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EXAMINING NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: IRAN AFTER

ROUHANI’S FIRST 100 DAYS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 13, 2013

Serial No. 113–107

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 6

Ms. Danielle Pletka, vice president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 23

Mr. Colin Kahl, associate professor, Georgetown University ............................... 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement .............................................................. 9

Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement .............................................................. 25

Mr. Colin Kahl: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 82

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 83

(1)

EXAMINING NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: IRAN 

AFTER ROUHANI’S FIRST 100 DAYS 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing in the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee is on Examining Nuclear Negotiations: Iran After 

Rouhani’s First 100 Days. We are going to evaluate the current 

state of nuclear diplomacy with Iran. And, of course, last week 

world powers in Iran held a second round of negotiations in Geneva. These are historical talks with a potentially profound impact on 

the national security interests of the United States. 

The administration is looking to negotiate an interim agreement 

in which Iran commits to placing some limits on its nuclear program for 6 months in exchange for immediate and significant sanctions relief with reportedly as much as $50 billion in frozen oil revenues being released as part of the agreement. This deal was not 

reached in Switzerland. 

Some U.S. allies believe the Iranian commitment was insufficient. Of great concern, the proposal failed to adequately address 

Iran’s heavy water reactor. The proposal also, Members, would 

allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium and would allow Iran to 

continue to build centrifuges. The French Foreign Minister warned 

of a fool’s game, in his words. 

There is growing concern in Congress that the outlines of this 

agreement do not meet the standards needed to protect the United 

States and to protect U.S. allies. Central to these talks is the issue 

of uranium enrichment and reprocessing. These technologies can 

produce the explosive material needed for a nuclear weapon. Indeed that is why Iran wants the capability, and that is why multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions have reiterated one demand, and that demand is that all of Iran’s enrichment activities, 

regardless of their purpose, must be suspended. 

On this question the world has spoken decisively, but the administration envisions permitting Iran to enrich to low levels. Regardless of the name, low-enriched uranium and medium-enriched uranium are close to weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. That is 

because the effort needed to produce weapons material eases as 

you advance. Nonproliferation experts tell us that while mediumVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:07 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\111313\85551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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enriched uranium is nearly weapons grade, low-enriched uranium 

still represents seven-tenths of the effort to get to weapons grade. 

Of course, Iran continues to assert that the nonproliferation treaty grants it the so-called right to pursue these dangerous technologies. We must remember, and I would suggest we must insist, 

that the treaty was designed to stop the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. Simply because a nuclear activity can be used for people 

for peaceful purposes does not mean the NPT’s members have an 

unconditional right to pursue or acquire it, let alone a country that 

has actively deceived the international community and violated its 

International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear safeguard agreements. Iran can have peaceful energy, peaceful nuclear energy, but 

not with the access to technology that could be used to advance a 

weapons program. 

There is the question of sanctions, which have been painstakingly developed by Congress over many, many years. Sanctions 

have battered the Iranian economy not just because of their depth, 

not just because of the breadth of the sanctions, but because of the 

market forces at play. International companies seeking to avoid 

their web, the web of sanctions, steer clear of Iran. As one witness 

has written, Iran sanctions have been as much psychological as 

legal. The easing of sanctions, no matter how minor they my 

seem—and the Geneva sanctions relief was not minor—the easing 

of those sanctions could deflate these forces, eliminate our leverage, 

and indeed remove the reason, 600 billion in capital flight out of 

the country, the very reason that Iran is at the table today. 

Sanctions have forced Iran to the table. We should build upon 

the success with additional measures like those now pending in the 

Senate to compel Iran to make meaningful and lasting concessions. 

The Iranian regime hasn’t paused its nuclear program; why should 

we pause our sanctions efforts as the administration is pressuring 

Congress to do? Only when the Iranian regime is forced to decide 

between economic collapse or compromise on its rush to develop a 

nuclear weapons capability do we have a chance to avoid that terrible outcome. 

I will now turn to the ranking member for any opening comments he may have. Mr. Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you for holding this important hearing and to welcome all 

of our witnesses here this morning. I look forward to hearing their 

testimony. 

In late September Chairman Royce and I wrote an op-ed about 

Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani. We were curious if beyond 

the charm offensive and gentle smile, he would use his first 100 

days in office to attempt to fundamentally change the direction of 

the Iranian Government and demonstrate a genuine willingness to 

end Iran’s nuclear weapons program. The chairman and I wrote 

this op-ed piece together because we thought it was important to 

show a congressional unity on such an important issue as Iran. 

And after Rouhani’s first 105 days in office, it is clear to me that 

Iran still poses a significant threat to the United States and to our 

allies. Iran remains the world’s top state sponsor of terrorism, and 

continues to support Hezbollah. They are actively supporting the 

Assad regime in Syria, which has slaughtered tens of thousands of 

3

innocent civilians, and they are working to destabilize our allies in 

the gulf. 

But the biggest threat so far, by far, is Iran’s continuing effort 

to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Many experts believe that 

Iran is approximately 1 year away or maybe even less from acquiring this capability, and we must do everything possible to prevent 

that from happening. 

The successive sanctions bills crafted by this committee and 

signed into law by President Obama, taken together with international sanctions, have had a devastating impact on Iran’s economy. Iran is having trouble selling its oil in the global markets, has 

been cut off from the international financial system, and is starved 

for hard currency. This intense pressure brought Iran back to the 

negotiating table, and this pressure must be maintained, and 

strengthened if necessary, until Iran has taken verifiable steps to 

freeze and even dismantle this nuclear weapons program. 

The Iranians are masters at negotiation for the sake of buying 

time. We must remember that Rouhani formerly served as Iran’s 

chief nuclear negotiator, and he has bragged about deceiving the 

West in previous negotiations. 

Now, some people say he is a reformer. I don’t believe he is a reformer because no reformers were allowed to run for President. He 

may be the most moderate of all the hardliners that were allowed 

to run, but he is no reformer. The reformers were all eliminated. 

And it is not clear to me that even if he decided or desired to do 

so, that he would be able to take Iran into a new direction. It appears to me that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei still has 

the power, and so we really just don’t know where we are going. 

So while we must have a genuine openness to a diplomatic process that resolves all outstanding issues, we must judge Iran by its 

actions, not by any rhetoric that we might hear. And, by the way, 

the rhetoric that Rouhani came back to Tehran and spoke to the 

Iranian Parliament is rhetoric with hard line and not much different from what we have heard over the past several years. 

About 4 weeks ago the Iranians came to Geneva with what some 

thought appeared to be a new attitude. For the first time they admitted that the sanctions were hurting them badly. And for the 

first time they started talking about the specifics of an agreement. 

Since that initial meeting, technical experts from the P5+1 have 

met with their Iranian counterparts to discuss the contours of a 

possible deal, and at the end of last week another key meeting took 

place at the ministerial level. Much has been reported in the press 

about this latest meeting, the offer that was left on the table, and 

the reactions of Iran and the P5+1. Let us be clear: None of us here 

today were at the negotiating table, and as far as I know, none of 

us have yet been briefed on the details, so I think it would be wise 

for all of us to speak with some degree of caution until all the facts 

are known. 

But having said that, I am deeply troubled by reports that the 

proposed agreement would not have required Tehran to stop all enrichment. If Iran intends to show good faith during these talks, I 

believe it must at a minimum abide by United Nations Security 

Council resolutions calling for a halt to enrichment, and it is my 

hope that we achieve much more. 

4

In addition, I forcefully reject any notion that Iran has a right 

to enrichment, and that is the position the administration has publicly supported on many occasions. The bottom line for me is this: 

If these talks are about Iran abandoning its nuclear program, then 

to show good faith at the very least while the talks are going on, 

Iran should stop enrichment, period. 

Given the failure to reach an agreement in Geneva, I believe it 

is time for my colleagues in the Senate to take up the Iran sanctions legislation that I coauthored with Chairman Royce and which 

the House passed overwhelmingly this summer. We must make it 

crystally clear to Iran that even tougher sanctions are coming down 

the pike if the regime is unwilling to take concrete and verifiable 

steps to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program. 

I know the Secretary of State has a profound interest in the legislation Congress is considering on Iran. I hope the administration 

understands that we cannot take their concerns fully into account, 

nor truly understand events at the negotiation table, or grasp the 

impact our legislation may have on their efforts if they do not do 

a better job of keeping Congress informed and taking into account 

what Congress thinks. 

I support the President’s effort to engage Iran and believe we 

must continue to explore every diplomatic option to resolve this crisis. Nobody wants another conflict in the Middle East, but we must 

also recognize the fact that Iran is getting closer and closer to a 

nuclear weapons capability with each passing day. There is still 

time to test Iran’s intentions, but that time is growing short. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. I 

look forward to hearing the suggestions from our witnesses about 

the next best steps to take to tackle this difficult problem. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go now to the chair of the Middle East Subcommittee, Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we know, in September Secretary Kerry said that a bad deal 

is worse than no deal on the Iranian nuclear negotiations, yet now 

reports indicate that the administration was willing to offer Iran 

limited sanctions relief in return for a 6-month pause to only some 

of its nuclear program. The administration has seemingly acquiesced to the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran and has failed to learn 

from past negotiations with that rogue regime. 

We must not accept Iran’s false claim to the right of enrichment, 

nor should we offer to ease any sanctions on this murderous regime. Iran would be able to quickly start up its enrichment program due to its advanced centrifuges without irreparably harming 

its objectives. But if we step back on our sanctions, it will be extremely hard to reinstate them. 

There must be no deal that does not include a full and verifiable 

dismantling of all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and until Iran is 

ready to accept those terms, we must continue to increase the pressure by fully implementing sanctions on the book and enacting 

even stricter sanctions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

5

Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida is ranking member of the Middle East 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member 

Engel, for calling this hearing. 

Let me be absolutely clear: The international community cannot 

permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons capability, and every option 

must remain on the table to ensure that it does not. This conflict 

will only end when Iran ends its effort to acquire nuclear weapons 

and we can verify this action with full and total confidence. 

We know this Iranian regime has misled the international community for years, claiming only peaceful intentions while installing 

thousands of advanced centrifuges and building a heavy water reactor at Arak. It is time to put Iran to the test. Any agreement, 

partial or full, should do this: Iran must immediately come clean 

about its entire nuclear program. Iran should respond to the evidence of its nuclear weapons program by granting immediate access to Parchin, the hidden military site that has yet to be open 

to international inspectors, and it should mothball Arak, the heavy 

water plant that will accelerate the weapons program. 

With diplomatic talks resuming in 7 days, I urge our Senate colleagues to continue to advance this sanctions legislation. It is the 

crushing economic sanctions that force the Iranians on a march to 

the negotiating table. Tougher sanctions will not, as some have 

suggested, rule out a diplomatic resolution; they will strengthen 

our ability to get one that ends Iran’s nuclear program. This regime must know exactly what is at stake if diplomacy fails. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

We now go to Judge Ted Poe of Texas, chairman of the Terrorism 

and Nonproliferation Subcommittee. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Iran has technology-enriched uranium and has developed nuclear 

weapons with Israel and the United States in its sights. It seems 

the administration believes that appeasement and lessening sanctions will help negotiate a deal with Iran. 

When I met with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu last week, he 

agreed with me that our sanctions are the only reason why Iran 

is at the table in the first place. He said this proposed deal was 

the worst deal of the century. I agree. 

What Iran wants is to ease the sanctions so that it can continue 

developing nuclear weapons without the pain of sanctions to its 

economy. Who would have thought that the French would save us 

from making a bum deal. The United States must be clear there 

will be no reductions in sanctions without verified steps to show 

that Iran is abandoning its nuclear weapons program, not just a 

temporary freeze on development. Mr. Rouhani is a slick snake oil 

salesman. He puts his arm around the West and stabs us in back 

at the same time. They cannot be trusted. No deal, Mr. Rouhani. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brad Sherman of California, ranking 

member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Our sanctions program for the last 3 years is one 

of the very few things that our Federal Government is doing that 

works. It is one of the very few things that is bipartisan. That is 

6

why we need to do more of it, not less. And that is why the Senate 

should immediately pass the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, which 

passed the House with 400 votes. 

An interim deal is a bad idea because what the Iranians get 

eliminates the threat to regime survival by just reducing the sanctions enough to restore their economy. What we get is at best a few 

months delay in when they have a nuclear weapon. They can restore their nuclear program at the end of the deal easily by flipping 

the switch. We will have a hard time reassembling other countries 

to impose strict sanctions when their businesses want do business 

as usual. And $50 billion for them while they continue their plutonium enrichment plant in Arak seems like a bad idea. 

It is time to declare that Iran has no right to enrich because it 

has violated the NPT, and it is time to move toward a final deal 

in which Iran has—gives up its centrifuges and imports its fuel, 

just as Canada does, just as Sweden does, just as South Korea 

does. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

panel of experts on Iran. Mr. Mark Dubowitz is the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is an expert 

on sanctions and previously testified before the committee. He has 

advised the U.S. administration and numerous foreign governments on Iran sanctions issues. 

Before joining the American Enterprise Institute, Ms. Danielle 

Pletka served for 10 years as senior professional staff member for 

the Near East and South Asia on the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Foreign Relations. She is currently a vice president of AEI. 

Mr. Colin Kahl is an associate professor at Georgetown University. He was previously the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for the Middle East at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2011, serving as 

senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements 

will be made part of record. The members here may have 5 days 

to submit statements or questions or extraneous material for the 

record. And we will ask, of course, all our witnesses to summarize 

their testimony to 5 minutes as we have your written testimony in 

the record. 

We will begin with you, Mr. Dubowitz. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Thank you, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify to this committee, which really has done so 

much to enhance coercive diplomacy with Iran through sanctions. 

It is an honor to be here as well with Dani and with Colin. 

Regrettably, the proposed Geneva deal was not likely to keep 

Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. The French Foreign Minister rightly criticized the proposed agreement because it relaxed 

economic sanctions, while only reigning in the less important components of Iran’s nuclear program. Now, this is not surprising. 

Over the years no country has been more consistent than France 

7

in recognizing the Iranian regime’s mendacity over its nuclear 

weapons ambitions. With talks set to resume on November 20th, 

lawmakers who want to encourage Western negotiators to cut a 

better deal now have an opportunity to do so by enacting more 

hard-hitting sanctions. 

What seems to have troubled the French about the negotiations, 

but reportedly nobody else in Geneva, was that the proposed deal 

would not have constrained Tehran’s pathway to a plutonium 

bomb, and that not one piece of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would 

have been dismantled. Let us be clear, there was no freeze. Geneva 

reportedly also left significant loopholes for the Iranian regime to 

exploit during the 6-month period between an interim deal and a 

final deal. 

As just two examples, first, Iran would be permitted to continue 

to enrich uranium to 31⁄2 percent, adding almost another bomb’s 

worth to its existing 31⁄2 percent stockpile of five to six bombs during that 6-month period. Now, this contravenes multiple Security 

Council resolutions that call for the immediate suspension of all enrichment. 

Second, Iran would be allowed to keep all of its installed centrifuges and produce thousands of additional ones without agreeing 

to the monitoring of any of its centrifuge manufacturing facilities. 

As a result, Iran could be well positioned to divert those centrifuges 

to secret enrichment facilities or to install them in its declared facilities at a time of its choosing. 

All of these nuclear facts on the ground would enhance Iranian 

leverage during negotiations for a final deal. We have seen this 

movie before, but it doesn’t have to go this way. 

Now, without new sanctions American negotiators will likely 

never again have as much economic leverage over Tehran as they 

do right now. The impact of European and American sanctions on 

Iran is what helped to jump-start these negotiations. But to whatever extent the Supreme Leader fears popular unrest provoked by 

sanctions, that trepidation will lessen if economic pressure is relaxed. 

The efficacy of sanctions depends on the threat of their escalation 

where an ever-expanding web of restriction keeps foreign firms 

from doing business with the regime. In many ways the Iranian 

sanctions program has been as much psychological as legal. So 

when the United States sends a signal that it is willing to block 

new sanctions and reduce existing sanctions for little in return, the 

impression abroad is that the White House’s resolve is waning. 

The White House says new sanctions will undercut the sanctions 

coalition. Actually the reverse is true. Without new escalating sanctions, the alternative is to rely on the enforcement of existing sanctions. This will invariably require the administration to punish 

many more companies that it has targeted in the past, including 

companies from its P5+1 allies. 

Now, reports out of Geneva indicate that the administration was 

ready to unfreeze assets; ease sanctions on gold, petrochemicals, 

the Iranian auto sector; give the regime tens of billions of dollars 

in hard currency. The regime would be allowed to take this hard 

currency back to Iran, giving Khamenei and Rouhani more cash to 

spend on nukes, terrorism, human rights abuses, or to support 

8

Assad. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that Rouhani, the 

right-hand man of former Iranian President Rafsanjani, who drove 

the nuclear program in the 1980s and 1990s, suddenly wants to 

forsake his nuclear legacy, but even if that were the case, why 

would the prospect of easing sanctions help him persuade 

Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards to abandon their deeply 

held cause? 

The Geneva negotiations indicated that Rouhani’s bosses are 

willing to make concessions that are easily revoked or not much of 

a nuclear impediment to start with. We have a capacity to increase 

this pressure. New sanctions could be written to lock up all of 

Iran’s overseas currency reserves. Financial relief should only come 

when Iran takes real steps to verifiably and irreversibly dismantle 

its military nuclear program. And there are ways to do this. We 

can discuss this more in the Q&A. 

Now, new sanctions may not be enough to stop an Iranian nuke, 

but America would have a much stronger hand in negotiations if 

Khamenei were put to a fundamental choice between economic collapse and his military nuclear program. 

Mr. Chairman, I argue here today that without new sanctions we 

are currently at the high-water mark of American negotiating leverage. If the Geneva proposal was as weak as our allies believed, 

what should make any of us think that a final agreement would 

be any better? 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]

9


85551a-1.eps

Examining Nuclear Negotiations 

Iran After Rouhani's First 100 Days 

Mark Dubowitz 

Executive Director 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Hearing before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Washington, DC 

November 13,2013 
10


85551a-2.eps

Mark Dubowitz November 13, 2013 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, on behalf of the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for inviting me to testify today on this 

important topic. 

Introduction 

After Iranian president Hassan Rouhani's first 100 days in ot1ice, the Islamic Republic is 

still repressing its own citizens, and contributing to the slaughter of Syrian civilians. 

While Rouhani has achieved only one of his 46 explicit campaign promises, the 

reopening ofTran's House of Cinema (Khaneh Cinema),l he may yet deliver on his most 

important promise: Economic relief from sanctions without otfering the West meaningful 

nuclear concessions. 

But for the 11th hour French intervention over the weekend, the new Iranian president 

would have scored a significant victory at Geneva. The U.S administration seemed ready 

to give tens of billons of dollars in irreversible sanctions relief, in addition to the 

unilateral sanctions relief by blocking new Congressional sanctions, in exchange for the 

promise of reversible nuclear concessions that do not roll back or freeze enough of the 

critical elements of Iran's military-nuclear infrastructure. In other words, Rouhani nearly 

delivered on his deputy nuclear negotiator Abbas Araqchi's pledge not to "allow even a 

gram of uranium to go out of the country.,,2 And he nearly vindicated the conservative 

Iranian parliamentarian Ali Motahari who proclaimed, "Negotiations do not require 

concession, rather, negotiations are a tool for us to receive concessions. ,,3 

Geneva negotiations will resume on November 21. There is no indication that the Obama 

administration will enhance its negotiation leverage by ending its opposition to new 

Congressional sanctions. Such an approach will likely lead to the eventual nuclearization 

ofIran. 

1. The "Deepening Human Rights Crisis" in Tran 

According to United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, 

Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, one hundred days into Rouhani's presidency, there is a "deepening 

human rights crisis" in lran4 Shaheed reports: "Systemic and systematic violations of 

political, economic, social, and cultural rights still characterize Iran's human rights 

situation. ,,5 

1 See Rouhani Meter. accessed November 6, 20n. (hltp:!/rOllhani111cwr.com) 

2 James Reynolds, "Upbeat mood as Iran nuclear talks start in Geneva." HHC News. October 15, 20n. 

(http://www.bbc.co.llk/newslworld-middle-east-14527659) 

3", ft'~ ,-,I)! ~I y ,-,.1=.1 "-! )p.-- )Jo..o~~ J,l~ If'i"~.r c-""'# ~ ts.,J'"\ )I.;;l'o..., ($i." Alehr NewsAKel1CV 

(Iran), September 30. 2013. (http:/;'\\\\\.mchrncws.com!dctaillNclts!214.'i492) 

4 Report to the United Nations General Assembly. "Situation of human rights in the Isla.mic Republic of 

IraIL" October 4,20 13. (http://silai1eedoniran.org/wp-C0l1tentiupioads!201YlO;NU5003I.pdf) 

5 C.omment posted on Dr. Ahmed Shaheed's twitter account on November 5. 20n. 

(l]1!ps:iltwitter.comlsllilheedStls13tl1s.n97770t)(,67854X07Q2) 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 
11


85551a-3.eps

Mark Dubowitz November 13, 2013 

The intimidation and abuses against the political opposition in Iran continues. Just last 

month, intelligence ministry agents beat up the daughters of 2009 presidential candidate 

and Green Movement leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who still is under house arrest, when 

they were visiting their father. 6 

Since Rouhani assumed office, the rate of executions has actually accelerated. Hadi 

Ghaemi, executive director of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran 

reported that, "Since Rouhani's inauguration, [an] increasing number of prisoners [are] 

being sent to the gallows" following unfair trials 7 During the two-week period in 

September that corresponded with Rouhani's trip to the UN, a record number of 

executions took place. R 

During his presidential campaign, Rouhani stated that Iran would begin "respecting and 

allowing minorities to practice religious rituals.,,9 He further stated that, "all Iranian 

people should feel there is justice. Justice means equal opportunity. All ethnicities, all 

religions, even religious minorities, must feel justice. Long live citizenship rights!" 10 

However, Rouhani's administration is persecuting religious minorities. 

In early October, for example, four Iranian Christians were sentenced to 80 lashes each 

for drinking wine during communion and for possessing a satellite antenna. 11 Iranian 

intelligence agencies continue to imprison converts to Christianity because of their 

religious beliefs. 12 

Meanwhile, the Baha'i community - a community that lacks protection under Iranian law 

- also continues to suffer. As the Baha'i World News Service notes: 

... reports to our office actually indicate a worsening of the situation facing Baha'is in 

Iran. The Baha'i community in Iran, like many other minorities in that country, 

remains deprived of its most basic rights, including ultimately the right to exist as a 

viable community. Iran's government must be held accountable for this hypocrisy and 

double standards. l3 

(, "'Y-""- >j,,J ~I ,J)yL..b.ji '--'Y'o--' Iy>j J <SY'Y ~Ji" ,/foJ F J Y--,""," Rahesabz (Imn), October 24, 

2013. (http://mywxahesabz.netiston'i77 1901) 

7 InternMional Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, "'Iran Should Halt Executions as Rate of Hangings 

Accelerates," October 8,201 J. <lltl.PmTIVw.irmmlll11alliigllts.org!2DJ2L!.OlexCCllli\l!W 

8 Intemational Campaign [or Human Rights in Iran, "Iran Should Halt Executions as Rate o[Hangings 

Accelerates:' October 8, 2013. (!ill:Q;!!vnvw.imnliumanrights.org!20 U/to/cxcelltioHsD 

'J Domestic Policy, Rouhani Meter. accessed November 6.2013. (!!!J:n.:!.Lrouhanllil9.CLcom) 

10 lntemational Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, '"Fulfilling Promises: A Human Rights Roadmap for 

Ronhani:' Augnst 21, 2013. (hllp:!!www.imnhm11nnrights.org!2()13I1lX/introdllctiol1-rouhanil) 

11 Benjamin Weinthal, "'Rouhani's Failed Human Rights Promises," fi!)!) I'o/icy Hrief. November I, 2013. 

(http://defenddcmocmcY.org!media-hitJrouhanis-faiJed-hlw13n-rights-promises/) 

I' ,"(",,1;.;1 r\4.! ""I", j~) .:...1 fo cS.; .::. )\..I ~ ~ cs.,.::. )\,,1 j;.;1 ,,",~I w.. J-<':' C;I.o.J j )' "",~I .::.)\,,1" 

April L 2013. 

'"Despite promises, Imn continues to violate human rights, says UN report:' Haha'i World News Service, 

October 23,201 J. (L1J.!lliL!.Iews.haha.LQrgL~2ID 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

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Mark Dubowitz November 13, 2013 

Additionally, rather than making good on "reviving the Association of Iranian 

Journalists,,,14 Rouhani's administration continues to engage in wide-scale webcensorship and blocks upwards of 5 million websites. 15 Rather than freeing the at least 40 

journalists and 29 bloggers who are currently serving prison terms in Tran, the regime has 

doubled down on its repression, banning the reformist daily Rahar16 Rouhani's Minister 

of Intelligence Mahmoud Alavi, has also accused independent-minded journalists of 

being foreign agents,17 a veiled threat that encourages self-censorship. 

2. Iran's Support for the Assad Regime 

Tran's actions in Syria and support of President Assad also provide a window into the 

soul of the regime and its new president. IfRouhani had wanted to use his int1uence and 

political capital during his first 100 days to demonstrate that he sought a new direction 

for Iran, he could have tempered Iran's full-throttled support for the Syrian regime's 

slaughter of its own people. 

Yet, we have witnessed the opposite. At his inauguration ceremony, Rouhani told Syrian 

Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi, "No force in the world can shake the solid, strategic and 

historic relations that bind the two countries in friendship. Syrian-Iranian relations are 

based on understanding and a common destiny.,,18 

Tellingly, during the first year of Assad's increasingly brutal crackdown on his people, 

Rouhani served as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council. 

He has repeatedly and publicly pledged his support for the Assad regime against what he 

ironically calls "foreign interference" 19 and "enemies in the region, especially the Zionist 

regime.,,2o 

Meanwhile, even as Rouhani claims that the Iranian people are suffering under sanctions, 

Rouhani's government continues to provide the Assad regime with a $3.6 billion line of 

14 Domestic Policy, Rouhani Meter, accessed November 6,2013. (hUp:!lwlIhanimelCrs.9l!)) 

15 Alexandra Olson, "UN rapporteur: Iran's human rights abuses arc widespread but Rouhani raises hope 

for reform," "Issoclated Press, October 23, 2013. 

"Tmnian Reformist Daily Becomes First Publication Banned Under Rohani:' RFWRT" 

October 29, 2013. (lillW!w\\ .rlerLorgleollle.!1lt.b'311-rr",;lill.:bans-roulmJli.l251:i 1237.h!lnlJ 

17 "'-" ~1.bJ "-! 04.;4 ul},~-,JP. c$)15-...> UY> Y' ,.u....;I J c$l~L..) J.IJ" c$~'," Intelligence Jfinist~v of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran, accessed November G, 2013. 

