In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-1806 

B.G., by his next friend, J.A.G., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:15-cv-06372 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 17, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 27, 2018 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. B.G. and his mother, J.A.G., appeal 

from the district court’s denial of their motion to reverse the 

ruling of an Illinois State Board of Education Impartial Hearing Officer. J.A.G. had sought public funding for several Individual Educational Evaluations because she believed the Chicago Public Schools’ (the District) evaluations of B.G. were inadequate. The hearing officer found that the District proved 

by a preponderance of the evidence that its evaluations were 
2 No. 17-1806 

appropriate. The district court denied B.G.’s motion1 to reverse the hearing officer’s decision, deferring appropriately to 

the hearing officer’s conclusions. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

I. Background 

B.G. had an unfortunate childhood. He lived alternately 

with his mother (who speaks only Spanish) and three siblings 

in a small apartment, and with his father, who was apparently 

so much an absentee parent that B.G. was left entirely to his 

own devices while he was there. He repeated first grade and 

would have repeated seventh grade had the District not promoted him because of his age. B.G. was diagnosed with a specific learning disability and also had significant behavior and 

attendance issues—he was absent for one third of the school 

year during his seventh grade year in 2013-14. All in all, B.G.’s 

situation at the start of 2014 was already quite bleak. 

Things only got worse when B.G.’s father died in April 

2014. B.G was hospitalized shortly thereafter with diagnoses 

of morbid obesity, hypertension, severe hypoxia syndrome, 

Type 2 diabetes, and obstructive sleep apnea. While B.G. was 

dealing with his medical issues and the grief from losing his 

father, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services received a report that his mother was not able to care for 

her children. As a result, B.G. was sent to live with his godmother for an unspecified period. He returned to his mother 

at some point, although the record is unclear about the timing. 

In July 2014, B.G.’s mother filed a request for a Due Process Hearing with the Illinois State Board of Education. She 

 

1 B.G. and J.A.G. are referred to collectively as B.G. 
No. 17-1806 3

alleged that the District had violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 and denied B.G. 

a Free Appropriate Public Education. The parties mediated 

this claim in August: the District gave B.G. an aide and moved 

him to a classroom with a teacher familiar with “multisensory 

approaches to teaching reading and writing for students with 

dyslexia.” B.G. by J.A.G. v. City of Chicago Sch. Dist. 299, 243 F. 

Supp. 2d 964, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (decision below). 

Around the same time, the District began to perform the 

assessments of B.G.’s educational needs that would wind up 

at the center of this case. The results of these assessments were 

presented at an October 9, 2014, meeting of B.G.’s Individualized Education Program (IEP) team. Present at the meeting 

were B.G.’s case manager, all of his District evaluators, his 

mother, and counsel for both sides. Although she did not 

voice any objections to the IEP team’s report at the meeting, 

B.G.’s mother soon requested Independent Educational Evaluations (IEEs) at public expense in seven areas: psychology, 

speech and language, physical therapy, occupational therapy, 

nursing, social work, and assistive technology. Believing its 

evaluations were appropriate, the District sought a Due Process Hearing with the State Board of Education to defend its 

decision not to fund IEEs. 

An administrative hearing began in February 2015 before 

Board-appointed Impartial Hearing Officer Janet K. MaxwellWickett. The District presented as witnesses the professionals 

who evaluated B.G., while B.G. presented two experts who 

reviewed the record and offered their conclusions that the 

District’s various evaluations were inadequate. The hearing 

officer found the District’s witnesses credible and persuasive, 

and she discounted the testimony of B.G.’s experts because 
4 No. 17-1806 

they lacked Illinois certifications and had never met B.G. She 

thus concluded that the District had carried its burden to 

show that its evaluations were appropriate. 

B.G. filed motions in the district court to supplement the 

administrative record and to reverse the hearing officer’s decision. The district court then denied (in relevant part) B.G.’s 

motion to supplement the administrative record and denied 

his motion to reverse the hearing officer’s decision. B.G. by 

J.A.G, 243 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2017). He timely appealed 

to this court. 

