Safety Culture 

Common Language

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-2165
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Safety Culture 

Common Language

Manuscript Completed: February 2014

Date Published: March 2014

Prepared by: 

Molly Keefe1

, Ronald Frahm1, 

Kamishan Martin1, Rebecca Sigmon1, 

Undine Shoop1, Stephanie Morrow2 

Diane Sieracki2

, Ray Powell3, 

Scott Shaeffer4, Jack Rutkowski5, 

and Eric Ruesch6

1

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

2

Office of Enforcement

3

Region I

4

Region II

5

Region III

6

Region IV

Molly Keefe, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-2165

 

iii

ABSTRACT

The importance of a healthy nuclear safety culture has been demonstrated by a number of 

significant events in the United States and throughout the world. Use of consistent definitions 

and terms to describe a model safety culture is a first step in ensuring consistent development, 

implementation, and monitoring of safety culture. This report documents the outcomes of public 

workshops to develop a common language to describe safety culture in the nuclear industry. 

These workshops, held in December 2011, April 2012, November 2012, and January 2013, 

included panelists from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the nuclear power 

industry, and the public. This report presents a suggested common language, agreed upon by 

NRC staff and the nuclear industry for classifying and grouping traits and attributes of a healthy

nuclear safety culture.

v

FOREWORD

The information in this report has been developed solely for informational purposes. It is not a 

statement of policy. It describes the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff’s 

implementation of the Commission’s Safety Culture Policy Statement (76 FR 34773). The NRC 

staff intends to use the agreed-upon common language in this document to implement elements 

of its programs that provide oversight of regulated activities. Parts of the common language are 

being incorporated into the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for operating nuclear reactors.

Any changes to oversight programs, including the ROP, will be documented in their associated 

Inspection Manual Chapters and Inspection Procedures. 

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................iii

FORWARD ................................................................................................................................ v

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ..............................................................................................................ix

ACRONYMS..............................................................................................................................xi

1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 1

2 SAFETY CULTURE COMMON LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.............................................. 3

3 EXPLANATION OF TERMS .......................................................................................... 5

3.1 Terms............................................................................................................................. 5

3.2 Relationships among Roles ............................................................................................ 6

4 TRAITS, ATTRIBUTES, AND EXAMPLES.................................................................... 7

4.1 Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA).................................................................... 7

4.2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI).....................................................................11

4.3 Personal Accountability (PA) .........................................................................................13

4.4 Work Processes (WP) ...................................................................................................15

4.5 Continuous Learning (CL)..............................................................................................17

4.6 Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)........................................................................19

4.7 Effective Safety Communication (CO) ...........................................................................21

4.8 Respectful Work Environment (WE) ..............................................................................23

4.9 Questioning Attitude (QA)..............................................................................................25

4.10 Decision making (DM) ...................................................................................................27

5 REFERENCES..............................................................................................................29

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors of this report thank the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff members, 

industry representatives, and members of the public who participated in the four public 

workshops to develop this Safety Culture Common Language. We appreciate the willingness 

shown by all parties to work collaboratively to build consensus around a common language.

xi

ACRONYMS

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations

FR Federal Register

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

ROP Reactor Oversight Process

SCPS Safety Culture Policy Statement

SCWE safety-conscious work environment

1 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has long recognized the importance of a 

healthy nuclear safety culture. In 1989, in response to an incident at the Peach Bottom Nuclear 

Power Plant, the NRC issued a “Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant 

Operations” [1], which described the NRC’s expectation that licensees place appropriate 

emphasis on safety in the operation of nuclear power plants. That policy statement placed an 

emphasis on the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity 

that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants. Additionally, the policy statement 

underscored management’s responsibility for fostering the development of a healthy safety 

culture at each facility and for providing a professional working environment in the control 

room—and throughout the facility—to ensure safe operations. 

In 1996, following an incident at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station in which workers were 

retaliated against for whistleblowing, the Commission issued another policy statement, 

“Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns without Fear of 

Retaliation” [2]. This policy statement described the NRC’s expectation that all NRC licensees 

establish a safety-conscious work environment. A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) 

is described as an environment in which workers feel free to raise safety concerns without fear 

of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination. Such a safety-conscious work 

environment continues to be an important attribute of a healthy nuclear safety culture. 

In 2002, investigations into the discovery of degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head at

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station revealed that safety culture weaknesses were a root cause 

of the event. The NRC took significant steps within the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to 

strengthen the agency’s ability to detect potential safety culture weaknesses during inspections 

and performance assessments. Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13, “Information on the 

Changes Made to the Reactor Oversight Process To More Fully Address Safety Culture” [3],

was issued on July 31, 2006, to provide information to nuclear power reactor licensees on the 

revised ROP. Most notably, the NRC revised the existing cross-cutting areas of human 

performance, problem identification and resolution, and safety-conscious work environment to 

incorporate aspects that are important to safety culture. The intent of the revisions to the ROP 

was threefold:

(1) To provide better opportunities for the NRC staff to consider safety culture weaknesses 

and to encourage licensees to take appropriate actions before significant performance 

degradation occurs.

