kunar and Nuristan will periodically attack isolated ANA positions and target resupply convoys in the mou

fix the ANSF, disrupt their resupply, and make outlying positions untenable. 

o If the ANA pulls back from the northeast, attacks on nearby Pakistani border positions are likely to increase, exacerbatin

Kabul and Islamabad and between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border. 

o The remnants of al Qaeda are likely to maintain a low profile and remain largely contained to remote valleys in the nort

generate if the tempo of counterterrorism operations decline and the ANSF pull back from Kunar and Nuristan. Al Qaedother remote areas of the east, such as Ghazni. 
76Table 9. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2015–2018 

Assessments

o In the southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktiya, Paktika, and Ghazni, the Haqqani network will expand its networks, as w

areas of transit between North Waziristan and Kabul. 

o The Haqqani network will target ALP commanders and occasionally mass against ALP positions in Ghazni and Paktiya t

routes. 

o There are likely to be massed ambushes on convoys transiting the Kabul–Kandahar and Khost–Gardez highways. o The Taliban will seek to expand its influence among minority Pashtun populations—particularly around Kunduz—but th

limited. 

o If the insurgency achieves success in the south and divisions emerge between Kabul and powerbrokers in the western pa

the Taliban may once again seek inroads into Herat through targeted killings and alliances with local powerbrokers at odernment. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers

 It is not likely that Pakistan will take further military action against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan or other faction

Regardless of how well the ANSF performs post-2014, the Taliban will remain a viable force at the strategic level as long as safe inside Pakistan. 

 Pakistan will seek to pressure the Afghan government through the Haqqani network, and may press for greater attacks inside 

between the two governments improve, Pakistan may use its influence to restrain the Haqqani network. 

 In regard to the Quetta-based leadership, Pakistan will not disrupt its movements, but will use its control over continued san

that Taliban leaders amenable to Pakistani interests dominate the movement and future negotiations. 

 India will increase efforts to strengthen Afghan ministries and train ANA officers in India. If India believes the Taliban is resu

may support former leaders of the Northern Alliance. 

 Iran is likely to engage in activities to stabilize the government in Kabul, while pulling back from tactical support to Taliban 

tional U.S. forces depart, but it may continually aid insurgents in attacks on strategic bases and airfields in the west. Iran maIran powerbrokers if its influence in Kabul erodes. 
77

2019–2023: Assessment of the long-term future threat 

It will take at least two to four years for the ANSF to prove themselves 

in the absence of substantial U.S. and NATO involvement. If the 

ANSF manage to hold areas of strategic and operational importance 

and disrupt the insurgency in key rural areas, they will enable the 

government in Kabul to remain viable and allow key political actors 

on all sides to stop hedging and plan for the long term. It may then 

be possible for an enduring political solution to be negotiated between the government and the Taliban. The ANSF are not likely to be 

able to enforce stability in the absence of a political solution, or to 

succeed in decisively defeating the Taliban on the battlefield. 

The Taliban will test the ANSF for several years after 2014, until it is 

clear what the force is truly capable of without substantial U.S. and 

NATO support. The group will not likely relinquish the military option until it is clear the ANSF cannot be defeated and that violence 

no longer promises to increase its leverage in negotiations. The Taliban will likely retain their overall unity and command and control as 

long as they have momentum; but they may weaken and fracture if 

the ANSF hold and prove stronger than anticipated. Once Taliban 

leaders have pushed the military option to its limits, they will likely 

seek a negotiated settlement and insurgent threats to the ANSF will 

diminish over time. 

Looking further into the future, if the ANSF achieve their operational goals and hold against the insurgency for several years after 2014, 

they will prove their ability to endure independent of substantial coalition support. This would remove uncertainties associated with U.S. 

and NATO withdrawal and decrease incentives for insurgents to continue fighting, thereby creating the conditions necessary for an enduring political solution to the conflict. Assuming that the ANSF are 

successful through 2018, we assess that this is the most likely strategic 

end-state during the 2019–2023 timeframe. 

Table 10 summarizes the key points for this portion of our future 

threat assessment. 
78

Table 10. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2019–2023 

Assessments

 Assuming that the ANSF will have the capabilities required to sustain themselves long-term, the most 

likely strategic end-state during the 2019–2023 timeframe is an enduring political solution following 

several years of fighting in which the ANSF prove themselves capable of holding with minimal U.S. 

and NATO support. 

 Once Taliban leaders have pushed the military option to its limits, it is likely that they will seek a negotiated settlement and that insurgent threats to the ANSF will diminish over time. It is not likely that the 

ANSF will decisively defeat the Taliban on the battlefield or succeed in stabilizing the country in the 

absence of a political solution. 

 If the ANSF manage to hold areas of strategic and operational importance and disrupt the insurgency 

in key rural areas through 2018, this will enable the government in Kabul to remain viable and allow 

key political actors on all sides to stop hedging and plan for the long term. Then, as a result, the Taliban may come to terms with Kabul. These conditions will be necessary for a lasting settlement. 

Conclusion 

Based on our analysis of Afghan history and the present situation: 

We conclude that the insurgency will pose a greater threat post-2014 than it 

does now. 

The last several years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have weakened the insurgency considerably, while the ANSF 

have grown stronger. The Taliban nonetheless remain a viable force 

with sanctuaries in Pakistan. Their overall intent appears unchanged, 

and they remain capable of high profile attacks in key cities and 

massed attacks in rural areas. It is likely that the insurgency will regenerate at least some of its lost capability as U.S. and NATO forces 

draw down and the tempo of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations declines. 

Our historical analysis of three case studies in which insurgents conducted a campaign against the Afghan government showed that in all 

three cases, insurgents employed a strategy in which they focused first 

on controlling and influencing rural areas, to enable a later focus on 

taking key urban areas and cities—and insurgents were largely successful at doing so in all three cases. 
79

Based on these past precedents: 

We conclude that the Taliban are likely to follow a gradualist campaign in 

2015–2016, focused on continually testing the ANSF in order to gauge the 

force’s vulnerabilities in the absence of coalition forces.

Such a campaign would involve terrorist attacks in key cities from bases in nearby rural areas, expansion of bases and transit corridors between Pakistan and Kabul, a combination of small and large-scale 

attacks on outlying ANSF outposts and district centers in rural areas, 

and ambushes along vulnerable stretches of key highways. We assess 

that the Taliban will conserve resources in the near term for such an 

offensive, while carrying out enough attacks in the interim to remain 

relevant. 

We also conclude that there will be increased risk of a large-scale offensive 

after 2016. 

We assess that Pakistan will not take further military action against the 

Haqqani network or other insurgent groups focused on Afghanistan 

until there is greater clarity on the future makeup of the regime in 

Kabul and the long-term viability of the ANSF. Pakistan also is not 

likely to take action against Quetta-based Taliban leaders. Instead, 

Pakistan will use its control over insurgent sanctuaries to ensure that 

leaders amenable to Pakistani interests dominate these movements. 

With our future threat assessment in hand, we next describe the 

framework that we used to size and structure the ANSF.

ANSF force-sizing framework 

The U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan as stated in the 2013 NDAA is: 

“Prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world.”12

 

To determine the size, structure, capabilities, and posture of the 

ANSF, we needed to operationalize this policy goal by writing nested 

goals at the operational level—focused on security—that the ANSF 

 

12 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, Section 1215. 
80

could reasonably be expected to achieve with U.S. and NATO support (per our overarching assumptions). 

Using the construct of security tiers, we can state operational goals 

that, if achieved, will support the U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan during the timeframe of this study. As such, we assess that the operational goals for the ANSF in 2015–2018 should be to: 

 Neutralize the insurgency in Tier 1 (National/Strategic) and 

Tier 2 (Operational) areas. 

 Disrupt the insurgency in Tier 3 (Tactical) and Tier 4 (Support/Transit) areas. 

 Maintain civil order in Tier 5 (Civil Order) areas. 

For the sake of this study, we use the following definitions in support 

of these goals: 

 Neutralize: To put out of action or make incapable of action.13

 Disrupt: To cause disorder or turmoil.14

 Maintain: To keep in a specified state.15

To be clear, these operational goals are minimalist in nature. They 

are designed to prevent the overthrow of the government of Afghanistan and the presence of insurgent and terrorist safe havens within its 

borders. They are not designed to result in the military defeat of the 

Taliban. While the latter may be a desirable outcome, it is not the stated 

policy goal of the United States. 

Using these operational goals and our future threat assessment (most 

notably, the map of security tiers shown in Figure 2), we identified 

the missions the ANSF would need to conduct to counter insurgent 

threats in the 2015–2018 timeframe. These missions are: 

 

13 Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. Accessed Sep. 10, 2013, 

at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/neutralize. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 
81

 Maintain security and civil order 

 Deter insurgent massing against, and prevent infiltration into, 

the major cities 

 Secure key lines of communication 

 Secure points of entry and interdict in the border zone 

 Conduct counterinsurgency operations 

 Conduct counter-network and counter-facilitation operations 

 Conduct reinforcement and quick response operations 

We then cross-referenced these missions against the various force 

types within the ANSF and our map of Afghanistan by security tier to 

identify which force types are required for each mission, and in which 

tiers (areas) those forces would need to conduct the missions. The 

resulting “force sizing framework” is shown in Table 11 on the next 

page. 

This framework allows us to clearly identify which force types we need 

to size, for which missions, and in which areas—in other words, it enables a troop-to-task analysis. In the next section, we perform this 

analysis to determine the overall size, structure, posture, capabilities, 

and regional differentiation needed for the ANSF to achieve the operational goals (in support of the U.S. policy goal) in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. 
82Table 11. Force sizing framework (ANSF missions by force type and security tiers) 

ANSF Missions

Force Type

Maintain 

security and 

civil order

Deter insurgent 

massing and 

prevent infiltration

Secure key 

lines of communication

Secure points of 

entry and interdict 

in the border zone

Conduct 

counterinsurgency 

operations

Conduct counter

network and 

counterfacilitation opera

tions

Uniform Police All Tiers Tier 2 Tier 2 N/A Tiers 3 and 4 N/A 

Local Police N/A N/A N/A N/A Tier 3 N/A 

Customs and 

Border Police N/A N/A N/A 

Tier 1 airports and 

Tiers 3, 4, and 5 

border areas 

N/A N/A 

Army (includes 

AAF and supporting forces) N/A Tier 2 Tier 2 N/A Tiers 3 and 4 N/A 

SOF and 

Special Police N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A All Tiers 
83

Assessment of ANSF size, structure, capabilities, posture, and 

regional differentiation 

The NDAA asked us to analyze the strength, force structure, force 

posture, and capabilities required to make the ANSF capable of 

providing security for their own country so as to prevent Afghanistan 

from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten 

Afghanistan, the region, and the world. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) asked us to analyze ANSF regional differentiation in capacity, capabilities, resources, challenges, and 

relationships with Kabul. As our analysis proceeded, it became clear 

that these tasks were intertwined; thus, we have integrated their discussion here. 

Assumptions and caveats 

In addition to the study’s overarching assumptions, we assume that 

the ANSF’s counter-narcotics missions in 2015–2018 will not be substantially greater than they are today. Therefore, we do not size a 

force type to conduct this mission. If the government of Afghanistan 

or the U.S. and the international community want an increase in 

counter-narcotics operations in 2015–2018, it would require forces 

beyond what we calculate here. 

In structuring our analysis for this task, we realized that calculating 

the size and structure of the ANSF in the abstract could lead to a 

force so different from the current one as to be unreachable during 

the timeframe of this study. To avoid this, we made a conscious decision to constrain our analysis by holding certain aspects of the ANSF 

constant. Specifically, we took the following as design constraints: 

 The broad contours of the ANSF will stay roughly constant. We 

considered each of the forces that the ANSF currently have relative to the missions needed in each security tier to accomplish 

the operational goals. We did not consider the creation of new 

forces. 

 The broad contours of each force type also will stay roughly 

constant. For example, the ANA will continue to have six regional (corps) headquarters (though we do allow the number 

of troops and battalions in each corps to vary). 
84

Finally, there are many different ways to size security forces, none of 

which is perfect or free of criticism. As a means of providing additional rigor, and avoiding the pitfalls of any single technique, we used 

several approaches for determining the number and type of forces 

required whenever possible. By using several methods to determine 

force requirements, we were able to identify where the different approaches converged and where they diverged. We then looked more 

closely at the latter, consulted with subject matter experts, reviewed 

the literature, and used these sources to make our best judgment as 

to the appropriate force levels needed. 

Assessment 

The following sections describe our troop-to-task analysis for the various components of the ANSF. In each section, we briefly describe the 

current mission and activities of each force type, as well as the force 

levels in comparable situations (such as historical conflicts or the current force levels in neighboring countries), before calculating the size 

of the force. We conclude this section with a comparison of the force 

levels calculated via our analysis and the ANSF forces currently expected in 2015. 

Our analytical approach is intended to identify the minimum force 

size and structure required to counter the expected threats in the 

2015–2018 timeframe. Throughout this section, however, we test the 

sensitivity of our results to our key planning assumptions and highlight how different assumptions and planning factors could lead to 

different estimates for the ANSF force size. 

Afghan Uniformed Police, Anti-Crime Police, and special police 

The police in Afghanistan today differ significantly from a police 

force in the U.S. or Europe. In most of Afghanistan, the police are 

better thought of as a paramilitary guard force than as a civilian police force that provides law enforcement. The police secure Kabul, 

Kandahar, and other major cities in southern and eastern Afghanistan by having large numbers of policemen standing watch on street 

corners, directing traffic, and deterring violence. The police also 

stand guard at a number of police outposts and vehicle checkpoints 

scattered across rural communities and along major roads. In much 

of southern and eastern Afghanistan, 8 to 20 police will live at these 
85

small police outposts, watching traffic and guarding the communities 

served by these roads 24 hours a day. 

This situation is a result of numerous factors, to include the insurgent 

threat in Afghanistan, the lack of a functioning statutory judicial system, and a history devoid of the types of community policing familiar 

to Western audiences. Traditionally, and still today in much of rural 

Afghanistan, most crimes and civil disputes are resolved through 

community dispute resolution mechanisms. This means that tribal, 

religious, or village elders help people resolve their disputes without 

involving the government. Today, the police in most rural areas bring 

only a handful of cases per month to district and provincial prosecutors—typically these are the most egregious of crimes that cannot be 

otherwise resolved via traditional means. 

In its 10-year vision for the police, the MoI calls for the police to 

move from paramilitary-style policing toward community policing 

and law enforcement.16 The MoI’s vision statement acknowledges that 

this transition will occur gradually over the next decade and at different rates in various parts of the country. In particular, the police in 

southern Afghanistan are expected to continue performing checkpoint security and holding areas after counterinsurgency operations 

have been completed. They are expected to have a limited role in 

supporting law enforcement, due to ongoing insurgent activity and 

the limited reach of the statutory judicial system in the south.17

The Afghan National Police currently have an end-strength cap of 

157,000. The ANP is an overarching term that encompasses the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan Anti-Crime Police, specialty police task forces, the Afghan Border Police, and various headquarters 

and support personnel. In this section, we are primarily concerned 

with the approximately 105,000 police working for the AUP, AACP, 

 

16 Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392-1402. Afghanistan 

Ministry of the Interior. Apr. 22, 2013, accessed Sep. 23, 2013, at 

http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-visionenglish-final-version.pdf.

17 Author interviews in Regional Command (RC)–East, RC–South, and RC–

Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 12- 24, 2013. 
86

and specialty police units.18 We address the other 50,000 ANP personnel in subsequent sections. 

Methodology and assumptions 

In the international literature on security sector reform, the size of a 

police force is often reported as the number of police per 1,000 inhabitants. Thus, to determine the force size for the uniformed police 

in Afghanistan, we consider police-to-population ratios in other countries (both in the region around Afghanistan and in other postconflict countries) and review police-to-population ratios across Afghanistan today, compared to current threat levels. We also use insights that we gathered from Afghan leaders, coalition police 

advisors, and other subject matter experts in the U.S. and Afghanistan regarding the factors to consider when determining the appropriate police-to-population ratios for Afghanistan in 2015. They noted 

that geography, population density, demographics, and the nature of 

the threats facing a community also play a significant role in determining police requirements, and we take these factors into account 

in our analysis. 

Determining force sizes for the anti-crime police and special police 

units is beyond the scope of this study. Some of the requirement for 

these forces is included in police-to-population ratios, as most countries around the world have major crimes taskforces and police intelligence officers. We acknowledge, however, that Afghanistan has 

particularly large requirements for crisis response, counterinsurgency 

and counterterrorism task forces, given the significant threats facing 

Kabul, and we discuss these requirements when we address the police 

requirements in the capital. 

 

18 The AUP include community and paramilitary police working in precincts 

and districts (and their associated headquarters at the provincial and regional levels); police who are specifically designated to provide security 

in Kabul, provincial centers, and other key infrastructure such as power 

plants; and a small number of fire and rescue personnel in Kabul and 

other provincial centers. 
87

Comparable forces 

To provide perspective on the requirements for police forces, we first 

review the size of those forces in other countries. These numbers are 

somewhat difficult to compare directly, as different countries include 

different types of forces in their civilian police.19

Across the globe, the median number of police per 1,000 inhabitants 

is 3.0.20 Given the security situation in Afghanistan, one would expect 

its requirement for police to be higher than the global median. On 

the other hand, the ratio can vary dramatically even among countries 

that have recently experienced civil war and international interventions; it depends on the level of on-going criminality and violence after the international intervention, the size of the country’s army and 

other security forces, and the number of international forces remaining in the country. Table 12 gives some examples.21

 

19 For example, some countries include civil-order police, riot police, paramilitary police, and border security forces in the police force, under the 

MoI, while other countries authorize such forces under their MoD. In 

addition, contracted guards may provide fixed-site security to government buildings and infrastructure, such as government ministries, universities, and power plants. Finally, the size and composition of fire and 

rescue forces varies internationally and these personnel are not uniformly counted across international police forces. For additional discussion, 

see: Scott Chilton, Eckart Schiewek, and Tim Bremmers. Evaluation of 

the appropriate size of the Afghan National Police Force Manning List 

(Tashkiel). Report for the European Commission, Letter of Contract No 

2009/207401. Jul. 15, 2009. 

20 State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide. United Nations Report of 

the Secretary General, Twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 

Criminal Justice. Feb. 1, 2010. 

21 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building. RAND National Security Research 

Division. 2007. 
88

Table 12. Police per 1,000 inhabitants 5 years after an international intervention began 

 

Police 

per 1,000 inhabitants 

East Timor 1.5 

El Salvador 2.1 

Kosovo 2.7 

Iraq (2 years after) 3.7 

Bosnia Herzegovina 4.5 

Cambodia 5.8 

The police-to-population ratio also varies significantly among countries in central and south Asia, as shown in Table 13. There are several takeaways from these comparisons. First, India’s ratio is not the 

most useful one for estimating Afghanistan’s requirement, as India 

has one of the lowest police-to-population ratios in the world and the 

Indian government has recently acknowledged that it needs to recruit and train significant numbers of additional police to deal with 

both criminal activities and the Hindu-Muslim violence occurring in 

parts of the country.22 Second, the number of police in Iran is uncertain because the country has a large number of paramilitary and other security forces who maintain order but are not counted in this 

figure for civilian police. 

Pakistan’s ratio is the most useful for our purposes. The figure for the 

police force in Pakistan includes provincial police (who serve in the 

southern provinces), as well as frontier constabularies who serve in 

the Tribal Areas and along the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

It also includes all the federal police agencies, including the antinarcotics force, airport security forces, highway police, and the police 

intelligence bureau. It does not appear to include any fire and rescue 

personnel. 

 

22 Malavika Vyawahare. “India’s Police Force Lags Much of the World.” India 

Ink, New York Times, Jan. 16, 2013. 
89

Table 13. Police per 1,000 inhabitants in Central Asia 

 

Police 

per 1,000 inhabitants 

India23 1.3 

Iran24 2.0 

Pakistan25 3.3 

Turkmenistan26 3.3 

Kyrgyzstan27 4.2 

Tajikistan28 4.5 

Assessment 

Overall, Afghanistan currently has about 97,500 police in the AUP, 

AACP, and specialty police task forces. This yields a police-topopulation ratio of 3.1 to 1,000, which is slightly lower than the police-to-population ratio in Pakistan. As shown in Table 14, the policeto-population ratio varies regionally across Afghanistan because the 

MoI has allocated different numbers of police to each district, based 

on each district’s size and the MoI’s assessment of the threat level.29 

 

23 Ibid. and Hassan Abbas. Reforming Pakistan‘s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 

266. Feb. 11, 2011. 

24 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. The Gulf Military Forces 

in an Era of Asymmetric War: Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jun. 28, 2006. 

25 Abbas, Reforming Pakistan‘s Police.

26 “Security and Foreign Forces: Turkmenistan.” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Russia and the CIS. Nov. 2012, accessed Oct. 1, 2013, at 

https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=

Reference&ItemId=+++1303096&Pubabbrev=CIS. 

27 Chilton, Evaluation of the appropriate size of the Afghan National Police 

Force Manning List (Tashkiel). 

28 Ibid. 

29 The population of Afghanistan is uncertain, as the last official census was 

conducted in the 1970s. Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) 

provides annual population estimates for each district. The total popula-
90

Table 14. Current police-to-population ratios by region30

Region 

Population 

(millions) 

AUP, AACP, and special police 

per 1,000 inhabitants 

Capital (greater Kabul) 4.8 3.8 

North and west 13.0 2.2 

East 9.3 2.9 

South and southwest 4.0 5.9 

All Afghanistan 31.1 3.1 

Below, we calculate numbers of police needed by security tier. In total 

we assess a requirement for about 104,000 police, based on our forcesizing framework and the threats expected in each security tier. This 

corresponds to an increase of about 6,500 police (or 7 percent) from 

the current force level. Our results for this section are summarized in 

Table 15. 

 

tion of Afghanistan according to those numbers is 25.5 million. In contrast, the CIA World Factbook estimates the population at 31.1 million. 

Based on our interviews with ISAF personnel in Kabul, the higher population estimate is considered more accurate. For our analysis, therefore, 

we scaled district populations reported by the CSO by a factor of 1.22 so 

that the total population of Afghanistan matches the CIA World 

Factbook’s population. See: Afghanistan CSO. Settled population by 

provinces: 2012–2013, accessed Sep. 29, 2013 at 

http://cso.gov.af/en/page/6449; and “Afghanistan.” CIA World 

Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, accessed Aug. 22, 2013, at 

www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 

30 Table 14 is broken down by region—based on the boundaries of the ANA 

Regional Corps—rather than security tier, because the police are currently organized in district and provincial units rather than by security 

tier. Provincial-level forces, such as provincial headquarters, provincial 

response companies, and other specialty anti-crime police stationed in 

the provinces currently have jurisdiction and support operations across 

entire provinces, and it was not feasible using their current manning 

document to allocate them across tiers in the provinces that span several 

security tiers. 
91

Table 15. Summary of calculated police force sizes, by security tier 

Threat 

Tier Assessment Force size considerations 

Population 

(millions) 

Assessed 

police 

per 1,000 

population 

Calculated number of 

police 

5 

These areas will be 

largely stable, but 

will require a baseline of security forces. 

Unchanged from current average 

levels in north and west. This policeto-population ratio is well within the 

international norm for police in stable countries.

12.5 2.2 27,500 

4 

The threat level in 

Tier 4 will be higher 

than in Tier 5, as anti-government forces 

will pass through and 

stage in these areas. 

The requirement for police is only 

slightly higher than in Tier 5, as ANA 

and SOF will conduct the bulk of the 

counter-network and interdiction 

operations required in Tier 4.

3.1 2.5 7,800 

3 

On-going counterinsurgency. The ANA 

will be conducting 

up-to battalion sized 

counter-insurgency 

operations in these 

areas. 

Large numbers of police are required 

to protect communities, hold areas 

after ANA operations, and gather 

information about insurgent movements. This level of police is approximately the same as the level in the 

southern Tier 3 areas today, and is at 

the high end of police-to-population 

ratios in other countries that have 

recently faced insurgencies.

5.8 6.0 34,800 

2 

The ANSF will need 

to provide a “ring of 

steel” to 

protect Tier 1 

urban centers, but 

much of this security 

will be provided by 

the ANA. 

We size the police here at the high 

end of the range of police seen internationally. We expect Tier 2 areas 

to be stable enough that the ANA’s 

operations will be on a smaller scale 

than in Tier 3, so the police will not 

need to hold areas after battalionsized ANA operations.

2.9 3.0 8,700 

1 

(Kabul) 

Security in Kabul is 

good today, in part 

because the police 

have a large and 

visible presence 

across the city. 

Unchanged from current levels. 

Maintaining a strong police presence 

in Kabul is necessary as international 

forces withdraw. This police-topopulation ratio includes the police 

in the national headquarters and the 

specialized police task forces.

4.8 3.8 18,200 

1 

(other 

cities) 

Securing the other 

Tier 1 cities is also 

essential for security 

in 

Afghanistan as a 

whole. 

Proportional to the force structure for 

securing Kabul, minus the force 

structure for national-level 

police headquarters.

2.0 3.5 7,000 

Total 31.1 3.3 104,000 
92

We now describe our force-sizing calculation for the police in more 

detail, starting with Tier 5. 

Tier 5 (Goal: Maintain civil order) 

We assess that the number of police in Tier 5 should remain at current levels. Tier 5 areas are relatively secure today, and our threat assessment suggests they will remain relatively secure in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. These areas, therefore, need only a baseline of security 

forces. The provinces in Tier 5 currently have, on average, 2.2 police 

per 1,000 inhabitants. This ratio is within the range for stable countries around the world (i.e., between 1.0 and 3.0).31 Moreover, our interviews with subject matter experts in theater indicated that the 

number of police is roughly appropriate across the Tier 5 provinces.32

Tier 4 (Goal: Disrupt the insurgency) 

Based on our threat assessment, we conclude that the requirement 

for security and civil order forces is higher in Tier 4 areas than in Tier 

5, but not significantly higher. In our force-sizing framework, much of 

the additional requirement for security in Tier 4, compared to Tier 5, 

will be addressed by a higher level of military presence (e.g., ANA) to 

reinforce the police (as described below). Currently, there is significant variability in the ratio of police to population in Tier 4 areas; 

from around 2 per 1,000 inhabitants in the eastern parts of Tier 4 

(including Kapisa, Ghazni, Laghman, and Nangarhar provinces), to 

around 6 per 1,000 inhabitants in the southern parts (including Paktika, Uruzgan, and Zabul provinces). The high numbers of police in 

the southern provinces are likely due to the fact that these areas have 

seen insurgent activity and high levels of U.S. and NATO operations 

over the past several years. The MoI, therefore, likely considered 

these areas to have high threat levels—and thus high police requirements—when it last allocated police across the country. In 2015 to 

2018, however, we assess a reduced need for police forces across Tier 

 

31 State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide. United Nations Report of 

the Secretary General, Twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 

Criminal Justice. Feb. 1, 2010. 

32 Author interviews in RC–North and RC–West and with police advisors. Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. Aug 12–24, 2013, and Sep. 2013. 
93

4, since our threat assessment identifies these areas as being of lower 

priority for the insurgency. 

Tier 3 (Goal: Disrupt the insurgency) 

Our threat assessment concludes that Tier 3 areas will contain active 

insurgent threats. Given the operational goal of disrupting these 

threats in Tier 3 areas, we assess that the police will continue to require significant force structure there. The ANA will be conducting 

up to battalion-sized operations in Tier 3, and the police will need to 

protect communities from insurgents and hold ground after ANA 

clearing operations. 

Today, the police in parts of southern Afghanistan accomplish this 

mission by manning a large number of small posts and checkpoints 

along roads and in rural villages. Several cultural advisors and Afghan 

police leaders told us that this distributed and visible security presence is an essential part of the police’s ability to build public confidence and demonstrate the government’s ability to secure the 

countryside.33 This approach necessitates large numbers of police. 

Currently, the ratio of police is just over 6 per 1,000 inhabitants in 

Helmand and Kandahar provinces. This ratio of police to population 

is on the high side of ratios worldwide and also on the high end of ratios for countries that have recently experienced international interventions (see Table 12). 

Our interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan personnel in theater 

made clear that AUP and ANA commanders desire additional police 

in southern Afghanistan. Today, the ANA maintain a number of small 

outposts in southern Afghanistan, which reduces the ANA’s ability to 

mass forces to conduct offensive counterinsurgency operations. ANA 

commanders, therefore, would like to transition some of these 

checkpoints to the AUP. U.S. and NATO advisors told us, however, 

that while a few specific areas in Helmand and Kandahar could use 

an additional police presence, the overall number of police author-

 

33 Author interviews with personnel from RC–South and RC–Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 12-20, 2013; and Catherine E. Norman. What do Afghans want from the police? Views from Helmand Province. CNA 

Research Memorandum D0026181.A2. Jan. 2012. 
94

ized for southern and southeastern Afghanistan is appropriate. ISAF 

personnel also indicated that the AUP in southern and southwestern 

Afghanistan have excess capacity in some districts that they could redistribute to areas with limited police presence. The AUP could also 

increase its on-duty manpower in southern Afghanistan by reducing 

the number of “ghost police” on the payroll (i.e., people who are 

drawing a paycheck while not actually working). 

In contrast, we assess that the police could use additional force structure in the Tier 3 areas of eastern Afghanistan. While the operational 

goal of disrupting the insurgency is the same in eastern and southern 

Tier 3 areas, the nature of the insurgent threat is different. The 

threat in the east largely stems from the Haqqani network. The 

Haqqanis are not as interested in taking, holding, and administering 

populated areas as the Taliban are in the south; rather, they run network operations to target cities such as Kabul with high profile attacks 

and assassinations. 

As a result, we assess that the ANSF in eastern Afghanistan should 

transition from a counterinsurgency to a counter-network approach. 

This means that the ANSF require fewer ANA to conduct battalionsized operations in the remote areas of Tier 3, but need more SOF 

operations to disrupt insurgent networks and more police to secure 

communities and gather information on insurgent movements. Tier 

3 areas in eastern Afghanistan currently have about 4 police per 1,000 

inhabitants. To provide sufficient force structure to disrupt insurgent 

threats in the east using a counter-network approach, we increase the 

police-to-population ratio in eastern Afghanistan so that it is consistent across the Tier 3 areas.34

Tier 2 (Goal: Neutralize the insurgency) 

Tier 2 areas are intended to act as a “ring of steel” to protect the major population centers in Tier 1. To address this, we will later articulate a requirement for significant ANA force structure in Tier 2 areas. 

Based on our threat assessment, however, we anticipate that ANA op-

 

34 This force-sizing factor results in an increase of about 9,000 police in the 

Tier 3 areas of eastern Afghanistan—from about 17,500 to 26,500. The 

population of these areas is about 4.4 million. 
95

erations in Tier 2 areas will be smaller in scale and more focused on 

deterrence than the battalion-sized clearing operations we expect in 

Tier 3. The police in the rural parts of Tier 2, therefore, do not require high levels of force structure to hold areas after ANA clearing 

operations, as they do in Tier 3. Instead, we assess that Tier 2 areas 

should have a police-to-population ratio of 3 per 1,000 inhabitants, so 

they can provide security and civil order within the rural communities of Tier 2 areas. This ratio is at the high end of the international 

range for stable countries.35

Although the police currently provide some checkpoint security on 

Highway 1, the force requirement for securing roads does not depend on the number of people living near them. Therefore, we address the need to secure the roads designated as Tier 2 below. 

Tier 1 

Kabul currently has a strong and very visible police presence, and we 

assess that it should maintain this force structure in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. Maintaining security in Kabul is essential to maintaining 

stability in Afghanistan, so the police must be able to deter and prevent attacks in the capital, as well as successfully respond to and investigate the attacks that will inevitably occur. 

Today, the police force in Kabul includes the headquarters of the 

ANP, as well as the bulk of the personnel in the counterterrorism and 

other special police task forces. Kabul also has thousands of traffic 

police, who stand on nearly every major street corner and in every 

 

35 Internationally, the police-to-population ratio ranges from about 1 to 3 

per 1,000 inhabitants in stable countries. Tier 2 areas in eastern Afghanistan have approximately 3 police per 1,000 inhabitants today, while Tier 

2 areas in southern Afghanistan have about 6 per 1,000 inhabitants. The 

MoI sized police forces in southern Afghanistan based on high threat 

levels in 2010–2011, when ISAF and the ANA were conducting active 

counterinsurgency operations in central Helmand and Kandahar. Even 

today, counterinsurgency operations have been largely pushed out to the 

outlying parts of those provinces (which are Tier 3). As a result, we assess 

that a gradual reduction in police numbers in central Helmand and 

Kandahar is appropriate. State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide. U.N. Report of the Secretary General. 
96

traffic circle, as well as police who guard government ministries, embassies, and other government infrastructure. Based on our interviews with international police advisors, the AUP in Kabul may have 

more traffic cops and infrastructure security guards than are required 

to maintain order and security, especially if some of those functions 

could be transferred to other organizations such as the Afghan Public 

Protection Force. 

On the other hand, the total number of police in Kabul is well within 

international norms for a city of its size. A recent examination of major metropolitan areas in the United States noted that its cities have 

an average of 4.1 police per 1,000 inhabitants (compared to 3.8 in 

Kabul).36 Of course, the metropolitan police in American cities have a 

different role than the police in Kabul—they spend much less effort 

on guarding buildings and directing traffic and much more on criminal investigations. As the security situation evolves in Afghanistan 

and police training increases, the MoI’s 10-year vision for the ANP includes the idea that some police force structure may be transitioned 

from guarding streets and buildings to practicing community policing and law enforcement. The MoI expects this transition to take several years, and we assess that the number of police conducting 

criminal investigations in Kabul is unlikely to increase significantly 

during the timeframe of this study.37 

In addition to keeping the number of police constant in Kabul, we 

use the number of police there as a benchmark to size the police in 

the other urban areas of Afghanistan. The other Tier 1 cites have a 

similar need for a highly visible police presence, but they do not require the force structure for the national police headquarters which 

is located in Kabul. If we were to subtract the police who serve in the 

national police headquarters and the police specifically designated to 

protect national-level infrastructure (such as ministerial buildings 

 

36 John J. McGrath. Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency 

Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007. 

37 As discussed in the sections on ANA SOF and the AAF, the ANSF’s ability 

to recruit and train additional personnel with specialized skills is hindered by the limited pool of qualified recruits and the limited time remaining before 2015 to train personnel in multi-year university-level 

programs in areas such as intelligence-led policing and forensics. 
97

and embassies) the police-to-population ratio in Kabul would be 3.5 

to 1,000. We assess, therefore, that the other Tier 1 urban areas 

should have this level of police. 

In summary, we assess a requirement for about 104,000 Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, and Special Police Units 

which results in an increase of 6,500 police over the 97,500 police authorized today (Table 15). This force structure yields an overall ratio 

of 3.3 police per 1,000 inhabitants for Afghanistan—about the same 

as the police-to-population ratio in Pakistan. 

Sensitivity analysis 

One advantage of our approach is that our force-sizing framework 

can be easily adjusted based on different conclusions about the threat 

or appropriate police-to-population ratios. To illustrate the sensitivity 

of our results to the planning factors we used in our calculations, we 

undertook several excursions: 

 Make the cities the same. We used a slightly lower police-topopulation ratio in the cities other than Kabul (3.5 relative to 

3.8 for Kabul), arguing that figures for Kabul included national-level headquarters not needed in the other cities. If the ratio 

for Kabul was simply used for the other cities as well, it would 

result in an increase of 600 police (or 0.5 percent). 

 Strengthen the “ring of steel.” Increasing the police-to-population 

ratio in all of the Tier 1 and 2 areas so that it matches the current ratio in Kabul would increase the total police force by 

about 3,000 (or 3 percent). 

 Further strengthen the “ring of steel.” Increasing the police-topopulation ratio in Tier 2 areas so that it matches the highest 

ratio anywhere (i.e., the level of police in Tier 3), would increase the overall police force by about 8,700 (or 8 percent). 

 Leave the east alone. In our discussion of police in Tier 3 areas, 

we argued that the level of police should be increased in these 

areas in eastern Afghanistan, such that the police would have a 

greater presence and be able to gather more information on 

insurgent networks operating in these remote areas. If instead 

the police-to-population ratio was left at current levels, the 
98

overall police force size would decrease by about 8,800 (or 8 

percent). 

 Standardize Tiers 4 and 5: Taking the threat in Tier 4 (insurgent 

transit and support zones) to be only marginally higher than in 

Tier 5 (civil order areas), and using the Tier 5 police-topopulation ratio for both areas would result in a net decrease 

of about 1,000 police (or 1 percent). 

These excursions are summarized in Table 16. 

Table 16. Sensitivity analysis of police-to-population ratios (police per 1,000 inhabitants) 

Tier affected 

Police-topopulation 

planning factor 

in our analysis 

Adjusted policeto-population 

planning factor 

Total 

adjusted 

force size 

Change in 

total force 

size 

Percent 

change 

Tier 1 areas 

(other than Kabul) 

3.5 3.8 (same as Kabul) 104,600 600 0.5 

All Tier 1 and Tier 

2 areas (other 

than Kabul) 

3.0 and 3.5 3.8 (same as Kabul) 106,900 2,900 3 

Tier 2 areas 3.0 6.0 (same as Tier 3) 112,700 8,700 8 

Tier 3 areas in 

eastern Afghanistan 

6.0 4.0 (same as current 

police levels) 

95,200 (8,800) (8) 

Tier 4 areas 2.5 2.2 (same as Tier 5) 103,000 (1,000) (1) 

In much of Afghanistan, the role of the police is likely to evolve from 

paramilitary to community policing over the next decade or more. In 

addition, the MoI may choose to adjust the skill sets of the police 

force, so that it consists of fewer traffic police and more highly 

trained specialists serving on criminal task forces. However, we do not 

see a need to significantly increase or decrease the number of police 

to accommodate these changing roles and missions in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. In particular, we see an on-going requirement for large 

numbers of paramilitary-style police to provide a large and visible 

presence across the Tier 3 areas that face on-going insurgent threats. 

Afghan Local Police 

Currently, ALP “Guardians” are located in villages across Afghanistan, 

including in the north and west. We assess that threat levels will re-
99

main low in the north and west, and that the ALP there could be 

transitioned to the AUP. We assess, however, that the conditions that 

gave rise to the need for the ALP program (e.g., a need to protect rural communities in higher-threat areas from insurgent intimidation) 

are likely to persist in the outlying and contested villages of Tier 3 areas in the 2015–2018 timeframe. The original planning factor for the 

ALP was to have no more than 300 Guardians per district.38 Using 

that planning factor for each of the 97 districts in Tier 3 yields a total 

ALP force size of 29,100. This figure is nearly identical to the MoI’s 

long-range plan for 30,000 ALP across Afghanistan, though concentrating these forces in Tier 3 areas would make better use of them 

against the insurgent threat. 

Afghan Customs and Border Police 

Internationally, the border security mission involves preventing the illegal movement of weapons, contraband, and people while enabling 

legal border crossings. This mission has two parts. The blue (or police-type) border mission is to provide security and collect customs 

revenue at border crossing points and airports. This mission includes 

immigration screening, personnel searches, and cargo inspections. 

The green (or paramilitary) border security mission is to provide security and interdict illegal activity in the zone around the border. It 

includes interdicting potential insurgents or terrorists who may have 

illegally crossed the border, stopping vehicles with IED components 

or weapons, and preventing the export of illegal drugs and other illicit goods. Current international practice is for the blue border security 

mission to be conducted at specific points of entry, while the green 

 

38 Currently, most districts with ALP have at most 300 Guardians. This number, like the current 30,000 end-strength cap on the ALP, was not analytically derived. Rather, it was the result of a political negotiation between 

U.S. officials who saw value in the program and Afghan officials who 

feared that the ALP might become large, armed militias for local warlords. Author’s interview with personnel from the American Academy of 

Diplomacy, Aug. 2013. 
100

border security mission is conducted in a zone along the border (rather than at specific posts on the border itself).39

The ANP currently has two components that conduct the border security mission: the Afghan Border Police, who are split into blue and 

green missions; and the Afghan Customs Police, who are responsible 

for collecting duties at border crossing points and airports. As shown 

in Table 17, about two-thirds of the ABP perform the green border 

security mission by guarding the 50-kilometer (km) zone around the 

border. Some of these ABP guard the border from posts along the 

border itself, while others maintain checkpoints along roads emanating from the border. 

Table 17. Current ANSF border and customs security forces, by type 

Type of border security force Number of forces 

ABP headquarters staff 4,000 

ABP at airports and border crossing points 3,700 

Afghan Customs Police 700 

"Green" ABP battalions 15,500 

Total border and customs police 23,900 

Having reviewed the forces conducting the blue border security mission at border crossings and airports, we conclude that the force level 

for this mission is appropriate now and will continue to be appropriate in the 2015–2018 timeframe. First, we do not foresee a significant 

increase in the number of official border crossings or airports in Afghanistan before 2018. In addition, the MoI determined the staffing 

requirements for the border crossings and airports in consultation 

with international experts on border crossings and airport security, 

and, during our review of international reporting on the ANSF and 

our interviews with Afghans and international advisors, we did not 

hear any arguments that ABP staffing levels at border crossing points 

and airports are inappropriate. Moreover, the relatively small numbers of police currently working at border crossing points and airports have a role of great importance to the Afghan government: the 

 

39 Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and 

Advise the Afghan Border Police. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector 

General DODIG-2013-081. May 24, 2013. 
101

collection of customs duties makes up a significant fraction of the 

government’s overall revenue generation.40 It therefore seems likely 

the MoI is already resourcing the security of official border crossings 

and customs collection missions at reasonable levels. 

Methodology and assumptions 

Taking the number of ABP conducting the blue border security mission as constant, we determined the force requirements for the green 

border security mission by examining the security tiers that the border zone falls into, the countries on the other side of Afghanistan’s 

border, and the geography in the border zone itself. We examined 

the current size of the ABP on each of Afghanistan’s borders, gathered subject matter experts’ opinions on whether the current force 

size is appropriate, and developed logical arguments for sizing the 

border security mission based on current force levels, current capabilities of these forces, and expected threats in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. 

Assessment41

As shown in Table 18, the MoI has already differentially apportioned 

the ABP along its borders based on the neighboring country, perceived threats, and geography.42

 

40 “According to Afghan Ministry of Finance data, this revenue accounted 

for nearly 50 percent of Afghan domestic revenue in Solar Year 1390, the 

latest year for which data were available.” Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police. DoD Inspector General. 

41 We attempted to look at comparable border police forces in Afghanistan’s 

neighboring countries, but concluded that the available data on these 

forces exhibit too much variation and are subject to too many caveats to 

be of much help in sizing the ABP. 

42 Author interview with former ABP advisor. Washington, D.C. Sep. 24, 

2013. 
102

Table 18. Afghan Border Police, by adjacent country 

 Length of border

Current number of 

ABP authorized 

ABP per 

50 sq km 

Pakistan 2,430 10,900 4.5 

Other borders 3,023 4,600 1.5 

Iran 936 1,700 1.8 

Uzbekistan 137 150 1.3 

Tajikistan 1,206 1,150 1.0 

Turkmenistan 744 1,600 2.1 

Total ABP 5,453 15,500 2.9 

We calculate the size of the ABP by security tier below, but overall we 

assess a need for about 27,300 ABP, which corresponds to an increase 

of 3,400 police (or 15 percent) from the current force level (Table 

19). We hold the number of forces conducting the blue border security mission constant and add 2,800 additional forces to the green 

border security mission. Given the magnitude of this increase, we assess that the national ABP headquarters may require additional personnel. Currently, the national and regional headquarters are about 

17 percent of the total ABP force. To maintain this staffing level, we 

increase the number of personnel at the ABP headquarters by 600. 
103

Table 19. Summary of calculated Afghan Border Police forces, by tier 

Region Assessment 

Force sizing 

considerations 

ABP 

authorized 

Number 

of ABP 

forces 

calculated 

Net 

additional 

ABP 

forces 

Green border police 15,500 18,300 2,800 

North and 

west 

Threat expected to remain low 

to moderate. Afghan and ISAF 

advisors assess that the borders 

have some gaps in security 

Increase border police 

operating north of 

Mazar-e Sharif, near the 

border with Uzbekistan 

 4,600 4,800 200 

Tier 5 areas 

on Pakistan 

border 

Threat expected to remain low. 

Remote and difficult terrain 

Maintain current ABP 

force levels 

600 600 0 

Southeast 

border with 

Pakistan 

Threat expected to remain moderate. Current force levels—with 

assistance from SOF—can disrupt cross-border threats 

Maintain current ABP 

force levels 

5,000 5,000 0 

Northeast 

border with 

Pakistan 

Threat of cross-border infiltration is significant and the forces 

currently providing border security are insufficient to overmatch 

the threats, even with current 

levels of SOF assistance 

Increase ABP force 

levels by 50% 

5,300 7,900 2,600 

Blue Border Police

The number of police securing 

border crossings and airports 

and collecting customs duties is 

largely appropriate 

Maintain current force 

levels 

4,400 4,400 0 

ABP headquarters 

Administrative requirements for 

the larger green border security 

force require additional personnel at the national ABP headquarters 

Maintain the ABP headquarters’ proportion to 

total ABP force size 

4,000 4,600 600 

Total 23,900 27,300 3,400 

Tier 5 (Goal: Maintain civil order) 

We now consider the requirements for border security forces by security tier, starting with Tier 5. This tier includes the entire length of the 

borders with Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. There is 

some threat of insurgent or terrorist smuggling and trafficking along 

Afghanistan’s northern and western borders, but the threats facing 

the ANSF in these areas are relatively low. Based on our interviews in 

theater, we assess that the current level of border police along these 
104

borders is generally appropriate, although we recognize a need for 

some additional border police north of Mazar-e Sharif.43 The force 

structure along the border with Uzbekistan (due north of Mazar-e 

Sharif) is relatively low, compared to other areas of the northern and 

western borders, and cross-border traffic is expected to increase over 

the next few years with the construction of an additional railroad line 

heading north from Mazar-e Sharif.44 By increasing the number of 

border police by about 200, the number of police in the border zone 

north of Mazar-e Sharif will be on par with the average number in the 

border zone with Turkmenistan. That border zone has a higher ratio 

of border police per area than any other area in northern or western 

Afghanistan.45

The number of ABP operating in the zones that border Pakistan varies by region today, as shown in Table 20.46 These areas (the far 

northeastern and southeastern segments of the Afghanistan–Pakistan 

border) have a relatively low ABP presence compared to other areas 

of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, in large part due to the difficulty 

of operating in—or moving through—these remote areas. Our interviews in theater did not identify any reasons why the number of border police in these areas should be increased (or decreased).47 We 

 

43 Author interviews in RC–West and RC–North. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 

2013. 

44 “Afghan Province Upset At Being Left Out Of Touted Rail Network.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Free Afghanistan, Jul. 31, 2013, 

accessed Oct. 11, 2013, at www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-railwayplanned-route--shir-khan-bandar/25062586.html. 

45 Although the average number of ABP along the border with Tajikistan 

appears relatively low, much of this border is nearly impassible—it crosses mountains that are over 3,000 meters (10,000 feet). We assess that the 

number of border police operating in the lower elevations of this border 

zone is appropriate. 

46 This table shows combined figures for the ABP for Paktiya/Khost and 

Zabul/Kandahar because Paktiya and Zabul have very short borders with 

Pakistan and the ABP battalions that serve in those provinces also have 

jurisdiction in Khost or Kandahar. 

47 Author interviews in RC–East and RC–Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–

24, 2013. 
105

therefore assess that the level of ABP in the Tier 5 areas of the border 

with Pakistan is largely appropriate and should remain constant. 

Table 20. Current Afghan Border Police on the border with Pakistan, by province 

Region Province 

Security 

tier 

Length of border 

with Pakistan (km) 

ABP on border 

with Pakistan 

ABP per 

50 sq km 

Northeast Badakhshan 5 416 250 0.6

East 683 5,300 7.7

 Khost and Paktiya 3 226 1,800 7.8

 Kunar 3 162 1,300 8.1

 Nangarhar 3 201 1,800 8.8

 Nuristan 3 94 400 4.7

South 1,331 5,350 4.0

 Helmand 4 and 5 207 1,200 5.9

 Kandahar and Zabul 3 and 4 586 2,200 3.8

 Nimruz 5 177 350 2.0

 Paktika 4 361 1,600 4.4

Entire border with Pakistan 2,430 10,900 4.5

Tiers 3 and 4 (Goal: Disrupt the insurgency) 

Likewise, we assess that the number of ABP in the Tier 3 and Tier 4 

areas along the southeastern border with Pakistan should remain 

constant. ABP commanders in Kandahar and Helmand have expressed a desire for additional personnel in these provinces, but ISAF 

personnel told us that stationing ABP farther south along the actual 

border with Pakistan is infeasible, even in the 2015–2018 timeframe.48

U.S. and NATO advisors also estimated that the number of ABP actually on hand in southern Afghanistan is substantially lower than the 

 

48 In Helmand and southern Kandahar, the actual border with Pakistan 

passes through remote, unpopulated areas of high desert. The ABP, 

therefore, have a string of outposts a significant distance inside the border, from which they patrol and conduct interdiction operations. The 

ABP would face substantial logistical challenges to construct and operate 

border posts along the actual border in this region. We assess that the 

ABP will continue operating as they do today in the 2015–2018 

timeframe, and so do not provide additional force structure for additional border posts along this segment of the border. Interviews at RC–

South and RC–Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 12-20, 2013. 
106

number allocated in the official manning document.49 Thus, actually 

stationing the number of border police authorized in southern Helmand and Kandahar would result in a significant increase in the size 

of the operating force and could allow the ABP to close some currently identified holes in border security. 

The requirement for border security operations in the Tier 3 portions of the border in northeastern Afghanistan is more substantial, 

in part because of the insurgent networks that operate in these areas. 

These networks have demonstrated their intent and capability to 

move people, weapons, and other contraband across the border with 

Pakistan. Senior MoI officials have told international personnel that 

the size of the ABP should be doubled due to these threats. They say 

they would like to have a 1-to-1 ratio of Afghan to Pakistani border 

guards along the entirety of this border.50 The precise number of 

staffed border posts on both sides of the border is uncertain, though 

the number on the Afghan side is indisputably lower.51 

That said, we agree with international advisors who argue that there 

is limited value in attempting to cover the border with substantially 

more border posts. The terrain in eastern Afghanistan is difficult and 

mountainous. Most of the legal and illegal border crossings occur 

along passes or river valleys, and the most commonly traversed of 

these passes already have border posts and checkpoints. Given this 

terrain, we assess that establishing significantly more border posts 

would have diminishing returns. We assess that border security would 

be conducted more effectively through mobile interdiction operations. Some parts of this mobile interdiction mission are now and will 

 

49 This is the Solar Year 1392 tashkiel. Interviews at RC–South and RC–

Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 2013. 

50 Author interviews. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013; and Assessment 

of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise 

the Afghan Border Police. DoD Inspector General. 

51 ISAF personnel examined satellite imagery of the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border and estimated that the Pakistani side had approximately 1.5 to 2 

times as many border posts as Afghanistan was planning at that time. 

The number of border posts on the Pakistani side is uncertain, however, 

as some are only manned seasonally, and some buildings are intended to 

be used only temporarily, in times of high threat. 
107

continue to be conducted by ANA SOF (as discussed in more detail 

below), but we believe that some parts are also appropriate for the 

ABP. 

The ABP battalions in eastern Afghanistan, however, have limited capability to conduct mobile operations, as most of their forces are currently fixed at border posts and checkpoints along roads. While it 

may be possible to redistribute some ABP personnel from fixed 

checkpoints to a more mobile border defense mission, we assess that 

the ABP are unlikely to reduce the number of border posts along this 

key stretch of the border by the 2015–2018 timeframe, as they actually would like to increase the number of border posts to match the 

number on the Pakistani side of the border. 

We assess, therefore, that the number of ABP in the Tier 3 border areas of northeastern Afghanistan should be increased by 50 percent. 

We chose this factor because it strikes a balance between the argument that the ABP force size must be doubled to enable the construction of significantly more border posts (with the goal of matching 

Pakistani construction) and the more modest argument that the border security forces require more checkpoints in key areas, as well as a 

robust and mobile quick-reaction capability. Note that we do not increase the ABP force structure in these areas in isolation. The ANA 

will need to reinforce, resupply, and provide casualty evacuation 

(CASEVAC) for the ABP, particularly in remote mountainous areas. 

We therefore provide the ANA with substantial force structure in Tier 

3 areas as described later in the report. 

Sensitivity analysis 

The planning factor that most drives the increase in ABP force structure is the increased requirement for border police along the northeastern border with Pakistan. We assessed a requirement to increase 

this force structure by 50 percent. If the force structure along that 

segment of the border should be doubled, as the MoI desires, then 

the total number of ABP needed would increase by another 2,600 

personnel (for a total of 29,900 ABP). 

Afghan National Civil Order Police 

The ANCOP are a national police force akin to a gendarmerie (a military force with police duties among civilian populations). Our inter-
108

views in theater and our own observations suggest that the ANCOP 

currently perform a role that is duplicative of the uniformed police 

and army. As a result, we do not see a requirement for the ANCOP 

within the set of missions that comprise our force sizing framework, 

and have thus zeroed out this force in our calculations. That said, 

discussions with U.S. and NATO personnel in theater highlighted a 

view that—despite their duplication of army and police capabilities—

the ANCOP are a very effective counterinsurgency force in practice. 

Additionally, we recognize that the Afghan government could keep 

the ANCOP if it desired. Thus, while we do not find a requirement 

for the ANCOP within our force-sizing framework, we acknowledge 

that further analysis of this point is likely warranted. If such analysis 

determined that the ANCOP should be kept, doing so would require 

an increase to the overall end-strength of the ANSF beyond what we 

calculate. 

Afghan National Police support forces 

The current manning document for the ANP includes about 3,200 

personnel who provide logistical, medical, and other support. Some 

of these billets could likely be civilianized, but given the importance 

of logistics and medical support to overall police operations, and our 

recommendation of an only slightly-larger police force overall, we 

conclude that the number of these personnel should remain unchanged from current levels. 

Afghan National Army combat battalions 

In this section, we focus on sizing the army’s general purpose forces 

(we address the other elements of the ANA, such as the air force and 

SOF, separately below). Based on our threat assessment, we expect 

the ANA’s operations to vary by security tier, but in general, the 

ANA’s mission set includes battalion-sized operations to clear insurgent-held areas; interdicting insurgents, weapons, or other contraband materials; maintaining security checkpoints on key roads used 

to transport insurgent personnel and materiel; providing presence 

patrols and deterrence around key urban areas that may face significant insurgent threats; and reinforcing police forces when they face 

more serious insurgent threats than they are equipped to handle. 
109

Methodology and assumptions 

Following the same format we used for the AUP and ABP, we consider force requirements for the ANA by security tier. We focus our calculations at the level of infantry battalions (kandaks). This level of 

detail strikes a balance between the overly general brigade level 

(which would not allow sufficient flexibility to differentiate between 

the requirements of different regions and threat areas) and an overly 

detailed analysis beyond the scope of this study. 

For each security tier, we considered several analytical approaches. 

Many of these approaches rely on planning factors, rules-of-thumb, 

or subject matter expertise, and any one of these arguments, if used 

by itself, might lead to questionable results. Thus, we considered several methodologies for determining the force requirements in each 

tier and then compared the results to see where and why they converged or diverged. In the latter case, we used an understanding of 

the divergence to make a judgment as to which planning factor to 

use. 

We focused on determining the number of battalions based on the 

size of the battalion’s area of operations. This approach captures the 

ANA’s basic mission requirement—to conduct up to battalion-sized 

counterinsurgency operations in Tier 3 and 4 areas and to have sufficient forces to provide timely reinforcement to police throughout the 

country. Many other analyses have used the number of counterinsurgents required per population as a planning factor for army forces. At 

the end of this section, we will compare our results to those attained 

by using this approach. 

Requirement for combat battalions 

Today, the number of ANA battalions varies by region, depending on 

the region’s size and the level of threat present. For reference, Table 

21 lists the number of battalions in each region today, as well as the 

number of battalions per population and the average size of the areas 

of operation of the battalions in each region.52

 

52 The number of battalions is shown by region rather than by security tier 

because the ANA force laydown is currently by region. Some units are 
110

Table 21. ANA battalions by region, per population, and per area 

Region Corps 

Number of 

battalions 

Population 

(millions) 

Battalions /

 million 

inhabitants 

Area 

(sq. km) 

 Average 

sq. km / 

battalion 

North 207th 12 8.9 1.3 165,000 13,750 

West 209th 12 4.1 2.9 160,000 13,300 

South/southwest 205th & 215th 30 4.0 7.5 200,000 6,700 

East 201st & 203rd 33 9.3 3.5 120,000 3,600 

Kabul 111th Division 8 4.8 1.7 5,000 625 

All Afghanistan 95 31.1 3.1 650,000 6,800 

We calculate the requirement for ANA forces by security tier below, 

but overall we assess that the army requires 81 combat battalions, as 

summarized in Table 22. This represents a reduction of 14 infantry 

battalions (or 15 percent) relative to the ANA today. 

Table 22. Summary of recommendations for ANA infantry battalions, by tier 

Area description ANA mission 

Recommended

force level 

(battalions) 

Tier 5 areas that currently have no ANA battalions (Bamyan, Panjshir, 

Parwan, and Daykundi) 

None. (Police and SOF can continue to maintain 

security and disrupt insurgents passing through these 

areas, when needed) 

No ANA 

battalions 

Other Tier 5 areas Deterrence and occasional reinforcement for police 7 

Tier 4 Deterrence and ability to simultaneously conduct one 

battalion-sized clearing operation and reinforce one 

district center per province 

20 

Rural areas in the south 

(Tiers 2 and 3) 

Disrupt the insurgency and prevent it from threatening 

Tier 1 and 2 areas 

12 

Rural areas in the east 

(Tiers 2 and 3) 

Support SOF, reinforce police, and conduct 

operations to counter networks in eastern Afghanistan 

11 

Major roads in Tier 2 Security, checkpoints, and patrols along major roads 7 

 

headquartered near Tier 1 and 2 cities, but operate across areas we have 

designated as Tiers 2 through 5. 
111

Table 22. Summary of recommendations for ANA infantry battalions, by tier 

Area description ANA mission 

Recommended

force level 

(battalions) 

Kabul Security around Kabul, with a “ring of steel” of 

checkpoints and the ability to conduct patrols and 

operations in rural areas around the city, as needed 

8 

Other major cities Security around other major cities 16 

Total requirement 81

We now describe our assessments of the force requirements for ANA 

general purpose force battalions, by security tier. 