II. Discussion 

A. Motion to Supplement the Administrative Record 

As a preliminary matter, we must review the district 

court’s partial denial of B.G.’s motion to supplement the administrative record. B.G. argues that the district court should 

have added to the record (1) blank testing protocols for the 

Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL); 

and (2) IEEs performed after the administrative hearing by 

Mari Lane and Ari Goldsmith (the latter of whom was one of 

B.G.’s experts at the hearing). The court declined largely because it concluded that the proposed additions would change 

the character of the proceedings from a review of the hearing 

officer’s decision to a trial de novo. Additionally, it found that 

(1) the protocols were not necessary because B.G. had been 

given several other assessments; and (2) post-hearing IEEs 

were not relevant to review of the hearing officer’s decision. 

We review the denial of the motion to supplement for 

abuse of discretion. Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L. on 

Behalf of Brock L., 102 F.3d 895, 901–02 (7th Cir. 1996). And the 
No. 17-1806 5

district court was right to consider whether additional evidence would change the nature of the proceeding; we have 

cautioned that trial courts should guard against admitting 

“such evidence to change the character of the hearing from 

one of review to a trial de novo.” Id. at 901 (quoting Town of 

Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir. 1984)). 

We cannot say the district court abused its discretion by 

concluding that considering the post-hearing IEEs would turn 

the proceedings into a trial de novo. We have explained that 

“the appropriateness of an IEP ‘can only be judged by examining what was objectively reasonable at the time’ the case 

conference committee created the IEP.” M.B. ex rel. Berns v. 

Hamilton Southeastern Schools, 668 F.3d 851, 863 (7th Cir. 2011). 

The same logic applies to IEEs procured not only after the IEP 

team met, but after the hearing officer heard the case. The district court was in no position to judge how the new IEEs might 

have contributed to the IEP team’s conclusions. Further, admitting the new IEEs into the record would have made the 

district judge the first arbiter of those evaluations—precisely 

what we have cautioned district courts to avoid. We decline 

to disturb the district court’s conclusion on this point. 

Nor can we say the district court abused its discretion by 

refusing to add the blank testing protocols to the record. Unlike the IEEs, which B.G. obtained after the due process hearing, the protocol issue was raised at the hearing. The hearing 

officer sustained the District’s objection to the admission of 

the blank protocols on the ground that they were not the actual protocols that had been used to examine B.G., but she 

permitted B.G.’s counsel to question the District’s speech and 

language evaluator about whether she had filled out the 

CASL protocols. In the end, the hearing officer was convinced 
6 No. 17-1806 

that the absence of the protocols used to evaluate B.G. was 

immaterial because the CASL was only one of several tests the 

speech and language evaluator administered. As we explain 

below, the hearing officer’s conclusion was reasonable. Thus, 

the district court’s decision to exclude the blank protocols did 

not amount to an abuse of discretion. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to supplement the record with the additional IEEs and 

CASL protocols. 

B. Motion to Reverse the Administrative Decision 

With the motion to supplement the record resolved, we 

move to the heart of the case: whether the district court erred 

in denying B.G.’s motion to reverse the hearing officer’s decision. When a parent disagrees with a public agency’s educational evaluation of her child, she has the right to an IEE at 

public expense in certain situations. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1). 

However, the agency may (as the District did here) seek a due 

process hearing in order to demonstrate that its evaluation 

was appropriate. Id. § 300.502(b)(2)(i). The appropriateness of 

the agency’s evaluation is generally measured by its compliance with federal regulations, specifically 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.304 

and 300.305. If the agency proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that its evaluation was appropriate, the parent is not 

entitled to an IEE at public expense. 

In reviewing the hearing officer’s decision, the district 

court was required to “give ‘due weight’ to the administrative 

process proceedings.” Monticello, 102 F.3d at 901. The level of 

deference due the hearing officer depends upon how much 

new evidence the district court allows into the record. When 
No. 17-1806 7

the court hears no new evidence, it owes “considerable deference” to the hearing officer’s factual findings. Alex R. ex rel. 

Beth R. v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 221, 375 

F.3d 603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004). It may set the judgment aside 

“only if it is ‘strongly convinced that the order is erroneous.’” 

Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 

2002)). This standard is “akin to the standards of clear error 

or substantial evidence” under which we review the decisions 

of the Social Security Commissioner. See id.; cf. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining the standard 

of review in Social Security cases). 

On appeal, we review the district court’s legal conclusion’s de novo and factual findings for clear error. Alex R, 375 

F.3d at 612. We emphasize that neither the district court nor 

this court should treat IDEA cases “as ‘an invitation to the 

courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational 

policy for those of the school authorities which they review.’” 

