### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

NO. 03-0 7 -00 319 -CV

RobertScott, in his of

fi cial capacity as Com m ission er of Edu cation for th e St at e of Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v. P residio I.S.D., App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GV-06- 0013 62 , HO NORAB LE SCO TT H. JENK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N Reversingcourse on rehearing , a majority of this panel now c oncludes that the consent re quirement in subsec tion 21.307(a)( 2) of the T exas Education Code is a jur i s d ictional statutory prer equisite within the me aning of sec tion 311.034 of the Texas Governme nt Code that require s P re s i d i o to obtain the Commi ssioner’s c onsent befor e prose cuting an appe al from the Commi ssioner’s a dminist rative or der in the Tr avis County District Court. The majority ’s statutory construction of subse ction 21.307(a) (2) ig nores the pla in langu age of the statute, r ender s other portions of the educ ation code me aning less, leads to absur d results, and c reates o p p o rt u n i t ies for g amesmanship. B eca

use I disag ree with the majority ’s i n t erpr etation of subsec tion 21.307(a)( 2), Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.2 For m an y y ears, Texas law re cog nized that statutory prer equisites wer e mandatory and jurisdictional. See M ingus v. W

adley , 285 S.W
. 1084 (Tex. 1926). Eig ht y ear s ag o, the Texas Supreme Court over

ruled this longsta

nding prec edent in favor of a new rule. See D ubai Petroleum In c . v . Ka zi , 12 S.W .3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000). I n Du ba i P e tro le um I nc. v. Ka zi , the supreme court deter mined that statutory prer equisites, while mandatory , wer e no longe r jurisdictional. Id. at 76. The c ourt reje cted the dic hotomy betwee n statutory

and common-la

w cause s of action esta

blished in Mingus v. W

adley and its prog eny

on th e g round that district courts in Texas wer e cour ts of g ener al j urisdiction. Id. a t 75 -7 6; se e als o Tex. Cons t. art. V, § 8. Unde r this rationale, a party ’s failure to satisfy

a statutory

prer equisite did not deprive the distri ct co u rt o f jurisdiction to hear the pa rt y ’s c la im b ut m e re ly

de te rm ine d w he the r a

pa rt y “ e sta bli sh e d th e ir

ri g ht und e r the statut e to g o f o r w ar d w it h th [e ir ] sui t.” Dubai , 12 S.W .3d at 75-76. The court e x plained, “‘ The rig ht of a plaintiff to maintain a suit, while fre quently treated as g oing to the que stion of jurisdiction, has been
sa id t o g o in

re a lity to t he ri g ht o f t

he pla int if

f t o r e lie f r a the r tha

n to t he jur isd ic tio n o f t

he c ourt to aff ord it.’” Id. at 76-77 (quoting21 C.J .S. Cou rts § 16 at 23 (1990))
.

Whil e this new r

ule prove d worka

ble in many

case s, Dubaie ff

e c te d a se a c ha ng e in those are as of law

involving suits aga i n s t g overnme ntal entities, espec ially in administrative law. See, e .g. , Hill v. Board of Trs. of the Ret. Sy

s. of Tex. , 4 0 S. W.3 d 6 76 , 6 78 -7 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 01 , n o p e t.) (h old ingc on tent of mo ti on fo r r e he ari ngno lon g e r j ur isd ic tio na l, b ut m e re ly
e sta bli sh e d w he the r cl aim ha d b e e n p re se rv e d) ; Sierra Club v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n , 26 S.W. 3d 68 4, 68 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 ) (h old ing pla int if f’ s fa ilure to c omp ly

wi th service require ment was no long er jurisdictional), a ff’ d , 7 0 S. W.3 d 8 09 (T e x. 20 02 ); but cf. King3

v . Te x as De p’ t of Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 28 S.W .3d 27, 31 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (a s s u m ing without deciding that time limi tations in Tex as Commissi on on Human Rig hts Act are jurisdictional
even a fter Dubai ); se e als o Tyler Johnson, Do Statutory Prerequisites Affec t Jurisdiction to Hear Ad mi nis tra tiv e Ap

pe als in T e x as afte r Dubai ? , 3 Tex. Tech J. Tex . Admin. L . 157 (2002) ( discussing Dubai ’s ef

