MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 22 ME 43 Docket: Wal

- 21

- 309 Argued : April	6,	2022 Decided: August 9 ,	2022
Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD ,	JABAR , HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ. *

PATRICK	R.	MORAN

v.
WHITNEY	D.	MORAN

CONNORS ,	J. [¶1] Whitney	D.	Moran	appeals	from	a	divorce	judgment	entered	by	the District	Court	 (Belfast, Walker,	J. )	 on	Patrick	R.	Moran’s	 complaint.	 	Whitney
contends	that	the	trial	court erred	or	abused	its	discretion	in	its	classification of	 the	parties’	retirement	accounts and its denial	of	her	request	 for	attorney
fees. 1 We vacate the	judgment	in	part	and	remand	for	further	proceedings

.

* Although	 Justice	 Humphrey	 participated	 in	 th e appeal,	 he	 retired	 before	 t his	 opinion	 was certified.

1 Whitney also argues	that	the	trial	court	erred by	assigning	a	value	of	$8,500	to	the	parties’	real property.		Because the trial	court’s	 finding is	supported	by	competen t evidence	in	 the	record ,	we discern	 no	 error

. See Berntsen v. Berntsen , 2017 ME 111, ¶ ¶ 13

- 14 , 163 A.3d 820; Theberge v. Theberge , 2010 ME 132, ¶ ¶ 17

- 18 , 9 A.3d 809; Peters v. Peters , 1997 ME 134, ¶ ¶ 13

- 14 , 697 A.2d 1254.2
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The record	supports	the following	facts. Patrick	and	Whitney were married	in	August	2017 ,	and	they	have	one	child	who	was	born	in	January	2019

. In	 June 2019,	 Patrick	 filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 divorce.	 	Whitney	 answered	 and
counterclaimed. [¶ 3 ] Two	years	later,	the	court	held	a	tw o - day	trial. The	parties	testified
about	their	decision in	February	2019 to	begin	living	apart. They both testified
that	Patrick	had emotionally withdraw n from	 the	marriage	during	Whitney’s pregnancy	 and	 that,	 approximately	 two	 weeks	 after	 their	 child	 wa s	 born, Whitney	went	to	California	with	the	child	to receive support	from	her	family. Before	Whitney	and	the child	left ,	Patrick	and	Whitney	signed	a short statement
entitled “ I nformal M arriage A greement” in	which	 they stated	 that	 they were
neither legally	separating nor terminating	their	marriage. [¶ 4 ] The	parties	also	testified	about	their	decision in	June	2019 to	legally end	 their	 marriage. Whitney	 testified	 that,	 after	 several	 months	 “without answers,”	she	filed	a	petition	for	legal	separatio n	on	May 31, 2019,	in	California. A	few	days	later,	Whitney	returned	to	Maine	with	the	parties’	child	for	a	visit. During	the	visit, after	learning	that	Patrick	had	been	having	an	affair, Whitney3
had	Patrick	served with	a	copy	of	the	petition.		Patrick t hen filed	for	divorce	in

Maine. [¶ 5 ] The	 parties	 also	 testified	 about	 their income and retirement accounts,	 and	 the	 court	 admitted	 numerous	 financial	 documents.	 	 Patrick
testified that	he	has	worked	for	Versant	Power

— formerly	Emera	Maine

— since
2014. In	 2020,	 he	earned	 $103,176.64. Patrick further	 testified that	he	has three	retirement	accounts:	(1)	a	Vanguard	brokerage	account,	(2)	a	Vanguard Roth	IRA,	and	(3) a	Versant	Power	401 (k)	account. Because	the	parties	had	a “short	 marriage,” Patrick	 suggested	 that the	 court determine the marital portion	of	his	retirement	accounts using	the	value s of	the accounts on the “date of	separation”	rather	than	at	the	time	of	the	hearing

. He	off ered	several	exhibits
to	 establish	 the	 balances	 of his	 retirement	 accounts on various “milestone” dates, includ ing the	date	of the marriage,	the	“date	of	separation,” the	date	of the	judicial	settlement	conference, and the	date	of the	divorce	hearing. Some	of
the	exhibits	used	a “ date	of	separation ” in	February	2019 , while other	exhibits
used	 a “ date	 of	 separation ” in	 June	 2019. At	 the	 time	 of the trial,	 Patrick’s

re tirement	accounts had	a	combined	value	of $357,063.50. [¶ 6 ] Whitney	 testified	 that	she	currently	works	as	a	special	education
teacher	in	California and	 that	she	had	worked	as	a	special	education	 teacher4
when	she	lived	in	Maine