Monticello, 102 F.3d at 901 (quoting Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). 

The vast majority of B.G.’s brief focuses on alleged errors 

by the district’s psychologists that, in B.G.’s view, render the 

district’s psychology assessment inappropriate. We will start 

there and proceed through B.G.’s complaints about the other 

assessments. In the end, however, the significant deference 

we owe to both the hearing officer’s and the district court’s 

factual findings dictates the outcome. This case is fact-intensive, and the hearing officer’s review of the evidence in her 

written decision was comprehensive. Because the hearing officer resolved the factual issues in the District’s favor, our 

power to disturb her judgment is significantly constrained. 
8 No. 17-1806 

Substantial evidence in the record supports the hearing officer’s decision that the district’s evaluations were appropriate under the governing regulations. 

 1. Psychology Assessment 

Two psychologists, Nicole Cintron and Yazmin Coehlo, 

conducted the district’s psychological assessment of B.G. At 

the time of the administrative hearing, Cintron had been a 

lead psychologist for the district for eight years. Before that, 

she was a first grade teacher for seven years and a special education teacher for three years. She holds a bachelor’s and a 

master’s degree in bilingual special education. Coehlo had 

been a school psychologist for three years and holds a master’s degree in special education, an Illinois Type 73 license,2

and bilingual certification in Spanish. 

Coehlo administered two assessments before she went on 

maternity leave and left Cintron to interpret the data: the 

Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition 

(WISC-IV),3 and the Behavior Assessment System for Children, Second Edition (BASC-II).4 Cintron then attempted to 

administer the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement, 

 

2 The Type 73 license is the Illinois School Counselor Certification. 

3 WISC-IV is a full-scale IQ test designed for children between 6 and 

16 years old. 

4 The BASC-II is an assessment intended to help “understand the behaviors and emotions of children and adolescents.” See https://www.pearsonclinical.com/education/products/100000658/behavior-assessment-system-for-children-second-edition-basc-2.html#tab-details (last visited August 9, 2018). 
No. 17-1806 9

Third Edition (KTEA-3),5 but found B.G. to be uncooperative 

and the test results unreliable. 

Cintron reviewed B.G.’s academic history, previous evaluations, and medical history. She also performed classroom 

observations in a general education class and in B.G.’s special 

education classroom. Cintron noted that B.G. had been hospitalized in May 2014 and diagnosed with morbid obesity, hypertension, and diabetes among other things. She also observed that B.G. was exhibiting some signs of depression after 

his father died around that same time and he had to move in 

with an aunt (his godmother) while his mother sought stable 

housing. Unfortunately, due to B.G.’s uncooperativeness, 

Cintron was unable to conduct an interview with him on two 

separate occasions. 

After all this, Cintron composed a report for B.G.’s IEP 

team which the hearing officer deemed “comprehensive.” 

Hearing Officer’s Decision, Findings of Fact ¶ 42. Based on 

Cintron’s report, the IEP team concluded B.G. was eligible for 

services under the emotional disability and special learning 

disability categories. The team also used Cintron’s report to 

write goals for B.G. At the IEP meeting, the team shared the 

report with B.G.’s mother, who raised no objections. 

As far as we can tell from the briefing, B.G. has eight main 

objections to the psychological assessment: (1) the psychologists were not sufficiently trained and knowledgeable; (2) errors in administering the assessments rendered them invalid, 

 5 The KTEA-3 is “an individually administered measure of academic 

achievement from ages 4.5 through 25.” See http://txautism.net/evaluations/kaufman-test-of-educational-achievement-third-edition-ktea-3 (last 

visited August 9, 2018). 
10 No. 17-1806 

and, relatedly, the District’s failure (in his view) to assess 

whether B.G. has an intellectual disability; (3) the psychologists erred when they concluded that B.G. was an English 

speaker (and further erred by providing minimal Spanish 

translation on one of the tests administered); (4) the psychologists incorrectly thought B.G. was suffering from an emotional disability; (5) the assessment did not consider that B.G. 

might have had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 

(ADHD); (6) Cintron entered the IEP meeting thinking that 

B.G. should no longer be classified as learning disabled; (7) 

the District failed to report certain academic data; and (8) 

Cintron’s recommendations to the IEP team were erroneous. 