"Iran's Rowhani tells Syrian PM alliance will stay strong," Ai Arahiyo, August 4.2013. 

(!l\lp:1 I engl; sh.alerab i v a.l@!enlNews/mi<iciJ".:.!'asl!20 l.li08/04!IIlUl-s-RouJ!fmi::klli>.:::'s v rian-PM -allimlcew ill-slav-slrong-Jllml) 

1') "Presidcnt Rouhmri Condemns Foreign Interfcrence, Tcrrorism in Syria." Fars Nell'S "lgenc)! (Iran), 

August 4,2013. (http://english.farsnews,convnewste,:t.aspx?lm= 13920513000825) 

20 "New Imn President Backs Syria's Assad, Hezbollah," Associated I'ress. July 16. 2013. 

(h1tl1.!/bi gstorv.n P,Q rg/a Iti c1 ~/ ne\y-ira Il:PJesident -bacJ5s-svri(1'i-a ssad -hezbo 1181:0 

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credit,21 not to mention the senior military and intelligence advisers to help suppress the 

rebels and murder Syrian civilians. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (JRGC) 

continues to train thousands of militiamen and volunteers to fight in Syria22 At Tehran's 

direction, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, Iraqi Shi'a volunteers, and JRGC Ground Forces 

militarily engage with rebels directly2l JRGC military advisers have also fought in key 

battles24 

In sum, Iran is a big reason for the death toll of more than 120,000 in Syria. 

3. "A Bad Nuclear Deal is Better than No Deal" 

Above all else, Rouhani has made it a priority to relieve the sanctions pressure on Iran to 

deter its illicit nuclear program. In fact, he staked his political future on getting sanctions 

relief while maintaining the fundamental elements of that nuclear weapons program. This 

was the motivating factor for his diplomatic charm offensive, which has already yielded 

impressive results. 

The P5+ 1 has responded to Rouhani's diplomatic overtures with the Geneva diplomatic 

process. Notwithstanding their statements to the contrary, American negotiators seem to 

believe that a "bad deal is better than no deaL" The Obama administration has already 

diminished its own negotiating leverage by renouncing additional economic sanctions as 

a means to persuade Tehran to verifiably dismantle its military-nuclear program, 

including the suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing, as required by multiple U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. 

The Obama administration has also undermined the deterrent effect of the U.S. military 

option. Senior administration officials have repeatedly warned about the grave dangers of 

u.s. or Israeli pre-emptive military strikes2 ) The botched messaging and the ultimate 

21 "Iran Grants Syria $3.6 Billion Credit to Buy Oil Products," Reulers, July 31. 2013. 

(http://www.reuters.com/3rticleI201 JI07i31ius-sHia-crisis-imn-idl i SBRE961.:0XN20130n I) 

" Famaz Fassibi. Jay Solomon and Sam Dagber. "Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria," The Wall Sireel 

Journal, September 16, 2013. 

"Iran's Strategy in Syria," FDD PolievBrie!, September 19, 2013. 

hltp:lidefenddemocr2cY.orgll11cdia-hit/imns-stmtegy-in-svriaJ. See also Karim Sadjadpour. "Imn's 

Unwavering Support to Assad's Syria," Comhatting TerrorislIl Center (WestPoint), August 27, 20Ll. 

hlm:/ h,.., \"'l.L.ClC. u sma.!.~d!lillosts/jDJ-.!!S-un.W\ erill&illllW-.9Jl -to-assads-m.m 

24 Famaz Fassihi. Jay Solomon and Sam Daghcr, "Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria," The Wall Street 

Journal, September 16, 2013. 

h1:!p Iionline. wsj .com/newslarticlcslSB 1 O()O 1';24127g~7313 8646045 7906 738286180898-1 

'5 For example, Luis Ramirez "US Defense Chief Warns Against Military Strike on Imn," la~. November 

10, 2011. (http://wwlY.yoanews.comlcon!cntlns-clel.ense-chief-·warns-a gai '''I-milita,y -strike-ol1-imn--

]}1659()2S/1-+7996.iIlml) Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Jay Solomon. "U.S. Warns Ismel on Strike." 

The Wall Sireel Journal, January 14, 2012. 

(hUp:!/onlinc. wsj .co minc",/arliclcsiSB I 000 1-l2405297020440900-15771592025560R707 -l"lI1od~ ,\is} hp 

MfDDLENcxttoWlllnsNcwsSCCOlld) Katarzyna Klimasinska and Danicllc Ivory, "Israeli Attack on Iran 

Would Be Destabilizing, Joint Chiefs' Dempsey Says," Bloomberg, February 19,2012. 

(http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/20 12 -02-1 X/israeli-attack -011-1 mn-wollld-bc-deslabil i71 llg-joinl-chicfsdempsev.::!ill)'s. h(1111) 

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decision to shrink away from threat of military force against the Assad regime in Syria in 

September also diminished U.S. credibility. With enhanced economic measures and the 

military option off the table, the Obama administration is now hoping it can constrain the 

nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic by diplomacy alone, leading to a verification 

and inspection regime based on trust with an Iranian leadership that has a three decadeslong track record of utter mendacity. 

To rationalize this decision to conclude an interim nuclear deal that falls well short of 

even the de minimis requirements recommended by nuclear experts,26 the Obama 

administration is betting on the hope that Rouhani is a true "pragmatist.,,27 It is said that 

the White House negotiation theory assumes that sanctions relief and minimalist nuclear 

demands will sideline TRGC hardliners and give Rouhani the political space to sell a 

more comprehensive nuclear deal to his boss, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. 

Historically, banking on Iranian "pragmatism" has never paid otT "Pragmatism" doesn't 

make Iranian leaders less committed to an atomic weapon, less anti-American, or more 

averse to viewing terrorism as statecraft. All the major players in Iran's nuclear weapons 

program, including Rouhani's patron Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,2R the former majordomo of the political clergy and father of Iran's nuclear program, Supreme Leader Ali 

Khamenei, and even the firebrand Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were politically pragmatic 

when circumstances required it. Like the others, Rouhani wants both the bomb and 

sancti ons reli ef. 

The Proposed Genem Deal Will Not Prevent the Nuc/earization of fran 

Iranian leaders went to Geneva last week for one reason: to test Barack Obama's mettle. 

Had it been signed this past weekend, the Geneva deal would have ignored Iran's history 

of nuclear deception and allowed Tehran to retain the essential elements of a longstanding nuclear weapons program. 

Obama administration officials know Rouhani is lying when he says that the Islamic 

Republic has never had any intention of building an atomic weapon. Defecting Iranian 

nuclear engineers told U.S. officials in the late 1980s that the mullahs' program, then 

hidden, was designed exclusively for such arms. 19,000 centrifuges, a heavy-water plant, 

a robust ballistic missile program, and alleged testing of nuclear trigger technology -

Institute for Science and Intemational Security, "'Determining the Irreducible Elements of an Interim 

Agreement "ith Iran: A Freeze Pius," November 5, 2013. (hltpJiisis-onlinc.org/isisreports/det8il/irreducihle-e!emen1S-of-:1n-imedm-agreement-with-iran!) 

27 Rouhani is often cal1ed a "pragmatist" in \Vestern media. For example see. Jason Rezaian and Joby 

Warrick, ""Moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani wins Iran's presidential vote." Washington Post, June 15. 20n. 

@lp:l/wwW.llilShillglonpost.coml.\orldlimnians-3\Yail-presi.l.! .. ntial-eleClio!l-rc.§.vlls-rollowi!~xtell.i!.oJ!::: 

of-polling-hourS/20 t3;OGII5/3800c27G-<l593-llc2.-a73c-82Gd299Jl'l59 ,tOl'\. hIm!) 

2" Max Fisher. "'Rafs311iani's disqualification follows tumultuous relationship with Imn's supreme leader." 

May 22.2013. 

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everything Western intelligence services have tracked since then matches those early 

revelations. 

Thus, U.S. partIcIpation in the negotiations doesn't appear to be premised on an 

expectation ofTranian veracity. Tfit were, President Obama wouldn't have sent Secretary 

of State John Kerry to Geneva until Tehran had come clean about its past deceits. Even 

the behavior of South Africa's apartheid government - total transparency about the 

militarization of its atomic program - isn't expected from Tran. 

Our low expectations stem from fear. Washington isn't willing to go to war again in the 

Middle East, even to defend our national security, and the Iranians know it. The White 

House continues to warn that if the U.S. and our allies are too "maximalist" in our 

demands, the talks will fail 29 Ask too much - the suspension of all enrichment and 

reprocessing as demanded by five U.N Security Council resolutions - and the Iranians 

may walk away from the table. The problem is that the Administration is not even 

prepared to propose what nuclear expert David Albright calls "irreducible minimum" 

conditions - the five bare minimum conditions required to delay Iran's dual-pathways to 

uranium and plutonium bombs, and to mitigate the risk of secret Iranian enrichment 

facilities 30 Those conditions include: 

I) Iran must halt all centrifuge installation and disable the centrifuge modules 

beyond the three holding the 9,000 IR-I centrifuges. 

2) Iran must halt all production of 20% enriched uranium and convert or ship all 

20% enriched uranium to oxide or out of the country. 

3) Iran must halt the construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor. 

4) Iran must accept new inspection/monitoring requirements, including cameras at 

all centrifuge plant locations or daily inspections. 

5) Iran must freeze all centrifuge manufacturing immediately. 

Contrary to the Albright irreducible deal, the Geneva deal reportedly3! did not demand 

that Iran remove or disable any other centrifuges;32 it did not require Iran to address 

2') Undersecretary Wendy Shennan: "So, you know. a negotiation begins with everybody having their 

ma:'Cimalist position. And we have ours, too, which is they have to meet all of their obligations wlder the 

NPT and the U.N. Security Council resolutions .... And they have their maximalist position, and then you 

begin a negotiation." Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iran's Nuclear Program, October 3, 

20 I J, (http://www.cq.comia lertmatc i1/19g()'(9!)6X"uid~congression8ltmnscripts-l] 50U 17) 

3G Institute [or Science and Intemational Security, "Determining the Irreducible Elements o[ an Interim 

Agreement with Iran: A Freeze Plus," November 5, 2013. 

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centrifuge manufacturing, the ongoing production of thousands of new and more efficient 

centrifuges,]] (a key element to Iran's secret enrichment program); and, as the French 

objection made clear, it did not roll back the plutonium nuclear pathway, instead 

permitting continued construction at Arak 34 Indeed, the proposed Geneva deal would 

have allowed Iran to maintain a still-dangerous uranium breakout capacity with enough 

centrifuges to move, at a time of its choosing, to weaponize uranium. Put simply, every 

Iranian nuclear concession would have been easily reversible in a very short time period. 

In other words, the Obama administration oiIered Iran an "impossible-to-say-no-to" deal 

instead of using its extensive sanctions leverage to demand the suspension of all 

enrichment and reprocessing as required by five U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

The Pre-emption of u.s. Sanctions Policy 

Providing significant sanctions relief to the Iranians at this point is a mistake. The 

existing sanctions regime works because energy companies, financial institutions, 

insurers, shippers, and others have cut their business ties with Iran because they believe 

that the U.S. will enforce sanctions against violators. If the United States allowed 

sanctionable activities to occur without consequence, the floodgates could open. 

Companies that had chosen to cease activity in Iran rather than risk U.S. actions would 

re-enter the Iranian energy, shipping, and financial sectors. This would yield a massive 

financial windfall for Iran. 

The eHicacy of sanctions has always been built upon a strategy of escalation, where an 

ever-expanding web of restrictions scared off foreign business that wanted to invest in 

Iran. Sanction violators, of which there are more than the administration has punished, 

didn't really matter because Washington (Congress, really) created an impression that it 

intended to envelop Iran with an economic minefield 

The impact of sanctions has been as much psychological as it has been legal. So, when 

the administration starts reducing sanctions for little in return, the general impression 

abroad-reinforced by French objections to the soft American position in Geneva-is 

that the White House's will is declining. Especially now, the administration will have to 

sanction foreign companies, even those from our European allies, to keep the 

psychological dynamic from reversing. Moreover, the Administration will also have to 

dramatically ratchet up its supervision of the legitimate humanitarian trade channels with 

Iran, to prevent the abuse of these pathways. 

32 Laurence Norman and Jay Solomon, "Iran Nuclear Talks End Without Deal." 'Ihe Wall Street.!ournal, 

November 9,2013. 

(!ltmjiolllinc. 'Bli.com/news/articlesiSB 1000 1424052702:10 130'2~·15 79187 £424:!2,291Qill 

33 Karl Pcnhaul. Elise Labott and Greg Botelho, "No deal on Iran's nuclear program, despite 'concrete 

progress'," CNN. Novcmbcr 10, 2013. (littp.!lwww.clln.comi2013/11/09iworldimcastiimn-nuclcaf-lalks!) 

34 Julian Borger and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Iran nuclear negotiations at cmcialjuncture over Arak 

reactor:' lhe Guardian, November 9, 2013. (http://mvw.theguardisn.com/worldl20P/noviOY/iran-nuc1eunegiti(ltjons-af3k:~~Qctor-cmci® 

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Tehran, meanwhile, senses that the sanctions regime is crumblingJ5 This is due to the 

fact that the Obama administration had already offered extensive sanctions relief before 

the two rounds of Geneva negotiations had begun. In anticipation of sanctions giving 

way, the Iranian regime is now encouraging companies to return to Iran, with a number 

beginning discussions on new business deals. 

In many ways, the administration has already started to dismantle the sanctions regime. 

The administration ~ased the p:essure on Iran by slowing down the pace of designations 

since the electIOn ot Rouham: The administratIOn also blocked Senate legislatIOn; tough 

new legislation has been languishing in the Senate Banking Committee for months, 

despite the passage of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act by a vote of 400-20 in July by the 

House of Representatives. 

Legislators are growing concerned. They know that the administration resisted some of 

their best sanctions ideas in the past, including those that have cut Iranian oil exports in 

half. Congress also recognizes that a decision not to enhance sanctions is equivalent to a 

willingness to diminish them. 

The fact is, sanctions require constant updating and vigorous enforcement. Without new 

legislation that closes loopholes and shuts down new Iranian circumvention techniques, 

Iran continues to create front companies and concoct sanctions-busting schemes, bringing 

Iran that much closer to the bomb. This includes black-market oil sales estimated at 

150,000-200,000 barrels per day, concealing illicit financial transactions as permissible 

humanitarian purchases, incorporating Iranian banks like Mir Bank in friendly 

jurisdictions like Russia,37 and overturning European sanctions by courts demanding 

access to classified intelligence JR These are just a few recent examples. 

The Dollar Value of the Proposed Sanctions Reliefat Genem 

In addition to the administration's decision to hold off on new sanctions, the sanctions 

relief package offered at Geneva, if ultimately approved, will rescue Iran's struggling 

economy. Based on open source reporting, and an analysis by the Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies, the dollar value of the proposed sanctions relief at Geneva could yield 

Iran a minimum of $20 billion or more through the repatriation of frozen Iranian assets, 

gold transfers to Iran in exchange for its oil and natural gas sales, petrochemicals exports, 

and the lifting of sanctions on the Iranian auto sector. Providing $20 billion in repatriated 

cash to the regime could hardly be considered "modest," as some have described it. 

35 Steve Mufson, "Iran tests waters for Westem investment in oil exports." Washington 1'0st, November 9. 

201 :1. (http://\\-'''1,'','-VaShi ngto npost. co m/bnsi ness/eco no my /i r::w-tests-\Yllte rs-fo r -,Yestern-investment -i n-o Hexp0rts.'20 I :1!11!09/dJ92Xa 14-4959-11 e3-b6fll-37X2ff6ch769 storY.hlml) 

36 Eli Lake and Josh Ragin, "Obama's Secret Iran Detente:' iffe /)ailv Heast. November 8,2011 

Benoil Fauco" '·U.S. WanIS Russia on Iranian Bank," The Wall Sireel Journal, December 12.2012. 

(http/Jonlin".wsj.comincws/articlcsISB 10001-12-11278873233 30G0457814507 19309(j99(j6) 

" Justyna Pawlak "Insight: How European courts are dismantling sanctions on Iran:' Reuters, July IS, 

2013. (http://www.reuters.comlm1ic1ei20 1 ]101: l.1111s-imn-nuc1ear-courts-i nsightldljSllRE%EOLS20U(£,J..~) 

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Financial Relief: The Obama administration has offered what it has described as 

"limited, temporary, and reversible sanctions relief':19 that does not undermine the "core 

sanctions architecture," and could be "turned on or off' quickly.40 

This is a one-time repatriation of Iranian assets that have been trapped overseas as a 

result of financial sanctions. Reportedly, the proposed Geneva deal included an offer to 

release $3 billion of these assets back to Iran 41 Other public sources indicated that the 

P5+ 1 was contemplating the release of trapped oil funds valued at over $50 billion,42 

through installment payments that could add significantly to this amount. 

Gold Sanctions Relief: The deal on the table reportedly afforded Iran the ability to 

resume the export of precious metals. Based on trade data compiled by the Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies and Roubini Global Economics,43 gold imports from Turkey 

to Iran in 2012 reached as high as $1.6 billion per month. Using this figure as a guide, if 

gold sanctions relief is given for six months in the period leading up a possible tinal 

nuclear agreement, Iran has the potential to pocket at least $9.6 billion in gold sales. 

Petrochemical Sanctions Relief: According to a recent iJusiness Munitor internatiunal 

report, Iran exported $11.2 billion last year in petrochemical products and projects an 

increase of another $1 billion next year

44 If petrochemical sanctions relief is provided, 

using these numbers as a guide, Iran could enjoy a windfall of $5-6 billion over six 

months. 

Automotive Sanctions Relief: Under U.S. sanctions since June 2013,4, Iran's auto sector 

is inextricably linked to Iran's nuclear program because of its involvement with the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran's procurement networks and sanctions 

39 "Sanctions relieffor nuclear concessions: 6 world 

November 7, 2013, 

Rcvcrsibility ofPotcntial Agrccmcnt with Iran," VOA. Novcmbcr 

"In Geneva. the French hold out for tougher conditions on Iran." Times of Israel, November 9,2013. 

(hltp:llvvww.tilllesofismel.com/world-powers-set-for-new-round-or-iran-nuke-t!llksLl 

4' Louis CharoOimeau and Yeganeh Torbati, "Iran nuclear deal as split 

diplomats." Reuters, Novcmbcr 9. 2013. (!!I!tJUiilli'1l,IT.!lli1iiRQillbl!:!:k.~;QJill:[lJ.!S't.1in!dLii!t.!ll!>~![: 

.ldUCillRP--'2A804X2Ql31 J..Q2) 

43 Gary Clark, Rachel Ziemba and Mark Dnbowitz, "Iran' s Golden Loophole:' Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies and Roubini Global Economics. 13.20n. 

,. Blisiness Afon;lor lnlernalionol, August 2013. (Accessed via ProQuest). 

(http://ww,,.markctrcscarch. com/n II s i ncss-Monitor-International-, 3 O-W rall-Pclrochcmicals-Q4-7 7815481) 

"' The White House Press Releasc. "Exccutivc Order -- Authorizing the Implementation of Ccrtain 

Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 and Additional Sanctions 

To Iran," June 3, 2013. (htU1.i!mcU.Y~~hill~£Q:ffi!~~ili:.\@~:mJ.liJf0.ill~gl!i.Y£: 

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evasion 46 During a seven-month period in 2012, before the sanctions were imposed, Iran 

exported approximately $1.4 billion for its auto industry47 Thus, if the administration 

provides automotive sanctions relief, this could be worth approximately $1.3 billion to 

Iran over a six-month period. 

The Bottom Line: Iran currently has approximately $80 billion in foreign exchange 

reserves. Of those funds, $10 billion is frozen, $20 billion is fully accessible, and $50 

billion is only semi-accessible for barter trade in escrow accounts in China, India, Japan, 

South Korea, and Turkey4R A deal that offers $3 billion in cash, plus another $16-17 

billion, totaling $20 billion in sanctions relief, would give a 25 percent boost to Iran's 

total foreign exchange reserves, bringing that number up to $100 billion. 

It would also double the amount of fully accessible foreign exchange reserves currently 

available, from $20 to $40 billion. If the P5+ I went further and released trapped oil funds 

valued at over $50 billion, through installment payments, this would increase Iran's fully 

accessible reserves from $20 billion to a staggering $70 billion. 

A massive sanctions relief windfall of $20 billion or even more, granted in exchange for 

reversible nuclear concessions that do little to dismantle Iran's military-nuclear 

infrastructure, is exactly what Iran would need to relieve the pressure from sanctions and 

enhance its negotiating leverage in the run up to any final agreement. 

Recommendations 

In his first 100 days in office, we have seen no evidence that President Rouhani' s policies 

on the human rights front, in its Syria policy, or on the nuclear tile represent a strategic 

shift on the part of the Iranian regime. If anything, his new government has changed its 

tone without changing any of the substance and instead has recommitted to nuclear 

deception in keeping with Rouhani' s track record. 

To this end, 1 offer the following recommendations: 

Esclllllte Sllnctions: The proposed Geneva deal would have been a significant victory for 

the new Iranian president and would have set back the Obama administration's goal of 

stopping Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions. Instead of relaxing sanctions, we must match 

Iran's continued nuclear activity with continued sanctions efforts to exert more pressure 

on Iran. New legislation in Congress should close loopholes and shut down new Iranian 

circumvention techniques to prevent Tehran from simultaneously dodging sanctions and 

advancing its nuclear program. 

16 Mark Dubowit, and Emanuele Ottolenghi, "lmn's Cm Industry: A Sanctions Buster," f/orhe.l', 5, 

20 13. ()!1\lW;::;HtJg.t:!:>~'&Q.!!1!,.':!l.~~"'jlilliQ!IT!~2JJ.ill;5!,illIill]Kq.!:::11!(lJ.lli!l[V-=,!::lJJig::~~.ill1!Ql]i:lw~liffi) 

47 "Iran's car exports fall by 82.21 percent," Trend, October 12. 2013. 

(http://CILtrcnd.azlrcgionslinm!220069-l.html) 

4' Mark Dubowitz and Rachel Ziemba. "When Will Iran Rnn Out of Money?," Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies and Roubini Global Economics. October 2. 20n. (http://defenddemocmcv.orglmedi8-

bit!vvhcn-'\"Ul:-lrnn-fllll-out-of-rnonev!) 

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According to a study conducted by my organization, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, and Roubini Global Economics, while sanctions have had a dramatic effect 

on the Iranian economy, Iran's foreign exchange reserves and "off-book" assets remain at 

sufficient levels to enable Iran to muddle through for at least 12 months, ifnot longer.~9 

The United States should move forward with new financial sanctions to effectively lock 

up all ofIran's currency reserves held abroad - around $80 billion and Iran's existing oil 

revenues, estimated to be an additional $3.4 billion per month 50 These sanctions would 

use the threat of U.S. tinancial penalties to persuade foreign banks to block Iranian access 

to - or use of - its overseas financial reserves for any purpose except permitted 

humanitarian trade, etIectively shutting down non-humanitarian imports and possibly 

even collapsing the rial. 

In particular, the U.S. and its allies should take the following actions to put further 

pressure on Iran's foreign exchange reserves and its balance of payments: 

1) Sanction any financial institution that provides Iran access to, or use of, its foreign 

reserves. The U.S. should backdate this sanctions provision during the legislative 

process so that, regardless of when the tinal bill is signed by the president, 

tinancial institutions do not take steps before the final passage of legislation to 

provide Iran with access to frozen cash reserves; 

2) Dramatically reduce permissible imports of Iranian crude products (especially as 

Iran continues to increase its black-market sales of crude and other oil products); 

3) Require countries buying Iranian crude to dramatically reduce their exports of 

non-humanitarian commercial goods to Iran; 

4) Require a specified percentage of Iran's escrow funds be spent only on 

humanitarian goods (e.g., certain food, medicine, and medical devices); 

5) Blacklist additional sectors of the Iranian economy owned or controlled by the 

government of Iran and/or the lRGC, including the mining, engineering and 

constructi on sectors; 

6) Vigorously enforce gold sanctions to deny Iran access to gold to replenish its FX 

reserves; 

7) Impose tighter sanctions on non-oil Iranian commercial exports; 

8) Expand the definition of crude oil sanctions to include all oil products; and, 

4') Ibid. 

50 Marjorie Olster. "'US: Iran Can't Access Mnch Oil Income:' ."ssociated I'ress, August 30, 2013. 

Qillp~L!?igstor'iJjJ1Q!giarticle/apnews!?Eeak-lls-ir{ln-{:Dnt-3ccess-much-oil-incolOO 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

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85551a-13.eps

Mark Dubowitz November 13, 2013 

9) Impose additional sanctions against the holdings ofTran's honyad~ and investment 

funds, and entities owned and or controlled by the TRGC, the Quds Force, the 

Supreme Leader, and other entities which continue to engage in human rights 

abuses and terrorist activities inimical to US interests and values. 

Require Meaningful Iranian Nuclear Concessions: As Geneva demonstrated, there is 

great danger in engaging in an interim process with Iran where significant sanctions 

concessions - through the administration's blocking of new sanctions and the provision 

of $20 billion or more in hard currency relief - are granted in exchange for nuclear 

concessions that don't adequately roll-back Iran's nuclear weapons program. Any interim 

deal must demand, at a minimum, that Iran: 

1) Cease all enrichment and reprocessing as required by multiple U.N. Security 

Council resolutions; 

2) Disable all of its existing centrifuges, cease all centrifuge manufacturing and 

implement an inspection regime of all centrifuge manufacturing sites. Without 

these concessions, the regime retains a dangerous breakout capacity and could 

easily build hard-to-detect clandestine facilities with small cascades with 

advanced centrifuges; 

3) Cease all construction and work at the Arak heavy-water reactor: Any agreement 

should prohibit Iran from continuing work on its Arak heavy-water reactor. By 

allowing Iran to continue construction of the Arak reactor over the next six 

months, Tehran will gain an extra six months to develop the capacity to produce a 

plutonium bomb; 

4) Export Iran's 20 percent-enriched uranium stockpile; and, 

5) Provide full disclosure of all past weaponization research, full implementation of 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty's Additional Protocol, and agreement to the 

inspection of any military or Revolutionary Guard site suspected of harboring 

nuclear research. 

Offer Smart Non-Sanction Financial Relief The sanctions relief offered up last week in 

Geneva gave too much. It was not reversible. It had no mechanism to punish Iran if it 

cheated. Indeed, the deal would have dramatically diminished American economic 

leverage, putting the Obama administration in a worse position to negotiate an acceptable 

comprehensive and final deal. Indeed, the only irreversible part of the sanctions relief on 

the table was the damage this deal would have done to the international effort to constrain 

Iran's illicit economic activity. 