. In	2020,	s he	earned	approximately	$28,000. Whitney
further testified	that	she	has	four	retirement	accounts:	a	MainePERS	account,	a
Cal STRS account,	 a	 Vanguard	 brokerage	 acco unt,	 and	 a	 Vanguard Roth IRA. Regarding	 her	 MainePERS	 account,	 Whitney	 testified	 that	 the	 account	 was valued	at	$4,739.25	at	the	time	of	the	marriage	and	$10,689.76	as	of	April	2021. Regarding	her	Cal STRS account , Whitney	testified	that	the	account	was	v alued at	$3,018.66	as	of	January	2021. Two	weeks	before	trial, Whitney submitted	an updated	 financial	 statement in	 which	 she	 indicated	 that	 her	 Vanguard brokerage	account	and	Vanguard	Roth	IRA had	a	combined	value	of	$15,773.67
and	that	the	accounts	had	b oth	marital	and	nonmarital	components.		At	trial, Whitney testified	 that her Vanguard	 accounts had	 a	 combined	 balance	 of $3,817.41	at	 the	 time	of	 the	marriage and that	 the y	had	a current	balance of $16,031.48. To	 support	 her	 testimony, Whitney	 offered	account	 statements,
which	 the	 court	admitted

. According	 to	 th is evidence, Whitney’s	 retirement
accounts	had	a	total value	of	$29,739.90.5 [¶ 7 ] Whitney	requested	that	Patrick	pay $12,987.20 toward	her	attorney
fees and submitt ed an	 affidavit showing that	 she	 had	incurred that	 amount , excluding	fees incurred for the	two	days	of	trial. 2 [¶ 8 ] On	August	 4,	 2021,	 the	 court	 entered	 a	judgment of divorce	 and
den ied Whitney’s	 request	 for	 attorney	 fees. 3 Although	 the	 court	 did	 not expressly find	 that	 the	 parties	 had	legally	 separated,	 t he	 court relied	 on	 the “date	of	separation” 4 to	determine	the	marital	and	nonmarital	components	of
Patrick’s	 retirement	accounts. For	Patrick’s	401(k)	account,	 t he court found
that it was	valued at $32,847.21	on	the	date	of	the	marriage	and	$78,407.24	on
the “ date	of	separation. ” T he	court	determi ned	that	the	increase	in	value from the	date	of	the	marriage	to	the “ date	of	separation ” was	marital property and divided	it	 evenly	 between	 the	 parties. For	 Patrick’s	 Vanguard	 accounts, the

2 Whitney’s	attorney	fee	affidavit also did	not	include

— and	she	did	not	seek

— attorney	fees that she had incurred	in	California.

3 A	table	showing	a	distribution	of	the	parties’	retirement	accounts	and	real	property appears in the	trial	court	file	and	was	included	in	the	appendix. See , e.g. , Carter v. Carter , 2006 ME 68, ¶ 8 & n.4, 900 A.2d 200. The origin	of the	table is	not	apparent	from either	the judgment	or	the table itself ,	but the	parties	agreed	at	oral	argument	that	the	trial	court	created	the	table and	that	the	table	forms part of	the	judgment

. The	best	practice	 for a t rial	court	including an attachment with	a judgment	is	to expressly	incorporate	the	attachment into	the	judgment by	reference

.

4 The	trial	court	did	not identify	the	date	on	which	it	found	that	the	parties	had	separated. Based on the	record,	it	appears that	the	trial	court	used a	“date	of	separation” of	 June	2019 for Patrick’s 401(k)	account but	used	a “date	of	separation ” of	February	2019 for	Patrick’s	Vanguard	accounts. Th e	trial	court	did	not use any “date	of	separation” to determin e the	character	or	values	of	Whitney’s accounts.6
court	 found	 that they had	a	combined	value	of	$88,570.86	on	 the	d ate	of	 the marriage	and	$137, 8 45 .00 on	the “ date	of	separation.” The	court	f urther	found
that Patrick had made	a	“nonmarital	gift”	of	$25,000	during	the	marriage	that
had contributed	 to	 the increase	in the Vanguard accounts’	 combined value

