Salvatore R. Mercogliano

NAVA L H I STORY & H ER ITAGE COM M A N D | THE U.S. NAVY AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Fourth Arm

 of Defense

Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War
Front Cover: Soldiers of the Army’s 11th Light Infantry Brigade stand at 

attention at a ceremony in Qui Nhon, marking their deployment to South 

Vietnam by MSTS troopships in December 1967. NHHC VN Collection
THE U.S. NAVY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 

Edward J. Marolda and Sandra K. Doyle, Series Editors

Fourth Arm

of Defense

Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War

Salvatore R. Mercogliano

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, DC

2017
© 2017 Naval Historical Foundation

All rights reserved.

No portion of this book may be reprinted without written permission from the Naval Historical Foundation.

Printed in the United States of America.

Published by

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in partnership with the Naval Historical Foundation

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Use of ISBN

This is the official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify

its authenticity. Use of 978-0-945274-96-4 is for the U.S. Government Publishing Office Edition only.

The Superintendent of Documents of the U.S. Government Publishing Office requests that any

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Mercogliano, Salvatore R., author.

Title: Fourth arm of defense : sealift and maritime logistics in the Vietnam War / Salvatore R. Mercogliano.

Other titles: Sealift and maritime logistics in the Vietnam War

Description: Washington, D.C. : Naval History and Heritage Command, [2017] | Series: The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War

Identifiers: LCCN 2017007729 (print) | LCCN 2017010115 (ebook) | ISBN 9780945274964 (alk. paper) | ISBN 9780945274971 (pdf) | 

ISBN 9780945274988 (epub) | ISBN 9780945274995 (mobi)

Subjects: LCSH: Vietnam War, 1961-1975—Transportation. | Military sealift—United States—History—20th century. | United States. 

Navy. Military Sea Transportation Service. | Merchant marine—United States—History—20th century. | Vietnam War, 1961-

1975—Naval operations, American.

Classification: LCC DS559.8.T7 M47 2017 (print) | LCC DS559.8.T7 (ebook) | DDC 959.704/345—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017007729

∞ The paper used in this publication meets the requirements for permanence as established by the American National Standard for 

Information Sciences “Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials” (ANSI Z39.48-1984).

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Mail Stop: IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001
CONTENTS

Introduction 1

The U.S. Merchant Marine and Early Sealift Operations 5

The Buildup of Forces 11

Organizing the Trans-Pacific Logistics Operation 23

Moving Cargo Onto and Along the Shore 31

Merchant Mariners Under Fire 43

The Drawdown 53

The End of U.S. Military Operations in Southeast Asia 65

Conclusion 73

Sidebars

The Army’s Aircraft Carrier: USNS Corpus Christi Bay 18

The Master of Sealift: Vice Admiral Lawson P. Ramage 25

The Tragic Saga of the SS Badger State 53

The SS Columbia Eagle Mutiny 57

USNS Taluga and Underway Replenishment of the Fleet 62

Acronyms 76

The Author 77

Acknowledgments 77

Suggested Reading 78
vi

USNS Card (T-AKV-40) underway. The ship’s mining in the port of Saigon attested to the danger inherent in logistics operations during the Vietnam War.

Author’s Collection
INTRODUCTION

As the streaks of sunlight emerged 

from the eastern sky over Saigon, the 

port awoke on the morning of 3 May 

1964. Like many others throughout 

the world, the harbor contained a plethora of small 

boats scuttling to and fro as they moved their 

products to market. On board one such vessel 

were Lam Son Nao and Nguyen Phu Hung, men 

of the 65th Special Operations Group, a fighting 

unit of the National Liberation Front (NLF). The 

Communist insurgent organization, whose fighters 

the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies 

referred to pejoratively as the Viet Cong (VC), 

was established in 1960 and was directed by the 

government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

(North Vietnam) in Hanoi. The purpose of the 

NLF and its northern backers was to overthrow 

the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South 

Vietnam). 

The underwater sappers had just affixed explosives to the hull of the aircraft transport USNS Card

(T-AKV-40), a former aircraft carrier and veteran of 

World War II. Card had been awarded a Presidential 

Unit Citation for her involvement in the sinking of 

eight German U-boats during that conflict. Hence, 

the ship served as a symbol of the strength of the 

United States and its military assistance to the 

Republic of Vietnam. 

Meanwhile, Card’s cooks, bakers, and stewards 

prepared the morning meal, the smells from the 

galley mixing with the odor of floating garbage, 

gasoline, and sewage emanating from the waters 

of the port. At approximately 0515 local time, just 

as a South Vietnamese police boat closed on the 

vessel occupied by the pair of Viet Cong sappers, 

an explosion ripped into Card. Two bombs, each 

consisting of 88 pounds of C4 and TNT, detonated 

along the starboard side at the waterline and just aft 

of the quarterdeck. At that moment, Second Mate 

Raymond Arbon, a merchant mariner from New 

Orleans, was walking the quarterdeck. Down in the 

boiler room, Fireman John McDonald stood under a 

vent blower, enjoying what relief he could find from 

the heat of the boiler and the tropical environment. 

The detonation sent a geyser of water over the top 

of the former carrier, knocking Arbon off his feet 

and drenching him. McDonald was hurled upward 

into the blower and then thrown back down on the 

engine room platform as the lights went out. Some 

veterans on board, who had sailed during World 

War II and faced German U-boats, thought the ship 

had been torpedoed. 

Card, the first of 11 U.S. merchant ships sunk 

by enemy action during the long Vietnam War, 

was an aircraft transport operated by the Military 

Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). The ship and 

three others like it delivered combat planes from the 

United States to the Republic of Vietnam in an effort 

to strengthen the country’s military, the Republic of 

Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). President Lyndon 

B. Johnson, advised by Secretary of Defense Robert 

S. McNamara after the latter’s March 1964 visit to 

Vietnam, had approved the provision of $60 million 

in military assistance to the government of Prime 

Minister Nguyen Khanh. Card left the United States 

loaded with Douglas A-1 Skyraider attack planes 

and Bell UH-1B Iroquois “Huey” helicopters for the 

Vietnam Air Force. 

Card was not the first U.S. merchant ship to 

carry military material to Saigon. In February 1951 

during the First Indochina War, USNS Windham 

North Vietnam commemorated the sinking of Card

(T-AKV-40) with this propagandized and inaccurate stamp.

Author’s Collection

1
Bay (T-CVE-92), a U.S. Navy-manned escort carrier 

operated by MSTS, delivered Grumman F8F Bearcat 

fighters to French forces. Some of the ship’s crew 

heard bomb- or grenade-like explosions when 

they went ashore, but they were not deterred from 

enjoying three days of liberty in the Vietnamese city, 

called by some the “Paris of the Orient.” 

A decade later, on 11 December 1961, USNS Core

(T-AKV-41) arrived in Saigon bearing 32 Piasecki 

H-21 Shawnee helicopters and 400 soldiers of the 

U.S. Army’s 8th and 57th Transport Companies. 

Core’s arrival caused quite a stir, particularly with 

Stanley Karnow, a journalist dining on the terrace 

of the Majestic Hotel and seated next to a U.S. Army 

press officer. The two Americans were discussing 

whether or not American involvement in the war 

was increasing. As the aircraft ferry arrived in port, 

the surprised Karnow exclaimed, “Look at that 

carrier!” Endeavoring to downplay the evidence that 

U.S. intervention was indeed on the rise—a Johnson 

administration tactic—the public affairs officer 

replied, “I don’t see nothing.” The Viet Cong, on the 

other hand, recognized the importance of the sighting and attempted to sink Core. The effort failed, 

however, when VC sappers were unable to ignite 

their explosive charges. 

MSTS served the Navy but civilian merchant 

mariners crewed Core and Card and other formerly 

commissioned U.S. vessels. These civilian-manned 

ships operated with fewer crew members than they 

would have during the years of heavy combat that 

would follow so there were no armed men patrolling Card’s deck during her fateful visit to Saigon. 

Moreover, too few South Vietnamese policemen 

Merchant mariners off-load an A-1 Skyraider attack plane from the deck of the aircraft ferry Core (T-AKV-13) at Saigon in mid-1965.

NHHC VN Collection

2
kept watch over the port facilities. As a result Lam 

Son Nao and Nguyen Phu Hung were able to enter 

the sewer system and travel to a discharge drain that 

emptied near Card, allowing the men, unseen, to 

attach their explosives to the ship’s hull. 

The explosion opened the main engine, 

emergency diesel, generator, and gasoline pump 

rooms, and shaft alley to the Saigon River. As Arbon 

recovered from the blast, he noticed the forward 

and aft mooring lines slacken as the carrier listed 

to starboard. When emergency lighting snapped on 

in the engine room, Fireman McDonald discovered 

water flooding the lower levels, extinguishing the 

boiler, and cutting off power to the pumps and forcedraft fans. With the loss of watertight integrity, the 

ship sank to 48 feet—double its normal draft—and 

settled into the mud alongside the dock. 

Borge Langeland, Card’s master, immediately 

alerted Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon, 

the U.S. Navy’s major command in the capital, of 

the ship’s situation. The Navy soon dispatched a 

five-man salvage crew from the Ship Repair Facility 

at Subic Bay in the Philippines to Saigon. MSTS 

headquarters in Washington, DC, also flew out two 

salvage experts, Commander R. E. Wurlitzer and J. 

W. Giberman. Other naval personnel, Vietnamese 

contractors, and the salvage ship Reclaimer (ARS42) converged on the port. The team raised the 

vessel and, 17 days later, Tawakoni (ATF-114) took 

Card under tow and brought her first into Subic Bay 

and later to Yokosuka, Japan, for repairs. The ship 

returned to duty on 11 December 1964 and soon 

afterward transported elements of the 1st Cavalry 

Division to South Vietnam.

By then the United States was already on a direct 

path to war. In August 1964, three months after the 

attack on Card, North Vietnam’s navy attacked the 

destroyer Maddox (DD-731) in the Gulf of Tonkin, 

prompting President Johnson to order retaliatory 

carrier strikes on naval vessels and installations in 

North Vietnam. Of greater significance, Congress 

passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution enabling the 

President to take military measures he deemed fit 

to counter Communist aggression in Indochina. 

Equally focused on war, North Vietnam dispatched 

major ground units against the Republic of Vietnam 

and, in November, Viet Cong forces attacked the 

U.S. airfield at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, destroying 

planes and killing American service members. 

Card’s sinking made the headlines in the United 

States, but it was soon overshadowed by the Rolling 

Thunder bombing campaign launched against North 

Vietnam and the deployment of U.S. combat divisions to South Vietnam. While lacking the drama 

of the combat operations, the oceangoing logistics 

effort mounted by the U.S. Navy and America’s 

merchant marine from 1965 to 1973 was nothing 

short of monumental. The MSTS (renamed the 

Military Sealift Command in 1970) enabled the 

United States to fight and sustain an eight-year 

conflict on the continent of Asia, 7,000 miles from 

American shores. The U.S. Merchant Marine and its 

civilian crewmembers transported 99 percent of the 

ammunition and fuel and 95 percent of the supplies, 

vehicles, and construction materials employed by 

allied forces in the war. With dozens of ships steaming between the United States and South Vietnam 

on any given day of the war, a virtual “steel bridge” 

spanned the vast Pacific Ocean. •

3
4

Vice Admiral Emory S. Land oversaw a massive merchant marine building program that 

was instrumental to America’s victory in World War II.

USNI
THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AND EARLY SEALIFT OPERATIONS

The provision of logistics support 

to U.S. armed forces overseas was 

a common occurrence in modern 

American history. During the 

Philippine-American War, World Wars I and 

II, and the Korean War, the merchant marine 

transported American armies to Asia and Europe 

and kept those forces well-armed, equipped, and 

provisioned. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 

championed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

stipulated that it was “necessary for the national 

defense and development of its foreign and 

domestic commerce that the United States shall 

have a merchant marine.” The legislation further 

provided for a merchant marine “capable of serving 

as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war 

or national emergency.” The merchant marine 

especially proved its worth in World War II during 

which President Roosevelt referred to the organization and its mariners and sailors as the nation’s 

“Fourth Arm of Defense.” Vice Admiral Emory S. 

Land simultaneously oversaw the U.S. Maritime 

Commission, the U.S. Maritime Service, and the 

War Shipping Administration. Those organizations 

spurred a building program that produced 5,777 

merchant ships that then transported 63 percent 

of all the world’s goods. After World War II and 

during the early Cold War, there was much less 

demand for a sizeable merchant fleet. At the same 

time, automation and mechanization enabled the 

fleet to operate fewer but more efficient ships with 

smaller crews and hence lower operating costs. 

Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson 

authorized establishment of the Military Sea 

Transportation Service on 1 October 1949. As 

outlined in its initiating directive, the organization’s 

purpose was “to provide, under one authority, 

control, operation and administration of ocean 

transportation for personnel, material, mail, and 

other cargo.” Through this directive, American 

leaders hoped to end interservice bickering between 

the Navy and Army, the latter of which had long 

operated its own vessels. In 1950 the Army transferred its 115 ships and 17,000 merchant mariners 

and civilian staff members to MSTS. 

During the Korean War MSTS grew to a fleet 

of close to 500 ships (including 214 under charter), 

which transported 4,750,363 troops, 51,769,067 tons 

of cargo, and 21,354,978 long tons of petroleum 

to the combat theater. MSTS also supported the 

movement to Europe of four U.S. Army divisions 

in support of the new North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, established in 1949. During the period 

75 percent of the MSTS operating budget went to 

the commercial maritime industry. 

MSTS ships delivered supplies during the early 

1950s to another locale that figured prominently in 

the next decade—Vietnam. In San Francisco on 25 

June 1950—ironically, the first day of the Korean 

War—SS Steel Rover loaded armored vehicles, 

trucks, jeeps, and ammunition as part of the $2.6 

billion U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 

The material was not intended for the South Korean 

armed forces but for the French forces fighting 

Communist Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh movement in 

Indochina.

Ho Chi Minh’s ally in the fight against France 

was the People’s Republic of China, also hostile to 

the United States. Hence, it was no surprise when 

Chinese guns opened up on Steel Rover when she 

passed along the Chinese coast south of Hong Kong 

on 6 August. One round hit the ship’s starboard 

side but caused only minimal damage. Escorted 

by a Royal Navy ship the following day, Steel Rover

continued her journey and reached Saigon without 

further incident. Many more U.S. vessels, including 

13 ships contracted with the Waterman Steamship 

Company of Mobile, Alabama, supplied the French 

throughout the war. 

Despite U.S. assistance the Viet Minh defeated 

their French opponents, most notably at the battle 

of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. The resulting 5
Geneva Agreement of July 1954 provided 

for French withdrawal from Indochina and 

the temporary partition of Vietnam at the 

17th parallel. The agreement also allowed 

Vietnamese north of the dividing line, an 

area governed by the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam, to settle in the south, which was 

controlled by a non-Communist government. 

The United States aided that effort in 

Operation Passage to Freedom. In August 

U.S. Seventh Fleet combatants and MSTS 

ships, under the command of Rear Admiral 

Lorenzo S. Sabin, began embarking refugees 

at Haiphong in the north and transporting 

them to Saigon in the south. Sabin had served 

as a vice commander and inspector general 

of MSTS and directed amphibious operations 

on Normandy’s Omaha Beach during World 

War II, so he brought a wealth of knowledge 

about naval and commercial shipping to the 

mission. A naval vessel, the attack transport 

Menard (APA-201), took on board the first 

passengers on 16 August. The first MSTS 

ship to do so was SS Beauregard, a chartered 

freighter/passenger ship that embarked 

refugees on 2 September. 

The exodus generally proceeded uneventfully during the next months, but neither 

Haiphong nor Saigon possessed adequate cargo 

facilities or pier space. USNS Pembina (T-AK-200), 

for instance, arrived in Haiphong to load 2,000 

tons of cargo, taking 13 days to do so. As another 

example, Sabin had to enlist merchant seamen, U.S. 

Sailors, and members of the French Foreign Legion 

to serve as stevedores in loading SS Culucundis.

USNS Marine Adder (T-AP-193), one of six 

MSTS troop transports to take part in the operation, 

loaded her first refugees on 13 September. During 

succeeding months the ship made six round trips. 

Her crew delivered 14 babies while at sea and served 

the passengers over 82,000 pounds of rice. The ship 

also gained recognition when she transported the 

100,000th Vietnamese refugee to Saigon. Finally, 

on 18 May 1955 Marine Adder became the last U.S. 

vessel to depart Haiphong in Operation Passage to 

Freedom. In 1957 the government of the Republic of 

Vietnam awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to 

nine nucleus fleet vessels and seven chartered ships, 

including Marine Adder and Beauregard. The oceangoing operation transported 293,002 Vietnamese 

civilians and 14,868 soldiers, 2,978 French military 

personnel, 8,135 vehicles, and 68,757 tons of cargo. 

MSTS streamlined its operations after the First 

Indochina War. Headquartered in the Old Navy 

Building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, 

D.C., Commander MSTS oversaw four regional 

area commands: Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean, 

Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East (based in Yokohama, 

Japan). The latter command was responsible for 

supporting the war effort in Vietnam. MSTS also 

incorporated two former subordinate entities, the 

Naval Transportation Service and the Petroleum 

Indian Ocean Java Sea

South China Sea

Andaman

Sea

Gulf

of

Siam

Gulf

of

Tonkin

Sulu Sea

Cambodia

China

Burma

North

Vietnam

South

Vietnam

Laos

Thailand

Malaya

Taiwan

Philippines

Sumatra

Borneo

North Borneo

Brunei

Sarawak

Java

Celebes

Indonesia

Singapore

Djakarta

Hong Kong

Quemoy

Island

Haiphong

Hainan

Hue

Danang

Paracel

Islands Luzon

Manila

Spratly

Islands

Phnom

Penh

Saigon

Bangkok

Rangoon Mekong River

Red River

Hanoi

Dangerous

Ground

25o

20o

15o

10o

5o

0o

5o

10o

100o 105o 110o 115o 120o

100o 105o 110o 115o 120o 25o

20o

15o

10o

5o

0o

5o

10o

N

CREDIT: NHHC / J. M. Caiella Southeast Asia

NHHC

6
Vietnamese refugees board LST-516 in Haiphong Harbor prior to the ship’s departure for southern Vietnam in the 1954–1955 

Operation Passage to Freedom.

NHHC VN Collection

7
and Tankers Branch. The first organization comprised auxiliaries, amphibious ships, transports, 

attack cargo ships, and oilers manned by naval 

personnel, and provided logistics support to Navy 

bases in the Pacific. By the mid-1960s MSTS had 

decommissioned all but three transports and 

replaced them with similar ship types with civilian 

crews. The Petroleum and Tankers Branch originally 

operated 55 T-2 and 2 T-1 tankers, but by the time of 

the Vietnam War, MSTS reduced the fleet to 21 T-1, 

T-2, and larger T-5 tankers. The Keystone Shipping 

Company, Marine Transport Lines, and Mathiesen 

Tanker Industries managed and crewed the tankers. 

Several factors led to a decline in MSTS’s 

ability to support a major military commitment 

in Southeast Asia during the early 1960s. An 

agreement signed earlier in the Cold War between 

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and 

Secretary of Commerce 

Charles Sinclair Weeks (the 

Wilson-Weeks Agreement) 

stipulated that commercial 

interests would be allocated 

approximately 50 percent 

of the overseas shipping 

business in support of 

the military. Cost-cutting 

measures also halved the size 

of the merchant fleet by late 

1964. MSTS then operated 

201 cargo ships, tankers, and 

troop transports. 

