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OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS: FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

REGULATORY REFORM, 

COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 

Serial No. 113–52 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, FLORIDA 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DANIEL FLORES, Chief Counsel 

JAMES PARK, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 

Commercial and Antitrust Law .......................................................................... 4 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 5 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Howard A. Shelanski, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

The Honorable C. Boyden Gray, Boyden Gray & Associates, PLLC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor at NYU School of Law; Senior Advisor, Podesta Group 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 52 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

John F. Morrall, III, Affiliated Senior Scholar, Mercatus Center, George 

Mason University 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61 

Nicole Riley, Virginia State Director, National Federation of Independent 

Business 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 67 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 69 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ........................................ 80 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law ................................... 83 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 87 
Page

IV 

Material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 94 

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Howard A. 

Shelanski, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ....................................................................................................................... 95

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable C. Boyden Gray, 

Boyden Gray & Associates, PLLC ...................................................................... 107 

Response to Questions for the Record from Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor 

at NYU School of Law; Senior Advisor, Podesta Group ................................... 113 

Response to Questions for the Record from John F. Morrall, III, Affiliated 

Senior Scholar, Mercatus Center, George Mason University ........................... 121 

Response to Questions for the Record from Nicole Riley, Virginia State Director, National Federation of Independent Business ........................................... 124 
(1) 

OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY 

AFFAIRS: FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND 

REGULATORY REFORM 

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:04 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Spencer Bachus (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bachus, Goodlatte, Holding, Collins, 

Cohen, DelBene, Garcia, and Jeffries. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Daniel Huff, Counsel; Ashley Lewis, 

Clerk; Doug Petersen, Intern; Philip Swartzfager, Legislative Director for Rep. Bachus; Jonathan Nabavi, Legislative Director for 

Rep. Holding; Jennifer Lackey, Legislative Director for Rep. Collins; Justin Sok, Legislative Assistant for Rep. Smith of Missouri; 

and (Minority) Susan Jensen, Counsel. 

Mr. BACHUS. The Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law hearing will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee 

at any time, although we don’t anticipate a recess—unless something wonderful happens, right? 

Let me welcome Administrator Shelanski and all our witnesses 

to this oversight examining the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory Reform. 

I think if there is anything that brings Members of both parties 

together is the importance of jobs and of creating more jobs in our 

economy. People call home ownership the American dream, but if 

you don’t have a job you have very little way of ever affording a 

home. And to me, really, the American dream is having a good-paying job that allows you to provide for your family and for your financial future. 

Unfortunately, today there are too many people looking for good 

work in our economy, and there are simply not enough jobs. And 

that is also impacting our budget. You know, we are talking about 

budget deficits and the national debt. We have doubled the food 

stamp program, the number of people on it in the past 5 or 6 years. 

We have done the same thing with Social Security Disability. 
2 

Those programs are growing exponentially and are really beginning 

to overwhelm our Federal budget, and all because people apparently can’t find a job. 

And that is where I think we can tie a part of that to regulations 

because I think we all agree, and I know Mr. Cohen said many 

times that regulations aren’t bad and we shouldn’t assume that 

they are bad. And a lot of regulations are good, they help safeguard 

our economy, our safety with our food regulations, and our health. 

But, then again, and really our past three Presidents have all identified in State of the Union addresses the need to cut back on Federal regulations. 

When you have excessive regulations that is separated from a 

true consideration of cost and benefits, you can do real damage to 

the economy and people’s lives. I remember in economics one of the 

first things you are taught is about GDP, and GDP is basically a 

function of capital plus workforce, some people say population, and 

then productivity. But capital is an essential part. And so to generate jobs you have to have capital and you have to have workforce, 

and any time you deny that economic working capital you cost jobs. 

Now, what does capital have to do with—we know what it has 

to do with jobs, but what does it have to do with regulations? Well, 

consider this. A Small Business Administration report based on 

2008 data—so this is rather dated—but it put the annual cost of 

Federal regulations at $1.7 trillion, and at that time it was 14 percent of our economy. Now, we are not talking about State regulations, we are not talking about local regulations, we are not talking 

about taxes, we are not talking about health benefits. We are talking about simply the cost of complying with Federal regulations. 

According to the Small Business Administration, not some conservative think tank, not Republican talking points, the Small Business 

Administration. 

Now, as I said, President Clinton, President Bush, and President 

Obama have all said we need to reduce excessive regulations. Well, 

have we done that? And let me say this: President Bush added to 

regulations, President Clinton more regulations. But how about 

President Obama? Well, as of January 2013 Congressional Budget 

Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin testified—and he testified before this 

Committee in January of this year—that the Obama administration had added $520 billion worth of new regulations. 

Now, that number doesn’t include many of Dodd-Frank regulations because they are still being enacted. It doesn’t include all the 

regulations under the Affordable Health Care Act or, as the President has started calling it, Obamacare. It doesn’t include many of 

the regulations being proposed under the President’s climate control agenda, which includes many dictates against carbon. 

So you take all these regulations, well intended, but they cost 

money. They cost capital. And taking that capital out of the economy costs jobs. And I am sure there is nobody in this room that 

has not read that our GDP is growing by 2 percent, 2.5 percent, 

and that that is not sufficient to create new jobs, that we need to 

be growing at least maybe 2 percentage points higher. And if we 

do that, we will create jobs, we will bring in more taxes, it will 

positively affect Social Security Disability, the pension fund in a 
3 

positive way. It should cut down on our food stamp benefits and 

hundreds of other Federal programs. 

And think about 14 percent cost of Federal regulations, if we 

could just add to the economy about 2 percent. Now, if all regulations cost the same, that would be one out of seven regulations. If 

you could just decrease the cost of regulations by 2 percent, you 

would actually add 2 percent to our GDP. 

And that is where you come in, Administrator. As the new head 

of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, you stand as 

one of the important checks and balances in the Federal regulatory 

system. You might say, well, Congressman, you also do, you pass 

the laws, and then the regulators write the regs. And I will tell you 

that even with the Administrative Practice Act and all these acts, 

I know in the last decade or 15 years we have only repealed one 

regulation, so one law, and that was ergonomics. So, unfortunately, 

the Congress just doesn’t seem to ever repeal a law and the regulations that go with it. 

Executive agencies must submit their proposed and final rules to 

your agency for approval before they can be published in the Federal Register. You have the authority to return a rule to the 

issuing agency if you find defects in the process or analysis. 

With this power often comes great pressure from parties interested in regulations and from the issuing agencies themselves. 

Your office must be committed to fair and unbiased reviews. You 

are sort of like a college football referee, passions are high on both 

sides, but you have to make the call. Some of them may be unpopular with someone’s agenda, but your job is to make the call and to 

get it right. 

And in making those calls, if you find that a regulation can be 

less restrictive, less costly, the benefit does not outweigh the cost, 

you can actually help create jobs. You can give someone a job. And 

so my message to you is, when you think about these regulations, 

think about will it cost someone their job or will it result in a job 

not being created. 

Accordingly, I look forward to examining your activities in detail, 

particularly on several key issues. What is being done to ensure 

that agency cost-benefit reports are not overstating benefits or inappropriately mixing direct benefits with secondary benefits? This 

has concerned me as I have reviewed the administration’s rationale 

for additional carbon emission standards, which will have a severe 

impact on the use of coal. 

Now, I am not as concerned about that as I am people working 

in the industry, of labor. Coal mining jobs are one of the highest 

paid professions in America, and I think you realize we need highpaying jobs. You have the responsibility with regard to the regulatory impact analysis process. An issue arising from that is what 

your agency is doing to make sure that real problems are being 

identified and whether the best regulatory approach is being used 

to address the problem. 

If you don’t know already, Administrator, I have a particular interest in whether independent agencies, like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, should be required to submit their rules to 

you for review. Presently they are not. They are exempt despite the 
4 

huge impact that their rules will have on the economy and on consumers. It is an agency in desperate need of oversight. 

To conclude, if your agency exercises its authority properly, it 

can be a gatekeeper to ensure smart and effective regulations. We 

all know what the flip side of that is: regulatory overreach that 

both puts a drag on our economy, retards job creation and growth, 

and fails to provide commensurate environmental health and consumer benefits. That is a bad deal for the American people. 

With that, I look forward to hearing from you and our second 

panel of experts on how our regulatory regime is functioning, how 

it can be improved, and how, if properly supervised, can create 

more jobs. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cohen of Tennessee, 

for his opening statement. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I begin, I 

wish to make public the information that we shared this morning 

that, unfortunately, you are announcing you are going to be leaving 

Congress. Being on this Subcommittee and being ranking person, 

I have got to know you, and I value your service to the country and 

the Congress. 

At times, I have seen heroic action on your part. Your background in Alabama and seeing civil rights has caused you to make 

the statements and take positions of moral rectitude concerning 

civil rights and legislation, and concerning basic human dignity 

which reaped, I think, some constituent abuse when you stood on 

the right side, which I think, if I read correctly, you based on your 

good values from your position on immigration. 

So you have got the kind of moral rectitude this Congress needs 

and that would make us a better Congress if you stayed. So I regret that you are leaving, but I have enjoyed the experience and 

will continue for the next year and a half or so. 

Mr. BACHUS. I will be here for the next year and a half. I am 

not retiring as much as I am not seeking reelection. So there is a 

difference. But I very much appreciate those remarks. And my father, if he were alive today, I am very proud of his role in the civil 

rights movement under great financial penalty at times to his business. But thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. You are welcome, sir. It has been a pleasure and will 

continue to be so. 

Now to OIRA, one of our particular areas of jurisdiction. And, 

Mr. Shelanski, you are new to the game here, but you are an outstanding economist, and for that reason, as I understand it, your 

nomination went through the Senate without any controversy and 

I think a lot of plaudits from both sides of the aisle. I commend 

you for that. 

Presidents, as the Chairman has said, Clinton, Bush the younger, and President Obama, have all said basically the same thing 

about reducing regulations, making them more efficient, harmonizing rules, et cetera. And I know that your predecessor, Mr. 

Sunstein, attempted to do that, and I am sure you will, too, and 

get rid of the bad ones, the outmoded ones, refine them, and give 

us, like Tide, a new, improved Tide, and that is what we need. 

There have been efforts to modernize. But when we come here, 

and as the Chairman said, I always say that the regulations have 
5 

benefits, too, and there is a lot of good in regulations. They are not 

necessarily evil. They do keep our food safe, they keep our airplanes in safe condition, flying and landing and all those things 

that they need to do, and a lot of regulations keep our financial 

world safer and will continue to do that. 

There is a difference among some of us in the way we look at 

the benefits from regulations. And my home paper, the Commercial 

Appeal, had an article this year that was published, a columnist by 

the name of Doyle McManus, and he cited Cass Sunstein and said 

that in President Obama’s first 4 years in office he issued fewer 

new Federal regulations than any of the four Presidents who came 

before him, including President Reagan. I take Mr. McManus’ article as being accurate. Moreover, the op-ed noted President Obama 

has revoked hundreds of outmoded rules that produce savings for 

government, businesses, and consumers that will add up to billions. 

So I look forward to learning about the continuing efforts today 

that the President has pushed to have agencies improve and modernize the existing regulatory system. The cost of regulations, there 

is a cost, but there is a benefit, and according to the Office of Management and Budget in their 2012 draft report on the benefits and 

costs of Federal regulations, the net benefits of regulations in the 

first 3 years of this administration totaled $91 billion. That is 25 

times greater than during the comparable period under Bush the 

younger. Moreover, fewer final rules have been reviewed by OIRA 

and issued by executive agencies during the first 3 years of this administration than in the comparable time during the second Bush 

administration. 

Similarly, the 2013 draft report to Congress noted the benefits of 

Federal regulations between fiscal year 2002 and 2012, a 10-year 

period, ranged from $193 billion to $800 billion in benefits as 

against $57 billion to $84 billion in costs. That is a pretty nice ratio 

of benefits over costs. 

So I would like to thank you for your service to our country in 

this important position, and I would like to know from all of our 

witnesses, including the second panel, what steps Congress can 

take to help OIRA do its job, including whether Congress should 

provide OIRA with more resources so that you can be even more 

effective in streamlining regulations. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today. And more importantly, I thank Chairman Bachus for his many times of showing 

leadership and courage in this Congress. 

Yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BACHUS. I thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the full Committee, Chairman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, for his opening statement. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

you for holding this hearing. I want to join the Ranking Member 

in congratulating you, thanking you for your many years of service. 

We entered the Congress at the same time, just a few years ago, 

and your service has been very meaningful for the people of your 

district, I have no doubt, but also for people who work here with 

you, and I thank you for that. 
6 

When you served with great distinction as Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, and as we require on our side of the 

aisle, you had to give that up because of term limits, I was absolutely delighted that you agreed to come back to this Committee 

and take the Chairmanship of this Subcommittee, and you will do 

great work. You already have, and you will for the next 15 or so 

months, and we will look forward to getting a lot done during that 

time. But we will also miss you because of your good work, your 

demeanor, your honesty, your character, and your determination to 

do the right thing. So thank you very much for that service. 

I also want to make mention, since I may—I have to attend a 

couple other things—I may after I give my opening statement, I 

won’t be here necessarily when the second panel is introduced, and 

I do want to welcome one of my—she now lives outside the district, 

but she is a native of the 6th District of Virginia and someone who 

has been very close to my office and to some of the key people in 

my office for many, many years. And that is Nicole Riley, who is 

originally from Augusta County, Virginia, and who has served as 

the State director of the NFIB since 2011. She has also been educated in the 6th District of Virginia, which is a very key thing, at 

Roanoke College, which is now in the 9th District but was when 

she was educated there, and she also was a legislative assistant to 

my good friend, Delegate Steve Landes, and she was a legislative 

policy analyst under Attorney General Jerry Kilgore, and a special 

assistant for legislative affairs when current Governor Bob McDonnell was our attorney general. So she comes to us with a great deal 

of experience and very capable in representing the interests of 

NFIB members. 

Let me turn to the subject that she and others will be testifying 

in a moment. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, or 

OIRA, has been called the most powerful Federal agency that most 

people have never heard of. OIRA is responsible for overseeing the 

development and promulgation of agency regulations. In particular, 

OIRA must review required cost-benefit analyses of economically 

significant rules, which are those rules having an annual effect on 

the economy of $100 million or more. 

Such cost-benefit analysis is critical because, since early in the 

Obama administration, many have attributed the economy’s lack of 

recovery in large part to increases in regulation and regulatory uncertainty. Even the administration acknowledges the problem. In a 

January 18, 2011, Wall Street Journal op-ed, President Obama 

stated that overregulation ‘‘stifles innovation,’’ and has a, ‘‘chilling 

effect on growth and jobs.’’ The President has even issued a number of executive orders and memoranda that address regulatory 

burdens. These include Executive Order 13563, which directs agencies to ‘‘propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs.’’ 

While these executive orders look good on paper, it appears that 

it is all the Obama administration is willing to do. I want to know 

what OIRA is doing to ensure agencies actually implement the 

stated principles. 

Unfortunately, there are grounds for concern. Roughly two-thirds 

of the claimed benefits of economically significant final rules OIRA 

reviewed in 2010 were actually from secondary effects that were 
7 

not the statutorily authorized targets of the rules. What is OIRA 

doing to make sure that the bulk of the benefits agencies claim for 

their rules arise specifically out of improving the conditions Congress authorized those agencies to address by regulation? 

Similarly, in May of 2013 the administration quietly increased 

its estimate of the benefit of reducing carbon from the atmosphere 

from $21 to $35 per metric ton. That will dramatically increase 

agency estimates of benefits from regulations limiting emissions. 

However, there are significant concerns that the administration’s 

new figure is substantively flawed and that the process for issuing 

it was not transparent. The Government Accountability Office is investigating. 

Administrator Shelanski joined OIRA at a critical time. Job creation continues to fall short of expectations. In August 2013 employers added only 169,000 jobs to payrolls, less than expected, and 

gains for June and July were revised downward. The unemployment rate ticked down to 7.3 percent, but only because fewer people are looking for work. Even more worrisome, the labor participation rate is the lowest it has been in roughly 40 years. The economy as a whole also remains sluggish. On September 18, 2013, the 

Federal Reserve lowered its economic growth forecast for 2013 and 

2014. 

In light of this worrisome data, I am particularly interested in 

hearing how Administrator Shelanski plans to ensure the administration’s actions match its rhetoric about reducing the regulatory 

burden on the small businesses that form the backbone of our economy. The National Federation of Independent Business surveys; 

government regulations are consistently a top concern for smallbusiness owners whose compliance costs are also higher than those 

of larger businesses. We cannot afford to regulate small-business 

job creators out of business. 

To this end, the OIRA administrator holds a number of tools that 

can be powerful if he chooses to use them. If an agency’s cost-benefit analysis is improper or if the agency fails to consider alternatives or account for the impacts on small business, OIRA can return the regulation to the agency so it does not take effect. During 

the Bush administration, OIRA sent 27 return letters. During the 

Obama administration, though, OIRA has sent only one. 

OIRA’s zealous enforcement of the cost-benefit analysis, least 

burdensome alternative, and other requirements to regulations 

under consideration by the executive branch will help to prevent 

unnecessary and excessively costly regulations that harm the economy and kill jobs. And that is why I am pleased Subcommittee 

Chairman Bachus has called this oversight hearing, and I look forward to Administrator Shelanski’s testimony, as well as that of our 

second panel of distinguished experts. And I thank you and yield 

back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Chairman. 

Now recognize the Ranking Member for a unanimous consent request. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. I would ask unanimous consent to 

enter into the record the statement of Mr. Conyers. 
8 

Mr. BACHUS. Without objection, the full Ranking Member’s statement, the gentleman from Michigan, John Conyers’ statement will 

be added to the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 
9 

To that end, they have pushed through this 

Comn1ittee a series of anti-regulatory bills, all of 

which are substantially identical to measures 

considered in the last Congress and that were the 

subject of veto threats by the Administration. 

Take, for example, the so-called REINS Act, 

which would require both Houses of Congress and 

the President to approve all new major ntles before 

they can take effect. 

If the Congress cannot agree to keep the federal 

government funded or to prevent it from violating 

the debt limit, I do not see how it could reach 

agreement on a broad array of rules, some of which 

will undoubtedly be controversial. 

2 
10 

In effect, the REINS Act would essentially be a 

procedural "chokehold" on Federal agency 

rulemaking so that essential public safety, health, 

and environmental protections that business interests 

oppose do not go into effect 

Although this bill is intended to "rein-in" the 

Adrllinistration's control over ruleillaking, Illy 

friends on the other side of the aisle also are 

pursuing a bill - known as the Regulatory 

Accountability Act - that would give more control 

to the Administration over the rulemaking process. 

And, it would require agencies to ignore prohibitions 

in other statutes, such as the Clean "Vater Act and 

the Clean Air Act, against using cost-benefit 

analysis. 
11 

Yet another bill, the so-called Sunshine for 

Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act, would 

allow virtually anybody who claims to be affected 

by the proposed decree or settlement to intervene in 

the court proceeding. Thus, for eXalnple, if the 

settlelnent pertains to the Clean Air Act, the bill 

would conceivably allow anyone who breathes air to 

intervene in the court case. 

From Iny perspective, these bills simply do not 

make sense. But, I would appreciate your thoughts 

on these measures. 

And, I want to know what the Administration 

has been doing to make the regulatory process 

more efficient without congressional intervention. 
12 

I believe all of us on this Subcommittee can 

agree that good regulations are necessary and that 

unnecessary regulations are burdensome to all. 

This is why the Obama Administration has 

demonstrated a remarkable ability to balance the 

Government's obligation to protect the health, 

welfare, and safety of Americans with the need to 

foster economic growth. 

This accomplishment is aU the more remarkable 

in light of the fact that this Administration inherited 

the most devastating economic crisis since the Great 

Depression, which was largely the result of lax 

regulation. 
13 

Nevertheless, in response to COnCell1S voiced by 

small businesses and others, the Administration has 

issued a series of executi ve orders intended to reduce 

regulatory burdens, by -

It requiring meaningful retrospective reviews of 

regulations that are already on the books; 

.. ensuring greater opportunities for members of 

the public to comment on proposed rules 

through the Internet and by providing online 

access to the rulemaking docket in an easily 

searchable and downloadable format; and 

.. requiring agencies to identify ways to reduce 

costs and simplify by harmonizing rules through 

inter-agency coordination. 

6 
14 

Do you have any additional suggestions on how 

OIRA can improve the regulatory process? 

Finally, I want to hear from Mr. Shelanski as 

well as from each of our other witnesses about other 

ways we can accomplish real regulatory refonn. 

For example, OIRA has been chronically 

understaffed and underfunded for years. I note that 

one of the few areas of agreement among the 

witnesses on the second panel- namely former 

OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen and Mr. Morrall 

with the Mercatus Center - is that OIRA needs Inore 

resources. 

Do you concur? 

7 
15 

Could the lack of adequate resources possibly 

explain, at least in part, the backlog of rules under 

review at your agency? 

Given the stature and experience of the 

witnesses on both panels, I am optimistic that they 

will have some pragmatic and meaningful 

recommendations for reform. 

8 
16 

Mr. BACHUS. And now we have our witness introduction for the 

first panel. I am told the Judiciary Committee, unlike Financial 

Services, introduces just one panel at a time, so I want to honor 

that approach. But we do have a very esteemed second panel, and 

we are very much looking forward to that. 

I do want to introduce a member of the audience, the chairman 

of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Paul 

Verkuil. 

Would you stand up, Mr. Verkuil? We are honored to have you. 

And so thank you and your staff. 

At this time I will make an introduction of our first panelist. 

Howard Shelanski is the administrator of the Office of Information 

and Regulatory Affairs, the Office of Management and Budget. He 

was previously the Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission and a professor at Georgetown University 

Law School. From 2011 to 2012 he was of-counsel to the law firm 

of Davis Polk & Wardwell. He was also the Deputy Director for 

Antitrust in the FTC’s Bureau of Economics from 2009 to 2011. 

Mr. Shelanski was on the faculty at the University of California 

at Berkeley from 1997 to 2009. He served as Chief Economist of 

the Federal Communications Commission from 1999 to 2000 and as 

senior economist for the President’s Council on Economic Advisers 

at the White House from 1998 to 1999. He was an associate with 

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans from 1905 to 1997, served 

as a clerk for Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme 

Court, for Judge Louis Pollak of the U.S. District Court in Philadelphia, and for Judge Stephen F. Williams of the U.S. Court of Appeals here in D.C. Mr. Shelanski received his B.A. From Haverford 

College and a J.D. And Ph.D. from the University of California, 

Berkeley. 

Welcome to the hearing. And, Administrator, you are welcome to 

give an opening statement. And we are not going to time you as 

far as 5 minutes. If it is 6 minutes or 7 minutes, you are fine. So 

don’t let the lights bother you. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. That is one procedure I violate, by giving people a 

little more time. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you very much. Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Cohen, Chairman Goodlatte, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss recent developments at OIRA and my priorities for the Office going forward. 

In the roughly 12 weeks since I took office in July, it has been 

my privilege to work with the excellent and dedicated OIRA staff, 

the first-rate leadership team at OMB, and our hard-working colleagues throughout the executive branch. Together we are working 

to achieve the administration’s goals of promoting economic growth 

and employment while simultaneously protecting the health, safety, and welfare of Americans now and into the future. 
17 

OIRA has a broad portfolio that extends beyond regulatory review. For example, under the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office 

ensures that information collection by the Federal Government is 

not unnecessarily burdensome. OIRA also provides guidance on privacy policy to Federal agencies and oversees the implementation of 

government-wide information quality and statistical standards. 

One of my objectives as Administrator is to work with colleagues 

across the government to ensure that Federal policy in each of 

these areas adapts to the ever-changing technological environment 

while remaining clear and consistent with the law. 

To be sure, the largest area of OIRA’s work is the review of regulations promulgated by executive branch departments and agencies. A set of executive orders establishes the principles and procedures for OIRA’s regulatory reviews. Most significantly, as Chairman Bachus mentioned, Executive Order 12866 and Executive 

Order 13563 delineate processes for regulatory review and establish standards and analytic requirements for rulemaking by departments and agencies. And importantly, Executive Orders 13563 and 

13610 focus on the reduction of regulatory burdens through the retrospective review of existing rules. 

My priorities as OIRA administrator are directly rooted in the 

relevant executive orders. One such priority is to increase the predictability of the regulatory review process by improving the timeliness and transparency of OIRA’s key functions. In that regard, I 

have committed to publishing the Unified Agenda and Regulatory 

Plan of agency rulemaking activity twice each year. OIRA staff 

have been working closely with all Federal regulatory agencies toward the timely publication of the fall plan and agenda. 

Of similar importance to clarity and certainty of the regulatory 

environment is that rules, both new rules and those already under 

review, move through OIRA as efficiently as resource constraints 

and rigorous analysis permit. It has been a top priority of mine 

since coming to OIRA to reduce the frequency of extended regulatory reviews and to work with agencies on rules that are already 

under extended review. 

While OIRA’s consideration of Federal regulations must first and 

foremost uphold the standards of analysis that the executive orders 

establish, unnecessary delays in review are harmful to everyone: to 

those who are denied the benefits of regulation, to those wishing 

to comment on proposed rules and influence policy, and to those 

who must plan for any changes the regulations require of them. I 

am pleased to report that, thanks to the tireless work of OIRA staff 

in the months before and since my arrival, we have more than cut 

in half the number of rules that were under review for more than 

200 days, and the number of rules under review for more than 90 

days is down considerably and continues to fall. 

While increasing the predictability of the regulatory process 

through timely review of rules and publication of regulatory plans 

and agendas is essential, the executive orders also make clear that 

removal of unnecessary burdens is an essential element of the regulatory process. As I have previously testified, ensuring flexibility 

for small businesses and reducing regulatory burdens for everyone 

through the retrospective review process are high priorities for me 

as Administrator. Retrospective review is a crucial way to ensure 
18 

that our regulatory system is modern, streamlined, and does not 

impose unnecessary burdens on the American public. It can also 

provide an opportunity to improve regulations already on the 

books. 

As I testified in July, our retrospective review efforts to that 

point had already produced significant results, bringing near-term 

cost savings of more than $10 billion to the U.S. economy. As agencies move forward with their current plans, OIRA will work with 

them to achieve even greater gains. Ensuring follow-through on 

such plans will be one of our key objectives going forward. 

Finally, OIRA has important responsibilities in the area of international regulatory cooperation under Executive Order 13609. We 

have made progress in a number of areas with our international 

partners and will continue to further our regulatory international 

mission in coordination with the Department of State and USTR. 

Regulatory cooperation benefits both businesses and consumers by 

promoting consistent standards and procedures across borders and 

by preserving safety and welfare while promoting competitiveness 

here and abroad. 

In conclusion, the many activities of government bring great benefits to Americans but can also carry costs. It is therefore critical 

that paperwork and information collection are not unduly burdensome, that Federal agencies ensure privacy and use only high quality data, and that regulation protects health, safety, and welfare in 

a manner that is consistent with job creation and economic growth. 

These are central objectives of this administration and are the 

main tasks of OIRA. 

It is my honor and privilege to serve as OIRA’s Administrator as 

we continue to meet these challenges. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Administrator. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shelanski follows:] 
19 

{EMBARGOED UNTIL 4:00 PM, SEPTEMBER 30J 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 

OFFICE O:F MANAGEIVIINT A'IID miDGET 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503 

wViw.whitehouse.gov/omb 

TESTIMONY OF HOWARD SHELANSKI 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY REFORM, COMMERCIAL AND ANTITRUST LAW 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

September 30, 2013 

Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. I am pleased to have this opportunity to 

discuss recent developments at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and my 

priorities for OIRA going forward. 