Tier 5 (Goal: Maintain civil order) 

Within our security tier construct, we defined Tier 5 as areas the insurgency is not able to penetrate, due to unfavorable local conditions. In these areas, the threats are localized, criminal, and at a low 

enough level that they can be largely handled by the police and border police discussed earlier. Four Tier 5 provinces (Bamyan, Daykundi, Panjshir, and Parwan) currently do not have any permanent ANA 

presence. For the reasons given above, we see no need to add ANA to 

these areas. ANA brigades stationed in adjacent provinces should be 

able to conduct short-duration operations in these areas to counter 

specific threats, if needed. 

We assess, however, that the rest of the Tier 5 areas will continue to 

require some ANA forces in the 2015–2018 timeframe to deter insurgent threats from within Afghanistan, as well as from any potentially 

violent actors located in neighboring countries. The ANA will likely 

also provide occasional reinforcement to the police, particularly in 

provincial or district centers.53 Given the low overall threat level in 

these areas, however, we assess that the likelihood of several simultaneous and coordinated attacks in Tier 5 is low. 

 

53 Over the past few years, the Tier 5 areas have seen some violent activity, 

such as the recent attack on the capital of Badakhshan province that left 

18 police officers dead. “Afghanistan militants kill 18 police in Badakhshan.” BBC News, Sep. 20, 2013. 
112

We determine the force structure requirement for ANA in Tier 5 

based on the area in which a battalion can provide reasonable response times to district centers or outlying police checkpoints. According to our interviews with U.S. and NATO personnel in theater, 

the ANA do not expect to provide reinforcement to outlying district 

centers or police posts during an attack. Today, most firefights are 

over too quickly for the ANA to reach the scene in time. In cases 

where police have abandoned outposts in the face of an insurgent attack, the ANA often take a day or two to plan and gather forces, and 

then set out to reestablish government control over the area. Given 

the limited nature of the threats in Tier 5 areas, we assess that this 

timeline of operations will continue to be appropriate in the 2015–

2018 timeframe. 

We calculate that the ANA requires between five and nine battalions 

to reach all areas that may require reinforcement (such as district 

centers and other important villages) within a day’s travel from the 

battalion headquarters.54 This calculation also yields an area of opera-

 

54 This calculation is based on the following considerations. First, we note 

that the ANA have limited ability to operate at night, so we assume they 

will need to reach everywhere within their area of operations within 6 

hours. This time frame allows them to leave their battalion headquarters 

in the morning and have several hours to establish their position before 

nightfall. We also assume that ANA vehicles can travel at an average 

speed of 40 kilometers per hour (25 miles per hour) between their 

headquarters and a site requiring reinforcement. We selected this travel 

speed because we assume that the vehicles will be traveling primarily on 

unpaved roads once they leave the vicinity of a provincial center, but that 

the threat of IEDs in these Tier 5 areas will be low. The ANA should only 

need to conduct counter-IED route clearance in the vicinity of an overrun checkpoint or contested village. 

Given these planning factors, a battalion should be able to reach all the 

areas requiring reinforcement within 240 kilometers from the battalion 

headquarters. Based on a review of the road network in northern and 

western Afghanistan (using imagery from Google Earth) some district 

centers are connected to their provincial centers via relatively straight 

roads. For others, it is not uncommon to travel 1.5 to 2 times farther 

than the crow flies. Assuming the roads are so indirect that battalions 

must travel twice as far as the crow flies to reach a district center, the radius of an average battalion’s area of operations should be no larger 

than 120 kilometers, which yields an average area of operation for each 
113

tions for each battalion that is about three times larger than that used 

today. 

To determine the appropriate number of battalions within this range, 

we considered the political geography of northern and western Afghanistan. Aligning ANA operational boundaries with provincial 

boundaries is desirable, as this enables better communications with 

the police and provincial governments. Currently, the ANA have one 

battalion assigned to most provinces in northern Afghanistan and 

three or four assigned to the higher threat and larger provinces of 

Herat and Farah in western Afghanistan. Calculating the requirement 

based on political geography—and assuming that each battalion can 

cover about three times as much area as today—we find that the ANA 

would require seven battalions in the Tier 5 areas: three battalions in 

the nine provinces in northern Afghanistan, three battalions in the 

four provinces in western Afghanistan,55 and one battalion in Nimruz. 

Tier 4 (Goal: Disrupt the insurgency) 

Within our force-sizing framework, the ANA in Tier 4 areas will perform the following missions: deterrence; support to SOF operations 

to disrupt insurgent movements; reinforcement of the police and district centers; and clearing or cordon-and-search operations, as needed. 

Given the results of our threat assessment and this set of missions, we 

assess that the ANA in Tier 4 will need the ability to simultaneously 

conduct one battalion-sized clearing operation or reinforce one district center per province. To ensure that one battalion’s worth of 

forces is always available for operations in each province, we assess 

that the ANA requires three battalions per province—since some 

forces are always away on leave or in training. In addition, ANA forces 

 

battalion of about 45,000 square kilometers. Given the overall area of 

Tier 5, this set of planning factors yields a requirement for about 9 ANA 

battalions in Tier 5. If the roads are sufficiently direct that the ANA only 

needs to travel 1.5 times further than the crow flies, then the ANA would 

require only 5 battalions to cover the Tier 5 areas. 

55 We allocate one battalion for Baghdis and Ghor provinces because most 

of Ghor province is part of the Hazarajat region of Afghanistan and, like 

neighboring Bamyan and Day Kundi, has no ANA presence today. 
114

in Tier 4 areas are currently spread thin with a few soldiers stationed 

in many small outposts across the region. ANA commanders and U.S. 

and NATO advisors told us that the ANA intend to consolidate their 

forces into larger positions over the next few years, as they are able to 

hand security responsibilities for more areas to the police. We assess, 

however, that it is unrealistic to assume that the ANA will close all of 

its small outposts by 2015. As a result, we assess that ANA forces will 

continue to man a number of outposts in key locations. By this reasoning, we identify a requirement for three battalions in each of the 

six provinces or significant areas in Tier 4.56

The remote, high deserts of southern Helmand and Kandahar provinces are also in Tier 4. Given the difficulty of living and operating in 

this terrain, the ANA have few forces stationed in these areas today, 

and we assess that they will need few forces stationed there in the 

2015–2018 timeframe. To enable the ANA to conduct some operations in these areas—and to support the ABP when required—we allocate one ANA battalion to the Tier 4 areas in Helmand and 

Kandahar. 

The above considerations yield a total requirement of 20 battalions 

for Tier 4. With this force level, the average area of operations for 

battalions in Tier 4 is about 6,700 square kilometers, which is somewhat higher than the current average battalion area of operations in 

eastern Afghanistan and slightly lower than the average area in 

southern Afghanistan (Table 21). With an area of operations of this 

size, a battalion headquarters would be within a few hours’ drive of 

the district centers in the region, depending on terrain and road 

conditions. 

Based on our interviews with U.S. and NATO personnel in theater 

and our research of the ANSF’s current performance against the 

threats in Tier 4 areas, we assess that it is appropriate to reduce the 

number of personnel stationed in Tier 4 areas in the east. Our threat 

assessment indicates that these areas face threats from groups such as 

 

56 These Tier 4 areas include Uruzgan, Zabul, and Paktika provinces (which 

are mostly or entirely within Tier 4) as well as the Tier 4 portions of 

Farah and Ghazni provinces. We also allocate three battalions to the Tier 

4 area northeast of Kabul, which is split between several provinces. 
115

the Haqqani network that are able to slip past small and dispersed 

military outposts. We assess that a more dedicated counter-network 

strategy using SOF and community policing would be more effective 

at countering the threats in eastern Afghanistan. Thus, we assess that 

the number of ANA forces currently spread across Tier 4 areas in 

small outposts can be reduced without lowering the area’s overall level of security. Reducing the number of small military outposts in remote areas may also reduce the number of ANA casualties, as fewer 

soldiers will be defending outposts that are difficult to reinforce. 

Rural areas in Tiers 2 and 3 (Goal: Neutralize and disrupt the insurgency, respectively) 

In contrast to Tiers 4 and 5 (where the ANA only needed to conduct 

occasional operations and reinforce the police), the ANSF requires 

sufficient forces in Tier 3 to hold ground after conducting clearing 

operations. The police play a significant role in holding ground, and 

we sized them generously in Tier 3 areas so they can contribute to the 

counterinsurgency holding mission. We assess, however, that the ANA 

will also require forces to hold areas in the immediate aftermath of 

their operations and to reinforce more highly contested areas. 

Based on our interviews in theater and our review of current assessments of ANSF performance, we assess that current force levels in 

southern Afghanistan are the minimum required to achieve these 

goals in Helmand and Kandahar.57 With current force levels, the ANA 

are able to maintain a significant number of small outposts across the 

region and consolidate enough forces to conduct some battalionsized operations. 

We also reviewed the historical literature to determine whether the 

current area of operations for battalions in southern Afghanistan is 

reasonable, compared to those in other counterinsurgencies. We 

found that the size of a battalion’s area of operations has varied considerably in historical conflicts, due to geographical considerations, 

 

57 Author interviews in RC–South and RC–Southwest. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–

20, 2013; and Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. U.S. DoD. Jul. 

2013. 
116

the nature of the insurgent threat, and the constraints of overall force 

levels available to counterinsurgents. 

Here, we consider two historical case studies: the Philippines Insurrection (1889–1901) and the Malaysian Emergency (1948–1960). We 

find these cases compelling because they are considered two of the 

most successful counterinsurgency efforts in the modern era and the 

counterinsurgent forces in these conflicts did not have significant (or 

any) air support—making them not dissimilar from the ANA’s situation today. In both the Philippines and Malaysian conflicts, counterinsurgents had about 0.23 forces per square kilometer,58 which 

equates to an area of operations of about 5,100 square kilometers for 

an ANA-sized battalion.59

Calculating the area of operations of battalions in Tier 3 is not easy, 

as current battalion areas of operation do not coincide with the geographical boundaries of our security tier areas. We therefore examined the entire area of Helmand and Kandahar. The 20 battalions in 

these provinces currently have an average area of operations of about 

5,600 square kilometers. Removing the farthest reaches of the mountains of northern Helmand and the high deserts of southern Helmand and Kandahar (where the ANA rarely operate today) the 

average area of operations for a battalion today is about 4,800 square 

kilometers. These numbers are in line with the area of operations in 

the successful counterinsurgencies discussed above. 

To maintain the current force levels in Helmand and Kandahar, 

therefore, the Tier 3 areas of these provinces require 12 battalions. 

(In the other parts of this section, we assess a requirement for 8 battalions in Tiers 1, 2, and 4 in Helmand and Kandahar). 

 

58 John J. McGrath. Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency 

Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007. 

59 Here, we estimate that an ANA battalion has about 1,170 personnel, based 

on the 1392 tashkiel. This figure includes 745 personnel in the battalion 

itself, as well as a pro-rated share of the brigade and corps-level headquarters staff and brigade and corps-level enablers such as artillery, engineering, logistics, and maintenance. 
117

In contrast, we assess that the level of conventional ANA forces in the 

rural areas of eastern Afghanistan is currently higher than necessary.60

The ANA currently maintain many small outposts in remote mountainous areas, and we assess that these outposts are not effective at interdicting insurgent traffic or at preventing the Haqqani network 

from operating in the region. We assess, therefore, that the ANSF 

should take more of a counter-network approach to disrupting the 

insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. Such a counter-network approach 

requires a collaborative effort between conventional ANA forces, 

ANA SOF, and the police. Based on our arguments for police-topopulation ratios in Tier 3 above, we increased the number of district 

police in eastern Afghanistan by about 8,000. We also assessed a requirement for about 2,600 additional border police along the northeastern border with Pakistan, Given these sizable increases in police 

force structure, we assess that the ANA should be able to hand over 

checkpoints in many areas to the uniformed or border police, and 

thereby accomplish the overall security mission with fewer army outposts scattered across the mountains and valleys of the east. 

The ANA will still require a significant presence in the rural areas of 

eastern Afghanistan in order to conduct the following missions: reinforcement of uniformed and border police; support to SOF (both 

basing and mobility); combat patrolling; and some larger-scale clearing and cordon-and-search operations (we acknowledge the additional requirements to provide security for Tier 2 roads and Tier 1 

cities in the next sections). 

We assess, therefore, that the ANA requires 11 battalions in the rural 

areas of eastern Afghanistan. With this number, battalions in the rural 

areas of eastern Afghanistan have an average area of operations of 

4,800 square kilometers (about the same as the average area of operations for battalions in rural Tier 2 and Tier 3 areas in southern Afghanistan). This is somewhat larger than the average area of 

 

60 Our force-sizing framework is based on author interviews in RC–East, Aug. 

12–24, 2013; and current assessments of ANSF performance. For the latter, see Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. 

Jul. 2013. 
118

operations in rural parts of eastern Afghanistan today, but smaller 

than the area of operations in Tier 4.61

Tier 2 roads (Goal: Neutralize the insurgency) 

Ensuring the safety of travel along the major roads is an essential part 

of providing security and stability in Afghanistan as a whole. In this 

section, we provide augmentation for security forces in the areas 

along the 1,800 kilometers of major roads to account for the additional force structure necessary to secure this key infrastructure. 

One method for determining the number of forces needed to secure 

the roads is to determine the number of checkpoints needed to ensure that they can reinforce each other if one comes under fire. 

Along some segments of the Ring Road (Highway 1) between Helmand and Kandahar today, the ANA and police have checkpoints 

about every kilometer. The ANSF positioned the checkpoints this 

close to each other so that the police or soldiers manning them can 

see adjacent checkpoints and respond to incidents rapidly (on foot, if 

vehicles are not available).62 That said, the entire length of the major 

highways does not require this level of security now, and we assess 

that it will not require that level of security in the future. 

Personnel in theater report that most small firefights are currently 

over within about 10 minutes, so we could take as a requirement that 

security forces need to travel between checkpoints within 10 

minutes.63 Alternatively, we could set the requirement such that ANA 

checkpoints could be spaced 20 minutes apart—with police checkpoints in-between—such that the ANA could reinforce any interven-

 

61 In this force-sizing calculation, we take into account the area of all the Tier 3 areas in eastern Afghanistan, as well as the more outlying Tier 2 areas around Kabul and Ghazni. We include these Tier 2 areas because our 

“ring of steel” analysis for the Tier 1 areas below does not adequately account for the security requirements of outlying rural communities in Tier 2 areas. The forces allocated to the “ring of steel” are dedicated to 

protecting the urban centers in Tier 1, not conducting operations to secure the rural areas in Tier 2. 

62 Author interviews in RC–South. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–20, 2013. 

63 Author interviews in Kabul and RC–South. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
119

ing police checkpoints within 10 minutes. Table 23 shows the force 

requirements for four cases, in which we varied the travel speed between checkpoints from 100 to 25 kilometers per hour (to account 

for road conditions varying from straight, well-paved roads to switchbacks in the mountains), as well as the number of people required 

per checkpoint.64 The calculations for the number of infantry battalions needed to maintain the number of checkpoints shown in the table assume that half of the personnel in a battalion are available for 

checkpoint duty at any given time.65

By taking an average of the four cases shown in Table 23, we see that 

seven battalions are needed to secure the major highways. We are not 

advocating that the ANSF should set up checkpoints on this scale. 

However, based on our discussions with subject matter experts, we assess that seven battalions would provide a reasonable number of additional forces to augment security along the major highways. The 

ANSF could use these forces to provide checkpoint security, to conduct patrols in the vicinity of the major roads, or to support other 

operations in the areas surrounding the roads in order to prevent or 

deter insurgents from attacking travelers. 

Table 23. Calculation of infantry battalions to augment security on Tier 2 major roads 

Case 1: 

Straight, wellpaved roads 

Case 2: 

Lower-quality 

roads 

Case 3: 

Lower-quality 

roads with 

larger checkpoints 

Case 4: 

Mountain 

switchbacks 

Travel time between checkpoints 

(minutes) 

10 10 20 20 

Travel speed between checkpoints (km/hr) 100 50 50 25 

No. of checkpoints required 108 216 108 216 

No. of personnel per checkpoint 12 12 20 20 

No. of infantry battalions 3.5 7 6 11.5 

 

64 If a checkpoint has 12 people, it could have three shifts with four people 

on duty at any given time. With 20 personnel, a checkpoint would also 

have capacity to conduct patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoint. 

65 This figure assumes that the other half of the personnel in the battalion 

would be on leave or required for headquarters administration, logistics, 

sentry duty at the battalion and company headquarters, or other duties. 
120

Tier 1 urban areas (Goal: Neutralize the insurgency) 

The ANA currently have eight battalions stationed around Kabul, and 

given the results of our threat assessment we assess it pragmatic to 

maintain that force size in the 2015–2018 timeframe. These ANA battalions form a “ring of steel” around Kabul through a series of layered 

checkpoints on the roads into the city and frequent operations in the 

rural areas around it. Reducing the ANA presence around Kabul 

could encourage insurgents to test the reduced security footprint and 

thereby threaten the actual—or perceived—security level within the 

city. Even a few more spectacular attacks in Kabul could reduce public confidence in the government, which could have strategic and political consequences across Afghanistan and internationally. 

Having set the security requirements for Kabul, one way of determining the security requirement for the other cities is to ask how many 

forces they would need to have a proportionally-sized “ring of steel.” 

Table 24 shows how the populations and circumferences of the other 

cities compare to those of Kabul.66 The final column shows how many 

battalions we allocated to the security of each city, based on the city’s 

geographic area, population, and security tier, as well as the security 

tier of the surrounding areas. 

Table 24. ANA infantry battalions calculated for the protection of Tier 1 cities 

City Population 

% pop. 

of Kabul 

Approximate

circumference

(km) 

% circum. 

of Kabul 

Calculated 

force level 

(battalions) 

Kabul 3,289,000 100% 110 100% 8 

Kandahar 491,500 15% 40 36% 3 

Herat 436,300 13% 35 32% 3 

Mazar-e-Sharif 368,100 11% 40 36% 3 

Jalalabad 206,500 6% 30 27% 2 

Gardez 107,500 3% 20 18% 1 

Ghazni 157,600 5% 20 18% 1 

Khost 133,700 4% 20 18% 1 

Kunduz 304,600 9% 20 18% 1 

Lashkar Gah 100,200 3% 25 27% 1 

 

66 We estimated the circumference of the urban areas in each city by viewing 

satellite imagery in Google Earth and drawing an approximate circle or 

box around the areas of each city that appeared densely populated. 
121

Based on our interviews, research, and our own judgment, it seems 

reasonable to add one to three battalions to the areas surrounding 

the major urban centers as shown in Table 24. Adding these extra 

forces for Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities takes into account that there are 

additional threats in these provinces due to the presence of the major 

cities. Like the forces we added to provide highway security, these extra battalions would not necessarily need to form a “ring of steel” 

around each of these cities. Instead, they could provide extra combat 

power and flexibility to the brigades in the provinces with these urban areas. 

All total, we assess a requirement for 81 infantry battalions, based 

primarily on the area in which a battalion can effectively operate. Table 22 summarizes our force-sizing framework and the number of 

battalions recommended by tier. 

Afghan National Army operational reserve (or national swing force) 

In addition to the 81 battalions identified above for the counterinsurgency mission, we assess that the ANA also requires an operational 

reserve or national-level swing force that the MoD can employ as required to reinforce areas as insurgents adjust their tactics and focus.67

According to U.S. doctrine, defending commanders should “retain 

[operational] reserves as a means of ensuring mission accomplishment and for exploiting opportunities through offensive action.”68 If 

all the army’s forces are committed to static positions and fixed areas 

of operation, the army lacks flexibility and “can cede the initiative to 

an adaptive, free-thinking enemy.”69 As noted in our review of the enemy’s operations in Afghanistan over the past few decades, various in-

 

67 This section discusses the need for an operational reserve of active duty 

army personnel, not the need for a reserve component of non-active duty personnel who could be recalled for service in time of need. The ANA 

do not currently have a non-active reserve component, and we do not 

believe it is feasible or necessary to create such a reserve component in 

the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. 

68 Offense and Defense. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-90. Aug. 2012. 

69 Ibid. 
122

surgent groups have shown themselves to be adaptable and able to 

exploit holes in the government’s defenses. 

The ANA have recently begun fielding a force that could be considered an operational reserve or national swing force: the Mobile Strike 

Force (MSF). The MSF is currently building towards its authorized 

end strength of seven battalions. Based on our review of U.S. Army 

doctrine and our interviews with subject matter experts, it appears 

that an operational reserve of seven battalions compared to 81 regular infantry battalions might be high—if the forces were held back as 

an operational reserve of last resort and only employed occasionally. 

The ANA, however, are more likely to employ the MSF as a national 

swing force.70 As such, the MSF would be regularly supporting infantry battalions in Tier 3 areas and reinforcing ANA operations to protect key Tier 1 and Tier 2 areas. Based on our threat assessment, the 

ANA must defend four Tier 1 and 2 areas in eastern Afghanistan, two 

Tier 1 cities in southern Afghanistan, and the long stretches of Tier 2 

roads connecting Kandahar to Kabul, Herat, and the borders with 

Iran and Pakistan. We assess, therefore, that having seven MSF battalions to act as a national swing force would not be out of line to counter the threats expected in the 2015–2018 timeframe.

Throughout our discussion of the operations that the ANA must 

conduct, we have stressed the need for the ANA to conduct mobile 

operations, to reinforce district centers or police posts, and to actively 

conduct larger-scale clearing operations to disrupt insurgent strongholds. One could argue, therefore, that the ANA require more than 

seven MSF battalions. We do not recommend this, however, as we assess that the ANA will face significant logistical difficulties maintaining and resupplying the heavy vehicles in the seven MSF battalions 

that are currently planned (see our assessment of ANSF capability 

gaps for more details). 

Afghan National Army supporting forces 

To determine the total number of ANA forces necessary, we must determine not only the number of combat battalions needed to counter 

 

70 Author interviews with 205th Corps advisors. Kandahar, Afghanistan. Aug. 

12–20, 2013. 
123

insurgent threats, but also the number of personnel needed to support those combat battalions. Such support personnel include headquarters (at the brigade, corps, and national levels), combat support 

(e.g., artillery, engineering, and medical), combat service support 

(e.g., logistics and maintenance), and other capabilities (e.g., intelligence analysis, communications, and contract management). 

During our interviews in theater, we heard repeatedly that the ANA’s 

supporting establishment is too small, mainly because the ANA have 

been able to rely on the U.S. and NATO for many support functions, 

including operational planning, intelligence analysis, logistics, medical, and engineering. The commander of ISAF has also highlighted 

ANSF logistics as one of the top areas requiring significant improvement over the next few years.71

Methodology 

Given the time constraints of this study, we were unable to conduct a 

ground-up capabilities-based analysis of the ANA’s support requirements. We did not examine whether the current mix of artillery, engineering, counter-IED, and other personnel in the combat support 

battalions is appropriate. Instead, we reviewed the ratio of combat 

support battalions to infantry battalions and assumed that the ANA 

would maintain one combat support battalion per brigade, as described below. 

For other support requirements, we examined the “tooth-to-tail” ratio 

for the ANA and for militaries in several other conflicts in the 20th

and 21st centuries. This ratio measures the number of combat forces 

(tooth) relative to support forces (tail). Based on this historical analysis, we concur with U.S. and NATO advisors who argue that the ANA 

is extremely lean and will need additional logistics and support capabilities in the future. 

 

71 General Joseph Dunford. “Commander ISAF’s Afghanistan Update, 

Summer 2013.” www.ISAF.NATO.int Official Website of International 

Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, accessed Oct. 3, 2013, at 

www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-news-list/commander-isaf-s-afghanistanupdate-summer-2013.html. 
124

Assessment 

Currently, each ANA brigade is assigned one combat support battalion to provide artillery, engineering, and other support, and we assess 

that this level of combat support will be needed in the future as well. 

Ensuring the ANA have sufficient combat support—and in particular 

sufficient artillery—will be essential as U.S. and NATO air power 

draws down and ANA infantry battalions become more dependent on 

ground-based artillery fires. We therefore hold constant the ratio of 

combat support battalions to combat battalions. Given that we reduced the number of infantry battalions by 14, we reduce the number of combat support battalions by 3 (Table 25).72

Table 25. Calculated combat support battalions, by region 

Region

Infantry

battalions 

today

Infantry 

battalions 

calculated Change

CS 

battalions 

today

CS

battalions

calculated Change

Kabul 8 8 0 2 2 0

East 33 27 (6) 8 7 (1)

South & SW 30 28 (2) 8 7 (1)

West 12 11 (1) 3 3 0

North 12 7 (5) 3 2 (1)

Total 95 81 (14) 24 21 (3)

To determine the requirement for other supporting forces, we reviewed studies that examined tooth-to-tail ratios for the U.S. and Afghan militaries. For example, McGrath used several approaches to 

calculate the tooth-to-tail ratios for the U.S. Army in five conflicts 

from World War I to Iraq, as well as five snapshots from peacetime 

and the Cold War.73 He found that both approaches resulted in an 

 

72 We do not include the MSF in this analysis because the MSF battalions are 

not currently supported by combat support battalions. The force structure for the MSF battalion includes some organic capabilities that would 

be considered combat support in the rest of the ANA. 

73 McGrath calculated an “operational tooth-to-tail” ratio by counting the 

number of forces that were assigned to operational units, defined as divisions prior to 2007 and brigades after the Army’s 2007 reorganization. 

Second, recognizing that “operational units do not consist entirely of 

combat elements and some combat elements are not found in divisions 
125

average post-1941 tooth-to-tail ratio for deploying forces of approximately 1:2 (i.e., one-third of deploying forces were combat units), 

although this ratio has decreased somewhat over the years. 

We calculated the “tooth-to-tail” ratio for the ANA using its current 

tables of organization (the 1392 tashkiel). We defined the supporting 

establishment to consist of headquarters staffs, forces required to 

provide “life support” at major bases (e.g., military police and army 

medical centers), logistics, and other combat service support elements. Conversely, we defined the combat forces to include the infantry battalions and their associated combat support battalions. We 

also included the Mobile Strike Forces as part of the combat forces.74

Table 26 summarizes the force distribution of the ANA today with 

McGrath’s findings for historical U.S. Army deployments since 1941. 

Our calculated figure of 59 percent combat forces in today’s ANA is 

significantly higher than the corresponding figures for U.S. forces in 

any conflict since World War II.75 In those conflicts, the fraction of 

combat forces averaged 33 percent, ranging from a high of 39 percent in World War II to a low of 25 percent for the 2005 rotation of 

 

or brigades,” McGrath calculated a more detailed, “functional tooth-totail” ratio, by binning units below the division/brigade level according to 

their roles (combat or supporting). John J. McGrath. The Other End of 

the Spear. 

74 This analysis does not include the ANA personnel working at the MoD or 

at the recruiting and training commands. In McGrath’s analysis, these 

personnel were located in the U.S. and thus were not part of the deployed forces. The figures also do not include the AAF or ANA SOF, as 

McGrath’s calculations include only conventional U.S. Army forces. 

75 McGrath omitted the numbers from World War I because the command 

structure of those forces was significantly leaner than in more modern 

forces. Specifically, U.S. forces in World War I were 65 percent combat 

forces, 32 percent logistics and life support forces, and just 3 percent 

headquarters staffs. For example, “Divisions with a size of 28,105 in November 1918 only had a headquarters element of 304 (1.1 percent).” 

McGrath. The Other End of the Spear. 
126

forces in Iraq (the latter figure counts contractors and support troops 

in Kuwait as part of the tail).76

Table 26. Types of forces in the current ANA force structure, compared to historical U.S. Army 

forces 

Category 

ANA troops

today % of total ANA 

% of historical U.S. 

Army forces 

Combat units 86,100 59 33 (25 – 39) 

Headquarters staffs 22,500 15 25 (16 – 38) 

Logistics and life support 37,200 26 43 (36 – 57) 

Total 145,800 100 100 

Most likely, the ANA have a larger fraction of combat forces because 

the ANA logistics system is relatively immature, as the ANA have relied on the U.S., NATO, and contractors for logistics, maintenance, 

and other support functions. 

We assess that for the ANA to grow into a self-sustaining force, their 

headquarters and logistical support tails will need to grow to at least 

the minimum levels found by McGrath. This means that at least 36 

percent of the total ANA force structure should provide logistics and 

support functions and at least 16 percent should be part of headquarters staffs. Based on historical U.S. forces, this is a conservative estimate for the forces needed for logistics and life support. With an 

active-duty logistics force of this size, the ANA would still require significant additional support from civilians and contractors for maintenance, supply, and administrative support. That said, having civilians 

provide maintenance, logistics, and other functions such as medical 

treatment or intelligence analysis has some advantages, primarily that 

it increases the number of active duty personnel who are available to 

conduct combat operations. Moreover, modern U.S. forces are also 

highly dependent on contractor support. In 2010, for example, there 

were over 95,000 contractors in Iraq and over 112,000 in Afghani-

 

76 Counting just the active duty military personnel in Iraq, McGrath calculated that 40 percent of the U.S. forces were combat forces, 36 percent 

provided logistics and life support, and 24 percent provided headquarters functions. 
127

stan—more than the number of U.S. troops deployed to those countries.77

Total conventional force requirement for the ANA 

In total, we calculate the size of the conventional ANA at about 

155,900 personnel, as summarized in Table 27. This is an increase of 

about 10,000 personnel over the conventional forces currently allocated to the ANA.78

Table 27. Summary of calculated conventional ANA forces 

Type of forces 

No. 

of units

 calculated 

No. of 

forces 

per 

unit 

Force size

calculated

% 

of the 

force 

Total 

force 

calculated 

Current 

ANA 

forces Difference

Infantry battalions 81 745 60,300 

Combat support battalions 21 475 10,000 48 74,800 86,100 (11,300)

Reserve / swing force (MSF) 7 640 4,500

Headquarters 16 25,000 22,500 2,500

Logistics and support 36 56,100 37,200 18,900

Total conventional forces 155,900 145,800 10,100

Taking into account the threats and requisite ANA mission sets in 

each security tier, we assess that the number of ANA infantry battalions should be reduced from 95 to 81. We also assess, however, that 

the number of combat support battalions providing artillery and engineering support to the infantry should be reduced by only 3 battalions. In addition, the logistics support structure should be increased 

from 26 percent to at least 36 percent of the total force size. With this 

increase in logistical support, ANA infantry battalions will be more 

sustainable and thus more capable. Even with this substantial increase 

 

77 Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel. U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO-11-1. Oct. 2010. 

78 The current end-strength cap for the ANA is 195,000. This figure includes 

the 145,800 operational forces, as well as about 30,000 personnel who 

work at the MoD, provide the staff for training and recruiting, or are 

new recruits in training. In addition, the ANA also includes about 20,000 

personnel in SOF and the AAF. We address all these personnel in subsequent sections. 
128

in logistics force structure, however, the ANA will likely remain reliant 

on contractor support for maintenance for the foreseeable future, as 

discussed in our assessment of ANSF capability gaps. 

Sensitivity analysis 

To test the sensitivity of our results to our planning factors, we varied 

several assumptions, as shown in Table 28. In particular, increasing 

the requirement for logistics and headquarters functions such that 

combat battalions are only one-third of the force increases the total 

requirement for ANA by 70,800, which is an increase of 45 percent 

over the force defined by our force-sizing framework. 

Table 28. Sensitivity analysis for ANA planning factors 

Planning factor adjustment 

Adjusted 

ANA 

force size 

Change in 

ANA force 

size 

Percent 

change 

Infantry battalions stay constant at 95, but logistics forces are 

increased to 36% of the total force.79

181,100 25,200 16 

Logistics and headquarters forces are set at the median (rather 

than minimum) values based on the comparison with deployed 

U.S. Army forces in the 20th century

80

226,700 70,800 45 

As a final comparison, we also considered the number of forces that 

would result from the commonly cited 14 or 20 counterinsurgent 

 

79 Based on our force-sizing framework, each infantry battalion yields a total 

requirement for 1,800 personnel. This figure includes the 745 personnel 

in the infantry battalion and one-quarter of the personnel in a combat 

support battalion (120 personnel). These combat forces are 40 percent 

of the total force requirement, with logistics support (36 percent) and 

headquarters personnel (16 percent) rounding out the total force. 

80 Our force-sizing construct may still be a conservative estimate for the total 

requirement for logistics and headquarters personnel, as it assumes the 

minimum values seen in deployed U.S. forces in the 20th century. The 

force size here assumes that a sustainable ANA requires the median values seen in deployed U.S. Army forces in the 20th century (i.e., 33 percent combat forces, 43 percent logistics forces and 25 percent 

headquarters staff). 
129

forces per 1,000 inhabitants.81 Although the analysis behind these 

figures has been questioned,82 it is worth calculating them for comparison with the above analysis, which was based primarily on the area in which combat battalions can effectively operate. These 

population-based planning factors yield a requirement for 33 to 57 

combat battalions in the rural areas of Tiers 2 and 3, compared to the 

23 battalions derived in our analysis.83 This equates to an increase in 

the size of the ANA of 18,000 to 61,000 (or 11 to 40 percent). That 

said, the mission set of full-spectrum population-centric counterinsurgency upon which these planning factors are based is significantly 

more expansive than the operational goals and missions for the ANA 

as we have calculated it. As a result, it is not surprising that these 

planning factors yield a requirement for a substantially larger force 

than the one based on our force-sizing framework. 

Afghan Air Force 

Air power is generally regarded as a crucial military capability, especially in a counterinsurgency and especially in a country such as Afghanistan where mountainous terrain, a lack of navigable roads, and 

the prolific use of roadside bombs hinder ground travel. In particular, Afghan and ISAF military personnel interviewed for this study 

highlighted the benefits of close air support, air mobility, and casualty 

evacuation via helicopters. 

 

81 James T. Quinlivan. “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability 

Operations.” RAND, Review 27, no.2, Summer 2003: 28-29, and 

McGrath. Boots on the Ground.

82 Jeffrey A. Friedman. “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical 

Foundations for Theory and Doctrine.” Security Studies, 20, no. 4, 2011: 

556-591. 

83 As these planning factors include all security forces—both military and 

police—we must take into account that our analysis has already allocated 

6.0 police per 1,000 inhabitants. The population of the rural areas in Tiers 2 and 3 is approximately 8.7 million, so these planning factors yield a 

requirement for 70,000 to 120,000 ANA personnel. We estimate that an 

ANA battalion has about 1,170 personnel, based on the 1392 tashkiel. 

This figure includes 745 personnel in the battalion itself, as well as a prorated share of the brigade- and corps-level headquarters staff and brigade- and corps-level enablers such as artillery, engineering, logistics, 

and maintenance. 
130

To determine an appropriate size for the AAF, we concluded that 

demand for air forces would always exceed supply in a country such 

as Afghanistan. Therefore, we instead focused on analyzing how 

much the AAF (and the Special Mission Wing (SMW)) could possibly 

grow between now and 2018. Our assessment of AAF and SMW 

growth factors finds that these forces cannot feasibly grow more than 

already planned in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. These forces are already struggling to grow to their planned size, and even if additional 

recruits were found, only a small number could become operational 

by 2018 given the length of the required training. 

Methodology and assumptions 

In our interviews in Washington D.C. and Afghanistan, subject matter 

experts universally agreed that demand for air support in Afghanistan 

would always exceed supply. Given Afghanistan’s limited resources, 

the AAF will simply not be able to provide as much air support as U.S. 

and NATO militaries would deem required to counter the threats 

within Afghanistan. 

In this section, therefore, we do not provide a threat- or demandbased analysis of the requirements for air support. Instead, we consider whether it is even feasible to increase the size of the AAF more 

than is currently planned over the next few years. We first review the 

current size of the AAF and examine how it is expected to grow by 

2018. Then we review the AAF’s ability to recruit and train more personnel and maintain its currently planned fleet of aircraft. 

A complete review of whether the AAF can support and maintain its 

expected fleet is beyond the scope of this assessment. We do, however, review the criticisms of the AAF and consider whether it is likely to 

be able to maintain as many different platforms as it is expected to 

have in 2018.84

 

84 Critics argue that the AAF costs too much and provides too few benefits. 

Even without considering the cost of procuring the aircraft and helicopters, the NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan estimates that sustaining the AAF will cost $600 million per year by 2017. As the AAF has 

too few qualified maintenance personnel, this figure includes the international contractors required to keep the AAF flying. Given that current 
131

Current forces and capabilities 

There are two components of air power within the ANSF: the Afghan 

Air Force and the Special Mission Wing. The AAF has been under the 

control of the ANA since its creation in 2005. It supports the operations of the ANA’s regional corps from its three primary air bases in 

Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. The SMW supports ANA SOF and 

ANP special police units. According to a recently signed air charter 

between the MoI and the MoD, the intent is for the SMW to fly 

roughly 50/50 counterterrorism and counter-narcotics missions.85

Currently, the AAF and SMW have a combination of Russian helicopters and Western fixed-wing aircraft, for a total of 105 platforms, as 

shown in Table 29. Based on current procurement projections, the 

AAF in 2018 will have approximately 120 aircraft and the SMW will 

have 48, for a total of 168 aircraft.86

 

levels of international financial commitments may not be high enough 

to sustain the police and conventional army forces (as discussed further 

in our assessment of ANSF resources), critics fear that the AAF’s planes 

and helicopters will end up broken and unused. They argue that international resources being spent on aircraft would be better spent on lowtech systems—such as mortars, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) balloons, and trucks—that the Afghans will be able to use 

and maintain more effectively. Author’s interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 2013; and Afghan Special 

Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward with $771.8 Million Purchase of 

Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR Audit 13-13. Jun. 

2013. 

85 The SMW began as the MoI’s counter-narcotics Air Interdiction Unit in 

2006. The ANSF subsequently identified a requirement for an Afghan 

aviation capability to support counterterrorism operations, and this unit 

was re-designated as the Special Mission Wing in July 2012. Author’s interview with Special Mission Wing Special Operations Advisory Group. 

Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 17, 2013; and Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013. 

86 Authors’ interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 2013; and “NATO Air Training Command Afghanistan 

(NATC-A)/438 Air Expeditionary Wing Welcomes Center for Naval 

Analysis.” PowerPoint presentation prepared by NATO Air Training 

Command. Aug. 2013. 
132

Table 29. AAF and SMW inventory, October 2013 and projected 2018 

Aircraft

Type Platform 

Command Roles and Missions Current 

(Oct 2013) 

Projected 

(2018) 

Mi-17 Rotary wing

(RW) 

AAF Aerial assault; troop movement; 

supply, resupply; CASEVAC and 

human remains transport 

48 58 

Mi-35 RW AAF Close Air Support (CAS); Aerial 

reconnaissance 

6 0 

MD-530 RW AAF Training 6 6 

C-182 Fixed wing

(FW) 

AAF Training 6 6 

C-208 FW AAF Training; troop movement; supply, resupply; CASEVAC and 

human remains transport 

26 26 

C-130 FW AAF Heavy lift; troop movement; 

supply, resupply 

2 4 

(2 delivered in 

late 2014) 

A-29 FW AAF CAS; close air attack; aerial reconnaissance 0 20 

(2 arrive per 

month Sep. 14 - 

Jun. 15) 

Mi-17 RW SMW Aerial assault; troop movement; 

supply, resupply; CASEVAC; 

night flying 

10 30 

(full delivery by 

Dec. 2014) 

PC-12 FW SMW ISR (geospatial intelligence/imagery intelligence) 0 18 

(by mid-2015) 

The AAF and SMW are nascent forces, and their current capabilities 

are quite limited. Afghan pilots and air crews currently conduct resupply, casualty evacuation, human remains transport, and passenger 

transport missions across the country.87 The AAF, however, has limited 

capability for air assault, armed escort, and ISR—and none of its 

crews are capable of flying at night. The SMW has only six crews 

trained to perform aerial assault and ISR missions at night.88 The 

AAF’s ability to provide CAS is extremely limited, with only two operational Mi-35 helicopters providing air-to-ground attack capabilities 

 

87 With a range of 1,000 miles, the fixed-wing C-208 can provide resupply 

and troop transport across the country, and the rotary-wing Mi-17 can 

conduct airlift to remote locations across most of the country. Progress 

Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013. 

88 Authors interview with Special Mission Wing Special Operations Advisory 

Group. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 17, 2013; and Progress Toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013. 
133

in and around the Kabul area.89 The AAF expects to phase out these 

attack helicopters by 2016 and replace them with 20 A-29 Super Tucano fixed-wing light-attack aircraft. These new aircraft are expected 

to give the AAF a nation-wide capability for close air support, as the A29s are expected to be based in Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. 

Assessment 

One way to increase the overall capability of the AAF and SMW would 

be to purchase more aircraft for these units. This approach, however, 

ignores the reality that recruiting qualified personnel is the key shortfall facing the AAF and SMW. 

The AAF and SMW are currently about 1,600 personnel short of their 

planned final end-strengths, and the NATO Air Training CommandAfghanistan (NATC-A) projects that the personnel shortfall will continue to be about 1,000 personnel in the 2014 to 2015 timeframe.90 To 

mitigate this, NATC-A is bringing in advisors from recruiting commands in the U.S. to build Afghan recruiting expertise. Even with 

additional recruiting efforts, however, it will be difficult to overcome 

the fact that Afghanistan has a limited pool of qualified candidates.91

 

89 Author’s interview with advisor to the Afghan Air Force 207th Detachment. 

Herat, Afghanistan. Aug. 20, 2013. 

90 The AAF has about 6,900 personnel (out of a planned force size of 7,900) 

and the SMW has about 200 personnel (out of 800). Specifically, the 

AAF has about 650 pilots and aircrew (out of 780 planned), 1,000 maintainers (out of 1,370) and 5,200 support and security personnel (out of 

5,750). The SMW currently has about 45 pilots (out of 190 planned), 30 

crew chiefs (out of 140), 90 mechanics (out of 385) and 20 security personnel (out of 90). Authors’ interview with Special Mission Wing Special 

Operations Advisory Group. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 17, 2013; and Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward with $771.8 Million 

Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain. 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR Audit 

13-13. Jun. 2013. 

91 The AAF requires recruits to be fully literate in their native language and 

have a functional literacy in English, but the literacy rate in Afghanistan 

is less than 30 percent and only 5 percent of the population have had 

training in the English language. In addition, the SMW has an 18- to 20-

month vetting process, designed to eliminate candidates who have asso-
134

Once qualified and vetted recruits are found, it requires, on average, 

two to three years to train pilots and five years to fully train mechanics. Crews capable of night operations require several more years of 

training.92 The real bottleneck, however, is not the length of the training but the lack of recruits to train. As of August 2013, only 373 out of 

1600 slots at the Afghan Air University were filled, and over 100 of 

the 560 slots for English language training remained empty. 93

The AAF’s inability to organically maintain airframes and systems—

resulting from a lack of qualified maintenance personnel—also limits 

the ability of the AAF and SMW to support additional aircraft.94 First, 

relying on international contractors increases the cost of aircraft 

maintenance. Second, reliance on international contractors limits the 

geographical distribution of AAF air frames. ANA Corps commanders 

have told U.S. and NATO personnel that they would like to have the 

aircraft more widely distributed across the country, but greater dispersion of contracted maintenance personnel would further increase 

 

ciations with criminal or insurgent activity, and the SMW has had difficulty finding qualified candidates who can pass this strict vetting process. 

Author’s interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 2013; “NATC-A Story Level I and II Combined.” NATO Air 

Training Command briefing. 2013; and Afghan Special Mission Wing. 

Jun. 2013. 

92 Author’s interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 2013; and author’s interview with advisor to the Afghan 

Air Force 207th Detachment. Herat, Afghanistan. Aug. 20, 2013. 

93 “NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A)/438 Air Expeditionary Wing Welcomes Center for Naval Analysis [sic].” Aug. 2013. 

94 DynCorp and Northrup Grumman contactors currently perform about 

half of the maintenance and repairs to the SMW’s fleet of 30 Mi-17s, as 

well as about 70 percent of critical maintenance and logistics management and spare parts procurement. NATC-A planning assumes that contract maintenance will continue until at least 2020 and predicts that 

contractor support must increase by over 50 percent over the next couple of years in order to support the arrival of new aircraft and integrate 

the new capabilities Afghan Special Mission Wing. Jun. 2013; “NATC-A 

Story Level I and II Combined.” Aug. 2013; and author’s interview with 

NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 2013. 
135

costs and security requirements, and therefore be even harder to sustain.95

Maintenance of the infrastructure to support air operations is also a 

concern. In some locations, such as Herat, some newly built infrastructure is already falling into disrepair and the AAF has shown little 

capability to maintain it.96

Finally, U.S. and NATO personnel expressed concerns that the AAF 

may have difficulty maintaining the relatively large number of different platforms expected to be part of the force in 2018 (see Table 

29).97 In particular, several subject matter experts have expressed 

concern about the AAF’s ability to operate and maintain C-130s. 

Based on current plans, the AAF is expected to have four of these aircraft by 2014. The C-130 is a complicated modern aircraft that requires specialized flight crews, specially-trained mechanics, and a 

completely separate inventory of spare parts, compared to the rest of 

the AAF’s fleet. The AAF is expected to use these aircraft primarily to 

transport ANA soldiers traveling across the country on leave.98 We assess that the ANSF could achieve this mission by moving soldiers via 

ground transportation or chartered commercial flights. For example, 

Afghanistan’s national airline, Safi Airways, already provides flights 

between Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Kabul. We assess, therefore, 

that the AAF does not require C-130s and will be inhibited by the cost 

of sustaining these aircraft over the long term. Eliminating the C-130s 

from the AAF fleet would yield a significant cost savings, mainly in international contractor support for these aircraft. In addition, without 

these aircraft, the AAF would require at least 100 fewer personnel.99

 

95 “NATC-A Story Level I and II Combined.” Aug. 2013; and author’s interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 19, 

2013. 

96 Author’s interview with advisor to the Afghan Air Force 207th Detachment. 

Herat, Afghanistan. Aug. 20, 2013. 

97 Author’s interview with NATO Air Training Command. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug 19, 2013. 

98 Ibid. 

99 Current plans indicate that the AAF will have six aircrews of five persons 

each for the four C-130s. The AAF would also require maintenance per-
136

In sum, we conclude that the AAF and SMW cannot feasibly grow beyond their current planned end-strength. Additionally, we conclude 

that the AAF cannot support the addition of C-130s to its fleet, and 

we therefore reduce its end-strength by the 100 personnel associated 

with these aircraft. 

Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces 

Like air support, special operations forces are generally considered 

an essential part of the overall counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan. We expect ANA SOF to conduct operations throughout Afghanistan—both to protect Kabul, and to prevent 

insurgent and terrorist networks from gaining strongholds in the remote areas of Tier 3 and 4 where it is difficult for conventional forces 

to reach. 

We conclude that demand for SOF in Afghanistan is likely to always 

exceed supply. Since this is similar to the case for the AAF, we took a 

similar approach of assessing how much bigger ANA SOF could feasibly become prior to 2018. We conclude that while it would be possible to train a significant number of additional SOF in the coming 

years, the ANSF lack the intelligence analysis, air mobility, and logistics capabilities to support their effective employment. We therefore 

conclude that ANA SOF should stay the same size in the 2015–2018 

timeframe. 

Methodology and assumptions 

Based on our interviews with various subject matter experts, the 

common wisdom is that the demand for SOF will always exceed supply, especially in areas such as Afghanistan that have a significant 

threat of high-profile attacks from insurgent and terrorist networks. 

As such, we do not attempt to calculate an unconstrained force size 

for SOF. Instead, we follow a similar methodology as with the AAF: we 

review the current force size and capabilities of ANA SOF and consider the potential for expanding these forces, given difficulties in recruiting, training, and equipping such highly specialized personnel. 

 

sonnel and additional flight line security personnel for the C-130s. 

“NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A)/438 Air Expeditionary Wing Welcomes Center for Naval Analysis.” Aug. 2013. 
137

We then consider whether the ANA are likely to have sufficient logistics infrastructure, intelligence, and air mobility to support additional 

SOF operations. 

Current forces and capabilities 

Today, ANA SOF include three primary types of forces: the ANA 

Commandos, the ANA Special Forces (ANASF), and the elite counterterrorism force called the Ktah Khas. 

The ANA Commandos focus on the enemy, whereas the ANASF focus 

on the population. More specifically, the Commandos are designed 

as a light infantry assault force similar in structure and design to the 

U.S. Army’s Ranger battalions. They are a direct-action force, trained 

in infantry tactics, raids, assaults, high-value targeting, ambushes, 

cordon and search, and close target reconnaissance.100 The Afghan 

government has indicated that it places a high priority on the Commandos and intends to keep these forces after 2014.101

The ANASF are modeled after U.S. Army Special Forces. Their training includes preparation for many of the same missions as the Commandos, as well as reconnaissance operations, key leader 

engagements, information operations, and training for the ALP. Despite this wide range of training and potential mission sets, much of 

the ANASF’s current efforts are focused on the ALP and Village Stability Operations (VSO) program, in large part because U.S. SOF developed the ANASF specifically to be their partners in VSO.102 That 

said, the role of the ANASF after 2014 is unclear. Oversight of the 

ALP is currently in the process of being transitioned from U.S. SOF 

 

100 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 

2013. 

101 Kenneth Katzman. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and 

U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress RL 30588. Sep. 19, 2013. 

102 VSO is a U.S. SOF program that was designed to extend government control into the countryside and down to the village level, while at the same 

time building security, governance, and economic capacity from the bottom up, connecting the villages to the district and provincial government and economic development programs. As part of the VSO 

program, U.S. SOF recruit and train the ALP, who then defend their villages against insurgent violence and intimidation. 
138

to the AUP at the district level, and it is not clear that the ANASF will 

have any role with the ALP going forward.103

The Ktah Khas is Afghanistan’s national-level counterterrorism unit. 

U.S. counterterrorism forces created this force so they could have Afghan partners to support high-value counterterrorist operations. 

These forces are highly effective, but also highly dependent on U.S. 

counterterrorism forces (e.g., for intelligence, targeting, and air 

transportation).104

Assessment 

Based on the ANA’s ability to recruit and train personnel, we assess 

that the ANA could potentially increase the number of Commando 

forces by up to 3,000 personnel per year between now and 2018, with 

additional international assistance. The growth potential for the 

ANASF is more limited because Special Forces take longer to train, 

have a smaller base from which to recruit, and have higher attrition 

rates than the Commandos. Significantly increasing the ranks of the 

elite Ktah Khas counterterrorism force is likely infeasible without lowering its recruiting standards. 

Recruiting and training more Commandos is feasible, but would likely require additional international trainers and might negatively impact the quality of the force. The Commandos reached their 

maximum authorized end strength in late 2012. They currently have 

an attrition rate of about 3 percent and have no difficulty recruiting 

and training enough personnel to maintain their overall force 

strength.105

 

103 Interviewees in theater told us that the Chief of the ANA General Staff 

does not want the ANASF to be formally associated with the ALP program, in part due to the ALP’s past record of human rights abuses. 

Therefore, it does not appear that the government of Afghanistan intends for the ANASF to continue raising ALP after 2014. 

104 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 

2013. 

105 Author interviews. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013; and ibid. 
139

From mid-2011 to mid-2012, the international community surged 

trainers to the ANA Commando School of Excellence and trained 

about 3,000 Commandos over the course of 12 months.106 In theory, 

the ANA could recruit and train Commandos at that level in the future.

107 Recruiting more than 3,000 new Commandos per year could 

potentially be accomplished by re-designating and training existing 

ANA battalions as Commandos, as was done to stand up the Commando forces initially. This approach could rapidly increase the 

number of Commandos, but would result in lower recruiting standards and likely reduced operational performance by those units, 

compared to the units more recently formed through individual selection and training. Based on our interviews with ISAF advisors, this 

“bulk approach” to generating additional SOF is not recommended.108 

The growth potential for the ANASF is more limited because the 

Special Forces take longer to train, have a smaller base of highly qualified personnel to recruit from, and are still building to their total authorized end-strength. Despite the desire to build the force, the 

ANASF gained only about 400 personnel per year between mid-2011 

and mid-2013, in large part because the recruiting standards are 

higher than for the Commandos, as is the attrition rate during initial 

 

106 Data on the number of Commandos trained over time were compiled 

from the Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report 

to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. U.S. DoD. Oct. 2011, 

Apr. 2012, Dec. 2012, and Jul. 2013. 

107 The Commando School of Excellence is currently 95 percent staffed by 

Afghan trainers, but only at a level to train a number of recruits appropriate to maintain the current force size of ANA Commandos. Increasing the number of students at the school would likely require 

international personnel as instructors. Author interviews. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 2013; and Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013. 

108 The length of time required for training is not a constraint on the number of Commandos that could be trained between now and 2015, as the 

basic training for Commandos is a 10-week course focused on light infantry tactics and specialty skills that follows the regular basic training for 

ANA soldiers. 
140

ANASF training.109 One potential way to increase the recruiting pool 

for the Special Forces—and reduce attrition during training—would 

be to recruit Special Forces from within the ANA Commandos, as was 

done to recruit the original ANASF in 2010.110 We do not recommend 

this approach, however, as it would concurrently reduce the capabilities of the Commandos. 

Recruiting standards and the intensive 15-week basic training course 

are not the only barriers to generating more ANASF. Currently, once 

ANASF recruits finish basic training, they are then partnered with a 

U.S. Army Special Forces team for an additional six months of on-thejob training.111 Building additional ANASF, therefore, likely requires 

not only additional international personnel to conduct basic training; 

but also a greater commitment of U.S. Special Forces for the sixmonths of on-the-job training. 

As the role of the ANASF evolves away from supporting the VSO and 

ALP programs, however, the future role for population-centric Special Forces within Afghanistan is not exactly clear. Given the difficulties noted above with expanding the ANASF in size, combined with 

this lack of clear mission post-2014, we do not recommend increasing 

the size of the ANASF beyond its current end-strength. On the other 

hand, eliminating the ANASF force structure is not advisable, as these 

personnel are already highly trained and they could conduct a wide 

 

109 Data on the number of ANASF trained over time were compiled from the 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. U.S. DoD. Oct. 2011, Apr. 2012, 

Dec. 2012, and Jul. 2013. 

110 In 2010, the recruits for the first several ANASF classes were drawn from 

the best performers in the existing Commando battalions, which reduced Commando force strength and capability significantly. So as not 

to continue decimating the experienced personnel from the Commandos, the ANASF began recruiting from the regular ANA in 2011. 

111 “ANA special forces soldiers receive berets in ceremony.” ISAF press release. Jun. 11, 2010, accessed Oct. 6, 2013, at 

www.dvidshub.net/news/59550/ana-special-forces-soldiers-receiveberets-ceremony. 
141

variety of reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, or direct action missions along with the Commandos. 

Significantly increasing the size of the Ktah Khas counterterrorism 

forces would be difficult without reducing training and vetting standards. Ktah Khas recruits come from the current ranks of the ANP, 

NDS, and ANA, or sometimes directly from the Kabul Military Training Center. Recruits have to be approved by the ANA Chief of Staff 

and have to pass face-to-face interviews, physical tests, psychological 

exams, counter-intelligence investigations, and polygraph tests in order to be selected for service. Acceptance standards are very high and 

the training is difficult: recruit attrition is about 98 percent.112 In addition to these very high standards, Ktah Khas is almost entirely dependent on U.S. enablers for intelligence, targeting, and air mobility. 

As a result, we assess that significantly expanding the Ktah Khas is neither feasible nor advisable by the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. On the 

other hand, assuming that the United States maintains a counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, it is appropriate to maintain the Ktah 

Khas force structure to provide Afghan personnel to support U.S. operations. 

We note, however, that all of the ANA SOF continue to depend heavily on international logistics, intelligence, and air mobility, as described further in our assessment of ANSF capability gaps. Simply 

increasing the numbers of SOF without addressing these other support requirements will not increase their overall capability to disrupt 

and degrade criminal, insurgent, and terrorist networks in Afghanistan. 

Given the great need for SOF operations to counter insurgent and 

terrorist activity across Afghanistan and the assessment from subject 

matter experts that the ANA SOF will be able to continue conducting 

operations with reduced support from United States forces, we assess 

that the size of the ANA SOF should remain unchanged from current 

levels. 

 

112 For example, of 300 recent applicants, 114 passed the physical test. Of 

these, only 38 were admitted to the basic course after the other tests and 

vetting. Only 20 completed the basic course. Author interviews with Ktah 

Khas commander. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 2013. 
142

Other force requirements 

To complete our analysis of ANSF force size and structure, we consider three additional categories of personnel. 

First, we assess that the ANSF will continue to require approximately 

the same number of personnel for recruiting and training as they do 

today. The number of personnel dedicated to recruiting appears to 

be sufficient, as the ANSF have been recruiting enough personnel to 

grow and maintain their end-strength the past few years, despite significant levels of attrition. We assess that the ANSF are likely to continue to face relatively high levels of attrition over the next few years, 

and so will continue to require today’s level of recruiting staff. We also hold the number of training staff constant at current levels, as we 

assess that the ANSF will likely require approximately the same number of regional training centers since the number of trainees only decreases slightly (see below).113 Afghan personnel are largely 

conducting their own basic training today—and this training will 

need to continue. While the ANA may require a few additional trainers to train specialty skills that are currently trained by ISAF personnel, such as counter-IED and bomb disposal, we assess that the 

quantitative requirement for such specialty trainers is small. 

Second, ANSF manning documents include about 19,300 billets for 

trainees (i.e., new recruits in basic training). If we assume that this 

force structure is appropriate to maintain today’s force, then the 

ANSF will need to recruit and train a proportional number of personnel to maintain the force structure that we have recommended. 

Thus, we also hold the number of billets for new recruits receiving in-

 

113 Currently, the number of billets for new police and army recruits in training is about 6 percent of the total ANSF force structure. This percentage 

is low compared to that of U.S. forces. For example, about 15 percent of 

the U.S. Marine Corps is currently in the status of “trainee.” On the other hand, the U.S. Marine Corps has a longer basic training course and 

provides more sustainment and follow-on training to its personnel, so 

one would expect the percentage of trainees in U.S. forces to be larger 

than it is in the ANA. “Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower Performance Indicators Information.” www.manpower.usmc.mil Official Website of the United States Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 

accessed Oct. 7, 2013. 
143

itial training constant at 6 percent of the force, which results in a net 

reduction of 600 personnel. 

Third, ANSF manning documents today also include approximately 

5,500 personnel currently assigned to the MoD and just under 7,000 

personnel assigned to the MoI. As discussed further in our assessment 

of the MoD and MoI below, we assess that many of these administrative, ministerial-level functions could and ultimately should be conducted by civilians—so we have sized the ANSF here with zero 

uniformed personnel on staff at the MoD and MoI. If civilians with 

the appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or trained for these 

MoD positions—or if military personnel cannot be transitioned to 

the civil service—then the ANSF force structure will need to be increased to accommodate them. 