There is a better approach that would enhance Western negotiating leverage, while still 

offering relief if Iran were to verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its military-nuclear 

program. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

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Mark Dubowitz November 13, 2013 

First, while keeping all existing sanctions in place, Iran should be given an ultimatum: (I) 

Freeze all uranium enrichment at Natanz and Fordow - where nuclear experts estimate 

that Iran is no more than eight months from achieving an undetectable nuclear breakout; 

and, (2) Suspend all work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak, where the IAEA remains 

concerned that Iran could soon reprocess plutonium for a bomb. In exchange for these 

two Iranian moves, the United States could freeze implementing additional sanctions. If 

Iran rejected this "freeze for freeze," it should face immediate and crippling new 

sanctions. 

These new sanctions should encourage foreign banks to freeze all of Iran's overseas 

funds, estimated to be around $80 billion, and turn otl'the spigot of Iran's existing oil 

revenues, estimated to be an additional $3.4 billion per month. These sanctions would 

have a devastating impact on the Iranian economy, cutting otl'the funds Iran needs to pay 

for its imports and support its currency. 

These new measures don't need to be permanent. Iran should be able to end its own 

financial isolation - but only in exchange for irreversible nuclear concessions that 

dismantle the entire military-nuclear program. 

However, unfreezing Iranian assets unconditionally is a bad idea, particularly if Iran can 

use those funds for proliferation and terrorism. That's why Tehran only should be 

permitted to transfer funds from escrow accounts in China to escrow accounts in 

Germany and other European countries, for example. Tehran has an estimated $20 billion 

in accounts in China but can't find enough non-sanctionable Chinese goods to buy. In 

contrast, Tehran likes to shop in Germany. 

If Iran cheats, and doesn't verifiably dismantle its military-nuclear program, including 

coming clean with the IAEA, or if Iran uses the German escrow funds to buy sanctioned 

goods, these funds should snap back, like a rubber band, and be blocked again. 

All core sanctions should remain in place, in case the Iranian regime falls out of nuclear 

compliance, as it has done in the past, and only until it demonstrates that it is acting in 

good faith. This is an economic enforcement mechanism to support any verification and 

inspection regime that can be used more frequently than the threat of military strikes to 

punish Iran for noncompliance. The credibility of U.S. military strikes as an enforcement 

mechanism has already been diminished as a result of the Obama administration's Syria 

policy and its repeated warnings that U.S. or Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear 

facilities could have grave consequences for U.S. security interests. 

Given his past nuclear mendacity, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should be expected to 

cheat. And that's why a freeze, a big stick, and a carrot tied to a rubber band, is a better 

negotiating strategy than unilateral sanctions relief in exchange for meaningless nuclear 

concesSIOns or haggling with the mullahs over the price of every minor Iranian 

compromise. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to your questions. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies www.defenddemocracy.org 

13 
23

Chairman ROYCE. Ms. Pletka. 

STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, VICE PRESIDENT, 

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Ms. PLETKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, 

members of the committee. It is always an honor to appear before 

House Foreign Affairs. Thank you very much for including me. I 

am also honored to sit next to Colin and Mark, two people whose 

views I take very seriously on the Iran question. 

As we assess the current negotiations over Iran about its illicit 

nuclear weapons program and measure the efficacy of our sanctions, our overall Iran policy, and the quality of our negotiations 

themselves, a few things should be clear. We have rarely achieved 

anything of note in negotiations over such nuclear weapons programs. Despite assiduous efforts to roll back, eliminate, neutralize 

or otherwise alter the trajectory of programs in North Korea, in 

Pakistan, in India over the years, we failed in almost every case 

bar one, and that was Libya where Qadhafi’s assumption of an imminent American military action forced him to relinquish most, although we now know not all, of his nuclear capabilities. 

We have also been fortunate in the nature of our adversaries. 

Only because the Islamic Republic has been so brazen, only because of its singularly incompetent leadership, only because of its 

catastrophic economic mismanagement have sanctions actually 

begun to bite. 

In addition, successive Presidents of the United States have consistently underused the authorities granted to them in law both 

through IEEPA and a series of Iran- and proliferation-oriented 

pieces of legislation. Enforcement has depended far more on personality than on capacity. Congress, too, has proven itself more 

eager to draft legislation than it is to hold the administration’s feet 

to the fire, and here I include both the Obama, and the Bush, and 

the Clinton administrations before it. I am regularly struck by the 

willingness of committees of oversight to give a pass to State Department officials unwilling to enforce the letter of the law, and 

their lawyers who view sanctions-related determinations as optional instructions from the Congress. 

It is true every President should be eager to end the Iranian nuclear weapons program and stifle Tehran’s attempts to dominate 

the Middle East. The question before us is simply on what terms. 

Unfortunately those terms keep changing. In each new round of negotiations with Iran, the Obama administration has proffered a 

sweeter set of incentives and fewer demands of Tehran. That gives 

Iran every reason to play out the clock, advance its program, and 

hope for a better offer the next time around. 

In April 2013, just this year, the P5+1 negotiating team demanded among other measures that Iran suspend all of its enrichment above 5 percent with Iran, and suspend all of enrichment at 

the Fordow underground facility, and transfer all collected uranium 

oar, including enriched oar, to facilities within Iran. 

Previously the P5 and its earlier iteration, the EU-3 and the 

United States, demanded a suspension of all enrichment. Before 

that the group demanded no enrichment at all and an end to the 

24

conversion of UF6 into precursors for enrichment. This time the 

only suspension demanded is reportedly for 6 months, and there is 

no demand to transfer enriched fissile material internally, we understand from reports, although as the ranking member says rightly, I don’t think any of us have seen the actual proposal. 

When I asked an administration official about Parchin last week, 

which is the suspected site of nuclear weaponization activities, he 

responded that Parchin is the IAEA’s problem, not the American 

negotiators’ problem. 

Finally, on the question of how Iran will step back from its nuclear weapons program, we need to consider the strong possibility 

that Iran has secret nuclear sites. Indeed the United States has not 

discovered any covert Iranian nuclear site until it was well advanced, and in most cases it was revealed by another party. I 

haven’t spoken to a single official familiar with the intelligence 

from the U.S. Or elsewhere who has denied that they suspect that 

Iran is operating a secret facility. 

Will additional sanctions persuade the Iranians of the need to 

end their program? Will strong actions from the Congress prevent 

the administration from demanding more of the Iranians? Yes and 

no. Only the strongest of sanctions have gotten Iran to the table. 

They have yet to agree to the de minimis demands of the Obama 

administration, let alone the more stringent ones of the United Nations and the IAEA. It is true, as my colleague said and as you 

said, that only tougher measures will keep them at the table. 

One final point. We have spoken today of Iran’s nuclear program, 

though, of course, Iran also has a growing and sophisticated missile 

arsenal. In addition, the regime in Tehran is the prime engine of 

Assad’s regime battlefield successes in Syria; the sole sponsor of 

Hezbollah, the world’s most powerful terrorist group; a sponsor of 

Hamas; a spoiler in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Bahrain and Yemen; 

and, of course, an abuser of the Iranian people’s own rights. 

Last I want to say a word about Rouhani, which is one the topics 

of the hearing. The committee asked about the domestic and Iranian environment in which Rouhani finds himself. I believe actually that Rouhani is a reformer within the context that is allowed 

by the Supreme Leader, but his remit is to sustain the system that 

was put at risk by Ahmadinejad, not to give up the Iranian nuclear 

program. It is important to understand that his job is to set Iran 

on a stable footing, not to give up nuclear weapons or reconcile 

with a region. 

American officials who see themselves as key to Rouhani’s credibility, as they have said, would be better served worrying about 

their own credibility. Their efforts to micromanage American domestic politics have been pretty unsuccessful. Efforts to manage 

Iran are certain to fail. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]

25


85551b-1.eps

Danielle Pletka 

Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Wednesday, November 13th, 10:00am 

Examining Nuclear Negotiations: Iran After Rouhani's First 100 Days 

1 
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85551b-2.eps

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel, Members of the Committee, it's always an honor 

to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Thank you for including me. 

You asked your witnesses today to address several specific questions and make 

suggestions regarding future steps. 

As we assess the current negotiations with Iran over its illicit nuclear weapons program 

and measure the efficacy of our sanctions, our overall Iran policy, and the quality of our 

negotiations themselves, a few things become clear. From the 35,000 foot perspective, 

looking at more than just Iran, we see that despite the vast economic, military, and in 

most cases political superiority of our nation vis-a-vis our adversaries, we have rarely 

achieved anything of note in negotiations over nuclear weapons programs without 

some deus ex mach ina. Consider U.S. efforts over the years with the North Korean, 

Pakistani, Indian governments over their nuclear programs. While in no way equating 

the nature of these governments, one consistent theme emerges: Despite assid uous 

efforts to roll back, eliminate, neutralize or otherwise alter the trajectory of each 

country's program, we failed in almost every case, bar one, and that is Libya, where 

Qadhafi's assumption we would use force caused him to relinquish most (though not all) 

of his nuclear program. Indeed, only where governments have fallen or systems have 

changed (as with the collapse of the USSR, or the end of apartheid) have countries 

negotiated away advances to their nuclear programs. This lesson should guide any 

assessment of efforts regarding Iran. 

We have also been fortunate in the nature of our adversaries. For decades, the world 

has been willing to cut Iran a break, overlook its steady advance toward a nuclear 

breakout capacity and brush aside its increasingly sophisticated missile programs. Only 

because the Islamic Republic has been so brazen, only because of its singularly 

incompetent leadership, only because of its catastrophic economic mismanagement 

have sanctions actually begun to bite. The Islamic Republic has pursued a regional 

policy that has alienated and terrorized its neighbors, wielded a brutal and heavy hand 

in Iraq and in Syria, interfered wantonly both at sea and on land in the affairs of Gulf 

states and otherwise made itself no friends. It has done so to advance a Persian vision 

of regional hegemony most - and I wish I could include the United States in this - find 

anathema. 

In addition, successive presidents of the United States have consistently underused the 

authorities granted to them in law, both through IEEPA and a series of Iran and 

proliferation oriented pieces of legislation. Enforcement has depended far more on 

personality than on capacity (here I should mention the pioneering efforts of Stuart 

Levey at Treasury). Congress too has proven itself far more eager to draft and even pass 

new legislation rather than hold the administration's feet to the fire in the enforcement 

of existing laws. I am regularly struck by the willingness of committees of oversight to 

give a pass to State Department officials unwilling to enforce the letter of the law, and 

2 
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85551b-3.eps

their lawyers who view sanctions related determinations as optional instructions from 

the Congress. 

Designations and the imposition of sanctions slowed dramatically since the June 

elections in Iran. Some journalists have suggested this amounts to sanctions relief in 

and of itself, a gesture from the Obama administration to the incoming Rouhani team. 

can't speak to whether this was a deliberate slow down or not, but there is ample 

evidence that the President is very eager to make a deal with Tehran. This, we should 

add, is a good thing. Every president should be eager to end the Iranian nuclear 

weapons program and stifle Tehran's attempts to dominate the Middle East. The 

question is simply on what terms. 

Unfortunately, those terms keep changing. In each new round of negotiations with Iran, 

the Obama administration has proffered a sweeter set of incentives and fewer demands 

of Tehran. This gives Iran every reason to play out the clock, advance its program and 

hope for a better offer next time around. 

In April, 2013, the PS+l negotiating team demanded that Iran: 

-Suspend all enrichment of uranium above 5 percent within Iran. 

-Suspend all enrichment at the Fordow underground facility and increase monitoring by 

the International Atomic Energy Agency there, including cameras with real-time 

encrypted connectivity to agency headquarters in Vienna. 

#Transfer all collected uranium ore, including ore enriched to 5 percent, to facilities at 

Natanz or Esfahan and put under IAEA safeguards. 

-Remove from the Fordow facility any uranium enriched above 5 percent. Take an 

unspecified amount of uranium enriched to 20 percent and retain it as working stock for 

the Tehran Research Reactor, which is used for medical purposes. 1 

Previously, the PS+l and its earlier iteration, the United States and the so-called EU-3, 

demanded a suspension of all enrichment. Before that, the group demanded no 

enrichment at all and an end to the conversion of UF6 into precursors for enrichment. 

This time, the only suspension demanded is reportedly for six months. There is no 

demand to transfer enriched fissile material internally within Iran, let alone abroad. It is 

unclear whether the administration insisted on the shuttering of the heavy water facility 

at Arak. When I asked an administration official about Parchin, the suspected site of 

nuclear weaponization activities that Iran has assiduously been cleaning up over the last 

two years, he responded that Parchin is the IAEA's problem. For a full recounting of the 

evolving offers to and from Iran, the Arms Control Association has an excellent and 

specific history.2 

1 http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-1O-07/world/42795228 _i_en richment -iran-s-economy-fordow 

1 http://www.armscontrol.orgffactsheets/lran_Nuclear_Pro posa Is 

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85551b-4.eps

Finally, on this question of how Iran will step back from its nuclear weapons programs, 

we need to consider the strong possibility that Iran has secret nuclear sites. Indeed, the 

United States has not discovered any covert Iranian nuclear site until it was well 

advanced, and in most cases revealed by another party. I have not spoken to a single 

official familiar with the intelligence from the United States or elsewhere who will deny 

that they suspect Iran is operating one or more covert nuclear sites. 

Of course, the administration pats itself on the back that it holds the trump card in its 

hands: military action. I believe that the Iranians assess the likelihood of American 

military action under Barack Obama at zero. If they had any doubt about that before 

President Obama promised to bomb Syria and then backed off, the Syria spectacle has 

settled the matter. Both American and Israeli red lines for military action have evolved 

so dramatically over the years that no such statement can be viewed as a deterrent. In 

2003, the IAEA demanded that Iran "suspend all further uranium enrichment-related 

activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz ... " In 2005, 

George Bush said, "We cannot allow the Iranians to have the capacity to enrich." In 

2009, Barack Obama said: "[W]e do want to make sure that by the end ofthis year 

we've actually seen a serious process move forward, and I think that we can measure 

whether or not the Iranians are serious." 

Ditto the Israelis: In 2005, Ariel Sharon said that Israel cannot live with an Iran with 

nuclear technology. In 2011, Ehud Barak said: "[T]he Iranians are gradually, deliberately 

entering into what I call a zone of immunity [ ... ]1 cannot tell you for sure, nor can I 

predict whether it's two quarters or three quarters. But it's not two or three years." 

Last year he warned that no more than one year remains to stop Iran from obtaining 

nuclear weaponry. Also last year, Benjamin Netanyahu said: "The red line should be 

drawn right here ... Before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment 

necessary to make a bomb. Before Iran gets to a point where it's a few months away or 

a few weeks away from amassing enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear weapon." 

Iran has already reached that point according to numerous experts. 

Even the United Nations Security Council has laid out its own set of red lines, demanding 

in no fewer than six binding resolutions that Iran suspend "all enrichment related and 

reprocessing activities". Remember that next time the Obama administration accuses 

anyone of ignoring the will of the international community or flouting international law. 

Will additional sanctions persuade the Iranians of the need to end their program? Will 

strong action from the Congress persuade the administration to demand more of the 

Iranians? Yes and no. Only the strongest of sanctions have gotten Iran to the table. 

They have yet to agree to the de minimis demands of the Obama administration, let 

alone the more stringent ones of the United Nations and IAEA. Only tougher measures 

will keep them at the table and force genuine negotiations. Regarding the 

administration, however, we should understand that once given, concessions are hard 

to withdraw. What new sanctions will do is signal to the world that the United States is 

4 
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85551b-5.eps

not opening the floodgates to Iran, that this is not the beginning ofthe end of Iran's 

isolation, and that even if the administration chooses to use its own latitude to ease 

sanctions on Iran, Congress will backfill when possible. 

One final point; we have spoken today of Iran's nuclear program, though of course Iran 

also has a growing and sophisticated missile arsenal. In addition, the regime in Tehran is 

the prime engine of the Assad regime's battlefield successes in Syria, the sole sponsor of 

Hezbollah, the world's most powerful terrorist group, a sponsor of Hamas, a spoiler in 

Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Bahrain, in Yemen, and a threat to the Iranian people. On most 

of those issues, the United States is doing too little. We are imposing few costs on Iran 

for its behavior at home or abroad, easing the path for Iran to destabilize the Middle 

East. And while this is not a hearing about terrorism or Syria, our decision not to impose 

costs on Iran for being one of the most malign regimes operating today means that we 

have needlessly frittered away leverage that could have offered us additional pressure 

points in nuclear negotiations. 

The Committee also asked about the domestic Iranian environment in which Hassan 

Rouhani finds himself. My colleague at AEI, Will Fulton, assesses Rouhani as a genuine 

reformer within the context of the Islamic Republic. He wishes to sustain the system 

which was put at risk by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his friends in the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard Corps. Mr. Rouhani is reportedly not on good terms with the IRGC, 

though he still enjoys the backing of the Supreme Leader. That being said, it is 

important to understand that Rouhani's remit is to set Iran once again on a stable 

footing, not to relinquish the nuclear weapons option or reconcile with the 

neighborhood's Sunni governments. American officials who see themselves as the key 

to Rouhani's credibility would be better served worrying about their own credibility. 

Their efforts to micromanage American domestic politics have been unsuccessful; 

efforts to manage Iran's are certain to fail. 

Thank you. 

5 
30

Chairman ROYCE. Dr. Kahl. 

STATEMENT OF MR. COLIN KAHL, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. KAHL. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify. 

Dani and Mark, it is great to be at the table with you. 

The most recent round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva were serious and sustained. Differences between the parties 

have been narrowed, bringing the broad contours of an interim 

agreement broadly into view. 

It is clear that several sticking points remain, and we do now 

know whether a deal will materialize on November 20th when the 

parties reconvene, but if it ultimately resembles the agreement described in recent press reports, it would be a meaningful first step 

on the road to a final comprehensive agreement. 

In the coming months the opportunity to meaningfully constrain 

Iranian nuclearization could be seized, leading to a peaceful outcome, or squandered, setting the stage for an Iranian bomb, another military confrontation in the Middle East, or probably both. 

As a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, I firmly believe 

that all options need to remain on the table to prevent Iran from 

acquiring nuclear weapons, but I also know enough about how a 

military conflict with Iran would likely unfold to understand that 

an enduring diplomatic outcome is far preferable to another war in 

this part of the world. 

Achieving a peaceful solution will require close cooperation between the Obama administration and Congress. We have enough 

leverage at the moment to start the ball rolling toward a final 

agreement. More sanctions at this juncture are not required. 

According to U.S. intelligence officials, Iran has already mastered 

the basic knowledge and technology required to eventually produce 

nuclear weapons if the regime decides to do so. Nothing, including 

a complete dismantling of the Iranian program, will put that technological genie back into the bottle. Instead negotiations should 

focus on a more concrete and achievable objective, which is placing 

meaningful and verifiable constraints on Iran’s ability to translate 

rapidly its accumulated knowledge and civilian nuclear capabilities 

into nuclear weapons. That is, the deal we should be focusing on 

is one that would prevent an Iranian breakout capability. 

Some analysts argue that U.S. negotiators should capitalize on 

existing leverage created by crippling sanctions and Iran’s apparent 

willingness to negotiate to insist on a maximalist deal. My colleagues at the table appear to share that view. This approach is reflected in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s four noes: No uranium enrichment at any level ever, no stockpiled enriched uranium, no centrifuges or centrifuge facilities, and no Arak heavy 

water reactor. 

Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as 

possible by making these demands seems reasonable, but in reality 

the quest for an optimal deal that requires a permanent end to Iranian enrichment at any level would likely doom diplomacy, making 

31

the two worst outcomes, an Iranian bomb or a war with Iran, much 

more likely. 

Regardless of the pressure from the United States, the Iranian 

regime is simply unlikely to agree to permanently end all fuel cycle 

activities, including enrichment. Khamenei has invested far too 

much of the regime’s domestic legitimacy in an excess of $100 billion to defend Iran’s so-called rights to find this domestic enrichment to completely capitulate now. Indeed the Supreme Leader 

likely fears such a humiliation more than he fears escalating economic sanctions, economic collapse, or even targeted military 

strikes against his nuclear facilities. 

Given profound reasons for the regime to reject a maximalist 

deal, pursuing one would require the United States to go to the 

very brink of war with Iran to achieve it. It would also require dramatic escalation of existing sanctions. 

Yet pursuing such a high-risk strategy is unlikely to work and 

could backfire badly. First, it is unclear whether any escalation of 

sanctions could bring the regime to its knees in time to prevent 

Iran from achieving a nuclear breakout. If the Iran nuclear issue 

is as urgent as we all believe, that argues for having a deal sooner 

rather than later. 

Second, and somewhat paradoxically, escalating sanctions at this 

moment would actually end up weakening international pressure. 

Whether one believes Rouhani or not, he has changed the international narrative and made Iran look reasonable. If we start to 

look like the unreasonable party, it will make it much more difficult to sustain the international cooperation isolating Iran. 

Third, issuing more explicit military threats is also unlikely to 

achieve a maximalist diplomatic outcome since targeted military 

strikes against Iran’s program would not hold the regime at risk. 

And, worse yet, signaling that our entire goal is to bring about an 

existential crisis for the regime would probably motivate them to 

accelerate their nuclear behavior to get a deterrent before that outcome materializes. So instead we should be focusing on a sufficient 

deal that prevents breakout. 

The deal that the administration appears to be negotiating in Geneva would be a useful first step toward this outcome. It is not in 

and of itself the outcome; it is a first stop toward the outcome. The 

broad countours of the deal have already been outlined by the 

other speakers, although I will say that the financial relief is not 

anywhere close to $50 billion. It is probably less than $10 billion. 

The question becomes whether in and of itself the first deal is 

a meaningful step, and the answer is yes in a number of respects. 

First of all, eliminating the 20 percent stockpiling, stopping 20 percent enrichment would double the breakout time from its current 

level. That is, it would take Iran twice as long to produce weaponsgrade material after this deal goes into place than is true today. 

That is meaningful. 

The deal would also put firm restrictions on building the fuel assemblies for the Arak nuclear reactor, which would also stop the 

clock on making that an unstoppable breakout capability for plutonium weapons. 

I could go into the other details about why the inspections regime 

and the rest of the detail of the agreement are likely to serve U.S., 

32

Israeli and other interests in whatever detail the committee members would like. 

Last but not least, just let me say something about sanctions. Because of your hard efforts and the efforts of the administration, we 

have accrued an enormous amount of leverage. Nothing in the limited sanctions relief under this deal guts the oil or financial sanctions which are required to drive the Iranians toward a final proposal. And nothing of it would be permanent if the Iranians reverse 

course. At this juncture we have enough sanctions to get the Iranians across the goal line. The bigger risk is escalating sanctions 

at a very fragile moment of diplomacy and being responsible for diplomacy careening off the cliff. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kahl follows:]

33


85551c-1.eps

llimrem,ber 13, 

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Prepared Statement of Dr. Colin H. Kahl 

Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 

Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security 

Chairman Royce, Ranking IYTernber Engel, disLinguished members or the Cnmrnillee, thank you ror 

inviting me here today to discuss negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. 

The long-simmering nuclear crisis i,'llith Iran is approaching a critical inflection point_ The election of 

IIassan Rouhani, a moderate former nuclear negotiator, as Iran's ne\v president has re-energized 

diplomacy belween Iran and the PS+l (lhe United Slales, BriLain, China, !'rance, Germany, and Russia). 

~anctions have taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and Rouhani believes he has a popular 

mandale and sumcienllaliLude from Iran's supreme leader, Ayalollah Ali Khamenei, lo reach an 

accommodation ''lith the international community in exchange for lessening the pressure. The prospects 

for a comprehensive agreement to peacefully resolve the nuclear impasse have never been higher. 

The most recent round of talks behvcen Iran and the 1'5+1, held in Geneva, concluded on November 10. 

The negoliaLions were serious and suslained, including several hours olinLensive bilaleral discussions 

bet\veen the United States and Iran, Ditkrences bet\yeen the parties have been narrmvcd, bringing the 

broad contours of an interim nuclear agreement into vie,'v. Nevertheless, a number of sticking points 

remain.] Talks are set to resume in Geneva on November 20. 

We do nol yet know whelher an iniLial deal will malerialize. RUl ifil nllimalely resembles lhe agreernenl 

described in recent press reports, it \vould be a meaningful first step on the road to a tinal, comprehensive 

accord to address the Iranian nuclear challenge. 

In the coming months, the opportunity to meaningfully constrain Iranian nuclcarization could he seized, 

leading lo a peaceful resolulion or a decades-long conilict, or squandered, selling Lhe stage for an Iranian 

nuclear bomb, another war in the JVliddlc East, or both. As a former Deputy A"istant Secretary of DetCnsc 

for the Middle Last, I firmly believe all options should remain on the table to prevent Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons, Bul I also knovv enough abouL l}()'\,v military cilntlicl "'\lith Iran \vould likel}' unfold to 

understand that an enduring diplomatic outcome is far preferable to another ,"var. 

Achieving a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear lvcapons lvill require continued 

I Julian Borger and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Geneva Talks End WithiXltDeal on Iran's NuciearProgramme," TheGuardian, November9, 2013, 

h Hp:! /\,p,vw .1he~lI'Hd iclllJ um! ,,,orld/:;Of;f[; ,;v! IOIi(J~l n c, cirJI ·deal ·'i:a! 1',- r"illtcr pi utlJfl ilJIll-ffdnCi'?(MP;o;;l,/,t .. 91l; Laura Rozen, JlProgress, B utNo Deal Yet as Iran 

Talks Conclude/' A/-Monitor, NClllem berlO, 2013, http://bJ(kdldr: nel.d-rnonitcLm:' ;in ~i"x. phpi2()13llI!696JJ I r3n-\'J()fld-p'Jwtr~-dJi [,l-pr'JgrE':;s-i '1-talk,- b ut-say0(;31 nel~15 mo:~ vwrkJ; and iV\kl1ael R, Gordm, iV0rkLandierand JoJj Rudorell, "Iran llalked atLanguiKJecfGtaftNuclear)eal, WeStern DiplomatsSay," Nef~1 York Times, 

tJovi'm bfr 10, lOn h tlp://WW\!J ,flytlfl]l'~/ OITI :':JOBi 1/1 Y,'iC'dd/!n iddlff'(I~t/kpli}'· []()--df:\ll- in-lid!ld-dfit"llh- m'~JOjl,ltm\J-)tratHJy-on 

irJIl.htrnl!l1p8c[o.,c.&Va(]EV!aMea--=dll. 