I am honored that President Obama nominated me, and that the Senate confirmed me, to be the 

Administrator of OlRA. In the roughly 12 weeks since I took office in July, it has been my 

privilege to work with the excellent and dedicated OlRA staff, the first-rate leadership team at 

the Office of Management and Budget under Director Sylvia Burwell, and our hardworking 

colleab'lleS throughout the Executive Branch. Together we are working to achieve the 

Administration's goals of promoting economic growth and employment while simultaneously 

protecting the health, safety, and welfare of Americans now and into the future. 

OIRA has a broad portfolio that extends beyond regulatory review. For example, under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, the Otlice is responsible for reviewing collections of information by 

the Federal Government to ensure that they are not unnecessarily burdensome. OIRA also 

provides b'llidance on privacy policy to Federal agencies and oversees the implementation of 

government-wide information quality and statistical standards. One of my objectives as 
20 

Administrator is to work with colleagues across the Government to ensure that Federal policy in 

each of these areas adapts to the ever-changing technological environment while remaining clear 

and consistent with applicable law. 

To be sure, the largest area of OIRA's work is the review of reS'lIlations promulgated by 

Executive Branch departments and agencies. A set of Executive Orders establishes the 

principles and procedures for OTRA' s regulatory reviews. Most significantly, E.O. 12866 and 

E.O. 13563 delineate processes for regulatory review and establish standards and analytic 

requirements for rulemaking by departments and agencies. 

Other important Executive Orders focus on the reduction of regulatory burdens through the 

retrospective review of existing rules (EO 13563 and 13610), and on international regulatory 

cooperation (EO 13609). 

My priorities as OIRA Administrator are directly rooted in the relevant Executive Orders. One 

such priority is to increase the predictability of the regulatory review process by improving the 

timeliness and transparency of OlRA's key functions In that regard, I have committed to 

publishing the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan for agency rulemaking activity twice each 

year. O1RA staff have been working closely with all Federal regulatory agencies toward the 

timely publication of the fall plan and agenda. 

Of similar importance to clarity and certainty of the regulatory environment is that rules-both 

new rules and those already under review-move through OlRA as efficiently as resource 

constraints and rigorous analysis permit. It has been a top priority of mine since coming to 

OIRA to reduce the frequency of extended regulatory reviews and to work with agencies on rules 

that are already under extended review. While OIRA's consideration of Federal reS'lIlations must 

first and foremost uphold the standards of analysis that the Executive Orders establish, 

unnecessary delays in review are harmful to everyone: to those who are denied the benefits of 

regulation, to those wishing to comment on proposed rules and influence policy, and to those 

who must plan for any changes the regulations require of them. T am pleased to report that, 

thanks to the tireless work of OIRA staff in the months before and since my arrival, we have 

z 
21 

more than cut in half the number of rules that were under review for more than 200 days, and the 

number of rules under review for more than 90 days is down considerably and continues to fall. 

While increasing the predictability of the regulatory process through timely review of rules and 

publication of reS'lIlatory plans and agendas is essential, the Executive Orders also make clear 

that flexibility and removal of unnecessary burdens are essential elements of the Federal 

rulemaking process. As T have previously testified, ensuring regulatory flexibility for small 

businesses and reducing regulatory burdens for everyone through the retrospecti ve review 

process are high priorities for me as Administrator. 

Retrospective review is a crucial way to ensure that our regulatory system is modem, 

streamlined, and does not impose unnecessary burdens on the American public. 

Even regulations that were well crafted when t1rst promulgated can become unnecessary or 

excessively burdensome over time and with changing conditions. Retrospective review of 

regulations on the books helps to ensure that those regulations are continuing to help promote the 

safety, health, welfare, and well-being of Americans without imposing unnecessary costs. 

Agencies filed their most recent retrospective review plans with OIRA in July. OIRA completed 

its review of those plans a few weeks later and agencies have posted them on their websites. 

As T testitied in July, our retrospective review efforts to that point had already produced 

significant results, bringing near-term cost savings of more than $10 billion to the US economy. 

As agencies move forward with their current plans, OIRA will work with them to achieve even 

greater gains Many of the retrospective review efforts particularly benefit small businesses. 

The Department of Transportation's retrospective review plan alone identifies over two dozen 

initiatives to save money for small businesses and local governments. The institutionalization of 

retrospective review to ensure follow-through on such plans will be one of our key objectives 

moving forward. 

Finally, OIRA has important responsibilities in the area of international regulatory cooperation 

under EO 13609. We have made progress in a number of areas with our international partners 

through the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council and the Mexico-United States 

3 
22 

High Level Regulatory Cooperation Council. OLRA has also furthered its international 

regulatory mission in coordination with the Department of State and USTR, including activities 

in support of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) discussion of reb'lliatory 

cooperation between the US and the European Union. Regulatory cooperation benefits both 

businesses and consumers by promoting consistent standards and procedures across borders, and 

by preserving safety and welfare while promoting competitiveness here and abroad. While the 

international role of OTRA is small compared to its key missions of regulatory review and 

implementing Federal information policy, it is nonetheless an important etfort going forward. 

In conclusion, the many activities of government bring great benefits to Americans but can also 

carry costs. It is therefore critical to ensure that paperwork and information collection do not 

impose undue burdens; that Federal agencies ensure privacy and use only high-quality data; and 

that regulation protects health, safety and welfare in a manner that is consistent with job creation 

and economic growth. These are central objectives of this Administration and are the main tasks 

of OIRA. It is my honor and privilege to serve as OIRA's Administrator as we continue to meet 

these challenges. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

4 
23 

Mr. BACHUS. And at this time I recognize the gentleman from 

North Carolina, Mr. Holding. We have a U.S. Attorney be your first 

examiner. 

Mr. HOLDING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And first off I would be remiss if I didn’t thank the Chairman 

for not only his leadership, but his friendship. Although I am a new 

Member of Congress and a new Member of this Committee, the 

Chairman has taken the time to impart to me more than a bit of 

his wisdom. 

And I appreciate your friendship and look forward to that continuing in all the endeavors that you have for the future. 

As Chairman Goodlatte said earlier, pointed out that it was in 

January 18, 2011, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that President 

Obama stated that overregulation stifles innovation and has a 

chilling effect on growth and jobs. I assume you agree with that 

statement? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes, sir, I would believe that overregulation 

would certainly have that effect. 

Mr. HOLDING. Turning to the Unified Agenda and Regulatory 

Plan, I applaud your commitment to complying with the law and 

publishing that on a regular basis as specified. During the 12 

weeks or so that you said that you have been on the job, I assume 

one of the first things that you have done is kind of do an analysis 

of where OIRA is, what resources do you have at hand, what shortcomings do you have. And I would assume that you have looked at 

the failure to publish the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan in 

the past in a timely fashion. And as you have done that analysis, 

where are the shortcomings in OIRA that have caused this failing? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you very much, Congressman Holding. 

The OIRA staff is an absolutely first-rate staff that is dealing with 

an enormous set of responsibilities, as outlined in my opening 

statement, and indeed the opening statements that we heard earlier this afternoon. I don’t see any shortcomings in the talent, the 

commitment, the ability of OIRA as a whole or, indeed, of any 

member of the staff. They are all extremely diligent, working very 

hard to ensure that the executive orders are observed. 

My priority in arriving in early July as Administrator was simply 

to make sure that nothing from the past would be an impediment 

moving forward and that would enable me to uphold the commitment I made during my confirmation hearings to ensure that that 

Unified Regulatory Plan and Agenda did get published twice a 

year. 

As to what may have happened in the past, I was not there at 

OIRA, and I was not particularly interested, to be honest, about 

what exactly happened at that time. What I was interested in finding out was whether there was anything at the agency that would 

prevent me from moving forward and ensuring publication twice 

each year, and indeed I found nothing that would be an impediment to that task. 

Mr. HOLDING. Well, I would recommend to you that you find out 

what was the impediment in the past to ensure that you have it 

identified. It may be there right before your very eyes, but since 

you haven’t identified what the impediment was in the past, it is 

kind of hard to fix it in the future. 
24 

You know, I feel very strongly that when the President failed to 

release the Unified Agenda and never released one until December 

of 2012, after the election, I think that was very unfair to voters. 

I think it is unfair because they were not told what regulations the 

President planned to do when he was—if he were to be reelected. 

And I believe had they known what regulations that the President 

had in mind of implementing after his reelection, it may very well 

have impacted the vote. So I think you have got a problem there, 

and if you are not undertaking the steps to identify what that problem was just a year ago, I think you are making a mistake. 

Turning toward transparency, you know, elaborate for me the 

importance to businesses large and small, you know, that they 

have a clear outlook as to what regulations are coming down the 

pike and looking at them, what they are looking at as they make 

determinations about what business plans they want to implement. 

You know, speak to me a little bit about transparency and its importance. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Well, thank you very much. This actually relates 

to one of the issues with the Unified Regulatory Agenda. 

One thing that has happened in the past year and a half, really 

because of the good work and the attention that OIRA staff has 

dedicated to the issue, is that what is published in that Unified 

Plan and Agenda is far better than what was published in the past. 

We have been working very closely with agencies to ensure that 

what they do publish in terms of their plans going forward actually 

aligns reasonably closely with what they are publishing, what they 

are, in fact, doing. That way businesses, small and large, will be 

able to identify real targets, will be able to identify real issues on 

which they want to comment. 

In fact, if agencies just put everything they are thinking about 

on the Regulatory Plan and Agenda, that may look like transparency, but it is obfuscation. It is just like what happens in a discovery dispute when somebody pulls 27 semis up in front and 

dumps all those documents on your lap and you have got to go 

hunt through for the things that are really relevant. 

Well, we have tried to make the Unified Regulatory Plan and 

Agenda something that is clearer, by being more rigorous, better, 

by working more closely with the agencies, so people will know 

what the real plans are. And that is actually something that during 

whatever happened in the past to delay the publication, there were 

a lot of improvements that occurred in the process and in what the 

publication would be. So I think that certainly helps transparency. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Are you familiar with a group called the Heritage Foundation? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. COHEN. The Heritage Foundation issued a report last year 

that claimed that the Obama administration during its first 3 

years, and I quote the report, ‘‘unleashed 106 new major regulations that increased regulatory burdens by more than $46 billion 

annually, 5 times the amount imposed by George W. Bush’s administration in his first 3 years.’’ Now, that quote is contrary to what 
25 

I said in my opening statement. Are you familiar with that position 

that the Heritage Foundation took? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I am not familiar with that specific report, but 

I have heard such numbers quoted. 

Mr. COHEN. And how would you respond to such numbers that 

are quoted by the Heritage Foundation? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Well, thank you very much for that question, 

Ranking Member Cohen, because I think it gets to an interesting 

issue. 

Over a period of years one can come up with many different ways 

to count the costs and benefits of regulation, many different ways 

to compare regulation across administrations, pages of regulations, 

costs of proposed rules, final rules. It is often hard to know what 

go into these different calculations. 

What I am interested in is this: making sure not that we only 

count the costs of regulation, but that we pay attention to whether 

those regulations were rigorously developed and reviewed by OIRA 

in where such review is appropriate, to ensure that they are bringing benefits that exceed those costs. And so simply pointing at the 

cost side of regulation and what might often be very questionable 

estimates of the cost side of regulation does not tell the story of 

why agencies regulate and of the benefits that may be brought. 

And so what I am interested in when I look at regulatory tallies 

is, sure, I care what the costs are. You can come to a point where 

the cumulative costs imposed on a particular sector of the economy 

really are creating difficulties for businesses, for consumers, job 

creation, economic growth. That needs to be paid attention to. But 

we also need to look at what the purpose of those rules is. And if 

those rules are bringing substantial benefits, benefits that themselves reduce costs currently and into the future, rules that themselves may in fact safeguard and stabilize the economic system 

going forward, I think that we have to look very carefully at what 

we are getting for those costs and not simply look at the cost side. 

Mr. COHEN. Are you familiar with the Crain study? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes, I am familiar with the Crain and Crain 

study. 

Mr. COHEN. And would you put that on a pedestal or would you 

put it underneath a pedestal? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I am not sure I can say in polite company, sir, 

where I would put that study. But let me say pretty clearly that 

that study has been, I think, pretty thoroughly refuted by everybody who has looked at it. In fact, the Small Business Administration, I don’t see them relying on that study. It was not an official 

report of the SBA. It was done by two outside consultants. There 

are a variety of methodological problems with that study that I 

won’t take the time to go into here. Others have, Congressional Research Service, I think GAO. One of those organizations put out an 

analysis thoroughly debunking that study. There have been a number of pieces that have pointed out the analytical flaws with it. So, 

no, I put that—— 

Mr. COHEN. Somewhere beneath the Saturday Evening Post, 

maybe? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes. So my view is that that study is not one 

that I take particularly seriously, and I actually think it is very 
26 

unhelpful because it tells, I think, a story that is very frightening 

until one looks at the fact that the numbers are completely concocted and have very little basis in any real data, any real science, 

any real analysis. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, we do have a problem with science here, we 

are still working on evolution, we are working on climate change, 

we are working on economic relativity, shutdowns, and debt ceilings. So it is an area where we need improvement. 

Are you aware of any empirical evidence linking jobs—— 

Mr. BACHUS. Did you say evolution? 

Mr. COHEN. There are some people who have questioned evolution on your side of the aisle. 

Mr. BACHUS. Oh, oh. I didn’t know if we had any rules on evolution. 

Mr. COHEN. No, it is beyond our Subcommittee. It is in our larger 

unisphere, hemisphere of science and the lack of faith therein. 

Are you aware of any empirical evidence linking jobs and regulations? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. There are studies that have attempted to link 

job effects to regulation, but the link between any particular regulation and jobs, or indeed between our entire regulatory system and 

GDP and jobs, is a very tenuous one, and I am not aware of any 

study that has strong consensus in the economic community. 

Mr. COHEN. If I may ask one last question. Your agency has suffered through sequestration, as has the rest of government. How 

has sequestration affected your agency, and if you were not affected, if you had more money, do you think you could refine more 

rules and create more productivity? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you very much for that question. Sequestration is hurting all government agencies. OIRA is not unique in 

this respect. And indeed OMB as an organization itself is just 

doing a tremendous amount in every aspect on the budget side, the 

management side in my regulatory office, it is doing a lot with 

greatly pared-down resources. I can’t say for certain, but we may 

well be at historic staffing lows in OIRA and indeed OMB-wide. 

It would certainly be a benefit to all of the Office of Management 

and Budget if we had more resources office-wide with which to do 

our work, and I at OIRA would certainly like to have my share of 

those additional resources so that we could do deeper and further 

work and move more quickly in providing clarity to the regulatory 

environment. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. I yield back the proverbial nonexistent 

balance of my time. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Mr. Collins. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you, and 

I appreciate also, like my friend from North Carolina, your wisdom 

and patience as we learn the ropes, and I thank you for your service that will span beyond your years in this Chair. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. This is actually better than a funeral. 

Mr. COLLINS. Yeah, you actually get to hear it. I have done plenty of those in my life, too. 

Mr. COHEN. Wait until you get to Ms. DelBene, she is going to 

say wonderful things about you. 
27 

Mr. COLLINS. I love it, I love it. 

Again, thank you for being here. I think there is a lot more that 

of course we can get into, and we will look forward in my office 

working with you as we go forward. I want to follow up briefly, I 

have a few more questions, I want to follow up briefly from the 

gentleman from North Carolina’s question concerning the guidelines. One of the things that you talk about in your opening statement, but also that you had listed out and had sent a memo to 

agencies regarding publishing of the fall agenda. And I think the 

deadline on that was that you had asked for it to be due August 

29th. Is that correct or is that wrong? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Oh, in terms of receiving our reports from the 

agencies? 

Mr. COLLINS. Yes. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Subject to check, that was approximately I think 

the deadline we set, yes. 

Mr. COLLINS. So is a guesstimation around the 29th? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. It was very close to that time period. 

Mr. COLLINS. How many have actually got close? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Almost everybody. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. We are actually in very good shape. I think we 

are waiting for one independent agency to come forward with their 

report. 

Mr. COLLINS. I think it follows up on, as what was said, is where 

the impediments are and then actually getting real information, it 

would be of service. I think there is some general agreement across 

both sides of this dais as far as trying to find what helps business 

and grow jobs and the economy and the things that help and doing 

away with the things that do not. Do you have any suggestions for 

legislative reforms that this Subcommittee can look at that are consistent with this administration’s goal to create regulatory system 

for the 21st century? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. You know, I think that the—and, Congressman 

Collins, I thank you for that question because I think it is an interesting question. Having been at OIRA for about 12 weeks I am still 

developing an opinion on areas in which we might or might not 

benefit from regulatory reform, but my inclination so far is to say 

that we have the tools that we need at OIRA to do good regulatory 

review. And I have some concerns about some of the regulatory reforms that I have heard about. 

We have got a good set of executive orders that set forward I 

think the right analytic principles and the right regulatory process 

for reviewing rules. We are working closely with the agencies to ensure that their analyses meet those requirements. And, as Chairman Bachus said, it is our responsibility to go back to the agencies 

and let them know when we think that they have not done a good 

analysis. 

I think that process works well, and at this point I think that 

leaving the process where it is, with OIRA under the executive orders to develop in that environment, will be sufficient to ensure a 

sound regulatory system going forward. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. That is, again, I think something we could, 

I want to say, you know, relatively, the new role that you are in, 
28 

and getting into it later I think there is some questions there I 

have. But you had mentioned earlier about the cost and the benefits issue, and I am concerned that agencies don’t always have the 

data that they need to accurately calculate, in fact, what you just 

said, the proposals will have on businesses, local and State economies, whether good or bad. 

There has been some proposals that OIRA actually should issue 

specific guidelines on how agencies should conduct more scientific 

evaluations of existing regulations and also agencies required to develop plans for future retrospective evaluation, which you made 

part of your confirmation. As part of the agencies’ initial regulatory 

impact analysis, do you think the agencies currently possess all the 

data they need to accurately calculate the impact of a proposed rule 

and, if so, do you think they are consistently using the data to 

make accurate calculations? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. So this is a very important question. So let me 

start by saying that I share your concern about the need for additional what I might call institutionalization or guidance on the retrospective review process, and that is something that we are very 

seriously and in real time working on at OIRA, because it is a very 

important priority, and the more guidance we can give the agencies, the more closely we can work with them, I think the more 

beneficial this process will be, and to the extent there is underbrush that can be usefully cleared out in doing that and freeing 

American businesses from excessive burdens and from protecting 

American citizens by improving regulations by reviewing them 

through the retrospective review process. 

When it comes to guidance on the cost and benefit analysis, you 

know, we at OIRA do have a set of guidances, our biggest one is 

Circular A-4, that tells agencies how we want them to do the costbenefit analysis, working on issues such as discount rates they 

should apply, what kind of data they should use, what the standards are. It is unquestionably true that there are rules in which 

the data are hard to come by for the agencies, and so there often 

is a lot of back and forth in working with the agency to ensure that 

they are using the best science, the best data that are available. 

We don’t work in a world of certainty. Economics, cost-benefit 

analysis, a lot of the issues that come up under this rubric are new, 

and so we try to ensure that there is enough data to make a reasoned decision and that they are using the best data without artificially discounting data that might be inconvenient, to do a rigorous 

analysis. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired, but I will 

be submitting for the record a question concerning rule review on 

positive impact of over $100 million as well, a significant factor 

there. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back nothing because I have no time 

left. 

Mr. BACHUS. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Collins. 

At this time I will recognize the gentlelady from Washington, Ms. 

DelBene. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I first want to say thank 

you for all of your service. And as someone who started my life as 

well in Alabama, it was a great honor for me to be able to go to 
29 

Alabama with you and many others earlier this year as we did the 

civil rights trip. And I appreciate even more now that I have an 

opportunity to do that while you are still here serving in Congress. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

Ms. DELBENE. I am only disappointed that now when you finally 

learned how to pronounce my name, though, we won’t—— 

Mr. BACHUS. It is not DelBene, it’s DelBene? 

Ms. DELBENE. No, actually the first time you just said it there 

you got it right, so maybe we will keep working with you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Yeah, they keep giving me different—I have nerve 

damage in my ears. 

Ms. DELBENE. And thank you, Mr. Administrator, for being here 

today. I appreciate your time. You were talking a little bit about 

retrospective reviews, and with changes in technology and kind of 

the way our economy works in many ways, we have reviews and 

cost-benefit analysis, but some of that also needs to take place because, you know, something that worked in the past just may not 

work anymore given changes. 

And so how do you view that and how can we make sure that 

we do a good job with helping agencies look at cost-benefit analysis 

in a different way when the way businesses work, et cetera, may 

be changing over time? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you very much. That is really a critical 

question. And one of the things that we need to make sure of is 

that we don’t have regulations that might lock industry into a technology that is on its way out the door or lock them into very expensive capital expenditures when something might be able to be done 

a lot less expensively shortly down the road. You know, it is like 

somebody who 3 years ago built a house wiring all kinds of fancy 

cable through their house, and then someone showed up with a $10 

wireless modem a month later and said, well, you could have saved 

yourself a lot of money there. We want to avoid that kind of situation. 

And I think the agencies, first of all, they are very attuned to 

these kinds of issues. They have no interest in imposing costs that 

are unwarranted. In the time I have had the pleasure of serving 

in this role, I have had the chance to meet with and talk with top 

officials at most of our executive agencies, and this is a very serious concern on their part. 

So as part of the cost-benefit analysis, what is being asked is 

what technologies are on the horizon, what might there be, a benefit in waiting, might there be a benefit in adopting standards that 

are flexible so that new technologies can come in. 

When it comes to looking at existing rules in the retrospective review process, it is often the case that new technology has emerged 

that might allow something to happen more inexpensively. The 

problem is, you know, sweeping that rule away might actually be 

more costly for industry because often they have already absorbed 

the fixed costs of regulatory compliance of 10, 20 years ago. And 

it is one thing to say new businesses coming in don’t have to do 

things the same way. I think that is an important thing for us to 

look for and it is an important kind of flexibility to have. But to 

mandate a change for those businesses that have already made the 

capital expenditure and adapted to an old rule just for the sake of 
30 

adopting a new technology could actually be very costly. And despite the fact of the new technology being cheaper, if you were 

doing this for the first time, might not be cheaper for some of these 

businesses. 

So where do we get the information? We work very closely with 

agencies, with industry. We hear a lot every time there is a rulemaking process going on during the notice and comment period. 

The agencies hear from industry saying, this will be very costly for 

us in ways you don’t understand. 

Or we can get the same result in a less expensive way. And when 

a rule is under review at OIRA, under the process of the on-therecord publicly disclosed 12866 meetings that we have with stakeholders on all parts, we also hear from them. And so we can go 

back to agencies and say, why didn’t you consider this? What was 

wrong with this idea? Why isn’t this right? And where it is right, 

part of our job, under the executive order, is to make sure that the 

agencies take into account of that information. So—— 

Ms. DELBENE. Is there a way to share best practices? If one 

agency goes through an issue and kind of updates that as the way 

that information gets shared so everyone can benefit from that? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I think that the Administrative Procedure Act 

and the executive order are really, and the documents, the circulars and things that are associated with the executive orders, really 

set out the procedures that bring to bear a set of best practices in 

terms of how information is processed. The variation across different industrial segments, different areas in which the departments and agencies regulate is so great that there is probably no 

single solution. 

And this actually gets back to a question Mr. Collins asked me 

about legislation. I worry about locking in a fixed set of practices, 

a one-size-fits-all procedure when different industries, in fact, may 

need different ways of approaching these problems. 

So I think there is a set of best practices in the sense of making 

sure that one is doing the cost benefit analysis, using all available 

data, really listening to the stakeholders through the notice and 

comment procedure. And in terms of ways to make sure that we 

gather information from retrospective review, that is one of the 

things that we are trying to reach a similar level of development 

on right now. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I also yield back my nonexistent time. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Ms. DelBene. And Mr. Jeffries, I heard 

you are a man on the move and you are going to go next? Is that 

right? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Okay, well thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BACHUS. The Ranking Member said you have to leave in a 

few minutes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Well I appreciate you yielding to me and of course 

your tremendous and distinguished service over the many years 

that you serve the people of Alabama and this country. 

It is my understanding that pursuant to statute, you have approximately 90 days by which to undertake a review of a pending 

regulation, is that correct? 
31 

Mr. SHELANSKI. The executive order sets a timeline, and the initial review period that it sets is a 90-day period. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now is it often the case that you are unable, for 

a variety of reasons, the agency, to complete its work during that 

90-day period and then there is a process by which an extension 

is granted? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes. There is a process by which extensions can 

be granted, and the interpretation that is developed of that provision is at the request of the agency and/or granted by the agency. 

There could be multiple extensions and certainly a lot of the regulation that we review at OIRA is very complicated stuff. And so we 

do have to resort to that. I would say not most of the time, but 

there is certainly plenty of examples out there. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. It is also my understanding that under your tenure, the backlog that had accumulated has largely dissipated, is 

that right? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Well, I don’t want to claim credit for it. It is 

something that really began before I got there under the acting administrator who preceded me and really run by the excellent staff 

at OIRA. They really got with the program before my arrival, and 

Director Burwell at OMB made it a prior to of hers before I was 

in place to ensure the office was moving in that direction. I have 

tried since arriving 12 weeks ago to add some additional energy 

and push. And so we are down by more than half in terms of rules 

and extended review from where we were. And I would really like 

to, and have every intention of pushing that much farther down. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, would it be fair to say that sequestration 

complicates your ability to evaluate pending rules on a timely 

basis? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. It has been problematic, Mr. Jeffries, because I 

have had to have staff on furlough. And every individual on my 

staff is incredibly important because each individual desk officer 

has a portfolio on which they are working, and a day on which they 

are not allowed to look at their government email or do any work 

is a day in which that slips further behind, and on top of which, 

we have already, I can’t backfill positions when people leave, and 

so it becomes a slippery slope. And it is problematic. 

And as I have stated in my opening statement, timeliness is important, clarity is important, but ultimately the most important 

thing, and the reason for being of OIRA, is rigorous, careful analysis of the rules. And we won’t compromise on that. And to be sure, 

furloughs, sequestration, the inability to hire and even backfill positions we have lost greatly compromise our ability to do that rigorous analysis in a timely way. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. If we fail to pass a continuing resolution over the 

next few hours, will your agency be required to shut down? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Like most other Federal agencies, we will not be 

able to continue operation. So in my particular case, my staff at 

OIRA will go from approximately 40 to two. And I will call back 

people as needed to meet court deadlines, but all of our rulemaking 

review will certainly stop during a period of shutdown. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. So it is also my understanding I think that the 

courts could possibly shut down over the next few weeks, so I am 
32 

not even clear what deadlines might actually be salient moving forward, but hopefully, we can avert all of those complications. 

One or two last questions, so it is my understanding that you review sort of what is deemed significant proposed regulations and 

final rules, is that right? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And how is that significance determination made 

as to what is appropriate for your agency to consider? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Well the primary category of significance is economic significance. And executive order 12866 which came out 

under President Clinton set a target of $100 million a year of economic turnover, of economic effect as a benchmark for economic 

significance. So we do review rules where the annual effect on the 

economy will be $100 million or more. 

There could be other significant determinations that arise because of something has to do with a particularly urgent or important issue. But that is the main category of significance. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. And I thank the Chair and the distinguished Ranking Member. 

Mr. BACHUS. I thank the gentleman from New York. 

Administrator, you went to Haverford which is a Quaker background? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes, sir. It is a small Quaker college. 

Mr. BACHUS. And to Cal Berkeley? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Quite a change yes. 

Mr. BACHUS. Was that a change? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. It certainly was. There was no question about 

that. 

Mr. BACHUS. Are you from Philadelphia? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I am a native of Philadelphia. In fact, most of 

my extended family is still there. My immediate family, my wife 

and child we live here in D.C. and rest of my immediate family 

lives in Brooklyn, New York. 