Conclusion 

Based on our troop-to-task analysis: 

We conclude that the ANSF will need about 373,400 personnel in the 2015 

to 2018 timeframe to conduct the missions required in support of the operational goals that support the U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan. 

This overall figure is similar to the current total end-strength of the 

ANSF (382,000, including 30,000 ALP), though the structure of the 

force derived via our analysis differs significantly from the current 

ANSF force structure. Most notably, we assess a need for fewer ANA 

combat forces, but substantially more logistics and support forces to 

enable combat operations. 

The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) also asked us to address the 

regional implications of our recommended changes to ANSF force 

structure. Table 30 illustrates four major points along these lines. 

First, we assess that the forces in Kabul in 2015 should remain about 

the same as today. The small increase is due to the additional requirement for border police headquarters personnel. In contrast, our 

force-sizing calculations yield an increase in the forces required in 

eastern Afghanistan and a reduction in the forces in northern, western, and southern Afghanistan. 
144

Second, we assess that the northern parts of Afghanistan are relatively 

stable today and that the insurgency is unlikely to make significant inroads into these areas in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. Thus, we reduced the ANA presence in northern Afghanistan by five battalions. 

Similarly, we reduced the number of ANA battalions in western Afghanistan by one. 

Third, we assess that the Haqqani network poses a significant threat 

to eastern Afghanistan and recommend that the ANSF refocus their 

efforts from a counterinsurgency strategy to a dedicated counternetwork strategy. As a result, we have reduced the ANA by six combat 

battalions in the remote parts of eastern Afghanistan, but we have increased the police and border police in these areas, and we assess 

that SOF should increase their presence and operations in these areas as well. 

Finally, we assess that the Tier 3 areas in southern Afghanistan will 

continue to require a significant ANA presence to conduct up-to battalion-sized counterinsurgency operations and a large-scale police 

presence to protect communities and hold areas after ANA clearing 

operations. Based on our threat assessment, however, we assess that 

the Tier 4 areas of southern Afghanistan will be a lower priority for 

the insurgency, and so will require fewer ANA and police forces to 

maintain stability in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe than they have today. 

We also assess a reduced requirement for police in the Tier 1 and 2 

areas of southern Afghanistan, as these areas are no longer facing the 

same insurgent threats as in the past. 
145

Table 30. Difference in calculated force levels and current force levels, by region114

 

Current force

levels 

Calculated force 

levels Change 

Kabul 26,900 27,300 400 

East 63,500 74,000 10,500 

South & Southwest 55,600 44,500 (11,100) 

West 23,700 22,800 (900) 

North 33,300 31,700 (1,600) 

We recognize that the Afghan government might find it politically 

difficult to reduce the number of combat forces in northern Afghanistan as starkly as we recommend. Such a sharp reduction could create 

an imbalance in the current power-sharing relationships across regional and ethnic lines. In addition, reducing the number of ANA 

personnel in the north could result in a disproportionate increase in 

unemployment in this region. Although these areas are currently 

more stable than the rest of Afghanistan, reduced employment opportunities may adversely affect that stability. Similarly, reducing the 

police force in the Tier 4 areas of southern Afghanistan could also result in increased unemployment in these rural areas, which could result in increased instability. 

Our force size and structure analysis, however, is not intended to provide advice to the Afghan government on where to position its forces. 

Instead, we built this force-sizing construct to provide a logical and 

traceable framework with which to conduct an independent assessment of the number of ANSF forces required to counter the threats 

expected in the 2015–2018 timeframe. We acknowledge, therefore, 

that the Afghan government can distribute its forces as it deems appropriate. 

 

114 The regional figures shown in this table do not include the Mobile Strike 

Force or the ANCOP, as the MoD and MoI have the option to relocate 

these forces across regions. We also did not apportion the ANA headquarters, logistics, and support forces by region, because we did not assess a specific troop-to-task assignment for the additional headquarters 

or logistics personnel. Thus, it is not clear how many of these additional 

personnel should be physically located in the regions and how many 

should be at the national headquarters in Kabul. 
146

Finally, we identify three factors that could significantly increase the 

number of ANSF forces needed in the 2015–2018 timeframe: 

1. As noted in the sensitivity analysis at the end of the section describing the ANA supporting forces, we increased the requirement for ANA logistics and headquarters forces by relatively 

conservative margins. Increasing these support forces so that 

they are at the median levels seen for deployed U.S. Army forces in the 20th century would yield a requirement for about 

70,000 more ANA soldiers. 

2. Our analysis assumes that if the ANA consolidate and reduce 

forces in the north, west, and east, they will have sufficient mobility to respond to insurgent activity when required—either by 

conducting occasional larger operations or by having sufficient 

mobile forces to assist police units requiring reinforcement. As 

discussed further below, the ANA have significant difficulties 

maintaining their vehicles today, and it is likely that these capability gaps will persist after 2014. If the ANA are not able to operate in a more mobile fashion, they may require more 

battalions than calculated here. For example, if the ANA continue to require 95 infantry battalions but the logistics forces 

are still increased to 36 percent of the total force, the ANA will 

require an additional 25,000 personnel. 

3. We note that our force-sizing analysis has not taken into account the need for unit rotations and collective training across 

the ANA. Currently, conventional ANA units are always in the 

field. Soldiers take leave as individuals, but—unlike in the U.S. 

Army—units never return to their home base to take leave as a 

group and then conduct unit-level (company- or battalionsized) training exercises. U.S. and NATO personnel we interviewed for this study stressed that such unit-level collective 

training is an essential part of the professionalization and development of the ANA.115

 

115 Of note, the SOF already employ this so-called “red-amber-green” rotation cycle, and ISAF advisors cite this as one of the reasons that ANA 

SOF have better performance and morale than conventional forces. 
147

If conventional ANA forces were to institute a red-amber-green 

(leave-training-operation) rotation cycle across the country in 

the 2015 timeframe, they would require significantly more 

forces than calculated here in order to have sufficient numbers 

of fielded forces to conduct the operations necessary to achieve 

the operational goals identified above. We touched on this issue when we discussed how it takes three battalions in Tier 4 to 

ensure that one battalion’s worth of forces will always be available to conduct operations. We did not include this type of rotation cycle throughout our analysis because it does not seem 

likely that the ANA will be able to implement a company or 

battalion-sized leave-training-operations rotation cycle by 2015. 

If threat levels decrease during the 2015 to 2018 timeframe and 

beyond, the ANSF may want to implement such a rotation cycle 

in order to increase professionalization, morale, and retention. 

In the next section, we consider the capability gaps of the ANSF in 

the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

Assessment of post-2014 ANSF capability gaps 

We were asked to identify any capability gaps in the ANSF that are 

likely to persist after 2014 and that will require continued support 

from the United States and its allies. 

Assessment 

Before we can identify the ANSF’s capability gaps, we must first identify what capabilities the ANSF require. In plain language, any security force (military or police) must be able to: 

 Sustain its force through recruiting and training 

 Gather information to determine what activities are needed 

 Conduct police or military operations 

 Resupply and maintain equipment 

To successfully conduct those functions, a security force also requires: 

 An appropriate organizational structure to support operations 

 Leadership and planning capabilities 
148

 Information sharing between headquarters and subordinate 

commands, and communications during tactical operations. 

Table 31 summarizes these capabilities using the language of the U.S. 

DoD’s Joint Capability Areas (JCAs).116 The first column of the table 

lists the nine overarching JCAs, and the second column lists a subset 

of the JCA sub-categories that are most relevant to the ANSF. The final column summarizes areas where the ANSF have shortfalls today, 

which we identified by synthesizing the results of a number of previous studies on ANSF capability gaps with our own observations.117

 

116 The JCAs are “collections of like ... capabilities functionally grouped to 

support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision 

making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force 

development and operational planning.” See Capability Portfolio Management. U.S. Department of Defense DoD Directive 7045.20. Sep. 25, 

2008. The JCAs were designed for the U.S. DoD and contain some capabilities that do not apply to the ANSF and some that are more relevant at 

the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Afghan MoD. We 

used the list of JCAs simply to ensure we did not inadvertently omit any 

key ANSF capabilities from our analysis. Also, while the language of the 

JCAs is military specific, the general categories of capability areas apply 

to police forces in Afghanistan as well, since the operations they currently conduct have significant overlap. 

117 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 

2013; John R. Allen, Michele Flournoy, and Michael O’Hanlon. “Toward 

A Successful Outcome in Afghanistan.” Center for a New American Security. May 2013; Catherine Dale. War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report 

R40156. Mar. 9, 2011; Anthony H. Cordesman (with assistance from 

Bryan Gold and Ashley Hess). “The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the 

Challenges of Transition.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 2013; Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to 

Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National 

Army. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General DODIG2012-028. Dec. 9, 2011; Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition 

Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise the Afghan Border Police. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General DODIG-2013-081. May 

24, 2013; Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO-13-218SP. February 11, 2013; Afghan Army Growing, 

but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. 

United States Government Accountability Office GAO-11-66. Jan. 27, 
149

Based on our review of prior studies of ANSF capability gaps as well as 

our own extensive interviews in theater, we assess that the ANSF will 

likely need continued development in all these capability areas during the 2015–2018 timeframe. That said, not all of these capability 

gaps are of equal priority. To identify the highest-priority capability 

gaps, we cross-referenced those in Table 31 against the set of ANSF 

missions in our force-sizing framework. Doing so highlighted six capability gaps that, if not addressed, might result in the inability of the 

ANSF to perform those critical missions, thereby imparting risk to the 

operational goals (and therefore the U.S. policy goal). These are: 

 Mobility 

 Air support 

 Logistics (maintenance, supply, contracting) 

 Communications and coordination between ANSF pillars 

 Intelligence gathering and analysis 

 Recruiting and training of personnel with specialty skills (including police task forces, SOF, and the air force) 

Over the next few pages, we describe further how we arrived at these 

key capability gaps, the nature of each, and how each shortfall could 

be addressed, using Afghan or international resources. We considered not only financial resources, but the full range of ways and 

means of addressing capability shortfalls, including doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 

(DOTMLPF). 

Table 31. Summary of ANSF capability gaps, by Joint Capability Area 

Joint Capability Area 

JCA sub-categories 

relevant to ANSF Current and expected ANSF shortfalls 

Force support Force preparation Recruiting (specialty skills)

Training (specialty skills) 

Health Casualty evacuation and treatment 

Battlespace awareness Intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance Collection, analysis, and dissemination 

 

2011; Obaid Younossi et al. The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
150

Force application 

Maneuver Vehicle and airborne mobility 

Engagement 

Battalion-sized operations

Fires (ability to employ mortars and artillery)

Close air support 

Logistics 

Supply Inventory management

Supply distribution 

Maintain Equipment maintenance 

Operational contract 

support 

Contract management (e.g., for food service 

and equipment/facilities maintenance) 

Engineering Counter-IED

Construction 

Installations support Base security

Facilities maintenance 

Command and control 

Organization Unity of effort across ANSF pillars

Leadership 

Planning 

Strategic, operational, and tactical planning 

Monitoring and assessment of operations

Planning of follow-on operations 

Net-centric Information exchange Communications (connectivity between headquarters units and tactical radios) 

Protection Prevent and mitigate 

kinetic attacks 

Checkpoint and base security

Reinforcement plans and capabilities 

Building partnerships Communications 

Relationship building with government 

officials, community leaders, and the public 

(especially for police)

Relationships with coalition forces 

Corporate management Compliance Audits, inspections, and other anti-corruption 

measures 

Mobility 

Mobility is an essential prerequisite for the ANA to operate as described in our force sizing framework. The ANA require mobility to 

reinforce district centers or other key areas in Tiers 4 and 5. They also require mobility to conduct battalion-sized clearing operations in 

Tier 3. We also noted the need for the border police to have mobile 

interdiction forces, particularly along the northeastern border areas 

with Pakistan. Special Operations Forces also require mobility to 

reach their targets. SOF would benefit greatly from air mobility (as 

discussed in the next capability gap on air support), but they can also 

conduct many missions via ground transportation. 
151

The gap in ground-based mobility capabilities can be addressed in 

several ways: 

 Additional vehicles. Additional international resources would be 

required to procure additional vehicles, if appropriate (determining how many additional vehicles may be needed was beyond the scope of this study). We note that the ANA Special 

Operations Command began fielding several Mobile Strike 

Force companies in early 2013 and the conventional ANA 

stood up four Mobile Strike Force battalions during this past 

summer. These forces have armored vehicles and more ground 

mobility than other ANA forces or SOF, and are intended to act 

as quick reaction forces to support other ANSF units. That said, 

because these units are so new, their operational capabilities 

are not yet known. 

 Redistribution of existing mobility assets. The MoI and MoD could 

assess whether the current distribution of vehicles between 

ANA battalions and ABP units is appropriate, given the threats 

and terrain in each unit’s area of operations. Developing and 

implementing an equipment redistribution plan, however, depends on whether Afghan decision makers at the MoI and 

MoD can come to agreement on such an issue. International 

advisors may be able to assist the MoI and MoD in developing 

equipment-appropriate plans and to work through the political 

and personal difficulties involved with transferring equipment 

between units, regions, and commanders—though we anticipate this could be a difficult, and lengthy, process. 

 Improved logistics and maintenance capabilities. These would reduce the number of broken vehicles across the country and increase their vehicles’ availability. Our interviews in theater 

identified this as a current point of emphasis of U.S. and 

NATO forces. 

Logistics 

The ANSF’s ability to maintain its vehicles and aircraft is the most essential factor in the ANSF’s ability to be—and remain—a mobile 

force. The commanding general of ISAF has highlighted ANSF logistics as one of the top areas requiring significant improvement over 

the next few years, and we heard his comments echoed in nearly all 
152

of our interviews across Afghanistan.118 Addressing the ANSF’s logistical shortfalls will require a comprehensive approach to address several interrelated issues, including: 

 Supply shortfalls. The Afghan supply system currently has national-level shortfalls in some supplies, such as spare parts required for vehicle maintenance and disposable medical 

equipment (e.g., personal first aid kits and tourniquets). Currently, financial resources are available to procure these supplies. The problem is that appropriate numbers of parts have 

not been ordered from international vendors.119 International 

advisors are assisting the MoI and MoD with forecasting and 

ordering supplies. 

 Inventory distribution. The ANSF logistics system is currently a 

hybrid between the Western-style pull system (units should order supplies when they need them) and the Soviet-style push 

system (headquarters sends out supplies and parts on a fixed 

schedule or as it sees fit). International advisors are assisting 

the MoI and MoD in developing improved inventory management and distribution systems that will work within the Afghan 

context. Given the magnitude of this problem, it is likely to 

remain an issue in the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

 Logistics for SOF. The ANA Corps commanders own the regional 

supply centers and ISAF advisors report that they do not always 

share their scarce resources with military units that are not under their control (e.g., ANA SOF). In addition, SOF have specialty equipment, such as night vision goggles and weaponsmounted lights and lasers that are not part of the conventional 

ANA forces’ supply chain. U.S. advisors told us that U.S. SOF 

routinely provide parts for and repair these items outside ANA 

logistics and maintenance processes. This enables ANA SOF to 

continue conducting operations, but does not help build a sustainable logistics process for them. 

 

118 General Joseph Dunford. “Commander ISAF’s Afghanistan Update, 

Summer 2013.” 

119 Authors’ interview with RC – South personnel. Afghanistan. Aug. 12-20, 

2013. 
153

 Lack of trained maintenance personnel for basic equipment. This is 

the case for items such as generators and Ford Rangers (the 

primary vehicle for Afghan army and police forces). Training 

courses are available to teach soldiers to repair generators and 

vehicles, though we note that the ANA have difficulty retaining 

soldiers with specialized skills: once a solider has these skills, he 

can earn more money by opening a repair shop than by staying 

in the army. This problem is not easily solved. 

 Lack of trained maintenance personnel for advanced equipment. This 

is the case for aircraft and engineering vehicles. Training personnel to repair specialized equipment takes several years and 

requires literacy and often proficiency in English. The ANSF 

could hire additional contractors (international and/or Afghan) to maintain vehicles, other equipment, facilities, and 

aircraft. This would require additional international financial 

resources, as well as additional contract management capabilities within the ANSF. 

 Limited staff capacity to manage contracts. The MoI currently contracts out all vehicle and facility maintenance across the country, and the ANA could resolve some of their maintenance 

shortfalls by hiring additional civilian contractors. The ANSF, 

however, have extremely limited staff capabilities to manage 

budgets, disburse funding, monitor contract progress, and ensure contract compliance. International advisors could help the 

MoI and MoD develop training courses for staff officers at the 

provincial police headquarters and corps (or brigade) headquarters. 

Air support 

The AAF does not have the capability to close the gaps in close air 

support and air mobility caused by the drawdown of U.S. and NATO 

forces. Given the AAF’s difficulty in recruiting and training personnel 

and in maintaining the equipment it currently has, we do not recommend procuring additional airframes for the AAF in the 2015–

2018 timeframe—especially if they are aircraft not currently in the 
154

AAF inventory.120 As a result, the ANSF will face two corresponding 

capability gaps: 

 Limited close air support capabilities. The AAF currently has very 

limited capability to provide close air support (CAS) to the 

ANA, and it will continue to have limited CAS capabilities, even 

with the twenty A-29 Super Tucano fixed-wing light-attack aircraft it is expected to receive over the next few years. The AAF 

has considered arming its Mi-17 transport helicopters to provide additional attack capabilities (e.g., by adding rockets and 

heavy machine guns). If this were done, it could help reduce 

the gap in close air support by supplementing the A-29s or 

bridging the gap until the A-29s are fully operational.121 It does 

not appear, however, that the AAF currently has concrete and 

funded plans to do this. 

The ANA could at least partially make up for the reduction in 

CAS by increasing their ground-based artillery support. Currently, each ANA brigade is authorized to have one artillery 

unit as part of its combat support battalion. In many parts of 

Afghanistan today, the ANA are not using their artillery personnel and equipment as intended. Instead, they are using the 

artillery-trained solders as regular infantry, to increase the 

number of personnel available to stand on checkpoints. If this 

practice were stopped, the ANA would have more artillerymen 

performing their designated role. 

 Diminished air mobility capabilities. ANA SOF are currently dependent upon U.S. and NATO air transport, and in particular, 

 

120 The AAF will be significantly challenged to fly and maintain the aircraft 

already planned for their inventory. The addition of new type model series aircraft would further complicate the AAF logistics, maintenance, 

and training systems. 

121 “Afghanistan National Security Forces Airpower Requirements Review.” 

ANSF Program of Record Review Team Information Paper. Feb. 28, 

2010. Several members of our Senior Review Panel felt strongly that the 

A-29s were not the best platform for providing CAS to the ANSF, and 

that arming the Mi-17s or purchasing additional Mi-35 attack helicopters 

would be a better option. A number of interviewees in theater expressed 

similar views. 
155

helicopter lift. Some of this capability could be filled by leaving 

some U.S. air assets in Afghanistan after 2014, in particular to 

support the ANA SOF’s counterterrorism mission set. As coalition helicopter transport becomes less available, ANA SOF will 

have to travel more by ground. Since ground transportation is 

difficult in many areas of Afghanistan, and is inherently slower 

than air transport, this will reduce the effectiveness and operational reach of the ANA SOF. Furthermore, driving requires 

coordination with other elements of the ANSF that control 

roads and check points, potentially slowing ANA SOF forces 

down even more and increasing the likelihood of friction between them and other pillars of the ANSF.122

Coordination 

Our observations and interviews in theater identified effective coordination between the pillars of the ANSF as a correlate of operational 

success and poor coordination as a correlate of operational failure. 

But the root cause of the ANSF’s problems with coordination is no 

longer equipment—the ANSF have largely solved issues such as radio 

shortfalls and U.S. and NATO personnel are helping the ANSF set up 

communications equipment at headquarters facilities, such as the 

provincial Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs). Instead, the 

ANSF’s coordination issues are a result of: 

 Inter-personal issues and lack of trust. At the tactical level, the main 

problem with coordination between ANSF pillars today is interpersonal. Where army, police, SOF, NDS, and Afghan government officials trust each other, they share information and 

effectively coordinate operations. In areas where Afghan leaders do not trust each other, U.S. and NATO advisors have 

sometimes been able to facilitate coordination by acting as gobetweens. But this gap will widen as those advisors decrease in 

number. Going forward, coordination issues must be addressed 

by Afghan leadership. But given their track record to date, we 

assess that coordination problems will persist post-2014. 

 

122 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. July 

2013. 
156

 Complex organizational structures. Another piece of the coordination problem is organizational. For example, the ANA maintains control of SOF and Mobile Strike Force assets at the 

national level, and ANA Corps commanders must reach up to 

their higher headquarters to coordinate with these forces. In 

addition, the police have a complex command and control 

structure, such that the various types of police (e.g., AUP, 

ANCOP, ALP, Afghan Anti-Crime Police, and special police 

units) all work for different deputy ministers within the MoI. 

U.S. and NATO advisors can provide advice on how to streamline such processes, but streamlining the command structure 

within the ANA or ANP would require action at the highest 

levels of the MoD and MoI, respectively. 

Intelligence 

Like all military forces, the ANSF require information and intelligence to inform operational planning. Over the past few years, U.S. 

and NATO forces have been sharing a great deal of intelligence with 

the ANSF—in particular, ANA SOF have been extremely dependent 

on U.S. SOF for intelligence gathering and analysis, and mission 

planning based on that intelligence. The ANSF will be able to collect 

some information and intelligence, particularly from human sources. 

Additionally, our interviews identified general acknowledgement that 

the NDS runs a significant and successful intelligence source network 

across Afghanistan. Going forward, if the police are able to transition 

from fixed checkpoints to community policing, they should also be 

able to gather more information. The ANSF will suffer, however, from 

the decline in technical intelligence such as video from unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) and signals intelligence as the United States 

and NATO draws down their own capabilities in these areas. 

 Diminished capability to gather intelligence, particular via technical 

and electronic means. In the short term, the U.S. will continue 

sharing intelligence with the ANSF, particularly to support ANA 

SOF and Ktah Khas counterterrorism missions. In the longer 

term, the ANSF could develop greater capacity for intelligence 

gathering through technical means (such as signals intelligence and UAVs). However, the key capability constraint here 

is not equipment, but qualified and trained personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. 
157

 Diminished capability for intelligence analysis. Similarly, the gap in 

intelligence analysis and fusion requires additional personnel 

with highly specialized training and skills—personnel that are 

in short supply but in high demand across the country. 

Recruiting and training personnel with specialty skills 

The final potentially show-stopping capability gap is that, in general, 

the ANSF have limited numbers of personnel with specialty skills, 

such as intelligence analysis, police task forces, forensic analysts, SOF, 

pilots, and aircraft mechanics. Several factors work against the ANSF’s 

ability to recruit additional highly-qualified personnel: 

 Limited recruiting pool. This problem is likely not solvable in the 

immediate term, given the low levels of education across the 

country. There is simply a glaring lack of skilled human capital 

in Afghanistan. In the longer term, the gains made in education over the past decade will broaden the potential pool of recruits, but this is likely to take longer to realize than the 

timeframe of this study. 

 Lengthy vetting process for sensitive positions. This is an issue for 

some units, such as special police, Ktah Khas, and the Special 

Mission Wing. 

 Limited training capacity. The ANSF also have limited capabilities 

to train personnel for these specialty functions. While the 

ANSF are expected to be largely self-sufficient in training for 

basic police and military skills by 2015, they will not be selfsufficient in training specialty personnel. For example, Afghan 

trainers provide only about half of the instruction for air crew 

training.123 To address this, the international community could 

provide trainers inside Afghanistan or pay to send highlyqualified and vetted recruits abroad for training.124

 

123 “NATC-A Story Level I and II Combined.” PowerPoint presentation prepared by NATO Air Training Command. Aug. 2013. 

124 A number of Afghan pilots and pilot candidates have traveled to the U.S. 

for English language, instrument, and undergraduate pilot training. In 

limited numbers, trainees continue to travel abroad to schools in the 

U.S., the United Arab Emirates, and the Czech Republic. “NATO Air 
158

Conclusion 

Table 32 summarizes the six key capability gaps that may limit the 

ANSF’s ability to conduct the critical missions we identified in our 

force-sizing framework and identifies whether the capability gaps require international assistance in the 2015 to 2018 timeframe.125

Table 32. Capability gaps that could prevent the ANSF from conducting critical missions 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe 

Critical capability gap 

Requires international assistance 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe? 

Mobility Yes. 

— May require additional mobility assets, 

especially vehicles for the border police. 

— Advisors could help MoI and MoD assess 

whether vehicle redistribution is feasible and appropriate. 

Logistics 

(maintenance, 

supply, 

contracting) 

Yes. 

— Advisors to help ANSF work through inventory management and 

contracting issues. 

— May require additional international funding to pay for additional 

contractors to maintain equipment. 

Air support Yes. 

— U.S. could leave air assets as part of the post-2015 assistance 

force, especially to provide air mobility to SOF and counterterrorism forces. 

Communications and 

coordination between 

ANSF pillars 

No. 

— These issues must be addressed by ANSF leadership. U.S. and 

NATO can provide advice on streamlining cross-pillar ANSF coordination processes. 

 

Training Command Afghanistan (NATC-A)/438 Air Expeditionary Wing 

Welcomes Center for Naval Analysis.” PowerPoint presentation prepared 

by NATO Air Training Command. Aug. 2013. 

125 We derived the ways that the international community could assist with 

these capability gaps based on our interviews in theater (Aug. 2013) and 

our research into the ANSF’s capability gaps. 
159

Table 32. Capability gaps that could prevent the ANSF from conducting critical missions 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe 

Critical capability gap 

Requires international assistance 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe? 

Intelligence gathering 

and analysis 

Yes. 

— U.S. ISR assets, especially in support of the ANA SOF’s counterterrorism mission, may need to be retained within Afghanistan. 

— International advisors and trainers to teach intelligence collections, analysis, and dissemination. 

— International advisors to assist police in developing community 

policing techniques to better gather police intelligence. 

Recruiting and training 

personnel with specialty 

skills 

Recruiting: No. 

— The recruiting pool for personnel requiring high levels of education or specialty skills is limited by the low levels of education in 

Afghanistan. 

Training: Yes. 

— International personnel to conduct specialty training within Afghanistan. 

— Send qualified recruits for training abroad. 

We conclude that international support (to include the presence of advisors) 

will be required to address the gaps in mobility, logistics, air support, intelligence gathering and analysis, and training of specialty skills though at 

least 2018. 

In the next section, we address whether the resources available to the 

ANSF are sufficient to address these key capability gaps. 

Assessment of current ANSF resource proposals 

We were asked to analyze whether current proposals for resourcing 

the ANSF after 2014 are adequate to establish and maintain longterm security for the Afghan people, and implications of the underresourcing of the ANSF for U.S. national security interests. 

Assessment 

The last formal declaration of the international community’s plan for 

the future of the ANSF came at the summit held in Chicago in May 

2012. At this conference, the Heads of State of ISAF coalition partner 

nations and the Government of Afghanistan issued a joint declaration 

on the future of the ANSF. It stated, in part: 
160

The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined 

by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 

with an estimated annual budget of U.S. $4.1 billion.... As 

the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least U.S. $500m in 2015, with the aim 

that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.126 

At the Chicago Summit, the U.S. pledged $2.3 billion, other countries and international organizations pledged $1.3 billion, and the 

Afghan government pledged $0.5 billion toward the expected $4.1 

billion per year cost of an ANSF sized at 228,500. 

At a size of 373,400 personnel, our calculated ANSF is significantly 

larger than that envisioned by the U.S. and NATO at the 2012 Chicago Summit. It is also likely to be more expensive. Unfortunately, due 

a lack of detailed data on the current cost of the ANSF, we were unable to determine exactly how much more our calculated force of 

373,400 would cost. We were able to apply planning factors from several recent official cost estimates to our calculated force. These figures, shown in Table 33, primarily consist of the costs to train and pay 

forces, as well as the fuel and ammunition required for operations. 

Having reviewed each source’s assumptions, we assess that it is highly 

likely these numbers underestimate the total cost of sustaining 

equipment and infrastructure. Therefore, they should be viewed as 

highly approximate and we recommend further analysis be done to 

generate an accurate cost estimate of the 373,400-member force. 

 

126 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. May 21, 2012. 
161

Table 33. Rough estimates of annual ANSF sustainment costs 

Source 

Estimated

annual cost of 

352,000 ANSF 

Additional 

annual cost of 

30,000 ALP 

Total estimated 

annual cost 

(382,000 ANSF) 

Total estimated 

cost of 373,400 

ANSF

OSD Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation (CAPE)127

$6.5B $180M $6.7B $6.0B

NATO Training Mission – 

Afghanistan (NTM-A) / Combined Security Transition 

Command – Afghanistan 

(CSTC-A)128

$4.6B $180M $4.8B $4.8B

The important take-away from Table 33 is that both estimates significantly exceed the $4.1 billion pledged at the 2012 Chicago Summit. 

Although the Afghan economy is projected to grow robustly during 

through 2018,129 it does not appear that the Afghan government will 

be able to close this funding gap by itself. The $500 million pledged 

by the Afghan government at the Chicago Summit already represents 

14 percent of Afghanistan’s projected 2015 domestic revenues.130

In addition to the $2.3 billion per annum that the U.S. has pledged 

to support ANSF salaries and operations through 2017, the U.S. Congress is also considering a $1.15 billion package of initiatives that was 

included as part of the DoD’s larger Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Afghan Security Forces Fund submission (this package is sometimes referred to 

as “enhancements above the APoR”).131 As noted in Table 34, these 

 

127 Estimate for 2017, from “ANSF Cost Analysis.” Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation briefing. Aug. 25, 2011. 

128 Estimate for 2018, from “Capability Delivered to the ANSF.” NATO Training Mission / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 

briefing. May 2, 2013. 

129 Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014. Vol. 2: Main Report. 

The World Bank. May 2012. 

130 Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. United States Government Accountability Office GAO-13-218SP. Feb. 2013. 

131 As of the writing of this report, the “enhancements above the APoR” had 

not yet been approved by the U.S. Congress (authors’ communication 

with personnel in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), 

Nov. 21, 2013). 
162

enabler initiatives may help to mitigate some of the critical capability 

gaps that we identified in the previous section. 

Table 34. Comparison of enhancements above the APoR to critical ANSF capability gaps 

Critical capability gaps Enhancements above the APoR 

Mobility $1.0 billion for 116 armored personnel carriers for two Mobile 

Strike Force battalions, plus 180 additional specialized MSF 

vehicles 

$14 million for man-portable IED countermeasures 

Logistics $49 million for training maintenance and logistics personnel 

Intelligence gathering and analysis $56 million for expanded aerostat-based and tower-based 

sensor coverage 

That said, we do not necessarily endorse any of these specific enabler 

initiatives; nor were we able to examine whether they are the most 

cost effective ways to close the ANSF’s capability gaps. In addition, the 

capability gaps we identified for the ANSF are systemic problems that 

will not be solved quickly via materiel solutions. Therefore, we assess 

that U.S. and NATO enablers, to include advisors, will be required to 

assist the ANSF in addressing (at a minimum) capability gaps in mobility, logistics, air support, intelligence gathering and analysis, and 

training of specialized skills, through at least 2018. 

Conclusion 

Our threat assessment concludes that the Taliban will resurge in the 

2015–2018 timeframe. Thus, the ANSF will require sufficient forces 

and capabilities to maintain security in the face of significant threats 

and with substantially fewer U.S. and NATO forces in support. Maintaining the ANSF at 373,400—well above the planned end-strength of 

228,500 (plus an additional 30,000 ALP) envisioned at the 2012 Chicago Summit—will likely increase the annual financial requirement 

for the U.S. and the international donor community. While we were 

unable to calculate an exact cost, rough estimates suggest the increase will be on the order of $1 billion or more per annum. 

Our assessment of capability gaps for the ANSF made clear that the 

critical gaps are systemic problems not easily solved via the provision 

of materiel solutions. As such, while it appears the enhancements 

above the APoR can help mitigate the ANSF’s critical capability gaps, 
163

we assess that they will not close them and that additional U.S. and 

NATO enablers, to include advisors, will be required in theater 

through at least 2018.

Conclusion of independent assessment of the ANSF 

Using a quantitative troop-to-task analysis tied via five security tiers to 

a qualitative future threat assessment: 

We conclude the ANSF (including the Afghan Local Police) should have a 

total end-strength of about 373,400 through at least 2018. This force size is 

significantly larger, and likely to be more expensive, than that envisioned by 

the U.S. and NATO at the 2012 Chicago Summit. 

The envisioned drawdown of the ANSF to a significantly smaller force 

size was predicated on an assumption of a much-reduced insurgent 

threat in the post-2014 timeframe. Our threat assessment finds this assumption to be faulty. As a result: 

We conclude that proceeding with the planned drawdown of the ANSF as 

announced at the Chicago Summit will put the current U.S. policy goal for 

Afghanistan at risk. Instead, we recommend that the international community establish a new plan to fund and sustain the ANSF at an end-strength of 

about 373,400, with a proportionally sized assistance mission (including 

advisors), through at least 2018. 

If the international community did this, and if the ANSF are successful 

through 2018:

We assess that a negotiated political settlement to end the war would become 

much more likely in the 2019–2023 timeframe.

The next section will discuss the findings from our additional assessments. 

 
164

This page intentionally left blank 
165

Additional assessments 

This section contains our assessments of the additional topics of interest to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). In it, we address 

the capabilities of the MoD and MoI and the requirement for MoD 

and MoI advising; the legal authorities required to enable the post2014 U.S. assistance mission; the relationship between the ANSF and 

the Pakistani military; and likely ANSF responses to several political 

scenarios. Each assessment is a stand-alone topic; as such, the discussion of each will begin with a brief summary of the results, followed 

by the details of our assessment. We end this section with an overall 

conclusion of our findings from these additional assessments. 

Supporting the ANSF: Assessment of the capabilities of the 

MoD and MoI and the requirement for MoD and MoI advising 

We were asked to assess the capabilities of the Ministries of Defense 

and Interior to perform the planning, programming, budgeting, 

management, oversight, and sustainment functions for their respective forces. We were also asked to assess the appropriate proportion of 

military and civilian advisors to assist the MoD and MoI and their required functional/professional expertise. We begin with a summary 

of our findings, followed by the details of our assessment. 

Summary 

We found that the MoD and MoI face a considerable set of challenges, including inadequate long-range planning; a lack of staff development and training; poor logistics; a lack of a professional civil 

service; pervasive corruption; inadequate budget, accounting, and 

cost-control systems; and low levels of budget execution. These challenges will almost certainly persist beyond 2014. 

We assess that for the MoD and MoI to function at a reasonably proficient 

level, and to carry out their responsibilities to support army and police forces in the field, they require the following four core capabilities: logistics; 
166

strategy and policy planning; financial management; and personnel management.

In addition, we found that six institutional enablers are important for 

ministerial success: anti-corruption; gender integration; local ownership; information technology; intelligence; and “civilianization.” 

Using a combination of primary sources (to include our own observations and in-theater interviews) and previous studies: 

We conclude that the MoD and MoI are not likely to be fully independent at 

any of these capabilities or enablers by 2018. We therefore assess that international advisors within the MoD and MoI will be required through at least 

2018. 

The absence of advisors will not likely lead to the collapse of the 

fielded forces in the short term, but it has the potential to undermine 

their combat effectiveness over the timeframe of this study, thereby 

imparting additional risk to the U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan. 

We examine several different ways an advisor program could be constructed (e.g., bilateral versus multilateral, civilian versus military), 

but we conclude that there is no obvious “best choice” as each approach has significant advantages and disadvantages. We therefore 

refrain from making a specific recommendation as to how best to 

construct an advisor program and instead suggest that the U.S. 

should make a clear-eyed decision on the structure of such a program 

based on the pros and cons we have identified in our analysis. Finally, 

we conclude that a thorough and deliberate advisor selection and 

training process—one that emphasizes previous experience, maturity, 

professional skills, and the ability to work across cultures—would 

help strengthen the post-2014 ministerial advisory effort. 

Methodology 

To make our assessment, we followed these steps: 

1. We examined the relevant security sector reform (SSR) literature, to include studies on Afghanistan as well as other conflict 

and post-conflict settings such as Iraq. Among other things, analyzing this literature helped us identify best practices and 
167

think about “ideal types” of security institutions and their required capabilities. 

2. We used results from our earlier ANSF capability gap analysis to 

inform where the ANSF needed help from the MoD and MoI. 

We also drew from our in-country interviews with U.S. and Afghan personnel, government studies, and official documents to 

identify required core capabilities for the MoD and MoI. Using 

the same sources, we identified a set of critical “institutional 

enablers” that are important for helping ministries to function 

as modern bureaucracies.132

3. We used these same sources to assess whether the MoD and 

MoI were likely to be able to perform any of these of core capabilities and institutional enabling activities independently in 

the 2015–2018 timeframe and if not, what their key shortfalls 

would be. 

4. We leveraged previous CNA analyses, field research in Afghanistan, government reports, and the SSR literature to identify 

and assess the characteristics that advisors working in the MoD 

and MoI should possess. We also identified the advantages and 

disadvantages of different approaches to advising (e.g., personal mentoring versus functional advising). 

5. We leveraged studies on advising in previous conflicts to provide general recommendations on identifying, recruiting, and 

training advisors in a way that will enhance the effectiveness of 

ministerial reform in Afghanistan. 

Caveats 

The scope of this assessment is not comprehensive. Time and resource constraints prevented us from an all-inclusive review and analysis. For example, we do not develop specific recommendations 

 

132 Our research for this task included in-depth, semi-structured interviews 

with senior officials, their staffs, and advisors at ISAF, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), CSTC-A, MoI, and MoD. Aug. 12–24, 2013. Two key documents for our research were: Report on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013; and Afghan Ministry of Interior Advisor Guide. Kabul: NTM-A/CSTC-A, May 2011. 
168

about the size of the security ministries, nor do we identify the numbers of advisors needed to support the MoD and MoI in the future. 

Instead, the results of this assessment are intended to show the broad 

contours of Afghan ministerial capabilities; suggest areas where international advisors should concentrate their efforts; and highlight 

advisor characteristics that are the most salient in terms of strengthening the security ministries as institutions. 

Finally, while the MoD and MoI are distinct and separate ministries, 

they have much in common. The fielded forces they command and 

support have different roles, missions, and functions, but these frequently overlap in the field. The general capabilities the MoD and 

MoI must develop are largely identical—and are in fact features of 

any competent modern bureaucracy. That said, we recognize these 

ministries do have some particular requirements, as we note below in 

our discussion of advisor skill sets. 

Assessment 

“Ideal-type” security ministries 

Having reviewed the relevant SSR literature, we find that there is no 

universally agreed upon definition of security sector reform. According to one U.S. government definition, SSR is: 

the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, 

security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these 

services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate 

public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.133 

For its part, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development describes the goal of SSR as increasing “the ability of partner 

countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in 

 

133 Security Sector Reform, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. 

DoD, and U.S. Department of State. Feb. 2009, accessed Aug. 20, 2013, 

at www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf. 
169

a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of 

governance and the rule of law.”134

However, the differences among the many SSR definitions in circulation are largely ones of nuance and emphasis.135 Similarly, an analysis 

of the literature reveals a widespread agreement among scholars and 

practitioners about what SSR should be seeking to achieve, at least in 

very general terms. The literature stresses the importance of transparency, respect for human rights and gender, local ownership, and 

rule of law.136

 

Transparency, according to Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, means that “basic information about security policies, planning and resourcing [is] accessible both to the civil authorities and to 

members of the public.”137 In the view of David Law, the promotion of 

transparency and accountability is “the bread and butter of security 

sector reform.”138 SSR literature also emphasizes the importance of 

 

134 DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

Paris: OECD. 2005:11. The OECD defines the “security system” in broad 

terms to include not only the security forces (that is, the police, armed 

forces, and intelligence services), but also penal institutions and the judiciary, as well as “the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g., Parliament, the Executive, and 

the Defence Ministry).”

135 For more on the definitional and conceptual problems surrounding SSR, 

see David Chuter. “Understanding Security Sector Reform.” Journal of 

Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No. 2. Apr. 2006. 

136 For a representative statement, see “EU Concept for ESDP Support to 

Security Sector Reform.” Council of the European Union, Brussels. Oct. 

13, 2005, accessed Sep. 21, 2013, at 

www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/resources/EU_Concept_for_ESDP_s

upport_to_Security_Sector_Reform.pdf. 

137 Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka. “The Challenges of Security 

Sector Reform.” SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and 

International Security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Oxford University Press, June 2002, accessed Sep. 5, 2013, available 

at www.sipri.org/yearbook/2002/files/SIPRIYB0204.pdf. 

138 David M. Law. “Transparency, Accountability and Security Sector Reform 

in South East Europe: An Analysis of the Stability Pact Self-Assessment 

Studies.” In Eden Cole et al., eds. Defense and Security Sector Govern-
170

rule of law. Christoph Bleiker and Marc Krupanski conclude that 

“peacebuilding” requires both the rule of law and SSR: “On a conceptual level the two are mutually reinforcing and intertwined, while 

on a practical level their complementary application is indispensable.”139 The literature also stresses the importance of the respect for 

human rights and gender.140 

Much of the SSR literature focuses on political and procedural questions surrounding the organization, training, and oversight of security forces, and the relationship between those forces and the civilian 

communities they are intended to protect. Relatively little attention 

has been paid to ministerial reform—and most of what has been written focuses on MoD development.141

 

That said, there is recognition among some leading specialists that 

the reform of security ministries, and the strengthening of their institutional capacities, should be a central SSR component. Andrew 

Rathmell highlights the importance of international assistance to security ministries that includes “technical advice in situ, support for 

development of new management systems and procedures, technical 

 

ance and Reform in South East Europe Self-Assessment Studies: Regional Perspectives. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces, 2004.

139Christoph Bleiker and Marc Krupanski. The Rule of Law and Security 

Sector Reform: Conceptualising a Complex Relationship. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012. 

140 See for example Eirin Mobekk. “Gender, Women and Security Sector Reform.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 2: 278-291; and Arnold 

Luethold. “Security Sector Reform in the Arab Middle East: A Nascent 

Debate.” In Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds. Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 

2004.

141 Alison Laporte-Oshiro. “From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons 

from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR.” U.S. Institute of Peace, Peace 

Brief No. 115, Nov. 17, 2011, accessed Aug. 10, 2013, at 

www.usip.org/sites/default/files/from%20militants%20to%20policeme

n.pdf. 
171

training for ministry staff, and the creation of an ongoing education 

process.”142

 

As noted above, ministries of defense and interior have much in 

common functionally and institutionally. However, interior ministry 

reform presents its own challenges, particularly for the United States. 

Lacking an MoI counterpart at home, U.S. decision-makers, advisors, 

and military officers have often failed to appreciate the history, roles, 

missions, functions, and requirements of interior ministries—as 

demonstrated in the case of Iraq.143

Essential MoD and MoI ministerial capabilities 

Institutions as large and complex as the Afghan MoD and MoI face 

considerable challenges. These include, but are not limited to, the 

following: 

 Inadequate long-range planning144

 High leadership turnover at senior levels145

 Lack of staff development and training146

 

142 Andrew Rathmell. “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why is the Reform of the Ministry of the Interior so Hard?” Center for Strategic and 

International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project Special Briefing, Nov. 2007: 13.

143 See for example Robert M. Perito and Madeline Kristoff. “Iraq’s Interior 

Ministry: The Key to Police Reform.” U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, Jul. 

2009. In addition, interior ministries—in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many 

other countries—are highly politicized in ways that defense ministries 

typically are not. For example, the greater degree of police contact with 

day-to-day life (relative to the army) means that policemen have greater 

opportunities to enrich themselves through corruption. Moreover, they 

are often useful to powerful political actors, who can deploy them in 

pursuit of narrow personal, community, or ethnic purposes. This gives 

interior ministries a political dynamic that is less likely to exist in defense 

ministries. 

144 Authors’ interview with CSTC-A/Ministerial Advising Groups (MAGs). 

Afghanistan. Aug. 15, 2013.

145 Authors’ interview with CSTC-A/MAGs. Afghanistan. Aug. 15, 2013.

146 Authors’ interview with ISAF personnel. Afghanistan. Aug. 13, 2013.
172

 Poor logistics147

 Lack of a professional civil service148

 Pervasive corruption149

 Inadequate budget, accounting, and cost-control systems and 

low levels of budget execution150

In the past, CSTC-A leaders have articulated a daunting number of 

what it terms “areas of focus,” ranging from personnel to gender integration to intelligence.151 More recently, the command has prioritized these areas and is concentrating on a smaller set of institutional 

 

147 Author’s interview with senior MoD and MoI officials. Afghanistan. Aug. 

18, 2013. 

148 In the case of the MoI, the ministry lacks “merit-based appointments, adequate pay grades, vetting of senior political appointments and monitoring of the reform process.” Fatima Ayb, Sari Kouvo and Rachel 

Wareham. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” International Center for Transitional Justice and The Initiative for Peacebuilding. Apr. 

2009, accessed Sep. 7, 2013, at www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/ 

pdf/Security_Sector_Reform_in_Afghanistan.pdf.

149 Mark Checchia. “Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces.” 

Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Jan. 2012, accessed Aug. 29, 2013, at 

www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Security%20Archive/

CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption-in-ANSF_Jan12.pdf. 

150 The Afghan MoD is able to execute only 20 percent of its budget—a byproduct of “over-centralization, limited educated human capital, limited 

experience with program management systems, and natural bureaucratic friction.” Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. 

DoD. Jul. 2013: 53. 

151 Mike Farrage. “NTM-A/CSTC-A Orientation.” NTM-A briefing prepared 

by Mike Farrage, Commodore CBE RN, Chief of Staff, undated; Alix 

Julia Boucher. “Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current Practice.” 

Henry L. Stimson Center. Dec. 12, 2009: 24. The GAO lists 28 areas of 

focus for the MoD and 26 for the MoI. Many of these areas overlap. Afghanistan Governance: Performance Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity. United 

States Government Accountability Office GAO-11-907. Sep. 2011, accessed Sep. 20, 2013, at www.gao.gov/assets/330/323498.pdf. 
173

capabilities—an important development, given the likelihood of reduced levels of advisory support after 2014.152

 

Drawing on the SSR literature, the results of our earlier ANSF capability gap analysis, interviews in theater, and government documents 

and studies, we identified the key institutional capabilities that Afghanistan’s security ministries require. Many capabilities are desirable, but based on these sources our assessment is that the following 

are those essential for consistent ministerial progress and effective 

support to the fielded forces: 

 Logistics, including warehousing, the management of facilities, 

and the provision of weapons, uniforms, fuel, and other supplies 

 Strategy/policy planning—that is, the processes through which 

a ministry “can visualize its future and develop the necessary 

operations to achieve that vision”153

 Financial management, such as budgeting, cost accounting, 

and other controls and planning 

 Human resource management, including recruiting, professional development and training 

We have also identified a set of what we term “institutional enablers.” 

Although sometimes categorized in U.S., NATO, and Afghan government documents as capabilities, these are better understood as 

means to an end—namely, the development of more efficient and effective ministries in the post-2014 time period. These enablers are: 

 Anti-corruption policies, programs, and structures—that is, limiting the misuse of authority for personal gain154

 

152 Although the command has narrowed its focus, its capabilities milestone process continues to assess 46 lines of operation in the MoD 

and 31 lines in the MoI. Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013: 54-58. 

153 Robert M. Perito. “The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform.” U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 223. May 2009: 9.
174

 Gender integration, particularly the recruitment of women into the ANP 

 Local ownership, broadly defined as public support for state institutions 

 Information technology, at a level of cost and sophistication 

appropriate for the Afghan context 

 Intelligence—that is, the collection, analysis, and dissemination 

of information on threats to the state and public safety and security 

 “Civilianization,” defined as an increasing role for nonuniformed personnel in the administration of the ministries 

The presence (or absence) of these capabilities and enablers at the 

ministerial level will have an impact on the performance of the ANSF 

in the field. The Afghan security system is highly centralized, with 

most, if not all, important decisions made in Kabul. It is not uncommon for the security ministers to be directly involved in the command and control of operations from Kabul.155 Everything from 

policies, equipment, and personnel decisions flow outward and 

downward from the national level to the regions, provinces, and districts. Inefficiencies, incompetence, and lack of capacity in Kabul 

have knock-on effects on the deployed ANA and ANP, which rely 

heavily on the MoD and MoI for direction, resources, and management. Neglecting ministerial-level capabilities—what has been 

termed the “brains of the system”—can undercut tactical gains and 

cause long-term system-wide paralysis.156

 154 “What is Corruption?” www.transparency.am, Official Website of Transparency International, undated, accessed Oct. 1, 2013, at 

http://transparency.am/corruption.php. 

155 Author interviews with ISAF personnel. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 12–

24, 2013. 

156 Andrew Mackay, Mark Sedra, and Geoff Burt. “Security Sector Reform 

(SSR) in Insecure Environments: Learning from Afghanistan.” Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 8, No. 3. Sep. 2011: p. 8. 
175

Summary of MoD/MoI assessment 

Having analyzed the multitude of sources mentioned above, we identified the key capabilities, institutional enablers, and shortfalls for the 

MoD and MoI as summarized in Table 35 and Table 36. The key 

shortfalls in the fielded forces came from our ANSF capability gap 

analysis. 

Table 35. Core capabilities and key shortfalls of the MoD, MoI, and fielded forces 

Capability Key Shortfalls (MoD) Key Shortfalls (MoI) 

Key Shortfalls 

(Fielded Forces) 

Logistics 

Not fully independent; relies 

on mix of Afghan, ISAF, and 

U.S.-funded contractor support

Heavy reliance on U.S.-

funded contractor support 

Limited abilities to 

manage inventory 

and supply distribution 

Strategy/policy 

Limited planning capabilities; 

gaps in key enabler areas (e.g., 

intelligence) 

Requires coalition support, 

but evidence of growing 

capability 

Limited abilities to 

plan at all levels 

Financial management 

Major gaps in cost accounting, 

budgeting, ability to plan and 

execute a budget 

Major gaps in cost accounting, budgeting, ability to 

plan and execute a budget 

Difficulties letting 

and overseeing contracts 

Human resource 

management 

Lack of career civil service; 

high turnover; lack of staff 

training and development 

Lack of career civil service; 

high turnover; lack of staff 

training and development 

Difficulty recruiting 

and training personnel with specialized 

skills 

Table 36. Institutional enablers and key shortfalls in the MoD, MoI, and fielded forces 

Institutional 

Enabler Key Shortfalls (MoD) Key Shortfalls (MoI) 

Key Shortfalls 

(Fielded Forces) 

Anticorruption Some corruption Endemic corruption at all 

levels 

Lack of inspections and other 

anti-corruption practices 

Gender integration Very few females working 

in the ministry 

Very few females working 

in the ministry 

Very low female recruitment 

levels in ANP 

Local ownership N/A (high level of public 

support exists for ANA) 

Little public support for 

ANP—little or no community policing 

Poor relationships with community leaders and the public

Intelligence 

Lack of analytical expertise 

and heavy reliance on international assistance 

Lack of analytical expertise 

and heavy reliance on international assistance 

Difficulties with intelligence 

collection, analysis, and dissemination, particularly with 

technical intelligence 

Civilianization Posts filled largely by uniformed military 

Posts filled largely by uniformed police 

Many logistics posts (e.g., at 

depots) filled by uniformed 

personnel could be filled by 

civilians 
176

Key themes from our analysis in Table 35 and Table 36 include the 

following: 

 Afghanistan’s security ministries will likely continue to function 

with at least some degree of competence and professionalism 

in the post-2014 period. However, we assess that the MoD and 

MoI will continue to require sustained financial and advisory 

assistance from international donors. Our own observations, 

along with our interviews of U.S. and NATO personnel, indicate that ministerial capacity is unlikely to reach that needed 

for independent, effective support to the fielded forces by 

2015. Additionally, we assess it is unlikely to reach adequate 

administrative and organizational standards prior to 2018. 

 Until recently, the focus of the MoD and MoI has been the 

command and control of fielded forces—as suggested by the 

heavy presence of uniformed personnel in those institutions. 

Indeed, a number of our interviewees described these ministries as having acted as “national police and army headquarters” in years past.157 This emphasis on command and control 

has justified the presence of a large number of uniformed personnel within the MoD and MoI. As a result, there is a large 

gap between the MoD and MoI currently and the ministerial 

ideal types and best practices discussed above. 

 In many of the capability and enabler areas, the Afghan ministries are able to perform only key functions (e.g., logistics) with 

extensive assistance from the international community. 

 Financial administration remains rudimentary and will require 

continued advisory attention and support. Budget execution 

remains well below target levels, and while the MoD has a relatively robust system of paying soldiers via electronic means, the 

MoI has resisted implementation of a similar system, at least in 

part because of its potential to infringe on corrupt practices 

such as “skimming” the pay of policemen. 

 

157 Authors’ interviews with CSTC-A/MAG and ISAF personnel. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
177

 Long-range policy planning remains underdeveloped, and 

should receive continued attention. The MoI’s recently issued 

Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police, although probably 

over-ambitious in its recommendations, nevertheless suggests 

movement in the right direction.158

 An overarching shortfall across the MoD and MoI (and really, 

across all of Afghanistan’s ministries) is a lack of human capital. 

There simply are not enough educated, literate technocrats in 

Afghanistan now relative to the number required for the ministries to be independently effective. This is a problem without 

an easy or quick solution, and it underscores the need for sustained international community support to the ministries going 

forward. 

Clearly, there are a number of significant capability gaps that exist 

within the MoD and MoI relative to their ability to perform the planning, programming, budgeting, management, oversight, and sustainment functions for their respective forces. Our interviews in 

theater and review of other sources strongly suggest that, while the 

capabilities of the ministries are likely to improve between now and 

2015, the capability gaps identified above are not likely to be closed 

by that time. In addition, given how recent the emphasis on ministerial development has been in Afghanistan and the significance of the 

capability gaps we identify relative to the human capital available, we 

assess that these gaps are also unlikely to be closed by 2018. As such, 

we assess the presence of international advisors within the MoD and MoI will 

be required during the timeframe of this study (2015–2018). 

The absence of advisors will not likely lead to the collapse of the 

fielded forces in the short term, but it has the potential to undermine 

their combat effectiveness over the timeframe of this study. Also, the 

lack of advisors in the ministries will significantly stymie their development (and the development of better governance in Afghanistan) 

and increase opportunities for corruption at the national level. 

 

158 Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392–1402. Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior. Apr. 22, 2013. 
178

With this in mind, we next examine the advantages and disadvantages 

of various approaches to structuring a ministerial advising program 

for Afghanistan and characteristics of successful advisors. 

Ministerial advisors 

Building the institutional capacity of Afghanistan’s security ministries 

has been a relatively recent priority for the country’s international 

partners. The NATO organizations initially responsible for bolstering 

Afghanistan’s security forces focused overwhelmingly on organizing, 

training, and equipping the ANSF for offensive operations against insurgents. Given the nature of the threat at the time, NTM-A (established in 2009) had to balance immediate operational support with 

longer-term ministerial reform.159

 

Although a number of countries such as Australia and Germany provide ministerial advisors, as does the European Union Police 

(EUPOL) and a variety of U.S. government agencies, the precise 

number of personnel serving in ministerial advisory positions is unknown.160 Many advisors are contractors and U.S. military personnel, 

though civilian agencies such as the Department of the Treasury and 

the Department of Justice also have advisors within the ministries. 

Civil servants from the U.S. DoD—roughly 70 at any given time—also 

serve in an advisory capacity. Under the Ministry of Defense Advisors 

(MoDA) program, DoD identifies, selects, and trains members of the 

Pentagon’s civil service (typically GS-13s, GS-14s, and GS-15s) for one-

 

159 Although not yet fully approved by NATO, ISAF has divided responsibilities between NTM-A and CSTC-A, with the former responsible for the 

fielded forces and the latter responsible for ministerial development. 

160 Authors’ interview with U.S. DoD policy official. Arlington, Virginia. Sep. 

12, 2013. For more on EU police advisors, see EUPOL–Serving 

Afghanistan, European Police Mission in Afghanistan Newsletter. May 

2012. The mandate of the International Police Coordination Board 

(IPCB) is to synchronize international efforts to reform the MoI in areas 

such as personnel, career development, and finance. Member countries 

and organizations include Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, 

EUPOL, IJC, and the MoI. See “Membership.” IPCB.Wordpress.com, 

Website of the International Police Coordination Board – Afghanistan, 

accessed Sep. 12, 2013, at http://ipcb.wordpress.com/ipcb-boardmeetings/membership. 
179

year assignments in the MoD and MoI.161 Once in theater, these civilian advisors fall under the authority of CSTC-A, which places them in 

ministerial advisory positions.162 

However, CSTC-A has reportedly used some civilian advisors to fill 

staff jobs within the command.163 In addition, not all of the DoD civilians in the MoDA program were career civil servants, according to 

one study.164 A surge of patriotism initially led to a deluge of highly 

qualified DoD personnel, but as the war dragged on, the Pentagon 

reportedly had to recruit short-term hires to generate sufficient personnel.165

Within CSTC-A, the Ministerial Advising Groups (MAGs) have had a 

major role in supporting the MoD and MoI.166 Until recently, ministerial advising had focused on individual mentoring rather than institutional development. Today, through the MAGs, advisors are increasincreasingly stressing capacity-building in areas such as resource 

management (e.g., logistics and finance); transparency and accountability; strategic plans and policies; and human resources management. A member of the civilian Senior Executive Service is in charge 

of each functional area.167 Although the emphasis may be adjusted in 

response to changing developments, our assessment of MoD and MoI 

 

161 For a description of the MoDA program, see “Ministry of Defense Advisors Training Program.” DoD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Personnel and Readiness. 2012, accessed Sep. 20, 2013, available at 

http://modatraining.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/modatraining-booklet-20121.pdf. 

162 Victoria Stattel and Robert M. Perito. “Innovative Transformation: An 

Evaluation of the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan.” 

U.S. Institute of Peace. Feb. 2012: 8. MoDA, according to the authors, is 

the first DoD advisor training program since the Vietnam War. Ibid: 9. 

163 Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed 

for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program. DoD Inspector General 

DODIG-2013-005. Oct. 23, 2013.

164 Stattel and Robert M. Perito. “Innovative Transformation.” 8. 

165 Ibid: 8. 

166 Author’s interview with senior CSTC-A personnel. Afghanistan. Aug. 15, 

2013.

167 Ibid. 
180

capability gaps above suggests that advisors in the near- and mid-term 

will need to continue to focus on the lines of effort currently being 

pursued by the MAGs. That said, we also assess that attention must 

continue to be paid to the institutional enablers identified above. 