fec t on admin i s trative a ppeals in Texas); Elizabeth R. St erling , Af te r Dubai , A re Pr oc e du ra l P re re qu isi te

s to J ud ic ial Re v ie w St ill

J ur isd ic tio na l? , State B ar of Te xas: Twelfth Annual Adva

nced A dminist rative L aw Course (Oc t. 26- 27, 2000). One of the primary

conce rns was h o w to r e c o n c il e th e n e w r u le e s ta b li s h e d b y th e s u

p r e me c o u rt in Dubaiwith the doctrine of
sovere ign immunity
. See, e .g. , King , 28 S.W .3d at 31. This doctrine pr ovides that a pa rty may not sue the gove rnment unl ess t he legislature has clearly and unambiguously consente d to suit. Tooke

v . Ci ty of M e x ia , 1 97 S.W. 3d

32 5, 33 1 (T e x. 20 06 ). Mo re ov e r, it ha s long be e n re c og nize d that a state may be sued “ only

in the manner , place , and cour t or courts d es i gnated” by the leg islature. Sta te v . I sb e ll , 94 S.W .2d 423, 424 (Tex. 1936). After Dubai , questions arose a bout how to construe the many statutory require ments imposed by the legi s l at u re when it consented to suit, there by waiving its sover eig n immunit y . Se e Hi ll , 4 0 S. W.3 d at 67 8- 79 ; King , 2 8 S. W.3 d at 31 ; Sierra Club , 26 S.W .3d at 688.

Such require ments had long been considere d jurisdictional unde r the rule e stablished in M ingus
. See, e .g. , Gr ou nd s v . To lar In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 707 S.W .2d 889, 891-92 (Te x . 1986), ab ro ga te d by Du ba i Pet

ro le um In c . v . Ka

zi , 12 S.W .3d 71 (Tex. 2000)
. I n an ef fort to re solve the confusion and restore the Mingus rule for those suits ag ainst g overnme ntal entities, the leg islature, in 2005, amende d section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act to include the following lang uag e:For purposes of this dissent, Iassum e wi t hout deciding that education code 1 subsection 21.307(a )(2) is a statutory prer equisite within the me aning of g overnme nt code se ction 311.034. Neve rtheless, in lig ht of the fundamen t al rule that pa rties ca nnot confe r subject- matter jurisdiction by

consent or a g ree ment, see, e .g. , Sti nev . S tate , 908 S.W .2d 429, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 95 ); Moore v . Blagge , 3 8 S. W. 9 79 , 9 84 (T e x. 18 97 ), it i s p os sib le that it is n ot. 4 Statutory prer equisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, a re jurisdictional r e qu i r e m e n t s i na l l s u i t s a g a i n s ta g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y.
Act of May 25, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1150, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 3783, 3783 (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (West Supp. 2007)).

Thus, we a

re pr esente d with two questions: (1) is subs ection 21.307(a )(2) a statutory pr e re qu isi te wi thi n the me anin g of g ov e rnme nt c od e se c tio n 31 1. 03 4; and , if the ans we r to t his question is “y es,” the n (2) was the school district require d to obtain the commissioner’s ag ree ment to f ile i t s s u i t f

o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n T r a v i s C o u n t y ? T h e m a j o r i t y n o w an s w e r s b o t h o f the se qu e sti on s in

the a ff ir mativ e . B ut, e ve n if

on e a ssu me s f or the sake of

argume nt t

hat th e ans we r t o the first question is “y es,” Isubmit t hat the answ er to the se cond question must stil l be “no.” 1
Wa s the sc hoo l dis tric t re qui re d to ob tai

n the Commissio ne r’

s c ons e nt b e

fo re fi ling its ap pe al i n Travis Coun ty?