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commitment to serious, tough-minded negotiations, and close cooperation between the Obama 

adrninisLraLiofl and Congress. Given the profound disLrusL bd\-veen Lhe United SLates and Iran, care mUSl 

be taken to maintain diplomatic momentum and avoid missteps and backsliding that could othcrv·,risc put 

Lhe parLies on Lhe road to conCrnntaLion. In particular, as U.S. negoLiators work to get an iniLial agreement 

by the end of 2013 to halt the most troubling and urgent dimensions of iran's nuclear enterprise, 

Congress should refrain from imposing additional sanctions or taking other actions that would tie the 

hands of our diplomats and undermine the prospects (or success. 

The Goals of a Peaceful Diplomatic Solution 

According to U.S. intelligence offlcials, Iran has already mastered the basic knowledge and technology 

required to eventually develop nuclear weapons, should the regime decide to do so.' Nothing, including 

the complete dismantling orIran's nuclear infraslruclure, will pUl lhls kchnolugkal genie back in Lhe 

hottle. Instead, negotiations should focus on a more concrete and achievable objective: placing meaningful 

and verifiable conSlrainLS on Iran's abilily Lo LranslaLe iLs accurnulaLed knowledge and civilian nuclear 

capabilities into nuclear ,""capons. 

Specilkally, diplomacy should aim lo prevenllran li'om achieving a nuclear "breakoul capabilily," dellned 

as the point at ·which Iran could produce fissile material for one or more nuclcar l,veapons so quickly or so 

secreLly lhaL Lhe inlernational cornrnuniLy could not deLecl iL and respond in Lime. i\ final diplomatic 

agreement sufllcicnt to prevent brcakollt should seck to: 

Lengthen breakout timelines. The l1nal agreement should include sunlcienl Lechnical constraints to 

ensure the timcframe het''\Teen the iIlltiation of breakout and the production of fissile material for one 

or more weapons is suffkienL Lo allow inLerdicLion. 

Shorten detection timciines. Verification mechanisms must be in place to ensure that breakout 

activilies would be delecled by InlernaLional Atomic Energy Agency (L~EA) inspeclors and lhrough 

other means at the earliest possible stage. 

Provide assurances against a covert nuclear infrastructure. Transparency and verification 

mechanisms should be sufficient to detect construction of covert fuel-cycle facilities and 

\veaponizaLinn activities. 

Maintain a credible response to breakont. In the aftermath of any agreemenl, the UniLed Slales (and 

the international community) must also maintain the will and capability to take effective action, 

including the use of military force if necessary, to prevent the acquisition of enough fissile material for 

a nuclear weap<'Jn i(breaknuL is de lee Led,' 

lAsDirectorofNationallntelligenceJamesClappertestlfiedearlierthisyear,'llran hasthescientific,technical,and industrial capacitytoE'VentualiyprOOucE' nuclear 

weapons." James R. Clapper, JlStatement forthe Record: Worl dwid e Th reatAssessmentoftheU.S.1 ntell Ig enee COOl m u nity," Senate Select Com m ittee on I ntell igence, March 

12,2013, 7, http://Wl·ll.lI.dnLgov!Jjlt·5!d;;x:mrents/ltitl·lli~ enu:)i.-2GP'IOPor15.'20137(,20A !Aii,2OSf-R%20forS·t2CSj(Jc;.)2()1l;'S2Ck\..'!'fu2()2013.pd f. 

'Foradiscussionoftheserequirements,seeRobertEinhOOl,"lsa'Good'DeaIPossible?"(Brookingslnstitution,Qctober24,2013), 

h l1j.lJ iwww,brookings.edu! rl'seJ~;.h/s02('(r es(201)/ iOi 24· !1 ud :O<1r· ~t'i.ll- pcssiblt'-itJri tin ho;n, 

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85551c-3.eps

An agreement that met these condiLions would prevent and dder Iran from racing to a nuclear bomb and, 

should the regime nevertheless decide to do so, provide ample time for the United States and the 

inLernational communiLy to inLerdicL the process before it was completed. 

The Dangers of Pushing for a Maximalist Deal 

Some analysts argue that U.S. negotiaLOrs. should capiLalize on lhe exisLing leverage created by crippling 

economic sanctions and Iran's apparent v,,·illingness to negotiate to in,l,ist on a maximalist deal. 

T\:faximalists con lend lhat nothing short of a complele dbmantling ofIran's fuel cycle aCLiviLiesincluding its (urrent uranium enrichment activities, as ',vell as facilities that could eventually enable Iran 

to produce weapons-grade plutonium - can achieve the objective of preventing nuclear breakout, and 

noLhing sh'Jrt oj" Lhis ideal ouLcome would merit lessening pressure on Iran.'! This approach is reflected in 

Israeli Prime JVlinister Benjamin Nctanyahu's "Four No's": no uranium enrichment at anylevcl; no 

stockpile of enriched uranium; no centrifuges or centrifuge facililies; and n(l Arak heavy waler reaclllr.5 

Iran 'I.\'ould also have to acquiesce to intrusiV(~ inspections to VCrif)T the dismantling of these capabilities 

and provide a full accounting of "past military dimensions" of its nuclear program.o Incentivizing Iran to 

accepl such an agreement, proponenLs argue, requires a steady escalaLlon of U.S. sancLions and a credible 

threat of military action if Iran fails to agree.':" 

Attempting to keep Iran as far away tl-om nuclear weapons as possible by demanding that the country 

completely ahandon fuel-cycle activities, particularly the demand for zero enrichment, seems prudent and 

reaS<.1llable. All else being equal, lhe tolal absence of enrichment activities puts Iran further away from 

nuclear ,\'capons than allowing some limited enrichlnent, and it ·would be easier to verify. A-loreovcr, most 

counLries wiLh civilian nuclear power planls ft.lrgo domestic enrichment. (Although iL is also the case thal 

Argentina, BraziL Germany, Japan and the Netherlands have domestic enrichment capabilities "\vhile 

remaining compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) Ilut in reality, the quest for an optimal 

deal Lhat requires a permanenL end to Iranian enrichment aL any level would likely d(lOm diplomacy, 

making the far worse outcomes of unconstrained nuclearization or a military shmvdown over '1 chran's 

nuclear program much mOfe likely. 

Regardless of pressure from the United States, our allies, and the "\.I,'ider international community, the 

Iranian regime is unHkely L<'l agree Lo pennanenLly end all enrichment. Khamenei, Lhe ulLimaLe decider on 

the nuclear file, has invested far too much of the rq,rimc's domestic lq,ritimacy in defending Jran's "rights" 

4See, for exam pie, Mi chael Sing h, liThe Straig htPath toa Nuclear Deal with I ran ," Washington Post, Ocober13, 2013, il':tO:/iwwv'l.wash IflQ tonpostcom! cpin! ons/1hep]til to a· f'llril'{)t o('al With· ,tanl;O ~3j 10/ 18f5734iib 10 ?SOt>. !'le3 2Ju' 4t2di:.:08311c_~tory.html 

5

11T ranscri pt ofNetanyahu's UN General Assem bly Speech," Haorerz, October 1, 2013, r tt~:i iwww.n",{J[i"il,COm f nf:w~/d iplornac)i defensf:/ 1. ~)(X',ll 

'For a discussion of pastm ilitary dimensions of the prog ram, see Office ofthelAEA Di rectorGeneral, "1m plem entation of the NPTSafeg uards Ag reementan d Relevant 

Provisions of Security (ou ncil Resolutions in the Islam IC Republic ofl ran" (Novem ber 8, 2011), Annex. 

iReul MarcGerechtand MarkDubowitz, Illran Wants the Bomb-and Sanctioos Relief," Washington Post,October11, 2013, 

http.! h\fWW.v'l3~.hingtot1pos!.(om/op:nion~ilri.l'~ ·WJ11ts the b::>mb- and sJn(tI(J:~~-r\!!id/2013;10i1 iJ201fl17.<4· 3h:7-11e3·9<:68 U6·m103:iO_stor~dltm:;and Michael 

Singh, "Iran Nuclear Talks: A Brief History and theRoad AheCKl," PoJicyNlJtes, No. 15(Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October2013), 

bttp$:;.!www.washitlg~ojlins!itllt.:.(lqfup!oads/!)oc~llwts!pLlbs/P(~icytlole15a_.;.iilgh.p;jf. 

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(defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate now, even in the face of withering economic 

sancLions. The Tslamic Republic has spent mOl'e lhan $100 billion over decades and enormous amounts or 

political capital to master the kncnvlcdgc and centrifuge technology associated '''lith uranium enrichment.s 

The nuclear program and "resisLance Lo arrogant powers" arc firmly imbedded in the regime's ideological 

raison d'etrc Khamcnci and hardliners within the Revolutionary Guard arc therdi)re unlikely to sustain 

support for further negotiations, let alone acquiesce to a final nuclear deal, if the end product reflects a 

Lolal surrender for the regime. HKharncnei cries uncle and dismanlles the enUre Iranian program, how 

"rill he explain the tremendous expense and justify the years of sanctions and Isolation to his people? 

\VhaL would iL all have been [or? Kharnenei likely fears such a humiliaLion mure Lhan he [ears economic 

collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities. As RAND Corporation Iran analyst 

Alireza Nader observes, "[sJanctions are a danger to their rule, but weakness in the face of pressure might 

be no less a lhreal."9 

Nor are president Rouhani and his negotiating team likely to agree to halt enrichment and advocate for 

such a policy wiLhin the regime, since doing so would be poliLical suicide. In 2003. during Rouhani's 

previous role as Iran', chief nuclear negotiator, hc convinced Khamcnci to accept a temporary suspension 

or enrichmenl. Bul rurlher Lalks wilh Lhe inlernalional communily slalled in early 2(105 over a failure Lo 

agree on Iran's asserted right to enrichment, and fehran ('nded its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani 

believes - as do the supreme leader and Rouhani's critics in the Revolutionary Guard - that the West 

pockeled Iranian concessions and Tehran gol nOlhlng in return. The failure of"Iran's earlier approach 

under Rouhani facilitated the risc of l'vlahmoud Ahmadincjad and his hard line policies, including thc 

developmenl o[ a much more r ..lbusl uranium enrichmenl capabilily. Rouhani is unlikely Lo make lhal 

mistake again. And even if Rouhani and his lead negotiator, foreign minister Javad Zarif, lvere somehO\\l 

convinced to do so, the Iranian president would be savaged by his right flank." 

Somc analysts disagree. The Council on Foreign Relations' Ray Takcyh, for cxample, argues that 

Khamenei and Rouhani have boxed Lhemselves in by raising such high expeclaLions among Lhe Iranian 

people for si6rnificant sanctions rdief. According to this line of reasoning, regime fears of a popular 

backlash in the event that diplomacy fails produce considerable leverage for the international community 

Lo insisl on a maximalisL dea1.l1 Bul lhis misreads Iranian pn\iLical currenLs. RaLher Lhan boxing lhe regime 

in, Khamenei morc likely bclieves that Rouhani's election has bolstered the rq)mc's domestic standing, 

badly damaged afler Lhe iraudulenL20()Y presidenlial e1eclions, buying Lhe regime additional room /()r 

3ScottPetersoo, "How Much is a NuciearProgram Worth? Forlran, Well Over$100Billion," Christian 5cienceMonitor, April 3, 2013, 

htt:r://www.(smr)tlit;)f.comi\NnriJ/M!drll(.·FJstrlm.V(14%.!io ... l-mlJ(i1!~·il:-wc:ci1r·progfil!TI\Mor1hFor!ran·w(.I!·(f;(..-100·blliior. 

"Alireza Nader, I!Pauseoo Additiooallran Sanctioos Crucial toNegotiations/, TheHifI, November5,1013! htq:n'ithfhiil (im/opiilioni'l-1-rrl/189371-p(J\,)f'-Ofl-<lclditionaiirdn-<;dnd!onHlllciJi-til-neg0tiat'ClIl'J 

"JThis section draws on Colin H. Kahl and AlirezaNader, I!Zero-Sum Enrichment/' ForeignPolicy.com, October14,2013, 

htlp:!iwww.to:t:ltjtlpolicy.u):.;liai1Ic1E~/21)13i.lfl.:14izHo_.;um_etjii(hmf..nUIJfI_us_tluclear_de.)I?pge-flill. 

11 Ray Takeyh, !ITheU.S., Notlran, Has the Upper Hand in NuciearNegotiations," Washington Past, Nwember6,20l3, ht!p:/I\'l'b't.'.-Ilit,hinqt0f1pt)',Lcomiopini0ll5/raytak"yh·the not·ir~!l has tll' UPPI;'[ ~iJnj in·nlJc'ear nl'~I'~tla[k>l:5;2mlll.'06/28217ttl4'157111':3-i.ll%·3544](i.1cnSl_story.htmi 

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maneuver with the Iranian puhlic. 12 Rouhani's new moderate tone with the international community has 

alse) recasLlhe Islamic Republic as the reascmable parly, furlher mitigaling Lhe risks of a popular backlash, 

espenally if further negotiations deadlock over "unreasonable" ma..x:imaHst demands. According to a 

recenL Gallup poll, only 13 percenl of Lhe Iranian public holds Lhe regime responsible for Lhe hardships 

produced by economic sanctions ('16 percent blame the United States). The samc poll found that 68 

percent of Iranians support continuing the country's nuclear program despite economic sanctions,I' a 

finding cnnsiSlenl wiLh other surveys sho\-ving \videspread support for maintaining Iran's enrichment 

program even if it results in additional economic pressure.1-1 Consequently, if talks arc seen to collapse 

because o[\\TashingLon's insisLence on demands [or zero enrkhmenL, lhe Iranian publk is likely Lo direct 

their ire at United Sates, not the regime, telr the diplomatic t<,i1ure. 

Given profound reasons j()r Lhe regime lo rejecl a maximalisl deal, pursuing one w(lUld require Lhe UniLed 

States to go to the brink of the abyss \vith Iran, escalating economic and military threats to the point that 

Lhe regime's survival was acuLely and imminently at stake. L5 YeL pursuing such a high-risk slralegy is 

unlikely to succeed, and the consequence, of failure would be profound. 

f.irsl, it is unclear if any escalation of sanclions could bring the regime Lo ils knees in time to prevent Iran 

from achieving a breakout capability. Although some analysts believe Tehran is on the ropes and that 

addiLional sanctions can rorce Iran Lo completely dismanLle Us nuclear program, they rarely explain how 

more sanctions '\vould produce a sutflcicnt threat to th(~ regime fast enough to prevent Iran from crossing 

critical nuclear thresholds.ll, Iran's apparent willingness to negotiate under pressure is not, in and of itself, 

evidence lhat more pressure wm produce total surrender on the nuclear issue. There musL be a 

mechanism to produce a regime crisis - and it must happen fast enough. Yet, \vhilc Iran's economy is in 

dire sLraiLs, the c/luntry does not appear to be [acing imminent economic collapse. L7 Khamenei and Lhe 

11 Nazila Fathi, "Can Iran's PresidentRouhani DeliverChange in Relationswith U.S.?" CNN.(om, September24, 2013, h ttp: . .'iwwvunn.(cwn!J,J13/W/2A:cpinioniopiniDnfdthi-r0llh.~ni-Ll~/. Seealsothediscussion ofKhamenei's speech atRouhani's Inauguration in M.lstafaal-Labbad, !lRouhanL Khamenei Agree: Iran toFoliow a Mooerate 

DiSCOJ rse," AI-MOI)itOf, Aug ust5, 1013, http:!;wl!.w ,:;1- mo,ltor com; pulw/tr/cont."nt5/ article,! politlcs,')()13.'ll3/iran-n",w- ~), e5ldf'JlL- rJssan-roli han i- inallgu Iztioll5P,~(x~,html. 

Ii Jay Losch ky, "Mostl ran ian Say Sanctions Hurti ng Thei r Livel ihood s," Gallup WorM, Novem ber6, 2013, http://w\w\ •. gall LIP .':n!TI/ pol i !l6S743/i raniar"ls<JY-'iMI.;:tlon'ihurtli1g-llvf'llhoc.:ls.aspx. 

11 Geneive Abdo, "Iran's NuciearResistan ee," foreign Palicy.com, October15, 2011, h ltp:,'/ nmka<;t fiJreiS rJpoi icy.( (1m! pmtsl201J!10175/ir,1f)s _flU(: eaue':ii~ t/lflCf. 

ilGerechtand Dubowitz, "Iran Wants the Bomb-and Sanctions Relief-" Atthesametime, theseauthors almititis very unlikely to succeed. "Everycwntryhas an 

economic breaking poi nt," Gareehtand Dubowitzwrite. "B utach ieving thatmomen tin the Islam ic Republic will beextr<Ylrd inarily d ifficultbecause such com promise is 

tantamounttospiritualsuicide" 

lOSee, forexample, Thomas Erdbrink, !llran Staggers as Sanctions HitEconomy," New York Times, SeptemberJO,2013, 

httv'//ww'NJlytitnr:;.(oll1/2()13/ lQ/lil/'.",m!d.:tnlddlf't:J'it;irclrl-<;tlqljNS- ,]S s,]nrt!:)n5 hi!-f'(c)[1omy htrnl!_r--0; and MarkDubowitzand Rachelliemba, "When Will 

Iran Run OutofMoney? ThelmpactofSanctions on Iran's Foreign Exchange Reserves and theBalanceofPayments" (F(Jlndation forDefenseofDemocfacies and Roubini 

Global Econom iC5, October2, 1013L h tlp:/ l>.'\Iw'N_dcfrno lip,., ()( ra;y."g 15111ff/ II ~IO;hl,)/ d ex Im1<'m')/lr<l~' _ Repoil_ Fin<:I_Lpd f. 

17 Andrew Torchia, "Analysis: Iran EconomyFarFrom Collapseas Sanctions Tighten," Reuters, Februaryl0, 2013, h~lp:i,\'1l1\,,·.'_lfutff'i.com;~r!j(!('!?Ol3f02!70! . 'j-iranf'( Cl!lO:r1l'-Qn( tio!]s- idUSBREY1JOS!I,!.201J02BJ; Patrick Clawson, "Iran Beyond Oil?" Policywatch 2061 (Wash ington Institute for Near EastPolicy, April 3, 1013), 

ht!P:!iwww.washln:Jt()nln~~ tute crglp(~icy ilti.'llysI5!\Ie'Nilfzm b~'ond -oii;Ariel Zirulnick, "Iran Sanctions: How Much Are TheyReallyHurting?" CiuistionScience 

MOl) itor, October 15, 2013. har;:i /Wl/.f1,1j.(\1l1011 itor t."m/Wllr' d.' iVlddle-tZl'i V20B!l(n;;;,'hJn-~,;n(t:0n,,-H(~'f- much-<lf(:'-thf'Y-I\\llIy- h urti fig; and Kenneth Katzman, Iran 

Sanctions" ((ong ressional Research Servi ce, October 11, 2013), 51- 54, h ttp:(!w,;.r/J [J:;,orgisgp/ ([5/ mideas ;./R5i087 LJ1df. 

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Revolutionary Guard also seem to believe that the Islamic Republic weathered worse during the Iran-Iraq 

war, an eighl year wnllicllhal killed hundreds of thousands "nranians and produced (wer half a lrillion 

dollars in economic losses before Iran agreed to a ccascfirc. Even if Congress goes fon'lJard \vith additional 

hars.h sancLlons, economic condilions are nul likely Lo produce enough exislenLial angst among Iranian 

leaders, generate mass unrest, or othcrvl'isc implode the regime before Iran achieves a nuclear breakout 

capability. And even if the regime miraculously fell, it stin might not prove sufficient to force a nuclear 

surrender. Arler all, the imprisoned leaders or the Green I\:Iovement and Iranian secularisLs opposed to Lhe 

Islamic Republic also support Iran's declared right to enrichment. 1:" fhcrcforc, if preventing nuclear 

breakout is an urgenl priorHy, it would be advisable lo pursue a framework lhat can realislically achieve 

that objective over the next ycar rather than gambling on a maximalist strategy that is unlikely to work 

and almost certainly will not ,,,Tork in time. 

Second, and somewhat paradoxically, escalating sanctions at this moment could actually end up 

weakening inlernaLional pressure on Iran. For beLler or worse, Rouhani has already succeeded in shi[ling 

international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than Iran, comes across as the intransigent 

party, it will become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating 

Tehran. In parlicular, ii'negoLiaLions on a comprehensive Cramev/ork collapse because (lC\VashingLon's 

uu\villingness to make It deal on limited enrichment - a deal Russia and China and numerous other 

European and Asian naLions SUpporL - H will likely become much harder In enforce sane Lions. St.lme fence 

sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable 

position of chOOSing between imposing extraterritorial sanctions on banks and companies in China, India, 

Japan, Snulh Korea, Turkey and elsewhere, or acquiescing lo Lhe erosion of" Lhe comprehensive sancLions 

regime. 

Third, issuing more explicit military threats (through a possible authorization of the usc of military force, 

for example) is also unlikely to achieve a maximalist diplomatic outcome. There is little douht that 

maintaining a credible miHlary option affecLs the Iranian regime's cakulaLinns, raising Lhe potential ((Jsls 

associated "\"lith nuclearizatioil. And, if diplomacy fails, the United States should reserve the option of 

using force as a lasl resort lo preclude Iran from developing nnclear weapons. Bul shol"l of invading, 

occupying and imposing regime change, threats to surgically strike Iranian nuclear sites, no matter ho,,\' 

credible, would not hold the regime sufficiently at risk to compel them to completely dismantle their 

nudear program. 

Finally, allempling lo generate an exislen Lial crisis for the Islamic Republic could backfire by increasing 

the regime's incentives to acquire nuclear \\rcapons. Ihis is especially true in the current diplomatic 

context. If the United States escalates economic or military pressure at tlle very moment that Iran has 

bc:gun lo nnaHy negotiate in earnest, Khamenei Vli11 hke1y concluue lhallhe real and irrevocable goal of" 

u.s. policy is regime change rather than a nudear acco1'o."9 Solidifying this perception would enhance, 

13 "Mousavi: Iran Will NeverHaltEnrichment," Payvolldlroll News, April 14,2009, http://WW1K,P()~'VJtld,(()n/~elNs!\fI.'apr!m6,~tml, 

W For exam pi e, two prom i nentcham pioo 5 ofe5calating sanctions arg liE', !lifwe aregoing tOPli r5l1etollg heri n tem ationalsanction s ag ainstl ran - and we should - the goal 

shouldberegimechangeinlran,notstoppingproliferation ... DesigningsanctioostomakeKhameneirelentinhis30-yearquestforthebombisadelusion;sanctions 

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rather than lessen, Tehran's motivation to develop a nuclear deterrent as the only means of ensuring 

regime survival. 

In short, "playing chicken" wiLh Iran in pursuit of rnaxirnalisL g()ais is not likely to work. Gambling 

everything by insisting on an optimal deal could vcry likely result in no deal, leaving Iran tiTer and 

potentially more motivated to build atomic arms. 

Good Enough: Pushing for a Sufficient Deal 

A complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program- including a permanent end to uranium enrichmentis Lhererore not in the cards. Inslcad of pushing ror an ideal-bul-unachievable agreement, Lhe UniLed 

~tates and other "\Ilorld pmvcrs should push for a sufficient and achievable one: an accord that significantly 

limils fuel-cycle activiLies under stringent c(mdWons and verificaLion procedures designed lo preclude 

Iran's ability to rapidly produce nuclear weapons. 

A "sufficient" deal ,.\-Tould have several major components: 

Significant constraints on uranium enrichment, including: a cap on enrichmenl allhe 5 percenl 

level sufficient for civilian nuclear pmver reactors but far from bomb-grade; neutralizing or othcr\-I,Tisc 

BmiLing Lhe size orIran's domestic stockpile orIow-enriched uranium (LEU) to below one-bomb's 

1,Yorth of material; limits on the number, quality and/or output of centrifuges; and limit the number 

and size of enrichment facilities. 

Significant constraints on the plutonium track, including: dismantling Arak, converting Arak to a 

pnJ1iferation-resisLanllighl waler reacLor or otherwise neutrali/ing the Jacilily; and prohibiLing the 

future construction of reprocessing facilities. 

An intrusive inspections regime, including: ratiiicaLion and implementalion of the IAEA AddiLiunal 

Protocol, allowing inspections of undeclared facilities: requirements for early notification of new 

nuclear sites; more frequent inspecLions and 24/7 remole surveillance oCke), facilities; monitoring 

centrifuge research, development and production facilities, and uranium mint's; and enhanced 

monitoring of trade in sensitive goods and technologies. 

Transparency into past military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program, including: accounting 

ror past weapons-relaLed research and development; and providing IAF,A access to ke), research 

facilities anJ scientists. 

Taken Logether, these measures would substantially lengthen break(lUL limelines, shOrLen detecLion 

timelincs and providc assuranccs against an Iranian covert infrastructurc. for thcse reasons, leading anns 

control experts believe that such a comprehensive agreement would be sufficient to prevent Iranian 

thatcould contributetopopularunrestand political tumultarenot"Reuel MarcGerechtand MarkDublMritz, "EconomlC Regime-ChangeCan Stop Iran Bomb," Bloomberg, 

January16/2012/hnp:/!www.bl:.-J:l~ber~.(ol;.lln .. WsI21)12-01 17i(?(I)n!1Ylic [t";Jim'.' (n2nge ~an stl);: irJn ,ommcl1ta;y-by qere(ht and-dubcwltZ.ltrnl. 

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85551c-8.eps

nuclear breakout." Furthermore, nothing about this proposal would take any options "off the table" in the 

event that Iran violaled the agreemenl, reconsLiluLed elements o/'iLs program and atLempted to build 

nuclear \'Ilcapons. 'J he United State" and other members of the mternational community \'I[{)Uld retain the 

ability to set back the program by force if necessary - and Lhe nalure of the conslrainLS and verification 

procedures contained in the deal would ensure ample '\varning time to carry out such actions before Iran 

crossed the nuclear threshold. 

The significant constraints imposed on Iran's program by such a proposal may be difficult for Tehran to 

stomach. But i[paired \vith meaningful sanCLions relief, it has a much beLLer chance of success than 

insisting on the complete dismantling of Iran's program. CrUcially, irrespective of \,rhether the United 

States and its P5+ 1 partners formally recognize a right to enrichment (a step U.S. negotiators correctly say 

lhey will nol do), lhe]act "i"1imiled enrichmenl under a sumcienl deal could slill allow Khamenei and 

Rouhani to claim Iran's asserted rights had bccn respectcd. Thus, unlikc the maximalist approach, \vhich 

banks on creaLing an exislenLial crisis for the regime Lhat is likely to fail Of backfire, a dealthal allows 

some limited enrichment under stringent constraints oftt'rs the regime a face-saving ,yay out. Unckr such 

an agreement, Khamenei could tell the Iranian people: "I said we never wanted nuclear weapons and I 

have issued a lalwa lre1igious rulingJ agalnslthem. But I insisLed thal our righLs be respecLed, and n<.lW 

thcy arc."21 Civen the reprehensible conduct of the Iranian regime, an outcome that allcl\\'s the supreme 

leader lo save [act' wiLh his people is unpalaLable. Bul iL is clearly preferahle to a \vorlJ in which the same 

regime marches tmvard an atomic bomb. 