The level of attention given to the latter can be less than that given to 

the ministries’ capability gaps, but it should not be completely diminished as these enablers are still very important to the ministries’ overall development. 

Our in-theater research revealed a new effort by U.S. and NATO officials to map the critical ministerial processes that need to exist within 

these areas for the ministries to support the fielded forces effectively. 

Given the nascence of that effort, we were unable to conduct an independent assessment of those mappings to determine where exactly 

advisors would be best placed in the MoD and MoI. Instead, we examined the MoD and MoI organizational structures (see Appendix F) 

along with our other sources to identify in which offices and at what 

level advisors could be most helpful in addressing the capability gaps 

above. As a result, we assess that advisors should focus at the deputy 

minister level within the MoD and MoI.168 Within the MoD, these include the offices of the assistant ministers of defense for personnel 

and education; strategy and policy; and acquisition, technology, and 

logistics. Deputy minister offices within the MoI that should receive 

particular attention include strategy and policy; administration; and 

support. 

In addition, we thought critically about the general characteristics of 

an advising program and advisors themselves to identify pros and 

cons of various ways of structuring a ministerial advisor program, as 

summarized in Table 37. 

 

168 See Appendix F for MoD and MoI organizational diagrams. 
181

Table 37. Comparison of ministerial advising approaches 

Advising

Approach Strengths Weaknesses 

Civilian 

 More “civilian” skills (e.g., planning and budgeting, law-enforcement) 

 Would reinforce the need to “civilianize” the MoD 

and MoI 

 Less deployable (e.g., tend to desire sho

 Smaller and less selective personnel poo

ance on volunteers

 Harder to remove advisors that are unde

Military 

 More deployable and flexible  Easier to remove advisors that are underperforming 

 Undercuts message of requirement to ci

tries 

 Less expertise in “civilian” skills 

 Mismatch between military expertise an

the MoI 

Contractor 

 Easier to find skills otherwise unavailable 

 Easier to remove advisors that are underperforming 

 Financial incentives to prolong assignme

 Increased cost compared to military or c

U.S. – Afghanistan 

Bilateral 

 Simplifies relationships and enhances unity of effort 

 Maintains continuity of advisor priorities and approach 

 Limits pool of available personnel  Places cost burden of advising solely on 

 U.S. does not have an MoI equivalent 

Multilateral (e.g., 

EUPOL and NATO) 

 Increased size and diversity of personnel pool 

 Some NATO members have direct MoI analogs  EUPOL has expertise in developing post-conflict 

civilian policing institutions and strategies beyond that of NATO or its member countries 

 Spreads cost of advising across the international 

community 

 Likely to decrease unity of effort  Risk of significant discontinuities due to 

backgrounds of NATO and EUPOL memgoals and systems of NATO and EUPOL 

 Higher turnover (NATO military membe

shorter tours than U.S.) 
182

Key themes that emerged from our analysis and Table 37 include the 

following: 

 Institutional maturation within the security ministries and what 

is likely to be a reduced advisor presence suggest that U.S. and 

NATO forces should continue to shift emphasis to functional 

advising rather than close-in personal mentoring. Doing so 

would also reduce the risk to ministerial capabilities posed by 

the likelihood of leadership changes in the wake of next year’s 

Afghan presidential election. 

 Advisors with extensive civilian law-enforcement experience 

should have a more prominent role within the MoI. There are 

general organizational and managerial skills that military and 

DoD civilian advisors can impart. But policing policy, programs, 

and oversight have specialized requirements.169 International 

advisors with significant law-enforcement expertise in areas 

such as personnel management, anti-corruption, and community relations are particularly valuable in the MoI context. 

 Turning ministerial advising over to NATO would likely bring 

with it most of the challenges associated with the current system (e.g., the over-militarization of MoI advising)—and introduce new ones (e.g., the problem of integrating competing 

NATO member political goals and approaches). 

Taken together, the comparisons in Table 37 make clear that there is 

no obvious “best approach” to ministerial advising in Afghanistan. 

Rather, whatever approach is chosen will have pros and cons relative 

to others. It will be important going forward for the U.S. to deliberately choose which approaches it endorses with a clear understanding 

of the strengths and weaknesses the approach entails. 

Advisor characteristics 

Earlier studies looking at advisor recruitment, training and performance stretching back to the Vietnam era have identified key charac-

 

169 For more on this point, see David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito. The 

Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010: 50-60. 
183

teristics associated with successful advising.170 These are likely to remain relevant to post-2014 advisory missions in Afghanistan. Key 

characteristics of successful advisors and advisor programs are described below. 

 Selecting the right advisors is critical. In addition to professional expertise, advisors need to bring with them personal qualities such as maturity; empathy for counterparts; and a 

willingness to work in demanding and sometimes dangerous 

environments. Such attributes cannot be taught—they must be 

identified beforehand within the pool of potential advisors. 

 Advisor training should emphasize cultural familiarization; 

building cross-cultural understanding through role-playing and 

other techniques; and language skills. Such training is expensive, but the evidence from earlier advisor experiences suggests 

that it is worth the investment. 

 Building rapport with counterparts is essential to advisor success. This is true at all levels of advising (national, operational, 

and tactical). As discussed earlier, U.S. and NATO forces are 

moving towards functional rather than personal advising. Nevertheless, advising necessarily involves interaction and some 

measure of reciprocal trust. The ability to establish rapport is to 

some degree an “un-teachable” personal attribute. However, it 

can be strengthened through the kinds of training mentioned 

above. 

 A major finding of past CNA work on advising is that, to be effective, advisors generally need to have some form of leverage 

with their counterparts. Rapport is essential, but often the abil-

 

170 See for example William Rosenau et al. United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future. CNA Research Memorandum DRM2013-U-005404-Final. Aug. 2013; William Rosenau and Carter Malkasian. 

Criteria for Measuring U.S. Advisor Success in Afghanistan. CNA Paper 

CME D0026827. Feb. 2012; Seth W.B. Folsom. In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010; 

Charles T. Williamson. The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959–1963. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999; and John Grider Miller. The 

Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 
184

ity to provide—or withhold—resources plays a critical role as 

well. In the current and future environment of declining U.S. 

and NATO resources in Afghanistan, it will be important for 

advisors to have some form of leverage with their counterparts 

and to know what resources they can provide or withhold to 

help generate it. 

Finally, it should be noted that advisor recruitment, particularly 

among the U.S. civil service, is likely to be a significant challenge after 

2014. The initial surge of patriotism and desire to serve abroad that 

followed the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 has waned significantly. As a result, the pool of potential advisors has been shrinking.171 Ensuring that the correct incentives are in place—including 

post-deployment support—will be crucial. 

Conclusion 

Within the past year, U.S. and NATO forces have increasingly focused 

on developing institutional capacities within the Afghan security ministries. Our assessment is that this emphasis is a positive development. 

A continued emphasis on capabilities such as logistics, strategy and 

policy planning, financial management, and human resource management, as well as enablers such as anti-corruption policies, programs, and structures, gender integration, local ownership, 

information technology, intelligence, and civilianization, are needed 

to help the MoD and MoI become reasonably self-sufficient and professional institutions capable of supporting the fielded forces. 

International advisors working in the MoD and MoI should continue 

their relatively new emphasis on functional (as opposed to personal) 

advising. Advisors with extensive civilian law enforcement experience 

should be used more widely within the MoI. In both the MoI and 

MoD, U.S. and NATO should work to develop capabilities at the 

deputy ministerial level, where much of the important day-to-day 

ministerial work needs to be carried out. We refrain from making a 

 

171 Author’s interview with U.S. DoD policy official. Arlington, Virginia. Sep. 

12, 2013; and author’s interview with USIP personnel. Alexandria, Virginia. Sep. 20, 2013. Returning civilian advisors face a number of challenges, including the lack of “decompression” support (e.g., for dealing 

with post-traumatic stress disorder).
185

specific recommendation as to how best to construct a post-2014 advisor program and instead suggest that the U.S. should make a cleareyed decision on the structure of such a program based on the pros 

and cons we have identified. Regardless of which course of action 

policymakers take, they should remain aware of what Afghanistan 

and previous conflicts have taught us about what contributes to advisor success. Particularly important are careful selection (for personal 

as well as professional attributes and experience); and predeployment training in areas such as cultural awareness, language 

skills, and role-playing. 

In the next section, we discuss the results of our assessment of legal 

authorities required for the U.S. assistance mission to Afghanistan in 

the 2015–2018 timeframe. 

 
186

Supporting the assistance mission: Assessment of legal authorities required post-2014 

We were asked to assess and provide recommendations on legislative 

authorities that would enable—or hinder—success of the U.S. assistance mission post-2014. We begin with a summary of our findings, 

followed by the details of our assessment. 

Summary 

Our assessment identified more than 20 specialized legal authorities 

and many more standing authorities and international agreements 

that enable the U.S. military’s mission in Afghanistan. The current 

“authorities regime” is an amalgam of Title 10 and Title 22-type authorities with different managers, accounting rules, and reporting requirements (see Appendix G). This collection of laws allows the U.S. 

Department of Defense to maintain a presence and engage in combat operations in Afghanistan, transfer goods and services to the 

ANSF and coalition partner nations, and receive and spend public 

funds on specified programs. Some of the authorities have “sunset” 

clauses; others are permanent but require funding re-authorization 

each year. 

Our research suggests that post-2014, the U.S. military will focus on 

four missions in Afghanistan: counterterrorism operations; training, 

advising, assisting (and possibly continuing to equip) the ANSF; retrograding personnel and equipment; and, when called upon, protecting U.S. civilians working on the ground. 

In terms of authorities for this post-2014 mission set: 

We conclude the U.S. Department of Defense will require the same types of 

authorities that it has today with the possible exception of authorities for 

counterinsurgency programs which are not part of the envisioned post-2014 

mission set for the U.S. military. 

These include civil infrastructure development, economic development programs, and combatant reintegration programs. In addition: 

We conclude that the decentralized and makeshift nature of the current authorities regime promotes waste and inefficiencies.
187

Having been developed in piecemeal fashion, the existing regime is 

cumbersome and difficult to track and manage. Instead of the existing, disjointed assortment of authorities, we recommend they be consolidated into one omnibus authority where possible. 

As an illustration of this, we prepared a U.S. assistance mission “model law,” which contains all of the authorities we conclude are necessary for the post-2014 mission set (see Appendix H for full text of the 

model law). It is structured to lower administrative and transactional 

costs, speed up and simplify transfer processes, and provide the onscene commander flexibility to adjust programs as needed. Key features of the model law include: 

 Centralization of management and oversight with the Secretary 

of Defense 

 Codification and reaffirmation of the right to conduct counterterrorism operations alongside the train, advise, and assist mission 

 Establishment of a single fund to pay for all incremental expenses associated with the training and assistance mission 

 The provision of broad transfer authorities to the ANSF (and 

allies and friends) outside the typical Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) program, since Afghanistan can neither afford nor 

manage participation in this program. 

The difficulties of enacting the model law notwithstanding, we assess 

it can serve as a useful checklist of authorities needed to enable the 

post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. 

Methodology 

Our methodology for this assessment consisted of three steps: 

1. We constructed a matrix that aligns current assistance missions 

with mission managers and the legal authorities that allow 

them to operate. We reviewed U.S. operational plans to identify which missions are currently being conducted. Using open 

source literature and interviews with DoD, Department of State 

(DoS), and NATO personnel, we then identified who is con-
188

ducting these missions and under which legal authorities they 

operate.172 

2. We reviewed public statements from U.S. leaders and government officials, and interviewed U.S. and NATO personnel to 

make informed assumptions about the types of missions the 

U.S. military will carry out in Afghanistan in the 2015 to 2018 

timeframe. 

3. In order to identify which legal authorities will need to remain 

in place, we compared current assistance missions to future 

planned missions. To present our findings, we prepared a U.S. 

assistance mission “model law” which clearly details all of the 

legislative components that will need to be kept in place to allow the U.S. to successfully conduct the post-2014 assistance 

mission.173 Through the model law, we also derived recommendations for how to streamline and overcome current inefficiencies in the authorities regime. 

Assumptions and caveats 

In addition to our overarching assumptions, for this assessment we also assumed that the U.S. will continue to rely on support from allied 

and friendly countries that are willing to assist but that may require 

continued U.S. financial and logistical assistance in order to participate. 

In our discussions with personnel in the Office of the Under Secretary for Defense (Policy) for this assessment, they defined “assistance 

mission” as those operations carried out under U.S. Code (USC) Title 10 authority. Thus, our analysis will not consider Title 22 (diplomatic) or Title 50 (intelligence, covert) activities. Moreover, our 

analysis dealt only with legislative authorities and international 

 

172 We liaised with lawyers and U.S. government personnel from the DoD 

Office of General Counsel, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and 

U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to ensure our authorities matrix 

was as complete as possible. 

173 The use of a model law was suggested by several of our interviewees as a 

helpful construct for compiling and presenting all the various authorities required in the post-2014 timeframe. 
189

agreements, and did not assess operational authorities resulting from 

executive orders. 

Finally, the intent of the model law is to provide a consolidated 

checklist of legal authorities and a readymade omnibus statute template, in the event our recommendation of a more consolidated and 

streamlined approach were to be adopted. We make no judgment as 

to the political modalities of gaining the enactment of successor authorities or the chances of ultimate passage of the model law. 

Assessment 

Current authorities 

The U.S. military is currently conducting or supporting a number of 

missions in Afghanistan, such as combat operations against insurgents and terrorists, advising and equipping the ANSF, and funding 

programs geared at building government institutions and capacity. 

Though the Secretary of Defense has some inherent authorities (e.g., 

directing military operations to defend the U.S.), in order to commit 

funds, transfer equipment and property, create certain types of 

spending or support programs, or assign military personnel to situations in which they are susceptible to hostile fire, a congressional authorization is necessary. 

Currently, U.S. military activities in Afghanistan are enabled by a 

plethora of legal authorities. These authorities can be divided into 

three broad categories: legislative authorities created specifically for 

operations in Afghanistan; general and standing authorities (i.e., Title 10 authorities); and international agreements (e.g., the temporary 

U.S. –Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA, is based on 

an exchange of diplomatic notes). These authorities and agreements 

serve to control the distribution of funds, the transfer of materials, 

and the deployment of forces in combat roles. They also delineate 

the jurisdictional status of U.S. military personnel and the legal basis 

for their presence in Afghanistan. 

The major authorities and agreements that are currently in place are 

listed in Table 38 on the next page (see Appendix G for a full listing). 

For each, we list the title of the authority and what it allows the U.S. 

military to do in Afghanistan, along with its expiration date (if appli-
190

cable) and whether our analysis suggests the authority will be required to enable the post-2014 mission set. 

Table 38. Current legal authorities for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (abbreviated) 

Title Programmatic Objective Exp. Date 

Needed 

in 2015?

Afghanistan Specific Authorities

U.S./Afg. Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreement 

(ACSA) 

Provides logistic support, supplies, and services. Indefinite Yes 

Expanded ACSA Allows a no-cost loan of “covered equipment,” 

(i.e. vehicles, add-on armored kits, counter-IED) 

not otherwise eligible for transfer under ACSA. 

Possibly 

expired 

Yes 

Afghan Infrastructure Fund For high priority, large scale infrastructure projects to aid the counterinsurgency. 30 Sep 

2014 

No 

Afg. Public Protection Fund Provides funds for the APPF. 30 Sep 

2017 

Yes 

Afg. Reintegration Program Provides funds for reintegration of combatants. 31 Dec 

2013 

No 

Afghan Security Forces 

Fund (ASFF) 

Provides funds for the benefit of the ANSF in the 

form of supplies, services, infrastructure repair, 

renovation and construction, equipment, etc. 

30 Sep 

2014 

Yes 

Authorization for Use of 

Military Force (AUMF) 

Enables use of force against insurgents/terrorists. Indefinite Yes 

Coalition Readiness Support Program Authority given to the Secretary of Defense to 

provide specialized training, or loan of supplies 

and equipment on a non-reimbursable basis to 

coalition forces. 

Possibly 

expired 

Yes 

Coalition Support Funds 

(CSF) 

Used to reimburse coalition countries for logistical, military, and other expenses. 30 Sep 

2014 

Yes 

Commanders Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) 

Enables commanders to carry out small-scale 

projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian 

relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements. 

30 Sep 

2013 

Yes 

Economic Support Fund 

(ESF) 

Builds capacity of Afghan public and private 

institutions and entities. 

Possibly 

expired 

No 

Non-Excess Defense Articles Authority to transfer defense articles from the 

stocks of the DoD. 

31 Dec 

2014 

Yes 

Lift and Sustain (Afghanistan) Funds to transport foreign forces to and from Afghanistan and provide sustainment and subsistence while they serve with U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan. 

30 Sep 

2013 

Yes 

Logistical Support for Coalition Forces Provides supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift), and other logistical 

support to coalition forces. 

30 Sep 

2013 

Yes 
191

Table 38. Current legal authorities for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (abbreviated) 

Title Programmatic Objective Exp. Date 

Needed 

in 2015?

No-Cost Transfer of Defense 

Articles to Military and Security Forces in Afg. 

Allows for the authority to transfer non-excess 

defense articles from stocks of DoD, without 

reimbursement from the government of Afghanistan. 

31 Dec 

2014 

Yes

Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Fund 

Funds to help suppress the development of IEDs 

and proliferation of precursors. 

30 Sep 

2013 

Yes

Authorization to Procure 

Supplies and Services along 

the Afghan Supply Routes 

Allows for procurement of equipment and supplies for US and coalition forces. 31 Dec 

2014 

Yes

Reimbursement of Coalition Nations for Support Reimburse any key cooperating nation for logistical and military support. 30 Sep 

2013 

Yes

Task Force for Business and 

Stability Operations 

(TFBSO) 

First created in 2009. Supports projects to help 

reduce violence, and enhance stability by identifying areas of the economy viable for investment. 

Possibly 

expired 

No 

General Authorities

Combatant Commander’s 

Initiative Fund 

Provides urgent and unanticipated humanitarian 

relief and reconstruction assistance. 

Indefinite Yes

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund Codifies the practice of making funds available 

for high-priority unforeseen requirements related 

to combating terrorism. 

30 Sep 

2014 

Yes

DoD Drug Interdiction and 

Counter-Drug Activities 

Supports military operations against drug traffickers; builds Afghan law enforcement capacity in 

the counter-narcotics area; and provides special 

equipment, training, and facilities. 

Indefinite No 

Authority to Transfer Excess 

Defense Articles 

Defense articles declared as excess by the Military Departments can be offered to foreign governments. Indefinite Yes

Foreign Excess Pers. Property Authorizes transfer of excess personal property 

as part of base closure. 

Indefinite Yes

Foreign Excess Real Property Authorizes transfer of excess real property as 

part of base closure/base transfer. 

Indefinite Yes

Global Lift and Sustain Authorizes provision of logistics support, supplies, and services to allied forces participating in 

combined operations with U.S. Armed Forces. 

Indefinite Yes

Global Security Contingency Fund Supports security, counterterrorism, and rule of 

law programs. 

30 Sep 

2015 

Yes

Global Train and Equip 

Fund 

Additional authority to train and equip partner 

nations for counterterrorism operations. 

30 Sep 

2013 

Yes

Law and Order Trust Fund 

for Afghanistan (LOTFA) 

Helps pay police salaries. Indefinite NA

Military Operations to 

Combat Terrorism 

Funds for foreign forces, irregulars, or individuals facilitating U.S. SOF counterterrorism ops. 30 Sep 

2015 

Yes
192

Table 38. Current legal authorities for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan (abbreviated) 

Title Programmatic Objective Exp. Date 

Needed 

in 2015?

International Agreements

Creation of ISAF ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386. 

Oct 2013 Yes 

Diplomatic Notes 2003 Diplomatic notes give the U.S. legal jurisdiction 

over U.S. personnel. 

Indefinite Yes 

“Joint Declaration” Gives U.S. forces access to Afghan military facilities in order to prosecute counterterrorism. May 2012 NA 

ISAF SOFA Gives coalition nations exclusive jurisdiction over 

ISAF and supporting personnel. 

2015 Yes 

Strategic Partnership 

Agreement (SPA) 

A framework for the presence and activities of 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014. Commits 

parties to initiate negotiations on a BSA. 

2024 NA 

Future missions 

The authorities that will be needed to successfully complete the post2014 mission will depend on what the mission actually entails. Activities conducted by the U.S. military will be driven by what is agreed 

upon with the Afghan government and eventually made explicit in 

the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the two countries.174

Our analysis suggests that the U.S. military will be involved in four 

missions in Afghanistan come 2015. Statements from U.S. and Afghan officials suggest that U.S. forces will be conducting both counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting (TAA) missions with 

the ANSF.175 In addition, the U.S. military will be responsible for important ancillary missions such as the retrograde of military equip-

 

174 President Barack Obama. “Remarks by President Obama in Address to 

the Nation from Afghanistan.” Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. May 1 

2012, accessed Sep. 9, 2013, at www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan. 

175 There is some debate about what “assisting” the ANSF means. According 

to current ISAF leadership, this could include combat support—likely in 

the form of aviation support—but a U.S. policy decision on that aspect 

has not yet been made. See: Kristina Wong. “Some Troops to Stay in Afghanistan after 2014.” Washington Times, Sep. 8, 2013. 
193

ment and personnel.176 Finally, as is the case in all conflict-prone 

countries in which there is a U.S. embassy or civilian presence, the 

U.S. military will also be responsible for protecting non-military personnel.177

Legislative authorities to enable the post-2014 mission 

Our examination of the current authorities regime and the likely 

post-2014 mission set yielded two key findings. 

First, the post-2014 assistance mission set will be significantly reduced 

from what it is today (e.g., major U.S. led combat operations against 

insurgents will cease and U.S. military led governance and economics 

programs will be terminated). But the nature of the new mission set 

is similar enough that it will require largely the same types of authorities that are currently in place (e.g., distribution of funds, transfer of 

materials, authority to engage in combat operations). One possible 

exception might be those authorities for resourcing and managing 

governance, economic, and other programs specific to U.S. forces actively fighting a counterinsurgency.178

Our analysis of the likely post-2014 mission set suggests that the reduction of missions will result in decreased combat activity, but will 

not eliminate all types of kinetic operations nor eliminate the need to 

have a broad set of use of force authorities. Moreover, since the 

changes in the TAA, retrograde, and U.S. government protection 

missions in the 2015–2018 timeframe will likely be minimal compared to the present, requirements for authorities to enable these activities should also not change. 

 

176 “Withdrawing from Afghanistan: The big retrograde,” The Economist, 

Apr. 27, 2013. 

177 Gopal Ratnam. “Afghan Counterterror Work Adds to Post-2014 Troops, 

Dunford Says.” Bloomberg, Apr. 17, 2013. 

178 This is not to suggest that U.S. investments in governance, economics, 

and reintegration programs may not be necessary to achieve the desired 

end states as specified by the 2013 NDAA. Rather, given its reduced mission set, the DoD may not be the best agency to retain legal responsibility for resourcing and managing programs in these areas.
194

We therefore recommend that in order to enable the post-2014 mission, the DoD should be provided the same types of authorities that it 

enjoys today. We base this recommendation on our evaluation of how 

closely each authority aligns with and contributes to the success of 

each of the four predicted post-2014 missions, as shown in Table 38. 

Our second finding, based on an analysis of our full authorities matrix (see Appendix G), is that the de-centralized and makeshift nature of the current authorities regime promotes inefficiencies and 

may potentially hinder the post-2014 mission if it is not streamlined. 

A common thread in many reports by the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) was inattentive management by a diversity of U.S. program managers. Our discussions with 

relevant DoD legal personnel and our professional experience in international programs, suggest that simplification, consolidation, and 

central management could lead to both greater efficiencies and fewer 

opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. 

As such, we also recommend that the current authorities regime be 

streamlined. To do this, we suggest that a new omnibus authority be 

considered to replace the current patchwork of 20-plus specialized 

authorities. 

Model law: The Defense of Afghanistan Act of 2014 

In order to provide a consolidated checklist of legal authorities and a 

template for an omnibus statute, we drafted a U.S. assistance mission 

“model law,” which is presented in its entirety in Appendix H.179

In essence, the model law incorporates all authorities necessary for 

conducting the presumed post-2014 assistance mission set under one 

statute and reaffirms our basic finding that on-scene commanders will 

 

179 While we make no judgment as to the chances of passage of the model 

law, there is some precedent (e.g., Plan Colombia), for successfully consolidating funding streams for operations. See: Sydney Freedberg, “Special Operations: What New Powers They Need from Congress & 

Pentagon,” BreakingDefense.com, Apr. 15, 2013, accessed Oct. 15, 2013, 

at www.breakingdefense.com/2013/04/15/special-operations-what-newpowers-they-need-from-congress-and-pe. 
195

require roughly the same types of authorities that currently exist.180 In 

addition to reauthorizing much of what is currently in place, we include provisions to centralize and standardize funding, reporting, 

and oversight in an attempt to reduce opportunities for fraud, waste, 

and abuse. 

In general terms, we designed the model law to: 

 Enable the Secretary of Defense, acting through the on-scene 

commander, to centrally manage activities related to the TAA 

mission, eliminate opportunities for waste or inefficiency, and 

gain situational awareness on whether the activities are actually 

leading to the accomplishment of mission objectives. 

 Renew and codify the Afghan specific authorities listed in our 

authorities matrix (Appendix G) that enable the on-scene 

commander to provide personnel and material support to both 

the ANSF and those who are helping the U.S. to train, assist, 

and advise the ANSF to become self-sufficient. 

 Lower transactional costs associated with transferring various 

types of necessary support to the ANSF and those countries 

helping the U.S. in Afghanistan. 

 Provide the on-scene commander flexibility to adjust programs 

and spending as needed to address conditions on the ground. 

 Free the on-scene commander of legal responsibility for resourcing and managing programs related to social and economic development, such as the Afghan Infrastructure Fund 

(AIF) and TFBSO. 

 

180 Given that most of the current authorities listed in Appendix G are under the oversight jurisdiction of the Defense Authorization Committees 

in the Senate and House (Title 10), we envision that this model law 

would ultimately become a Title 10 authority if it were adopted. There is, 

however, language in the model law to not rescind or abrogate any additional standing Title 10 authorities or other types of assistance authorities implemented by the Department of State or other Agencies, 

including the Intelligence Community under Title 22, Title 40, or Title 

50 of the United States Code. 
196

 Establish transfer authorities (under Title 10) in lieu of using 

the traditional Foreign Military Sales route since all of the assistance envisioned will be on a grant basis (i.e., Afghanistan cannot afford to purchase equipment via the FMS program), and 

because Afghanistan lacks the capacity to manage complex 

FMS transactions. Laying these transfer authorities under Title 

10 should also expedite and simplify the transfer process within 

the U.S. government. 

A simplified authorities regime could serve to promote a “unified 

command” over the four missions in the post-2014 era. Our model 

law gives the Secretary of Defense, via his on-scene commander, the 

legal authority to quickly redirect resources within the central fund 

from one program element to another based on real-time conditions 

on the ground. A single funding authority should also minimize interagency competition over who is in charge and how assistance monies will be spent.181 This type of centralized authorities and funds 

management is in line with congressional intent in the unified command structure of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986.182 This act was passed to eliminate interagency rivalry and 

wasteful spending by the individual service branches, and to improve 

operational effectiveness via the use of the Unified Command Plan 

structure. This unified command structure has resulted in significant 

operational improvements.183

 

181 Parallels can be drawn to the winding down of U.S. activities in Iraq. 

There were multiple areas of disagreement between DoD and DoS regarding operation of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) 

which had primary responsibility for all of the U.S. government security 

assistance programs in Iraq (conducted under Title 22 authorities). The 

Inspector General has detailed significant disagreements between DoD 

and DoS over the OSC-I’s base mission; the size, scope, and funding of 

the OSC-I activity; and its authority over the DoD to conduct military to 

military activities. See: Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation 

– Iraq Mission Capabilities. U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General DODIG-2013-136. Sep. 18, 2013. 

182 H.R. 3622; Public Law 99-433, Oct.1, 1986. 

183 Inter-service rivalries were an “appreciable handicap” in the war effort in 

World War II. Additionally, operational setbacks suffered by the military 

in the “the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the seizure of the Mayaguez, the 
197

The use of the unified funding approach should also enhance the 

ability of Congress to have visibility over all DoD activities in Afghanistan—in contrast to the current situation wherein activities are conducted pursuant to disparate legal authorities with different types of 

Congressional and interagency oversight. Such a focusing of oversight should also help to ensure greater accountability of funds. 

In addition, we recommend that the current authorities unrelated to 

the new mission, including the Economic Support Fund, TFBSO, and 

AIF be reassigned responsibility to the Secretary of State and 

USAID.184 Strong consideration should also be given to mandating 

that a sizable share of the DoD counter-narcotics program be transitioned to a U.S. civil agency like the Department of Justice or Drug 

Enforcement Agency. While the DoD should not be legislatively precluded from funding select counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan, we assess that another agency should have the primary 

responsibility for this mission in the post-2014 timeframe. 

Legislation that could hinder the post-2014 mission 

There are numerous pieces of legislation that could potentially hinder the DoD’s ability to conduct its post-2014 mission set. A comprehensive review of all laws in this regard was not feasible within the 

scope of this study. A cursory review, however, yielded the following 

examples of potential legislative “hindrances”: 

“Leahy Law” 

The “Leahy Law” (named for Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont) restricts the DoD from providing assistance to training programs under 

the NDAA that involve a unit of foreign security forces or police if the 

 

failed Iranian rescue mission, the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, 

and the Granada incursion....had a number of common denominators – 

lack of unity of command and inability to operate jointly.” See: James 

Locher. “Has it Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act.” 

Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4: 95, 97–99. 

184 DoD should be statutory included in the process of reviewing projected 

activities under the ESP, TFBSO, and AIF programs since the Combatant 

Commander has an excellent perspective on where stabilization projects 

will have the greatest impact on the U.S. security mission. We recommend that DoD consultation should be statutorily required. 
198

Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the DoS 

that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.185 The 

Secretary of Defense can make exceptions if he determines that such 

a waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances. 

As the ANSF assume full responsibility for defending Afghanistan and 

as U.S. and NATO oversight diminishes, we assess there will be an increased possibility of Afghan units committing human rights abuses. 

If such violations occur, the “Leahy Law” may hinder the ability of the 

U.S. to continue funding such units. Of particular concern are the 

Afghan Local Police, who have previously been accused of committing abuses of the population.186

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Congress created the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities. Under the 

authority of Section 1229 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-

181), SIGAR conducts audits and investigations to promote efficiency 

and effectiveness of reconstruction programs, and to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

While the SIGAR organization works hard to combat fraud and corruption within Afghanistan and to expose inefficiencies in DoD programs, we assess that the public nature of SIGAR reports might 

hinder the post-2014 assistance mission by publishing information 

that could potentially undermine efforts by the Combatant Commander, and other agencies, to help build the stature of the Afghanistan government and the ANSF. For that reason, we have suggested in 

our model law that oversight activities be consolidated under the direction of the DoD Inspector General. 

 

185 Public Law No 113-6, Division C, Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act for 

2013, Section 8057. 

186 “Just Don’t Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias and the ‘Afghan Local Police.’” Human Rights Watch. Sep. 2011, accessed Sep. 15, 2013, 

www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf 
199

The Stop Taxing American Assistance to Afghanistan Act (H.R. 936) 

Written by Rep. Peter Welch and Rep. Walter Jones, the Stop Taxing 

American Assistance to Afghanistan Act (H.R. 936) would have 

barred future assistance to Afghanistan unless U.S. contractors and 

subcontractors delivering aid were exempted from taxation by the 

government of Afghanistan. Representative Welch’s bill was incorporated into the FY2013 NDAA, but was later removed during conference negotiations with the Senate. In May 2013, Rep. Welch 

reintroduced legislation that would block all U.S. taxpayer assistance 

to Afghanistan until the U.S. president reaches a bilateral agreement 

with the Afghan government that would exempt American contractors from Afghan taxation.187

“AUMF Sunset” 

We are aware of the existence of efforts by at least one member of the 

House Intelligence Committee to develop a bill that would undo the 

basic legislative authorities that permit the U.S. military to conduct 

the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan and beyond. If legislation to “sunset” the Authorization for the Use of Military Force law 

was passed without follow-on legislation permitting a continued 

counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, this would severely hinder 

the U.S. post-2014 mission. A previous effort to re-examine the 

AUMF failed in 2010. 

Conclusion 

The success of the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan will depend on 

the appropriate legal authorities remaining in place. Currently, the 

U.S. military relies on numerous specialized and standing authorities, 

some of which will sunset or require reauthorization and funding in 

the coming years. 

 

187 See “Welch bill to prevent Afghanistan from taxing U.S. aid coming to 

House floor tomorrow.” www.welch.house.gov, Official Website of United States Congressman Peter Welch, accessed Oct. 14, 2013 at 

www.welch.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id

=2027%3Awelch-bill-to-prevent-afghanistan-from-taxing-us-aid-comingto-house-floor-tomorrow&catid=41%3A2012-pressreleases&Itemid=16#sthash.vmOPiKbI.dpuf. 
200

We assess that in order to accomplish its post-2014 mission set; the 

U.S. military will generally require the same types of specialized authorities that it currently enjoys. If Congress fails to extend these specialized authorities, U.S. forces in Afghanistan could find their legal 

ability to execute the train, advise, and assist mission compromised. 

Relevant standing authorities are simply too underfunded and limited in scope to effectively support this mission on their own. The 

counterterrorism mission is at much less risk. Absent a repeal of the 

Authorization for Use of Military Force, the U.S. military will retain 

the domestic legal authority to engage in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. 

We also assess that the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan would benefit from the creation of a new, streamlined authorities and funding 

regime. The current patchwork system of authorities creates systemic 

challenges that could hinder the success of the mission and create 

opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. The political difficulties of 

enacting a single all-inclusive statute notwithstanding, such an authority might be an appropriate solution to the inefficiencies inherent in the current authorities regime. While it would be possible for 

Congress to simply pass “extenders” of some of the specialized authorities, we assess that a comprehensive and integrated plan that addresses both the contours of the post-2014 U.S. military mission, and 

how that mission will be resourced and managed, is a more effective, 

less costly, and ultimately more sustainable way forward. 

In the next section, we discuss the results of our assessment of opportunities for cooperation and prevention of conflict between the ANSF 

and the Pakistani military. 

 
201

Supporting regional stability: Assessment of the ANSF – 

PAKMIL relationship 

We were asked to conduct an assessment of the opportunities for cooperation—or prevention of conflict—between the ANSF and the 

Pakistani military (PAKMIL), especially along the Afghanistan–

Pakistan border. We begin with a summary of our findings, followed 

by the details of our assessment. 

Summary 

Relations between Afghan and Pakistani forces are often strained and 

prone to escalation, yet tensions between the ANSF and PAKMIL 

have yet to lead to open warfare. There is considerable demand 

among officers on both sides for a more stable relationship. We assess 

that there will be continuing opportunities for cooperation between 

the two forces post-2014, especially at the tactical and operational 

levels, as well as a reduction in tensions along the border. At the same 

time, there will be areas of enduring conflict that will require constant attention—some of which may worsen in the coming years. 

Having conducted numerous interviews with Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., 

and NATO forces at multiple levels on both sides of the border: 

We conclude that a significant reduction in the U.S. and NATO commitment 

to Afghanistan or Pakistan will destabilize the border region, exacerbate existing tensions between the two countries, and jeopardize fragile mechanisms 

for cross-border cooperation and de-escalation that have been built in recent 

years. 

Many in the Pakistani military do not believe that the international 

community will provide sufficient resources for the ANSF to survive 

past 2014 or that the U.S. will continue to resource Pakistani military 

operations in the border areas. Uncertainty about the future is forcing the two militaries to plan for worst case scenarios. 

We conclude that there will be continual conflict on a number of issues in the foreseeable future. These include Afghanistan’s reluctance to recognize the border, difficulties associated with 

demarcating the border line, the tendency of some Afghan leaders to 

exploit anti-Pakistan sentiment among the Afghan population, Paki-
202

stan’s continued relationship with elements of the Taliban, insurgent 

sanctuaries inside Pakistan (and increasingly in parts of Afghanistan 

as coalition forces withdraw), and Afghanistan’s growing security relationship with India. 

Despite the likelihood of conflict over these issues, there are areas of 

common interest as well as potentially enduring mechanisms for 

communication and cooperation that could help reduce conflict and 

stabilize the relationship over time. Some of these include: expanding road networks and cross-border trade, repatriation and resettlement of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, continued 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations on both sides of 

the border, expansion of border coordination mechanisms at the tactical and operational levels, bilateral meetings between the two forces 

at all levels, and, finally, cooperation on countering IEDs, which officers on both sides see as a major future threat to their forces. 

Methodology 

Our methodology for this assessment consisted of two steps: 

1. We documented the past and current dynamics of the relationship between the ANSF and the Pakistani military. To do so, we 

first consulted secondary sources in the literature. We then 

conducted interviews in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul with 

Afghan army, border police, SOF, intelligence personnel, and 

uniformed police at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—including on the border itself. We also spoke with U.S. 

and NATO personnel involved in Pakistan border issues. We 

conducted interviews in Islamabad, Pakistan with members of 

the Office of the Defense Representative – Pakistan (ODR-P), 

U.S. embassy personnel, the director general of the Pakistani 

military joint staff, and the director general of military operations for Afghanistan in the Pakistan army. 

2. We then used this understanding of the past and present to 

elicit areas of likely enduring conflict, as well as areas where the 

two countries may increase cooperation or, at the very least, reduce tensions in the future. 
203

Assessment 

Dynamics of the relationship 

The relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan is complex and 

varies considerably at every level of command, from the national level 

down to tactical units manning border posts. Dynamics at each level 

are constantly affected by those at other levels. For example, tactical 

incidents often escalate to become national issues, and conflict at the 

national level inhibits efforts to cooperate at lower echelons. In order 

to understand these dynamics, it is necessary to lay out the issues at 

each level of command, including national political issues between 

the two governments, and to describe how they interact. 

The national level: Areas of persistent conflict 

The fundamental bone of contention between the two countries is 

their dispute over the border, known as the Durand Line. The line 

was drawn in 1893 as part of an accord between the British Indian 

government and the ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Abdul Rahman 

Khan. Successive Afghan leaders have repudiated the agreement for a 

variety of reasons—arguing that the Amir signed it under duress, that 

it was never meant to be permanent, and that when British suzerainty 

ended, the agreement became null and void. Pakistan, which was 

carved out of British India in 1947, insists that it inherited the agreement intact, and has repeatedly insisted that Afghanistan recognize 

the line as a permanent international boundary.188

As recently as May 2013, Afghan president Hamid Karzai stated that 

he would never recognize the Durand Line. Afghan politicians, particularly Pashtun leaders, have periodically asserted that all Pashtun 

majority areas in southwest Asia should be part of Afghanistan—in effect, claiming all lands to the Indus River in Pakistan, which includes 

nearly half of Pakistan’s total land mass. Afghan leaders have periodically raised the so-called “Pashtunistan” issue over the decades, causing considerable concern among Pakistan’s security establishment. 

 

188 Bijan Omrani. “The Durand Line: History and Problems of the AfghanPakistan Border.” Asian Affairs, Jul. 2009. 
204

According to some scholars, the Durand Line agreement was not 

meant to delineate an actual line, but rather spheres of influence 

separated by a frontier region or buffer zone between the settled areas of British India (and later Pakistan) and Afghanistan. The British 

at the time were concerned about the expansion of the Russian empire from Central Asia and sought to create a buffer zone between 

British imperial domains and expanding Russian influence. When 

the agreement was signed in 1893, British and Afghan officials apparently understood that the geography and demographics on both 

sides of the line were such that demarcating and enforcing an actual 

international border was not possible. Instead, they agreed on a general area where both governments agreed to limit their influence.189

Despite this understanding in the original agreement, successive Afghan, British and (later) Pakistani governments built border posts 

where they believed the line to be. 

Various Pashtun and other tribes straddle the border. Most of those 

living in the border regions treat the line as if it did not exist. Tens of 

thousands of people cross it every day, many of them informally in 

sectors where no official border posts exist. There is no agreed upon 

mechanism between the two governments for regulating this movement. Many of the tribes in the border region refuse to accept the authority of either government. There is a vast expanse of ungoverned 

space on both sides where each state has little or no authority. The 

tribes in these areas largely run their own affairs and people move 

back and forth without regard to the actual line. 

The Pakistani military and intelligence services have effectively violated the border by supporting various insurgents fighting Afghan government forces from bases inside Pakistan since the 1980s. Karzai has 

repeatedly accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban. The Haqqani 

network has carried out numerous high profile attacks against national-level leaders and institutions in Kabul. Afghan leaders believe 

that the group, which operates from bases in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency, acts at the bidding of Pakistan’s intelligence services. Attacks against Indian embassies and consulates have been 

 

189 Bijan Omrani and Frank Ledwidge. “Rethinking the Durand Line: The 

Legality of the Afghan-Pakistani Frontier.” The RUSI Journal, Oct. 2009. 
205

traced to the Haqqani network, indicating that it remains, at least in 

part, a tool of Pakistani intelligence.190 

Anti-Pakistan sentiment is pervasive in many parts of Afghanistan, especially among the non-Pashtun minorities, but among sections of 

the Pashtuns as well. Karzai, a Pashtun from Kandahar, has consistently sought to stoke and exploit this sentiment for domestic political 

gain, taking a strident line against Pakistan in public forums and intentionally escalating clashes at the tactical level along the border into international incidents. The rhetoric of asserting Afghan 

sovereignty against Pakistan has proven a powerful political tool. 

There are few issues that unite Afghans more than this particular issue.191

The national level: Areas of cooperation 

Despite serious differences, the two countries have never fought a war 

or engaged in any large-scale military clash over their common border. By comparison, Pakistan has fought four wars with India over the 

Line of Control in Kashmir, which is the second most militarized 

border in the world (behind that between North and South Korea). 

Pakistani civilian and military leaders have consistently called for 

peace with Afghanistan, despite occasionally hostile rhetoric from 

Kabul. The Pakistani military has indicated that it would prefer a stable border to the west, especially if tensions with India were to escalate. During the last few years in particular, the Pakistani military has 

indicated that it seeks a friendly relationship with Kabul and greater 

cooperation with the ANSF.192 Since Karzai’s visit to Islamabad in Sep-

 

190 Authors’ interviews with Afghan security officials. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–

24, 2013. 

191 This was demonstrated most clearly during a conflict over a border post 

in May 2013 at a place known as Goshta. Our interviews with Afghan security officials suggested widespread belief that the Karzai government 

intervened and intentionally escalated the incident. 

192 Authors’ interviews with the Pakistani military. Islamabad, Pakistan. Sep. 

23–27, 2013. Pakistani officers repeatedly pointed out that their relationship with Afghanistan to the west, though considerably strained, is far 

more peaceful than their relationship with India to the east. 
206

tember 2013, there has been some reciprocal movement in this regard on the Afghan side, as well as at the national level. 

Trade and the safe movement of goods is one issue the two governments have effectively cooperated on over the years. Other things being equal, Pakistan seeks a stable Afghanistan with which to trade and 

through which to export goods to Central Asia. Afghanistan is a landlocked country that depends heavily on routes through Pakistan to 

the sea. Pakistan allows Afghan goods to pass through its territory 

free of duty (since it is also Afghanistan’s largest trading partner). 

The two governments have worked together to improve road links. 

One of the largest and most successful initiatives of USAID is to construct roads in both countries that connect at the border and to link 

these roads to national highways on both sides. As these road networks have expanded and trade has grown, there has been greater 

realization on both sides of the need to secure these routes from attacks by insurgents and criminals.193 

Another issue on which the two countries share common interests is 

repatriating and resettling Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan—most of whom have been living in Afghanistan since the 1980s 

and 1990s. There are approximately 1.6 million registered Afghan 

refugees living in Pakistan, the largest population of long-term refugees in the world. Since March 2002, an estimated 3.8 million have 

returned to Afghanistan with the help of the United Nations. In a July 2013 tripartite meeting with Afghan and UN officials, Pakistan announced that it would extend refugee cards for Afghans living in 

Pakistan.194

 

Most recently, Pakistan has made tentative steps towards cooperation 

with the Karzai government over reconciliation with the Taliban. The 

Pakistani military promised to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a 

high-level Taliban leader believed to be a deputy to Mullah Mohammed Omar and integral to eventual negotiations. Baradar’s release 

 

193 Authors’ interviews with USAID officials. Islamabad, Pakistan. Sep. 23–

27, 2013. 

194 “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Report 2012: 

Pakistan.” UNHCR.org, Official Website of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, at www.unhcr.org/51b1d63f0.html. 
207

was a key demand from the Afghan side during Karzai’s September 

2013 visit to Islamabad. Karzai’s visit is believed to have opened some 

political space for greater cooperation on other issues as well, but the 

full effect of his visit remains to be seen. 

The strategic level: Areas of persistent conflict 

Though the two militaries have never clashed directly, there is considerable tension at the strategic level between the commanders of 

both countries’ armies. At least overtly, the Afghan side has shown the 

greatest degree of bellicosity. Pakistani generals have been careful to 

demonstrate restraint in response to what they believe to be potentially escalatory provocations on the part of Afghan military leaders. 

Afghan generals have issued orders to mobilize conventional forces 

along the border, ostensibly against Pakistan. Following a recent clash 

at a border post in Nangarhar province in May 2013, the ANA sent a 

number of tanks to the border as a signal to Pakistan that it intended 

to defend the country’s sovereignty. Many of these moves were publicly announced and likely were done for political effect. They suggest 

that political leaders in Kabul are prepared to use the Afghan military 

in order to posture against Pakistan, and that the military is comfortable with the idea of posturing against Pakistan as a means of conventional force, as opposed to merely fighting insurgents. 

The Karzai government has repeatedly demanded the international 

community provide Afghanistan conventional weapons such as tanks 

and fighter jets. The ANA as well has asked for more heavy weapons 

in order to protect the country against regional powers. Afghan officers consistently point to Pakistan as the primary threat to their country. Though they recognize that this threat is mainly unconventional 

in nature (i.e., insurgents fighting in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in 

Pakistan), they insist on heavy weapons in order to deter Pakistan 

from supporting the insurgency.195 The Indian military has followed a 

similar strategy against Pakistan over apparent covert support to insurgents in Kashmir and terrorists elsewhere in India—that is, mobi-

 

195 ANSF at all levels raised the issue of sanctuaries and the threat from Pakistan during authors’ interviews in Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
208

lizing for conventional war in response to evidence of Pakistani support for insurgent attacks in India. 

Uncertainty about what will happen in the years following 2014 

breeds mistrust between the two militaries and forces both sides to 

plan for worst case scenarios. Many in the Pakistani military leadership believe that the ANSF are likely to fail in the coming years, leading to a disintegration of the force—similar to what happened after 

the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. They are especially concerned about 

this likelihood if the U.S. does not provide sufficient resources after 

2014. Pakistani military leaders have raised this possibility with their 

U.S. counterparts and warned them of the fallout it would have inside 

Pakistan—hundreds of thousands of men next door with military 

training and weapons but no salary or leadership, not to mention millions of potential refugees flooding over the border and further destabilizing Pakistan.196 ANSF leaders appear to be aware of this belief 

on the part of Pakistan’s security establishment. The view among 

some is that Pakistan plans to allow and perhaps even enable the disintegration of the ANSF, despite attempts by Pakistan to reassure 

them otherwise. 

Finally, Afghanistan’s security agreements with India are a cause of 

great concern among Pakistani military leaders. The Afghan army 

sends officers to India for training and education, but refuses to send 

any to Pakistan. Afghanistan has also reportedly asked India for military aid, particularly sophisticated weapons in the event of a precipitous loss of U.S. support. The Pakistani military has interpreted this 

as an indication of India’s growing influence inside Afghanistan’s security establishment, fueling fears of encirclement in Pakistan and 

breeding distrust of the ANA. 

The strategic level: Areas of cooperation 

U.S. forces have encouraged several initiatives to help stabilize the relationship between the two countries at the strategic level. Both sides 

have responded positively to these initiatives, some of which promise 

to become part of an enduring bilateral strategic relationship. Paki-

 

196 Authors’ interviews with Pakistani military officers. Islamabad, Pakistan. 

Sep. 23–27, 2013. 
209

stani military leaders have also taken steps to reassure their Afghan 

counterparts and appear to have altered their long standing policy of 

looking at Afghanistan as a potential source of “strategic depth” in 

the event of a war with India.197 

Pakistan has deployed an estimated 158,000 soldiers (including Frontier Corps forces and army) to the tribal areas near the border with 

Afghanistan. The army has conducted large-scale counterinsurgency 

operations in the region since 2009, with smaller operations dating 

back to 2002. Before 2002, the Pakistani army had never deployed 

forces to the tribal areas. According to the Pakistani military, more 

than 5,000 soldiers have died in these operations and many more 

have been wounded. Most of these operations have focused on insurgents fighting the Pakistani state, not those targeting Afghan forces, 

yet both countries’ armies recognize that Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas have weakened the Taliban as a whole and 

helped to stabilize Afghanistan. 

There is now a strategic hotline connecting the Pakistani army headquarters to the ANA general staff, allowing the two army chiefs to 

speak directly in the event of a crisis (such as escalation along the 

border). The two sides recently agreed to have weekly phone conversations. This initiative was based on a similar phone line between the 

Pakistani and Indian army chiefs on each side of the Line of Control 

in Kashmir. The India–Pakistan hotline is viewed as a success, as a facilitator of regular conversation and rapport between the two army 

chiefs, and as a tool for preventing unwanted escalation in the event 

of a crisis. The idea is that if such a hotline can work between two 

hostile powers such as India and Pakistan, it will work between Afghan and Pakistani forces as well.198

 

The two militaries participate in periodic tripartite meetings involving U.S. forces, depending on the current climate of relations at the 

national level. Many of these meetings have been in Afghanistan, 

usually on U.S. bases in Kabul. Yet, Afghan army leaders have also vis-

 

197 Ibid. 

198 Authors’ interviews with Pakistani military officials, and U.S. officials at 

ODR-P. Sep. 23–27, 2013; and with U.S. and Afghan officials responsible 

for border coordination. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
210

ited Pakistan as part of larger delegations. In June, the Afghan Chief 

of the Army General Staff traveled with the Commander of ISAF to 

Rawalpindi to meet with the chief of the Pakistan army to discuss cooperation over the border. 

The Pakistani military maintains liaisons at key U.S. headquarters in 

Afghanistan. There are Pakistani military liaisons at ISAF and RC – 

East at Bagram Air Field. These officers are reportedly of high caliber. 

Most receive promotions upon their return to Pakistan, indicating 

the importance of these positions to the Pakistani military. All are on 

U.S. or NATO bases; the Pakistani military refuses to leave any officers under the protection of Afghan forces. There are no Afghan liaisons in Pakistan, despite offers from the U.S. and Pakistan to host 

them. 

The operational level: Areas of persistent conflict 

Afghanistan and Pakistan share one of the most difficult borders in 

the world. It passes through high mountains at elevations over 14,000 

feet where there are few natural boundaries that might enable demarcation or regulation of movement. The operational challenges 

associated with manning outposts along this border and interdicting 

illegal activity are extreme. The tribes living on both sides—mostly 

Pashtun, but some Nuristani and other ethno-linguistic groups as 

well—have a long history of violent resistance to all outside authority. 

The region spanning the border on both sides is affected by insurgent violence, with various local, regional, and international militant 

groups carrying out attacks on forces in both countries and seeking 

control over transit routes and populations. In reality, there is a vast 

belt of militancy that spans both sides of the border and it has become increasingly interconnected over the last decade of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the two countries. In 

Afghanistan, this problem is often treated as an insurgency being 

supported by sanctuaries in Pakistan or vice versa (depending on 

whether one talks to Afghan or Pakistani officers). Since the 1980s, 

when the Afghan Mujahideen fought the Soviet army from bases in 

Pakistan, the problem of sanctuaries has been mainly on the Pakistani 

side. Yet, as U.S. forces have pulled back from northeast Afghanistan, 

insurgents have taken refuge there and use these areas to target Pakistani military and border forces. 
211

The lack of trust, confidence, and perceived common interests between the two countries’ military forces has prevented coordinated 

action against this problem. Afghan officers do not trust their Pakistani counterparts with advance information about future operations, 

fearing that Pakistani forces will compromise these operations by 

providing advance warning to insurgents. There is little substantive 

intelligence sharing between the two militaries. Pakistani officers 

have little faith in the capabilities of the ANSF, and are rarely willing 

to participate in complementary cross-border operations. From Pakistan’s perspective, counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan 

pushed insurgents into Pakistan, leading to further radicalization and 

militarization of the tribes on the Pakistani side.199

 

Numerous large- and small-scale operations have been conducted on 

both sides of the Durand Line by ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani military 

forces. Some of these have been coordinated, with forces operating 

on both sides of the line simultaneously to prevent insurgents from 

fleeing over the border, but most have not been—often because neither military trusts the other. As a result, there is continual risk of 

unwanted escalation and fratricidal incidents, an example being the 

U.S. airstrikes in November 2011 that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers operating near the border. 

Afghan and Pakistani forces each man hundreds of posts spread 

across more than 1,500 miles of border, many of them in remote and 

isolated locations in the mountains. Simply manning, protecting, and 

resupplying these positions puts an enormous burden on both security forces. Pakistan’s Frontier Corps depends heavily on the Pakistan 

army for logistics and quick reaction forces, especially in the northernmost sectors of the border, where massed attacks on border posts 

are relatively common. The Afghan Border Police depend heavily on 

ANA combat power as well (particularly in the northern parts of the 

border), but receive much of their logistical support through the 

MoI. 

Interdiction on the border itself is rarely effective on either side, 

though the presence of border forces does disrupt and slow move-

 

199 Authors’ interviews with Pakistani military officials. Islamabad, Pakistan. 

Sep. 23–27, 2013; and with Afghan military officials. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
212

ment over the border. Most illicit men and material are interdicted 

far from the border on their way to central locations. Pakistan’s Frontier Corps conducts some mobile operations close to the border, yet 

forces on both sides remain fixed largely in static positions. Most of 

these posts lie along recognized crossing points, yet there are hundreds of other small roads and donkey trails that bypass these positions. When passing within the line of sight of border posts, especially 

on the Afghan side, it is common for insurgents and smugglers to put 

harassing fire on these positions in order to fix border forces in their 

positions. Intimidation and bribery are also common methods for 

limiting interdiction.200

 

Agreements between Afghan and Pakistani forces at the operational 

level have been impeded by different command structures on each 

side. On the Afghan side, each force has a separate reporting chain 

all the way back to Kabul, with no unity of command at the operational level capable of enforcing agreements with Pakistani forces or 

ensuring coordination. The ANA falls under the MoD, and the ABP 

under the MoI; Afghanistan’s intelligence service, the NDS, reports to 

the Office of the President. On the Pakistani side, all forces (border 

units, military forces, and intelligence personnel) fall under the operational command of the all-powerful army. 

The operational level: Areas of cooperation 

Over time, there has been growing realization among the two militaries that they face some common operational challenges along the 

border. U.S. forces in Afghanistan have worked with the Office of the 

Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODR-P) to raise awareness of 

these common challenges among officers on both sides, bring them 

into regular contact in a variety of different venues, and create sustainable mechanisms for cooperation at the operational level. 

U.S. forces operate Joint Border Coordination Centers (JBCCs) in 

Afghanistan at the two main border crossings—Torkham Gate on the 

Khyber Pass between Peshawar and Jalalabad and Spin Boldak on the 

 

200 Authors’ interviews with Afghan and U.S. officials in eastern Afghanistan 

at the strategic and operational levels, and with forces on the border in 

the southeast. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
213

Chaman Pass between Quetta and Kandahar. The JBCCs are U.S. bases commanded by a colonel and linked to ISAF and ODR-P. The 

JBCC at Torkham Gate houses liaisons from Afghan and Pakistani 

military and border forces representing the commands responsible 

for the northern sector of the border. Liaisons from commands responsible for the southern sector are stationed at the Spin Boldak 

JBCC. Because they are U.S. bases, the JBCCs are considered safe and 

neutral ground by Afghan and Pakistani forces. 

The two JBCCs are the only location where Afghan and Pakistani 

forces interact regularly. Officers stationed there have helped deescalate numerous incidents along the border and resolve operational issues before they have had a chance to impact the relationship at 

the national and strategic levels. The fact that the JBCCs are located 

on the border and far from the capital allows them to deal with issues 

pragmatically without undue political interference. Information sharing between the two forces about upcoming operations and the 

movement of forces near the border is usually handled at the 

JBCCs.201

As U.S. and NATO forces have drawn down in Afghanistan, there has 

been an increase in bilateral meetings between Afghan and Pakistani 

officers at the one-star level and below. Afghan officers do not require 

political approval for meetings below the two-star level. Many of these 

meetings have occurred without U.S. officers present. Some of these 

meetings reportedly occurred on the Pakistani side of the border, indicating a higher level of trust among the ANSF than in the past. It is 

widely believed that the interactions facilitated by U.S. forces at the 

JBCCs were integral to making these bilateral meetings possible.202 

 

201 Authors’ interviews with Pakistani, Afghan, and U.S. forces. Aug. 12–24 

and Sep. 23–27, 2013. There is considerable agreement that the JBCCs 

have been effective and that such mechanisms should continue in some 

form. 

202 Afghan and Pakistani officials mentioned such meetings, indicating that 

they were more frequent than in the past and that most were quite effective at building rapport and reducing border firings. Authors’ interviews 

with Afghan (Aug. 12–24, 2013) and Pakistani (Sep. 23–27, 2013) military officials. 
214

Despite tensions at the national level, there are pragmatic professional officers on both sides who see common ground in the operational 

challenges along the border. This has come about over time as officers on both sides have discussed operational issues face to face and 

have built rapport. Officers on both sides recognize that they have 

mutual interests in coming to an agreement over demarcation of the 

Durand Line, including recognition at the national level. Despite political resistance in Kabul, many Afghan officers treat the boundary as 

a de facto border in discussions with their Pakistani counterparts and 

complain about their government’s refusal to recognize the Durand 

Line. 

