U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

82–963 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–57] 

PLANNING FOR SEQUESTRATION IN 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 AND PERSPECTIVES 

OF THE MILITARY SERVICES ON 

THE STRATEGIC CHOICES AND 

MANAGEMENT REVIEW 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JACK SCHULER, Professional Staff Member 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013, Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 

2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices 

and Management Review .................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013 ............................................................................ 51 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

PLANNING FOR SEQUESTRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 2014 AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE MILITARY SERVICES ON THE STRATEGIC 

CHOICES AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S. Marine 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 10 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy ...... 6 

Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............................... 4 

Welsh, Gen Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force .......................... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Amos, Gen James F. ......................................................................................... 97 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W. ........................................................................... 69 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 55 

Odierno, GEN Raymond T. .............................................................................. 59 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 57 

Welsh, Gen Mark A., III .................................................................................. 84 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 116 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 110 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 117 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 116 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 117 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 116 
(1) 

PLANNING FOR SEQUESTRATION IN FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE MILITARY SERVICES ON 

THE STRATEGIC CHOICES AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 18, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony on ‘‘Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military 

Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review.’’ 

I would like to begin by expressing the committee’s shock and 

sadness about this week’s tragic shooting at the Washington Navy 

Yard. The victims and their families continue to be in our thoughts 

and prayers. At this time, I request the committee hold a moment 

of silence to honor those patriots who lost their lives. 

[Moment of silence observed.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Greenert, I hope you will convey the committee’s deepest 

sympathies for all those who were affected under your command. 

I spoke yesterday to the Secretary and asked him to express our 

thoughts also to every member of the Naval family that he comes 

in contact with. 

The Nation is grieving with you. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. As you are all aware, this committee has held 

numerous hearings on the impact of sequestration to our national 

security since 2011. 

While many of us have warned about the catastrophic impact 

these cuts have had to our military readiness and offered specific 

legislation to fix them, we have nonetheless encouraged the Department of Defense to fully plan for sequestration. Our attitude 

has been work for the best, but prepare for the worst. With that 

said, we welcome this review in the hopes that it would answer 

some of the many unanswered questions we have about how the 

Department will operate in a post-sequestration budget environment. 
2 

While I appreciate the intent of this review as an assessment, 

frankly, I was disappointed and troubled by the lack of specificity 

it offered. The review contained little in the way of new information, leaving us only marginally more informed than we were 2 

years ago. 

Last month, Secretary Hagel directed each service to develop two 

separate Future Years Defense Programs for fiscal year 2015, one 

at the President’s budget level and an alternate accounting for full 

sequestration. While we all would agree that the higher budget 

level would be preferable, our focus today is on the alternate program under development. 

Earlier this month, I wrote to Secretary Hagel, urging him to authorize each of you to discuss the specific impacts you have identified in the preparation of your alternate program, including the reductions in size of the force, the modernization programs that will 

be canceled or curtailed, bases that will have to be closed, capabilities that no longer can be sustained, and training that will be limited. 

In your testimony today, I hope you will be frank about the deviations that will have to occur to the President’s fiscal year 2015 

budget request as a result of sequestration and how those decisions 

will impact the execution plans for fiscal year 2014. 

Gentlemen, for 2 years, you or your predecessors have come to 

this committee describing the consequences of sequestration in generalities and percentages. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs told us 

you can’t be cut one more dollar without changing the defense 

strategy, but when you’re cut, administration downplays the impacts. Your credibility with this committee and with me is on the 

line this morning. 

I respect each of you deeply. But now is the time for you to act. 

Each of you carries the responsibility to give Congress your best 

and unbiased military advice. Each of you has a higher obligation 

to provide security for the American people. Today I expect to hear 

in very clear terms what elements of that security you will no 

longer be in a position to provide should sequestration continue. 

I expect to hear what risk you will have to assume in order to 

provide it. 

Last week we had a hearing with Secretary Kerry, Secretary 

Hagel and General Dempsey. I have been talking for the last couple of weeks against going into Syria or going anywhere else with 

this military until the sequestration problem is fixed, until we have 

back-loaded the money that has been taken from defense over and 

above the $487 billion, which all of you said you could live with but 

not a dollar more. But they each pointed out in their testimony 

that I was probably focused too much on just money; when things 

evolve, develop, occur about our national security, we would find 

the money. There is no question we will find the money. But it 

comes out of something else, something else that is very important. 

I would like to hear from you today what that would be. 

I look forward to hearing your testimony. I thank all of you for 

your witnesses for being here, for your service to this Nation. 

And now I recognize Ranking Member Smith for his statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I join the chairman expressing my condolences to Admiral Greenert and the Navy and to our entire military family for 

the tragic and horrific incident this week. Our thoughts and prayers are with you. Whatever we can do to help, please let us know. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank the chairman for his leadership on that. 

And I also thank the chairman for the consistent hearings that 

we have had on sequestration. This is a significant challenge, and 

I don’t think anybody in this Congress has been more out front 

than Chairman McKeon and early explaining to us what was coming and the challenges in trying to sound the alarms, so that hopefully we could do something about it. And I appreciate those hearings and those discussions. 

I would hope today that we would skip the normal partisan arguments about whose fault it is. We have, gosh, done that back and 

forth throughout so many times that I think just about everybody 

in this room could probably repeat what I would say and then what 

others would say, and so we know all that. We don’t need to have 

that argument. We need to figure out where we are going to go and 

how are we going to deal with this. And it is a multifaceted problem. 

Certainly sequestration, which is set to go on for another 9 and 

a half years, and we have only been dealing with it now since 

March. Doing the math in my head, but I think that is roughly 6 

months. Those 6 months have been bad, the choices that have had 

to be made. Members in their individual districts, if you have military bases there, you see the impact on the military; you certainly 

see the impact on the contractors. But that is 6 months, we have 

got 9 and a half more years to go of sequestration if we don’t do 

something about it. 

In addition, here we go again in terms of another threat of government shutdown as we come up to September 30th. And it is to 

the point where there is virtually no hope of getting an appropriations bill. We are hoping that we can get a CR [continuing resolution]. And a CR is, in many ways, depending on who you are, as 

bad as sequestration in terms of how it impacts what money can 

be spent by the various departments within DOD [Department of 

Defense]. Then, of course, shortly thereafter, we have the debt ceiling and the debate over whether or not to raise that. 

I will just say that you don’t have the debate with your credit 

card once you have incurred the charges; you pay the bill. Then you 

can have a discussion about whether or not you want to continue 

to rack up bills that are that high. But if you are the United States 

Government, I don’t think you have the option of not paying your 

bills. But we will face that as well. 

On all of those fronts, we need to figure out what money we 

have. I would hope that Congress will continue to work to solve sequestration, to pass appropriations bills, to get past the debt ceiling. I know that is going to be a challenge, but it is not something 

that we can throw up our hands on and say, No, we are not going 
4 

to get there. We have to keep trying to get there. And in the meantime, you gentlemen have to try and figure out whether or not we 

are going to get there or how short of there we are going to wind 

up and try to figure out how we are going to spend the money. 

And I take the chairman’s point about, you know, we would like 

more specifics, but part of the challenge that I do want to remind 

the committee is you are not free at DOD to simply make the decisions that you want to make. You are, to some degree, reliant on 

us for a number of those decisions. Personnel costs are an enormous part of what we face. But if you want to do anything with 

retirement or anything with health care, you have to come through 

us. 

And about the only clear message that Congress has sent you is, 

Don’t cut that. That has been a lot of different things, from the 

Guard to the retirement of certain ships, and on and on and on. 

But you are limited by what we allow you to do in many instances, 

and then you have to sort of backfill from there. 

So, as we have this discussion, I hope Members will approach it 

in that cooperative spirit, not just say What are you going to do 

but, more accurately, look at it and say, What can we realistically 

do together? Because I agree with the chairman, with the cuts we 

are facing, we are going to have a fundamental change in strategy. 

But to get to that change in strategy, it is the nature of our system, 

no one person is in charge of it. The executive branch and the legislative branch have to work together to come up with whatever that 

new system is. And right now, we are not. 

So I guess if I have one hope for this hearing, it is that we can 

sort of have that cooperative spirit. And if you gentleman tell us, 

hey, look, here is where we need to cut and if any member of this 

committee says, no, we can’t do that, well, then, where do you want 

to cut? What advice do we have for you on what would be acceptable to us on how we restructure our military strategy, given the 

fiscal realities that we have all talked about. So I hope we can have 

that discussion. 

Again, I thank the chairman for his leadership on focusing on 

this issue. And I would say I look forward to your testimony and 

the questions, but honestly, I really don’t, because this is not an 

easy subject, and there is no good way out of it. We will deal with 

it as best we can. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let’s start with General Odierno and go right down the line 

please. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General ODIERNO. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith 

and other distinguished members of this committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to speak with you about sequestration in fiscal 

year 2014 and the strategic choices facing the Army. 
5 

The United States has drawn down military forces at the close 

of every war, and today is no different. This time, however, we are 

drawing down our Army before a war is over and at a time when 

there is grave uncertainty in the international security environment that we witness every single day. 

Today, the total Army, the Active Army, the Army National 

Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserves remains heavily committed in 

operations overseas and at home. More than 70,000 soldiers are deployed as we sit here today, including 50,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and nearly 88,000 soldiers are forward-stationed across the 

globe. 

During my more than 37 years of service, the U.S. Army has deployed soldiers to fight in more than 10 conflicts, including the 

longest war in our Nation’s history, in Afghanistan. No one can 

predict where the next contingency will arise that will require the 

employment of ground forces. We only know the lessons of the past. 

In every decade since World War II, the United States has deployed U.S. Army soldiers to defend our national security interests. 

There are some who have suggested there will be no land wars in 

the future. While I wish that were true, unfortunately, there is little to convince me that we will not ask our soldiers to deploy again 

in the future. 

We have also learned from previous drawdowns that the full burden of an unprepared and hollow force will fall directly on the 

shoulders of our men and women in uniform. We have experienced 

this too many times in our Nation’s history to repeat this egregious 

error again. 

As Chief of Staff, it is my responsibility to provide my best military advice in order to ensure that we have an Army that will meet 

our national security needs in the complex, uncertain environment 

of the future. It is imperative that we reserve the full range of strategic options for the Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense 

and the Congress. Together, we must ensure our Army can deliver 

a trained and ready force that deters conflict but, when necessary, 

has the capability and capacity to execute a sustained, successful 

major combat operation. 

The Budget Control Act [BCA] with sequestration simply does 

not allow us to do this. If Congress does not act to mitigate the 

magnitude and speed of the reductions under the BCA with sequestration, the Army will not be able to fully execute the requirements 

of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. By the end of FY14 [fiscal 

year 2014], we will have significantly degraded readiness in which 

85 percent of our Active and Reserve brigade combat teams will not 

be prepared for contingency requirements. 

From fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2017, as we continue to draw 

down and restructure the Army into a smaller force, the Army will 

continue to have degraded readiness and extensive modernization 

program shortfalls. We will be required to end, restructure or delay 

over 100 acquisition programs, putting at risk the Ground Combat 

Vehicle Program, the Armed Aerial Scout, the production and modernization of our other aviation programs, system upgrades for unmanned aerial vehicles and the modernization of our air defense 

command and control systems, just to name a few. 
6 

Only in fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2023 will we begin to rebalance readiness and modernization. But this will come at the expense of significant reductions in end strength and force structure. 

The Army will be faced to take further end strength cuts from a 

wartime high of 570,000 in the Active Army, 358,000 in the Army 

National Guard, and 205,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves to no more 

than 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National 

Guard and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves. 

This will represent a total Army end strength reduction of more 

than 18 percent over 7 years, a 26 percent reduction in the Army, 

in the Active Army, a 12 percent reduction in the Army National 

Guard, and a 9 percent reduction in the U.S. Army Reserves. 

Additionally, this will result in a 45 percent reduction in Active 

Army brigade combat teams. In my view, these reductions will put 

at substantial risk our ability to conduct even one sustained major 

combat operation. 

Ultimately, the size of the Army will be determined by the guidance and funding provided by Congress. It is imperative that Congress not implement the tool of sequestration. I do not consider myself an alarmist. I consider myself a realist. Today’s international 

environment and its emerging threats require a joint force with a 

ground component that has the capability and the capacity to deter 

and compel our adversaries who threaten our national security interests. 

The Budget Control Act and sequestration severely threaten our 

ability to do this. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, 

and I look forward to your questions to expand on the comments 

that I made. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify about the Navy situation in fiscal year 2014 

and our perspective on the recent Strategic Choices and Management Review. 

But Chairman, before I address that and this statement of mine, 

please indulge me. 

I would like to extend my deep condolences to the families, the 

friends, and the coworkers of the victims of Monday’s events at the 

Washington Navy Yard. 

Chairman, we lost shipmates on Monday. The Secretary of the 

Navy and I and our leadership have our full attention on ensuring 

that the victims’ families and their coworkers are provided with the 

care and the support that they need and that they deserve during 

this difficult time. 

We are grateful for the teamwork and the heroism which the 

first responders showed when they reacted, and we are working 
7 

closely with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and other 

law enforcement authorities to conclude this investigation. 

Now, as directed yesterday by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy and me, we are reviewing the security procedures and the access control for all our Navy installations around 

the world. I expect to have a rapid review completed within 2 

weeks, which, of course, we will share with you. Nothing matters 

more to us than the safety and security of our people. 

I know you are aware of the DOD, the Department of Defense 

IG [Inspector General] report released yesterday that cites cost-control measures as a potential cause for vulnerabilities in contractor 

access procedures for our bases. 

Chairman, I have read the report. We are reviewing it right now. 

And to the degree we have vulnerabilities, we will correct them, 

and we will do it expeditiously. We are grateful to the DOD IG for 

working with us on this, and I can assure you, however, that the 

cost-control measures that were mentioned in this report have 

nothing to do with budget shortfalls or sequestration itself. 

We don’t cut budgetary corners for security, Chairman. The two 

are unrelated. 

Now if something needs added or changed, we will fix it right 

away. Further, we will continue to work closely with the Department of Defense IG staff, and we will reconcile all these recommendations in this report I just held in my hand. 

Again, nothing is more important to me, Chairman. 

Now I would like to address with the time remaining two more 

points, our budget situation and our plan in fiscal year 2014 and 

the long-term impacts of sequestration. 

Mr. Chairman, presence remains the mandate for the Navy. We 

have to operate forward where it matters, and we got to be ready 

when it matters. Recent events have clearly demonstrated our ability to do that. Quickly, we positioned ourselves, and we offered options to the President in this past month. This ability also reassures our allies, and it ensures that U.S. interests around the 

world are properly served. 

Now, as we prepare for 2014, sequestration is going to further reduce our readiness. The impacts of sequestration will be realized 

in two main categories, operations and maintenance, and our investments. There are several operational impacts, but the most 

concerning to me is that reductions in operation and maintenance 

accounts are going to result in having only one nondeployed carrier 

strike group and one amphibious ready group trained and ready for 

surge operations. We will be forced to cancel maintenance. This 

will inevitably lead to reduced life for our ships and for our aircraft; assure we will only conduct safety-essential renovation of facilities; and it will further increase the backlog in this area. We 

will probably be compelled to keep the hiring freeze in place for 

most of our civilian positions, and that will, of course, effect the 

spectrum and the balance of our civilian force. 

We will not be able to use prior year funds to mitigate sequestration cuts in our investment accounts like we could in fiscal year 

2013. So, without congressional action, we will lose at least a Virginia-class submarine, a littoral combat ship and a float-forward 

staging base. And we will be forced to delay the delivery of the next 
8 

aircraft carrier, the Ford, and we will delay the mid-life overhaul 

of the George Washington aircraft carrier. Also, we will cancel procurement of 11 tactical aircraft. 

The key to a balanced portfolio, Chairman, is a spending bill and the ability to transfer money. We need to transfer I think about $1 

billion into the operations and maintenance account and about $1 

billion into our procurement accounts post sequestration, mostly so 

we can get shipbuilding back on track and to meet our essential 

needs. We will need to do this by January. 

Other program deliveries of programs and weapons systems may 

be delayed regardless, depending on the authority that we are 

granted to reapportion funds between accounts. 

Now when it comes to the Strategic Choices and Management 

Review, it is complete. And the Navy’s focus now is on crafting a 

balanced portfolio of programs within the fiscal guidance that we 

were provided. More details of what we are doing there are outlined in my written statement, which I request be entered for the 

record. 

In summary, we will maintain a credible and modern sea-based 

strategic deterrence. That is our number one program. We will 

maximize forward presence, as I passed to you before. That is what 

we need to do. And we will use ready deployed forces to do that. 

And we will continue investing in asymmetric capabilities while, 

with this committee’s help, we will do our best to sustain a relevant industrial base. 

However, in a given fiscal scenario, within the Budget Control 

Act cost caps, there are numerous missions that are in the Defense 

Strategic Guidance passed that we signed up to a few years ago we 

can’t perform. These are laid out in great detail in my written 

statement, and I will save you going through each and every one 

of these in my oral statement here. 

But applying one fiscal and programmatic scenario, we would result in a fleet inventory of about 255 ships in 2020. That is our 

benchmark year for the Defense Strategic Guidance. That is about 

30 less than today. It is about 40 less than was in our Pres bud 

[President’s budget] submission, and it is 51 less than our force 

structure assessment of 306 ships. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I understand the pressing need for the Nation 

to get its fiscal house in order. And I am on board with that, but 

I think we need to do it—I think it is imperative that we do it in 

a thoughtful manner to ensure that we sustain appropriate 

warfighting capability, that we have proper forward presence and 

readiness. Those are the attributes we depend on from our Navy— 

from your Navy. 

I look forward to working with the Congress to find solutions 

that will ensure our Navy retains the ability to organize, to train, 

and to equip the great sailors in defense of our Nation who operate 

in concert with the Marine Corps. 