Pushing /()r a l<.lugh-bul-fair deal along Lhese lines would also have the added bendlL oJ"mainLaining vilal 

international cooperation. \Vhereas insisting on maximalist demands risks shattcring hard-built international 

consensus, pushing a sufficienL deal along Lhe lines suggeSLed above wllUld help main lain inlernali(mal pressure if 

talks falter. And, should it ever beeom,' necessary for the United States to employ militaIY force to set back Iran's 

progTam, championing a reasonable deal would increase the international legitimacy of such actiolls." 

The Path to a Final Deal 

Achieving a comprehensive accord sumcienllo prevenliranian nuclear breakoul will be difficnll. Bul 

given the progress made thus far in Geneva, tl1('re is a plausible path forward. 

Ongoing negotiations belween Iran and Lhe PS+ 1 envision a Lwo-sLep process loward a comprehensive 

agreement. During fin;t phase, which is thc subject of current ncgotiations, media rcports suggest that 

Iran would be required lo: 

10 PatrickMigliorini, David Albright, Houston WlXld and Christina Walrond, ulranian BreakoutEstimatE's, Updated SeptE'mbE'r2013" (InstittlteforSciE'ncE'and IntE'rnational 

Security,Octooer24,2013t 10- 13, ht!p:i/i5b-cfllif1P.org/llp:Oddsiisi~·'(-'poft~!d[u rn<'flls/Bft\lk,')llt_Stlldy_240r.tobl'rJOV pdf; and Einhorn, Is a'Good' Deal Possible?" 

11 See Ali Hashem, uObamaReferencetoFatwaMakes Iran Hard-Liners TakeNote," AI-Monitor, September25, 2013, r tt~:.' iV,;l!."#.J'-

m()f1itou0m/PlJlse/Nlgindlsi:013if1Jiok1mHo:Jhar,-IJ~gd-fdtwd-irdfl.htrn:. 

II Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, "Iran's NuciearGames Demand a ToogherU.S.Approach," Wasl1illgton Post, May27, 2013, 

h ttp:! ;.www.v.i!~hIn9tun[lOSUom.!Cflini0f1~/ir?:·~-fllJ(h:·.cl!-gd:l·.·.;-di.ITIdld·f()l-d-touuhei-tls- .. PP·tdCh/20.11/0)! 27!i61fA,'/E'-C0f')-111'2-92'1-5-

!73cO'i23c027_stoly.hlml 

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85551c-9.eps

Stop producing enriched uranium at the near-homb-grade 20 percent level. 

Neutralize most of its existing 20 percent stockpile through some combination of oxidation, 

dnwnhlending and/of conversion Lo fuel assemblies 

Agree not to activate advanced IR -2m centrifuges. 

~'rcczc or reduce the number of operational IR-l centrifuges enriching to the 3.5 percent level. 

Halt construction of the Arak heavy water reactor or, at the very least, ren'ain from loading fuel into 

the reactor. 

Agree to more intrusive inspections. n 

In exchange for these initial Iranian steps to address the most urgent clements of their nuclear probrram, 

the Ohama administration appears prepared to offer limited, targeted and reversible sanctions relief. 

According to media reporLs, Lhls may include: a temporary suspension or sane Lions on trade with Iran in 

petrochemicals, gold and other precious rnctals; "\vaiving proliferation designations of Iran's auto industry; 

providing access to clvilian aircrafL pans; and/or a mechanism (or releasing some Iranian funds Lied up in 

overseas escr01N accounts.:1 Sanctions v·,roulJ only be ttuspended for the period of the ab'1-eement 

(approximately six months) and could be "turned back on" ifIran fails to honor the deal. 

Critics of this prospective deal, most vocally Prime 1vlinistcr Netanyahu, arguc that it does far too little to 

constrain Iranian nuclear capabiliLies. They also con Lend that lhe associated offer or economic relief is too 

generous, risking the viability of the overall sanctions regime and reducing the prcstture required to 

compel more meaningful Iranian concessions. 2r 

But a closer examination reveals that the proposed intcriIn agreement is very much in the interest of thc 

Uniled Slales and OUl' c10sesL allies, including Israel. If an inlerim deal along lhese lines is agreed Lo and 

implemented, it would halt and begin to roll back the most troubling aspects of the Iranian prolo'ram. By 

halting 20 percent enrichment and Significantly reducing Iran's stockpile of 20 percent material, it would 

immediately address the very lhreaL Ndanyahu hlghlighLed in his "red line" speech to Lhe United NaLions 

b Karl Penhaul and EliseLabon, Hopes Riseforlran NuclearAccord Soon; Netanyahu Warns Against'VeryBad Deal, 'CNN.com, November8, 2013, 

htlp / Ni .. "w.rn:'J()rni2013!11/o.~,rwmj'1/nWJst';:Fm nlJd~'JI-1alk<l;and Daryl G. Kimball and KelseyDavenport, "A Realistic, Meaningful NuciearDeal witi1lran is 

Within Reach," Arms (ontrofNow, November8,2013,httP;l;.:mm~0n~fclrO'/.'.org!1011/ll;O&a Ff'1iISti( mra!1inqful rwc:far [J('<11 wim iran i<;·withi~-r(';:r:hl 

11 Kimball and Davenport,"ARealistic, Meaningfill NuciearDealw ithlranisWithinReach" 

15 Jodi Rudoren,"On Iran, Netanyahu (an Only Fume," New York Times, November8,2013, ~llp:;!\f!ww.~ytirPf:.,(ollll)01J/l1/09f\f,"or,d/rr;lddifP6j/on-iLln-nrtJnyanuUJj-J)~ Iy- flJ me"htITII?pag",':alt~G ~2&pagt'wdf1ted -::--dll; Barak Ravid f "Israel Believes U.S. Making Too ManyConcessions in Negotiations with Iran/' Hoaretz, Novem ber9, 

2013, http://vf'Nw.haare2.comj mijbil~! .pr'..'rr III '71 1.557131 :'~o'l1J\DB)8!tE5l89f 417rc';lD05.~311D>C5B; and Jean- Lu( Renaud ie, "Israel Moves to Thward 'Dan gerous' I ran 

Deal," Yahoo! News, NovemberlO, 2013, hl1p:i/ fI('v,:".YJrl()J., !Jml I1l'ld!lj(Jh tH\I:.inU- irdfl ~;.mctiofl~ r'. tti n~Hl0le- CI (;'-

17445·i229,ntml;_ylt=.-A2KJ3C1I:~9)I1Q4.t,AI~QlDl,rID. 

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85551c-10.eps

General Assembly last year.'o The Institute for Science and International Security estimates it would 

currently Lake Iran as liLLIe as 1.3-2.3 months to produce one bomb's worLh of\veapons-grade uranium 

using a combination of its 3.5 percent and 20 percent uranium stockpile. 27 lImvcvcr, if Iran stops 20 

percenl enrichmenL and neutralizes most o(its 20 percent stockpile, Lhis would lengLhen the breakout 

time for weapons-grade uranium to 3.1-3.5 months. It '\vould thus takc longer for Iran to produce fissile 

material the day after such an agreement was implemented than is the case today. And since IAEA 

inspectors visil Iran's enrichmenL i'adliLies al Natanz and fordow every nne Lo two \veeks, on average, 

there 'ivcmld be slltIicicnt time to detect any Iranian attempts to produce bomb-grade materiaL 

Furthermore, if an iniLial agreement freezes IR-l cenLri[uge inslal1aLion and precludes opera Lion of 

advanced IR-2m centrifuges, as reported, it \'\lOuld make it more difticult for Iran to make further 

advances over the next six months that would otherwise reduce the time needed to enrich its stockpile of 

3.5 percenL LEU lo weapons-grade level. T asL but nolleasL, if lhe agreemenl s]mvs or halls lhe 

construction of Arak, or at least credibly prevents fuel loading, it \'Imuld address the pressing concern that 

Lhe reaclor could become operali()nal as soon as rnid-2014, potenLially providing Iran with an unsloppable 

plutonium pathway to a bomb before a llnal deal to resolve the status of the reactor can be rcached." In 

short, there is little doubt that this agreement would leave us better off relative to the status quo and 

anticipated Iranian lechnical advances over Lhe corning mnnlhs. 

To be sure, an inLerim deal along lhese lines would nol, in and o[itself, be enough III achieve the objective 

of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. No member of the 1'5+ 1, and ({Ttainly not the Obama 

administration, is under any illusion about this fact. nut it would serve as a vital "first step" toward a final 

sdtlement, pULLing essen liailirne back on lhe nuc1ear clock I(lr a second phase or negotialions aimed al 

reaching a comprehensive agreement. 

Also overblO\vn is the concern that the envisioned sanctions relief in phase one of this process vlOuld 

undermine the ability to achieve a final deal. Nothing about the temporary and reversible sanctions relief 

package currenLly under discussion fundamenLal1y weakens oil and financial sancLiI..JTls - Lhe rnosL 

crippling clements of current pressure on Iran - or disI11<:lntles the international architecture supporting 

lhe,e measures. ComequenLiy, even arler lhe inlerim deal goes inlo errecl, lhe United Slales and ils PS+l 

partners ,vould still maintain Significant leverage to inC(:ntivize the Iranian regime to agree to 

comprehenSive constraints on its program during the next phase of negotiations. 

Not the Time for New Sanctions 

According to media reporLs, Lhe adminislraLion has asked Congress L(l refrain [rom passing addiLional 

sanctions legislation until the end of the year in order to conclude the first phase of this two-step process. 

)/,YFull Text: Benjamin Netanyahu's Speech attheUnited Nations General Assembly," National }oumaf, September27,2012, 

h Itp://w,vvul<lti:Jfldljollrllili"-Olfll[,rlticndist'Hlr,tyn'tl 11- j('xt- bl'f!jJffl :[1- np!..T'jiih tJ-,-~pePl h-J':-li1e- ,H] i !pd-n dtioli"- gerwJdl- ,t,<,o-'rnb!y- 20 1/(192/, 

17 PatrickMigliorini, David Albright, Houston Wood, and Christina Walrond, "Iranian BreakoutEstimates, Updated September2013," (Institute for Science and International 

Security, Octooer 24,2013), http://ISIS on line,orq! IJ nl,)3QSiISls-rmorts/docu merlE/BreaKout Studv 240(t~ber2013.pdf, 

28 EmailcorrespondencewithDavidAlbright, November", 2013 

I"ltisworthnotingtl1atArakhasexperiencedrepeatedconstructimdelaysandlranappearstobehavingsignificantproblemsproducingadequatenumbersoffuel 

assem blies forthe reactor. Consequently, Arak is not likelytobecomeoperiitionaluntilliite 20140r2015, attheearliest. See MarkHI bbs, The IR-40and Dip lom<KY" (Carneg ie 

Endf.llNment forlnternational Peace, October24, 2013), h1tp;/ i ,:ame::j ieendowm'~nt ory! len/Wi Wi r 40-rf;a<:tw qr68. 

wvvw.cnas.org 10 
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85551c-11.eps

Given the apparent willingness of the Iranians to engage in serious negotiations under the pressure of 

exisling mulLilalera] and unilaleral sane Lions (including Lhose imposed by previous legisialinTl passed by 

Congress), this is a reasonable request. 

At this stage, there is no need for Con6rrcss to pass additional sanctions unless Iran fails to a&rrcc to 

concessions in the current phase of talks. It would also be counterproductive to impose new sanctions at 

Lhis juncture since doing so risks convincing the supreme leader that Rouhani's experimenl wiLh 

moderation is a fool's errand, empowering Iranian hardliners and aggravating tensions \"'!thin the PS+ 1 

and lhe wider inlernaLinnal coalition currenLly isolating Tehran.!O 

Nevertheless, Congress should be prepared to ramp up the pressure through additional sanctions 

legislaLioJl if no meaningful inLerim agreemenl is reached by the end or Lhis calendar rear, or if one is 

conciuJcd and Iran backslidcs. If Congress docs so, hmvcver, lav'lInakcrs should carefully construct the 

legislaLion lo ensure thal ne\.\' sancLions are reversible in the event of a rinal nuclear deal and avoid 

attaching conditions tied to other undesirable, but unrelated, Iranian behavior. Congress should also 

refrain from limiting executive discretion or ",;'aiver authority. Undermining executive discretion would 

greatly comphcale diplomacy by conveying lo Iran thal American offers of even lemporary, reversible 

sanctions relief are simply not credible. Stripping presidcntial"waiver authority could also complicate thc 

Obama administration's efforts to keep many of Tehran's c10sestlrading parlners from exiling lhe 

international coalition isolating Iran. Tremendous sanctions efficacy is derived from the adherence of 

China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and a few other remaining Iranian energy consumers. If 

Congress takes away the administration's leverage lo cran an accommodation with Iran lhal is viable for 

Iran's main trading partncrs, it risks alienating and driving a\vay thcse countrics. The result could be a net 

reduction in the effectiveness of pressure on Iran. 

Finally, if Iran ultimately agrees to and implements a comprehensive and verifiable deal sufficient to 

prevent nuclear breakoul, Congress should be prepared to supP{lrL such an agreement by offering 

proportional sanctions relief. To be clear, non-nuclear Iran sanctions focused on terrorism and human 

righls should nol be eased by progress on the nuclear issue. If a nuclear accommodalion is achieved, lhe 

only sanctions that should be rolled back arc those related to Iran's nuclear activities or the generation of 

revenue Tehran can use to finance nuclear activities. '1 

Conclusion 

As diplomacy wiLh Iran enlers a crilical period, the UniLed Slales should be mindful nollo accepl a bad 

deal. But an interim agreement along the Hnes discussed in Geneva ,'-muld not be a bad deal; rather, it 

would serve as a meaningful first step toward a comprehensive resolution to the Iranian nuclear challenge. 

As Lhe Obama adminlsLraLion and its P51-1 parlners \Yurk lo prevenL Iran from acquiring nuclear 

"\veapons, Congrcss has an important role to play to ensure that any final accord advanccs U.S. national 

inLereSLS. As it does so, however, lawmakers should resiSl the LempLalion to insisl {1l1 an oplimal bUl 

~)Nader!"PauseonAdditiooallranSan(ticmCrucialtoNegotiations." 

,1 Fora morefulsomedis(ussion,seeElizabeth Rosenberg and Colin H. Kahl, TheGreatUnwind: Iranian NuciearNegotiations and Principles for Sanctions Relief' (Centerfor 

a New American Secu rity, October2013), http://v,'\v\li,(t1as.org/tlles!uocumen ts/PL Jllcatlons/(NAS __ (jreatdnINI nd_ pc:licybr",CRosE'n b~lg :\al1: ,ad f. 

wvvw.cnas.org 11 
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85551c-12.eps

unachievable agreement. If we are to avoid the worst possible outcomes - unconstrained Iranian 

Iluclearizalion <)f anolher major war in lhe Middle Easl- lhen a good-il'-imperiecl deal is clearly 

preferable to no deal at all. 

www.cnas.org 12 
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85551c-13.eps

Dr. Colin H. Kahl 

Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University 

Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program, 

Center for a New American Security 

Dr. Colin H. Kahl is an assodaLe proCessor in the SecU1oiL)' SLudies Program al 

Gcorgctcl\vn University's .L:dmund A. vValsh School of Foreign and a Senior 

Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a 

New American Security (CNAS). 

!'rom !'ebruary2009 through December 20ll, Dr. Kabl served as tbe Deputy 

Assistanl Secretary of Defense for the Middle Easl. In lhat capacity, he 

developed and implemented the U.s. Defense Department's strate6'Y and 

policy toward Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel and the Palestinian territories, 

jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi !\rabia, Syria, the United !\rab 

Emirates and Yemen. During his tenure, he played a lead role in: designing 

and overseeing the responsible drawdown and lransiLion slralegy in Iraq; 

shaping the Pentagon's efforts to counter Iran's nuclear \\rcapons ambitions and destabilizing activities; 

promoting unprecedented defense cooperation with Israel; building a regional security architecture in the 

Gull; and crafting the Department's response to the !\rab Awakening. In june 20tl, Dr. Kahl was awarded 

lhe Secretary or Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary Robert Gales. 

Dr. Kahl has published widely on U.S. defense strategy in the Middle East, including articles in AIMonitor, Dejl'nse One, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, The Los Angeles Times, 

Middle East Policy, The National Interest, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Washington 

Quarterly. He has also published numerous works on the sources orpoliLical instability and violent 

conflict in developing countries, including States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World 

(Princeton University Press, 2006). 

From 2000-2005 and 2007 Dr. Kahl was a professor of international relations in the political science 

department allhe UniversiLy nf Minneso la. In 2005-200fl he was a Council on foreign Relations 

International Affairs Fellow v.mrking on stability operations and counterinsurgency at the Department of 

Defense. In lYY7-J YY8 he was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University's Olin Institute for 

Strategic Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science /i-om Columbia University in 2000 and his BA 

in pniiLlcal science from the UniversiLy oCIvIichigan in 1993. 

www.cnas.org 13 
46

Chairman ROYCE. I remember well—before I go to my question, 

Ms. Pletka, I wasn’t in Congress at the time, but I remember well 

the Reagan administration arguing as passionately against escalation of dramatic sanctions against South Africa that had the 

bomb, and I remember the consequence of Members of Congress insisting that regardless of the fact that those sanctions might be debilitating, might create a certain crimp in our diplomacy with 

South Africa, the probable result, said Republicans and Democrats 

in the House and Senate at the time, was that we would bring 

South Africa to the table because it would be unendurable for the 

South Africans to continue both their efforts with apartheid as well 

as their ongoing efforts with their nuclear program. 

It turned out in retrospect that the Members who passed that 

legislation in the House and Senate did have the legislation vetoed 

by the administration, but that veto was overridden by both 

Houses, as I recall, and the consequences of it was that the Government of South Africa, those involved in that process, said afterwards, we wouldn’t have lasted a week if we had not turned over 

the nuclear weapons program, if we had not turned over the bomb, 

and had we not changed from apartheid. 

I would just say that we have heard from the experts before in 

terms of the likely results, adverse results, of dramatically increasing sanctions, but I was going to ask Danielle Pletka, Dani, what 

is your take on what happened with respect to our failure to do so 

with North Korea? Because I remember well Treasury designed a 

program in 2005 to put sanctions on North Korea, and we did it. 

State wanted them lifted; argued that if we lifted it, that we would 

get the results that were promised by the leader in North Korea 

at the time. And the consequences, of course, were very different 

than what was anticipated. We did not go through in that case 

with our full-throttle sanctions, we lifted that, and what was the 

consequence? 

Ms. PLETKA. I think North Korea has tested three times as a result of our fine negotiating efforts. And I want to remind the members who was involved with the negotiating efforts because it was 

Wendy Sherman, the same person who we have in Geneva. 

There is another point here. There are two important points. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Point of personal privilege. No relation. 

Ms. PLETKA. No accusation from me. 

There are two important points in what you said, I think. The 

first is about South Africa. The only time when these negotiations 

have succeeded is when government changed. So, for example, 

some of the former states of the Soviet Union have also been willing to give up their nuclear programs, but it is only when the government is changed. It is not as a result of clever negotiations on 

the part of the United States or anyone else. 

The second point is how similar these discussions and the framework, which is being referred to casually as a framework, with Iran 

is to the agreed framework with North Korea. It is also premised 

on this notion of sequencing, which is that is they give a little, we 

give a little, and then theoretically they give a little more, and by 

that we all build confidence in each other. 

As you rightly said, I think the evidence is pretty clear about 

North Korea. We gave a little, they gave nothing. We gave more, 

47

and they still gave nothing. By the end we were actually giving to 

get them to the table. We were giving them food and bribing the 

North Koreans just in order to get them to agree to come to the 

talks, and then they would take that and provide it to their military, and so we even had to stop that. So point well taken. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, during the Bush administration we had 

these arguments with the Bush administration. Democrats and Republicans were arguing with the administration. The administration was saying a small amount of sanctions relief was worth it to 

get a deal that would constrain its nuclear program. Unfortunately 

had we listened, in my opinion, to Treasury at the time, talking to 

some of the defectors out of the missile program, they said when 

those sanctions have been deployed, they couldn’t get the hard currency to buy the—on the black market to buy the gyroscopes that 

they needed for their missiles. 

I was going to ask Mr. Dubowitz about his comment about this 

limited sanctions relief and the argument that if you go down that 

road, the floodgates, as you said, could be opened in terms of the 

unraveling of existing sanctions, which serve right now to drive a 

lot of capital flight out of the country to try to—that serve right 

now to force the Government of Iran to make some tough choices. 

Give me your assessment on that again in detail, if you would. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Thank you, Chairman Royce. 

First of all, I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding 

about sanctions. There is a lot of reference about the sanctions architecture. Somehow these sanctions are a house, and that we have 

got pieces of legislation with words on them, and that has created 

fear in the marketplace. 

What has created fear in the marketplace has been the escalation of sanctions. It is the fear that every few months the administration is going to impose new sanctions through designations 

and Executive Orders, and every 6 to 12 months Congress is going 

to pass new sanctions, and it is going to create an economic mine 

field around Iran. 

And as a result of that, the administration hasn’t had to actually 

sanction that many companies. If you look at the number of companies that have been penalized and the number of designations that 

have actually taken place, they are actually relatively few, and the 

reason for that is it has created fear, and fear is a great motivator 

in overcoming greed in the international marketplace. 

What we are talking about now with respect to sanctions relief 

in its most general terms is to actually stop that escalation, to actual deescalate. And in deescalating the sanctions, what we are 

doing is we are enticing international companies to test our resolve 

and to go back into Iran’s lucrative energy sector to start facilitating financial transactions and start facilitating shipping, et 

cetera. There are companies who want to go back in. We see media 

reports of major energy companies who want to invest back in Iran, 

who want to buy more black market oil, and those companies are 

waiting to test our resolve. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, Dr. Kahl warns against pushing for what 

he terms a maximalist deal with Iran. Ms. Pletka notes that there 

are six binding resolutions of the U.N. Security Council demanding 

48

that Iran suspend all enrichment and all reprocessing activities. So 

the administration’s approach would undercut these resolutions. 

Mr. Dubowitz, you note that the administration isn’t even working toward a de minimis agreement. What are the conditions that 

we need to see put in place, in your opinion? And I will close with 

that question.

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I think that the de minimis agreement—

and David Albright has actually come forward with an interesting 

de minimis proposal, a bare minimum proposal. And one of the elements that I found most interesting in David’s proposal is the requirement that Iran must freeze all centrifuge manufacturing immediately. 

It is important to understand that what the Iranians have been 

very adept at doing is creating nuclear facts on the ground, and 

that this reported Geneva deal would not terminate any centrifuge 

manufacturing. So what the Iranians could do in the next 6 months 

is they can build new centrifuges. They can build thousands of new 

centrifuges, and they can take those centrifuges, they can put them 

in inventory, they can wait until they get closer to a final deal, 

then if a deal breaks apart, they are ready to install thousands of 

new centrifuges, which extends their breakout capacity. They can 

also take some of those centrifuges and they can hide them away 

in secret enrichment facilities. 

So one of the reasons this is a key deal term is this is absolutely 

critical to ensuring that Iran doesn’t have secret enrichment facilities, which has been the fear of the Intelligence Community for 

many, many years. That is one element of a de minimis deal that 

reportedly was not part of the Geneva negotiations. 

I think just as an overall response, Chairman Royce, we are at 

the high-water mark of our negotiating leverage right now, and the 

fact that we even term our demands maximalist instead of the absolute bare minimum shows that from a negotiating point of view, 

the Iranians are willing to come in, negotiate with us, and bring 

our demands down. We should be insisting that enrichment is a 

minimum requirement, not a maximalist requirement, as Under 

Secretary Sherman said just a couple of months ago. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To me, one of the questions—and you all talked about it a little 

bit, but I would like to hear more about it. The question really 

hinges on whether we need an interim agreement, or should we 

just be negotiating a final agreement. Netanyahu has said that we 

shouldn’t reach an interim deal with Iran where they only limit 

part of their nuclear program in return for the relief of some sanctions. He argues that once you relieve the pressure on Iran, you 

will never be able to turn it back up, and Iran will never take the 

necessary steps to eliminate the nuclear weapons program. The administration thinks, or said to me, they think an interim deal is 

necessary in which we pursue and even set back the Iranian program for 6 months. They say much about the fact that this will be 

the first time that the Iranian nuclear program would be slowed 

down. 

49

So the question I would like to really ask is do we need an interim deal, or should we just not—should we negotiate until we 

have a final deal? I would like to ask each of you that. 

Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, the dangers of the interim framework is exactly what we are seeing, is that the Iranians are giving up de 

minimis nuclear concessions, and we are essentially unilaterally 

suspending the escalation of our sanctions. And in addition, we are 

offering real tangible hard currency sanctions relief. 

The dangers of an interim process is that the Iranians are going 

to enhance their nuclear negotiating leverage through facts on the 

ground, and we are going to diminish our economic leverage as 

companies become less fearful of U.S. sanctions and penalties, and 

as the web of sanctions begins to unwind. The architecture in legal 

terms may stay in place, but the absolute psychology may change. 

We may find ourselves in 6 months’ time back in Geneva where the 

Iranians have enhanced their negotiating leverage, we have undermined ours, and that final deal will not do what it was intended 

to do, which is to stop Iran’s march to nuclear weapons capability. 

That is the danger of an interim framework. I think that is why 

we should be approaching these negotiations as an entire negotiation where everything is on the table. While the Iranians continue 

to enrich and continue to construct their heavy water reactor and 

building centrifuges, we need to be escalating our negotiating leverage through new and additional sanctions. Then let us put 

Khamenei to the test between a nuclear bomb and the survival of 

his economy. 

Mr. ENGEL. Ms. Pletka? 

Ms. PLETKA. What is most striking to me is how the nature of 

our negotiations has changed. We are negotiating on Iranian terms, 

and I think it is important to understand that when you think 

about the interim agreement. 

We have always characterized the battle in Iran as two 

timelines, the timeline in which our sanctions are effective in getting them to the table and giving up their program, and their race 

to a bomb. Essentially what we are giving them by what we understand as the proposed offer that was given in Geneva is we are giving them the time to work on their program and the relief from the 

sanctions. So we are really giving on both sides while gaining almost nothing. 

There is another factor here. I was really struck by something 

Colin said, that we need a deal sooner because Iran is close. And 

if we don’t do a deal sooner, if we have to look at a military option, 

they may well be at a point where they have a nuclear weapon. 

Do we understand what leverage we have over time given the 

Iranians that he has just given away in this statement that we better do a deal now, otherwise they are going to have a nuclear weapon? That is unconscionable. In addition, what are the Iranians proposing to give away? Something that before 11⁄2 years ago they 

weren’t doing, which is enriching to 20 percent. 