(2) To provide the NRC staff with a process to determine the need to specifically evaluate a

licensee’s safety culture after performance problems have resulted in the placement of a

licensee in the degraded cornerstone column of the action matrix.

(3) To provide the NRC staff with a structured process to evaluate the licensee’s safety 

culture assessment and to independently conduct a safety culture assessment for a 

licensee in the multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone column of the action matrix.

In 2004, also in response to events at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, the Institute for 

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) published a document titled, “Principles for a Strong Nuclear 

Safety Culture” [4], which described principles and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture 

as developed by an industry advisory group. In 2009, in partnership with the Nuclear Energy 
2

Institute (NEI) and INPO, the nuclear power industry began a voluntary initiative to enhance 

safety culture. The process for monitoring and improving safety culture used INPO’s principles 

and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture as a framework and was described in the 

document NEI 09-07, “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture” [5].

In 2008, at the direction of the Commission, the NRC staff began an effort to expand the 

Commission’s safety culture policy to address the unique aspects of security and ensure 

applicability to all licensees and certificate holders. The NRC engaged in a unique collaborative 

effort with stakeholders, including Agreement States, to develop a definition of nuclear safety 

culture and a list of traits that describe that safety culture. The goal of this effort was to develop

a model that could be applied to any of the diverse stakeholders responsible for the safe and 

secure use of nuclear materials. The final NRC Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS) was 

published on June 14, 2011 [6]. This SCPS provides the NRC’s expectation that individuals and 

organizations performing regulated activities establish and maintain a healthy safety culture that 

recognizes the safety and security significance of their activities and the nature and complexity 

of their organizations and functions. Because safety and security are the primary pillars of the 

NRC’s regulatory mission, consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with 

their significance, is an underlying principle of the SCPS. 

The SCPS applies to all licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, authorization holders, 

holders of quality assurance program approvals, vendors and suppliers of safety-related 

components, and applicants for a license, certificate, permit, authorization, or quality assurance 

program approval subject to NRC authority. In addition, the Commission encourages the 

Agreement States (i.e., States that have signed formal agreements with the NRC to assume 

regulatory responsibility over certain nuclear materials within their borders), their licensees, and 

other organizations interested in nuclear safety to support the development and maintenance of 

a healthy safety culture within their regulated communities.

The SCPS defines nuclear safety culture as the core values and behaviors resulting from a 

collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to 

ensure protection of people and the environment. The SCPS also includes a list of traits further 

defining a healthy safety culture. The SCPS notes that these traits describe patterns of thinking, 

feeling, and behaving that emphasize safety, particularly in goal conflict situations (e.g., safety 

considerations given precedence over concerns about production, schedule, and the cost of the 

effort). The SCPS notes that these traits are not all-inclusive. Some organizations may find that 

one or more of the traits are particularly relevant to their activities. There may also be traits not 

included in the SCPS that are important in a healthy safety culture. 
3

2 SAFETY CULTURE COMMON LANGUAGE INITIATIVE

The safety culture common language described in this report builds on the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) and the nuclear industry’s ongoing focus on safety culture. It 

is the result of an attempt to harmonize differences in terms that different groups have used to 

describe a healthy nuclear safety culture. In particular, this refers to the Institute for Nuclear 

Power Operations’ (INPO’s) principles and attributes of safety culture, the NRC’s safety culture 

components and aspects described in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) [7], the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety culture characteristics [8], and the safety 

culture traits in the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy Statement. This initiative is within the 

Commission-directed framework for enhancing the ROP treatment of cross-cutting areas to 

more fully address safety culture.

Before work began on the 2011 Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS), the nuclear power 

industry approached the NRC about starting an effort to develop a shared set of terms to 

describe safety culture. This effort was deferred while the SCPS was being developed. With 

insights gained during the development of the SCPS, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

(NRR) hosted a public workshop in December 2011 to begin to discuss the idea of a safety

culture common language. The public workshop included a panel of representatives from 

INPO, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), all four NRC regional offices, and several offices 

within NRC headquarters. It was open to public participation. The intent of this initiative, as 

requested by the industry, was to align terminology between the NRC’s inspection and 

assessment processes within the ROP and the industry’s assessment process as documented 

in NEI 09-07, “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.” 

During the December 2011 workshop, panelists used affinity diagraming methods to group

various safety culture terms and examples under common themes. The panel used the nine 

traits of a positive safety culture described in the SCPS as the primary themes. The panelists 

also identified an additional theme, “Decision making,” as being equally important as the nine 

SCPS traits in describing a healthy safety culture in nuclear organizations. During a subsequent 

workshop in April 2012, the panelists created and defined subcategories under each of the 

10 traits. These subcategories became the 40 attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture 

described in this report.

To assist individuals and organizations in understanding and applying the common language 

traits and attributes, the panelists reconvened in November 2012 and January 2013 to develop 

examples of each attribute and a glossary of terms to define levels of an organization. The 

examples more fully describe the values and behaviors that a nuclear organization and its 

members should demonstrate in maintaining a healthy nuclear safety culture. The common 

language was finalized during the January 2013 meeting. This report documents the agreed 

upon common language describing the traits, attributes, and examples. INPO has also 

published this common language in INPO 12-012, “Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety 

Culture” [9].

