Reverse and Remand; Opinion Filed June 28, 2016.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-15-01528-CV

FREEDOM LHV, LLC, Appellant

V.

IFC WHITE ROCK, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-03920-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and O’Neill1

Opinion by Justice Stoddart

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order granting a temporary 

injunction. The order enjoins Freedom LHV, LLC from terminating IFC White Rock, Inc.’s 

right to peaceful possession of leased premises, including initiating any “lockout” against IFC.

In four issues, Freedom argues the trial court erred by granting the temporary injunction. We 

conclude the temporary injunction is void because it does not comply with the mandatory 

requirements of rule of civil procedure 683. We reverse the trial court’s order granting the 

temporary injunction, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the case to the trial court 

for further proceedings.

 

1

The Hon. Michael J. O’Neill, Justice, Assigned
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IFC operates a health club in premises it leases from Freedom. A dispute arose between 

the parties after the roof above the health club began leaking and water damaged the interior of 

the club. IFC sued Freedom. In its petition, IFC asserted that Freedom would terminate IFC’s

right to possession of the premises if it failed to replace the roof. IFC sought a temporary 

injunction to prevent Freedom from terminating IFC’s right to possession of the leased premises. 

Freedom asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. Following a two-day hearing, the trial 

court issued an order granting a temporary injunction. The trial court’s order states:

2

1. Defendant intends to terminate immediately Plaintiff’s right to peaceful possession of 

the leased premises by initiating a lockout of Plaintiff;

2. Unless this restraint is ordered immediately, without notice to Defendant, Plaintiff 

will suffer irreparable injury immediately, because no other legal remedy can be 

obtained and effected before the injury occurs;

3. Plaintiff will probably be awarded a recovery in this cause;

4. If Defendant’s threatened conduct as described above is not enjoined during the 

pendency of this suit, Plaintiff will be injured because: Plaintiff’s business interests 

will be terminated, which will lead not only to financial losses but additional harm to 

its employees’ livelihood, well-being, and access to medical treatment. Further, the 

financial losses alleged are not readily quantifiable;

5. Plaintiff has exercised due diligence in prosecuting the underlying claim in this cause;

6. Plaintiff’s injury will outweigh any injury to Defendant that may occur on issuance of 

this injunction;

7. The injunction will not disserve the public interest;

8. Defendant’s intended conduct as described above will change the status quo, which 

should be maintained in the public interest.

The trial court ordered a “temporary injunction issue . . . enjoining Freedom LHV, LLC from 

terminating Plaintiff’s right to peaceful possession of the leased premises including initiating any 

‘lockout’ against Plaintiff to the leased premises.”

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove three specific 

elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and 

(3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 

356 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 

 

2

IFC is the plaintiff below and Freedom is the defendant.
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S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011 (West 2008)). For 

purposes of a temporary injunction, an injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be 

adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain 

pecuniary standard. Id. (citing Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Wilson N. Jones Mem’l Hosp. v. Huff, 

188 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)). “The general rule at equity is that 

before injunctive relief can be obtained, it must appear that there does not exist an adequate 

remedy at law.” Id. at 744 (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 210). 

In relevant part, rule of civil procedure 683 requires every order granting a temporary 

injunction state the reasons for its issuance, be specific in terms, and describe in reasonable detail 

and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; El Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 744. “[T]he obvious purpose of [rule 683] is 

to adequately inform a party of what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so 

enjoined.” El Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 744 (quoting Schulz v. Schulz, 478 S.W.2d 239, 244–

45 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, no writ)).

A trial court’s order stating its reasons for granting a temporary injunction must be 

specific and legally sufficient on its face and not merely conclusory. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 

(order “shall be specific in terms”); El Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 744-45 (collecting cases). 

The requirements of rule of civil procedure 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed. El 

Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 745 (citing Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 

337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Indep. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 795 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)). Even if a sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere 

in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms that rule of civil 

procedure 683 is mandatory. See State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1971) 

(Calvert, J., concurring) (“The requirement in Rule 683 that the reasons for issuing an injunction 
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be stated in the order could hardly be couched in stronger language. It is mandatory.”); El 

Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 745. 

If a temporary injunction order fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of rule 

of civil procedure 683, it is void. El Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 745 (collecting cases). “An 

appellate court can declare a temporary injunction void even if the issue has not been raised by 

the parties.” Id. at 745 n.4 (quoting City of Sherman v. Eiras, 157 S.W.3d 931, 931 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, no pet.)).

Here, the trial court’s order does not state the specific reasons for its issuance, specify 

any facts relied on, or describe in reasonable detail the acts sought to be restrained. See id. at 

744. Other than stating that IFC’s “business interests will be terminated,” without any 

explanation about how or why, the temporary injunction order simply sets out the elements 

necessary for injunctive relief.3 The trial court’s conclusory recitals of the elements of a 

temporary injunction without explanation, including about how IFC would suffer probable, 

imminent, and irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, are insufficient. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 

(order “shall be specific in terms”); El Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 747 (conclusory statement 

plaintiff “will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy” failed 

to explain probable, imminent, and irreparable harm absent injunction); Collins, 261 S.W.3d at 

796 (collecting cases) (recital of “irreparable damage herein and injury by virtue of the 

Defendants’ conduct” lacks the specificity required by rule 683); In re Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 

299, 305-06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (temporary-injunction 

order reciting: “The Court finds . . . Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury for which he has no 

legal remedy if this injunction is not granted” was void). 

 

3

To the extent the trial court relied on alleged harm to IFC’s employees to support its finding that IFC would be irreparably harmed, IFC 

stated in its brief on appeal that it “does not contend that such harm constitutes irreparable injury” to IFC. We agree and do not consider the trial 

court’s recitation of harm to employees’ wages, well-being, and access to medical treatment to be harm to IFC.
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Because the trial court’s order granting the temporary injunction fails to comply with the 

mandatory requirements of rule of civil procedure 683, it is void. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; El 

Tacaso, Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 745. 

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order granting the temporary injunction, dissolve the 

temporary injunction, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

151528F.P05

/Craig Stoddart/

CRAIG STODDART

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

FREEDOM LHV, LLC, Appellant

No. 05-15-01528-CV V.

IFC WHITE ROCK, INC., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 1, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-03920-A.

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. 

Justices Fillmore and O'Neill participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we reverse the trial court’s order 

granting the temporary injunction, we dissolve the temporary injunction, and we remand the case 

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 28th day of June, 2016.