With the help of ISAF and ODR-P, officers at the operational level 

agreed to a set of standard operating procedures for operations near 

the border, as well as rules for cross-border communications. The 

agreement does not require Afghanistan to sign off on the Durand 

Line, but only to follow certain procedures when conducting operations near the line. The purpose of the accord was to prevent the two 

forces from accidentally firing on each other during near-border operations or mistaking accidental border crossings or airspace violations for intentional incursions. The agreement arose out of a 

November 2011 incident in which U.S. aircraft mistook Pakistani 

forces conducting an operation near an un-demarcated portion of 

the border for insurgents and fired on them, killing an estimated 24 

Pakistani soldiers. A key finding from the investigation into the “Salala incident,” as it is known, was that the two sides had failed to share 

information on the locations of their forces.203 

In the past year, the two forces have begun to cooperate on countering IEDs. Both forces have lost numerous soldiers and paramilitaries 

to IED explosions and recognize that IEDs pose a common threat. 

For example, a three-star Pakistani general was recently killed in an 

IED blast in northwest Pakistan. In September 2013, Pakistani officers 

attended an IED conference in Kabul, and Pakistan has taken steps to 

regulate access to commercially available chemicals, such as ammonium nitrate (present in fertilizer), that are found in IEDs in Afghanistan. 

 

203 Authors’ interviews with U.S. forces responsible for managing border issues. Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aug. 12–24 and Sep. 23–27, 2013. 
215

The tactical level: Areas of persistent conflict 

There are a number of issues at the tactical level that are distinct 

from those at the higher echelons. It is important to understand 

these tactical issues, as they have considerable impact on the overall 

relationship between the two countries. It is not uncommon for incidents at the tactical level to escalate and become strategic or national 

crises, or for localized events along the border to become major political issues between the two countries. 

Pakistani, and especially Afghan, forces take fire regularly from insurgents just across the border. It is common for insurgents to fire on 

the ABP from unmanned Pakistani border posts, and in many cases 

from near these positions, forcing Afghan units to fire across the 

border onto areas very close to Pakistani posts. In those cases in 

which insurgent fire has come from the vicinity of Pakistani border 

posts manned by Frontier Corps personnel—causing Afghan forces 

to fire on manned Pakistani positions—Pakistani forces have returned fire, causing tit-for-tat exchanges that have escalated into major skirmishes resulting in casualties on both sides (more so on the 

Afghan side given the higher level of training among Pakistani forces). Many of these incidents, which occur in remote locales, are difficult to substantiate; the two sides often provide widely divergent 

accounts of what happened. 

There have been many incidents in which insurgents have massed 

against Afghan or Pakistani border posts or patrols and then fled 

across the border. Neither government accepts the right of the other’s forces to pursue insurgents over the border, even though the 

original Durand Line agreement makes provisions for these kinds of 

“hot pursuit” events. Nonetheless, because the border is not demarcated in many places, it is not uncommon for Afghan or Pakistani 

forces to pursue insurgents over the border where they run the risk of 

being fired upon by the other’s forces. The recent agreement on 

standard operating procedures for near-border operations requires 

each side to inform the other of such movements. In practice, there 

is not always enough time or adequate communications to ensure 

that this occurs. 

In the past few years, as insurgents targeting Pakistani forces have 

taken refuge in parts of northeast Afghanistan, Pakistani forces have 
216

fired thousands of artillery rounds across the border, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to homes and livestock. These incidents 

have become a major political issue in Afghanistan. President Karzai 

has described them as deliberate and unprovoked violations of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and has come under pressure from influential 

politicians in the northeast to take action on the issue. There have also been protests against the firings in populated areas in the northeast that have been covered by the national media. 

Along some sections of the border, especially in the mountainous 

northern areas, there is considerable uncertainty over where the border actually lies. The original Durand Line agreement was unclear on 

the exact location of the border in places. By and large, the line is not 

demarcated; Afghan and Pakistani forces use tactical maps with conflicting delineations of the border. There are numerous Pakistani 

border posts on what Afghanistan claims is its side of the line. In 

some places, this is because of terrain advantages—for example, areas 

where Pakistani forces have occupied the high ground usually happen to be on what Afghans believe is their side of the line. In other 

locations, Pakistani forces appear to have occupied posts left empty 

during the Taliban era and during Afghanistan’s long civil war. Afghan officers also claim that Pakistan has occupied a number of outposts vacated by U.S. forces.204 

There has been little movement in regard to de-conflicting tactical 

maps, coming to an agreement over the locations of individual border posts, or demarcating the line. As a result, there are constant firings between border posts and other tactical incidents that cause 

instability in the overall relationship between the two countries. For 

example, in May 2013, Pakistani forces began refurbishing a border 

post on what Afghanistan believed to be its side of the line, at a place 

known as Goshta in Nangarhar province. Afghan border police attempted to destroy the structure, causing Pakistani forces to retaliate, 

resulting in casualties on the Afghan side. The ABP also attempted to 

 

204 ANSF at the tactical and operational levels repeatedly raised this issue. 

The ANA and border police on the ground were concerned more about 

demarcating the line and reducing conflict with Pakistani forces than 

challenging the legitimacy of the border. Authors’ interviews with Afghan security officials. Aug. 12–24, 2013. 
217

take five Pakistani posts elsewhere along the border they believed to 

be inside Afghan territory. President Karzai intervened personally, 

turning the Goshta incident into a national issue, and ordered the 

ANA to send forces to the border. The issue has since been resolved 

with the help of U.S. forces. 

The tactical level: Areas of cooperation 

Despite frequent skirmishes on the border and disagreements at the 

tactical level over the location of the line, most sectors of the border 

are stable. Border post commanders do not intentionally provoke 

one another, as is often the case along the India–Pakistan border. 

There appears to be a mutual understanding among tactical units on 

both sides that there is little to be gained from escalation. To this 

end, there have been several successful initiatives aimed at creating 

sustainable mechanisms for cross-border cooperation at the tactical 

level. 

There is now a phone line connecting the Afghan border post at 

Schkin in Paktika province in southeast Afghanistan with the Pakistani position at Angor Adda—where cross-border firings have been a 

frequent occurrence. According to the Pakistani Army, the phone 

line has led to a considerable reduction in such incidents. As a result, 

both sides have agreed to construct phone lines between six more 

positions and are in discussions about an additional three. Given that 

there are hundreds of posts along the border, there is clearly a long 

way to go, yet the precedent has been set. 

In the past year, there have been reports of bilateral meetings between border post commanders—sometimes on the Afghan side, 

other times on the Pakistani side. U.S. forces are not present at these 

meetings and have little information about them. Forces on both 

sides, however, have reported increased rapport between border post 

commanders in some areas and modest improvement in cooperation 

on tactical issues. 

Enduring issues in the relationship 

The military-to-military relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, unstable even in the best of times, is entering a period of considerable uncertainty and transition as the U.S. and NATO pull back 

from Afghanistan and re-evaluate their policies towards the region. 
218

Some of the dynamics of the current relationship that we discussed 

previously are likely to endure, while others are likely to change. This 

section identifies areas where conflict is likely to remain and perhaps 

worsen, and areas where there may be opportunities to maintain or 

increase cooperation in the future. 

Areas of enduring conflict 

It is unlikely that Afghanistan will set aside its irredentist claims to Pakistani territory and recognize the Durand Line, at least not in the 

foreseeable future. Afghan leaders are likely to raise “the Pashtunistan issue” from time to time for domestic political reasons, causing 

tensions with Islamabad. The issue will continue to prevent full normalization of relations between the two countries. Lack of resolution 

of the issue at the national level will inhibit proper demarcation of 

the line, as well as efforts to resolve the issue of Pakistani posts on 

what the Afghans believe to be their side of the border. Incidents 

such as the one over the gate at Goshta are likely to recur periodically. 

Anti-Pakistan sentiment among sections of the Afghan population is 

likely to remain a recurring problem. Various Afghan leaders will 

seek to exploit these sentiments in an effort to rally the population 

against outside powers and to paint the Taliban insurgency as a tool 

of external aggression rather than as an internal problem. Afghan 

leaders may intentionally escalate incidents along the border and 

make threatening military maneuvers for political effect. As a result, 

there will be continual risk of border incidents becoming national issues that might otherwise be resolved at the tactical level. If Islamabad genuinely assists with Taliban reconciliation, Pakistan’s 

reputation among Afghans could improve, but popular distrust of 

Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment, based on many 

years of covert activities inside Afghanistan, will remain for quite 

some time. 

The Pakistani military will hedge and prepare for the worst until the 

ANSF have been tested following the drawdown of coalition forces, 

causing Afghan leaders to distrust Pakistan’s ultimate intentions. Pakistan’s military leaders are concerned that the ANSF may not survive 

much past 2014, leaving them with hundreds of thousands of trained, 

armed, and unpaid soldiers and millions of Afghan refugees. There 
219

appears to be genuine interest among Pakistani military leaders in 

seeing the ANSF succeed and ensure long-term stability in Afghanistan, but many do not believe this will happen. If the ANSF falter, it is 

possible that Pakistan, concerned about its own stability and survival, 

could revert back to earlier policies aimed at assisting pro-Pakistan 

elements of the insurgency and pushing as much of it as possible into 

Afghanistan, further destabilizing the country and harming relations 

between the two nations. If Coalition Support Funds and other U.S. 

support to Pakistan were cut—leaving the military without sufficient 

resources to conduct operations in the tribal areas—such an outcome 

would become all the more likely.205

 

The issue of insurgent sanctuaries will remain a major source of tension on both sides, particularly for the Afghans. The Pakistani military may conduct additional operations in the tribal areas, but is not 

likely to take action against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. 

No matter how much relations improve between the two countries, a 

series of terrorist attacks in Kabul traced to the group could quickly 

spoil the relationship. For the Pakistani military, the problem of Pakistani militants taking refuge inside Afghanistan is likely to become 

worse in the coming years as U.S. and NATO forces withdraw. With 

few forces in southeast Afghanistan, it will be then become even less 

likely that Pakistan would act against the Haqqani network, for fear of 

making an enemy of a group that could easily flee into Afghanistan 

and wage war against the Pakistani state. The issue of sanctuaries 

could diminish if the Taliban reconcile, but the problem is likely to 

remain significant, with various local factions continuing to fight both 

governments from bases on the opposite side of the border. 

Afghanistan is likely to seek closer relations with India in the coming 

years, heightening fears of encirclement among Pakistani military 

leaders. As U.S. and NATO support declines, leaders in Kabul will 

look to New Delhi for military equipment, financial aid, and training 

and education for their officers. India may seek to expand intelligence activities inside Afghanistan if the Taliban grow in power. Indian officials are concerned that Afghanistan could once again become 

a safe haven for terrorists targeting India if the Taliban take over 

 

205 Coalition Support Funds are used to reimburse Pakistan for operations 

conducted against the Taliban and al Qaeda. 
220

parts of the country. Pakistan’s intelligence services are likely to respond with extreme measures—including terrorist attacks on Indian 

embassies and consulates—against any reported Indian intelligence 

activities in the border areas, no matter their aim or how small. 

Opportunities for future cooperation 

Afghanistan and Pakistan are unlikely to ever become close allies; 

there will always be tensions in the relationship. The two countries, 

however, are bound together by a porous border and a large Pashtun 

population that straddles both sides of it. Both countries share a 

common interest in stabilizing the Pashtun Belt and ensuring the 

success of each other’s border forces. Violence and instability in Afghanistan have a major effect on Pakistan and vice versa—a fact that 

is widely recognized on both sides. 

Whatever happens politically and militarily, cross-border trade will 

continue. Forces on both sides of the border will have an enduring 

interest in securing this trade and expanding road networks on both 

sides, including through the most violence-afflicted areas. Increasing 

economic interdependence is likely to improve ties between the two 

nations over time, even if there are tensions in other aspects of the 

relationship. Road networks can be expanded on a bilateral basis between the two governments with assistance from USAID and other international donors. 

It will be necessary for the two governments to cooperate over the repatriation and resettlement of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. If violence increases in Afghanistan in the near term, there could be 

another flood of refugees into Pakistan, which would put a heavy 

burden on the Pakistani government. Agencies such as the UN will 

continue to play a vital role in providing assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and in helping the two governments come to mutual 

agreements on the refugee issue. 

There is potential in the future for the two forces to cooperate in a 

variety of ways against insurgents operating on either side of the border. If Pakistan pulls back from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas, the result will be greater 

instability in Afghanistan. The same is true on the other side of the 

border. It will be necessary going forward to continue Coalition Sup-
221

port Funds and other support to the Pakistani military, so that it has 

the resources required to continue these operations. So far, complementary operations have proven elusive, yet awareness has grown 

over time that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are interconnected 

and pose a common threat to both forces. 

Despite tensions at the national level, there is likely to be continued 

interest in maintaining and further expanding mechanisms for cooperation between forces on both sides of the border. It may be possible 

to expand many of these mechanisms (described in detail in previous 

sections) and to further institutionalize them. Cross-border communications in particular, such as phone lines between border posts, 

could be expanded across the board. Continued U.S. funding could 

be used to incentivize expansion of these mechanisms. Over time, 

these mechanisms are likely to further stabilize the situation at the 

tactical and operational levels, allowing for agreements over demarcation of the border in various sectors and perhaps eventually a permanent agreement over the Durand Line that puts Pakistan’s 

concerns to rest. 

There is likely to be continued demand for a border coordination element in Kabul, as long as U.S. forces remain to provide safe and 

neutral ground for Pakistani military liaisons. It may not be possible 

to maintain the JBCCs on the border itself, due to U.S. force protection and medical evacuation requirements.206 If these centers are 

closed, it is likely that Pakistan will remove its liaisons from these positions, making the coordination element at ISAF in Kabul all the more 

important. It may be advisable to maintain a small coordination element at ODR-P as well, one capable of interfacing directly with the 

Pakistani military leadership over larger strategic issues or in the 

event of a major crisis over the border. 

There is likely to be continued demand among officers at the tactical 

and operational levels for bilateral meetings at border posts and operational headquarters. It will be important to maintain the tempo of 

 

206 After 2014, when there will be fewer U.S. and NATO bases, the JBCCs 

may be too far away for wounded U.S. personnel to be evacuated within 

the required “golden hour”—the period of most effective medical 

treatment, immediately following a casualty event. 
222

these meetings, regardless of the ups and downs in the relationship at 

the national level, and to clearly separate the operational and tactical 

issues discussed at these meetings from potentially divisive political 

disagreements. U.S. personnel may play a constructive role in facilitating interactions that might not otherwise occur, through coordination elements and trilateral meetings—with the ultimate aim of 

transitioning them to regular bilateral interactions in which U.S. 

presence is not required. 

There are likely to be many escalatory incidents between forces on 

both sides that will require U.S. involvement to help reduce tensions. 

Over time, as mechanisms for military to military communication and 

cooperation improve, the requirement for U.S. involvement may diminish. Until the standard operating procedure for near-border operations becomes fully institutionalized on both sides, it will be 

necessary for U.S. personnel to work with officers on both sides to 

ensure they are aware of the rules and follow them carefully. 

Finally, there is considerable potential for cooperation on countering 

IEDs, an area where the two forces have only begun to work together. 

It is highly likely that the IED threat against both forces will increase 

in the coming years as the Taliban test the ANSF and attempt to put 

pressure on the Pakistani military in the tribal areas. The drawdown 

of U.S. and NATO forces will enable IED networks to move more 

freely over the border. There is potential for both sides to treat the 

IED threat holistically as a problem spanning the border, and to cooperate on restricting material used for trigger devices and precursor 

chemicals, and perhaps to share specific intelligence on IED networks and facilitators. U.S. forces could play a key role in this regard 

by offering consistent and standardized counter-IED equipment and 

training to both forces, working with both sides to restrict IEDmaking material, and to facilitate information sharing. 

Conclusion 

In our discussions on both sides of the border, we identified many areas of enduring conflict between the Afghan and Pakistani militaries, 

such as recognition and demarcation of the border, insurgent sanctuaries, and Afghanistan’s relationship with India. Some of these will 

worsen in the coming years as U.S. and NATO forces pull back from 

Afghanistan. However, there are also many areas of potential cooper-
223

ation that have a proven track record of success over the past several 

years, and that have counteracted many of the tensions in the relationship. 

There appears to be considerable demand among officers on both 

sides to continue, and in some areas expand, cooperative initiatives. 

The primary concern on both sides is continued U.S. and NATO 

commitment to the region—whether international personnel will 

remain in Afghanistan and Pakistan to help facilitate relations, and 

whether there will be enough funding from the international donor 

community (especially the U.S.) to maintain mechanisms for crossborder cooperation. 

If the U.S. and NATO continue their commitment to the region, we 

assess it will help mitigate some, though certainly not all, of the areas 

of enduring conflict between the two countries, and will bolster the 

opportunities for cooperation. If the U.S. and NATO significantly decrease their commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, we assess many 

areas of enduring conflict are likely to be exacerbated, and areas of 

potential cooperation are unlikely to reach their full potential of 

helping to stabilize the region. 

In the next section, we discuss the results of our assessment of likely 

ANSF responses to various political scenarios. 
224

Testing our assumptions: Assessment of likely ANSF responses 

to political scenarios 

We were asked to assess difficulties the ANSF may face—and likely responses and directions they could go—under several potential political situations or scenarios. We begin with a summary of our findings, 

followed by the details of our assessment. 

Summary 

We created three scenarios to identify possible ANSF reactions to 

events that might impact political stability in Afghanistan, from which 

we draw some limited conclusions. These scenarios are: 

 Reconciliation happens (either as a grand bargain or via a 

splintering of the Taliban) 

 A “bad” 2014 Afghan Presidential election (resulting in a nonconsensus candidate or unstable transfer of power) 

 The loss of international community support (in the form of 

advisors or financial assistance) 

These scenarios were chosen to test aspects of four of our overarching assumptions. 

While it is impossible to remove all nature of speculation from future 

assessments of this type, we structured our thinking about these scenarios via a combination of interviews and literature study to derive 

most likely responses for the ANSF, looking at both leadership and 

rank-and-file reactions. We also considered what events might have to 

occur to cause a negative reaction (e.g., fragmentation, desertion, 

military coup) by the ANSF. 

For the first scenario (reconciliation happens), we examined a wide 

body of literature and interviewed subject matter experts to identify 

likely ANSF responses to Taliban reconciliation. Having reviewed 

these sources: 

We conclude that so long as the Afghan president adequately consults, listens 

to, and addresses the concerns of ANSF leaders as part of the reconciliation 

process, and during the implementation of a settlement, the ANSF are likely 

to accept the settlement’s terms.
225

Given Afghan culture and the current Afghan president’s precedent 

for calling Loya Jirgas prior to making significant national decisions, it 

seems likely there would be considerable behind-the-scenes consensus building before the president agreed to any terms or conditions 

of a settlement. That said, we also conclude that there is a low probability of Taliban reconciliation by 2018, either in whole or in part. 

For the second scenario (a “bad” election): 

We conclude that as long as the winning presidential ticket maintains the 

current ethnic balance of power, the ANSF will largely accept the results of 

the election.

That said, it is possible that in a Pashtun versus Pashtun runoff some 

rank-and-file ANSF members loyal to the losing ticket could desert or 

defect to the insurgency. If a non-Pashtun were to win the election, it 

could lead to more widespread desertion or defection on the part of 

rank-and-file ANSF (especially within the police), along with increased violence in the south and the east of the country and protests 

within the major cities. We assess that these possibilities are of low-tomoderate likelihood. 

For the third scenario (loss of international community support): 

We conclude that if the United States and NATO do not maintain a training 

and advisory mission in Afghanistan, the absence of advisors in 2015 is likely to result in a downward spiral of ANSF capabilities—along with security 

in Afghanistan—unless the ANSF can find other patrons to fill the resulting 

“enabler vacuum.”

We assess that the speed of this downward spiral would likely be most 

strongly dependent on the level of continued international community financial aid. If the U.S. and NATO discontinue training and advising the ANSF, we assess that many ANSF leaders would likely 

soldier on, since they are well-invested in the future of Afghanistan 

and its security forces. At the rank-and-file level of the ANSF, however, 

the loss of U.S. and NATO enablers could have a more dramatic effect—to include increased desertion and defection rates and the possibility of unit fragmentation or dissolution. We find this excursion to 

be of moderate likelihood, with moderate-to-high likelihood of these 

negative ANSF responses as a result. 
226

With respect to the loss of international community financial support, this was the one point on which every one of our interviewees 

agreed: The loss of funding, or even a too-rapid decline in funding, 

to the ANSF would carry with it a high likelihood of increased desertion rates, fragmentation or splintering of ANSF units, or defection of 

units to the insurgency. 

We conclude that the absence of international community funds for the ANSF 

and Afghanistan’s government is likely to result in another civil war in Afghanistan. 

In the absence of such funding, the centripetal forces of Afghanistan’s various power centers are likely to pull the country apart once 

again. 

We summarize the results of our assessment in Table 39. 

Table 39. Summary of likely ANSF responses to several political scenarios 

Scenario Excursion Likely ANSF Response 

Likelihood of 

Excursion Coming to Pass by 

2018 

Likelihood of 

Negative ANSF 

Response 

Reconciliation 

Happens 

Full reconciliation (a “grand 

bargain”) 

Acceptance—as long as the 

president of Afghanistan adequately considers views and 

concerns of senior ANSF leaders 

and terms of agreement do not 

cross ANSF “redlines” 

Low Low 

Partial reconciliation (splinter faction) 

Acceptance—as long as the 

above conditions were met and 

the ANSF were not pressured to 

try and stop Taliban infighting 

Low Low 

“Bad” Election 

Non-consensus 

victor 

Possible fragmentation of ANSF 

leadership and units. If nonPashtun wins, possible desertion 

or defection by rank-and-file 

ANSF (especially police) and 

increased violence in the east 

and south 

Low to moderate Moderate 

“Bad” transfer of 

power (e.g., 

sweeping changes in ANSF leadership) 

Possible fragmentation of ANSF 

leadership and units. If nonPashtun wins, possible desertion 

or defection by rank-and-file 

ANSF (especially police) and 

increased violence in the east 

and south 

Low to moderate Low to 

moderate 
227

Table 39. Summary of likely ANSF responses to several political scenarios 

Scenario Excursion Likely ANSF Response 

Likelihood of 

Excursion Coming to Pass by 

2018 

Likelihood of 

Negative ANSF 

Response 

Loss of 

International 

Community 

Support 

No training and 

advisory mission 

Pleas to other countries for resources to fill the “enabler vacuum.” Increased desertion and 

defection rates 

Moderate Moderate to 

high 

Loss of international financial 

aid 

Sharp increases in rank-and-file 

desertion and defection. Fragmentation of ANA units. Alliances with former Mujahideen 

leaders and other powerbrokers. 

Pleas to other countries for support 

Low to moderate High 

Methodology 

Our methodology for this assessment consisted of four steps: 

1. We used our set of overarching assumptions to craft a set of political scenarios in which some of those assumptions could be 

tested. In particular, we chose to individually test assumptions 

pertaining to Taliban reconciliation, a peaceful and acceptable 

transfer of political power in 2014, and the continuance of U.S, 

NATO, and international community support. 

2. We conducted background literature research to understand 

which aspects of our scenarios have been studied and analyzed 

previously and what conclusions were drawn by others. 

3. We interviewed subject matter experts at a wide variety of organizations—including a significant number of Afghans—to 

gather their views on how the ANSF might respond under 

these scenarios. 

4. We consolidated these views to derive what we assess to be most 

likely responses for the ANSF to the scenarios, looking at both 

leadership and rank-and-file reactions. We also considered 

what events might have to occur to cause a negative reaction 

(e.g., fragmentation, desertion, military coup) on the part of 

these aspects of the ANSF. 
228

Caveats 

Attempting to predict the future is always difficult, though there are 

methodologies (e.g., alternative futures methods) that exist to assist 

in approaching this challenge in a systematic way. However, such 

methodologies were beyond the scope of this task. While we have attempted to keep our thinking structured using the above methodology, we acknowledge the necessarily speculative nature of the 

discussion that follows. Also, we have not developed these scenarios 

to address all possible levels of analysis. For example, in thinking 

about likely ANSF reactions to the 2014 Afghan presidential election, 

it is clear that such reactions would vary by the specific individual 

elected. However, analysis to that level of detail was unfeasible within 

the confines of this assessment. As such, we suggest this section be 

considered a departure point for further discussion and study, rather 

than a comprehensive political analysis. 

Assessment 

Political scenarios 

We used four of our overarching assumptions (those pertaining to 

Taliban reconciliation; a peaceful transfer of political power in 2014; 

and continued U.S., NATO, and international community support in 

the form of advisors and financial assistance) to generate three political scenarios for examination. Note that each scenario tests one, and 

only one, of these assumptions. 

 Reconciliation happens: In this scenario, a negotiated settlement is reached between the Taliban, the government of Afghanistan, the U.S., and Pakistan. We consider two possibilities: 

that the Taliban reconciles as a movement—or in other words, 

that there is a “grand bargain” struck between stakeholders that 

leads to most, if not all, Taliban leaders reconciling with the 

Afghan government; and that a faction of Taliban leaders splinter off from the main group and reconcile with the government, leaving the others to continue the insurgency. 

 “Bad” election/transfer of power: In this scenario, the presidential election of 2014 or the subsequent transition of political power goes badly. We consider two possibilities: that the 
229

winner of the election is a non-consensus candidate, and that 

the transfer of power does not go smoothly.207 

 Loss of international community support: In this scenario, the 

international community significantly or completely reduces its 

support to the Afghan government. We consider two possibilities: that the U.S. and NATO discontinue their training and advising mission to the ANSF; and that the international 

community significantly curtails, or even ceases, its financial assistance to the government of Afghanistan (e.g., as a result of 

the latter failing to perform satisfactorily against the Tokyo 

Conference benchmarks). 

We will explore each of these scenarios in more detail below. 

Reconciliation happens 

A grand bargain 

With the opening of a Taliban office in Doha on 20 June this year, 

talk of reconciliation as a means of ending the war in Afghanistan 

once again came to the fore, only to diminish when the office was 

closed shortly thereafter. This repeated an increasingly familiar pattern—in which reconciliation talks briefly become more tangible, only to fade once again to the ethereal—highlighting how unclear the 

pathway to reconciliation really is.208 That said, our task here is to analyze likely ANSF reactions to a reconciliation scenario, so the specifics 

 

207 We considered including the possibility that the election gets significantly 

postponed or cancelled, but our discussions with subject matter experts 

indicated that this was unlikely to happen, given the importance the international community has placed on the election and the articulation 

of that importance to the government of Afghanistan. In addition, we 

considered the possibility that the election would be fraudulent—but 

the 2009 Afghan presidential election was widely considered to suffer 

from significant irregularities, yet the outcome was generally endorsed 

by the international community and by Afghans. If the election was so 

fraudulent as to exceed the international community’s “redlines,” it likely would result in cessation or sharp curtailment of financial support to 

Afghanistan, which is addressed in our third scenario. 

208 “Q&A: Afghan Taliban Open Doha Office.” BBC News, Jun. 20, 2013, 

accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22957827. 
230

of that pathway are less important for our purposes than who the parties to the reconciliation deal are and what conditions they might 

agree to as part of a settlement. We will therefore focus our discussion 

on these latter aspects.209

To be credible, a formal reconciliation deal would have to include (at 

a minimum) the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the U.S., 

and Pakistan.210 Some have said that India should also be a signatory 

(which implies its participation in the negotiations), while others 

have suggested Iran, China, and the Central Asian states as well.211

For this assessment, we examine what we consider to be the most likely scenario, in which the signatories are the principal four mentioned 

above. 

Through our interviews and literature search, we identified likely 

demands that each party would bring to the negotiating table. We 

used these sources to categorize demands as essential versus desired. 

While there was not perfect agreement among our sources regarding 

this categorization, we generally took the majority view in compiling 

the following:212

 

209 This is not to suggest that the pathway is unimportant; indeed, it is critical. However, it is also so uncertain as to necessitate its being outside the 

scope of what we can address in this task. For a good overview of the difficulties associated with the pathway to reconciliation, see: Talking About 

Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan. International Crisis 

Group, Asia Report No. 221. Mar. 26, 2012. 

210 We refer to the government of Afghanistan in this scenario as including 

the three branches of government (and to include political opposition 

members, women, and minorities) and not simply as the Karzai executive branch. 

211 See, for example: Olsson. “Afghanistan After 2014.” 65. 

212 In this list we do not include items that might be addressed as part of 

confidence-building measures—for example, the release of Taliban prisoners or return of U.S. and NATO prisoners of war, or the de-listing of 

Taliban members from UN sanctions. Rather, we focus on items that are 

more strategic and enduring. Ibid., 65–70; Stephen Biddle. “Ending the 

War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid Failure on the Installment Plan.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139644/stephen-biddle/ending-
231

Afghanistan demands: 

 Cessation of insurgent violence, attacks against government 

personnel and facilities, and attacks against civilians (essential) 

 Dismantling of Taliban shadow governance structures and cessation of shadow (sharia) courts (essential) 

 Taliban acceptance of the “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” 

(essential) 

 Taliban acceptance of the current Afghan constitution and its 

protections for minorities and women (desired) 

Taliban demands: 

 Complete departure of all foreign forces from Afghanistan (essential) 

 

the-war-in-afghanistan; Michael Semple. “Talking to the Taliban.” Foreign Policy, Jan. 10, 2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/10/talking_to_the_tali

ban; Michael Semple, Theo Farrell, Anatol Lieven, and Rudra 

Chaudhuri. “Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation.” Royal United Services Institute, Briefing Paper, Sep. 2012, accessed Sep. 2013, at 

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Taliban_Perspectives_on_Recon

ciliation.pdf; “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the 

United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” May 

2, 2012, accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 

default/files/2012.06.01u.s-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf; Caroline 

Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Brian Katulis. “Afghanistan Transition: 

Elevating the Diplomatic Components of the Transition Strategy at the 

Chicago NATO Summit and Beyond.” Center for American Progress, 

White Paper, May 2012; “Talking About Talks.” 24; Secretary Hillary 

Clinton. “Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society's Series of Richard 

C. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses.” Feb. 18, 2011, accessed Sep. 2013, 

available at www.state.gov; Azeem Ibrahim. “Afghanistan 2012: The Beginning of the End Game.” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Policy Brief #52, Jan. 2012. Authors’ interviews with personnel at 

ISAF, IJC, DoS, Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, and 

U.S. CENTCOM, Aug. 12–24, 2013 and Aug. 29, 2013; and personal 

communication with Dr. Theo Farrell, King’s College of London, Aug. 9, 

2013. 
232

 Revision of Afghanistan’s Constitution to more strongly reflect 

the principles of Islamic justice (essential) 

 Restoration of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (desired) 

 Control of several government ministries (most likely the Ministries of Justice and Education, possibly also the Ministry of 

Public Health) and/or provincial- and district-level leadership 

positions in the south and east (desired) 

 Integration of low- and mid-level fighters into the ANSF (desired) 

U.S. demands: 

 Taliban sever any association with al Qaeda and renounce international terrorism (essential) 

 Means of verifying that al Qaeda does not return to Afghanistan (essential) 

 Taliban accept Afghanistan’s current Constitution and its protections for minorities and women (desired) 

Pakistan demands: 

 The government of Afghanistan will act to deny safe haven for 

insurgent groups oriented against Pakistan (essential) 

 The government of Afghanistan will not allow other countries 

to use Afghanistan as a staging ground for attacks into Pakistan 

(essential) 

Clearly there are conflicts across these demands that would have to 

be worked out via negotiation to reach an agreement. While difficult 

to predict what concessions the various stakeholders would be willing 

to make, we presume a deal would have to include the essential items 

for each actor as described above. Taking these as baseline conditions, we then used the desired conditions for each actor as “trade 

space” to achieve a balanced agreement. In doing so, we arrived at 

the following minimum conditions for an agreement: 

 The Taliban sever ties with al Qaeda and renounce the latter’s 

use of Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism 
233

 The Taliban cease attacks against the Afghan government and 

dismantle their shadow government structures (to include 

shadow courts) 

 The Afghan Constitution is modified to more strongly reflect 

the principles of Islamic justice (i.e., sharia), and more evenly 

distribute power across the branches of government and between national and local levels, but retains protections for the 

rights of women and minorities; and the country retains the 

name “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” 

 The Taliban are given several non-security ministerial (cabinet) 

positions and a number of provincial- and district-level leadership positions in the south and east 

 A number of Taliban fighters are to be integrated into the ANA 

 U.S. and NATO combat forces withdraw from the country, but 

a Joint Monitoring Commission remains (for a minimum of 

five years) to verify that the tenets of the deal are upheld by all 

parties 

Given reconciliation under these conditions, what is the likely reaction on the part of the ANA and ANP? 

For both forces (and for most Afghans), there likely would be relief 

at the signing of a grand bargain, since it would hold the promise of 

significantly reducing the amount of fighting and violence in the 

country. There would also likely be trepidation as to whether the deal 

would hold, and skepticism as to the Taliban’s intentions. In addition, 

there may also be disappointment at the withdrawal of U.S. and 

NATO advisors, and fear that such an agreement would lead to expectations of a “peace dividend,” resulting in reduced international 

financial assistance to the ANSF, with likely end-strength reductions 

as well. 

That said, if the above conditions (or something approaching them) 

constituted the reconciliation agreement, our interviews and research suggest that the ANA and ANP would generally accept them. 

Discontent with, and possible negative reactions to, a “grand bargain”-type agreement would likely stem from several possibilities: 
234

First, failure of the Afghan president to adequately build a platform 

of consensus within the leadership of the ANA and ANP prior to 

agreeing to a reconciliation deal would be problematic. The leadership of the ANA, and to a lesser extent the ANP, is largely Tajik and 

contains many former members of the Northern Alliance. Ensuring 

these leaders were adequately engaged and supportive of the conditions of a peace deal would be essential to them accepting it. 

If the Afghan president were to make concessions (as part of the 

agreement) that cross certain “redlines” of ANA or ANP leaders, the 

latter likely would react negatively. Specific redlines might include 

giving too many ANSF or other leadership posts to Taliban members 

(e.g., heads of ministries, or provincial and district governorships); 

integration of Taliban fighters into the ANSF wholesale via the creation of autonomous Taliban units (as opposed to distributing them 

among existing units); or other items that significantly infringe upon 

the patronage networks or personal interests of current ANSF leaders.

213

Second, if the international community too rapidly reduced its financial assistance to the ANSF in the wake of a settlement, it likely would 

translate into a too-rapid drawdown of ANSF end-strength. This 

would cause the loss of a significant number of jobs for young Afghan 

men and a loss of patronage at more senior levels. Similarly, even if 

end-strength were kept constant, but significant numbers of current 

ANA soldiers (and possibly police) were displaced to enable integration of Taliban fighters, it could lead to significant discontent within 

the ANSF. 

Whether or not the level of discontent would rise to cause nonsupport of the agreement by ANSF leadership, fragmentation of the 

ANSF, or action against the Afghan government (e.g., deposing the 

president or a military coup), would strongly depend on how far out 

in front of ANSF leadership the president got in negotiating—and 

agreeing to terms of—a peace settlement.214

 

213 Author interviews with ISAF, IJC, and CENTCOM personnel. Aug. 12–

24, and Aug. 29, 2013. 

214 Ibid. 
235

In terms of the likelihood of these negative outcomes, given the Afghan culture of consensus and President Karzai’s precedent for convening Loya Jirgas prior to moving forward with high-level political 

decisions,215 it seems unlikely that he (or his successor) would act unilaterally or agree to terms that were so far removed from what ANSF 

leaders would accept as to cause a negative reaction. More likely is 

that unacceptable terms would be informally rejected, debated, and 

new terms would be identified in a repeated process of internal negotiation (within Afghan political circles) until acceptable terms were 

identified and agreed upon by the most critical stakeholders. Of 

course, it is very difficult to predict how long that process could take, 

or whether it would even reach the required degree of consensus. 

A fragmented agreement 

In the absence of a grand bargain, there remains the possibility that a 

faction of Taliban (or other insurgent group) leaders could be induced to rejoin the Afghan government. While there is no precedent 

of Taliban factions reconciling in this way, individual Taliban members have left the group and rejoined the government in the past.216

If this were to happen, our research suggests two possibilities. The 

first is that the splinter group is relatively small or not significantly 

powerful, with a resultant slight to moderate net impact on the insurgency’s overall strength. In this case, splinter reconciliation might 

lead to the cessation of fighting by some fighters who are loyal to the 

leaders of the splinter group; those that remained would be the hardliners with every intention of continuing to fight.217 A second possibility envisions a more significant splintering in which a group of senior 

 

215 As this report was being finalized, President Karzai convened a Loya 

Jirga to discuss a Bilateral Security Agreement with the U.S. He did the 

same in November 2011, to approve a Strategic Partnership Agreement 

with the U.S. See “Loya Jirga Approves Afghan-U.S. Partnership.” Tolo 

News, Nov. 19, 2011, accessed Sep. 25, 2012, at 

http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/4456-loya-jirga-backs-afghan-uspartnership. 

216 “Talking about Talks.” 23. 

217 Ibid: 4; also, author interviews with ISAF, IJC, and CENTCOM intelligence personnel. Aug. 12–24, 2013 and Aug. 29, 2013. 
236

Taliban members decide to reconcile and take fighters from whole 

areas of southern or eastern Afghanistan with them. In this case, attacks against government forces in these areas might decrease, but 

overall security could still decline as a result of an internal struggle 

for control within the Taliban.218

The impact on the ANSF of the first possibility is likely to be minimal. 

Given that a relatively small or insignificant splinter faction would 

have less bargaining power than the whole of Taliban leadership, it 

seems unlikely that such a scenario would result in concessions exceeding what ANSF leaders would accept. In addition, while such 

reconciliation might require the integration of some number of 

fighters into the ranks of the ANSF, the relatively small size of such a 

contingent should admit that possibility without significant issue. 

In the second possibility, the more significant nature of the reconciliation deal could invoke a negative response by the ANSF, if any of the 

“redlines” identified above for a full reconciliation were crossed. In 

addition, if security in Pashtun areas deteriorated too much as a result of Taliban infighting, the ANSF (particularly the ANA) could be 

directed by the Afghan president to intervene, which could put them 

in the crossfire of a limited Pashtun civil conflict. Given that much of 

the ANA’s leadership is non-Pashtun, and that most of its rank-andfile come from areas other than those likely to be involved in such a 

conflict, there could be significant reluctance on the part of the ANA 

to follow such direction—especially if the violence escalated significantly. The president of Afghanistan would have to walk a fine line 

between ordering the ANSF to get involved and the political blowback that might accompany such an order. If he proved unable to 

successfully walk that line, a negative response from the ANSF could 

result—ranging from ignoring his order to intervene (thereby undermining his power and civilian control of the ANSF) up to and 

possibility including actions to depose him. The actual course of 

events would be strongly dependent on how vociferously the Afghan 

president tried to press the ANSF to act against their will. 

 

218 Personal communication with Dr. Theo Farrell, King’s College of London. Aug. 9, 2013. 
237

In sum, for the “Reconciliation Happens” scenario, we conclude that 

as long as the Afghan president adequately consults, listens to, and 

addresses the concerns of ANA and ANP leaders as part of a reconciliation process and during the implementation of its terms, there is a 

low likelihood of a negative reaction on the part of the ANSF. Given 

Afghan culture and the current Afghan president’s precedent for 

calling Loya Jirgas prior to making significant national decisions, it 

seems likely that there would be considerable behind-the-scenes consensus building before the president agreed to any terms or conditions of a settlement. Perhaps more dangerous is the period 

immediately following the announcement of such an agreement, during which its implementation will result in the shifting of power and 

influence among various political centers. If the Afghan president is 

not able to successfully manage this delicate transition phase, it could 

lead to negative responses on the part of the ANSF. 

“Bad” election/transfer of power 

Non-consensus candidate 

The next Afghan presidential election is currently scheduled for 

April 2014. Per Afghanistan’s Constitution, President Karzai is prohibited from seeking a third term, and to date he has assured the international community that he intends to step down when his second 

term expires. If he holds to that promise, the election would mark 

the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history and 

would create additional momentum toward long-term political stability in the country. As such, the international community has placed a 

high degree of emphasis on the election as a bellwether for the future of Afghanistan. 

The Afghan electoral process requires a candidate’s ticket (the presidential candidate, plus candidates for the first and second vice presidencies) to obtain a majority of the popular vote in order to be 

elected. If no candidate does so in the first round of polling, the top 

two vote-getting candidates run against each other in a second, runoff round. Such was the case in Afghanistan’s 2009 election, in which 

President Karzai was unable to secure a first-round majority—though 

in that election, his opponent in the second round, Abdullah Abdullah, decided to “not participate” in the runoff election due to a number of grievances with the Karzai administration and Afghanistan’s 
238

electoral process. As a result, Afghanistan’s Independent Election 

Commission subsequently declared Karzai the winner.219

This electoral system is designed to ensure the elected President is a 

consensus candidate and can enter office with a political mandate 

based on majority popular support. That said, looking ahead to the 

next election, there are several ways in which a candidate could win 

without necessarily being a consensus candidate.220

First, given the precedent of a runoff and the likely large number of 

candidates in the 2014 election, it is entirely possible that the first 

round of elections could fail to produce a majority victor. The second 

round would then amount to one of three possibilities: two Pashtun 

candidates running against each other (i.e., a split Pashtun vote), a 

Pashtun and a non-Pashtun, or two non-Pashtuns. All three cases 

have the possibility of leading to disenfranchisement of some segment of the Afghan population.221

Second, the possibility of widespread insecurity on the day of the 

elections cannot be ruled out. In 2009, Election Day proved to be the 

most violent day in the history of the war to that point. If this happens again, it could lead to a large swath of Pashtuns across the south 

and east of the country being unable to exercise their voting rights, 

with a non-Pashtun winning as a result. 

How would the ANA and ANP respond to these situations?

In the first instance, the current balance of political power within the 

government of Afghanistan’s executive branch is a Pashtun president 

 

219 “The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan.” 

National Democratic Institute. 2010, accessed Sep. 25, 2013, at 

www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009. 

220 It is worth noting that these scenarios could occur even in the event of a 

completely non-fraudulent and technically perfect election. 

221 According to the CIA’s World Factbook 2013, Afghanistan’s ethnic distribution is as follows: Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek 

(9%), Aimak (4%), Turkmen (3%), Baloch (2%), other (4%). As of July 

2013, the ethnic breakdown of the ANA was: Pashtun (46%), Tajik 

(33%), Hazara (10%), Uzbek (6%), other (6%). Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. Jul. 2013: 65. 
239

(Karzai), a Tajik first vice-president (Mohammed Fahim), and a 

Hazaran second vice-president (Karim Khalili). As long as the winning ticket from the runoff election maintained that balance of power, the ANSF likely would accept the results of the election—though 

it is possible that in a Pashtun-versus-Pashtun runoff some rank-andfile members loyal to the losing ticket could decide to desert the 

ANSF, leading to low-scale fragmentation of some ANA units or possibly low-level defections of police to the insurgency. The risk of 

fragmentation also exists, though more within the officer corps, in a 

non-Pashtun–versus–non-Pashtun runoff. 

If the winner is a non-Pashtun, it could lead to more widespread desertion or defection on the part of rank-and-file ANSF (especially 

within the police), along with increased violence in the south and the 

east of the country and protests within the major cities. If the remaining ANSF were to react violently to such provocations—actions for 

which there is precedent222—it could lead to an escalation of negative 

events, with consequences up to and including widespread instability 

and a popular boost to the insurgency as part of its theme of opposing an illegitimate and unpopular government. 

We conclude that these events are of low-to-moderate likelihood. It is 

clear to many observers that Afghan political elites understand the 

critical importance of this election to both the future stability of Afghanistan and continued international community support—with the 

result being significant efforts on their part to generate a consensus 

 

222 See, for example: “Afghan Troops Kill Protester Near Iran Consulate.” 

Associated Press, Sep. 7, 2013, accessed Sep. 27, 2013, at 

www.news.yahoo.com/afghan-troops-kill-protester-near-iran-consulate095356342; “Afghan Police Fire on Student Protesters, Killing at Least 

Four and Wounding 30.” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 2012, accessed Sep. 

27, 2013, at www.news.google.com; and “Afghanistan Security Forces 

Open Fire on Anti-U.S. Protesters, 7 Killed.” Associated Press, Feb. 22, 

2012, accessed Sep. 27, 2013, at www.nydailynews.com/news/world/ 

anti-american-demonstrations-erupt-outskirts-kabul-consecutive-dayarticle-1.1026684. 
240

platform prior to the elections.223 As Andrew Wilder of the United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently stated: 

A strategy being pursued by some political actors is to try to 

generate a consensus prior to the elections among key political elites around a post-election national agenda and 

power-sharing arrangement. If successful, this elite consensus-building effort would be followed by a national campaign to endorse this effort, with the hope that the 2014 

elections would ultimately serve more as a referendum on 

this national agenda and power-sharing arrangement rather 

than a highly contentious and divisive electoral contest.224

While the success of these efforts is far from guaranteed, their existence reinforces the seriousness with which Afghan political elites are 

approaching the election, and their desire for it to conclude in the 

first round with a consensus candidate as the victor. 

“Bad” transfer of power 

In the event the election proceeds relatively smoothly and a candidate is chosen without causing widespread instability, there are still 

two major avenues for issues to arise. The first is if major powerbrokers in the current administration are not brought into the next administration in a way that is satisfactory to them. Some of these 

powerbrokers—for example, Mohammed Fahim (the current first 

vice president) and Ismael Khan (the current Minister of Water and 

Energy)—have patronage networks that extend into the ANSF. As 

such, they have the potential to stoke negative actions on the part of 

ANSF leaders if they are not sufficiently appeased by the next administration—and have at times publicly stated their willingness to do 

so.

225 

 

223 Author interviews with ISAF, IJC, NATO Senior Civilian Representative, 

and CENTCOM personnel, Aug. 12–24, 2013, and Aug. 29, 2013. 

224 Andrew Wilder. “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central 

Asian Affairs.” Washington, DC. May 21, 2013. 

225 Author interview with IJC personnel. Kabul, Afghanistan. Aug. 16, 2013; 

and Christian Neef. “Return of the Lion: Former Warlord Preps for 

Western Withdrawal.” Spiegel Online International, Sep. 23, 2013, ac-
241

A second, related possibility is that of missteps on the part of the new 

administration with respect to political appointees. Most significant 

for the ANSF is the fact that Afghanistan’s president currently appoints not only the heads of the security ministries, but also the provincial and district chiefs of police and ANA general officers (e.g., the 

ANA corps commanders). If the new president made changes in 

these leadership positions that were too quick, too sweeping, or that 

otherwise significantly infringed on the interests (e.g., patronage 

networks) of current ANSF leaders, it could result in the fragmentation of ANSF units or invite a backlash from ANA and ANP leadership, up to and possibly including attempts at a military coup or dedeposing the president. However, based on our discussions with a 

range of subject matter experts, we judge these latter events as unlikely. More likely is that smaller numbers of individuals will be initially 

replaced, and President Karzai’s pattern of fairly routine movements 

and replacements of mid-level ANSF leaders (especially within the 

police) will continue under the new president’s direction. This has 

the potential to cause friction within some circles of political elites 

and at local levels, but will probably not rise to the level of widespread 

dissatisfaction within the ANSF. 

In sum, for the “Bad Election” scenario we conclude that as long as 

the current balance of power within the Afghan government’s Executive Office is maintained and the new Afghan president is politically 

savvy enough to placate significant Afghan powerbrokers and not 

make overly-sweeping changes to ANSF leadership in the wake of taking power, both ANSF leaders and its rank-and-file are likely to accept 

the results of the election. If there was a split in the Pashtun vote, a 

non-Pashtun winner (e.g., due to widespread violence in the south 

and east that prevented large numbers of Pashtuns from voting), or if 

the new President made sweeping changes to ANSF leadership, it 

could inspire a violent response on the part of some members (and 

possibility units) within the ANSF. It could also lead to fragmentation 

of some units, desertion, and possibly defection of low-level fighters 

to the Taliban. We assess these scenarios to be of moderate likelihood. 

 

cessed Sep. 27, 2013, at www.spiegel.de/international/world/afghanwarlords-like-ismail-khan-prepare-for-western-withdrawal-a-924019.html. 
242

Loss of international community support 

No training and advising mission for the ANSF 

In the months leading up to the drafting of this report, there was significant discussion as to whether the U.S. and Afghanistan would be 

able to complete a Bilateral Security Agreement to enable a U.S. 

training, advising, and counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan post2014, whether NATO and Afghanistan could come to terms on a Status of Forces Agreement to enable a NATO training and advising 

mission, or whether a so-called “zero option” might come into play in 

which the U.S. military and NATO completely depart Afghanistan. 

Given this discussion, it is worth considering: 

How would the ANA and ANP react if the U.S. and NATO discontinued their ANSF training and advising missions in 2015? 

To answer this question, it is worth considering what the likely impact 

on the ANSF of the loss of U.S. and NATO enablers (to include advisors) would be. To do this, we compiled observations from our trip to 

theater to generate Table 40, which shows which aspects of the ANSF 

we assess might endure and which would not if the U.S. and NATO 

withdraw all of their enablers in 2015. The table is not meant to be 

comprehensive in terms of every aspect of the ANSF; rather it is illustrative of some of the more critical aspects. This table presents a synthesis of observations from visits to each of the units it addresses, 

along with our in-theater interviews. 
243

Table 40. Likely enduring, non-enduring, and questionable aspects of the ANSF in 2015, absent 

U.S. and NATO enablers 

Entity Enduring Aspects Non-Enduring Aspects 

Questionable 

Aspects 

Ministry of 

Defense 

 ANA force generation 

(recruiting, training) 

 Payment of salaries 

 Financial management (e.g., the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and 

Execution process) 

 Evolving the force to a focus on “national defense” vice counterinsurgency 

 Strategy and 

policy 

Ministry of 

Interior 

 ANP force size 

 Payment of salaries 

 Financial management (e.g., the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and 

Execution process) 

 Attempts to reduce corruption and political interference in the police 

 Professionalization of the force (e.g., 

moving toward community policing or 

having a 100% trained force) 

 Strategy and 

policy 

ANA 

 Human intelligence 

 Tactical operations 

 Some level of deliberate planning 

 Supply of food, water, 

and fuel

 Some level of crosssecurity pillar coordination and synchronization

 Technical intelligence (e.g., signals intelligence) 

 Supply of spare parts 

 Maintenance 

 AAF (to include air CASEVAC, 

MEDEVAC, and CAS) 

 Counter-IED

 Brigade or higher operations

 Officer education 

 NonCommissioned Officer 

corps

 Presence in 

OCCs

ANP 

 Ability to stand tactical 

checkpoints 

 Maintenance (via contract) 

 Supply of food, water, 

and fuel

 Some level of crosspillar coordination and 

synchronization

 Afghan Local Police 

 Civilian policing activities

 Coordination with the Ministry of Justice

 Border and 

Point of Entry 

Security

 Presence in 

OCCs

SOF and 

Special 

Units 

 Police Special Units  Special Mission Wing

 Ktah Khas

 Afghan Commandos and 

Special Forces 

In looking at Table 40 it is clear the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO 

enablers in 2015 would likely result in the inability of the MoD and 

MoI to do many of the higher-order functions required of a security 
244

ministry to support the fielded forces. While it is likely they would 

find a way to ensure that the ANSF continue to receive their salaries,226 functions like financial management, budget execution, and 

the ability to tie long-term procurement to requirements derived 

from strategy and policy would likely not endure. In short, the MoD 

and MoI would likely revert to acting as high-level army and police 

headquarters, vice civilian entities providing oversight of, and support 

to, the fielded forces. 

For the ANA, the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO advisors and other 

enablers in 2015 would likely lead to significant reductions in the 

Army’s ability to generate actionable intelligence via technical means, 

maintain its vehicles, or counter IEDs. In addition, the AAF would 

not likely endure very long on its own. Taken together, these developments would result in a standing Army with decreasing flexibility, 

declining ability to maneuver, and a diminishing capacity for deliberate operations over time. 

For the ANP, the loss of U.S., NATO, and international (e.g., 

EUPOL) advisors and other enablers would likely result in the degradation of attempts to professionalize the police force, move it toward a civilian policing (vice paramilitary) model, and coordinate 

with the Ministry of Justice in support of the rule of law. Additionally, 

it would likely result in an increasingly corrupt and predatory police 

force. Finally, the Afghan Local Police are not likely to endure once 

U.S. SOF are no longer present to provide support and over-watch to 

them. 

When it comes to Afghanistan’s SOF and police special units, the latter have achieved a level of capability that will likely allow them to 

endure; though their mobility would be sharply curtailed and their 

operational tempo and reach would be reduced (they rely heavily on 

ISAF air transportation). The Special Mission Wing and Ktah Khas

(Afghan counterterrorism unit) are not likely to endure in the absence of U.S. and NATO enablers. An open question is what would 

become of the Afghan Commandos and Special Forces—at a minimum, their operational effectiveness would be reduced by the loss of 

 

226 Recall we are assuming here that international community financial assistance continues even in the absence of U.S. and NATO advisors. 
245

ISAF intelligence and air mobility assets. All of this would likely result 

in significant reductions in the ANSF’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and in the operational reserve for the ANA and 

ANP. 

Taking all of the above into consideration, we assess that the loss of 

U.S. and NATO enablers (to include advisors) is likely to result in an 

overall downward spiral of ANSF capabilities and security in Afghanistan, though it is unclear just how quickly that spiral would occur.227

Our discussions with ANSF leaders in theater made it clear that they 

understand this quite well.228 They are acutely aware of the ANSF’s reliance on ISAF for the vast majority of combat support and combat 

service support functions (e.g., intelligence, fire support/close air 

support, logistics, and medical and casualty evacuation 

(MEDEVAC/CASEVAC)). They are also cognizant of the fact that, 

while the ANSF are likely to continue to grow in their ability to perform these functions in the coming year, they are unlikely to be independently capable in many of these areas by 2015. As such, while our 

interviews suggest that many ANSF leaders would soldier on in the 

absence of U.S. and NATO advisors, it is likely that they would also 

look to other countries for assistance. These countries might include 

Russia, India, China, and those of the Persian Gulf (e.g., Saudi Arabia) and Eastern Europe (former Soviet bloc countries). In addition, 

they may appeal to the U.S. and NATO to continue providing training for specialty capabilities (e.g., pilots, SOF) and officer education 

outside of Afghanistan.229

At the rank-and-file level of the ANSF, the loss of U.S. and NATO enablers could have a more dramatic effect. Our interviews in theater 

 

227 Several of the subject matter experts with whom we spoke felt that the 

speed of this downward spiral would be mostly dependent on the level of 

financial aid provided by the international community. Author interviews with ISAF and IJC personnel. Afghanistan. August 12–24, 2013. 

228 Author interviews with Afghan personnel in the MoD and MoI as well as 

numerous ANSF personnel (see Appendix C). Afghanistan. Aug. 12–24, 

2013. 

229 Author interviews with ISAF, IJC, NSOCC-A, and ANSF personnel. Afghanistan. Aug. 12–25, 2013. 
246

suggested that the decrease in MEDEVAC/CASEVAC capabilities 

provided by ISAF this year is already affecting morale in some units.230

The full loss of this capability, along with intelligence, logistics, close 

air, and other support might be beyond what many rank-and-file soldiers and police are willing to accept to stay in the ANSF. As such, it 

seems likely that desertion rates would increase (perhaps significantly), and the possibility that some units might suffer casualties to the 

point of fragmenting or breaking will increase. Also, without U.S. 

SOF to provide them support, it is likely that some (if not many) ALP 

units will dissolve or defect to the Taliban.231 It is also possible that 

some Afghan SOF units, such as Ktah Khas, could cease to perform 

their current missions and instead be used by various powerbrokers 

to further their own interests. 

The bottom line is that the discontinuance of the U.S. and NATO 

training and advising missions in 2015 will likely not lead to the 

wholesale dissolution or failure of the ANSF (at least not in the near 

term). But it will result in an “enabler vacuum” that ANSF leaders will 

look to have filled by other providers. If they are unable to find such 

providers, it is likely that ANSF capabilities will begin to spiral downward; issues with desertion, defection, and fragmentation will increase; and the insurgency will be emboldened to eschew 

reconciliation and go on the offensive to test the “enabler-less” ANSF 

in the 2015–2018 timeframe. In other words, all of the issues that are 

currently of concern to those watching the ANSF are likely to be exacerbated in the absence of a continued U.S. and NATO training and 

advising mission. 

Loss of international donor contributions 

At the July 2012 Tokyo Conference, the U.S. and other international 

partners committed to continue providing development assistance to 

Afghanistan through the so-called “Decade of Transformation” 

(2014–2024). Through the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 

(TMAF), international donors committed to providing Afghanistan 

 

230 Ibid. 

231 Author interview with American Academy of Diplomacy personnel. Aug. 

1, 2013. The historical analysis in our threat assessment also suggests the 

likelihood of this occurring. 
247

$16 billion in aid through 2015 and continuing assistance at levels 

commensurate with the last decade through 2017. In turn, Afghanistan committed to strengthening governance, building a legislative 

framework to ensure a credible, transparent, and inclusive transfer of 

power; and making structural changes to ensure the government remains solvent and Afghan citizens can participate in a growing economy.

232

Since that time, the international community came together on 3 July 

2013 to review progress, key policy issues, and the way forward under 

the TMAF. As the conference statement suggests, the report card for 

Afghanistan in meeting its obligations under the TMAF was decidedly 

mixed.233 While the outcome of the meeting will not result in reductions to international community assistance to Afghanistan in the 

near term as a result of lack of progress against the TMAF benchmarks, a number of our interviewees noted that several nations were 

unsatisfied with progress made by Afghanistan’s government since 

last year’s Tokyo Conference.234 These nations pushed for reductions 

in funding to Afghanistan to demonstrate the conviction of the international community to the TMAF benchmarks. While these nations’ arguments did not carry the day, it is entirely possible that the 

government of Afghanistan will continue to lag expectations of progress, increasing the risk of the international community changing its 

position and significantly reducing, or even eliminating, its financial 

contributions to Afghanistan.235

Throughout our interviews in and out of theater, we paid close attention to points of convergence and divergence among our interviewees on various topics. As might be expected, on most topics we 

 

232 “U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet: Afghanistan.” U.S. DoS, Sep. 25, 

2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.state.gov/ 

r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm. 

233 “Joint Statement” TMAF Senior Officials Meeting. Kabul, Afghanistan. 

Jul. 3, 2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at www.afghanistan-un.org. 

234 Author interviews with ISAF and IJC personnel. Afghanistan. August 12–

24, 2013. 

235 Of the TMAF’s benchmarks, those pertaining to a credible, transparent, 

and inclusive transfer of power are the most likely to upset the international community if they are not met. 
248

recorded divergences of varying degrees. The only topic on which we 

observed universal convergence was this particular issue—loss of international community financial support. Everyone we spoke with 

during the course of this study agreed that the loss of funding, or 

even a too-rapid decline in funding, to the ANSF would carry with it 

the strong possibility of the following:236

 Sharp increases in rank-and-file desertion from the ANA and 

ANP if salaries are not able to be paid. Interviewees added a caveat by saying that in units that had good, effective leaders, individual soldiers and policemen might be willing to stay on for 

a period of months without pay, but would eventually desert 

once it became clear that pay was not forthcoming. In units 

with poor leadership, desertion would likely occur much more 

rapidly. 