Mr. BACHUS. Haverford has a stellar reputation producing very 

good graduates. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. President Obama wrote an op-ed in The Wall Street 

Journal so—not The Wall Street Journal this is President Obama 

and The Wall Street Journal, I want to clarify that for the Ranking 

Member, but he said that overregulation stifles innovation and has 

a chilling effect on growth and jobs. Do you agree? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I think the overregulation, that is to say, regulation that exceeds the benefits that it provides and that makes it 

difficult for an industry to grow or plan or function is going to have 

a variety of negative effects, exactly what effects at what time may 

be hard to tell. But I have long believed that regulation that serves 

no purpose, or regulation that can’t be shown to achieve its purpose 

is better left undone because of the risks it could run. 

Mr. BACHUS. And I know you mentioned executive order 12866 

four or five times in your testimony. That allows you to do a return 

letter to the agency? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Yes. The return letter is one tool that the administrator has for a rule that does not meet the standards, and it is 
33 

not going to through a process of interaction with the agency and 

during a process of review to ever meet the standards. 

Mr. BACHUS. I know under the present administration, I think 

they only issued one return letter, as opposed to, I know during the 

George W. Bush administration there were 27 returns. 

Are you going to take a closer look at that tool? Or what are 

some other alternatives to that that you will be using? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you, sir. That is a very good question. I 

don’t have any predetermined target of how many return letters I 

will or won’t send, and I wouldn’t feel unfulfilled in my term as administrator if I never sent one. In fact, I might see that as a success. 

But certainly it is one tool and if an appropriate circumstance 

arises, I would not hesitate to use the return letter authority in the 

executive orders. 

There is other authority that can be used, and one is the authority simply to push agencies to actually make a rule compliant with 

the analytic requirements of the executive orders. 

The other tool is that agencies can withdraw rules. And sometimes if there is simply a very great gulf between, for example, and 

this, again, gets to a question I think either Mr. Holding or Mr. 

Collins asked me about is the availability of information and data 

for the agencies, if they don’t know enough, they may take the time 

to find out, to do a study, to wait for more information to develop 

out there in the world, and that can be an appropriate time for the 

agency to say, okay, we are going to withdraw the rule, and we will 

repropose it at such a time that we can get the available data and 

meet the requirements. 

And that is a tool that actually happens, that is actually used 

quite a bit more frequently than the return letter, in fact, has been 

used several times in recent weeks. 

And I find that to be, there is something good about the withdrawal in that it is really the agency coming to terms with what 

more it needs to do, and at least in my limited experience of 12 

weeks, it is something that can be a more amicable solution than 

a return letter. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. Coming from the Financial Services 

Committee, I can’t tell you the number of times that financial institutions have told me that although there is a big difference in a 

rule and guidance, that often they are told, you are not complying 

with guidance, and that actually can have as much of an impact. 

Of course, guidance you don’t get to review guidance. Or do you? 

What is your role there? 

Mr. SHELANSKI. We actually do review guidance. This is actually 

something that the agencies are not always happy with us about. 

But in my view, the label that is attached to something that is produced by an agency is a lot less important than the effect that it 

actually has. So we try to work with agencies to have them submit 

things that they call notices or guidance because very often those 

do have, in fact, regulatory effect, and we have, on numerous occasions at OIRA, gone back to them with effectively asking for cost 

benefit analysis of notices and guidance. We have sometimes 

asked—in fact, this just happened with EPA where they had a 

guidance, a very helpful guidance, that was really responsive to 
34 

two Supreme Court decisions to articulate the jurisdiction of the 

Clean Water Act. And they withdrew that guidance and reproposed 

it as a rule. And that will emerge once it is through OIRA review 

as a proposed rule for the public to comment on. 

The reason is that we felt notice and comment was very important although they had done notice and comment on their guidance, but some things should be labeled what they really are which 

is regulation, not guidance. But if it comes in and it is called a 

guidance and it has regulatory effect, we will review it. 

Mr. BACHUS. I very much appreciate that answer. And I think 

the Financial Services Chairman and Committee would also, in a 

bipartisan way, appreciate that. 

I am not going to go into question on the so-called social cost of 

carbon, but the administration did appear to disregard two of 

OMB’s guidelines on cost benefit in issuing them, but I may want 

to write a letter on it and maybe be joined by some of the other 

Members. But I don’t think at this time I will go into that. 

But let me just close by saying, make a case to us that your all 

your employees are essential in this continuing resolution. Sequestration is creating problems and as oversight committee, I think we 

have an obligation—and I have done that with the SEC to urge the 

appropriators to, they have made tremendous new obligations and 

task and have not provided the funding. 

So I think it is a proper role for us to make that case for you. 

And I have really not heard too many Members on either side of 

the aisle, the OMB and its different segments and departments I 

think is one of our most valuable departments. And so we would 

love to at least give us the opportunity to look at that. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. I greatly appreciate that sir. And I would just 

emphasize that OIRA is in no different position than any other 

part of OMB. Every one of those offices is working flat out performing vital functions. 

Mr. BACHUS. And I have really, I have not heard, I have heard 

almost no criticism of OMB. I will probably be criticized for saying 

that, but it returns its value many times over. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. With that, we will excuse the administrator and 

thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. SHELANSKI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BACHUS. And we will call our second panel. 

We are going to delay the start for just a minute. 

I think we might proceed. I don’t know what that bell is. 

Mr. COHEN. How many years do you have to be here until you 

know what the bells mean? 

Mr. BACHUS. I think we are going to hit the badminton thing 

back over the fence. 

Maybe we are getting it from the other. 

Professor Sally Katzen has enjoyed a distinguished career in 

legal practice, government service and academia, the first female 

partner at the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering. Wow. 

Ms. Katzen also has served as section chair of the American Bar 

Association’s administrative law and regulatory practice groups. 

When we get past the sequestration, we may ask you if you want 

to come back up here and work. She served for 8 years in the Clin-
35 

ton administration including 5 years as administrator for the Office 

of Information Regulatory Affairs in OMB. She has a bachelor’s degree from Smith College and a JD from the University of Michigan 

Law School. 

She has taught at the George Washington University, University 

of Michigan, George Mason University—George Mason University—the University of Pennsylvania and Georgetown University 

Law School and currently is a visiting professor at NYU School of 

Law. Is she the Democratic witness? 

Mr. COHEN. I thought she was. The George Mason thing got me 

totally confused. 

Mr. BACHUS. Did you see that in her resume when you asked her 

to testify? 

Mr. COHEN. At least she didn’t have Liberty University in there. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. Welcome, Ms. Katzen. 

And Boyden Gray, former partner of Wilmer Hale served as 

White House counsel for former President George H.W. Bush, subsequently the U.S. ambassador to the European Union. He was 

also appointed to the U.S. special envoy for European Affairs and 

for Eurasian energy. 

In 1993, he received the Presidential citizens medal from President Clinton. He is currently on the board of directors of the Atlanta Council and the European Institute. Boyden Gray is the 

founding partner of Boyden Gray and Associates, a law and regulatory strategy firm in Washington, D.C. following many years of 

service to his Nation in both domestic and diplomatic posts. 

As White House counsel to President George H.W. Bush, he assisted the President’s enactment of the Clean Air Act amendments 

of 1990, development of a cap and trade system for acid rain emissions, and enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 which aimed 

to decrease American independence on foreign oil, protect our environment and promote economic growth. He previously had served 

as counsel to President Ronald Reagan’s task force on regulatory 

relief and as legal counsel to vice president Bush. 

Later under President Bush, he served as U.S. Ambassador to 

the European Union special envoy for Eurasia and energy, diplomacy and a special envoy for European Union affairs. 

In addition to his public service and private legal work, he also 

serves on a variety of boards dedicated to public health, regulatory 

reform, constitutional law and a variety of other civic and charitable causes. 

We welcome you, Mr. Gray. 

And Dr. John F. Morrall, III, is an affiliated senior scholar with 

the Mercatus Center of George Mason University. There you go. 

And independent contractor for IMAP data and Bloomberg government. He specializes in regulatory impact analysis reform and 

government, benefit cost and cost effective analysis, health, labor, 

housing, and homeland security policy, and risk assessment. 

In the last 5 years he has also performed work for USAID the 

School of Public Environmental Affairs of Indiana University, the 

Pew Charitable Trust, the United States Chamber of Commerce, 

the Institute of Brazilian Issues at George Washington University, 

and the OECD in South Africa and the Institute for applied economic research in Brazil. What is the OECD in South Africa? 
36 

Mr. MORRALL. It is the Organization of Economic Cooperation 

and Development formed after World War II. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. And Institute for applied economic research in Brazil. I don’t know if I complete that. 

But from 1989 to 2008, Dr. Morrall was branch chief for the Office of Information Regulatory Affairs. 

So you were at OIRA and acting deputy administrator the highest position at OIRA from 2006 to 2007. 

Dr. Morrall has authored several books and articles and graduated magna cum laude from Tufts University and received his 

Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

And Tufts is also in Philadelphia, right? Is it in Philadelphia? 

Mr. MORRALL. No. It is outside Boston. 

Mr. BACHUS. Well, two fine cities. 

Ms. Riley, I think the Chairman introduced you. And he read the 

entire statement. But I would like to acknowledge your work with 

NFIB which the Chairman mentioned. And I think you saw firsthand some of the effects of regulation on job creation and deployment of capital or non-deployment of capital or use of capital in 

maybe not as, sometimes not as productive a way. 

We now proceed under the 5-minute rule with questions and we 

again will start. 

Barney Frank used to do this all the time. He didn’t give the 

panel the time to do the opening statements. He would go right to 

questions and now I have done it. 

I guess it was time for me not to run for reelection. 

At this time, I apologize, our panelists will be recognized for 

their opening statements which we won’t take, we won’t adhere 

strictly to the 5-minute rule. We want to hear what you have to 

say. 

Mr. BACHUS. Ambassador Gray. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE C. BOYDEN GRAY, 

BOYDEN GRAY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear. I want to make one basic point which is that the 

OIRA review process ought to include independent agencies as well 

as executive branch agencies. That is my main point. 

But I do want to make a point at the outset that I am honored 

to be at the same table with Sally Katzen and the point is the bipartisan nature of this whole endeavor has been apparent in the 

very, very beginning. It is one of the few places in Washington that 

still is bipartisan. I hope it stays that way. She was a law partner, 

tennis partner, is now a teaching colleague. And we get along pretty well together, and I also want to just note a little piece of trivia, 

that your first witness, his predecessor was at the Office of Legal 

Counsel in the Department of Justice in 1981 when the first executive order was drafted. And he was a high powered intern just off 

the Supreme Court clerkship, and he is the one who approved, if 

not, in fact, drafted the cost benefit language that survived her rewrite of that order 12866 which Ms. Katzen wrote, preserving the 

work of her, one of her successors, Cass Sunstein in the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs. So there is a very tangled web 
37 

of Republicans and Democrats who try to keep this a common endeavor. 

The point that I have made in my prepared testimony and just 

want to reiterate is the importance of covering independent agencies. Now, we did not do so in 1981, not for strictly legal reasons, 

but because we thought the political difficulties were greater than 

the benefits, the political costs were greater than the political benefits. That decision was carried forward, as I understand it, by 

12866 and it is still true. But I don’t believe now anymore that the 

political costs are greater. I think the political benefits are far 

greater to cover them. They are much more powerful than they 

used to be. The FCC is obviously much more powerful than it used 

to be, and you perhaps as much as anybody on the Subcommittee 

and the Committee are aware now how powerful most of the financial agencies are, most of which are independent: the SEC, FCC, 

the CFPB, a newcomer, and, of course, the Fed itself. 

I don’t believe that my neighbor to my immediate left now objects 

to this general notion that OIRA should be reviewing independent 

agency regulations. I think I have uncovered statements where she 

has now agreed with that, but she can speak for herself, but I do 

think this is something which I think has bipartisan support, and 

I do think that it is absolutely critical to making the system work 

properly. 

I can come up with many examples, but one of my favorites was 

the issue of the CFTC issuing, or trying to issue under DoddFrank, rules on derivatives and we had thought that Congress, 

you, had exempted and used derivatives, that is common hedging, 

that has been going on for decades by utilities and energy firms. 

But for a while, it looked as though, well, that wasn’t going to get 

exempted and that is a case where it didn’t make any sense to divorce what the CFTC was doing with what EPA was doing which 

is the primary and the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission, 

FERC, the primary regulators of utilities, it didn’t make any sense 

to divorce those. It doesn’t make any sense to divorce financial 

services from the rest of the economy. 

And so I would make the plea that this be done, it can be done 

by executive order, the President can do it now, the President has 

asked, President Obama has asked independent agencies to submit 

their rules for review, but it is not mandatory. It could be, should 

be, and I think we would all be better off if it were. 

I can remember trying to go see Cass Sunstein myself on behalf 

of some clients engaged in the derivative issue, and he wouldn’t 

meet because it was—the CFTC was an independent agency. So I 

do hope that it is fixed. It is better done by legislation, because 

that represents more democratic input, but it could be done, it 

could be done by executive order. 

In my prepared statement, I do have a quibble about something 

which has repeatedly come up so far, the social cost of carbon because I do think it is, you know, an example of why things should 

get full notice and comment, Administrative Procedure Act review 

with its review in the OMB in the proper course of its review obligations. The numbers don’t make any sense. 

We have two markets that are extant, the European market, 

market in California and the price of carbon in those two markets 
38 

is a fraction of what the government says is the social cost of carbon. So I could go into more detail in answer the questions but I 

did want to make that point. 

OMB has also approved, I think, erroneously, EPA’s assessment 

of the benefits of certain of its coal regulations based on benefits 

of reducing PM2.5. Most of the reductions occur in areas that are 

well under the PM2.5 standard, even the tightened standards, one 

wonders whether you should really cap benefits in areas that are 

in complete attainment for the standard. 

I will stop there, but again, just repeat I hope that independent 

agencies get the review from OMB that they deserve. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gray follows:] 
39 

Hearing before the 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

"THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS: 

FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND REGULATORY REFORM" 

September 30, 2013 

Statement of Amb. C. Boyden Gray 

I am honored to have been invited to testify before the Judiciary 

Committee's Subcommittee on Regulatory Iteform, Commercial and Antitrust 

Law on the subject ofthe Office ofTnformation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

The focus of my remarks today will be the regulatory reforms that can be 

accomplished by subjecting proposed regulations to the oversight ofOIRAperhaps the most powerful office in the administrative apparatus of our 

Government, but one of its best-kept secrets. 

1. REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 

In the last Congress, I twice testified before the full J ucliciary Committee in 

support of the Regulatory Accountability Act of2011.' As I said in2011, ,,[bJy 

incorporating the provisions of the Regulatory Accountability Act ... into the 

I j\/Ty stCltf'111f'nts rf'111<lin <lvClibble on the C0111111ittf'P's wf'b site. <It 

http://juuiciary .hoLlse.gov Ihearing'sl pdf/ Gruj'%QOI OQ.:JQOll.pcli' and 

http://jurticiary.house.gov/hearings/Hearing'S 'lOl'2/Gray 09'20QOl'2.prlf 
40 

overarching structure of the Administrative Procedure Act- which does not 

exempt independent agencies-Congress will commit the independent agencies 

to Oll{A guidance and oversight, including the discipline of cost-benefit analysis 

and alternatives analysis." This remains, to my mind, one of our administrative 

law system's most critical needs. 

A. OlRA. OVERSIGHT OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 

Before examining the cost-benefit analysis in particular, I will spend a 

moment on the virtues of OIl {A oversight in general. As federal agencies 

proliferate and the regulatory burden on American public and American industry 

grmvs, it becomes increasingly important that the myriad cooks stirring the 

regulatory soup be sul~ject to meaningtLtl oversight. As Sally Katzen observed 

after her time as OIRA. Administrator under President Clinton, "the problems 

that plagLle our nation do not fit neatly into one agency"; "nor are they likely to 

be solved by one regulatory adion."2 Sul~jecting independent agencies to OIRA 

oversight would therefore result in "better coordinated and coherent regulatory 

actions, and ultimately better decisionmaking.":l The need to bring independent 

agencies into the fold grows more urgent as Congress delegates more amI more 

power to them. The Securities and Exchange Commission, National Labor 

~ Sf-illy ]"\f-l.tzt'Tl. O!R.4. at Thirt.1': RPjlutions and RfimmmendatiOJIJ. O.S ADMIN. L. HEV. 10:3, lOS, 111 (02011). 

,;J ld. at 110. 

2 
41 

Relations Board, and other longstanding agencies \vield immensely more power 

than they once did. And the Dodd-Franl, Act granted \·ast new powers to existing 

independent agencies such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and 

created another new independent agency, the Bureau of Consumer Financial 

Protection CCFPI3"), with unprecedented power and unprecedented independence 

from all three branches of government. Exempting independent agencies from 

OTRA oversight is sometimes justified by the argument that, whereas executive 

agencies are the President's, independent agencies are Congress's. The premise is 

no longer true if it ever was: Congress is increasingly unwilling to oversee those 

agencies, as demonstrated by the Dodd- Frank provisions preventing Congress 

even from reviewing the budget of the self-funded CFPR. 

As a general matter, Congress and the courts can only react to 

administrative rules after they have already been promulgated; meaningfLl1 

oversight of the administrative state must start in the executive branch. Indeed, 

beginning with my experience as counsel to Vice President Bush, I have observed 

that centralized review of administrative agencies is most effective when the 

Office of the Vice President takes an active role in its supervision. I have seen 

ambitious regulatory reform succeed with vice presidential leadership, and T have 

seen inter-agency eff(wts Elil few want of centralized leadership. vVhether or not 

the Vice President takes an active role in regulatory matters, however, it is now 
42 

more important than ever that OTRA be granted the authority it needs to direct 

and supervise a coherent administrative policy across all federal agencies-not 

just those whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President. 

It is well accepted that the President's constitutional duty to faithfully 

execute the laws gives him authority to subject independent agencies to OTRc\ 

review' But this is an area in which congressional cooperation, rather than 

unilateral executive action, is preferable for purposes of inter-branch comity. 

\\!hile the Obama Administration has made much of the fact that it nominally 

asked independent agencies to review the costs and benefits of their regulations, 

the executive branch has not taken serious steps to actually align the costs and 

benefits of independent agencies' regulations. And OTRA does not discuss 

proposed independent agency rules with the public as it does with respect to 

executive agencies. 

B. COST-BENEFIT ANAL YS1S 

One ofthe greatest virtues of the Regulatory Accountability Act is that it 

would sul~ject independent agencies to the re<[uirement that they establish that 

the costs imposed by their rules are justified by the benefits they accrue. 

Cost-benefit analysis is sometimes unfairly disparaged as tool of 

,. See VIVIAN S. CIIU & DA)!IEL T. SIIEDD, Pm:SIDENTIAL HEVIEW or IKDEPENDE):T REGl"LATOIl.Y CO:VIlv[]SSION 

RULElvLlliING, LEGAL ISSUES (Sept. 10. QOIQ), at 12-15. available at 

http://www .hs.org-I sgp/ crs/misc /R4~7~O.pdf. 
43 

conservatives, and as designed to "promote a deregulatory agenda under the 

cover of scientific ol~jectivity."" Both claims are false. 

1. IDEOLOGICALLY NEUTRA.L 

The detractors of cost-benefIt analysis tend to oppose it for its results, not 

its method. For example, there are those who criticize economic analysis because 

it "has never been the environmentalist's friend."" Economic analysis vie\ved in 

the abstract is ideologically neutral. \Vhen it is used correctly, cost-benefit 

analysis promotes regulations that are good for society by deterring regulations 

(from any political quarter) that would elevate the interests of a few above the 

good of the whole 7 

But conservatives are by no means the only advocates of cost-benefit 

analysis. 

Sally Katzen opposed codification of cost-benefit analysis while in ofTice,s 

o FRANI, ACKEruvL\): & LIs:\ HEINZERLI'IG, PRICELESS, ON !"lKOWING TIlE PRICE 01' EVERYTIII):G AKD TIlE VALUE 

OT' NOTIII::\G 9 (2001); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Hole cf Cost-benifitdna('vsis, 76 L". CIII. L. REV. 13JJ. 

1366 (2009) (arguing that cost-benefit mmlysis is motivated by "political bias against regulation") (revic\ving 

ACI-\ERl'vL<\':\ & IIEI:\ZERLING, sujJra); Jonathan D. Guynn, Tlte J!olilical1!.c01lOrr!V?! Fillawial nulemakiflJ{ Lifte}" 

Busint'ss HOllTldtllhlf'. 99 VA. J.I. HEY. 641. 0-44 (Q01 :3) (citing"llrglnTlt'llts that cost-lwrlf'fit analysis is "df'signt'd to 

fLu,ther a deregulatory agenda by creating rewuatory gricliock, imposing an impossible burdcn of proof on the 

regLuators or lIlaking' it prohibitively expensive for agencies to issue regluations:'). 

6 Li::;a Heinzerling, Lisa Heinzerling Responds to Richard H.evesz on Cost-Benqfit Alza~vsis, GmST (I\.:Iay 15,2008), 

http:// gTi st.org / tlrtic] e / cost-henetit-environ111en ttl] i S111-tln-oxY111oron / 

7 I\.'Iattheyv D. Aclier & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benifit Ana~}'sis, 109 YALE L.J. 165,225-26 (1999) (,,[Vv]e 

argLle that CEA. properly understood. is consistent , ..... ith every political theory that holds that the government 

should GI.rP about tllf' ovpndl \vpll-lwing of its citi;;kns."). 

S I\:atzen. supra note 2. at lOS. 
44 

but she had a change of heart after she left OIRA. In 2011 she wrote that 

"re<juirements f()r economic analysis and centralized review should be extended to 

the Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs-those multi-headed agencies, 

such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications 

Commission, the I'ederal Trade Commission, etc., whose members do not serve at 

the pleasure of the President and can be removed only for cause."9 Citing reports 

by OMB and Resources for the Future, Katzen observed that "IRCs do not 

typically engage in the rigorous economic analysis that has corne to be expected 

(and generally accepted) for executive branch agencies. In light of the wave of 

financial regulations triggered by the Dodd-Frank Act, Katzen called extending 

cost-benefit analysis to independent agencies "a no-brainer."l0 I agree. 

And Cass Sunstein, \vho headed OIRA during President Obama's first term 

and authored The Cost Benefit State, published by the American Bar Association, 

wrote that "us [ingJ cost-benefit analysis in a highly disciplined way" to 

"ensur[ e ] that high costs are justified by high benefits-is especially important in 

a period of economic difficulty."!! 

This is not a new idea. Judge Patricia vVald, f(JrIner Chief Judge ofthe n.c. 

Circuit, appointed by President Carter, wrote in l!J8S that ,,[eJven when the 

9 ld. at 109. 

lU Jd. at 110. 

11 Cass R. Sllllstcin. ll11fJlallt~Z;ng C'osi-lJentjiL _1fW~VJ";S. Em'o. Q J. OF RISK REG. :3 (2011). 

6 
45 

governing statute says nothing specific ahout economic principles, the agency 

may rely heavily on economic analysis to meet more general statutory criteria, 

such as determining that rates are 'j ust and reasonable.' "!2 

Given the bipartisanship support its practitioner's have yoiced for costheneflt analysis, it should come as no surprise that it "has become a mainstream 

tool used hy Presidents ofhoth parties and memhers of Congress on hoth sides of 

the aisle."!" 

2. FACILITATION OF JUDlCAL REVIEW 

Requiring agencies to suhject their regulations to cost-benefit analysis also 

allows for meaningful judicial revie\v of agency action. \Vithout suhstituting its 

policy judgment for that of the agency, a court can ensure that the agency 

employed its expertise to craft a regulation that \vill do more good than harm. 

Perhaps the hest example of judicial review of administrative cost-henefit 

analysis is Business Roundtable "1'. S.E.C., the very case that sparked some of the 

loudest complaints that cost-benefit analysis is a partisan device. That case 

involved an appeal of the S.E.C.'s "proxy access rule." A federal statute required 

the S.E.C. to consider the costs and benefits of that rule. \Vhen the proxy access 

rule was appealed in the D.C. Circuit, the court did not try to undertake its own 

12 Pf-ftrici:-t M. \\iald. Jlldirial RJ?'l.Jlea: ojEconomic AJla{l·Sl~~. 1 YALF.I. 0:\ KEG. 1,;3, [·;3 (19",.1). 

15 Guynn, Sltj1l"il note 5, at G-!<-!<--k5. 

7 
46 

economic analysis, or even micromanage the agency's own substantive review; 

rather, the court reviewed only whether the S.E.C. had sufficiently considered the 

evidence in the record bef()re the agency, and whether the agency had 

meaningfully considered and replied to aflected parties' arguments about the costs 

of the rule. The agency clearly had failed to satisfy those minimal requirements. 

As the court held, the agency had "inconsistently and opportunistically framed 

the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or 

to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to sLlpport its 

predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial 

problems raised by commenters."H But rather than dictating an outcome, the 

court vacated the rule and remanded the matter to the agency-it gave the 

agency another bite at the apple. The court did not prohibit the S.E.C. from 

reaching the same substantive outcome; it simply required the agency to satisfy 

the applicable procedural requirements. 

This is precisely what the reviewing court is supposed to do when 

confronted with an agency's statutorily required cost-benefit analysis. In the 

words ofJudge \Vald, 

'INhere a governing statute requires the agency to conduct an 

economic analysis as a basis for action, ... the court must insist that 

it be done and that it include whatever components Congress 

specified. Little or no deference is due the agency in such threshold 

l4lJusilless nOllfldLable v. Sli.,C', 647 F.sd 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

8 
47 

scrutiny .... The court must assure itself that the statutorily 

mandated decision ... has been made and that the agency's reasoning 

was rational and supported by evidence. An agency cannot immunize 

arbitrary or capricious substantive decisions by dressing them up in 

the Emperor's clothes of economic jargon15 

Husiness Roundtable demonstrates that judicial review of cost-benefit analysis 

promotes a rulemaking process driven by expertise and not mere politics. There 

is no good reason why independent agencies, which are responsible for some of 

the costliest rules in the Federal Register, should be exempt from this process. 

S. PROBLEMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 

None ofthis is to suggest that simply requiring agencies to perf()rm costbenefit analysis of their rules is a fail-proof solution for the problems of 

regulatory mismanagement. Like any form of analysis, cost-benefit analysis 

inevitably ref1ects the value judgments of the regulator. Congress, and this body 

in particular, must therefore be vigilant in regulating the regulators. 

This vigilance is especially needtill in the current Administration, which, by 

its own estimate, has imposed up to $51.5 million in regulatory costs between 

2009 and 2012, considering only the 5R so-called "m,uor rules" issued during that 

1& \Vald, JlljJ!"anotc 12. at 50. 

9 
48 

time period16 And that self-serving estimate should be viewed skeptically: As 

ftJrlner OTRA Administrator Susan Dudley has observed, 

Agencies have strong incentives to demonstrate through analysis 

that their desired regulations will res Lilt in benefits that exceed costs. 

[AJs the regulatory game is now structured, OIM is the 

umpire-the sole judge of the balls and strikes pitched by the 

agencies. vVhen the umpire boasts with such enthusiasm about his 

team's score, one has to wonder who will ensure that the game is 

played fairly.17 

Tn sharp contrast to the Administration's own estimate, the American Action 

Forum (led by Douglas lToltz-Eakin, former chief economist of the President's 

COllncil of Economic Advisers and director of the Congressional13udget Oflice) 

estimates that this Administration's regulatory burden on the economy exceeds 

$518 billion. 