We consider these objections in turn and ultimately find that, 

in light of the record and factual findings by the hearing officer and the district court, none has merit. 

 a. Qualifications and training 

As noted above, Cintron and Coehlo possess all the traditional credentials and markers of individuals qualified to perform psychological evaluations. Nobody can question their 

their education, certifications, and years of experience. Yet 

B.G. contends that despite Cintron’s training and experience, 

she lacked important knowledge that rendered her unqualified under 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(iv). As the District points 

out, however, B.G.’s claims are based on a selective reading of 

the record. For example, nothing B.G. cites indicates that 

Cintron had any “glaring” gaps of expertise with respect to 

reading. And B.G.’s citations do not support his claim that 

Cintron did not know the difference between phonemic 

awareness and phonics. In short, the record contains substantial evidence that Cintron (and Coehlo) had sufficient 
No. 17-1806 11

knowledge, training, and experience to administer an assessment. 

Further, we cannot fault the hearing officer for discounting the testimony of B.G.’s expert, Dr. Goldstein, that Cintron 

should have tried harder and used different methods to administer assessments to B.G. After all, Cintron knew B.G., 

while Dr. Goldstein had never met or evaluated him. Given 

that, it is understandable that the hearing officer thought 

Cintron’s explanation was more persuasive than Dr. Goldstein’s objections.6

b. Intellectual disability and testing irregularities 

B.G. argues that Cintron did not adequately consider 

whether his score on the WISC-IV indicated an intellectual 

disability. He takes issue with Cintron’s conclusion that his 

drop in IQ evidenced by the two assessments was a result of 

either an emotional disability or depression caused by his father’s death. Admittedly, B.G.’s 2014 IQ, according to the 

WISC-IV, was 71, just one point above the cutoff for an intellectual disability. But, as B.G.’s expert Dr. Goldstein acknowledged, B.G.’s 2009 WISC scores were much higher and not indicative of an intellectual disability. Administrative Record at 

3118. Since B.G. had not experienced a head injury or other 

condition that would lead to such a drop in IQ, see id. at 3471, 

we cannot say the hearing officer was wrong to credit 

 6 To the extent that B.G. argues Cintron should have done something 

different to assess his academic skills (such as math) because he was uncooperative during her attempt to assess the KTEA-3, the hearing officer’s 

factual findings do not support his claim. See Hearing Officer’s Decision, 

Findings of Fact ¶ 33–34 & p. 61. 
12 No. 17-1806 

Cintron’s belief that something else—whether it be grief, depression, an emotional disability, or extended absences from 

school—had caused the drop in B.G.’s IQ score.7

B.G. relatedly argues that admitted mistakes in the administration of the WISC-IV and BASC-II rendered their results 

invalid. But here, too, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusion that these errors were harmless. The 

errors included Coehlo’s decision to provide minimal Spanish 

translation while administering the WISC-IV, Cintron’s failure to explain “f scores” on the BASC-II in her report, and 

Cintron’s failure to consider B.G.’s results on the Vineland assessment administered by B.G.’s former special education 

teacher. The hearing officer credited the District’s psychologists’ testimony that these errors did not invalidate the results 

of the assessments (and the ultimate conclusion that B.G. did 

not have an intellectual disability). See Hearing Officer’s Decision p. 62. Importantly, even Dr. Goldstein was not willing 

to state at the hearing that these errors invalidated the results.8

 

7 Here, too, B.G.’s factual assertions are best described as a selective 

reading of the record. For example, B.G. faults the District for failing to 

report discrepancies between the Verbal Confirmation and other indices 

on the WISC-IV, but as the District points out, the cited portion of the transcript is Dr. Goldstein testifying about these very discrepancies. B.G. also 

charges that Coelho’s failure to administer subtests for visual closure rendered her assessments inadequate, but ignores that the District’s occupational therapist did administer such a test. In any event, all of this is at the 

margins; the bottom line is that substantial evidence supports the hearing 

officer’s conclusion that B.G. did not have an intellectual disability. Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 38. 

8 B.G. contends that the hearing officer shifted the burden by requiring 

his expert to “definitively state” that the errors affected the results. That is 

not so. The hearing officer simply discounted Dr. Goldstein’s testimony in 

part because of his unwillingness to go on the record to that effect. Finders 
No. 17-1806 13

Hearing Officer’s Decision, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 55, 57 & p. 62. 

