No. 2--01--0818

_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOSEPH E.	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court 

BIRKETT, 	State's Attorney of	)	of Du Page County. 

Du Page County, Illinois, 	)

	)

	Plaintiff-Appellee, 	)	

		)	

v. 	)	No. 00--MR--–948

	)

1998 CHEVROLET CORVETTE, VIN	)

1G1YY22G2W5108366,	)

	)

	Defendant	)

	)		Honorable 

(Robert Doyle, Claimant-	)	Bonnie M. Wheaton,

Appellant).	)	Judge, Presiding. 

  			_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE CALLUM delivedred the opinion of the court: the 

	The State filed a verified complaint seeking the forfeiture of a 1998 Chevrolet Corvette, VIN 1G1YY22G2W5108366.  The complaint

alleged that the Corvette was subject to forfeiture pursuant to

section 505(a)(3) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act

(Substances Act) (720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West 2000)) and the

provisions of the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (Forfeiture

Act) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)).  The complaint alleged that the car was used or was intended to be used to facilitate a

violation of the Substances Act and was seized from Dina M. Doyle

on August 28, 2000.  Claimant, Robert Doyle (Robert or claimant),

filed a verified claim asserting that he was an innocent owner of

the Corvette and that it was not forfeitable as neither he nor Dina Doyle, who was alleged to have an interest in the car, was involved in any illegal action making it subject to forfeiture. 

	 Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Dina

Doyle was the owner of the Corvette within the meaning of the

Forfeiture Act and ordered the forfeiture of the car to the State

as provided by law.  Claimant appeals, arguing essentially that (1)

the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that the use of the

car (in connection with a drug offense) by a third party (Michael

Mohr) was more than mere "incidental use" of the car; (2) the car

did not "facilitate" a violation of the Substances Act; and (3) the

trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of claimant's interest

in the car as he was a co-owner of the car and did not know of,

acquiesce in, or consent to a third party's conduct that gave rise

to the forfeiture.  We affirm. 

	At the trial, the parties stipulated that, if Officer Mario

Mineo were called to testify, he would testify essentially as

follows.  On August 28, 2000, Mineo was a Glendale Heights police

officer.  He assisted in the arrest of Dina Doyle on an outstanding

warrant.  Upon his arrival at 139 E. Montana, Mineo observed Dina

standing at the rear of a white 1998 Corvette, with the rear hatch

open.  A second person known to Mineo as Michael Mohr was sitting

in the driver's seat with the door closed.  Mohr was leaning over

the center console with his hands toward the passenger side of the

car.  Mineo asked Mohr to exit the car and, as he did, Mineo could

see that Mohr was sweating and shaking.  Mineo looked into the

passenger side of the car and saw a small tin foil package lying on

the floor of the passenger side.  Mineo knew that heroin is

commonly packaged in tin foil.  He retrieved the package and opened it, finding a white powdery substance that later tested positive

for the presence of heroin.  Mohr had previously told Mineo that he 

used heroin. 

	When Mineo told Mohr and Dina what he had found, Dina stated,

without being questioned, that the heroin was Mohr's and that she

knew that he also had a needle in the car.  Mohr denied knowledge

of the heroin at that time.  Later, Mohr told Mineo that the heroin

was Dina's and that he had done heroin earlier that day.  Mohr was

charged with possession of a controlled substance for the heroin

found in the Corvette on August 28, 2000.  Dina was not charged. 

	Officer Mineo had also arrested Dina on August 13, 1999.  On

that day Mineo stopped the 1998 Corvette. Mohr was the driver. 

Mohr was arrested for driving with a revoked license, and Dina was

arrested for possession of heroin.  Dina had two baggies in her

purse; one had a white powdery substance and one had white residue. 

Dina admitted that the substance was heroin.  Dina pleaded guilty

to that offense and the case (No. 99--CF--2017) was still open. 