My thanks to you and this committee for the support and care 

you have shown our Navy during this difficult time and in many 

other times. Clearly, you continue to have our best interests at 

heart. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the 

Appendix on page 69.] 
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General WELSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. 

It is always an honor to appear before you. I thank you for your 

continued support of airmen and their families. The results of the 

SCMR [Strategic Choices and Management Review] were sobering, 

I think, to all of us, and if sequestration remains in place for fiscal 

year 2014, the Air Force will be forced to cut flying hours by up 

to 15 percent. And within 3 to 4 months, many of our flying units 

will not be able to maintain mission readiness; will cancel or significantly curtail major exercises again; and will reduce our initial 

pilot production targets, which we were able to avoid in fiscal year 

2013. 

Over the long term, of course, it will significantly impact our 

force structure, readiness and modernization. For force structure, 

over the next 5 years, we could be forced to cut up to 25,000 total 

force airmen, which is about 4 percent of our people. We also will 

probably have to cut up to 550 aircraft, about 9 percent of our inventory. And to achieve the necessary savings in aircraft force 

structure, we will be forced to divest entire fleets of aircraft. We 

can’t do it by cutting a few aircraft from each fleet. 

As we look at which force structure we need to maintain, we will 

prioritize global, long-range capabilities and multirole platforms required to operate in a highly contested environment. Other platforms will be at risk. 

We plan to protect readiness to the maximum extent possible. 

We also plan to prioritize full spectrum training because if we are 

not ready for all possible scenarios, we will be forced to accept what 

I believe is unnecessary risk, which means we may not get there 

in time; it may take the joint team longer to win; and our people 

will be placed at greater risk. 

If sequestration continues, our modernization recapitalization 

forecasts are bleak. It will impact every one of our programs. 

These disruptions will, over time, cost more money to rectify contract breaches, raise unit costs and delay delivery of critical equipment. We are looking at cutting as many as 50 percent of our modernization programs if the ALTPOM [Alternative Program Objectives Memorandum] is actually the way we go. 

We will favor recapitalization over modernization whenever that 

decision is required. That is why our top three acquisition priorities 

will remain the KC–46, F–35 and the Long Range Strike Bomber. 

The United States Air Force is the best in the world and is a 

vital piece of the world’s best military team. That won’t change 

even if sequester persists. And when called, we will answer, and 

we will win, but the impacts are going to be significant, and the 

risk occurs from readiness in the ways that impacts our airmen. 

Thank you for your efforts to pass a funding bill that gives us 

some stability and predictability over time, which is the thing we 

need most. 

I look forward to your specific questions. 
10 

[The prepared statement of General Welsh can be found in the 

Appendix on page 84.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, committee members, thank you again for the opportunity to speak to 

you regarding sequestration and the Strategic Choices Management Review. Sequestration by its scale and inflexibility will significantly stress our force, degrade readiness and create a significant risk to our national security, all at a time of strategic rebalancing, all done on a world stage that is chaotic and volatile. 

I urge this committee and the Members of Congress to consider 

the full range of risks across the joint force, not just for my service 

but for all of us, and ask for your continued assistance in mitigating the effects of sequestration. 

Our Nation expects a force capable of responding to a crisis anywhere around the globe at a moment’s notice. Readiness is the critical measure of our ability to be able to do that. This is our Nation’s strategic hedge against uncertainty. 

In times of crisis, forward-deployed naval forces provide decisionmakers with immediate options that can control escalation, buy 

time, create decision space for our national leaders and enable joint 

follow-on forces. The Marine Corps’ high readiness levels mitigate 

the risks inherent in an uncertain world by responding to a wide 

range of capabilities across real-world scenarios. 

Your Marines remain a constant, effective hedge against the unexpected and provide the American people a national insurance policy. 

Our world is a dangerous place, and America must always be 

ready to meet emerging crises that threaten our national security 

interests. 

As a member of the Joint Chiefs, I am particularly concerned 

about the long-lasting and devastating impacts of sequestration. 

The very nature of sequestration erodes both Marine Corps readiness and that of the joint force. 

Scheduled tiered readiness is not an option for the United States 

Marine Corps. We must be prepared when a crisis erupts. Over the 

last year, we have maintained our equipment readiness to the maximum extent possible. Maintenance costs are increasing, and our 

Marines are working longer hours to keep aging equipment running. We have maintained the near-term readiness of our forwarddeployed forces and our next-to-deploy forces at the expense of infrastructure and sustainment and modernization programs. 

This can’t continue over the long haul. We are in a Catch-22. If 

we are to succeed on future battlefields, we must modernize, and 

we must care for our infrastructure and our training facilities. 

Sequestration has already started to degrade our infrastructure. 

We have been forced to reprioritize infrastructure maintenance and 

recapitalization efforts on our facilities to be able to sustain a ready 

force. Soon, there will be little left within these accounts to offset 

our readiness requirements. 
11 

Over my 43-year career as a United States Marine, I have seen 

the effects of strategic miscalculations resulting from declining resources and budget-driven strategies that resulted in wholesale 

force cuts. We only need to look back to the 1990s, when our Nation executed the first drawdown of the All-Volunteer Force. 

Following the Gulf War, we saw firsthand how deep cuts in our 

military produced unintended consequences and increased risk to 

our Nation. During the mid to late 1990s, we were challenged by 

a host of limited conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Kosovo, along with 

the bombing of our East African embassies. By the end of the decade, the U.S. military had reduced its Active Duty force by 25 percent. Operations and maintenance funds were slashed. Peacetime 

deployment tempo increased, wearing down the force and wearing 

down our families. For this very reason, Congress began to require 

the services to track and to report our deployment tempo. The force 

was overly stressed, and we considered this to be peacetime. 

We see these same problems today. In order to meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic Guidance, I need a Marine Corps 

of 186,800 Active Duty Marines. A force of 186.8 allows us to meet 

our steady-state requirements as well as be able to go to war. It 

preserves a 1:3 dwell for our Marines. Our share of the 2011 Budget Control Act’s $487 billion reduction cut our end strength to 

182,000. Based on sequestration, I simply cannot afford a force that 

size. Sequestration will force us to plow through scarce resources, 

funding our old equipment and weapons systems in an attempt to 

keep them alive and functional. We will be forced to reduce or cancel modernization programs and infrastructure investments in 

order to maintain readiness for those deployed and next-to-deploy 

units. Money that should be available for procuring new equipment 

will be rerouted into maintenance and spare accounts for our legacy equipment. This includes our 42-year-old Nixon-era amphibious 

assault vehicle. 

In February, we initiated a parallel study to the Department of 

Defense’s Strategic Choices Management Review. Our internal review redesigned the Marine Corps to a force that I could simply afford under sequestration. This was not a strategy-driven effort. 

This was a budget-driven effort. Our exhaustive research backed by 

independent analysis determined that a force of 174,000 Marines 

is the smallest force that can meet mission requirements. This is 

a force with levels of risk that are minimally acceptable. For instance, assuming that global requirements for Marine forces remain the same over the foreseeable future, a force of 174,000 will 

drive the Marine Corps to a 1:2 dwell for virtually all Marine units; 

gone 6 months, home 12 months, gone 6 months. Furthermore, the 

174K force accepts risk when our Nation commits itself to its next 

major theater war. 

In plain terms, we will have 11 fewer combat arms battalions, 14 

fewer aircraft squadrons to swiftly defeat our adversary. This is a 

single major contingency operation force that would deploy and 

fight until the war’s end. In other words, we would come home 

when the war was over. 

Marines who joined the corps during that period would likely go 

from drill field to battlefield. Across the joint force, America will 
12 

begin to see shortfalls in the military’s ability to accomplish its national strategy. 

Today we are seeing only the tip of the iceberg. Tomorrow’s Marines will face violent extremism, battles for influence and natural 

disasters. Developing states and non-state actors will require new 

technology and advanced conventional weapons that will challenge 

our ability to project power and gain access. 

In order to be effective in this new environment, we must maintain our forward influence, our strategic mobility, power projection 

and rapid response capabilities that Marines are known for today. 

We will balance an increasing focus on the Asia-Pacific region 

with a sustainable emphasis in the Middle East and Africa 

littorals. I will continue to work with the members of this committee to fix the problems we are faced with today. I thank you for 

this opportunity to appear before you, and I am prepared to take 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 97.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much again for your service and 

for your testimonies. 

I’m going to yield my time this morning to the gentlelady from 

South Dakota, Kristi Noem. 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding, and I want 

to thank all of our service chiefs for being here today and for your 

service to this great country. 

Admiral, my thoughts and prayers are with you and the Navy 

during this difficult time. We appreciate your service. 

We are again confronting the difficult choices and tradeoffs that 

we have in the face of sequestration. Like you, I have heard from 

service members about their concerns with sequestration. I have 

found that their personal impact is secondary to their concerns 

about continuing to defend this great country. 

As you mentioned, General Welsh, we have had our B–1 bomber 

squadrons grounded, which is eroding our readiness and costing 

more in the long run. Our National Guard military technicians 

were furloughed. While many of the technicians that I talked with 

were extremely concerned about the inconvenience for them and 

how hard it was on their personal budgets, they also mentioned 

that if we continue to break faith with them in the coming year 

and beyond, they have told me that they will find the need to start 

looking for another line of work. The thought of losing such highly 

trained individuals, service men and women, is very troubling to 

me and I am sure that it is with you as well. 

Clearly, the options that are presented in the SCMR are not 

pleasant ones. I hope we can rally around what is our most important duty, and that is to provide for the common defense and to 

protect our national security. 

General Welsh, my first question will go to you. As you know, 

Ellsworth Air Force Base is located in South Dakota. It is home to 

part of the B–1 bomber fleet. The SCMR contemplated all of the 

B–1s being retired. Given the B–1’s strong track record and our operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, I believe it would be very 

shortsighted. 
13 

Are there foreseeable missions that would go unsupported if this 

aircraft is, in fact, retired? And how would you mitigate that loss 

of the aircraft group in this overall strategy? 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. We have a problem with mitigating 

losses in the bomber fleet, as you know, especially over time. Were 

we to make a major reduction to the bomber fleet, we would have 

extreme difficulty meeting some of the guidance in the Defense 

Strategic Guidance, and as a result, I don’t think there is major 

discussions inside the Air Force on that being a fleet that we would 

eliminate. 

Mrs. NOEM. In your testimony, you talked about, in fact you 

quoted that we cannot continue to bandage, in your written testimony, old airplanes as potential adversaries roll new ones off the 

assembly line. Then you go on to mention that the B–52 is as old 

as you are, which I won’t speculate on that today, but why then 

would you consider retiring the B–1 bombers that are about half 

the age of the B–52s? 

General WELSH. Ma’am, right now, we cannot retire a major portion of the bomber fleet at all and meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. I think when we look at what we can do over time, we have 

to look at every platform, and we are looking at every platform, 

every upgraded program to those platforms and the impact of divesting an entire fleet. And what we will need to do is balance the 

requirement to conduct an operation globally, which is something 

the entire bomber fleet is engaged in, the requirement to conduct 

that operation over time if, God forbid, we were in a major conflict 

requiring that fleet to be operated that way versus the short-term 

risk to readiness and modernization the sequestration has presented us with. Those are the only two places we can go to to have 

an impact on this right now and to take money to pay for the bill 

over the first couple of years. So that is why we are having the discussion, not because we think strategically it is a good idea. 

Mrs. NOEM. I was glad to see within your testimony that you 

talked about the long-range bombers being a priority and something that you have identified as well, although I did have concerns 

with some of the ideas that were laid out within the SCMR as it 

was portrayed to us. So I will open up the questioning to anyone 

else or who whoever would wish to answer this question. 

We understand that prior year funds can be used to reduce the 

impact of sequestration on current year accounts. However, many 

available prior year funds have already been utilized to buy down 

fiscal year 2013 sequestration. To what magnitude does the lack of 

available prior year funds impact fiscal year 2014? I will open it 

up to General Amos, first, if he would like to speculate on that. 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, we have been successful in 

doing that in the past. And as you implied in your statement, as 

we move into fully sequester budget, that flexibility is not there. 

As we move into procurement, and even in some cases, military 

construction accounts, there are opportunities to be able to realign 

moneys and be able to reach and move moneys across what might 

be a boundary, a rule boundary. 

All I would like to see in the future, especially as we go into a 

sequester budget, would be the ability to be able to take a look at 

how we are doing in execution. And as things, it becomes apparent 
14 

that you can’t do things, I would like the opportunity and the flexibility to be able to move that. 

Mrs. NOEM. And that flexibility does erode as we get deeper and 

deeper into sequestration, is that correct? 

General AMOS. Yes. Yes. 

Mrs. NOEM. Thank you. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, just one question, two 

parts. I know we are supposed to be talking about sequestration, 

and I know we will continue to do that. But could you give us just 

a little bit of a flavor of the impact of having to live with a CR, 

assuming we can get one before the end of the year, and then also 

the impact of the threat of what if we don’t raise the debt ceiling? 

How do those two things impact all of what we are talking about 

here today? And I will throw that open, whoever wants to dive in. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, as we talked in this room before, Mr. 

Smith, the issue with the continuing resolution is you can’t get any 

new starts going. And so, every year, we would like to do new 

projects, from repair barracks to runways to get shipbuilding started to even overhaul an aircraft carrier. That is a new start. Under 

a continuing resolution, you can’t do any of that. 

You are also limited to the prior year funding. And when you are 

limited to a prior year funding level, well, when it comes to maintenance and operations, they are not consistent. And so, to the extent 

they are greater, we are out of luck. We just don’t have that money 

because we are spending that, the previous year’s level. 

When it comes to personnel, in order to shape our force and do 

the things we need to do for our people, those are new starts, too. 

So that can be anywhere from bonuses to changing re-enlistment 

factors, if you will; somebody gets more than less. And it is about 

shaping the force. And you lose a lot of flexibility and the ability 

to operate the force. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, as you know, it depends on how 

long the CR is. Then all of a sudden you have a CR plus sequestration, which will pile on to what occurred in 2013. And we have already pushed $400 million worth of problems from 2013 to 2014 in 

our depots; $100 million of problems in our maintenance accounts 

to 2014. We pushed over $100 million of training readiness to 2014. 

And now you get a continuing resolution, and now you get continued sequestration, and so it starts to build and build and build. 

And it gets to a point, as I mentioned, by the end of fiscal year 

2014, if that occurs, 85 percent of our Army brigade combat teams 

are now unready because of this continued pressure on our budget. 

And the reason that is the case for the Army is I can’t take the 

end strength down fast enough. And the way the budget has been 

written, any end strength above 490 is in OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations], and so I gain nothing in our base budget, even 

though we continue to reduce the size of our Army over the next 

several years. 
15 

So, for us, it is a huge problem, and that is one of the real issues 

that we face. And we are planning for that because, frankly, that 

is the worst-case scenario, and so that is what we are planning for 

this year. So I am looking for, right now, a significant degradation. 

My biggest fear—I have been asked what keeps me up at night— 

is I have to, I am asked to deploy soldiers on some unknown contingency, and they are not ready. And so we are going to have to 

severely tier our readiness to say I am going to have—we are going 

to now—maybe I can get seven brigades trained, so if we have to 

go, at least I have seven brigades that are highly trained, ready to 

go. And if we have to go more than that, we now have a significant 

problem. So that is the impact on us. 

General WELSH. If I could add one of the things that affects all 

of us is the longer the CR goes, the greater the impact. And so the 

length of that period makes a major difference. 

The prior year unobligated funds question that was asked a moment ago is significant. We paid a full 25 percent of our fiscal year 

2013 sequestration bill with prior year unobligated funds, which 

are now not available. 

The other thing that the CR does to us is we have all deferred 

infrastructure maintenance sustainment, and we are down to only 

doing critical infrastructure sustainment. The CR keeps us from 

doing that as well, which adds in to greater costs in the future and 

adds to the buy wave that we experienced last year. 

General AMOS. Congressman, one last, I am in sync with all my 

colleagues here. Just a point of reference, from just last year’s CR 

effort, as we finally got that fixed in the H.R. 933, because there 

are no new starts, last year I had $850 million worth of military 

construction that was in jeopardy because I couldn’t execute it. 

H.R. 933 helped me. 

This year, because of the way the budget is written under sequestration, I dropped my military construction by 40 percent. So 

if we get CR and I can’t execute those military construction contracts, I have gone from 60 percent of the requirement to, perhaps, 

nothing. And in many cases, I can’t roll that in—in fact, I can’t. We 

will just have to restart it again the next year, and it will pile on 

those requirements. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Amos, the Marine Corps has recently issued correspondence to the families of Marines who died in the MV–22 crash in 

Marana, Arizona, in April of 2000. The correspondence seems to acknowledge for the first time that problems with the MV–22 program may have contributed to this tragic mishap. 

Can you please comment on that statement by me? 

General AMOS. Congressman Jones, you are absolutely correct. 

The letter was sent to the families of both those great pioneers that 

lost their lives in that airplane in Marana. It acknowledged a series, a complex series of programmatic program execution, monetary, unsubstantial monetary support in—there is just a series of 

things that were all happening during the V–22 program during 
16 

the summer of 2000, the springtime and summer of 2000. That is 

what the letter acknowledged. 

There was also challenges aerodynamically with the airplane because the test program had been cut back in some areas to the 

point where it was on bare minimum. Those pilots were the pilots 

who were flying that airplane using the data that they had at the 

time. So it is an acknowledgment of that. 

Congressman, as I have said to you in private, I am going back 

through all of that right now. I mean, it was a complicated period 

of time; and interesting, because we are talking about budgets and 

we are talking sequestration and reducing costs, that program was 

about as anemic as any program that I have ever seen for a major 

acquisition program. And that is part of how we ended up getting 

where we were, not only during the March timeframe but as we 

went through the summer and the fall. 

So, Congressman, I am going back in there again and not only 

the aerodynamics but the programmatics and the reality of what 

was taking place with that period of time, and I intend to come 

back to you in this House with my final resolution on that. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Commandant. 

