alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(logo) Rialto CAPITAL

 

 

**2016 Annual Statement ofServicer Compliance (Item 1123)**

 

 

Pooling and ServicingAgreement (the “Pooling and Servicing Agreement”) dated as ofSeptember 1, 2016 by and among GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, asDepositor, Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Associationas Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC as General Special Servicer,TriMont Real Estate Advisors, LLC as 540 West Madison Special Servicer,Pentalpha Surveillance LLC as Operating Advisor and Asset RepresentationsReviewer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Certificate Administratorand Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee relating to the GSMortgage Securities Trust 2016-GS3, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,Series 2016-GS3 **(GSMS 2016-GS3)**

 

 

The undersigned, a dulyauthorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, as special servicer (the“Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1. All servicing activitiesand performance of such servicing activities under the Pooling and ServicingAgreement are performed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2. A review of the servicingactivities and performance by the Special Servicer for the period of September 30,2016 to December 31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordancewith the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been conducted under mysupervision.

 

3. To the best of myknowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in allmaterial respects for the Reporting Period and if there has been a failure tofulfill any such obligations in any material respect, each failure and thenature and status thereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

Certified by: /s/ Adam Singer

Adam Singer, Managing Director

 

Date: March 1, 2017
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                           1,101
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,081
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      8,892
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                16,538
<PP&E>                                           9,674
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  26,662
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,571
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            41
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         32
<OTHER-SE>                                      15,404
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    26,662
<SALES>                                          7,704
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,704
<CGS>                                            5,115
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,115
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,283
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 145
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    161
<INCOME-TAX>                                        59
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                101
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       101
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03
        

</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 10(k) THIRD AMENDMENT TO
AGREEMENT OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
OF
PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, LP This Third Amendment (Amendment) to the Agreement of Limited Partnership
dated March 3, 1992, among Arcadian Corporation, a Delaware corporation
(Arcadian), as the General Partner, Mark S. Flynn, as the Organizational
Limited Partner, and Arcadian Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
(Arcadian Partners), as the Limited Partner, as amended by Amendment to
Limited Partnership Agreement dated March 6, 1997 between PCS Nitrogen, Inc. a
Delaware corporation (Nitrogen), as successor to Arcadian, and Arcadian
Partners and by Second Amendment to Limited Partnership Agreement dated
December 15, 2002 between PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer Operations, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (Operations), as successor to Nitrogen, and PCS LP, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (PCS LP, together with Operations, Partners), as
successor to Arcadian Partners (such Agreement of Limited Partnership, as so
amended, being referred to as the Agreement), is made this 15th day of
December 2003 between Operations and PCSLP. WHEREAS, Operations and PCS LP are all the Partners to the Partnership
Agreement; WHEREAS, the Partners wish to amend the Partnership Agreement with respect
to distribution to the General Partner; NOW THEREFORE, effective as of the date of this Amendment, the Partners
hereby agree to amend the Agreement as follows: The Partners hereby agree as follows:  1.
    
    Add the following in its entirety to the end of Paragraph (a) of Section 4.6
Capital Accounts:To the extent that a Partner shall have a capital account balance in
excess of its Percentage Interest in the Partnership of the sum of the Capital
Accounts of both Partners, the Partnership may make distributions to that
Partner of such excess to the extent that the General Partners conclude that
such a distribution would not be detrimental to the operations of the
Partnership and would not be in violation of applicable law, including Section
17-607 of the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as amended (or
any successor provision thereto).




---



##### 



2.
    