Mineo also reviewed Glendale Heights police report No. 9917213,

which contained facts regarding Dina's arrest for having no valid

driver's license.  On December 2, 1999, Dina was again stopped

while driving the Corvette and was arrested for not having a valid

driver's license.  At the time of the arrest, Dina's purse was

searched, and Officer Lambert located a rolled- up dollar bill with

white powdery residue on it.  That substance later tested positive

for heroin. That case (No. 00--CF--2198) was still pending. 

	During Mineo's arrests of Dina, he saw in the car women's

clothing consistent with what he knew to be Dina's employment at

the time.  Mineo also had prior noncustodial contacts with Dina while she was in the Corvette and on those occasions the vehicle

contained women's clothing. 

	Garry Harrison, Ddeputy Cchief of Ppolice of Glendale Heights,

testified that, in connection with the investigation in August

2000, he obtained documents pertaining to the purchase of the car,

and he testified regarding their content.  The parties stipulated

to the admission of these documents as business records generated

at the time of sale, July 29, 1999.   Exhibit No. 1 is a bill of

sale for the Corvette from Woodfield Chevrolet, showing the total

purchase price ($36,097.58), the down payment ($15,000), and the

balance due.  At the bottom is the signature of the buyer, "Robert

Doyle," and the co-buyer, "Dina Marie Doyle."  Exhibit No. 2 is a

warranty buyer's guide signed by "Dina M. Doyle."  Exhibit No. 3 is

a "We-Owe" statement that the seller owed nothing to the customer

and it has the signature of "Dina M. Doyle."  Exhibit No. 4 is a

"GM Resale Disclosure Notice of Nonconformity" with the signature

of "Robert Doyle" as consumer and that of "Dina M. Doyle," which is

crossed out.  Exhibit No. 5 is a credit application signed "Dina

Marie Doyle."  Exhibit No. 6 is a La Salle Bank truth-in-lending

disclosure form signed "Robert Doyle" and "Phyllis Doyle."  Exhibit

No. 7 is a $15,000 down payment check made out to Woodfield

Chevrolet in the amount of $15,000 and signed "Dina Marie Doyle." 

Dina M. Doyle's name and address are printed on the check. 

Harrison testified that the signatures for Dina Doyle all appear to

have been made by the same person. 

	Harrison interviewed Robert and Phyllis Doyle on August 31,

2000.  Harrison asked Robert about a previous arrest of Dina in

1999 for a drug violation and the extent of his knowledge of Dina's drug use.  Robert was aware of the August 1999 arrest.  Robert was

aware that in the 1999 arrest Dina blamed the possession of the

drugs on Mohr.  Robert had found a court order in connection with

the arrest, ordering his daughter Dina into rehabilitation, which

Robert and his wife had set up for her.  Robert learned of Dina's

and Michael's drug use at that time.  Robert stated that the

Corvette was in his name, as were all the vehicles at the house,

and the insurance was in his name.  Robert said that Dina made the

payments on the Corvette, and she was the primary driver of the

Corvette, but he had made a few payments when Dina did not have the

money.  Robert said he had driven the car occasionally, but he did

not like to drive it because it was too hard to get in and out of

and it was "too fast."  

	Harrison asked Phyllis Doyle about her daughter Dina's drug

use.  She knew of Mohr's drug problem and was beginning to think

that Dina was involved in drugs.  Phyllis said that the car

belonged to Robert and that Dina saved her money and made the down

payment and the monthly payments, but the car was in Robert's name

because of Dina's credit and employment history.  She said Dina was

the primary driver of the Corvette except when she was unable to

make the monthly payments.  

	Harrison further testified that Phyllis told him that Robert

threatened to sell the Corvette and throw Dina out of the house. 

He also recalled Robert saying he was going to sell the car and

move to Florida.  The first statement was made in reference to a

1999 arrest, and the second was made in reference to the most

recent arrest in 2000.  Phyllis told him she knew that after the

first 1999 arrest a seizure of the car was possible.  Harrison explained that, after the first arrest, Mineo wanted to seize the

car but explained to Phyllis that the vehicle was not going to be

seized because, at that time, too much money was owed on it. 