In light of all this, we conclude that the hearing officer was 

within her discretion to credit the psychologists’ assertions 

and discount Dr. Goldstein’s testimony. 

 c. Testing in English 

B.G. next contends that the hearing officer erred by accepting the psychologists’ conclusion that he was proficient in 

English. The upshot here is that if B.G. were tested in English 

even though he was not proficient in the language, the assessment might be racially or culturally biased. 34 C.F.R. 

300.304(c)(1)(i). But the evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusion that English was the proper language in 

which to test B.G. Cintron knew from her review of B.G.’s records that he was no longer an English Language Learner and 

that he was instructed in and spoke English. Hearing Officer’s 

Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 37. Several of the District’s other 

assessors testified that B.G. was proficient in English and preferred it to Spanish. See id. ¶¶ 63, 65, 67, 127, 171. And Dr. 

Goldstein agreed that if a student is proficient in English, the 

WISC-IV does not have a racial or cultural bias. Id. ¶ 55. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusion 

that B.G. was proficient in, and indeed preferred, English. 

Thus, the hearing officer was correct that the testing was not 

racially or culturally biased. 

Relatedly, B.G. contends that nonverbal IQ testing would 

have been more accurate. Cintron testified that nonverbal 

 

of fact are entitled to do that without conducting unlawful burden shifting. Indeed, the hearing officer would have been entitled to discount Dr. 

Goldstein’s testimony even if he had been unequivocal, since a competing 

explanation exists in the record. 
14 No. 17-1806 

testing is appropriate for students who are English Language 

Learners, but that designation no longer applied to B.G. Id. ¶ 

37. Furthermore, Cintron and Coehlo had observed that B.G. 

was comfortable communicating in English; he responded 

only in English when Cintron asked him test questions. Id.

Thus, the hearing officer had no reason to doubt the psychologists’ assertion that B.G. was proficient in English and could 

be tested in that language. 

 d. Emotional disability 

B.G. next contends that he should not have been classified 

as a student with an emotional disability. He accuses the District’s psychologists of conflating an emotional disability with 

the short-term effects of coping with his father’s death. But it 

is unclear what the District could have done differently even 

if grief, and not a disability, were the primary cause of B.G.’s 

poor emotional indicators. As the District notes, B.G.’s mother 

demanded a publicly-funded IEE in this case; it was not practicable for the District to postpone its evaluation until B.G. 

was no longer grieving. And B.G.’s evaluation pointed towards emotional issues, as B.G. himself reported that he has 

desire for self-harm and always feels like his life is getting 

worse. See id. ¶ 30. B.G. also had very few friends at school 

and had already been held back a year. Combine this with his 

significantly falling IQ scores and we cannot say that the hearing officer erred by concluding that B.G. suffered from an 

emotional disability. 

 e. ADHD 

Next, B.G. claims that the psychologists ignored potential 

ADHD in their evaluations. ADHD is a medical diagnosis not 

within the area of expertise of the evaluators (or the hearing 
No. 17-1806 15

officer), but the evidence suggests that the psychologists did 

consider the possibility of ADHD. As the district court noted, 

the hearing officer found that B.G.’s 2009 Psychological Evaluation Report, which indicated ADHD symptoms, was unreliable because it was out of date. B.G. by J.A.G., 243 F. Supp. 

3d at 982 (citing Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 

210). B.G.’s mother then had five years to follow up on the 

potential of ADHD, but she failed to do so. Without a diagnosis, there was nothing the District’s psychologists could have 

done differently. They were not obliged to make a medical diagnosis during their evaluation of B.G. 

f. Cintron’s opinion on B.G.’s learning disability 

There is no question that Cintron believed that B.G.’s primary problem was either an emotional disability or his economic disadvantage and lack of attendance. Cintron found 

that B.G.’s attendance problem made it hard to assess whether 

he actually had a learning disability. But, contrary to B.G.’s 

assertion, Cintron did not recommend that B.G. lose access to 

audiobooks even if he were not classified as learning disabled. 

