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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 28, 2014

Serial No. 113–115

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Mark D. Wallace, chief executive officer, United Against Nuclear Iran (former United States Ambassador to the United Nations) ........... 9

Mr. Gregory S. Jones, senior researcher, Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center .................................................................................................................... 24

Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, Harvard University (former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) ........................................................................ 32

Mr. David Albright, founder and president, Institute for Science and International Security .................................................................................................. 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Mark D. Wallace: Prepared statement ........................................ 12

Mr. Gregory S. Jones: Prepared statement ........................................................... 26

Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement ................................................................ 34

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 42

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 80

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 81

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, and responses from: 

The Honorable Mark D. Wallace ........................................................................ 83

Mr. Gregory S. Jones ........................................................................................... 84

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State of Rhode Island, and responses 

from: 

Mr. Olli Heinonen ................................................................................................ 85

Mr. Gregory S. Jones ........................................................................................... 88

(1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR 

DEAL 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa) 

presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. So the joint subcommittee will come to order. After recognizing myself, Ranking 

Member Deutch, and, of course, we will hear from our Foreign Affairs full committee chairman Mr. Royce, we will hear from Chairman Poe and Ranking Member Sherman, for 5 minutes each for 

our opening statements, and then due to time limitations, we will 

go directly to our witnesses’ testimony. And without objection, the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record. 

And members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions 

for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

On November 24, 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that an interim negotiated settlement had been reached between the P5+1 

and Iran on its nuclear program. The announcement contained the 

broad strokes, but was short on the details. 

The picture that was painted was that Iran would agree to modest limits on its enrichment capabilities, increased International 

Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, the cessation of manufacturing 

centrifuges, and it would not fuel the Arak heavy-water reactor. In 

exchange, Iran would receive an easing of sanctions on its oil sales 

and the suspension of certain sanctions on the import of precious 

metals and exports from Iran’s auto and petrochemical sectors. 

No doubt President Obama will count this deal as the ultimate 

achievement for diplomacy and peace while excoriating those of us 

who had the temerity to say, hey, wait a minute, I don’t trust the 

Iranian regime. Let’s have a backup plan to increase sanctions on 

Iran if it is found to be acting unfaithfully, which, as history has 

shown, is not out of the realm of possibility. 

But though the announcement was made in November, it wasn’t 

until 1 week ago, on January 20th, that the technical details were 

agreed upon and finally implemented. The most glaring deficiency 

2

with this interim deal is its lopsidedness. Iran got a sweetheart 

deal, and the rest of the world is not any safer from the Iranian 

bomb than before. 

Our closest ally and friend in the region, the democratic Jewish 

State of Israel, has been very concerned with what this deal means 

for its security from the get-go. And other countries in the Gulf region feel slighted by our approach to this issue. 

But let’s set aside the dangerous precedent that this sets for the 

rest of the world and the bridges that we have burned with allies 

to reach this agreement. Remember, this agreement doesn’t even 

live up to the obligations set forth by the U.N. Security Council’s 

resolution on Iran and is far from our policy of disarmament from 

only 10 years ago, and focus on what Iran is allowed to do. 

Iran is allowed to keep its nuclear weapons program infrastructure intact and will still be allowed to enrich. Sure, there are caps 

to the enrichment, and it will have to convert some of its uranium 

to oxide, but Iran will maintain the ability, know-how and proficiency that if it decides to break the agreement, it can continue 

toward breakout capability with only a minor setback in any timetable. 

It is a shame that we have seemingly acquiesced to Iran’s demand that it has some sort of right to enrich. Iran had long ago 

abandoned all claims to a right of enrichment when it decided to 

conduct a covert nuclear program and was in violation of its international obligations under the NPT and other treaties. It therefore 

must not be allowed to enrich, and I fear that by starting out 

where the P5+1 did here, Iran will never be pushed off this stance 

in a final comprehensive agreement. 

The interim deal focuses on the nuclear aspect and falls short on 

Iran’s weaponization efforts and its ballistic missile program, which 

it now has more time to advance. And there is nothing in the interim agreement that allows the International Atomic Energy 

Agency to access Iran’s military sites. And, for me, what is really 

at the crux of the issue here: Time. From announcement to implementation, 2 months’ time has passed. This gave the regime plenty 

of time to continue to make advancements while the parties hashed 

out all of the technical details. I don’t believe this was done by mistake on their part, as Rouhani is an expert in delay tactics and 

doubletalk. 

In the 2 months after Secretary Kerry’s press conference in Geneva, Tehran has announced that it has made advances in its 

ICBM technology, it has designed a new generation of uranium 

centrifuges and is ready to manufacture them, and that it would 

continue construction at its heavy-water reactor in Arak. I envision 

a scenario in which Iran may comply with this agreement for 6 

months, but even if Iran does violate the terms of the agreement, 

the joint commission that it established in the final document has 

murky authority at best to conduct oversight, enforce compliance, 

or impose strict consequences. There is no mechanism that allows 

for adjudication of violations in this deal, and that is very troublesome. 

Bottom line: As long as the infrastructure is in place for Iran to 

continue its nuclear program, the threat that it can create a nuclear weapon will always be all too real, and that is where the 

3

P5+1 monumentally failed in this interim agreement. And with 

Rouhani and Zarif stating just last week that Iran would not dismantle any part of it nuclear program under any circumstance, it 

has me fearing what the administration will accept in a final comprehensive agreement. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, their testimonies, 

and the views of my colleagues. And now I turn to my good friend, 

the ranking member, Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Chairman Poe, for 

holding today’s hearing to examine the implementation of the first 

phase of the Iran nuclear deal. And thank you to our panel of very 

distinguished experts for appearing here today. We welcome your 

expertise and your insight as we determine the efficacy of Iran’s actions under the JPOA, and the next steps in reaching a final agreement to achieve our ultimate goal of preventing a nuclear-armed 

Iran. 

Let me be clear from the outset: There is no doubt that resolving 

the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomacy has always been the 

preferred track of the administration and of the Congress. I think 

we all recognize the significant achievement of the U.S. efforts to 

bring Iran to the table. But there are many members of both sides 

of the aisle who feel that it is absolutely appropriate for Congress, 

the body that built the sanctions architecture that brought Iran to 

the table, to remind the Iranians that full sanctions relief will come 

only when a deal acceptable to the P5+1 and our regional allies is 

reached. 

This relief can only come if Congress acts, so I would also suggest that it is appropriate to send Iran a reminder, as well as to 

remind the companies lining up to visit Tehran a message of what 

is at stake if Iran violates the terms of the Joint Plan of Action. 

A deal is in place, and if we are going to move forward with the 

final deal, we have to focus on ensuring that Iran fulfills its obligations, while beginning to define the acceptable parameters of a 

comprehensive solution. We are 8 days into the implementation of 

the Joint Plan of Action, a 6-month deal to freeze Iran’s nuclear activities, resulting in a complete cessation of Iran’s 20 percent enrichment and the conversion of its current stockpile, as well as to 

open up Iran’s nuclear program to intrusive inspections. And while 

these caps on Iran’s current program are substantial, we know that 

they cannot be the terms of a long-term deal. We must ultimately 

see serious, permanent rollbacks of the program, not just easily reversible freezes. 

We know that the Joint Plan of Action sets the course for Iran 

to maintain a mutually defined enrichment program consistent 

with practical needs. Iran continues to claim a right to enrich for 

nuclear power, but we must understand that none of Iran’s current 

enrichment activities are useful for a civilian nuclear program. 

Consider: Iran already has a nuclear energy reactor at Bushehr 

that is running on imported Russian fuel. In fact, the Russian deal 

requires the use of Russian imported fuel, just as other offers from 

Western nations to fill Iran’s nuclear power needs are contingent 

on the use of imported fuel from those nations. It would take Iran 

years to build the technology necessary to turn its low-enriched 

uranium into fuel for a power reactor. We must remember that 

4

none of Iran’s current stockpile of domestically enriched uranium 

can be used in its nuclear reactor. To that end, the majority of nations with nuclear power don’t domestically enrich uranium, and 

instead import the fuel from other countries. 

So what does this all mean? Iranian stockpiles are essentially 

useless for their domestic energy program. However, 19,000 centrifuges and 7 tons of enriched uranium are highly useful when a 

nation is trying to build a nuclear weapon. 

We can all agree that nuclear science is complicated, but it seems 

that someone with only a cursory knowledge of nuclear technology 

understands the dangers posed by Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities. 

Despite the access granted under the JPOA to the IAEA to inspect centrifuge-manufacturing facilities, can we be sure that we 

are going to be able to see the manufacturing of all the various 

parts that make up—again, can we be sure that Iran is not continuing to manufacture more centrifuges at other locations? Moreover, can we verify that Iran has not already commenced a third 

unknown enrichment site? It should not be lost on us that both 

Fordow and Natanz were also constructed in secret until being exposed by the international community in 2002 and 2009 respectively. And Iran has long said that it intends to have up to 10 enrichment facilities. 

Under the JPOA, Iran may continue its research and development, allowing them to continue work of centrifuge development. 

Mr. Albright, you note in your testimony that centrifuge R&D could 

also lead to breakthroughs in materials or methods that would further strengthen a secret breakout effort. How concerned should we 

be that continued R&D will simply allow Iran to install highly advanced centrifuges in 6 months, or in a year, or in 5 years? These 

are the kinds of difficult questions that have to be answered if the 

P5+1 are to reach an acceptable final deal. 

But perhaps most critically, before any long-term deal is reached, 

Iran must come clean about all aspects of its program. This includes finally addressing all outstanding IAEA concerns of the possible military dimensions, the development of nuclear explosive devices, procurement of nuclear-related materials by the IRGC, and 

military-run activities at the Parchin site. 

The Institute for Science and International Security described 

the Parchin site as a huge site dedicated to the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets and high explosives. 

Iran must know at the outset that they will not be able to sweep 

these allegations under the rug. 

I look forward to discussing with our witnesses the path forward 

to halting what is the greatest threat to international security, a 

nuclear-armed Iran. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now we turn to our full committee chairman Mr. Royce for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, 

and I thank you, and I thank Chairman Ted Poe, and also Mr. 

Deutch, for that very well-reasoned argument that he just laid out. 

And, Ileana, I think you laid out a compelling case as well. 

5

I think all of us are a little stunned. I think we are stunned that 

not only does Iran continue to enrich uranium, but they are very, 

very vocal about the fact that they are going to continue the research and development on faster and faster spinning of centrifuges. And for them to be making this pronouncement in the 

middle of this interim agreement on how they are reaching this capability to develop and spin these centrifuges at supersonic speeds, 

setting new records, implies a certain intent on undetectable nuclear breakout capability. 

I think this is what Members worry about. We worry that, you 

know, as you try to work out an agreement here, and we talk about 

the plutonium reactor, the heavy-water reactor facility at Arak, 

they make the point that they are going to continue performing 

work at that site. 

I think the large quantities of existing stockpiles when they 

make the comment that, no, they are not going to draw down on 

those stockpiles, all of this sends a message in terms of what their 

intent is, and, quite simply, these elements of a nuclear program 

which we are talking about right now will continue to operate as 

the talks go on. So I think for the Members of the House here on 

the Foreign Affairs Committee, we are a little concerned that unless Iran is pressed to fully reveal Iran’s extensive activities to develop and test a nuclear device, unless we get that out on the 

table—and, as we hear today, there is a great deal of evidence that 

Iran has devoted much effort to this over the years. Unless we 

have the details on that, I think we are left wondering about Iran’s 

clear intentions here. 

And I don’t think we want them to cover up that extensive evidence either. And part of it is because we watch Iran’s actions. 

Over 400 executions last year of political and of religious opposition 

in the country. Stoning is still going on in Iran as a penalty. It is 

a capital offense for things such as adultery. As has been mentioned a number of times, a regime that is stoning women with one 

hand shouldn’t be allowed with the other hand to get its grip on 

a nuclear weapon. 

I mean, this is just logical that we be concerned about this. And 

if a comprehensive agreement is reached, the threat of a nucleararmed Iran is not going to be over for a couple of other reasons. 

One of today’s witnesses has estimated that even if we were to 

force Iran to dismantle 80 percent of its 19,000 installed centrifuges, and, of course, they say, you know, they won’t dismantle 

one of them, even if we were to force it to close its entire enrichment facility at Fordow, even if we were to dismantle or convert 

its planned heavy-water reactor to a light-water reactor, agree to 

a multidecade intrusive inspections regime, the fact is that Iran 

would still be 6 months away from nuclear breakout. So if we are 

in a situation right now where they won’t give ground on any of 

these points that I have just raised, I think we have something of 

a problem on our hands. 

So even if the administration were to achieve this agreement, 

which increasingly, many say, might be a 50/50 proposition, I think 

that was the administration’s assumption, especially now that we 

have let up on sanctions pressure, Iran will likely still possess the 

capability of very quickly producing a nuclear weapon. Why do I 

6

say that? Because when you let up on sanctions pressure, you let 

up on the one thing you had that made it hard for them to get hard 

currency, that might make the ayatollah make the tough choice between compromising on the nuclear program or economic implosion. So that is gone now. The message is out, you know, Iran is 

open for business. You see the headlines, you know, the next day 

in the Wall Street Journal: Businesses rush to Iran to cut business 

deals. You see their stock market go back up, their currency go 

back up in value. So we could end up, if we are not careful, ending 

up on a track to have us face a permanent nuclear threat from Iran 

because we rehabilitate their capabilities. 

And so that is why I thank the chairwoman, I thank Mr. Poe and 

Mr. Deutch for their observations on this. But I especially thank 

the panel of witnesses, because our four witnesses today are true 

experts in this field. We look forward to the testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well put. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

We now turn to the ranking member of the TNT Subcommittee, 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. A November agreement was supposed to last 6 

months, but not until 2 months after it was signed, 8 months. It 

can be extended for another 6 months. We are looking at 14 

months. What happens during the 14 months? Their 20 percent 

stockpile, half gets oxidized, but it is still 20 percent. Another half 

gets diluted and oxidized. More low-enriched uranium is created 

and stockpiled, albeit in oxidized form. Work on centrifuge technology continues, though certain centrifuges will not be used. This 

delays only for a short time when Iran would have a nuclear weapon, because the 20 percent oxidized uranium can be converted back 

to a gas quite quickly. Iran uses that same technology to convert 

yellowcake into gaseous uranium. And at the end of this agreement, Iran may be a little bit further than they were in November 

from their first bomb, but will be closer to a cache of 5 to 10 bombs 

because they will have all of the additional low-enriched uranium 

that they create during the pendency of the deal. 

The sanctions relief has been very substantial because it has 

changed the business climate. It is not just the content of the relief. 

There are loopholes in our existing sanctions laws. Companies have 

been reluctant to exploit those because they figure the next sanctions law was around the corner. Well, now it is not, and so we see 

a rush to do business with Iran. 

The disagreement here in Washington is actually rather modest. 

There seems to be agreement that we are not adopting new statutory sanctions until July, or at least not letting them become effective until July. The administration significantly has agreed to enforce existing sanctions, and would do that even if the Iranians 

threatened to walk out of the agreement. 

Secretary Kerry was in this room where your witnesses are sitting now. He agreed that he would continue enforcing the existing 

law. Within a day they designated roughly a dozen entities, the 

Iranians walked out. They came back. So we agreed to enforce existing laws. We agree no new laws will become effective until July. 

So the question is under what circumstances will new sanctions beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
7

coming effective in July go into effect, and who will make that decision, the President alone or the President with Congress? 

Who will decide that Iran is just engaged in a delay program, or 

that we have reached sufficient progress? I don’t think Congress 

should surrender this role, because Congress has been right, and 

three administrations have been wrong. From 1996 to 2010, Congress didn’t enact major sanctions legislation. Why? Because three 

administrations sought so effectively, usually in the Senate, to prevent the adoption of that legislation. Congress is right. The House 

was more right than the Senate, and Congress was more right than 

three different administrations. 

Now we are being asked, oh, just don’t do anything. Trust the 

President. He will do the right thing. The fact is that we are told 

by the administration we can adopt new sanctions in a nanosecond, 

should we decide that that is important. What he really means is, 

what the administration means is, we can adopt new sanctions in 

a nanosecond if the administration agrees with them; but if they 

don’t, their capacity for delay and obfuscation, for dilution and defeat of sanctions has been proven. It was proven effective in 2009. 

It was proven effective for the 8 years of the prior administration. 

What are our choices? We can act now and adopt sanctions that 

will go into effect in July, but also schedule a vote in July where 

Congress could decide by joint resolution to suspend or prevent the 

sanctions from becoming effective, and we would do so if adequate 

progress is made. We can have a compromise approach, right, and 

conference on the sanctions, and schedule a vote, affirmative vote, 

of both Houses of Congress without delay, without filibuster, without obfuscation, without further division between the committees 

and the Houses as to what the content would be, and pass new legislation, if warranted, in July, and soon enough to prevent any 

pocket veto since we go out in August. 

The final approach is what I call the narcolepsy approach: Go to 

sleep until the administration decides to wake us up. Then they 

say, then we will get around to thinking about something in July 

because we will notice that the 6 months which is 8 months has 

passed. At that point you can be sure that this administration, like 

the prior two administrations, will be for delay, dilution and defeat, 

and we will be in session only a few weeks between the end of July 

and the end of the year. So Iran will get a full year of relief from 

sanctions, and actually 14 months. 

I think the one thing for this hearing to establish is that we are 

not going to adopt the narcolepsy approach; that we are going to 

have sanctions that Iran will know will go into effect in July if adequate progress, determined by Congress, is not reached, and with 

that, I think our negotiators will be far more effective than if Congress is regarded as on vacation. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman. 

And now we go to the chairman of the TNT Subcommittee, Judge 

Poe from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

The world powers surrendered to the Iranian nation’s will. Those 

are the words of Iranian President Rouhani. It should not surprise 

any of us that the Iranians view this agreement as a win for them, 

8

a loss for us, and a loss for a safer world. Iran’s Foreign Minister 

boasted, we did not agree to dismantle anything, referring to their 

enrichment activities. He is right. Iran not only gets to keep its infrastructure intact, it gets to keep enriching, or it gets to keep its 

yellow cake and eat it, too. 

The U.N. has voted on five occasions, saying Iran has cheated in 

its nuclear capability, and they should not be able to enrich at all. 

In one deal Iran just wiped away all of those U.N. resolutions. 

When the United States negotiates a deal that makes the U.N. 

look tough, we got a problem. Just as bad, none of its changes 

agreed to are permanent, and verification is difficult. Hours after 

Iran signed the agreement, their top nuclear negotiator bragged on 

Iranian TV that they could ‘‘return to the previous situation in 1 

day.’’

In reality, estimates suggest the Iranians could still achieve nuclear breakout capability in 6 months. This agreement doesn’t force 

Iran to stop its nuclear program. Rouhani is a snake oil salesman. 

He sold poison medicine to us, and the State Department gave 

away the farm and the mineral rights in exchange. This agreement 

bars Iran from installing nuclear equipment at its heavy-water reactor, Arak, but allows them to continue to construct its nuclear reactor. The problem is that Arak’s reactor size and design is too big 

for a peaceful reactor. Experts say it more closely resembles a nuclear weapons facility. Well, no kidding. 

When asked if he thought that Arak could be used for peaceful 

purposes, former State Department nonproliferation official Robert 

Einhorn said, ‘‘Yes, it could. A 12-inch hunting knife could also be 

used to spread jam on your toast in the morning.’’ In this deal Iran will get $6 billion in cash payments over 6 

months. Iran also gets billions more as companies who were sitting 

on the sidelines out of fear of the sanctions now say it is okay to 

do business as usual with Iran. This could inject about $20 billion 

into Iran’s economy according to sanctions expert Mark Dubowitz. 

The Iranians know there is no enforcement mechanism once a 

final agreement is reached because all sanctions will be lifted. Despite what the White House says, it will be nearly impossible to restart punishing sanctions if Iran cheats or lies. You can’t turn on 

sanctions, can’t turn them on and off like a light switch. 

I talked to Prime Minister Netanyahu right after this deal was 

signed. He is correct. This is a bad deal for Israel and a bad deal 

for the United States. The only leverage we had on Iranian 

hardliners was tough sanctions that brought their economy to its 

knees. By easing sanctions we have blunted our sharpest tool to get 

a peaceful solution. We have made peace less likely. This is a 

flawed appeasement deal that gave away too much to Iran. It is 

similar to Chamberlain’s appeasement to the Nazis in the 1930s, 

where the allies boasted of peace in our time and got World War 

II. I think we will see this interim deal extended for another 6 

months while Iran continues to enrich and march closer to a nuclear weapon. 

Iran has agreed to freeze its nuclear enrichment. They must dismantle their nuclear weapon program, not just freeze it. The Iranian Supreme Leader hasn’t changed his goal. He has said he 

wants to destroy Israel. He wants to destroy the United States. I 

9

think we should believe him when he says he wants to get rid of 

us. So Congress cannot wait. We should pass tougher sanctions, not 

let up on sanctions at this time. And that is just the way it is, 

Madam Speaker. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Judge Poe. 

And the bells have rung, but I am going to introduce our witnesses, and I think that we will have time to listen to our first witness, Ambassador Wallace, before we break. 

First we will welcome Ambassador Mark Wallace, Chief Executive Officer of United Against Nuclear Iran, which he founded in 

2008. His organization has been a leader in pressuring businesses 

to end their dealings with Iran, and has promoted sanctions legislation to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Prior to this position, Ambassador Wallace was U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations on 

U.N. management and reform issues. We welcome you, sir. 

Next we will welcome Mr. Gregory Jones, thank you, Senior Researcher at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Mr. 

Jones has been a defense policy analyst for the past 40 years and 

brings great expertise in the areas of nonproliferation and counterproliferation, especially regarding terrorist organizations and regimes attempting to acquire nuclear technology. Welcome, sir. 

Third, we welcome Mr. Olli Heinonen—I am sorry if I don’t say 

that right—close enough—Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy 

School of Government. Prior to this position, he served for 27 years 

at the International Atomic Energy Agency, including as Deputy 

Director General. He led the Agency’s efforts to identify and dismantle nuclear proliferation networks, including overseeing its efforts to monitor and contain Iran’s nuclear program. He has led nuclear programs investigations around the world, including to South 

Africa, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria. Welcome, Olli. 

Last but not least we welcome Mr. David Albright, a physicist 

and founder and president of the Nonprofit Institute for Science 

and International Security. Mr. Albright has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the 

world and has coauthored several books on the subject. 

Your statements in full will be made a part of the record, and 

please feel free to summarize them. We will start with you, Mr. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK D. WALLACE, CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN 

(FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED 

NATIONS) 

Ambassador WALLACE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Deutch——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think you need to—I don’t know if the mike 

is on. 

Ambassador WALLACE. There we go. Thank you, Chairman, and 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Members Sherman and Deutch, and members of the joint subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

testify before you once again. I am honored to sit here on the panel 

with a group of very distinguished and committed colleagues. It is 

a true honor. 

10

We at UANI sincerely hope that a comprehensive and verifiable 

agreement that rolls back Iran’s nuclear program is reached in 6 

months, but the prospects appear small, and we must confront the 

difficulties with candor and bipartisan debate. 