The Administration's estimate ofthe benefits of its regulations is just as 

problematic as its estimate of costs. Take, for example, the Administration's 

estimate ofthe "social cost ofcarbon"-a figure that is critical to the cost-benefit 

analyses for an increasing number of greenhouse gas emissions-related 

regulations. IS According to former OIM Administrator Cass Sunstein, the social 

16 See OIRA. 2013 Draft Report to Congress on the BCllcfits and Costs of Fcclcral Regulations mId Agcllcy 

CompliancE" with tlw l~nf1mdf'd i\,·Iflnriatf'S Refonn Art," at 1~, fit 

http://www.\vhitt.hoIISt..gov/sitt.s/dt.f:-lltit/filt.s/omb/infort-.g/ 201 :3_ch/dmfCQ01 ;3_cost_ht'Tlt'fiCn-'port.pdf 

17 Susan F.. Dudley, Perpetuatinp,; Piffle! ..... : An Ana(p'/~\' f!fthe Composition r!/ O,11R's Reported Bem:jiis ~fR.egfitation, HI S. 

ECON. 17,3. at 175 (Q01Q). 

IS Cass R. SUllstcin. \Vorking' Paper: TIll! Heal If orld ?fCosl-lJetu::!tI Lllla~ySl~\': Thir~v-.8i.l" QuesLions (a lid ~llmosl as 

}L4,.KV. L. SCHOOL PUB. L. & LEGAL THEOKY \VOHliJNG PAl'EK SEKIES, Paper ::.Jo. IS-II (:"·Iay 15, 

(Social cot>t of carbon "valuet> are LLsed to establish the benefits of regulatory efforts to reduce gTeellhouse 

gas e111issions. and they have played a significant role in 111flny nlle111all:ings."). avu.i/ahte at 

10 
49 

cost of carbon (now $36 per ton), which was the product of an interagency 

worl,ing group, is "binding until [it is] changed" by "some kind off()rmal 

process." Until that time, says Sunstein, ,,[a]gencies and departments (including 

OIBA and others within the Executive OHice ofthe President) may not reject 

such documents, in whole or in part, in the context of particular rules." lU nut 

those estimates haye never been the su~iect of a stand-alone notice and comment 

procedure. And the estimated cost declared by the committee is particularly 

problematic because the risk it attributes to carbon emissions (and therefore the 

benefit of their reduction) is global in scope, whereas the cost of regulation is 

necessarily borne only by entities within the United States. Thus, EPA justifies 

regulations that impose enormous costs on U.S. industry by reference to benefits 

that are shared the world oyer. This is in tension with an OMn Circular stating 

the commonsense proposition that "Analyses should f()cus on benefits and costs 

accruing to the citizens of the United States in determining net present value. 

'iNhere programs or projects have efiects outside the United States, these efiects 

should be reported separately."~o My point here is not to propose a solution but to 

guard against complacent acceptance of cost-benefit analysis by administrative 

agencles. 

http://papers,ssrll,com/so13/papers,cflIl?abstract_id=QI9911Q (citing Lig'ht-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 

F-mission St,moflrris. 76 Fed. Reg. 26,Wl-h Q!5,6'20-,')Q4 (\,1C1Y 7, '2(10) (to he (;oriifif'o CIt 49 CF.R. pts. ,'),')1. ,J,').'), 6~$(-j. 

,),'l7. ,')~;:..;); F-nergy Conserv<ltion St,mriClrris for Residenti<ll Refriger<ltors, Refi'igerCltor-Frf'f'7.f'rs. (lnd Frf'f'7.f'rs, 76 

Fed. Reg. 57,516, 57,559-57,561 (Sept. 15, ;2011) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 1.30)). 

19 [d. at k 

or\'IB Circular .<\.-94 (revised), available at http://Y'I\V\V,'',\lhitchousc.gov/omb/ circulars_a094. 

11 
50 

II. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT 

Under the current Regulatory Flexibility Act. each of three "coyered 

agencies"2! must COIlYene a reyiew panel to assess the impact on small businesses 

of ill-defined economically "significant" proposed rules."" The Regulatory 

Flexibility Improvements Act (H.R. 254<2) would give primary responsibility t()r 

this assessment to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration,"S and would require the interagency panel that receives the Chief 

Counsel's report to include an OUL;\. employee."' The Act would also allow 

OIRA, not just the originating agency-to decide what rules are covered. 25 

Finally, the Act \vould require executive agencies to submit to OIRA (and to 

Congress) their periodic reviews of small business impacts oftheir existing 

rules. 26 Including OIRA in the process in these ways would promote consistency 

and reduce bias in the assessment of regulatory impacts on small businesses-a 

matter ofyital importance to the economy. 

Ill. SUNSHINE FOR REGULATORY DECREES AND SETTLEl\1ENTS 

ACT 

~l The "covered agellcie::;" are EPA. CFPI3, and OSHA. 5U.S.C. § 609(<.1). 

rd. § :509("). 

ILR. 25-kZ, sec. G, llillcnrting:5 U.S.c. § G09(b). 

n Id .. amending' 5 U.s.c. § Goo(d). 

~b [d., arnt'nding";; lJ.S.C § 60D(t'). 

~G Id., sec. 7. amending 5 L.S.C. § GI0. 

12 
51 

Although the primary su~ject of my remarks has been OIRA, I would be 

remiss in did not address the Sunshine ftJr Regulatory Decrees and Settlements 

Act (H.R. 4078, Title III). This legislation would help to solve the longstanding 

collusion between activist groups and sympathetic regulators, which use sham 

("sue and settle") litigation to achieve through "consent decrees" administrative 

rule that cannot be obtained through the ordinary regulatory process. Relegating 

administrative rulemaking to backroom deals between administrators and 

particular interested parties undermines the transparency, public participation, 

and agency expertise that are the hallmarks of our administrative law system. By 

requiring greater public notice, tougher judicial scrutiny, a more open judicial 

process, and (in the Attorney General's office) direct accountability at the highest 

levels of the Executive I3ranch, this Act would ensure that "public interest" 

litigation truly promotes, not impairs, the public interest. 

13 
52 

Mr. BACHUS. And I think we welcome statements of bipartisanship, because again, that is really the only way we are going to accomplish anything of any importance is by reaching across the 

aisle. And we try to do that on this Committee, and if anything can 

unite us, I think this is one of the issues that should. And Professor Katzen, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF SALLY KATZEN, VISITING PROFESSOR AT NYU 

SCHOOL OF LAW; SENIOR ADVISOR, PODESTA GROUP 

Ms. KATZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate your inviting me to testify 

today on the point that Ambassador Gray was just speaking to. It 

is not free of controversy, but there is broad support across the political spectrum for extending the requirements for economic analysis and OIRA review to the Independent Regulatory Commissions 

and I have been supportive of S. 1173 that accomplishes this in the 

Senate. 

I would like to use my allotted 5 minutes to make three points: 

First, agency regulations, like legislation enacted by Congress, is 

legitimate activity of the government, and experience has shown 

that they are affirmatively good. Complaints about their cost, their 

inconvenience, their intrusiveness gets traction, at least with some 

constituents, and in some quarters. I was cheered by the Chairman’s and the Ranking Member’s statement about the benefits of 

regulations because regrettably, we hear less about that than about 

the costs. 

Too often, the benefits are taken for granted and I think in a 

hearing such as this, it bears emphasis that because of regulations 

the air we breathe, the water we drink are cleaner than they otherwise would be, that our homes, our workplaces, our cars and 

planes, our children’s toys, our parents’ medical devices are safer. 

It is because of regs that we are able to enjoy our civil liberties, 

our privacy, the freedom from discrimination and regs provide us 

with information to make intelligible choices and promote competition and fair practices in our markets so that they are open and 

acceptable and function effectively. 

Regulations are not intrinsically evil to be restrained or suppressed because they bring to life the laws that Congress has enacted and the values that we all share. 

It is important, I believe, not to forget this attribute of regulations when we speak blithely about regulatory reform which, in 

some instances, means additional hurdles for the agencies, or obstacles to overcome in their rulemaking effort, and that sensitivity 

should be in the forefront. 

Second, the regulatory process includes many players starting 

with the agencies to whom Congress has delegated its authority, 

and including those affected by the regulations, whether they be 

the regulated entities or the regulatory beneficiaries. And there is 

a critical role for OIRA to provide a dispassionate objective critique 

of proposals to ensure to the extent permitted by law that the work 

of the agencies takes into account the perspective of other agencies 

and is consistent with the preferences and priorities of the President. 
53 

Some see OIRA a gatekeeper. Others call it a coordinator or 

facilitator, but the importance of OIRA is beyond dispute. Which 

brings me my third point, the ability of OIRA to carry out its function effectively. 

OIRA has new leadership, and this oversight hearing has given 

you an opportunity to hear directly from Mr. Shelanski and to 

judge his competence and capabilities. 

You can draw your own conclusions. I believe his background and 

his performance for the last 12 weeks has proved that he has the 

qualifications, the skills and the temperament to lead OIRA. He 

has, however, an exceedingly hard task, because regrettably we 

have come to the point that OIRA does not have the resources, 

namely manpower, to continue to perform its function effectively. 

When President Reagan signed executive order 12291 and gave 

OIRA the task of coordinating centralized regulatory review—and 

there were a lot of rulemakings at that time just as there are a lot 

now—there were 90 staff members, 90 FTEs. There are now fewer 

than half that number. It is closer to 40. And during the intervening years, Congress has given OIRA a series of responsibilities, 

be it filing reports with Congress or additional specific responsibilities under a multitude of statutes. 

On top of that, we can talk about morale. I thought Mr. 

Shelanski was quite restrained, but the OIRA staff is extremely 

dedicated and diligent. But the sequester hurt. I think that each 

member of the staff had 8 days of furlough this summer. In addition, we are talking about OIRA’s capacity tonight when tomorrow 

morning, it is possible that the staff will be told to pack it up, go 

home, and don’t do their work. They won’t know how long, they 

won’t know whether they will be ever be paid for the downtime 

that they have suffered. I am not sure there is a whole lot more 

to say if you are talking about oversight of the OIRA function at 

this point, but I thank you for including me on this panel and I 

look forward to any questions you may have. 

Mr. BACHUS. I appreciate that passionate statement and it was 

I can tell you they will be given every consideration. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Katzen follows:] 
54 

Statement of Sally Katzen 

before the 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Refonn, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

of the 

House Judiciary Committee 

on 

"The Office ofTnformation and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory 

Reform" 

September 30,2013 

Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Cohen, Members of the Subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today about the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"). The Subcommittee's last oversight hearing on OIRA was 

in March 2012. Since then, there has been an election, and President Obama has 

nominated (and the Senate has confirmed) new leadership both for OIRA and the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB). I believe both OIRA and OMB are in exceedingly 

capable hands, and the work that has been done in the last few months suggests that it is 

on the right path to effectively perform its responsibilities. 

As you know, I served as the Administrator of o IRA for the first five years of the 

Clinton Administration, then as the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic 

Policy and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council, and then as the Deputy 

Director for Management ofOMB. After leaving the government in January 2001, T 

taught administrative law courses at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 

University of Michigan Law School, George Mason University Law School, and George 

Washington University Law School, and also taught American Government courses to 

undergraduates at Smith College, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of 

Michigan in Washington Program. For the last few years, 1 have been at the NYU School 

of Law teaching a seminar in advanced administrative law and a first-year course, 

Legislation and the Regulatory State; this fall I am also serving as the co-Director of 

NYU Law School's Washington DC Clinic for third-year law students. I am also a 

Senior Advisor at the Podesta Group here in Washington. Before entering government 

service in 1993, I was a partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, specializing in regulatory 

and legislative issues, and, among other professional activities, I served as the Chair of 

the American Bar Association Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice 

(1988-89). During my government service, T was the Vice Chair (and Acting Chair) of 

the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). Since leaving the 
55 

government in 200 I, I have written articles for scholarly publications and have frequently 

been asked to speak on administrative law in general and rulemaking in particular. 

Since the last oversight hearing, regulations have not gotten a whole lot of 

favorable press. We are told repeatedly that there has been an unprecedented surge in 

regulations during the Obama Administration and that the resulting burden (and the 

likelihood of more regulations in the next few years) is a drain on the economy, the 

reason why job growth has not been as strong as expected, and the reason why American 

industry is at a competitive disadvantage in the global market, to name just a few of the 

assertions by the critics. 

In fact, with respect to the number of regulations, there have beenjewer (rather 

than more) final rules, and fewer signiilcant final rules (those reviewed by OIRA), 

published in 2012 and 2013 (to date) than during any year of the George W. Bush 

Administration (or any year of the Clinton Administration) In addition, it bears 

emphasis that the I 11th Congress enacted several major pieces of legislation, including 

the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 

Protection Act, which include delegations of authority to federal agencies for hundreds of 

regulations to implement these laws. That is what the Constitution charges the Executive 

to do: "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Art. II, Sec. 3) There may be 

some in the current Congress who want to repeal these laws, but their efforts to that end 

have so far been unsuccessful, and as long as the laws are on the books, the agencies are 

responsible for issuing implementing regulations giving effect to the legislative 

mandates. 

With respect to the total cost of all regulations, the basis for the oft-quoted 

quantiilcation has been fiercely disputed and discredited, and the sponsoring agency has 

recently clarified that the underlying study "cannot appropriately be used to inform 

discussion about any regulatory costs that have or have not been incurred since 2008." 

hl1p:!lwww.sba.[',(lV/advoacyl7~40/4~291. Similarly, there are precious few facts to 

support the various allegations regarding the adverse effect of recent regulations on the 

economy. An April 8, 2013, paper entitled "What are Regulation's Effects on 

Employment?" irom the University of Pennsylvania Program on Regulation observed: 

"researchers and agency analysts have made remarkably few attempts to evaluate 

systematically the broader employment effects of regulations after they have been 

adopted and implemented." It did look at several recent studies, which essentially found 

"no substantive or statistically significant effects oflocal air pollution regulations on 

employment" (emphasis added). hups//wvvw.law.upenn.edu/blogs/reblog/20 l3/04/08-

coglianese-re~!Ulation-and-employment.htm1. An April 3. 2012, report from NYU's 

Institute for Policy Integrity made essentially the same point: "The current debate on 

jobs and environmental regulation too often relies on thinly-supported forecasts about 

2 
56 

jobs "killed" or "created" by public protections." 

httpjlp(llicyintegritY.(lTg/pub]ications!detail!regul atorv -red -h eni n16 

Moreover, while we hear a lot about the costs of regulation, we rarely hear about 

the benefits of regulation - for example, improving our health or the air we breathe or the 

water we drink; protecting our safety in our homes, our automobiles, or our workplaces; 

or increasing the efficiency of our markets. Those who embrace costlbenefit analysis 

should speak to the benefits as well as the costs of regulation. Here, there are data --

incomplete as they may be - which clearly show that the benefits of rules issued during 

the Obama Administration have been substantially greater than the costs of those rules. 

For example, the 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 

Regulations showed that for FY2011 (the most recent fiscal year for which data are 

available), the rules "were estimated to result in a total of $34.3 billion to $89.5 billion in 

annual benefits and $5.0 billion to $10.1 billion in annual costs." 

www.whitebouse.gov/sites!defaultlfilesiomb!inforeg!2012 cb!2012 cost. benefit report. 

ill![ at 24. Therefore, even taking the lowest estimate of benefits ($343 billion) and the 

highest estimates of cost ($10.l billion), the rules issued in 2011 produced at least $24.2 

billion in net benefits 

In my testimony for the last oversight hearing, I mentioned in passing the subject 

of the adequacy of OIRA resources. While it is fashionable to argue that government 

agencies should do more with less, there comes a point when that is simply not possible. 

We are now at that point. When OTRA was created and President Reagan signed EO 

12291 (the predecessor of EO 12866 which today governs regulatory review), there were 

about 90 FTEs (full-time equivalent employees) at OIRA; during my tenure, the number 

was between 60 and 50. The current number is hovering around 40. Yet during this 

period, Congress has assigned new tasks to OMB, including requiring various reports to 

Congress and imposing specific on-going responsibilities under the Unfunded Mandates 

Refonn Act of 1995, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, the Data 

Quality Act of 2001, the Regulatory Right-To-Know Act of 2001, the Small Business 

Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, and the E-Government Act of 2002. And all of this is 

without regard to the extended furloughs of all of the OIRA staff during the past summer 

as a result of the effect of the sequestration on an agency whose primary costs are for its 

personnel, and add to that the fact that this hearing is taking place on the last day of this 

fiscal year, and tomorrow the staff of 01RA could possibly be told to stay home and not 

do any work; even if a government shutdown is averted after this statement is submitted 

to the Subcommittee, the OIRA staff, like the staff of almost all government agencies, 

spent a great deal of time and effort last week (and possibly before that) working on 

contingency plans for a shutdown rather than on regulatory reviews or other routine 

business of the office. The business community has repeatedly argued with great force 

3 
57 

and logic that certainty is critical to its planning and operations; the same principle, I 

submit, applies with equal force and logic to government operations. 

1 am not oblivious to the widespread appeal for smaller government as an abstract 

concept. But it would, in my opinion, be penny-wise and pound foolish to apply that 

concept indiscriminately across all programs and agencies. The President's Council on 

Jobs and Competitiveness, which was created to provide non-partisan advice to the 

President on strengthening the Nation's economy and enhancing our competitiveness in 

global markets, stated in its final report: "Thorough review by OlRA improves the quality 

of regulatory analysis and decisions. Even modest improvements in regulations can 

yield billons of dollars in benefits to the public." hltQ.;LLfiles.jobscouncil.com/files!2011l10/JobsCoullcil Regulatory.pdf. The Council recommended that 

OIRA's staff be increased. There are other voices calling for an increase. See 

http://ww-w.rollcaILcom/news/more resources for regulatory review would benefit co 

nsumers commentarv-227408-l.hnnl. Having had the privilege of serving as 

Administrator of OIRA, I am convinced that the staff of OIRA is one of the best 

investments we can make to continue progress in the regulatory arena. 

Another topic I raised in the last oversight hearing that relates to the orientation of 

OIRA, which traditionally has focused virtually all of its time and resources on the 

review of individual regulatory actions developed by the agencies - one at a time (except 

where two or three arrive in close proximity to one another). While this review is critical 

in providing a dispassionate and analytical "second opinion" on an agency's significant 

regulatory actions and in ensuring that each new significant regulatory action is 

consistent with the President's policies and priorities (as well as coordinating regulatory 

policy within the Executive Branch through the inter-agency process over which it 

presides), it would be an important step forward ifOIRA could do more than one-by-one 

reviews. The issues plaguing our country are not likely to be solved by a single regulatory 

action, nor do they always fit neatly in one agency. Whether it be clean air, worker 

safety, food purity, energy efficiency, or a host of other issues of concern, it is often 

valuable to look beyond the specific proposal presented and consider the broader picture 

- in efTect, construct a framework for addressing the problem, allocating resources, and 

ensuring a coherent and comprehensive regulatory solution. 

The mechanism for embarking on and developing such an approach is already in 

place - Section 4 of Executive Order 12866, "Planning Mechanism." Under sub-section 

(c), "The Regulatory Plan," both Executive Branch agencies and IRCs must send to 

OIRA (for OIRA review and circulation to other interested agencies) a document that 

includes a statement of the agency's regulatory objectives and priorities as well as a 

summary of "the most important significant regulatory actions that the agency expects to 

issue in proposed or final fonn in that fiscal year or thereafter." These materials are 

4 
58 

published in the semi -annual Unified RegltlatOlJi Agenda. I Imow that the Agenda has not 

always been published on time (in this and previous Administrations), and that last year 

one of the semi-annual Agendas was not published. Some have implied that the lapse 

last year was the result of nefarious political manipulations at work, but my 

understanding is that the delay was occasioned by an altogether legitimate (and much 

needed) effort to make the Agenda a more useful tool for all concerned. 

The Agenda is the one systematic government-wide report of contemplated (and 

completed) regulatory actions. As such, it is used both by those inside the government 

and by stakeholders potentially affected by the regulations- be they regulated entities or 

regulatory beneficiaries -- to monitor what is happening at the various regulatory 

agencies. But the document is only as valuable as the information is accurate. 

Regrettably, over the years, a number of regulatory proposals were included in the 

Agenda because someone at an agency thought it was possible that action on that 

proposal might occur within a few years; then, once entered into the Agenda, the entry 

takes on a life of its own even if there is virtually no likelihood of any activity on the 

proposal in the foreseeable future. The infonnation then becomes misinformation or 

obscures what is truly relevant. While it should be easy to "clean up" the Agenda, it 

apparently is appreciably more difficult and time consuming than anyone thought. 

F or this and other reasons, the process of submitting entries to the Agenda has 

become more of a paper exercise than an analytical tool. Again, this is not new; before, 

during and after my tenure at OIRA, the focus was on the transactions, rather than 

broadening the inquiry and better coordinating the regulatory activity of the agencies. 

But it does not have to be that way. Professor Peter Strauss of Columbia law School and 

others have called for OIRA to put meat on the bones of this planning process. I concur, 

so long as OIRA is given the support and resources to do so. 

Thank you again for inviting me to participate in this hearing, and 1 look forward 

to answering any questions you may have. 

5 
59 

Mr. BACHUS. And that is a striking number that the staff is half 

of what it used to be, and I notice that the administrator said that 

each of those analysts is a specialist. They have different areas of 

expertise and they are not interchangeable, and so there definitely, 

the way we are approaching our budget and our funding leaves a 

lot to be desired. Mr. Morrall, or Doctor, I am sorry. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. MORRALL, III, AFFILIATED SENIOR 

SCHOLAR, MERCATUS CENTER, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. MORRALL. John. 

Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Cohen and Members of the 

Committee thank you for this honor to testify on the role of OIRA. 

I have spent my working life trying to improve regulatory policy, 

much of it at OIRA as a civil servant from its beginning in 1981 

until. 

Mr. BACHUS. Doctor, if you will turn on your mic. 

Mr. MORRALL. I have spent my working life trying to improve 

regulatory policy, much of it as OIRA as a civil servant from its beginning in 1981 to my retirement exactly 5 years ago today. During 

that time, we reviewed almost 22,000 final rules out of 130,000 

published by all Federal agencies, including the independent agencies. I am currently an affiliated scholar at Mercatus, and the regulatory analyst for Bloomberg government. My day jobs entail reading each day’s Federal Register, so please forgive me if my remarks 

make your eyes glaze over, or I don’t always use plain language. 

Blame years of reading hundreds of thousands of pages in the Federal Register. 

A well-known Washington saying is, where you stand is where 

you sit. I sat in thousands of meetings discussing specific regulations as both regulator and as a regulator of regulators with agency 

officials supporting regulatory proposals, outside interests trying to 

modify them to their advantage, and White House officials, including Boyden and Sally, trying to do the right thing. 

So I have some thoughts about how to improve the regulatory 

process and its results. I wish to make two broad points, present 

some research findings that I have been involved with and offer 

some suggestions for the new administrator. 

First, OIRA should focus on its original mission to mitigate unintended consequences of agency actions. Even a well functioning administrative process is not likely to produce smarter regulations 

absent a strong, internal advocate for economic efficiency and an 

independent ability to verify the evidence offered. 

Incentives and pressures applied to agencies create an ever 

present risk, decision making influenced more by politics and preferences than objective analysis focused on problem solving for 

which OIRA and OMB have traditionally been advocates. I told my 

staff to represent the people not at the table who don’t likely don’t 

even know there is a table. 

Second, an effective OIRA needs more of the right staff members, 

individuals trained in economics, benefit cost analysis and the scientific method. And they need more time and opportunity to evaluate major rulemakings that heavily impact economic growth and 

jobs. 
60 

At many of the meetings I attended to discuss regulatory impact 

analysis, politics not economics dominated. Program officials and 

their lawyers viewed OIRAs as a procedural hurdle to overcome 

and a possible danger to their regulations either in their public 

rollouts or judicial review. The economists from the agencies often 

sat quietly and later in follow-up could not talk to OIRA without 

going through their general counsel’s office. 

The vast literature on OIRA’s role and effectiveness is in improving regulations with some exceptions, agrees that safeguards 

against capture, tunnel vision and ex post rationalization are keys 

to better regulation. I saw OIRA’s main role evolve from watchdog 

whose job was to ensure that agencies use economic logic and quality benefit cost analysis when regulating to a ‘‘conveyor and convener and information aggregator assuring that agencies properly 

follow the Administrative Procedure Act. 

The new administrator is uniquely qualified with both formal 

legal and economic training to pursue both roles but rulemaking 

needs more careful analysis of consequences and fewer advocacies 

for special interests, which are always well represented. With the 

goal of approving regulation in mind I recommend the following. 

First, the OIRA administrator needs to insulate the economic 

analysis and recommendation from politics as much as legally feasible. It is difficult for agencies to achieve objectivity when subject 

to so many subjective forces. OIRA can serve as a mechanism for 

regaining focus on the potential effects of the rulemaking which 

will impact everyone, rather than being focused on who does or 

does not support the rule. 

Number 2 make it a priority to expand OIRA’s resources in the 

areas where it matters the most, specialists in benefit cost analysis 

and risk assessment, errors in these two areas can be major barriers to successful problem solving which is the intent and purpose 

of rulemaking. 

And last, make the time devoted to rulemaking as productive as 

it can be. Consider making procedural change to have agencies submit an OIRA contain a description of the problem, options for addressing it and cost benefit analyses of each option to OIRA for 

quality control and approval before the agency actually drafts its 

proposed rule. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Doctor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrall follows:] 
61 

MERCATUS CENTER 

George Mason University 

REINVIGORATING, STRENGTHENING, AND 

EXTENDING OIRA'S POWERS 

BY JOHN F. MORRALL III 

Ii 

~ 

..... ",","'dI'" "" m. 1\.oc!;<Ia.y 

... <II' '''''' 10<)' .Io..., . GootI .... " .. , _ ..... "" ... 1 Low 

TESTIMONY 

l'hank you [or your rime .nd i""il~lio" to 1~"lify b<>for~ this corumiuee on Ihe role "fOMB', Olliel: of 

infnrlnn!ion and Regul3tory Af(.'t~, Q I' OIRA f!)r short. I h;we been studying.. teaching. ~nd ""rking to 

improve reguilltory policy for over ~o years, including my tim~ as an economist, branch chief, and OIenn!; 

deputy "cimini.eral",'t Ol ItA rrun. its ""b';nnj"&",,, 198110 my ""i"'''H'flI [ro'" the govcrn",,,m I!xactlr 

!lve ye.rsago today, While I w.satOIRA. we reviewed21,NI finnl ru!esunder EO 12866 ~nd It!> "redece:o-

&01',01110(129,481 liMI r"les ptobli,;hed br~lI federal :IJ,'l'ncies.Aoom 300ofth""eruJes lV'm,' mnjor rules 

wilh co<t., bt:nelils, or bolh over $100 million, The ",,,,,torth,,.... 300 rules. ~dding up th~ 3gt",cie.' nwn 

cUimatcs in today'$ dollar.., i. about $19S billion annuQl1y. ' 

I W:U; 0 career civil ,:en.,.nl and economist rc\"icwingrcgulation~'l.Dd h~lping to man:tg'C tb~ rcgulnltll}' 

pruc~"" under\'ariou.""'~cuti\'t.'orders3nd ftv~ presidents. I ai,,, work .. d al Departmen' ofLnbm, Hou ... 

ing,and UrbM De\'c!oprnent, Council,,,, Wage and PriCf St~bil ty (n pr~dece.~or ofOlRA in the Carter 

adminisu·uion) . and ae the Brookings n'lil~tion nnd lhe America n Ene .. rpri~ e Jn~eiluce. Before Ihal I 

I:lllght international t"Cunumic. in the n; vcr8;tyQfFIQr d~'.busine",sch(l(ll. I am cum:ntlyan affiliated 

.senior ..::hola. 31the Mer","IU~ Center at George Mason University and • • eg" lalOry ana ~l ror Bloom~rg 

Gowrnm lII ! My currenl jQb,; entail reading """h day's h'd~al Rcgi.<u. and analyzing tbe et(lnon,ical1y 

significant ... gublion. "nd Hcgub'OfY Impact AnalySt's, something I used 10 do ... agovl'rnmen' .. conn· 

Ill;'!. So pl,,~~e forgive me ifmy rem~rh make your e)'e~)(lne over Ot I don'! alway~ u~e plnin longuage, 

A well, known Wa.hillgton saying is. "Wh~n you ,;tand i~ ,,·here you ,il: ~nd I hnvt',;al in thousands of 

m~eling. 31 all sideg ofth~ lab I .. , di1«;u .... ;n,8 spt'dfic r .. gulalio".~ as both. "'gUI.,,,, and ... " .~gulator 

1. SeeJOOlJ R_ '" ~ *,t/>< C ... _ s....,., .f'_ ¥., .. "'. [)II;O< Gf M."",,_ , I'd 901di"', Q/t;co 0/ Mof", ... _..,d 

Rog~lo"'yNf .. ,. 