See Defendants’ Appendix at 692. And the IEP team ultimately concluded that B.G. was eligible for services because 

he had a specific learning disability, see Hearing Officer’s Decision at p. 61, so Cintron’s beliefs did not factor into the final 

decision of the IEP team. It is hard to see what Cintron did 

wrong here; on the contrary, her reservations were quite reasonable. We find no error here. 
16 No. 17-1806 

 g. Failure to report academic data 

B.G. argues that the District almost totally failed to report 

academic data, but the citations in his brief are limited to subtests that were not completed because B.G. proved uncooperative. Even Dr. Goldstein admitted that B.G. was not engaged 

in the process of testing and that the subtests of the KTEA that 

Cintron tried to administer were not necessary. Administrative Record at 3175–76, 3419. Moreover, even were we to 

credit B.G.’s position on the difficulty of testing him, IEP team 

member Uchenna Obialor performed a comprehensive 

“Learning Environment Screening” that included significant 

detail regarding B.G.’s academic weaknesses. See Defendants’ 

Appendix at 699–704. We see no error with respect to the District’s reporting of academic data. 

 h. Cintron’s recommendations 

Finally, B.G. faults Cintron for failure to recommend to the 

IEP team that B.G. have a multisensory program and failure 

to specify how many instructors he needed and how long he 

should be instructed. But it was the IEP team, not Cintron herself, whose job it was to create educational goals for B.G. And 

the IEP team did write a goal to use “a systematic multi-sensory approach” with B.G to help him learn to decode unfamiliar words. Administrative Record at 759. Thus, the IEP team 

used Cintron’s report to develop an apparently appropriate 

goal. We find no error. 

 2. Occupational Therapy Evaluation 

Rebecca Cassidy, an outside contractor with the District 

who is employed by private rehabilitation facility Health Pro 

Rehabilitation, performed the District’s occupational therapy 

evaluation of B.G. She has worked with the District for nearly 
No. 17-1806 17

30 years, supervising the District’s occupational therapists 

and providing professional development training. Cassidy 

holds a bachelor’s degree in occupational therapy and is licensed in Illinois. 

Cassidy evaluated B.G. on September 19, 2014. She observed B.G. in the classroom and followed him “through daily 

transitions, observing his sensory processing, movement, interaction with other students, and strategies to get from place 

to place.” B.G. by J.A.G., 243 F. Supp. 3d at 973 (citing Hearing 

Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 116). She also saw that 

B.G. could access the school environment relatively easily and 

do basic self-help activities independently. Cassidy also evaluated B.G.’s writing through the McMasters Writing Assessment, finding that B.G. could legibly copy 50 letters per minute, an appropriate level for a sixth grader. But her attempt 

to administer the Visual Closure subtest of the Developmental 

Test of Visual Perception (DVPT-A) failed due to B.G.’s unwillingness to engage. Nevertheless, Cassidy was able to conclude that B.G. could write and type a bit slower than average 

for his age, although he had trouble putting his thoughts onto 

paper. She recommended the use of word prediction software 

and increased keyboarding practice to improve B.G.’s speed 

in performing work. 

B.G. faults Cassidy for failing to assess his hygiene, but the 

record does not reveal that personal hygiene was a problem 

for B.G. at the time of the evaluation. Neither Cassidy nor any 

of the other District evaluators made any notes suggesting 

that B.G. appeared to be neglecting his personal hygiene. On 

the contrary, B.G. responded positively during a life-skills assessment he took around the time of the IEP meeting, noting 

that he brushed his teeth and bathed daily. Administrative 
18 No. 17-1806 

Record at 804. B.G.’s hygiene problems appear to have been 

in the past by the time he was evaluated. What is more, B.G. 

is incorrect that Cassidy testified at the hearing that she was 

unware of hygiene concerns; as the district court explained, 

plaintiff’s counsel never elicited such testimony. B.G. by 

J.A.G., 243 F. Supp. 3d at 985–86 (citing Administrative Record 

at 2914). In short, the record does not support B.G.’s contention that Cassidy ignored hygiene issues. Nor does it support 

B.G.’s contention that Cassidy conducted a cursory evaluation. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusions. 

 3. Social Work Evaluation 

Jennifer Avilas conducted the District’s social work evaluation. She had eighteen years of experience as a social worker 

for the District and holds a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in 

Social Work and an Illinois type 73 license. Avilas is also fluent in Spanish. She interviewed B.G. in English (without concern) and B.G.’s mother in Spanish; B.G.’s mother indicated 

concerns that B.G. was unable to verbalize his frustrations. 

Avilas noted that B.G.’s family lived in a small apartment and 

received social welfare benefits. 