The NRC and the nuclear industry recognize continuous learning as an important trait of a 

healthy nuclear safety culture. As the NRC’s and the nuclear industry’s knowledge and 

experience continues to develop, and as research on safety culture continues, this common 

language may require revision to better describe model behaviors observable in a healthy 

nuclear safety culture.

5

3 EXPLANATION OF TERMS

3.1 Terms

Organizations have different structures and terms for organizational roles and positions. This 

listing defines terms used in this document and was developed as part of the common language 

initiative. Each organization can determine how these terms apply to its unique organizational 

structure.

Nuclear Safety Culture

The set of core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and 

individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 

environment

The Organization

The collective group of all individuals, the reporting structure, and the procedures, policies, and 

practices that individuals use to set goals and make decisions, to accomplish tasks, and to 

implement and maintain a healthy nuclear safety culture.

Individuals

All people at all levels of the organization; individuals include all leaders, individual contributors, 

and supplemental personnel.

Leaders

Individuals who influence, coach, or lead others within the organization and determine the 

vision, goals, or objectives of their teams; leaders include executives, managers, supervisors, 

and others who influence individuals in the organization.

Executives

Corporate decision makers who are responsible for setting the long-term strategic goals for the 

organization; executives develop and implement corporate policies.

Senior Managers

Those managers who are responsible for the execution of business activities, including setting 

priorities for and monitoring the performance of the organization.

Managers

Individuals assigned to managerial positions who control, direct, guide, and advise; managers 

include senior managers, and may include some supervisors.

Supervisors

Individuals who provide direction of the day-to-day activities of individual contributors; 

supervisors may include superintendents, foremen, or work group leads.

Work Groups

Groups of individuals who work collaboratively to accomplish tasks; work groups may exist at 

any level of the organization.
6

Individual Contributors

Individuals who operate individually or as members of work groups to accomplish tasks; 

individual contributors may include leaders when leaders are acting in a nonsupervisory 

capacity or are accomplishing tasks as members of a work group.

Supplemental Personnel

Individuals who accomplish work for but are not employees of the organization; supplemental 

personnel include short- and long-term contractors and individuals who are not employed by the 

organization but occasionally perform work related to nuclear safety.

Independent Oversight Organizations

Groups that independently review the performance and direction of the organization.

3.2 Relationships among Roles

Figure 3.2-1 is a graphical representation of the interrelationships among the terms defined in 

Section 3.1, as visualized by members of the common language initiative.

Figure 3.2-1 Relationships among Roles in a Hypothetical Nuclear Industry Organization
7

4 TRAITS, ATTRIBUTES, AND EXAMPLES

4.1 Leadership Safety Values and Actions (LA) 

Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors.

LA.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other 

resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. 

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining

safety and reliability.

(2) Managers ensure there are sufficient qualified personnel to maintain work hours within 

working hour guidelines during all modes of operation.

(3) Managers ensure facilities are available and regularly maintained, including physical 

improvements, simulator fidelity, and emergency facilities.

(4) Leaders ensure tools, equipment, procedures, and other resource materials are 

available to support successful work performance, including risk management tools and 

emergency equipment.

(5) Executives and senior managers ensure sufficient corporate resources are allocated to 

the nuclear organization for short- and long-term safe and reliable operation.

(6) Executives and senior managers ensure a rigorous evaluation of the nuclear safety 

implications of deferred work.

LA.2 Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in working areas of the plant 

observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from 

standards and expectations are corrected promptly.

Examples:

(1) Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, 

including contractors and supplemental personnel, such that nuclear safety is supported.

(2) Leaders from all levels in the organization are involved in oversight of work activities.

(3) Managers and supervisors practice visible leadership in the field and during safety 

significant evolutions by placing “eyes on the problem,” coaching, mentoring, reinforcing 

standards and reinforcing positive decision making practices and behaviors.

(4) Managers and supervisors discuss their observations in detail with the group they 

observed and provide useful feedback about how to improve individual performance.

(5) Managers encourage informal leaders to model safe behaviors and high standards of 

accountability.
8

LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions and Rewards: Leaders ensure incentives, sanctions, and 

rewards are aligned with nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and outcomes 

that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure disciplinary actions are appropriate, consistent, and support both 

nuclear safety and a safety conscious work environment. 

(2) Managers reward individuals who identify and raise issues affecting nuclear safety.

(3) Leaders foster an environment that promotes accountability and hold individuals 

accountable for their actions. 

(4) Managers consider the potential chilling effects of disciplinary actions and other 

potentially adverse personnel actions and take compensatory actions when appropriate.

(5) Leaders publicly praise behaviors that reflect a positive safety culture.

LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure plant priorities are aligned to 

reflect nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers reinforce nuclear safety as the overriding priority.