So the notion that we are somehow more skilled negotiators than 

the Iranians and that we are going to gain a trick on them by this 

interim step to me seems palpably false. 

50

Mr. ENGEL. Let me ask Dr. Kahl. I am sure his answer will be 

a little different. 

Mr. KAHL. You probably suspect my view differs a little bit. Look, 

we have to have an interim deal, and the reason is we need the 

time, and we need the time for two reasons. First, the ultimate 

comprehensive deal, whatever its shape, maximalist, de minimis, 

whatever your terms are, is going to take a long time to negotiate. 

It is going to take 6 or 12 months. 

And that brings me to the second issue, which is Iran is making 

steady nuclear progress. Nobody denies that. The challenge is if 

you don’t slow or halt or start to roll back their program, you are 

going run out of negotiating room before they reach a critical 

threshold that would enable them to break out. So it is irresponsible, in my view, not to have an interim deal that effectively stops 

the clock so that you can negotiate the final deal. 

The alternative is that we basically play a game of chicken with 

the regime. We gamble on the notion that their regime will be 

brought into an existential crisis in the next 6 months, and that 

they will swerve. The problem is this is a regime that lasted for 

8 years during the Iran-Iraq war in which they lost 1⁄2 million dead 

and experienced more than $1⁄2 trillion in costs. They are not on 

the brink of extinction, they are not likely to cry uncle in the next 

6 to 12 months, which means we need to by time through an interim deal. 

Mr. ENGEL. But, Dr. Kahl, let me say this: Shouldn’t we be saying to the Iranians, as long as we are negotiating, you don’t enrich. 

Shouldn’t we at the minimum be sitting down with them saying—

I think that Mr. Dubowitz and Ms. Pletka mentioned this—there 

have been United Nations Security Council resolutions saying that 

Iran must abandon its enrichment, so why are we stepping back 

from those resolutions? Might not that be a way to buy time? 

Mr. KAHL. I don’t think the administration is actually stepping 

away. I think that the U.N. Security Council resolutions will have 

to be addressed during the period of negotiations. The question is 

whether you can get the Iranians to completely suspend their program now. They are unlikely to do it. For one thing, Rouhani 

agreed to do that in 2003 and believes that the West pocked those 

concessions. He is not likely to make that mistake again. So we 

have to push for the U.N. Security Council resolutions to be addressed as part of the process of a final deal. 

But in terms of interim deal, it doesn’t need to be addressed. And 

I think it is important for the committee to understand this deal 

would stop 20 percent enrichment; it would eliminate or neutralize 

most of their 20 percent stockpile; it would stop new installations 

of centrifuges. Contrary to what Mark said, it would not allow 

them to stockpile new centrifuges; it would allow them to repair 

broken ones, but not stockpile them. And it has a meaningful solution for Arak. It would halt the program, the most troubling parts 

of the program, for a period of time to negotiate an agreement that 

can address the U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

Mr. ENGEL. I am way over my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

51

Well, history has shown us that our high hopes on Iran are misplaced and are always met with empty promises. The U.S. should 

only deal with Iran from a position of strength, and Iran senses 

weakness in our current approach. Iran is using the North Korea 

playbook until it realizes its ultimate objective. 

It took years for us to get sanctions in place that were strong and 

effective enough to bring Iran to the negotiation table, and now 

that the moment is upon us, we cannot falter. We must stay strong 

in sanctions, yet at the first sign of this fairy tale progress, we 

balked. We offered Iran sanctions relief just for the opportunity to 

give them more time to complete its nuclear ambitions without any 

enforcement—true enforcement mechanisms. 

Dr. Kahl, you state that escalating sanctions now could weaken 

international pressure on Iran, and that doing so would tie the 

hands of our diplomats. But if Iran came to the negotiation table 

because the impact the sanctions are having on its economy, 

wouldn’t continuing to pressure Iran bring it to the point where it 

would be forced to decide between total collapse of its economy or 

completion of its nuclear program? 

And I will continue, the impact sanctions have had on Iran are 

obvious, but imagine how much more effective they could have 

been if we in the United States fully and forcefully implemented 

and enforced them 100 percent of the time with no waivers. That 

is not happening now. 

Ms. Pletka, you testified that you believe that Congress has not 

done its due diligence, and we have not forced the administration 

to enforce existing laws. I could not agree more with you. For over 

10 years, administration after administration, I have been trying 

to remove waiver authority, have introduced and passed several 

sanctions bills, and constantly pushing for stronger and more comprehensive sanctions so that the true intent and impact of these 

laws can be felt. 

Do you believe the lack of enforcement has weakened our hands 

at the negotiations and undermined sanctions? 

And finally, Mr. Dubowitz, you argue that core sanctions should 

remain in place, but favor unfreezing certain Iranian assets. 

Wouldn’t injecting funds into Iran’s economy embolden the regime 

and alleviate the pressure, thus eliminating the only reason why 

it came to the negotiation table? 

We will start with any of you. Ms. Pletka. 

Ms. PLETKA. A lot of questions. Thank you, Congresswoman RosLehtinen. 

You asked me about enforcement. What has always struck me 

about this problem—and I came to the Hill in 1992, and we were 

working on the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act when I came. It is 

always—sanctions are always a lagging indicator of the seriousness 

of the Iranian nuclear program, and that is the real problem. The 

closer they get, the more serious we are. But it is triggered by 

them, not by us. And I believe that the President has had the tools 

in his hand. I believe Bill Clinton had the tools in his hands in 

1992 to begin to do the right thing. I think successive Presidents 

have had additional tools in their hand and substantial pressure 

with the legislation. 

52

The problem really is that they have never wanted to enforce, 

and they have never wanted to lean particularly on our allies. 

Colin is absolutely right, they didn’t want that pressure. But what 

we see now at this eleventh hour is those sanctions made a difference, and the problem is that new ones will make a bigger difference. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. The problem right now is that we have had a policy of all options are on the table. And now the President of the 

United States is taking all of those options off the table. He is taking the military option off because of the debacle in Syria, and because nobody, including Ali Khamenei, believes that the U.S. President will use military force to blow out his nuclear facilities. He is 

now asking the U.S. Congress to take sanctions off the table. So 

no military force, no sanctions, rely on diplomacy. Well, diplomacy 

without military threat and without sanctions is not coercive diplomacy, it is ‘‘trust me’’ diplomacy, and this is a regime that we cannot trust. 

By the way, this is a regime that has blinked many times in the 

past in response to significant U.S. Pressure. The notion that this 

regime does not cry uncle is not supported by the facts. 

Third is the idea of sanctions relief. If you are going to give sanctions relief, first thing you should do is take away all of Iran’s 

money. They have over $80 billion in foreign exchange reserves. 

Quite a bit of that is accessible. Lock it down through financial 

sanctions. Once you have locked it down, only then if they take 

steps to verify and dismantle their military nuclear program should 

you begin to release some money, but don’t give it back to Ali 

Khamenei and Rouhani. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So there is still so much we can do. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, the fact of the matter is don’t give it back 

to the regime; take it out of Chinese escrow accounts, put it in German escrow accounts, where the Iranians like to go shopping. At 

the end of the day snap it back when they cheat. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We are out of time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Those sanctions, at least tougher than we had before, brought Iran this far. They are clearly better now than they 

were 6 months ago. 

Why wouldn’t the negotiations be more successful if the Senate 

were to pass the bill that this House passed by 400 votes? Why 

abandon the strategy that I think everybody agrees has forced Iran 

to at least change its image and its sound, to put sugar in its rhetoric, and, according to the opponents of sanction, have caused Iran 

to improve its behavior? 

Dr. Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. That is a good question. I don’t think there is any 

doubt that the pressure of sanctions has brought the Iranians to 

the table. I think that it partly explains why Rouhani campaigned 

on the platform that he did, which was to improve the Iranian 

economy through an accommodation——

Mr. SHERMAN. So if something is working, why would you do 

less? 

53

Mr. KAHL. The point is I think we have sufficient leverage, actually, to get the ball rolling toward a comprehensive deal. I think 

that is the leverage that the administration is trying to capitalize 

on. The sanctions relief they are talking about in the context of the 

Geneva Accord would be, I think, around $6 billion total of relief, 

and it would be temporary. It would not undermine the oil or financial sanctions that give us the leverage. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Kahl, I mean, I want to go to the next witness, but I want to comment. You didn’t give me a reason why we 

would do less except to say that our current sanctions, which were 

not sufficient to get a deal good enough for the French, are somehow sufficient, but you didn’t say why not to increase them. So I 

will go to Mr. Dubowitz. 

Mr. KAHL. I was about to say that, but if——

Mr. SHERMAN. I know, but they won’t give me 10 minutes. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. The fact of the matter there is too much focus, 

again, on how much we are offering at Geneva in terms of hard 

dollars. Is it $6 billion? Is it $20 billion? We can have to that debate. I am sure will you see the briefings. 

The more thing is the psychology of sanctions, Congressman 

Sherman. You have understood this over the years, and you have 

offered sanctions bills in this respect. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yeah. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. You have got to change the fundamental psychology of the marketplace. It is motivated by greed and fear. 

When fear overrides greed, they stay out of Iran. When greed overrides fear, they go back into Iran. If you don’t escalate sanctions 

through the passage of that Senate bill, then greed will override 

fear, and you will be facing the dismantlement of the sanctions regime, which may be maintained on paper, but it won’t be maintained in practice. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to ask all three witnesses to respond 

for the record. What specific elements should we have in the next 

sanctions bill that I hope comes before this committee, keeping in 

mind that we can’t just wave a magic wand and get our allies to 

participate? We can’t just say, all money in Chinese banks has to 

be moved to German banks, otherwise, what, we won’t accept any 

Chinese imports? I don’t think we are to that point. 

So I would ask you to craft not the perfect wish list, but the list 

of things that Congress could pass and among the—and I hope 

you—I don’t know if any of you have, you know, one silver bullet 

you want to share with us now, but I want all the bronze, silver, 

and gold bullets in your written response. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, there are no silver bullets. There is only silver shrapnel. And my testimony has eight specific ideas. 

I would say the one piece of silver shrapnel that I think would 

really wound this regime economically is if you said that any financial institution that gives Iran access to or use of its overseas foreign exchange reserves would be cut off from the U.S. financial system, it would effectively freeze Iran’s access to its money. And only 

then once you have frozen all of its money should we even be discussing sanctions relief. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Pletka, do you have any silver bullets for us? 

54

Ms. PLETKA. There are no silver bullets. It is all about the perception of enforcement and momentum. Mark is exactly right. I 

have looked at sanctions on any number of countries and worked 

on them. It is the psychology of the global marketplace, and right 

now the perception is that we are close to changing our mind and 

reversing momentum on Iran, and the Chinese are already back 

negotiating with the Iranians because they keep a close eye on this, 

and they are interested in the market. So I think the most important thing is to keep the administration and the Iranians’ feet to 

the fire. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. There are those who draw the red line 

where Iran gets one bomb. You are not really a nuclear power until 

you have several. You have got to test one and have some. Without 

revealing, basing your answer on classified information, they have 

got enough 3 percent uranium, so if enriched to 90 percent would 

provide for how many bombs? And under this agreement, do they 

keep creating more and more 3 percent? 

Mr. Kahl—Dr. Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. So they currently have enough 3.5 percent low-enriched uranium to produce about half a dozen nuclear weapons, 

were they to decide to do so, a decision that our Intelligence Community says they haven’t made. 

Under this agreement, my understanding—none of us know all 

of the terms, but my understanding is they would actually be required to do certain things to their 3.5 percent stockpile that they 

would produce in this next 6 months to make it unavailable for nuclear weapons, and so——

Mr. SHERMAN. So they get to keep all they have now, and then 

the additional they create would be disabled in some way. 

Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I don’t have the details that Colin has, but 

if they maintain the 9,000 spinning centrifuges over 6 months, I 

believe the calculation that I have seen from David Albright is that 

they would produce almost a bomb’s worth, another bomb’s worth, 

of 3.5 percent. So unless there are some details in the Geneva 

agreement that prevent that that I am not aware of, that would 

allow them almost another bomb’s worth, so over 6 months of negotiations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So they get one bomb plus $6 billion to $50 billion. I think my time is expired. 

Ms. PLETKA. That is just the 3.5 percent. That is not speaking 

of the 20 percent they have been enriching for the last year. They 

have ample fissile material to make a nice arsenal of nuclear weapons in a quick time, and don’t let anybody reassure you on the 

question of conversion to oxide. It takes about a week or two to convert back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Chris Smith of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

important hearing. Thank you, our witnesses, for your fine testimony. 

You know, in yet another sign of Iranian bad faith and wanton 

cruelty, American Christian pastor Saeed Abedini’s situation has 

55

deteriorated significantly. The Christian Post today has an article. 

It begins,

‘‘Pastor Saeed Abedini has been placed in a single cell with five 

death-row inmates in Rajai Shahr Prison, and is prevented 

from having any visitors, the American Center for Law and 

Justice said, raising further concerns that officials placed him 

there to ‘disappear.’ ’’

It is a murderers’ jail, that jail, according to Jordan Sekulow 

from ACLJ, and, again, the risk that he faces now is extraordinary. 

As I think many of you know, Congressman Wolf chaired a hearing, and I plan on doing one very shortly, but he chaired one, and 

we heard from Naghmeh Abedini, who made an impassioned plea 

for her husband. 

And it seems to me if there is a canary in a coal mine, it is the 

human rights issue. When a regime so horrifically mistreats people, in this case an American citizen—and there are other Americans, too, that are being held, as well as many other indigenous 

Iranians who have been tortured because they espoused democracy 

or a particular religious belief, many of them being Christian—that 

also suggests how believable or not believable they are on the nuclear issue. You might want to have our witnesses speak to 

Abedini. 

Secondly, there was a report in The Daily Beast. The United 

States has done everything but stop blacklisting individuals and 

companies that help Iran evade international sanctions since 

Rouhani’s election on June 4th. And then Treasury says, we have 

not let up on vigorous sanctions enforcement one iota. Who is telling the truth? You can’t have it both ways. Either we are truly enforcing vigorously, or we have begun to back off very significantly. 

And finally, there is a report suggesting that China is purchasing 

its oil through a barter system to evade the sanctions regime, and 

including 40 joint infrastructure development purchases, capital 

equipment, technology, and materials to evade cash. Your thoughts 

on that. 

And finally, much of the focus has been on Iran’s declining crude 

exports, oil exports; less focus has been paid on the exports of fuel 

oils. Should that be part of a sanctions regime? 

Ms. PLETKA. If I may address the first question about the human 

rights situation, this is one of the things I alluded to in my testimony, and I don’t want to take up too much of the time. I know 

my colleagues have something to say on these other questions as 

well. But it is remarkable how much we have left on the table visa`-vis Iran. I mean, think to yourself, okay? These negotiations in 

Geneva went better, the Iranians gave up more, we were all satisfied in an interim deal. 

Do we realize that we would be opening the door and relieving 

sanctions at the same time that the Iranians are abusing the rights 

of their own people? The population of Evin Prison, in addition to 

the one you mentioned. The Baha’is. But set aside even the Iranian 

people. Let us say we don’t care about them. What about Syria? 

What about Hezbollah? What about Hamas? What about Iranian 

interference in the Gulf? 

56

The day when we see Saudi Arabia and Israel banded together 

in opposition to our policy tells us that we have got something seriously wrong, and we have left all of that leverage on the table. 

That is a very serious area of pressure that we should be doing 

more on. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. There are very few people more committed to 

sanctions enforcement than the U.S. Treasury Department and the 

Office of Terrorism Financial Intelligence, but there is no doubt 

that before Rouhani’s election, the pace of designations was rapidly 

increasing. After his election it has been decreasing. And the reason for that is they get their marching orders from the White 

House, and it has been very clear that this administration, in order 

to grease the wheels for negotiation, has tried to offer essentially 

unilateral sanctions relief by slowing down designations, by blocking new sanctions in Congress, and by trying to lay the table for 

goodwill and confidence-building measures. So you are seeing that. 

In terms of oil, what we are seeing now, in fact, 150,000 to 

200,000 barrels a day of black market oil is moving from Iran to 

other purchasers. This is a great example of an emerging loophole 

in our sanctions laws that the new Senate bill and the House bill 

you passed was designed to actually fill, and because we are not 

filling the loopholes, the Iranians are driving an oil tanker through 

it. 

Mr. KAHL. If I could just say one quick thing on the human 

rights issue, which I take very seriously. There is no question that 

this is a reprehensible regime in many respects, but it is also the 

case that throughout the Cold War we repeatedly negotiated arms 

control agreements with the Soviet Union, which was at least as 

reprehensible as this regime. 

We don’t have to make a choice. We should continue to pressure 

them on human rights, on Syria, on terrorism, on other issues, but 

we shouldn’t hold any of those hostage to the nuclear issue, which 

is a very urgent issue and very much in our interest and our allies’ 

interest. So we can do both. 

Mr. SMITH. But very briefly, American Pastor Abedini, his situation has gone from horrific to even worse, and that is unconscionable. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, the rate of executions has accelerated under 

Rouhani, so I am afraid it is going to get worse, not better. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to continue to explore the details of the reported 

agreement. I know that Secretary Kerry is over in the Senate today 

briefing colleagues there, and reports are that Under Secretary 

Sherman and Cohen will brief the Senate Banking Committee 

again tomorrow. I hope that this committee will also be briefed on 

the specifics of the proposal, in the appropriate location and at the 

appropriate time, sooner rather than later. 

I would like to just touch on the broader question of what the 

Iranians’ intentions are with their nuclear program, and I would 

like to move a bit beyond the back-and-forth over they want the 

right to enrich, there is no right to enrich, and take them at their 

word for a moment. And if the Iranians are truly committed to a 

57

peaceful nuclear program, how much—Dr. Kahl, let me ask you 

this question—how much low-enriched uranium would they need to 

operate the one reactor that exists in Iran? 

Mr. KAHL. The answer is, under the current relationship they 

have with Russia, they don’t need any low-enriched uranium because they get fuel from Russia. That is right. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. 

Mr. KAHL. The issue is, and the challenge for our negotiators is, 

that this is a regime that has spent between $100 billion and $200 

billion on its nuclear infrastructure, and, more importantly, its entire ideology is routed around a resistance to arrogant external 

powers and the notion that their nuclear rights are inviolable. 

Now, I don’t agree with that, and I suspect you don’t either from 

your comments. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. Right. 

Mr. KAHL. But we have to negotiate with the enemies we have, 

not the enemies we want. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I understand, but we also have to acknowledge 

what the facts are surrounding the arguments made by the people 

sitting across the table. And I would simply suggest that there is—

if we take them at their word that, in fact, there is no desire for 

nuclear weapon, they don’t need any more—they don’t need any enriched uranium, but understanding why they want to be able to enrich, why not come clean about the rest of the program? Why not 

respond to IAEA investigations of the possible military dimensions 

of the program or the designs of triggers, or let inspectors into 

Parchin? Why not ship out the advanced centrifuges since those 

aren’t necessary for them to be able to enrich and have nuclear 

power? Why allow the construction of Arak to continue for another 

6 months, which puts us in a very dangerous position that will let 

Arak get closer and closer to going online even as we continue to 

negotiate? 

There was a report this morning that said Arak will be capable 

of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for one nuclear 

weapon per year. Why, as part of all of this, instead of simply accepting the response that we sometimes get that we are not interested in nuclear weapons, and there is a fatwa against nuclear 

weapons, why not as part of these negotiations, as part of any deal, 

preliminary or final, why not have them respond to all of the allegations, the possible military dimensions that we all know about 

that the international community is well aware of? 

Mr. KAHL. So I think proliferation scholars would say that what 

they are engaged in is a nuclear hedging strategy. That is, they are 

definitely trying to put all of the pieces in place to develop nuclear 

weapons at some point in the future if the leader decides to do so. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Kahl, I am not asking—I don’t want to speculate. That is my point. I don’t want to speculate—no, let me just 

finish. I don’t want nuclear scholars to speculate about what they 

may or may not be doing. If we are putting in place—if the goal 

is to put in place a deal, a diplomatic solution, which I support if 

we can get to one that works—I think all of us do—if that is where 

we are trying to go, why not as part of that expect them to and 

require them to respond to all of the things that they have done 

58

that have caused us to pass sanctions legislation, bill after bill, 

over the years? 

Mr. KAHL. I think we should. I think that—I think that we 

shouldn’t trust them. We shouldn’t trust the fatwa or take them at 

their word. The entire purposes of negotiations is to put in place 

meaningful and verifiable constraints on their nuclear program to 

assure all of us that they will never go for a nuclear weapon. That 

is the goal of diplomacy. The question, though, is should we go all 

in on an optimal deal that is likely not achievable and could result 

in a collision——

Mr. DEUTCH. You know, I understand. 

Mr. KAHL [continuing]. Or should we go for a deal that is possible and also meets our national interests? 

Mr. DEUTCH. I understand, but I am trying to get beyond—we 

have gone back and forth on that. I understand that that is the 

part—that is the way any negotiation works. My question is what 

seems to be missing, but I don’t know—I don’t know, because it has 

not been confirmed, but what seems to be missing is that requirement that, look, if you want to deal, then at least come clean on 

all of these other aspects. Sit and tell us, respond to every question, 

let us have full access to Parchin. Tell us what you have been doing 

that has prompted the IAEA to continue to point out the possible 

military aspects of your program. Why is that too much to ask? 

Mr. KAHL. It is not too much. I think in the final deal, the comprehensive deal that the administration wants to negotiate over the 

next 6 to 12 months, they would have to come clean on the past 

military dimensions of the program. And I should say they are in 

ongoing negotiations with the IAEA on those facilities. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Why shouldn’t they have to do that now at the outset as part of any preliminary deal? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, I think because the things that the initial deal 

has to address are the most urgent risks of a nuclear breakout; 

their 20 percent material, their advanced centrifuges; the loading 

of fuel assemblies into the Arak reactor; freezing centrifuge installations; putting in place more intrusive inspections in Fordow and 

Natanz, because I think the urgent aspects of the program have to 

be addressed first, and that is what the administration appears to 

be doing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am sorry, Doctor, but I just disagree with 

your somewhat positive analysis about where we are and where we 

are going. We are going in exactly the wrong direction with Iran 

right now. We are going exactly the wrong direction in a lot of 

areas. This administration is rapidly becoming the epitome of failure from the top, because what we have got, these failures that we 

are discussing today and the other failures that we are—are plaguing the people of the United States from its own government, can 

be traced right back to the methodology that this President is using 

to exercise authority and power granted to him during the elections. 

We have—let me just finish. For example, my colleague Mr. 

Smith was noting that the Treasury Department reveals—a review 

of the Treasury Department reveals notices that the United States 

59

Government has all but stopped the financial blacklisting of entities and people that help Iran evade international sanctions since 

the election of its President. 

Okay. So what we have here is that someone is offering waivers 

to what was the policy, and the blacklisting of people who were 

evading international sanctions, this is something our Government 

is supposed to be doing, but it is not doing it because of an intentional policy that was created where? And that the—later on in 

that article that my colleague Mr. Smith was reading, it states, 

‘‘Like the waivers on Obamacare, the administration believes it is 

a law unto itself.’’

So what we have here is the President of the United States not 

following what would be the normal procedures of our Government 

and coming up with failure both domestically and internationally. 

I don’t see any reason for hope at all in terms of things getting 

better about Iran. This last series of overly optimistic negotiations 

have left us with nothing, nothing, but it appears to the world that 

we are weak. 

You know, going back to the Koreans—and this has happened before, it is not just this President, but other Presidents have made 

these kind of mistakes in approach. But we gave food and oil to 

Korea, to North Korea, with the idea that was going to make it 

more likely that they were going to pull in and reign in their nuclear program. And what we ended up doing was subsidizing dictatorship, subsidizing a vicious dictatorship, and actually perhaps 

elongating its life. 

We are now talking about Iran, about the mullah regime in Iran. 

It would be the equivalent of a Hitlerite regime in the midst of the 

world, and it is about ready to obtain the ability of dropping nuclear bombs on countries and on people that it has targeted. This 

is a catastrophe if we let this happen, and it has been coming on 

and coming on, and this administration is making it worse. 

I do not see, as you stated, Doctor, I am sorry, but you said we 

are buying time? We are not buying time. We are making a fool 

out of ourselves. We should—instead of being groveling to these 

people who murdered their own people, I might add—the mullahs 

murdered their own people; we can’t expect them to treat the world 

in a different way—but while we are groveling, instead we should 

be spending our time supporting those elements in Iran that are 

opposed to the mullah regime. They would get—very quickly they 

would get the word if all of a sudden the Azaris, and the Baluchs, 

and the Kurds and the other people within Iran started receiving 

support from the outside on—that type of pressure, perhaps, they 

understand. 

And I might add that this administration started off right in the 

very beginning refusing to condemn the slaughter of democracy 

seekers in the streets of Tehran, who are protesting the mullah regime’s stealing of the last election. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think I have made my point. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Brian Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, a lot has been discussed here about perception, but 

clearly the United States has an objective here, and that is the prevention of Iran having a nuclear weapon, not the containment of 

60

it after the fact. We cannot allow Iran’s nuclear program to reach 

a breakout capability; meaning that Iran cannot have a civil nuclear program that allows them, at a moment of their choosing, to 

turn it into a nuclear weapon. 

You know, there is good news here, and there is bad news. Iran 

is a country of 90 million people. Half the population is under the 

age of 25, and they are tech savvy. Social media is not on the side 

of the regime. Social media is used by Iranian youth not only for 

organizational purposes, but also for aspirational purposes. They 

can see how the rest of the world is living, and they ask the question, why not us? Organizationally, social media can be used for organizational purposes. 

What has the regime in Tehran been expert at? Suppression. 

Suppression. I suspect that sometime in 2014 you will see mass 

demonstrations on the streets of Tehran again because of the deplorable condition that the Iranian economy is in. They produce a 

lot of oil, but they don’t have the capacity to refine that oil. So they 

export oil and then have to import gasoline because they lack that 

capacity. 

On a positive note Hassan Rouhani won an election, and there 

were only six candidates. He ran as the reform candidate. He ran 

against the policies that produce economic sanctions, he ran 

against the policies that produce international isolation, and once 

he became President, he said the economy was even worse than he 

originally thought it was. 

So the question is: Is Iran serious about change, and can 

Rouhani negotiate a deal that he can deliver on? The backdrop to 

that, ironically, is that Rouhani was Iran’s nuclear negotiator for 

10 years. Ten years ago Iran had 164 centrifuges, the big machines 

that enrich uranium. Today Iran has 18,000 centrifuges, enough to 

allow Iran to make a bomb, to avoid detection, and to act before 

we can act against it. 