One of the wives lives in my district, Connie Gruber, and her 

husband was the co-pilot. The co-pilot’s wife, Connie Gruber lives 

in my district. The pilot’s wife lives in Steny Hoyer’s district. And 

I want to thank the Commandant publicly for making this statement and taking this position because I have always believed that 

the dead cannot speak for themselves. And for the Commandant to 

take this position, I want to thank you on behalf of the two wives, 

the 17 Marine families who were sitting in the back of that plane 

who were burned to death. 

And sir, this shows that you are a man of integrity, who seeks 

the honesty into what happened, and I want to say that I have 

great respect for you for making the statement that you just made 

to the committee. 

Thank you so much, sir. 

General AMOS. Thank you, Congressman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I certainly want to thank you all for being here, and I especially 

want to thank you for continuing to sound the alarm. Because I 

think that we hear what you are saying, we know that readiness 

is at risk, and yet I do sincerely worry that we are not acting on 

that, on what we are hearing, and this is really getting serious. 

I wonder if you could talk about some of the decisionmaking that 

goes on when you are dealing with capacity and capability at the 

same time. 

And I know that, Admiral Greenert, you particularly mentioned 

the need for cyber operators, and yet we also have fleet maintenance. We also have a whole number of other areas that you have 

to focus on. So I think just trying to, the short term and the long 

term, what else do we need to know to be able to act on what you 

are telling us? 
17 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, you have to prioritize, Congresswoman. 

I mean, that is obvious. So, as I said, we have, my job is to provide 

strategic nuclear deterrent, safe and credible, number one. Right 

behind that is cyber, and we have talked in this room quite a bit 

about the importance. 

We are staying the course on our cyber warrior plan that we 

briefed in here. Through any budget scenario that I see out there, 

we have got to maintain that. That is critical. 

Number three, as I have mentioned before, I have got to be 

where it matters when it matters, and we do everything we can 

using whatever innovative means we can to be forward, but we 

have got to be ready. So whatever we have forward has to be ready. 

Then, you say, what about the rest of it? The rest of it becomes 

that surge issue I talked about. What do we have to surge? And 

it is getting less and less. And I am very concerned about it. 

Today, one carrier strike group, one amphibious ready group is 

ready to surge with their organized, trained, and equipped. Normally, ma’am, we have three. So you can see that. In the future, 

I am not sure. I have to look at those scenarios, and that is an important attribute. 

The undersea domain is critically important. We have to own 

that. We do today. We have to do that in the future. So it is about 

prioritizing and then deciding within, you know, you have to have 

a certain capacity to have a capability, but then once you have the 

capability, how much of it can you, can we afford to have, and that 

is the conundrum that we are dealing with today. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Odierno. 

General ODIERNO. So part of it is the process of the budget that 

you have to put the puzzle together properly. And so, for the Army, 

as we face just the reductions from the $487 billion, which, by the 

way, we are still implementing, as we implement that, we have to, 

in order to get our end strength down to the levels of 490 from 570, 

which is just the first increment, based on potential decisions that 

we have in the budget, we have to take risk and readiness in modernization because, until we get at the 490, we don’t gain any savings from that in the budget process. So, as we get continued cuts, 

all of our cuts for the next 3 years almost all come out of readiness 

and modernization, until I can reduce end strength further. 

And then what happens is we are going to get our end strength 

reduced to a level that I believe makes our Army too small, in 

order to get it in line with the readiness and modernization efforts 

that we have. 

The other thing is, there are fixed costs to operating a service 

that we tend to overlook. Just the fact of how we recruit, how we 

initially train, how we educate. There is a huge fixed cost within 

our service that we have to fund first because if we don’t do that, 

we fundamentally lose our ability to develop an Army. 

So then you have got to take what is left. And all the cuts have 

to come out of that area. And that is the problems we are facing 

as we move forward. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And General Amos, I know that 174,000 is a figure 

that sounds like, not a figure that people feel good about, but I am 

wondering, how much lower do you think that can go? 
18 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, at the end of the day, we will go 

as low as Congress is willing to, I guess, pay for. 

The 174 force is the floor, as far as I am concerned, in several 

ways. First of all, it does meet a major theater war. History has 

proven that over time, we will probably commit our Nation again, 

even though it is hard to imagine right now, but we will probably 

do that again. And when that happens, that force is the minimum 

size force to go off to war. 

And as I said in my opening statement, they will go to war, and 

they will come home when it is over. 

But even greater than that, the day-to-day steady-state operations, the requirements around the world require a force that is 

no lower than 174,000. 

That is the stuff that is happening in the—off the African 

littorals right now. That is what is happening aboard our ships 

with the Navy. That is what is happening in Afghanistan. That is 

what was happening in the Far East and the Pacific down in Australia. That is the steady-state requirements. 

Inside that 174 force, which I think is an alarm bell, is that is 

designed to be a 1:2 dwell force. I referred to that in my opening 

statement. That is a critical point because, as the assistant commandant, I testified we want to build a force post-Afghanistan that 

is at least 1:3 so that you give the force the opportunity to come 

back and reset; you give families the opportunity to come back and 

reset with their loved ones. This force is 1:2. That is unprecedented, unless in a time of peace. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. And not just 

to flatter you, but any one of the four of you have more experience 

defending this country than any other member sitting on this committee. And if we took the four of you collectively, you have more 

knowledge right now of what we need to defend the country and 

the resources that we have than this entire committee together. 

Most of us on the committee, some of us will disagree on how we 

got to sequestration. We disagree on a way forward, but we are at 

least unified in the fact that we need to do away with sequestration. 

Unfortunately, that is not true for all the leadership in Congress. 

It is not true for every Member outside of this committee. And part 

of that reason is because our message has not always been spoken 

with clarity. When we had these cuts that we can argue whether 

it is $487 or $778 billion, which our staff believes it to be, we 

weren’t real clear from this committee; we weren’t real clear from 

the Pentagon. 

But we are where we are today, and that is why I want to ask 

you this question so we can speak with clarity to those who may 

think sequestration is good to go forward. The Defense Strategic 

Guidance, General, that you talked about in 2012, before that, we 

had a win-win situation as our defense strategy. And because of 

cuts that we made, we basically felt we needed to go to the new 

Defense Strategic Guidance, which was really somewhat of a 

minimalist approach where we said we would win one encounter 

and hold another one. 
19 

My question to each of the four of you in as close to a yes or no 

answer, not to box you in, but just so we can be clear in communicating this, if sequestration goes forward, can you meet the requirements necessary that you have to meet to comply with that 

minimal Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012? 

And General, if you would give us your assessment first. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I mentioned it in my opening 

statement—I will just repeat it—is that I believe at full sequestration, we cannot meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. In fact, it is 

my opinion that we would struggle to even meet one major contingency operation. It depends on assumptions, and I believe some of 

the assumptions that were made are not good assumptions. They 

are very unrealistic and very positive assumptions. And for that, 

they would all have to come true for us to even come close to being 

able to meet that. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Admiral, I know you have looked at this. You have agonized over 

it. It has kept you up at night. Can the Navy meet the requirements necessary if sequestration continues? 

Admiral GREENERT. No, sir. We cannot. And, in fact, I am concerned in sequestration in 2014 about that. I am very concerned, 

particularly about our strategic nuclear, our SSBN(X) [ballistic 

missile submarine] replacement. If that program is sequestered, it 

falls behind. It cannot fall behind. And so I am concerned about 

2014 as well. 

Mr. FORBES. And General, same thing with the Air Force. 

Can you meet the requirements if we continue sequestration the 

way it is going forward? 

General WELSH. No, Congressman, we cannot. I believe any executable strategy will always be resource-constrained or at least informed. If the resources change significantly, you have to relook at 

strategy. 

Mr. FORBES. And General Amos, what about the Marines? Can 

we meet the requirements necessary, the minimal requirements for 

the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 if sequestration continues 

forward? 

General AMOS. Congressman, we can’t—I came from a one MCO 

[major contingency operation] perspective, but if it is a one MCO 

and do something else somewhere else, I cannot. I simply don’t 

have the depth on the bench. We are going to continue with the 

rebalancing in the Pacific. That comes at the price of readiness 

back home. So, over time, our readiness back home will become unacceptable. So the answer in both cases is no. 

Mr. FORBES. Yeah. 

Mr. Chairman, I would just state that if nothing else, that message ought to be communicated and we ought to have a commitment, as I know we all do in this committee, to make sure that we 

are doing whatever we can in Congress to get this foolish thing 

stopped so we can meet those requirements. And with that, I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. You know, I think some of us last week met with 

Mr. Luntz, who had just gone into the field with a poll asking the 

American people if they felt like they would be more safe or less 

safe in the next 10 years, and they said 83 percent felt like they 
20 

would be less safe 10 years from now than they are now, and that 

was before they heard this testimony. You can see, if the American 

people are tuned in, if they are listening to this, that probably will 

go up to 95 to 100 percent, and with great reason. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I admire you gentlemen for your service to the Nation, and I admire your work, particularly since you are having to operate in an 

irrational budget environment. And almost none of your predecessors have ever had to do that. There were drawdowns, there 

were cutbacks, but seldom has it been this completely arbitrary as 

sequestration is forcing you to operate. 

I really think that you gentlemen should be questioning us, because we are the parties at fault here. Congress is failing to adequately fund our military in a responsible and reliable fashion, and 

that is a significant charge. Past generations have done a better job 

of funding our military needs. We are failing, and this Congress 

and both parties and both Houses of Congress need to get their 

acts together so we do a better job and do a better job quickly. 

The challenge is great when we have a House of Representatives 

that refuses to even open discussions with the Senate on a budget 

for America. In our degraded media environment, many folks back 

home are unaware of this. They are mad at Congress in general 

and they don’t understand that one House of Congress is unwilling 

to talk to the other House of Congress about having a budget for 

America. Somehow we have gotten into our heads, especially the 

younger Members, that it is okay for the House to have a budget 

and for the Senate a separate budget and never the two shall meet. 

Well, we are supposed to have a budget for America. 

This committee in markup, it was my amendment, voted overwhelmingly by voice to give the Pentagon flexibility so that it could 

address its most pressing defense needs, but when a recorded vote 

was asked for people put on their partisan jerseys and the same 

vote failed. This is the largest committee in the House of Representatives. Presumably we have some influence, if only by Members, on our colleagues, and yet we are somehow unable to behave 

responsibly ourselves, much less encourage our colleagues in the 

House to behave responsibly. 

We have the end of the fiscal year coming up. Many of the pundits are predicting that there will be at least a government shutdown, perhaps a default on our national credit, all because of political bickering. And you gentlemen, and most of all the men and 

women in uniform, should not have to suffer as a result of this 

fighting. So why aren’t the compromises more forthcoming on this 

side of the aisle? You gentlemen have to resolve your differences 

in the tank. You gentlemen have to make very important life-anddeath decisions almost every day. But we on this side of the dais 

are unwilling to even come up with a budget for America. We saw 

near default on American credit in 2011, we lost our AAA credit 

rating, and that looks to be happening again. 

The best case circumstance for you is you get a short-term CR, 

so as you gentlemen have testified, you are not able to start any 

new projects, you are having to operate in an incredibly irrational 

and constrained budget environment for, what, 2, 3 months at a 
21 

time, in addition to having to probably furlough again all your civilian military employees. 

So the message of this hearing really should be to take the valuable information you have given us, for us on this side to resolve 

to do better, to come up with bipartisan and bicameral compromises that get budgets for America, budgets for our military, 

budgets for the national defense, because as I said in my committee 

markup amendment, if sequestration were foisted on us by a foreign enemy, we would declare it an act of war, and yet we have 

done it to ourselves, because the super committee was unable to 

come up with a bipartisan agreement, because we have been unable to unravel that knot since, even though we have had some of 

our generals testify to us that their Departments are in chaos. This 

should not be happening in America. 

So I am hopeful that this committee with its large membership 

will take this message to heart ourselves and to other Members so 

that we can do better, can get a budget for America before the end 

of the fiscal year, can get the proper appropriations bills passed, 

can have a sensible HASC [House Armed Services Committee] 

markup that actually provides you gentlemen with the resources 

that you need to do the job you need to defend our country. 

So I thank the chairman for his indulgence. I see my time has 

expired. I hope for better things for our country. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have the greatest respect for the gentleman, 

but there are just a couple of things I would like to clarify for the 

record. One is there is another body, and while we haven’t worked 

together to resolve our budget, they didn’t pass one for about 3 or 

4 years. And this time the one they passed, they have $91 billion 

more in their budget than we have in ours. And we followed the 

Budget Control Act, which gave us a number that we had to work 

with. So I agree that we haven’t done the type of job that we 

should, and we need to dig in and really work hard on this problem. And it is not any of your fault. It is us, and we need to work 

together on it. 

The other thing for the record was the voice vote on the gentleman’s amendment, he is correct, but it was not, when we did a roll 

call vote, it was not a partisan vote, it was something we all 

worked together on and did change for several reasons. 

So next we have Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. I have empathy for the 

job you have, but I am grateful that you are having that job at this 

time. I hope you find it a challenging and enjoyable situation, or 

at least challenging situation, especially in an era, as the chairman 

and the other member recently said, when the military has gone 

through three cuts in its budget. You have had to manage through 

all of those. Had we not had the two prior cuts, then the third one, 

which we call sequestration, may not have caused the cup to overflow, causing some of the problems that we are facing. So I recognize you have to realize and manage all three of those cuts, and 

you have done it well. 

I happen to be very proud of the House. At least in our budget 

and our defense authorization bill from this committee, as well as 

the defense appropriation bill, recognized that situation and stay-
22 

ing within the sequestration number reprioritized the military up 

to where it needs to be. And I would hope that the Senate would 

actually pass that appropriation bill so that we could move forward 

with it. 

I have, General Welsh, three rather parochial questions I would 

like to add on you, and then one for Admiral Greenert. Let me see 

if I can actually get through those in a relatively quick fashion. 

General Welsh, first of all, I had the opportunity of hearing from 

Generals Wolfenbarger, Moore, and Litchfield this morning. You 

have a good team under you. I am very proud of what they are 

doing. And I asked some of these questions of them as well, but, 

as you know, in the last sequestration issue, there was an issue 

with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and contract towers that were critical to some of the bases within the Air Force. 

There was not a good communication between them until we told 

the FAA they could do what they always could have been done anyway had they not been told to do it. 

Are you either having a new updated list or are going to engage 

earlier with the FAA on dealing with those towers that have an impact on the military bases we have in the Air Force? 

General WELSH. Yes, Congressman, we are. After our last discussion on this topic, actually we have established a process with the 

FAA where as soon as they come up with a list of contract towers 

it comes to the Department. The Air Force takes the lead on that, 

just because we are connected to them. We share it with all the 

other services who do aviation work. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

General WELSH. And we will continue that cycle. 

Mr. BISHOP. Appreciate that. Let me also talk about the record 

of decision for OPS 1 location for the F–35, which has been postponed again. My concern is obviously that every delay you have in 

signing that record of decision causes problems in financing the 

capital improvements that need to go along with it. I understood 

that now the idea is to wait until there is a new Secretary before 

you are actually signing that. Is there some way we could actually 

speed up that process? Are you looking at that still as the timetable, that when the next Secretary comes in it will be signed? 

General WELSH. Congressman, we are not waiting on the next 

Secretary. The timetable to get the data put together to complete 

the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] report and findings 

with the updated census data just is after the new Secretary hopefully will be confirmed, if that goes well. If not, we will not delay 

the decision waiting on the new Secretary. 

Mr. BISHOP. Pending a Secretary. 

General WELSH. I have not heard that intent expressed, and it 

certainly wasn’t a discussion between the Acting Secretary and myself. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is good news, and I am looking anxiously for 

that actually to be decided so we can move forward in that. It is 

a wonderful thing that will help the Air Force. 

In the appropriations act, we went through great statements to 

restate what I think is still Federal law in Title 10, Section 2742 

that deals with the working-capital fund. If indeed we have a problem going forward in the next and we do not actually have the Sen-
23 

ate passing our appropriation bill, are you looking towards once 

again using furloughs, especially in that working-capital fund, in 

which I still think is being prohibited by the section I just mentioned? 

General WELSH. Sir, we are not planning to do furloughs at all 

in fiscal year 2014. If the CR is 6 months or less, if there is one, 

then I think it is completely avoidable. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is a better answer than I would have hoped 

for. 

Let me go to Admiral Greenert. Representative Forbes, I 

thought, did great questions in presenting as to what the concept 

could be. Our policy has always been to be able to deter and defeat 

any adversary in any area. In your written testimony you stated 

we would not be able to conduct one large-scale operation and also 

counter aggression by an opportunistic aggressor in a second theater. Are you stating before this committee that under sequestration you would not be able to deter and defeat aggression specifically in one theater if our forces were committed to a large-scale 

operation elsewhere? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, I am. And let me clarify, if I may. 

The Defense Strategic Guidance says just what you stated. The reduced surge that I described, the readiness of those carrier strike 

groups, amphibious strike groups, et cetera, I believe can react to 

one major contingency operation or can in each theater, the two 

major theaters, deny. So that is an ‘‘or’’ statement—deny in two 

theaters or respond to one. That is what I have concluded based 

on what I know right now. 

Mr. BISHOP. Are you using deny and defeat interchangeably? 

Admiral GREENERT. No, I am not. Deny would be the alleged aggressor would look and say, I don’t think this would work out very 

well, there seem to be good forces here. And I am not saying deter. 

That is a tough one. Deter, deny. I don’t do very well trying to pull 

those together. But the point is you preclude in each theater, you 

know, small contingencies, or you come together and roll into one 

and do a major contingency operation. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate your answers very much. 

And, General Welsh, I appreciate your leadership. I have an Air 

Force base in my district. We appreciate very much what you are 

doing up there for us. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I just want to at the outset express again my condolences 

and outrage actually in terms of what happened on Monday at Sea 

Systems Command. I have had a chance up close to deal with Admiral Hilarides and his predecessor, Admiral McCoy, and the great 

team that is over there. 