    Except as set forth above, all provisions of the Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Operations and PCS LP have caused this Amendment to be
duly executed and delivered by their respective representatives as of this 15th
day of December, 2003.  PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER OPERATIONS, INC.By:
    /s/   James F. DietzJames F. DietzPresidentPCS LP, INC.By:
    /s/   James F. DietzJames F. DietzPresident
§ 44.6419-1 Credit or refund generally. ( a ) *Overpayment of wagering tax; in general.* If a person overpays the tax imposed under section 4401, he may either file a claim for refund on Form 843 or take credit for such overpayment against the tax due on a subsequent monthly return. A complete statement of the facts involving the overpayment shall be attached either to the claim or to the return on which the credit is claimed. Every claim for refund shall be supported by evidence showing the name and address of the taxpayer, the date of payment of the tax, and the amount of such tax. A credit taken on a return shall be supported by evidence of the same character.
( b ) *Statement supporting credit or refund.* No credit or refund shall be allowed whether in pursuance of a court decision or otherwise unless the taxpayer files a statement explaining satisfactorily the reason for claiming the credit or refund and establishing ( 1 ) that he has not collected (whether as a separate charge or otherwise) the amount of the tax from the person who placed the wager on which the tax was imposed, or
( 2 ) that he has either repaid the amount of the tax to the person who placed the wager or has secured the written consent of such person to the allowance of the credit or refund. In the latter case, the written consent of the person who placed the wager shall accompany the statement filed with the credit or refund claim. The statement supporting the credit or refund claim shall also show whether any previous claim for credit or refund covering the amount involved, or any part thereof, has been filed. If the overpayment of tax relates to a laid-off wager accepted by the taxpayer, no credit or refund shall be allowed or made unless the taxpayer complies with the provisions of the first sentence of this paragraph, not only as to the person who placed the laid-off wager, but also with respect to the person who placed the original wager.
( c ) *Limitation on credit or refund.* No claim for credit or refund of a tax shall be allowed unless presented within the period of limitations prescribed in section 6511. (For regulations under section 6511, see the Regulations on Procedure and Administration (part 301 of this chapter).)
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVA NIA** 

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF CHAIR AND VICE - CHAIR OF THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : No. 288 DISCIPLINARY BOARD APPOINTMENT DOCKET

**ORDER PER CURIA** **M AN**  **D NOW**  , this 22 nd day of February, 2016, Jane Gowen Penny, Esquire, is hereby designated as Chair and David E. Schwager, Esquire, as Vice - Chair of the Disciplinary Board of Pennsylvania commencing April 1, 2016. Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
#### Janet Melendez, Appellant, v New York City Housing Authority, Respondent.

[803 NYS2d 547]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan J. Saks, J.), entered July 30, 2004, which granted defendant building owner’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff’s admission that she never saw what it was that caused her to slip renders her claim that it was food debris, a condition she had observed in the stairwell on previous visits to the building, mere speculation. In any event, assuming that it was a food debris/oily substance hazard that caused plaintiff to fall, there is no evidence tending to show that defendant created *212or had actual notice of the condition, or how long it had been on the stairwell before the accident *(see Rivera v 2160 Realty Co., L.L.C.,*4 NY3d 837 [2005], *revg*10 AD3d 503 [2004]). Plaintiffs prior observations at best tended to show only a general awareness by defendant of litter in the stairwell, and were thus insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to constructive notice *(see id.; Piacquadio v Recine Realty Corp.,*84 NY2d 967 [1994]). Concur—Buckley, P.J., Tom, Andrias, Sullivan and Malone, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2

                                  Certification
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                                   As Adopted
                         Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                                   Sarbanes -
                                Oxley Act of 2002

         In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of HQ  Sustainable  Maritime
Industries,  Inc. (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September
30, 2004, as filed with the  Securities and Exchange  Commission  ("SEC") on the
date hereof (the "Report"),  the undersigned  officer of the Company  certifies,
pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of her knowledge:

         1.       the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

         A signed  original of this written  statement  has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and will be  furnished to the SEC or
its staff upon request.



 /s/ Jean-Pierre Dallaire
-------------------------
Jean-Pierre Dallaire
Chief Financial Officer