Avilas also gave the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire to B.G.’s then-current and former special education 

teachers; the current teacher indicated a normal rating, but the 

former teacher provided answers indicating concern with 

B.G.’s lack of considering the feelings of others, ability to 

share, disruptive behavior, obedience, and work completion. 

She observed him in class on September 19, 2014, and noted 

that he was disruptive and refused to take direction. 
No. 17-1806 19

Avilas’ report recommended social-emotional accommodations be implemented for B.G. throughout the day. She also 

offered to provide B.G.’s mother with a list of professionals 

for B.G. to seek counseling for grief. Further, she agreed that 

B.G. had an emotional disability. B.G.’s mother, present at the 

IEP meeting, specifically noted that she agreed with Avilas’ 

report. 

B.G.’s first concern is that Avilas never conducted a home 

visit and so had no basis to conclude that he could do homework at home. But the hearing officer thought a home visit 

was not necessary given Avilas’ interview with B.G.’s mother, 

who was deemed credible. Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 178. This allowed Avilas to testify about B.G.’s 

living situation with sufficient specificity that a home visit 

was unnecessary. Avilas testified credibly that she had 

worked with families with ten children who manage to do 

their homework in a two room apartment. Administrative 

Record at 2849–50. The hearing officer was within her discretion to accept this testimony. 

Next, B.G. questions the appropriateness of Avilas’ Functional Behavior Assessment (or, as the district court put it, 

Functional Behavior Plan). See B.G. by J.A.G., 243 F. Supp. 3d 

at 987. In the district court, B.G. cited only to the testimony of 

Dr. Goldstein, which the hearing officer had discounted because it did not consider him an expert in areas other than 

psychology. Id. The hearing officer instead credited Avilas’ 

testimony that the Assessment was adequate and that her recommendations were based on appropriate research. See Administrative Record at 2791. Like the district court, we find no 
20 No. 17-1806 

reason to disturb the hearing officer’s finding that Avilas conducted the Functional Behavior Assessment appropriately. 

The same is true for the entirety of the social work evaluation. 

 4. Physical Therapy Evaluation 

Andrea Alter conducted the District’s physical therapy 

evaluation of B.G. She holds a Doctorate in Physical Therapy 

from Boston University, is a licensed physical therapist in Illinois, and has worked for the District for three years. She 

evaluated B.G. on October 24, 2014, including observations 

during class, recess, lunch, and transition periods. Alter observed that B.G. could sit upright in class and was able to navigate the halls and stairs between classes. B.G. also demonstrated strong gross motor skills. He even participated in 

physical education class and met weekly with the school social worker for twenty minutes of interval circuit training. 

Alter found B.G. had decreased endurance due to his 

weight and other medical conditions, but that this was not an 

issue for the short periods of movement required during the 

school day. Relatedly, Alter concluded that B.G. could independently access the education environment. While she recommended modifications to his physical education program, 

Alter ultimately concluded that B.G. did not need physical 

therapy services. 

B.G. argues that Alter’s assessment did not assess his pain 

or posture issues. With respect to pain: while the district court 

correctly pointed out the hearing officer’s mistaken conclusion that Alter had ruled out pain, the court also observed that 

“there is actually no significant evidence that B.G. was, in fact, 

experiencing pain such that physical therapy was necessary.” 

B.G. by J.A.G., 243 F. Supp. 3d at 985. We agree with the district 
No. 17-1806 21

court that the hearing officer’s small error in this instance was 

harmless. As for posture, B.G. is simply incorrect that Alter 

ignored such concerns. He is also incorrect that Cassidy (the 

District’s occupational therapist) noted posture issues; she actually concluded that B.G.’s penchant for leaning on his desk 

rather than sitting up was out of habit rather than a lack of 

strength. Administrative Record at 694. We agree with the district court that the hearing officer committed no error in finding the physical therapy evaluation appropriate. 

5. Speech and Language Evaluation 

Joeyllyn Martin performed the District’s speech and language evaluation of B.G. She had 12 years of experience with 

the District, holds a graduate degree in Speech and Language 

Pathology, and is licensed in Illinois with a certification in 

clinical competence. Martin observed B.G. in September 2014; 

this observation included watching B.G. communicate with 

others in small and large groups as well as a one-on-one interview with him. She reported that B.G. was comfortable 

speaking English and able to maintain an appropriate conversation. 

