Filed 5/23/14 P. v. Turner CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HAZEL MAE TURNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

F067073

(Super. Ct. Nos. BF145491A, BF145497A, 

BF145531A)

O P I N I O N

THE COURT

APPEAL from the judgments of the Superior Court of Kern County. Colette M. 

Humphrey, Judge.

Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and 

Charity S. Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

 

 Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Franson, J.
2

Hazel Mae Turner appeals from the trial court’s imposition of fees in the amount 

of $45 pursuant to former Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d)

1

(now subdivision 

(e)).

2

 Turner contends the $45 fees were unauthorized because they exceed $30, the 

maximum amount allowable under the statute. She further contends the court was only 

authorized to impose a single $30 fee because she was sentenced in multiple cases on the 

same day.

The Attorney General concedes the maximum allowable fee under the statute is 

$30 and requests that the $45 fee be stricken. The Attorney General, however, does not 

agree that the trial court erred in imposing a fee in each case. We will order the three $45 

fees stricken and corrected to reflect a $30 fee in each case. In all other respects, we 

affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On December 5, 2012, the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint in case 

number BF145491A charging Turner with two counts of second degree burglary (§ 460, 

subd. (b)) and two counts of forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)) related to offenses that occurred in 

July 2012. On December 6, 2012, the district attorney filed a complaint in case number 

BF145497A charging Turner with second degree burglary and two counts of forgery

(§ 470, subds. (a) & (d)) related to offenses that occurred in December 2012. On 

December 7, 2012, the district attorney filed a complaint in case number BF145531A 

charging Turner with second degree burglary related to an offense committed in June 

2012. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Section 1205, as amended in 2012, redesignated subdivision (d) as subdivision (e) 

with no changes. (Stats. 2012, ch. 49, § 1, pp. 2203-2204.) 
3

In February 2013, Turner appeared at a plea and sentencing hearing on all three 

cases and pled no contest to two counts of forgery in case number BF145491A, to two 

counts of forgery in case number BF145497A, and to one count of second degree 

burglary in case number BF145531A in exchange for a total term of three years in jail, 

dismissal of the remaining charges in the three cases as well as the charges in a fourth 

case (BF145905A). 

After entering her no contest pleas, Turner requested immediate sentencing in all 

three cases. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court denied Turner’s application 

for probation and orally pronounced judgment separately in each case. The trial court 

selected one of the forgery convictions in case number BF145491A as the principal term 

and imposed the upper term of three years. The court sentenced Turner to the upper term 

of three years for the remaining convictions to be served concurrently. The court also 

imposed restitution fines (§ 1202.4, subds. (b) & (f)) and fees including an accounts

receivable fee of $45 pursuant to section 1205, subdivision (d) as to each case. 

This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

Turner contends the trial court was not authorized under section 1205, 

subdivision (d) to impose multiple fees in excess of $30. Former section 1205, 

subdivision (d) (now subdivision (e)) (hereinafter referred to as subdivision (e)), 

authorizes the $30 fee to cover the clerical and administrative costs required to process a 

defendant’s fine payments. Subdivision (e) provides in part: 

“The defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court or the collecting agency a 

fee for the processing of installment accounts. This fee shall equal the 

administrative and clerical costs, as determined by the board of supervisors, 

or by the court, depending on which entity administers the account. The 

defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court or the collecting agency the fee 

established for the processing of the accounts receivable that are not to be 

paid in installments. The fee shall equal the administrative and clerical 

costs, as determined by the board of supervisors, or by the court, depending 
4

on which entity administers the account, except that the fee shall not exceed 

thirty dollars ($30).”

The parties agree the trial court erred when it imposed $45 fees. We concur and 

will order the fee amount reduced to $30.