(2) Managers develop and implement cost and schedule goals in a manner that reinforces 

the importance of nuclear safety.

(3) Managers ensure production requirements are established, communicated, and put into 

practice in a manner that reinforces nuclear safety.

(4) Executives and senior managers use information from independent oversight 

organizations to establish priorities that align with nuclear safety.

(5) Executives and senior managers establish strategic and business plans that reflect the 

importance of nuclear safety over production.

(6) Executives and senior managers ensure corporate priorities are aligned with nuclear 

safety.

LA.5 Change Management: Leaders use a systematic process for evaluating and 

implementing change so that nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

Examples:

(1) When making decisions related to major changes, managers use a systematic process 

for planning, coordinating, and evaluating the safety impacts and potential negative 

effects on the willingness of individuals to raise safety concerns. This includes decisions

concerning changes to organizational structure and functions, leadership, policies, 

programs, procedures, and resources. 
9

(2) Executives and senior managers ensure nuclear safety is maintained when planning, 

communicating, and executing major changes.

(3) Managers maintain a clear focus on nuclear safety when implementing the change 

management process to ensure that significant unintended consequences are avoided.

(4) Managers ensure that individuals understand the importance of, and their role in, the 

change management process.

(5) Managers anticipate, manage, and communicate the effects of impending changes.

(6) Managers and supervisors actively monitor and address potential distractions from 

nuclear safety during periods of change. 

LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders clearly define roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities to ensure nuclear safety. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders ensure roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined, understood, 

and documented.

(2) Managers appropriately delegate responsibility and authority to promote ownership and 

accountability.

(3) Executives and senior managers ensure corporate managers who support the nuclear 

organization and managers at the station understand their respective roles and 

responsibilities.

(4) Recommendations and feedback from corporate governance, review boards, and 

independent oversight organizations do not override senior managers’ ultimate 

responsibility for decisions affecting nuclear safety.

LA.7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear safety is constantly 

scrutinized through a variety of monitoring techniques, including assessments of 

nuclear safety culture.

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers ensure that board members and members of 

independent oversight organizations meet with leaders and individual contributors in 

their work environments to develop an understanding of the status of the organization’s 

safety culture.

(2) Executives and senior managers obtain outside perspectives of nuclear safety through 

selection of qualified and critical independent safety review board members with diverse 

backgrounds and perspectives.

(3) Executives and senior managers use a variety of monitoring tools including employee 

surveys, self- and independent assessments, external safety review board member 
10

feedback, and employee concern investigations to regularly monitor station nuclear 

safety culture. 

(4) Leaders support and participate in candid assessments of workplace attitudes and 

nuclear safety culture, and act on issues that affect trust in management or detract from 

a healthy nuclear safety culture.

LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for safety.

Examples

(1) Leaders “walk the talk,” modeling correct behaviors, especially when resolving apparent 

conflicts between nuclear safety and production.

(2) Leaders act promptly when a nuclear safety issue is raised to ensure it is understood 

and appropriately addressed.

(3) Leaders maintain high standards of personal conduct that promote all aspects of a 

positive nuclear safety culture.

(4) Leaders demonstrate interest in plant operations and actively seek out the opinions and 

concerns of workers at all levels.

(5) Leaders encourage personnel to challenge unsafe behavior and unsafe conditions, and 

support personnel when they stop plant activities for safety reasons.

(6) Leaders motivate others to practice positive safety culture behaviors.
11

4.2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI) 

Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly 

addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance.

PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a 

low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, 

and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. 

Examples:

(1) Individuals recognize deviations from standards. 

(2) Individuals understand how to enter issues into the corrective action program.

(3) Individuals ensure that issues, problems, degraded conditions, and near misses are 

promptly reported and documented in the corrective action program at a low threshold.

(4) Individuals describe the issues entered in the corrective action program in sufficient 

detail to ensure they can be appropriately prioritized, trended, and assigned for

resolution.

PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates problems to ensure that 

resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety 

significance. 

Examples:

(1) Issues are properly classified, prioritized, and evaluated according to their safety 

significance.

(2) Operability and reportability determinations are developed, when appropriate.

(3) Apparent and root cause investigations identify primary and contributing causal factors 

as required.

(4) Extent of condition and extent of cause evaluations are completed in a timely manner, 

commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

(5) Issues are thoroughly investigated according to their safety significance.

(6) Root cause analysis is rigorously applied to identify and correct the fundamental cause 

of significant issues.

(7) The underlying organizational and safety culture contributors to issues are thoroughly 

evaluated and are given the necessary time and resources to be clearly understood.

(8) Cause analyses identify and understand the basis for decisions that contributed to 

issues.

(9) Managers conduct effectiveness reviews of significant corrective actions to ensure that 

the resolution effectively addressed the causes.
12

PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues 

in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. 

Examples:

(1) Corrective actions are completed in a timely manner.

(2) Deferrals of corrective actions are minimized; when required, due dates are extended 

using an established process that appropriately considers safety significance.

(3) Appropriate interim corrective actions are taken to mitigate issues while more 

fundamental causes are being assessed.