	After the State rested, Robert Doyle testified that he was 62

years old, that his daughter was Dina Doyle, and that he was

married to Phyllis Doyle.  He had a 40-year-old daughter and a 22-

year-old son.  Robert said he had previously purchased a 1995

Corvette but it was "totaled" by his son in July 1999.   It was

stipulated that Robert received a check from the insurance company

for the loss in the amount of $17,070.09.  The insurance company

had paid out a partial initial check in the amount of $9,322.41

that was placed into a savings account with his daughter at West

Suburban Bank.  He also had a joint checking account with Dina at

St. Paul. 

	Dina went with Robert to purchase the 1998 Corvette at

Woodfield Chevrolet.  After agreeing on the purchase, Robert told

Dina to write out a check for the down payment from their joint

checking account because she had her check with her.  She had her

own checks without Robert's name on them.   Robert paid for the

insurance on both Corvettes.   He had the authority to say who

could use the car and when.   He stated he had barred Dina from

using the car many times.  His son, Leon, used the car many times.

	Robert testified that, on the day the 1998 Corvette was

seized, he had not given Mohr permission to go inside the car and

did not know that Mohr had drugs on him.  Robert made payments on

the car.  Dina also made some payments when Robert gave her the

money.  His son also made payments when Robert gave him the money. 

Robert had told Harrison that they all made payments on the car as there were times when Robert could not make it to the bank.  Robert

admitted that he told Dina, his wife, and the police that he was

going to sell the car because of what was going on.  The loan for

the car at La Salle Bank was in the name of Robert and Phyllis, and

the bank was demanding payment from Robert.  Robert claimed that

the Corvettes were used as family cars. 

	On cross-examination, Robert further testified that he owned

four "family" cars and any of the family members could drive any of

the cars.  His son had a 1996 Lincoln Continental, which Phyllis

and Robert also drove, but it was in Robert's name.  Robert also

had a Beretta that he and his wife drove.  All the family drivers

were listed on the insurance policy that Robert maintained. 

	Robert explained that Dina went to pick out the Corvette with

him because he needed a licensed driver to drive it home.  He did

not know what Dina's credit was like as he never asked her, but she

had accounts with department stores, so he surmised she must have

had some credit.  She never had a car titled in her name.  Robert

denied that Dina was a "co-buyer."  When asked to explain why Dina

signed her name as co-buyer on exhibit No. 1, Robert explained that

she would then be entitled to drive the car home under the

insurance policy.  He insisted that he, not Dina, bought the car.

He acknowledged that Dina wrote the check for $15,000 on their

joint account but he did not have his checkbook with him that day,

as it did not occur to him that he might need his checkbook to buy

a car. 

	Robert admitted that on August 13, 1999, when Mohr and Dina

were arrested for possession of heroin, Robert knew then or shortly

thereafter that Mohr was a drug user.  He was upset and threatened to take the car away from Dina "[t]hat time and times before that

also ***."  Robert stated that he had been handicapped for 10 years and walked with a cane, and it was "pretty tough" for him to get in and

out of the Corvette.   When asked why Dina signed the papers at the

dealership, Robert first stated it was because the office was on

the second floor and there was no elevator.  He then explained

that, although he could have gone to the second floor, it did not

seem to be "that big of a thing for her to go up and sign as me." 

	 The trial court found that the State had met its burden of

showing that Dina was the owner of the Corvette within the meaning

of the statute, despite the casual use of the vehicle by others and

the title in Robert's name.  The court found by a preponderance of

the evidence that the vehicle was used to facilitate Mohr's

possessory drug offense, and the car was ordered forfeited.