There is no dispute that section 21.307 clea rly and unambig uously waives the state’s
sovere ign immunit y fr o m suit by its ex press languag e that “[e]ither party may appea l the commissioner’s dec ision . . . .” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307(a ) (West 2006). The dispute turns
on whe re a par

ty may file an appea l. Subsection 21.307(a) (1) allows a party to file an appea l in “a district court in the county in w hich the [school] district’s centr al administrative off ices a re loc ated.” Id. § 2 1. 30 7( a )( 1) . Su

bs e c tio n 2 1. 30 7( a )( 2) a llo ws a pa rt y to f ile an a pp e a l “ if agreed by all parties ,5

[i n] a district c ourt in Travis County .” Id. § 2 1. 30 7( a )( 2) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . I t is thi s c la us e , “ if
a g re e d b y a ll p art ie s, ” that ha s g ive n r ise to t his a pp e a l. The Commissioner urg es that this clause “if ag ree d by

all parties” includes the Commi ssioner bec ause subse ction 21.307(c) require s the Commi ssioner to be made a party to the appea l. See id. § 21. 30 7( c ). Th e sc ho ol dis tr ic t cou nte rs that, wh e n r e a d in

its pr op e r c on te xt, th is clause does not include the Commissioner beca use the Commissioner would not appea l his own decision. See id. § 21.307(a) (allowing either pa rty to appea l the Commi ssioner’s de cision). The majority corr ectly discerns that this is a matter of statutory construction, which
we r eview de novo. Se e Sc ott v . Pre sid io I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. , No. 03-07-00319- CV, ___ S.W .3d ___, ___, slip op. at 3, su

pra (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 08 ). Be y on d th a t, h ow e ve r, the ma jor ity misconstrues the plain languag e of the statute and e rrone ously conclude s that Presidio w as re quired t o o b t a i nt h e C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s c o n s e n tb e f o r e f i l i n g i t s s u i tf

o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i nT r a v i s C o u n t y. I n it s e nti re ty , s ub se c tio n 2 1. 30 7( a ) s tate s: (a) Either par

ty may appea l the commissioner’s dec ision to: (1) a district cour

t in the county i n wh i ch the district’s ce ntral administrative offic es ar e located; or ( 2 ) i f a g r e e d b y a l l p art i e s , a

d i s t r i c tc o u rti nT r a v i s C o u n t y. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307(a ). The pla in l an g uag e of this statute sug g ests that there are two possible parties to the administrative pr ocee dings be fore the Commiss ioner who may wish to appea lI t is conce ivable that there might be more than two parties in the ad m i n istrative 2 proce eding s befor e the Com missioner. I n some circ umstances, ther e may be more than one tea cher who was subjec t to discipli nary proce eding s befor e the school district and par ticipated in an a

ppeal to the Commi ssioner. 6 the Com mis sio ne r’ s d e c isi on —th e te a c he r o r t

he sc ho ol d ist

ri c t. Although the statut e d o es not 2 define the term “ party” or “ parties,” nothing in the plain languag e of the statut e s u ggest s that the Com m i s s i o n er would be included in those te rms, since the “ party” would be a ppealingthe Commi ssioner’s de cision, and the Commissioner presumably woul d not appea l his own decision. When the leg islature uses a word in a st atute in one sense and with one mea ning, a nd there afte r uses the same wo rd in de sc ri bin g the same su bje c t matt e r, it is unde rs too d that the latte r w or d is us e d in the same s en se and w ith the same mea ning a s the forme r. Brown v. Darden , 50 S.W .2d 261, 263 (T e x. 19 32 ); see also Rylander v. Fisher Controls Int’l, Inc. , 4 5 S. W.3 d 2 91 , 3 01 (T e x. Ap p— Au sti n 20 01 , n o p e t.) (r e

je c tin g the Com

ptr oll e r’ s a tte mpt to g ive dif fe re nt m e anin g s to the same wo rd in two statutes on the same subject matter). This r ule of statutory construction also a pplies when the words or phrase s are substantially the s ame. Br own , 5 0 S. W. 2 d a t 2 6 3
. Re a d in it s p r o p e r

c o n te xt wi th t he int ro du c tor y c la us e of su bs e c tion 21 .3 07 (a ), the le g isl a tur e ’s us e of the te rm “ pa rt ie s” in subsection 21.307(a )(2) can only ref er to those pa

rties authorized to appe al the Commissi oner’ s d e c is io n in th e in tr o d

u c to r y c la u s e o f s u b s e c ti on 21.307(a)
. See id. F or thi s r e a so n, Iwo uld
c on c lud e tha