. 5 After	setting	aside $113,570.86	to	Patrick	as	his	nonmarital	property,	the	court found	 that	 the	 remaining	 $24,274.14	 was	 marital	 property	 and	 divided	 it evenly	between	the	parties. [¶ 9 ] Regarding	Whitney’s	retirement	accounts,	the	court	found	that	her

Mai nePERS account was	 entirely	 marital	 and	 that	 her	 Cal STRS account	 was entirely	nonmarital. The	court	awarded	both	accounts	to	Whitney. The	court
further awarded	 to	Whitney her Vanguard	 brokerage	account	and	Vanguard Roth	 IRA, which	 the	 court	 found	 were	 entirely	 marital	 property	 and were valued	at	$15,773.67	and	$ 12,214.07,	respectively. [¶ 10 ] Whitney	 timely	 filed	 a	 motion	 for	 further	 findings	 of	 fact	 and
conclusions	of	law	wit h	an	incorporated	motion	to	alter	or	amend	the	judgment.
See M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(b),	59(e). She also renewed	her	request	 for	attorney	 fees,

5 A t	trial, Whitney	argued	that Patrick’s	$25,000	contribution	was	marital	property	because	the bank	account	from	which he	made	the transfer	contained	comingle d marital	and nonmarital	funds

. S he does not	challenge	the	court’s	finding on	appeal

.7 seeking	 an	 award	 of	 $5,000. The	 court	 denied	 Whitney’s	 motion s ,	 and	 she timely	appealed

. II.		DISCUSSION
A. Classification	of	the	Parties’	Retirement	Accounts [¶1 1 ] Whitney	argues	that	the	trial	court	erred in	its	classification	of	the parties’	retirement	accounts	by	relying	on	 the	parties’ de	 facto separation	 to characterize	 portions	 of Patrick’s	 accounts as	 n onmarital and by	 not	 setting aside	 the	 nonmarital	 portions	 of	 her	 accounts	 as	 required	 by	 statute .	 	 She further	argues	that	the	trial	court	erred by	awarding her an	account	that	d oes
not	exist

. “ A	court’s	determination	that	a retirement benefit	or	account,	or	a part	 thereof,	 is	 marital	 or	 nonmarital property is	 reviewed	 for	 clear	 error.” Bojarski v. Bojarski , 2012 ME 56, ¶ 15, 41 A.3d 544. “However, we review the application of the law to the facts de novo.” Id. “ Although we ordinari ly assume
that a trial court found all the facts necessary to support its judgment, when , as here, a motion for findings has been filed and denied, we cannot infer findings
from the evidence in the record .” Mooar v. Greenleaf , 2018 ME 23, ¶ 7 , 179 A.3d
307 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. “ We confine our review	to	the	court’s	explicit findings and	determine	whether	those	findings	are	supported	by	the	record.”
Sulikowski v. Sulikowski , 2019 ME 143, ¶ 11, 216 A.3d 893.8
1. The	delineation	 of	Whitney’s	public employ ment retirement accounts	as	marital	or	nonmarital	property	must	be	calculated pursuant	to	the	three

- step	process	for	division	of	property	in a	divorce	matter. [¶1 2 ] “ We ha ve long	 recognized	 a	 three

- step	 process for	 distributing property	in	a	divorce.” Laqualia v. Laqualia , 2011 ME 114, ¶ 13, 30 A.3d 838;

see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953	(202 1 ). 6 “The trial court must first distinguish marital
from nonmarital property. Then,	the	court	must	set	apart	nonmarital	property. Finally,	the	court	must	divide	marital	property	in	such	proportion	as	the	court deems	just.” Laqualia , 2011 ME 114, ¶ 13, 30 A.3d 838 (citations	and	quotation marks	omitted). [¶1 3 ] “T he	 trial	 court	 has	 no	 discretion	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 the
nonmarital property ;	it	must	be	transferred	to	the	spouse	to	whom	it	belongs.”
Id. ¶ 15 (quotation	marks	 omitted). W hen	a	 party	in	a	 divorce	action	 has	a
retirement	account	that	accrued both	before	and during	the	marriage,	the	trial
court	should first determine	the	present value	of	the	account

. See Skibinski v.
Skibinski , 2009 ME 13, ¶ 7, 964 A.2d 641

. It should then determine	the value of

6 Title	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953 has	been	amended twice since	the	divorce	judgment	was	entered. See P.L. 2021,	 ch.	 122,	 §	 3	 (effective	Oct.	 18,	 2021) (codified	 at	 19

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 953 (1) (B)