The parties disagree, however, on whether the trial court was authorized to impose 

a $30 fee for each case. Turner contends subdivision (e) should be construed as 

permitting the imposition of a single $30 fee when a defendant is sentenced in multiple 

cases on the same day. She reasons that other fee-imposing statutes specify whether the 

fee applies to “every conviction” or “per count.” If the Legislature intended for 

subdivision (e) to apply to each case, she contends, it knows how to force such a 

requirement by express terms. As examples, she cites section 1465.8 which imposes a 

court operations charge for “every conviction for a criminal offense” and Government 

Code section 70373 which imposes a court facilities “assessment ... on every conviction 

for a criminal offense.” Since the Legislature did not specify that the fee in subdivision 

(e) should be applied to “every conviction” or “in any case,” she further contends, 

subdivision (e) is ambiguous and under the doctrine of lenity should be construed in her 

favor. Construing it in her favor would authorize the trial court to apply the fee “once to 

an aggregate judgment .... ”

We find no ambiguity in the language of subdivision (e). It requires a $30 fee to 

fund the clerical and administrative costs of processing accounts receivable that are not 

paid in installments. Unlike the statutes Turner cited as examples, subdivision (e) relates 

to accounts, not convictions. Conceivably the person or entity collecting the fee would 

set up an account by case number. Where, as here, the criminal cases are not 

consolidated under one case number but instead treated separately for purposes of 

sentencing, there would be three separate accounts and a separate $30 fee payable for 

each account.
5

Our conclusion the trial court properly imposed separate fees for each of Turner’s 

three criminal cases is bolstered by the California Supreme Court’s holding in People v. 

Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58 (Soria) which─though it pertains to restitution fines under 

sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.45─is instructive for our purposes. “Section 

1202.4(b) requires the [trial] court to impose ‘a separate and additional restitution fine’ 

... ‘[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a crime,’ absent ‘compelling and 

extraordinary reasons for not doing so.’ Section 1202.45 similarly requires ‘an additional 

parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to 

subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4,’ ‘[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a 

crime and [the] sentence includes a period of parole ....”’ (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

p. 62.) 

In Soria, the defendant was separately charged in three different cases. He entered 

negotiated pleas in all three cases at a single hearing and the trial court ordered restitution 

fines in each case. The defendant appealed, arguing that imposing separate fines in each 

case was unauthorized. The Court of Appeal agreed. It found the “statutory term ‘in 

every case’ to be ambiguous as applied to a plea bargain resolving separately filed 

charges.” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 62.) It also found that “the resolution of 

multiple charges in a single plea bargain amounts to an ‘effective consolidation.’” (Id. at 

pp. 63-64.) Thus, it held that the “phrase ‘in every case’ in sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 

‘may reasonably be construed to include multiple cases that are fully and completely 

resolved at the same time under a package plea bargain’” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 

p. 62) and therefore only one set of restitution fines could be imposed. (Id. at p. 61.) 

The Soria court rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion and held: “When 

separate pleas are entered in separately charged cases, ‘every case’ plainly means each 

case filed against the defendant.” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 62-63.) The Court 

stated:
6

“When several cases are resolved by a single plea bargain in which the 

defendant enters separate pleas, it is plain that there is one bargain but 

multiple cases.” (Soria, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 65.) Absent consolidation, 

“separately filed cases remain separate for purposes of the restitution 

statutes, even when they are jointly resolved at the plea and sentencing 

stages. In the context of sections 1202.4(b) and 1202.45, a ‘case’ is a 

formal criminal proceeding, filed by the prosecution and handled by the 

court as a separate action with its own number.” (Id. at pp. 64-65.) 

“Defendants who commit multiple crimes, and are consequently before the

court in multiple cases when their pleas are taken, are properly subject to 

multiple fines.” (Id. at p. 66.)

In our view, the rationale enunciated in Soria applies to the fees imposed under 

subdivision (e) in this case. Turner entered into a plea agreement which resolved three 

unconsolidated cases at the same hearing. In its oral pronouncement, the trial court

identified each case by its case number in rendering Turner’s sentence. As to each case, 

the court imposed a fee under subdivision (e) which it was authorized to do. 

DISPOSITION

The judgments set forth in the minute orders of February 13, 2013, in case 

numbers BF145491A, BF145497A, and BF145531A are modified by striking the 

accounts receivable fee of $45 in each case and imposing an accounts receivable fee 

under Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (e) in the amount of $30 in each case. As 

amended, the judgments are affirmed.