t th e pla in langua g e of su

bs e c tio n 21 .3 07 (a ) do e s no t inc lud e the Com mis sio ne r w ith in the terms “par

ty ” or “par

ties” and, there fore , Presidio w as not r equire d to obtain the Commi ssioner’s
c on se nt b e fo re fi lin g its a pp e a l in a Tr a vis County

dis tr ic t c ourt
.7 Th is c on str

uc tio n is c on sis te nt w iththe re ma ind e r o f s e c tio n 21 .3 07 and wi th other provisions of the e ducation code . Whil e it i s t ru e that subsection 21.307(c) r equire s the Commi ssioner to be made a par ty to an appe al of his dec ision, there is not h i n g i n t h e langua g e of
su bs e c tio n 2 1. 30 7( a ) o r ( c ) t hat r e qu ir e s th e Com mis sio ne r to c on se nt t o f ili ngan a pp e a l in Tr a vis County . The mer e fa ct that subsection ( c) re q u i res the Commissioner to be made a par ty to the appea l does not sugg est that the C ommissi oner must ag ree to the venue in whic h an appe al is filed. I ndeed, the p ro h i b ition aga inst ex parte communications in section 21.306 of the e ducation code would appea

r to prohibit such an a g ree m ent between the Commissioner and any party who participated in the administrative proc eeding s befor e the Commissioner. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.306 (West 2006) (prohibiting ex parte communications betwee n the commissioner and his staff and any party

). Although the majority

asser ts in footnote 4 of its opinion, su pra , that the prohibition ag ainst e x p arte c o mm

u n ic a ti o n s is li mi te d

to th e c o n te xt o f

a dmi n is tr a ti v e p r o c e e d in g s b e f o re the Commiss ioner, nothi ng in section 21.306 limits t he prohibition ag ainst ex parte communications in t he ma nn e r s ug g e ste d b y

the ma jor ity . Se c tio ns 21 .3 06 and 21 .3 07 are bo th i nc lud e d in subchapte r G of chapter 21 of t he education code. There is nothing in the plain languag e or struc ture of t h e e d u c a t i o n c o d e t h a t s u

p p o rt s t h e m a

j o r i t y ’ s c o n s t r

u c t i o n l i m i t i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o na g a ins t ex parte communications only to administrative proce eding s befor e the C o m missioner. See id. §§ 21.306-.307. The majority ’s conclusion that a party is r equire d to obta in the C ommissi oner’ s
c on se nt t o f

ile an a pp e a l in Tr a vis County

wo uld re nd e r t he prohib iti on

a g a ins t e x part e
c omm un ic a tio ns in s e c tio n 2 1. 30 6 me anin g le ss.Co u n s e l f o r th e Co mm is s io n e r

c o n c e d e d

a s mu c h w h e nc o u n s e l a g r e e d w it h th e district 3 court that the Commissioner “would virtually alway s ag ree to venue in Tra vis County .” 8 L ikewise, the ma

jority ’s interpre tation of subsection 21.307(a )(2) leads to absur d results and e ncoura g es g am es m anshi p. The supre me cour t has ca utioned that courts should not
c on str ue a statut e in a

mann e r t

hat le a ds to a

bsurd re su lts wh e n a

no the r, mor e re a so na

ble interpre tation exi sts. National Plan Adm’rs, Inc . v. National Health Ins. Co. , 235 S.W .3d 695, 701 (T e x. 20 07 ); University of Tex

. Sw. M ed. C t r . v. L outzenhiser , 140 S.W .3d 351, 356 n.20 (Tex. 2004). Yet the ma

jority does just that when i t i n t erp rets subsection 21.307(a)( 2) to requir e Presidio to obtain the Comm issioner’s conse nt before filing a n appea l f

ro m the Commiss ioner’s decision in Travis County
. No t h i n g i n t he statute sug g ests a leg islative intent to allow the Commi ssioner to dictate w here an appe al must be filed. See Tex. Educ
. Code Ann
. § 2 1
. 3 0 7 (a). Rather the pla in lang uag e of the s t at u te leave s that decision to the par ties that participate d in the administrative proc eeding s befor e the Commissioner. Id.