- (D) (2022)) ; P.L. 2021,	ch.	285,	§	1	( effective Oct.	18,	2021) (codified	at	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953(10)	(2022))

. Although the	amendments	do	not	affect	our	analysis,	w e nevertheless cite	the	statute	that	was	in	effect	when t he	judgment	was	entered.9 the	nonmarital	portion	 that	is	 to	be	set	aside	and determine the value of the marital	portion	that	is	subject	to	division. See	i d. [¶1 4 ] Title	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953(2)	broadly	defines	“marital	property”	as “all	 property	 acquired	 by	 either	 spouse	 subsequent	 to	 the	 marriage.” “Nonmarital	 property”	 includes property	 that	 falls	 into	 the	 statutorily
enumerated exceptions	 to	 “marital	 property ,” see id. § 953(2)(A)

- (E) , and property	acquired	by	either	spouse	before	the	marriage , s ee Miliano v. Miliano , 2012 ME 100, ¶ 16, 50 A.3d 534 ; Long v. Long , 1997 ME 171, ¶ 9, 697 A.2d 1317. [¶1 5 ] Here, Whitney	testified	that	her	MainePERS	account	had	a balance of	$4,739.25	at	the	time	of	the	marriage	and	a	balance	of	$10,689.76	near	the time	of	trial.		Whitney	further	testified	that	her	Cal STRS account	had	a	balance of	$3,018.66	as	of	January	2021.		Although	the	court	correctly	determined	the present	val ue	of	Whitney’s	MainePERS	account,	the	court	erred	by	not	setting aside	 to	 Whitney	 as	 her	 nonmarital	 property	 the	 $4,739.25	 that	 was	 in	 the account	 before	 the	 marriage. See 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 953(1)

- (2); Miliano , 2012 ME 100, ¶ 16, 50 A.3d 534

. Similarly,	the court	correctly	determined	the present	value	of	Whitney’s	Cal STRS account,	but	the	court’s	determination	that the	account	was	wholly	nonmarital	is	not	supported	by	the	record because the undisputed	 evidence	 shows	 that	 the	 account	 was	 established	 during	 th e10 marriage. See 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 953(1)

- (2); Miliano , 2012 ME 100, ¶ 16,
50 A.3d 534

. [¶1 6 ] Patrick	concedes	that	the	trial	court’s	findings	are	erroneous	but argues	that

— at	least to	some	extent

— the	errors	are	harmless because the	trial court	 awarded	 to	 Whitney	 all	 retirement	 accounts	 in	 her	 name.	 	 Patrick contends	that	the	court	does	not	have	to	“do	math	with	surgical	precision”	and that	“[r]ough	mathematical	justice	is	sufficient. ”		Because	we	cannot	say	that	it is	 highly	 probable	 that	 the	 trial	 court’s	 division	 of marital property	was	 not affected	by	its	erroneous	findings,	the	errors	are	not	harmless. See Marston v.
Marston , 2016 ME 87, ¶ 9, 141 A.3d 1106.
2

. The	relevant	date	for	determining	the	marital	and	nonmarital portions	of	Patrick’s	retirement	accounts	is	not	the	date	of	the parties’ de facto	separation	but	rather	the date	of	the	entry of the	divorce	judgment. [¶1 7 ] As	mentioned	above, “ n onmarital	property”	refers	to	property that
falls	 into any one	 of	 the	 exceptions	 to	 “marital	 property” listed	 in

section 953(2) (A)

- (E)

. One	such	exception	is	“[p]roperty	acquired	by	a	spouse after	a	decree	of	legal	separation.”		19

- A M.R.S.	§	953(2)(C).		Separation	decrees are	governed	by	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	851	(2022).		“[O]nce	a	decree	of	separation	has been	entered,	all	marital	property	distributed	to	each	spouse	by	decree	and	all property	 newly	 acquired	 by	 each	 spouse	 after	 the	 decree	 w ill	 thereafter	 be11 treated	as	nonmarital	property	pursuant	to	subsection	953(2)(C)	if	the	parties’ marriage	 is	 subsequently	 dissolved	 through	 a	 divorce	 decree.”	 	 Levy, Maine Family	Law §	7.6[4][c]	at	7

- 41 (8th	ed.	2013)