 Fragmentation or fracture of the ANA, with units (or groups 

within units) breaking off to follow various powerbrokers—in 

particular, former Northern Alliance leaders and others who 

commanded large groups of men during the civil war of the 

1990s (e.g., Mohammed Fahim, Ishmael Khan, and Abdul Rashid Dostum). 

 Defection of units (or groups within units) to the insurgency, 

especially within the police in the south and east. 

To justify these conclusions, most simply point to the historical record 

of what happened once the Soviet Union abruptly ceased its line of 

funding to the Najibullah regime in 1992. Some interviewees did allow for the fact that the situation in Afghanistan is not exactly the 

same as it was then, but nonetheless, Afghanistan’s political system is 

still largely one of patronage. So long as there is money available to 

support those patronage networks, some degree of stability may remain. Once that is no longer the case, the centripetal forces of Af-

 

236 Author interviews with personnel from organizations listed in Appendix 

C. July–September 2013. 
249

ghanistan’s various power centers will begin to pull the country apart, 

and history may well repeat itself.237

It is clear that the international community appreciates this aspect of 

Afghanistan’s history and understands the likely repercussions of curtailing aid to Afghanistan too rapidly. But at the same time, events 

such as the Kabul bank scandal238 and the high level of corruption in 

Afghanistan (and the Afghan president’s refusal to take strong action 

against corruption) are increasingly frustrating the international 

community and testing the patience and generosity of some donor 

countries. As such, we deem this scenario of low to moderate likelihood. 

In sum for this scenario, our interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan 

personnel strongly suggest that the inability to conclude a BSA between the U.S. and Afghanistan (with the resulting departure of all 

U.S. and NATO forces by 2015), is likely to result in a downward spiral of capability for the ANSF and the security situation in Afghanistan—unless the ANSF are able to find other countries to backfill the 

resultant “enabler vacuum.” If they are unable to do so, we assess that 

the likelihood of a negative ANSF response is moderate to high. In 

addition, the speed of that downward spiral is likely to be most heavily dependent on the level of international community financial support to Afghanistan and the ANSF. If this is also lost, the country is 

highly likely to pull apart, fragment, and eventually return back to a 

 

237 A recent report by the World Bank takes a more nuanced view in saying 

that the vast amounts of aid to Afghanistan have: 

become a source of rents, patronage, and political power, 

sometimes inadvertently exacerbating conflicts and grievances among different groups. So a decline in aid and international military spending...may benefit the longer term 

political economy. But in the short term, the dislocations 

and adaptations of different interest groups could be disruptive. 

Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (Volume 1: Overview). The 

World Bank. May 2012: 3. 

238 Matthew Rosenberg. “Trail of Fraud and Vengeance Leads to Kabul Bank 

Convictions.” New York Times, Mar. 5, 2013. 
250

civil war between the Taliban and its associated groups, and armed 

groups following other powerbrokers in the west and north of the 

country. 

Conclusion 

In this section, we considered difficulties the ANSF may face—and 

likely responses and directions they could go—under several potential political situations or scenarios. We chose to analyze three scenarios: Taliban reconciliation, a “bad” Afghan presidential election in 

2014, and the loss of international community support. 

All three of these scenarios carry with them the possibility of negative 

reactions on the part of various aspects of the ANSF—from low-level 

desertion or defection to the insurgency up to deposing the Afghan 

president. For the first scenario, very few of our interviewees believed 

the Taliban would reconcile during the timeframe of our study (i.e., 

before 2018), if at all. But even if they did, our results suggest that so 

long as certain ANSF “redlines” were not crossed, the likelihood of a 

negative ANSF reaction would be low. 

For the second scenario, most of the subject matter experts with 

whom we spoke indicated that the international community has effectively communicated the seriousness of this election to Afghan political leaders, and that as a result there is significant consensus 

building taking place ahead of the elections to ensure that a viable 

ticket—one that can win a majority in the first round—is fielded. As 

such, we assess the overall likelihood of this scenario coming to pass 

is low-to-moderate; though we assess the likelihood of a negative 

ANSF response if it does to be moderate. 

In the third scenario, the discontinuance of a U.S. and NATO training and advising mission seemed to be a moderate probability event 

in the eyes of our interviewees—and we assess a negative ANSF reaction to this event would be of moderate-to-high likelihood. Also, a 

number of the U.S. and NATO personnel with whom we spoke were 

concerned about the government of Afghanistan’s lack of progress 

against the TMAF benchmarks and the negative future implications 

of a trend along those lines to the international donor community’s 

willingness to underwrite the Afghan government for the foreseeable 

future. That said, the international community also understands that 

a sharp decline in funding to Afghanistan carries with it a strong risk 
251

of negative consequences, so we assess this to be of low-to-moderate 

likelihood—though we also assess that if this were to happen, it 

would carry with it a high likelihood of a negative ANSF response. 

 
252

Conclusion of additional assessments 

Taking into consideration all of our additional assessments, we conclude that the security ministries that support the ANSF will require 

international enabling assistance—including advisors—through at 

least 2018, and this assistance mission will need similar authorities to 

the mission in Afghanistan today. We also conclude that sustained 

commitment of the international community in Afghanistan is likely 

to mitigate tensions in the region and increase prospects for regional 

cooperation, but withdrawal of international community support is 

likely to have consequences up to and including a renewed civil war 

in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region. 

 
253

Appendix A: Biographies of the authors 

Dr. Jonathan J. Schroden 

Director, CNA’s Center for Stability and Development

Jonathan’s research interests include security force assistance, stability 

operations, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, operations assessment, Marine Corps and special operations, Middle Eastern, South 

Asian, and African studies, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. Requested by name by two Commanders of ISAF, Dr. 

Schroden has deployed or traveled seven times to Afghanistan over 

the past six years to support a variety of analytic initiatives. He has 

previously deployed twice to Iraq, traveled throughout the Middle 

East, gotten underway with numerous Navy ships, and supported disaster relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Prior to his 

current position, Dr. Schroden served as the CNA field representative 

to ISAF, U.S. CENTCOM, Multi-National Forces–West in Iraq, and 

the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force. He holds Ph.D. and M.S. degrees 

in Physical Chemistry from Cornell University and B.S. degrees in 

Chemistry and Physics from the University of Minnesota–Duluth. 

Dr. Catherine E. Norman 

Senior Research Scientist 

Catherine’s recent research efforts include service delivery in Helmand province and force structure requirements for the U.S. Marine 

Corps post Afghanistan. From 2010 to 2012, she served as the CNA 

representative to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). Dr. 

Norman twice deployed with I MEF (Forward) to Afghanistan, where 

she worked with the Regional Command–Southwest Assessments 

Group to assess progress across the security, governance, and development lines of operation. In addition, she supported ANP advisor 

teams by examining what the Afghans want from their police, to ensure coalition police advising efforts were in line with Afghan expectations. Dr. Norman also compared advisor training programs with 

the role of ANSF advisors in theater, and recommended additions to 

advisor training. Prior to reporting to I MEF, she focused on counter-
254

IED analysis and spent two years as CNA’s scientific analyst to the 

Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Dr. Norman holds an undergraduate degree in International Relations from Georgetown 

University and a Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics from Northwestern 

University. 

Dr. Gerald M. (Jerry) Meyerle 

Senior Research Scientist

Jerry’s current research focuses on the future of irregular warfare for 

the U.S. Marine Corps, analysis of governance in Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan’s continuing war against the Taliban. He has served on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy reviews and as an advisor to the commander of the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team in eastern 

Afghanistan. From 2011 to 2012, he served as an advisor to the commanding general of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) in 

southern Afghanistan. He is the lead author of the book On the 

Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice (Marine Corps 

University Press, 2012), as well as numerous articles and studies on 

the insurgency in Afghanistan, the ANSF, militancy in Pakistan, and 

regional security issues in South Asia. He speaks Urdu and has a 

Ph.D. in Political Science and South Asian Studies from the University of Virginia. 

Mr. Patricio A. Asfura-Heim, J.D. 

Senior Research Scientist 

Patricio’s research focuses on the Middle East, North Africa, and 

South Asia. His areas of expertise include partner capacity building, 

rule of law in stability operations, conflict analysis, and non-state actors in war, revolution, and peacemaking. Mr. Asfura-Heim has spent 

significant time supporting U.S. Marine and Department of State 

governance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2006 through 

2008, he advised coalition forces in determining capability requirements for the Iraqi Security Forces and worked alongside U.S. Marines to develop the rule of law in Al Anbar Province. From 2009 to 

2010, he worked with the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand Province, Afghanistan to promote dialogue between influential 

community leaders and local government officials. Of particular interest, he conducted a study looking at the future feasibility of the 

Afghan Local Police. Mr. Asfura-Heim is a trained attorney and a 
255

member of the Washington, D.C. Bar. He holds a J.D. and M.A. in 

world politics from Catholic University of America.

Dr. William G. (Bill) Rosenau 

Senior Research Scientist 

Bill’s research focuses on security force assistance, non-state armed 

groups, and intelligence policy and history. His recent publications 

include United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future

(CNA, 2013); Governance in Helmand Province (CNA, 2012); and Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

(Marine Corps University Press, 2010). Before joining CNA, he spent 

ten years in the International Security Program at the RAND Corporation, where he chaired the RAND Insurgency Board. Dr. Rosenau 

also served as an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His previous positions include: Senior Policy Adviser, Office of the Coordinator for 

Counter-Terrorism, U.S. Department of State; Senior Analyst, Strategy and Policy Analysis Department, SAIC; Legislative Assistant for Defense and Foreign Policy, U.S. Senate; Professional Staff Member, 

U.S. DoD Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces; 

and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, U.S. DoD. He holds an A.B. 

in political science (Columbia); an M.A. in History (Cambridge); and 

a Ph.D. in War Studies (King’s College, London). 

Dr. Delwyn L. Gilmore 

Principal Research Scientist

Del has worked on a variety of issues such as Navy force structure requirements, anti-access/area-denial threats, naval mine warfare, and 

Marine Corps systems. In addition to projects at CNA headquarters, 

he has had on-site assignments at the Pentagon providing analytic 

support to OSD’s Capabilities Assessment and Program Evaluation 

directorate, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

Navy Quadrennial Defense Review. He has also done overseas assignments with the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and embarked with the 

George Washington Carrier Battle Group staff for Operation Southern Watch and Operation Enduring Freedom. Dr. Gilmore earned 

his Ph.D. in Materials Science and Engineering from the University of 

Virginia and his B.S. from the California Institute of Technology. Be-
256

fore joining CNA in 2000, he completed post-doctoral research fellowships at Oxford University and the U.S. Department of Energy’s 

Sandia National Laboratories. 

CAPT (ret.) Mark Rosen, J.D. 

Vice President and Deputy General Counsel 

Mark is an international and national security lawyer providing corporate law support to CNA on a variety of ethics, government contracts, intellectual property, and regulatory matters, including human 

subjects research and export compliance. Mr. Rosen also provides 

support to the research staff on international and national security 

law matters and has authored numerous international and operational law studies in such areas as maritime disputes, law of the sea, 

law of armed conflict, international agreements, and arms control. 

Prior to joining CNA, Mr. Rosen served as the Associate General 

Counsel for Science and Technology Directorate of the Department 

of Homeland Security and was the Department’s Regulatory Compliance Officer for all Department of Homeland Security-sponsored research. He also worked in the Small Business Administration’s Office 

of International Trade, serving as the point person for all trade-policy 

matters and negotiating market-access agreements with various foreign governments. Mr. Rosen is a retired Navy Captain and served in 

various international law positions in the Pentagon. He holds A.B. 

and J.D. degrees from the University of Georgia and an LLM from 

the University of Virginia, and is a member of the State Bars of Georgia and Virginia (Corporate Counsel Designation) and various federal courts.

Ms. Daniella Mak 

Associate Research Analyst

Daniella’s research focuses primarily on Africa political-military affairs. Prior to joining CNA, Ms. Mak worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Africa Program and the CSIS 

Turkey Project. She previously served as an Annenberg Fellow with 

the U.S. Department of State, where her portfolio included Somali 

piracy, sanctions, and threat finance issues. Ms. Mak is the recipient 

of a U.S. Fulbright Fellowship, Princeton American Research Institute in Turkey Language Fellowship, and Andrew W. Mellon Research Fellowship. She holds a B.A. degree in Diplomatic History, 
257

African Studies, and Modern Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. in History and International Relations from the ISCTE–Lisbon University Institute. 

ENS Nicholas A. Hutchinson 

U.S. Naval Academy Fellow

Nick, a 2013 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, served as 

a USNA Fellow in CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies prior to commencing Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training in Coronado, 

California. ENS Hutchinson did most of his undergraduate research 

with the Naval Research Laboratory working on compounds that 

neutralize nerve agents. While at the Academy, he also developed a 

strong interest in political science and did extensive research on U.N. 

interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda. 

 
258

This page intentionally left blank 

 
259

Appendix B: Biographies of Senior Review 

Panel members 

Convener 

The Honorable Robert J. Murray 

President and Chief Executive Officer, CNA 

Robert J. Murray is President and Chief Executive Officer of CNA, a 

non-profit research and analysis organization devoted to independent and objective analysis of public issues. Prior to CNA, Murray was a 

teacher, first at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, where he was 

Dean and Director of the College's Advanced Research Center and 

creator/director of the Strategic Studies Group; and from 1983–

1990, a faculty member at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and director of the School's national security program. He served in government in various capacities before 

his stint at teaching. He was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary of the Navy in President 

Jimmy Carter's Administration, where he had previously held an appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International 

Security Affairs). Earlier, Murray was the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and then became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 

Mr. Murray is a graduate of Suffolk College and Harvard University. 

He served in the U.S. Marine Corps before entering civilian government service.

Members 

Mr. Thomas A. Betro 

Former Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Thomas Betro was appointed in January 2006 to be the third civilian 

director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, a position he 

held until his retirement in 2009. Mr. Betro joined Naval Criminal Investigative Service in 1982 and served in a variety of organizational as-
260

signments and mission areas both within the United States and 

abroad. As Deputy Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, investigations and operations, Thomas Betro oversaw the organization’s 

response to the USS Cole bombing which led to significant increase 

in Naval Criminal Investigative Service force protection support to 

naval expeditionary forces. In 2001, he was selected to serve as a 

Deputy to the National Counterintelligence Executive and later became the Acting National Counterintelligence Executive, the President’s principal advisor on counterintelligence. As Director, Betro led 

the expansion of the Law Enforcement Information Exchange system 

to more than 30,000 law enforcement professionals across 800 federal, state, and local public safety agencies. Under his leadership, the 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service filled every validated Combatant 

Commander request for forces for Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of 

Africa on a volunteer basis. Hundreds of special agents were deployed to those locations during his tenure. 

Thomas Betro holds a B.A. degree in Government from Colby College and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the 

Naval War College. He is currently Vice President of NTT DATA Federal Services, a global information technology services firm. 

Dr. Stephen Biddle 

Professor of Political Science and Former Strategic Assessment Advisor to 

Generals McChrystal and Petraeus 

Stephen Biddle joined the faculty of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in 2012 where he 

is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs. Dr. Biddle is 

the author of Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 

Battle (Princeton U. Press, 2004). His research seeks to use the methods of modern social science to explain underlying causal relationships on which defense policy positions rest. In 2012, Stephen Biddle 

was the Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council 

on Foreign Relations and earlier held the Elihu Root chair in Military 

Studies at the U.S. Army War College as well as teaching and research 

positions at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs. He served on General David Petraeus’ Joint 

Strategic Assessment Team in Baghdad in 2007, on General Stanley 

McChrystal’s Initial Strategic Assessment Team in in Kabul in 2009, 
261

and as a Senior Advisor to General Petraeus’ Central Command Assessment Team in Washington from 2008 to 2009. 

Stephen Biddle holds A.B., M.P.P. and Ph.D. (Public Policy) degrees 

all from Harvard University. 

General James T. Conway, USMC (Ret.) 

Former 34th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps 

As Commandant of the Marine Corps from November, 2006 to October, 2010, General Conway served as the senior uniformed Marine responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of over 

250,000 active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel serving in the 

United States and overseas. He managed an annual budget on the 

order of $40 billion. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was a 

military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security 

Council, and the President. Previous high level assignments included 

President of the Marine Corps University, command of the 1st Marine 

Division and commander of the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force during two combat tours in Iraq . In 2004, he was reassigned as the Director of Operations, J-3, Joint Staff in Washington, DC where he 

oversaw the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

General Conway is a graduate of Southeast Missouri State College 

and attended the Seminar XXI M.I.T. Fellowship Program and the 

Harvard University JFK School of Government Seminar in International Relations. 

Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF (Ret.) 

Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters United 

States Air Force 

Lieutenant General Lawrence Farrell became President and Chief 

Executive Officer of the National Defense Industrial Association in 

2001. Prior to his retirement from the Air Force in 1998, General 

Farrell served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Plans and Programs, 

Headquarters U.S. Air Force, where he was responsible for integrating the Air Force’s future plans and requirements to support national security objectives and military strategy. Previous positions included 

Vice Commander, Air Force Material Command and Deputy Director, Defense Logistics Agency. A command pilot with more than 3,000 

flying hours, he flew 196 combat missions in Southeast Asia. 
262

General Farrell is a graduate of the Air Force Academy and holds an 

MBA from Auburn University. He is also a graduate of the National 

War College and the Harvard JFK School Program for Executives in 

National Security. He has served on a number of study groups supporting The United States Air Force as well as on corporate and nonprofit advisory boards. 

The Honorable Nelson M. Ford 

Former Under Secretary of the Army 

Nelson Ford has been chief executive of LMI, a government consulting firm since January 2009. He is also Chairman of the Board of the 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis. Before leaving government, Ford served as Under Secretary of the Army from 2007 to 

2009. Prior to that, he served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Financial Management and Comptroller from 2006 to 2007 and 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller from 2005 to 2006. From 2002 to 2004, he 

was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Budgets and Financial Policy in the Department of Defense. Previously, Nelson Ford was Chief 

Executive Officer of a medical manufacturing company and of the 

Georgetown University Medical Center. He managed the health care 

consulting practice for Coopers & Lybrand and has extensive experience in financial management, health care management and resource management. 

Nelson Ford holds a B.A. in History from Duke University and an 

M.A. in Education from the University of Delaware and has completed additional professional training at the University of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Bart R. Johnson 

Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police and former 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department 

of Homeland Security 

Bart Johnson, who has more than 31 years of law enforcement experience, currently serves as the Executive Director for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization with members from 

over 100 countries around the world. Prior to his appointment in 

November 2011, Johnson was the Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security where he was responsible for integrating the Department’s intelli-
263

gence efforts. He also oversaw the Department’s programs to evaluate 

and improve state and local fusion center capabilities and establish a 

nationwide, integrated information sharing fabric. Prior to this assignment, Bart Johnson was Director of Homeland Security and Law 

Enforcement in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

He previously served for 24 years in the New York State Police. 

Mr. Johnson holds a B.S. degree in Business Management and Economics from Empire State College in New York. 

Lieutenant General Francis H. (Frank) Kearney III, USA (Ret.) 

Former Deputy Combatant Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command 

Lieutenant General Frank Kearney retired from the United States 

Army in 2012 following more than 35 years of service. His final active 

duty assignment was as Deputy Director for Strategic Operational 

Planning at the National Counter-Terrorism Center in Washington, 

DC. He is now president of his own consulting company, InsideSolutions-LLC, which focuses on leader development in organizations. General Kearney planned and participated in the opening 

campaigns of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq and commanded all Theater Special 

Operations forces in the Middle East from March 2005 to June 2007. 

Subsequently, he served as Deputy Combatant Commander for the 

United States Special Operations Command from 2007 to 2010. 

General Kearney is a 1976 graduate of the United States Military 

Academy and holds a MEd from the University of South Carolina. He 

serves as a member of the Secretary of Defense’s Threat Reduction 

Advisory Committee and on the advisory boards of a number of 

companies. 

Dr. Katherine A. McGrady 

CNA Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer 

Appointed CNA’s first Chief Operating Officer in June 2009, Dr. 

Katherine McGrady is responsible for the execution of CNA’s strategy 

and business processes, assuring consistency of policy and approach 

across the organization, and maintaining an environment of accountability and high performance. She began her career at CNA as 

analyst in 1988. As the field representative to the Commander of Ma-
264

rine Forces Central Command and Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force, she served in the Persian Gulf during the first Iraq war 

(Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). Later she deployed in 

support of the Commander, Unified Task Force, Mogadishu, Somalia. 

Subsequently as a vice president at CNA Headquarters, she led a 

team of analysts focused on analysis of expeditionary systems, logistics, operations and tactics, and training for expeditionary operations. 

She directed the Marine Corps Program, where she developed the 

annual research program and was the primary interface between 

CNA and the senior Marine Corps leadership. In 2004, Dr. McGrady 

became CNA’s Senior Vice President for Research, and in 2006, she 

was promoted to Executive Vice President. 

Dr. McGrady holds an A.B. degree in Chemistry from Smith College 

and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Macromolecular Science and Engineering from the University of Michigan. 

Mr. Dean G. Popps 

Former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology 

A former Army Acquisition Executive, Dean Popps currently serves 

Of Counsel to the law firm of Fluet Huber+Hoang and is a senior advisor to clients in the defense industry. From 2004 to 2010, during 

two administrations, Popps served as both the Acting Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and the Principal 

Deputy. He was the Service Acquisition Executive and Science Advisor to the Secretary of the Army. His responsibilities included providing oversight for the management and sustainment of Army weapons 

systems and equipment from research and development, through acquisition, logistics, fielding and disposition. In 2008, he served on the 

independent, bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting to 

study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2004 to 

2007, while serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for ALT, he also served as Director of Iraq Reconstruction and 

Program Management. In 2003, he was recruited from a successful 

career in the private sector to join the Department of Defense’s Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad where he served as Director 

of Industrial Conversion. 
265

Dean Popps holds a B.A. in Political Science from Marquette University and a J.D. from the Potomac School of Law. He is admitted to the 

District of Columbia bar. 

General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA (Ret.) 

Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and former Commander, U.S. Special 

Operations Command 

General Peter Schoomaker retired from active service in December 

2000 as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations 

Command and was recalled to active duty on 1 August 2003 to serve 

as the 35th Chief of Staff of the United States Army and member of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He returned to retired status on 10 April 

2007 after more than 35 years of service in a variety of command and 

staff assignments with both conventional and special operations forces. During this time, he participated in practically every major joint 

contingency operation conducted from Operation Eagle Claw in Iran 

to the current Global War on Terror. In January 1978, he was one of 

the first operational officers during the formative days of 1st Special 

Forces Operational Detachment – Delta and continued operational 

assignments there through command of Delta Force as a colonel 

from 1989 to 1992. Among his general officer assignments, 

Schoomaker was Commanding General, Joint Special Operations 

Command from July 1994 to July 1996 and then Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command until October 1997 

when he was promoted to four star general and assumed command 

of U.S. Special Operations Command. 

General Schoomaker was commissioned as a Distinguished Military 

Graduate through Army ROTC at the University of Wyoming with a 

B.S. in Education. He holds a M.A degree in Management from Central Michigan University and is a graduate of the USMC Amphibious 

Warfare School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and 

the National War College and attended the Harvard JFK School Program for Executives in National Security. He is a consultant on defence matters, serves on several public and private company boards, 

and is a director on the board of the Special Operations Warrior 

Foundation which provides college education and support to the 

children and spouses of fallen special operators of all services. 

 
266

This page intentionally left blank 
267

Appendix C: Organizations contacted during 

the study 

As part of the study’s data collection and analysis, the CNA study 

team interviewed or discussed our analysis with individuals from the 

organizations listed in Table 41. 

Table 41. Organizations contacted during the study 

Organization Type Organization (in alphabetical order) 

U.S. organizations  The American Academy for Diplomacy 

 Center for Army Analysis 

 Central Intelligence Agency 

 Combined Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Afghanistan

 Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan 

 Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 

 COMISAF Advise and Assist Team 

 Defense Intelligence Agency 

 Department of Defense Inspector General 

 Department of Defense Office of General Counsel 

 Department of State 

 Government Accountability Office 

 Human Terrain Teams 

 Joint Staff Pakistan – Afghanistan Coordination Cell 

 National Security Staff 

 Office of the Defense Representative – Pakistan 

 Office of the Under Secretary for Defense – Policy 

 Regional Platform South 

 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

 Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan 

 Special Operations Task Force – East 

 Special Operations Task Force – West 

 Train, Advise, Assist Command – Northeast 

 Train, Advise, Assist Command – Southeast 

 U.S. Counterterrorism Task Force 

 U.S. Embassy Islamabad 

 U.S. Forces Afghanistan 
268

Table 41. Organizations contacted during the study 

Organization Type Organization (in alphabetical order) 

International Organizations  205th Corps Advisors 

 207th Corps Advisors 

 209th Corps Advisors 

 215th Corps Advisors 

 Afghan Border Police Advisors 

 Afghan National Civil Order Police Advisors 

 Afghan Uniform Police Advisors 

 Combined Task Force Dragoon 

 Combined Task Force Uruzgan 

 European Union Police Helmand 

 Helmand Provincial Chief of Police Advisors 

 Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team 

 International Security Assistance Force 

 ISAF Joint Command 

 Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police Advisors 

 Ministerial Advising Groups 

 NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan 

 NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan 

 NATO Transition Mission – Afghanistan 

 Operational Coordination Center – Regional (North) Advisors

 Regional Command – East 

 Regional Command – North 

 Regional Command – South 

 Regional Command – Southwest 

 Regional Command – West 

 Regional Military Training Center Advisors 

 Regional Support Command – South 

 Task Force Helmand 

Afghan Organizations  Afghan National Army 201st Corps Headquarters 

 Afghan National Army 203rd Corps Headquarters 

 Afghan National Army 205th Corps Headquarters 

 Afghan National Army 207th Corps Headquarters 

 Afghan National Army 215th Corps Headquarters 

 Afghan Air Force 

 Afghan Border Police 

 Afghan National Army General Staff 
269

Table 41. Organizations contacted during the study 

Organization Type Organization (in alphabetical order) 

 Afghan National Army Special Operations Command 

 Ktah Khas 

 Laghman Provincial Chief of Police 

 Ministry of Defense 

 Ministry of Interior 

 National Directorate of Security 

 Nangarhar Deputy Provincial Chief of Police 

 Operational Coordination Center – Regional (East) 

 Operational Coordination Center – Provincial (Laghman) 

 Paktiya Provincial Chief of Police 

 Paktiya Regional Medical Center 

 Regional Logistics Support Center 

 Regional Military Training Center 

 Special Mission Wing 

Pakistani Organizations  Pakistan Army Joint Staff 

 
270

This page intentionally left blank 
271

Appendix D: Threat assessment case studies 

The case studies that follow are not intended to be comprehensive. 

Our analysis of these cases is empirical and entirely dependent on the 

availability of reliable historical information. Compared to what is 

available on government forces, there is little accurate historical information on insurgents in Afghanistan; as a result, there are gaps in 

the historical analyses. We have therefore focused on documenting 

clearly what historical facts were available, as well as where we had to 

make our own assessments to address these gaps. 

1987–1992: Soviet withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the government 

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and spent the next 10 

years battling a variety of Afghan insurgent groups known collectively 

as the Mujahideen. During this time, Soviet forces rebuilt the Afghan 

army and police, as well as the country’s security ministries. They also 

raised irregular forces, then known as militias, to supplement the 

regular army and police and to secure more remote areas. The Mujahideen employed guerrilla tactics against Afghan and Soviet forces, 

targeting patrols, bases, and lines of communication. They intimidated pro-government populations, targeted officials, and built parallel 

governments. 

In January 1987, the Soviet Union announced the end of major combat operations and the transition of security responsibility to Afghan 

forces, and began a long withdrawal that lasted until February 1989. 

Following the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen launched a series of 

major offensives, culminating in the eventual collapse of the Kabul 

government in 1992 and the disintegration of the Afghan army. The 

purpose of this case study is to detail the dynamics of these offensives 

and the impact they had on Afghan forces, in order to make predictions about what the Taliban might do once U.S. and NATO forces 

have drawn down—that is, after 2014. 
272

Threats to the national government 

The Mujahideen sought to overthrow the regime in Kabul through 

force and to cause the disintegration of the Soviet-backed Afghan 

army and police.239 The Mujahideen built parallel government structures in liberated areas, including security forces to provide law and 

order. The insurgents sought to supplant the government’s security 

forces with their own through a combination of attack and cooptation.240

There was considerable debate within the Mujahideen as to which areas of Afghanistan were of greatest strategic importance, and therefore where and when forces should be massed for a final assault on 

the Soviet-backed government. A handful of Mujahideen factions—

mainly those based in Peshawar with close links to Pakistani intelligence—argued that Kabul should be the primary target and that 

once the capital had fallen government forces elsewhere would follow 

in short order. The majority view among the Mujahideen was that the 

regional capitals and certain key provinces were most vital, and that 

once those had fallen Kabul would as well.241 

Those factions focused on Kabul—among them Jalaluddin Haqqani 

and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—established bases in the rural areas 

around the capital, cut lines of communication along the outskirts, 

and infiltrated small teams into the city to conduct terrorist attacks, 

assassinations, and other high-profile operations. The aim was to 

threaten individual members of the regime and cause the disintegra-

 

239 Stephen Tanner. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the Fall of the Taliban. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002: 

248. 

240 Tanner. Afghanistan: 248. As the Soviets withdrew, entire units defected 

with their weapons and joined the Mujahideen. Including the militias, 

the total number of government security forces in 1988 was an estimated 

300,000. Rodric Braithwaite. Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 

1979–1989. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011: 298. 

241 Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992: 224; Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, 

Civil War, and the Future of the Region. New York: Palgrave, 2002: 106–

109. 
273

tion of national-level institutions. At the same time, these Mujahideen 

factions sought to maintain pressure on major garrisons in the provinces to keep them fixed and tied down—especially bases at Bagram, 

Jalalabad, Kandahar, Ghazni, Gardez, Shindand, Herat, Mazar-eSharif, and Kunduz. In 1990, one of the militarily most effective of 

the Mujahideen factions led a major assault on Kabul but was forced 

back by Afghan forces.242

The majority of the Mujahideen, based in different areas of the country and focused on the provinces and regional capitals, agreed to divide Afghanistan into nine zones where each commander would 

establish his own administration after the capture of each province.243

Only then did they plan to march on Kabul. These factions sought to 

stop the others from targeting Kabul. The government in Kabul survived into 1992. Ultimately, it was the provinces and outlying areas 

that fell first. Kabul fell only after the insurgents overran the regional 

capitals and coopted large parts of the Afghan army. After Mazar-eSharif in the north fell to the insurgents, the security forces crumbled 

in Herat and Kandahar. The insurgents then surrounded and descended on Kabul.244

There was a relative lull in hostilities as Soviet units retrograded in 

1988 and 1989, followed by an escalation of violence in 1990 once the 

Soviet withdrawal was complete. The Mujahideen harassed departing 

convoys but generally refrained from major offensives during the period of withdrawal and transition. Available evidence indicates that 

the insurgents preferred not to confront Soviet forces as they withdrew and sought to conserve resources for later offensives once the 

government could no longer count on direct Soviet military support. 

The withdrawal of Soviet forces initially galvanized an otherwise 

fragmented resistance as they mobilized additional men and material 

to overthrow the government in the capital and the provinces. But as 

the government held against various offensives through 1990 and 

1991, proving stronger than many had anticipated, and the Mujahi-

 

242 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 224. 

243 Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban: 106–07. 

244 Tanner. Afghanistan: 276. 
274

deen suffered heavy casualties, fractures reemerged, and infighting 

resumed. 245 

The Mujahideen debated how and when to take the offensive and 

seek victory (i.e., when to shift from hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to direct assaults on major cities and military garrisons).246 The mix of direct and indirect assaults varied by region according to calculations 

on the part of various Mujahideen factions as to the strength of their 

forces relative to regional Afghan units. Insurgents massed against 

Jalalabad in 1989 and took heavy casualties, forcing the Mujahideen 

to revert back towards indirect tactics for a period of time. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions 

During the first year following the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen 

launched significant attacks on Khost, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. 

They also overran numerous isolated garrisons in the northeast at 

Barikot, Azmar, and Asadabad in Kunar and Nuristan provinces—

areas that the Soviet military and Afghan forces had barely penetrated despite numerous attempts to do so.247 More remote areas were 

the first to fall, particularly in the mountains near the border with 

Pakistan. Afghan forces retreated from many smaller bases and ceded 

large areas to the insurgents.248 Despite the appearance of a nationwide offensive, most of these insurgent operations were uncoordinated actions by local or regional commanders. 

Jalaluddin Haqqani’s faction in Khost first isolated the city by cutting 

the Khost–Gardez highway. His forces infiltrated Khost city and declared the province an independent zone.249 His men then moved up 

 

245 For example, as the Afghan army held against a major assault on the city 

of Jalalabad in the spring of 1989 and the Mujahideen took heavy casualties, divisions emerged and command and control broke down. 

246 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 224. 

247 Ibid: 227. 

248 Larry P. Goodson. Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 

2001: 72. 

249 Mark Urban. War in Afghanistan. London: MacMillan, 1988: 180; Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban: 108. 
275

the highway to Gardez in an effort to overrun the garrison there and 

take the city, putting Haqqani’s forces along the southern approach 

to Kabul.250

 

In Mazar-e-Sharif, the main city in the north, there were growing terrorist attacks, including major bomb blasts on residential buildings 

housing pro-government political leaders.251 There were large-scale 

attacks in Kunduz, which has a large Pashtun population.252 In the 

west, there were assaults on the airfield at Shindand in which many 

aircraft were destroyed.253 In the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul, insurgents massed in large numbers and overran garrisons, taking several hundred prisoners.254 

In March 1989, one month after the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, several thousand insurgents attacked Jalalabad, a major city 

70 miles east of Kabul.255 They attacked directly from the east and 

seized the airfield.256 The city was well-defended with layered security 

perimeters reaching far beyond the city limits. The Afghan army held 

against the assault and more than 3,000 Mujahideen were killed.257

During four months of fighting, the Mujahideen ran low on ammunition, command and control broke down, and factionalism broke out 

in the ranks. The insurgents were tactically proficient but lacked the 

command structure to effectively wage such a large battle involving 

multiple contingents of fighters.258 Splinters emerged among the Mujahideen in the east following their defeat at Jalalabad and confidence was restored in parts of the ANSF. 

 

250 Tanner. Afghanistan: 268. 

251 Urban. War in Afghanistan: 171. 

252 Tanner. Afghanistan: 269. 

253 Urban. War in Afghanistan: 172. 

254 Gregory Feifer. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New 

York: Harper, 2009: 220. The Afghan army responded by closing a 500-

man garrison at Peshgar. 

255 Tanner. Afghanistan: 271. 

256 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 228. 

257 Tanner. Afghanistan: 271. 

258 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 228. 
276

The Mujahideen were locally based, and concerned mainly with 

fighting in their areas. They were not capable of large-scale coordinated actions, especially across large areas of the country. What limited cooperation they did engage in quickly broke down under 

pressure or a lack of unifying goal. They tended to resist the idea of 

discipline or strategy.259 They were unable to translate momentum into strategic victory, owing to their lack of cohesion and operational 

coordination and inability to seize and hold the initiative in a disciplined enough manner to secure victory.260

 

Some commanders, especially among the non-Pashtun minorities in 

the north, were more organized, but this was less true among the 

Pashtun groups.261 At one point, there were 16 or 17 different organizations. Some reported to Pakistan, others to Iran.262 The 7 main 

Peshawar-based parties took their aid from Pakistan and operated 

mainly in the Pashtun areas. Among them there was considerable 

disunity as well. Levels of organization and of command and control 

varied among the different outfits. In some groups, field commanders were given considerable autonomy, while others were more centralized and directed by leaders based in Pakistan.263

Tactics 

Roadside bombs, direct fire, and anti-air attacks 

The Mujahideen used IEDs, though the term did not exist at that 

time. Most IEDs were anti-tank or anti-personnel mines detonated by 

command wire or remote control. The main target of IEDs was large 

Afghan and Soviet army convoys, and to a lesser extent, foot patrols 

(most Afghan and Soviet patrols were mounted). The Mujahideen relied mainly on direct fire tactics, particularly hit-and-run ambushes 

 

259 Urban. War in Afghanistan: 216. 

260 Ibid: 216. 

261 Ibid. 

262 Antonio Giustozzi. Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan. 

New York: Columbia University Press, 2009: 44. 

263 Ibid: 48. 
277

on large convoys. The Mujahideen were particularly adept at flanking 

and encirclement, and the use of the L-shaped ambush.264 

The Mujahideen relentlessly targeted the long, vulnerable supply 

lines of the Soviet-backed Afghan army—particularly along isolated 

mountain roads. Garrisons became isolated and starved of ammunition and food. The insurgents also targeted isolated bases, many of 

which were overrun. Before the collapse of the central government in 

1992, the majority of Afghan army forces were tied down protecting 

bases and lines of communication and resupplying forward positions. 

The insurgents focused on controlling rural areas, while ceding most 

urban areas to government forces until after the Soviet army withdrew. In some cases, the Mujahideen laid siege to such cities as Jalalabad. In others—for example, Kandahar and Kabul—they took 

control over rural areas on the outskirts of the city and used them as 

bases from which to infiltrate urban areas, making it relatively easy to 

take them over when the time came. 

In the late 1980s, surface-to-air threats emerged, with the introduction of heat-seeking Stinger missiles. The Mujahideen began targeting aircraft, helicopters in particular, to a degree unseen before in 

the conflict. The denial of Soviet air superiority shifted the balance of 

power to the Mujahideen and left many Afghan army outposts vulnerable to massed attacks and impossible to resupply. 

Political tactics and local ceasefires 

Many smaller, more localized insurgent factions negotiated separate 

deals with the government, though the larger and militarily stronger 

factions refused to engage in talks. Many of these agreements took 

the form of tactical ceasefires between local insurgent groups and 

nearby Afghan forces.265 In places where government forces were 

stronger, these agreements took the form of reconciliation on the 

part of the insurgents. 

 

264 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico, VA: United States 

Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 1995: xii–xxii. 

265 Antonio Giustozzi. War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan: 1978–1992. 

Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000: 179. 
278

In other areas where the insurgents were in a stronger position and 

Afghan forces under considerable pressure, the terms of these 

agreements often favored the guerrillas – and could not, therefore, 

be considered a form of insurgent reconciliation. In many areas, 

these local agreements amounted to de facto defection on the part of 

government forces. In places where the army pulled back, it was 

common for local police and irregular forces to defect, especially 

during the winter when quick reaction forces had greater difficulty 

reinforcing besieged positions. Many local Mujahideen groups encouraged government forces to defect, offering amnesty if they did 

so.

266

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

Pakistan 

Pakistan’s strategy during the 1980s rested on covert support to the 

Afghan resistance. The idea was to raise the costs of the Soviet occupation, but without forcing a war with the Soviet Union that Pakistan 

would most certainly lose.267 Soviet presence in Afghanistan threatened to squeeze Pakistan between two hostile powers to the east and 

west, each capable of defeating Pakistan in a conventional war.268 The 

Soviet presence also threatened the ability of the Pakistani army to retreat into Afghanistan in the event of a major war with India. 

By the late 1980s, Pakistani intelligence had built an extensive insurgent infrastructure near the border with Afghanistan. Some 16,000 to 

18,000 recruits passed through Pakistani training camps every year. 

Pakistani military and intelligence personnel also set up camps to facilitate guerrilla operations not directly sanctioned by higher authorities. These alternative camps trained around 6,000 to 8,000 recruits 

each year, many of them from Arab countries.269

 

266 Ibid: 218. 

267 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 20. 

268 Frédéric Grare. Pakistan: In the Face of the Afghan Conflict 1979–1985. 

New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003: 46. 

269 Yousaf. The Bear Trap: 20. 
279

When the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan, the InterServices Intelligence (ISI) attempted to forge greater unity among 

the disparate Mujahideen factions and to prevent infighting among 

them – in order to put up a united front to topple the government in 

Kabul. The idea was that if Kabul fell, the rest of the provinces would 

do so as well in short order. This plan conflicted with those of various 

Mujahideen factions, which preferred to take over the provinces and 

key regional cities first. Working mainly through its favored proxies, 

including the followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin 

Haqqani, the ISI attempted to persuade the Mujahideen to focus on 

Kabul first – to surround and squeeze the capital and infiltrate into 

the city to conduct attacks – with the ultimate aim of targeting the regime itself in Kabul. The ISI pushed weapons and other material to 

those factions that agreed to follow this plan.270

Iran 

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran backed various Shia Mujahideen factions, as well as regional warlords in the west and north. 

The Shia Mujahideen groups were quite separate from the mainly 

Sunni groups based in Pakistan and supported by the Pakistani military, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.271 Iran deepened its involvement with Hazara and other pro-Iran Shia guerrillas near the 

end of war, seeking to influence the makeup of the post-Soviet regime.272 When Tajik leader Barhanuddin Rabbani became president 

of Afghanistan in 1992, Iran backed his government and sought to 

play a stabilizing role.273

India 

India had little influence in Afghanistan during the late 1980s and 

early 1990s. New Delhi does not appear to have supported any of the 

Mujahideen groups, nor did it have close relations with Soviet-backed 

 

270 Ibid: 142–157. 

271 Tanner. Afghanistan: 251. 

272 Urban. War in Afghanistan: 171. 

273 “Iran and Afghanistan.” www.understandingwar.org, website for The Institute for the Study of War, accessed Oct. 2013, at 

www.understandingwar.org/iran-and-afghanistan. 
280

governments in Kabul. The Indian government did not condemn the 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was on good terms with Moscow 

through much of the 1980s. 

India’s role, if any, was indirect, through its hostile relationship with 

Pakistan. Pakistan’s effort to control Afghanistan following the Soviet 

invasion was motivated in large part by Pakistan’s ongoing military 

competition with India. The Pakistani military sought a friendly government in Kabul that would ensure a secure western front and possibly allow the movement of Pakistani military assets into Afghanistan 

in the event of a war with India. 

Vulnerabilities within the Afghan Security Forces 

Dependence on foreign aid 

The government in Kabul was heavily dependent on military aid and 

financial support from Moscow. The continued flow of resources 

from the Soviet Union allowed the regime to survive for several years, 

despite the fall of towns and major cities in the provinces.274 The Afghan military was heavily dependent on supplies from the Soviet Union and the airlifting of these supplies given the growing insecurity 

along the roads. In January 1992, Moscow abruptly stopped all aid to 

the Kabul government, including money and military hardware. This 

change greatly weakened the army and police. Unable to pay salaries 

to its soldiers, command and control in the army broke down and entire units defected. 

The sudden stoppage of funds caused a breakdown in patronage 

networks essential for the survival of the regime, causing progovernment militia commanders to defect once the flow of goods 

ceased to reach their units. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the strongest progovernment militia commander in the north and a key ally of the regime in Kabul, turned on the government in February 1992 following 

the stoppage of funding and joined the Mujahideen.275 His forces 

 

274 Goodson. Afghanistan’s Endless War: 72. The Soviet Union sent an estimated $300 million in military supplies every month after February 1989 

until the supply line was cut in January 1992. Also, Braithwaite. Afghansty: 296. 

275 Tanner, Afghanistan: 276. 
281

then overran Mazar-e-Sharif. Soon after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, the 

army began to crumble in Herat.276 The same happened in Kandahar. 

The central government quickly collapsed. In April 1992, the Mujahideen overran the garrisons at Kabul, and the capital fell under insurgent control. 

Reliance on Soviet air support and air lift 

Afghan forces were heavily dependent on Soviet air support and air 

lift. With the withdrawal of Soviet aircraft, Afghan ground forces 

could no longer count on close air support. With many roads and 

mountain passes cut, large areas of the country became unreachable 

by government forces. It became impossible to provide reinforcements to isolated checkpoints or garrisons under assault, or to evacuate wounded soldiers and police. As a result, many isolated areas that 

had been dependent on air support and/or aerial transport and resupply fell to the Mujahideen. This trend increased with the withdrawal of most Soviet aircraft and pilots and the eventual cutting of 

military aid to the fledgling Afghan air force. 

The lack of air support reportedly demoralized troops in some areas 

of the country where air support was integral to the defense of patrols 

and garrisons. In the Arghandab valley north of Kandahar city, mass 

defections from the army were attributed to lack of air support. The 

Mujahideen secured an important victory there before the Soviet 

withdrawal and took control of the valley, putting Kandahar city at 

risk.277

Irregular forces and pro-government militias 

The Soviet military raised irregular forces across the country, especially during the later years of the war, to reduce the burden on regular forces and to control local areas and lines of communication. 

These militias emerged as a potent threat to the regime in their own 

right following the withdrawal of the Soviet army, the reduction in 

funding to irregular units, and weakening oversight and resupply 

 

276 Ibid. 

277 Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story 

of the Soviet Withdrawal. London: Oxford University Press, 1995: 257. 
282

from the MoI and the Army.278 Militias took over local areas they had 

been entrusted with securing, expanded their control, began targeting police and other government officials who opposed them, and to 

varying degrees preyed on the population. Many defected to the Mujahideen after 1989.279 After the fall of the government in 1992, most 

of the country fell under the control of various militia commanders 

who fought among themselves during the years of civil war in the 

1990s.280

Desertions in the Army 

Attrition due to desertion, which plagued the enlisted ranks of the 

army throughout the 1980s, remained constant through 1989 and increased thereafter. Desertions were most common among border 

troops and others in highly contested areas, as soldiers deployed far 

away from their native ethnic group. Numbers spiked before major 

operations, in the middle of winter, and during the harvest. In an effort to stem desertions, the Soviet command lowered the operational 

tempo of Afghan units. As Soviet forces withdrew, mass desertions of 

entire units became more common, causing severe disruptions in the 

Army.281

1994–2000: The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan 

Years of civil war followed the collapse of the central government in 

1992.282 Rival warlords fought over control of towns and cities and 

preyed on the population. In the absence of law and order, indiscriminate violence and extortion became the norm. The Taliban 

 

278 An elaborate framework was put in place to ensure that militias did not 

go rogue. Commanders were chosen by the MoI from a list given by 

tribal leaders. The militias fell under the command of regular army 

units. 

279 Giustozzi. Empires of Mud: 66–67. 

280 Ibid: 54–55 and 66–67. 

281 Giustozzi. War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan: 84–86. 

282 Tanner. Afghanistan: 277. 
283

surged into Afghanistan in 1994 under the banner of: “Restore peace, 

disarm the population, and enforce Sharia Law.”283 

The Taliban were largely welcomed by the population, first in the 

Pashtun south and later in the east, but met resistance in the north 

and west. By 1996 the group controlled 22 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, including Kabul. By 2000, the Taliban controlled over 90 percent of the country. The purpose of this case study is to describe the 

Taliban’s campaign to conquer Afghanistan in the late 1990s—the 

group’s overall strategy, which areas were targeted when, and the tactics employed.284

Threats to the national government 

The strategy of the Taliban during this period evolved as the group 

became stronger and attracted new allies. The Taliban struck first in 

Kandahar, then Helmand, before moving into Farah province and 

north to Herat. As the group conquered new areas and its ranks 

swelled, its goals became increasingly ambitious and national in character. Throughout its military campaign, the Taliban focused its efforts on major towns and cities—as opposed to rural areas—and 

fought large-scale battles around large population centers and garrisons controlled by regional warlords. 

In its early stages, the Taliban offered an attractive alternative to the 

corrupt and predatory rule of local and regional warlords. They took 

advantage of this situation in the south and used the area as a launching point to build a movement that would soon snowball across almost the entire country.285 As time went on, the Taliban emerged as a 

national force capable of putting an end to the civil war and brokering peace between warring factions.286 They took the Pashtun areas of 

the south and east quickly, but faced intense resistance from the nonPashtun militias in the north and west. 

 

283 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010: 22. 

284Rashid. Taliban: 54; Tanner. Afghanistan: 285. 

285 Rashid. Taliban: 97. 

286 Ibid: 95. 
284

Unlike the Mujahideen, the Taliban were not regionally based or partitioned in overall leadership. Though the Taliban would stand up 

governing bodies composed of Taliban leaders in the cities and regions they would overtake, these bodies were still very much connected to the strategic-level leadership. Especially in the early years, all 

decisions, whether military or otherwise, were directed by Mullah 

Omar. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions 

The Taliban’s first major battle was at Spin Boldak on the border with 

Pakistan in Kandahar province.287 The force then moved down the 

Quetta-Kandahar road and took Kandahar City in November 1994. 

Within three months, the group had established control over the 

main population centers of southern Afghanistan with relatively little 

fighting. Thousands of southern Pashtuns joined the Taliban’s 

ranks.288

In early 1995, the Taliban pushed north. They took Ghazni and 

pushed farther into the mountains of the east. The Taliban then 

moved against former Mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the strongest of the Pashtun militia commanders, based at 

Charasyab south of Kabul. The Taliban first cut the road to Jalalabad 

and overran Charasyab during several days of intense fighting.289 

The Taliban then focused their efforts on capturing Kabul, then 

largely under the control of Tajik militia commander Ahmed Shah 

Massoud. Fighters attacked the city from three different directions. 

Massoud’s forces drove the Taliban back, all the way to Ghazni. Following this defeat, the Taliban relieved pressure on Kabul and focused its forces—by late 1995 numbering at least 20,000—on Herat 

and other parts of the west. Forces loyal to Ishmael Khan pushed the 

Taliban back in a major battle south of Shindand in southern Herat, 

and forced the group back to Delaram on the border between Hel-

 

287 Tanner. Afghanistan: 279. 

288 Ibid: 280. 

289 Tanner. Afghanistan: 281. 
285

mand and Farah in the southwest. The Taliban regrouped and counter-attacked, eventually taking the city of Herat in September 1995.290 

The Taliban focused again on taking Kabul, this time from a stronger 

position and with a larger number of forces.291 The group launched a 

relentless barrage of assaults on the garrisons of various militia commanders in and around the capital in late 1995 and early 1996. Rival 

commanders joined forces for the first time to push the Taliban away 

from Kabul. The Taliban responded by moving against Jalalabad east 

of Kabul and cutting the capital off from the passes into Pakistan. 

From there they pushed toward Bagram, cutting off supply routes 

north of the capital as well. Massoud and others pulled back from 

Kabul and the capital fell to the Taliban in September 1996 292

 

Taliban leaders established the rudiments of a national government 

in Kabul and sent the bulk of its forces north.293 Taliban fighters 

pushed north out of Herat, taking areas along the northwest corridor, 

in the provinces of Baghdis and Faryab. Fighters also pushed in from 

the northeastern mountains, over much of Takhar province and parts 

of Kunduz. In 1997, the Taliban attacked areas around Mazar-e-Sharif 

but were forced back. The remaining non-Pashtun militia commanders banded together under the Northern Alliance and held against 

the Taliban, leading to a military stalemate in key areas of the 

north.294

Tactics 

Due to the frontal, siege-like nature of many battles, the Taliban employed rockets and artillery to wear down such cities as Kabul and 

Herat. In April 1996, the Taliban reportedly fired 866 rockets on Kabul.295 In addition to indirect fire, the Taliban employed mobile 

 

290 Ibid: 282. 

291 Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban: 148. 

292 Tanner. Afghanistan: 283. 

293 Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban: 137. 

294 Tanner. Afghanistan: 284–85. 

295 Rashid. Taliban: 47. 
286

ground assaults using tanks and pickup trucks.296 Taliban forces attacked in mobile columns involving a line of small pick-up trucks 

moving directly against enemy lines.297 Despite poor coordination 

among units, these ground assaults proved effective. 

The Taliban had very little in the way of aircraft. Their use of airpower was limited to poorly-maintained stolen aircraft and dependent on temporary alliances with rival militia commanders. For example, Uzbek militia commander Abdul Rashid Dostum bombed 

positions around Herat in support of the Taliban before turning 

against the group when it attacked Mazar-e-Sharif.298 Though the Taliban captured 52 MiG-21 and other helicopters at Shindand airbase, 

these aircraft were useless without pilots and technicians provided by 

Dostum in a deal brokered by Pakistani intelligence.299 

The Taliban was also limited by their poor logistical support and a 

weak command structure. As a byproduct of these deficiencies, they 

had almost no capacity for medicine or medical facilities, and Taliban 

fighters were unlikely to be treated if wounded in battle.300

The Taliban bought the support of many local militias, allowing them 

to take many areas without a fight and incorporate additional forces 

into their ranks. The group often mixed the threat of military defeat 

and subsequent slaughter with the promise of generous payments for 

a peaceful surrender. The funds generated for these payments came 

from a variety of sources, including cash from the drug trade, 

transport security, and external aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.301

Kandahar was largely taken in this manner, as was Jalalabad.302 

The Taliban immediately built rudimentary, but relatively effective, 

interim administrations in the areas that fell under their control. 

 

296 Ibid. 

297 Ibid: 39. 

298 Ibid: 36. 

299 Tanner. Afghanistan: 282; Rashid. Taliban: 64. 

300 Rashid. Taliban: 36. 

301 Ibid: 40. 

302 Ibid: 28–29. 
287

They established makeshift courts and clamped down on lawlessness 

and predation. They dismantled illegal checkpoints on roads, allowing the free movement of goods and people for the first time in 

years.303

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

Pakistan 

The Afghan Pashtuns who led and initiated the Taliban were trained 

in Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan.304 The bond between the Taliban 

and Pakistan traces its roots to a symbiotic relationship of support 

and cash flow in exchange for security and political stability in Afghanistan. This in turn enabled Pakistani trade, which depended on 

transit routes through the war-torn country.305 Pakistani backing for 

the movement increased as it became clear that the movement was 

capable of defeating the warlords and potentially ending the country’s civil war. 

Pakistani intelligence provided assistance in the form of cash funding, arms, vehicles, bribe money, a steady supply of Afghan refugee 

recruits coming from Pakistani madrassas, military advisors, and Pakistani fighters. In 1998, the Pakistani government provided more than 

$6 million in direct contribution to the Taliban.306 With time, the 

number of Pakistani agencies providing manpower also increased. At 

the forefront of this was the Pakistani ISI, which had officers deployed in cities across Afghanistan as advisors during the Taliban’s 

conquest of the country. The ISI played a key role in directing Taliban leadership as well as facilitating the flow of goods and other aid 

being shipped to the Taliban. Other advising and support was reported to have come from the Pakistani army and air force. There were 

even reports of direct fighting by both immigrating Pakistani nation-

 

303 Ibid: 35. 

304 Thomas Barfield. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, reprinted 2012: 255. 

305 Tanner. Afghanistan: 279. 

306 Barfield. A Cultural and Political History: 258; Seth Jones. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: W.W. 

Norton and Co., 2010: 63. 
288

als and the Pakistani Frontier Corps, a federal paramilitary force 

largely made up of Pashtun fighters.307

Iran 

Iran largely opposed the Taliban, which was in great measure a Sunni 

Pashtun movement supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The 

group was responsible for many attacks on Afghanistan’s Shiite minority.308 During the siege of Kabul, Iran provided supplies, training, 

and anti-aircraft missiles to militias opposing the Taliban.309 Iran later 

emerged as a major backer of the Northern Alliance. Iran increased 

its support following mass killings of Afghan Shias in the north in 

1998. When the Taliban executed Iranian diplomats in Mazar-eSharif, Iran mobilized troops along its border with Afghanistan. 

Vulnerabilities within the Afghan Security Forces 

Opposition to the Taliban was extremely divided. The remnants of 

the post-1992 national government and security forces were marred 

by infighting. Various regional warlords were unable to resolve their 

disputes for control, leading to a breakdown in negotiations, the fracturing of the security forces, and the onset of civil war. 310 Rival militia 

commanders fought for control over different parts of Afghanistan 

for the remainder of the decade. 

Local and regional militias fought for personal gain and were easily 

bribed. Many had difficulties generating reliable sources of revenue 

and paying their fighters on a regular basis.311 During the battle for 

Kandahar in 1994, it is believed that the militias and security forces 

guarding the city were paid to stand down, allowing the Taliban to 

take the city with little fighting.312 In the taking of Jalalabad, the city’s 

 

307 Jones. Graveyard: 63–65. 

308 Rashid. Taliban: 35. 

309 Ibid: 44. 

310 Ibid. 

311 Giustozzi. Empires of Mud: 74–75. 

312 Rashid. Taliban: 28–29. 
289

leader, Haji Abdul Qadeer, was given a substantial bribe, rumored to 

be in the magnitude of $10 million, to leave the city. 

The self-interested rivalry found in the upper echelons translated into poor discipline, lack of cohesion in the rank-and-file, and difficulties recruiting and retaining skilled fighters. The warlords lacked the 

ideological glue necessary to forge unity and act towards strategic 

aims. Looting and rape by militiamen became common place partly 

because military leaders could not control it but also because its allowance was used as an incentive in the absence of pay.313

2006–2009: Taliban offensive in the south and east 

The Taliban, having been strategically defeated in 2001 and 2002, attempted to make a comeback in 2006 inside Afghanistan, launching 

attacks across the southern provinces and to a lesser extent in the 

east. The organization reestablished its networks, recruited new 

fighters, and reconstituted itself militarily to fight a guerrilla war 

against coalition and Afghan government forces. The Taliban infiltrated rural areas, assassinated and intimidated local leaders, overran 

smaller towns in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, surrounded garrisons, and threatened Kandahar city and Helmand’s provincial capital at Lashkar Gah. In the eastern provinces as well, where the 

insurgency was more fragmented, there was considerable growth in 

violence. 

Additional U.S. and NATO forces managed to blunt the Taliban’s offensive, regain control over many areas that had fallen under insurgent control, and increase the capability and capacity of the ANSF. As 

thousands of additional ISAF forces were deployed to Afghanistan in 

2009, it became clear that the Taliban would not be able to force the 

collapse of the Afghan government or the immediate withdrawal of 

coalition forces. This case study, which focuses on Taliban activities 

from the initial months of their resurgence in 2006 to the deployment of additional U.S. forces in 2009, illustrates how the Taliban 

might target Afghan forces in the event of a renewed insurgent offensive after 2014.

