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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JASON R. RAYFORD,

Appellant No. 3249 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000016-2008, CP-15-CR-0001637-

2007, CP-15-CR-0002076-2007, CP-15-CR-0002079-2007

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 03, 2016

Appellant, Jason R. Rayford, pro se, appeals from the order denying 

his third petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized part of the procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

On March 31, 2008, after a trial spanning six (6) days . . . , a 

jury convicted [Appellant] of numerous charges in connection 

with the robberies of four (4) banks in Chester County, 

Pennsylvania over the course of six (6) months beginning 

September 30, 2006 and ending March 3, 2007. All four (4) 

dockets were consolidated together for purposes of trial. 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant was sentenced] on October 24, 2008 to an 

aggregate term of twenty (20) to forty (40) years in a state 

correctional facility. [Appellant’s] sentence consisted of four (4) 

mandatory minimums of ten (10) to twenty (20) years under 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(1), as [Appellant] already had two (2) prior 

convictions for Aggravated Robbery in the State of Tennessee. 

[The sentencing court] ran two (2) of these four (4) mandatories 

consecutive to each other and two (2) of them concurrently with 

each other. While [the sentencing court] initially made one of 

the mandatories run consecutive to a three (3) to ten (10) year 

term at Count I of docket number 15-CR-0002079-2007, [the 

sentencing court] modified [Appellant’s] sentence on March 2, 

2009 pursuant to a post-sentence Motion to Modify and Reduce 

Sentence filed on November 3, 2008, wherein [Appellant] raised 

a challenge to the legality of his mandatory sentences, to make 

this mandatory run concurrently with the three (3) to ten (10) 

year term. Thus, [Appellant’s] aggregate sentence in the abovecaptioned matters is twenty (20) to forty (40) years, consisting 

of four (4) mandatory minimums of ten (10) to twenty (20) 

years each, two (2) of which run consecutively to one another 

and two (2) of which run concurrently, with the remaining 

sentences on all of the lesser offenses for which [Appellant] was 

convicted running concurrently with the mandatories.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/7/15, at 2-3. 

Appellant timely appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of 

sentence on February 17, 2010. Commonwealth v. Rayford, 998 EDA 

2009, 996 A.2d 14 (Pa. Super. filed February 17, 2010). Appellant filed a 

petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on March 

19, 2010, which was denied on September 16, 2010. Commonwealth v. 

Rayford, 196 MAL 2010, 8 A.3d 344 (Pa. filed September 16, 2010). 

Appellant did not file a writ for certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court.
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On September 9, 2011, Appellant, pro se, filed his first PCRA petition. 

PCRA Petition, 9/9/11. Counsel was appointed and was later permitted to 

withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley.

1

 Order, 12/27/11. Appellant’s first 

PCRA petition was dismissed by order entered December 27, 2011. Order, 

12/27/11. On appeal, this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal due to his 

failure to file a brief. Order, 374 EDA 2012, 7/23/12. 

On October 27, 2014, Appellant, pro se, filed a second PCRA petition. 

PCRA Petition, 10/27/14. On December 11, 2014, Appellant’s second PCRA 

petition was dismissed as untimely. Order, 12/11/14.

On August 24, 2015, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant, third PCRA 

petition. PCRA Petition, 8/24/15. On September 30, 2015, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition as untimely. Order, 9/30/15. Appellant timely 

appealed. Appellant was directed to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and 

he timely complied. The PCRA court prepared an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 

A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 

A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 

2001)).

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time 

requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not 

ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. 

Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 762 (Pa. Super. 2013). A judgment of sentence 

“becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), 

and (iii), is met.2 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed 

within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 

____________________________________________

2

 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the 

PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove 

specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time 

frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.

Our review of the record reflects that Appellant was sentenced on 

March 2, 2009.3 As noted, Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on February 17, 2010. 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal was denied on September 16, 

2010. Appellant did not file a petition for writ of certiorari. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

December 15, 2010, when the time for seeking certiorari from the United 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).

3 As noted, Appellant was originally sentenced on October 24, 2008. After 

the sentencing court’s consideration of his post-sentence motion, his 

sentence was modified on March 2, 2009. 
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States Supreme Court expired.4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (providing 

that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.”). Therefore, Appellant had to file the current PCRA petition by 

December 15, 2011, in order for it to be timely. Appellant did not file the 

instant PCRA petition until August 24, 2015. Thus, Appellant’s instant PCRA 

petition is patently untimely. 