The Joint Plan has provided disproportionate sanctions relief to 

Iran, and allowed Iran to retain and continue to develop and advance a dangerous nuclear program. Under the agreement, Tehran 

will not dismantle a single centrifuge or its heavy-water reactor at 

Arak, IR–40. Today Iran retains the ability to produce enough 

weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in as little as 2 months, and 

Iran has not indicated that it would end its development of the IR–

40. At the same time the sanction’s architecture, developed over 

decades, has been significantly rolled back, and enforcement has 

fallen to a trickle. What is the acceptable scope and size of Iran’s 

enrichment program, and will we permit Iran to operate the IR–

40? 

If Iran truly only sought a peaceful nuclear energy program, 

there would be no need for any enrichment or a heavy-water reactor. The international community seems to have forgotten there are 

multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment. Regrettably, the Geneva Joint Plan declares 

that in any final accord, Iran will be permitted to enrich and is, 

at best, vague regarding the future of the IR–40. 

Today you will hear a range of opinions on what an acceptable 

Iranian enrichment program would look like and the dangers of 

Iran’s operation of the IR–40. We should all agree that extending 

Iran’s breakout time from its current 30 to 60 days to well beyond 

is the imperative. But does any serious person believe that Iran is 

prepared to dismantle between 15,000 and 19,000 centrifuges and 

forego the installation of far more efficient and advanced centrifuges? Clearly not. 

Sanctions have become so important to this matter. Unfortunately, the White House has described the sanctions relief provided 

in the agreement as economically insignificant. We disagree. Iran’s 

economy is blossoming. 

Some hard data. The rial has increased in value by more than 

25 percent. The Tehran stock exchange has increased by nearly 100 

percent. Dozens of multinational corporations are returning to 

Iran. Iran’s oil exports have increased by nearly 60 percent. 

Iran’s oil exports have risen to 1.2 million barrels per day from 

a low of 761,000 barrels per day. Under the Joint Plan, Iran’s oil 

exports will increase further, and if oil sanctions continue 

unaltered, Iran’s oil sales would have continued to drop to as little 

as 500,000 barrels per day by the end of 2014. 

Importantly, the administration has curtailed its enforcement efforts. In 2013, the United States Treasury Department designated 

183 entities for Iran’s sanctions violations. Since President 

Rouhani’s election, the United States has blacklisted only 29 entities. The Obama administration must hold to its pledge to enforce 

sanctions. 

The White House estimates that Iran stands to receive $6 billion, 

to $7 billion in sanctions relief. The true value of sanctions relief 

is well more than $20 billion. Just calculate the increase in oil 

sales, lest there be any doubt. Now we believe there will be far less 

11

pressure for Iran to actually make material concessions on its nuclear program. 

The Congress must actively take part in this process and make 

its position known. We all must agree that Iran will not be permitted to retain an industrial-scale nuclear program. This would 

entail capping the number of IR–1 centrifuges to a small fraction 

of the nearly 20,000 Iran currently possesses or, more appropriately, none at all. Iran must be kept well over a year away from 

breakout, given its long history of duplicity and hostility. Rouhani 

strongly supports efforts to impose sanctions on Iran in 6 months’ 

time until a final accord is reached. 

The Congress should pass and the President should sign into law 

the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, which has the support of a bipartisan majority. It is wrong that the White House is characterizing those who support new sanctions or question the Joint Plan 

as dishonest warmongers. 

History offers a disturbing precedent. In the 1990s, we entered 

into a similar interim nuclear agreement with North Korea. The 

Agreed Framework became the proverbial can that was kicked 

down the road. No final agreement was ever struck, and the DPRK 

surprised the world with a nuclear test. This time Congress must 

make clear that if there is no final agreement after the Joint Plan’s 

initial 6-month term, that Congress will adopt more robust sanctions. We must learn the lessons of history and not repeat its mistakes. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wallace follows:]

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Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal 

Testimony before the Joint Middle East and North Africa as 

well as Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittees 

January 28, 2014 

The Honorable Mark D. Wallace 
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INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman Poe, members ofthe Joint Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to speak before you today. Today's hearing on Iran is as important as it 

is timely. With respect to importance, I need hardly tell you about the dangers posed by Iran's 

relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons capability is the 

greatest single security threat facing the United States today. 

At United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), we are deeply concerned about whether the 

Geneva Joint Plan of Action (the "Joint Plan" or "Interim Agreement") will advance U.S. national 

security and foreign policy goals. While we sincerely hope that a comprehensive and verifiable 

agreement that rolls back Iran's nuclear program is reached in 6 months, the prospects appear 

dim at best. 

The Joint Plan has provided disproportionate sanctions relief to Iran, and given that 

Tehran will not dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran has not rolled back its nuclear infrastructure. 

With the thousands of centrifuges that it is currently operating and has installed, Iran will 

retain, even if it abides by the full terms of the agreement, the ability to breakout and produce 

enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as 2 months. At the same 

time, the carefully constructed sanctions architecture developed over decades has been 

significantly rolled back. 

The question today for all of us - members of this committee and all of the Congress - is 

what would be an acceptable scope and size of Iran's enrichment program and whether we will 

permit Iran to operate the heavy water reactor at Arak. Iran claims that its program is peaceful 

in nature and that it is solely for civilian nuclear energy and medical purposes. To be clear, if 

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Iran truly only sought a civilian and peaceful nuclear energy program, there would be zero need 

for any enrichment capacity or the heavy water reactor. Many countries have peaceful nuclear 

energy programs without engaging in enrichment nor operating heavy water reactors. The 

international community seems to have all too quickly forgotten that there are multiple UN 

Security Council Resolutions calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment. Regrettably, the Geneva 

Joint Plan seems to declare that in any final accord, Iran will be permitted to enrich and is at 

best vague regarding the future of the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak. 

Today you will hear a range of opinions on what "an acceptable" Iranian enrichment 

program would look like and the dangers of Iran's operation of a heavy water reactor. The 

range of debate will likely focus on the parameters of a final accord whereby Iran is limited to 

between 0 and 4000 first-generation IR-l centrifuges. We should all agree that extending Iran's 

'breakout time' from its current 30-60 days to well beyond a year is the imperative. But does 

any serious person believe that Iran is prepared to dismantle between 15,000 and 19,000 

centrifuges, and forego the installation of far more efficient and advanced IR-2 centrifuges? 

Clearly not. 

With respect, each and every member of this committee and the United States Congress 

should make his or her position known on the acceptable levels of Iran's enrichment capacity 

and its operation of the heavy water reactor - the IR-40. The U.S. Congress must become 

involved in this debate and weigh in on the essential principles that would underpin any final 

nuclear agreement with Iran. It is quite an appropriate role for Congress to play, given its 

authority in passing, lifting and potentially increasing sanctions against the Islamic Republic. 

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THE DEAL IS DISPROPORTIONATE 

As Foreign Minister Zarif and President Rouhani have become the toast of diplomatic 

and business circles, it has become increasingly clear that the Joint Plan is disproportionately in 

Iran's favor. The administration touts that the agreement has halted Iran's nuclear progress, 

but this is not true. During the duration of the accord, there are a number of ways by which the 

Iranian regime will continue to develop its nuclear program. For example: 

• Iran will continue to perform excavation and civil construction work at the Arak Heavy 

Water Reactor, which is considered a prime proliferation threat. 

• Iran will continue to perform ongoing R&D activities that preceded the agreement. As 

one component of its ongoing R&D, Iran will continue experimenting with a range of 

advanced centrifuges that are multiple times faster than their predecessors. This could 

eventually put Iran's breakout time at a matter of weeks, if not days. 

• Iran will continue long-range ballistic missile testing, which is a central component of a 

modern nuclear weapons program. 

• Iran retains its entire stockpile of low-enriched 3.5% uranium, which is enough to build 

six nuclear bombs if enriched to weapons-grade. While Iran is diluting and converting its 

20% enriched uranium stock, it is a dangerous canard to say that this puts Iran much 

further away from a bomb. Due to the non-linear, exponential nature of the uranium 

enrichment process, by enriching to the 20% level, Iran has already done 80% of the 

work necessary to reach weapons-grade uranium. 

By any definition, Iran will continue to make substantive progress on its nuclear program. 

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THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS 'SANCTIONS EASING' 

So what have we given Iran, in return for these superficial concessions? The White 

House has described the sanctions relief provided in the agreement as "economically 

insignificant" and insisted that "Iran's economy will also continue to suffer." David Cohen, the 

U.S. Treasury Department official tasked with enforcing the u.S. sanctions program declared, "I 

am confident that the sanctions pressure on Iran will continue to mount. Iran will be even 

deeper in the hole six months from now, when the deal expires." We find such 

pronouncements fully disconnected from the true condition of Iran's economy, which is 

blossoming. 

Proponents of this agreement do not appear to understand the fragility of sanctions, or 

the dangers of rolling them back and easing the economic pressure on Iran. The four 

interdependent elements of a successful Iran sanctions regime are (1) increasingly strict laws 

and regulations, (2) enforcement action, (3) reputational risk, and; (4) the psychological impact 

on the Iranian economy. Regrettably, the run-up to and the adoption of the Joint Plan have 

undermined each of those four elements, and as a result, the architecture of the sanctions 

regime is crumbling. This is underscored by hard data: 

First: A key measure of economic pressure on Iran is the value of its currency, the rial, 

which is reflected in the black market value exchange rate. Last year, with economic 

pressure at its peak, Iran suffered from severe hyperinflation, and the rial became the 

least valued currency in the world. Since Hassan Rouhani was elected president on June 

14, the Iranian rial has increased in value by more than 25%, from 36,500 rials/dollar to 

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29,000 rials/dollar today, which is also up from record-lows of 40,000 rials/dollar in 

February 2013. Correspondingly, inflation is steadily falling. 

Second: Since Rouhani's election, The Tehran Stock Exchange index has increased by 

nearly 100%, from about 45,000 points to over 80,000 points. Consumer confidence in 

Iranian commerce and companies has skyrocketed. 

• Third: Iran's oil exports have increased nearly 60% from October 2013 to January 2014. 

At the time of the signing of the Geneva agreement on November 24, a senior 

administration official said, "Iran's oil exports will remain steady at their current level of 

around 1 million barrels per day." Unfortunately, even before the January 20 

implementation of the agreement, Iran's oil exports rose to 1.2 million barrels/day 

(bpd), from historically low levels of 761,000 bpd in October 2013. It is clear that the 

Geneva agreement and the run-up to its signing changed the market psychology and 

reduced risks for oil buyers. Now that the agreement is being implemented, Iran's oil 

exports are in a position to increase further as tanker insurance provisions are relaxed 

and shipment costs for the Iranian oil sector are reduced. Moreover, had the oil 

sanctions continued, Iran's daily oil sales would have continued to plummet and by the 

end of 2014 Iran's daily oil exports could have fallen to 500,000 bpd or less. 

• Fourth: As reported by The New York Times, "In the first two weeks of the year, Iran 

welcomed more [trade and diplomatic] delegations from Europe than in all of 2013." 

Governments are eager to ensure that their national companies are the first ones to get 

their foot in the door and benefit from the large Iranian market. 

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• Fifth: Dozens of leading multinational corporations are publicly pursuing the renewal or 

expansion oftheir business in Iran. With the momentum of sanctions reversed, and a 

budding expectation that the sanctions regime could soon be lifted in its entirety, 

companies no longer see the same reputational and financial risk of doing business with 

a terrorist regime. 

You may be surprised to learn that much of these economic gains were achieved well before 

the signing of the Geneva Agreement on November 24 or its implementation that began this 

past week. In fact, the momentum of an ever strengthening international sanctions regime was 

halted following Rouhani's election in June 2013 in an apparent effort by the U.S. to court the 

regime and to set a tone for renewed negotiations. One clear indication ofthe administration's 

efforts to court Rouhani is its less aggressive approach to enforcing sanctions since his election. 

In 2013 before Rouhani's June 14 election, the U.S. Treasury Department designated 183 

entities as having violated Iran sanctions. Since Rouhani's election, the U.S. has only blacklisted 

a total of 29 entities. When the U.S. Treasury designated 19 Iran sanctions violators on 

December 12,2013, Iran falsely claimed that the U.S. had violated the Joint Plan and 

temporarily walked out of negotiations to implement the interim nuclear agreement. UANI is 

deeply concerned whether the Obama administration will hold to its pledge to maximally 

enforce sanctions, or if its enforcement team will continue walking on eggshells in orderto 

avoid offending the Iranian regime, which may use enforcement as a pretext to subvert the 

accord. 

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The White House characterizations of sanctions as a spigot that can be turned off and 

back on are therefore clearly unrealistic. While the White House estimates that Iran stands to 

receive $6 billion to $7 billion in sanctions relief through the agreement, the true value of the 

sanctions relief is well more than $20 billion when accounting for the full macroeconomic 

picture in Iran. By rolling back sanctions now, the international community is significantly 

lessening the pressure on Iran's economy. Six months from now, we believe there will be far 

less pressure for Iran to actually make material concessions on its nuclear program. It is no 

wonder that Rouhani believes that "the world powers surrendered to Iran." 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 

If Iran is permitted to retain an industrial-scale enrichment program, it is important to 

stress that it will likely do irreparable damage to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a 

vital pillar of international security. In upholding its so-called right to enrich, Iran often refers to 

the "double standards" of the "arrogant powers" who are preventing Iran from exercising its 

"inalienable rights" to nuclear energy. In fact, by asserting that it "will not accept any 

limitations" on its nuclear program, the Iranian regime is actually seeking special treatment and 

asserting that it is above international norms. The fact is that the majority of countries with 

nuclear power programs do not possess domestic uranium enrichment programs because of 

the proliferation threat and the great economic cost of such projects. Given its immense oil 

and natural gas reserves, it is of course economically nonsensical for Iran to build its 

enrichment capacity unless of course it had a clear ulterior motive - a nuclear weapon. 

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At UANI, we urge policymakers to preserve the "Gold Standard" for u.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy as negotiations continue with Iran. Under the "Gold Standard", NPT 

signatories such as South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have developed 

peaceful nuclear energy programs in cooperation with the U.S. while voluntarily eschewing 

domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities due to the inherent proliferation risk. All told, 

there are 17 countries that have a nuclear-civil ian-cooperation agreement with the U.S. and do 

not have enrichment or reprocessing activities on their soil. Simply put, it will be nearly 

impossible--politically and diplomatically--to expect allies and other countries (the 'responsible 

actors') to forego nuclear fuel-making activities if in a final agreement, we allow Iran, one of the 

worst global actors and an egregious violator of international law, to retain domestic 

enrichment on its soil and at an industrial-scale. This will put the cause of nuclear 

nonproliferation, particularly in the volatile Middle East, at profound risk, and be totally 

contradictory to President Obama's priority of creating "a world without nuclear weapons." 

TO WHAT END A FINAL AGREEMENT? 

The ultimate purpose ofthe Interim Agreement should be to reach a final accord that 

resolves all outstanding concerns about Iran's nuclear program. However, the views of Iran and 

the U.S. on what a final deal should look like are so fundamentally different that it is quite clear 

that a final agreement will not be able to be negotiated within these six months. For example, 

while President Obama says Iran does not need the underground fortified Fordow facility, the 

Arak heavy-water reactor, or advanced centrifuges "in order to have a limited, peaceful 

program," Rouhani just declared in a CNN interview that Tehran "will not accept any 

limitations" on its nuclear program and that Iran would not destroy any centrifuges "under any 

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circumstances." There is no reasonable room for compromise when the Iranian regime has 

already laid out maximalist positions that show it is not prepared to negotiate in good-faith and 

rollback elements of its nuclear program. 

The White House needs to be much more assertive in stating what it seeks in a final 

agreement, and Congress must actively take part in this process and make its position known. If 

the White House refuses to engage in such a discussion, Congress must take up the debate 

itself on the House and Senate Floors. It is vital that the u.S. make clear to Iran that in any final 

deal, it will not be permitted to retain an industrial-scale nuclear program. We believe that this 

would entail capping the number of IR-1 centrifuges to a small fraction of the the nearly 20,000 

Iran currently possesses or, more appropriately, none at all. If Iran is able to retain its industrialscale infrastructure, it will be able to 'breakout' at a time of the Supreme Leader's choosing. In 

a final agreement, Iran must be at least 18 months away from breakout given the long history 

of duplicity on its nuclear file. 

We respectfully calion Congress to debate this matter paramount to our national 

security and ensure that any final accord Iran will not be able to breakout in a time period that 

would be inconsistent with our abilities of detection and our abilities to act. 

CONGRESSIONAL SANCTIONS DEBATE 

Given that Iran is clearly not prepared to negotiate in good faith over its nuclear 

program, UANI strongly supports efforts to impose sanctions on Iran in six months' time if no 

final accord is reached. The Senate's "Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act," which has the support of 

a bipartisan majority of u.S. Senators and contains humanitarian carve-outs, reversibility, broad 

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discretionary and waiver authority for the President, and delayed implementation 

corresponding to the Geneva agreement, would achieve just that. 

It is greatly disappointing that the White House is characterizing those who support new 

Iran sanctions or question the Joint Plan as dishonest warmongers. It is nonsensical and out of 

bounds to say that a bipartisan majority of U.S. Congressmen secretly want war with Iran. As 

President Obama has stated, sanctions are a non-violent policy tool used to avoid war, and they 

succeeded in severely weakening and isolating the Iranian regime and its economy, and 

bringing Iran back to the negotiating table. 

If the White House has reservations with the content of the legislation, it should work 

collaboratively with Congress to address those issues. But rather than take such initiative, the 

administration instead has chosen to slander Congressmen as warmongers. It is time for the 

White House to work collaboratively with Congress and commit to new sanctions should Iran 

fail to live up to its commitments. 

CONCLUSION 

History offers a disturbing precedent for the trajectory of the Iran nuclear file. In the 

1990's the United States had entered into a similar interim nuclear agreement with North 

Korea. That agreement, called the Agreed Framework, was to be temporary and lead to a final 

accord fully resolving the nuclear issues between the DPRK, the u.s. and the international 

community. Regrettably, the Agreed Framework became the proverbial can that was kicked 

down the road. No final agreement was ever struck, the Agreed Framework was passed along 

and the DPRK surprised the world with a nuclear weapons test. The Joint Plan has many of the 

hallmarks of the Agreed Framework. All of us must ensure that the Joint Plan does not become 

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the Agreed Framework II. To prevent this, Congress must make clear that if there is no final 

agreement after the Joint Plan's initial six month duration that Congress will adopt and impose 

more robust sanctions. The Joint Plan must not become a de facto final accord. We must learn 

the lessons of history and not repeat its mistakes. 

Today we respectfully call on Congress to enact new sanctions on Iran to be imposed in 

six months in the event that no final accord is achieved and respectfully call on Congress to 

make clear the acceptable levels of enrichment, if any enrichment, that Congress would accept 

in order to end sanctions. Iran must know that if it continues on its nuclear path it will face 

ever growing financial and diplomatic isolation. Iran must know that if it does not reach a final 

accord with the United States and its allies after the Joint Plan's six month period it will face 

more sa nctions. 

Honorable Chairs, distinguished members of this Subcommittee, thank you for taking 

the time to allow me to discuss UANI's views on the current status of negotiations. We stand 

ready to work with you in any possible way. 

12 
24

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And the subcommittees will recess while we 

vote, and we will come right back to hear the rest of our panelists 

and to have members question them. The subcommittee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Thank you for your patience as we voted. We will have another 

set of votes at 4 o’clock, so we hope that we can almost wrap it up. 

Mr. Jones, you are welcome to make your statement, and your 

prepared remarks, as we said, will be made a part of the record. 

Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GREGORY S. JONES, SENIOR RESEARCHER, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

In early November, Secretary of State Kerry said of the ongoing 

negotiations with Iran, ‘‘We need to get the right deal. No deal is 

better than a bad deal.’’ Unfortunately, the November 24th Joint 

Plan of Action is a bad deal. This fact has been obscured by both 

a mischaracterization of the deal’s benefits and the denial of the 

deal’s great flaw. 

President Obama has said that the deal has ‘‘cut off Iran’s most 

likely paths to a bomb.’’ This is not true. Before the current nuclear 

deal, Iran could produce the highly enriched uranium, HEU, for a 

nuclear weapon in just 6 weeks. Over the next 6 months, the Joint 

Plan of Action will increase this interval only slightly, to 8 weeks. 

Iran will remain perilously close to a nuclear weapon. 

The Joint Plan of Action allows Iran to continue to produce 3.5 

percent enriched uranium, which is the key starting material for 

any uranium effort to produce HEU for weapons. Iran’s stockpile 

of this material will continue to grow during the course of this nuclear deal, though several White House statements as well as Secretary Kerry have incorrectly claimed otherwise. As this stockpile 

of enriched uranium grows, the number of nuclear weapons that 

Iran could produce from it will grow as well. 

Iran’s stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium in the form of 

uranium hexafluoride is not supposed to grow. Iran is supposed to 

convert the excess into an oxide form, but Iran can easily convert 

this material back into hexafluoride once it begins to produce nuclear weapons. This fact is well known to U.S. technical experts, 

but their input was apparently either not sought or heeded. 

The Joint Plan of Action does have some benefits, and there are 

those who have argued that even limited benefits are better than 

no deal, but this view ignores the great flaw in the deal. It permits 

Iran to retain centrifuge enrichment. Centrifuge technology puts 

any country within an arm’s reach of the HEU for nuclear weapons. 

The Joint Plan of Action has already stated that when the followon so-called comprehensive solution has expired, Iran ‘‘will be 

treated in the same manner as that of any nonnuclear weapons 

state party to the NPT.’’ This means that in, say, 5 or 10 years, 

Iran’s nuclear program will be under no special restrictions, and if 

the P5+1 members have allowed Iran to keep its centrifuge enrichVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
25

ment program, then not only could it build as many centrifuges as 

it wants, it could also import centrifuges as part of normal nuclear 

trade. Iran could then have a larger, more robust centrifuge enrichment program and be much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons 

than it currently is. 

What is worse, the Joint Plan of Action will be setting a precedent for all other nonnuclear-weapon countries. After all, if Iran is 

to be treated in the same manner as that of any nonnuclear-weapons state party to the NPT, then the reverse would be true as well. 

If Iran, that has violated its IAEA safeguards by conducting clandestine centrifuge enrichment and has defied multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt its centrifuge enrichment, is allowed to retain this capability, on what basis can 

any country that has abided by its IAEA safeguard obligations be 

denied centrifuge enrichment? The Joint Plan of Action is setting 

the stage for many countries to acquire centrifuge enrichment, 

making it very easy for them to produce the HEU for nuclear 

weapons whenever they desire them. 

Unfortunately, there are no good options to head off a nucleararmed Iran. Any negotiated settlement would require major reductions in Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program, reductions that Iran 

has already said it will not agree to. Further sanctions are unlikely 

to be effective since countries such as Russia and China will probably undercut them. Military strikes could easily lead to an ill-advised major war with Iran. 