(4) Corrective actions resolve and correct the identified issues, including causes and extent 

of condition.

(5) Corrective actions prevent the recurrence of significant conditions adverse to quality.

(6) Trends in safety performance indicators are acted upon to resolve problems early.

PI.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective 

action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and 

common cause issues. 

Examples:

(1) The organization develops indicators that monitor both equipment and organizational 

performance, including safety culture.

(2) Managers use indicators that provide an accurate representation of performance and 

provide early indications of declining trends. 

(3) Managers routinely challenge the organization’s understanding of declining trends.

(4) Organizational and departmental trend reviews are completed in a timely manner in 

accordance with program expectations.
13

4.3 Personal Accountability (PA)

All individuals take personal responsibility for safety

PA.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance of adherence to nuclear 

standards. All levels of the organization exercise accountability for shortfalls in meeting 

standards. 

Examples:

(1) Individuals encourage each other to adhere to high standards.

 

(2) Individuals demonstrate a proper focus on nuclear safety and reinforce this focus 

through peer coaching and discussions.

(3) Individuals hold themselves personally accountable for modeling nuclear safety 

behaviors. 

(4) Individuals across the organization apply nuclear safety standards consistently. 

(5) Individuals actively solicit and are open to feedback.

(6) Individuals help supplemental personnel understand and practice expected behaviors

and actions. 

PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and demonstrate personal responsibility 

for the behaviors and work practices that support nuclear safety. 

Examples: 

(1) Individuals understand their personal responsibility to foster a professional environment, 

encourage teamwork, and identify challenges to nuclear safety.

(2) Individuals understand their personal responsibility to raise nuclear safety issues,

including those identified by others.

(3) Individuals take ownership for the preparation and execution of assigned work activities.

(4) Individuals actively participate in pre-job briefings, understanding their responsibility to 

raise nuclear safety concerns before work begins.

(5) Individuals ensure that they are trained and qualified to perform assigned work.

(6) Individuals understand the objective of the work activity, their role in the activity, and 

their personal responsibility for safely accomplishing the overall objective.
14

PA.3 Teamwork: Individuals and workgroups communicate and coordinate their 

activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is 

maintained.

Examples:

(1) Individuals demonstrate a strong sense of collaboration and cooperation in connection 

with projects and operational activities.

(2) Individuals work as a team to provide peer-checks, verify certifications and training, 

ensure detailed safety practices, actively peer coach new personnel, and share tools 

and publications.

(3) Individuals strive to meet commitments.
15

4.4 Work Processes (WP) 

The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is 

maintained.

WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, 

controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding 

priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk 

commensurate to the work. 

Examples:

(1) Work is effectively planned and executed by incorporating risk insights, job site 

conditions, and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities.

(2) The work process appropriately prioritizes work and incorporates contingency plans, 

compensatory actions, and abort criteria, as needed.

(3) Leaders consider the impact of changes to the work scope and the need to keep 

personnel apprised of work status.

(4) The work process ensures individuals are aware of plant status, the nuclear safety risks 

associated with work in the field, and other parallel station activities.

(5) Insights from probabilistic risk assessments are considered in daily work activities and 

change processes.

(6) Work activities are coordinated to address conflicting or changing priorities across the 

whole spectrum of activities contributing to nuclear safety. 

(7) The work process limits temporary modifications.

WP.2 Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains equipment within 

design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic 

and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product 

barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment. 

Examples:

(1) The work process supports nuclear safety and maintenance of design margins by 

minimizing long-standing equipment issues, preventative maintenance deferrals, and 

maintenance and engineering backlogs.

(2) The work process ensures focus on maintaining fission product barriers, 

defense-in-depth, and safety-related equipment.

(3) Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and changed only with great 

thought and care. 

(4) Safety-related equipment is operated and maintained well within design requirements.
16

WP.3 Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate and 

up-to-date documentation. 

Examples:

(1) Plant activities are governed by comprehensive, high-quality, programs, processes and 

procedures.

(2) Design documentation, procedures, and work packages are complete, thorough, 

accurate, and current.

(3) Components are labeled clearly, consistently, and accurately.

(4) The backlog of document changes is understood, prioritized, and actively managed to 

ensure quality. 

WP.4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work 

instructions. 

Examples:

(1) Individuals follow procedures.

(2) Individuals understand and use human error reduction techniques.

(3) Individuals review procedures and instructions before work to validate that they are 

appropriate for the scope of work and that required changes are completed before

implementation.

(4) Individuals manipulate plant equipment only when appropriately authorized and directed 

by approved plant procedures or work instructions.

(5) Individuals ensure the status of work activities is properly documented. 
17

4.5 Continuous Learning (CL)

Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented.

CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, 

evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely 

manner. 

Examples:

(1) There is a process to ensure a thorough review of operating experience provided by 

internal and external sources.

(2) Operating experience is effectively implemented and institutionalized through changes to 

station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs.

(3) Operating experience is used to understand equipment, operational, and industry 

challenges and adopt new ideas to improve performance. 