We talk a lot in this committee about protecting the industrial 

base. That is what they do every single day. And a lot of them don’t 

wear uniforms. They are civilian employees who took a hit with sequester and furloughs already. And, again, I just have the highest 

regard and admiration for all of them, and it was just incredible 

to see, you know, the events unfold on Monday. 
24 

So please convey, I am sure from the whole committee and myself, again, our thoughts and prayers are with that great group of 

individuals. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yeah. I will do that, Congressman. And I 

know you are a good friend of NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command]. You go there often. These are our shipmates, and I appreciate that and I will pass it along. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

And, again, I am pleased to hear that the IG’s report is something that the Navy is going to incorporate. Frankly, and this is 

sort of just me speaking, coming from Connecticut, it has been 9 

months since Sandy Hook. There are too many mentally ill people 

getting too easy access to weapons, and it is time for this Congress 

to pass a background check bill, which would help, frankly, all installations in terms of trying to make sure these incidents don’t 

ever happen again. And hopefully people are going to respond in 

this Congress to something that is perfectly constitutional and obviously necessary. 

Admiral, in your testimony, again, I just want to say, as far as 

I am concerned, you have been very explicit and specific in terms 

of what the impact of CR and sequestration has been and will be. 

We had 85 shipyard workers on Monday who received layoff notices 

because of the cancellation of the Miami repairs. And, again, I 

think, you know, we spend a lot of time talking about shipbuilding 

and platforms, but the fact is that the repair and maintenance end 

of your Department is obviously another critical piece to the industrial base. 

Your testimony indicated that you are going to be cancelling 34 

of 54 planned maintenance availabilities. Can you describe what 

that means in terms of, again, protecting critical skills, particularly 

in some of the private shipyards? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, if I were to quantify it, Congressman, 

it is about 8,000 jobs. That is our best estimate. And our big areas 

are the Hampton Roads area and the San Diego area. That is 

where the big shipyards are. But it is up and down the coast, to 

your point earlier. And so those individuals, those presidents of 

those companies, they can’t plan. 

So as I mentioned, I really want to be able to do a reprogramming or give me an appropriation bill, and we can preclude many 

of those 34. Half would be my plan. If I get that billion dollars I 

was mentioning in my oral statement, we could preclude at least 

half. We would then take to repair the ships that are going to deploy next year or the year after, or the ones that absolutely have 

to do a life upgrade because it is necessary. In other words, we 

have a priority and a scheme. Then we can converse with the shipyard, we can make plans and we can recover. 

Subject to that, that is where I am, Congressman, and it is really 

about balance. You know, the CR stops, it puts me at last year, no 

new starts, sequestration takes everybody down, we go where the 

money is and we got to operate forward and meet the commitments 

of today, number one. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And the repair and maintenance work is also, I 

think, a mechanism that you have employed to, again, protect critical skills, again. So if there is, you know, the six or seven ship-
25 

yards around the country, you can actually, again, protect welders, 

carpenters, machinists, et cetera, if there is maybe a downtick in 

one of the shipyards. And so losing that, I think, is really, again, 

going to hit muscle and bone, is that right, in terms of our base? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, that is correct. You are referring to 

what we call the ‘‘One Shipyard’’ concept, where we will move 

workers to another area of the country and they will assist. And 

there is good cooperation between our public shipyards. Some of 

the private shipyards are adopting it as well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. And, you know, in terms of the operational 

force, you know, if CR minus sequester goes through, again, we 

have a 6-month delay on the Truman, a number of other deployments. Again, what do you see in 2014 and 2015 for the operational 

force? 

Admiral GREENERT. What I see is we would be able to maintain 

one carrier on deployment and one in surge. And then the George 

Washington is in the forward-deployed naval force, so she is in 

Japan. So at any given time you have one carrier in the western 

Pacific and one carrier in the Arabian Gulf and one carrier strike 

group that can respond. The others are waiting to get into maintenance, because I just don’t have the capacity to move them into 

maintenance, or they are in maintenance. 

Now, key and critical part are the air wings. So when carriers 

come back, instead of keeping them at a proficiency level able to 

respond, we will let them gracefully decline and they will shut 

down for a period of about 3 months, and then we will take them 

what we call tactical hard deck. That is just a level of flying statistically determined to be safe. It is sort of like driving your car occasionally so that when the time comes you could get in and, you 

know, practice and maybe become a delivery person or whatever, 

and that is when these air wings would go into work up. 

So we would have on any given time three air wings, a tactical 

hard deck, two shutdown, and then three getting ready to, well, deploy or on deployment. This is a situation we haven’t been in before 

and it is not our covenant with the combatant commanders. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for the clarity that you are providing. I 

appreciated your very strong answer to Randy Forbes’ question as 

to the effects of a second year of sequestration. The President’s sequestration was intended to be a process by which the President 

would seek, with Congress, alternative offsets so that defense 

would not bear the brunt of these cuts. The President now, not 

bringing forth any other offsets, but calling on Congress to repeal 

it, has placed this stasis, this gridlock that we have. 

I opposed this from the beginning because I feared that we would 

be right here where we are, where the President is not coming to 

the table with any recommendations for us to be able to find those 

offsets. But with the clarity that you are providing, this is important, because it is going to help us frame the discussion of how important it is that this process be stopped. 

Dr. Miller was before Congress when he was discussing Syria, 

and he said that the administration is very well aware of the mes-
26 

sage that you provided today, but we need it out in the public, we 

need the message of clarity that you are sounding the alarm that 

one more year of sequestration would be absolutely devastating to 

our military. 

I want to go to Hagel’s Strategic Choices and Management Review—this is known as the SCMR analysis—which appeared to be 

largely sequestration driven. And I would like to focus with General Odierno and General Welsh on the effects of the conclusions 

of the SCMR analysis. 

And so, General Odierno, you had said that they had some rosy 

assumptions. It is my understanding that a number of assumptions 

underpin the sequester-driven SCMR analysis, such as a 6-month 

duration for wars, no follow-up for stability and support operations, 

and a 90-day mobilization for Reserve Component formations. And 

as you are saying, you know, their readiness is actually declining, 

not remaining stable. 

General Welsh, I am certain you have some concerns as to how 

it affects Air Force squadrons. And if the two of you might speak 

of whether or not you also have similar concerns the SCMR analysis conclusions may affect our ability for readiness. 

General Odierno. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, you had it just right. I have 

some concerns. I mentioned that I think some of them are somewhat rosy assumptions that I think can be somewhat dangerous. 

As you mentioned, conflicts 6 months in duration, no casualties in 

these conflicts, the fact that we would fully disengage from everything else we are doing. My problem with that is we just got done 

fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We never disengaged 

from Korea, we didn’t disengage from the Sinai, we didn’t disengage from Kosovo, so why is there belief that we will disengage 

in the future when we haven’t done it when we got done fighting 

two wars at the same time? 

There is no mission for weapons of mass destruction, that was 

not considered, which is a significant scenario in many of the scenarios that we have to address. 

So all of those are my concerns, that were really put in there so 

we could say we need a smaller Army, and that is concerning to 

me. And I have raised those issues very privately in all of our discussions that we have had during the SCMR process. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I think it is important for us to know 

that as part of the discussion, that those conclusions should not 

just be merely accepted. 

General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I think the SCMR process made 

some things very clear to me. First is that what sequestration does, 

the topline reductions over time related to sequestration actually 

creates a capacity-versus-capability discussion that Admiral 

Greenert referred to previously. That is a longer-term issue that 

you can deal with in some kind of methodical and well-planned 

approach. 

What the mechanism of sequestration does—and the SCMR analysis made this very clear—is that it creates a ready force today 

versus modern force tomorrow dilemma. And that has defined the 

decisions that the Air Force is making right now, the ones we made 
27 

last year, and the ones we will make for the next couple of years. 

The mechanism, the abrupt arbitrary nature, especially over the 

first couple of years, prevents you from making wise, long-range 

planning choices and drives you into this discussion of do you want 

to be modern in the future or do you want to be ready today. That 

is a terrible debate to be having. 

The other thing that came out of the SCMR analysis that was 

significant to me is that the cost of having a ready force, whatever 

the size of that force, the cost of making it ready is marginal compared to the cost of the force structure itself. I see the Air Force 

as an asymmetric advantage for our country. And by the way, the 

other services, I think, are the same. But we provide things quickly. We provide mobility rapidly. We provide ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] support tonight, not in 3 or 4 weeks. 

And we provide global strike capability right now. That requires a 

readiness level that is not sometime in the future we will be ready 

to go. And to me that was a significant takeaway from SCMR. The 

cost of that is marginal compared to the cost of actually having the 

force structure. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have been here 

almost 6 years. I can recall when I was appointed, I didn’t realize 

that it was and does have a proud tradition of being very bipartisan in its thinking, its commitment to producing a bill, bringing 

that bill to the floor, passing it out of the House, and then going 

to conference after the Senate similarly passes a bill. And it is in 

that conference where we resolve our differences, swallow some of 

them, proudly proclaim success in others, and then move on, because we understand how important it is to the defense of our 

country. 

And I think Chairman McKeon has honored that tradition, and 

I am suggesting maybe he should become head of the House Budget Committee, because we know the House has passed a budget, 

the Senate has passed a budget. There is a process, and it is called 

conference committee. It is a process that we honor and engage in 

every year. 

But back to sequester, I am dismayed that we had many, many 

hearings in which we talked about the damages of sequester, and 

now we are really talking about how to weather them. And I commend you all. I for one do think there is room for additional cuts. 

I am ranking member of Oversight and Investigations. We have 

had a hearing about the growth in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, that there is growth in the overhead. There are areas 

where we can look carefully and bring about savings in order to put 

more funds into things that really count. But sequestration obviously is not the way forward, because of the kind of across-theboard lack of discretion that you all confront. 

And General Odierno, when I hear you talk about readiness and 

I see the extraordinary bravery of those who serve in our behalf, 
28 

the wounds they have to absorb, the life-changing nature of being 

in war, to think that we would ever compromise their readiness, I 

think, and put them in harm’s way, knowing they are not adequately trained, and I know you would not do that, you would find 

a way to avoid it. But I think it is a way of bringing home to the 

American people what sequestration means. It is an All-Volunteer 

Force, it is not one in which we call upon all Americans to think 

about our young people coming to serve. And we would never want 

to send our young people to war without knowing that they were 

trained. 

I think the other way in which sequestration has become so hard 

is it is such a big term, the dollar amounts are so large, but you 

hear about it, we hear about it in our districts, we hear about it 

through the furloughing of people. And one of the places in which 

I have heard about it in my district, it is home to Natick Soldier 

Systems Center. It is a center that really invests in research and 

development, science and technology with a focus to, again, protect 

our soldiers and find new ways forward to protect them as they engage in war. I have seen some great work done there around lightening the load of body armor, developing body armor tailored to 

women, making uniforms fire retardant, the ways in which to conserve energy and recycle water out so that our soldiers don’t have 

to put themselves in harm’s way. 

But I have also learned that there has been a real bleeding of 

that workforce. It is my understanding that there they have sustained a workforce attrition of 52 personnel in this fiscal year, 

more than double the annual average, and including a number of 

Ph.D.s. So for an installation that develops this life-saving equipment, we know Ph.D.s are the heart and soul of research and development, and technology and science are key, key. We cannot develop those new cost-saving, life-protecting measures without all 

the tremendous investment. 

So we are not going to be repealing sequestration any time soon. 

How do you, General Odierno, protect that investment in this important work so that we know we are always on the cutting edge 

protecting our soldiers? 

General ODIERNO. First, Congresswoman, thank you very much 

for your question. And I would just say number one priority is our 

soldier systems, as you mentioned, getting them the best equipment possible for them to be able to conduct the operation we want 

them to do, whether it is lightening the load, all the things you 

mentioned, to include many, many others. 

The problem is, is that, you know, because we have had to go 

into a hiring freeze, because of furloughs, because of incidents like 

this, we are starting to lose some of our very important workforce, 

because they are uncertain about the future that they have working with us. So we have to make sure that we maintain a balanced 

force that allows us to continue in our highest priority, which is 

what you just talked about. So for us it is very concerning. 

We will—I will—take a look at programs that will allow us to 

keep the best, because we need our scientists, we need our engineers, we need our Ph.D.s to help us to come up with the new ideas 

and technologies for us to take care of our young men and women 

in uniform. 
29 

Ms. TSONGAS. I urge you to do that, despite all these financial 

challenges. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Odierno, I will focus my questions towards you. 

You all, all four of you did a great job in the outset in describing 

the impact of sequestration and how wrong-headed it is for the 

country, but particularly for your respective service branches. And 

I appreciate your candor on that, because the American people 

need to hear it. A lot of Members of Congress who aren’t on this 

committee need to hear it. I think most of us on the committee already understood the impact, but we appreciate your candor. 

General Odierno, the disruption and uncertainty that sequestration is causing the civilian workforce and its impact on our readiness, I think, is the wrong way for us to budget for our military. 

But, sir, in year two, what current maintenance and overhaul programs are you looking to preserve? 

General ODIERNO. Well, first off, our problem is we want to sustain our reset program, which is resetting our equipment that is 

coming back from war, and right now we don’t have the dollars to 

completely do that. And so I want to preserve all of that. I need 

that equipment in order to feed back to all of our units. And right 

now we are looking at, because of sequestration, having to lay off 

2,400 people in our depots who do that very important work for us, 

and then another 1,400 because of lack of workload; not because we 

don’t have the workload, but because we don’t have the dollars to 

support the workload over the next 2 to 3 years. So I need that, 

because what that means, it will delay the reset of our trucks, our 

soldier systems, our mortar systems, our individual weapons, and 

that causes us to reduce readiness down the road if this continues. 

Mr. ROGERS. How do the possible reductions that you just described, those reductions in the force, impact the equipment mix 

and the workload of our depots and arsenals? 

General ODIERNO. So obviously as we reduce the force over time 

and reduce the number of brigade combat teams, that reduces the 

amount of equipment that we have to sustain our readiness. So I 

mentioned earlier that if we go to full sequestration, just in the Active Component, we are looking at a potentially 45 percent reduction in our brigade combat teams. That means less tanks, less 

Bradleys, less trucks, less M–16s, less mortars, less artillery systems. So it impacts all of our workload, because we are getting 

smaller. And, again, as I have stated, I think that is a bit too 

small, but it is going to have a significant impact on our civilian 

workforce as we move through this process. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, again, thank you. I think everybody in this 

room would agree that the sequestration maneuver was a tactical 

error made by the Congress in the Budget Control Act that blew 

up in our face, and we need to acknowledge it was a stupid mistake 

and correct it. And I pledge to you all, I intend to become a very 

aggressive Member in trying to bring this to a quick and immediate halt. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 
30 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you very much for your service and the 

good work and tough situations that you face. 

General Welsh, I think you are aware I am going to ask a question about the KC–10. It has been quoted in the newspaper that 

a decision is in process to eliminate the entire fleet of the KC–10s, 

obviously a major impact, particularly on Travis Air Force Base, 

which houses half of that fleet, at a time when we are going to 

reposition ourselves to the Pacific. Can you explain in detail, and 

I guess as briefly as possible, why you are suggesting the elimination of the KC–10s at this time? I understand it is for the 2015 

budget proposal. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. First of all, anything that was in the 

paper is not a decision yet. We are considering divestiture of the 

KC–10 fleet, along with divestiture of lots of other things. 

One of the things that we got into as we looked at the ALTPOM, the sequestered POM, especially for 2015, is that $1 trillion-plus 

out of the Department of Defense is going to leave a bruise. It is 

going to be significant and it is going to impact many, many things 

across the Air Force. 

We looked at the refueling fleet, we looked at our permissive ISR 

fleet, we looked at everything we do in the MILCON [military construction], facilities sustainment arena. We still haven’t been able 

to get at facilities and infrastructure or personnel costs, which are 

significant to us, and so we are back to modernization or readiness. 

Those are our choices. 

And so as we looked at modernization, recapitalization, we 

looked at fleets of airplanes to see where we could save big 

amounts of money as opposed to a whole bunch of little amounts 

of money, which don’t make savings over time. That is why the 

KC–10 fleet was examined, as part of that effort. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Rather than the KC–135s, which are older? 

General WELSH. Sir, you can’t eliminate the KC–135 fleet and 

still do the job that we do for the Department of Defense worldwide. It is too large. There is nothing good about divesting any aircraft fleet right now. What we are looking at is where can we take 

savings and not completely stop our ability to do our job. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We have very little time here, and I will not go 

further at this moment, but I am definitely going to go into this 

in far more detail with you and your staff. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will look forward to that. 

General WELSH. We expect to do that. I look forward to the conversation. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you take a look at the triad? And this is, 

I guess, for Admiral, as well as for you, General. There is no mention of the triad here, where billions upon billions are spent in 

modernization of our nuclear force and the nuclear bombs, yet 

there is no mention of any of that in this testimony. Did you consider that? I will start with you, Admiral Greenert. 

Admiral GREENERT. Sir, my number one statement is my top program is the SSBN(X) and the sea-based strategic nuclear program, 

and that is number one. I will fund that above all else in any 

ALTPOM, if you will, scenario. However, sir, it is not exempt from 
31 

sequestration, that program, and so I am very concerned. It got sequestered in 2013. We were able to reprogram. It gets sequestered 

again in 2014. These delays, months and months and months, add 

up to years. This program is very tight. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Welsh, on triad. 

General WELSH. Congressman, as I mentioned before, we have 

looked at every modernization program we have in our portfolio. 

We are looking at everything. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. There is no specificity about the triad, about the 

land-based ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]? 