_O~ 

1 M)' ""' ..... _..,. '~m.,..._ ... "fj ___ ~. "'" ...,... ... /)' ,0/1"", 1'" "'"'"' 0/ ~""', '"" M.'":''''' COO'\""'~' 

fQo ...... ,... ....... -.".--.... I<-,~-,.., _.,_",1<11'_""'1"_-=<>&'_"" _ .. e..o., or '-""'_ ww-....... J).II ff"f .. ~ ""'" ~"" W,z.'»' 
62 

of regulators, which is one view of OIR""s role held especially by fhe agencies, So naturally I have some 

thoughts about howto improve both the regulatory process and outcomes, I hope they rellect a balanced 

staff perspective. They are in the form of obsenrations, lessons learned, and recOlnmendations for the 

new administrator from a lifelong advocate of better regulation, III view of tbe fact that o IRA's key (unction is to review regulations according to the good government principles of various executive orders and 

the president's own policies, I wish to make two broad points, First, OIRA should focus on its uaditional 

mission of being a "watchdog" for fhe public, including citizens not yet born, seeking and attempting, if 

possible, to 11litigate any unintended consequences of agency actions. Even a \vell-functioning process is 

not likely to produce good regulations absent a strong advocate for fhe broad public imerest in the rule111aking process or an independent ability to verify agency clainls. I \\Till explain w-hy the incentives and 

pressures applied to agencies create an ever-present risk of decision-rnaking influenced more by politics 

and preferences tban by the objective analysis focused on problem-solving tbat OIRA and OMB have 

tradiIionally been advocates for, 

rvlysecond, and related point, is that an effective OIRA needs n10re of the right staff n1embers-individuals 

trained in benefit-cost analysis and risk assessment-and more time to evaluate economically significant 

rulemakings. 

BACKGROUND 

OlRA's key function is to revie"r regulations according to the good governn1ent principles of various 

executive orders and fhe president's own policies, It reviews regulations issued by fhe executive branch 

agencies before they are published in the Federal Register as both proposals for notice and comment under 

fhe Administrative Procedure Act and as final regulations, By executive order, Executive Branch agencies 

are not permitted to publish significant regulations until completing OIRA revie-w. 

01RA was established by President Carter in 1980 to control red tape and charged by President Reagan 

in January 1991 to help combat an economic crisis many feel was worse than the one we have just been 

fhrough, Stimulative monetarypolicycould not cure a crisis ithad created, Micro policy could, by reforming regulations. Reducing regulatory costs and maximizing its net benefits could create economic grmvth, 

higher employment, and a safer anJ more healthful society;' Twenty years ago today, President Clinton, 

after an internal debate about 01RA's furnre, decided to strengthen President Reag,m's EO 17.291 by issuing 

EO 12866, which focused review efforts on the most significant regulations and codified certain transparency and open government procedures. Despite the inherent controversy of having to say no to agencies 

and their constituencies, OIRA revie-w and Regulatory Ilnpact Analysis) as outlined in EO 12866) ren1ain 

the basic framework for managing the executive branch regulatory process, (In the old days our softball 

team proudly called ourselves the No-Men,) 

At many of fhe meetings to discuss the Regulatory Impact Analysis of the regulation, or RIA, a certain 

dynamic was often clear. The program officials and their lawyers saw the RIA as proceJural hurdle to 

overcome and a possible danger to defending the regLliation, either in fhe public rollout or upon ajudicial 

challenge. EconOll1ists frOll1 the agencies often sat quietly in the n1eetings and 'vere not supposed to talk 

to OIRAeconomists without going through their general counsel's office, Another important observation 

,"vas that in meetings \'lith outside interests, including the regulated: hardly anyone opposed a specific 

regulation, Rather, fhey suggested ways to tweak fhe regulation to fheir advantage or increase the costs 

to their competitors, 

There is a vast literature about o IRA's proper role, its effectiveness in improving regulation, and recon1-

mendations for improvement, written by political scientists, economists and administrative law specialists, 

3. rhen Vice preSluent George H.W Bush was put In overall charge dthat effort as head of the Task Force Orl '\eguiatory Relief 
63 

and environmental law professors! Except for the environmental law professors, the literature generally 

ag-rees that safeguards against capture, tunnel vision, and ex post rationalization are needed in the regulatory developrncnt process. 

I will mention just a few recent findings with which I have been involved that may prove useful to the 

ne"Y administrator, but first, I '~lill provide son1e recent context. 

An Obse,-vation: From Watchdog to Information Ret,-iever 

OIRAJs 111ain modus operandi appears to have evolved after 42 years fr0111 being a vratchdog\vhose Job ,"vas 

to ensure that agencies used economic logic and quality benefit-cost analysis \;vhen reg1.l1atingto heing a 

"conveyor and convener" and "information aggregator" for the agencies so that they properly followed 

the Administrative Procedure Act and the "prescriptions of the relevant executive orders!" 

Certainly, following the Administrative Procedure Act is a veIl' in1portant con1ponent of high-quality 

regulation, but the agencies have both strong incentives to make sure their regulations are not overturned 

on APA grounds and many more lm"l'ers than OIRA .. MoreoveI; the agencies have specific missions and 

mandates to mitigate important social problems by regulation and thus have fewer incentives than OMR/ 

OIIL'" to ensure that costs and benefIts have been carefully analyzed and alternative approaches examined. 

OMB's mandate is much broader and reports directly to the president. Given our limited government 

and private resources, Ol\.-IBJs traditionalmissionj not to mention its con1parativc advantage, has been to 

worry about and, if possible, mitigate any unintended consequences of agency actions and to make policy 

recon1mendations on budge'C and regulatory priorities \vithin various statutory fran1eViTorks. 

My observation is tllat the more recent OIIL'\ has shifted its focus from the substance of regulatory policy 

issues and a soft regulatory bLldget role to ensuring that the management of the l'egLllatory process is full 

and complete. My observation is supported by con1paring the vie\vs of recent administrators on the role 

of o IRA, expressed after they left pLlblic service ill the University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 200B 

and the Harvard Law Review in 2013. The earlier article emphasizes the important role that benefit-cost 

analysis and priority played in OIRA review while the later article emphasizes the importance of its administrative role as a "conveyor and convener" and '(information aggregator," although they both discuss the 

roles of process and substance.,i 

The big picture view of o IRA's mission was well expressed by Cass SUl1stein in 2002: 

OIRA should also see, as one of its central assignments, the task of overcoming tunnel vision, 

by ensuring that aggregate risks are reduced and that agency focus on particular risk does not 

mean that ancillary risks are ignored or increased.; 

Effective OIIL'" administrators appreciate old Washington wisdom, such as the already mentioned "where 

you stand is where you sit;' and the newly populor "trust but verifY." Even a well-functioning process is 

not likely to produce good regulations absent a strong advocate for the broad public interest in the rule4. Tlw alJthors Include both Supreme Court Justices and Nc.'bcl Laureates in econorrllCs. 

Law Reviewarticie, "OiRA Myths and Real!tlE's," 

the "prt':s;:nptlom of the r~levant executive (1rder< was a main message of Adrnl01strator Howard Shelanskl's July 24, 2013 testlrTlCny befere the 

Reduc:ng Red laDe hearings o~ tr:e House of Reprt!sejltatlve~, CommiTtee on Smail 8uslness. 

6. See John Grahar'cl "Saving Lives ihrough Ad~n:0Istratlve Lawand Er~onornlcs" Umversi(Y ofPer;nsywama Law i?evlew157, no 2 (Oecember 

20(8) and Cass SUnstein "0: ~A: Myths a1ld Realities·' }--/arvard La\>\' Review 126 (20"13). "1842. 

7. !bld 
64 

making process or an independent ability to verifY. OTRA and OMB have traditionally been both advocates 

for economic efficiency and experts in impanial data analysis. The ne'v administrator is uniquely qualified with both formal legal and ecollomic backgrounds. As someone who knows what it's like to work at 

OIRA, I wOLlld tell the new administramr that I think regulatory ,10licy needs more careful analysis of 

conseq uellces and less advocacy of specitic interests. In my career, I recall several instances where better 

and I110re objective RIAs might have avoided significant harm to our national economy: HUD goals and 

timetable rules for GSEs that led to rhe increase in sub prime mortgages and EP~s renewable fuel standanls and ethanol rehrulations that increased corn prices. 

To reinvigorate that role, OIRA needs first to restore its economic and technical staffing levels, \vhich have 

been cut in half over its existence while its fmlctions in paperwork, information policy, and statisrical policy have been dramatically expanded. At one time, OIRAhad a specific branchof a dozen or so economists 

who specialized in beneflt-cost ,malysis, and OIRA hired scientific experts in risk analysis. Today ir has a 

fe\v experts scattered an10ngfive branches \vho are, for the 1110St p::-ut, staffed ,vith overw-orked although 

highly competent desk officers. In the past, OIRA was also fortunate to attract top economists on detail 

from the agencies. They impartially reviewed RIAs from other agencies, making substantive contributions 

·while gaining insights that advanced their careers and agency regulatory policy when they returned.s 

RECOMMENDATiON 

In the \vords of Cass Sun stein's 2002 recommendation, "OIRA should be reinvigorated, and its powers 

should be extended and strengthened, so as botb to deter unreasonable regulation and to ensure that reasonable regulation is forthcoming."" 

As a first step, OIRAs ability to thoroughly review benefit-cost analyses and ensure high-quality standards 

should be a high priority of a new administrator. 

Findings from the Recent Literature: OiRA Has a Lot of Potential to Improve Regulation but Must 

Overcome Strong Politicai influences 

Recent findings from stLldies of the regulatory process by Mercatus scholars and others show that regulatory refonn and hetter regulation are clearly needed and have significant potential to improve investnlent 

and econOlllic grov{th. This is \vell understood by nlost of the "\'i-"orld, \vith over 50 countries adopting RIAs 

and regulatOlY oversight practices informed by OIRAs early success. What we bave learned is that botter 

regulation is a constant struggle against short-term political gain for narrow interests. 

First, while at OIRA, I developed league tables of risk regulations and found that the cost-effectiveness of 

final regulations aimed at saving lives can vary by several orders of magnitude. The findings imply that a 

better systenl of setting priorities ,vhen it conles to regulation could save thousands of lives while saving 

billions of dollars by focusing time and effort on issuing regulations that could save more lives at lower 

costs. to 

Second., a study with Stewart Shapiro of Rutgers University, also a fornler OIRA economist, called "The 

8 Sever allater cecame heads of the poliCY shops at their agencies 

9. Ibid Shortly "iter thiS recommendation. O'RAwas reinvigorakd and strerlgtherled by John Graha~TJ, who wa, President Bu,h's :w!y onfirmed O!RA admln:strator. He hived more economl5ts and sClentls[s, iT'turned regulations to the agencies, USing pub!lc "retum letters." ard even 

sugge~ted cost-effeCTive regl~la~lon5 to the agencies. uSing ·'prompt letters 

10 See MOITaii, "A Revie\ov of ~he Record,' Regulation (Noverf1ber IOecember 1986) and "Sav,ng Lives' OJ ReView of The Record," journal of Risk 

and Uncertamty 27, no 3 (200'3) 
65 

Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit Cost Analysis and Political Salience," published after we left OIR"', 

found upon analyzing ten years ofhenefit-cost data for 109 major rules that there was no relationship 

between the amount of information considered in the analysis and the net benefits in the rule." ';Ye then 

decided to test other variables that might potentially affect the net benefits of a regltlation. In paliiclllar, 

we wanted to examine the effect of political factors on the results of an analysis. vVe divided our dataset 

both by the C0111111ents received on the rule (assu111ingthat rules that received more comnlents ·ViFere more 

political) and by whether the rule was a "midnight" regulation promulgated in the last six months of an 

administration (assu111ing that adnlinistrations 'ilfait to the end of an administration to promulgate their 

more controversial rules). Our findings were stark Rules that were issued away from the glare of the 

political spotlight had higher net benefits than politically salient rules. 

The paper concludes, ~'Politics and econo111ics in the ruleluaking process are fatefully internvined. CongTessional politics influences the statute that puts bounds on the policy options an agency may consider. 

Presidential and agencypo]itics influence agency choices both on policy and, a.<.; shov,rn here, on the analysis of the policy,'J An OIR.4.. adn1inistrator needs to insulate the econon1ic analysis and recommendations 

from politics as much as is legally feasible. 

Third, in a second paper with Shapiro, "Does Haste Make Waste? How Long Does It Take to Do a Good 

RIA," v.re exan1ine the relationship bet,Yeen the amount of informacion in an RIA and the time it takes 

to write and review the RIAY We find fbat fbe longer an agency spends developing the regulation and 

the longer that OIRA spends review-ing it, the more information in the analysis. Ho,;vever, the direction 

of causality is unclear. Better analyses may take more time to revie,\'. Or more reviev;.r may make analyses 

better. Vtle recomnlend increasing OIRA staff, ,vhich has advantages regard1ess of the direction of causality. Increasing OIRA staff has significant potential for improving regulatory analysis and the underlying regulations at a relatively lov;.r cost, even taking into account that the regulation provides significant 

net benefits, as OIM maintains. As a second-best option, increasing OIRl\. review rime would also likely 

provide net social benefits. 

Fin ally, in a study based on data from the RIA Report Card project at the Mercatus Center at George 

Mason University with colleagues Jerry ElIig and Patrick McLaughlin," we found that, apart from relatively poor-quality scores, there was little overall difference in fbe quality and use ofRIAs between the 

Bush and Obama administrations, althollgh interestingly we found that the more liberal agencies (Labor, 

Heah:h and I-Iuman Services) got through OIRA \vith lm.~-er-quality analyses in the Obanla administration, while the more conservative agencies (Defense, Homehmd Security) got through OIM with lowerquality analyses in the Bush administration. OIM needs to do a better job enforcing its quality standards 

and being aware of political influences. 

The staff had a saying in OIRA when I ,vas there: 'we don't make policy decisions; \ve just raise the cost of 

making bad decisions (by making thelTI more transparent). 

11. See Stuan Shapiro and john Morrall, "The Triumph of Regulatory PolitiCS: Benefit Cost AnalYSIS arJd Political Sa!ience,' Regulation and Governance 6, nc'. 2 (June 2:112). 

12. See Stuart Shapiro 3'ld .John Morrall, "Does Haste Make Waste? How Long Does It Take to Do a Good "publis-

'wo unllnl' 21 AlJgust 2013,Administrarion & SOUdy benefits of longer revlCwtlrTleWere connrrn[;d hy F:llig and uSing a olfFercnt data 

seL See Jerry Ellig and Rosemary Flke, "Regulatot-y Process, Regulatory RefoiTTl. and the Quality of Fl.eguiatory lrT'pact Ana!ysls" (Working Paper 

No 13-13, Mercaws Centel' at Ge;xge Mascn UniversIty, .Arllngton, VA, Ju!y 2013). 

13 See lerry Eilig, Patnck A 1V..cLaugi-:!in, and John Morrall, "Con~inuily, Change, and PrIOri~le5' The Quality and Use of Reguiatory AnalYSIS 

Ac.ross Us, ,..'\dmlnistI3tIOrlS, Regulation and Governance 7, no 2 (Jure 2C13) 
66 

FINAL THOUGHTS 

The enornl0US anlount of re.6:FUlation generated each year and the huge potential for ilnproving it could 

provide enormous net benefits to society. A strong watchdog agency is needed to provide the transparency 

and checks and balances needed to set priorities for high-impact regulations. 

In addition to rebuilding OIRAs technical staff and enhancing its voice in policy debates with the agencies, several other more subtle steps should be considered by the administrator. 

In its 2008 draft report to Congress, OIRr'\ proposed publishing a scorecard that consisted of nine questions to rate the completeness of agency RIAs.'4 It was already using such a scorecard for internal purposes, such as staff perfonnance ;;-nvards. The hope ,vas that this transparency approach would directly 

encourage agencies to do a better job providing the information required by OMB circular 1\-4, which 

established best practices for RIAs. However, even though the three peer reviewers asked by OIRA to 

review the report expressed support for the scorecard concept and no adverse comment was received, 

OIRA has not gone fonvard with the project." Given that the scorecard conceptis widely used in the academic literature on regulatory policy, inclLlding by the Mercatus Center, it may be time for OIRA to step 

up to the plate and increase its leverage. 

Finally, a procedural change that would likely 

strengthen and reinvigorate OIRA would be to require 

that agencies perforn1 '(heir RIAs, includingcost-benefit analyses of alternatives, before they choose their 

preferred alternative and draft the regulation. Agencies would be required to describe the problem to be 

solved, including any market failure, and send the RIA 

formally to OIRA for quality control and approval 

before the proposed regnlatory language is sent. An 

amendment to EO 12866 could formalize this process. 

A80UT THE AUT HOR 

Thank you again for the chance to express my vic\vs. sC' '::1t 

A80~)T THE MERCATUS CENiER 

14_ OIRA Draft 2008 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 18_ This scorecard was used by Shapiro and Morrall 

to rate final RIAs wl:h bo~f' cost and benefi'ts from 2001 TO 20G8 In t'1etwo articles cited above A more complete scorecard based In part on this 

one ~as oeen used to rate all proposeo majOr rules since 2008. Thoy are posted at http://ITlerC2tUS.Org!reportcara. 

15 OIRA, 2008 Final r?eport to Congress Of) the Co9s3nd Benefits ofrederal Rf:gulatlotlS. 20-24 
67 

Mr. BACHUS. And Ms. Riley. 

TESTIMONY OF NICOLE RILEY, VIRGINIA STATE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 

Ms. RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here on behalf of the National 

Federation of Independent Business and our 350,000 members 

across the country, 5,500 of those that are in the State of—Commonwealth of Virginia. So I know they very much appreciate the 

Committee’s interests on how Federal regulations impact them as 

small business owners and the amount of time and resources it 

takes for them to comply. So thank you very much for this opportunity. 

In my written testimony, you will find more details regarding 

how members feel about today’s regulatory climate, but I did want 

to first recognize that our small business owners are very much 

aware and recognize the need for regulation, understanding that 

there is public safety for consumers, for clients and for the general 

public. But what they really do worry about is they want to make 

sure that those regulations are sensible. And what we mean by 

that is that they accurately weigh all the costs and benefits, including flexible compliance options. For many small business owners 

one size does not fit all and so many of them, flexibility would certainly be helpful. 

But what I really want to spend most of my time this afternoon 

speaking of are actually to give you three good examples of members’ stories that I have heard while I have been out on the road 

visiting with our members across the Commonwealth, because I 

think a lot of times it helps to really get a real picture, a flavor 

for what small business owners are actually experiencing. 

The first example I want to talk about is members that we have 

in Roanoke City, Chris and Betsy Head, they are franchisee owners 

of Home Instead Senior Care, which means they provide companionship-type services for their clients, for people who are elderly or 

disabled. And this allows these people to stay in their homes more 

than having to put them in facilities to be cared for. 

Specifically, the Department of Labor just 2 weeks ago finalized 

a rule that was known as the companionship exemption for minimum wage and overtime for home care workers employed by third 

party agencies, many of which are small businesses, including the 

Heads. And specifically this overtime portion is where, I think, a 

lot of folks including the Heads are really going to feel an impact 

on their business, but there is also going to be impact on their clients and there is going to be impact on their employees. 

The Heads often provide what they call sleep over service for 

their clients. And this is where a worker comes in at night for a 

10 to 12-hour shift, ensures the client eats dinner and gets them 

ready for bed, and then while the clients is asleep, the worker 

sleeps as well on site in case of an emergency. 

The new Department of Labor rule will require employees be 

paid time and a half for every hour worked over 40 in a given 

week. Under the exemption, employees received their straight 

hourly wage for hours over 40. So this will significantly increase 

the cost for these employees that provide this type of sleep-over 
68 

service. Many clients simply won’t be able to afford this change. 

The Heads anticipate that they will see a 20 to 25 percent number 

of clients that will leave and try to go elsewhere. And they might 

end up trying to find, what they are worried about is they potentially go to folks who are not licensed, they would do more, go to 

someone who might work in that gray area. But to stay competitive, the Heads will have to limit their employees to 40 hours to 

keep costs down so that that client could afford them. 

So but we are seeing where both the client is going to be seeing 

less care or not be able to afford the care that they need, and you 

are also going to see employees who typically would have had more 

hours in pay are now going to be limited to 40 hours. 

Another example comes from Mr. Bill Neff from Harrisonburg, 

Virginia. He is a commercial real estate developer has been in business about 50 years. And he ran into some trouble not too long ago 

with a church actually that was trying to construct on a new piece 

of property that they had. He put together a projected cost for that 

project, and it included what would need to deal with stormwater 

runoff. And a lot of this comes from the EPA particularly where 

Harrisonburg is located it is in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, so 

there are a lot of stringent rules regarding stormwater runoff. 

He typically, in this project, originally proposed that they put in 

a retention pond with rock to be able to filter the runoff during the 

storm. He submitted that project for permits. It was rejected, and 

he ended up having to put in a filtration system that would now 

cost $60,000. The original proposal was only $10,000. 

So this was a significant burden on that church. And now any 

new commercial property project that he takes on, he will have to 

now consider those costs into the project. 

A third example is Rob Frazier with Frazier Quarry. They are a 

limestone company in Rockingham County, and they recently have 

had to deal with a rule that came through a couple years ago that 

requires a mining operation to, in the event of an emergency, make 

the a call to the agency to report that emergency within 15 minutes 

of the emergency occurring. 

They had a situation where this did occur here. They did not 

want to face the 5- to $60,000 fine that would be incurred upon 

them, even though within 15 minutes of that emergency they are 

really more concerned about obviously making sure emergency personnel are onsite, their employees are taken care of, but here they 

are having to make this call to this agency within 15 minutes. 

Once they did make the call, they did make the call within 15 

minutes, they were given a phone service. That individual on the 

call did not know why they were calling, did not understand why 

they were making this call. And so then they had to spend additional time trying to explain why they were trying to call the agency to report this emergency. 

So a lot of times for small business owners, it is also the frustration of just the compliance piece that they face on a daily basis. So 

hopefully these three situations give a little bit of an illustration 

of what they face on a day-to-day basis. And I certainly appreciate 

the time and I will take any questions. Thank you. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Riley follows:] 
69 

House of Represel1ltatives Committee on the Judiciary 

Subcommittee on Ftegulatory Reform, Commercial and 

Antitrust Law 

on the date of 

September 30, 2013 

on the subject of 

The Off;ce of Information and Regulatory Affairs: 

Federal Re£lulalions and Regulatory Reform 
70 

Dear Chairman Bachus and Ranking Member Cohen: 

On behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), I appreciate 

the opportunity to submit for the record this testimony for the Subcommittee on 

Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law's hearing "The Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory Reform." 

My name is Nicole Riley and I serve as the Virginia state director for NFIB. NFIB is the 

nation's leading small business advocacy association, representing members in 

Washington, D.C., and all 50 state capitals. Founded in 1943 as a nonprofit, 

nonpartisan organization, NFIB's mission is to promote and protect the right of its 

members to own, operate, and grow their businesses. NFIB represents about 350,000 

independent business owners who are located throughout the United States. 

In my job as NFIB's Virginia state director, I routinely travel the state and visit with small 

business owners hoping to grow their business and create job opportunities within their 

community. All too often, however, I hear stories about how unreasonable federal and 

state regulation is becoming a greater ordeal to comply with. Our members tell me that 

routinely a new regulation affecting them is added to the list of rules they already 

struggle to comply with. And if a new rule doesn't directly threaten the existence of their 

business, it certainly takes time away from running their business and creating jobs. 

The statistics back up the stories I hear. According to NFIB's monthly survey of its 

members, Small Business Economic Trends, "government requirements and red tape" 

is the second most-frequent response to the question: What is the single most important 

problem facing your business today? More than one in five small business owners 

answered that regulation is the biggest problem they face. The only problem ranking 

higher is taxes. 1 

Every day, the problem is getting worse. From January 1 through September 27 of this 

year, federal agencies have issued 2,878 rules according to regulations.gov, the federal 

government's online rulemaking portal. 2 That is more than 10 new requirements a day 

that small business owners need to review to see if they apply to their business. The 

entrepreneurs that I visit with simply don't have time to keep up with the load. 

Accurate Cost Estimates are Important 

Small business owners are increasingly concerned with what they believe are 

questionable agency estimates of the benefits of rules versus the cost. When we 

explain to them how an agency estimates the costs for a particular rule, they find it 

unfair that an agency is allowed to use indirect benefits to generate large purported 

benefits but there is no requirement that agencies calculate reasonably foreseeable 

costs to indirectly regulated entities, which often are small businesses. This discrepancy 

applies to regulatory flexibility analyses as well 

Take for example a proposed rule issued recently by the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) to limit carbon emissions from new power plants. NFIB members are 
71 

greatly concerned about the potential impact of this rule on their ability to get affordable 

electricity. Yet in its regulatory flexibility analysis, the EPA concluded that the rule will 

not have a significant impact on small businesses because they are not directly 

regulated. So EPA has not even considered the impact of rising electricity prices on 

small businesses as a part of the total costs of the rule The small business owners I 

talk to do not think this is fair. 

NFIB believes that getting an accurate portrayal of indirect regulatory costs would help 

paint the picture of the impact these rules have on small businesses. That is why we 

have strongly supported the Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, which I'm pleased 

to say has been favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee under the 

leadership of Chairman Goodlatte and Rep. Bachus. 

Examples of the Impact of Regulation on Virginia Businesses 

I want to take this opportunity to provide you with a few real life stories from NFIB 

members in Virginia that illustrate the bottom-line impact and frustration that regulations 

often cause small business owners. 

The Oepartment of Labor's Companionship Exemption Rule 

The first example I want to mention is a rule that was just finalized by the U.S 

Department of Labor (DOL) about two weeks ago. Even though it failed to adequately 

identify a market failure, the Wage and Hour Division finalized a rule eliminating what's 

known as the companionship exemption for minimum wage and overtime for home care 

workers employed by third party agencies, many of which are small businesses. These 

workers serve clients - typically the elderly and disabled that cannot fully take care of 

themselves - in a non-medical capacity by making sure clients stay safe. Occasionally, 

they will help prepare meals, help the client get dressed, or even playa board game 

with the client to pass the time. However, their primary function is to ensure the safety of 

the client by providing companionship. 

This industry provides an affordable alternative for families that don't want to see a 

loved one placed in a nursing home or other type of care facility. Yet this recent rule has 

jeopardized an entire industry of third party providers, including the business of Chris 

and Betsy Head. The Heads are franchisees of Home Instead Senior Care, and their 

company is located in Roanoke County. Last year, as part of NFIB's Small Businesses 

for Sensible Regulations campaign, the Heads detailed how the proposed changes in 

the rule - which were substantively maintained in the final rule - would affect their 

company. 

The Heads said they had no problem with the minimum wage portion of the rule. Their 

employees' average wage is $9.40 per hour and none make less than $8.50 per hour. 

However, the overtime portion is going to have serious negative impacts on their 

company, the clients, and - contrary to what DOL believes - the workers themselves. 