The U.S. instead needs to try to strengthen the overall nonproliferation system, which appears to be unraveling. Key to this 

effort will be to stop countries from using nominally peaceful nuclear activities to acquire the HEU or plutonium needed for nuclear 

weapons. The U.S. needs to urge the IAEA to clarify which materials and facilities it can effectively safeguard and which it cannot. 

A negotiated agreement with Iran that legitimizes its centrifuge 

enrichment program would be a step in the wrong direction. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jones. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

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Written Statement of Gregory S. Jones 

Senior Researcher, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Hearing on: Implementation of the Iran N ucIear Deal 

January 28, 2014 

In early November, Secretary of State Kerry said of the ongoing negotiations with Iran: " ... we 

need to get the right deal, no deal is better than a bad deaL,,1 Unfortunately the November 24 

"Joint Plan of Action" is a bad deal. This fact has been obscured by both the mischaracterization 

of the deal's benefits and the denial of the deal's great flaw. 

President Obama has said that the Joint Plan of Action has "cut off Iran's most likely paths to a 

bomb.,,2 This is not true. Before the current nuclear deal Iran could produce the highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in just six weeks. By the end of the Joint Plan of Action's 

six month period, Iran will be able to produce this material in just eight weeks. 1 Iran will still 

remain perilously close to a nuclear weapon. 

The Joint Plan of Action allows Iran to continue to produce 3.5% enriched uranium which is the 

key starting material for any Iranian effort to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. 

Iran's stockpile of this material will continue to grow during the course of this nuclear deal 

though several White House statements as well as Secretary Kerry have incorrectly claimed 

otherwise' The amount ofHEU for nuclear weapons that Iran could produce from its enriched 

uranium stockpile in November 2013 was 67 kilograms. By July 20, 2014, six months after the 

Joint Plan of Action has taken effect, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile will have grown 

sufficiently so that Iran will then be able to produce 76 kilograms of HEU-a 13% increase. 

Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has made clear that it is Iran's stockpile of3.5% 

enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride that is not supposed to grow, not its total 

stockpile of this materiaLs Iran is supposed to convert the excess into an oxide form but it is 

unclear whether this will take place, as Iran has yet to get its conversion facility into operation'" 

At any rate, Iran can easily convert this material back into hexafluoride once it begins to produce 

I "[nter\'iew WiU, Da\'id Gregory of Meet the Press," November 10, 2013. 

~ "Full text of President Obama' s remarks on Tran agreement" November 2J, 201 J. 

'Gregory S. Jones. '-Inm's Emiched Uranium Stocks CanProdllce EnoughHEU for 3 to 5 Nuclear \Veapons, The 

World's Commitment to Nonproliferation is in Doubt, Centrifuge Enrichment and the TAEA August 2g, 2011 

Safeguards Update." Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. September 10,2013, 

hltP:/!npolicv.org/articJc.pll]J?aid= J 122& lid'----~ 

4 Office of the Press Sceretary. The White House, "Summary of Technical Understandings Related to the 

Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action on the Islanuc Republic ofIran's Nuclear Progmm, January [6, 20 I ~~ 

Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, --Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic 

Republic orTran's Nuclear Program, No\'ember 23,2013; "The P5+ I's First Step Agreement With Iran on its 

Nuclear Program," Testimony, John Ken}" Secretary of State, Opening Remarks Before the House Foreign Affairs 

Conmuttee, Waslungton, DC. December !O, 2013 

5 "Assessing the P5+ I Joint Plan of Action With Tran:' Testimony, Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs, \Vritten Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Ulban Affairs, 

Waslunb'lOl1. DC, December [2, 2013. 

6 Fredrik Dahl, "Tran's nuclear stockpile may rise for nmv despite deal ,,,,ith pmvers-RTRS. 'Reuters, January 22, 

20[~. 
27


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nuclear weapons using existing facilities that Iran already uses to produce uranium hexafluoride 

for its centrifuge enrichment process. This fact is well known to U.S. technical experts but their 

input was apparently either not sought or heeded on this matter which is rather surprising given 

the technical nature of these negotiations. 

The Joint Plan of Action does have some benefits and there are those who have argued that even 

limited benefits are better than no deal. But this view ignores the great flaw in the deal, it 

permits Iran to retain centrifuge enrichment. This fact has been denied by Secretary of State 

Kerr/ but the Joint Plan of Action says in two separate places that the follow-on Comprehensive 

Solution would "involve a mutually defined enrichment programme ... " Note that the text says 

"would," not "might" or "could." That the Comprehensive Solution will permit Iranian 

centrifuge enrichment was later confirmed by the Obama administration national security 

spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan who said, "We are prepared to negotiate a strictly limited 

enrichment program."g 

It has been the policy of the U.S. and others to prevent the acquisition of enrichment and 

reprocessing technologies by non-nuclear weapon states. Indeed the Joint Plan of Action flatly 

prohibits Iran from developing reprocessing technologies and facilities so it is even more 

puzzling that this deal approves Iran's continuing possession of centrifuge enrichment. 

Centrifuge technology puts any country within an arm's reach of highly enriched uranium for 

nuclear weapons. 

The Joint Plan of Action also provides that when the follow-on so-called Comprehensive 

Solution has expired, Iran "will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon 

state party to the NPT." This means that in say five or ten years, Iran's nuclear program will be 

under no special restrictions. If the U.S. and the otherP5+1 members have allowed Iran to keep 

its centrifuge enrichment program, then not only could Iran build as many centrifuges as it 

wants, it could also import centrifuges as part of normal nuclear trade. Iran could then have a 

larger, more robust centrifuge enrichment program and be much closer to acquiring nuclear 

weapons than it currently is. 

What is worse, the Joint Plan of Action will be setting a precedent for all other non-nuclear 

weapon countries. After all, if Iran is to be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear 

weapon state party to the NPT, then the reverse would be true as well. Other countries could 

claim the same treatment afforded to Iran. If Iran which has violated its International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards by conducting clandestine centrifuge enrichment and defied 

multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt centrifuge enrichment, is 

allowed to retain this capability, on what basis can any country that has abided by its lAEA 

safeguard obligations be denied centrifuge enrichment? The Joint Plan of Action is setting the 

stage for many countries to acquire centrifuge enrichment, making it very easy for them to 

produce the HEU for nuclear weapons whenever they desire them. 

, Aaron Blake, "Kerry olllmn: "\Ve do not reco,gnize a right to enrich:" The Washington Post, November 2-1-.2013. 

S Jim Acosta, "\Vhite House prepared to allo,,\' limited Iran nuclear enrichment" CNN Political Ticker, December 4, 

2013. 
28


86466b-3.eps

The only reasonable negotiating position is for the U.S. and the P5+ 1 to insist that Iran stops all 

uranium enrichment and dismantles its centrifuge enrichment facilities. President Obama and 

others have recognized that this would be the best outcome from the negotiations with Iran but 

have said that it is an unrealistic demand since Iran would never agree. However, the whole 

point of the negotiations is to reduce Iran's centrifuge enrichment facilities and enriched uranium 

stockpiles so that it would take Iran at least a year to be able to produce the HEU for a nuclear 

weapon. To accomplish this goal would require Iran to export over three quarters of its current 

3.5% enriched uranium stockpile and reduce its number of centrifuges from the current 19,000 to 

only a few thousand. Is it any more likely that Iran will agree to this large-scale reduction of its 

centrifuge enrichment program? The real danger is that the so-called realists will, in order to 

achieve some kind of agreement, allow Iran to retain the bulk of its centrifuges and enriched 

uranium stockpile and Iran will remain within a few months of being able to acquire the HEU 

needed for nuclear weapons. 

The U.S. Congress has been considering yet more sanctions to pressure Iran. However, these 

sanctions would not be supported by Russia and China. Since the fall of2011 these two 

countries have refused to allow the United Nations to authorize any further sanctions on Iran, 

leaving the U.S. and EU to impose sanctions by themselves. Both Russia and China have 

refused to support what they consider unilateral U.S. and EU sanctions. Both countries have 

continued trading with Iran and China has continued to purchase oil from Iran. In an important 

development, Russia and Iran are negotiating an agreement that would allow Iran to increase its 

oil exports by 50% by creating a barter arrangement whereby Russia would receive 500,000 

barrels a day of Iranian oil in exchange for Russian equipment and goods9 Russia is essentially 

going to "launder" Iranian oil by hiding it in Russia's own large oil exports. 

Nor are China and Russia the only countries that have not supported the U.S. and EU sanctions. 

India, with its important economy, has said that is will not follow unilateral sanctions but only 

those imposed by the UN. India has gone so far as to change its tax code so as to facilitate a 

method of payment for purchases of Iranian oil that involves using rupees rather than dollars. 

With such an attitude by non-Western countries, it is unlikely that U.S and EU sanctions will 

have the necessary bite to compel Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program. 

The Obama administration has repeatedly said that all options including a military strike against 

Iran's centrifuge enrichment program are on the table. In the past, the Israelis have destroyed 

nuclear reactors in both Iraq and Syria. However, attacking centrifuge enrichment facilities is 

quite different from attacking single nuclear reactors and Iran's enrichment program is already 

well into a zone of immunity with regard to a single air strike. At its main enrichment facility at 

Natanz, Iran has 96 completed cascades designed to operate in paraUel.lO An air strike on Natanz 

that scored multiple bomb hits would shut down the entire facility. But the majority of the 

cascades would be undamaged and not able to operate only due to damage to piping and the loss 

of utilities. It would only take a few months of repairs before these undamaged cascades were 

back in operation. Even for the cascades that suffered bomb hits, the majority of the centrifuges 

would still be undamaged. Iran could pull out the undamaged centrifuges and use them to build 

9 "Iranian minister says oil-goods s\vap deal 110t topic 011 Russia visit" Reuters, January 16, 2014. 

1(0 Imn has declared to the lAEA that it has 52 of these cascades in opemtion. 
29


86466b-4.eps

new cascades. It would only take four to six months before Iran would return to nearly full 

production. 

A further problem is that Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium in November 201 3 were about 

4,600 kilograms of3.5% enriched uranium and 132 kilograms of 19.7% enriched uraniumll 

These stockpiles represent years of centrifuge plant operation but would be very difficult to 

destroy by air attack. The combined volume of these two stockpiles is less than two cubic 

yards-making them very easy to hide or protect. 

It is small wonder that, when discussing possible attacks on Iran's centrifuge enrichment 

program, U.S. officials have talked of bombing campaigns rather than single strikes. 12 By 

bombing Iran's facilities every few months, it would be possible to keep Iran's current 

enrichment facilities shutdown. Such a campaign would also have the advantage that the 

question of whether US. large bunker-buster bombs can actually penetrate and hit Iran's 

underground enrichment facility near Qom would largely be moot. No matter how deep and well 

protected a bunker is, it is always possible to collapse the entrance tunnels and cut off the utilities 

from the outside. 

There are two problems with such an air bombing campaign. First, Iran could respond by 

dispersing its centrifuges. Indeed, centrifuge enrichment with its many parallel cascades would 

be ideal for such dispersal. The U.S. would be able to find and bomb some of these dispersed 

enrichment sites but many would continue in operation undetected. Second, such a prolonged 

bombing campaign would run a serious risk of turning into a large-scale war with Iran. Though 

no doubt the US. would eventually win such a war, I think that given the financially-weakened 

and war-weary condition of the U.S. such a war would be ill-advised. 

There are no good options to head off a nuclear-armed Iran. However, this does not mean that I 

think Iran will become an overt nuclear weapons state in the near future. Iran is likely taking the 

long view. If the negotiations on the Comprehensive Solution fail, then Iran can quickly resume 

producing 20% enriched uranium and expanding its centrifuge enrichment facilities If the 

negotiations succeed, Iran can claim the prize of having international approval of its possession 

of centrifuge enrichment, wait out the term of the restrictions of the Comprehensive Solution and 

then greatly expand its centrifuge facilities giving Iran easy access to the HEU for nuclear 

weapons. Recall that in the past other countries have outlasted US efforts to stop their 

acquisition of nuclear weapons. For example, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in the late 

1980s but it was not until 1998 that Pakistan actually tested a nuclear weapon. 

As bad as the Iranian situation is, an even worse problem is the potential unraveling of the entire 

nonproliferation system. In August 2013, Syria conducted large-scale chemical weapon attacks 

against rebel held areas using the nerve agent sarin, exposing many thousands and killing at least 

many hundreds. This attack was the first time in 25 years that a nation has employed chemical 

weapons on such a large scale. 

11 These are only the stockpiles of enriched uranium in the form of llranillll hexafluoride. 

l~ Joby \Varrick: "Tran's underground nuclear sites not immune to U.S. bunker-busters, experts say," The 

Washington Fost. February 29, 2012. 

4 
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The world's reaction to this serious breach of nonproliferation nonns was underwhelming. 

Though France carne out strongly in favor of taking military action against Syria, the UK went 

"wobbly," as the late Margaret Thatcher would have said, with the British parliament voting 

against taking any military action against Syria. The U.S. took a very deliberate approach, with 

President Obama trying to get the support of Congress before taking any military action. But the 

statements of some U.S. lawmakers indicated that they did not see any value in taking military 

action to punish Syria for its use of chemical weapons and to deter Syria from any further use. 

Such statements indicate that these lawmakers saw no value in maintaining nonproliferation 

nonns, which was a rather disturbing development. These events must certainly undennine the 

credibility of the Obama administration's claim that all options are on the table with regard to 

Iran. 

Even before Syria's large-scale use of chemical weapons and the world's tepid response, the 

accumulation of decades of neglect and short-tenn "fixes" has put the nuclear nonproliferation 

regime under considerable stress. During this interval both Pakistan and North Korea have 

acquired nuclear arsenals and Tran has made steady progress toward nuclear weapons. 

One result of the most recent North Korean nuclear test was to increase pressures in both Japan 

and South Korea to acquire their own nuclear weapons. 13 Influential political figures in South 

Korea have suggested that now might be the time for South Korea to develop its own nuclear 

weapons or that at least the U.S. should return tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. 14 South 

Korea has strongly pressed the U.S. to allow it to extract the plutonium from its nuclear reactor 

spent fuel. This step would provide South Korea easy access to nuclear weapons. 

Japan already has a plutonium stockpile of 44 metric tons produced as a result of its civil nuclear 

power program. About 35 metric tons are stored overseas but about 9 metric tons (enough to 

produce thousands of nuclear weapons) are stored in Japan. IS Recently a number of Japanese 

political figures have openly argued that Japan should continue its plutonium program as a 

nuclear weapon hedge and Japan's parliament has amended its atomic energy act to explicitly 

include "national security" as one of the prime missions ofJapan's civilian nuclear energy 

program. 

These developments in East Asia provide a preview of how events in the Middle East may play 

out Though countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey currently lack the necessary 

nuclear technology to be able to produce nuclear weapons any time soon, this may be changing. 

Saudi Arabia has said it plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030 and wants to have the 

first two in operation by 2023. 16 With such a large nuclear power program, Saudi Arabia could 

easily say that it also requires a large centrifuge enrichment program to provide fuel for these 

reactors, which would provide it with easy access to the HEU needed for nuclear weapons. 

Questions have also been raised about Turkey's plans to acquire Japanese nuclear reactors. 

1, Hem}' SokolskL "After North Koreas Nuclear Test" Ine National Revim Online, february 12,2013. 

t4 Martin Fackler and Choc Sang-Han, "South Korea Flirts With Nuclear Idcas as North Blusters," The New rork 

Times. March 10.2013 

1') ·'The Current Situation of Plutonium Management in Japml. " Cabinet Office. Secretariat of the Atomic Enerb~' 

Commission. Japan. September II, 2013. 

16 "Saudi Ardbia to have lG nuclear reactors by 2030." The Times ojindia. AU),'llSt 27. 2013. 
31


86466b-6.eps

Turkey requested that a provision be added to its nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan that 

would allow Turkey to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technologies ifboth parties agree. 17 

The IAEA needs to stop being complicit in this problem. The IAEA must end the pretense that it 

can effectively safeguard all nuclear material and activities, no matter how dangerous. Nuclear 

safeguards are supposed to be more than an accounting system. Rather the purpose of IAEA 

safeguards " ... is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of lIuclear material 

from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear 

explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early 

detection." 18 [Emphasis in original.] 

For safeguards to be effective, non-nuclear weapon countries must be prohibited from possessing 

any materials or facilities that can quickly provide fissile material for nuclear weapons. This 

includes prohibiting not only enrichment and reprocessing facilities but also separated REV, 

plutonium or U-233; and HEU, plutonium or U-233 that is contained in unirradiated reactor fuel 

(such as REV fuel for research reactors or mixed oxide fuel for power reactors).19 Such 

restrictions would require shutting down enrichment facilities not only in Iran but also in 

Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil and Japan, as well as reprocessing facilities in Japan. Such 

restrictions would also require the removal of Japan's massive plutonium stockpile. 

The U.S. needs to examine how it can strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation system as a whole. 

Key to this effort will be to stop countries from using nominally peaceful nuclear activities to 

acquire the HEU or plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. The U.S. needs to urge the IAEA to 

clarify which materials and facilities it can effectively safeguard and which it cannot. A 

negotiated agreement with Iran that legitimizes its centrifuge enrichment program would be a 

step in the wrong direction. It will also be important for the U.S. to continue to prohibit South 

Korea from producing separated plutonium and to help Japan find a way to dispose of its huge 

plutonium stockpile. 

l' "Japan's enerb~' pact \"ith Turkey mises nuclear weapons concerns," ~~sahi ShimbuJ1. January 7. 2014. 

18 "The StructuTC and Content or Agreements Bcl\vccn The Agency and Stales Required in Connection With The 

Treaty 011 the NOIl-Pro1iferation of Nuc1ear \Veapons.'· International Atomic Energy Agency, TNFCTRC/153 

(Corrected). June 1972, p.9. 

19 U-233, like plutonium and HEU, can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. It is produced by the irradiation of 

thorium. 11ixed oxide power reactor fuel is a mixture of uranium and plutonilUll oxides. 

6 
32

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr.—help me out. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Heinonen. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Heinonen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Got it. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY) 

Mr. HEINONEN. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very 

much for inviting me to address this hearing. 

I will concentrate my remarks on the verification aspects of this 

deal which was concluded on the 20th of November, highlight some 

of the implications from a verification angle, and make some minor 

proposals for the way forward. 

The interim agreement is a small but important step forward, 

which got, after a long delay, finally a good start on the 20th of 

January. Under this deal Iran continues to produce low enriched 

uranium, keeps both 5 and 20 percent enriched uranium stocks on 

its soil, maintains centrifuge production capabilities, including the 

skills of the workforce, and continues with centrifuge R&D and 

testing. 

Iran will produce additional centrifuge rotors only to replace broken ones, but is not restricted in its production of other key centrifuge components or raw materials. No new centrifuges will be installed or new enrichment locations will be built during this period. 

Some of the 5 percent enriched uranium and all the 20 percent enriched uranium gets converted to oxides. 

In terms of capacity, that is, when Iran is able to produce enough 

weapons-grade UF6 material for a single nuclear explosive, the 

sliding bar will move from 2, 3 weeks to 3 months as a result of 

this deal. In other words, Iran maintains its semi-industrial enrichment capabilities. 

Construction work in nonnuclear parts is permitted at the Arak 

IR–4 reactor, and reactor component manufacturing proceeds elsewhere. The production of heavy water continues. The halting of the 

fuel production at Isfahan and prohibiting of the installation of nuclear components delays the commissioning of Arak reactor until 

2016. 

In November 2003, EU–3, France, Germany, and the U.K., and 

Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs in Iran, implementing provisionally the additional protocol, 

and providing the IAEA with a complete picture on its past nuclear 

program. The verification of details worked out in 2003 agreement 

by the IAEA and Iran generally have provided IAEA a much wider 

access than this agreement. 

The 2003 undertaking included, inter alia, access to the nuclear 

R&D not involving nuclear material. An example of such access 

was the IAEA visits to centrifuge mechanical testing, but this is in 

Tehran, Natanz, and Isfahan, and to centrifuge component manuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
33

facturing facilities, and to key raw materials such as high-strength 

aluminum or maraging steel. 

One of the current challenges the IAEA is facing is to establish 

the actual inventory of centrifuge rotors manufactured by Iran. 

Iran commits itself not to construct new enrichment locations, reconvert uranium back to hexafluoride, and that it will not construct 

any facility capable for reprocessing. With the access provided currently by Iran and the JPA, the IAEA remains limited in its capabilities to confirm the statements made to this end by Iran regardless whether it is to do with the centrifuges, past centrifuge enrichment, laser enrichment, or reprocessing. 

The preamble of this JPA refers to additional steps between initial measures and the final step, which include addressing the U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. Those include outstanding issues such 

as related to the possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear 

program. In other words, Iran needs, according to those resolutions, 

to explain—resolve the questions related to all its studies, missile 

reentry vehicle, green salt, and certain high-explosive studies. 

It has to explain why it acquired that uranium metal document, 

which was to do with the manufacturing of a nuclear warhead. It 

has to clarify the procurement and R&D activities of military-related institutes and companies, and has to explain the production 

of nuclear equipment and components by companies related to the 

military establishment. 

Without addressing these questions, the IAEA Secretariat will 

not be able to come to any conclusion that all nuclear material in 

Iran is in peaceful use, which is essential in building confidence of 

the international community over Iran’s nuclear program. To this 

end, I give in my written statement some proposals how to proceed 

on this way, gradually to set up and build this confidence about the 

peaceful nature of the program. 

Then at the end I would like to say that this agreement serves 

an interim stage. It should not be either an end by itself or be sustained indefinitely beyond the allotted time period up to 1 year 

without end game in sight. Further extensions may also run the 

risk of proliferation consequences in the region when the states see 

Iran not only maintaining its current nuclear breakout capabilities, 

but slowly advancing them, in particular areas which remain 

unaccessible to the IAEA inspectors. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much for your expertise. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]

34


86466c-1.eps

January 28,2014 

Implementation of the Irall Nuclear Deal 

om Heinonen 

Senior Fellow 

Helfer CenterFJr Science and International Alfairs, 

John F. Kennedv ,<.,'chool olGovemmenl 

Harvard University 

Chaimlan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address this hearing on the 

"Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal". 

In my short testimony today, I will focus on the verification aspects of the Iran 

nuclear deal concluded in Geneva on 24 November 20 13!, highlight some key 

implications, and make some suggestions for the way forward. 

On 16 January 2014 the White HOLise made public details from a more extensive 

non-paper, which specifies the current tmderstandings between Iran and the 1'5+ 1 

on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JP A) in months to come. On 17 

January, thc IAEA issued a report on its monitoring plans lmder the JPA on Iran's 

nuclear progranl to its Board of Governors, and followed 1lp on 20 January 2014 

with an infonnation document regarding Iran's first actual steps in implementating 

the JPA. 

Very briefly, let me outline the technical markers being laid out in the Joint Plan of 

Action. 