	In denying Robert's motion to reconsider, the court explained

that a number of factors supported its finding that Dina was "the

owner" of the Corvette.  Dina signed most of the documents at the

time of the purchase; she was seen driving the car on numerous

occasions; she was the subject of two prior arrests for possession

of heroin while in the vehicle; many aspects of Robert's testimony

were either incredible or improbable; and the court observed

Robert's demeanor and determined that he would have had difficulty

getting in and out of the car.  Additionally, Dina had written the

check, and there was testimony that she made payments on the

vehicle.  The court concluded that Robert was merely the holder of

"naked title" to the car.  The court also determined that the car

provided a dimension of privacy that facilitated the use or

possession of a controlled substance.

	 Because the trial court is best suited to evaluate the

testimony of the witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from

the evidence, this court will not reverse an order of forfeiture

unless the trial court's decision is against the manifest weight of

the evidence.  See People v. One 1982 Maroon Ford Mustang, 258 Ill. App. 3d 127, 132 (1994).  We must consider whether the Corvette was

"used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to

facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or

concealment of" a controlled substance pursuant to section

505(a)(3) of the Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West

2000)).  We must consider first whether the State sufficiently

showed the existence of probable cause for the forfeiture of the

car.  Next, we consider whether the trial court properly found that

Dina was the owner of the car for statutory purposes and whether

Robert failed to prove his innocent owner defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. 

	In an effort to deter drug offenses, the Forfeiture Act, which

took effect in 1990, sets out uniform procedures for the seizure

and forfeiture of property under the Substances Act.  The

Forfeiture Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its

remedial purpose (725 ILCS 150/13 (West 2000)). People v. $1,124,905 United. States. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 326 (1997); People v. $52,204.00 United States Currency, 252 Ill. App. 3d 778, 782 (1993).  With respect to a forfeiture

proceeding, the Forfeiture Act controls over the Substances Act. 

	We first state the burden of proof in this proceeding under

the Forfeiture Act.  This Act provides that the State shall have

the initial burden to "show the existence of probable cause for forfeiture of the property."  725 ILCS 150/9 (G) (West 2000); Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d at 326.  Where the State satisfies its burden of establishing probable cause, then the burden shifts to the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not

subject to forfeiture.  725 ILCS  150/9(G) (West 2000); People v. 1515 Coolidge Avenue, Aurora, Illinois, 308 Ill. App. 3d 805, 810 (1999).  During the State's probable cause portion of the  proceeding, "the court must receive and consider, among other

things, all relevant hearsay evidence and information" (725 ILCS

150/9(B) (West 2000)), whereas during all other portions of the

proceeding, the law of evidence related to civil actions applies

(725 ILCS 150/9(B)(West 2000)).  Astro Van, 177 Ill. 2d at 326-27.  The trial court may rely on circumstantial evidence to assist in

establishing probable cause to support the forfeiture of the

property.  $52,204.00, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 782. 

	In People v. 1946 Buick, VIN 34423520, 127 Ill. 2d 374 (1989), the court considered the meaning of an earlier but similar version

of section 505(a)(3) of the Substances Act, which provided that a

vehicle is subject to forfeiture if it is used or intended for use

"in any manner to facilitate aany violation of this Act."  Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1985, ch. 561⁄2, par. 1505(a)(3) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West 2000)).   According to the supreme court, to "facilitate" is to make possession of the controlled

substance easier.  1946 Buick, 127 Ill. 2d at 377.  In 1946 Buick, the owner emptied a packet of cocaine onto the floor of his vehicle

in order to hide it--unsuccessfully--from the view of the police. 

The court noted that the claimant not only possessed the drug on

his person but also used the vehicle to hide the cocaine from the police.  The court concluded that the vehicle was used

unsuccessfully to make the offender's continued possession of the

drug easier, and the vehicle was thus subject to forfeiture. 

	In People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 154 Ill. 2d 27 (1992) (holding reinstated by In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 (1997)), the supreme court found, as in 1946 Buick, that the driver's attempt to hide a small amount of a drug (0.4 of a gram of cocaine) under a

piece of carpeting on the floor of the car showed that the driver

"clearly intended to use" his car to make his possession of cocaine

easier by preventing the police from finding the cocaine, and the

court concluded that the car facilitated his possession and was

subject to forfeiture.  Mercury Cougar, 154 Ill. 2d at 32-33. 