General WELSH. Well, first of all, the land-based ICBM, the cost 

of maintaining and operating that day to day is not significant. It 

is very, very low compared to the cost of other things. The modernization part of this over time is what we are discussing and 

where can you make savings, where can we work together with the 

Navy on pieces of the—whether it is weapons development, warhead development, infrastructure, to make sure that we are saving 

costs there, command and control, those areas. But we are looking 

at all of that, Congressman. It is all on the table. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. I would expect to have you develop that 

detailed information and present it to the committee, or at least to 

me. I would appreciate if you would do that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Also, Admiral, very quickly, you are going to 

build a new base at what I call Camp Malibu, otherwise known as 

Hueneme, in Ventura County, for your BAM [Broad Area Maritime] System. Why are you not using the existing facilities at 

Beale? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, it is really about space. And if we had 

the space at Beale, I think we might consider it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You do have the space at Beale. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, I will tell you what I will do then, Congressman. I will regroup and we will come and show you why we 

decided to do what we decided to do, rather than use all the rest 

of your time. Is that okay? We will come and lay it out. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes. I would appreciate that, sir. 

Admiral GREENERT. You bet. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much again for joining us. Thanks 

again for your service to our Nation. 

Admiral Greenert, please again pass on my condolences and 

prayers to the entire Navy family, especially those at the Navy 

Yard and to the families of the victims of that terrible tragedy. I 

know it is a very tough time for the Navy family, and please let 

them know we are thinking about them and praying for them. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. I will pass your 

feelings along. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 
32 

Admiral Greenert, I want to go back to the submitted statement 

that you had, and you spoke about both the CR combined with sequestration for 2014 and what the effects of that would be. And you 

say that most concerning, however, is we will have two-thirds less 

surge capacity in fiscal year 2014. And let me get you to elaborate 

on that a little bit, because I think sometimes people think of surge 

as extra or excess. Can you give us some real examples of where 

recently you have needed that surge capacity and how it is used? 

And then give us a focus, too, on what diminished surge capacity 

means. And that is, if our Nation is challenged, does it mean we 

deploy nonready forces or do we just refuse actual deployments, or 

in those situations say, listen, we can’t respond? So if you could 

give us that perspective. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. I will go backward. I think that 

might work. Today we have the Nimitz in the Red Sea and we have 

the Truman in the North Arabian Sea of the Arabian Gulf. So the 

Nimitz is a surge carrier strike group. She was on her way home. 

As soon as she goes off station, whomever the strike group is, they 

become the surge. And had she gone back to her home port, she 

would be on call, if you will, until further notice. Well, she was 

called. So she is that one that I spoke of. If this situation continues, 

there will come a time when it is time for Nimitz to go home. We 

will call on one other carrier strike group. So that is how that 

works. 

Now, if there is more than one, well, we have a problem, because 

we don’t have a carrier strike group ready. The carrier is nuclear 

powered. That is not the issue. It is the air wing. They are not organized, trained, equipped, proficient. The destroyer is organized, 

trained, equipped, proficient and certified for a whole host of missions. For example, the destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean, 

they are there for ballistic missile defense, the European Phased 

Adaptive Approach. They happen to be multimission, so they could 

do, if called upon, other missions, which we are pretty well aware 

of. 

So back to the Red Sea. Those destroyers that are there, they are 

out about 9 months now, 10, 11. When the time comes that we 

send them home and say we need to sustain this, we will need to 

reach for destroyers coming out of the west coast probably, and 

they are not ready yet. So we will have to now tailor and be very 

clear on what they are certified to do. We have never had to do 

that before, Congressman. So we could be very soon in that kind 

of an arena. 

To summarize, we have a covenant with the global combatant 

commanders and the National Command Authority. We provide 

carrier strike groups forward ready on deployment, and that is generally two. We have two to three, generally three ready to respond 

within about 14 days. And then we have about three within 60 to 

90 days. That is what we have signed up to. That is called the 

Fleet Response Plan. That has to change now. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Got you. Let me ask you, I think those are very 

great points. Give me your perspective. When we have a strike 

group like Nimitz that now is on deployment now approaching 11 

months, what does that operational tempo mean for sailors? But 

tell me, too, what does that mean when you are looking at mainte-
33 

nance availabilities? And we all know that those kind of get 

stacked up, too. What happens if maintenance availabilities have 

to be cancelled, and then you are talking about not maintaining 

ships? What does that do to affect, again, your capacity to respond 

and then the life expectancy of those ships? So give me your perspective on personnel and equipment. 

Admiral GREENERT. Personnel, we tell our sailors and we shoot 

for, as the Commandant said, you know, he talked about dwell and 

he talked about turnaround ratio and rotation. We tell our sailors 

you should expect about a 7, 71⁄2 deployment. When you get up to 

11, they say, okay, you know, 11-month deployment. Then they 

come home and then they are turning around within about a year. 

So you are getting close to 1 to 1.2, 1.3 when you do that by the 

time that particular carrier turns around. 

We are at a point in our economy, things are changing, so I am 

concerned about the debilitating effects of that. Take that kind of 

carrier strike group and its air wing with the ones that are sitting 

there at hard deck. These are shut down. So I have got pilots looking out the windows saying, gee, I wish I could fly. I have got others saying, I am flying so much and deploying so much, I can’t even 

get a will done to do that. And so we have got imbalance here, sir. 

Deployment-wise, the carriers are heel-to-toe in our nuclear repair shipyards. If somebody is delayed, that is a problem and now 

they are stuck in there, and that means they are not ready to deploy eventually. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And before I begin my questions, Admiral, I just want to, along 

with my colleagues, extend my condolences to you and the entire 

Navy family. The whole country, I think, is heartbroken over what 

happened on Monday. I spoke yesterday with Secretary Mabus and 

offered my personal assistance as well as condolences. Having been 

a survivor of a mass shooting myself, I have a sense of what is 

going on with the families, those who lost loved ones and those who 

survived. And I just want to say that personally I am available any 

time for any purpose that would be helpful to those families, and 

please feel free to call me for that purpose. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, sir. I think we will seek your 

counsel on how to deal with this since you have that experience. 

I appreciate it very much. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, let me turn to the questions at hand. We have 

had this discussion so many times. But I just want to say at the 

outset that sequestration was a bad idea and I have opposed it 

since I got here a little over a year ago. 

General Welsh, I just want to ask a question specific to a fleet 

of aircraft that are stationed in my community at Davis-Monthan 

Air Force Base. There have been recent reports that, as we have 

discussed here this morning with other potential decisions, of getting rid of the A–10 in the future. And some people have made the 

argument that the A–10 just doesn’t fit the Air Force’s future because it isn’t a multirole fighter. And in my view, this is a very 

shortsighted and potentially dangerous idea. 
34 

As you know, General, the A–10 is unsurpassed in its ability to 

provide close air combat support. And I know fully, as you do, the 

A–10’s role in combat, search and rescue operations, finding service 

members behind enemy lines, relaying information, escorting helicopters and assets in and out of combat zones. And the A–10s 

based in my district and across the country have been retrofitted 

with new airframes, airframe wings, and electronics packages that 

now have given them a life span of till 2028. 

General, as you know, the SCMR is built on four guiding principles, and I want to just quote a couple of them. The first is that 

we must remain ready for the full spectrum of military operations. 

And another is that we will remain strategy driven based upon the 

Defense Strategic Guidance and our ability to execute our five core 

missions against the full spectrum of high-end threats. Given what 

we know about the A–10 and the potential of future need for the 

A–10, General, can you tell me why it is that we would even consider retiring an entire fleet of this very valuable aircraft when 

there is no other alternative in place? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. Because we have been handed a bill 

within the Department of Defense of $1 trillion-plus that we have 

to pay over the next 91⁄2 years. 

A–10 was my first fighter, Congressman. I love the airplane. I 

have 1,000 hours flying it. It is the best airplane in the world at 

what it does. It is not the best at a lot of other things. It is capable 

in many areas. If we are going to look at what we must divest, not 

what we want to divest, but what we must divest, we have to be 

very honest with ourselves inside the Air Force about how much 

we can afford. And if we have platforms that can do multiple missions well and maybe not do one as well as another airplane, but 

the airplane that is limited to a specific type of mission area becomes the one most at risk, I think there is some logic to this that 

is hard for us to avoid no matter how much I happen to love the 

airplane. 

Mr. BARBER. But how is it possible, General, that we could support General Odierno’s ground troops should they ever be deployed 

again with another aircraft if the A–10 is not available? 

General WELSH. Congressman, people seem to assume that 100 

percent of the close air support being done in Afghanistan today is 

being done by the A–10. That is not even close to the truth. It is 

actually a small percentage of the close air support that is being 

done by many, many other platforms. We have got to provide the 

United States Army, the United States Marine Corps, United 

States naval forces and our coalition partners close air support. We 

do it every day with a number of platforms, and we will continue 

to do that. 

Mr. BARBER. Talking to Army personnel who have been deployed, 

they tell me when those Warthogs show up, they are much happier 

than anything else. So I just want to say that that is an important 

area. 

Let me just turn quickly, General Odierno, with the remaining 

time. I am concerned about the future of our ability to do cyber and 

intelligence work. As you know, Fort Huachuca is a major area of 

this. How do you see sequestration affecting that? And obviously 

that is important to our warfighters today and tomorrow. 
35 

General ODIERNO. So in terms of cyber, as was stated by the 

other chiefs of services, is that we are going to increase our investment in cyber. Even though we are decreasing our budget, we are 

increasing our investment in cyber. We are going to increase the 

force by at least 1,800 people right now. So that is part of what 

we are doing. 

In terms of intel, as you know, we provide not only intel for the 

Army, but intel for the broader strategic and operational force, 

which is key to the combatant commanders. We are reviewing how 

we do that, but the primacy of what we do in our Intelligence Community will not change and the requirements that we have in our 

Intelligence Community will continue to be a key piece of our strategy as we move forward. So we are looking at very carefully how 

we gain some efficiencies without losing the depth and capabilities 

that we have to support a strategic operational and tactical level. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And as always, thank all of you for coming. You know, it is days 

like this, I suppose, that we are all a little more cognizant of the 

sacrifice that you all personify here today. And, Admiral Greenert, 

I suppose that it is impossible for us to be as aware as we are 

today all of the time of the importance of people being willing to 

sacrifice all of their tomorrows so that we could have freedom 

today. And I certainly hold you all in great respect and appreciation. 

General Welsh, I will start with you, if you don’t mind, sir. Yesterday you gave a brief at the AFA [Air Force Association] convention, and you started your speech with a thought about partnership 

and how during times of fiscal austerity, if that is what we can call 

this, rather than backing away from or defunding our training opportunities, we should, quote, ‘‘hold our partners close.’’ And I 

would like for perhaps all of you to elaborate to a degree on how 

important military exercises are with our allies, especially in those 

regions of great instability, and how sequestration might affect 

these opportunities, specifically with allies like Israel. And what 

does it tell our allies and our foes when we choose, in my mind, 

to spend our money wisely on exercises like these? 

So, General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Sir, I think it just increases the trust, it increases their belief in our willing to partner with them even when 

it is not convenient. And I think if we assume that the future is 

about coalition engagement, which I assume that that is the best 

way for the Nation to go whenever possible, we have to have the 

ability to engage as a coalition, and that requires training. It is a 

very practical problem for the military. It is helpful for us, it benefits us in term of time and cost in the future, and it creates capability that is meaningful and it can be brought together very, very 

quickly as opposed to spending months trying to train together before conducting an activity, whether it is a humanitarian relief or 

it is a contingency operation. 

Mr. FRANKS. Any other thoughts? 
36 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, it is key. I mean, I just returned from the Pacific Army Commanders Conference, and the 

whole point of the conference was about multilateral engagements, 

multilateral exercises, sharing of information, interoperability. 

That is the key as we move forward. I am going next week to the 

European Commanders Conference. Why is that important? Because NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and our close allies are helping us as we work issues in other parts of the world. 

So the interoperability piece, it is all very important to them. And 

so to me it is key. In the future, we are going to have to operate 

in a joint interagency, multinational environment. We know that. 

And we have to do that the best we can. 

My only last point would be is our partners are also significantly 

reducing their investments in their militaries, so we have to be 

very careful about our assumptions about what we think they will 

do for us, because they are reducing as well. So it is a combination 

of all of those things we have to consider as we move forward. 

Mr. FRANKS. Please. 

Admiral GREENERT. If I may. Partners, allies very important. We 

need to look beyond it. And I would say I just had the opportunity 

last week to sit down with my counterpart in the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli, and negotiate eight opportunities for further engagement and partnership potentials at sea. So 

this goes, as my colleague said, it is clearly important for us and 

allies, but it goes beyond that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. Well, General Odierno, I might ask you one 

more question. You know, I had the privilege, I guess you would 

call that, of being in a helicopter 150 feet off the ground and 150 

miles an hour pitch black going over Iraq, and you were one cool 

customer, might I add. You had a lot of faith in that helicopter 

pilot. But would you agree that relying more on operational Guard 

and Reserve will help mitigate the rising personnel expenditures 

and knowing that, you know, these men and women, obviously they 

are paid only when they are trained or mobilized, but also recognizing that they have a proven combat capability and we would 

maintain a strong protection for our country? 

General ODIERNO. We have to have the right combination, Congressman. So it is not Guard versus Active. I have got to have the 

right number of Active and I have got to have the right depth that 

is provided by the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. It is not 

one or the other. And you can’t compare costs, because they provide 

different capabilities based on the dollars that they are given obviously and the time that they have to train and the time they have. 

So it is gaining that right synergy between the two. 

So as I have developed, and as I testified, we are taking a 26 percent reduction in the Active Component and only a 12 percent reduction in the National Guard, so I have taken that into consideration. But to go further than that is very dangerous because you 

lose the immediate readiness that you have with the Active Component. We need both, and I am an advocate of having both. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kilmer. 
37 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As presented in the report, under sequestration the cuts will be either in capability or in 

capacity. And, Admiral Greenert, I was hoping to ask you if you 

could describe those tradeoffs when discussing the submarine fleet. 

Admiral GREENERT. We need to have an adequate submarine 

fleet to distribute in a proper way what the combatant commanders 

need and what we need to respond to around the world for the missions. So that is a capacity piece. But you can’t cover all the oceans 

of the world with submarines. So it gets to what capabilities do we 

need to have an undersea network of submarines, fixed and unmanned systems under the ocean. So we have got to develop those 

capabilities. 

And then aircraft, the P–8 aircraft and the Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance. That is a Global Hawk kind of tricked-out for maritime operations. It is a combination of that network. And, number 

one, you have to have all of the capability of that network. Then 

number two, the capacity to broaden it. But I think step one, we 

need to bring in that capability. So that is the priority that I put 

in that when I talk undersea domain. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

I know the focus of this hearing is on sequestration, which I 

think I have concluded is a Latin word for stupid, but now we are 

also facing a potential government shutdown. And certainly in my 

neck of the woods, where we have Naval Base Kitsap and then 

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, a lot of the focus has been on the potential kind of parochial economic impact of seeing a lot of civilian 

workers not receiving a paycheck. I was hoping you all could speak 

instead, though, to the national security impacts of a potential 

shutdown. 

General ODIERNO. First, I would like to talk a little bit about the 

impacts on the individuals. You know, we furloughed this year. It 

was horrible, you know. And it kind of comes to roost when you 

look at what happened this week. You had these dedicated civilians 

who dedicate their lives to our military, and because of these reductions we are furloughing people who have given their lives to 

us, and yet we are forced to do these kind of things. So for me it 

is unconscionable that we have to do this. And if we can ever avoid 

it, we will never do it again. 

But the national security impacts of reducing the size of our civilian workforce, it was mentioned earlier, the Ph.D.s, the scientists, the engineers, the logisticians that support us, we are 

going to lose that capability. And once you lose it, it is very difficult 

to get it back. And that becomes a real concern for us, that in a 

time of need, if people think we can automatically regenerate this 

capability, you can’t. And so we now have a problem. And so for 

me, that is the real strategic impact of those reductions. 

Admiral GREENERT. If you go up to Fort Meade and you look in 

the parking lot, I mean, those are our civilian, to me, sailors and 

airmen and marines and soldiers. And so I think the national security implications are obvious. You go to Offutt Air Force Base, it 

is Strategic Command. And then you go to, you know, what you 

and I are familiar with, our public shipyards, our naval shipyards, 

hey, we are heel-to-toe in there, and so we have got to get that 

work done. It starts falling behind, we have aircraft carriers that 
38 

are not ready to go out and go out in the world, and so whoever 

is out there is stuck, and that is untenable. 

General WELSH. Just from a corporate perspective, if you just 

forget the personal impact, which is dramatic, 8 million man-hours 

lost for the Air Force with 6 days of sequestration this year. That 

is an awful lot of work that is not getting done on behalf of the Nation. 

Mr. KILMER. I had another question, but I don’t think time will 

permit, so I will just end by echoing the condolences extended, Admiral Greenert, to you and to your team. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thanks, Congressman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, again, to all of you. And, Admiral, on behalf of my 

family, we certainly are thinking of you and the Navy and all of 

the families and personnel that are affected by this. 

And to each of you, I always want to take the opportunity to 

thank you for your service to our country, but also to extend that 

thank you to your families, to your spouses and your children and 

all the sacrifices that they make. 

General Odierno, first and foremost, I appreciate the Army’s execution of the ITEP, the Improved Turbine Engine Program, and its 

acquisition strategy of maintaining competition to milestone B. And 

as you know, Congress continues to support this important program, as evidenced in our defense bills, for the increased capability 

it provides and because it is in compliance with best practices and 

acquisition reform measures to reduce risks early on in a program. 

And so I believe that maintaining competition and schedule reduces the risk considerably for the Army and the taxpayer. Can 

you please just comment on the Army’s commitment to competition 

in support of the ITEP program? 