America’s merchant 

marine was in somewhat 

better shape by 1965, 

operating 965 ships with a 

combined carrying capacity 

of 14.7 million deadweight 

tons. In addition the World 

War II building program had 

produced 1,512 vessels (14.4 

million deadweight tons) 

anchored and in reserve at 

eight locations around the 

nation. On the negative side, 

many of these ships built during that war were obsolete by 1965. The commercial fleet possessed some 

unique attributes, such as standardized C-class 

freighters that could handle certain oversized cargo 

on deck and employ their own equipment to off-load 

cargo at undeveloped ports. Before Vietnam, the 

United States also constructed 55 tankers, including the 106,500-ton SS Manhattan that dwarfed 

standard 16,500-ton T-2 tankers. 

Hence, MSTS and the merchant marine had 

both strengths and weaknesses as the United States 

prepared to deploy major combat forces to Southeast 

Asia on the eve of the Vietnam War. •

Left to right, Lieutenant General W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, Rear Admiral Lorenzo S. 

Sabin, and U.S. Ambassador Donald R. Heath on hand to mark the arrival of 100,000 

refugees in southern Vietnam.

NA[National Archives]-80-G-652355

8
MSTS Fleet – 1965 (All ships are USNS unless otherwise indicated)

Miscellaneous Auxiliaries: 

Mission Capistrano T-AG-162

Kingsport T-AG-164

Pvt. Jose F. Valdez T-AG-169

Sgt. Joseph E. Muller T-AG-171

Phoenix T-AG-172

Provo T-AG-173

Cheyenne T-AG-174

Sgt. Curtis F. Shoup T-AG-175

Shearwater T-AG-177

Harris County T-LST-822

Flyer T-AG-178

Range Instrumentation: 

Ranger Tracker T-AGM-1

Range Recoverer T-AGM-2

Longview T-AGM-3

Richfield T-AGM-4

Sunnyvale T-AGM-5

Watertown T-AGM-6

Huntsville T-AGM-7

Wheeling T-AGM-8

General H. H. Arnold T-AGM-9

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg T-AGM-10

Twin Falls T-AGM-11

American Mariner T-AGM-12

Sword Knot T-AGM-13

Rose Knot T-AGM-14

Coastal Sentry T-AGM-15

Coastal Crusader T-AGM-16

Timber Hitch T-AGM-17

Sampan Hitch T-AGM-18

Vanguard T-AGM-19

Redstone T-AGM-20

Oceanographic Research:

Josiah W. Gibbs T-AGOR-1

James M. Gillis T-AGOR-4

Charles H. Davis T-AGOR-5

Sands T-AGOR-6

Lynch T-AGOR-7

Elatnin T-AGOR-8

Mizar T-AGOR-11

Survey: 

Bowditch T-AGS-21

Dutton T-AGS-22

Michaelson T-AGS-23

Cable: 

Albert J. Myer T-ARC-6

Helicopter Repair: 

Corpus Christi Bay T-ARVH-1

Roll-on/Roll-off: 

Comet T-LSV-7 Taurus T-LSV-8

C-4 Cargo: 

Pvt. Leonard F. Brostrom T-AK-255

Marine Fiddler T-AK-267

C-3 Cargo: 

Schuyler Otis Bland T-AK-277

C-2 Cargo:

Wyandot T-AKA-92

VC-2 Cargo: 

Greenville Victory T-AK-237

Pvt. John R. Towle T-AK-240

Pvt. Francis X. McGraw T-AK-241

Sgt. Andrew Miller T-AK-242

Sgt. Archer T. Gammon T-AK-243

Sgt. Morris E. Crain T-AK-244

Lt. George Boyce T-AK-251

Lt. Robert Craig T-AK-252

Sgt. Truman Kimbro T-AK-254

Pvt. Joseph F. Merrell T-AK-275

Sgt. Jack Pendleton T-AK-276

Lt. James E. Robinson T-AK-274

Fleet Ballistic Missile VC-2 Cargo: 

Norwalk T-AK-279 Furman T-AK-280

C-1 Cargo: 

Fentress T-AK-180

Herkimer T-AK-188

Muskingum T-AK-198

Col. William J. O’Brien T-AK-246

Short Splice T-AK-249

Pvt. Frank J. Petrarca T-AK-250

Mirfak T-AK-271

Sgt. Jonah E. Kelley T-APC-116

Reefer: 

Bald Eagle T-AF-50 Bondia T-AF-42

Blue Jacket T-AF-51 Asterion T-AF-63

Laurentia T-AF-44 Perseus T-AF-64

Aircraft Ferries: 

Card T-AKV-40 Core T-AKV-41

Breton T-AKV-42 Croatan T-AKV-43

Light Cargo Ship: 

AKL-31 Redbud T-AKL-398

Dock Cargo Ship: 

Point Barrow T-AKD-1

Landing Ships: 

LST-47 LST-117 LST-176 LST-230

LST-276 LST-277 LST-399 LST-456

LST-488 LST-491 LST-530 LST-546

LST-550 LST-566 LST-572 LST-579

LST-581 LST-587 LST-600 LST-607

LST-613 LST-623 LST-629 LST-630

LST-649 LSM-335

T-5 Tanker: 

Maumee T-AO-149

Shoshone T-AO-151

Yukon T-AO-152

American Explorer T-AO-165

SS Shenandoah

T-2 Tanker: 

Suamico T-AO-49

Tallulah T-AO-50

Cache T-AO-67

Pecos T-AO-65

Millicoma T-AO-73

Saugatuck T-AO-75

Schuylkill T-AO-76

Cosstot T-AO-77

Chepachet T-AO-78

Cowanesque T-AO-79

Mission Buenaventura T-AO-111

Mission San Rafael T-AO-130

Mission Santa Cruz T-AO-133

Mission Santa Ynez T-AO-134

Pioneer Valley T-AO-140

Shawnee Trail T-AO-142

T-1 Tanker: 

Rincon T-AOG-77

Nodaway T-AOG-78

Petaluma T-AOG-79

Piscataqua T-AOG-80

Alatna T-AOG-81

Chattahoochee T-AOG-82

P-2 Transport: 

General John Pope T-AP-110

USS General W. A. Mann T-AP-112

USS General William Mitchell T-AP-114

General W. H. Gordon T-AP-117

General William Weigel T-AP-119

General Daniel I. Sultan T-AP-120

General Hugh J. Gaffey T-AP-121

General Alexander Patch T-AP-122

General Simon B. Buckner T-AP-123

General Edwin D. Patrick T-AP-124

General Nelson M. Walker T-AP-125

General Maurice Rose T-AP-126

General William O. Darby T-AP-127

USS General J. C. Breckinridge T-AP-176

Barrett T-AP-196

Geiger T-AP-197

Upshur T-AP-198

C-4 Transport: 

General R. M. Blatchford T-AP-153

General Leroy Eltinge T-AP-154

9
10

Soldiers of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, cheer their arrival at Cam Ranh in July 1965 on board the troop transport 

General LeRoy Eltinge (T-AP-154).

NHHC VN Collection
THE BUILDUP OF FORCES

I

n the early months of 

1965, President Johnson 

decided, based on the 

advice of Secretary of 

Defense McNamara and other 

key civilian and military advisors, to mount major military 

operations against North 

Vietnam and Communist forces 

in South Vietnam and Laos. 

In March, aircraft based on 

Seventh Fleet carriers in the 

Gulf of Tonkin and Air Force 

planes in South Vietnam and 

Thailand launched the Rolling 

Thunder bombing campaign 

against North Vietnam. This 

would last until the end of 

October 1968, during which time combat aircraft 

flew more than 300,000 sorties against North 

Vietnam and dropped 864,000 tons of bombs and

missiles on the nation. This total surpassed both 

the combined air effort of the Korean War and the 

Pacific campaign of World War II. Also in March 

1965 Seventh Fleet landed a Marine expeditionary 

brigade in northern South Vietnam to protect the 

air base at Danang from any Communist retaliation for the U.S. air strikes. That same month, the 

U.S. Navy deployed ships and patrol planes along 

South Vietnam’s 1,200-mile coast to interdict the 

seaborne infiltration of arms and other munitions 

from North Vietnam. 

In April President Johnson allowed the Marines 

ashore to transition from their defensive mission 

to offensive operations against the Viet Cong in 

the region around Danang. Two months later the 

President approved plans to deploy the equivalent 

of several U.S. Army infantry divisions to sites in 

South Vietnam, and by 1968 U.S. forces ashore 

totaled 549,000. Washington also moved ahead 

with plans to strengthen the military and economic 

infrastructure of South Vietnam and the existing 

counterinsurgency campaign against the Viet Cong. 

These actions would require an oceanic troop movement and logistics effort on the scale of World War II.

Directing the overall Vietnam logistics support 

effort from his new headquarters at 3800 Newark 

Left to right, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam Maxwell D. Taylor, 

Secretary of State Dean C. Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara discuss aspects of the Vietnam War.

The landing of 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, at Danang on 8 

March 1965 marked a significant milestone in the escalation 

of the Vietnam War.

NHHC VN Collection NHHC VN Collection

11
Street in Washington, D.C., was Vice Admiral Glynn 

“Donc” Donaho, Commander MSTS since 30 June 

1964. The 1927 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy 

served on board fleet submarines in the Pacific 

during World War II. He earned four Navy Cross 

Medals and a Silver Star while commanding Flying 

Fish (SS-229), Picuda (SS-382), and a submarine 

division. 

Managing the voyages to and from Vietnam in 

1965 was his subordinate Commander MSTS Far 

East, Captain James L. Hunnicutt. Headquartered in 

Yokohama, Japan, Hunnicutt directed the staff work 

of 23 officers, 45 enlisted sailors, 105 civil servants, 

and 223 Japanese civilians. Subordinate offices operated at Sasebo and Okinawa, Japan; Taipei, Taiwan; 

and Inchon and Pusan, South Korea. He later set 

up offices in Guam, Subic Bay, and Thailand. To 

carry out his functions, Hunnicutt directed a fleet 

of three C-1 freighters, a heavy-lift C-4 cargo ship, 

two coastal cargo ships, five T-1 tankers, and 17 tank 

landing ships (LSTs).

One of the captain’s first priorities was to 

establish an MSTS presence in Vietnam, so in early 

1965 he dispatched Lieutenant Commander G. 

J. Kaiser (relieved in November 1965 by Captain 

Donald J. Jacques) and another officer to Saigon. The 

pair initially operated from a small room at Naval 

Support Activity Saigon. Eventually, the MSTS office 

in Saigon, with more than 100 staff members, took 

over an entire floor of a former French shipping firm 

on Trinh Minh Street. The office also dispatched 

several five- to seven-man teams to ports around 

the country to monitor the arrival, off-loading, and 

departure of MSTS ships. 

The first major combat formation transported to 

Vietnam after the Marine landing at Danang was the 

Army’s Okinawa-based 173rd Airborne Brigade. Air 

Force transports moved most of the troops by air to 

the base at Bien Hoa, northeast of Saigon. The Navy 

was called on to bring in the unit’s artillery, antitank 

guns, engineering equipment, and headquarters 

staff. USNS General William A. Mann (T-AP-112), 

one of three Navy-manned troopships under MSTS 

operational control, and three MSTS tank landing 

ships arrived at Vung Tau, southeast of Saigon, after 

a five-day voyage from Okinawa. Soon thereafter, 

they delivered their cargo to the South Vietnamese 

capital.

The transportation of American forces by sea 

had been standard throughout U.S. history, so it was 

not unusual that in 1965 the United States deployed 

more than half of its expeditionary force to Vietnam 

on troop transports. MSTS then operated 16 

Vice Admiral Glynn R. Donaho, Commander MSTS, oversaw 

the massive trans-Pacific movement of U.S. and allied troops 

and supplies to Vietnam from 1965 to 1967.

Pvt. Frank J. Petrarca (T-AK-250), a C1 freighter of the 

MSTS Far East Fleet, tied up at Saigon, March 1969. 

USNI

USNI

12
troop ships, all of which were run solely by civilian 

mariners. One of the ships, USNS General Nelson M. 

Walker (T-AP-125), was a veteran of Magic Carpet, 

the operation to return troops to the United States 

after World War II and the Korean War. During the 

latter conflict, she sailed more than 35,000 miles 

in three months and loaded over 18,000 passengers 

at 15 different ports. A typical voyage from San 

Francisco to Vietnam in 1965 for General Nelson M. 

Walker took 18 to 21 days. A civilian crew of 233 and 

a military contingent of 18 men operated the 608-

foot ship, which could transport 2,746 troops and 

454 cabin passengers at a speed of 19 knots. 

The passage to Vietnam posed a challenge. The 

supply line stretched 7,000 miles across the Pacific 

Ocean from the West Coast of the United States. A 

ship sailing from San Francisco to Saigon proceeded 

not westward but northwestward on the Great Circle 

The French-built headquarters building of MSTS Vietnam on the Saigon waterfront. 

USNI

13
Route due to the curvature of the earth. Each vessel 

first sailed along the Aleutian Chain into the North 

Pacific—one of the most dangerous bodies of water 

during the winter months—then southwest, paralleling Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula and the coast 

of Japan. Merchantmen then had to contend with 

typhoons, common during the summer months, 

along the coasts of China and the Philippines. The 

final leg of the journey brought the ships into the 

South China Sea, notorious for its shoals and other 

“dangerous grounds.” For those ships traveling to 

Saigon, a 45-mile segment remained, including 

the Long Tau River that passed through the Rung 

Sat Swamp (the Vietnamese called it the “Forest of 

Assassins”) teeming with Viet Cong guerrillas. 

The trans-Pacific experience was unique for 

those soldiers, Sailors, airmen, and Marines who 

made the voyage to Vietnam on a troopship. One 

soldier, Jerry Baker, described conditions on board: 

“It was full of people, always people, wherever you 

went.” As the ship reached tropical waters, the 

heat below often became unbearable, compelling 

many passengers to sleep on the weather deck or in 

lifeboats. For some, this was their first time on the 

ocean and seasickness typically hit them very early 

in the voyage, taxing the ship’s medical departments. 

The prolonged transit gave commanders an 

opportunity to orient the men to their units and 

prepare them for the mission ahead. The long voyage 

also afforded the men an occasion to reflect on how 

they would deal with combat in an alien land. Baker 

often sought solitude on General Nelson M. Walker’s 

stern. He remembered that “at night there was 

nothing nearer than the dark with a zillion stars.” He 

Army troops of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) bound for Vietnam board an MSTS troopship in Charleston, South 

Carolina, November 1965.

NH 103689 

14
added, “You’d hear a ‘swrrrr’ sound going through 

the water [from the ship’s two propellers]. [The 

stern] was one of those places you could get away 

to and be by yourself. This was the perfect spot.” 

Robert Simpson used the time afloat to scribble 

lyrics on the bottom of the bunk over his head. To 

the tune of a popular song of the era, “Universal 

Soldier,” he wrote: 

You’re the one who must decide who’s to live and 

who’s to die. 

You’re the one who gives his body as a weapon of 

the war–

And without you all this killing can’t go on.

The voyages enabled the soldiers and Marines 

to ease their transition from peace to war. For those 

men who survived death or injury during their tours 

of 12 or 13 months in country, which actually began 

when they boarded the initial transport to Vietnam, 

the trip home afforded them time to prepare for the 

return to civilian life. On both legs of the journey, 

the men could take advantage of movies, recreational 

activities, and long hours of conversation with 

comrades. 

Another veteran of the trans-Pacific operation 

was USNS General LeRoy Eltinge (T-AP-154), a 

freighter converted into a troopship during World 

War II and then put in reserve. Hastily recalled 

to service, on 13 May 1965 she set sail from San 

Francisco to Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam, 

loaded with the Army’s 35th Engineer Group, 

which would construct port facilities. The aged 

troopship, however, broke down 450 miles west 

of Midway Atoll. USNS Furman (T-AK-280) soon 

rendezvoused with General LeRoy Eltinge and 

towed the immobilized ship to the atoll for repair 

work. MSTS dispatched USNS Barrett (T-AP-196) 

to the site where she embarked the Army engineers 

and completed the journey to Vietnam, reaching 

the destination nine days later than General LeRoy 

Eltinge’s scheduled arrival. During the same period, 

General W. H. Gordon (T-AP-117) and three freighters loaded 2nd Brigade, the 1st Infantry Division’s 

equipment and transported it and the troops to Qui 

Nhon. Once again seaworthy, in July General LeRoy 

Eltinge embarked the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 

Division, in California. Although configured to 

carry a maximum of 3,650 troops, the 3,600 soldiers 

on board complained about the crowded conditions. 

The soldiers were clearly not enamored with their 

troopship. One of the paratroopers described the 

vessel as “five hundred and ten feet of rusting gray 

steel.” Nonetheless, General LeRoy Eltinge completed her mission and delivered the combat unit to 

Vietnam. She and her sister ship, USNS General R. 

M. Blatchford (T-AP-153), remained in service until 

January 1967. 

President Johnson’s announcement on 28 July 

1965 that he was ordering the 1st Cavalry Division 

(Airmobile) to Vietnam occurred at the same 

time that he decided to significantly reinforce the 

ground forces already there. During the next several 

months, the ten MSTS troopships in the Pacific 

transported the 1st Infantry Division, the Republic 

of Korea (ROK) Capital “Tiger” Infantry Division, 

and the ROK Marine Infantry “Blue Dragon” Brigade 

to Vietnam. By the end of 1965, General William 

C. Westmoreland, Commander U.S. Military 

Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) 

had three Army infantry divisions and a brigade, 

the 3rd Marine Division, one regiment of the 1st 

Marine Division (transported by Seventh Fleet 

amphibious ships), and one Korean division and a 

brigade on hand. MSTS delivered 82,800 troops to 

Vietnam in 1965 and the Air Force airlifted another 

85,100, nearly an even split between sea and air 

transportation. 

Vice Admiral Donaho marshaled his resources 

to accomplish the deployment of the 1st Cavalry 

Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam. The operation 

demonstrated MSTS’s ability to accommodate 

not only the troops but also the equipment for an 

entire combat division in one operation. Not since 

the demise of Operation Gyroscope—the rotation 

of Army divisions to Europe in 1958—had MSTS 

attempted to move such a large force overseas. To 

handle the transportation of the airmobile division, 

comprising 15,000 soldiers, 452 Bell UH-1 “Huey” 

helicopters, and 98,000 tons of equipment, Admiral 15
Donaho deployed six Atlantic fleet troop transports 

to Savannah, Georgia, and Charleston, South 

Carolina. To maintain the flow of troops to Europe, 

MSTS chartered berths on board the superliner 

SS United States and other commercial ships and 

airliners. On 16 August 1965 USNS General Simon 

B. Buckner (T-AP-123) departed Charleston with 

the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division embarked. 

USNS General William O. Darby (T-AP-127), USNS 

General Maurice Rose (T-AP-126), USNS General 

Alexander M. Patch (T-AP-122), USNS Upshur

(T-AP-198), and USNS Geiger (T-AP-197) soon 

followed. 

General Alexander M. Patch and Upshur were 

the first ships to arrive at Qui Nhon with elements of 

the division’s headquarters staff. As other troopships 

arrived at the port, they anchored in the roadstead 

since no oceangoing berths existed there at the 

time. Landing craft completed the movement of 

the troops ashore. Afterward, ten freighters arrived 

carrying trucks and equipment. 

Among the MSTS fleet at Qui Nhon were three 

ships especially suited to the movement of the 

Army’s wheeled vehicles. Developed during the 

late 1950s, roll-on/roll-off ships enabled vehicles 

to be driven on and off the vessels quickly via side 

and stern ramps. USNS Comet (T-LSV-7), USNS 

Taurus (T-LSV-8), and SS Transglobe participated in 

the 1st Cavalry Division move. Subsequently, they 

established a service among Okinawa, Cam Ranh, 

and Saigon, later adding Qui Nhon, Danang, and 

Bangkok, Thailand, to their routes. 