 

313 Ibid. 
290

Threats to the national government 

The strategic goal of the Taliban during this period was to seek a military victory and to force the withdrawal of all coalition forces. The insurgent leadership’s stated goals were fairly consistent on this point.314

The Taliban leadership apparently believed that the handover of responsibility for southern Afghanistan from U.S. to British and Canadian forces in late 2005 and early 2006 signaled that the United States 

was preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan, and that a large-scale 

insurgent offensive would, therefore, hasten this withdrawal and give 

the appearance of a Taliban victory. The insurgents did not appear 

interested in negotiations, but instead sought an outright military victory. It was clear at the time that the Taliban rejected the Afghan government and its constitution and sought its overthrow, as well as the 

dissolution of its security forces. 

At the national level, the Taliban’s strategy appeared to be to take 

over outlying rural areas and from there put pressure on larger towns 

and provincial centers. They carried out acts of terrorism and targeted assassination in urban areas from bases in outlying villages. Insurgents infiltrated the suburbs around several key cities, especially 

Kabul and Kandahar, and fought pitched battles to control some of 

these areas. The Taliban launched direct assaults at some towns in 

outlying areas, especially in northern Helmand, but relied mainly on 

infiltration and terrorist methods to undermine security in major cities. Over the course of the Taliban’s many offensives in 2006 through 

2008, there was considerable disagreement within the leadership over 

the appropriate use of terrorism and assassination, especially suicide 

attacks and bombings involving civilian casualties. 

Beginning in 2006, insurgents infiltrated into the rural areas around 

Kabul, especially in Logar, Wardak, and Kapisa provinces. By 2008, 

many areas around Kabul had fallen under the insurgents’ control.315

 

314 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, 

Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001–2011. Wiltshire, UK: Arts and Humanities Research Council, 

2012: 12. 

315Mohammed Osman Tariq Elias. “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: 

Logar and Wardak.” In Antonio Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Tali-
291

From there, they targeted convoys entering and exiting the city and 

infiltrated the city itself.316 

Bombings and suicide attacks emerged as a threat in Kabul beginning 

in the latter half of 2007 and grew steadily thereafter. In 2008, there 

were a number of commando-style fidayeen attacks involving considerable planning and executed by well-trained operatives—

characteristic of attacks conducted by militants trained by Pakistan’s 

intelligence services. These attacks involved a mix of suicide bombings, car bombings, and direct fire. Many of these attacks targeted 

high-security installations, including Afghan ministries.317 Attacks in 

Kabul had strategic effects, as they were widely reported in the news 

and for the first time in the war threatened the security of national 

leaders and institutions. 

Many of these attacks were attributed to the Haqqani network based 

in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency, as were many insurgent 

operations in the southeast and along the southern approaches to 

Kabul. Though this network often used more sophisticated tactics, 

strategically and politically the group remained allied with the Taliban writ large and its leadership in Quetta, Pakistan. The Haqqani 

network leadership openly accepted the leadership of the Quetta 

Shura Taliban and espoused the same goals at the national level.318

 

The Taliban targeted food and oil tankers across the Pashtun belt. In 

Helmand, in particular, constant ambushes nearly cut British supply 

lines and left many bases isolated and dependent on aerial resupply. 

Insurgents on the Pakistani side of the border targeted convoys of 

U.S. supplies and equipment moving through Pakistan. Most of these 

 

ban: Insights from the Afghan Field. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2009: 54. 

316 The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland. Brussels: International Crisis 

Group, 2011: 7; Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The 

Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2008: 128–29. 

317 Thomas Ruttig. “Loya Paktiya’s Insurgency,” In Giustozzi, ed. Decoding 

the New Taliban: 59. 

318 Gilles Dorronsoro. The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009: 10. 
292

attacks were against Pakistani and Afghan truck drivers. These operations put pressure on U.S. supply lines and cast uncertainty on the security of the ground lines of communication through Pakistan.319

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions 

The Taliban’s resurgence in the southern provinces of Kandahar and 

Helmand was large in scale and coordinated across time and space. 

Many of the fighters were local, as were many field commanders, but 

the intensity of the violence across so many towns and districts indicated substantial planning and organization by leaders based in 

Quetta. There was a marked rise in violence across the eastern provinces as well beginning in 2006, but this activity was more scattered 

and appeared to be the work of separate commanders acting relatively independently. Beginning in early 2008, the Taliban carried out a 

series of smaller offensives in the northern provinces of Kunduz and 

Baghlan where there is a small Pashtun population. The Taliban also 

expanded into Baghdis province northeast of Herat in the west. Generally speaking however, the Taliban’s post 2005 offensives were limited to the Pashtun belt in the south and east. 

The southern provinces 

Before 2006, the insurgents focused on reconstituting their political 

organization and military capabilities across the south, and engaged 

in relatively low-key activities; for the most part, they refrained from 

large-scale attacks that might attract the attention of coalition forces 

and invite retaliation. During 2004 and 2005, the Taliban cadres in 

southern Afghanistan carried out targeted assassinations, quietly cemented alliances with sympathetic tribes and powerbrokers, and recruited fighters and mid-level commanders from local tribes and 

militias that had become alienated from the government—laying the 

groundwork for the offensive that would follow.320

 

 

319 Christopher Reuter and Borhan Younus. “The Return of the Taliban.” In 

Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban: 114. 

320 An unknown number of militiamen and their commanders who had previously worked with the government switched sides and joined the Taliban, especially in Helmand where a number of militias were disbanded 
293

They infiltrated the rural areas around Kandahar City and from there 

established operational networks inside the city itself. In a number of 

outlying areas of Helmand province where NATO and Afghan forces 

were few in number, Taliban cadres quietly assumed control and began putting pressure on vulnerable district centers.321

 

In early 2006, the Taliban came out into the open and launched a series of direct and simultaneous military offensives that immediately 

put coalition and Afghan forces on the defensive across the southern 

provinces and threatened to cut the region off from the rest of the 

country. The scope and intensity of these attacks sent the message 

that U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan were faltering and that the 

Taliban had recovered from their defeat in 2001 and 2002.322 The relative lull in activities before 2006 followed by a massive surge in attacks appeared to be part of a larger strategy to fundamentally alter 

the strategic situation—an effect that would not have been achievable 

through more gradual measures.323 

In 2007 and 2008, the insurgents maintained a high operational 

tempo against Afghan and NATO forces, even after it became apparent that coalition forces were not about to withdraw. The Taliban lost 

thousands of fighters between early 2006 and late 2008, most of them 

in direct assaults on NATO and ANSF outposts. Heavy attrition 

caused the Taliban to alter its tactics and organization, but not its 

 

and politically isolated but not demobilized or incorporated into the 

government’s security forces. 

321 Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi. “The Taliban at War: Inside the 

Helmand Insurgency, 2004–2012.” International Affairs 89: 4, 2013: 850. 

322 There were few police to secure the population, and only a battalion plus 

of British forces in Helmand and similar numbers of Canadian forces in 

Kandahar. Carter Malkasian, Jerry Meyerle, and Megan Katt. The War in 

Southern Afghanistan: 2001–2008. Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2009: 11. The 

militia forces that had worked with U.S. troops to expel the Taliban in 

Kandahar had been demobilized and only partly incorporated into the 

army. The same was true of many pro-government militias in Helmand. 

Sean Maloney. “A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province, 2003–07.” Small Wars & Insurgencies

19:2, 2008: 211. 

323 Maloney. “A Violent Impediment.” 209–210. 
294

overall strategy and aims. The Quetta-based leadership directed its 

field commanders to cease large-scale direct assaults and to operate 

in smaller formations and utilize IEDs against convoys and patrols.324

Kandahar 

In Kandahar province, the Taliban targeted 11 of 13 districts beginning in January 2006 and escalating into the warmer months. The police were the main target of these operations, especially checkpoints 

and headquarters. From 2006 to 2008, the Taliban consolidated their 

control over many rural areas, recruiting new fighters and in some 

places building fortified camps. As Canadian forces attempted to regain the initiative through a series of major clearing operations, large 

formations of insurgents fought open pitched battles, making use of 

bunkers and other semi-conventional techniques. 

Local insurgent commanders kept the pressure on Canadian and Afghan government forces across the province and expanded their attacks into more remote areas, causing Canadian forces as well as 

Afghan army units to spread out and become tied down fighting in 

remote areas. The insurgents frequently withdrew under pressure 

from clearing operations and infiltrated back again to target forces 

left behind to hold and build. The result was that fewer forces were 

available to secure Kandahar city and its surrounds.325 

While targeting vulnerable rural areas, the Taliban carried out suicide 

attacks and car bombings in Kandahar city aimed at police commanders and other heavily guarded officials, including a Canadian 

ambassador. The Taliban expanded into Zharey and Panjwai districts 

along the western approaches to Kandahar city. They attempted to 

capture the Arghandab valley just north of Kandahar city, known as 

the “gateway to Kandahar,” but were pushed back by a tribal powerbroker and militia commander close to the government.326 Compared to many rural areas, Kandahar city remained relatively safe 

 

324 Farrell and Giustozzi. “The Taliban at War.” 864–65. 

325 Malkasian et al. The War in Southern Afghanistan: 29; Maloney. “A Violent Impediment.” 211. 

326 Maloney. “A Violent Impediment.” 210. Malkasian et al. The War in 

Southern Afghanistan: 17. 
295

until 2008 when the Taliban managed to divide and intimidate the 

tribes of the Arghandab, from where they moved into Kandahar city 

and carried out a series of sophisticated suicide bombings and commando-style fidayeen attacks that caused security in the city to deteriorate sharply.327

Helmand 

In Helmand province, there were simultaneous massed attacks on 

government centers across the northern part of the province. Large 

formations of insurgents attacked police posts in the towns of Sangin, 

Musa Qala, and Now Zad and succeeded in overrunning a number of 

garrisons and killing several district governors and chiefs of police, as 

well as numerous rank-and-file ANP.328 Musa Qala, the northernmost 

town in Helmand, was completely overrun and turned into a Taliban 

sanctuary soon after British forces pulled back from their base 

there.329 

As British forces moved to prevent towns of northern Helmand from 

being completely overrun, insurgents targeted government positions 

in central Helmand, the heart of the province, and overran positions 

farther south toward the border with Pakistan. Insurgents surrounded British and Afghan police positions in northern Helmand, keeping them under constant pressure and nearly overrunning them on 

many occasions. At the same time, they ambushed convoys and cut 

many ground lines of communication, nearly shutting down British 

and Afghan logistics, forcing the Afghan and coalition forces to rely 

heavily on aerial resupply and cutting them off from the population. 

The Taliban made repeated attempts to assassinate the Helmand 

provincial chief of police and other officials and allies of the governor. Several district governors from outlying areas were evacuated 

from their districts because of threats of assassination. After gaining 

control over the district of Nad Ali west of the provincial capital at 

 

327 Malkasian et al. The War in Southern Afghanistan: 48. 

328 Fifty-two policemen were killed in Sangin alone during the first half of 

2006. Ibid: 22. 

329 Musa Qala was retaken in 2007 in a major joint operation by U.S., British, 

and Afghan forces. 
296

Lashkar Gah, some 200 insurgents massed on the outskirts of the city 

in preparation for an attack on the governor’s house and the headquarters of the NDS, Afghanistan’s intelligence service. The attack 

was repulsed after 10 days of heavy fighting.330 

As thousands of insurgent fighters were killed in massed assaults in 

2006 and 2007, the Taliban in Helmand shifted towards smaller formations and greater use of IEDs. They ceased attempting to overrun 

district centers and never again attempted to mass against the provincial capital.331 Compared with Kandahar, there were few suicide attacks and car bombings in Lashkar Gah, a city of relatively little 

political significance. The Taliban in Helmand focused mainly on 

strategically important rural areas and key district centers. As British 

and Afghan forces regained lost ground in 2007 and 2008, the Taliban pushed into more outlying areas. At the same time, they left behind underground networks in cleared areas and retained a 

significant presence across the province. 

The eastern provinces 

Insurgent commanders in the eastern provinces launched their own 

series of military offensives from 2006 on, though these activities were 

more disparate and variable—a product of the relatively fragmented 

and difficult terrain. There was less coordination among various field 

commanders in the east and less central direction from Pakistanbased Taliban leaders. The eastern insurgency was relatively disjointed and localized, involving a diverse array of insurgent factions operating independently but espousing loyalty to the Taliban movement 

writ large. 

There were pockets of intense fighting—as intense as the most violent parts of Kandahar and Helmand during the height of the Taliban offensive there—while nearby areas remained calm. Overall, the 

locus of fighting was in outlying areas, less so in cities and large 

towns. Yet, as the insurgency spread in 2007 and 2008, the more am-

 

330 Malkasian et al. The War in Southern Afghanistan: 49; Tom Coghlan. 

“The Taliban in Helmand.” In Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban: 

145. 

331 Farrell and Giustozzi. “The Taliban at War.” 865. 
297

bitious eastern commanders—the Haqqani network in particular—

crept toward Kabul, infiltrating key areas around the capital from secure bases farther east, and emerged as a serious threat to the regime 

itself. Pakistani militants and Pakistani intelligence played a greater 

role in the east because of the proximity of Pakistan’s lawless tribal 

areas and the porous and mountainous border (see sub-section below 

on Pakistan). 

The northeast (Kunar and Nuristan) 

Some of the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008 was in 

the isolated mountain valleys of central Kunar and parts of Nuristan 

along the northern border with Pakistan.332 The areas of greatest contention were the Korengal valley in central Kunar, Kamdesh in eastern Nuristan, and the major passes through the mountains into 

Pakistan. The insurgency in Kunar and Nuristan is highly dispersed 

and fragmented – a consequence of the difficult terrain, which is 

characterized by narrow valleys through the mountains.333

 

There was a diverse mix of Pakistani and Afghan groups operating in 

the region, as well as foreign fighters, with different and at times conflicting tactical goals and areas of influence. Many of these groups 

were focused on fighting ISAF forces, yet there were factions of the 

Pakistani Taliban engaged in open warfare with the Pakistani state, 

state-sponsored Pakistani militants focused on India, and members of 

al Qaeda. There was considerable in-fighting among these groups. 

The overall Taliban commander for Kunar in 2008 claimed to be 

fighting a war on multiple fronts against coalition forces, the Afghan 

government, and the Pakistani military.334

 

 

332 In 2009, U.S. forces pulled back from the more heavily contested areas in 

the two provinces. 

333 Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2010: 61–72 and 105–112. 

334 Michael Moore and James Fussell. “Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking U.S. 

Counterinsurgency Operations.” Institute for the Study of War, July 

2009: 11–15. His name was Qari Ziaur Rahman; he was reportedly killed 

in 2013. 
298

Insurgent activity in Kunar and Nuristan was initially quite isolated 

from developments farther south and was, for the most part, sparked 

by early U.S. operations targeting fleeing al Qaeda fighters. Much of 

the heaviest fighting was in areas with ethnic Nuristani (i.e., nonPashtun) populations known more for their militant resistance to all 

outside forces than for loyalty to the Taliban. Over time, local insurgents developed connections with the Afghan Taliban leadership and 

with various Pakistani Taliban factions. In 2007 and 2008, the area 

emerged as a key base for insurgents infiltrating districts north and 

west of Kabul through mountain passes running through western 

Nuristan. These routes also connected the northern districts of Kabul 

to insurgent bases in northwest Pakistan.335

 

As a result of U.S. drone strikes into Pakistan’s tribal areas, a number 

of al Qaeda cadres took refuge in Kunar. A number of al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, had connections to Kunar dating 

back to the 1980s. In some places, they became integrated with local 

fighters; in others, they were rejected. Al Qaeda operatives kept a low 

profile, preferring to remain behind the scenes working as facilitators 

among different groups on both sides of the border and facilitating 

the ingress of Arab, Chechen, and Uzbek fighters.336 The extent of its 

influence and presence was a matter of some debate (see sub-section 

below on al Qaeda in Afghanistan). 

Fighters in Kunar and Nuristan demonstrated considerable proficiency in direct fire tactics. They nearly overran several U.S. bases in 

sophisticated large-scale assaults that took U.S. forces by surprise. Unlike in the south, where attacks on fixed positions tended to take the 

form of simple human wave assaults, attacks on bases in the northeast 

exploited the element of surprise (demonstrating an ability to plan 

complex operations and move undetected in large numbers), made 

effective use of terrain, and exploited vulnerabilities in U.S. defenses 

 

335 Moore and Fussell. “Kunar and Nuristan.” 7–9. 

336 Ibid: 11–12. 
299

(indicating effective intelligence collection and careful study of U.S. 

and Afghan forces).337 

The insurgents operated a sophisticated logistical network stretching 

into Pakistan. Training camps and arms bazaars across the nearby 

border with Pakistan fed into the groups fighting in Kunar and Nuristan. Local militants tended to remain in their valleys, but more sophisticated outfits with broader aims (often made up of Pakistani or 

other out-of-area fighters) moved on foot from valley to valley, targeting government forces, recruiting fighters, providing training and 

expertise to local militants, and building an organization. Many of 

these fighters appear to have received formal military training, likely 

in camps in Pakistan. Before large operations, mid-level commanders 

and out-of-area fighters moved into an area, activated a network of 

local fighters, and coordinated their actions against U.S. or Afghan 

forces.338

 

Insurgents in Kunar and Nuristan also conducted a number of successful ambushes on U.S. and Afghan convoys involving large numbers of enemy fighters in channelized mountain terrain. These 

insurgents have repeatedly targeted road movements, seeking to cut 

routes through the mountains, forcing U.S. and Afghan forces to rely 

on aerial resupply and air support to protect large convoys. There was 

an increase in IED attacks in 2007 and 2008, most detonated by remote control—though direct fire ambushes remained the tactic of 

choice. Against the police, they have focused on large-scale attacks, 

many of which involved overrunning isolated posts and kidnapping 

large groups of police for psychological effect. 

The southeast (Khost, Paktika, Paktiya, Ghazni) 

Farther south, in the provinces of Khost, Paktika, Paktiya, and Ghazni—another quasi-autonomous region with its own complex dynamic—the insurgency had a different character. The Quetta Shura 

 

337 Randal Steeb, et al. Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat: Challenges Facing Small Unit Operations in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2011. 

338 David Kilcullen. “Taliban and Counterinsurgency in Kunar.” In Giustozzi. 

Decoding the New Taliban: 239–240. 
300

Taliban operated in parts of the southeast where it sought to overrun 

and control district centers and coordinate its activities with the larger offensive occurring in the south. Yet the brunt of the insurgent offensive in the southeast was spearheaded by the Pakistan-based 

Haqqani network, a largely family-run tribally based organization with 

ambitious aims. Its leadership was based in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal agency and enjoyed the support of the Pakistani military. 

Haqqani network leaders accepted the overall leadership of the 

Quetta Shura and were represented on its councils, yet they operated 

independently and pursued their own aims at the tactical and operational levels. 

The Haqqani network’s influence spanned both sides of the border 

with Pakistan. The Haqqanis were from Khost province in eastern Afghanistan, but they had resided for years in neighboring North Waziristan and formed close working relationships with Pakistani tribal 

and militant leaders there. The network also had close ties with Pakistani intelligence dating back to the 1980s.339 Despite these ties to Pakistan, the Haqqani Network largely maintained its independence, 

ever more so as its reach inside Afghanistan expanded. The Pakistani 

military claimed that it could not shut down the Haqqani network’s 

sanctuaries in North Waziristan for fear the group would target the 

Pakistani military from Afghanistan, and U.S. and NATO forces could 

not shut down the organization in large part due to its sanctuaries inside Pakistan.340

 

Before 2006, there were sporadic attacks on outlying bases and assassinations of district officials and other pro-government leaders in the 

southeast, but the area was believed to be relatively stable. In 2006, 

the Haqqani network carried out its first suicide attack against an Afghan army checkpoint in the Barmal district of Paktika. Later that 

year, a suicide bomber traced to the Haqqanis killed the governor of 

Paktiya province. The group then detonated a bomb at the governor’s funeral. Many targeted assassinations occurred in areas where 

there was a substantial government presence and officials and infor-

 

339 Ruttig. “Loya Paktiya’s Insurgency.” in Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New 

Taliban: 62. 

340 Meyerle. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. 
301

mal powerbrokers had some reason to feel safe enough to resist. In 

addition to district officials, the Taliban targeted doctors, teachers, 

NGO workers, and intelligence personnel.341

 

In 2007, the security situation deteriorated drastically, because the 

Haqqani network expanded beyond its traditional base areas in 

Khost. Numerous attacks on the Khost–Gardez road threatened the 

vital line of communication in the southeast. Insurgents conducted 

direct assaults on district centers and police posts, several of which 

were overrun. A number of district governors, fearing assassination, 

moved to urban areas. Large groups of fighters engaged in prolonged firefights with U.S. and Afghan forces in western and northern Paktiya. 342 Andar district in Ghazni saw similar developments.343

The Haqqanis also expanded into Logar and Wardak along the 

southern approach to Kabul and targeted outlying ANSF posts in 

those two provinces.344

 

Attacks continued to grow through 2008 in both number and reach. 

Fighting was particularly intense in Khost and Paktiya and along the 

Khost–Gardez road. In the spring of that year, as many as 4,000 Pakistani Taliban from Pakistan’s North and South Waziristan tribal agencies entered the fray. District centers came under greater pressure. 

Later that year, insurgents attempted to storm the Paktika provincial 

center at Sharana. 

In 2008, the group leveraged newly acquired bases along the southern approaches to Kabul to infiltrate into the city and execute a 

number of high-profile suicide bombings on heavily guarded targets. 

They also conducted commando-style fidayeen operations that had 

 

341 Giustozzi. Koran Kalashnikov and Laptop: 102. 

342 Ruttig. “Loya Paktiya’s Insurgency.” In Guistozzi, ed. Decoding the New 

Taliban: 70. 

343 Christopher Reuter and Borhan Younus. “The Return of the Taliban in 

Andar District, Ghazni.” In Guistozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban: 

106–111. 

344 Ruttig. “Loya Paktiya’s Insurgency.” In Guistozzi, ed. Decoding the New 

Taliban: 70. 
302

considerable impact at the strategic level, despite the relatively small 

number of insurgents involved.345 

The Haqqani network relied more on terrorist methods to achieve its 

aims than did insurgents in Kunar and Nuristan or those fighting for 

control over the south. The group showed relatively little interest in 

controlling populations or holding ground. It operated like a tightlyrun family syndicate—highly disciplined, secretive, and less prone to 

infighting than other groups. It sought to expand its operational 

reach—the ultimate goal being to threaten Kabul itself through a disciplined underground network—not to control towns and villages 

and set up shadow governments and military commissions. Despite 

numerous attacks on outlying district centers by Pakistani and other 

Taliban forces working with the Haqqani network, the group tended 

to avoid open confrontations with Afghan or U.S. forces. 

The northern and western provinces 

The Taliban’s focus has clearly been on the south and to a lesser extent on the east. Yet, the group has also sought to make its presence 

known in parts of the north and west where there are some Pashtunmajority areas. This appears to have been part of a loose strategy to 

expand their geographic reach, even if only slightly, following many 

of the same routes as during their conquest of Afghanistan in the late 

1990s. 

The Taliban reactivated old networks in pockets of Kunduz, Takhar, 

and Baghlan beginning in 2006. Local factions affiliated with the Taliban had considerable influence in some areas but maintained a relatively low profile until 2008 when they began targeting NATO and 

Afghan government forces.346 Many of these attacks were against key 

highways passing north into central Asia, disrupting ISAF’s northern 

distribution network. Several analysts have attributed these developments to an effort to open up another front, however small, among 

isolated Pashtun populations in the north. The insurgency in the 

 

345 Ibid: 70–74. 

346 Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam. “Northern Exposure for the Taliban.” In 

Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban: 257–58; Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: 130. 
303

north is disparate and fragmented, and does not appear to be tightly 

controlled or coordinated. Some groups are little more than local 

criminal organizations seeking to control the smuggling trade. By 

2010, many of these groups had diminished in strength as a result of 

ISAF and ANSF operations.347

 

The Taliban also expanded into the western provinces. Insurgents 

fled into the southwestern province of Farah beginning in 2006, to 

escape British offensives in nearby Helmand. They found sanctuary 

among disaffected Pashtun populations in the eastern part of the 

province and overran isolated district centers at Bakwa, Bala Baluk 

and Gulistan. They massed in large numbers to attack small U.S. and 

Afghan patrols, resulting in a number of near catastrophic ambushes 

– including some of the largest firefights in Afghanistan. They largely 

failed to expand into the Tajik areas farther west toward the Iranian 

border. 

From Farah, Taliban members infiltrated into Herat province further 

north and carried out a handful of terrorist attacks in Herat city and 

engaged in skirmishes with Tajik militias. In 2007, large numbers of 

Taliban confronted U.S. and Afghan forces in the Zerikoh valley near 

Shindand in southern Herat, leading to a major military confrontation that resulted in U.S. airstrikes and the alleged death of numerous civilians, an incident that attracted international attention and 

led President Karzai for the first time to call for restrictions on U.S. 

airpower. During this period, the Taliban to a lesser degree infiltrated 

parts of Ghor and Baghdis where they engaged with former allies 

from the late 1990s and formed alliances with local criminal groups 

in remote areas.348

 

347 Anthony Bell, David Witter, and Michael Whittaker. “Reversing the 

Northeastern Insurgency.” Institute for the Study of War, Apr. 2011: 9–

10. 

348 Meyerle et al. Insurgent Tactics in Southern Afghanistan; Antonio Giustozzi. “The Taliban’s Marches: Herat, Farah, Bagdhis, and Ghor.” In 

Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban: 213–228.
304

Tactics 

In remote rural areas, the Taliban first entered villages in small 

groups, usually at night, and engaged with local leaders and threatened local security forces and pro-government elders. Most of these 

small-scale operations were uncoordinated, and carried out mainly by 

local Taliban factions operating under general guidance from higherlevel commanders. After gaining control over areas, they built shadow 

governments, recruited fighters, and communicated directly with regional Taliban commanders. Over time, the Taliban began operating 

overtly during the day and establishing permanent Sharia courts.349

This appeared to be part of an overall strategy to build Taliban control in outlying areas and gradually move towards more populated 

towns and urban centers. 

The Taliban built defensive positions to blunt the advantages of U.S. 

and NATO airpower. These included underground bunkers, particularly in the heavily cultivated rural areas south and west of Kandahar 

city where insurgents resisted major offensives by Canadian forces. 

They also made use of caves and rock fortifications in the mountains. 

The heavily forested valleys in the mountains of the east proved effective against airpower. The Taliban targeted remote outposts difficult 

to reach by air and fought constantly to cut ground lines of communication, especially in mountainous and hilly terrain. During the 

height of the Taliban offensive in Helmand in 2006 through 2008, insurgents relentlessly targeted British helicopters, most often as they 

attempted to land and takeoff, severely disrupting rotary wing airlift. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

Pakistan 

Since the fall of the Taliban regime, the group’s leadership has taken 

refuge in the city of Quetta in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, as well 

as a number of smaller towns closer to the border with Afghanistan. 

The Pakistani military carried out very few operations in this area of 

the country, and few Taliban leaders were arrested. The Taliban leadership in Baluchistan maintained a low profile and refrained from violence and other destabilizing activities inside Afghanistan. It is 

 

349 Elias. “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul.” 51. 
305

widely believed that the Pakistani government in turn allowed the 

group to operate unmolested. 

It is believed that the Taliban were able to reconstitute their networks 

and organization, rebuild their military capabilities, and plan a resurgence from sanctuaries inside Pakistan between 2002 and 2006. During the height of the Taliban offensives in the south from 2006 to 

2009, the group’s senior leadership remained relatively secure in 

Quetta and other parts of Baluchistan. Whether or to what degree 

Pakistani intelligence provided active support to the Taliban is unclear. There is some evidence, however, that Pakistani intelligence 

provided advice to the Quetta-based Taliban leadership and helped 

forge unity among its factions. 350

 

Before 2009, the United States and NATO were largely focused on 

eliminating the threat from al Qaeda, which had taken refuge in Pakistan’s FATA along the border with Afghanistan to the north. The 

Pakistani military carried out a number of limited operations in the 

FATA against al Qaeda and associated groups, but did not take concerted action against insurgents focused on fighting inside Afghanistan. The Haqqani network in particular retained its safe haven in 

North Waziristan, as did a number of smaller and lesser known insurgent groups operating from South Waziristan.351

Iran 

During this period, Iran pursued a dual-track strategy of backing the 

central government while simultaneously providing limited military 

support to certain factions of the Taliban with the apparent aim of tying down U.S. forces. Iran’s initial response to the NATO intervention in Afghanistan had been favorable. Iran reportedly even offered 

to help train the ANSF. Iran also continued to channel significant aid 

to the Afghan government through development work, particularly 

in the Shia region of Hazarajat in central Afghanistan. 

However, the subsequent invasion of Iraq, escalating tensions over 

Iran’s nuclear program, and concerns about the lingering U.S. mili-

 

350 Giustozzi. Koran Kalashnikov and Laptop: 97. 

351 Meyerle. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: 

18–38. 
306

tary presence on its eastern borders prompted Tehran to establish 

links with the Taliban. Iran reportedly provided training to the Taliban on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect weapons fire, and shipped them a variety of small arms and explosives.352 

Although the support that Iran provided to the Taliban remained 

limited, Tehran had evidently calculated that its long-term objective 

of expanding its influence on the ground in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would have to be subordinated to 

the near term expedient of undermining coalition efforts and opposing the international military presence in Afghanistan.353 Iran may 

have also calculated that it could gain broader leverage against the 

United States by demonstrating that Iran was in a position to cause 

U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan. 

Vulnerabilities within the Afghan Security Forces 

In 2006, the ANSF were still in the nascent stages of development, after being raised almost from scratch following the fall of the Taliban 

in 2001 and 2002. Many districts had functioning police forces but 

they were minimally trained and only lightly armed. The police and 

army reported through separate chains of command to different 

ministries at the national level; provincial and district governors had 

little authority. There was little or no coordination among the different forces. 

There were no ANA battalions capable of independent operations. 

The army was not capable of planning operations, analyzing intelligence, or sustaining itself logistically. It had no capability for air lift 

and little artillery. At the tactical level, ANA battalions occasionally 

performed well, but only when U.S. and NATO forces were present. 

In Helmand, security was mainly provided by a cabal of former warlords led by the provincial governor. Many of these militias were dismantled in 2004 and 2005 but were not replaced with capable police 

 

352 Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. U.S. Treasury Department, Aug. 3, 2010: 61; Maria Abi-Habib. “Iranians Build Up Afghan Clout.” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26, 2012. 

353 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. DoD. July 

2013: 179–180. 
307

or army forces. Hundreds of former militia fighters were cut loose 

from the government and later joined the Taliban. Local powerbrokers were essential to security in Kandahar and parts of the east as 

well where capable ANSF had not yet formed. 

Today: Assessment of current threats 

Since 2009, additional ISAF forces have pushed the Taliban back 

from many areas in the south and east, and they have killed and captured thousands of fighters. The group’s earlier offensives were 

blunted, and it was forced to settle into a long war of attrition that has 

become increasingly difficult to sustain. The last few years of intensified counterinsurgency operations have forced the group deeper underground, disrupted its communications, and put strains on both its 

organization and command and control. 

Vastly expanded targeting operations by U.S., NATO, and Afghan 

special operations forces have eliminated many insurgent leaders at 

different levels and degraded their networks. Drone strikes into Pakistan’s tribal areas have eliminated higher level commanders, removed 

some of the security provided by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and disrupted the insurgency’s ability to communicate and plan. The insurgents 

are no longer as militarily capable as they were in 2006 through 2008. 

At the same time, the U.S. and NATO built up the ANSF—raising 

new units, such as the 215th Corps in Helmand, and expanding training, education, and combat advising. As a result, the ANSF now have 

the capability to provide for security in many areas. The ANA have 

the capability to operate in difficult areas such as Kunar and Nuristan 

in the northeast and in northern Helmand. These areas have been 

difficult even for U.S. and NATO forces. The capabilities of Afghan 

SOF, including highly trained raiding units, have been raised and expanded. Compared with the period of 2006 to 2008, when the ANSF 

were clearly overmatched in many key areas, the balance of power 

has shifted toward the ANSF. 

Threats nonetheless remain to the capital and key areas in the provinces. The Taliban has not been strategically defeated and remains a 

viable force capable of targeting national leaders and institutions in 

Kabul and overrunning government positions in the south and east. 

Insurgents have retained their base areas in some rural areas around 
308

Kabul, and there continue to be attacks in the cities of Kandahar and 

Jalalabad. The insurgents have largely retained key sanctuaries in Pakistan—the Haqqani network in particular—and continue to move 

men and material across the porous Afghanistan–Pakistan border. 

Threats to the national government 

Despite efforts at negotiations, it does not appear that the Taliban has 

fundamentally altered its strategic aims in regard to toppling the government in Kabul and targeting the ANSF in the provinces. There 

does not appear to be significant disagreement between insurgent 

commanders focused on fighting in the provinces and those focused 

on Kabul, as was the case during and after the Soviet withdrawal in 

1989. Over the last few years, the Haqqani network leadership has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the Quetta Shura—indicating a greater level of unity at the strategic level than was the case in the past. 

Today, the Taliban’s primary strategic objective appears to be high 

profile attacks in Kabul and other cities that threaten the government 

at the national level. Terrorist attacks in Kabul continued over the 

course of the surge from 2009 to the present, and in some respects 

they escalated. In 2012, in particular, there were growing attacks (in 

terms of number, scale, and sophistication) against heavily guarded 

U.S., NATO, and ANSF targets in the capital, most of them attributed 

to the Haqqani network. The total number of security incidents in 

the capital was lower in 2013, yet the incidence of high profile attacks 

against strategic targets increased. Some of these attacks were successful; most, however, were not. A substantial number have been foiled; 

a number of others failed to reach their intended targets or unintentionally killed large numbers of civilians. 

In support of attacks in Kabul, the Haqqani network has continued to 

retain bases and sources of support in the districts around Kabul, particularly areas to the south in Logar and Wardak. Insurgents continue 

to move through areas north and west of the capital—transiting to 

and from the northeast and the northern reaches of Pakistan—but 

their presence is not nearly as strong as it was before 2009. 

Threats in Afghanistan’s geographic regions 

During the last few years of counterinsurgency operations, U.S. and 

NATO forces pushed the insurgency back from many areas taken in 
309

2006 through 2008 and built up the ANSF to hold these locations. 

The Taliban were largely forced into peripheral areas and no longer 

control key districts. The Haqqani network’s ability to move men and 

material from Pakistan has been greatly disrupted due to counterinsurgency operations, SOF targeting, and the deployment of ALP and 

conventional police and army forces. 

Insurgents have inflicted several recent tactical defeats on ANSF in 

remote areas, yet these appear to have been isolated events. The Taliban have yet to achieve any successes at the operational level involving multiple coordinated tactical actions. As of late summer 2013, the 

Taliban had not retaken any district centers. Some ALP checkpoints 

have been overrun and a substantial number of local police killed, 

particularly those that threaten freedom of movement in key insurgent transit areas in the southeast. Yet most of these checkpoints were 

later retaken, indicating that the Taliban are either unable or unwilling to hold new ground. There have been terrorist attacks in cities in 

the south and east, but no major offensives against large population 

centers. 

The Taliban have maintained pressure on key lines of communication, particularly the Kabul–Kandahar highway and parts of the Ring 

Road in the southwest between Helmand and Herat. Insurgents have 

also targeted the Kandahar–Spin Boldak and Torkham–Kabul highways, the two key routes to and from Pakistan. The cutting of the Kabul–Kandahar road would sever a key link between Kabul and the 

southern provinces, while loss of control over the Torkham–Kabul 

highway between Jalalabad and Kabul could cut off much of the east 

and the most important crossing point into Pakistan. The Taliban in 

the past has threatened both roads as a means of starving Kabul of 

supplies and isolating it from the Pashtun belt. 

The southern provinces 

The Taliban has been forced back from much of Kandahar and Helmand provinces where the majority of U.S. surge forces were deployed, cutting it off from populations from which to recruit fighters 

and consolidate popular support. Key areas in central Helmand and 

around Kandahar city were retaken and remain under government 

control, though the Taliban have retained an underground presence 

in many cleared areas. Kandahar city in particular has remained relatively calm over the last year and there appears to be no immediate 
310

threat to Helmand’s central districts or the provincial capital, though 

there have been some terrorist attacks in Lashkar Gah. Most reports 

indicate that the Taliban in the south are tired from years of fighting 

and are struggling to maintain control over a number of field commanders. 

At the same time, the Taliban in the south have adapted in response 

to several years of intense counterinsurgency operations. Despite the 

loss of thousands of fighters and many mid-level commanders, the 

group has largely retained its organization and ability to pursue military objectives at the strategic and operational levels. Several years of 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have greatly attenuated the group’s command and control, yet the leadership has 

also taken numerous measures to counteract these effects. The Taliban reduced factionalism in their ranks and developed a more centralized command structure stretching back to the leadership in 

Quetta, Pakistan. They instituted policies to rotate field commanders 

and to require their regular travel to Pakistan in order to reorient 

them to the strategic objectives of the movement. Finally, the southern Taliban clamped down on some of the most egregious attacks on 

civilians, especially indiscriminate suicide bombings in Kandahar that 

were common in 2006 and 2007.354

Kandahar 

Counterinsurgency operations since 2009 in the rural areas around 

Kandahar – especially in insurgent strongholds in Panjwai, Zharey, 

and the Arghandab – pushed the Taliban back from the outskirts of 

Kandahar city, resulting in a gradual improvement in security there. 

Kandahar city is no longer surrounded and under threat as it was in 

2006 through 2008, largely because of a strong provincial police 

chief. In recent months, the security situation in and around Kandahar city has remained relatively stable. The relative stability in and 

around Kandahar, the main population center in the south and a 

traditional stronghold of the Taliban, indicates that the southern insurgency has been substantially weakened, or at the very least is in a 

period of retrenchment. 

 

354 On evolutions of the Taliban since 2009, see Farrell and Giustozzi. “The 

Taliban at War.” 845–871. 
311

Some outlying areas have seen steady and occasionally increasing levels of violence. Taliban activity in Maiwand, a district northwest of the 

provincial capital and a key transit zone between Kandahar and Helmand provinces, has remained high. Insurgents have overrun a 

number of ALP checkpoints in remote areas, but they fled in the face 

of ANSF quick reaction forces and have been unable to hold these 

positions, most of which were re-occupied by ALP. There have been 

few reports of massed attacks; the Taliban in Kandahar move in 

groups of 8 to 15 men, enough to overrun a small checkpoint but not 

to hold ground or overwhelm an important ANSF position. 

Helmand 

Counterinsurgency operations in Helmand since 2009 have largely 

pushed the Taliban out of central Helmand, though the group retains underground networks there. U.S. and NATO forces regained 

control over towns that were overrun in 2006 in the northern and 

southern reaches of the province. A new ANA Corps (215th Corps) 

was raised and dedicated to security in Helmand. Police were stood 

up in central Helmand, where they have succeeded in holding with 

the help of the ANA and U.S. and NATO forces, and later in the 

north. ALP were also raised and remain a relatively effective force in 

several key districts in central Helmand, though their record is more 

mixed in outlying areas to the north. The ANSF in central Helmand 

have proved effective, allowing governance to be consolidated. Farther north, the ANSF have come under greater pressure and have 

struggled to hold ground taken by U.S. and NATO forces. 

No district centers have fallen to the Taliban since ISAF forces began 

their drawdown. However, insurgents have launched significant attacks on vulnerable towns in the northern part of the province. Musa 

Qala, the northernmost district, has come under particularly heavy 

pressure and appears in danger of falling to the Taliban. In Sangin, 

insurgents launched simultaneous attacks on a number of police 

outposts, though these attacks were eventually repulsed with the help 

of U.S. and NATO forces. The Taliban have targeted the ALP, particularly in villages north of the provincial center. Local powerbrokers 

have stepped in to hold the Taliban at bay in parts of the north, yet 

they also appear to be fighting among themselves, a development 

that presents new dangers. 
312

The eastern provinces 

The state of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan is more difficult to 

gauge, given the difficult terrain and fragmented and more localized 

nature of many groups fighting in the east. Kunar and Nuristan remain a threat, according to senior ANSF commanders, and the 

Haqqani network continues to transit through and control parts of 

the southeast. Terrorist attacks and assassinations in the city of Jalalabad have emerged as a serious concern for the police, as have Taliban operations in rural areas south of the city where ANSF quick 

reaction forces have run into massed ambushes that inflicted heavy 

casualties. Insurgents have put considerable pressure on parts of the 

Torkham–Kabul highway that runs through Jalalabad. There continues to be considerable insurgent movement over the border in all 

sectors and harassing attacks against border forces as insurgents seek 

to move around border posts. 

The northeast (Kunar and Nuristan) 

As U.S. forces pulled back from Kunar and Nuristan beginning in 

2009, the Taliban quickly filled the vacuum. By the summer of 2010, 

the insurgents were openly governing large parts of Nuristan and 

some parts of Kunar and operating training camps.355 In September 

2011, the governor of Nuristan claimed that six of the province’s 

eight districts were under Taliban control.356 The region became a 

sanctuary for Afghan and Pakistani militants from a variety of organizations, as well as members of al Qaeda. Fighters from across the 

spectrum appeared to be working together throughout the mountainous border region spanning northeast Afghanistan and northwest 

Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which had become increasingly involved 

in the insurgency in northeast Afghanistan, was well entrenched in 

parts of Kunar. Several senior Lashkar-e-Tayyiba operatives were killed 

in raids, indicating that the group had become a priority target for 

U.S. special operations forces.357 

 

355 Syed Saleem Shahzad. “Taliban Take Over Afghan Province.” Asia Times, 

Oct. 29, 2009. 

356 “Taliban Govern Openly in Nuristan.” Long War Journal, Apr. 6, 2011. 

357 Meyerle. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. 
313

A number of al Qaeda fighters have also taken refuge in Kunar after 

being instructed to do so by Osama bin Laden. In 2011, there were 

reports of multiple al Qaeda-run camps training Afghan and Pakistani militants in Kunar. Dozens of Arab militants, as well as Pakistani 

fighters affiliated with al Qaeda, were killed in U.S. airstrikes on these 

camps.

358 In Kunar, al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba operatives appeared to be working and training together. Members of both organizations have been killed in airstrikes there.359 The extent to which 

Taliban insurgents are tied into these networks and train in these 

camps is unclear. There is little doubt, however, that the region had 

become a hub for a variety of different militant organizations involved in attacks on U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani forces.360

As of August 2013, there were less than 100 al Qaeda members taking 

refuge in parts of Kunar and Nuristan. They have integrated with certain factions of the insurgency and local tribal leadership. Many have 

married into local clans and developed close local ties. Despite these 

ties, al Qaeda and associated groups continue to transit to and from 

Pakistan, particularly in the hard-to-reach northern sectors of the 

border. There have also been reports of renewed al Qaeda presence 

in the mountains of Ghazni in the southeast and of al Qaeda cadres 

being involved in attacks on U.S. forces. 

The southeast (Khost, Ghazni, Paktiya, Paktika) 

In the southeast, additional U.S. forces cleared a number of Haqqani 

network base areas, and bolstered border forces and police and army 

units farther inland, greatly disrupting the flow of men and material 

from Pakistan. U.S. and Afghan SOF carried out numerous raids on 

Haqqani network leaders and facilitators. Drone strikes into North 

Waziristan eliminated a number of senior leaders in Pakistan. 

The Haqqani network, though weaker than in 2006, has remained 

entrenched in the southeastern provinces and from there has ex-

 

358 “Al Qaeda Makes Afghan Comeback; ISAF captures al Qaeda’s top Kunar 

commander.” Long War Journal, Apr. 6, 2011. 

359 “Al Qaeda emir for Kunar, deputy, and facilitator killed in airstrikes.” 

Long War Journal, Aug. 5, 2012. 

360 Meyerle. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan. 
314

panded its reach into the rural areas south of Kabul. The Pakistani 

military has largely refrained from acting against the group, despite 

heavy U.S. pressure. Infiltration over the border between North and 

South Waziristan and Afghanistan’s southeastern provinces continues 

to be a serious problem. SOF have hit many targets in the southeastern border areas, yet insurgents have largely maintained freedom of 

movement along key lines of communication. 

In Ghazni province and parts of Paktiya, insurgents have relentlessly 

targeted local anti-Taliban movements and ALP. Insurgents, possibly 

belonging to the Haqqani network, have assassinated a number of anti-Taliban movement leaders and massed against ALP checkpoints, 

killing substantial numbers of local police (17 in one particularly 

large attack). Yet, like in the south, insurgents have fled ANSF quick 

reaction forces, and ALP have retaken most of these positions. There 

has been a growth in attacks along parts of the Kabul–Kandahar road 

that runs through Ghazni. 

The north and west 

Compared with the south and east, the threat to the ANSF in the 

north and west is minimal. The Taliban’s current strategy in these areas appears limited to undermining security in some pockets with 

large Pashtun populations. Few of these areas are strategically significant. Even in Pashtun dominated areas, no district centers have fallen 

to the Taliban. Much violence attributed to the insurgency is actually 

criminal in nature and is not part of any overall battle plan. 

The insurgency in the north is struggling to survive in a handful of 

isolated pockets with large Pashtun populations in Kunduz, Faryab, 

and Baghlan provinces. Limited offensives by Taliban insurgents were 

largely blunted in 2010 and violence was brought down to manageable levels, though the Taliban maintained a small presence. There 

does not appear to be a concerted push by the Taliban to expand 

their influence in the north. Non-Pashtun powerbrokers have kept 

the insurgency contained to these areas. The Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan, a group with links to al Qaeda, has helped the Taliban in 

some areas. It is small in number and focused on fighting in neighboring Uzbekistan. Links to the Taliban senior leadership in Quetta 

are weak. Much of the violence attributed to the Taliban is localized 

and criminal in nature. 
315

The main areas of insurgent activity in the west are in Farah province, 

especially the relatively remote, Pashtun-majority districts of Gulistan 

and Bala Baluk, which are largely under the control of the Taliban. 

There is also a significant insurgent presence in pockets of southern 

Herat not far from Shindand Airbase and in parts of Baghdis and 

Ghor provinces. The insurgency in these areas are known to be highly fragmented, plagued by bad leadership, and heavily involved in extortion and other criminal activities. The Taliban leadership in 

Quetta has attempted to replace some field commanders in these areas and reduce infighting between them. 

There have been a number of high-profile massed ambushes on convoys traveling on Highway One between Helmand and Herat that attracted attention at the national level. It appears, however, that many 

of these attacks were related to extortion rather than a campaign to 

control the area. The Taliban have also assassinated a number of lowlevel ANSF, often on their way home on leave from remote outposts. 

Some ANSF checkpoint commanders in particularly remote and vulnerable locations have agreed to local ceasefires and, in some places, 

have cooperated with the insurgency. Most cases have been ALP 

checkpoints, but some ANP and ANA officers have cut deals with local insurgents as well. 

There is little substantial threat to the populated areas in and around 

Herat. ANSF assisted by non-Pashtun powerbrokers with their own 

militias have kept the region relatively secure. The Taliban have attempted to assassinate key powerbrokers and stoke and exploit rivalries among them, as the group did in the late 1990s when it captured 

Herat, but they have met with little success. 

External threats and the influence of regional powers 

Pakistan 

The Haqqani network leadership remains based in Pakistan’s North 

Waziristan tribal agency. U.S. drone strikes have targeted a number of 

Haqqani network leaders in North Waziristan, yet the Pakistani military has not moved to shut down the group’s sanctuaries there. 

Haqqani and his followers have strong alliances with Pakistani 

tribesmen and militant groups operating in the area, and they may 

receive some support—active or passive—from Pakistani intelligence, 

though the Pakistani government has repeatedly denied this. Sanctu-
316

ary in North Waziristan is essential for the group’s operations, which 

involve considerable planning, coordination, and training. Given that 

the Haqqani network is the main entity threatening Kabul, the continued sanctuary in North Waziristan poses a strategic threat to Afghanistan. 

Since 2009, Pakistan has conducted a number of operations against 

Taliban militants. These operations, however, were focused on insurgents fighting the Pakistani state; those focused on Afghanistan were 

largely left alone. The Pakistani government sought agreements with 

Taliban commanders focused on Afghanistan and largely left these 

commanders alone as long as they refrained from attacks inside Pakistan. The military then focused its efforts on those groups that insisted on fighting the Pakistani state. As a result, the Taliban’s 

sanctuaries remain. 

There have been several confrontations between Pakistani and Afghan border forces along poorly demarcated portions of the border. 

Some of these altercations resulted in exchanges of fire. Pakistan has 

also fired artillery into Kunar province, apparently in response to attacks by Pakistani Taliban based on the Afghan side of the border. 

There is little evidence to indicate that the Pakistani military intends 

to launch conventional attacks against ANSF positions. Despite exchanges of fire along the border, the threat from Pakistan remains 

largely unconventional in nature (i.e., from the Taliban and its supporting infrastructure on the Pakistani side of the border). 

Iran 

Since 2009, Iran has continued to pursue a hedging strategy in Afghanistan. Iran continues to provide aid to the Afghan government, 

including cash payments to the president and key parliamentarians. 

Tehran also continues to pursue development and aid projects at the 

provincial level—mainly through quasi-governmental charities, such 

as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee. Iran has opened health 

clinics, invested in trucking companies, and expanded its consulate 

in Herat. At the same time, Iran has continued to provide limited 

military aid to the Taliban in the southwest, including explosively 
317

formed projectiles and possibly anti-aircraft munitions.361 Iranian intelligence and paramilitary personnel are active along the border and 

have significant influence with the ABP deployed on the Afghan side. 

India 

India has stepped up its commitments to Afghanistan over the past 

four years, mainly in the civilian sector. This increase may be part of a 

larger Indian policy in Central Asia, but it is also linked to enduring 

Indian concerns about the Taliban once again taking power in Afghanistan. Each year, a contingent of Afghan officers study at Indian 

military colleges. Mid-level officers, including company and platoon 

commanders receive training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism at specialized Indian training academies.362 India has offered 

to provide light military equipment as part of recent agreements with 

Kabul. A debate has begun within the Indian government over 

whether to deepen its military cooperation, such as by training ANSF 

in Afghanistan and providing such hardware as attack helicopters, 

fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, and artillery and communication 

gear. India continues to operate consulates in Kabul and the regional 

capitals. Pakistani authorities have claimed that India is carrying out 

covert intelligence activities from these locations, though the actual 

extent of these activities is a matter of some debate. 

Vulnerabilities within the ANSF 

Infighting and lack of coordination among different elements of the 

ANSF remain a critical vulnerability. The force has come a long way 

since 2006 in this regard, though coordination among ANSF units 

remains intermittent. Coalition forces stood up coordination centers 

in district and provincial centers and at the regional level that are 

equipped with communications equipment and staffed by representatives of relevant services. Relationships have developed among 

commanders at the tactical and operational levels, and there have 

 

361 Robert M. Shelala II, Nori Kasting, and Anthony H. Cordesman. U.S. and 

Iranian Strategic Competition: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia

(Washington, DC: CSIS), Jun. 2, 2012, accessed Oct. 11, 2013 at 

http://csis.org/files/publication/130602_AfPak_Cent_Asia.pdf. 

362 Naveed Ahmad. “Pakistan Concerned Over Afghanistan-India Relationship.” Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Jun. 14, 2013. 
318

been many joint operations. Yet the police, army, and NDS still report 

through separate chains of command and suffer from varying degrees of coordination and mutual support. 

The ANSF depend on local powerbrokers and their militias to provide security in a number of outlying areas. This practice appears to 

be particularly salient in the north and west where the warlords were 

strongest during the civil war in the 1990s. The ANSF have also relied 

on local powerbrokers in parts of northern Helmand and Farah. In 

these places, local militias have helped contain the Taliban, yet there 

has been considerable infighting among these militias that threatens 

to spill into other areas. 
319

Appendix E: Afghanistan’s districts by security 

tier 

Table 42 lists Afghanistan’s districts, categorized by province and security tier. 