So while there are hopeful signs, there are also ominous signs as 

well. And while we are talking currently in the negotiations to destroy the Iranian atomic infrastructure, there is next-generation infrastructure that is held within the knowledge of Iranian universities and laboratories that even if we get a deal on the destruction, 

the next generation can be developed more quickly, the infrastructure itself, to facilitate the making of a bomb that much more 

quickly. 

So I will tell you that as Americans’ interest in that region, particularly with respect to Israel, you know, we have to not put our 

brakes on relative to sanctions, but accelerate, because only if there 

is internal pressure by the emerging youth that is better capable 

of challenging the regime and the deplorable state of the Iranian 

economy will the Iranians change at all. 

So I would just ask you to respond to those thoughts. 

Mr. KAHL. So I think you hit a very important point. Even completely dismantling their program, completely, doesn’t prevent 

them from reconstituting it at some point in the future. They have 

the knowledge in their head. So the question is if we are to prevent 

breakout along the lines you suggest, we need to maximize the 

amount of time it would take for them to build a bomb, we need 

to shrink the amount of time it would take for the international 

61

community to detect it so we could stop it if they moved in that 

direction, and we need to address the past military dimensions of 

their program along the way, along the roads that Congressman 

Deutch mentioned. 

I think Rouhani is serious. I think he believes he has a public 

mandate, and I think he believes he has some room to maneuver 

from the Supreme Leader. But I also think he believes he doesn’t 

have all that much time, which is why I think he is anxiously 

pushing for a deal, and I think we are actually quite close on this 

first-step deal leading to the final-step deal. 

The challenge at the moment is that he has his own domestic political issues, and he has basically made the argument within the 

regime, give me a chance. Give me a chance. I am going to negotiate seriously. I will get a deal. And if we rush forward with sanctions now and appear hell-bent to increase sanctions regardless of 

Rouhani and Zarif’s changed tone and their approach to negotiation, it risks empowering the hardline voices inside Iran who will 

undermine his ability to get us to a mutual objective of cutting 

some kind of deal. 

I also—my last point on the youth. I agree with you that the 

youth of Iran are extraordinarily important. I am less confident 

than you are that our economic pressure would somehow mobilize 

hundreds of thousands of folks to take to the streets in Tehran. It 

is worth keeping in mind, every opinion poll and survey done in 

Iran for a decade has shown overwhelming support for Iran’s nuclear program, including its enrichment activities. The likelihood 

that if we tried to force the regime to capitulate completely on its 

nuclear program that that would mobilize domestic political opinion I think is just not borne out by the reality of public opinion in 

Iran. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. If Rouhani wanted to sell a deal, he will sell a 

deal, because from his perspective and from the Supreme Leader’s 

perspective, it will be a great deal. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Tom Marino of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good afternoon—good morning, still morning. Thank you for 

being here. 

We are still dealing with the Iranian regime, and in the past 

these people have proved themselves to be murderers, and butchers, thugs, and psychopaths, and clearly and repeatedly they publicly articulate fanatical proclamations that all people who do not 

follow, who do not follow their absurd beliefs must be wiped off the 

face of the Earth, including children. Now we are going to negotiate 

with these people? You are negotiating with terrorists that have 

funded and backed suicide bombers and murderous gangs, and now 

you want to reward them. Absurd at best. 

Iran has a different President, Rouhani, of course; however, don’t 

forget that he is a puppet and still controlled by the Supreme Leader. So are you going to continue to capitulate? What in God’s name 

do you think has changed the minds of these butchers? 

Dr. Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, I would point out that we need to negotiate with 

our enemies, not just our friends, and we have negotiated with regimes——

62

Mr. MARINO. But we don’t negotiate with terrorists. That has 

been a proclamation from the administrations since the 1970s, so 

now we are going to turn that around and negotiate with terrorists? 

Have you considered at all, has this administration considered at 

all, Israel’s plight in this, who is the stability there? And it is a 

slap in the face to Israel, and it allows the Iranians to know that 

now Israel and the United States may not be as close as they are, 

which isn’t true, and it shows a weakness on our part. How do you 

account for that? 

Mr. KAHL. Well, I obviously don’t represent the administration. 

I am not in the administration anymore. When I was there, I can 

tell you I did as much as any senior Pentagon official in recent history to support Israel’s security, and I believe that every Israeli official I worked with would say the same thing. And I think that 

is not about me, it is about the Obama administration——

Mr. MARINO. I disagree with you on this that it shows that every 

person in that administration, regardless of whether you are there 

now or in the past, is very concerned about Israel, just the move 

that we are making now. And I am not holding you personally responsible for this. I disagree with many of the things that you had 

to say about what effect this is going to have. But what has happened to persuade you to think that these butchers are going to 

change their mind about whatever they do? 

Mr. KAHL. Actually I am not sure that they will. I think we need 

to test the possibility that they will, because, Congressman, what 

is the alternative? The alternative is we don’t negotiate. We try to 

waive our diplomacy. And do you know what there will be? There 

will be a war. 

Mr. MARINO. No, I do not agree with you. The alternative is 

going to be that there will be financial—there will be more financial devastation to that country. The people will—some of the people there, not many, are going to continue to uprise. And if they 

don’t have the money, they cannot do anything. 

Mr. KAHL. But they are not anywhere close to that point. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, then we need to make sure that they are closer to that point. You know, we should do what we did, what was 

d1 years ago in the 1960s: Ignore what they are trying to pull over 

our eyes. If this administration does not understand—the President 

has changed his mind on this issue again, and as far as being a 

diplomat, as far as knowing what foreign policy is, he is way off 

base. And, sir, I just—I get so upset over the fact that he thinks, 

or this administration thinks, that if they put their arms around 

these terrorists, they are going to say—we are going to sing 

Kumbaya, and everything is going to be fine. I just vehemently disagree with you. 

Mr. KAHL. With all due respect, I don’t think that is their position. Look, we can’t have it both ways. One cannot make the argument that Iran is on the brink of a nuclear weapon, and also make 

the argument which I am hearing which is we should just sanction 

them out of existence and wait until the regime falls. 

The timelines don’t link up. There is no evidence even if we did 

everything that Mark subscribed, or everything that you passed in 

July, or everything that the Senate is considering, that it will bring 

63

the regime to its knees in a timeframe that prevents them 

from——

Mr. MARINO. Sir, you are comparing apples with oranges here, 

and you are basing your premise on the fact that the Iranians have 

changed in ideology of some sort, have at the very least realized 

that while these sanctions are hurting us, and we have to do something before we are completely bankrupt. And so you and I can debate this all day long. I respect your opinion, but——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And, Congressman, I would say it is a false 

choice. I mean, we are not passing sanctions to bring them to their 

knees and collapse their economy within 3 months. What we are 

trying to do is we are trying to pass sanctions in order to massively 

enhance American negotiating leverage so that we end up with a 

good deal, a good deal that we, you, the administration can sell to 

the American people. That is the goal. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, we have to be the ones to call the shots here, 

not the Iranians. 

I see my time has run out, and I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Marino. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Gosh, when I hear statements like that that seem to suggest this 

President is not a reliable supporter or friend of Israel, I think that 

would come as news to the President of Israel, who awarded this 

President one of the highest awards that Israel has to give as a 

friend and supporter of Israel. 

But I am also not sure where that last line of questioning was 

supposed to take us. I certainly can appreciate the frustration, my 

friend, but, Dr. Kahl, I mean, what are the choices here? If we 

choose not to negotiate with Iran, irrespective of what we think of 

the regime, what is the choice in front of us? What is the option 

if we choose not to negotiate with them because they are ‘‘murderers, and thugs’’? 

Mr. KAHL. The options are twofold. One, we could continue to escalate sanctions in the hopes of imposing regime change. I would 

say, you know, Mark has been a leading advocate in imposing economic sanctions not for the purposes of forcing them to capitulate 

on their nuclear program, but for regime change. He has written 

about that repeatedly. We could take that course. The problem is, 

it is not going to work in a timeframe that satisfies our interest 

of avoiding a nuclear weapon. Or we could strike their nuclear program militarily, or the Israelis could do it, in which case you would 

set their program back a few years. They would rebuild it on the 

back end of those strikes. It would cause instability in the interim. 

It would shatter the international coalition surrounding Iran, and 

they might emerge on the back end with a nuclear weapon anyway. 

So all I am saying is diplomacy is hard. It is tough. It is going 

to take a while. And because it is going to take a while, we need 

to put some time on the clock, which is why we need an interim 

deal that leads to a comprehensive deal. There is—look, I don’t like 

this option either, but it is better than every other alternative. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that is a good question. And I see you, Mr. 

Dubowitz. I will give us a chance in just 1 second. 

64

I think I hear some of the critics focusing on the suggested firstphase interim negotiation as some kind of sell-out that should be 

avoided at all costs. It is all or nothing. I think I hear you saying 

that that is not how it works, and that won’t work. And we are 

going to have to be willing to provide some kind of first phase if 

we are ever going to get to an ultimate negotiated settlement that 

is to our liking and Israel’s; is that correct? 

Mr. KAHL. It is absolutely correct. I would make just two quick 

points: One, that the initial deal that is being discussed in and of 

itself is a good deal in terms of addressing the most urgent parts 

of the program; and second, it is absolutely essential to get to the 

final deal. 

Look, nobody in the administration that I have spoken with or 

others have spoken with believe that this interim deal is the final 

deal. It is not. It is the first step toward the final deal when Secretary Kerry, all of the rest see it that way, as does the President. 

We need to give it a shot. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Dubowitz. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, the French, who are the guardians of nonproliferation, certainly didn’t see that it way. So let us be very 

clear. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Didn’t see it what way, Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, they don’t agree with that characterization, 

because at Geneva they insisted that that deal was not a good deal, 

and they refused to sign it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Another way of saying that maybe is the French 

felt too much as was given away, or not enough was addressed on 

enrichment, for example, in phase one to satisfy them. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Correct. Which is why it was a bad deal. 

The second issue is sanctions are designed to put in the Supreme 

Leader’s mind that they will bring economic collapse; not for regime change, not for provoking democracy demonstrations, but to 

put in his mind the fear that unless he concedes on his nuclear 

weapon program, he will lose his regime. 

Third of all, Colin has been a leading supporter of using military 

strikes as a verification and enforcement mechanism in a post deal 

environment. In other words, we will put in the safeguards regime, 

they will sign additional protocols, and then when they cheat, we 

will use military strikes in order to actually get them to comply. 

Now, the fact of the matter is that is just not credible. And the Iranians engage in strategic incrementalism——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Dubowitz, so what it is you think we should 

do since that is not credible and you think it is a bad deal phase 

one? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, we got to get the best deal possible that 

doesn’t allow Iran to retain the essential elements of enrichment 

and reprocessing that allow it to build a nuclear weapon, because 

no gold standard safeguards regime in the world is going to prevent a dedicated ideological regime that wants to pursue a nuclear 

weapon from doing so at the time of its choosing unless you 

credibly think that the U.S. President is going to use military force 

as an enforcement mechanism for verification. Colin seems to think 

so. I don’t. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. I am down to 20 seconds. 

65

So what is the leverage we have got to get a better deal? Military 

strikes, or keeping the sanctions absolutely as is in place and 

maybe——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. The leverage is what the President of the United 

States has repeatedly said it was. All options are on the table; a 

credible threat of military force and crippling sanctions, in the 

words of former Secretary Clinton and the administration. Crippling sanctions, a credible threat of military force. If you take both 

options off the table, you don’t have course of diplomacy, You have 

discussions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

We will go to Mr. Brooks of Alabama. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

This hearing’s premise is that there is something wrong with 

Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. My series of questions hope to 

elicit information on this point. Now, first, if Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons at their current pace, in your best judgment, 

when is the soonest Iran will have a usable nuclear weapon, the 

soonest, Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, I believe that the estimates are that Iran 

is already in the position where it could actually weaponize uranium very quickly, in a matter of about a month. And so then the 

real question then is if it has the essential enriched uranium, 

weaponized uranium, to build a bomb, how long will it take to design a warhead, and a trigger, and a delivery vehicle? 

Mr. BROOKS. That is what I asked. When will they have a usable 

nuclear weapon? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Right. 

Mr. BROOKS. So how much time, in your best judgment, the soonest? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, the open reporting that I have seen is 2014, 

2015. 

Mr. BROOKS. Ms. Pletka? 

Ms. PLETKA. I think the problem that we are going to face, answering your question, is what you mean by usable nuclear weapon. If you mean a dirty bomb, they could do it today. If you mean 

a rudimentary nuclear device that they could deliver in the back 

of a truck or a bus, a month. If you mean a weapon, miniaturized 

on a delivery vehicle to—that works successfully, longer, probably 

a year, maybe even longer than that. 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Kahl? 

Mr. KAHL. So our senior defense and intelligence officials have 

testified it would take them about a year to create a crude nuclear 

device. It would take them a few years to create a device that could 

sit on a missile. The long pole in the tent, though, is the fissile material, which all of us agree on. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. I just needed your time estimates. And 

I apologize for cutting you off, but I have 5 minutes, as everybody 

else does. 

In August 2011, I was part of a congressional delegation that 

met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, wherein he unambiguously warned us that Israel will not 

allow Iran to have nuclear weapons, period, exclamation point. My 

66

question: What has Iran done or said that justifies Israel’s concerns? 

Mr. Dubowitz. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, let us see. They have threatened to wipe 

Israel off the map. The Supreme Leader has called Israel a cancerous tumor. They have had a 20-year, at least, nuclear weapons 

program that everybody acknowledges has taken place. They have 

engaged in nuclear deception, and I think, as Congressman Deutch 

pointed out, they have got essential nuclear elements that cannot 

be explained away for civilian purposes, and if it can be, then why 

aren’t they explaining it away by coming clean on their past nuclear deception? 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Ms. Pletka, do you have anything you can add to that? 

Ms. PLETKA. In addition to what Mark laid out, I think that what 

the Israelis look at is the willingness of the Iranian regime to arm 

proxy groups like Hezbollah, like Hamas with increasingly sophisticated devices. And the better the Iranians get, the better the products that they are willing to supply to those groups. So we now see 

that Hezbollah has guided missiles, that Hamas has missiles that 

can reach Tel Aviv. What is to stop Iran eventually from sharing 

more information? 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Kahl, is there anything that you can add to 

that? 

Mr. KAHL. I would just say that I think President Obama shares 

Netanyahu’s view that is unacceptable for them to get nuclear 

weapons, that it is a vital threat to us and a threat to Israel, and 

that the deal—that, you know, the getting the ball rolling on a diplomatic deal is aimed to precisely address those threats. 

Mr. BROOKS. Has Iran done or said anything that should cause 

America to be concerned that Iranian nuclear weapons may be 

used to directly or indirectly, via terrorist surrogates, by way of example, attack American cities? 

Mr. Dubowitz? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, there is certainly open-source reporting 

that the Iranians are building an intercontinental ballistic missile 

program. They don’t need ICBMs to hit Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. 

They need ICBMs to hit the United States. 

Mr. BROOKS. What about the distribution of nuclear weapons to 

terrorist groups who may try to smuggle them into America via our 

rather porous borders? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. It is an absolute nightmare scenario. I mean, 

they have close relationships with the most deadly terrorist organizations in the world that have killed Americans. 

Mr. BROOKS. Ms. Pletka, do you have anything to add that might 

cause America to pause and be concerned about Iran’s obtaining 

nuclear weapons? 

Ms. PLETKA. Iran has invested an enormous amount of diplomatic, political, economic, and military effort into building its relationships in Latin America over the last few years. This committee 

has been very seized of that matter, and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has had 

a number of hearings on the question in the last few years. Venezuela, Nicaragua, in addition Hezbollah has very substantial networks in Canada; we believe also in the United States. 

67

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Kahl, 10 seconds is all I have left. 

Mr. KAHL. Iran is a leading state sponsor of terrorism. It is 

worth noting, however, that they currently have chemical and biologic weapons capabilities and have never passed those weapons to 

terrorists. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, and again, thank you to the witnesses for being here. 

I think it is important to reflect a bit why we are here, and talking about the need to increase sanctions pressure to have negotiations to get to where we are going. I think on sanctions, and I will 

repeat what has become a mantra, that we need to increase the intensity of the bite. We have to accelerate the pace of acceleration, 

but to do so, as you said, Mr. Dubowitz, to leverage the ability we 

have in negotiations with the credible threat of force to ultimately 

achieve a permanent prevention of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. 

That is what this is about. 

And as I think about it, let me posit some ideas of what has to 

be included in an agreement, a final agreement. And as I see it, 

the first and foremost thing, we need Iran to come clean on their 

nuclear programs, halt and stop the weapons programs—and that 

would include Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and Parchin—to understand 

what they have, and any others that we aren’t aware of. We have 

to not just have that halt, we have to have a reverse of their programs, a dismantling of Arak, a—whether it is mothballing or removal, as you touched on, of the centrifuges. But ultimately we also 

have to have a permanent block or closure of the pathways Iran 

has, any pathways, both uranium and plutonium, to acquiring nuclear weapons. 

You, in your testimony, your submitted testimony, you talked 

about David Albright’s irreducible minimums of what is required 

on those things, on the uranium pathway, on the plutonium pathway, the ability to acquire weapons. I will open this to all of you. 

As you look at what has been reported from Geneva, do we achieve 

that first step, the halting, the freezing of anything, do we achieve 

any of the movement that David Albright is calling for in his minimum requirements? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So my sense from the reporting is we achieve 

some of it. We don’t achieve all of it. And remember, Dr. 

Albright’s—it is called the irreducible minimum deal, but not for 

nothing. It is because all of those elements have to be there in 

order for it to be even a de minimis deal. So I think it is critical 

to understand that. 

I would also add to this, I mean, the Iranian regime have negotiators who are not only masters of nuclear deception, but they 

really know their file. I mean, they have forgotten tricks that our 

negotiators haven’t even learned. And the key is they look for loopholes. You see that on the sanctions side. You see it on the nuclear 

physics side. They look for loopholes. They look for ways to reinterpret the nonproliferation treaty. They look for ways to give on 20 

percent, and rope-a-dope us on 20 percent, while still maintaining 

the ability to manufacture centrifuges and not to declare the cenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:07 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\111313\85551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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trifuge manufacturing facility so they can build up those nuclear 

chips for those negotiations. We are dealing with people who understand loopholes. They have a slew of loopholes on nuclear side, 

and we can’t be fooled by loopholes on the nuclear side. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Kahl. 

Mr. KAHL. So I have had back-and-forth with David Albright on 

precisely this question, and this is Albright’s analysis. If the deal 

stops 20 percent enrichment and neutralizes most of the stockpile, 

it doubles the estimated time that Albright has calculated for a 

breakout. That is not enough, but it is a step in the right direction; 

that is, it rolls back the program. If the deal——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Six weeks? 

Mr. KAHL. If the deal stops centrifuge, additional centrifuge installation and operation, that also prevents Iran in the next 6 

months from shrinking the time in which it could use its stockpile 

to go for nuclear weapons, and if the deal stops them from making 

fuel assemblies for the Arak nuclear reactor, then they also can’t 

bring that online. And if the deal increases inspections on facilities, 

it would be harder for them to cheat and not get detected. All of 

those things are actually quite good. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Kahl, isn’t it a case that Iran has already 

said they are delaying until 2014 bringing the Arak reactor online? 

They will still be doing construction of Arak? 

Mr. KAHL. Yeah. So, no, that is a very good point. I think there 

is a lot of confusion in the media about this. The agreement on the 

table, to include the one that existed before the French ever raised 

objections, would have been to prevent Iran from producing fuel assemblies. It is not just that they just can’t turn it on, they have 

to build the fuel assemblies at Isfahan to actually load them into 

the Arak reactor. If you prevent them from building any of those 

assemblies for the next 6 months, it is not like the day after the 

6 months they can insert them all. They would then have to start 

the process of constructing the fuel assemblies all over again. So 

it is meaningful. The most meaningful aspect of construction for 

Arak that the Israelis are worried about and that we are worried 

about are the fuel assemblies and——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Once those are in, we cannot destroy the reactor 

without——

Mr. KAHL. But this deal will push that way to the right. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So we are like—what I have heard is we are 

talking about 6 months. We don’t have 6 months. It has to be much 

shorter. As I think Mr. Dubowitz was saying, it is 6 weeks is the 

timeframe. How do we make sure that we bring—to your words, 

you said it is unclear sanctions can bring a deal in time to prevent 

a breakout. How do we make sure that we continue to accelerate 

the pace, increase the intensity, and bring Iran to a decision point 

before they get to their final point of having a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. KAHL. Let me invoke David Albright one last time. They 

have been at the point for actually about a year where in a couple 

of months they could produce fissile material for a weapon. The 

reason why they haven’t done that is that inspectors visit those facilities every week or two, which means they get caught. So I know 

6 weeks doesn’t sound like a long time, and I wish it was a lot 

longer, and we should push for a deal that makes it a lot, lot 

69

longer. But the reality is that inspectors visit there every week or 

two, and the regime is not going to go for a bomb if it gets caught, 

because the reason is they don’t want to get hit by the Israelis, by 

us, or by anybody else. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But we need the sanctions to make sure they 

don’t move forward. We have to increase the pressure and we continue to negotiate so that we get to a place, in your words, that we 

have sanctions that get us to a place where we prevent them from 

having a bomb. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. All right. And also, I understand 

that come 12 o’clock, there are some flights out, and I know, Dr. 

Kahl, you had mentioned that you will have to catch a flight at 

that time, and we appreciate very much your testimony. Any time 

you need to go, we understand because of your flight schedule. 

But we are going to go now to Mr. Ron DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses. 

You know, this issue is frustrating because I remember when 

Rouhani was elected in Iran, I started reading about how he was 

a moderate. A lot of the Western press was very hopeful that this 

signaled a big change. But then as you look beneath the surface, 

I mean, a lot of this I think the moderation is basically a function 

of differences in tactics and tone, and I think that he is smart to 

do that. Ahmadinejad said outrageous things because he meant 

outrageous things, and people at some point started to believe that 

he actually meant those things. 

So you look at this Iranian President. Does he reject outright in 

the same way that the Holocaust happened like Ahmadinejad? No, 

not really. He says, well, look, people may have died, but I am not 

an historian, is what he will say. And he will come to the West and 

offer soothing-sounding platitudes, but looking beyond the surface 

of the words that he provides, this is somebody who, in my judgment, is very much in tune with the Iranian mullahs who are running that regime. 

I mean, even when he was running as a candidate, you know, he 

said, saying death to America is easy. We need to express death 

to America with action. Last decade he called Israel a terrorist nation. One of his defense ministers was one of the plotters of the 

1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. September of this year, 

he said, our Government will not give up one iota of its absolute 

rights on the nuclear issues. He bragged about how he tricked the 

Europeans, essentially duping them to buy more time so that Iran 

would be able to convert uranium yellowcake. And, of course, he 

was the head of Iran’s National Security Council from 1989 to 

2005. Of course, during that time, you had the bombing of the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, and the 1996 bombing of the 

Khobar Towers. 

And so I guess my concern is, you know, I don’t believe—I could 

see how some people because of the sanctions would see a need 

from an Iranian perspective to have a deal, but I just don’t think 

somebody who is representing the regime’s perspective would actually believe that foregoing a nuclear weapon would be in their interest as they define it in opposition to the United States and 

70

Israel. And so am I right to have this degree of skepticism about 

this particular President, and, of course, obviously, with the regime 

that ultimately controls him? 

Ms. PLETKA. You know, in my testimony I said that we were fortunate in our adversaries, and I think that was true under 

Ahmadinejad. He made it pretty easy to make the case that Iran 

was a menace. Rouhani is much cleverer, and I think that even internally he is going to handle things very skillfully. 

I think as Mark has said, and as many members of the committee have said, the issue here is whether we can change Iran’s 

calculations. If Iran did not need to change its calculations, there 

should be no doubt in our minds that they wish to develop a nuclear weapons option; not necessarily a device, but certainly a 

breakout capability, and an option. So can we change their calculus 

sufficiently in order to get them to delay it, understanding that 

that weapon is so debilitating to their ability to maintain domestic 

control and to keep the country economically afloat, that they are 

willing to put it off? That at the end of the day is the calculation. 

That is why, to me, the arguments that we should lessen sanctions 

seems so inapt, because that is what this is about. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And I would just add to that, I mean, it was not 

about Rouhani, it was not about Khatami, it is not even about 

Ahmadinejad. It is about the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali 

Khamenei, okay, who is a man who has ruled that country with an 

iron fist, who has dedicated himself to building a nuclear weapon, 

who calls Israel a cancerous tumor, and who is basically funding 

an ICBM program to hit the United States of America, and who, 

by the way, tweeted out a few days ago, reportedly from his Twitter account, we believe it is his Twitter account, a picture of the 

Iranian negotiators, and it said, these are not compromisers. These 

are children of the revolution. 

I mean, it is all very interesting. I mean, so what is he trying 

to tell us by that? Well, he is actually saying exactly what we fear: 

There are not compromisers. They will not compromise on Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions. These are children of the revolution, which is 

ideologically committed. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Which is exactly why my skepticism remains, because, from their perspective, getting involved in these negotiations, you know, these fig leafs back and forth, that, to me, is just 

buying them time. If you are not going to have tough sanctions, if 

you are not going to have potential consequences that could change 

the calculus, you know, I fear that they are going to proceed, and 

I think it will be much more difficult once they are successful in 

that regard. So I really appreciate your comments. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay, we are going to go to Mr. Sires of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here, and I know it is late. And I heard just 

about every argument, but I come from a different perspective. I 

come from the perspective of how we negotiate. Here we have a 

country that just a couple of years ago was willing to blow off 

somebody here in Washington, DC, fomenting all sorts of trouble 

throughout the world and terror, and all of a sudden somebody 

71

blinked, and we are negotiating. And you have the President calling him on the phone. I mean, the next thing he is going to ask 

him to play golf or something. 

I really don’t get the way you negotiate with this regime. I mean, 

they are nothing but trouble, liars, oppressing their people. Like 

you said before, there are more assassinations in the country, you 

know, than ever before. So I don’t understand how we, all of a sudden, are willing to just open the doors, negotiate, reduce the sanctions. 

You know, I negotiated many contracts over many years, and the 

last person that the contract comes to is the leader. You send everybody else in, so you are at the end, you can really get some of 

the things that you want in a negotiation. But to jump in from the 

beginning, I just wonder what you think of that? I mean, like, come 

on, you are making a phone call already? It is ridiculous. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, we are negotiating with people 

who we like. I actually disagree; we are negotiating with people 

who we really like. We are negotiating with ourselves. We are negotiating with ourselves in Washington, DC, and we are asking a 

fundamental question. And I don’t want to—Colin is not here, so 

I don’t want to put him on the spot. 

Mr. SIRES. Well, I was hoping you could tell me——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. There is a temptation in this city in approaching 

these kinds of seemingly intractable problems to negotiate with 

ourselves and for us to deem what is reasonable, and then we take 

what is reasonable to the Iranians, and they have one word for it. 