According to the provisions of the interim agreement, Iran continues to produce 

low enriched (below 5%) uranium and keeps both 5% and 20% enriched uranium 

stocks on its soil. Iran maintains centrifuge production capabilities including the 

skills of the work force, and continues with centrifuge R&D aud testing. Iran is 

allowed to produce additional centrifuge rotors only to replace broken ones, but is 

not restricted in its production of oiher key centrifuge components or raw 

materials. In addition, no new centrifuges will be installed or nc\v emichment 

1 Communication dated 27 November 2013 received from the EU High Representative 

concerning the text of the Joint Plan of Action, lAEA, INFClRC/855, 27 November 2013. 
35


86466c-2.eps

locations will be built during this period. With regard Iran's uranium stockpile and 

production, some of the 5% enriched uranium and all the 20% enriched manilUll 

gets convelied to oxides. In terms of capacity - that is, when Iran is able to 

produce enough weapons grade UF6 material for a single nuclear explosive - this 

moves the sliding bar to three months from the cUITently estimated two to three 

weeks window given Iran's currently known facilities. 

Construction work in non-nuclear parts is pemlitted at the Arak lR-40 reactor, and 

reactor component manufacturing for iR-40 ean proceed elsewhere. There are no 

restrictions to the production of heavy water. However, the halting of fuel 

production at Isfahan that would feed the Arak reactor and prohibiting the 

installation of nuclear components delays the commissioning of the Arak reactor 

until 2016. 

Centrifuge manufacturing and installatioll 

In November 2003, the EU3 (France, Ge1Tilany and the United Kingdom) and Iran 

agreed2 that the latter suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs, 

signs and implements provisionally the Additional Protocol, and provides the 

IAEA with a complete picture on its past nuclear program. Ten years ago, when 

Iran entered into agreement with the EU3, the nuclear program of Trall was less 

extensive and sophisticated. To-day Iran has mastered all aspects of the front end 

of a nuclear fuel cycle at semi-industrial scale, and has indegenous capabilities to 

produce domestically most nuclear equipment. The EU3-Iran arrangements in 

2003, and verification details worked out between Iran and the IAEA, provided the 

IAEA with generally wider access rights to centrifuge manutacturing and testing 

than under the current Plan of Action. The 2003 undertaking included, inter alia, 

access to nuclear R&D not involving nuclear material. An example of such access 

was the IAEA visits to the centrifuge mechanical testing facilities in Tehran, 

Isfahan, and Natanz, which is excluded from the ClIITent pla11. This would be 

relevant for any advanced centrifuge testings being carried out today. Another 

difference is that in 2003-2005, the lAEA had access to centrifuge component 

manufacturing facilities, and all components and key raw materials such as high 

strength aluminum or maraging steel were subject to monitoring by the IAEA. 

2 Implementation of the NPT Safe6'1lards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA, 

GOV/2003173, 10 November 2003. 

2 
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86466c-3.eps

Under the CUlTent agreement, Iran would produce additional centrifuges only to 

replace the broken ones, and it commits to placing all manufactured rotor cylinders 

and centtifuges under lAEA control, One of the challenges the LI\EA is facing is to 

establish whether all rotors manufactured or acquired by fran have been, indeed, 

declared. While it is not obvious from the Joint Plan of Action and the non-paper 

whether the IAEA will be provided with the essential information on the 

acquisition and inventories of raw materials in order to be able to confirm the 

declaration, this infoTIlmtion is clearly needed to provide a more complete picture. 

Some additional complications may also arise from the fact that the lAEA does not 

have access to Iran's R&D installations where the mechanical tests of centtifuges 

are being conducted without nuclear material. 

Enriched uranium inventories 

\Vhat will be the stocks of uranimn in Iran six months from now') Iran will 

continue to produce 5 % enriched uranium with a monthly ratc of about 250 kg 

UF6. However, it will convert any newly produced UF6 to uranium oxide by the 

end of the six 1110nth period. Tran can be expected at the end of the period to tally 

7.5 to 8.0 tons of 5 % enriched UF6, the rest being held in oxide form. This 

remains a substantial amount. A separate deal that was negotiated in 2009 but 

ultimately fell through that sought to provide fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, 

foresaw Iran's inventory of low enriched unmium not exceeding 1.2 tons of UF6. 

Under today' s agreement, Iran will dilute half of its 20 % enriched uranium to 5 % 

and convert it to uranium oxide. The other half will be converted in the coming 

months to oxide, but it will be kept as a working stock to produce 20 % enriched 

uranium fllel for the Tehran Research Reactor. These dilution and conversion 

activities of 20 % enriched uranium are the major factors which extend the breal(-

out times to over three months, with currently known and installed centrifuges. 

Such conversion activities meet the criteria set out lmder the JP A, which is meant 

to serve an interim stage. A more long lasting resolution however would clearly be 

needed going tixward given stocks of 20 % uranium in pure oxide tann can be 

reconverted to uranium hexafluoride and enriched further. As required by the Joint 

Plan, Iran has stated that there is currently no reconversion line to reconvert 

uranium oxide enriched up to 20 % U-235 back to uranium hexai1uoride UF6. 

With the access provided currently by Iran and the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA 

can confirm Iran's statements only at facilities and buildings to which the lARA 

currently has access. 

3 
37


86466c-4.eps

IAEA inspections 

Will the lARA be able to establish in a timely manner if production of higher 

enrichments of uranium commences in Nattmz and Fordow? The agreement 

provides TAEA inspectors daily access to these installations, but only to 

survcillance records, and not to anywhere else at the facilitics" Thc surveillance 

measures are dcsigned to covcr only certain activities such as removal of large 

objects from the cascade areas. Any changes to the actual cascade stmctures can be 

physically witnessed only during inspection visits into the cascade halls. To 

cOlmtcract these limitations, thc lAEA canies out unannounced inspections. 

Increased unannounced inspections would increase the ratio of possible detection. 

Additionally, to dccrease detection time, thc lAEA has to enhance its verification 

measures for both the 5'% as well as 20 % enriched uranium, not only in Natanz, 

but also at the facilities in Isfahan. Understanding the actual parameters of what the 

IAEA does is impOltant ""hen addressing lhe issue of timely detection under the 

present revised system 

To strengthen timely detection, TAEA access to uranium mines and milling 

facilities should be another factor subject to verification, with infonnation 

provided to include Iran's cunent and past production of uranium, and the 

whcreabouts of the current stocks. 

According to the Joint Plan of Action, Iran commits itself not to construct new 

emichment locations. With the access provided cunently by Iran and the Joint Plan 

of Action, the lAEA remains limited in its capabilities to confhm the statements 

made to this end by Iran regardless whether it is do with centrifuge or laser 

enrichment 

Iran has also stated, as required by the Joint Plan of Action, that it will not engage 

in reprocessing activities or construction of facility capable for reprocessing. With 

the access provided currently by Iran and the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA can 

confinn the statement at the lacilities and buildings to which it cun·ently has 

access" 

Dealing with the possible military dimensions ofIran's nuclear program 

The preamble of the Joint Plan of Action refers to additional steps between the 

initial measures and the tlnal step, which include addressing UN Security COlU1cil 

4 
38


86466c-5.eps

resolutions3 The 2010 UN Security Council resolution reaffirnled "that Tran shall 

cooperate fully with the lAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which 

give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear 

program, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, 

persons and documents requested by the IAEA ... ,,4 As pointed out in the IAEA 

reports in May 20085 and November 2011 G, this is essential for the IABA to 

provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 

activities in Tran. Tran needs to, inter alia: resolve questions related to the alleged 

studies (missile re-entry vehicle, high-explosive studies); provide more information 

on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document describing 

production of high enriched uranium components for a nuclear explosive device; 

clarity procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and 

companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear 

equipment and components by companies belonging to defense industries. 

Without addressing those questions, the TAEA Secretariat will not be able to come 

to any conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful use, which is 

essential in building confidence of the international conmlunity over Iran's nuclear 

program. 

Tackling the military concerns ofIran's nuclear program has been just as difticult 

as it is necessary. Justification that such queries would never be admitted by Iran 

and serve to hinder negotiations and therefore be set aside, is actually contrary to 

its logic. A comprehensive deal can only be reached if uncertainties over Iran's 

military nuclear capability are addressed. Such concerns, however, can be 

approached in a forward-looking way. For instance, the IAEA can establish, which 

of the past activities have been terminated, contirm that all nuclear material and 

facilities are subject to the lAEA safeguards, and activities contradicting the letter 

and spirit of the NPT have ceased. These tindings will then serve as a baseline for 

a monitoring scheme7

, which starts with a grace period where the IABA 

3 Communication dated 27 November 2013 received from the EU High Representative 

concerning the text of the Joint Plan of Action, INFClRC/855, lAEA, 27 November 2013. 

'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929,2010. 

5 Implementation of the NFT Safeh'llards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA, 

GOV/2008115, 26 May 2008. 

'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions in the Islamic Republic oflran, lAEA, GOV/2011165, 8 November 2011. 

7 OUi Heinonen, The verification of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, in S.H. Chang 

and J. Kang, Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea: Technical Aspects, 

2012. 

5 
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86466c-6.eps

verification access go beyond the safeguards agreement and the Additional 

Protocol. Such a stepwise process will be useful in building gradually confidence 

about the peaceful nature and content of Iran's nuclear program. What kind of 

uranium enrichment capacity - "mutually defined enrichment programs with 

mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs." - is in line with the 

actual needs of the nuclear program of Iran? Which kind of research reactor meets 

best Iran's training, R&D and isotope production needs? Working on a viable 

solution to replace the Arak heavy water reactor with a smaller modem up-to-date 

light water reactor?s To allow for a negotiated contour of some civilian nuclear 

power in Iran that would likely be envisaged in a final deal, Iran should outline, at 

an early stage, a comprehensive energy and nuclear enerh'Y plan - a white paper -

which explains rationally its needs and vision for the future in a transparent way. 

In summary 

The current agreement between the P5+ 1 and fran is a small first step that tests the 

grmmd for the possibility of a comprehensive deal. In this sense, this agreement is 

important, insoiar as it forms part of the route to what can constitute as a 

consequential final accord. This is not going to be easy as the most difficult parts 

lie ahead: agreement on the scope of uraniLUll cnricl1men1 and heavy water 

program, and Iran's seriousness in addressing questions and concerns related to its 

nuclear program's military dimension, which go well beyond access to one 

pm1icular building at Parchin. 

Since this agreement serves an interim stage, it should not be either an end in itself 

or be sustained indefinitely beyond the alloted time period of up to a year without 

an end game in sight. Further extensions may also run the risk of proliferation 

consequences in the region, when states see Iran not only maintaining its current 

nuclear break-out capabilities, but slowly advancing them, in particular, in areas, 

which remain unaccessible to the IAEA during the interim phase. 

The IAEA Director General Mr. Amano stated in the IAEA Board meeting 011 24 

January that he plans to repOli the progress in monthly intervals in addition to his 

qUill1erly reports. It is recommended that the IAEA Board makes them public as it 

has done with its qumierly repons. 

80lli Heinonen, The 20 Percent Solution, Foreign Policy, 11 January 2012. 

6 
40

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Albright. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much for inviting me today. It is 

a great pleasure to be here. And I appreciate all your work that 

you are doing to try to sort through the proper oversight role of 

Congress, which I personally believe is extremely important in this 

situation. 

I think we have discussed the interim deal of the Joint Plan of 

Action quite a bit, and I think its strengths and weaknesses have 

been identified. I think the real test of the Joint Plan of Action is 

going to lie in negotiating the long-term arrangements, and that is 

a process that many are not giving a high probability of success. 

But nonetheless, this long-term, comprehensive solution is going to 

have to create meaningful limits on Iran’s nuclear program, combined with adequate verification sufficient to ensure that any attempt by Iran to build nuclear weapons would be detected in a 

timely manner and provide adequate time for an international response. 

Now, the interim deal is, from my point of view, an important 

confidence-building measure, but it certainly has its weaknesses, 

many of which have been talked about. And we yesterday published an article on some problems and loopholes involving centrifuge R&D, which we think rather than criticizing the interim 

deal, I would argue that that has to be fixed in any comprehensive 

solution; that Iran’s ability to make advanced centrifuges has to be 

severely curtailed, and the process that they are involved in with 

centrifuge R&D has to be much more transparent, and particularly 

to deal with some of the problems Olli has confronted. 

Also, I want to agree with what Olli said, that the interim deal 

should not continue past its planned lifetime. By itself it is by no 

means sufficient. And if you can’t get a comprehensive deal, the interim deal is not a substitute in any manner. 

Also, I want to say that a real test of Iran’s intentions in the 

short to medium term is how it is going to treat the IAEA on these 

issues involving the allegations of Iran’s past work on nuclear 

weapons and other military programs. Iran has delayed the meeting with the IAEA that was supposed to happen in January until 

February 8. Is it going to delay it again? Is it going to—and if it 

has a meeting, is it going to allow the IAEA to go to Parchin and 

other facilities and meet with people so the IAEA can get to the 

bottom of it? 

Now, on the comprehensive solution, my testimony and our studies at ISIS have outlined what we see as a model, and certain 

things have been talked about. Certainly we want to see much 

greater breakout times. To meet our national security interests, we 

think the breakout times should be measured in 6 to 12 months to 

allow detection time and response time, and that is going to require 

Iran to remove over 14,000 centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow. 

Also, some of my colleagues have mentioned the problem with 

oxide. I mean, the stocks of LEU need to be reduced, particularly 

the 20 percent stocks. Putting them into oxide may work in an inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
41

terim deal, but it doesn’t work in a comprehensive deal. We all 

agree that the Iraq reactor, Iran’s plutonium route to nuclear 

weapons, has to be blocked. 

Also, we haven’t talked a lot about it, but there needs to be much 

greater verification that is put in play. Often Iran says, we will accept the additional protocol. We would argue it has to be the additional protocol plus. There has to be another set of verification conditions in this deal that are going to provide much greater transparency of the program. 

The other thing that is also important is to remember how long 

these conditions would last. The administration is talking about 20 

years. Iran is talking about 3 to 5. I think it is very important that 

20 years be the minimum, and that the administration be held to 

that minimum. I think if that is done, and in a sense Iran would 

be on probation for 20 years, that could provide the confidence that 

Iran has turned a corner. 

One thing that this Joint Plan of Action doesn’t deal with is how 

do they in a sense come out of probation; that it is right now implied that the conditions would end from one day to the next. And 

whatever the length is, probably some work needs to be done to 

make sure that the conditions are removed only if Iran has satisfied certain criteria. 

I think I have talked enough about the verification, but I do 

want to reemphasize that Iran has been very tough on this. It has 

resisted all kinds of verification. It is resisting it today. And I think 

that another test is going to be whether Iran is fully cooperative 

with the IAEA and with the IAEA’s effort to get to the bottom of 

all its outstanding issues, which are going to require much more 

intrusive verification, and that would be played out over the next 

several months if the comprehensive solution is going to be negotiated by the end of this 6-month period. 

Let me just end there. I am sorry. I realize I am over time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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86466d-1.eps

Testimony of David Albright 

Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

on the 

Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal 

January 28, 2014 

The Joint Plan of Action (JPA) negotiated between Iran and the United States and its partners in 

the P5+ I accomplishes a great deal in the short run, but its success remains uncertain, pending 

the negotiation oflong-term arrangements. The JPA's interim steps, which began on January 20, 

2014, are technically sound and lengthen Iran's breakout time to make enough weapon-grade 

uranium for nuclear weapons, establish transparency over many previously opaque Iranian 

nuclear activities, and freeze and even temporarily reverse key portions of the nuclear program. 

The JPA, however, leaves many key issues unsettled regarding a long-term, comprehensive 

solution. The test of the JPA lies in negotiating these long-term arrangements, a process 

President Obama gives a 50-50 chance of succeeding. A final agreement must create long-term, 

meaningful limits on Iran's nuclear program combined with adequate verification sufficient to 

ensure that any attempt by Iran to build nuclear weapons would be detected in a timely manner 

and provide adequate time for an international response. To improve the chances of success, the 

United States needs to clearly state its goals and be willing to walk away from a bad deal. If a 

comprehensive solution cannot be negotiated by the end of the interim period, the United States 

should increase economic sanctions on Iran and move to further its political isolation, while 

avoiding military strikes. 

Limited Interim Deal 

For six months, Iran has pledged to halt advances in major parts of its gas centrifuge program 

and its Arak reactor. An important accomplishment is that Iran is committed to eliminating its 

most readily nuclear weapons-usable stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium through 

dilution or conversion into oxide fonn. Iran will not make, install, or stockpile centrifuges 

during the six month period It will not enrich in any of its approximately 1,000 installed 

advanced IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, which can enrich three to five 

times faster than its first generation IR-l centrifuges. The International Atomic Energy Agency 

(TAEA) will have greater access to Iran's nuclear sites and information; overall transparency will 

increase significantly. All these conditions mean Iran's nuclear program will pose fewer risks in 

the short term. 

In particular, Iran would take longer to break out, namely divert its low enriched uranium and 

further enrich it to weapon-grade in sufficient quantities for a bomb. Once all the near 20 

percent low enriched uranium is diluted or converted into oxide, the breakout times, if Iran used 
43


86466d-2.eps

its currently installed centrifuges, would lengthen from at least 1 to 1.6 months to at least 1.9 to 

2.2 months. This may seem a small increase but with lAEA inspectors visiting daily the Natanz 

and Fordow enrichment sites, this increase in breakout times would be significant and allow the 

United States and its allies more time to respond to stop Iran before it produces enough weapongrade uranium for a bomb. For the first time since Iran's capability to break out began 

approaching dangerous levels this year, breakout times would lengthen. 

While the interim steps remain in place, Iran will be unable to reach the point where it has 

sufficient centrifuges and near 20 percent enriched uranium to break out and produce enough 

weapon-grade uranium for a bomb without being detected. ISIS calls this dangerous threshold 

"critical capability," and estimates that, absent a deal, Iran could achieve this capability in mid2014. The interim deal, by eliminating Iran's stock of near 20 percent enriched uranium 

hexafluoride, will delay by many months Iran from achieving this destabilizing threshold, even if 

the constraints imposed by the deal end after six months. 

But the interim steps are not without problems. They are limited in nature and are all reversible. 

So, ifno long-term comprehensive solution is reached, Iran could resume making near 20 

percent low enriched uranium and installing more centrifuges. The lAEA monitoring, while 

improved, falls far short of what is necessary for a long term agreement. Moreover, the increase 

in breakout times expected at the end of the six-month period may be helpful but is woefully 

inadequate for the long term and must be lengthened significantly in any comprehensive 

solution. 

Further, an area that was not frozen in the interim deal is Iran's centrifuge research and 

development (R&D) program. The interim steps are not expected to seriously affect Iran's 

centrifuge research and development program. These steps may delay the final development of 

new centrifuges that have not yet used uranium hexafluoride at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment 

Plant. However, Iran can continue development of several existing types of advanced 

centrifuges, including the IR-2m, the IR-4, IR-6 and IR-6s. Although this threat is manageable 

in the short run because of the typically slow progress in Iran's centrifuge efforts, it is very 

problematic in the long term. A centrifuge five to ten times more capable than the lR-I 

centrifuge would require five to ten times fewer centrifuges to make the same amount of 

weapon-grade uranium for nuclear weapons, allowing for much smaller facilities, fewer 

personnel, and procurement ofless material. Centrifuge R&D could also lead to breakthroughs 

in materials or methods that would further strengthen a secret breakout effort and make both the 

implementation and verification of a comprehensive solution extremely ditlicult. More 

significant limitations on Iran's centrifuge R&D combined with greater transparency of this 

program need to be included in the final step of a comprehensive solution, given that Iran's 

development of more advanced centrifuges would greatly ease its ability to conduct a secret 

breakout to nuclear weapons. 

Because of the limitations of the interim deal, it is rightly viewed as only temporary. It is not a 

substitute for a long-term solution. It is intended as a six-month measure that can be followed by 

an extension of six-months for a total of one year. This finite limit is essential to the integrity of 

the JPA. By no means should the interim steps be seen as sufficient for a long term resolution of 

the nuclear issue. 
44


86466d-3.eps

Addressing the TAEA's Concerns about Military Dimensions 

One issue that needs to be resolved before the finalization of a comprehensive solution is settling 

the TAEA 's concerns about Tran's past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons and other 

alleged military nuclear activities. Tran has stalled on doing this for years. U.S. officials have 

stated that unless Iran satisfies all the lAEA's concerns there will be no comprehensive deal. 

During the last several months, Tranian oftlcials, including President Hassan Rouhani and 

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarifhave emphasized that Iran has never pursued or sought 

a nuclear bomb. Unfortunately, the available evidence provides little reason to believe them. 

The TAEA has considerable evidence ofTranian work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004 

and some evidence suggesting that some of that work continued afterward and may 

continue today. In its November 2011 safeguards report, the lAEA provided evidence of 

Tran's pre- and post-20m nuclear weaponization etforts. The TAEA found, "The 

information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 [the activities] took place under a 

structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the 

development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still 

be ongoing." 

Western intelligence agencies are united in assessing with high confidence that Iran had a 

nuclear weapon program prior to 2004. They are less united about any such work after 

2004. 

There is general agreement that the Iranian regime has not made a decision to build a 

nuclear weapon. There is less agreement whether Tran will refrain from building a nuclear 

weapon in the future. 

The TAEA is scheduled to meet Tran in early February to discuss the next steps for Tran 

addressing the outstanding issues. Iran will need to allow the IAEA to visit several sites and 

interview a range of experts and oftlcials in order to address its concerns. 

The IAEA has identified several sites to Iran, but so far Iran has refused the IAEA's requests to 

visit these particular sites. The most prominent is a site at the Parchin military complex that is 

alleged to have been involved in undertaking high explosive tests related to the development of 

nuclear weapons. After the TAEA asked to visit this site in early 2012, Tran undertook extensive 

excavation and reconstruction at this site, compromising the lAEA's ability to settle this issue. 

Iran will need to address the Parchin issue to the satisfaction of the IAEA, which will inevitably 

involve more than simply allowing a visit. Other sites include workshops that were involved in 

making mock-ups of missile re-entry vehicles suitable to hold a nuclear warhead. An upcoming 

test ofTran's intentions will be whether it soon allows the TAEA to visit Parchin and conduct 

follow-up visits and interviews at other sites. 

3 
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86466d-4.eps

TfTran is unwilling to detail its past efforts to build nuclear weapons, or at the very least 

acknowledge the existence of a program, it will undermine the credibility of statements about its 

present-day nuclear intentions. If Iran wants the world to believe it will not build nuclear 

weapons in the future, the Iranian government should reconsider its blanket denials of ever 

seeking nuclear weapons in the past. 

The Tranian government may reason that if it comes clean about its past activities, it will be 

punished by the international community. But other cases, such as South Africa, Brazil, and 

Libya, argue against such a response. The key is admitting these past activities as part of a 

process of placing strategic limitations on its nuclear programs and instituting far greater 

transparency. The IAEA and other governments can then develop confidence that Iran is not 

seeking nuclear weapons. But ifIran seeks to continue to hide its past military nuclear efforts, it 

may find that no amount of limitations and transparency on its current programs is enough to 

reassure the international community. Significant questions about its motives, such as a desire to 

maintain a latent breakout capability, will likely remain. 