. [¶1 8 ] Generally,	 p roperty	 acquired	 during	 a	 de	 facto	 separation, however,	is	marital.		In Kaye	v.	Kaye , 538	A.2d	288,	289	(Me.	1988),	the	husband argued	 that	 the	 trial	court	had	impermissibly	characterized	property	 that	he had	acquired	by	his	sole	effort	after	he	and	his	wi fe	had	separated as	marital

. We	disagreed	and	held	that [t]he	legislative	definition	of	all	property	acquired	after	marriage and	prior	to	“a	decree	of	legal	separation”	as	presumptively	marital, constitutes	 a	 deliberate	 choice	 of	 a	 clear	 demarcation	 point evidenced	 by	 a	 formal	 decree.	 	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 judicially sanctioned	 separation,	 the	 parties’	 agreement	 to	 a	 de	 facto separation	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 marital	 presumption	 from attaching	to	subsequently	acquired	property.
Id. (examining	 the	 predecessor	 statute	 to	 19

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 953).	 	 Similarly,	 in
Doucette	v.	Washburn ,	2001	ME	38,	¶¶ 2

- 6 ,	766	A.2d	578, the husband argued
that the trial court should have set aside to him as his nonmarital property a
workers’ compensation lump s um award that he received while the parties

were living apart. Citing section 953(2)(C) and Kaye , we summarily rejected
his argument, stating that it had “no merit.” Id. ¶ 16 n.10.12 [¶1 9 ] T he record	is	clear regarding the parti e s’	separation

. Patrick	and Whitney began	 living	 apart	 in	 February	 2019 when	 Whitney	 moved	 to
California

. At	 that	 time,	 they	 signed a n agreement in	 which	 they	 expressly stated	that	they	were not legally separating.		Whitney	filed	a petition for	legal separation	 in	 Califo rnia	 and	 had	 Patrick	 served	 with	 the	 paperwork in June 2019

. Patrick	filed	for	divorce	a	few	days	later.		T here	is	no	evidence	in the	 record	 that	 any	 court ever issued	 a decree of	 legal	 separation,	 and	 the parties do	not contend	that	they	were	legally	separated. [¶ 20 ] Although	the	trial	court	did	not	expressly	find	that	the	parties	had legally	separated, see 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953(2)(C), the	 trial	court	assigned	a total value	 of	 $216,252.24	 to	 Patrick’s	 retirement accounts ba sed	 on	 the “date	 of separation

. ” In	 doing	 so,	 the trial	 court	implicitly	 found	 that	 the	increase in
value of	Patrick’s	retirement	accounts	after	the	parties ’	de	facto	separation was Patrick’s	nonmarital	property

. T his erroneous	 finding resulted	in more	 than $140,000 being	improperly	 classified	as Patrick’s nonmarital	 property given the	 undisputed	 evidence	 show ing that	 Patrick’s	 retirement	 accounts	 had	 a
balance	of $357,063.50	at	the	time	of	trial

. 7

7 The trial	 court	 did	 not	 find

— and	 the	 record would	 not	 have support ed a	 finding

— that	 the approximately	 $140,000 increase	 in	 the	 value	 of	 Patrick’s	 retirement	 accounts	 after	 the	 parties’ de f acto	separation was solely due	to	“[a]ppreciation	resulting	from	market	forces”	or	“[a]ppreciation13 [¶ 2 1 ] When a court	 divides	 the	 marital	 estate,	 it	 may	 consider	 “all relevant	factors,”	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953(1),	including	the	duration	of	the	marriage,

see Monahan v. Monahan , 2015 ME 65, ¶¶ 3, 6, 116 A.3d 950; Eaton v. Eaton , 447 A.2d 829, 831 (Me. 1982). The	duration of	the	marriage	is	not	a	relevant factor,	however,	in	determining whether	property	is marital	or	nonmarital. See Laqualia , 2011 ME 114, ¶ 15, 30 A.3d 838

. “ The	 equitable	 considerations applicable	 to	 the	just	division	of	marital property do	not	apply	 to	 the	setting apart	of	nonmarital property .” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted).
3

. The	trial	court	erred	by	double	counting	Whitney’s	Vanguard retirement accounts. [¶ 2 2 ] Whitney	submitted	an	updated	financial	statement	before	trial	in which	 she	 indicated	 that	 her	 Vanguard	 accounts	 had both	 marital	 and nonmarital	components	and a	combined	value	of	$15,773.67.		At	trial,	Whitney produced	a	current	account	s tatement	showing	that	the	balance	of	the	accounts had	 increased	 to	 $16,031.48 since	 she	 submitted	 her	 updated financial

statement and	that	the	accounts	had	a	balance	of	$3,817.41	at	the	time	of	the marriage