Another trio of ships loaded the division’s 

helicopters at Mobile, Alabama, and Jacksonville, 

Hundreds of officials and other citizens take part in a June 1967 ceremony in the port of Pusan to mark the departure of South 

Korean combat troops for Vietnam on board the transport General W. H. Gordon (T-AP-117). 

NH 104846

16
Florida. USNS Croatan (T-AKV-41), the refurbished Card, and the reactivated USNS Kula Gulf

(T-AKV-8), carrying a total of 271 aircraft, departed 

the embarkation ports in August 1965 bound for 

Vietnam. Overcrowding on board these ships led 

to disputes among the division commander, Major 

General Harry W. O. Kinnard and MSTS officers, 

but they worked out their problems. Rumors that 

the division would have to launch a combat landing 

once it reached Vietnam caused further anxiety.

The Navy supplemented these ships, at Admiral 

Donaho’s request, with the amphibious assault 

ship Boxer (LPH-4), originally an Essex-class 

aircraft carrier and combat veteran of World War 

II. The ship was used to transport Air Force North 

American P-51 Mustangs to Japan during the 

Korean War, so the new mission was not unusual. In 

Jacksonville, she embarked 239 aircraft, including 

57 Boeing CH-47 Chinooks, 4 Sikorsky CH-54 

Tarhe “Flying Cranes,” and 6 Cessna OV-1 Birddogs. 

The ship then steamed to Qui Nhon by way of the 

Mediterranean and Suez Canal. Once there, crew 

Vice Admiral Glynn R. Donaho, along with his subordinate officers, bounds up the gangway during one of his frequent visits to 

ships operated by MSTS.

CAMBODIA

THAILAND

SOUTH

VIETNAM

SOUTH CHINA SEA GULF of

SIAM

CENTRAL

HIGHLANDS

R

Dung Quat Bay

Cape Kega

Vung Ro

Ben Goi Bay

Cam Ranh

Bay

Son Island

Phu

Quoc

Island

Cape Ca Mau

Saigon

Cua Viet

Quang Tri

Hue

Dong

Ha

Danang Hoi An

Chu Lai

Quang Ngai

Kontum

Pleiku

Qui Nhon

Tuy Hoa

Nha Trang

Dalat

Phan Thiet

Vung Tau

Cat Lo

Binh Gia

Bien Hoa

Phuoc Vinh Tay Ninh

Cao

Lanh

My Tho

U Minh

Can Tho

Duong

Dong

An Thoi

Phnom Penh

Mekong River

Plain of Reeds

LAOS

DMZ

MEKONG

DELTA

South Vietnam

NHHC

Author’s Collection

17
The Army’s Aircraft Carrier: USNS Corpus Christi Bay

TO PROVIDE REPAIR SUPPORT for the large 

helicopter complement of the Army’s 1st Cavalry 

Division (Airmobile) and other units in Vietnam, in 

August 1964 the Maritime Administration recalled the 

seaplane tender Albemarle (AV-5) from the National 

Defense Reserve Fleet at James River, Virginia. The 

ship was then placed in service as USNS Corpus 

Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1) in honor of the Army aviation 

base in south Texas. Captain Harold Anderson 

and his crew of 130 merchant mariners and 370 

Army technicians placed the ship in service on 27 

March 1965.

The naval shipyard at Charleston, South 

Carolina, transformed the ship into a floating army 

maintenance facility. The reconfigured vessel boasted 

42,000 square feet of workshops, 10,000 square 

feet of storage area, two helicopter landing pads, and 

two 20-ton cranes capable of hoisting aircraft. The 

ship, with Army Lieutenant Colonel Harry O. Davis’ 

1st Transportation Battalion Air Maintenance Depot 

(Seaborne) embarked, sailed for Vietnam on 11 

January 1966 under MSTS control. The ship carried 

out her maintenance and repair duties at Cam Ranh 

Bay, Vung Tau, and elsewhere along the coast of 

South Vietnam throughout the war. 

Following her Vietnam deployment, which ended 

on 19 December 1972, Corpus Christi Bay completed 

one more mission. In Operation Hula Hoop, the ship, 

along with USNS Wheeling (T-AGM-8), monitored 

French nuclear tests in the Tuamoto Archipelago 

The aircraft repair ship USNS Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1) in Charleston, South Carolina, prior to her departure for 

service in Vietnam.

NH 99782 

18
members freed the aircraft from their “Spraylot” 

(shrink-wrapped) coverings and readied them for 

flight. Landing craft then ferried aircrews out to 

the ship who flew the aircraft to the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s base at An Khe in central South Vietnam. 

The next period of the Vietnam buildup, which 

lasted from April 1966 to January 1967, consisted of 

the MSTS deployment of the 4th Infantry Division, 

9th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 196th 

Light Infantry Brigade, and the ROK 9th “White 

Horse” Infantry Division. Seventh Fleet deployed the 

remaining two regiments of the 1st Marine Division. 

In Phase II, MSTS transported 91,000 troops in 

organized units to Vietnam and airlift-delivered 

371,000 men as individual replacements—one out of 

every five troops traveled by sea. 

The 3,124-man 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 

initially intended for a crisis in the Dominican 

Republic, boarded General William O. Darby and 

USNS General Alexander M. Patch (T-AP-122), 

under John LeCato, in Boston, Massachusetts, on 15 

July 1966. The ships then set sail for Vietnam. After 

traversing the Panama Canal and stopping briefly 

at Long Beach, California, the ships delivered their 

passengers to Vung Tau on 11 August. The 12,358-

mile journey then marked the longest troop transit 

in MSTS history. 

In mid-1966 General Westmoreland requested 

three Victory-class ships based in Subic Bay, 

Philippines—USNS Phoenix (T-AG-172), USNS 

Provo (T-AG-173), and USNS Cheyenne (T-AG174)—to deploy the 11th Armored Cavalry 

“Blackhorse” Regiment, to defend road convoys. 

The ships had been loaded with combat equipment 

years before as a readiness measure championed 

by Secretary of Defense McNamara. He wanted 

cargo and fuel ships forward deployed near trouble 

spots. The Vietnam War preempted plans to deploy 

nineteen floating forward depot (FFD) ships. The 

overwhelming need for resources in Vietnam ended 

the experiment. The concept of Army afloat prepositioning would benefit from this experiment in the 

future, however, when the Army revived the concept 

in 1994—ships deployed at Diego Garcia loaded 

out the equipment of the 11th Armored Cavalry 

A UH-1B Iroquois “Huey” helicopter lifts off the aircraft 

repair ship Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1), then operating 

at Danang. 

Captain Anderson (left), one of six master mariners to 

command Corpus Christi Bay (T-ARVH-1) during her 

seven-year deployment to Vietnam, hosts a visit to his 

ship by Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr., Commander 

II Field Force, Vietnam.

of the South Pacific. Plans to maintain the ship in a 

reserve status at her namesake port proved impossible due to budgetary constraints following the war. 

Corpus Christi Bay was stricken from the Naval Vessel 

Register in 1974 and scrapped the following year. The 

afloat aviation support concept lived on, however. 

During the 1980s the Maritime Administration converted SS Wright (T-AVB-3) and SS Curtiss (T-AVB-4) to 

provide repair support for U.S. Marine aviation units. •

Author’s Collection USNI

19
Regiment, then being demobilized in Germany. 

With the completion of Phases I and II, MSTS 

placed four P-2 transports in reduced operation at 

Caven Point, New York, and three P-2 and two C-4 

transports at Hunter’s Point, California. A skeleton 

crew of 50 merchant mariners at each site kept 

the ships ready for activation in 90 to 120 days for 

potential use in another sealift operation. 

During Phase III, which ended in June 1968, 

seven MSTS transports deployed additional units to 

Vietnam, including the Royal Thai Army Volunteer 

“Queen’s Cobra” Regiment, two U.S. Army divisions, 

and two U.S. Marine Corps regiments. With this 

mission completed, by 1970 MSTS deactivated the 

ships at Cavin and Hunter’s Points. During the last 

years of the war, only Barrett and Upshur remained 

in the troop transport business; the pair deployed 

elements of the Thai “Black Panther” Division to 

Saigon and rotated Korean troops between Vietnam 

and South Korea. After the war, these vessels and 

sister ship Geiger were employed in the training of 

thousands of merchant mariners at the New York, 

Maine, and Massachusetts maritime academies. •

Hoping to stem the Communist tide in South Vietnam during 

1965, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander U.S. 

Military Assistance Command Vietnam, urged MSTS to rush 

the deployment of combat troops to the war zone.

A T-1 tanker pumps fuel ashore to a tank farm at Vung Tau, a port on the southern end of the dangerous route to Saigon.

Author’s Collection USNI

20
General Simon B. Buckner (T-AP-123), General William O. Darby (T-AP-127), General Alexander M. Patch (T-AP-122), and 

General Maurice Rose (T-AP-126) of the MSTS Ready Reserve Fleet tied up at the Cavin Point, New York, Army Depot in 

early 1967.

USNS Sea Lift (T-LSV-9) underway in the East China Sea in 1968. Renamed USNS Meteor (T-AKR-9) in 1975, she was one of 

a planned class of six vessels, capable of transporting an entire armored division.

NH 104181 National Archives K-54226

21
22

SS Brinton Lykes enters the port of Seattle. Lykes Lines and other shipping firms were critical to the success of the war’s 

seaborne logistics effort.

USNI
ORGANIZING THE TRANS-PACIFIC LOGISTICS OPERATION

The Wilson-Weeks Agreement dating 

from the 1950s limited the size of the 

MSTS nucleus fleet in peacetime but 

enabled the Navy to obtain extra ships 

in times of conflict. From 1965 to 1968 the MSTS 

nucleus fleet grew modestly. The number of ships 

expanded from 68 to 91, including two aircraft 

transports, three troop transports, and 25 LSTs. 

To handle the Vietnam buildup, however, 

the government looked primarily to the civilian 

marketplace. One of the first actions performed was 

to call upon the established U.S. shipping companies 

to honor service agreements that allowed the Navy 

to contract for cargo or ships. Many of the Pacificbased shipping firms initially added Saigon as one of 

their ports of call. As cargo backed up at Saigon—

sometimes idling ships for weeks and impacting 

service to other ports in the region—the firms not 

only charged the U.S. government hefty late fees but 

balked at taking on new military cargo. 

In December 1966 the Navy solicited contract 

bids whose purpose was to stimulate competition 

in the American shipping industry. It worked. 

American Export-Isbrandtsen, American Mail, 

American President Lines, Isthmian, Lykes Brothers, 

Pacific Far East, States Marine Lines, States 

Steamship, United States Lines, and Waterman 

Steamship signed contracts with the naval service. 

These agreements specified that the contracting firm 

had to provide space in their ships for military cargo 

and include Saigon in their scheduled stops. 

MSTS also directly chartered vessels from two 

firms that figured prominently in the Vietnam 

buildup—Lykes Line and Seatrain. Fidel Castro’s 

Cuban revolution and the resulting U.S. embargo 

in the early 1960s severely reduced the shipping 

business in the Caribbean that Lykes Line had dominated. At the same time ships that the company had 

ordered constructed in more profitable times began 

to roll off the building ways. Beginning in 1960 

The MSTS Contracting Office. Civilians played a major role in the logistics support of the Vietnam War.

Author’s Collection

23
26 James Lykes-class C3 freighters and 12 Louise 

Lykes-class C4 cargo ships entered service. The firm 

then had an excess number of modern freighters 

with little business to conduct in the region. Seizing 

the opportunity, Lykes Line signed contracts with 

the Navy that assigned a sizeable number of the 

company’s ships to MSTS and Vietnam service. The 

sight of Lykes Line freighters tied up at the docks in 

Southeast Asia became common during the war. 

Another firm similarly affected was Seatrain, 

known for pioneering the field of ocean transportation of fully loaded railroad boxcars. The military 

prized these ships for their ability to haul large 

pieces of equipment and oversized cargo. During 

World War II Kitty Hawk (AKV-1), formerly SS 

Seatrain New York, delivered Navy and Marine 

Corps aircraft to Midway Island just prior to the 

climactic 1942 battle. SS Seatrain Texas, famous 

for her delivery of Sherman tanks to the British 

8th Army on the eve of the Battle of El Alamein in 

World War II, frequently docked at Saigon during 

the Vietnam conflict. MSTS employed a dozen 

Seatrain vessels during the 1965–1968 buildup. 

Despite a labor strike for improved working conditions and pay that idled 100 ships at Atlantic and 

Gulf ports, U.S. shippers and labor unions rallied to 

the cause when MSTS called on them. The shippers 

and labor unions were the first to handle the initial 

wave of combat units deploying to Vietnam, making 

available 47 ships for three to six months of service. 

A sizeable increase in the number of ships 

available for Vietnam service occurred in 1965 when 

Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor mobilized 

25 ships of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, many 

of which had been anchored at eight sites around the 

country since World War II. Because of the Vietnam 

emergency, the first ships went to sea without 

resolving numerous mechanical problems; some of 

them immediately broke down. Better preparation of 

ships for sea duty, most of them VC-2 Victory-class 

ships, later reduced underway problems. During 

the buildup from 1965 to 1968, the Maritime 

Administration activated 172 ships from the reserve 

fleet at a cost of $549,000 per ship, in the process 

scrapping 28 ships that failed to measure up to 

operational requirements. The administration also 

negotiated agreements with 40 shipping companies 

to manage the activated vessels. 

Finally, the government contracted for the 

services of 30 foreign ships (10 percent of the total 

chartered on average, each year). The use of nonAmerican ships and crews, however, sometimes 

SS Seatrain Georgia, Upshur (T-AP-198), SS Seatrain Maryland, and SS Seatrain Florida share pier space at Danang in September 1968. 

USNI

24
NO MSTS COMMANDER WAS MORE RESPONSIBLE

for the success of the trans-Pacific logistics operation of the Vietnam War than Vice Admiral Lawson P. 

Ramage, USN. 

A 1931 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, 

Ramage earned national fame during World War II as 

one of America’s most fearless and successful submarine commanders. As the commanding officer of Parche

(SS-384), on 31 July 1944 he led his submarine into 

battle against a heavily defended Japanese convoy and 

sank four merchant ships. His extraordinary courage 

and professional leadership under fire earned Ramage 

the nation’s highest award, the Medal of Honor. Similar 

feats against other Japanese merchantmen and warships resulted in the award of a Navy Cross and a Gold 

Star in lieu of a second Navy Cross. 

During the postwar period, Ramage ascended the 

Navy’s hierarchy as he commanded submarine forces 

and served in key billets in the Pentagon. In recognition 

of his superior leadership and organizational skills, in 

July 1964 Chief of Naval Operations David L. McDonald 

appointed him Commander Third Fleet and shortly 

afterward Deputy Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. 

Understanding the need for an exceptional leader 

to handle the challenging Vietnam support effort, in 

March 1967 the Navy called on Ramage to command 

MSTS. Ironically, the storied warrior, who had sunk 

many merchant ships in World War II, directed the 

operations of the U.S. merchant marine in the Vietnam 

War. He readily took on the responsibility, since he 

later stated that even before he joined the Navy, he 

“had [his] eyes set on the merchant marine.” 

From the start, Ramage focused not only on 

maintaining the flow of vital supplies to the fighting 

forces in Vietnam but also improving the function 

and cost-effectiveness of the operation. He worked 

especially hard to strengthen relations between the 

Navy on the one side and the commercial shipping 

industry, merchant seaman’s unions, and foreign-flag 

carriers on the other. Recognizing that “we couldn’t get 

enough U.S. tankers,” the admiral chartered foreignflag ships that, at one point, constituted almost half of 

the vessels in the petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) 

pipeline. He championed the contract with Sea-Land 

Services because of its revolutionary employment 

of container ships and shipping containers to deliver 

supplies to the forces ashore. He was especially proud 

The Master of Sealift: Vice Admiral Lawson P. Ramage

Vice Admiral Lawson P. Ramage, April 1967. The MSTS 

commander ensured that the 500,000 American troops 

fighting in South Vietnam were amply supplied with 

ammunition, fuel, weapons, and other vital resources.

that containers with “refrigerated cargo . . . would 

come off the ship [and be transported by truck to 

the troops so that] they had frozen or chilled produce 

right there at their doorstep.” He believed that “this 

greatly increased the quality of the food they were 

getting.” He was equally pleased with the efficiency of 

Alaska Barge and Transport’s movement of supplies 

along Vietnam’s coast and into the rivers as well 

as the bravery of the company’s civilian mariners. 

Ramage improved the efficiency of the 500-plus 

logistics fleet by inactivating scores of older ships 

and promoting the development of more capable 

cargo ships and tankers. 

The admiral later observed that his time at the 

helm of MSTS was “the greatest experience of my 

life.” The Navy was equally pleased with the admiral’s 

performance, awarding him a Gold Star in lieu of a 

second Distinguished Service Medal when he stepped 

down as commander of MSTS and retired from 

the Navy on 1 April 1970. The Arleigh Burke-class 

destroyer USS Ramage (DDG-61) commemorates the 

sixth commander of MSTS. •

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25
caused problems. For instance, the Mexican government prohibited employment of SS El Mexicano in 

the Vietnam War zone. The crew transferred the 

military cargo to a Greek ship but their government 

also refused to allow its vessel to enter Vietnam. 

Finally, after much delay, an American ship completed the delivery. 

Even as MSTS gathered resources for the 

Herculean logistics effort, ships already in service 

rushed critical war materials to the operational 

theater. Initially, too many ships crowded into 

Vietnam’s few ports, severely complicating port 

operations. To cope with the situation, MSTS 

Far East established interim anchorages in the 

Philippines, Okinawa, and Guam. The service office 

in Subic Bay synchronized the movement of ships 

from the reserve sites with MSTS Office Vietnam. 

It also directed some ships to transfer their cargo to 

lighters for delivery to smaller outlying ports. 

The Navy established a “special express” program 

to expedite the movement of high-priority Air Force 

munitions to Vietnam. As directed by the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS), in April 1965 MSTS chartered SS 

Audrey J. Luckenbach, the first of the program’s dedicated ships. By June 1966 19 ships served the “special 

express” mission. Convinced of the program’s value, 

the Navy’s Chief of Material then persuaded MSTS 

to set aside four ships as floating forward depots to 

support Seventh Fleet’s ammunition requirements. 

The service ended the express program in early 1967, 

once Vietnamese port services were able to expedite 

the flow of ammunition to the combat forces.

General Westmoreland’s command planned 

for major depots in Saigon and Cam Ranh that 

would have on hand supplies that could sustain 

combat operations for 45 days. COMUSMACV also 

wanted the support commands at Vung Tau, Can 

Tho, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Danang to have 15 

days’ worth of supplies on hand. At first, the Army 

Materiel Command (AMC) employed a “push” 

system for ships fully loaded with supplies that the 

AMC thought the combat units wanted. Frequently, 

however, laden ships arrived lacking material the 

combat troops desperately needed. Later, AMC 

adopted a “pull system” in which the depots in 

Vietnam communicated the needs of the combat 

units before the Army loaded the cargo onto MSTS 

ships in the United States. 

POL were other vital commodities transported 

by MSTS ships throughout the war. Anticipating 

the need for fuel to power Air Force and Marine aircraft, even before the buildup in Vietnam, Secretary 

of Defense McNamara deployed a pair of tankers for 

storage at Subic Bay. Waiting for the call to action in 

April 1965 were USNS Petaluma (T-AOG-79) and 

the T-2 tanker USNS Cossatot (T-AO-77). Petaluma

was a 325-foot tanker powered by four diesel-electric 

engines, crewed by merchant mariners, and carrying 

4,000 tons of aviation fuel. 

The ship’s third officer, Charles Hoffman, read an 

article in Stars and Stripes about Marines preparing 

to land at Chu Lai in northern South Vietnam. 

Ironically, the next day Hoffman learned of orders 

directing his ship to Chu Lai. At a top speed of 

Cargo handlers off-load C-rations transported to Danang by 

SS Hibueras in December 1966.

Stevedores help off-load bombs from an MSTS ammunition 

ship.

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26
A Lykes Lines ship chartered by MSTS off-loads oil drums at Saigon the old-fashioned way. Tankers employing hose lines that 

stretched from ship to shore proved a much more effective method for delivering fuel. 

USNI

27
10 knots, it took the ship 75 hours to reach what 

Petaluma’s officers had identified as Chu Lai. Only 

the following day did they discover that their actual 

destination was 60 miles to the north. Unfamiliarity 

with the country’s geography caused similar problems in the early war years.

A tank farm for the storage of POL destined for 

Saigon existed just south of the capital at Nha Be. 

Prior to 1965, the commercial firms Caltex, Esso, 

and Shell maintained one million gallons of fuel 

there. Once hostilities against North Vietnam had 

begun, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined 

that close to two million gallons—or a 30-day 

supply—needed to be stored there for the use of U.S. 

armed forces in the Saigon region. 

To meet that challenge and keep fuel flowing 

to U.S. forces throughout the country, MSTS 

reinforced the tanker fleet; USNS Saugatuck (T-AO75) and USNS Chattahoochee (T-AOG-82) joined 

Cossatot and Petaluma on the runs to Nha Be, Cam 

Ranh, Danang, and Qui Nhon. Smaller T-1 tankers 

anchored off the country’s smaller ports to deliver 

their cargo ashore via lighters or floating hoses. By 

1968 Danang and Cam Ranh could accommodate 

large tankers, including T-5s. At the height of the 

war, a tanker loaded with POL supplies, two-thirds 

of which came from the Middle East, arrived off 

Vietnam every ten days. The Six-Day War of June 

1967, which resulted in the closure of the Suez Canal 

and an oil embargo, put a strain on the logistics 

effort, but only temporarily disrupted the flow of 

POL. MSTS sought out alternative oil supplies in 

the Caribbean and the United States and chartered 

more foreign-flag tankers to carry the cargos to the 

Western Pacific. 

In addition to ammunition and fuel, MSTS 

assured the provision of ample perishable and 

nonperishable food to General Westmoreland’s 

troops. In the early years four refrigerator ships 

serviced Vietnam: USNS Perseus (T-AF-64), USNS 

Asterion (T-AF-63), SS Contest, and SS Flying 

Dragon. To accommodate the growing number 

of troops streaming into the country, the service 

deployed a pair of refrigerator ships off Danang. The 

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 

wanted a 15-day supply of food on hand, therefore, 

MSTS contracted the United Fruit Company’s entire 

fleet of “banana boats,” mainstays of the Caribbean 

trade, to provide fresh food to the troops during 

the buildup. Later in the war, refrigerated container 

ships replaced many of United Fruit’s ships. 

In a speech at the Naval War College in 1969, 

Vice Admiral Ramage, the MSTS commander, 

observed that one of his major challenges was 

A T-1 tanker and SS Ontario pump fuel to a tank farm ashore via a fuel pier.

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28
finding crews for the merchant ships. The average 

age of a merchant mariner at that time was 50, not 

typical of the average young Sailor, airman, Marine, 

or soldier serving in country. Each ship called up 

from the reserve fleet needed a crew of 40 officers 

and men. To cope with the problem, the U.S. 

Merchant Marine Academy at King’s Point, New 

York, and the state maritime academies shortened 

the graduation times for future deck and engineering officers. MSTS also installed more automated 

equipment in its ships to lessen the need for sizeable 

crews. Ramage also bemoaned the constant push 

and pull between MSTS and the commercial sector 

for ships. Unlike World War II, when the nation 

employed all of its resources for survival, during the 

“limited conflict” in Vietnam, the rule was business 

as usual with many shipping firms searching for 

profits. Finally, he observed that too many freighters 

and tankers built in World War II were approaching 

obsolescence and taxing the efficiency of the logistics effort. These deficiencies, however, important as 

they were, did not appreciably hamper the oceangoing logistics effort. •

Perseus (T-AF-64) steams from San Francisco with a cargo of 

refrigerated goods in August 1967.

Seventy-seven-year-old Junior Licensed Engineer Anthony 

F. Rieber stands by to operate the engine order telegraph on 

board General Maurice Rose (T-AP-126) in 1966. He and 

other veteran merchant mariners answered the call by MSTS 

for experienced crews.

USN 1126555 NHHC

NH103229 

29
30

Ships tied up at Cam Ranh Bay’s North Pier (left) and Delong Pier, January 1966.

USNI
MOVING CARGO ONTO AND ALONG THE SHORE

The U.S. logistics support establishment 

had to not only transport military 

material to Vietnam but also move it 

ashore. Even as MSTS gathered and 

deployed its maritime assets for the buildup, other 

commands evaluated Vietnam’s capacity to handle 

the massive influx of soldiers, tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, construction materials, ammunition, 

fuel, and other essential war-making supplies. 

They were distressed with what they found; few 

places on earth were as unprepared as Vietnam in 

1965 to accommodate such a monumental influx. 

Danang, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh boasted excellent natural harbors on the South China Sea, and 

Saigon, while far inland, had been a major port 

since French colonial times. The port facilities at 

these sites, however, were minimal or nonexistent. 

Saigon boasted 10 berths—only three of which 

handled military cargo—for oceangoing ships and 

Cam Ranh had two, but Vietnam had no other 

deep-water berths. Lieutenant Colonel Richard 

Paris Clark, on the MACV J-4 (logistics) staff, 

summarized the situation. He observed that “ten 

first-class ports in the continental United States 

were shipping materiél to South Vietnam as fast as 

they could, but MACV only had four second-class 

ports to receive it.” 

Few warehouses or outdoor storage sites existed 

at any port to accommodate a massive influx of 

equipment and supplies. Since South Vietnam’s railroads had been largely destroyed by the fighting and 

its roads were rudimentary or under enemy control, 

much of the material shipped to the major ports had 

to be reloaded onto coastal vessels for delivery to 

smaller ports. Too few of the efficient U.S. utility 

landing craft (LCUs) reached Vietnam in 1965. A lack 

of requisite material-handling equipment—trucks, 

forklifts, pallet-jacks, and handcarts—slowed the 

movement of cargo off the docks. Vietnamese port 

authorities had to employ an army of unskilled stevedores to off-load incoming cargo. Few watercraft 

Chief Boatswain’s Mate Charles H. Fitzgerald (left) confers 

with William B. Barton, the master of SS President McKinley, 

as the ship enters Danang in June 1968.

Old salts. Master Chief Boatswain’s Mate John Gonzalez 

(left), Chief Boatswain’s Mate William Fischer, and Chief 

Boatswain’s Mate Harold W. Hurst discuss their duties as 

Danang harbor pilots, May 1967.

USNI USNI

31
were available to lighter or transport material from 

ships anchored in the harbor to the shoreside facilities. Finally, cultural, linguistic, and other differences between South Vietnamese and U.S. logistics 

authorities complicated delivery. The ports soon 

became hopelessly clogged with cargo waiting for 

movement inland and ships stood idle because they 

could not be unloaded. The situation was so chaotic 

that by November 1965, 122 fully loaded ships 

waited at anchor off Saigon and at holding areas 

throughout Southeast Asia, Japan, and Guam. 

The U.S. Army’s 1st Logistics Command, established in April 1965, began a robust construction 

program to expand and improve South Vietnam’s 

port facilities. Lending support to that effort were 

MSTS, Service Force Pacific Fleet, Naval Support 

Activity Saigon, and Naval Support Activity Danang. 

The objective of this enormous project was to build 

additional piers for oceangoing ships at Saigon, 

Danang, Cam Ranh, and Qui Nhon and berths at the 

minor ports of Can Tho/Vung Tau, Chu Lai, Phan 

Rang/Nha Trang, and Vung Ro. Eventually, there 

would be 32 deep-draft piers in South Vietnam. 

When the minor ports were ready to receive ships, 

MSTS Office Vietnam posted 5- to 8-man teams at 

each to coordinate cargo deliveries. 

In August 1966 even as the piers were being built 

at the various ports, the Army Corps of Engineers 

brought in large dredges to clear 65 million cubic 

The busy port of Saigon, with the MSTS Vietnam headquarters shown in the lower center of the photo, needed extensive 

development.

Cargo unloaded from SS President Pierce awaits transportation from a Saigon dock to U.S. military bases inland.

Forklifts operated by Vietnamese women help unload cargo. 

Thousands of Vietnamese civilians—male and female—

worked long hours moving the supplies forward. 

USNI Author’s Collection

USNI

32
feet of mud from South Vietnam’s harbors, large 

navigable rivers, and ship channels. The dredges 

accomplished their mission, but not without cost. 

Viet Cong sappers killed three civilian crewmen and 

sank Jamaica Bay on 9 January 1967 and, in later 

years of the war, the VC sank the dredges Thu Bon I, 

Sandpumper, Davidson, and New Jersey. 

For Vietnam the Army adapted a technology that 

had enabled the Allies to hold and then expand their 

Normandy invasion beachhead during World War 

II. The Mulberry harbors, built by the United States 

and Great Britain, helped the Allies move equipment 

and supplies ashore even before they had captured 

Cherbourg, Antwerp, and other major ports from 

the Germans. During the 1950s the United States 

devised a similar structure, the Delong Pier, that 

consisted of a string of connected barges anchored 

by pilings. In 1966 MSTS transported one, in two 

pieces, from Charleston, South Carolina, to Danang 

and reassembled it there in 45 days. After the 

success of that operation, MSTS had firms in Japan 

build Delongs for South Vietnam’s other ports. By 

the end of pier construction, South Vietnam could 

handle more than 500,000 short tons per week, up 

from an original 16,000 tons. 

Army engineers also established mooring points 

seaward of the major ports, allowing MSTS tankers 

to pump fuel through underwater hose lines to 

tank farms and bladders ashore. Recognizing that 

there was no additional space for berths at Saigon, 

the Army constructed an entirely new $25 million 

cargo facility, aptly named Newport, just upriver 

from Saigon. By April 1967 it boasted four berths 

Commander Robert W. Freeman, Officer in Charge MSTS 

Unit Cam Ranh Bay, July 1968. The U.S. naval personnel who 

served at Vietnam’s seaports proved essential to the speedy 

delivery of supplies.

Radioman Second Class R. G. Brown of MSTS Unit Cam 

Ranh Bay communicates with his counterpart at Qui Nhon to 

coordinate ship arrivals at these ports on the central coast of 

South Vietnam, July 1968. 

The Army dredge New Jersey works to keep Cam Ranh Bay 

navigable for deep draft ships. Viet Cong underwater sappers 

sank the dredge in the latter part of the war, killing three 

civilian crewmen.

USNI

NHHC VN Collection

USNI

33
Logistics operations at deep draft piers constructed at Danang.

A Delong Pier at Cam Ranh Bay takes on cargo from SS American Hawk in April 1967. Enemy underwater sappers sank the ship at 

Qui Nhon in June 1971.

USNI USNI

34
for oceangoing ships and four ramps for LSTs. To 

assist in the distribution of cargo all along the coast, 

MSTS and the Navy dispatched LSTs, landing craft, 

mechanized (LCMs), and LCUs to South Vietnam. 

The Army also provided lighter amphibious resupply 

cargo (LARC) vehicles that could move from the 

water onto the beach to deliver supplies. 

According to an article in Sealift magazine, 

in March 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara 

observed: 

Indeed we are moving more than 700,000 

measurement tons per month to Southeast Asia 

by ship and these ships are now being unloaded 

promptly. In November of last year we had 122 

ships with military cargoes awaiting unloading 

in South Vietnamese ports or in holding areas. 

This total is now down to 41 ships, well within 

the normal range for an operation of this size. 

The cargo backlog, which rose as high as 257,000 

measurement tons on the 27th of November, is 

now down to less than 100,000 tons, the 

equivalent of 4 days of work at the current 

unloading rate.

Even veteran mariners noted the change in the 

scope and scale of operations. Captain A. G. Smith 

of SS Mormachawk wrote to the commander of 

Naval Support Activity Danang, “Please be advised 

that the discharge of this vessel by Naval personnel . . . was over and above, in every respect, any 

comparable operation this writer has experienced 

during World War II, the Korean, and present 

Vietnam conflicts.”

One of the hallmarks of U.S. maritime and naval 

history has been the country’s ability to introduce 

and adopt new technologies such as clipper ships, 

steam propulsion, and steel hulls. During the 

Vietnam War vessels capable of over-the-beach 

supply, tugs and barges, and cargo containers made 

significant contributions to the logistics effort. 

American LSTs first made their mark in World 

War II. American naval leaders considered the 

logistics ship so essential to a successful landing in 

Normandy that they recommended delaying the 

operation until enough were on hand. Upset about 

the delay, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 

referred to the cause as “some goddam things called 

LSTs.” The American LSTs proved their worth not 

The fuel bladders on the beach at Cam Ranh Bay supplemented more permanent storage facilities inland. 

USNI

35
A wharf intended to accommodate oceangoing vessels is under construction at Newport, a facility north of Saigon.

only on D-Day but throughout World War II and the 

Korean War. 

American naval leaders understood in 1965 that, 

with Vietnam’s ports unable to handle a massive 

movement of incoming supplies, only vessels capable 

of “logistics over-the-shore” operations could ease 

the burden. The LST was ideally suited for that 

mission. Each 4,000-ton, 327-foot ship could load 

and discharge cargo, including tracked and wheeled 

vehicles, through cavernous bow doors directly onto 

the beach or onto quickly built concrete ramps. 

MSTS employed some of its LSTs to load supplies at 

Saigon, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh, and Danang and to 

distribute those materials at smaller ports along the 

coast and into the larger rivers of South Vietnam. 

Other ships transported material from Subic Bay 

and Japan by way of Okinawa.

These ships were unique in one respect: Japanese 

and Korean nationals crewed them. Right after World 

War II, the United States occupation authorities in 

Tokyo and Seoul employed Japanese and Korean 

mariners aboard LSTs to repatriate hundreds of thousands of former Imperial Japanese Army soldiers. 

The ships and their non-American crews continued 

to serve U.S. interests during the Korean War and 

remained in operation right up to the Vietnam War.

At the end of 1965, Admiral Donaho realized 

that the seven LSTs then carrying out duties along 

the coast of Vietnam were too few to accomplish 

all the missions required by MACV. By activating 

ships and transferring others from the Atlantic, 

Donaho added 19 LSTs to the MSTS Far East fleet 

by March 1966. Another six ships—all manned by 

Koreans—entered Vietnam service in February 

USNI

36
1967. Eventually, 42 LSTs supported MSTS as did 

the Navy’s Landing Ship Squadron 2 with five ships 

crewed by American Sailors. The Republic of Korea, 

the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Thailand operated a total of six LSTs as part of the multinational 

effort to preserve the independence of South 

Vietnam. 

Complementing the work of the LSTs were 

tugs and barges that MSTS chartered for Vietnam 

service. Ironically, the Alaska Barge and Transport 

Company (AB&T), headquartered in Vancouver, 

T-LST-572 discharges cargo at Danang’s Museum Pier in January 1966. 

An Army truck and a crane unload ammunition and other 

cargo from T-LST-277, one of the versatile LSTs operated 

by MSTS. 

Army trucks stand by to take on board barbed wire and other 

cargo delivered by T-LST- 491 in July 1967. 

USNI

NH 74483 USNI

37
Washington, proved to be one 

of the stars of the logistics 

effort. Beginning in December 

1965, AB&T convoyed 17 

World War II-era Miki-class 

tug boats and 38 barges across 

the Pacific. These units began 

their work in March 1966 and 

served throughout the war. 

They proved indispensable 

to logistics movement on the 

South Vietnamese rivers and 

canals. AB&T’s units not only 

transported material but also 

carried out stevedoring, towing, 

salvage, and liberty boat services. At the peak of operations, 

the company employed 1,200 

Vietnamese and 220 American 

civilians. Rear Admiral Samuel 

Moore, Commander MSTS 

Far East and later Commander 

Military Sealift Command, 

related that he had “never seen 

a more dedicated group of men 

on such a job.” 

AB&T crews braved enemy 

fire to transport supplies along 

the inland waterways of South 

Vietnam and, later in the war, 

the Mekong River to Cambodia. 

The Miki-class tugs had been 

constructed of wood, due to 

steel shortages during World 

War II, and their hulls and deckhouses often proved 

more resistant and better able to absorb damage 

from Soviet- and Chinese-built rockets than steel. 

The Viet Cong frequently targeted the company’s 

tugs and barges, which were unarmed and manned 

by merchant mariners. On 7 April 1968 the tug 

Michael became the first such vessel to experience an enemy attack on the Mekong River. That 

morning, Viet Cong rockets severed the tow cable 

and drum on the aft of the tug and also exploded in 

the pilothouse, severely wounding Captain Wally 

Proux and Mate James Almony. Relief Captain 

Nathan Durbin rushed to the bridge and assumed 

command. He piloted Michael out of danger and 

stopped her at Vung Tau to seek medical assistance 

for Proux and Almony, but both merchant mariners 

succumbed to their wounds. Even ashore, AB&T’s 

merchant mariners faced danger. On the 4th of July 

1968, a Viet Cong platoon launched mortar, rocket, 

and small arms fire against the base at Phan Rang 

that killed one merchant mariner. During the war 

AB&T lost 11 tugs and barges to enemy action and 

The Saigon headquarters of the Alaska Barge and Transport Company, which operated 

tugs and barges in the dangerous waters of South Vietnam from the beginning of the war 

to the very end. 

Author’s Collection

38
natural events. Despite the danger, the men of this 

firm provided vital logistical support throughout 

the war. 

The use of cargo containers proved to be one 

of the most innovative, efficient, and timely means 

of providing logistics support to America’s armed 

forces in Vietnam. Historians credit Malcolm 

McLean, a former truck driver and owner of the 

seventh largest trucking company in the United 

States during the 1950s, with designing the modern 

shipping container. He believed that a container 

could be loaded with cargo at a point of origin, 

sealed, transported by truck or rail to a port, lifted 

whole onto a ship for the ocean transit, and then 

lifted off the ship at a point of delivery. At no time 

during the transportation process would stevedores 

have to handle the cargo inside the container. In 

1956 SS Ideal X sailed from Newark, New Jersey, 

to Houston, Texas, with fifty-eight 35-foot trailers 

stacked on an elevated weather deck, the first test of 

this revolutionary concept. 

McLean recognized in 1965 that containerized 

cargo in general and his Sea-Land Services firm in 

particular could make a significant contribution 

to the Vietnam logistics support effort. With the 

blessing of General Frank S. Besson Jr., head of the 

Army Materiel Command, McLean and two of his 

top managers flew to Saigon in December to begin 

discussions with officials at MSTS Office Vietnam. 

While McLean met with initial opposition, in 

May 1966 MSTS contracted three Sea-Land “containerships” to transport 476 containers between 

Oakland, California, and Okinawa every 12 days. 

The success of that operation prompted MSTS in 

October to put out bids for container service to 

Vietnam. McLean’s firm won the contract in part 

because he promised to provide ships, containers, 

trucks, chassis, and relevant terminal services. 

Under the terms of the contract, Sea-Land was also 

responsible for moving the 35-foot containers from 

the ports of entry to depots inland. Hence, Sea-Land 

was able to track shipments, retain oversight of the 

containers, and ensure that the empty boxes were 

returned for further use. Containers sometimes 

“disappeared” in the sprawling Army base complexes of Vietnam; MACV had to pay Sea-Land for 

the missing units. 

On 29 March 1967 MSTS signed an agreement 

for $70 million with Sea-Land to provide seven 

ships and develop terminals at Danang and Cam 

Ranh. The three C-2 ships at Danang possessed the 

necessary cranes to off-load 274 containers in port. 

The Miki-class tug Makah underway.

Author’s Collection

39
The ships sailed between Oakland or Seattle every 

15 days. On the morning of 1 August, SS Bienville

arrived in Danang with 226 containers holding 

7,221 measurement tons of cargo and completed 

off-loading the boxes by dawn the following day. 

Unloading a typical “break-bulk” or palletized 

cargo freighter would have taken many more days. 

Eventually, modified T-3 ships with a 476-container 

capacity replaced the smaller C-2s. Sea-Land’s 

manager for Vietnam, Phillip Clarke, oversaw the 

installation of container-handling cranes ashore at 

Cam Ranh and that November, witnessed the arrival 

of containership SS Oakland, a converted C-4 troop 

transport able to carry more than 600 containers. That ship and two others operated between 

California and Cam Ranh on a 16-day cycle. Later, 

three additional C-4s also made the run from the 

Unites States to Cam Ranh; a ship arrived at the port 

every eight days. Beauregard, a C-2 under Captain 

“Uncle” Alfred J. Stewart, and SS Raphael Semmes,

commanded by Jack “Three-Finger” Kuhn, served 

as shuttle ships between Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon, 

Danang, and Newport. 

Between 1967 and 1969 the number of containers 

delivered to Vietnam every month by Sea-Land ships 

rose from 456 to 2,688. From 1967 to 1973 Sea-Land 

earned close to $450 million, most of the profits 

resulting from its Vietnam service. Admiral Ramage 

related that the Sea-Land ships transported three 

times the cargo normally carried by conventional 

freighters, and by the end of the war were delivering 

10 percent of all the cargo to reach Vietnam. This 

was a truly impressive performance. •

SS Oakland, a C-4 in the Sea-Land Corporation’s container fleet, arrives for off-loading at Cam Ranh Bay, July 1968.

USNI NHHC VN Collection

Tug Osceola moves along the waterfront at Danang.

40
SS Beauregard, a modified C-2 with shipboard cranes, taking on board cargo containers in Houston, Texas, 1966.

A dockside crane prepares to transfer cargo containers from a Sea-Land 

ship to trucks waiting on the dock, 1968. 

USNI

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41
42

SS Eastern Mariner, sunk by Viet Cong forces on 26 May 1966, lies beached on a mud flat in the Long Tau near Nha Be.

NHHC VN Collection
MERCHANT MARINERS UNDER FIRE

After braving the dangers of the sea, 

many merchant mariners and their 

ships had to fight to survive the hostile 

environment of Vietnam. One of the 

most perilous legs of the journey from the United 

States to Saigon was the last 45 miles. Viet Cong 

forces armed with command-detonated mines, 

recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and 

small arms lined both sides of the Long Tau, a 

shallow, serpentine river between Vung Tau on 

the South China Sea and Saigon, South Vietnam’s 

largest city. Bordering the river was the Rung Sat 

Swamp, a lightly populated bog of dense foliage, 

meandering waterways, and mud. The Rung Sat 

concealed many Viet Cong guerrillas. Throughout 

the war the enemy made a concerted effort to 

cut the Long Tau, an accomplishment that would 

have isolated the capital of South Vietnam and 

frustrated allied military objectives throughout the 

Mekong Delta. The Viet Cong never achieved that 

goal, but allied merchant mariners and fighting 

men paid a price to deny the enemy that victory. 

From the earliest days of the Republic of 

Vietnam, the River Force of the Vietnam Navy 

(VNN) had fought to secure the Rung Sat. The 

United States continued that effort with Operation 

Jackstay in March 1966. During that fight, U.S. Navy, 

U.S. Marine, and South Vietnamese forces carried 

out a major combined action to clear the enemy 

from the area. Navy patrol boat, river (PBR); motor 

launch minesweepers (MLMS); minesweeping boats 

(MSBs); Sea-Air-Land forces (SEAL) commandos; 

and helicopters deployed for the action. In the end 

the allied forces killed or captured 69 enemy troops 

and destroyed Viet Cong supply sites, but the enemy 

was far from beaten. 

To counter the efforts of the VC in the Rung Sat, 

the allies deployed forces to keep the Long Tau River 

open. On 20 May 1966 the Navy established Mine 

Squadron 11, Detachment Alpha (later renamed 

Mine Division 112). The unit’s twelve 57-foot fiberglass-hulled MSBs, along with VNN minesweeping 

motor launches, continuously swept the river to 

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Soirap River

Long Tau River

Dong Nai

River SAIGON

Nha Be

Vam Lang

Ly

Nhon

Go Cong Dong

30 Miles to Tuan Bien

Vung Tau

Phuoc Hoa

Rt 15

Ganh Rai Bay

The Rung Sat. 

Homemade Viet Cong mines like this one posed a lethal 

threat to American and South Vietnamese naval vessels and 

merchantmen transiting the Long Tau River. 

NHHC

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43
ensure the safety of the merchant ships. Patrols were 

conducted early in the morning from Nha Be using 

paravanes and chain drag sweeps to sever electrical 

wires that connected mines in the river with Viet 

Cong guerrillas ashore ready to trigger them. 

Heavy Viet Cong activity against U.S. merchant 

ships and river patrol forces on the Long Tau 

occurred during the period from December 1965 to 

February 1967. During that period the enemy made 

18 attempts against allied vessels. One such assault 

took place on 23 August 1966. That morning, SS 

Baton Rouge Victory waited in the Vung Tau roadstead at Vung Tau, preparing to head up the Long 

Tau for Saigon with a cargo of 8,250 tons of vehicles, 

electronic equipment, general supplies, and postexchange goods. Captain Konrad Carlson’s ship, 

which the Maritime Administration had contracted 

States Marine Lines to operate, had been activated 

from the National Defense Reserve Fleet at Suisun 

Bay, California, the previous December.

As Baton Rouge Victory waited at Vung Tau, 

a pair of Vietnam Navy minesweeper motor 

launches departed Nha Be to sweep downriver 

toward the sea. At 0640 Viet Cong small-arms and 

recoilless-rifle fire ripped into MLMS 151, killing 

one sailor, wounding another three, and forcing the 

South Vietnamese unit to 

suspend its mission. Other 

motor minesweepers made 

one check of the same 

waters and passed word 

that Baton Rouge Victory

could proceed on her 

mission. 

At 0910 while only 

miles from Saigon, Baton 

Rouge Victory hit a 

moored mine that ripped 

a 35-by-45-foot hole in 

the port side, ruptured the 

port boiler, and disabled 

the main propulsion and 

primary steering controls. 

The detonation and 

superheated steam escaping from the boiler killed seven crewmen (Raymond 

Barrett, John Bishop, Earl Erickson, James McBride, 

Timothy Riordan, Robert Rowe, and Charles 

Rummel) in the engine room; two men managed to 

escape. The survivors were little comforted with the 

knowledge that they would receive $300 for enduring the attack on their ship or that their beneficiaries 

would have been able to cash in a $20,000 life 

insurance policy had they been killed. The men’s 

contracts with MSTS, common to merchant mariners who agreed to serve in the combat theater, had 

no provision for long-term medical care for wounds 

received during enemy attack. 

Fearing that his vessel would sink and block the 

main shipping channel to Saigon, Captain Carlson 

immediately conned the ship toward the shore and 

beached her on the south bank of the river. Rear 

Admiral Norvell G. Ward, Commander Naval 

Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV) suspended ship 

traffic on the river and quickly dispatched U.S. and 

South Vietnamese combat units to the scene. Navy 

river patrol boats, SEALs, and soldiers of the Army’s 

1st Infantry Division secured the ship and surrounding area to await the arrival of salvage forces. 

Salvage Master L. B. Delanoy of the Navy’s Harbor 

Clearance Unit 1, oversaw the ship’s recovery by 

SS American Corsair steams upriver to Saigon as a Navy minesweeping boat uses its sweep 

gear to prevent Viet Cong guerrillas on shore from triggering command-detonated mines.

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44
two heavy-lift craft that towed the ship to Vung Tau 

17 days after the mining. After USNS Sport Splice

(T-AK-249) delivered the patch for the stricken ship’s 

hull and she was repaired, she sailed from Vung Tau 

on 9 December. Unfortunately, the next day another 

merchant ship rammed the ill-fated merchantman. 

Eventually, Baton Rouge Victory reached Singapore 

where she was scrapped. The mining of Baton Rouge 

Victory proved to be the only time during the war 

that the enemy managed to interrupt the logistics 

lifeline to Saigon for a full day.

American and Vietnamese sailors paid a high 

price to keep the shipping lane open. In August 

1966 attackers sank a Vietnam Navy motor launch 

minesweeper, killing or wounding five Vietnamese 

sailors and wounding two American naval advisers. 

Guerrillas sank another MLMS in January 1967. On 

15 February 1967 ambushers struck MSB-49 with 

75mm recoilless-rifle and automatic-weapons fire 

that wounded all six crew members and devastated 

the boat. That same day, the enemy sank MSB-45, 

killing two American Sailors and wounding 

another 16.

On 13 March 1967 MSTS Office Vietnam issued 

specific instructions for merchant ships slated to 

make the run to Saigon: 

a. Transit the river only after the Military 

Police detachment has embarked. 

b. Ensure transceiver for 2716 KC [Kilocycles] 

voice is in good operating condition. Guard 

[monitor] 2716 KC voice from one hour prior 

Commander Naval Forces Vietnam Rear Admiral Norvell G. 

Ward (center) discusses the enemy threat with his subordinates, Captain John T. Shepherd (left) and Commander James 

A. Hodgman, USCG. 

With an Army tug and the Alaska Barge and Transport Company tug Patrick in the lead, a pair of heavy-lift craft operated by the 

Navy’s Harbor Clearance Unit 1 proceed downriver with SS Baton Rouge Victory after they raise her from the mud of the Long 

Tau River. 

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45
to getting underway until ship is berthed 

and clear of the river. Report any hostile 

activity and passing of miles 35, 30, 25, 22, 

18, and 10 to Saigon Port Control (MSTS 

Office Saigon). 

c. Ensure that there are no unnecessary personnel topside or in the engineering spaces. 

d. Keep all watertight doors secured except 

leave escape hatches open. 

e. If attacked, repeatedly fire a red flare or 

smoke flare in the direction of attack and 

sound long blasts on the ships whistle until 

air support arrives. 

f. Lay out and charge main deck fire hoses. 

g. If ship is critically hit and sinking, the 

Master must make every attempt to ground 

the ship clear of the shipping channel. 

h. It is recommended that U.S. Navy ships 

transit the river at General Quarters. 

i. Have anchor detail stationed with one 

anchor ready for letting go.

These instructions were necessary because the 

Viet Cong maintained their interdiction campaign. 

For instance on 20 April 1967, while en route to 

Saigon, T-LST-550 came under 75mm recoilless-rifle 

fire that killed one Japanese crew member and 

wounded another five. On the 18th of November, the 

American President Lines SS President Buchanan

departed her anchorage at Vung Tau. Captain E. 

A. Olsen and a Vietnamese pilot conned the ship 

into the Long Tau. Almost an hour later the ship, 

steaming at 12 knots, neared the second major turn 

in the river. As Olsen prepared to issue an order to 

his helmsman, a fusillade of mortar, recoilless-rifle, 

and machine-gun fire opened up on the ship’s 

starboard side. The ship’s anchor crew sought cover 

on the bow as two Army military policemen posted 

on board for security opened fire with their M-14 

rifles. Olsen ordered all hands below deck and rang 

up full speed ahead. The captain and his bridge crew 

then ducked behind the bulwarks. For the next 12 

minutes, President Buchanan endured a steady hail 

A Viet Cong ambush on 15 February 1967 badly damaged MSB-49, mortally wounded one of her crewmen, and injured five others.

NHHC VN Collection

46
of enemy fire. Eventually, Navy river patrol boats and 

Army helicopters arrived and suppressed the attack. 

None of the crew sustained injury, thanks in part to 

Olsen’s quick thinking and the men’s readiness for 

action. 

Five other merchant ships sustained direct 

attacks during 1967. However, 1968 proved to be 

an even more harrowing time for the merchant 

mariners on the Saigon run. The enemy launched 44 

assaults that year. The VC, for instance, carried out 

strikes in February on three ships and an assault in 

April that killed two men on the tug Michael. The 

enemy, employing B-40 and B-41 rocket-propelled 

grenades, recoilless rifles, and automatic weapons 

executed ten attacks in May. On 30 August they 

assaulted the roll-on/roll-off ship Transglobe, a 

frequent enemy target. The guerrillas launched a 

122mm rocket, normally a high-arching indirect 

fire weapon, directly at the ship. It struck the ship 

and critically wounded crew member Ernest Goo. 

Captain Leon Jean called for a helicopter that 

evacuated the man but he died of his injuries. Later 

that year Major General Charles T. Horner Jr., 

commander of the Army’s 2nd Logistical Command, 

presented Jean with a plaque emblazoned with four 

battle stars and a Purple Heart to acknowledge 

the ship’s combat actions and the loss of her crew 

member. 

The VC launched 51 assaults in the first half of 

1969, but by the end of the year the allies had won 

U.S. naval personnel inspect a launcher similar to the equipment used by the Viet Cong to fire a 122mm rocket at SS 

Transglobe in August 1968.

NHHC VN Collection

47
the battle for the Rung Sat. The victory resulted from 

a campaign kicked off in June, the goal of which 

was to destroy a VC sapper battalion, the enemy’s 

primary fighting force operating on the Long Tau. 

The sappers operated from the Nhon Trach District 

of Bien Hoa Province north of the Rung Sat. A force 

of U.S. and South Vietnamese riverine combatants; 

attack helicopters; and U.S., Australian, and Thai 

infantry units swept through Nhon Trach and 

part of the Rung Sat. The operation resulted in the 

destruction of four enemy base camps and the death 

or capture of 53 guerrillas. 

Afterward, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces 

kept applying pressure on the enemy guerrillas, 

frustrating their efforts to regroup. Army bulldozers 

and aerial-sprayed herbicides denuded much of the 

Rung Sat’s foliage. The enemy did not launch a single 

attack on the merchant ships transiting the Long 

Tau well into 1970. Lieutenant Robert W. Champion, 

the commanding officer of Mine Division 112, 

reported later that after more than 2,000 operations by his minesweepers, the only enemy gear 

they recovered were 17 lengths of wire and not a 

single mine. On 1 November 1970 the VC carried 

out an attack on the American President Lines’ SS 

President Coolidge, but the next attack did not occur 

until a year later when the enemy struck Sea-Land’s 

Raphael Semmes.

The allies suffered damage to their merchant 

ships and the death or wounding of seamen, but 

the merchant mariners succeeded in their effort to 

keep the fighting forces armed, fueled, and supplied. 

Over the course of the war, the enemy attacked 138 

merchantmen on the Long Tau. 

But in the wake of the May 1964 VC attack on 

Card, U.S. and South Vietnamese military leaders 

moved swiftly to improve the security of ships in 

the port of Saigon. Prior to and during the arrival 

at Saigon of Core with a load of 70 Douglas A-1 

Skyraider attack aircraft in the summer of 1965, the 

Vietnam army deployed 500 soldiers along the dock 

on 24-hour patrols. Periodically, these men tossed 

hand grenades into the water to discourage, wound, 

or kill enemy swimmers attempting to place mines. 

Divers scoured the harbor bottom and nearby piers 

for explosive devices. The U.S. Army’s 716th Military 

Police Battalion then escorted vehicles carrying 

the planes from the dock to Tan Son Nhut Airport. 

These precautions resulted in the incident-free 

delivery of combat aircraft to the Vietnam Air Force. 

These measures, however, did not always work to 

frustrate the enemy’s determined effort to cut the 

logistics lifeline to allied forces by attacking merchant ships in port. On 26 May 1966, for instance, 

the enemy mined three ships at Nha Be. At 0150, 

sappers detonated an explosive device next to SS 

Eastern Mariner, a Panamanian-flagged freighter 

loaded with 4,000 tons of bagged cement. The vessel 

settled by the stern as the crew abandoned ship. 

Later, with the assistance of tugs, the crew beached 

the ship and divers surveyed the hull. 

Chief Warrant Officer Robert L. Henshaw, the officer in 

charge of Nha Be’s explosive ordnance team, works to neutralize a Viet Cong mine loaded with 75mm recoilless-rifle 

rounds discovered in the Long Tau River, February 1968. 

USNI

48
At 1000 that same day, the French-flagged 

tanker Milos Del Mar prepared to anchor when she 

exploded a mine that caused no damage to the ship. 

As Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) divers 

inspected the hulls of the other ships at Nha Be, they 

discovered a mine near SS Our Lady of Peace, which 

carried 500-pound bombs. The enemy weapon consisted of 130 pounds of TNT, an electrical detonator, 

and a timing device attached to the ship’s anchor 

chain by a length of nylon parachute cord. When the 

tide changed, the mine would have drifted under 

the surface to the side of the freighter and exploded. 

An EOD team defused the mine and recovered it for 

study. Prior to these attacks, the allies stored both 

ammunition and fuel at Nha Be, but the 26 May 

event convinced authorities to separate the dangerous substances. As a result the Army established 

three moorings for ammunition ships at Cat Lai, 

near Vung Tau. 

Ammunition stowage in shipping containers, 

unlike other cargo, was not always feasible; artillery 

and other rounds needed special handling and care. 

Hence, beginning in June 1966 the Coast Guard 

dispatched five detachments to Vietnam to oversee 

the unloading of ammunition. 

During 1966 and 1967 the U.S. Navy employed 

significant resources to protect South Vietnam’s 

major ports and the merchant ships docked there. 

COMNAVFORV deployed Inshore Undersea 

Warfare Units (IUWU) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 at Vung Tau, 

Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Ro, 

respectively. In Operation Stable Door, these units 

operated landing craft, personnel, large; Boston 

Whalers; and 45-foot picket boats that constantly 

patrolled the harbors. EOD divers routinely searched 

harbor waters and the hulls of anchored or docked 

merchant ships for mines. Each IUWU established 

a harbor entrance control post manned by Sailors 

and equipped with surface search radars and radios 

that enabled quick reaction to any suspicious activities in port. Despite the ability to sink or damage 

a few ships, during the period from 1965 to 1968, 

the enemy never appreciably slowed the delivery of 

troops, ammunition, fuel, and other supplies. 

A trio of National Defense Reserve Fleet Victory ships moored at the Cat Lai ammunition depot in November 1969. 

USNI

49
In recognition of MSTS’ successful maritime 

logistics effort during the buildup phase, early 

in 1969 Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius 

awarded MSTS Office Vietnam a prestigious 

Navy Unit Commendation, the citation for which 

read: 

For exceptionally meritorious service during 

the period 15 April 1965 to 30 September 

1968, in providing urgently needed sealift 

support for the logistic buildup of United 

States, Republic of Vietnam, and free world 

military assistance forces in an arduous and 

hostile environment, and for development 

of Republic of Vietnam sea and river ports, 

in the face of extremely difficult conditions, 

including attacks from enemy forces at all 

locations along the Republic of Vietnam 

coastline. Military Sea Transportation 

Service Office, Vietnam, through able 

administration of MSTS shipping assets, 

contributed materially to the success of the 

U.S. effort in Southeast Asia. •

As part of Operation Stable Door, the crew of a 45-foot picket boat 

of Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 51 inspect a sampan for enemy 

contraband in March 1969. 

A Navy explosive ordnance disposal diver working to prevent enemy 

underwater sappers from placing mines on the hulls of ships in port.

Sailors of MSTS Unit Vung Tau read the citation awarding a 

Navy Unit Commendation to MSTS for outstanding service from 

April 1965 to September 1968. (left to right) Storekeeper Arthur 

D. Huntington, Yeoman Second Class David Christiansen, and 

Boatswain’s Mate First Class Donald L. Dircks.

NHHC VN Collection NHHC VN Collection USNI

50
Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius on board a Navy river patrol boat in the Bassac River during his visit to South Vietnam in 

October 1968. 

USNI

51
52

Vice Admiral Arthur R. Gralla’s testimony helped dissuade Congress of the notion 

that the Army would be a more efficient steward than the Navy of the sealift 

function.

USNI
THE DRAWDOWN

The surprise and severity of the 

Communist Tet Offensive of January 

1968 convinced many Americans, 

including President Johnson, that 

victory in Vietnam was unattainable. His public 

address of 31 March calling for peace negotiations 

with Hanoi, the end of bombing north of the 19th 

parallel of North Vietnam, and his forthcoming 

retirement from office heralded a turning point in 

the war. Richard M. Nixon, elected President in 

November 1968, announced his plan to gradually 

withdraw U.S. forces from the war and prepare the 

South Vietnamese armed forces to carry on the 

fight in a program known as “Vietnamization.” 

During the years from 1968 to 1973, MSTS was 

responsible for returning much of the equipment 

of the 500,000-man U.S. expeditionary force to 

the United States; transporting the latest weapons 

to Vietnam for the RVNAF; and maintaining the 

flow of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies to the 

American troops still in country. Indeed, during the 

post-Tet years, the war was far from over. 

In the early 1970s the North Vietnamese and 

their Viet Cong allies increased attacks on shipping 

in South Vietnam’s ports. This campaign to destabilize the allied war effort registered more success 

than in previous years because the withdrawal 

of U.S. Navy port security and harbor defense 

resources taxed the capability of the VNN. On occasion the South Vietnamese defenders stymied enemy 

attacks on merchant ships. On 22 April 1972, for 

example, VNN divers discovered and disarmed an 

explosive charge affixed to the hull of Upshur, loaded 

with Korean troops. 

Enemy sappers, however, had greater success 

in the period from March 1970 to May 1972 when 

they sank seven ships at Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh, 

and Danang, the major ports supplying central 

The Tragic Saga of the SS Badger State

FOR MSTS SHIPS AND MERCHANT MARINERS, 

the transportation of ammunition across the Pacific 

Ocean could be a dangerous endeavor. The States 

Marine Lines C-2 freighter SS Badger State sailed 

from Bangor, Washington, bound for Vietnam in 

mid-December 1969. Soon after departure, the ship’s 

steering system began leaking hydraulic fluid, compromising the operation of the rudder. Heavy weather 

in the North Pacific rocked the ship, causing her to 

roll repeatedly more than 50 degrees. Rough seas 

often buffeted the MSTS ships making the transit 

to Vietnam, but Badger State’s case was especially 

worrisome since she carried 6,109 tons of bombs in 

her holds. Author William R. Benedetto, in his history 

of this event, noted, “in the annals of maritime 

history . . . no other ship has ever been held hostage 

by a cargo of bombs.” 

The Navy depot in the states had loaded the 

ammunition during a rainstorm that soaked the wood 

used to secure the cargo (dunnage), and prevent one 

bomb from banging into another. Two days out to sea, 

the crew discovered bombs breaking loose and knocking about the holds. The mariners were not comforted 

when they remembered advice published in the May 

1968 issue of Sealift, the official publication of MSTS: 

Ordnance experts and others knowledgeable 

about such matters as unarmed bombs, will be 

quick to reassure the laymen that there is little 53
to fear from a bomb or projectile as long as there 

is no detonator attached. But, despite all the 

evidence that it is virtually impossible to explode 

one, that an unarmed 1,000-pound bomb is about 

as lethal as 1,000 pounds of cabbage, it is nevertheless nerve-racking to be riding a ship with even 

one such bomb adrift in a cargo hold. 

Concerned, Captain Charles T. Wilson altered 

course and headed the ship toward a safe haven 

in the roadstead at Midway Atoll and requested an 

escort in case he and his crew had to abandon ship. 

Making matters worse, Badger State encountered a 

severe storm on Christmas Day. The next morning 

the crew peered into the ship’s holds and made a 

terrifying discovery; several dozen 750-pound bombs 

were rolling free and causing sparks as metal hit 

metal. At 0940, an explosion blew off hatch number 5 

and opened an 8-by-12-foot hole in the starboard hull. 

Soon other bombs broke loose, starting a fire that 

threatened to ignite another hazardous cargo: 10,640 

barrels of fuel oil. The captain ordered abandon ship. 

Crewmen lowered a lifeboat and as they worked 

to prepare it for operation, the boat drifted aft down 

the starboard side. Suddenly, bombs started to 

spill out of the hole in the hull and rain down on 

the boat. Some men leapt into the sea while others 

remained on board. 

Paul C. Kinney, in “The Fate of Badger State,” 

which was published in the October 1981 issue of 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, described the scene 

as it unfolded:

A 2,000-pound bomb slid out nose first very 

quickly and, narrowly missing the boat, fell into 

the water. When the ship rolled back to port, a 

second bomb, having gained momentum in the 

starboard roll, came out of the hole in the manner 

of a ski jumper. This bomb hit one crewman in 

the head driving him out of the boat. The bomb 

then landed squarely in the laps of four other 

crewmen. As the bomb landed in the boat, then 

about one-third full of water, someone yelled, 

“Let’s get the hell out of here.” In one continuous 

motion of the bomb landing in the boat and the 

remaining crewmen rushing to the outboard side, 

the boat capsized.

Those men who made it out of the boat entered 

frigid 56 degree water lashed by heavy winds. 

Fortunately for the survivors, the Greek freighter MV 

Khian Star had arrived on the scene and her boats 

came to their rescue. In the end, however, only 14 of 

the 40-member crew survived. Considered a hazard to 

navigation, gunfire from a Coast Guard ship later sank 

the crewless Badger State. 

A Coast Guard investigation blamed the catastrophe on faulty loading materials and procedures; the 

tendency of the ship to “snap roll,” which put great 

stress on the bomb restraints; routing of the ship 

through the rough waters of the North Pacific; and, 

not least, the severity of the storm.

Even as Badger State and her crew suffered 

their fate, MSTS had taken steps to improve the 

handling and transportation of ordnance. That same 

December, the Concord Weapon Station in California 

loaded SS Azalea City with ammunition, but in this 

instance the cargo was secured in 226 specially 

designed and reinforced 35-foot containers. This 

method of moving ammunition minimized cargo 

handling, reduced costs, and speeded up the loading 

process—it took only one day to load Azalea City. 

The sacrifice of Badger State’s merchant mariners 

States Marine Lines’ SS Blue Grass State, a sister ship of SS Badger State.

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54
in support of the war effort did not go unnoticed. 

Just after noon on 31 August 1970, the President 

posthumously awarded Boatswain Richard D. Hughes 

of Badger State the American Merchant Marine 

Seamanship Trophy, which was presented to Mrs. 

Richard D. Hughes and her daughter at the Oval 

Office. The citation read that Hughes had displayed 

“distinguished seamanship under great stress . . . 

during the fire and explosion which cost him his life.” 

The following men lost their lives in the disaster:

Mohamed T. Al-Muwallad, Wiper

Gilbert F. Baker, Chief Engineer

Nick Barbieri, Oiler

Sam A. Bondy Jr., Third Mate

Bennie L. Brown, Steward

Joseph Candos, Able Seaman 

Leonard Cobbs, Chief Mate

Charles E. Coe, Messman

Nelson Fabre, Able Seaman

Ali A. Gazaly, Messman

Edward C. Hottendorf, Able Seaman

Richard D. Hughes, Bosun

John H. Jenkins, Galleyman

Edwin L. Jones, Messman

William K. LaFayette, Radio Officer

Konstantinos Mpountalis, Electrician

Richard C. Murray, Ordinary Seaman

Francisco C. Nunez, Oiler

Raymond W. Reiche, Second Assistant Engineer

Floyd K. Rilling, Able Seaman 

Jose A. Rodriguez, Second Electrician 

Leonard J. Scypion, Fireman-Watertender

Calvin R. Smith, Oiler

Kinnie Woods, Third Assistant Engineer

Robert A. Ziehm, Second Mate 

•

Sailors of the aircraft carrier Intrepid (CVS-11) load a pallet of bombs transferred to their ship from an ammunition ship 

off Vietnam in October 1966. 

USNI

55
and northern South Vietnam. The upsurge began 

at 0456 on 12 March 1970, when sappers mined SS 

Americloud, which was tied to a Delong Pier at Qui 

Nhon. The explosion tore a huge hole in the ship’s 

hull, compelling tugs to 

move her away from the 

dock and into shallow 

water where she could be 

more easily refloated. Tugs 

took similar action on 

22 September 1970 when 

the enemy exploded a 

device that badly damaged 

SS Americo, which was 

unloading ammunition at 

Cam Ranh. An explosion 

on 21 March 1971 at Qui 

Nhon blew a large hole 

in the starboard side of 

SS Robin Hood, requiring 

the ship’s departure from 

Vietnam for repairs. On 

14 June at the same port three months later, Viet 

Cong sappers sank the fully loaded SS American 

Hawk in 33 feet of water. 

The enemy scored their greatest coup with the 

17 August 1971 attack in Qui Nhon against the 

freighter SS Green Bay, the largest merchant ship 

sunk during the war. The explosion injured two 

merchant mariners and ripped an 18-by-31-foot hole 

in the hull. The ship listed to starboard, capsized 

at the dock, and sank. Ultimately, the freighter 

had to be scrapped. The action shifted to Danang 

during 1972. In April sappers sank the heavy-lift 

ship SS Transcolorado and, the following month, 

SS Jefferson City Victory. Quick action by their 

masters to refloat and patch the vessels enabled 

them to survive the attacks. 

During the post-Tet period, the war spread 

beyond Vietnam. The horrendous losses suffered by North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong 

forces in 1968 enabled the allies to go on the 

offensive. In 1969 President Nixon authorized U.S. 

bombing operations against enemy sanctuaries 

in Cambodia. In March 1970 supporters of Lon 

Nol, the Cambodian defense minister, ousted proCommunist Prince Norodom Sihanouk from power 

and established friendly relations with Washington. 

During late spring South Vietnamese and U.S. 

A South Vietnamese diver (on the right) involved in the 

operation to prevent Viet Cong swimmers from attaching 

limpet mines to the hulls of allied merchant ships. 

SS Green Bay, sunk by a Viet Cong mine in August 1971, lists to port at the dock in Qui Nhon. Author’s Collection

NHHC VN Collection

56
The SS Columbia Eagle Mutiny

THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE did not escape 

attempts to hinder military operations by Americans 

opposed to the war. On 14 March 1970 the captain of 

SS Rappahannock reported picking up 24 merchant 

mariners who had been afloat in two lifeboats in 

the Gulf of Thailand. The men claimed that Donald 

Swann, the master of the Victory-class freighter SS 

Columbia Eagle, had ordered them to abandon their 

ship because of a supposed bomb on board. As they 

waited in their boats for the master and the remaining 

15 crew members to join them, however, the ship 

belched a cloud of black smoke and steamed off. 

Only later was the mystery cleared up. Earlier 

that day, Fireman Water Tender Clyde W. McKay and 

bedroom Steward Alvin L. Glatkowski asked Chief 

Mate Herrick Morgan to arrange for an audience with 

Swann. As soon as the trio entered the master’s 

stateroom, McKay brandished a pistol and made 

demands. According to Columbia Eagle’s logbook: 

At 1315 this vessel was seized by Clyde W. 

McKay and Alvin L. Glatkowski who held captain 

and chief mate hostage in the master’s quarters 

under the threat of setting off a bomb unless 

the master and chief officer complied with their 

demands while being held at gun-point. 

The ship carried a load of 750- and 500-pound 

bombs for the Air Force and was bound for Sattahip, 

Thailand, when the two men took control. The mutineers were especially incensed that part of the cargo 

included napalm bombs. During the passage from the 

United States, McKay and Glatkowski had hatched 

their plan to seize the ship and order the master to 

sail it to China, North Vietnam, or the Middle East. 

Realizing that the U.S. Navy would in all likelihood 

frustrate that plan, the mutineers directed Swann to 

head for Sihanoukville, Cambodia, the primary port of 

the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a friend 

to America’s foes China and North Vietnam. 

After their arrival in port two days later, McKay 

and Glatkowski announced their intention to seek 

asylum with the Cambodian government. When a 

pair of Cambodian naval vessels docked next to the 

Columbia Eagle, the mutineers surrendered the ship 

and their weapons to the Cambodians. Washington 

ordered the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Mellon, steaming 

in the vicinity, to remain in international waters but 

prepare to seize the vessel if the Cambodians did not 

return her. That action proved unnecessary; the ship 

was released and sailed to the Philippines and later 

Taiwan, where she was scrapped. 

Sihanouk’s overthrow by his pro-American defense 

minister, Lon Nol, did not work to the benefit of the 

mutineers. The new government detained the pair 

for several months. McKay escaped and went into 

hiding. Pol Pot’s murderous Khmer Rouge may have 

killed the American when they took over the country 

in 1975. On 15 December 1970 Glatkowski turned 

himself in at the U.S. Embassy in the capital of 

Phnom Penh. The government charged him with one 

count of Mutiny on the High Seas, nine counts of 

Assault with a Dangerous Weapon on the High Seas, 

12 counts of Transportation of Kidnapped Person in 

Foreign Commerce, and one count of Neglect of Duty 

by Seamen. On 2 March 1971 Glatkowski appeared in 

U.S. District Court in Los Angeles and pleaded guilty 

to the mutiny and assault charges. Judge Manuel L. 

Real sentenced him to ten years for mutiny and five 

years for the assault on Swann, the sentences to 

run concurrently. Glatkowski, who served his time 

at Lompoc Federal Prison in California, was the first 

American convicted of mutiny in 150 years. •

Mutineers Clyde W. McKay (left) and Alvin L. Glatkowski, 

who seized control of SS Columbia Eagle in March 

1970, shortly before their incarceration by Cambodian 

authorities.

Courtesy Roberto Loiederman and Richard Linnett. 

57
ground forces entered Cambodia and destroyed 

or captured tons of North Vietnamese weapons, 

ammunition, and other supplies cached at base areas 

along the border. 

The conflict in Cambodia also spread beyond 

the border areas when an indigenous Communist 

guerrilla force, the Khmer Rouge, launched major 

offensives to defeat the new government in Phnom 

Penh. The group’s forces soon isolated the capital 

from the country’s seaports. Under attack by the 

Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese army, Lon 

Nol called on the United States to provide his forces 

with ammunition and fuel. The only way to transport these vital commodities to the capital, however, 

was by water—the Mekong River. 

On 12 January 1971 Vice Admiral Jerome H. 

King Jr., COMNAVFORV, instructed his deputy, 

Rear Admiral H. Spencer Matthews, to oversee 

a U.S.-South Vietnamese-Cambodian convoy 

operation on the Mekong. This military support to 

Cambodia was essential, since enemy forces had 

launched eight attacks against vessels on the river 

beginning in November 1970. In the last of these, 

on 6 January 1971, enemy 75mm recoilless rifles put 

a number of rounds into a Shell Oil Corporation 

tanker and a barge tied up alongside, killing six 

crewmen. 

Cambodian and South Vietnamese ground 

forces took responsibility for securing the banks of 

the river from the border with South Vietnam to the 

capital, a distance of 70 miles. South Vietnamese 

and Cambodian naval forces escorted the merchant 

ships and American air forces (Air Force, Army, and 

Navy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters) provided 

overhead cover. 

The first convoy, designated TP-1, sailed on 17 

January with three merchant ships and two tugs 

towing barges laden with fuel. Enemy fire along 

the river killed one South Vietnamese sailor and 

wounded ten, but the convoy ultimately delivered its 

cargo to Phnom Penh. The going got tougher on the 

23rd, when the 30 escort vessels and 24 ships, tugs, 

Rear Admiral H. Spencer Matthews Jr., who organized the allied resupply convoys to Phnom Penh, confers with South Vietnamese 

and Cambodian naval officers on board his vessel anchored at Tan Chau on the Mekong River.

Courtesy Michael A. Taylor 

58
and barges of TP-3 had to fight off four ambushes to 

accomplish their mission. 

The missions soon took on the likeness of the 

Allied convoys running the gauntlet of Nazi attacks 

in their voyages to Murmansk in the Soviet Union 

during World War II. On 22 February 1971, for 

example, convoy TP-7 sailed with two merchant 

ships, two tugs towing ammunition and fuel barges, 

a tanker, and an LCM-8 loaded with ammunition. 

On three separate occasions, the enemy hit the 

convoy with B-40 rocket, 57mm recoilless-rifle, and 

small-arms fire. 

During the third attack three enemy shells hit 

the Alaska Barge and Transport’s tug Shawnee, 

knocking out the vessel’s electricity and steering 

and grievously wounding Chief Mate Theodore 

D. Sauers, whose brain injury later permanently 

disabled him. As a merchant mariner, Sauers was 

not entitled to veteran’s benefits. In addition, he had 

signed on for service to Vietnam, not Cambodia. His 

family eventually sued Alaska Barge and Transport 

and the U.S. government to obtain compensation 

to cover his steep medical bills. In 1979, after an 

appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court, he was awarded 

$685,113.79. 

The Mekong River convoys continued to deliver 

their supplies to Phnom Penh but it took an increasing number of ground, air, and naval forces to do so. 

When the eight merchant vessels of TP-18 sailed on 

8 May 1971, they were protected by a fleet of South 

Vietnamese and Cambodian landing ships, river 

patrol boats, assault craft, minesweepers, and U.S. 

Navy helicopters. Between February and September 

1971, 640 fuel carriers, ammunition barges, and 

tugs in 32 convoys traveled to and from the South 

Vietnamese border to Phnom Penh. The enemy 

carried out 29 attacks against them. 

When the Americans were in overall charge of 

the Mekong River convoys, the enemy failed to halt 

even one transit to or from the Cambodian capital. 

By July 1971 the fuel ships and barges were delivering 25,000 tons of POL to Phnom Penh each month. 

The Mekong River convoys did not fare as 

well in succeeding years. In keeping with the 

schedule of U.S. withdrawals from South Vietnam, 

COMNAVFORV ended American direction of the 

Mekong River convoys in March 1972. Soon after, 

Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese closed in on 

Phenom Penh and increased their attacks on the 

convoys. In April 1973 river ambushers sank two 

freighters, an ammunition barge, and a fuel barge 

and damaged another eight vessels. The final convoy 

to and from the capital, on 26 January 1975, lost 

five vessels to enemy ambushes and mines. In April 

1975 the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh, overthrew the Lon Nol government, and soon turned 

Cambodia into the “killing fields” of Southeast Asia. 

The U.S. overseas logistics establishment 

changed some of the ways it did business, partly as a 

result of the Vietnam War experience. The Air Force 

renamed its Military Air Traffic Service the Military 

Airlift Command and in September 1970 the Navy 

retitled the Military Sea Transportation Service 

the Military Sealift Command (MSC). By the end 

of the war, most of the troops went to Vietnam and 

returned to the United States by air. Recognizing 

that fact, MSC inactivated its fleet of transports. It 

also culled its fleet of old freighters and tankers and 

replaced them with newer and more technologically 

advanced ships. For instance, the command leased 

American Challenger-class C-4 freighters from 

United States Lines and retained in service many of 

the Sea-Land container ships. MSC also contracted 

Seal of the Military Sealift Command 59
with Marine Transport Lines to build and operate 

nine Sealift-class tankers.

The Navy planned to replace the aging Victoryclass freighters with thirty new forward deployment 

logistics (FDL) ships. MSC wanted a vessel capable 

of 24-knots, humidity-controlled holds, roll-on/

roll-off ramps, and the ability to off-load either pier 

side or at anchor. Planners also anticipated that the 

ship would employ helicopters to deliver supplies 

ashore, a concept successfully tested during the war 

by HMAS Sydney, an Australian aircraft carrier.

The Navy selected Litton Industries to design the 

FDL. The vessel would be propelled by 60,000-shaft 

horsepower-geared steam turbines driving twin 

screws. It would be 855 feet in length and have a 

104-foot beam, the latter to allow the ship’s passage 

through the Panama Canal. Litton concluded that 

their ship would be able to off-load its entire cargo 

onto the pier in 12 hours and from an anchorage in 

24 hours. A single FDL would be able to carry cargo 

equal to that of seven Victory-class freighters, a 

quartet would be capable of transporting the equipment of an entire infantry division, and eight could 

move an armored division. The FDL did not come 

to fruition, however, because the enormous $150 

billion outlay for the long Vietnam War precluded 

significant warship or merchant ship construction. 

The FDL concept did, however, materialize in the 

form of large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships 

after the Persian Gulf War. 

HMAS Sydney steams for Vung Tau with a load of trucks and other essential materials for Australian forces deployed southeast of Saigon.

NHHC VN Collection

60
In addition to coping with limited resources, the 

new Military Sealift Command had to battle bureaucratic foes for its existence. On 24 February 1971 

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard issued 

a memorandum to the secretaries of all military 

branches and the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating: 

In order to improve effectiveness of supply 

support and to increase efficiency and economy, 

traffic management functions for land and 

ocean transportation, other than intra-theater 

land transportation in overseas areas, will be 

consolidated and assigned to the Secretary of 

the Army as the Single Manager for surface 

transportation. 

This proposal aimed to transfer all sealift functions, except for the operation of the small MSC 

nucleus fleet, from the Navy to the Army. The Navy 

would no longer be able to charter ships from the 

commercial sector. 

Vice Admiral Arthur R. Gralla, Vice Admiral 

Ramage’s relief as Commander Military Sea 

Transportation Service in April 1970, was not about 

to let that happen without a fight. He served as a 

16-year-old deck hand on merchant ships in the 

1930s and fought with distinction in World War II, 

earning a combat award for his actions at the Battle 

of Leyte Gulf. He commanded warships and worked 

in numerous staff billets in the postwar period and 

served as head of the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance 

and Inspector General before his assignment as 

Commander MSTS. 

Gralla testified before Congress in September 

1971 that Packard’s proposed measure would 

“disrupt, disorganize, and I suspect, demoralize 

the relationship of military sealift and merchant 

marine interests.” Chief of Naval Operations Elmo 

R. Zumwalt Jr. and the other members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, with the exception of Army Chief of 

Staff General Westmoreland, concurred with Gralla. 

Congress did not endorse the proposed change. 

The Navy’s bureaucratic opponents, however, 

exacted their revenge. The admiral was forced 

into retirement in November 1971, the MSC area 

commander billets were reduced from one-star flag 

rank to captain, and the Commander MSC billet was 

reduced from two-star to one-star. Gralla’s deputy, 

Rear Admiral John Chase, then took the helm as 

Commander MSC. 

The huge expenditures of the Vietnam War 

compelled the Navy to reduce personnel costs and 

decommission many fleet oilers whose primary duty 

had been to refuel carriers and other warships by 

underway replenishment. In that process, a Navy 

oiler would steam parallel to a combatant and pass 

fuel to the latter via hose lines strung between them. 

Admiral Zumwalt was impressed with the Soviet 

Navy’s use of commercial tankers to replenish warships so he ordered a test to see if U.S. commercial 

tankers could be equipped and manned by merchant 

mariners to directly serve deployed naval forces. He 

observed that “U.S. flag commercial ships constitute 

hundreds of mobile U.S. bases which can be utilized 

by our government in many ways for furtherance of 

our national interests.” 

As with any new concept, opposition quickly 

Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. and most of 

the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor 

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard’s proposal for 

reordering the maritime transportation program. 

NHHC VN Collection

61
OWING TO THE STELLAR PERFORMANCE of USNS 

Taluga (T-AO-62) and her crew of merchant mariners, 

Charter Log II had the greatest long-term impact on 

the operating Navy, MSC, and the merchant marine. 

In May 1972 the Navy decommissioned the oiler 

Taluga and transferred her to MSC to become the command’s first true underway replenishment oiler. During 

the next six months Captain Lawrence Nasset, the 

master of Taluga, oversaw the training of 105 civilian 

mariners and 16 naval personnel to handle the work 

previously accomplished by the 220-man Navy crew. 

Navy yard workers removed the vessel’s weapons and 

converted cavernous personnel berthing areas into 

two- and four-person staterooms. 

Taluga then completed a three-week training 

program at Port Hueneme, California, where the crew 

learned how to operate the underway replenishment 

(UNREP) gear. That accomplished, the ship and her 

crew spent the next two weeks at sea with the Fleet 

Training Group putting into practice what they had 

learned. In Underway Replenishment of Naval Ships, 

Captain Henry Phelps, tasked with evaluating the 

experiment, reported:

I know a professional job when I see one, and 

UNREPs conducted by Taluga have been top 

drawer. Crew progress has been noticeable and 

is continuing. Everyone pitches in with stewards, 

oilers, and wipers doubling as line handlers, signalmen, and phone talkers. Spirit is great, morale 

is high aboard ship, and there is a healthy spirit of 

competition in every operation.

As a final test of the ship’s readiness for fleet 

service, Taluga replenished the Ranger (CV-61) carrier 

battle group. While the carrier steamed along Taluga’s 

port side, other task group warships took on fuel from 

hoses on the starboard side. 

The Navy was now convinced that Taluga and her 

crewmen, nicknamed the “tigers,” were ready for 

operations with the fleet. In October 1972 the ship 

reported for duty with Service Group 3 (Task Force 73) 

at Yankee Station. The Attack Carrier Striking Force 

(Task Force 77) was then involved in combat operations against North Vietnam. Over the next two years, 

USNS Taluga and Underway Replenishment 

of the Fleet

surfaced. Critics pointed out that commercial 

tankers normally transported crude oil, not the 

refined fuel used in diesel or gas turbine-powered 

warships. Portions of the commercial industry 

opposed their ships being directly tied to Navy 

service. Some Navy leaders did not want to rely on 

commercial tankers crewed by civilian mariners as 

their secondary, much less sole, source of fuel. 

As directed by Zumwalt, Admiral Gralla and 

the Maritime Administration launched a series of 

tests—named Charter Log—to evaluate different 

concepts. MSC contracted the Hudson Waterways 

Company for the use of SS Erna Elizabeth in 

Charter Log I, which began in February 1972. 

Refueling at Sea by Walter E. Brightwell. 

USNS Taluga (T-AO-62) proved that civilian-manned 

tankers could successfully service the Navy’s combat 

vessels.

Navy Art Collection Author’s Collection

62
Taluga carried out over 500 UNREPs. In June 1973 the 

oiler earned the second highest rating of all logistics 

ships in the Western Pacific. The following year, she 

was rated number one. 

In Sidney W. Emery Jr.’s Proceedings article titled 

“Civilian-Manned Support Ships: A View from the 

Fleet,” one sailor who worked with Taluga’s crew 

praised the “tigers”:

Those guys were damned good. . . . To be sure, 

they were a motley-looking bunch compared to 

our crew. You could pick out every sort of garb 

from khaki cutoffs to rugby shirts; all of them 

wearing lifejackets. The Taluga was carrying a 

small crew, and her men were generally much 

older than their counterparts on board our cruiser. 

Yet, something in the way they handled the rigs, 

the way they communicated once alongside, the 

manner in which they responded—all spoke of 

professionalism.

The Charter Log experiments validated the 

concept of civilian mariners operating in direct 

support of U.S. naval vessels, not only in peacetime 

but also in wartime. In recognition of his outstanding 

performance in command of Taluga, the Navy awarded 

Captain Nasset its highest award to a civilian, the 

Distinguished Civilian Service Award. Chief Engineer 

Donald K. McKee earned a Navy Superior Civilian 

Service Award for his dedication to the mission. 

Rear Admiral John D. Johnson, Commander Task 

Force 73, who later became MSC’s tenth commander, 

noted the “outstanding support Taluga has continually 

provided to units of the Seventh Fleet.” The Seventh 

Fleet commander, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III, 

was so impressed with the success of the Charter Log 

experiment and Taluga’s performance with his fleet 

that he accelerated the deployment of civilian-manned 

tankers to MSC when he became CNO in July 1974. •

The small tanker could transport 275,000 barrels 

of fuel (35,000 tons) at a maximum speed of 16.5 

knots. Equipment compatible with Navy underway 

replenishment gear, including an astern fueling rig, 

was installed on the ship. Captain William “Billy” 

Phillips, who rode the ship as Admiral Zumwalt’s 

representative, pronounced Charter Log I a success. 

The astern fueling rig, however, proved too cumbersome and manpower intensive. 

Six more tests followed: 

Charter Log II: Determining whether civilian 

mariners could replace a Navy crew on board an oiler.

Charter Log III: Manning an oiler with senior 

Navy enlisted personnel, in a manner similar to 

civilian manning. For practical and political reasons, 

this test was never conducted.

Charter Log IV: Testing the capability of MSCchartered tankers in astern refueling opportunities.

Charter Log V: Turning over cable repair ships 

and fleet tugs to MSC and replacing their crews with 

civilian crews.

Charter Log VI: Refueling from commercial 

tankers, carried out in the Indian Ocean.

Charter Log VII: Determining whether a commercial lighter aboard ship could resupply Navy 

combat store ships at sea. •

The use of civilian-manned oilers to refuel naval vessels, 

as ably demonstrated during Taluga’s service with the 

fleet, persuaded Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 

James L. Holloway III to approve tasking MSC with that 

responsibility. 

NHHC VN Collection

63
64

The AB&T tug Pawnee and an AB&T barge assist in the transfer of refugees to SS Green Port during the chaotic evacuation of 

central South Vietnam in March 1975.

NHHC VN Collection
THE END OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

When North Vietnam launched the 

Easter Offensive on 30 March 

1972, only a small number of 

American military advisors 

remained in South Vietnam. President Nixon, 

however, immediately ordered increased logistics 

support for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 

The Task Force 77 carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin 

and U.S. Air Force and Marine aircraft based in 

Thailand and South Vietnam also needed massive 

supplies of petroleum to help defeat the enemy’s 

assault. To meet this requirement MSC chartered 

44 U.S. and foreign tankers. The need for this 

supply continued through the year as South 

Vietnamese ground troops, with U.S. air support, 

defeated North Vietnam’s offensive and President 

Nixon ordered the Operation Linebacker bombing 

campaign against North Vietnam.

The Department of Defense upgraded the 

weapons and equipment in the hands of the South 

Vietnamese under Project Enhance from May to 

October 1972. As peace talks resumed in Paris in 

October, the United States ordered a large-scale 

shipment of supplies to Vietnam in Operation 

Enhance Plus, before a treaty was signed. Beginning 

on 12 October and ending 23 December, the 

Department of Defense shipped more than 105,000 

tons of equipment, including 70,767 weapons, 382 

artillery pieces, 622 tracked vehicles, and 2,035 

wheeled vehicles—in total nearly $2 billion worth 

of military hardware. The powerful allied military 

response finally convinced the leaders in Hanoi 

to settle the conflict. In accordance with the Paris 

Agreement of 27 January 1973, signed by the United 

States and the Vietnamese parties to the hostilities, 

all American military forces would be withdrawn 

from South Vietnam by 29 March. 

MSC, in Operation Roll-Up (28 January to 29 

March), employed 20 merchant ships to remove 

144,876 tons of U.S. military and 82,833 tons of 

allied military cargo. A civilian, D. E. Berney, took 

charge of MSC Office Vietnam when the last naval 

officer in charge, Commander T. J. Sullivan, left the 

country. The Alaska Barge and Transport Company 

closed its terminals and turned over its assets to the 

South Vietnamese government. 

During the Vietnam War, MSTS/MSC and the 

U.S. Merchant Marine mounted and sustained a 

trans-Pacific logistics operation equaled only by 

America’s global effort in World War II. From July 

1964 to March 1973, ships under MSTS control 

transported more than 81 million tons of cargo and 

97 million tons of fuel to Vietnam. In comparison, 

during World War II, the United States shipped 

203 million tons of cargo and 64 million tons of 

petroleum. In 6,799 voyages to Vietnam, chartered 

and commercial ships delivered 64 percent of these 

cargos, MSC nucleus fleet ships transported 21 

percent, and activated reserve fleet ships another 

15 percent. Only the United States could have 

handled such a Herculean overseas operation in the 

20th century.

The Military Sealift Command took center 

stage for the last major operation of the conflict 

in Indochina—the evacuation of refugees. That 

endeavor began on 10 March 1975 when North 

Vietnam’s army launched its final offensive to seize 

South Vietnam. Enemy forces attacked the remote 

town of Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands 

and routed the South Vietnamese troops there. 

Concluding that his army was not strong enough 

to defend all of the country, President Nguyen Van 

Thieu ordered the withdrawal of his forces from the 

surrounding region. That movement of troops and 

civilians toward the coast turned into a panicked 

flight when enemy forces cut the main roads.

Learning of the disaster, the troops guarding 

the northern provinces of South Vietnam also 

began to flee toward the major port of Danang, 

with five North Vietnamese divisions close behind. 

Thousands of soldiers, marines, and civilians 

crowded into the city hoping for evacuation by sea. 65
The Vietnam War Logistic Effort

Commodity

(Tons x 1,000) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Total

General Cargo 2,071 6,038 8,301 8,627 6,581 4,888 3,658 1,625 215 42,002

Aircraft 182 178 321 250 261 57 20 33 0 1,301

Ammunition 386 833 1,694 2,196 1,927 1,447 1,012 1,120 156 10,771

Bulk Cargo 0 2 0 384 2,145 2,958 2,921 1,150 234 9,793

Trailers/

Containers 0 244 270 237 229 222 163 3 0 1,367

Refrigerated 68 191 335 423 393 301 205 72 6 1,993

Special 

(Military) 1,491 2,398 2,495 2,624 2,281 1,162 839 472 53 13,814

Petroleum 6,380 8,986 12,600 16,033 14,182 11,838 9,887 9,060 N/A 97,083

Ship Arrivals 

in Vietnam 385 991 1,360 1,304 1,002 781 473 435 68 6,799

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

Nucleus Cargo 

Ships 57 (1) 68 (1) 84 (2) 91 (1) 91 90 87 (14) 77 (7) 75 (12) 72 (41)

Nucleus Tankers 25 (1) 26 27 27 27 27 26 25 20 (3) 17

Nucleus 

Transports 16 (3) 16 16 16 (9) 16 (11) 11 (9) 3 (1) 2 2 0

Chartered Cargo 

Ships 15 33 (1) 139 (3) 174 (7) 171 (4) 157 131 83 96 49

Charter Tankers 20 16 (2) 38 51 67 52 31 31 29 23

NDRF Activated 2 2 101 166 144 144 

(26) 70 (68) 0 0 0

TOTALS 135 (5) 161 (4) 405 (5) 525 

(17)

516 

(15)

481

(35)

348

(83) 218 (7) 222 (15)

161 

(41)

*Numbers in parenthesis indicate number of ships in reduced operating status.

Because the Paris Agreement barred U.S. military forces from entering South Vietnam’s territorial 

waters, on 24 March the Navy directed MSC to use 

its unarmed civilian-manned ships in an evacuation 

mission. Five tugs towing barges were immediately 

sent to Danang and the following day the command 

alerted 10 freighters to prepare to evacuate refugees 

from the port. Soon after the first ships arrived 

at Danang, they embarked U.S. consulate, MSC, 

and other American personnel and thousands of 

Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. Once filled to 

capacity, the ships steamed for the south. By 30 

March order had broken down in the city so the 

MSC ships loaded all the people they could—the last 

of the 30,000 embarked during the four-day operation—and withdrew from the port. On that day the 

North Vietnamese army stormed the city.

The enemy captured the ports of Qui Nhon, Tuy 

Hoa, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh in rapid succession. 

MSC ships took on board thousands more refugees, 

but the speed of the enemy’s advance limited the 

number of refugees the ships could rescue. Crowding 

and the lack of sufficient food and water for the 

thousands of embarked passengers prompted armed 

South Vietnamese soldiers to order the masters 

66 of several MSC ships to head for Vung Tau, south 
of Saigon, rather than the chosen disembarkation 

site, the remote island of Phu Quoc in the Gulf of 

Thailand. Alarmed by this development, the Navy 

dispatched 50-member Marine security details to the 

MSC ships to restore order and resupply the ships 

with food, water, and medicine. The maritime exodus 

of 130,000 refugees from northern and central South 

Vietnam finally ended when the North Vietnamese 

advance to the south slowed. During the first week of 

April, the front stabilized east of Saigon at Xuan Loc. 

Deciding that Hanoi had breached the terms of 

the Paris Agreement with its brazen offensive, the 

administration of President Gerald R. Ford ordered 

the Seventh Fleet to concentrate south of Saigon and 

to prepare to evacuate Americans and endangered 

South Vietnamese citizens. An armada of 27 ships, 

including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and 

amphibious ships, gathered off the port of Vung 

Tau. MSC reinforced the naval force with 10 ships: 

USNS Sgt. Truman Kimbro, USNS Sgt. Andrew 

Miller (T-AK-242), USNS Greenville Victory (T-AK237), SS Pioneer Contender, SS Pioneer Commander, 

SS Green Forest, SS Green Port, SS American 

Challenger, Boo Heung Pioneer, and Audaz. 

 As fighting resumed at the end of the month 

and North Vietnamese forces continued their push 

toward Saigon, MSC directed its staff in the capital 

to destroy or ship out their records and relocate 

to the Seventh Fleet flagship, Blue Ridge (LCC-19). 

MSC Office Vietnam then directed the actions of the 

merchant ships offshore from Blue Ridge. Ironically, 

Charles Hoffman, who had steamed to Chu Lai with 

Petaluma at the start of major conflict in 1965, was 

on board for the final act of the Vietnam War. 

Finally, on 29 April the Navy ordered the evacuation of Saigon in Operation Frequent Wind. Even 

as Marine and Air Force helicopters lifted refugees 

from the besieged city, the tugs Harumi, Chitose 

Maru, Saigon 240, Shibaura, and Asiatic Stamita

and Korean LST Boo Heung Pioneer towed barges 

filled with refugees from Saigon’s docks and headed 

for the open sea. The enemy fired on the vessels as 

they traversed the treacherous Rung Sat Swamp. 

This convoy eventually reached Vung Tau at 0200 on 

30 April. 

As the log of SS Pioneer Commander recounted, 

the situation offshore was anything but orderly: 

Tuesday April 29, 1975:

1900 First evacuees boarded, from small craft 

alongside causeway.

2038 Many private boats alongside. Total aboard 

at this time 411.

2110 Five or more boats cut loose and abandoned. Drifting in area of vessel’s rudder 

and propeller.

2130 Eleven private boats astern. . . . Both 

manned and derelict boats continue to 

cross and hover in stern area of this vessel.

2145 This vessel advised (task force) CTG 76.5 

that due to the massive number of private 

craft, we are unable to maintain any kind 

of control in separating evacuees with 

priority.

2200 In excess of twenty boats and more 

coming.

2300 About 2,500 evacuees aboard.

Wednesday April 30, 1975:

0000 Sighted burning derelict in vicinity of 

vessel and boats.