Martin also administered several assessments. Through 

the Oral Motor Assessment and an informal Voice Assessment, she found that B.G. “was functional for educational 

purposes.” An Articulation Assessment revealed B.G.’s tendency to substitute the ‘f’ sound in place of ‘th.’ The Peabody 

Picture Vocabulary Test and the CASL showed that B.G. had 

“moderate deficits in receptive vocabulary.” Martin did not 

believe B.G. had an issue with expressive vocabulary. She also 

chose not to perform the Mean Length of Utterance test, explaining at the hearing that research indicates it should not 
22 No. 17-1806 

typically be used for children B.G.’s age. B.G.’s expert Dr. Bailey substantially agreed. Administrative Record at 3543 (Dr. 

Bailey’s testimony that “[a]s children age, traditional assessments of length of utterance with MLU become less talked 

about in the literature and less accurate as an indicator, because often times teenagers are able to give a whole lot of 

meaning with very short words.”). Finally, Martin reviewed 

the results of the Lindamood-Bell assessment administered 

by an outside individual procured by B.G.’s mother, but 

found it somewhat unhelpful because the assessor did not 

provide an explanation of his or her findings. 

Martin concluded that B.G. was impaired in receptive language and was eligible for speech services. While she lost the 

testing protocols for the CASL after the IEP meeting and was 

unable to produce them at the hearing, the hearing officer 

found that this did not invalidate the results because Martin’s 

report was comprehensive, assessing B.G.’s needs and formulating speech and language goals. Hearing Officer’s Decision, 

Finding of Fact ¶ 81. Finally, Martin declined to give an opinion on B.G.’s reading skills; she testified at the hearing that 

reading skills are beyond her area of expertise and that she 

would defer to the District’s reading specialist. 

B.G. argues that the hearing officer incorrectly found the 

lost CASL protocols to be harmless. But it is hard to see why 

Martin’s misplacement of the protocols should invalidate the 

CASL results, much less Martin’s entire evaluation. As the 

district court noted, B.G.’s CASL results corroborated the results of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. B.G. by J.A.G., 

243 F. Supp. 3d at 972. Moreover, Martin had the protocols 

when she attended the IEP meeting, and still possessed the 

scores and other information in her report at the time of the 
No. 17-1806 23

hearing. See Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 81. 

It is unfortunate that she misplaced the protocols and could 

not produce them at the hearing, but we agree with the hearing officer and the district court that Martin’s mistake did not 

doom the entire assessment. 

B.G. argues that Martin was incapable of administering 

the CASL, but points to no useful evidence to support this allegation. Instead, B.G.’s argument is based on (1) an IEE conducted by Mari Lane which B.G.’s mother procured after the 

hearing; and (2) the psychologists’ handling of the BASC-2 

and WISC-IV assessments. The former piece of evidence is not 

in the record, see supra at 5, and the latter is irrelevant to the 

question whether Martin could administer the CASL. 

B.G. also takes issue with Martin’s decision not to test expressive vocabulary, but Martin felt no need to do so because 

B.G. did not have a problem finding the proper word to use 

in English. Hearing Officer’s Decision, Finding of Fact ¶ 84. 

Given that Martin had interviewed and observed B.G., it was 

reasonable for the hearing officer to credit her testimony that 

an assessment was not necessary. Substantial evidence exists 

in the record to support the hearing officer’s decision in this 

area.9

III. Conclusion 

This case involves a voluminous administrative record 

dealing with subject matter beyond the expertise of federal 

 

9 B.G.’s brief fails to develop arguments with respect to the Nursing 

and Assistive Technology assessments, so we find these arguments 

waived. Weinstein v. Schwartz, 422 F.3d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005). Absent 

wavier, we would agree with the district court that the hearing officer’s 

conclusions on these assessments were supported by substantial evidence. 
24 No. 17-1806 

judges. That is why we defer to the hearing officer’s factual 

findings and decline to substitute our own views on educational policy for the hearing officer’s. The hearing officer in 

this case conducted a five-day hearing, heard the relevant evidence, and concluded that the District’s experts evaluated 

B.G. appropriately. While B.G. presents many complaints 

about the District’s evaluators, the record shows that the District’s evaluators were competent, well-trained, and performed comprehensive evaluations. Particularly under the 

deferential standard of review applicable here, we have no 

cause to set aside the hearing officer’s well-reasoned decision. 

AFFIRMED