Their word is ‘‘no.’’

Mr. SIRES. Absolutely. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And what they do, which is very adept, is they 

take—and Congressman Deutch talked about this on the issue of 

enrichment—they say the right to enrichment is nonnegotiable, 

nonnegotiable. We will not negotiate over it. So we say, well, okay, 

we have our maximalist position on the right to enrichment, and 

they have their maximalist position, and then we will negotiate. 

Well, the fact of the matter is our maximalist position, as we so 

termed it, should be the minimum condition. It should be the one 

that the five U.N. Security Council resolutions stipulate. But we 

don’t do that. We negotiate with ourselves, we come up with reasonable deals, and the Supreme Leader says no. And that is how 

the Iran regime negotiates, which is why they are taking us and 

are going to take us to the cleaners. 

Mr. SIRES. They are taking us to the cleaners. 

Ms. PLETKA. It is important to understand, as you underscored, 

that a negotiation remains a negotiation no matter what. The problem for us is the Iranians have dealt themselves a very nice set of 

cards and are constantly willing to hand off things to us that are 

facts, as you say, on the ground that they have created over the 

last couple of years. They weren’t enriching to 20 percent before. 

Now all of a sudden they are willing to give it up at a time when 

we were demanding that they end all enrichment. 

We have not dealt ourselves a fine set of cards in the sense that 

every bad actor position that Iran has taken throughout the region, 

whether it is trying to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in 

Washington, DC, arming Hezbollah, what it is engaging in in 

72

Syria, we have not—we haven’t brought those things up. We 

haven’t said, you know what, okay, we will talk to you about these 

things if you talk to us about that. We have not negotiated this 

skillfully. And I don’t believe that Secretary Kerry, I don’t believe 

Wendy Sherman, I don’t believe any of these people are fools, and 

I don’t believe that they want to do a bad deal. The problem is they 

want do a deal more than the Iranians do. 

Mr. SIRES. To me, it just seems that if they sense in us that we 

are incompetent negotiating, or somehow that we are weak negotiating, they are just going to become tougher to negotiate with. 

They will just keep adding and adding and make no concessions. 

To me, we should pass this bill that we have in the Senate, continue the pressure on this government so if somehow we can have 

a negotiations, not that it will lead to what we eventually want, 

but I think we have to keep the pressure on the——

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Keep all options on the table. As the President 

of the United States has said repeatedly, keep all options on the 

table; don’t unilaterally take them off the table. 

Mr. SIRES. But this business of buddy buddies, oh, come on, that 

is ridiculous. I am sorry. 

What were you going to say, Ms. Pletka? Were you going to add 

something. 

Ms. PLETKA. No, thank you. 

Mr. SIRES. Okay. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you guys being 

here. You are doing a great job. 

Ms. PLETKA. Will you forgive? I need to step out. My daughter 

just hit her head and——

Mr. YOHO. Absolutely, I understand completely. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. This is about which witness is the last one standing. 

Mr. YOHO. That is right. I don’t know if you win or lose, though. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. This is good. I am worried. 

Mr. YOHO. It just amazes me to hear what is going on right now 

in the present situation with these negotiations when we have always had a policy of nonnegotiation. And the thing I like about 

this, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you putting this together, is 

it is bipartisan. Pretty much everybody is the same on this. 

Iran, what I have heard is they have got enough 3.5 percent uranium for six to seven bombs. This is despite the international sanctions and also with what is going on over the last 30 years. I mean, 

they have had a tough situation that we put a lot of pressure on 

there, not just us, but the world, and despite that, they are still 

doing this. And they have lied or misled, and they have just talked 

about the same thing over and over again, no, we are not doing 

this, but yet they have. 

And I remember the words of Ronald Reagan that said trust by 

verify, but I feel Iran, and especially Mr. Rouhani, has lied, denied, 

deceived, but keep building, and that is what I have seen. And they 

are going to get a bomb, and then we are going to have to contend 

with that. 

And my concern is that they already have the material to do a 

dirty bomb. And with their association with the terrorists and 

73

things they have done just to hurt Americans and, you know, the 

destabilization of the Middle East, you know, I just see this getting 

worse and worse despite what we have done. And at a time where 

we have had these sanctions and they have done this would be not 

a time to back off. 

And I don’t understand the administration’s perspective of why 

they want to go in there and loosen these sanctions up. I agree 

with everybody else here. I think this is the time to put more sanctions in there, tougher sanctions. 

And I like the idea about dealing with the international markets, 

with the banking. I think that was you who brought up that. We 

can’t dictate to anybody else, but we certainly can say, well, if you 

are dealing with those, we can freeze assets. 

I think we also need to look in the South Americas with Venezuela and Central America that are helping them stay afloat financially. I would just like to hear your thoughts on that. 

And I would also like to hear your thoughts on—and you have 

already addressed this a little bit—is what state of the development of their ICBM program are they, and how soon do you think 

that will be available? And what kind of numbers are you looking 

at? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So just on the ICBM, I am not obviously—I don’t 

have access to classified intelligence on this, but I see an opensource reporting that the Intelligence Community believes that 

they may have ICBM capability by 2015. 

In response to your other points, Congressman, I would just say 

this: Let us not be under illusions, we don’t have crippling sanctions. We don’t have them. We have sanctions that are painful, 

where Iranians are painfully muddling through, but they have 

more than sufficient foreign exchange resources to take themselves 

to critical nuclear capability, which is something that Colin was 

raising as a concern and rightly so. But we haven’t imposed crippling sanctions. So we talked about it, the rhetoric has suggested 

that, we have had bills, we have had designations, we have had a 

lot of activity, but we haven’t moved to crippling economic sanctions. And there is a way to do it, and we should do it, but we have 

got to do it now. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. I think that is what we need to do right is 

put now more pressure on them, because I think their willingness 

to come to the table or wanting to is maybe they are feeling a little 

bit of pain over there, and I think this is the time to tighten up 

the pressure on it. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And there is no credible military threat. I mean, 

let us not delude ourselves. The Supreme Leader doesn’t think that 

the administration is going to bomb these nuclear facilities, and 

this administration has done everything it can to box in the 

Israelis and undercut their credible military threat. So both have 

been taken off the table. You take it off the table, you no longer 

have coercion. When you don’t have coercion, then you are going 

to enter a diplomatic game where even the French say, ‘‘Arrete.’’

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

We are going to go now to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

74

Well, I guess I am ready now to ask questions. Listening to all 

of this is really excruciating, because we all know that as we talk, 

Iran is not up to any good. So let me just start out with what I 

think everybody here agrees is that an Iran with nuclear capabilities is bad. It is bad because it is a state sponsor of terror, it is 

a habitual human rights violator, it is directing Hezbollah’s war in 

Syria. And something else which I think we haven’t mentioned is 

that it would lead to uncontrolled nuclear proliferation in a very 

unstable region of the world. So we all agree with that: Iran cannot 

be allowed to have nuclear weapons. 

So my first question—I have a series of questions. Let me ask 

them to you, and you can answer in any order. One, do you think 

a diplomatic solution is ever possible? And number two, I am assuming you do agree that this temporary agreement that is being 

suggested is not sufficient as a permanent deal, and so my next 

question, which I would have liked to give to Mr. Kahl, was can 

you ever go back to a tougher stance once you seem have a lesser 

stance? Is there any concern about a regime change for the worse 

if we do not go forward with this temporary arrangement? And 

what do you suggest would be the next steps? And then when is 

enough enough? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. So I think those are great questions, Congresswoman. I believe very strongly that there can be a diplomatic resolution of this nuclear crisis, and I think it can be done through 

tough negotiating, through coercive diplomacy, through crippling 

sanctions and a credible threat of military force. That is the stated 

policy of the Obama administration. 

I think the danger that we have gotten into is we have decided 

to negotiate with this regime, and in doing so, and even before the 

negotiations, we set the table, but we set the table in a way that 

was advantageous to our opponent. We engaged in unilateral sanctions relief. Unilateral sanctions relief. We took our leverage, our 

economic leverage, and we diminished it. We blocked these sanctions in the Senate, we diminished the pace of designations, and 

we sent a message to the world that, you know what, just wait, because pretty soon the architecture will remain, but the psychology 

will shift, and you can go back to business. Because if you go back 

to business, we are not going to sanction companies from Beijing 

to Berlin. We are not going to sanction companies from Moscow to 

Paris. And that is a fundamental problem, so we have diminished 

our negotiating leverage as we have gone in. 

At the same time on the deal side, what the Iranians are doing 

as to nuclear physics, they are enhancing their negotiating leverage. That is exactly what they did in Geneva. They are giving concessions that are increasingly less relevant to their nuclear weapons capability, like the 20 percent. The 20 percent is becoming increasingly less relevant because they have installed over 19,000 

centrifuges, which is getting them a more and more rapid breakout 

capability. 

There are major loopholes in that Geneva proposal as reported. 

It is the reason the French said no. Those loopholes are being created at the negotiating table, and over the next 6 months the Iranians will expand the loopholes, find other loopholes, and they will 

do everything they can to get to Geneva in 6 months’ time with inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:07 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\111313\85551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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creased nuclear negotiating leverage while having diminished our 

economic negotiating leverage, which is why I suggested to you earlier I don’t understand how we are going to get from a bad interim 

deal to a better final deal when this is the high-water mark of 

American negotiating leverage. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Just to continue with some of those questions, I 

have heard the argument that if we don’t do a temporary deal, that 

this could lead to a worse regime taking over in Iran. Have you 

heard that argument, and what would you say to that? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. I have heard the argument, and I would say to 

you I couldn’t imagine a worse regime in Tehran. I mean, I don’t 

foresee who actually would replace Khamenei, the Revolutionary 

Guards, which has been a dictatorial regime, it has brutalized its 

own people, is a state sponsor of terrorism, and is devoted to building a nuclear weapons program, with anything worse. I mean, I 

don’t see who is waiting in the wings. Now, who is waiting in the 

wings are not Jeffersonian Democrats. This is not going to be Canada. 

And speaking of Canada, I mean, this is interesting. So there are 

34 countries in the world that have actually nuclear programs. You 

know, nineteen of those countries actually don’t buy nuclear fuel 

from abroad. Well, I should say they do buy nuclear fuel from 

abroad; they don’t enrich, and they don’t reprocess them. One of 

them is Canada, right? And there are 14 European countries and 

South Korea and South Africa and others. And then there are a 

whole bunch of countries that do enrich and reprocess of which 

nine have nuclear weapons, and the five that don’t have nuclear 

weapons but enrich and reprocess are actually Holland, and Germany, and Japan, Brazil and Argentina. 

So here is the fundamental question for you on this issue of the 

regime: Are we negotiating with King Willem of Holland or Ali 

Khamenei of Iran? And do we think that when Ali Khamenei is 

gone, that there will be the new king of Iran who will be better? 

I think there will be, I think he will be better. I think when Ali 

Khamenei and this regime is gone, we will have a better regime 

in Tehran with whom we can negotiate a serious arms control and 

nonproliferation treaty, but not with this regime. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Dubowitz. You get the stamina prize. 

This is all—for me anyhow, this is all so predictable. You know, 

the great unwashed of us out there have been watching this for the 

better part of 20 years, and predictably, as Iran does this slow 

march toward their inevitable goal, and we keep talking and fiddling, so to speak. 

I wonder—and I am disappointed Dr. Kahl has left—if he would 

agree with your assessment of strategic incrementalism, because 

that is what most of us have seen, and unlike the enlightened 

class, again, to us it seems somewhat inevitable. 

I do want to make mention of your characterization of the negotiations with Iran like—and I would characterize them as very 

similar to what happened in DC about a month ago, where we neVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:07 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\111313\85551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gotiated with ourselves on this side of the aisle, and the other side 

said no. I find that fascinating in this circumstance. 

Dr. Kahl talked about the pride that Iranian citizens have with 

their nuclear program. And I would like you, if you could very 

quickly, to quantify that, because what I don’t know is with their 

nuclear program as a weaponized program for aggressive proactive 

strike, so to speak, as necessary, or a peaceful civilian nuclear program which produces power, which one do they have affinity for? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, that is actually a great question. I don’t 

know what polls Dr. Kahl is referring to. The polls that I have seen 

actually don’t draw the distinction. And so the question is are you 

asking Iranians do they support a civilian nuclear program, or do 

they support a nuclear weapons program? And furthermore, are 

you asking Iranians if you get to choose between a nuclear weapons 

program and the collapse of your economy, which one do you 

choose? I haven’t seen the results. 

Mr. PERRY. So we are led to believe there is this false choice for 

Iranian citizens, who many are friendly with the United States, 

that they have to have this all-or-nothing proposition. And I don’t 

necessarily agree or believe it is the case, and I appreciate your 

clarification. 

I do think that in this instance, because there is so much at 

stake, that negotiation is reasonable on this instance because there 

has been a change in the top, and the rhetoric has changed, and 

just explore what the options are. But I am, as many Americans 

are, concerned about implications for the broader region, and for 

our only true ally in the region, which is Israel, which has very 

much at stake to lose. 

So I ask you what, other than the rhetoric, anything other than 

the rhetoric, has changed on the ground regarding the nuclear program and ambitions of Iran that should lead us to believe that we 

should change our position? Is there anything other than rhetoric, 

tangible? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Nothing has changed in—fundamentally changed 

in the rhetoric, I would argue. The nuances have changed. The nuclear physics have changed. Iran has advanced its programs significantly. 

I think what has changed is there is a sense now in Iran that 

they can have their cake and eat it, too. They can have a nuclear 

weapons program and a buoyant economy——

Mr. PERRY. Let me redirect——

Mr. DUBOWITZ [continuing]. Except for—I am sorry, just to finish—that was the choice. 

Unfortunately the negotiations at Geneva are showing the Iranian regime that they can have a nuclear weapon, and sanctions 

relief, and a stabilized economy that gets the oil flowing. And then 

Supreme Leader Khamenei can do what he has always wanted to 

do. He wants to be a regional power; he doesn’t want to be the Persian equivalent of North Korea. 

Mr. PERRY. My question, I guess, should have been very clear: 

What has changed for us? What would incentivize us? What would 

motivate us? I know what is changed for them. What is in it for 

us? Aren’t they still buying time? Aren’t they still enriching? Why 

don’t we require them as a minimum standard to dismantle their 

77

military portion of it, knowing that they could enrich to very low 

levels and create power if they wanted to and have no military application. Shouldn’t that be our minimum standard? What has 

changed in that calculation for America? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Congressman, nothing has changed. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to say Vive la France. Vive la France. Thank God 

for the French. They saved us on this one. 

Mr. PERRY. It is unfortunate. 

Mr. VARGAS. It is unfortunate, no, but thank God for the French. 

It is interesting how the French really stepped in and say, what 

are you guys doing? This is not enough. You can’t trust this deal. 

And I completely agree with them. 

I mean, it seems to me if you really want to get a deal, you have 

to get the ultimate deal first, and that is you have to agree, you 

and Iran have to agree, that you can’t get a nuclear weapon, that 

you can’t have the nuclear weapons program. Let us agree to that 

first, agree to that; then we will agree to the interim program. 

Then we can talk about what we can do to get there. But agree 

with that first. 

But I don’t think they will ever agree to that, because I think 

that is what they want. I mean, it seems almost ludicrous to me 

to think that they want anything other than that. 

Their nuclear program is interesting because it actually began 

back in the 1950s, and the United States was the one that helped 

them. That was the Atoms for Peace program, I think it was called. 

We were the ones that first got involved with this nuclear program 

with the Iranians. And they wanted to develop energy, of course, 

and now it has taken on a very new dimension since the revolution 

there. And I think it is ludicrous for us to think that they are trying to do anything other than that with this program. 

One of the things I was going to—and I do want you to talk 

about is this, because I don’t think most Americans get this. When 

I talk to people about this, they say, well, they need this fuel, that 

is why they are doing it. No, they don’t. You mentioned 19 countries, but could you explain more specifically why they don’t need 

to enrich to this level, because many, many countries have nuclear 

programs, nuclear energy, and they don’t do this. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. That is exactly right, Congressman. So, again, 

there are 19 countries in the world that have civilian nuclear programs, they buy their nuclear fuel from abroad, and the economic 

assessments that I have seen actually demonstrate that it is more 

expensive for Iran to power a civilian nuclear program with its own 

domestic enrichment capability or plutonium reprocessing capability than it would be to buy nuclear fuel from abroad. 

So it doesn’t make economic sense. It certainly hasn’t made sense 

at all, because they have been under punishing sanctions that have 

really put severe stress on their economy, though those sanctions 

haven’t been crippling enough to actually change their fundamental 

calculus. And so one wonders why they continue to persist in this 

program. If this program is for civilian purposes. It makes no sense 

78

economically, it makes no sense politically, but it makes a whole 

lot of sense if your goal is to build a nuclear bomb, and to have 

regional power, and to achieve regional hegemony, and to threaten 

your neighbors. Then it makes a lot of sense. 

Mr. VARGAS. And that, to me, sounds absolutely obvious. Why 

would they allow themselves to go through these sanctions when 

they could very easily say tomorrow, you know what, we are going 

to give up this program; you know, we are going to give up this 

enrichment program, we are not going to weaponize. Instead we 

just want peaceful nuclear energy. We just want nuclear energy to 

run the lights here in our country. They could do that tomorrow 

and not go through these sanctions that are—they are not crippling, but are going to damage their economy. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, that is exactly right. And you would also 

ask, well, why have you engaged in decades of nuclear deception? 

Why haven’t you come clean with the international community on 

these possible military dimensions of your program? Why have you 

lied? And since you have lied, how can we actually believe in your 

promises of transparency going forward? 

I mean, it gets back to this old issue which we don’t even talk 

about, at least I haven’t heard this discussion, what does the safeguards regime look like? What does the verification and inspection 

regime look like postdeal? 

And by the way, when the Iranians engage in strategic 

incrementalism, which is known as incremental cheating, what is 

our response going to be? So they don’t let inspectors into Parchin 

2, Parchin 3 and Parchin 4, okay, or they block access to certain 

critical facilities where they are manufacturing centrifuges, et 

cetera, et cetera. What are we going to do as the United States of 

America to ensure those inspectors get to see what they want to 

see, and that the Iranians are not engaging in cheating and diverting their enriched uranium for military purposes? 

I would contend to you, sir, that a lot of experts at that point will 

say to you, that is when we are going to use military force. And 

I would suggest to you as well that I find that very hard to believe. 

Mr. VARGAS. I would, too. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. And not credible. 

Mr. VARGAS. Especially where we are right now. That is why I 

think we have to get the ultimate deal first or no deal at all. Then 

you can negotiate the interim. But until we get there, I don’t see 

how we can have any kind of meaningful deal that is verifiable or 

enforceable. So again, in light of that, I would say again Vive la 

France. Thank God for the French on this. At least they are openeyed on this. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. The French are the guardians of nonproliferation. 

And there is a great editorial in Le Monde today, which is the leading French newspaper. I would suggest all of you read it. Le 

Monde, I think, described this very, very carefully and accurately 

about why the French care so deeply about stopping Iran’s march 

to nuclear weapons. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

We go now to Jeff Duncan of South Carolina. 

79

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a very timely and valuable hearing for the American people to watch and for 

us to participate in. 

Most of my questions were answered. I just don’t want 2013 to 

resemble 1938. I don’t want to reach a deal that is so weak that 

it will resemble the deal, the Munich Agreement, which Neville 

Chamberlain so aptly said, ‘‘Peace in our time’’; is so remembered 

for an agreement which allowed Germany to continue its march to 

war unfettered. I do not want Iran to continue its march to a nuclear arsenal unfettered. 

Chinks in armor. For centuries enemies have looked for chinks 

in the armor. And I think when a Presidential candidate says that 

he would sit down with a country like Iran, who Americans know 

are not sincere, they sit down with no preconditions, I think that 

begins the chink in the armor. I think when you have weak agreements, that you expand that chink and give the enemy an opportunity to get into the underbelly, the weak underbelly, of a country. 

Mr. Rahall mentioned earlier our relationship with Israel, the 

United States relationship with Israel, and I think you said that 

it has never been stronger. But, you know, Israel is concerned 

about this to the point that they have come out strongly opposed 

to the Obama administration negotiations. In fact, Prime Minister 

Netanyahu tweeted on November 7th this: He said in his tweet, if 

the news from Geneva is true, this is the deal of the century for 

hashtag Iran. And he went it on to say, Saudi Arabia has invested 

in Pakistan nuclear weapon projects with a potential ability to obtain atomic bombs at will. Israel is concerned, and they should be. 

Since June when Rouhani was elected, Treasury has issued only 

two designation notices that identified six people in four companies 

violating the Iranian sanctions. The Obama administration has 

also opposed new Iran sanctions, the bipartisan legislation which 

has passed Congress. We have every right to be concerned. We 

have every right to hold these kind of hearings to raise awareness 

and address these issues. I think the panelists have done a great 

job really identifying the problems and the concerns that we all 

should have. 

So I want to shift gears, Mr. Dubowitz, and just ask you about 

the gold sanctions implementation just for a minute, because I had 

an amendment to a bill that came through this very committee 

which addressed the gold sanctions and specifically Turkey. Section 

5(a) of Executive Order 13622 sanctions a person that has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, among other 

items of purchase or acquisition, U.S. Bank notes or precious metals by the Government of Iran. This is an Executive Order by the 

Obama administration. Given that any effort to evade or avoid the 

sanctions is a violation, how many people has the administration 

sanctioned under this Executive Order, to your knowledge? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. To my knowledge, none. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Who specifically has the administration sanctioned 

for gold or related transactions with the Government of Iran? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. Well, that was hard. That was the answer to my 

question, none. 

Mr. DUNCAN. None. Same answer, none. 

80

So if we are not enforcing these kind of Executive Orders and 

these kind of sanctions, what kind of weight do they carry, and 

what signal does that send to the folks in the region? 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. On the gold issue it is complicated, but it is instructive for the way forward. That Executive Order was in July 

2012. Between July 2012 and July 1st of 2013, when the congressional gold sanctions came into effect, at the request of the administration they were delayed, as you remember, by 180 days. Iran 

earned $6 billion worth of gold between July and July to add to its 

foreign exchange reserves. Now, since congressional sanctions had 

actually come into effect in July of this year, the gold sales to Iran 

have plummeted. They have come off a cliff. And the congressional 

sanctions have been actually very, very effective. 

Now, if we are now going to be offering gold sanctions relief as 

part of some interim measure, we estimate that that gold relief 

could be worth about $9.6 billion over a 6-month period. And we 

get that because the height of the monthly gold sales that Iran was 

actually accessing last July was about $1.6 billion per month, so 

they were at about a monthly high of $1.6 billion. If they get back 

to $1.6 billion with gold sanctions relief, that is 6 months at $1.6 

billion, that is $9.6 billion, almost $10 billion worth of gold, which, 

by the way, is 50 percent of their total fully accessible foreign exchange reserves. So right now they only have $20 billion in fully 

accessible reserves. We are about to add $10 billion to the $20 billion and give them $30 billion in accessible reserves. That is the 

price of sanctions relief in exchange for incremental nuclear concessions that buy them economic runway and don’t give us the opportunity to efficiently block their nuclear physics runway. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It continues to buy them time. 

Mr. DUBOWITZ. $10 billion. It is 50 percent increase in their fully 

accessible reserves. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And from what I hear you saying, the gold sanctions have worked. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the chairman, and I thank the witnesses, too. I thank them for their testimony. 

And, Members, thank you for being here today. These are critical 

times for the national security of the United States. And as we 

have heard, central to these talks is the issue of uranium enrichment and reprocessing. These technologies can produce the explosive material needed for a nuclear bomb, and that is why multiple 

U.N. Security Council resolutions have reiterated the demand that 

all of Iran’s enrichment activities, regardless of their purpose, must 

be suspended. Six such resolutions. On this question the world has 

spoken decisively, and on this question I think our members of the 

committee have spoken, too. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(81)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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85551n.eps

FlJLL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

November 13, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

AtIairs, to be held in Room 2172 oftbe Rayburn House Otlice Building (and available live via 

the Committee website at h11;p~iL10:2:.y"':l'()~!)igrrAfl:!lirs.hQll~~9.!,J 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

The Committee on 

Wednesday, November 13, 2013 

10:00 a.m. 

Examining Nuclear Negotiations Iran After Rouhani' s First 100 Days 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz 

Executive Director 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Ms. Danielle Pletka 

Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies 

American Enterprise Institute 

Mr. Colin Kahl 

Associate Professor 

Georgetown University 

By Direction of the Chairman 

seeks /11 make 11.1' /~/(:ihlies dCC(},\'slhle II) 
83


85551m-1.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE T-lEARING 

Day Wedne,.dav Date. ___ ~I",I/,-,1",3,-,/1,-,3,----__ Room, ___ -=2",1.:..7=-2 __ _ 

Starting Time 10:08 A.M. Ending Time 12:34 P.M. 

Recesses _0_ ( __ to --'l L-to -l L-to --'l ( __ to --'l L-to __ ) L-to __ ) 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Edward R. Royce, Chairman 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session I1J 

Executive (closed) SessionD 

Televised I1J 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Recorded (taped) I1J 

Stenographic Record I1J 

Examining Nuclear Negotation .. : Iran After Rouhani's First 100 Days 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See Attendance Sheet. 

:-.ION-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

None. 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? YesC] NoD 

at' Uno ", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements suhmitted for the record) 

None. 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 12:34 P.M. 
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FilII Committee Hearing 

Member Present Member 

Edward R. Royce. CA X Eliot L EngeL NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, AS 

lleana Ros-Lehtinen. FL X Brad Sherman. C A 

Dana RohrabaeheL CA Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Steve Chabot. OH X Albia Sires. NJ 

Joe Wilson. SC X Gerald E. Connolly. VA 

Michael T. McCaul, TX X ll1eodore E. Deutch. FL 

Ted Poe. TX X Brian Higgins. NY 

Matt Salmon. AZ X Karen Bass. CA 

Tom Marino, PA William Keating. MA 

Jeff Duncan. SC X David Cicilline, RI 

Adanl Kinzinger, lL Alan Grayson. FL 

Mo Brooks. AL X Juan Vargas, CA 

Tom Cotton. AR X Bradley S. Schneider, IL 

Paul Cook. CA X Joseph P. Kennedy III. MA 

George Holding, N C X Ami Bera. CA 

Randy K. Weber, Sr., TX X Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Scott Perry, PA X Grace Meng, NY 

Steve Stockman. TX X Lois Frankel, FL 

Ron DeSantis. FL Tulsi Gabbard. HI 

Trey Radel. FL X Joaquin Castro. TX 

Doug Collins. GA 

Mark Meadows. NC 

Ted S. Yoho. FL 

Luke Messer. TN