The Joint Plan of Action is structured to require Iran to satisfy the lAEA's concerns about the 

possible military dimensions of its nuclear programs prior to achieving a comprehensive 

solution. TfTran does not, then U.N. Security Council (UNSC) and U.S. economic sanctions 

should not be removed. In the case of UN SC sanctions, only one member state of the P5 need 

veto a resolution to prevent removing them, and this state would be fully justified since the 

TAEA's concerns about possible Tranian military nuclear programs are central to UNSC 

resolutions. 

Comprehensive Solution 

In parallel to Iran/lAEA negotiations, the P5+ I will soon start negotiating the provisions of the 

comprehensive solution. The U.S. negotiators will face very tough resistance from Iran as they 

seek to achieve a long-term comprehensive agreement that will limit Tran's most dangerous 

nuclear programs and ensure adequate veritication. 

The over-riding goal of the negotiations of a comprehensive solution is to establish a set of 

provisions, and associated verification measures, which if Tran agreed to them would protect the 

national security interests of the United States and its allies. The resulting limited nuclear 

programs and extensive verification measures would eliminate the risk of Iran breaking out to 

nuclear weapons at declared or covert nuclear sites without that effort being detected in a timely 

manner and without adequate time for U.S. and international responses that would prevent Iran 

from succeeding in that effort This approach depends on the United States remaining ready for 

many years to take the steps necessary to prevent Tran from obtaining nuclear weapons. 

The Joint Plan of Action does not grant Iran the right to enrich uranium, but it accepts that in a 

comprehensive agreement Iran will maintain a centrifuge program. However, Iran conceded that 

4 
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86466d-5.eps

for a period to be agreed upon, any such program would be subject to limitations on the number 

of centrifuges, the location of any centrifuge plants, the level of enrichment, and the size of 

stocks of enriched uranium. It also agreed that the program must be consistent with "practical 

needs" within "mutually agreed parameters." 

In negotiating limitations on Iran's centrifuge and other nuclear programs and adequate 

verification requirements, the United States should be guided by several key principles, 

including 

Extending breakout times significantly to at least 6-12 months. This requires that Iran 

remove over 14,000 centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow; 

Reducing and limiting Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium and natural uranium; 

Blocking Iran's plutonium route to nuclear weapons; 

Reducing significantly Iran's ability to build secret facilities to enrich uranium or 

separate plutonium; 

Ensuring that Tran commits to stopping its illicit procurements for its nuclear programs 

Achieving that any limits on Tran's nuclear programs have a duration of at least 20 years 

Tmplementing adequate veritication that goes beyond the Additional Protocol; and 

Conditioning any end to UN Security Council and US. economic sanctions on Tran 

addressing all of the IAEA's concerns, in particular those about Iran's past and possibly 

on-going nuclear weapons etforts. 

The following are a list of provisions that would meet the above principles and form the basis of 

a comprehensive solution able to protect adequately national security interests. For more detail, 

the reader is referred to a recent ISIS report on the necessary elements of a comprehensive 

solution. For background information, the reader is referred to the !)1J!in JSlS_J:!!ebsit~ and its 

Iran-specific website. 

Conditions without a defined duration 

The Arak reactor complex will be upgraded to a light water reactor using low enriched 

uranium fuel. 

Tran will not reprocess any irradiated fuel or build a facility capable of reprocessing. 

Tran will not enrich above 5 percent in the isotope uranium 235, and will not produce 

stocks of enriched uranium that exceed in quantity the needs of its civilian program, 

noting that it has long term LEU fuel delivery agreements with Russia and would be 

expected to have additional ones with foreign reactor vendors after the conclusion of a 

comprehensive solution. 

Iran will commit not to procure goods for its nuclear programs abroad in a manner that is 

considered illicit ("illicit nuclear tratlicking or trade"). 

Conditions and parameters with a defined duration of 20 years 

Tran will have only one enrichment site, the one at Natanz. The Fordow site will be shut 

down or converted into a non-centrifuge-related site. 

5 
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86466d-6.eps

Centrifuge research and development will only be conducted at the one enrichment site. 

All centrifuge testing, with or without nuclear material, will occur at this site. Centrifuge 

research and development will be limited to centrifuges with the theoretical equivalent 

enrichment output of no more than five separative work units in kilograms uranium (swu) 

per year. This is about the level of the TR-2m centrifuge. 

Major centrifuge component manufacturing and storage locations will be limited in 

number and identified. 

Centrifuge assembly will occur only at the one enrichment site. 

The number and type of centrifuges will be limited to ensure that breakout times are 

measured in many months and will be a minimum of six to twelve months at all times. 

In order to define a cap in practical tenus, it is necessary to first consider the case where 

only TR-I centrifuges are enriching at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Tn the case of a 

six month breakout time, a cap on total number ofIR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz site is 

derived from the condition of the historical IR-I centrifuge operations at the Natanz Fuel 

Enrichment Plant and the size ofTran's residual stock of 3.5 and near 20 percent LEU 

The estimated cap is about 4,000 LR-J centrifuges in the case of a breakout estimate of 

six months and fewer centrifuges in the case of a 12 month breakout estimate. 

Because Iran may seek to replace the LR-I centrifuges with more capable ones, a more 

general enrichment cap is derived from the cap on TR-l centrifuges developed above and 

is approximately 3,600 swu/year. This value serves as a general enrichment cap 

regardless of the actual enrichment capacity of any centrifuge that would replace the LR-I 

centrifuge in the future. If Iran deployed IR-2m centrifuges, for example, the parties 

would need to agree upon an average centrifuge enrichment value before deriving the 

number of LR-2m centrifuges needed to produce 3,600 swu/yr. For example, if an LR-2m 

centrifuge has an average enrichment output of 4 swu per year, then the cap would be 900 

TR-2m centrifuges. TfTran deploys any other enrichment technology, such as laser 

enrichment, it and any centrifuge plant would need to have a total enrichment output at 

this cap or below. 

In the case of the IR-I centrifuges, centrifuge manufacturing would be limited to the 

replacement of broken centrituges, ifno spares exist (see below). For example, in the 

case of LR-I centrifuges, a stock of many thousands of uninstalled centrifuges would be 

stored and then drawn upon to replace broken ones. Thus, Tran would agree not to build 

any TR-I centrifuges until this stock is exhausted1 Centrifuge manufacturing of new 

centrifuges in the case of the LR-2m centrifuge, if used for enrichment at the Natanz Fuel 

Enrichment Plant, would be unnecessary, at least initially, because any broken ones could 

be drawn from a surplus stock of them. In the case of new centrifuges, Iran will not build 

more centrifuges than allowed to be installed under the above enrichment cap of 3,600 

swu/year and would build more only to replace broken ones. 

When the long term agreement takes effect, centrifuges and all associated cascade 

equipment in excess of the cap would be turned off, so that no centrifuges are operating 

1 Broken ccntrifuges will be replaced with centrifuges of U,e salllc type. TillS should mean, for e"mnple. Umt an 

installed lR-1 centrifuge \vQuId be replaced \vith an lR-l centrifuge of the same design and enrichment capability as 

the one removed. A broken centrifuge is defined <]s one that has a rotor assembly incapable of spinning Hnder po\ver 

and cannot be repaired. 

6 
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86466d-7.eps

and the cascades are not under vacuum. Centrifuges would be turned off in a controlled 

manner so as to limit centrifuge damage. 

Right after the comprehensive solution is implemented, excess centrituges and the 

cascades containing them would be disabled in a manner so as to require at least one 

month to restart any disabled cascades. 

Excess centrifuges and associated cascade piping and equipment will be scheduled for 

removal trom Natanz and Fordow and stored under lAEA monitoring. These centrifuges 

and associated cascade items will be stored at an agreed-upon site under IAEA 

monitoring, pending their use as replacements of broken centrifuges and cascades or their 

destruction under monitoring. 

Tran will not build any conversion lines that can convert enriched uranium oxide into 

hexafluoride form. 

LEU stocks will be limited, based on a realistic civil justification. 

o With regard to near 20 percent LEU, Iran will not possess any such LEU in 

hexafluoride form and its total stock in unirradiated oxide form including in tresh 

fuel elements and assemblies, will be less than the equivalent of 100 kg of near 20 

percent LEU hexafluoride soon after the start of the implementation of the 

comprehensive solution. It has the equivalent of approximately 3 10 kg near 20 

percent LEU hexafluoride, ignoring additional production in the last few months. 

A priority is achieving a reduction of the stock soon after the start of the 

implementation of the comprehensive solution to no more than the equivalent of 

100 kg of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. During the implementation period, 

this stock will be reduced further to below the equivalent of 50 kg of near 20 

percent LEU hexafluoride. 

o Iran will not possess more than the equivalent of 20 tonnes of unirradiated, less 

than tive percent LEU hexafluoride, almost all ofwhich should be in oxide form. 

Of this total LEU inventory, Tran will possess no more than 1.5 tonnes LEU 

hexafluoride at anyone time; in essence this cap requires Iran to convert LEU 

hexafluoride into oxide form. 

o LEU in excess of these caps will be blended down to natural uranium or shipped 

abroad for storage or fuel manufacturing. In practice, this step is likely to be 

necessary only ifTran does not find a way to use this LEU in reactors during the 

next decade. 

Uranium mining, milling, and conversion facilities will be limited in throughput to the 

actual need for enrichment or other mutually agreed upon use. 

At the beginning of the period of the comprehensive solution, a procurement channel will 

be established for items needed in Iran's nuclear programs. The list of items will be 

established by mutual agreement and will include major nuclear facilities, nuclear 

components, nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods, and other sensitive items such 

as those on watch lists. Procurements of listed items outside this channel will be banned 

and considered illicit nuclear trade. This condition will also have the benefit of more 

clearly identifying procurements from North Korea to Iran as illicit. Iran will declare to 

the lAEA the key exports received and these items will be subject to lAEA verification. 

7 
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86466d-8.eps

Iran will not export or otherwise transfer nuclear materials, reactors, centrifuges, 

reprocessing equipment, other nuclear facilities or equipment, or the means to make such 

equipment or facilities to any state, company, or other entity2 

By the end of the period in which the comprehensive solution will be in force, Iran will 

implement an export control system in line with the requirements of the four main export 

control regimes (lists and guidance) and submit a comprehensive report to the 1540 

Committee on Iran's implementation of the resolution. Iran will also commit not to 

export or otherwise transfer reprocessing or enrichment technologies or goods to any 

state or non-state actor after the comprehensive solution period ends. 

Adequate Verification 

The provisions in a comprehensive solution require intrusive verification ofTran 's nuclear 

program aimed at ensuring that Iran's declarations are correct and complete and developing 

confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and materials. The latter condition 

must include sufficient verification measures to detect the construction and operation of secret 

gas centrituge plants, a daunting task in the best of circumstances. 

Certain key aspects of the verification arrangements are already clear. One overriding condition 

that will need to be accepted by Iran is what is commonly called the "Additional Protocol Plus" 

or "AP Plus." This condition recognizes that, despite its central importance, the Additional 

Protocol (AP) by itself is necessary but not sufficient to verify any comprehensive solution. The 

other elements that would comprise the "Plus" need to be turther developed, but some have been 

identitied in general. One element is the veritication of centrituge manufacturing, including the 

declaration and verification of key raw materials and components. The declaration needs to 

include the origin and amounts of key raw materials and the total number of major components, 

including the number held in stock, the number manufactured or procured, and their fate. 

Another element is the verification of uranium obtained abroad and produced domestically, e.g 

in uranium mines and mills. A third area is the veritication of any key facilities, materials, and 

components associated with the former military dimensions ofTran's nuclear programs. This 

step, once put in place, would depend on Iran already having satisfied the lAEA' s concerns 

about the military dimensions of its nuclear programs. A fourth step is that Iran would agree to 

provide the TAEA with details of past and tuture imports, exports, and uses of key items listed 

under lNFCLRC 254 part 1 and 2 and other critical goods that are used in lran's nuclear 

programs. 

Goal of Negotiations of Comprehensive Solution 

As 1 have underlined, the over-riding goal of the negotiations of a comprehensive solution is 

eliminate the risk of Iran breaking out to nuclear weapons at declared or covert nuclear sites 

without that effort being detected in a timely manner and without adequate time for US. and 

2 A model condition developed by ISIS: The slale of concern agrees nollo lransfer to any slale or entily "lmlsoeve," 

or in any way help a state or entity obtain, nuclear \veapons or e:\.--plosive devices, or components of snch \veapons; 

nuclear materiat nuclear know-hmv OT technology; OT equipment, material. goods, technology designed faT, 

prepared for, or that can contribute to the processing, use. or production of nuclear materials for nuclear \VeapOlls or 

in sanctioned nuclear programs. 

8 
50


86466d-9.eps

international responses that would prevent Iran from succeeding in that effort. In return for these 

concessions and adequate verification, the United Nations Security Council, the United States, 

and allied countries should in a phased and reversible manner lift the economic sanctions 

currently in place against Tran. 

An adequate comprehensive solution will depend on the United States and its allies now making 

clear to Iran what is required of it. Thus, this is indeed a pivotal moment. If the two sides are 

not able to negotiate an agreement, the P5+ I needs to be prepared to reestablish and increase 

economic sanctions on Iran. That eventuality needs to be prepared for today. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify. 

9 
51

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to the excellent panelists. 

We will begin with our set of questions. 

My first question is why is this deal in secret? Why is it that 

Members of Congress have to go to a supersecret secure location, 

cone of silence, Get Smart kind of place to look at the deal? And, 

Mr. Acevedo, our subcommittee staff director, and I did that, and 

we went into the room, and it is a very easy-to-read document. One 

doesn’t have to be as an expert as one of our panelists is to understand what is there. It is quite eye-opening. I encourage all of the 

Members to go there and read the document. You can’t take notes. 

You can’t take it out. 

But if this is such a great deal, if this is so good for peace and 

diplomacy in our time, why is it held in secret? And do you worry 

about the details in this plan? Do you worry about what may be 

or may not be in it? I just ask that as a general question, because 

having read it, if the administration is proud of it, I think that they 

should highlight it. 

I will ask the panelists, what is the greatest worry you have 

about this deal? And, Ambassador Wallace, last week there were 

reports that Iran could use the money from sanctions relief to fund 

terrorism against us. What kind of oversight or mechanisms are in 

place, do you know, to ensure that the proper and adequate use of 

sanctions relief funds, and can we follow the money once it is released? 

So the secretive nature of the deal; why doesn’t the public have 

it; why can’t we just have it in an open setting; your greatest 

worry; and can we follow the money? Whoever wants to get at that. 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

My biggest worry about the deal is that we have significantly 

rolled back the sanctions architecture which all of you, both sides 

of the aisle, have carefully constructed, and defied a variety of 

Presidents over a long time, and created the sanctions architecture. 

Mr. Sherman said it quite well in his intervention where he said, 

you have to have ever-increasing sanctions for them to be effective. 

The moment you start dialing them back, they start falling away. 

So we have really undercut dramatically the sanctions effort, and 

the Iranian economy, as I said, is blossoming. 

At the same time, we haven’t rolled back their nuclear program 

in any material way. No one on this panel, and there are true experts on this panel on the complexities of the nuclear physics, can 

show that a single centrifuge has been dismantled. Whatever the 

range of opinions here, if you believe in no enrichment or some limited enrichment, it means that Iran can only have something like 

zero to maybe 4,000 IR–1, the most primitive centrifuge. That is 

the range of opinion probably at this table. I don’t want to speak 

for my colleagues. What are the chances that Iran is going to dismantle 15,000 to 19,000 of its centrifuges? I say none. 

So my worry is that the interim agreement becomes the permanent agreement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Any other panelists? 

Mr. Jones. 

52

Mr. JONES. Can I just say with regard to the terms being somewhat secret, this does bother me, and not necessarily for the reason 

you think. It appears to me that the administration has negotiated 

an agreement it doesn’t fully understand, and I don’t understand 

how that can happen, because obviously there are technical experts 

in the national labs who know as much as I, if not more. But it 

is clear there are various places, and one is the 3.5 percent enriched uranium stockpile won’t grow, which is obviously not correct. Another is that disconnecting the tandem cascades would prevent Iran from producing 20 percent, where we know that they 

originally produced it with single cascades, which was what they 

would be left with. 

So I am left with the impression that the administration doesn’t 

really understand what it has negotiated, and that I find most worrisome. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. 

About the document and the secret agreement, actually it is not 

very unusual in this. I think there are similar understandings 

where at the time of the Agreed Framework with North Korea. So 

we have seen those before. 

When I look at the technical explanations, where this really—especially the White House, I didn’t see any reason technically to 

keep those provisions secret. But there might be some other parts 

which I just don’t know because I have not seen the document and 

how big it is. But I think it would clarify a lot of areas if it is made 

public. 

Then the second thing, my worries. I think that I mentioned my 

worries in my opening statement, and particularly really this becomes a kind of final agreement, or agreement which has a long 

life expectancy, because we really don’t get any insight to the content of the Iranian nuclear program with this deal. It is better than 

what was a year or 2 ago the situation, but it is not the final solution. 

And I still want to remind from the verification point of view 

that every day when the IAEA doesn’t have access to this so-called 

military dimension, it would be more and more difficult for it to 

verify what actually took place. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Albright, we will have to wait for your statement 

maybe in another set of questions from my colleagues. 

And I would like to encourage our members to please go and 

read the document. I encourage you to do so. 

And before I recognize Ranking Member Deutch, I hear that his 

older brother is in the front row; is that right? 

Mr. DEUTCH. That is correct. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You told me he was your younger brother. 

Thank you so much. Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. That is one I don’t 

believe that I will live down for a while. 

That is right, Ranking Member Sherman points out he does have 

more hair than his younger brother. 

53

Mr. SHERMAN. Not that I would notice. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I wanted to just follow up with Mr. Albright. If I 

understand correctly, the quote that I referred to in my opening 

statement about Parchin being a huge site dedicated to the research, development, production of ammunition, rockets, and high 

explosives, which is owned by Iran’s military industry and has hundreds of buildings and test sites, is one that came from your organization; is that correct? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. We have looked at that quite a bit. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So if you could just speak to what is, I think, the 

crux of all this entire debate. This is not about just the centrifuges 

that are spinning, this is about how to prevent Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. And that statement and Parchin seems to be 

right at the heart of this, and yet we don’t yet have the details behind. 

Mr. Heinonen, you just alluded to this as well. What do we have 

to see there? How likely is it for the Iranians to have completely 

swept clean Parchin? And when we talk about Iran coming clean 

on the possible military dimensions, what is it that they have to 

provide; and are there examples of other regimes in similar circumstances who have faced this question, and what have we expected from them? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think Parchin, there is a site there that is alleged to have been engaged in high-explosive work related to nuclear weapons development. The IAEA has evidence of it. It asked 

to go for over 18 months and has been denied. And in that time 

Iran has significantly modified the site to the point where it may 

not be possible for them to take environmental sampling and find 

something. 

But I think the key thing is, one, Iran has to allow the visit, and 

then they have to allow the follow-up. It is not just a visit. I mean, 

the IAEA will come, they will do things that Iran will have to allow 

them to do, and then they are going to have to give them access 

to the people involved, based on IAEA information at least, and answer the basic question, did they do this work. 

Mr. DEUTCH. When were the previous inspections? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. They have never been to this building, or to this 

particular complex. They have been to Parchin, Olli can talk about 

that, but it was a long time ago, and the information available was 

much less complete than it is now. And so I think the focus now 

is on this particular site of high explosives. 

Now, you asked there is other sites, too. There are sites involved, 

workshops that are alleged to have made reentry vehicles prior to 

2004. The IAEA has asked to go there in the past and has not been 

allowed. 

So I think in cases where it has worked, Libya, South Africa, the 

country cooperates, and in that cooperation you can see that it can 

work out, and that IAEA can do its job. Iran has not shown that 

level of cooperation. 

And so one of the first things to look for, if Iran is going to settle 

this, is it cooperating, and so that the IAEA is able to get the people, gets the information it needs, and then is able to ask followup questions to get to the very bottom of this? 

54

Mr. DEUTCH. But we are not operating in the dark here. We have 

a list, presumably, and, Mr. Heinonen, I would ask you this as 

well. We know who we would like—the IAEA knows the people 

that need to be spoken to, correct? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, they know some, but they won’t know the 

complete list. I mean, it is not possible. I know in the case of South 

Africa, there were people that you wouldn’t have expected who provided important information. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But you don’t get those other names until you start 

with the ones that we have. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. You need to start. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So tell us about the discussions that have taken 

place thus far. Have we identified those individuals that we wish 

to speak with? And what is the response from——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes, but Olli should really answer the ones they 

have spoken to. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Please. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Actually, those discussions are reflected in the 

IAEA reports, in 2008 March report and then again for the June 

report of 2008. And at that point in time, when we come to these 

so-called or possible military dimensions, we have an opportunity 

to discuss with the first director of that so-called physics research 

center which Iran had programmed for more than 10 years, but unfortunately he was not able to answer all the questions. And then 

we wanted to see his successor, which never materialized. 

So the IAEA has a good understanding of those; also, about the 

people who had procured certain equipment which had been used 

in those experiments; some scientific publications which have been 

published by these people. So there is quite a good starting point. 

And then you start to talk, and look at the facts, and go from there 

and see whom else you might need to be seeing. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But is there—if I may, Madam Chair, have we prepared this list and presented it to the Iranians in all of the talks 

thus far? And is there an acknowledgment that, yes, those are appropriate questions, and we will make sure that these individuals 

will respond? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Well, when you go through an investigative process, you don’t give the whole list. You start with the key persons, 

and then you work your way from there. So I don’t think that the 

IAEA has prepared a very long list at this stage; only the starting 

point and then go from there. But such kind of list exists. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And were those names included in the last report? 

Mr. HEINONEN. No, only one name, I think, has been in the reports, because that is another reason the IAEA doesn’t want it disclosed for a number of reasons, the names. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But that name has been disclosed——

Mr. HEINONEN. Yeah, one name has been disclosed. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Since that would certainly be a good place to start, 

and he has already been identified in the report, has he agreed to 

engage in these discussions? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. We met him, I think, twice. But then at one 

point in time, then the process got stopped, and we never got to 

his successor. 

55

Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Chairman, just before I yield back, I hope 

later in Mr. Heinonen’s responses he might be able to elaborate on 

the comment that he made in his opening statement that in 2003 

in the agreement there was much greater access provided than 

there is today. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can I add one thing, though, to add to Olli’s answer? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Go right ahead. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. One is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has been identified. 

Olli was talking about Shahmoradi, who ran the physics research 

center. So there are lists of names that have been made public. 

And no, I don’t think any of them have ever talked about anything 

to do with the military dimensions. Shahmoradi, correct me if I am 

wrong, Olli, talked about work he did as a professor at Sharif University, but he didn’t talk about the physics research center work. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

And we appreciate the younger brother being here to get you here 

on time after the votes. Now we know the weapon when Mrs. 

Deutch is not available. 