(4) Operating experience is used to support daily work functions with emphasis on the 

possibility that it “could happen here.”

(5) Station operating experience is shared in a timely manner. 

CL.2 Self-Assessment: The organization routinely conducts self-critical and objective 

assessments of its programs and practices. 

Examples:

(1) Self- and independent assessments, including nuclear safety culture assessments, are 

thorough and effective and used as a basis for improvements.

(2) The organization values the insights and perspectives provided through assessments.

(3) Self-assessments are performed on a variety of topics, including the self-assessment 

process itself.

(4) Self-assessments are performed at a regular frequency and provide objective, 

comprehensive, and self-critical information that drive corrective actions.

(5) Targeted self-assessments are performed when a more thorough understanding of an 

issue is required.

(6) A balanced approach of self-assessments and independent oversight is used and 

periodically adjusted based on changing needs.

(7) Self-assessment teams include individual contributors and leaders from within the 

organization, as well as from external organizations, when appropriate. 
18

CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other organizations to continuously 

improve knowledge, skills, and safety performance. 

Examples

(1) The organization uses benchmarking as an avenue for acquiring innovative ideas to 

improve nuclear safety.

(2) The organization participates in benchmarking activities with other nuclear and 

non-nuclear facilities.

(3) The organization seeks out better practices by using benchmarking to understand how 

others perform the same functions. 

(4) The organization uses benchmarking to compare station standards to the industry and 

make adjustments to improve performance.

(5) Individual contributors are actively involved in benchmarking.

CL.4 Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to 

maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety 

values. 

Examples:

(1) The organization fosters an environment in which individuals value and seek continuous 

learning opportunities.

(2) Individuals, including supplemental workers, are adequately trained to ensure technical 

competency and an understanding of standards and work requirements.

(3) Individuals master reactor and power plant fundamentals to establish a solid foundation 

for sound decisions and behaviors.

(4) The organization develops and effectively implements knowledge transfer and 

knowledge retention strategies.

(5) Knowledge transfer and knowledge retention strategies are applied to capture the 

knowledge and skill of experienced individuals to advance the knowledge and skill of 

less experienced individuals.

(6) Leadership and management skills are systematically developed.

(7) Training is developed and continuously improved using input and feedback from 

individual contributors and subject matter experts.

(8) Executives obtain the training necessary to understand basic plant operation and the 

relationships between major functions and organizations.
19

4.6 Environment for Raising Concerns (RC)

A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise 

safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination.

RC.1 Safety-Conscious Work Environment Policy: The organization effectively 

implements a policy that supports individuals’ rights and responsibilities to raise safety 

concerns, and does not tolerate harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination 

for doing so. 

Examples:

(1) Individuals feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retribution, with 

confidence that their concerns will be addressed.

(2) Executives and senior managers set and reinforce expectations for establishing and 

maintaining a safety-conscious work environment.

(3) Policies and procedures reinforce that individuals have the right and responsibility to 

raise nuclear safety concerns. 

(4) Policies and procedures define the responsibilities of leaders to create an environment in 

which individuals feel free to raise safety concerns.

(5) Policies and procedures establish the expectation that leaders will respond in a 

respectful manner and provide timely feedback to the individuals raising concerns.

(6) Leaders are trained to take ownership when receiving and responding to concerns, 

recognizing confidentiality if appropriate and ensuring the concerns are adequately 

addressed in a timely manner.

(7) Individuals are trained that behaviors or actions that could prevent concerns from being 

raised, including harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination, will not be 

tolerated, and are violations of law and policy.

(8) All claims of retaliation are investigated and any necessary corrective actions are taken 

in a timely manner, including actions to mitigate any potential chilling effect.

RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The organization effectively implements 

a process for raising and resolving concerns that is independent of line-management 

influence. Safety issues may be raised in confidence and are resolved in a timely and 

effective manner. 

Examples:

(1) Executives establish, support, and promote the use of alternative processes for raising 

concerns, and ensure corrective actions are taken.

(2) Leaders understand their role in supporting alternate processes for raising concerns.
20

(3) Processes for raising concerns or resolving differing professional opinions that are 

alternatives to the corrective action program and operate outside the influence of the 

management chain are communicated and accessible to individuals.

(4) Alternate processes are independent, include an option to raise concerns confidentially, 

and ensure these concerns are appropriately resolved in a timely manner.

(5) Individuals receive feedback in a timely manner.

(6) Individuals have confidence that issues raised will be appropriately resolved.

(7) Individuals assigned to respond to concerns have the appropriate competencies.
21

4.7 Effective Safety Communication (CO)

Communications maintain a focus on safety.

CO.1 Work Process Communications: Individuals incorporate safety communications 

in work activities. 

Examples:

(1) Communications within workgroups are timely, frequent, and accurate.

(2) Work groups and supervisors communicate work status with other work groups and 

supervisors during the performance of their work activities. 

(3) Individuals communicate with each other such that everyone has the information 

necessary to accomplish work activities safely and effectively. 

(4) Communications during shift turnovers and pre-job briefs provide information necessary 

to support nuclear safety. 