The Heads often provide their clients "sleepover" service, where the worker comes in at 

night for a 10-12 hour shift, ensures the client eats dinner and gets them ready for bed. 

3 
72 

Then, while the client is asleep, the worker sleeps as well on site in case of an 

emergency. The new DOL rule will require employees be paid time-and-a-half for every 

hour worked over 40 in a given week. Under the exemption, employees received their 

straight hourly wage for hours over 40. 

However, the client simply can't afford this change. As Chris Head told the Roanoke 

Times last year, "we anticipate that between 20 and 25 percent of our clients receiving 

care will have to go elsewhere, either to institutionalized settings, or do without, or go 

into the gray market and hire someone by paying under the table without any of the 

insurance or oversight or other benefits of going through an agency.,,3 

To stay competitive, the Heads will have to limit employees to 40 hours to keep costs 

down where the client can afford. A third party provider like the Heads will have to send 

multiple workers to cover the same number hours. This type of arrangement is not just a 

burden on the business, but can present dangers for the client as well. In cases of 

dementia, Alzheimer's or other cognitive impairment, the client relies on familiarity with 

the care provider A client's safety may now be at risk because of this rule 

Paradoxically, this regulation intended to make workers better off will actually make 

them worse. One of the Heads' employees currently working 50 hours at Home Instead 

will now be lim ited to 40. In order to make up the 10 hours lost, he or she will have to 

find employment with another company and travel from site to site. The worker will not 

get to enjoy the overtime benefits promised by DOL and instead will spend additional 

time looking for and traveling from job to job. 

DOL's removal of the companionship exemption is likely to lead to a significant drop off 

in the Heads' business, major disruptions and reduced care quality for those that need 

it, and worse circumstances with no increased pay for employees. Everyone loses with 

this rule. 

The Environmental Protection Agency's Chesapeake Bay Runoff Rules 

My next example illustrates how the continued ratcheting down of rules presents 

challenges for small businesses. 

Bill Neff, Sr. has owned Bill Neff Enterprises, a commercial real estate development 

business in Harrisonburg, for over 50 years. He recently shared with me a story about 

how he agreed to help out a local church with its construction on a new site that ran into 

significant red tape and higher costs than he could have imagined. 

Because the church is located in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, there are certain 

measures developers must take to prevent stormwater contamination from making its 

way downstream to the bay. In this instance, Mr. Neff originally proposed to incorporate 

an open pond or basin with rock to capture rain and treat it before it made its way into 

the ground water that heads to the bay. 

Under previous standards, Mr Neff quoted the church that such a pond would cost 

about $10,000. However, when Mr. Neff submitted the plan for approval of a permit, he 

4 
73 

was surprised to learn that EPA had changed the water quality standard to the point that 

before being released into the ground the water had to be filtered to "drinking water' 

quality. The new filtration system required to reach the new levels would increase the 

total cost of the pond to nearly $60,000. But the added costs don't end there. The water 

quality must be monitored every month and a report sent in. Also, once a year an 

engineer must be hired to verify the water quality and send in yet another report. 

Obviously, since Mr. Neff was trying to do things cost-effectively for the church, these 

expenses raised significant concerns and jeopardized the entire project. 

The Mine Safety and Health Administration's Emergency Reporting Rule 

As my last example illustrates, many times even when there is clear direction from 

Congress on a very well-intended regulation, how an agency handles compliance efforts 

from small businesses can lead to frustration. 

Rob Frazier operates The Frazier Quarry, a limestone quarry in Rockingham County 

and a third and fourth-generation family business. Mine safety is serious business. After 

disasters at the Sago and Aracoma Arma mines in West Virginia in January 2006, 

Congress responded by passing the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response 

(MINER) Act. Within this act, Congress required mine operators to inform the Mine 

Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) within 15 minutes of a serious accident. 

Congress required this 15-minute deadline because the agency was already working on 

developing the requirement when the MINER Act was drafted in Congress. 

To many in the mining business, including Mr. Frazier, the 15-minute requirement was 

too restrictive because when a serious accident happens the mine operator is focused 

entirely on making the situation as safe as possible, evacuating miners and other 

personnel, calling 911 to get medical attention to the site quickly, and taking other 

emergency measures. Surely notifying MSHA of a serious accident is important, but not 

at the cost of the safety of those on the site. 

Regardless, mine operators expect that if such notification is required the agency must 

be equipped to deal with calls when a serious accident happens. Mr. Frazier had a 

reportable event happen at his job site. Rather than risk the $5,000 to $60,000 penalty 

for mine operators who fail to notify MSHA within 15 minutes, Mr. Frazier called the 

MSHA hotline. His call was answered by a phone answering service, and the person on 

the other end seemed to have no idea why he was calling. 

This troubling story shows how frustrating compliance can be. Put yourself in the shoes 

of Mr. Frazier. Something serious has happened at your mine. You are responsible for 

the safety of everyone at the site. You take the time out of your emergency response to 

alert the federal government and the person on the other end of the line seems 

confused as to why you're calling. If small businesses are held to high standards of 

compliance, then the least the government could do is be prepared to take their call. 

5 
74 

Conclusion 

As I hope these stories illustrate, small business owners do not take regulatory 

compliance lightly. They recognize that while it is certainly not the reason they started 

their business, it is a necessary task in running one. What small business owners ask is 

that the agencies that regulate them only regulate them. The owners that I talk to 

frequently are frustrated by what seems like a constant flow of new mandates coming 

out of Washington that provide little practical impact 

Agencies and OIRA need to recognize the genuine burden each regulatory requirement 

places on small businesses. To do so, they need to be committed to a true accounting 

of a proposed rule's actual costs and benefits, including those costs on indirectly 

affected small businesses. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share these stories with you today. 

Sincerely, 

~~ ().Lf(~ 

Nicole Riley 

State Director 

NFl BNirginia 

1 NFIB Research Foundation. Small Business Economic Trends. September 2013. pp. 18. 

http:/ {www.nfib.com{Po rta Is/DIP D Efrb~et201309. pdf 

2 www,regu!<ltions,gov 

3 Roanoke Times. NFIB, Del. Chris Head & Wife comploin obout proposed Dept. of Labor regulation. April 19, 2012. 

bl:p:I(blQg>J:llill1oke.(Q!!I1I2Q)illlli2012/0.'!~fib-Qel-chri5-h~iW:"/ife-coJillllain-ab9.ill:J2!:Q20sed-deQ1-of-laborrf'£~J!'3Ji9_nj 

6 
75 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Holding. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The introduction of Mr. 

Gray left out a very important element that he is a distinguished 

North Carolinian, and hails from a family that has been committed 

to public service within North Carolina and throughout the United 

States for generations, and it is an honor and a pleasure for me 

to be here sitting across from you, so thank you. 

Mr. Gray, in your written testimony, you note that centralized 

review of administrator agencies is most effective when the Office 

of the Vice President takes an active role in its supervision. If you 

could share with us a little bit about your experience in seeing this 

process work when the Vice President is taking an active role, and 

whether or not you know if Vice President Biden’s office is has 

taken on such a role and should if it has not. 

Mr. GRAY. Well, of course, my experience with this comes 

through my service as counsel to Vice President Bush who was delegated the authority to convene all of this effort beginning in 1981. 

But Vice President Quayle continued in that capacity when Vice 

President Bush became President, and Vice President Gore did the 

same thing when President Clinton was elected. So there is a long 

history of this. And why is it important? Because I think OMB, 

even more now probably than ever, because of the cuts in the staff, 

OMB needs a champion in the West Wing, OMB is part of the larger executive office of the President and the head of the director of 

OMB is a member of the cabinet and attends senior staff, et cetera. 

But it is always great to have a champion in the White House. It 

certainly, I think, was important to John, he can speak for himself 

and his colleagues and I would be willing to say that Sally would 

second the motion when she was head of OIRA. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you. You also had pointed out regarding 

EPA regulations and the specifically co-regulations coming out of 

the EPA, and I just wanted to give you a minute to elaborate on 

your thoughts there and the problems that you see. 

Mr. GRAY. Well the social cost of carbon leaving aside the procedural defects, which I think are fairly clear, there is just a mixup 

on the numbers and the number of 36, which is now the number 

used, $36 a ton is a worldwide benefit. But I don’t think that can 

be attributed to reductions made just in the United States. The 

costs all occurred here but the benefits are worldwide. I think the 

benefits should be attributed to a rule containing carbon in the 

United States should be what the benefits are in the United States, 

that is what the OMB circular actually provides for and I think 

that is what should happen. 

Now what is the benefit in the United States? It couldn’t be any 

greater than U.S. share of GDP, world GDP which is under 25 percent, it is probably a lot less because we have controlled carbon better than many countries, contrary to the sort of public image, and 

probably closer to 10 or 15, maybe as low as 7. 

And if you look at the delta, the difference between say 15 and 

36, it is more than $100 billion a year and the potential regulatory 

costs, you could say it is the equivalent of a $1 trillion tax increase 

over a 10-year period. That is not peanuts. And so I think it needs 

to be sorted out. 
76 

As I said, the price that Europeans pay is about $7.50 give or 

take, and the price that is paid in California which is a pretty good 

proxy for the U.S. is 20 percent of the U.S. economy is less than 

12. And so I think that needs to get sorted out. 

On the question of PM2.5, which is mainly to the present time a 

coal issue, the benefits for some of the rules have been astronomical, the MACT rule, the air toxics rule, the actual air toxic benefit 

from the air toxic reduction is like about 5/10 of, half of 1 percent 

of the total benefits. The total benefits are in 99 percent derived 

from calculations of what it means to reduce PM2.5 but those reductions, as I said a few minutes ago, all occur most of them, I mean, 

90 percent or more in attainment areas that is parts of the country 

that are well in attainment of the standard. And I don’t think you 

can imply a straight line benefit down to zero for your PM2.5 reduction. I am a lawyer I am not a scientist. John can talk to this if 

you want to ask him a question with much greater sophistication 

than I can. 

But why do we have attainment? Why do we have national air 

quality standards if you are going to continue to regulate below the 

level of the standard and claim the same benefit? 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you. Ms. Riley, quickly I just wanted to 

thank you very much for being here. The NFIB is a great resources 

in my district, and has brought to my attention many examples 

analogous to the ones that you have brought here before the Committee and the impact unfair and unreasonable burdensome regulations are bringing upon small business. Chairman Goodlatte’s 

district and my district share a lot of similarities. 

And as I listened to the examples that you brought forth, they 

are very similar to what the folks in my district are facing. So 

thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Holding, and the gentleman from 

Memphis. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Thank you. It is I think appropriate that 

this may be the last substantive Committee that meets before the 

government closes down. It is not the sexiest subject, it is not the 

most watched and provocative subject, so a good way to wind down 

into halting government. 

The big issue, I guess, and the big picture, Ambassador, is—let 

me ask you, in 1985 were you working with the administration? 

Mr. GRAY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you recall when there was an attempt to not 

raise the debt ceiling and President Reagan spoke about that? 

Mr. GRAY. I am afraid to say I do not recall that specific incident. 

There were several, we were talking about this in the ante room, 

several shutdowns during the Reagan-Bush years, and quite frankly, I can’t remember the details of any of them except that for the 

very first one I was deemed nonessential, and it was one of the 

most humiliating things in my life. 

Mr. COHEN. That didn’t last long, though, did it? 

Mr. GRAY. No, it was only about 2 or 3 days but I didn’t dare 

appear in public during daylight hours for fear someone would look 

at me and say look, he is not essential. It was quite traumatic. It 

is traumatic for anybody. When I was on the council, I had to oversee a couple of shutdowns, and we worked with OMB over who was 
77 

supposed to be nonessential and essential. And I am telling you 

what a very pain, it is a very, very painful exercise. But I do not 

remember—— 

Mr. COHEN. President Reagan, this was about getting beyond the 

debt limit, what do you think would happen you got so much experience I read your vitae, what would happen to the world’s economy 

if we on October 17th did not raise the debt ceiling? 

Mr. GRAY. I think that the consequences would be very severe, 

and I can not really get my arms around my head around what 

would happen if we just ignored it. 

Mr. COHEN. And let me ask you something. When you play tennis with Professor Katzen, does she go to her left and you go to 

your right? 

Mr. GRAY. We are very bipartisan when we play, but I probably 

play more opposite her than with her, and don’t ask me or her who 

usually wins. It is always sort of mixed doubles, so it is kind of 

hard to trace the actual causality in these matches. 

Mr. COHEN. And then tell me this, none of this is relevant to 

anything, but except to the big picture. You clerked for Chief Justice Warren. Can you tell us something about Chief Justice Warren? He was one of my heroes, and I was impressed to see that you 

had time with him. 

Mr. GRAY. Gosh. Well, it was one of the great experiences of a 

lifetime, and maybe the best experience, and he was wonderful to 

work for. All of his ex-clerks loved him. He never, I think, got over, 

always complained about his service on the Warren Commission. I 

think he thought that was the biggest mistake he ever made, and 

I can still remember his wife saying, you know, it is a good thing 

that Earl was not a woman because he can never say no. But he 

was a wonderful man to work for, and what I most admired about 

him were two things: He had an uncanny sense for what was really 

going on in litigation, and at the Supreme Court, he really knew 

what was going on, and he really understood the legal issues, and 

writing dissents for him was very difficult because you couldn’t 

quite capture his own passion, and he wrote extremely well legally, 

and I was always surprised that here is somebody who had been 

a politician who could handle legal analysis so well. 

The other thing was is that he was used to being in the public 

eye. I don’t want to belabor this point, used to being in the public 

eye all of his life, and when he came to the Court, he pulled down 

the curtain and never gave another press conference, never appeared in public again and shut it off cold turkey, and I think that 

is an extraordinary gift to the Nation when he did that. 

Mr. COHEN. I have got something I want to share with you. I 

think I have got it here if I can read it. Have you been out to— 

do you know these words, ‘‘Where there is injustice, we should correct it; where there is poverty, we should eliminate it; where there 

is corruption, we should stamp it out; where there is violence, we 

should punish it; where there is neglect, we should provide care; 

where there is war, we should restore peace; and wherever corrections are achieved, we should aim them permanently to our storehouse of treasures’’? 

Mr. GRAY. I should know who said this. I wish I did know. Was 

that Chief Justice Warren? 
78 

Mr. COHEN. That is a verbiage from 1970 that is placed on his 

stone. Of course he passed, I guess he passed later, but that is 

what is on his tombstone. 

Mr. GRAY. On the tombstone. 

Mr. COHEN. I went out across the river in Arlington and photographed that because I thought it was just so beautiful, and he was 

a great man, and that is one of his quotes, but happy for your experience, and that was good. 

Mr. GRAY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Professor Katzen, how did you end up at George 

Mason, and what did you teach? Balancing your resume? 

Ms. KATZEN. No, I always was under the impression that administrative law was a bipartisan effort, that there are principles that 

one can subscribe to that do not go along ideological lines. The 

Chair was quite kind to mention that I had been chair of the administrative law section. I followed Justice Scalia, and then Chairman Verkuil from ACUS followed me. 

There is no rhyme nor reason or predetermination for a position, 

and if I was teaching administrative law, it seemed to me that I 

could teach anywhere. I found the experience very interesting because of the faculty lunches every day, I learned new things. 

Mr. COHEN. Were you forced to eat crow ever? 

Ms. KATZEN. No. No, and I didn’t require them to, either. 

Mr. COHEN. Good for you. Good for you. I yield back the balance 

of my time, and thank each of the witnesses. 

Mr. BACHUS. I taught law school at the university just on a very 

brief basis when the professor was disabled, and it was a very challenging experience because you are dealing with very bright students, and you better get the message right, you better; what you 

say better be correct or they will correct you, and I don’t think 

there is a tougher profession, more demanding than teaching at 

any level, but at the college level, but it can be delightful because 

you can—you also learn as much as you teach. 

This has been an excellent panel. I am very encouraged by the 

fact that there is some bipartisan agreement on some things. The 

bill in the Senate that Senator Warren and—Warner and others 

have, so I think it gives us a lot of direction, and I am not going 

to—I think we have had a good hearing. I am not going to mess 

it up, particularly after I announced today I wouldn’t be running 

for reelection, and the government appears to be shutting down, 

so—so I have probably said enough. But it is a sad day for our 

country if, in fact, the government does shut down, and so thank 

you very much for your attendance and your testimony, and this 

is a very bright panel and a lot of good information to digest. 

This concludes today’s hearing, and thank you to all of our witnesses, again, for attending, and without objection all Members will 

have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for 

the witnesses or additional material for the record. This hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(79) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
80 

Statement of Subcommittee Chainnan Spencer Bachus 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Refonn, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

Hearing on "The Office ofInfonnation and Reb'lliatory Affairs: Federal Reb'lliations and 

Regulatory Refonn" 

Monday, September 30, 2013, at 4:00 p.m. 

(Final) 

Let me welcome Administrator Shelanski and all our witnesses to this oversight 

hearing examining the OtTice ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, Federal Regulations 

and Regulatory Reform. 

To begin, if there is one thing that should bring Members from both sides of the 

aisle together, it is the need for more jobs in our country. They call owning a home the 

American Dream. Not to take anything away from that, but I have always believed that the 

real American Dream is having a good-paying job that allows you to provide for your 

family and build your own wealth. Unfortunately, there are too many people still looking 

for good work in our economy today. And part of the reason for that is the growing 

burden offederal regulations. 

Now, there really isn't anyone who would seriously argue that we need no regulation 

at all. Sensible regulations preserve our environment, the safety of our food, and our 

health. But when you have excessive regulation that is separated from a true consideration 

of costs and benefits, you can do real damage to the economy and people's lives without 

providing commensurate protections. 

Consider these figures. A Small Business Administration report from 2008 put the 

annual cost offederal regulations at $1.75 trillion- about 14% of the economy. Since then, 

$520 billion worth of new regulations have been added and that does not even count the 

rules yet to come from Obamacare, the Dodd-Frank-Act, and the President's climate 
81 

change agenda. These regulations, however well-intended, cause businesses to divert 

capital from creating jobs and leave them less able to grow. 

Administrator Shelanski, as the new head of the Office ofInformation and 

Regulatory Affairs, you stand as one of the important checks and balances in the federal 

regulatory system. 

Executive agencies must submit their proposed and final rules to your agency for 

approval before they can be published in the Federal Register. You have the authority to 

return a rule to the issuing agency if it finds defects in the process or analysis. 

With this power often comes great pressure, from parties interested in the 

regulations and from the issuing agencies themselves. Your office must be committed 

to fair and unbiased reviews. In fact, I'd compare it to being an SEC referee during the 

Iron Bowl between Alabama and Auburn - passions might run high, but your job is to get 

the call right. 

Accordingly, I look forward to examining OIRA's activities in detail, particularly on 

several key issues. What is being done to ensure that agency cost-benefit reports are not 

overstating benefits or inappropriately mixing direct benefits with secondary 

benefits? This has concerned me as I have reviewed the Administration's rationale for 

additional carbon emission limits, which will have a severe impact on the use of coal. 

OIRA also has responsibilities with regard to the Regulatory Impact Analysis 

process. An issue arising from that is what OlRA is doing to make sure that real problems 

are being identified and whether the best regulatory approach is being used to address the 

problem. 

2 
82 

f 

If you don't know already, Administrator Shelanski, I have a particular interest in 

whether independent agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should be 

required to submit their rules to you for review. The CFPB is exempt despite the huge 

impact that its rules will have on the economy. It is an agency in desperate need of 

oversight. 

To conclude, if OIRA exercises its authority properly, it can be a gatekeeper to 

ensure smart and effective regulation. We all know what the flip side of that is - regulatory 

overreach that both puts a drag on our economy and fails to provide commensurate 

environmental, health, and consumer benefits. 

With that, I look forward to hearing from Administrator Shelanski and our second 

panel of experts on how our regulatory regime is functioning and how it can be improved. 

### 
83 

Statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen 

for the Hearing on the 

"Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: 

Federal Regulations and Regulatory Reform Under 

the Obama Administration" 

Before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 

Commercial and Antitrust Law 

Monday, September 30, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. 

2141 Rayburn House Office Building 

Before I begin, I just wanted to congratulate Chairman 

Spencer Bachus on his announcement that he intends to retire at 

the end of this Congress. Although we will still have some time 

left to work together, I would like to take the opportunity to say 

what a pleasure it has been to get to know him and work with 

him. He is a thoughtful and kind man with a generous spirit, 

and I will miss him. 

It has been a year and a half since our last oversight hearing 

on the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and I thank 

the new Administrator, Howard Shelanski, for taking the time to 

appear before us. 

On January 18,2011, President Obama issued Executive 

Order 13563, which supplemented and reaffirmed the principles 

of Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton. EO 

13563 added an emphasis on increasing public participation in 
84 

the rulemaking process and identifying ways to reduce costs and 

simplify and harmonize rules through inter-agency coordination. 

EO 13 563 clarifies that agencies must identify and consider 

regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain 

flexibility and freedom of choice for the public, including 

considering alternatives to mandates, prohibitions, and 

command-and-control regulation. 

Perhaps most significantly, EO 13563 requires agencies to 

develop a plan to conduct a periodic review of existing 

significant regulations that "may be outmoded, ineffective, 

insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, 

streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has 

been learned." 

Mr. Shelanski's predecessor, Cass Sunstein, issued a 

number of guidance memoranda regarding EO 13563 and 

particularly its requirement that agencies conduct periodic 

review of existing significant regulations, emphasizing the need 

for agencies to "consider strengthening, complementing, or 

modernizing rules where necessary or appropriate - including, if 

relevant, undertaking new rulemaking." 

Those efforts thus far appear to be working. In an op-ed 

that appeared in the Memphis Commercial Appeal earlier this 

year, columnist Doyle McManus cited Mr. Sunstein, who noted 

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85 

that in President Obama's "first four years in office, he has 

issued fewer new federal regulations than any of the four 

presidents who came before him, including Ronald Reagan." 

Moreover, the op-ed noted, President Obama has revoked 

"hundreds of outmoded rules [that] produced savings for 

government, business and consumers that will add up to 

billions." 

I look forward to learning about the continuing efforts to 

date of the President's push to have agencies improve and 

modernize the existing regulatory system. 

Based on some of the statements I have heard from some of 

my colleagues, I imagine we will hear about the costs of 

regulations under this Administration. 

I note that according to the Office of Management and 

Budget's 2012 Draft Report on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 

Regulations, the net benefits of regulations in the first three 

years of this Administration totaled $91 billion, which is 25 

times greater than during the comparable period under the Bush 

Administration. 

Moreover, fewer final rules have been reviewed by OIRA 

and issued by executive agencies during the first three years of 

the Obama Administration than in the comparable period of the 

Bush Administration. 
86 

f 

Similarly, the 2013 draft Report to Congress notes that the 

benefits of federal regulation between FY 2002 and FY 2012 

ranged from $193 billion to $800 billion in benefits, as against 

$57 billion and $84 billion in costs. 

Finally, I would like to know from all of our witnesses on 

both panels what steps Congress can take to better help OIRA 

do its job, including whether Congress should provide OIRA 

with more resources. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today and look forward 

to their testimony. 

4 
87 

Statement of Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

Hearing on "The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal 

Regulations and Regulatory Reform" 

Monday, September 30,2013, at 4:00 p.m. 

(OH - FINAL) 

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 

or "OIRA" has been called "the most powerful federal 

agency that most people have never heard of." OIRA 

is responsible for overseeing the development and 

promulgation of agency regulations. In particular, 

OIRA must review required cost-benefit analyses of 

"economically significant rules," which are those 

rules having an annual effect on the economy of $100 

million or more. 

Such cost benefit analysis is critical because, 

since early in the Obama Administration, many have 
88 

attributed the economy's lack of recovery in large part 

to increases in regulation and regulatory uncertainty. 

Even the Administration acknowledges the 

problem. In a January 18, 2011, Wall Street Journal 

op-ed, President Obama stated that over-regulation 

"stifles innovation" and has "a chilling effect on 

growth and jobs." The President has even issued a 

number of Executive Orders and Memoranda that 

address regulatory burdens. These include Executive 

Order 13563, which directs agencies to "propose or 

adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that its benefits justify its costs." 

While these Executive orders look good on paper, 

it appears that is all the Obama Administration is 

willing to do. I want to know what OIRA is doing to 

2 
89 

ensure agencies actually implement the stated 

principles. 

Unfortunately, there are grounds for concern. 

Roughly two-thirds of the claimed benefits of 

economically significant final rules OIRA reviewed in 

2010 were actually from secondary effects that were 

not the statutorily authorized targets of the rules. 

What is OIRA doing to make sure that the bulk of the 

benefits agencies claim for their rules arise 

specifically out of improving the conditions Congress 

authorized those agencies to address by regulation? 

Similarly, in May 2013, the Administration quietly 

increased its estimate of the benefit of reducing 

carbon from the atmosphere from $21 to $35 per 

metric ton. That will dramatically increase agency 

estimates of benefits from regulations limiting 

3 
90 

emissions. However, there are significant concerns 

that the Administration's new figure is substantively 

flawed and that the process for issuing it was not 

transparent. The Government Accountability Office is 

investigating. 

Administrator Shelanski joins OIRA at a critical 

time. Job creation continues to fall short of 

expectations. In August 2013, employers added only 

169,000 jobs to payrolls, less than expected, and 

gains for June and July were revised downward. The 

unemployment rate ticked down to 7.3%, but only 

because fewer people are looking for work. Even 

more worrisome, the labor participation rate is the 

lowest it has been in roughly forty years. The 

economy as a whole also remains sluggish. On 

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91 

September 18, 2013, the Federal Reserve lowered its 

economic growth forecasts for 2013 and 2014. 

In light of this worrisome data, I am particularly 

interested in hearing how Administrator Shelanski 

plans to ensure the Administration's actions match its 

rhetoric about reducing the regulatory burden on the 

small businesses that form the backbone of our 

economy. In National Federation of Independent 

Business (NFIB) surveys, government regulations are 

consistently a top concern for small business owners, 

whose compliance costs are also higher than those of 

larger businesses. We cannot afford to regulate small 

business job creators out of business. 

To this end, the OIRA Administrator holds a 

number of tools that can be powerful if he chooses to 

use them. If an agency's cost-benefit analysis is 
92 

improper or if the agency fails to consider alternatives 

or account for the impacts on small business, OIRA 

can "return" the regulation to the agency so it does 

not take effect. During the Bush Administration, OIRA 

sent 27 return letters. During the Obama 

Administration, though, OIRA has sent only one. 

OIRA's zealous enforcement of the cost-benefit 

analysis, least-burdensome alternative, and other 

requirements to regulations under consideration by 

the Executive Branch will help to prevent unnecessary 

and excessively costly regulations that harm the 

economy and kill jobs. That is why I am pleased 

Subcommittee Chairman Bachus has called this 

oversight hearing. 

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93 

f 

I look forward to Administrator Shelanski's 

testimony and to that of our second panel of 

distinguished experts. 

### 

7 
94 

Material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary 

f 
95 

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Howard A. 

Shelanski, Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
96 

November 8, 2013 and FDA published the rule on November 13, 2013. The public has had an 

opportunity to comment on all aspects of the proposed rule, including the substantive policy and 

the underlying legal authority. The comment period has been extended to March 13,2014, from 

its original deadline of January 13, 2014. OIRA consults other otlices as needed in the course of 

significance determinations. When OIRA detennines that a rule is significant, OIRA conducts 

its review under the provisions of Executive Orders 12866 and 13563. This includes review of 

the agency's assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the regulatory action, including an 

explanation of the manner in which the reb'lliatory action is consistent with a statutory mandate 

and, to the extent permitted by law, promotes the President's priorities and avoids undue 

interference with State, local, and tribal governments in the exercise of their governmental 

functions. 