Judge Poe. That’s just the way it is. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to say amen to your comments about the deal being public 

not only for Members of Congress, but for American people as well, 

since it affects us. I am perplexed why it is not. And I still don’t 

know why it is not. 

Iran is the mischief maker in the Middle East. They have the 

military. Their military is involved in Syria. They support terrorism throughout the world. They are sending rockets to 

Hezbollah in Lebanon so they can be fired into Israel. They are responsible for the attacks on the Iranian dissidents, the MEK in 

Iraq, over the last several years. 

The Supreme Leader of Iran said that he wants to destroy Israel. 

He wants to destroy the United States. They are building intercontinental ballistic missiles. They are expanding their conventional war capabilities. 

What in the world are we thinking that they want to deal with 

us and cut back on their nuclear weapon development? What incentive? I mean, they might just not be telling us the truth that they 

will cut back. I don’t think we should believe anything they say. 

Contracts, deals are made when both sides agree, and there are 

inspections, or people act in good faith. The Iranians aren’t acting 

in good faith. I don’t see any evidence over the last few years they 

have ever acted in good faith. Sanctions have worked, and we are 

now backing off the sanctions. They have to be forced not to be able 

to build nuclear weapons. 

Now, I agree peace is the best answer, negotiations is the best 

answer. Long term we got to do that. We don’t want to be involved 

in some type of military action, and we have to prevent that from 

happening. But long term, Mr. Albright, you talked about the longterm situation, we look down the road months, years, it doesn’t 

look too good for the free world as far as nuclear weapons go. I 

mean these ICBMs, they are being built not to go Israel, but to go 

west, Europe, go to the United States. 

56

So, Ambassador, and I will let all of you comment on this, long 

term how are we going to resolve the problem that Iran is determined to have nuclear weapons; what is the answer to that question? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I guess I will take a first crack at that 

big question. 

President Obama recently said that somehow if we could have a 

nuclear deal with Iran, that it would resolve the sectarian tensions 

that are plaguing the region. I disagree with that strongly, particularly since the nature of this deal seems to not understand their 

nuclear weapon program. 

The U.N. Security Council passed several resolutions saying that 

Iran must suspend its enrichment and clarified the military aspects 

that Olli and Mr. Albright were talking about. That hasn’t happened. So I think that we are a long way away from getting to a 

point where we can use this nuclear file in a vacuum to deal with 

the problems in the region and the like. 

And I remain greatly concerned that we seemingly forgot those 

Security Council resolutions which required suspension of enrichment, required a clarification on military dimension. And in the 

agreement it says that Iran will have a mutually defined enrichment program in the final deal. I thought that was an unfortunate 

step. 

I don’t think that goes a long way to answering your big question, but I want to allow my colleagues time. 

Mr. POE. Well, Ambassador, let me ask you this: Is it correct that 

Iran is developing ICBMs? Is that correct? 

Ambassador WALLACE. We have seen a variety of evidence that 

they are looking at the other aspects of obtaining a nuclear weapon, which is the delivery capacity, the ignition capacity, and the 

like. 

So we have seen a lot of evidence of this. I think there is a really 

important part of the agreement that hasn’t been focused on, which 

is clarifying these other military aspects of the program. We 

haven’t heard from Iran about this. They haven’t clarified that. 

Those reports are very disturbing. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Jones, you want to weigh in on this? Give us the 

long-range answer. 

Mr. JONES. Well, unfortunately I am always the party pooper at 

these things. I believe the ship has sailed, that it is too late to stop 

Iran. 

Mr. POE. So you think Iran is going to get nuclear weapons. 

Mr. JONES. That is correct. And that depresses everyone who 

hears me talk, but that is what I believe, because, as I said in my 

statement, I can’t see how there is going to be any agreement. I 

don’t see how the sanctions with the Russians, Chinese, the Indians undercutting them are going do any good. As you correctly 

pointed out, I am not in favor of getting into yet another war in 

the Middle East. 

Mr. POE. We have got the Saudis and the Israelis working together. Who would have ever thought of this? I mean, the Saudis 

are worried about the nuclear weapon capability of Iran, of course 

Israel is, and they are working together and denouncing this deal. 

57

Mr. JONES. It certainly shows the level of the threat and the concern in the region. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Judge. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

First, if Iran has nuclear weapons, Americans shouldn’t feel that 

they are safe even if missile defense worked, because you can 

smuggle a nuclear weapon inside a bale of marijuana. 

Second, the best argument for this agreement remaining secret 

is it must contain wonderful pro-American provisions that 

hardliners in Iran are unaware of. Unfortunately, and I know the 

hardliners look to me for advice and information, but we have seen 

it. It doesn’t. So it is peculiar that this agreement is not disclosed. 

Nobody wants just one bomb. You are a nuclear power when you 

have got several and you are confident enough to test one. In July, 

Iran will have a certain stockpile of enriched uranium. It will have 

about half its 20 percent enriched, with that being in oxide form. 

It will have its low-enriched uranium hexafluoride that it has 

today, and then it will have an additional supply of low-enriched 

uranium oxide. 

Assuming they don’t do anything with the yellowcake, they are 

just looking at the enriched uranium that they will have in July, 

how many bombs is that enough uranium for once they enrich it 

to weapons grade? 

Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I would estimate around four weapons. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Four. Okay. And how long would it take them, 

knowing that they can spend the next 6 months doing experiments 

and engineering on their advanced centrifuges, but are not making 

any more centrifuges, as I understand the agreement, but they 

have got what they have got, they are learning how to use it better—how long will it take for them to use this stockpile of enriched 

uranium and make four weapons, assuming breakout? 

Mr. JONES. With just what they have got, they get the first weapon in about 2 months; the four weapons, I don’t know, probably 4 

or 5 months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. 4 to 5 months. I will go down the panel. Everybody agree with Mr. Jones? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I would. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You do agree. 

Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I would like to add to the picture another part, 

which is the unknowns. It is easy to talk about this what we see. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HEINONEN. But the most important thing is to register the 

amount of unknowns. Are there additional centrifuges? If there are, 

are there additional stocks? And I think this is where the whole 

focus——

Mr. SHERMAN. Based on what we do know, and one of the only 

advantages of this agreement is we are inspecting a few things we 

hadn’t been inspecting before, but answering the question Mr. 

Jones did, do you agree with him basically four weapons in 4 

months? 

58

Mr. HEINONEN. I think it will take longer than 4 months, but the 

first weapon will be there in 2, 3 months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. And Mr. Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. In terms of the first one, in 2 months, around 

that, but I think to get to four or five, I would probably just multiply that number by four or five. So you are talking about 8, 10 

months. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. So you tend to agree first weapon in 2, 

fourth weapon in 4 to 8. 

I would point out that if we lose this game, it is not because of 

who was calling the plays in the final quarter. We didn’t field a 

team for the first three quarters. 

From 1996 to 2010, although this committee did everything possible to pass new sanctions, they were stopped by three successive 

administrations. Our effective sanctions against Iran began in 

2010; their program began 10 years sooner. 

We are now committed to this goal-line stand just a few yards 

from the goal line, and it is not clear which play we could possibly 

call, but we have got three. We have got the voluntary sanctions, 

which is what we have now. That is to say we have the sanctions 

we can get other countries to agree to. Then there are secondary 

sanctions where you basically threaten a cutoff of world trade if 

they don’t radically change their laws. The Iran Sanctions Act calls 

for that, but we don’t do it. And then finally there is the prospect 

of military action. 

If we took military action, would we be able to turn into rubble 

the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow; do I have an answer? Mr. 

Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I discuss that in my written testimony. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

Mr. JONES. Unfortunately, the centrifuges are quite resistant to 

bombardment because you have at Fordow 96 parallel cascades——

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

Mr. JONES [continuing]. That can run. So you certainly you take 

out some. A bombing raid, and we saw this in World War II, you 

knock out the utilities, the plant goes down. But how quickly can 

it get back? And it turns out fairly fast. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me put up one other thing. And then the final 

possibility is that we threaten to hit every oil field and industrial 

and strategic target in Iran if they don’t allow Mr. Wallace to go 

in with 400 experts, along with the entire panel, and just clean out 

everything. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I don’t think I have time to ask for your comment on that, so you can respond in writing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Hold that thought, Olli. Thank you. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Mr. Sherman. I thought those were great questions. 

And to the panel, thank you for being here. I am having a hard 

time actually figuring out what the United States got out of this. 

I mean, you know, the Iranians got a lot. They basically got an imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
59

plicit right to enrich uraniun, and we have allies that are begging 

us in 3–2–1 agreements to be able to enrich uranium. 

We say no to allies, but then to enemies we basically give them 

the right to enrich uranium as a reward for doing it the wrong 

way. I mean, I guess I am really having a hard time figuring out 

anything that the United States gained besides being able, I guess, 

for the next year to go in front of the American people and say that 

we won something, but then that will only be proven wrong by history. 

This, to me, is like the equivalent of a police officer pulling somebody over for DUI, and the person in the car is saying, well, Mr. 

Officer, I will be happy to pull over, but you have to let me have 

the keys in the car with the engine running, and I am not going 

to get out. And then the officer saying, you know what, that sounds 

like a fair deal. That is a good deal for me. So I am having a hard 

time with that. 

I also, you know, think back to what happened in North Korea. 

And I remember the agreement that was hailed as, you know, the 

peace in our time of the Korean nuclear agreement in North Korea, 

that they were going to not have a nuclear weapon. And, in fact, 

I remember reading some of the editorial papers that basically said 

this was a huge victory against the warhawks and the people that 

said diplomacy could never work. And then a year later, North 

Korea has nuclear weapons, and that is something we are dealing 

with today. And that, I think, is a regime that, as threatening as 

they are, are probably less threatening than what would happen if 

the Iranians got nuclear weapons. 

And I think of how the sanctions went down even in—and I 

know Iraq is a touchy subject, so not talking about the war in 2003, 

but the inspection regime in the 1990s, and this cat-and-mouse 

game that occurred and everything like that. So I am trying to figure out what the enforcement mechanism on our end and the motivation to prevent Iran from playing the cat-and-mouse game. And 

the second they do, is this a matter of, okay, well, the deal is off, 

and we are back to the full sanctions? But I get no indication that 

that is the case either. 

I want to ask the members of the panel both about the North Korean parallel here and something we ought to be concerned with, 

and your words of wisdom on that. But also, if you think back to 

when we have used sanctions in the past, times that they have 

been successful and times that they have not been successful, pulling the trigger on relieving sanctions too early, I think, leads to 

unsuccess. And so I want to know if any of you all have an example 

of that, or maybe even a counter example to what I am saying. 

Maybe pulling the trigger early has helped. And then also discuss 

the North Korean parallel. 

Ambassador, I will start with you. 

Ambassador WALLACE. Sure. I will try to get at the sanctions 

question and leave it to my colleagues on some other previous examples. 

Look, I think we did pull the trigger well too early on sanctions 

here. I am not a sanctions apologist. I run a group that engages 

in economic pressure and engages in sanctions promotion, but they 

don’t always work. Actually, this committee and this Congress 

60

showed that they were working in the context of Iran. Iran’s economy was veering toward the red zone, and I think that we blinked, 

unfortunately, 4 to 6 months too early. 

There are many more examples of sanctions not working historically than they have worked. I would argue that our sanctions on 

Iran were maybe the most effective, but we unraveled them too 

quickly. There is no secret here. There are only four tools in the 

tool shed: Sanctions, diplomacy, a military option, and covert action. A serious foreign policy would engage in all of them. Unfortunately, we just dialed back the sanctions when they were just 

about to have the great fundamental impact. 

Mr. KINZINGER. It is like, in essence, if you look at those old 

1980s shows when, you know, the investigator always should 

punch the bad guy one last time, and you know it, and he walks 

away and the bad guy gets up. 

Mr. Jones. 

Ambassador WALLACE. A Roadrunner episode is coming to mind. 

Mr. JONES. I want to first say that much of what you said sounds 

like you were reading off my sheet here. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Maybe I was. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

But on North Korea, I want to point out how these failures are 

damaging U.S. credibility worldwide. I was discussing Iran with 

some Canadian intelligence analysts a while ago, and I gave my 

pessimistic views on Iran, and one of the Canadians said, but the 

U.S. administration said they are not going to allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. And before I could say anything, one of the other 

Canadians said, that is what they said about North Korea, too. And 

these are our friends. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, and I also think the administration would 

probably have never said that Fallujah would be taken over by alQaeda again when they left, but that is another issue. 

I guess maybe briefly the last two. My time has expired, but if 

you would just real quick. 

Mr. HEINONEN. It brings to my mind my discussion in 2003 with 

my North Korean counterpart when we were kicked once more out 

from North Korea and I asked, what next? Is it a nuclear weapon? 

He told me that, Olli, don’t worry, we will not build a nuclear 

weapon. Plutonium is our weapon. Well, we know now what happened, and I think this is exactly the situation with Iran——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will have you hold that thought just because, sir, I have to be fair to everybody——

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. And be equally rude to everyone 

and cut you off. Thank you. 

Mr. Higgins is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I just want to go back to the elections that brought Rouhani into 

office. You know, there were six candidates running. Rouhani ran 

against the policies that created international isolation, he ran 

against the policies that created sanctions, and then he won the 

election. 

Now, Iranian elections aren’t like United States elections. 

Rouhani could not have won without the Supreme Leader, 

61

Khamenei, willing it. In fact, in Iran if you don’t get 50 percent of 

the vote, there is a runoff. Rouhani got 50.6 percent of the vote. 

It tells us that either the Supreme Leader is trying to bamboozle 

the United States into believing that Iran is committed to reform, 

or that the Supreme Leader is allowing Rouhani an opportunity to 

negotiate a deal. But the big question is we don’t know if it is a 

deal that we can live with, and we don’t know if it is a deal that 

the international community can live with. 

Now, there is three generations of nuclear proliferation in Iran. 

The first one was basically a glorified national science project. Iran 

10 years ago had 164 centrifuges, which is basically the machinery 

that spins uranium at supersonic speeds to produce weapons-grade 

fuel. Today Iran has 19,000 centrifuges. It has a multibillion-dollar 

atomic infrastructure that has given Iran breakout capability, 

which means that Iran can produce now weapons-grade material 

before we can detect it and act against it, which is in fundamental 

conflict with the objectives of the United States, and that is Iran 

will not get nuclear weapons, not the containment of a nuclear 

weapon once they get it. 

So the objective of prevention may be lost. And in addition to 

19,000 centrifuges, Iran also constructed its first heavy-water reactor for plutonium enrichment, another bomb fuel. 

There wouldn’t be this discussion, and Iran wouldn’t be at the 

table unless we imposed sanctions, because that is the only thing 

that they respond to. I think if we take sanctions off the table, you 

take away the leverage, assuming that Rouhani is sincere about 

this—he ran the nuclear program for 10 years prior to his election 

as President—and the only leverage we have. 

Remember the Iran-Iraq war. They were at war for 8 years. It 

was basically a stand-off. Nobody won. Khamenei said that upon 

basically calling a truce, it was like drinking poison from a chalice. 

Then the United States went in Iraq and did in 3 weeks what Iran 

couldn’t do in 8 years, and guess what Iran stopped doing? Enriching uranium. 

So, you know, we have been through this, and I think the United 

States gets played by leaders in Iraq. They push us away when 

they are doing well; they pull us in when they are being challenged. Same in Afghanistan and the same in Iran. 

I think we need to be very careful as a Nation before we begin 

to provide relief from sanctions because the Iranian economy is a 

mess. It dropped 6 percentage points last year. They don’t even 

have the capacity to refine the oil that they produce for so many 

other countries. Europe stopped buying oil from Iran. China, who 

continues to buy oil from Iran, said, we will continue to buy it from 

you so long as it is deeply discounted, which further hurts Iran. 

Now, there are 90 million people in that country, the vast majority of whom are under the age of 30. They are sick and tired of 

these repressive regimes, and because of social media, Twitter, the 

Internet, YouTube, they see how the rest of the world is living. And 

the tools of social media are not only used for aspirational purposes 

and seeing how everybody else is living, but it is used highly effectively for organizational purposes. 

Iran was always good at suppression. Tehran is not like New 

York City, it is like Los Angeles. It is spread out. But the regime 

62

was always good at keeping people down. So I just think that we 

need to be very, very careful. 

I know that I went on a little bit longer here. So I just ask a brief 

comment. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Maybe we will have them comment in someone else’s answers. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. Perry is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Gentlemen, just a couple quotes because I think they bear repeating over and over again. And this is a key quote out of Iran 

earlier in the decade:

‘‘The dilemma was if we offered a complete picture, the picture 

itself could lead us to the U.N. Security Council, and not providing a complete picture would also be a violation of the resolution, and we could have been referred to the Security Council 

for not implementing the resolution.’’

And then the next one just from last week when President 

Rouhani said, as Judge Poe already indicated, ‘‘The Geneva deal 

means the surrender of big powers before the great Nation of Iran.’’ 

And in that context it seems to me that all the of the American 

people, liberals, conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, people that 

don’t care, can see exactly what is happening here, and the only 

folks that genuinely support this somehow come out of academia 

with some hope for a better solution that is not based in reality. 

My first questions, I guess, would go to Mr. Albright. It seems 

like you are kind of in favor of the deal, but I just want to get your 

context. Do you understand it is a deal about nonproliferation? Is 

that what we are trying to get to? And is it your opinion that it 

gets us a little closer to nonproliferation? As quickly as you can. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The goal of the deal is to ensure that Iran does 

not get nuclear weapons. But again, it is the comprehensive solution that would get this, not the interim deal. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. Right. But we don’t trust these folks, and they 

have no reason to have our trust. They haven’t done anything to 

earn it over a period of time. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is right. 

Mr. PERRY. Now, there is this 3-year study recently published by 

the Pentagon that intelligence agencies are not yet organized or 

fully equipped to detect the development of nuclear weapons or the 

ramping up of existing arsenals in foreign countries. Are you familiar? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. So with that in mind—have you ever been to Iran? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I have not. 

Mr. PERRY. I mean, you have seen it on a map. It is a big country, right? I mean, it is——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I have studied it a lot. 

Mr. PERRY. Yeah. Hard to find big things and little things in——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But one thing, that study, you have to remember 

in Iran the Intelligence Community has done pretty well. It has exposed many secret sites. 

63

Mr. PERRY. Many, which is great. But there is not a lot of margin 

for error. So do you think the elements of the Joint Action Plan and 

the implementation agreement can be adequately verified under 

the current context? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think, well, the interim deal is limited steps. 

Yeah, I think that can be adequately verified. I think many things 

that are important are not included in that, and in order to verify 

those, there is going to have to be a great deal of stepped-up 

verification. 

In terms of the Intelligence Community, certainly any efforts to 

improve their abilities is good, but I would say that on——

Mr. PERRY. But by your own testimony, didn’t you already say 

that earlier this month Iran has already been somewhat intractable and nonresponsive or not interested——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, and that is right. But you asked me if it can 

be done. I think it can be. And one of the verification conditions 

is are they cooperating. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. In the context that everything in the world is 

possible, anything can be done. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, no, it is not possible. If Iran is not cooperative, they are not abiding by——

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. The verification conditions, then that 

is an early test of whether they intend——

Mr. PERRY. But again, we are working within the context of 

there is no—in my mind anyhow, especially if you live in Israel—

no margin for error. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I have lived in Israel. So I think there is plenty 

of room to design a verification regime. 

Mr. PERRY. But you are not in Israel now. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, obviously not. But there is plenty of——

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Okay. So, Ambassador Wallace, have we already moved from prevention to containment? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I certainly hope not, but it is certainly 

looking that way. 

Mr. PERRY. How is that measured? Do we know how that is 

measured? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I would just say, particularly with the expertise on this panel, absent countries that fully and 100 percent 

cooperate, there is no such thing as verification that works. 

So we are deluding ourselves in the context of Iran that additional protocol plus—I don’t want to speak for my colleagues—is all 

great to ask for, but absent 100 percent cooperation, verification 

equals bomb. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 

So back to my other question regarding containment or prevention, because we have been told by this administration we are 

going to prevent, we are going to prevent, we are going to prevent. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I have worried about this. 

Mr. PERRY. Have we moved to containment? 

Ambassador WALLACE. If we had made this deal 10, 15 years ago 

and locked in at a very early stage of Iranian nuclear program, I 

would say we aren’t containing. Now it sure looks like we are containing. 

64

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. As I said, I think the ship has sailed. We are to containment. 

Mr. PERRY. So when did we get to containment, in your opinion? 

Mr. JONES. In, I don’t know, maybe 2008, 2009. I mean, you 

know, it was a gradual process as they add more and more. 

Mr. PERRY. Could we, if we kept the sanctions present, could we 

have gotten—if we got to containment in 2008 and 2009 and didn’t 

admit it, if the sanctions would have continued, would we have 

been able to get back to prevention, in your opinion? 

Mr. JONES. Well, if we had the sort of sanctions we are talking 

about now back then or maybe 2006, I think so. Now I think it is 

too late. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, for sharing 

your insights. I want to thank you for what you all do every day. 

I don’t think a day goes by where I am not reading something from 

UANI, from ISIS, from Belfer, many days from all three. So thank 

you. 

I have said before, you highlighted here, the Joint Plan of Action 

is an agreement fraught with dangers, some—Olli, as you said, 

some known, some unknown. But I thought the point was well 

taken that the real test of these negotiations is not the Joint Plan 

of Action, but the final comprehensive agreement, in my words, 

ending Iran’s nuclear ambitions and rolling back and dismantling 

their nuclear programs, and that is what we have to work towards. 

I consider the Joint Plan of Action, it is necessary that it not be 

allowed, as you have all said, to extend beyond its parameters, 

ideally 6 months, at the longest 12 months. We just block and then 

close any and all pathways for Iran to get a nuclear weapon; not 

just plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor, I believe, the uranium 

enrichment, both in centrifuges and in laser. And as Mr. Heinonen 

said, we must address the military aspects. What you said in your 

testimony, a comprehensive deal can only be reached if uncertainties over Iran’s military nuclear capability are addressed. I think 

that is crucial. 

Mr. Albright, you wrapped up your written testimony, and I 

think it is worth restating. An adequate comprehensive solution 

will depend on the United States and its allies now making clear 

to Iran what is required of it, and that this is indeed a pivotal moment. 

I guess this is where I come in with my question to you all is 

as we talk about passing a resolution in the House, extending what 

we passed last summer on the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, I am 

worried that if at 6 months, 12 months we are not quite there, the 

question will be, the argument will be, don’t do more sanctions now 

because we are close. I am worried that 12 months from now, if we 

are almost there, but not quite, the argument is going to be we 

must wait now. I am further worried that as we sit here today, if 

we can clearly and transparently indicate to the Iranians not just 

what is expected, but that the sanctions that will follow a failure 

65

of these negotiations will be orders of magnitude greater than what 

they faced when it brought them to the table back in November, 

that that makes it easier to stay on this path to peacefully ending 

the nuclear ambitions. 

I guess my question to the panel—and, Mr. Albright, I will start 

with you—is if the administration—or if the Congress passes a resolution in the House that says this is what we intend to do if we 

can’t go down this path, but we want to stay on the path that will 

peacefully end in a comprehensive solution, why is that not a good 

strategy? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I personally think it is. I think it is important to 

lay out the criteria that the agreement should reach or should ascribe to; that, in a sense, minimum conditions need to be laid out. 

I think it would be very useful. I think it would certainly clarify 

things to Iran. It would also make sure that the administration understands what the minimum conditions are, because, again, in the 

heat of the moment, there are tendencies to make compromises. So 

I think Congress has a very important role and hope that it can 

work to lay down basic conditions the agreement should reach. 

And I think the Senate started that in the recent legislation introduced, and that can be extended. And I hope it is done, because 

Iran is certainly doing it. I mean, it is doing it privately inside of 

Iran, I am sure, and it is doing it publicly. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ambassador Wallace. 

Ambassador WALLACE. Remember what we are talking about 

here. We are saying we are not going to do business with you. We 

are going to close our pocketbook. We are not invading them. We 

are just simply saying, we don’t like your policy. We are going to 

close our pocketbook. Somehow that is being turned into warmongering. Somehow that is in debate. 

I don’t know about you all, but if somebody does something that 

I don’t like, I don’t want to do business with them. We shouldn’t 

do business with Iran. That is what we are debating here. Is that 

so controversial? We cannot allow partisanship to enter this debate 

and say that we are somehow warmongering because we don’t want 

to open our pocketbook. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Heinonen. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Actually I agree with what both of these gentlemen say, but in a somewhat a different way, if I may say so. First 

of all, I think it is important to put the red lines there and say 

what the United States of America wants from Iran. That needs to 

be a clear-cut message, because Iran says at the same time, no one 

centrifuge will be dismantled; we won’t quit building our reactor. 

So it is important for the discussion. But having said that——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Having said that, I am going to interrupt you 

yet again. I am rather disciplined with the time, because we are 

going to be voting, and then members won’t have the time. Thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. DeSantis, my Florida colleague. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thanks to 

the witnesses. 

Ambassador Wallace, I appreciate that last comment. I mean, 

when I am hearing these things and people say that trying to move 

66

forward with sanctions is tantamount to saying that we need to invade Iran to me is just not acceptable. 

The President said not too long ago that he thought the chance 

of a deal actually succeeding was about 50/50, and, to me, I was 

really alarmed by that. I mean, here is the guy who is supposed 

to believe in what they are doing, and he still thinks it is essentially a coin toss. 

It just seems to me that understanding the nature of this regime, 

we may never be able to actually have an agreement that works, 

just given who they are, but why would you go easy on sanctions? 

Seems to me the way would be to apply more pressure on them, 

show them that we are serious about this, and maybe they would 

be able to reevaluate whether it is actually in their interests. 

And it has been mentioned earlier, but some of these military 

sites likes Parchin, you know, Ambassador Wallace, it doesn’t seem 

to me that we would be able to really monitor what goes on there. 

Ambassador WALLACE. You are right. Absent cooperation, we 

wouldn’t be able to. 

I want to give some of my time to Olli because he was cut off 

a couple of times. But I was talking about sanctions previously and 

how wonderful in a bipartisan way this committee and other Members of Congress have said what sanctions should be. Now I respectfully implore you all to say what are your red lines on enrichment, on the heavy-water reactor and the like. Olli was about to 

refer to that, I think, in his testimony, but I have had the privilege 

of testifying before you all many times. I have never asked something of you like this, but please, each one of you should go on the 

record with the President, the future President, as to what your 

red lines are. That is important that Congress speak with a unified 

voice. I beg you to do that. 

I defer to Olli. Olli, you need to get in there. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you. 

What I wanted to say that it is not totally about the United 

States of America. It is also about the unity of the international 

community, and more needs to be invested to P5+1 and get the 

Russians and Chinese fully behind it, because without them the 

sanctions won’t be a success. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in terms of—and I think that is true in terms 

of what our red lines are. It seemed to me that the United Nations 

had always said that Iran wasn’t going to be the able to enrich, 

and now it is like, well, you know, you know, well, you can enrich. 

So I think the red line for Congress should be no enrichment. I 

think that is the only way that we can have a somewhat degree 

of certainty that this is something that we can prevent from happening in terms of them having a nuclear weapon. 

One thing that is odd about this whole agreement and these negotiations is nobody is talking about, within the context of this, terrorism and Iran’s role in international terrorism, and I worry. They 

are a leading state sponsor of terrorism. They have committed terrorist acts against the United States going back from the Embassy 

takeover to Beirut, which they were involved in. They were attacking our service members in Iraq with EFPs. So how can it be that 

we are just kind of just acting like the terrorism aspect doesn’t 

67

exist? This seems to me to be a very serious shortcoming for this 

agreement. Does anyone want to weigh in on that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Let me just say, I think—I have worked on many 

agreements. I mean, typically the nuclear is roped off. I mean, that 

has been the tradition, but it doesn’t mean that the terrorism issue 

can be let lie unsettled. And I think Congress is going to have to 

face—in reviewing the lifting of sanctions, it will have to review 

that condition. My understanding is that is part of the law. So I 

think the administration eventually is going to have to answer how 

it is going to deal with that. 

But traditionally these nuclear deals are done in—I don’t want 

to say in isolation, but done as cutouts in a sense. And it would 

be up to, in a sense, oversight to decide whether that is enough to 

remove sanctions. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I just wonder whether that model is applicable to 

a regime like this that would have been to maybe some of these 

other nuclear powers, and, of course, we have had negotiations 

with countries like North Korea that have ended up backfiring on 

us. So I appreciate that, but I still have a lot of concerns. 

So Mr. Jones, I mean, what would you recommend? You say, hey, 

the cat is out of the bag. So what should we be doing in Congress 

if we are somebody who is concerned about this regime possessing 

nuclear weapons? You seem to think that we are not going to be 

able to prevent that at this point, so what should our response in 

Congress be? 

Mr. JONES. I am not sure other than to look at the problem more 

broadly. I mean, look down the road to prevent further Irans. We 

have had a string of failures: Pakistan, North Korea, Iran. We are 

looking at possibly now Saudi Arabia, even Turkey, suddenly showing interest. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Jones. 

Thank you, Mr. DeSantis. 

And Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Again, 

thank you for holding this hearing. I appreciate it. And thank you 

to the witnesses. 

I am usually a rather optimistic person, but I am not optimistic 

at all, and I continue to think that this interim deal was a mistake. 

In fact, I think it was a terrible mistake. And I hope that I am 

wrong, but I continue to think it was a mistake. 

I think we are naive in these negotiations. I think that this notion that these are just a tiny easing of the sanctions I think is 

wrong-headed; in fact, just the opposite, I think, that this easing 

of the sanctions is, in fact, going to allow their economy to blossom 

and to take off. I think it is a terrible mistake, and it is going to 

be very hard, I think, afterwards to try to put the genie back in 

the bottle and get these sanctions going once again. 

And another thing that I am very fearful of, I think the 6 months 

is going to turn into a year, and then they are going to ask for 

more time, and aren’t we close, and it is going to continue to slide 

and to be more and more problematic. 

And, in fact, I think all we have to do is really listen to the Iranians themselves on what they are saying. I mean, Iran’s leaders 

recently made it very clear that they have no intention of coming 

68

into compliance with the international obligations in the nuclear 

arena. I don’t think they have any intention. 

In fact, I would like to read a transcript very quickly here from 

Fareed Zakaria, who is the host of CNN, and Rouhani: ‘‘Iran will 

absolutely retain its enrichment?’’ That is what Fareed asked. And 

this is Rouhani responding: ‘‘It is our national pride, and nuclear 

technology has become indigenous. And recently we have managed 

to secure very considerable prowess with regards to the fabrication 

of centrifuges. We will not accept any limitations.’’

So Zakaria asked him again, ‘‘So there will be no destruction of 

centrifuges or existing centrifuges?’’

Rouhani: ‘‘No, not at all.’’

I think they have made it very clear where they want to go with 

this. He goes on. They asked him later if it is for a nuclear weapon 

and he says, ‘‘No, no, of course not.’’

He says, ‘‘And to know that when, from a religious point of view, 

religious leaders, to be more specific, the great and eminent leader 

of the revolution, announces and states that the fabrication and the 

stockpiling of nuclear weapons is haram, religiously forbidden, this 

should tell you that we don’t want to build a bomb.’’

And yet, everything they have done is to build a bomb. Everything they have done. Does anyone disagree with that? Does anyone believe that what they have been doing so far has been, in fact, 

for peaceful purposes? Does anyone there? Nobody? 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. JONES. Can I add just one thing because that interview was 

very important. And one thing that didn’t get quite explicated is 

Rouhani also said that he wants 20,000 megawatts of nuclear 

power and for Iran to provide the fuel for this. Well, I did some 

quick math. That is like 1 million or 2 million centrifuges, not 

19,000. So that gives you an idea of what the Iranian view of this 

is. Thank you. 

Mr. VARGAS. No, thank you. And I appreciate that. And I do 

think that—unfortunately, that we eased up on sanctions right 

when they were starting to work. Because I do think that we 

should have put the real question to them, do you want an economy, or do you want a nuclear weapons program? And I think 

tightening down the sanctions was the right way to go, and I think 

that it was finally working, and easing up now is going to be just 

the opposite. It is going to be so much harder now to get things 

back on track. 

I would like to ask you, Ambassador, about that. What do you 

think? And I know that you do this every day, but I would like to 

hear you again on this. 

Ambassador WALLACE. Sure. I thank you. 

I prepared a quick chart for this. Congressman Deutch and I 

talked about this. But this shows sort of the oil production that is 

happening now on a daily basis in Iran, around $1.2 billion a day, 

and presumably going up. This green line shows where it would go 

down to, which would be about 334,000 barrels a day, assuming a 

trending out over the course of the year. The next time the administration says that it is truly only $6 bil- lion or $7 billion of sanctions relief, ask them this question: $27 billion alone just on oil sales, not even getting to the Iranian auto inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:14 Mar 20, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\012814\86466 SHIRL
69

dustry and the other sectors. I think this is a very powerful indication of what the sanctions relief is all about. 

Mr. VARGAS. Anyone else like to comment on that? Because I 

guess my point would be it is not so much just the $6 billion; I 

think it is more than that. An economy looks at confidence; you 

know, is there confidence in the economy to take off. And I think 

that is the problem here; that all of a sudden the world has confidence that these sanctions are going to be lifted. That is why 

their economy is taking off. It is going to be very hard to impose 

sanctions once again. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah, I think that—maybe I am by nature an optimist, but the thing to me that seems imminent or urgent to do 

is to send a signal that the sanctions are going to be fully enforced, 

and they are going to be strengthened if time clock——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, and I am going to be 

a disciplinarian. We are going to cut it down to 4 minutes so that 

we can all get our questions in. And I apologize. 

Mr. Weber is next. 

Mr. WEBER. Can you cut it down on the next person? Can you 

cut it down on the next person, Madam Chair? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, of course I can. Thank you. Go ahead. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. To any of you all on the panel, does November 4, 1979, ring a bell? That is the day that they took hostages, Iran did, at our U.S. Embassy. Do you know how long they 

held them for? Four hundred and forty-four days. 

Now, so November the 4th will be the 35th anniversary of that 

hostage taking. They have been exporting terrorism for almost 35 

years. I am going to follow up on what Adam Kinzinger said when 

he said, what is the U.S. getting for this? They have been exporting 

terrorism forever, and what are we getting out of this? We are getting told that, as Mr. Wallace said, that we are somehow warmongers because we want to strengthen those sanctions, because 

we want to make them come to the table and negotiate, and they 

are about to do that. 

So you all work with me here. Any of you all think that 35 years 

is a long time? Simply a yes-or-no question? 

Ambassador WALLACE. That is the easiest one I have had in a 

long time. That is a long time. 

Mr. WEBER. You all will agree that—is 444 days a long time? 

Mr. JONES. If you are a hostage, yeah. 

Mr. WEBER. It is a long time, isn’t it? 

Now, do you agree with Brad Sherman’s comments that ‘‘the first 

three-quarters of this game, we have been missing in action, that 

we are down to the goal line stance’’? Do you all agree with that? 

I am getting a no from Albright, I am getting two over here, and 

the guy in the green is just kind of contemplating that. He is not 

admitting to anything. 

But here is the point. If we continue to hold them under sanctions for 444 days, we haven’t taken their hostages. We haven’t had 

an act of violence take them by violence. So if we make them toe 

that line, then we can’t be accused of being violent or being oppressive. 

70

By their own words, they want to wipe America and Israel off the 

face of the map. Now, have we threatened to wipe Iran off the face 

of the map, anybody? Have we threatened to wipe Israel? 

Mr. Albright, you lived in Israel. Do you have any family living 

there now? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Mr. Wallace, you said that 100 percent cooperation was needed, and we would know that pretty quick if we 

are not going to get that in verification. Should we give them 444 

days? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I am very skeptical. They haven’t shown 

any indication they want to cooperate, and there is no verification 

without cooperation. 

Mr. WEBER. Excuse me. Mr. Albright, you said we ought to lay 

out minimum conditions earlier in the negotiations. And the man 

in the green, and I can’t pronounce your name, you said we ought 

to have a red line. We don’t have a real good track record on red 

lines right now. Would you be in favor of military action if those 

red lines are passed? Would it be one of the conditions, Mr. 

Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. For the red lines on the comprehensive solution, 

no, no, of course not. The red line that has been articulated by 

President Obama is that they be prevented from getting a nuclear 

weapon. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah, well, since they saw us bomb Syria, with 

President Obama’s red line, they know how serious we are. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, the threat of military strikes has to be credible, and the U.S. is going to have to reestablish that credibility if 

it wants to deal with Iran. 

Mr. WEBER. Yeah, well, we don’t have a lot of credibility with the 

threat of red lines. I am just——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, Syria is not Iran. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, I understand that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, we didn’t have a lot of vested interest in 

the——

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Schneider, I am going to follow up on what he 

said. In 12 months we don’t want them coming back and saying, 

look, we are almost there. No more sanctions. 

Do any of you all think that Iran is going to be serious and that 

we have 12 months, or are we going to have two bombs, four bombs 

in 12 months? 

Would you want to go over and live in Israel, Mr. Albright, right 

now? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would, and I don’t think that——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, we are going to miss you. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. 

Mr. WEBER. The guy in the green. Would you live over there? 

Anybody else? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, we are done. Thank you so much. You 

had the full 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Ms. Frankel is recognized. Thank you. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you so much 

for bringing this diverse panel. And really, this is very complicated, 

71

at least it is to me. Some of these other folks see it more simple, 

but I think we all agree that Iran should not be allowed to obtain 

a nuclear weapon, although, Mr. Jones, you think they already 

have one. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. So you agree they shouldn’t have been allowed, but that is too late. The three of you, the rest of you, think 

they don’t have a nuclear weapon, or you are not sure. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. They do not. 

Ms. FRANKEL. You think they do not? 

Ambassador WALLACE. They do not, but they have the capability 

within 2 or 3 months of breaking out with that ability to have a 

nuclear weapon. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. And I think everybody here pretty much 

agrees that the interim agreement should not be the long-term 

agreement, right? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Absolutely. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Right? But logic does tell me that, you know, in 

a give-and-take situation, Iran would eventually want all of the 

sanctions relieved; is that right? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think they already have that. I 

think——

Ms. FRANKEL. You think they have all the—okay. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think that their sanctions relief is far 

greater than what meets the eye. Their economy is booming right 

now, coming back very strongly. Certainly we could lift other sanctions, but we have to send a message that more sanctions are coming to stop that growth in the Iranian economy. That is a key thing 

that this committee can participate in. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. So we would expect them to go further, give 

up something further than what is in the interim agreement in 

order to get further relief. 

Mr. JONES. Well, remember, the current agreement says that 

when we finally get done, there is not going to be any restrictions 

on Iran at all. They are going to be treated like any other non-nuclear-weapon party to the NPT. That means they are scot-free at 

that point. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, not exactly. I mean, I would expect embargoes on military goods. I mean, there would be counterproliferation 

sanctions. And again, we are talking—if this works as the administration has outlined, we are talking about a deal that is extremely 

restrictive of its nuclear program, and the conditions last 20 years. 

They have dealt with the IAEA concerns. Their weaponization or 

past weaponization infrastructure is under verification. They have 

shown cooperation. So I think it is—when the sanctions would 

come off, Iran would have had to have met many, many conditions. 

And so it is not at all like the interim deal. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And, Mr. Jones, do you rule out or do you advocate 

any kind of military action? 

Mr. JONES. No. I think it would take a full-scale war with Iran, 

and I don’t see that the U.S. is in any position to embark on such 

a war at this point, which is why I think there is nothing we can 

do. I mean, if we could take military action, then Iran wouldn’t 

have nuclear weapons, or wouldn’t have them for long. 

72

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. So it is very easy to be the Monday-morning 

quarterback. So let me just—it is what it is right now. Could you 

each—my last question is what do you recommend we do next, 

given the situation? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Six months from the adoption of the interim agreement, this Congress should make clear that Iran will 

face the most robust sanctions in history, and its oil sales will go 

down to nearly zero, its auto industry will not be able to function, 

and their economy will cease to exist. That is the message the committee must send in order for Iran to dial back its nuclear program, 

which is a requirement, in my opinion, for a final deal. 

Mr. JONES. Well, I don’t believe the sanctions are going to be 

nearly that effective. The Russians have already said they are 

going to negotiate a barter arrangement to launder Iranian oil. I 

think the Iranians have options. The Indians have helped them as 

well; so have the Chinese. I am not optimistic. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. You know, I think it is important to articulate 

what a comprehensive solution would look like, if you want zero enrichment articulated, if you want——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much. I appreciate it. 

Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador Wallace, I really appreciate what you say about 

sanctions. I actually believe in them, too. There are always variables that are associated with them. You know, my background, I 

was in the military for quite a while, 26 years, and we always said 

the NATO scenario—this is back in the Cold War time, and, you 

know, the threat was always the Soviet Union for nuclear war. And 

after the wall came down, we have never had those similar scenarios, and now it has kind of changed completely with what is 

going on with North Korea and, obviously, Iran. 

In your opinion, how close, in your opinion, anyone, do you think 

that Iran would—I think we all agree that they are going to get 

the bomb, and many of them. Would they use it, or is that just a 

threat? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think one of the greatest dangers of 

Iran going nuclear are the incredible sectarian tensions that are 

plaguing that region right now and the fact that we will have a nuclear arms race in the region. We will take the most volatile region 

in the world and we will make it more volatile and nuclear volatile. 

And if it were me as a leader, if I were a leader of one of those 

countries, the ayatollah and others have said that they could conceivably use these types of weapons before, I think you have to 

take them at their word. I think you have to take it quite seriously. 

Mr. COOK. Before you answer any more, the reaction of other 

countries. Let’s just go with the scenario that they have the nuclear 

bomb. We are talking about Saudi Arabia, some of the other Arab 

States; Arab, you know, Persian, Iranian, the animosity between 

them. Do you foresee many other countries that would be very 

eager to do exactly what Iran did just because of what happened? 

Any suggestions on what countries would acquire the bomb in that 

region? 

73

Ambassador WALLACE. I think it is very clear that other countries in the region, again, playing along the sectarian lines, would 

seek to go nuclear. It might take them a little bit of time. 

Mr. COOK. Which ones? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. COOK. Anyone else? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think the Emirates. I think Turkey, 

Egypt, a variety of countries in the region. 

Mr. COOK. So as many as perhaps six? 

Ambassador WALLACE. All of them. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Does the panel share that opinion? 

Mr. JONES. I am not sure I think quite so high, but I would also 

point outside the region. I mean, with North Korea, and if the general regime starts to collapse, I think we could be talking about 

South Korea, Japan. I mean, I think this problem is broader than 

the Middle East. 

Mr. COOK. And then the possibility for use of a nuclear attack 

from a mathematical standpoint, if you do the math, which is very, 

very scary, there would be some kind of event, as opposed to when 

I was in the Cold War, it was limited to just a few powers. 

Mr. JONES. Well, certainly, I am already, frankly, quite concerned about Pakistan. I mean, it looks like at various points Pakistan might just dissolve and break into some sort of Islamist sectarian fight, and who knows who would wind up with the weapon. 

Same thing with North Korea. 

Mr. COOK. I just wanted to——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it shows why it is so important to prevent 

Iran from getting nuclear weapons. 

Mr. COOK. And I agree with you, and I just—you know, trust and 

verify, and going down this road, it shows just how naive we are, 

and the consequences are enormous. And I hope this body here, 

which seems to be one of the few that is addressing this, will continue to fight for that action. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And although votes 

have started, we have two more members who are going to ask 

questions, so we are fine with the time. I didn’t cut anyone off. 

Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And welcome to 

the panel. 

My colleague just referred to naivete. I am not sure what he was 

referring to. To support an interim agreement that is supported by 

a number of the players, main players, trying to get Iran to desist 

might be wisdom rather than naivete. We don’t know yet. 

Mr. Heinonen, were you involved at IAEA in any of the negotiations with Iran, or discussions with Iran, or verification experiences 

with Iran? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes, I was, indeed. I visited a number of times 

there, maybe 20, 30 times. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is it your impression, based on that experience, 

that Iran is hellbent on getting nuclear weapons, and that an interim agreement such as the one successfully negotiated is merely 

a stalling tactic until they reach their ultimate goal? 

74

Mr. HEINONEN. I think there is one more scenario here, and this 

is that Iran pushed its enrichment capability to such a level that 

it is not in—breaking its safeguards obligation, but may not be in 

the spirit of the NPT. And this will be the most difficult situation 

for the international community to handle. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Were you surprised, based on your knowledge 

and experience in Iran, that they agreed to this interim agreement? 

Mr. HEINONEN. No, I was not surprised, because I have seen 

them following this partial, small deal, small step at a time, agree 

on something, and then back off and agree again. So this is in the 

pattern. But now we need to break this pattern, and this is for the 

red lines that the resolutions and in my mind comes to the picture. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador Wallace, you talked about the complete shut-down of their economy. One wonders whether that is 

possible, but certainly their economy has hurt. Based on fairly—

about—I mean, I am old enough to remember sanctions going way 

back on all kinds of countries, and with a spotty record. I mean, 

sometimes sanctions work pretty well, sometimes they don’t. And 

it is not clear to me that they are always an efficacious tool of foreign policy, but they certainly are a tool available to us, and in this 

case it looks like it has had a desired effect. 

I assume that your concern is that, with the best of intentions 

with an interim agreement, that we take our foot off that pedal a 

little bit and ease back on sanctions, if not the United States, others, and that that obviously would be a counterproductive development until we see their performance in this agreement and their 

willingness to now finalize an agreement 6 months hence. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think that is right, Congressman. My 

concern is not just the foot off the gas, though, but I think we really dialed back the sanctions regime, and their economy is flourishing. We measure their currency, we measure their inflation, we 

measure their stock market, and it is booming. And I am concerned 

that the very little concessions that we got, no real rollback was 

met with a dramatic rollback of the economic pressure so that they 

had an economic boom to their economy. And I think my concern 

is, and I am certainly being effusive, you can’t shut down their 

economy. We can certainly get their oil sales down to a few hundred thousand barrels, and we should try. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But until very recently, all of the reports I saw 

were that they were having trouble moving their oil in international markets. 

Ambassador WALLACE. The low point was about 761,000 barrels 

a day. Right now it has already gone up to 1.2 million barrels a 

day and even higher. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me for interrupting, but is that because 

of some of the carve-outs in the agreement for India, for example, 

and some others? 

Ambassador WALLACE. It has been—actually if the carve-outs 

were kept in place, the reduction of oil sales would go down to 

about 334,000 barrels. Right now we are on a trajectory of between 

1.2-plus over the course of this year. That was in anticipation of 

the agreement and the agreement itself. So you have seen a huge 

economic windfall for the Iranians. 

75

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time is up. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And you are an ex-Senate staffer. You forgot. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It is not something I bring attention to, but——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Inside joke here. 

And to wrap up, Mr. Collins, I am expecting big things from you. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, we thank you for being here, and we will get 

to it. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Look, I think the interesting comments right there in just that 

last conversation was Iran would take a little, and then they would 

back up, take a little and back up. And then Mr. Wallace just 

pointed out they are now—and now their economy is doing well. It 

is even more incentive just to back up and say, well, we can’t get 

there right now. Can we get a little more time? And I think that 

is the concern that most of us have here is the sense of, as has 

been said earlier—and I am not going to rehash it, because I have 

got a more specific question—when you look at it, we, frankly, did 

not get anything from this. They got what they were looking for, 

and I think the only reason we got to the place to start with was 

the sanctions were having an effect. So we have to look at it from 

a different perspective. 

I want to get a little more technical, and anyone can answer this 

question. Three basic steps needed to produce a nuclear weapon. 

You know, a primary fissile material, sufficient quantity and quality for the nuclear device. You have to have a weapon that will survive a nuclear warhead and produce an effective means for delivering the weapon. So I have a question. What is known of Iran’s 

development of the delivery method for a nuclear warhead, and 

what type of delivery mechanism would be needed to develop to 

target Israel or the U.S.? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Their ballistic missile capability is pretty robust. 

What is not known, do they have the ability to put a warhead on 

that ballistic missile, and there are divisions whether they can actually do that. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Eventually, they would be able to if they went 

down that route. 

Mr. COLLINS. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can I say, though, I don’t think we got nothing 

for this deal. I mean, I don’t want to get into a debate. I am sure 

you did last week with the administration, but we did get something, and so I think that has to be——

Mr. COLLINS. Messed over I think would be a good——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, I think progress was stopped. Freeze is worth 

something. And so I think there were benefits to this deal, and we 

can argue the value in terms of sanctions, and I think we are all 

worried about the sanctions slipping more than the administration 

intended. 

Mr. COLLINS. No, actually I am not worried as much about a 

sanction. I am worried about a nuclear Iran. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think we all are. 

Mr. COLLINS. I think we are in disagreement in understanding 

what that—and I will happily, you know, concede your point and 

my point—but I think one of the things that is of concern here is 

76

if we are looking toward this, let’s look at the overall of the pattern 

of what is developed. You have an opinion that it worked; I have 

an opinion that it doesn’t. And I think the concern is that a nuclear 

Iran that has this capability here which I am concerned about from 

an actual projection and actual use of a nuclear material to actually provide a warhead that actually can be used against Israel and 

actually be used against the United States. That is my question. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. 

Mr. COLLINS. And my next question, if targeted with a nuclear 

warhead, what deterrent, if any, does Israel have? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Israel is in a bad situation. I mean, it is a nation 

that one or two nuclear weapons, if they had sufficient yield, can 

almost end its existence. I mean, for Israel, it truly is an existential 

threat, and I think we would argue that we have to work harder 

together to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons. 

Mr. COLLINS. You also have to agree, and from your end it is not 

just a threat to Israel, it is a threat to us. We have assets in that 

region that we can’t overlook. We think about Israel, and other 

members of this committee have worked very hard on our partnership with Israel and helping Israel, but we also can’t just neglect 

ourselves from this. We have assets. I served in Iraq. We still have 

got military people there. This is something we can’t do—take 

apart. 

Ambassador WALLACE. Congressman, you are right, and since, as 

you know, you served in Iraq, most of the various site casualties 

that occurred in Iraq were as a result of Iranian meddling. Right 

now nothing—one big absence in this hearing was Iran’s role in 

Syria. Many, many, if not a vast majority of the casualties that are 

occurring are occurring as the result of Iranian largesse of arms 

and money. So we haven’t even touched on that part of the Iranian—I don’t think we mentioned Syria one time in terms of Iran’s 

support of Syria in this hearing. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, and how much they got out of this deal—you 

are talking about who lost—I think that is an issue that does need 

to be discussed and the amount of money they have now that they 

could funnel into Syria. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Collins. 

But now the Florida contingent is really the best. Dr. Yoho, you 

are recognized. 

Mr. COLLINS. Go, dog. 

Dr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. I appreciate 

you guys’ patience. 

Mr. Jones, you said, I feel Iran will get nuclear weapons, and 

that is something I have talked about before in these panels. In 

fact, we had Ambassador Bolton here, and he said that we can’t 

allow that to happen, but yet our sanctions have been going on 

since pretty much 1979 at different levels. You know, they started 

off, you know, more mild, you know, we froze some bank accounts, 

and now we have gone all the way to where we prevented oil from 

being sold out of that country. And we have put these sanctions in 

place since 1979. Yet, from what I am hearing from the four of you 

is within a year, I think, if I understood this right, they are going 

to have five to six nuclear weapons despite our sanctions. 

77

So my question is the sanctions, you know, I know they were 

well intended, but they don’t seem to have worked, so what else 

can we do? And, Mr. Albright, you brought up that we need to work 

together, and I assume with our allies, to prevent Iran from getting 

a nuclear weapon. 

Number one, Mr. Jones, I ask you, do you feel like they are going 

to have these weapons regardless? 

Mr. JONES. I feel like regardless, but not necessarily in the near 

term. We should think of like Pakistan that developed these weapons in the late 1980s, but it wasn’t until 1998 that they actually 

tested. I mean, most of these countries take a long view. I think 

Washington tends to be sort of too myopic on some of this material. 

Also, just on the sanctions, I would like to point out, as Ambassador Wallace has said, sanctions have certainly hurt Iran. But 

Iran hasn’t stopped, and, to me, that flips around the other way. 

It shows how interested and how determined the Iranians are to 

move forward and not give up. 

Dr. YOHO. Well, and then if you go back and watch over the last 

25, 30 years, there has been a cat-and-mouse game where they are 

building them; no they are not; yes, they are; you know, and we 

all proved that, yes, they are enriching. And, I mean, if you look 

over the last 10 years, they have gone from a few centrifuges to 

over 19,000. 

Mr. Albright, what you were talking about, how do we prevent 

this? I mean, what is your idea of preventing them from getting a 

nuclear weapon? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Not possessing one at all. 

Dr. YOHO. But how do you do that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think that what the priority is now is to make 

sure that Iran is tested on whether it is going to accept very serious limitations on its nuclear program and accept verification requirements that allow an adequate job to be done so that early detection is guaranteed, and there is time for a response. So I think 

that is what needs to be done now, and there is a clock ticking that 

this can’t be extended. 

Dr. YOHO. Yeah, I see that clock ticking since 1979. We have 

been working to prevent that, but, you know, I just heard you guys 

say there was four to five bombs they will have the capacity to 

build within a year. And so we can watch them for another 6 

months, another 6 years. My feeling, like Mr. Jones said, is they 

are going to get one, and what I would like to focus on, what do 

we do looking forward, and how are we going to deal with it? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, one is I think we don’t have to worry as 

much now about them getting four to five bombs in the next year 

because of this Joint Plan of Action; that it did buy time; that it 

removes some of the pressure. 

Dr. YOHO. But earlier on today you just said, you know, it was 

going to be about a year, and they would have four to five bombs 

is what I understood. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is if they want to do it. I mean, it was a theoretical question if they want to do it. I think the Joint Plan of Action has bought us time where I don’t think they are going to try 

to do it in the next 6 months or a year if it is extended. So I think 

that is an advantage of this deal. 

78

Dr. YOHO. What can we do? If we look back retrospectively on 

sanctions, how can we handle this differently in the future going 

forward, other than sanctions? I mean, I think the diplomacy is the 

big thing we need to do, and I also think we need to prepare. Like 

you said, Pakistan went ahead and developed bombs. India has 

them. North Korea has them. I think we need to have a different 

policy in place for when they do get one. How are we going to handle that, Mr. Heinonen? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I think the focus needs to be moved somewhere 

else, particularly for this so-called military dominance. If we all the 

time put all of the efforts on the enrichment program only, it is like 

a chain where you try to improve the strength of a chain by improving one ring. But the rest of the rings you leave, so never the 

chain will then be strong. So there is a need for refocus, and for 

really to that part find what is there, what is going on, and then 

dismantle single-use and multiuse capabilities. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, and I agree with that. I mean, it is really—

the ultimate tests, are they going to come clean about nuclear 

weapons? And if they didn’t work on nuclear weapons, are they 

going to provide the information to convince people that that is the 

case? And that can be tested quickly. 

Dr. YOHO. Madam Chair——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Dr. YOHO. Thank you. Thank you, guys. I appreciate your time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Heinonen, I finally let you finish an answer. Not bad, 1 out of 25. 

Thank you so much, panelists, for excellent testimony, thank you 

to all of the members for wonderful questions, and thank you for 

the audience and the press for covering this. And with that, our 

subcommittees have adjourned, and zero seconds to get to the floor. 

No problem. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(79)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

January 21, 2014 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held jointly by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building (and available live on the Committee website at ~'£",JQ~igrl!ljTair~J'-Ql1.li"1illY)· 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, January 28, 2014 

200 p.m 

Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal 

The Honorable Mark D. Wallace 

Chief Executive Officer 

United Against Nuclear Iran 

(Former United States Amhassador to the United Nations) 

Me. Gregory S. Jones 

Senior Researcher 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 

Me. Olli Heinonen 

Senior Fellow 

Belfer Center for Science and International Atfairs 

Harvard University 

(Former Deputy Director General C!fthe international Atomic linerKY AKency) 

Me. David Albright 

Founder and President 

Institute for Science and International Security 

By Direction of the Chairman 

Tf )lOlI are 1I11if!f'd 0/ Ipec;,d accommodafWI1.\, plea\e 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGK AFFAIRS 

M1NUTES OF SUBCOMlvIlTTEE ON _______ -"c: l1E"".'-=-"1:..:/TC'-N:.=-T _______ HEARING 

Day_----'T"","'Ie"'s"'da"'yL' __ Datc ___ -"O""1."'2"'SI."'1"'4'--__ Room Room 2172 

Starting Time _--,,"2 ,,,,fJ,,,O,-!p:L.JLu ... _Lndin~ Time 4: 56 p m 

Recesses _1_. l£:Uto.l.;,l,2) ~to __ ) ~to __ ) ~to __ ) ( __ to __ ) ~to_. 

Presiding Member(,) 

CJwirman RoS'-Lehtil1t!Jl 

Ch.<:k "II ofthefollowillg that apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

Executh'e {dosed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Implementation i~f tlte Iran .Nuclear Oeal 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESEl\T: 

(See attached attendance sheet) 

Eledronically Recorded (taped) 0 

Stenographic Record CZJ 

~-ON-SUBCOlVJl\IIITTEE j\·IEMBERS PRESENT: (Mork with (fY/ * U:'tft.e.y ()re riot members o/jiJll commiUee) 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached') Yes [2] No 0 

(If "no "J please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS fOR TIlE RECORD: lList any statements submitted}or the record.) 

TIME SCIIEJ)VLEJ) TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

11ME ADJOUR"IIEO --'!..:56 p,m, 
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Joint Hearing Attendance 

Hearing Title Implementation of the Iran Nuc1earDeal 

Date: 1128114 

NOflcomm;lIee Members 

Member Present Member 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (FL) X Deutch, Ted (FL) 

Chabot, Steve (OR) Connolly, Gerald (V A) 

Wilson, Joe (SC) Higgins, Brian (N Y) 

Kinzinger, Adam (IL) X 

Cicilline, David (RT) 

Cotton, Tom (AR) X 

Grayson, Alan (FL) 

Vargas, Juan (CA) 

Weber, Randy (TX) X 

Schneider, Bradley (IL) 

Desantis, Ron (FL) X 

Kennedy, Joseph (MA) 

Collins, Doug (GA) X Meng, Grace (NY) 

Meadows, Mark (NC) Frankel, Lois (FL) 

Yoho, Ted (FL) X Sherman, Brad (CA) 

Messer, Luke (TN) X Lowenthal, Alan (CA) 

Royce, Ed (CA) X 

Poe, Ted (TX) X 

Cook, Paul (CA) X 

Perry, Scott (PA) X 

Brooks, Mo (AL) X 

Present 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
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Questiou 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Luke Messer 

To (he Honorable Mark D. Wallace 

I appreciate my colleagues' coucerns regardiug the secrecy of the Joiut Piau of Actiou's 

text. I am also deeply concerned by this lack of transparency. After the interim deal was 

reached in November, President Rouhani's statements about the terms of the JPA 

contradicted those of the Administration, signaling to the international community that 

Iran's intentions do not align with their commitment under the JPA. Perhaps the most 

fundamental disagreement is whether or not the deal recognizes Iran's right to enrichment. 

Iran says the deal recognizes a right to enrich, the U.S. says it does not. I am worried that 

the classified nature of the deal only exacerbates the inconsistent interpretations of the deal 

making Iran's noncompliance even more likely. 

Yes, it is indeed concerning that an agreement Iran is boasting about has not been made fully 

public. I believe that transparency in this situation would help hold Iran more accountable. 

Question 2: 

Given that Iran's compliauce with the JPA is crncial to our national security, wouldn't it 

make sense to make the JPA's text available to the public so that Iran is held accountable 

to the terms and that there is no ambiguity as to what those terms are? 

Indeed it would. Of course I understand that there are sensitivities during diplomatic 

negotiations, however in this case accountability is a very high priority. Iran is after all a bad 

actor with a long history of cheating and deceit when it comes to its nuclear program. And on top 

of that, the agreement reached in Geneva has not been widely embraced by the American people, 

to say the least. Having more eyes on the situation, and broadening the debate especially to 

include Congress, would be a welcome development. 
84

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Question 1: 

Question for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable Luke Messer 

To Mr. Greg .Jones, ,,",'enior Researcher 

Nonproliferation Policy Hducation Center 

President Rouhani has insisted that Tran will not dismantle a single one of its existing 

centrifuges. If that is the case, what are the prospects for reaching a final agreement? 

The prospect ofreaching a negotiated settlement to the problem of Iran's enrichment program is 

poor. Most in the West assume that a negotiated settlement will severely truncate Iran's 

enrichment program, leaving Iran with only a token program. The numbers that are usually 

mentioned are that Iran could retain only a few thousand of its current 19,000 centrifuges. I have 

never thought it likely that Iran would accept such a large-scale reduction and President 

Rouhani's statement only seems to confinn thi s. 

In the same statement President Rouhani went on to say that Iran wants 20,000 megawatts of 

nuclear power and Iran wants to supply the fuel for these reactors indigenously. This implies 

that Iran would need the equivalent of 1 to 2 million of its current IR-I type centrifuges. I do not 

take this statement at face value but it shows the position Iran plans to take during the 

negotiations. 

Note that the Comprehensive Solution is not a "final agreement" but only a long-tenn interim 

agreement. The Joint Plan of Action already spells out what the final agreement with Iran will 

be. Iran will be allowed to have an enrichment program that will be unrestricted since Iran "will 

be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT." 

Question 2: 

I'm concerned that the six months to a year envisioned for negotiations on a final 

agreement will be extended and then extended again and the talks will just drag on. What 

can the U.S. and our international partners do to ensure Iran doesn't slow roll us? 

In some sense Iran has already slow rolled us. Iran has made steady progress since resuming its 

centrifuge enrichment effort in 2006 and can currently produce the Highly Enriched Uranium for 

a nuclear weapon in just six weeks. The restrictions of the Joint Plan of Action will only 

increase this time to eight weeks. As I indicated in my answer to Question #1, I consider the 

prospect of achieving a "Comprehensive Solution" with Iran that meaningfully restricts its 

centrifuge enrichment program to be poor. 
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Questiou 1: 

Question for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable David Cicilline 

To Mr. Heinonen 

Page 1 of3 

What do you see as the major disagreements between the P5+ I and Iran in negotiating a 

long-term agreement before the temporary agreement expires? 

From a personal perspective, in mapping out the tinal contours of a possible comprehensive deal 

over Iran's nuclear program, the starting point of discussions should not begin with how many 

centrifuges or how much enriched uranium Iran should have. These are not redundant issues and 

likely have to be tackled as a subsequent step. But from a technical as well as tactical 

perspective, the onus should rather be put to Iran to tirst present an outline on its comprehensive 

energy and nuclear energy plan, which rationally explains its needs and future of its nuclear 

program in a transparent way. Iran has stated that its program is peaceful. Yet Iran had built a 

broad clandestine nuclear program in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. Getting 

Iran to explain its nuclear plans is not a case for Iran to provide a plan based on wishful thinking, 

but to clearly convey that that is meant to be furnished within the context of deciding whether a 

comprehensive deal with agreed parameters mapped out for Iran's nuclear program can be 

achieved in line with the Unites States' own boundaries laid down. 

If the end vision of a civilian nuclear program can be reached, a phased in plan on the needs of 

uranium enrichment or uranium enrichment R&D can be developed and agreed upon. It must 

meet whatever set of undertakings the United States is comfortable with in terms of preventing 

an Iranian military nuclear capability. 

Question 2: 

What other demands should be negotiated in a permanent agreement that would move 

Iranians away from capacity to produce higher level uranium - so that in case Iran violates 

the terms, it will take longer than a few weeks for them to return to current capacity? 

In order to demonstrate that Iran's uranium enrichment needs are for peaceful uses only, Iran 

also has to address in a credible manner questions regarding possible military dimensions of its 

nuclear program, as explained in the IAEA reports of May 2008 and November 20 I I. 

Question 3: 

What should our goal be as a minimum "breakout time" for Iran to reach weapons level 

capacity? 

With regard to IAEA inspections and addressing specitically timely detection of the "break-out 

time", the agreement should have provisions: To enable detection of such actions not only at 

declared sites, but also encompass veritication requirements that allow for detection of existence 
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Page 2 of3 

of covert facilities and activities (e.g. requiring broader access to non-nuclear related sites that 

may provide leads to the existence of other facilities not declared); to put in place mechanisms 

that can be triggered in the light of transgressions on the comprehensive agreement if reached 

with Iran; and to build in enough time for the international community to act in terms of 

sanctions or other actions including a military option that can be credibl y demonstrated. 

In terms of time lines, this means instead of months, perhaps giving up to one to two years for the 

international community to deal with the indications ofpossible non-compliance. 

Question 4: 

Many have argued that a final deal must restrict Iran from any level of enrichment: the 

temporary agreement limits some enrichment. What is your assessment of Iran's 

willingness to limit enrichment? What should the P5+ 1 set as the hard line in negotiations 

in terms of enrichment? 

Regarding levels of enrichment, there is no need in the foreseeable future for Iran having any 

enrichment above 5 % U-235. Thus one should factor this in as one parameter as part of an 

agreed settlement on what can constitute a civilian nuclear program. Another useful parameter is 

to benchmark enrichment capacities in Tran in terms of separative work units (SWU). For 

instance, to produce uranium for an annual reload of a Bushehr type of reactor - about 20 tons of 

low enriched uranium is needed annually - a fleet of more than 120000 TR-l instead of current 

19000 IR-l centrifuges is needed. But there is no technically justified need (noting the 10-year 

delivery agreement by Russia for fuelling Bushehr) for such an enrichment capacity in Tran. Thus 

another way of looking at enrichment in Iran is to refocus the program to allow enrichment R&D 

with a full cascade or two to test and demonstrate the perfoTInance of next generation centrifuges 

without going to semi-industrial scale with thousands of such centrifuges (and with thousands of 

SWUs) and without accumulating significant stocks of enriched uranium. This, together with a 

robust verification regime would provide the international community with time enough to act, if 

Iran decides to break out from its commitments. 

We should also recognize that Iran has developed over the years a substantial skilled work force 

and industrial infrastructure to support its nuclear program. It is essential that the long-term 

agreement also address the issue of human resources in a creative manner and from a nonproliferation perspective. For instance, over the longer term, avenues can be explored to channel 

such personnel to supporting e.g. construction of nuclear (light water) research reactors and fuel 

fabrication in joint ventures with current foreign technology holders. 

Question 5: 

Mr. Jones indicated that we are already at a point of no return, and that Iran will 

inevitably acquire nuclear weapons capability. Do you agree? If not, why? 

In terms of technological know-how, what Iran has achieved thus far places it as a nuclear 

threshold state. However, by credibly addressing the military-related concerns, rolling back its 

uranium enrichment capacity, and dismantling some aspects of its nuclear program, the P5+ 1 and 
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Iran can create conditions where the Iranian nuclear program's needs are brought in line to meet 

the requirements of a civilian program but not one with nuclear military aspirations. 
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Question 1: 

Questions for the Record 

Submitted by the Honorable David N. Dcilline 

To Mr. Greg .Jones, ,,",'enior Researcher 

Nonproliferation Policy Hducation Center 

What do you see as the major disagreements between the P5+ 1 and Iran in negotiating a 

long-term agreement before the temporary agreement expires? 

(No answer given.) 

Question 2: 

What other demands should be negotiated in a permanent agreement that would move 

Iranians away from capacity to produce higher level uranium - so that in case Iran violates 

the terms, it will take longer than a few weeks for them to return to current capacity? 

Iran should halt all uranium enrichment, dismantle all centrifuges, eliminate all centrifuge 

production facilities and export all stocks of enriched uranium. To allow the fueling of the lRRI research reactor Iran should be allowed to keep a small quantity of fabricated fresh fuel 

containing no more than six kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. As additional research reactor 

fuel was needed, additional small quantities should be fabricated outside of Iran. 

Question 3: 

What should our goal be as a minimum "breakout time" for Iran to reach weapons level 

capacity? 

One year. 

Question 4: 

Many have argued that a final deal must restrict Iran from any level of enrichment; the 

temporary agreement limits some enrichment. What is your assessment of Iran's 

willingness to limit enrichment? What should the P5+ 1 set as the hard line in negotiations 

in terms of enrichment? 

Iran has shown that it is willing to halt its production of 20% enriched uranium. However, Iran 

appears to be unwilling to limit the scale of its enrichment effort. In an interview broadcast on 

CNN on January 26,2014, Iranian President Rouhani said that Iran would not destroy any of its 

19,000 existing centrifuges. He went on to say that Iran needs 20,000 megawatts of nuclear 

power. This implies that Iran would need the equivalent of one to two million of its current TR-I 

type centrifuges. I do not take this statement at face value but it shows the position Iran plans to 

take during the negotiations. For the last specific question, see my answer to number 2.