	Similarly, in this case, the clear inference from the facts is

that Mohr attempted to ditch the heroin by placing it on the floor

on the other side of the car with the intent to make his possession

easier and thus the car facilitated his possession of the drug. 

Mohr's conduct rendered the car subject to forfeiture, and the

State met its initial burden of showing probable cause for the

forfeiture. Under the controlling cases cited, it is irrelevant

that Mohr was unsuccessful.  Furthermore, because Mohr did not

possess the drug on his person, the cases claimant cites regarding

incidental possession of a drug on one's person or in a carrying

bag or purse are inapplicable here.  

	We next consider in tandem whether the trial court properly

found that Dina, rather than Robert, was the owner of the car for

purposes of the forfeiture provisions and whether Robert failed to 

prove his innocent owner defense by a preponderance of the evidence.   We agree with the trial court and conclude that Dina

was "the owner." 

	In People v. Dugan, 125 Ill. App. 3d 820 (1984), the State brought a civil forfeiture action against a Cadillac.  Robert F.

Dugan provided funds for the purchase of the car, but the title was

held by Sandra Martinez.  The civil action was brought under

section 36--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 36--1 et seq.), which provided for the forfeiture of property used with the knowledge and consent of the

owner in the commission or attempt to commit certain crimes--in

that case, syndicated gambling.  When Dugan appealed the forfeiture

of his car, the reviewing court recognized that ownership and title

may not reside in the same person.  The court determined that the

knowledge and consent of the owner isare paramount in determining

whether a vehicle is subject to forfeiture.  There, the term

"owner" waiss used to describe one who has dominion or control over a

thing, title to which is in another.  Dugan, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 830. 

	In that case, the evidence showed that Dugan negotiated the

car's purchase, paid the dealer for the vehicle, and returned the

vehicle for repairs. Martinez had title and purchased the

insurance, but allowed Dugan to borrow the car for an indeterminate

period.  She claimed that the money used to pay for the car came

from cash that she kept in her home.  However, the trial court

found her testimony incredible.  The reviewing court held that the

evidence showed that Dugan was the true owner of the car and that

his knowledge of, and consent to, the use of the car in the

commission of the crime rendered it subject to forfeiture.  

	In People v. 1991 Chevrolet Camaro, VIN 1GFP23E9ML117842 , 251 Ill. App. 3d 382 (1993), the forfeiture action was again brought

pursuant to the Criminal Code.  There the evidence showed that the

father, Joseph Boehm, and his son, Edwin Boehm, purchased the car

with cash belonging to both of them, but it was intended that the

car be used as a family car. Joseph and his wife, Debra, were

listed on the insurance as the principal drivers.  Joseph testified

that Debra was the primary driver, but Edwin could use any vehicle

when he asked permission to do so.  Edwin was listed as the primary

driver of another vehicle, a Buick.  Joseph testified he had no

knowledge or any reason to know that Edwin would use the Camaro in

connection with a burglary.  Joseph became aware of Edwin's arrest

only two months later.  Edwin testified that his father did not

know of the burglary.  The title to the vehicle was in the name of

both the father and the son.  The State conceded that the father

did not know or have reason to know that the car was used in the

commission of an offense.  The trial court found for the father. 

	On appeal, the State argued that, under Dugan, the court should have found that Edwin was the true owner of the car.  This

court disagreed, distinguishing Dugan on its facts and noting that,

in Dugan, the defendant negotiated and paid for the car, returned it for repairs, and kept it for his own use for an indeterminate

period.  Furthermore, the trial court there, as here, did not

believe the testimony of the titleholder, and the judgment was

affirmed as it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

This court also noted that Dugan was largely dependent on its particular facts, and the court stated that what constitutes a

sufficient ownership interest for an innocent claimant to avoid a forfeiture appears to depend on the particular facts of the case. 