(5) Work groups integrate nuclear safety messages into daily activities and meetings. 

CO.2 Basis for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the basis for operational and 

organizational decisions is communicated in a timely manner. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders promptly communicate expected outcomes, potential problems, planned 

contingencies, and abort criteria for important operational decisions. 

(2) Leaders share information on a wide range of issues with individuals and periodically 

verify their understanding of the information.

(3) Leaders take steps to avoid unintended or conflicting messages that may be conveyed 

by operational decisions.

(4) Leaders encourage individuals to ask questions if they do not understand the basis of 

operational and management decisions.

(5) Executives and senior managers communicate the reasons for resource allocation 

decisions, including the nuclear safety implications of those decisions. 

CO.3 Free Flow of Information: Individuals communicate openly and candidly, both up, 

down, and across the organization, and with oversight, audit, and regulatory 

organizations. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders encourage free flow of information.

(2) Individuals share information openly and candidly.
22

(3) Leaders respond to individuals in an open, honest, and nondefensive manner.

(4) Individuals provide complete, accurate, and forthright information to oversight, audit, and 

regulatory organizations.

(5) Leaders actively solicit feedback, listen to concerns, and communicate openly with all 

individuals.

(6) Leaders candidly communicate the results of monitoring and assessment throughout the 

organization and with independent oversight organizations.

CO.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that 

nuclear safety is the organization’s overriding priority. 

Examples:

(1) Executives and senior managers communicate expectations regarding nuclear safety so 

that individuals understand that safety is of the highest priority.

(2) Executives and senior managers implement a strategy of frequent communication using 

a variety of tools to reinforce that nuclear safety is the overriding priority.

(3) Executives and senior managers reinforce the importance of nuclear safety by clearly 

communicating its relationship to strategic issues including budget, workforce planning, 

equipment reliability, and business plans. 

(4) Leaders communicate desired nuclear safety behaviors to individuals, including 

providing examples of how behaviors can positively or negatively affect nuclear safety. 

(5) Leaders routinely verify that communications on the importance of nuclear safety have 

been heard and understood.

(6) Leaders ensure supplemental personnel understand expected behaviors and actions 

necessary to maintain nuclear safety.
23

4.8 Respectful Work Environment (WE)

Trust and respect permeate the organization.

WE.1 Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with dignity and respect. 

Examples:

(1) The organization regards individuals and their professional capabilities and experiences 

as its most valuable asset.

(2) Individuals at all levels of the organization treat each other with dignity and respect.

(3) Individuals treat each other with respect within and between work groups.

(4) Individuals do not demonstrate or tolerate bullying or humiliating behaviors.

(5) Leaders monitor for behaviors that can have a negative impact on the work environment 

and address them promptly.

(6) Leaders ensure policies and expectations are enforced fairly and consistently for 

individuals at all levels of the organization.

(7) Individuals treat decisionmakers with respect, even when they disagree with a decision.

(8) Leaders ensure facilities are conducive to a productive work environment and 

housekeeping is maintained. 

WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged to voice concerns, provide 

suggestions, and offer questions. Differing opinions are respected. 

Examples:

(1) The organization encourages individuals to offer ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing 

opinions, and questions to help identify and solve problems.

(2) Leaders are receptive to ideas, concerns, suggestions, differing opinions, and questions.

(3) The organization promotes robust discussions, recognizing that differing opinions are a 

natural result of differences in expertise and experience.

(4) Individuals value the insights and perspectives provided by quality assurance, the 

employee concerns program, and independent oversight organizations.

WE.3 High Level of Trust: Trust is fostered among individuals and workgroups 

throughout the organization. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders promote collaboration among work groups.

(2) Leaders respond to questions and concerns in an open and honest manner.
24

(3) Leaders, sensitive to the negative impact of a lack of information, share important 

information in an open, honest, and timely manner such that trust is maintained.

(4) Leaders ensure that plant status and important work milestones are communicated 

throughout the organization.

(5) Leaders acknowledge positive performance and address negative performance promptly 

and directly with the individual involved; confidentiality is maintained as appropriate.

(6) Leaders welcome performance feedback from throughout the organization and modify 

their behavior when appropriate. 

WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflict. 

Examples:

(1) The organization implements processes to ensure fair and objective resolution of 

conflicts and differing views.

(2) Leaders ensure conflicts are resolved in a balanced, equitable, and consistent manner, 

even when outside of defined processes. 

(3) Individuals have confidence that conflicts will be resolved respectfully and professionally. 
25

4.9 Questioning Attitude (QA)

Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities in 

order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action.

QA.1 Nuclear Is Recognized as Special and Unique: Individuals understand that 

complex technologies can fail in unpredictable ways. 

Examples:

(1) The organization ensures that activities that could affect reactivity are conducted with 

particular care, caution, and oversight.

(2) Individuals recognize the special characteristics and unique hazards of nuclear 

technology including radioactive byproducts, concentration of energy in the core, and 

decay heat.

(3) Individuals recognize the particular importance of features designed to maintain critical 

safety functions, such as core and spent fuel cooling.