3. Experts have expressed concern that (JIRA 's methodology jor cost-benejit analysis is 

j/cn<'ed. For example, ajiliitwo-thirds of the claimed benefits of economically sign!ficant 

rules that OiRA reviewed in 20iO were actuallyfrom secondaty or indirect effects that 

were not the target of the rules. 

a) What is (JIJI.A doing to make sllre that the bulk of claimed benefits arise 

specifically 01lt of improving the conditions that Congress authorized the agency 

to address by regulation and that secondary or indirect effects are handled 

separately in regulations under statlltes directly aimed at those effects? 

b) Since OJRA cOllnts secondary or indirect benefits, does it equally consider 

secondary or indirect costs ;,/ its analysis? r(Jr example, FDA proposed to 

regulate the spent grain that brewers sell at deep discounts as animal feed (RlN 

119 JO-A(35). RreH'ers have done thisjiJr generations with no apparent human 

health risk. Jt may be cheaper for brewers to discard the grain than to comply 

and sell it, which could raisejeed costsjorjarmers. Similarly, the labeling rule 

rejerenced in question two could trigger SiJ.,Tflijicant litigation and related drug 

monitoring costsfor generics and could raise drug pricesjiJr consumers and 

govemmenljimded medical plans. Jf OJRA does no/ equally consider such 

secondCllJ! or indirect costs, why /lot? 

c) In its September 23, 2013 rulejor new coal burning plants, EPA claimed 

negligible compliance costs because Ihe industry is shifting 10 renewablefilels. 

ihis seems inconsistent with }Y A '5 claim of benefitsfrom prewnting flew 

construction of high emission coal plants. Fither these coal plants would never 

be built anyway, so the rule has no benefit, or they would be, but for the rule, in 

which case there is a cost. What are YOll doing to ensllre that agencies have 

analyzed "costs as accurately as possible, " as required by President Obama ',I' 

F;xecutive Order 1356J?~ 

ANSWER: The primary purpose of any regulation is to address the specific problem that 

Congress authorized the rule-writing agency to address. Reb'lliations often have collateral costs 

and benefits, however, and it is appropriate and consistent with Executive Orders 12866 and 

13563 to analyze these through the agency's regulatory impact analysis. Agencies should 

consider all significant costs and benefits in their regulatory impact analyses, including 

z 
97 

"secondary" and "indirect" costs and benefits, to the extent practicable. During OlRA review, 

OIRA staff and agency staff have many discussions to ensure that "costs [of any given regulation 

are analyzed] as accurately as possible," as required by EO 13563. 

The appropriate baseline for any regulatory impact anal ysis is the state of the world absent the 

rule. In some cases, agencies use multiple baselines to reflect a range of plausible states of the 

world absent the rule. It is essential, however, that whatever baseline(s) an agency chooses, it 

use the same baseline(s) for its evaluation of costs and benetits. 

For the proposed rule regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new power plants, EPA 

projected that no new coal burning power plants would be built during the period of analysis, 

absent the rule. For this reason, EPA projected that the requirements applicable to new coalfired power plants would have no quantified costs ()[ benefits. 

4. What are you doing to ensure that agencies are using ReglilatOl}' Impact Analysis (RIA) 

properly, to il?jorm their rulemaking rather than tojust!jj' a predetermined approach 

(e.g, requiring agencies be specific about how they used the RiA to develop the proposed 

rule)? 

ANSWER: OTRA reviews regulatory impact analyses with the view to having them reflect the 

best available scientific evidence and the best practices for cost-benefit analysis (as summarized 

in OMB Circular A-4). The assessment of reh'lliatory alternatives within an RIA serves to show 

whether the selected policy is the best option that could reasonably be considered. 

5. The Dodd Frank Act gives the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFP B) 

uflprecedenled power and independence. For example, Dodd-Frank hal'S Congressfrom 

even reviewing the hudget of Ihe selffunded CFPR. In light of F;xeclllil'e Order 13579, 

regarding independent agencies, what can (JIRA do to ensure that its rel'iew of CPP B 

regulations is as strong as can be gil'en that other sc?jegllards are lacking? 

ANSWER: CFPB is an independent regulatory agency, and therefore, not subject to Executive 

Orders 12866 or 13563, or to the centralized regulatory review conducted by OlRA. As you 

note, in July 2011 the President issued E.O. 13579, "Regulation and Independent Regulatory 

Agencies," calling upon independent agencies to voluntarily comply with E.O. 

I 3563,"Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review," which reinforces the importance of 

thorough and rigorous cost-benefit analysis by agencies, originally required by E.O. 12866. 

Under E.O. 13579, independent agencies are asked, to the extent pennitted by law, to make 

regulatory decisions only after consideration of costs and benefits (qualitative and quantitative). 

In addition, under changes to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) enacted as part of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, CFPB must, prior to the promulgation 

of a proposed rule, convene and chair a Small Business Review Panel to consider the impact of 

regulatory proposals that it determines would have a significant economic impact on a 

3 
98 

substantial number of small entities. The Panel consists of representatives from the CFPB, the 

Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, as well as OIRA. The Panel 

process allows small entities that would be affected by a regulatory proposal to be consulted 

about the pending action and be offered an opportunity to provide information on the proposal's 

potential effects. 

6. On September 20, 2013, iTA announced rules/in' new coal burn;'lg plants requiring that 

they cllrb or mpture -10 percent of their greenhouse gas output. The rule relies on the 

l'iahility of what many argue is still unproven carbon capture andsequestration 

technology to reduce emissions. What did OJRA do to ensure that F;P A 's rule rested on 

proven rather than spewlative tedmology 1 Did EPA heed OIRA 's advice on the lise of 

new or unproven technology 1 Ilnot, did you consider llsing a retllrn leffel''? What is 

UJRA doing generally 10 emure that agencies' rules rest 011 proven rather than 

speculative lechnology? 

ANSWER: OIRA conducted its review of this proposed rule and determined that it was 

consistent with the regulatory principles embodied in Executive Order 12866 and 13563. The 

EOs state among other things that, "each agency shall base its regulatory decisions on the best 

reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information" and that agencies, 

"shall ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological information and processes used 

to support the agency's reb'lliatory actions." The rule docket includes detailed supporting 

documentation that explains the technical basis for EPA's determination that the technologies on 

which the proposed requirements are based are "adequately demonstrated" as required by the 

Clean Air Act. To further clarify the basis for its determination that the technology on which the 

proposed rule is based is adequately demonstrated, EPA recently submitted to OMB for review a 

Notice of Data Availability and supplemental Technical Support Document. 

7. There is concern that agencies like ~'P A are simply refllsing to comply with requirements 

that Ihey consider Ihe impact of their proposed regulations Oil small husinesses. What 

are you doing to ensure regulations are as least burdensome as possibfe on small 

busillesses 1 When agel/cies/clil to address the burden 0/1 smarr business adequately, 

what does OiRA do to ensure compliance (e.g, retllrn letterp 

ANSWER: I believe small businesses are critical to economic growth and job creation. The 

President issued a Memorandum directing Federal agencies to consider ways to reduce 

regulatory burdens on small businesses. As part of the OIRA review process, we work very 

closely with the regulating agency to consider -- and where possible, mitigate or eliminate --

smail business impacts. OlRA also works closely with the SBA Office of Advocacy to explore 

possible alternative regulatory approaches as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). 

8. New researchfrom the Mercatus Center highlights the regressil'e effects of 

overregulaliofl. Because of the law of diminishing marginal relums, regulated enlilies 

have to spend increasingly more to achieve increasingly smaller marginal regulatO/J! 

4 
99 

henefits. Accordingly, low income hOllsehold~ are spending money mitigating low 

probability regulatory risks thar they could better spend reducing higher risks of more 

immediate relevance to them. What is (JIRA doing to identifj; a1/(1 analyze the potential 

regressive effects of proposed regulations on vulnerable populations? 

ANSWER: In accordance with OMB Circular A-4, OIRA urges agencies to assess, as part of 

their regulatory impact analyses, the distribution of impacts across sub-populations, including 

various income groups and sectors of the economy. Such assessments shed light on the 

distributional equity consequences of rule making, which-as noted in Executive Orders 12866 

and 13563-are appropriate considerations in regulatory policy. 

Question from Subcommittee Member Doug Collins 

I. Administrator Shelanski, as you know, "economically significant" regulatory actions are 

those hal'ing "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more" or meeting 

other specified criteria. 

a. Does 01RA defer to agencies' economic effect calculations in determining 

whether a proposed rule should be classified as economically significant? 

h. Would a rule he classified as "economically significant" and thus suhject to 

additional layers of review, even where the costs alone are well helow the 

threshold, but the projected benefits are velY high and so added together they 

exceed $100 million? 

c. What are the henefits of additional review in silch a case? 

ANSWER: OIRA does not independently investigate the expected costs and benefits of 

proposed rules. We do review agencies' analyses of the economic effects of rules, however, and 

work with agencies to ensure that their analyses are sound. In the course of such review, there 

may be cases when an agency initially believes that a proposed or final rule should be classified 

as a particular level of significance, but after further review the rule is classified as a different 

level of significance. 

Rules are classified as "economically signiticant" if they have annual costs, benefits, or transfers 

0[$100 million or more in anyone year. Sometimes, there are rules that are expected to have 

benefits above the $\00 million threshold, while costs are below. These would still be classified 

as economically significant. In such a case, treatment as an economically significant rule is 

warranted because of the substantial impact that the rule may have. For example, one of the key 

components of regulatory analysis is the analysis of alternatives. When rules have large effectswhether in the form of costs, benefits, or transfers - analysis of alternatives can reveal 

information that leads to improved reb'lliatory decisions that could increase the net benefits of 

rules. 

5 
100 

Questious from Raukiug Member Steve Coheu 

i. At the hearing, I asked ),011 abollt a report/rom the Heritage Foundation report that 

claims Ihe Obama Adminislralion during ilsfirsllhree years "lInleashed 106 new major 

regulalions Ihal increased regulalory bllrdens by more Ihan 546 billion annually,five 

times the amount imposed hy the George W Rush Administration during its first three 

years. 

What are YOllr ohservations regarding this report '.I·.findings? 

Was this report peer reviewed? 

Was this report peer-edited? 

Was this report suhjected to puhlic commem? 

ANSWER: This question appears to refer to the Heritage Foundation's report, "Red Tape 

Rising: Obama-Era Regulation at the Three-Year Mark," from March 2012. The report attempts 

to aggregate the costs of new federal regulations. The figures in the report differ from the 

aggregation of costs in OIRA's annual report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 

Regulations in several significant ways. First, the Heritage report includes costs of regulations 

imposed by independent agencies, while OIRA does not. Second, OIRA's report excludes rules 

that have been overturned or reconsidered, while the Heritage report appears to include them. 

Third, in some cases when the agency was unable to provide an estimate of costs, the Heritage 

report uses estimates from other sources. Fourth, the Heritage cost totals do not include costsavings from dereb'lliatory rules. I have no knowledge of whether this report was subject to peer 

review, was edited by any peer reviewers, or was subject to public comment. 

2. Please describe how OMB goes about preparing its annual report to Congress on the 

benefits and costs offederal regulations. Why is there such a range with respect to the 

reporl 's range of anlicipaled henefils of major federal regulalions? Tn dispuling Ihe 

Administralion's estimale thai the cost of the 58 major rules issued helween 200Y and 

2012 was $51.5 billion, Mr. Gray cites the American Action Forum's estimate that this 

amount was actually $518 billion. What is your response to this assertion? How do we 

know that Ihese numbers aren 'I just puffery? How do we sqllare Ihis reporl with Ihe 

Heritage Foundalion reporl? 

ANSWER: OIRA prepares the OMB Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 

regulations in accordance with Section 624 of the Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act of2001, which is also known as the Regulatory-Right-to-Know Act. In the 

Report, we summarize estimates by Federal regulatory agencies of the quantified and monetized 

benefits and costs of major Federal regulations reviewed by OMB over the last ten years. Prior 

to finalizing the report, we publish a draft of the Report for public comment and peer review. 

The tinal Report reflects consideration of input received from the public and peer reviewers. 

In the 2013 Draft Report to Congress, we report that the estimated monetized benefits associated 

with federal regulations range between $192.7 billion and $799.7 billion between October 2002 

and September 2012. The breadth of the range of these estimates is largely attributable to 

6 
101 

uncertainties associated with EPA's estimate of air quality improvements from fine particulate 

matter reduction, which the Draft Report discusses. 

We have not tried to fully reproduce the American Action Forum (AAF) number, but we believe 

that the $500 billion is constructed using a set of questionable assumptions and practices. For 

example, the AAF appears to use the cumulative costs of regulations and attribute those costs to 

the year in which the rules were published rather than reporting annualized costs and benefits 

We have not made an attempt to thoroughly explore or explain the ditTerences between the 

Heritage and American Action Forum Reports. 

3. As YOII may recall, the Administration isslled a strong veto threat against the Regulator)! 

Accountability Act in the last Congress. A substantially similar bill is pending before the 

cllrrent Congress. This bill would add more than 60 additional procedural and 

analytical requirements to the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking process that 

agencies lise to promulgate regulations and oven'ide various laws prohibiting agencies 

./i'om considering cosls when public health and safety are at stake such as the Clean Air 

Acl, the Clean WaleI' Act, Ihe Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Federal Mine 

Safety and Health Act. Tt even requires formal rulemaking for certain so-called high 

impact rules, a process long rejected by virtually eVeTJlone in the administrative leM 

community. In issuing its veto threat, the Administration warned that the bill "would 

seriolTsly lTndermine the ability of agencies to execute their statutory duties" and would 

aIm "impede the ability of agencies to provide the public with basic protections, " among 

other concerns, What are YOllr thoughts about this bilf? 

ANSWER: As you mentioned, the Administration issued a statement indicating that senior 

advisers would recommend a veto of the Regulatory Accountability Act in the last Congress. It 

continues to be our position that this bill would "impede the ability of agencies to provide the 

public with basic protections, and create needless confusion and delay that would prove 

disruptive for businesses, as well as for state, tribal and local governments." 

4. Why has the Administration heen so proactive in addressing regulator)! issues? 

ANSWER: The Administration is committed to a 21,t-century regulatory system that is costeffective, evidence-based, and modern. 

5. What more can the Administration do to ensure that our reglliatory system is the most 

effective? 

ANSWER: The Administration continues to work to maintain a balance between our obligation 

to protect the health, welfare, and safety of Americans and our commitment to promoting 

economic growth, job creation, competitiveness, and innovation. 

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6. What is YOllr re~ponse to the allegations that: 

regulations kil/jobs? 

regulations lead 10 uncertainty? 

regulations lead to higher prices? 

regulations are forcing American companies to move off-shore? 

ANSWER: The Administration is obviously sensitive to imposing unjustified reb'Ulatory costs. 

Whenever agencies issue new regulations, Executive Order 13563 requires, among other things, 

that agencies ensure that the benefits justify the costs, select the least burdensome alternatives 

consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, consider public participation, simplify rules, and 

adopt flexible approaches to rulemaking. This is also why the President, in the same reb'Ulatory 

executive order, called for a historic government-wide review of regulations on the books - a 

"regulatory lookback" -- to streamline, modify, or repeal regulations and reduce unnecessary 

burdens and costs. 

That said, the fact that some regulations should be streamlined or modified does not change the 

fact that most regulations are on the books in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 

the American public. The Obama Administration believes that we don't have to sacrifice 

Americans' health and safety to drive growth, job creation, and innovation-and our record 

shows that. The net benefits of rules finalized through the fourth fiscal year of the Obama 

Administration were $159 billion, including not only monetary savings but also lives saved and 

injuries prevented. And in the meantime, the number of final rules reviewed by the White House 

01RA and issued by Executive Agencies during the first term of the Obama Administration was 

actually lower than the number reviewed and issued during the first term of the Bush 

Administration. 

7. What (;an Congress do to improve the regulatOlY system ') 

ANSWER: At this time, and with the issuance of the President's Executive Orders on 

regulation, I believe the Administration has the tools it needs to maintain a regulatory system that 

is cost-effective, evidence-based, and modern. 

8. When OiRA reviews a mfe and suggests certain changes, are those suggestions made 

public? 

ANSWER: Changes to a rule during OIRA's interagency review process, whether changes made 

by OIRA, the drafting agency, or anyone else in the Federal government, can be seen after the 

rule is published by comparing the published version to the draft that was submitted to OIRA for 

review. 

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Y. Is tral1.lpareficy essential to the legitimacy of the OIRA review process? 

ANSWER: Yes. The Federal rulemaking process has a strong foundation in transparency as 

evidenced by the notice and comment process set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. In 

addition, the Administration's Open Government etforts have focused on increasing the 

openness of the rulemaking process. For example, the Administration launched a regulatory 

review dashboard at and OIRA has issued memoranda in recent years, such as 

Inc:n=.,!sing OJ)~nne<;sin pro~.e,ss_ -Trm:ll:ovjngEI(;qfollicDllckel§ and 111~r,asing 

Openness ill th~.Rl!lcmllkingI)rocess .. JJ,s~QfR.egtJliltion. Idernificjlti()n Nlll1lb.cr 

10. Please explain the difference between OIRAjiJrmal review o/rules and the il?jiJrmal 

review o/rules that OIRA conducts prior to itsjiJrmal review, 

ANSWER: When OIRA is formally reviewing a rule, OIRA conducts interagency review 

according to the procedures set forth in E.O. 12866 and E.O. 13563, and the public can track the 

status of the review on OIRA's website at h.ttp:i/,y,,,,vregillfo,g()v. Of course, before rules come 

in for fonnal review, agencies and OIRA may consult with each other or otherwise discuss a rule 

that will come to OIRA at some point in the future. 

11. Some believe that agencies mllst request and obtain permission/rom 01RA be/ore 01RA 

accepts an agency's rule /orjiJrmal review. Is this true? Ifso, please explain. 

ANSWER: Agencies often have discussions with OlRA about the content of regulations they 

are considering sending to OIRA for interagency review. In order to ensure that OIRA, other 

offices within the Executive Office ofthe President, and other interested Federal agencies have 

sufficient time and resources to properly review a rule, we do also sometimes discuss with 

agencies the sequencing of the submission of their various rulemakings. 

12. Are "return letters" and "prompt letters" a good or bad idea? 

ANSWER: I believe that returning rules to agencies according to the provisions of Executive 

Order 12866 is one of many ways in which the Administrator of OIRA can help ensure that 

agency rules comply with the law, the relevant Executive Orders, and O:MB Circular A-4. At the 

same time, I believe in having a collaborative relationship with the agencies and that such letters 

are usually not necessary. 

13. What impact has sequestration had 011 your agency? 

ANSWER: We would refer you to OMB' s previous statements about the significant, negative 

impacts of sequestration. OMB had the highest number offurlough days as a result of 

sequestration. In total, OMB staff were furloughed for 8 days. We would note that the bipartisan 

appropriations bill represents a positive step forward It adheres to the funding levels in the 

9 
104 

budget agreement enacted in December 2013, and unwinds some of the damaging cuts caused by 

sequestration. 

1-1. Whal impacl has sequeslralion had ollihe abilily of agencies 10 promulgale rules? 

ANSWER: We would refer you to the agencies themselves for specific questions about the 

impact of sequestration on their ability to develop and issue rules, but in general, sequestration 

had a signiticant negative impact on many core Government functions. 

15. Can (JlRA override the safety determination of an agency based on an adverse costbenefit analysis? 

ANSWER: When developing rules, both E.O. 12866 and E.O. 13563 require the agencies, to the 

extent permitted by law, to propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 

that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefIts and costs are difficult to 

quantify). OIRA does not "override" authority granted by law to a department or agency, and 

the extent to which an agency is authorized or required to take balancing factors such as costs 

into account is defined by Congress through an agency's statutory authority. 

16. If Congress direcls an agency 10 improve safety by regulating an activity, may Ihal 

agency decline (or can OJRA direct the agency to decline) to regulate in that area hased 

on cost considerations? 

ANSWER: Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 clearly state that nothing in the orders should be 

construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by law to a department or agency. 

If Congress properly directs an agency to issue a regulation, it must do so. 

17. If Congress direcls all agency 10 lake .specijicji.lclors, excluding cosls, inlo accoulIl in 

promulgaling a rule, alld Ihe agency delermines Ihal Iheseji.lclors warranl a cerlain 

regulatOlyoutcome, may OJRA or the agency nevertheless consider cost? 

ANSWER: As discussed in question 16, nothing in E.O. 12866 orE.O. 

13563 should be construed to impair or otherwise atfect the authority granted by law to a 

department or agency. If Congress requires the agencies to take specific factors into account in 

promulgating the rule, and specifically prohibits consideration of costs, the agencies follow the 

law. 

OIRA expects the agencies, however, to complete a cost-benefit analysis as required by the 

Executive Orders, because a good regulatory analysis is designed to infonn the public and other 

parts of the Government of the effects of the chosen regulatory approach and its alternatives. In 

addition, OIRA is required to report to Congress on the costs and benefits of maj or 

10 
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Federal regulations, pursuant to Section 624 of the Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act of2001, also known as the Regulatory-Right-to-Know Act. Providing the 

public with information on the costs and benefits of a regulatory action provides transparency, 

and allows for a more complete understanding of the consequences of the regulatory action. 

I ii. In response to a Congressional directive to enhance safety, mayan agency move jonvard 

with a safety rule even in the absence (if a po.IHive cost-ben~ftt analysis? 

ANSWER: Please see the responses to Question 16 and 17. 

19. When developing regulations, should agencies view cost-benefit analysis as decisive or 

delerminative whereby no regulation can be adopted if its costs do nol exceed its henefits 

or should such analysis play all informalil'e role in comhinalion with olher analyses Ihal 

agenciespeljimn when developillg rules? 

ANSWER: As OMB's Regulatory Analysis Guidance (Circular A-4) explains, regulatory 

anal ysis is a tool agencies use to anticipate and evaluate the likely consequences of rules. The 

motivation behind the analysis is to learn if the benefits of an action are likely to justify the costs, 

or discover which of various possible alternatives would be the most cost effective. Agencies 

often develop and use other analyses in developing rules, such as risk assessments and other 

scientitic and technological information. E.O. 13563 requires that each agency ensure the 

objectivity of any scientific and technological information and processes used to support a 

regulatory action. 

20. With re,lpeclto HR. 2122, Ihe "RegulaIO/y Accountahilily Act," should all agencies he 

required to adopt the least costly regulalion, even when alternative I'ersirms of the 

regulation would provide mllch greater benefits at ollly a slighter higher cost? 

ANSWER: EO. 13563 states that each agency should "select, in choosing among alternative 

regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential 

economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; 

and equity)." The Administration continues to believe this is the right way to choose among 

alternative ret,'lliatory approaches. 

21. Cass SUl1steill, ill a 2002 article, argued that cost-henefit analysis can "sometimes 

produce an illusion of certainty. ,. He observed that the ':false promise" of cost-benefit 

analysis can "produce bottom lines to be mechanically applied by regulatory agencies. ,,1 

Whal are your Ihoughls ahoul Mr. Sunstein's ohservations? 

1 Cass Sunstein,Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Ceo. L.J. 2255, 2258 (2002). 

11 
106 

f 

ANSWER: I, like fonner Administrator Sunstein before me, believe that cost-benefit analysis 

can be a useful tool when applied thoughtfully. OMB's Circular A-4, which sets out guidance to 

agencies on conducting sound and informative regulatory analyses, recognizes that benefit-cost 

analysis is a tool regulatory agencies use to anticipate and evaluate the likely consequences of 

rules. The Circular states that it may not always be possible to express in monetary units all of 

the important benefits and costs, and explains how agencies should take non-quantified benefits 

and costs into account. Circular A-4 also includes a section that directs agencies to consider and 

describe the significant sources of uncertainty in their estimates. A regulatory impact analysis 

prepared under the guidance of Circular A-4 can therefore set out a balanced assessment of the 

impacts of a proposed acti on. 

We believe OMB's Executive Orders and Circulars acknowledge that cost-benefit analysis is not 

a merely mechanical exercise. It may not always be possible to express in quantitative and 

monetary units all the important impacts of a chosen regulatory approach. 

22. Under what circumstances is a proposed rule withdrawn? Is a public explanation 

prol'idedwhen a rule is withdrawn? 

ANSWER: An agency might elect to withdraw a rule from OIRA review for any number of 

reasons. For example, the agency might determine that it has additional analytical work to 

complete before moving ahead with a rule. The question of whether to provide an explanation 

for the withdrawal is a matter for agency discretion, and depends on the circumstances of the 

particular rule. As part ofOIRA's commitment to transparency, OIRA's website, 

www.reginfo.gov, records the fact that the rule was withdrawn and the date on which the 

withdrawal took place. 

23. Could YOII please identify any ways in which OlRA review of rulemakings cOllld be made 

more Iral1.lparenl? 

ANSWER: OIRA will continue to work with agencies on improving the rulemaking process. 

OIRA already follows a number of transparency procedures; for example, when a rule is under 

review at OIRA, the fact of the review and the status of the review (pending or concluded) is 

disclosed on the OlRA website. In addition, whenever a member of the public meets with OlRA 

on a rule under review, the fact of the meeting and the names of the participants are disclosed on 

the OIRA website. 

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Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable C. Boyden Gray, 

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to allow public participation in rulemaking,5 and to simplity and harmonize 

"redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping regulations."· (That E.O. reaffirmed 

President Clinton's Executive Order 12866, which in turn built upon the foundation 

set by President Reagan in Executive Order 12291.) On the same day he issued that 

executive order, the President issued a memorandum "firmly committ[ingJ" his 

Administration "to eliminating excessive and unjustified burdens on small 

businesses, and to ensuring that regulations are designed with careful consideration 

of their effects, including their cumulative effects, on small businesses. ,,' The 

memorandum urged the agencies "to give serious consideration to whether and how 

it is appropriate ... to reduce regulatory burdens on small businesses, through 

increased flexibility. ,,8 And just weeks later, Cass Sunstein, President Obama's 

Administrator for the Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, followed up with 

a memorandum to the heads of agencies, reiterating and further stressing the need for 

agencies to improve public participation, cost-benefit analysis, inter-agency 

coordination, and retrospective review of burdensome, outdated regulations 9 

Unfortunately, the Administration has not practiced what it preached. 

Its agencies have shown themselves all too willing to abandon these principles when 

they interfere with the Administration's political agenda. 

Instead of responsibly weighing the costs and benefits of proposed 

regulations and carefully tailoring rules so as to minimize burdens on regulated 

entities, the Administration has tacked a staggering regulatory price tag onto the cost 

of doing business in the United States. According to the agencies' own estimates, the 

Obama Administration's regulations from 2009 through 2012 have imposed a 

combined cost of $518 billion, not including rules promulgated by independent 

agencieslO The agencies have justified these staggering costs with benefits that are 

SId. § 2; see also Memorandum on Openness and Transparency (Jan. 21, 

2009) ("[M]y Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of 

openness in Government."). 

6 Exec. Order No. 13563 § 3. 

7 Presidential Memorandum - Regulatory Flexibility, Small Business, and Job 

Creation (Jan. 18,2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/20 II 10 I 1 18/presidential-memoranda-regulatory-flexibility-small-businessand-job-cre. 

, [d. 

• Cass R. Sunstein, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 

and Agencies, and ofIndependent Regulatory Agencies (Feb. 2, 2011), available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov Isitesl default/files/omb/memoranda/20 11 Imll10.pdf. 

10 See Sam Batkins, Piling On: The Year in Regulation, American Action Forum 

(Jan. 14,2013). 

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too often illusory,1I merely incidental to the purpose of the relevant regulation/' 

derived from paternalistic limitations on free choice,l3 and, as I shall discuss below, 

incommensurate with the rules' immense costs. 