General ODIERNO. No, you have hit the points. We agree. It is 

about the best engine for the best price while preserving competition to minimize our risk, and that is what this does. And so for 

us, we are totally committed to it. You know, we are going to wait 

for the analysis on alternatives as we decide for our future investment in this. And it becomes even more important, because sequestration actually makes it more difficult to pursue robust R&D [research and development] efforts. We have got to do this the best 

way we can, programs like this. And so for me this is kind of our 

model going forward, and so we are very pleased with this program 

and we are obviously going to continue to support it as we move 

forward. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

General Welsh, you know, I feel very strongly that education and 

training is the cornerstone of our modern day Air Force, and I am 

very sure that you feel the same way. And so I would like if you 

would please talk about the Air Force’s commitment to ensuring 

that that cornerstone remains strong and what transformations 

you anticipate for Air University’s officer and enlisted professional 

military education [PME], and particularly in light of all of the 

things that we have discussed here today, not just sequester, but 
39 

the potential to operate under a continuing resolution, as well as 

issues surrounding the debt ceiling debate. 

General WELSH. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do share your 

view on education and training being foundational to our Air Force. 

I spent time 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, I guess, down in Montgomery talking to the leadership at Air University, last week down 

in San Antonio talking to the leadership of Air Education and 

Training Command. We discussed the enlisted PME program that 

is under development to turn it into a continuum of learning, using 

both distance learning and residence courses. 

Same thing on the officer side of the house, what can we afford 

to do, and what we cannot afford to do is stop educating our professional force and stop training it better than anyone else trains 

their airmen. We are committed to this. We will remain committed 

to it. Everything is affected by sequestration, but this is not something that would be a wise long-term move to take a whole lot of 

capability out of our ability to educate and train these great airmen 

we are lucky enough to have come into our Air Force. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, I appreciate that continued commitment. 

And again, to each of you, thank you for all that you do. We appreciate your candor here with us today in light of these very difficult decisions that we have ahead, and we appreciate your continual efforts to educate us so that we are better prepared as we 

move into that. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Welsh, I had a couple of questions specifically for you. 

Yesterday afternoon, I had an Air Force Reserve wing commander 

in my office. And he was talking to me about the sequester and the 

effects of sequestration on his role. And he particularly expressed 

to me concern about the way the furloughs had been handled, that 

is going from 22 days to 11 days to 6 days over a period of time, 

and because of the impact that it had on those people. 

There are now serious trust issues between his Air Reserve technicians, his civilian workforce, and the Air Force and DOD. And as 

the wing commander, he feels that tension and those trust issues. 

General, I am sure that those trust issues extend throughout the 

entire DOD civilian workforce. And now, earlier this morning, you 

testified that the Air Force is not planning for any furloughs for fiscal year 2014. So with Scott Air Force Base sitting in my district, 

am I able to go back to my district and assure my rather anxious 

constituents, as well as that Air Force Reserve commander, am I 

able to assure to them that the Air Force is not planning any furloughs for 2014? 

General WELSH. Sir, I meant exactly what I said: We have no 

plans to furlough in fiscal year 2014. I will add this, we had no 

plans or even concept of furloughing in fiscal year 2013. I had 

never heard of it before. We have got to resolve whatever we call 

this thing, sequestration, fiscal crisis whatever it is; we have got 

to fix it. We are doing things that are unprecedented as far as decisions being made inside services, including furloughs. 
40 

It was a breach of faith with our civilian workforce. I tell everybody in the Air Force that. I sent a letter to every civilian in Air 

Force saying that. I understand why the decision had to be made. 

I understand why we didn’t have the transfer authority to take 

money from other places to put in the civilian pay accounts, but we 

as a government have got to do better on this one. 

Mr. ENYART. General, I couldn’t agree with you more. And I 

think that it has been clearly expressed here today. But sequestration was a bad idea to begin with, and it is a worse idea as we go 

forward, particularly when we are dealing with CRs and all of the 

problems that that impacts on your budgets and the budgets of everyone, frankly. 

General, I did have one other question for you and that is that 

if sequestration continues, will the Air Force have to reconsider its 

KC–46 alpha basing decisions? 

General WELSH. I don’t believe there is any reason to reconsider 

the basing decision as a result of sequester, no, sir. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you. 

Admiral, as the son of a Navy firefighter and even though I chose 

the path of ‘‘Go Army, Beat Navy,’’ I would like to express my condolences to the entire Navy family. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Congressman. 

I know it comes from the heart. I appreciate it. 

Mr. ENYART. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all of our service chiefs for all that you do, 

and obviously, you care immensely about this Nation, but more importantly, I believe you care about those that serve under you and 

that carry the task out on a daily basis. 

So, General Odierno, I really do appreciate your comment in regards to soldiers have got to be number one. They have got to be 

the number one priority. And I worry, and I am new to this committee as of at least January, I worry that through sequestration 

and through the political gyrations that got us there, it doesn’t 

matter how we got here, but we got here, the damage that we are 

doing to our services—and I think you hit it on the head when you 

said that we really don’t do a very good job of identifying future 

threats. I think major threats, strategic threats, probably so, but 

I don’t think anybody saw Afghanistan or Iraq coming up on the 

horizon. 

And now we are bringing our force structure, I agree with you, 

dangerously low, and the lack of readiness across the whole mission area should concern everyone. And I am concerned. And I am 

concerned about the readiness of our troops, in particular across all 

the services, but obviously, in the Army, just because of the large 

nature of it and the, in the Marine Corps, the personal nature of 

that type of combat that you have to engage in puts people at extreme risk on a very close basis. 

How do we continue to keep a force that is all volunteer? How 

do we continue to keep them in place when we hear from, in the 

SCMR, in particular, was talking about benefits for those that are 
41 

going to serve us and have volunteered to serve us and put themselves at risk? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you for that question because it is a 

very important question as we look to the future. And there is no 

doubt in my mind, I think it is absolutely essential we keep an AllVolunteer Force for a lot of different reasons. I won’t talk about 

that. 

Let me talk a little bit about compensation. We have very generous and appropriate benefits packages today for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in my opinion. But what I think, as I go 

around and talk to our soldiers, they understand the fact that we 

are not going to, our thoughts at least on pay and benefits is not 

to decrease them but decrease the rate of increase. And if we do 

that, we can save enough money that allows us to appropriately 

continue to have an All-Volunteer Force. And they understand 

that. 

So I think we have to work together with Congress on this because I know how much you care about taking care of our men and 

women in uniform. That is very clear. But we have to come together to decide there are ways to do this in such a way that we 

don’t reduce their pay but reduce the increases that we have projected, which saves lots of money. And that will enable us, I think 

in the long run, to maintain an All-Volunteer Force. 

Mr. NUGENT. I faced the same issues when I was sheriff in regards to budgeting and looking at the increases as it forecast down 

the road, so I get that. But I also hear it relates to, it is not just 

pay, and you hit it on the head. And I had the same thing in the 

civilian world, but it is about training in particular about, you 

know, are men and women having the ability to fly, are men and 

women having the ability to go to advanced training? 

Yes, sir, Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, in the Navy, we talk about a formula, 

the quality of the service, of the sailor, equates to their quality of 

life—and that is the stuff we were talking about, their pay, their 

housing, their entitlements and all that—and the quality of their 

work. And that is what you just hit the nail on the head Congressman. 

Do I have spare parts? Do I have a boss that cares for me? Do 

I have a boss? Am I training? Do I feel like I am doing something 

worthwhile? And is my schedule predictable? What is their work 

environment? 

In our world, when they leave the pier, walk across the road and 

get in their car and drive off, their quality of life is pretty good and 

General Odierno relayed that. 

When they go back down the pier, get on the ship and go out to 

do that, we have work to do there, and I am concerned that we 

focus so much on the quality of life, and the quality of work vector 

is going down a lot. And we need to balance that, in my opinion. 

Mr. NUGENT. I agree. And just one last statement, it is not a 

question to you, because you don’t have the answer on this one, but 

I really do call upon the Commander in Chief to take a more active 

role in regards to working with this Congress, particularly with the 

Senate, to move issues as it relates directly to our security here in 
42 

this country and having the ability to project force but also to protect the forces that we are projecting. 

And I think the Commander in Chief owes that to those that he 

commands and has that overall responsibility. 

And I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I will confess to you that there is not a lot of water 

where I live. But I will also tell you that every single resident of 

that congressional district, the 23rd in Texas, feels your pain. And 

on behalf of the constituency that I represent, I want you to know 

that our prayers are with you, with your fellow members of the 

service, and certainly with all of the families who have lost someone over the course of the last few days. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I have the privilege of representing several military facilities, Joint Base San Antonio, which includes multiple Air 

Force and Army components, Laughlin Air Force Base, and in El 

Paso County, there is Fort Bliss. They are all very dedicated public 

servants, both in the uniform side and the nonuniform side. And 

my own view is they deserve better than what they are getting 

from our government, certainly from the Congress. 

As I have listened to the testimony, it seems to me that, in some 

instances, Congress is a very difficult partner because we make our 

life harder, instead of easier, and you can’t say that, but I can, especially since I just got here in January. 

So when I listen to the idea, for example, that having to reduce 

pilot production, potentially reducing 25,000 airmen or a 9 percent 

cut in aircraft or choosing between readiness today and a modern 

Air Force tomorrow, or when I listen to the testimony about how 

it is unconscionable to do the furloughs, I understand that all of 

that is not in your control. It is in the control of the members of 

this institution. ‘‘Institution’’ is a very interesting word for this 

place. 

I would like to talk, General Odierno, you and General Walsh, 

about the impact of one of the disconnects I think there is, is many 

people don’t understand the importance of the civilian side with respect to the uniform side. And so when you look at Joint Base San 

Antonio or when you look at Laughlin, people don’t understand— 

or Fort Bliss—the importance of the contribution of the civilian 

side. 

Can you talk a little bit about that and how that spillover affects 

the uniform side? And how they work in tandem? And if you have 

specific examples about, at some point, I would also like specific information offline about the bases that I represent and how they 

would be impacted. 

General. 

General ODIERNO. So, for us, you know, we have three major 

commands, actually four major commands, in San Antonio. We 

have Medical Command. We have Installation Management Command. We have U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South, all in San 

Antonio. They are three, four key components to what we do in the 

Army. And medical, obviously, a huge responsibility of providing 
43 

support to our soldiers, both in combat and our families and not 

in combat, and our civilians there play a huge role in that command. Installation, they manage all of our installations, both in the 

United States and outside the United States, a huge role. And then 

Army North is one who is really the Army component to provide 

homeland defense, homeland security for our Nation. These are all 

key components. They all have key civilian workforce that is essential for them to accomplish their mission. 

In fact, at SAMMC [San Antonio Military Medical Center], the 

hospital in San Antonio there, we have some concern. We are losing some of our critical civilian employees because of the furlough 

because they would rather go work now for VA [Veterans Affairs] 

or other opportunities because now they have lost, as has been 

mentioned, there some faith and trust in the fact that they will 

have some consistent employment with the Department of Defense, 

so those things that I will tell you are so important to us. 

Mr. GALLEGO. General. 

General WELSH. Sir, I will give you an example, the maintenance 

group at Randolph Air Force Base. I was down visiting with the 

maintenance group director, who is a civilian, the entire maintenance group at Randolph Air Force Base to support the training 

that goes on at that base, the flying training, is civilian, all Air 

Force civilians. 

Because of the furlough this last year, we actually lost enough 

of those 8 million man-hours I mentioned that weren’t being done, 

a percentage of those were at Randolph, a large enough percentage 

that we lost the ability to support a number of flying hours equal 

to an entire pilot training’s class worth of work, which is why I said 

in my opening statement, we will look at changing our initial pilot 

production numbers next year because we learned here we are 

going to have to cut a class, whether we want to or not, just as a 

result of lost production and from the impact on our civilian workforce and on our depots. 

The other place it affects us is when you take 8 million manhours off the books, there are tasks that would have been done during these 8 million man-hours that can’t wait because of the operational activities that they support. So the uniform workforce that 

is there will pick those up as an additional duty. The civilians 

would have done it and just worked a longer day before they took 

their furlough, but we are not letting them, so we can limit the 

number of hours we have to put against furlough, and we are not 

letting them work overtime. So everybody is frustrated because 

they like to do their job, not just because they are losing 20 percent 

of their pay during that period. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank the gentlemen here today for your testimony and the 

answers to our questions. I think we are, there has been a lot of 

talk about sequestration. I don’t think anybody in their hearts 

voted for sequestration. I think it was just something that was a 

part of a bad bill that was put together, and we were never meant 
44 

to get here, and I think everybody has pretty much said that in different ways. 

But if we go back to Admiral Mullen, he basically, where you are, 

said the greatest threat to our national security is our national 

debt. We are $17 trillion in debt, and there seems to be no turning 

that around. 

We have had record deficits. We have had record unemployment 

for the past 4 years. And there seems to be no solution to it. And 

so that is why we are having these arguments, these fights, not 

just inside each party and also with other, you know, outside the 

party; it is because we are fighting over shrinking discretionary 

budgets. 

And while we do nothing to address the number one driver of our 

deficits and our debt, and that is the mandatory out-of-control entitlement spending. And I hate this because I feel like this is going 

to be Groundhog Day over and over as long as we are in Congress. 

It is just de ́ja` vu. We are going to keep having these conversations. 

But until we put people and policy ahead of politics, we are going 

to have to keep having these squabbles amongst one another. And 

we can get there. We can fix our economy. It is simple. We just 

have to listen to the American people, and I think they want to see 

our spending cut, but they want to see it done responsibly. 

I think they want to see a balanced budget. All 50 States have 

a balanced budget. Why is the Federal Government different? Is it 

somehow more special? And they want to see us grow the economy. 

What people are talking about in my district when they are not 

being distracted with Syria or Obamacare or something else, they 

are talking about jobs. They are starving for jobs. They want to see 

this economy get back on track. And you know, there are some of 

us that know how to create jobs in Congress. And I think we need 

to elevate their voices. And we do that through less taxes, less regulation. We don’t need to have throwing up obstacles because there 

is a lot of money sitting on the sidelines, but people are uncertain. 

They don’t know what is going to happen tomorrow. So they are 

very much reserved. 

I would just like to say a few comments. I hope that the Guard 

and the Reserves does not go back to being a strategic Reserve. I 

hope they maintain an operational force presence. I think it is extremely important. I think they have earned their place in our military. They cost one-third of what an Active Component would. But 

also, I think there are multiple missions they can engage in. I 

know they have some border enforcement opportunities in the past. 

I think we can—instead of adding 40,000 more Border Patrol 

agents, we ought to see how we could surge the Guard to the border; maybe other homeland security means, too. 

Also, with our, Admiral Greenert, with our pivot to the Pacific, 

I know we are going to need ships, we are going to need destroyers, 

we are going to need amphibs. And I know with the multiyear ship 

procurement and being able to plan in advance that is a benefit, 

and I hope this Congress continues to do that to give you the ability to go drive down costs and get the best quality product for our 

taxpayer. 

General Welsh, I can’t thank the Air Force enough for delaying 

the transfer of the C–130J’s. I have been kind of on that for a long 
45 

time. I know because there is so much uncertainty. We don’t know 

what the force is going to look like tomorrow. And I tell you the 

community, the Mississippi community is very appreciative because 

after winning the Commander in Chief’s Installation Excellence 

Award out of all the bases in the military, we hope you take a hard 

look moving forward. And hopefully, you will determine that they 

need to stay there. 

I do have one question. This question will be for General Amos. 

As sequestration settles on the force, we hear often that services 

will be forced to do less with less. In your unvarnished opinion, 

what are the risks to major contingency operations, as well as 

steady-state ops, if they continue and these cuts are realized? 

General AMOS. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to be 

able to speak frankly about that. I don’t see any slacking in the requirements for all of our services for the next decade. I read the 

same pundits. I read what they say. I listen to them, and they talk 

about a peace dividend coming out of Afghanistan. And I think that 

is overly optimistic at best. I don’t see the requirements changing. 

In fact, I would say the world is probably more dangerous today 

than it was prior to 9/11. 

Folks have said, and I began to, as we shape the Marine Corps 

down to this 174 force—and as I said in my opening statement, it 

was a budget-driven effort; it wasn’t a strategic-driven effort—I 

started with, well, okay, we will do less with less, but what we will 

do we will do very well. 

I don’t believe that. I think we are going to do the same with 

less, and we are going to do that very well. We are going to work 

real hard to do that. But I don’t see any slacking of it, Congressman, if that answers your question. I think we are going to be 

doing the same with less. 

General ODIERNO. I know we are out of time. If I could just add, 

the issue is let’s take 2013; 2013, we were under continuing resolution with sequestration. And if you asked each one of us, we would 

tell you our requirements went up in 2013. That is the concern. So 

budget went down, forced by sequestration, and our requirements 

increased as the year went on. 

That is the conundrum that we are in right now, and that is my 

concern as we continue down this road. 

So, thank you, sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. And it is ours as well. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

And I, too, would like to offer my condolences from the people of 

New Hampshire’s First District. And I would like to say that while 

the sequester is absolutely devastating, I have concerns about what 

we are saying openly and letting people know, and I am amazed 

that probably more people abroad and our enemies know the impact more than the Members of Congress. And that is absolutely 

shameful. 

There is a bill that could cancel the sequester today if it would 

only come to the floor. But I am very, very concerned, as we all are, 

but the message doesn’t seem to be leaving this chamber right now. 
46 

So, while we are dealing with this, I would like to talk to all of 

you about the impact on the civilians, the impact on the members 

of the services and what appears to be the lack of impact on contractors right now. I know that, for the headquarter budgets, they 

are talking about 20 percent cuts for the civilians who work for the 

government and also seeing it in the budget. But I haven’t heard 

that talk about contractors. 

So could each of you address that? I actually saw something that 

said contractors numbers or their profits hadn’t seemed to drop 

along with the pay that dropped for some of the people who are 

serving our country. 

So I would like to address that, please. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you for the question. As part of the 

guidance the Secretary of the Army and I gave, as we were looking 

at the Army, the Army is looking actually at a 25 percent reduction 

in headquarters because we are trying to gain as much space. 

The first place to look, the guidance we gave, was with contractors, knowledge-based contractors we call them who do studies and 

other things, as well as other types of contractors that we have. Because we want to try to keep as much of the civilian force and our 

military force as possible. 