As a pra ctical matter , for pur poses of ve nue, t h e C o mmissi oner—a statewide officia l—resides in Travis County , the seat of state g overnme nt. Se e Bu rto n v . R oge rs , 504 S.W .2d 40 4, 40 6 ( Te x. 19 73 ); Gul f C o a st Bus. Forms, Inc. v . Texas Employm ent Comm’n , 498 S.W .2d 154, 154 (Tex. 1 9 7 3 ) ( p e r c u r ia m)
. I na d d it io n , th e T e xa s A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l, w h o r e p r e s e n ts the Commi ssioner in the appe als broug ht under sec tion 21.307, also resides i n T ra v i s County for purposes of ve nue. See B urton , 5 04 S.W. 2d a t 40 6; Gulf Coast Bus. Forms , 498 S.W .2d at 154. As the arb ite r o f t

he de c isi on

be inga pp e a le d, the Com mis sio ne r s ho uld be ind if fe re nt to the ve nu e in which an a

ppeal is filed. The majority ’s construc tion of subsection 21.307(a) (2), howe ver, le ads

39

to th e a b s u r d r e s u lt th a t th e Co mm is s io n e r , n o t th e p arti e s a p p e a li n g h is d e c is ion, can—a nd should—dictate the ve nue of a ny appea l under sec tion 21.307. Havingwaived s o v er eign immunity to allow a par

ty to appea l from the Commi ssioner’s decision, surely it is absurd to c onclude that the leg islature inten d ed the Com mis sio ne r, and

no t th e a pp e a lin g pa

rt ie s, to c on tr ol whe re that a pp e a l mu st b e take n. Th e ru le in T exas is that the plaintiff—or the appea ling pa rty , in this i nstance —“g ets the first choic e of ve nue by filing suit.” In re Team R ocke t, L.P. , 256 S.W. 3d 25 7 ( Te x. 20 08 ); see also In reMasonite Corp. , 997 S .W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (describingTexas venue law ). B y g iving the pa

rties to the administrative proc eeding s the rig ht to f ile suit ag ainst the Commis sioner to cha lleng e his dec ision, the le g isl a tur e a c kn ow le dg e d thi s g e ne ra l ru le of Te xas l aw a

nd sig na le d it s in te nt t o le t th os e pa rt ie s, not the Commi ssioner, dete rmine venue . The majority ignor es this ge nera l principle in favor of a
ru le that g ive s th e Com mis sio ne r a uth or ity to d ic tate wh e re the a

pp e a l mu st b e br ou g ht. The majority ’s constru cti on also enc ourag es g amesmanship. In this case, the Commi s s i o n er p re fe rs t he venue of Presidio County at a distanc e of a lmost 500 m iles. As the colloquy betwee n counsel for

the Commiss ioner a

nd the district court be low reve als, the Commi ssioner does not wa nt to consent to venue in Travis County in this case bec ause “ it provides an opportunity

to dismi ss . . . [ a]nd once it’s dismissed, it’s too late to br ing [an a ppeal] in another county .” Counsel’s stated r ationale f or this result is that “while the Comm issioner might not objec t to Travis County , the Commiss ioner likes to have h[i s] dec isions st and.” T hus, the Commis sioner
conce des that, at lea st in thi s case , he has ulterior motives f or denying his c onsent to br ing a n appea l in Travis County
. Havingwaived sove reig n immunit y to allow appea ls from the Commissi oner’ s10

de c isi on s, it i s unreasona ble to c on c lud e tha

t th e le g isl a tur e int e nd e d f or the Com mis sio ne r t o deprive a par

ty from bring ing a

n appea l simpl y

by denying his c onsent to a par ticular ve nue. A more r easona

ble construc tion of the stat ute would be that the le g islature
never intended to r equire an appea ling party to obta in the Commi ssioner’s consent. A m ore
rea sonable c onstruction of t he st atute would allow t he choice of w here to file an a ppeal to be ma de by those parties ap p ea l i n g the Commiss ioner’s de cision, not the Commi ssioner. B eca use the majority adopts what I

believe to be an unre asonable and unwor kable c onstructi o n o f the statute, Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Filed: August 28, 2008