— a	 difference	 of	 $12,214.07. The trial court foun d	 that	Whitney’s Vanguard	accounts were presently valued	at	$15,773.67	and	$12,214.07 and

resulting	from	reinvested	income	and	capital	gain.” 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	953(2)(E) (1 ) ; see Miliano v. Miliano , 2012 ME 100, ¶¶ 13, 23 , 50 A.3d 534

.14 that	they	were	entirely	marital

. The trial court’s	findings	are	erroneous	for	two reasons.		First,	it	appears	that	the	court mistakenly	double counted Whitney’s Vanguard accounts ,	thereby	awarding	her	an	account	that	did	not	exist. Second, although competent	evidence	in	 the	 record	 supports the	 tri al	court ’s	 finding that	$12,214.07	of	Whitney’s	Vanguard	accounts	was	marital	property where
the accru al	occurred during	 the	marriage	using	marital	 funds,	 the trial court erred	by	not determining	the	accounts’	present	value	and	by	not	setting	aside
the $3, 817.41 that	 existed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 marriage	 to	 Whitney	 as	 her nonmarital	property. [¶ 2 3 ] In	sum,	we	vacate	the	trial	court’s findings	regarding	both	parties’
retirement	accounts	and	remand	to	the	trial	court	to redetermine	the	marital and	nonmarital	portions	of	each	retirement	account	of	each	party	and reassess
the	fairness	of	the	division	of the	marital	estate. See Cole v. Cole , 561 A.2d 1018,
1021 (Me. 1989). Although divorce	 actions	 present	 many	 challenges, particularly	when	 complicated	 financial	matters	are	involved,	 the	 challenges
are	not	insurmountable. “ By	applying	a	clear,	step

- by

- step	analysis	pursuant to	statutory	mandates,	and	allocating	appropriate	burdens	of	proof along	the way,	 counsel	 and	 the	 cou rts	 can	make	 their	 way	 through	 the	 potential	legal quagmire	 that	 these	 cases	 often	 present.” Miliano , 2012 ME 100, ¶ 11,15
50 A.3d 534; see also Axtell v. Axtell , 482 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Me. 1984) (“Casting
the judgment in specific amounts will make the result more comprehensible for
the litigants and will facilitate appellate review

. . . .” (quotation marks omitted) ).

B. Attorney	Fees [¶ 2 4 ] Title	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	105(1)	(202 2 )	provides	that,	in	a divorce	action, the	court	may	order	a	party	 to	pay	another	party’s	reasonable	attorney	 fees.
A decision	 on	 a	 request	 for	 an	 award	 of	 attorney	 fees	 “necessarily	 requires consideration	of	the	parties’	relative	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	litigation	in
addition	to	all	other relevant factors	that	serve	to	create	a	fair	and	just	award
under	the	total ity	of	the	circumstances.” Riemann v. Toland , 2022 ME 13, ¶ 42 , 269 A.3d 229

. “The court must provide a concise but clear explanation of its

reasons for grant or denial of the fee award.” Neri v. Heilig , 2017 ME 146, ¶ 16,
166 A.3d 1020 (quotation marks omitted). “ We review a trial court’s decision

on attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. ” Sulikowski , 2019 ME 143, ¶ 20,
216 A.3d 893. [¶ 2 5 ]		Because	we	vacate	the	portion	of	the	judgment	dividing	the	parties’ marital	property,	we	also	vacate	the trial court’s	denial	of	Whitney’s	request	for attorney	fees.		On	remand, in	determining	whether	to	award	Whitney	attorney16 fees, the	 trial	 court must consider	 the	 disparity	 in	 the	 parties’	 income	 and

assets , as	well	as	any	other	factors	that	the	court	deems	relevant , and articulate
the	reason	for	its	decision

. The	entry	is:
The judgment is vacated	 as	 to	 the	 property division and	attorney	fees.		The	remainder	of	the judgment	 is	 affirmed.	 	 Remanded	 for	 further proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.

Kelley	E.	Mellenthin,	Esq. (orally) ,	Lincolnville	Center,	for	appellant	Whitney D

. Moran Scott	 J.	 Lynch,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Lynch	 &	 VanDyke,	 P.A.,	 Lewiston,	 for	 appellee Patrick	R.	Moran

Belfast	District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2019

- 116 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY