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86–004PDF 2014

AFGHANISTAN 2014: YEAR OF TRANSITION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 2013

Serial No. 113–109

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable James F. Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 4

Mr. Michael J. Dumont, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, & Central Asia, U.S. Department of Defense ................................... 15

Mr. Donald L. Sampler, Assistant to the Administrator, Office of Afghanistan 

and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ................. 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James F. Dobbins: Prepared statement ....................................... 7

Mr. Michael J. Dumont: Prepared statement ........................................................ 17

Mr. Donald L. Sampler: Prepared statement ........................................................ 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: 

Material submited for the record ........................................................................ 65

Questions submitted for the record to the Honorable James F. Dobbins ........ 69

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable William Keating, a 

Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to: 

The Honorable James F. Dobbins ....................................................................... 71

Mr. Donald L. Sampler ........................................................................................ 72

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph P. Kennedy 

III, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to the Honorable James F. Dobbins ......................................................... 73

(1)

AFGHANISTAN 2014: YEAR OF TRANSITION 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. We will ask 

all of the members to take their seats. 

I have been focused on Afghanistan since before 9/11, warning of 

an emerging terrorist sanctuary there in that part of the world. 

Today, the committee recognizes the tremendous sacrifices made by 

our troops, made by their families, so that America is safe from the 

type of attack that Osama bin Laden launched from Afghanistan. 

Next year, the administration plans to transition from combat operations to an advise and assist role in Afghanistan. And we need a 

workable and realistic transition plan in place. 

Last month, a bipartisan committee delegation led by Representative Adam Kinzinger, and joined by Representatives Scott Perry 

and Juan Vargas, traveled to Afghanistan and traveled to Pakistan, and these members collected information useful to this committee. So I thank them for their important oversight work. And 

I also want to recognize the committee’s military advisor, Colonel 

Andrea Thompson, who has served tours in Afghanistan and who 

organized the trip. 

I am concerned that the administration has not adequately defined a mission in Afghanistan. U.S. troop strength will drop to 

34,000 in 2 months. And pending a bilateral security agreement, 

these numbers will drop much lower. The remaining troops will 

have a limited role, as they should, but what will be our objective? 

What constitutes success? 

Insufficient planning for this transition could put American lives 

at risk. At present, it is questionable whether our diplomatic facilities are sufficiently equipped, physically and staffing-wise, to protect U.S. personnel. This danger will only increase as more troops 

withdraw, and transition planners better best figure out how to 

protect our personnel during this transition. 

Unfortunately, endemic corruption in Afghanistan places our aid 

programs there at constant risk of waste, of fraud, of abuse. And 

despite years of rule of law training, the Afghan Government has 

few workable safeguards in place to prevent the misuse of U.S. aid 

money. 

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Widespread corruption in Afghanistan also threatens the Presidential and the provincial elections that are set for next April. Free 

and fair elections are essential, of course, to establishing a stable 

Afghan Government capable of preventing Taliban-induced chaos. 

A repeat of the widespread election fraud that we saw in 2009 

would almost certainly undermine Afghans’ faith in their government, dangerously setting back the country. 

Corruption hinders Afghanistan’s economy. The country’s mining 

sector could tap deposits of critical industrial metals by attracting 

more foreign investment, but that won’t happen with its off-thecharts corruption in Afghanistan. 

On the security front, Pakistan’s military and security service 

continue to complicate matters by supporting the Taliban. Pakistan 

is a double-dealer, paying lip service to cooperation with the United 

States, unfortunately while simultaneously undermining our primary objective of bringing Afghanistan under the control of a 

democratically-elected government. 

Lastly, Iran continues to support the Taliban while utilizing Afghanistan’s banking system to circumvent U.S. and international 

sanctions. Iran will intensify its meddling during the transition, at 

our expense. And just yesterday, it was announced that President 

Karzai had agreed to a long-term friendship and cooperation pact 

with Iran. We need to counter this because, as you know, our 

troops continue to be targeted. 

Afghans will determine their future of course, not us. What we 

can do is help them develop a stable and reasonably democratic 

government, one respectful of universally recognized human rights. 

That is what most Afghans want, it is in our interests, and it is 

what our sacrifices demand we strive for. 

I will now turn to Mr. Ted Deutch for any opening statement he 

might want to make. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to the panel for being with us today. 

We went to Afghanistan with the goal of rooting out al-Qaeda. 

And we have, with the work and service of our nation’s finest and 

bravest citizens, together with, it bears noting, the service and 

commitment of 48 of our allies and their bravest citizens. 

We have made tremendous gains in decimating al-Qaeda’s core 

infrastructure, but there have also been tremendous gains in women’s rights, in access to education, in maternal and child health. 

But 12 years later we still have 47,000 troops in Afghanistan, with 

the potential for thousands more to remain for many years. 

I am concerned that President Karzai’s blustering over whether 

or not he will sign the bilateral security agreement risks destabilizing Afghanistan by destabilizing the security situation even 

further, and puts the safety of both U.S. personnel and Afghans in 

jeopardy. 

I hope President Karzai understands that he is risking Afghanistan’s future by playing this very dangerous game on the bilateral 

security agreement. If he is truly committed to a long-term U.S.-

Afghan partnership, he should cut the theatrics, including his latest move to negotiate a security pact with Iran, and he should sign 

the agreement. 

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The patience of the Congress and the American people is wearing 

thin. Without a bilateral security agreement, it is possible that Afghanistan will once again become a safe haven for al-Qaeda, a 

worst-case scenario for the United States, and a legacy that I suspect President Karzai would very much like to avoid. 

I know that continuing to achieve strategic gains in Afghanistan 

is not going to be easy, but I fear that the potential of undoing 

these gains has far greater consequences for U.S. and for regional 

security. 

I look forward to discussing the path forward with our witnesses 

today, and I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. And our Chairman Emeritus, Ileana RosLehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

As chair of the subcommittee of jurisdiction over Afghanistan, 

and together with Chairman Chabot and the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, we held two hearings this year that examined this very 

issue—the transition in Afghanistan and the way forward for the 

U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan. 

I also led a bipartisan congressional delegation to Kabul this past 

Memorial Day weekend with my wonderful colleagues, Mr. Kennedy and Dr. Bera, and had the honor to meet with our brave men 

and women who serve our country in Afghanistan, both as armed 

services and State Department personnel, and they do a tremendous job day in and day out. 

While in Afghanistan, we had the opportunity to speak with Mr. 

Karzai, and you never know what you are going to get. From our 

conversation, it seemed like then he was pretty optimistic about 

the final bilateral security agreement, was looking forward to its 

completion. 

Now, however, Karzai is balking at signing the bilateral security 

agreement, which his grand council endorsed, and as recently as 

this past weekend lashed out at the U.S. and accused us of threatening him. I am extremely concerned that these latest developments will damage our national security interests in the region, 

further destabilize the region, and Karzai’s flirting with Iran is 

quite dangerous for our U.S. national security interests. So we remain quite perplexed and concerned. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. This morning we are pleased to be 

joined by representatives of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. 

Ambassador James Dobbins currently serves as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Ambassador has 

held a number of senior positions at the State Department and 

White House. He was previously the Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. 

We also have Michael Dumont, currently the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. 

Prior to joining the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dumont 

served as a Federal prosecutor in the Criminal Division of the U.S. 

4

Department of Justice, and managed the Justice Department programs in Iraq. 

Larry Sampler currently serves as the Assistant to the Administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. He previously worked at the U.S. Department of State, the Institute for 

Defense Analysis, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan. 

And, gentlemen, welcome. Without objection, your full prepared 

statements will be made part of the record. We are going to ask 

you each to summarize in 5 minutes your statements. And members here are going to have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the record that you might be asked subsequently to respond to, as well as any extraneous materials that they want to 

put into the record. 

So, Ambassador Dobbins, we will begin with you. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES F. DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my oral remarks, let me concentrate on what I think is probably the most 

topical and immediately important aspect of our situation in Afghanistan, which is the fate of the bilateral security agreement and 

the prospects for a longer term American commitment. 

As I think you all know, President Karzai called a Loya Jirga, 

or grand council, to discuss the draft bilateral security agreement, 

which we and he had concluded. This involved 2,500 of Afghanistan’s influential citizens from throughout the country. After 3 days 

of debate, the Loya Jirga overwhelmingly endorsed the BSA as 

written and urged President Karzai to sign it before the end of the 

year. This decision underscores the clear and strong desire of the 

Afghan people to continue their partnership with the United States 

and the international community. 

The United States agrees with the Afghan people. Signing the 

BSA will send an important signal to the people of Afghan and to 

the Taliban, to our allies and partners, and to the region. For the 

Afghan people, it will reduce anxiety and uncertainty about the future, allowing them to concentrate on the upcoming elections and 

to invest with confidence in their own economy. 

A signed BSA will tell the Taliban, who may think that the end 

of 2014 means the end of international support, that their only 

path to peace is by ending violence, breaking ties with al-Qaeda, 

and accepting the Afghan constitution. A signed BSA will assure 

the region that the United States will remain engaged and will not 

abandon Afghanistan, as we once did in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal. 

To our NATO allies and other international partners, a signed 

BSA will open the door for NATO to begin negotiations of its own 

status of forces agreement. 

For all of these reasons, the administration is committed to expeditious signature of the bilateral security agreement. Delaying signature is in no one’s interest. A delay would add another element 

of uncertainty as Afghanistan prepares for the April 2014 Presidential elections. For the United States and our NATO allies, delay 

5

means a lack of clarity needed to plan for the post-2014 military 

presence. That, in turn, would jeopardize fulfillment of the pledges 

of assistance that NATO and other countries made in Chicago and 

Tokyo in 2012. 

As Ambassador Rice made clear during her recent visit to Kabul, 

although it is not our preference, without a prompt signature we 

will have no choice but to initiate planning for a 2014 future in 

which there would be no U.S. or NATO troops. 

Let me make clear, however, that plans are not decisions, and 

assure you that we are not about to decide to abandon all we and 

the Afghan people have achieved over the past 12 years. Based on 

the results of the Loya Jirga, expressions of public opinion throughout the country, and discussions during my own visit to Kabul last 

week, I don’t believe that there can be any serious doubt that the 

Afghan people want American and NATO forces to stay and recognize that the bilateral security agreement is a necessary prerequisite. 

The bilateral security agreement is also the keystone of a much 

wider international commitment involving over seven countries 

ready to provide economic and security assistance to Afghanistan 

beyond 2015. Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, with the exception 

of Iran, also understand the importance of the BSA. 

I understand, for instance, that President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, Prime Minister Singh of India, and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan have all personally urged President Karzai 

to conclude the bilateral security agreement. Several of these leaders are no fans of American military presence in Central Asia, but 

all of them seem to recognize that without a continued international military and economic support Afghanistan risks falling 

back into civil war, with the attendant rise in extremist groups, 

outflow of refugees, and disruptions in commerce that would 

threaten the region as a whole. 

Given this coincidence of Afghan public and regional governmental opinion, I see little chance that the bilateral security agreement will not eventually be concluded. Awaiting the arrival of the 

next Afghan President do so, however, will impose large and unnecessary costs on the American—on the Afghan people. Already the 

anxiety caused by President Karzai’s refusal to heed the advice of 

the Loya Jirga is having that effect. 

While in Kabul last week I learned from the World Bank and 

other sources that the Afghan currency is slipping in value. Inflation is increasing. Capital is fleeing. Property values are dropping. 

Perhaps for the first time since 2001, the outflow of population exceeds the return of refugees. 

The longer this uncertainty about the future international commitment to Afghanistan continues, the more anxiety among the 

population will increase, potentially dominating the upcoming Presidential elections, threatening to turn these into a polarizing rather 

than a unifying experience for the country. 

Prolonged uncertainty over the bilateral security agreement will 

also erode larger international support for Afghanistan. In Tokyo 

and in Chicago, in 2012, the international community pledged billions of dollars to support the Afghan security forces and the Afghan economy beyond 2014. As in the United States, fulfillment of 

6

these pledges is dependent on public support and parliamentary 

approval. 

Prolonged delay in concluding the bilateral security agreement, 

and the also required NATO equivalent agreement, can only diminish the prospect that these pledges will be fully met. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I continue to believe that the bilateral security agreement will ultimately be concluded, but I am seriously 

dismayed at the cost to the Afghan people that delay—that significant further delay will cause. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

We are going to go to Mr. Dumont next. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL J. DUMONT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, & CENTRAL ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. DUMONT. Chairman Royce, members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

upcoming year of transition in Afghanistan. 

Before turning our attention——

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Dumont, just move the mic a little closer. 

Mr. DUMONT. Before turning our attention to the upcoming year, 

I would like to quickly review the status of the security transition 

in Afghanistan. In June of this year, the Afghans reached a decisive milestone, assuming lead responsibility for security countrywide. This milestone also signaled the shift in the International Security Assistance Force’s primary mission from combat to training, 

advising, and assisting the Afghan security forces. 

The ANSF, a large integrated force, are now successfully providing security for the people of Afghanistan. This past summer 

fighting season was the first time that both planned and executed 

with the Afghans wholly in the lead. The ANSF proved to be both 

capable and resilient, conducting nearly all combat operations 

across Afghanistan while taking the majority of the casualties. 

They successfully held the security gains of recent years, and the 

insurgency failed to achieve its stated objective. 

The fact that the ANSF, a force in its infancy just 4 years ago, 

is increasingly able to maintain the gains made by a coalition of 

49 nations, is a significant accomplishment. As we look toward the 

coming year, DoD will focus on the key areas of support for a successful political transition in Afghanistan, continuation of the train, 

advise, and assist mission to develop the ANSF into a sustainable 

force, a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission, and the drawdown and realignment of U.S. forces for a post-2014 train, advise, 

and assist mission. 

Our train, advise, and assist mission will continue to emphasize 

developing ANSF capabilities to conduct high-level planning and 

execution of operations, as well as the capability to sustain and enable those operations. 

Ministerial-level assistance will continue to be focused on institutionalizing the systems and capabilities necessary to organize, resource, train, and sustain the ANSF. This will include acquisition, 

contracting, strategy and policy development, human resources, 

management, and financial and resource management. The ANSF 

can be a guarantor for a secure and democratic Afghanistan but 

not without continued progress toward developing a sustainable 

and professional force. 

As we draw down our presence, we will focus on improving accountability and increasing oversight of funding for the ANSF. This 

is to ensure adequate capacity and measures of accountability are 

in place as we incrementally increase direct contributions to the Afghan Government while their financial management capacity 

grows. 

16

Coalition forces are working with the Afghans to finish implementing automated systems that will increase transparency and 

accountability in the areas of pay, logistics, human resources, and 

financial management. They are also focused on developing the 

technical expertise necessary in the Afghan security ministries to 

plan, program, budget, and execute financial transactions to sustain the ANSF. 

Although the combat leadership shift from ISAF to the ANSF 

demonstrates first and foremost the capability and resolve of the 

Afghan security forces to secure their people and their nation, it 

also enables the United States and other coalition partners to reduce their forces. 

As President Obama announced in the State of the Union address in February 2013, the U.S. will reduce its force level to 

34,000 personnel by February 12, 2014. This force level will generally be maintained through the election period to ensure we are 

able to provide support if requested. 

The steady pace of force level reductions from now to February 

2014, and after the election period, will allow our train, advise, and 

assist effort to consolidate from lower to higher levels of command 

as the ANSF displays greater capacity. This progression will enable 

effective assistance as coalition forces drawn down and allow for a 

smooth transition of the ANSF to operate with reduced coalition 

support. 

The ANSF will exercise greater autonomy and leadership of security operations while still having access to support from ISAF as 

required and as available. While this process is underway, NATO 

remains on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end 

of 2014 and transition to the new NATO train, advise, and assist 

mission. 

The mission for U.S. forces in Afghanistan is also shifting to a 

continued counterterrorism mission against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in training, advising, and equipping Afghan forces as part of 

the NATO mission. As the President has made clear, however, the 

United States must secure an agreement that protects U.S. troops 

and must have an invitation from the Afghan Government to fulfill 

the promise of the post-2014 partnership discussed at the 2012 

Chicago NATO summit. 

We welcome the Loya Jirga’s endorsement of the bilateral security agreement, and we are prepared to sign the agreement. Concluding the BSA promptly would be an important signal to the people of Afghanistan, to the Taliban, and our allies, and to the world 

that we intend to continue our partnership in support of Afghanistan. 

After more than a decade of dedication and sacrifice by our 

forces, our coalition partners, and the Afghan people along multiple 

lines of effort, we have seen remarkable turnaround in Afghanistan. Today, the Afghan people have greater economic opportunity, 

greater access to health care, education, and more freedoms and individual rights than in the past. 

Thank you for continuing to support—your support for the mission in Afghanistan and our service men and women. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dumont follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Sampler. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD L. SAMPLER, ASSISTANT TO THE 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. SAMPLER. Chairman Royce, members of the committee, 

thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you 

today. I have been working on and in Afghanistan, in both civilian 

and military roles, since 2002. In addition to having worked with 

the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga, and then the Afghan Constitutional Loya Jirga, I have served as a representative of an international NGO, and as Chief of Staff of the U.N. Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan. 

After the fall of the Taliban, I saw firsthand an Afghanistan that 

had been devastated by decades of conflict. The unprecedented investment of U.S. taxpayers and the international community, in 

partnership with the Afghans themselves, has created transformational changes in Afghanistan that are reflected in the 

United Nations 2013 Human Development Index. Afghanistan improved its score in that index by more than 60 percent, more than 

any other country. 

Changes of this magnitude are not made overnight, especially in 

such a deeply traditional society and such a challenging operational environment. The results of international civilian assistance are significant but fragile. For example, in 2002, there were 

only 900,000 Afghan children in school, and virtually none of them 

were girls. Today, there are nearly 8 million children in school and 

more than one-third of them are girls. 

Life expectancy in Afghanistan has increased from 42 years to 

over 62 years. Maternal mortality rates have declined by 80 percent, and child mortality has decreased by almost 50 percent. In 

2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. 

Today that number is 18 percent. 

In 2002, there were very few fixed telephone lines, and making 

a telephone call out of Afghanistan required a satellite telephone. 

Today, the combined phone networks in Afghanistan cover 90 percent of the population, and 85 percent of women in Afghanistan 

have access to a cell phone. 

Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned businesses and associations. Almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher education 

are now women. And women are active participants in the Afghan 

political process. 

As we enter the transition period, USAID’s strategy is threefold. 

First, to maintain and make durable the gains in health, education, 

and the empowerment of women. Second, to mitigate the economic 

impact of the military drawdown. And, finally, to foster improved 

stability by supporting legitimate and effective Afghan governance, 

to include the 2014 elections. 

USAID places a high priority on ensuring that American taxpayer funds are used wisely. While many of the issues in Afghanistan are unique to that country, monitoring projects and challenging environments is something that our agency does well 

around the world. In designing the Afghanistan monitoring stratVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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egy, USAID has incorporated lessons learned from our monitoring 

programs in places like Colombia, Pakistan, and South Sudan. 

I will note that these programs which form the basis of our Afghanistan monitoring program have been reviewed in six separate 

Inspector General reports, as well as three reports by the Government Accountability Office. 

Finally, external audits provide useful oversight and discipline 

for our work, and complement and reinforce USAID’s own efforts 

to ensure U.S. tax dollars are used effectively and efficiently. There 

are currently over 100 audits that are ongoing now of USAID programs in Afghanistan. The bottom line is that USAID will terminate programs if we feel a particular program is not adequately 

overseen or is not producing development results. 

With regard to the elections, a credible, transparent, and inclusive electoral process is essential and central to U.S. Government’s 

transition strategy and is critical to Afghan stability and democratic development. USAID remains focused on supporting an inclusive and democratic process by supporting Afghan electoral authorities and by building the capacity of democratic stakeholders in 

Afghanistan to participate in a robust and informed way. 

USAID supports independent domestic observers, civil society, 

media, political parties, helping them appropriately engage in the 

democratic process. USAID is also supporting the participation of 

women in all aspects of the electoral process. We are promoting the 

hiring and training of female polling staff, promoting public outreach to women voters by civil society and public officials, and enhancing the ability of women candidates to campaign effectively. 

In conclusion, I have worked in Afghanistan as a member of the 

Department of Defense, USAID, and the Department of State. I 

have attended ramp ceremonies for the fallen heroes of all three organizations. I am personally, and USAID is institutionally, keenly 

aware of the enormous sacrifices made by Americans to build a secure and stable Afghanistan. And we fully understand the need for 

constant vigilance, particularly during this delicate transition period. 

We are making tough decisions, we are prioritizing our investments, and we are looking for things that have the greatest potential for long-term success. 

As USAID navigates through the 2014 transition period, we continue to be committed to safeguarding taxpayer funds and ensuring 

that the remarkable development goals and development progress 

made in Afghanistan is maintained and made durable. 

It is an honor to be able to share with you today a small glimpse 

of what USAID is doing in that regard. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Sampler. 

Thank you for your good work, gentlemen, on all of these fronts. 

But as you are pointing out, Mr. Sampler, about the steps that 

are being taken concerning the election, the reality is that in 2009 

President Karzai had his hand in the fraud-plagued election. And 

the concern I think many of us have is, what is being done to make 

certain that we don’t have a repeat in this? 

We already hear some of his commentary about possibly postponing an election. All right? What steps are being taken to make 

certain that the international community has in place something 

that can stand up to his efforts to try to manipulate the election 

process? Should he try to do so again? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think both State and AID are 

working on this, so Larry may want to amplify. First of all, I would 

note that in 2009, although there was a great deal of fraud, there 

was also no doubt about who the winner was, since even if you disallowed for all of the fraud, Karzai was still 20 points ahead. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, that may be true. But the fact that he 

was willing to go in and——

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, I agree. 

Chairman ROYCE [continuing]. Commit the fraud is what is concerning to me, because when this is over Afghans have to have 

some level of confidence, and they know what he tried to do last 

time. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No. I mean, that was prefatory to saying 

that it is more serious this time because the election is likely to be 

closer. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. And it is important that the margin of victory not be smaller than the margin of fraud. 

Now, I think we are reasonably satisfied that the election preparations data are much better than they were in 2009 or 2004. 

They are being undertaken in accordance with legislation rather 

than a Presidential decree. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. The legislation has been fully followed 

with reasonable adherence to its provisions. The Electoral Commission seems to have a strong leadership, and so far has made decisions which are broadly accepted by most of the candidates as fair. 

The international community, and the United States in particular, are continuing to follow this closely and render support in 

a number of sectors, and I think Larry can expand on that. 

President Karzai has not said anything to date which would indicate any desire to postpone the election. Everything he said, privately and publicly, to us and to everybody else we know of is consistent with his desire to conclude this election on time and to 

leave office on schedule. 

There is a lot of suspicion, as you say, based on earlier experiences. And in any new democracy that kind of suspicion is, in any 

case, endemic. But for the moment, we haven’t seen any evidence 

of such——

Chairman ROYCE. This is encouraging. I did want to ask Larry 

Sampler about specifically, if I could, the election monitors, because 

I think that’s one area where we are playing a pretty important 

34

role. The security forces, the election monitors, particularly female 

officers, since that is necessary in this environment to sort of 

screen women voters as they come in. We want to make sure all 

women have the ability to vote in this situation, that all Afghans 

and young people have the ability to cue up and have their ballot 

cast. Give us a quick update on that front. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. is contributing about $100 million to this election. Of that, roughly $55 million is going into a UNDP basket fund to support the elections. 

That provides the technical assistance that will help the Afghan 

Independent Electoral Commission conduct the elections in a way 

that is as free and fair and independent of fraud as can be done. 

The other $45 million we are retaining and investing bilaterally 

in areas where we see particular need. Voting monitors and polling 

station monitors is one of those areas. Another is civil society engagement, particularly with respect to women’s interest groups. 

And we are investing in technology that we really didn’t have access to or we didn’t have the sophistication to have access to in the 

last election. 

And as an example, I spoke yesterday about SMS technology that 

women in Afghanistan are now using to collaborate and coordinate 

their approach to their candidates to make sure that they are getting their issues on the platforms of all the candidates. So there 

are both technological and technical assistance ways that we are 

investing our resources in support of the elections. 

Certainly areas—there continue to be areas that concern us. One 

of them is the access of women to polling places. I was in Afghanistan a month ago, and each time I visit I go to the Independent 

Election Commission and get an update. They are aware of the 

problem, and they are working to fix it. 

Now, I can’t promise you that their solution will be robust in 

every district of Afghanistan, but to be honest, having been engaged there now for 12 years, I am just pleased to see that they 

have a methodological approach to how they are identifying these 

problems and pushing and addressing them. 

They are putting money where the problems are. They are training women security, and they are training women polling place 

workers. And I think we will see an improvement—a dramatic improvement over 2009 in that regard. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. My time has expired. I am going 

to go to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Dumont, in a recent foreign affairs 

piece, former Ambassador to Afghanistan retired General Karl 

Eikenberry wrote that the counterinsurgency strategy failed in Afghanistan. Would you agree with his assertion that COIN was not 

successful in Afghanistan? And, if so, why didn’t it work? 

Mr. DUMONT. I would not agree with that, and the reason I say 

that is as we look at the gains that have been made to date in Afghanistan since we have arrived there, and with the support of 48 

coalition nations, as well as the Afghan security forces, the strides 

made have been monumental. And I think it is too early for anybody to claim that a counterinsurgency effort has failed. 

35

The ANSF has been consistent in taking the fight to the enemy 

through this fighting season. They have done remarkably well. 

They have adopted the training and tactics that have been provided to them and taught them. Their police are stepping up to the 

plate more and more each day. And, quite frankly, the most recent 

fighting season that they have had this past summer has given 

them confidence and skill that they have not had in the past. 

They are certainly exceeding our expectations, and I continue 

that—I believe that will continue for the future. But to say that it 

is a failure I think is wrong. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And, as you know, many of our constituents want 

us—and they expressed this very clearly—want us to bring home 

every last U.S. soldier. Every one. So when the Department of Defense recommends the size of a residual force going forward, what 

factors do you consider? And what will the mission of those forces 

that might remain in Afghanistan after 2014 be? And, finally, to 

the extent you wish to comment, how would you respond to so 

many Americans who just simply think that it is time to bring everyone home? 

Mr. DUMONT. Sir, I understand the position of the American people, and I have served in combat myself on three occasions, including a year in Afghanistan. So I understand the concerns. 

What I would say is is that our top priority is to prevent the return of al-Qaeda and any affiliated terrorist groups that can launch 

attacks on the United States from the country of Afghanistan. That 

is our first and foremost priority, and I think the American people 

understand that. I can assure you the American military understands that. 

As far as what the mission will be after 2014, given a BSA and 

an invitation to remain in Afghanistan by the Afghan people, is a 

train, advise, and assist mission to assist the Afghan security 

forces in further developing and advancing their skills and their capabilities into the future, so that they can assist with providing 

their own security and ensure regional stability. 

Like any emerging country, any emerging military force or police 

force, they will require training, assistance, and support generally 

as we provide with many other nations. But our mission after 2014 

will be a train, advise, and assist mission, along with coalition 

partners, who will and have offered to remain there. 

And as Ambassador Dobbins said, BSA will be critical to that, 

and the Afghans are fully aware of that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. And, Ambassador Dobbins, Mr. Sampler, if there were to be a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, 

do you believe that the Taliban would accept the provisions of the 

constitution? And, if so, would that be sufficient? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. We have laid down three conditions for 

successful negotiation with the Taliban—that they accept the Afghan constitution, that they lay down their arms, and they break 

ties with al-Qaeda. And we would require all three of those for any 

solution that we would support. 

I don’t see early breakthroughs in the negotiations. In fact, I am 

not sure that we will even be negotiating in the next few months. 

We have made efforts in the past. We are consistent in support of 

a reconciliation process, but it takes two to tango. And the Taliban, 

36

while they have been willing to talk to us, have not been willing 

to talk to the Afghan Government. And, frankly, it is the Afghans 

who have to negotiate peace. 

So I don’t predict early advances in this sphere. I would hope 

that there would be at least some procedural steps, but I can’t 

promise it. Over the longer term, we do believe that reconciliation 

is the only way the war is going to end, and the quicker you start 

the faster you will get there, even if it is going to be a multi-year 

process. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

As I had mentioned, we had met with President Karzai, as all 

delegations do when they go over there, and in our delegation we 

raised the concerns about his neighbor, the Iranian regime, the 

threat that that poses to our interests in the region. 

And Mr. Kennedy and Dr. Bera will probably agree that he dismissed the threat, that Iran poses no problem at all. ‘‘But Pakistan, that is the real threat to stability for Afghanistan,’’ he said. 

So it shouldn’t come as a big surprise that this past weekend 

Karzai and the leader of Iran, Rouhani, announced the agreement 

of a long-term strategic pact that ranges from political cooperation 

to economic and security partnerships, once again undermining and 

jeopardizing the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship. 

What is Karzai’s calculus here? Is he trying to hedge his bets by 

cozying up to Iran and being outwardly defiant to the U.S.? What 

is his thinking? If you could give us some insight into that. 

And while in Afghanistan and during our hearings, I also expressed my concerns about the status of the counternarcotics operations in post-drawdown Afghanistan, and we have been talking 

about that this morning. We were told that due to lack of personnel, these U.S.-led counternarcotics operations will be severely 

limited in scope. The latest numbers indicate that this was a record 

year for poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and this issue of counternarcotics operations is not getting the attention it rightfully deserves considering that terrorist activities are typically funded 

through narcotics. 

If we can’t conduct the kind of operations needed to reduce the 

poppy production, and if we don’t have enough manpower now to 

fight this issue, what are we going to do next year and post-2014 

to stop the illicit drug trade that generates over $100 million a 

year for terrorist groups? 

And I have been concerned that we are allowing the post-2014 

residual force size also to be decided politically, and that is purely 

numbers-driven rather than focused on the task and what is needed. What is the mission that still needs to be accomplished in Afghanistan? 

And, Mr. Dumont, you testified that a significant accomplishment since taking the lead is the Afghans have been increasingly 

able to maintain the gains made by our U.S. and coalition forces. 

And although that may be true now, what about in the post-withdrawal Afghanistan when they won’t have quite a robust interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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national force in support or possibly with no U.S. presence at all, 

if the President goes with the Zero Option? When the extremists 

no longer see us as an impediment to their goals and come against 

the Afghanistan forces in full force, will they be able to sustain 

those gains? What will happen? 

When do you think that we will get that troop level number from 

the White House and the State Department? I will leave it open 

to all of you. 

Thank you. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. Well, on Iran, as the chairman 

pointed out, Iran has provided arms and money to the Taliban. It 

has, however, provided a great deal of more money to the Afghan 

Government. It has quite substantial aid programs—most of them 

are quite benign—in Afghanistan. 

Iran has, in general, a very bad relationship with the Taliban. 

It almost went to war with them well before we did. But it is hedging its bet, and it is hedging it largely as part of the competition 

with the United States rather than because it has an inherent positive interest in the Taliban. 

Karzai has visited Iran once or twice a year since he became 

President 12 years ago, and so I don’t attach a special importance 

to this particular visit. They haven’t negotiated an agreement. 

They have simply announced an intention to negotiate an agreement. There is no agreement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. There is no draft on the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let me turn it over to the other two gentlemen. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. DUMONT. Ma’am, I would say, first and foremost, we do continue working with Afghan counternarcotics police. They have 

made significant strides in enhancing case management and prosecutions, including the ability to develop evidence, arrests, conduct 

trials, and imprison those convicted. They do demonstrate a determination to uphold rule of law, and they are increasingly resistant 

to the influences of corruption. 

Several reasons for this, besides the training and assistance they 

get, they also know that the eyes of contributing nations and donor 

nations are on them, and they understand that it is important 

upon them, and incumbent upon them, to make changes. And they 

are making achievements in that regard. 

We work with them also on developing good practices for sharing 

intelligence with the police forces, so that they can get at their narcotics trade and that they can make strides. But, again, it is a 

work in progress, and it will require them to assume some responsibility and ownership themselves based on some of the good practices and training that they have received from us and other coalition nations. 

As far as the ANSF continuing to uphold the security gains that 

have been made and the future, the groundwork is there for the 

gains that they have made——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DUMONT [continuing]. Both as an institution and as a force. 

38

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Sorry. Out of time. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Joseph Kennedy from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of 

the witnesses for testifying today. Thank you for your service. 

I was fortunate enough, as former Chairman Ros-Lehtinen indicated, to visit Afghanistan several months ago and had an extraordinary visit to see the work of—your work and the work of many 

of the folks you support. So thank you very, very much for all that 

you do for our country. 

I wanted to speak first, if I could, to Special Representative Dobbins. Mr. Ambassador, if you could focus just specifically a bit on 

one program that has come up in a number of meetings that I have 

had and that some constituents were concerned about about contractors and translators. 

So those who have performed extraordinary service to our military and civilian corps both in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are now 

subject to death threats and violence for their affiliated work with 

us, these are programs both in Iraq and Afghanistan, my understanding is, that have—they have run into some fairly severe challenges. I believe under the—in 2008, under the NDAA, Congress 

created 25,000 visas for Iraqis who worked for the government at 

least for a year. Another I think 8,750 were created under the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, again, for our Afghan allies that 

worked for the United States in some capacity. 

Can you give me an outline, sir, just to the best that you can, 

one, of how many Afghans are eligible for that program? How 

many have been processed to date? What that timeline is, and 

what that backlog might be, the causes to that backlog, and what 

we can do to try to help? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. I believe that we were slow in 

getting this process into gear, and for the first several years the 

number of applicants who successfully completed the process was 

fairly low. 

Over the last year, however, this has significantly accelerated. In 

fact, I think the last year we had 10 times more successful completions than in the previous year. In fact, we are now approaching 

the legislative limit in the numbers available, and we are looking 

forward to working with Congress to extend our authority to bring 

in additional people. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And how many more would you——

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think about 1,600 have been approved 

over the last year, if I remember the figures correctly. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And how many more visas, sir, would you recommend, or would you be asking for help from Congress to——

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not sure. I don’t have the figures, but 

there is—in addition to the total number, I believe there is an annual number. And I believe that runs out in March or April, and 

we will need to work with Congress to get that extended because 

there will be additional people in the pipeline who would qualify. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Okay. Thank you very, very much. 

And, Mr. Dumont, I wanted to build a little bit off of the chairman’s comments or Ms. Ros-Lehtinen’s comments about the poppy 

39

cultivation. When we were in Afghanistan, that was certainly 

something that—the point that was made over and over again. And 

I just wanted to see if you could outline—give any detail to enforcement strategy or a mechanism to try to get that trade under control. 

Mr. DUMONT. We do have an interagency task force and an interagency coordination center that continue to provide intelligence 

support, training, and assistance to the counternarcotics police. 

They enable the Afghans to target narcotics traffickers and connections with insurgent groups. They go after the movements, communications, and financing involved, and groups involved in the drug 

trade. 

They are also working to provide support for investigations and 

for military operations that identify people who are involved in the 

drug trade, getting at their financing, getting at their cultivation, 

getting at their movements, getting at the delivery of those illicit 

drugs. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, sir. I am sorry to cut you off. Time is 

limited. 

So, Mr. Sampler, if I could, there is obviously a piece to this 

which is an economic issue for the cultivation of the poppy from 

farmers that are choosing to cultivate poppy in terms of the economic income that they can generate from that. I would imagine 

that falls very much under USAID’s auspices. Can you give a brief 

30-second outline as a strategy there, and how you see that forecast going? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, certainly. I appreciate that you recognize 

that. The issue with counternarcotics is not one purely of enforcement. We have to provide alternate livelihoods. 

USAID and the international donors writ large are working to 

create value chains for other crops that are either as profitable or 

even in some cases—saffron, for example—more profitable than 

poppy. The problem is it is a very, very harsh environment, and 

poppy is a very resilient crop. It doesn’t—I mean, it does well in 

Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, the traffickers do all of the heavy lifting for the 

growers. So until we can get the value changed for saffron, fruits, 

and nuts, up to the level of what the narcotraffickers have for 

poppy, this is going to be a difficult and a challenging environment 

for us. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy, we 

want to recognize and thank you for you and Mr. Bera’s trip there 

accompanying Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, both in terms of the oversight 

of this committee but also in visiting the troops in Afghanistan. 

We want to also recognize Joe Wilson for his recent trip there, 

but also for his son’s service in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. Mr. 

Wilson, it is your time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for your interest in the security of Afghanistan, American security, even prior to 9/11. And people need to understand—

and I want to thank each of you for the difference you are making—that indeed the attacks on our country September 11, 2001, 

40

originated out of caves in Afghanistan. We should never forget 

that, and that is why I am really grateful for our military service. 

I have had the opportunity—the USAID, I have seen the 

progress that has occurred. I have been there 12 times. My National Guard unit, former unit, served there, and led by Adjutant 

General Bob Livingston. It was the largest deployment of troops 

from South Carolina since World War II—1,600—and they really 

developed a great affinity for their Afghan brothers, so we saw 

that. 

And then I appreciate the chairman referencing my youngest 

son. First Lieutenant Hunter Wilson returned last Thursday from 

his service this year in Afghanistan. So as I talk about military 

service, it is quite personal. We are very proud of the 122nd Engineer Battalion, South Carolina Army National Guard, for their 

service there. 

I was particularly glad to see Representative Kennedy raise the 

issue of the special immigrant visas. I have had two sons serve in 

Iraq. They have actually cooperated in bringing their interpreters 

back to the United States for opportunity, for security. I am very 

grateful. I have had a nephew in the Air Force, Allen Heritage, 

served twice in Iraq. 

So I know firsthand—and, indeed, again with my son serving in 

Afghanistan—how the interpreters, the civilians working with the 

American—and our allies—how important they are. And so I want 

to—I do want to work with you and I specifically hope that we will 

have an extension agreement or proposal, Ambassador, as soon as 

possible, so we can give hope to the people in that country and 

thank them. 

I am also, though, concerned about Iranian weapons in Afghanistan. In August 2010, the Treasury Department sanctioned two 

Iranian Kuds Force officers for supplying funds or material to Afghan terrorists. That was just one example of Iran playing an active role in fueling the conflict in Afghanistan. What is the role 

that Iran is playing supporting the Afghan terrorists? What groups 

does Iran support, and why? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, as I said a little earlier, Iran supports both the government and the Taliban. Its dominant support 

is to the government and to largely benign aid programs, roads, 

and other things. But it does support—it has provided money and 

arms to the Taliban. 

The arms and money flows across the Pakistani border are much 

more important than across the Iranian border, but, nevertheless, 

Iran is playing both sides of the house. It is doing that not out of 

a love for the Taliban. They hate the Taliban. It is doing it as part 

of the competition with the United States, and as an effort to demonstrate to the United States that they could play tough, too, if we 

got into some kind of military conflict with them. 

So I think they are hedging their bet, and it is quite unhelpful, 

but it is not the totality of Iran’s approach to Afghanistan, which 

with this very important exception has largely historically been 

quite coincident with our own. They were quite helpful in 2001, 

and, as I have said, they have had a significant and largely benign 

aid program for Afghanistan. 

41

Mr. WILSON. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you give real meaning to diplomacy and so—trying to keep an even balance on these issues. 

I want to thank you for your service. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. And, additionally, I am concerned about Iran’s sanction violations, that in January it was determined the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction that possibly there 

had been purchase of fuel for Afghan forces, in violation of the 

sanctions. Has that been stopped? And what can be done to make 

sure that the sanctions stay in place? Which have been so effective. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am not familiar with the case. I assume 

this is a DoD purchasing issue, but I am afraid I can’t give you a 

quick answer. 

Mr. DUMONT. I am sorry, Mr. Wilson, I don’t have that information either. I would have to take that back and get you a response. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is very important, because we have seen 

the success of the sanctions bringing pressure on the Iranian regime, and I am still hopeful that in particular that the sanctions 

have the potential of encouraging a Green Revolution. 

The young people of Iran deserve to have a better life than what 

they have now and what their prospects are, and so the sanctions 

have multiple purposes, but one is to truly assist a positive change 

in Iran. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank our witnesses, very distinguished witnesses, for coming. Thank you for 

being here, and the three of you have what I consider to be some 

of the most complex and thankless jobs in the U.S. Government. 

And all of us appreciate your service very, very much. 

I share the frustration of my colleagues about the games that 

President Karzai has been playing. He ought to sign the BSA and 

stop the nonsense. I just want to stay that. 

Let me ask Ambassador Dobbins, and then perhaps Mr. Sampler 

can comment, much of the resource planning for post-2014 is happening in the field. But I would like to know what State and 

USAID here in Washington—how you are doing similar planning. 

What is the timeline in which the Afghanistan and Pakistan offices at State and USAID are going to return to the Bureau of 

South and Central Asian Affairs and Asia Bureau? And how are 

State and AID planning to address the new resource environment 

and the personnel changes that will occur with these transitions? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I wouldn’t say at this point we have a firm 

plan. There is a general intention to look at the current bureaucratic arrangement in the State Department in light of the transition at the end of 2014 when we will move from a combat operation 

to a train, advise, and assist operation with a much lower number 

of troops. 

I think even then Afghanistan is likely to remain difficult 

enough, tricky enough, and important enough to the United States 

that you are going to want more than just a desk officer handling 

it. But I think there probably could at that point be a closer assoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ciation with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, and 

we probably would move to some such arrangement. 

But it is—I think the actual transition is not very complex to 

make. It is simply changing some lines on—you know, on an organization chart. It is not as if people are going to have to be fired 

or recruited. So the fact that we haven’t made a decision now a 

year and some months off doesn’t mean we won’t be able to make 

a timely decision. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Ranking Member, the only thing I would add is 

that I think at USAID the bureaucratic changes will be driven by 

the effects we want to achieve in the agency. My two missions are 

the largest missions by an order of magnitude that the agency has 

anywhere in the world. So even if we were folded back into the Bureau, it would have to receive particular and unique attention. 

You asked what we do here in Washington to help the field team 

work on their resource allocation, and I think the single greatest 

value that we add is engaging the communities of interest here, 

whether it be your staff or members themselves, the diaspora community, the think-tank community. We get an awful lot of valuable 

input and a refining of our ideas by engaging in Washington and 

in supporting the field in that regard. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Ambassador, let me ask you this, a key 

element of the economic transition in Afghanistan is obviously regional trade, and a key barrier to getting Afghan goods to market 

is the barrier that exists between Pakistan and India, so that most 

Afghan goods wanting to get to Indian markets go through Iran. 

I know that India provided Pakistan with most favored nation 

trading status back in 1996. Could you provide an update on where 

the Pakistani announcement of giving India trade status currently 

stands, and a more general vision of the role connectivity in the region can have on stabilizing Afghanistan? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we have raised this with the Government of Pakistan on several occasions, and, indeed, with the 

Government of India—specifically, the grant of most favored nations. It came up while Prime Minister Sharif was here in Washington during a visit a month ago. 

The Pakistanis have indicated their intention is to provide—is to 

grant MFN to India. The question is one of timing. We, of course, 

have urged it to be done as quickly as possible. 

I think—they didn’t say so, but I think they may be waiting until 

a new Indian Government takes office. They probably want to do 

this in the part of a context of other improvements in the relationship. 

The Pakistani Government, under the new Prime Minister, has 

reached out and tried to improve that relationship. The Indians, for 

good, historical reasons, are approaching this very cautiously. They 

take the Prime Minister—they believe that the Prime Minister is 

acting in good faith, but they are a little skeptical he can deliver 

on some of the things that they need if the relationship is going 

to progress. 

MFN for India would be a positive step, and, indeed, a general 

opening of the border to more commerce would also be very helpful 

43

for Afghanistan, as you have indicated. And for all of those reasons, 

we continue to support it. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to just 

take a few minutes to point out some of the taxpayer dollars that 

have been sent to Afghanistan and spent almost wastefully. And I 

would like to put an article from Bloomberg News in the record 

about planes parked in the weeds in Kabul after $486 million were 

spent. These are G–222 aircraft, some of which are sitting in the 

weeds, not being used. Those are taxpayer dollars that were spent 

to purchase those. We also spent somewhere between $25 million and $36 million 

on a 64,000 square foot unoccupied building in Camp Leatherneck, 

which in May 2010 the Commanding General, General Mills, recommended cancellation of the construction, and that was overridden by his superiors. And then, in May 2013, the building still 

sitting, not used, the Army Regulation 15–6 investigation said we 

ought to convert that building to a gymnasium and spend more 

money converting it to a movie theater. That was overridden. The 

building is still sitting unoccupied. Thank goodness we didn’t spend 

any more money. 

Two hundred thirty million dollars in spare parts in an inventory 

warehouse—there was no good inventory or accountability for those 

spare parts—these are vehicle parts—and an additional $13 million 

in spare parts were ordered just in October 2013. 

I want to commend the work of Congressman Jason Chaffetz of 

the Oversight Committee who has been working with the Special 

Investigator of Afghan Reconstruction, or the SIGAR. He has identified fuel usage and waste and theft in Afghanistan. He has talked 

about the expenses of the hospital in Kabul where U.S. tax dollars 

have been wastefully spent. We could go into the Bank of Kabul 

fiasco and allocation of dollars there, but infrastructure projects 

that are all over Afghanistan and there is no oversight. These are 

in areas that are inaccessible to civilian employees. 

And I would like to point out—and I know the panelists are 

aware of this—but this is the Afghan oversight access in 2009. The 

shaded areas are areas that civilian contractors or U.S. employees 

had access to in 2009 to do oversight on U.S. taxpayer dollars being 

spent. 

If I flip over to the projected 2014 oversight areas, you will notice 

a stark contrast. I know it is difficult to see, but these gentlemen 

are aware of this. There are just little dots there. These are areas 

that U.S. inspectors did not have access to for oversight. These are 

U.S. taxpayer dollars. How much more money are we going to continue to spend in Afghanistan without proper oversight? And that 

is really what it is about. 

So I don’t have any questions along those. I could go through a 

lot of other examples, but I think the American taxpayers that are 

watching understand that their tax dollars are being spent without 

a lot of oversight on the part of their government. 

So I would like to shift gears to Ambassador Dobbins. I think 

that is who I would address this to. But I am interested in the SpeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cial Immigrant Visa Program and the delays that are going on 

there, because Congress has recognized the unique dangers faced 

by Iraqi and Afghan civilians who worked on behalf of the U.S. 

Government by creating programs for these individuals to become 

lawful permanent residents here in the U.S. 

I have had an example of a gentleman I met in the Kandahar—

excuse me, yeah, the Kandahar region of Afghanistan about 2 years 

ago. He was embedded with the military there, had acted as a 

translator, had taken up weapons to help defend the colleagues of 

the unit he was working with, and he was definitely threatened by 

the Taliban. His uncle was killed, other family members were 

threatened, and went through a 2-year process where officers from 

the unit that he was embedded with, other folks that knew this 

gentleman vouched for his service to America there in Afghanistan, 

but yet it took over 2 years. 

He was actually issued a visa by the State Department, and then 

it was revoked right before he left, and he had to go through 

months of trying to understand why it was revoked, and then it 

was reissued. I think it was reissued only after Congress got involved questioning why, but—so I ask, why have there been so 

many delays in the Afghan SIVs, Ambassador? And I am assuming 

you are the right one to ask that question. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, I think that is right, sir. I think we 

have—we were slow in the early years to implement this program. 

Over the last year, however, it has accelerated significantly. I think 

there were 10 times more visas issued this year than there were 

a year ago. And, in fact, we are approaching the limit of the program. We will run out of numbers shortly, and we will want to 

work with Congress for an extension of the program, since there 

will be additional people who will qualify if we have additional 

numbers. 

On specific cases, I mean, we have to determine that they did 

work for the U.S. military. We have to determine that they are 

under threat. That depends in part on where they live, and there 

are other security-related concerns. I can’t explain any particular 

case. I know the case that you are referring to. And within I think 

2 or 3 weeks, maybe even less, of the visa denial it was then reissued, as you indicated. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And I appreciate the assistance on that, and got 

the gentleman here. 

Mr. Chairman, I did want to put this in the record, and I 

would——

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Ami Bera of California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses. 

As has been mentioned previously, I had the opportunity over 

Memorial Day to visit Afghanistan with Congresswoman RosLehtinen as well as my colleague, Mr. Kennedy. When we were 

there, we met some of the most remarkable young men and women 

in our troops, and, you know, I really do want to praise our troops 

for meeting every mission and, you know, for the wonderful job 

that they have done. 

45

We also had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Karzai, and in 

that meeting—this was back in May, you know, he unequivocally 

expressed a desire to get a BSA done fairly quickly and, at the 

same time, unequivocally said, you know, he has no desire to, you 

know, stand for election again and wanted to see the elections that 

are coming up in 2014 take place without any interference. 

Given that the Loya Jirga has supported the BSA and now Mr. 

Karzai is backtracking, you know, I would make the observation 

that this is—he happens to be someone who we have to negotiate 

with, but he is not someone that I would call an honest broker and 

an easy one to negotiate with. 

I also had the opportunity to visit India and chat with our allies 

in India, who have made significant investments in Afghanistan, 

over $2 billion in investments in infrastructure and projects like 

the Salma Dam. And others also have had the opportunity to meet 

with business groups like CII and FICCI, and major Indian multinationals like the Tata Group and the Mahindra Group, that are 

interested in making investments and helping fill the void that will 

occur regardless of whether there is a BSA or not as we start to 

drawdown and drawdown our own investments. 

Their major concern, though, is the security situation there. In 

addition, as I have met with the Indian Government, Indian dignitaries, there is also a very real concern that hardened, trained 

Jihadi fighters will start shifting over to the India and Pakistan 

border, where we are already seeing a flareup, and, you know, increasing incidence. 

Given that—and maybe this is a question for Ambassador Dobbins—what can we do working with India to, one, you know, continue to maintain an economic structure in Afghanistan? You 

know, again, I do worry about as we drawdown, significant economic resources are going to come with that, as well as working 

with India on the India and Pakistan border as some of these fighters shift over. I am not sure Pakistan has control over these fighters either. 

So, you know, Ambassador Dobbins, your perspective? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we do work closely with India on Afghan issues. I met with the Indian Foreign Secretary yesterday on 

this, for instance. President Karzai is visiting India later this week 

for a state visit, in fact. 

India has a significant aid program and significant investments. 

To the extent—probably the greatest contribution India could 

make, and Pakistan can make, in Afghanistan is improving their 

bilateral relationship. Improved relationships between India and 

Pakistan will have two effects on Afghanistan. One effect is it will 

greatly increase the access of Afghan trade to India via Pakistan, 

but, secondly, and equally important, it will reduce the competition 

between the two countries for influence in Afghanistan in a way 

that has often proved highly destabilizing. 

So we have been encouraging both Afghanistan—I am sorry, both 

Pakistan and India to overcome their differences in Kashmir, their 

differences over Afghanistan. And, you know, I think there is some 

hope with the new Pakistani Government—of course, the Indians 

have elections shortly—but it is an area that we are continuing to 

press. 

46

I don’t think that there is any near-term danger of foreign fighters shifting from Afghanistan to the border with India, among 

other things because unfortunately the war in Afghanistan isn’t 

over. But the Indian concerns are legitimate, and it is something 

that we do need to be careful about. 

Mr. BERA. Do you sense in your conversations with the Pakistani 

Government that there—I sense that the Indian Government certainly does want to see improved relationships with Pakistan as a 

mechanism of stabilizing South Asia as well. Do you sense that 

same, you know, desire from the Pakistani side? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do, and I think the Indians do as regards 

the new Prime Minister and his civilian leadership. Now, in Pakistan traditionally the security sphere has been left largely to the 

military, and they have been largely free of civilian oversight or 

control. The last time Nawaz Sharif tried to exercise that kind of 

control he was overthrown by General Musharraf, so he has to be 

careful about how quickly he moves to assert civilian control to 

their military and a stronger civilian role in designing and implementing Pakistan’s national security policy. 

I think the Indians—he has expressed himself very clearly that 

Pakistan can’t be secure unless Afghanistan is at peace and relations with India are improved. And he has tried to move in both 

directions. 

I think the Indian Government takes him at face value and believes he is sincere. They are a little skeptical that he will prevail 

in exercising enough influence over the Pakistani military, and we 

will just have to wait and see. But we give him a fair chance of 

being able to do so, among other things because the Pakistani military now realize that their biggest threat is internal, and they realize that they need the political leadership to take responsibility for 

the kinds of sometimes harsh measures that will be needed to deal 

with that internal threat. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. Great. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We now go to Adam Kinzinger of Illinois, who 

served as an Air Force pilot in Afghanistan and also served with 

Special Operations. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here. Appreciate your service and taking the time with us. 

As the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, I just came 

back from Afghanistan. Actually, we did Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Pakistan is quite a complicated relationship and one that I expect 

will probably continue to be complicated. 

But, Ambassador, as you alluded to, I believe and I hope that the 

Pakistanis are actually starting to understand that the Taliban is 

actually their problem, too, and it is no longer a tool they can use 

to posture against India or whatever went into that whole I guess 

calculus there. 

The one point I want to make from this is the people of Afghanistan, there is a message that has not gotten out to the United 

States. The people of Afghanistan are good people. The people of 

Afghanistan want to live in freedom. The Taliban’s approval rating 

in Afghanistan is something like 10 percent, slightly higher than 

Congress, but it is still about 10 percent, which means the Taliban 

are not popular in Afghanistan. 

47

This is a message that I don’t think has gotten out, and then 

Karzai is posturing to do whatever it is he calculates he wants to 

do. We met with him as well, and I have got to tell you, I got a 

very different view coming out of the meeting one on one with 

Karzai than what I have seen in the media and what he is spouting. I see a man who said, ‘‘Hey, we want the United States to be 

here. We want a long-term relationship.’’ And then for whatever 

domestic consumption he thinks he is doing he is actually doing 

more harm than I think he realizes. But they are good folks. 

And I am hoping that, you know, we learned our lessons from 

the complete withdrawal from Iraq, which was a terrible mistake, 

and I think is being shown all over the world as a terrible mistake, 

and I hope that we continue to press ahead with getting this BSA 

done and having a long-term commitment. 

A couple of quick points I want to make. As I mentioned, the 

Americans don’t see the success in Afghanistan. I think Americans 

still think there is 150,000 troops that are marching up and down 

the hill, engaging in the Taliban, and we are taking the brunt of 

the casualties. The Afghan military is actually losing about 100 soldiers a week. 

They are taking the fight to the Taliban when they find themselves engaged. They don’t have the air support that the American 

military has, but they are fighting very bravely. It is a completely 

different situation than what we saw even 2 years ago. 

Secondly, so that is what Americans think. My concern—I just 

want to put this on the record. I can’t think of the last time I saw 

the President of the United States tell the American people why we 

are in Afghanistan. I can’t do that. Now, I believe we are in Afghanistan for good reason. I believe us remaining engaged in Afghanistan post-2014 is important. I can’t remember the last time 

I have heard the President say that. 

The President recently, fairly recently, went to Afghanistan and 

did not meet with President Karzai. I thought that was an oversight. So there is things along that line. 

But let me get now to my questions. We are looking at a residual 

force, from what I am understanding, 9,000 to 10,000 American 

troops and a few more NATO troops in that process. What was 

General Allen’s recommendation in terms of a residual force? Mr. 

Dumont, maybe you can answer that, or whoever. 

Mr. DUMONT. I am sorry, Congressman. I don’t have that number 

off the top of my head. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Do any of you three know what General Allen 

recommended? Because I believe it was somewhere around 15,000 

to 20,000 American troops post-2014. I say that to say I am concerned that we are going to undershoot the amount of troops we 

have available in Afghanistan to do both counterterrorism and support, both in building the Afghan establishment and government 

and then also in supporting their troops engaged in the field. 

I think it would be very unfortunate for 20 years from now for 

us to read the history books and say that America was 5,000 troops 

short of actually being successful in Afghanistan. 

We visited the prison, Parwan prison, in Afghanistan, and we 

visited—there is I think right now 59 TCNs in prison. Mr. Ambassador, do you have any idea like, what are we going to do with 

48

these TCNs that we continue to have? The Afghans obviously don’t 

want them. I wouldn’t either. And now we have to figure out, what 

are we going to do with them as we reach the post-2014? Are any 

of you guys familiar with that situation and have any ideas for 

what we do? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, in general, we are going to have to 

do something with them by the end of 2014. Some of them will be 

turned over to the Afghans. Some of them will be returned to the 

country of origin when those countries undertake to deal with them 

appropriately. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Let me ask one more question, just because my 

time is running out. So now we are into this kind of reduction posture. In fact, I think the vast majority of American forces are now 

focused on withdrawing instead of necessarily taking the fight to 

the enemy. It is unfortunate, but how do you think the offensive 

went against Haqqani? 

Do you believe it was completed, or do you believe we are leaving 

too quickly to finish that fight against the Haqqani network? Mr. 

Sampler, let us start with you. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Thank you. I really don’t have an opinion on the 

Haqqani network. I mean, I have worked in Afghanistan since 

2002. They have been there decades before that, so—but I don’t 

have any opinion on the——

Mr. KINZINGER. It would be nice if they were gone, though, 

wouldn’t it? 

Mr. SAMPLER. It would, Congressman. It would. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Mr. Dumont, do you have any thoughts on 

Haqqani? 

Mr. DUMONT. It is something, obviously, that we take seriously 

and that we follow and track closely and fight against each day. 

And it is something we remain focused on because it is serious to 

us. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Mr. DUMONT. And the Afghans understand that as well. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. Well, thank you all for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go now to Tulsi Gabbard of 

Hawaii who served as an Army officer in Iraq. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Aloha. Thanks for being here, and thanks for your hard work 

and your service, each of you. 

You know, we have seen different opinions and different perspectives here today through the committee on the issues in Afghanistan. I think these conversations reflect the conversations that we 

hear when we go back to our districts, that we hear in the public, 

about why there is an overwhelming public sentiment to bring all 

of our troops home, is that there seems to be a lack of a clear definition on what our mission is. 

What is the end state that our troops are trying to accomplish 

or that we are trying to accomplish there? Who is the enemy that 

threatens the United States in Afghanistan that our troops are 

fighting against? And when we say we need to accomplish the mission, what does that even mean? What does that look like? 

49

You know, when we look back to why we went there in the first 

place, Osama bin Laden is no longer a threat. Al-Qaeda has largely 

been decimated in Afghanistan. We see now, of course, pockets and 

threats coming from other countries and other regions from these 

terrorist networks. And we have also seen that because al-Qaeda 

has no allegiance to a specific flag or country that our best and 

most efficient way to deal with this threat is through some of the 

quick strike forces that we have successfully used in the past with 

some of these areas. 

You know, when we look at stability, people have talked often 

about stability in Afghanistan as being an end state. We have 

given many tools, training, infrastructure, to the Afghan people, 

the Afghan forces in order to attain this end state, but we also talk 

about the corruption, the other challenges that exist within the 

country, the tribal influences, which really lead us to understanding that this stability at the end can only be achieved by the 

Afghan people. 

So I have got three questions that follow kind of this structure. 

First is, with the bilateral security agreement, what are the next 

steps at this point, given what Karzai has said and his posturing 

in not looking at this until after the Afghan elections, and how long 

do we wait for him to make up his mind on what he wants to do? 

If eventually the bilateral security agreement is completed and 

agreed to, the remaining forces that are being projected to stay in 

Afghanistan have two missions or two purposes from what I have 

seen, and that is to train and assist and also a counterterrorism 

element. I am wondering what percentage of that projected—how 

those troops are broken up between those two missions. 

And, lastly, with that contingent that is left in Afghanistan, I 

think the BSA has kind of a 10-year timeline. What is the timeline 

for our U.S. presence there in Afghanistan? Is it a timeline? And 

if it is not a timeline, is it an end state that we are trying to 

achieve and say, ‘‘Once this is achieved, then there will be no presence.’’

So, Ambassador Dobbins, if you could start really on the next 

steps of the BSA, and then, Mr. Dumont, talk a little bit about our 

forces there. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Okay. Well, we are there to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a country with a government that 

supports al-Qaeda and allows it free reign within that country, 

something the Taliban did and which they would do again if they 

came back to power. 

We believe that concluding the BSA as soon as possible is necessary to sustain the large, broad, 70-nation coalition that supports 

Afghanistan. We believe it will begin to fragment, and we believe 

the Afghan people will become increasingly anxious the longer this 

goes on. But we haven’t, at this point, set a date beyond which we 

are no longer prepared to wait. We simply believe there is a big 

cost in waiting, and it is a cost going to be paid for by the Afghan 

people. 

I will let Mr. Dumont comment on the relationship between the 

training assistant and CT elements in terms of the timeline. The 

assumption is that this is going to be a declining presence over 

time, that whatever decision is made for 2015 will be again reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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viewed in the course of 2015, with the hope that the number can 

be reduced in 2016, et cetera. 

The objective over time is an Afghanistan that is capable of securing its territory and its population without more than the normal level of external assistance that countries at that level of development receive around the world. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. Dumont, quickly. 

Mr. DUMONT. Yes, ma’am. As you know, the train, advise, and 

assist NATO mission is to assist the Afghans to become a capable 

force, reliable CT partner, so that we don’t have to do the CT, and 

that will take place over time. There will be a combined effort for 

sometime, I imagine. 

The percentage of who will do what I don’t believe has been 

worked out yet. It will remain to be seen how quickly the Afghans 

can assume more control for the CT fight in their own country, and 

how much assistance and support they will require from donor nations. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Appreciate you being here. 

I want to build on some of the statements made by my colleague 

from Hawaii and Mr. Duncan in the regards of the money being 

spent, how much money we have spent. You were talking about 

$100 million for elections, and another $45 million for equipment 

for elections. And with what Ms. Gabbard was saying, what is the 

end game? I mean, what are we hoping for? That they will have 

a stable government, one that is not wrought with fraud, waste, 

and abuse? And that will run a country that we can be good allies 

with and trading partners? 

Mr. Sampler, if you would, define the end game. I mean, what 

is our—what are we looking to gain? I mean, for success, what 

would you say that is? 

Mr. SAMPLER. There is two questions, and the larger end game 

I will yield to Ambassador Dobbins for. That is a policy question. 

With respect to the $100 million on elections, of which $45 million 

is the bilateral part, what we are hoping for is an election that the 

Afghans are happy with. 

I mean, our goal—I get asked the question quite often, what are 

we doing in Afghanistan? And the answer that I use as my own, 

it is not government policy, but it is a secure, stable, and democratic Afghanistan that governs this population justly and secures 

its geographic space. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

Mr. SAMPLER. We don’t want to have to go back. 

Mr. YOHO. Let me stop you there. How much effective is that—

the ANSF right now? I mean, are they more effective? Are they 

standing up and—do they own the security and the—it is like they 

are fighting—they know it is their responsibility? 

Mr. DUMONT. Yes, sir, they do. We have transitioned security to 

them. They are in the lead. They are taking the majority of casualVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ties, and I venture to say close to 90 percent of the operations the 

military is conducting are Afghan-led, Afghan-directed, Afghanplanned. 

In some others, for unilateral CT missions that we do, it is also 

in conjunction with them. They do have a presence on it. They are 

involved in the planning. But they are doing the majority of the 

fighting and taking the majority of the casualties. 

Mr. YOHO. How much of that effectiveness is based on us being 

there and our presence there? 

Mr. DUMONT. Well, to get them to the point that they are at, it 

has been a long-term effort obviously. 

Mr. YOHO. Correct. 

Mr. DUMONT. Now we are providing, depending on the level of 

the unit—for instance, there are counterterrorism forces. We provide very little assistance. We have a presence there, but they are 

skilled, they are capable, and they are taking the fight to the insurgent threat. And their regular ANSF forces, the conventional 

forces, are making strides every day and making great progress. 

We do have an advising mission with them, but they are in the 

lead. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Are we looking at some point at being able to 

pull out altogether? Is this going to be another permanent U.S. 

military base around the world that we have? 

Mr. DUMONT. I don’t envision a permanent presence as you speak 

about. I think what it will depend on is how well progress is made, 

how well stability in Afghanistan is in effect over time, and how 

well regional stability is in effect also. 

I think it will be a long-term sort of focused effort that will take 

review over a period of time to assess how well things are progressing and what the enduring threat is to the United States, if 

any. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And going back to you, Mr. Sampler, you 

were saying that the infrastructure is built up and, you know, a 

lot more women are voting, a lot more women are in colleges and 

school, and that is a good thing. Is that going to be sustainable 

without our presence there? Is that something they believe in 

philosophically? Or is it just an ideological feeling—or not an ideological feeling but an ideal of ours that we are instilling upon them 

in a Muslim country that they won’t maintain after we leave? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, that is a great question. It is not an 

issue of Islam; it is more an issue of Afghan society. And it is something that they are adapting as their own, and that is the only way 

that we will be resilient, is if they make it their own philosophy. 

Increasingly——

Mr. YOHO. Without our presence, though. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Without our presence. I mean, the Afghans appreciate what we have done for them, but the Afghans themselves 

want us to—want to reach a point where they are self-sufficient 

and self-sustaining. Not all Afghans see it this way yet, but that 

is the progress that we are making. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. And, you know, we have talked about the poppy 

fields, how we need to change the farmers and the whole production mechanism so there is a more profitable crop and get away 

from $100 million in poppies, yet we are giving $100 million for 

52

elections. And we have talked about that for 25, 30 years. I mean, 

it goes back to 1992, I mean, even before that. That is just a way 

of life. Is that really realistic, that we can change that without just 

changing the whole dynamics over there as far as the government 

and the structure and all of that, and, you know, Western 

ideologies? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, I hate to speak in generalities, but 

most Afghan farmers don’t choose to grow poppies because they 

want to. They would rather grow food. It is just not profitable, and 

it is just not sustainable. So our job at USAID is to make it possible for them to make a living off of non-criminal activities. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate your input. Thank you. I am out. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We now go to Lois Frankel of Florida. Representative Frankel’s 

son served in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I did have the privilege of visiting our troops in Afghanistan, and our folks from 

USAID, with Mr. Wilson. And I am glad his son has returned home 

safely, as has mine. And my son also served in USAID. He went 

back after the Marines and went back to Afghanistan. 

So I thank you all for your service. I am grateful for his service 

and everybody’s service, but I still have to say that I remain skeptical of the money we are spending there and the waste and the 

fraud and all of that. 

But with that said, I do have a number of questions. 

First of all, you talked about education, and it is heartening to 

hear about the advancement in education. But specifically I would 

like—you know, there is a saying that—I don’t know who I am 

quoting, but ‘‘A great teacher under a tree is better than an ignorant one in a new American-built school.’’

So my first question is, what are the metrics that we are using 

in terms to assess whether there is success? Is it—are these test 

scores? Is it secular courses? Is there any anti-West propaganda 

being taught? I mean, what is the metric used? 

And if the agreement is reached, and we do stay there, do you 

feel that you have a good understanding among all the agencies 

which groups are significant threats to the United States and 

which have goals that are only local? And in terms of the various 

programs, are we going to see the State Department lead on diplomacy, USAID on development, IC on intelligence? Or will the military continue to drive those lanes? 

Those are my basic questions. And if you have time, I would like 

to hear also the answer again from some of the others—I think 

Ambassador Dobbins did answer—why we should stay. I would like 

to hear the other gentlemen’s response to that. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Do you want to start on the education, 

larry? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, sure. On the education, you know, we can 

measure outputs our outcomes, and I am very much a proponent 

of measuring desirable outcomes. And one of the most positive 

things I think in Afghanistan in the recent years is the figure I 

cited in my testimony. Of Afghans entering higher education, 20 

percent are women. That would be unthinkable even a decade ago, 

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cations. And that is a sustainable achievement. Those women won’t 

be rolled back to burkas, they won’t be put back in the back corner 

of a compound. 

So in terms of outcomes, that is one of the metrics. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Excuse me. But you—but what are they learning? 

I am asking you, do you know when they get through the system 

what they have learned? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes. Afghanistan has entrance exams for their universities. I am not familiar with what they are. I have been told 

by others that they are comparable to other universities in the region, but I can get more information on that if you would like. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me just add one point on this, which 

is twice as many Afghans can read and write today as could 10 

years ago. And that number will go up to three times as many 10 

years from now if the kids in school now stay in school. So at a 

basic level, literacy is the outcome. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Your other question in terms of anti-Western bias 

and their education, USAID did a $27 million contract with the 

Ministry of Education to purchase textbooks. And we did have the 

right to refuse it. They were Afghan textbooks. They designed the 

curriculum. We didn’t interfere in that, but we were satisfied that 

it was not prejudicial to the United States or the West. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Do you want to say something about why 

we are there? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, ma’am. I appreciate the question of why we 

are there. I mean, I think this is something that all of the Foreign 

Service officers have to deal with. Why am I leaving my family and 

going to do this? 

I am struck, given my military time, that we can do this right 

or we can do it again. And our hope is that we will be able to create and support a secure, stable, and democratic Afghanistan that 

governs its population justly and secures its geographical space. 

I use that quite often with new Foreign Service officers going out, 

and it captures most of what I think are the reasons that we are 

there. 

Mr. DUMONT. And, ma’am, with respect to the groups that we 

know are a threat to the U.S., and ones that are local, while we 

have those identified, there is no guarantee that the ones who are 

focused on local activities will not merge and compile resources and 

personnel to attack ourselves or other coalition nations. And that 

is of concern is that because some of these groups they affiliate and 

they have far-reaching effect than it was ever intended, and we are 

mindful of that. 

Ms. FRANKEL. What about driving the various programs? Can 

somebody answer that? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. I mean, I think, you know, to be fair, 

I think that there is a division of labor between Defense, State, 

AID, and the intelligence community at the moment that is pretty 

clear. The collaboration—I have been in every administration since 

Lyndon Johnson’s, and I think the collaboration among agencies is 

pretty straightforward and pretty amicable and as good as any administration I have seen. 

I don’t see DoD rolling over the other agencies. I think they are—

on the diplomatic side, they are quite a differential to the State DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:52 Mar 05, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\121113\86004 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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partment, and of course we are to them on the military operations 

side. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know 

where to begin here. How much are we spending annually in Afghanistan now? How much is the cost to the American taxpayer? 

Anybody know? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I mean, I think each of us have somewhat 

different budgets there. The total budget I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. What would be the—nobody knows the 

total budget of what we are spending in Afghanistan? It is a hearing on Afghanistan. Can I have an estimate? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am sorry, Congressman. I can’t give 

you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I will just have to say that it is disheartening to have a briefing from our Government people who are 

involved in a project and they can’t tell me how much we are 

spending annually in——

Ambassador DOBBINS. It isn’t a matter of——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. How many killed and wounded have 

we suffered in the last 12 months? Mr. Dumont, would you know 

that? 

Mr. DUMONT. Sir, I do not. I will have to get back with you on 

that one also. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We don’t know what the cost is, and we don’t 

even know how many killed and wounded there are, and we are 

supposed to believe that you fellows have a plan that is going to 

end up in a positive way in Afghanistan? Holy cow. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. We do know that the number of Afghan 

soldiers and police killed is 30 times the number of——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know what? I will have to tell you something. I am more interested in knowing how many Americans have 

been killed, because the Afghans have been killing themselves for 

centuries. 

And, you know, my father fought in Korea. And I remember 

when he told me, he said, ‘‘Dana, all of our units—these young men 

who were with me out fighting in Korea, they would never have believed that we would be there after 50 years.’’ They have—not one 

of those guys who went to Korea to try to stop the Communist 

takeover would have believed that that meant that we would have 

been committed for 50 years. 

Okay. We don’t know how many are killed and wounded. We 

don’t know what the cost is. So what will be the cost—you are presenting a plan now. What will be the cost to the United States per 

year annually after your plan is applied to Afghanistan, if they accept it? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we haven’t defined force levels there. 

I think the rough figure is probably about $1 million per soldier, 

so you could work out——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how many soldiers are we asking them, 

pleading with them, to let us send our boys into harms way? How 

55

much—how many soldiers is the plan to continue with our presence? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. The President hasn’t made that decision 

yet. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there a proposal to Karzai on that? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No. And Karzai——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I heard the number 14,000. Is that out of the 

ballpark? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. If you are talking about a U.S.-NATO, everybody together, figure, that would still probably be somewhat 

high. Karzai in fact has expressed no interest in the size of the residual presence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, yesterday the Secretary of State 

was here, and he was telling me different things of why—what we 

can’t do to make the mullahs mad. Of course, he wasn’t putting it 

that way. But when I suggested that there was groveling going on, 

I think we are groveling again. 

Maybe this is the grovel administration. We are groveling to 

Karzai. I know Karzai. I have known him for 20 years. And we 

don’t—and to suggest he—his family, we all know what his family 

has done. They have become filthy rich and we are dealing with a 

group there now centered around the Karzai clique. I mean, drug 

dealing, skimming of U.S. aid, cronyism at its worst, and we are 

dealing with Pakistan in order to make sure we have a presence 

there and where—meaning in Afghanistan, and the Pakistanis are 

doing what—we know the Pakistanis are behind the ISI, who they 

are financing. We know that they spend money that they end up 

getting from us to kill American soldiers. This is insanity. 

And then we have people who want to stay longer? It is time for 

us to get our butts out of that country. Maybe not for their sake, 

for our sake. We don’t even care enough to know how much it is 

costing or how many killed and wounded that we suffered. That 

should be right on the tip of your tongue, because that is a cost to 

everybody’s kid. I mean, everybody who has got a son there has to 

know that we—our number one priority is that person who we sent 

over there, we care about him enough. 

But we have some other agenda in Afghanistan. I don’t see what 

we are going to accomplish. And we are asking what the goals are, 

if you believe that that is accomplishable in Afghanistan, I have got 

a bridge to sell you in California. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, let me just say 

I do think—I say to the panel, Mr. Rohrabacher is right. How you 

can come to a congressional oversight hearing on this subject, with 

your titles, and not know how much we are spending every year, 

and not know how many casualties we incur every year, or this last 

year, I will say to the chairman of this committee is actually a 

stunning, stunning development. I have been involved in foreign 

policy hearings and oversight for a long time. Like that wouldn’t 

be a question on the tip of one’s tongue? But put that aside. 

Mr. Sampler, what is going to happen to the oversight of AID’s 

projects in Afghanistan post-2014? Are you going to have to—is 

56

AID going to have to pull back from whole geographic chunks of 

Afghanistan for want of security? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, thank you for the question. We hope 

not, but hope is not a plan. In most countries that we work in 

around the world, we rely on host national security forces to provide areas that are secure enough for us to work. But there is a 

range from what I would call regular aid missions where that is 

the case to Afghanistan, and then in between we have places like 

Pakistan, Colombia, South Sudan, Yemen, where we have to come 

up with creative measures to balance normal operations against 

conflict operations. 

In Afghanistan post-2014, we have got programs scattered 

around the country. Some we will be able to continue to operate; 

some may have to be adjusted. It will depend on the security situation in the specific micro-area as opposed to the countrywide——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Are there parts of Afghanistan where you are operating now that absent something happening you have to plan for 

withdrawal or significant curtailment because of want of security? 

That clearly the Taliban is going to reassert itself in certain sectors 

of Afghanistan? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, I can’t name a specific area, but categorically I think there certainly must be. There will be some place 

in Afghanistan that we are working today where a year from now 

the situation will have changed and we will no longer be able to 

work. We will have to readjust and pull back. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One of the concerns I had when I went to Afghanistan in 2009 was the emerging—of emergence of CERP as actually sort of a parallel, unregulated, no oversight stream of development assistance, economic assistance funding, entirely controlled 

by local commanders, our military commanders on the ground. 

I think it started out with great intentions, but it ballooned. It 

became fairly substantial, and it always worried me that it didn’t 

get the attention, say, bilateral aid programs do. It is not really—

you know, it is kind of ad hoc projectized. It doesn’t get the kind 

of careful scrutiny and evaluation we would normally expect for 

any kind of normal aid project. 

What is the status of CERP funding? And are the concerns I had 

in 2009—do you think they have been resolved or addressed in the 

interim? And I ask that of any one of the three of you. 

Mr. SAMPLER. I will hit——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure. 

Mr. SAMPLER [continuing]. Mike speak to the current status. 

Your concerns in 2009 were not unfounded. Commander’s Emergency Response Program money was to serve as a stabilization 

goal. And I have been in the military, and I have been at USAID, 

and I can appreciate the value of what they were attempting to do. 

One of the ways that we, with our DoD colleagues, remedied this 

was by putting senior development advisors at each of the regional 

combatant commands, and then embedding USAID officers all the 

way down to the PRT and the district support team level. So from 

2007, ’08, and ’09, to the most recent times, I think we have addressed this. We no longer see CERP programs that don’t have a 

developmental eye cast upon them. 

57

Now, that doesn’t always mean that CERP programs are what I 

would consider good long-term development programs. But that is 

not their goal. Their goal is to satisfy something that that tactical 

commander needs at that moment. And we tolerate that; we work 

with CERP to make sure that it integrates into good development. 

Even if at the moment it may not be a developmentally sound 

project, it does serve a military goal. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, any comment on that? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, obviously, CERP is dramatically reduced as a result of the reduction in——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador. Can you——

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am sorry. Obviously, CERP is dramatically reduced as a result of the reduction in U.S. forces. And I 

would guess as we move to a training, advise, and assist role, that 

it will be reduced to virtually zero. So whatever the problem was, 

I think it will be resolved in that sense. 

But I do agree with Mr. Sampler that over time AID and Defense 

created a joint mechanism for managing CERP that brought developmental considerations to bear on those expenditures. 

I might just mention, in response to your earlier questions about 

total levels of spending and casualties, that State and AID between 

them spend about $2 billion a year in Afghanistan at the moment. 

It was about double that 2 years ago. 

Casualties, about 21-, 2,200 killed in action since the beginning 

of the conflict, and about 20,000 injured. 

As to the cost of the troops, as I said, it is about $1 million a 

day per troop, so we currently have 50,000 troops there. If that was 

a constant through the year, it would be $50 million. It will be less 

than that because we are bringing those troop numbers way down 

over the next year. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

And I know my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the witnesses for your time here, but also critically for the service you give 

to our country. 

I want to repeat what—some of the sentiment that has already 

been shared—the supreme disappointment in President Karzai’s 

refusal to sign the bilateral security agreement and his game-playing with it at a time—as, Ambassador Dobbins, you have said—

time is of the essence here. It has an ongoing impact. 

You know, being the last one to ask questions, it is a chance to 

wrap up. Ambassador Dobbins, you mentioned the war in Afghanistan is not yet over, and I think, Mr. Sampler, you touched on it 

and said it most eloquently. We either do it right this time or we 

do it all over again. And the goal, the reason we have invested so 

much in blood and treasure, is to eliminate a threat, but also long 

term to make sure that we have a stable government that is working for the prosperity of its people, and justly and regional security, 

and that is critical. 

What struck me listening to the testimony today is that—a common thread that you all touched on. Mr. Sampler, you said that 

58

continued U.S. engagement is critical to Afghanistan’s stability and 

to protecting the vital interests of our own country. 

And, Mr. Dumont, I think you put it a little bit differently, but 

the ANSF can be a guarantor for a secure and democratic Afghanistan, but not without continued progress toward developing a sustainable and professional force. And I think that requires ongoing 

support. 

And, finally, Ambassador Dobbins, all recognize that without 

continued international, military, and economic support Afghanistan risks falling back into civil war. So it becomes, in some respect, a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

As we sit here in December and looking to a new year, we look 

forward to next summer and the summer fighting season again. So 

I guess my first question after a long introduction—and, Mr. Dumont, maybe you are the one to look to for this—what do you see 

as the critical success factors if the ANSF is going to stand up and 

successfully make it through next summer, and we are going to 

continue down a path we are hoping to see? 

Mr. DUMONT. I think there are several things. One is, obviously, 

providing for a safe and secure election. They are quite adept at 

providing a secure environment for voter registration to take place, 

and there were no significant security interests during that time. 

And I think that is a good indicator. But their ability to secure the 

elections will be critical, and what that will do is that will enhance 

their confidence going forward. 

I also think as we drawdown and they realize that there is less 

coalition presence, how well they continue to take the fight to the 

insurgence will be key. They have been quite adept at doing it during this fighting season. It has enhanced their confidence tremendously. 

What is going to be next for the ANSF is the ability to continue 

to train and equip their troops themselves, the ability to deploy 

their people where they need them, the ability to sustain their 

force based on the resources that they get from both donor nations 

and their own resources. Those will be the key indicators in the 

months and years ahead. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Sampler, you know, outside the context of 

the military—anticipated military challenges next summer, spring 

with the election, from your standpoint, what is—what are the 

greatest threats to your ongoing effectiveness in the next 12, 24 

months? 

Mr. SAMPLER. It is something that was discussed in the hearing 

yesterday—I haven’t heard it discussed today widely—and it is the 

hedging behavior of Afghans in a current area or a current time 

of uncertainty and instability. If Afghans have a sense that there 

is a way forward, and if the elections go well, I think hedging behavior will diminish. 

But if Afghans feel that the international community is going to 

walk away from them and leave them to their devices, then hedging behavior will be things like returning to feudal warlords and 

ethnic warlords, continuing to salt away resources. It will encourage more corruption, not less corruption. So part of our job at 

USAID will be to encourage them that USAID’s engagement in Afghanistan is not a short-term thing. We engage in countries for 

59

decades if there is a need and if there is support from the U.S. 

Congress. 

Our goal will be to convince the Afghans that we the U.S., and 

we the international community, are here to stay, so we can minimize the hedging behavior on behalf of the Afghans. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Does that hedging behavior—I mean, I am trying to put it in context, get my own mind around it. Does the hedging behavior lead to a more fractious Afghanistan, pulling it further away from that secure, just, increasingly prosperous Afghanistan? Is that the challenge? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes. I think hedging behavior is basically where 

family and clan leaders decide to focus on protecting their own, so 

they don’t make business investments. They don’t reach out to 

other ethnic groups. Their political decisions are going to be very 

clan-centric and very ethnically centric in a hedging environment. 

Whereas, if we can convince them that there is some stability 

and the opportunity to move forward, they will be more I think outgoing and more entrepreneurial. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Good. Thank you. 

Ambassador Dobbins, I had hoped to give you the final word, but 

I ran out of time. So I apologize. But, again, thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, thank you. Mr. Schneider, thank you 

very much for yielding back. We thank our members. We thank 

also the witnesses for being before us today. 

As we saw in Afghanistan early this morning, another car bomb 

exploded, this one outside the northern gate of the Kabul International Airport, and the Taliban claimed responsibility for this attack. Those carrying out the attacks had ties to the Haqqani network. 

In terms of the amount spent per month in Afghanistan, it is about $6.7 billion by the United States. This committee has oversight over this issue. 

I want to, again, thank the witnesses for their testimony today. 

But, as you know, there were a number of questions asked by committee members. If you can get back to those members with written answers to anything not answered today, and there will be 

some additional questions forthcoming from members of the committee. 

Thank you again for your testimony, and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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