Chevrolet Camaro, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 387-89.  In Chevrolet Camaro, the evidence showed that the father had more than a naked legal

title to the property and had no reason to know of the criminal

conduct.  The court thus concluded that the trial court's decision

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

	Claimant's reliance on United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, 817 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Ill. 1993), is not of much aid in establishing his innocent owner defense.  There, in a summary

judgment proceeding, the claimant was merely attempting to

establish that she had standing as an innocent owner because she

financed her son's purchase of the car, and she licensed and held

title to it, although the son appeared to have had exclusive

possession.  The government correctly argued that possession of

bare legal title may be insufficient to establish ownership. 

However, there were disputed issues of material fact regarding

whether she was nevertheless an innocent owner in light of her

son's conduct and her possible joint adventure with her son.  Thus,

the government's motion for summary judgment was denied.  

	As in Dugan, we conclude here that the evidence was sufficient to show that Dina was the true owner of the car for forfeiture

purposes even though Robert ostensibly retained some minimal

interest in it as titleholder.  Those factors supporting the trial

court's decision have been previously enumerated and all of them

need not be reiterated here.  Suffice it to say, the evidence

showed that Dina purchased the car with her own check, she signed

the documents pertinent to the purchase, she made payments on the

car, she was clearly the principal driver, and she retained dominion and control of the car and drove it on a regular basis. 

Furthermore, it is significant that the trial court did not believe

Robert's testimony regarding the indicia of his ownership.  The

evidence also clearly showed that Dina and Mohr had previously been

arrested for drug offenses while using the car, that Dina knew of

the presence of the heroin on this occasion, and that she

incriminated Mohr.  He in turn attempted to incriminate her.  She

thus cannot be deemed an innocent owner. 

	Even assuming arguendo that Robert presented some evidence of ownership, he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

he qualified as an innocent owner.  Under the applicable innocent

owner provisions of the Forfeiture Act, Robert had to prove that

(1) he was not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to

the forfeiture, did not acquiesce in it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known that the conduct was likely to occur; (2) he did not hold the property jointly or in common with a person

whose conduct gave rise to the forfeiture; and (3) he did not hold

the property for the benefit of, or as nominee for, any person

whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/8(A)(i),

(C), (D) (West 2000). 

	Robert cannot pass the first hurdle.  The testimony regarding

the police interview with Robert and Phyllis shows that Robert knew

of Dina's arrest in August 1999 for a drug violation when Mohr was

the driver of the car, and Robert was aware that Dina blamed the

possession of drugs on Mohr.  Robert learned of Dina's and Mohr's

drug use at that time.  Dina was stopped in the car in December

1999 and was again arrested for a drug violation.  As a result of

Dina's first arrest, Robert threatened to sell the car and "throw" Dina out of the house and, in another instance, he threatened to

sell the car and move to Florida.  Thus, Robert cannot claim that

he did not know and could not reasonably have known that a drug

violation was likely to occur in connection with the car.

	Citing  People v. 1991 Dodge Ram Charger, 250 Ill. App. 3d 810 (1993), Robert claims that an innocent owner-father's interest in

a vehicle jointly owned with his child is not subject to forfeiture

where a third party (like Mohr) used the vehicle in committing a

drug offense.  In that case, the father paid for the vehicle and

did not know of the third party.  The reviewing court preserved the

father's innocent owner interest from forfeiture because the son

himself did not engage in conduct giving rise to the offense. 

Because the son knew about the conduct, his own interest was

subject to forfeiture.  However, the father, as a joint owner of the vehicle, successfully claimed on appeal that he was an innocent

owner because it was "clear" that the father "knew nothing about,

nor had reason to know about, the use of the truck for any drug-

related activity." 1991 Dodge Ram Charger, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 815.  Such is not the case here. 

	Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's decision in

ordering the forfeiture of the vehicle was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. 

	 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is

affirmed. 

	Affirmed. 

	CALLUM, J., with BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ., concurring.