0100 Wire cable parted on stem-end of causeway due to heavy strain of 25 to 39 junks 

secured to same.

0645 Embarkation complete with approximately 

6,000 refugees aboard.

0752 Causeway away.

0800 Preparing to get underway.

On the evening of the 30th, Sgt. Andrew Miller 

loaded refugees from two barges tied up alongside. 

Shortly afterward, a helicopter full of refugees crashlanded on the now empty barge. The helicopter’s 

passengers and crew, none of whom apparently 

suffered injuries from the mishap, boarded Sgt. 

Andrew Miller. The MSC crew cut the flaming barge 

and helicopter loose. Not all operations went as 

smoothly; the foreign-flagged merchant ship Audaz, 

which was denied a Marine security detachment 

by the Navy, sailed from Vung Tau empty. On 2 

May, the MSC ships, with 44,000 passengers, were 

joined by a fleet of 26 Vietnam Navy ships carrying 

30,000 refugees. The mass of ships headed for the 

Philippines. After lifting a total of 179,050 refugees 67
by 15 May 1975, MSC’s role in the Vietnam War was 

finally over.

Despite the evacuation from Vietnam and the 

end of the war, American merchant ships still 

faced danger in the waters of Southeast Asia. At 

1418 on 12 May 1975, Captain Charles Miller of 

the Sea-Land Corporation’s container ship SS 

Mayaguez, en route to Sattahip, Thailand, radioed 

an alarming report: “Have been fired upon and 

boarded by Cambodian armed forces [Khmer Rouge 

soldiers] at 9 degrees, 48 minutes north/102 degrees 

53 minutes east. Ship is being towed to unknown 

Cambodian port.” 

A Navy patrol plane, fired upon by the forces 

below, located the ship off the island of Koh Tang. 

Armed with this information, Washington ordered 

an operation to recapture the ship and rescue the 

crew. Intelligence reports persuaded American 

leaders that at least some of the men were being 

held on the island. In actuality the Khmer Rouge 

had moved all the men to Kompong Som. With the 

approval of President Ford, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

directed the deployment of Navy warships to the 

area. The destroyer escort Harold E. Holt (DE-1074), 

the guided missile destroyer Henry B. Wilson (DDG7), the aircraft carriers Coral Sea (CVA-43) and 

Hancock (CVA-19), and the amphibious assault ship 

Okinawa (LPH-3) immediately headed for the scene. 

As U.S. forces converged on the area, the accidental 

crash of a Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter in 

Thailand killed 23 American service personnel. 

An Air Force helicopter airlifted to Harold 

E. Holt six volunteer merchant mariners, led by 

Greenville’s First Officer Clinton J. Harriman. Their 

purpose was to get Mayaguez underway if the crew 

could not be found. Air Force helicopters also transported elements of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, to 

the destroyer escort. 

Traumatized refugees rescued from Saigon by a Marine helicopter move across the deck of the aircraft carrier Midway (CVA-41) 

off the coast of South Vietnam on 30 April 1975.

NHHC VN Collection

68
Refugees Lifted by MSC-Controlled Ships from March 28 to May 15, 1975

Ship Total Number of Refugees

SS American Challenger – United States Lines 23,500

SS American Racer – United States Lines 3,900

Boo Heung Pioneer – Republic of Korea Navy 7,200

SS Green Forest – Central Gulf Lines 8,000

SS Green Port – Central Gulf Lines 15,000

SS Green Wave – Central Gulf Lines 5,200

SS Pioneer Commander – United States Lines 22,000

SS Pioneer Contender – United States Lines 34,200

SS Pioneer Contractor – United States Lines 100

Seapac tugs and barges 6,800

SS Transcolorado – SeaTrain Lines 11,800

USNS Greenville Victory – MSC 10,000

USNS Sgt. Truman Kimbro – MSC 8,200

USNS Sgt. Andrew Miller – MSC 23,000

Tug Vera 8 150

TOTAL 179,050

Washington ordered the guided missile destroyer Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) and other warships to the waters off Cambodia where 

Khmer Rouge fighters had seized SS Mayaguez.

NHHC VN Collection

69
Marines raise Old Glory on recaptured SS Mayaguez

.

NHHC VN Collection

70
As planned, on the morning of 15 May combat 

aircraft from Coral Sea bombed the airfield at 

Kompong Som as Air Force helicopters deployed a 

Marine assault force on Koh Tang. The fight for the 

island proved to be a hard one that cost the lives of 

14 Marines, two sailors, and two airmen and the loss 

or damage of 13 helicopters.

Meanwhile, Harold E. Holt and her embarked 

Marines moved to recapture Mayaguez. Just before 

Commander Robert A. Peterson laid his naval vessel 

alongside the merchant ship, Air Force LTV A-7 

Corsair IIs dropped tear gas on her to incapacitate 

any defenders. At 0715, the boarding party, wearing 

gas masks, moved quickly and efficiently to secure 

the ship. The crewmen had earlier been put on a boat 

by the Khmer Rouge and sent toward the American 

ships. Shortly after the assault, Harriman and his 

men and six sailors from Duluth (LPD-6) boarded 

the ship to get her underway. The merchant mariners 

eventually restored power to the vessel and were 

joined by the released crew of Mayaguez. Later, in 

the Oval Office of the White House, President Ford 

presented the volunteer merchant mariners from 

Greenville Victory Meritorious Service Awards. •

Sailors and merchant mariners observe as the destroyer escort Harold E. Holt (DE-1074) prepares to take SS Mayaguez under tow 

after her dramatic recapture by U.S. naval forces on 15 May 1975.

NHHC VN Collection

71
72

The Vietnam War logistics experience strengthened the U.S. sealift establishment for the challenges of the future. To support 

Operation Desert Shield, fast sealift ship USNS Regulus (T-AKR-292), escorted by a Coast Guard cutter, departs Savannah, 

Georgia, to deliver war materials to U.S. forces deployed to the Persian Gulf.

NHHC Persian Gulf War Collection
CONCLUSION

The sealift effort mounted by the United 

States to support American and allied 

forces fighting in Vietnam was one 

of the most remarkable maritime 

logistics operations in military history. Military 

Sea Transportation Service, the National Defense 

Reserve Fleet, America’s commercial shipping 

industry, and contracted foreign firms put to sea a 

mighty fleet that helped enable the United States 

to deny North Vietnam a quick conquest of the 

Republic of Vietnam. In two years—1965 and 

1966—sealift ships transported 173,000 American 

and South Korean troops and their equipment to 

the combat theater. Simultaneously, cargo ships 

and tankers delivered the ammunition, fuel, food, 

building materials, and other supplies essential to 

the sustainment of an expeditionary force that, by 

1968, totaled more than half a million troops. For 

over eight years, the sealift forces maintained the 

logistics pipeline across the broad Pacific Ocean 

and with the end of hostilities assisted in the 

humanitarian evacuation of more than 179,000 

Americans, Vietnamese, and other friendly nationals from Indochina. 

The sealift operation that entailed close to 

7,000 ship transits to Vietnam succeeded because 

U.S. government agencies responsible for maritime 

affairs, the Navy and the other armed forces, 

American shipping firms, and friendly foreign governments cooperated to an unprecedented degree. 

Also instrumental to the success of the sealift operation were the MSTS/MSC commanders, especially 

Vice Admirals Donaho, Ramage, and Gralla, who 

oversaw much of the ambitious enterprise. 

Enemy action in Vietnam (and Badger State’s

disaster at sea) claimed 12 ships and 11 tugs and 

barges. Hostile forces also seized Mayaguez and 

her crew, albeit briefly. America’s civilian mariners 

braved the dangers of the sea and the hostile 

environment of Vietnam to carry out their duties 

as their fathers had done in World War II and the 

Korean War. Badger State’s tragedy cost the lives 

of 26 merchant seamen while enemy gunfire on the 

Long Tau and Mekong rivers and mines in port and 

ashore killed another 25 U.S. naval officers, enlisted 

personnel, and American and non-American 

merchant mariners. Since there was no “front line” 

in Vietnam, even those service personnel at the 

bases sometimes became casualties. On 16 October 

1969, for instance, a Viet Cong mortar round killed 

Lieutenant Commander Paul E. Wall of MSTS Unit 

Vung Tau while he carried out his responsibilities at 

the small port. An enemy attack killed 21-year-old 

Seaman John J. Stegeland III at his post in Qui Nhon 

at the start of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive in 

April 1972. Many more merchant mariners suffered 

wounds during the war. 

In the early years allied logistics forces faced 

monumental challenges to accomplish the mission. 

Ships withdrawn from the National Defense Reserve 

Fleet, many of them built during World War II, 

needed significant repairs to ready them for service 

on the tempestuous North Pacific. Key U.S. ports 

were not accustomed to loading ships with huge 

stores of ammunition, fuel, heavy armored vehicles, 

and other bulky and sometimes dangerous cargo. 

The ports of South Vietnam, the final destination 

for this material, were woefully unprepared to 

accommodate hundreds of ships in their roadsteads 

and lacked requisite cranes or other off-loading 

equipment, warehouses, or fuel storage facilities. 

Initially, MSTS lacked sufficient or capable landing 

craft, barges, tugs, LARCs, or other conveyances to 

lighter cargo along the coast or transfer it across the 

beaches. 

The sealift organizations, however, surmounted 

these obstacles with dogged determination and 

innovative thinking. The Maritime Administration 

and MSTS honed procedures for loading cargo in 

the United States and transporting it safely and 

expeditiously across the Pacific. The containerization of cargo and construction of container ships, 73
championed by the pioneering Malcolm McLean, 

significantly improved the delivery of vital war 

materials as did the chartering of additional foreignflag ships. A crash construction program undertaken 

by the Army and MSTS provided the Republic of 

Vietnam with ports able to handle oceangoing ships. 

The revolutionary Delong Piers and the Newport 

facility near Saigon enhanced the off-loading process 

as did new warehouses, cargo hardstands, LST 

ramps, mobile cranes, and other cargo-handling 

equipment. Roll-on/roll-off ships sped the disembarkation of armored fighting vehicles. Advanced 

offshore discharge gear facilitated the transfer of 

fuel supplies to the fighting forces ashore. Landing 

ships and craft, barges, and tugs—some operated 

and crewed by men from the Republic of Korea, 

Republic of China (Taiwan), and Thailand—eased 

the distribution of cargo to South Vietnam’s minor 

coastal ports and into the country’s rivers. LARCs 

and other amphibians enabled the transfer of cargo 

over unimproved beaches. The MSTS/MSC offices 

in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, Thailand, and 

Vietnam were critical to the efficient functioning of 

the overall sealift effort. 

The Vietnam War’s huge draw on the country’s 

resources eventually compelled the U.S. Congress 

to reduce not only the nation’s military forces and 

overseas commitments but ships and personnel of 

the merchant marine and MSC. The 965-ship merchant fleet of 1965 had been reduced by 1975 to 517 

vessels. During the same period MSC’s fleet dropped 

from 201 to 161 ships. Fewer than half of the 48,273 

merchant mariners and 9,809 other civilians serving 

with MSC in 1965 remained on the job in 1975. 

Nevertheless, the war in Vietnam inspired the 

U.S. maritime organizations to modernize and 

streamline their resources in preparation for future 

conflicts. The Military Sealift Command Maritime 

Administration eliminated almost all of its troopships, aircraft transports, and old break-bulk 

freighters and tankers in the reserve fleet. In 1977 

the U.S. government created within the National 

Defense Reserve Fleet the Ready Reserve Force 

and eventually provided the new organization with 

102 of the most advanced cargo ships, tankers, and 

other support vessels. Five tankers were equipped 

with hoses and other equipment enabling them to 

transfer fuel ashore from a point 3 miles out to sea. 

Congress also funded the construction of advanced 

roll-on/roll-off ships and container ships equipped 

with cranes that could off-load other ships as well as 

themselves. 

The concept of forward-deploying ships loaded 

with military supplies to global trouble spots before 

the outbreak of a conflict, first conceived in the 

Vietnam War era, came to fruition in the 1980s 

with a $7 billion investment by the government. 

Congress funded the construction and conversion of 

13 specialized maritime prepositioning ships (MPS). 

The Kocak-, Hauge-, and Bobo-class vessels featured 

controlled climate holds and the combined capabilities of containerships, break-bulk freighters, roll-on/

roll-offs, and tankers. The ships also mounted cranes 

and embarked lighters that allowed the vessels to 

off-load while at anchor. Concluding that Corpus 

Christi Bay had provided a valuable aircraft repair 

service to the Army during the war, the Marine 

Corps persuaded the Navy Department to convert 

a pair of Wright-class containerships into aviation 

logistics ships. MSC deployed its modern ships in 

three MPS squadrons based in the Atlantic Ocean, 

Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and the Mariana 

Islands. Each squadron contained equipment and 

thirty days’ worth of supplies for a 16,500-man 

Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). The other 

armed services stowed material in 11 dedicated 

ships at Diego Garcia and the Western Pacific. 

MSC purchased from the Sea-Land Corporation 

eight SL-7 containerships built in the early 1970s 

and modified them into fast sealift ships (FSSs) 

by installing a roll-on/roll-off area amidships and 

pedestal cranes able to load and discharge cargo 

swiftly, even at ports lacking requisite cranes and 

other off-loading equipment. The eight ships, each 

capable of 33 knots, could embark a full mechanized 

U.S. Army division at East Coast ports, transport 

the unit to a crisis spot, and return to the United 

States to load additional units. 

The successful use of the civilian-crewed oiler 

74 Taluga to fuel warships in the latter stages of the 
Vietnam War led to the general use of merchant 

mariners to operate fleet tugs, ammunition ships, 

combat stores ships, and submarine tenders in 

support of the Navy’s operating forces. On 1 

February 2010 Frank Cable (AS-40) became the last 

Navy auxiliary ship to be turned over to MSC for 

manning by civilian mariners. 

The proof that America’s maritime organizations 

had profited from the Vietnam experience was 

plain to see 15 years later in the Persian Gulf War. 

Just two weeks after the 2 August 1990 invasion 

of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces, a 

trio of MPS ships off-loaded the armored fighting 

vehicles, ammunition, and equipment of a Marine 

expeditionary brigade in Saudi Arabia. The troops 

arrived soon afterward by air. On the 25th, other 

MPSs discharged the gear and supplies for a second 

MEB in Saudi ports. Hence, in relatively short order, 

strong U.S. ground units were on hand to deter or 

defeat an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. This rapid 

deployment of combat forces validated the maritime 

prepositioning concept. The Ready Reserve Force 

(RRF) also earned its keep in Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm. The activated ships of the 

RRF, along with the fast sealift ships and ships of the 

U.S. and foreign merchant fleets, transported a halfmillion-strong U.S. combat contingent to the theater 

of war in only seven months. In June 2002 USNS 

Watson (T-AKR-310) off-loaded cargo in Kuwait 

and was followed by 154 other vessels in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Years of effort by the U.S. maritime organizations 

and the sacrifices made by MSC personnel and 

American and foreign civilian merchant mariners 

did not bring victory in the Vietnam War. But the 

10-year experience deploying and supplying allied 

forces in Southeast Asia strengthened the U.S. sealift 

establishment for the challenges of the future. •

MV PFC Dewayne T. Williams (T-AK-3009), operated by the Military Sealift Command, offloads armored fighting vehicles 

and earth-moving equipment at a port in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War.

NHHC Persian Gulf War Collection

75
Acronyms

AB&T Alaska Barge and Transport Company

AMC Army Materiel Command

COMNAVFORV Commander Naval Forces Vietnam

COMUSMACV Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

FDL forward deployment logistics 

FFD floating forward depot

FSS fast sealift ships

IUWU inshore undersea warfare units 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

LARC lighter amphibious resupply cargo

LCM landing craft, mechanized

LCU utility landing craft

LST tank landing ship

MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MLMS motor launch minesweepers

MPS maritime prepositioning ships

MSB minesweeping boats

MSC Military Sealift Command

MSTS Military Sea Transportation Service

NLF National Liberation Front

PBR river patrol boat

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

ROK Republic of Korea

RRF Ready Reserve Force

RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SEAL Sea-Air-Land forces

UNREP underway replenishment 

VC Viet Cong

VNN Vietnam Navy

76
The Author

Salvatore R. Mercogliano has been a professor of History at Campbell 

University in Buies Creek, North Carolina, since 2010. He teaches courses in 

Western civilization, U.S. history, American military experience, the Civil War, 

and world maritime history. He was named Professor of the Year in 2015 and 

2011 and honored by his colleagues with the D. P. Russ Jr. and Walter S. Jones 

Sr. Alumni Award for Teaching Excellence. He has also taught at Methodist 

University, East Carolina University, Central Carolina Community College, 

the U.S. Military Academy, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and 

the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. Dr. Mercogliano has published numerous articles and given presentations on a variety of maritime related topics, 

with a focus on the role of the merchant marine in national defense. He holds 

degrees from the State University of New York Maritime College (BS in Marine 

Transportation), East Carolina University (MA in Maritime History and Nautical Archeology), and the 

University of Alabama (PhD in Military and Naval History), along with his U.S. Merchant Marine deck license. 

Dr. Mercogliano lives in Fuquay-Varina, North Carolina, with his wife Kathy and son Christopher.

Acknowledgments

This work originated with my participation during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm when I sailed on 

board several ships for the Military Sealift Command, in particular the hospital ship Comfort (T-AH-20). While 

serving on board Comfort, my interest in the role of the merchant marine in national defense was awakened. 

With the encouragement and support of my wife Kathy, I enrolled in the graduate program at East Carolina 

University, where my advisor, Dr. Michael A. Palmer, encouraged my research and connected me with the 

series editor, Dr. Edward J. Marolda. The concept for my master’s thesis (the basis for this work) arose after 

reading a manuscript of Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War. When the Naval 

History and Heritage Command and Naval Historical Foundation decided to publish a series on The U.S. Navy 

and the Vietnam War, I was honored to resurrect my previous research and delve into a topic that is rarely 

studied by naval historians. 

This work would not have been possible without the aid and assistance of many personnel, especially the staffs 

at the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and Military Sealift Command (in particular, several 

articles by Lane Kendall); the libraries at Campbell University, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 

and the U.S. Naval Academy; and all those veteran merchant mariners who contributed to the research and 

understanding of this subject. Thanks to Roberto Loiederman and Richard Linnett for the use of their photo of 

McKay and Glatkowski. Lori Janice Jorgensen of the U.S. Naval Institute and Lisa Crunk of the NHHC’s photo 

archives were particularly helpful in the photo research for this work. 

Lastly, none of my work and effort would have been possible without the endless support of my wife Kathy and 

son Christopher. 

77
Publisher’s Note 

The Naval History and Heritage Command extends a grateful thank you to the Naval Historical Foundation for 

making the U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War series possible. They generously sponsored not only the author’s 

work on this book, but also the subsequent editorial services that helped make it a reality. The NHHC is grateful for the NHF’s support and its dedication to telling the story of this important era in the Navy’s history.

Suggested Reading

Beltrone, Art, and Lee Beltrone. Vietnam Grafitti: Messages from a Forgotten Troopship.

Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press Inc., 2004. 

Benedetto, William R. Sailing into the Abyss: A True Story of Extreme Heroism on the High Seas. New York: 

Kensington Press, 2005. 

Kendall, Lane C. “The Merchant Marine: The Last Satisfactory Solution?” In Vietnam: The Naval Story.

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 

Linnett, Richard, and Roberto Loiederman. The Eagle Mutiny. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001. 

Mansfield, Robert S., and William L. Worden. Towboats to the Orient. Seattle, WA: PAC, 1970. 

Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in 

Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994. 

Muir, Malcolm. End of the Saga: The Maritime Evacuation of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Washington, DC: 

Naval History and Heritage Command, 2017. 

Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of Mayaguez. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975.

78



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