November 15, 2004




         This  Certification of Chief Financial  Officer pursuant to Section 906
of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002. This exhibit is not "filed" for purposes of
Section 18 of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 but is instead  furnished as
provided by applicable rules of the Securities Exchange Commission.
§ 31.3402(o)-1 Extension of withholding to supplemental unemployment compensation benefits. ( a ) *In general.* Withholding of income tax is required under section 3402(o) with respect to payments of supplemental unemployment compensation benefits made after December 31, 1970, which are treated under paragraph (b)(14) of § 31.3401(a)-1 as if they were wages.
( b ) *Withholding exemption certificates.* For purposes of section 3402(f) (2) and (3) and the regulations thereunder (relating to withholding exemption certificates), in the case of supplemental unemployment compensation benefits an employment relationship shall be considered to commence with either the date on which such benefits begin to accrue or January 1, 1971, whichever is later, and the withholding exemption certificate furnished the employer with respect to such commencement of employment shall be considered the first certificate furnished the employer. The withholding exemption certificate furnished by the employee to his former employer (with whom his employment has been involuntarily terminated, within the meaning of paragraph (b)(14)(ii) of § 31.3401(a)-1) shall be treated as meeting the requirements of section 3402(f)(2)(A) and the regulations thereunder if such former employer furnishes such certificate to the employee's current employer, as defined in paragraph (g) of § 31.340(d)-1, or if such former employer is the agent of such current employer with respect to the employee's withholding exemption certificate. However, the preceding sentence shall not be applicable if such employee furnishes a new withholding exemption certificate to such current employer (or his agent), provided that such withholding exemption certificate meets the requirements of section 3402(f)(2)(A) and the regulations thereunder. See the definitions of payroll period in paragraph (c) of § 31.3401(b)-1 and of employee in paragraph (g) of § 31.3401(c)-1.
[T.D. 7068, 35 FR 17329, Nov. 11, 1970, as amended by T.D. 7803, 47 FR 3546, Jan. 26, 1982]
#### Jacqueline Carr, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Cody Carr, an Infant, et al., Appellants, v Burnwell Gas of Newark, Inc., et al., Respondents.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[803 NYS2d 453]

Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Wayne County (Dennis M. Kehoe, A.J.), entered January 28, 2004 in a personal injury action. The order denied plaintiffs’ motions for an order setting aside the verdict and directing a new trial on the issue of liability.

It is hereby ordered that said appeals be and the same hereby are unanimously dismissed without costs *(see Smith v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens,*155 AD2d 435 [1989]; *see also*CPLR 5501 [a] [1], [2]). Present—Hurlbutt, J.P., Scudder, Smith, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
#### Mary Canfield McPadden *v.*Harold J. Morris et als.

Maltbie, C. J., Avery, Brown, Jennings and Ells, Js,

Argued May 10

decided June 5, 1940.

*658
      *Francis J. King*and *Isadore L. Kotler,*with whom on the brief, was *Alexander L. DeLaney,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Walter Werner,*with whom was *Harry Schwartz,*and, on the brief, *John V. Donnelly,*for the appellees (defendants).

Per Curiam.

For the reasons stated in the memorandum of decision, quoted above, we find correct the conclusion reached, that the plaintiff was not “the surviving spouse of such member who shall have been married to him and living with him as his wife at the time of his death,” within the meaning of the charter provision. As stated by the trial court, there is no room for construction when the wording of the statute is clear and direct.

The brief of the plaintiff is, in the main, concerned with the claimed inequitable result of this application of the statute. She points out that while she was living apart from her husband, it was through no fault of hers and argues that the Legislature could not have intended to deprive widows in her situation of the benefit of the pension. Similar arguments have been frequently made and have never prevailed where the wording of the statute is as plain and unambiguous as that here under consideration. *State*v. *Nelson,*126 Conn. 412, 416, 11 Atl. (2d) 856. We are not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom of legislation, *Connelly*v. *Bridgeport,*104 Conn. 238, 249, 132 Atl. 690, nor with the recognition of equities which contravene such wording. *Wilcox*v. *Bliss,*116 Conn. 329, 332, 164 Atl. 659; *Blodgett*v. *New Britain Trust Co.,*108 Conn. 715, 719, 145 Atl. 56; “We construe the Act as it is, and are not concerned in determining whether, if other provisions had been included, the Act would *659have been a better Act.” *State ex rel. Lewis*v. *Turney,*97 Conn. 496, 504, 117 Atl. 499.

The phrase “living with him” and similar wording has uniformly been interpreted as meaning actually residing with, making a home with. *Nelson’s Case,*supra, 469; *Gallagher’s Case,*supra; *State ex rel. Livingston*v. *Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Association,*205 Minn. 204, 285 N. W. 479. In each of these cases the wife was living apart from her husband without fault on her part but relief was denied her because of the wording of the statute. In the only case cited by the plaintiff on this point, *Reymond*v. *Louisiana Trust & Savings Bank,*177 La. 409, 425, 148 So. 663, the question arose under a homestead statute and the husband was not dead but very much alive and apparently engaged in a conspiracy to defraud his wife and the court.