(4) Executives and senior managers ask probing questions to understand the implications 

and consequences of anomalies in plant conditions. 

(5) Executives and senior managers challenge managers to ensure degraded conditions are 

fully understood and appropriately resolved, especially those involving equipment 

important to nuclear safety.

QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions.

Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders reinforce expectations that individuals take the time to do the job right the first 

time, seek guidance when unsure, and stop if an unexpected condition or equipment 

response is encountered.

(2) Individuals maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs and job-site reviews to

identify and resolve unexpected conditions.

(3) Individuals challenge unanticipated test results rather than rationalize them. For 

example, abnormal indications are not automatically attributed to indication problems, 

but are thoroughly investigated before activities are allowed to continue.

(4) Individuals communicate unexpected plant responses and conditions to the control 

room.

(5) Individuals stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition, 

communicate with supervisors, and resolve the condition prior to continuing work 

activities. When appropriate, individuals consult system and equipment experts. 

(6) If a procedure or work document is unclear or cannot be performed as written, 

individuals stop work until the issue is resolved.
26

QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge assumptions and offer opposing 

views when they think something is not correct. 

Examples:

(1) Leaders solicit challenges to assumptions when evaluating nuclear safety issues.

(2) Individual contributors ask questions to fully understand the bases of operational and 

management decisions that appear to be contrary to nuclear safety.

(3) Managers question assumptions, decisions, and justifications that do not appear to 

sufficiently consider impacts to nuclear safety. 

QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of 

mistakes, latent problems, or inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes.

Examples:

(1) The organization is aware that latent conditions can exist, addresses them as they are 

discovered, and considers the extent of the conditions and their causes. 

(2) Before authorizing work, individuals verify procedure prerequisites are met rather than 

assume they are met based on general plant conditions.

(3) Individual contributors perform a thorough review of the work site and planned activity 

every time work is performed rather than relying on past successes and assumed 

conditions.

(4) Leaders ensure specific contingency actions are discussed and understood during job 

planning and pre-job briefs. 

(5) Individuals consider potential undesired consequences of their actions before performing 

work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools. 
27

4.10 Decision making (DM)

Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are systematic, rigorous, and thorough.

DM.1 Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make 

decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. 

Examples:

(1) The organization establishes a well-defined decision making process, with variations 

allowed for the complexity of the issue being decided.

(2) Individuals demonstrate an understanding of the decision making process and use it 

consistently. 

(3) Leaders seek inputs from different work groups or organizations as appropriate when 

making safety- or risk-significant decisions.

(4) When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, leaders 

re-evaluate these decisions to ensure they remain appropriate. 

(5) The organization uses the results of effectiveness reviews to improve future decisions. 

DM.2 Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making practices that emphasize 

prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined 

to be safe to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. 

Examples:

(1) Managers ensure that conservative assumptions are used when determining whether 

emergent or unscheduled work can be conducted safely.

(2) Leaders take a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when information 

is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

(3) Leaders consider long-term consequences when determining how to resolve emergent 

concerns.

(4) Managers take timely action to address degraded conditions commensurate with their 

safety significance.

(5) Executives and senior managers reinforce the expectation that the reactor will be shut 

down when procedurally required, when the margin for safe operation has degraded 

unacceptably, or when the condition of the reactor is uncertain. Managers implement 

this expectation.

(6) Individuals do not rationalize assumptions for the sake of completing a task. 
28

DM.3 Accountability for Decisions: Single-point accountability is maintained for 

nuclear safety decisions. 

Examples:

(1) The on-shift licensed operators have the authority and responsibility to place the plant in 

a safe condition when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions.

(2) A designated, on-shift licensed senior reactor operator has the authority and 

responsibility to determine equipment operability.

(3) Managers maintain single-point accountability for important safety decisions.

(4) The organization ensures that important nuclear safety decisions are made by the 

correct person at the lowest appropriate level.
29

5 REFERENCES

[1] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1989). Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear 

Power Plant Operations. Federal Register Notice 54 FR 3424. 

[2] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1996). Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear 

Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation. Federal Register notice 

61 FR 24336. 

[3] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2006). Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13.

Information on the Changes Made to the Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully 

Address Safety Culture. Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML061880341.

[4] Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. (2004). Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety 

Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML091940546.

[5] Nuclear Energy Institute. (2009). NEI 09-07. Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety 

Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML091590728.

[6] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2011). Final Safety Culture Policy Statement. 

Federal Register notice 76 FR 34773. ADAMS Accession No. ML111650336.

[7] Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2011). Components within the Cross-Cutting Areas. 

NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 0310. Version Issued October 28, 2011. ADAMS 

Accession No. ML091480473.

[8] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006). Application of the Management System 

for Facilities and Activities: Safety Guide. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.1. 

Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1253_web.pdf

[9] Institute for Nuclear Power Operations. (2012). INPO 12-012. Traits of a Healthy 

Nuclear Safety Culture. ADAMS Accession No. ML13031A707.




UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG-2165 Safety Culture Common Language