Instead of seriously assessing alternatives to direct regulation, agencies 

often fail even to question the premises on which their regulations are based, much 

less to calculate the costs and benefits of alternatives. The Affordable Care Act 

promises that "nothing in this Act (or an amendment made by this Act) shall be 

construed to require that an individual terminate ... health insurance coverage in 

which such individual was enrolled on March 23,2010."14 Despite the Department 

of Health and Human Services' recognition of "Congress's intent to preserve 

coverage that was in effect on March 23,2010,"15 the agency's grandfathering 

regulation effectuated a conscious preference for migrating individuals onto new 

Affordable Care plans. It selected the standard it did because it "permit[tedl enough 

flexibility to enable a smooth transition in the group market over time. ,,16 The agency 

offered no explanation, much less a cost-benefit analysis, for favoring migration to 

Affordable Care plans over the congressionally protected freedom to retain one's 

original plan. 

Instead of using the best available cost-benefit techniques, agencies 

tend to use whatever tools help them justify predetermined policy choices. In 

calculating the "social cost of carbon," an inter-agency working group noted that 

"[ulnder current OMB guidance contained in Circular A-4, analysis of economically 

significant ... regulations from the domestic perspective is required, while analysis 

from the international perspective is optionaI."17 Instead offoIIowing that guidance, 

however, the working group explicitly rejected it, calculating at a global level the 

11 Susan E. Dudley, OMB's Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good To Be 

True?, Regulation 26,26-28 (Summer 2013), available at 

http:// research. columbian.gwu. edu/ regulatorystudies/ sites/ default/ files/ u41 /Dudl 

ey _OMB_BC_Regulation-v36n2-4. pdf. 

12 Id. at 28-29. 

13 [d. at 29-30. 

14 42 U.S.c. § 1801l(a)(I). 

15 75 Fed. Reg. 34546. 

16Id. at 34546. 

17 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States 

Government, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of 

Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (May 2013), 

available at 

http://Vvv<w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/sociaLcosCoLcarbo 

ll_focria_20 13 _update. pdf. 

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benefits of carbon reductions, even though the relevant regulatory costs will be borne 

exclusively by domestic entities. 1" 

Instead of promoting public participation in the rulemaking process, 

the current administration has demonstrated a proclivity for regulating in the dark. 

The interagency working group's most recent estimate of the social cost of carbon 

was the product of a closed-door process that denied the public any opportunity to 

comment on the new estimate. 19 

Instead of reducing "redundant, inconsistent, [and] overlapping 

regulations," such regulations have proliferated under the current Administration. 

Take the 2012 rule governing motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and fuel 

economy standards-a joint rulemaking by the EPA and the Department of 

Transportation2o DOT faithfully implemented the 1975 Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act's non-discretionary requirement that a gallon equivalent of natural 

gas be deemed to have "a fuel content of .15 gallon of fuel" for purposes of fuel 

economy standards. 21 But EPA's greenhouse gas rule nullified the 0.15 multiplier by 

setting emissions standards that are blatantly inconsistent with it. 22 This would be 

bad enough by itself, but the Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that 

EPA had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions relied on the express 

assumption that the two agencies could "both administer their obligations and yet 

avoid inconsistency. ,,23 Despite the governing statute and DOT's implementing 

regulation, the EPA replaced the statutory formula with a much less beneficial 

"incentive" of its own-allowing a natural gas vehicle to be counted 1.6 times for 

purposes of the fleet-wide carbon dioxide emissions standard. And even that 

incentive phases outby 2022. 

Instead of eliminating unjust burdens on small businesses, the Obama 

Administration has piled on more. As calculated by the Competitive Enterprise 

181d. at 14-15. 

19 See Susan E. Dudley, et al., Public Interest Comment on Reconsideration of 

the Department of Energy's Final Rule: Energy Conservation Standards for Standby 

Mode and Off Mode for Microwave Ovens 2-3,5,9-10 (Sept. 6,2013). 

20 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 

and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 

(Oct. 15,2012). 

21 49 U.s.c. § 32905(c). 

22 See Rulemaking Comments of Boyden Gray & Associates, NHTSA-2010-

0131 and EPA-HQ-OAR-201 0-0799 Proposed Rule, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (Feb. 

13,2012). 

23 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (emphasis added). 

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Institute, the Administration's (untimely) 2012 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and 

Deregulatory Actions listed 854 rules in development that would affect small 

businesses.24 Of those, 470 were sufficiently substantial to require a Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis-more than in any other year in the past decade." 

2. You note the need for OlRA to "guard against complacent acceptance of cost-benefit 

analysis by administrative agencies." Is that especially true of the Social Cost of 

Carbon estimate given its centrality to rulemaking efforts by multiple agencies? 

Yes. The interagency working group's estimate of the social cost of 

carbon has been and will be used by multiple agencies to justify all ma=er of 

regulations that touch on greenhouse gas emissions. 

This year alone, the Department of Energy and the EPA cited the 

social cost of carbon in the following rules and proposed rules: National Emission 

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, 

and Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters 26; Energy Conservation Program: 

Energy Conservation Standards for Distribution Transformers27 ; Effluent Limitations 

Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 

Categorf'; Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for 

Standby Mode and Off Mode for Microwave Ovens29; Energy Conservation 

Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Metal Halide Lamp Fixtures30; Energy 

Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Coolers and 

Freezers3

!; Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for 

24 Wayne Crews, Congress to Mark Up Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Bill, 

OpenMarket.org: The Blog of the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Sept. 17, 2013), 

http://www.openmarket.orgI2013/09 / 17 /congress-to-mark-up-small-businessregulatory-flexibility-bill/ (citing Ten Thousand Commandments, Table 6, 

https:/ / docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ pub?key=OAiYyxLrbTl9 _dDJfSU a 1 SHIlckJ 

tMEdlUHRMZnVuSWc&output=html). 

25 ld. 

26 78 Fed. Reg. 7138-01. 

27 78 Fed. Reg. 23336-01. 

28 78 Fed. Reg. 34432-01. 

29 78 Fed. Reg. 36316-01. 

30 78 Fed. Reg. 51464-01. 

3! 78 Fed. Reg. 55782-01. 

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Commercial Refrigeration Equipment32 ; and Energy Conservation Program for 

Consumer Products: Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Furnace Fans. 33 

Because of the importance of the social cost of carbon in the costbenefit analysis of these and similar rules, the defects in the administrative process 

that resulted in the latest social cost of carbon estimate are especially grave. This list 

of regulations that depend on the social cost of carbon will only grow in the coming 

years as agencies use reductions in carbon emissions-whether intended or 

ancillary-to justify more costly regulations. For these regulations to be legitimate, 

the social cost of carbon must be determined in a process that is transparent and open 

to public comment, and the domestic costs associated with domestic regulations 

ca=ot be offset by global benefits. 

As it currently stands, the "cost of carbon" established by 

Administration fiat is utterly at odds with the prices set by mechanisms more closely 

resembling markets. In the California Air Resources Board's August 2013 auction, 

carbon allowances reached a settlement price of $12.22 per metric ton3

"; meanwhile, 

in Europe, carbon allowances are reportedly selling for just $5.99 per metric ton. 35 To 

be clear, these are not markets in the truest sense, since they are largely constructed 

by governments to (at best) imitate real markets 36 Nevertheless, even these partialmarket mechanisms-a vast improvement upon prices dictated wholly by 

regulators-result in prices far, far lower than the Administration's fiat price of $37 

per metric ton." Indeed, just this week the Financial Times reported that banks were 

fleeing the European carbon market precisely because "carbon prices have 

plummeted. "," 

32 78 Fed. Reg. 55890-01. 

3378 Fed. Reg. 64068-01. 

34 http://www.arb.ca.gov I ccl capandtradel auctionl august-20 13/results. pdf. 

35 Mathew Carr, EU, California Show China How to Avoid Carbon-Permit 

Oversupply, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 19,2013) ("4.43 euros ($5.99) today 

in Europe on ICE at 8:52 a.m."), athttp://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-11-

19 I eu-california-show-china-how-to-avoid-carbon-permit -oversupply. 

36 See, e.g., Reuters, EU this week to OK talks on helping carbon market, official says 

(Nov. 4, 2013); Pilita Clark, EU votes to prop up carbon prices on emissions trading system, 

FINANCIAL TnvlES (July 3, 2013). 

37 White House, "Refining Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon" (Nov. 1, 

2013), at http://www.whitehouse.gov Iblogl20 131 11101 Irefining-estimates-socialcost-carbon. 

38 Jim Pickard and Ajay Makan, London banks quit carbon trading, FINANCIAL 

Tnv!ES (Nov. 18,2013); see also Stanley Reed and Mark Scott, In Europe, Paid Permits 

for Pollution are Fizzling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013). 

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Responses to Questions from Ranking Member Steve Cohen 

1. Please name the principal clients that your law firm represents. 

The principal clients that my firm currently represents are: 

The Competitive Enterprise Institute 

State National Banle of Big Spring, Texas 

The State of Kansas 

The State of Montana 

The State of West Virginia 

The 60 Plus Association 

2. You mention that the cost o/regulations/or the period 0/2009 to 2012 could be as high 

as $518 billion. Please tell us what was the total amount 0/ benefits that these 

regulations generated. 

The defects in this Administration's cost-benefit methodology prevent 

an accurate calculation of the true benefits of its regulations. Susan Dudley, the 

OTRA Administrator under President George W. Bush, has cogently outlined these 

methodological deficiencies in an article titled OMB's Reported Benefits a/Regulation: 

Too Good To Be True?,9 

The vast bulk of the regulatory benefits claimed by this Administration 

come from reductions in fine particulate matter (PM,.,) and the reductions in 

premature mortality that are supposed to follow. Using PM,s as the primary 

justification for regulatory cost is rife with problems. One is that even OMB admits 

"significant uncertainty" about the causal connection between reducing PM,s and 

delaying death and about how to quantify the value of delaying death. ''"0 (Most of 

the beneficiaries ofPM,.5 reductions are octogenarians, and they stand to gain fewer 

than six months of additional life expectancy from PM,s levels; the estimated value of 

mortality risk reduction does not take these important facts into account. 4!) A second 

problem is that the Administration quantifies benefits for reducing PM2s even in 

places where PM2s emissions are already below the National Ambient Air Quality 

Standard-the EPA-determined acceptable level for atmospheric PM,s:' A third 

39 Dudley, supra note 11. 

4°1d. at 27. 

4! 1d. at 28. 

"2 [d. 

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problem is that many of the claimed benefits from PM" reduction (a majority in 

2012) are attributed to rules intended to solve other problems but coincidentally 

reduce PM" as well.·3 Finally, Dudley found that recent regulations purport to derive 

benefits from "allegedly saving businesses or consumers money by constraining their 

choices," without finding any market failure that wouldjustity such paternalism.-l4 

I have not attempted to recalculate the benefits of all of this 

Administration's regulations according to a fair methodology, and I am not aware of 

anyone who has attempted a comprehensive recalculation. Dudley notes that almost 

80% of the total regulatory benefits reported by OMB are attributable to three 

dubious categories of benefits: reductions of particulate matter by rules designed for 

that purpose, ancillary reductions of particulate matter by rules designed for other 

purposes, and alleged savings to businesses and consumers from rules that prevent 

their choices. If these alleged benefits were properly discounted, the costs of many 

regulations would far exceed their benefits. 

3. You state that the there is "longstanding collusion between activist groups and 

sympathetic regulators. " 

Please identify a jew verifiable examples of collusion. 

John Cruden, a former senior career official in the Department of Justice's 

Environment and Natural Resources Division for more than two decades 

during two Republican and two Democratic Administrations, testified before 

this Subcommittee in the 112'h Congress Mr. Cruden stated that he was: 

not aware of any instance of a settlement, and certainly none 

[that he] personally approved, that could remotely be described 

as "collusive." Quite the opposite: in every case of which [he 

was] aware, the Department of Justice vigorously represented 

the federal agency, defending the agency's legal position and 

obtaining in any settlement the best possible terms that were 

consistent with the controlling law. 

Was Mr. Cruden mistaken or did he make a misrepresentation to Congress? 

The EPA has been party to a troubling history of regulation-throughsettlement. 45 The sue-and-settle model of rule making subverts the features of our 

43 1d. at 28-29. 

4-1 [d. at 29. 

45 See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind Closed 

Doors (May 2013), at 

http://www . uschambeLcoml sites I default/files/reports/SUEANDSETTLEREPO 

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regulatory system designed to protect against agency overreach. When the agency 

commits itself to promulgating a rule in a court-approved settlement with an 

environmental organization, it evades the notice-and-comment requirement that is 

the hallmark of American administrative law, and the protects the resulting rule from 

full judicial review, under the shield of a co urt order. 

Examples of regulations resulting from settlements between EPA and 

environmental organizations include the 2012 Utility MACT Rule,->6 the Lead 

Renovation, Repair and Painting (LRRP) Rule,"' the Oil and Natural Gas MACT 

Rule,"' and the Florida Nutrient Standards for Estuaries and Flowing Waters 49 The 

Chamber of Commerce has catalogued many other regulations resulting from sue 

and settle cases. 50 

I do not know whether Mr. Cruden was involved in any of these cases 

or whether he was otherwise aware of the settlements, so I cannot comment on Mr. 

Cruden's knowledge when he testified before this Subcommittee. I will note that 

even where all parties genuinely believe that a closed-door settlement results in the 

"best possible terms," that result comes at a high cost-the loss of transparency and a 

meaningful opportunity for public notice and comment, and an insulation of the 

resulting regulation from review by the Office of Management and Budget. A 

backroom deal does not cease to be collusive simply because the parties involved 

think they are achieving laudable goals. 

4. Does OIRA have adequate resources to fulfill its responsibilities? 

T do not have first-hand knowledge of OTRA's resources, but at a 

public event on cost-benefit analysis hosted by NYU Law's Institute for Policy 

Integrity, persons familiar with OIRA's work indicated that the office is short-staffed 

to a degree that affects its ability to fulfill its important role as the executive branch's 

check on agency overreach. 

RT-FinaJ.pdf. 

46 77 Fed. Reg. 9304. 

47 75 Fed. Reg. 24802. 

48 77 Fed. Reg. 49490. 

49 See Federal Nutrient Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida's 

Estuaries, Coastal Waters, and South Florida Inland Flowing Waters (Coastal Rule), 

http://water.epa.gov Ilawsregs/rulesregs/florida_coastal.cfm ("The Consent Decree 

deadline for the final numeric water quality criteria ... is September 30, 2013.). 

50 U.s. CRANIBER OF COMMERCE, SUE AND SETTLE: REGULATING BEHIND 

CLOSED DOORS 30 (2013), available at 

http://vrww.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports 

ISUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf. 

BOYDEN GRAY & ASSOCIATES PLLC 

16271 STREET, NW, SUITE 950· WASHINGTON, DC 20006 
116 

House Judiciary Committee 

November 5,2013 

Page 10 

5. Hypothetically, if a consent decree pertains to air quality standards under the Clean Air 

Act, should anyone who breathes air be allowed to intervene in an underlying civil 

action pertaining to such standards and be heard on such decree? 

I do not believe that merely breathing air qualifies an individual to 

intervene in any case involving Clean Air Act regulation pursuant to a consent 

decree. Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

That rule gives a mandatory right of intervention to anyone who "claims an interest 

relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 

situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 

movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent 

that interest." 

In most cases, the EPA, which is the agency charged with 

administering the Clean Air Act is competent to represent the interests of individuals 

whose only interest is limited to the general public interest in breathing clean air. But 

entities with a specific interest in the subject matter of these sue-and-settle cases, 

including businesses that would be affected by regulations that come about as a result 

of consent decrees, should be given a reasonable opportunity to intervene in these 

cases. The agency that is a party to such a case should be required to publish notice 

of a proposed consent decree a reasonable time before it is filed "tith the court. 

6. Unfortunately, proponents o/regulatory rejiJrm and those who oppose anti-regulatory 

initiatives appear to be at polar opposites on various issues. 

What role could the Administrative Conforence of the United States play with respect to 

these issues? 

The non-partisan character of the Administrative Conference of the U ruted 

States makes it uniquely competent to mediate between divergent opinions about the 

proper direction of administrative law. As I testified before this Subcommittee in 

2004 concerning the reauthorization of the Administrative Conference, through the 

years, the Conference was a valuable resource providing information on the 

efficiency, adequacy and fairness of the administrative procedures used by 

administrative agencies in carrying out their programs. S1 

The Conference's success was based in large part on the breadth of its 

volunteer membership and in its reliance on empirical research by academics to 

ensure that its recommended improvements to the administrative process were based 

in fact and not ideology. As I testified in 2004, for "over a quarter century the 

51 Reauthorization of the Administrative Conforence of the United States: Hearing 

Be/ore the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law 0/ the House Comm. on the 

Judiciary, 108th Congo (2004), available at 

http://judiciary.house.gov /legacy /93 774.PDF. 

BOYDEN GRAY & ASSOCIATES PLLC 

16271 STREET, NW, SUITE 950· WASIDNGTON, DC 20006 
117 

f 

House Judiciary Committee 

November 5,2013 

Page 11 

Administrative Conference of the United States has maintained a reputation for nonpartisan, expert evaluation of administrative processes and recommendations for 

improvements to those processes. It had no power but the power to persuade, and no 

political constituency other than those interested in improving administrative 

government. ,,52 

The Conference's work in some cases resulted in bipartisan legislation to 

improve the legislative process. For example, both the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 

1990 and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act were the product of the 

Conference's work, both in terms of the studies and reports that underlay the 

justification for these two laws and also in terms of the interested persons and 

agencies brought together to support the law. 

I believe that the Conference remains a valuable resource for the reform of 

our regulatory system. As it was in the past, the Conference is well equipped to look 

beyond anti-regulatory and pro-regulatory labels to find empirically grounded 

solutions to the challenges of the modem administrative state. 

Sincerely, 

C. Boyden Gray 

BOYDEN GRAY & ASSOCIATES PLLC 

52 [d. at 61. 

BOYDEN GRAY & ASSOCIATES PLLC 

16271 STREET, NW, SUITE 950· WASIDNGTON, DC 20006 
118 

Response to Questions for the Record from Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor 

at NYU School of Law; Senior Advisor, Podesta Group 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

Hearing on 

The Oftice ofTnfonnation and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory Refonn 

September 30,2013 

Questions for the Record 

OUESTIONS FOR SALLY KATZEN 

Questions from Ranking Member Steve Cohen 

I. One of the principal arguments proponents of so-called regulatory reform make is the 

claim that regulations "kill jobs" and "bury businesses in red tape." 

What is your response? 

Are you aware of any evidence supporting these allegations? 

Answer: 

Although the allegation of "job-killing regulations" is often repeated, there is very little credible 

evidence that support such claims. 

OMB's 20 II Report to Congress summarized the literature on the relationship between 

regulations and jobs. The takeaway is that the evidence is mixed, with some analyses finding 

layoffs and others finding hiring, and still others finding regional or sectoral shifts in 

employment opportunities. These outcomes are highly contingent on the industry, the type of 

regulation and many other factors, so they cannot (and should not) be used to support any 

general claims about regulation "killing jobs." 

An excellent conference was held by the Institute for Policy Integrity of NYU Law School in 

October 2013 and there is a new book from Coglianese, Finkel, and Carrigan, "Does Regulation 

Kill Jobs," that include materials from leading experts discussing the difticulty and 

manipulability of existing economic models designed to answer this question. 

2. Does OTRA have adequate resources to fulfill its responsibilities? 

Answer: 

No. OTRA (and OMB generally) have inadequate resources to fulfill its responsibilities; its staff 

has been reduced over the past years while its responsibilities have increased. 

J. Do agencies exaggerate benetlts and minimize costs as Mr. Gray appears to argue? 
119 

Answer: 

There have been many (contlicting) assertions about the accuracy of ex alile estimates of costs 

and benefits, even though there are very few studies of the issue and those studies yield a mixed 

picture. My review of the literature suggests that agencies do not "exaggerate benetlts and 

minimize costs." To the contrary, agencies typically overstate actual costs, because the rules, 

once adopted, produce technological advances (American ingenuity at work) or because of 

changes in the scope of the rules (either through revisions to the rule or enforcement discretion). 

The variations in compliance (and enforcement) can also lead to an overstatement of benefits. So 

far as 1 am aware, however, there is no systematic choice by agencies to misrepresent either the 

costs or the benetlts of a rule. 

4. You discuss in your prepared testimony the benefits of having a "Regulatory Plan." 

Please elaborate. 

Answer: 

In my prepared testimony, I mentioned the Regulatory Plan, which is a piece of the existing 

regulatory apparatus, that could be used to address one of the concerns about OIRA's traditional 

focus on each proposal as a separate transaction - namely, the cumulative impact of multiple 

proposed or tlnal rules from a single agency or multiple proposed or final rules trom multiple 

agencies on a particular sector of the economy. Because the agencies are required to provide 

OIRA (and other Executive Branch agencies and oftlces) a brief description of the regulatory 

actions they are expecting to focus on during the upcoming year, this Plan can serve not only as 

an advanced notice to the public (its intended purpose), but also as an analytical tool to explore 

the cumulative impact of the regulatory agenda. 

5. Mr. Morrall appears to believe that politics and economics influence the rulemaking 

process. He recommends that the OIRA Administrator should "insulate the economic 

analysis and recommendations trom politics as much as legally feasible." 

Answer: 

Could this initiative potentially impede the ability of these agencies to promptly 

respond to imminent risks or crises? 

OIRA has traditionally conducted its review of the economic analysis separate trom any other 

consideration so it can produce "the facts ma'am, just the facts," in the immortal words of 

Sargent Friday on Dragnet. But the economic analysis, while incredibility informative, is not 

dispositive in the review of a proposal or draft final rule for a variety of reasons, including that 

there may be costs or benetlts that cannot be quantified and monetized, there may be significant 

variability in the data or significant uncertainties, or there may be distributional aspects of the 

rule that should not be ignored, to name a few. So once you have the economic analysis, it is 

essential to consider the policy considerations. When describing the process, I use the term 

"policy" rather than "politics" because the latter term sometimes carries a negative connotation 

not related to substance whereas "policy" implicitly includes substantive considerations. 
120 

f 

Tn any event, if the Administrator ofOTRA, who is after all a political appointee (nominated by 

the President and confirmed by the Senate), to decide to decline to entertain policy 

considerations along with the economic analysis, there could b a number of unintended adverse 

effects, including occasions when agencies could not promptly respond to imminent risks or 

cnses. 
121 

Response to Questions for the Record from John F. Morrall, III, 

Affiliated Senior Scholar, Mercatus Center, George Mason University 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law 

Hearing on 

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Federal Regulations and Regulatory Reform 

September 30, 2013 

Questions for the Record 

Answers for OUESTIONS FOR JOHN MORRALL 

Submitted November 20, 2013 

Questions from Snbcommittee Chairman Spencer Bachns 

In your written testimony, you mention two rulemakings for which improved analysis 

might have avoided significant national harms. Can you elaborate on those? 

Answer: The two rulemakings T mentioned were HIJD's regulation implementing 

Affordable Housing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSE's) and EPA's 

Renewable Fuel Standards. Both programs mandated progressively tighter annual quotas 

for firms to meet that although well intentioned had drastic unintended consequences. 

Better analysis and in particular closer attention to market forces could have reduced the 

signiticant hanns to our economy that resulted from the arbitrary quotas. Tn 2004 HUD 

set mortgage quotas for low income borrowers that the GSE's had to meet for the years 

2005 to 2008 that relied on subprime mortgages without carefully analyzing safety and 

soundness concerns or impact of defaults on the national economy. Its RIA actually 

estimated that there would be a $180 million transfer from the GSE's and lenders to the 

borrowers. In 2007 EPA set its biofuel blending quotas in absolute terms from 2007 and 

beyond without regard to the actual demand for gasoline. Its RTA assumed that the quotas 

would not be binding or signiticantly impact com and other agricultural prices, The well 

recognized harms these reb'lliations caused subsequently led to corrective reb'lliatory 

actions, Congress transferred HUD' s authority to set affordable housing goals and 

timetables to a new agency and EPA has recently proposed to reduce renewable fuel 

standards for 2014. 

2, Tn your view, how etfective have agencies been in conducting retrospective reviews to 

identify and eliminate outdated or unnecessary reb'lliations? 

Answer: Understandably, agencies have great difficulty in objectively evaluating their 

own programs and regulations, Moreover, although there is widespread support for the 

concept of retrospective regulatory review, any specific existing regulation will often 

have strong supportive interests from those who benefit as well as those who have 

already borne the costs while broad and diverse interest that may benefit from its removal 

tend not be well organized. All Presidents since 1981 have had formal retrospective 

review programs that in my view had little success beyond tinkering along the edges with 

the exception of the 1981 to 1983 program, It succeeded partly because it was the first, 

closely overseen by a White House Task force led by Vice President and the 
122 

Administrator of OIRA, and it took place during a severe economic crisis. Clearly 

strong and independent agency oversight is needed for effective retrospective review 

J. Based on your experience at OTRA, do you think OTRA should have given more scrutiny 

to the Admini strati on's update to the Social Cost of Carbon? Tf so, how? What 

opportunities might be available for OIRA to revisit the issue for greater analysis and 

transparency? 

Answer: My understanding is that OlRA was involved but so were 10 other agencies 

including four other White House agencies so it is not clear how much additional OTRA 

scrutiny would have improved the estimates. Tn any case, the Administrator of OTRA has 

recently called for a notice and public comments on revised estimates. My concern with 

Social Cost of Carbon estimates is that they diverge from the b'llidance in OMB Circular 

A-4 by not including a 7% discount rate as required by the Circular and used in other 

RIAs and by including global benefit estimates because "Even if the United States were 

to reduce its greenhouse gas emi ssions to zero, that step would be far from enough to 

avoid substantial climate change" and using global estimates might help persuade other 

countries (read China) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

Questions from Ranking Member Steve Cohen 

I. Sally Katzen recommends that agencies be encouraged to develop a "Regulatory Plan" as 

provided in section 4 of Executive Order 12866. 

What are your thoughts about this suggestion? 

Answer: I agree with my former boss and wonder why OlRA has not published one for 

2013 as required by EO 12866. 

2. Should the role of OIRA be that of a "gatekeeper" or a "collaborator"? 

Answer: In my experience, OlRA best performed its good government role when it 

served as a "gatekeeper" for quality Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) that accompany 

major regulations. Tn addition it plays an important collaborator role by facilitating and 

organizing agency and especially White House Otlices comments on specific regulatory 

actions. 

Should cost-benefit analysis be determinative or informative when agencies develop 

regulations? 

Answer: It is well recognized by economist and policy analysts that cost-benefit is not 

determinative but an information tool to aid in organizing relevant evidence for decision 

makers. EO 12866 and OMB Circular A-4 both make this clear and list other relevant 

considerations besides costs and benefits that should be examines in an RIA such as 

impacts on distributional equity and basic civil rights. When these other consideration 
123 

f 

are paramount, cost-benefit analysis can often show the most cost-effective alternative to 

meet the goals of the regulatory action 

4. Can cost-benetlt analysis "sometimes produce an illusion of certainty," as former OTRA 

Administrator Cass Sun stein wrote in 200n 

Answer: Yes, if improperly performed. OMB Circular A-4 provides guidance on costbenefit analysis that emphasizes the importance of taking into account uncertainty through such 

methods as ranges, sensitivity analysis and formal uncertainty analysis such as Monte Carlo 

simulations for regulations of over a billion dollars of impact. But practitioners often emphasize 

one estimate that can lend an illusion of uncertainty. For example, the Administrator ofOTRA 

recently wrote in a White House Blog that the Administration was lowering the cost of carbon 

estimate used in regulatory analysis from $38 per metric ton (an estimate made in May 2013) to 

$37 per metric ton for 2015. 10 the past OlRA had used broad ranges to emphasize uncertainty 

for key values used in cost-benefit analysis. For example, Circular A-4 issued in 2003 

recommended that a range of values of $1 million to $10 million should be used in estimating the 

economic value of regulations that may prolong life. 
124 

Response to Questions for the Record from Nicole Riley, Virginia State 

Director, National Federation of Independent Business 
125 

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