So we are absolutely looking at that as we move forward. That 

is one of the key pieces. And we have a study group that is coming 

back to us with recommendations that we expect will happen within the next several months. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you expect that will help you save money? 

Because I know when they were asked, the contractors cost an average of about 2 and a half times more than a government employee. 

General ODIERNO. They do. The balance is they give a short-term 

capability. But, yes, it will save us money and allow us to invest 

in other places or not take cuts in other places. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I am encouraged to hear that. 

Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, ma’am. As I look out at the 2015 to 

2022 timeframe, that SCMR piece, and we addressed this in our 

ALTPOM, we are looking at about a one-third reduction in overhead and that includes contractors. We have methodically, in partnership with our research development acquisition executive, Mr. 

Stackley, gone through and reduced support contracts. 

This has been quite a drill to go in there and peel apart where the money goes precisely. But that is $20 billion of a $60 billion 

that we are targeting. Now that is across a FYDP [Future Years 

Defense Plan], a 5-year plan. 

Overhead-wise, like Ray says, we are about the 28 percent on reduction of headquarters. That is not contractors, but it is overhead 

and headquarters reduction. 

General WELSH. Exactly the same ma’am. Contractor reductions 

will be at least the same if not greater than reductions in our civilian workforce. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you are targeting that. 

General AMOS. Congresswoman I think we are all in sync on 

that. We are all reducing both civilian personnel in the long run 

as we go through the ALTPOM. In my service, we are reducing 
47 

28,000 Active Duty Marines, so there will be a commensurate civilian reduction. We don’t know what that is going to be yet. But we 

are looking very seriously at our contractors. 

I would just like to make an anecdotal comment on civilians; as 

we have talked a lot about furloughs here today, we have talked 

about in essence keeping the faith. I think we are in danger of losing those wonderful, highly skilled professionals that my colleagues 

have talked about here today because of the furlough and then the 

anticipation of a government shutdown. And they will reach a point 

where they are going to look for employment elsewhere, whether 

it be in San Antonio; you are medical professional, whether you are 

a Ph.D. 

It became a point of faith in the United States Marine Corps as 

I looked at our civilian Marines, and I think we are in danger of 

losing an awful lot of talent if we continue to abuse them. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I do, too. I thank you for saying that. We have 

the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in our district, and the men and 

women who go there and serve this country every day deserve better than what they are seeing. 

We also have a National Guard. They deserve better. And so, 

across the whole spectrum, the men and women who serve this 

country deserve to know their paycheck will be there and they can 

count on us. And so far we have failed them. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Greenert, I, too, join my colleagues in giving my condolences. And I will tell you I was very impressed by the actions of 

your personnel in helping one another survive that tragic situation. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate it. I know 

it is from the heart. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

General Odierno, you and I have had this conversation before, 

and I just sort of would love for you to expand a little bit on the 

role of the Guard and Reserve. You have been very clear, and I appreciate it, in terms of defining a role for the Guard and Reserve, 

not only in a new strategic environment but as an operational force 

and also in the current budget climate. I don’t have any military 

bases in my district, but I certainly have a lot of National Guardsmen and Reservists, and I also have a lot of military technicians 

suffering from the furloughs trying to keep those helicopters and 

those aircraft functional. 

And as we see in Colorado right now, the National Guard has 

really stepped up with those efforts. 

Could you speak a little bit, General, given the lower life cost of 

the Guardsmen and Reserve Components compared to Active Duty, 

could you speak a little bit to what extent or ratio you would like 

to see a reduction of the Active Component be in the relation to the 

Guard and Reserve? 

General ODIERNO. Sure thank you. So as I have testified, if we 

have to go to the full sequestration, there will be a 26 percent reduction in the Active Component, a 12 percent reduction in the Na-
48 

tional Guard, and an 8 percent, 9 percent reduction in U.S. Army 

Reserves. 

Now I want to go back to somewhat the question that Mr. 

Palazzo asked, the real reason is if I keep their structure, I am not 

going to be able to fund them as an operational Reserve. I can’t afford the training to keep them as operational Reserve, which is 

what I want. 

So I have got to reduce their structure a little bit but not as 

much as the Active Component because I don’t get as much savings. 

Now, the overall balance, though, I have to maintain is, obviously, they cost 33 percent of the Active Force, but their readiness 

is less than the Active Force so I got to keep that right balance. 

So I need the right amount of Guard. I need the right amount of 

Active Component, and I am very conscious of that as I work my 

way through this. 

So I have, in fact, taken more out of the Active Component because of that cost factor, but I have to take a little bit out of the 

Guard so I can continue to keep them and fund them as an operational Reserve. 

And so that is the balance that I am trying to achieve. There are 

some that say we should increase the Guard and further reduce the 

Active. To me, that is out of balance, and then we will not have 

the capability to respond the way we need to for contingency operations. So I am trying to find that right balance. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. General Welsh, could you address 

that as well? 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. The cost is different, and you can 

save more capacity and force structure by putting into the Reserve 

Component over time, you just have to balance how far you can go 

in each mission areas, and we are looking at it by type aircraft 

even within those mission areas because you do hit a point where 

your operational capability or your ability to respond quickly are 

impacted. 

It is different in every mission from space to mobility to fighters; 

they are all different. And we are looking at each one. 

The other thing I think that is important for us to consider is the 

real benefit of a Reserve Component to the Nation is that you have 

this very experienced force over time that is available to respond 

quickly in any type of contingency, small or large. 

One of the most troubling things we are seeing right now is, over 

the last couple of years, a much diminished desire by people leaving the Active Air Force to go into the Reserve Component. Only 

15 percent of those eligible are doing so over the last 2 years. That 

is much lower than traditionally. 

And if we get to the point where our Reserve Components are inexperienced, while they may be cheaper, they will not provide the 

operational Reserve that you need to be a valid fighting force as 

an entire total force. 

And so we have got to make sure we aren’t doing things in the 

Active Component that keep people from becoming members of the 

Reserve Component. 

So we are looking at all that right now. We have actually got a 

very robust discussion going. The biggest issue is still exactly what 
49 

are the cost factors in each of these areas. We decided on a model 

we are using for planning, but that model probably still needs to 

be refined a little. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Can you speak a little bit to the role of military 

technicians in your Reserves and then also to the Guard? 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am, they are essential. They are essentially, 4 days a week, a civilian member of the Air Force. Our civilian workforce is essential. We can’t do our job without them. They 

are in virtually every mission area, and in some mission areas, 

they are the entire mission area, like the maintenance group I 

mentioned before in our training command. The same thing is true 

at Guard and Reserve units. That is what the dual status technicians do. They are fantastic. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. We could end sequestration. We 

should end sequestration. And I don’t think people realize that 

those military technicians are soldiers, airmen, folks who do both 

jobs, and if you are going to ask them to give up their jobs on the 

full-time side, they are not going to be there on the M-day side. I 

yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Admiral, my condolences for the tragedy in the Navy Yard, along 

with the other members. 

I represent San Antonio, Texas, of course, very important in the 

military, and I have a few questions about some of the operations 

there. 

The first one is, do we know what impact will another round of 

sequestration cuts have on the services provided at Wilford Hall 

Ambulatory Center? And can you address whether medical research performed at Wilford Hall will be impacted? 

General WELSH. Congressman, I can’t give you an answer on the 

specific impact of sequestration at Wilford Hall, but I will get it to 

you. I am sorry, I just don’t know the details of that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. CASTRO. No problem. The second one that, of course, concerns San Antonio, in my district, I have Lackland Air Force Base, 

is will sequestration affect any of the programs related to combating sexual assault in the military? 

General WELSH. No, sir. 

Mr. CASTRO. So those will be protected? 

General WELSH. We actually protected our civilian workforce involved in sexual assault, sexual assault response coordinators, a 

few victims advocates, et cetera, from furlough to prevent that from 

occurring and will continue to put that kind of emphasis on those 

programs. 

Mr. CASTRO. Those are my two questions. 

Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your testimony, for your work and 

for the continued efforts that you make to live with these very restrictive budgetary problems that you are dealing with. I know that 
50 

this is going to be an interesting week for us. We have to get a CR 

passed. We have to shortly get a debt ceiling limit increase. And 

I think every Member of Congress is taking these issues seriously, 

but there is 435, 434, maybe 433 Members now, and they come at 

it from, every one of those come from different directions. 

I know that the Armed Services Committee is keenly aware of 

the points that you bring up and I think very supportive of the 

military, and we are the largest committee in Congress, and maybe 

we can have some sway in some of these discussions. We haven’t 

done so well so far. But maybe, going forward, we can. 

Again, thank you for your service. Please let the men and women 

you serve with know that we appreciate greatly their efforts and 

the things that they do. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

(55) 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

(109) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As DOD implements the Secretary’s planned 20% cuts to headquarters, how will the Department balance these cuts among contractor, military, 

and civilian employees? Does the Department have sufficient visibility into the size 

and cost of the contractor workforce in headquarters roles? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you are all aware, defending investments in research and development can be very difficult since the investments, while crucial to future capabilities, are necessarily speculative in nature, and don’t have much of the bureaucratic support or immediate impact of, say, an increase or decrease in an active procurement program. Can each of you speak to the ways in which the services and 

the Department have valued R&D and STEM investments in your budgetary deliberations, as well as the pressures that sequestration’s budgetary bottom lines and 

across-the-board nature have placed on those activities? How has the Department 

weighed the risk factors of decreasing or increasing R&D and STEM relative to 

other investments, particularly given the hard budgetary futures that you are examining? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can each of you address the effects of continued sequestration on 

cyberspace activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports of 

CYBERCOM’s plan to grow the number of cyber operators? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, I appreciate the emphasis you placed in your testimony 

on the critical importance in any budget scenario of our undersea capabilities—Virginia-class subs, the Virginia Payload Module, and the Ohio Replacement. Since, as 

you know, I strongly agree with that sentiment, it was all the more jarring when 

you stated on September 5th that ‘‘shipbuilding will drop in fiscal 2014,’’ and specifically that you envisioned ‘‘the loss of a littoral combat ship, an afloat-forward staging base and advanced procurement for a Virginia-class submarine and a carrier 

overhaul.’’ 

I’m assuming that the reference there was to a FY15 boat per your testimony, but 

could you speak to how would this affect the proposed block buy? Is this an effect 

of the need for an NDAA and an appropriations bill, of the reduced spending levels 

associated with sequestration, or of both, and could incremental funding or some 

other mechanism be used to mitigate? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I’m also deeply concerned about the reference in your testimony 

to a delay in the procurement of the first SSBN(X) by a year. As we’ve heard over 

and over, these boats are not just a critical Navy need, but a national strategic requirement as the most survivable part of our deterrent. Can you elaborate as to the 

effects of any further delay in the program, and what mitigating steps would, at a 

minimum, be needed? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As DOD implements the Secretary’s planned 20% cuts to headquarters, how will the Department balance these cuts among contractor, military, 

and civilian employees? Does the Department have sufficient visibility into the size 

and cost of the contractor workforce in headquarters roles? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you are all aware, defending investments in research and development can be very difficult since the investments, while crucial to future capabilities, are necessarily speculative in nature, and don’t have much of the bureaucratic support or immediate impact of, say, an increase or decrease in an active procurement program. Can each of you speak to the ways in which the services and 

the Department have valued R&D and STEM investments in your budgetary deliberations, as well as the pressures that sequestration’s budgetary bottom lines and 

across-the-board nature have placed on those activities? How has the Department 

weighed the risk factors of decreasing or increasing R&D and STEM relative to 
110 

other investments, particularly given the hard budgetary futures that you are examining? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can each of you address the effects of continued sequestration on 

cyberspace activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports of 

CYBERCOM’s plan to grow the number of cyber operators? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As DOD implements the Secretary’s planned 20% cuts to headquarters, how will the Department balance these cuts among contractor, military, 

and civilian employees? Does the Department have sufficient visibility into the size 

and cost of the contractor workforce in headquarters roles? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you are all aware, defending investments in research and development can be very difficult since the investments, while crucial to future capabilities, are necessarily speculative in nature, and don’t have much of the bureaucratic support or immediate impact of, say, an increase or decrease in an active procurement program. Can each of you speak to the ways in which the services and 

the Department have valued R&D and STEM investments in your budgetary deliberations, as well as the pressures that sequestration’s budgetary bottom lines and 

across-the-board nature have placed on those activities? How has the Department 

weighed the risk factors of decreasing or increasing R&D and STEM relative to 

other investments, particularly given the hard budgetary futures that you are examining? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can each of you address the effects of continued sequestration on 

cyberspace activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports of 

CYBERCOM’s plan to grow the number of cyber operators? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As DOD implements the Secretary’s planned 20% cuts to headquarters, how will the Department balance these cuts among contractor, military, 

and civilian employees? Does the Department have sufficient visibility into the size 

and cost of the contractor workforce in headquarters roles? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you are all aware, defending investments in research and development can be very difficult since the investments, while crucial to future capabilities, are necessarily speculative in nature, and don’t have much of the bureaucratic support or immediate impact of, say, an increase or decrease in an active procurement program. Can each of you speak to the ways in which the services and 

the Department have valued R&D and STEM investments in your budgetary deliberations, as well as the pressures that sequestration’s budgetary bottom lines and 

across-the-board nature have placed on those activities? How has the Department 

weighed the risk factors of decreasing or increasing R&D and STEM relative to 

other investments, particularly given the hard budgetary futures that you are examining? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can each of you address the effects of continued sequestration on 

cyberspace activities and how you intend to manage the fiscal pressures given increasing demands in this regime, particularly in light of the reports of 

CYBERCOM’s plan to grow the number of cyber operators? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to know more about SCMR results with respect to 

the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Can you please elaborate on the impacts of competing 

resources with respect to our commitment to the Pacific region? I am concerned that 

our commitment may appear to be nothing more than rhetoric to our allies in the 

region. I have had numerous meetings with senior officials from Asia-Pacific region 

that have valid concerns. I want to know that we will begin to see tangible actions 

that support our statements emphasizing our support in the region. 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I supported an Andrews amendment to the FY14 NDAA at the 

House markup to extend a cap on service contracting by two additional years. I understand that GAO staff briefed Congressional staff last week, and they reported 

that the Department spent at least $1.34 billion more than allowed under law for 
111 

service contracts and that there is little evidence that the Department is making 

the specific cuts in service contract spending required by the law. Worse, it has been 

speculated that elimination of the caps’ loopholes would result in even more overspending. Perhaps most concerning is that DOD officials acknowledged to GAO a 

lack of fiscal controls that would allow them to satisfactorily comply with the cap. 

How can we achieve greater transparency over service contract costs so that we can 

impose and actually enforce caps and cuts in service contract spending? Given this 

GAO report, is there any reason to think that DOD will actually cut service contract 

spending as the Department downsizes, as opposed to disproportionately cutting 

spending on civilians and military? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent correspondence, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Young expressed concern to Secretary Hagel that the Pentagon’s planned cuts for headquarters were focused disproportionately on the civilians 

and the military, but not on the contractors. That doesn’t make any sense. In June, 

Comptroller Hale conceded in Senate testimony that contractors cost two to three 

times civilians. What assurance can you provide that the headquarters cuts and cuts 

generally undertaken by the Department will take into account contractors as well 

as civilians and military? The Department was required in 2007 to establish an inventory of service contracts in order to better understand the cost and size of the 

contractor workforce. When will that inventory be complete and how is it being used 

to inform the Pentagon’s budget-cutting efforts? For example, how many contractors 

work in headquarters and how much do they cost? Presumably, the Pentagon wants 

to cut the contractor workforce by the same 20% as it intends to cut the civilian 

and military workforces? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The size and cost of military and civilian personnel in your component’s management headquarters workforce are known. How many contractor employees are included in your component’s management headquarters workforce, 

what is their total cost, and what is the average cost of a contractor employee in 

your component’s management headquarters workforce? Will your component’s answers be based on the inventory of contract services? Are your component’s answers 

to those questions regarding the size and cost of service contractors reliable, comprehensive, and well-informed? If not, how can your component properly determine 

the extent to which your component should reduce its reliance on contractor personnel? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Both the Congress and the Administration have identified instances in which contractor personnel are inappropriately performing functions that 

are inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and 

critical. Will your component take into account instances in which contractor personnel in the management headquarters workforce should be reduced because they 

are performing inappropriate functions? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations 

Subcommittee, the Secretary and the Comptroller agreed that contractors are significantly more expensive than civilian personnel, particularly for the provision of 

long-term services. To what extent will your component generate savings in management headquarters workforce spending through insourcing, consistent with 10 

USC 2463? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are non-civilian personnel involved in making recommendations 

for reductions in total headquarters budgets? If so, how have the inevitable conflicts 

of interests been addressed? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent does your component have a policy of reviewing 

service contracts for savings when confronted with a requirement to furlough civilian personnel with the objective of using savings from service contracts (e.g., cancelling low-priority contracts or imposing deductive changes on such contracts) to offset 

the need to impose furloughs? If your component engaged in such efforts in FY13, 

when did such reviews occur, and what were the results of those reviews? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Army’s historic leadership on the inventory of contract services does the Army great credit. Taxpayers have a significant interest in the inventory finally being implemented. Is the Army continuing to fulfill its commitment to 

assist OSD in leveraging the Contract Manpower Reporting Allocation for implementation across the Department? And is OSD continuing to facilitate this effort? 

Is the Army using the significant cost data it has collected already to inform its per-
112 

formance decisions, consistent with the DOD Instruction 7041.04? And is the Army 

using the cost data and the Plan for Documentation of Contractors for budget projections? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Section 808 of the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act imposed a cap on the amount of money that could be spent on service contracts in 

FY12 and FY13. To what extent in FY12 did the Army over-execute spending on 

service contracts and under-execute spending on civilian personnel? Will the Army 

be able to improve upon that performance in FY13? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In an April 1 letter to the American Federation of Government 

Employees, Secretary McHugh wrote: ‘‘. . . I have temporarily adjusted certain of the 

Army’s restrictions on the use of (Borrowed Military Manpower, BMM) . . . Please 

be assured that my action is intended only as a short-term solution—the temporary 

modification of the Army’s BMM policy to address emergency requirements associated with the current budgetary situation does not contemplate the permanent conversion to military performance of work presently allocated to civilian employees. 