There is no error.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 167 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 167

 Expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the Iraqi Government's 
           campaign against the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            November 17 (legislative day, November 2), 1993

    Mr. Moynihan (for himself and Mr. Pell) submitted the following 
  resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the Iraqi Government's 
           campaign against the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

Whereas the government of Saddam Hussein has a long and well documented history 
        of brutal repression of the population of Iraq;
Whereas Saddam Hussein carried out a methodical campaign of genocide against 
        Iraqi Kurds, including extensive efforts to render large areas of Iraqi 
        Kurdistan uninhabitable and the use of poison gas in violation of 
        international law;
Whereas Saddam Hussein is now conducting a massive campaign of repression 
        against the population of Shi'ite Arabs in southern Iraq known as the 
        marsh Arabs or the Maadan;
Whereas this campaign includes an enormous effort to drain the wetlands at the 
        confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates which have sustained the 
        distinct marsh Arab civilization for thousands of years;
Whereas in addition to draining the wetlands Iraqi troops have extensively 
        shelled villages in the marshes;
Whereas the campaign against the marsh Arabs appears to constitute an effort to 
        drive the entire civilian population out of the marshes and to destroy 
        the way of life for a distinct community within Iraq;
Whereas there are recent reports that Iraqi troops have employed chemical 
        weapons against the marsh Arabs in violation of international law and 
        United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq; and
Whereas prior to the Gulf War the world community did not stop Saddam Hussein 
        from employing similar tactics against the Kurds: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the United States Government should immediately--
            (a) raise the issue of Saddam Hussein's campaign against 
        the marsh Arabs in the Security Council;
            (b) insist that United Nations weapons inspectors be 
        permitted to conduct on site inspections concerning the 
        possible use by Iraqi troops of chemical weapons;
            (c) seek to provide humanitarian assistance to persons 
        fleeing from the marshes; and
            (d) study and report to the Congress concerning the 
        environmental consequences of the destruction of this vast 
        wetlands area.

                                 <all>
```
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 JUAN R. EDWARDS, 2 Petitioner-Appellant, 3
v. NO. A-1-CA-36045 4 LAUREN A. WRIGHT, 5 Respondent-Appellee, 6 and 7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. 8 HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 9 Intervenor. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 11 Matthew J. Wilson, District Judge 12 Juan R. Edwards 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Pro Se Appellant 15 David Foster Law Firm, P.C. 16 David R. Foster 17 Albuquerque, NM 18 for Appellee 192 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 VANZI, Chief Judge. 2 {1} Summary affirmance was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of 3 proposed summary disposition. No memorandum opposing summary affirmance has 4 been filed and the time for doing so has expired. 5 {2} AFFIRMED. 6 {3} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________________________________ 8 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

_________________________________ 11 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 12

_________________________________ 13 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 14
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 17

- 00330

- CR

Britt Lee Miller

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From Criminal District Court No. 1

o f Tarrant County (1456595D )

June 7, 2018

Opinion by Justi ce Gabriel

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

Justice Lee Gabriel
§ 31.3306(b)(9)-1 Moving expenses. ( a ) The term “wages” does not include remuneration paid on or after November 1, 1964, to or on behalf of an employee, either as an advance or a reimbursement, specifically for moving expenses incurred or expected to be incurred, if (and to the extent that) at the time of payment it is reasonable to believe that a corresponding deduction is or will be allowable to the employee under section 217. The reasonable belief contemplated by the statute may be based upon any evidence reasonably sufficient to induce such belief, even though such evidence may be insufficient upon closer examination by the district director or the courts finally to establish that a deduction is allowable under section 217. The reasonable belief shall be based upon the application of section 217 and the regulations thereunder in Part 1 of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations). When used in this section, the term “moving expenses” has the same meaning as when used in section 217 and the regulations thereunder.
( b ) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (a) of this section, or in a numbered paragraph of section 3306(b), amounts paid to or on behalf of an employee for moving expenses are wages for purposes of section 3306(b).
[T.D. 7375, 40 FR 42351, Sept. 12, 1975]