As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA 

petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three 

limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file 

his petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be 

asserted. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). This is true despite the fact that 

Appellant’s petition presents a challenge to the legality of his sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 592 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, 

claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions 

thereto.”).

____________________________________________

4

 Appellant had ninety days from the date of the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court’s decision on direct appeal to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with 

the United States Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 

978, 980 n.4 (Pa. 2008); United States Supreme Court Rule 13.
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In his brief, Appellant asserts that he was sentenced illegally and that 

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and related recent 

Pennsylvania case law, is applicable to his case. Appellant’s Brief at 9 

(unnumbered). Appellant asserts that “[s]ince the Appellant was sentenced 

under the mandatory minimum statute, which has since been ruled

unconstitutional, the Appellant is serving an illegal sentence. Therefore, his 

judgment of sentence must be vacated.” Id. at 10. Thus, Appellant’s 

argument may be characterized as an attempt to assert the “new 

constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time-bar based on Alleyne v. 

United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).

In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional jury 

trial right requires any fact, other than a prior conviction, that 

triggers a mandatory minimum sentence to be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt before the finder of fact. Alleyne is an 

application of the Court’s prior pronouncement in Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 

(2000), which ruled that any fact that increases a maximum 

sentence must be found by the factfinder beyond a reasonable 

doubt or admitted by the defendant during his guilty plea. In 

Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled 

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 

L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), which held that a fact that involves a 

mandatory minimum sentence does not implicate jury trial 

rights. Alleyne also implicitly abrogated McMillan v. 

Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 

(1986), which withstood an Apprendi attack in the Harris 

decision.

In Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 

(Pa.Super.2014) (relying upon Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 

A.3d 108, 118 (Pa.Super.2013) (en banc)), we noted that 

Alleyne will be applied to cases pending on direct appeal when 

Alleyne was issued. 
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Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(emphasis added). 

While this Court has held that Alleyne applies to cases that were on 

direct appeal when Alleyne was issued, we have declined to construe that 

decision as applying retroactively to cases in which the judgment of 

sentence has become final. 

In concluding Alleyne does not satisfy the new retroactive 

constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s one year time bar, 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), the [Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014)] Court explained:

Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new 

constitutional right, neither our Supreme Court, nor 

the United States Supreme Court has held that 

Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in 

which the judgment of sentence had become 

final. This is fatal to Appellant’s argument regarding 

the PCRA time-bar. This Court has recognized that a 

new rule of constitutional law is applied retroactively 

to cases on collateral review only if the United States 

Supreme Court or our Supreme Court specifically 

holds it to be retroactively applicable to those cases.

Id. at 995 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 

Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d. 54, 58 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis in 

original). Indeed, our Supreme Court recently held that “Alleyne does not 

apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review.” Commonwealth 

v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).

As noted, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 

15, 2010. Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 

2151. Appellant’s judgment of sentence was finalized years before Alleyne 
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was decided. Therefore, Appellant’s PCRA petition does not qualify for the 

new constitutional-right exception to the PCRA time-bar under Alleyne. 

Additionally, we note that although a challenge based on Alleyne does 

implicate the legality of a sentence, “a legality of sentence claim may 

nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an untimely PCRA petition for 

which no time-bar exception applies.” Miller, 102 A.3d at 995-996. Thus, 

the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s instant PCRA petition as 

untimely. It was filed beyond the one-year general deadline, and Appellant 

cannot rely on Alleyne or its progeny to invoke the timeliness exception at 

section 9545(b)(1)(iii).5

Consequently, because the instant PCRA petition was untimely and no 

exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims 

presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 

396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to 

hear untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the 

merits of any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007) 

____________________________________________

5 We also note that to the extent Appellant argues in his petition that the 

PCRA one-year time-bar does not apply in this case because Alleyne is 

“newly-discovered evidence,” PCRA petition, 8/24/15, at 3, this Court has 

ruled that judicial decisions are not facts for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii). See Cintora, 69 A.3d at 763 (“a judicial opinion does not 

qualify as a previously unknown ‘fact’ capable of triggering the timeliness 

exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.”).
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(“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate

a controversy.”).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/3/2016