Further, Army prerequisites to the use of BMM remain compliant with the 2012 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness policy.’’ Will the Army continue to use BMM consistent with the commitments Secretary McHugh made in his 

correspondence—principally, that any use of BMM will be temporary because of 

emergency budget requirements and that Army policy will be compliant with the 

2012 OSD policy? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. According to the DOD Deputy Secretary’s July 31 memorandum, 

the OSD Organizational Review is intended to achieve a 20% cut in ‘‘total headquarters budgets.’’ However, in the Army’s memorandum of August 14, you and Secretary McHugh write that it is necessary ‘‘to determine how to reduce Army headquarters (both institutional and operational, at the 2-star and above levels) in the 

aggregate by 25%.’’ The 20% cut called for by the Deputy Secretary is completely 

arbitrary, of course, but what analysis supports even greater cuts in the Army than 

in the other components? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Your August 14 memorandum directs the establishment of ‘‘specific targets for each focus area in dollars and full-time equivalents (FTE) . . .’’ However, your memorandum never uses the word ‘‘contractor.’’ Even the Deputy Secretary’s July 31 memorandum acknowledges that reductions must include service 

contractor personnel: ‘‘Total headquarters budgets include government civilian personnel who work at headquarters and associated costs including contract services . . .’’ How will the Army be taking into account the size and cost of contractor 

personnel in the management headquarters workforce in the development of recommendations? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to know more about SCMR results with respect to 

the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Can you please elaborate on the impacts of competing 

resources with respect to our commitment to the Pacific region? I am concerned that 

our commitment may appear to be nothing more than rhetoric to our allies in the 

region. I have had numerous meetings with senior officials from Asia-Pacific region 

that have valid concerns. I want to know that we will begin to see tangible actions 

that support our statements emphasizing our support in the region. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to know more about SCMR results with respect to 

the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Can you please elaborate on the impacts of competing 

resources with respect to our commitment to the Pacific region? I am concerned that 

our commitment may appear to be nothing more than rhetoric to our allies in the 

region. I have had numerous meetings with senior officials from Asia-Pacific region 

that have valid concerns. I want to know that we will begin to see tangible actions 

that support our statements emphasizing our support in the region. 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I supported an Andrews amendment to the FY14 NDAA at the 

House markup to extend a cap on service contracting by two additional years. I understand that GAO staff briefed Congressional staff last week, and they reported 

that the Department spent at least $1.34 billion more than allowed under law for 

service contracts and that there is little evidence that the Department is making 

the specific cuts in service contract spending required by the law. Worse, it has been 

speculated that elimination of the caps’ loopholes would result in even more overspending. Perhaps most concerning is that DOD officials acknowledged to GAO a 

lack of fiscal controls that would allow them to satisfactorily comply with the cap. 

How can we achieve greater transparency over service contract costs so that we can 
113 

impose and actually enforce caps and cuts in service contract spending? Given this 

GAO report, is there any reason to think that DOD will actually cut service contract 

spending as the Department downsizes, as opposed to disproportionately cutting 

spending on civilians and military? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent correspondence, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Young expressed concern to Secretary Hagel that the Pentagon’s planned cuts for headquarters were focused disproportionately on the civilians 

and the military, but not on the contractors. That doesn’t make any sense. In June, 

Comptroller Hale conceded in Senate testimony that contractors cost two to three 

times civilians. What assurance can you provide that the headquarters cuts and cuts 

generally undertaken by the Department will take into account contractors as well 

as civilians and military? The Department was required in 2007 to establish an inventory of service contracts in order to better understand the cost and size of the 

contractor workforce. When will that inventory be complete and how is it being used 

to inform the Pentagon’s budget-cutting efforts? For example, how many contractors 

work in headquarters and how much do they cost? Presumably, the Pentagon wants 

to cut the contractor workforce by the same 20% as it intends to cut the civilian 

and military workforces? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The size and cost of military and civilian personnel in your component’s management headquarters workforce are known. How many contractor employees are included in your component’s management headquarters workforce, 

what is their total cost, and what is the average cost of a contractor employee in 

your component’s management headquarters workforce? Will your component’s answers be based on the inventory of contract services? Are your component’s answers 

to those questions regarding the size and cost of service contractors reliable, comprehensive, and well-informed? If not, how can your component properly determine 

the extent to which your component should reduce its reliance on contractor personnel? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Both the Congress and the Administration have identified instances in which contractor personnel are inappropriately performing functions that 

are inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and 

critical. Will your component take into account instances in which contractor personnel in the management headquarters workforce should be reduced because they 

are performing inappropriate functions? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations 

Subcommittee, the Secretary and the Comptroller agreed that contractors are significantly more expensive than civilian personnel, particularly for the provision of 

long-term services. To what extent will your component generate savings in management headquarters workforce spending through insourcing, consistent with 10 

USC 2463? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are non-civilian personnel involved in making recommendations 

for reductions in total headquarters budgets? If so, how have the inevitable conflicts 

of interests been addressed? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent does your component have a policy of reviewing 

service contracts for savings when confronted with a requirement to furlough civilian personnel with the objective of using savings from service contracts (e.g., cancelling low-priority contracts or imposing deductive changes on such contracts) to offset 

the need to impose furloughs? If your component engaged in such efforts in FY13, 

when did such reviews occur, and what were the results of those reviews? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I know the Air Force has been challenged with modernization 

needs. Recent world events, and the desire to minimize boots on the ground, highlight the need for a Long Range Strike capability. As a co-chair of the House Long 

Range Strike Caucus, I want to know how you intend to protect funding for the 

NextGen bomber? Can you elaborate on the importance of this program to the future of the Air Force? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I supported an Andrews amendment to the FY14 NDAA at the 

House markup to extend a cap on service contracting by two additional years. I understand that GAO staff briefed Congressional staff last week, and they reported 

that the Department spent at least $1.34 billion more than allowed under law for 
114 

service contracts and that there is little evidence that the Department is making 

the specific cuts in service contract spending required by the law. Worse, it has been 

speculated that elimination of the caps’ loopholes would result in even more overspending. Perhaps most concerning is that DOD officials acknowledged to GAO a 

lack of fiscal controls that would allow them to satisfactorily comply with the cap. 

How can we achieve greater transparency over service contract costs so that we can 

impose and actually enforce caps and cuts in service contract spending? Given this 

GAO report, is there any reason to think that DOD will actually cut service contract 

spending as the Department downsizes, as opposed to disproportionately cutting 

spending on civilians and military? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent correspondence, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Young expressed concern to Secretary Hagel that the Pentagon’s planned cuts for headquarters were focused disproportionately on the civilians 

and the military, but not on the contractors. That doesn’t make any sense. In June, 

Comptroller Hale conceded in Senate testimony that contractors cost two to three 

times civilians. What assurance can you provide that the headquarters cuts and cuts 

generally undertaken by the Department will take into account contractors as well 

as civilians and military? The Department was required in 2007 to establish an inventory of service contracts in order to better understand the cost and size of the 

contractor workforce. When will that inventory be complete and how is it being used 

to inform the Pentagon’s budget-cutting efforts? For example, how many contractors 

work in headquarters and how much do they cost? Presumably, the Pentagon wants 

to cut the contractor workforce by the same 20% as it intends to cut the civilian 

and military workforces? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The size and cost of military and civilian personnel in your component’s management headquarters workforce are known. How many contractor employees are included in your component’s management headquarters workforce, 

what is their total cost, and what is the average cost of a contractor employee in 

your component’s management headquarters workforce? Will your component’s answers be based on the inventory of contract services? Are your component’s answers 

to those questions regarding the size and cost of service contractors reliable, comprehensive, and well-informed? If not, how can your component properly determine 

the extent to which your component should reduce its reliance on contractor personnel? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Both the Congress and the Administration have identified instances in which contractor personnel are inappropriately performing functions that 

are inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and 

critical. Will your component take into account instances in which contractor personnel in the management headquarters workforce should be reduced because they 

are performing inappropriate functions? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations 

Subcommittee, the Secretary and the Comptroller agreed that contractors are significantly more expensive than civilian personnel, particularly for the provision of 

long-term services. To what extent will your component generate savings in management headquarters workforce spending through insourcing, consistent with 10 

USC 2463? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are non-civilian personnel involved in making recommendations 

for reductions in total headquarters budgets? If so, how have the inevitable conflicts 

of interests been addressed? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent does your component have a policy of reviewing 

service contracts for savings when confronted with a requirement to furlough civilian personnel with the objective of using savings from service contracts (e.g., cancelling low-priority contracts or imposing deductive changes on such contracts) to offset 

the need to impose furloughs? If your component engaged in such efforts in FY13, 

when did such reviews occur, and what were the results of those reviews? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would like to know more about SCMR results with respect to 

the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Can you please elaborate on the impacts of competing 

resources with respect to our commitment to the Pacific region? I am concerned that 

our commitment may appear to be nothing more than rhetoric to our allies in the 

region. I have had numerous meetings with senior officials from Asia-Pacific region 
115 

that have valid concerns. I want to know that we will begin to see tangible actions 

that support our statements emphasizing our support in the region. 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I supported an Andrews amendment to the FY14 NDAA at the 

House markup to extend a cap on service contracting by two additional years. I understand that GAO staff briefed Congressional staff last week, and they reported 

that the Department spent at least $1.34 billion more than allowed under law for 

service contracts and that there is little evidence that the Department is making 

the specific cuts in service contract spending required by the law. Worse, it has been 

speculated that elimination of the caps’ loopholes would result in even more overspending. Perhaps most concerning is that DOD officials acknowledged to GAO a 

lack of fiscal controls that would allow them to satisfactorily comply with the cap. 

How can we achieve greater transparency over service contract costs so that we can 

impose and actually enforce caps and cuts in service contract spending? Given this 

GAO report, is there any reason to think that DOD will actually cut service contract 

spending as the Department downsizes, as opposed to disproportionately cutting 

spending on civilians and military? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent correspondence, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Young expressed concern to Secretary Hagel that the Pentagon’s planned cuts for headquarters were focused disproportionately on the civilians 

and the military, but not on the contractors. That doesn’t make any sense. In June, 

Comptroller Hale conceded in Senate testimony that contractors cost two to three 

times civilians. What assurance can you provide that the headquarters cuts and cuts 

generally undertaken by the Department will take into account contractors as well 

as civilians and military? The Department was required in 2007 to establish an inventory of service contracts in order to better understand the cost and size of the 

contractor workforce. When will that inventory be complete and how is it being used 

to inform the Pentagon’s budget-cutting efforts? For example, how many contractors 

work in headquarters and how much do they cost? Presumably, the Pentagon wants 

to cut the contractor workforce by the same 20% as it intends to cut the civilian 

and military workforces? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. The size and cost of military and civilian personnel in your component’s management headquarters workforce are known. How many contractor employees are included in your component’s management headquarters workforce, 

what is their total cost, and what is the average cost of a contractor employee in 

your component’s management headquarters workforce? Will your component’s answers be based on the inventory of contract services? Are your component’s answers 

to those questions regarding the size and cost of service contractors reliable, comprehensive, and well-informed? If not, how can your component properly determine 

the extent to which your component should reduce its reliance on contractor personnel? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Both the Congress and the Administration have identified instances in which contractor personnel are inappropriately performing functions that 

are inherently governmental, closely associated with inherently governmental, and 

critical. Will your component take into account instances in which contractor personnel in the management headquarters workforce should be reduced because they 

are performing inappropriate functions? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. In recent testimony before the Senate Defense Appropriations 

Subcommittee, the Secretary and the Comptroller agreed that contractors are significantly more expensive than civilian personnel, particularly for the provision of 

long-term services. To what extent will your component generate savings in management headquarters workforce spending through insourcing, consistent with 10 

USC 2463? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are non-civilian personnel involved in making recommendations 

for reductions in total headquarters budgets? If so, how have the inevitable conflicts 

of interests been addressed? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent does your component have a policy of reviewing 

service contracts for savings when confronted with a requirement to furlough civilian personnel with the objective of using savings from service contracts (e.g., cancelling low-priority contracts or imposing deductive changes on such contracts) to offset 

the need to impose furloughs? If your component engaged in such efforts in FY13, 

when did such reviews occur, and what were the results of those reviews? 
116 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Why is the Army terminating the Modernization Thru Spare Program (PAC–2 convergence to GEM–T) in FY13 when the Average Per Unit Cost 

(APU) is $560K to upgrade an existing asset to GEM–T Configuration compared to 

a new PAC–3 Procurement at $3.3M+ during these times of great fiscal austerity? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sequestration resulted in 6 days of unpaid furlough for DOD civilians. Even though this was not as harsh as the original predicted 22 days, these 

civilians lost faith and trust in our leadership leaving morale at an all-time low. 

What is being done to blunt the effects of possible future furloughs as the highest 

quality personnel of our civilian workforce are already seeking employment in the 

private sector? More specifically, how are we going to preserve the competent, 

skilled workforce who will be needed to reset, maintain and modernize an evergrowing backlog at our depots and arsenals? 

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sequestration resulted in 6 days of unpaid furlough for DOD civilians. Even though this was not as harsh as the original predicted 22 days, these 

civilians lost faith and trust in our leadership leaving morale at an all-time low. 

What is being done to blunt the effects of possible future furloughs as the highest 

quality personnel of our civilian workforce are already seeking employment in the 

private sector? More specifically, how are we going to preserve the competent, 

skilled workforce who will be needed to reset, maintain and modernize an evergrowing backlog at our depots and arsenals? 

Admiral GREENERT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sequestration resulted in 6 days of unpaid furlough for DOD civilians. Even though this was not as harsh as the original predicted 22 days, these 

civilians lost faith and trust in our leadership leaving morale at an all-time low. 

What is being done to blunt the effects of possible future furloughs as the highest 

quality personnel of our civilian workforce are already seeking employment in the 

private sector? More specifically, how are we going to preserve the competent, 

skilled workforce who will be needed to reset, maintain and modernize an evergrowing backlog at our depots and arsenals? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sequestration resulted in 6 days of unpaid furlough for DOD civilians. Even though this was not as harsh as the original predicted 22 days, these 

civilians lost faith and trust in our leadership leaving morale at an all-time low. 

What is being done to blunt the effects of possible future furloughs as the highest 

quality personnel of our civilian workforce are already seeking employment in the 

private sector? More specifically, how are we going to preserve the competent, 

skilled workforce who will be needed to reset, maintain and modernize an evergrowing backlog at our depots and arsenals? 

General AMOS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Welsh, some recent internal Pentagon reviews have discussed delaying the next procurement of Space Based Infrared Systems and Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites. With long development timelines, and 

aging on-orbit constellations, how do you ensure you will continue to provide these 

critical capabilities to the warfighter? What is the risk if you are unable to provide 

missile warning and secure communication capabilities? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. General Welsh, can you please provide data on the number of close 

air support missions conducted by airframe for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Include data of missions by airframe that were ‘‘danger close’’ in 

support of ‘‘troops in contact.’’ Where the data exist, include the type of control used 

to execute the close air support mission. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. General Welsh, in public, Army and Marine commanders have advocated for maintaining close air support capability, specifically the A–10, within the 
117 

Air Force. In proposing to divest the Air Force of the entire fleet of A–10s, have 

the sister service chiefs been officially sought for comment on the proposed divestiture and loss of capability? If so, what have their responses been? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. General Welsh, has the Air Force conducted relevant simulations to 

ensure the F–35 can appropriately replace the A–10’s role in close air support, combat search and rescue (CSAR) support, strike coordination and recon (SCAR), and 

as a forward air controller (airborne)? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. General Welsh, in recent months, it has been brought to my attention that the Air Force is considering transferring the Combat Search and Rescue 

(CSAR) mission from the Air Combat Command (ACC) to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The transition would also change the primary CSAR aircraft from the HH–60 to the CV–22 Osprey. Members within the CSAR community 

have expressed concern that the CV–22 Osprey is wholly unsuited for the CSAR 

mission given the tremendous downdraft created by the airframe in hover mode. 

Has the Air Force conducted appropriate, comparative simulations and testing to 

ensure the CV–22 is the best airframe to conduct the CSAR mission? Please provide 

the results of the simulation and testing. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Due to sequestration, the Air Force recently cancelled its 

SpaceFence program with no indication of when or if at all it will resume the program or if it will begin to build the next-generation program. Can you address the 

strategic significance of a loss of this kind? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Welsh, no one needs to remind you of the importance of our 

space systems to the warfighter. In light of the criticality of these systems, can you 

describe the importance of space situational awareness? And also, please describe 

how the future Space Fence will contribute to that mission, and how that program 

is affected by the Strategic Choices and Management Review. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Welsh, if we know the warfighter needs the Space Fence, 

why are is the Department delaying the acquisition of a critical capability? It would 

seem that we need to find the money elsewhere, rather than delay this important 

program. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Welsh, I have been hearing rumblings that one of the platforms you are looking at cutting completely is the KC–10 tanker. This was also included as part of an Air Force Times article earlier this week: ‘‘AF Considers Scrapping A–10s, KC–10s, F–15Cs, CSAR Helos.’’ The KC–10 platform has more than 

proved itself a workhorse in support of air refueling in Iraq, Afghanistan, homeland 

defense and other missions as called upon. It can refuel Air Force, Navy, and international military aircraft with its dual boom and hose-and-drogue systems. I am 

proud to have Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB MDL) in my District, which 

as you know is home to the KC–10, supporting the Northeast Tanker Corridor and 

various overseas deployments. 

With the new tanker coming online slower than expected, and the fact that there 

is no decrease in refueling demand, for the record what are your plans for this critical platform? Is there programmed funding in FY15 in support of this vital refueling asset? I would like to meet with you personally on this issue in the near future. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Æ