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Ab Band Ghazni 4 Koh-i-Safi Parwan 2 

Ab Kamari Baghdis 5 Kohistan Badakhshan 5 

Ab Shar Panjshir 4 Kohistan Faryab 5 

Achin Nangarhar 3 Kohistanat Sar-e-Pul 5 

Adraskan Herat 5 Kohsan Herat 5 

Ahmadaba Paktiya 3 Kot Nangarhar 3 

Ajristan Ghazni 4 Kufab Badakhshan 5 

Alasai Kapisa 3 Kunduz Kunduz 3 

Ali Abad Kunduz 5 Kushk (Rubat-i-Sangi) Herat 5 

Alingar Laghman 3 Kushk-i-Kuhna Herat 5 

Alishing Laghman 3 Kuzkunar Nangarhar 2 

Almar Faryab 5 Laja Ahmad Khel Paktiya 3 

Anar Dara Farah 5 Laja Mangel Paktiya 3 

Andar Ghazni 2 Lal Wa SarJangal Ghor 5 

Andarab Baghlan 5 Lalpoor Nangarhar 3 

Andkhoy Faryab 5 Lash-i-Juwayn Farah 5 

Aqchah Jowzjan 5 Lashkargah Helmand 1 

Arghandab Kandahar 2 Mahmood Raqi Kapisa 3 

Arghandab Zabul 4 Maidan Shahr Wardak 2 

Arghanj Khwah Badakhshan 5 Maimana Faryab 5 

Arghistan Kandahar 3 Maiwand Kandahar 3 

Argo Badakhshan 5 Malistan Ghazni 4 

Asad Abad Kunarha 3 Mandol Nuristan 4 

Asl-i-Chakhansur Nimruz 5 Manduzay (Esmayel 

Khil) 

Khost 3 

Atghar Zabul 4 Mara Wara Kunarha 3 

Aybak Samangan 5 Mardyan Jowzjan 5 

Azra Logar 3 Marjeh Helmand 3 

Baak Khost 3 Markaz-i-Behsud Wardak 4 

Bad Pash Laghman 3 Marmul Balkh 5 
320

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Baghlan-i-Jadeed Baghlan 5 Maruf Kandahar 4 

Baghran (Bughran) Helmand 4 Mata Khan Paktika 3 

Bagram Parwan 2 Mazar-i-Sharif Balkh 1 

Bagrami Kabul 1 Mehterlam Laghman 3 

Baharak Badakhshan 5 Mingajik Jowzjan 5 

Baharak Takhar 5 Mir Bacha Kot Kabul 1 

Bakwa Farah 4 Miramor Daykundi 5 

Bala Buluk Farah 4 Mirzaka Paktiya 3 

Balkh Balkh 5 Miyanishin Kandahar 4 

Balkhab Sar-e-Pul 5 Mizan Zabul 3 

Bamyan Bamyan 5 Mohammad Agha Logar 2 

Bangi Takhar 5 Muhmand ◌ِ ◌ِ Dara Nangarhar 3 

Bar Kunar Kunarha 3 Muqur Ghazni 4 

Baraki Barak Logar 2 Muqur Baghdis 5 

Bargi Matal Nuristan 3 Murghab (Bala 

Murghab) 

Baghdis 5 

Barmal Paktika 4 Musa Khel Khost 3 

Bati Kot Nangarhar 2 Musa Qala Helmand 3 

Bazarak Panjshir 3 Musahi Kabul 1 

Behsud Nangarhar 2 Nad Ali Helmand 3 

Bilchiragh Faryab 5 Nadir Shah Kot Khost 3 

Burka Baghlan 5 Nahreen Baghlan 5 

Chahab Takhar 5 Nahr-i-Saraj Helmand 2 

Chahar Asyab Kabul 1 Nahri Shahi Balkh 5 

Chahar Darah Kunduz 5 Namak Ab Takhar 5 

Chak-i-Wardak Wardak 3 Narang Wa Badil Kunarha 3 

Chal Takhar 5 Nari Kunarha 3 

Chapa Dara Kunarha 4 Naw Bahar Zabul 4 

Chapar har Nangarhar 2 Nawa Ghazni 4 

Char Bolak Balkh 5 Nawa-i-Barikzayi Helmand 2 

Char Burjak Nimruz 5 Nawur Ghazni 4 

Char Kent Balkh 5 Nawzad Helmand 3 

Char Sada Ghor 5 Nazyan Nangarhar 3 

Charikar Parwan 2 Nerkh Wardak 2 

Charkh Logar 3 Nesh Kandahar 3 

Chighcheran Ghor 5 Nijrab Kapisa 3 

Chimtal Balkh 5 Nika Paktika 4 

Chinarto Uruzgan 4 Nili Daykundi 5 

Chishti Sharif Herat 5 Noor Gram Nuristan 4 

Chora Uruzgan 4 Noorgal Kunarha 3 

Dahana-i-Ghuri Baghlan 5 Obe Herat 5 
321

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Daichopan Zabul 4 Omna Paktika 4 

Daimir Dad Wardak 3 Pachir Wagam Nangarhar 3 

Daman Kandahar 2 Paghman Kabul 1 

Dand Kandahar 2 Panjab Bamyan 5 

Dand Patan Paktiya 3 Panjwayee Kandahar 3 

Dangam Kunarha 3 Paroon Nuristan 4 

Darah Panjshir 4 Paryan Panjshir 5 

Darah-i-Noor Nangarhar 3 Pasaband Ghor 5 

Dara-i-Pech Kunarha 4 Pashtun Kot Faryab 5 

Dara-i-soof-i-Bala Samangan 5 Pashtun Zarghun Herat 5 

Dara-i-soof-i-Payin Samangan 5 Puli Alam Logar 2 

Darayim Badakhshan 5 Pul-i-Hisar Baghlan 5 

Darqad Takhar 5 Pul-i-Khumri Baghlan 5 

Darwaz-i-Bala (Nesay) Badakhshan 5 Pur Chaman Farah 5 

Darwaz-i-Payin (Mamay) Badakhshan 5 Pushtrud Farah 5 

Darzab Jowzjan 5 Qadis Baghdis 5 

Dashti Qala Takhar 5 Qaisar Faryab 5 

Dasht-i-Archi Kunduz 5 Qala-i-Kah Farah 5 

Dawlat Abad Balkh 5 Qala-i-Now Baghdis 5 

Dawlat Abad Faryab 5 Qala-i-Zal Kunduz 5 

Dawlat Shah Laghman 4 Qalandar Khost 3 

Dawlatyar Ghor 5 Qalat Zabul 4 

Deh Salah Baghlan 5 Qara Bagh Ghazni 4 

Deh Bala Nangarhar 3 Qara Bagh Kabul 1 

Deh Yak Ghazni 2 Qaram Qul Faryab 5 

Dehdadi Balkh 5 Qarghayee Laghman 3 

Dehraoud Uruzgan 4 Qarqin Jowzjan 5 

DehSabz Kabul 1 Qurghan Faryab 5 

DilaWa Khushamand Paktika 4 Qush Tepa Jowzjan 5 

Dishu Helmand 5 Raghistan Badakhshan 5 

Duab Nuristan 4 Rashidan Ghazni 4 

Dularam Nimruz 4 Reg Kandahar 4 

Duleena Ghor 5 Reg-i-Khan Nishin Helmand 4 

Dur Baba Nangarhar 3 Rodat Nangarhar 2 

Dushi Baghlan 5 Rui-Do-Ab Samangan 5 

Enjil Herat 5 Rukha Panjshir 3 

Eshkamesh Takhar 5 Rustaq Takhar 5 

Eshkashim Badakhshan 5 Sabari (Yaqubi) Khost 3 

Estalef Kabul 1 Saghar Ghor 5 

Faiz Abad Badakhshan 5 Saighan Bamyan 5 
322

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Faizabad Jowzjan 5 Salang Parwan 3 

Farah Farah 5 Samkani Paktiya 3 

Farkhar Takhar 5 Sancharak Sar-e-Pul 5 

Farza Kabul 1 Sangin (Sangin Qala) Helmand 3 

Feroz Nakhcheer Samangan 5 Sang-i-Takht Daykundi 5 

Fersi Herat 5 Sar Kani Kunarha 3 

Firing Wa Gharu Baghlan 5 Sar Rawza Paktika 4 

Gardez Paktiya 2 Sar-e-Pul Sar-e-Pul 5 

Garm Ser Helmand 3 Sawkai Kunarha 3 

Gelan Ghazni 4 Sayyad Sar-e-Pul 5 

Ghazi Abad Kunarha 3 Sayyid Abad Wardak 3 

Ghazni Ghazni 2 Sayyid Karam Paktiya 3 

Ghorak Kandahar 3 Sayyid Khel Parwan 3 

Ghormach Baghdis 5 Shah Joi Zabul 4 

Ghoryan Herat 5 Shah Wali Kot Kandahar 3 

Giro Ghazni 3 Shahidhassas Uruzgan 4 

Giti (Kiti) Daykundi 5 Shahrak Ghor 5 

Giyan Paktika 4 Shahri Buzurg Badakhshan 5 

Gizab Daykundi 5 Shahristan Daykundi 5 

Gomal Paktika 4 Shakar Dara Kabul 1 

Gosfandi Sar-e-Pul 5 Shamul Khost 3 

Goshta Nangarhar 3 Sharan Paktika 3 

Gozargah-i-Noor Baghlan 5 Shaykh Ali Parwan 3 

Guldara Kabul 1 Shebar Bamyan 5 

Gulistan Farah 4 Sheberghan Jowzjan 5 

Gulran Herat 5 Shemel Zayi Zabul 4 

Gurbuz Khost 3 Sher Zad Nangarhar 3 

Gurziwan Faryab 5 Shibkoh Farah 5 

Guzera (Nizam-iShahid) Herat 5 Shigal Wa Sheltan Kunarha 3 

Hazar Sumuch Takhar 5 Shighnan Badakhshan 5 

Hazrati Imam Sahib Kunduz 5 Shiki Badakhshan 5 

Hazrat-i-Sultan Samangan 5 Shindand Herat 4 

Herat Herat 1 Shinkai Zabul 4 

Hesarak Nangarhar 2 Shinwar Nangarhar 2 

Hissa-i-Awal (Khing) Panjshir 5 Shinwari Parwan 3 

Hissa-i-awali Behsud Wardak 4 Shirin Tagab Faryab 5 

Hissa-i-Awali Kohistan Kapisa 3 Sholgara Balkh 5 

Hissa-i-Duwumi Kohistan Kapisa 3 Shorabak Kandahar 4 

Ishterlai Daykundi 5 Shortepa Balkh 5 
323

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Jabulussaraj Parwan 3 Shuhada Badakhshan 5 

Jaghatu Wardak 3 Shutul Panjshir 3 

Jaghatu Ghazni 4 Shwak Paktiya 3 

Jaghuri Ghazni 4 Sozma Qala Sar-e-Pul 5 

Jaji Paktiya 3 Spera Khost 3 

Jaji Maidan Khost 3 Spin Boldak Kandahar 3 

Jalalabad Nangarhar 1 Surkh Rud Nangarhar 2 

Jalrez Wardak 3 Surkhi Parsa Parwan 3 

Jani Khel Paktiya 3 Surubi Kabul 1 

Jani Khel Paktika 4 Surubi Paktika 4 

Jawand Baghdis 5 Syahgird (Ghurband) Parwan 3 

Jurm Badakhshan 5 Tagab Kapisa 3 

Kabul Kabul 1 Tagab Badakhshan 5 

Kahmard Bamyan 5 Takhrta Pul Kandahar 2 

Kajaki Helmand 3 Tala Wa Barfak Baghlan 5 

Kakar Zabul 4 Taluqan Takhar 5 

Kalafgan Takhar 5 Tanay Khost 3 

Kalakan Kabul 1 TarangWa Jaldak Zabul 3 

Kaldar Balkh 5 Tashkan Badakhshan 5 

Kama Nangarhar 2 Taywara Ghor 5 

Kamdesh Nuristan 3 Tirinkot Uruzgan 4 

Kandahar Kandahar 1 Trayzayee (Ali Sher) Khost 3 

Kang Nimruz 5 Tulak Ghor 5 

Karrukh Herat 5 Turwo Paktika 4 

Kejran Daykundi 5 Unaba Panjshir 3 

Khak-i-Jabar Kabul 1 Urgoon Paktika 4 

Khak-i-safed Farah 4 Waghaz Ghazni 2 

Khakrez Kandahar 3 Wakhan Badakhshan 5 

Khamyab Jowzjan 5 Wali M Shahid 

(Khugyani) 

Ghazni 2 

Khan Abad Kunduz 5 Wama Nuristan 4 

Khanaqa Jowzjan 5 Waras Bamyan 5 

Khani Charbagh Faryab 5 Wardooj Badakhshan 5 

Khar War Logar 3 Warsaj Takhar 5 

Khas Kunar Kunarha 3 Washer Helmand 3 

Khas Uruzgan Uruzgan 4 Watapoor Kunarha 3 

Khash Badakhshan 5 Waygal Nuristan 4 

Khashrod Nimruz 5 Wazakhwah Paktika 4 

Khedir Daykundi 5 Wormamay Paktika 4 

Khinjan Baghlan 5 Wuza Jadran Paktiya 3 

Khost Khost 2 Yaftal-i-Sufla Badakhshan 5 
324

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier 

District Province 

Security 

tier District Province 

Security 

tier 

Khost Wa Firing Baghlan 5 Yahya Khel Paktika 4 

Khugyani Nangarhar 3 Yakawlang Bamyan 5 

Khulm Balkh 5 Yamgan Badakhshan 5 

Khuram Wa Sarbagh Samangan 5 Yangi Qala Takhar 5 

Khushi Logar 2 Yawan Badakhshan 5 

Khwahan Badakhshan 5 Yosuf Khel Paktika 3 

Khwaja Bahawuddin Takhar 5 Zanakhan Ghazni 2 

Khwaja Dukoh Jowzjan 5 Zaranj Nimruz 5 

Khwaja Ghar Takhar 5 Zarghun Shahr Paktika 4 

Khwaja Hejran (Jalga) Baghlan 5 Zari Balkh 5 

Khwaja Omari Ghazni 3 Zebak Badakhshan 5 

Khwaja Sabz Posh i 

Wali 

Faryab 5 Zendahjan Herat 5 

Kiran Wa Menjan Badakhshan 5 Zhire Kandahar 2 

Kishindeh Balkh 5 Ziruk Paktika 4 

Kishm Badakhshan 5 Zurmat Paktiya 3 

Koh Band Kapisa 3 
325

Appendix F: Ministry of Defense and Interior 

organizational charts 

As of August 2013, Afghanistan’s MoD and MoI had the organizational structures shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. 

Figure 4. Afghanistan Ministry of Defense organizational chart 
326

Figure 5. Afghanistan Ministry of Interior organizational chart 

 
327

Appendix G: Matrix of authorities 

Table 43 (next page) shows the full list of current authorities we identified as part of our assessment of legal authorities. 
328Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Afghanistan Specific Authorities

U.S./Afghanistan Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) 

ACSAs are permitted in accordance with Title 10 of the USC, sections 2341-2350 

An ACSA is an agreement providing logistic support, supplies, and services to foreign militaries on a cashreimbursement, replacementin-kind, or exchange of equal value basis. 

After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter into an ACSA with a NATO country. The Secretary of Defense may enter into an ACSA with a NonNATO country, if, after consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination is made that it is in the best interests of the national security of the United States. 

Indefinite authority. Expiry as per agreement. 

U10 

Expanded ACSA NDAA 2007, Section 

1202, NDAA 2011, Section 1203 extended this authority through fiscal year 2012. 

Enhanced ACSA authority allows no-cost loans for “covered equipment,” (i.e. vehicles, addon armored kits, CIED) not otherwise eligible for transfer under an ACSA, to the forces of a country participating in combined operations with the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Executive agent is Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of State. Equipment provided under this authority may be used only to aid in the personnel survivability of forces. Equipment loaned under this authority may only be used by partner nation no longer than one year. 

May have expired 

N

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) FY2013; Sec 1219; P.L. 112-239 For high priority, large scale infrastructure projects to aid the 

counterinsurgency strategy, including, but not limited to, water, power, and transportation projects and related maintenance and sustainment costs. 

Executive agent is Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of State. 30 Sept. 2014 N

Afghanistan Public Protection Fund (APPF) 

FY2013; Sec 1531c; within the ASFF language 

Provides funds for the APPF, a state owned enterprise designed to contract with both domestic and international customers to protect people, infrastructure, facilities and construction projects. 

 30 Sept. 2017 N

Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) FY2013; Sec 1218; P.L. 112-239 Provides funds for reintegration of combatants, anti-government 

elements and political leaders who renounce violence and terrorism. 

31 Dec. 2013 N
329

Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Pro

grammatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) 

P.L. 111-32 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 

Provides funds for the benefit of the ANSF in the form of supplies, services, infrastructure repair, renovation and construction, and equipment, etc. Monies from this fund are used to fund ANA and ANP and related activities (i.e. detainee ops). Was also used to fund the purchase of SMW aircraft (FY 2012 funding). 

Executive agent is DoD. Secretary of State concurrence is required for disbursements. NTM-A/CSTC-A has primary responsibility for its implementation. The fund can also receive foreign contributions. 

30 Sept. 2014 N

Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) 

Sept 14, 2001 Joint Resolution Authorizing Use of Force, P.L. 107-40 

Enables use of force against insurgents/terrorists. 

The authorization granted the President the authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” against those whom he determined “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the September 11th attacks, or who harbored said persons or groups 

Indefinite 

Coalition Readiness Support Program 

FY2011 NDAA; PL 111-65; A subset of Coalition Support Funds. 

Authority given to the Secretary of Defense to provide specialized training, or loan of supplies and equipment on a nonreimbursable basis to coalition forces supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. government will retain title to the equipment and transfer custody to coalition forces as necessary. 

Executive agent is DoD The criteria for eligibility are: The country could not provide the support without specialized training, supplies, and/or equipment; and the country’s participation is essential to the success of U.S. military operations. 

May have expired 

N

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) 

FY2013; Section 1227; P.L. 112-239 

CSF are used to reimburse coalition countries for logistical, military, and other expenses incurred in supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

30 Sept. 2014 N

Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

FY2013; Section 1221; P.L. 112-239 

Enables commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements which benefits the people of Afghanistan. 

Executive agent is DoD (via Combatant Commands). Renewed each year for one year. 

30 Sept. 2013 N
330Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Economic Support Funds (ESF) 

P. L. No. 112-10, Section 2122, Apr. 15, 2011 After 2011 see also P.L. 111-117 

Funds are used to support and strengthen the capacity of Afghan public and private institutions and entities to reduce corruption and to improve transparency and accountability of national, provincial, and local governments; emphasizes the protection of women’s rights. 

Executive agent is USAID. May have 

expired. No extender found. 

DAtio

Non-Excess Defense Articles 

FY2013, Section 1222;P.L 112-239 

Authority to transfer defense articles from the stocks of the DoD and to provide services in connection with the transfer of such defense articles to the military and security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Joint Staff must submit to NDAA. 31 Dec. 

2014 

N

Lift and Sustain (Afghanistan) FY05 P.L. 108-287; Temporary Authority Funds to transport eligible for- eign forces from approximately 

25 countries to and from Afghanistan and provide sustainment and subsistence while they serve with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 

OSD Comptroller must submit for NDAA. 30 Sept. 2013 N

Logistical Support for Coalition Forces 

Section 1216 of the NDAA of 2012. Reauthorization of Section 1234 of NDAA for 2008 (P.L. 110-181) 

Subject to available funds, DoD may provide supplies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift), and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting United States military and stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

Executive agent is DoD. Covers logistical support versus transfers of lethal military assistance regulated by the AECA. 

30 Sept. 2013 N

No-Cost Transfer of Defense Articles to Military and Security Forces in Afghanistan 

FY2013, Sec 1222; P.L. 112-239 

Authorization to transfer nonexcess defense articles from DoD stocks, without reimbursement from the government of Afghanistan, and provide defense articles to the military and security forces to support peace and security efforts. 

Executive agent is Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of State. This authority supplements basic authority in in Section 516 of the FAA to transfer EDA. 

31 Dec. 2014 

N
331

Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Pakistan Counter Insurgency Fund 

Section 1228 of the NDAA for 2013 extends Section 1224(h) of the FY2010 NDAA, PL 111-2647. Originally created in PL 111-32 (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009). 

Funds to help suppress the development of IEDs and the dissemination of explosive raw materials in Pakistani economy. Allows for the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, and funds; and facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction to build the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps 

Limits in PL 112-705 (NDAA of 2013), Sec. 1228, predicated on a Secretary of Defense/ Secretary of State certification that the Pakistani armed forces are working to suppress IED development/dissemination. 

30 Sept. 2013 N

Authority to Procure Supplies and Services Along the Afghan Supply Routes 

Section 841 of the 2013 NDAA. , PL. 112-705. 

Allows for procurement of personnel, equipment and supplies for U.S. forces and “coalition forces” 

DoD can use this authority to provide direct assistance to coalition participants from Pakistan and others. 

Dec. 31, 2014 

N

Reimbursement of Coalition Nations for Support Subsection (a) of 1233 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110–

181) Reauthorization in Section 1227 of the NDAA of 2013, PL 112-705. 

DoD may reimburse any key cooperating nation for logistical and military support provided by that nation to or in connection with United States military operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. 

DoD may not enter into an advance agreement (contracts) to provide support – intent is to reimburse a foreign government for its support. 

30 Sept. 2013 N

Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) 

P. L. No. 111-383, Section 1535, as amended by P.L. No. 112-81, § 1534, Dec. 31, 2011; P. L. No. 112-10, § 9012, Apr. 15, 2011 

First created in 2009. Supports projects to help reduce violence, enhance stability by identifying areas of the economy viable for investment. 

Projects are discussed and formulated by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul on quarterly basis. The source of the funds is U.S. Army operations and maintenance funds and special funding under the NDAA. Will transition to USAID in 2014. 

May have expired 

N
332Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

General Authorities 

Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund Uses existing authorities under Title 10 USC 

166(a) 

Established to provide urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance. Projects must qualify in one of seven categories: 1. Joint Exercises and Force Training, 2. Contingencies and Selected Operations, 3. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, 4. Command and Control, 5. Military Education and Training of Foreign Countries, 6. Personnel Expenses of Defense Personnel for Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs, 7. Force Protection. 

Funds cannot be used to support initiatives that have other funding sources (cannot fund budget shortfalls) One time funding source that must be fully obligated in the fiscal year that it is received (one year appropriation) 

Indefinite – Subject to annual appropriations 

U10 

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund 

Title 10, U.S.C. Section 166(b) 

Funds available for high-priority unforeseen requirements related to combating terrorism. 

30 Sept. 2014 U

10 

Contingency Construction Authority (CCA) Section 2808, Division B of P.L. 108-136; 117 

Statute 1723 

Authority to obligate appropriated O&M funds to carry out construction projects outside the United States. 

Project must meet the following the criteria: 1) necessary to meet urgent military operational requirements of a temporary nature; 2) not carried out at a military installation where the U.S. is expected to have a long-term presence, unless the installation is located in Afghanistan;3) U.S. has no intention of using the construction after the operational requirements have been met; 3) minimum necessary to meet the temporary operational requirements; and 4) the project is in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility or the area of responsibility and area of interest of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. 

30 Sept. 2013 N

DoD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities 

DoD-counter-narcotics funds are not specially appropriated; they are reprogrammed from funds generally appropriated to DOD for all CN purposes. 

Funds to support military operations against drug traffickers, building Afghan law enforcement capacity in the counternarcotics area and provide special equipment, training and facilities. 

Executive agent is DoD Indefinite – 

subject to annual appropriations 

N
333

Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Authority to transfer Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 

22 USC Section 2321(j) Foreign Assistance Act, Section 516 and FY2013 NDAA; Sec 1222 (i); P.L. 112-239 

Working under authorities established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act, defense articles declared as excess by the Military Departments can be offered to foreign governments or international organizations in support of U. S. national security and foreign policy objectives. 

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is responsible for administering the EDA program. This excess equipment may be offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients. 

Indefinite U

22 

Foreign Excess Personal Property 

Title 40 U.S.C. Section 704 

Authorization to transfer of excess personal property without reimbursement as part of base closure/base transfer. 

Indefinite U

40 

Foreign Excess Real Property 

Title 40 U.S.C. Authorization to transfer of 

excess real property without reimbursement as part of base closure/base transfer. 

 Indefinite U

40 

Global Lift and Sustain Title 10, U.S.C. Section 

127d 

Authority to provide logistics support, supplies, and services to allied forces participating in combined operations with US Armed Forces. 

Executive agent is the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State Indefinite – subject to 

annual cap. 

U10 

Global Security Contingency Fund FY2012; Section 1207 Fund is to carry out security and counterterrorism training, 

and rule of law programs such as border and maritime security, internal defense, peace support operations consistent with US foreign policy and national security interest. 

OSD must submit for NDAA. 30 Sept. 2015 N

Global Train and Equip Fund 

FY2012; Section 1206; P.L. 109-163 

Additional authority (uses Pseudo FMS procedures) to train and equip partner nations for counterterrorism operations. Assistance goes to forces under MoD control 

Combatant Commands develop annual plan which is coordinated with DoS. Secretary of State concurrence is required. Has been used to assist the Republic of Georgia to conduct operations in Afghanistan. 

30 Sept. 2013. 

N

Law and Order Trust Fund ( UN Development Program) 

Annual DoS appropriations Targets the MoI to pay police salaries. $2.7 Billion paid into the LOTFA. The U.S. con- tributed 1.0B to the fund. Indefinite – subject to 

annual appropriations 

U22 
334Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Programmatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

Military Operations to Combat Terrorism 

FY2012; Section 1203; P.L. 112-81 

Funds for support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals assisting ongoing military operations by U.S. special operations forces to combat terrorism. 

30 Sept. 2015 

N

NATO funding of ISAF Annual DoD appropriations Build capacity of the ANSF. Build and maintain infrastructure. Executive agent is NTM-A Indefinite – subject to annual appropriations 

International Agreements

Creation of ISAF U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 1386 - December 20, 2001. 

ISAF was created by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF—previously the ISAF command rotated among donor forces including Turkey and Britain. 

Resolution 2069 of October 10, 2012, renewed the mandate for another full year (until October 11, 2013). ISAF was initially authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 as a Chapter VII action and periodically reauthorized by the UN Security Council. On Oct. 14, 2013 activities in Afghanistan go from ISAF under Chapter VII, to presence by agreement/consent by host nation. 

Oct. 2013 

Diplomatic Notes (US/Afghanistan SOFA) 

T.I.A.S. Exchange of notes September 26 and December 12, 2002 and May 28, 2003. 

U.S. forces currently operate in Afghanistan under “diplomatic notes” between the United States and the interim government of Afghanistan. The notes give the United States legal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel serving in Afghanistan. The agreement does not provide immunity for contract personnel. The agreement with Afghanistan does not expressly authorize the United States to carry out military operations within Afghanistan, but it recognizes that such operations are “ongoing.” 

Although the agreement was signed by the ITGA, the subsequently elected government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan assumed responsibility for ITGA’s legal obligations and the agreement remains in force. 

Indefinite 
335

Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission in Afghanistan 

Title Citation 

Pro

grammatic Objective Discussion Exp. Date S

“Joint Declaration” Made in May 23, 2005 Limited strategic partnership 

agreement established on May 23, 2005, when Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration.” The declaration provided for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” 

Karzai’s signing of the declaration was approved by a consultative Jirga. That Jirga supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security. The “Joint Declaration was replaced by the SPA in 2012. 

May 2012 

ISAF SOFA Annex to the Military 

Technical Agreement entitled “Arrangements Regarding the Status of the International Security Assistance Force.” 

The agreement provides that all ISAF and supporting personnel are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national elements for criminal or disciplinary matters, and that such personnel are immune from arrest or detention by Afghan authorities and may not be turned over to any international tribunal or any other entity or State without the express consent of the contributing nation. 

 

Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) 

Signed May 2012 The SPA provides a framework 

for the presence and activities of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014,; specifically for the purposes of training Afghan Forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda and its associated forces, and commits the United States and Afghanistan to initiate negotiations on a BSA to supersede current agreement. As provided for in the Agreement, the United States designated Afghanistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. 

There is a risk that if the BSA negotiations fail, the Afghans could take the position that the SPA is evidence that the parties did not intend the May 2003 diplomatic notes to extend indefinitely and refuse to be bound by them. 

2024 
336

This page intentionally left blank 
337

Appendix H: Model law for Afghanistan authorities post-2014 

What follows is the full text of the model law we developed as part of 

our analysis of legal authorities. 

THE DEFENSE OF AFGHANISTAN ACT OF 2014363

A. GENERAL. Commencing with cessation from combat operations and the withdrawal of most U.S. combat forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the Secretary of Defense, shall 

assume responsibility for U.S. Government activities in the 

territory of Afghanistan to supply and support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), organizing and directing counter-terrorism operations by the United States, and protecting 

U.S. government and allied personnel. 

B. MISSION AND AUTHORIZATION. Notwithstanding any 

other laws, The Secretary of Defense, acting through the relevant Combatant Commanders, is authorized to train, advise, 

assist, and equip the ANSF so they are able to adequately provide for the internal and external security of Afghanistan. 

Such assistance and equipping activities will be conducted taking into account the Secretary’s responsibilities to retrograde 

U.S. military equipment. The Secretary of Defense, acting 

though the relevant Combatant Commander, retains authority to conduct counterterrorism operations consistent with 

Public Law 107-40 of September 14, 2001 authorizing the use 

of military force against those responsible for the attack on 

September 11, 2001 and to prevent any future acts of international terrorism. The Secretary may also authorize such military operations as necessary to protect and support U.S. 

personnel, and personnel of allied and friendly nations who 

 

363 U.S. Special Operations Command and all Title 50 related activities are 

unaddressed in this legislative construct. Our intent is that those authorities, and their reporting requirements, are unaffected by this enactment. Also unaffected (and not merged into this draft statute) are 

authorities which relate to the economic development of Afghanistan. 
338

are present in Afghanistan to assist the ANSF assume responsibility for its own defense and internal security. 

C. BENCHMARKS REQUIRED. The President shall establish, 

and update from time to time, a comprehensive set of 

benchmarks to evaluate progress being made toward the 

ANSF having the independent capacity to defend Afghanistan 

from internal and external threats. The Secretary of Defense, 

acting through the relevant Combatant Commanders, will 

produce a single report for delivery to the defense committees. The first such report will be issued not later than June 1, 

2014 and updated bi-annually. 

D. OVERSIGHT. The Secretary of Defense will make full use of 

his Inspector General to ensure that funds authorized and 

appropriated pursuant to this Act are used in an appropriate 

manner and that there is no fraud, waste, or abuse in the 

award of contracts to implement the Secretary’s responsibilities under this Act. It is the Sense of Congress that the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction appointed 

pursuant to Section 1225 of Public Law 111-2647 has made 

excellent strides in identifying issue areas for investigating and 

monitoring by the Inspector General for the Department of 

Defense. However, to eliminate duplication of effort and to 

control the public dissemination of information that can adversely affect the Secretary’s ability to build capacity with officials and institutions in the Government of Afghanistan, the 

Inspector General of the Department of Defense will have 

sole oversight jurisdiction over matters relating to the lawful 

and efficient implementation of this Act. 

E. CONSULTATION AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. The 

Secretary of Defense may, as delineated below, provide training, military equipment, assistance, Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services, intelligence support and excess military 

property to the ANSF and to allied and friendly countries, including NATO, that are assisting U.S. forces to train and 

equip the ANSF to assume responsibility for the internal and 

external security of Afghanistan. Funding for such activities 

shall be drawn from the Afghan National Security Forces 

Transition Fund established herein. The Secretary of Defense 

shall regularly consult with the Secretary of State concerning 

proposed activities, obligations, and expenditures in support 

of this Act. The Secretary of Defense will report at least quarterly to the Chair of Committees of Armed Services in the 

Senate and House on activities conducted pursuant to this 
339

Act, planned obligations, and on progress towards realization 

of the benchmarks established by the President pursuant to 

paragraph C above. The Secretary of Defense will also report 

annually, on a fiscal year basis, to all Appropriate Committees 

of Congress on past and planned obligations, and on progress 

towards realization of the benchmarks established by the President pursuant to paragraph C. The Secretary of State may file 

a separate report to the Chair of the Appropriate Committees 

of Congress if he or she disagrees with the Secretary of Defense’s assessment of progress and any other relevant matters 

relating to the purpose of this Act. 

F. TRANSFER, ADVISING, AND MILITARY AND LAW 

ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITIES. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to draw and obligate funds from 

the Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund 

(ANSFT) established herein to acquire and transfer property, 

equipment, and services and to make transfers from existing 

stock to complete the mission described in Paragraph B of 

this Act. Subject to the availability of funds in the ANSFT, The 

Secretary may: 

(1) Provide equipment, Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services, ANSF facility and infrastructure repair, renovation and construction, and funding without reimbursement to the ANSF in such amounts that the 

Secretary determines necessary to enable that force to 

be combat capable of autonomously operating to 

provide for the internal and external security of Afghanistan; provided however, that funds for infrastructure repair, renovation or construction shall only 

be available for the facilities to be used by ANSF forces; 

(2) Provide surplus real property, including improvements, from the accounts of the U.S. Department of 

Defense to the ANSF for use by the ANSF without reimbursement or a requirement to make improvements to such property to make it suitable for 

transfer; 

(3) Provide equipment, Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services to the ANSF without reimbursement to both 

enable and to build their capacity to conduct military 

and law enforcement operations against drug traffickers; 
340

(4) Provide assistance to the Pakistan Security Forces including the provision of equipment, Logistic Support, 

Supplies, and Services without reimbursement to help 

build the counterinsurgency capacity of Pakistan’s 

military and Frontier Corps, of which up to 

$2,000,000 per fiscal year shall be available to provide 

urgent humanitarian assistance to the people of Pakistan in conjunction with civil-military training exercises in which the U.S. and Pakistan forces are 

participating; 

(5) Loan or transfer military equipment, subject to subparagraph (6) below, currently in the land territory of 

Afghanistan to the ANSF without reimbursement. 

This includes used U.S. military equipment which 

does not meet the criteria for being “excess,” that 

which is “excess” to U.S. government needs, as well as 

associated U.S. training services; provided that the 

Secretary may draw from the Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund to pay the costs associated 

with making any such equipment serviceable for 

transfer, the costs of Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services to support the equipment’s ongoing operations, and any incremental costs incurred in providing training associated with the operation of the 

equipment so provided; 

(6) Loan or transfer of significant military equipment 

currently in the land territory of Afghanistan to the 

ANSF without reimbursement with the concurrence 

of the Secretary of State and fifteen days advance notice to All Appropriate Committees of Congress. 

This includes used U.S. military equipment which 

does not meet the criteria for being “excess” as well as 

associated U.S. training services; provided that the 

Secretary may draw from the Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund to pay the costs associated 

with making any such equipment serviceable for 

transfer, the costs of Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services to support the equipment’s ongoing operations, and any incremental costs incurred in providing training associated with the operation of the 

equipment so provided; 

 
341

(7) Acquire and transfer foreign made equipment, including Significant Military Equipment, to the ANSF 

without reimbursement if required because particular 

items are currently in the ANSF inventory; subject to 

the concurrence of the Secretary State and fifteen 

days’ advance notice to All Appropriate Committees 

of Congress if the items to be acquired and transferred constitute Significant Military Equipment; 

(8) Loan or transfer of Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services including air and sea lift with or without reimbursement to the armed forces of allied and friendly nations to enable such armed forces, as coalition 

members, to assist U.S. forces conduct the mission 

described in Paragraph B of this Act; 

(9) Transfer funds to any key Coalition Partner Nation as 

reimbursement for Logistic Support, Supplies, and 

Services, including sea and air lift provided by that 

nation to or in connection with support to United 

States military operations in fulfilling mission requirements of this Act as set forth in Paragraph B 

above; 

(10) Provide specialized training, loans of equipment, 

air or sealift, and Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services to any Coalition Partner Nation, wherever such 

forces are situated, to enable those forces to be ready 

and present to assist U.S. forces to carry out the missions described in Paragraph B of this Act; and 

 

(11) Carry out small-scale construction projects designed to meet the urgent humanitarian relief requirements or reconstruction requirements which 

benefit the People of Afghanistan in amounts not to 

exceed $___________ per fiscal year. Funding for 

such projects shall be drawn from the Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund established herein. 

G. AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES TRANSITION 

FUND. 

(1) ESTABLISHMENT. There is established on the Books of the 

Treasury of the United States an account to be known as the Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund (ANSFTF).” For 

Fiscal Year 2015, $_____ is authorized to be appropriated into 
342

the fund for the purposes set forth in this Act. The unobligated 

balances of funds separately appropriated as part of the Afghan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF), DOD Interdiction and Counter 

Drug Activities Fund (DOD CN), The Afghan Infrastructure 

Fund (AIF), the Pakistan Counter Insurgency Fund, and the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) shall be merged in the ANSFTF and 

remain available to the Secretary of Defense until expended. 

 

(2) AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT GIFTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS. 

The Secretary of Defense may accept and use money, funds, Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services, property and services from 

foreign governments, international organizations, and public 

and private sources, as applicable, and such funds and contributions merged into the ANSFT and be available for the purposes 

set forth in this Act. 

 

(3) LIMITATION. The total amount of funds authorized for obligation in fiscal year 2015, including those unobligated balances 

merged from prior years, may not exceed $_______ 

(H) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES. The transfer and assistance 

authorities established in this Act are in addition to any standing 

transfer and assistance authorities available to the Department of 

State or the Department of Defense or other agencies under Title 22, Title 40, or Title 50 of the United States Code.364

(I) DEFINITIONS. In this Act, the following definitions will apply: 

1. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) means the 

Afghan national armies, border security forces, civil defense 

forces, infrastructure protection forces, and police. [has the 

same meaning as given in Section 1202 of the National De-

 

364 There are general transfer and assistance authorities which DoD could 

use in the post-2014 environment. They include inter alia: Exercise Related Construction (10 USC 2805), CINC initiative (10 USC 166a), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Authority (10 USC 2341 et seq); 

Humanitarian and Civic Action (10 USC 401), Training and Exchange 

Programs (general operating authorities), and Cooperative Airlift (10 

USC 2350C). These authorities are general in nature and are “additive” 

to the authorities noted above. Because they are of general applicability, 

they are not included in the legislative recommendations. 
343

fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-

375365]. 

2. The Term “Allied and Friendly Countries” shall have the 

same meaning as that given in section 2350a of title 10, 

United States Code. 

3. “All Appropriate Committees of Congress” means: 

(A)The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 

on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate; and 

(B)The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 

4. The term “Coalition Partner Nation” refers to any nation 

that has provided material, logistics, financial, or military 

personnel in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 2001. 

5. The term ‘‘Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services’’ has 

the meaning given that term in section 2350(1) of title 

10, United States Code. 

6. The term “significant military equipment” shall have the 

same meaning as that given in 22 CDR 120.7 and the 

U.S. Munitions List. 

7. The term “United States Personnel” means active duty 

military personnel, civilian employees of the U.S. government, and contractors present and operating in Afghanistan in support of U.S. operations. 

 

 

365 Section 1202 established the Afghan Security Forces Fund. 
344

This page intentionally left blank 
345

Acronyms 

AACP Afghan Anti-Crime Police 

AAF Afghan Air Force 

ABP Afghan Border Police 

ACP Afghan Customs Police 

ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 

AIF Afghan Infrastructure Fund 

ALP Afghan Local Police 

ANA Afghan National Army 

ANA SOF Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces 

ANASF Afghan National Army Special Forces 

ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police 

ANP Afghan National Police 

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 

ANSFTF Afghan National Security Forces Transition Fund 

APoR Afghan National Security Forces Plan of Record 

APPF Afghan Public Protection Force 

ARP Afghan Reintegration Program 

ASFF Afghan Security Forces Fund 

AUMF Authorization for Use of Military Force 

AUP Afghan Uniform Police 
346

BSA Bilateral Security Agreement 

CAS Close Air Support 

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation 

CENTCOM Central Command (U.S.) 

CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program 

CSF Coalition Support Funds 

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan 

DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) 

DoS Department of State (U.S.) 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities 

EDA Excess Defense Articles 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

EUPOL European Union Police 

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center 

FMS Foreign Military Sales 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office (U.S.) 

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

IJC ISAF Joint Command 

ISAF International Security Assistance Force 

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) 
347

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JBCC Joint Border Coordination Center 

JCA Joint Capability Area 

km Kilometer 

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 

MAG Ministerial Advising Group 

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 

MoD Ministry of Defense (Afghan) 

MoDA Ministry of Defense Advisors 

MoI Ministry of Interior (Afghan) 

MSF Mobile Strike Force 

NATC-A NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghan) 

NGO Non-Governmental Organization 

NTM-A NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan 

OCC Operational Coordination Center 

ODR-P Office of the Defense Representative–Pakistan 

OSC-I Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSD-CAPE Office of the Secretary of Defense–Capabilities Assessment and Program Evaluation 

PAKMIL Pakistani Military 
348

RC Regional Command 

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

SMW Special Mission Wing 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 

SPA Strategic Partnership Agreement 

sq. km Square Kilometer 

SSR Security Sector Reform 

TAA Train, Advise, and Assist 

TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 

TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UN United Nations 

U.S. United States 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USC U.S. Code 

USFOR-A U.S. Forces–Afghanistan 

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace 

VSO Village Stability Operations 
349

Bibliography 

2013 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 4310, Section 1215, 

accessed Sep. 10, 2013, at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310enr.pdf. 

Abbas, Hassan. Reforming Pakistan‘s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 266. Feb. 11, 

2011. 

Abi-Habib, Maria. “Iranians Build Up Afghan Clout.” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 26, 2012. 

Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not 

Determined. United States Government Accountability Office GAO-11-

66. Jan. 27, 2011. 

Afghan Ministry of Interior Advisor Guide. Kabul: NTM-A/CSTC-A, May 

2011. 

“Afghan National Army special forces soldiers receive berets in ceremony.” ISAF press release. Jun. 11, 2010, accessed Oct. 6, 2013, at 

www.dvidshub.net/news/59550/ana-special-forces-soldiers-receiveberets-ceremony. 

“Afghanistan National Security Forces Airpower Requirements Review.” ANSF Program of Record Review Team Information Paper. 

Feb. 28, 2010. 

“Afghan National Security Forces Cost Analysis.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation briefing. Aug. 

25, 2011. 

“Afghan Police Fire on Student Protesters, Killing at Least Four and 

Wounding 30.” Associated Press, Nov. 12, 2012, accessed Sep. 27, 

2013, at www.news.google.com 

“Afghan Province Upset At Being Left Out Of Touted Rail Network.” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Free Afghanistan, Jul. 31, 
350

2013, accessed Oct. 11, 2013, at www.rferl.org/content/afghanistanrailway-planned-route--shir-khan-bandar/25062586.html. 

Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward with $771.8 Million 

Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR Audit 

13-13. Jun. 2013. 

“Afghan Troops Kill Protester Near Iran Consulate.” Associated Press, 

Sep. 7, 2013, accessed Sep. 27, 2013, at www.news.yahoo.com/afghantroops-kill-protester-near-iran-consulate-095356342. 

Afghanistan Governance: Performance Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment 

of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity. United States 

Government Accountability Office GAO-11-907. Sep. 2011, accessed 

Sep. 20, 2013, at www.gao.gov/assets/330/323498.pdf. 

Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014. Vol. 2: Main Report. The 

World Bank. May 2012. 

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO-13-218SP. February 11, 2013. 

“Afghanistan militants kill 18 police in Badakhshan.” BBC News, Sep. 

20, 2013. 

Afghanistan Opium Risk Assessment 2013. United Nations Office on 

Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Apr. 2013, accessed Sep. 10, 2013, at 

www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_re

port_2013_phase12.pdf. 

“Afghanistan Security Forces Open Fire on Anti-U.S. Protesters, 7 

Killed.” Associated Press, Feb. 22, 2012, accessed Sep. 27, 2013, at 

www.nydailynews.com/news/world/anti-american-demonstrationserupt-outskirts-kabul-consecutive-day-article-1.1026684. 

Ahmad, Naveed. “Pakistan Concerned Over Afghanistan-India Relationship.” Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Jun. 14, 2013. 

Allen, John R., Michele Flournoy, and Michael O’Hanlon. “Toward A 

Successful Outcome in Afghanistan.” Center for a New American Security. May 2013. 
351

 “Al Qaeda emir for Kunar, deputy, and facilitator killed in airstrikes.” 

Long War Journal, Aug. 5, 2012. 

“Al Qaeda Makes Afghan Comeback; ISAF captures al Qaeda’s top 

Kunar commander.” Long War Journal, Apr. 6, 2011. 

Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Mission Capabilities. 

U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General DODIG-2013-136. 

Sep. 18, 2013. 

Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics 

Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General DODIG-2012-028. Dec. 9, 2011. 

Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Train, Equip, and 

Advise the Afghan Border Police. United States Department of Defense 

Inspector General DODIG-2013-081. May 24, 2013. 

Ayb, Fatima, Sari Kouvo and Rachel Wareham. “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan.” International Center for Transitional Justice 

and The Initiative for Peacebuilding. Apr. 2009, accessed Sep. 7, 

2013, at www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Security_Sector_ 

Reform_in_Afghanistan.pdf. 

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Sippi. “Northern Exposure for the Taliban.” 

In Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban 

Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, reprinted 2012. 

Bayley, David H. and Robert M. Perito. The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, Inc., 2010: 50-60. 

Bell, Anthony, David Witter, and Michael Whittaker. “Reversing the 

Northeastern Insurgency.” Institute for the Study of War, Apr. 2011. 

Biddle, Stephen. “Ending the War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid Failure on the Installment Plan.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 

2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 

articles/139644/stephen-biddle/ending-the-war-in-afghanistan. 
352

Bleiker, Christoph and Marc Krupanski. The Rule of Law and Security 

Sector Reform: Conceptualising a Complex Relationship. Geneva: Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012. 

Boucher, Alix Julia. “Defence Sector Reform: A Note on Current 

Practice.” Henry L. Stimson Center. Dec. 12, 2009. 

Braithwaite, Rodric. Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989. 

New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 

“Capability Delivered to the ANSF.” NATO Training Mission / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan briefing. May 2, 

2013. 

Capability Portfolio Management. U.S. Department of Defense DoD Directive 7045.20. Sep. 25, 2008. 

Checchia, Mark. “Corruption in the Afghan National Security Forces.” Civil-Military Fusion Centre. Jan. 2012, accessed Aug. 29, 2013, at 

www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20AFG%20Security%20Archiv

e/CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption-in-ANSF_Jan12.pdf. 

“Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of 

State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to 

the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.” Chicagonato.org, The official Host Committee Website for the Chicago NATO Summit, 

May 21, 2013, accessed Oct. 10, 2013, at 

www.chicagonato.org/chicago-summit-declaration-on-afghanistannews-44.php. 

Chilton, Scott, Eckart Schiewek, and Tim Bremmers. Evaluation of the 

appropriate size of the Afghan National Police Force Manning List (Tashkiel).

Report for the European Commission, Letter of Contract No 

2009/207401. Jul. 15, 2009. 

Chuter, David. “Understanding Security Sector Reform.” Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No. 2. Apr. 2006. 

Clinton, Hillary. “Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society's Series 

of Richard C. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses.” Feb. 18, 2011, accessed Sep. 2013, available at www.state.gov. 
353

Coghlan, Tom. “The Taliban in Helmand.” In Giustozzi, ed. Decoding 

the New Taliban. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 

Cordesman, Anthony H. (with assistance from Bryan Gold and Ashley 

Hess). “The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 2013. 

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. The Gulf Military 

Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jun. 28, 2006. 

Cordovez, Diego and Selig Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. London: Oxford University Press, 1995. 

“Corruption by Country/Territory: Afghanistan.” Transparency.org, The 

Official Website of Transparency International, accessed Sep. 10, 2013, at 

www.transparency.org/country#AFG. 

DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 2005. 

Dale, Catherine. War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for 

Congress. Congressional Research Service Report R40156. Mar. 9, 

2011. 

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The 

Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building. RAND National Security Research 

Division. 2007. 

Dorronsoro, Gilles. The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan. 

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

2009. 

Dunford, Joseph. “Commander ISAF’s Afghanistan Update, Summer 

2013.” www.ISAF.NATO.int Official Website of International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, accessed Oct. 3, 2013, at 

www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-news-list/commander-isaf-s-afghanistanupdate-summer-2013.html. 

Elias, Mohammed Osman Tariq. “The Resurgence of the Taliban in 

Kabul: Logar and Wardak.” in Antonio Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New 
354

Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2009. 

“Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the United 

States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” May 2, 

2012, accessed Sep. 2013, at 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.safghanistanspasignedtext.pdf. 

EUPOL – Serving Afghanistan, European Police Mission in Afghanistan 

Newsletter. May 2012, accessed Sep. 20, 2013, at www.eupolafg.eu/sites/default/files/EUPOLServing%20Afghanistan%205_12_

0.pdf. 

“EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform.” Council 

of the European Union, Brussels. Oct. 13, 2005, accessed Sep. 21, 

2013, at www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/resources/EU_Concept_ 

for_ESDP_support_to_Security_Sector_Reform.pdf. 

Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Iran’s Support for Terrorism. 

U.S. Treasury Department, Aug. 3, 2010. 

Farrage, Mike. “NTM-A/CSTCA-A Orientation.” NTM-A briefing 

prepared by Mike Farrage, Commodore CBE RN, Chief of Staff, undated. 

Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New 

York: Harper, 2009. 

Folsom, Seth W.B. In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010. 

Friedman, Jeffrey A. “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical 

Foundations for Theory and Doctrine.” Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, 

2011. 

Giustozzi, Antonio. Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan. 

New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 

Giustozzi, Antonio. Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008 
355

Giustozzi, Antonio. War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992. 

Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 

Giustozzi, Antonio. “The Taliban’s Marches: Herat, Farah, Bagdhis, 

and Ghor.” In Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 

Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 

2001. 

Grare, Frédéric. Pakistan: In the Face of the Afghan Conflict 1979-1985. 

New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003. 

Hackett, James. The Military Balance 2013. The International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, Oxford: Routledge Journals, 2013. 

“Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower Performance Indicators Information.” www.manpower.usmc.mil , Official Website of the United States 

Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs, accessed Oct. 7, 2013. 

Hendrickson, Dylan and Andrzej Karkoszka. “The Challenges of Security Sector Reform.” SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament 

and International Security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Oxford University Press, June 2002, accessed Sep. 5, 2013, 

available at www.sipri.org/yearbook/2002/files/SIPRIYB0204.pdf. 

H.R. 3622; Public Law 99-433, Oct.1, 1986. 

Ibrahim, Azeem. “Afghanistan 2012: The Beginning of the End 

Game.” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Policy Brief 

#52, Jan. 2012. 

“Iran and Afghanistan.” www.understandingwar.org, website for The Institute for the Study of War, accessed Oct. 2013, at 

www.understandingwar.org/iran-and-afghanistan. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges 

in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel.

United States Government Accountability Office GAO-11-1. Oct. 

2010. 
356

Jalali, Ali Ahmad and Lester Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico, VA: United States 

Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 1995. 

 “Joint Statement” TMAF Senior Officials Meeting. Kabul, Afghanistan. Jul. 3, 2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at www.afghanistan-un.org. 

Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. 

Washington, D.C.: W.W. Norton and Co., 2010. 

“Just Don’t Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias and the ‘Afghan Local 

Police.’” Human Rights Watch ISBN: 1-56432-806-6. Sep. 2011, accessed Sep. 15, 2013, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 

afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf. 

Katzman, Kenneth. Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and 

U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress RL 30588. Sep. 19, 2013. 

Kilcullen, David. “Taliban and Counterinsurgency in Kunar.” in Giustozzi. Decoding the New Taliban. New York: Columbia University Press, 

2009. 

Laporte-Oshiro, Alison. “From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons 

from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR.” U.S. Institute of Peace, 

Peace Brief No. 115, Nov. 17, 2011, accessed Aug. 10, 2013, at 

www.usip.org/sites/default/files/from%20militants%20to%20police

men.pdf. 

Law, David M. “Transparency, Accountability and Security Sector Reform in South East Europe: An Analysis of the Stability Pact SelfAssessment Studies.” In Eden Cole et al., eds. Defense and Security Sector 

Governance and Reform in South East Europe Self-Assessment Studies: Regional Perspectives. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of 

Armed Forces, 2004. 

Locher, James. “Has it Worked? The Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act.” Naval War College Review, Vol. LIV, No. 4. 

“Loya Jirga Approves Afghan-US Partnership.” Tolon News, Nov. 19, 

2011, accessed Sep. 25, 2012, at 

http://tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/4456-loya-jirga-backs-afghanus-partnership. 
357

Luethold, Arnold. “Security Sector Reform in the Arab Middle East: 

A Nascent Debate.” In Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds. Reform 

and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004. 

Mackay, Andrew, Mark Sedra, and Geoff Burt. “Security Sector Reform (SR) in Insecure Environments: Learning from Afghanistan.” 

Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 8, No. 3. Sep. 2011. 

McGrath, John J. Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007. 

“Membership.” IPCB.Wordpress.com, Website of the International Police Coordination Board – Afghanistan, accessed Sep. 12, 2013, at 

http://ipcb.wordpress.com/ipcb-board-meetings/membership. 

Meyerle, Jerry. Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History. CNA Report DRP-2012-U-003250-Final. Nov. 

2012. 

Meyerle, Jerry, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis. On the Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in Practice. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2010. 

Miller, John Grider. The Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 

Moore, Michael and James Fussell. “Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking 

U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations.” Institute for the Study of War, July 

2009 

“Ministry of Defense Advisors Training Program.” DoD Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 2012, accessed Sep. 20, 2013, available at http://modatraining.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/moda-training-booklet-20121.pdf. 

Mobekk, Eirin. “Gender, Women and Security Sector Reform.” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 2. 

“NATC-A Story Level I and II Combined.” NATO Air Training Command briefing. 2013 
358

“NATO Air Training Command Afghanistan (NATC-A)/438 Air Expeditionary Wing Welcomes Center for Naval Analysis.” PowerPoint 

presentation prepared by NATO Air Training Command. Aug. 2013. 

Neef, Christian. “Return of the Lion: Former Warlord Preps for Western Withdrawal.” Spiegel Online International, Sep. 23, 2013, accessed 

Sep. 27, 2013, at www.spiegel.de/international/world/afghanwarlords-like-ismail-khan-prepare-for-western-withdrawal-a924019.html. 

Nojumi, Neamatollah. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. New York: Palgrave, 

2002. 

Norman, Catherine E. What do Afghans want from the police? Views from 

Helmand Province. CNA Research Memorandum D0026181.A2. Jan. 

2012. 

Obama, Barack. “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan.” Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. May 1 2012, 

accessed Sep. 9, 2013, at www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nation-afghanistan. 

Offense and Defense. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army 

Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90. Aug. 2012. 

Olsson, Stefan, Erika Holmquist, Samuel Bergenwall, Helene 

Lackenbauer. Afghanistan After 2014: Five Scenarios. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, Apr. 2012. 

Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the 

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program. United States Department of Defense Inspector General DODIG-2013-005. Oct. 23, 2013. 

Perito, Robert M. “The Interior Ministry’s Role in Security Sector Reform.” U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 223. May 2009 

Perito, Robert M. and Madeline Kristoff. “Iraq’s Interior Ministry: 

The Key to Police Reform.” U.S. Institute of Peace Briefing, Jul. 2009. 

Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress in 

accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authoriza-
359

tion Act for Fiscal Year 2008. United States Department of Defense. Oct. 

2011, Apr. 2012, Dec. 2012, and Jul. 2013. 

Public Law No 113-6, Division C, Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act 

for 2013, Section 8057. 

“Q&A: Afghan Taliban Open Doha Office.” BBC News, Jun. 20, 2013, 

accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia22957827. 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Jul. 30, 2013, accessed Sep. 

10, 2013, at www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-07-30qr.pdf; 

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. U.S. Department of Defense. Jul. 2013, accessed Sep. 10, 2013, at 

www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf. 

Quinlivan, James T. “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of 

Stability Operations.” RAND, Review 27, no.2, Summer 2003. 

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010. 

Ratnam, Gopal. “Afghan Counterterror Work Adds to Post-2014 

Troops, Dunford Says.” Bloomberg, Apr. 17, 2013. 

Reuter, Christopher and Borhan Younus. “The Return of the Taliban.” in Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2009. 

Rosenau, William and Carter Malkasian. Criteria for Measuring U.S. 

Advisor Success in Afghanistan. CNA Paper CME D0026827. Feb. 2012. 

Rosenau, William et al. United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, 

and Future. CNA Research Memorandum DRM-2013-U-005404-Final. 

Aug. 2013. 

Rosenberg, Matthew. “Trail of Fraud and Vengeance Leads to Kabul 

Bank Convictions.” New York Times, Mar. 5, 2013. 

Rosenberg, Matthew. “Impasse With Afghanistan Raises Prospect of 

Total U.S. Withdrawal in 2014.” New York Times, Oct. 4, 2013. 
360

Ruttig, Thomas. “Loya Paktiya’s Insurgency,” in Giustozzi, ed. Decoding the New Taliban. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 

“Security and Foreign Forces: Turkmenistan.” Jane’s Sentinel Security 

Assessment – Russia and the CIS. Nov. 2012, accessed Oct. 1, 2013, at 

https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocTy

pe=Reference&ItemId=+++1303096&Pubabbrev=CIS. 

Security Sector Reform, U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), U.S. DoD, and U.S. Department of State (DoS). Feb. 2009, 

accessed Aug. 20, 2013, at www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 

115810.pdf. 

Semple, Michael. “Talking to the Taliban.” Foreign Policy, Jan. 10, 

2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles 

/2013/01/10/talking_to_the_taliban. 

Semple, Michael, Theo Farrell, Anatol Lieven, and Rudra Chaudhuri. 

“Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation.” Royal United Services Institute, Briefing Paper, Sep. 2012, accessed Sep. 2013, at 

http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Taliban_Perspectives_on_Rec

onciliation.pdf. 

Shahzad, Syed Saleem. “Taliban Take Over Afghan Province.” Asia 

Times, Oct. 29, 2009. 

State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide. United Nations Report of 

the Secretary General, Twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention 

and Criminal Justice. Feb. 1, 2010. 

Stattel, Victoria and Robert M. Perito. “Innovative Transformation: 

An Evaluation of the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan.” U.S. Institute of Peace. Feb. 2012. 

Steeb, Randal, John Matsumara, Thomas Herbert, John Gordon, and 

William Horn. Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat: Challenges Facing Small 

Unit Operations in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2011. 

“Taliban Govern Openly in Nuristan.” Long War Journal, Apr. 6, 2011. 

“Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan.” 

International Crisis Group Asia, Report No. 221. Mar. 26, 2012. 
361

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the 

Great to the Fall of the Taliban. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002. 

Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392-1402. Afghanistan 

Ministry of the Interior. Apr. 22, 2013, accessed Sep. 23, 2013, at 

http://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-visionenglish-final-version.pdf. 

“The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan.” National Democratic Institute. 2010, accessed Sep. 25, 2013, at 

www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009. 

The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland. Brussels: International Crisis 

Group, 2011. 

“UNHCR Global Report 2012: Pakistan.” UNHCR.org, Official Website 

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at 

http://www.unhcr.org/ 

51b1d63f0.html. 

Urban, Mark. War in Afghanistan. London: MacMillan, 1988. 

“U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet: Afghanistan.” U.S. Department 

of State, Sep. 25, 2013, accessed Sep. 2013, at http://www.state.gov/ 

r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm. 

van Linschoten, Strick, and Felix Kuehn. Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 

2001-2011. Wiltshire, UK: Arts and Humanities Research Council, 

2012. 

Vyawahare, Malavika. “India’s Police Force Lags Much of the World.” 

India Ink, New York Times, Jan. 16, 2013. 

Wadhams, Caroline, Colin Cookman, and Brian Katulis. “Afghanistan 

Transition: Elevating the Diplomatic Components of the Transition 

Strategy at the Chicago NATO Summit and Beyond.” Center for 

American Progress, White Paper, May 2012. 

“Welch bill to prevent Afghanistan from taxing U.S. aid coming to 

House floor tomorrow.” www.welch.house.gov, Official Website of United 

States Congressmen Peter Welch, accessed Oct. 14, 2013 at 

http://www.welch.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=
362

article&id=2027%3Awelch-bill-to-prevent-afghanistan-from-taxing-usaid-coming-to-house-floor-tomorrow&catid=41%3A2012-pressreleases&Itemid=16#sthash.vmOPiKbI.dpuf. 

Wilder, Andrew. “Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and 

Central Asian Affairs.” Washington, DC. May 21, 2013. 

Williamson, Charles T.. The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963. 

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 

 “Withdrawing from Afghanistan: The big retrograde,” The Economist, 

Apr. 27, 2013. 

“What is Corruption?” www.transparency.am, Official Website of Transparency International, undated, accessed Oct. 1, 2013, at 

http://transparency.am/ 

corruption.php. 

Wong, Kristina. “Some Troops to Stay in Afghanistan after 2014.” 

Washington Times, Sep. 8, 2013. 

Younossi, Obaid et al. The Long March: Building an Afghan National 

Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 

Yousaf, Mohammad and Major Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992. 
363

List of figures 

Figure 1. Afghanistan and Pakistan administrative divisions. .......... 10

Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan by security tier .................................... 23

Figure 3. Map of Afghanistan by security tier .................................... 73

Figure 4. Afghanistan Ministry of Defense organizational chart ... 325

Figure 5. Afghanistan Ministry of Interior organizational chart ... 326
364

This page intentionally left blank 
365

List of tables 

Table 1. Summary of ANSF troop-to-task analysis planning 

factors .................................................................................... 25

Table 2. Summary of calculated ANSF force levels in the 2015 

to 2018 timeframe ................................................................ 26

Table 3. Key force size and structure takeaways, by ANSF force 

type ........................................................................................ 27

Table 4. Difference between current and calculated ANSF 

force levels by region ........................................................... 30

Table 5. Summary of findings and implications of the “Soviet 

withdrawal, Mujahideen offensive, collapse of the 

government” case study ....................................................... 47

Table 6. Summary of findings and implications of “The 

Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan” case study .................. 51

Table 7. Summary of findings and implications of “Taliban 

offensive in the south and east” case study ........................ 54

Table 8. Summary of findings from current threat assessment ...... 60

Table 9. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2015–

2018 ....................................................................................... 74

Table 10. Summary of assessments for the future threat: 2019–

2023 ....................................................................................... 78

Table 11. Force sizing framework (ANSF missions by force type 

and security tiers) ................................................................. 82

Table 12. Police per 1,000 inhabitants 5 years after an 

international intervention began ....................................... 88

Table 13. Police per 1,000 inhabitants in Central Asia ..................... 89
366

Table 14. Current police-to-population ratios by region ............ 90

Table 15. Summary of calculated police force sizes, by 

security tier ..................................................................... 91

Table 16. Sensitivity analysis of police-to-population ratios 

(police per 1,000 inhabitants) ...................................... 98

Table 17. Current ANSF border and customs security forces, 

by type ........................................................................... 100

Table 18. Afghan Border Police, by adjacent country ............... 102

Table 19. Summary of calculated Afghan Border Police 

forces, by tier ................................................................ 103

Table 20. Current Afghan Border Police on the border with 

Pakistan, by province ................................................... 105

Table 21. ANA battalions by region, per population, and per 

area ................................................................................ 110

Table 22. Summary of recommendations for ANA infantry 

battalions, by tier .......................................................... 110

Table 23. Calculation of infantry battalions to augment 

security on Tier 2 major roads .................................... 119

Table 24. ANA infantry battalions calculated for the 

protection of Tier 1 cities ............................................ 120

Table 25. Calculated combat support battalions, by region ..... 124

Table 26. Types of forces in the current ANA force 

structure, compared to historical U.S. Army forces .. 126

Table 27. Summary of calculated conventional ANA forces .... 127

Table 28. Sensitivity analysis for ANA planning factors ............ 128

Table 29. AAF and SMW inventory, October 2013 and 

projected 2018 .............................................................. 132
367

Table 30. Difference in calculated force levels and current force 

levels, by region .................................................................. 144

Table 31. Summary of ANSF capability gaps, by Joint Capability 

Area ..................................................................................... 149

Table 32. Capability gaps that could prevent the ANSF from 

conducting critical missions in the 2015–2018 

timeframe ........................................................................... 157

Table 33. Rough estimates of annual ANSF sustainment costs ...... 160

Table 34. Comparison of enhancements above the APoR to 

critical ANSF capability gaps ............................................. 161

Table 35. Core capabilities and key shortfalls of the MoD, MoI, 

and fielded forces .............................................................. 175

Table 36. Institutional enablers and key shortfalls in the MoD, 

MoI, and fielded forces ..................................................... 175

Table 37. Comparison of ministerial advising approaches ............. 181

Table 38. Current legal authorities for U.S. military operations 

in Afghanistan (abbreviated) ............................................ 190

Table 39. Summary of likely ANSF responses to several political 

scenarios ............................................................................. 226

Table 40. Likely enduring, non-enduring, and questionable 

aspects of the ANSF in 2015, absent U.S. and NATO 

enablers ............................................................................... 243

Table 41. Organizations contacted during the study ...................... 267

Table 42. Afghanistan’s districts by province and security tier ....... 319

Table 43. List of authorities currently enabling the U.S. mission 

in Afghanistan .................................................................... 328

 
368

This page intentionally left blank 

DRM-2014-U-006815-Final